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**Globalization and Turkey:
Economy, Society and Culture**

E.FUAT KEYMAN

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**ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE
FOR ADVANCED STUDIES**

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Bilkent University

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As we enter the new millenium, the rapid pace and the unpredictable direction of social and political changes in the world seems to be forcefully undermining the established terms of politics. It appears to be more and more difficult, if not impossible, to think of politics by situating it solely at the national context. Such modern referents of politics as the nation state, national identity and national economy have been loosing their explanatory power for the analysis of social and political change, as a result of the process of increasing interconnectedness of societies, making national context vulnerable and exposed to global/regional forces and local pressures.¹ While the process of economic globalization, that is, the globalization of capital as a powerful global force, is challenging and undermining the authority of nation-states by creating a borderless global market place, the process of cultural globalization is rendering the idea of national development problematic by giving rise to local reactions which pave the way to the emergence of alternative modernities and cultural identity claims. Thus, it is not the inter-state relations, or the national unit of analysis alone, but the interactions between the universal Western values and the particular/local claims to authenticity that are framing the content and the direction of social change in our globalizing world.² It is in this context that it becomes necessary, if not imperative, to analyze critically and empirically the historically constituted interactions between the global and the local, in order not only to understand social change, but also to imagine a democratic world-vision as a foundation for a better world.

It can be suggested here that Turkey, in this context, is not an exception: on the contrary, during the last decade, Turkish society has undergone rapid social/cultural, economic and political change, the manifestations of which have been felt in every sphere of social life. Let us make three generally accepted points to make this suggestion more concrete: firstly, that one of the sites at which such change has manifested itself is the resurgence of Islam, secondly that this resurgence has taken different forms, discourses, clashes and attitudes, and finally that the processes of globalization have, to a large extent, framed the way in which Islam has begun to play an important role in political, economic and cultural affairs in Turkey. As for the political landscape, radical change has occurred as Islamic discourse has been politicized and 'political Islam' became one of the defining elements and powerful actors of Turkish politics.³ This was

¹ A comprehensive analysis of globalization and its political impacts on the national context can be found in D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Köhler (eds.) *Re-imagining Political Community*, (Cambridge, Polity, 1998).

² See M. A. Bamyeh, *The Ends of Globalization*, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

³ For a more detailed explanation, see E. Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2000), chp.3.

also the beginning of the period characterized by the ‘secularism versus Islam polarization’. On the other hand, in the economic sphere we have witnessed both the increasing role of Islamic discourse and values in economic organizations and the emergence of ‘economic Islam’ with its actors, discourses and strategies. Likewise, intellectual life, the activities of civil society organizations, and popular culture and consumption patterns have been exposed to Islamic symbols and religious identity claims to tradition and authenticity. Thus, ‘cultural Islam’ has entered into and has begun to characterize the formation of Turkish social and cultural life.

In each sphere, the processes of globalization have played an important role and have been *integral* to the operation of the political, economic and cultural discourses of Islam.⁴ However, on the basis of the research I have done on the relationship between cultural globalization and societal affairs in Turkey, I will argue in this paper that especially in the last decade, the impacts of the processes of globalization on the formation of the economic and the cultural life in Turkey, as well as the role of Islam in it, should not be understood as a cause and effect relationship in a linear causality.⁵ Such impacts vary and create different consequences, depending on which sphere of social life we are analyzing. In other words, for example the secularism versus Islam polarization in political life does not reflect directly on economic life, where Islamic actors attribute a positive quality to cultural globalization and articulate it into their own discourses as the necessary and indispensable element of new economic life.

It is not the secularism versus Islam polarization, but the ‘co-existence’ between globalization and Islam that exists and frames the economic life. However, two points are worth making here: *firstly, cultural globalization in economic and social life creates multi-dimensional impacts in the form of the co-existence between Western values and religious identity-claims to tradition and authenticity; and secondly, co-existence comes into being in different degrees and with different meanings, and generates different discourses, strategies and clashes, thereby creating peculiarities in each sphere of social life.* In this sense, I argue that cultural globalization is not a unitary process, but a multi-dimensional process generating different impacts and consequences,

⁴ Z. Öniş, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of Welfare Party in Perspective”, *Third World Quarterly*, 18:4, pp.743-766, 1997.

⁵ This paper is based on the research I have done on the impacts of globalization on Turkey with respect to economic actors, civil society organizations and popular culture. This research was part of ‘Cultural Globalization Project’ directed by Prof. Peter Berger of Boston University. See E. Fuat Keyman, “Cultural Globalization and Turkey”, in P. Berger (ed) *Many Globalizations*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002).

which makes possible the co-existence of the modern values and Islamic traditional norms, symbols and discourses.⁶

I shall substantiate my argument by documenting the findings of my research, and in doing so I proceed from commonalities that can be found among economic, civil societal and cultural actors, to specific characteristics, perceptions and approaches that differentiate these actors from one another in terms of their conceptions of globalization and its impacts on societal affairs in Turkey. With a certain level of generality, the ideas and the arguments, commonly shared by almost all actors of economic life and civil society, can be grouped as (a) the changing meaning of modernity, (b) the crisis of the strong state tradition, (c) the end of the Cold War, and (d) the process of globalization.

Situating the Role of Islam in Turkish Modernization

All the actors share the idea that the last two decades have brought about a fundamental change in Turkish modernization, and have also created a ‘paradox’ in Turkish society, a paradox that has not yet been solved.⁷ This paradox finds its meaning in the simultaneous development of the increasing dominance of economic liberalization in economic life, whose laws of motion are, to a large extent, dictated by economic globalization, that is the economic logic of Western modernity, and the resurgence of Islam as a powerful political and cultural force in Turkish social and political life. In other words, the formation of Turkish modernization since the 1980s has been increasingly marked by the co-existence of economic liberalization and the resurgence of traditionalism and its appeal to the ‘return to authenticity’.⁸ This paradox, on the one hand, indicates that globalization is not confined to economic space, and that there is in fact cultural globalization operating hand in hand with

⁶ At this point, it should be pointed out that my argument does not ignore the importance of historical and sociological “internal” factors that have contributed to the process of Islamic resurgence. To argue that globalization constitutes the historical context in which such resurgence has occurred is not to argue that globalization determines the resurgence of Islam, nor to underestimate the crucial historical fact that Islam has always played an effective symbolic role in the formation of Turkish cultural life. In fact, since the beginning of the Turkish Republic, as I argued elsewhere, Islam has been integral to identity formation of everyday life, operated as a strong symbolic reference-point for cultural life, and thus always remained as a crucial element of Turkish modernization. For more detail, see E. Fuat Keyman, “Globalization, Civil Society and Islam: The Question of Democracy in Turkey”, in J. Jenson and B. de Sousa Santos (eds) *Globalizing Institutions*, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001), pp.207-231.

⁷ These actors are the leaders of economic, civil society and cultural organizations, and the findings of the research come from the in-depth interviews I conducted with them.

⁸ This point has also been made by Heinz Kramer in his recent book, *A Changing Turkey*, (Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2000), chp.1.

economic globalization, but creating different impacts on, and results in, social and political life. It also indicates that in order to understand the formation of Turkish modernization, cultural globalization should not be taken as a reflection of the economic base, but as an object of analysis with its own peculiarities and specificities.

All the actors commonly suggest that the historical context, in which the resurgence of Islam has occurred and influenced Turkish social and political life, is not only national, but also global in nature. They also suggest that four distinct, but nevertheless interrelated processes have dictated the path and the direction of Turkish modernization since the 1980s. The first process is the changing meaning of modernity, that is, *the emergence of alternative modernities*. Economic actors, civil society organizations and intellectuals agree that since the 1980s, the process of Turkish modernization involved new actors, new mentalities of development and new identity claims. *This means, first, the emergence of the critique of the status of the secular-rational thinking as the exclusive source of modernity in Turkey, and second, the increasing strength of Islamic discourse both as a "political actor" and as a "symbolic foundation" for identity formation, and third, the recent calls for the need to think of modernity in terms of democracy created a context for the upsurge of interest in civil society, citizenship and the democratic self.*

The second process is related to *the legitimacy crisis of the strong state tradition* in Turkey since the 1980s. The actors agree that Turkish modernization, since the beginning of the Republic, has been characterized by and has given rise to the strong-state tradition. This tradition means, first, that the state has assumed the capacity of acting almost completely independent from civil society, and second, that the state, rather than the government, has constituted the primary context of politics. In this sense, the strong state tradition refers to the fact that the state-elite rather than political-elite (political parties) acts as a potentially autonomous actor which frames, dictates and determines the boundaries of the political by assuming a dominant role in deciding what is 'good' for society.⁹ In this way, the strong-state tradition has functioned as the organizing "internal variable" of Turkish politics up until the 1980s. However, since the 1980s, the emergence of new actors, new mentalities and the new language of modernization, as well as democracy as a global point of reference in politics, has made culture and cultural factors an important variable in understanding political activities. Thus, *the state has a legitimacy problem in maintaining its position as the primary context for politics, as a*

⁹ For detail, see M. Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, (north Humberstone, The Eothen Press, 1985), chp.1 and 2.

result of the shift towards civil society and culture as new reference-points in the language and the terms of politics.

In order to understand these two processes, that is, the emergence of alternative modernities, and the legitimacy crisis of the strong-state tradition, the actors commonly argue that we also have to refer to both the *end of the Cold War* and the process of *globalization* as those constraining factors that have had important short-term and long-term impacts on the interaction of politics, polity and policy in the 1990s in Turkish politics. It is suggested, in this context, that the end of the Cold War has generated important consequences for Turkey in terms of its foreign and domestic policy initiatives. While, since 1989, the geo-political and historical significance of Turkey in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia has become increasingly apparent, the collapse of the Soviet Union has drastically changed Turkey's role as a buffer-state in the East-West relations during the Cold War. More importantly, the end of the Cold War has created important changes in political culture, as it has brought about a possibility that Turkish people in a nationalistic fashion, "may now come to see themselves once again at the centre of a world emerging around them rather than at the tail-end of a European world that is increasingly uncertain about whether or not it sees Turkey as part of itself".¹⁰

Likewise, actors share the common suggestion that since 1980, Turkish society has been subject to significant change, in which the processes of globalization operate and generate impacts on societal affairs. For them, in general, globalization refers to the process of increasing interconnectedness between societies so that events in one part of the world more and more have economic, cultural and political effects on peoples and societies far away. This understanding of globalization implies, first that change in a globalizing world requires us to come to terms with the fact that it is no longer possible to understand change only with reference to the national unit, since global/local forces have become as important as national actors. It implies, secondly, that culture can no longer be taken as secondary to politics and economics. *It is culture that makes it possible for new actors to emerge, for us to think about politics and political actors outside of the strong-state tradition, and for hitherto silenced identities to create a change in the meaning of modernity.*

According to the actors however, the way in which culture becomes a main point of reference for the analysis of change does not constitute a single process, but manifests itself differently in different spheres of social life. Cultural globalization creates both the universalization of Western values and cultural patterns, and at the same time the revitalization of local values and

¹⁰G.E. Fuller and I.O. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geopolitics*, (Boulder, Westview, Press, 1993).

traditions. Cultural globalization, while creating MacWorld in the sense of the world-wide standardization of consumption patterns and life-styles in economic life, also provides a suitable platform for the revitalization of tradition, the emergence of local identities and the popularization of the discourse of authenticity.¹¹ To put it differently, *cultural globalization amounts to the process in which we observe both the universalization of Western modernity and the emergence of alternative modernities, the most clear example of which is the resurgence of Islam in Turkey.*

The Varying Impacts of Cultural Globalization on Turkish Society

These four general points, shared commonly by the actors about the role that cultural globalization has played in the formation of Turkish modernization since the 1980s, should not lead us to ignore that cultural globalization is not a unitary process, but rather carried out by different institutions and processes that interact with each other. Therefore, in order to understand the impacts of cultural globalization on Turkish society, we have to move to a more concrete level of analysis and explore in detail the various ways (or various faces) in which globalization has brought about a number of co-existing cultures and alternative modernities in Turkish socio-political life. Following Peter Berger's analysis of the different faces of globalization¹², in my research I looked at how globalization has played a constitutive role in:

(a) *the formation of economic life*: that is, the increasing importance of global market and capital accumulation, and its articulation by both secular and Islamic industrialists. The main question to be investigated in this context is the extent to which the logic of the global market creates a possibility for the emergence of Islamic capital and the co-existence of secular and Islamic cultures.

(b) *the formation of civil society and democracy*: that is, the impact of cultural globalization on the emergence of new discourses of identity, politics and democracy, as well as on the clash between modern and traditional values which translates itself in the debates on both European integration and Islam; and,

(c) *the formation of cultural life*: that is, the extent to which Islamic identity, presenting itself sociologically and politically as anti-modern, is embedded in, and operates within, the consumerist culture of globalization.

¹¹ For an important source, see P. Berger, "Four Faces of Globalization", *The National Interest*, no:49, 1997.

¹² *Ibid.*24.

Cultural Globalization and Economic Life ¹³

One of the sites where the most visible impacts of cultural globalization on Turkish society can be observed is economic life whose scope, discourse and actors have been enlarging since the 1980s, and whose organizational structure has been increasingly extended beyond the national and territorial borders.¹⁴ In fact, since the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s, the Turkish economy has been; (a) exposed to the process of the globalization of capital and trade, and (b) organized on the basis of the primacy of the global market over the domestic one, which has led economic actors to realize (c) that market relations require rational and long-term strategies, and (d) that in order to be secure and successful in (globalized) economic life, it is imperative to gain organizational capabilities to produce or maintain technological improvement and strategic planning for production and investment. As a result, in the last decade, we have seen the increasing importance of the discourse of free market, the multiplication and the dissemination of economic actors, and the pluralization of economic organizations in Turkish society.

While up until the mid-1980s, economic life in Turkey was organized mainly around national industry without a cultural codification, the 1990s have witnessed the rise of what is called “Islamic capital” as a powerful economic actor.¹⁵ The rise of Islamic capital has given rise to the introduction of Islam to the political economy of Turkish capitalist development, both discursively and organizationally. During the 1990s, Islam began to operate as an economic code open to free market ideology, and also created its own economic organization founded upon the (Weberian) principles of rational, technical knowledge and expertise. The establishment of what is called “The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen” (hereafter MUSIAD) was a clear sign of the articulation and the co-existence of Islam with free market ideology. It should

¹³ From now on, the use of quotation marks in the text indicates a direct quotation from interviews I have done with the leaders of these organizations.

¹⁴ These business organizations constitute the organizational structure of the registered, legal and tax-paying Turkish economy. In this sense, statistically they cover the whole economic life, including big business organizations, the medium and small scale organizations and the family-based economic organizations. Their operations include production, trade and service sector, and they differ from each other not only in terms of their main economic activities, but also with respect to their ideological and political stands on Turkish modernization. In this sense, the information that this paper gives about them is not statistical but sociological, insofar as my research is intended to explore the ways in which these representative organizations of economic life approach the processes of globalization and articulate their impacts into their own strategies and discourses.

¹⁵ The term “Islamic capital” is also used interchangeably as the “green capital” or the “Anatolian capital”.

be noted here that the qualification of MUSIAD as “Islamic” is due to the fact that “(a) it is affiliated with religious sects and communities; (b) Islam appears as a significant point of reference in its activities; and (c) it has close ties with political Islam mainly represented in Turkey” since the 1980s by the Welfare Party and then the Virtue Party.¹⁶ The success of MUSIAD to “bring together a large number of enterprises of different sizes located in different geographical regions of Turkey”, and “to create a network within economic life on the basis of relations of trust among believers” can be considered an indicator of the possibility of the co-existence of Islam with the Western-rational model of organizational behavior.¹⁷ Thus, it can be argued that during the last decade, in addition to political Islam, economic Islam too has put its print on Turkish modernity.

The establishment of MUSIAD, and the dissemination of its sub-units, throughout the country, has also ended the dominance of “The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen” (hereafter TUSIAD) as the primary and the major economic actor of Turkish capitalist development since the mid-1970s. Today, it is not possible to analyze the globalization of Turkish economic life without reference to MUSIAD which has become one of the primary and major voices of the Islamic movement by creating a strong economic base for Islamic discourse. In this sense, with MUSIAD we have seen not only the introduction of an Islamic print in economic life, but also the pluralization of economic actors with different discourses and strategies.¹⁸

However, since the early 1990s, a third-type of economic organization in Turkey has occurred as a significant point of reference in understanding the formation of economic life in Turkey and the impact of cultural globalization in it. This type of economic organization is called at the very general level, “The Association of Industrialists and Businessmen” (hereafter SIAD), but gains a concrete institutional quality as it is associated with a city or a region in Turkey. In other words, SIADs exist in most of the Anatolian cities and they are organized independently from TUSIAD and MUSIAD. They have been included in my research not only because they are important economic actors and contribute to advancing our understanding of the changing nature of

¹⁶ See also A. Buğra, *Islam in Economic Organizations*, (İstanbul, TESEV, 1999).

¹⁷ *Ibid.* pp.11-12.

¹⁸ In our research, we have done an extensive investigation of MUSIAD and TUSIAD by conducting in-depth interviews, mapping their publications and collecting data from the related literature on these organizations. Whereas TUSIAD and TUSIAD members are mainly located in Istanbul, the organizational scope of MUSIAD extends towards Anatolia. For this reason, our in-depth interviews for MUSIAD involved trips to Anatolian cities where there is a strong tie between the development of export-oriented economic activities and the organizational activities of MUSIAD.

Turkish economic, political and cultural life, but also because some cities in Anatolia, such as Gaziantep, Konya, Denizli, Çorum, Kayseri and Eskişehir, have provided us with interesting, if not significant, economic success stories, and have acted as the examples of a peculiar model of what can be called 'morally and culturally loaded-economic modernization'.¹⁹

(A) TUSIAD: Since its establishment in 1971-73, TUSIAD has undergone radical changes and transformations. Known as "the biggest and most powerful business organization and pressure group in Turkey" and sometimes called "the club of the rich", TUSIAD had perceived the 1961 Constitution as too democratic for Turkey. It also supported the 1980 military-coup. But now, TUSIAD acts as the strong voice in the call for the democratization of Turkey in accordance with the standards of democracy in Europe and argues for the need to protect civil rights and liberalization. It presents itself as an organization that "has changed over time". As the president of TUSIAD, Erkut Yücaoğlu says that this change, which the organization has gone through in the last two decades, has to a large extent been framed by globalization; that is, by the changing nature of world economic and political affairs that have made democracy not only necessary but the sufficient condition for modernization and development.

To substantiate this general point, the following claims are made by the members of TUSIAD:

(i) They perceive globalization to be a process that operates beyond the borders of national societies. As a process, globalization is mainly concerned with the globalization of the market, and is about the emergence of the interconnectedness between countries, especially with respect to the movements of capital, finance and trade. Likewise, *globalization is regarded as an "objective reality", a "social fact" which should not be resisted nor celebrated, but should be viewed as the new context of economic development, as well as the historical context for national politics.* According to TUSIAD, as opposed to the import-substitution industrialization during the 1960s and 1970s, in which the nation-state was the major actor of national development, we are living in a time when the globalization of market relations, taking place beyond the reach of the nation-states, plays the role of being the main point of reference for the economic life and its actors;

¹⁹ That is why these cities are sometimes characterized, in analogy with the South Asian-model of economic development, as "Anatolian Tigers". Understanding the process in which this model has been put into practice in these cities gives us crucial insights which could explicate and delineate the varying impacts of cultural globalization in Turkey.

(ii) In this sense, *globalization brings about a set of new relations that are novel in their own context*, relations such as the emergence of new trade relations which make geographical distances recede, the increasing importance of supra-national relations (for example the European Union for Turkey) which create new regulations beyond the borders of the nation-state, and the fragmentation of domestic market relations into regions, each of which has its own economic relations abroad (for example the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the trade relations with new Turkish Republics or Tourism for the West and South regions of Turkey);

(iii) However, globalization, according to the members of TUSIAD, brings about a new culture in economic life, that is, it forces the economic actors to acquire a new economic rationality in accordance to which they are supposed to act, prepare economic strategies, and take decisions. Globalization creates a new discourse of economic life that frames cognitively the strategies and the decisions of economic actors. *This implies that the possibility of economic success lies in the mentalities of economic actors themselves, their ability to articulate cognitively the new economic rationality, and their capacity to make long-term strategies to secure their position in global markets which can only be possible by focusing on technological innovation and quality maintenance;*

(iv) Two points can be extrapolated from the new economic rationality. According to a TUSIAD member, *a new economic rationality also creates changes in the mentalities of economic actors whose identity-formation now involves new values, such as technological orientation, the advocating of knowledge and information over tradition, the adaptation of a global network society and the preference of the long-term strategies over short-term gains;*

Secondly, the adaptation to the new economic rationality also brings about a new cultural platform for the creation of a cultural identity based on a set of symbols by which economic actors differentiate themselves from one another, as well as from the early generation industrialist and businessmen. In this sense, *one of the impacts of globalization in economic life has been the creation of symbolic capital internal to the identity-formation of economic actors*. This identity involves post-modern references to such symbols as life-styles, taste, outlook, body, and consumption patterns, makes symbols important aspects of identity, and breaks with tradition and locality by privileging MacWorld over past-national culture. In this context, it is suggested that economic

globalization generates changes not only in economic organization, but also in the identity-formation of economic actors;

(v) TUSIAD holds the idea that at the level of society at large the processes of globalization have given rise to two interrelated facts, namely the rise of cultural identity which has taken the forms of the resurgence of Islam and the “Kurdish problem” and the need for the protection of civil rights. Both of these facts require a democratic organization of the state-society relations in Turkey. TUSIAD thinks that Turkey’s exposure to the globalizing world has two-dimensions: the first is the problem of integration into the European Union, and secondly, the status and the location of Turkey in world politics. Turkey has the potential to become what they call “a country that belongs to the first league”, but they believe that in order to achieve both, Turkey has to solve the problems stemming from the lack of democratization and political liberalism, problems such as the violation of human rights, the protection of civil rights and the acceptance of the rule of law as the fundamental basis of state power. *Globalization in this sense appears both as the process related to the emergence of the problems confronting the Turkish state and as the primary-point of reference for the solution of this problem through democratization;*

(vi) Therefore, for TUSIAD, the possibility of the realization of its economic interests embedded in the global market is directly linked to the democratization of Turkey at large. Especially during the 1990s, TUSIAD has also acted as a civil society organization by assuming a “democratic-identity” having a societal vision to make Turkey a liberal, plural democratic society. This means that as opposed to the 1970s and the 1980s, *TUSIAD “has changed” in the 1990s by acting not only as an economic actor but also as a civil society organization assuming responsibility for what is good for Turkey at large and striving for democratization* which is the necessary condition for “the elevation of Turkey to the first league in world affairs”; and

(vii) In its societal vision for democratic Turkey, TUSIAD regards cultural globalization as creating both the universalization of democracy and the revitalization of traditional values and norms. However, while they value the rise of cultural Islam as a powerful symbol of identity to the extent that it functions within the pluralistic and multi-cultural social formation, they have a suspicion and hesitation about the role of the politicization of Islam with respect to democracy. *In this context, the co-existence between Western values and cultural Islam is possible as far as*

cultural life in Turkey is concerned, but this does not alter the clash between secularism and political Islam insofar as the latter remains both in discourse and in practice as a “threat to liberal democracy”.

It can be concluded here that the changing nature of TUSIAD during the 1990s cannot be understood without reference to cultural globalization which functions, first, as an “integral element” of the discourse, the strategy and the activities of the organization. Second, it functions as internal to the identity-formation of TUSIAD both as an economic actor and as a democratic civil-society organization. Third, globalization contributes to the enlargement of the scope and the content of TUSIAD activities from an economic self-interested pressure group, to a collective-identity striving for the realization of its vision of democratic Turkey.

(B) MUSIAD: There is no doubt that MUSIAD is the most important business organization that claims to carry with itself an “Islamic identity”. Since its inception, it has played a crucial role in (a) linking together business organizations having closer ties with the rise of Islam, (b) supporting, promoting and protecting their economic interests, and (c) developing a societal vision on the basis of Islamic principles. By creating a “powerful network based upon trust-relations” among Islamic economic actors, MUSIAD has become as significant and powerful as TUSIAD, even to the degree of confronting its dominance in Turkish economic life. With MUSIAD, what has occurred is the emergence of economic Islam with its actors, strategies and discourses, as well as the possibility of the link between Islam and Western rationality, and more importantly the fact that the embeddedness of Islamic discourse in economic and cultural globalization creates the co-existence between Islamic identity and free market ideology. Moreover, what is called “Homo Islamicus”, which Islamic discourse derives from “Mohammed’s rules to guide the exchange activity in the Medina Market”, defines Islam as compatible with exchange relations resting upon market-competition and the minimal state.

This general account of MUSIAD can be substantiated on the basis of the following points we have extrapolated from our research of MUSIAD:

(i) Like TUSIAD, MUSIAD too views globalization as a process whereby exchange activities go beyond the borders of the nation-state and operate within a global market. For them, globalization creates interconnectedness among societies, economies and cultures, and sets “the rules of the game” which requires a rational thinking, long-term strategies and organizational capacities. In this sense, *globalization*

becomes the new historical context for economic development. MUSIAD also attributes a positive quality to globalization because it is as a result of the globalization of market relations that a suitable ground was created for the rise and the success of “economic Islam”;

(ii) However, unlike TUSIAD, MUSIAD is founded on Islamic principles, such as the feeling of trust and solidarity, the primacy of community over the individual, the discourse of the just-self over the self-interested actor, and the privileged status of ethical codes over individual morality. Thus, MUSIAD argues that *Islamic discourse is far more compatible with globalized market relations* than the existing state-supported bourgeois class in Turkey, insofar as it creates the relation of trust and solidarity in a given in Turkey. The reason for the compatibility of Islam and the free market is given by MUSIAD with reference to the “East Asian model of development”, in which, it is believed, *the success comes from “the “strategic fit” between the traditional institutions that regulate social relations and the requirements of global markets”*. The former and the first president of MUSIAD, Erol Yazar explains the importance of the East Asian model with respect to the economic development of Turkey in the following way: “at the threshold of the twenty-first century, once again the western side of the Pacific, that is the East of China is becoming the dominant center of the world economy”. The crucial point here is that as opposed to the Western industrial model, this new model is based on the link between “small or medium sized enterprises” and “the culture of traditional values” embedded in family or religion. The East Asian model’s success relies on its commitment to cultural identity and its break with Western civilization that gave primacy to secularism over religious morality and values. By following this model, *MUSIAD presents itself as an alternative to the nonviable capitalist development and centers its activities on “Homo Islamicus” which is the proper ethical basis for economic development, rather than “homo economicus” that has given rise to a self-centered individualistic morality.*

(iii) In this context, MUSIAD argues that its discourses, strategies and actors create what is called, the “proper Islamic discourse” which is neither backward, nor mystical, nor solely traditional, but, on the contrary, is progressive, open to economic and technological innovation, compatible with free trade and capitalism, and able to create the sources of wealth. This means that like TUSIAD, *MUSIAD promotes technology and quality maintenance. Its actors prefer and prepare long-term and rational strategies over short-term interests to secure their success, and*

their entrepreneurial activities are embedded in capitalism and the economic rules of capitalist rationality. Economic Islam, then, promotes capitalism as economic globalization but situates it in Islamic discourse as its cultural basis. As the representative of economic Islam, *MUSIAD articulates Islamic religion with economic globalization, but at the same time creates a societal vision, based on the primacy of cultural/communitarian identity over individualistic morality.* In other words, it represents a societal vision for Turkish socio-political life which is founded upon “Homo Islamicus” rather than “homo economicus” that promotes self-interest over what is good for society;

(iv) This vision has been directly derived from MUSIAD’s positive view of globalization, which provides a basis both for the challenge MUSIAD initiates against the existing politico-economic order (that is, statism and secularism), and for its promotion of Homo Islamicus. Thus, MUSIAD sees globalization as a factor contributing to the development of pluralism and multiculturalism, thereby creating a platform for democratization in Turkey. Here globalization is seen in relation to the integration process in Europe, where Turkey wants to be a full-member of the European-Union. Here globalization functions as both a conditioning and an enabling factor: (a) conditioning in the sense that it requires, even forces the Turkish state to be open to democracy, which creates a legitimate ground for Islamic discourse as an element of pluralism and multiculturalism; and (b) enabling in the sense that it enables economic Islam to operate beyond the borders of the nation-state;

(v) However, two points should be made here: first, MUSIAD’s view of pluralism and multiculturalism is not liberal, insofar as it accords primacy to community over the individual. In fact, for them, it is not individuality but community, in which self-identity is discursively constructed and defined. *Community, based on Islamic discourse, comes before individual preferences and morality, so that the references to democracy, freedom and morality, and in this sense pluralism and multiculturalism, are situated in and framed by the communitarian ideology rather than liberalism.* Secondly, this communitarian ideology, which also explains the link between economic Islam and its aspiration of the East Asian model of economic development, gives a clear expression to MUSIAD’s view of the community-based economic organization. MUSIAD constitutes a community-based economic organization, founded upon an articulation of Islamic cultural/moral identity and free trade, which overrides class/power/wealth differences between capital and labor. This means that *Islam defines the identity of both the owner and the producer,*

makes them part of the economic community, and masks the inequality, the unevenness and the difference between them in terms of power and wealth. For example, the discourse of justice and fairness that economic Islam uses never involves references to the organizational rights of producers for unionization, strike, security, health and welfare. In fact, the communitarian ideology that economic Islam promotes acts against the principles of the welfare state and distributive justice in general, and the organizational rights of the producers in particular. Herein, we can see that MUSIAD is in fact a class-based organization which uses Islamic discourse to “justify” its communitarian ideology and to “mobilize” its economic activities. Herein, we can see also that *at the ideological level, MUSIAD and its Islamic economic identity differs radically from TUSIAD and its economic identity that has recently placed a special emphasis on the language of civil rights as a basis for the process of democratization in Turkey.*

(C) SIADs: In recent years, we have witnessed the increasing importance, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the province (city)-based and the regional-based industrialist and business organizations (SIADs). Thus, in addition to TUSIAD and MUSIAD, Turkish economic life now involves SIADs as economic actors with their own discourses and strategies. Even though they are not as strong and influential as TUSIAD and MUSIAD, they deserve our attention, insofar as (a) they have created a dynamic economic life in Anatolia, especially with the emergence of the economically successful Anatolian cities, known as “Anatolian tigers”; (b) with their economic success stories, they have played an important role in changing our “orientalist vision” of Anatolia as an agriculture-based, underdeveloped and traditional social totality; and therefore (c) they have shown us that there are different ways in which the global is articulated with the local and creates different “social forms” and “societal visions”.

In many ways, SIADs appear similar to TUSIAD and MUSIAD, in terms of their positive attribute to economic globalization, their adherence of free trade ideology and their critique of the existing politico-economic order that privileges the strong state tradition over economic and cultural activities. Also, in terms of the scale and the scope of their economic organization, they represent, as in the case of MUSIAD, small and medium-scale enterprises taking place in different regions of Anatolia. Thirdly, they promote a model of economic development, in which the link between free trade and traditional/communitarian cultural identity defines the very basis of economic life. In fact the condition of existence of SIADs and their *modus vivendi* is

founded upon the promotion of community ties over individuality, as the precondition for economic success.

However, SIADs differ from TUSIAD and MUSIAD and gain specific characteristics in three fundamental ways:

(i) In their province- or region-based organization, SIADs operate without state support and represent local development that depends exclusively on trade relations beyond the borders of the nation-state. In fact, they are the clearest cases in which the globalization of the local can be observed. For this reason, SIADs *view economic and cultural globalization both as “internal” to their emergence and development, and as processes making a positive and valuable contribution to the protection of their local cultures*;

(ii) All SIADs give primacy to community over individuality. They all define community as an “organic social and cultural unity”. In this sense, they all prefer homogeneity, commonality and sameness to pluralism and difference. Thus, they all promote conservative and communitarian societal visions over liberal individualism. And they all maintain that *success in economic life derives from the protection and the organization of cultural life as an “organic unity”*. However, their view of what constitutes organic unity differs from MUSIAD, in that for SIADs Islamic discourse is not the exclusive source of cultural identity. Such references as nationalism, family ties, traditional norms, ethnicity and premordialism, also play a significant role in creating communitarian ties that make social and cultural life an organic unity. Successful SIADs, known as the Anatolian Tigers, for example Gaziantep, Konya, Kayseri, Çorum, Denizli, Aydın, Adana and Antalya, explain their economic development by emphasizing the importance of establishing organic organizational and cultural ties among powerful actors in their own communities. In fact, one of the ideas commonly shared by SIADs is related to the significant emphasis placed on the role of culture for economic development: that is, *the extent to which organic unity is produced and reproduced in a given community determines the degree of success in economic life*. Therefore, while those success stories were pointing out the value of organic unity for a successful linkage between the local and the global, in the provinces where underdevelopment remains, the economic actors complained about the lack of community spirit to create organic unity;

(iii) This emphasis on organic unity explains the overarching power of nationalism and conservatism at the political level in most of the provinces and regions of Anatolia, where moral and ethical community as an organic unity is seen as an unquestioned basis of the development of economic and cultural life. For this reason, SIADS, while promoting the linkage between the local and the global, also function as the “bearers of conservatism and nationalism” in their societal visions. It should be pointed out, however, that *their societal visions are limited in content, scope and scale to the provinces wherein they operate*. They are concerned about, and with, the success of their own provinces, and thus, unlike TUSIAD and MUSIAD whose societal vision talks about Turkish society at large, SIADS remain small-scale organizations both discursively and functionally, with their limited societal visions and their attempt to create an organic unity in their own communities.

Having outlined the main outcomes of my research concerning the linkage between cultural globalization and economic life in Turkey, I can conclude that such linkage takes the form of “the relation of co-existence” between the global and the local. However, the meaning that economic actors attribute to the impacts of cultural globalization vary in accordance with their economic discourses and strategies. While all of them see globalization as an internal element of the changing nature of economic and cultural life in Turkey, they differ in terms of their own societal visions. This difference manifests itself in the simultaneous promotion of both the universal language of civil rights and individuality, and the protection of cultural/moral identity and the creation of a community as an organic unity. This means that *free trade ideology as an expression of economic globalization coexists with both liberalism and communitarianism in Turkish economic life*.

Cultural Globalization and Civil Society Organizations

Since the 1980s, but especially during the 1990s, there has been an upsurge of interest in exploring alternative ways in which socio-political change in Turkey can be freed from the strong-state tradition. It is in this context that civil society organizations have emerged and become an important actor in Turkish politics. The sources of this interest in civil society are located not only in the general societal dissatisfaction with the strong-state tradition in Turkey, especially with respect to its increasing independence from society and its concomitant failure to respond social and cultural demands and to cope with societal problems. As my research indicates, it is also “global” in nature, insofar as the emergence of what is called “global civil society” has also provided both normative and institutional basis for the call for a more participatory culture in Turkey. Thus,

civil society organizations value cultural globalization, to the extent that it contributes to “the creation of the language of politics which is not associated exclusively with the state”.²⁰

In Turkey, both the crisis of the strong-state tradition and the process of cultural globalization have created a suitable platform for the significant qualitative and quantitative increase in civil society organizations during the 1990s. Civil society organizations have been considered (a) an “indispensable element” of the process of democratization; (b) a “necessary factor” to create stability in the relations between Turkey and the European Union; and (c) an “important element” of the modernization and the liberalization of the Turkish state, so that it transforms itself into a political organization whose power and activities are “accountable” to society.

The discourse of civil society has been normatively supported and actively promoted in academic and public life in Turkey during the 1990s. Thus, civil society organizations have gained a “(political) actor-like quality” with normative and discursive power, influencing us to rethink the state-society/individual relations beyond the strong-state tradition and by employing the globalization of the language of civil rights. As we have seen before, for example, the changing nature of TUSIAD in the 1990s has been influenced by the discourse of civil society, which can be easily observed in its attempt to act as a civil society organization by redirecting its activities to the promotion of civil rights as a necessary element of democratization.

The tragic and devastating events of 1999 have also led us to think of civil society organizations seriously. The Marmara Earthquake on August 17 destroyed a large portion of the most industrial region of Turkey, causing almost 20.000 deaths and thereby creating one of the most tragic events of the century, and then there was the Düzce Earthquake on November 12. These two disasters made it very clear to Turkish people that the strong state is in fact very weak in responding and coping with serious problems. This failure of the Turkish state to respond quickly to crisis-situations has given rise to a common belief among people that civil society organizations and a more participatory political culture are necessary for the efficient and effective solution of the problems confronting Turkish society.

²⁰ For detail, see A.N.Yücekök, İ.Turan and M.Ö.Alkan, *Civil Society Organizations in İstanbul*, (İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı, 1998); A.Gönel, *Primary Civil Society Organizations*, (İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı, 1998); and Turkish Economy and Social History Foundation, *Civil Society Organizations*, (İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı, 1998). All these publications are in Turkish.

At the same time, the role of foreign search and rescue teams and the global outpouring of help to people who lost their families and homes, have created a point of articulation between globalization and civil society in Turkey. The large amount of financial and moral help coming from various societies, institutions and even individuals has created a significant shift in people's attitudes and behavioral patterns from a more nationalistic view of the world to a more transnationalist and universalistic approach to social relations. The normative value of civil society organizations and their call for the global acceptance of the language of civil rights and the participatory democracy has increased immensely in Turkey.

Having accounted for the reasons for the increasing importance of civil society organizations in Turkey, and its "embeddedness" in what is called "the global talk of civil society", it should be pointed out, however, that *paradoxically, most of the civil society organizations in Turkey, in fact, see globalization as "a process to be resisted in the long-run" or as "a problem to be seriously dealt with in order to make its impacts positive for Turkish society"*. In other words, the general intellectual discourse of civil society, which sees globalization as one of the contributory-factors for the development of civil society organizations in Turkey, does not correspond to the way in which civil society organizations themselves speak about the utility of globalization.

Unlike economic actors and the area of popular culture, where we have seen a "positive quality" commonly attributed to the impacts of cultural and economic globalization in societal relations in Turkey, civil society organizations appear to be skeptical about globalization. Except some civil society organizations whose mission is to contribute in an intellectual fashion to the democratization of the state-society relations, *most of civil society organizations appear to be "quite skeptical" in the way in which they approach the question of the long-term impacts of cultural globalization*. This skepticism sometimes operate in a strong fashion, to the extent that globalization is seen as nothing but a new form of imperialism creating undemocratic power relations in the world on behalf of rich countries. Sometimes, it takes the form of seeing globalization as an objective reality that produces both positive and negative impacts; *positive* in the sense of confronting the power of the strong-state and creating a platform for the protection of civil rights, and *negative* in the sense of supporting the liberal hegemonic vision of the world, based on free market ideology.²¹

²¹ On the other hand, the leaders of some civil society organizations, such as citizenship initiatives, environmental organizations and organizations that are directly dealing with the

An illustrative example in this context, is three effective “Human Rights Organizations in Turkey. Human Rights Organization, which receives global support for its activities, takes the strong skeptic position on globalization, and argues that although they support the existing global discourse on the protection of human rights, globalization in the long-run serves the interests of the economically powerful countries in the World. Thus, the organization thinks that in the long run it is necessary that globalization should be resisted, in order to create democratic global governance. The other human rights organization, associated with Islamic discourse, (Mazlum-Der), presents a softer version of skepticism, and argues that cultural globalization provides a platform suitable for its activities, although the liberal discourse of human rights it promotes is problematic in dealing with cultural rights. On the other hand, the third human right organization (Helsinki Vatandaşlar Derneği), which was founded in Europe and operates in Turkey, views cultural globalization as a problem simultaneously generating positive and negative impacts for both the nation-state and civil society. That is, cultural globalization cannot be rejected nor celebrated, but should be dealt with seriously in order to take advantage of its positive qualities, such as its support for the universalization of the discourse of civil rights.

To point out the differences between these three human rights organizations is important, in the sense that they also illuminate a general problem that confronts civil society organizations in Turkey, and this problem determines, to a large extent, their approach to the question of cultural globalization. This problem is the “boundary-problem”; that is, the extent to which civil society organizations in Turkey are in fact operating as a “civil society organization” in terms of the scope and the content of their activities, their relation to the state, and their normative and ideological formations is uncertain, ambivalent and contingent. The general definitional discourse on civil society in Turkey finds the institutional distinction between the state and society as a “sufficient condition” for thinking of organizations taking place outside the boundaries of the state as civil society organizations. In fact, a large number of civil society organizations make use of this definition in describing themselves. However this definition does not involve two important criteria, used in the literature to define civil society organizations, namely that they are issue-specific organizations, and that they are not interested in creating or supporting ideological societal visions.

problems of urban life, think of cultural globalization positively as a process “internal” to their activities.

When we approach civil society organizations in Turkey on the basis of these two definitional criteria, we see that most of them act in a way that their activities are not issue-based in scope and content, instead they are embedded in big societal visions. There are some civil society whose organizational discourse is framed by big societal visions, such as, Kemalism, a modern Turkey, the protection of contemporary civilized life, the secular-democratic Turkey or Islamic order, Islamic life, a socialist Turkey, and Kemalist Woman, to name a few. Secondly, while some civil society organizations institutionally take place outside the state, they can have strong normative and ideological ties with state power. An illustrative example of this was the process of closing the Welfare Party, where strong ties were established between some civil society organizations, the military and the state. In this case, the search for what is good for society at large constituted a mission around which civil society organizations center their activities.²²

My research has also indicated that the way in which civil society organizations think of globalization is based upon how much normativity their discourses and strategies involve. I have found that *the skepticism about the impacts of cultural globalization on societal relations in Turkey increases in civil society organizations whose activities are not issue-specific and closely tied with general ideological and normative societal visions*. On the other hand, the degree of skepticism decreases in issue-specific civil society organizations that attribute a positive quality to cultural globalization, and conceive of it as creating an historical context for their activities.

By way of conclusion, I can argue that as far as the relationship between cultural globalization and civil society, there is a difference between the intellectual discourse about civil society and the way civil society organizations perceive the impacts of globalization. *Intellectual discourse locates civil society in a space that has occurred between the legitimacy and the governability problem of the strong-state tradition and the changing nature of societal relations partly because of the processes of globalization, and thus sees civil society as a necessary-condition for democratization, pluralism and multiculturalism*. However, *most of the civil society organizations act on the contrary with their ideologically and normatively-loaded discourses and strategies*. This is precisely because of the boundary-problem by which most of the civil society organizations are confronted today. Even though their numbers are increasing and they are becoming important actors, how civil they are still remains uncertain.

²² E.F. Keyman, "Globalization, Civil Society and Democracy in Turkey, in D. Durst (ed) *Civil Society in South Eastern Europe*, (London, Vertigo, forthcoming).

Cultural Globalization and Popular Culture/Consumption Patterns

In addition to economic life and civil society/intellectual life, the significant impacts that the process of cultural globalization has generated in Turkish society have involved also popular culture and consumption patterns.²³ In the areas of popular culture and consumption patterns, significant changes have occurred in recent years. These changes, which have created two inter-related trends, namely the post-modernization of values and the globalization of the local, have manifested themselves in our identities, our life-style preferences and our consumption patterns. These two trends have also functioned, in French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's terminology, as "the cultural/symbolic capital" of the 1990s, played a role, as important as economic capital, in creating and mobilizing identities. Thus, as opposed to the political arena, which has been characterized by the "secularism versus Islamic traditionalism polarization" during the 1990s, in popular culture, we have witnessed the emergence of "calls for pluralism, the multiplicity of identities, the value of the local, the increasing of traditional symbols, and the emergence of consumerist culture". In other words, cultural capital has performed a double-role; both as a factor of differentiation by giving meaning to the creation and the mobilization of different identities, and as an element of commonality among different identities in terms of their tendency towards consumerism.

In the realm of popular culture, cultural globalization is seen as a process that creates a relationship of coexistence among the global and the local, rather than a clash between them. Three points are worth making here;

(i) In my research, I have found that the relationship of coexistence appears to be most visible in the consumption patterns of different identities having different political preferences and different economic status or well being. This means that although the difference between identities in terms of their choice of newspapers, magazines, TV channels, is noticeable, sometimes to the degree of "significance", this difference vanishes, when it comes to their approach to consumption. In other words, while the choice of the newspaper or TV channels is still based upon political or cultural identity codes, the significant increase in consumption patterns of different identities has brought about what is called the "McDonalization of (Turkish) society". For example, although those who locate themselves near or in Islamic discourse usually prefer newspapers and TV channels associated to the Islamic movement, they

²³ This part of our research was based on in-depth interviews and the reports by DAP marketing research company on "Life Standards, Values and Preferences in Turkey" 1998 and 1999. We would like to thank for Akin Alyanak and Erkanı Keyman for their time and their suggestions.

nevertheless very much accept the universalization of Western consumer culture and its symbols, just as in the case of those who define themselves as Western or secular;

(ii) On the other hand, cultural globalization is seen as creating a suitable platform for the revitalization of tradition, not only as a political or economic movement, but also as a cultural movement with its actors and its discourses. *As a result of globalization, Islamic identity no longer represents a backward-self closed to change.* On the contrary, we have seen, on the one hand, the emergence of cultural capital used by Islamic identity in terms of fashion, music, art and tourism. On the other hand, we have observed an emergence of a consumerist Islamic identity acting as an economic citizen, integrated to shopping-mall culture, making use of technology, and aware of the symbolic power of money. In this sense, Islamic identity is part of new consumerist culture as much as secular identity, by seeing this culture not as an evil originated from the West, but as a basis of status and power in society;

(iii) Cultural globalization is viewed, in this context, as a positive element for the vitalization of local art forms, cultural objects and signs, thereby creating more plural, democratic and multicultural cultural life. By creating a platform for the marginalized and silenced cultural forms and objects to become noticeable and marketable, globalization ends the hegemony of secular culture that aims at producing and maintaining a homogeneous cultural life. At the same time, it makes an important contribution to the expression of difference through the discourse of tradition, locality and authenticity. That is to say that through the globalization of the local, the more plural and multicultural cultural life has come into existence, which is conceived as a necessary-condition for the process of democratization in Turkey.

In light of the above-discussion and the exposition of the differing impacts of cultural globalization on the actors, discourses and strategies of economic life, civil society and popular culture in Turkey, it can be concluded that coexistence rather than clash is the form that delineates the interactions between the global and the local. Coming to terms with this fact, I believe, is of utmost importance not only for understanding the changing nature of Turkish modernity, but more importantly for establishing democracy in Turkey.

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