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The 'Imama vs. the 'Iqal: Hadari-Bedouin Conflict and the
Formation of the Saudi State

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The *‘Imama* vs. the *‘Iqal*: *Hadari*-Bedouin Conflict and the Formation of the Sa[‘]udi State*

At the height of the Ikhwan’s power in the 1910s and 1920s, a ranking Wahhabi Shaykh, Sulayman ibn Sihman (d. 1349/1930-31 AH),¹ was observed in Riyadh wearing an *‘iqal* on top of his headdress, contrary to the customary attire of the Najdi *‘ulama* who until this time eschewed donning this piece which to them symbolized worldly concerns. The pious scholar was led to this action by the confluence of some extraordinary events that were threatening to unravel the long-fought-for achievement of imposing central authority in Arabia and the application of the *shari‘a*. Among these was the notion held by the Ikhwan that those Bedouins who wore the *‘iqal* instead of the newly-fashioned *‘imama* (a thin white turban) were not real Muslims and could be fought. This shaykh not only wore the piece to demonstrate its permissibility and that such customary dress had no legal or theological significance, but authored at least two legal/polemical tracts against this belief (Sihman, 1340a and b)² in addition to joining in a number of *fatwas* disapproving of the practice.³

By investigating this and related controversies, this paper aims to examine the nature of the Sa[‘]udi state and the relationship between its two main social components, namely the *Hadar*, or settled communities, and the Bedouins, or nomadic tribes. For in writings about the country, the Sa[‘]udi state is typically identified with the Bedouin, the tribe or nomads, and “tribal values” are supposed to suffuse the state, at least at its inception. Such identification is difficult to sustain notwithstanding its prevalence, for this state had been (and continues to an extent to be) an exclusively *Hadari* endeavor with profound anti-tribal and anti-Bedouin tendencies, and circumscribed roles for the Bedouins and their tribes.⁴

The origin of the Sa[‘]udi state has been seriously characterized as an “act of God,” presumably implying that there are no readily discernible or rationally analyzable causes (Cook 1989, 679). We need not succumb to this modern Ash‘arism (or question divine omnipotence) to be able to identify a number of factors which led to its formation and eventual consolidation.⁵ First and foremost, the Sa[‘]udi state is a *Hadari* project that aimed, among other things, to end Bedouin historical hegemony throughout pre-modern Arabia. The Wahhabi revivalist movement, and the state that emerged from it, had been conceived, spearheaded and manned by the *Hadari* communities, especially those of the

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southern areas of Najd,⁶ through a long and arduous process of coalition building by the founders of the movement/state.

Wahhabism was the response to the profound crisis that Najdi society had been experiencing in the 18th century. This crisis was rooted in two prominent characteristics of the society at the time. First, Najdi *Hadari* population, especially in the southern areas, where the Wahhabi movement originated, had lost its tribal organization⁷ and suffered from profound political instability. Second, and this concerns the Bedouin communities, Najdi pastoral nomadism had been characterized by a high degree of flux resulting in instability in inter- and intra-tribal as well as Bedouin-*Hadari* relations.

The earliest known political formations which could be loosely described as “states” in Najd were very limited and either depended on tribal support or inherited religious charisma, *i.e.*, ‘Alawi descent. The Kinda of southern Najd, which flourished a few centuries before Islam, was a tribally based polity, followed by the hegemony of B. Hanifa⁸ who were one of the last tribes to accept Islam and who were later to significantly contribute to the *ridda* wars and Khariji rebellions. The Umayyads exercised a degree of control which the Abassids were unable to maintain for long. The B. ‘l-‘Ukhaydir emerged in the 9th century in the Khidhrima (today’s Kharj, south of Riyadh) and were the closest thing to an indigenous dynasty, relying for their power on their legitimist pretensions as descendants of the Prophet with a Zaydi creed.

After the collapse of the B. ‘l-‘Ukhaydir (mid-11th century) very little is known about the history of the area.⁹ There are no known local Najdi sources and precious few references to the region in other Islamic chronicles until about the 17th century when some rather primitive local recording of events starts. This “black hole” (11th-16th centuries AD) in Najdi history makes it difficult to paint an accurate picture of the society during those long centuries and even after that period, and until the advent of Wahhabism, the little that actually survived is of limited value. Nevertheless, it appears that Najd, or parts of it, was subject to periodic invasions/raids by the neighboring powers; the Sharifis in Hijaz made occasional forays but the succession of the tribally-based polities in the east appear to have had closer ties. The objective of such raids seems to be mainly the pacification of the various nomadic tribes and protection of trade/pilgrim routes as well as collection of tribute (Al-Juhany 1983, 266, 267); it does not appear that any direct control was imposed.

On the basis of rudimentary, pre-Wahhabi written records, it has been suggested that population growth was significant after the 15th century and contributed to the emergence of the Wahhabi movement (Al-Juhany 1983). While this suggestion has been challenged (Cook 1989, 677), detribalization,

which is not necessarily inconsistent with Al-Juhany's demographic explanation, has been proposed as the main social process that led to the emergence of Wahhabism (Al-Dakhil 1998). Starting with the destruction of the B. Hanifa in the early Islamic centuries, the *Hadari* population of Najd gradually lost any meaningful tribal organization. By the 18th century, the *Hadaris* were reduced to a melange of small communities, where every town boasted a number of large families, often of differing genealogical origins. Moreover, the redoubtable B. Hanifa were on the verge of extinction and only small remnants survived in a few towns, especially in Dir^ciyya. The other well-known Najdi tribe, Tamim, fared much better and had somehow managed to preserve its identity despite its complete sedentarization and total loss of any nomadic component. Still, Tamim was never able to recover its pre-Islamic dominance, although a number of its leading families were able to maintain some tenuous "rule" over a few villages in Najd.

Chronicles are replete with references to the exceedingly difficult crises these towns were facing. None of the towns had any stable rule and many were split into a number of antagonistic neighborhoods and warring chiefs; violence was endemic (Al-Bassam 1999, 7: 74-5).¹⁰ Indeed, a striking characteristic of *Hadari* society had been its utter failure to develop any reliable mechanism for effective rule and orderly succession. In many cases, more than one family had been vying for dominance, sometimes from differing genealogical backgrounds and succession was more often effected through murder. The history of pre-Wahhabi Najd is in many respects a chronicle of these events, a relentless trail of blood-soaked struggle and political intrigue at an extremely localized level. The towns of ^cArid rarely managed successions without murder and the villages of Washm and Sudayr displayed striking violence within their walls as well as with neighboring settlements.¹¹

The history of the Bedouins and their tribes is even less understood than that of the settled communities although we know enough general events to be able to venture a few generalizations. Perhaps the most impressive feature of Najdi nomadism is its relative instability in comparison with other tribal systems in the area. In North Yemen, for example, Dresch (1993) draws a portrait of Yemeni tribes that had managed to maintain themselves essentially intact over the same territory from pre-Islamic times until the present. Similarly, the tribes of southwest Sa^cudi Arabia in the ^cAsir and southern mountains of Hijaz have maintained their territorial and genealogical continuity over many centuries.¹² The tribes of those mountainous areas, unlike Najdi Bedouins, are sedentary. This phenomenon is not replicated in Najd where there has been high turnover in tribal formations through both immigration into Najd from the south and southwestern areas and migration out of Najd into the Fertile Crescent.¹³ The seemingly constant movement into and out of Najd¹⁴ created a complex process

of fission and fusion among the nomadic tribes (and to a lesser extent, the *Hadar* communities), where today it is practically impossible to trace, with any degree of confidence, the original roots of most surviving clans and lineages.

The persistent state of flux that characterized Najdi nomadic tribes is readily identifiable and is repeated many times over. At any given time, a tribe would move from the south or southwest into upper Najd, presumably because of population pressures or droughts in its original home, seeking access to pasture lands and watering places of the area either peacefully¹⁵ or by force. Defeated tribes would move east and north, causing further displacement, and a ripple effect would reach as far as al-Jazira in northern Mesopotamia, the northernmost ecological frontier of Arabian nomadism. As a result of this incessant process, genealogies become hopelessly intertwined, further complicating the political situation. But Bedouin political culture readily accommodates this instability by means of alliance-building, where the new section(s) is quickly accepted and eventually taken for granted to be part of the tribe's genealogy.¹⁶ This process is not as readily available to the *Hadar* since genealogy (and tribalism in particular) plays a considerably less important role in their social and political life.¹⁷

In this landscape, like many others, dominance is dependent on military prowess with profound consequences to Bedouin (and to a lesser extent, *Hadari*) political culture and social structure. Because of their dependence on the use and threat of force to ensure survival in the desert, those Bedouins who fail to maintain their military strength are gradually reduced to an inferior status.¹⁸ By failing to maintain independence vis-à-vis others, a nomadic tribe could only survive economically by paying tribute to the stronger, dominant tribe in order to maintain access to pasturages, losing in the process its *asil* ("pure") Arabian genealogy. Through such a process, many tribes became "outcasts" and the *asil* tribes would cease intermarriage with them (Rosenfeld 1951, 157). This "caste" formation emerged as an effective way to maintain the stronger tribes' monopoly of resources and as a means of collecting tribute from the inferior ones (p. 73).¹⁹ Being a function of military strength, the process is reversible if and when the requisite power is demonstrated.²⁰

Curiously enough, the *Hadar* who historically paid tribute to their neighboring tribes did not suffer the same fate and the *asil* elements of the *Hadar* maintained their "pure" genealogies, including the ability to intermarry with the *asil* Bedouins. Nonetheless, *Hadari* society exhibited the same attitudes as the Bedouins' towards their *Hadari* non-*asil* groups, called B. Khadir,²¹ and the *asil Hadaris* would not intermarry with them. Unlike the case of the Bedouins, however, it is difficult to see any obvious economic function for this "caste" system within *Hadari* society, and it may be nothing more than a

holdover from Bedouin attitudes, or perhaps a way for the dominant *Hadari asil* groups to establish, when available, alliances with neighboring *asil* tribes.²² The *Hadari non-asil* social group has been the most overlooked element within the Wahhabi/Sa^udi coalition despite its critical contributions to the process of state formation and consolidation, where they were major beneficiaries.

Bedouin society has been defined according to an ideology based on kinship where patrilineal descent operates as the overriding organizing principle. *Hadari* identity, on the other hand, is far less dependent on kinship and is markedly territorial and more defined by common residence. Towns were typically composed of a number of families or lineages claiming descent from differing tribes, some of which survived only as *Hadar*. The towns of °Arid were very mixed, with Tamim, B. Hanifa, Subai°, °A‘ith, Lam, Dawasir, °Anaza, and many others living together. Despite these apparent genealogical distinctions and the constant internal conflict in the towns that had characterized the life of the *Hadar*, it is clear that by the 18th century a territory-based definition of the inhabitants had taken hold, the most important manifestation of which is dialect. Although there have been a few studies of Najdi dialects, they tend to be more concerned with “tribal” rather than the *Hadari* inhabitants. Yet, as recently as a generation ago, it was possible to identify any individual simply by the way he spoke. While these dialects are mutually intelligible, enough differences exist in pronunciation, intonation and lexicon to be *easily* identifiable along Bedouin-*Hadari* and regional lines. An aspect of dialect in Najdi society is the possibility of identifying a speaker as Bedouin or *Hadari* through dialect though for both communities there exist marked differences among their constituent groups dialects. For the *Hadar*, each of the “regions” into which Najd is traditionally divided has a uniform dialect. From region to region, dialects gradually but perceptibly change and are distinctly identifiable: thus, from south to north, there are dialects for W. al-Dawasir, Aflaj, Fura°, °Arid, Sha°ib, Mihmal, Sudayr, Washm, Zilfi, Qasim, Jabal Shammar; and in °Alyat Najd, al-°Ird and Dawadimi.²³

While dialect is probably the most prominent feature of territorial identity among the *Hadar*, other manifestations of this identity may be found in two other common Najdi practices, °uzwa or *nakhwa*,²⁴ best translated as war cry, and *wasm*, the system of symbols used to brand animals.²⁵ It appears that every Najdi town or group of settlement (or even a whole region) typically employs one standard *nakhwa* which is derived from some physical features of the area or invoking a person’s name or a noble deed as with tribal customs.²⁶ Perhaps the most famous is that of °Arid, *ahl al-°awja*, of uncertain origin (ibn Khamis 1980, 424; 1987, 6: 137-8), but is used by inhabitants of the territory regardless of tribal (or Khadiri) affiliation.²⁷ But even within °Arid there are various local *nakhwas*, e.g., Muzahimmiyya/Durama (*ahl al-hamad*, a reference to the plains they inhabit (ibn Khamis 1980, 1: 343) and Riyadh (*ahl al-dirayn*, a reference to two local hills (ibn Khamis 1980, 2:125)). Another well-known *nakhwa* is that of the whole of Qasim, *awlad °Ali*, which connotes no particular ancestor and is used by all groups within the area.²⁸ The *nakhwa* of Zilfi is °yal al-Juraysi.²⁹ °Usahqir, the stronghold of many of the modern Tamimi clans uses as its

nakhwa ^ʿ*ukl*, the old name of the town, derived from the name of an ancient tribe.³⁰

Branding (*wasm*)³¹ is one of the most widely used practices in pre-modern Arabia by both Bedouin and *Hadari*. Typically, a clan would brand its camels in a standard way to facilitate the immediate identification of the owners. On occasion various groups within a clan would seek to distinguish their property by employing an auxiliary *wasm*, called *shahid*, which it would affix in addition to the standard *wasm*. A raiding party would therefore be able to avoid those camels that belong to its co-tribesmen or allied clans. This practice is widespread within the *Hadari* communities as well, although it appears that *Hadari wasms* are determined not along the lines of clans or lineages but according to a territorial concept. Thus, the inhabitants of Qasim typically use as their common *wasm* the *hayya* (“serpent”) with the various towns employing different *shahids*. In Zilfi, the region with which I am most familiar, the *wasm* is presumably that of the dominant ^ʿUtaybi clan, the *halqa* (or “circle”, much like the letter O) and all residents, regardless of tribal or Khadiri background, would so brand their camels. The northern settlements in Zilfi use a *shahid* to further distinguish their camels in the shape of *mish^cab*³² (or “stick,” much like the letter T with only the right part of the cross).³³

Situated in marginal lands with scarce vegetation and water, Najd could offer its inhabitants only a precarious existence and surplus was limited. Economic relations among the various social groups in pre-modern Arabia are nevertheless complex with the *asil* nomadic tribes the clear winners. There is of course peaceful, non-coercive and reciprocal economic exchange of goods between the “desert and the sown,” where the *Hadari* and Bedouin would transact goods and obtain their value in return. But the pre-modern system has significant coercive aspects that ensure the transfer of resources within the Bedouin economy from non-*asil* to *asil* tribes and from *Hadari* communities and individuals to the same nomadic tribes. The effective vehicle for ensuring this economic dominance is military superiority institutionalized in the venerable Bedouin tradition of raiding (*ghazw*), the major occupation of Bedouin men (Sweet 1965, 1136; Rosenfeld 1951, vi, 75).³⁴ While seemingly of uniform nature, the *ghazw* in fact performs differing functions within the pre-modern Arabian economy. For within *asil* nomadic groups, this practice is reciprocal and no more than a sporting event, where small raids are organized and death is minimized (Rosenfeld 1951, 65, 68, 69); it serves to ensure a general balance in the distribution of resources, principally camels (Sweet 1965, 1147). Through this type of *ghazw*, resources are simply circulated among the nomads and no net gain to the *asil* nomadic economy is realized. A less common but more lethal form of *ghazw*, called *manakh*, usually embracing large sections of a tribe(s) and lasting sometimes for months at higher toll in human life, is periodically

engaged in by the Bedouins for control over pasture lands and watering places (Rosenfeld 1951, 71).³⁵ The winner of these battles obtains exclusive possession of pasturages and associated water wells, while the loser is reduced to a tributary of the winner or ends up departing to other areas.

While both types of *ghazw*, from the perspective of the *asil* Bedouin economy taken as a whole, are economically neutral, this cannot be said of the tributes, *khuwa*,³⁶ collected from the inferior tribes and the *Hadari* populations which represent net gains in the “balance of payment” of the *asil* tribes. Again, military power, as reflected in the *ghazw*, is the mechanism through which this transfer is effected. The *Hadari* communities could always protect their livestock, agriculture produce and trade routes from nomadic predations if they are able to muster enough military resources; this would require the existence of larger political units, something the *Hadar* were unable to achieve prior to Wahhabism. Failing such effective organization, the *Hadar* were reduced to tributaries of the more powerful nomadic tribes and regular payments had to be maintained. Those payments were typically made by a town, village or settlement to one of the chiefs of the tribe or clan within whose territory (*dira*) it is located. Though difficult to document, most Najdi towns had to pay tributes to the surrounding Bedouins or risk loss of property.³⁷ Another mechanism for collection of tribute is the custom of the *rafiq* in which a person, group or caravan, in order to pass through a tribal *dira* without fear of harm and expropriation of property, must purchase protection through retaining one or more members of this tribe. Unlike the *khuwa* paid by towns, this practice is more readily documented in the literature with prices varying according to circumstances (e.g. Al-^cUbayyid, 342-3). This institution must have been lucrative for the Bedouins, as any (capable) member of the tribe could extend this protection and collect the *khuwa* for himself.³⁸

The security cost shouldered by the *Hadari* economy is made all the more onerous by the high “turnover” within the Najdi tribal system. In areas with stable tribal formations, most inhabitants of the towns would be co-tribesmen of the dominant group and, relying on genealogical politics, would be exempt from payment of *khuwa*. This case is illustrated, for example, by Jabal Shammar (Ha'il) and its dominant tribe of the same name.³⁹ However, in most other areas of Najd, towns and villages were too genealogically mixed to benefit from this tribally-based exemption and security had to be purchased, apparently at considerable cost. Relative to other areas, they were at a distinct disadvantage which contributed to their attempt (and eventual success) at overturning Bedouin hegemony.

It is under these conditions that Wahhabism appeared. Its founder, a *Hadari* Najdi Shaykh, Muhammad ibn ^cAbd al-Wahhab, envisaged nothing

short of a radical transformation of the moral, political, economic and social landscape of Najd. Expressed through the vehicle of revivalist Islam of the *mujaddid* tradition, ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab effectively utilized Hanbali ideas and doctrines that first emerged in Baghdad (9th-11th centuries AD) and elaborated in Damascus two centuries later.⁴⁰ Through this *daʿwa*, he sought to unify the warring towns and bring the Arabian Bedouin to the fold of Islam. His views required the destruction of old patterns, of superstitions, sufism (perhaps it was too particularistic), raiding, and not least extra-*sharʿi* taxes. He was not to die (1792) until he saw the success of the movement he had launched.

When embarking on his reforms, ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab did not seek the support of the Bedouin tribes, all of whom he held in deep contempt.⁴¹ Instead, he began his preaching among the *Hadar* of ʿArid who were ideally suited for his cause as that area at the time had the largest concentration of *Hadar*, and relatively minor Bedouin elements.⁴² In ʿUyayna, the largest town in Najd and ruled by Ibn Muʿammar, a Tamimi like the Shaykh himself, the reformer targeted some common practices that were held to be inadmissible and met with initial successes. His activities attracted the attention of the hegemonic power at the time, the Humaydi rulers of the B. Khalid tribe who held sway over al-Ahsa and extended their suzerainty to some Najdi towns. Because of ʿUyayna’s economic dependence on the Humaydis, the chief of the town had to withdraw his support and the Shaykh was obliged to flee (ibn Bishr 1982, 1: 40).⁴³ He took refuge in Dirʿiyya, a smaller town with a chief by the name of Muhammad ibn Saʿud⁴⁴ (r. 1139-79/1726-65), the founder of the Saʿudi dynasty. The deal that was struck reflects that the two parties, the Shaykh and the *Amir*, clearly understood the political goal they sought, the establishment of a single polity in the area that would unite the warring towns, villages and tribes into a realm with one imam and where the *shariʿa* would reign supreme.⁴⁵

It is common to ascribe to the Saʿudi family a genealogy and an affiliation that would ensure its strong tribal/Bedouin identity. The lineage of the family is reckoned by some authorities to come from the Masalikh of the ʿAnaza tribe, despite the fact that the Wahhabi sources are unanimous that it belonged to the remnants of B. Hanifa (Ibn Bishr, 2: 23).⁴⁶ It appears that this ascription solves the puzzle of the prominence of the family and the success of Wahhabism which perhaps could be conceived only through the Khaldunian model of tribal *ʿasabiya*. Yet, it is indeed the relative *insignificance* of the Saʿudi family at that time that allowed it the success it gradually achieved.⁴⁷ For it was that characteristic of the family above all else, of being neither Bedouin nor affiliated with a large tribe, that allowed it to build the effective *Hadari* coalition which eventually defeated its many opponents, the most serious of whom had considerable Bedouin and tribal backing. While the Bedouins did contribute to

the process, their role, on the whole, had been opportunistic and subsidiary to that of those detribalized *Hadaris*.

Using Dir^{ci}yya as its base, the Wahhabi *da^{ci}wa* was initially conducted by peaceful means which eventually had to give way to military *jihad*. In a process that would last close to half a century, the Wahhabis slowly defeated their opponents both ideologically and militarily. The pace of the extension of the realm was by no means spectacular but it was steady, not least because the Wahhabis had to rely on ideological subversion more than physical force, which they did not manage to deploy effectively until later in their history. Never able to muster a large standing army, the Wahhabis depended heavily on the *Hadar* to man their armies with Bedouins only serving more or less opportunistically (Shaafy 1969-73, 61; Zdavowski 1994, 132, Wahba 1956, 10).⁴⁸ The chronicles suggest that, at least initially, most of the warfare had been directed against other towns, but in due course even the Bedouins were subdued. For the *Hadari* communities, incorporation within the Wahhabi state resulted in several changes. First, the Sa^{ci}udi Imams would maintain their *Hadari* coalition by appointing local *amirs* to the conquered towns and would rarely replace them with outsiders. The tax system would also change as *zakat* would be collected and any extr-*shar^{ci}i* levies would be abolished. A *shar^{ci}a* expert would be appointed as judge to administer the law, and to the extent that non-*shar^{ci}i* customs were enforced, that too would be eliminated. Less learned individuals, the *matawi^{ci}a*, were also dispatched to the various communities to proselytize; occasionally they had to forfeit their lives when towns rebelled against Wahhabi rule (Al-Bassam 123; Al-Salman 1999, 19).

The changes brought by Wahhabism to Bedouin society were just as drastic. The Bedouins were instructed in the principles of the faith, and ritual observance was enforced.⁴⁹ More profoundly, not only were old Bedouin privileges of raiding and collection of tributes from other Bedouins, *Hadari* towns and travelers abolished, but the tribes had to pay *zakat* to the *Hadari* treasury, a reversal of the pre-Wahhabi regime. Ibn Bishr unfailingly highlights these achievements. Writing during the period of the Sa^{ci}udi civil war, following the death of Imam Fayasl in 1865 when the Sa^{ci}udi state disintegrated and insecurity was rampant, the author appears to be acutely aware of the Bedouins' power, and his unqualified contempt for and hostility to them are palpable. For example, in a section devoted to the *manaqib* of the second Sa^{ci}udi Imam, ^{ci}Abd al-^{ci}Aziz (killed 1218/1803),⁵⁰ he devotes several pages to his success at curbing Bedouin hegemony and imposing security throughout the realm (ibn Bishr, 1982, 1: 268-274). His diagnosis of the Bedouin problem is typical of the general *Hadari* view. In a sort of eternal, binary opposition, the hostility between the *Hadar* and the Bedouins is perceived as natural and the Bedouins could be tempered only by the "sword" (p. 271).⁵¹ The Wahhabi Imam was

ruthless with the Bedouins and employed several strategies to deal with them. For their transgressions, he would impose heavy fines and put their shaykhs in jail; in one instance, for maximum humiliation, the chief of °Anaza, al-Humaydi ibn Haththal, was jailed, shackled with a non-*asil* Hutaymi Bedouin (p. 271).⁵²

To bring the Bedouin “problem” under control, the Wahhabis deployed legal concepts that exploited the nomads’ own social system in order to provide the means for ensuring security and compliance with the law. In a fascinating passage written by an eminent Wahhabi scholar, shaykh °Abd al-Latif Al al-Shaykh (d. 1293/1876),⁵³ he relates the response to a question he had addressed to his father, °Abd al-Rahman (d. 1285/1868-69),⁵⁴ another eminent scholar, concerning the legality of the practice of the Najdi *amirs* of holding men responsible for the transgressions of their kin. In his long response, the father recalls the conditions of Najd before the *da°wa* where nomads oppressed the *Hadar*, hardly observed any *shar°i* rules, and were engaged in constant strife. When the Wahhabi reformers launched the *da°wa* the Bedouins were hostile to it but the reformers pressed the fight; when one tribe would “obey God and adhere to the *shari°a*” they would use it to fight those still in error. But even after they had accepted Islam, the stronger tribes would continue to oppress weaker Bedouins and *Hadar*. So a Bedouin would steal or commit highway robbery and then take refuge with his strong tribe which would offer him its protection. If the tribe is left alone and only the person who had committed the crime is held responsible and who is protected by the tribe, all rights, life and property would be lost and the *shari°a* would be abandoned. Collective responsibility⁵⁵ would be the only way to ensure the application of the law through which security could be achieved, and it is thus legal for those administering justice to hold tribal relatives responsible until they deliver the accused. This opinion is qualified only to the extent that those held responsible for the crimes of their kin must be of stature and influence and are able to deliver, and not just simply kinsmen who are of no consequence (ibn Qasim 1994, 6: 422-23).⁵⁶

The first Sa°udi state was impressively successful at the twin tasks of forging *Hadari* unity and Bedouin pacification. Perhaps its constant, successful wars with its many opponents ensured that parties, especially the Bedouins, had plenty of resources to compensate them for losses stemming from the overthrow of the old order. But despite the incorporation and pacification of the nomadic tribes in the Wahhabi realm, it is difficult to see any role for them besides their opportunistic participation in the wars of conquests whose core forces were always the *Hadar* anyway. As indicated above, the Sa°udi Imams followed a conscious policy of coalition building among the *Hadar* and, after the conquest, typically left the ruling chiefs (or their relatives) in charge of the towns and settlements (Rihani 1954, 63). When they occasionally need to post an outsider, he was always *Hadari*, and no Bedouin would ever be appointed *amir* over a

Hadari settlement, a practice that survives to this day.⁵⁷ Indeed, it was possible for the Sa^udi Imams to employ *Shi^ui amirs* for the Qatif region (ibn Bishr 1982, 2: 230), but no nomads could achieve this post. In fact, the only direct employment I can find for nomads is in a limited number of military commands.⁵⁸

The expansion of the Sa^udi state was ended by the superior power of Egyptian arms and by 1818 Dir^uyya was in ruins. With such crushing defeat, the old ways quickly reasserted themselves. Towns became independent again and the nomads merrily reverted to their old pre-occupations. Wahhabi historians freely hurl accusations of treachery at the tribes for their cooperation with the Egyptians, but the *Hadar* do not escape unscathed either. The upshot is a marked decline in order which the Sa^udi Imams along with their Wahhabi ^ulama tried to restore, a task at which they were partially successful. The post-invasion reigns of Imam Turki (r. 1236/1820-1246/1830) and his son, Faysal (r. 1246/1830-1254/1838 and 1258/1843-1282/1865), are characterized by constant conflict within Najdi society with a tendency for the Bedouins to figure more prominently in their campaigns than had been the case with the first state. Chronicles show a picture of a society rent by centrifugal forces on several fronts. The realm has substantially shrunk in both size and power with the Sa^udi writ confined to Najd and areas of the eastern coast. There were efforts to expel the remnants of the invading Egyptians and restore Najdi independence and unity. The nomadic tribes appear again as a major obstacle to unity and a menace threatening *Hadar* settlements, and frequent expeditions were launched against the disobedient Bedouins. An example of the length to which the Imams had to go to restore peace is the decapitation of the leader of the ^uIjman tribe in al-Ahsa in 1262/1846 after he had plundered a caravan of pilgrims, apparently the first time the Sa^udis went to that extreme with the Bedouins (ibn Bishr 1982, 2: 237).

The first Sa^udi state that was vanquished by the Egyptians was remarkable for its stability. In pre-Wahhabi Najd, all settlements lacked a system of orderly succession and internecine wars were frequently the result. The Wahhabis successfully introduced the tradition of primogeniture that had not been practiced in the past either by Bedouins or *Hadar*. This stability gradually eroded during the hapless second Sa^udi state, first by the murder of Turki by his nephew, who was in turn killed by Turki's son, Faysal, and later by the outright rebellion of Sa^ud against his older brother, ^uAbd Allah, shortly after the death of Faysal, their father. This era between the destruction of Dir^uyya and the Sa^udi civil war witnessed further transformation in the political life of the Najd. On the nomadic front, two major, new tribes made their presence felt, the ^uIjman⁵⁹ in the east and ^uUtabya⁶⁰ in upper Najd. The annals are full of stories of their deeds and misdeeds along with those of their protagonists, both nomadic

and settled. The Sa^udi Imams seem to have spent much of their energies in battles with the two tribes as well as others. For the *Hadari*, the most striking development had been the gradual emergence to prominence of the northern regions of Najd, specifically, Qasim and Ha'il.⁶¹ Over the following several decades, both regions were to offer serious alternatives to the Sa^udi/Wahhabi coalition, but neither ultimately succeeded at supplanting the Sa^udi state.

The history of the Rashidi *amirate* in Ha'il starts with the appointment of its founder, ^uAbd Allah ibn ^uAli ibn Rashid (d. 1847), to be the *amir* of the region by Imam Faysal in gratitude for the former's services to the Sa^udis, fulfilling ibn Rashid's life-long ambitions. With the ascendance of ibn Rashid, we are able to identify a distinct shift in Najdi politics from a clearly and exclusively (hybrid) *Hadari* governance to a reliance on tribal affiliation as the basis of power. For the first time in the history of Najd since the early Islamic centuries,⁶² an aspiring family pursues power on the strength of its nomadic tribal affiliation. And that must have been a conscious decision by the founders, for it is related that one of the earliest causes of friction between ibn Rashid and his predecessor, ibn ^uAli, who belonged to the same Shammari clan,⁶³ was the accusation by ibn Rashid that the *amir* was not doing enough to support the nomadic Shammar in their battles with their ^uAnaza enemies. Disobeying the *amir*'s instructions, ^uAbd Allah and his brother, ^uUbayd, took it upon themselves to organize military support and come to the aid of their Bedouin Shammar kinsmen (Al-Rashid 1966, 61, 65; Al-^uUthaymin 1991, 74-5; ibn ^uAqil 1982-6, 132-8).⁶⁴ This shift in the region's politics was to prove a critical factor both in the success and eventual failure of that Ha'il/Shammar⁶⁵ hegemony.

At the same time of Rashidi ascendancy, Qasim was developing its own local identity and striving for independence, including collection of *zakat* from neighboring tribes (Al-^uUbayyid, 36).⁶⁶ Known as the most enterprising merchants in Najd, the Qasimis developed extensive trading relations with the outside world, especially the export of camels to the Fertile Crescent and Egypt.⁶⁷ Heavily dependent on this trade with the north, Qasim was acutely interested in securing its caravan routes to the Levantine and Egyptian markets which frequently brought it into conflict with the Rashidis. In this struggle (and later conflict with the resurgent Sa^udis), the Qasimis suffered from several disadvantages. Being a thoroughly *Hadari* society, it was no match for the Rashidi *amirate* with its loyal Shammari tribesmen. In order to counter the Rashidis' tribal advantage, Qasim made common cause with the ^uAnaza Bedouins, the historical foes of the Shammar, but their alliance proved inadequate to overcome the Shammaris, both settled and nomadic.⁶⁸ A further disadvantage was the Qasimis' chronic inability to achieve unity, the bane of *Hadari* politics. The two major towns, Burayda and ^uUnayza, were ruled independently and Burayda's attempt to control the region always stumbled on

Unayza's obstinacy. A further limitation on Qasim's bid for its own independence came from the profound Wahhabi penetration of its society, rendering it susceptible to Sa'udi influence, and the local Wahhabi *ulama* had a major role in advancing the Sa'udi cause against both the quest for independence and Rashidi designs. Other members of the Qasimi elite, especially the *uqayli*⁶⁹ merchants, were aware of the Rashidis' ability to block their trade routes, and influential segments advocated an alliance with Ha'il.⁷⁰

Relying on the combined powers of their *Hadar* and Shammari supporters, the Rashidis gradually displaced their competitors, and by 1889 their realm extended throughout Najd after expelling the last Sa'udi *amirs* from Riyadh (Al-Rasheed, 1991; Al-Uthaymin, 1991; Za'arir, 1996). Although the Rashidis attained and maintained their rule on the basis of a specific tribal Bedouin *asabiya*,⁷¹ it is clear that their more astute leaders always recognized that unless the chronic Bedouin-*Hadari* problem was dealt with properly their dominion would be shaky. The great Rashidi *amir*, Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah (r. 1869-1897) appears to have been aware of the need to curb Bedouin hegemony in order to prop up the dynasty's rule; he reportedly vowed that were he to live long enough he would abrogate all Bedouin *khuwa* on the *Hadar* (Al-Ubayyid, 40).⁷²

Even foes of the Rashidi dynasty give him credit for his political acumen. In the aftermath of the Sarif debacle (1318/1901) (Al-Salman 1999, 288-291) in which his successor, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Mut'ib (r. 1897-1906), routed his many opponents, Sa'udis and others, near Qasim, Al-Ubayyid reports that Imam 'Abd al-Rahman (King 'Abd al-'Aziz's father) was asked whether there was any hope left for the Sa'udis to recover their rule in Najd. His answer is indicative of the profound awareness of the problematic issue of Bedouin/*Hadari* relations. 'Abd al-Rahman's response⁷³ thus starts with charting the possible reactions now open to the Rashidi victor. One possibility, which would preclude a Sa'udi recovery, would be for 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Rashid to emulate the conduct of Muhammad ibn Rashid, his predecessor, after the latter's own triumph at Mulayda (1308/1890). "Listen people of Najd," the chronicle reports Muhammad declaring,

"the transgressor, the victim, the good and the bad: Today we start with a clean slate in Najd; it is in my protection (*wajh*) and the security of God, from Wadi al-Dawasir [in the extreme south] to Jauf al-'Amr [in the extreme north]. As to you Bedouins, listen [carefully]: by God, if [a Bedouin] deprives a *Hadari* of a *mahashsh* [a small scythe], I shall deprive him of his head. Listen to me again, oh Bedouins, do not say that Muhammad ibn Rashid has deceived us, [by God]... I shall raid you [in early morning for] a *mahashsh* you take from a *garrash* [typically a *Hadari* collector of desert grass and wood]; so be quiet and obey me and I shall protect you from all dangers" (Al-Ubayyid, 45).⁷⁴

Unfortunately for the Rashidi House, his successor was long on bravery and short on diplomacy and never followed the example of his able predecessor. Relying on his solid support among the Shammar, he embarked on a policy of confrontation with all surrounding powers (with the exception of the Ottomans). In his relentless military expeditions against his foes, both *Hadar* and Bedouins, he succeeded only in forcing his adversaries to overcome their differences (at least temporarily) and unite against him. The major battle of Sarif, alluded to above, was a watershed in the history of the area. Responding to Rashidi provocations, the *amir* of Kuwait organized a large army composed of many Kuwaiti and Najdi *Hadaris* (including the exiled Sa^udi and Qasimi *amirs*) as well as a number of Bedouin groups. After routing the invaders, ^uAbd al-^uAziz ibn Rashid exacted terrible vengeance, in money and lives, against the defeated forces, further alienating the *Hadar* of the area, especially those of Qasim (al-Bassam 1999, 7: 346). The Rashidi/Shammar hegemony was proving to be too oppressive for the Najdi *Hadar*, thus giving an opening to a resourceful and determined young Sa^udi leader, ^uAbd al-^uAziz ibn Sa^ud, who launched his successful attack to recover Riyadh and expel the Rashidis the following year.

The task facing ibn Sa^ud was daunting. He had to unify the historical Sa^udi power base in ^uArid, deal with Qasim, overcome Rashidi considerable power and somehow confront the perennial Bedouin problem. Since the Wahhabi ^uulama had considerable influence and other local elites enjoyed close relations with the Sa^udis, the recovery of ^uArid was accomplished with relative ease. His conquests of the areas further north and south were more difficult since the local elites either enjoyed running their affairs independently or were allied with the Rashidis, and in this respect, Qasim proved to be the most intractable. With its own elite split, a plurality wished to maintain its own independence (or even be under Ottoman tutelage (Rihani 1954, 149, 151)), with another faction convinced that an alliance with the Rashidis was best in order to protect the region's mercantile interests (Rihani 1954, 151; ^uAbd al-Muhsin, 2: 49). The pro-Sa^udi faction, represented mostly by the Wahhabi ^uulama and to a lesser extent by some of the ^uuqayl, was not strong enough to overcome the opposition immediately. By 1908, and after many broken promises and much treachery, the pro-Sa^udi faction finally gathered enough support to open the gates of Burayda in the middle of the night and admit in Sa^udi forces; Burayda's ambitious *amir* was immediately banished to Iraq (ibn ^uAbd al-Muhsin, 2: 89).

The annexation of Qasim proved to be far easier than the destruction of the Rashidi *amirate*. With a loyal local *Hadar* population in alliance with the equally loyal Shammar Bedouins, the Rashidis were able to offer stiff resistance and the Sa^udis were unable to defeat the dynasty until 1921. With the fall of this dynasty, the Sa^udi model, basing its power on a heterogeneous *Hadari*

coalition, proved its superiority over the tribally-based polity of Ha'il. While the tribal nature of the Rashidi House has been correctly identified by many scholars (e.g., Al-Rasheed 1991, 1992), the critical *Hadari* character of the Sa'udi State has often been overlooked. Al-Rasheed, in describing the essential differences between the two dynasties, characterizes the Sa'udi polity as based on religion (Al-Rasheed 1992, 156)⁷⁵. This is correct of course but it happens to be equally valid for the Rashidis who enjoyed their own authentic Wahhabi qualifications.⁷⁶ The key difference between the Sa'udi and Rashidi houses actually lies in the antithetical nature of their power bases. Relying on the Shammar as the main prop for their realm, the Rashidis offered other Najdis, both *Hadar* and nomads, no choice but to submit to the supremacy of that tribe, which the majority found threatening. The Sa'udi polity, on the other hand, had neither Bedouin nor tribal identity and was open to all social groups on (theoretically) equal footing. It was therefore inevitable that in due course the Sa'udi resurgence would triumph with relative ease.⁷⁷

Defeating the Rashidis, difficult as it was, was a relatively easier challenge for the Sa'udis than finding a solution for the perennial Najdi problem, the nomadic tribes. Used to essentially unfettered freedoms, the Bedouins understandably view *Hadari* conflicts through the prism of their own immediate interests, namely plunder, freedom from payment of *zakat* and the pursuit of *ghazw*. In practical terms, this meant a minimum of ideological loyalty and a readiness to join the winning side and enjoy the spoils of victory. The portrait of the Bedouin given by local historians (and preserved by collective memory) is clearly of a fickle group with no loyalty to anyone or anything except sharing in the loot of campaigns, for which end, if given the opportunity, they would even rob their own allies (Wahba 1956, 10).⁷⁸ During the early Wahhabi battles, the Bedouins appear to have played supporting roles for the *Hadari* forces and few examples are given of the typical Bedouin "treachery." Starting with the Egyptian invasion, Bedouins are frequently encountered in the traditional plundering role. Even the great Sarif defeat is partially attributable to Bedouin flight (ibn 'Aqil 1994, 149, 150, 163).⁷⁹ King 'Abd al-'Aziz, perhaps the foremost expert on Bedouins, would employ Bedouins in *Hadari* campaigns by putting them in front and have the *Hadar* behind them to ensure they do not flee so readily.⁸⁰

Faced with the Bedouin problem, the Wahhabis employed a long-term strategy of proselytization as the best way to curb the violent practices of the nomads.⁸¹ Indeed, as early as the original Wahhabi campaigns, we are able to discern a new trend towards a change in the moral outlook of the Bedouins, starting with the observance of rituals, especially the daily congregational prayers. Muhammad ibn Hadi ibn Qarmalah, the chief of Qahtan (the strongest tribe in Najd at the time) in late 18th/early 19th century, is reported to have had

his own prayer *imam* (ibn Khamis 1987, 3: 287).⁸² The great °Utaybi chief, Turki ibn Humayd (d. 1280/1863-64) had a manumitted *Hadari* slave as his *imam* who was always in his company (Al-°Ubayyid, 265); his elegant poetry is a testimony to a surprisingly refined religious sensibility.⁸³ With this emerging religiosity, the transition towards delegitimation of raiding and *khuwa* becomes considerably less difficult. In fact, by the end of the 19th century, we find the chief of the Shayabin clan of °Utayba, Haththal ibn Fuhayd, not only retaining his own *imam* (at one time, none other than Al-°Ubayyid) and ensuring that all those around him observed prayer (and were punished if they failed to), but he would boast that he would never raid a *Hadari*; he confined his *ghazw* to Bedouins like himself.⁸⁴ He also returned 4,000 riyals (Maria Theresa thalers), a huge sum by the standards of the time, that were taken from a Mutayri Bedouin once its *Hadari* owners (the famous Bassams of °Unayza) were conclusively identified (Al-°Ubayyid, 123-4). This (new) moral vulnerability led him in one instance to accept the "brotherhood in Islam" as sufficient ground to return the donkey of a *Hadari* lifted by his tribesmen though by the customs of the desert he was under no obligation to do so (Al-°Ubayyid, 123).⁸⁵

The Ikhwan movement should, therefore, be viewed as the logical culmination of a long, if unsystematic, process of *Hadari* proselytism that had its natural conclusion in the attempt to settle the nomads and fully induct them into the *Hadari*'s moral outlook, that of Wahhabism.⁸⁶ The earliest reports we have of the *systematic* attempt to transform the nomads into reliable and peaceful *Hadar* concerns a Harbi Bedouin, ibn Fa'iz, at the head of a group of the B. °Ali clan, who chose Artawiyya as the first *hijra* (Al-°Ubayyid, 178), a settlement that later became an important center of Ikhwan activity after the whole-sale settlement of Mutayr there and elsewhere. By the 1920s, a large number of *hijar* (pl. of *hijra*) of varying tribes, size and importance had proliferated in Najd. Through these *hijar* and its Ikhwan, the Bedouins would play a stronger role in Sa°udi affairs than had hitherto been the case.⁸⁷ By the time of attack on Ha'il, we see Ikhwan contingents fully participating in the Sa°udi conquest of the town and the overthrow of the Rashidi dynasty. The Ikhwan's role was to become more pronounced during the campaigns against the Sharifis of Hijaz⁸⁸ where their fierce reputation preceded them and may have been a major cause of their easy victories. After the annexation of Hijaz in 1926, most of the territorial expansion of the Sa°udi state had been accomplished and the Ikhwan, not surprisingly, became the next front facing the *Hadari* State.

Local history (or at least what is accessible of it) is not very helpful in allowing us to determine the exact role played by the *Hadari* preachers, the *matawi°a*, who more than anyone else were responsible for this systematic transformation in Bedouin beliefs and life style; they were later to be accused of being behind their excesses.⁸⁹ For the Ikhwan quickly metamorphosed into a

danger much worse than that of the early Bedouins, as this time it was armed with a righteousness that deprived it of its former sporting quality and traditional restraint, turning it into a deadly affair.⁹⁰ The new moral certainty inculcated into much of the Ikhwan provided them with a justification to commit horrible massacres and to terrorize the rest of the population, both *Hadar* and Bedouin. To the extent that Moore's equation between monotheistic belief and bloody fanaticism is correct (Moore, 2000), the Ikhwan provide an excellent case in point. To this day, their antics are told and retold. Al-^oUbayyid, who experienced their tyranny first hand, writes (in the 1950s) about the Ikhwan with palpable horror and a good dose of contempt, not least because much of the Ikhwan religious views had simply no valid religious or legal basis; to him (and to much of the *Hadar*) they were ignoramuses masquerading as guardians of Islamic morality.⁹¹ The Ikhwan settlement, accordingly, has simply transformed the Bedouin menace to a more lethal form. While in the past a Bedouin expressed no interest in *Hadar*'s morality and confined his attention to looting, now a member of the Ikhwan was dangerously obsessed with *both*.⁹² Formerly, the Bedouin would rob and avoid murder; now he feels obligated to do both with frightening moral certitude.⁹³

Following the conquest of Ha'il, and after much friction and conflict between the Sa^oudis and the Sharifis, the Ikhwan were given the green light to attack and conquer Hijaz. They accomplished the first task, the fall of Ta'if, with maximum surprise and some losses in civilian lives.⁹⁴ The news of the Ikhwan's conduct in Ta'if preceded them and had the effect of delivering Mecca without a fight. Jidda was to succumb only after a long siege. The defenders of Medina, apparently fearful of the Ikhwan's lack of discipline, insisted that their surrender be made to one of the King's sons, for which task Muhammad ibn ^oAbd al-^oAziz was dispatched, and the famous Ikhwan chief of Mutayr, Faysal al-Duwish, was instructed to leave the area. This deprivation of glory was to add to his already considerable pique.

In the next few years, 1926-1929, this great Bedouin chief, along with the chiefs of the Barqa clan of ^oUtayba and the ^oIjamn and a number of lesser sections of other tribes, entered into more or less open conflict with the Riyadh government.⁹⁵ Now that conquests and spoils of war were no longer available, the chiefs and some of their tribesmen were practically disoriented. Settled after disposing of their livestock, spending much time in religious "learning" and having no productive pursuits, they really knew nothing except how to fight and enrich themselves in the process. If raiding is banned against local Bedouins because all had become *zakat*-paying Muslims,⁹⁶ and if war against outsider infidels are prohibited by the encroachment of modern borders and international treaties, they are simply going to be reduced to second rate *Hadar*, unable to compete with them in most economic pursuits. The battle lines were being

drawn in technical legal and theological terms, reflecting at their core much of the Bedouins sense of loss and a crumbling social and economic order.⁹⁷

And the signs of an impending crisis abound much earlier. Ibn Sihman's tracts (1340a; b) are both published in 1340/1921 in Egypt at ibn Sa'ud's own expense (and rank as one of the earliest publications of the Sa'udis), and at least the first was written in 1335/1916-17 (ibn Sihman 1340a, 63). In these polemics, as well as in the *fatwas* issued by the *'ulama* (e.g., Rihani 1954, 433; 'Abd al-Muhsin, 2: 259-60), a number of questions are discussed, all betraying an unusual degree of fanaticism and exclusivism, even by Wahhabi standards. The Ikhwan held to certain beliefs that the *'ulama*, including ibn Sihman, found no support for in the *shari'ca*. The Ikhwan's attitude towards other nomads was chief among them, for they accuse anyone not settling and making the *hijra*, to be a non-Muslim; even a Bedouin of the Ikhwan who went to areas of better pasturage with the intention of returning was so accused.⁹⁸ They wished to practice *hajr*, a sort of social boycott, for the slightest imperfection, and would use force to bring those not conforming to their ideal to correct their ways. For all their odd and problematic perspective, however, nothing seems to match their position on the wearing of *'imama*,⁹⁹ for the Ikhwan held that not to wear such an item and wear the *'iqal* would render one suspect of unbelief (ibn Sihman, 1340b, 72).¹⁰⁰

There is very little in the *shari'ca* about a proper Muslim vestimentary code.¹⁰¹ In certain chapters in legal treatises, e.g., prayer, one can find reference to the required cover for the body, and occasionally certain material is prohibited (e.g., pure silk for men), and there is a general command not to emulate the unbelievers. Besides these standard references, the *shari'ca* regards dress as a matter governed by custom and not an issue of worship.¹⁰² There is no ground to believe that a Muslim needed to use a specific "sign" in his clothing and actually "standing out" is something the jurists would frown upon as a sign of immodesty. It is true that the Prophet wore the *'imama*, but so did the pagans of his time. Moreover, to the extent that the Ikhwan were trying to follow the *sunna*, the Prophet's example, they were wearing the wrong *'imama*, for the Prophet's was worn over a *qulunsuwa* (a head cap) and covered most of the head, came under the chin (*muhannaka*), and its end was left dangling on the back. The Ikhwan's *'imama* had none of these qualities, which is certainly permissible, according to the *'ulama*, but hardly amounts to emulation of the Prophet let alone be a basis of belief and unbelief.¹⁰³ *Fatwas* and polemics apparently did not put an end to the matter as it would surface again until the final defeat of the Ikhwan.

The Ikhwan's alienation under the new order was becoming evident. Even during the conquest of Hijaz, signs of discontent were conspicuous. As related by Al-°Ubayyid (p. 233) on the authority of Al-Duwish's *imam*, ibn Sa°ud had instructed the chief to go to Yanbu° to support the troops besieging the town, but midway decided to go to Medina to make up for the missed opportunity in Ta'if where he did not participate. After he was dispatched away from Medina, his opposition to the Riyadh government took a more threatening tone. Nor was he alone, for both the chief of °Utayba, Sultan ibn Bijad, and the chief of °Ijman, Daydan ibn Hithlayn, were of similar opinion. In contrast with the other two, the °Utaybi chief was believed to have been inspired by a deep, albeit misguided, sense of religiosity. The ostensible causes for the escalating conflict were discussed in a public assembly (with 800 persons in attendance) that ibn Sa°ud gathered in Riyadh in 1346/1928. Not surprisingly, none of the three leaders attended. The matters discussed indicate a shift in the struggle for supremacy in Arabia; with the other nomads characterized as Muslims and *Hadar* out of reach, the Ikhwan had to look for other ground to pursue their objectives. As discussed in the assembly and as contained in the various contemporaneous *fatwas*, the Ikhwan now wanted to ban the use of the telegraph on the theory that it was forbidden magic.¹⁰⁴ They were also finding objectionable ibn Sa°ud's inability to stop the British infidels from erecting fortifications on the Iraqi borders and his willingness to enter into friendly relations with them; they wanted permission to wage *jihad* against the Iraqi tribes and government (ibn °Abd al-Muhsin, 3: 178, 186).¹⁰⁵ With respect to British actions on the Iraqi borders, the consensus of the gathering was that they were provocative and considered the fortifications legitimate targets of attack, but acknowledged that, in matters of war, it was only the imam (*i.e.*, ibn Sa°ud) who had the exclusive authority to declare it.¹⁰⁶ This assembly, in retrospect, was a last-ditch attempt to persuade the Ikhwan to stop their challenge to the government without resort to force, but it was not successful. By outlawing raiding of other Sa°udi-controlled Bedouins and forbidding *jihad* against the non-Muslim Iraqi government and tribes, the Ikhwan were asked to live in peace and enjoy the (probably meager) fruits of settled life and forgo their age-old occupation, constant war. And that they were not going to do without a fight.

The Ikhwan did not spend their time idly. Their forces partook in raids and counter raids against the northern tribes and had their deadly encounters with British air power.¹⁰⁷ They also extended their wrath against "infidel" *Hadar*, especially those who happen to be in possession of potential loot (ibn Khamis 1987, 7: 268; Wahaba 1956, 294)). The old restraint was of course gone; when the Ikhwan raided Sa°udi Shammar, they found some men from Qasim whom they executed by smashing their heads with axes (Al-°Ubayyid, 239).¹⁰⁸ They organized a meeting near Qasim to invade °Unayza but their plans were pre-maturely leaked and thwarted (Al-°Ubayyid 235). The leaders'

ambitions took a new turn with a meeting they held in Artawiyya; according to Al-[°]Ubayyid, the major shaykhs made a pact, once the *Hadari* government was defeated, to divide Sa[°]udi-controlled territory among themselves (p. 234).¹⁰⁹

On several occasions, Ibn Sa[°]ud dispatched a number of respected [°]*ulama* to dissuade the rebels, but they found themselves accused of complacency in return for material gains.¹¹⁰ By March 1929, all attempts at peaceful containment of the Ikwan's rebellion came to naught and the competing camps organized for battle. The two armies met on the plains of Sabala in that month. On Ibn Sa[°]ud's side were all the major *Hadari* forces and the loyal Ikhwan¹¹¹; the rebels were mostly Mutayr and [°]Utayba. Ostensibly making a last-minute bid to avoid bloodshed, Al-Duwish visited the Sa[°]udi camp for negotiations, which led nowhere.¹¹² And again, the Bedouins, Ikhwan or otherwise, were no match for a determined *Hadari* army and the battle that ensued was short and dealt the rebels a convincing defeat. None of the leaders was killed though; Ibn Bijad, the [°]Utaybi chief, surrendered shortly afterward, was jailed until his death, and his *hijra* was emptied and razed to the ground. Al-Duwish, on the other hand, returned to his ways and engaged the government in skirmishes¹¹³ that ultimately forced him to take refuge with the main infidel force in the area, the British authorities in Iraq and Kuwait, all compunction about treating with unbelievers gone. He was turned over to Ibn Sa[°]ud and thrown in jail until his death also.¹¹⁴

By the 1930s, the defeat of the Bedouins was probably inevitable. The telltale signs of the impending change in the balance of power between the Bedouins and *Hadari* control had already been witnessed in Iraq with the introduction of modern technology (Williamson 1975). In Najd, the Wahhabi ideological subversion of the nomads had been at work for close to two centuries; with the addition of modern technological innovations—the telegraph, the automobile, heavy weaponry—the odds against continued Bedouin independence became insurmountable. Henceforth, the Bedouins would unquestionably submit to *Hadari* authority, give up *ghazw*, *talio* and any kind of self-help, exclusive control over pasturages, submit to the *shari^ca* and abandon anything “Bedouin” or “tribal” that may be in conflict with the new triumphant order, *Pax Hadarica*.¹¹⁵

The Sa[°]udi state, for more than two hundred years, was never a friendly place for the nomads and its only restraint in confronting the Bedouin tribes had been the practical limits on its power. While on occasion a Bedouin would be employed as military leader, no man of nomadic background would ever be entrusted with a significant function of the government. Administration of government would be exclusively vested in the *Hadari* community; all regional and town governors were of *Hadari* origin, as were the judges. Even to this day

in the military, no Bedouin has been appointed as chief of staff.¹¹⁶ Moreover, in the bastion of tribal and nomadic privilege, the National Guard, the erstwhile *asil* Bedouins have to share political and social space as well as resources with the non-*asil*, both *Hadar* and nomads, who maintain their own brigades. Not only would the Bedouins be excluded from much of the apparatus of the modern state, but even their traditional nomadic *hima*, the exclusive dominion a tribe enjoyed over its *dira*, would also be abolished (Hajra, 23-4)¹¹⁷ while that of the *Hadari* villages and towns preserved.¹¹⁸

With such unqualified antipathy characterizing the Sa^cudi state from its early history until the present, it is naturally surprising to see the Bedouins and the tribes accorded the prominent position they enjoy in much of the literature on the Sa^cudi state. But it is perhaps understandable; after all, the Bedouin cuts an impressive image. For the western travelers (who probably set the tone for subsequent scholarship), the appeal of the Bedouin was irresistible.¹¹⁹ He had very little in common with the hated Turk, he was humanist in the richest sense, not prone to religious prejudice, and willing to judge a man by his own qualities.¹²⁰ The Najdi *Hadar*, in contrast, possessed none of these qualities, and were simply a more uncouth version of the Levantines made all the more unsympathetic by the excessive Wahhabi xenophobia. The Bedouins were equally impressive for other Arab and Muslim observers, but in a negative way, for they represented a perennial threat. Their frequent forays into the Levant were a menace to the inhabitants. The regularity of their pillaging of the pilgrimage caravans was both a memory and a living reality to most who would write about them.¹²¹ For Arab writers, there were no redeeming qualities in the nomads, and Najd to them was nothing more than an incubator of Bedouins and the *Hadar* hardly registered.¹²² Whatever the reasons, the (reductionist?) pre-occupation with the Bedouin and the tribe results in a serious misunderstanding of the Sa^cudi state. The *Hadar*, unromantic and non-menacing as they may be, should be recognized for their role and the accomplishments they have made for a better understanding of the Sa^cudi state, then and now.

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NOTES

¹ For his biography, see Al-Bassam (1419, 2: 399-412).

² Ibn [°]Aqil (1994, 75) suggests there is a third printed book, *al-jawab al-fariq bayn al-[°]imama w'l[°]as'ib*, which I have been unable to locate.

³ See, for example, ibn Qasim (1994-99, 4: 258; Wahba 1956, 292).

⁴ The theme is so pervasive as to hardly require documentation, but here are some examples anyway. Kostiner (1990; 1993; 1995) analysis is thoroughly tribe- and Bedouin-centric. "[T]he key to political power in Saudi Arabia is the tribal structure" where the royal family is the "dominant tribe" (Duguid 1970, 199). King [°]Abd al-[°]Aziz was an "obscure tribal chief"; Arabian society "tribal in structure"; a handful of King [°]Abd al-[°]Aziz's cousins, the [°]Ara'if, are elevated to the status of full tribe; (Troeller 1976, xz and 102, xzii, 38); "one modelizes a tribal population" (Cook 1989, 661); tribal [°]asabiya is the linchpin of Wahhabite ideology (AzmeH 1996, 105); the same author describes how the state is a "tribal polity" (p. 111) and throughout imputes a strength to the Saudi "clan" that is quite impressive if ahistorical; AzmeH in part bases his analysis on Sharara (1981) whose ideas are centered on "clans"; Peterson lumps the Sa[°]udi polity with "tribal states" (1991, 1437) where the state "evolved out of tribal leadership" (p. 1441) only to puzzle later over the success of a "minor family" (ibid.) and further finds King [°]Abd al-[°]Aziz "heavily dependent on the Ikhwan" (ibid.); Glubb finds [°]Abd al-[°]Aziz a "Bedouin" (1988, 161); Harik, in his typology of Arab states, finds Saudi Arabia a good example of a polity in which "authority is vested in a tribal chief" (1987, 24); Salame, imposing the Khaldunian model, finds the success of Wahhabism (and the Saudi state) the result of Wahhabis' attachment to "a strong tribal [°]asabiyya, that of the Sa[°]ud family" (1987, 213). Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, practically no author names this impressive tribe of which Al Sa[°]ud are the presumed chiefs. For more on the same theme, see Cole and Altorki (1992).

⁵ In the following pages, all factors and processes suggested as contributing to the emergence of the Sa[°]udi state are endogenous. This by no means implies that there were no exogenous elements; but our knowledge is so far insufficient to support more than speculations. Be that as it may, the rise of the state came on the heel of interesting changes internationally and regionally. Perhaps the presence of the Portuguese in the Gulf could have altered trade and

caravan patterns. The same may be said for the rise of *Shi'ism* in Safavid Iran and the later fall of the dynasty; one wonders about that conversion from *Sunnism* and its effects on pilgrimage routes which used to go through Ahsa and Najd. In addition, the 1720s and 1730s witnessed intensive conflict between Iran and the Ottomans centered around Iraq which may have disrupted certain trade patterns.

⁶ Najd here is defined as the areas bordered from the south by the empty quarter, the east by the Dahna sand belt, the north by the Nafud and the west by the Hijaz mountains. Geographically, it is divided into two parts, the western, [°]Alyat (Upper) and eastern, Safilat (Lower) Najd. [°]Alyat Najd geomorphology and soil conditions make it ideal as pasture for nomads when rain falls, but its water resources are limited and only few permanent settlements could survive. Conversely, the younger geological sedimentary formations of Safilat Najd with their extensive wadi systems, superior soil, and relatively abundant groundwater is where the *Hadar* are concentrated. For a competent summary of the geography and ecology of the area, see Al-Juhany (1983, 44-71).

⁷ *Hadari* society is composed of two distinct groups, the *asil* families who are of “pure” Arabian descent and the non-*asil*, or Khadiri community (see below). The fact that the *asil* groups maintain genealogies should not be confused with a tribal structure similar to the Bedouins’. The loss of tribal organization is further exacerbated by the fact that most towns were of mixed population (not even counting the Khadiris who are often ignored) and regions are even more mixed in terms of genealogies so that no contiguity is maintained to allow the rudiments of a tribal organization to exist in any given territory. Many tribes from which the *Hadar* claim descent were either no longer extant or have migrated to the Levant and the surrounding tribes usually had no genealogical connections with much of the *Hadari* core areas. The great Tamimi groups are so dispersed throughout Najd as to render any *tribal* structure or control meaningless (they spread from Ha’il in the north all the way down to Hawtat Bani Tamim in the south). The same could be said about the other Wa’ili groups who are just as widely spread. For the latter and their dispersion, see Al-Bassam (99-102). The story in many respects is not plausible (Al-Jasir, 2:922; *Al-[°]Arab* 31(3,4): p. 280 (1996)), especially the claim of using firearms before their invention. The Wa’il groups (to which the Sa[°]udi family belongs) are said to be of [°]Anazi descent, which is also problematic (Al-Jasir, 2: 921-24; ibn Jurays 1999, 31). In addition to Wa’il, many of the old Najdi families would seem to trace their genealogies to older (and extinct) groups such as the [°]Uraynat who are Subay[°]i by *hilm* and reckoned to come from the ancient Rabab (*Al-[°]Arab* 29(7,8): p. 548, 552 (1994)). The Bani Zayd of ancient Quda[°]a populate Shaqra and other parts of Washm as well as upper Najd and [°]Ird and are now identified with the generic Qahtan label. Study of complex genealogies has been enjoying a resurgence for the last 20 years. The best sources for an appreciation of the difficulties facing Najdi *Hadar* and how meaningless the tribal identification to them had become is Al-Jasir’s *Jamhart* as well as the issues of the journal he edited, *al-[°]Arab*, over the last 20 years or so. Another source, although a biographical dictionary of Najdi [°]ulama, Al-Bassam (1419), is extremely rich with genealogical information (as a rule, if the author fails to mention a tribal background, the person is of Khadiri origin). Cole and Altorki (1992) are useful in discussing the Khadiri groups; Al-[°]Ubayyid (382-6) discusses the tribal background of the inhabitants of his native town, [°]Unayza, and suggests that the Khadiris (he calls them *mawali*) are “equivalent” to the “Arabs,” presumably in numbers.

⁸ The process of detribalization may have begun as early as the 7th century (Eickelman 1967, 28).

⁹ Al-Jasir (1386) is a short history of the region from earliest times down to the 20th century.

¹⁰ In this example, Tuwaym, a village in Sudayr, had four different chiefs assassinated in 1120, and the solution to the problem was to divide the town into *four* independent quarters (ibid.). Muqbil al-Dhukayr (d.1363/1944), a foremost expert on Najdi history, concludes telling the episode: “this is a microcosm of the prevalent conditions in Najd.” ‘Ushayqir had two independent quarters (Al-Bassam 106; *Al-^cArab* 25(5,6): p. 402 (1990)).

¹¹ The chronicles are rich in such news. One efficient way to appreciate the excessive instability within these towns and among them is to read the “*sawabiq*” section appended to Ibn Bishr’s chronicle (1982, 2: 295-377) which covers the pre-Wahhabi period. Cook (1989) offers a good picture of such politics in the Washm area, although his description of it as “tribal” misses the point, and if Qasab and Hurayyiq, which he excludes, are taken into account, the picture would be even bleaker. Sawayan (2000) touched on the politics of Sudayr settlements (p.403-96).

¹² Hamad Al-Jasir, *Al-^cArab* 24(1,2): 62 (1989); 25(7,8): 551 (1990).

¹³ The ecology of Najd is the most likely explanation of this phenomenon. A version of the biblical “seven-year” cycle has been documented (e.g., Al-Juhany 1983, 108-14; Al-Barrak and Hussain 1983). It seems that the nomads are the most vulnerable to droughts followed by the northern Hadari areas that depend on superficial (non-aquifer) groundwater for irrigation, especially Sudayr. Both communities regularly migrate in response to droughts, the Bedouins to the Levant and the *Hadar* to Iraq and Ahsa.

¹⁴ Dominant tribes in early Islamic centuries (e.g., Asad, Bakr, Bahila) became weaker, merged into stronger groups or disappeared altogether. This process continued throughout the following centuries. By the 7th/13th century Lam was formed by the grouping of Tay and other clans and vying for supremacy in Najd with the other newly formed tribal federation, al-Dafir. By the 10th/16th century, other tribes appeared including ^cAnaza which took over the pasture lands of upper Najd from al-Dafir. Perhaps due to climactic conditions, sections of ^cAnaza and Shammar pushed northward into the Levant in the middle of the 17th century relieving the pressure on Dafir, which reasserted its dominance over Najd (Al-Juhany 1983, 116). A century later Mutayr ascended and became the most powerful group. Qahtan and Dawasir appeared on the scene during the 16th century. By the 19th century, Qahtan had become the dominant tribe. New tribes still appeared in the 19th century: ^cUtayba displaced Qahtan in Upper Najd and ^cIjman and Al Murrah pushed further eastward and displaced the B. Khalid. For much of this tribal history, Al-Juhany is very useful for the pre-Wahhabi period (1983, 104-29); for ^cUtayba, see Al-^cUbayyid (315 and *passim*) and ibn ^cAqil (1982-86, *passim*); for ^cIjman, see ibn ^cAqil (1983c).

¹⁵ See a discussion of this custom in ibn ^cAqil (1982-6, 1:123).

¹⁶ Many of the well-known leading families and clans of the famous Arabian Bedouin tribes are acknowledged to have come from other tribes. The Al Humayd, chiefs of the Barqa section of ^cUtayba, are reckoned to be from the Buqum; Duwish, the paramount chiefs of Mutayr, from Shahrān; the Dhuwaybi chiefs of Harb from ^cUtayba (Al-^cUbayyid, 262, 317-18, 321); the Jarba chiefs of the Jazira Shammar are proud of their Sharifi descent and are considered fully Shammaris (ibn ^cAqil, 1983b, 210); the Sa^cdun of the Muntafiq in Iraq and the Tayyar family of ^cAnaza are of Hashimi origins.

¹⁷ There exists a tendency within *Hadari* society to identify with the dominant tribe that is closest in kin to them. But unlike the Bedouins, this process is less supple and rather meaningless since the *Hadar* are not participants in the life of the nomads and no benefit seems to accrue from such identification. Tribalism within *Hadari* society appears to mean nothing more than a recordation of genealogies as attested by the nasty disputes among the same lineages within each settlement.

¹⁸ Rosenfeld (1951, 9) uses the term “caste” to designate this inferior position; within Arabian social structure this term is probably an exaggeration.

¹⁹ The non-*asil* tribes are collectively dubbed “Hutaym,” a designation that is rejected by many of its constituent groups. A typical classification would include Shararat, °Awazim, B. Rashid, Huwaytat, and B. °Atiyya (Al-°Ubayyid, 372). Of even lower status is the Salab.

²⁰ In early 20th century, the non-*asil* Huwaitat, who had to pay tribute in the 19th century to the Shararat, another non-*asil* tribe (Musil 1928, 8; Rosenfeld 1951, 45), were essentially rehabilitated to a full *asil* status in recognition of their ascendant military prowess (Al-°Ubayyid, 376). Note that the non-*asil* tribes are not equally non-*asil* in their own eyes; many would not intermarry with other, more inferior ones. Some are genuinely residual groupings, like the designation Hutaym, which tends to be an agglomeration by outsiders and not necessarily accepted by the presumed members. The B. Rashid, for example, trace their origins to ancient Arabian tribes and were on the ascendance when the modern Sa°udi state was consolidated in the 1930s. Prof. Sowan, who follows tribal events in conjunction with his interest in *nabati* poetry, told me in a private conversation that he was of the opinion that, if it had not been for the advent of state, that tribe would have achieved full *asil* status in the 20th century.

²¹ This is a large part of Najdi society, perhaps as much as a quarter of the population. It is not a “tribe” *per se* but a residual category in which any person with problematic (or no) genealogy would be classified. Ibn Khamis (1987, 4: 86) suggests that the name is a holdover from the B. °I-°Ukhaydir era when the dynasty attempted to stamp out tribalism in reaction to which some people had to abandon or hide their tribal identity. It is more likely that this term has an ethnic basis and is an expression of darker complexion. In northern parts of Najd, the term is not used and replaced by derogatory epithets, such as *sunna°* (craftsmen) or °*abid*, *i.e.*, slaves.

²² In *Hadari* society, Khadiris did not pay any special tribute to the *asil* groups and had wide latitude in terms of occupations; indeed *all* occupations were open to them and it was only the *asil* ones who had restrictions. Only becoming chiefs of settlements seems to have eluded them. The only instance I can find is the assumption of power by a slave of the chief of Riyadh when his master died leaving minor children; he was expelled and the famous Diham ibn Dawas, the most energetic enemy of Wahhabism of his time, took over in 1151/1738-39 AH (Al-Bassam, 106). The only other instance is the frequent assumption of the amir/shaykh status by members of the non-*asil* Al Zuhayr family in Al-Zubayr in southern Iraq. The town was, for all practical purposes, a natural extension of the Najdi social order (Raunkiaer 1969, 25). Even factions there were identified by their original Najdi *towns* and not by tribe or genealogy (ibn °Aqil 1997b; Al-Bassam 1999, 9:109, 111-12). It is only after the advent of Wahhabism that we see the Khadiris assume prominent political and military positions. One of the earliest is the appointment of Ali Al-Urasysi as *amir* of the town of Raghaba (*Al-°Arab* 29(7,8): p. 550 (1994)).

²³ Though I am unaware of any scholarly treatment of the subject, it seems that in the extreme north and south, in Jabal Shammar and W. al-Dawasir, there are no discernible differences in the dialects of the *Hadari* and Bedouin populations.

²⁴ In addition, the *Hadaris* peculiarly use their respective *nakhwas* as means of identification during the pilgrimage to Mecca.

²⁵ Regrettably, I am unaware of any studies of either, therefore, the comments made should be considered tentative.

²⁶ The richest collection of *nakhwas*, though still limited, is found in Ibn Khamis (1980) under several town entries.

²⁷ This is also the *nakhwa*, used by the Wahhabis in general. It is not clear whether it pre-dates the movement.

²⁸ Al-^oAwni's famous poem urging the Qasimi ^o*uqayl* to come to the rescue of their homeland after the battle of Sarif (see below) invokes the term frequently (Al-Bassam 1999, 7: 356-8; Sawayan 1985, 82-3)

²⁹ Like many *nakhwas*, its provenance is uncertain. There is an area by the name Juraysi in the town of Baq^oa (near Ha'il) from which the original settlers in Zilfi came (Al-Fahd 2000, 56). A family of the clan was called by that name also but no longer extant (p. 108); the only family now existing with the name is Khadiri.

³⁰ Another related matter is the *bayraq*, or war standard, where each town or region would march to battle under its own standard. It is not clear whether such regional *bayraqs* were generic or employed distinctive designs for each area.

³¹ We are addressing here the most significant of *wasms*, that is, of camels. Other animals, such as sheep and goats, are also branded but the identification tends to refer to smaller families and not larger units. There are tens, if not hundreds, of *wasms* which differ in their shapes and their locations on the animal.

³² There is a quaint story circulating in the area about the origin of this *shahid*. It is said that the shaykhs of the Dafir tribe, the Al Suwayt, were forced to take refuge in ^oAlaqah in northern Zilfi and in gratitude to the *Hadari* assistance suggested that they add this *shahid* to their *wasm* so that Dafiri raiders would be able to recognize their camels and refrain from stealing them (Al-Fahd 2000, 197).

³³ Another indicator of weakened tribal sentiment is the disappearance among the *Hadar* of the Bedouin practice of *tahyir* through which a first cousin would have a claim to marry his first cousin and a right to block her marriage to anyone else. Although difficult to document, it appears also that *Hadar* are much more exogamous than the nomads. Finally, the *Hadar* long ago lost the habit of maintaining their tribal identity as part of their names, and only Bedouins did (and still do) maintain this custom.

³⁴ The centrality of *ghazw* to Bedouin life is nicely captured in following, well-known anecdote. When Farhan (d. 1890), the great chief of the Jarba Shammar of Iraq, noticed the impressive physique of some Iraqi villagers, the following exchange took place:

Farhan: Do you practice *ghazw*?

Villagers: We do not know how.

Farhan: Why not raid those shittier than (*atga^o*) you!

(ibn ^oAqil 1983b, 194)

³⁵ Al-Bassam records not fewer than forty *manakhs* between the beginning of his chronicle (850 AH) and the rise of Wahhabism and fewer than ten afterward. Ibn ^oAqil has a long section on the last of the *manakh*-type conflicts in upper Najd during the ascendancy of ^oUtayba in the late 19th century written by a contemporary (1982-6, 139-70).

³⁶ Or *akhawa*, both words connoting brotherhood/companionship.

³⁷ A striking (and maybe understandable) feature of Najdi chronicles is their (almost) total silence on the issue of *khuwa* paid by the Najdi towns to the Bedouins (Al-Juhany 1983, 270). It is of course possible that some towns, especially the larger ones, could resist payment but most did not have enough power to avoid it. The best documentation is available in writings about the nomads of northern Arabia, Iraq and Syria, mostly by foreign travelers (Rosenfeld 1951, 25; Guarmani 1938, 17; Burckhardt 1968, 3, 10, 193; Musil 1928, 126, 257, 263); Tayma for a time was under Rashidi rule and simultaneously paying *khuwa* to the Bili tribe (Al-^oUthaymin 1991, 258). For the tributes paid by the interior towns of Najd, the evidence is mostly through *nabati* poetry, anecdotes and the fleeting written reference (ibn ^oAqil 1982-6,

150-1). Some examples are given by Al-[°]Ubayyid. [°]Utayba apparently collected *khuwa* from several towns in upper Najd like Nifi (p.67) and Dirriya (p. 315). He twice mentions a poetic exchange (p. 67 and 282) between a Bedouin [°]Utaybi and his *Hadari* counterpart (the famous ibn Subayyil [d. 1352/1933-34]) from the town of Nifi. The former taunts the *Hadari* by his association with the cow (never possessed by Bedouins) and instructs him to pay up the *akhawa*. Ibn Subayyil retorts that he is simply giving him a bone like to a dog so that he would keep barking and protect the town. There is an edited version of a letter given by an [°]Utaybi to Shaqra, a town in Washm, in which he renounces any claims to *akhawa* or *rafiq* rights (Al-Bassam 1999, 2: 236). During Ottoman rule in Ahsa, the [°]Ijman apparently collected *khuwa* (ibn [°]Aqil 1983, 160). The [°]ulama found that payment of *khuwa* that is done by “some towns to the Bedouins” to “avoid their evil” to be permissible (ibn Qasim 1994-99, 9: 337).

³⁸ The fears and worries (and costs) associated with desert travel as late as early 20th century are richly captured by a Danish traveler (Raunkiaer 1969).

³⁹ It is noticeable that on the periphery of Najd, the *Hadar* of several towns come from the same Bedouin tribe in whose *dira* the towns are located. In addition to Jabal Shammar, Khurma in eastern Hijaz is heavily identifiable with Subai[°] (though more than half of the population were reckoned at one time to be non-*asil* (Rihani 1954, 250)); some distance to the north, Turaba is considered a Buqum town; in the southtowns of Wadi al-Dawasir are inhabited mainly by same groups as the Dawasir Bedouins.

⁴⁰For Wahhabism as a *Hadari* ideology, see Al-Hamad (1986). What is meant by Hanbalism here is not the legal school (*madhhab*) but the creed of *ahl al-hadith*, whose champions were the Hanbalis, but was widely held by members of other schools which had been developed in Muslim urban centers. In its intellectual genealogies, there is certainly nothing Bedouin about Wahhabism, but Musil (1928, 257) characterizes it as a religion of the nomads anyway.

⁴¹ The Shaykh’s writings are full of references to the Bedouins and their tribes, whom he held to be pure *kafirs* as they would not even believe in resurrection and many basic Islamic tenets (ibn Qasim 1994-99, 8: 117-9; 9: 385-95; ibn Sihman 1340b, 4-5).

⁴² Apparently, [°]Arid is more resistant to the periodic droughts that afflict Najd since some of its water is obtained through springs ([°]*uyun*) that tap into ancient fossil aquifers (as old as 20,000 years (Thacher *et al*, 1965)) making extensive *Hadari* settlements possible. The area is also less hospitable to pastoral nomadism and fewer Bedouin tribes make it home. The population balance is therefore most likely to be to the advantage of the *Hadar*. It should be noted also that in the 1136/1723-4 Najd suffered probably its worst drought in recorded history (named *sihhi*); the Bedouins of Najd and the northern *Hadari* areas, which depend on non-aquifer waters, were more afflicted (*i.e.*, [°]Attar in Sudayr was left with only four men and four water wells) (Al-Bassam, 98), which would leave the demographic balance in favor of the southern *Hadar* vis-à-vis both other *Hadar* and nomads. Assertions that Najdi nomads are superior in numbers to *Hadar* (Al-Juhany 1983, 130; Kostiner 1990, 226) are potentially misleading. Firstly, they are at best conjectures, and secondly, distribution of nomads and *Hadar* is not even throughout Najd and varies according to climactic conditions.

⁴³ Ibn Humayd must have also feared the reformer’s views on the legitimacy of taxes he was collecting (ibn Ghannam 1949, 2: 3).

⁴⁴ The circumstances of his becoming chief of the town are bloody and his position was not very secure which may have contributed to his support of the Shaykh (Al-Juhany 1983, 189).

⁴⁵ The Shaykh is reported by ibn Bishr (1: 42) to explain to the Sa[°]udi ruler the power of the idea of *tawhid* and that those who champion it “shall rule over people and land” and that he hopes that the ruler would unify the Muslims and be their imam and his sons afterward. When

ibn Sa'ud asked for exemption to continue collecting the extra-*shar'ī* taxes, the Shaykh declined to accept and it had to be abandoned. The conspicuous political nature of Wahhabism is further attested by Al-Dhukayr when he explains the tough resistance (27 years) by the Riyadh chief, Diham ibn Dawwas, as well as other local Najdi chiefs, to have been based on their political fears and not necessarily a rejection of revivalist Islam *per se* (Al-Bassam 1999, 7: 112-3).

⁴⁶This may be explained in part by a number of factors. One is genealogical and in that both B. Hanifa and 'Anaza are considered by some to share a common ancestor, Wa'il. The other is the historical coincidence of the rise of the Sa'udi family at the same time when 'Anaza was the hegemonic tribe in Najd (ibn Khamis 1987, 4: 29). King 'Abd al-'Aziz, moreover, found it useful to claim this affinity to further his territorial gains, especially in his negotiations with the British (Rihani 1954, 308-9, 311). Finally, it is not unusual for weaker groups to identify (or be identified) with more successful ones, as commonly observed in many Najdi families, both Bedouin and *Hadari*. This, for example, is the case with the other ascendant *Hadari* families at the time, the 'Utub of Kuwait and Bahrayn (Al Sabah and Al Khalifa) who are also described as 'Anazi. For a full discussion of these controversies, see ibn 'Aqil's introduction to Jurays (1999, 11-66; Jasir, 2: 860-8; Al-Juhany 1983, 230 n. 53).

⁴⁷ That the Sa'udis never had the numbers nor the '*asabiya* that Bedouins had is clearly understood; Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan describe them as "a small family" (*hathihi al-hamula 'ala qillatihim*) (ibn Qasim 1994-99, 8: 86); see also ibn Khamis (1980, 1: 417; 1987, 6: 132, 173; Wahbah 1956, 215).

⁴⁸ "War" for the Bedouin is not a lethal affair as a rule and a nomad would not lose his life in order to protect his camel (Wahba 1956, 287); he knows that next time he would be able to recover it or pilfer someone else's. He would not be expected to fight in the determined way of the *Hadaris* and in many historical battles the first to flee are the nomads which usually causes their side to lose (Wahba 1956, 10). War for him, in addition, is an enterprise for loot; thus a common tactic in *Hadari* battles is to ensure that loot is available for the opposing forces to distract them and cause their Bedouins to busy themselves with booty (Al-'Ubayyid 54).

⁴⁹ They also attacked their customary laws and imposed *shari'ā* judges on them (Burckhardt 1968, 288). The '*ulama* hold that Bedouin customary law (*sawalif*), if applied, is ground for *kuf'r* (ibn Qasim 1994-99, 10: 426), and characterize their judges as *taghuts* (p. 502-11).

⁵⁰ He is considered the first Imam to abolish the Bedouins' custom of collecting *khuwa* from towns and wayfarers (ibn Khamis 1987, 6: 190).

⁵¹ For a reaffirmation of this by the most successful of Sa'udi leaders, King 'Abd al-'Aziz, see Rihani (1954, 309). Local folklore also corroborates the view of the natural differences and conflict between the two communities. The "classical" legend encompassing some attitudes held by Bedouins towards the *Hadar* (lack of courage in battle) is immortalized by a well-known poem by a *Hadari* protesting such denigration after his success in battle in recovering his Bedouin neighbors' losses (Sowayan 1985, 21-3). An example of some attitudes held by the *Hadar* is humorously told by a famous 19th Hijazi 'Utaybi (*Hadari*) poet, Budaywi al-Waqdani, who admonishes his son for keeping company with the Bedouins and advises him to avoid them because their "ways are not your ways" and who would steal his belongings if they ever have a chance etc.

⁵² He also shackled that chief together with the chief of Mutayr (Al-Bassam 137). Al-Dhukayr supports this and further emphasizes that the Imam imposed on the tribal chiefs the task of maintaining law and order within their *diras* and held them personally responsible for their

tribesmen's offenses (Al-Bassam 1999, 7: 152-3). For the legal justification for this policy, see below.

⁵³ For his biography, see Al-Bassam (1419, 1: 202-214).

⁵⁴ For his biography, see Al-Bassam (1419, 1: 180-201).

⁵⁵ See Wahba (1956, 220) for the practice of Imam Sa^ud (d. 1229/1814). There is an interesting letter sent by ^uAbd al-^uAziz to a Bedouin chief addressing some issues, including how he would hold the tribe collectively responsible for certain acts by individual tribesmen (ibn Khamis 1980, 2: 367-8).

⁵⁶ There are other legally-sanctioned anti-Bedouin practices which would require a separate treatment.

⁵⁷ This is perhaps understandable. The Bedouins are assumed to be unskilled administratively and, more importantly, the feelings of group solidarity, *asabiya*, among the Bedouins is a great disadvantage as the *Hadaris* could never trust them to administer the town fairly. For a list of Sa^udi-appointed amirs, see ibn Bishr (1982, 1: 278; 362; 423). See below for more on this.

⁵⁸ A rule of thumb to determine the background of a person is the name. Practically all Bedouin names terminate with their tribal identity, a practice which survives to this day. Accordingly, ibn Bishr mentions only a few: three commanders from the Mutayr tribe and one ^uUtaybi leader of the cavalry, who was accused of being too quick to surrender to the invading Egyptians.

⁵⁹ The ^uIjman (an offshoot of the large Yam tribe of Najran) migrated into Najd in small numbers from around the end of the 18th century and were cause for a major Wahhabi defeat when the Yamis invaded the Wahhabis in 1178 (ibn Bishr, 1: 93). Imam Turki, fleeing the Egyptians, resided with an ^uAjmi clan and married into them. Later, he was to encourage them to settle in the Ahsa area as counterweight to the B. Khalid. Henceforth the ^uIjman were to prove a major challenge to any Sa^udi ruler well into the 1930s.

⁶⁰ ^uUtayba made its presence felt in upper Najd as early as 1236/1820 (Al-^uUbayyid, 315); however, there are references to ^uUtaybi raiders in upper Najd as early as 1148/1735-6 (Al-Bassam 106). By the early 20th century, they became the dominant tribe in that area, creating further pressures on the rest of the nomads and causing a major redistribution of their clans within Najd.

⁶¹ Whereas pre-Wahhabi Najd was dominated by ^uArid, by the 19th century a clear shift in population size and economic resources are clearly discernible. This may have been related to growth in trade and trade routes between these areas and the outside world, especially the Levant. Although pre-dating Wahhabism (Al-Juhany 1983, 225), it is towards the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries that the *uqayl* emerges as a significant factor in the economy of the region.

⁶² The Humaydi dynasty in the east which preceded Wahhabism was similarly built on a tribal power base; the Rashidis, however, enjoyed the advantage of the loyalty of both *Hadar* and Bedouin groups in the Jabal, something the Humaydis were not able to achieve due to the detribalization of the *Hadari* communities in Ahsa.

⁶³ For a discussion of the relationship between the Bedouin and *Hadari* leaderships, see ibn ^uAqil (1983b, 84-7). It seems that, unlike his kinsmen, the Rashids, ibn ^uAli was in the traditional *Hadari* mold with little attachment or influence with the Shammar Bedouins (Al-^uUthaymin 1991, 46).

⁶⁴ Although the Rashidis were clearly *Hadari*, they seem to wish to emphasize that their concerns are not typically *Hadari* and instead they are like Bedouins in their pre-occupation with warfare (ibn ^uAqil 1982-6, 91).

⁶⁵ The identification between *Hadari* and Bedouin in the Rashidi *amirate* is practically total, thus even their *nakhwa* was none other than that of their ʿAbda (nomadic) clan, *al-sanaʿis*. Indeed, chronicles often describe ibn Rashid as the “chief of Shammar Bedouins and villages of the Jabal” (e.g., Al-Bassam 1999, 3: 152). For more local *nakhwas* in Haʿil, see Rihani (1954, 221)

⁶⁶ Both Al-Salman (1999) and Sawayan (1985, 75-87), who carefully studied the region during this period, never take their own analyses to their logical conclusions, independence.

⁶⁷ In fact, Qasim was so strongly identified with camel exports that the traders’ name, *ʿuqayl*, almost became synonymous with the inhabitants of the region despite the fact it was not exclusive to them (see below).

⁶⁸ There were many bloody encounters between the two sides with Qasim often on the losing side. Baqʿa, the earliest battle (1257/1841), was caused by Qasim’s attempt to help their ʿAnaza allies (Al-ʿUbayyid, 24-5, Al-Bassam 1999, 7: 217-8; Al-Salman 1999, 122-132) and the battle of Mulayda (1308/1891) was caused by, *inter alia*, friction over collection of *zakat* from neighboring Bedouins (Al-ʿUbayyid, 36; Al-Bassam 1999, 7:284-6; Al-Salman 1999, 253-279).

⁶⁹ *ʿUqayl* and *ʿUqaylat*, whose etymology is of uncertain origin, and who mostly came from Qasim, are originally the camel traders from central Arabia, but the meaning over time came to cover all people who go outside Najd and were either traders or mercenaries. With the pre-occupation with tribes, some westerners dubbed *ʿuqayl* a tribe or even a “race” (Guarmani 1938, 142; Glubb 1988, 106), and since its membership represents a cross section of Najdi *Hadari* society, including Khadiri elements, Dickson, the British agent in Kuwait, describes them not only as a tribe but a non-*asil* one at that (Rosenfeld 1951, 46) a view held by Guarmani also (1938, 142); Rosenfeld, who is otherwise insightful, erroneously suggests that *ʿuqayl* may be a “caste-like group” and claims that *asil* nomads would not intermarry with *ʿuayli* (1951, 116), which is untrue so long as the person is of *asil* origin. This group further reflects the depth of *Hadari* Najdi detribalization as many of its most influential members are Khadiri. In early 19th century Baghdad, the chief of the ʿArid *ʿuqayl* was Ibn Ghannam, a Khadiri (Al-Bassam, 174), see also *Al-ʿArab* 33(3,4): p. 283-5 (1998).

⁷⁰ The Bassam family is the best example. Upon king ʿAbd al-ʿAziz’s conquest of ʿUnayza, he expelled a number of their leading men (Al-Bassam 1999, 7: 389-90; 5: 138-41).

⁷¹ Unlike the Saʿudis, the Rashidis failed to develop a system of succession, though it is said that ʿAbd Allah and his brother ʿUbayd made a pact that succession would be through ʿAbd Allah’s line only. Within that branch, the first succession was smooth but the second occurred laterally and subsequent successions were effected usually through regicide. The Rashidis appear to have inherited the worst of *Hadari* traits, disorderly succession. It is noteworthy that among the Bedouins, succession to the position of the chief, as a rule, is peaceful even when no rules of primogeniture exist. The only exception I am able to find for Najd is the assumption of Faysal Al-Duwish of the leadership of Mutayr through the murder his predecessor in 1312/1894-95 (Al-ʿUbayyid, 107; Al-Bassam 202), a harbinger of things to come (it should be noted that when Najdi tribes migrate to the Levant and interacts with stronger central governments, this rule no longer applies).

⁷² Al-ʿUbayyid further quotes him saying that he never knew of a *Hadari* wronging a Bedouin (p.31). Al-ʿUbayyid’s book is a valuable source for the less known parts of the history and ethnology of Najd, especially for the period to which he was an eyewitness. He was an itinerant *Hadari* trader from Al-Qasim; he lived in Mecca, Taʿif, and Khurma where he was prayer *imam* for Khalid ibn Luʿay. He was also an *imam* for the chief of the Shayabin clan of ʿUtayba. For his biography, see Bassam (1419, 6: 306-11).

⁷³ °Abd al-Rahman was not the only or first Sa°udi leader to articulate a pro-*Hadari* stand as a basis for their rule; his cousin, °Abd Allah ibn Thunayyan, who ruled between Faysal’s two reigns, vowed that if he lived long enough he would not “leave even one horse with the Bedouins” (Al-Rashid 1966, 34).

⁷⁴ His pro-*Hadar* views are further corroborated in Al-Bassam (1999, 4: 133; 7: 318-9).

⁷⁵ The famed Philby also subscribes to this view (Habib 1978, 23)

⁷⁶ That the House of Rashid, population of Ha’il and the surrounding areas were Wahhabis are amply documented (Al-Za°arir 1995, 34; ibn °Aqil 1994, 254, 257; Al°Uthaymin 1991, 184-5); for comments on their “fanaticism” see Guarmani (1938, 56, 91). The famous °Ubayd al-Rashid, for all his bloody history, is often described as a supporter of Wahhabism (Al-Rashid 1966, 9). Even the Rashidi flag is identical to the Sa°udi with its Islamic inscriptions and unsheathed sword (Guarmani 1938, 91). The °*ulama* of the Rashidi realm were the same as those of the Sa°udi Sate as well as the judges (Al-Za°arir 1995, 106-7). It is true that for the people of southern Najd, the relaxed ways of the north (e.g., smoking) were frowned upon, but in the essentials no differences existed. Nonetheless, a close scrutiny of the °*ulama*’s polemics during the days of the Rashidi *amirate* and the first few decades of the Sa°udi restoration, reveals an interesting yet barely perceptible difference between the °*ulama* supporting the competing houses; it revolves around the question of to what extent the Ottomans may be seen as true Muslims. Since the Rashidis were allied to the Ottomans, the pro-Sa°udi °*ulama* maintained that the Ottomans were simply non-Muslims which led to the Rashidi *amirs* persecuting those who held such views. This difference must, however, be seen in context. It was the Sa°udi ruler, °Abd Allah (d. 1889) who first requested Ottoman help against his brother, Sa°ud, splitting his own °*ulama* in the process. King °Abd al-°Aziz’s intercourse with the definitely non-Muslim British presented the same challenge to the Wahhabi °*ulama* but they still managed to maintain their support for that House. The best sources covering this subject are ibn Qasim (1994-99) and Al-Bassam (1419).

⁷⁷ Al-Rasheed recognizes that the dominance of Shammar, as reflected in the Rashidi dynasty, was not something other groups were going to accept easily (1992, 155); hence it would take a non-tribally-based alternative to appeal to the non-Shammar groups, something the Sa°udis offered.

⁷⁸ The logic behind this, according to the Bedouins, is that since the ally is going to lose his possessions anyway, it may as well be kept by its “friends” (Wahba 1956, 10).

⁷⁹ During °Abd al-°Aziz’s campaigns, he was also to suffer from Bedouin unreliability; in the battle of Jurab (1915), he was defeated mostly due to the plundering of his camp by his own Bedouin forces in contrast with the loyal Shammar Bedouins who stood their ground with their leaders (Al-Bassam 1999, 7: 504-5; ibn °Aqil 1983c, 79; ibn Khamis 1980, 1:68); also the °Ijman retreated prematurely (Rihani 1954, 222, 224; ibn °Aqil 1983, 78; Al-°Abd al-Muhsin 2: 183-4). His uncle, °Abd Allah, suffered a similar fate in the battle of Juda (1287/1870-71) when Subay° retreated and plundered their own allies (ibn °Aqil 1983, 66-7, 153; Rihani 1954, 99).

⁸⁰ See also Al-°Abd al-Muhsin (2: 81, 92; Rihani 1954, 174, 179, 185, 186).

⁸¹ See, for example, the poem accusing the tribe of Qahtan of insulting one of the *matawi°a* sent by Imam Faysal by plucking his beard (ibn °Aqil 1983, 240).

⁸² The *imam* invariably had to be *Hadari* since even rudimentary learning was not available to Bedouins.

⁸³ Much of this is published in the usual *nabati* collections, see ibn °Aqil(1982-86, 1: 115-206).

⁸⁴ This equally applies to the paramount ʿUtaybi chief, Muhammad ibn Hindi ibn Humayd (d. 1914/5) who is reported to have had the same attitude (ibn ʿAqil 1982-6, 3:156, 193).

⁸⁵ This transformation in outlook is attested in oral and written tradition. Al-ʿUbayyid (p. 279) relates the story of the hapless *qadi* of Ranya who was robbed by Bedouins while traveling. When it was time for prayer, the robbers respectfully asked the *qadi* to be the *imam*. When he inquired why their fear for God would not extend to his property, the answer was blunt, “We do not wish to make enemies of God,” but were willing to have the *qadi* as an enemy. A similar incident is still being reported in Zilfi in which their pilgrims were watering near a Bedouin encampment in Upper Najd when they noticed an ʿUtaybi chief performing his prayers, a sight they could only snicker at. When he had completed his prayer, the chief turned to the *Hadari* detractors and declared that they were senseless since he had no intention of fighting God on *all* fronts (*i.e.*, robbing as well as not praying). Further north, Musil observes that Ruwala did not pray in 1908-9 but were doing so by 1914 (Rosenfeld 1951, 136).

⁸⁶ The creation of the Ikhwan, as is well known, involved the copying of early Muslim models. Thus the *hijra*, the flight from unbelief to Islam, became the generic name of their numerous settlements. The Bedouin thus became a *muhajir* and left his old, errant ways and embraced the faith wholeheartedly. The nomad settlers sold their camels and tried to pursue a life of learning and agriculture with varying degrees of success (Rihani 1954, 262-3). Rihani (1954, 454-6) has a list of the *Hijar* and their tribal affiliation; Habib (1978) remains the best study on the subject though inaccurate on some points (*e.g.*, he exaggerates the Ikhwan’s military contributions (p. 65; 156); his assertion that conquest was the *raison e’etre* of the movement (p. 117) is a simplification of a more complex process; he also implies that proselytism was the work of Bedouins).

⁸⁷ Some authors attribute to this force a critical role in the formation of the third state. Al-Rasheed, for example, considers the “creation of a religious fighting force” to be the “most crucial step in Ibn Saʿud’s expansion” (1992, 150). For another view, see Al-ʿUthaymin (1984, 219).

⁸⁸ The Sharifis were first to recognize the military potential of the Ikhwan and in the early stage of conflict offered to cease hostilities in return for certain concessions, including allowing the Ikhwan to revert to nomadic life (Rihani 1954, 249).

⁸⁹ It seems that the ascendance of this group of “half-learned” individuals with extreme views began with the Saʿudi civil war (ibn ʿAqil 1994, 50-1). One interesting person, ibn Biti, is credited with some of the successes (and excesses) of the Ikhwan and engaged ibn Sihman and other ʿulama in polemics (*e.g.*, ibn Qasim 1994-99, 8: 421). For his role and his subsequent demise, see ibn ʿAqil (1994, 52-4). In Riyadh, I have heard some prominent Wahhabi names suspected of having been at least sympathetic with Ikhwan excesses. Ibn Sihman (1340b,72) mentions one, ʿAbd Allah Al-Damigh. Two other names are mentioned in ibn ʿAqil (1994, 78) but no further information are given.

⁹⁰ This is also observed by Troeller (1976, 210).

⁹¹ They would resent the *Hadar* generally for knowing the truth and taking so long to relay it; anyone not to declare that Sharif Husayn was not a *kafir* would forfeit his life; they would not grant the traditional Bedouin *manʿ*, bodily safety after surrender; they would take no prisoners (Al-ʿUbayyid, 189); and in their role as roving inquisitors, if they ask a man about his religion and he happens to answer correctly, they would simply declare that his knowledge was useless since he would not practice anyway (p.190).

⁹² One of interesting anecdote related by him shows that as far as some Ikhwan were concerned, the new belief simply provided a different basis for plunder and not necessarily

precluded it. The story goes as follows. “ I [Al-^ʿUbayyid] have been told by a member of the Ikhwan that once while traveling in the desert they were met by a man with a donkey. The donkey was carrying two goat-skin bags full of ghee [*samn*] on his way to al-Khurma [a town on the border between Hijaz and Najd] to sell there. They were eight people; some said to the others, “Ask him whether or not he knows his religion.” They asked about his knowledge of religion and he answered all their questions competently and correctly and they failed to find a [single] mistake in his response. He and they almost went on their [separate] ways when they discussed [his fate] among themselves and one addressed him saying, “ Are you among those who believed then did not believe or among those who did not believe and then believed?” [The man] sensed that they were planning to kill him and take the donkey along with its load so he answered them saying, “I am among those who abandoned the donkey and fled” and he ran away. Since they were from ^ʿUtayba and he was from Shalawa he feared he would be assassinated in this wilderness where no one was around to help him.” (Al-^ʿUbayyid, 190)

⁹³ A major part of Al-^ʿUbayyids’ manuscript is a recording of Ikhwan’s deeds and misdeeds, including many first hand experiences. One worthy of mention is the Ikhwan’s murder of the brother of Khalid ibn Lu’ay, the famous sharif of Khurama and leader of the Wahhabi campaigns in Hijaz, for “worthless” reasons and the brother’s inability to do much about the murderers who were cloaked by religious untouchability (p. 191). Their impertinence spread all over Najd and was not confined to specific areas. My uncle Muhammad (b. 1915) tells me that he once went with his uncle (d. 1960) to look for some stray camels and needed to spend the night in the Bedouin *hijra* of Mulaih, about 25 miles south of Zilfi. When the last evening prayer was due, the Ikhwan summoned them to prayer. They tried to explain to them that they were travelers and as such had availed themselves of the permission to perform this prayer earlier, to which the answer was a contemptuous “you are *sferi* [travelers, another of the sins invented by the Ikhwan] and would not even pray?” The two men, sensing imminent danger, hastened to obey the Ikhwan and perform the prayer one more time. In the same vain, Ahmad al-Nadawi (d. 1950s), a townsman from Zilfi, was friends with a Mutayri Ikhwan from the nearby *hijra* of Artawiyya, but this friendship had to stop at its gates. Once when Nadawi was praying in the *hijra*’s mosque and his friend was seated next to him, the latter, having no choice but to avoid greeting his polluted *Hadari* friend (he was a “traveler” after all), whispered under his breath “what kind of a heaven is this, oh Nadawi” (*ya janat ‘l-brekah ya ‘nnedawi!*).

⁹⁴ Although the Sa^ʿudis accept some responsibility for the events, they still maintained that much of the killing and looting was done by Hijazi Bedouins pretending to be Ikhwan.

⁹⁵ Kostiner (1985, 308) claims that the early interests of the Ikhwan were to “mould the entire Najdi population of Najd in their own likeness.” This is a generous reading of their interests; freedom to raid and wage *jihad* were what they were most interested in.

⁹⁶ As early as 1338 (1919), the ^ʿ*ulama* were taking a strong position on Ikhwan raids of others and urging the Imam to prevent these transgressions (ibn Qasim 1994-99, 9: 94-6).

⁹⁷ Thus Al-Duwish declares that “we are neither Moslems fighting the unbelievers nor are we Arabs and Bedouins raiding each other and living on what we get from each other” (Habib 1978, 136).

⁹⁸ While condemning these excesses, the Wahhabi ^ʿ*ulama*, nonetheless, would not deviate from the strict orthodox position that “*ta^ʿarrub*” after the *hijra* is a major sin and may rise to total unbelief if done with certain intentions and attitudes (ibn Qasim 1994-99, 8: 81-2, 454-5; 10: 452). For *ta^ʿarrub*, see Bosworth (1989).

⁹⁹ It is not clear whether the *‘imama* itself, as opposed to the legal rules pertaining to its use, was a new innovation. *Nabati* poetry is replete with reference to it and one of ibn *‘Abd al-Wahhab* sons is described as wearing one similar to the one worn by the Prophet (ibn *‘Aqil* 1994, 76).

¹⁰⁰ For further elaboration on the exchange at that time, see ibn *‘Aqil* (1994, 52-81).

¹⁰¹ Azmeh misunderstands the issue when he finds the ‘Wahhabite polity’ imposing such a code (1996, 116).

¹⁰² The rules are conveniently listed, according to the various legal schools, under “albisa,” *al-mawsu‘a al-fiqhiya*, vol. 6, Kuwait: wizart al-awqaf, 1986.

¹⁰³ Of all Ikhwan beliefs and practices, this issue seems to be the most difficult to interpret with some rationality. First, they seem to address it mostly to other Bedouins and not to the *Hadari*. Second, to the extent it was meant to be a means of easy identification (e.g., another *wasm*), it was *easily* thwarted by wearing the piece to avoid danger (Al-*‘Ubayyid*, 286). Finally, and this may be an indication of the original motive, the attacks against the *‘iqal* are justified sometimes by the fact that “soldiers” wore it (ibn Sihman 1340b, 94), and since Najd really had no soldiers at the time, it must have been a reference to Sharifi forces.

¹⁰⁴ The objection to this device is made easier by the fact that the *‘ulama* in an earlier *fatwa*, while declining to declare it *haram*, refused to say it is legal and professed inability to understand its nature to make a ruling (ibn *‘Abd al-Muhsin*, 3: 182). Perhaps the Ikhwan’s hostility may have been based on the technological advantage it would give the central government, something they must have heard of in the experiences of the Hijazi and Iraqi Bedouins.

¹⁰⁵ They also objected to his use of non-Muslims such as Philby (p. 178). Interestingly, one of their demands was the abolition of extra-*shar‘i* taxes (p. 178). Kostiner (1985, 312; 1990, 232), in a reflection of his pre-occupation, speaks of such taxes on the “tribes.” The objectionable taxation is simply custom duties imposed on (almost always exclusively) *Hadari* traders (or perhaps dues collected from pilgrims), hardly targeted at any tribe. The *‘ulama*, in typical fashion, objected to the “*ta‘shir*” of Muslims and declared it impermissible (ibn Qasim 1994-99, 9: 302-10). The state needed the money and the rulings were conveniently ignored.

¹⁰⁶ The *‘ulama* were later to strongly urge *jihad* against the Iraqis (ibn Qasim 1994-99, 9: 349-52).

¹⁰⁷ The story is told in detail by Glubb (1960).

¹⁰⁸ In Al-Bassam (1999, 6: 228) the author says 30 men, including a major *‘uqayli* merchant who were returning from Iraq were murdered. It should be noted that the non-*asil* tribe of Al-*‘Awazim* in Ahsa region was very effective in defeating two combined Ikhwan forces shortly after the Sabala defeat (ibn *‘Aqil* 1983, 98-99).

¹⁰⁹ So *‘Utayba* would be in charge of most of Hijaz and Qasim; Mutayr most of central Najdi; Harb the areas around Medina and Yanbu‘; *‘Ijman al-Ahsa*; *‘Anaza* the northern territories (Al-*‘Ubayyid*, 234). For other thwarted ambitions, see ibn Khamis (1987, 7: 254-55)

¹¹⁰ When an eminent jurists came to talk to Al-Duwish, he responded by tapping the jurist’s belly: “speak, oh money,” an accusation that he was simply doing ibn Sa‘ud’s and not God’s bidding (Al-*‘Abd al-Muhsin*, 3: 203).

¹¹¹ It should be noted that ibn Sa‘ud’s army in this battle was not exclusively *Hadari*; the Wahhabi call had managed to split tribal coalitions and many loyal sections entered the battle against their own tribesmen, e.g., the chief of the Ruwika section of *‘Utayba*.

¹¹² It is generally assumed that he had come to assess *‘Abd al-‘Aziz*’s power. He is reported to have informed his camp upon his return that he saw easy booty; “I saw a *Hadari* (ibn Sa‘ud)

trembling of fear surrounded by a bunch of cooks only good for sleeping on cushy mattresses” (Wahba 1956, 296; Al-^cAbd al-Muhsin, 3: 206).

¹¹³ He was not alone; several Bedouin chiefs launched their own raids in a direct challenge to the government, but all were eventually defeated (ibn Khamis 1987, 7: 287).

¹¹⁴ The ^cIjman did not participate in the battle, but the Sa^cudi governor of the eastern area pursued them and killed their chief, losing his own son in the process (^cAbd al-Muhsin, 3:21-11).

¹¹⁵ I have not come across any specific document organizing the relationship between the central authority and Najdi tribes. After the conquest of the Hijaz, however, there is ample documentation of the “covenant” (^c*ahd*) entered into by the Hijazi tribes with the government. The texts are available in the first few issues of the Sa^cudi official Gazette, *Umm al-Qura*, and they are conveniently grouped in Al-Bassam (1999, 10: 203-10, 302-3). It is reasonable to assume that the same terms would govern relations with the Najdi tribes.

¹¹⁶ In the military, only over the last few years were Bedouins promoted to command major defense forces (*e.g.*, Land Forces). The national guard, which is heavily manned by Bedouins, is also commanded by *Hadari* officers. While this may reflect the understandable *Hadari* advantage in education, it is difficult not to see it as a carryover from old prejudices and fears (especially of divided loyalty between tribe and state).

¹¹⁷ The formal order was made in 1953 and later clarified to exclude the traditional *hima* system of the non-nomadic groups in the southwestern mountains.

¹¹⁸ Legally speaking, the ^c*ulama* find no justification for any *hima* except that set up by the Imam for public interest (ibn Qsim 1996-99, 6: 459). But the jurists still would acknowledge a right of *Hadar* to preclude Bedouins from access to pasture lands in the immediate vicinity of their towns (*ibid.*).

¹¹⁹ Burckhardt (1968), for example, is full of compliments for the Bedouins and their character. There is a charming passage (1: 363-4) which displays his interpretation of the negative effects of mingling of Bedouins with townsmen; see also (p. 367-8).

¹²⁰ It is inconceivable for a Najdi *Hadari* to name his son after a Christian. For a Bedouin, so long as such a person possessed the requisite “manliness” (*merjleh=rujula*), religion was of no importance; thus the chiefly family of the Ruwala tribe named their son Orans, after the famous Lawrence of Arabia, who died only recently.

¹²¹ References to raiding pilgrims are found in the very early history of Islam; thus the ancient tribes of Ghifar, Aslam, Muzayna and Juhayna were nicknamed “*surraq al-Hajj*” (Rubin 1988, 260), an epithet still hurled at some tribes today, principally Harb and ^cUtayba.

¹²² One exception is Rihani whose experience in Najd educated him about the profound differences between the two communities and who in many ways internalized the attitudes of the *Hadar* towards the Bedouins (1954, *e.g.*, 258-90); the same applies to Wahba (1956, 10, 286-7).

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