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FOCUSING THE MIND? HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION AFFECTS  
ISSUE COVERAGE IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS

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**MAX WEBER PROGRAMME**

*Focusing the Mind?*  
*How the European Union Affects Issue Coverage in National Elections*

**KYRIAKI NANOU**

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## **Abstract**

It is commonplace to assume that what determines the coverage of issues in parties' political agendas are domestic factors such as their own issue priorities and those of their political rivals, the attention devoted by the mass media and the importance of issues to the wider electorate. However, we know very little about what can explain how issue coverage evolves over time. Do certain issues receive constant attention over time, whereas others receive more or less coverage over time? By focusing on the effect of delegation to the EU-level institutions as an external influence, this paper aims to explain whether issue coverage is more or less impervious to change. It examines the impact of increasing delegation of policymaking to the EU institutions on the coverage of issues in parties' manifestos. It expects that, as policy competence shifts from the national to the EU level in a range of policy domains, parties place less emphasis on those issues and instead focus competition on issues where policy-making authority is largely retained by the member states. The effect is expected to vary across those groups of issues classified as either 'principled' or 'pragmatic'. These expectations are tested by using ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression to analyse references to 16 issues in manifesto data covering elections from 1968-2005. The analysis involves 18 European countries.

## **Keywords**

Party competition; party manifestos; issue coverage; European integration; policy delegation.

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Max Weber Fellow, 2010-2011*



## **Introduction**

Moravcsik has argued that the types of issues delegated to the EU institutions have generally been of lower importance for both political parties and voters in the member states (2001: 512). Instead, those issues where decision-making power remains largely at the national level are the more salient ‘bread and butter’ issues for citizens and parties. I examine an alternative question: what is the impact of delegation of issues to the EU on the attention they receive in the domestic context? The process of European integration has had an impact on the environment within which political parties operate by placing new issues on the political agenda and by altering how parties compete on votes. This paper aims to highlight how external factors, such as the process of European integration, can explain the coverage of issues in party manifestos during electoral competition. There are two theoretical approaches that try to explain the varying attention parties give on issues. The first approach argues that parties make pre-electoral pledges on those issues that are important to them and to their competitors. This approach focuses on how parties can be associated with particular issues, such as the Greens with issues of environmental protection, or extreme right parties with the issue of immigration, or even Social Democratic parties with discussing measures on how to tackle unemployment and Conservative parties’ preoccupation with lower taxation. Though parties are sometimes associated with certain issues, this does not preclude other parties from also covering these issues in their manifestos since they want to remain relevant. So, if an issue is debated by their competitors, there is a greater likelihood that they will also want to address it. The second approach focuses on the effect of the importance placed on issues by the mass media and public opinion. This approach distinguishes between those issues, such as the management of the economy, that are constantly emphasised by most parties since they are important ‘bread-and-butter’ issues for the electorate; whereas other issues gain short term prominence for a shorter period of time based on a specific event or set of circumstances and attention received in the mass media.

This paper aims to examine a third possibility, the effect of the process of delegation to the European institution on issue coverage. There is an increasing amount of legislation that derives from the EU and has a direct impact on the member states. EU institutions are increasingly responsible for the majority of decisions taken in policy areas, such as commercial negotiations and monetary policy. In this paper, I examine variation in coverage of issues in party manifestos as a result of the delegation of policy making authority to the EU level. I expect that as policy competence is shifted from the national to the EU level this will have an impact upon the attention placed on issues in parties’ manifestos. Does EU membership influence which issues are placed onto the domestic agendas in member states that parties cannot ignore or, alternatively, is the opposite scenario more likely to occur? I expect that for those issues where the EU acquires higher decision-making authority – especially when it has sole decision-making power or the majority of policymaking competencies – then parties downplay these issues in their manifestos since they cannot credibly offer policy alternatives to the voters.

## **Delegation to EU institutions and issue coverage**

There are a number of insights from existing studies in this area which inform the analysis undertaken here. Mair (2000) observes that EU membership, which has entailed the increasing transfer of policymaking competencies from the national to the supranational level, might have an *indirect* effect on party competition. Mair (2000: 48-9) expects that, as a result of the EU’s impact, there will be a ‘hollowing out’ of competition between parties – particularly affecting those with office-seeking goals – since they are constrained in the range of feasible policy alternatives they can offer to the electorate. Empirical analyses conducted within this theoretical approach have shown that European integration has some effect on parties’ positions, thereby contributing to convergence of parties’ platforms (Hix, 2003; Bernhard, 2004; Pennings, 2005; Dorussen and Nanou, 2006). Moreover, there are two studies that directly examine the impact of European integration on the attention that issues receive in party manifestos. Binnema (2002) argues that when issues are decided almost exclusively at the EU level they will gradually disappear from domestic political agendas, because it would be unrealistic for

parties to continue to compete on those issues and make promises they cannot deliver. Instead, parties will primarily focus on those issues for which national authorities still retain some degree of decision-making power. Similarly, Bernhard (2004) holds that parties will downplay policy areas where the EU constraints are high and adopt moderate positions on such issues, shifting their attention to other policy areas. In this scenario the focus of the parties' manifestos could be law and order or security issues, such as asylum and immigration policies, or the focus could be on more traditional voter concerns, such as social policy and education. These issues are less heavily constrained by EU regulations or policy outcomes (Bernhard, 2004: 5-7).

There are two exceptions where we might observe either a reduced impact of EU constraints on levels of issue coverage or, depending on the country and time period, even the opposite effect – an increase in the coverage of some issues despite, or rather because of, growing EU competence. The first possibility is that the coverage of certain issues might generally decline over time for both parties and voters but not because of the effect of delegation to the EU. There may have been a series of wider social and political factors in play which have caused the declining coverage of particular issues over a period of time. As Green-Pedersen has observed: 'Parties will still focus on left-right issues as they have historically done, but also on other issues, resulting in a decline of the relative dominance of mainly economic left-right issues' (2007: 611).

The second possibility is that delegation to the EU institutions itself might have stoked controversy and made those issues a more prominent part of the domestic political agenda (Harmsen and Spiering, 2005; Milner, 2000). A pertinent example is domestic debates on monetary union and macroeconomic policy centering on EMU commitments. In almost every EU member State, whether it is a member of the EMU or not, this issue has received frequent attention in the national media (De Vreese et al., 2001). A similar argument holds for issues such as the environment, social policy or even immigration. Binnema found consistent evidence in relation to environmental policy whereby greater EU competence led to an increase in the attention this issue received (2002: 18). The financial and economic crisis within the Eurozone also shows variation across countries in the effects of delegation to EU institutions. Currently, three Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) are severely affected by the recent financial and debt crises and require the assistance of joint IMF-EU rescue packages. Following from this we might observe variation across the EU member states depending on the implications of issue delegation for their domestic interests.

The aim of this paper is to extend this work conducted by Binnema (2002) and Bernhard (2004) by assessing whether there is variation in the effect of delegation across particular groups of issues. Unlike most studies of issue competition that distinguish between positional and valence issues (Stokes, 1963; Budge and Farlie, 1983; Budge, 1991), I use the classification employed by Tavits (2007) and distinguish between 'principled' and 'pragmatic' issues. The distinction is based on an interpretation of the nature of issues: between those considered 'in material or pragmatic terms include economics, expedience, practicality, or personal self-interest' and those 'commonly interpreted in principled or ethical terms are very different and include human rights, religious morals or personal principles' (2007: 153). The different considerations derive from voters' expectations of stability and change between these two categories of issues. Whereas voters require stability in terms of parties' positions on 'principled issues' they are prepared for more responsiveness on those 'pragmatic issues' (2007: 153). So parties need to be responsive and potentially shift their positions on 'pragmatic issues' but need to try and maintain their positions on 'principled issues' since voters associate them with long-standing beliefs. Responsiveness to changing circumstances can be beneficial in electoral terms for parties in relation to 'pragmatic issues' but the same strategy can be detrimental for 'principled issues'. Delegation to the EU institutions could be seen as one such significant change in the environment within which parties operate and the same can be said for the effect of globalization and of greater economic interdependency (Kriesi et al., 2006). Following this argument, I therefore anticipate that parties will be more responsive to the effect of delegation to EU institutions in relation to 'pragmatic issues' and place less emphasis on such issues. For 'principled issues', the impact of EU constraints may itself engender controversy and, as a result, increase the attention to these issues in party manifestos. Alternatively, parties might disregard EU constraints on 'principled issues' since parties relinquishing long-held principles are likely to be perceived as lacking in credibility by rational



voters and it may also prove detrimental in terms of the continued allegiance of party members and activists. In such cases, parties might even be rewarded for sticking to their principles and contesting the policy derived from EU institutions.

Informed by the theoretical propositions and empirical findings discussed above, I specify the following hypotheses, which will be tested here:

**H1:** Increasing EU decision-making competence is expected to have a (negative) impact on the coverage of ‘pragmatic issues’ but not on ‘principled issues’. ‘Pragmatic issues’ are considered to be mainly practical and material in substantive terms, such as issues relating to the performance of the economy, foreign policy and defence. ‘Principled issues’ include those associated with parties’ core beliefs and principles, including welfare, minority rights and social and cultural values.

**H1a:** Less emphasis is expected to be placed on ‘pragmatic issues’ as delegation to the EU institutions increases since parties are required to be more responsive on pragmatic issues.

**H1b:** Increasing EU constraints are expected either not to have an impact on the coverage of ‘principled issues’ or to increase the coverage of such issues since parties can use this strategy to benefit themselves electorally.

## **Data and method**

In this section I discuss the data and method used for this analysis. The dependent variable, *Coverage*, measures the average issue coverage for all parties per issue in a country for each election. Higher values of the variable indicate that, on average, parties increase their attention to an issue in their manifestos. The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), collected by Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2006), is the data source for the measure of the average coverage of issues in parties’ manifestos. The CMP has generated a dataset of policy commitments offered by parties to their electorates in manifestos for national elections (which represent their official platforms). This data derives from the systematic hand-coding of individual statements in official party documents into 56 standard issue categories.<sup>1</sup> Each policy statement in a manifesto is considered to be a coding unit and assigned to one of these issue categories. At the end of coding each document, the CMP estimates the frequency of the policy statements into each issue category, expressed as a percentage of the total number of statements<sup>2</sup>. This process ensures that the data are standardized to avoid distortions derived from the varying lengths of documents. The data generated by the CMP measure the percentage share of coverage that a party dedicates to each particular issue relative to all other issues contained in each manifesto.

Delegation to the EU institutions is captured by a set of predictors based upon expert evaluations of the varying degree of EU decision-making authority across issue areas and over time. Hooghe and Marks (2001), continuing work initiated by Schmitter (1996), provide the information on the level of delegation to the EU institutions. They have assigned scores – ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high) – to indicate the extent of EU authority across a range of issue areas based on existing and subsequent treaty obligations. The specific time periods correspond to the ‘foundation period’ (1950-1957), the EEC (1957-1968), the EC (1968-1992), and the EU (1992-2000, Maastricht Treaty; 2001 onwards, Amsterdam Treaty). The choice of 16 issues included in my analysis was determined by the availability of information on *both* parties’ policy statements included in the CMP data and the level of policymaking competence included in Hooghe and Marks (2001). Since my intention here is to measure coverage, I added together references to the issue categories that are thematically related to create separate policy domains.

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<sup>1</sup> A full list of the policy categories together with a detailed description can be found in (Budge et al., 2001: appendix III and Klingemann et al., 2006: appendix I).

<sup>2</sup> A comprehensive description of the coding process is included in Budge et al. (2001: appendix II) and Klingemann et al. (2006: appendix II).

To capture any potential differences in the effects on EU member states and non-member states<sup>3</sup>, I have created a set of four explanatory variables distinguishing between EU members and non-members and principled<sup>4</sup> and pragmatic<sup>5</sup> issues. The theoretical expectation requires identifying which issues fall into the ‘pragmatic’ and the ‘principled’ groups. Following Tavits (2007), I classify issues relating to the economy as belonging to the ‘pragmatic’ group and issues relating to the social domain as belonging to the ‘principled’ group. Tavits (2007: 156) argues that identifying issues as ‘principled’ or pragmatic’ is a substantive task. Issues such as environmental protection, law and order and welfare can be identified as ‘principled’ issues since they can be associated with specific ideologies.

To have confidence in the reliability of the estimates regarding the impact of EU constraints on issue coverage and to avoid omitted variable bias, it is necessary to control for other explanatory factors that may have an effect on the dependent variable. Globalization may function as an indirect constraint on the range of policy choices available to national governments and parties, mainly concerning economic issues. These constraints tend to differentially affect the long-standing commitments of parties belonging to different party families. For example, Social Democratic and Communist parties are more affected by these constraints than Conservative, Christian Democratic and Liberal parties. I control for the impact of globalization by including the variable *Trade Openness*<sup>6</sup> in the models.

The coverage of issues is also expected to be influenced by external shocks. These are broadly defined as unexpected events that increase, often markedly, the political attention given to a particular issue. I include a measure of national growth rates<sup>7</sup> to control for poor economic performance that could reasonably be expected to raise the coverage of economic issues. I also control for party system polarization in order to measure differences in the level of support for mainstream and non-mainstream parties. Higher values of the *Polarization* variable indicate that the overall vote share received by non-mainstream/alternative parties increased compared to the total vote share that mainstream parties received in the election.<sup>8</sup> Smaller values of the variable indicate that the electorate supported mainstream parties to a greater extent and that the vote is more concentrated.

## Results and analysis

First, I present descriptive statistics to demonstrate variation in the average coverage of issues across different degrees of delegation, across countries and differences between the two types of issues. Second, I discuss the results from the models estimations with testing of the hypotheses. In this section I show how coverage varies across issues, levels of delegation and the effect of delegation on coverage by type of issue (those classified as ‘principled’ or ‘pragmatic’).

(Figure 1 about here)

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<sup>3</sup> This is equivalent to the procedure of testing differences in the sample between EU member states and non-members but only for the *EU competence* variable and it does not affect the impact of the other explanatory variables. I use the Wald test of significant differences in the estimated coefficients to examine whether the coefficients of *EU competence member* and *EU competence non-member* within the model are indeed statistically significantly different from each other. When the results of the Wald test are significant at the ten per cent level I can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the different groups are similar. This is the case for all regressions. This same procedure is used by Plümpert and Troeger (2008: 669-70) to test whether the coefficients of different time groups are statistically significantly different from each other, whereas here I test differences in the coefficients of two country groups (EU members and non-members).

<sup>4</sup> ‘Principled issues’ consist of the following policy areas: Social Policy/Welfare State, Environmental protection, Citizenship, Participation, Police and Public Order, Foreign Aid and Education.

<sup>5</sup> ‘Pragmatic issues’ consist of the following areas: Industry and Competition, Trade, Economic Policy, Agricultural, Military, Diplomacy-Internationalism, Regional Policy, Transport and Communication and Labour-Management Relations.

<sup>6</sup> This measure of globalization has been used in a number of studies (Hix, 2003; Bernhard, 2004; Milner and Judkins, 2004).

<sup>7</sup> This variable is compiled from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2.

<sup>8</sup> The polarization index has been constructed using the formula from Pelizzo and Babones (2007: 56), which consists of extreme vote minus centre vote.

Figure 1 shows the average coverage of each issue for all parties in the sample. The graph shows that the issues of political participation, industry and competition and social policy have attracted the most attention in party manifestos across member and non-member states. Trade policy, foreign aid and military and defence have received the least coverage in the party agendas.

*(Figure 2 about here)*

Figure 2 shows the mean coverage in party manifestos by the degree of issue delegation at the EU level. Figure 2 displays a bar that stretches 1.96 standard deviations from the mean value, which is around 1. There is a slight downward trend in the level of coverage as delegation to the EU institutions increases, with a more pronounced decline in coverage when all decisions are taken at the EU level. The bars indicate a greater degree of variation when decisions are shared between the two levels and when only some decisions are taken by the EU institutions.

*(Figure 3 about here)*

The effect of delegation on issue coverage becomes particularly interesting when we compare across types of issues, ‘principled’ and ‘pragmatic’ issues, as illustrated in Figure 3. What is immediately striking is that party governments seem to have chosen to mostly delegate decisions on ‘pragmatic’ rather than ‘principled’ issues to EU institutions. The mean coverage across levels of delegation on ‘pragmatic’ issues varies between close to 0 (when all decisions are taken at the EU level) and 1.5 (when only some decisions are delegated to the EU level). It is interesting that the downward trend of coverage when decisions are shared between the two levels is interrupted by an increase in coverage for those issues for which most decisions are delegated to the EU level. As in Figure 2, the greatest variation of issue coverage around the mean is when decisions are shared between the two levels. There are situations where parties pay considerable attention to issues on which decisions are shared by the national and EU levels and situations where parties place the least attention on such issues. This could indicate the varying effect of EU decisions on the interests affected across parties and countries. In the case of ‘principled issues’, there is an upward trend in coverage as delegation to the EU institutions increases, indicating a different effect than that for ‘pragmatic issues’. The overall finding is that delegation to the EU level has some effect on the coverage of issues in party manifestos across Europe and, importantly, that this varies between ‘pragmatic’ and ‘principled’ issues. I next examine whether this can be attributed to the increasing delegation of powers to the EU level and EU membership, while accounting for other explanatory factors that might have a contributory effect.

Table 1 reports the results for the regression estimation examining the impact of increased EU delegation on the average coverage parties give to ‘principled’ and ‘pragmatic issues’ in their manifestos. The data are set up as country issue panels, OLS country corrected robust standard errors and a lagged dependent variable to correct for autocorrelation. I also include country dummies in the model.

*(Table 1 about here)*

The focus is on the varying nature of issues and, in particular, the ways in which parties compete differently when engaging with either ‘pragmatic’ or ‘principled’ issues. According to the hypothesis, parties are expected to be responsive to changes to their environment – such as those that derive from delegation to the EU institutions – for ‘pragmatic’ but not for ‘principled issues’. I expect that parties will place less attention on ‘pragmatic issues’ as a response to increasing delegation to the EU institutions, whereas on ‘principled issues’ they will pay more attention to them or continue as before.

The results from the regression estimation indicate that there is a difference between the impact of delegation to the EU institutions on the average coverage parties place on ‘pragmatic’ and ‘principled’ issues in both member and non-member-states. As the process of delegation to the EU increases, parties in member states de-emphasise pragmatic issues ( $p < 0.01$  and  $b = -0.027$ ) and

emphasise principled issues ( $p < 0.01$  and  $b = 0.025$ ). This finding of a differential impact of EU constraints on issue coverage in member states between ‘pragmatic’ and ‘principled’ issues is also confirmed by the Wald test ( $F = 80.26$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ), and the null hypothesis can be rejected at the one per cent level.

Moreover, the impact of delegation also differs in terms of the level of emphasis placed on ‘pragmatic’ and ‘principled’ issues by parties in non-member countries. Whereas parties in both EU members and non-members de-emphasise ‘pragmatic issues’ and emphasise ‘principled issues’ as EU competence increases, the results are non-significant for ‘pragmatic issues’ in non-member states. The impact of delegation on the emphasis parties in non-member states place on ‘principled issues’ is significant, with a positively-signed coefficient ( $p < 0.01$  and  $b = 0.066$ ). This indicates that, similar to parties in member states, parties in non-member states are more likely to emphasise ‘principled issues’ in their manifestos in response to changes in their environment deriving from increasing delegation to the EU level. Moreover, the impact of EU constraints on the coverage of principled issues is greater for parties in non-member states than in EU members, as is shown when comparing the standardised coefficients of 0.053 and 0.028, respectively. This result is further supported by the Wald test ( $F = 22.26$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ) since, in this instance, the null hypothesis can be rejected that the coefficients of *EU competence non-member principled* and *EU competence member principled* are similar at the one per cent level. A possible explanation for this interesting finding is that parties in non-member states either feel strongly about those principled issues for which increasing delegation to the EU takes place or, alternatively, emphasize those issues as a result of EU constraints in order to express their opposition to its powers in these areas.

I also control for other factors that might plausibly have an impact on levels of issue coverage. Globalization has a similar impact to EU regulations, since it also serves to change the environment within which governments and parties operate. The impact of globalization is primarily indirect, whereas the constraints resulting from increasing delegation to the EU have a more direct impact. Moreover, the latter has an effect upon a wider range of issues whereas the effect resulting from globalization is generally limited to issues of an economic nature. As economies become more exposed to globalization, the pressures that derive from globalization will increase and parties are expected to de-emphasise economic issues. The results from the estimation do not confirm this theoretical expectation. Although increased exposure to globalization has an impact on the average attention placed on issues by parties, parties appear to give *more* attention to issues as a result.

The emphasis placed on issues within the political agenda is also influenced by more *ad hoc* and often unforeseen external factors (Carmines and Stimson, 1986). These can be broadly defined as unexpected events that increase, often markedly, the degree of attention given to a particular issue. Such events could conceivably range from economic crises or political scandals to participation in an international conflict, such as the Iraq war, and natural disasters, such as the widespread flooding of countries in mainland Europe in 2002. Some of these events are expected to have a similar EU-wide impact in terms of increasing the coverage of a particular issue, but other events may only increase attention in just a single country or a group of countries. It is, though, difficult to control for the impact of such events across a wide array of issue areas. I include a measure of countries’ individual growth rates per election year to control for poor economic performance, which could be expected to raise the attention given to economic issues.

I also control in the models for the intensity of party competition by using a measure of the degree of polarization for each party system. The more polarized a party system is, the more the overall vote share of non-mainstream/alternative parties increases compared to the total vote share received by mainstream parties in an election. So, in more polarized systems voters are more likely to support alternative parties such as the Greens, the Communists and extreme-right parties. This measure captures to what extent the electorate supports mainstream or non-mainstream parties. In cases of increased polarization, I expect issue ownership will take place to a greater extent and thus parties will compete by placing emphasis on different issues. This could have an indirect impact by decreasing the average level of coverage parties place on each issue, since the parties’ attention is dispersed amongst a wider range of issues. The results in Table 1 show that the degree of party system polarization has an impact on the average attention parties place on issues. As party system

polarization increases and voters support non-mainstream/alternative parties to a greater extent, average issue coverage decreases. This interesting result is significant at the one per cent level for all models. Overall, the results reported in Table 1 confirm the main expectation that as EU decision-making competence increases in issue areas parties respond by de-emphasising 'pragmatic issues' in their manifestos. In contrast, the finding relating to 'principled issues' indicates that parties respond to increasing delegation to EU institutions by devoting greater attention to them in their manifestos. These findings provide support for the hypotheses set out earlier on.

## **Conclusion**

The findings of the empirical analysis support the core argument that increased decision-making powers at the EU level in a number of issue areas affects the average coverage that parties place on these issues in their manifestos. The impact of EU constraints on issue coverage differs across parties in member states and in non-member countries. In effect, EU constraints appear to have a more direct impact on parties in member states compared to those in non-member countries. The results also show that parties in member states are more responsive to changes that derive from delegation to the EU institutions on 'pragmatic' issues compared to 'principled' issues. Parties pay less attention to 'pragmatic issues' in their manifestos as a response to delegation whereas they pay more attention to 'principled issues'.

Taken together, the results in this paper confirm and extend the findings of Bernhard (2004) on the impact of European integration on issue coverage in party manifestos. They also underline the arguments put forward by Bernhard (2004) and Mair (2000) on this question. These results make an important contribution to the limited number of existing studies in this area. Based on the findings of this paper and those reported in previous studies (Hix, 2003; Nanou and Dorussen, 2004; Bernhard, 2004; Pennings, 2005; Dorussen and Nanou, 2006), I can conclude that not only do parties' positions converge on issues where the EU has predominant decision-making power, but that these issues are increasingly de-emphasised in their manifestos. The impact of European integration on party competition both restricts the range of feasible policy options for both parties and voters at national elections and, as a consequence of this, reduces the coverage of these issues in domestic political debate. Taken together, these findings suggest potentially deleterious consequences for the quality and nature of democratic choice within the member states and highlight from a different perspective the complexities of the debate surrounding the EU's much-discussed 'democratic deficit'.

Figures and Tables




Figure 1. Average Coverage of Issues in Party Manifestos




Figure 2. Coverage of Issues in Party Manifestos by Level of Delegation




Figure 3. Coverage of Principled and Pragmatic Issues by Level of Delegation



Table 1. European Integration and Issue Coverage, Robust Country Cluster OLS Estimators with Country Dummies (1968-2005)

<i>Coverage</i>		
	Coefficients	Standardised Coefficients
<i>Ln Coverage Lag</i>	0.8282 (0.0157)**	0.8242
<i>EU competence member pragmatic</i>	-0.0271 (0.0043)**	-0.0475
<i>EU competence non-member pragmatic</i>	-0.0076 (0.0072)	-0.0096
<i>EU competence member principled</i>	0.0250 (0.0072)**	0.0287
<i>EU competence non-member principled</i>	0.0661 (0.0084)**	0.0532
<i>Trend</i>	0.0005 (0.0006)	0.0072
<i>Growth rate</i>	0.0024 (0.0013)+	0.0099
<i>Openness</i>	0.0017 (0.0004)**	0.0879
<i>Polarization</i>	-0.0017 (0.0004)**	-0.0699
F –test difference of EU competence-coefficient member pragmatic = member principled (p> F)	80.26 (0.0000)	
F –test difference of EU competence- coefficient member principled = non-member principled (p> F)	22.26 (0.0002)	
F –test difference of EU competence- coefficient member pragmatic = non-member pragmatic (p> F)	7.82 (0.0124)	
F –test difference of EU competence- coefficient non-member pragmatic = non-member principled (p> F)	59.30 (0.0000)	
Observations	2864	
Adjusted R-squared	0.94	

Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%. The individual country dummy estimates are not reported in the table but are available upon request.

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