Department of Political and Social Sciences

PRINCIPLES, INTERESTS AND BELIEFS: PUBLIC OPINION ON INTERNATIONAL AID

Jørgen Bølstad

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of
Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute

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ABSTRACT

Why do some individuals show more support for international aid than others? And are people in donor countries less supportive of the idea of aid than those in recipient countries? These are the primary questions motivating this thesis, and the results can be summarized by four main findings. One is that the level of economic development, which determines a country's status as a potential aid donor, has a strong influence on support for aid, as citizens of more developed countries are considerably less in favor of increasing aid than others are. The second finding is that, among donor countries, the level of development is positively related to several forms of opposition to the donation of aid. This appears partly due to the fact that more developed countries have donated more aid, for a longer period. Respondents in countries that donate more are more likely to find current levels of international aid sufficient, and this may explain part of the between-country differences. In other words, people in donor countries may find the extent of international aid satisfactory at lower levels than those in other countries. Most notably, however, people in more developed countries are more likely to state disinterest as a reason for not supporting aid, and this reason is the only one that has a clear impact on aggregate levels of support. There is also some evidence that greater donations increase skepticism regarding the impact of aid, but it is not clear that this affects aggregate support. Furthermore, the third finding is that individual beliefs regarding the impact of aid are endogenous to support for aid. While such beliefs appear to influence the support for aid at the individual level, there is also a significant effect of support on the beliefs themselves. The fourth finding is that the negative relationship between economic development and support holds for all but the very least developed countries of the world. It appears that respondents in the latter countries are living under such conditions they lack the critical opinions typically found in more developed countries, making it hard to compare them to those from more developed countries.

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1. INTRODUCTION

We live in a world of considerable economic inequality, and while inequalities within nations are notable, international inequalities are even more pronounced. Differences between countries' mean incomes explain between 75 and 88 percent of the world's overall income inequality, and "[a]n American having the average income of the bottom US decile is better-off than 2/3 of the world population" (Milanovic 2002: 89). Such international inequality is a relatively recent phenomenon, having been negligible compared to intra-national economic inequality up until the last few centuries. The rapid development of global communications has also increased the interactions between people living under different conditions, making them more aware of these inequalities and confronting them with related ethical dilemmas. Just as the presence of inequality and poverty within a country generates calls for redistributive measures, international inequalities tend to create calls for international redistributive measures. Jan Tinbergen, for example, a Nobel Prize winner in economics, takes the following position:

> [T]here should … be redistribution at the international level through development cooperation. … As the world economy becomes increasingly integrated, so the redistribution of world income should become similar to that within well-governed nations. (Tinbergen 1994: 88; cited by UNDP 1999)

Along the same lines, Pogge (2008: 107) finds international inequality particularly grave compared to national inequality, due to the lack of democratic international institutions: "even a large majority of those on whom [the existing global economic order] is imposed – the poorest four-fifths of humankind, for instance – cannot reform it by peaceful means".[1] Whether or not we find this perspective appropriate, it is clear that international inequalities generate a number of dilemmas, and that the citizens of developed countries may have an important influence on how they are handled. Thus, we are led to the question of how the public – not least in developed, democratic countries – form its opinions on international issues and foreign policy.

[1] Against this background, it has even been claimed that "the contours of the world today bear an eerie resemblance to the political dilemmas that [were] found in the years leading up to the revolutions in England, America, France, and Russia" (Webb 2006: 84), but this is not the issue here.

While some features of domestic politics are paralleled internationally, others are undeniably different, and the comparison of the two spheres has proven fruitful to both empirical research and political theory. In domestic politics, it is frequently taken for granted that economic self-interests influence the distributive principles people endorse and the preferences they express. The expected pattern is typified by traditional class conflicts, in which "individuals who objectively benefit from the stratification system in comparison with others are more likely to judge its inequalities to be just" (Robinson and Bell 1978: 128). Yet, with regard to development aid for example, people of donor countries appear highly supportive and altruistic (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003). This paradox has received limited attention, and we know little about aggregate patterns of support for international aid and what explains them. Given theories holding states to be fundamentally self-interested (e.g. Gilpin 1987; Keohane 1984; Waltz 1979), and others holding foreign policy to be shaped by public opinion (e.g. Aldrich et al. 2006; Hartley and Russett 1992; Jacobs and Page 2005; Shapiro and Jacobs 2000), we might expect public opinion to reflect national interests, but we do not know whether this is the case. The best way to address this matter may be to focus on issues where individual self-interests generally overlap within countries, and it is argued below that international aid is such an issue, at least to a greater extent than most other foreign policy issues.

MAIN QUESTION

Thus, this study is centered on the following question: Why do some people and some countries show more support for development aid than others? Of particular interest is the more specific question of how and why such support varies with levels of economic development in the countries within which it is measured. In order to provide an answer to this last question, other explanations than economic development requires an examination, meaning the first question has also to be addressed. Nevertheless, focus will be on economic development, as it provides the basis for possible international disagreements based on self-interest, which makes it particularly interesting. The "why" parts of these questions call for investigations going deeper into cognitive processes underlying public opinion on this issue. It therefore invites analyses of the reasons respondents give for their expressed opinions and the role these play for aggregate levels of support. It also calls for analyses of the possible external influences on these reasons, as well analyses of the directions of causality between the opinions in question. Some of these questions to be investigated here are inspired by a little noticed article called *Perceptions of Global Inequality: A Call for Research* (Olson

1997). While some of the hypotheses posed in that article are too complex to be answered by existing survey data, others are not, and some of the questions investigated here still resemble those suggested there.

As mentioned, the most intuitive hypothesis with regard to the main question is that greater economic development leads to popular lower support for international aid, as developed countries generally must expect an overall economic loss from their aid donations, while people in less developed countries may stand to gain from them. This is a simple and plausible interest-based hypothesis. In fact, it is the main hypothesis of this project. While it may seem obvious, it would be a mistake to take its validity for granted – as later chapters will demonstrate. One point to note is that support for aid donations is reported to be strong in donor nations, which seems to contradict the idea that there is much interest-based opposition to such donations. In addition, one could pose a plausible counter-hypothesis, namely that of post-materialism (Inglehart 1997). According to that theory, the increasing economic and physical security related to economic growth should gradually turn people away from materialist values, towards an emphasis on individual autonomy and self-expression. It is also held to predict a shift towards environmentalism, humanitarianism, and cosmopolitanism. Thus, according to this theory, greater economic development might be related to greater support for international aid, as international obligations might be perceived as stronger, and the costs of donations less important. In short, we know little about what determines the support for international aid at the aggregate level, and we cannot take any answers for granted.

So What?

Why should we care about opinions on foreign policy, and aid policy in particular? What does it matter? There are several answers to these questions. The first is practical. While the debate regarding the impact and effectiveness of development is left for a later section of this introduction, there is little doubt aid policies have important consequences. Thus, they clearly merit attention and scrutiny. We also know that public opinion influences many forms of public policy, as demonstrated, for example, by the literature on dynamic representation (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). Several studies suggest this also applies to certain areas of foreign policy (see e.g., Aldrich et al. 2006; Hartley and Russett 1992; Jacobs and Page 2005; Shapiro and Jacobs 2000). Thus, public

opinion on foreign aid may influence actual aid policies, which in turn have important consequences. Collier, for example, argues:

> The key obstacle to reforming aid is public opinion. … Public opinion drives [politicians] into the "I care" photo opportunities that dominate aid. (Collier 2008: 183)

While the link between public opinion and policy has also been argued to be weak with regard to development aid (Olsen 2001), very little research has been conducted on this issue and the evidence is inconclusive. Thus, it deserves more attention. A brief look at the data suggests that there may be an effect of public support on development aid donations, at least cross-sectionally, as illustrated by Figure 1.1 below. Looking only at the early members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), there is a reasonably strong relationship between support and donations, with a correlation of .66 (N = 10).[2] Of course, this is not strong evidence that public opinion influences aid policy, but it is at least consistent with such a conclusion. This, then, is the first answer to the "so what" question; these opinions may be of considerable consequence.

[2] The countries that joined (and remained in) the DAC later (i.e. after 1985) are shown in grey. These countries, in particular Greece and Spain, blur the picture somewhat, because their donations are lower than their public support would suggest, compared to other countries. This could be due to the shorter period in which aid donations appear to have been a relevant issue, and the presence of greater domestic policy challenges, but this is not the place to test such explanations.



Figure 1.1. National aid donations over public support for aid, EU, 1999.

Note: Countries that joined the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) before 1985 are shown in black, while those who joined later are shown in grey with hollow circles. The line is a linear least squares fitline based on the first group of countries. Aid donations are measured as Official Development Assistance (ODA) as percentage share of the Gross National Income (GNI), for 1999. The data are from the OECD (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003). Support for aid is measured by the percentage of the population who says it is important or very important "to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop". The data are taken from the the Eurobarometer 50.1 (Melich 2006), conducted in 1999.

The second reason why the topic matters is theoretical. Theories of international relations make assumptions about the nature and the behavior of states, and the sources of this behavior. Opinions on foreign aid are particularly useful for starting to assess such assumptions empirically. Several strands of international relations theory hold that states have an essentially self-interested behavior, and identify domestic political factors, including public opinion, as the sources of this behavior. An example with regard to international political economy, is the position of Gilpin (2001: 18), who holds that "the economic/foreign policies of a society reflect the nation's national interest as defined by the dominant elite of that society", but also that such policies are determined by "the pressures of powerful groups within a national society", along with other influences. In light of this, we could expect public opinion on international matters to reflect national interests, underpinning the assumed self-interested behavior of states. While Gilpin admits "there is a subjective element in an elite's definition of the national interest", he also argues "objective factors … are of great importance". Thus, the interests perceived by the public may similarly be derivable from objective features. In economic terms, for example, the national interest may involve maximizing the national average income, and the appropriate policy to do so may depend on objective features of the national economy. As we know little of whether public opinion

actually reflects such objectively defined interests as some theories seem to imply, an investigation of this matter may teach us more also about international relations.

Foreign aid is a particularly useful case in this regard. For most policy areas, it is possible to identify policies that will increase, if not maximize the national income. Yet, for most of them, such as trade policies, or currency regimes, different domestic interests will also be fundamentally at odds, public opinion may be swayed in different directions, and the strongest groups may succeed in setting policy, whether this promotes the national income or not. When it comes to foreign aid, on the other hand, it is less complex. Citizens of donor countries must in general expect economic losses from international aid, taking on the burden of financing it, while those of recipient countries stand to gain, or at least not lose. While considerations that are more complex may also come into play, foreign aid is an economic issue with a simpler structure of interests than those of most others. Surveys also (e.g. PIPA 2001) seem to support the assumption that the public generally perceives development aid as a tool for alleviating human suffering and promoting economic development abroad, rather than for promoting national interests. Thus, opinions on aid are interesting as they may both be shaped by altruistic motives and interests that conflict with them, and may say something about the relative strength of the two.

The last reason why this topic deserves attention is more ethical. The debates on the effect of foreign aid, and conflicts between interests and principles, make this area suited for studying political psychology. This, in turn, may improve the processes by which we form our opinions. Identifying unacknowledged influences on our political behavior, and confronting us with these, may alert us to cognitive mechanisms that are ethically hard to justify. An example is the possible influence of self-interests on opinions on foreign aid. As illustrated by, for example, the work of normative theorists such as Rawls and Barry, when principles are chosen for serving the interests of the actors choosing, we tend not to regard them as genuine ethical beliefs. Thus, results indicating such a pattern could provoke reflection as to whether commonly held beliefs are indeed genuine, impartial and properly considered. As Miller (1992: 589) notes, “disagreement of this sort is not fundamental in the sense that people who understand what justice is should be willing to revise their beliefs when these are shown to be biased by self-interest.”

Some may still question whether the average survey respondent has a considered opinion on these issues. What if he or she does not think in terms of general moral principles, but produce

"opinion statements" on the fly, as Zaller (1992) suggests? A possible answer is that it does not matter. Even if people do not hold "opinions," but rather have different "response probabilities" based upon their averaging across considerations they find salient – as Zaller holds – their attachment of salience to such considerations implies a value judgment. If people in developed countries find an "additional tax contribution" a more salient negative consideration than they find "to help people in poor countries" a positive one, it is consequential. If people are asked to explain their responses they will at least tend to rationalize and justify them *post hoc*, in terms of principles, even if that was not how they came up with the response. If their expressed opinions reflect their political behavior in general, they are important regardless of how considered they are. Collier (2008: 184), for example, argues that aid agencies need to reform their practices, taking more risks, but that they are unable to do so, due to "ordinary citizens who support vociferous lobbies without bothering to get informed."

WHAT WE KNOW

As the later chapters will demonstrate, the main question of this study spurs other, smaller, and more specific questions, which relate to several different literatures. The full body of literature thus made relevant will not be reviewed here, but rather discussed in later chapters, where appropriate and necessary. At this point, it appears most useful to focus on studies of immediate relevance to the main question of this project. That is, studies of opinions on international aid, and particularly those that relate them to economic development. The discussion is kept short, and even some studies of opinions on aid that are left aside to be discussed later, as they are mainly relevant to later chapters.

Several international organizations and public agencies regularly monitor public opinion on development aid, producing a number of reports on the topic. In addition to national surveys, several international ones have included questions regarding development aid, such as the International Social Survey Programme ISSP (ISSP 1999), the World Values Survey (EVS/WVS 2006), the Pew Global Attitudes Project (Pew Research Center 2007b), and several of the European Commission's Eurobarometers (EB). The EB is a main source of data on the topic, having been repeated several times, in several countries, with the same questions. A notable finding from the EB reports is that support for the donation of aid appears to be consistently high, with 75 to 95% of the respondents saying it is important or very important "to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to

develop". The report based on the EB 62.2 also notes that "[t]he striking point in the results is the high proportion of respondents who position themselves at the extreme end of the answer scale: at the European Union level as many as 53% respond that it is "very important" to help people in poor countries" (TNS 2005: 26). Along the same lines, an OECD report assessing earlier survey data notes that, "[p]ublic support in OECD DAC Member countries for helping poor countries has remained consistently high for almost two decades: there is no aid fatigue" (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003: 10).

While these reports contain much information, they are mainly descriptive, reporting aggregate results for different groups of respondents – countries, age groups, occupational groups etc. The EB 62.2 (TNS 2005: 26), for example, shows that respondents who are younger, have higher education, or live in urban areas are more supportive of aid than others. The same holds for managers and students, compared to other occupational groups, and for people who place themselves to the left on the political left-right scale. In addition, people who were born outside of Europe, but now reside in the EU, as well as those who have at least one parent born outside of Europe, are more supportive of aid than others are. While this information is interesting, it is generally not given a theoretical framework, nor is it based on analyses that take the causal structure into account. Considerable amounts of data have been produced, and reports based on them present only the most readily available information. Most notably, they tend not to provide analyses of between-country differences, which is the focus of this study.

A few other studies have looked at international differences in the support for aid donations, and of particular interest are those that investigate the role of economic development in explaining these differences. Lübker (2004) uses data from the ISSP (1999) to relate support for international aid to GDP per capita. Looking mainly at a bivariate aggregate analysis, he finds that the most developed countries in the world tend to show somewhat lower support. However, the analysis "failed to explain why support differs greatly within the developed world", and he notes that "the level of income alone cannot account for the variance between countries" (Lübker 2004: 123). Using a multilevel model, including 17 developed countries, Paxton and Knack (2008) find, contrary to their expectation, that "the GDP of a society has a significantly negative effect on support for foreign aid" (Paxton and Knack 2008: 16). They provide no explanation of this finding, but find it interesting that: "in contrast to the generally positive effect of socio-economic status on support for foreign aid at the individual level, in the aggregate, richer countries do not exhibit greater support for foreign aid" (Paxton and

Knack 2008: 16). It should be noted, however, that this latter finding is based on a selection of only developed countries, and thus cannot be assumed to hold more generally. In short, the few studies that relate support for aid to economic development fail to give clear answers, in part due to the limitations of the analyses, whether in sophistication or country coverage.

As a preliminary step, it may also be useful to look at the development of opinions on aid over time, something the Eurobarometer data allows at least to some extent. Unfortunately, earlier attempts to do so appear somewhat unreliable,[3] so it is may be worth turning to the original data. Since the EB 36.0 in October-November 1991, surveys with the same or virtually the same question have been repeated for a total of seven times until the EB 71.2 in May-June 2009.[4] Combining these datasets and aggregating them up to the country level, we get a small set of panel data for a selection of European countries. Figure 1.2 shows the data over time, for the countries whose data are available from each of the seven surveys.[5] As can be seen, public opinion on this matter generally moves in the same direction in different countries, suggesting it responds to shared external influences, such as global economic trends, international events or crises, or debates with an international reach. It can also be noted that, although there may have been a slight drop in support from 2005 to 2010, support over the period as a whole appears to have increased somewhat. In most countries support is higher in

[3] For example, the report based on the EB 62.2 (TNS 2005) shows a plot of support for the EU as a whole, but the pattern is somewhat different from – and even inconsistent with – the one presented below. The problem appears to lie in the report, since is also conflicts with earlier reports. For the EB 44.1, for example, the report shows 95% support in the EU as a whole, while the earlier report (INRA 1996) says it is 77%, and finds no country with a share above 90%. For the EB 46.0, on the other hand, the reported number appears to be too low, compared to the number given in the original report (INRA 1997), which appears to be more correct.

[4] In the two first surveys, the EB 36.0 and 44.1, the questioning differed from those of the later ones. Respondents were asked: "Here is a list of problems that people of [this country] are interested in to varying degrees. [show card] Could you please tell me for each one whether you personally consider it is a very important problem, important, not very important, or not at all important?" One of the issues listed was "Helping poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc.". Thus, the word "develop" was introduced later when the question was asked only in relation to development aid and not other issues. However, the differences are slight, and do not have an obvious impact on the trends.

[5] These are France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain and Portugal.

the last than the first survey, and towards the end, none of the countries show as low support as some did in the beginning.



Figure 1.2. Support for aid from 1990 to 2010 for twelve EU countries with complete data.

Note: Respondents who say it is important or very important "to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop" are coded as supporters. The countries included are France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain and Portugal. The data sources are the EB 36.0 (Reif 1998a), 44.1 (Reif 1998b), 46.0 (Melich 2000), 50.1 (Melich 2006), 58.2 (Soufflot de Magny 2007), 62.2 (European Commission 2007), and 71.2 (European Commission 2009).

FOREIGN AID AND ITS IMPACT

Just as the presence of inequality and poverty within a country generates calls for redistributive measures, international inequalities and, especially poverty within countries whose governments appear unable respond, tends to create calls for international redistributive measures. However, such policies are even more controversial than are those implemented within countries. In practice, calls for international action against poverty have resulted in the donation of foreign aid, a term that refers to voluntary transfers of public resources from one country to another, at least in part motivated by a desire to improve the conditions of the recipient country. A more formal definition is this: "a voluntary transfer of public resources, from a government to another independent government, to an NGO, or to an international organization (such as the World Bank or the UN Development Program) with at least a 25 percent grant element, one goal of which is to better the human condition in the country receiving the aid" (Lancaster 2006: 9).[6] While foreign aid has sometimes been given

[6] This resembles OECD's definition of official development assistance (ODA) which is given below.

such a wide interpretation as to include military assistance, most governments and organizations now leavesuch aid out of their aid figures.

A more important distinction is that between development aid and humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid usually refers to short-term efforts to reduce suffering or save lives, in response to humanitarian crises that may result from natural disasters or violent conflict. Such aid generally takes the form of logistical and material assistance. Development aid, on the other hand, aims to improve social and economic conditions in the long-term, by addressing deeper obstacles to development. The OECD define official development assistance (ODA) as: "Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount)" (OECD 2007: 546). If we stick to the common definition of humanitarian aid as short-term responses to immediate crises, the kind of aid in focus of this project is development aid, although the distinction is often blurred.

Both within and outside academic circles, there are intense debates regarding the impact and desirability of development aid, and they are about as old as such aid itself (see for example Friedman 1958). In part, this is due to different views on what aid is to achieve. If the main goal is to create economic growth, and eventually remove the need for further aid, as many have though and still think, there is indeed much room for debate. While there are many notable advocates of aid, vocal critics argue that it fails to produce growth, and instead creates bad incentives, invites corruption and is misused (see for example Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009). Another concern has been that volatile and temporary aid flows may lead to "Dutch disease".[7] That is, an appreciation of the real exchange rate and increased demand for domestic non-tradable goods and services, at the expense of private investment and tradable industries (e.g., Younger 1992). Unfortunately, whether conclusions are drawn in favor of aid or not, they are often based on anecdotal evidence. Advocates and critics appear equally able to muster evidence of development aid successes and failures, respectively, and so disagreement on whether aid promotes growth continues

However, there is an increasing body of statistical studies on the impact of aid. Academic interest in this issue grew considerably after the publication of an article by Burnside and

[7] A term coined by *The Economist* in 1977, to describe the effect of natural gas on the Dutch economy.

Dollar (2000: 847), which found that "aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies". This provided both a rationale for giving aid, and had implications for who the recipients ought to be – governments implementing good policies. Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) attempted to replicate the analysis, based on a dataset expanded in terms of time and country coverage (see also Easterly 2003). However, with the new data they "no longer find that aid promotes growth in good policy environments" (Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2004: 779). Still, they do "not argue that aid is ineffective", but rather "note that adding additional data to the […] study of aid effectiveness raises new doubts about the effectiveness of aid". In their reply, Burnside and Dollar (2004), argued that the interaction between policy and aid is non-linear, and that the evidence does to some extent still support their claims.

While research has been conducted on the relationship between aid and growth for many years now, no consensus can be said to have emerged. Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) conduct a meta-analysis of 97 studies published before 2005, and argue that the "preponderance of the evidence indicates that aid has not been effective". The study "failed to find evidence of a significantly positive effect of aid", and the authors thus conclude that "if there is an effect, it must be small" (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009: 457). Other scholars argue aid has significant detrimental effects fitting the model of Dutch disease, and suggest this may explain why aid often appears not to have a positive effect on growth (Arellano et al. 2009; Rajan and Subramanian Forthcoming). In short, many empirical studies give reason to doubt the effectiveness of aid in generating economic growth.

However, studies of this kind face numerous challenges. As Wright and Winters (2010: 63) note, "[o]ne difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of foreign aid in fostering economic growth is that we know significant amounts of aid were never intended to bring about economic growth but rather were given to governments for geopolitical reasons". The motivations for donating aid may also have changed over time. Claessens, Cassimon, and Van Campenhout (2009), for example, find that bilateral aid has become more responsive to poverty and to the quality of policy and institutional environment in recipient countries. Thus, separating aid by type, or motivation, however difficult, may be crucial to obtain meaningful results. One recent attempt to distinguish the effect of aid intended to generate growth from that given for other reasons found a positive long-term effect on growth of the first kind of aid (Minoiu and Reddy 2010). However, another study, that attempts to do the same and

comments on an earlier version of the mentioned study, fails to find a similar effect (Rajan and Subramanian 2008). In short, it may be too early to conclude on the effect of aid on growth. There may even be reason to doubt that all the questions economists and policy-makers would like to see answered on this issue can be (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007).

The apparent failure of aid at the macro level stands in contrast to the apparent success at the micro level, something Mosley (1986, 1987) have referred to as the micro-macro paradox. While macro-level studies have failed to yield clear evidence that aid generates economic growth, most individual development projects appear successful. Aid projects usually have evaluation mechanisms, and general studies reviewing their success present a largely positive picture. Most aid projects are reported to succeed in terms of their own objectives, and few are found to do harm, even when they do not succeed (e.g. Cassen 1986, 1994). There may be several reasons for this apparent discrepancy, but the most obvious is that different outcomes are in focus. As White (1992: 165) notes, "[p]roject benefits counted at evaluation may well not contribute to increased national income".

This is a reminder that generating growth need not be the only goal of aid – if it is to be one at all. It is worth noting the position of Easterly (2007: 331), who believes "development assistance was a mistake":

> [I]t doesn't necessarily follow that foreign aid should be eliminated. Once freed from the delusion that it can accomplish development, foreign aid could finance piecemeal steps aimed at accomplishing particular tasks for which there is clearly a huge demand – to reduce malaria deaths, to provide more clean water, to build and maintain roads, to provide scholarships for talented but poor students, and so on.

The kind of aid Easterly calls for may blur the distinction between humanitarian aid and development aid. It is motivated by humanitarian concerns and aimed at specific problems, but without being short-term disaster relief. However, while it is neither directly aimed at creating long-term economic growth, it may still fall under the definition of development aid, insofar as this entails promoting the "welfare of developing countries", as the OECD definition does. Leaving this aside, the point is that there appears to be a potential for aid to play a positive role even if it does not generate economic growth.[8] Although the present study

[8] The main challenge to this idea is that such aid also may lead to Dutch disease – especially if aid flows are unstable over time (cf. Arellano et al. 2009).

is generally agnostic about the general effectiveness of aid and its impact on growth, this potential is part of what makes aid deserve scholarly attention, along with public opinion on the issue.

Outline of Chapters

The following four chapters address different aspects of the general topic, each having their own hypotheses and analyses, and a discussion of relevant literature. They are ordered according to a logic progressing from the more general to the more specific, as the later chapters address questions that arise from the earlier ones. In this sense, the earlier chapters provide rationales for the investigations in the later ones, while the latter make the answers of the former more complete.

Chapter 2 addresses the main questions in a straightforward way.[9] That is, it looks at macro-level explanations of international differences in opinions on aid, with a special focus on the role of economic development. The main hypothesis is that people in more developed countries are less supportive of international aid than those of less developed countries, and that, in this sense, there is disagreement between them. Other hypotheses, that are both interesting in their own right and that may help bring forward and clarify the role of economic development, are also assessed. One is that egalitarian attitudes increase the support for aid at the individual level, while another is that this helps explain between-country differences, as some countries are more egalitarian than others. A third hypothesis is that greater domestic social and economic challenges decrease the support for aid. To assess these hypotheses, hierarchical regression models are employed, using opinion data from the ISSP (1999) that include a good indicator of support for aid, and covers a good range of countries. When other salient explanations are taken into account, the level of economic development is found highly influential, which means that there is considerable disagreement between the citizens of more and less developed countries. Among developed countries the effect of GDP appears due to the length of the period in which a country has been donating aid, which is strongly related to the level of development. The analysis also finds support for the hypothesis that domestic challenges reduce support, while egalitarian attitudes fail to explain much of the overall pattern.

[9] It is based on a paper presented at the CEU Graduate Conference on Development and Participation, Budapest, June 19-21, 2009, and at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 2-5, 2010.

Chapter 3 starts from the observation that Chapter 2 only establishes there is a relationship between the responses in question and economic development, without going deeper into what explains the pattern. It could be the product of self-interest, but it does not necessarily need to be, as it could be due to, for example, a greater skepticism regarding the impact of aid. This could make a considerable difference with regard to how we interpret the pattern. Thus, Chapter 3 takes a closer look at the different kinds of reasons respondents give for their opinions. Of particular interest is whether these explain between-country differences, and whether other macro-level variables help to explain them. Only respondents' tendency to state they are not interested in aid appears able to explain national levels of support for aid. Interestingly, such disinterest is positively related to GDP per capita, as well as the length of the period in which a country has been donating aid. The analysis also suggests these variables are related to greater skepticism regarding the impact of aid, but it is not clear whether this affects the aggregate support for aid.

Chapter 4 takes a closer look at the role of beliefs regarding the impact of aid, and questions the assumption that such beliefs are exogenous determinants of the level of support for aid.[10] Because skepticism regarding the impact of aid tends to be seen as highly legitimate reasons for not supporting aid, the chapter hypothesizes that those who are less inclined to support aid in the first place may develop a greater skepticism regarding its impact. This hypothesis is based on the theory of cognitive dissonance and the assumption that individuals who do not support aid, yet believe it works and would help people in need, are likely to experience dissonance, and therefore adjust their beliefs or opinions. This is investigated using two research designs involving different datasets and indicators. The first deals with reciprocal causation using a two-stage instrumental variable approach. The second design uses indicators that avoid the challenge of reciprocal causation, but may suffer from the presence of a particular confounder. Thus, propensity score matching based on several measures of this confounder is used, before the effect on various measures of beliefs in effectiveness are estimated. Both analyses find significant effects of support for aid on beliefs regarding effectiveness.

[10] It is based on a paper presented to the EUI Colloquium on Political Behavior, Florence, November 25, 2010, and at the 68th Annual National Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, IL, April 22-25, 2010.

Chapter 5 departs from the observation that the selection of countries in Chapter 2 leaves out the poorest countries of the world.[11] It therefore turns to an alternative indicator from Pew Research Center (2007b) with wider country coverage, and examines its relationship with economic development. It shows that when it comes to the very least developed countries respondents tend to express greater satisfaction with – or less critical attitudes towards – current international aid efforts. Two hypotheses are presented that may account for this. One is parallel to the model of the public as thermostat (Wlezien 1995), suggesting that when countries receive more aid, their citizens become more satisfied with current aid levels and are less likely to call for more aid. The other hypothesis is that respondents in the least developed countries have a general tendency to give less critical assessments on large range are issues. These hypotheses are assessed in a multi-level mixed-effects logit analysis, which provides support for the latter hypothesis. That is, the respondents are less critical in countries whose level of development is very low, suggesting that particular care should be taken when responses from these countries are compared to those from other countries.

[11] It is based on a paper presented to the EUI Colloquium on Political Behavior, Florence, March 10, 2010 and at the 69th Annual National Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, IL, March 31 - April 3, 2011.

2. Economic Development and Opinions on Aid

In national politics, it is often taken for granted economic that self-interests influence the distributive principles people endorse and the policy preferences they express. The expected pattern is typified by traditional class conflicts. However, when it comes to international issues, it is less clear what to expect, and we know little of the behavior actually demonstrated. With regard to development aid, for example, people in donor countries appear highly supportive (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003). Thus, they seem to behave altruistically and to disconfirm the hypothesis that they might be less supportive than the citizens of recipient countries. Still, this issue has not received sufficient attention for a conclusion to be reached. What explains support for international redistribution – in the form of aid – has not been much explored with regard to macro-level explanations across levels of development. Prior studies leave open even the already outlined, fundamental question: do nationally defined economic interests explain international differences in opinions on international aid? This question needs to be answered in tandem with a consideration of other potential explanations, but it will receive most attention.

As mentioned in the introduction, the question posed above is interesting in part because the opinions in question may influence policy, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Public opinion has not only been shown to influence domestic policy (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995), but also foreign policy (e.g. Shapiro and Jacobs 2000).[12] In international relations theory, states are often assumed to pursue national interests, and given the link between public opinion and policy, we are led to the question of whether foreign policy is in part defined by self-interested national constituencies.[13] The best way to address this matter may be to focus on issues where individual self-interests generally overlap within countries, and it is argued here that international aid is such an issue.

[12] As discussed in Chapter 1, the link between public opinion and policy has been argued to be weak with regard to development aid (Olsen 2001), but the evidence on this matter is inconclusive and the issue deserves more attention.

[13] Of course, much international relations theory (e.g. Gilpin 1987; Keohane 1984; Waltz 1979) sees states as self-interested actors without necessarily drawing the link to public opinion. However, adding the assumption that governments pursue what they believe their constituents would want leads to the hypothesis that the opinions of these constituencies are informed by self-interest.

The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section discusses relevant theory and previous findings, before a set of hypotheses are introduced. Then, the indicators to be used in the later analysis are discussed along with selected relationships at the aggregate level. A subsequent section reports and discusses a set of hierarchical regression analyses. This is followed by a further discussion of the interpretation and generalizability of the findings. A short conclusion ends the chapter by discussing the results in a wider perspective and in relation to the other chapters.

THEORY AND PRIOR WORK

In the sphere of domestic politics, self-interest has been found to influence normative and empirical beliefs regarding economic inequality and redistribution. In the US, for example, an early study by Form and Rytina (1969: 29) could note that "about seven-tenths of the rich and one-tenth of the Negro poor felt the federal government had done too much for the poor". Similarly, Robinson and Bell (1978: 128) later found support for the "underdog principle", according to which "underdogs will tend to favor equality", while "individuals who objectively benefit from the stratification system in comparison with others are more likely to judge its inequalities to be just". Although the amount of variance explained this way varies, the pattern appears widespread. Thus, even the studies that seek a fuller picture of what explains preferences for domestic redistribution tend to confirm its presence in the process (e.g. Alesina and Ferrarab 2005; Fong 2001).

One might expect to find a similar pattern with regard to international aid comparing the public opinions of different countries. Citizens of more developed countries could be said to "objectively benefit" from the current structure of international political economy, in terms of having a higher average income. Thus, they may be less likely to see international inequalities as unfair, and be less in favor of aid. While many foreign policy issues have a nature that makes for national interest-based political conflicts, international aid may provide an attractively simple case. Here, individual interests may be easily defined and tend to coincide within countries. Countries that are potential net contributors of aid transfers could be said to have an objective interest in limiting them, whereas potential recipients have an interest in increasing them. Admittedly, it has been argued that international aid can lead to welfare improvement even in donor countries (Hatzipanayotou and Michael 1995), and potential domestic benefits are often pointed out by proponents of aid. Nevertheless, the main argument for giving aid is to help recipients achieve such goals as human development, economic

growth, or democracy. Survey data seem to support the assumption that the public generally perceives development aid as a tool for promoting such goals, rather than domestic interests (e.g. PIPA 2001). If development aid is accordingly perceived as redistribution in a zero-sum game, this simple model would make this issue well-suited for identifying any influence of nationally defined interest on public opinion.

A couple of studies relating opinions on aid to macro-level variables may indeed suggest opinions on aid are shaped by interests. While most research on such opinions tends to be descriptive and bivariate (e.g. INRA 1996, 1997; Lübker 2004) or to stay at the individual level (e.g. Chong and Gradstein 2008), Paxton and Knack (2008) employ a multilevel model that includes 17 developed countries. Looking at GDP per capita, they find that, contrary to their expectation, "the GDP of a society has a significantly negative effect on support for foreign aid" (Paxton and Knack 2008: 16). They provide no explanation of this finding, but find it interesting that: "in contrast to the generally positive effect of socio-economic status on support for foreign aid at the individual level, in the aggregate, richer countries do not exhibit greater support for foreign aid" (Paxton and Knack 2008: 16). The other study that relates support for aid to GDP per capita mainly relies on a bivariate aggregate analysis (Lübker 2004). It finds a relationship at the aggregate level, as the populations of the most developed countries tend to show somewhat lower support, but it also finds that:

> support for international redistribution turns out to be far higher in a number of almost equally wealthy countries (Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain). [... In addition,] at very similar income levels, people in Latvia (6,428 PPP$ per capita) are the strongest opponents of international redistribution, while people in Brazil (7,173 PPP$ per capita) almost unanimously support it. This already indicates that the level of income alone cannot account for the variance between countries. (Lübker 2004: 123)

Thus, the analysis "failed to explain why support differs greatly within the developed world" (Lübker 2004: 123).

While these studies take some steps toward understanding the role of GDP (per capita) in shaping opinions on international aid, they do not provide a complete picture. If GDP "cannot alone account for the variance", other explanations must have been omitted, and we do not know what effect of GDP remains – or appears – once these omitted variables are properly taken into account. Paxton and Knack's study may be the most valuable with respect to the topic in question, but the fact that their sample only includes aid donors – countries that are

relatively well developed – means that the generality of their finding is uncertain. It tells us something about differences among donor countries, but it is not clear what, and it does not necessary demonstrate an interest-based pattern of redistributive preferences at the international level. The clearest prediction at the international level is that there would be disagreements on a broader scale, when potential net contributor countries are compared to recipient ones. Paxton and Knack's findings may, however, be a regional variation of this, as the least developed countries in their sample are EU members that, as Noël and Thérien (2002: 645) note, "have themselves benefited from European regional development programs" (cf. INRA 1996, 1997). Thus, their citizens may interpret the questions as pertaining also to intra-European transfers, or they may be more positive toward international transfers because of their own positive experiences.

In light of this, we may benefit from studying a wider selection of countries, which would also be interesting because some evidence suggests that there cannot be much disagreement across levels of development. Public agencies monitoring the support for development aid in donor countries continue to conclude that there are large majorities supporting the donation of aid, and broad consensus regarding its importance. As an OECD report puts it, "[p]ublic support in OECD DAC Member countries for helping poor countries has remained consistently high for almost two decades: there is no aid fatigue" (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003: 10). However, the report also notes:

> It may therefore seem a paradox that, for all these strong political declarations and commitments, global aid flows to developing countries have been declining continuously since the early 1990s. Indeed, the volume of ODA as a share of the combined gross national income (GNI) of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Member countries fell from 0.33 per cent in 1992 to 0.22 per cent in 2001, far from the 0.7 per cent share they have committed to (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003: 11).

This suggests that the cited support may have little substance – an issue to be discussed further below (as well as in the general Appendix to this thesis, which discusses the measurement of public support).

Before that, alternatives to interest-based explanations deserve attention. An obvious hypothesis reflects the theory of "the public as thermostat" (Wlezien 1995, 1996), which is part of the literature on dynamic representation (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). As most survey questions on public policy ask

whether respondents want more or less of something, compared to the current state of affairs, they can be said to capture *relative* (as opposed to absolute) policy preferences. In national contexts, classic system theories of democracy suggest that relative policy preferences should respond to policy outputs, producing feedback to the system (Deutsch 1963; Easton 1953, 1965). This is exactly what Wlezien (1995, 1996) finds, arguing that the public works like a thermostat (cf. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Franklin and Wlezien 1997; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). That is, the public adjusts its calls for more or less spending on an issue according to what it gets, so that "the public's preference for more (less) policy – its relative preference […] – represents the difference between the public's preferred level of policy […] and policy […] itself" (Wlezien 1995: 985-986):

$$\textit{Relative preference} = \textit{Absolute preference} - \textit{Policy}. \quad (1)$$

Thus, the question of whether survey questions capture absolute or relative preferences – or a mixture – is crucial. As will be clear below, the measure used in this chapter is phrased as a question of preferences relative to the current situation, asking whether aid should be increased. However, it does not refer to the policies of specific countries, and this could potentially obscure a pattern of thermostatic responsiveness, as respondents may have different assessments of current levels of aid in general and current levels of aid donated by their own country. Nevertheless, this potential explanation deserves consideration.

Another alternative hypothesis stands in even clearer contrast to that of self-interest. The assumption that people are self-interested actors has had an exceptionally strong theoretical and empirical standing in many fields, not least in economics. It has been so commonplace that much work has been done just to demonstrate that people are not always and completely self-interested (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher 2002; for an overview, see: Fehr and Schmidt 2006; Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan 1981). Rather than disconfirming the role of self-interest, these studies add nuance to the traditional model by demonstrating that normative beliefs play an independent role in determining behavior, in addition to interest. Similar effects seem to be present with regard to development aid and international redistribution. Paxton and Knack, for example, find an effect of left-right self-positioning.[14] Perhaps more relevant, however, Lumsdaine (1993) finds that Americans

[14] Also of possible relevance, Chong and Gradstein (2008) find greater support for aid among those who are more satisfied with the people in office and expressing greater confidence in the government.

supporting domestic social spending tend also to support the donation of development aid. This may suggest that attitudes toward international aid reflect a more general egalitarianism. It may further explain why aid policies seem to reflect domestic welfare regimes (Lumsdaine 1993; Noël and Thérien 1995). That is, domestically generous welfare-states also tend to be more generous in terms of the share of GDP allocated to ODA. If opinions on both domestic and international redistribution are informed by egalitarian beliefs, countries in which egalitarianism is stronger on average may both develop more generous welfare states and development aid policies. In this light, it may be of significance that countries tend to form clusters on major value dimensions based on, for example, their religious and ideological heritage (e.g. Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Ideology, measured, for example, in terms of left-right self-placement, may explain opinions on international aid both at the individual and aggregate level. This is a clear alternative to the interest-based hypothesis, as ideology tends represent a deeper commitment to values that inform attitudes on a number of issues (cf. e.g. Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Noël and Thérien 2008; Noël, Thérien, and Dallaire 2004). Admittedly, individual ideology, especially as it relates to national redistribution, tends to correlate with interest measured as income, as mentioned above. However, a similar connection can hardly arise at the international level, as individual interests with regard national redistribution are much clearer and do not overlap with those related to international redistribution which are more clearly identified at the country level. Thus, with regard to international aid, ideology should provide a clear alternative to the self-interest.

However, while support for international aid may reflect a general egalitarianism, among certain donor countries, a negative aggregate level relationship has been identified between support for domestic and international redistribution (Noël and Thérien 2002). Of crucial importance here, however, is to distinguish between policy preferences that are absolute or "ideal" and those that are relative to current policies and circumstances, as explained above (cf. Wlezien 1995).[15] Noël and Thérien's measure of support for domestic redistribution is

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However, while this could reflect deeper values concerning for example the proper role of the state, it could also merely reflect current political satisfaction.

[15] This could help explain Paxton and Knack's negative relationship between support for development aid and GDP, as their most important indicator measures *relative* support (Paxton and Knack 2008). The most supportive countries do indeed seem to be ones whose aid levels currently make up small shares of GDP. However, they only find a significant effect of actual donations of ODA/GNI when excluding US and Japan, and GDP appears to explain more than ODA.

based on a question regarding the importance of "working towards reducing the number of very rich or very poor people" in the country (cf. Reif and Marlier 1996). In other words, it regards how important is it to work for *greater* national equality (than that which obtained at the time of the survey). Thus, Noël and Thérien interpret their finding as evidence that the perception of facing greater challenges related to national inequality reduces concerns about international inequality. "When equality has been institutionalized as an important principle, the public acknowledges the results and support for foreign aid is high; when this is not the case and domestic disparities remain important, redistribution at home appears more pressing and international justice less so" (Noël and Thérien 2002: 645). While this interpretation is based on a bivariate analysis of only ten countries, it does appear to hold, at least for these countries. In general, this argument may imply that citizens living in countries facing greater social and economic challenges (or those perceiving that they are) will show less support for development aid. However, Noël and Thérien also argue that some of those challenges, those related to inequality, are of a kind that are addressed by Leftist governments, and will therefore be less prevalent where the political Left has been strong and where there is a socialist welfare state. This is measured by the cumulative cabinet power of the Left (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993) and the socialist attributes of the welfare state (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990), respectively. Noël and Thérien find negative correlations between these two variables and the aggregate of calls for domestic redistribution, which in turn has a negative correlation with calls for international redistribution. These two variables have also been found to be important determinants of foreign aid (Noël and Thérien 1995; Thérien and Noël 2000). Thus, such institutional and political variables also deserve attention.

Lastly, there is the possibility that international differences in opinions on aid are due to differences in beliefs regarding the impact of aid. In light of the debates regarding the effect of aid outlined in Chapter 1, it is not surprising that many people are skeptical about giving aid. Public agencies surveying the support for aid frequently cite concerns about waste and inefficiency as a major reason for non-support (e.g. Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003; TNS 2005). If people were perfectly rational, and their goals were to achieve a certain level of development in all countries, then those believing aid to have less effect (but still a positive one) might want a higher level to aid to make up for the waste. However, it is more likely, as is often assumed, that greater skepticism regarding the positive impact of aid leads to lower support for aid. If the goal is to minimize waste, rather than achieving a certain level

of development, this makes sense. It also makes sense if respondents believe aid has no positive effect, or even a negative one.

What is important noting here, is that beliefs regarding the impact of aid may correlate with a country's experience with aid, as such experience, for example, may involve a greater public interest and therefore also more negative press coverage when projects have failed or research has questioned aid policies. Thus, such beliefs may also correlate with economic development, as more developed countries tend to give more aid. In other words, beliefs regarding the impact of aid may provide alternative explanations of why aid donations or economic development may have negative effects on support for aid. Unfortunately, this cannot be tested in the present analysis, but it will be tested in the next chapter, which uses survey data regarding respondents' reasons for their opinions.

HYPOTHESES

The following set of hypotheses will be assessed in this chapter:

1. Citizens of economically developed countries (as likely net contributors of international aid) will show less support for it than those of less developed countries.

2a. Citizens who place themselves to the left on the left-right scale will show more support for international aid.

2b. The relationship in Hypothesis 2a helps explain macro-level patterns, due to between-country differences in left-right self-placement.

3. Citizens of aid donating countries facing social and economic challenges will show less support for international aid than will those of such countries that fare better. Similarly, citizens of countries where equality has been institutionalized as an important principle, as the Left has been strong or a socialist welfare state has developed, will show more support for aid.

4. Citizens of countries that currently donate more aid are less in favor of increasing aid donations.

INDICATORS AND MACRO-LEVEL PATTERNS

The paradox identified by the OECD report mentioned above (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003) suggests that the choice of indicators deserves particular attention, as do the demonstrated role of framing effects when it comes to opinions on other international issues

(Hiscox 2006). The indicators relied upon by the OECD report (as well as Eurobarometer reports) to draw the conclusion that support for aid is consistently high may not be well suited. The most relevant Eurobarometer question, on which the OECD report partly relies, asks: "In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very important, or not at all important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?" (e.g. Melich 2006). An advantage of this question is that it asks respondents to rate importance of actually giving help, rather than just to express their concern for poor foreigners. However, helping others to develop is not weighted against other goals that respondents are also likely to care about. Any respondent just marginally more interested than completely indifferent about living conditions for people in less developed countries, are likely to attach some importance helping them develop. Thus, the support detected by this question does not necessarily imply much substantial commitment. Facing trade-offs against increased taxes, increased budget deficits or reduced domestic spending, respondents expressing support may still have other priorities. The pressure they generate on politicians may still place a relative emphasis on other goals than helping people in other countries.[16]

Thus, indicators that mention political trade-offs, and thereby make the responses less *a priori* predictable, may be better suited. Such responses are more likely to tap deeper commitments influencing consequential political behavior. Therefore, support for international aid is here measured by an indicator from one of the International Social Survey Programme's waves on Social Inequality (ISSP 1999): "Turning to international differences, do you agree or disagree… […] People in wealthy countries should make an additional tax contribution to help people in poor countries." A possible problem here is that people may favor drawing funds from other budget posts rather than increasing tax levels. Apart from this, however, the mentioning of taxation is an advantage, as agreement with this statement requires that respondents are willing to make the trade-off and (have developed countries) bear the costs of increased aid. A further advantage is that the question is cast in general terms, referring to "wealthy" and "poor countries" rather than being tied to the current national level of aid.[17]

[16] See the general Appendix to this thesis for a comparison of how the wording of relevant survey questions influence the level of support detected.

[17] Nevertheless, the role of national aid donations will be considered below, in accordance with the hypotheses above. The *ODA* measure reports donations for 1999 in current USD, while *ODA / GNI* gives ODA as a share of GNI. The data are from the OECD (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003).

This means the data may be more comparable across donor countries, and even allows the question to be asked in aid-receiving countries. Thus, a last advantage is that the ISSP survey encompasses countries representing a wide range of development, including the Philippines at the lower end.

The selection of countries for which the indicator is available is of some consequence when it comes to the macro-level indicators. As implied by Hypothesis 1, national redistributive interests are assumed to reflect levels of economic development, which here will be measured by the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for 1999, converted to constant 2005 international US dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates.[18] The bivariate relationship between this variable and the dependent variable is illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. It is worth noting that all the countries in the lower end of the spectrum, apart from the Philippines and Chile, are post-Communist ones. By 1999, these countries were in a process of economic transition. This means that the GDP values at the time may fail to capture the level of economic development and relative international standing in this regard.



Figure 2.1. Aggregate support for increased international aid over GDP per capita, ISSP, 1999.
Note: Both GPD and survey data are from 1999. Post-Communist countries are marked with circles, others with solid dots. The indicator of support is the same binary one as described for Model 4 below. In this figure, as well as Figure 2.2, the observation of Germany is a population-weighed mean of the eastern and western ISSP sample.

[18] The data are taken from the World Bank (2008). Whereas this chapter often refers (national) *incomes*, as this makes sense theoretically, it is strictly speaking inaccurate, given the use of GDP. Nevertheless, the inaccuracy is slight: for the countries in question, the gross national income (GNI) and GDP correlate at 0.99. In fact, the PPP-conversion is of greater consequence, reducing the correlation to 0.95.

Indeed, at the time of the survey, GPD had been stable or declining since the beginning of the political and economic transitions about ten years earlier, in all included post-Communist countries but Poland and Slovenia. This is illustrated by Figure 2.2 below, which plots the support for aid over the proportional change in GDP from 1989 to 1999.[19] For some of the countries the economic decline was severe, demonstrated by Russia's forty percent drop. This may explain why these countries appear as outliers in Figure 2.1. Despite scoring low in terms of GDP at the time of the survey – and despite the fact that the mentioned countries were all receiving some form of ODA at that point (World Bank 2008) – the populations of these countries may still have perceived their countries as developed ones. This becomes clearer if one puts GDP aside, and rather looks at for example literacy rates. Thus, respondents in these countries may, especially in the long run, see themselves as likely donors rather than potential recipients of development aid. If this is so, the variable measuring ten-year *GDP-change*, serves to capture some of the error introduced by using current GDP as a measure of relative international economic standing and the corresponding roles of countries as potential donors or recipients. Notably, Figure 2.2 does suggest that the ten-year growth variable explains some of the outliers in Figure 2.1. This is also supported by the fact that the bivariate correlation with aggregate support is stronger for GDP measured in 1989 than in 1999 (-.47 versus -.33).[20]

However, the low or negative growth also suggests that the post-Communist countries at the time of the survey were facing severe social and economic policy challenges at home. If the argument above is correct, that their citizens saw these countries as potential aid donors, this may be relevant to Hypothesis 3 above – that domestic challenges reduce the support. While having the advantage of capturing how all countries fared in the ten-year period, rather than just those experiencing transitions, the GDP-change variable is still strongly related to the post-Communist transitions (with a correlation of -.62 if the latter are identified by a dummy variable). This suggests that it will also partly capture some of their other features, such as

[19] GDP is measured the same way for 1989 as for 1999. For the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia, 1990 GDP is used in place of missing 1989 data.

[20] For these macro-level correlations, the World Bank data refer to Germany as a whole, whereas in the analyses reported below, the eastern and western samples are treated as separate clusters of individual level observations (sharing the same macro-level data). Thus, the macro-level correlations have 25 observations, whereas the analysis below operates with 26 clusters. This is of minimal consequence, however.

high unemployment and sharp increases in economic inequality and poverty. The latter are circumstances explicitly cited by Noël and Thérien as causes for lower support for development aid among major donor countries.[21] The GDP-change variable does indeed have a strong and significant correlation with *unemployment*.[22] It is less related to *unemployment change* (which only looks at change over the last five years to maximize the number for countries for which data are available). With regard to income inequality (the *gini coefficient*), the relationship is insignificant and the direction is opposite of what one might have expected (growth is related to greater inequality).[23] The data do not permit looking at the relationship to *changes* in inequality, however, which may be more relevant. As unemployment, unemployment change, and the gini coefficient may be more direct measures of domestic policy challenges, their roles are considered in the analysis section below.

[21] Thus, Figure 2 may also suggest an additional explanation for the negative effect of GDP on support for increased aid within the group of donor countries. The least developed and most supportive among them, such as Cyprus, Portugal and Spain have indeed experienced solid economic growth in the ten years prior to the survey. Thus, in line with Noël and Thérien's argument, their citizens may feel that their domestic challenges are under control, and that one can afford sending aid abroad.

[22] Cf. Table 2.4 in the Appendix. The unemployment variable is the standardized unemployment rate as reported by the OECD. The data are taken from Huber et al. (2004). The unemployment change variable measures the five-year change in this the standardized unemployment rate.

[23] This measure is taken from the World Bank (2008). As many countries have available data for 2000, these are used as far as possible. For other countries, an average of available years between 1995 and 2002 are used. In most of these cases, the observations used are close in time to the survey (1999).



Figure 2.2. Aggregate support for increased international aid over the proportional change in GDP per capita from 1989 to 1999, ISSP surveyed countries, 1999.

As mentioned above, the analyses below will also include the socialist attributes of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990) and the cumulative cabinet power of the Left. The latter variable measures Left seats as percentage of all parliamentary seats held by government parties and summarizes the scores for each year between 1946 and 1999. The data are taken from Huber et al. (2004). In order to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, left-right self-placement will be used as a measure of general ideological orientations. This variable will be included at the individual level, in order to test Hypothesis 2a – that individual attitudes are related across the domains of domestic and international redistribution. However, if this holds true and there are systematic differences between countries in basic attitudes, the variables will compete with the macro-level variables in providing explanations of the aggregate patterns. As the focus of this chapter is mainly on macro-level explanations of between-country differences in opinions, the most important individual level controls are those that are likely to vary substantially between countries, having the potential to explain international differences. However, the inclusion of an individual level hypothesis calls for some general individual level controls as well. Thus, the analysis below will control for age and formal education, in addition to the mentioned variables.[24]

[24] Education is measured by two dummies: one for secondary education and another for university education (whether the education is completed has not been taken into account). The missing values for these variables have been imputed by multiple imputation, for each country separately. It would also be desirable to include household income, but this variable has been left out because it is missing for Israel. Including it in the analysis, excluding Israel does, not appear to make much of a difference,

In order to assess Hypothesis 1, that respondents disagree over international aid, depending on their country's level of development, we need to compare a wide range of countries, which the ISSP data allows to some extent. However, looking at the plots above, it is also clear that there are notable differences among developed countries. As such differences are apparent even looking exclusively at aid donors, they are less likely to be the result of self-interest. In addition, Hypotheses 3 and 4 can only be appropriately applied to aid donating countries, and even the assumption that the Left-Right dimension has a similar meaning across countries appears more plausible looking at a narrower selection of countries. Thus, in order to understand differences among developed countries, it may be more helpful focusing on these countries only. The question of whether or not to compare developed and developing countries has a parallel in comparative welfare state research, where researchers choosing different approaches to case selection have produced widely diverging results (for overviews, see e.g. Uusitalo 1984; Wilensky 2002). For understanding the development of welfare states in developed countries, focusing on these countries alone has come to be considered the best option, and the same logic can be applied here. Thus, to move beyond the comparison of more and less developed countries, and better understand the differences among the former, additional analyses including OECD DAC countries will be conducted.

Among DAC countries, self-interest provides less clear expectations. In other words, in this universe, the effect of economic development, which may appear present looking at the plots above, may be more indirect, through some other variable, related to development. Looking at the plots above, there is one feature in particular that appears related both to support for aid and to economic development. This is not the amount of aid that is donated (although to some extent that too), but the period for which the country has been a donor. The most supportive DAC countries are all among the most recent joiners of the DAC (ignoring the fact that Portugal joined in 1960, and then withdrew in 1974, before it joined again and stayed from 1991).[25] This could be an indication that countries for which international aid has been an issue for about 40 years (at the time of the survey), have populations who know their country is an aid donor and likely to be among those bearing the costs if aid is to increase. However,

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however. Income has a small and significantly negative effect, but the standard deviation of its random effects is almost as large as the fixed effect.

[25] The *DAC years* variable used below measures the number of years that had passed since a country first joined the DAC (without withdrawing) at the time of the survey.

alternative interpretation if this variable proves relevant, such as skepticism about aid effectiveness increasing over time as more projects have been subjected to scrutiny and more failures may have been reported. This will be further investigated in the next chapter where the effect of such variables on respondents' reasons for non-support will be investigated. For now, we can only assess whether the length of DAC countries' membership, and thus their aid programs, has an effect of support. If it does, this may help explain the possible effect of GDP among these countries, as more developed countries have joined the DAC and started donating aid earlier.

ANALYSIS

The analysis of individual opinions is best conducted at the individual level, making the most of the available data and drawing stronger causal inferences. However, the inclusion of macro-level variables in the same analysis calls for an adjustment of the degrees of freedom used in calculating the variances (and standard errors) of their estimated effects. The same adjustment is called for by the fact that the set of individual level observations is made up of samples drawn from different populations. This could be dealt with by using clustered standard errors.[26] Another alternative, however, is modeling the cluster differences, estimating models including random components, which is a better option (see e.g. Guo and Zhao 2000; Leeuw and Meijer 2007; Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The analyses reported below are such models, all of them including random components for the intercepts. With regard to the individual level variables, this is more efficient than using robust standard errors. The proportion of the overall variance due to country-differences in intercepts – the variance to be explained by between-effects – is given by the intra-cluster correlation coefficient, ρ. Before introducing independent variables (i.e. for the total variance), ρ is 0.092 ($p < 0.000$). The substantial significance of this between-cluster variance can be seen from Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 above. Excluding post-Communist samples, ρ is 0.068 ($p < 0.000$), and including only DAC countries, it is 0.066 ($p < 0.000$).

The dependent variable has been recoded into a binary indicator of explicit agreement (agree and strongly agree are coded as one). The binary coding and logistic link function do not much affect the results, but this alternative avoids treating the original ordinal variable as a scale and takes ceiling effects into account. The number of countries will be referred to as *J*,

[26] Estimating only within-effects, taking out differences in cluster means, is not an option here, as the between-effects at the macro-level are of main interest.

the number of explanatory variables at the lower level (X) as P, and the number of explanatory variables at the upper level (Z) as Q. Using summation notation, the mixed-effects (logit) models to be estimated can be expressed with the following equation:

$$\ln\left(\frac{pr_{ij}}{1-pr_{ij}}\right) = \gamma + \sum_{p=1}^{P}\gamma_p X_{pij} + \sum_{q=1}^{Q}\gamma_q Z_{qj} + u_j + \gamma_{ij} \qquad (1)$$

where the subscript j is for the country ($j = 1 \ldots J$) , i is for individual respondents ($i = 1 \ldots n_j$), p are for explanatory variables at the lower level ($p = 1 \ldots P$) and q at the upper level ($q = 1 \ldots Q$). The coefficients denoted γ form the fixed part of the model, while the residual error term at the country-level is referred to as u_j.

Table 2.1 below reports six regression models, all including random intercepts at the upper level. Model 1 includes all countries, except the post-Communist ones. It only includes GDP per capita, which has a strong and significant effect, consistent with Hypothesis 1. Model 2 includes the post-Communist countries, and also adds the ten-year GDP-change variable, which appears to account for some of the differences between these and other countries. Both these variables have strong and significant effects, which would be consistent with both Hypothesis 1 and 3 – that economic challenges reduce the support for aid donation. Together, the two variables explain 46 percent of the between-country variance. Model 3 is also based on all samples and further includes Left-Right self-positioning, age and education at the individual level, all of which have significant effects. As expected, respondents who place themselves to the left are more supportive of aid, as are older respondents, and those with less education.

However, as mentioned, there are also clear differences among aid donating countries, such as Spain and Portugal on the one hand, and most other OECD countries on the other. To better understand such differences, the remaining models look only at OECD DAC countries. Model 4 is similar to Model 3, but is based only of this new selection. All variables still have significant effects with the expected signs. However, while Left-Right self-placement has a significant effect, it appears to add little when it comes to explaining between-country differences. Running Model 4 without Left-Right self-placement yields a ρ that is only marginally larger. Similarly, the inclusion of Left-Right self-placement does little to explain the effect of GDP. Model 5 introduces the DAC-years variables, which has a significantly negative effect. It also renders both GDP variables insignificant and reduces ρ notably. Thus,

this variable appears to explain why there is an effect of GDP even among donor countries. More developed countries joined DAC earlier, and now show lower support for aid. As the GDP variables are insignificant, they are dropped from Model 6, which has almost as low a ρ as Model 5, and a lower BIC value, suggesting this is a better model – the other being overfitted.

Table 2.1. Hierarchical logistic regressions of support for increased aid, ISSP, 1999.

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
	Ex. post-C.	Inc. post-C.	Inc. post-C.	DAC only	DAC only	DAC only
GDP per capita / 10 000	-0.529***	-0.442***	-0.417***	-0.464***	0.016	
	(0.131)	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.162)	(0.247)	
ΔGDP, 1989-1999, prop.		2.117***	2.061***	4.920***	1.349	
		(0.506)	(0.517)	(1.462)	(1.970)	
Left-Right, self-pos.			0.309***	0.387***	0.388***	0.389***
			(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Education, secondary			-0.355***	-0.207***	-0.206***	-0.207***
			(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Education, university			-0.520***	-0.104*	-0.105*	-0.106*
			(0.041)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Age			0.007***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
DAC years					-0.034**	-0.037***
					(0.015)	(0.008)
Constant	1.273***	0.561***	0.478**	-0.255	0.177	0.600**
	(0.355)	(0.213)	(0.223)	(0.501)	(0.464)	(0.265)
N	19749	29249	29249	15435	15435	15435
N of Clusters	17	26	26	14	14	14
Rho	0.068	0.059	0.062	0.032	0.023	0.025
BIC	25298.02	37868.77	37174.05	19827.07	19832.13	19813.99

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The countries included in the most encompassing selection are those surveyed by the International Social Survey Programme in 1999.

Table 2.2 goes on to test the remaining variables, few of which have interesting effects. Model 1 shows that the socialist attributes of the welfare state only has a weak and insignificant effect. The inclusion of this variable makes the DAC-years variable insignificant, but this is because data are missing for the crucial countries Spain and Portugal. Model 2 shows that the cumulative power of the Left, has a moderate effect with the expected sign, significant at the ten-percent level. Again the DAC-years variable is insignificant, but this is also because data are missing for Spain and Portugal. Model 3 shows that total ODA donations have no discernible effect, and the same is true of ODA as a share of GNI in Model 4. Model 5 shows that unemployment-change over the last five years does have a notable and significant effect, with the expected sign, as increasing unemployment reduces the support for aid. A model including current levels of unemployment is not reported, as this variable proves irrelevant. Also in model 5, the DAC-years variable is insignificant due to missing data for Spain and Portugal.

Table 2.2. Hierarchical logistic regressions of support for increased aid, ISSP, 1999.

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
	DAC only	DAC only	DAC only	DAC only	DAC only	DAC only
Left-Right, self-pos.	0.408***	0.392***	0.389***	0.389***	0.394***	0.415***
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Education, secondary	-0.128**	-0.135**	-0.208***	-0.207***	-0.157***	-0.243***
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.056)
Education, university	-0.020	-0.010	-0.106*	-0.106*	-0.041	-0.155**
	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.064)
Age	0.009***	0.009***	0.008***	0.008***	0.009***	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
DAC years	-0.014	0.014	-0.035***	-0.037***	0.009	-0.036***
	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Socialist attributes	0.025					
	(0.027)					
Cumulative Left power		0.007*				
		(0.004)				
ODA, current USD, 1999			-0.000			
			(0.000)			
ODA / GNI, 1999				-0.030		
				(0.395)		
ΔUnemployment, 5-year					-0.098***	
					(0.029)	
Gini index						-0.006
						(0.019)
Constant	-0.410	-1.463**	0.577**	0.607**	-1.270***	0.813
	(1.077)	(0.596)	(0.265)	(0.280)	(0.431)	(0.757)
N	12094	13158	15435	15435	13158	12593
N of Clusters	11	12	14	14	12	12
Rho	0.010	0.009	0.024	0.025	0.005	0.024
BIC	15791.26	17115.71	19813.67	19823.63	17107.28	16259.94

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The countries included in the most encompassing selection are those surveyed by the International Social Survey Programme in 1999.

Table 2.3 investigates whether any other variables than DAC-years are able to explain away the GDP-effect among DAC countries. The models parallel those in Table 2.2, but include the two GDP variables instead of DAC-years. It appears that these variables fail to do what the DAC-years variable does, as the only model in which the two GDP variables are insignificant is Model 2, which includes cumulative Left power. As mentioned above, missing data for Spain and Portugal means that these crucial countries are excluded. The cumulative Left power variable itself is insignificant, so the fact that the GDP variables are insignificant cannot be credited this variable. In sum, only the DAC-years variable appears able to explain why DAC members with different levels of economic development differ so clearly.

Table 2.3. Hierarchical logistic regressions of support for increased aid, ISSP, 1999.

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
	DAC only	DAC only	DAC only	DAC only	DAC only	DAC only
GDP per capita / 10 000	-0.290*	-0.147	-0.437***	-0.441**	-0.202*	-0.420**
	(0.168)	(0.157)	(0.170)	(0.174)	(0.104)	(0.176)
ΔGDP, 1989-1999, prop.	2.534*	1.818	4.534***	4.981***	2.077**	4.166***
	(1.319)	(1.480)	(1.660)	(1.466)	(0.896)	(1.606)
Left-Right, self-pos.	0.407***	0.392***	0.387***	0.387***	0.396***	0.414***
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Education, secondary	-0.121*	-0.137**	-0.207***	-0.207***	-0.160***	-0.244***
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.056)
Education, university	-0.008	-0.010	-0.105*	-0.104*	-0.038	-0.155**
	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.064)
Age	0.009***	0.009***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Socialist attributes	0.019					
	(0.023)					
Cumulative Left power		0.004				
		(0.004)				
ODA, current USD, 1999			-0.000			
			(0.000)			
ODA / GNI, 1999				-0.171		
				(0.486)		
ΔUnemployment, 5-year					-0.093***	
					(0.025)	
Gini index						0.010
						(0.022)
Constant	-0.512	-0.805**	-0.206	-0.277	-0.739***	-0.468
	(0.389)	(0.342)	(0.507)	(0.502)	(0.236)	(0.994)
N	12094	13158	15435	15435	13158	12593
N of Clusters	11	12	14	14	12	12
Rho	0.008	0.009	0.031	0.032	0.003	0.033
BIC	15791.26	17115.71	19826.85	19836.59	17107.28	16259.94

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The countries included in the most encompassing selection are those surveyed by the International Social Survey Programme in 1999.

In sum, the results above do seem to support Hypothesis 1 – that citizens of more economically developed countries show less support for aid than those of less developed countries. However, this pattern is also found among developed countries, and this is apparently due to the fact that more developed countries stared donating aid much earlier than a few less developed donors, such as Portugal and Spain. People in countries that have donated aid for a longer period of time are less supportive of aid. The results also support Hypothesis 2a – that ideology plays an important role at the individual level. More leftist individuals are more supportive of international aid. However, the analyses give little support to Hypothesis 2b – that ideology helps explain between-country differences to a significant degree. Also Hypothesis 3 – that people in countries facing social and economic challenges show less support – finds support in the analyses. Long-term economic growth increases the support for aid, while increasing unemployment reduces it. Levels of economic inequality do not appear to have an effect, however. Neither does the degree to which welfare states have

socialist attributes. There is, however, a weak sign that cumulative Left power may have an effect, as this variable is weakly significant in one model. Interestingly, Hypothesis 4 – that national levels of aid donations reduce public support – does not appear to hold. Neither total ODA donations, nor ODS as a share of GNI shows an effect.

CONCLUSION

While the citizens of developed countries readily express their concern for less fortunate foreigners along with their disapproval of the current level of international inequality, it is hard to assess what level of commitment is involved. One way to put such opinions into perspective is to compare them to those of other, less advantaged people. That is one of the aims of this chapter. It conducts a more advanced analysis of a broader selection of countries than has been done in previous research. The analysis suggests that interests may play an important role in determining individual support for international aid, as the level of development is shown to have a strong effect. Citizens of countries that are likely contributors rather than recipients of international redistributive transfers are much less likely to support them. In this sense, international politics parallels domestic politics.

However, even among aid donors there is a negative effect of GDP, which appears to result from the fact that more developed countries have donated aid longer. It appears harder to find support for increasing international aid in countries that have already donated aid for several decades. This may still be consistent with an interest-based explanation, as citizens of these countries may be more aware of their country's status as a donor, but it may also suggest a process of resignation is taking place, as people receive critical reports about aid, or grow tired of the issue. This illustrates a limitation of this analysis – it stops short of looking at the reasons for people's opinions, which may help us better understand why such relationships appear. This is the topic of Chapter 3.

The analysis has a few other limitations. It is not based on a random sample of the world's population or all of its countries, so the results are not statistically generalizable to other countries than those included. As a representation of the world, the selection of countries is particularly biased in terms of economic and human development. The present analysis lacks the empirical evidence to back up any claim about opinions in the countries harboring the poorest half of the world population (measured by average income). It appears plausible that these opinions will conform to the revealed pattern, and thus be at least as supportive of international aid as those in the least developed country included in the analysis. However,

poorer countries generally receive more aid, and their people may therefore be more content with the current levels. Low levels of human development may also mean that their people know less about the extent of international inequalities. It is also possible that they perceive international moral obligations as weaker, or attribute their national poverty to local causes calling for local solutions. Thus, Chapter 5 looks at the issue of generalization and the extent to which the least developed countries can be included in the analysis.

APPENDIX

Table 2.4. Correlations between macro-level variables and aggregated individual level indicators.

	DV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1. GDP per capita / 10 000	-0.416	1.000					
2. ΔGDP, 1989-1999, prop.	0.538	0.262	1.000				
3. DAC years	-0.821	0.622	-0.440	1.000			
4. Left-Right, self-pos.	0.688	-0.290	0.479	-0.482	1.000		
5. Education, secondary	-0.359	0.070	-0.176	0.367	-0.463	1.000	
6. Education, university	-0.367	0.524	-0.226	0.411	-0.420	-0.037	1.000
7. Age	0.097	-0.261	0.018	-0.004	0.046	0.117	-0.326
8. Socialist attributes	0.247	0.152	0.273	-0.323	-0.085	0.108	-0.173
9. Cumulative Left power	0.440	0.162	0.445	-0.341	0.126	0.309	-0.417
10. ODA, current USD, 1999	-0.400	0.181	-0.416	0.440	-0.161	-0.363	0.367
11. ODA / GNI, 1999	-0.161	0.416	0.212	0.194	-0.103	-0.004	0.094
12. ΔUnemployment, 5-year	-0.602	-0.162	-0.191	0.074	-0.118	-0.387	-0.380
13. Unemployment,	0.250	-0.565	-0.523	0.070	0.358	-0.100	-0.078
14. Gini index	0.263	-0.336	-0.016	-0.368	0.193	-0.167	0.288

Note: DV refers to the dependent variable, support for international aid, 1999. The correlations pertain to the selection of DAC members. While the analysis of DAC members reported in the text has up to 14 clusters, treating the Eastern and Western German samples as separate clusters, these correlations are based on up to 13 observations, as Germany is treated as a single observation (weighting the survey samples by population size). When socialist attributes are involved, New Zealand, Spain and Portugal are excluded because of missing data. The same is the case with Spain and Portugal and cumulative left power, unemployment and unemployment change. Gini inequality data are missing for Australia and Japan.

Table 2.5. Correlations between macro-level variables and aggregated individual level indicators, cont.

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
8. Socialist attributes	-0.180	1.000					
9. Cumulative Left power	0.161	0.729	1.000				
10. ODA, current USD, 1999	0.119	-0.538	-0.596	1.000			
11. ODA / GNI, 1999	-0.242	0.846	0.718	-0.159	1.000		
12. ΔUnemployment, 5-year	0.189	-0.375	-0.190	0.582	-0.114	1.000	
13. Unemployment,	0.036	-0.035	-0.185	-0.107	-0.169	-0.152	1.000
14. Gini index	0.103	-0.793	-0.772	0.283	-0.760	-0.245	-0.018

Note: DV refers to the dependent variable, support for international aid, 1999. The correlations pertain to the selection of DAC members. While the analysis of DAC members reported in the text has up to 14 clusters, treating the Eastern and Western German samples as separate clusters, these correlations are based on up to 13 observations, as Germany is treated as a single observation (weighting the survey samples by population size). When socialist attributes are involved, New Zealand, Spain and Portugal are excluded because of missing data. The same is the case with Spain and Portugal and cumulative left power, unemployment and unemployment change. Gini inequality data are missing for Australia and Japan.

Table 2.6. Descriptive statistics for pre-imputed individual level variables, DAC members.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Support int. aid (dep. var.)	15435	0.429	0.495	0	1
Left-right, self-pos.	13119	3.459	1.670	1	7
Education, secondary	15898	0.503	0.500	0	1
Education, university	15898	0.301	0.459	0	1
Age	16161	46.458	16.687	16	96

Table 2.7. Data on current aid donations for ISSP countries, 1999.

	ODA in billion $	ODA of GNI	DAC-years	Aid receipts / GNI
Australia	96.0	0.26	33	.
Austria	54.2	0.26	34	.
Bulgaria	.	.	.	-2.12
Canada	178.9	0.28	39	.
Chile	.	.	.	-0.10
Cyprus	.	.	.	-0.57
Czech Republic	.	.	.	-0.55
France	577.1	0.39	39	.
Germany	551.0	0.26	39	.
Hungary	.	.	.	-0.55
Israel	.	.	.	-0.90
Japan	1548.7	0.35	39	.
Latvia	.	.	.	-1.38
New Zealand	14.4	0.27	26	.
Norway	143.5	0.91	37	.
Philippines	.	.	.	-0.86
Poland	.	.	.	-0.71
Portugal	31.1	0.26	8	.
Russian Federation	.	.	.	-1.03
Slovak Republic	.	.	.	-1.57
Slovenia	.	.	.	-0.14
Spain	140.8	0.23	8	.
Sweden	178.2	0.70	34	.
United Kingdom	338.7	0.23	38	.
United States	928.6	0.10	38	.

3. SELF-REPORTED REASONS FOR NON-SUPPORT OF AID

In Chapter 2, we saw that people of more economically developed countries were less in favor of international aid transfers than those of less developed ones. We also saw that the differences among aid donors may be due to the fact that more developed donors have been donating for a longer time. Still, the earlier analyses leave open a few questions regarding what explains the pattern identified in Chapter 2. This could make a considerable difference for how we interpret the pattern, but we know very little in this regard. If it is the result of self-interest, the implications may be very different from those of a situation in which it results from greater skepticism regarding the impact of aid. This chapter aims to narrow this gap, although the focus is broader, directed at the question: What reasons explain citizens' degree of support for aid in donor countries and, in particular, the negative relationship between such support and GDP per capita? While this chapter aims to use the best data available on this question, even these data have limitations that put notable restrictions on the analyses. For example, the analysis of between-country differences inevitably becomes a low-N exercise, requiring parsimonious modeling. Nevertheless, the question addressed here is sufficiently important in light of the general topic of the thesis to merit attention, and the analysis does provide several qualified answers.

The chapter starts by discussing explanations that may be relevant to understanding non-support of aid, and by proposing a set of hypotheses in relation to these. The hypotheses are of two kinds: The first regards the impact of different types of expressed reasons for non-support of aid on the national levels of support. The second regards how such reasons are influenced by objective circumstances at the national level. After this first section, a discussion of how best to measure the reasons for respondents' opinions on aid follows. Then, in the analysis section, the limitations of the data are discussed, and the proposed hypotheses are tested to the extent the data allow. The conclusion sums up the findings and includes a more general discussion.

HYPOTHESES

The analysis in this chapter will focus on the reasoning behind support for aid, looking at people's expressed reasons and how these relate to external circumstances. In this sense, the question refers to two stages. One (let's call it stage a) regards how people's reasons relate to (aggregate) levels of support, the other (stage b) regards how people's reasons relate to

external circumstances. Hypotheses will be put forward with regard to both, based on the theories discussed in the last chapter. The specific wording of each hypothesis is also slightly influenced by the available data, which will become apparent in the empirical sections.

Of course, since explaining the negative effect of GDP per capita on support for aid is the main aim here, the variables related to each hypothesis will be of particular interest to the extent they are empirically related to economic development. For most of them, such a relationship appears plausible. In light of Chapter 2, it would be interesting to test whether "interest" influences support, but it is clear that the data employed here do not allow for such a test, as this is something that generally needs to be inferred from behavior. Nevertheless, it is also clear that some of the hypotheses to be tested are more compatible with an interest-based model than others are, which is discussed below.

As a simple explanation, we may expect the public's degree of cosmopolitanism, understood as concern for people in less developed countries, to influence support for aid. Relating this idea to the available survey data, introduced below, we find indicators capturing explicit disinterest, which can be seen as measuring a lack of such concern. Both these ways of referring to this idea are used below. While this kind of concern may influence support through other expressed reasons for non-support, as will be discussed below, it may also have an effect of its own, and for now this direct effect is the question. The hypothesis is this:

1. *a. Support for the donation of aid is lower in countries where concern for people in less developed countries is lower and disinterest is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support.*

Identifying plausible external influences on such concerns may be more difficult than it is for other reasons for non-support, as these reasons may be expressions of deeper values and not have immediate external causes. Nevertheless, it may seem plausible that non-supporters in more developed countries have fewer alternative reasons to point to, since their countries are doing relatively well, and therefore are more likely to state disinterest as their reason. It is also worth noting, as illustrated by the effect of economic development identified in chapter 2, that respondents in more developed countries are more likely to be paying for increases in international aid, as they are the best placed to do so. If respondents find such prospects unattractive, and have few other reasons for not supporting aid, they may find that stating their disinterest is the best way out of the dilemma. It may even be an accurate statement.

Further, if such reasons are to explain the pattern in which support declines with economic development, they will have to depend positively on such development. Thus, the following hypothesis deserves attention:

1. *b. Disinterest with regard to less developed countries is greater and is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support in more economically developed countries.*

However, if this hypothesis appears to hold, we saw in the previous chapter that, among the countries in question (all donor countries) the effect of economic development may be due to the length of a country's aid experience. While the OECD report cited earlier (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003) concludes there is no fatigue in the public support aid, the relevant hypothesis here could be interpreted as saying there is one. This may explain the possible effect of economic development on disinterest as a reason for non-support. Thus, we want to check whether disinterest is higher in countries that have donated aid longer (as measured by the length of their continuous membership in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC):

1. *c. Disinterest with regard to less developed countries is greater and is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support in countries that have donated aid for a longer period.*

As mentioned in the previous chapter, support for aid may also depend on current levels of aid, as suggested by the model of "the public as thermostat" (Wlezien 1995). A crucial question, however, is whether survey questions capture absolute or relative preferences – or a mixture. As in most other policy areas the questions regarding aid tend to be phrased as relative to current policy, such as the ISSP (1999) question in the previous chapter, or the Pew (2007b) question "Do you think the wealthier nations of the world are doing enough or not doing enough to help the poorer nations of the world with problems such as economic development, reducing poverty, and improving health?" However, as will be clear below, the most relevant dataset for this chapter is the Eurobarometer (EB) 50.1 (Melich 2006), whose most relevant question for capturing support for aid is this: "In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very important, or not at all important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?" This question does not ask whether current levels of aid are sufficient, or whether they should be increased or decreased – it does not refer to the current levels at all. Thus, strictly speaking, the question is a measure

of absolute rather than relative preferences, and might not respond to current levels of policy. It simply asks: "How" important? Nevertheless, as discussed in the general appendix at the end of this thesis, the EB and ISSP indicators are strongly correlated (with a coefficient of .92).

If the EB indicator measures absolute preferences, as it appears to at face value, this may introduce another problem as well, as such preferences may influence policy over time, in accordance with the theory of dynamic representation (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). The countries in which absolute support is higher may donate more aid, although the evidence on this matter is inconclusive, as discussed in the introduction (Chapter 1). This relationship has the opposite direction of that regarding the effect of such donations on relative preferences. Thus, the former effect may blur the pattern, and make it harder to detect the latter effect – the possible public response to policy, which could explain lower support in donor countries. However, even if the indicator appears to measure absolute preferences, it is not unlikely that its aggregate to some extent will behave as a relative preference, as some respondents may take current levels into account. This may be revealed in the analysis, as the indicator's relationships with alternative indicators and current policy are examined. The theory of the public as thermostat gives rise to the hypothesis that support for the donation of aid is lower in countries where current donations are greater. At stage a, this means that:

2. *a. Support for donation of aid is lower in countries where the level of current donations is perceived as higher and where this level is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support.*

This involves a further assumption. The survey question does not refer to specific countries – it does not ask "how important is it *this country* gives aid". For international differences in aid donations to influence public support, respondents must interpret the question as pertaining to their country, or have their opinions influenced by the national context while applying them more generally. Again, this is not unlikely.

At stage b, we can hypothesize that:

2. *b. The level of current donations is perceived as higher and is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support when actual current donations are greater.*

In addition, whether respondents deem a certain level of donations to be sufficient should depend on their preferred level of donations, according to the thermostatic logic. This level may be an expression of their level of concern or interest regarding the matter. Thus, we may expect the extent to which current levels are seen as sufficient to depend on the level of concern or explicit disinterest:

2. *c. The level of current donations is perceived as higher and is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support where levels of disinterest are greater.*

Fortunately, most of the other relevant explanations of public support should affect absolute preferences, and so have effect, regardless of whether relative or absolute preferences are captured. Most notably, according to the findings of Noël and Therien (2002) mentioned in Chapter 2, support for the donation of aid is lower when respondents are more concerned about policy challenges at home. Noël and Therien focus on inequality and argue support is greater in countries where equality has been institutionalized through redistributive policies and welfare states. More generally, we may expect support to be undermined by any perceived domestic social and economic challenges. Thus, when it comes to explaining between-country differences in support, we have the following hypothesis:

3. *a. Support for the donation of aid is lower in countries where social and economic challenges are perceived as greater and are more frequently cited as reasons for non-support.*

Of course, this requires that the respondents perceive their country as an actual or potential donor of aid rather than a recipient. At stage b, we expect that:

3. *b. National social and economic challenges are perceived as greater and are more frequently cited as reasons for non-support where actual challenges are greater.*

In addition, absolute preferences may depend on the extent to which respondents value the welfare of foreigners as opposed to their nationals, which in want of a better word, we could refer to as nationalism, and which may be captured by the indicators needed to test Hypothesis 1.

While all the mentioned types of reasons fit quite well into the framework of absolute and relative preferences, there is another type that fits less well, namely the one related to inefficiency, mentioned in the previous chapter. Concerns about efficiency changes the whole

reasoning about how much we should try to achieve and how much of an effort should be made, as it removes the assumption that we can achieve what we want. Nevertheless, we can see the preference for avoiding waste as a factor influencing the absolute preference for aid donations. At stage a, we have the following hypothesis:

4. *a. Support for the donation of aid is lower in countries where skepticism regarding the impact and effectiveness of aid is greater and is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support.*

It is not clear what we would expect to explain between-country differences in such beliefs, but it could be that countries with more aid experience (donating more over a longer span of time) are likely to have seen more debates and negative reports regarding aid effectiveness, and therefore demonstrate greater public skepticism:

4. *b. Skepticism regarding the impact and effectiveness of aid is greater and is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support in countries with more aid experience.*

In addition, it is likely that more economically developed countries have fewer social and economic challenges that serve as reasons for non-support. This could move non-supporters from reasons based on national priorities over to reasons related to inefficiency. Because aid donations tend to correlate with economic development, it may be worth controlling for economic development to be sure any detected effect of donations is not really due to economic development. The hypothesis involved is this:

4. *c. Skepticism regarding the impact and effectiveness of aid is greater and is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support in countries that are more economically developed.*

As with Hypothesis 2, it is also possible that the reasons in question depend on the level of concern or interest with regard to less developed countries. As will be explained and investigated at length in the next chapter, individuals who are less inclined to support aid may develop a greater skepticism with regard to its efficiency and positive impact. At the aggregate level, this could mean that levels of skepticism are greater in countries where levels of disinterest are higher:

4. *d. Skepticism regarding the impact and effectiveness of aid is greater and is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support in countries where levels of disinterest are greater.*

As mentioned, some of these hypotheses are more compatible with an interest-based model than others are. If skepticism regarding the effectiveness of aid explains the pattern found in Chapter 2, it is probably not due to interests, and the same applies if it is due to a thermostatic response to national policy. While national problems may explain international differences in support, as Chapter 2 suggests, these are unlikely to explain the pattern in question, as more developed countries by definition are in a better situation to solve national problems and tend to do so. The hypothesis most compatible with the interest-based model may be that regarding levels of concern and disinterest, as suggested in the discussion of that hypothesis. These reasons may seem to express that respondents do not think giving aid is worth the cost to their country. If respondents in more developed countries, which would be likely to pay for increased aid, are more likely to state disinterest and lack of concern for foreigners as their reason for non-support, and if these reasons appear to explain aggregate levels of support, this may at least be consistent with an interest-based explanation.

MEASURING REASONS

If we want to analyze the reasoning behind opinions on development aid, we need data referring to people's justifications of their views. One particular dataset stands out as relevant in this regard. This is the EB 50.1, which was conducted by face-to-face interviews, in respondents' homes, in the appropriate national language, towards the end of 1998. As mentioned, the main question tapping the support for development aid is: "In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very important, or not at all important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?" (Melich 2006). In the analysis below, this variable has been recoded to range from 0 (not at all important) to 1 (very important), with the intermediate answer categories at equal intervals. In the last EB on development aid before 50.1, the EB 46.0 (Melich 2000), individuals responding "not very important" or "not at all important" were given the open-ended follow-up question: "why not?", and then: "anything else?". Thus, they were allowed to give up to two reasons for their positions, although most gave only one. For the EB 50.1 the equivalent group of respondents was given a follow up question, but now the responses from the EB 46.0 were used to construct a set of answer categories that were read out and shown to respondents using a card:

"From this list, please tell me why you think it is not important to help them?" Respondents were allowed to select multiple alternatives from the following list:

1. First we should solve problems (poverty, unemployment, the economy) in [this country]
2. This aid is too expensive for [this country]
3. It is a waste of money to help poor countries because their situation does not improve
4. The money will be misused and will not reach those who need it
5. We (our country/Europe) already give them enough money
6. The more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they have
7. Poor countries should stop fighting and stop buying arms
8. There will always be rich and poor countries
9. I don't know enough about these countries to decide whether it makes sense or not to help them
10. Poor countries don't interest me
11. I don't like foreigners (*spontaneous response*)
12. Others (*spontaneous response*)
13. Don't know

While these are the most detailed and comprehensive comparative date available on the reasoning behind people's opinions on aid, they do have their problems. Most notably, the survey designers appear to have adopted the language of the responses from EB 46.0, instead of constructing neutral categories that clearly represent one specific reason. Unfortunately, this means that certain items may appeal to certain categories of respondents, due to their wording, rather than just their content. Some of these indicators also seem to combine several kinds of reasons for non-support. For example, the alternative "the more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they have" may be an expression of concern about aid effectiveness, but also the view that recipient governments should take more responsibility. In addition, it may only appeal to a particular subgroup of those who would agree with a more neutral statement such as "recipient governments do not make a sufficient effort to limit population growth", or "recipient governments should take more responsibility". Thus, not all of the items are equally useful for identifying particular types of reasons as explanations of between-country differences. Still, as these data are the best available, they will be used in the analyses below, but certain items may be preferred above others.

Table 3.11 (in Appendix B) reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in this chapter. The stated reasons for non-support (among non-supporters) are the most interesting. The

statistics refer to their country-level aggregates, as these statistics are more interesting than those at the individual level. Of course, in order to get the correct mean of the pooled populations of all countries surveyed, the aggregates would have to be weighed by population size, which is not done here. Instead, each country counts as one. As can be seen, the by far most frequently cited reason for non-support is that "first we should solve problems (poverty, unemployment, the economy) in [this country]". The average across these samples is 74 percent, which means a majority of the non-supporters cite this reason, which may be a reflection of the fact that any country, at any time, is likely to have some social or economic problems. It is also worth noting that the standard deviation of the aggregates for this variable is not particularly large, compared to those of the other items. In fact, it is notably smaller than those of a few others are. In other words, there is not particularly much variation between countries in the propensity for non-supporters to cite this reason – it is common in all countries. This further suggests that – even though it is the most common reason – it may not be the most important explanation of between-country differences in support.

The second most cited reason, with an average of 45 percent, is: "The money will be misused and will not reach those who need it". Third, with 34 percent, comes: "Poor countries should stop fighting and stop buying arms". Then, with 22 percent, follows: "This aid is too expensive for [this country]". Then, both with 21 percent, are: "There will always be rich and poor countries", and: "It is a waste of money to help poor countries because their situation does not improve". With 17 percent, we find: "We (our country/Europe) already give them enough money". An cross-country average of 14 percent say: "The more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they have", and 9 percent say: "I don't know enough about these countries to decide whether it makes sense or not to help them". The remaining items are quite rare, as they have averages of 3 percent or less.

Most of these indicators seem to fall into two general categories based on the hypotheses above, one related to efficiency and waste, and another related to domestic priorities and limited concern for people in less developed countries. A couple of answers do not fit such a categorization, namely the items "I don't know enough […]" and "don't know". Excluding these, an exploratory principal component factor analysis has been conducted, keeping factors with an Eigenvalue above one. The results are reported in Table 3.1 below. Orthogonal varimax rotation has been used, which clarifies the results somewhat. To make patterns easier

to detect, factor loadings above .5 are reported in bold.[27] While similar answer categories might have served as substitutes, and so be unrelated or negatively related, this does not appear to be the case. The pattern that emerges is largely as one would expect from the content of the alternatives. In other words, the mentioned general categories of reasons do seem to work as underlying dimensions influencing specific responses.

The analysis results in three extracted factors. The first, with an Eigenvalue of 1.78, seems to be an expression of skepticism regarding the impact and effectiveness of aid, which we could call *Waste*. The items that load more than .5 on this factor are: "It is a waste of money to help poor countries because their situation does not improve", "the money will be misused and will not reach those who need it", "the more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they have", and "poor countries should stop fighting […]". The second factor, with an Eigenvalue of 1.35 seems to tap domestic priorities that prevail over inclination to donate aid. We could call it *Priorities*. The items that load more than .5 on this factor are the following: "First we should solve problems […] in [this country]", "this aid is too expensive for [this country]", and "we […] already give them enough money". The last factor, with an Eigenvalue of 1.27, differs from the other factors in that it does not acknowledge the goal of helping foreigners. Rather than pointing to domestic problems, the items that load more than .5 on this factor express disinterest in the fates of foreigners or even a dislike of them: "Poor countries don't interest me", and "I don't like foreigners". Thus, we could call this factor *Disinterest.* These responses are very rare in most countries and seem to represent a distinctive type of non-support. The only answer that does not load clearly on a single factor is "there will always be rich and poor countries". A possible explanation is that is both be an expression of skepticism about effects ("we will never be able to achieve development") and disinterest ("life is not fair, and we have to accept that"). As it is not clear what is expressed by this indicator, it may be best to focus on the others.

[27] An additional advantage of the rotation stems from the fact that the first factor extracted in part may be driven by a tendency to use more answer categories. The rotation may prevent this from affecting the results, which seems to be the case.

Table 3.1. Results from a rotated principal component factor analysis yielding three factors, EU, 1998.

Item	Factor 1 (Waste)	Factor 2 (Priorities)	Factor 3 (Disinterest)	Unique variances
1. First we should solve problems […] in [this country]	-0.146	**0.528**	-0.293	0.614
2. This aid is too expensive for [this country]	0.071	**0.668**	0.050	0.546
3. It is a waste of money to help poor countries because their situation does not improve	**0.518**	0.173	0.252	0.638
4. The money will be misused and will not reach those who need it	**0.718**	-0.063	-0.132	0.464
5. We […] already give them enough money	0.141	**0.687**	0.155	0.485
6. The more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they have	**0.544**	0.139	0.246	0.625
7. Poor countries should stop fighting […]	**0.702**	0.098	-0.071	0.492
8. There will always be rich and poor countries	0.395	0.290	0.218	0.712
10. Poor countries don't interest me	-0.061	0.072	**0.710**	0.487
11. I don't like foreigners (*spontaneous response*)	0.010	0.016	**0.678**	0.540

Note: N = 2883, factor loadings above .5 are in bold. The Eigenvalues are 1.78, 1.35 and 1.27, respectively. The cumulative explained variance is .44. Orthogonal varimax rotation has been used.

The results above provide a useful basis for constructing measures for further analysis. They confirm several of the categories of reasons implied by the hypotheses above, namely disinterest, focus on national problems, and concerns about efficiency. The factor analysis does not, however, produce a separate factor that is relevant to test Hypothesis 2 – that expressed support is relative in the sense that it responds thermostatically to greater donations. The item that appears most relevant in this regard, Item 5, "we already give them enough", loads strongly on the Priorities factor, and thus appears intertwined with the other items that also does so. Nevertheless, because it appears well suited to test Hypothesis 2, it will be kept separate from the other items in the analysis below.

Because several of the available items tap the same general dimensions, and because the number of degrees of freedom at the country level is severely limited, it is helpful to construct indices. A few considerations are relevant here. First, because the items, at least for some respondents, may serve as substitutes, and because the degree to which this is true may vary by country, it is best to keep as many items as possible. Second, it is not necessarily true that respondents who use more than one item from a category of reasons feel this reason more strongly. As mentioned, some items may be substitutes, and some may appeal more to certain respondents than they do to others. Thus, some respondents may use more items than others do, for other reasons than the strength of their opinion. In short, indices of an additive form may be unsuited. Instead, the indices used below are coded as binary indicators that take on

the value of one for respondents who have used at least one item within the category of responses in question. This has the advantage that the aggregation provides the share of these respondents who cite at least one reason from each category.

The indices are as follows. National Priorities is based on Item 1, "first we should solve …", and Item 2, "this aid is too expensive for this country". Ineffectiveness is based on Item 3, "waste of money … because their situation does not improve", Item 4, "money will be misused", Item 6, "more aid … more children", and Item 7, "poor countries should stop fighting". Already enough will refer to the single relevant indicator, Item 5. Disinterest is based on Item 10, "poor countries don't interest me", and Item 11, "I don't like foreigners".

Figure 3.1 shows how the first two indices relate to each other, by plotting the share of non-supporters in each country who make use of reasons related to national priorities over the share that mentions efficiency-related reasons. As can be seen, Spain stands out as country in which people give few reasons of either type – which is interesting as it is usually also a country with greater support than others. Greece and Portugal stand out as countries in which non-support is more based on domestic priorities than concerns about efficiency, while countries such as the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark stand out with more efficiency concerns and less emphasis on domestic priorities, compared to other the countries.



Figure 3.1. Share of non-supporters who cite at least one reason related to domestic priorities over the share who cite at least one effectiveness-related reason, for samples within EU countries, 1998.

Figure 3.2 shows how the last two indices relate to each other, by plotting share of non-supporters in each country who think their country already gives enough over the share who cites disinterest as a reason. This plot shows a clear positive relationship between the two, as respondents are more likely to say "we already give them enough" in countries where they are

also more likely to say they are not interested in poor countries or dislike foreigners. A plausible interpretation is that respondents who are not interested have a lower absolute preference for the donation of aid, and therefore find that aid is sufficient at lower levels than others do. In this sense, this fits with the thermostatic model, in which relative preferences depend on both policy and absolute preferences.

There are, however, also a couple of notable outliers in the plot. Ireland scores higher on disinterest than any other country, but is at about the same level as the those at the top when it comes to the share saying current aid donations are enough. The West German sample is also an outlier, as the share disinterest is low, while the share who say "we already give enough" is higher than in any other sample. It is notable that the East German sample fits the general pattern much better, which could suggest that the respondents in West Germany at the time of the survey felt they were already sacrificing enough due to the German reunification, and therefore had a lower absolute preference for the donation of foreign aid. As can be seen in Appendix B, without these two outliers (and excluding Luxemburg for other reasons), the correlation is corresponding to the plot is .78. Including them, it is .45.



Figure 3.2. Share of non-supporters who say "we ... already give them enough" over the share who cite disinterest as a reason for non-support, for samples within EU countries, 1998.

Table 3.12 (in Appendix B) reports bivariate correlations between aggregates of the mentioned items and the macro-level variables used in the analysis below. The correlations between the items, and their correlations with the dependent variable give some further clues with regard to what the items capture and to what extent they may serve as explanations. As mentioned, although "first we should solve […]" is by far the most common reason, it may not be the most important explanation of between-country differences. Indeed, several items show stronger correlations with the dependent variable. It is further worth noting that the

aggregate correlations are broadly consistent with the factor analysis, as the items loading on each factor tend to correlate considerably. In addition, the separation of "we already give them enough" from the national priorities factor appears justified at the aggregate level, as this item has no positive correlation with the two items remaining in the index (-.24 and -0.07), while these two items correlate at .70 among themselves.

ANALYSIS

We both want to assess the impact of external circumstances on the tendency for non-supporters to cite particular types of reasons, and the impact of these reasons on support for aid. Starting with the hypotheses related to the first topic, instead of those regarding the impact of various reasons on support, will help us assess the validity of the measures of these reasons, serving as convergence based tests of construct validity.[28]

Disinterest

As mentioned, with regard to the category of reasons referred to as disinterest, there are few plausible external explanations. Still, there is Hypothesis 1b above, which holds disinterest increases with the level of development. Figure 3.3 below plots the share of non-supporters citing disinterest-related reasons over GDP per capita. It shows a positive relationship as hypothesized. Although the relationship appears curvilinear, due to the zero bound on the outcome, it can be approximated with a linear model, as shown in by the correlations reported in Appendix B. The correlation corresponding to Figure 3.3, where Luxembourg is excluded for its extreme value on the GDP variable, is .47 and is significant at the 5 percent level in a one-tailed test. When Ireland, which has an unusually high value on disinterest, is also excluded, the correlation is .59. This supports the hypothesis that disinterest is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support where the level of economic development is higher.

[28] Appendix A reports individual level analyses of how different reasons relate to the strength of respondents' non-support. The appendix also includes analyses of how socio-economic traits relates to support for aid and to the use of different reasons for non-support.



Figure 3.3. Share of non-supporters who cite disinterest as a reason over GDP per capita, EU, 1998.

Note: Luxembourg is excluded, being an extreme outlier on the GDP measure.

However, we also have Hypothesis 1c – that disinterest increases with the length of a country's aid experience. Figure 3.4 below plots the share of non-supporters citing disinterest-related reasons over the DAC-years variable introduced in Chapter 2. Again, we see a quite strong relationship, if we ignore the outlier of Ireland. The correlation between the two variables are .34 (N = 15). However, if we exclude Ireland (and Luxembourg for comparability with the correlations for GDP) the correlation is .73 (N = 13) – stronger than for GDP per capita. This picture also appears in regressions, where DAC-years is the only significant variable when Ireland is excluded. (Including Ireland, the GDP variable is only significant [p = 0.09] when the DAC-variable is left out, and neither is significant when both are in the same model.) Thus, we do seem to find some support for both Hypothesis 1b and 1c – disinterest is higher in more developed countries, and this may appear due to the length of a country's aid experience. More developed countries have donated aid longer, and their citizens are more likely to say they are not interested in poor countries as a reason for not supporting aid.



Figure 3.4. Share of non-supporters who cite disinterest as a reason over DAC years, EU, 1998.

Thermostat

Hypothesis 2b holds that the public detects current policy, so that greater donations lead more respondents to cite the level of current donations as a reason for non-support. In order to test the role of the level of actual donations, we need a relevant measure. An obvious alternative is the value of official development aid (ODA) donations, given in US dollars.[29] Another alternative is ODA donations as a share of the gross national income (GNI). This measure takes into account that smaller economies have less to give, and that nominally small donations may be large when the size of the economy is taken into account. As both these are relevant, and we need to limit the number of variables in the analysis, a factor score has been constructed from the two, and will be referred to as the aid donation index.[30]

Table 3.2 reports three models where the share of non-supporters who say "we already give them enough" is regressed on disinterest and the aid donation index.[31] As was already illustrated in Figure 3.2 above, there is a strong relationship between the dependent variable and disinterest. As that figure also illustrated, West Germany is an outlier in this regard, and

[29] This measure is constructed by multiplying data on ODA as a share of GNI by GNI (in current US $) for 1999. The GNI data are taken from the World Bank (2009b). The data on ODA donations as a share of GNI, which are both used in this calculation and included in the analysis, are taken from the OECD (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003: 33). Data for 1999 are used instead of 1998, as data for Greece are missing for 1998.

[30] The two variables have also been tested standing alone, but the factor score outperforms both.

[31] In these analyses, Germany and UK are treated as single entities, since their macro-level data are for the whole countries. This is why the number of observations falls to 15 from 17 above.

here, where Germany is treated as a single unit, this causes Germany to be an outlier. If it were included in Model 3 in the table, it would have a standardized residual of 2.386, while no other residual would be above 2. Since West Germany obscures what is otherwise a clear pattern, and this is likely to be due to the particular circumstances related to German re-unification, Germany has been excluded from the analyses in Table 3.2. (The results that obtain when it is included are reported in Table 3.10 in Appendix B, and demonstrate that the estimates are not very different, although the standard errors are larger and the explained variance is lower). Model 1 includes only disinterest, which shows a strong effect, explaining almost 40 percent of the variance (in terms of the adjusted R^2). Model 2 includes only the aid donation index, which has a more modest effect, explaining some 12 percent of the variance. When the variables are entered together in Model 3, this picture remains largely the same, with the model explaining slightly more than 50 percent of the variance.

Table 3.2. Regressions of "already … enough" on aid donations and disinterest, excl. outlier, EU, 1998.

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Disinterest	1.139***		1.113***
	(0.381)		(0.335)
Aid donations		0.028*	0.027**
		(0.017)	(0.013)
Constant	0.106***	0.163***	0.109***
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.020)
N	14	14	14
R^2	0.43	0.19	0.59
R^2, adjusted	0.38	0.12	0.52

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Overall, then, we do seem to find support for Hypothesis 2B, albeit moderate. The public does seem to detect the level of aid donations and adjust its opinion accordingly. Figure 3.5 below corresponds to Model 2 in Table 3.2 and plots the share of non-supporters who say "we already give them enough" over index of aid donation. Although the general picture is a bit blurred, it conforms to what we would expect from Hypothesis 2B – greater donations increase the tendency for respondents to say current donations are enough. Still, there appears to be a notably stronger effect of disinterest on the propensity to who say "we already give them enough".



Figure 3.5. Share of non-supporters saying "[w]e already give ... enough" over aid donations, EU, 1998.

Domestic Priorities

Turning to domestic priorities, the relevant Hypothesis is 3b – that respondents more frequently cite domestic priorities as reasons not to support aid when challenges are in fact greater. In particular, it is interesting to gauge the role of the variable that proved highly influential in Chapter 2, namely the proportional ten-year change in GDP per capita, from 1989 to 1999. Figure 3.6 below plots the share of non-supporters who cite at least one reason related to domestic priorities over this variable. Ireland is excluded as its growth measured this way makes it an extreme outlier. The plot may give a hint of a relationship with the expected sign, but it is not significant at any acceptable level, and the adjusted R^2 of this effect would be .04. Thus, this provides little evidence that the public considers actual national challenges in explaining non-support of aid.



Figure 3.6. Share of non-supporters who cite domestic priorities as reasons over the proportional ten-year change in GDP per capita, EU, (end of) 1998.

Note: Ireland is excluded, as its extreme growth as measure by the present indicator makes is an outlier.

However, if used as a test of construct validity, this also suggests that the measure may have low validity. This appears particularly likely given the strong effect found in Chapter 2 of national challenges on the support for aid donations. It should also be noted, as can be seen from Table 3.12 in Appendix B, that one of the measures used to construct the index of national priorities correlates much stronger with the GDP change variable than the other does. That is, while "first we should solve …" has a modest correlation of -.25, the response "this aid is too expensive for [this country]" has a strong correlation of -.72, which is significant at the one percent level. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 3.7. It may appear that the former item is so frequently used in all countries – it is the most common response – it fails to detect actual differences between the countries. The latter, on the other hand, refers directly to the economic costs of giving aid, and may thereby be better able to capture the effect of economic problems. Thus, while the index of reasons related to national priorities lends little support for Hypothesis 3b, item 2 used separately appears to yield considerable support, which is consistent with the findings in Chapter 2.



Figure 3.7. Share of non-supporters who say "this aid is too expensive for [this country]" over the proportional ten-year change in GDP per capita, EU, (end of) 1998.

Note: Ireland is excluded, as its extreme growth as measure by the present indicator makes is an outlier.

Inefficiency

Lastly, we have the reasons non-support related to inefficiency. Three hypotheses were suggested above as explanations of these, pointing to the level of national engagement or experience with aid donations, the level of economic development, and levels of disinterest. Table 3.3 reports five regression models related to these hypotheses. Model 1 includes only disinterest, which has a weak and insignificant effect. Model 2 includes only the aid donation index introduced above, which has a significant effect, and an adjusted R^2 of 42 percent.

Figure 3.8 below illustrates this relationship. Model 3 includes only GDP per capita, which also has a significant effect, and an adjusted R^2 of 55 percent. Model 4 includes both the DAC-years variable introduced in the previous chapter, measuring the number of years a country has been a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. Also this variable has a strongly significant effect, explaining 39 percent of the variance. Model 5 includes all these variables, and yields a significant effect only for the GDP variable.

Table 3.3. Regressions of inefficiency on disinterest, aid donations and GDP, EU, 1998.

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Disinterest	0.900				-0.350
	(1.213)				(1.054)
Aid donations		0.106***			0.049
		(0.033)			(0.044)
GDP per capita / 10 000			0.328***		0.290*
			(0.080)		(0.181)
DAC years				0.008***	-0.001
				(0.002)	(0.004)
Constant	0.581***	0.624***	-0.244	0.414***	-0.101
	(0.073)	(0.033)	(0.214)	(0.076)	(0.384)
N	14	14	14	14	14
R^2	0.04	0.46	0.58	0.44	0.66
R^2, adjusted	-0.04	0.42	0.55	0.39	0.51

Note: * p<0.20, ** p<0.10, *** p<0.02. Luxemburg is excluded from all the models, due to its extreme GDP per capita value.

Thus, the results appear to support both Hypothesis 4b and 4c. Skepticism regarding aid effectiveness is more often cited as a reason by non-supporters in countries that donate more aid, as well as countries that have donated aid for a longer period. However, countries that donate more aid are also more economically developed, and the level of development appears to have a stronger effect, and more robust effect. In part, this may be due to more economically developed countries having fewer economic challenges that serve as reasons for non-support, leading non-supporters to cite ineffectiveness as a reason more often. When it comes to Hypothesis 4d – that ineffectiveness is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support where disinterest is greater – the results appear to offer little support. However, as can be seen from the correlation tables in Appendix B, separating the items contained in the index of disinterest may alter this picture a bit. In particular, the item "foreign countries don't interest me" correlates at 0.56 with the index of inefficiency-related reasons in Table 3.13 (the corresponding p-value is 0.059). Still, the support for Hypothesis 4d is limited.



Figure 3.8. Share of non-supporters citing reasons related to inefficiency over aid donations, EU, 1998.

Impact on Support

What remains is the main question of this chapter: What explains non-support for aid at the aggregate level? Why do some countries' populations express less support than others do? Trying to answer this question in the analysis below, the above indices of cited reasons will be related to support. As country-level data from other sources are not included in the analyses, each sample will be aggregated separately to maximize the number of observations. This gives a western and an eastern German sample and one for Northern Ireland in addition to Great Britain.

As a preliminary step it may be useful to inspect bivariate plots and identify potential outliers. Figure 3.9 plots support for aid over the index of disinterest, and demonstrates a strong relationship between the two, only disturbed by Ireland. This observation is completely at odds with the pattern displayed by the other countries, by scoring unusually high on disinterest, yet being among the most supportive samples. Thus, unless another variable can be included that explains this, Ireland may create problems in the analysis. As, can be seen from the correlation tables in Appendix B, the correlation corresponding to this plot is -.26 when Ireland is included, and -.73 when it is excluded (along with Luxemburg and Germany).



Figure 3.9. Support for aid over the share of non-supporters citing disinterest as a reason, EU, 1998.

Note: Aggregate support is based on an individual level scale from 0 (not at all important) to 1 (very important).

Figure 3.10 plots support for aid over the share of non-supporters who say "we already give them enough". Again, there appears to be a relationship with the expected sign, but it is notably weaker than that shown above. As can be seen from the correlation tables in Appendix B, the corresponding correlation is -.47. Figure 3.11, in Appendix B, shows the support for aid over the index on inefficiency-related reasons. It does not show a very clear relationship, although it suggests Belgium may be an outlier, excluding which a weak relationship might appear. Figure 3.12, also in Appendix B, plots support for aid over the index of national priorities, and fails to show a clear relationship between the two.



Figure 3.10. Support for aid over the share of non-supporters citing the current level of aid, EU, 1998.

As a last step, Table 3.4 reports models in which support for aid is regressed on the indices of reasons for non-support. When all four indices are included in a single model, as they are in Model 5 in Table 3.8 in Appendix B, it turns out that Ireland has a standardized residual of

2.31, while the second largest, that of Belgium, is only -1.72. Therefore, Ireland has been excluded from all the models in Table 3.4. Table 3.9 in Appendix B excludes both Ireland and Belgium for comparison.

Model 1 in Table 3.4, which includes only the variable "already enough", attributes this variable a significant effect explaining 25 percent of the variance, in terms of the adjusted R^2. As would be expected from the plot discussed above, Model 2, which includes only national priorities, does not attribute a significant effect to this variable. The same is true of ineffectiveness, which is the only variable in Model 3. Disinterest, on the other hand, which is the only variable in Model 4, is attributed a highly significant effect with the expected sign that explains 50 percent of the variance. When all these variables are entered together in Model 5, only disinterest is attributed a significant effect, which is slightly weaker than that estimated in Model 4. The explained variance is also about the same as in that model. The other variables all retain the expected sign, but fail to reach significance.

Table 3.4. Regressions of support on expressed reasons, excl. one outlier, EU, 1998.

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Already enough	-0.517**				-0.183
	(0.212)				(0.230)
National priorities		-0.164			-0.183
		(0.202)			(0.148)
Ineffectiveness			-0.150		-0.067
			(0.120)		(0.110)
Disinterest				-1.935***	-1.607***
				(0.485)	(0.537)
Constant	0.770***	0.810***	0.776***	0.754***	0.959***
	(0.040)	(0.160)	(0.079)	(0.023)	(0.144)
N	16	16	16	16	16
R^2	0.30	0.05	0.10	0.53	0.64
R^2, adjusted	0.25	-0.02	0.04	0.50	0.51

Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, one-tailed tests.

In sum, the only hypothesis that receives unambiguous support with regard to explaining international differences in support is Hypothesis 1a, that support is lower where disinterest is cited as a reason for non-support. This may not be surprising, but it is nonetheless important. Model 1 above could seem to support Hypothesis 2a, that support shows a thermostatic responsiveness to national aid donations. However, the fact that its effect is much weaker, and statistically insignificant, when controlled for disinterest, undermines this interpretation. A better interpretation may be that the levels of aid respondents judge sufficient depends on the level of interest or concern, which itself has an effect on support, causing spurious correlation.

Hypothesis 3a, that support is lower where national challenges are cited as reasons for non-support receives little support. This is somewhat surprising, given that Chapter 2 found a strong relationship between national economic problems and support, and this may again put the construct validity of the involved measures in doubt. It was mentioned above that the index of national priorities may have low validity. However, if Item 2, "this aid is too expensive" were used instead of the index in the above analysis, its estimates would still be insignificant, and the estimates of the other variables would hardly change. Thus, the dependent variable may also be thrown in doubt, and a likely problem is that it refers to the "importance" of helping other countries, without relating it to other policy objectives, allowing respondents to acknowledge its importance, while they might not support an increase in actual aid.

Hypothesis 4a, that support is lower where inefficiency is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support does not receive strong support. It should be noted, however, that in Model 3 in Table 3.9 in Appendix B, where Belgium is excluded, inefficiency is attributed a significant effect. The only problem is that when the other variables are included in Model 5, this effect is cut in half and rendered insignificant. Thus, Hypothesis 4a receives little support here. Nevertheless, as the next chapter will illustrate, using other indicators, there may be something to the idea that support for aid is influenced by beliefs regarding effectiveness.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to explore which explicit reasons explain respondents' degree of support for international aid. Explaining differences between countries is the most interesting as this may also help explain why more economically developed countries tend to show less public support. It was expected that one could distinguish between four categories of reasons for non-support: disinterest, thermostatic responsiveness, national priorities, and ineffectiveness. A factor analysis confirmed this with one possible exception – expressions of thermostatic responsiveness correlate with national priorities.

Several hypotheses receive support in the analyses above, in particular those regarding the relationships between particular reasons for non-support of aid, and the objective circumstances that give rise to them. In more economically developed countries, respondents are more likely to cite disinterest as a reason for not supporting the donation of aid. However, this relationship appears due to the fact that more developed countries have donated aid longer, and disinterest is more widespread in such countries. This is interesting in light of

Chapter 2, which suggested the differences in support among aid donors also in part is due to the length of their aid experience. The present results may suggest the public grows tired of aid over time. It also appears that greater national donations of aid lead more respondents to see the "we already give them enough" as a reason not to support aid – in accordance with the notion of a thermostatic response. However, respondents' use of this alternative appears to depend even more on disinterest than actual donations. In addition, while greater national economic challenges – measured by (low) economic growth over ten years, does not appear to influence respondents' propensity to cite reasons related to domestic priorities in general, it does increase their tendency to say that "aid is too expensive" for their country. Concerns about wasted resources and aid inefficiency may appear to increase with greater national donations and the length of a country's aid experience, but the level of economic development may appear more important in this regard.

When it comes to explaining the between-country variance in support for aid (stage a) with the reasons cited for non-support, the hypotheses fare less well. Only one type of reasons appear to have a statistically significant effect, namely that of disinterest, which for its part appears to be highly influential. It appears that half of the international variation in support can be explained by disinterest. While the results also seem to suggest there is an effect of respondents saying "we already give them enough", this ultimately appears to be a result of disinterest rather than actual aid donations, undermining the interpretation of this as a thermostatic response. The reasons related to national priorities and ineffectiveness are not found to have clear and strong effects.

However, given the effect found of national economic challenges on support in Chapter 2, the mentioned results may put the construct validity of the measure of support in doubt. As mentioned, a possible problem is that the indicator refers to absolute preferences for aid donations rather than relating them to current levels of aid to capture relative preferences. Another is that the donation of aid is not set up against other policy objectives, so that the indicator fails to capture the importance attributed to donating aid within a frame of necessary trade-offs. This is likely to explain why the relationship between support and economic development is blurred in this analysis. It is also likely to explain why national priorities are not found to have an effect on support, despite national economic problems proving

influential in chapter 2.[32] Respondents may find the donation of aid important, and yet think their national problems should be given priority for the time being. Similarly, this may in part also explain why the effect of reasons related to inefficiency is unclear, and why there is no clear evidence of a thermostatic response. Thus, the analyses in this chapter hardly make for strong conclusions dismissing any of these hypotheses.

Still, we see that the only explanation receiving strong support is that of disinterest. In addition, we see that disinterest increases with economic development and the length of a country's aid experience. Disinterest is more frequently cited as a reason for non-support in the countries that would be likely to pay for increased aid. As this reason may be seen as an expression respondents do not think giving aid is worth the cost to their country, these findings may appear consistent with the hypothesis put forward in Chapter 2, that self-interest causes individuals in more economically developed countries – those that are potential aid donors – to be less in favor of international aid than individuals in other countries. However, the results also suggest a slightly more nuanced picture, as the effect of economic development on support among aid donors may be indirect, and work through the length of a country's aid experience, which may gradually exhaust public support.

[32] It should also be noted that this effect could not possibly explain the relationship that is of most interest here, the negative effect of economic development on support for aid. The economic challenges as measured here are negatively related to economic development, as greater increases in production (fewer challenges) are related to greater overall production. Greater increases in production give fewer domestic challenges as potential reasons for not supporting aid. Rather than helping to explain the negative effect of economic development, economic challenges would provide an additional explanation.

APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSES

Another way to analyze the data, turning to the individual level, is to investigate how socio-economic characteristics affect both the support for aid, and the use of different reasons to explain non-support. While this does not directly explain between-country differences in the support for aid, it may yield information about what groups tend to support aid or not, and what reasons they tend to use. This may also tell us something about the nature of the items measuring the reasons. Table 3.5 reports several regression models, all of which report "fixed effects", i.e. they are models where the country means are removed, so that between-country differences do not affect the results. Model 1 and 2 take the support for aid as the dependent variable. Model 1 includes age, education and income.[33] Model 2 adds respondent cooperation, as coded by the interviewer, ranging from excellent (1) to bad (4).[34] This variable is included to give further clues as to which respondents use which reasons. Model 1 shows that younger respondents, those with higher education, and those with higher income express a stronger support for the donation of aid. When respondent cooperation is introduced in Model 2, the effect of income is reduced and rendered insignificant, suggesting that the former variable intervenes in the causal relationship. Respondents who show less cooperation in the interview situation also show less support for aid.

Overall, it is clear that the independent variables do not explain much of the propensity to use any of the reasons investigated. Nevertheless, there are a few significant effects that may be interesting. Respondents with higher education are less likely to say that "first we should solve problems […] in this country" and that "the more aid we give […] the more children they have". As mentioned, these respondents are also more likely to support aid. Those with higher income are more likely to be concerned about the impact and effectiveness of aid, saying "It is a waste […] because their situation does not improve", and that "the money will be misused and will not reach those who need it". They are also more likely to say that "Poor countries should stop fighting". Thus, it seems that respondents with higher incomes to a

[33] Education is measured as the year in which education was ended. Where respondents are still in education, the value has been set equal to present age. To avoid rare and extreme values, the variable has been set to vary from 14 to 25, with values outside this range being set to the closest accepted value (14 or 25). Income is measured in quartiles (lowest = 1, highest = 4).

[34] The missing values for each of these variables have all been imputed using the available values of the other. The imputation was done for each sample separately, to accommodate differences in means, and the relationships between the variables.

greater extent place responsibility for underdevelopment with people in poor countries. This may parallel the pattern in which such respondents are more skeptical with regard to national redistributive policies.

Older respondents behave much the same way as those with higher income, being more likely to state the three mentioned reasons related to efficiency and local fighting. In addition, they are less likely to say that "poor countries don't interest" them, and somewhat less likely to point to domestic problems. However, it is also worth recalling that age differs from income when it comes to support for aid, as older respondents are less supportive of aid than younger ones.

When it comes to respondent cooperation, those who are less cooperative are more likely to point to domestic problems. Interestingly, they are also less likely to say that "[m]oney will be misused" – the expression of concerns about efficiency that has the most neutral and nuanced wording. In addition, they are less likely to say "poor countries should stop fighting", and more likely to say "poor countries don't interest me" and "I don't like foreigners". This may illustrate the problem with the wording of the alternatives. Less cooperative respondents, appear more likely to use alternatives that lack nuance and contain implicit or explicit prejudice towards foreigners and poor countries.

While this is only indicative with regard to how different reasons affect the support for aid, it may be worth noting which categories show more and less support, and which reasons they tend to use. For example, that older respondents tend to be more concerned about efficiency, and also tend to be less supportive of aid, or that those with lower education are more concerned about domestic problems, and less supportive of aid. For income, which has a less clear effect on the support for aid, the picture is less clear, as higher incomes are positively related to support for aid, and for concerns about aid effectiveness.

Table 3.5. Fixed effects linear and logistic regressions of support for aid and reasons for non-support on socio-economic variables and respondent cooperation, EU, 1998.

	Model 1 Support	Model 2 Support	Model 3 Item 1	Model 4 Item 2	Model 5 Item 3	Model 6 Item 4	Model 7 Item 5
Education	0.009***	0.009***	-0.043***	-0.017	0.003	-0.005	-0.008
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Income quartile	0.005**	0.002	-0.056	0.024	0.095*	0.102**	0.089
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.055)
Age	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.005*	0.003	0.009***	0.008***	0.003
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Respondent coop.		-0.027***	0.135**	-0.007	-0.077	-0.159***	-0.007
		(0.003)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.063)
Constant	0.525***	0.583***					
	(0.015)	(0.016)					
N	15187	15187	2883	2883	2883	2883	2883
R2, adj./pseudo	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00

Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 3.6. Fixed effects logistic regressions of reasons for non-support of aid on socio-economic variables and respondent cooperation, EU, 1998 (continued form Table 3.6).

	Model 1 Item 6	Model 2 Item 7	Model 3 Item 8	Model 4 Item 9	Model 5 Item 10	Model 6 Item 11
Education	-0.046**	-0.006	-0.004	0.029	-0.044	0.000
	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.050)
Income	-0.026	0.088*	-0.057	-0.090	-0.077	-0.028
	(0.059)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.073)	(0.120)	(0.156)
Age	0.004	0.005**	-0.002	-0.003	-0.026***	-0.008
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Respondent coop.	-0.113	-0.161***	-0.059	0.097	0.234*	0.506***
	(0.069)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.084)	(0.122)	(0.153)
N	2883	2883	2883	2883	2693	2746
R2, pseudo	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.02

Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The number of observations for the two last models is lower, because countries in which these rare responses did not occur at all are excluded.

At the individual level, we are unable to analyze the impact of reasons for non-support on the full scale of support, as the survey only asks the relevant questions to non-supporters. However, we do know whether these respondents say helping people in poor countries is "not very important" or "not at all important". This allows us to analyze how the reasons relate to the strength of respondents' non-support, which is done below.

Table 3.7 below therefore reports a fixed effect logistic regression of the two categories of non-support on the indicators included in the factor analysis above. "Not at all important" is given the highest value (one), so positive coefficients means that items are related to stronger opposition. First, it should be noted that the analysis does not explain much of the variance, with a pseudo R^2 of .04. Nevertheless, there are several highly significant coefficients, and some of them are negative – suggesting that some reasons for non-support are related to more moderate stances. The only priorities-related reason with a significant coefficient is "this aid is too expensive", which is related to stronger opposition to aid. The disinterest-related items

(10 and 11) are both highly significant and positive, again suggesting strong relationships with greater opposition. With regard to the waste-related items the picture is less clear. Two of them have significantly positive coefficients, namely "it is a waste of money […] because their situation does not improve" and "the more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they have". However, another item has a significantly negative effect, namely "the money will be misused and will not reach those who need it".

This points us towards an important concern: How these items relate to support for aid may depend as much on question wording as on the logic or the type of the reasons in question. The items that are related to moderate positions (i.e. "not very important") also appear to be more moderate and nuanced. In addition to the "money will be misused"-item, this applies to "there will always be rich and poor countries" and "I don't know enough about these countries to decide".

We should also note that the items that get negative coefficients in this analysis would be unlikely to receive negative coefficients if we had the whole scale of the support available. The concerns that are related to moderate oppositions are still reasons for showing lower support. Similarly, the items that do not get significant estimates may still be important when the whole scale is taken into account. They just do not influence the degree of non-support.

Table 3.7. Fixed effects logistic regression of "not at all" versus "not very" important to help, EU, 1998.

Item	Model 1
1. First we should solve problems […] in [this country]	0.135
	(0.105)
2. This aid is too expensive for [this country]	0.439***
	(0.102)
3. It is a waste of money […] because their situation does not improve	0.323***
	(0.113)
4. The money will be misused and will not reach those who need it	-0.283***
	(0.097)
5. We (our country/Europe) already give them enough money	0.025
	(0.115)
6. The more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they have	0.391***
	(0.122)
7. Poor countries should stop fighting and stop buying arms	-0.128
	(0.100)
8. There will always be rich and poor countries	-0.291**
	(0.114)
9. I don't know enough about these countries to decide […]	-0.355**
	(0.163)
10. Poor countries don't interest me	1.390***
	(0.223)
11. I don't like foreigners (spontaneous response)	1.173***
	(0.283)
N	2883
N of Clusters	15
R^2, pseudo	0.04

Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01



Figure 3.11. Support for aid over the share of non-supporters citing inefficiency as a reason, EU, 1998.



Figure 3.12. Support for aid over the share of non-supporters citing national priorities, EU, 1998.

Table 3.8. Regressions of support on expressed reasons, incl. outliers, EU, 1998.

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Already enough	-0.481**				-0.362
	(0.222)				(0.321)
National priorities		-0.089			-0.084
		(0.200)			(0.208)
Ineffectiveness			-0.152		-0.055
			(0.122)		(0.157)
Disinterest				-0.675	-0.287
				(0.507)	(0.573)
Constant	0.770***	0.757***	0.783***	0.715***	0.863***
	(0.042)	(0.159)	(0.080)	(0.028)	(0.202)
N	17	17	17	17	17
R^2	0.24	0.01	0.09	0.11	0.27
R^2, adjusted	0.19	-0.05	0.03	0.05	0.03

Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, one-tailed tests.

Table 3.9. Regressions of support on expressed reasons, excl. two outliers, EU, 1998.

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Already enough	-0.396**				-0.117
	(0.213)				(0.255)
National priorities		-0.043			-0.158
		(0.193)			(0.156)
Ineffectiveness			-0.200**		-0.103
			(0.100)		(0.125)
Disinterest				-1.674***	-1.410**
				(0.569)	(0.624)
Constant	0.756***	0.724***	0.819***	0.747***	0.947***
	(0.039)	(0.151)	(0.067)	(0.024)	(0.148)
N	15	15	15	15	15
R^2	0.21	0.00	0.23	0.40	0.53
R^2, adjusted	0.15	-0.07	0.17	0.35	0.35

Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, one-tailed tests.

Table 3.10. Regressions of "already ... enough" on aid donations and disinterest, incl. outlier, EU, 1998.

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Disinterest	0.926**		0.937**
	(0.507)		(0.436)
Aid donations		0.037**	0.037**
		(0.018)	(0.016)
Constant	0.128***	0.172***	0.128***
	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.025)
N	15	15	15
R^2	0.20	0.25	0.46
R^2, adjusted	0.14	0.19	0.36

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 3.11. Descriptive statistics for macro-level variables.

Support for aid, aggregated from EB 50.1:				
a. Support of aid, from not at all important (0) to very important (1)	0.683	0.076	0.537	0.830
Macro-level variables:	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**
b. ODA, in 100 billions, current US $	1.822	1.869	0.126	5.771
c. ODA / GNI	0.402	0.260	0.150	1.010
d. Aid donation index	0	1	-1.256	1.571
e. GDP per capita, 1998, PPP, 2005 USD[a]	26496	3760	19086	31304
f. ΔGDP, 1989-1999, proportional[b]	0.212	0.079	0.112	0.388
g. National Priorities	0.785	0.099	0.623	0.931
h. Inefficiency	0.625	0.156	0.372	0.859
i. Disinterest	0.047	0.036	0.000	0.137
Reasons for not supporting aid, aggregated from EB 50.1:				
1. First we should solve problems […] in [this country]	0.739	0.108	0.575	0.898
2. This aid is too expensive for [this country]	0.221	0.071	0.115	0.345
3. It is a waste of money […] because […] does not improve	0.209	0.090	0.055	0.422
4. The money will be misused and will not reach those who need it	0.446	0.167	0.175	0.746
5. We (our country/Europe) already give them enough money	0.172	0.075	0.069	0.318
6. The more aid we give […] the more children they have	0.137	0.076	0.019	0.227
7. Poor countries should stop fighting and stop buying arms	0.335	0.129	0.052	0.525
8. There will always be rich and poor countries	0.210	0.084	0.071	0.323
9. I don't know enough about these countries […]	0.091	0.042	0.034	0.160
10. Poor countries don't interest me	0.032	0.028	0.000	0.109
11. I don't like foreigners (*spontaneous response*)	0.020	0.018	0.000	0.056
12. Others (spontaneous response)	0.024	0.021	0.000	0.062
13. Don't know	0.012	0.012	0.000	0.034

Note: The table is based on the same 15 observations as Figure 3.5 above, where the United Kingdom and Germany are treated as single observations.

[a] Luxembourg is excluded from the analyses involving this variable, as it has the extreme value 52580. Therefore, these summary statistics are also based on the 14 other countries.

[b] Ireland is excluded from the analyses involving this variable, as it has the extreme value 0.847. Therefore, these summary statistics are also based on the 14 other countries.

Table 3.12. Correlations between macro-level variables and aggregates, including outliers.

		a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.	h.	i.
b.	ODA, in 100 billions, current US $	-0.09	1.00							
c.	ODA / GNI	0.07	0.07	1.00						
d.	Aid donation index	-0.02	0.73	0.73	1.00					
e.	GDP per capita, 1998[a]	-0.34	0.44	0.50	0.62	1.00				
f.	ΔGDP, 1989-1999, proportional[b]	0.15	-0.17	0.29	0.09	0.12	1.00			
g.	National Priorities	-0.21	-0.02	-0.45	-0.32	-0.42	-0.34	1.00		
h.	Inefficiency	-0.32	0.38	0.62	0.68	0.76	-0.13	-0.32	1.00	
i.	Disinterest	-0.26	0.03	-0.04	-0.01	0.47	-0.20	0.32	0.20	1.00
1.	First we should solve […]	-0.14	-0.02	-0.40	-0.29	-0.45	-0.25	0.98	-0.36	0.23
2.	This aid is too expensive […]	-0.43	0.35	-0.30	0.03	-0.11	-0.72	0.61	0.13	0.08
3.	[…] situation does not improve	-0.05	0.46	0.73	0.81	0.66	-0.12	-0.38	0.71	0.12
4.	The money will be misused […]	-0.17	0.28	0.67	0.65	0.60	-0.12	-0.27	0.94	0.06
5.	We […] already give them enough	-0.47	0.49	0.23	0.50	0.69	0.13	0.06	0.54	0.45
6.	[…] the more children they have	-0.71	0.32	0.32	0.44	0.71	0.00	-0.18	0.75	0.35
7.	[…] should stop fighting	-0.58	0.24	0.42	0.45	0.62	-0.14	-0.10	0.89	0.23
8.	[…] will always be rich and poor	-0.47	0.35	0.68	0.71	0.73	0.06	-0.36	0.76	0.04
9.	I don't know enough […]	-0.28	-0.09	0.72	0.43	0.55	-0.05	-0.32	0.84	0.16
10.	Poor countries don't interest me	-0.13	-0.09	0.03	-0.04	0.38	-0.16	0.17	0.29	0.91
11.	I don't like foreigners	-0.34	0.31	-0.02	0.20	0.47	-0.15	0.43	0.08	0.71
12.	Others (spontaneous response)	0.32	0.26	0.00	0.18	0.05	0.13	-0.32	-0.27	-0.08
13.	Don't know	-0.41	-0.18	-0.28	-0.32	-0.08	0.00	-0.14	-0.03	-0.02

		1.	**2.**	**3.**	**4.**	**5.**	**6.**	**7.**	**8.**	**9.**
2.	This aid is too expensive […]	0.57	1.00							
3.	[…] situation does not improve	-0.37	0.04	1.00						
4.	The money will be misused […]	-0.27	0.14	0.66	1.00					
5.	We […] already give them enough	0.06	0.23	0.52	0.44	1.00				
6.	[…] the more children they have	-0.22	0.20	0.51	0.61	0.68	1.00			
7.	[…] should stop fighting	-0.18	0.23	0.46	0.80	0.54	0.76	1.00		
8.	[…] will always be rich and poor	-0.33	0.13	0.76	0.70	0.58	0.73	0.64	1.00	
9.	I don't know enough […]	-0.37	-0.04	0.54	0.84	0.26	0.53	0.81	0.67	1.00
10.	Poor countries don't interest me	0.07	-0.01	0.10	0.20	0.34	0.39	0.27	-0.01	0.27
11.	I don't like foreigners	0.40	0.22	0.16	-0.07	0.41	0.18	0.12	0.21	-0.02
12.	Others (spontaneous response)	-0.36	-0.42	0.01	-0.39	-0.33	-0.33	-0.41	-0.25	-0.33
13.	Don't know	-0.25	-0.19	-0.34	-0.17	-0.25	0.25	0.22	-0.24	0.00

		10.	11.	12.	13.
11.	I don't like foreigners	0.38	1.00		
12.	Others (spontaneous response)	-0.17	0.12	1.00	
13.	Don't know	0.07	-0.22	0.23	1.00

Note: The table is based on the same 15 observations as Figure 3.5 above.

[a] Luxembourg is an outlier on this variable and is excluded, which makes N for these correlations 14.

[b] Ireland is an outlier on this variable and is excluded, which makes N for these correlations 14 (except for with GDP where it is 13).

Table 3.13. Correlations between macro-level variables and aggregates, excluding outliers.

		a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.	h.	i.
b.	ODA, in 100 billions, current US $	0.01	1.00							
c.	ODA / GNI	0.12	0.25	1.00						
d.	Aid donation index	0.09	0.74	0.83	1.00					
e.	GDP per capita, 1998[a]	-0.37	0.43	0.55	0.63	1.00				
f.	ΔGDP, 1989-1999, proportional[b]	0.25	-0.01	0.17	0.11	0.12	1.00			
g.	National Priorities	-0.35	-0.03	-0.43	-0.31	-0.49	-0.39	1.00		
h.	Inefficiency	-0.33	0.29	0.74	0.67	0.75	-0.22	-0.40	1.00	
i.	Disinterest	-0.73	0.41	0.04	0.26	0.65	-0.18	0.17	0.36	1.00
1.	First we should solve […]	-0.24	-0.03	-0.41	-0.30	-0.52	-0.35	0.99	-0.45	0.10
2.	This aid is too expensive […]	-0.48	0.11	-0.20	-0.08	-0.17	-0.69	0.72	0.07	0.26
3.	[…] situation does not improve	0.00	0.38	0.85	0.81	0.66	-0.05	-0.41	0.72	0.34
4.	The money will be misused […]	-0.17	0.25	0.75	0.66	0.57	-0.35	-0.33	0.95	0.14
5.	We […] already give them enough	-0.61	0.43	0.37	0.51	0.71	0.03	-0.04	0.46	0.78
6.	[…] the more children they have	-0.71	0.29	0.32	0.39	0.72	-0.19	-0.16	0.75	0.76
7.	[…] should stop fighting	-0.63	0.07	0.52	0.40	0.60	-0.26	-0.16	0.88	0.43
8.	[…] will always be rich and poor	-0.40	0.32	0.73	0.69	0.80	-0.02	-0.30	0.82	0.45
9.	I don't know enough […]	-0.33	-0.04	0.75	0.49	0.57	-0.14	-0.36	0.91	0.13
10.	Poor countries don't interest me	-0.64	0.36	0.12	0.28	0.60	-0.28	-0.06	0.56	0.84
11.	I don't like foreigners	-0.49	0.48	0.05	0.31	0.49	-0.05	0.39	0.12	0.75
12.	Others (spontaneous response)	0.43	0.41	0.03	0.26	0.15	0.51	-0.30	-0.19	0.02
13.	Don't know	-0.37	-0.23	-0.37	-0.38	-0.04	-0.02	-0.05	0.02	0.22
		1.	**2.**	**3.**	**4.**	**5.**	**6.**	**7.**	**8.**	**9.**
2.	This aid is too expensive […]	0.70	1.00							
3.	[…] situation does not improve	-0.39	-0.11	1.00						
4.	The money will be misused […]	-0.36	0.19	0.70	1.00					
5.	We […] already give them enough	-0.07	0.24	0.59	0.31	1.00				
6.	[…] the more children they have	-0.24	0.25	0.52	0.58	0.70	1.00			
7.	[…] should stop fighting	-0.25	0.19	0.44	0.78	0.43	0.76	1.00		
8.	[…] will always be rich and poor	-0.30	0.13	0.79	0.75	0.72	0.72	0.68	1.00	
9.	I don't know enough […]	-0.41	0.01	0.60	0.89	0.31	0.58	0.90	0.76	1.00
10.	Poor countries don't interest me	-0.16	0.25	0.40	0.37	0.65	0.91	0.57	0.44	0.30
11.	I don't like foreigners	0.39	0.24	0.20	-0.03	0.59	0.30	0.17	0.37	-0.04
12.	Others (spontaneous response)	-0.30	-0.66	-0.01	-0.28	-0.10	-0.28	-0.34	-0.32	-0.34
13.	Don't know	-0.18	-0.21	-0.38	-0.15	-0.19	0.26	0.30	-0.36	0.03
		10.	11.	12.	14.					
11.	I don't like foreigners	0.31	1.00							
12.	Others (spontaneous response)	-0.08	0.13	1.00						
13.	Don't know	0.41	-0.17	0.17	1.00					

Note: The table is based on 12 of the 15 observations as Figure 3.5 above, as three outliers are excluded: Luxembourg for its extreme value on GDP per capita, Ireland for its extreme value on ten-year GDP change (and disinterest), and Germany for West Germany's tendency to say "we .. already give them enough", making Germany an outlier with regard to most bivariate relationships.

4. COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND BELIEFS ON AID EFFECTIVENESS

> As we might expect, those believing that governmental aid makes a difference to the lives of people in poor countries are more inclined to consider that it is "very important" to give aid to these countries. (TNS 2005: 27)

> That the minority who are non–supporters [of official development aid] mention corruption, aid diversion and inefficiency — in addition to preference for their own domestic concerns — to explain their attitude is easily understandable. (Mc Donnell, Lecomte, and Wegimont 2003: 26)

Surveys of opinions on development aid may help us understand how public opinion relates to international relations. However, any interpretation of responses regarding support for aid requires assumptions about the reasons for people's positions – at the very least. Any reliable interpretation would require that their reasons be empirically investigated, as attempted in Chapter 3. Most importantly, reasons based on beliefs regarding aid effectiveness ought to be separated from other reasons, as they determine the perceived scope for aid to make a difference. Low confidence in the effectiveness of aid is commonly seen as highly legitimate reasons for showing limited support. However, taking such beliefs into account requires a causal model of how they relate to support for aid. As the quotes above suggest, previous studies based on existing survey data, assume a one-directional effect of beliefs regarding effectiveness on support for aid.

However, this may be too simple, as reciprocal causation is also plausible. Some theories suggest that those less inclined to support aid have reasons to adjust their expressed empirical beliefs regarding aid effectiveness. Most importantly, cognitive dissonance theory may suggest that individuals wanting to maintain positive self-concepts, while not supporting aid, have motivation to be more pessimistic in their empirical beliefs. If this is correct, people's stated beliefs regarding aid effectiveness are not neutral reasons for their positions on the donation of aid.

This is investigated using two research designs, involving different datasets and indicators. The first uses data from the EB 62.2 and deals with reciprocal causation using an instrumental variable approach. The second design uses indicators from the Eurobarometer (EB) 50.1 that avoid the challenge of reciprocal causation, but possibly suffer from the presence of a particular confounder. Propensity score matching based on several measures of this

confounder is used, before the effect on several measures of beliefs in effectiveness are estimated. In both cases, the preliminary results suggest there are significant effects of support for aid on beliefs regarding effectiveness. The chapter starts by discussing the theoretical background and the assumptions required to form the mentioned hypothesis. Then, the two analyses are presented and discussed in two separate sections, followed by a discussion of the differences between the two designs as well as the emerging overall result.

THE PATTERN

The first analysis will be based data from the EB 62.2, conducted towards the end of 2004 (European Commission 2007). As in other EBs, the main question tapping support for development aid is this: "In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very important, or not at all important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?". The dataset also includes a quite direct measure of expressed beliefs in aid efficiency, namely the question: "Thinking about development aid provided by the [national] Government, is this aid making any difference to improving the lives of poor people in developing countries (Africa, Latin America, Asia, etc.)?". The possible answers are "yes", "no" and "do not know". For the EU as a whole, 51 percent say "yes", 32 say "no" and 17 "do not know" (TNS 2005). Unfortunately, the dataset does not contain the "do not know" responses, but they presumably coincide with the missing values (except for those for Bulgaria and Romania where the question was not asked). Nevertheless, the indicator has been kept as a binary indicator.

At the individual level, this variable is quite strongly related to views on the importance of giving aid, with a correlation of .18. At the aggregate level, however, the question does not readily make for international comparisons, as it specifically refers to the impact of national aid donations. For the present purposes, international comparisons are not required, but an attempt to make such comparisons may nevertheless be worthwhile. The survey asks its respondents: "Do you think the [national] Government helps poor people in Africa, Latin America, Asia, etc. to develop? We are not talking here about humanitarian aid (that is assistance provided in emergency situations like war, famine, etc.), but about development aid." This is indented to capture whether or not respondents believe their governments are at all giving development aid. At the aggregate level, this variable is strongly related to beliefs regarding the impact of aid, with a correlation of .74. Running a regression of beliefs regarding the impact of aid on this variable and calculating the residuals should result in a

more internationally comparable measure. Figure 4.1 below plots aggregate support for aid over this measure, and shows a reasonably strong relationship. The corresponding bivariate correlation is .62 (N = 27).



Figure 4.1. Support for aid over beliefs regarding the impact of national aid, expanded EU, end of 2004.

The relationship illustrated in Figure 4.1 appears to support the idea that beliefs regarding the impact of aid are important determinants of the support for giving aid. This may appear surprising, given that the Chapter 3 failed to identify a significant effect of such beliefs. However, a few reasons may help explain this discrepancy. Most importantly, the pattern above is likely to be confounded in several ways. Given that this measure of aid impact, as mentioned, asks whether national aid makes a difference, respondents are more likely to respond affirmative in countries where aid donations are greater, simply because greater efforts make it more likely that some result is achieved, and also because aid donations correlate with spending on programs to inform citizens in donor countries about aid policies. In addition, the indicator of aid support is likely to capture absolute policy preferences, and over time to influence national levels of aid donations, as suggested in Chapter 1. Thus, support is likely to increase donation, which may increase beliefs that national aid makes some difference, which would confound the pattern above.[35]

[35] Other explanations are also possible. It should be noted that Chapter 3 is based on a much more limited selection of countries due to data availability, which results in lower power for the statistical tests. The estimated coefficients of beliefs regarding these beliefs are negative also in Chapter 3, but not large enough in relation to their standard errors to achieve a satisfactory level of significance. In addition, the indicators used in these tests, and in Chapter 3 in particular, are far from perfect, their wording not living up to standards of good practice in survey design. Their validity is probably lower

Nevertheless, it may be tempting to interpret this pattern as moderate support for the hypothesis that beliefs regarding aid effectiveness explain levels of aid support. However, even if the explanation above were proven wrong – if the effect of support of aid does not confound this relationship, interpreting it in light of a one-directional causal model, would still involve a risk of overestimating the effect, even at the individual level. As will be argued at length below, reverse causation is likely in this case, as the support for aid may influence beliefs regarding the impact of aid. If this conjecture is correct, a normal regression of support for aid on beliefs regarding aid effectiveness would be biased as an analysis of the one-directional effect, as it would also capture the one in the opposite direction. Thus, we see that the bivariate relationship between the two cannot be taken *a priori* as a one-way causal effect. The next section introduces a theoretical underpinning of an alternative causal interpretation of this pattern.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS

The basic idea of cognitive dissonance theory is that when an individual holds two inconsistent cognitions, he or she will experience *dissonance* – a negative drive state (Festinger 1957). This unpleasant experience induces a drive to reduce the dissonance, by changing one or more of the cognitions. This theory has inspired much research in psychology, and several modifications and further specifications have been suggested (see Aronson 1997; Cooper 2007; Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999; Tavris and Aronson 2007). Most notably, it has been suggested the theory is more likely to apply whenever individuals' self-concepts are involved (Aronson 1960). This means that the initial work, which did not take this into account, can be said to implicitly have made the assumption that the individuals in question had sufficiently high self-concepts for dissonance to occur (Aronson and Carlsmith 1962). More specifically, self-concepts may be divided into three aspects, and, accordingly, attempts to maintain them can be seen as struggles to maintain a sense of self that is (a) a consistent and predictable, (b) a competent, and (c) a morally good (Aronson et al. 1974; Aronson 1968).

This theory, then, may suggest a hypothesis that stands in contrast to the assumption that beliefs in development aid effectiveness are given, and can be seen as neutral reasons for opinions on whether or not aid should be given. The first point to note in forming this

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than that of the present indicator, which may exacerbate the problem of identifying real relationships in a test that already has low power.

hypothesis is that the norm of relieving human suffering if one can – without large costs to oneself – stands reasonably strong in most developed countries. A case in point is Singer's argument (1972: 231), which seems to have a strong intuitive appeal:

> I begin with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. […] My next point is this: if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it. […] This principle seems almost as uncontroversial as the last one.

Although Singer uses examples where the suffering is due in part to wars and natural disasters, he also notes the problem of "constant poverty", and his argument seems also to apply to conditions due to a lack of development, if they are avoidable and equally dire. As Singer notes, the intuitive force of this argument is so strong it seems "uncontroversial". Nevertheless, he also notes that the argument "takes […] no account of proximity or distance" and "makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position". Singer thinks such circumstances may influence the likelihood that we will help, but that they nonetheless are morally irrelevant. Thus, interestingly, he provides a moral argument that appears to have strong intuitive appeal, but one that also may be more demanding than many will accept in practice.

It is also worth noting that the argument leaves one legitimate reason for not acting to relieve suffering, as it only applies "if it is in our power" to do so. As illustrated by the discussion in Chapter 1, it is hard to determine what outcomes development aid enables us to achieve. Some policy areas are by their nature detached from the experiences of most citizens, making them dependent on media coverage and scholarly research for relevant information. Citizens may differ considerably in how they sort out the contradictory information they face and how they consequently form their beliefs – even descriptive beliefs, on empirical matters. When the design and impact of policies are subject to as much controversy and debate as development aid is and has been, such differences may be of great consequence. In other words, citizens may have considerable scope for forming different beliefs about aid effectiveness – and they may still be able to cite examples backing them up.

Cognitive dissonance theory suggests the following hypothesis: *Individuals' initial inclination to support or not support development aid influences their belief in the effectiveness of such aid*. Not supporting aid, while believing it has a strong impact, is likely to create dissonance

for some individuals. In particular, the drive to maintain a sense of self as morally good may, among those inclined not to support the donation of aid, induce a motivation to believe aid is ineffective, and, thus, that it is not in their power to help. Of course, a similar effect may also be present at the other side of the spectrum. Those who are strongly determined to support the donation of aid may ignore more information about the problems of aid projects and maintain a strong belief in the effectiveness of aid, as this is a condition of their continued support for aid.

The analyses below make a few additional assumptions. The datasets do not include any good measures of self-concepts, and the main analyses will not try to measure them. Thus, they can be seen as making the assumption that the respondents have self-concepts that are sufficiently high for dissonance to occur. Of course, it would be preferable not having to make this assumption, as the resulting inaccuracy may make it more difficult to identify relevant patterns. A further implied assumption is one suggested by Singer, namely that distance in geographical or cultural terms does not provide sufficiently good and legitimate reasons for not helping suffering people, if the principle otherwise applies. This is another circumstance that may make it harder to identify the hypothesized effect, even if it is present.

The hypothesis involves a technical challenge, as the most obvious direction of causality is the reverse of the one hypothesized. Most studies assume that beliefs regarding aid effectiveness influence positions on the donation of aid, whereas the present hypothesis implies reciprocal causation, which cannot be detected by ordinary regression analyses.

ANALYSIS 1

Thus, we need to avoid the bias caused by reciprocal causation, and we can do so by instrumenting the independent variable of interest, by way of a two-stage least squares procedure (2SLS).[36] As Kennedy notes, instrumenting involves selecting variance that is common to the instrumented variable and the instruments. In this sense, one is no longer dealing with the same variable, and the "choice of instruments should be constrained by what it is a researcher wants to measure" (Kennedy 2008: 146).[37] Instruments related to nationalism may be preferable here, as nationalism may explain a considerable degree of the variation in support for aid, while not being accepted as fully legitimate in all social contexts.

[36] For formal definitions of instrumental variables, see e.g. Pearl (2000).

[37] Cf. Imbens and Angrist (1994).

The two main criteria for an instrument to be valid are: (1) it is correlated with the endogenous variable and thus able to predict it, conditional on other covariates (in other words, it is not a weak instrument), and (2) the exclusion criterion: it is uncorrelated with the error term in the final equation, so that it can be excluded without biasing the estimate (see Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996: for a formal explanation of the criteria). The first can be tested empiricaly, as it depends on observables. The seconds is harder to test, and is usually justified by theoretical resoning. It invites the question of how many instruments should be used. Having two instruments for the endogenous variable allows the instrumental variable to have a mean, and three allows it to have a variance. Such "overidentification" allows testing of overidentifying restrictions, most notably the exclusion criterion, while an exactly identified equation (having a single instrument) precludes this. However, even finding a single valid instrument is usually hard, and the use of multiple instruments can exacerbate the problem of bias resulting from weak instruments, especially in small samples. Thus, in the present analysis, a single instrument is used.

This instrument is a question regarding the EU. The survey asks the standard EB question: "Generally speaking, do you think that [this country]'s membership of the European Union is...?" The following alternatives are read out: a "Good thing", "Neither good nor bad", or a "Bad thing?". This question is useful as an instrument because EU attitudes are influenced by nationalist sentiments (De Master and Le Roy 2000; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Lubbers and Scheepers 2007). Overall, in this dataset, the instrument correlates reasonably well – given the individual level data, and the large number of respondents – with the variable to be instrumented, the opinions on the importance of giving aid ($r = .16$). However, the correlations vary notably between countries, and in order to strengthen the analysis, it is helpful to select the countries in which the instruments are better able to predict the variable to be instrumented. Thus, only samples in which the correlation is above .20 have been selected. This leaves an initial selection of 4641 respondents in the samples from France, Belgium, Eastern Germany, Western Germany, Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Whether the instruments are still problematically weak will be discussed using diagnostics presented along with the analysis.

Having had a first look at the condition that the instrument predicts the instrumented variable, we can turn to the second condition for instruments to be valid, namely its independence of the error term in the final equation. That is, the instrument should not be related to the dependent variable apart from the correlation resulting from their causation of the

instrumented variable and, in turn, this variables' causation of the dependent variable. Reverse causation or third variables affecting both the instruments and the dependent variable would violate this condition. This could be the case if views on the EU reflect a general skepticism towards elites, government, or public policy (Anderson 1998), which also influences the outcome in question. One way to address these problems is to include suspected confounders in the analysis, as control variables. However, doing so precludes the otherwise straightforward interpretation of the second-stage estimates (Angrist and Pischke 2008).

Thus, a better alternative, which is used here, is to match the respondents in terms of relevant covariates before conducting the IV analysis. Like including controls in a 2SLS procedure, this approach will by construction render treatment (i.e. the IV) orthogonal to the covariates. In other words, it ensures orthogonal errors in the first stage, which is what justifies the exclusion of the IV in the second stage. This procedure is non-parametric and thus avoids making functional form assumptions. It also makes the analysis more transparent, and allows more confidence that the covariates are properly dealt, as covariate balance can be inspected before conducting the analysis. The particular matching procedure used here is often referred to as genetic matching as it uses an evolutionary search algorithm to determine the weight given to each covariate (Diamond and Sekhon 2008; Sekhon and Mebane 1998). This procedure tends to outperform other matching procedures in terms of Mean Squared Error, and in some cases, bias (Diamond and Sekhon 2008).

Fortunately, the dataset provides a wide range of measures likely to capture possibly confounding attitudes. Perhaps most important are those explicitly related to the EU, democracy and national governance, as these may represent a general attitude towards elites, politics and public policy – the most plausible confounder in the present case. One such is the following question: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?" Another is this: "For each of the following, please tell me if you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied? […] The way democracy works in [this country]" The latter question was also asked with regard to "Your life in general". Another question that may be relevant is this: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"[38] The assumption of the analysis below is

[38] The alternatives are: "Most people can be trusted", "You can´t be too careful", and "It depends" (if given spontaneously). The latter has been recoded to take on the value in the middle of the two others.

that these covariates together succeed in capturing any general attitude towards government that could confound the results, so that achieving balance in these terms avoids this possible problem.

While limiting the number of covariates facilitates the matching on those included, a few demographic ones are also taken into account. These are age, gender and education.[39] In addition, the respondents are matched on dummies identifying each sample, to ensure that the instrument does not depend on respondents' origin. The instrument is coded as a binary variable, where those who say EU membership is a bad thing are 1 and the rest are 0. Figure 4.2 shows balance before and after matching. Before matching, the p-value for the means of the treated and control groups to differ were practically zero for most of the covariates. After matching the lowest p-value is 0.288, suggesting the two groups do not differ significantly in these terms.

[39] This is measured as the age at which education was ended. Those who have not received full-time education are coded with the lowest group (ending education at the age of 14), those who have not completed their education by the time of the survey are on average above 20, and have been coded with the highest group (ending education at the age of 22 or above).



Figure 4.2. Covariate balance before and after genetic matching.

Results

Having identified a suited instrument and achieved balance in terms of possible confounders, we can turn to the analysis. Table 4.1 reports a two-stage instrumental variable model. The estimates are highly significant at each stage, suggesting the instrument is valid (which is discussed further below), and that there is an effect of the support for aid on beliefs regarding the impact of aid. It is also clear that in this case we cannot attribute too much weight to the exact size of the estimated effect, as it depends on the choice of instrument, and its ability to predict the instrumented variable. 2SLS estimates are always more or less biased, and as such, their exact size is of secondary interest. In this particular case, the main question is whether or not there is an effect, and the analysis suggests there is one.

Table 4.1. Two-stage instrumental variable regression of beliefs regarding aid effectiveness, EU, 2004.

	Stage 1 Predicting support for aid	Stage 2 Effect on beliefs regarding effectiveness
EU membership bad thing	0.164*** (0.047)	-0.482*** (0.186)
N	1390	1390

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, two-tailed tests. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. First-stage Cragg-Donald Wald F = 12.207. Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical F-values with regard to Wald test distortion: 10%: 16.38; 15%: 8.96; 20%: 6.66 (Stock and Yogo 2005).

Table 4.1 reports an F-statistic for assessing the question of weak identification – that the instrument may be too weakly correlated with the instrumented variable (Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002). It is a Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic. With only one instrument, the statistic cannot be evaluated in terms of bias relative to OLS, but it can tell us about the appropriateness of our significance tests. The statistic is well above the critical value for 15% maximum Wald test size distortion (cf. Stock and Yogo 2005), suggesting that the significance tests are not considerably distorted by weak instruments.[40]

ANALYSIS 2

The second analysis will be based on the EB 50.1, which was conducted towards the end of 1998 and is described in Chapter 3. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the main question tapping the support for development aid is: "In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very important, or not at all important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?" (Melich 2006). The list of reasons for not finding aid important is relevant also here:

1. First we should solve problems (poverty, unemployment, the economy) in [this country]
2. This aid is too expensive for [this country]
3. It is a waste of money to help poor countries because their situation does not improve
4. The money will be misused and will not reach those who need it
5. We (our country/Europe) already give them enough money

[40] The analysis also performs well using a Kleibergen-Paap rk LM to test for testing for underidentification – making sure the instrument is relevant in terms of being able to predict the instrumented variable (the test is an LM version of Anderson 1951). The significant statistic (p-value < 0.001) suggests that the model is identified. Similarly, the analysis passes the Anderson-Rubin Chi^2-test, which has as a null hypothesis that the coefficient of the endogenous regressor is equal to zero, while the overidentifying restrictions hold (Anderson and Rubin 1949; cf. Stock and Wright 2000). This hypothesis is rejected as the Chi^2 has a p-value of 0.003.

6. The more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they have
7. Poor countries should stop fighting and stop buying arms
8. There will always be rich and poor countries
9. I don't know enough about these countries to decide whether it makes sense or not to help them
10. Poor countries don't interest me
11. I don't like foreigners (*spontaneous response*)
12. Others (*spontaneous response*)
13. Don't know

Most of these answers can be categorized as either referring to domestic priorities, or to concerns regarding the effectiveness and impact of the aid giving – as illustrated by the factor analysis reported in Table 3.1 (Chapter 3). Items 1, 2, 10 and 11 may be seen as reflecting a low priority attached to the welfare of foreigners relative to that of fellow citizens, whereas 3, 4, 6, 8 (and perhaps 7), refer to concerns with the impact of aid. Item 9 does not fit well in either category, and, from a theoretical perspective, neither does 5, as it does not specify why we "already give them enough".

This means that we have indicators for both relative priorities and beliefs in effectiveness. With regard to this dataset, the hypothesis in question may suggest that there is an effect of these priorities on beliefs in effectiveness, at least if the priorities are seen as less legitimate reasons for not supporting the donation of aid. However, in general it is not possible to isolate the causal effects between these indicators in either direction. The solution that this dataset allows for is to select indicators for which reciprocal causation can be ruled out. In particular, item 11 – the spontaneous statement that "I don't like foreigners" – is unlikely to be affected by beliefs regarding effectiveness. Indeed, the response is rather extreme, which is demonstrated by the fact that it is given by a mere 2.2 percent of the respondents (in the pooled, non-weighted data). A quick glance at the data suggests that this indicator is strongly related to low support for aid. As mentioned, only the respondents who find aid "not very important" or "not at all important" were presented with the relevant question. Within this group of respondents, 64 percent of those saying "I don't like foreigners" find aid not at all important, whereas only 27 percent of the other respondents do. This variable, then, will be the main independent variable of interest, serving as an indicator of opposition to aid that is strong, but due to reasons that may be less than fully legitimate in all social contexts. The question is whether this has an impact on the measures of beliefs in effectiveness.

A Methodological Challenge

There is a serious challenge in using these indicators, however. Reciprocal causation can largely be ruled out, due to the extreme nature of the independent variable in question. However, the fact that the measures of beliefs in effectiveness are items from a multiple-response question, and that the independent variable is based on the same, means that respondents who have a tendency to use a greater number of answering categories may have a greater probability of scoring high on both the independent and dependent variables. In other words, the likelihood of a confounding variable being present is great. The problem could be reduced by the use of item 11 as independent variable, as this response is given spontaneously. However, the potential problem cannot be ruled out *a priori*, as the mentioned category of respondents may also be more likely respond spontaneously. Indeed, preliminary analyses comparing suggests that there may be a problem. The only solution is to measure the confounder and take it into account.

Fortunately, the EB 50.1 dataset has other, unrelated modules with questions that also allow respondent to make use of multiple answering categories. While excluding the alternatives "none of these" and "don't know", additive indices have been made from all such questions that are not restricted to a few countries. There are five such questions, resulting in five measures of the likely confounder (which will be referred to as C1-C5).[41,42] Figure 4.3 in the Appendix plots the means of an index summarizing the alternatives for not supporting aid

[41] The first question regards media equipment (C1): "Which, if any, of these are you planning to buy in the next six months?". Another follows up on respondents who are not interested in at least one among a long list of services potentially available through television or internet (C2): "And, from the following list, why are you not interested in some of these services?". The three others ask asks respondents (C3): "Which of the following do you consider to be a family?", (C4): "In your opinion, what are the main roles of the family in society today?", and (C5): "And, what are the main roles of the family for you personally?".

[42] Some of these questions may be less suited than others, as they leave less scope for responses to be influences by character traits. For example, the question on people's planned purchase of media equipment and their definition of a family may leave less such scope than those on why they are uninterested in certain services and what they think the role of families are in society. Nevertheless, all the indices may contain useful information and deserve consideration. Notably, in terms of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, all of them are significantly related to the measures of beliefs in effectiveness.

(except “don’t know” and item 11) over C1-C5. As can be seen, the five indices (C1-C5) have the expected relationships to the dependent variables. With regard to the key independent variable, the relationships are less clear-cut, but still appear to be present, as can be seen from Figure 4.4 (below). What is clear is that those few respondents who give the maximum number of responses on (C3-5) behave differently from others, having a much greater propensity to register on the independent variable – although it should also be noted that these categories of respondents are very small. Three dummy variables will be used to identify these respondents. It is also clear that for C2 and C4, those using none of the answering categories for some reason behave differently (in terms of the independent variable). Their greater propensities to register on the independent variable cannot confound the hypothesized relationship, but they may inhibit a proper modeling of the relationships with the indices. Thus, dummies are constructed to identify these respondents as well. It is further clear, especially from Figure 4.3, that the remaining relationship between the indices and the variables in question may not be linear. In particular, for C3-C5, values above 5 appear not to increase the probability of high values on these variables. The same could be said for values above 6 for C2. Thus, these four indices have been transformed so as to stop increasing and rather be constant above the mentioned values (i.e. values on C3 above 5 are coded as 5).

Propensity Score Matching

We know with almost certainty that we have a confounding variable, but fortunately it appears that we can do quite well in measuring it. The fact that the independent variable is binary, and thus can be seen as a “treatment”, being present or not, means that propensity score matching is a suitable solution to the selection bias that confounding variables introduce (see e.g. D'Agostino 1998; Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Ho et al. 2007; Pearl 2009; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Such a bias is especially difficult to deal with when the selection depends on multiple measures. Propensity score matching overcomes the dimensionality problem by reducing the dimensions into a single conditional propensity to be among the treated. The fact that the sample is large means that such a design is feasible, despite the exclusion of a large number of observations, and the fact that the “treatment” is rare means that it may be appropriate, as it helps to focus the analysis on relevant observations. Such a design allows us to investigate the extent to which we succeed in neutralizing the influence of the confounding variables on the selection into treatment and control groups. It is also attractive for producing readily interpretable results, comparing outcomes for treated and non-treated individuals.

A propensity score has been estimated for respondents in the pooled sample via a probit regression of item 11 on a set of pretreatment covariates: the five (transformed) indices, dummies for maximum values on C3-C5, dummies for minimum values on C2 and C4, country dummies, and a set of controls.[43] Samples for which there is no variation on the independent variable are excluded (this applies to Northern Ireland, Spain, and Greece). Only those treated units for which there is common support, i.e. those that have propensity scores within the range of those of the control units, are kept. Three units are dropped using this criterion, leaving us with 59 treated units. One-to-one nearest neighbor matching without replacement, based on the estimated propensity score, has been used to match the treated units with 59 control units.[44]

This matching appears very successful in neutralizing the influence of the tendency to give multiple responses on the independent variable. In a repeated probit regression of this variable on the matching variables within the matched sample, all the variables are far from having a significant impact. However, it may be useful also to inspect the results visually. Figure 4.5 plots means of the independent variable over initial indices, based on the matched data. As can be seen, the initial positive relationships, as well as the particularistic behavior of extreme categories that is evident in Figure 4.4 appear to be neutralized. (It should be noted that the empty categories do not contain any observations, and therefore do not represent bias in terms of zero means.) The need for matching and the extent to which it succeeds can also be seen from the quantile-quantile plots in Figure 4.6 below. The two first plots are based on the raw data, the second of them including only observations on the common support. Both are consistently and considerably below the diagonal, 45-degree line, suggesting that the treated and control units are different, and that selection bias poses a serious challenge to causal inference. The third plot in Figure 4.6 is based on the matched data, and shows that the matching makes the propensity scores of the treated and control units virtually identical at every quantile. It is also worth noting that the difference in the mean propensity score for the treated and control units is only 0.003 of the standard deviation of the propensity score for the

[43] These are: left-right self-placement, the age at which education was ended, income quartile of the head of household, age, sex, the number of people present during the interview, the duration of the interview, and respondent cooperation.

[44] In the reported analysis, allowing replacement would not make a practical difference, as all control units would be used only one time in any case.

matched observations. The ratio of the variances of the propensity scores of the two groups is 1.022. Both of these diagnostics are very acceptable.

Results

Having preprocessed the data, and thus considerably reduced the problem of selection bias, we can turn to more traditional modes of analysis. Table 4.2 reports average treatment effect on the treated units (ATT) estimated from the matched data. The results are given for the four most relevant indicators related to beliefs in aid effectiveness (items 3, 4, 6, and 8). Positive ATTs are estimated for each item, but only the effects on two of these (3 and 6) are statistically significant at the five-percent-level. The effect on item 4, however, is significant at the ten-percent-level in a one-tailed test. The effect on item 3 may be the most notable, as 53 percent of the treated think it is a "waste of money to help poor countries because their situation does not improve" while only 19 percent of the untreated think so. Thus, the treated are almost three times as likely to think so, and the ATT is 0.34.[45] Although it has a low t-value, the effect on item 4 is also notable, as this item has high content validity as an indicator of beliefs in effectiveness. The treated are more than 25 percent more likely than the untreated to think that the "money will be misused and will not reach those who need it".

Table 4.2. Average treatment effects on the treated (ATTs) for efficiency-related reasons, EU, 1998.

	Item 3	**Item 4**	**Item 6**	**Item 8**
	It is a waste of money to help poor countries because their situation does not improve	The money will be misused and will not reach those who need it	The more aid we give to poor countries, the more children they have	There will always be rich and poor countries
Mean of control group	0.186	0.373	0.169	0.322
Mean of treated group	0.525	0.475	0.389	0.373
ATT	0.339	0.102	0.220	0.051
Standard error of ATT	0.083	0.091	0.081	0.088
T-statistic	4.084	1.121	2.716	0.580

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

When it comes to interpreting the results, it is worth noting that the hypothesis in focus here yields predictions very similar to social desirability effects. That is, the tendency for individuals to over-report socially desirable behavior and under-report undesirable behavior (e.g. DeMaio 1984; Edwards 1957; Holbrook, Green, and Krosnick 2003; Phillips and Clancy 1972). Thus, if Singer's argument does have a strong intuitive appeal, survey respondents who do not support the donation of aid may, if they do not exaggerate their support, rather

[45] While ATTs are reported to save space, it can be noted that using a full set of controls in the final regression does not change the results notably.

exaggerate their pessimism regarding aid effectiveness – producing a pattern similar to that hypothesized above. The difference between the two theories is that social desirability effects are more superficial, and not involving an actual change of beliefs. However, while this distinction is theoretically meaningful, the issue of whether the identified effect does indeed involve truly changed beliefs may not matter for practical purposes. The effect shows that expressed beliefs in aid effectiveness are not neutral in any case.

Furthermore, even if a social desirability effect is present, this would not rule out a dissonance effect. In fact, it may give rise to it. Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that individuals who see themselves as truthful persons may come to believe the views they express, unless they can find some legitimate reason for why they might have acted untruthfully (cf. e.g. Festinger and Carlsmith 1959). In addition, it is worth noting that whereas the effect found in Analysis 2 might be due to a social desirability effect, this does not seem to be the case with Analysis I. In the latter, there is little reason for respondents to over- or under-report their beliefs in aid effectiveness, as these are not directly related to question about the donation of aid. Thus, the effect seems to require a deeper change of beliefs, suggesting that dissonance theory is relevant.

Leaving theory aside, it is also worth noting that the second analysis uses data only for a selection of the respondents that hold rather extreme views, whereas the first analysis uses whole national populations, giving a more general picture. The disadvantage of these two analytical designs is that they are not optimal for detecting the hypothesized effect. The first places a stronger emphasis on getting the causal inferences right than getting the size of the coefficients right. The second suffers from the nature of the available indicators. The advantage of putting these two rather different designs together is that they increase our confidence in the results, as they both lend some support to the hypothesis. It seems reasonably clear that beliefs regarding aid effectiveness are not neutral reasons for the support or non-support of aid: Those initially less inclined to support the donation of development aid express a greater pessimism regarding its effects. However, the effects identified here are reasonably small and do not account for the larger part of the variation in beliefs regarding effectiveness. Nevertheless, we are looking at an effect that is not only statistically significant, but also has substantial implications. The most obvious of these is that expressed beliefs regarding the impact of aid cannot be treated as neutral reasons for expressed positions on aid, but rather as opinions interrelated with them trough psychological mechanisms.



Figure 4.3. Means of additive index of all alternatives except "don't know" and Item 11 over five measures of the tendency to use multiple answering categories (C1-C5, respectively).



Figure 4.4. Means of the independent variable (Item 11) over five measures of the tendency to use multiple answering categories (C1-C5, respectively), based on the pooled (pre-matched) dataset.

Note: Empty categories do not demonstrate bias (in terms of zero means) as they do not contain any observations.



Figure 4.5. Means of the independent variable (Item 11) over five measures of the tendency to use multiple answering categories (C1-C5, respectively), based on the matched data.



Figure 4.6. Quantile-quantile plots of propensity scores for treated and controls, pre and post-matched.

Note: The two plots on the left, plot the raw data; the first plots the whole range of propensity scores, whereas the second, only shows scores for which there is common support. The plot on the right plots matched data.

5. Survey Responses in the Context of Low Development

Chapter 2 shows that public calls for increased international aid are weaker where the level of economic development is higher. This is consistent with an interest-based model, in which individuals who might lose from redistribution are more opposed to it. However, this pattern has only been identified among middle- and high-income countries. While it appears likely that the same picture would hold more generally, this has not been investigated with regard to less developed countries. In fact, the little evidence available seems to suggest that the pattern may be different. This chapter takes a closer look at this issue. It aims to clarify the general picture, using an indicator from a dataset covering a broad range of countries, and to explain the pattern found among the less developed countries.

The chapter starts by discussing the general pattern of satisfaction with current aid levels over GDP per capita. The pattern does not conform to the previously identified pattern. At the very lowest levels of development, there is a sharp drop in respondents' calls for more international aid. The subsequent section discusses two hypotheses that may explain this. One is that national receipts of aid cause respondents to cease their calls for more aid. This hypothesis is a version of the theory of the public as thermostat. Another hypothesis is that there is a general tendency for survey responses to be less critical where the level of development is lower. A measurement-section establishes measures of the variables necessary to test these hypotheses. The analysis section sets the hypotheses up against each other in multi-level mixed effects logit-models. It is shown that even responses regarding to domestic institutions are less critical in less developed countries, and that this is not a product of repressive governments or a lack of freedom of speech. Thus, the results favor the explanation related to less critical responses. A brief conclusion ends the chapter and adds a bit more discussion.

The Puzzle

The pattern in which public calls for increased international aid are weaker where GDP per capita is higher has only been established among the more developed countries of the world. This is because the indicator used to do so, taken from the International Social Survey Programme, is available only for a very limited selection of countries. A related indicator with wider coverage can be found in Pew's Global Attitudes Project (Pew 2007). This survey was

conducted by face-to-face interviews in 2007.[46] The following question was asked in 47 countries: "Do you think the wealthier nations of the world are doing enough or not doing enough to help the poorer nations of the world with problems such as economic development, reducing poverty, and improving health?" The available answer categories were (1) "Doing enough" and (2) "Not doing enough".[47] Respondents who refused to answer or replied that they did not know were given their own codes. These have been excluded in the following analysis, and the variable has been recoded as a binary indicator, with dissatisfaction (not enough) scoring high.[48] The binary indicator will be referred to as "dissatisfaction with current aid levels".

The question is how this indicator, which allows the inclusion of a broader selection of countries, relates to GDP per capita. Figure 5.1 plots the aggregate of the indicator over GDP data for 2007. It reveals an interesting non-linear relationship. In fact, the pattern appears to consist of two different relationships. Within the range of development covered by the ISSP indicator, the more developed part of the world, the previously identified relationship is not very clearly discernible at first glance. However, the pattern would be more pronounced if we took into account circumstances that have proved salient before (in Chapter 2), such as the particular situation of the post-Communist countries. It would also become much clearer if we did not use PPP conversion, but this is done for the sake of consistency with earlier models.

Among the less developed countries, however, the relationship is reversed. Lower GDP per capita goes together with greater satisfaction with current aid levels, and *vice versa*. This relationship may be counterintuitive, as the countries whose populations on average express the greatest satisfaction with current aid levels are among who might benefit the most from increased aid. As the implications of this relationship may differ greatly depending on what

[46] The only exceptions, in which telephone interviews were used, are the US, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As explained below, these countries are not part of the analysis.

[47] For the purposes below, both of these indicators have been aggregated as country means, using the supplied weights. Germany and the UK are treated as single observations. The Pew indicator has been subtracted 1, so as to become a binary variable.

[48] These respondents are generally fewer than 10 percent of the samples. Judged by the inclusion of their share of these samples as independent variables in aggregate level regressions, their exclusion does not make a noticeable difference for the analysis conducted here.

explains it, further attention is merited. The rest of this chapter will focus on explaining this pattern, and the next section presents two relevant hypotheses in this regard.



Figure 5.1. Dissatisfaction with aid levels over GDP per capita, PPP, Pew surveyed countries, 2007.

Even the relevant sub-section of the overall pattern (that among the less developed countries) is non-linear, which means a transformation is in place. Instead of the original values of GDP per capita, their natural logarithms will be used. When a fractional polynomial is used to fit the aggregate opinions to the transformed GDP values, and outliers are excluded, the overall relationship changes direction when the logged GDP is approximately 9.5. Therefore, only countries with a value lower than this are selected for the analysis in this chapter. Figure 5.2 plots the two variables against each other for the selected countries. Within the selected range, and with the transformed GDP variable, the relationship is very strong and approximately linear. Excluding the outlier Indonesia, the bi-variate correlation corresponding to the plot is 0.87 (N = 26).



Figure 5.2. Dissatisfaction with current levels of aid over logged (ln) GDP per capita, PPP, for 2007, among Pew surveyed countries with a logged GDP below 9.5 (and available data for the analysis below).

HYPOTHESIS 1

While the identified pattern may seem counterintuitive, two hypotheses may plausibly explain it. The first is related to the theory of the public as thermostat, mentioned in Chapter 2 (Wlezien 1995, 1996). As the indicator used here asks whether current efforts are sufficient or not, it measures policy preferences that are relative to current policies. As mentioned before, the model suggests the public adjusts its calls for more or less spending on an issue – expressed as such relative preferences – according to what it gets. While this model has only been applied to national policies in developed countries so far, it may also apply to preferences in less developed countries and with regard to other countries' policies, as in the present case. Thus, in this context, a plausible hypothesis is that the populations of countries receiving aid take notice and thus reduce their calls for even more. Although the survey question refers to aid as a general phenomenon, without mentioning respondents' own countries, aid received by a respondent's country may influence their responses. This could be if aid receipts receive more media attention in recipient countries than in non-recipient ones, or that respondents simply know more about the aid receipts of their own country than those of other countries. The first hypothesis to be considered is therefore:

1. Respondents in countries that receive more foreign aid are less likely to call for more.

This hypothesis has already been argued to explain the pattern in question. Based on the survey data that are used here, a report from the Pew Research Center and Kaiser Family Foundation (Brodie et al. 2007) states that "people in those countries that are the biggest

recipients of international aid tend to give more credit to wealthy nations than those in other countries". The report classified 18 countries as major aid recipients and found that:

> In 10 out of these 18 countries, a third or more residents say that the wealthy nations of the world *are* doing enough to help poorer nations. Comparatively, in the 16 other low- and middle-income countries (which were not classified as major aid recipients) and 13 high income countries surveyed, the share is not higher than about a quarter in any country.

Thus, the report concludes that this "could be a sign that donor assistance is more likely to be felt in the places where it is channeled". However, the report fails to give this explanation a strong empirical foundation. The analysis is bi-variate, comparing differences in means of the opinions over a dummy variable identifying recipient countries. It fails to consider alternative explanations and to make use of interval level information. Thus, it is reasonable to treat this explanation as a hypothesis, to be tested against other hypotheses.

It also worth noting, however, the report says the explanation "is perhaps most evidenced by public perceptions in Indonesia, which ranked highest on this question with a majority saying donors are doing enough; Indonesians' recent experience with the 2004 tsunami, and significant international response, appears to have reverberated among the public" (Brodie et al. 2007: 25). The case of Indonesia may indeed support Hypothesis 1. However, as the measures used here do not capture its special circumstances, and it is an outlier in most analyses, a dummy will be included to identify it.

HYPOTHESIS 2

If Hypothesis 1 fails, the pattern in question may appear particularly striking and counterintuitive. An alternative hypothesis is that the pattern has little to do with the content of the question and is an artifact of some sort. Comparing aggregate levels of survey responses across countries requires that such levels are comparable, and that no country-specific circumstances influence the responses in ways that are not captured by the analysis. Instead of relying on this assumption, we can test whether it is the case. If some unknown factor influences the survey responses in ways that have little relation to the specific content of the questions, this may apply to more questions than the one we are interested in here, and this may allow us to detect a general tendency. With regard to the aid related indicator, respondents in less developed countries are less critical, which could be a general pattern.

The hypothesis that evaluations of policies and political institutions are less critical where the level of development is lower is consistent with Inglehart and Welzel's arguments regarding the effect of modernization on people's values (e.g. Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel and Inglehart 2009). They argue that self-expression values and emancipative values (which correlate very strongly with the former) get stronger as a society develops:

> By providing rising incomes and other resources, modernization raises ordinary people's sense of existential security, modernization leads to growing emphasis on emancipatory values. At the same time, rising education, information levels, opportunities to connect with people and other resources, broadens people's action repertoires, further increasing the utility of freedom. (Welzel and Inglehart 2009: 136)

Using Vanhanen's index of power resources (Vanhanen 2003), Inglehart and Welzel find such resources to explain 28 percent of the cross-national variance in emancipative values. The index of power resources is closely related to economic and human development as it includes such variables as literacy rates, students per 100 000 citizens, the urban share of the population and the non-agricultural share of the population. Inglehart and Welzel's measure of emancipative values includes responses regarding gender equality, tolerance vs. conformity, autonomy vs. authority, and participation vs. security. In the latter category falls questions of whether giving people more to say in government and protecting free speech should be given priority over keeping prices stable. Thus, they argue people are more willing to accept limitations on democratic freedoms when emancipative values are weak. This is relevant here because it means people in less developed countries may give more favorable assessments of national policies and institutions than one might otherwise expect. Further, as Inglehart and Welzel also note in the passage quoted above, "rising education, information levels, opportunities to connect with people and other resources" may also influence people's opinions and political actions. In general, we may find both lower expectations and lower levels of information where levels of development are lower, leading to less critical assessments of a number of policies and institutions.

It could also be, however, that the responses are more random, and that their means are therefore closer to the middle of the answer categories. Leaving Indonesia aside, the lower development, the closer the mean response regarding aid is to 0.5, which is the middle of the two answer categories, and this is consistent with such an explanation. For now, the main question is whether there is a general pattern that undermine comparisons across levels of development, but we may still pose this as two different hypotheses:

2. a. Respondents in less developed countries are less critical with regard to many aspects of current affairs, including levels of international aid, as self-expression and emancipative values are weaker, and levels of information are lower.

   b. Respondents in less developed countries tend to give responses whose means are closer to the middle of the answer categories.

One way to test these ideas is to look for the same pattern in opinions on different, but comparable, issues. To differentiate between the two hypotheses, we will have to look at whether or not responses do indeed tend toward the middle categories as development decreases. If either Hypothesis 2a or 2b appears to hold true, there is a further question that may help us understand the underlying mechanism. The question is whether the pattern is a result of individual level characteristics or country-level circumstances. In other words, we want to know whether it is the same individuals that cause the pattern on one indicator that causes it on another. Alternatively, it could be that different individuals within the same countries are responsible, which would suggest that there is something about the countries that affect all citizens, rather that some citizens being different from the others within these countries.

Responses regarding national institutions should be well suited to capture the hypothesized tendency for responses from less developed countries to systematically differ from those from other countries. This makes for especially strong tests of Hypothesis 2a and 2b, as the relationship we would expect in the case of national institutions is the reverse of what would follow from most reasonable evaluations of the objective facts. The present hypotheses predicts that these responses show the same pattern as shown above – that people in less developed countries are less critical of their national institutions than people in more developed countries. Objectively, however, the influence of national institutions appears to be more deserving of negative assessments in the less developed countries than in others. Corruption and dysfunctional national institutions are frequently cited as barriers to development.

If the pattern predicted by Hypotheses 2a and 2b is present with regard to national institutions, only one other explanation appears plausible, namely that repressive governments make respondents afraid to speak their true mind. Therefore, it will be necessary see if measures related to free speech explain between-country differences in the expressed opinions on domestic institutions. If lower development is related to less critical responses, and the extent

to which governments deny free speech fails to explain this, Hypothesis 2a or 2b will stand out as the most convincing explanation. This would strongly suggest that the same effect is responsible for the pattern with regard to the opinions on international aid. This last test of Hypothesis 2b, is presented in a separate section, after the main analysis. First, the variables need to be operationalized.

MEASUREMENT

Aid Receipts

In testing Hypothesis 1, an important question is how to measure aid receipts. The mentioned Pew report (Brodie et al. 2007: 24) classified countries as major aid recipients if they met one of four conditions: that they "1) are eligible to receive concessional loans from the World Bank (IDA); 2) are a focus country under the United States Government's PEPFAR program; 3) have $200 million or more in approved grants to date from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; or 4) received $1 billion or more in OECD Official Development Assistance in 2005." In other words, four binary indicators were used to create a single binary indicator.

While these indicators are relevant, they have a few problems. Most importantly, number 1, eligibility to receive concessional World Bank loans, is by definition linked to GDP per capita. Two criteria are used to determine such eligibility (World Bank 2009a). One is the "[l]ack of creditworthiness to borrow on market terms and therefore a need for concessional resources to finance the country's development program". The other is "relative poverty defined as GNI per capita below an established threshold and updated annually" – for the fiscal year of 2010, the threshold is $1,135.[49] As creditworthiness is also likely to correlate with economic development, the eligibility measure is not far from being a binary measure of low GDP per capita. In fact, the bi-variate correlation with the logged GDP variable used here is -.90, N = 27. Thus, the problem with this indicator is that even if it were found to have an

[49] The only difference between gross national income (GNI) – or product (GNP) – and the gross domestic product (GDP) is that the former is defined by ownership and the latter is defined by location. GNI counts all products produced by enterprises owned by a country's citizens, GDP counts all products produced within a country's borders. Thus, as only differences in the balance of international income receipts and payments set them apart, the two measures are usually strongly correlated.

effect, it would be hard to know if should be interpreted as a sign that respondents take notice of the World Bank funding aid projects, or if might just be an effect of low development. In short, it is better to find more direct measures of aid receipts.

The best candidates in this regard are based on total receipts of official development aid (ODA). The World Bank (2009b) provides such data in current USD for 2007. As interval-level indicators contain more information than binary indicators, Pew's indicator 4 will be replaced by the continuous variable of total ODA receipts (for 2007). In addition to the raw data of total ODA receipts, ODA as a percentage of the gross national income (GNI) may be relevant, as this helps to take into account the size of the economy of recipient country. Aid receipts may appear smaller and receive less attention in a country with a bigger economy. If we make an additive index of Pew's indicator 2 and 3, and include it along with the two ODA measures in a principal component analysis, we get a single factor explaining 71 percent of the variance for the countries in the analysis (N = 27). This factor will be referred to as (the) *Aid Receipts* (Index). It is preferable to stick to this index, to simplify the analysis below. This does not appear to disadvantage Hypothesis 1 in the analysis. This index correlates more strongly with the dependent variable than any of the measures do alone (cf. the Appendix).

Figure 5.3 shows dissatisfaction with current aid levels over the Aid Receipts Index. There seems to be a relationship, but it is blurred by a few countries. Indonesia is the greatest outlier, which, as mentioned, may be due to the extraordinary aid given after the 2004 tsunami, which is not captured by the aid measure used here. The best solution to this problem may be to include a dummy variable for Indonesia, and interpret its effect as support of Hypothesis 1 – albeit weak and exceptional. If we exclude Indonesia, the correlation between the Aid Receipts Index and dissatisfaction with current levels of aid is -.72 (N = 26).



Figure 5.3. Dissatisfaction with current levels of aid over the Aid Receipts Index, for less developed, Pew surveyed countries, 2007.

Critical Responses

To test of Hypotheses 2a and b, we also need a measure of how critical the respondents are with regard to other issues than current aid levels. The following question appears particularly useful:

> As I read a list of groups and organizations, for each, please tell me what kind of influence the group is having on the way things are going in (survey country). Is the influence of (read name of organization) very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in (survey country)?

The objects referred to include: (a) our national government, (b) the Prime Minister/President (specific to each country), (c) the military, (d) [news organizations/the media] – such as television, radio, newspapers and magazines, (e) religious leaders. These indicators will be used below. To reduce the possible bias resulting from the fact that they have some missing values, and to allow all respondents to be included in the analysis, the missing values have been imputed by single imputation.[50] This has been done for each country separately, allowing the variables different relationships in different countries, and yielding imputed

[50] Multiple imputation would help to get better estimates of the standard errors of the imputed data, and estimates based on them. However, as these variables are used in a factor analysis, this does not appear very helpful. Admittedly, the single imputation may lead to slightly underestimated standard errors with regard to coefficients based on the index created from the imputed variables, but this question should be of minimal practical importance.

values with plausible country means.[51] Another issue also arises with regard to missing data. For a few countries (China, Kuwait and Morocco) some of the indicators are not available at all. Thus, we lack the information to get the correct country mean for the imputed values. Their missing values for these countries have not been imputed, and the countries will have to be excluded.[52]

Hypotheses 2a and b suggest that we should be able to extract a factor reflecting the tendency for respondents to give critical responses. As a measure of this tendency, an index would contain less measurement error than each single indicator. Therefore, a principal-component analysis has been conducted both at the individual and aggregate level. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5.1. It shows that most of the indicators load considerably on a single factor. At the individual level, the factor has an Eigenvalue of 2.30, and the proportion of the variance the factor accounts for is .46. The latter number is not very good, but acceptable – especially given the fact that these measures obviously capture more than what we are interested in. Cronbach's Alpha for the five indicators is 0.71, which is also acceptable. The indicator that has the most of unique variance is, perhaps not surprisingly, the one regarding religious leaders (e). If it were dropped, the scale would perform better in terms of the mentioned parameters, but it has nevertheless been kept, as it does provide some additional information. Based on this analysis, a factor score has been constructed, which will be referred to as (the Index of) *Critical Responses*. Table 5.1 also reports the results of a similar analysis at the aggregate level, which shows a similar picture, except for the fact that (e) loads more strongly than (c). As would be expected, the aggregation cancels out some measurement error, and the factor performs better in terms of the Eigenvalue and the variance explained.

[51] The variables used in the imputation include the unimputed versions of the five indicators to be imputed, and responses to the same question with regard to immigrants and large companies. In addition, the following additional variables are used: respondents' self-placement on a "ladder of life" (i.e. life satisfaction), opinions on growing trade and business tied with the outside world, the extent to which respondent claims to follow international news, the age at which the respondent completed full-time education, and the age of respondent.

[52] In addition, in the few developed countries in which interviews were conducted by telephone (cf. footnote above), the samples were split, and one part was not asked the relevant questions. The missing values for these respondents have neither been imputed. However, this does not affect the analysis below, as the countries of these respondents are not included.

Table 5.1. Principal component analyses of critical responses regarding national institutions, Pew, 2007.

	Loadings, individual	Uniqueness, individual	Loadings, aggregate	Uniqueness, aggregate
Our national government	0.775	0.399	0.861	0.259
The Prime Minister/President	0.785	0.384	0.876	0.233
The military	0.658	0.567	0.670	0.551
News organizations/the media	0.584	0.659	0.738	0.456
Religious leaders	0.554	0.693	0.718	0.484
Eigenvalue	2.297		3.017	
Explained variance	0.460		0.604	

N = 36184 at the individual level, N = 44 at the aggregate level.

Figure 5.4 plots the Index of Critical Responses over GDP per capita and shows a strong relationship between the two variables. However, it also shows that Ethiopia, for reasons unknown, is an outlier. Therefore, when this index is used, a dummy will be used to identify Ethiopia. Ethiopia is also excluded from the correlations reported in the Appendix – even from those where it would not be an outlier, to make the correlations directly comparable. Excluding Ethiopia, the correlation corresponding to the plot is .55 (N = 26).

Table 5.7 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics for the items in the index. The items are coded from 1 to 4 where 1 is "very good" and 4 "very bad". As the table shows, the mean responses for all respondents in the analysis tend to be around 2 (and very few countries have means above 2.5). In other words, we can reject Hypothesis 2b, which holds mean responses in less developed countries tend toward the middle of the answer categories. In Figure 5.4, these responses move away from the middle, in a less critical direction – consistent with Hypothesis 2a. Lower economic development is linked to a tendency for respondents to give less critical responses also with regard to national issues.



Figure 5.4. The Index of Critical Responses over logged (ln) GDP per capita, PPP, for less developed, Pew surveyed countries, 2007.

Figure 5.5 plots the responses regarding whether "wealthier nations of the world are doing enough" over the Index of Critical Responses. Again, there is a strong relationship. If we exclude the outliers Ethiopia and Indonesia, the bi-variate correlation is .71 (N = 25, cf. the Appendix). These bi-variate patterns provide preliminary support for Hypothesis 2a, but we still need to control for the most plausible alternative explanation before we conclude.



Figure 5.5. Dissatisfaction with current levels of aid over the Index of Critical Responses, for less developed, Pew surveyed countries, 2007.

ANALYSIS

The dependent variable is from the same dataset as one of the independent variables of interest, namely the Index of Critical Responses. Thus, the relationships of interest are not only among aggregates at the country level, but also at the individual level, making a hierarchical model well suited. In order to allow the individual level relationships to differ between countries, a mixed-effects model will be used (see e.g. Guo and Zhao 2000; Leeuw and Meijer 2007; Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Further, the dependent variable is dichotomous, which makes a logit model more appropriate than a linear regression model.[53] The models to be estimated will include all the variables mentioned above: GDP per capita (the effect of which would ideally be explained by the other variables), the Aid Receipts Index, the Index of Critical Responses, and dummy variables identifying Ethiopia and Indonesia. The models will include random coefficients for the Index of Critical Responses along with random country intercepts. The number of countries will be referred to as *J*, the number of explanatory variables at the lower level (*X*) as *P*, and the number of explanatory

[53] Respondents who failed to use one of the two available answer categories are excluded.

variables at the upper level (Z) as Q. Using summation notation, the mixed-effects (logit) models to be estimated can be expressed with the following way:

$$\ln\left(\frac{pr_{ij}}{1-pr_{ij}}\right) = \gamma + \sum_{p=1}^{P}\gamma_p X_{pij} + \sum_{q=1}^{Q}\gamma_q Z_{qj} + \sum_{p=1}^{P}u_{pj}X_{pij} + u_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where pr is the probability that the outcome Y is 1 (dissatisfaction) as opposed to 0, the subscript j is for the country ($j = 1 \ldots J$) , i is for individual respondents ($i = 1 \ldots n_j$), p are for explanatory variables at the lower level ($p = 1 \ldots P$) and q at the upper level ($q = 1 \ldots Q$). The coefficients denoted γ form the fixed part of the model. The random parts of the model – the random coefficients and the residual error term at the country-level – are referred to as u_{pj} and u_j, respectively. The standard deviations of the random effects will be referred to as $\sigma(u_p)$, and that of the random intercepts (i.e. country-level error term) simply as σ_u.

Table 5.2 reports results from four hierarchical mixed-effects logistic regression analyses. Model 1 is a random intercept model that only includes the natural logarithms of GDP per capita along with the dummies for Ethiopia and Indonesia. Model 2 further includes Aid Receipts, which has a weak and insignificant effect. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) increases for Model 2 compared to Model 1, suggests the model is over-fitted and that Aid Receipts adds little to explain the outcome variance. Model 3 further includes the Index of Critical Responses, while Model 4 drops Aid receipts, its effect being even weaker in Model 3 than Model 2. The BIC is decreased from Model 2 to Model 3 and further reduced in Model 4, suggesting that the Index of Critical Responses improves the model, while the Index of Aid Receipts, which is dropped in Model 4, does not. It is also worth noting that the dummy for Ethiopia is rendered insignificant in Model 3 and 4, suggesting it is no longer an outlier when the Index of Critical Responses is included.

In addition to the individual level version of the Index of Critical Responses, the country means of this variable are included separately, to see whether between-country differences in this variable may have an effect in addition to the individual level relationship. This appears to be the case, as both versions of the variable have significant estimates. Including these two versions of the Index of Critical Responses in Model 3 and 4 does not appear to explain much additional variance (as the standard deviation of the random country-level intercepts is only moderately reduced), however. Neither is the effect of GPD more moderately than reduced in

Model 3 and 4, as can be seen from Table 5.5 in the Appendix (which reports predicted values for the highest and lowest observed GDP values for all the models in Table 5.2).

Thus, while the Index of Critical Responses has a significant effect, and reduces the effect of GDP per capita, it fails to fully remove this effect and present itself as an intervening variable in this relationship. However, it should also be noted that the Index of Critical Responses is strictly speaking not a direct measure of a tendency for respondents to give critical responses, but a measure constructed of a specific set of responses that are likely also to be influenced by substantial matters. As a measure of a tendency for respondents to give critical responses it must contain a considerable degree of measurement error. In a more developed causal model, both the Index of Critical Responses and the opinions on aid would be modeled as influenced by the actual underlying tendency to give critical responses, and as such containing error if used directly as measures of it. GDP per capita, on the other hand, is a measure with little error. Thus, if the underlying tendency to give critical responses is strongly related to GDP per capita, as these results suggest, it is likely the error contained in the Index of Critical Responses makes it less related to the opinions on aid than GDP is, even if it is a measure of an intervening variable. The mere fact that there is a similar pattern in opinions on national institutions as in opinions on aid – a pattern is hard to explain by other means – is a strong suggestion that these patterns result from other factors than the substance of the relevant survey questions. In other words, the analysis does provide notable support for Hypothesis 2b.

An interesting question is therefore whether the Index of Critical Responses has a greater effect at the individual level or the country-level. The significant estimate for the individual level estimate demonstrates that individuals who tend to be less critical regarding national institutions also tend to be less critical of current levels of international aid. However, the significant estimate for the country-level means of the index suggests there is an additional effect at the country-level, as respondents are less likely to be critical of current levels of international aid if they are in a country where people in general also tend to be less critical of their national institutions. Table 5.4 in the Appendix reports additional models including these variables, and it appears that the country level relationship demonstrated in Figure 5.5 above is not so much explained by the individual level effect as the country-level effect. Both the standard deviation of random country-level intercepts and the effect of GDP are lower in Model 6, which contains only the means of the index, than in Model 5, which contains the individual level variable. Furthermore, Model 4, which includes both, does no better than Model 6 in these regards.

Table 5.2. Hierarchical mixed-effects logistic regressions of dissatisfaction with aid levels, Pew, 2007.

			Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Fixed part, lower level	(γ_p)	Critical Responses			0.326***	0.327***
					(0.041)	(0.041)
Fixed part, upper level	(γ_q)	Critical Responses, mean			0.381*	0.416**
					(0.202)	(0.197)
		Aid Receipts		-0.181	-0.077	
				(0.130)	(0.113)	
		ln(GDP per capita)	0.787***	0.657***	0.590***	0.637***
			(0.088)	(0.126)	(0.108)	(0.084)
		Indonesia, dummy	-1.612***	-1.633***	-1.588***	-1.577***
			(0.421)	(0.407)	(0.334)	(0.337)
		Ethiopia, dummy	0.906**	1.095**	0.047	-0.084
			(0.449)	(0.454)	(0.490)	(0.456)
Intercept	(γ)		-5.171***	-4.110***	-3.389***	-3.764***
			(0.734)	(1.039)	(0.900)	(0.719)
Random part	(u_p)	$\sigma(u_{\text{Critical Responses}})$			0.178***	0.178***
					(0.035)	(0.035)
Intercept	(u)	σ_u	0.351***	0.342***	0.318***	0.322***
			(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.049)
		N	23463	23463	23463	23463
		N of Clusters	27	27	27	27
		BIC	24345.25	24353.44	24041.15	24031.55

Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, two-tailed tests. Standard errors are given in parentheses. σ denotes standard deviations of random components.

It is also worth noting that both the random intercepts and the random effects for the Index of Critical Responses are highly significant. The latter are illustrated in Figure 5.6 below, which plots them (in grey) along with the fixed part of the estimated effect of the individual level version of the index (in black, with a 95 percent confidence interval). While the effects differ significantly between countries, the plot also illustrates that they are somewhat similar, and all in the same direction. Table 5.6 in the Appendix reports predicted values that correspond to the presented figures. It shows, as illustrated by Figure 5.6, that an individual scoring the highest value of the Index of Critical Responses has a predicted probability of dissatisfaction with current aid levels of .91, whereas the same for one scoring the lowest is .68 (in a country whose average score equals the average among all countries).



Figure 5.6. Predicted probabilities of dissatisfaction with current aid levels over the Index of Critical Responses, based on Model 4.

Note: The solid black line gives the fixed part of the effect; the dotted lines give a 95 percent confidence interval for the fixed effect, while the gray lines give the country-specific effects. The other independent variables have been kept at their mean (except for country dummies, which have been kept at zero).

Figure 5.7 below illustrates the total effect of the Index of Critical Responses by plotting predicted outcomes for values of the index ranging from the highest to the lowest observed at the individual level, for both the highest and the lowest observed national means. The figure is based on Model 4 in Table 5.2, and shows that an individual scoring the highest in a country whose average score is also the highest among all countries has a predicted probability of dissatisfaction with current aid levels of .94, whereas the same for one scoring the lowest in a country whose average score is the lowest is .58. Based on a model without GDP (Model 7 in the Appendix), the corresponding numbers would be .98 and .42, as illustrated by Figure 5.11 in the Appendix. The mean predictions for individuals in two such countries, based on the same model, would be .93 and .56, respectively.



Figure 5.7. Predicted probabilities of dissatisfaction with current aid levels, over the Index of Critical Responses, within the countries that score highest and lowest on the Index of Critical Responses, based on Model 4.

Note: The solid lines give the fixed part of the effect, while the dotted lines give a 95 percent confidence interval for these effects. The other independent variables have been kept at their mean (except for country dummies, which have been kept at zero).

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

As mentioned, as a last step, we may want to consider the possibility that a correlation between repressive governments and aid receipts generate a spurious correlation between expressed dissatisfaction with aid and dissatisfaction with the government. This could be the case Hypothesis 1 were true while repressive governments caused respondents to be afraid to give critical responses.

Thus, we need a measure of freedom of speech. Two datasets are particularly useful in this regard. Freedom House's (2008) *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties* contains data on several political and civil rights for 2007. Particularly relevant are the following three measures (all of which are among the four that make up Freedom House's index of civil liberties): D. Freedom of expression and belief, E. Associational and organizational rights, F. Rule of law. The first captures, among other things, whether there are "free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression", and whether there is "open and free private discussion". The latter is assessed answering the following two questions: "Are people able to engage in private discussions, particularly of a political nature (in places including restaurants, public transportation, and their homes) without fear of harassment or arrest by the authorities?" and "Does the government employ people or groups to engage in public surveillance and to report alleged antigovernment conversations to the authorities?". Thus, these measures should capture the

extent to which respondents have reason to be afraid to give critical responses. The three measures correlate at .88 or higher (N = 193).

The other dataset is the *CIRI Human Rights Dataset* (Cingranelli and Richards 2009), which provides measures of very similar concepts. Of particular interest is "Freedom of Speech", "Freedom of Assembly and Association", and "Independence of the Judiciary" (for variable descriptions, see: Cingranelli and Richards 2008). These are broadly equivalent of the above measures. The three measures correlate at .55 or higher (N = 192). A principal component analysis of all six mentioned measures yields a factor that explains 79 percent of the variance, and has a Cronbach's Alpha of .86 (N = 189). In addition, the CIRI dataset provides a "Physical Integrity Rights Index", which is based on four measures of politically motivated, unlawful, violence by the government: Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance (details on its construction can be found in: Cingranelli and Richards 1999). A principal component analysis of this index and the score resulting from the analysis explained above yields a factor that explains 85 percent of the variance. A factor score has been constructed based on the latter analysis, and will be referred to as (the) *Freedom of Speech* (Index).

Figure 5.8 plots the Index of Critical Responses over the Freedom of Speech Index. While the plot does not show a very clear relationship between the two variables, if we exclude Ethiopia, the bi-variate correlation is .38 (N = 26). This is a notable relationship, although it needs a one-tailed test to be statistically significant at the five percent level (p = .055).



Figure 5.8. The Index of Critical Responses over the Freedom of Speech Index, for less developed, Pew surveyed countries, 2007.

We want to test both the hypothesis that repressive governments make respondents less critical against the alternative that low development does so. Table 5.3 reports plain OLS regressions at the aggregate level, with the Index of Critical Responses as the dependent variable. Ethiopia is identified by a dummy in all models, as it is an outlier in most cases, and it could bias the results. Model 1 includes the Freedom of Speech Index, which has a positive, but insignificant estimate. Model 2 adds GDP per capita, which has a positive and significant estimate, increasing the explained variance to 37 percent. In this model, the already insignificant estimate for the Freedom of Speech Index is cut in half. Model 3 drops the Freedom of Speech Index, while the other estimates remain largely unchanged. Thus, there is little sign of repressive governments causing respondents to hold back unfavorable assessments of domestic institutions.

Table 5.3. Regressions of Critical Responses on Freedom of Speech and GDP per capita, Pew, 2007.

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Freedom of Speech	0.147	0.077	
	(0.109)	(0.097)	
ln(GDP per capita)		0.226***	0.241***
		(0.077)	(0.074)
Ethiopia, dummy	1.148**	1.446***	1.382***
	(0.433)	(0.391)	(0.379)
Constant	-0.125	-2.030***	-2.188***
	(0.094)	(0.653)	(0.617)
N	27	27	27
R^2, adjusted	0.17	0.37	0.38

Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

CONCLUSION

This chapter started by noting a puzzling pattern, namely that the respondents who are on average the most satisfied with current levels of international aid are found in some of the least developed countries in the world, and that the resulting relationship with economic development is very strong. The main aim of the analysis above was to explain this.

There is little support for Hypothesis 1, that the amount of aid received by respondents' countries explains the mentioned pattern. The point that may provide the most support for Hypothesis 1 is that a dummy identifying Indonesia has a significant effect in the analysis. As Indonesia received considerable amounts of humanitarian aid after the 2004 tsunami, a few years before the survey, this might be interpreted as a sign that the population has acknowledged the aid, and responded accordingly. However, it should also be noted that this is a particular kind of aid (humanitarian, triggered by a disaster), and that this single country dummy does not provide a strong test. Still, it may provide limited support for Hypothesis 1,

not in the sense that aid receipts explain the relationship with economic development, but in the sense that under extraordinary circumstances, where there is considerable public attention, the public in less developed countries can respond to aid receipts.

Hypothesis 2a suggests that low development results in a general tendency for individuals to give less critical survey responses. This hypothesis receives more support, as even responses regarding the performance of domestic institutions tend to be less critical when development is lower. That the governments in these countries are more oppressive fails to explain this relationship. The constructed index of critical responses is notably related to opinions on aid at the individual level, showing that respondents who are critical with regard to one also tend to be so with regard to the other. Nevertheless, the individual level effect fails to account for the full aggregate level effect, and the average levels of the index appear to have additional explanatory power. This suggests there is something about national contexts and not just individual circumstances that explain the pattern.

The results are broadly consistent with Inglehart and Welzel's argument (2009) that modernization leads to more emancipative values, which will involve more critical assessments of a range of policies and institutions. In addition, their point that levels of information are lower where development is lower is very likely to be important here. At the national level, it appears likely that the nature and content of mass media, which is related to the level of development, plays a role.[54] Furthermore, Downs noted already in *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) that there are costs attached to acquiring political information. When the benefits of more information are low, he argued "rational ignorance" might prevail. Along the same lines, people living in poverty have less time and fewer resources to spend acquiring information, and may not have much general information to base their responses upon. The most general implication of these findings is that caution is needed when survey responses from the world's least developed countries are compared to those of other countries.

[54] While the impact of mass media on public opinion was once said to be slight (e.g. Klapper 1960), more recent research, with better specified theories and models, have found notable effects (e.g. Feldman 1995; Kinder 1998; Zaller 1989, 1991, 1992, 1996; Zaller and Feldman 1992; Zaller and Hunt 1994, 1995).

APPENDIX

An Alternative Measure of Development

If the tendency for respondents to give less critical responses is indeed an effect of low development, as Hypothesis 2a suggests, it may be interesting to assess its role using better measures of development than GDP per capita. The extent to which people live in poverty may be particularly relevant. The World Bank (2009b) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2009) provide useful data for measuring poverty. Among the variables that the UNDP use to form the human development index, a few stand out. The percentage of the population living on less than 2 dollars per day gives a good measure of the share of people living in poverty. In addition, average life expectancy at birth captures the severity of a country's living conditions. The World Bank provides a measure of telephone lines per 100 people, which of course is connected to economic development, but is also related to the population's ability to communicate and access information. For the countries in question, these measures correlate at .77, .81, and .87. The telephone line indicator has one missing value, and the less than 2 dollar per day indicator has two. Each has been imputed using the observations on the other two variables. A principal component analysis of the three variables gives a single factor that explains 88 percent of the variance (N = 27). The resulting factor score will be referred to as (the) *Absence of Poverty* (Index).

To examine further the role of the Absence of Poverty Index, Figure 5.9 plots dissatisfaction with current aid levels over it. The relationship is much like the one for GDP, save for the fact that it is even a bit stronger, with a correlation of .91 (N = 26).



Figure 5.9. Dissatisfaction with current levels of aid over the Absence of Poverty Index, for less developed, Pew surveyed countries, 2007.

According to Hypothesis 2a, the Index of Critical Responses should also depend on the Absence of Poverty Index, and Figure 5.10 plots the former over the latter. The two show a reasonably strong relationship, with a bi-variate correlation of .58, when Ethiopia is excluded (N = 26). Interestingly, dissatisfaction with current aid levels has a stronger correlation with the Absence of Poverty Index than do the Critical Responses (the Appendix reports directly comparable correlations). As mentioned in the text above, using responses regarding domestic institutions as indicators of a general tendency to be more or less critical, involves the strong assumption the responses have little substance. Thus, the fact that poverty appears more strongly related to the opinions on an international issue than national ones may reflect that the latter are more influenced by objective country-specific circumstances. When the responses are used this way, there may be more "error" in the national opinions.



Figure 5.10. The Index of Critical Responses over the Absence of Poverty Index, for less developed, Pew surveyed countries, 2007.

Table 5.4. Additional hierarchical mixed-effects logistic regressions of dissatisfaction with aid levels.

			Model 5	**Model 6**	**Model 7**
Fixed part, lower level	(γ_p)	Critical Responses	0.332***		0.325***
			(0.041)		(0.041)
Fixed part, upper level	(γ_q)	Critical Responses, mean		0.742***	1.217***
				(0.195)	(0.292)
		Aid Receipts			
		ln(GDP per capita)	0.732***	0.615***	
			(0.077)	(0.084)	
		Indonesia, dummy	-1.614***	-1.548***	-1.570***
			(0.361)	(0.339)	(0.609)
		Ethiopia, dummy	0.502	-0.147	-1.984***
			(0.388)	(0.456)	(0.682)
Intercept	(γ)		-4.626***	-3.603***	1.676***
			(0.636)	(0.718)	(0.133)
Random part	(u_p)	$\sigma(u_{\text{Critical Responses}})$	0.179***		0.178***
			(0.035)		(0.035)
Intercept	(u)	σ_u	0.346***	0.325***	0.592***
			(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.083)
		N	23463	23463	23463
		N of Clusters	27	27	27
		BIC	24025.71	24343.34	24052.01

Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, two-tailed tests. Standard errors are given in parentheses. σ denotes standard deviations of random components.



Figure 5.11. Predicted probabilities of dissatisfaction with current aid levels, over the Index of Critical Responses, within the countries that score highest and lowest on the Index of Critical Responses, based on Model 7.

Note: The solid lines give the fixed part of the effect, while the dotted lines give a 95 percent confidence interval for these effects. The two country dummies have been kept at zero.

Table 5.5. Predicted values for all observed values of GDP per capita, by model.

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Model 1	0.758	0.123	0.506	0.909
Model 2	0.763	0.103	0.555	0.893
Model 3	0.775	0.090	0.594	0.889
Model 4	0.773	0.097	0.577	0.896
Model 5	0.767	0.113	0.537	0.906
Model 6	0.770	0.095	0.580	0.891

Note: Country dummies have been kept at zero, other variables at their mean.

Table 5.6. Predicted values for all observed values of the Index of Critical Responses, corresponding to reported figures, based on respective models.

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Model 4, Figure 5.6	0.784	0.052	0.675	0.914
Model 4, Figure 5.7 (high)	0.847	0.040	0.760	0.942
Model 4, Figure 5.7 (low)	0.712	0.063	0.584	0.878
Model 7, Figure 5.11 (high)	0.930	0.020	0.886	0.975
Model 7, Figure 5.11 (low)	0.562	0.077	0.418	0.784

Note: Country dummies have been kept at zero, other variables at their mean.

Table 5.7. Descriptive statistics for indicators used in the Index of Critical Responses, Pew, 2007.

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
National government,	24930	2.263	0.909	1	4
Prime Minister/President	24903	2.094	0.956	1	4
Military	24169	2.011	0.895	1	4
Media	24816	2.036	0.879	1	4
Religious leaders	24334	2.046	0.894	1	4

Note: The table refers to variables as they were before imputation.

Table 5.8. Descriptive statistics for relevant variables.

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Dissatisfaction with Current Aid, aggr.	0.760	0.143	0.514	0.947
Index of Critical Responses, aggr.	-0.188	0.422	-1.119	0.594
GDP per capita, 2007, ln	8.288	0.971	6.923	9.496
Telephone Lines per 100 people	10.485	9.086	0.0	28.0
Average Life Expectancy at Birth	64.556	9.707	47.7	78.5
Less than 2$ per day, %	37.582	31.126	0.5	96.6
Absence of Poverty Index	0.038	1.011	-1.496	1.376
ODA of GNI, 2007	3.363	5.047	0.010	17.430
ODA, current USD, 2007	888	739	71	2810
Pew indicator (2) PEPFAR + (3) Global Fund	0.440	0.768	0	2
Aid Receipts Index	-0.082	0.938	-0.982	2.754
Freedom of Expression and Belief, Freedom House	11.680	3.473	5	16
Associational and Organizational Rights, Freedom House	7.960	2.685	2	12
Rule of Law, Freedom House	7.720	2.836	3	15
Freedom of Assembly and Association, CIRI	1.160	0.624	0	2
Freedom of Speech, CIRI	0.760	0.779	0	2
Independence of the Judiciary, CIRI	0.600	0.645	0	2
Physical integrity Rights Index, CIRI	3.520	1.917	0	7
Freedom of Speech Index	-0.458	0.765	-1.906	1.210

Note: These statistics are based on 25 observations, as Indonesia and Ethiopia are excluded.

Table 5.9. Correlations between macro-level variables and aggregated individual level indicators.

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	Dissatisfaction with Current Aid, aggr.	1.000								
2.	Index of Critical Responses, aggr.	0.711 (0.000)	1.000							
3.	GDP per capita, 2007, ln	0.894 (0.000)	0.553 (0.004)	1.000						
4.	Telephone Lines per 100 people	0.880 (0.000)	0.671 (0.000)	0.879 (0.000)	1.000					
5.	Average Life Expectancy at Birth	0.787 (0.000)	0.379 (0.062)	0.800 (0.000)	0.769 (0.000)	1.000				
6.	Less than 2$ per day, %	-0.893 (0.000)	-0.584 (0.002)	-0.866 (0.000)	-0.866 (0.000)	-0.805 (0.000)	1.000			
7.	Absence of Poverty Index	0.913 (0.000)	0.584 (0.002)	0.907 (0.000)	0.940 (0.000)	0.915 (0.000)	-0.952 (0.000)	1.000		
8.	ODA of GNI, 2007	-0.659 (0.000)	-0.475 (0.017)	-0.691 (0.000)	-0.593 (0.002)	-0.617 (0.001)	0.633 (0.001)	-0.656 (0.000)	1.000	
9.	ODA, current USD, 2007	-0.640 (0.001)	-0.512 (0.009)	-0.690 (0.000)	-0.684 (0.000)	-0.601 (0.002)	0.811 (0.000)	-0.748 (0.000)	0.588 (0.002)	1.000
10.	Pew (2) PEPFAR + (3) Global Fund	-0.579 (0.003)	-0.375 (0.064)	-0.432 (0.031)	-0.485 (0.014)	-0.661 (0.000)	0.528 (0.007)	-0.595 (0.002)	0.428 (0.033)	0.510 (0.009)
11.	Aid Receipts Index	-0.763 (0.000)	-0.556 (0.004)	-0.742 (0.000)	-0.719 (0.000)	-0.761 (0.000)	0.806 (0.000)	-0.815 (0.000)	0.822 (0.000)	0.861 (0.000)
12.	Freedom of Expr. and Belief, Freedom House	0.148 (0.482)	0.262 (0.206)	0.201 (0.334)	0.145 (0.488)	-0.052 (0.807)	-0.132 (0.529)	0.082 (0.697)	0.109 (0.603)	-0.261 (0.208)
13.	Associational and Org. Rights, Freedom House	0.102 (0.627)	0.212 (0.309)	0.176 (0.401)	0.144 (0.494)	-0.086 (0.685)	-0.059 (0.779)	0.043 (0.838)	-0.016 (0.941)	-0.232 (0.265)
14.	Rule of Law, Freedom House	0.026 (0.904)	0.003 (0.989)	0.118 (0.575)	0.147 (0.483)	-0.047 (0.822)	-0.048 (0.819)	0.054 (0.798)	0.128 (0.543)	-0.186 (0.373)
15.	Freedom of Assembly and Association, CIRI	0.136 (0.516)	0.273 (0.187)	0.190 (0.364)	0.228 (0.273)	0.102 (0.629)	-0.128 (0.543)	0.164 (0.435)	0.232 (0.265)	-0.253 (0.223)
16.	Freedom of Speech, CIRI	0.349 (0.088)	0.385 (0.057)	0.308 (0.134)	0.346 (0.090)	0.267 (0.197)	-0.315 (0.125)	0.331 (0.106)	-0.205 (0.325)	-0.277 (0.180)
17.	Independence of the Judiciary, CIRI	0.074 (0.724)	-0.010 (0.963)	0.194 (0.352)	0.012 (0.954)	0.028 (0.893)	-0.060 (0.777)	0.036 (0.865)	0.047 (0.823)	-0.229 (0.270)
18.	Physical integrity Rights Index, CIRI	0.272 (0.189)	0.224 (0.282)	0.186 (0.373)	0.234 (0.261)	0.156 (0.457)	-0.332 (0.105)	0.258 (0.213)	0.240 (0.249)	-0.373 (0.067)
19.	Freedom of Speech Index	0.262 (0.206)	0.265 (0.201)	0.242 (0.243)	0.255 (0.218)	0.124 (0.556)	-0.289 (0.161)	0.239 (0.250)	0.173 (0.408)	-0.382 (0.059)

Note: P-values are reported in parentheses. The correlations are based on 25 observations, as Indonesia and Ethiopia are excluded to reflect that they are represented by dummy variables in the analysis and to make the correlations comparable.

Table 5.10. Correlations between macro-level variables and aggregated indicators (cont.).

		10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
11.	Aid Receipts Index	0.776	1.000							
		(0.000)								
12.	Freedom of Expr. and	0.039	-0.051	1.000						
	Belief, Freedom House	(0.852)	(0.809)							
13.	Associational and Org.	0.049	-0.086	0.915	1.000					
	Rights, Freedom House	(0.815)	(0.683)	(0.000)						
14.	Rule of Law, Freedom	0.078	0.003	0.731	0.814	1.000				
	House	(0.711)	(0.988)	(0.000)	(0.000)					
15.	Freedom of Assembly	-0.153	-0.072	0.524	0.427	0.591	1.000			
	and Association, CIRI	(0.466)	(0.734)	(0.007)	(0.034)	(0.002)				
16.	Freedom of Speech,	-0.234	-0.291	0.479	0.573	0.440	0.339	1.000		
	CIRI	(0.260)	(0.158)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.097)			
17.	Independence of the	0.034	-0.065	0.665	0.688	0.778	0.579	0.464	1.000	
	Judiciary, CIRI	(0.873)	(0.757)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.019)		
18.	Physical integrity Rights	-0.218	-0.145	0.533	0.393	0.526	0.728	0.227	0.444	1.000
	Index, CIRI	(0.294)	(0.491)	(0.006)	(0.052)	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.276)	(0.026)	
19.	Freedom of Speech	-0.160	-0.153	0.777	0.700	0.767	0.803	0.493	0.700	0.911
	Index	(0.445)	(0.465)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.012)	(0.000)	(0.000)

Note: P-values are reported in parentheses. The correlations are based on 25 observations, as Indonesia and Ethiopia are excluded to reflect the fact that they are represented by dummy variables in the analysis.

6. CONCLUSION

While the chapters of this thesis are rather self-contained, they are pieces of a larger picture, and this brief conclusion aims to put the pieces together. First, it recapitulates the main questions and summarizes the findings of each chapter, while pointing out the necessary qualifications and limitations of these findings. The final part contains suggestions for further research.

The underlying question motivating this study is simple: Do citizens of more and less developed countries disagree over international issues whose costs and benefits will affect them differently? Or, put differently, do they disagree over how they should be distributed? And, if so, does their behavior conform to a self-interested pattern, in which their disagreement would parallel traditional class conflicts within countries? To address these questions, this thesis has focused on opinions on development aid, because this issue is most often perceived as a zero-sum game, which makes it better suited than most other international or foreign policy issues. Thus, the main questions of this thesis are why some people and some countries show more support for development aid than others how and why such support varies with levels of economic development. The questions mentioned in the beginning of this paragraph are too general to be answered fully, but this focus on development aid allows a partial answer, and this answer may at least to some extent be generalized theoretically, in so far as the reasons for the observed patterns of opinions are also investigated. In other words, the questions above invite the further questions of what reasons people have for their opinions and how these reasons differ between countries. This further invites the question of whether their expressed reasons are genuine and independent or whether different types of reasons interact, so that for example one reason could take the form of another. Lastly, there is the question of whether patterns found in among more developed countries can be generalized to hold more generally, including the least developed countries in the world. This invites the question of whether survey responses in the latter countries are at all comparable to those of the former.

Chapter 2 addresses the overall topic more directly than the other chapters, looking at macro-level explanations of national support for the idea that more developed countries should donate more aid financed by taxes. While particular attention is given to the question of whether citizens of more and less developed countries disagree over this issue, the chapter

also looks at other potential explanations of international differences in such opinions, especially among aid donors. At the aggregate level, which this chapter looks at, a few explanations appear important. One is that support for international aid is lower in countries facing economic difficulties, measured by long-term economic growth (or even decline). The other major explanation is the level of economic development, as support is lower the more developed the country in question is. However, looking at aid donors only, among which notable differences remain, it appears that the relationship between these opinions and economic development is dues to the fact that more developed countries started donating aid sooner, and that support is such countries is now lower. While the levels of donations in absolute and relative terms do not have clear effects, it is clear that getting support for increasing aid is harder in countries that have been donating aid for a long time. This may in part be due to their citizens knowing better that their country is a donor, but also, that they gradually lose faith and interest in the notion of aid, as Chapter 3 suggests. Thus, Chapter 2 does reveal a clear effect of GDP, which is consistent with an interest-based explanation, but among aid donors, the picture is less clear.

Chapter 3 investigates the reasons people give for their support or non-support of international aid and the extent to which these reasons explain their opinions at the aggregate level. The analysis looks at reasons related to disinterest, thermostatic responsiveness, national priorities, and ineffectiveness. Interestingly, economic development is positively related to respondents' tendency to cite disinterest as a reason for not supporting aid. It is also related to reasons based on inefficiency. It appears that these relationships may be due to the fact that more developed countries have donated aid for a longer period of time, which may have caused the public to lose interest and faith in efforts to promote development abroad. Turning to the impact of the different types of reasons on the level of support for aid, only disinterest is found to have a clear effect. However, all categories of reasons have estimates with the expected negative sign in each analysis, they just fail to reach a level of statistical significance – which is hard given the low number of observations and thus the low test strength. Add to that suboptimal indicators, and we see that we cannot draw strong conclusions on this basis. It is still quite likely that all of these categories have some effect, but these may be too weak, or too much obscured in the analysis to come out as significant. Chapter 2 illustrates this clearly, as it finds an effect of domestic economic challenges – a variable that in Chapter 3 is found to influence a measure of reasons related to national priorities, although that measure does not register an effect on the dependent variable used in Chapter 3.

Chapter 4 addresses the issue of whether respondents' expressed reasons for their opinions on development aid are independent of each other and initial opinions on aid. In particular, it looks at whether reasons related to inefficiency and waste are related to initial support for aid. In other words, whether there is causality going in the opposite direction of what is usually assumed and what the respondents express. This case is particularly interesting because reasons related to inefficiency are widely accepted as legitimate reasons even by those who otherwise believe the donation of aid is a good idea. Thus, such reasons provide an easy, conflict-avoiding way of justifying low support for the donation of aid. The chapter uses an instrumental variable analysis (after a matching procedure), as well as an additional analysis where it is argued causality can only flow one way. Both these analyses lend support to the hypothesis that initial support for development aid affects the propensity to express skepticism regarding the efficiency and impact of such aid.

Chapter 5 addresses the question of whether the pattern found in Chapter 2 can be generalized to the whole world or whether it might just apply to the countries investigated, which do not include the very least developed countries of world. To address that question, one must also tackle the question of whether survey responses in so widely different countries are comparable, not least at the aggregate level. The chapter is largely preoccupied with the latter question. It shows that survey responses regarding development aid, as well as a number of other issues, are heavily influenced by the level of development, making aggregate level comparisons across such levels difficult, if not impossible. In other words, the chapter cannot answer the first mentioned question, which it would ideally answer. Instead, it provides a more general insight about the feasibility of international comparative survey research including the worlds least developed countries. With regard to the question of generalization, we are still left only with the findings of previous chapters, and possible assumption that the relationship between economic development and opinions on aid is monotonic.

This discussion already identifies a few limitations of the analyses and necessary qualifications to the findings. Chapter 2 identifies a pattern in which economic development has a negative effect on national support for the idea that developed countries should help less developed countries (more than they currently do). It is hard, however, especially with aggregate data to rule out all alternative explanations, and the interpretation of this pattern as a result of self-interest depends on the assumption that other explanations fail. While an attempt is made in the chapter to rule out such explanations, and the same is done in Chapter 3 one can never achieve full certainty. Chapter 3 is limited in its own way, relying on

Eurobarometer (EB) data that are only available for a relatively small selection of EU countries. In addition, the survey questions regarding respondents' reasons for their opinions on aid are only available for those not supporting the donation of aid, so that the additional assumptions are necessary in order to generalize about the whole populations. The EB questions are also worded in ways that do not conform to good practice in survey design, resulting in data whose validity is less than optimal. Chapter 4 shows that there is reverse causation between the support for aid and expressed beliefs regarding aid efficiency. It does not, however, address how other reasons may interact and influence each other, or how they also may depend on the support for aid. Chapter 5 shows that generalizing the pattern found in Chapter 2 to include the least developed countries of the world is difficult, rather actually determining whether or not the pattern does indeed apply. Ideally, it would also do the latter, but the chapter suggests this may be impossible, unless one can find a way to produce comparable data.

Thus, we see a few ways in which further research could improve upon what is done here. To strengthen our confidence in the present results, it would be a very helpful if they were replicated using different datasets, including more countries, possibly using more recent data, if such were to become available. Replication and triangulation across datasets, researchers, selected subjects, and more is key to establishing knowledge, and can still contribute much in this case. Some of the data used here are about ten years old, and a recent poll found majorities of the people in eight surveyed OECD countries explicitly willing to fund cutting hunger and severe poverty in half by the year 2015 – a key Millennium Development Goal (Kull 2008; WorldPublicOpinion.org 2008). While it remains to be seen whether they in practice will put stronger demands on politicians to provide domestic services and keep taxes low, and also reward politicians who satisfy these demands, this finding once again appears to confirm their strong support for development aid. In other words, while the pattern revealed in Chapter 2 appears quite pronounced, there is a danger of over-generalizing it. Whether it is to be found on a worldwide basis in the long run, is a question for further research. The need for replication on a wider basis is also clearly illustrated by the suboptimal data and low power and of the analyses in Chapter 3, and not least by the possible discrepancy between some of the results of that chapter and analyses in the other chapters.

Apart from this, the previous chapters invite further research along several paths. Chapter 4 shows that conclusions individuals draw regarding the effectiveness of international aid depend on whether individuals find helping other countries important, in contrast to the one-

directional causation one would expect based on a purely rational model. These two ideas are both part of a broader cluster of ideas that map on to the general Left-Right dimension in most countries. Thus, the topic of Chapter 4 relates to a much larger research topic, namely how dimensions of public opinion form and sustain themselves. Chapter 4 shows an instance in which individuals adapt their empirical beliefs to fit their normative views, which may be an importance mechanism is this regard, but many questions remain in this area, both regarding individual behavior and the role of parties in framing issues and mapping them onto existing political structures. Such questions are important both with regard to aid, and other political issues.

There are also more specific questions regarding the role of the left-right dimension and how different groups interpret it with regard to international aid. Chapter 2 shows that more leftist individuals are more supportive of international aid, and we know from before that Left-Right self-positioning depends on personal income. There is a question, however, as to when lower-income groups support international and not. In light of Noël and Thérien's findings (2002), and the findings here, that support is lower when a country is facing social and economic challenges, we may expect an interaction between such challenges and the effects of income and left-right positioning on support for aid. It is an open question whether the opinions of higher-income groups are affected in the same way by such challenges, or whether it is mainly the solidarity of lower income groups that depends on national circumstances.

More generally, further research might expand in other directions, looking for example at whether one finds the same patterns among political elites as among the public, and see how the opinions of the two groups relate to each other – a topic that at least to some extent might connect with the literature on dynamic representation. The role of parties, policies and institutions in forming opinions on aid is still not completely clear. Lastly, and in light of the overall topic of which the questions of this thesis is part, further research might look at whether nationally defined interests influence opinions on other issues where the costs of international policy coordination, or the absence of such, are likely to be distributed unequally among countries. For example, one could investigate what the publics of different countries think about policies to limit CO_2 emissions, and the different possible ways of distributing the costs of such policies. Such an investigation might reveal whether or not there is a general pattern in which nationally defined interests shape public opinion on international matters.

This leads us on to the implications of this study. The results are broadly consistent with the notion that opinions on development aid are in part shaped by self-interested considerations. Another is that the reasons respondents give for their opinions – and the beliefs they genuinely hold about the efficiency of giving aid – are influenced by whether they like the idea of giving aid in the first place. Those who like it want it to work, while those who don't become more skeptical about its effects. A third lesson is that comparing survey responses from the least developed countries to those from other countries requires caution. Leaving the last point aside, what are the implications of the two former points? With regard to the first, it may help us better understand international relations, and it appears to fit with models in which governments are driven by the interests of their citizens. More generally however, the two first points both alert us to patterns of behavior we may not like, as self-interested reasoning about political issues is at odds with truly principled reasoning, which ideally would be independent of such interests. The second point, on the other hand, alerts us to a psychological mechanism that may be as human as it is irrational, namely cognitive dissonance leading us to allow normative opinions shape our empirical beliefs. While such findings may promote our understanding of political psychology, they may also be relevant at a more basic level. By helping us better know ourselves, reminding us of behavior we may not like, they alert us to challenges we may need to overcome in order to arrive at truly well-considered and rational opinions.

7. General Appendix

Measurement and Validity

Chapter 2 uses the following indicator from one of the International Social Survey Programme's waves on Social Inequality (ISSP 1999): "Turning to international differences, do you agree or disagree… […] People in wealthy countries should make an additional tax contribution to help people in poor countries." In the original dataset it is coded as an ordinal variable with five categories: "strongly disagree", "disagree", "neither agree nor disagree", "agree" and "strongly agree." In contrast to most survey questions on this and related issues, this question has a higher threshold for people to give socially desirable responses. This is demonstrated by the greater degree of international variation in the aggregate levels of responses to this as compared to other questions. It is thus a well-suited indicator for detecting international differences. Its main weakness is its limited coverage of levels of development. The least developed country covered is the Philippines, which leaves out the half of the world population with lower GDP per capita.

Chapter 5 therefore uses a related indicator with wider coverage that comes from Pew's Global Attitudes Project (Pew 2007). This survey was conducted by fact-to-face interview in 2007.[55] The following question was asked in 47 countries: "Do you think the wealthier nations of the world are doing enough or not doing enough to help the poorer nations of the world with problems such as economic development, reducing poverty, and improving health?" The available answer categories were: (1) "Doing enough" and (2) "Not doing enough". [56] Respondents who either refused to answer or replied that they did not know were

[55] The only exceptions, in which telephone interviews were used, are the US, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As explained below, these countries are not part of the analysis.

[56] For the purposes below, both of these indicators have been aggregated as country means, using the supplied weights. Germany and the UK are treated as single observations. The Pew indicator has been recoded as a binary variable (by subtracting 1).

also coded. These have been excluded in the following analysis, and the variable has been coded as a binary indicator.[57]

At face value, the ISSP and Pew indicators seem to capture approximately the same attitude, namely the extent to which respondents think developed countries are giving a sufficient amount of aid to less developed countries. The main difference is that the ISSP indicator explicitly relates aid to costs and in terms of increased taxes in donor countries. The Pew indicator does not mention taxes or set aid up against other policies, so it may not properly capture the strength of the respondents' support. It does not tell us whether they are willing to forgo other options, to finance the donation of aid. Thus, respondents are likely to express their support, even when it is weak compared to that of alternative policies, which may be illustrated by the very high percentage of supporters across different countries.

Figure 7.1 below plots the aggregate of the Pew indicator along with the dichotomized ISSP indicator (where the categories of agreement are given one and the others zero). The correlation between the two is quite strong ($r = .71$, $N = 15$), and as the Pew indicator was measured approximately 8 years later, this suggests that the differences between countries are quite stable. It is also worth noting that the countries that fit the least well are post-Communist countries (excluding them the correlation would be .88). This confirms that their recent national experiences set their responses somewhat apart, as found in Chapter 2.

Figure 7.1 also demonstrates that respondents are much more likely to express a call for more aid as a response to the Pew indicator than to the ISSP indicator. This is especially the case in countries where people such calls are less common. While more than 70 percent of the Japanese think developed countries are not doing enough to help less developed ones, only 26 percent of them think people should pay higher taxes to support an increase in aid. Thus, Pew's statement (2007a) that "the survey shows substantial support among wealthier nations to do more to help poorer nations", may be an exaggeration. While it is clearly detecting support, it is more questionable whether it is substantial.

[57] These respondents are generally fewer than 10 percent of the samples. Judged by the inclusion of their share of these samples as independent variables in aggregate level regressions, their exclusion does not make a noticeable difference for the analysis conducted here.



Figure 7.1. Aggregates of the ISSP and Pew indicators of dissatisfaction with current levels of aid plotted against each other, for available countries.

The Eurobarometer (EB) indicator used in Chapters 3 and 4 is based on the following question: "In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very important, or not at all important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?" (e.g. Melich 2006). This indicator is similar to the Pew indicator in not referring to the costs of donating aid. However, it differs from the two others in neither referring to current levels of aid, making it more likely to capture absolute rather than relative policy preferences compared to the others. However, despite the differences in wording, and the fact that the ISSP indicator asks for relative policy preferences and the EB indicator for absolute preferences, the two are strongly related. If we aggregate both, and keep East and West Germany as well as Great Britain and Northern Ireland separate to maximize the observations, we have 9 observations for which both indicators are available. The aggregates of the two indicators correlate at .92 and form an almost straight line in scatter plots. If we dichotomize the ISSP indicator in the manner done in Chapter 1, the correlation remains strong. Exactly how strong depends on what we do to the EB indicator. Dichotomizing it on the middle, results in a correlation of .78. However, if we lower the threshold for the ISSP indicator to include neutrals as supporters, or raise the threshold for the EB indicator, looking only at those who say "very important", the correlations approximate the one initially reported of .92.

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