Those who *came* and those who *left*

The Territorial Politics of Migration in Scotland and Catalonia

Jean-Thomas Arrighi de Casanova

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute

Florence, February 2012
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**Examining Board:**

Prof. Rainer Bauböck, EUI (Supervisor)  
Prof. Michael Keating, EUI (Co-supervisor)  
Dr Nicola McEwen, University of Edinburgh  
Prof. Andreas Wimmer, UCLA

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Whilst minority nationalism and migration have been intensely studied in relative isolation from one another, research examining their mutual relationship is still scarce. This dissertation aims to fill this gap in the literature by exploring how migration politics are being fought over not only across society but also across territory in two well-researched cases of protracted nationalist mobilisation, Catalonia and Scotland. It meets three objectives: First, it introduces a theoretical framework accounting for sub-state elites’ and administrations’ boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants and emigrants. Second, it systematically compares the evolution of boundary-making strategies in Catalonia and Scotland, prior to and after the establishment of self-governing institutions. Third, it identifies the circumstances under which nationalists came to adopt a predominantly territorial conception of national membership, privileging the inclusion of immigrants over that of emigrant populations.

The main hypothesis states that minority nationalists have a vested interest in emphasizing residency as a significant criterion of national membership irrespectively of one’s place of birth and degree of attachment to the land in order to enhance their internal and external legitimacy. In addition, the location of the membership boundary depends upon the relative openness of the Territorial Opportunity Structure, which comprises three dimensions: the formal distribution of migration-related competencies, the initial boundary and its implications for later developments, and the dynamics of party competition at sub-state level.

The empirical analysis shows that the attitudes of political elites in Scotland and Catalonia towards immigrants and emigrants have been shifting through time. This illustrates how nations are constantly constructed and reconstructed through processes of boundary-building, in a context also shaped by state-wide nationalism. The findings corroborate to a considerable extent the main hypothesis and show that dynamics of party competition have played a greater role in affecting boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants and emigrants than historical path dependencies or the formal distribution of competencies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Most would agree that writing a PhD dissertation is a solitary endeavour, punctuated of personal doubts and great intellectual joys which can hardly be shared with anyone. However, no thesis is ever the product of one person's efforts, and certainly this one was no different. Looking back at the four years I spent writing it, I realize how much it owes to the help and support of many friends and colleagues. My biggest thanks go to my supervisors, Rainer Bauböck and Michael Keating, who provided me with patient and constant guidance and kept spurring my interest for the discipline over the years. I was also given the opportunity to spend extensive periods of time doing fieldwork in Scotland and Catalonia. I am grateful to Ricard Zapata-Barrero who invited me to spend three months in the department of Political and Social Sciences of the Pompeu Fabra University, and Charlie Jeffery who offered me a visiting scholarship at the Institute of Governance of the University of Edinburgh. Robert Liñeira initiated me to the subtleties of Catalan and Spanish politics and David Ralph introduced me to some of the finest ales in Scotland. I would like to thank both of them for making my stay on the field so enjoyable. The European University Institute is a peculiar institution where one learns as much about politics having casual conversations on the terrace of the Badia or in the bars and restaurants of Florence as in seminar classrooms. I would like to acknowledge the debt I owe to Dejan Stjepanović, Charles Gottlieb, Sylvain Gambert, Sergi Pardos, and Adrien Costes for offering me so many opportunities to escape the library and discuss the little contrarieties of life in good company. My special thanks go to Anders Herlitz who listened to me repeating the same ideas over and over again without ever showing the slightest sign of boredom. Magda Cyprys spent way too many sunny Sunday afternoons hearing about nationalism and migration and became, albeit reluctantly, an expert in the field. For that and many other things, I am profoundly grateful to her. Last but not least, I dedicate this dissertation to Daddy, Silvère, and Ferréol, three men of good will the conversation with whom I truly miss.
# CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1

### 1. CONCEPTUAL AND EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK ............................................. 7

1.1. Migrations, stateless nations, and the state ............................................................ 7
   1.1.1. The multicultural perspective and its limits ......................................................... 8
   1.1.2. The nationality question .................................................................................... 13
   1.1.3. The migration question .................................................................................... 17

1.2. The puzzle: the territorial politics of migration ..................................................... 20
   1.2.1. The root causes of migration: a territorial politics perspective ....................... 21
   1.2.2. The territorial politics of migration ................................................................... 24

1.3. The making and unmaking of political boundaries .................................................. 26
   1.3.1. Civic or ethnic?: between ambiguities and normative bias ............................... 26
   1.3.2. A more promising avenue: the boundary-making approach ............................ 29
   1.3.3. Boundary-making strategies: territorializing and ethnicizing ......................... 31

1.4. Explanatory framework .......................................................................................... 36
   1.4.1. Main hypothesis ............................................................................................... 36
   1.4.2. The territorial opportunity structure ............................................................... 40

### 2. ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK ............................................... 49

2.1. Analytical framework ........................................................................................... 49
   2.1.1. Boundary-making strategies in a historical perspective ..................................... 50
   2.1.2. Immigration policies: those who will come ....................................................... 56
   2.1.3. Immigrant policies: those who came ............................................................... 61
   2.1.4. Emigrant policies: those who left ..................................................................... 64

2.2. Comparative framework ......................................................................................... 70
   2.2.1. The territorial politics of migration in Québec ............................................... 70
   2.2.2. Scotland and Catalonia compared ................................................................... 82

### 3. THE MONGREL NATION .......................................................................................... 89

3.1. 1800 - 1914: the Workshop of the Empire ........................................................... 91
   3.1.1. Highland clearances and Lowlands lure of opportunity ..................................... 91
   3.1.2. The Irish exodus ............................................................................................... 95

3.2. 1914-1960: The years of lead .................................................................................. 97
   3.2.1. From opportunity to exile .................................................................................. 97
   3.2.2. The ‘menace to the Scottish race’ ..................................................................... 100

   3.3.1. The twilight of sectarian Scotland ..................................................................... 104
   3.3.2. ‘Fresh talents’ against ‘white settlers’ ............................................................... 106

3.4. Internal minorities and the road to devolution ...................................................... 111
4. THE TERRA DE PAS .................................................................117

4.1. The historical origins of the ‘immigrant question’ in Catalonia ............................ 119
  4.1.1. Migration and territorial structuring ........................................... 120
  4.1.2. 1900-1936: from the Lerrouxist peril to the Civil War ......................... 123

4.2. 1950-1978: the ‘New Catalans’ at the time of anti-Francoist mobilization .......... 125
  4.2.1. The pacific invasion ..................................................................... 126
  4.2.2. Boundary-making strategies in the pre-transition period ....................... 128
  4.2.3. Catalan citizenship in the 1979 Statute ........................................... 132

4.3. 1980 – 1998: integration into a single bilingual community ......................... 134
  4.3.1. The political context ................................................................. 136
  4.3.2. ‘Linguistic normalization’ and PSC’s moderating role ......................... 139
  4.3.3. Fluctuat nec mergitur: the failure of PPC’s challenge .......................... 143

5. REGULATING IMMIGRATION IN A PLURINATIONAL CONTEXT ..........147

5.1. Scottish immigration policy: devolution and the limits of control .................. 149
  5.1.1. Immigration and the ‘population crisis’ ....................................... 150
  5.1.2. Squaring the migration circle ..................................................... 153
  5.1.3. Devolution and the limits of control ......................................... 157

5.2. Catalan immigration policy: much ado about nothing? ............................... 159
  5.2.1. Spanish immigration policy ....................................................... 161
  5.2.2. The Catalan response ............................................................... 163
  5.2.3. A new start............................................................................. 166

5.3. Analysis of results ........................................................................... 169

6. IMMIGRANTS INTO SCOTSMEN ...........................................173

6.1. The evolving boundaries of Scottish citizenship ......................................... 175
  6.1.1. The historical transformations of British citizenship ......................... 175
  6.1.2. Defining the Scottish citizenry on the eve of devolution ..................... 178
  6.1.3. The citizenship rights of asylum seekers and the path to citizenship .... 181

6.2. ‘One Scotland, many cultures’? ................................................................ 185
  6.2.1. Community cohesion in the devolved policy context ......................... 187
  6.2.2. Multiculturalism and the growing discursive gap ......................... 190
  6.2.3. Britishness versus Scottishness .................................................... 193

6.3. Analysis of results ........................................................................... 195
  6.3.1. The new institutional context ..................................................... 198
  6.3.2. Historical heritage and path-dependency ..................................... 200
  6.3.3. Party system and patterns of party competition .............................. 200

7. IMMIGRANTS INTO CATALANS ........................................203

7.1. Catalan citizenship and the limits of expansion ........................................ 206
  7.1.1. The Vic controversy ................................................................... 209
  7.1.2. The Llei de acollida ................................................................... 212
  7.1.3. The anti-immigrant vote and the vote of immigrants ....................... 214

7.2. A ‘Catalan way of integration’? ......................................................... 216
  7.2.1. Reframing the linguistic controversy ........................................... 218
  7.2.2. Interculturalism: a convenient middle-ground ................................ 223
7.2.3. The European shadow and the ‘Muslim question’ .......................................................... 226

7.3. **Analysis of findings** ....................................................................................................... 231
   7.3.1. The institutional context ............................................................................................. 232
   7.3.2. Historical heritage and path-dependency ..................................................................... 234
   7.3.3. Party system and patterns of party competition .......................................................... 235

8. **EMIGRANTS INTO AMBASSADORS** ............................................................................. 239

8.1. **The Scottish diaspora, a ‘Kingdom of the Mind’?** ........................................................ 240
   8.1.1. Negotiating electoral rights .......................................................................................... 242
   8.1.2. Reaching out to the ‘ancestral’ diaspora ..................................................................... 244
   8.1.3. An economic resource, a cultural liability? ................................................................. 246
   8.1.4. A country of five million, or a community of thirty million? ....................................... 250

8.2. **The Principate, and beyond?** ...................................................................................... 251
   8.2.1. Catalonia, a country of (forced) emigration? ............................................................... 251
   8.2.2. A boundary-making strategy still looking for its purpose .......................................... 254
   8.2.3. Campaigning abroad: a limited electoral incentive ...................................................... 259

8.3. Analysis of findings ........................................................................................................... 260

**CONCLUSION** .................................................................................................................... 263

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ................................................................................................................. 275
# TABLES

Table 1: Examples of boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants .................. 34
Table 2: Examples of boundary-making strategies in relation to emigrants .................... 35
Table 3: Populations of Scotland, England and Wales, and UK (1900-1991) ................... 103
Table 4: UK General election results in Scotland (1951-1997) .................................. 113
Table 5: Net migration - rest of Spain and abroad, (1941-1980) .............................. 126
Table 6: Election results to the Catalan parliament (1980-1999) ................................. 137
Table 7: Net migration rate – Spain and abroad (1980-2010) ................................. 160
Table 8: Foreign nationals resident in Catalonia (2000-2010) .................................. 164
Table 9: Election results to the Scottish parliament (1999-2011) .............................. 201
Table 10: Number of acquisitions of Spanish nationality in Catalonia (2003-2009) ...... 215
Table 11: Main foreign nationalities residing in Catalonia (January 1st 2010) ............. 223
Table 12: Election results to the Catalan Parliament (1999-2010) ............................ 235
Table 13: Election results for expatriates at Catalan elections, (1999-2010) .............. 260
INTRODUCTION

In April 2010, the residents of 200 Catalan municipalities were given the opportunity to pronounce themselves over the Catalan people’s right to self-determination in a non-binding referendum initiated by pro-independence civil society associations. The consultation was the second of its kind to be organized in less than a year and reflects the growing popularity of outright independence in a country where support for secession has been traditionally weak, despite a fervent and diffuse national sentiment. The referendum was held three months before the Spanish Constitutional Court struck down some of the most contentious articles of the Catalan Statute, approved four years earlier by 89% of Catalan MPs and 74% of Catalan voters. Although the new Statute considerably expanded the Generalitat’s means of self-government in a broad spectrum of public policy fields, notably in fiscal matters, its most controversial dispositions were to be found in the symbolic realm. The preamble in which Catalonia is defined as a nation reawakened deeply-rooted disputes over the very nature of the Spanish state and showed how, for better or worse, identity questions remain at the forefront of contemporary European politics. In some European capitals, this was interpreted as the ultimate manifestation of the “Catalan malaise”, the latest “querelles de clocher” in a long series of sterile disputes aggravated by a blatant nationalist rhetoric. For the French intellectual Michel Onfray, regional languages are no less than the “Trojan horse of xenophobia,” and keeping them alive is as absurd as intending to “reintroduce dinosaurs in Saint-Germain des Prés.” Yet successive referenda in Catalonia have challenged the almost universal rule limiting the right to vote to citizenship holders by expanding the electoral franchise to ‘every resident aged 16 or older’, thus including undocumented and legally resident aliens whose names figure on the local registry. The ‘Nous Catalans’, whether born in the rest of the Spanish state or beyond, were expected to express their views over the right of the Catalan people to self-determination. At the same time, at the northern end of Western Europe, the SNP government published its much-awaited Draft Referendum Bill over the independence of Scotland.

1. For a striking illustration, see for instance the Editorial of Le Monde, December 12, 2009, entitled Le ‘Mal’ Catala. The article also refers to Spain’s endless “querelles de clocher”.
The re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, which was meant to “kill the nationalists stone dead”\(^3\), has neither undermined the SNP’s seemingly irresistible ascent, nor its secessionist ambitions. But as in Catalonia, the boundaries of the electoral franchise as defined in the bill were based on residency and not ethnicity, thus excluding those who were born in Scotland and lived elsewhere in the UK, while including British citizens born in England and EU citizens residing in Scotland. Again, the ‘New Scots’, whether born in the rest of the British state or beyond, were invited to cast their ballot in a still hypothetical referendum over the Scottish people’s right to self-determination.

The right of people to self-determination is enshrined in international law, although the membership and territorial boundaries delimiting the space over which this right can be exercised are almost always contested. Protracted migrations and the intermingling of nationalities across a single geographical space have often meant that one nation-building project could not be achieved without undermining another. These precedents have given some credence to those who believe that an oppressed nationality, once having acquired territorial means of self-government, would then subjugate those constructed as aliens, who in turn would have no other option but to seek to establish a state on their own, thus mechanically dividing the world into ever smaller independent units. As emigration and immigration provoke a mismatch between population and geographical boundaries, between the *people* and the *homeland*, nationalists would have no other option but to retain ties with emigrants to preserve the nation’s strength, and segregate immigrants to safeguard its cultural integrity. Seen from this perspective, the latest evolutions in Catalonia and Scotland evoke a paradox. As nationalists sought to acquire further autonomy from their respective states, they predominantly defined the people as the sum of individuals residing within their territorial jurisdiction, but hardly beyond. Rising popular support for self-government, if not outright independence, has not translated into an upsurge of anti-immigrant sentiments, but on the contrary went hand-in-hand with an elite-driven strategy to expand the national boundary to those who came, but not to those who left. As the significance of the territorial boundary with the rest of the state was being strengthened, so was the perceived need to blur ethnic boundaries within the homeland. However, far from being a Catalan or Scottish

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\(^3\) George Robertson, then Secretary of State for Scotland, famously declared in 1995 that “devolution would kill the nationalists stone dead.”
idiosyncrasy, these seemingly contradictory trends can be observed to varying degrees in other well known cases of protracted nationalist mobilization, such as in the Basque Country or Québec.

Whilst minority nationalism and migration have been intensely studied in relative isolation from one another, research examining their mutual relationship is still scarce. This dissertation intends to fill this gap in the literature by uncovering what I call the territorial politics of migration, which in its broadest sense refers to the consequences of human mobility on how migration politics are organized and fought out not only across society, but also across territory. It proceeds from the observation that political entrepreneurs making claims upon the centre on behalf of a people and a homeland which do not coincide with state and national boundaries have had to cope with the fact that a varying proportion of those who were born there have left to, and of those who reside there have come from, the rest of the state and beyond. In that context, this dissertation meets three objectives. First, it introduces a theoretical framework accounting for sub-state elites and governments’ boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants and emigrants. Second, it systematically compares boundary-making strategies in Catalonia and Scotland, today and in the past. Third, it identifies the circumstances under which minority nationalists come to adopt a predominantly territorial conception of national membership, privileging the inclusion of immigrants over that of emigrant populations.

The explanatory framework comprises a main hypothesis emphasizing agents’ interests and identifies three dimensions of the territorial environment which affect sub-state elites and governments’ boundary-making strategies towards immigrants and emigrants in a systematic way. The main hypothesis states that minority nationalists have a vested interest in emphasizing residency as a significant criterion of national membership in order to enhance their internal and external legitimacy. By expanding the membership boundary to immigrants, nationalists who seek to establish, maintain, and expand a stable structure of power over a specific geographical space acquire internal legitimacy for their rule over the totality of the resident population and defuse counter claims of self-determination within the homeland. On the other hand, polishing their external legitimacy enables them to break the state’s monopoly over the constitutional
establishment of liberal democratic norms, and to discourage reluctant elites from using internal divisions as a means to oppose their claims. In consequence, it becomes much harder for the state to accommodate a nation-building project the legitimacy of which is not rooted in narrowly-defined ethnic criteria but grounded in a culturally plural population inhabiting a common homeland. Whilst they may also seek to expand the membership boundary to emigrants and their descendants for a cultural, symbolic, economic or electoral purpose, they would nonetheless be more reluctant to give a prominent voice in homeland politics to individuals residing in a foreign land over which they do not claim sovereignty, and whose interests can hardly be reconciled with the nation-building project being pursued in the homeland.

In addition, the location of the membership boundary depends upon the relative openness of the Territorial Opportunity Structure, which designates the ever-evolving political context in which sub-state elites operate. It comprises three interrelated dimensions: the formal distribution of migration-related competencies; the initial boundary and its implications for later development; and the dynamics of party competition at sub-state level.

In order to evaluate the strength of the explanatory framework, I systematically compare empirical developments in Catalonia and Scotland along four analytical dimensions. First, I explore boundary-making strategies in a historical perspective. The attitudes of nationalist elites’ towards immigrants and emigrants prior to the establishment of self-governing institutions appear critical insofar as they set a path for later developments. I then shift to the contemporary period and examine the evolution of migration-related policy-making and associated discourses between 2000 and 2010. Immigration policies designate the set of rules establishing the conditions of aliens’ entry into the territory for long-term stay and settlement. Immigrant policies comprise both citizenship policies, regulating the citizenship rights of non-citizens and the formal rules of acquisition of citizenship; and integration policies, institutionalizing immigration-induced pluralism and determining the degree of cultural convergence an individual or a community is expected to achieve in order to be considered as a full and equal member of the political community. Lastly, emigrant policies are meant to create, influence, maintain or conversely weaken the set of political, economic and cultural links with specific groups of emigrants and their descendants. Admittedly, sub-state governments enjoy limited room for manoeuvre to implement public policies that depart markedly from their
respective central states that have retained a strong grip over most migration-related competencies. However, they are able to contest decisions taken by the central administration, use their competencies to take initiatives that show variations and consolidate a normative frame differing more or less markedly from the state-wide framework. While the historical sections rely extensively on the existing literature, the analysis of immigration, immigrant, and emigrant policies is based on a broad range of primary sources, including policy drafts, party manifestos, parliamentary transcripts, migration-related legislations and semi-structured elite interviews conducted in each case between January 2009 and May 2010.

The results show that, like sovereign nation states, the Catalan and Scottish governments have sought to exercise some control over the number and provenance of immigrants entering their territorial jurisdiction. They have devised policies and institutions meant to integrate those who came into their own national community and established formal economic, social and cultural ties with those who left and their descendants. However, they did not use their self-governing competencies as a means of building impenetrable fences around the homeland, to contract the membership boundary towards immigrants and to expand it to emigrants on the sole basis of an alleged shared ethnicity. Instead, they sought to reconcile migration-related concerns with their strategy of economic development, which sees immigrants bringing desirable skills as essential for generating endogenous growth, and emigrants as a key resource to break into overseas markets. Although this did not come without tremendous difficulties, mainstream Catalan and Scottish nationalists sought to accommodate immigration-induced pluralism by promoting an over-arching national identity constructed around a common territorial interest, thus blurring political boundaries within the homeland. While they selectively expanded the membership boundary to specific categories of emigrants and their descendants for cultural and economic purposes, they have nonetheless been more reluctant to give them a prominent voice in homeland politics. By categorizing, naming, and counting individuals as immigrants and emigrants and debating and institutionalizing their terms of membership into their own imagined national communities, sub-state governments and political elites consistently incorporated migration-related concerns into their broader nation-building projects. Catalan and Scottish nationalists have not only challenged the wider state’s capacity to define political boundaries, but also contested its hegemony in its own
liberal and democratic normative space. Far from being paradoxical, these developments corroborate to a considerable extent the main hypothesis. The results also show that dynamics of party competition have played a greater role than historical path dependencies or the formal distribution of competencies in affecting boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants and emigrants.

The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter I delineates the puzzle, discusses the main concepts and introduces an explanatory framework accounting for sub-state elites and government boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants and emigrants. Chapter II specifies the units of analysis, briefly explores the territorial politics of migration in the case of Québec and introduces the comparative framework. Chapters III and IV look at the intersection between territorial structuring and migration in a historical perspective. I then shift to the contemporary period and study the evolution of boundary-making strategies between 2000 and 2010. Chapter V examines the process through which the Catalan and Scottish governments sought to gain further leverage to regulate immigration into their jurisdiction and how these demands were largely unfulfilled. Chapter VI and VII review public policies and associated discourses concerned with immigrant integration and citizenship, against the background of state-wide developments. Chapter VIII compares the evolution of emigrant engagement policies in both cases. The Conclusion briefly summarizes and contrasts the findings, evaluates the strength of the explanatory framework and opens an agenda for future research.
I

Conceptual and Explanatory Framework

1.1. Migrations, stateless nations, and the state

Although migration-induced and national pluralism are conceptually distinct, they share a family resemblance. Indeed, they both challenge the myth of the isomorphism between nation and state, of the congruence between the territorial boundaries of the homeland and the membership boundaries of the nation. Accordingly, they have been increasingly examined within a common ‘multicultural’ analytical framework. However, the conceptual differences between them have not always been stressed clearly enough, providing good reasons as to why they were kept separate in the first place. I first briefly review the main arguments raised in the multicultural debate in normative political theory, and show why a culturalist perspective fails to provide a satisfying account of what makes them distinct. It is instead more fruitful to distinguish them on the basis of the challenge that they mount to an international system constituted by mutually exclusive territorial nation-states. In this light, they can no longer be considered as categories of analysis but of political practice, a by-product of the institution of the nation-state.
1.1.1. The multicultural perspective and its limits

Both phenomena gained currency – at least in their contemporary form – in the wake of modernity. Ernest Gellner’s famous assertion (1983: 17) that “nationalism is a phenomenon connected not so much with industrialisation or modernisation as such, but with its uneven diffusion” could equally account for the acceleration of migration flows in the wake of the industrial revolution (Zolberg 2006b). Marxist scholars have also highlighted some similarities among them, arguing that migrations and minority nationalism both stemmed from profound dislocations brought about by capitalist penetration into peripheral territories. Building on Wallerstein’s world system theory (1974), the argument contends that the exploitation of peripheries by the Western core created an uprooted proletariat prone to move abroad, and economically subjugated ethnonational groups forming a homogenous underclass. Although the Marxist paradigm is no longer as popular as it was, the concept of uneven economic development has survived in the study of nationalism, and the core/periphery model gave way to the less value-laden ‘push and pull’ and ‘migration system’ theories in mainstream scholarship of international migrations (Massey et al. 1998, Fawcett 1989).

But the most ambitious attempt to build a link between both forms of diversity arose out of the multicultural debate in normative political theory which gained momentum in the 1990s in Canada, where the national question is never far from the surface of politics. Like Australia and to a lesser extent Britain and the Netherlands, Canada adopted multiculturalism as its official doctrine for immigrant integration in the early-1970s, although this decision has been primarily driven by pragmatic rather than normative considerations. Indeed, the simultaneous challenges of the Quiet Revolution in Québec and sustained immigration against the backdrop of increasingly vocal indigenous claims put the question of national identity at the top of the agenda and forced federal elites to reinvent the Canadian nation (Gagnon 2009).

In his plea in favour of ‘multicultural citizenship’, Will Kymlicka (1995) combined ‘ethnic immigrants’, ‘national minorities’, and ‘indigenous groups’ within a common normative theory of minority rights in liberal democracies. The traditional liberal

perspective conceived of society as the gathering of free and rational individuals, which presupposes the effective ethnic, cultural, religious and racial neutrality of the state (Walzer 1983). But some have questioned this ideal of neutrality on liberal grounds, arguing that it is a legitimate function of the state to promote the national culture within its borders, insofar as it contributes to the realization and preservation of liberal democratic values (Tamir 1993), and to sustain feelings of trust and solidarities underpinning the welfare state (Miller 1995). Turning this argument on its head, Kymlicka (1995, 2001) showed how the presumed neutrality of the liberal state is but a myth, and that, although the strength of the link between state and culture varies greatly, it has always remained in one form or the other. Even in France and the United States – often regarded as archetypes of neutrality – the system is heavily weighted in favour of the majority: “it is the majority’s language that is used in public institutions; the majority’s holidays that are recognized in the public calendar; the majority’s history that is taught in school; and so on” (2001: 43). Some have retorted that cultural diversity constitutes a provisional anomaly that is soon corrected by the assimilationist machinery of the state. However, beside the practical difficulties this entails, a number of prominent scholars have argued that such groups have a valid claim not only to non-discrimination, but also to explicit accommodation and recognition, which can only be achieved through group-differentiated rights.

Advocates of a multicultural citizenship share the view that culture is central to individual self-realization, although the reasons as to why this is so diverge from one author to the other. For some, cultural minority rights provide an answer to individuals’ needs to have their identity recognized (Taylor 1994), while others have emphasized their instrumental value. Kymlicka, for instance, argued that cultural pluralism could be reconciled with liberalism as culture fosters individual autonomy by determining the boundaries of the imaginable. In a similar fashion, although with strong communitarian overtones, Joseph Raz observed that “individuals find in them a culture which shapes to a large degree their tastes and opportunities, and which provides an anchor for their self-identification and the safety of effortless, secure belonging” (1994: 118). Chaim Gans (2003) provided a thicker version of the instrumental argument. In his view, cultural rights ought to be complemented with a right to cultural preservation, as a people’s belief that a memory of their endeavours will remain after they have died constitutes a potent catalyst for self-realization. Others have claimed that culture has an intrinsic
This is the position of communitarians like Bhikhu Parekh (2000), who see cultural diversity as adding to the variety of life and wielding aesthetic significance, whilst not requiring an overarching liberal framework in order to operate. From this perspective, national minorities and ethnic immigrants are equally subjects to state-driven nation-building projects striving to make cultural and political boundaries congruent. This line of reasoning has had some policy implications. For instance, European policy-makers have sought to encourage research linking integration policy research on the position of migrants and national minorities with the aim of enforcing legal standards of minority rights in Eastern Europe (Favell 2001: 370). The Council of Europe deliberately made some connections between migrants’ integration and national minorities, thus forcing Eastern European Candidates to “accept minority rights and citizenship guarantees as part of the Agenda 2000 package” (ibid.).

Ephraim Nimni (2005) went so far as to argue that the model of National-Cultural Autonomy (NCA), combining constitutionally guaranteed collective rights with wide cultural autonomy and cultural (non-territorial) self-determination could redress the deficiencies of the liberal democratic order and be applied to both categories. Yet, most would agree that their similarities do not preclude a distinct remedy. Kymlicka and others advocate a right to ‘territorial self-government’ for national minorities, unlike immigrants who have a valid claim to ‘polyethnic rights’, respectful of their cultural specificities, but are nonetheless expected to integrate into the mainstream society of settlement, which mirrors the constitutional consensus in Canada. Kymlicka legitimizes this differential treatment on two grounds: the argument of consent, and the argument of asymmetrical capabilities. First, national minorities were incorporated involuntarily and collectively into a state where they do not constitute the majority. By contrast, immigrants came voluntarily and individually to live in liberal democracies, thus wilfully ‘waiving’ their right to their culture of origin. However, the argument of consent is inconsistent with Kymlicka’s theory of multicultural citizenship, which conceives of cultural belonging as essential to individual autonomy. Besides, arguing that national minorities were incorporated against their will into a state is often empirically wrong, as the 1707 Act of Union between Scotland and England or the 1469 alliance of the Crowns of Castile and Aragon illustrate. Second, national

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5. The historical circumstances under which the 1707 Act of Union came about are subject to controversies in British historiography. See Keating (2009b).
minorities, because they are territorially concentrated, are capable of sustaining what Kymlicka calls a “societal culture, providing its members with meaningful ways of life across a full range of human activities” (1995: 76). On the contrary, ethnic immigrants “have left behind the set of institutionalized practices, conducted in their mother tongue, which actually provided culturally significant ways of life to people in their original homeland” (ibid. 77). But here again, Kymlicka takes the ability of national minorities to sustain a societal culture and immigrants’ inability to do so as essential givens, neglecting how this is in fact largely conditioned by the relative openness of their respective institutional environment. Hence, the capability argument is tautological, as it suggests providing national minorities with the means to develop their societal culture on the grounds that they do have one, whilst denying it to immigrants on the basis that they do not.

Gans’ demonstration (2003) is more persuasive. In his view, immigrants can adhere to their culture of origin within the host society through polyethnic rights, while their long-term endeavours to have their culture preserved over subsequent generations are being satisfied in their country of origin if the latter is self-governing. Immigrants voluntarily choose their second-best choice, i.e. integration on reasonable terms, because their country of immigration better suits their other interests. On the other hand, national minorities, because they do not have a state of their own, have no alternative to preserve their culture but to establish self-governing institutions. However, assuming that self-government would be immigrants’ first choice is not supported by empirical evidence. Besides, limiting nationality claims to the cultural realm fails to acknowledge that nationalists are more often than not eager to stress cultural differences as a means to achieve self-government rather than the other way around (Bauböck 2001). While some suggested substituting the vertical hierarchy of rights by a horizontal continuum that could accommodate a broader spectrum of categories (Carens 2000), others rejected it altogether, pointing to the “multinational bias” supposedly embedded in Kymlicka’s theory that “reflects the author’s own political concerns with Native North Americans and Québécois” (Modood 2008: 34). Hence, a strictly culturalist perspective fails to provide a convincing answer as to why national and migration-induced pluralism are distinct, and thus should be accommodated differently. While Kymlicka’s framework

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6. A suggestion that was later endorsed by Will Kymlicka (2001).
does account reasonably well for the idiosyncrasies of contemporary Canada, it can hardly travel through time or space without being significantly altered (Keating 2001c).

Rainer Bauböck offers a political alternative, which takes the international order as a starting point from which he derives a theory of minority rights giving prominence to political membership, insofar as “cultural rootlessness is a more viable option for some, although certainly not for all, individuals in our world than living without attachment to any political community” (2007: 98). He points to the detrimental consequences of the traditional conception of sovereignty, which cannot apprehend national minorities and migrants as anything but ‘anomalies’ or ‘misfits’ provoking a mismatch between territorial and membership boundaries. Henceforth, national minorities can either be assimilated into the state(s) in which they do not represent the majority, be eradicated through genocidal means, or seek to establish a state of their own, a solution that is undermined by the inherent difficulty of making cultural and territorial boundaries congruent. As for migrants, this leaves them with no alternative but to renounce their nationality of origin when acquiring that of the country in which they live, while being imposed a precarious legal status in between (Hammar 1990). Again, this solution, however unsatisfactory, is made difficult in practice as states, because they jealously retained the sovereign right to define the terms of membership to their political community, have to cope with a varying proportion of aliens living within their borders, and of citizens abroad. As a result, Bauböck contends, the normative foundations of the international system ought to acknowledge the existence of nested, shifting, and overlapping political boundaries as legitimate forms of political membership, on the grounds that individuals have a “fundamental right to membership in self-governing communities that entails a correlative collective right to self-government” (ibid. 102).

On the one hand, “interlocking nation-building projects” resulting from the mismatch between territorial and national boundaries can be accommodated through the generalization of national minority right to self government (Bauböck 2002: 10). On the other hand, migrants’ stake in several political communities resulting from their ties and

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7. Hammar (1990) coined the expression ‘denizenship’ to stress how migrants in Western Europe have increasingly enjoyed similar rights as citizens without becoming fully-fledged members of the political community. However, only citizens enjoy full active and passive political rights and an unconditional right to abode. Besides, recent developments in EU member states reflect states’ willingness to downgrade migrant status and draw a sharper line between citizens and aliens (Guild et al. 2009)
bonds spanning across borders ought to be acknowledged through a general right to *transnational citizenship*. But given the territorial nature of self-government, immigrants who “import rights of self-government into a receiving society would be invaders” (Bauböck 2001: 343), an anachronistic equivalent to what colonial settlers did in the Americas, New Zealand and elsewhere.

Bauböck’s approach has various strengths, not least because it carefully avoids treating national minorities and migrants as essentially given categories existing in isolation from the political context in which they came about. Instead, they can only be differentiated on the basis of the challenge that they mount to a world constituted by a system of states that recognize international boundaries as significant dividers between national territories, and acknowledge each other’s sovereignty over a particular population of citizens. However, while his theory is built upon a more sophisticated sociological premise acknowledging their constructedness, his normative agenda precludes a more elaborate inquiry into the making and unmaking of these categories, a task which requires leaving the world of ideas to enter that of politics. I now examine how they are in fact the by-product of ongoing processes of nation-building, the unintended consequences of the institution of the modern nation state.

**1.1.2. The nationality question**

I have so far used the term ‘national minorities’ to refer to the territorially-bounded people which do not have a state of their own, and on behalf of whom a claim of self-determination is made. However, a variety of alternatives can be found in the literature, illustrating the inherent difficulty of defining a phenomenon that seldom finds recognition in international law, is highly contentious in all its manifestations, and encompasses a variety of cases that do not fit so easily into procrustean categories.

‘Minority nations’ (Norman 2006, Zapata-Barrero 2009), ‘stateless nations’ (Keating 2001a, b), ‘nations without a state’ (Guibernau 1999), ‘nested nations’ (Miller 2000), ‘ethnonationalities’ (Conversi 1997) are some of the most widely-used terms, although other authors have sought to empty the concept of its normative substance, loosely referring to ‘sub-state communities’ (Barker 2007) or ‘regional nationalities’ (Barbosa
Those less sympathetic to their claims have deliberately employed a regional idiom to stress their disdain for a matter they perceive to be a mere anachronism. One way around it might be to resurrect\(^8\) the nineteenth century ‘nationalities question’, which presents the advantage of both highlighting the resilience of the phenomenon, as well as mitigating its militant overtones. However, this runs into other difficulties, as using an umbrella term means abandoning any attempt to discriminate one case from the other. This nonetheless invites us to reflect upon the reasons as to why the ‘nationality question’ arose at the very time simultaneous processes of state-formation and nation-building were reaching a peak in Europe. This does not suggest that proto-national conflicts and territorial tensions were literally absent prior to the French Revolution. But the collapse of the Ancien Régime and the diffusion of the doctrine of popular sovereignty provided incentives for elites to homogenize their population, and claim exclusive control over a more or less contested homeland. The claim to speak on behalf of national majorities originated counter-claims made on behalf of national minorities, “turning the logic of national representativity on its head” (Wimmer 2008a: 991). In other words, one cannot exist without the other, and both are the by-products of the territorial nation state, whose legitimacy is rooted in most instances in the chimerical congruence of political and cultural boundaries. Derek Urwin (1982b: 429) made a similar point, arguing that regional and national movements are the “creatures of the national revolution”, which by bringing further administrative centralization and cultural standardization, put considerable strain upon existing arrangements and encouraged the “organization in the territorial arena of parties for the protection of minority or territorial interests.”

For Michael Keating, a ‘stateless nation’ has no independent homeland, whereas a ‘national minority’ is linked to an external kin-state where its nation-building project is established as the dominant one (2001b: 24). Hence according to his typology, Catalonia and Scotland belong to the first category whereas ethnic Hungarians in Romania or Slovakia are to be considered as national minorities. However, this is further complicated by the fact that these categories are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they can overlap in more or less tidy ways, shift over time, and in the overwhelming

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\(^8\) Article 2 of the 1978 Spanish constitution formally acknowledged the existence of “historic nationalities”. The constitutional court struck down the preamble of the 2006 reform of the Catalan Estatut in which Catalonia was defined as a nation in July 2010.
majority of cases be internally as well as externally contested. For instance, the German-speaking minority in South-Tyrol was simultaneously placed under the protection of Austria until the Autonomy Statute was passed in the 1970s while enjoying significant autonomy from the Italian state (Markusse 1997: 79-81). Ethnic Hungarians living in Transylvania have interacted with their Hungarian kin-state as well as the Romanian host-state, such a constellation being rather the norm than the exception in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (Brubaker 1996, 2007). Some have pointed out too that a national minority could also refer to a distinct national group which finds itself in an inferior position within the state in which it is established (Bauböck, 2002: 4), the term ‘minority’ referring here to a power asymmetry rather than a demographic reality. But despite their singularities, all these cases have in common the fact that a claim of self-determination is made on their behalf by political entrepreneurs enjoying significant support among their population. Here, self-determination shall not be understood as necessarily implying secession, but supposes at least that the people should be considered as the subject rather than the object of constitutional change (Keating 2009b), which in practice has taken various forms. In most instances, this has been translated into a federal-like arrangement combining territorial autonomy in the periphery and power-sharing at the centre, according to the logic of self-rule and shared-rule (Elazar 1987). Admittedly, agreeing upon a territorial boundary has sometimes been a hopeless task, especially in cases where political elites make self-determination claims over the same geographical space in the name of two groups politically constructed as mutually exclusive, as in Northern Ireland or in Israel/Palestine. In some instances, this inherent difficulty has been addressed by the introduction of a consociational system, whereby group-representation is guaranteed on a non-territorial basis (Lijphart 2004).

For the purpose of this dissertation, the empirical investigation is limited to two cases – Catalonia and Scotland which I shall refer to as ‘stateless nations’ – while bearing in mind the numerous difficulties that this entails. The latest constitutional row in Catalonia shows how much the national idiom in Spain remains a polarizing issue, whereas it is almost unchallenged in Scotland⁹, given the openly multinational self-

understanding of the British Union state. This by no means suggests that either one or the other can be objectively described as such, nor that they possess immutable characteristics that can be observed independently of the broader political context in which they operate. But the term stateless nation has an obvious strength, as it supposes that what makes them distinct from nation states is not their nationness, but their statelessness. In other words, the absence of an independent state is the constitutive element of stateless nations, which are no less imagined than nation states, and also have their share of “ideological habits which enable them to be reproduced” (Billig 1995: 6). Referring to them as nations does not necessarily entail reifying them, nor overlooking their constructedness, but presents the advantage of dissociating the concepts of nations and states that are so enduringly imbricated in the social sciences. Furthermore, the object of inquiry can be narrowed down by defining Catalonia and Scotland as nations located within plurinational democracies, as opposed to multilingual democracies such as Switzerland\(^\text{10}\), and plurinational autocracies such as China. James Tully (2001) defines multinational democracies as contemporary states composed of two or more nations where citizens are recognized as full and equal members of the political community. In his view, contemporary states such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Spain constitute good examples of multinational democracies. However multinationalism supposes the coexistence of “discreet and separate national groupings within a polity” (Keating 2001a: 25), which is empirically inaccurate. Hence, the term plurinational is more appropriate to define democracies that exhibit three commonalities at institutional, sociological and political levels which have far-reaching implications in relation to immigrants and emigrants:

a) Nested institutions. Territorial relations are constitutionally mediated, and the arrangement generally comprises territorial autonomy at the periphery and power-sharing at the centre. As a result, migration-related competences are distributed across multiple tiers of government;

b) Nested identities. More than one national identity can pertain to a single group or even an individual, which in consequence may be nested, overlap and shift in more or less tidy ways (Keating 2001a: 26). Migrants can have a stake in both political communities, in addition to their ties with their home country, thus opening the

\(^{10}\) Although Kymlicka sees Switzerland as a multinational state, others would argue that it is rather multilingual and multisecular (Kriesi et al. 2008).
possibility for them to have multiple national affiliations that are not necessarily conflicting with one another;

c) Nested nation-building projects. The different tiers of government are engaged in rival nation-building projects whereby they compete for the hearts and allegiance of the same people (Norman 2006). This must be seen as a form of politics, which is not necessarily incompatible with liberal democratic norms, but can hardly ever be resolved once and for all.

1.1.3. The migration question

The transnational paradigm emerged in the 1990s in reaction to the tendency of migration students to consider the nation state as a hermetic container of social processes, an unproblematic unit of analysis dividing world space into mutually exclusive groups, each distinguished by a unique culture, internally bounded by mutual solidarities and sharing a common identity (Glick-Schiller et al. 2002). In the transnational light, international migrations are no longer a perennial phenomenon destroying the putative congruence between nations and states. Instead, they ought to be considered as a recent political construction, which gained currency when modern nationalizing states started to police their borders and issue passports separating the national wheat from the alien chaff. By doing so, states acquired a monopoly over “the legitimate ‘means of movement’, particularly though by no means exclusively across international boundaries” (Torpey 1999: 4). Similarly, Adrian Favell observed that “the very process by which collectivities manage movers by naming and counting them, and thereby distinguishing them from non-movers or residents, is the fundamental way in which the territorial nation-state society constitutes itself in the first place” (Favell 2006: 271). These assertions invite us to rethink the conceptual differences between ‘immigrants’, ‘emigrants’ and ‘migrants’. While seen from Mars international and internal migrations are indistinguishable, the difference between them can only be understood in the context of an international order predominantly made of territorial nation states recognizing the borders separating one another as meaningful. According to the definition adopted by the United Nations Population Division (UNPD),

11 For an insightful account of the enduring legacy of Herder’s social ontology in contemporary immigration research, see Andreas Wimmer (2009).
individuals who cross an international border and remain in a country other than the one in which they were born for a period of at least twelve months belong to the category of international migrants. The term emigrant embraces the perspective of the sending country, and immigrant, that of the country of destination. This comes as no surprise from an organization based from its very conception on “the sovereign equality of all its members.” However, these space and time criteria are far from being universally applied, and the considerable variations that can be found across states – which by the way makes their systematic comparison all the more difficult – also illustrate the contingent nature of these categories as well as their intimate relationship with nation-building processes. By contrast, references to internal migrants are virtually never preceded with the Latin prefix in nor ex, suggesting that they are neither entering, nor exiting. If their mobility is not aimless, the very fact that they do not cross an international border, although they may sometimes travel very long distances within the confines of the state, draws a sharp conceptual line between them and their international peers. Accordingly, the transfer across jurisdiction is the ‘constitutive element’ of international migration, distinguishing it from migration, the mobility of citizens within the boundaries of an established state (Zolberg 2006a: 64). According to UNPD estimates, there were 214 million international migrants in 2009, a figure which pales in comparison with the 740 million internal movers who, because they have resettled within the boundaries of the state in which they were born, are largely ignored (Withol de Wenden 2010: Chapter 1). Hence, Castles and Miller (2003) were perhaps right to describe the beginning of the new millennium as the ‘Age of Migration’, although their assertion would have certainly gained considerable strength were it not limited to the admittedly more spectacular movement of people across sovereign states.

The distinction between these categories is not always clear, and shifts over time according to changes in the configuration of political boundaries. Hence, French emigrants to Algeria at the time of colonization were regarded from the perspective of the colonial power as internal migrants, citizens relocating from one administrative division to another and entitled to an identical bundle of rights. However, this changed dramatically with the independence of Algeria in 1962, when citizens/settlers turned

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13. French emigration to Algeria accelerated in the 1880s. When Algeria gained its independence in 1962, a million pieds-noirs were “repatriated” to the métropole in a matter of weeks.
into unwanted aliens and were subsequently expelled. Similarly, Commonwealth citizens until 1962 shared many similarities with intra-state movers, enjoying the right of free mobility and entitled to vote and stand for elections in the United Kingdom on the basis of residency. Likewise, the free mobility of EU citizens across member states enshrined in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the gradual equalization of citizenship rights encouraged some to interpret intra-EU mobility as a form of internal migration, a politically unrecognized and invisible act (Recchi et al. 2009). However, the ‘Polish plumber’ controversy in France and the Netherlands that contributed to the large popular rejection of the Constitution in 2005 made the fragilities of European citizenship all the more apparent (Aarts et al. 2006). Migrants themselves possess meaningful agency, and are able to make strategic use of these categories to advance their aims: Commonwealth citizens have stressed their emotional attachment to a common political community, the former British Empire, in order to differentiate themselves from mere aliens (Modood 2008). On the other hand, EU-citizens can invoke their Europeanness to mark their distance from Third-Country Nationals (TCN), while pieds-noirs were to some extent able to negotiate the terms of their return with the French state on the basis of their legal status, as well as their ethnicity.

Ultimately, one can question the relevance of such categories in a plurinational context, wherein individuals can cross an inter-national border while remaining within the same state. As the meaning and hierarchical order of jurisdictional boundaries are essentially contested, the transfer of jurisdiction that is the constitutive element of international migration is itself problematic. In Catalonia, immigrants from the rest of the Spanish state have since the late nineteenth century been constructed as ‘immigrants’, and are since the 1980s counted in official statistics as ‘immigrants from the rest of Spain’\(^{14}\). In Scotland, the large settlement of Irish-born British subjects in the nineteenth century occurred prior to the independence of Ireland in 1922. While they were formally internal migrants, this did not prevent them from being constructed as the significant other and provoking fears about the potential ‘Irishisation’ of Scotland. On the other hand, Italian citizens from the South relocating to the North have been stigmatized as ‘terromi’ and socially constructed as aliens, a phenomenon which has been politically exploited by the Lega Nord. The Belgian case provides the most compelling example.

\(^{14}\) IDESCAT. The official category in Catalan is ‘Immigrants procedent de la resta d’Espanya’.
The presence of Francophones in the electoral district of Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde – the last remnant of bilingual Belgium since the 1962 fixation of linguistic borders, comprising the 19 communes of Brussels-Capital and 35 communes of the Flemish Brabant – has become the recurring target of Dutch-speaking parties. The crisis reached a momentum in 2007, when all Dutch-speaking MPs but the Greens voted in favour of a bill opening the way for the split of the electoral district in order to prevent further immigration of Francophones and impose the exclusive use of the Dutch language (Sinardet 2010: 347). Eventually, the vote provoked enormous turmoil and precipitated the country into a political crisis that at the time of writing shows no sign of improvement\(^\text{15}\).

For the purpose of this dissertation, immigrants and emigrants shall be defined contextually, retracing how they are being constructed as categories of practice, discursively articulated and institutionally entrenched in the Catalan and Scottish political arenas. These categories, far from being immutable, are subject to constant contestations, can be imposed or propagated more or less forcefully, and shift at specific critical junctures. However, their constructedness does not make them less real, as they are embedded in social institutions that have far-reaching implications for those who are thus categorized.

1.2. The puzzle: the territorial politics of migration

In the previous section, I argued that stateless nations, immigrants and emigrants can best be understood as categories of political practice embedded in relatively stable social and political institutions. On the one hand, minority nationalists claim to speak on behalf of territories and groups which do not coincide with state boundaries and populations. On the other hand, international migrations create a mismatch between territorial and membership boundaries, whereby states find themselves with a significant proportion of aliens within their frontiers, and of citizens abroad. However,  

\(^{15}\) In the Yugoslav federation, internal migrants retained the citizenship of the Republic in which they were born while they were entitled to the same citizenship rights as natives when taking up residence, an institutional arrangement that proved particularly harmful when the need came for newly-independent states to define the boundaries of their citizenry.
they do not only represent parallel challenges to the nation state, but also intersect: indeed, minority nationalists formulate their claims on behalf of a people whose homeland is crossed by individuals migrating to and from the rest of the state and beyond.

1.2.1. The root causes of migration: a territorial politics perspective

The extraordinary set of factors encouraging individuals to move away from their family and community and settle down in an alien land in search of a hypothetical improvement of their living conditions have been identified and discussed within a variety of disciplines. Once combined, they provide a reasonably exhaustive framework for understanding the driving forces of international and, although it is rarely acknowledged, internal migrations. The ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors theory derived from neo-classical economics stresses that people seek to improve their economic well-being by selling their labour in markets in which demand and wages are higher. In the long-run, this provokes a better allocation of resources between capital and labour, thus improving market efficiency in both areas of origin and destination. Shifting the unit of analysis away from the individual to the household level, some have emphasized how families use migration as an instrument of risk management (Stark et al. 1985). By diversifying their means of subsistence, members of a single household residing in locations where welfare provision is almost non-existent enhance their capacity to cope with risks and overcome market failures. It complements the previous one by adding a twist to the rational motivation of actors who no longer operate individually, but as a group bounded together by kin ties. Focusing exclusively on economic conditions in the area of destination, other authors have examined the changing nature of the labour market in post-industrial societies. As native populations in advanced economies are increasingly educated, they are no longer willing to accept poorly-paid low-skilled jobs, which subsequently lead to a bifurcation of the labour market (Piore 1971). Against the popular orthodoxy, it suggests that migrants do not compete with native workers but complement their activity, to the benefit of all. A more controversial paradigm is derived from Wallerstein’s World System Theory (1974), according to which the modern world system is a product of the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe and its diffusion to the rest of the world. Here, the rapid penetration of the market
economy in pre-market societies put considerable strain upon existing social and economic arrangements, and created a precarious population of workers who have no other option but to move to earn an income. Lastly, social network theory indicates that once a migration pattern is initiated between one location and another, the consolidation of migrant networks creates a phenomenon of chain migration that tends to be self-perpetuating (Waldorf 1996, Palloni et al. 2001). Instead of accounting for the initial phase of migration, it explains why flows are sustained through time, relatively independent of market conditions. These additions to the neo-classical paradigm suggest that migration is not solely the product of an economic mechanism driven by relative inequalities among territories, originating extensive movements of labour from deprived areas to others that are economically better endowed (Massey et al. 2006/1998). Indeed, the persistence of emigration flows after countries have reached a reasonable level of development, as reflected in the large number of Western-European and North-American citizens still seizing their right to ‘exit’ militates against such a parsimonious account emptied of social, political and cultural considerations.

While these theories point to different causal relations to explain human mobility, they can equally shed light on the driving forces of international and internal migration. Each of them acknowledges that human mobility, whether individuals trespass an international border or not, is not only caused by factors operating across countries, but also within them. Labour migrations from the Scottish Highlands to the Lowlands in the nineteenth century were part of a broader household strategy, and remain so in contemporary Senegal, where internal mobility from rural areas to the Dakar region is used as a means to mitigate crop risk (Sakho et al. 2010). The protracted migration of Bretons to Paris in the twentieth century has not only been driven by economic push and pull factors, but also by the strengths of social networks located in the capital city. They were first limited to families and friends, and later increasingly institutionalized and encompassing the broader imagined community of Bretons, whose bonds were no longer built upon face-to-face interactions but on a common geographical origin (Prado 1980). Patterns of internal migration were incorporated into Michael Hechter’s ‘internal colonialism’ interpretation of British national development (1975) to highlight how the English core presumably developed itself at the expense of the Celtic fringe, whereby

16. E.G. Ravenstein (1889), in one of the first systematic scientific attempt to uncover the ‘the Laws of Migration’, did not distinguish internal and international flows but assumed that they obeyed the same rules.
the survival of ethnic distinctiveness among internal migrants is said to rest upon a cultural division of labour. The bifurcation of the labour market in large cities has also attracted internal migrants from economically ailing regions willing to accept poorly-paid jobs natives no longer want to do, as the case of enduring Italian South-North migration illustrate.

My purpose here is not to give a definitive answer as to which theory best explains human mobility, a task that falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, I merely contend that the multiple root causes of human mobility identified in the literature do not operate only across countries but also within them and transcend state borders. In accordance with Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller’s (2002) path-breaking critique of methodological nationalism in the social sciences, it seems that the analytical divide between internal and international migrants is more the consequence of an epistemic bias than a substantial distinction. They compellingly show how the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world has had a considerable influence on migration scholarship. Hence, they conclude that the study of transnational communities offers a promising avenue to overcome the self-imposed analytical limits of methodological nationalism. Whilst I share their diagnosis, their remedy is also coloured with questionable assumptions and leaves room for alternative approaches. At least since the turn of the century, adopting a transnational perspective has almost become a pre-requisite for those seeking to join the ever-expanding circle of migration studies. Whilst this greatly contributed to the revision of established paradigms and the exploration of unknown areas, its original purpose of challenging the nation state as the main unit of analysis has been only partially met. Paradoxically, it may even have reinforced its predominance, as the very term ‘transnationalism’ suggests that nations and states are coterminous units, “neglecting the numerous distinctive forms of territorial communities within and across state boundaries” (Jeffery et al. 2010: 173, my emphasis). By locating migration flows within a transnational context, sociologists have been able to cast a new light on ‘transnational social spaces’, the circular flow of persons, goods, information and symbols across countries that have been triggered in the course of international migrations (Portes 2000, Faist 2009). Political scientists sought to interpret countries’ responses beyond domestic idiosyncrasies by examining the incidence of supranational institutions (Soysal 1994, Sassen 1996, Sassen 2006) and countries of origin on
migration-related policy-making in destination countries\textsuperscript{17}. However, while the approach successfully sheds light on \textit{trans-state} economic, cultural and political practices connecting migrants and featuring institutions spanning countries, it has little to say about what happens \textit{within} the state, nor how other forms of territorial community have apprehended migration flows and their consequences.

To be fair, this statement is only partially true. In particular, the burgeoning literature on migration politics at the local level has successfully moved away from a state-centric perspective and showed how cities, as the main recipients of international and internal flows and operating in an increasingly globalized environment, have found innovative ways of addressing the consequences of immigration. (Ireland 1994, Rogers & Tillie 2001, Penninx 2010). Besides, in recent years there has been a growing interest in trans-local studies of migration, examining how emigrants played a prominent role in local politics both in their city of origin and residence (Østergaard-Nielsen 2011, Robert Smith 1998, 2008). However, much less attention has been given to meso-level governments, in spite of the fact that they have increasingly turned into prominent loci of authority and political arenas at least since the 1970s (Jeffery 2008). This is even more so in plurinational democracies where decentralization processes have not only been driven from the top\textsuperscript{18}, but also from the bottom in the wake of the resurgence of nationalist movements.

\textbf{1.2.2. The territorial politics of migration}

To date, research examining the intersection of territorial politics and migration politics is still scarce. I intend to fill this gap in the literature by uncovering what I call \textit{the territorial politics of migration}, which in its broadest sense refers to the consequences

\textsuperscript{17} Rainer Bauböck (2003: 702) rightly argued that political transnationalism is not “only about direct or indirect participation in sending states from outside their borders, but also about the impact of migrants’ external political ties on the political institutions of the host country.” In many respects, Sassen and Soysal are rather internationalist than transnationalist scholars \textit{per se}. Nevertheless, Sassen’s impressive historical inquiry into the interaction between territory, authority and rights betrays her inclination towards a transnational approach (2006).

\textsuperscript{18} Charlie Jeffery explains how the highly centralized states that emerged after World War II were encouraged to strengthen, and at times create, meso-level governments on rationalist grounds, in order to cope with the emergence of new functions addressing new needs. This occurred against the background of a paradigmatic shift from neo-Keynesianism to neo-liberalism, and in a broader context of increasingly scarce resources (2008-547).
of human mobility on how *politics are organized and fought out across territory*\(^{19}\). Whilst this research agenda can be expanded to all kinds of meso-level governments, the scope of this dissertation is limited to cases of stateless nations as defined in the previous section. It proceeds from the observation that political entrepreneurs making claims upon the centre on behalf of a people and a homeland which do not coincide with state and national boundaries have had to cope with the fact that a varying proportion of those who were born there *have left to* and of those who reside there *have come from* the rest of the state and beyond.

Adopting a territorial lens challenges a pervasive assumption of most of the state-centric literature, which cannot be fully overcome by embracing a transnational perspective. The volume and composition of migrant stocks are not only unevenly distributed across states, but also within them, a phenomenon which can only be understood in the light of their respective territorial structuring resulting from historical processes of state-formation and nation-building. Uneven spatial patterns of human mobility across a single state place considerable cultural and economic strain upon existing territorial arrangements, and have been an enduring political concern at the centre, in the periphery, and in their mutual interactions. However, while this is an important concern, it is certainly not the main one. Indeed, minority nationalism is a phenomenon that erupts, evolves, gains, or loses significance over time for a variety of reasons that are relatively independent of migration flows. It is therefore essential to distinguish between what nationalists *want and what they do to get it*, and their attitude towards immigrants and emigrants; between the territorial politics of *nation-building*, and the politics of *boundary-making*. On the one hand, I define nation-building as the process through which political entrepreneurs seek to create, maintain and expand a stable structure of power over a territory and a population. The territorial politics of nation-building refers to the way in which two or more nation-building projects interlocked within the same state interact with one another. Although it has significant administrative, cultural and economic ramifications, the phenomenon is essentially political. On the other hand, the *politics of boundary-making* designates the phenomenon through which political entrepreneurs respond to migration flows and their consequences by discursively articulating and institutionally entrenching a boundary between members and non-

\(^{19}\) Here, I am building on Tarrow’s definition of territorial politics which does “not intend to analyze politics about territory but rather politics about other issues that are fought out across territory” (1978: 1, underlined in the original).
members. My contention is that elite attitudes towards immigrants and emigrants is to a considerable extent conditioned by interests that far exceed migration-related issues, and yet have a profound impact on how they are being perceived and addressed. Henceforth my purpose is not to examine how patterns of boundary-making constitute in themselves an instrument of nation-building, but rather to explore how and the extent to which they are being organized and fought out within broader patterns of nation-building. In the remainder of this chapter, I further unpack the concepts mentioned above by proceeding in two stages. First I examine the politics of boundary-making in relation to immigrants and emigrants, and introduce a heuristic tool distinguishing between territorializing and ethnicizing boundary-making strategies. I then establish an explanatory framework specifying a main hypothesis and identifying dimensions of the territorial environment that contribute to shape nationalist attitudes towards immigrants and emigrants.

1.3. The making and unmaking of political boundaries

1.3.1. Civic or ethnic?: between ambiguities and normative bias

Students of nationalism have long sought to distinguish nations and varieties of nationalism according to their terms of membership. While some typologies are extremely elaborate, the most popular distinctions have tended to be binary and dichotomous and overlap to a great extent (Brubaker 1999: 133). The one that has received most attention and resonates the most within and beyond academic circles today is that first introduced by German intellectuals in the nineteenth century and then popularized by Hans Kohn in a lengthy book published shortly before the end of World War II, in which he draws a line between ethnic and civic kinds of nationalism. He opposed Western nationalism, derived from “a rational and universal concept of political liberty and the rights of man, looking towards the city of the future”, to the evils of Eastern nationalism, “basically founded on history, on monuments and graveyards, even harking back to the mysteries of ancient times and tribal solidarity”

20 See for instance A.D. Smith who classified nationalism by the formal criteria of ‘intensity’ and ‘achievement’ and the substantive criteria of ‘independence’ and ‘distinctiveness’, leading to a framework of 39 types for which he found corresponding historical examples (A.D. Smith, 1986)
This distinction has inspired a variety of seminal studies, (Brubaker 1992, Ignatieff 1993, Keating 2001a, Greenfeld 1992), and contributed to making the discipline more widely intelligible beyond the limited circles of pundits. Whilst its simplicity has made it a very appealing tool for conceptualizing the Janus-like faces of nationalism (Nairn 1997), it came under such criticism that some have suggested abandoning it altogether (Kuzio 2002, Brubaker 1999, Yacks 1996). However, pointing at its limits proved to be an easier task than finding a coherent and consensual substitute. Kohn’s original distinction between Eastern and Western kinds of nationalism, the former then encompassing Germany, seemed particularly questionable and is no longer used. It became increasingly consensual among scholars to avoid seeing these categories as mutually exclusive but to conceive of them as two ends of a continuum in constant flux, with culture falling somewhere in between and leaving a broad scope for context-specific interpretation (Kymlicka 2001). As Anthony Smith put it, “no nation, no nationalism, can be seen as purely the one or the other, even if at certain moments one or other of these elements predominates in the ensemble of components of national identity” (Smith 2000: 25). One important issue, however, is to discern whether it is meant to be an analytical instrument empirically differentiating terms of national membership across space and time, a normative tool distinguishing good and bad varieties of nationalism, or a category of practice enabling self-proclaimed civic nationalists to pursue their varied aims in a normative space leaving no room for outright ethnic claims.

After World War II, modernization theory assumed that nation states were the product of the gradual emergence of a common market, the diffusion of a common culture, and the consolidation of nationally-based political parties mediating electoral competition across the totality of their territories. They were then able to develop and sustain plural and civic institutions that are essential to the functioning of complex societies (Sartori 1997). There may have been some revolts in the periphery during a transition period

21. For instance, Brubaker (1999) skillfully draws the lists of its pitfalls, but then fail to propose a useful alternative. His suggestion to substitute it by distinguishing between ‘state-framed’ and ‘state-seeking nationalism’ brings further confusion to the existing literature, especially as minority nationalists do not necessarily seek to establish a state of their own (Keating 2001b).

22. For Kuzio (2002) Kohn’s framework disregards any anti-democratic forms of nationalist ideology that have existed in the West, and carefully avoids cases that contradict his argument in the East, such as Czechoslovakia in the inter-war years.

23. Karl Deutsch (1966), writing two years before the 1968 student protests, came close to this conclusion. Giovanni Sartori (1997) attributes the development of civic institutions in European states to the gradual acceptance of toleration in the aftermath of the wars of religion.
but, ultimately, integrative forces won out and made political, cultural and economic boundaries congruent, diffusing the liberal ideas of the centre to the deep end of its territory until it met the resistance of another centre. Rokkan saw the advent of mass democracy in respective Western European states as closely intertwined with concomitant processes of state-formation and nation-building, which, by limiting exit options and channelling voices inward, facilitated the development of territorially homogeneous democratic institutions (Rokkan 1999). But the resurgence of peripheral nationalism in the 1960s forced the scholarly community to rethink the underlying assumptions of modernization theory. Rokkan and Urwin argued that the reactivation of territorial identities within European states marked an unfreezing of cleavage structures and “shook to the core the concept, held for much of the twentieth century, of the nation state as the norm for territorial organization” (1982: 3).24 It appeared that some peripheries had made their way into modernity while conserving some cultural markers and a subjective sense of territorial distinctiveness. Although movements exploiting these differences for a political purpose challenged the legitimacy of existing states, there was prima facie no reason to qualify them as fundamentally ethnic. The Italian Lega Nord provides one of the most compelling examples of the limits and contradictions of equating the existence of civic institutions with a civic kind of nationalism. Indeed, against the common orthodoxy, the most virulent and successful anti-immigrant political party in post-1945 Italy has not erupted in the South, where “regions are cursed with vertically structured politics, a social life of fragmentation and isolation, and a culture of distrust” (Putnam et al. 1994: 15). Instead, the movement was engendered and gained prominence in Lombardy, a region “blessed with vibrant networks and norms of civic engagement” (ibid.), the origin of which, according to Robert Putnam, can be traced as far back as the Middle-Ages.

Ultimately, it seems that disregarding minority nationalism as a remnant from the past or extolling it as a legitimate reaction to an oppressive and impersonal state bureaucracy has too often been driven by normative inclinations rather than empirically informed analysis. For Celia Applegate (1999: 5), “the devaluation of regions and their pasts […] emerged naturally alongside the triumph of the national historiographies”, and drew on

24. For Rokkan, “the great wave of reaction against the anonymity of modern urban society that began in the 1960s found many alternative forms of expression: in the call for a return to the local community, in the cult of smallness, in the ecological nostalgia for simpler forms of life, and also in the accentuation of origins, dialects, distinctiveness.” (Peter Flora et al. 1999: 206).
“a rich vocabulary – common to all European bourgeois elites since the Enlightenment – stigmatizing the provincial, the particular, the parochial.”\(^{25}\) Thomas Franck (1997: 153), for instance, disqualified all forms of minority nationalism as ‘tribal romanticism’, an anachronistic resurgence of ethnic particularisms that cannot be reconciled with the challenges facing modern societies. Conversely, some have taken at face value the claims of minority nationalists who, in order to gain legitimacy, have adapted their discourse in accordance with the changing winds of international norms. In the inter-war years, most legitimized their claims on ethnonational grounds, in line with the dominant paradigm of the time. By contrast, in the wake of decolonization, many embraced a colonial frame, drawing a parallel between their experiences of subjugation within long-established states with that of colonized peoples (Laffont 1968). In the 1980s, the secular dream of a ‘Europe of the People’ was resurrected against the backdrop of rapid European integration by those who wanted to enhance the role of meso-level governments in a changing continent coming to terms with the evils of state-framed hostile nationalism. Ultimately, while acknowledging that nationalism is an essentially normative phenomenon, the civic/ethnic distinction fails to draw a clear line between its empirical manifestations and the normative challenges they raise.

1.3.2. A more promising avenue: the boundary-making approach

The boundary-making paradigm proceeds from the premise that national boundaries are primarily social and political constructions cast along lines that are perceived as relevant and acquire political salience, and yet do not constitute the sum of all objective cultural differences than can be observed from the outside (Zolberg et al. 1999).

Ernest Renan argued long ago that selective readings of the past were an essential component of how national consciousness arises and is sustained through time. In his view, the progress made in historical studies, a comment made in the 1880s, the high point of nationalist historiographies in Europe, endangered the very fabric of the national community by shedding light on atrocities committed by ancestors and turning

\(^{25}\) Of course, minority nationalists are usually eager to distinguish themselves from regionalists, who make no claims to self-determination. However, the virtual impossibility of agreeing on a common idiom to define the phenomenon, as well as the vacillation of some movements that alternately label themselves as one or the other – such as in Flanders or Brittany – shows how thin the line between the two is, especially when seen from the government chambers of European capitals.
past glories into collective shames. But if nation-building still requires today as much collective amnesia as remembrance, it also relies heavily on a highly questionable sociological understanding of the present, neglecting the inherent complexity of the social world and the plurality of experiences of individuals who together make up a political community. To put it more bluntly, political entrepreneurs need bad sociology as much as they need bad history, insofar as political boundaries are made and remade on the basis of reification processes that do not stand up to any reasonably thorough sociological inquiry. Elite discourses are predominantly meant to serve a political purpose by confining immigrants and emigrants into narrow categories that hardly account for complex sociological phenomena.

Rogers Brubaker (2004) warned against the danger of treating nations as internally homogeneous and externally hermetic groups, as real entities to which common interests and purposes can be attributed. To be sure, this fallacy is never as pronounced as in the mouths of nationalists themselves, and protagonists tend to internalize these categories as essential and natural givens of their environment, over which they can disagree without ever being entirely able to escape their cognitive influence. But scholars working in the field should neither downgrade the significance of this phenomenon as a mere nationalist folklore on the grounds that nations are de facto socially and politically constructed, nor embrace it as an unproblematic unit of analysis. Rather it should be apprehended as a fundamental feature of the way nations work, as opposed to what nations are. Although this reification process may be little more than a subtle stratagem that cannot stand up to objective sociological or historical analysis, it should nonetheless be taken seriously, as “it is central to the practice of politicized ethnicity” (ibid. 66, original emphasis). The study of the making and unmaking of political boundaries can be approached in one of two ways: from below, by examining “the ways in which the categorized appropriate, internalize, subvert, evade, or transform the categories that are imposed on them”, or from above, by scrutinizing the ways in which political boundaries are “proposed, propagated, imposed, institutionalized, discursively articulated, organizationally entrenched, etc…(ibid: 38)” While not downgrading the academic value of observing the phenomenon from below, this dissertation is primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with elites and the way political boundaries in relation to immigrants and emigrants are being discursively articulated and institutionally entrenched. Admittedly, in today’s complex democracies, the power
to influence people’s beliefs and self-conceptions in any sense is much more atomized and decentralised than ever before (Norman 2006). Consequently, the capacity of political elites to unilaterally shape political boundaries has considerably diminished. However, there is little doubt that because their power relation with the population on whose behalf they speak is highly asymmetric, they are left with considerable scope to shape, influence and transform senses of nationhood. While the underlying mechanism of boundary-making is strikingly similar across space and time, they can serve diametrically-opposed purposes, alternately seeking to expand, retract, or blur the membership boundary in relation to immigrants and emigrants. For the purpose of this dissertation, I distinguish two forms of boundary-making strategies: territorializing and ethnicizing. These non-mutually exclusive ideal-types correspond to two ways of (re)constructing a people in response to the incongruence of territorial and membership boundaries resulting from migration flows.

1.3.3. Boundary-making strategies: territorializing and ethnicizing

This section elaborates a typology of strategies of boundary-making in relation to immigrants and emigrants building extensively on previous works by Bauböck et al. (1998), Zolberg et al. (1999) and Wimmer (2007, 2008a,b).

In relation to those who came:

a) Expanding the boundary consists in creating a more encompassing boundary including immigrants and their descendants. This can be achieved by making the gate to citizenship easier to cross for foreign-born residents and equalizing the rights of foreign nationals with that of citizens.

b) Contracting the boundary consists in narrowing down the pool of eligible members by drawing a sharper line between natives and immigrants. This can be achieved by downgrading the rights of foreign residents and strengthening the rules of acquisition of citizenship.

26. These two ideal-types far from exhaust all the possibilities, and are merely meant to address the purpose of the dissertation. For an exhaustive list of boundary-making strategies, see Wimmer (2008b: 1025:1055).
c) **Blurring the boundary** consists in reducing the salience of the boundary between natives and immigrants by overcoming ethnicity as the dominant form of categorization (Wimmer 2008: 989), or by tolerating multiple affiliations “hitherto thought to be separate and mutually exclusive” (Zolberg et al. 1999: 21). This can be achieved by appealing to another form of classification, such as class or residency, or by institutionalizing immigration-induced pluralism and recognizing multiple affiliations as a legitimate form of full and equal membership in the political community.

A **territorializing** boundary-making strategy consists in blurring ethnic boundaries within the homeland and expanding the membership boundary to immigrants and their descendants. Conversely, an **ethniciizing** boundary-building strategy consists in contracting the membership boundary, mechanically excluding foreign-born residents and their descendants.

*In relation to those who left:*

a) **Expanding the boundary** consists in creating a more encompassing boundary including emigrants and their descendants. This can be achieved by upgrading the rights of non-resident citizens or modifying the rules of acquisition of citizenship by reinforcing *jus sanguinis* provisions.

b) **Contracting the boundary** consists in narrowing down the pool of eligible members by drawing a sharper line between internal and external citizens. This can be achieved by excluding non-resident citizens from the electoral franchise or weakening *jus sanguinis* provisions in order to limit the right of expatriates to pass their citizenship over to their descendants.

c) **Blurring the boundary** consists in reducing the political salience of the ethnic bonds and ties with emigrants and their descendants by overcoming ethnicity as the dominant form of categorization or tolerating multiple affiliations. This can be achieved by
appealing to another form of classification such as class or residence, or by encouraging emigrants’ full incorporation in the host country.

A territorializing boundary-building strategy consists in blurring and ultimately contracting the membership boundary in relation to emigrants and their descendants. Conversely, an ethnicizing boundary-building strategy consists in expanding the membership boundary to expatriates and/or their descendants, on the basis of a putative shared ethnicity.

The tables below illustrate the different boundary-making strategies along the four units of analysis to which I apply the conceptual and explanatory framework by contrasting the cases of Catalonia and Scotland. The list is far from being exhaustive and the examples can in many ways be challenged and contradicted. However, they are merely meant to provide the reader with a general idea of boundary-making strategies and their empirical manifestations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Boundary-making Strategies</strong></th>
<th><strong>Boundary blurring</strong></th>
<th><strong>Boundary contraction</strong></th>
<th><strong>Boundary expansion</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior to Self-Government</strong></td>
<td>Legitimizing claims for self-determination on other grounds than putative national differences, such as democratic aspirations.</td>
<td>Promoting a narrow category of membership de facto excluding significant sections of the foreign-born resident population.</td>
<td>Promoting a more encompassing category of membership – such as territory – and seeking support among foreign-born residents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E.g.:</strong> intimate link made between the struggle for political autonomy and anti-Francoism in 1970s Catalonia.</td>
<td><strong>E.g.:</strong> Rising antagonism between recently-settled ethnic Arabs and Sahraouian in Western Sahara.</td>
<td><strong>E.g.:</strong> The shift from a discourse emphasizing ethnic descent to one emphasizing residence as the main criterion of national membership in the Basque Country in the 1970s.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration Policies</strong></td>
<td>Selecting immigrants according to another form of classification such as skills and socio-economic status.</td>
<td>Selecting immigrants on the basis on cultural/racial/ethnic/religious affinities.</td>
<td>Emptying the immigration legislation of ethnic and cultural criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E.g.:</strong> the current Canadian points-based system giving prominence to skills and linguistic criteria.</td>
<td><strong>E.g.:</strong> the “White Australia Policy” discriminating against Asian and Black immigrants until 1969.</td>
<td><strong>E.g.:</strong> In the US, abrogation in 1964 of the Asian Exclusion Act adopted in 1924.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Immigrant Policies</strong></td>
<td>Appealing to another form of classification transcending ethnic boundaries such as socio-economic considerations or individuals’ equal moral worth. This can also be achieved through state-promoted multicultural policies.</td>
<td>Downgrading the rights of foreign residents and making the gate to full membership harder to penetrate.</td>
<td>Expanding the boundary of the citizenry to foreign-born residents (formal equality).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E.g.:</strong> The 2008 reform of the points-based system in Britain that gives privileged access to nationality for highly-skilled and skilled migrants and introduces fast-track access to those who can justify having been engaged in “community work”.</td>
<td><strong>E.g.:</strong> The proliferation of an ever-more demanding “path to citizenship” in Europe, Denmark and the Netherlands being the most striking examples.</td>
<td><strong>E.g.:</strong> Gradual loosening of the rules of naturalization for resident aliens in Germany, culminating in 2000;</td>
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Table 2: Examples of boundary-making strategies in relation to emigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boundary-building Strategies</th>
<th>Boundary blurring</th>
<th>Boundary contraction</th>
<th>Boundary expansion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior to Self-government</strong></td>
<td>Emphasizing residence as the main criterion of membership. <em>E.g.</em>: the gradual loosening of ties between French Canadian associations and Québécois nationalists in the 1960s.</td>
<td>Deliberately pushing aside diaspora and transnational organizations from the national movement. <em>E.g.</em>: Repeated attempts by moderate nationalists in Northern Ireland to insulate homeland politics from the influence of members of the diaspora settled in the USA.</td>
<td>Seeking political and economic support among expatriates and their descendants. <em>E.g.</em>: the reactivation of the ethnic Albanian Kosovo diaspora from the 1999 War to the independence of Kosovo in 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration Policies</strong></td>
<td>Selecting immigrants according to non-ethnic criteria. <em>E.g.</em>: The Swedish government policy in the 1990s taking in a relatively large number of asylum seekers and refugees on humanitarian grounds.</td>
<td>Reforming immigration policies so that co-ethnics no longer enjoy a privileged right to abode. <em>E.g.</em>: the introduction of visa requirements for Latin American nationals in Spain in 2005.</td>
<td>Privileging right of entry for ‘co-ethnics’. <em>E.g.</em>: The Israeli Law of return for individuals who can justify having at least one Jewish grand-parent to ‘return’ and be entitled to financial and logistical assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emigrant Policies</strong></td>
<td>Providing a fast-track access to citizenship for categories of applicants who do not fall into the co-ethnic category. <em>E.g.</em>: Fast-track acquisition of Spanish citizenship for refugees and victims of persecution (5 years of residence instead of ten).</td>
<td>Curtailing the citizenship rights of non-resident citizens; tightening up <em>jus sanguinis</em> provisions in the nationality code; <em>E.g.</em>: Gradual abrogation of preferential access to nationality in Germany for <em>Aussiedler</em> throughout the 1990s.</td>
<td>Strengthening <em>jus sanguinis</em> provisions in the nationality code, upgrading the rights of non-resident citizens, <em>E.g.</em>: Creation of the Italian ministry for Italians abroad and extension of electoral suffrage to non-resident Italian citizens in 2001; the Spanish ‘Historical Memory Act’ extending citizenship to emigrants and their descendants up to the third generation.</td>
</tr>
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1.4. Explanatory framework

This section introduces a theoretical framework determining which strategies of boundary-making nationalists are more likely to adopt. The main hypothesis states that nationalists seeking control over a territory have a vested interest in expanding the membership boundary to immigrants while contracting it towards emigrants as they will, by doing so, increase their internal and external legitimacy. While the main hypothesis emphasizes agential factors, actors’ capacity to articulate and institutionally entrench a *terrorializing* boundary-making strategy is also affected by the relative openness of the Territorial Opportunity Structure, which comprises three dimensions: the formal distribution of migration-related competencies, the initial boundary and its implications for later developments, and the dynamics of party competition at sub-state level. The first dimension stresses how nationalists are more likely to expand the boundary to immigrants if given the institutional means to regulate immigration and integrate immigrants into their own political community. As the devolution of migration-related powers weakens the importance of ethnic affiliations, so does the perceived need to maintain a strong link with emigrants and their descendants. The second dimension suggests that the way the boundary was initially created in relation to immigrants and emigrants provides an institutional and discursive path that conditions later developments to a considerable extent. Lastly, the third dimension emphasizes how the way in which the nationalist cleavage overlaps and cuts across ideological cleavages shapes the struggle over the making and unmaking of the boundaries.

1.4.1. Main hypothesis

Michael Billig pointed out that in both popular and academic writing, nationalism is associated with those who struggle to create new states or with extreme-right politics. However, he found that there was something misleading about this accepted use of the
word, which ‘always seems to locate nationalism on the periphery. (…). In consequence, those in established nations – at the centre of things – are led to see nationalism as the property of others, not of ‘us’ [thus] overlooking the nationalism of the West’s nation-state’ (1995: 5-6). Prominent scholars are not immune from this assumption, forcefully restated by Michael Hechter in a book published as late as 2000: ‘There is no motive for nationalism when the boundaries of the nation and the governance unit are congruent, for then the nation already has self-determination’ (2000: 26, original emphasis). In a similar vein, there is an enduring tendency in the literature to refer to all political parties speaking on behalf of stateless nations as ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ (Tursan et al 1998), or ‘ethnonationalists’ (Connor 1994, Conversi, 1997), neglecting the fact that they may equally be seen as territorial entrepreneurs.

For the purpose of this dissertation, I understand stateless nation-building as an elite-driven political project the aim of which is to establish, maintain, or expand a stable structure of power over a territory and a population. To be sure, nation-building cannot be understood in strictly instrumental terms, as a mere manipulation of elites inventing traditions from scratch and appealing to individuals’ narcissistic predispositions with the sole aim of increasing their relative power (Hechter 2000). But while objective differences and historical experiences do provide the necessary raw material to legitimize a claim of self-determination, they must necessarily be translated into a political project articulated in national terms, a task usually undertaken by political elites. Besides, the literature has long suffered from the tendency to reduce nationality claims to their economic dimension, ignoring the fact that they are primarily a response to ‘relative political deprivation’ (Connor 2001), and that claims of self-determination are above all about people’s fundamental interest in membership in a self-governed political community (Bauböck 2006). Likewise ‘the return of the ethnic’ (Smith 1991), perhaps more pronounced in the social sciences than in the real world, replaced economic reductionism with cultural reductionism, no less problematic than the former.

Likewise, Wimmer and Glick-Schiller have argued that ‘nationalism appears as a force foreign to the history of Western state-building’ (2002: 167).

Walker Conner (1994) also warned his peers against the danger of under-estimating the passionate nature of ‘ethnonationalist claims’, in his view largely detached from the rational motivations driving elites’ behaviour in normal politics.

Michael Hechter (2000) defends a strictly instrumental approach to the study of nationalism, which leaves almost no space for objective cultural and historical factors. However, the presence of objective differences is essential for any nationalist mobilization to succeed, and although the understanding of the past can be stretched to a considerable extent, claims must nonetheless be credible enough and resonate among an increasingly-educated population (Evans 1997).
which attempted to limit the phenomenon to its cultural manifestations. In its worst materialization, this was translated into cultural determinism and an approach permeated by the Herderian belief that “if each nation had remained in its place, one could have perceived the world as a garden, where this human nation-plant flourished here and another one there, each following its own Bildung and nature” (Herder 1968:326, quoted in Wimmer 2007: 3).

Affirming the prevalence of political motives over cultural and economic ones does not mean dismissing their significance altogether. It merely contends that the fundamental aim of minority nationalists is to advance their autonomy goals and all other concerns, albeit not negligible, are subordinated to this broader objective. Accordingly, they select the frame of reference that is most suitable to the pursuit of their perceived interest.

Hence, nationalists who seek to establish, maintain or expand a stable structure of power over a specific geographical space have a vested interest in expanding the membership boundary to immigrants in order to gain internal legitimacy over the totality of the resident population and defuse counter claims of self-determination within the homeland. On the other hand, polishing their external legitimacy enables them to break the state’s monopoly over the enforcement of liberal democratic norms, and to discourage reluctant elites from using internal divisions as a means of opposing their claims. As the democratic and liberal environment in which they are embedded discredits coercive means to make their territorial and membership boundaries congruent, emphasizing residency as a significant criterion of national membership is among the most effective ways of achieving their autonomy goals through democratic means. Whilst they may also seek to expand the membership boundary to emigrants and their descendants for a cultural, economic or electoral purpose, they would nonetheless be more reluctant to give a prominent voice in homeland politics to individuals residing in a foreign land over which they do not claim sovereignty, and whose interests can hardly be reconciled with the nation-building project being pursued in the homeland. Ultimately, it becomes much harder for the state to accommodate a nation-building project the legitimacy of which is not rooted in narrowly-defined ethnic criteria but grounded in a culturally plural population inhabiting a common homeland.

This can be contrasted with other kinds of claims which put the emphasis on the membership space and were later translated into non-territorial constitutional arrangements, or in some cases mutated into protracted and seemingly intractable
conflicts involving physical violence and coercion. These categories are not mutually exclusive and multiple kinds of claims can be simultaneously deployed. Besides, predominantly territorial claims can shift over time, either because the territorial project has failed or because actors’ perceived interests have evolved as a result of environmental changes.

a) Non-Territorial Claims: claims that are meant to gain greater representation in central institutions and advance the autonomy of a territorially-dispersed population. Accordingly, political entrepreneurs are more likely to pursue an ethnicizing boundary-making strategy in relation to emigrants and emigrants, in order to increase their demographic weight and relative power within the territory in which they operate.

b) Claims over Disputed Territories: rival claims that are meant to gain exclusive control over a territory in the name of two populations constructed as mutually exclusive. Again, political entrepreneurs are more likely to pursue an ethnicizing boundary-building strategy for the same reasons as claims made on behalf of non-territorialized groups, although the implications are likely to be far more dramatic. Indeed, political elites first need to establish a demographic majority within the disputed territory, which may involve ethnic cleansing and resettlement in extreme cases.

c) Irredentist Claims: Claims made on behalf of a ‘national minority’ seeking incorporation or at least a rapprochement with an ‘external national homeland’ are more likely to pursue an ethnicizing boundary-making strategy in relation to immigrants and emigrants, in order to reinforce their demographic weight within their portion of territory, and their legitimacy vis-à-vis the ‘external national homeland’. Reciprocally, claims made on behalf of an ‘external national homeland’ are more likely to adopt an ethnicizing boundary-making strategy, in order to polish their ethnic credentials vis-à-vis their putative kin-minority.

Evidently, this does not come without difficulties, not least because minority nationalism brings political boundaries closer to the surface of politics and is too complex a phenomenon to be exclusively driven by merely rational calculations. Brubaker listed among his six “pernicious postulates” of the literature on nationalism the “architectonic illusion” according to which nationality claims could be solved once
and for all with a single remedy which can be applied to all cases, irrespective of the broader environment in which claims are formulated (1978: 274). The main hypothesis introduced above emphasizes agential factors over structural determinants and can easily be dismissed by a brief examination of empirical developments in a variety of cases. Hence, my contention is that the capacity of nationalist elites to articulate and institutionally entrench a territorializing boundary-making strategy is also affected by the ever-evolving political context in which they are embedded. Therefore, this is contingent upon the relative openness of the Territorial Opportunity Structure, which designates the dimensions of the environment that provides actors with incentives and constraints to undertake actions.

1.4.2. The territorial opportunity structure

The territorial Opportunity Structure comprises three interrelated dimensions that, in theory, shape the struggle over the making of the boundary: the formal distribution of migration-related competencies; the initial boundary and its implications for later development; and the dynamics of party competition at sub-state level.

The distribution of migration-related competencies

For Kymlicka, ‘national minorities’ can adopt a ‘post-ethnic’ identity and a ‘multicultural’ approach to immigrant integration under two necessary conditions. First, they must have some control over the volume and composition of immigration in order to exorcize the fear becoming a minority “within their own traditional territory.” Second, they must have some leverage to decide upon the terms of immigrant integration “in order to mitigate the strong temptation for immigrants to integrate into the dominant culture (which usually offers greater mobility and economic opportunities)” (2001: 67). According to this line of reasoning, minority nationalists would mainly, if not exclusively, be concerned with the preservation of the national culture and would be willing to expand the membership boundary to newcomers only insofar as the latter would be subject to the patchwork of policies supposedly constituting a coherent integration model and guaranteeing national survival over subsequent generations. According to Kymlicka, the shift from boundary contraction to
boundary expansion towards immigrants follows an incremental path correlated with the gradual devolution of migration-related competencies. While Kymlicka does not specifically address the question of emigrants, his argument suggests that political elites’ boundary-making strategy towards those who left would follow a diametrically opposed path. As the ethnic bond loses its significance in the wake of devolution, so does the link with emigrants and their descendants.

Kymlicka proceeds from the accurate premise that encouraging human mobility can be used as an instrument of territorial management aiming at homogenizing a culturally diverse population. For instance, the Moroccan government has encouraged the resettlement of ethnic Arabs to the Western Sahara in order to weaken the cultural basis of the Sahraouian movement (Petithomme 2010). On the other hand, historical occurrences of central elites using human mobility as a tool to mitigate peripheral dissent are plenty. One obvious example is the USSR, where both internal mobility and emigration were severely constrained, the explicit economic rationale conflating with the implicit aim of moderating secessionist tensions in the periphery (Torpey 2007). The mass-deportations of Kalmyks, Crimean Tatars and Chechens from their homeland to the Kazakh SSR (later Kazakhstan) in 1944 are only some of the many examples that can be drawn from the Soviet case. Some authoritarian regimes have also sought to stimulate inflows of co-ethnics for a similar purpose. In the 1990s, the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic encouraged ethnic Serbs living in Croatia to settle in Kosovo where ethnic Albanians represented the majority, with the illusory hope that this would tip the demographic balance in the contested territory.

However, Kymlicka’s hypothesis suffers from at least two flaws. First it relies on an essentially culturalist understanding of minority nationalism, an ontological bias which has already been discussed at length in previous sections.30 Second, it is based on a naïve understanding of institutions and the way they mediate actors’ behaviour in a plurinational context. If institutions do matter, their incidence is much more complex and subtle than Kymlicka seems to acknowledge. From a territorial politics perspective, the struggle over the distribution of competences across multiple tiers of government is not only driven by good governance and normative considerations, but also by the more

30. As Andreas Wimmer put it, “Kymlicka’s world is made of state-bound societies composed of ethnic groups, each of which is endowed with its own culture and naturally inclined to in-group solidarity” (2009: 249).
trivial logic of blame-shifting. A number of scholars have for instance noted how the devolution of welfare competencies to regional and local administrations came about in a context of welfare retrenchment, necessitating the adoption of unpopular reforms, and financial strains, requiring drastic budgetary cuts and difficult trade-offs in the allocation of scarce resources. From this perspective, the decision can also be interpreted as a crafty way of “devolving deficits” and shifting the burden of responsibility for chronically under-funded public provision to other tiers of government (Keating 2009c). To be sure, blame-shifting is not the exclusive property of the centre, and minority nationalists miss few opportunities to blame it for all the evils occurring within their territory. As Derek Urwin (1982: 228) put it, “regionalist mobilization is much easier when hostility prevails: otherwise, the problem for regionalist protagonists is to break the benignancy of the relationship.”

As for migration-related competencies, states have admittedly been reluctant to give away powers they consider strategically relevant and closely associated to their sovereignty, either beyond to supranational institutions, or below to regional governments. The European Commission learned this lesson the hard way, after several frustrated attempts to harmonize immigration policies and naturalization procedures across the European Union, in spite of compelling evidence that the absence of coordination between member-states was counter-productive, especially since internal border controls were suppressed by virtue of the 1985 Schengen agreement and the Citizenship of the European Union introduced by the 1992 Maastricht treaty31. But a territorial politics perspective cast doubts on the simplistic assumption according to which the conquest of competences constitutes an end in itself. Bearing this in mind, the systematic comparison of empirical developments in Scotland and Catalonia provides a fertile ground to evaluate the strengths of Kymlicka’s hypothesis.

The initial boundary and path-dependency

While nationalists may have a fundamental interest in stressing residency as the main criterion of membership, they are nonetheless constrained by the way in which the

31. Unlike most federations, in which the federal level enjoys legislative powers over the acquisition and loss of the status of full and equal membership, European citizenship is acquired automatically, as it is derived from member-state nationality. In effect, this complex institutional architecture multiplies the anomalies generated by the non-cooperative behaviour of sovereign states (Bauböck 2006). A similar mechanism is at play with the harmonization of immigration policies within the Schengen area, and the open-method of coordination has to date largely failed to deliver (Caviedes 2004).
boundary was initially created and its evolution over time. Historical institutionalists tend to emphasize continuity over change, on the grounds that institutional patterns tend to reproduce themselves and mould politics over extensive periods of time according to the logic of path dependency (Peters 2005). There is indeed evidence that states have responded to immigration-induced pluralism following the cognitive channels established by past experiences with national, religious, ethnic or territorial pluralism. In France, they were apprehended with the very same ‘one and indivisible’ Republican frame while in Britain, the large discretion traditionally granted to peripheral elites in Wales and Scotland heavily influenced the way in which ‘race relations’ came to be managed from the 1960s onwards (Bulpitt 1986). Likewise, the multiculturalist doctrine in Canada was built upon the pre-existing historical compromise between the two ‘founding nations’ (Winter 2008), while the Dutch management of religious pluralism known as Verzuiling was for a time replicated in response to post-colonial immigration (Penninx & Schrover 2002). Yet, this phenomenon has sometimes been over-estimated. In his oft-cited historical comparison of nationality laws in France and Germany, Brubaker (1992) attributed their supposed stability over the past two centuries to the resilience of cultural idioms, well-entrenched conceptions of nationhood that can be traced far back in the past and have conditioned the state’s attitude towards immigrants to the present. However, Brubaker himself revised it later and gradually came to adopt a radical constructivist posture, stressing how national boundaries can shift over a short period of time according to changing political circumstances. Ultimately, between those proclaiming path dependency as a supreme principle occurring irrespective of environmental changes and radical constructivism, there remains considerable scope for a more tempered and contextual approach. There is no contradiction in acknowledging that political boundaries can be remarkably stable and outlive the purpose for which they were initially created, producing unintended effects constraining actors’ ability to address new challenges as they can shift at specific critical junctures or gradually evolve over extensive periods of time (Steinmo 2008). As Rogers Smith put it, “because no political community is simply neutral and all are products of contestation and compromise, the politics of people-making, involving both force and story, is always an ongoing as well as competitive politics, even within apparently well-established unified political communities” (Rogers Smith 2003: 42). Would-be leaders and new entrants are encouraged to comply to varying degrees with the pre-established frame, while being left with sufficient room for altering, modifying,
and in turn be influenced by it. Let us consider for instance the case of the ‘one-drop-of-blood’ rule in the United States, which was initially enforced to segregate and subjugate the locally born Black population. The 1960s Civil Rights movement marked a critical juncture, although the rule did not disappear altogether but rather re-oriented public policies and institutions in a diametrically-opposed direction. Through a mechanism of *boundary-inversion*, the norm of negative discrimination was replaced by that of positive discrimination without fundamentally affecting the location of the boundary (Wimmer 2008b). Closer to the purpose of this dissertation, the ethnic or even racial boundary initially established by early Basque ideologues in the late nineteenth century was eventually abandoned after World War II (Diez Medrano 1994). Nevertheless, it influenced later developments and fed the antagonism between natives and immigrants from the rest of Spain, in spite of the fact that the national movement in the pre-Franco period emphasized residency as the main criterion of national membership (Linz 1981).

Likewise, in the Belgian case, Patrick Loobuyck and Dirk Jacobs attributed the contrasted approaches to immigrant integration in Wallonia and Flanders to their distinct national history and sensitivities. In their words, “it is not by accident that in Flanders there is a lot of emphasis on language competence and the importance of ethnic cultural identities – two issues which have had a prominent role in the history of the Flemish nationalist movement” (2009: 113).

Boundary-making strategies in relation to emigrants are fraught with similar ambiguities. On the one hand, the membership boundary can be expanded relatively easily, as the 1990s U-turn of the Mexican federal state in relation to Mexican nationals settled north of the border illustrates (Robert Smith 2003). However, boundary contraction is likely to be a much more protracted and contested process, as *dismantling* the existing web of institutions connecting the homeland with specific segments of its population abroad is a necessarily harder task than *establishing* it. Besides, groups and organizations enjoying a privileged voice in homeland politics, or privileged access to economic or cultural resources, are less likely to renounce it so easily. Hence, contracting the boundary in relation to emigrants is usually preceded by a more or less extensive period of boundary blurring. In Galicia for instance, political parties have been heavily dependent on the electoral support of overseas-voters settled in South America at least since 1980 and the establishment of a democratically-elected Galician Parliament. In 2010, the Spanish Parliament passed a law reducing the scope of the
electoral franchise at local elections to resident citizens only and a similar reform in regard to meso-level elections is also being considered. Yet, the negotiations have been particularly difficult and brought to the surface a variety of competing interests, both in the homeland and overseas\textsuperscript{32}.

\textit{Party system and dynamics of party competition at sub-state level}

Radical right wing nationalist parties, operating at state-wide level and defending anti-immigrant positions, and minority nationalist parties are often amalgamated as two sides of the same coin. In a careful analysis of what makes them distinct, Cass Mudde found that minority nationalist parties could embrace a variety of ideologies, covering the entire political spectrum. He nonetheless found that the numerous labels used in the literature – autonomist, regional nationalist, ethnonationalist, non-state-wide parties, moderate nationalist – made their commonalities particularly hard to establish (Mudde 2007: 28). In an equally ambiguous way, Seymour Lipset listed them among his ‘revolts against modernity’. However, he also acknowledged that, in stark contrast with the pre-war period when most of them were “identified with rightist socioeconomic politics, sometimes fascist ones, and often had strong links to the church” (1981: 464), the 1960s saw the development of territorial movements associated with “larger forms of post-industrial protest which characterized New Left politics” (1981: 464). To be sure, the \textit{Lega Nord} in Italy and \textit{Vlaams Belang} in Belgium illustrate how minority nationalist claims can go hand-in-hand with a virulently racist rhetoric, equally attacking immigrants coming from other parts of the state and beyond. However, the exaltation of ethnic particularisms, if frequent, is far from being the privilege of minority nationalist parties, as the proliferation and rising popularity of state-wide radical right wing parties across Europe illustrates.

In one of the few studies examining minority nationalist’ attitudes towards immigrants, Gershon Shafir (1996) contrasted historical developments in the Catalan, Basque, Latvian and Estonian cases and attributed the variations in outcomes to their distinct routes to modernization. In his view, hostility towards immigrants is rooted in the danger they once posed to the privileges of economic, cultural and political elites already destabilized by the tidal wave of modernity. Admittedly, some traditional elites

\textsuperscript{32} The Galician case is further examined in Chapter II, section 2.1.4.
in the periphery have been threatened by industrialization and subsequently turned to ethnic nationalism, the early days of the Basque movement being a classic example. However, Shafir reduces minority nationalism to a political device created and controlled by a narrowly-defined privileged class pursuing its self-interest, failing to acknowledge that it overlaps and cuts across other cleavages. In stateless nations, political parties are encouraged to position themselves on both the centre-periphery and left-right axes and defend positions that are more or less polarized along both lines of differentiation, be they competing across the whole state or only in the territory over which they lay claim. In Flanders, support for outright independence is stronger among right-of-centre and far-right parties, whereas in Québec, the Parti Québécois combines its secessionist aspirations with a social-democratic agenda. In Corsica, the highly fragmented nationalist political space never managed to develop a clear socio-economic doctrine, although the movement leans towards the left and comprises a potent ecological wing. Hence, the way in which support for nationalism overlaps with socio-economic and ideological cleavages varies from one case to the other. One phenomenon, however, remains constant across cases. The sub-state party system and associated patterns of party competition considerably influences the struggle over the making and unmaking of membership boundaries. There is now a growing body of literature examining the incidence of party systems and dynamics of party competition on migration-related policy-making.

As far as immigrants are concerned, parties can either compete for the vote of immigrants, or for the anti-immigrant vote. Although this assertion is not equally valid in all settings, left-of-centre parties have privileged the first option, notably by blurring boundaries in the name of class solidarity and/or equality, whereas right-of-centre parties have rather flirted with the second one (Thranhärdt 1994, Bell 2008). Hence, we may reasonably expect that if support for nationalism strongly overlaps with a left-of-centre ideology, nationalist parties are more likely to seek support among immigrants. Conversely, if the nationalist cleavage is primarily associated with a conservative ideology, nationalist parties are more likely to compete for the anti-immigrant vote. As for emigrants entitled to vote in their province of origin, political parties’ ideological identities have not systematically impacted upon their willingness to compete for the votes of expatriates. However, a growing body of literature suggests that patterns of party competition in the homeland do affect strategies of boundary-making in relation to
those who left (Lafleur 2011). As expatriates tend to adopt more volatile electoral behaviour than domestic voters and parties have limited knowledge of their characteristics, actors usually rely on preconceived ideas that are often far from reality. The Italian example shows that the decision to expand the boundaries of the franchise may turn against those who took it with the belief that they would be electorally rewarded for it. In 2001, the Italian Parliament extended the constitutional right to vote to Italian citizens abroad, an initiative that proved to be decisive in the 2006 centre-left coalition victory. Ironically, the reform was proposed by the neo-fascist MP Mirko Tremaglia – who became in 2001 the first ‘Minister for Italians in the World’ (Choate 2007: 729) – and passed with the unconditional support of the Northern League which was equally outvoted. In Belgium, the development of the ethnic conflict in the homeland over the past forty years has led to the parallel division of Belgian political opinion abroad. Indeed, Belgian expatriates, especially from Flanders, have gradually turned to nationalist parties, following the deterioration of the political climate in the homeland (Lafleur 2011b). However, Belgian political parties have been reluctant to instrumentalize them as a means to export the ethnic conflict beyond their borders, and the Flemish government has mainly used Vlamingen in de Wereld, the most influential Flemish association abroad, as a cultural and economic resource rather than an electoral one. On the other hand, emigrants and self-identified members of the diaspora have sometimes played a role that goes beyond homeland parties' electoral strategies. In some cases, they themselves instigated and constructed the national movements’ ideological identity and drew the initial boundaries of the people (Vertovec 2007). In Corsica, the intellectual underpinnings of the national movement were initiated and formalized on the benches of the University of Nice and later imported into the homeland, a phenomenon which goes far in explaining its romantic undertones. Ultimately, no general hypothesis can be formulated in regard to the incidence of the party system in boundary-making strategies vis-à-vis emigrants. It seems, however, that specific parties are more likely to seek their support, on the basis of a more or less accurate perception that they will be electorally rewarded for it.
II

Analytical and Comparative Framework

2.1. Analytical framework

This section introduces the four analytical dimensions along which I intend to apply the explanatory framework by contrasting empirical developments in Catalonia and Scotland. First, I explore boundary-making strategies in a historical perspective. I then shift to the contemporary period and discuss three fields of public policy-making that are related in practice and yet are meant to address distinct concerns. *Immigration policies* designate the set of rules establishing the conditions of aliens’ entry into the territory for long-term stay and settlement. *Immigrant policies* comprise both *citizenship policies*, regulating the citizenship rights of non-citizens and the formal rules of acquisition of citizenship, and *integration policies*, institutionalizing immigration-induced pluralism and determining the degree of cultural convergence an individual or a community is expected to achieve in order to be considered as a full and equal member of the political community. Finally, *emigrant policies* are meant to create, influence, maintain or conversely weaken the set of political, economic and cultural links with *specific* groups of emigrants and their descendants. I am mainly concerned with discursive and public-policy frames, the patterns of boundary-making they bring to the surface of politics, and how they relate to the Catalan and Scottish nation-building projects.
2.1.1. Boundary-making strategies in a historical perspective

As Rod Rhodes put it, the study of territorial politics has too often been an ‘exercise in ‘upper class journalism’, or, to be less tendentious, over-preoccupied with current affairs” (1987: 3). Like Bulpitt (1983) and Rokkan (1999), he contended that examining the way in which politics is fought out and organized across territory could not be properly done without locating present events in their historical context and should ideally “encompass the formation of the modern state in the nineteenth century” (ibid.: 5). This sub-section is divided into three parts. The first examines how the rise of the modern nation state increased the salience of and institutionally entrenched the categories of resident aliens and expatriates. The second explores the relationship between territorial structuring and migration. The last contends that examining the way the boundary was initially constructed is critical insofar as it establishes a path for later developments.

Nation state building, expatriates, and foreign residents

While human mobility is a fundamental feature of European history, modernity-induced migrations marked a quantitative turn, as the phenomenon gained formidable vigour, and a qualitative one, as the average distance of migration increased dramatically (Zolberg 2006b: 141). Likewise, while the origins of nations have long been a subject of controversy between perennialists and modernists, there is little doubt that the territorial nation state as we know it today began its irresistible ascent at roughly the same time. With as many as 55 million persons leaving European countries between 1815 and 1939 and a large number moving within and across them, mobility was more than ever “a demographic fact of life during Europe’s great age of nationalism” (Gabaccia et al. 2007: 63). The fact that both phenomena have occurred simultaneously can be attributed to three intertwined and equally fundamental normative changes occurring in the political, cultural and economic realms.

In the political realm, the spread of liberal ideas across Europe in the wake of the French Revolution is often taken as the vehicle for the gradual demise of the bonds of
serfdom that had hereditarily tied peasants to the land (Torpey 2007: 69). Among the revolutionary novelties figured the right to move freely, within the state but also beyond, a liberty enshrined in the 1791 Constitution. Admittedly, mobility was already permitted or even encouraged in a number of countries or for some categories of subjects prior to the late eighteenth century (Bade 2003: 1-33). However, it has gradually been expanded to all social strata on liberal grounds. The fact that illiberal states such as the USSR and China have systematically constrained mobility highlights its intimate link with the underlying values of the liberal state. In the economic realm, the diffusion of free trade ideas in the course of the Industrial Revolution brought in its wake the belief that free mobility of labour, capital, and goods would ultimately maximize the allocation of resources, and in consequence should not be constrained (Zolberg 2007). Hence, the emergence of a new political doctrine – liberalism – and a new economic paradigm – free trade – mutually reinforced the belief that individual freedom to come and go as one pleases was both a fundamental right and a catalyst for economic development. However, the period also saw the expansion of another ideal, intimately connected with the previous two and yet considerably limiting their scope. Now that sovereignty was meant to lie in the people, the urge to define and construct the sum of their individual members and draw membership boundaries around them became more pressing.

The ‘National Revolution’ is sometimes wrongly associated with closure, whereas the concomitant processes of nation-building and state formation that spanned Europe were equally driven by mechanisms of boundary opening and boundary closing (Rokkan 1999: 44-47). As tariff barriers within the state were gradually abolished, others were erected or strengthened at the frontier. As railway networks were mushrooming and cross-ruling the territory of existing states, cross-border connections were deliberately made difficult. As democratization was gaining ground through successive expansions of the electoral suffrage, the dividing line between members and non-members became sharper. In other words, nation-building processes facilitated the propagation of the economic and political ideals of free mobility, but only partially, within the confines of the territorial nation state in-the-making. Beyond, citizens turned into aliens, subject to the entry requirements and membership regulations of another state (Torpey 1999). This phenomenon is the consequence of the transition from the Ancien Régime, where

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33. The right to internal mobility for certain categories of citizens has been constrained from 1932 to 1990 in the USSR and from 1955 to the present in the Democratic Republic of China (Torpey 2007).
“borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another,” to a world made of territorial nation states (Anderson 1983: 25). As citizenship was converted into a “device to divide up the world’s population” (Hammar 1990: 31), migrants became simultaneously categorized as resident aliens who came to live in a state other than their own, and expatriates who left their homeland.

Migration and territorial structuring

While this accounts reasonably well for the process of boundary-making in established states, it says little about how other forms of territorial communities have responded to the acceleration of migration flows. Rokkan and Urwin (1982: 13)\textsuperscript{34} drew an insightful distinction between ‘polycephalic’ states, characterized by a marked dispersion of political, economic and cultural resources across the territory, and ‘monocephalic’ states where all resources tend to be concentrated within a specific location, thus conferring upon it a clear advantage over the periphery. In polycephalic states, migration flows, whether external or internal, can come from and be directed to multiple locations. To a reasonable extent, they could be distributed evenly across the territory, one area predominating at a time, without ever succeeding in maintaining its hegemony over the long run. By contrast, in monocephalic states, they have tended to be unidirectional and enduring, paralleling the consolidation of a clearly identified centre and in turn reinforcing its domination. Hence, human mobility is closely dependent upon the specific territorial structuring of a given state and can mitigate or exacerbate conflicts between the centre and its periphery. However, while migration patterns are driven as much as they impact upon the cultural, economic and political aspects of centre-periphery relations, they are, in most instances, not their main determinant. It is probably more appropriate at this stage to provide some brief examples examining this phenomenon in practice.

In France, the rural exodus from the countryside to the Ile-de-France in the wake of industrialization reflected the supremacy of Paris over the Province. Yet, France was the first country to experience a serious decline in its fertility rate (Braudel 1986a: 167) which, combined with the resilience of a sizeable, if unproductive, agricultural sector

\textsuperscript{34} Surprisingly, Rokkan did not link this typology with migration flows in his work on the resilience of territorial distinctiveness across Europe (Rokkan 1983). Nevertheless, he did touch upon the issue of mass migration and conquest in the Middle-Ages to account for the ‘peopling’ of Europe.
providing jobs in rural areas (Zolberg 2007), mitigated the rush to the city. However, this uneven pattern did fuel peripheral unrest when it became clear that the Province was being inexorably emptied of its *forces vives*. The publication in 1947 of Jean-François Gravier’s pamphlet *Paris et le désert français* marked a watershed in the territorial politics of migration in France, which in turn considerably informed the decentralization process initiated in the 1960s. Large cities, particularly Paris but also Marseille and Lyon, were accused of “devouring the human resources of the periphery” (Gravier 1947: 13). In Gravier’s view, the “tentacular grip of the capital” was also responsible for the expanding settlements of Poles, Italians and Spaniards, that he saw as a substitute to the children that “discouraged Frenchmen no longer want to have” (ibid.: 67). While imbued of a parochial vision of rural France that has long inspired radical right wing movements (Winock et al 1994), Gravier’s inquiry shed light on long-standing and accelerating demographic imbalances that have remained a subject of concern to policy-makers ever since.

On at least one occasion, they constituted a catalyst for regionalist mobilization. Corsicans have migrated to mainland France ever since the territory was incorporated in 1769. The phenomenon gained considerable vigour during the Napoleonic era, reinforcing the presence of native Corsicans, and their descendants who often retained an exceptionally strong ethnic identity across several generations, in the administration, setting a pattern which has lasted to the present day. By the 1940s, Marseille was the ‘biggest Corsican city’, although the most adventurous islanders were moving much further to the confines of the French Empire, where they were over-represented in the colonial administration35 (Follorou et al. 2004: 14). However, the collapse of the Empire meant that many of them returned to their homeland, thus placing additional strain on the labour market of an economically backward territory. At the same time, the mass repatriation of *pieds-noirs* in the aftermath of the Algerian war pressed the government to relocate some of them in scarcely populated areas. Up to 17,000 were relocated to the Eastern Plain of Corsica and were granted large subventions to modernize and exploit the local agriculture (De la Calle et al 2010: 399-400). In 1975, the movement *Action Régionaliste Corse* (ARC) occupied the cooperative of a winegrower of pied-noir origin

35. Although estimating the size of the ‘Corsican Diaspora’ is admittedly hard to evaluate and above all inconsistent with the constructivist approach defended in this dissertation, Harguindéguy and Cole (2009: 950) found there were at least 500,000 self-identified Corsicans living in France, especially in Provence and Ile-de-France, and 1,000,000 residing overseas, against a resident population on the island of 261,000 in 1999.
to protest against what it saw as unfair competition on the labour market. The police intervened and the assault soon degenerated, prompting the creation of the terrorist-group *Front de Libération Nationale de La Corse* (FLNC), which has multiplied violent attacks against state and foreign-owned interests throughout the past three decades under the slogan ‘*vivre et travailler chez nous*’.

While shifting migration patterns are certainly not the main driving force behind the resurgence of Corsican nationalism, they nonetheless provided the spark that enabled an initially small group of individuals to gain legitimacy and aggregate widespread discontent among the resident population. In the 1990s, Corsica became the second region after the *Ile-de-France* with the highest proportion of foreign-born residents, representing 10% of the population in 2001, a figure which does not take into account internal migrants. Besides, the last decade saw a sharp rise of immigration pulled into the region by the real estate and construction boom (Michaux et al. 2004). While the number of racist crimes *per capita* is significantly higher than in the rest of the country and graffiti such as ‘*Francesi Fora*’ and ‘*Arabi fora*’ have long been visible on walls and public signs across the island, the main nationalist parties came to embrace a territorial conception of membership, a strategy that is consistent with the main hypothesis. However, the initial construction of the boundary has precluded the emergence of networks and solidarities cutting across ethnic lines.

By contrast, the French state has been more fortunate in other territories, the fate of Occitania being perhaps the most compelling example. The region, which could have potentially evolved into an alternative centre in the late Middle-Ages, failed to acquire a critical size and to expand its power. The consolidation of a national labour market and the mass emigration it induced further weakened what was left of Occitan culture, and the territory that once upon a time could compete with the Ile-de-France has long ceased to represent a threat to the territorial integrity of the state (Rokkan 1983). As in Corsica, the 1960s rallying cry of Occitan nationalists was ‘*Volem vivre al Pais*’ in response to the new wave of mass emigration that accompanied the *Trente Glorieuses* in the aftermath of World War II (Aymard 1986). In either case, migrations have not been the main determinant of centre-periphery relations. Yet, they played a role that is as significant as it is over-looked in the literature of territorial politics.
The significance of the initial boundary

This brief overview of the relationship between territorial structuring and human mobility does not do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon, nor to its multiple manifestations across space and time. Minority nationalism turns specific aspects of territorial pluralism into politically salient boundaries, which in turn bring legitimacy to claims of self-determination. Whilst the main hypothesis contends that nationalists have a vested interest in defining membership on territorial grounds, the definition of a common territorial identity transcending other social divisions may be undermined by the way the boundary was initially created. An obvious example is the state of Israel where the permanence of an ethno-religious boundary has encouraged political elites to both contract the membership boundary in relation to non-Jewish immigrants and autochthonous minorities and to expand the boundary to the diaspora. In the Belgian case, the prevalence of the linguistic boundary has not made the territorial division of the state too difficult in the overwhelmingly monolingual regions of Wallonia and Flanders. But the propagation of the linguistic conflict to the bilingual region of Brussels institutionally entrenched a boundary between Dutch speakers and Francophones. Local elites have tended to identify with the city, which could potentially offer the possibility of blurring political boundaries by emphasizing local community bonds (Wimmer 2008b: 1041-42). However, they have been instrumentalized by the neighbouring regions that have acted as external national homelands, and by doing so reinforced the salience of the boundary36. In consequence, migration-related issues in the Brussels region cannot be dissociated from the salience of administrative linguistic categories, immigrants being “de facto considered as either Francophones or Flemish” (Bousetta 2009: 95). Hence, in most instances, the boundary-making strategy, be it ethnicizing or territorialising, is more likely to maintain and reproduce itself once it has been harnessed in relatively stable institutions. An in-depth inquiry into its initial construction is therefore essential to understand later developments.

36. As Hassan Bousetta put it, “Brussels is actually dependent on the balance of power between Francophones and Flemish at the federal level and that is precisely one of its main problems” (2009: 94).
2.1.2. Immigration policies: those who will come

For Nick Griffin, leader of the British National Party (BNP), Britain should urgently “close the door to more because this is the most overcrowded country in Europe and is way beyond its proper carrying capacity in population terms.”\(^{37}\) Likewise, the French Minister of Immigration and National Identity [sic] legitimized the need to introduce stricter border control on the grounds that “France’s hosting capacity is simply limited”, which requires putting an end to the “migratory chaos which consists in accepting migrants without restrictions.”\(^{38}\) Comparable arguments have regularly been deployed in Germany, the United States, Australia, Switzerland, and many other countries where the supposedly uncontrollable influx of immigrants has been presented as exceeding the nation’s capacity to cope with the consequences. But does the BNP leader refer to the London conurbation, where inward flows have indeed been considerable since 1945, or to the English Midlands, Scotland or Cornwall, where the main concern has been protracted emigration? Is Brice Hortefeux solely concerned with the situation in the Ile-de-France and the Bouches-du-Rhône, or with the notorious diagonale du vide stretching from the Meuse to the Landes, where the population density barely exceeds 30 inhabitants per km\(^2\), a heritage of the nineteenth and twentieth century rural exodus? Does the right-wing slogan ‘America is full’ encompass the empty lands of the Midwest, or is it meant to halt the ongoing inflow to the five greater metropolitan areas concentrating 60% of all immigrants in the country?\(^{39}\)

Immigration policies at regional level of government

By shifting the unit of analysis from state to regional level, migration trends can shift dramatically, not only in quantitative terms, but also in regard to the cultural and socio-economic composition of migrant stocks. In consequence, the costs and benefits of migration flows, be they internal or external, are unevenly distributed across the territory of a single sovereign state, a phenomenon which may reinforce existing regional inequalities or create new ones (Ballesteros 2005). Yet, immigration policies have generally been considered “a part of national foreign relations and as such to

\(^{37}\) Nick Griffin, quoted in MidDay.com, June 14, 2009.
\(^{39}\) According to Wright and Ellis (2000), 60% of all immigrants residing in the United States in 1997 were concentrated in the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Chicago and Miami.
require ultimate central government control” (Spiro 2001: 6). As a result, meso-level governments have traditionally played a marginal role in immigration policy-making, even in relatively loose federations. However, the devolution of immigration competencies paves the way for a greater degree of preference satisfaction among sub-state units, insofar as sub-state administrations are, at least in theory, in a privileged position to assess their needs. Besides, this could also improve administrative procedures by decongesting overcrowded central offices (ibid 2001: 9). Such arguments greatly influenced the introduction in 1973 of the Australian points-based system, which has a strong territorial component. Like the Canadian Provincial Nominee Programme, the Australian Regional Skilled Migration Scheme (RSMS) allows employers in low population growth areas of Australia to run an autonomous immigration policy. Conversely, some expressed their fear that multi-layered immigration schemes could be counterproductive in highly integrated labour markets and inconsistent with the liberal doctrine of workers’ free mobility. According to this line of reasoning, market forces, the interplay between push and pull factors, once freed from institutional constraints, are deemed to optimize the allocation of labour throughout the territory. The Schengen agreements, later incorporated into the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, provided for the removal of systematic border controls between the participating countries under the assumption that all would benefit. This, however, eventually sparked intense controversy at EU level\textsuperscript{40}.

Now these polemics mainly stem from the literature on mechanical federalism, and do not specifically address the case of plurinational states. In this strand of the literature, the debate has taken a more explicitly normative connotation, and has been closely connected to the issue of self-government and the accommodation of national pluralism (Kymlicka 2001). The underlying questions have been whether the governments of stateless nations should be entitled to regulate the conditions of alien entry for long term stay and permanent settlement, and the reasons as to why this is so. A nationalist perspective contends that, as immigration irreversibly transforms the composition of the political community, regulating it is a matter of self-determination. On the other hand, a culturalist perspective operates from the premise that immigration places additional

\textsuperscript{40} The new EU member-states voiced their concerns in terms of brain-drain, while countries of destination feared that this sudden influx of cheap labour – epitomized by the potent image of the ‘Polish plumber’ successfully mobilized as a scarecrow during the 2005 EU-constitution referendum campaign in France and the Netherlands – could place additional strain on the domestic labour market and welfare provisions (Galgoczi, Leschke & Watt 2009).
strain on the national culture. Therefore, control over immigration policies is critical to guarantee its long-term survival. The Canadian immigration policy is territorially-differentiated and provides the Québec government with far-reaching autonomy to select immigrants on the basis of their ability to speak French. However, in practice, the cultural dimension has to a great extent been overshadowed by economic and political concerns. In Belgium for instance, the government of the Flemish Region did seek to gain greater leverage to control the volume and composition of immigration. But this initiative has hardly been driven by cultural considerations, as tapping into the narrow pool of Dutch speakers was not a realistic alternative. Instead, its primary purpose has been to attract skilled migrants irrespective of their geographical origin in order to remedy labour shortages in specific sectors of its economy and to contain the rise of anti-immigrant parties by tightening the entry requirements for those applying within the framework of family reunification (Loobuyck et al. 2009: 108). Indeed, irrespective of their anxieties about cultural conformity, nationalists have to convince their constituencies that further political autonomy from the centre would not undermine their economic prospects\textsuperscript{41}, against the background of a shift in the dominant paradigm of regional development since the 1980s giving a prominent role to endogenous growth and the promotion of human capital.

\textit{Immigration and economic growth in the age of competitive advantages}

In the aftermath of World War II, uneven patterns of economic development could be mitigated through mechanisms of inter-regional redistribution, enthusiastically promoted by the central state eager to maintain territorial cohesion. Wealthier regions were willing to cooperate, as in this positive sum game, diversionary policies could alleviate inflationary pressures in fast-growing territories while providing them with a protected market in which to sell their goods. Every region was given a chance to develop a comparative advantage, so that, in theory at least, there should be no losers (Keating 1998: 47). This was also seen as an efficient means to contain internal migration and the detrimental consequences of a rural exodus combined with uncontrolled growth in urban areas.

\footnote{41. For instance, in the 1970s the SNP committed to turn ‘poor Britons into rich Scots’, a slogan that resonated well after the discovery of North Sea Oil.}
But by the late-1970s, this mode of territorial management came under severe strain. In Europe, the commitment to free trade culminated with the creation of the single market in 1986 and was simultaneously expanded worldwide through successive GATT (later WTO) rounds. As wealthier regions could no longer count on protectionist measures to enjoy privileged access to the domestic market, redistributive mechanisms came to be perceived as a burden, damaging their capacity to remain competitive vis-à-vis other regions within the state, on the European stage and beyond. For Stefano Bartolini, this process of boundary-opening meant no less than the “demise of the nation state Keynesian policy capacity”, in functional as well as in spatial terms (2000: 21). In this new context, socio-economic development became increasingly contingent upon the zero-sum logic of the quest for a competitive advantage, encouraging regional administrations to maximize their competitiveness, and thereby undermining the redistributive rationale that had prevailed in the era of comparative advantages (Omhae 1995). In consequence, economic development became increasingly contingent upon the region’s capacity to generate endogenous growth (Keating 1998: 72-78). In order to do so, regional governments must be able to retain home-grown labour while at the same time attracting preferably skilled immigrants. Indeed, by closing their doors to immigrants, sub-state administrations would inhibit economic growth, which in turn would mechanically fuel emigration. Sub-state administrations can pursue a ‘nation-building strategy’ whereby the pursuit of economic growth goes hand-in-hand with the aim of acquiring further autonomy from the central state. In the same way as “support for free trade can be part of a political strategy by nationalist leaders seeking further autonomy or outright independence” (Meadwell et al. 1996: 80, see also Hamilton 2004), immigration can be incorporated within a broader nation-building strategy, connecting the territory with transnational flows of labour in order to bolster economic growth.

The other side of the coin

To be sure, ethnicizing the boundary can also be part of an economic strategy seeking to use immigrants as a docile and cheap workforce, concentrated in economic activities native workers no longer wish to do and highly sensitive to wage variations. This eventually leads to the segmentation of the labour market along ethnic lines. In regions where the cost of abandoning unproductive sectors proves too high, sub-state
governments may be tempted to use immigration as a means of maintaining economic activities that would otherwise disappear. The agriculturally rich regions of southern Spain and Italy, which have recently attracted a considerable number of seasonal workers coming from North and Sub-Saharan Africa, provide a striking example. In January 2010, the town of Rosarno in Calabria suffered a night of violence after two migrant workers from Africa were shot and two more were beaten. The investigation soon made clear that like many of their peers hired for the labour-intensive harvesting of citrus and clementines, their living conditions were particularly harsh. In regions unable to keep up with the requirements of an increasingly open economy, the rationale for exploiting immigrants by maintaining them in a subordinated status is twofold. First, as immigrants are concentrated in the least-rewarding sectors and have little or no opportunity for upward social mobility, they complement rather than compete with native workers on the labour market. Second, it can be seen as a way of boosting economic growth without having to go through the admittedly difficult process of upgrading human capital and stimulating innovation through ambitious structural reforms. Such a strategy, however, is unlikely to serve nationalists’ interest in acquiring further support for autonomy in the long-run, notably because economic sectors with low added-value are necessarily more vulnerable to external shocks. Thus, they require the protection of a more potent and diversified economy, broadening the scope of intervention at the bottom of economic cycles.

In most instances, both strategies are not mutually exclusive but co-exist, legal provisions and discourses underlying them varying from one category of migrants to another. In California, the backlash against irregular migrants that culminated with the 1995 SOS initiative (see below), stigmatized a much broader population, ‘Latinos’ to use the official census category, and was put into perspective by reference to the presumed danger that an invasion of Spanish-speakers represented for the permanence of a culturally plural yet monolingual America (Zolberg et al. 1999). However, highly skilled immigrants working in the Silicon Valley, whichever country they came from, have rarely if ever been constructed as anything but an economic asset. Ultimately, this suggests that ethnic boundaries cut across and overlap with class and socio-economic divisions.
2.1.3. Immigrant policies: those who came

In a migration perspective, the citizenship rights of non-citizens, the formal rules of acquisition of citizenship, and integration policies mark the distinction between citizens and resident aliens. The establishment of a federal-like system creates the conditions for individuals to hold two citizenships at the same time. Unlike multiple citizenship that is a consequence of a person’s belonging to two or more territorially distinct sovereign states, they are nested in that “they are related to one another, in some cases may derive from one another, and function toward each other via a clear hierarchy of legal norms” (Jackson 2001: 160). As such, federal systems open the way for people to enjoy differentiated rights according to the province they inhabit. In some rare instances, sub-state governments can intervene in the regulation of the citizenship rights of resident aliens. In others, even rarer, they can have a say in the rules of acquisition of citizenship. More compellingly, territorial self-government implies that sub-state administrations enjoy legislative and executive powers over a number of public policy fields that cut across and overlap with immigrant integration.

The citizenship rights of non-citizens

The multiplication of forms of membership and the upgrading of rights for non-citizen residents have blurred the once clear-cut divide separating aliens from citizens (Hammar 1990). Some have gone so far as to argue that the consolidation of an international human rights regime had made the very concept of citizenship redundant, as liberal states have been increasingly constrained to approximate the status of resident aliens with that of citizens (Sassen 1996, Soysal 1994). But at the turn of the century, governments across Europe sought to draw a brighter line between citizens and aliens, by downgrading the rights of foreign nationals while simultaneously reasserting the value of citizenship (Joppke et al, 2003). For some, this is only the most visible part of a worrying influx of “illiberal practices among states that are supposed to bestow and adhere to the principles of liberalism and the rule of law” (Elspeth Guild et al, 2009: 1). However, how these changes have come about in plurinational democracies, where membership boundaries are internally challenged and subject to ongoing contestations, has not been systematically explored.
Here again, the distribution of competencies across multiple levels of government in federal states has had far-reaching implications for the regulation of alien status. In the United States, proposition 187, (better known as the Save our State (SOS) initiative), was passed in California in 1995, following a referendum that saw 61% of voters supporting the legislation, the most controversial aspect of which was the right given to government agents who suspect a person of violating immigration law to investigate the claimant’s immigration status. This in turn would have considerably limited undocumented residents’ access to social services. Eventually, the law was later found unconstitutional by the federal court on the grounds that it infringed upon the federal government’s competence. Conversely, sub-state governments have at times militated to upgrade the rights of non-citizens, as in the case of the Land of Hamburg which approved in 1989 local voting-rights for aliens who could document 8 years of legal residency. However, the legislation was later struck down by the German Constitutional court in 1990 on the grounds that elections must be representative of the ‘people’, restrictively understood as the German citizens resident on the territory of that administrative unit (Lansbergen et al. 2010). The Belgian case is also instructive in this respect. While French-speaking elites have actively militated to enfranchise foreign residents for local elections, Flemish-speaking parties have been more reluctant to do so, not least because they feared this would weaken their electoral position in Brussels and its periphery (Bousetta 2009: 115).

The rules of acquisition of citizenship

Unlike internal migrants who in most instances acquire provincial citizenship by taking up residence, resident aliens have to comply with a more or less demanding set of rules in order to become fully-fledged citizens. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the central state is exclusively competent in setting the rules of naturalization, although some significant exceptions are worth mentioning. In the US, it has historically been made difficult by the dualism of state and national citizenship. As naturalized citizens in one state enjoyed the rights associated with citizenship in all other states, “states with the most open provisions thereby imposed their views on all others” (Zolberg 2006c: 85). The issue was partially solved in 1868 with the 14th amendment adopted shortly after the Civil War. While naturalization by birth became a federal competence in order
to prevent the Supreme Court from striking down the 1868 Civil Rights Act, naturalization on the basis of residence remained a state prerogative and the procedure continued to show significant territorial variations until the beginning of the twentieth century.

The most prominent European example is Switzerland where communes and cantons are responsible for naturalization matters, although the federal government lays down relevant criteria. Hence, Swiss citizenship is only acquired by those applicants who, after obtaining the federal naturalization permit, have also been naturalized by their communities and cantons. As a rule, there is no legally protected right to naturalization by a community and a canton (Acherman et al. 2010). In Germany, the federal government monopolizes legislative powers over naturalization, while executive powers are devolved to the Lander. As a result, the procedure has been considerably more demanding in some states than in others and affected naturalization rates accordingly. In 2006, the government of Baden-Wurttemberg made the acquisition of German citizenship conditional upon the completion of a formalized test in the form of an interview guide that was soon labeled the ‘Muslim test’ for its clear bias against Turkish applicants (Van Oers et al 2010: 74-7).

Again, the challenge mounted by sub-state units to the central state’s supremacy in determining the rules of acquisition of citizenship can work both ways. Sub-state units can either seek to retract the membership boundary on the grounds that the state-wide framework is not strict enough, or manifest their opposition to a legislation perceived as too restrictive by seeking to expand the formal membership boundary to all residents. Alternatively, they may seek to modify the rules if the latter are seen as not taking into account sufficiently the plurinational nature of the state. In Wales, for instance, nationalists sought and gained the (highly symbolic) right for applicants to British citizenship to pronounce the oath of allegiance and take the newly-introduced citizenship test in Welsh.

Integration policies

Sub-state governments are competent over a number of public-policy fields cutting across and overlapping with immigrant integration policies. The emergence of a ‘liberal multiculturalist consensus’ foreseen by Kymlicka in 2001 was short-lived, and the
subsequent academic debate paralleled empirical developments in liberal democracies which rediscovered the virtues of liberalism’s “old privatization strategy” (Barry 2001, Joppke et al. 2003, Joppke 2007). Although I share the view of a number of scholars who have questioned the existence of fully-fledged ‘integration models’ (Freeman 2003, Joppke 2007, Favell 2006), there remain significant variations in the way integration is being framed across political arenas which closely correlates with the dominant understanding of nationhood at a given point in time (Roux et al. 2010, Jacobs et al. 2007). In a plurinational context, the establishment of a federal-like system opens the way for people to enjoy distinct cultural rights across the territory of a single state. While nationalist demands are primarily political, self-government also implies that sub-state governments enjoy the means to ensure the reproduction of the national culture over subsequent generations. Again, this does not concern the sum of all objective cultural markers making up the national community but specific cultural elements that became politically salient and entrenched in self-governing institutions. In many instances, linguistic arrangements have played a central role in the resolution of nationality claims, although they are by no means the only meaningful boundary. In consequence, this enables immigration-induced pluralism to be institutionalized in different ways and framed in different terms across levels of government. Here my main purpose is not so much to review all integration policies and identify an ‘integration model’, stable through time and functioning relatively independently of immigrant claims and state-wide developments. Instead, I examine how integration policies enable sub-state governments and political elites to reflect upon the meaning of the political community, and how this relates to their nation-building project. While actual institutional variations may be minor, sub-state governments can take the opportunity to challenge the state in its own normative space, and by doing so enhance their legitimacy in an environment that leaves little room for outright ethnic claims.

2.1.4. Emigrant policies: those who left

Eusko Jaurlaritza, the government of the Basque Autonomous Community, regularly refers in official documents and discourses to the community of ‘nine million Basques worldwide’. Besides encompassing the populations of the province of Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and Araba, the count includes the inhabitants of the French Basque Country, the Spanish autonomous province of Navarra, as well as the “six million members of the
Basque Diaspora dispersed across the globe” (Douglas 2007: 113). This assertion is problematic for at least three reasons. First, it includes many residents of the jurisdiction of the Basque administration who do not identify as Basques. Second, it makes a territorial claim over kin-minorities located in a neighbouring autonomous community – Navarra – and state – France. Third, it relies on a gross approximation of the number of individuals who once resided in the contested homeland and their descendants over several generations. This provides a telling example of governments’ willingness to construct their political community irrespective of territorial boundaries, and actively engage the alleged national community residing outside its frontiers.

In the past decades, considerable attention has been given to receiving state’s attitude towards immigrants, in sharp contrast with the benign neglect for the role played by sending states in retaining or loosening ties with their expatriates (Massey 1999). While this uneven level of interest comes as no surprise in the archetypal immigrant societies of North America, the European case is more puzzling. In the thirty years of unprecedented prosperity that immediately followed World War II, the relatively large-scale settlements of labour migrants from the European periphery and what was then called the Third World soon overshadowed the fact that the continent had been for a long time the indisputable champion of emigration in all its forms. From the rush to the New World and imperial settlements to the mass-displacements and ethnic cleansing of the first half of the twentieth century, European states have historically been lands from which one leaves (Bade 2003). This diagnosis, however, is much less valid today, a decade or so after the transnational revolution that saw the proliferation of research on diaspora, shifting the disciplinary focus away from those who came to those who left, embracing both the perspective of sending and receiving countries, and witnessing the emergence of self-sustaining networks connecting individuals across them. But however dramatic this change may have been, it brought in its wake much of the epistemological assumption of methodological nationalism, treating ‘diasporas’ and ‘transnational communities’ in the same way as others had taken the existence of national and ethnic ‘groups’ as essentially given categories (Brubaker 2006).

Early scholarship on transnationalism was imbued with militant overtones, celebrating the declining capacity of the nation state to exercise control over citizens residing beyond its borders and of resident aliens. However, past the initial ecstasy for a
paradigmatic shift away from the essentially host society-centric literature, the scholarly community came to realize that transnational ties, by virtue of which “individuals residing beyond the frontiers may nonetheless consider themselves as fully-fledged members of the community” (Vertovec 2007: 7), were not a new phenomenon. Instead, some emphasized how they had been an important feature of the great migrations of the nineteenth century, characterized by high rates of return and sustained interactions bringing together individuals and communities living on both sides of the Atlantic (Bade 2003: 160-163). Others rightly observed too that the increase in transnational practices was not an indication of the gradual demise of the nation state as the most prominent locus of authority. The initial belief that the state was being overwhelmed by the consequences of a ‘globalization from below’ (Portes 2000), with movers creating dense networks connecting people irrespective of territorial borders and relying extensively on technological changes, was soon disappointed. Indeed, a number of recent studies have shed light on state-led transnational engagement policies in the contemporary era (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003) but also in the past (Weil & Greer 2007), revealing striking similarities in states’ attitudes towards their nationals abroad across space and time, which recreate “citizen-sovereign relationships with expatriates, thus transnationalising governmentality” (Gamlen 2006: 4). From this perspective, far from undermining a state’s control over its population, individuals and communities residing beyond their frontiers have been actively and deliberately channelled, instrumentalized, involved or pushed aside through state-driven initiatives.

While the phenomenon can be approached in a variety of ways, my intention here is to limit the scope of the analysis to ‘homeland-led emigrant engagement policies’ and examine how they relate to the broader nation-building project. As such, institutions and initiatives undertaken by self-identified members and their descendants across multiple areas of settlement are a secondary concern and shall be integrated into the analysis only insofar as homeland elites intervene through policies and institutions aiming at co-opting, transforming or actively seeking to reduce their voice. Besides, I focus on initiatives and discourses underlying them undertaken by meso-level governments enjoying a large array of prerogatives in domestic politics and yet have limited room to intervene beyond their borders, either in the rest of the state or in the international realm.
I contend that initiatives undertaken by sub-state administrations are contingent upon the perceived interests of homeland governments that carefully avoid taking actions that could possibly undermine them. Here, I adopt the view of Myra Waterbury, according to which administrations “increase their engagement with specific external populations because it serves a specific political and strategic purpose”, as they may be perceived as “a set of unique cultural, material and political resources which homeland elites come to recognise and seek to capture” (2010: 135, my emphasis). Let me now briefly review the distinct resources and liabilities in the economic, cultural, and political realms that provide incentives as well as constraints for sub-state administrations to engage with their populations abroad and construct diasporas or transnational communities as meaningful discursive and institutional categories.

**Emigrants as an economic resource**

Governments across the world have long realized that specific groups of individuals residing beyond their frontiers potentially represented a formidable economic resource which can be channelled and incorporated into a broader strategy of socioeconomic development. In developing countries, the Philippines being perhaps the most telling example today (Castles 2004), this was translated into institutions and policies meant to facilitate emigration and channel the remittances of economic migrants which represent the country’s main source of revenue.

While virtually all governments eager to strengthen their ties with specific populations abroad have embraced a global discourse encompassing all emigrants and their descendants irrespective of their socio-economic status and place of residence, actual initiatives have targeted a much narrower category, perceived as constituting a strategic resource. Hence, the all-encompassing discursive category of the ‘20 million strong Indian diaspora disseminated across 70 countries’ obscures the fact that diaspora engagement policies undertaken by the government are exclusively addressed to the much narrower pool of highly-skilled expatriates employed in knowledge-intensive sectors in the United States, and to a lesser extent Britain (Pandey et al. 2006). On the other hand, it intentionally excludes low-skilled expatriates settled in South East Asia and nationals residing in politically sensitive neighbouring countries such as Pakistan.
In the economic realm, sub-state administrations can institutionalize international networks gathering self-identified members of the community and acting as a bridge between homeland businesses and foreign markets. The burgeoning literature on the link between emigration and development suggests that communities of expatriates and their descendants can be mobilized around a common economic project and stimulate domestic growth through knowledge transfers, business networks, or philanthropic initiatives (Kutznetsov et al. 2006). The transnational perspective has gradually become the dominant paradigm in international organizations eager to promote the positive aspects associated with emigration, which for long had been almost exclusively envisaged as detrimental to sending territories emptied of their *forces vives*.

**The cultural dilemma**

Sub-state governments may also have a perceived interest in formalizing and strengthening their relationship with specific sections of their populations abroad in order to diffuse, increase and strengthen the visibility of the national culture. However, transnational communities may represent a liability rather than a resource for homeland elites pursuing a territorial-nation building project in the homeland. Indeed, emigrants and their descendants develop a distinct identity which, because it cannot be sustained by a complex and potent linkage of territorially-based institutions, is disconnected from the experience of everyday life in the homeland. Although this phenomenon is by no means universal, individuals interested in cultivating their hyphenated identity are more likely to emphasize traditional and folkloric artefacts imbued with ethnic undertones rather than develop interest in the vibrant cultural scene the homeland government is desperately trying to promote. Gloria Totoricaguëna found for instance that the overwhelming majority of Basque institutions abroad have promoted “a conservative, traditional delineation focusing on ancestry, quite nostalgic and folkloric and centered on cultural traditions and history” (2007: 239). In consequence, their interests can hardly be reconciled with the goals of the Basque government which seeks to project the Basque Country “in its post-Franco ultramodern presence” as a “post-modern service-industry society” (ibid. 253) while at the same time actively defending a territorial conception of membership in order to defuse residual tensions along ethnic and
linguistic lines in the homeland. Besides, the resources needed to maintain distinct cultural markers among territorially-dispersed emigrants, whether through language training, cultural associations or schools abroad, are necessarily high and the outcome uncertain, which militates against a homeland-driven project. Instead, these activities are often undertaken by emigrants themselves through civil society associations, the importance of which depends upon their ability to mobilize resources, their degree of attachment to their homeland, and the tangible benefits that maintaining a distinct culture can entail in their country of residence as well as in their relationship with homeland institutions.

Political engagement: opening Pandora’s Box

More importantly for our purpose, political elites and governments can also actively seek to engage specific sections of the diaspora in homeland politics. In countries where expatriates are entitled to vote at local or meso-level elections, political parties have an incentive to compete for their votes by campaigning abroad, although emigrants tend to adopt more volatile electoral behaviour. They rarely pay taxes in the homeland, are not directly subject to most of the decisions undertaken there, as they only apply within a territorially-defined jurisdiction, and are likely to be more concerned with the prestige and tangible benefits they may acquire from political parties that sought their support rather than by actual socio-political developments in the homeland (Osteergard-Nielsen 2003).

In some instances, emigrants have literally hijacked local and meso-level elections, tipping the balance in favour of political parties that failed to attract a majority of resident voters. Until the 2010 electoral reform in Spain, close to 350,000 Spanish citizens living abroad whose ultimate locality of residence (or that of their ascendants in the case of second and third generation emigrants) was in the Autonomous Community of Galicia were entitled to vote in local elections, representing up to 15% of the electoral registry, a figure which rose to 45% in certain localities. The state-wide centre-right party Partido popular, which enjoys considerable resources and well-

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42. This point is further developed in chapter VIII, Section 8.2.1. where I contrast the Catalan and Basque approaches to citizenship in relation to immigrants.
43. ‘El censo electoral Gallego crece a un ritmo de 1650 emigrantes al mes’ in La Voz de Galicia, March 8, 2011. More than a 100,000 voters registered on the Galician electoral census live in Argentina, and the latter is commonly referred to as “the fifth Galician province”.

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established networks overseas, has benefited disproportionately from the vote of Galician citizens abroad, whereas the nationalist party BNG has been adversely affected. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, president of the Galician government between 1990 and 2005 and former minister of the Franco government, cultivated strong links with the ‘Community of 10 million Gallegos’. He has animated a dense clientelist network spanning mainly but not only Latin American countries. There are, however, strong incentives for elites pursuing a territorial nation-building project not to expand, and in some circumstances actively seek to contract, the membership boundary with specific sections of their populations abroad. This can be either because they have diverging political interests, or because the cost of retaining ties with them proves too high. Regarding the first factor, the case of Québec discussed at length in the next section shows that the rise of a territorial nation-building project in the 1960s came at the price of loosening ties with French Canadian elites and institutions located in the rest of the state, whose interest in preserving the myth of two territorially-dispersed founding nations could hardly be reconciled with the Québec territorial project. As for the second argument, the Galician example is quite telling. The recent decision of the Spanish Parliament to curtail non-resident citizens’ electoral rights was actually supported by large sections of homeland elites, who perceived the cost of maintaining extensive ties for mere electoral calculations as being excessively high, especially in an adverse economic climate.

2.2. Comparative framework

2.2.1. The territorial politics of migration in Québec

Québec was selected as a shadow case for two reasons: First, the migration/nationalism nexus in the Canadian province has been particularly well covered, and the broad patterns of its historical and contemporary development can be briefly reviewed by relying exclusively on secondary sources. Second, the Québec case is instructive insofar as political boundaries have shifted dramatically over the past fifty years, from

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44. Manuel Fraga Iribarne provided financial assistance to those established in Argentina during the 2001 economic crisis, in spite of the fact that the Autonomous Community of Galicia figures among the least economically developed Spanish regions.
embracing all *French Canadians* irrespective of their province of residence, to a primarily territorial conception of membership, encompassing the resident population of the Québec state. While the conflict opposing the province to the central administration has not lost any of its intensity and the *Parti Québécois* (PQ) has not put aside its secessionist ambitions, the ethnic and exclusionary overtones of early nationalist claims have gradually faded away, even though the commitment of Québec elites to a territorial nation-building project still competes with an ethnic core inherited from the movement’s conservative origins.

**Boundary-making strategies in a historical perspective**

In the past fifty years, the basis of national identity has shifted from that of French Canadian, underpinned by the Catholic Church, the Parish and language, to that of *Québécois*, territorially-based (Keating 2001a). The 1960s Quiet Revolution has often been wrongly interpreted as Québec’s delayed entry into modernity, neglecting the fact that modernization processes were already well advanced beforehand. More accurately, the national question was then monopolized by conservative forces, which saw the preservation of a predominantly rural society as the only way of avoiding unilateral assimilation, and subsequent loss of a collective identity, in the overwhelmingly English-speaking industrial and business sectors. Indeed, Francophones living in Québec and beyond in the rest of Canada have been historically subject to discrimination, notably in the realms of education, employment and language, and could not rely on state institutions to advance their sectional interests (Rocher 2002). Following the conquest of New France by British troops after the Seven Years War (1760), provincial institutions were dismantled. After having flirted with the idea of forced assimilation, the Parliament of Great Britain issued the Québec Act in 1770 re-establishing the official use of French as well as French Civil Law. Yet, despite subsequent legislative recognition and accommodation of Québec’s French heritage, Canadian trade and political elites were still overwhelmingly Anglophone until the second half of the twentieth century, including in Québec, and most especially in Montréal⁴⁵.

⁴⁵. See Pierre Drouilly’s volume (1996) *L’espace social de Montréal (1951-1991)* for an exhaustive account of the transformation of the constellation of linguistic, social, and economic cleavages in the Québec Capital since the resurgence of the national question.
Since the nineteenth century, the most pervasive issue for French Canadian elites has been emigration, whereas their Anglophone homologues have primarily been concerned with overseas immigration. Writing in 1961, the demographer Albert Faucher saw “emigration as the most significant event in nineteenth century French-Canadian history.” 46 In 1840, the overall population of British North America amounted to 750,000, about half of whom were French-speaking and Roman Catholics (Zolberg 2007: 47). By 2001, the proportion of self-identified Francophones barely represented 22% of the overall population, a steady decline nurtured by uneven immigration and emigration patterns. The strong sense of peoplehood that bound French Canadians together made the issue of emigration more pervasive than among their Anglophone fellow-countrymen. The colonization of Quebec by “brothers and sisters” living in exile has been a long-standing concern of the provincial government, which saw the considerable flow of Francophones to the economically booming United States between 1890 and 1940 as a “threat to the living forces of our race” (Ramirez 2007: 216). While the flow considerably diminished in the wake of the Great Depression, it never entirely dried out and has remained until today a contentious issue. Besides, it was common among Québec intellectuals to accuse the federal government of intending to overwhelm the homeland with English-speaking immigrants. Although these grievances have gradually disappeared as the province has gained more leverage to run its own immigration policy, the belief that English-speaking Canada acquired its demographic predominance over Francophones through immigration has left a profound imprint on public debates and policy-making over past decades (Winter 2008).

As a paradigmatic settlers’ society, Canada never ceased to attract large numbers of immigrants, especially as the economic gap between former British North America and the United States progressively narrowed. In 2006, those officially categorized as members of ‘visible minorities’ amounted to 16.2% of the total population, against 13.4% five years earlier (Canadian Census figures, 2006). By 2031, the foreign-born population is expected to rise to 28%, with a higher proportion in Western provinces, and notably British Columbia where inflows from Asian countries have been particularly vigorous in recent decades (Beaujot et al. 2007). But this has not always been so, as until 1962, the federal government pursued an immigration policy

46 Quoted in Paquet and Smith (1983: 423), my translation.
discriminating against Asians, Blacks and later Jews, on similar lines as the notorious White Australia Policy.\(^47\) Non-racial selection criteria were then adopted and by 1967, a points-based system was introduced in order to maximize ‘Skills Matching’ between prospective migrants and labour market needs, and thus mitigate the detrimental economic consequences of a long-standing pattern whereby the most skilled migrants from Europe opted for the US. Therefore, the migration question in Canada has been framed against the backdrop of a settlers’ society controlling an immense territory, whose capacity to attract immigrants has historically been undermined by its geographic proximity to an economic giant. Accordingly, federal elites’ immigration strategy has primarily been guided by pragmatic considerations, the so-called ‘cost and benefit’ rationale underlying policy-making at federal level since the 1960s. In relative terms, the drain of the *forces vives* from Québec has been historically much more pronounced than in the rest of Canada, and its perceived cost not limited to the economic realm. Instead, it has been portrayed as a threat to the very *survivance* of the *fait français* in North America and until the Quiet Revolution contributed to maintain an ethnicized French Canadian identity, left with no option but to cultivate a pre-modern lifestyle, as upward socio-economic mobility almost necessarily meant assimilating into the Anglophone mainstream.

**Immigration policies: controlling the territorial boundary**

Things began to change in 1960, when the victory of the Liberal party challenged Maurice Duplessis’ ideology imbued with a parochial and rural vision of French Canadian identity. The Liberal government initiated an ambitious state-building strategy aiming at modernizing the province and inverting the economic domination of Anglophones, an objective well encapsulated in the slogan ‘*devenir maîtres chez nous*’. A corollary concern was to jugulate the growth of the number of Anglophones in the province, either in the form of continued immigration or through the deliberate switch of rationally-motivated native French-speakers abandoning their language or refraining from passing it to their descendants in order to enhance their socio-economic status (Arel 2001, see also Laitin 2007\(^48\)). But the *complete closure* of the territorial boundary

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\(^47\) Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, *Fact sheet 8: Abolition of the White Australia Policy*, [consulted on line on April 20, 2010].

\(^48\) In chapter II of his book *Nations, State and Violence* published in 2007, David Laitin applied Schelling’s tipping point model to linguistic patterns for ‘Russians in the Near Abroad’ and ‘internal migrants’ in Catalonia. As
was not even considered, as Québec’s road to economic expansion was seen both as the most effective solution to limit the haemorrhage of natives and was closely dependent upon attracting foreign labour. Second, apart from the institutional difficulties it entailed, complete closure would have undermined the Liberal party’s progressive agenda, and subsequent efforts to turn cultural decay into a viable political project. As a result, the provincial government sought to stimulate inward flows of preferably skilled French-speaking workers with the aim of reconciling its economic and cultural aspirations.

The outcome was the creation in 1967 of a Québec Ministry of Immigration, and a series of federal-provincial agreements designed to enable Québec to exercise greater control over the selection and recruitment of immigrants. The conquest of immigration competencies was initiated in 1971, deepened in 1978 and culminated in 1991 with the Canada-Québec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens. The latter officially aimed to guarantee “the preservation of Québec’s demographic importance within Canada and the integration of immigrants to that province in a manner that respects the distinct identity of Québec.”

Within the Canadian points-based immigration framework, the government of Québec has been able to modulate the selection criteria, thereby giving prominent weight to applicants’ ability to speak French while downgrading the relative significance of skills and education. This strategy was complemented by a dense and well-funded network of provincial offices abroad, reminiscent of Canadian recruiting agents travelling through Europe in search of potential settlers in the 1920s (Harper 1998). But the positive impact of a sustained influx remained counterbalanced by enduring emigration of natives and immigrants alike to the rest of Canada and to a lesser degree the United States. Indeed, immigrants in Québec are more likely to leave in the first year after their arrival than in Ontario, and Québec-born movers to speak English only (Devoretz et al. 2008). Besides, the number of exits far exceeded the number of entries between Québec and the rest of Canada between 1962 and 1998, 1988 being the only year when the net migration balance came

individuals expect others to invest in new attributes (i.e. the ability to speak Catalan), they feel the urge to do the same in order to upgrade or at least maintain their socio-economic status. Whilst in my view Laitin’s model is fairly disconnected from the Catalan experience, there is some truth in the assertion that language shifts in multilingual societies are partly driven by actors’ strategic calculations. This point shall be discussed more extensively in chapter IV, section 4.3.

49. Canada-Québec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of aliens, Gouvernement du Québec, p. 2.
close to zero. Over the entire period, Québec’s net loss of residents to the rest of the country amounted to more than 610,000 people, the times of greatest net outflows corresponding to the “periodic flare-ups in Québec’s cultural laws and referenda on sovereignty, with the overall peak occurring during the passage of the first language laws, and the 1980 referendum” (Stevenson 2000: 64).

The consequences for the Québec national movement have been twofold. First, it has constituted a net loss of painfully-acquired human capital. This in turn calls for further opening of entry channels from abroad, thus increasing the risk of reawakening a native backlash instrumentalizing the culturally-rooted fear of ‘minorization’ (Arel 2001). Second, the relatively higher rate of emigration from Anglophones is but one manifestation of the resilient conflict opposing the Québec Francophone majority to internal minorities. To a considerable extent, the term ‘Québécois’ once synonymous with French-Canadians living in Québec has acquired a territorial dimension, encompassing Anglophone minorities re-labeled as ‘Anglo-Quebeckers’. But opinion polls carried out in the run-up to the 1995 referendum over independence indicated that merely 6% of Anglo-Quebeckers intended to vote Yes, against 14.5% of Allophones (Gagné et al. 2003: 36). In this respect, Québec looks rather like a consociation, in which a sizeable linguistic minority enjoys a wide array of cultural rights but does not identify with the national project and manifests its disagreement either through exit (emigration) or voice (opposition to independence). The proportion of self-reported Anglophones in Québec decreased from 13.8% in 1951 to 8.5% in 1996 and that of Allophones represented 9.3% of the population in 1996. In 2001 the Québec government published a three-year plan for immigration which pursues the objective of increasing the share of highly skilled and French-speaking immigrants, and the most recent developments suggest that this aim has been met (Blad et al. 2009).

*Immigrants into Québécois*

By contrast with its far-reaching competencies in regulating immigration, Québec has no control over the gate to citizenship, the status of full and equal membership in the province being conditional upon the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. The federal

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50. This statement corroborates Caldwell and Obermeir’s study (1978) which found that between 1971 and 1976, some 33% of Anglophone youth emigrated, a figure much higher than the proportion of Allophones (19%).
government has skillfully used this prerogative to build allegiance to the Canadian nation among new citizens. The minimum length of residence required to become a citizen is only four years, among the lowest in industrialized countries. In addition, immigrants have to swear a Citizenship oath\textsuperscript{51} to Canada, which can be pronounced either in French or in English, and “virtually all of them have highlighted the emotion they felt during the ceremony, although they did not necessarily expect it” (Gagnon 2009: 46). Following the failure of the 1995 referendum – notoriously attributed by the Québec Prime Minister Jacques Parizeau to “money and the ethnic vote”\textsuperscript{52} – the Ministry of Relations with Citizens and Immigration was created in order to dismiss residual ambiguities regarding the inclusiveness of the nation-building project. The notion of Québec citizenship gradually gained currency in political discourses, promoting a more individualistic mode of belonging and pursuing the objective of instilling a common purpose and fostering solidarity among Québec’s increasingly diverse population. The Provincial Assembly adopted its own \textit{Charte des droits et libertés de la personne} in 1976, six years before the federal state adopted a pan-Canadian Charter of Rights, providing internal minorities with constitutional guarantees, including in the case of independence. Besides, there is evidence that provincial elites have sought to upgrade the rights of non-citizens who receive more subsidized human capital benefits in the form of education, language training, and skills certification than in any other province in Canada (Devoretz et al. 2008: 364).

Linguistic divisions within the homeland have influenced considerably public debates and policies over immigrant integration in Québec. In 1977, the infamous Bill 101 (\textit{Loi 101}), adopted under the leadership of the PQ, imposed French as the only language of education in public schools for immigrants and their descendants, except for those whose children were already enrolled in English-speaking schools. The legislation was perceived by some as an unfortunate necessity to preserve the \textit{fait français} in North America and by others as another illustration of nationalist intransigence (Magnet 1990). Besides, this differential treatment of autochthonous ‘Anglo-Quebeckers’ and

\textsuperscript{51} The oath reads as follows: “I swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Queen of Canada, Her Heirs and Successors, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Canada and fulfill my duties as a Canadian citizen.”

\textsuperscript{52} Jacques Parizeau, unable to contain his disappointment, declared: « C’est vrai qu’on a été battus, au fond, par quoi? Par l’argent et le vote ethnique, essentiellement. Alors cela veut dire que la prochaine fois, au lieu d’être 60 ou 61% à voter OUI, on sera 63 ou 64%, et que cela suffira. N’oubliez pas que les trois cinquièmes de ce que nous sommes ont voté OUI » (quoted in Lecours 2000 : 163, my emphasis).
‘immigrants’ shows the extent to which categories inform political practices, distinct groups being entitled to distinct rights according to how they are being categorized. On the one hand, the Québécois nation-building project could not be achieved at the expense of Anglophone minorities, not so much by virtue of their ancestors having inhabited the land for centuries, the reason officially invoked, but rather as a result of a collective identity pre-dating the Quiet Revolution, their exceptional organizational resources and privileged relationship with the federal government\textsuperscript{53}. By contrast, newly-established immigrants have been expected to ‘integrate’ into the pre-existing political community, most of the controversy stemming from the latter’s contentious definition and boundaries\textsuperscript{54}. The resident population of Québec is therefore made up of a complex mosaic of distinct categories that have progressively been institutionalized and condition the individual’s relationship to the different tiers of government.

The most interesting dimension of the migration-nationalism nexus in Québec has to do with the rival frames of integration forcefully propagated by both levels of government. In Canada, multiculturalism was adopted as the official doctrine in 1971 in order to promote a pan-Canadian national identity based on the pluralism of the country. Indigenous groups and Québécois nationalists were initially fiercely opposed to multiculturalism which they saw as a means to dilute their specificity and an attempt by the federal state to co-opt immigrants into an English-speaking majority. In response, the Québec government sought to create its own model of integration, based on the premise that “a clear affirmation of the French-speaking community and institutions as the pivot for the integration of newcomers is essential if the enduring reality of the French fact is to be assured in Québec.”\textsuperscript{55} The term ‘interculturalism’ emerged at this time to stress how pre-existing ethno-cultural norms should serve as the dominant social context into which immigrants must integrate, by contrast with Canadian multiculturalism, which places more emphasis on the recognition of cultural pluralism (Rocher et al. 2007: 40). In other words, it pursues the difficult task of maintaining a distinct French cultural foundation while at the same time promoting immigration-induced pluralism. For Joseph Carens (2000) the only distinctive cultural commitment

\textsuperscript{53}. Tens of thousands of American Loyalists fled to Québec following US independence.

\textsuperscript{54}. Bill 101 was not retroactive and entitled immigrants already settled in Québec whose children were already enrolled in English-speaking schools to retain the right to choose.

\textsuperscript{55}. \textit{Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble : énoncé de politique en matière d’immigration et d’intégration}, Ministère des Communautés Culturelles et de l’Immigration, Gouvernement du Québec, p. 17. This Policy plan was preceded by \textit{Autant de façons d’être Québécois}, published as early as 1981.
that Québec requires of immigrants for full social membership is knowledge of French. Hence, immigrants can be full members of Québec’s distinct society even if they “look and act differently from the substantial segment of the population whose ancestors inhabited Québec and even if they do not in any way alter their own customs (…) so long as they act within the confines of the law” (ibid.: 125). After 2003 and the election of the federalist PLQ, the Québec intercultural policy has adopted a more explicitly communitarian dimension, embracing the idiom of cultural communities (Labelle et al. 2009). For instance, the celebrations of ‘Citizenship Week’ formerly introduced by the PQ government have given way to the ‘Intercultural Week’56, French language apart, strikingly similar to Canadian multiculturalism. To be sure, the so-called ‘intercultural model’ so vocally defended by the Québec government does not come without problems in a society which has long feared for its ‘survivance’. In 2006, the Québec Prime Minister, confronted with rising social tensions, and the sudden breakthrough of a populist party, launched the Taylor-Bouchard commission,57 charged with the difficult task of examining the ‘accommodements raisonnables’ that ought to be accorded on religious or cultural grounds. The adoption by the French Parliament in May 2010 of a law prohibiting the wearing of the integral veil, more colloquially referred to as the Burqa, in public spaces reignited the controversy in Québec, although legislative changes have to date not been undertaken58. Overall, it seems that the debate in Québec has been framed in a way that is more akin to Continental Europe than the rest of Canada.

‘French Canadians’ into ‘dead ducks’

There is a dense literature on the Québec government’s paradiplomatic activities, which have important ramifications in the economic, cultural and political realms and are closely associated with the broader territorial nation-building project (Keating 2001a, Lecours 2000, Lachappelle 2003). The government successfully sought to use its competencies in order to develop extensive relations with international organizations, French-speaking countries (notably through the preponderant role of Québec in the Organisation International de la Francophonie) and other self-proclaimed stateless

56. Literally « Semaine québécoise des rencontres interculturelles. »
57. Officially, the Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accomodement reliées aux différences culturelles.
nations and federated governments, chiefly the Catalan Generalitat and the Flemish regional government. By contrast, emigrants and/or their descendants residing beyond the frontiers of the Canadian state have not been targeted through a comprehensive set of policies constituting a genuine diaspora strategy. Indeed, retaining ties with expatriates does not figure among the aims and objectives of the Ministère des Relations Internationales, the strategy of which being mainly elite-oriented\textsuperscript{59} and focusing on traditional diplomatic channels. To be sure, the Ambassade de la Délégation Générale du Québec in Paris constitutes a powerful interface with citizens living in what was once considered as a kin-state.

But the evolution of the relationship between the Québec government and organizations defending the interests of French-Canadians or emigrants from Québec residing elsewhere in Canada is far more instructive. French Canadians, territorially-dispersed across provinces, are evidently not all emigrants or descendants of emigrants born in Québec, but today’s manifestation of historical patterns of colonial settlement across North America. They tend to be concentrated in a few provinces, representing, according to census figures for 2001, 11.6% of the population in British Columbia, 11.2% in Ontario and 16.2% in Nova Scotia, against 75% in Québec. In the nineteenth century, up to 900,000 Francophones migrated to the United States, mainly to New England, but were gradually assimilated into the Anglophone mainstream. However, Québec has long played the symbolic and political role of a motherland where French-speakers represented a critical mass and were therefore in a privileged position to ensure the survival and continuity of the fait français in North America. As argued earlier, the national movement from the late nineteenth century until the 1960s sought to protect the rights of French-speakers irrespective of their province of residence, with elites based in Québec playing a preponderant role in the national struggle. The period was marked by intense solidarity and close ties between elites across Québec, the state of Ontario, and to a lesser extent beyond. This was reflected in the development of a French Canadian institutional apparatus, the purpose of which being to defend and promote the rights of

\textsuperscript{59} The main aim of the Québec Ministère des Relations Internationales is “to promote and defend Québec’s interests internationally while ensuring respect for its authority and the consistency of government activities”, with an explicit focus on “international organizations” and “other governments and influential networks of nations, federated states, or priority regions.” (Mission statement, ministère des relations internationales du Québec, www.gouv.qc.ca, [consulted online on January 15, 2011].)
‘French Canadians’, a category coined and propagated in the nineteenth century by French-speaking elites.

However, the situation changed radically with the Quiet Revolution and the victory of the Liberal party which brought to power self-proclaimed neo-nationalists who deliberately shifted from a pan-Canadian non-territorial strategy to a territorial project confined to the Québec state. Gradually, yesterday’s ‘sisters and brothers’ and privileged partners in their crusade for the recognition of the rights of all French Canadians turned into ‘dead ducks’ and the ‘cadavres encore chauds’ of the confederation, ‘tombeau des minorités’ (Martel 1997: 18). As the boundaries of the nation were being contracted from the whole of Canada to what became in the 1960s the state of Québec, the interests of those who spoke in the name of French Canadians and Québécois started to diverge, until they literally clashed and became durably irreconcilable. As long as Francophone elites were struggling for the survival of the French language over subsequent generations, the alliance between homeland elites in Québec and the representatives of territorially-dispersed Francophones was perceived as a necessity. These ties were embedded in well-funded institutions such as the Conseil de la survivance de la vie française en Amérique, which was then dissolved in 1962 when the Québec government, its main financial contributor, stepped out of the initiative. The Council militated for state-wide bilingualism, an objective that was increasingly at odds with the Québec government’s strategy of turning Québec into a primarily French-speaking territory, even if this came with the price of abandoning bilingualism in the rest of Canada. Francophone elites in Ontario were particularly concerned with the gradual emancipation of Québec and the neo-nationalist project, “downgrading the myth according to which Canada was born on a pact made between two equal non-territorial nations sharing a single state” and substituting it with the one of “two territorially-based nation-states” (ibid. 162). The conflict between Francophone communities and Québec nationalists became more prominent in the late-1980s, was exacerbated by the tense negotiations over the 1987 Meech Lake agreements and reached a climax in 1995 on the eve of the referendum over independence, when the Federation of Francophone and Acadian Communities in Canada launched a large-scale campaign reiterating its attachment to the confederation and fierce opposition to secession. For the advocates of independence, the federation was not only pursuing divergent objectives but was also the ally of the federal government, accused of funding the campaign. These tensions
were made particularly acute by the memory of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau who sought to strengthen the use of the French language in federal institutions in order to stimulate bilingualism and counter the Québec nationalist claim to constitute the only viable Francophone enclave.

Nowadays, representatives of Francophone minorities primarily address their claims to the federal government and promote an identity which is increasingly associated with the province they inhabit, Franco-Columbians, Franco-Manitobans, Franco-Ontarians etc having a different flag and relating to distinct tiers of government through distinct institutional arrangements according to the relative openness of the opportunity structure in each arena (Schmachtel 2003).

**Concluding remarks**

This brief review of the territorial politics of migration in Québec corroborates to a great extent our hypothesis. Québec nationalists have indeed sought to reconcile migration-related concerns with their aim of acquiring further territorial autonomy from the federal state and in the case of PQ, outright independence. Immigrants have been “solicited, politicized and ultimately instrumentalized by politicians who use them for their own aims of consolidating the identity within their respective spaces” (Labelle et al. 2009: 75). Likewise, the development of the territorial project in Québec came at the price of abandoning the historical link with representatives of French Canada who pursued diverging interests. The provincial government has used migration-related policies as a means to gain further internal legitimacy, by rallying immigrants to their cause and neutralizing potential claims to self-determination by internal minorities, and external legitimacy, by challenging the federal state in its own normative space. By couching their demands in civic terms, and providing internal minorities with constitutional guarantees akin to the most advanced liberal democracies, they mitigated considerably inter-ethnic tensions within the homeland, although support for independence remains much more popular among the Québécois de souche than ethno-cultural minorities.

While it appears evident that nationalist elites have consciously acted as territorial entrepreneurs, they have competed with a state-wide nation-building project that proved to be particularly effective. The multicultural doctrine adopted at federal level has
constituted an attractive option for immigrants, be they in Québec or in the rest of Canada. Besides, recent developments suggest that Québec’s balancing act between the preservation of its French heritage and the promotion of cultural pluralism does not come without difficulties, manifest in the sudden breakthrough of Action Démocratique du Québec which combines an autonomist middle-ground between PLQ federalists and PQ sovereigntists with a tougher stance on migration-related issues and an ambitious pro-natality agenda as a substitute for the current immigration policy. The Parti Québécois, that presents itself as social-democratic has been able to gain some support among immigrants and internal minorities on ideological grounds. However, its uncompromising commitment to independence has encouraged the party to stress cultural markers in its definition of national boundaries and to construct Québécois and Canadian identities as mutually exclusive. In consequence, electoral data show that there is still a strong correlation between ‘PQ voters’ and ‘French as a mother tongue’ (Lecours 2000: 161). By contrast, the federalist PLQ currently in office has been better able to articulate consistently a territorial conception of nationhood, and therefore to attract a considerable share of the ‘ethnic vote’. Ultimately, ethnic cleavages associated to the national question cut across social and cultural cleavages, which singularly mitigates opposition related to the definition of the political community, a phenomenon which can be largely attributed to the consolidation of territorially-bounded institutions that turned Québec into a “quasi-nation-state” (Gagné et al. 2003: 7).

2.2.2. Scotland and Catalonia compared

In Catalonia and Scotland, the emergence, diffusion and consolidation of a nation-building project has been accompanied, at least since the 1970s, with an elite-driven conscious attempt to accommodate immigration-induced pluralism by promoting an overarching identity constructed around a common territorial interest. This attitude is underpinned by the myth of the ‘Terra de Pas’ in Catalonia and that of the ‘Mongrel Nation’ in Scotland, relayed and diffused by journalists and intellectuals alike and permeating the public debate. Nationalist leaders in both instances have polished their

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60. Party Manifesto, available on www.adq.qc.ca, [consulted online on January 12, 2011]. Although the party has often been accused of populism and racism by its competitors, it is far from constituting a radical right-wing party as defined by Mudde (2008), and can by no means be compared with the French Front National, the British BNP, or for that matter any of the radical right-wing parties that have proliferated and encountered growing success across a number of European states over the past decade.
civic credentials, although the salience of the linguistic boundary in Catalonia has made its cultural manifestations more explicit. They are by no means the most difficult cases of protracted nationalist mobilization, and I do not contend that they constitute a blueprint for examining the nationalism/migration nexus across time and space. However, an in-depth comparison of empirical developments in both cases provides fertile ground to identify the favourable factors conducive to a predominantly territorializing boundary-making strategy in relation to immigrants and emigrants.

They share a number of similarities that facilitate their systematic comparison. For Rokkan, they both constituted clear examples of “failed-centre peripheries that tried to build up their own core structures but fell victim to more effective drives of incorporation launched by other centres” (1983: 28). They are both self-proclaimed stateless nations with identities which find their roots in the Middle-Ages, and nationalist cleavages that cut across socioeconomic and ideological lines. They have been leaders of processes of devolution that have had profound constitutional implications and affected the rest of their respective states. In their domestic politics, they treat themselves as similar, with leaders showing interest in one another, conferences and public events focusing on each other, their media regularly covering their respective news and political developments. Since 2002, government officials and experts have met regularly and cooperated on a variety of public-policy fields through a number of official and unofficial networks. In 2008, a meeting of representatives from Flanders, Québec, Scotland and Catalonia was held with the aim of sharing good practices and discussing mutual experiences in matters of immigration. This was formalized in 2009, through the creation of an official framework whereby their respective governments agreed to meet on a regular basis to exchange information about immigration and integration policies.

Today, the Scottish government and the Generalitat enjoy similar competences in a broad spectrum of domestic policies and have much more limited room to manoeuvre in the international realm. The formal distribution of migration-related competencies between the different tiers of government in a devolved Scotland and Catalonia reflects a similar pattern. In the past decade, sub-state administrations have sought to gain some leverage in immigration policies, but were firmly rebuffed by their respective central states which jealously retained control over what they interpreted as acts of sovereignty.
Likewise, the rules of acquisition of citizenship and the regulation of alien status have remained the exclusive competence of the central administration. By contrast, immigrant integration policies cut across a number of policy areas that are devolved such as education, lifelong learning, health, social care services and housing, which provides considerable scope for policy divergence. Besides, while they have no control over emigrants’ formal status, they are both engaged in paradiplomatic activities providing them with opportunities to maintain meaningful ties with their expatriates and their descendants through transnational policies with ramifications in the cultural, economic and political realms (Adelcoa et al. 1999).

Their respective states also share a number of similarities. In geographic terms, the Iberian Peninsula and Britain are equally isolated from Continental Europe and neither's territory today covers the totality of their respective geographic spaces. Indeed, the Republic of Ireland gained its independence in the 1920s and Portugal recovered its sovereignty in 1668, eighty years after the creation of the Iberian Union. They both share a glorious imperial past which left a lasting imprint on the world as it is today as well as on their current foreign policy and respective nationality legislation. Rokkan (1982) defined the United Kingdom and Spain as paradigmatic Union states, distinguishing them from unitary states, although acknowledging that the Spanish centre pursued a much more aggressive nation-building project than Britain. While the conditions under which the Union came about are in some respects comparable, later developments in the relationship of Catalonia and Scotland with their respective states followed radically different paths. While the 1707 Act of Union enabled the Scots to conceive of themselves as minor partners in dominating the British Empire, the Catalans were militarily vanquished in 1714 and the territory was incorporated into a formally centralized state until 1978, with some brief periods of political autonomy in between. Unlike Scottish devolution which came about under the auspices of a long-established parliamentary democracy, the Spanish decentralization process ran in parallel with the democratic transition following forty years of dictatorship. While the United Kingdom was in the front line of two solidarity-forging world wars and the post-1945

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61 “A union state is not the result of straightforward dynastic conquest. Incorporation of at least parts of its territory has been achieved through personal dynastic union, for example by treaty, marriage or inheritance. Integration is less than perfect. While administrative standardization prevails over most of the territory, the consequences of personal union entail the survival in some areas of pre-union rights and institutional infrastructures which preserve some degree of regional autonomy and serve as agencies of indigenous elite recruitment” (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982: 11).
consolidation of the welfare state, the Spaniards saw feelings of mutual trust severely damaged by the experience of the Civil War and subsequent decades of dictatorship.

Importantly for the purpose of this dissertation, their experience of migration flows could hardly be more different, illustrating territorially uneven patterns of economic development since the nineteenth century. Spain has long conceived of itself as a country from which one leaves, and the UK as one to which one comes. On the contrary, shifting the unit of analysis from the state to the sub-state level reverses this trend, as Catalonia has since the late nineteenth century been subject to intense waves of internal influx, whereas Scotland has historically been a land of protracted emigration. In relative terms, the Catalan population went from representing 11% of that of Spain as a whole in 1900 to 16% in 2010. In sharp contrast, the resident population of Scotland shrank from representing 12% of the UK in 1901 to 8% today.

Between 1911 and 1930, 600,000 people settled in Catalonia from other parts of Spain. Between 1950 and 1975, this figure reached 1.4 million, the majority coming from Andalusia, Murcia and Galicia, so that by 1975, 38% of the Catalan resident population was born elsewhere in Spain. The influx almost completely dried out between 1975 and 1990, the net migration balance throughout this period being consistently negative. However, it began again by the middle of the decade and gained considerable vigour at the turn of the century. Unlike in earlier periods, immigrants no longer came from the rest of Spain but from a variety of countries. By 2010, the proportion of foreign-born residents amounted to 16.2% of the population, against 2% a decade earlier. Out of the 1.2 million foreign residents, almost a quarter come from Africa, another quarter from Latin America, and another 15% from Asia. The same year, official figures released by IDESCAT revealed that 19.7% of the population residing in Catalonia was born in another part of Spain and 17.4% in another country. Hence, at that date, the proportion of Catalan-born residents represented merely 63.5% of the entire population. On the other hand, Catalan history also saw sporadic waves of emigration, to the Caribbean in the second half of the nineteenth century and to France and Latin America following the military defeat of the Republicans in 1939. However, the scale of the phenomenon pales in comparison with other Spanish territories, although the memory of the ‘exile’ still serves a symbolic purpose. In 2010, there were 171,000 Catalans registered in Spanish
consulates abroad. In addition, 398,000 individuals born in Catalonia resided in another Autonomous Community.62

As Scotland’s population remained remarkably stable in the past hundred years, the population of England rose from 29 to 56 million (Lisenkova et al 2008). Whilst uneven fertility and mortality rates did play a role in the relative demographic decline of Scotland, distinct historical records of migration flows account for most of the discrepancy. Some 2 million people emigrated from Scotland in the nineteenth century, and as many did so in the twentieth (McCrone 2001). On the basis of the 2001 Census figures, the Scottish government Social research estimated that 835,000 individuals born in Scotland resided elsewhere in the UK, while another 250,000 lived overseas63. On the other hand, the major influx of Irish immigrants to the Western Lowlands declined after 1914. Since the 1950s, a growing number of individuals born in England have migrated to Scotland, their proportion of the total population rising to 8.1% in 2001. Since the EU-enlargement in 2004, inward flows to Scotland have grown considerably, mainly proceeding from Poland, so that between 2001 and 2010, the General Office for Statistics in Scotland registered a population increase of 230,000, almost exclusively attributed to immigration. In 2009, 6% of the Scottish population was born outside the United Kingdom. Among them, 67% self-identified as white, 16% as Asian, 5% as Black and 4% as Chinese.64

Catalonia and Scotland’s distinct historical experiences with migration flows have nurtured and moulded distinct norms that are embedded in today’s policies and institutions, and the discourses underlying them. Whether in the form of emigration or immigration, the discrepancy between population and territorial boundaries has been, is, and most likely will remain a fundamental aspect of Catalan and Scottish politics. Ultimately, despite the extraordinary number of people dispersed across the world claiming a blood link with Scotland, and the impressive number of people living in Catalonia who cannot do so, residency has consistently been promoted as a significant

62. Padrón de residentes en el Extranjero (PERE), published by Instituto Nacional de Estadística, June 1, 2011.
64. Regional Characteristics of foreign-born people living in the United Kingdom, Office of National Statistics, report prepared by Alice Reid and Caroline Miller, 2010.
criterion of membership in the nation. This has not always been so, has been shifting over time and is still in many ways internally and externally contested.
III

The Mongrel Nation

What purpose would there be in our getting a Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh if it has to administer an emigration system, a glorified poor Law and a desert?

– Tom Johnston, Memories

In 1992, the Glaswegian novelist William McIlvanney yelled from a bus in an Edinburgh home-rule rally gathering 25,000 people: “NEVER forget that we are the bastard people of a mongrel nation!” Two years later, Alex Salmond replied to those who accused the SNP of being imbued with anti-English sentiments: “We are proud to be part of what Willie McIlvanney called our 'mongrel nation’. In fact, our biggest problem is not immigration, but emigration. Every year we lose talented Scots and we welcome any talented replacements from wherever they come.”65 While the allusion to the ‘bastard people’ was quickly forgotten, the reference to the “glorious diversity of our mongrel nation”66 survived and gradually turned into a national credo cutting across

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party lines. It is usually accompanied with a no less vibrant celebration of the New Scots’ contribution to the nation, an expression first coined by the Pakistani-born Glaswegian figure Bashir Maan in 1992, and soon incorporated into the mainstream political idiom.

Yet this has not always been the case, as conceptions of Scottishness have considerably evolved in the course of the twentieth century. Today, to say that “one is Scottish is to say that one has left-of-centre values; and to say that one is British is to assert distinctly more right-of-centre views, largely the opposite of the meaning in England” (McCrone 2001: 27). This contrasts strikingly with a century earlier, when “being a Protestant, a unionist and proud of Empire confirmed an identity which treated Scottish and British as complements of each other” (ibid. 13). In this chapter, I reconstruct the broad patterns of emigration from and immigration to Scotland in a historical perspective by distinguishing three periods: 1800 - 1914: the Workshop of the Empire; 1914 -1 960: The years of lead; 1960 - 1997: A nation reborn. My ambition is not to dismiss the historical foundation of the dominant understanding of the past in the Scottish national movement. Rather, I intend to show that the gradual embrace of a territorializing boundary-making strategy, underpinned by the myth of the Mongrel Nation, served an instrumental purpose. Indeed, a narrowly-defined ethnic claim would have been internally divisive in a country which – although the proportion of residents born abroad has been relatively low compared to Catalonia – encompasses a fundamentally plural population. With a relatively large and geographically diverse territory, a network of medium-sized cities without a clear hegemon, extensive rural areas, and a multilingual and multi-secular society, the intrinsic pluralism of the Scottish people can hardly be accommodated without an overlapping territorial identity. In addition, I argue that this was facilitated by the emergence of favourable factors in the political opportunity structure from the 1960s onwards. First, the nationalist movement leaned increasingly towards the left of the electoral spectrum, conflating class and national identity. Second, the ‘democratic deficit’, and the subsequent perceived need to revise the current institutional arrangement, enabled the emergence of a broad home-rule coalition cutting across religious and ethnic lines.
3.1. 1800 - 1914: the Workshop of the Empire

Scotland is one of the few countries in nineteenth century Europe whose impressive migration outflows were almost matched by inflows. While the eighteenth century Scottish enlightenment represents an intellectual *Golden Age*, the nineteenth century resembles more a *Gold Rush*. The formidable industrialization of England rapidly spilled over to Scotland which, strong of a genuine educational advantage and zealously playing its part as a junior partner in the Empire, had become by 1850 the second most urbanized country in Europe, exceeded only by its southern neighbour (Brock 1999). Fighting on the front line of the ‘Great transformation’, Scotland was then the “workshop of the Empire”, its textile and later naval sectors providing jobs to an ever-expanding working class and wealth to its autochthonous industrial captains. This section provides an overview of migration flows from, within and to Scotland, throughout a period characterized by profound economic, cultural and political transformation.

3.1.1. Highland clearances and Lowlands lure of opportunity

“Rats, lice, and Scotsmen: you find them the whole world over”\(^{67}\), the French medieval proverb goes. In the late Middle-Ages, Continental Europe was by far the main destination of Scottish emigrants. But the 1707 Act of Union, which entitled Scots to “full freedom and intercourse of trade and navigation to and from the Dominions and plantations,” gave the phenomenon a new impetus by reorienting the flow to what had now become a fully *British* Empire. Nowadays, the belief that most nineteenth century Scottish emigrants were evicted from their homeland by avid landlords and forced to renounce their ancestral lifestyle is enduring, especially among Diaspora-Scots. In the Canadian province of Nova Scotia, established as a Scottish settlement in the early seventeenth century, a sense of Scottishness has survived until today, primarily as a romanticized version of a Highland identity, due to the “resilience of a powerful victim imagery highlighting the plight of Highlanders and downgrading the contribution of Lowland skilled migrants” (Harper et al 1999: 17). Indeed the eviction of Highlanders from their homes reached a peak in the 1840s. The Emigration Act of 1851, together

\(^{67}\) Quoted in David Armitage, (2005: 225).
with the creation of the Highland and Island Society, facilitated landlords’ strategy of clearing the poorest from their land and replacing them with crofters who could afford to pay the rent. However, the attitude of the state was more ambivalent than commonly acknowledged in nationalist historiographies, especially as the Highland population had long been seen as a source of military recruitment. Besides, the depopulation of the Highlands had started about a century earlier, when Highlanders were already migrating en masse to the West Central Lowlands, where they could fill urban jobs or take advantage of the earlier harvests in the south-east in order to maintain their existing lifestyle (Brock 1999: Chapter 1). The lack of opportunities in large portions of the Scottish territory meant that by 1800, Scotland was already a “mobile society” (Campbell 1985: 45). Henceforth, external flows were the prolongation of internal ones rather than a distinct phenomenon altogether. The emergence of new industries, from textile to steel-making, shipbuilding and heavy engineering, provided jobs for those who stayed. On the other hand, the rapid decline of other industries and concomitant collapse of the agricultural sector encouraged others to move, “not necessarily within a nationally-bound labour market but also beyond to the Empire” (ibid. 46). The haemorrhage did not slow down despite the promulgation of the 1886 Crofter’s Holding Act officially putting an end to the clearances. Between 1831 and 1931, the Highlands went from representing 8.5% of the population of Scotland to merely 2.7%.

Hence, what remained of Highland culture after the Jacobite rebellions were crushed in 1745 was further weakened by mass emigration, which is itself mainly the consequence of broader economic transformations within the British Isles rather than a forced exile. Gaelic ultimately lost out because the local resources were too weak to stem the tide of emigration, while its symbolic heritage was taken over as part of a Scottish identity that accepted English as the basic standard (Rokkan 1982: 96). The Highland clearances did not trigger a profound wave of sympathy among nineteenth century Lowland Scots who for the most part were reaping the economic benefits of the Union, although the land reform movement was closely associated with the Liberals. In Christopher Harvie’s powerful prose, “it was Scots landlords and factors who forced the Highlanders on to the emigrant ships” (1977: 72). Although by 1891 merely 6% of the population could still speak Gaelic, Highland symbols were by then popular among bekilted Lowland

68. According to Campbell (1985), the agricultural sector employed no more than 10% of the active Scottish population in 1910.
Scots taking pride in their largely fantasized Celtic past, fomenting in turn a pan-
Scottish identity. Tartan and bagpipes had been fully incorporated into Lowland
Scottish identity, and “Highlandism”\(^{69}\) had turned into the most recognizable marker of
Scottishness. Some have used this “invention of tradition” as a way of discrediting the
cultural façade of Scottish nationalism, and there is a large literature on whether Tartan
was a nineteenth century English invention, an ancestral Highland dress, or a
combination of both\(^{70}\). But these historiographical quarrels are of secondary importance,
as romantic interpretations of the past were common in a nineteenth century Europe
destabilised by the tidal wave of modernization (Hobsbawn et al 1983). Gaelic speakers
have ever since been nostalgically portrayed as relics of a distant past. But unlike in
Wales, where were numerous enough to constitute the basis of the national movement,
they merely represent one aspect of Scottish identity, symbolically important but
numerically insignificant. Ultimately, “the quasi-destruction of a nationality” (Nairn
2003: 122) facilitated the permeability of the natural border between the Highlands and
the Lowlands. This in turn paved the way for the emergence of a common nationality
encompassing the entire territory, which was paradoxically more similar to England
than ever before and yet was now able to stress its differences with its southern
neighbour.

Despite the resilient tendency to associate emigration with the Highland clearances
today, the overwhelming majority of those who left Scotland after 1850 came from the
towns and cities of the Lowlands (Devine 2006a: 468). Historian Tom Devine refers to
this phenomenon as the ‘emigration paradox’: how could early-industrialized and
relatively wealthy nineteenth century Scotland experience such a spectacular level of
outward migration? Part of the answer lay in the difficulties of everyday life in the fast-
growing cities of the Lowlands. Indeed, the evils of the industrial revolution were
especially acute in Scotland where living standards among the working class were even
lower than south of the border (Riggs 1994). For many Scots, the choice of destination
was between the Glasgow slums and overseas, depicted in letters received from peers as

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\(^{69}\) ‘Highlandism’ is the expression used by Tom Devine (2006) to designate the appropriation of Highland symbols
by Lowlanders between 1770 and 1850. Tom Nairn (2003/1977) uses the term ‘Tartanry’ to stress his contempt for
what he sees as the main impediment to Scotland’s embrace of modernity while McCrone (1995) speaks of the
‘Making of the Scottish Brand’ to highlight its continued relevance in today’s market economy.

\(^{70}\) Hugh Trevor-Roper (1983) in a highly controversial essay entitled The Invention of Tradition: The Highlander
Tradition of Scotland argues that the sartorial myth of Tartan and the kilt was largely invented but rapidly sanctified
by the people of Scotland who felt the need to stress their moral superiority over other peoples inhabiting the British
Isles. See Keating (2009b) for a critique of British historiography.
well as in the propaganda of recruiting agents as a safe haven (Harper 1998, Ramirez 2007). For Aristide Zolberg (2007), emigration from the Celtic fringes was also orchestrated from London, where it was seen as a way of turning the culturally heterogeneous United Kingdom into a fully-fledged nation-state while increasing the relative demographic weight of England in the British Isles. But even if this was potentially a concern – especially in the case of Ireland – emigration was if anything rather constrained than encouraged by the state until 1918 (Feldman & Baldwin 2007). Until that date, the state proved reluctant to intervene, as the cost of state-sponsored emigration was perceived as greater than its benefits. Furthermore, Scottish emigration could not be characterized as the flight of the poor. Unlike the Irish who were incontestably cleared out of their lands by starvation or extreme poverty, Scottish emigrants were rather driven by pull factors in destination countries than push factors at home. The rapid development of the Empire created irresistible incentives to emigrate. Relatively well educated, English-speaking and Protestant, the Scots working men saw emigration as “the road to freedom, the realization of the libertarian impulses of Burns” (Harvie 1977: 177). Even though a pan-British identity never entirely overshadowed pre-Union national identities, the Empire was unquestionably British and allowed the constituent parts of the United Kingdom to take great pride in and reap the benefits of its expansion (Colley 1992). Unlike the Catalans who were barred from trading with the colonies until the second half of the eighteenth century, the Scots were over-represented in the imperial administration and were given the opportunity to fully exploit their potential away from their homeland. Indeed, the Empire was the means through which the Scottish nationality could emphasize its equal partnership with England (Devine 2006b: 165).

Although the United States remained their privileged destination before and after independence, Canada and Australia were also important recipients of adventurous Scots. Besides, Scottish emigrants did not only seek a better life in the confines of the

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71. This is consistent with contemporary migration patterns from poorer countries, which reflect how emigrants from developing countries belong to the middle classes, as poorer households do not have sufficient resources to move.

72. In his book *The Great Irish Potato Famine* (2001), James Donnelly provides a frightening account of this episode, which he attributes more to internal conditions in Ireland than to the unwillingness of the British state to assist the population.

73. The bitter hostility endured by Irish emigrants in the US provides a stark contrast with the Scottish case, and goes far in explaining the sustained involvement of the diaspora in the Anglo-Irish and later Northern Irish conflict, successively as peace-wreckers (especially during the 1919-1921 war of independence), and more recently as peace-builders with the Good Friday agreement through intensively lobbying the Clinton administration. For a full account of the participation of Irish Americans in the pursuit of Irish independence, see Harris (2009: 123-53)
Empire, but also south of the border, at the heart of an increasingly monocephalic state, so that it already seemed in the late eighteenth century that “the noblest prospect which a Scotchman ever sees, is the high road that leads him to England.”\textsuperscript{74} While this point has sometimes been over-stressed, there is some truth in the assertion that Scottish elites traded off their right to a separate state and renounced the consolidation of an alternative centre in Edinburgh against the advantages of integration with the English economy and a privileged position in the Empire (Rokkan 1983: 88). The potent forces pushing towards further integration with England meant that emigration, in this period of great transformation, was perceived positively, as a privileged exit option and a safety valve at a time when Malthusian anxieties were exacerbated by spectacular rates of demographic growth\textsuperscript{75}.

3.1.2. The Irish exodus

Between 1800 and 1914, waves of Irish, Italians, Jews and Lithuanians, settled in Scotland. Most Lithuanian immigrants were working in coal mines and were received with bitter hostility by native workers, who feared that foreigners might drive down wages and reduce the power of the unions. Besides, the Lithuanian community, 10,000 members strong in 1914, was at times stigmatized for its fervent practice of the Catholic faith (Dzialtuvaite 2006: 80). Many chose to anglicize their names, so that second-generation migrants became virtually invisible. As for the Italians, they were committed to the catering trade and had emerged as an identifiable community in the eve of World War I, although they barely amounted to 5,000 people. Because they were not employed in the industrial sector, they complemented rather than competed with native workers on the labour market, and resentment towards them remained limited. Of a much greater magnitude, the uninterrupted settlement of Irish immigrants between 1850 and the outbreak of World War I left a profound imprint on Scottish society and politics. Until the creation of the Irish Free State in 1923, Irish immigrants from the south were formally internal migrants, although they were crossing an inter-national border between two constitutive countries of a multinational state. Despite partition, citizens of

\textsuperscript{74} Dr Johnstone in 1767, quoted in Brock 1999: chapter 1. This quote is actually widely-used and well-known among Scottish academics.

\textsuperscript{75} Fears of a Malthusian crisis were particularly acute in the United Kingdom after 1830 (Zolberg 2007, Campbell 1985). In Scotland, the population increased from merely 1.3 million in 1800 to 2.9 in 1851, and up to 4.5 million by 1900.
the Republic of Ireland living in the United Kingdom are still entitled to political rights, a privilege now reciprocated to British citizens living in Ireland under the 1998 Anglo-Irish agreement (Lansbergen et al. 2010). Leaving aside the sensitive and complex case of Northern Ireland, these elements further undermine the stark distinction commonly made between international and internal migrations.

Twelve miles of water separates the Northern end of Ireland from the Western shores of Scotland. Unsurprisingly, migration flows directed to one side or the other of the North Channel according to shifting economic and political circumstances take their roots far back in history. Between the opening of the Anglo-Scottish Ulster plantation in 1609 and the 1641 uprising, tens of thousands of Lowland Scots settled in Ulster, setting the stage for one of the most enduring ethnic conflicts in Europe76. While significant inflows from Ireland occurred before the 1848 potato Famine, the phenomenon gained considerable vigour from then on and showed no sign of weakening until 1914. In relative terms, Irish immigration to Scotland was much more substantial and steady than to England and Wales77. In 1901, there were 205,000 Irish-born residents in Scotland, mainly concentrated in the Western urban areas, similar to the 207,000 of half a century earlier (Collins 1991: 1). This constant influx over subsequent generations contributed to renew and at times reinforce a common bond among Irish settlers. However, the population of immigrants was itself heterogeneous and internally divided. Around one-fifth of them were Ulster Protestants, often of a distant Scottish stock, which eased their (re)incorporation into the dominant society as much as it impeded that of their Catholic peers (Walker 1991). Initially, the Liberal Party, which had dominated Scottish politics since 1832, also enjoyed some support among Irish Catholics. But the vast majority were still excluded from the electoral suffrage, despite successive reforms gradually widening the franchise in 1832, 1868 and 1884.

Their relative isolation from mainstream politics meant that their concerns were primarily directed towards the political turmoil in their homeland. To a greater degree than those settled in England, they were profoundly committed to the Irish nationalist cause. Hence, their support for the Liberals declined sharply after the latter split in 1886

76. Most of today’s Protestants in Ulster are descendants of Scottish colonists, small tenant farmers from Ayrshire and Galloway, Argyll and Fife who settled in Ireland in the first half of the seventeenth century.

77. In 1851, The Irish-born population stood at 7.2% in Scotland, against 2.9% in England and Wales.
over the issue of Irish Home Rule and the subsequently-founded Liberal Unionist party
aligned itself with the Conservatives. The Irish Home rule crisis was increasingly
turning into an open conflict threatening to spill over to Scotland, where the fear of
‘Rome-rule’ had a profound impact on Protestant working-class communities. Indeed
Calvinism was perhaps of all the varieties of Protestantism the most antipathetic to
Catholicism, an aversion that was reinforced by the immigration of Ulster Protestants:
by 1900 there were more Orange lodges than anywhere in the rest of Britain but in
Ireland (Hutchinson 2006: 188). On top of this, the scarce resources of Catholic schools
severely limited their prospects for upward social mobility. The 1872 Education
(Scotland) Act made education compulsory for all children and created a state-funded
secular system in which religious education was facultative. But Catholic schools
refused to be incorporated into the scheme, so that by 1914 the gap in educational
achievement between denominational and non-denominational schools had considerably
widened (C. Brown 1987).

3.2. 1914-1960: The years of lead

In the inter-war years, the Scottish economy went through an unprecedented recession
the consequences of which were twofold. First it triggered a massive wave of
emigration that was now widely perceived as a symptom of Scotland’s industrial decay.
Second, it exacerbated inter-religious tensions, which reached a peak in 1936 but were
then (at least temporarily) diluted in the cross-cutting wave of patriotism that brought
together the entire British people against a common enemy during World War II. This
section successively examines the shifting perception of emigration in Scottish politics
and rising sectarian tensions between the Catholic and Protestant communities, although
paradoxically, inflows from Ireland had almost dried up by 1918.

3.2.1. From opportunity to exile

Scotland paid a heavy tribute during World War I and human losses on the battlefield
were relatively higher than in England or Wales. In theory, such a rise in male mortality

78. Especially among Irish Protestant migrants, who settled in Glasgow and represented an ever increasing proportion
of Irish immigration after 1880.

97
and subsequent demographic gap should have been translated into a labour shortage. Yet, the 1920s saw a recrudescence of emigration. The 1931 census recorded for the first time a net loss of population since its creation in 1855, despite the post-war increase of the fertility rate. Unlike the previous period when high rates of emigration went hand-in-hand with economic expansion, the inter-war years were marked by economic decline and social conservatism in the homeland. The Scots were then fleeing the consequences of the collapse of a once great industrial economy no longer able to provide its relatively well-educated workforce with rewarding opportunities. In the shipbuilding industries – until then the jewel in the crown of the Scottish economy – employment collapsed from 100,000 in 1920 to 10,000 in 1932 (Harper 1998: 91). The country entered a period of prolonged depression, aggravated by the rise of protectionism in the 1930s, making its export-dominated sectors increasingly fragile (Keating 2001a: 244). Concurrently, the long-standing laissez-faire attitude of the state towards emigration shifted in 1921 with the promulgation of the Empire Settlement Act (ESA). Unlike earlier legislations which only targeted the Highlands, it was now extended to the whole of Scotland (Harper 1998: 38). As the government’s promise of providing ‘homes fit for heroes’ after the War proved far-fetched in a receding context, the programme of state-funded emigration came to be seen in imperialist circles as a way of simultaneously mitigating unemployment in the homeland and boosting economic and demographic growth in the Dominions. By contrast, the Labour Party claimed that resources should rather be invested in social reforms and in modernizing domestic industries, while the nationalists attributed the flight of Scotland’s most enterprising spirits to the absence of self-government.

The impact of this new wave of emigration in Scotland was ambivalent. On the one hand, it constituted a safety valve in a time of recession, by allowing ambitious youth to seize the opportunities it could no longer find at home. On the other, it inhibited the development of a domestic market for the increasingly consumer-oriented economy of the twentieth century (Harvie 1977: 169). The transition to a Fordist industrial model, the purpose of which being to increase wages in order to stimulate domestic

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79. In France and Russia for instance, this was translated into a dramatic rise in female employment.
80. Touring Scotland in the 1930s, the poet Edward Muir captured well the dominant mood of the time: “My main impression is that Scotland is gradually being emptied of its population, its spirit, wealth, industry, art, intellect and innate character. If a country exports its most enterprising spirits and best minds years after years, (…) some result will inevitably follow.”
consumption, was made difficult in a country where natural demographic growth was severely undermined by emigration. This in turn further intensified the recession, which instead of triggering a violent reaction against the centre increased reliance on England. Although already bending, the Empire still represented an appealing exit option. Emigration was then mainly directed to the cities of Canada, relatively less affected by the great depression than its southern neighbour and acting as a potent magnet for semi-skilled and skilled Scottish workers (Ramirez 2007). While unionists could still claim that Scotland would be (even) worse off outside the British realm, nationalists could not use the widespread discontentment that economic downturns usually entail as a catalyst for change. Besides, the myth of the ‘community of twenty million’, bridging together homeland and diaspora Scots, provided a sentiment of continuity and a potent justification to the Conservative strand of Unionism. Although Scotland had become by any standards a periphery in the British Isles, the protracted outflow of Scots to the confines of the Empire still furnished the “image of Scotland as a metropolis, a mother-country; as centre and not as periphery” (McKenzie 1981: 157).

To be sure, the ‘haemorrhage’ from Scotland did figure among the concerns of British policy-makers anxious to provide incentives for talented Scots to stay, despite the severe economic downturn. The inter-war years saw the first, and somewhat rudimentary, territorial development plans and Edinburgh was designated as a Special Area as early as 1934. Another way to do so was to strengthen the responsibilities of the Scottish Office and consolidate a web of depoliticized public institutions able to incorporate a sizeable number of home-grown skilled workers into an expanding civil service, which also presented the advantage of reinforcing their allegiance to the state. In 1939, the Conservative government, following the Gilmour report recommendations, agreed to deepen administrative devolution by relocating the Scottish office and its increasing number of departments in order to “transfer people and power to Scotland.” The Reorganization of Offices (Scotland) Act led to the creation of a “mini-White Hall with almost all under one roof”, the great bulk of civil servants being hosted in the recently-opened St Andrew’s House in Edinburgh (Mitchell 2009: 21).
3.2.2. The ‘menace to the Scottish race’

As for Irish immigrants and their descendants, the period began on a positive note, not least because the 1918 Education (Scotland) Act made “the country’s Catholic schools the first in a predominantly non-Catholic nation to be incorporated into a state-system” (C. Brown, 1987: 201). In exchange for agreeing to the transfer of their schools, Catholic authorities were assured that religious instruction would be maintained at existing levels and that only teachers acceptable to the Church in regard to religious faith and character could be appointed. The reform was brought forward by the Liberal party with the support of the Labour Party, against the background of rising hostility in Ireland and fierce opposition of the Church of Scotland. Its purpose was to nationalize the ‘Scoto-Irish’ Catholics in Scotland by dragging them into mainstream Scottish society. Meanwhile, the 1918 Representation of the People Act broadened the scope of the franchise by abolishing all property qualifications. Labour greatly benefited from the reform as the electorate tripled and most new voters were drawn from the working class. The Irish Catholic community in Scotland shifted en masse to the Labour party, which, besides being more supportive of the Irish Republican movement, had become “synonymous with the defence of council housing, jobs in heavy industry and sectarian schools” (Smout 1986: 270).

Arguably, class solidarity was sometimes undermined by Irish-born workers who were competing with natives in a ruthless labour market, providing industrial leaders with the opportunity to lower wages and break strikes. While this is to a degree true, others have stressed the patterns of shared class interests between native Protestants and Irish Catholic workers and their sustained cooperation within the union movements (M. Mitchell 1999)\textsuperscript{81}. This notwithstanding, Labour greatly contributed to the integration of Irish immigrants and their descendants into mainstream society, not so much because of the rather limited material gains it brought ordinary Catholics, but “because such an involvement set a lot of them on the road to integration” (Gallagher 1991: 28). Reciprocally they wholeheartedly gave their votes to the Labour party, which was committed to promoting Irish Catholic sectional interests in return for electoral support. Hence, they played a crucial role in its consolidation in the western urban areas and

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\textsuperscript{81} There has long been a strain between the Skilled Workers’ Union in which most members were native Scots and Protestants, and the Labourers’ Union, with a higher Irish Catholic presence, as well as less visible strains within the Labour party.
subsequently as the dominant political formation in Scotland in the second half of the twentieth century (McCaffrey 1991).

However, the process through which Catholics came to embrace a Scottish identity compatible with their faith stretched over several decades. In 1912, the Scottish Conservative party became the Scottish Unionist party, in an effort to stress its opposition to Irish home-rule and its determination to preserve Scotland’s Protestant heritage. Fears of a Rome-led ‘Irishisation’ of Britain, already widespread in Victorian England, gained momentum in Scotland during the inter-war years. Paradoxically, this occurred at a time when Irish immigration had almost dried out after a century of sustained inflows. The Church of Scotland moved to the right of the political spectrum and in 1923 approved a report purposely entitled the Menace of the Irish Race to our Scottish Nationality. Interestingly for our purposes, this fear was exacerbated by protracted emigration: “The Scot, who as a colonist is eagerly sought by all the Dominions and by America, is being driven from his own shores, and his place taken by an immigrant who makes a very much less satisfactory citizen.” Some extremist groups such as the Scottish Protestant League were formed and made some inroads into the working class vote in Glasgow and Edinburgh, while calls were made to disenfranchise the Roman Catholics. Although Glasgow never quite reached the same degree of spatial segregation and systematic discrimination as Belfast, sectarianism nonetheless had some political implications. Indeed, the Unionist party could rely as late as 1955 – (when it was elected with 51% of the vote, an impressive result never matched again by any party in subsequent elections) – on the support of the medium-skilled Protestant working class. Unlike in Wales, the Conservative party squeezed the support of the Liberal party even further in its traditional rural strongholds, “as the ‘Scottish periphery’ had to choose between being anti-London or anti-Glasgow” (Urwin 1982: 47). Since the Union, the Church of Scotland had served as a surrogate Parliament which spoke for the country in social and political matters, retaining a potent moral grip over the population at a time when secularization was already well-advanced south of the border (Harvie 1977: 207). To be sure, its influence had already been

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82. The name of the party was changed again in 1964, when it became the Scottish Conservative Party. For some, this shift illustrated a loss of autonomy and alignment with the British Conservative Party.
83. The report exempted the Orange population from its grievances: “They are of the same race as ourselves and of the same Faith and are readily assimilated.”
eroded by the 1843 Disruption and long-standing conflicts among the different strands of the Protestant faith, compared to which sectarianism seemed at times a secondary concern. Nonetheless, the Church of Scotland was reunited in 1929 and its membership reached an all-time high in the 1950s (Devine 2006b: 167). Until then, class politics were subject to the resilience of religious cleavages, the Tories attracting a disproportionate number of Protestants and Labour almost monopolizing the Catholic vote.

The period from 1918 to 1960 is often considered to be one of gradual homogenization of the British state’s constitutive parts. The convergence in voting patterns between Scotland and England is commonly perceived as an illustration of Rokkan’s nationalization thesis, whereby the freezing of cleavage structures facilitated the emergence of a class-based form of politics in which territorial differences no longer mattered and consecrated the consolidation of a unitary nation state. Indeed at no time throughout these four decades did the periphery mount a serious challenge to Westminster’s authority. But this period of “peripheral docility” was above all the consequence of the “decline of peripheral dissidents, and the domination of territorial conservatives favourable to the existing state of the Union” (Bulpitt 1983: 63). This was reflected in the unusual popularity of the Unionist-Conservatives and declining support for Home-rule among Labour ranks, the party setting aside its commitment to bringing about a Scottish Parliament in the 1920s, before officially renouncing it in 1958 (Keating & Jones 1985). Hence, the creation of the SNP in 1934 was a response to the decline of nationalist forces among mainstream parties rather than evidence of an upsurge of political nationalism, which was if anything much weaker than in the years preceding World War I. In 1914 home-rule agitation among the working-class and the highland crofters’ movement forced the Westminster Parliament to seriously consider a ‘home-rule all round scenario’. Scottish nationalism was indeed on the rise. However, this was not the kind of nationalism that was to re-emerge more forcefully in the 1960s with the first electoral breakthrough of the SNP, territorially based and directed against the British state. Instead, the period saw the heyday of the Conservative strand of nationalism, for which Scotland’s national destiny lay in the union with England and was cemented by the Protestant faith and Empire.

85. Nationalism grew steadily from the 1850s onwards, so that in 1885, the Scottish Office was established because a “growing body of Scots felt that Scottish distinctiveness was being ignored” (Mitchell 2009: 19).
3.3. 1960 – 1997: A nation reborn?

The formidable persistence of emigration combined with scarce immigration since the large inflows from Ireland considerably diminished after 1914 have nurtured the impression that Scotland was primarily a country from which *one leaves*, and not one to which *one comes*. While the population of Scotland has remained remarkably stable since 1900, that of England almost doubled over the same period, consolidating its self-understanding as a potent cultural, economic, and political magnet. Between 1914 and 1991, net migration in Scotland has systematically been negative, exceeding at times (-) 20,000 a year (McQuaid et al 2008: 9).

<table>
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*Source:* My own compilation from the General Register Office for Scotland (GROS).

Historian Murray Pittock summarized in a very illustrative way the shifting position of Scotland within the United Kingdom, “from an economic power-house of native industry to an also-ran assembly plant for US and Asian multinationals” (2001: 103).
The period that stretches from the 1960s onwards saw a recrudescence of political nationalism which brought constitutional issues to the fore of politics. In this section, I first briefly discuss the decline of sectarianism, and the simultaneous migration of highly-skilled Scots to England, and less economically-active Englanders to Scotland. I show how the SNP has consistently sought to polish its civic credentials and to gain support among internal minorities. The last part examines the long road to home-rule and shows how the combined effect of a party system that leans towards the left of the electoral spectrum and the reason invoked by home-rulers to legitimate their claims – in the name of a ‘democratic deficit’ – facilitated the constitution of a broad coalition of support cutting across religious and ethnic lines and territorially based against an England dominated state.

3.3.1. The twilight of sectarian Scotland

The decline of sectarianism in Scotland is usually attributed to the rise of secularism from the 1960s onwards. Indeed, it is only from then that the loosening of religious and class cleavages and inter-marriage have significantly weakened inter-religious tensions (McCrone 2001: 25). But other factors have also been determinant. Aside from the fact that the gradual domination of Labour gave them more visibility, the 1918 Education settlement was, after two generations, beginning to deliver. As descendants of Irish Catholics were now able to climb the social ladder, the socio-economic gap between religious communities was finally being plugged. Irish Catholics and their descendants proved to be efficient institution-builders, establishing a well-organized parish system, charities and schools, as well as a football club – Celtic – which won the European Championship in 1967. The accommodation of Irish Catholics and their descendants shares some similarities with the Dutch tradition of institutionalized pluralism known as ‘pillarisation’, which lost much of its significance as a result of individualization and secularization (Lijphart 2004). By the advent of devolution in 1997, instances of discrimination and violence on religious grounds were seldom, although whether sectarianism is a fact or a myth is still subject to controversy (Devine et al. 2000). Patricia Walls and Rory Williams (2003) conducted 72 interviews with descendants of Irish Catholics and found continuing experience of discrimination, especially in the labour market. But others concluded that this could equally be read as evidence of the “power of social myths” (Bruce et al. 2005: 151). Despite the major economic crisis of
the 1980s, there has not been a return to the 1930s religious tensions. Admittedly, a community feeling among the descendants of Irish Catholic migrants has been sustained by prominent institutions and may sporadically be strengthened by residual tensions with the Protestant majority. Joseph Bradley (2006) found that it is primarily through football that an Irish Catholic identity is manifest in Scotland and that their experience and perception of continued prejudice is more apparent. This phenomenon is epitomized in the long-standing Celtic versus Rangers rivalry in Glasgow. However, this has more to do with hooliganism that with racism per se, and is largely detached from nationality.

Besides, these residual tensions at grassroots level are not reflected in the party system. Indeed, the role of Labour in managing and mitigating tensions within its own party structure sets the Scottish case apart. It shares some commonalities with the socialist party PSC in Catalonia, which, as we shall see in chapter IV, contributed greatly to blurring the antagonism between native Catalans and internal immigrants in the aftermath of the democratic transition by appealing to common class interests. From 1964 onwards, the gradual decline of the Conservatives significantly diminished the visibility of an uncompromising form of unionism, which was the main ideological barrier to the incorporation of the Catholics into a revamped Scottish national identity, no longer equated with Protestantism but increasingly territorially-defined.

In the 1990s, the SNP explicitly intended to reach out to the Catholic vote, in order to challenge the Labour party in its Glaswegian strongholds, but also in response to anti-Catholic accusations made against the party after the 1994 Monklands East by-election (Lynch 2002: 212). The 1994 campaign took place against the background of rising sectarian tensions in this electoral district of the Strathclyde region. Although the SNP was founded in 1934 out of the fusion of the Scottish Party, which comprised a strong element of anti-Catholic bigotry and anti-Irish racism, and the National Party of Scotland that was impregnated by a Pan-Celtic ideology, its sectarian heritage had been deliberately abandoned by the 1960s (Mitchell 1996). The SNP initiated a campaign to repeal the Act of Settlement, a 300 year-old law that excludes Catholics from the line of succession to the throne. In addition, the party sought the support of Catholic bishops by vocally backing Catholic schooling. A statistical breakdown of the 1997 Westminster elections results showed that Labour attracted 66% of the Catholic vote, while only 8% went to the SNP, 4% for the Conservatives, and 21% to the Liberals (Denver 1997). But
the Catholic hierarchy, who participated on an equal footing with the Church of Scotland to the 1989 Scottish Convention, proved to be a fervent supporter of devolution, as the introduction of a Scottish political arena could in no circumstances undermine its relative power (Steven 2007).

3.3.2. ‘Fresh talents’ against ‘white settlers’

Since the 1960s, the main concern of British policy-makers regarding immigration has been to cope with the sizeable proportion of Commonwealth citizens coming from the Indian sub-continent and, for many of them, what became after the 1948 partition the state of Pakistan. But this proved to be mainly an English concern, as Commonwealth immigration to Wales and Scotland remained relatively much lower. In 2001, there were only 42,577 self-identified Muslims in Scotland, against 1,524,887 in England (GROS 2001). Unlike the Catholics, Muslims in Scotland are a young community, concentrated in the Glasgow area and relatively much less numerous than in the city belt of Northern England. While the Labour party has long relied on their indefectible support (Maan 1992), the association Asian-Scots for Independence, funded by and affiliated to the SNP, was created as much for bolstering the party’s self-conscious civic positioning as for an electoral purpose. Indeed, although the Muslim community is relatively small, its high concentration in a few constituencies gives it a political weight that largely exceeds its actual size. The association’s convenor Bashir Ahmed – who became in 2007 the first Pakistani-born MSP – gave his own version of civic nationalism at a 1995 SNP rally in terms that historians may find puzzling: “[a]t the time of Robert the Bruce, the drive for Scottish independence involved people from all backgrounds and nationalities, who shared a common vision of humanity in Scotland. That is our vision too.”86 The predominance of constitutional issues and the limited size of Asian and Black communities have led to an absence of a “racialization process in Scotland since 1945, rather than an absence of racism per se” (Miles & Dunlop 1987: 119). In one of the few systematic studies dedicated to the subject in Scotland before devolution, Miles and Dunlop also stressed the construction of the increasing number of English-born immigrants living in Scotland as the ‘significant other’, taking over the role until then occupied by the Catholic community in the national imaginary87.

87 See also McIntosh et al. (2004) for a sociological account of grassroots anti-English racism in Scotland.
While there is a widespread belief that the Irish constitute the single largest immigration-induced minority in Scotland’s contemporary history, census data suggests that as early as 1921, they had been overtaken by the English. First generation migrants born in England came to represent 8.1% of the population of Scotland in 2001, against 7% in 1991, after four decades of a steady increase. Yet the issue is barely ever discussed in Scottish politics, which led some to speak of an ‘invisible’ and yet ‘audible’ minority, an immigration by stealth, a constant and quiet inflow of English nationals to the northern end of the Union. The phenomenon has not drawn significant scholarly attention either, the first comprehensive study of it having been published as late as 2003. This lack of interest is reflected in the persistence of myths and preconceived ideas that are often far from reality. The common wisdom assimilates English migrants with middle-class pensioners relocating in the rural Highlands. But Murray Watson (2003) convincingly showed that the overwhelming majority of them actually lived in the Lowlands urban belt and presented similar socio-economic characteristics as the native population. Yet, “incomers are sometimes explicitly vilified, as outsiders with imperialist aspirations to subjugate and destroy local lifestyles and culture, described as ‘white settlers’. [the English], defined by an apparently clear – if vaguely specified – identity, has to some extent come to symbolize the negative popular perspective placed on cultural and social change associated with migration, throughout Scotland and specifically on rural Scotland” (Short & Stockdale 1999: 177-78).

To be sure, counter-urbanization trends are a well-documented aspect of late-modernity resulting from the increasing salience of post-materialist values. The ‘White settlers’ phenomenon in Scotland is no exception and tensions arising from it have been mainly of an urban versus rural kind. But the very term is reminiscent of a colonial idiom which

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88. Report on Scotland’s population in 2001, General Register Office for Scotland, 2002. These figures should nevertheless be handled carefully, as they are only based on the place of birth and do not distinguish the (numerous) cases of returned Scots born in England and second generation English immigrants. These complex migration patterns illustrate the extent to which the Scottish and English peoples, bounded by a common state for three centuries, have been intertwined.

89. The concept of the ‘audible minority’ coined by Bond, Charsley and Grundy (2009) to designate ‘English immigrants’ living in Scotland captures well the important role played by speakers’ accents in the UK in general and in Scotland in particular. Indeed McCrone et al (2006) have shown that having a Scottish accent was, with birth, the most significant marker of Scottish identity.

was common in European regionalist debates in the 1960s\textsuperscript{91} and struck a sensitive chord in Scotland. Explicitly anti-English groupuscules like White Settlers or Settlers Watch\textsuperscript{92} were set up, and although they never gathered more than a few hundred members, spurred the interest of the media that took the opportunity to speculate on the “warnings that Scotland’s patient nationalism could turn nasty.”\textsuperscript{93} Neil Ascherson reporting for the Independent in 1993 captured this fear in a telling way: “[s]lowly and almost indefinably, the climate in Scotland is changing. To be a child with an English accent in a Scottish school yard was never an easy ride, but these days it is markedly rougher. Unexpected people will now talk of ‘white settlers’ or of ‘rich folk from down South’, and there is a new edge in their voice. This anxiety crystallizes around the idea of English immigration.”\textsuperscript{94} Successive rows over the intake of English students and the appointment of English staff in Scottish universities provided those denouncing the ethnic undertones of Scottish nationalism with further legitimacy.

However, while anti-English sentiments may be diffuse at grassroots level, none of the political parties ever intended to instrumentale them for an electoral purpose. In 1994, the SNP clearly distanced itself from Scottish Watch, founded by a former SNP activist with the aim of “cleansing Scotland of English white-settler exploitation.”\textsuperscript{95} The association New Scots for Independence, affiliated to the SNP that at its height gathered several hundred individuals, was founded to reassure non Scottish-born residents that they would not be discriminated against in an independent Scotland. In 1995, the party won an injunction against the extreme anti-English group Settler Watch to stop issuing pamphlets urging support for the SNP\textsuperscript{96}. Furthermore, English-born residents are not geographically concentrated, nor do they constitute a clearly identifiable community living on the margin of Scottish society. The ‘Scottishing effect’ (Dickson 1994),  

\textsuperscript{91}. For the French case, see Robert Laffont’s influential essay La revolution régionaliste (1967) and the even more eloquent Décoloniser en France (1971). The colonial idiom was especially popular among regionalist movements in the 1960s, when people’s right to self-determination was re-interpreted in order to include former colonies. However, this became old-fashioned in the 1990s and is hardly ever used today. In the British context, the term White Settlers refers more specifically to British settlers in Kenya and Rhodesia, who were a block to colonial independence.  

\textsuperscript{92}. These groups only gathered a few hundred members and never managed to enjoy broad appeal (Watson 2003).  


\textsuperscript{94}. Irvine Welsh’s hero in Trainspotting (1993) put the 1990s Scottish malaise in a more telling if vulgar way: “Ah hate cunts like that… Cunts that are intae baseball-batting every fucker that’s different, pakis, poofs, n what huv ye. Fucking failures in a country ay failures. It’s nae good blaming the English for colonizing us. Ah don’t hate the English. They’re just wankers. We are colonized by wankers. We can’t even pick a decent, vibrant, healthy culture to be colonized by. No. We’re ruled by effete arseholes. What does that make us?... The most wretched, servile, miserable, pathetic trash that was ever shit intae creation.”  

\textsuperscript{95}. Quoted in the Observer ‘SNP’s tartan embrace of the sooth mooth’, November 4, 1999.  

\textsuperscript{96}. See UNHCR, Minorities at Risk Project (2004).
through which English-born migrants become rapidly incorporated into Scottish society, reflects how, for better or worse, Scotland shares numerous similarities with its Southern neighbour. English immigrants never attempted to constitute a distinct political party on ethnic lines in order to defend their interests, nor have they tried to establish specific sections within existing parties, nor sought to gain recognition as a culturally distinct minority. Reciprocally, Scottish emigrants living in England are equally invisible and the SNP never seriously considered them as a potential electoral resource. Unlike in Québec where the English-speaking community sought recognition – and was encouraged to do so by the federal government – as a distinct group, nothing similar occurred in Scotland, where Britishness still provides an overlapping identity, and hence a back door to inter-ethnic tensions.

In fact, rising hostility towards English-born residents cannot be understood independently of the broader political and economic context of the 1980s. This was not so much the result of Scottish nationalism turning ‘nasty’ as the consequence of two changes.

First, the boundary between English and Scots residing in Scotland was far from being clear-cut. As support for nationalism increasingly overlapped with and reinforced the class cleavage, the ‘others’ were not so much the ‘English’, a discursive category that is particularly at odds with the sociological patterns of a territorially dispersed and loosely connected population. Instead, the national boundary increasingly excluded the native upper class, an “internal periphery strongly addicted to the symbols of Scottish ‘patriotism’” and yet well integrated into the England-dominated British state (McKenzie 1981: 162-63). Although this category is equally far from representing a socio-demographic reality, it nonetheless suggests that the boundary shift through contraction was rather a class than an ethnic mechanism per se.

The second factor has to do with the seemingly inexorable economic decline of Scotland, which found its expression in the recrudescence of emigration now mainly directed to the South-East of England. By 2001, 735,000 people born in Scotland were living in England alone – on average younger and more skilled that their English-born
peers living in Scotland – while merely 250,000 were residing overseas. The recovery brought about by the war-related industries during World War II proved to be short-lived, and the 1950s saw a further decline of Scottish traditional industries. A series of regional development policies were introduced by successive Labour and Conservative governments during the heyday of the welfare state. In spatial and social terms, the state committed itself to providing assistance and care to Britons ‘from cradle to grave’, wherever they happened to reside across the territory. Apart from mitigating peripheral dissent by diverting resources from the centre, it was meant to reduce the incentives for emigration by creating employment opportunities in economically ailing areas. The 1960s saw the creation of more sophisticated growth poles and major industrial developments were relocated to Scotland (Keating 2001a: 245). A Development Office for Scotland was set up in 1961, followed in 1964 by the Highland and Islands Development Board. However, this period of state-funded reindustrialization came to an end in the 1970s, when the priority shifted from mitigating within-state territorial inequalities to encouraging endogenous growth (Keating 1998: 27). The relative failure of post-war territorial management through diversionary policies in the context of an increasingly open economy encouraged the Thatcher-led Conservative government to advance its neo-liberal agenda north of the border. The potion proved to be particularly bitter in Scotland, where a sharp rise in unemployment combined with the prevalence of foreign-owned branch factories (Mitchell 1997) – more vulnerable to adverse economic conditions – provoked a new wave of skilled emigration from the Lowlands. Between 1981 and 1991, some 250,000 people fled the economically depressed region (Armitage 2005). The phenomenon came to be referred to as the ‘Lowland Clearances’, building a link between the “nineteenth century depopulation of the Highlands with the late twentieth-century depopulation induced by the collapse of heavy industry, coal mine and car production in the urban Lowlands” (Harper & Vance 1999: 17). The SNP emphasis on relative economic deprivation was perfectly in tune with the increasing perception that emigration was but another symptom of the Union. More than ever before, home-grown talents educated in Scottish universities took their skills elsewhere and increasingly to the South-East of England, in sharp contrast with earlier periods when Scottish nationalists could at least take pride in their sons and daughters roaming

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98. Peter Jones and Christopher Harvie (2000) in their book The Road to Home Rule made a link between the destruction of working class communities brought about by the ‘Lowland clearances’ in the 1980s – that dislocated traditional voting patterns – and the rise of support for the SNP.
the earth. The demise of the Empire and the concomitant emergence of the South East of England as emigrants’ main destination gave some substance to the nationalist claim that Scotland would be better off once emancipated from London.

As British elites saw no other option but to manage decline, Scotland faced the choice between remaining a managed periphery or profoundly revising the terms of the Union with the hope of a new distinctly Scottish impulse. This dilemma was well understood by H.J. Hanham, writing in 1969: “Now that the Empire is dead many Scots feel cramped and restricted at home. They chafe at the provincialism of much of Scottish life and at the slowness of Scottish economic growth, which is related to that provincialism. To give themselves an opening to a wider world the Scots need some sort of outlet, and the choice appears at the moment to be between emigration and re-creating the Scottish nation at home” (quoted in Devine 2006b, my emphasis). This touches upon another fundamental aspect of centre-periphery relations in the United Kingdom, which for a time mitigated peripheral dissent as centripetal forces were powerful enough, but ultimately could no longer stem the tide. The geographical frontier between England and Scotland has remained unchanged since the thirteenth century, which makes it one of the oldest borders in Europe. After 1707, the symbolic significance of the border remained, although by then, the numerous Scots who crossed it were no longer in a foreign land inhabited by their Auld Enemy, but on the way to the political, economic and cultural centre of the British nation/Empire in the making. Yet, by the 1980s, the case that the mariage de raison with England was still a positive-sum operation from which all could benefit was put under severe strain, at least within the current institutional arrangements.

3.4. Internal minorities and the road to devolution

As in Catalonia, support for nationalism in Scotland cuts across and overlaps with religious, class, and ethnic cleavages. However, because of the idiosyncratic structure of the Union state, the recognition of Scotland as a nation has rarely been subject to controversy. As a result, Unionists and Nationalists alike have been able to pull the

99. To be accurate, Scots-born subjects were no longer considered as aliens on English soil since the Union of the Crowns a century earlier. This point is further developed in Chapter VI, section 6.1.
nationalist string, while conceiving constitutional issues in a radically different way. The question of Scotland’s constitutional status has been sporadically debated ever since 1707, although it never came to the fore of the political debate until the 1970s. At least since the creation of the Scottish Home-rule Association in 1886, constitutional change has been discussed and advocated by umbrella organizations seeking to create a broad coalition of support, aggregating groups and individuals with distinct ideological inclinations and yet united in their common objective to reform the Union-state. The period from 1918 to 1964 saw the consolidation of a two-party system in Britain organized along class cleavages, although, as I showed earlier, class divisions competed with religious ones in Scotland throughout the entire period.

The first breakthrough of the SNP in the 1967 Hamilton by-elections marked an important shift in Scottish politics, as the class cleavage for four decades to come would no longer be superseded by religious affiliations, but by divergences over Scotland’s constitutional status, “at times cutting across and at other times reinforcing the class cleavage” (Mitchell 2009: 33). Scottish nationalism has historically been associated with the Liberals and the Labour party, which emerged as an autochthonous force in the second half of the nineteenth century (Keating & Bleiman 1979). The main reason for its hegemony north of the border, apart from following the regional pattern of industrialization, lies in the party’s successful balancing act between class and national interests. For a long time, this consisted in tapping resources from the centre rather than seeking partial exit in the form of political autonomy. In the 1970s, the Labour party’s renewed interest in devolution did not stem from a genuine ideological shift but came primarily in response to the SNP electoral threat. With 21.9% of the vote in 1974, the SNP was challenging the Labour party in its old Scottish bastion and forced the Labour leadership to reconsider its position. However, its reluctance to do so was manifest in the profound internal dissensions that ultimately contributed greatly to the referendum failure and subsequent fall of the Labour government100.

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100. Although a majority of Scottish voters supported the devolution Bill, the result fell short of reaching the 40% electorate threshold, an amendment passed to appease anti-devolutionists within Labour ranks.
Table 4: UK General election results in Scotland (1951-1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Cons</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Lib-Dem</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


But in the 1980s, successive victories of the Conservatives in general elections acquired an ever-growing territorial dimension. While quasi-hegemonic in the South-East of England, the party lost its ability to mobilize its traditional electorate in the periphery, and especially in Scotland where its vote share went down to 24% and 10 seats in 1987, against 42.5% and 50 seats for Labour. In her notorious Sermon of the Mound in 1988 at the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, Margaret Thatcher vainly attempted to reconcile her neo-liberal agenda with what she saw as a deeply rooted Scottish religious ethos\textsuperscript{101}. However, clergymen and pundits alike received her intervention with scepticism, the Conservatives’ steady electoral decline being the consequence of the party’s inability to deliver economic growth in Scotland, the secularization of Scottish Protestantism and the rise of political nationalism (Mitchell & Bennie, 1996).

Besides, the decade saw the development of another phenomenon that was to have crucial consequences for the evolution of Scottish nationalism. As Labour was adopting a more explicitly nationalist discourse and coming to terms with its internal divisions

\textsuperscript{101} In the words of Margaret Thatcher, the Scottish religious ethos was “about spiritual redemption, not social reform.”
over devolution, the Conservatives, whose uncompromising unionism had been reinvigorated under the influence of Margaret Thatcher, became markedly anti-devolutionist. More than ever before, constitutional and class cleavages in Scotland overlapped and reinforced one another, the nationalist struggle taking a clear anti-Tory dimension (Mitchell 1998). For the Conservatives, Scotland’s national destiny now lay in the exaltation of private enterprise and the eradication of the Scots’ ‘dependency culture’ through the dismantling of the welfare state in an increasingly centralized state. In stark contrast, home-rulers, despite their ideological divergences, shared the view that Scottish national identity was primarily territorial, leaning towards the left of centre, and necessitating a profound revision of Scotland’s current constitutional status. Electoral breakdowns of the 1979 referendum clearly show that support for devolution was mainly dragged from working class and Catholic voters and geographically concentrated in the West Central Lowlands.

The decline of the Conservatives, combined with evidence that the reserves of potential electors were to be found on the left of the political spectrum, encouraged the SNP to become explicitly left-wing in the 1980s, following a long period throughout which the party had been reluctant to position itself on the ideological axis (Lynch 2002). In the 1970s, Scottish Labour sought to counter the rise of the SNP by accusing it of being the ‘Tartan Tories’, hostile to working class interests. However, this seemed increasingly far-fetched now that the party was clearly hunting on Labour’s territory.

By the late-1980s, Labour endorsed the idea of cross-party campaigning for devolution and participated in the Scottish Constitutional convention, together with the Liberal Democrats, the Churches, Trade Unions and a number of civil society associations. The SNP, torn apart by internal dissensions between fundamentalists and gradualists, remained at the margin of the initiative without entirely disqualifying it. The subsequent

102. The widespread belief that the 1978 Scotland Act was meant to entrench a Catholic-friendly Labour domination in Scotland through an assembly elected by the first-past-the-post system goes a long way to explain the referendum failure (McKenzie 1981). This is of course not the only factor that has been invoked. However, the decision to introduce proportional representation for elections at the Scottish Parliament in the 1997 Scotland Act was partly taken in order to dissipate these doubts.

103. In 1979, a group of party members – the 79 Group – created an internal faction and sought to persuade the SNP leadership to take an actively left-wing orientation. Although they were expelled in 1982, the party nonetheless evolved towards a more left-wing strategy, following the changing winds of Scottish politics and surfing on the widespread opposition to Margaret Thatcher’s neo-liberal agenda.
release of the Scottish Bill of Rights\textsuperscript{104} illustrates the expansion of political nationalism, not limited to the SNP but covering the entire political spectrum apart from the Conservatives. The important difference from the previous decade is the intimate link built between devolution and democracy, or more precisely, between self-determination and the 'democratic deficit' engendered by the decline of the Conservatives, portrayed as having ‘no mandate in Scotland’ (Mitchell et al. 1998). Although the Catalan case was admittedly more problematic in the 1970s, the Scottish road to devolution also associated political autonomy with democratic legitimacy, undermined by the declining support of the Scottish electorate for the Westminster government and the development of an increasingly distinct party system. The 1997 referendum – imposed by Labour party backbenchers and endorsed by Tony Blair – illustrated the changing mood of the Scottish electorate who, after 17 years of Conservative rule, voted en masse in favour of the bill.

However, electoral breakdowns show significant variations along ideological, class and religious lines. While merely 8\% of Conservative voters registered a double-yes vote, 85\% of Labour voters and 90\% of SNP voters did so. Class divisions show a similar pattern: 46\% of middle class voters supported the scheme against 74\% of lower class voters. More strikingly, the overwhelming majority of Roman Catholics (83\%) registered a double-yes vote, while no more than 59\% of Church of Scotland members did so (Denver 2002). These figures are sufficiently compelling to conclude that the re-establishment of the Scottish parliament marked the decline of the Conservative strand of unionism, and a concomitant rise of a territorially-defined national identity, asserting more left-of centre values, and cutting across religious and ethnic lines. On the eve of devolution, the national boundary was more than ever before territorialized. In 1995, the SNP former MP and future MSP George Reid was able to span a thousand years of Scottish history to give his own teleological vision of contemporary Scottish national identity, “built on the commonwealth of the Celts, the moral responsibility of the Calvinists, the social concern of the Catholics, the humanity of the Labour movement, and the civic nationalism of today.”\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{104} The Statement of the Scottish Bill of Rights reads: “We, gathered as the Scottish Constitutional Convention, do hereby acknowledge the sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of Government best suited to their needs, and do hereby declare and pledge that in all our actions and deliberations their interests shall be paramount.”

\textsuperscript{105} Georges Reid speaking at the Donaldson lecture, 1995.
IV

The Terra de Pas

Low fertility is the eternal problem of decadent people, whose members privilege the satisfaction of their immediate interests to the long-term fate of their fatherland.

–José Antonio Vandellos, Catalunya: Poble Decadent

Jaume Vicens Vives, the most famous Catalan historian of the twentieth century, characterized Catalonia as a “passage across cultures and continents”, and the Catalan people as the “fruit of diverse yeasts” (1959: 56-59). The reference to the ‘Terra de Pas’ has a long historical pedigree in Catalan historiography, and served an instrumental purpose when nationalists became confronted to the need in the 1970s to reconstruct the Catalan people on a basis that could accommodate internal immigrants who came from other parts of Spain, and represented close to 40% of the population in 1975. It provided a potent justification to those who defended a territorial conception of national membership, and contributed to avoid the emergence of institutionally-entrenched divisions on ethnic or linguistic lines in the homeland. Those who spoke in the name of the Catalan people before and after the democratic transition turned this sociohistorical observation into an almost unchallenged category of political practice. Hence, for the former president of the Generalitat Jordi Pujol, “Catalonia has received Castilian immigrants since the Middle Ages, great numbers of Frenchmen in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Many people of Europe, at one time or another, have passed
through Catalonia, a country linking the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe, a natural gate of entry” (1976: 104-05). His assertion that “everyone who lives and work in Catalonia is to be considered a Catalan” gradually turned into a national credo celebrating the inclusive character of the Catalan nation-building project.

In this chapter, I explore the territorial politics of migration in Catalonia in a historical perspective. I pay particular attention to political elites’ boundary-making strategies in relation to internal immigrants throughout the period that preceded and followed the democratic transition and the re-establishment of political autonomy in 1979. Prior to the transition, the large proportion of residents who were born outside Catalonia encouraged nationalists to define national membership in territorial terms. This boundary-making strategy fulfilled two objectives. First, it enabled them to acquire further internal legitimacy by not providing immigrants with incentives for opposing the national project. Second, it strengthened their external legitimacy, thus limiting opportunities for reluctant central elites to exacerbate internal divisions along linguistic or ethnic lines. The 1979 Statute conferred legal substance on this claim by defining Catalan citizenship on the basis of residency, thus translating a conception of political membership that could accommodate residents irrespective of their place of birth and their degree of attachment to the land. Accordingly, those who were born elsewhere in Spain could become political Catalans. After the re-establishment of the Generalitat, Catalan nation-builders have conceived of integration in an ambivalent way. While the institutional framework officially entrenched bilingualism, it also actively gave preference to the Catalan language and conferred a clear advantage on those who could speak it. Catalan nationalists have pursued an ambitious and far-reaching strategy of ‘linguistic normalization’, while carefully preventing the linguistic conflict from becoming politicized and the language from turning into a salient membership boundary.

Both boundary-making strategies did not come without difficulties, have been challenged and questioned on several occasions, without ever being significantly altered. I contend that this outcome can best be understood when seen as the consequence of a self-conscious elite strategy, facilitated by favourable dimensions of the opportunity structure. The first dimension concerns the politico-institutional context in which actors have been embedded. In the years preceding the democratic transition,
repression organized by a highly centralized and authoritarian state provided incentives for fragmented and ideologically divided opposition groups to achieve minimal consensus, equating the democratic struggle with the quest for political autonomy. After the transition, the re-establishment of the Generalitat provided a favourable environment, where divisive issues could be mediated in a liberal democratic context.

The second dimension stresses the role of parties on the left, which established strong links with immigrants who were over-represented among the working class, and dragged them into the national movement. The communist party PSUC was particularly instrumental in this respect during the pre-transition period, but this role was gradually taken over by PSC in the 1980s, as communist parties, in Catalonia as elsewhere in Western Europe, lost their appeal. Both parties, while maintaining an ambiguous relationship with the Catalan nation-building project, have contributed to blurring ethnic boundaries within the homeland, providing a link with the rest of the state and fusing working class and national claims.

4.1. The historical origins of the ‘immigrant question’ in Catalonia

Catalonia's political trajectory has to be examined in the light of the historical vagaries of the Spanish state-building process (Linz 1973). In the United Kingdom, democratization has followed an incremental path which continuously, although to a variegated degree, enabled the maintenance of distinct institutions in Scotland. The low penetration of the British administration until 1945, combined with the consolidation of the Scottish Office throughout the twentieth century, enabled Scottish political elites to enjoy a reasonable degree of autonomy and Scotland to retain distinct institutional features, in spite of the ever more pronounced concentration of power at the centre. Spanish unity was achieved as the successive and asymmetric union of several kingdoms, who put aside their long-standing enmities for the higher purpose of the Reconquista. In 1469, the formal union of the crowns of Aragon and Castilia did not seriously affect Catalonia’s political autonomy. But this changed dramatically in the aftermath of the war of the Spanish succession which ended in 1714. The new context
provided the new king of Spain with the opportunity to rationalize the administrative patchwork inherited from the asymmetric alliances of the Union state. The territories of the Crown of Aragon were not the only ones to be affected by this centralizing turn. Indeed, the promulgation of the *Nueva Planta* decrees in 1715 also put an end to the organization of Castilia into distinct kingdoms and abrogated most of the privileges and liberties of localities. But Catalonia paid a particularly high price for its alliance with the defeated coalition led by the Austrian emperor. The abolition of the *Corts* and of the *Consell de Cent* went hand-in-hand with the suppression of the Catalan language from the administration that, for two centuries, would function exclusively in Castilian (Gimenez Lopez et al. 1994). To be fair, this occurred at a time when the *Principat* had entered a period of decline, torn apart by internal conflicts opposing the agrarian peripheries and the urban core, economically ailing and registering sharp demographic decline. In spite of the brutal circumstances under which centralism came about and the genuine efforts to resist it in Catalonia, the *forces vives* were for a time successfully integrated into a clearly-identifiable centre, which ultimately strengthened the territorial legitimacy of the state (Vilar 2006: 112-15). In 1778, the gates to the colonies were finally opened to Catalan merchants, a privilege until then reserved to the territories under the rule of the Castilian Crown. The eighteenth century saw marked population growth, in Catalonia as well as in the whole of Spain, the number of residents increasing respectively from 407,000 to 900,000 and from 6 to 11 million between 1716 and 1789 (Vilar 1976: 447-450).

### 4.1.1. Migration and territorial structuring

While the eighteenth century was a period of progressive state-building, the project of constructing a single nation out of a variety of peoples inhabiting the same state became a major concern in the nineteenth century. The 1812 Cadiz Constitution represents a cornerstone in the history of Spanish liberalism. This frustrated attempt to turn Spain into a democratic nation state came to symbolize the struggle of enlightened forces...

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106. Rokkan sees some similarities with the Swiss fight against the German emperors, with the important difference that by the end of the fifteenth century Castile had become the dominant player as a result of the *Conquista* and the opening of the Atlantic trade route, while simultaneously the Aragonese federation was losing ground in the Mediterranean (Peter Flora et al. 1999: 183-84). Pierre Vilar makes a similar point: between 1333 and 1450, the volume of external trade in Barcelona was divided by five (2008: 46-52).

107. Between 1654 and 1660, the plague was responsible for the death of up to 1/5th of the Catalan population (Tarrés 1969: 40-1).
against absolutism (Perez-Garzón 2007). The discussions over the territorial organization of the state that the Constitution was meant to establish evinced important dissensions within the liberal camp. The disagreement opposed the advocates of the rationalist and universalist ideals that brought legitimacy to the 1789 division of France into quasi-geometrical départements irrespective of historical precedents, and what was then referred to as “the spirit of provincialism”, concerned with the preservation of historical divisions inherited from the Union state of the Reconquista, and only partially destroyed in 1715. For the Catalan deputy Felip Aner, aggregating existing territories without any consideration for their customs and languages would not “make Catalans forget that they are Catalans”, a concern to which the president of the court replied: “we are speaking of territorial divisions as if there would be no communication whatsoever among provinces, an impenetrable wall like the one separating the Tartar world from China […]. But what difference would it make for a citizen moving from one province to another? Well, none; he would just move from one room of the paternal house to another, and be subject to the same rules, not to a foreign and hostile land where no one would be concerned with his well-being (quoted in Garcia Alvarez 2003: 76).”

By 1900, what was merely a parliamentary quarrel over a hypothetical phenomenon in Cadiz turned into a salient political issue in Barcelona, where the rise of Catalan nationalism corresponded with a period of significant immigration from the rest of Spain. The Catalan capital had become in the second half of the nineteenth century a major recipient of internal migration pulled into its buoyant industries. At that date, 28% of the population was born in another part of Spain, a figure that rose to 31.5% a decade later108. In 1887, immigrants represented merely 1.2% of the population of the four Catalan provinces, increasing to 4.2% in 1900, 5.4% in 1910, and up to 14% in 1920 (Termes 1984: 180-89). Besides, the period was marked by formidable movements of populations within the boundaries of Catalonia itself, from the rural peripheries of the hinterlands and the Pyrenees, which suffered a 30% absolute demographic decline between 1875 and 1900, to the province of Barcelona. The consequences bear some similarities with nineteenth century Scotland, where internal migration resulting from radical economic transformations broke the geographical border between the Highlands and the Lowlands and reinforced a sense of territorial

108 While immigration from the rest of Spain was significant in Barcelona, the other provinces were almost entirely unaffected.
identity. Likewise, in Catalonia, the rural exodus considerably diffused the awareness of a territorial identity, encompassing the four provinces with Barcelona at its core, as “the duality and opposition between the mountain and the plain, the hinterlands and the coast, that had divided Catalonia ever since the thirteenth century until the third Carlist War, were now overcome” (Balcells 1977a: 88). Hence, natives of other parts of Spain increasingly found themselves in an environment where Catalans were more than ever aware of their collective identity. But more importantly for our purpose, regional elites were increasingly eager to assert this *fet diferencial* and translate it into a claim of self-determination. In consequence, Spanish citizens migrating from one province to another turned into *immigrants* in a contested territory, wherein two nation-building projects were to compete with one another.

By then, there was little doubt that the project envisaged in Cadiz of turning Spain into a modern nation state had politically, culturally, and economically failed. The administrative penetration of the state into the periphery had done little but reveal its organizational weakness and the bureaucratic deficiencies of a corrupt system. In 1900, the literacy rate barely reached 30%, with important territorial variations (de Gabriel 1998: 37). The process of cultural homogenization had been if anything counter-productive, especially in Catalonia where the rise of a romantic movement known as the *Renaixença* had revitalized the Catalan language, boosted interest in historiography, and provided peripheral elites with a rich usable past on which to build their claim. Perhaps more importantly, in spite of the fact that monetary and fiscal unification had been formally achieved, Spain as a nation in the nineteenth century sense of the term, as a ‘nation-market’, organized around a fully-fledged bourgeoisie, had failed (Vilar 1976: 79). The industrialization of Catalonia, and later of the Basque Country, provoked a territorially uneven pattern of economic development. In spite of the concentration of administrative and cultural resources at the centre, the northern peripheries became economically more powerful, turning Spain into a polycephalic state. The series of political crises that punctuated the century culminated in 1898 with the humiliating loss
of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the last remnants of the Empire. This traumatic event cast serious doubts on the viability of the Spanish state which, combined with the limited rewards entailed for Catalan industrialists in privileged access to a state-wide market protected from external competition by high tariff barriers, provided strong impetus to the national movement.

4.1.2. 1900-1936: from the Lerrouxist peril to the Civil War

In 1901, the Lliga Regionalista was founded and was to dominate the Catalan political scene until the advent of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship in 1923. The Lliga was both nurtured by the social conservatism of the Carlist movement and the romantic ideas of the Renaixença. It was equally committed to intervene in Spanish politics and transform the atavistic state from the centre so as to acquire further autonomy in the periphery (Ellrich 2004). It relied on the firm support of Catalan industrialists, who were opposed to progressive labour reforms which could undermine their competitiveness and opportunistically used the repressive apparatus of the state to police an increasingly agitated working class (Balcells 1976b: 5). Besides, immigration from the rest of Spain provided a seemingly infinite resource of cheap labour, which was used as a means to break strikes and weaken class solidarity. But by trying to empty the Catalan movement of its progressive components, the Lliga mechanically reinforced the legitimacy of Alejandro Lerroux, a young and charismatic politician who was charged with the task of reinvigorating Spanish Republicanism in the turbulent region. He successfully capitalized on a working class backlash by presenting Catalanism as an essentially bourgeois ideology, hostile to their interests: “The Castilians, who represent one third of the inhabitants of this city, do not even dare to speak loudly on the Ramblas, because the separatist beast mocks their language with cynicism…”111 His demagoguery resonated well among an uprooted proletariat, clustered in the overcrowded slums of Barcelona, whose living conditions were in all respects extremely difficult and separated from the native population along self-reinforcing linguistic and socioeconomic lines. However, while Lerroux did make significant inroads in some neighbourhoods with a high concentration of immigrants, the hostile attitude of the

111. Alejandro Lerroux in a speech from 1905, quoted in Ellrich, 2004: 158.
central government towards the working class gave new vigour to the more progressive components of Catalan nationalism.

In 1923, the *Lliga*, concerned with the radicalization of the class struggle exacerbated by the success of the Bolshevik Revolution and adverse economic conditions, did not oppose General Primo de Rivera’s *coup d’état*. But the belief that Primo de Rivera was a providential figure, able to re-establish social order and expand the self-governing institutions they failed to obtain through parliamentary means, was soon disappointed. Indeed, the *Mancomunitat* was abolished in 1925. Besides, the authoritarian regime he imposed cast serious doubts on the *Lliga’s* capacity to articulate a territorial interest beyond the defence of the bourgeoisie’s privileges. The period saw the resurgence of immigration as a result of large-scale state-funded investment in infrastructure, public works, and preparations for the 1930 International exposition in Montjuic (Candel 1964: 39). The net migration rate rose sharply to 32,000 on average per year, so that close to 25% of the Catalan population was born elsewhere in Spain in 1930. Yet national and working class interests increasingly conflated into common opposition to the authoritarian central state, thus enabling the Catalanist left to begin the following decade as the dominant political force. The party *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC), founded in 1930, was able to build a broad coalition of support and retained an almost hegemonic position until 1936. After ERC’s large victory at the 1930 local elections, its leader Francesc Maciá proclaimed the ‘free Catalan Republic’ within a chimerical ‘Iberic federation’, a few days before the Second Republic was officially founded. But the new institutional context encouraged him to negotiate with Madrid and compromise for a solution that fell short of federalism, as Spain was constitutionally meant to remain an ‘integral state’; and yet enabled provinces to organize themselves into Autonomous Communities. In 1931, 99% of the Catalan electorate voted in favour of the Statute resurrecting the Generalitat more than two centuries after its dissolution, with an exceptionally high turnout of 75%. In the city of Barcelona, merely 3,000 voters opposed it, although 37% of its million inhabitants were born elsewhere in Spain (Balcells 1976b: 23-25). The change was considerable when compared to twenty years earlier when the *Lerrouxist peril* had threatened the cohesion of the Catalanist movement. In 1932, Francesc Maciá, then President of the Catalan Parliament, was well

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aware of the necessity to ground the legitimacy of the autonomous government in the entire resident population. He addressed the Catalan people with words that emphatically appealed to a territorial identity in-the-making: [a]ll Catalans – whether of blood, language, birth or residence – shall reap the benefits of political autonomy. We consider as Catalans – and I believe it is important to stress this – everyone who lives on our land and feels penetrated by our desires and ideals.”

Between 1930 and 1936, not a single MP elected at successive elections for the Catalan Parliament was born outside of Catalonia, although immigrants represented up to 25% of the Catalan population (Pitarch 1980: 80). From 1936 onwards, Spain and Catalonia were drawn into a revolutionary spiral, which found its denouement in 1938 with the imminent victory of the Franco army over the Republican troops besieged in Barcelona. In Homage to Catalonia, George Orwell relates his experience as a member of the International Brigades. In spite of his rudimentary Spanish, he was able to capture how the “Catalans professed to look down on the Andalusians as a race of semi-savages, (…) rustic-looking men, with faces deeply stained by the ferocious sun of further south,” which in turn fed rivalries among the Republican camp itself (2000: 84-85). But ultimately, the divide between immigrants and natives at a time of exceptionally high polarization was overshadowed by the prevalence and salience of mutually reinforcing ideological and religious cleavages. This precipitated the country into a Hobbesian war, wherein the extraordinary level of violence achieved on both sides was not directed towards alleged strangers, but fellow-countrymen.

4.2. 1950-1978: the ‘New Catalans’ at the time of anti-Francoist mobilization

This section examines the political developments that led to the definition of Catalan citizenship based on residency in the 1979 Statute of autonomy, irrespective of geographical origin and linguistic criteria. I successively show how the outcome has been facilitated by the politico-institutional context, solidifying a united front of

113 A locution of President Maciá, published in the daily newspaper La Publicitat on December 4, 1932. The original text is available in Ismael Pitarch (ed.) El President Maciá, el Parlament de Catalunya, Parlament de Catalunya, 2009, p.82.
ideologically divided actors agreeing on a minimal consensus equating the democratic struggle with the recovery of political autonomy, and by the role of the Catalanist left, and PSUC in particular in bridging immigrants’ social demands and nationalist aspirations.

4.2.1. The pacific invasion

Between 1950 and 1975, the population of the four Catalan provinces increased from 3.2 to 5.6 million, mainly as a result of the influx of 1,400,000 migrants coming from other parts of Spain. In 1975, the year Franco died, an estimated 38% of the Catalan population was born elsewhere in Spain and most immigrants were concentrated in the fast-deteriorating neighbourhoods of Barcelona’s outskirts. Hence, they amounted to 85% of the resident population in Cornella de Llobregat, 84% in Santa Coloma de Gramanet and el Prat de Llobregat, 77% in Hospitalet de Llobregat, and 75% in Sabadell.

Table 5: Net migration - rest of Spain and abroad, (1941-1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Net Migration/rest of Spain</th>
<th>Net Migration/abroad</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941-50</td>
<td>194,617</td>
<td>7,519</td>
<td>2,792,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-60</td>
<td>497,857</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3,164,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-70</td>
<td>684,675</td>
<td>16,572</td>
<td>3,890,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-80</td>
<td>306,081</td>
<td>6,115</td>
<td>5,041,205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pablo Alcaide Guindo et al. (2007)

The circumstances under which what some referred to as a ‘pacific invasion’ came about are still subject to controversies in the Catalan historiography. For Albert Balcells, the Franco regime purposely encouraged immigration, with the aim of weakening the Catalan working class associative tradition and achieving a “Castilianization from the bottom to the top, progressive and constant, facilitated by industrialisation and uneven fertility rates” (2004: 72). However, the government was equally concerned with the rapid and endogenous industrialization of the Northern peripheries, which it saw as a potential source of instability, as with their cultural homogenization. Internal migrations
gained considerable vigour in the wake of the Plan de Estabilización (stabilisation plan), initiated in 1959 by the new generation of bureaucrats who had recently replaced the old guard at the head of the state. While this initiative marked the end of autarchy and the opening of Spain to foreign investments, it also raised a number of concerns, as it provoked the desertification of the Castilian hinterlands and Southern peripheries and a massive rural exodus directed to the provinces of Barcelona, Vizkaya, and beyond to France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany (Gonzalez Temprano 1975). The government sought to mitigate this through the creation of state-planned development poles (polos de desarrollo), in order to stimulate industrialization in other provinces, by channelling investment in economically deprived areas (Cuadrado-Roura 2009). These measures cast doubt on the belief, still widespread in nationalist circles, that immigration was part of a broader conspiracy orchestrated by the state to turn the Catalan people into a minority within its homeland.\footnote{The concept of ‘cultural genocide’ was popularized in the Catalan context by Josep Benet, 1995.}

But whether or not immigration was deliberately encouraged by the state, the consequence of uneven patterns of industrialization, or a combination or both is of secondary importance, as this occurred at a time where Catalan institutions had been virtually suppressed. The 1932 Catalan Statute was formally abrogated and “in accordance with the principle of patriotic unity”, the four Catalan provinces recovered the “honour of being governed on an equal step with their sisters from the rest of Spain.”\footnote{Bill issued and signed by General Franco himself on April 5, 1938 abrogating the 1932 Statute, my emphasis. The original text is available at http://www.xtec.es/~jrovira6/gcivil1/estatut.htm. It is interesting to contrast it with the reply of the President of the Cadiz Court in 1812, for whom Spain was a ‘paternal house’.}

Besides, the repression went beyond the abrogation of self-governing institutions and was accompanied, especially in the early years, by the systematic persecution of political opponents, forced into exile, parked in concentration camps, summarily executed or imprisoned (Richards 1998: 40-7). The inseparable wall evoked by the President of the Cadiz Court in 1812 had been crossed and dismantled. Yet, this was not achieved in the name of liberty and democracy, but marked the beginning of a dictatorship that was to last for four decades.

The government used all the instruments of a modern state to pursue an uncompromising nation-building project – the “reespañolización cultural de Cataluña”\footnote{These are the words of the civil governor of Barcelona appointed by the Regime in 1939, quoted in Benet, (1978: 290).} –, banishing the flag and changing street names, forbidding the national...
anthem, and prohibiting the use of the Catalan language in the public sphere. Besides, internal migrants settling in Catalonia were not, as it is sometimes wrongly assumed, all working class, but also included an indeterminate number of Civil War veterans acting as the representatives of the state and occupying key positions in the Church, the army and the administration. Together with some sections of the autochthonous upper-bourgeoisie, they formed a small but cohesive elite who remained to the end loyal to the regime (Guibernau 2004). They were those who Francisco Candel, in his famous pamphlet published in 1964, called the “other immigrants”, who “unlike the kind of poor immigrants who represent a hope for our country, have the mind of a conquistador” (Candel 1972: 292). Jordi Pujol drew a similar line between the numerically small yet powerful group of those who “possess a pure Castilian mentality, central Castilian” and the poor and “uprooted” immigrants who came to seek a better life (1976: 124). As in Scotland, the upper bourgeoisie was criticized for its promiscuity with the regime, assimilation into a Castilian identity, and lack of support for the Catalan cause. Hence, the national boundary was not built on strictly ethnic or linguistic lines, but overlapped with class divisions and excluded members of a dominant class, whether they were born and bred in Catalonia, or came to ‘colonize’ it. Nevertheless, as immigrants were over-represented in lower-status occupations, class divisions overlapped with and reinforced linguistic and ethnic ones. This created a potentially explosive situation, characterized by two antagonistic nation-building projects laying claim to the same piece of territory. This, however, failed to materialize, as nationalist elites were aware of the risk associated with a strictly ethnic or linguistic definition of national membership.

4.2.2. Boundary-making strategies in the pre-transition period

Nationalist elites self-consciously sought to project a political conception of the nation beyond linguistic considerations and encompassing everyone living within the territory.

117 Here I carefully distinguish ethnic and linguistic divisions, which are not congruent but overlapping. A number of native Catalans deliberately shifted to Castilian and educated their children in Castilian prior to the transition, especially among the higher bourgeoisie. In 1996, a study carried out by the CIS reported that 55 percent of respondents in Catalonia identified Spanish as their mother tongue, a proportion which far exceeds that of immigrants, i.e. individuals who were not born in Catalonia residing in the region, suggesting that linguistic data is a rather crude and ultimately useless indicator for distinguishing immigrants from natives. Regarding the relationship between the place of birth and socio-economic situation, CIS (1997) reported that in 1995, in the Barcelona metropolitan area, 78% of individuals belonging to the middle class were born in Catalonia, while this figure decreased to 39.3% for the working class, and exactly the opposite for individuals born outside of Catalonia, respectively 22 and 60.7%.
In the period that preceded the transition, those who spoke on behalf of the Catalan people and were later to negotiate far-reaching territorial autonomy with the central state as an essential component of the democratization process, were pursuing the seemingly irreconcilable task of blurring ethnic boundaries within the homeland, while strengthening the meaning of the territorial boundary with the rest of the state. Indeed, invoking a narrow conception of membership would have jeopardized their chance to negotiate far-reaching territorial autonomy through democratic means for two interrelated reasons. First, a strictly ethnic basis would have mechanically excluded a large proportion of the population, thus undermining the internal legitimacy of an autonomous government. Second, this would have provided reluctant central elites with a blueprint for exploiting internal divisions as a means of opposing their claims. In the 1960s, many Catalan nationalists had turned into Pancatalanists, defending the political unification of the Catalan-speaking countries from the French département of Languedoc-Roussillon to Valencia, on the basis of their putative cultural unity.

However, this demand was gradually abandoned as the prospect of recovering political autonomy grew closer, and there is seldom evidence that it has ever been seriously considered. While it still officially figures among the propositions of ERC and is regularly denounced by the Valencian section of PP that associates it with the supposed imperialist aspirations of the Generalitat, the Pancatalanist ideology has had few implications beyond the realm of political rhetoric and parties’ electoral strategies. In fact, Francisco Candel’s premonition that the “New Catalans, with their clean souls, loving passionately the country, would be drawn towards the curious task of revalorizing the New Catalonia,” was recuperated by the most prominent nationalist leaders of the time (Candel 1972: 324). Speaking on Spanish public television in 1976, Jordi Pujol argued that being Catalan was “neither a linguistic nor a genealogical issue.” Likewise, the ERC leader Heribert Barrera declared that “one can be Catalan and speak in Castilian everyday, or not be able to speak in our language, this makes no difference whatsoever” (1980: 212).

Actually, the most pressing concern was to achieve the unity of all anti-Francoist groups in Catalonia, in spite of their profound divergences along the ideological and territorial axes. After the Civil War, the vanquished camp, internally divided among factions

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blaming the responsibility for the defeat on one another, sought to organize the opposition in exile and to a lesser extent in Spain. However, the gradual acceptance of the dictatorship by the international community after World War II\textsuperscript{119} and the inherent difficulty of organizing the contestation beyond symbolic actions precipitated anti-Francoist groups into a state of crisis that was to last until the beginning of the 1960s. Even then, it did not take the form of a mass protest, mounting an imminent threat capable of overthrowing the regime. Yet, the Basque Country and Catalonia became the most significant bastions of resistance. In Catalonia, the movement remained by and large pacific\textsuperscript{120}, a surprising development considering the degree of polarization and violence achieved during the Civil War. The unity of opposition forces was formally achieved in 1969 in the Comisió coordinadora de Forces Politiques de Catalunya and culminated in 1971 with the creation of the Assemblea de Catalunya\textsuperscript{121}. The outcome was a short document that demanded a) the amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles, b) the return of fundamental democratic liberties, c) the right of self-determination and the provisional re-establishment of the Generalitat. Hence, their demands were not strictly speaking the manifestation of a nationalist ideology. Instead, political autonomy and the recognition of Catalonia’s national character were envisaged as an essential component of the democratic struggle, assuming that one could not come about without the other. The project envisaged in Cadiz, equating liberal democracy with a centralized state, had been entirely discredited with the Franco experience when the concentration of power at the centre in the name of Spanish unity went hand-in-hand with authoritarianism (Ysàs 1994: 84-89, Linz 1991).

Consequently, democracy/autonomy and autocracy/centralism came to be seen in the pre-transition context as two mutually exclusive forms of government. While the Assemblea de Catalunya gathered a broad coalition of opposition groups divided along and cutting across left/right and centre/periphery cleavages, they were nonetheless all

\textsuperscript{119} Acceptance of the Franco Regime by the international community reached a peak in 1953 with the signature of a Defence Agreement with the US government, who saw in Franco a valuable ally in the Cold War. In December 1946, the United Nations “condemned the Franco regime in Spain and decided that, as long as that regime remains, Spain may not be admitted to the United Nations” in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly, thus provoking great hope in the anti-Francoist camp. However, the country was officially accepted as a member in 1955.

\textsuperscript{120} In 1981, the terrorist organization Terra Lliure undertook a series of minor violent attacks but was rapidly disintegrated.

\textsuperscript{121} The Assemblea de Catalunya gathered the communists of PSUC, the socialists of Moviment Socialista de Catalunya, the nationalists of the Front Nacional de Catalunya, the Christian Democrats of Unió democràtica de Catalunya, ERC, the Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional, Bandera Roja, the Catalan federation of PSOE, Workers’ Commissions, the Assemblea de Intellectuales (Ysàs 1994: 86).
driven by the same objective of overthrowing the regime and initiating the democratic transformation of the state. Besides, the document carefully avoided elaborating on a number of issues that were to re-emerge after the re-establishment of the Generalitat, where they could be contained and mediated within the framework of liberal democratic institutions. Hence, the degree of linguistic convergence, the scope of political autonomy, and the manner in which class divisions should be addressed were not even mentioned. On September 11, 1977, the national day of Catalonia commemorating the fall of Barcelona in 1714, the greatest protest in the history of contemporary Spain was organized. Again, the rallying cry of the million protesters marching in the streets of Barcelona was ‘Llibertat, Amnistia, Estatut d’Autonomia’, a consensual slogan that could accommodate everyone, be they native or immigrants, behind a democratic banner, without entering into potentially divisive questions.

More importantly for our purpose, immigrants were directly involved in the democratic struggle through the PSUC, which was by far the largest and most well-organized group within the anti-Francoist constellation. Indeed, it could rely on dense networks in the industrial areas of Barcelona and its outskirts, characterized by a high presence of immigrant workers. This predominance was the heritage of the Second Republic, when PSUC, the historical party of the Catalan Communists founded in 1936, enjoyed considerable resources, having absorbed at the time the Catalan federation of PSOE (Colomé 1996: 9). While significantly diminished, this heritage still conferred a privileged position upon the PSUC in the 1960s, enabling it to “retain much more influence among the working class than other prominent parties” (Balcells 2004: 162). As the main opposition group, it attracted a number of activists beyond the narrow circles of Communist militants, which in turn reinforced its predominance (Greer 2007b: 10-13). Most importantly, the PSUC was not only the heir of greater organizational capacity, enabling it to aggregate different movements, but also of a strong Catalanist identity. This differentiated it markedly from the state-wide PCE, to which it was only loosely affiliated (Lardin i Oliver 2006). Hence it played a key role in linking working class demands and nationalist aspirations, dragging into its orbit a sizeable proportion of immigrants for whom the Catalan right to self-determination was at best a secondary concern.
At the 1977 parliamentary elections, more than one elected MP out of five was not a native-born Catalan, a proportion which rose to 25% in 1979 (Pitarch 1980: 81). Furthermore, the proportion of militants and representatives who were not born in Catalonia in the main Catalanist parties almost matched their relative weight in the population. There was, in Ismaël Pitarch’s words, a “quasi-equality of opportunities”, albeit with considerable variations across parties (ibid.: 82). While close to half the delegates attending the 4th Congress of PSUC in 1977 were born elsewhere in Spain, the figure dropped to 20% in the case of PSC, and merely 5% for the Pujol-led CDC122. The PSC came first at the 1977 and 1979 general elections, followed by PSUC, while Pujol’s group obtained the same proportion of votes as the state-wide centrist party UCD. The relatively low score of non state-wide nationalist parties led some pundits to downgrade the salience of the centre/periphery cleavage, neglecting the fact that PSC and PSUC, which together obtained more than 50% of the votes, had played a key role in the revitalization of Catalanism in the late-Franco period and its diffusion to the middle and lower social strata (Blondel 1981). As PSC and PSUC were to play a key role during the negotiations, working class immigrants in Catalonia could reasonably assume that their interest would be represented and taken into account at the time of setting a constitutional path for a democratic Spain and a politically autonomous Catalonia.

4.2.3. Catalan citizenship in the 1979 Statute

The MPs who were elected in Catalonia in 1977 enjoyed an electoral legitimacy which transcended the immigrant/native cleavage and were united around the common aim to recover political autonomy. In consequence, they approached the constitutional debate in a relatively strong position. The 1978 constitution struck a fragile balance between the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”, and “the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that form it…”123 Josep Taradellas, the leader of the Catalan government in exile, was invited to return and appointed as the provisional president of the Generalitat, charged with the task of elaborating a new Statute of Autonomy. Its terms were not to be imposed from the outside, but negotiated with political elites deemed as sufficiently legitimate to

122. The data is taken from the 1st Congress of the PSC held in 1978, and the 2nd Congress of the CDC held in 1976.
123. 1978 Spanish constitution, article 2, my emphasis.
speak on behalf of the Catalan ‘nationality’, however moribund Catalan institutions in exile were at the time.

The 1979 Estatut provided that Spanish nationals who have taken up administrative residence in one of the municipalities located within the jurisdiction of the Generalitat should be considered as Catalans for a ‘political’ purpose. One year earlier, the second Congres Juridic de Catalunya decided that the term ‘ciutadania’ (literally citizenship) should be preferred to that of ‘regionalidad’ to designate the legal bond between the Generalitat and individual citizens (Raluy 1980). Hence, the Statute consecrated a definition of Catalan citizenship based on residency, and derived from Spanish nationality according to a clear hierarchy of legal norms. The Catalan condition was defined according to the veïnatge administrativo, which translated a conception of political membership that could accommodate residents irrespective of their place of birth and their degree of attachment to the land. As a result, those born elsewhere in Spain could become ‘political Catalans’, in very much the same way as the 1997 establishment of a democratically elected Parliament in Edinburgh allowed Britons born in England to become ‘political Scots’.

While this decision proved to be instrumental in building a broad coalition of support cutting across ethnic lines, it nonetheless did not go unchallenged, as some sought to derive the political condition of Catalan from civil rather than administrative residency. In accordance with the Catalan civil code, the status of civil resident is granted to everyone born in Catalonia and extended to their spouses, but not to immigrants, who are nonetheless eligible after two years of residence. Defining Catalan citizenship on the basis of the veïnatge civil would have meant that a sizeable proportion of immigrants would have been entitled to vote in their province of origin, but not in Catalan elections. Reciprocally, individuals born in Catalonia and residing elsewhere in Spain would have retained their electoral rights in their community of origin. The amendment was supported by a handful of politicians who, while agreeing on the means, differed radically in their motivations. One of them was the leader of the Andalusian nationalist party PSA, who defended the right of those living in what he referred to as the “9th province of Andalusia” to vote in their municipality of origin. On the other hand, some among the Catalanist party UDC feared that this arrangement would primarily benefit PSUC, whom they accused of “forcing immigrants to become Catalans with the sole
aim of getting their votes."124 But the mainstream media, intellectuals and politicians accused them of *Lerrouxisme*, a term that made its way into the political idiom to denounce any attempt to divide Catalan society on ethnic lines, which proved to be particularly useful after the transition when the need came to defend the Generalitat policy of ‘linguistic normalization’.125 Eventually, the amendment was rejected and the political and democratic idea of the Catalan nation prevailed, recognizing the civil unity of a plural territory, blurring to a considerable extent the antagonism between natives and immigrants.

4.3. 1980 – 1998: integration into a single bilingual community

Defining the boundaries of Catalan citizenship on the basis of residency was the consequence of a self-conscious strategy, facilitated by the instrumental role of PSUC and to a lesser extent PSC in bringing together working class interests with nationalist demands for political autonomy. However, an inclusive conception of citizenship represented only one side of the equation, as the linguistic issue was carefully left aside during the debate that preceded the re-establishment of the Generalitat. This concern was soon to re-emerge in the Catalan political arena, as CiU, controlling the Catalan government for 23 consecutive years, consistently considered ‘linguistic normalization’ as the backbone of its broader nation-building agenda, with important ramifications in the cultural, economic and political realms. In his investiture speech in 1980, Jordi Pujol announced his ambition in unequivocal terms: “[w]e are a people in danger of denationalisation and internal, deep and radical rupture. One of the fundamental objectives of the programme of this government will be the normalization of the Catalan language”, the long-term objective being to ensure that “in Catalonia, the own language and culture of the country are Catalan.”126 Likewise, the 1980 CiU Manifesto explicitly listed among its priorities the “Recatalanization of Catalonia.”127 The policy of linguistic normalization has intervened along four axes. First, in the toponymy of the

125. Rafael Aracil defines Lerrouxism with these words: “political doctrine based on the diffusion of Anticatalanism among the working class and immigrants, with the aim of driving Catalonia into two distinct linguistic communities” (2000: 389).
territory, by changing streets names and indicators in order to multiply the “unwaved flags” of nationalism in all possible settings, “which are easily forgettable and yet at least as important as the memorable moments of flags waving” (Billig 1995: 10-11). Second, in the cultural realm, the Generalitat pursued an ambitious arts policy meant to turn Catalan into a language of high culture (Crameri 2008: 110-13). Third, linguistic policy-makers intervened in the administration by making eligibility to the civil service contingent upon applicants’ ability to speak Catalan. Last, Catalan became the dominant language of instruction, so that in a few years, pupils went from receiving education in Castilian with Catalan taught as a second language, to a system of maximum ‘Catalanization’.

The literature has emphasized three complementary arguments to account for the rapid diffusion of the Catalan language in the 1980s and 1990s. First, Catalan and Castilian, as two Romance languages, grammatically and phonetically close to one another, can be understood and learnt without great difficulty. The Catalan case is usually contrasted with the Basque Country, where becoming proficient in Euzkadi requires a much greater investment (Conversi 2002). Second, Catalan carried significantly greater prestige than Castilian, an unusual characteristic for a minority language deriving from the superior economic position of native Catalan speakers, which provided immigrants with an incentive for second language acquisition (Woolard 1989, Woolard et al. 1990). In a slightly different vein, David Latin applied game theory to the socio-linguistic landscape of Catalonia, and identified a pattern of “competitive assimilation” (2007: 35-38). In his account, language entrepreneurs made credible the “threat that all future job openings would require facility in the Catalan language […] through a solidarity pact among businessmen that the language of all big businesses would be conducted in Catalan” (ibid: 37). In turn, immigrant families, fearing that their children would be discriminated on the labour market and expecting that their neighbours would strategically shift to Catalan for the same reason, faced compelling incentives to invest in the acquisition of a second language.

While these theories convincingly account for the diffusion of the Catalan language among non-native speakers, they only partially explain why linguistic divisions never turned into a salient boundary, in spite of the ever-more coercive institutional pressures aimed at privileging the Catalan language and those who were able to speak it. The
argument I wish to deploy here has to do with the specificities of the party system and the dynamics of party competition. In particular, I contend that PSC has been instrumental in keeping the linguistic issue away from competitive politics, by channelling and partially resolving conflicts within its own party structure. Furthermore, the only party that actively sought to exploit these divisions has been the right-wing PPC, which never managed to mobilize more than a fraction of the electorate. Paradoxically, it strengthened the solidarity of Catalanist parties, who consistently put aside their ideological differences in defence of the linguistic arrangement.

4.3.1. The political context

In 1980, the results of the first elections to the Catalan Parliament were to have crucial consequences for the institutional structuring of the Generalitat, setting an unexpected path that shaped and conditioned later developments to a considerable extent. PSC and PSUC emerged as the dominant forces in Catalonia in the first two rounds of general elections held in 1977 and 1979. Hence, PSC, although its campaign had been punctuated by a series of minor incidents between its Catalanist and more Madrid-inclined wings, could reasonably expect a large victory and the privilege of setting up autonomous institutions. Pujol’s narrow victory came as a surprise for most, and a rude awakening for an excessively confident PSC. In 1984, in the second Autonomous elections, CiU obtained an absolute majority in the Catalan Parliament and became the dominant political force until 2003.
Table 6: Election results to the Catalan parliament (1980-1999)

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<td>CiU</td>
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**Source:** My own compilation from the official site of the Generalitat, [www.gencat.cat](http://www.gencat.cat)

PSC's relatively low score in 1980 can partly be attributed to the fierce competition on the political space of the left. The Andalusian nationalist party PSA obtained close to 3% of the immigrant vote and PSUC was still remarkably strong, while ERC was able to attract 9% of the Catalanist vote. But the reason why the Catalan electorate has consistently voted for PSC-PSOE at general elections where CiU has been the most successful party in autonomous elections lies in what has been referred to as a differentiated turnout (Riba 2001). On the one hand, while political participation in general elections has matched the state-wide average, turnout for Catalan elections has been lower. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of those who abstain from voting in Catalan elections are PSC voters and internal immigrants in particular. For instance, 34% of immigrants who voted for PSC at the 1979 general elections abstained in 1980, a pattern which repeated itself over subsequent elections (Colomé 1996: 18). This creates an asymmetric pattern, whereby the interests of active Catalan speakers,
who constitute CiU’s core electorate, are over-represented by comparison with youth and immigrants, who predominantly support PSC and tend not to vote.

However, the ambivalent position of PSC along the centre-periphery axis constitutes a crucial difference between Catalonia and the Basque Country, where the PSOE federation, although it took the name of PSE – *Partido Socialista de Euskadi* – to polish its Basque credentials, is much more oriented towards Madrid, and the degree of polarization along the centre-periphery cleavage more pronounced. The PSC was founded in 1978 out of the fusion of three existing parties: PSC-*Congrés*, PSC-*Reagrupament* and the Catalan federation of PSOE. The first two were autochthonous parties, created a few years earlier out of the fusion of dispersed organizations operating exclusively within Catalonia with strong nationalist leanings. Unlike all other Spanish Autonomous communities where socialist parties were incorporated into the PSOE, the PSC was the only party federated with the Spanish socialists at state level (Colomé 1989). According to its 1978 Statutes, the PSC is both committed to “create a classless, self-managed and socialist society, in which all signs of class and national oppression have vanished”, and to “assert the national personality of Catalonia.”  

This ambiguous position has fed a constant tension with the PSOE. Well aware that they pay a high electoral price for tolerating the PSOE’s rejection of genuine federalism, the Catalan Socialists have pressed for regional power to be fully developed under the existing Constitution (Gillespie 1992: 8). In addition, these tensions are not only visible externally, between PSOE and PSC, but also internally, between native Catalans and immigrants within the PSC: “In Catalonia, the continuous tensions between the historical members of the Catalan federation of PSOE and the former leaders of PSC mirrored the basic tensions existing between native Catalans and immigrants. The federal structure of the party only partly managed to regulate the ongoing conflicts between the centre and the periphery.”  

The PSC was allegedly a “party of professionals and intellectuals with Catalanist backgrounds from the lower and middle bourgeoisie, while the Catalan federation of PSOE was the “party that overwhelmingly receives the votes of immigrants from other parts of Spain,” well-entrenched in the Barcelona outskirts with a more traditional working class identity (Jacobson 2010: 75). But these tensions have been managed within the party itself.

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Ultimately, the PSC took over the role formerly played by PSUC during the pre-transition period, which the latter was no longer able to fulfil as a result of its inexorable electoral decline. By appealing to working class interests and avoiding positioning itself clearly along the centre-periphery axis, the PSC has been able to bring a large number of internal immigrants into Catalan politics. Far from confining itself to being the ‘party of immigrants’, it actively sought to cultivate its Catalanist identity. In regard to the linguistic conflict, it acted as a moderator by seeking both a consensus with CiU and carefully preventing it from becoming a salient membership boundary.

4.3.2. ‘Linguistic normalization’ and PSC’s moderating role

The linguistic provision in the 1978 Constitution was sufficiently vague to leave significant scope for interpretation. The inherent tension of the constitution, between the indissoluble unity of the Spanish state and the recognition of its nationalities, is also embedded in article 3, which states that “Castilian is the official language of the state; all Spaniards have the duty to know it and the right to use it”, and yet specifies that “the other languages of Spain shall also be official in their respective Autonomous Communities.” The 1979 Statute enshrined an equally vague provision. In fact, the Catalan language, relegated to *menestralia* during the dictatorship, was relatively weak, including among natives. Besides, the virtual absence of institutions able to rapidly regain the ground that had been lost in the past forty years meant that nationalists had a vested interest in drafting a disposition that would remain ambiguous enough to be accepted by the majority of the electorate and leave sufficient room for later interpretations, according to the political conjuncture. The linguistic provision comprises three elements\(^{130}\). The first one consecrates Catalan as the “*lengua propria*” of Catalonia, following the proposition made by PSC and PSUC of resurrecting the idiom used in the 1932 Statute. This presented the advantage of stressing the symbolic significance of Catalan, by contrast with the somehow impersonal “language of the state.” The second one establishes Catalan as Catalonia’s official language, as is “Castilian which is official in the whole of the Spanish state.” While seemingly putting both languages on an equal footing, it formalized the *right* of citizens to speak Catalan,

\(^{130}\) *Estatut d’Autonomia de Catalunya de 1979*, art. 3.
as opposed to their right and duty to speak Castilian, a formal inequality that has remained contentious until today. The third one guarantees the normal and official use of both languages, by “taking the necessary measures to ensure that they are known, and creating the right conditions for them to become fully equal in terms of the rights and duties of the citizens of Catalonia.” Hence, to the great satisfaction of nationalists, the third disposition gave the Generalitat a blueprint to privilege the use of Catalan, which, at this stage, was relatively disadvantaged and could not be equalized with Castilian without massive public intervention.

The Constitution has allowed for the development of two distinct models of education in bilingual autonomous communities. The first one is the so-called model of partial or ‘total separation’, applied in the Basque Country, Navarra and Valencia and based on individuals’ right to choose the language of instruction. By contrast, the model of ‘linguistic conjunction’, based on the principle of non-separation, is meant to ensure that all students become proficient in both languages by the end of the period of compulsory education (Huguet 2004). By constraining individuals’ ability to choose their preferred option, the system is necessarily more conflictive. Catalonia is, with the partial exception of Galicia, the only Community that opted for the second option. As the system is mainly the result of administrative practices and decrees left at the discretion of the executive, it can potentially be modified without major legislative reforms and is consequently more subject to political changes. However, after 23 years of CiU leadership, the model is solidly anchored in stable institutions. The main source of inspiration of policy-makers was the Carte de la langue française, the infamous bill 101 adopted by the Québec Assembly in 1977, meant to turn the French language into the dominant vernacular of education. But unlike in Québec where nationalists have been forced to recognize the historic rights of Anglo-Quebeckers, effectively protecting their linguistic rights as well as those of immigrants who already integrated the Anglo-Québec community (Magnet 1990: 5-9), the legal framework in Catalonia has remained much more ambiguous.

Catalanist parties agreed on minimal parameters. First, the linguistic conflict should not be used for an electoral purpose. Second, all students should become proficient in both languages by the end of the period of compulsory education. However, within these broadly defined parameters, there were important disagreements across parties in regard
to the long-term aims and the means to achieve them. The first objective seemed especially far-fetched as the debate was being appropriated by civil society associations. One of the first actions taken by the newly elected CiU government in 1980 was to pass a decree making Catalan the normal vehicle of expression in all the administrative organs affiliated to the Generalitat\(^\text{131}\). This disposition has successively been expanded, so that access to the civil service rapidly became conditional upon an applicant’s ability to speak Catalan\(^\text{132}\). In order to be eligible for entry in the Catalan administration, applicants must provide a certificate delivered by the Junta Permanente del Catalan officially sanctioning their linguistic abilities. The selection procedure is regulated by a competitive examination and the accreditation of candidates’ linguistic skills, independently of their examination results. The autonomous administration generates directly around 5% of the jobs on the Catalan labour market and immigrants from the rest of Spain were largely excluded from the public administration in the 1980s (Alarcon 2005: 64). For CiU, this early disposition presented the advantage of giving privileged access to individuals who were proficient in Catalan in the early-1980s and hence were more likely to share the Generalitat’s nation-building agenda, while encouraging non-Catalan speakers to learn it. With a civil service by and large sympathetic to its aims and financially dependent upon it, the CiU-led Generalitat found reliable support for its ‘Recatalanization strategy’.

This decision prompted the publication of the *Manifesto de los 2,500*, denouncing the discrimination suffered by Castilian speakers and defending the right to receive education in one’s mother tongue\(^\text{133}\). This group was mainly constituted of pre-transition civil servants from the Department of Education, who rightly feared that the new linguistic regulations might endanger their position. At the same time, the *Crida a la Solidaritat* was founded in defence of the “Catalan language, culture and nation”\(^\text{134}\), and

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\(^{131}\) This decision was in fact the realization of a long-standing nationalist demand that can be traced as far back as the early days of political nationalism. In 1885, prominent figures of the *Renaixença* and political Catalanists issued the *Bases de Manresa*, a short document that was supposed to serve as the basis for the regional constitution of Catalonia. Although the boundaries of the citizenry were not strictly delimited and the rules of naturalization unspecified, the text mentioned that “only Catalans, by birth or by virtue of naturalization, shall be eligible to work in the public administration (*Base de Manresa* No. 3).”

\(^{132}\) As the Generalitat is formally a bilingual administration, applicants are also required to speak Castilian to be eligible for the Catalan civil service.

\(^{133}\) The Manifesto reads: “This initiative has not been motivated by a primary Anticatalanism, but by a series of measures taken in recent years, limiting the official and public use of Castilian, constraining the right of receiving education in one’s mother tongue, and violating the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of one’s language…” *Manifesto de los 2,300*, in reference to the number of “intellectuals and professionals who live and work in Catalonia” who signed the petition, published on January 25, 1981.

\(^{134}\) Encyclopèdia.cat, entry ‘*Crida a la Solidaritat*’. 

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demonstrated the same intransigence, which led some to fear that the linguistic conflict may become intractable and spill over to politics. In this context, the need to reach a consensus as broad as possible became more pressing. On the one hand, CiU and ERC sought to achieve a maximal Catalanization of the education system, even if this came at the price of creating a two-track scheme, whereby individuals would have the right to choose the dominant language of instruction (Ardelaguët 1996: 112-9). On the other hand, PSC was in favour of a bilingual system and committed to the principle of non-separation, not least because the party feared that institutionally entrenching the linguistic division would make the task of bridging linguistic communities increasingly difficult. CiU enjoyed a better position than its socialist rival, as the latter could easily be accused of Anticatalanism if a consensus failed to be reached. Besides, the recently-voted LOAPA Law in the Spanish Parliament, passed with PSC support, made this risk particularly acute. The party was originally opposed to fully-fledged and exhaustive legislation. However, it soon came to realize that CiU would not compromise and sought to negotiate a middle-ground, engaging in the difficult task of simultaneously polishing its Catalanist credentials, containing the influence of the PSOE in Madrid, and defending the interests of working class immigrants. Ultimately, PSC consented to the gradual Catalanization of the education system, and CiU endorsed the principle of non-separation. The Law of Linguistic Normalization was unanimously voted by all Catalan MPs in 1983, with the aim of consolidating the use of the Catalan language in “all settings and guarantee the normal and official use of Catalan and Castilian.” This remarkable consensus has meant that the linguistic issue has remained largely disconnected from politics, especially as the law was brought to the constitutional court which ruled out some of its dispositions in a legal battle that lasted until 1995. Throughout this period, the divide between the central state and the Generalitat overshadowed internal dissensions within Catalonia. Indeed, “the defence of the Catalan language, when it comes under attack, homogenizes the ideological diversity of political parties, as there is, at this very moment, one single enemy” (Cabré et al. 1986: 142).

135. The LOAPA – Organic law for the harmonization of the autonomous process – was passed in the Spanish Parliament in 1982, as a result of a pact between PSOE and UCD, with the aim of slowing down the devolution process. PSC MPs voted in favour of the law, although the negotiations saw some important dissensions between the PSOE and the Catalan Federation. The Catalan socialists paid a high electoral price for this decision at the 1984 Autonomous elections and have, ever since, carefully sought to emancipate themselves from the PSOE, at least in the Catalan political arena.

Initially, the system allowed for a significant degree of flexibility, as the language mix could be tailored according to the sociolinguistic landscape of each locality. While all schools were obliged to provide a bilingual education, individuals were in theory free to choose among three paths: maximal, medium and minimum Catalanization. However, the balance was rapidly tipped in favour of Catalan, especially after the programme of linguistic immersion was introduced in 1984. This decision came in response to a recent report which indicated that in schools with a high concentration of Castilian speakers, the objective of guaranteeing that all pupils would be proficient in both languages by the end of the period of compulsory education would most likely not be met. From a psycho-linguistic point of view, it was justified by the fact that language acquisition is a function of its meaningful use in context (Arnau et al. 1995). Accordingly, the purpose of the programme was to provide an environment where Catalan functions as the exclusive means of communication. Instead of specifically targeting pupils whose parents were not born in Catalonia, the programme was applied to all schools where the proportion of ‘non-native Catalan speakers’ exceeded 70%. In 1992, another decree was passed, further decreasing the degree of individual choice. By 1993, 88.8% of schools had reached a maximum level of Catalanization, whereas schools in which the language of instruction was predominantly Castilian had by then almost disappeared.

4.3.3. Fluctuat nec mergitur: the failure of PPC’s challenge

In the 1980s, no political party actively sought to politicize the language issue apart from the Catalan section of Alianza Popular, whose direct link with the Franco Regime – the party was founded by no less than seven former ministers – considerably diminished its credibility. Besides, the collapse of UCD in 1983, and the difficult re-composition of the electoral space of the state-wide right throughout the 1980s seriously limited its capacity to play a prominent role in Catalan politics (Hopkin 1999). From 1989 onwards, the Catalan section of PP, whose first leader, Alejo Vidal-Quadras, was notoriously known for his uncompromising Anticatalanism, took the lead of a virulent campaign against the Generalitat’s linguistic policy. He was assisted in his crusade by some conservative newspapers of the Madrid press. In 1993 ABC joined the fight with an unambiguous and provocative headline: “Como Franco pero al revés: la

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137. ‘Non-native Catalan speakers’ is the official category used in the bill.
In 1995, Vidal-Quadras published a pamphlet in which he denounced how “linguistic nationalism, in its segregating obsession, finds itself confined in cultivating an impoverished, vacillating, unsatisfying and insecure identity, and cannot accept that what constitutes the best and most noble aspect of Catalonia, is what we share with the rest of Spain, and beyond with Europe” (1995: 8). However, Vidal-Quadras was evicted from the leadership in 1996 after a series of increasingly virulent rows over the linguistic rights of Castilian speakers in Catalonia, a concession made by José-Maria Aznar to Jordi Pujol against its parliamentary support in Madrid. Paradoxically, the intransigent position of PPC has served nationalists’ interests rather than undermined them. Indeed, to date, the PPC has never managed to depart from its pro-Madrid reputation, partly because of its internal organization, more centralized than PSOE (Astudillo et al. 2010). Hence, the Catalan leadership is more dependent upon central elites for whom a reasonable degree of Anticatalanism serves an electoral purpose, by keeping alive the old separatist fear and alleged Catalan conspiracy against the integrity of the Spanish nation state. But in the Catalan political arena, its regular attacks against the policy of linguistic normalization are immediately criticized by all political parties, whose ideological differences suddenly evaporate and who sing the century-old ‘Lerrouxisme’ tune with one voice and coherence. In other words, it provides nationalists with tangible evidence that the survival of the Catalan language is still hypothetical, subject to the twin challenges of internal dissenters adopting the language of the state, and the remnants of Spanish nationalism – embodied in PPC – that has not abandoned its assimilationist ambitions. In Michael Billig’s idiom (1995), these are the sporadic and yet necessary moments when ‘banal’ nationalism turns ‘hot’, when the flags are being waved again, when differences are being put aside and national unity momentarily restored to face a common challenge.

By the mid-1990s, the progression of the Catalan language seemingly hit a glass ceiling (Crameri 2008). This pressed the CiU government to deepen the strategy of linguistic normalization. However, some cracks in the consensus became noticeable, and the law passed in the Catalan Parliament in 1998 only brought cosmetic changes to the

138. Meaning literally ‘Like Franco but the other way around: How Castilian is being persecuted in Catalonia’, ABC, November 12, 1993.

existing legislation. Besides, the reform failed to gain the support of ERC, for which the law was not going far enough, and PPC, for which it was going too far. On the other hand, a civil society association – foro Babel – was created and achieved much greater visibility than its predecessors had. However, its explicit aim is to defend bilingualism and its members have endorsed most existing policies and institutions aiming at diffusing the use and knowledge of Catalan. One of its most prominent members defines what ought to constitute a ‘Catalan’ in terms that most nationalists would have no difficulty appropriating themselves: “a Catalan is a citizen who lives in Catalonia, freely uses the language he or she wishes to use, and respect the language used by others.”

In fact, whether or not there exists a linguistic conflict in Catalonia is unclear, as the overwhelming majority of its residents are bilingual and see no inconvenience in shifting from one language to the other according to the audience in a situationist mode. Besides, Catalan nation-builders have not employed coercive means to achieve their aims, but have successfully encouraged and provided adequate opportunities to Castilian speakers, who by and large consented to assimilate. Catalonia has officially remained a bilingual territory where opportunities to speak Castilian in most social fields are not constrained. Last but not least, the main virtue of the principle of non separation resides in the fact that, as the pool of bilingual speakers ineluctably grows, it becomes very difficult to identify two mutually exclusive communities, separated from one another by the insurmountable wall of incomprehension. Ultimately, the development of stable and democratic institutions over the past decades consolidated a territorial conception of membership, which competes, cuts across, overlaps and at times supersedes linguistic and ethnic criteria. By the turn of the twenty-first century, the question of ‘immigrants from the rest of Spain’ was little more than an episode of the collective memory, providing institutional and discursive opportunities and constraints to political elites and policy-makers now confronted with the large-scale settlement of ‘immigrants from abroad’, a phenomenon discussed at length in subsequent chapters.

140 Francesc de Carreras, Professor of Constitutional Law at the Universita Autonoma de Barcelona (UAB) and member of the Foro Babel. ‘La verdadera normalización del Catalan’, in El País, May 1, 2003.
Regulating Immigration in a Plurinational Context

Who wants to be responsible? Whenever anything goes wrong, the first thing they ask is: ‘who's responsible for this?’

– Jerry Seinfeld, the Blood, 1997

Research examining the impact of territorial politics on immigration policy-making is still scarce. However, recent developments in a number of federal states suggest that regional governments are increasingly keen to influence immigration policy outputs, making demands upon the state to take territorial disparities into account. This is particularly true in plurinational democracies, where control over immigration came to be seen as an important feature of self-government and an instrument of cultural reproduction, economic development and social cohesion. In both Catalonia and Scotland, nationalists have looked to the example of Québec, where the provincial government has sought and gained significant leverage in administering its own immigration policy, allowing it to explicitly favour French-speaking immigrants. For the purpose of this chapter, I examine how the Catalan and Scottish governments have sought to gain some control over the regulation of immigration into their own jurisdiction and how these demands were largely unfulfilled. Scottish and Catalan elites have perceived the need to control the number and provenance of people entering their
respective territories in very different ways. For the former, immigration has been portrayed as a potential response to population ageing, a problem made particularly acute in Scotland by the combined effect of sustained emigration and low immigration. For the latter, the sudden and rapidly accelerating influx of international migrants to Spain affected Catalonia more than the rest of the country and reawakened deeply rooted concerns about the compatibility of immigration with the nation-building project. In both cases, political elites sought to run their own autonomous policy within the framework of a regionalized system. However, their respective central states proved equally reluctant to share their prerogatives in a matter they saw as closely associated with their sovereignty.

The conclusion is twofold:

First, the review of empirical developments over the past ten years suggests that the Scottish and Catalan administrations have used their competencies to further territorialize their nation-building projects. Indeed, by defining, naming and counting immigrants entering their territorial jurisdiction and invoking distinct needs and preferences in matters of immigration, sub-state administrations have reinforced the meaning of the territorial boundary separating them from the rest of the state. Their attempt to gain further control over immigration policies has not only been intertwined with claims of self-determination, but also integrated into a broader strategy of economic development which sees immigrants bringing desirable skills essential to generating endogenous growth, boosting internationalization and ultimately decreasing reliance on the domestic market.

Second, the ‘frustrated policy transfer’ (Davis 2009) is not necessarily at odds with nationalist preferences, as they retain the opportunity to blame the centre for policies that are hardly ever translated into electoral gains and characterized by an ever-widening gap between policy goals and outcomes, two phenomena which will be discussed at length in the conclusion. While nationalists cannot take credit for controlling their borders according to voters’ preference, they can nonetheless blame their respective central governments for failing to take into account the sectional interests of Scotland and Catalonia.
5.1. Scottish immigration policy: devolution and the limits of control

In Britain, the Conservative immigration policy between 1979 and 1997 was as restrictive as it was effective (Hussein 2001). Social unrest in some cities with a high proportion of non-white residents together with the governments’ zero-immigration ideological inclinations laid the ground for a restrictive policy framework. Since the implementation of the first Immigration Act in 1962, the British government has consistently managed to keep immigration at a significantly lower level than most Western European countries. As Joppke put it, “if Fortress Europe is being built on the foundation of its lowest common denominator, it is the Fortress Britain turned inside out” (1999: 133-4). After seventeen years of Conservative rule and an electoral victory that looked like a plebiscite, New Labour took office with an open borders agenda for those bringing desirable skills, although it had little idea of how this could be achieved in practice (Somerville, 2007). From 1997, the net migration balance grew sharply, stabilized in 2000, and rose again in 2004 with EU enlargement and subsequent flows of East European migrants into the fast expanding British labour market. With a net migration rate above the 250,000 threshold in 2004, it seemed the executive was no longer able to control borders effectively. However, New Labour’s ideological stance combined with business pressures have played a much greater role than the supposed loss of sovereignty resulting from globalization or Europeanization (Duvell & Jordan 2003). Until the middle of the decade, the government still perceived immigration as essential for the country’s continuing prosperity. But in 2005, the publication of the five-year strategy for asylum and immigration, Controlling our borders: Making Migration Work for Britain, came as a response to rising public¹⁴¹ concerns in the aftermath of the 2004 EU-enlargement.¹⁴² In 2008, a points-based immigration system was introduced, with the aim of simplifying the current framework and considerably tightening the channels of entry for low-skilled migrants. While some observed how immigration policy-making was gradually being ‘securitized’ in the very cradle of liberalism, others attempted to explain why, despite increasingly anxious public

¹⁴¹ A Yougov survey in December 2004 found that 75% of Britons think “there are too many immigrants coming into the country.” Another survey carried out in 2005 found that 58% of Britons thought the government’s policies on immigration and asylum were “not tough enough” (Migration Policy Group 2005a).

¹⁴² Interestingly, EU migrants, who constitute the great bulk of immigrants over the past decade, enjoy free mobility throughout the UK and fall beyond the scope of successive immigration reforms.
opinion, Downing Street only marginally constrained the entry of economic migrants to the British market (Boswell 2008). In line with Freeman’s institutionalist account of immigration policies in Europe (1995), there are reasons to believe that the British government has been reluctant to annihilate support of business interest groups that New Labour sought and gained when it came to office. This resulted in a two-track strategy, reinforcing control for ‘unwanted’ migrants, while broadening the channels of entry for skilled and highly-skilled ones.

5.1.1. Immigration and the ‘population crisis’

Like any political concern, immigration come on and off the political agenda, intermittently climbing up and down the ladder of priorities. Yet, in most instances, public interest is awakened by social unrest in one form or another occurring in neighbourhoods, cities, or regions hosting a substantial proportion of immigrants. In France, the 2005 riots following the death of two teenage youths of North African descent while they were escaping a police control in Clichy-sous-Bois ignited an intense and emotional debate, eventually leading to the adoption of more restrictive legislation a few months later (Waddington et al. 2009). In Spain, the 2000 migrants’ revolt in El Ejido encouraged the Spanish government to curtail the African route and widen channels of entry from Latin America and nurtured the widespread popular belief that borders can no longer be controlled effectively (Bujan & Perez 2005).

By contrast, in devolved Scotland, immigration has not become a ‘hot’ topic as a response to a traumatic episode shedding light on the failure of current immigration policies, the perceived incompatibility of essentialized migrant groups with liberal democratic values, or a popular belief that there are just ‘too many’ of them. Instead, it gained currency in the wake of the publication of the 2001 census figures, and was framed as a population crisis as opposed to a societal one, following the pre-established cognitive path closely associating emigration with national decay. Failing

143. This is not a normative statement but an argument that is never so far from the surface of migration-related debates in liberal democracies, and is no longer circumscribed to radical right-wing parties. See for example, a press article by Francis Fukuyama published in the Guardian, ‘The West has won: Radical Islam can't beat democracy and liberalism’ October 11, 2001.

144. In Britain, census figures are released every ten years. The organization in charge of collecting and gathering the data in Scotland is the General Register Office for Scotland (GROS). The figures were officially released in October 2002.

fertility, life expectancy that remains low by West European standards, and sustained emigration coupled with weak immigration were some of the most worrying issues made explicit in the Report on Scotland’s Population in 2010. While Britain’s population was expected to grow from 59.8 million to 64 million by 2025, that of Scotland, with current trends remaining constant, would soon start to decrease, down to 4.5 million by 2050. With compelling evidence that the Scottish population was ageing faster than that of England and Wales, the report left little room for optimism. For the vast majority of Scottish politicians, it constituted nothing less than “an illustration of the failure of Scotland’s economy over the past decades.”

Longitudinal and spatial comparisons were particularly influential in the rise of the population crisis. Indeed for the first time, the report provided a “concise and easily digested description of Scotland’s population […] and presented comparisons over time and between countries in the UK and beyond” (Graham et al. 2003: 378). This new layout corresponded with the first time the Census was taken under full domestic control as part of the devolution package. Besides, the psychological significance of the ‘5 million threshold’, under which the Scottish population might fall also played a crucial role. But the ‘crisis’ did not erupt solely as a result of comprehensive evidence that Scotland’s demographic difficulties were more acute than its neighbours. Indeed, they found particular resonance in Scottish politics, where depopulation is a long-standing trend that at least since the 1960s has been perceived as a brain drain and a symptom of increased dependence on London. Although the great bulk of Scottish emigrants over the past two centuries were primarily driven by ‘pull’ rather than ‘push’ factors, the memory of the Highland clearances and their idiomatic contagion to the Lowlands in the 1980s remained vivid and kept informing political practices in devolved Scotland.

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146. Publication of the General Register Office for Scotland, 2002. Substantial inflows of East European migrants since 2004 raised the number of residents to 5,116,900 in 2006. But this positive trend shall not overshadow the fact that the number of deaths have exceeded the number of births since the early 1990s (McQuaid et al 2008: 5). Demographic projections foresee that the population may start to decline from 2019 onwards, whereas that of the rest of Europe is expected to rise by 2.7% by 2031. Between 1995 and 2001 Scotland’s population fell by 1%, while the UK population rose by 2.8%, at a time when no other Western European country experienced such a demographic decline.

147. Although the extent to which population ageing actually constitutes a handicap is not clear, the negative effects it would engender, chief among them sky-rocketing pensions and state-subsidized healthcare for a ‘greying’ electorate – are nevertheless worrying.


149. The reference to the ‘5 million threshold’ is widespread and often cited in the media. For instance, Frank O’Donnell wrote in the Scotsman that “in 1939, before the outbreak of war, Scotland’s population broke through the significant five million mark for the first time.” (April 14, 2002).

150. See Chapter 3.
Once firmly established in the political landscape, the population crisis could not remain unanswered. The alleged sky-rocketing cost of the new Parliament\textsuperscript{151} and the misadventures of the McLeish administration encouraged the media to speculate on the failure of devolution\textsuperscript{152}. Within this context, the Labour–Lib/Dem coalition government, under the leadership of Jack McConnell, could not ignore the numerous challenges raised by the census figures. But “it was rather easy, before devolution, to invoke the Scottish cultural stereotypes […] since these statements in general had few consequences” (Keating et al, 2003: 152). It eventually became more difficult after devolution to systematically blame Westminster for taking decisions portrayed as damaging to Scotland and adopting rhetorical postures which have no consequences for actual policy-making. The systematic opposition to Conservative rule that provided a convenient common bond across the eclectic home-rule coalition was no longer sustainable in the light of the new constitutional settlement, or at least had to be accompanied with credible alternatives. Consequently, political actors have had to adapt to new rules and address ‘Scottish questions with Scottish answers’\textsuperscript{153}, thereby running the risk of annihilating “the village story of consensualism” carefully cultivated throughout the long road to home-rule (ibid.: 153). The Scottish electorate could legitimately expect the devolved government to address “the single biggest challenge facing Scotland as we move further into the 21\textsuperscript{st} century”\textsuperscript{154}.

But demographic upheavals are complex phenomena combining socio-economic, cultural and political concerns which can hardly be reconciled (Weil 1997). Demographic engineering is more often than not a hopeless task, the relative success or failure of which can only be measured in the long run. A common tool among demographers to assess demographic growth is the so-called Population Growth Identity (N), where $N = \text{Birth} - \text{Death} + \text{Immigration} - \text{Emigration}$. Government alternatives to impact upon N are fourfold. They can seek to (i) stimulate fertility; (ii) limit mortality; (iii) stimulate immigration and (iv) limit emigration. These are not

\textsuperscript{151} The Scottish Parliament, located in the heart of Edinburgh, ended up costing much more than the initial forecast, although the `10 times higher` slogan is more of a media myth and is far from reflecting actual figures. For an exhaustive reconstruction of the controversy, see Mc Crone, 2006b.

\textsuperscript{152} Henry McLeish (Labour), resigned as Scotland’s First Minister after allegations made over the sub-letting of his constituency office in Glenrothes. See BBC News, ‘McLeish steps down’, November 8, 2001.

\textsuperscript{153} This slogan was a rallying cry in the 1990s for the partisans of devolution.

\textsuperscript{154} New Scots, attracting Fresh Talents to meet the challenge of Growth, published by the Scottish Executive, February 2004.
mutually exclusive, and can be found to a greater or lesser extent in virtually all governments’ demographic strategies across the industrialized world. Yet some have deliberately placed emphasis on boosting fertility, while others have favoured inward migrations (Calwell et al. 2002). In Scotland, political initiatives undertaken in the aftermath of the GROS report suggest that efforts at stimulating fertility have been marginal. Rather, the Scottish executive, supported by a broad consensus cutting across party lines, identified enduring emigration together with low inward migration as being the main determinants of population decline. Consequently, the policy response has largely consisted in attempting to ‘square the migration circle’ rather creating the conditions for a new baby-boom through generous family-oriented welfare programmes. While this does not constitute evidence enough to label the government’s boundary-making strategy as being fundamentally territorializing, it does suggest that its ethnic components are rather weak. I now turn to the immigration policy framework introduced in Scotland in the aftermath of the population crisis.

5.1.2. Squaring the migration circle

Successive Labour-led governments in Scotland between 1999 and 2007 came under severe criticism. Notwithstanding a few ambitious initiatives in education and healthcare (Keating 2005), the belief that the Scottish executive did not sufficiently depart from its London counterpart has been widespread. This led some to argue that devolved administrative powers in Britain are “contingent, dependent on the passive restraint and non-opposition of the UK government or its active cooperation” (Trench, 2007: 12). Yet, immigration has been one area where, at least until the introduction of the UK-wide points-based system in 2008, intergovernmental relations appeared reasonably fruitful and cooperative. The collaboration between the Home Office in London and the Scottish executive resulted in the adoption of the Fresh Talent Initiative, based on the assumption that long-standing demographic decline could be reversed, or at least mitigated, by “promoting Scotland as an attractive location to live, work, study and do business.” The Scottish National Party (SNP) 2003 manifesto proposed the devolution of immigration competences and the creation of a Green Card aiming at attracting up to 50,000 highly-skilled migrants per year. By contrast, Scottish

155. Ibid.
Labour initiative focused on ‘softer levers’, not radically conflicting with the UK-wide framework. The overarching policy purpose was to raise awareness abroad and promote Scotland as a welcoming and dynamic nation. The Scottish executive-funded website has ever since provided exhaustive information to potential migrants, “offering warm encouragement to migration to Scotland which is not matched by the equivalent UK-wide websites” (Shaw, 2009a: 7). On the homepage, available in Chinese and Polish, Scotland is described as “a multicultural mix of 5 million people. People have been coming to live here from all over the world since centuries. So you can be sure of a warm welcome.” The campaign was complemented by the creation of a Relocation Advisory Service (RAS), with offices in Glasgow, providing personalized information about business and academic opportunities in Scotland in order to ease the relocation process.

But the most emblematic initiative of the Scottish government is the Fresh Talent: Working in Scotland Scheme (hereafter FTwiss), which entitled international graduates from Scottish universities to live and work in Scotland for two years without the need for a work permit, whereas international students in English and Welsh universities saw their visa expire immediately after graduation. To be sure, its explicit focus on highly-skilled workers does not substantially differ from Westminster’s “welcoming attitude towards those bringing desirable skills to the UK as a virtuous Dr Jekyll [as opposed] to the vicious Mr Hyde of asylum policy” (Migration Policy Group 2005a: 11). The initiatives undertaken to “Attract Fresh Talents to meet the Challenge of Growth” were directly inspired by Richard Florida’s pioneering book, in which it is argued that attracting the creative class, whose members choose to live in stimulating, tolerant and ‘bohemian’ environments, was key to boost economic growth in the era of the knowledge economy (Florida 2002). While his demonstration may be flawed – numerous inquiries have shown that economic factors remain by far the most significant determinant cause of labour mobility (Houston et al. 2008) – it nonetheless encountered great success among policy-makers and influenced immigration policies in a variety of local or regional governments. Inward migration is a crucial component of

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157. See scotlandistheplace.com, [accessed September 18, 2009].

the broader economic strategy later adopted with the Smart, Successful Scotland plan (Scottish executive 2004), closely associating economic growth with Scotland’s ability to attract and retain highly-skilled labour. Until not so long ago a fervent opponent to Thatcher’s repeated assaults on heavy industries and manufacturing, New Labour, on both sides of the border, abandoned once in office its former interventionism and committed itself to market modernization. This is by no means a British idiosyncrasy, but rather a normative inclination that has gained currency throughout post-industrial countries eager to boost economic growth in an increasingly competitive environment.  

While the policy output clearly shows the Scottish government’s willingness to foster immigration, the outcome failed to meet the policy goals. With a total of 8,000 international students having participated in the scheme up to 2008, the initiative hardly impacted upon demographic trends. Although inflows have consistently exceeded outflows over the past 10 years, 72,000 individuals have left Scotland each year since 2001. As for the recent wave of East European migrants, their impact on economic growth has been noteworthy. However, despite the fact that the level of skills and qualifications in the [A8] migrant workforce is extremely high, the majority of them work in low-skilled, low-paid segments of the labour market, with four in five of them earning on average between GBP 4.50 and 5.99 per hour in 2007 (Brown et al 2008: 44). On the other hand, the initiative targeted potential migrants in China and Poland while making virtually no effort to attract economically active individuals from the rest of the UK, either from the native or immigrant population. Several interviewees have acknowledged that more could be done to attract UK residents, although suggesting that such strategy would be ‘politically sensitive’.

Besides, the Lowlands urban belt has attracted the great bulk of recently-settled immigrants, and voices were raised in the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) to encourage more even distribution of migration across the territory. Indeed, the struggle for skilled migrants is not circumscribed on either national or regional

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159. The adoption by EU member-states of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 ushered in a new era of optimism across the continent, even though a decade later, the commitment to turn the European Union into “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world” has to say the least remained unfulfilled.


levels, and cities located within the same region also compete for attracting and retaining talents. Indeed, a report for Scottish Enterprise concluded that Edinburgh and Aberdeen, which run their own recruitment campaigns, have performed better than Dundee and Glasgow. But as the government’s demographic objective is exclusively quantitative and not disaggregated to take into account territorial disparities, no tangible initiative has been undertaken to address this problem. More importantly, the Scottish government’s claim that immigration can address the problems raised by an ageing and shrinking population is not backed by sufficient scientific evidence in the literature. In fact, demographers usually agree that if sustained immigration can potentially ease the effects of the demographic transition, notably through contributions to social security and pension schemes, it is by no means sufficient (de Santis et al. 2001, UNPD 2006). Some warned against the somehow naïve belief that inward migration could reverse demographic decline and argued that it should in any case be complemented with ambitious policies aiming at increasing fertility (Wilson & Rees 2003).

Ireland was until recently unanimously praised in nationalist circles for its ability to attract skilled migrants despite its peripheral location. Yet the Scottish economy never quite matched the dynamism of the Celtic tiger at its peak. Like other old industrial regions across Europe, Scotland at the turn of the century suffered from a variety of economic weaknesses, often inherited from its nineteenth century industrial golden age, its “past splendours” sitting uneasily with “contemporary mediocrity” (Coyle et al 2005: 19). Besides, the global economic crisis shed a new light on the sustainability of economic models once seen as the high road to development. The so-called ‘arc of prosperity’ of small nations running from Ireland to Iceland abruptly lost its appeal to nationalist leaders eager to convince their electorate of the benefits of independence. The collapse of the construction sector combined with skyrocketing deficits have cast doubts on the viability of the Irish path to development, based on low corporate taxation and a deregulated labour market. There is now compelling evidence that highly skilled

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163. Along with the rest of the UK, Scotland exhibits a low productivity rate, partly stemming from poor records in private research and innovation. Besides, entrepreneurship lags behind the UK in terms of new firm formation, a structural feature inherited from the country’s longstanding specialization in heavy industries (Keating, 2001a). The prevalence of branch factories is also symptomatic of regional development strategies implemented in the 1960s and 1970s, which focused on attracting inward investment (Mitchell 1997: 407). To be sure, the Scottish economy also exhibits a number of strengths. With 27% of the workforce educated to degree level and the world’s highest rate of academic papers per capita, Scotland enjoys key assets to compete in the knowledge economy (Rice et al. 2000).
Irish graduates have their eyes on overseas destinations, like their ancestors before them\textsuperscript{164}. But despite these limitations, the dominant view in Scotland is that, as the Scotsman’s editor commented: “Scotland has different needs from the rest of the UK, and it would be far easier for us to influence population and economic growth by having the ability to set our immigration policy.”\textsuperscript{165}

5.1.3. Devolution and the limits of control

With the SNP victory in May 2007, radical changes in immigration policy were to be expected, especially since raising the demographic growth rate to the EU average by 2011 was one of the party’s main campaign promises\textsuperscript{166}. The Aberdeen and Grampian Chamber of Commerce ordered a report in 2009 to be submitted to the Office of National Statistics to evaluate the pros and cons of the Canadian and Australian regionalized systems. The author of the report concluded that “evidence gathered from Canada clearly shows that a points-based system with regional elements works better and more effectively than country-wide procedures. Bespoke factors for Scotland could easily be factored in through bonus points or lower thresholds for those who agree to work, live and stay here for a minimum period of time, a process that could not only help us to find skilled people for jobs but will also help to boost the declining population in a targeted and controlled way.”

Professor Robert Wright (2008) from the University of Glasgow repeatedly advocated this solution on the grounds that the pool of talent coming from A8 countries who reversed the long-standing demographic trend in Scotland since 2004 will soon dry up, as a consequence of the relative decline of the value of the pound and increasing competition for skilled migrants from countries like Germany or France, which are set to lift EU migration restrictions by May 2011. But the Scottish proposal was firmly rebuffed by the Home Office, where it was argued that creating “a two tier system for Scotland at the same time as the Irish and British governments are working to close the existing ‘back doors’ does not make sense.”\textsuperscript{167} Undeniably, the newly-created Skills

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\textsuperscript{164} ‘Irlande, le chant du départ’, in Le Monde, March 8, 2010. The reportage argues that young graduates have been fleeing \textit{en masse} to Australia and Canada since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008.

\textsuperscript{165} Alex Orr, ‘Damaging to Scotland’ in the Scotsman, April 2, 2008.

\textsuperscript{166} SNP Party Manifesto, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Managing migration: A public sector dialogue on migration into Scotland}, published by COSLA, 2008.
Advisory Board (SAB) and Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), charged with the task of assessing the optimal number and skills of migrants to the UK economy did issue a distinct and exhaustive list of jobs to be filled by migrants in Scotland, including very specific activities such as ballet dancer and sheep shearer. In relative terms, their 2007 report revealed that the Scottish economy had almost three times as many vacancies for skilled workers as companies in England.\textsuperscript{168} Besides, the March 2008 Green Paper \textit{A Points-Based System} (Home Office) did touch upon the issue of territorial disparities and specified that “skilled and highly-skilled migrants [could be encouraged] to stay in Scotland in the longer-term, for example through a reduced qualifying period for some Tier 1 and Tier 2 migrants who can demonstrate they have lived and worked in Scotland for an appropriate period of time.”\textsuperscript{169} But these concessions, apart from the fact that they are still to be implemented, are far from incorporating a fully-fledged regional dimension similar to the Canadian Provincial Nominee Immigration Programme, in operation since 1967 and allowing provincial governments to select immigrants according to their economic needs. In 2008, FTwiss was mainstreamed into the UK-wide points-based system, Scotland \textit{de facto} losing its competitive advantage. For the Scottish Labour party, this also proved the success of devolution, portrayed as a catalyst for policy innovation, and of its own policy, which encouraged London policy-makers to expand it to the rest of the UK. Conversely the SNP saw it as another illustration of Westminster’s pernicious attitude towards devolution and long-standing inability to take into account Scottish sectional interests.

One of the first decisions made by the Conservative/Lib-Dem coalition after they took office in May 2010 was to impose an ‘immigration cap’ on the influx from outside the EU. In response, Alex Salmond pleaded that Scotland should be exempt from UK immigration rules, and that a wave of migrant workers should be allowed north of the border in order to “flood the recession and boost the country’s economy.”\textsuperscript{170} The SNP External Affairs Minister also argued that Scotland be exempt from the “damaging” and “negative” cap. But their demands were firmly rejected by the British Immigration Minister Damien Green, for whom the government was “committed to getting

\textsuperscript{168} ‘You’re welcome to come and live in Scotland, but only if you can...’ in the Scotsman, January 29, 2007.

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{A points-Based System: Making Migration Work for Britain} presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, March 2006.

\textsuperscript{170} ‘David Cameron rejects Salmond’s bid to flood recession hit Scotland with migrant workers’ in EU Times, June 22, 2011.
immigration back to sensible levels, after it had been “allowed to get out of control for too long.” By 2011, the gap between Westminster’s obsession with border control and Holyrood’s fear of another brain drain exacerbated by adverse economic conditions had grown wider than ever.

5.2. Catalan immigration policy: much ado about nothing?

In sharp contrast with Britain where the regulation of immigration has intermittently appeared on the political agenda since the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, the first piece of legislation in Spain was issued as late as 1985, one year before the country joined the European Community (EC). To that date, there were less than 250,000 foreign nationals living in Spain, a figure about 10 times below that of Spanish nationals living abroad. The initiative was taken in response to the pressures of some member-states who feared that Spain may become a backdoor into the continent while they were simultaneously trying to tighten their immigration policies. Until the mid-1990s, the concomitant processes of democratic consolidation and economic opening were not translated into a sharp rise in inward migration flows. Compared to its continental neighbours, Spain had little to offer potential immigrants but an obsolete productive apparatus, wages way below the EC average, weak productivity and an embryonic welfare state. In 1993, the Spanish economy went through a deep recession, so that by 1996 the unemployment rate had reached a record high of 22.4%. The combination of poor economic prospects and the multiplication of corruption scandals among socialist ranks put an end to the PSOE hegemony, already eroded since 1993 when it lost its absolute majority of seats, at the 1996 general elections. Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister and charismatic leader of the Socialist party failed to contain the popular tide of discontent and the PSOE was relegated to the opposition bench for the first time since 1983. The PP, born a few years earlier out of the ashes of Alianza Popular (AP) and rejuvenated by José-Maria Aznar’s leadership, formed a minority government relying on a parliamentary pact with the Catalan nationalists CiU, a support which was reciprocated in the Catalan Parliament where CiU also lost its absolute majority at the 1996 autonomous elections. The Spanish economy initiated a period of unprecedented

171. Ibid.
growth, boosted by the labour intensive construction and tourism sectors. Accordingly, the number of immigrants rose sharply towards the end of the decade.

In Catalonia although inward flows from abroad started relatively earlier than in the rest of the country, the phenomenon remained largely unnoticed until the early-1990s. Internal migrations had stopped abruptly in 1975, and the net migration rate was consistently negative in the 1980s. This trend, unseen since at least the mid-nineteenth century\textsuperscript{172}, can be attributed to a combination of two factors. First, while the Catalan economy was temporarily penalized by its old industries and the profound structural reforms undertaken to make it more competitive in European markets, other Spanish territories were growing at a fast pace. Hence, the territorial gap that had characterized Spanish economic development ever since the nineteenth century was gradually being plugged (Garrido Yserte et al. 2009). Second, a number of internal migrants who had settled in Catalonia were now returning home, encouraged to do so by the pre-pension schemes implemented at the time by the Spanish government as a means of fighting unemployment by decongesting the labour market.

\textbf{Table 7: Net migration rate – Spain and abroad (1980-2010)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Net Migration/rest of Spain</th>
<th>Net Migration/abroad</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981-90</td>
<td>(-)27,034</td>
<td>30,504</td>
<td>5,923,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-00</td>
<td>(-)113,015</td>
<td>299,884</td>
<td>6,261,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-10</td>
<td>(-)41,203</td>
<td>1,060,650</td>
<td>7,511,319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Source:} Pablo Alcaide Guindo et al. (2007) and IDESCAT 2010.

In the 1980s the great bulk of international migrants residing in Catalonia were in fact waiting to find a passage across the Pyrenees to France, Belgium and Germany (Miret 1997). But progressively, Catalonia went from being a \textit{springboard} to more appealing and yet seemingly unreachable destinations as Western European states were tightening their immigration policies, to a \textit{land of attraction} in the wake of its economic recovery. As the stock of internal migrants willing to move away from their homes and accept

\textsuperscript{172} In 1982 for instance, there were 17,762 more exits than entries. These figures do not differentiate internal and external flows, but merely calculate the difference between the number of \textit{entries} from the rest of Spain and beyond and the number of \textit{exits} to the rest of Spain and beyond.
poorly-paid jobs had dried out as a result of economic growth and falling birth rates, immigration channels from abroad were progressively institutionalized. By 1995, 30% of all foreign nationals in Spain were settled in Catalonia.

5.2.1. Spanish immigration policy

From 1999 onwards, immigration to Spain has increased at an extraordinary pace. In the 1990s, the great bulk of immigrants were either Spanish nationals or their descendants returning from abroad, West European pensioners or highly skilled workers. However, the period from 2000 to 2010 saw a dramatic change in the volume and composition of immigration. In 1999, the Institute of National Statistics (INE) recorded 127,365 entries. Five years later, this figure had risen to 684,348, came close to a million in 2007, and was then divided in two in 2009 in the turmoil of the economic crisis. In 2010, the number of foreign nationals figuring on local registries amounted to 5,708,940, converting Spain into one of the main recipients of international migration in the course of a single decade. The fairly expansive policy framework regulating immigration cannot be dissociated from elite efforts to integrate the country within the great international economic flows, underlined by a liberal economic consensus cutting across party lines (Benedicto 2005: 107). Yet this ambition, mainly driven by ideological inclinations, equating the commitment to the globalized market-economy with prosperity and modernity, has not been matched by sufficient means. The lack of resources dedicated to the effective recruitment of workers abroad and to border control has been an enduring feature of Spanish immigration policy over the past 15 years. Ultimately, the “cheap” approach prevailed, “allowing immigrants to come in irregularly, as ‘bogus tourists’, and then regularizing their status, either through collective amnesties or administrative arrangements” (Gonzalez-Enriquez 2009: 144). Indeed, since 1986, successive Spanish governments have decreed ‘extraordinary’\(^\text{173}\) regularizations in order to contain the rise of the underground economy, and reap the benefits of this sudden influx of additional tax payers and contributors to social security (Gala 2007: 376).

\(^{173}\) One may question the extent to which these regularizations are ‘extraordinary’. Indeed, they occurred periodically, in 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005.
The General Regime of entry, negotiated at a time of severe economic recession and mass unemployment, was rightly perceived as unable to address the needs of a booming economy, characterized by a substantial labour shortage. Within this framework, Spanish businesses could not recruit abroad until it was formally acknowledged that no native worker could fill the position. This administrative constraint appeared legitimate in a country where mass unemployment has long been a structural feature and remains high in times of economic growth. However, by 2000, policy makers came to realize that new arms were needed to feed in the new phase of economic expansion. The Organic Law 4/2000 provided for the creation of a parallel track of entry – the so-called Quota Regime – based on functional evaluation of needs, and granting Autonomous Communities a key role in determining the contingent. But this proved to be ill-suited to Spanish businesses, and in particular for Catalan SMEs that have been unable to anticipate their needs (Roig, 2007: 293). Besides, the scheme was far from covering the overall demand, at least during the boom years. In 2004, 30,978 foreign workers were granted a work permit through the quota system, while there were 687,138 applicants for the extraordinary regularization which took place a year later (Migration Policy Group 2005b). The decision to complement the quota system with a list of hard-to-fill positions issued by respective provinces and targeting skilled labour shortages was equally disappointing, not least because the visa system managed by Spanish consulates was essentially ineffective.

In 2000, The Aznar-led PP was re-elected with an absolute majority. The government immediately transferred immigration responsibilities from the Ministry of Labour to the Ministry of the Interior, thus tightening the legal channels of entry and mechanically making the need for mass regularization more pressing. From then on, the emphasis was put on border control and disconnected from labour market needs.

Likewise, Alejandro Aja and Jordi Nadal (2003: 70-71) concluded that the quota system had to date not significantly broadened the legal channels of entry, not least because of the lack of resources and subsequent administrative failures. In the year 2001 – 2002, merely 20% of the 20,000 permanent positions offered within the framework of the quota regime were filled, a figure which reinforces the cheap model thesis highlighting the ever-growing gap between immigration policy aims and objectives.
5.2.2. The Catalan response

The Generalitat has figured among the most virulent critics of the central administration immigration regime. Catalan elites’ discontent with the way things were ‘being done in Madrid’ in matters of immigration took various forms. One strand focused on the implicit preference for Latin American nationals embedded in Spanish immigration policy. Indeed, as a result of the perceived over-reliance on Moroccan immigrants, an ‘ethnic filter’ has been gradually built into the immigration policy framework, thus fostering the ‘Latinoamericanización’ of immigration in Spain. This came in response to “the preference of Spanish society, reflected in the government’s decisions, for immigration coming from Latin American countries” (Bujan & Perez 2005: 51). In the authors’ view, the cultural links between Spain and its former colonies has led political elites to believe that their integration would be “less problematic” and “less conflictive” (ibid. 56). This belief was exemplified in the words of the PP spokesperson in matters of immigration who declared in 2002 that Latin Americans, “because they are Catholics and speak Castilian, integrate more easily than Moroccan nationals.”

The interests of Catalonia, which defines itself in linguistic terms, seldom received attention from a central state which has favoured the entry of co-ethnics on the premise that they can be integrated more easily. Shortly before the end of his last term at the head of the Generalitat, Jordi Pujol publicly pressured the central government to demanding visas for all Latin American nationals. Another strand of critique explicitly targeted the Conservative government, whose immigration policy appeared so inefficient that it was at times interpreted as a deliberate attempt to make the action of the Generalitat more difficult. The belief that the central state purposely used immigration as a means to exacerbate social unrest in Catalonia was reawakened in the wake of the 2003 pateras crisis in the Canary Islands, and then again in 2006 when asylum seekers were diverted to other Autonomous Communities. For Ricard Zapata-Barrero, this

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175. To be sure, this normative inclination could be identified as early as 1994 in the first government plan which already stated that “the cultural and historical links of Spain with Latin America should be taken into account in our immigration policy. Far from being a mere cognitive disposition with no incidence on actual policies, this preference became increasingly visible in the set of institutions and policies regulating immigration. This can be observed in bilateral agreements, exemption of visa requirements, and most importantly in the Spanish nationality code, so that between 2001 and 2010, the number of Bolivians, Uruguayans, Ecuadorians and Colombians residing in Spain increased at a much faster pace than that of Moroccans.
179. In Spanish legal jargon, the expression ‘derivación’ designates this decision. In the United Kingdom, it was referred as ‘dispersal policy’.

163
reflected no less than the Conservatives’ “intention to put pressure on the Catalan government that does not have the tools to handle such immigration leading to social and public order conflicts” (2009: 27ff). In response to this, a mechanism of ‘burden-sharing’ was introduced in 2005 to deal with the dispersal of asylum seekers throughout the territory (Santolaya 2008: 93). But for most stakeholders, the central state’s inability to order migration flows and the negative consequences of the “cheap model” that affected Catalonia more than the rest of the Spanish territory appeared particularly damaging. The considerable strain upon public services that it came to represent in certain areas, the high degree of improvisation together with the virtual impossibility of reconciling immigration with labour market needs were perceived as clear evidence of the central state’s failure to implement appropriate public policies.

Table 8: Foreign nationals resident in Catalonia (2000-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign Nationals</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>% of foreign nationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>181,590</td>
<td>6,261,999</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>257,320</td>
<td>6,361,365</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>382,020</td>
<td>6,506,440</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>543,008</td>
<td>6,704,146</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>642,846</td>
<td>6,813,319</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>798,904</td>
<td>6,995,206</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>913,757</td>
<td>7,134,697</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>972,507</td>
<td>7,210,508</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,103,790</td>
<td>7,364,078</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,189,279</td>
<td>7,475,420</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,241,525</td>
<td>7,571,319</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: My own compilation from figures provided by GENCAT, 2010.

In an official visit to Montréal in May 2001, the representative of the Generalitat\textsuperscript{180} signed the Québec-Catalonia Agreement on Immigration and returned to Spain with the intention of advocating a regionally-differentiated immigration policy along Canadian lines. The CiU administration formalized its proposal, and lobbied the Conservative

\textsuperscript{180} Fundación CIDOB (2001) \textit{Anuario Internacional CIDOB 2000, edición 2001}.
government to introduce a mechanism of shared competences as part of a broader reform of the legislation under scrutiny. But besides the fact that PP no longer needed CiU’s parliamentary support, PSOE was equally reluctant to share power over a matter commonly understood as an “act of sovereignty” (Santolaya 2007: 67). Pujol responded to this is in an admittedly dramatic vein, insisting that the Generalitat had “to be able to run [its] own immigration policy, because immigration […] is, for Catalonia, a question of being or not being.”\(^{181}\) The degradation of intergovernmental relations between Barcelona and Madrid combined with a Maragall-led PSC far ahead in the polls during the 2003 Catalan election campaign pushed the Generalitat to bypass the central state by opening immigration offices in Poland, Morocco and Colombia. This initiative officially aimed to link Catalan employers with foreign candidates\(^{182}\), and make sure, in Artur Mas’ terms, that “newcomers know the reality and the culture of Catalonia.”\(^{183}\) The ‘Catalan embassies’ were mandated to provide Catalan language classes to prospective immigrants, in order to familiarize them with the “cultural specificities” of Catalan society.\(^{184}\)

Like France, the Netherlands and others (Guild et al. 2009), the Generalitat seemingly sought to incorporate its integration agenda into its immigration policy. Yet, this is only the tip of the iceberg, as the Generalitat was mainly using its para-diplomatic network to pursue a more targeted immigration policy in order to mitigate the deficiencies of the state-wide framework, build up friendly relations with sending countries and facilitate the recruitment of skilled workers. But the Spanish consulates in charge of delivering visas were unwilling to cooperate and were in any case already overloaded (Moya Malapeira 2007: 65). Besides, the Catalan initiative was taken to the Constitutional Court by the central government, and partially struck down in October 2003\(^{185}\), on the grounds that it constituted an invasion of state competencies. A few weeks later, CIU, despite its narrow advance over the Socialists, was not able to constitute a coalition with

\(^{181}\) Jordi Pujol, speaking soon after the end of his last term at the head of the Generalitat, quoted in el País, ‘Pujol pide el traspaso de competencias sobre inmigracion’, August 23, 2004. Interestingly, Jordi Pujol used the exact same terms as in 1980, in his analysis of the consequences of internal migration on Catalonia’s “national reconstruction” (See chapter 4, section 4.3.2). The path-dependent character of institutions and discourses directed to immigrants in the past and today are in fact significant, a point that is developed at length in Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2

\(^{182}\) Cataluña contratará inmigrantes a través de nuevas oficinas de empleo en el extranjero’ in El Mundo, January 10, 2002.


\(^{184}\) Ibid.

\(^{185}\) ‘Mas asegura que mantendrá las ‟embajadas” catalanas pese a la medida del Constitucional’ in El Mundo November 2, 2003.
fellow nationalists in ERC, committing it to pay a high price for its earlier alliance with PP. The tripartite coalition made up of PSC, ERC and ICV took control over the Generalitat, putting an end to Pujol’s six consecutive terms in office (1980-2003). Shortly after, the decision was made to close the existing offices and not establish new ones.

5.2.3. A new start

The 2003 change of leadership in Catalonia was soon followed by the no-less surprising return of the PSOE to office in Madrid at the 2004 general elections, when the terrorist attacks perpetrated in the Madrid-based Atocha Station by a group claiming some connections with Al-Qaeda three days before the poll precipitated the fall of the Conservatives. As far as immigration policy-making is concerned, the consequences were two-fold. First, it marked a clear shift away from a security-driven to a socio-economic agenda. Immigration went from the Government Office of Alien and Immigration Affairs, accountable to the Ministry of the Interior, to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. In addition, a more flexible job search visa system was introduced, allowing foreign nationals to enter the territory without a contract, and legally seek employment for a three-month period (Santolaya 2008). Second, the commitment of Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero during the campaign to back up the much-awaited reform of the Catalan Statute opened the way for a revision of the status quo. The New Statute, approved both by a referendum and the Catalan Parliament in 2006, provided the Generalitat with a new set of prerogatives in immigration matters186. As of October 2009, the Employment Services of Catalonia (Servei d’Occupació de Catalunya (SOC)) can issue and renew working visas whose validity is limited to the four Catalan provinces of Lleida, Barcelona, Gerona and Tarragona187.

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187. Besides, executive powers in matters of work inspection were also devolved to the Generalitat that, at least in discourse, expressed its will to be tougher. But while Catalan elites have long blamed the central government for failing to jugulate irregular immigration, it is difficult to say whether the Catalan administration will actually be more efficient. Although measuring the proportion of irregular workers is arguably difficult, Colectivo IoE (2008: 50) suggested that they represented 15% of the Catalan workforce in 2007, a figure slightly higher than state-wide estimates.
However, this competence is strictly administrative, thereby considerably limiting the Generalitat’s potential incidence of immigration other than by accelerating the application process (that within the existing framework took on average up to 6 months). Besides, the central state remains exclusively competent in the delivery of residence permits, thus requiring a cooperative exercise of competencies which could potentially be counter-productive. Yet the 2009 reform states that “the coordination should not be made at the expense of the self-government capacity of each Autonomous Community”, an addition that was sought and gained by CiU in return for its parliamentary support for the legislation. Another significant concession was the greater involvement given to the Generalitat in “the state decisions in matters of immigration with a special interest for Catalonia”, notably in regard to the Quota Regime. Yet the Autonomous Community of Madrid, whose President Esperanza Aguirre is well-known for her virulent opposition to Catalan nationalism, brought the case to the Constitutional Court, on the grounds that holders of working visas issued in Catalonia could end up working in Madrid. For the CiU leader Artur Mas, this was no less than “an idea inherited from the Franco state denying Catalonia’s legitimate right to self-government.” As of today, the decision of the Constitutional Court is still pending. While these long-awaited changes do alter the power of the state in setting the rules of entry into Spain, they can hardly be compared with the far-reaching competencies that were sought and gained by Canadian provinces. Overall, there is a broad consensus cutting across party lines in Catalonia that the Generalitat would be better off running its own immigration policy. Carles Campuzono, CiU MP in charge of immigration at the Spanish Parliament, summarized this frustration as follows: “one thing we can blame the central government for is the absence of control over migration flows. The mechanisms of entry into Spain have overwhelmingly favoured irregular channels.”

Where the Scots have looked to Ireland for answers, Catalan elites have found inspiration in Canada where Québec enjoys considerable leverage in controlling the volume and provenance of immigrants. However, there are at least two structural

\[188\] Catalán Statute, 2006, art. 138.2.  
\[189\] ‘Aguirre recurre que Cataluña pueda dar permisos de trabajo a extranjeros’ in La Vanguardia, October 7, 2009. Esperanza Aguirre is the President of the Madrid Autonomous Community, and notorious for her conservative postures and fierce opposition to Catalan and Basque nationalism. She is a PP prominent figure and was appointed Minister of Education and Culture during Aznar’s first legislature between 1996 and 1999.  
\[190\] Ibid.  
\[191\] Interview published in elsingulardigital, October 27, 2009.
elements that make both cases hardly comparable. First, the Canadian immigration regime is very efficient at attracting highly skilled migrants. Unlike most EU countries, where inward flows are mainly the consequence of family reunion, the Canadian points-based system aimed from its very conception at matching migrants’ profile with labour market needs (Beaujot et al. 2007). By contrast, the skills element hardly features in the Spanish policy framework and public debates have mainly revolved around the perceived need to control Spain’s natural border with North Africa. Second, the Québec national movement seeks to preserve the use of an exoglossic language in an otherwise English-speaking North American environment. The priority given to French-speaking immigrants is made possible by the vast reservoir of Francophone candidates seeking to enhance their economic utility while not having to renounce their mother tongue. By contrast, Catalan is an endoglossic language only spoken by a substantial share of the population in the Catalan countries. As a result, the underlying rationale of the Québec policy framework cannot be transposed to Catalonia. Nationalists, who have traditionally considered language as a significant marker of Catalan identity, have not been able to define a clear immigration strategy, unlike the Spanish central state that has clearly favoured Castilian-speaking Latin American nationals.

Yet it would be a mistake to interpret the Generalitat’s attempt to run a differentiated immigration policy through a strictly cultural lens. There is of course an audible voice in the nationalist camp, instrumentalizing the fear of being overwhelmed by hordes of Castilian-speakers in the very homeland, claiming that “it is evident that anyone wanting to españolise Catalonia has a vested interest in making sure that immigrants settle here.” But beyond the nationalist rhetoric, immigration plays a key role in Catalonia’s broader strategy of economic internationalization. The Catalan economy, although more competitive than other Spanish regions, has pursued a ‘low-cost model’ on the international stage until the 1990s. However, important efforts have been made ever since to upgrade human capital. The introduction of the Euro meant the demise of the low-cost model, and precipitated a shift from the Spanish market to the European

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192. Actually, Québec immigration policy is so successful at recruiting highly-skilled French-speaking migrants that it is fiercely criticized by some developing countries which have feared the detrimental consequences of this brain drain. This is for instance the case in Haiti, where educated elites have migrated en masse to Québec over the past 20 years.

and to an increasing extent the global market (Parelleda & Alvarez 2007). Hence, the external opening of the Catalan economy has grown significantly. The weight of trade with the rest of Spain has slightly decreased, where as international trade is twice as high, so that they were by 2006 equally significant in the Catalan economy, thus diminishing its reliance on the domestic market (Alonso 2007: 39-72).

The decline of the fertility rate which became more pronounced in the 1980s had a severe impact on the labour market from the 1990s onwards. Between 1996 and 2001, the unemployment rate went from 18.7 to 8.3%, which combined with the decline of the working age native population, attracted a considerable number of immigrants (Cabré & Domingo 2007: 124). While immigrants have unquestionably contributed to economic growth in the past decade, their relatively low-skilled profile, and concentration in low-productivity sectors such as tourism, catering and construction, has meant that overall productivity has decreased in absolute terms between 2001 and 2006 (Fernandez-Huertas Moraga et al 2006). Immigration also had detrimental effects on the diversification of the Catalan economy, whose over-reliance on the construction sector put considerable strain on the housing market, and made the region more vulnerable to global economic cycles. In recent years, significant efforts have been undertaken to upgrade the skills of those already settled and develop a more targeted immigration policy. This strategy, however, may be undermined by the ever growing number of individuals immigrating within the framework of family reunion, an unavoidable development now that immigration is a structurally consolidated phenomenon in Spain.

5.3. Analysis of results

This review of empirical developments in Catalonia and Scotland highlighted their respective central governments’ unwillingness to draw the consequences of the recognition of the plurinational nature of the state. By neglecting sub-state preferences, their attitude brings further legitimacy to the advocates of independence, who consider secession as the only remedy to ensure the cultural, economic and ultimately political flourishing of the national community. The decisions made by central administrations reflect their inability to find innovative ways of reconciling objectives pulling in opposite directions. Indeed, the growing securitization of immigration policies in Britain conflicts with Scottish economic and demographic preferences. Similarly, Catalan
nationalists have good reason to denounce the outstanding inefficiency of Spanish bureaucracy in opening more channels of regular migration and its reluctance to cooperate with stakeholders on the ground. More fundamentally, sub-state administrations and nationalist parties in particular have consistently stressed the inadequacy of the state-wide framework in addressing their territorial interests, which mechanically contributes to the construction of a distinct territorial identity. By running their own procedures for counting movers and distinguishing them from non-movers, by framing the issue in distinct terms and putting it in perspective with their own historical experiences as well as their own future aspirations, the Catalan and Scottish governments increased the significance of the territorial boundary separating them from the rest of the state. Yet they did not do so by contracting the boundary, presenting prospective immigrants as a threat to the nations’ cultural integrity, but consistently integrated immigration into their broader strategy of socio-economic development, giving prominence to endogenous growth and the consolidation of competitive advantage.

Second, the British and Spanish administrations’ reluctance to share their prerogatives in the regulation of immigration does not constitute an indisputable infringement upon sub-state elites’ preferences for two interrelated reasons. First, immigration policy-making is characterized by an ever-widening gap between policy aims and outcomes. Second, the positions of state-wide parties from both sides of the electoral spectrum have hardly ever been translated into electoral gains. Hence, who wants to be responsible for a public policy field that consistently fails to deliver the expected outcome and is more often than not electorally damaging? From this perspective, immigration policy-making can be seen as an exercise of blame-avoidance rather than credit-claiming, and non state-wide parties and governments in Scotland and Catalonia skilfully used their privileged position to criticize their respective central governments for failing to take into account sub-state territorial interests.

On the one hand, studies questioning the capacity of the state to accept or reject migrants as it sees fit usually begin from a puzzling paradox. Despite increasingly anxious public opinion and notwithstanding the growing popularity of radical right wing parties, immigration policies in industrialized countries have remained broadly inclusive and expansionist. In a seminal study examining immigrant claim-making in Europe,
Soysal (1994) argued that an international human rights regime came to play an ever-widening role in the regulation of immigration and should ultimately replace the state as the main locus of authority. Joppke offered a more nuanced version and concluded that constraints on sovereignty are self-imposed rather than externally inflicted” (1999: 162). For him, such limitations stem from the interpretation of liberal norms by judicial courts that increasingly strengthen a ‘rights-based’ approach to immigration. As a result, liberal democratic states have found their ability to enforce restrictions being internally challenged and came to accept a growing number of ‘unwanted migrants’. In a slightly different vein, Freeman (1995) argued that the discrepancy between popular preferences and policy outcomes stemmed from the logic of client politics and mirrors the existence of power asymmetries among stakeholders. The bearers of the costs are under-represented in the decision-making process, while beneficiaries are well organized and therefore better able to make their voices heard. Because the latter enjoy greater organizational capacities, policy outputs come closer to their preferences. Lastly, Hollifield (2004) focuses on the structural changes brought about by globalization. Hence, the ever-widening gap between political discourses and policy outcomes reflects a “liberal paradox”, which governments in post-industrial societies may find increasingly hard to resolve.  

On the other hand, the burgeoning literature on immigration and party politics has established that unlike radical right wing parties owing their popularity to their populist critique of immigration policies, mainstream parties have rarely benefited from their decisions in matters of immigration. While left-of-centre parties usually see immigrants as a source of electoral support, they have no option but to constrain migration flows to avoid a working class backlash. Furthermore, the moderate right is torn between its business wing, which sees immigrant labour as a means to lower wages and boost international competitiveness, and its identity wing which sees them as a challenge to national identity. Consequently, “the differences between left and right on this issue may be less important than the differences within each camp” (Schain 2008: 468). In addition, these tensions have been exacerbated by the fact that mainstream parties from both right and left have been increasingly vulnerable to the threat of radical right wing parties. Indeed, if moderate right parties neglect their identity wing, this strand of their...
The electorate is likely to defect to the extreme right. Left-of-centre parties failing to take into account working class preferences have faced a similar threat (Schain 2006). Seen from this perspective, the “frustrated policy transfer” (Davies 200) is not necessarily at odds with minority nationalist preferences, as they retain the opportunity to shift the blame on the central government which jealously retained an exclusive competence over a matter which offers limited electoral rewards and is characterized by an ever-widening gap between political discourse and policy outcomes. This blame-shifting strategy is encapsulated in the words of Alex Salmond: “I long for the day, as First Minister in the Scottish Parliament, that we can legislate for an immigration system that reflects the priorities, the needs and the attitude of this country.” Similarly, Catalan nationalists repeatedly contended that the Generalitat would be able to run an immigration policy that comes closer to voter preferences if given the means to do so. For the newly-elected president of the Generalitat, “Catalonia is a diverse and complex society. Immigration should be managed by the Generalitat rather than from some distant Madrid-based office.” While the PSC and Scottish Labour found it harder to blame their party comrades in power at the centre, non-state-wide parties have not faced similar constraints and have exploited this privileged position. By reiterating their demands for devolution without the burden of responsibility, minority nationalist parties have given some substance to their claim of being the sole representatives of the territorial interest.

VI

Immigrants into Scotsmen

Being Scottish in the twenty-first century is not about ethnicity; it’s just about being here.

– James Hunter, speaking at the 2009 Scottish Diaspora Forum

A brief overview of migration-related political developments in Britain since 1999 may seem quite puzzling to the advocates of a long-standing orthodoxy. Indeed, as the British government became increasingly concerned with the political cost of immigration, the Scottish executive has been particularly keen to portray devolved Scotland as “a country where all […] communities are recognized as threads which make up the tartan of our nation’s life.” After 2001, the most violent ‘race’ riots in English cities since 1982 and the subsequent backlash against multiculturalism have cast some doubts on the viability of what has been loosely referred to in the European press as the ‘British model of immigrant integration’. Despite Gordon Brown’s call to celebrate “the fact that our nation has shunned fanaticism and extremism”, the latest legislative developments and discourses underpinning them sit uneasily with the British

“traditions of openness and internationalism, tolerance and respect for liberty” (Brown 2009: 12). Throughout the period, the dominant discourse has shifted quite dramatically to the right. As a journalist in the Economist put it, the idea of ‘Cool Britannia’ promoted during the first term of the Blair government has been replaced by the fearful image of ‘Londonistan’\(^\text{198}\). British mosques no longer symbolize the country’s commitment to tolerance and celebration of difference, but a potential nest of radicalism and internal threats (Joffé 2008) where, in the words of David Cameron, “preachers of hate can sow misinformation about the plight of Muslims elsewhere, [and] promote separatism by encouraging Muslims to define themselves solely in terms of their religion.”\(^\text{199}\) The economic turmoil has lent the British National Party (BNP) renewed vigour, and Gordon Brown’s commitment to create “British jobs for British workers”\(^\text{200}\) turned into a disaster when popular protests were organized against the French-owned company Total for employing 2,500 Italian nationals, as opposed to native Britons, in its Killingholme-based oil refinery in January 2009. With the 2010 change of government in Westminster, the gap in style and substance between the Tory-led government in London and the SNP government in Edinburgh has grown deeper than ever. In February 2011, the Prime Minister delivered a speech in Munich, a few months after Angela Merkel officially announced the failure of ‘Multikulti Deutschland’ which marked another step in the pan-European backlash against multiculturalism: “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values [and] this hands-off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared.”\(^\text{201}\) In sharp contrast, Alex Salmond’s acceptance speech, following the victory of the SNP at Scottish elections with an absolute majority of seats in May 2011, was the occasion to reiterate the nationalist vision of Scotland as “open to all, whether they come from England, Ireland, Pakistan or Poland.”\(^\text{202}\)

\(^{198}\) ‘London’s other names, and what they say about Britain’s recent history’ in the Economist, January 29, 2009.

\(^{199}\) Prime Minister’s David Cameron’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, February 5, 2011.


\(^{201}\) Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, February 5, 2011.

\(^{202}\) Alex Salmond’s Acceptance Speech at the Scottish Parliament, May 10, 2011.
This chapter explores the boundary-making strategy of the Scottish government in relation to immigrants since devolution. By adding a democratic tier to existing institutions, devolution marked a critical juncture in Scottish politics, allowing for a greater degree of policy divergence and creating another electoral arena in which state-wide and non-state-wide parties compete at sub-state level. Actions taken in the fields of citizenship and integration are successively and critically reviewed, paying particular attention to public policies and associated frames on both sides of the border. I conclude that there is compelling evidence that the Scottish government, and more forcefully the SNP, have pursued a territorializing boundary-making strategy. They sought to gain further support among internal minorities and challenged the Westminster government in its own normative space by breaking the alleged monopoly of the state over the constitutional establishment of liberal democratic values. In the Scottish context, this has been facilitated by favourable dimensions in the opportunity structure: the new institutional context, historical heritage, and patterns of party competition, each of them being discussed at length in the third and last section.

6.1. The evolving boundaries of Scottish citizenship

Although the Scotland Act 1998 explicitly states that nationality constitutes an exclusive competence of the Westminster Parliament, devolution has provided new opportunities in Scotland to strengthen a legal definition of political membership distinct from the rest of the UK, chiefly as it required drawing the boundaries of electoral suffrage for the 1999 referendum and subsequent Holyrood parliamentary elections. Besides, it provided the Scottish government with enhanced instruments to contest and challenge the central administration’s boundary-making strategy in relation to immigrants.

6.1.1. The historical transformations of British citizenship

The evolution of British citizenship cannot be understood without reference to the tremendous geopolitical changes that occurred in the course of the twentieth century. In
1900, the UK controlled the major trade routes across the world, ruling one of the largest empires in history. Today, while still a major player on the international scene, it is heavily dependent upon its permanent seat at the UN Security Council and its special relationship with its transatlantic partner. When Common Law *jus soli* was first codified in 1914, British nationality was granted to everyone born on Empire soil, irrespective of one’s race, religion, or class. In sharp contrast, the current trend is to further restrict naturalization for many categories of people. In Sawyer’s words “the scope of British citizenship has shrunk from including everyone born in a vast empire to excluding even some people born in the territory of the UK itself” (2009: 1).

Although this change came gradually, three critical junctures in its historical development can be identified. The first episode of retrenchment came in 1962, when the Commonwealth Immigrants Act subjected Commonwealth citizens to immigration control. In 1968, the clause of patriality was introduced, restricting the right to abode to descendants of individuals born in the UK up to the third generation. From this date onwards, Commonwealth citizens, while still entitled to the same rights as British citizens after taking up residence in the UK, including the right to vote in general elections, have been subject to the same rules to enter and stay as any other categories of economic migrants. The second major drawback occurred in 1983, under the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, when the automatic acquisition of British citizenship became restricted to individuals whose parents were settled in the UK. The third major revision came progressively from 2002 onwards, through subsequent reforms strengthening the rules of acquisition of citizenship. Although many of the ideas put forward by a moribund Labour government towards the end of Gordon Brown’s mandate, whether in the Goldsmith report Citizenship: Our Common Bond (2008) or in the Green Paper A Path to Citizenship (2008), are unlikely to be adopted in the exact same terms, the Conservative-led government showed no intention of abandoning the aim of accentuating the divide between citizens and aliens.


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204. For a good review of legislative developments in a historical perspective, see Faulks (1998).
205. Prior to 1962, there was no distinction made between those who hold a British passport issued in the Commonwealth and in the UK.
206. Here, it is important to distinguish the categories of *economic migrants* and *refugees*, who are not subject to the same legal channels of entry.
207. Although one of the first decisions of the new government was to dispose of the ongoing and highly controversial reform requiring Third-Country Nationals to carry an identity card.
There is much confusion between the term nationality and citizenship in British politics and law. Indeed, prior to the legislative changes brought about by the 1948 British Nationality Act, British nationals were formally subjects of the Crown;208 The category of Citizens of the UK and Colonies (CUKC) came about at this time, not in response to domestic pressures but in the wake of decolonization and the corollary need for the now fully sovereign states of Canada and India to define the boundaries of their citizenry (McCrone & Kiely 2000). The legal category of British citizens was first introduced in 1983. While that of British nationals is to date still meaningful, only the former necessarily entails the unconditional right to enter and stay in the UK. Besides, residents of Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland209 tend to use the term ‘nationality’ to highlight their sense of belonging to the small nations making up the United Kingdom, while reserving the use of the term ‘citizenship’ to the legal bond with the British state. But the two idioms are so intertwined in practice that their conceptual differences are blurred to a considerable extent. It would be misleading to believe that Scots use the term nationality to stress their emotional attachment to their nation, and citizenship to designate the cold-hearted and impersonal relationship binding them to the British state. Indeed reality proves to be much more complex, the United Kingdom being itself a nation that, although explicitly multinational, comprises its share of emotional ties and bonds going beyond the set of rights to which its citizens are entitled. Unlike (most of) its Continental counterparts, a sense of common British identity was gradually instilled from the nineteenth century onwards while allowing for the permanence of distinctive features across the constituting nations (Asari et al. 2008). But British citizenship shall not be interpreted as a strictly legal notion emptied of any affective content. T.H. Marshall (2006/1948) compellingly highlighted the intimate link between successive development of civil, political and social rights and British nation-building. From this perspective, the gradual democratization process and the consolidation of the welfare state in the aftermath of World War II, underlined by the state’s commitment to provide assistance to Britons ‘from cradle to grave’ played a role no less significant than warfare and imperialism in the construction of an

208. The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914 stated that “any person born within His Majesty’s dominions and allegiance was a natural-born British subject” (Goldsmiths report 2007: 13).
209. In many ways, the sense of belonging to the English nation is much more problematic, although Englishmen and women have long tended to use the category of English and British interchangeably. For an insightful account of the evolving notion of Englishness, see Mc Crone (2003).
overlapping British identity, in which ethnic and national differences could sit alongside common citizenship.

Yet, this arrangement came under severe strain in recent decades, as a result of the resurgence of peripheral nationalism on the one hand, and sustained immigration on the other hand. Devolution marked a critical juncture, increasingly accentuating differences in citizenship rights within the UK (Mitchell 2006: 153). There is now compelling evidence that the demise of the welfare state in the wake of Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberal agenda contributed to the rise of peripheral dissent (Béland et al. 2008, McEwen et al. 2005). Since devolution, the Scottish and Welsh governments have used their competencies to promote a distinct social citizenship, clinging to a more universal and social democratic approach to welfare provision. In parallel, the acceleration of inward flows since 1997 mechanically increased the proportion of resident aliens. But unlike much of the post-war era in the course of which the status of resident has overshadowed that of citizen, and entitlement to citizenship rights have been largely detached from nationality (Favell 1998), the last decade has been marked by a deliberate attempt to reassert the value of full membership. In the remainder of this section, I examine how the Scottish administration has responded to these changes since devolution.

6.1.2. Defining the Scottish citizenry on the eve of devolution

Between the 1707 Act of Union with England and the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, the rules of acquisition of Scottish nationality have not been formally defined nor translated into law. Prior to the Union of the Crowns in 1603, whereby King James VI of Scotland became King James I of England as well, Scottish subjecthood was acquired at birth, in accordance with the medieval norm stating that everyone born on the soil controlled by the monarch was subject to his rule. In 1608, the court was asked to determine whether Robert Calvin, a man born in Scotland before the Union of the Crowns and now resident in England, shall be considered as an alien, hence not subject to the “proper rights, laws, and statutes of the Kingdom of

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210. In Scotland, this rule was embodied in the Latin proverb infra ligeantiam domini Regis regni sui Scot.
Sir Edward Coke, then Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, concluded that “every subject that is born out of the extent and reach of the laws of England cannot by judgment of those laws be a natural subject to the King.” As a result, Robert Calvin was denied the right to own property in England, a privilege then reserved to English subjects. Yet the decision also enshrined into law that individuals born after the Union either in Scotland or England would be subject to the rules of the same monarch. By contrast with most continental states (Weil 2001), this decision remained unchallenged, thus setting a path for the acquisition of British nationality, and later citizenship, through *jus soli*, as opposed to *jus sanguinis*.

But apart from this admittedly distant episode, the formal boundaries of Scottish nationality were not systematically discussed until the eve of devolution. As shown in Chapter III, the long road to home rule enabled Scottish elites to put aside their differences in defence of a common if poorly-defined territorial interest, underpinned by broad political and popular support for the re-establishment of a democratically-elected Scottish Parliament. The creation of the Scottish office in 1885, together with the permanence of a distinct parliamentary group for Scottish Westminster constituencies, consolidated a territorially-defined administrative and electoral arena in which issues of direct concern to the residents of Scotland could be discussed, thus keeping alive a frame of reference maintaining a ‘banal’ and self-reproducing territorial identity. However, by adding a ‘democratic tier’ to administrative devolution (Mitchell 2006), the Scotland Act 1998 raised the need to define the boundaries of the electoral franchise, an issue extensively debated in the House of Commons in June 1997. Ultimately, the decision was made to use the registry of local government electors for both the referendum on devolution and subsequent elections for membership of the

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211. Calvin’s Case 7 Coke Report 1a, 77 ER 377.
212. Ibid.
213. Although it occurred almost four centuries ago, the Calvin case is well-known and influential in the *jus soli* jurisprudence, especially as most European countries adopted the *jus sanguinis* principle following the French Revolution; *jus soli* being associated with the Ancien Régime. The 1805 Napoleon civil code provides a telling example, although Napoleon himself was opposed to the reform of the French nationality code which he saw as draining away resources for warfare (Weil 2001). This however, shall not hide the fact that Catholics and Jews were formally excluded from British nationality until 1778.
214. The issue was hardly mentioned during the parliamentary debates preceding the first referendum over devolution in 1979.
215. Until 1985, UK legislation did not provide expatriates with external voting rights. Besides, there were no local voting rights for EU citizens before 1997 either. Accordingly the issue was not systematically discussed prior to the 1979 referendum on devolution. Under the Scotland Act 1978, the persons entitled to vote as electors at the elections for the Scottish Assembly would have been those who had their names on the register of parliamentary electors, plus peers (Jo Shaw 2009a: 14).
Scottish Parliament.\textsuperscript{216} In consequence, EU citizens resident in Scotland, who under the provisions of the 1992 Maastricht treaty are entitled to vote at local elections in any member states, were given the right to have their say in the ‘settled will of the Scottish people’, unlike Scots-born emigrants no longer registered at an address within the constituency. While prior to the 2004 eastward enlargement the proportion of EU citizens living in Scotland was marginal, this highly symbolic decision considerably strengthened the national movements’ civic credentials, by giving English-born and EU-born immigrants alike the opportunity to become ‘political Scots’ (Kiely et al. 2005).

On the one hand, Labour’s support for using the local government franchise and electoral register as the basis for determining who could vote and stand for elections expressed an intuition that “devolution mark[ed] the extension of what constitutes ‘the local’ within UK constitutional politics” (Shaw 2009a: 11). In the run-up to the 1979 referendum, the party failed to overcome its internal divisions over Scotland’s constitutional future. While some saw devolution as the best way to contain the rise of the SNP, others, mainly among the industrial wing, fiercely opposed it on the grounds that nationalism undermined UK-wide class solidarity (Keating & Jones 1985, Mitchell 2009). Hence, 1997 New Labour, committed not to repeat the same mistakes as Old Labour buried a few years earlier in the turmoil of Tony Blair’s ascension, carefully emptied the devolution settlement of its nationalist connotations. Instead, emphasis was placed on the democratic benefits that bringing decision-making processes closer to the people would entail. By contrast, the Tories’ stance was in tune with their traditional conception of the Union. For the Conservative MP Peter Luff, this decision meant no less than the “government intending to give a Greek waiter temporarily working in a backstreet café in Edinburgh the right to vote in an election about Scotland’s future, but denying it to a Scottish journalist working here in Westminster for the Scotsman.”\textsuperscript{217} But the party, worn down after seventeen consecutive years in power, was no longer able to mobilize its traditional Scottish electorate. As it did not return a single MP in Scotland at the 1997 general elections, its capacity to alter the ongoing reform had

\textsuperscript{216} The Scotland 1998 Act does not comprise a clear legal definition of Scottish citizenship holders. However, article 11.1 states that “the persons entitled to vote as electors at an election for membership of the Parliament are those who would be entitled to vote as electors at a local government election in an electoral area falling wholly or partly within the constituency, and are registered in the register of local government electors at an address within the constituency.”

reached an all time low. As for the SNP, Alex Salmond’s reply to Peter Luff’s intervention captures well how his stance was in fact intertwined with the party’s territorializing strategy: “Is [the Hon. Gentleman] incapable of understanding why, as leader of the Scottish National Party, I am perfectly comfortable with the idea of people from England, Wales, France, the rest of Europe, or Timbuktu, who are resident in Scotland and contribute to the community there, voting on the future of the country? Is he totally incapable of understanding why residents who contribute to a community should have rights of determination, regardless of where they are from?”  218

6.1.3. The citizenship rights of asylum seekers and the path to citizenship

The SNP, and for different reasons, Scottish Labour’s commitment to envisage the boundaries of citizenship “based on the territorial and political entity of Scotland, not on place of birth, or ethnic group”, 219 is especially striking when compared to UK-wide legislative developments. This is equally true in regard to the citizenship rights of asylum seekers and the rules of acquisition of citizenship, successively examined in the remainder of this section.

The citizenship rights of asylum seekers

The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 marked a radical shift in British asylum policy. The National Asylum Support Agency (NASA) was set up and charged with the mandatory dispersal of all asylum seekers, away from the pressurized housing areas of the South-East to areas of surplus elsewhere in Britain, in order to “spread the burden” across the territory (Robinson et al. 2003). Glasgow was designated as a ‘cluster area’ so that by 2002 about 4,500 asylum-seekers had been dispersed there, with hundreds more arriving daily. Initially, the issue received little attention, whether from the media or the Scottish administration. However, this changed dramatically in August 2001 when the murder of Firsat Dag in Glasgow, a Turkish asylum-seeker, hit the national headlines. As a result, the relatively positive media reporting, “representing Glasgow and its people as welcoming and open to new residents,” (Coole 2002: 842) gave way to a series of articles built around the “stereotype of the racist, knife-wielding Glaswegian hooligan” (ibid. 846). This in turn forced the Scottish administration and local

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218. Ibid.
governments to step in. The *Scottish Refugee Integration Forum* (SRIF) was created and immediately endowed with significant resources provided through the government’s Race, Religion and Refugee Integration fund, with the aim of enabling “the successful integration of refugees in Scotland and the provision of more accessible, coordinated and good quality services.” Hence the asylum agenda in Scotland has seen some divergences from the rest of the UK. For example, asylum seekers are entitled to funding of integration activities, unlike the Home Office integration funding which is only available to those granted refugee status, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave. Besides, as of June 2011, the Scottish Trade Union Congress decided to accept them as trade union members. However, as asylum, like immigration, is a reserved matter, initiatives taken in Scotland were closely dependent upon the increasingly harsh UK-wide legislative framework. The Scottish Trade Unions, the Scottish Refugee Council and above all the Labour/Lib-Dem coalition government have campaigned hard to change the rules restricting the employment of asylum-seekers and refugees. First Minister Jack McConnell personally sought to negotiate some kind of differentiated framework in Scotland, following a row over the treatment of families of failed asylum-seekers who were forcefully deported. But he was firmly rebuffed by the Home Office, despite compelling evidence that asylum-seekers were put at risk by the government’s dispersal policy. The SNP immediately took this as an opportunity to blame the Labour administration on both sides of the border. For the SNP MSP Linda Fabiani, “where the Scottish people accept asylum seekers into our communities and the Scottish government works to ensure full integration, the Westminster Government wants to introduce isolation. Where the Scottish Parliament wants to deliver social justice, the Home Secretary wants to introduce social exclusion.” In 2008, the British government announced it would opt into the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child, thus putting an end to the incarceration of asylum-seekers’ children. But there is no reason to believe that the ‘Scottish lobby’ played any part in this sudden U-turn. Instead, this raised doubts about the Scottish government’s capacity to achieve any radical shift.

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221. ‘McConnell defiant in Asylum row’ in news.bbc.co.uk, November 25, 2005.
222. In 2002, the Home Office commissioned a team of researchers from Oxford Brookes University to evaluate the policy outcome of the dispersal policy. However, the report, extremely critical of the government’s action, was not published by the Home Office until 2007 under the Freedom of Information (FoI) Act.
223. Linda Fabiani, *Scottish Parliament Official Report*, October 31, 2001, Column 3463. Linda Fabiani was then the SNP MSP for Central Scotland. She became the Minister for Europe, External Affairs and Culture after the 2007 SNP victory.
in policy areas perceived as strategically relevant for Westminster (Williams et al 2006: 513).

**The path to citizenship**

Since 2002, citizenship has increasingly become the cornerstone of the British government’s migration agenda, and been particularly topical in public debates. The naturalization procedure has been profoundly transformed and tightened, the government deliberately requiring much more from those who wish to become citizens, who “must pass a residence test; be intending to make the UK their home; be of good character; and pass an English language requirement and a test of knowledge of life in the UK.”\(^{224}\) Prospective citizens are now required to pronounce an Oath of Allegiance to the Queen,\(^ {225}\) a duty that was to date reserved for a small category of high-ranking civil servants, and a US-style Pledge of Commitment to the UK\(^ {226}\) created from scratch for this occasion. Citizenship ceremonies are broadly identical across the UK, although they are “to be tailored to reflect the part of the United Kingdom in which they are performed, with the Scottish flag and the anthem Flower of Scotland being given prominence north of the border.”\(^ {227}\) There are virtually no territorial provisions in the content of the Life in the UK test that aliens have to pass in order to become fully-fledged citizens. Although some questions do stress national variations, the examination is clearly unionist in its outlook.

Furthermore, the Brown government in 2007 charged Lord Goldsmith with the implicit task of rationalizing the patchwork of membership categories inherited from the Empire. The Citizenship: Our Common Bond report published shortly after lamented the “blurring in the distinction between citizens and non-citizens, especially in terms of rights and entitlements.”\(^ {228}\) Moving away from the long-standing focus on residency as the most meaningful criterion for eligibility to the great bulk of citizenship rights, it

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\(^{225}\) Oath of allegiance to the Queen: “I (name) swear by Almighty God that on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and Successors, according to law”. Alternatively, new citizens can pronounce an “affirmation of allegiance”: I (name) do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and Successors, according to law”. (Sources: UK border agency, www.ukba.gov.uk, [accessed March 1, 2009]).  
\(^{226}\) United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA), 2008.  
proposed to draw a sharper line between UK citizens and foreign residents, notably by limiting “the right to vote in Westminster elections to UK citizens”, against the general trend in Europe which tends to expand the boundaries of suffrage rather than tighten it. The suggestions contained in the Goldsmith report were reformulated in the Green Paper Path to Citizenship published in April 2008, and formalized in the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act passed in Parliament in January 2009. The points-based system formerly introduced to manage immigration was forced into the citizenship agenda, resident aliens now being required to ‘earn’ their right to citizenship. The system comprises three stages: temporary residence, probationary citizenship and British citizenship. Only immigrants who entered the UK through tier 1 and 2 of the points-based system, the categories of highly-skilled and skilled migrants, shall be given access to citizenship. But the reform was fiercely criticized in Scotland, where it was feared that this could act as a disincentive for potential migrants, and consequently undermine the economic and demographic objectives pursued by the Scottish government. In response, the Home Office agreed to modulate the system according to territorial specificity, thus enabling migrants who settle in Scotland to get extra citizenship points.

Overall, these repeated attempts to strengthen a ‘Common Bond’ among British citizens have largely failed to produce the expected outcome in Scotland. Alex Salmond qualified Gordon Brown’s citizenship agenda as being “smacked of desperation”, “Monthy Pythonesque”, and “Basil Fawlty.” The SNP constitutional proposal for a free Scotland (2002) states that “citizenship shall be open to anyone who is permanently resident in Scotland at the date of independence, to anyone who was born in Scotland or either of whose parents was born in Scotland, and to such other persons as the Parliament of Scotland may prescribe.” Protracted migration patterns between Scotland and England, nurtured by three centuries of intense economic,  

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229. Ibid. p. 76. For a well-argued account of the practical impossibilities of bringing about these changes, see Shaw (2009a).
230. Although this point is debatable in relation to immigrants, there is no doubt that in the past century the electoral franchise has been expanded to categories of citizens traditionally excluded, notably women, and in the UK the working class as late as 1918. Besides, a number of countries have extended the right to vote to aliens at local elections and, in the case of Scotland, Wales, and the Greater London area, to meso-level elections as well. For a legal analysis of aliens’ electoral rights in Europe, see Shaw (2009b).
cultural and political exchange within a single highly centralized state, suggest that a very large proportion of residents could be entitled to dual citizenship, thus undermining the rationale for independence (Peter Jones 2002). But despite this limitation, the Draft Referendum Bill published by the Scottish government in January 2010 reiterated that the local registry, together with the Parliamentary and European ones, shall be used as a basis to determine the franchise, the party committing again to a territorial conception of citizenship with voting rights based on residence, not ethnicity. Accordingly, EU-citizens living in Scotland would not be expected to take a test, nor swear an oath before casting their vote. They are nonetheless invited to pronounce themselves in a hypothetical referendum over the Scottish people’s right to self-determination, on the basis of their residency.

6.2. One Scotland, many cultures?

In 1999, the quasi absence of an integration strategy in Scotland was at odds with the dominant discourse of civic nationalism. The relatively low concentration of minorities, a broad discourse of tolerance together with the predominance of constitutional issues had produced a neglect of integration issues. Despite the scarcity of evidence-based research on minorities in Scotland, the murders of Imran Khan and Surgit Singh Chokhar in Glasgow in 1998 challenged the understanding of Scotland as a non-racist nation. Although racial equality is a reserved matter, the Scottish government has been committed to ‘encourage’ its diffusion throughout Scottish society. Besides, the integration agenda cuts across a number of policy areas that are devolved such as education, lifelong learning, health, social services and housing. While devolution has enabled the Scottish government to establish a set of institutions that do not significantly depart from the rest of the UK, the differences in discourse are striking. Political parties north of the border, and chiefly the SNP, have clung to a vibrant celebration of diversity, while at the same time the London government was trying hard, although with mitigated success, to assert the value of Britishness across multinational and multicultural Britain.

236. To be sure, Scottish Labour has pursued a multicultural agenda since the 1960s. However, the passage from administrative to political devolution reinforced this trend.
The Labour government which took office in 1997 sought in its first term to modernize Britain, which, after seventeen years of Conservative rule, was seen in progressive circles as ill-prepared to step into the new millennium. Tony Blair in particular missed few opportunities to share his vision of Britain as a ‘young country’, while former Home Secretary Robin Cook famously coined the expression ‘Tikka Massala’ nation, confident in its dynamism and at ease with its pluralism. This re-branding exercise was in tune with the preponderant role occupied by spin doctors in the Blair government. As late as 2000, the Future of Multi-ethnic Britain report chaired by Lord Professor Bhikhu Parekh recommended with the blessing of the Labour government moving beyond a conception of Britishness imbued with “systematic, largely unspoken, racial connotations”, towards a “multicultural post-nation.” More than ever before, diversity was to be recognized and celebrated in the public sphere, and Britain to be conceived of as “a community of communities and individuals.” But the multicultural ecstasy was short-lived, as the most violent race riots in England for 20 years erupted in the Northern cities of Bradford and Oldham in August 2001. In response Ted Cantle, a local councilor in Bradford, was charged with the task of investigating the root causes of the riots. The conclusions of the Cantle Report pointed out a series of unintended effects produced by a seemingly well-intentioned idea. The fierce competition for public resources between groups institutionally divided on racial and ethnic lines had had the adverse consequence of cementing communities operating on “the basis of a series of parallel lives [that] often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges.”

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237. Robin Cook’s Speech to the Social Market Foundation in London, April 19, 2001: “Chicken Tikka Massala is now a true British national dish, not only because it is the most popular, but because it is a perfect illustration of the way Britain absorbs and adapts external influences.”
238. Runnymede Trust – The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000, p.38
239. Ibid. p. 7, my emphasis.
240. The riots in Bradford and Oldham were immediately and unproblematically qualified in the press and by the government as race riots. However, a brief comparison with subsequent riots – and far more dramatic ones – in the French suburbs since the 1980s highlights the constructedness of these categories. South of the Channel, pundits have been very reluctant to introduce an ethnic or racial element and have consistently emphasized the social dimension, in line with the Republican frame of reference, racial or cultural interpretations being left to the radical right.
6.2.1. *Community cohesion in the devolved policy context*

At UK-level, the coexistence of three distinct commissions – the Equal Opportunities Commission, the Commission for Racial Equality, and the Disability Rights Commission – appeared counter-productive now that the explicit aim was to foment community cohesion. They were then merged into a single Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) in 2007. Encompassing issues related to race, disability, age, sexual orientation, human rights, and gender, the EHRC embraced a holistic view of equality promotion. While competent in the UK as a whole, regional branches in Wales and Scotland were nonetheless created to take into account territorial specificity. In parallel, the Scottish Human Rights Commission (SHRC) was set up with the Scottish Commission for Human Rights Act (2006). Although the Scottish Parliament committed to its creation as early as 1999, the actual institution, the purpose of which being to promote “all human rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural”, was not operating until 2008. Within the Scottish administration, the Equality unit, part of the Department of Communities, also covers issues of age, disability, gender, race, religion and sexual orientation, reflecting a similar intention to integrate race-related concerns within a more broadly defined ‘Community Cohesion’ agenda. The Equality Unit identified two race equality organizations – CEMVO\(^{243}\) and BEMIS\(^{244}\) – which were given privileged access to the decision-making process. They received funding through the Race Equality, Integration and Community Support Fund to facilitate the development of networks and structures within minority ethnic communities and voluntary associations across Scotland. Significant resources were invested in order to plug the research and information gap. In addition, the government initiated a wide-ranging review of race equality work in Scotland, suggesting that the evidence-based new public management paradigm that has deeply transformed policy-making in Whitehall since 1997 has crossed the border and spilled over to the devolved administrations\(^{245}\).

\(^{242}\) Scottish Human Rights Commission (SHRC), Building a Strategic Plan, 2008.
\(^{243}\) Council of Ethnic Minority Voluntary Sector Organizations.
\(^{244}\) Black and Ethnic Minority Infrastructure in Scotland.
\(^{245}\) Although for Michael Keating (2005), the penetration of the new public management paradigm has not been as far-reaching in Holyrood as in Whitehall.
The year devolution came about saw a series of minor sectarian incidents targeting the Catholic community. This immediately prompted a passionate national debate which, because of the scarcity of data, relied mainly on anecdotal evidence and personal impressions. In the summer months of 1999, members of the national football team and the vice-chairman of Rangers Football club were accused of singing anti-Catholic songs. In August, James MacMillan, a famous Glaswegian Catholic composer, denounced in his speech at the opening of the Edinburgh Festival the “sleep-walking bigotry” and “visceral anti-Catholicism” that in his view had undermined everyday life in the Western Lowlands for too long. Soon after, the decision was made to include two voluntary questions on religion in the 2001 Scottish census, including a breakdown of Christians, as well as an Irish category (Walls 2001: 60). The 2001 Census form for England and Wales does not comprise a specific category for Roman Catholics, where the issue has not spurred much interest. Instead, the public debate has focused on whether or not the current racial monitoring form should be complemented with a set of questions on religion in order to evaluate the proportion of self-identified Muslims. This decision came in response to those who criticized the existing framework that, although broadly perceived as effective in tackling discrimination on the grounds of race, had failed to address those directed against the Muslim community (Modood et al. 1997, Modood 2008). By expanding the scope of current race relations legislation to questions of faith, the argument goes, policy-makers would be better equipped to address the consequences of Islamophobia, on the rise since the Satanic Verses controversy in 1989, and reaching a record high after the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York. But in Scotland, the Muslim community amounted to merely 0.8% of the population in 2001. Hence residual sectarian tensions have been framed as the most significant impediment to social cohesion. The issue prompted the publication of a series of academic studies covering different aspects of the life of what was now recognized as a sizeable portion of the Scottish population (Devine et al 2000, Rosie & Bond 2004).

In February 2005, the decision was made to organize a Summit on Sectarianism, in order to, in the words of the then (Labour) First Minister Jack MacConnell, tackle “the bigoted attitudes and behaviours of a minority that have scarred Scottish life for too

long.” The Labour party, increasingly challenged in its Glasgow strongholds by a reinvigorated SNP, sought to reaffirm its historical role as the incontestable champion of the Catholic community’s sectional interests. Besides, its century-old ties with the representatives of the Catholic Church had recently been undermined by the campaign over the repeal of clause 28 of the Local Government Act 1988. Again, the initiative has been profoundly influenced by the main findings of the Cantle Report. Chief among them was the perceived need to bring communities together and encourage mutual understanding. The Scottish administration’s Action Plan on Tackling Sectarianism in Scotland was published after the Summit was organized around the four key themes of education, sports, faith and parade. Besides, the government dared to tackle the question of denominational schools inherited from the 1918 Education (Scotland) Act that, despite their instrumental role in integrating the Catholic community, have often been criticized for cementing impenetrable boundaries between religious groups. As Elinor Kelly put it, it is difficult to think of any issue more likely to divide opinion in Scotland into “mutually incomprehensible and, on occasion, abusive camps than national debate about religion and especially denominational schools” (2003: 686). This statement is equally valid concerning the public debate in England in relation to publicly-funded Muslim schools, although the relative proportion of self-reported Muslims living in England is considerably lower (Flint 2007). The most emblematic action of the Plan, perceived by some as an attack against the 1918 arrangement, consisted in encouraging ‘twinning’ between denominational and non-denominational schools, by organizing common events, creating common facilities and promoting joint activities in order to “enrich the experience of their pupils and give them an opportunity to meet together.” Religious leaders were also encouraged to meet

248. The single biggest political battle in the short history of the Scottish Parliament occurred when the Labour-led Scottish Executive unveiled its plan to repeal Clause 28 Section 2A of the Local government Act 1988, the law prohibiting the promotion of homosexuality as a form of family life in schools. The Catholic Church launched a crusade against the government’s plan, which rapidly affected its long-standing alliance with Labour. For an interesting view on the place of religion in devolved Scotland, and the enhanced power of the Churches in general and the Roman Catholic Church in particular, see Martin Steven, 2007.
249. The Marches and Parades Section provided that parades organized by Orange Lodges should be notified 28 days before, against 7 days in the current legislation.
250. In her study of multiculturalism in school-age education, Suzanne Audrey found that “it is unofficially acknowledged that many local councilors feel ‘stuck’ over the issue of publicly funded Catholic Schools” (2000: 121).
251. Although as Flint rightly notes, there are 418 state-funded Roman Catholic schools in Scotland against 25 state-funded Koranic schools in England (2007).
252. There may actually be some truth in it, although the Labour party never seriously considered bringing the reform to Parliament. Indeed the former (Labour) Education Minister Sam Balgraithe and his Lib-Dem peer Lord Steel both argued in the Sunday times that “denominational schools were the root of sectarianism and bigotry” and called for them to be scrapped. See ‘the great faith School debate’ in the Sunday Times, January 7, 2007.
more regularly through an empowered version of the Scottish Inter-Faith council.\(^\text{253}\) Lastly, Labour's Lib-Dem coalition partners pushed for the addition of a new clause in the Criminal Justice Act creating a new offence on Sectarianism,\(^\text{254}\) passed in the Scottish Parliament in 2006.

In institutional terms, actions taken at the Scottish level have closely followed the UK-wide paradigmatic shift, although they were framed in a Scottish context, giving prominence to anti-Catholic sectarianism over Islamophobia. Civil servants in Edinburgh feared that the 2007 SNP victory would bring about major organizational changes. However, they were quickly reassured, as most of the existing institutions remained. The SNP government, far from rejecting the heritage of its predecessors, took a number of initiatives to expand it. In 2007, the government signed a Concordat with local authorities strengthening inter-governmental cooperation in matters of race equality. It also created a series of indicators aimed at assessing the government’s activities, and actions taken in the realm of race equality and integration fell into National Outcome 13 entitled: “We take pride in a strong, fair and inclusive national identity.” The differences in style and discourse between Holyrood and Westminster, however, have grown deeper than ever.

### 6.2.2. Multiculturalism and the growing discursive gap

Far from being an SNP idiosyncrasy, the vibrant celebration of cultural pluralism cuts across the entire Scottish political spectrum. Even the Scottish Tories have been reluctant to embrace the multicultural assault of their fellow party members south of the border. The most illustrative initiative of the Labour-led Scottish Executive is without doubt the One Scotland, Many Cultures campaign launched in 2002, the purpose of which being to “raise awareness of racism among the general public, draw attention to its negative impact on society, and to promote the benefits of a diverse population to Scotland.”\(^\text{255}\) The campaign is emblematic of the government’s eagerness

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\(^{254}\) Similar legislation on incitement to religious hatred was passed the same year in Westminster, with the aim of protecting the Muslim community, increasingly stigmatized in the aftermath of the 2005 terrorist attacks in London.

\(^{255}\) One Scotland, Many Cultures 2005/06 – Waves 6 and 7 Campaign Evaluation, published by the Scottish Executive (2007).
to promote an overlapping Scottish identity, able to accommodate individuals and communities irrespective of their ethnic or religious affiliations. But from 2007, the SNP, in office for the first time, sought to promote its own version of a multicultural Scotland, simultaneously pursuing the electoral objective of making inroads into the Catholic and Muslim vote, and the nationalist aim of challenging the British government in its own liberal democratic space.

As for the first objective, the SNP sought to strengthen its relationship with the Catholic community. Alex Salmond reiterated his unconditional support for Catholic schools and their “first rate record in Scotland” and insisted that the priority was rather to remove “the state sectarianism that is institutionalized in the Act of Settlement.” While the importance given to this matter certainly flattered the representatives of the Roman Catholic Church, it fell short of addressing the not negligible sectarian tensions (still) punctuating everyday life in Glasgow. More strikingly, Alex Salmond invested much of his time rallying the small yet growing South Asian community to his cause. The Muslim population in Scotland of just over 48,000, 65% of which are Pakistani (GROS Census 2001), exhibits distinct socio-economic features, the proportion of self-employed being higher than south of the border, and tend to identify more strongly as Scottish than their peers in England identify as English (Amir et al. 1999, Hopkins 2007). Miller and Hussain (2006) have shown how the majority of them voted yes in the 1999 referendum, and how they shifted en masse from Labour to the SNP following the 2004 Iraq invasion, the latter clinging to its pacifist tradition by vigorously opposing the intervention of British troops. In 1997, Mohammed Sarwar became the first Pakistani-born Muslim to be elected as a (Labour) MP in Westminster, but the first one to sit in the Holyrood Parliament was elected in 2004 under the SNP banner. The SNP-affiliated association Asian Scots for Independence was given more visibility, and the Scottish Islamic Foundation (SIF) was created with the government’s blessing. It gained backing from the SNP for state-financed Muslim schools, a project that so far has not

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256. In 2008, Alex Salmond declared in his speech at the Cardinal Winning Education Lecture, University of Glasgow: “I have long been a supporter of the quality of faith-based education in this country - and a particular admirer of the contribution of Scotland's Catholic schools... my advocacy for faith-based education extends beyond Catholic schools. I believe that here we are in full agreement on the tremendous role that faith schools can play in Scottish society.”


258. It is in this respect interesting to highlight that, despite the fact that the Scottish Muslim community is relatively small, the first Muslim MP ever to be elected in Westminster represented the Glasgow-Govan circumscription.
come to fruition. The head of the Scottish Foundation, Osama Saeed, who acquired a sulfurous reputation by taking a number of radical positions in the public debate, was the SNP candidate for Glasgow Central at the 2010 Westminster elections. In 2008, the group received GBP 215,000 from the government, infuriating prominent members of the Muslim community who accused the First Minister of “just helping his own party members”, and “ignoring established organizations.” In a similar vein, the SNP’s initial reaction to the failed terrorist attack against Glasgow airport in 2007 was interpreted by some as an illustration of the SNP’s uncritical stance on radical Islam (Gallagher 2008). Indeed, the day after the attack, the Minister of Justice Kenny McAskill stressed that they had not been perpetrated by “home-grown” terrorists and the suspects were not “born or bred here but had only lived in Scotland for a period of time”, thereby suggesting that no such thing could happen in Scotland. Tom Gallagher, in a virulent pamphlet against the SNP, found a paradox between the rather non-religious support base of the SNP and the party’s apparent support for a Muslim organization that is “committed to a Europeanized version of Islam that is highly evangelical and wishes to live according to Sharia precepts within Europe today” (Gallagher 2010: 141). Gallagher concludes that “as a devotee of radical forms of multiculturalism, the SNP emphasizes group rights over the exercise of individual citizenship”, while at the same time Downing Street is trying to fix the negative consequences of 30 years of “wrong-headed public policies that created a segmented society and fixed identities that played down individualism and concentrated powers in the hands of community leaders” (ibid. 227, my emphasis). But Gallagher’s critique of SNP-style multiculturalism overemphasizes policy divergences, and downplays the fact that the broader discursive environment has been considerably more open to diversity than south of the border. In no circumstances can the SNP efforts to cultivate the Muslim vote be interpreted as pandering to Islamic extremism.

259. In a similar vein, the widely-respected Scottish Health Secretary Nicola Sturgeon was almost forced to resign after she acknowledged having lobbied a court to give a member of her constituency a non-custodial sentence although he admitted a GDP 80,000 fraud. While her contrition helped fend off demands for her resignation, she failed to “dispel strong suspicions that she had been pressured by senior Asian Community figures within the SNP who have played a crucial role in her election in Glasgow Govan.” ‘Scottish deputy first minister apologizes over fraudster letter’ in the Guardian, February 24, 2010.


261. In bbcnews.co.uk, July 1, 2007.
As the National Conversation on Scotland’s Future was being launched in Edinburgh by the SNP, Gordon Brown opened a national debate on Britishness, the Prime Minister hoping to use his period of consultation to build an idea of Britishness “that would leave Alex Salmond’s Scottishness parochial and irrelevant.” The way in which Canadian national identity has been renegotiated to accommodate the nationalisme Québécois together with successive waves of immigrants is well known (Gagnon & Iacovino 2005). Likewise, the Australian version of multiculturalism was meant to address the aboriginal question and immigration-induced pluralism simultaneously (Joppke 2004). The UK is no exception. While for a long time the two issues have been treated separately, the recent debate on Britishness, initiated under the Blair government and enthusiastically pursued under the leadership of his successor Gordon Brown, was meant to kill two birds with one stone. The Scots-born Prime Minister, equally concerned with the growing popularity of the SNP in Scotland as with successive cracks in the ‘British model’ of immigrant integration, sought to address the multicultural and multinational challenges simultaneously. This strategy is encapsulated in the Prime Minister’s conception of Britishness: “what makes us feel British is our values, what we share in common. It was perhaps because we had to find a way for all the countries of the UK to live together, that we came to believe in tolerance, liberty, fairness to all and decency.” Likewise, the General Secretary of the Fabian Society sought to merge within a single narrative the great postwar identity debates, “over the union of Britain’s four nations; post-war immigration and multiculturalism and Britain’s reluctant Europeanism.”

However, Gordon Brown’s hope that his initiative would leave a lasting imprint on British politics was soon disappointed, as Britishness proved to be too complex and contentious a matter to be settled once and for all around a few consensual values. Some argued that ‘liberty for all, responsibility for all and fairness to all’ are virtues to which many nations may legitimately lay claim, and therefore cannot constitute the essence of the British people. Others pointed out, not without irony, how trying to

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define Britishness was in itself a very un-British exercise. Still others argued, in tune with Robin Cohen’s assertion that British identity has been shifting throughout history while always remaining “vague and hazy” (1994: 35), that the ultimate secret of its resilience was to be found in its fuzzy qualities. From a Scottish perspective, Tom Nairn (2006) published an essay in which he referred to Gordon Brown as the ‘bard of Britishness’, a figure representing in his view no more than the fading echo of the Empire and the ultimate symptom of the state’s deliquescence. More tempered pundits warned against the danger of conflating multinationalism with a multiculturalism that bears little in common, and pointed to the absence of a debate as to how a common citizenship could operate after devolution (Keating 2009a).

The main instruments supposed to instill and diffuse a sense of common purpose have either failed or are not applicable in Scotland. On the one hand, Gordon Brown’s attempt, following Lord Goldsmith’s recommendations, to establish a UK-wide national day modeled on the American celebration of July 4th, or the French commemoration of the storming of the Bastille on July 14th, and, although it has rarely been pointed out, reminiscent of Empire Day, failed dramatically. But in Scotland, the SNP proposal to establish Saint Andrews Day as the national day has been unanimously praised. For Alex Salmond, “national days in Britain have been clouded in uncertainty. They perhaps reflect precisely that uncertainty of what it means to be ‘British’. […] That sense of an inclusive Scottishness [supposedly embodied in St Andrew’s life] one which does not simply tolerate diversity but rather celebrates it, is at the heart of what I want St Andrews to become.”

On the other hand, the introduction of a compulsory citizenship subject in the school curriculum in 2002 was meant to be the cornerstone of the government’s citizenship agenda. The issue was discussed at length in the Goldsmith report, the author seeing it as a formidable instrument to strengthen a common set of values among British pupils. Yet Lord Goldsmith seemed to overlook the fact that, as education is devolved in Scotland, citizenship is not taught as an autonomous subject but figures among the National Priorities in Education adopted in 2001, alongside Achievement and Attainment and Inclusion and Equality, and cuts across the entire curriculum. Apart from the difficulties entailed in

265. Alex Salmond’s speech at the National Day Conference, Glasgow Caledonian University, November 30, 2007.  
266. Control over education is commonly portrayed as a fundamental tool of nation-building. For A.D. Smith, it is through compulsory, standardized public mass education that “state authorities hope to inculcate national devotion
introducing such a subject in England, where it has historically been regarded as a potential catalyst for radicalism (Heater 2001), the devolved administrations have been reluctant to follow the UK-wide guidelines. This has especially been so in Scotland where, together with the established Church and the legal system, education is one of the three institutions that contributed to sustain distinctive social and cultural features ever since the 1707 Act of Union. Hence, citizenship education has indeed become an important issue, but one which is increasingly associated with Scottish rather than British concerns and linked to the devolved policy context (Andrews et al. 2008: 146). Hence, the policy Plan in Scotland contends that “greater national autonomy is to be matched by an enhanced sense of social and political responsibility in the population.”

But unlike in England where the introduction of citizenship classes has been framed as a means to foment an enhanced sense of Britishness among pupils, the Scottish approach understood citizenship in its universal sense, and refrained to use it as an instrument of nation-building.

Overall, it seems that, despite the SNP’s allegedly excessive multiculturalism, the Westminster government’s attempt to reconstruct a national narrative largely failed to meet its objectives, either in Scotland or in the rest of the country. Indeed, as British politics seem to find no way out of Euro-scepticism, parochial unionism and ailing multiculturalism, the central government may find it increasingly hard to portray a Europhile nationalist party that celebrates a version of multiculturalism, that until recently represented New Labour’s greatest pride and to which a substitute urgently needs to be found, as “narrow-minded and irrelevant”.

6.3. Analysis of results

The analysis of boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants in Scotland confirms to a great extent the main hypothesis. Nationalists seeking to expand their means of territorial self-government have a vested interest in adopting a territorializing boundary-making strategy in relation to immigrants. Indeed, by doing so, they can acquire further internal legitimacy, by reducing the political salience of ethnic

and a distinctive homogenous culture, an activity that most regimes pursue with considerable energy under the influence of nationalist ideals of cultural authenticity and unity” (1991: 16).

boundaries in the homeland. In the Scottish case, the adoption of progressive citizenship and integration policies and discourses has also been the occasion to acquire further external legitimacy by showing that the Westminster government was not the sole carrier of liberal democratic norms. These findings are especially remarkable when contrasted with developments in Westminster, where immigration has increasingly been framed as a danger to social cohesion and a security threat. The strengthening of the rules of acquisition of British citizenship, the ever-widening gap between aliens’ and citizens’ right and ever harsher treatment of asylum-seekers find no equivalent in Scotland, where these developments have been systematically criticized for being counter-productive, detrimental to Scotland’s socio-economic interests, and incompatible with Scottish values. Although the notion of Scottish citizenship remains ill-defined, the use of the local registry at devolved elections and the SNP’s constitutional proposal for a free Scotland all point in the same direction: citizenship in devolved Scotland should as much as possible derive from residence, and under no circumstances from narrowly-defined ethnic or cultural criteria. Likewise, actions taken in the realm of integration mark a clear departure from the UK-wide politics of ‘Britishness’ that gained currency since 2001. The self-reassuring discourse that racism was ‘not a problem around here’ prior to devolution could no longer hide the absence of a genuine national strategy. The institutional framework that was gradually set up has been underlined by a ‘Community Cohesion’ paradigm, and does not show significant divergence from the rest of the UK, although it has increasingly been linked with the devolved policy context. But while Gordon Brown has been desperately looking for common values to keep Britons together, Alex Salmond has promoted his vision of Scottishness in terms that are reminiscent of the old multicultural doctrine, clinging to the celebration of cultural pluralism as an element of national pride.

In both the British and Scottish political arenas, immigrant policies and discourses have been used as instruments of boundary-making, although this took radically different forms. The shifting attitude of the Labour government in Westminster reflects how immigrants have been used as a scapegoat to (re)assert the value of British citizenship, not only understood as a legal status entitling its holder to a set of rights, but also as a bond linking individuals sharing distinct values, which together constitute the basis of the national community. These developments, far from being a British idiosyncrasy, have actually occurred to a varying extent all over Western Europe, as the proliferation
of path to citizenship schemes and integration tests, as well as the celebration of increasingly exclusive European values illustrate (Guild et al. 2009). But the British case sticks out in one important respect, as the 1997 series of constitutional change in the periphery mechanically fueled territorial variations in citizenship rights. The government sought to reinvent the British nation along explicitly multinational lines, and to merge immigration-induced and territorial pluralism into a common narrative. While the Labour government can be praised for at least trying to take the measure of the radical transformations induced by devolution, its attempt to reconstruct a common bond across multinational and multicultural Britain has been undermined by at least two factors. First, the Labour party kept functioning with the old unitary state paradigm. Consequently, it failed to acknowledge that, with the re-establishment of the Welsh and Scottish Parliaments, citizenship policies and discourses targeting immigrants would be increasingly territorially-differentiated, reflecting the distinct historical experiences, socio-economic landscapes and patterns of party competition shaping public policy-making in the devolved administrations. In many ways, the Labour government has been blinded by the erroneous belief that Britishness could still accommodate ethnic and national identities sitting alongside one another without meeting at any point, but bounded together by a common British citizenship. ‘Scots’ and ‘Welsh’ would remain ‘Scots’ and ‘Welsh’, denying the possibility that some could and actually do identify as ‘Asian-Scots’ or ‘Black-Welsh’. These mixed categories emerged as a result of institutional and policy variations, and more prominently of the banal instruments of nation-building and identity-shaping that have been strengthened by devolution. Second, this occurred at a time of rising suspicions and fears for the political, social, and territorial integrity of the British state: In political terms, the Labour government has had to cope with the renewed vigour of the BNP and scepticism of the Conservatives in opposition. Immigration has become an increasingly divisive and polarizing issue in the British political debate, which precluded the emergence of a consensus. In social terms, immigrants and their descendants born in Britain have increasingly been reified as a homogenous group, poorly integrated into a fantasized British society, and potentially constituting a security threat. With the economic crisis, the twin challenges of welfare chauvinism and competition on the labour market were added to this already long list of grievances. At last, the SNP victory at the 2007 devolved elections was interpreted as a serious territorial threat, which may precipitate the ‘break-up’ of Britain, a concern to which the Scots-born Prime Minister Gordon Brown proved to be particularly receptive.
Hence, the attempt to reconstruct a common bond has been driven by mutually reinforcing fears, and largely failed to produce the expected outcome.

By contrast, the review of actions taken in the field of citizenship and integration during the first ten years of devolution show the Scottish administration’s concern with blurring boundaries within the homeland, by promoting an overlapping Scottish identity, sufficiently thin to accommodate individuals and communities irrespective of their ethnic or religious affiliations. A thin national identity, however, is to be distinguished from a weak one. In fact, the contrast between the British and Scottish contexts contributed to strengthening the meaning of the territorial boundary. In the remainder of this section, I explain how these developments were eased by favourable dimensions of the political environment, which provided incentives for more progressive action.

6.3.1. The new institutional context

The new institutional context resulting from devolution provided favourable grounds for the Scottish administration to be recognized as legitimate over the totality of its jurisdiction. The re-establishment of a democratically-elected Scottish Parliament was meant to achieve three aims that the existing institutional arrangement, in the form of administrative devolution, could no longer fulfill: 1) addressing the ‘democratic deficit’ by creating an electoral arena reflecting the preferences of Scottish voters; 2) providing ‘Scottish answers to Scottish questions’ by tailoring policies and institutions to the needs of the Scottish electorate; 3) providing the administration with sufficient financial resources and legislative scope for the residents of Scotland to enjoy meaningful political autonomy in a broad range of domestic matters.

Between 1999 and 2007, Labour formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats and sought to consolidate the devolved institutions. Although its leadership has often come under fire, successive governments have created institutions of direct concern to immigrants and minorities, such as the Equality Unit cast in the Ministry of Communities, and the Scottish Refugee Council. After the release of the 2001 Census figures, a number of evidence-based reports have been commissioned and roundtables
gathering stakeholders and experts regularly organized. Prominent minority or immigrant associations have been identified and funded by the Race, Religion and Refugee Integration Funding Stream. However, initiatives taken in Scotland have often clashed with the UK-wide agenda or been constrained by increasingly harsh legislation over asylum, nationality and immigration, which have remained exclusive and jealously guarded competences of the central administration. After the SNP victory in 2007, the issue took a new direction, as the perspective of independence was added to the equation. From then on, the government was no longer only seeking legitimacy for a devolved administration while ultimate sovereignty lies with the Westminster Parliament, but for a potentially independent state in Europe. On the one hand, the SNP government invested considerable resources to make further inroads into the Catholic and South Asian votes, and to challenge the Labour party in its traditional bastions. On the other hand, the SNP, and more especially its charismatic leader Alex Salmond, used their time in office to challenge the nation state in its own normative space in an effort to acquire further external legitimacy. This task was made easier by the difficulties encountered in Westminster in presenting the UK as an archetypal liberal democracy while simultaneously downgrading aliens’ status, making the gate to full membership ever harder to penetrate. But while devolution has indeed provided the Scottish administration with new tools to institutionalize and frame a membership boundary that is distinct from the UK-wide framework, the inclusive and progressive consensus predates the establishment of a democratically-elected Scottish Parliament. Hence, there is no evidence that territorial self-government and the development of a territorializing boundary-making strategy are correlated. Instead, the distribution of competences across multiple tiers of government provides the means through which membership boundaries can be contested within a single state. Immigrant politics are not only fought out across ideological cleavages embodied by state-wide parties, but also across territorial cleavages. This form of politics manifests itself in intergovernmental tensions, representing one dimension of a broader pattern of rival nation-building projects interlocked within the same state.

268. In the period from July 1, 2008 to March 31, 2010, the fund allocated GBP 5.5 million to a variety of projects in the field of integration.
6.3.2. Historical heritage and path-dependency

The explanatory power of path-dependency is hard to establish in the Scottish case, not least because the membership boundary has been consistently ambiguous across time. The creation of the Scottish Office in 1885 and the permanence of a Scottish Parliamentary group in Westminster enabled the persistence of a territorial frame of reference. It also provided an arena where issues of immediate concern to the resident population could be debated. Yet, Chapter III showed how conceptions of Scottishness have evolved, if not shifted, throughout the twentieth century, from a predominantly conservative perspective, equating Protestantism, Unionism and imperial pride, to a territorially-based conception of membership, cemented against the England-dominated British state. Besides devolution represents a critical juncture which makes any attempt to trace institutional evolutions and clearly identify institutional path-dependency over extensive periods of time extremely difficult.

6.3.3. Party system and patterns of party competition

The most determinant dimension of the opportunity structure in providing fertile ground for the adoption of progressive policies and discourses towards immigrants can be found in the specificity of the sub-state party system and dynamics of party competition. Since 1970 when the SNP obtained 11.4% of the vote in Scotland at Westminster elections, the Scottish party system has increasingly diverged from the rest of the UK. In 1997, the adoption of a proportional system of representation enabled the development of a party system characterized by moderate pluralism, which clearly leans towards the left of the electoral spectrum (Bennie & Clarke 2003). Unlike in Britain where parties can reasonably expect to govern alone, parties competing in Holyrood have had to adopt a competitive-cooperative attitude as the executive must rely on a parliamentary majority.
Table 9: Election results to the Scottish parliament (1999-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib/Dem</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: My own compilation from www.scottish.parliament.uk

As a result, political parties, until then unaccustomed to the complex and skilful art of coalition-building, have adapted reasonably well to the new rules of the game. But as the table above suggests, Scottish Labour and the SNP consistently dominated the post-devolution political scene, with the Conservatives experiencing difficulty maintaining themselves at the third rank. In a few years, the SNP ascent has been irresistible. First, the party went from having blackmail power at general elections, to coalition power at Holyrood elections. By 2007, it was able to form a minority government, and obtained an absolute majority of seats in 2011. In Westminster, the Labour government’s boundary-making strategy came under pressure from two fronts. On the one hand, the Conservatives actively sought to politicize the issue and return to the heyday of Margaret Thatcher’s tough stance on immigration. On the other hand, the BNP, which won two seats at the 2009 European elections, represented a non negligible challenge in specific constituencies. This tension is reflected in Gordon Brown’s row with a widow and lifelong Labour voter during the 2010 electoral campaign whom he called a “bigoted woman” after she expressed her concerns about the rising number of East European immigrants.\(^{269}\) No such thing has occurred in Scotland, where the Labour party and the SNP have had strong incentives to compete for the vote of minorities and immigrants, as opposed to the anti-immigrant vote, as they face very limited competition on the right. Hence, successive actions of the Scottish government have been neither externally imposed, nor has the administration been forced by an ‘international human rights regime’ in-the-making to adopt minority-friendly policies.

Nationalists have not embraced a progressive approach at the price of their alleged aim of homogenizing their populations in order to differentiate themselves from other national movements the claims of which are ethnically rooted. Instead, their left-of-centre ideological identity encouraged them to engage in the politics of recognition, in the same way as other state-wide left-of-centre parties in Europe, with the important difference that they have not faced compelling pressures from the right, nor from their electorate, to adopt a tougher stance.
VII

Immigrants into Catalans

In Catalonia, the only stranger is the one who wants to be so.

–Artur Mas, speaking at a public event, November 2010

Ultimately, the main question is to know whether immigrants should be integrated in Catalonia, or in the Catalanist ideology, inoculating into their mind the belief that to be a genuine Catalan is merely about speaking Catalan.

–Carme de Rivera I Pla, speaking at a Catalan Parliamentary session, October 2009

Over the past ten years, Spain has undergone a series of profound transformations that can hardly be summarized in a few lines. The decade opened amid a euphoric atmosphere, boosted by economic expansion and social progress in a country where memories of harsher times inherited from a not-so-distant past remain vivid. But by 2010, the “party seemed definitely over”270, as the global recession lifted the veil on the economic weaknesses of the Iberian Tiger. In May 2010, the unemployment rate

crossed the 20% threshold against 7.6% in 2007, while at the same time an IMF report highlighted the “tremendous challenges” and “profound structural reforms” the Spanish government was urged to implement in order to move away from the spectre of bankruptcy\textsuperscript{271}. The recent collapse can under no circumstances be attributed to immigrants. Conversely, there is no doubt that the formidable inflow of foreign labour into Spain since the mid-1990s considerably bolstered economic growth. The figures are indeed vertiginous and marked the rapid transformation of Spain from a self-perceived country of emigration into one of the main recipient of international migration, with an average of 575,000 newcomers per year between 2001 and 2008, accounting for 81% of population growth. With 46 million inhabitants against 41 seven years earlier, the Spanish population now comprises close to 6 million immigrants registered on the local census, and 5.2 million foreign nationals. Spanish politics are still haunted by the experience of the Civil War and subsequent four decades of dictatorship. But unlike what might have been expected from a (still) convalescent political system not entirely acquainted with the experience of democracy, state-wide elites have not turned their back on their liberal commitments. This strikingly contrasts with what can be observed elsewhere, and chiefly in Italy. There, immigration has given a new impetus to the extreme right – whether in its state-wide neo-fascist form with Alleanza Nazionale, or in its regionalist variant with the Lega Nord – against the backdrop of a failing party system (Salvatore Palidda 2009).

In Catalonia, the process through which immigration gained currency in the public debate has been incremental and its exact terms are still difficult to pin down. To a considerable extent, it followed the pre-established path in relation to internal migrants constructed at the time of the democratic transition. The ‘other Catalans’ became the ‘new Catalans’, the conception of citizenship based on residency has been reasserted, and the policy of ‘linguistic normalization’ has been adapted and expanded to newcomers. However, the analogy between ‘immigrants from the rest of Spain’ and ‘immigrants from abroad’ rapidly showed its limits. By the turn of the century, it became evident that international migration raised distinct challenges in at least two ways. First, policy-makers were drawn to the fact that foreign residents were not entitled to the same rights as Spanish nationals and that the Catalan government enjoyed

\textsuperscript{271} ‘El FMI pide a España reformas urgentes en el mercado laboral y el sistema bancario’ in El País, May 24, 2010.
very limited room to intervene in these matters. This gave new impetus to the debate over the boundaries of Catalan citizenship that had been more or less settled at the time of the transition. Second, the formidable variety of sending countries made the depth as well as breadth of immigration-induced diversity much greater than earlier, thus calling for a renewed approach to immigrant integration.

This chapter critically examines the Generalitat’s boundary-making strategy in relation to immigrants between 2000 and 2010. It is divided into three sections: First, I scrutinize the developments of the citizenship agenda in Catalonia. I show how the initial reaction of the Catalan government has consisted in upgrading the rights of resident aliens, in a deliberate effort to challenge the central state in its own normative space and expand the boundaries of the Catalan political community to a new category of residents. But this aim has only been partially met, as the Catalan administration was being encouraged to counterbalance migrant rights with duties. In the second section, I review how the ‘Catalan way of integration’ has been gradually institutionalized. I successively examine efforts undertaken to expand the national boundary by actively seeking to diffuse the Catalan language among immigrants, to blur the boundary by promoting an intercultural approach to cultural diversity, and to contract the boundary in relation to Muslims, increasingly essentialized as a homogeneous group whose values cannot be reconciled with liberal democratic norms.

Overall, the review of boundary-making strategies over the past decade corroborates the main hypothesis. Nationalists can use immigrant policies and institutions as a means to acquire further internal legitimacy and challenge the central state in its own normative space. However, the Catalan case is less-clear-cut than the Scottish one. In the last section, I discuss these findings in the light of the dimensions of the opportunity structure – the institutional context, historical heritage, and the party system – and conclude that the dynamics of party competition made the definition of a common territorial interest bringing together old and new Catalans more difficult than during the democratic transition.
7.1. Catalan citizenship and the limits of expansion

The 1979 Statute legally entrenched a conception of Catalan citizenship based on *jus domicilii* and deriving from state-wide nationality according to a clear hierarchy of legal norms. Article 6.1 states that “Spanish citizens, who, in accordance with Spanish law, are administrative residents of any municipality of Catalonia, will be considered as *Catalans* for political purpose.” This encompassing definition played a key role in the incorporation of internal migrants in the 1980s, as it allowed Catalan nation-builders to mitigate the salience of linguistic and ethnic boundaries by not distinguishing the rights and duties of natives and immigrants from other parts of the Spanish state. But the rising number of international migrants settling in Catalonia fell into a distinct legal category, defined in article 7.2 of the 1979 Statute, according to which resident aliens can only become Catalan citizens after they have been naturalized as Spanish citizens. This distinction is confirmed by article 149.2 of the 1978 Spanish constitution, which consecrates the central state’s exclusive power in matters of nationality and alien status. The insignificant proportion of resident aliens at the time of the transition meant that the question of their status in what was to become a highly decentralized state, explicitly if reluctantly acknowledging its national pluralism, was altogether ignored. But with the sudden and large influx of foreign nationals from the 1990s, the existing arrangement came under severe strain. As the Spanish government tried to adapt its legal framework to a new and rapidly evolving socio-demographic landscape, the regulation of the legal status of resident aliens became intertwined in the *nationality question*. In the Spanish context, it became the means through which the governments of the ‘historic nationalities’ sought to assert their authority over their territory and resident population. However, they did not do so by engaging in a race to the bottom, downgrading the rights of foreign nationals and contracting the membership boundary on ethnic lines. Instead, they consistently sought to challenge the central state in its own normative space, by locating their actions and discourses in a liberal democratic space and providing tangible evidence that their territorial claims would not undermine the rights of newcomers.

In January 2000, the law 4/2000 on Aliens’ Rights and their Social Integration was passed in the Spanish Parliament – with the support of CiU, ICV, ERC and PSOE,
while PP abstained. Amid progressive circles, the initiative was celebrated as a significant step towards the recognition of Spain as a country of immigration and the emergence of a rights-based integration agenda. The most ambitious – and controversial – decision was to disconnect access to social rights from legal residence and extend it to undocumented migrants, provided they were registered on the local registry (thereafter padrón). It also enshrined immigrants’ civil rights to protest, form an association and strike independently of their legal status. But in the run-up to the 2000 legislative elections, immigration turned into an increasingly salient and polarizing issue (Perez Diaz et al. 2002: 87-103). Soon after its re-election with an absolute majority of seats, PP made good its campaign promise and revised the legislation, using the recently drafted Tampere Agreements and the need to comply with EU regulations as a pretext. The new legal framework drew a sharper line between undocumented and documented Third Country Nationals (TCNs) and limited foreign nationals’ access to housing benefits and post-obligatory education. In Catalonia, the CiU-led Generalitat took this as an opportunity to mark its difference in a highly symbolic matter, and released a second Interdepartmental Plan (2001-2004) for immigration which went “against the grain of standard migration policy and differ[ed] greatly from the Immigration Law approved by the Spanish parliament - or more precisely the Popular Party steamroller.” While the 1993-2000 Plan coined the category of ‘foreign immigrants’ to distinguish them from ‘internal immigrants’, its successor now referred to ‘Catalans born outside of Catalonia’ and ‘Catalans from an immigrant background’ to dissipate any doubt as to the inclusiveness of the nation-building project. Meanwhile, the Catalan parliament adopted the decree 188/2001 on Aliens and their Integration in Catalonia, which went against some provisions of law 8/2000, by re-introducing aliens’ rights to housing benefits and post-obligatory education. But these dispositions were ruled out in 2004 by the High Court of Justice of Catalonia, which considered the central state to be exclusively competent in determining aliens’ status, irrespective of their place of residence. Pablo Santolaya, a well-known professor of constitutional law legitimized this decision on the grounds that “despite the terminological difficulty implied in the expression ‘all Spaniards’ in these matters, there is in my view no other forms of conceiving citizenship but as a bundle of rights, and the state, any state for that matter,

272. More importantly, the law 8/2000 limited the right to reunion and to form an association to legally resident aliens, although this disposition was ruled out by the Spanish Constitutional Court in November 2007 (STC236/2007).
must be able to decide the degree of convergence between aliens and nationals, and consequently to determine basic standards of rights” (2007: 167). But in Catalonia, this decision was interpreted as creating an “incoherent situation whereby the government of the Generalitat must administer undesirable situations” in devolved policy areas, hence infringing upon its self-governing capacities (Zapata-Barrero 2009: 180). Jordi Pujol’s famous assertion that “everyone who lives and work in Catalonia is Catalan” seemed far-fetched now that a growing number of residents were subject to the legislation on alien status tightly regulated by the state.

At the 2003 Catalan elections, the change of government after 23 years of CiU leadership marked a historic shift in Catalan politics. The left-wing coalition made up of PSC, ERC, and ICV (hereafter referred to as the Tripartite) profoundly renewed the Generalitat’s approach in matters of immigrant integration. The 2005-2008 Citizenship and Immigration Plan issued by the newly-established Immigration Secretariat now referred to immigrants as the ‘New Catalans’, and proposed “a new conception of citizenship moving towards the full recognition of the rights and duties of all Catalans, irrespective of their nationality or legal status […]. Accordingly, all residents shall be considered as citizens for an administrative purpose, a definition which is disconnected from nationality in its conventional sense.”

In consequence, immigrants’ inscription on the local padrón constitutes “sufficient evidence of their willingness to settle down and become part of Catalan society.”

Although the Plan recognized that the Catalan administration cannot expand foreign nationals’ political rights beyond the limits fixed by the state-wide legislation, it nonetheless created a category of practice that was incontestably more inclusive than the state-wide legal category. Since language is performative, it soon penetrated the fabric of public discourse. The Catalan section of the TV channel TV2 has been running a weekly show dedicated to the Nous Catalans since 2006, an idiom that is also widely used in the media and in the external communication of local and autonomous administrations. CiU incorporated it into its communication strategy, while American-style hyphenated identities of ‘Afro-Catalans’ and ‘Latino-Catalans’ have also gradually emerged. Besides, Catalan parties and

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275. Ibid., p. 50.
276. In 2009, the CIU-funded website www.nouscatalans.cat was created within the framework of the Gran casa del Catalanisme, an initiative launched a few months earlier by the CIU leader Artur Mas to bring together all nationalist forces of the country, irrespective of their ideological inclinations.
institutions committed themselves to push for a massive regularization of undocumented migrants and to lobby the central government to grant all foreign residents the right to vote at local elections after 5 years of residence, as well as to liberalize the rules of acquisition of Spanish nationality.

A similar disposition was adopted simultaneously in the Immigration Plan of the Basque government, in which citizenship was not only dissociated from nationality, but also from “any other identity considerations and exclusively acquired on the basis of residence.”\(^{277}\) By doing so, the Basque and Catalan administrations showed the same willingness to challenge the sovereignty of the central state and project themselves in a liberal and democratic space where the ‘right to have rights’ is not the privilege of those sharing common descent, but is extended to all individuals living within their jurisdiction. However, their approach also differs in a fundamental way. In Catalonia, it was based on the questionable premise that immigrants, through the simple act of registering on the local padrón, manifest their will to become part of the Catalan political community. Hence, the extension of rights is grounded in a voluntary commitment to join the nation à la Renan, and is thus derived from national membership. By contrast, the Basque Plan makes no reference to the ‘New Basques’, and legitimates its decision on the basis of “an extensive recognition of human rights” and “the human dignity of all persons”, thereby embracing a discourse that is much closer to post-national membership à la Soysal, whereby rights are derived from universal personhood and truly disconnected from nationality.

7.1.1. The Vic controversy

As with earlier potentially divisive issues related to internal migrants, political elites have consistently sought to “work with political and social consensus on actions and measures dealing with immigration.”\(^ {278}\) All political parties from right and left – apart from the PPC and Ciutadans – have participated in and contributed to the consultation process that preceded the release of successive policy Plans and collectively agreed

\(^{277}\) Basque Immigration Plan 2003 – 2005. The government explicitly stated that its approach marks a clear shift from earlier experiences with internal migrants. As the Head of the Immigration Department of the Basque Government, Omer Oke, argued in 2002, the main aim of his Department has been “to approach the phenomenon of immigration with a totally different attitude and style to that shown in the past, basing our actions on the respect and recognition due to individuals and their particular situations” (quoted in Ibarrola-Armendariz 2009: 237).

\(^{278}\) Resolution on the Policy of Foreign Immigration, adopted by the Catalan Parliament in 2001.
upon their terms and conditions. This strategy, which culminated with the publication of the National Pact for Immigration released in 2008, presented at least two advantages. First, by maintaining close contacts and a broad coalition cutting across the ideological cleavage, Catalanist parties could present PPC as working against the territorial interest. Second, by agreeing not to use immigration as an electoral device, they believed the issue could be kept apart from party politics. However, cracks in the consensus gradually appeared, and the well-known Catalan tradition of pactisme and consensus-building found its limits in the multiplication of anti-immigrant protests at local level which turned immigration into an increasingly salient and polarizing issue.

The law 2000/4 made access to social services conditional upon registration to the local padrón, irrespective of individuals’ legal status. But in 2003, the decision was taken to authorize the services of the Ministry of the Interior to consult local registries in order to facilitate the central government’s energetic commitment to fight illegal immigration. The reform was initiated by the PP parliamentary group and passed with the support of PSOE. However, the new disposition contradicted the rationale of the previous legislation, which was meant to avoid a situation whereby local administrations would be unable to effectively evaluate the size of the resident population and be forced to actively participate in the ‘clandestine hunt’ officially pursued by the state (Sala 2005). The law 4/2000 should not be interpreted only as a means to foster integration, but also as a pragmatic response to the exceptionally high proportion of irregular immigrants de facto residing and working in Spain, a direct consequence of the 'cheap model' of immigration policies discussed in Chapter IV. In this light, the Spanish legislation on alien status can be interpreted as a balancing act between the awareness that expelling all irregular immigrants is neither feasible nor desirable, and the electoral need to take into account public preferences. In practice, the new disposition was never enforced279, although the confusing legal framework has meant that the rules of registration have varied considerably from one locality to another280. By employing the idiom of

279. In 2004, the Ministry of the Interior ordered 74,467 expulsions of illegal immigrants and communicated extensively on this figure. However, less than 20,000 were actually carried out. In 2003, 53,778 expulsions were ordered and 14,404 actually carried out (Kleiner-Liebau 2009: 91)
280. As stated in the resolution 21-07-01 issued by the Ministry of the Presidency and in accordance with article 18.2. of the Local Regime Legislation, local authorities cannot intervene in the delivery of residency permits, and do not have the competence to control whether residents reside legally or not on Spanish territory. Yet, According to a study carried out by the provincial authorities of Barcelona in 2001, 90 municipalities out of a total of 121 required foreign applicants to show their residency permit prior to registration. For a more extensive discussion of this disposition, see Lurbe y Puerto 2005, pp. 291-93.
citizenship irrespective of immigrant status, the Catalan government sought to turn an unpopular decision, driven by pragmatic considerations and hidden from public scrutiny, into a political stance.

Bearing in mind that evaluating the number of irregular migrants residing in Catalonia is no easy task, Colectivo IoE (2008b: 27) estimated that there were 226,491 to be registered locally in January 2008 against 329,678 a year earlier, amounting to 22% of the total number of foreign nationals who settled in Catalonia since 2000. The Generalitat’s commitment to lobbying the central state to “regularize all undocumented migrants through social and work-related rules in an efficient and flexible way”, lost credibility in January 2010 when the city of Vic hit the headlines of virtually all the newspapers in the country, an unusual attention for a town in the Catalan hinterlands with a mere 40,000 inhabitants. The day before, the Municipal Council decided to modify the rules of inscription to the local padrón, so that undocumented migrants could no longer register, and were thus deprived of basic social rights. Hence, the vibrantly celebrated notion of residential citizenship was not challenged from the top by a central administration eager to reassert its sovereignty, but from the bottom by a very Catalan locality. Vic is emblematic of the contradictions, difficulties, and ultimately the limits of the Generalitat approach to immigrant integration. In the 1980s, it was one of the few cities controlled by a CiU majority which, in spite of its supremacy in rural areas, was unable to challenge the PSC in its urban strongholds. In 1983, Vic was defined by its CiU Mayor as “the Capital of Catalan Catalonia”, and “became the guiding light of the rural vision that CiU, unaccustomed to governing the Generalitat, cultivated in the first years of government” (Macià 1998: 32). In 2009, 23% of its residents were non-Spanish citizens, mainly coming from Morocco. The city, which in 2007 pioneered the introduction of the Aula de Accollida in education centres, was regularly praised as a laboratory of progressive integration policies (Noguer 2007). But it also hosts the headquarters of Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC), a radical right wing party created in 2002 which defines itself as “an independent Catalan party focused on citizen’s security, the control of immigration, and common sense.” PxC, which to date has carefully avoided positioning itself along the centre-periphery axis, made its first

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283 See section 7.2.2 for a more detailed discussion of the Aula de Accollida.
284 www.pxcatalunya.com, [accessed on November 12, 2010], my emphasis.
breakthrough in Vic in 2003 and obtained 18.5% of the votes at the 2007 local elections. A *cordon sanitaire* was soon erected around it, and PSC, CIU and ERC formed a Catalanist municipal coalition in a desperate attempt to contain its influence. But they nonetheless felt compelled to incorporate some of its propositions, and their decision to prohibit irregular migrants from registering on the local *padrón* marked a watershed in the Generalitat’s vision of an all-inclusive citizenship.

The central government immediately stepped in, arguing that localities had the duty to register all their residents irrespective of their legal status. Prime Minister Zapatero, who had just taken the chair of the rotating EU presidency, declared in the European Parliament: “We shall not accept that, because of a city hall trick, human beings find themselves without assistance or unable to attend school (...). We will not let them downgrade the rights of immigrants.” The Generalitat timidly condemned the initiative and the Vic Council regulation was withdrawn, but Catalonia was for a time perceived as the main bastion of xenophobia in Spain. This was especially so as CiU in opposition supported the municipality’s decision, and accused the central state of failing to take into account legitimate claims.

7.1.2. The *Llei de acollida*

The multiplication of incidents at local level provided incentives for the Generalitat to renew its strategy. As late as 2008, “all Catalan administrations [were] committed to promote the extension of rights to everyone living in Catalonia.” But in May 2010, the Catalan Parliament approved the *Llei d’Acollida de les persones immigrades I de les retornades a Catalunya* (literally Reception Law for immigrants and returnees), as reception policies figured among the migration-related competences that were sought and gained in the New Statute. Unlike previous plans the scope of which was limited

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285. This is reminiscent of the first local breakthrough of the Front National in the French city of Dreux, although the initial reaction of the mainstream right RPR-UDF was to integrate four FN representatives into their list for the second ballot. For David Art the introduction of a *cordon sanitaire* prohibiting alliances at local level came too late to contain the phenomenon, which became a defining feature of French local politics throughout the 1990s. (David Art, forthcoming).


288. See article 138 on immigration, 2006 Statute of Catalonia: the Generalitat has exclusive power over a) the initial reception of immigrants, which includes socio-sanitary attention and guidance; b) the development of integration policy for immigrants in the framework of its powers; c) the establishment and regulation of the required measures
to the administrative and political realms, the *Llei de Acollida* was legally-binding and articulated the relationship between the Generalitat and foreign residents in a much less impressionistic way. It officially aimed to promote the autonomy and equal opportunities of immigrants and returnees by removing the obstacles to their integration, identified by the legislator as “the lack of linguistic competencies and the lack of knowledge of the host society and its administrative organization.”

The reform symbolizes the shift away from a fairly liberal and expansive approach to another emphasizing conditionality and introducing integration requirements. The Generalitat is now in charge of issuing an individual report accrediting applicants’ “integration efforts” for the attribution or the renovation of a residency permit. The *regularización por arraigo* shall be attributed not only on the basis of the length of residence and labour-related and/or family considerations, but also of the applicant’s completion of “work-related and cultural training programmes.” The report should also be taken into consideration in the procedure of residency-based naturalization. Although the exact terms are still to be elaborated, the National Pact for Immigration suggests that this could be made conditional upon the applicant’s basic knowledge of the Catalan language and attendance at the classes that were agreed upon with the reception services. A similar conditionality clause has been introduced in regard to resident aliens’ political rights. Originally, all Catalan parties except PPC committed to pressure the central government to reform the existing legal framework by advocating change in the current legislation, so that an immigrant could be entitled to vote at local elections after 5 years of permanent residence. But these changes did not come to fruition, and there is scarce evidence that Catalan parties actually intended to translate their promises into actions. Chiefly, CiU reconsidered its position and proposed instead that the right to vote should be conditional upon the status of permanent residence and an accreditation delivered by the Generalitat confirming the “applicant’s integration efforts.” In a similar vein, The Tripartite coalition was in favour of including in the

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289. Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya, Núm. 5629 – 14.05.2010, Llei d’acollida de les persones immigrades i de les retornades a Catalunya.
290. Since 2000 (Law 4/2000) irregular migrants can be regularized if they can justify that they have been living for at least three years in Spain, have a work contract, or have meaningful social ties established in Spain.
291. Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya, Núm. 5629 – 14.05.2010, Llei d’acollida de les persones immigrades i de les retornades a Catalunya.
National Pact the right of TCNs to join the Catalan civil service, but again this disposition was opposed by CIU.

These developments are in tune with the European-wide trend of pursuing “liberal aims through illiberal means” by shifting the burden of integration from the administration to the migrant him/herself (Joppke 2007). By contrast with most Western European governments who have consistently incorporated their integration agenda into the regulation of immigrants’ legal status and naturalization (Guild et al. 2009), the Spanish government has only timidly started to do so. Catalan nationalists are well-prepared to negotiate far-reaching autonomy to impose their own conditions, and make sure that the Spanish “path to citizenship” that will eventually be introduced will reflect its national pluralism. When compared with recent developments in the rest of Europe, the Catalan approach remains fairly liberal, not least because all classes provided by the Generalitat are free and – at least for the time being – not compulsory. Besides, PPC’s proposition of evaluating integration efforts through a formalized test has not been included, and all other political parties have agreed that attending classes was sufficient. This however is already far more demanding than earlier claims that the simple act of registering on the padrón constituted evidence enough of immigrants’ willingness to become Catalans.

7.1.3. The anti-immigrant vote and the vote of immigrants

The early reaction of the Generalitat closely followed the pre-established path of defining membership on the basis of residency. In the remainder of this section, I argue that the relative failure of this strategy is a consequence of the fact that the overwhelming majority of resident aliens have not been entitled to vote. This is especially detrimental at municipal elections, as it provides local elites with incentives to compete for the anti-immigrant vote, as opposed to the vote of immigrants.

The table below indicates the rate of naturalization in Catalonia over the past seven years. Again, these figures show how the frequency of naturalization has remained slight when compared with the number of foreign nationals inhabiting the territory, estimated at 16.4% of the resident population in July 2010. Besides, they obscure the fact that the frequency of naturalization for individuals who do not fall into any of the
special categories is to date insignificant. Hence, while close to 20,000 foreign residents acquired Spanish nationality in 2009, there were less than 3,000 Moroccan nationals, although they constitute by far the largest collective in Catalonia.\(^{293}\)

Table 10: Number of acquisitions of Spanish nationality in Catalonia (2003-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>16,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>19,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>19,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>93,173</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2011

On January 1st 2008, the proportion of immigrants registered on the local *padrón* represented 26.4% of the resident population in Alt Empordá, a majority of them being Moroccan nationals, 21.4% in Baix Empordá, 20% in Girona and 18.7% in Tarragona, to name just a few.\(^{294}\) The small town of Guissona, located in the province of Lleida, is the first municipality where the number of foreigners registered on the electoral *padrón* exceeds that of Spanish citizens. Hence, the restrictive legislation on nationality, combined with the extraordinary suddenness of international settlements in Spain, create a situation whereby a significant proportion of the resident population is not entitled to vote at local elections. On the other hand, the autochthonous population, concerned with potential strains on public services and the rapid transformation of their immediate surroundings in a receding economic context, may turn to PxC, or at least expect their local leaders to adopt a tougher stance. Consequently, the latter, irrespective

\(^{293}\) Secretaria de Inmigracion y Emigracion, estadisticas, 2010.

\(^{294}\) The figures for all *Comarcas* are available in the first issue of the Immigration Newsletter published by the Immigration Secretariat of the Generalitat and entitled *Distribució territorial i diversitat comarcal*, June 2009. These figures refer to *comarcas*, not localities.
of their ideological inclinations, have a clear interest in seeking to attract the anti-immigrant vote as opposed to the vote of immigrants. However, the situation may gradually be evolving and having an impact upon party strategy as the number of naturalized citizens and foreign residents entitled to vote is expected to grow sharply in the immediate future. According to the Immigration Secretary of the Generalitat, the number of registered voters of non-Spanish origins who have been naturalized has reached 150,000\(^{295}\) in 2010, representing about 3\% of the total electorate. Besides, the high concentration of immigrants in certain electoral districts suggests that their vote may be decisive in key constituencies. At the latest round of local elections in May 2011, the number of TCNs and European citizens entitled to vote rose to 338,000\(^{296}\), amounting to 6.1\% of the Catalan electorate\(^{297}\). The political behaviour of these new voters has to date not been systematically studied, although pundits have suggested that they would be more inclined to vote for parties on the left, and the PSC in particular. This would see the continuation of a long-standing pattern in Catalonia whereby immigrants tend to vote for PSC, although CiU and to a lesser extent ERC have made some significant inroads into the vote of second generation immigrants (M.J. Hierro 2006).

7.2. A ‘Catalan way of integration’?

The emergence of an integration agenda in Catalonia can be traced back to the release of the informe de Girona in 1992, a civil society initiative that greatly informed subsequent political practices. In 1991, the PSOE-led Spanish government proceeded to an unprecedented regularization of foreign workers. Catalonia turned out to be the main recipient of international flows among Spain’s seventeen ACs, while Madrid ranked second and the rest of the territory remained largely unaffected until the second half of the decade\(^ {298}\). In Girona, the cooperation between local politicians, immigrant

\(^{295}\) This estimate includes foreign nationals who were naturalized elsewhere in Spain and then moved to Catalonia.

\(^{296}\) This includes i) non-Spanish citizens, residing legally in Spain for at least 3 years, (only 2 in the case of Norway), and who are nationals of countries with which Spain has signed a bilateral agreement: Colombia, Ecuador, Norway, New Zealand, Peru and Chile. Similar agreements have recently been signed with Bolivia and Iceland, although the Bill has to date not been published and ii) EU citizen residents.

\(^{297}\) Departament de Benestar Social I Familia, Actualitat published on November 30, 2010.

associations and academics proved exceptionally fruitful and led to the publication of a report comprising 50 propositions meant to “facilitate and strengthen immigrant integration.” The report found a significant echo in Catalonia and prompted the publication of a policy Plan – the first of its kind in Spain – and the creation of a commission whose purpose was to coordinate the initiatives taken by different departments of the Catalan government in the realm of integration. But while the Spanish government comprehended the phenomenon as a strictly administrative matter, the Generalitat immediately saw it through a nationalist lens, explicitly envisaging immigrant “participation in the national construction of Catalonia”, and their “contribution to the Catalan identity and patrimony” as long-term objectives. Yet the issue receded from the political agenda until it re-emerged with renewed vigour at the turn of the century. The year 2000 marked a critical juncture, as the number of immigrants coming from abroad exceeded for the first time the number of immigrants coming from the rest of Spain (Cabré et al. 2007: 115). For Jordi Pujol, Catalonia now found itself, once again in its history, facing “the great challenge of immigration”, which required all Catalanist forces to agree upon a ‘national model of integration’: “The Americans do have a doctrine […] based on the promise of progress, a vision towards the future, the philosophy of borders and open society, the American pride. The French as well have a doctrine. I don’t know whether it is a good or bad one […], my purpose here is not to defend the French model, but to highlight the fact that we too must have a doctrine.”

The tenets of the ‘Catalan Way of Integration’ were spelled out for the first time in the second Pla Interdepartamental de integració covering the period 2001 – 2004. In the words of Artur Mas, the designated successor of Jordi Pujol and then Conseller en Cap of the Generalitat, “one of the principal novelties of this plan is to articulate a Catalan way of integration, seeking to find an optimal balance between respect for diversity and the feeling of belonging to a single community. This model is based on the need for immigrants to respect the democratic convivencia, the Catalan language and culture that developed across centuries and were successively enriched by external elements, while simultaneously respecting immigrants’ own origins and identities.” But apart from

heated discussions about the formal distribution of competencies and symbolic references to an idealized past, the CiU government showed little political will to build an institutional apparatus able to coherently bring together the different fields of integration-related public policies. The election of the Tripartite in 2003 introduced a great deal of fresh thinking to the policy-making process. It was accompanied by the creation of ambitious institutions specifically dedicated to immigrant integration and endowed with considerable resources. In 2003, the immigration dossier went from the Department of the Presidency to the Department of Families and Welfare, a clear indication of the social approach embraced by the new government. The victory of CiU at the latest autonomous elections in November 2010 has not led to a major organizational change. Although the Immigration Secretariat took the name of the General Office for Immigration for strictly political reasons, it is still cast within the Department of Families and Welfare and retained the essential features formerly established by the Tripartite. Speaking of a fully-fledged Catalan model of immigrant integration would be misleading. However, three guiding principles orienting public policy-making can be identified, and will be successively discussed in the remainder of this section: the linguistic controversy; interculturalism; and compliance with European norms.

7.2.1. Reframing the linguistic controversy

During the Pujol years, the Generalitat legitimized its linguistic policy by presenting the language as an essential component of the Catalan identity, victim of an attempt at ‘cultural genocide’ during the Franco era and facing a real threat to its survival over subsequent generations. The belief that the language constitutes an essential determinant of the national personality finds its roots in the early years of the Conservative strand of Catalan nationalism, when cultural and political claims were closely intertwined (Vilar 1976: 62-8). As early as 1906, Enric Prat de la Riba proclaimed that “the language is the nationality”, as “peoples who have reacted against their absorption by others, who have felt the need to affirm their individuality, to proclaim their personality, have clung

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303. The expression was popularized in the Catalan context by Josep Benet, 1995.
304. Enric Prat de la Riba is considered to be one of the fathers of Catalan nationalism. He conceived of the Catalan nationality in primordial and essential terms, partly as a result of his proximity with the romantic writers of the Renaixença. He belonged to the Catalan bourgeoisie, and was the leader of the Lliga Regionalista. He presided over the Mancomunitat from 1914 until his death in 1917 (See Chapter 4).
Almost a century later, Jordi Pujol gave his own interpretation in no less romantic terms: “The identity of Catalonia is first and foremost a linguistic and cultural one. Our claims have never been ethnic, religious, based on geographic considerations, or strictly political. There are many elements making up our identity, but language and culture are its backbone.” Unsurprisingly, the initial reaction was to make sure that the New Catalans would not damage the country’s vital organ but join the community of Catalan speakers. In another speech, Jordi Pujol explained how immigrants constituted a danger to the preservation of the language, shedding light on the Generalitat’s balancing act between rights and duties: “The other day, an Argentinean immigrant got upset when he heard that his son had to learn Catalan at school. However, this is our right and our law. And I believe we have to say these things clearly. He then told me: ‘Right now, I am in Barcelona, but within a few years I might go to Madrid or Saragossa. Then what would my kid have learnt Catalan for?’ And me to answer: ‘you have the same rights as us in matters of health, education, labour… But you also have the same duties with regards to language…’”

Hence, the linguistic boundary, established as a significant marker of Catalan identity since the democratic transition, remained the focal point of attention. In the 1980s and 1990s the Generalitat’s strategy of linguistic normalization targeted ‘non-Catalan-speaking pupils’ through the Service of Catalan Instruction (hereafter SEDEC), notoriously known as the cultural arm of CiU (Palandrious 2006). In 1997, the rising number of non-Spanish pupils joining the school system in the middle of the academic year prompted the creation of the Programme of Later Incorporation, monitored and managed by the SEDEC. Children falling into this category were redirected to the Classes of Academic Adaptation (hereafter TAE). Their purpose was to create a parallel education system, where pupils could spend up to 20 hours a week with 50% dedicated to intensive Catalan classes, until they acquired a level of Catalan deemed sufficient to be incorporated into the mainstream school system.

After 2003, the Tripartite sought to renew this approach. In particular, the PSC was given the opportunity to dissociate the Catalan language from national identity and shift the frame from an intrinsic to an instrumental conception of language. To be sure, the

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305. Enric Prat de la Riba, 1985: 667, my emphasis.
aim of overcoming “the risk of accommodation to the State language and identity and make Catalan into the vehicular language of immigrants”\textsuperscript{308} was reasserted at least as vigorously by the Tripartite. However, unlike earlier policy documents which placed emphasis on the cultural and identity dimensions of language, successive Plans from 2003 onwards have presented the role of language in terms of “social cohesion in a multilingual society”\textsuperscript{309}, and “socio-economic integration and mobility”\textsuperscript{310} for individual migrants (Pujolar 2009). Between 1980 and 2003, language planning and policy came under the remit of the Departament de Cultura. One of the first actions taken by the Tripartite when it came to power was to transfer these functions to the Departament de la Presidencia, as “a direct response to what they saw as an unhealthy link between language and culture that had become institutionalized during the previous twenty-three years” (Crameri 2008: 74). In 2004, the TAE was replaced by the much more ambitious programme de Taula de Acol·lida (literally hospitality rooms), no longer exclusively run by the SEDEC but co-administered by the newly created Service of Interculturalism and Social Cohesion and specifically targeting non-Spanish pupils. While in 2002 there were merely 39 TAE in all four provinces, 643 hospitality rooms were initially set up in 2003, and their number rose to 1081 in 2005, and 1234 in 2008\textsuperscript{311}. In addition to the objective of establishing a homogeneous network covering the entire territory, this sharp increase was also a consequence of the growing number of non-Spanish pupils enrolled in Catalan-schools, from 2.5% in 2002 to 13.7% in 2008. All hospitality rooms have been located within the premises of existing schools and pupils cannot spend more than 12 hours a week segregated from their fellow students. Hence, the Catalanist consensus around the need to pursue the “normalization of the Catalan language” has remained, and immigrants have been used as a means to expand it. The 2010 Llei de Acol·lida justifies the exclusive use of Catalan on the ground that “the first image, the first contact, the first relationships condition the newcomer’s vision of the place in which he arrived.”\textsuperscript{312} However, Catalan is no longer presented as a mark

\textsuperscript{308} Pla de Ciutadania i Immigracio 2009-2012, Generalitat de Catalunya, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{309} Pla per a la llengua i la Cohesio Social, Departament de Educacio, 2008, 5.
\textsuperscript{310} For example, in the Pla de Ciutadania i Immigracio 2005-2008 (p. 138) Catalan is exclusively presented as “a language of opportunity”, which is no longer the vehicle through which Catalan identity acquired its unique character, but rather a medium maximizing individual autonomy and upward social mobility. See also Consolidar la Cohesio Social, l’Educacio Intercultural i la Llengua Catalana, Caixa d’Eines. Report prepared by Xavier Besalu and Ignasi Vila, 2008.
\textsuperscript{311} Pla per a la llengua i la cohesio social, 2008: 6. By 2008, 14% of pupils enrolled in public schools and 4% in private schools were non-Spanish citizens.
\textsuperscript{312} Pla de Ciutadania i Immigracio 2009-2011, p. 145.
of achieved status and full membership in the national community, but as the “common language for immigrant integration and social mobility.”

The shift from an intrinsic to an instrumental conception of language serves at least three purposes. First, while Catalan nationalists could reasonably associate the language with the democratic impulse and thirst for freedom of the pre-transition period, as opposed to the ‘language of the state’, the situation has dramatically changed. Indeed, institutional pressure for diffusing the knowledge and use of Catalan, the ‘language of the Generalitat’, have grown. Second, unlike internal migrants who shared with natives the experience of the dictatorship and settled permanently in Catalonia, today’s ‘transmigrants’ are mainly driven by the lure of opportunity and more likely to move according to shifting economic circumstances. They are in any case less receptive to the past-oriented nationalist discourse that keeps commemorating the 1714 fall of Barcelona and subsequent suppression of the Catalan language on the national day. Nevertheless, they are at least as concerned as their predecessors with upward social mobility and equal opportunity, whether for them or their children. In consequence, some of them will eventually cross the linguistic boundary in order to benefit from the ‘Catalan premium’, whereby the probability of being employed increases between 3 and 5 percentage points if individuals know how to speak and read Catalan (Rendon 2005). Last but not least, decoupling the language from the militant and ethnic overtones to which it was closely associated brings it closer to liberal norms. From this perspective, linguistic policies and discourses directed at immigrants are indeed used as an instrument of boundary-making, but one of a particular kind, as it aims to blur ethnic boundaries within the homeland by uniting a linguistically diverse population around a common medium of communication.

However, this strategy did not go unchallenged. The role of systematic opposition to the Generalitat’s linguistic policy were distributed among the usual suspects: the PPC opposed the Llei de Acollida because of the priority given to Catalan. For the PPC MP spokesperson in matters of immigration, addressing immigrants in Catalan is like “imposing upon them a toll”, and making a “fool out of them” while the PPC leader

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314. ‘El PP i el grup mixt s’oposen a la prioritat des català com a llengua vehicular de la llei d’acollida’ in El Punt Avui, October 10, 2009.
saw it as a means to “turn immigrants into nationalists.” As in the 1990s, the party was assisted in its crusade by right-wing newspapers, for whom “[The Catalan linguistic policy] strikingly illustrates the way in which the Catalan nation-building project runs against citizens’ real interests and necessities. By requiring immigrants to speak Catalan, Catalan nationalists put an extra-burden on a population already facing the challenge of integrating into a new country...”

But the PPC failed to get the support of immigrant representatives. An important reason for this is the fact that the Tripartite skilfully used its time in office to consolidate a network of publically funded immigrant associations whose leaders enjoy privileged access to the policy-making process. Successive Plans from 2003 onwards were the result of a vast consultation, in which stakeholders and representatives from civil society were actively encouraged to participate. This was formalized in 2008 with the creation of the Taula de Ciudadania de Inmigracio – substituting itself to the former and considerably weaker Consell assessor de la inmigracio. This enabled the Generalitat to create a network of Catalan-specific organizations, loosely connected to similar entities operating in other parts of the state and bringing legitimacy to the devolved administration’s actions in the realm of immigrant integration.

In July 2010, the defensor del pueblo – the highest jurisdiction in Catalonia – brought the recently-voted Llei de Acollida to the Constitutional Court on the ground that the exclusive use of Catalan put an extra burden on immigrants wishing to relocate in another part of the state. The Taula de Ciudadania, with the support of all its members, immediately took “the defence of the Catalan language and the decisions democratically undertaken in Catalonia, in the name of the esteem and sense of compromise towards their host country” in a letter made public. Hence, by co-opting immigrants’ representatives into its own structures, the Generalitat found a powerful ally to legitimize its linguistic normalization strategy.

316 ‘Competencias sobre inmigración al servicio de un proyecto de construcción nacional’ in El Mundo, February 13, 2006, my emphasis.
7.2.2. Interculturalism: a convenient middle-ground

The analogy with internal immigrants found its limit in the increasing awareness that “although much of the current processes find their origins in the past, they exhibit a number of new elements: of particular significance in the demographic dynamic is the strengthening of a new immigration coming from foreign countries.” As a result, the integration agenda gradually gravitated around the perceived need to ‘manage cultural diversity’ in a society perceived as much more plural than in the past.

Table 11: Main foreign nationalities residing in Catalonia (January 1st 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of total foreign population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>243,691</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>99,879</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuadorian</td>
<td>78,765</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivian</td>
<td>57,864</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>50,295</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian</td>
<td>49,750</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>48,818</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>41,092</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>35,030</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peruvian</td>
<td>35,802</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The term ‘Interculturalism’ officially appeared in policy documents soon after the Tripartite took office, a clear indication of the impact of parties and their ideological inclinations in immigrant-related public policy-making. The genesis of the term itself is hard to track down. It has appeared in Spanish policy documents since the early-1990s, when the need to find innovative ways to integrate Gypsy pupils into the school system became more pressing (Calvet et al 2008). The intercultural approach in relation to

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318. Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya, Núm. 5629 – 14.05.2010, Llei d’acollida de les persones immigrades i de les retornades a Catalunya.
immigrants has also been promoted at state-wide level, a large section of the state-wide *Plan de Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-2010* being exclusively dedicated to it. In the Catalan context, it seems that the concept was imported from Québec where it has become the official doctrine of immigrant integration since 1993. Indeed, the Canadian province has long been a key source of inspiration for Catalan policy-makers who communicate extensively with their opposite peers across the Atlantic through official and informal channels. On the other hand, what is actually meant by ‘Interculturalism’ is equally hard to pin down. It is successively defined as “a behaviour based on empathy and mutual discovery”[^319], an approach “based on equality, solidarity and respect for cultural diversity in a context of dialogue and *convivencia,*”[^320], or a “doctrine aiming at constructing an open and more democratic model of society, respectful of minority rights.”[^321] Policy-makers and stakeholders themselves are most often unsure about the exact meaning of the term and its actual implications. However, they see it as a convenient middle-ground between a caricatured version of ‘British multiculturalism’ and ‘French Republicanism’, both perceived as having failed.[^322] Hence, the Generalitat sought to navigate within these broad and ill-defined parameters. This, however, had significant implications for policy-making. On the assimilationist side, the Generalitat proved particularly reluctant to categorize the population on ethnic lines. Successive policy plans explicitly dismissed “the categorization of the population on ethnic or cultural lines” and encouraged the ’New Catalans’ incorporation and participation into the associations, political organizations, corporate and trade unions, avoiding the constitution of parallel networks.”[^323]

Be they Catalans or Gallegos, Basques or Murcians, Spaniards have inherited from the Franco era the kind of scepticism and defiance towards the state commonly observed in post-authoritarian societies (Encarnacion 2004). Besides, in Catalonia, the memory of the *Lerrouxist* peril has left a deep scar and is to this date regularly evoked, mainly with the express aim of denouncing inflated attempts by the PPC to exacerbate linguistic and ethnic divisions in the homeland.

[^319]: *Pla de Ciudadania i Inmmigracio 2009 – 2012.*
[^320]: *Pla per la Llengua e la Cohesio Social*, Departament d’Educacio de la Generalitat, 2005: 5.
[^321]: Ibid. p. 12.
[^322]: A similar willingness has been observed in Italy. The *Commissione per le politiche di integrazione degli immigrati* issued a report in 2000 stating that the terms of “reasonable integration” should be “less assimilationist than the French model and less multiculturalist than the British one.” (Roux et al. 2009: 9)
On the other hand, the Generalitat has not been dogmatic. For instance, most immigrant associations selected as members of the Taula de Ciutadania are organized on national rather than on functional lines. Hence, the powerful Fede Latina, notorious for its proximity with PSC, claims to speak on behalf of Latin Americans and is itself subdivided into sections representing different countries of the area. The association Ibn Batuta is to a great extent considered as the voice of Moroccans while the Romanian association of Catalonia can reasonably claim to represent the interests of Romanian nationals. To be sure, the Taula also comprises institutions the purpose of which goes beyond defending the interests of a single community, SOS racisme being perhaps the best example. This balancing act is also visible within parties. The PSC rapidly transformed its organizational structure to expand its traditional grip over internal immigrants to international immigrants by creating internal branches targeting distinctive groups. The xarxa Latina was created as early as 2005, followed by the Arabic, African and Romanian equivalents. By contrast, internal organization of the CiU does not separate immigrants according to their geographical area of origin, clinging to the more traditional view that immigrants should integrate into the web of existing organizations and institutions, as opposed to parallel ones. Besides, while PSC sees no inconvenience in addressing immigrants in Castilian or even their native languages – thus breaching the rule of linguistic immersion – immigration-related events organized by CiU are consistently held in Catalan. On the multiculturalist side, significant efforts have been undertaken to train intercultural mediators, appoint representatives to administrative boards, involve immigrant associations in the policymaking process and adapt the school curriculum to a culturally-diverse population. Overall, the intercultural paradigm illustrates what Brubaker called the return of assimilation in liberal democracies, no longer associated with “the school-teachers of the third Republic” (Brubaker 2004: 532), and understood as a unilateral move towards a monolithic national society implying complete acculturation, but opposed to long-term structural “ghettoization, segregation and marginalization” (ibid. 543). As such, it represents a clear attempt to blur the cultural boundary by acknowledging the value of immigration-induced pluralism while considering social cohesion as the main long-term objective.
7.2.3. The European shadow and the ‘Muslim question’

A striking feature of policy plans published at various levels of government in Spain and more generally in the public debate is the pervasive reference to the European Union as the main basis of legitimacy. Integration is invariably defined as “a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation”324 and diversity-friendly policies find their limits in the need for immigrants to “respect the basic values of the European Union”325, and not in particularistic values supposedly embodied in the national spirit. Policy-makers appropriated themselves the EU-sponsored notion of “civic integration”, which was re-framed as “civic citizenship” in the Spanish plan, and the “norm of civism”, or the “importance of civic-mindedness” as a guiding principle underlying the government’s actions in Catalonia. This eagerness to conform to EU norms could be interpreted as a clear illustration of the post-national thesis, reflecting the emergence of an integration model disconnected from nationhood and embracing the increasingly legally-binding rules of an international human-rights regime finding its most compelling incarnation in the European Union (Soysal 1994). Alternatively, this could indicate that Western European states' policies on immigrant integration are increasingly converging beyond national models – provided that the latter ever existed (Joppke 2007). However attractive these two interpretations may be, they fail to account for the specificities of the Spanish case, where Europe and the ideas it supposedly embodies have played an ambivalent and yet no less fundamental role in the construction of nationhood, which took a new direction in the aftermath of the democratic transition.

The role of Europe in providing a frame of reference for actors involved in the construction of a Spanish national identity can be traced far back in the past, successively embodied in the nineteenth century struggles opposing liberals and Carlists/Monarchists, in the 1930s fratricidal war between Red and Black Spain, and continuing today in tensions between the Euro-enthusiastic PSOE and the incontestably more Euro-sceptical PP, more concerned with consolidating the Atlantic Alliance than

324. These are the exact words of the definition coined by the Council of Europe in the List of Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU in 2004. Actually, this definition of integration has been used in virtually all policy Plans issued by Spain’s 17 Autonomous Communities. For a full review, see Cachon Rodriguez, 2008.
with supporting a Franco-German dominated Europe. The group of intellectuals who gained prominence after the loss of the last colonies in 1898 – known as the Generación del 98 – found in Europeanización the ultimate remedy to national decay and the means through which national revival could be achieved. While the Franco ideology has sometimes wrongly been perceived as anti-European, it was in fact the fervent defender of a vision of the European continent as the cradle of the Christian civilization, threatened by the twin evils of communism and liberalism (Preston & Smith 1984).

In 1986, at a time when the transition to democracy was hardly consolidated, entry into the European community was interpreted as the realization of a long-awaited national vocation, frustrated throughout the twentieth century. For Felipe Gonzalez, it was no less than a “historic occasion to participate in the ideals of liberty, progress and democracy”, which also fulfilled the instrumental purpose of diffusing centre-periphery tensions into the European post-national project. In the Catalan historiography, the reference to Europe is no less present. For the famous and celebrated historian Vicens Vives, “the Hispanic task undertaken by Catalonia in the 19th century constituted one of the most serious efforts to configure Spain to its own image, which was itself a reflection of the image of Europe” (1995: 139). Jordi Pujol rarely missed an occasion to stress the Catalans’ openness to European ideas of liberty and progress. In his words, joining the EC was for Catalonia “like going home” (quoted in Guibernau 1997: 14).

But as regards immigration, the reference to Europe cuts both ways. On the one hand, policy-makers and political actors appropriate the liberal idiom of equality, respect for cultural pluralism and tolerance, as a sine qua non condition for immigrant ‘civic integration’. These concerns do not hollow out in a transnational space awaiting capture

326. The firm commitment of Prime Minister Aznar to back the American intervention in Iraq by sending Spanish troops in spite of the diplomatic pressures of its European allies, and the decision of Luis Rodriguez Zapatero immediately after he took office to withdraw them illustrates this enduring tension.
327. This has perhaps been expressed most forcefully by José Ortega y Gasset in a public lecture delivered in Bilbao in 1910: “To feel the ills of Spain is to desire to be European... Regeneration is indissociable from Europeanization; for this reason, from the moment in which the reconstructive emotion was felt – the anguish, the shame and the desire – the idea of Europeanization was conceived. Regeneration is the desire; Europeanization is the means to satisfy it. It has been clear from the beginning that Spain was the problem and Europe the solution.” (quoted in Pablo Jáuregui, 1999: 172-73).
328. Indeed, Spain joined the EC five years after the failed 1981 military coup d'état, a watershed in the democratic transition. Although the victory of the Socialist party in 1983 is often taken as the official date of the end of the democratic transition process, most would agree that its actual consolidation lasted longer.
329. Quoted in Benedicto 2005: 42.
by legitimacy-seeking politicians. They resonate particularly well among progressive parties and were naturally promoted and institutionally entrenched by the Tripartite government, which combined its Catalanist agenda with a left-of-centre concern for minority rights. However, they also provide the basis for an anti-immigrant discourse, a means to exclude specific categories of immigrants on the grounds that they do not share the very liberal values presumably constituting the backbone of the political community. Too often, the scholarly community defines ‘Europeanisation’ as a unilateral and unproblematic phenomenon, whereby liberal norms and values are being diffused from the top to lower tiers of government. However, this neglects the fact that behind the progressive credentials of the European Union lays another Europe, whose historical record in the protection of minority rights is to say the least mitigated and in which radical right-wing parties have proliferated over the past decades. They skillfully adapted their discourse to the minimum requisites of the liberal mainstream, sharing ‘good practices’ of another kind by meeting regularly (Art, forthcoming). In Catalonia, both Europes have coexisted and simultaneously influenced and shaped discursive frames and public policy-making in matters of immigrant integration.

The 2010 Llei de Acollida made numerous references to the European Union, and rooted its legitimacy in the Manual of Good Practices published by the DG Justice, freedom and security in 2004, and drafted by the influential Brussels-based Migration Policy Group\textsuperscript{330}. It mentions as its main source of inspiration the List of Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU, approved by the Council of Europe in 2004. But as in other EU countries, the official aim of promoting immigrant autonomy sits uneasily with the unofficial objective of mitigating the native backlash against immigrants, by introducing “highly symbolic obligations reflecting abstract arguments about national identity and cohesion and overlooking more basic and practical concerns” (Penninx 2009: 7).

More dramatically, the references to Europe impregnating the Catalan debate have fed the backlash against the Muslim community, essentialized as a homogeneous group whose collective values cannot be reconciled with liberal democratic norms. Catalonia is the Autonomous Community with the highest proportions of immigrants coming from predominantly Muslim countries. Arvi Astor (2009) estimates the size of the Muslim

\textsuperscript{330}. A second updated edition was published in 2007, and a third in 2010.
population residing in Catalonia in 2008 at 326,667, or 4.4% of the total population. According to the Generalitat, the total number of mosques in the four provinces amounted to 169 in 2009. Astor found that opposition to the construction of mosques was much more widespread and virulent in Catalonia than in the rest of Spain – it occurred in more than 30 municipalities against none in Madrid. He attributes this phenomenon to the self-reinforcing spatial and social divisions of Barcelona and its outskirts. Indeed, immigrants tend to be concentrated in economically-deprived areas, neglected by local authorities and characterized by a high presence of Spanish-speaking internal immigrants employed in lower-status occupations. But while tensions may indeed be more pronounced at grassroots level, they were also politically exploited by right-wing parties.

In September 2010, the French debate over the integral veil, replacing the long-standing affaire du foulard, crossed the Pyrenees and ignited an intense controversy in Catalonia. Although the Generalitat evaluated that merely six women were actually wearing an *burka* throughout the entire territory, the municipality of Lleida prohibited it in all public administrations. PPC presented a similar motion in Barcelona, but was firmly rebuffed by the PSC-led local government. Although the Generalitat officially qualified this decision as disproportionate and inefficient, the debate monopolized the headlines, until a Bill presented by PP at the Spanish Parliament was eventually countered by all other parliamentary groups. In February 2011, the Constitutional Court of Catalonia ruled out the local initiative on the grounds that prohibiting entry to public services represented a clear prejudice against a narrow category of women. Interestingly, no political party legitimized their position on explicitly Islamophobic grounds. Instead, they framed it either as a gender-friendly, or a security initiative. The PPC leader Alicia Sanchez-Camacho expressed her fear that mosques may turn into “nests of fundamentalism” and presented the *burka* ban as an “essential and brave measure to fight against gender discrimination.” Likewise, the radical-right wing party PxC immediately embraced the neo-populist discourse in defence of a liberal democratic Europe, internally challenged by immigrants from the Muslim world and their descendants who inherited the burden of what is portrayed as a parochial and backward civilization. In its manifesto, the party advocates “another immigration policy and the

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necessity to fight against the systematic violation of women’s rights.”

Beyond the rhetorical posture, the party is an avatar of the archetypical neo-Francoist Spanish Extreme-Right. Its leader Josep Anglada was a member of Fuerza Nueva in the 1980s and reportedly claimed: “we’re not interested in building a link with Francoism (…) although I have it in my mind, I cannot use it politically: it doesn’t sell.”

While the party has so far failed to reach the 5% threshold of votes necessary for parliamentary representation, it successively multiplied spectacular initiatives at local level, and managed to challenge the hegemony of mainstream parties in a number of localities. In the latest round of local elections held in May 2011, 67 PxC councilors were elected, against 17 four years earlier.

These developments are consistent with the argument presented earlier in this chapter, which attributes the rise of anti-immigrant initiatives at local level to the fact that most foreign nationals are not entitled to vote. This local phenomenon is gradually spilling over to Catalan politics, encouraging mainstream parties to adopt a tougher stance. In 2009, the left-wing coalition passed a law in Parliament, with the support of CiU, the purpose of which being to facilitate the construction of mosques across the territory. The *llei dels centre de culte* addressed the issue in overtly technical and administrative terms, considering that the construction of such premises was exclusively contingent upon “the respect of technical conditions of safety and hygiene,” accredited by a licence delivered by the Generalitat. However, this arrangement has recently been challenged by a bill passed in September 2011, under the impulse of PPC and with the support of CiU. The new bill states that “Catalan tradition and history”, as well as the “rootedness of each confession” should also be taken into account when delivering the licence. Hence, the Catalan case evokes a similar paradox as in other European countries. The decline of religious beliefs and practices among the population sits uneasily with the consolidation of a kind of nationalism rediscovering its Christian roots and instrumentalizing its attachment to supposedly European values of liberty and

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334. It is also interesting to note that the party is not fundamentally anti-European. Point 10 of its manifesto reads: “Europe shall be constructed from its localities: we want a Europe of citizens, for its citizens”.


336. Cf. Section 7.1.3.

democracy to contract the national boundary against recently-settled Muslim populations.

7.3. Analysis of findings

Successive plans issued by the Generalitat have invariably defined Catalonia as a paradigmatic “land of hospitality” whose culture has been enriched by a constant influx of people throughout its history, and “whose actions are influenced by its collective memory as a society with a long-standing history of immigration.”

Significant efforts have been made to revamp the myth of the Terra de Pas and adapt it to a fast-moving demographic landscape. Although there is clear evidence that Catalan nationalists sought to reconcile immigrant integration with their territorial nation-building project, the review of boundary-making strategies over the past decade reveals that this aim has been only partially met. First, attempts to bypass the central administration by expanding the boundaries of citizenship to all residents irrespective of their legal status did not resist the multiplication of anti-immigrant grievances in a number of municipalities. With the 2010 Llei de Acollida, the objective of challenging the central administration in its own normative space has been overshadowed by the aim of consolidating a Catalan path to citizenship. While the linguistic boundary remained an important marker of membership, immigrants have been encouraged to cross it and its ethnic and militant undertones have been mitigated. The ill-defined intercultural doctrine represents a clear attempt to blur ethnic boundaries within the homeland by acknowledging the virtues of cultural pluralism. However, this strategy found its limits in the increasing stigmatization of the Muslim population, portrayed as a threat to the Catalan nation’s attachment to European values of liberty and democracy.

To a certain extent, the Generalitat could reasonably claim to pursue a more progressive agenda than the central government as long as the Conservatives were in power in Madrid, neglecting and at times being outspokenly hostile to immigrant integration. However, the election of the PSOE in 2004 marked a radical shift of perspective and the beginning of a progressive approach to immigrant policy-making. At least until the

outbreak of the global economic crisis, the economic strategy pursued by successive central governments whether from right or left has remained remarkably stable. Indeed, socialists and conservatives have not competed on the socio-economic axis but consensually agreed upon a broad liberal agenda, only differentiating at the margin (Benedicto 2005). As a result, post-materialist issues have dominated government actions during the first legislature. The PSOE pursued an ambitious progressive agenda strengthening minority rights, illustrated by a series of symbolically charged and highly controversial legislations aiming in the words of the Prime Minister at “constructing a more decent country”. A law passed in 2005 made Spain one of the first European states allowing homosexual couples to marry and adopt children. In 2008, the Parliament adopted an ambitious bill addressing the scourge of conjugal violence, while the Prime Minister polished his progressive credentials by appointing more women than men in his first government. The consolidation of one of the most liberal legislations on alien status in Europe – in sharp contrast with the highly restrictive legal framework regulating the acquisition of nationality – must be examined and understood in this light. Like other left-of centre parties in the post-industrial world, PSOE shifted from a politics of redistribution aiming at consolidating the welfare state in the 1980s to a politics of recognition. The supremacy of neo-liberal economics, combined with the perceived failure of Keynesian policies and the emergence of new concerns encouraged the left to seek support among ‘minority groups’. The Spanish socialists have been particularly eager to present themselves as the champions of liberalism and immigrant politics provided them with an ideal opportunity to do so.

In the remainder of this section, I examine these findings in the light of dimensions of the opportunity structure identified in chapter 1: the formal distribution of power; historical heritage; the sub-state party system. I conclude that the changing dynamics of party competition are the most significant factor explaining the outcome.

7.3.1. The institutional context

The settlement of international migrants occurred at a time when the institutions of the Generalitat were already consolidated. Yet, the distribution of competencies across the state-wide and sub-state level of governments initiated an ongoing battle opposing state-wide and sub-state elites.
By contrast with what could be observed in Canada and in the United Kingdom, efforts at bringing together the multinational and multicultural challenges into a single Spanish narrative have been marginal.\(^{339}\) This neither means that Spanish nationalism abruptly ceased in 1978 with the ratification of the Constitution, nor that nationalism is the exclusive prerogative of ‘historic nationalities’, as is often suggested in the writings of some Spanish intellectuals\(^{340}\). Yet considering PP’s attachment to Spain’s glorious imperial and Catholic past, the virtual absence of historical references in immigrant-related policies and discourses may seem quite puzzling. But as memories of the Civil War and four decades of dictatorship are still vivid and potentially divisive, the Conservatives have a vested interest in clinging to the 1977 ley de Amnistía collectively agreed upon in the early years of the transition, and broadly perceived as one of the keys to its success\(^{341}\). In the Spanish debate, explicit demonstrations of ‘Españolismo’ are seldom and are in any case wrapped into the less-divisive rhetoric of ‘Patriotismo Constitucional’. Repeated calls for a strict application of the 1978 Constitution have served to legitimize the Conservatives’ aversion to Catalan and Basque nationalists and discredit their claims to further autonomy. Actors usually limit their debates to the constitutionality of specific norms, and take the issue to the Tribunal Constitucional instead of formulating it in ideological terms and using references to past conflicts and positions\(^{342}\). In the realm of immigrant integration and citizenship, a legal approach assessing the compatibility of the legislation with constitutional and European norms also prevailed. This enabled the Socialists to differentiate themselves from the Conservatives while mitigating and diffusing tensions arising from rival conceptions of nationhood in an overtly legalistic fashion, with the Constitutional court acting as the ultimate arbitrator. Likewise in Catalonia, the ongoing controversies over the formal distribution of power between multiple tiers of government exacerbated by the concomitant negotiations over the New Statute have at times overshadowed identity concerns. This enabled Catalan elites to put aside their ideological differences and to

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\(^{339}\) While Prime Minister Zapatero did try in its first term to promote his idea of ‘España plural’, the concept was abandoned after the failure of the negotiations with ETA and the row over the Catalan New Statute.

\(^{340}\) In a well-argued pamphlet against peripheral nationalisms in Spain, Alberto Pérez Calvo (2005) meticulously deconstructed the notions of nationalities, nation, and people in Spanish law. The prevalence of law over social science disciplines leads to a situation in which the normative content of the ‘nationality question’ is hidden behind a legal-positivist and supposedly neutral approach.

\(^{341}\) The Law 46/1977 figures among the most important factors of the ruptura pactada, whereby political elites agreed to “amnesty all political acts, irrespectively of their consequences, undertaken before December 15, 1966” (article 1).

\(^{342}\) See also Linz (1991), who makes a similar point.
commonly oppose the perceived intransigence of the central administration and infringement upon the Generalitat’s self-governing capacities. Although the link with national identity has unquestionably been more pronounced in Catalonia, political elites have also repeatedly framed the immigration debate as a matter of competencies, evoking how the central administration was betraying the spirit of the Constitution which, as the sociopolitical landscape has evolved, should be modified accordingly.

Ultimately, there is little evidence that the formal distribution of competencies influenced the location of the boundary. Instead, ongoing quarrels over the allocation of power in matters of citizenship and immigrant integration reflect the way in which rival nation-building projects in Spain have manifested and have been partly defused by the growing judicialization of politics.

7.3.2. Historical heritage and path-dependency

Boundary-making strategies towards ‘immigrants from abroad’ over the past decade followed to a considerable extent the path established during and after the transition in relation to immigrants ‘from the rest of Spain’. Calls for rejuvenating the “militant and welcoming Catalanism of the 1970s”, (Ros 2001), or to “look in the rear-view mirror” to rediscover the Catalan tradition (Zapata Barrero 2009) were often made. However, the mere extension of existing policies and institutions has been undermined by the combination of two factors.

First, the legal distinction between Spanish nationals, acquiring Catalan citizenship automatically when taking up residence, and resident aliens, subject to the Spanish naturalization procedure, made both phenomena barely comparable. Immigrants from other parts of Spain were, at least in institutional terms, invisible. While their children were targeted in the school system as ‘non-Catalan speakers’, they nonetheless enjoyed the same rights and duties as natives. Consequently, the Generalitat did not seek to establish a fully-fledged integration model, but rather subjected them to the relatively banal instruments of cultural reproduction which have been strengthened over several decades of nation-building. By contrast, ‘foreign immigrants’ fell into a distinct legal category, which enabled the Generalitat to multiply policies and institutions specifically
targeting them and meant to foster their incorporation into what has been framed as a pre-existing and socially integrated national community.

The second factor is sociological. The analogy with internal migrants found its limits in the cultural, religious and racial composition of international immigrants. In consequence, linguistic concerns have competed, and at times been superseded by the perceived need to manage cultural pluralism in an increasingly diverse society.

7.3.3. Party system and patterns of party competition

Over the past ten years, immigration has turned into an increasingly divisive and polarizing issue, encouraging political parties to mark their differences from one another. By contrast with the 1980s and 1990s when successive linguistic legislations were only indirectly related to immigrant integration and systematically taken out of the realm of competitive politics by consensus-building among the main Catalanist parties, immigration has consistently remained a salient concern since 2000.

Unlike in Scotland, where nationalism leans clearly towards the left, the Catalan case is characterized by the presence of more relevant actors and nationalist alternatives on both sides of the electoral spectrum. The table below shows the results at Catalan elections between 1999 and 2010. CiU saw its vote share eroded from 1995 and was relegated to the opposition for the first time in 2003.

Table 12: Election results to the Catalan Parliament (1999-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CiU</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>IcV</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C's</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: My own compilation from [www.gencat.cat](http://www.gencat.cat)
Until well into the decade, CiU’s strategy in regard to immigration has, to say the least, been ambivalent, oscillating between the electoral need to address conservative voters’ preference by playing the anti-immigrant card, and the nation-building necessity of clinging to a territorial conception of national membership. As the main party in the opposition, the CiU discerned compelling incentives to harden its discourse: In 2006, it fought the autonomic campaign with the unofficial slogan ‘No hoi cap tothom’, literally ‘There is no room for everyone’. But the eruption of an outspokenly racist political formation since 2002 (PxC) and the ever harsher position of PPC have dissuaded the party from capitalizing on a native backlash. In 2008, Artur Mas officially launched the Gran Casa del Catalanisme, which explicitly aimed to create a ‘transversal nationalist space’ cutting across the left-right axis, and building a broad coalition of support in defence of a common territorial interest. Within this framework, Jordi Pujol’s successor at the head of the party sought to get its share of support among immigrants and appointed Angel Colom, a high-profile figure and former president of ERC, as the party’s immigration secretary. This prompted the creation of a section dedicated to the Nous Catalans, reminiscent of the SNP-affiliated association New Scots for independence, in order to dissipate any doubts regarding the party’s commitment to civic integration, but also as a strategic response to the need to make some inroad in the immigrant vote. During the 2010 campaign for Catalan elections, Artur Mas invited them to “embrace the values of Catalanism and share the Catalan dream.”

On the other hand, the PSC clearly demonstrated its intention to remain the party of immigrants and defuse within its own party structure potential conflicts that could arise between international immigrants and its traditional electorate. Since 2006, the party has been led by José Montilla, himself an immigrant from Andalusia whose Catalan is far from being fluent. In parallel, PSC embraced a more Catalanist platform as a result of two factors (Ridao 2007). First, Pascal Maragall, who was the head of the party between 1997 and 2006, created a parallel platform called Ciutadans Pel Canvi to insulate the party from the PSOE influence, and ran an autonomous campaign, more centred on Catalan matters. Second, the PSC formed a coalition ‘Catalanista i d’Esquerres’, literally Catalanist and left-wing, in 2003 with two Catalanist parties; ERC, advocating

343. Artur Mas gave a speech in front of 2,000 persons (“the overwhelming majority of whom were extra-communitarians” dixit the Barcelona-based newspaper La Vanguardia) on November 20, 2010, a week before CiU won the elections.
outright independence, and ICV-EUiA, the heir of the Communist party PSUC which shifted from Marxism to ‘eco-socialism’ (Barbera et al. 2009). Both coalition partners have also pursued an unquestionably territorializing boundary-making strategy in relation to immigrants. On the one hand, ERC inherited the leadership of the Immigration Secretariat and has been at the forefront of the preparation of successive Immigration and Citizenship plans. On the other hand, ICV initiated the most progressive legislations both in the Catalan and Spanish parliaments, and consistently defended immigrants’ right to vote at general elections after 3 years of legal residence.344

The only political parties which consistently sought to compete for the anti-immigrant vote have been the newly-formed PxC and PPC. In spite of a steady progression and an incontestable blackmail power at local level, PxC failed to obtain parliamentary representation at the latest Catalan elections, with barely 2% of the vote. On the other hand, PPC’s leader Alicia Sanchez-Camacho gradually toughened the party’s anti-immigration stance, using an idiom and formulating propositions that are more akin to radical right-wing parties than to the European Conservative mainstream. The Catalan section of PP, which never found in internal immigrants a reliable ally in their linguistic crusade, will most likely equally fail to make inroads in the vote of international immigrants.345 Ultimately, the anti-immigrant posture of PPC reinforces the hypothesis more than it undermines it. Indeed, PPC is the only relevant party which has positioned itself clearly on the Españolista side of the centre/periphery axis, and systematically opposed the Generalitat linguistic policy. It is emphatically presented by Catalanist parties as the internal enemy, the emissary of the intransigent Spanish right, and legitimate heir of its repressive and authoritarian tradition. Although its vote share rose sharply at the latest Catalan elections, it still serves the instrumental purpose of maintaining an artificial division between an uncompromising state-wide nationalism and a more liberal Catalanist alternative. In practice, the Catalan nation-building project is much more ambivalent regarding the language issue, as it is about its long-term constitutional endeavour. It is perhaps in these ambiguities that the secret of its strength,

344. ICV escenifica el apoyo de la inmigración que anhelan PSC y CiU’ in El País, October 15, 2010.
345. The PPC appointed Susana Clerici Lopez, a naturalized Spanish citizen of Argentinean origin, in charge of immigration (Secretaria Area Inmigración).
resilience and continual support among an ideologically, linguistically, socially and culturally divided population lies.

In 2010, 27.3% of the resident population aged between 16 and 29 were non-Spanish citizens, the majority of them being Moroccan, Romanian or Ecuadorian nationals. Hence, “tomorrow’s ancestors” will ineluctably have different ethnic phenotypes than yesterday’s, and will retain transnational ties in one form or another with their country of origin. Many of them may choose to speak Castilian, Catalan, or primarily communicate in their language of origin. Although it would be naïve to believe that tensions do not and will not arise at grassroots and elite level, the ‘new Catalans’ are also tomorrow’s voters and recent trends indicate that Catalanist parties are prepared to compete for their hearts. They also seem willing to leave them with sufficient space to cultivate several affiliations and allegiances, in a country where having multiple national identities that are nested and overlap in less than tidy ways has long been the norm and continues to inform political practices today.

346. *Butlletí del Secretariá per a la Immigració: La Immigració en xifres*, Número 8, La joventut extranjera a Catalunya, Published by the Secretaría de Inmigración, December 2010.
Emigrants into Ambassadors

Scotland’s Diaspora population around the world and across other parts of the UK consists of large numbers of people with a good will towards Scotland, who have the potential to improve our reputation and drive economic growth by acting as ambassadors for Scotland.


The Catalan Communities abroad contribute to create an associative network in the areas where they are located, and through the activities they organize and the relationships they establish, act as civil diplomats of Catalonia.

– Generalitat de Catalunya, 2009

This chapter systematically compares boundary-making strategies in relation to emigrants and their descendants in Catalonia and Scotland in the light of their respective nation-building projects. In both instances, national movements successfully sought to acquire significant means of self-government over a territory and the population residing within its boundaries. In both cases, those who once emigrated from the
homeland and their descendants have been identified as potential resources and their relationship with homeland governments gradually institutionalized. The review of transnational engagement policies suggests that Catalans and Scots living outside the homeland have been used mainly as a means to contribute to the cultural and economic flourishing of the homeland. While this strategy has been reasonably successful in a Scotland that can rely on a vast pool of individuals claiming Scottish ancestry, the historically small number of Catalan emigrants militated against the development of fully-fledged initiatives beyond the realm of political rhetoric. Accordingly, emigrants and their descendants have primarily been associated with the 1939 exile and served the symbolic purpose of maintaining the link between Catalan nationalism and the liberal and democratic impulse of the transition. By contrast, homeland elites have been more reluctant to exploit them as a political resource by limiting their ability to play a prominent role in homeland politics. In Scotland, this was facilitated by the historically low interest of Scots abroad for the nationalist cause as well as UK-wide institutional constraints limiting electoral incentives for competing for their votes. In Catalonia, the solid political links established between the homeland and exiles abroad during the dictatorship combined with the ‘vote abroad for home district’ (Collyer et al. 2007) Spanish electoral system made this task perhaps harder. However, the absence of a special electoral representation for absentee voters has limited electoral incentives for competing for their votes.

8.1. The Scottish diaspora, a ‘Kingdom of the Mind’?

According to David McCrone, about 2 million people left Scotland in the nineteenth century, and at least as many did so in the twentieth (2001: 101). In relative terms, the phenomenon reached a much greater scale than in England, and among European countries was only exceeded by Norway and Ireland. What is meant by the ‘Scottish Diaspora’ today is hard to pin down, let alone to quantify, estimates oscillating between 20, 40 and even up to 100 million members,\(^{348}\) depending upon the audience.

\(^{348}\) Alex Salmond declared: “I’ve heard various estimates of the size of the Scottish diaspora, what I prefer to think of as the Scottish family, and it won’t be far short of 100 million people around the face of this planet”, quoted in The Herald, June 16, 2008 ‘Salmond urges ex-pat Scots to return home to Scotland’. Yet, in a speech at Trinity College (Dublin), he mentioned the figure of 25 million, and 30 million in a later speech at Georgetown University.
Identifying when the term ‘diaspora’ came about to qualify the amazingly diverse population of Scottish emigrants and their descendants disseminated across the world, particularly in the United States, Canada, Australia and the rest of the UK is equally difficult. However, the term itself captures well the scale and protractedness of the phenomenon as well as the resilience of a highly recognizable Scottish identity among individuals living beyond its territory, despite the fact that many of them never set a foot in their homeland. In the words of David Armitage, “in their far-flung wanderings, their diverse settlements, and their well-tended nostalgia, the Scots are a diasporic people” (2006: 225). While the term diaspora may be analytically flawed (Brubaker 2005), its unanimous appropriation by the media and politicians alike, and its far-reaching penetration into the popular idiom makes it a potent category of practice, as well as a highly topical concern in post-devolution Scottish politics.

Efforts at diaspora-building were virtually non-existent prior to devolution, not least because British expatriates had no external voting rights until the 1985 reform of the electoral suffrage by the Conservative government and have only enjoyed a very limited opportunity to cast a ballot ever since. More importantly, emigrants and their descendants hardly ever manifested a genuine interest in homeland politics in general and in the nationalist cause in particular. In 1934, the future SNP leader Arthur Donaldson travelled to the United States in an attempt to gain support for home-rule from his fellow-countrymen. However, he soon came to the conclusion that “we [the SNP] should not appeal further for members in the US and the dominions [as] Scots who do have money (…) are not interested in our movement.” Repeated attempts to establish overseas branches of the SNP were equally frustrated, and regular tours across the Atlantic inciting expatriates to follow the example of their Irish counterparts in advancing the struggle for self-determination were received with benign indifference. This does not mean that emigrants were rapidly and fully incorporated into the receiving society and refrained to cultivate their sense of Scottishness. On the contrary, the permanence of an ethnic identity among emigrants was consolidated by the proliferation

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349. Sometimes referred to as the ‘Scottish brand’, see for instance McCrone (1995).
350. The absence of external voting rights in Britain was until then a direct heritage of the Empire, throughout which ‘internal migrants’ were acquiring the right to vote in the colonies while taking up residence there. The Representation of the People Act (1985) allowed British citizens who are resident outside the United Kingdom to qualify as ‘overseas elector’ for the constituency in which they were last registered, initially for a period of five years, extended to 20 years in 1989 and down to fifteen years today.
of Presbyterian churches, the St Andrews society and Burns clubs. But as there was no Scottish political arena to which they could relate, political initiatives directed to the homeland remained rare. Despite the diversity of their backgrounds, emigrants constructed a single and powerful Scottish identity overseas, using the cultural emblems of the Highlands to preserve a traditional culture, but also in pursuit of their economic and social advancement in their country of adoption rather that for the sake of the country they left. The consequence of this was the “misleading – but persistent – application of the powerful highland memories and definition of diaspora to the overall Scottish exodus” (Harper 1998: 408).

However, since devolution changed the political landscape, the Scottish government has taken a variety of initiatives in the cultural, economic and political realms that by 2010 formed a reasonably coherent boundary-making strategy towards those who left. Relations with the Scottish diaspora fall under the remit of the Department of Europe and External Affairs, and the SNP government sees no contradiction in seeking to “represent Scotland through a lens of independence” while at the same time “making full use of the UK resources at [its] disposal,” chiefly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Network around the World. In this section, I review the most emblematic actions undertaken by successive Scottish governments since 1999 and conclude that seeking to tap into the economic resources of persons living abroad who have an affinity with Scotland has consistently overshadowed political concerns. While this renewed interest in ‘Scots abroad’ sits uneasily with the territorial project so vocally pursued in the homeland, expansion of the membership boundary has had no other purpose but to advance the economic, cultural and ultimately political interest of the territory and those who happen to inhabit it.

8.1.1. Negotiating electoral rights

Devolution has not only been the occasion to delimit the scope of the electoral franchise in relation to resident aliens, but also to expatriates and their descendants. The question did not even pose itself for the first referendum held in 1979, a time when

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352 Scottish Government International Framework (2009). The Scottish Government International Framework has a demographic, economic and political agenda: i) creating the condition for immigration so that Scottish population growth matches the EU average; ii) creating the conditions for sharp economic growth so that GDP growth matches the UK’s by 2011; iii) managing Scotland’s reputation as a distinct global identity, and an independent-minded and responsible nation.
British expatriates were not entitled to vote in parliamentary elections. In tune with Labour’s and the SNP’s vested interest in territorializing political membership – albeit for different reasons –, expatriates were deliberately excluded from the suffrage of the 1997 referendum and successive Holyrood elections. But as “stories of peoplehood do not merely serve interests but also help to constitute them” (R. Smith 2003: 36), rational motivations were couched in deeply-rooted resentments towards those who left, draining away national strength. This view was made particularly explicit by a Labour MP speaking at a parliamentary session: “[emigrants] have made their choice to leave Scotland and to seek fame and fortune elsewhere. They earn big money for living outside Scotland. If that is their decision, one of the penalties they have to pay is that they cannot vote in elections in Scotland. That is an important distinction.”

While associations of overseas emigrants have lobbied the Scottish government to extend expatriate voting rights, their demands have been systematically frustrated. The 2010 Independence Referendum Bill proposed to use the registry for European, parliamentary and local elections to determine the boundaries of the franchise, thus mechanically entitling emigrants who left their parliamentary constituency less than 15 years ago to vote. On the other hand, the exclusion of Scots-born emigrants registered in an English, Welsh or Northern Irish constituency has hardly been noticed. Although Scots-born residents in England represent by far the largest and closest transnational community – with 735,000 for the first generation alone, against 250,000 established overseas – they have not been targeted by any of the successive initiatives undertaken by the Scottish government to reinvigorate the link with the diaspora. Besides, the fact that Scots living in England are geographically dispersed and never cultivated the kind of nostalgia and ethnic identity so widespread in North America, the Scottish government deliberately avoided appealing to them as a group, involving them in Scottish politics or encouraging them to contribute to the nation-building project. As Derek Urwin already observed in the 1980s, “in the United Kingdom, with its plural electoral system, only Irish nationalists have ever looked – and that to an insignificant extent – beyond their own bailiwick to attempt to tap the potential ‘ethnic vote’ support within England” (1982: 428).

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353. Interestingly, the question did not even pose itself in 1979, a time when British expatriates residing overseas were not entitled to vote in parliamentary elections.
354. John McAllion, (Labour) MP for Dundee (East), Hansard Debates, June 3, 1997, Col. 259, my emphasis.
In elite discourses, the intrinsic diversity of individuals identifying themselves as Scottish in one way or another is rarely acknowledged, the diaspora being instead reified in elite discourses as a homogenous group. There have been few attempts to discriminate between first generation emigrants who left the Lowlands in the 1980s and those whose connection with Scotland is little more than a distant ascendance on a dusty genealogical tree or a self-declared ethnicity on a US or Canadian census form. This is partly due to the inherent difficulty of drawing the boundaries of a community-in-the-making whose potential members are dispersed across the world and had until recently almost no formal ties with the homeland or among themselves. But this discursive frame contrasts sharply with the government’s actual initiatives, which have primarily targeted individuals from the ancestral diaspora, as opposed to members of the lived diaspora. Ultimately, the government’s diaspora strategy has been mainly directed at the American ancestral diaspora.

8.1.2. Reaching out to the ‘ancestral’ diaspora

In nineteenth century America, external signs of ‘Highlandism’ were, as in the homeland, mainly adopted by urban individuals of Lowlands descent settled on the East Coast, and the first Highland games were organized by the Highland society of New York in 1836 (Berthoff 1982: 8). They gradually lost their appeal and almost disappeared until the 1960s, when they became more popular than ever. However, they did not re-emerge in the East, following the traditional pattern of settlement of Scottish migrants. Instead, they regained prominence in Southern states, where folkloric events associated with a distant Scottish ethnicity flourished in spite of the few participants who could claim genuine Scottish ancestry. In fact, almost all American clans were created in the 1970s and had virtually no ‘old-country tie’, a phenomenon which cannot be understood without bearing in mind the “general American fashion for ethnic roots” and return of the hyphenated identities including among the white middle-class population (ibid. 13). Besides, most individuals with an interest in the Scottish revival in the United States are in fact descendants of immigrants from Ulster, translated into

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356. A 2010 government research paper establishes for the first time a typology, distinguishing members of the lived diaspora, who were born or lived in Scotland, the ancestral diaspora, who have Scottish ancestry, and affinity diaspora, who have a connection with Scotland. See Engaging the Scottish Diaspora: Rationale, Benefits and Challenges, Scottish Government Social Research, July 2009.
the category of ‘Scots-Irish’ in the American census, a term virtually unknown in the British Isles.

Perhaps because of the new geographical distribution of self-identified Scots in the US, the myth of the ‘Mongrel nation’ which has become so pregnant in Scottish politics has not crossed the Atlantic. Instead, Scottish symbols and narratives dragged in its rich usable past have been used to bring legitimacy to a radically different political project, far less committed to liberal democratic principles and even leaning towards a nasty form of nationalism. The rise of the neo-Confederate movement in the United States, exhibiting a clearly anti-modernist ideology, virulently opposed to civil rights, using Scotland as their mother country and Scottish nationalism as their second nationalism, provides a striking illustration. According to two of its most prominent ideologues, “American Southerners have much in common with the Scots and the Welsh in Britain […]. All have made enormous economic, military and cultural contributions to their imperial rulers, who rewarded their loyalty with exploitation and contempt.” The neo-Confederacy ideology is impregnated with the belief that the United States has historically been divided between the English Northern states and Celtic Southern states. The Civil War is presented as the continuation of the ancient antagonism of the Celts and the English. The defeat of the South, which made the United States abandon the ideas on which the country was built, parallels the supposed internal colonialism of the Celtic fringes by the English core. The promotion of equal rights for women, ethnic minorities and non-Christian religious groups are, the argument goes, symptoms that prevent the reconciliation of America with its original values (Hague et al. 2008).

In 1998, a Bill was passed in the US Congress declaring that April 6 would be ‘National Tartan Day’ to “honour the major role that Scottish Americans played in the founding of this Nation, such as the fact that almost half of the signatories of the Declaration of Independence were of Scottish descent.” But the proposal was carried

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357. Euan Hague advances the figure of 50,000 members at the height of the movement (2008). Rowland Berthoff (1982) tells how a kilted clansman he interviewed said he had joined the SNP on the supposition that the party, like the BNP, wanted to keep “Blacks and Pakistanis out of Britain”; a mere anecdote that nonetheless reveals the manner in which Scottishness is being perceived and instrumentalized in contemporary American politics.


359. Another example of the use of Scottish symbols can be found in the landscape and Gaelic preservation movements in the Canadian province of Nova Scotia, which legitimize their socially conservative inclinations with parochial imagery of the pre-modern Highlander.

forward by Trent Lott, a Republican senator known for his radically conservative positions in social matters and his sympathy for the views of the neo-Confederate movement. The event survived Lott’s later resignation after a series of outspokenly racist interventions, but the “unwholesome link between clans and klans was quickly made by detractors.”

While these incidents embarrassed a Labour-led executive eager to promote devolved Scotland as a multicultural nation at ease with its diversity, they were rapidly overshadowed by the economic potential that the flood of bagpipers parading down the streets of New York could bring. As a result, the Scottish government has not only financially supported the initiative, but also sent a large delegation of representatives ever since, although MSPs from both sides of the electoral spectrum have expressed reservations about “those bekilted politicians, most of whom should never bare their knees to the elements, marching through Manhattan in the fond belief that doing so somehow promotes Scotland.”

The initiative was re-branded Scotland Week in 2008 by the SNP government, and is apprehended from Scotland in strictly instrumental terms, as an opportunity to “showcase Scotland” in Canada and the US, the “focus of Scotland Week 2010 [being] to maintain confidence in Scotland as an internationally competitive business location and promote Scotland as a must-see, must-return visitor destination.”

8.1.3. An economic resource, a cultural liability?

The economic rationale underlying the government’s approach appears more forcefully in the Globalscot initiative, launched in 2001. This international business network of Scots and people with an affinity for Scotland (the latter are often stressed so as to dismiss ethnic allegations) is financed and managed by Scottish Enterprise, Scotland’s economic development agency accountable to the devolved government. With an annual budget of GBP 45 million in 2006, the initiative has been unanimously praised as a formidable competitive advantage for Scottish businesses, although its outcomes are arguably hard to quantify (MacRae et al. 2006). Far from being a Scottish idiosyncrasy, GlobalScot is part of a broader shift of academic thinking in regard to the

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361. ‘Can Scotland save Tartan Day on Tuesday’ in The Scotsman, April 3, 2004, my emphasis.
relationship between emigration and development. The brain drain of home-grown highly-skilled labour that has long inhibited economic growth in mainly (but not only) developing countries is now seen as a potential strength. Concepts such as “circular migration” (Vertovec 2007364), “knowledge transfer”, “diaspora engagement policies” (Gamlen 2006), or “Brain bank” (Kapur & McHale 2008), have made their way into the policy jargon of international organizations. Beyond the academic fashion, this shift has inspired a variety of transnational initiatives aiming at “tapping on expatriate Nationals”,365 and GlobalScot figures among the list of good practices published by the World Bank Institute in its 2006 report on Diaspora Networks366. Its members, by offering “their time, experience, contacts, knowledge and skills”,367 have for the most part been particularly keen to contribute, notably because they received a personal invitation from the First Minister Jack McConnell who masterminded the initiative. If anything, this strategy has been extended since the SNP came to office, as Alex Salmond, who showed a keen interest in international affairs during time spent as a Westminster MP, used his diplomatic skills to communicate extensively with GlobalScot members. With about 800 participants in 2010, the network exclusively targets a narrow economic elite in the corporate world, its members being predominantly white middle-aged men based in North America and Western Europe. To address this imbalance, Scottish Enterprise is now aiming to “extend its reach to growth markets”368, notably in India and China.

The GlobalScot initiative is part of a broader strategy aiming at reconstructing the image of Scotland from an ailing economy to a knowledge-based and globalized business hub. In this respect, nationalism is not essentially cultural and/or political, but is also a potent device to reconcile historic national characteristics with contemporary economic needs and aspirations. Today’s perceived economic interests are put into perspective with historical events, ‘repudiating’ those that no longer fit the current

364. Of course, Vertovec did not coin the term, but international organizations and scholars have in recent years shown renewed interest in this phenomenon which in the past was commonly referred to as seasonal migration, although the concepts are slightly different.
365. The best illustration is probably the UNDP-funded TOKTEN initiative (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals). Active in a variety of countries, the programme pursues the objective of using the “expertise of expatriates in order to reinforce national developments efforts” (http://www.sd.undp.org/projects/tokten.htm, November 1, 2011). However, the case of Scotland is interesting insofar as it has long been an industrialized country and yet experienced very high levels of emigration.
priorities while ‘reinterpreting’ those that do under a new light (Bond et al. 2003). The GlobalScot network provides a good illustration, as it intends to instill a culture of entrepreneurship among Scottish businesses by reconstructing Scotland as an “innovative, outward-looking nation” thriving to “break into overseas markets”, eluding the Red Clydeside episode and successive strikes under the government of Margaret Thatcher which could damage the image of Scotland as a business-friendly environment. Speaking at a parliamentary session in 2008, Alex Salmond unambiguously spelt out the objective of the government’s renewed interest in the diaspora established in the United States and Canada, which is “as much, if not more, about enhancing economic and cultural ties in the future as it is about celebrating historic ties of country and kin. The government’s message to our friends all across North America is that Scotland is a country on the move.” The international campaign of the Labour-led Scottish executive was meant to promote Scotland as “the Best Small Country in the World”. In a similar and yet paradoxically less overtly nationalistic vein, the SNP government international framework published in 2008 intended to present Scotland as “a Responsible and Independent-minded Nation.” In both cases, the idea that Scotland has changed, that it is no longer unable to provide its population with rewarding opportunities, is at the core of the government’s external communication strategy.

Galvanised by the rapid and unexpected success of GlobalScot, the executive sought to establish a similar network in the cultural realm. Global Friends of Scotland was created in 2005 with the aim of “reaching out to our extended family and friends around the globe and showing them this contemporary image of Scotland.” However, the initiative has not met the success of its economic model, not least

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369 Ibid.
370 Red Clydeside designates an era of working-class agitation in Glasgow. It has strong symbolic significance for the Labour party, notably in Scotland, and is sometimes used to legitimize the left-wing inclinations of Scottish nationalism.
374 The Homecoming TV advertisement, broadcast on US, Canadian and British national channels, provides a telling example. With its sentimental overtones, the spot stages the most prominent Scots-born stars – including Sir Sean Connery and Chris Hoy – singing A Scottish folk ballad defined by Alex Salmond as “one of the great Scottish anthems, its words capture perfectly the opportunities that the year of Homecoming offers Scotland and our economy’. “I don’t know if you can see, the changes that have come over me. […] Caledonia, you’re calling me and now I’m going home. And if I should become a stranger, you know it would make me more than sad. Caledonia’s been everything I’ve ever had.”
375 Friendsofscotland.gov.uk homepage [accessed online February 26, 2009].
because spurring its members’ interest in Scotland’s contemporary cultural scene, which has largely turned its back on Kailyardism and Tartanry, the traditional cultural markers of Scotishness overseas,\textsuperscript{376} proved to be a difficult task. Hence, the government’s vision of a modern and multicultural Scotland cannot easily be reconciled with the predominantly ethnic and romantic identity that has been constructed overseas. Hence, encouraging “millions of people in Canada and the United States to celebrate and view Scotland as a successful, vibrant and modern nation”\textsuperscript{377} seems ineluctably undermined by the enduring fact that, as the President of the Scottish American Association to the Promotion of Scotland worldwide put it, “the traditional image of Scotland are what tug at the heartstrings over here.”\textsuperscript{378}

The diaspora strategy reached a peak in 2009 with the launch of the Homecoming year, meant to be the in the words of the First Minister the “biggest celebration of Scotland’s achievement and culture.”\textsuperscript{379} The idea of organizing a series of events involving the diaspora on the occasion of the 250\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Robert Burns’ birth had already spurred the interest of the previous administration and took on much greater scale under the impulse of the SNP government. Again, despite the sentimental appeal of the promotional campaign, the initiative has mainly been discussed as an economic opportunity, targeting 100,000 additional international visitors. Ultimately there were 72,000, half having family ties in Scotland in a way or another, exclusively drawn by the celebrations which generated GBP 53.7 million of additional tourism revenue, 22\% above the target set for the year.\textsuperscript{380} The most emblematic events have been the world’s biggest clan gathering, the biggest celebration of Scottish whisky, and the most extensive exhibition of Golf Memorabilia. While appealing to overseas visitors eager to explore their Scottish roots, it is hard to see how such events could possibly help to project Scotland as a vibrant place hosting a buoyant cultural scene. This provides another illustration of the inherent contradiction of the Scottish government’s international strategy, the re-branding of which being almost systematically frustrated by the all-time best-selling products of “Scotland – the Brand” (McCrone et al 1995).

\textsuperscript{376} Tom Nairn (2003/1977) famously saw Tartanry and Kailyardism as the ultimate manifestations of Scotland’s cultural decay in the nineteenth century.


\textsuperscript{378} Quoted in the Scotsman, ‘Whisky, haggis and shortbread take a back seat as Tartan Week becomes Scotland Week’, March 8, 2008.

\textsuperscript{379} ‘Homecoming 09: Scotland’s call to the world’ in The Scotsman, June 17, 2009.

8.1.4. A country of five million, or a community of thirty million?

The Homecoming year was also the occasion to discuss the future of the government’s diaspora strategy with prominent representatives of Scottish associations overseas. The Scottish Diaspora Forum organized in June 2009 at the Holyrood Parliament was meant to be “only the beginning of what could be a long-term conversation.” Some expressed their concerns about the potential contradiction between the diaspora’s predominantly ethnic attachment to the homeland, and recent immigrants who built their Scottish identity on very different premises, share the accent and experiences that makes modern Scotland for indigenous Scots. In other words, the powerful image of the Mongrel nation may be contradicted, and ultimately undermined, by the government’s attempt to reach out to people whose connection to Scotland is necessarily ethnic. But Mike Russell, SNP Scottish minister for Culture, External Affairs and the Constitution, reflecting on Homecoming 2009, may have found an ingenious way to square this circle. In his words, “this ‘Mongrel Nation’ to quote one novelist (William McIlvanney) can be taken worldwide, as, to quote another (the Canadian Frederick Niven), Scotland is a true ‘Kingdom of the mind.’”

The parallel has repeatedly been drawn between Scotland as a country of emigrants and Scotland as a country of immigrants, brought together as two sides of the same coin. In a rather intriguing way, the image of the Scottish emigrant has been used in the ‘One Scotland Many Cultures’ campaign to stimulate empathy among the native population for the fate of immigrants. The 2006 ‘Canada’ TV advertisement staged a man and his son of seemingly Asian descent walking down the street. A voice-over, recognizably tainted by a Glaswegian accent, utters these words: “When we arrived in this country, we were not sure what to expect. We wanted to play our part, learn about the culture but also retain our own. People were unsure at first. But before long, we settled down, and we never looked back.” Shortly after, the spot reveals that Prendush Lleishi was in fact speaking the words of Dan McLaughlin, a Scot who migrated to Canada in 1952. In this ode to multicultural Scotland, emigrants and immigrants are portrayed as

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382. Mike Russell: ‘The Challenge is to keep alive the feeling of being one big family’”, in Scotland on Sunday, July 19, 2009.
sharing “the common and universal experience of the migrant.”\textsuperscript{383} This link is perhaps more compellingly embodied in the words of SNP Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill, for whom “as a nation of emigrants we wish to see immigrants coming to Scotland dealt with kindness and compassion, not brutality and oppression.”\textsuperscript{384}

\textbf{8.2. The Principate, and beyond?}

The politics of trans-border membership in Catalonia is not limited to the question of emigrants and their descendants but is also concerned with kin-minorities belonging to the imagined community of the Catalan countries. Although the scholarships on kin-state and migrant-sending state politics have evolved in relative isolation from one another, calls have been made to bridge the analytical divide separating them (Waterbury 2010). However, the scope of this dissertation is already broad enough and can hardly be expanded to the institutional and political relationship between the Generalitat and the Autonomous Community of Valencia, the Balearic Islands, and Catalunya-Nord ‘annexed by France in the eighteenth century’, according to the official jargon of the Catalan administration. In this section, I first briefly discuss the ties of emigrants and the homeland in a historical perspective, before focusing more extensively on the Generalitat’s boundary-making strategy towards ‘Catalan Communities abroad’ over the past fifteen years.

\textbf{8.2.1. Catalonia, a country of (forced) emigration?}

The overview of historical patterns of immigration presented in Chapter IV suggests that the myth of the ‘Terra de Pas’ is far from being fraudulent. Likewise, there is also some truth in the widespread belief that Catalonia is a country in which those who were born stay, except when they are forced to leave. This sharply contrasts with the rest of Spain and, by declining order, the autonomous communities of Galicia, Andalusia and the Basque country in particular. Using the data of the 1991 Census, Graciela Sarribble (2005: 41-2) found that individuals born in Catalonia have on average migrated three

\textsuperscript{383} This is a quote from a key speaker and representative of the Scottish diaspora, Scottish Parliament, Scottish Diaspora Forum, \textit{A Future for Our Past}, July 25, 2009.

\textsuperscript{384} Kenny MacAskill, ‘It’s time for Scotland to have Immigration Powers’, October 26, 2006.
times less than those born elsewhere in Spain. In 1991, merely 6% of persons born in Catalonia resided in another autonomous community, against 20% for Spain as a whole. Likewise, more than two million Spanish citizens lived abroad, amounting to 5.4% of the Spanish population, against 0.8% for Catalonia.\footnote{In Catalonia, the figure comprises the sum of all Spanish citizens residing abroad whose last residence while in Spain was in one of the four provinces making up today’s Autonomous Community of Catalonia. The recent adoption of the Historical Memory Act, entitling the descendants of those who emigrated during the Franco dictatorship to Spanish citizenship, and the sharp rise of emigration in the aftermath of the economic crisis substantially increased the number of Spanish citizens living overseas.} A brief overview of emigration patterns over the past two centuries reveals a similar pattern, the volume of emigrants from Catalonia paling in comparison with other territories. Notwithstanding sporadic economic difficulties in the course of the nineteenth century, the domestic labour market has been able for most of the period to absorb the large influx of immigrants from the rest of Spain as well as the native population who moved en masse from the hinterlands to Barcelona, but rarely beyond. Thanks to the spectacular industrialization of its economy, at least when compared with the rest of the Peninsula, and the sharp drop in the fertility rate registered during the period, the Catalan population never experienced the protracted outflow of \textit{forces vives} that characterized other territories destabilized by the tidal wave of modernization.

Until 1767, Catalan merchants were officially barred from trading with the colonies and overseas emigration was reserved to Castilian subjects. As soon as the ban was lifted under the reign of Carlos III, commercial links across the Atlantic increased exponentially (Vilar 1978, 300-304).\footnote{Pierre Vilar argued that in spite of the formal rule – \textit{A Castilia y a Leon, Nuevo Mundo Colon} – the limited participation of Catalonia in the colonial project mainly resulted from the regions’ relative demographic and economic weaknesses.} The trade route with Cuba was already well developed in the 1780s, and the volume of exchange continuously grew until the 1870s (Tornero 1989). The consolidation of commercial networks went hand-in-hand with significant outflows of mainly male and young Catalans, who returned regularly to the homeland and maintained strong transnational ties across the Atlantic. Increasingly aware of their distinct territorial identity, Catalan emigrants in Cuba were the first of all Spaniards abroad to establish a region-specific mutual aid society – \textit{the Sociedad de Benefencia de Naturales de Catalonia} – founded as early as 1840. In 1898, the loss of Cuba following a short war against the United States represented a major blow to the export-oriented Catalan industries heavily reliant on the Caribbean trade route for their raw materials. The rapid diffusion of political nationalism among homeland elites
spilled over to the former colonies. The proliferation of Catalan associations at the turn of the century can only be understood in the light of Spanish politics, and in particular the emergence of Catalan nationalism, and of the acceleration of emigration flows as a result of adverse economic conditions (Jensen 2008: 133). From this date, institutions with an explicitly political and militant character mushroomed in various locations, and especially in Cuba with the creation of the Centre Català and the Grop Nacionalista Radical in 1905. Both pursued a more radical agenda than the Lliga Regionalista and were from an early age committed to outright secession (Harrington 2001: 104). In fact, the evolution of Catalan associations abroad closely followed changing patterns of nationalism in the homeland, embracing a more conservative stance during the Lliga hegemony, and later moving towards the left in reaction to Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship.387

However, the Casals only acquired a critical role after the Civil War, when the 1939 exile suddenly increased the pool of potential members. More importantly, the dictatorship provided them with a new and more explicitly political mission, in defence of the motherland subject to a ‘cultural genocide’. Balcells evaluates the number of Catalan exiles who did not return to Catalonia a few months after the end of the civil war as 60,000 (2004: 155). While the figure may seem low – it barely represents 1% of today’s Catalan population – intellectuals or prominent union and political party members were over-represented. In consequence, many were to maintain intense political ties with the homeland (Pigenet 2005). Unlike Basque elites who successfully relocated the autonomous government to Paris, the attempt to establish a Catalan government in exile has been undermined by the mutual hostility between ERC and PSUC, who blamed one another with responsibility for the defeat. However, the fierce repression that characterized the early years of the dictatorship meant that, in spite of the difficulties in agreeing upon a common objective, activists in exile were to take the lead in the contestation. Whether in London, Paris or Mexico, the period from 1945 to 1960 represents the Casals’ golden Age, as they could count on the support of competent and dedicated members. Their direct experience of the Civil War encouraged them to dedicate a considerable amount of time and energy to maintaining the nationalist flame and diffusing the Catalan culture and language that could no longer

387. See Chapter IV section 4.2. for an exhaustive discussion of the evolution of the nationalist movement at the beginning of the twentieth century.
flourish in the homeland. However, by the 1970s the once young and motivated activists had grown older and were permanently settled in their country of destination. Their descendants, although nurtured by emotional family narratives and cultivating to varying degrees the memories of their Catalan roots, rarely spoke the language (Caballé 2005). They manifested less interest in the Casals, which subsequently saw their membership sharply reduced.

Besides, the Casals increasingly faced the competition of reinvigorated anti-Francoist groups in the homeland. The latter were determined not to let the old guard of the Second Republic, who fought and lost the Civil War and found a shelter abroad, hijack the contestation. Their representatives were unable to keep up with the rapid transformation of Catalan society in the wake of economic expansion and under the influence of protest movements spreading throughout Europe in the 1960s. The folkloric and past-oriented writings painfully disseminated across a shrinking pool of Catalan speakers abroad were insignificant when compared with the vibrant cultural scene of the homeland, revitalized by a new generation of artists and thinkers. When Josep Taradellas, the president of a moribund government in exile, was invited to return by Adolfo Suarez to chair the comissió dels vint, the illusion of continuity with the Second Republic could hardly hide the fact that little remained of the country exiles had left close to forty years ago. Taradellas was already 81 years old when the first elections to the Catalan Parliament were held in 1980. By then, it was clear in the minds of all that the priority for the decade to come was not to strengthen links with the descendants of exiles born and bred in other countries, but to (re)construct the nation – fer país – at home, and consolidate legitimate and democratic institutions across the territorial jurisdiction of the Autonomous Community.

8.2.2. A boundary-making strategy still looking for its purpose

From the 1980s onwards, the CiU government actively sought to develop Catalonia’s ‘international presence’ through a number of ambitious paradiplomatic initiatives. However, the Generalitat strategy mainly consisted in reinforcing the Catalan influence in traditional diplomatic arenas such as the European Union and the UNESCO, and

388 Jordi Pujol consistently referred to Catalonia’s ‘international presence’ as opposed to diplomacy in order to mitigate conflicts with the central administration in the international arena (Keating 2001a: 190).
creating public-private partnerships and bodies in strategically-relevant areas with a clear emphasis on economic development. Until the turn of the century, the ‘Catalan Communities abroad’ were at best a secondary concern. In other Autonomous Communities, emigrants and their descendants were identified as a key economic resource from an early stage. The Stabilisation Plan initiated in 1959 by the Franco regime provoked a massive wave of emigration, and the total amount of remittances went from representing USD 55 million in 1960 to 1 billion in 1972. Besides, in the economic peripheries, mass-exit mechanically provoked a rise of productivity while mitigating pressures on the labour market.389 In 1971, with the new *ley de emigración*, the right to emigrate became a cornerstone of the Regime’s economic strategy (Gonzalez Temprano 1975: 25-7). However, in Catalonia, emigration mainly served the instrumental purpose of exporting political dissent. The region’s endogenous economic development meant that economic outflows were remarkably low when compared with other provinces.

The first initiative targeting Catalans abroad came as late as 1996. The *Llei de relacions amb les comunitats Catalanes de l’Exterior* was intended to institutionalize the relationship between the autonomous administration and Catalan associations located beyond its frontiers, whether in the rest of Spain or abroad, although the former received relatively much less attention. While the Bill was proposed by the ERC parliamentary group, it was unanimously supported by all parties, including PPC. Parliamentary transcripts suggest that its purpose was twofold. First, it was framed as an “act of justice and recognition of the abnegation, tenacity and patriotism of Catalan entities and individuals [who were] forced into exile in the wake of the Civil war.” 390 Second, associations abroad were identified as a strategic economic and cultural resource which could be exploited as part of the government’s internationalization strategy: “[t]he aim is not only to pay homage to those who left in difficult times, but above all to increase our collaboration, so that they can both divulge abroad what Catalonia is, and contribute to the process of national reconstruction in the homeland.”391 However, the legislation

389 Gonzalez Temprano quotes a *chascarillo* on emigration from Andalusia, which, while anecdotal, gives an idea of the 1960s mass-exit from the region: “A villager went to Cordoba to get his papers before emigrating. In the office, he was told that he needed the signature from the mayor of his village. He went out and came back five minutes later with the document signed. The civil servant asked him how on earth he could have travelled all the way back to his village in such a short time. And the man to answer: ‘there was no need to do so, the mayor as well is waiting in the queue’” (1975: 27).
391 Ibid. p. 2158.
was hardly implemented, the Generalitat showing little political will to use Catalan institutions located beyond the homeland as a fully-fledged paradiplomatic instrument. The project of creating a Census of Catalan Residents Abroad never came to fruition and overall expenses remained marginal. While Casals across the world were identified and linked with one another through an official network, the consell de comunitats catalanes del exterior, which was created to coordinate their actions and liaise with the Generalitat, never came to play a prominent role. Instead, the agenda was for a time hijacked by a civil society organization. Unlike in Scotland where associations of Scots abroad are decentralized and loosely connected with one another, the Federacio Internacional d’Entitats Catalanes is a powerful institution aggregating the majority of Casals and Catalan centres across the world. As such, it has been able to claim to speak in the name of the interests of Catalans abroad, lobby the Catalan Parliament and enjoy a privileged position in the decision-making process. In 1998, it created the diada internacional de Catalunya Exterior, which became recognized as an official day by the Catalan Parliament in 1999, and has been celebrated every year ever since.

In November 2002, the Department of Governance and Institutional Relations of the Generalitat organized the ‘Week of Homage to Exile’. This series of commemoration events saw the creation of an Exile Museum in La Jonquera, and was the occasion to revive the link between Catalan nationalism and the democratic aspirations of the transition, as well as to remind younger generations how the road to political autonomy had been a long and tenuous one. At the same time, the Catalan Parliament pioneered the adoption of a law aiming at providing financial and logistical assistance to the 1939 Catalan exiles and their descendants, by facilitating their return and reinsertion into Catalan society. Again, the Law of Support to Catalan Exiles and Their Descendants392 was proposed by ERC and passed with the unanimous support of all political parties. In addition to the symbolic aim of acknowledging a “historical debt” towards those who left for a political purpose, the legislation was also meant to encourage the return of those who were identified as “a reservoir of skilled labour close to the country.”393 Beneficiaries could receive up to EUR 4,500 a year as well as personalized guidance. Between 2004 and 2009, the total number of beneficiaries amounted to 900, 90% of them coming from Latin American countries. However, most have been second or,

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392. Llei de les mesures de support al retorn dels ciutadans catalans i llurs descendents.
since the Historical Memory Act was passed in the Spanish Parliament, third generation immigrants, with little or no personal connection with the 1939 exile. While the law targeted heroes, those who came mainly saw it as an opportunity to migrate to Catalonia with privileged conditions. Given the financial strain on all public administrations since the beginning of the economic crisis, the initiative saw its overall budget significantly curtailed. Initially, the Generalitat committed itself to facilitate their insertion into the labour market by giving them priority access to 5% of jobs advertised by unemployment services. However, this disposition was never implemented, mainly because the overall influx of returnees remained insignificant, especially compared with that of foreign immigrants.

The Tripartite coalition, which took power in 2003, sought to revitalize the link with Catalan institutions abroad. The main reason for this renewed interest lies in the fact that ERC, which has long advocated a more determined attitude towards expatriates, took control of the Department of External Affairs. The 2006 Statute enshrined this ambition into law by committing the Generalitat to “foster social, economic and cultural links with Catalan communities outside Catalonia and provide them with any necessary assistance.” By 2010, the Generalitat officially recognized 124 ‘Catalan Communities Abroad’, established in 40 countries and strong of 15,000 active members. However, these figures have to be taken cautiously as the number of affiliated members plays a crucial role in the accreditation process and allocation of resources, thus providing applicants with incentives for over-estimating their size and significance. Casals and Catalan centres abroad are officially meant to project Catalonia in the world by acting as ‘civil diplomats’ and sharing their knowledge of the region in which they are located with homeland institutions. They can be habilitated by the Institut Ramon Llull to provide language classes and deliver linguistic accreditation. In 2010, the Commission of External Affairs published a five-year strategic plan in which the potential role of the Catalan Communities Abroad in the projection of a better image of Catalonia was made more explicit. The government expressed some concerns with the fact that members tend to be on average older than the general population and mainly interested in the “folkloric aspects of Catalan culture”. Hence, the government officially

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encourages their “modernization, and the enhanced participation of younger and more
dynamic segments.” They are encouraged to diffuse “not only the Catalan traditional
and popular culture”, but also “the new trends in cultural production.” However, this
objective is far from constituting a priority in the government’s broader aim of
“projecting Catalonia as a global and responsible actor, influential and prestigious,
committed to the construction of a more just and fair global order”, an objective that
shares striking similarities with the SNP government’s aim of promoting Scotland as a
“responsible and independent-minded nation.” In the economic realm, the Plan
acknowledges that the internationalization of Catalan businesses is constrained by the
lack of expertise of and networks established in foreign markets and identified the
Casals as a potential instrument to remedy this weakness. In 2007, the Generalitat
launched an Internet portal, ecatalunya.gencat.net, with the aim of maintaining and
strengthening the bonds among Catalan expatriates and the homeland. However, a brief
look at the website three years after its creation clearly shows that the objective of
generating a sustained and vibrant dialogue across multiple actors has not been met. In
the preliminary budget presented by the CiU government in June 2011, resources
allocated to Catalan Communities Abroad were curtailed by 41%. The Generalitat’s
unprecedented policy of financial austerity in response to the economic crisis forced the
government to reconsider its priorities, and the latter made clear that providing
assistance to Catalans residing abroad does not figure among them.

On January 1, 2011, there were 170,909 Catalans registered in Spanish consulates
abroad. In addition, 398,000 individuals born in Catalonia resided in another
Autonomous Community. The number of Catalans residing abroad increased by
23,000 in two years, half of them as a result of the economic crisis, and the other half as
a consequence of the increased number of naturalizations abroad in the wake of the Ley
de Memoria Historica. Between January and July 2011 alone, more than 100,000
individuals, whether Spanish or foreign citizens, have emigrated abroad. However,
unlike other Autonomous Communities, concerns for a potential brain drain have not
yet emerged in Catalonia. In 2007, in the Basque Country, the Department of

396. Ibid. p. 32.
397. Ibid. p. 34.
398. Ibid. p. 4.
399. Padrón de residentes en el Extranjero (PERE), published by Instituto Nacional de Estadística, June 1, 2011.
400. Press release of the Federació Internacional d’Entitats Catalans, May 5, 2011, available online at
Innovation and Economic Development launched a programme aimed at “establishing favorable conditions to retain and attract highly-skilled workers in the context of a knowledge-based and innovative society” (Ibarrola Amendariz 2009: 240). But Catalonia’s ability to attract immigrants in times of economic growth makes the elaboration of a fully-fledged economic strategy directed at emigrants rather unlikely for the foreseeable future.

8.2.3. Campaigning abroad: a limited electoral incentive

Unlike the United Kingdom where expatriate voting rights are limited to general elections, the Spanish electoral system offers meaningful means of political participation to Spanish citizens abroad. As such, it provides political parties with incentives for competing for their votes, whether at local, autonomous, or general elections. State-wide parties have enjoyed an advantage over non state-wide parties to fund and organize campaigns abroad as they can retrieve the cost of their international network by using it for multiple levels of elections. In Catalonia, the 1978 Statute provided that “Spanish citizens resident abroad whose last administrative residence was in Catalonia and who can provide accreditation of this situation at the corresponding Spanish consulate enjoy, as Catalans, the political rights defined in this Statute.”

However, the limited number of registered voters combined with the absence of a single electoral constituency for expatriates makes the incentives for competing for their votes fairly low. Indeed, merely 133,487 were registered on the Electoral Census of Absentee Voters in 2010. Besides, turnout for autonomous elections has traditionally been extremely low, reaching only 13% in 2010 against 21% in 2006. On the other hand, while ERC has long campaigned for the establishment of a ‘vote abroad for direct representatives system’, providing citizens abroad with their own directly elected representation in Parliament, the 2011 Spanish reform of the electoral system does not contemplate this possibility. On the contrary, the legislation, passed with the support of PSOE, PP and CiU, prohibited external voting rights at local elections and strengthened the rules of registration.

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401. 1978 Catalan Statute, article 6. This definition excludes Catalan-born citizens residing elsewhere in the Spanish state.

402. In Spain, the ‘vote abroad for home districts system’ allows citizens abroad to vote in consulates or through the post in their last municipality of residence, or that of their parents/grandparents for second and third generation naturalized citizens (Collyer et al. 2010).
Table 13: Election results for expatriates at Catalan elections, (1999-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered voters</td>
<td>87,235</td>
<td>100,042</td>
<td>108,851</td>
<td>133,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Votes</td>
<td>15,516</td>
<td>18,639</td>
<td>22,658</td>
<td>17,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CiU</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICV/EUiA</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table above shows that CiU and PSC have traditionally been the most popular parties among expatriates, who have adopted similar voting behaviour as domestic voters. During the 2010 campaign in the Catalan elections, the PPC organized 52 events abroad, relying extensively on the PP network across 25 countries. ERC organized political meetings in Uruguay and Argentina while all political parties campaigned in France which hosts the most important community of Catalan voters abroad. However, the political stake is limited as the expatriate vote hardly ever tipped the electoral balance, with the exception of the 2008 general elections when CiU lost a seat to the benefit of PP in Barcelona, bringing the number of CiU MPs from 11 down to 10.

8.3. Analysis of findings

While institutions and policies targeting Scots abroad were non-existent prior to devolution, the Scottish government has launched a number of ambitious initiatives since 2001, culminating the 2009 Homecoming year. The government’s diaspora-
building strategy has taken three forms, with the economic agenda proving to be successful. The Homecoming year and above all the GlobalScot network have both integrated the Scottish brand into a broader economic strategy aiming at promoting the homeland as a business-friendly environment and raising awareness among distant relatives interested in rediscovering their Scottish roots. The cultural purpose of marketing Scotland as an ideal place to live and work has only partially been met, as it had to compete with the romantic idealization of the homeland at the core of the diaspora identity. In the political realm, the diaspora has rarely ever been used to press the case for independence. The 2009 Scottish Diaspora Forum was meant to address the following question: ‘Is Scotland a country of five million inhabitants, or a potential community of thirty million?’ It seems that the response goes as follows: political membership is limited to the territorial boundaries of the ‘Mongrel Nation’, to which diaspora Scots are welcome to return under the same conditions as other migrants. By contrast, the devolved government envisions a cultural and economic Scotland that reaches out to the ‘Kingdom of the Mind’, the boundaries of which being deliberately hard to draw. People having an affinity with Scotland are being used as a paradiplomatic resource in order to project ‘Scotland: the brand’ overseas. They are invited to contribute to its nation-building project, which emphatically prioritizes the economic, cultural and ultimately political flourishing of its territory and of those who happen to inhabit it.

The review of emigrant policies in Catalonia shows important variations from the Scottish case, not least because of the much lower number of individuals abroad who can claim a blood link with Catalonia. Throughout the dictatorship, Catalans in exile acted as the keepers of the nationalist flame and took the responsibility of diffusing the Catalan language at a time when its survival was put at risk in the homeland. During the transition, the return of Josep Taradellas provided an illusion of continuity between the First Republic and the reestablishment of a democratically-elected Catalan parliament. From 1996 onwards, a number of initiatives targeting Catalans abroad have been undertaken. The Casal network has been framed as an economic instrument to break into foreign markets, and emigrants and their descendants as a potential source of culturally similar labour. However, the policy goals have hardly been met. In spite of significant efforts undertaken to institutionalize the relationship between the Generalitat and associations abroad, the boundary-making strategy thirty years after the
reestablishment of self-governing institutions has hardly gone beyond the realm of political rhetoric. Indeed, immigrants and their descendants have mainly served the symbolic purpose of commemorating the 1939 exile and subsequent forty years of dictatorship, through a series of initiatives such as the Week of Homage to Exile, the creation of the Exile Museum and the establishment of the International day of External Catalonia.

Overall, there is hardly any evidence, whether in the Scottish or Catalan case, that emigrants have been used as a means to “export ethnic divisions” (Lafleur 2011) by encouraging their political participation and contribution to the national struggle. The argument of path-dependency is equally disappointing, as boundary-making strategies have undergone significant changes in both cases. While the formal distribution of power has mattered, it provided a framework within which political boundaries could be contested beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Scottish and Catalan governments and their respective states rather than an explanation as to why political elites and governments embraced a predominantly territorializing boundary-making strategy. Instead, their boundary-making strategies towards those who left must be understood as a means to project the nation as a responsible actor onto the international scene and to strengthen the meaning of the territorial boundary delimiting their jurisdiction.
According to the data collected by the Catalan Institute of Statistics (IDESCAT), the population of Catalonia comprised 1,488,123 residents ‘born in the rest of the state’ and 1,314,367 residents ‘born abroad’ in 2010. At the same time, there were 170,234 ‘Catalan citizens residing abroad’ and 394,294 ‘in the rest of Spain’. IDESCAT also discriminated between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ flows and provided estimates of linguistic proficiency among the immigrant and native population. Likewise, in Scotland, the General Register Office (GROS) established that 45,007 persons came to Scotland ‘from the rest of the UK’ in 2010, against 41,132 who took the opposite path, while 46,100 came ‘from overseas’. The 2001 Census already monitored ethnic and religious data of the resident population. In addition, the 2011 Census included a question asking what respondents ‘feel their national identity is’ and proposed the non-mutually exclusive categories of Scottish, English, Welsh, Northern Irish, British and others.\[405\]

The process through which migrants are being counted and categorized as such is the fundamental way in which the territorial nation establishes itself and affirms its supremacy over a specific geographic space (Favell 2006). The very existence of the terms immigrant and emigrant cannot be dissociated from ongoing nation-building projects, whether they are deployed by political elites speaking on behalf of nation states or of stateless nations. By running their own procedures for counting movers and distinguishing them from non-movers, framing public policy-making in their own terms and putting it into perspective with their own historical experiences as well as their own future aspirations, nationalist elites and governments both in Catalonia and Scotland sought to incorporate migration-related concerns into their respective nation-building projects. Those who came and those who left have been the lens through which political elites have sought to reinvent the nation and reinforce the meaning of the territorial boundary separating the homeland from the rest of the state. Far from being the reflection of a ‘narcissism of minor differences’, it is as much the consequence of

political entrepreneurs seeking to fulfill their autonomy goals as of the resilience of a territorial arena in which issues of direct concern to the resident population can be debated.

The systematic comparison of boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants and emigrants in Catalonia and Scotland corroborates to a great extent the main hypothesis. Nationalists who seek to establish, maintain and expand a stable structure of power over a territory have a vested interest in predominantly defining their people in territorial terms in order to gain internal legitimacy among the totality of the resident population and to defuse counter claims of self-determination within the homeland. On the other hand, polishing their external legitimacy enables them to break the state’s monopoly over the enforcement of liberal democratic norms and to discourage reluctant state-wide elites from using internal divisions as a means to oppose their claims. In consequence, it becomes much harder for the state to accommodate a nation-building project the legitimacy of which is not rooted in narrowly-defined ethnic criteria but grounded in a culturally plural population inhabiting a common homeland. This, however, shall not be interpreted as a teleological endpoint, an irresistible movement towards the formation of a fully territorialized political community. The empirical investigation made clear that this ambition had been subject to ongoing contestations, has been shifting through time, and can be constrained or enhanced by changing conditions in the political environment. The results also show that the Catalan case has been more ambiguous than the Scottish one. Indeed, immigration has spurred more anxiety and the boundary between natives and immigrants has consistently been more politically salient there than in Scotland. To be sure, this can partly be explained by the much larger settlement of immigrants throughout Catalonia’s contemporary history. However, these contrasted outcomes are also the consequence of variations along the three dimensions of the territorial opportunity structure identified in Chapter I. By way of conclusion, I briefly summarize the findings, confront them to the three dimensions of the territorial opportunity structure and open an agenda for future research.

Catalonia
In the Catalan case, the historical chapter paid particular attention to political elites’ boundary-making strategies in relation to internal immigrants throughout the period that preceded and followed the democratic transition and the re-establishment of political
autonomy in 1979. Prior to the transition, the large proportion of residents who were born in the rest of Spain encouraged nationalists to define national membership in territorial terms. The 1979 Statute gave legal substance to this claim by defining Catalan citizenship on the basis of residency, thus translating a conception of political membership that could accommodate residents irrespective of their place of birth and their degree of attachment to the land. Accordingly, those who were born elsewhere in Spain could become political Catalans. After the re-establishment of the Generalitat, Catalan nation-builders have conceived of integration in an ambivalent way. Whilst the institutional framework officially entrenched bilingualism, it also actively gave preference to the Catalan language and conferred a clear advantage on those who could actively speak it. Under the leadership of Jordi Pujol, the Generalitat actively sought to ‘re-Catalanize Catalonia’ while carefully preventing the linguistic conflict from becoming politicized.

This outcome can best be understood as the consequence of a self-conscious elite strategy, facilitated by favourable dimensions of the opportunity structure. First, in the years preceding the democratic transition, repression by a highly centralized and authoritarian state provided incentives for fragmented and ideologically divided opposition groups to reach a minimal consensus, equating the democratic struggle with the restoration of political autonomy. Second, left-wing parties established strong links with immigrants who were over-represented among the working class, and dragged them into the national movement. The communist party PSUC was particularly instrumental in this respect during the pre-transition period, but this role was gradually taken over by PSC in the 1980s. Both parties have contributed to blurring ethnic boundaries within the homeland by maintaining an ambiguous relationship with the Catalan nation-building project and fusing together working class and national claims. Furthermore, the only party that actively sought to exploit linguistic and ethnic divisions has been the right-wing PPC, which never managed to mobilize more than a fraction of the electorate. Paradoxically, it strengthened the solidarity of Catalanist parties which consistently put aside their ideological differences in defence of the linguistic arrangement.

The settlement of international immigrants became significant at a time when self-governing institutions had already been consolidated after two decades of steady nation-
building under the leadership of CiU and his charismatic leader Jordi Pujol. The year 2000 marked a critical juncture, as the number of immigrants coming from abroad. The Generalitat sought to gain some leverage to run its own immigration policy within the framework of a regionalized system. However, this demand remained largely unfulfilled as the Spanish government proved reluctant to share its prerogatives over a field of public policy it perceived as an ‘act of sovereignty’. In regard to immigrant policies, the initial reaction of the Generalitat closely followed the cognitive path established in response to earlier settlements of immigrants from the rest of Spain. However, the analogy between ‘immigrants from the rest of Spain’ and ‘immigrants from abroad’ found its limits in the fact that, unlike internal migrants who have acquired Catalan citizenship by taking up residence there, foreign nationals saw their legal status tightly regulated by the central state. Second, the formidable variety of sending countries made the depth as well as breadth of immigration-induced diversity much greater than earlier, thus calling for a renewed approach to immigrant integration. The CiU government, worn down after six consecutive terms in office, appeared unable to find innovative ways of addressing this new challenge. The election of the left-wing Tripartite coalition in 2003 brought a great deal of fresh thinking into the policy-making process. The Tripartite created an immigration secretariat cast in the Department of Welfare and Families and endowed with considerable resources. It initiated a large consultation process involving all immigration-related stakeholders and turning the Generalitat into the focal point for immigrants’ claim-making.

Although there is clear evidence that Catalan nationalists have sought to reconcile the presence of immigrants in the homeland with their territorial nation-building project, the review of boundary-making strategies over the past decade reveals that this aim has been only partially met. First, attempts to bypass the central administration by expanding the boundaries of citizenship to all residents irrespective of their legal status did not prevent the multiplication of anti-immigrant rows at local level. By 2010 the objective of challenging the central administration in its own normative space had been overshadowed by the aim of consolidating a Catalan path to citizenship, conditioning the entitlement to social and political rights on the completion of courses accrediting immigrants’ integration efforts. On the other hand, the Catalan language remained an important marker of full and equal membership and immigrants were used as a means of extending institutional pressures to learn it over a new category of residents. However,
the Tripartite actively sought to emphasize its instrumental dimension by framing it as a means of communication contributing to social cohesion in a culturally plural society and enhancing immigrant socio-economic mobility. In parallel, the Generalitat embraced an intercultural doctrine of immigrant integration, presented as a middle-ground between caricatured versions of ‘French Republicanism’ and ‘British multiculturalism’, both perceived as having failed. While this strategy reflects a clear elite-driven attempt at blurring cultural boundaries within the homeland, it found its limits in the increasing stigmatization of Muslims. As in other European countries, the Catalan case evokes a paradox. The decline of religious beliefs and practices among the native population sits uneasily with the consolidation of a kind of nationalism rediscovering its Christian roots and instrumentalizing its attachment to supposedly European values of liberty and democracy to contract the national boundary towards recently-settled Muslim populations, reified as a homogenous group who carry with them the burden of what has increasingly been framed as a parochial and backward religion.

However, these developments are a poor reflection of the broader discursive and institutional environment. Indeed, the recently founded anti-immigrant party PxC, which has carefully avoided positioning itself on the centre/periphery axis, failed to obtain parliamentary representation in the latest Catalan elections held in 2010. In addition, the fact that the PPC has been at the forefront of the anti-immigration crusade strengthens the main hypothesis more than it undermines it. Indeed, it is emphatically presented by Catalanist parties as the emissary of the intransigent Spanish right and heir to its repressive and authoritarian tradition. Hence, it has served the instrumental purpose of maintaining an artificial division between an uncompromising state-wide nationalism and a more liberal Catalanist alternative.

Lastly, those who once emigrated from the homeland have been identified as potential resources and their relationship with the Generalitat gradually institutionalized. However, the historically small number of Catalan emigrants militated against the development of fully-fledged initiatives beyond the realm of political rhetoric. Accordingly, emigrants and their descendants have primarily been associated with the 1939 exile and served the symbolic purpose of maintaining the link between Catalan nationalism and the liberal and democratic impulse of the transition.

*Scotland*
In Scotland, the consolidation of a territorializing boundary-making strategy from the 1970s onwards went hand in hand with the irresistible rise of political nationalism. Although the proportion of residents born abroad has been relatively low compared to Catalonia, the myth of the ‘Mongrel nation’ has also served an instrumental purpose. Indeed, a narrowly-defined ethnic claim would have been internally divisive in a country that encompasses a fundamentally plural population. With a relatively large and geographically diverse territory, a network of medium-sized cities without a clear hegemon, extensive rural areas, and a multilingual and multi-secular society, the intrinsic pluralism of the Scottish people can hardly be accommodated without an overlapping territorial identity. In addition, I argued that this was facilitated by the emergence of favourable factors in the political opportunity structure. First, support for nationalism increasingly leaned towards the left of the electoral spectrum, conflating class and national identity. Second, the reason invoked by home-rulers to legitimate their claims – in the name of a ‘democratic deficit’ – facilitated the constitution of a broad coalition of support cutting across religious and ethnic lines and territorially defined against the England-dominated state.

In 2002, the publication of the 2001 Census figures highlighted how the Scottish population was ageing faster than the rest of the UK and had been stagnating over the past 100 years as a result of protracted emigration and limited immigration. The vast majority of Scottish politicians interpreted these trends as an illustration of the failure of Scotland’s economy over past decades. Instead of trying to stimulate fertility through generous family-oriented welfare programmes, the Labour-led Scottish government sought to address what it referred to as “the biggest challenge facing Scotland in the 21st century” by promoting Scotland as an attractive and dynamic place to live in order to stimulate immigration. As in Catalonia, the Scottish government sought to run its own immigration policy through a federalized system on Canadian or Australian lines, but the proposal was firmly rebuffed by the Westminster government which jealously retained exclusive control over a matter that was gradually turning into a major public concern south of the border. By 2011, the gap between Westminster’s obsession with border control and Holyrood’s fear of another brain drain exacerbated by adverse economic conditions had grown wider than ever.
On the other hand, the self-reassuring discourse that racism was ‘not a problem around here’ prior to devolution could no longer hide the absence of a genuine national strategy for immigrant integration. The institutional framework that was gradually set up has been underlined by a ‘Community Cohesion’ paradigm and does not show significant divergences from the rest of the UK, although it has increasingly been linked with the devolved policy context. But while Gordon Brown has been desperately looking for common values to keep Britons together, Alex Salmond has promoted his vision of Scottishness in terms that are reminiscent of the old multicultural doctrine, clinging to the celebration of cultural pluralism as an element of national pride. These findings are especially remarkable when contrasted with developments in Westminster, where immigration has increasingly been framed as undermining social cohesion and a security threat. The strengthening of the rules of acquisition of British citizenship, the widening gap between aliens’ and citizens’ rights and harsher treatment of asylum-seekers find no equivalent in Scotland, where these decisions have been systematically criticized for being-counter-productive, detrimental to Scotland’s socio-economic interests, and incompatible with Scottish values. The review of immigrant policies in the devolved policy context illustrated the Scottish administration’s eagerness to blur ethnic boundaries within the homeland by promoting an overlapping Scottish identity sufficiently thin to accommodate individuals and communities irrespective of their ethnic or religious affiliations. While it enabled the devolved administration to acquire further legitimacy over its jurisdiction, it mainly served the purpose of presenting it as more sensitive to liberal democratic norms than the Westminster government.

Lastly, the Scottish government has undertaken a variety of initiatives in the cultural, economic and political realms that by 2010 formed a reasonably coherent boundary-making strategy towards those who left. While this renewed interest in ‘Scots abroad’ sits uneasily with the territorial project so vocally pursued in the homeland, the expansion of the membership boundary has had no other purpose but to advance the economic, cultural and ultimately political interest of the homeland and those who happen to inhabit it.

**Power and the formal distribution of migration-related competencies**

While the institutional framework did influence boundary-making strategies, the Catalan and Scottish cases hardly support Kymlicka’s argument. As in Québec, nationalists adopted a predominantly territorial conception of membership prior to the
establishment of self-governing institutions. This has been especially striking in Catalonia, where the national movement which re-emerged in the 1960s promoted a conception of membership primarily based on residency in spite of the large-scale settlement of internal migrants and the Franco regime’s brutal strategy of cultural homogenization. In Scotland, the permanence of distinct institutions since the 1707 Act of Union combined with relatively low immigration made Kymlicka’s hypothesis hardly applicable, although the vibrant celebration of cultural pluralism preceded the passage from administrative to political devolution in 1999. However, the cases support a more general institutional hypothesis about territorial interest-formation. Prior to devolution, the widespread perception that the central state systematically failed to address peripheral concerns fostered the development of broad coalitions cutting across ideological and ethnic lines in defence of a common territorial interest. In Scotland, the rejection of Margaret Thatcher’s neo-liberal agenda and the democratic deficit engendered by the increasing gap in voting patterns between England and Scotland provided the glue that kept the eclectic home-rule coalition together. In Catalonia, opposition to the Franco regime encouraged ideologically divided groups to reach a minimal consensus associating the struggle for self-government with liberal democratic aspirations. Besides, the consolidation of territorially-bounded institutions singularly mitigated opposition regarding the definition of the political community as ethnic cleavages associated with the national question increasingly cut across social, ideological and cultural ones.

Ultimately, while the struggle over the location of authority in migration-related matters has originated ongoing tensions between state and sub-state administrations, it has not in itself shaped the boundary-making strategy in relation to emigrants or immigrants. Instead, it brought long-standing patterns of rival nation-building closer to the surface of politics and provided the means through which political boundaries can be contested not only horizontally, across ideological cleavages, but also vertically, across multiple tiers of government. This does not mean that Kymlicka’s hypothesis can be equally dismissed in all cases across time and space, although a territorial politics perspective casts doubt on the simplistic belief that the conquest of competencies constitutes and end in itself.

*The initial boundary and its implications for subsequent developments*
The path-dependency hypothesis contends that boundary-making strategies are remarkably stable over extensive periods of time, independently of environmental changes. To a certain extent, public policy-making and underlying discourses in Catalonia and Scotland in relation to immigrants and emigrants have been conditioned by historical precedents. However, institutional change is an ongoing phenomenon in plurinational states, thus making the task of identifying a clear path over extensive periods of time extremely difficult. Besides, by going back into the past, this dissertation made clear that the dominant cultural idioms informing political practices have been profoundly altered over time. This is partly due to changes in the composition and direction of migration flows. Hence, protracted emigration from nineteenth century Scotland when the country took pride in being the ‘Workshop of the Empire’ turned into an illustration of Lowlands’ industrial decay in the interwar years and became framed as a symptom of the Union and over-reliance on the Westminster government in the 1980s. In Catalonia, there has been important similarities in the way immigration from the rest of Spain in the 1960s and immigration from abroad over the past decade have been apprehended. However, the legal distinction between internal and international migrants as well as the sociological reality of a kind of pluralism going beyond linguistic differences made the policy response significantly distinct from earlier ones.

The way in which the past is being rediscovered and reinterpreted in order to address contemporary challenges and serve present interests is probably more striking than the presumed self-reproduction of institutions and cultural idioms outliving the purpose for which they were initially created. Of course, the extent to which the past can be stretched is limited, as historical arguments need to be ‘plausible’ and ‘sensible’ enough to resonate among and appeal to an increasingly educated electorate (Evans 1997, Norman 2006). Ultimately, whether or not labeling Scotland as a ‘Mongrel nation’ and Catalonia as a ‘Terra de pas’ constitute an accurate and objective historical observation is of secondary importance, at least for the purpose of this dissertation. Instead, I primarily sought to understand why they had been deployed by political elites seeking to bring legitimacy to their actions in the migration-related realm. While only parts of their respective histories, these contemporary understandings of the past have served the instrumental purpose of grounding their legitimacy in a culturally plural population inhabiting the same land. Similarly, portraying Scotland as a ‘Kingdom of the Mind’ fits well with the Scottish government’s aim of reaching out to the diaspora and exploiting
the economic and cultural resources of self-identified Scots abroad. In the Catalan case, ‘Catalan Communities abroad’ have been primarily constructed as the descendants of the 1939 exiles, thus contributing to maintaining the link between Catalan nationalism and the democratic impulse of the transition. Besides, this also served the purpose of reminding younger generations that Spanish nationalism once sat on the wrong side of history, or more accurately, of the post-transition mainstream historiography. Hence, while limited in their ability to interpret past experiences and alter long-established institutional paths, nationalist elites enjoy significant room for adapting them to contemporary challenges and reconciling them with their autonomy goals.

The dynamics of party-competition at sub-state level

In the cases that were put under scrutiny in this dissertation, dynamics of party competition at sub-state level proved to be the determining dimension of the territorial opportunity structure in shaping the struggle over the making and unmaking of membership boundaries. Unlike in Scotland where the nationalist cleavage has clearly leaned towards the left, the Catalan case is characterized by the presence of more relevant actors and nationalist alternatives on both sides of the electoral spectrum. In both cases, political parties’ ideological identity has played a greater role than their position along the centre/periphery axis in determining their attitude towards immigrants and, to a lesser extent, emigrants. On the other hand, the empirical investigation has discredited the thesis according to which boundary-making strategies are externally-imposed and forced into public policy-making by an omnipotent ‘international human rights regime’. Besides, nationalists have not embraced a progressive approach at the price of renouncing their alleged aim of brutally homogenizing their populations in order to differentiate themselves from other national movements the claims of which are ethnically rooted. Instead, the PSC’s and SNPs left-of-centre identity encouraged them to engage in the politics of recognition in the same way as other social democratic parties in Europe did. However, by contrast with Catalonia, the SNP government has not faced significant pressure from the right or the Scottish electorate to adopt a tougher stance.

As far as emigrants are concerned, the comparison clearly indicated that the rise and consolidation of political nationalism had significant implications for emigrant populations who have been solicited by political parties and governments to contribute to the nation-building project in the homeland and in their countries of residence.
However, both in Scotland and Catalonia, nationalist parties proved to be reluctant to emphasize ethnic affiliations. Instead, their diaspora-building strategies aimed to project a civic and modern conception of the national community beyond its borders, although this did not come without difficulties given the predominantly romantic identity cultivated by emigrant communities.

An agenda for future research

The study of the territorial politics of migration in a comparative perspective offers a promising avenue for future research.

First, a natural extension of the current analysis, mentioned on p. 251 of Chapter VIII would be to bridge the analytical divide between kin-minorities and emigrant communities. Unlike Catalan nationalists, Québécois, Catalan and Basque nationalists have both appealed to emigrant communities and territories with historical and linguistic links to the stateless nation inside the encompassing state or in a neighbouring state. The territorialization of their respective nation-building projects went hand in hand with a deliberate effort to contract the membership boundary towards those populations. Hence, analyzing this process could provide significant supporting evidence for the main hypothesis of the dissertation.

Second, the empirical chapters clearly identified an enduring link between migration patterns, be they internal or external, and concomitant processes of nation-building and state-formation. However, the limited number of cases put under scrutiny precluded a more thorough inquiry into this relationship. Covering more cases appears indispensable to both better understand the relationship between migration and territorial structuring in the past and examine more systematically migration-related policy making at regional level today. The comparison should primarily be expanded to other cases that show extensive variations in outcomes and along the dimensions of the opportunity structure. Indeed, the selection of reasonably successful cases inevitably introduces an empirical bias in the analysis. Therefore, the strength of the explanatory framework should be evaluated in the light of other cases where sub-state elites do not seek territorial autonomy or where the central is unlikely to meet their expectations. In order to address these limitations, the comparison should be broadened to include other cases where the territorialization of the boundary has been less pronounced, challenged, or reversed.
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