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1939-1975

by
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CONTENTS

GENERAL OUTLINE 1

1. THE PROBLEMS 1

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS STUDY 4

A) Broad Outline 4
   a) The objectives of the present study 4
   b) The Context of the Political Institutions 5

B) The Scope of the Research 6
   a) General Characteristics 6
   b) The Basic Sets 7
      b.1. Members of Parliament (Procuradores en Cortes) 7
      b.2. Appointments by Decree 8
      b.3. Companies and their Boards 8

C) Bureaucrats 9
   c.1. Civil Bureaucrats 9
   c.2. Military Bureaucrats 9

C) The formal nature of the data, and the scope of the present study 9

D) Sources 12

3. THE NATURF OF THE DATA BANK 13

4. METHODOLOGY 14
5. PROVISIONAL RESULTS

5.1. The size of the elite

5.2. Integration of the Political Elite
   a) Relationships between members of Parliament and political office
   b) Internal structure of the political elite

5.3. Civil Servants and the Political Elite
   a) Data concerning the presence of civil servants in the political elite
   b) Bodies ("Corps" of Civil Servants in the Political Elite)

5.4. The Economic Elite and the Political Elite

5.5. Conclusion (Provisional)
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SPANISH POLITICAL ELITE, 1939 - 1975

General Outline

The present report shows the initial hypotheses, the theoretical considerations and methodology that went into an investigation into the elite in power in Spain from 1939 to 1975, as well as the present state of the investigation, and an analysis of the first results obtained.

After describing the nature and present state of the data obtained, the analysis will focus on the problem of the degree of integration of the elite in power, the relationships between Members of Parliament, holders of political offices appointed by decree, directors of the big companies, civil-servants and members of the Armed Forces. A very small 'super-elite' is identified, which draws together all these institutional sections of society, and thus confirms the existence of one "power elite" covering all these sectors.

1. THE PROBLEMS

1.0 This present report is about the problems of power, and, as often happens, there are two different aspects, which are nonetheless inseparable: on the one hand there are positions defined in various organisations, and on the other, there are the individuals who, by occupying these positions, form part of an elite, the structure of which it is necessary to know.

These two aspects, positions and individuals, are reflected in the fact that there are certain organisations, and the elites which make them up. So, on the one hand it can be seen that the organisations are different arrangements of positions, and these, in turn, are defined by the relationships existing between them within the organisation, while on the other hand the concept of the elite refers to a group of individuals related in their own right, and not through position or status.

Besides this, it is important to ask oneself if the relationships between the members of the elite, and those existing between certain positions, and which therefore permit us to identify individuals belonging to the elite, are substantially different. An empirical study makes the distinction between them, but we do not know for certain up to what point the relationships between individuals are derived from position.
Any study which makes use of the elite concept is, therefore, obliged to define those organisations in which positions are identified, the occupancy of which would identify members of the elite. This definition can be made in a more or less limited way, using a concept of organisation which is more or less loose, or if preferred, social entities which are more or less formally institutionalised.

For the purposes of the present report, the organisation in which positions are defined is the State and the legislative, executive, administrative and judicial bodies which constitute it, and not only the State, but also the big companies, organisations which are the seat of economic power in modern nations.

This choice of state institutions and economic organisations can be justified in terms of the initial objective set out: the study of power, and not merely the internal structure of sectorial elites, although, as we shall see, state institutions certainly include part of the 'sectorial' elites. The State integrates the sectorial elites and thus directly coordinates social life and social relationships.

The results, still partial at present, of this study confirm the theory of the existence of an "power elite", i.e. of a group of individuals occupying posts in several diverse organisations simultaneously, or, in other words, that the sectorial elites are closely integrated, so much so that they may be considered united.

We shall not, here, discuss again the thesis of Pareto, Mosca and Michels, nor examine the arguments of C. W. Mills: modern research has shifted the problem of the study of elites and power to the terrain of structural sociology, which primarily seeks to describe networks of social relationships, and then to evaluate and compare structural characteristics which are theoretically significant. To do this, formalizations which derive from graph theory (centralization, cliques), from the theory of categories (structural equivalence, block models), or, various algebraic structures like simplicial complexes, or semi-groups, have been used. Statistics and probability models have also been found to be useful instruments for describing and comparing the networks of social relationships.
The utter necessity of using concepts which are valid as far as the providing of evidence of the structure of relationships has displaced a good deal of what might be called attention to methodology. A lot of modern research has been done, which is sophisticated treatment of data, of doubtful significance concerning social relationships for small groups of individuals. The methodology applied here have only allowed of being able to study the structure of relatively small groups of individuals (about one thousand), connected by a reduced number of different social relationships.

This, however, is not the only reason for the limitation of the range of these studies of the structure of the elites. The difficulty of obtaining primary information is also a limiting factor. This difficulty is not due to cost alone, but also the previous definition of the nature of the data which is to be used, which makes it necessary to have recourse to interview or questionnaire to obtain it.

In fact, the relationships which it is intended to use as data are, in the majority of cases, relationships between individuals, actual people. The existence of a relationship between two persons is established according to statements made by one or other of them referring to the other. With the exception of certain cases, studies of the scientific community based on quotations in articles, statements have had to be obtained by means of surveys, and when those persons interviewed have to be members of an elite, it is well-known that they are reluctant to answer.

However, this difficulty may be avoided by adopting a different methodological criterion: examining relationships between positions and not individuals. For this to happen, it is obviously necessary that there exist explicit criteria for these positions to be identified, independently of the individuals occupying them.

Having identified the positions, we can define the relationships between them in at least two ways:

a) If any two positions form part of the same organisation, the relationships between them, direct or indirect, forms a part of the definition of both.

b) If they be two positions in different organisations, one may use the criterion of the joint occupation of both by the same individual person as an indicator of the existence of a relationship.
Using these two criteria, it is possible to identify sets of positions defined within organisations, and identify relationships between them. Analysis of these networks of 'formal' positions gives evidence of a relationship structure between individuals, and makes it possible to point to a positional structure of real sociological significance.

This outlook has been used in research into the relationships between limited companies, Burt (1979), Allen (1974), Junting and Barbour (1971), Levine (1972), Miosi (1978), Sonquist and Koenig (1975), which are established as a result of one person being a member of the Board of Directors of two or more of them. Extension through other types of organisation has been minimal, even when Domhoff (1975) considered membership of Social Clubs and Policy-Planning Groups in addition to that of Boards of Directors, in his studies of the make-up of the dominant classes in America.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS STUDY

A Broad Outline

a) The objectives of the present study.

This research began in 1972, with the objective of verifying the presence of bureaucrats (highly-qualified civil servants or career military personnel) in the elite in power in Franco's Spain. In the first phase of research, covered by this article, facts and data pertaining to the period 1939-1975, i.e. until the death of Franco, were collected. Later on the data bank has been extended to cover the period 1975-1981, although data relating to this latter period are still in the final phase of analysis and collation.

The original objective of this study should be emphasised right from the start, for it explains the importance given therein to these bureaucrats, in the sense in which they have been defined above, i.e. using an operative concept of bureaucracy. Above all, however, it explains that the work carried on does not refer to the various sectorial elites, but in particular and directly to the national elite of political and economic power.

This implies that, from the beginning, certain previous assumptions have been made which do not coincide with those made by other studies of elites.
Bearing in mind that what one was trying to do was to individualise the elite in power in a capitalist society, from the very beginning, and quite formally, those individuals who exercised political and economic power were considered as that elite. It was inevitable that political power would be found in Parliament, (very characteristic of Franco's time as will shortly be seen) and in the Executive, i.e. the rest of the structure of the State. As for economic power, it was understood that this was the remit, above all, of those who ran the great companies with a determined volume of capital, these companies being, after all, the typical instrument of the capitalist system.

b) The Context of the Political Institutions.

Thus, these starting points were laid down so as to make particular reference to the Spain of Franco. At that time this was a regime which was initially totalitarian, which had gradually softened its ideology and the mechanisms of the exercise of power, without this implying for one moment loss of control of the institutions by the Head of State.

It should be noted that this totalitarian character, despite later softening, was indicative of the intention of the State to absorb all the important aspects of society. Consequently, such organisations as the Unions, (which were made official), and all or the majority of cultural institutions were directly under the control of the Executive. Thus the political elite did not just mean those people holding formal positions in the Government or the Central Administration, but was spread across other sections of society. If one thinks in terms of other studies of elites, the only group more or less excluded were people from the world of the arts.

Moreover the Parliament of Franco (called the Cortes Organicas), had other specific characteristics, as in practice only those who were followers of Franco could be in it, and on a high number of occasions, members of the chamber of an insititutional nature were the same people who held important posts in the Executive. This Parliament made and passed the laws, but with nothing to stop the Head of State creating legislation without it, and in any case his will prevailed over the Parliament itself. In fact this Parliament was representative, but not of the whole nation: it represented those supporters of the regime who were involved in official organisations. This of course made for an almost continuous intercommunication between the aforementioned Parliament and the Government, Public Administration and...
the numerous sectors controlled by it. There is therefore no doubt that the political elite consisted of these two formally defined sets of positions, those of the Parliament and posts held in the Executive. In terms of this last, being involved in these organisations was always an indication of power, although the personalist nature of the regime always led one to the conclusion that power was conceded at the highest level when the person had been nominated by the Head of State himself, even though this might have been at the suggestion of the Government. This would indicate the highest political confidence in a person by the dictator, and, as has been said, in a large number of cases meant automatic membership of Parliament.

As far as the economic elite is concerned, if it was really established on and around those people in control of the large companies, it should nevertheless be pointed out that there was never really a very clear difference between private companies and the public sector. The connections between the two were numerous, firstly because the Franco regime very frequently used the concept of the mixed companies, i.e. with private shareholdings, but with State control. Together with this, it must be borne in mind that the economic elites were represented in Parliament, doubly, and sometimes triply, through corporate organisations, i.e. the official trade unions and the Chambers of Commerce. Naturally the managing directors of these organisations were always directly appointed by the Head of State.

B The Scope of the Research

a) General Characteristics

Bearing in mind the foregoing, one may now proceed to talk about the generic nature of the work. It should be stressed that, although data is available for the period 1975-81, those which are to be analysed here refer only to the period 1939-1975, i.e. from the end of the Civil War until the death of General Franco.

The universe of the research consists of 9,978 persons, who were at one time or another members of the Parliament of Franco, directly appointed by the Head of State (normally at the behest of the Government), or members of the Boards of Directors of a large company with more than 100,000,000 pesetas share capital in 1972. It should be stressed that this set is not a sample, but the complete list of those persons who fulfilled the required characteristics, some of them being just members of Parliament, or just holders of positions...
appointed by the Head of State, or just big businessmen, but it was very common for there to be two or three of these characteristics simultaneously, or at least successively during the period under study.

As will be seen, we have not started from the individual position occupied by each subject, nor the relationship which he might have had with other members of the elite. In fact we began by making a formal definition of the sets of positions, and then identifying individually those persons belonging to them. This nevertheless shows a state of affairs where all the key people in the key positions are to be found, even if the position is not defined in terms of its occupant, but the other way round.

The aforementioned characteristics of the Franco regime have as their consequence that the universe of this research has an integrated and comprehensive nature. Practically all social sectors of any importance are included, with perhaps the sole exceptions being in the area of economic power, landowners, and in the cultural sector, artists. This is the result of the formal definition of the sets although in the case of the big landowners, there would have been great difficulty in obtaining information, as the principal sources were not usable because of being out of date, or in other cases, had been destroyed.

b) The Basic Sets

b.1: Members of Parliament (Procuradores en Cortes)

Data available on Members of Parliament is four years out of place with regard to appointments by the Head of State, which is due to the non-existence of Cortes Organicas or Parliament of any other type during the period 1939-1942.

However this data does cover the entire remaining period until 1975, with a total of 2,483 people, of which there would have been many more were it not for the continuous membership of Parliament by the same individual in a considerable number of cases. Information obtained on this set of people, while not being very extensive, has nevertheless shown significant results. They are about the Parliaments they belonged to and the organic groups formed by these people in the Parliament of Franco. The first kind of facts gives us information about the periods of time of belonging to the Parliament, as well as about the repeated permanence therein. The representative groups indicate those sectors of the organisation of the State (and of the society absorbed
by it) in which these persons were to be found, all of which gives a rich source of information, connecting it with that obtained for the appointments.

b2: Appointments by Decree

The number of persons appointed by the Head of State during the period 1939-1975 were 4,041, and it is here that the greatest amount of repetition occurs, to such an extent that one person was actually appointed fifteen times during the period under consideration. The arithmetical average works out at about 1.90 appointments per person.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the value of the information obtained in this regard. It is deduced hereby that the appointments made by the Head of State, apart from those which took place in Government, the Ministries and their dependent organisms, quite certainly affected the Administration of Justice, the important Advisory Councils and the very varied Special Tribunals, higher Military Administration, and the one political organisation (the "Movement"), as well as the official Unions, and also reached into Public Companies and Corporate Organisations, e.g. Chambers of Commerce, Agricultural Councils. All of these organic sectors were controlled by General Franco through these appointments, covering a very small group of people, who in consequence occupied key positions from the point of view of political power.

The information here gathered indicates with some precision that sector of the state organisation which brought about these appointments, and, as dates are given both for the appointments and the dismissal, the appropriate chronological studies can be carried out.

b.3 Companies and their Boards

Finally we come to the third basic group, consisting of 5,241 people: members of the Boards of the Public Companies (whether of mixed capital or totally state-owned) and private companies with more than 100,000,000 pesetas of share capital in 1972.

As far as these businessmen are concerned, we have tried to make the information as complete as possible, giving details of the range of the share capital (100 million to 500 million, 500 million to 1,000 million, etc.) whether any capital from abroad was used in the company, whether the company belonged in the group of the 'top 500 companies', and the economic sector to which each company belongs.
It should be borne in mind that this group, which, logically is the most numerous, should not nor cannot be disconnected from the previous ones, even if it be just because of the appointments by Decree made by General Franco to the Boards of the Public Companies.

c) Bureaucrats

In accordance with the initial objective of this study, it was attempted to demonstrate the presence, in the three foregoing groups, of civil or military bureaucrats. However, unlike the three foregoing cases, information on all those people considered to be bureaucrats is not complete: the only information we have refers only to those members of this group who also belonged to one of the three foregoing groups.

c.1 Civil Bureaucrats

Civil bureaucrats fulfilling the aforementioned condition numbered 2,718. If any reliability can be accorded to estimates of the total number of bureaucrats in the 'sixties', this figure would account for approximately 10% of the total number of civil bureaucrats, which, as any elementary arithmetical calculation will show, indicates the extraordinary power of bureaucrats in Franco's Spain.

c.2 Military Bureaucrats

The extreme political importance of the army in Franco's time made it necessary to take into account the nature of the military bureaucrat, normally defined as the career soldier, i.e. someone who had studied, becoming an officer, at a Military Academy. The present work does not concern itself with individual positions within the military organisation, but only with those cases where a civil position was occupied by a member of the armed forces. The total here is 830, and information has been obtained for each of them, as to which body they belonged to, Army, Navy or Air Force, and the military ranks held at the beginning of the period in question, towards the middle of it, and at the end of it. It must be pointed out that military presence in each of the three sets of positions is very varied but particularly high in the Executive. 518 military men received civil positions by being appointed by General Franco.

C The formal nature of the data, and the scope of the present study.

The basic data may be considered as a collection of attributes, but these attributes define the membership of those people possessing them to groups.
which are not just merely formally-defined sets of people, but real groups, as the formal criteria used to identify them correspond to significant social relationships.

Let us examine why this should be: as far as the group formed by Parliamentarians is concerned, it will hardly be necessary for much argument to take place before one is convinced that, given the peculiar circumstances of such a place, there is bound to be some kind of mutual acquaintanceship, personal relationship, and effective interaction. This would have been even more the case, given the non-existence of political parties in the Franco Parliament.

Appointments by Decree define a group of positions - and persons - which also constitute a real group. It is a relatively small group of individuals having institutionally defined relationships within the same administration, even when the positions they occupy belong to different departments. In the Spanish administration, there are a number of horizontal relationships, of an institutional type, (Advisory Councils), and there also existed a network of personal relationships which were brought about by institutional positions. This Co-membership of the administration presupposes, for the individuals forming part of it, a sharing of interests which of course makes the establishment of direct interpersonal relationships very easy.

On the other hand, in the case of civil servants, organised in different bodies (‘crops’) and selected according to tests which, by their very nature, turn out to be mere mechanisms for co-opting, interpersonal relationships are very intense within each body. The strengths of the Higher Bodies are, besides, small, around a few hundred for those bodies whose members form part of the politico-administrative elite.

Thus the possession of an attribute is equivalent to membership of a structured group. Social categories and roles - to adopt the terminology of Nadel - in this case are so close as to be virtually synonymous, with obvious methodological consequences.

For our present purpose, the most important thing in all this is simply that in these sets of individuals who are identified by their common possession of attributes are, in this present work, real groups and not just analytical categories. Later on we shall examine the strictly methodological problem that we thus find ourselves facing. Here, we shall confine ourselves to saying that,
by means of analysis of these groups of individuals and their relationships, we are giving evidence of sets of social positions with diverse degrees of structural equivalence. To this question we shall return later.

As we have already said, this present study covers the entirety of political posts held during the Franco regime, and they have been identified using a formal definition: those people who were members of the Parliament, and those nominated by Decree.

It must, however, be pointed out that this work has one special characteristic: the data collected are diachronic, and covers a period of thirty-five years. Thus, the information concerning appointments and dismissals actually has dates, which will permit us, in a later stage of exploitation of this data, to analyse structural characteristics of the politico-administrative institutions of Spain, derived from an analysis of temporal series of events. Here we shall be setting forth only the results of a first stage of the analysis, which therefore takes no account of the relationships that may derive from the temporal series of events, or from the utilisation of different levels of aggregation of data.

One more characteristic of this study is that, although it does not consider the higher civil servants in their entirety, whether they be civil (Bureaucrats, in the operative definition of Alberto Gutiérrez Reñón (1966-)) or military, it nevertheless bears in mind and defines the subgroups of both which have formed part of the political elite, and, given that we are considering the totality, the whole universe of political positions and the individuals occupying them, the subset of civil and military functionaries which forms part of the political elite also has a complete definition.

Finally, we shall point out one limitation within the study: the figures about Boards of Directors of Limited Companies are based solely on yearbooks for 1970 and 1972, and therefore do not cover the same period as the other data. For this reason we underestimate the importance of the links between the political-administrative elite and the economic one. Obvious budgetary reasons have prevented us from proceeding in a different manner.

As we have already mentioned, we are now working on the construction of a file with the same type of data, but covering the period 1975-1982. Once the basic task of collection of data is completed, a computarised file will be built and processed, and in the next few months we shall be able to study the effects of the change of political regime (of the introduction of democracy) on the structure of these political-administrative elites, and their connections with
the economic elites.

3) Sources

The formal nature of the sets as defined, and the intention of covering the whole spectrum and not just a sample of the positions has meant that sources have been relatively easy to come by, even though exploiting them has been a particularly laborious task.

Information about the members of Franco's Parliament was the first obtained, by one of the colleagues of Professor Baena, which in fact constituted his doctoral thesis (Banón Martínez, 1978), published by INAP, in the collection called 'Estudios Administrativos', series B, number 25, 1978. The information was obtained from the Parliament, and consisted of the lists of Members, published in the Chamber for internal use, giving information which was complemented from the archives of the same Parliament.

As for appointments by Decree, the source consisted of the Official Bulletin of the State (Boletín Oficial del Estado), where, in accordance with legal and reglamentary requirements, all these appointments are published. The study of such a tremendous number of Official Bulletins (covering the period 1939-1975) was especially laborious, for which reason this may well be the area of study which contains perhaps a slightly higher figure of human error in terms of collection of data.

Information about membership of boards of directors of companies was obtained using as a source two financial yearbooks concerning companies, one published by a private bank (Banco de Bilbao), and the other published privately. These two were selected from those known for greater reliability. For this set the sources are limited to the years 1970 and 1972.

The area of civil bureaucrats presented more problems. As a basic source, an official publication, the Index of State Civil Functionaries (Indice de Funcionarios Civiles del Estado) was used, and which was published by the Presidency of the Government of Spain in 1964, but the information on this list was updated to 1975 by using official or semi-official lists of all the Bodies of Higher Civil Servants, and, where these were lacking, by consulting the aforementioned Boletín Oficial del Estado, where names of civil servants appear.

On the other hand, military authorities co-operated fully. The data
concerning professional soldiers was taken from the publications of the Army, Navy and Air Ministries (Escalas y Escalillas) where all officers are listed, as well as Generals.

3 THE NATURE OF THE DATA BANK

The data mentioned above has been processed (up to 1975) on a disk based master file. It consists of a sequential file, and at the moment contains 13,000 entries.

Although these advance results here presented reflect no more than aggregates of data in big categories, we do have extremely detailed information about the various positions and memberships of each individual:

1. For Members of Parliament in Franco's time, we have entered the corporative sector(s) that they represent. In the democratic Senate and Parliament (since 1977) we have entered the political party as well as the province where the seat is held as well as parliamentary function, member, senator, president or vicepresident of one or the other chamber, etc.

2. For appointments by Decree, we have entered the administrative position identified with precision (which department, hierarchical level, formal title etc.) within the administrative structure. Dates of appointment and dismissal are also recorded.

3. Limited companies are identified, and their code corresponds to their position in the ranking. In addition, the volume of capital is encoded, as well as the presence or absence of foreign capital, the area of activity and the nature of the company, be it public or private. The geographical location of the headquarters of the company is also encoded.

4. For functionaries we know the Body and the Ministry to which they belong, as well as, by means of the registry number in the 'Dirección General de la Función Pública', their relative seniority within it.
This present study lies within the structural perspective appropriate to the analysis of networks. But, because of the nature of the total information available, the items of data which we handle are, basically, vectors of institutional positions which are associated with each individual. Therefore interpersonal relationships of the type a R b, which constitute the normal form of data used for the analysis of the structure of networks of social relationships, can only be derived analytically from our own data. And, as we shall see, when this derivation is carried out, transforming our bulk data into an adjacency matrix, it will only be useful in a later stage of the analysis, which as yet we have not carried out.

Thus in our present case, the relationships between individuals are derived from their membership, or inclusion, in groups. Obviously, the degree of institutionalisation of the group, as well as its size (the cardinal of the set) determine the intensity of interpersonal relationships, or, if preferred (vide the works of Samuel Leinhardt), the probability of the existence of a binary relationship, direct or indirect, derived from the basic fact of membership. On the other hand, the degree of institutionalisation and the size of sets are not only associated analytically in terms of their effect on the intensity of the relationships, but also, depend to a large extent on the criteria chosen by the researcher to define the groups. These criteria, in turn, are determined by the objectives of the analysis. An example will serve to explain the foregoing.

Appointments by Decree can be conceptualised:

a) As an entirety, unified by the trust of the Head of State.

b) as differentiated in as many groups as ministers directly responsible for the nomination.

Membership of Boards of Directors of companies can be examined:

c) considering each company and its corresponding board of directors as a different group.

d) grouping together the companies by areas of activity.

The same differentiation of criteria of membership appear in terms of Civil Service. Civil servants belong:

a) to the same 'Corps' of Body.
b) to the same Ministry.
c) to the same geographical region.
d) to the Civil Service in general.

In any event, and whatever might be the criteria selected to define the groups, the fact remains that these groups consist of sets of positions identified precisely by the levels of aggregation chosen.

These sets of positions can be treated as such, without it being necessary to represent them in the form of a network. The individuals occupying them can, therefore, be considered as links between sets of positions: the cardinal of the intersection of two categories or sets of positions, the number of individuals belonging to both, makes it possible to estimate the intensity of the connection between groups which are formally differentiated, and therefore define 'effective positions', or, if preferred, the network of individual relationships between groups which are institutionally different.

This is a view which we have developed, theoretically, in a paper presented at Uppsala (Pizarro - 1978), in which we examine the algebraic properties of social "places". Defining the place of an individual as a set of relations of memberships of different institutions and associating the institutions with the set of individuals which go to make them up, one can define the relationship between two individuals as that of the sets of institutions to which both belong at the same time, and, dually, the relationship between both. This duality of networks of individuals and institutions, recorded by Breiger (1974) is not the only property of networks of positions: defining a very natural law of composition about the set of "places" thus defined, a semi-group structure is revealed with characteristics of the type denominated 'rectangular bands', in which it is not possible to distinguish formally between primary and secondary (or derived) relationships.

This type of data can also be analysed by considering it as simplicial complexes, formally similar to the networks of places as defined by us. However, when the number of individuals belonging to a certain institution is great, use of the dual perspective is more appropriate, constructing a network of institutions connected by individuals.

In this perspective, the connection between institutions is a set of individuals, conceptually homogeneous with those institutions, which are themselves sets of individuals.

Our view is close to that of the analysis of intersections of social circles. But the concept of the social circle as defined by Alba an
Kadushin (1975) is an attribute of individuals, which is the starting point of analysis, and it is true that, in fact, the social circle consists of the set of individuals with whom every one of the individual members of the network has a relationship, primary (direct), secondary or n-ary (indirect).

The types of relationships which Alba and Kadushin consider are reciprocal: if $A \rightarrow B \iff B \rightarrow A$. But the existence of the relationship is established by starting from the two individuals who compose it. In fact, it is a question of relationships derived from subjective actions of each of the persons involved in them. A says he talks to, or is a friend of B, or refers to B, etc. However, in our study, on the contrary, the relationship between two individuals is deduced from the membership of both to a group with a greater or lesser degree of institutionalization: a body of civil servants (composed of individuals selected by co-opting), public office, being members of the same department, and therefore having been appointed by the same person, members of the board of directors of a company, etc.

If we tried to construct, on the basis of our data, the social circles of individual members of the elite, we would find groups of very large sizes for each one of them. For example: each member of Parliament would have all the 605 other members in his social circle, and in terms of those who, in addition, occupied high office, he would have at least those persons occupying posts in the same department, and this just restricting the social circle to direct relationships...

Therefore, intersections of social circles would also be groups with a high number of individuals in them: in practice, the utilisation of categories of posts, and the relationships between them because of joint membership reveals the same type of structure which the study of the intersections of individual social circles.

In fact, in this work, we use five categories of social position, A, B, C, F and M, admitting that two individuals occupying positions of the same category are directly related (or indirectly, but this we shall see later). Having, as we have, identified the groups of actual persons occupying positions of each type, it is obvious that:

1. Social circles of first degree of all individuals
who occupy one sole position in a category are, simply, those groups of individuals defined by the positions in that category: if individual \( i \in A \Longleftrightarrow \text{his social circle} \ C_i = A \).

2. Social circles of individuals occupying positions of 2 categories are, simply, the union of these.

3. Due to the existence of these individuals, and therefore, to the fact that the intersection of the sets is not empty, social circles of the second degree are, simply, the union of all the sets.

As can be verified, the absolutely crucial thing from the point of view of the network of interpersonal relationships is to establish up to what point formally grouped positions within a sector are related so that it must be presupposed that there exists a social relationship, which is direct, between its members.

We have seen that for members of the Parliament, this is obviously the case, and for people occupying posts to which they were appointed by Decree, local existence (in subgroups of B) it also is. To generalise this for the whole group of B would depend on how long the post was held, which would increase the probability of effective links being formed.

For civil servants (F) and military administrators (M), the probability of the existence of direct relationships between members of the sets is very high. But, as we have not yet evaluated this yet, little can be deduced from this statement. We shall see in an epigraph shortly how the analysis of the intersections of these groups allows of thinking, in any case, that relationships of the second degree are extremely dense, that the elite forms a social network with very short inter-individual distances, and that individual social circles are very extensive, and their intersections very important.

Our use of data about the positions of the elite during such a long period of time (35 years) gives rise to certain theoretical problems of interest: we cannot, in fact, ignore substitutions and shifts, nor phenomena of a sequential type. We hope, in a later stage of research, by using data of a temporal nature (dates) which figure in our file, to
study temporal components of interpersonal relationships.

We have verified the existence of numerous temporal processes of relationship as can be seen in the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>being Minister</th>
<th>from</th>
<th>nominates</th>
<th>Other positions of Appointment by Decree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(M.A.) Martín Artajo</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ruiz Giménez, 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(F.I.) Fraga Iribarne</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Pío Cabanillas, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P.C.) Pío Cabanillas</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus in the foregoing we see how Ruiz Giménez, Minister of Education from 1951 to 1956, appointed to a previous post (President of the Institute of Hispanic Culture) by Martín Artajo (1945-1957) in his turn appoints to his team Fraga, who later was to become Minister, who appoints to his team Pío Cabanillas, who...

Thus we can presuppose that Ruiz Giménez was in Martín Artajo’s social circle, that Fraga was in Ruiz Giménez’s, and that Pío Cabanillas was in Fraga’s. This may have been at different times, but it is also obvious that the personal relationships shown by the foregoing data about positional relationships by date, are more stable than the last ones.

We can consider that the formal relationships which go to make up our data are, at the same time, indices and results of another type of social relationship, which are brought about at more extensive temporal intervals both before and after those dates recorded in our data.

Precisely for this reason, to treat what happened in an extensive period of time as if it were a case of simultaneous data is the same as considering formal relationships at a given date as indices of 'permanent' social relationships, which in turn implies that, in this scheme of things, differences in types of position have no substantial character whatsoever.

The relationships between the actual people in our example are, what is more, wider, and subordinated by other institutional connections, nevertheless the chain of appointments cited runs from 1946 to 1974...

The type of data which we have also makes possible an analysis of another type: for example, bearing in mind the formally related positions and their hierarchy, to follow the replacement pattern, and also to detect synchronic networks and study the way they have changed during the period under consideration. To do this, we need to develop algorithms and programs
which are capable of treating sets of data of the size of those in our possession.

5 PROVISIONAL RESULTS

The circumstances in which this research has been carried out until now do not permit us giving more than provisional results for the period 1939-1975. It is hoped to obtain definitive results when data are treated in more detail, as well as when the period 1975-1981 is considered. However, it is important to point out, in the light of the provisional results, the high degree of integration among the elite.

Bearing in mind the institutional characteristics of the sets under study, it is no great matter for surprise that the political and economic elite of the Spain of Franco was closely integrated. Intercommunication between groups of members of Parliament, politicians directly appointed by the Head of State and important businessmen was total. If we leave out in each set those people who only satisfied one of the conditions (e.g. Members who served in only one Parliament, persons who only received one appointment, or only one membership of a board of directors held,) then the remainder of the study are seen, not to constitute different elites, but to form part of the same elite, possessing, to that end, diverse qualifications which accumulated easily.

In fact, a graphic representation of the groups of elites under consideration would look like a series of overlapping circles laid on top of one another, until a space shared by all would be seen, and in this space there would be 317 people. These 317 had been at the same or at different times Members of Parliament, active politicians and important businessmen. The presence of bureaucracy in this pinnacle of the elite was very high indeed, reaching a total of 166 people.

5.1 The size of the elite

The first thing which is important to define is the size of the political elite, given that the 9,978 people under study at the moment did not all occupy their politico-administrative positions in one year, but during a period of 35 years.

The political elite is smaller in the case of the Cortes during Franco's time: the total number of members for the ten parliaments that there were is
2,483. However, the average number of seats is 611 (the range is from 483 to 693 seats, depending on which parliament it was), and the total number of seats held during the 36 years was 6,113. Thus, actual people who have been members have been so in 2.46 parliaments on average, and 48 of these have been members of nine parliaments, and 28 in ten.

Something fairly similar occurs when we turn our attention to the group of people who received appointments by Decree. Here we have 4,041 people, but 7,633 appointments to occupy different posts. The average number of posts per person is, during the period under consideration, 1.90. Given that the average period for the occupancy of such a post is 8 years, then the average number of posts occupied each year is 1,707. Thus we can state that 4,041 people have occupied a yearly average of 1.707 posts during 36 years. Or, in other words, each of the 4,041 people has occupied an appointment by decree for a period (average) of 15.2 years.

In 36 years, in 10 parliaments, seats have been occupied, on average, by 4.05 people, and positions of appointment by Decree by 4.50 actual people. Obviously we are dealing here in terms of averages for the whole group of people and for all the posts; one does not here take into account that the political life of those who managed to reach the highest levels would be very much longer.

The political elite, then, is at the same time small (average of 611 members of parliament plus 1,707 positions of appointment by decree) and stable, given that positions of appointment by decree are occupied for an average of more than 15 years, and seats during an average of 2.46 parliaments. Thus the average size of the political elite at any given moment would be the sum total of 611 and 1707, or 2,318 people if each one held no more than one post. This of course is not the case, since 25.19% of the people in group B have occupied a post in group A, i.e. 430 people on average. The political elite (A+P ∩nB) has an average size of 1,888 people.

The size of the economic elite is 5,241, using data from 1970 and 1972 to establish this. If we suppose that the changes in number in between these years to have been minimal, we are still left with 5,241 people.

As we shall see in succeeding paragraphs, these people and those who form part of the political elite are partly one and the same, whether simultaneously or successively.

In the following analysis we have abstracted the time-factor, treating the entire elite of Franco as if their attributes were synchronic.
consider that, by proceeding in this manner, we reveal a structure which later analyses will essentially modify very little. One must not, in effect, forget the very high average length of time of occupancy of the different positions...

5.2 Integration of the Political Elite

a) Relationships between members of Parliament and political office

If we just consider the political elite of Franco-ism, individuals of groups A and B, members of Parliament and politicians nominated by the Head of State, we are then referring to an exhaustive set covering the totality, and not to sampling.

These two groups have total memberships respectively, during the 36 years in question, of 2,483 people in A and 4,041 in B.

As we can see in Table 1, 1,018 (A ∩ B) have belonged to both sets of people, which represents a percentage of 40.99% calculated on A, and 25.19% calculated on B. Thus, more than one third of members of Parliament have held politico-administrative posts, and one quarter of those who have occupied politico-administrative posts have also been members of Parliament.

The total number of people who, during these thirty-six years have formed part of this political elite, in the formal sense of the definition here being employed, is 5,506 people, no more, of whom, as we have said, 1,018 form part of both groups of people.

b) Internal structure of the political elite

As we have already said, it is obvious that the sum total of members of Parliament constitutes a real social group, and this not merely because they have gathered together in the chamber, because they know each other personally, but also because these relationships are stable and lasting. Let us not forget that, on average, a member stays in the Parliament for 2.46 parliaments, i.e. for 9.84 years. The replacement rate is very small, which guarantees a very high density of personal relationships between the members of the dyachronic set.

As far as those who have occupied politico-administrative positions
**TABLE I**

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GROUP OF POLITICAL NOMINEES (GROUP A) AND OTHER ELITE GROUPS. (Expressed by the size of intersection in absolute value)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(\cap A)</th>
<th>(\cap B)</th>
<th>(\cap C)</th>
<th>(\cap B \cap C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (\cap)</td>
<td>2.480</td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (\cap)</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M (\cap)</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (\cap) M (\cap)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table II

Relations between the group of political nominees (Group A) and other elite groups. (Expressed by the size of intersection in percentage on the cardinal of A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ΩA</th>
<th>A∩B</th>
<th>A∩C</th>
<th>A∩B∩C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ω</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>40.99%</td>
<td>19.39%</td>
<td>12.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>29.11%</td>
<td>19.67%</td>
<td>7.74%</td>
<td>6.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>12.01%</td>
<td>6.77%</td>
<td>2.41%</td>
<td>1.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F M M</td>
<td>1.45%</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>0.76%</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

is concerned, we can also point to the existence of a very high degree of internal integration. The reasons for this are as follows:

1) Formal relationships exist between actual positions within each department.

2) In each department there also exist informal relationships. The fact of occupying a position in a ministry presupposes having been proposed by the minister, and therefore to have some relationship with him, and, usually with the rest of the people nominated by him.

3) But, 1,803 of those people who have been nominated by decree, 42.14% of them, have held two or more different positions, which increases the density of relationships, both in the same department and in different ones. The average is 1.90 nominations per person.

4) In addition, as we stated previously, according to Spanish custom, occupancy of high political office makes it easy to establish personal relationships between those holding the offices.

Here we are referring, of course, to direct relationships. As far as indirect ones are concerned, it is obvious that the mere existence of the Council of Ministers, and the presence of holders of high political office in the chambers will establish numerous relationships of second order. However these are not the only ones existing between the members of this political elite, for the political elite is a mere formal construction within the power elite of which it is a part.

5.3 Civil Servants and the Political Elite

One of the initial objectives of this research was to examine the degree of participation by career civil servants and military functionaries, in the political elite, as well as to determine greater or lesser integration between politicians and functionaries.

We are in possession of data concerning membership of the higher Bodies of the Civil Service, of people who have been members of Parliament (group A) or those who have been nominated by Decree (group B)
Data concerning the presence of civil servants in the political elite.

As we can see from Tables I and II, 722 (FnA) of the 2,480 members of Parliament, i.e. 29.11% of the total, are career civil servants.

In Tables III and IV we see that 2,020 (FnB) of the 4,041 people who have occupied political office were career civil servants, which represents 49.9% of the total number.

In addition, of the 1,013 people who have belonged simultaneously to groups A and B, 48.03%, 439 were civil servants (FnAnB).

Therefore we can state that of the 5,506 people composing the political elite (A+B-AnB), 2,718 were civil servants, i.e. 49.36% of the total political elite.

In addition, 543 of those nominated to political office (MnB) and 298 of the members of Parliament (MnA) were military. The total number of military in the political elite is not, however, the sum of these last two figures: 169 soldiers have both occupied political positions and been members of Parliament (MnAnB), so that we have 722 career soldiers (besides 2,718 civil servants) in the political elite: 85 of them were, what is more, both civil servants and military functionaries at the same time.

For these facts to be correctly interpreted, it is necessary to recall that, in Spain, the Public Administration recruited its staffs through the system known as 'oposiciones', which are a series of examinations to which candidates having a higher university degree may be admitted, and for which several years of preparation are often necessary. Thus a civil servant, or military functionary or army officer, is the product of a period of training and preparation, and selection, which lasts for years. Thus the interpretation of intersection is not commutative: civil servants occupy political posts and it is not the case that the political elite occupies 'jobs' in Public Administration.

Also in Spain, as in France and Italy, to pass the various tests for selection makes a person a lifetime member of a Body of Functionaries, and he cannot be considered as just having a job in the administration. He actually forms part of it.

The existence of a high proportion of functionaries among the political elite is just as significant as the absolute number that we have (2718), represents in turn a high percentage of total number of higher
### Table III

Relations between the Group of Political Nominees (Group B) and Other Elite Groups. (Expressed by the size of intersection in absolute value)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>∩B</th>
<th>B∩A</th>
<th>B∩C</th>
<th>B∩A∩C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B∩B</td>
<td>4.041</td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F∩B</td>
<td>2.020</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M∩B</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F∩M∩B</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table IV

**Relations between the group of political nominees (Group B) and other elite groups.** (Expressed by the size of intersections in percentage on the cardinal of B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\cap B$</th>
<th>$B \cap A$</th>
<th>$B \cap C$</th>
<th>$B \cap A \cap C$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$B \cap$</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>25.19%</td>
<td>15.39%</td>
<td>7.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F \cap$</td>
<td>49.98%</td>
<td>12.10%</td>
<td>7.94%</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M \cap$</td>
<td>13.43%</td>
<td>4.18%</td>
<td>2.72%</td>
<td>1.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F \cap M \cap$</td>
<td>1.63%</td>
<td>0.76%</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

functionaries: around 10% (\(x\)) of the average of the total numbers.

b) Bodies ('Corps') of Civil Servants in the Political Elite.

We have shown that 10% of the civil servants belonging to the higher bodies occupy approximately half the total number of political positions. If we examine the bodies to which these civil servants belong, we discover, in fact, that they come from 66 of the 79 such bodies in existence, and, what is more, that 1,790 out of 1,967 civil servants who have occupied political office (in B) came from no more than 17 such bodies. In addition, and as can be seen in Table V, the proportion of civil servants occupying political office in 6 of these bodies is very much higher.

We can conclude that the Civil Service, and in particular some of the higher bodies, has constituted an important means of access to the positions of political power in Spain during Franco's time. This fact becomes more significant when we see it as representative of a stable characteristic of political power in Spain: since the restoration of the monarchy and during the dictatorship of Primo de Ribera and the Second Republic, higher civil servants have provided a high proportion of politicians, and although exact figures are not yet available, in the present democracy in Spain, this tendency has been maintained.

5.4 The Economic Elite and the Political Elite.

As we have already shown our files contain all members of Boards of Directors of limited companies having more than 100 million pesetas of share capital (around 1.0 million dollars) in 1970 and 1972.

There are actually 5,241 people: 2,904 of them occupy posts solely in the Boards of different companies, but the remaining 2,337 members of this economic elite (44.6%) also occupy positions in organisations of a different nature.

As we can see in Table VI, 482 company directors have also been members of Parliament (CnA) and 622 have occupied political posts (CnB). In addition, 319 of them have occupied both types of position. Thus we have a total of

*(By higher functionaries we mean those belonging to a Body which insisted on the possession of a University degree, as a previous requirement to entry.)*
### Table V

DISTRIBUTION OF HIGH LEVEL CIVIL SERVANTS, BY NUMBER OF POLITICAL POSITIONS OCCUPIED AND BY CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>1st Position</th>
<th>2nd Position</th>
<th>3rd Position</th>
<th>4th+ Position</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>% in total Staff (in 1963)</th>
<th>Total Staff (in 1963)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TECNICOS ADNOM CIVIL</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>6.95%</td>
<td>6.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMISTAS ESTADO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEÍTRADOS CONSEJO ESTADO</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>68.29%</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOGADOS ESTADO</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>36.70%</td>
<td>41.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGENIEROS CAMINO(OP)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>9.99%</td>
<td>5.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUECES Y MAGISTRADOS</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>8.08%</td>
<td>8.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISCALES</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>3.88%</td>
<td>3.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATEDRATICOS UNIVERSIDAD</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>33.52%</td>
<td>11.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATEDRATICOS E.T.S.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21.07%</td>
<td>1.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATEDRATICOS I.N.E.M.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4.17%</td>
<td>2.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSPECTORES TRABAJO</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>55.21%</td>
<td>5.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSPECTORES DIPLOMADOS TRIBUTOS</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11.38%</td>
<td>3.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGENIEROS INDUSTRIALES (IN)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6.41%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGENIEROS MINAS(IM)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIPLOMATICOS</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>50.91%</td>
<td>8.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGENIEROS AGRONOMOS</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>9.73%</td>
<td>3.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTARIOS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 17 CUERPOS.</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>1790</td>
<td>67.59%</td>
<td>15.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESTO CUERPOS. (SIN 49 PRESENTES)</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>413</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE VI

Relations between Board Members (Group C) and other Elite Groups. (Expressed by the size of intersections in absolute value)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$n_C$</th>
<th>$n_{CA}$</th>
<th>$n_{CB}$</th>
<th>$n_{ABC}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$c \cap c$</td>
<td>5.241</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f \cap f$</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m \cap m$</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f \cap m \cap f$</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
737 members of the economic elite who are also involved in the political elite, which represents a percentage of 15.04% in terms of the first, and 14.29%, in terms of the second.

In addition, as we can see in Tables VI and VII, 811 (FNC) company directors are civil servants and 281 (MNC) are soldiers: this represents 15.47% and 5.36% of the group of directors respectively.

Furthermore, 166 company directors who form part, simultaneously, of groups A and B (members of Parliament and persons appointed by decree) are civil servants as well.

Thus we find a high degree of integration between the members of the political and economic elites, which is accentuated by the presence of civil servants on boards of directors, which is even higher in percentage, as well as the presence of military personnel.

These results, however, are of an indicative nature, as collective C was identified solely from those members of boards of directors in 1970 and 1972, while the other groups, (A,B,F,M) cover the whole of the period from 1939-1975. It is more than probable that the relationships between the political, economic and bureaucratic elites have been underestimated, as the fact of being on the board of a company because of holding shares is stable, (and hereditary), so that the most important changes in the make-up of these would probably be due to the substitution of one civil servant and/or politician for another. We can verify this hypothesis in the next stage of our work, with data on companies from 1950.

5.5 Conclusion (Provisional)

At the present stage of our research, we have only managed to carry out a very elementary exploitation of our data: little more than a frequency table and the construction of contingency tables, in which large category groups are used.

Even so, the results obtained even at this level of analysis are of considerable interest: the degree of integration deriving from co-membership of large sets of positions is great, but it is easy to demonstrate that it is underestimated. It is enough to consider (see fig. 1) in the case of the two groups, A and B, that there are many people in this political elite that have no relationship at all with other groups, including F and M. These people are, however, those occupying just one position, either that of being a member of Parliament or a person holding an office to which he has been
TABLE VII

RELATIONS BETWEEN BOARD MEMBERS (GROUP C) AND OTHER ELITE GROUPS. (Expressed by the size of intersections in percentage with the cardinal of C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ΩC</th>
<th>Ω∩A</th>
<th>Ω∩B</th>
<th>A∩B∩C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C∩C</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9,19%</td>
<td>11,86%</td>
<td>6,04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F∩C</td>
<td>15,47%</td>
<td>3,68%</td>
<td>6,12%</td>
<td>3,16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M∩C</td>
<td>5,36%</td>
<td>1,14%</td>
<td>2,09%</td>
<td>0,87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F∩M∩C</td>
<td>0,76%</td>
<td>0,36%</td>
<td>0,47%</td>
<td>0,32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE I

LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ELITES

Total A = 2.483

A only
5/5
23.15%
1.908
76.84%

A n B = 1.023
A n B n C = .317

A n B total = 1.023
A n C = 1.023
B n C = .317
B n C total = 622

3.233
80.00%

B only
808
20.00%

B total = 4.041

C total = 5.241

C only
2.904
55.40%

A: Members of Parliament
B: Nominees by Decree
C: Board Members of Companies
appointed by decree, thus, their belonging to the political elite is, so to speak, accidental: at a given moment they occupy a position defined as being part of the elite, but it is really a transitory situation which does not really indicate effective membership of the power elite.

Thus, not bearing in mind those people occupying one sole position of one sole type as members of this elite, because they are on the periphery, we are left with a very small network, in which social proximity, measured by the cardinal of the intersections, divided by that of the total sets would be much bigger. Obviously here we are speaking of the social proximity of sets of individuals defined by their belonging to sets of formally assimilated positions.

However, those individuals grouped at the intersections which we have examined, and in particular the 317 in \( A \cap B \cap C \), have very similar social circles, and, at another level of analysis, we can state that they occupy a very central position in the Spanish elite: the super-elite, in fact.

This super-elite of little more than three hundred persons occupies a central position, which can be interpreted as inter-institutional or inter-organisational, which assure the circulation of the flow of information which regulates social life.

Thus, the elite of power in Spain is strongly integrated, and let us not forget that the operative definitions which we have used include, because of the 'Cortes Organicas', the university elite, for Rectors of the University are all members of Parliament, the Professional Colleges (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.), and, in general, representatives of all social activity legitimised under Franco. Excepting artists, only opposition to the regime is excluded from this study of the Spanish elites. The long duration of the regime, and the nature of the political transition which we are now passing through confirm up to what point the 'opposition elites' have had a very reduced political and social power. We hope that analysis of data of the post-Franco era will confirm this hypothesis, and adequately explain this process. One particularly important aspect is the role of the civil service in the transition to democracy.

Finally, it is important to point out that, in this study, we have observed how the State and its institutions form the space wherein the
integration and co-ordination of the social elites takes place. At present we do not feel that this a phenomenon associated with the totalitarian nature of General Franco's regime: the 'elite' of the Unions, associated to left wing parties (Socialists and Communists), has occupied seats in the democratic parliament, while at the same time being actually associated to those parties. These are questions which it is better to leave for the present.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Jürg STEINER</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Jens ALBER</td>
<td>The Emergence of Welfare Classes in West Germany: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Don PATINKIN</td>
<td>Paul A. Samuelson and Monetary Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Marcello DE CECCO</td>
<td>Inflation and Structural Change in the Euro-Dollar Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Marcello DE CECCO</td>
<td>The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate in the '20s and the '70s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Manfred E. STREIT</td>
<td>Modelling, Managing and Monitoring Futures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Domenico Mario NUTI</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Francis C. CASTLES/ Peter MAIR</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Karl HOHMANNN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Max KAASE</td>
<td>The Concept of Political Culture: Its Meaning for Comparative Political Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Klaus TOEPFER</td>
<td>Possibilities and Limitations of a Regional Economic Development Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Ronald INGLEHART</td>
<td>The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages Among West European Elites and Publics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Moshe LISSAK</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Economic Systems and their Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Dietrich HERZOG</td>
<td>New Protest Elites in the Political System of West Berlin: The Eclipse of Consensus?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Edward O. IAUAMANN/David KNOKE</td>
<td>A Framework for Concatenated Event Analysis</td>
</tr>
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<td>Author(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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