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HOW TO BECOME A CABINET MINISTER IN ITALY:  
UNWRITTEN RULES OF THE POLITICAL GAME

by

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According to the wise Roman jurists, if you take as a rule the most frequent cases, without worrying about possible exceptions, you are ordaining on the principle of plerumque fit. It is in this sense I am proposing here to codify rules that are not formally expressed, but which are well known by the most refined and ambitious minority of the Italian political class.

These rules institutionalize the recruitment process for positions of executive power. They have the advantage of rationalizing the means of access to cabinet positions, of eliminating the arbitrary, of orienting individual aspirations, and of avoiding congestion in the crossroads of political careers, through a series of signals and traffic regulations. Thus, political competition, which is extremely individualistic in Rome, has been ordered as in a chess game.

Between the fall of fascism and November 1982, 45 governments have followed one another, four before the end of the war. Among the 41 governments, from Parri to Spadolini, 14 were composed of just Christian Democrats, and 27 were coalition governments.

These rules were established in a relatively short period of time, toward the end of the de Gasperi reign, and in light of the experiences during the years 1953 and 1954: two Christian Democratic governments were still-born, for they did not obtain a vote of confidence in Parliament (De Gasperi 8th cabinet, Fanfani 1st cabinet), another was established but finally not appointed, (Pella). These rules, never written, have been formalized since 1954.

The analysis presented in these pages covers the period 1954-82. It focuses exclusively on the party which has dominated Italian

political life, the Christian Democratic Party, from whose ranks have been recruited all the prime ministers, except for Parri and Spadolini, and most of the ministers and undersecretaries of state.

It is important to underline here that the Christian Democratic Party governed alone for relatively little time, a fact which is too often forgotten, even in Roman political circles. Of the 14 single-party governments (monocolori) only five remained in power more than one year (Zoli, Segni 2nd, Fanfani 3rd, Fanfani 4th, Andreotti 3rd). All others were "semestrial", "for the summer," on a "temporary armistice" basis, or still-born. Criticisms of the Christian Democratic Party neglect this fact, although the governmental responsibilities were shared by several parties most of the time.

The various governmental experiences have given birth to a very rich vocabulary currently used by the mass media: monocolour governments, monochromatic, bicolor, tricolor, tripartite, pentacolor, center-left, organic center, convergence, limited spectrum, enlarged spectrum, total spectrum, minority-governments-benefitting-from-the-non-defiance-of-one-party, etc.

It would consequently be naive to try to analyze such a complex phenomenon by mathematical models, no matter how sophisticated they may be. In Machiavelli's country, political reality is made up of a thousand nuances and any attempt at quantification would soon become simplistic. Even an application of coalition theory would be deceptive.

How to elucidate this apparent paradox: the immovability of the same party in power for more than one third of a century despite governmental instability as measured by 41 governments? One

of the explanations of this fact is that except between 1948 and 1953, the Christian Democratic party, even if dominant, did not hold the majority of parliamentary seats.<sup>(1)</sup> It thus had to ally itself with other parties, most of them small, and the disagreements between them were a source of ministerial instability.

The other explanation of this apparent contradiction between immovability and instability comes from the factional nature of the Christian Democratic Party. A coalition government does not only rest on a big party flanked by two or three other small parties, but also on several factions of the central party, of the perpetually median party. It is sufficient that one or two of these factions want a change in policy, to endanger the life of the government. Since the political game often takes on a Byzantine character, many governments have been overturned by an initiative coming from within the dominant party. It is not possible to establish a direct relation between the activity of this or that faction and the fall of the government. There is always a conjunction of factors.

The rules of promotion are enumerated here according neither to their importance, nor to any chronological sequence in the selection process, since they intervene simultaneously. The logic of their linkage is nevertheless clear. Undoubtedly, it is rule 7 which is most dependent on the political game and which receives, in times of ministerial crisis, most attention.

It is through interviews with politicians, high civil servants and astute observers, that I was able to formulate these non-written rules. My interlocutors, including ex-ministers and potential future ministers, recognized them as true, even if they mentioned exceptions here and there. Departure from the rules is

possible for well founded reasons. (2)

#### THE SUMMIT OF THE CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRATIC PYRAMID

From June 1945 to November 1982, 653 persons occupied executive positions, (3) among whom 414 were Christian-Democrats. Seen from afar, these 414 personalities, situated at the summit of the dominant party's pyramid, present many common characteristics. In reality, it is a very diversified ruling group. To fully comprehend it, one must observe it from several angles, particularly by considering the varying weights of the different ministries, and the political generations.

One can distinguish four levels among Christian-Democratic ministers:

- A) The leaders of the party and of the factions, constituting what could be called the governmental nucleus, namely the prime ministers and the most important ministers, those who belonged to eight governments or more. As can be seen in Table 1, this nucleus includes 36 personalities.
- B) The ministers who belonged to a maximum of seven governments and a minimum of three; they form, around the nucleus, what could be called the "governmental circle". It includes 48 ministers.
- C) The ministers who belonged to only one or two governments, making up an enlarged circle of power and including 49 individuals.
- D) The undersecretaries of state, who have never reached the level of full ministership. They are twice as numerous as the full ministers: 281 versus 133.

These figures, simple but essential, reflect the situation at a certain moment, in November 1982.<sup>(4)</sup> But it is evident that the career of some of these men is not finished. Over the years, some ministers will continue their upward climb, and new men will appear on the front stage. Nevertheless, the political careers of most of these 414 men ended a long time ago.

If the rules of the political game continue as before, in ten years statistical tables on ministers and undersecretaries of state will indicate a distribution in four categories similar to the one we are presenting here, although the absolute figures shown will be higher.

One may observe three generations within the Christian Democratic political class.

The first generation includes men born before 1910. While this criterion is too rigid to be entirely satisfactory, it nevertheless has the merit of being precise. Of the 414 ministers 161 were born before 1910. As can be seen from Table 1, most of the leaders from the "governmental nucleus" belong to this first generation: 21 out of 36, as well as 66 out of 133 ministers of the "extended governmental circle."

To this first generation belong men of the stature of De Gasperi, Gronchi, Segni, Pella, Zoli, Tambroni, Vanoni, Togni, Gonella, Gava, Medici, Piccioni, Pastore, etc.<sup>(5)</sup> (as well as many leaders of other parties, particularly Togliatti, Nenni, Saragat, Einaudi or Parri). Twenty or thirty years before their accession to power, each one knew all the others and was known by all of them. The implication of this fact for the process of political cooptation is considerable. At the level of leadership,

there is no spontaneous generation, not even at the juncture of two historical periods. In effect, most of these men were elders of the Popular party. Others, without being ex-popolari, came from the network of Catholic Action. Among the 66 ministers born before 1910, that is more than 33 years old at the breakdown of the fascist regime, one could count 48 whose biographies are marked by these three characteristics: affiliation to the Popular party, activity in Catholic Action, and participation in the Resistance movement.<sup>(6)</sup> This observation is also valid for 76 of the 95 undersecretaries of state of the first generation.

The second generation of ministers was born after 1910 and raised in the League of Catholic Graduates. They include leaders like Moro, Rumor, Taviani, Gui, Piccoli, Fanfani (even if born in 1908, Fanfani belongs sociologically to this second generation). They erupted on the political arena at the Christian Democratic Congress in Venice in 1949.

The third generation was raised in the "Palace Court" of the Christian Democratic Party already in power, first in the youth movement, then in the party apparatus. They are professional politicians in the sense that they never had any regular jobs other than political ones, and they climbed the ladder by cooptation and patronage. This generation is illustrated by men like: Colombo, Andreotti, Forlani, Cossiga, Donat-Cattin, Gullotti, Sullo, Marcora, Granelli, De Mita, Sarti, Malfatti, Cicc<sup>l</sup>cardini, Bodrato, Arnaud, etc. Many of the men of the third generation prepared themselves for their political career on the editorial boards of newspapers and weekly journals.

The second and third generation intertwine in their political



careers. It seems nevertheless clear that the roots of the second generation are imbedded in the catholic organizations, with a high proportion of them also involved in the Resitance movement, while most of the third generation began directly in the local, provincial, and regional organizations of the Christian Democratic Party.

The various rules of promotion do not evidently have the same significance for each of these three generations. (7)

RULE 1:

THE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE RECRUITED: AMONG PARLIAMENTARIANS

The aspirant to ministerial positions should be a deputy or a senator. In effect, one can only count a handful of ministers who did not have a parliamentary mandate at the moment of their appointment. These few were experts or high civil servants, whose situation was "regularized", in the sense that their election was arranged at the first occasion. Among these exceptions, we could mention Corbellini, a railroad technician, appointed minister in 1947 because of his competence in the domain of public transportation; Bonifacio, member of the Constitutional Court; Stammati, former general director of the Treasury, and general accountant of the state, appointed minister of the Treasury; Ossola, former governor of the Bank of Italy.

It should be noted that this rule is practiced in most of the parliamentary democracies. The exceptions are France and the United States, which have presidential systems, as well as Netherlands and Norway, which have established an incompatibility between parliamentary mandates and ministerial positions.

Ministers and undersecretaries of state

June 1945- November 1983

Christian Democratic Party	born before 1910	2nd and 3rd generations	Total	
PRIME MINISTERS	9	6	15	governmental nucleus 36
Ministers 8 times or more	12	9	21	
Ministers 5, 6, 7 times	8	19	27	governmental circle 48
Ministers 3 or 4 times	8	13	21	
Ministers 1 or 2 times	29	20	49	extended circle 49
Total Ministers	66	67	133	
Undersecretaries of State 8 to 13 times	7	7	14	281 around the circle
Undersecretaries of State 5, 6, 7 times	17	36	53	
Undersecretaries of State 3, 4 times	22	48	70	
Undersecretaries of State 1, 2 times	49	95	144	
Total undersecretaries of State	95	186	281	
Overall	161	253	414	414

The question that should be asked regarding Italy is why so much attention is given to these experts. Should one see here the symptom of a certain discrediting of the professional political men in the public opinion? These experts are not apolitical men. They have a double quality: they are considered competent in a particular domain, such as finance, but it is admitted that even if they follow in the wake of a party, they are not men of the party's political apparatus, and this is an essential point.

About one quarter of the ministers and undersecretaries of state were senators at the moment of their appointment. The proportion of senators among ministers varied from 10% in 1948 to 40% in 1963. Nevertheless, among the ministers belonging to what we call the "governmental nucleus," the deputies dominate by a proportion of 85%. This is because the politicians who have dominated Italian political life during the last three decades were already in place at the beginning of the Republic. They were elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1946, which obviously should be seen as equivalent to the Chamber of Deputies, and they were reelected there regularly.

Later, a certain number of leaders opted for the Senate, preferring safe senatorial constituencies, so that the number of senators among Christian Democratic ministers has stabilized since 1970 at between 25% and 30%.

If the constitution had not provided that the government should obtain the confidence of both assemblies, and if, as in many countries, the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies had sufficed, the number of senators among ministers would have been considerably

smaller (and one of the causes of ministerial instability would have disappeared).

RULE 2:

ONE DOES NOT ACCEDE TO GOVERNMENT DURING A FIRST TENURE

A reelection is needed in order to open the possibility of reaching the governmental level. What are the reasons for the adoption of such a rule? Because of the preferential vote, practiced largely in legislative elections, the number of defeated parliamentarians, and consequently of new deputies, is relatively high: on average one third of the total membership of the Chamber of Deputies. If the choice of ministers is limited to the reelected former deputies, if the "greenhouse" is restricted, so much the better for those who are already there, that is to say those reelected. The rule of the waiting term before promotion to government protects the elders against the competition and the impatience of the new parliamentarians. Furthermore, to the degree that the stature and prestige of the ministers reinforces their local electoral position by the practice of preferential voting and clientelism, this rule allows the former ministers to deprive the new deputies of a precious trump for their reelection. Those non-reelected leave room for new deputies, who will not immediately compete with their seniors.

Denouncing "delayed change in the leadership and representation," Amintore Fanfani criticized at the National Council of the Christian Democratic Party in 1974 "the practice of the groups which do not accept the appointment of newly elected parliamentarians to government." (8)

This rule carries several exceptions, particularly during the first

years after the war. These cases had to do with men who played an important political role before 1922 and in the opposition against the fascist regime, and who found themselves together once again in the Constituent Assembly. We count 32 personalities, most of them notorious resistants who came to power before 1948. But these 32 personalities are not the only ones to escape the rule of the waiting term. There are 23 others who became ministers before the end of their first term: they represent about 5% of the total number of ministers. One must also note that two thirds of them became undersecretaries of state or ministers before 1954, that is a moment close to the foundation of the Republic. After that, the exceptions to this rule became extremely rare. An example is the case of Ferrari Aggradi, who made himself noticed by a report on the economic situation to the Christian Democratic Congress in 1952, and who was appointed undersecretary of state soon thereafter, even though he was then only a newly elected deputy.

It should be noted that this practice can be observed in other countries too. In England, the chances of being appointed to a government position during the first mandate are minimal, except in certain historical circumstances, such as when the Labour Party arrived in power for the first time, or when it returned to power after a long absence.

RULE 3:

ONE DOES NOT BECOME A MINISTER WITHOUT PREVIOUSLY BEING UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

One is first appointed undersecretary of state, and only later appointed minister in the full sense of the word. Until recently,

October 1980, the Christian Democratic group in the Chamber of Deputies, according to its internal procedures, drew up a list of deputies, by secret ballot, among whom the prime minister and the leaders of the party chose - after the appointment of ministers but before their investiture - the undersecretaries of state. The list sometimes included twice as many names as positions to be filled. The prime minister and the party leadership could choose between those elected by the group, but not among others. Through this ballot, the new and therefore "ineligible" deputies (according to rule 2) played a role in the selection among the elders. This "election" by the group was not entirely satisfactory, for in October 1980, just before the constitution of the Forlani government, the group decided by a large majority to suppress this norm, and to delegate to a committee of the parliamentary group the privilege of drawing up the list of "promotable" deputies to the rank of undersecretary of state. The committee drew up this list by taking into consideration the activity of parliamentarians in their party, their seniority in Parliament, the length of positions held elsewhere, and for some, their specialization.

Theoretically, it is the council of ministers that chooses and appoints undersecretaries of state. The proof that in reality it contents itself with confirming a list already established by the leaders of the parties of the governmental coalition is the fact - simple but enlightening - that it takes this decision during a very brief session. For instance, the council of ministers<sup>that</sup> met on October 2, 1980, did not take more than 50 minutes to appoint 57 undersecretaries of state.

Some figures should be kept in mind. The total number of undersecretaries of state for the period is 365, of whom only 84 were

later promoted ministers (at least until November 1982), that is 24%. Among the 281 undersecretaries of state who never reached the rank of full minister, 88 belonged to only one government, 56 to two governments or more. Some of these undersecretaries will probably be promoted ministers in the coming years, but it is already evident that for the great majority of them, 80% or more, the undersecretary of state was not a step but a summit.

From a different point of view, among the 133 ministers in the full sense of the word, 84 started as undersecretaries of state, and 49 were directly appointed full ministers. But it should be emphasized that among these 49 ministers, 31 belonged to the first generation, most of them having been prominent in political life before 1922 or in the resistance movement against the fascists. Furthermore, they acceded to power before 1954, that is to say in a period when this rule was still in its gestation.

The deviation from the rule for the remaining 18 men, born after 1910, who skipped the level of undersecretary of state could be explained by several intricacies. First an equivalence exists between a position at the summit of the party and the position of undersecretary of state. Regional or local notoriety may intervene in the same direction: Ripamonti, a Milanese personality, acceded directly to the rank of full minister; likewise, Restivo, president of the Sicilian regional assembly, and A. Gava, president of the regional council of Campania. The vice president of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies naturally skipped the level of undersecretary of state. These titles imply de facto or predominant position within the Cristian Democratic Party. For instance, G. Bartolomei, president of the Christian Democratic group in the Senate during three legislatures, became minister directly. Among the 18 men of the new generation who have benefitted from this

exception, are also included: Forlani, Piccoli, Gullotti, Marcora, Rognoni, Signorello, Codacci, Pisanelli, Andreatta, Corbellini, Bodrato, Dal Falco, Lombardini, Scaglia, Tesini.

The presidency of a parliamentary committee is not necessarily considered an equivalent position to that of undersecretary of state. In a "classical" type of parliamentary system where parliament is the regime's center of gravity, such as in France during the 3rd Republic<sup>(9)</sup> it is normal that promotion is channeled in great part through the parliamentary committees. But in a "partitocrazia", where the most important decisions are taken by the leaders of the parties, political careers are forged outside parliament in the organizations and factions of parties. It is not astonishing, therefore, to find that in Italy, contrary to other countries, the position of chairman of a parliamentary committee is not a springboard. In effect, there are very few political men whose promotion to ministerial rank could be explained mainly by their active role in a parliamentary committee. Among these rare examples could be mentioned Angelini, president of the Commission of Transportation; Monaldi, a doctor directly appointed minister of Health; Azara, a jurist appointed minister of Justice; Trabucchi, an industrialist appointed minister of Finance; Medici, a specialist in agricultural affairs, appointed minister of Agriculture.

The number of undersecretaries of state progressively increased from 1946 to 1980. In the last decade there were twice as many undersecretaries of state as ministers. In the "monocolor" governments, composed exclusively of Christian Democrats, one deputy for every two having a seniority of five years could receive either a ministerial armchair or just a stool. (In the House of Commons



too, a large number of MPs of the majority party are junior ministers). Because other deputies and senators simultaneously held important positions in the party hierarchy, it could be said that the majority of Christian Democrat deputies were rewarded.

In any case, a great number of undersecretaries of state were appointed for the first time (or the only time) on the occasion of the formation of a "monocolor" government. So, the second Rumor government (monocolor) in August 1969, which succeeded the first Rumor government (coalition), included 30 undersecretaries of state who did not belong to the previous government (and only four outgoing ministers were not reconfirmed).

Satisfying the greatest possible number of deputies is a necessity for the survival of the government in a parliamentary system which practices the secret ballot, thus permitting all maneuvers. Several governments have felt stabbed in the back by "snipers" belonging to the governmental majority itself. Although a formal vote of confidence in government is nominal and consequently disciplined, the adoption of laws and the ratification of decrees are done by secret vote. The government can be put without warning in minority by the vote of "snipers" who hope to obtain a ministerial position thanks to a crisis and a change of government. The ambition of those who are, or believe themselves to be potential ministers is a source of ministerial instability, as in France during the Third and Fourth Republics.<sup>(10)</sup>

It should be noted that the undersecretaryship of state as a

necessary stage on the road to full ministership applies only to the dominant Christian Democrat Party. This rule does not apply to the other parties, which participate in coalition governments after long periods in opposition and which receive, in these coalition governments, only a small number of ministerial posts; too many of their leaders have aged while in opposition.

What power do these undersecretaries of state hold? Most of them are ephemeral men at the governmental level, even if they are famous personalities in their provinces, where they may reign as 'lords' for 20-30 years. Others, without being entirely ephemeral, since they belonged to three or more governments, remain outside the ruling group.

RULE 4:

THE POSITION OF UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE IS LIMITED TO FIVE YEARS

No one can remain more than five years as undersecretary of state. If during this period the promotion to full ministership does not take place, the holder is in fact excluded from potential governmental circles. No one can indefinitely remain undersecretary of state. Promotion or exclusion! This is a custom that one finds in other countries too, particularly in England. It could also be found in certain public administrations which limit the time a person can occupy a certain position.

This rule of five years seniority poses a maximal, but not a minimal limit. It is not necessary to be undersecretary of state for five years in order to be appointed minister. The rule is interpreted with some flexibility. It is not applied in case of continuity of presence: then it is supposed that there is no

available post of full minister. It is rare that one returns to government as an undersecretary of state after a long interruption.

What is the significance of this rule? Should it be interpreted in terms of experience or competence, as in England, where the junior minister must show that he has the quality of a statesman? Is it justified by the need periodically to make room for new men? But what if this rule were adopted not only to ensure a circulation, but also in a Machiavellian spirit, to eliminate a certain number of middle-of-the-road competitors? This rule facilitates the promotion of new men to the rank of undersecretary of state, but at the same time it protects the great leaders against the impatience of men who, having already unsheathed their swords as undersecretaries of state, believe, rightly or wrongly, that their turn has arrived. Significant from this point of view, is the unusual proposition formulated by a large number of Christian Democratic deputies in February 1976, at the moment of the formation of the fifth Moro government. They asked the designated prime minister not to choose as ministers personalities who already had held ministerial responsibilities for more than eight years (since their first appointment). This proposition focused on the exclusion from government of men as influential as Rumor, Colombo, Donat-Cattin, Andreotti, Fanfani and a few others. It seems that this action was initiated by some former undersecretaries of state aspiring to become full ministers. They in turn would thus have liberated places for new undersecretaries of state, and this explains why the proposition, judged unreasonable at the highest level, nevertheless found a favourable response among the junior parliamentarians. This incident reflects the latent competition between generations among Christian Democrats. If Pareto were alive today, would he still say that the circulation of elites

is "viscous"?

Certain men remained undersecretaries of state for a long time. Should this longevity be interpreted as a success or as a half-failure? It is good to remain undersecretary of state, but it is even better to be promoted minister. A few concrete examples will provide us with some elements of a reply.

A. Sallzzoni, who was undersecretary of state thirteen times, in reality occupied a better strategic position than that of many ministers responsible for important administrations. He was in effect, as undersecretary of state to the presidency of the Council of Ministry, one of Moro's most intimate collaborators in the five governments directed by the latter. The function of undersecretary of state in the ministry of Foreign Affairs or of the Interior, which he exercised at other moments, could be considered, in certain circumstances, more important than the function of full minister of Tourism or of the Post.

G. Bosori was undersecretary of state in eleven governments between 1953 and 1963 almost without interruption, but it was always to the ministry of the Interior, where he undoubtedly acquired high competence in a domain considered to be essential.

Maria Badaloni was appointed undersecretary of state nine times, but always to the ministry of Public Education. It was necessary to have a woman appear among the male ministers, even if she was only offered, albeit in a gallant manner, a ministerial "stool".

Why has a personality, already nine times undersecretary of state

to the Treasury, never been promoted? It might be because of the difficulty of finding, in a coalition government, a position as full minister for a man who was not a leader of a faction ("capo corrente"). In any event, among the non-promoted undersecretaries of state who remained immobile for a long period, one could find men who were specialized in a particular sector.

Another non-written rule of the political game should be mentioned here, even if it is not directly related to the selection of ministers. A Christian Democrat who served four parliamentary terms, that is twenty years, and was not promoted undersecretary of state, "should" abstain from running for a fifth mandate. The other parties, particularly the Communist party, have also limited the length of the parliamentary careers of their members, except for the leaders; if Roberto Michels were still alive, he could test his "iron law of oligarchy" once more.

RULE 5:

ALL REGIONS SHOULD BE REPRESENTED IN THE GOVERNMENT

This principle of regional representation is respected in various countries, as in Germany, Belgium (from a linguistic point of view), Nigeria etc. But in Italy, this geographical prescription sometimes takes on the aspect of a distribution between "baronages." In effect, due to the Italian electoral system, based on proportional representation, large constituencies, and preferential voting, each great leader is well protected in his own constituency against the direct competition of other great leaders: Andreotti in Latium, Rumor in Veneto, Segni in Sardinia, Colombo in Basilicata, Taviani in Liguria, Tambroni in Marche, Gioia in Western Sicily and Gullotti on its eastern side. Wise precaution: male lions should not trespass

on the territory of other male lions.

The regional leaders are at the same time leaders of factions at the national level. When a government is formed, the regional dosage and the factional dosage (a point to be discussed later) are inseparable. To give a ministerial portfolio to any faction means to bring the "baron" of that region into government, and vice versa. To represent every region in each successive government would imply a monopoly of certain regional leaders. Fanfani was well aware of this. Recognizing "that the change was not always accomplished on the basis of wise criteria", he also admitted the incompatibility between a rigorous regional representation and personal competence as a priority criterion: "Other obstacles came from the presumption that the candidates for various posts should have true territorial origins in order to respond to the expectation of regions, provinces and cities. These obstacles had so much impact on selection based on merit and competence that it restricted the range of choice." (11)

In practice, the geographical dosage is satisfied considering that even an undersecretary of state is sufficient to represent a region in the government. If it were otherwise, the Christian Democratic leader of each important region would be permanently present in the government.

An analysis of the relations, for all regions, between the number of Christian Democratic electors and of the ministers during the three decades from 1948-1978 shows that the correlation is significant, though far from perfect: Lombardia, Emilia, and Tuscany have proportionally fewer ministers than voters, the opposite being true for Campania, Calabria and Basilicata. (12)

RULE 6

COMPETENCE IS ACQUIRED THROUGH EXPERIENCE

Such a principle clarifies the criteria for the selection of ministers as well as the subtlety of the political game in Rome. It could be argued that a man who is able to reach the highest levels within his party is a competent political man, in the most general sense of the word. But one could ask whether someone who shows himself astute in the partisan network and who has succeeded in obtaining preferential votes by imaginative propaganda, also necessarily possesses the qualities required of a statesman. Does a person who has spent twenty years in partisan politics and in the labyrinth of factions, without giving priority to parliamentary debates or activity in specialized committees, have the same profile as his French or English counterpart, who has acquired experience in parliament and the administration rather than in the party? Certainly in the selection of ministers, representativeness is sometimes as important as competence, but competence cannot be weighed by milligrams whereas the other is very visible. Undoubtedly, it is an amalgamation that ensures the best selection.

What is at issue here is the deliberate and systematic priority that is given to partisan criteria, often to the detriment of competence. I obtained the testimony of many Italian politicians who judged that expertise is not an essential reason for promotion to government.

The proof that competence is not the main criterion in the selection of ministers can be found in the chronology of government

formation. The number of ministers to be attributed to each party and each faction is determined first. Then, the departments are distributed. The factions do not necessarily have the competent men for the domains that are attributed to them. The distribution of departments between parties and factions and the designation of men by the factions are two independent processes, usually occurring at different moments in time.

It is too easily admitted in the Roman political milieu that competence is acquired through practice, that it results from experience, that the politicians should and can adapt himself rapidly to the governmental functions assigned to him. How can this be possible if the minister in question does not remain in his position more than a few months, if he moves from agriculture to transport, from education to social security? No doubt the minister does not need to be a specialist. Yet he must still familiarize himself with the problems of the ministerial department with which he is charged. It is significant that some journalists who advocated a selection of ministers based primarily on competence were accused of expressing "anti-democratic opinions."

The limited role played by the parliamentary committees in the selection process has already been stressed: the presidency of a committee does not constitute a springboard for ministerial appointment since these chairmanships are usually reserved for ex-ministers, instead of being a channel of access to government. That is to say, the succession of stages is reversed. There are some exceptions: Pandolfi, Bressani, Cossiga, and others revealed themselves in parliamentary committees.

If the channel of committees is not an efficient one, it is because



another channel, the faction, which will now be examined, plays a determining role.

RULE 7:

THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT PROPORTIONALLY REFLECTS THE STRENGTH OF FACTIONS WITHIN THE PARTY

The national council of the Christian Democratic Party is elected at the party congresses. It includes representatives from the groups in the Chamber and in the Senate, as well as from various satellite organizations. The election of the council is carried out according to lists that represent factions. The delegates have a number of mandates determined by the number of adherents and voters in their constituencies. The numbers of the national council are elected by proportional representation. So, in 1973, the Iniziativa Popolare faction (Rumor, Piccoli, Taviani) represented 35% of the national council; the Nuove Cronache faction (Fanfani, Forlani) 20%; Impegno Democratico (Andreotti, Colombo) 15%; Base 9%; Forze Nuove 8%; Moro 9%, others 1%.

The idea that the Christian Democratic representation in government should be proportional to the composition by factions of the national council became accepted soon after the retirement of De Gasperi. The proportional calculation has been ingeniously worked out. It is considered that a full ministerial portfolio is equivalent to three undersecretariats of state.<sup>(13)</sup> The value attributed to the presidency of the council of ministers is very significant: it is worth only two ministries. The number of points thus calculated is distributed among the factions according to their strengths in the national council of the party. For example, if the government is composed of 20 ministers, representing

60 points, and 50 secretaries of state, counting for 50 points, we reach the total, including the prime minister, who "weights" 6 points, to be proportionately distributed. In practice, the dosage is not so simple, as witnessed by the length of negotiations at the moment of a new government's formation.

All factions of the party are normally represented in government. Nevertheless, in a few circumstances, one or two factions have refused to occupy the ministerial positions to which they had the right. For instance, one leftist faction did not participate in the Tambroni government, which was oriented toward the right. Similarly, the "democratic left" (Marcora, Granelli, De Mita) refused to participate in the "monocolor" Rumor government. Sometimes the collaboration of certain factions is obtained for "the management of current affairs." In this case, it is considered that participation is ideologically neutral.

In the coalition governments, the number of ministries and undersecretaries of state going to the Christian Democrats are reduced, and consequently the application of proportionality is only approximate. In the last few years, one speaks less and less of rigorous proportionality, and more about "majority" and "minority" within the Christian Democratic party.

Some journalists attach excessive importance to the so-called "Cencelli manual", to which the Christian Democrats almost never refer. This "manual" consists of several disparate pages concerning the proportional calculations for the distribution of ministerial portfolios and undersecretaryships among parties and factions. I verified how this principle of proportionality was applied in reality: I did not find any rigorous correspondence

between the spectrum of factions and the distribution of portfolios and semi-portfolios, not even for the "monocolor" governments. It would be an insult to the intelligence of political leaders to believe that the distribution of ministerial departments could be made with a slide-rule. Mentioning decimals in analyzing a sophisticated and complex political game is to caricature a principle which is legitimate in one sense, and which has been practiced not only in the consociational democracies (Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland)<sup>(14)</sup>, but also in many political regimes which have adopted proportional representation.

In Italy, proportionality cannot be rigorous, first because the ministerial departments are not all of equal importance;<sup>(15)</sup> secondly, because the cooptation of an expert, even "outside the quota" or of a personal friend of the prime minister, may render the calculus of proportionality artificial. Furthermore, because the factions are unstable, a reference to the previous elections of the national council can rapidly become invalid. But above all, there are important positions within the party which can be offered as compensation to factions and personalities that are insufficiently satisfied, as well as some positions in the parliamentary assemblies, like chairmanships of committees. The criteria of equivalences are subtle and conform to democratic principles.

It would be useful to quote here one of the typical comments that can be read in the newspapers during ministerial crises. This comment implicitly confirms that, for the best informed journalist a rigorous proportionality in the distribution of

ministerial positions is out of the question. It also shows, like many other expressions, by its hermetic vocabulary, the distance that separates the political class from the popular masses. It is in effect highly probable that more than 90% of the citizens remain completely cool toward the competition between the factions. Among the pluralistic democracies, the only country comparable to Italy in this respect is Japan. Here is the text, concise though it may be: "For the Christian Democratic party, eight ministerial positions will go to the majority and six to the minority. Among the eight of the majority, three should be dorotei; one would go to the Fanfaniani who would also have the presidency for the Council; one to the friends of Colombo; one to the group of Rumor; and one to the Forze Nuove faction. Out of the six of the minority, four would go to the Zaccagnini reserve and two to the Andreottiani. <sup>(16)</sup> The historian of the year 2000 will have to be a goldsmith to orient himself in this labyrinth of factions.

RULE 8:

THE MINISTERIAL POSITIONS ARE DISTRIBUTED TO THE FACTIONS WHICH PROPOSE THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TO GOVERNMENT

Contrary to constitutional provisions, it is not the prime minister who chooses the ministers. The main preoccupation of the man in charge of building a governmental coalition is "the dosage". He does not have the power to select the members of his government, for the parties do this according to the proposals of factions, which designate their own representatives. In the last analysis, the government is a committee of delegates of factions. Consequently, it is undermined from inside. Most often it falls from

internal dislocation, and not from the pressure of the opposition. The contrast between the solidarity of the British cabinet and the heterogeneity of the Italian government, reflects the difference between the two political regimes.

It is the leaders who propose the representatives of their party to government, often not forgetting to designate themselves. The entire system is based on this possible fusion of roles: the man who designated can also be the designated man.<sup>(17)</sup> There is certainly an incompatibility between the ministerial functions and those of the party leadership. But one leads to the other. Several times the general secretary of the Christian Democratic party has become prime minister: De Gasperi, Fanfani, Rumor, Moro.

The existence of a permanent nucleus of influential men, on one side, and of a large number of ephemeral politicians, who only pass through, on the other, can be explained by this practice of self-designation.

One becomes minister because one is the chief of a faction. The chronology of the two positions leaves no doubt about this. How the selection is done within the faction, is a problem we cannot deal with here, for it would necessitate going into too many details.

This model was in operation between 1954 and 1979. After De Gasperi's resignation, his successor, Pella, in 1953, himself selected the ministers and undersecretaries of state for a "monocolor" government; but this manifestation of independence was "penalized", and his government fell after four months.

A new attempt in this same spirit, by Fanfani, resulted in failure ten days later. Scelba, who followed Fanfani, learned the lesson, and constituted a government of "delegates and representatives" from various factions in his party (with which two small parties were associated: Social Democrats and Liberals). During a quarter of a century, the prime minister exercised only a very limited influence in the choice of ministers. This influence was also discreet, because it could only be manifested during a meeting with the general secretary of the party and the presidents of the groups in the Chamber and Senate. This "tetrachy", as it is called, could communicate beyond the "conclave" only with the bosses of the factions - a detail full of significance. (18)

In 1979, Cossiga innovated when he formed his first cabinet after a series of "semestrial" governments and various ministerial crises: he asked the parties composing the majority, his own included, to indicate several names, among whom he could choose. From the Liberal Party, for instance, he asked three times more names than there were positions to be filled. (19) This new strategy could in part be explained by the lesson that the new prime minister drew from the unfortunate experience of Pandolfi, who had been designated a few days earlier by President Pertini to build a coalition government. After laborious negotiations and multiple modifications to the list of ministers, Pandolfi presented himself to the Quirinale. During his audience with the President of the Republic, he was called to the telephone by the leaders of the Socialist party, who told him that they did not like his "final list". Pandolfi was thus obliged to renounce his mission, not because of the competition among the factions of his own party but because the ministerial composition displeased the Socialists. "This is the first Government of the Republic to fall by telephone" remarked a man in good

strategic position, Luigi Granelli.

At the time of the constitution of his second government in April 1980, Cossiga had to bow to the rules of the game and to accept the designation formulated by the parties.

A new infringement on the norm occurred with the formation of the Forlani cabinet, in October 1980, whose gestation was observed in vitro. The general secretaries of the four parties forming the coalition (Piccoli, Craxi, Longo and Spadolini), met at the Chigi Palace with the prime minister designate. A list of new ministers was prepared, including 14 from the left (Socialists, Social Democrats and Republicans), and 14 Christian Democrats. Between 1 a.m. and 11 a.m. when Forlani arrived at the Quirinale Palace to present the list of ministers to President Pertini, six out of the 14 Christian Democratic nominees were replaced by others, following pressures exercised by various leaders, and also because of the unusual refusal by the President of the Republic to change the three ministers directly responsible for the struggle against terrorism (Interior, Defense, Justice), of whom only one was on the initial list. The prime minister designate therefore had to accept the request of the President of the Republic - a prerogative that had fallen out of use - as well as the demands of the leadership of his own party, which was more in conformity with the practice of the last quarter century.

The representatives of the other three parties had been designated by their own parties before the meeting of the general secretaries: here is what someone could have read in the official newspaper of the Social Democratic party: "This morning the groups in the Chamber

and Senate together with the executive committee are meeting in order to designate the colleagues (comrades) who will be destined to assume ministerial responsibilities, either as ministers or undersecretaries of state." (20) At the same moment many newspapers informed their readers about the meetings of the two other parties' leaders for the same purpose: the designation of the representatives of the party to the government.

It is certain that, with a few exceptions, a career within the party precedes a career in the government. For example, nearly all members of the executive committee in 1949, were later called to governmental functions. This was likewise true for nearly all parliamentary members of the national council elected at the same moment (with the exceptions of Dossetti, La Pira, Cappi, Lazzati, and two union leaders). This observation also applies to the parliamentary members of the national council elected in 1962.

On the contrary, very few provincial secretaries in office in 1952 were called to government during the following thirty years: 10 out of 93. The ambitious young men of today should learn the lesson: it is better, should they aspire to become ministers, not to focus on the position of provincial secretary. All provincial roads do not lead to Rome! Once arriving in Rome, that is having become deputies or senators, they would do better, as Machiavelli would have said, to reserve the best of their time and energy to the party and its factions, not to the parliamentary committees, since a ministerial career depends essentially on the possibility of crossing the lofty footbridge that links the party to the government. To reach the leadership level of the party,



there is only one road, and that is to adhere to a faction! To refuse is to go down a dead-end road. One cannot pursue a career apart from factions. (21)

RULE 9:

FACTIONS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO VETO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER FACTIONS

Loyalty to party and faction has priority over the collective responsibility of the government. In case of conflict, it is to the party and to the faction that ministers and undersecretaries of state show their loyalty. This is easy to understand since the appointments depend first on the faction, second on the party, and only thirdly on other considerations. The selection of the representatives of factions to the government is an internal affair that does not concern other factions. If someone is not elected by his own faction, he could not hope to be nominated by the chief of another. The only solution would be to switch factions. But double allegiance is not possible, nor are intrigues in neighboring factions. The chief of a faction cannot request the inclusion or the exclusion of representatives of other factions. It is forbidden to hunt on the lands of other factions. Poaching is prohibited! It is easy to imagine the consequences of such a "division of territories" on the coherence of a cabinet where personal enemies may sit side by side.

It is to be noted in this regard that there is less democracy within the factions than in the party itself, which is a federation of factions. The faction is based on loyalty, lineage, and friendship,

not on elections and ideology. It is a grouping for personal promotion and protection in a clientelistic chain, which descends through many intermediary steps from the barons to the most peripheral electors.

This interdiction of veto did not exist during the breaking-in phase of the political system. De Gasperi opposed the appointment of Dossetti (who retired to a monastery), and of Gronchi, who finally opted for the presidency of the Chamber; this latter position showed itself to be an excellent springboard for the presidency of the Republic. But the right to veto has sometimes been used in the formation of coalition governments. As a condition of their participation (or of their support without participation), some parties demanded the exclusion of this or that individual belonging to the rival party.

One again finds this rule, even if in diluted forms, in other countries, because wherever the government is a coalition, the representatives of the parties are divided between loyalty to the chief of the government and loyalty to their party. What is peculiar to Italy is the excessive importance of factions, which can be explained by the existence of a predominant party.

RULE 10:

THE PRINCIPAL ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AND OF THE PRIME MINISTER IS TO ARBITRATE, AND NOT TO SELECT

In a system where parties organized in factions dominate the parliament, the role of the president of the Republic in the selection of ministers is unavoidably limited. There is no

doubt that the successive presidents have managed to facilitate the career of a few parliamentarians, but all analysts of the Italian system agree that the president's role is honorific, except in the choice of the prime minister himself in the event that the leadership of the dominant party fails to propose a name. The "merry go round" of party chiefs and of personalities from the entire rainbow going to the Quirinale during ministerial crises, is an illustration of this discreet power of negotiation, which the president can exercise in going beyond the inanimate paragraphs of the constitution. For instance, Gronchi imposed Tambroni, Saragat recommended Colombo, Segni obtained the appointment of Carlo Russo, and Pertini strongly supported Spadolini. Tomorrow, when the historians will be able to open the archives, they will perhaps say that the choice of Spadolini as prime minister was the first free choice made by a president of the Italian Republic.<sup>(22)</sup> The personality of the president, without considering historical circumstances, plays an important role. The distance between Gronchi and Pertini on one side, and Segni and Leone on the other, is enormous.

Has the President of the Republic the right of veto? Has he the latitude of excluding this or that personality from the list that the prime minister designate proposes to him? There is no doubt that he could exercise an efficient influence, even if discreet, in this respect. In at least one circumstance, he openly vetoed some names. A. Piccioni succeeded in 1953 in building a government, but President Saragat opposed the designation of two ministers (Bettiol and Spataro). Piccioni, judging that the choice of ministers was his prerogative, abandoned his mission to form a government.

Is the prime minister the chooser of ministers? There is in the letter of the constitution a juridical fiction, to that effect, without doubt prudent and wise, but which does not stand up to any analysis. Even the presidents of the United States and of the Fifth Republic, even the British prime minister or German chancellor are not the only and unique choosers of ministers. That is a well established fact. (23)

The nine rules I have just enunciated engender the tenth and last rule: the selection is a complex process where the delegates of parties fed by their general secretaries propose or impose their representatives upon the prime minister designate.

It has only been since 1977 that on several occasions, the prime minister designate has asked the parties of the coalition for a bouquet of names. (24) In the best of hypotheses, he then has the option of choosing between the names proposed by the parties themselves.

The prime minister has been able sometimes to freely choose one, two or even three ministers, and then he has given priority either to personal friends, (25) or to experts, particularly in financial and economic matters.

It is nearly unanimously agreed that the prime minister has the right to choose freely his principal collaborator in the government, that is to say the undersecretary of state to the presidency of the Council, who, in spite of his title, plays in reality a more important political role than that played by most of the full ministers. It is significant from this point of view that

a former full minister, F. Campagna, accepted, for reasons of political equilibrium, the position of undersecretary of state to the presidency of the Council in 1981<sup>(26)</sup>.

What is the position of the prime minister in case of conflict? Is he the chief of the majority faction or the arbiter of rivalries manifested within the government? How can he reconcile this double role? Or, if he does not play the role of arbiter, who does? The frequent meeting of the executive committees of the parties seem to indicate that there is a collective arbitration, since the structure of power is collegial.

The distribution of portfolios between the factions, accompanied by the designation of the ministers by the factions themselves, might be considered as a violation of the constitution, which grants to the prime minister the right to choose the ministers and propose them to the President of the Republic. In fact, however, there is no violation because the government, no matter how it is made up, finally receives the vote of confidence in parliament. But obviously, what interests us here is the real process and not the legalistic aspect.

#### CONSEQUENCES: INSTABILITY OF CABINETS AND IMMOVABILITY OF KEY MEN

The chronic ministerial instability that characterizes the Italian political regime is balanced by the stability in power of a significant part of the political class, even by the quasi-immovability of their nucleus.

In effect, the 36 ministers who participated in eight cabinets

or more as full ministers (and in other governments as under-secretaries of state), altogether add up to more than 500 appointments. For instance, E. Colombo permanently remained in power, with an interruption of four years, between 1948 and 1982: 25 times as minister, once as prime minister and six times as undersecretary of state. G. Andreotti belonged to 27 governments: 5 times as prime minister, 16 times as minister, and 6 times as undersecretary of state. M. Rumor was present in 23 governments nearly without interruption for more than 20 years, after having been general secretary of the Christian Democratic party for two years.

The stability of men is particularly visible at the head of the principal departments. Thus, all the ministers of Interior except four (Taviani, Restivo, Gui, Rognoni), were former prime ministers or en route to this position. Since 1945, Italy has had 15 ministers of Foreign Affairs: 10 were previously or later prime ministers, the 5 others being men of the stature of Sforza, Saragat, Piccioni, Medici and Ruffini. Gonella was in charge of the ministry of Justice in eight successive governments after having assumed responsibility for Public Instruction in five governments. Andreotti was minister of Defense in eight governments. Taviani was minister of Interior seven times, minister of Defense five times, minister of the Treasury and Budget five times, and minister of the Mezzogiorno four times. Vanoni was minister of Finance for four years. Colombo, after having had the responsibility for the ministry of Industry during four governments, directed the Treasury in 13 governments, over seven years. Honour to the great leaders: De Gasperi was prime minister for eight years, and Moro for six.

In addition, during the intervals when these personalities were not charged with ministerial responsibilities, they were at the head of the dominant party or were presiding over one of the assemblies. Hence, they controlled the government.

These men had known each other for many years, some from their youth. They met each other long ago in the Federation of Catholic University Students (F.U.C.I.) <sup>(27)</sup> They launched themselves in politics during the first years of the Republic. They remained present in the Roman forum for twenty or thirty years, permanently in parliament, with some discontinuities in government, and alternatively in the leadership of their party. They pursued their route together, in spite of political rivalries. Consequently, they make up a political class in the sense that Mosca gives to this notion.

The length of governmental functions exercised by the 36 most important ministers greatly exceeds the longevity of the career of most of the principal ministers in the so-called stable democracies. The ministerial instability accompanied by the stability of ministers also characterized the Third and Fourth French Republics. Whereas in Italy the parties, very well organized, have been the central channels for ministerial careers, in France they were weak, permitting the parliament and its permanent committees to assume the selective function. In addition, the French political system was centripetal, which favoured the selection of men sitting in the center of the parliamentary hemisphere. <sup>(28)</sup>

Graviting around this governmental nucleus, there are 281 under-

secretaries of state whose collective influence was much more modest than that of the 133 full ministers. Most of them remained in government for just a short time. They only passed through. They were from the ministerial point of view, ephemeral men even if they were meanwhile, particularly in their constituencies, prestigious and powerful men, which they were.

If we put the political weight of the 84 most stable personalities, in terms of number of appointments, on the side of a scale, it would be much heavier than that of the 330 other ministers and undersecretaries of state.

Some observers of the political game in Rome worry about ministerial instability, others denounce the immovability of men. This paradox is fictitious, because, in a multiparty-system-with-a-dominant-party-organized-in factions, the two phenomena are intimately bound together.

If it is true that to govern is to foresee, ministerial instability does not allow politicians to plan long-term governmental policy, no matter what their personal virtues may be, and despite the quasi-immovability of some of them. The consequences of their decisions, or the absence of decision, will usually appear much later, at the moment when those responsible for the decisions are no longer present in the political forum, at least not at the front of the stage. But this is true to varying degrees in all political regimes.



NOTES

\*Paolo Ungari, professor at the National School of Administration in Rome, gave me valuable suggestions and generously helped me with his critical comments. I express my friendly gratitude to him and my admiration for his intimate knowledge of the Italian political class. Carlo Dané, from the Research Office of the Christian Democratic Party, drew my attention to several important points. I extend my appreciation to him. neither of them is responsible for the opinions presented here, or for the insufficiencies that may exist in this analysis.

1. Contrary to a tenacious error, committed even by some historians, the Christian Democratic party did not hold the majority of the seats in the Senate between 1948 and 1953. It held only 149 out of a total of 344 (including the appointed Senators).
2. It is not possible to detail here the reasons for these individual exceptions. This would take us too far afield, with the risk of missing the forest for the trees.

3. Among the 653 ministers and undersecretaries of state, there are 89 members of the PSI, 53 PSD, 35 PRI, 36 PLI, 15 PCI, 7 "experts", and 4 others.
4. For these 414 ministers and undersecretaries of state, we counted all the governments to which they had belonged since June 1945 (Parri government), without taking into consideration the participation of a few in previous governments. For instance, A. De Gasperi was minister in the two Bonomi governments and in the Parri government. Only the latter was counted. The second Spadolini cabinet, identical to the first one, is included in the analysis, but not the Fanfani cabinet formed in December 1982.
5. One might be surprised not to see among the ministers Dossetti (leader of an important faction), La Pira (who was only undersecretary of state in one government), Mattei (executive of an important complex of nationalized enterprises), Cappelletti (general secretary of the Christian Democratic party in 1949, and who became president of the Constitutional Court), Lazzati (rector of the Catholic University of Milan), Bonomi (president of the powerful organization of Coltivatori Divetti), and a few others. The reason that most of these personalities did not become ministers can be found in the nature of the positions they attained outside of government. As for Dossetti and La Pira they simply lost the battle.
6. It is not easy to give a definition of what should be considered participation in the Resistance, since the individual situations were extremely diverse. Some concrete examples will nevertheless suffice to indicate the criteria that have been used.

Considered as Resistants: Gonella, arrested in 1939 and put in secluded residence; Gatto, arrested in Venice in 1943; Marcora, commander of a group of partisans in Valdossola; Piccioni, involved in clandestine struggles in Tuscany in 1943; Scaglia, provincial commissioner of the committee of Liberation; Spataro, member of the national committee of Liberation; Taviani, one of the leaders of the insurrection in Genoa; Zaccagnini, member of the Garibaldi Brigade in Ravenna. Not considered as effectively engaged resistants: Cappa elected deputy in 1919, 1921, and 1924, who retired from politics and became a lawyer; Lucifredi, a lieutenant interned in a camp in Germany; Bettiol, whose clandestine action was limited to journalism, etc. In any case, the participation in Resistance did not have the same significance in the south as in the north, in Salerno and in Bologna.

7. Whereas the Christian Democratic Party obtained nearly two thirds of its votes from the female part of the electorate, only eight women represented this party in the government, and only one as a full minister, the other seven being only under-secretaries of state. This distortion of representation seems to have been accepted. On the female preponderance in the Christian Democratic electorate, see M. Dogan, "Le donne italiane tra il cattolicissimo e il marximo", in A. Spreafico and J. La Palombara (eds.), Elezioni e comportamento politico in Italia, Comunita 1963.

8. Cf. Democrazia Cristiana, Atti del Consiglio Nazionale, 18-21 luglio 1974, Roma, Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1974, pp. 69-70.
9. M. Dogan, "How to become a Cabinet Minister in France: Career Pathways 1870-1978," Comparative Politics, October 1979, p. 10.
10. For this reason DeGaulle required the inclusion in the constitution of the principle of incompatibility between ministerial position and parliamentary mandate: deputies appointed ministers should resign from parliament.
11. Cf. Democrazia Cristiana, op. cit., p. 70.
12. Cf. M. Calise et R. Mannheimer, "Misurare i governi: la distribuzione territoriale dei governanti italiani, 1948-1978," Il Mulino, 1981, n° 4, p. 570.
13. This equivalence may be the most important point in the so-called "Cencelli Manual." The paternity of this equation has been attributed by some to Adolfo Sarti, minister in many governments. During an interview, he told me that the true author is his old secretary, Massimo Cencelli. What is significant is the almost spontaneous acceptance of this proposition by the Christian Democratic apparatus and by the faction chiefs.
14. In the consociational democracies, proportionality is instead applied to linguistic and religious communities. For instance, in Belgium, the Walloons and the Flemish have the right to an equal number of portfolios no matter what the political composition of the government.

15. Some ministers are obviously very important: Treasury, Budget, Interior, Justice; others are prestigious: Foreign Affairs, or ministries without portfolios; others are more advantageous from the electoral and clientelistic point of view: Post Office, Industry, Nationalized Enterprises, etc. When a reform is planned, a department may temporarily become <sup>of</sup> a strategic importance. There are also departments of routine management which were accepted instead of nothing, for these positions allowed for participation in the council of ministers.
16. Cf. L'Umanità, 14 ottobre 1980.
17. "One could ask if a member of the delegation in charge of preparing, along with the prime minister, the list of ministers, could himself be appointed minister. It is as though he was choosing himself." A Statement by a former minister, B. D'Arizzo, to a journalist of the Corriere della Serra, October 29, 1980.
18. The "tetrarchy" does not meet at the central headquarters of the party, but in a villa in the middle of a well protected garden.
19. Cf. oral testimony of Salvatore Valitutti, minister in the Cossiga government.
20. Cf. L'Umanità, 17 Ottobre 1980.

21. Among the testimonies concerning the importance of factions one could mention that of senator F. Martinazzoli, member of the board of the group in the Senate, who denounced "the degeneration of the factions, "instruments for the self selection of the ruling groups", L'Unita, June 25, 1981.
  
22. The first politician chosen by the President of the Republic outside the Christian Democratic party as possible prime minister was B. Craxi in July 1979, but this change appeared premature.
  
23. Cf. R.F. Fenno, The President's Cabinet, Vintage Bookd, 1959; R. Rose, "The Making of Cabinet Ministers", British Journal of Political Science, 1971, pp. 393-414.
  
24. At the moment of his government, formation Spadolini expressed his good intentions: "The parties will give me several names from which I will choose, as Article 92 of the onstitution indicates. Naturally, the concern for political equilibrium will lead me to choices which I hope could be inspired by criteria of experience and confidence." / <sup>From</sup> newspapers of June 24, 1981. This statement provoked the following comment from an acute observer: "The appointment of ministers is the most insidious obstacle for Spadolini. The few names that the parties will propose could become ambushes for the prime minister designate, into whose hands will fall not the mission to freely choose the ministers, but rather to eliminate persons that the leaders

of the parties are unable to exclude. This is an extremely delicate operation. Spadolini would like to include in the government an expert in economic problems: Visentini or Baffi to the Treasury. This will complicate the distribution of positions." L'Unita, June 25, 1981. Finally, "the good intentions of Spadolini vanished - it is useless to deny it - in the face of the implacable logic of parties." La Repubblica, June 30, 1981. Because "the problem is to build a political government composed of parties and not a utopian government without an anchor." La Voce Repubblicana, June 31, 1981.

25. An example among others, of the importance of personal friendships to the political career: it is notorious that the appointment of C. Mazza was principally due to his friendship with President Leone. It would be possible to give two dozen examples of undersecretaries of state or ministers who owe their first appointment to the friendship of an influential leader. But political patronage cannot be maintained if the beneficiary does not prove that he possesses the qualities required of a member of government.
26. For instance, Taviani, as direct collaborator of De Gasperi in 1951-1953, was undoubtedly more influential than many ministers, in spite of the fact that he was only undersecretary of state.
27. One example among hundreds: Moro was president of the Federation of Catholic Students at a moment when Taviani and Andreotti were national councillors.
28. M. Dogan, "How to become a Cabinet minister in France", op. cit., pp. 12-13





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