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
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**THE THIRD FORCE, ATLANTICISM AND
NORWEGIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

by
Helge PHARO



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The Third Force, Atlanticism and Norwegian Attitudes Towards
European Integration.

HELGE Ø. PHARO

Oslo University
Department of History

I. Introduction.

During the first postwar decade the Norwegian Labor governments looked upon efforts towards European integration with considerable uneasiness. Economic and political integration might in itself be considered a welcome contribution towards strengthening the position of Europe - politically and economically as well as militarily. The Labor government, however, did not relish the probable implications of European integration for Norwegian foreign and economic policies. With only minor variations, and a few exceptions, the views of the Labor government were shared by parliamentarians of all non-communist parties and probably by informed public opinion.¹⁾

By and large Norwegians, whether holding public office or not, left the problems of integration to the continental Europeans. The Labor government held back and preferred to take its stand on an ad hoc basis as cooperation between the continental Marshall plan countries seemed to point the way towards some sort of European economic integration. By the end of 1949 the government was pushed to the point of formulating a tentative European integration policy. The establishment of the Council of Europe, the plans for Fritalux, and the ever-present fear of further American pressure prompted a series of talks on the topic by foreign minister Halvard Lange. Most of the elements of Lange's talks can easily be identified in previous public announcements or departemental position papers, but had not until that time been systematically presented in public.

In late 1949 and in the months following Lange presented the views of the Norwegian government in a coherent form to both an international audience through the Council on Foreign Relations, to a select Norwegian audience at the Christian Michelsen Institute in Bergen, and to the Norwegian Storting. At all times Lange emphasized the considerable economic and political differences that existed within Europe. In his opinion there was a wide gap in living standards between the north of Europe and the Mediterranean

area. Levels of social security varied almost as much, and finally Lange pointed out, the different European countries held conflicting views of economic policy while some of the goals of economic policy were not easily compatible. In Lange's opinion these differences suggested a regional approach to European economic integration.

To Lange, as to the rest of the Norwegian cabinet and the Labor party as a whole, in this context economic policy was the fundamental issue. Lange emphasized that Britain and the Scandinavian countries had made the maintenance of full

employment and of a high level of economic activity the paramount aim of their economic policies, and they consider central planning and government control of economic activity necessary to achieve that end. The governments of most continental countries of Western Europe, on the other hand, trust in the free play of the forces of the market and decidedly refuse to secure for themselves the powers required to enable them to control economic activity.

Lange maintained that the Norwegian people, "in so far as they take an active interest in the problem, are definitely sceptical of plans of integration, which once more place our economy at the mercy of continental cartels."

Rather than having Norway join in any kind of European efforts towards economic integration, Lange favored what he called "Scandinavian regionalism in the direction of a North Sea and a North Atlantic community, working in, that is, more closely with Great Britain and with the United States." Finally Lange emphasized his strong preference for a "functional" rather than a "federal" approach to European integration in general, with particular reference to the discussions taking place within the Council of Europe.²⁾

Lange thus in these speeches raised most of the central issues of Norwegian foreign and foreign economic policy during the first postwar decade, the glaring exception being defence. The government obviously felt that its planning system and a strong egalitarianism set Norway apart from most of Europe in the late 1940s. As far as the Norwegian government was concerned only the other Scandinavian countries and Britain adhered to similar economic policies.

In addition, sentiment and geography made Scandinavian economic and political cooperation seem necessary and desirable. Britain, of course, was ideologically acceptable, traditionally the major trading partner, and above all, the provider of security for Norway since independence. Since the Second World War the United States had reinforced Britain's military role in the north of Europe. If there had to be cooperation, Norway's favored choice was some sort of loose North Atlantic arrangement, based, to the extent possible, on common ideology, on geography, sentiment, and military requirements. Since Sweden was not a NATO member and the United States neither a European nor a social democratic power, it stands to reason that Norway did not strive for any kind of close integration.

This point comes out even more clearly when we look at the tacit dimension in Lange's speech to the Council on Foreign Relations. Towards the end of World War II the Norwegian government turned away from its policy of promoting a North Atlantic defence community towards making, verbally at least, the United Nations the point of departure for Norwegian foreign and security policies. This policy, dubbed "bridge-building", remained in force, though progressively weakened, until the end of 1947. Essentially the policy was a negative one, Norway should not take any steps that would aggravate relations between the west and the Soviet Union. Ideally Norway should strive to promote harmony between the antagonistic great powers. While promoting bridgebuilding Norway would shy regional alignments, for international as well as domestic reasons.³⁾ Even as bridgebuilding was abandoned, above all for reasons of security, scepticism against close regional cooperation for other purposes remained.

Accordingly, we shall to a considerable degree have to approach the problem of Norwegian attitudes towards European integration indirectly by studying other aspects of Norwegian foreign policy. Such issues as the Norwegian conception of the United Nations, the formation of NATO, and Nordic economic cooperation throw as much light on our problem as Norwegian attitudes towards the question of Euro-

pean integration itself. The United Nations as the provider of security, the concept of a third force, and Norway's alignment with the Anglo-American west must be our point of departure. Then we can focus our attention on the plans for a Nordic customs union, the Council of Europe, Uniscan and the Schuman Plan.

II. The United Nations, the Atlantic Policy and Bridgebuilding.

The replacement of Halvdan Koht by Trygve Lie as foreign minister in the fall of 1940 highlighted the decision of the Norwegian government-in-exile to abandon the traditional neutrality policy in favor of a policy of Atlantic alignment. There was widespread agreement among Norwegian planners and policymakers in London that the previously implicit British guarantee of Norwegian security had to be replaced by Norwegian participation in a North Atlantic security system, embracing not just Great Britain but also the United States. The system was to include most of the states adjacent to the North Atlantic, though its membership varied somewhat from time to time.⁴⁾

The concept of North Atlantic defence cooperation was directed against the possibility of a renewed German threat against Norwegian security, and the policy was designed also to take Norway out of its prewar isolationism.

We should not be tempted to read history backwards and conclude that the Atlantic policy was directed against the Soviet Union. Russia's reemergence as a major factor in Norwegian security considerations actually contributed to the gradual eclipse of the Atlantic concept. By May 1942, as Olav Riste has pointed out, Norwegian foreign policy makers realized that the Soviet Union would emerge from the war as a major power with legitimate security interests in the North. Norway was thus no longer merely having to find a place within a North Atlantic community, but might also find itself at the crossroads of competing big power interests.

The Norwegian government was thus caught in a dilemma between its desire for security guarantees from the west and

the necessity not to antagonize its neighbour in the east. The government sought to resolve the dilemma by strongly emphasizing the United Nations as a security guarantee from 1944 on, and by developing the bridgebuilding policy within the United Nations framework. The concept of the United Nations as a postwar security organization was predicated upon the assumption that the big powers would be able to maintain a reasonably harmonious relationship after they had accomplished their common goal of defeating Germany.⁵⁾

The bridgebuilding policy was designed to promote that goal. The term, however, is misleading in implying an active Norwegian policy. Bridgebuilding, as put into practice, embodied keeping a low profile. Norway, it was assumed, could make its major contribution by not adding fuel to potential big power disagreements. To some extent this could be accomplished by voting at different times with one or the other of the big powers in the United Nations, or by abstaining on controversial issues. In contrast to the Atlantic policy bridgebuilding by means of the UN entailed very few actual obligations for Norway. It was hardly conceivable that an organization made up of so disparate elements should make demands on Norway in the direction of close interstate cooperation or supra-national integration. The bridgebuilding ideology then, represented not only a step away from cooperation with the Atlantic powers, it also represented a step away from the kind of close interstate cooperation Norway had ventured into during the war.⁶⁾

The need to maintain a balancing act between the west and the Soviet Union was certainly not the only reason why the government-in-exile changed track from Atlanticism to bridgebuilding. When Trygve Lie and his associates developed the former concept from the fall of 1940 to the spring of 1942, their ideas were widely acclaimed, but none of the powers involved showed any interest in implementing the plans. Churchill found it too early to commit himself to such a regional scheme. As the war drew to a close it was also made abundantly clear to the Norwegian government that Britain in the short run could do little to defend the

exposed Northern parts of Norway. The area was partially liberated by Russian troops. British reluctance to get involved in the Norwegian schemes, and the former protector's lack of power or will to engage in the liberation of North Norway only served to underline the need to search for accommodation with the Russians, and to promote a harmonious big-power relationship.⁷⁾

The United States' opposition to the establishment of regional defence pacts was a corollary to the plans for a universal postwar organization. Thus US policies also served to undermine the Norwegian concept of Atlanticism. By and large the adoption of bridgebuilding reflected both changing big power configurations after the battle of Stalingrad and a new Norwegian appraisal of the likelihood of a North Atlantic regional pact. Thus when Eden in 1944 tried to resurrect the idea of western defence cooperation Norway took no part in the consultations. As the war ended both Atlanticism and the strongly pro-British bent of Norwegian foreign policy appeared to be things of the past.⁸⁾

Domestic political considerations also played their part. While the government-in-exile and its advisers in London were overwhelmingly Atlanticist and extremely conscious of Norway's dependence upon Great Britain and the United States for postwar security if new conflicts were to surface, within the other wartime political centers alternative concepts were strongly held. The exile milieu in Stockholm appears to have been both more Scandinavian and more European in its orientation, while the Home Front leadership was certainly less than enthusiastic about a western commitment. Soviet military advances produced widespread admiration for the Eastern neighbour in all political parties, and very considerable sympathy for Russia within the resistance movement.⁹⁾

All groups were able to agree upon the importance of United Nations for postwar big power cooperation, and consequently upon the importance of bridgebuilding for Norwegian national security. Security considerations were all-important when

the wartime Norwegian government promoted a closely-knit North Atlantic regional pact. As regards the United Nations national security considerations were less important and more loosely defined. Yet both instances point to the significance of security issues for Norwegian attitudes towards membership in postwar international organizations. At the same time this willingness represents a significant departure from the policies of the interwar years when Norway felt it had no choice but to enter the League of Nations, but for all practical purposes withdrew from the League prior to the outbreak of war.¹⁰⁾

To the extent that the government at the end of the war contemplated a reserve position to its publicly stated reliance upon big power harmony and bridgebuilding, it is to be found in the concept of close military cooperation with the powers on both sides of the North Atlantic. European integration or cooperation was not considered a Norwegian option. Nordic cooperation, military as well as within other fields was a favoured choice for many outside the London milieu, but was not seriously considered during the war. Bridgebuilding provided some flexibility in a fluid international situation, and gave the Labor government the means to straddle the very divergent political views within the Norwegian body politic. It was a policy perfectly designed to postpone hard choices and avoid any international obligations that would be resented in liberated Norway.¹¹⁾

Yet the dilemmas were not to be avoided. The lessons of April 1940 mandated the establishment of a much stronger Norwegian defence establishment than had existed before the war. The fact also remained that the only conceivable military threats in the postwar period would originate in the South or the East. The German attack had demonstrated that Norway could not hold out alone against a major power, and furthermore that military cooperation and aid from abroad could not be improvised. Prior peacetime preparations would have to be made. On the level of rhetoric and UN policies Norway stayed aloof from and apart from the western big powers. In practical matters, with regards to weapons

supplies, the training of officers, and by the inclusion of a Norwegian brigade in the British occupation army in Germany, links with Britain were preserved. This was the more necessary as the postwar Norwegian defence had to be constructed almost from scratch.¹²⁾

These so-called "functional ties" with Britain clearly indicated the direction in which Norway would move if the crucial premise for Norwegian bridgebuilding - a minimum of great power cooperation - should prove untenable. The common social democratic ideology of the British and Norwegian governments certainly made such functional cooperation more acceptable to informed public opinion than might otherwise have been the case. On the other hand, bridgebuilding meant very different things to different political clusters, inside and outside the Labor party. The concept was invested with a rhetoric of its own, and acquired a considerable momentum. Thus, if the international foundations of bridgebuilding were to be threatened, or altogether vanish, domestically the Norwegian government would face a difficult period of reorientation. Such threats, of course, were to come not merely from another attempt at North Atlantic military cooperation as international tension rose, but also from the initiatives for closer European cooperation and integration.¹³⁾ From such cooperative ventures power blocs might emerge.

III. Third Force.

The concept of a third force in Europe was employed mainly for domestic and tactical purposes by both proponents and opponents of western alignment, and consequently had its heyday in 1947-48. It is true that a few members of the Norwegian Labor Party were concerned with the question of a European third force during the war. Further indications of moderate interest may be found in the early postwar period. In 1946 a Norwegian Labor delegate to the Socialist conference at Clacton-on-Sea stated that Europeans did not necessarily have to choose between American capitalism on the one hand and Russian capitalism on the other. The

government mouthpiece, Arbeiderbladet, in December 1946 featured an article by Michael Foot called "The Third Alternative."¹⁴⁾ At that time the term was devoid of meaning, and does not appear to have caught on among Norwegian politicians or public opinion leaders.¹⁵⁾

A mere six months earlier Arbeiderbladet had in fact stated that even if Europe were to be divided into two blocs, a western one and an eastern one, "Norway and Scandinavia had to remain outside."¹⁶⁾

The early plans for European cooperation or integration primarily represented threats against the Norwegian foreign policy orientation while bridgebuilding remained in force. Any regional grouping in Western Europe, whether purely continental, inclusive of Britain, or including both Britain and the United States, would probably be considered threatening by Russia. Subsequently increasing international tension would be likely to put pressure upon Norway, and might at worst force the government to abandon bridgebuilding.¹⁷⁾

There was little substance to the socialist third force proposals. Plans for European cooperation that had a more solid core were formulated by conservative Europeans. Churchill and Coudenhove-Kalergi did not much appeal to the Norwegian Labor party. The Labor government never actually defined the critical minimum of great power cooperation necessary for continued bridgebuilding. Yet Lange on different occasions stated that once the point was reached when international tension was seen to arise from postwar rather than from peacemaking issues, bridgebuilding must be reconsidered. Until that point, however, Western European regionalism would endanger bridgebuilding.¹⁸⁾

As a consequence of the launching of the Marshall Plan and Bevin's 22 January speech in the Commons which led to the establishment of the Western Union, the framework for Norwegian foreign policy changed dramatically. As bridgebuilding had to be abandoned, the concept of a third force might be employed for different purposes.

Participation in the Marshall Plan negotiations, and mem-

bership in the CEEC and OEEC started the westward drift of Norwegian foreign policy, though the Labor government initially was careful to state that Norway regarded the Marshall Plan exclusively as a measure for economic reconstruction. It did not signify any westward alignment. With increasing international tension during the second half of 1947, Lange was, according to the precepts of the bridge-building policy, bound to reconsider its foundations.¹⁹⁾ After Bevin's 22 January speech, the coup in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet offer of a pact with Finland, and the possibility of a similar offer to Norway, Lange and defence minister Jens Christian Hauge turned to the west to inquire about what measures, if any, the western powers would take in such a case.²⁰⁾

Prior to the Bevin plan the few Norwegian proponents of a possible third way mainly belonged to the left of the Labor Party. Bevin's speech changed the scene. The pro-western forces within the party found reason to interpret the speech as an invitation to Western European cooperation, political as well as economic. We know today that Bevin was primarily interested in creating the basis for a Western European military alliance supported by or including the United States.²¹⁾

At the time of the speech, however, neither Bevin nor the Norwegian Labor party could be reasonably certain that the Americans would in fact be willing to make a military commitment in Europe. Harboring such doubts, as Labor party policy-makers did until early March, they could with some reason present the so-called Bevin plan as a third way in the consolidation of Western Europe. They grasped the opportunity to appeal to those elements within the Labor party that remained sceptical as to cooperation with a more conservative Europe, and particularly to cooperation with American capitalism, by emphasizing British social democratic leadership of a European third force.²²⁾

On the one hand then the third force concept was pursued for partly tactical reasons. While a number of Labor policyma-

kers were becoming increasingly North Atlantic in orientation, opposition remained considerable, particularly among the Labor representatives in the Storting.²³⁾ Yet there is no reason to believe that the Labor supporters of the Bevin plan were actually insincere. Several different outcomes of the process of Western European consolidation were still possible. Bevin did not propose a clear-cut Atlantic alliance, nor were his ideas of a strictly military nature. Prime Minister Gerhardsen, party secretary Haakon Lie, and editor of Arbeiderbladet Martin Tranmæl, could legitimately point to elements in Bevin's speech that might appeal to the doubters. Some Labor leaders seem to have preferred some sort of European cooperation, though not integration, under Social Democratic leadership to North Atlantic cooperation with American participation.²⁴⁾

Throughout this period the concept of a third force remained a hazy one among the Norwegian Labor politicians, left, right and center. As long as there were no actual proposals for a third way in Europe, Socialists or Social Democrats of various foreign policy persuasions could exploit the concept for their own purposes. They could point to symbols cherished by most Labor party politicians and voters, while either postponing a choice between east and west, or denying the necessity for choice altogether. Typically, neither the non-Labor press nor non-Labor politicians were concerned with or saw the possibility of a third way. Labor politicians belonging to a Labor party divided within itself found the concept useful during a transitional period - but different factions for different purposes.

IV. Western alignment.

During the years 1945-47 the Norwegian government fairly consistently held on to the basic tenets of bridgebuilding. In the United Nations Norway kept a low profile by declining a position on the Security Council. During the Paris Peace Conference the government similarly refused a seat on the eight-member secretariat of the Conference.²⁵⁾

The policy was sufficiently successful for all the major

powers to accept foreign minister Trygve Lie as the first Secretary General of the United Nations. However, the position as bridgebuilder could not be secured once and for all. It had to be reasserted by compromise positions in all conflicts between Britain and the United States on the one side and Soviet Russia on the other. In the short run the position as UN Secretary General was proof of good behaviour, in the longer run it would complicate the task of keeping a low profile.²⁶⁾

Underlying bridgebuilding, as we have seen, was the so-called implicit guarantee available through Britain's interest in denying other potentially hostile great powers control of Norwegian territory. Olav Riste has developed the thesis of the implicit guarantee in several works that break new ground in the study of Norwegian foreign and national security policies particularly as regards the period between the wars and the early postwar years. In the interwar period the Norwegian government on the one hand took it for granted that Britain's self-interest safeguarded Norwegian territory. At the same time the government was able to stay aloof from the unpleasantness of European power politics.²⁷⁾

The war demonstrated that this approach to a security policy for Norway was untenable. Close cooperation with the North Atlantic powers was the preferred substitute during the early war years. It was considered necessary to nail the Anglo-Saxon powers to the defence of Northwestern Europe. During the bridgebuilding period elements of the Atlantic policy were retained in the shape of the functional ties with Britain. As long as the relationship between the would-be protectors and the would-be threat to Norwegian security remained reasonably satisfactory, the informal ties could be considered adequate from a Norwegian point of view. By late 1947, however, the Labor government could no longer have its cake and eat it too. The American and the British governments grew increasingly dissatisfied with the Norwegian stance, while both the non-Labor opposition and certain Labor leaders wanted the government to move closer to

the emerging Western camp. As foreign minister Halvard Lange's principal adviser, history professor Arne Ording, pointed out, it was all right for Norway to crawl under the table now and again, as long as it did not stay there.²⁸⁾

The implicit guarantee would be of doubtful value if the protectors found Norway veering too far from the West in its attempts to reassure Russia of the validity of the bridge-building policy. Secondly, the German attack in April 1940 had demonstrated that military assistance could not be improvised. There had to be peacetime preparations for assistance in war, or for the establishment of an effective Western deterrent. Thus there were good reasons of both a diplomatic and a military nature for Norway to fall back to a reserve position that would resemble the Atlantic policy of the war years.²⁹⁾

On the other hand vocal groups within the Labor party were sceptical of a Western alignment in general and of the United States in particular. Furthermore, the foreign policy opposition maintained that the West would aid Norway if they considered it in their best interest to do so. By disregarding the question of preparation in peacetime they could claim that formal Western commitments to defend Norway would make no difference. The Labor leadership had to pay serious attention to public opinion and party unity as it mulled over the question of abandoning bridgebuilding and retreating to its reserve position.³⁰⁾

The reaction to the Marshall Plan marks the prelude to reorientation. Lange and his advisers reluctantly concluded that Norway had to accept the American offer and participate in the Paris conference beginning in July 1947. Staying outside would constitute more of a break with bridgebuilding than would joining, as all countries outside the Soviet bloc, except Finland, accepted. At the same time the Western bloc implications were kept to a minimum. The conference was publicly declared to be purely an economic one, and Norway sent only civil servants as delegates. The Norwegian government actively opposed measures designed to

foster closer integration or cooperation within the CEEC, was opposed to the creation of a permanent organization, and would have preferred the Economic Commission for Europe to handle any permanent tasks growing out of the conference.³¹⁾ The government followed the precept of Peer Gynt, going along while protesting to all the world.

Economic necessity in the end did matter in Norwegian Marshall Plan policies. The initial decision was, however, above all based on general security considerations. The government could not afford to end up in a position where the Western powers might come to doubt its basic allegiance. Until Bevin's speech and the events of February and March 1948 the government still felt that a final decision could be postponed even while it inched westwards. By that time, however, Lange found that the relationship between the powers had deteriorated to a point where the basis for bridgebuilding had disappeared, while the rumours of a Soviet pact proposal to Norway indicated that Norwegian security might be directly affected by these developments. The government then turned to the west to have the implicit guarantee replaced by an explicit one. At that point Norway wholeheartedly joined the race for Marshall Plan funds.³²⁾

Norway's road to NATO has been exhaustively treated in a large number of studies beginning with Knut E. Eriksen's DNA and NATO (The Norwegian Labor Party and NATO) and Magne Skodvin's Norden eller NATO (Scandinavia or NATO) were published in the early 1970s. Once the American-British-Canadian talks, initiated in March 1948, led to negotiations for a North Atlantic treaty, Norway was faced with the choice of joining the Western alliance or persuading Sweden to set up a Scandinavian defence treaty with a formal opening to the West. The Swedes appear to have been willing to join a Scandinavian pact rather than have Norway link up with the west, but the Swedish government insisted that such a defence union remain neutral. Membership in a Scandinavian pact with formal ties to the West was not considered compatible with Sweden's neutrality policy.³³⁾

The Scandinavian alternative floundered on opposing Norwegian and Swedish views of alignment with the West. Once the Labor government had decided that a commitment from the West to defend Norway was essential, a non-aligned Scandinavian union was not acceptable. As in the case of the Marshall Plan negotiations and the OEEC the government then changed from the role of reluctant suitor to working very actively for a strong and immediate American and British role in the defence of Norway. In both cases the government changed course hesitantly, but joined eagerly in North Atlantic cooperation once the decision had been made. We should also note that fairly close Scandinavian consultations preceded both decisions. All three Scandinavian governments were hesitant about creating dividing lines in the region. In the end, however, the need for a western security guarantee proved stronger than any feeling of Scandinavian Social Democratic solidarity. In questions concerning defence the Norwegian government did not consider Scandinavia a viable unit. We shall soon see that this also extended to economic cooperation.³⁴⁾

Only the North Atlantic powers were considered able to give Norway a credible security guarantee. The Continental states had neither the interest nor the capability. During the NATO negotiations France clearly demonstrated its lack of interest in the Northern flank of Europe. In addition French economic and social policies appeared quite alien to the Labor party, while Britain in many ways served as a model for postwar Norwegian social democracy. Even capitalist America probably seemed preferable to continental Europa after Truman's reelection in the fall of 1948. The necessity for a security guarantee, the desire to nail the Anglo-Saxon powers to the defence of Norway, and the emerging feeling of community with the North Atlantic powers did not, however, cause Norway to embrace NATO proposals for farreaching integration or cooperation. Even within the vital field of defence the government had certain misgivings. As Rolf Tamnes has put it, even in the early 1950's the government hoped to avoid too "pronounced an

Allied influence on the development of Norwegian security policy, and in particular to limit the physical presence of Allied personnel, and especially combat forces, in Norway during peace time."

Tammes, who has studied Norwegian policies within NATO during the first formative years, concludes that the Norwegians jealously guarded national independence and freedom of action, and that many centuries of foreign rule from Copenhagen and Stockholm caused a psychological reaction against highly visible foreign influence. Secondly, of course, the balancing-act with regards to Soviet Union had to continue. The Norwegians wanted to reassure the Soviet Union that North Norway would not constitute a springboard for attack. The government thus also had to balance the desire for security against other foreign policy costs and domestic policy considerations. Einar Gerhardsen, prime minister at the time of entry into NATO and again from 1955 to 1965, in 1952 is reported to have had "his doubts whether Norway had not gone too far in her Atlantic policy and too far for the party members."³⁵⁾

Defence cooperation and integration had relatively limited direct consequences for other sectors of Norwegian economic and political life. At the same time the western security guarantee was seen as absolutely vital for Norway. We may thus speak of the primacy of security interests in postwar Norwegian foreign policy. Even so questions of trading away parts of Norwegian sovereignty caused considerable uneasiness among Norwegian politicians. Economic and political integration would certainly involve much larger sectors of the domestic economy and political decisionmaking, while the gains to Norway would seem more doubtful. We shall now turn more closely to the questions of cooperation and integration outside the realm of defence.

V. The Council of Europe

Norwegian reluctance to engage in any kind of European cooperation comes out very clearly in the domestic debate on the Council of Europe as well as in the positions taken by

the Labor government in the negotiations leading up to the establishment of the Council. To some extent Norwegian politicians and public opinion makers simply were not very interested in Europe or European cooperation. Public debate was very muted, and it proved difficult to recruit Norwegian parliamentarians and other prominent public figures to the European movement. Only the Swedes appear to have held so strongly negative attitudes.³⁶⁾

As for the leading cadres of the Labor party their attitudes were largely conditioned by their desires to stay as close as possible to the British Labor party. As long as the British government seemed reluctant to go along with plans for European cooperation, the Labor government in Oslo was strongly opposed. Labor feared European federalism in general and continental economic policies in particular, and considered the European movement a conservative Churchillian organization. In the initial phase the European movement could only recruit non-Labor members in Norway. The pronounced scepticism remained even after the government in March 1948 had decided to turn to the West in the search for direct military guarantees.³⁷⁾ We should thus beware of trying to explain Labor policies merely in terms of bridge-building. Considerations of economic policy and a more general scepticism towards continental Europe seem to have played a role independently of the basic foreign policy goals. The more positive attitudes of non-Labor politicians, who certainly were not proponents of European federalism, may on the other hand largely be explained by the desire to abandon bridgebuilding and turn to western defence cooperation.

Once the British accepted a compromise Council of Europe the Norwegians decided to abandon their opposition. Furthermore the Norwegian government did not want to appear to be directly sabotaging efforts towards more extended European cooperation. By early 1949 Norway had groped its way towards a slightly more positive attitude. As the premises for joining were spelt out in public debate in Norway, and by Norwegian delegates at the conferences establishing the

Council, the divergent Labor attitudes towards foreign policy again emerged. By some elements within the foreign policy opposition the Council of Europe was described as an embryonic Third Force, implying independence from both Soviet Russia and the United States. Such attitudes may be discerned among politicians on the left who opposed NATO, and among the centrist proponents of a Nordic defence treaty who disliked the North Atlantic big power alignment.³⁸⁾

Both groups must certainly have been well aware that the Council of Europe was an unlikely Third Force, and that it was even more unlikely to include countries of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, as it turned out, the Council had the attraction of carrying very few obligations for Norway, and the Norwegian conference delegates did their best to make sure that the cooperative framework would be as limited as possible, and that countries likely to be run by governments of a very different political hue should be excluded. On this point, it seems, the different factions of the Labor party agreed, as did most Norwegian non-Labor politicians.³⁹⁾

Thus the Norwegians joined with the other Scandinavians and the British in opposing supranational features, emphasizing that they could accept confederal cooperation, but, as foreign minister Lange expressed the view, neither a federation nor a union. They did not consider it right, so to speak, to put on the roof till the house was built. Conceivably the Norwegian government might have felt more comfortable with a majority of social democratic regimes within the Council, but as we shall see, they were not inclined towards close cooperation even with their Scandinavian Social Democratic neighbours. There seems, however, no doubt that the preference for likeminded governments, and the reluctance to cooperate with those considered uncongenial, was real. Norway fought a brief rearguard action to prevent Greece and Turkey from becoming members. The desire to incur only minimal obligations also comes out in the Norwegian opposition to the establishment of the European court. Norwegian attitudes towards the Council of Europe

conforms to our picture of the reluctant and pro-British participant in European affairs.

VI. Integration: Scandinavian.

The proposals for a Scandinavian customs union encompassing Denmark, Norway, and Sweden grew out of the CEEC discussions regarding a European customs union. In the summer of 1947 Norway chose not to participate in the European Customs Union Study Group for economic as well as foreign policy reasons. The Danes, however, "by the logic of its own national economic development", as Alan Milward has put it, joined the group.⁴⁰⁾ The Norwegians at the time felt that the more positive Danish attitude was also due to the fact that they had a "more pressing need for American credits." As a compromise the Norwegians were willing to participate in a Scandinavian study group, mainly to make a "good impression in the United States."⁴¹⁾ The compromise was obviously intended mainly for cosmetic purposes. The Norwegian government did not wish to demonstrate a purely negative attitude to measures for economic cooperation that the Americans considered important. As comes out clearly in the subsequent negotiations the Norwegians were reluctant to enter into any process of economic integration, while at the same time feeling at a considerable disadvantage within a Scandinavian framework.

Throughout the Scandinavian negotiations, which dragged on until the end of 1950, with a finale based on renewed Norwegian interest in 1952, negotiators representing Norway were largely of secondary political importance, and recruited from outside the bureaucracies of the foreign and trade ministries. Taken by itself the choice of negotiators would appear to indicate only moderate Norwegian interest in a Scandinavian customs union. The impression is confirmed by the slow pace of the talks as well as by the positions taken by the Norwegian delegates as the negotiators made the rounds between the Scandinavian capitals.⁴²⁾

The terms of reference for the negotiations were set out in a Norwegian draft that was communicated to the other par-

ticipants by the middle of December of 1947. The basic question to be considered was the manner and extent of future Scandinavian economic cooperation. The Norwegians above all sought limited practical measures based on a loosely worded understanding. As the Norwegian draft terms of reference were worked out, the Norwegian ministry of finance emphasized that any understanding arrived at should involve a minimum of obligations for the country. The foreign ministers, meeting in Oslo at the end of February of 1948, decided in principle to initiate negotiations for a customs union. A Scandinavian committee was to meet by the end of April at the latest. The committee was empowered to study the possibilities for a Scandinavian customs union, to consider reducing tariff barriers, as well as the further development of a Scandinavian division of labor, and generally to discuss measures for cooperation in the field of trade policies. The final terms of reference for the committee were purposely vague, reflecting the diverging views of the three countries at the Oslo conference. The Danes were in a hurry to get started, the Swedes were undecided, while the Norwegians were in no mood to incur any formal obligations. The recently appointed Norwegian minister of trade, Erik Brofoss, explicitly warned against being taken in by references to the Benelux model.⁴³⁾

During the subsequent years of negotiations the Norwegians were consistently the least interested party, the Danish negotiators pushed hard for an agreement, while Sweden occupied an intermediate position. As early as the summer of 1948 the Norwegian members of the committee advised against the committee making any kind of recommendation to their respective governments, "at least at this point in time." By going into detailed questions of the level of the tariffs within the future customs union, the Norwegian delegates felt they were moving beyond what could be considered Norway's best interests. They compromised for the sake of Scandinavian unity by not immediately pushing the probable adverse results for Norway into the foreground.⁴⁴⁾

As the first rounds of the negotiations were drawing to a

close during 1949, Brofoss, the undisputed master of Norwegian economic planning and also largely in charge of Norwegian foreign economic policies, appears to have worried mainly about having to abandon Norwegian control measures within a larger Scandinavian union. The Norwegian draft agreement of 4 March 1949 was very loosely worded, proposing cooperation yet placing no firm obligations on the participating countries. The timing of the proposal, which on the face of it implied greater Norwegian activism, may largely be explained in terms of concurrent political developments; i.e. the Norwegian and Danish decisions to join NATO while the Swedes remained outside. Positive Scandinavian measures were at the time in great demand.⁴⁵⁾

Basic Norwegian goals did not change as the result of the need for a show of unity. It took only a few more months of negotiations before the Swedes and the Danes wondered out aloud whether the Norwegians were in fact negotiating in earnest. By this time the Norwegian delegates were pushing hard to move the discussions away from the general problem of a customs union towards concrete and limited measures of cooperation. They stuck to a well established policy of seeking piece-meal changes and avoiding general commitments. They probably would have preferred altogether to bypass the question of a customs union. As a second line of defence the Norwegians wanted the joint Scandinavian report to include both the pros and the cons of a customs union, clashing strongly with the Danes and somewhat more inaudibly with the Swedes, both of whom wanted the positive consequences of a Scandinavian union to be highlighted and the likely adverse effects to be swept under the rug.⁴⁶⁾

Predictably nothing resulted from the negotiations. In October 1949 the foreign ministers merely agreed to continue negotiations and to further look into the consequences of close economic cooperation. At the same time government made its reluctance a matter of public policy.⁴⁷⁾

Lange chose this moment to spell out the Norwegian objections in a major speech in Copenhagen. In his view a Scan-

Scandinavian customs union would not improve the dollar situation for the participating countries. Norwegian agriculture would need special arrangements, and the Norwegian home market industries would face very considerable problems, as Denmark and Sweden both were industrially more advanced than Norway. Norwegian manufacturing firms would thus be at a great disadvantage. On the other hand Norwegian export industries would not gain through expanded sales in the neighbouring countries. In fact there seems to have been considerable fear that a customs union would retard Norwegian economic development.

The Labor government in many respects considered Norway a fairly poor semi-industrialized country that would not benefit by close cooperation with more developed neighbours within such a small union. The point comes out very clearly in the modest attempt to exploit the recently established United Nations Extended Program for Technical Aid.⁴⁸⁾

Norway, in the opinion of the cabinet as well as of the negotiators, would not benefit either in the short or medium term from membership in a customs union. Furthermore, politically adverse reactions might be expected. The non-Labor parties were not likely to applaud a Social Democratic economic union. Certainly the response from the various branch organizations of industry and agriculture served to warn the government not to move too far in the direction of integration. In the late spring of 1950 the Scandinavian governments finally agreed to a Norwegian proposal for further study of closer but clearly delimited cooperation within narrowly specified fields. Thus the proposal for a Scandinavian customs union was in effect buried, while technical discussions dragged on and new reports were produced.⁴⁹⁾

In February 1952 the idea of reopening the Scandinavian customs union negotiations was taken up within the Norwegian foreign ministry. The foreign minister himself expressed genuine interest in the case. The motives were mixed, as comes out quite clearly in the departmental proposal. The foreign ministry official advocated the twin goals of

strengthening the Atlantic states and laying the basis for a joint Scandinavian stance towards the Schuman plan. It was recognized in the paper that Sweden's non-membership in NATO might prove a major obstacle, yet Lange was still interested. Significantly, the proposal must be seen as the outcome of a changing international situation rather than of a dramatic change in Norwegian perceptions of the advantages to be gained from a customs union.⁵⁰⁾

At the same time government perceptions both of Norwegian economic policies and Norway's economic situation were in a state of flux. The foreign exchange position was on the one hand much improved, while on the other hand the strict control system of the early postwar years was being dismantled. Direct regulations were being reduced to subsidiary instruments in Norwegian economic policy. From a political point of view a case could be made for strengthening the Scandinavian countries and the Atlantic states as a counterweight to the assumed concentration of political and economic power being developed on the continent. Under such circumstances even the sceptical Norwegian politicians were willing to consider closer Scandinavian cooperation as well as strengthening the relationship between the North Atlantic states.⁵¹⁾

During the first few years of Scandinavian negotiations the negative reactions of the various Norwegian economic interest group organizations obviously reinforced the government's reluctance to enter into negotiations in earnest. In 1952 the interests of manufacturing industry were mobilized against the new initiative. When the question of renewed negotiations was taken up, Fredrik Vogt, director general of "Vassdragsvesenet" (the water and electricity bureau) and chief delegate during the later Scandinavian talks, on behalf of Norwegian manufacturing industry expressed the opinion that general free trade was far preferable to a Scandinavian customs union. He was thus not willing to continue as chief negotiator. This negative reaction seems temporarily to have spelt the end of Norwegian interest in the Scandinavian plans. They were not to be taken up till

1954, when again they came to nothing.⁵²⁾

As regards the Norwegian government then, attitudes towards Scandinavian economic cooperation were in flux at the beginning of the 1950s. The economic situation was seen to be changing, as did government perceptions of Norwegian backwardness and of the need for direct control measures in the economy. The government appears not, however, to have been prepared to apply pressure on the private industrial sector to reduce its opposition. The proposal for renewed negotiations was primarily based on political desiderata which were reinforced by a diminished fear of the effects of Scandinavian integration on the economy. We may assume that this was too weak a base for a campaign in favor of a Scandinavian union which would be opposed by most of the major economic interest groups. The non-Labor parties would also be certain to oppose Scandinavian integration.

VII. Cooperation: Northwest European and North Atlantic.

At the outset the Norwegian decision to enter into the Scandinavian negotiations was mainly based on the need to mollify the Americans who demanded greater economic cooperation. At the time it seemed both hazardous with regard to economic policies and too much of a break with bridgebuilding to join the discussions concerning a European customs union. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1948 the Norwegian government decided to participate in the discussions.⁵³⁾ By that time bridgebuilding had been abandoned. Furthermore it appears that the government was moving towards giving support to Britain against the continental states in international economic discussions, rather than merely pulling out as in the question of a customs union in 1947. The Norwegian government was also trying to forge closer links with Britain in economic affairs.

This drift towards cooperation with like-minded governments comes out very clearly both in the OEEC context and through the establishment of Uniscan, the Anglo-Scandinavian forum for the discussion of common economic problems formed in late 1949.

As the Scandinavian negotiations were moving towards deadlock, the Norwegian government felt the necessity for alternative means of cooperation in order not to become isolated over questions of economic policy. Alan Milward has traced the origins of Uniscan to Norwegian initiatives in 1948.⁵⁴⁾ The actual proposal leading to the establishment of this joint Anglo-Scandinavian committee was made by Britain in early December 1949, and appears to have been the outcome of a meeting in Paris in the preceding month between Sir Stafford Cripps and the Scandinavian ministers of trade and foreign affairs. The Norwegians and the British were by far the most active parties, conducting a preliminary meeting to discuss both Anglo-Norse cooperation and the prospects for Anglo-Scandinavian cooperation. Lange and Cripps agreed that the opposing views of economic cooperation within the OEEC constituted a problem for the states of Northwestern Europe, and they expressed the hope that closer cooperation between the countries bordering the North Sea would be possible. They were even hopeful that it would prove possible to disconnect the Netherlands from the other continental states, as that country, in Lange's view, was not too far removed from the Scandinavian countries in terms of economic policy.⁵⁵⁾

Negotiations in Stockholm in the middle of December 1949 resulted in the establishment of the Anglo-Scandinavian committee. The committee was above all to discuss trade liberalization and the liberalization of current and capital payments. As it turned out, Uniscan never put forward any significant proposals for economic cooperation. The chief of the Norwegian delegation to the OEEC, Arne Skaug, put it very clearly in the summer of 1950 when responding to a letter from Dagfinn Juel, a leading government economist who informed him that the British government was not at the time likely to press for the development of "Uniscan into a framework for closer economic cooperation." Skaug commented drily that his statement was rather curiously phrased: "As yet there has been no concrete proposal from anyone that one should at this moment develop further the cooperative effort that has been initiated."⁵⁶⁾

The Norwegians were certainly interested in easing the restrictions on payments, but wanted to achieve this in an ad hoc manner. They were not willing to accept "automatic rules." They were as always worried that "increased liberalization of the imports of finished goods would make it impossible to carry out Norwegian investment policies." In practical terms then, neither the British nor the Norwegians made any serious efforts at forging a new and effective organization for economic cooperation, though the latter did view Uniscan as a more acceptable group for economic cooperation than they did the OEEC.⁵⁷⁾

It seems highly doubtful that any of the participating countries desired Uniscan as a viable instrument for closer economic cooperation. It was soon to become mainly a forum for the exchange of information and opinions on developments within the OEEC and the Schuman plan. For the Norwegians the Uniscan meetings offered possibilities for coordinating OEEC policies with the British and for tentatively promoting alternative frameworks for economic cooperation.⁵⁸⁾

By the summer of 1950 the Norwegian foreign ministry was growing increasingly worried over the divergent attitudes towards economic policy being held by the continental states on the one hand and the Scandinavian states and Britain on the other. In a highly important memorandum dated 20 July 1950 Arne Skaug outlined the crucial issues and the various policy options for the foreign minister. Skaug was concerned that work within the OEEC was becoming ever more pre-occupied with questions of principle rather than with practical programs. He was persuaded that steadily more time would be devoted to the question of harmonizing economic and financial policies. The rift between the OEEC countries was likely to grow larger, as there was little chance of moving towards supra-national agreements.

Skaug recorded his strong dislike of what he conceived as the continental economic policies of France, Italy, Belgium and West Germany, with the French leading the group:

They adhere to a *laissez-faire* policy. The so-called

financial stability, whereby they appear to mean a modest depression and resistance to controls and regulations, seems essential to them. They are by and large opposed to income equalization, and frequently opposed to public investments and control of investments. They consider trade liberalization as a goal in itself, but frequently undermine the results of such liberalization partly by a deflationary policy and partly by protectionism. They are not really concerned with adhering to agreements about maintaining full employment. The Anglo-Scandinavian system is largely the opposite of the continental European. The desire to maintain full employment and considerations of social justice have priority, other goals are secondary. These primary goals imply a kind of governmental responsibility which is most often alien to the continental philosophy.

Arne Skaug's point was not that the British and the Scandinavians agreed on all matters of economic policy. There were wide areas of disagreement, he thought. However, they did agree on matters of principle. Thus Arne Skaug expressed the consensus of the foreign ministry when he emphasized that the Scandinavian countries ought to give stronger support to Britain in the forthcoming discussions within the OEEC.⁵⁹⁾

The government in Oslo was not searching for an area of close agreement between the states that in different ways were opposed to the continental process of integration. The foreign minister and his principal advisers were rather looking for ways of redirecting the continental efforts, of accomodating the Schuman plan countries within a larger North Atlantic framework to include NATO, the OEEC, and the Council of Europe. They were looking for

closer European integration within a greater Atlantic context. From the Norwegian point of view Atlantic cooperation is the main thing. We should work towards one Atlantic organization which includes all kinds of cooperation.

Thus was the view of the foreign ministry formulated in the summer of 1951. No major changes seem to have occurred during the next few years.⁶⁰⁾

Basically Norway did not have a policy apart from wishing that European integration would not take place, and supporting Britain on matters of principle within the OEEC and the Council of Europe. In retrospect it seems quite

improbable that shrewd and seasoned politicians and bureaucrats actually believed in the fanciful schemes that were discussed. Yet to judge from the documentary evidence they must have entertained some hope that it would be possible to lead the process of integration - or cooperation - in a different direction. Not possessing any significant power to influence the process on the continent, not paying any close attention to the Schuman Plan, and unlike present-day observers not being able to see where the process was leading, the foreign ministry seems easily to have submitted to what we in retrospect would consider vague, wishful thinking. The proposals that were considered could more aptly be considered pious hopes for a future that would somehow accord with Norwegian desires.⁶¹⁾

VIII. Conclusion.

Until 1952 the Labor government was not prepared to discuss seriously the possibility of engaging in any process of economic integration which might significantly reduce the government's sovereign control of domestic economic policy. Therefore cooperation was sought within organizational schemes that in themselves would preclude farreaching agreements and close cooperation. Close contacts were by and large maintained only with nations of similar persuasions. The maintenance of sovereign control over economic affairs appears both to have been a goal in itself, and a means towards other ends. With regard to the OEEC and the Schuman Plan the Norwegians objected to the kind of economic policy they thought was being pursued on the continent. A Scandinavian union would have been more acceptable from the point of view of economic policy, on the other hand within a Scandinavian union it was initially assumed that Norway would suffer because of its relative backwardness.

Considerations of economic policy and economic development thus go a long way towards explaining the Norwegian reluctance to get involved in processes of economic integration, be they European or Scandinavian. The proposals for wider European or Atlantic cooperation were most probably made

partly to put Norway on the record as in principle in favor of cooperation, partly for diluting or derailing proposals that had been made for closer integration. But we must at the same time keep in mind that North Atlantic cooperation above all was a question of national security and not of economic integration.

As Olav Riste has pointed out, Norwegian governments have since the early years of independence felt dependent on the British security guarantee. 9 April 1940 proved the necessity of a formal guarantee and of peacetime preparations for wartime cooperation.

Within the limited field of defence the case for cooperation and minimal integration was widely accepted. Economic integration was bound to involve Norway in cooperative schemes of far wider scope. Such integration would be likely to involve the loss of sovereignty to supranational bodies dominated by nations adhering to alien doctrines of economic policy, or by economically more advanced countries. It would prove more difficult to make a case for such cooperation, and for years to come the Labor government did not find it necessary or urgent to do so, though another round of abortive Scandinavian negotiations took place from 1954.

Lange's 1949 speech to the Council on Foreign Relations undoubtedly reflected Norwegian attitudes towards European integration. The Norwegian government felt comfortable neither with the economic policies of the continental states nor with economic integration per se.

As we have seen, however, the Norwegian approach to the problems of European economic integration needs to be set in a wider perspective. Economic integration was clearly of only secondary importance in Oslo. The Labor government was above all preoccupied with problems of national security. We may indeed speak of the primacy of security policy. Even within this field the government showed considerable reluctance to accept measures involving actual military integration. However, the advantages to be gained, or the risks to be avoided, loomed sufficiently large for the Labor government to abandon bits and pieces of national sovereignty.

Possible gains and risks appear to have been viewed from a completely different angle with regards to economic integration. Issues of security policy are, of course, easily identified as concerning the survival of the nation, particularly so in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Accordingly, national security policies could easily be considered part of a sphere largely separate from other fields of foreign policy. Under such circumstances considerations of security might even play a crucial role in deciding other questions.

There is considerable evidence that such was the case. The decision to join fully in Marshall plan cooperation as well as the decision of the non-communist parties to close ranks around the 1948 long term program to the OEEC may to a considerable degree be explained by reference to the primacy of national security policies. Though research is scanty on the topic, we may also venture the hypothesis that Norway remained outside the Common Market precisely because national security considerations were so conspicuously absent during the years of debate leading to the referendum in 1972. Much research remains to be done before we can deal with this issue with any degree of certainty, yet the primacy of national security appears a promising point of departure for the study of Norway and European integration.

Obviously we must not close our minds to alternative explanatory frameworks or to significant modifications of the security hypothesis. The present state of knowledge is clearly inadequate as far as the economic issues are concerned. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the Labor government quite possibly did not find the economic gains sufficient, or the risks looming large enough to start bargaining over the questions of domestic control of the economy. We may thus be trying to explain a temporary phenomenon rather than a more permanent feature of postwar Norwegian foreign policy.

It is certainly true that the Labor government throughout the 1950s paid very little attention to the problems of

European economic integration, and accordingly was not inclined to enter into a process of give and take of the kind being pursued with regards to military cooperation. As long as the British refused to join the continental states the Norwegians were not about to join. The British/North Atlantic orientation was, of course, economic as well as military.

We may note one further point of general interest. To a great degree Norwegian negotiators, in a Nordic as well as a European or North Atlantic context, dealt with outstanding questions in a concrete way rather than as matters of principle. Norwegians bargained for the best possible result on each separate issue where Norwegian interests were concerned. Disagreements were as a rule not made on the basis of principle. Norwegians dealt with conflicts on a piecemeal basis, and generally tried to avoid taking a stand when their own interests were not directly involved. This does not mean that principles were not involved, but by and large the Labor government did not stand up for principles per se. We see this very clearly in another context with regards to negotiations within Cocom over strategic export control.

By further research along these lines we may be able to identify characteristic Norwegian attitudes towards the conduct of foreign policy. There appears to be a preference for low-key disagreements and bargaining as opposed to more noisy clashes over major issues. This preference for negotiating as a trusted insider comes out very clearly in the policies of the Norwegian government-in-exile in London during the Second World War, as well as in more recent NATO policies. It reflects considerable consistency on the part of Norwegian governments as regards the most effective modes of foreign policy conduct.

On the other hand, foreign policy also has to be explained on the domestic political scene. On this scene principles are given a more prominent place. The marked reluctance to join more closely-knit organizations where Norway might have to identify with policies at variance with her interests or

ideals may partly be explained by the need to cater for the domestic audience. We have seen this with regards to economic cooperation. The occasional debate over NATO and decolonization, as with the infamous NATO resolution on Indochina in 1952, may be another case in point.

In an organization such as the UN, being made up of states of widely different political systems, membership would not be likely to create such problems. Norway was indeed able to enter and work within the world organization without being unduly subjected to the crosspressures of internationalist ideals and practical work. An organization for European economic integration would be different. Membership would at least involve reduced control over national economic policy. It was at one time feared that even the Marshall Plan would have such consequences for Norway. The field of national security policy appears to represent the only major exception to the general reluctance to enter into binding commitments. Yet also within NATO Norway appears to have preferred a policy of low-key, ad hoc negotiations. The twin questions of the modus operandi of Norwegian foreign policy and the primacy of national security should be well worth pursuing also in regards to economic integration.⁶²⁾

NOTES.

I want to thank the archivist of the Foreign Ministry, Erik-W.Norman, for his kind and ready assistance on this and many other occasions when I have needed to consult the archives of the Ministry.

1. This theme has not been explored to any great extent in recent Norwegian historical writing. Writing on postwar Norwegian foreign policy is still largely concentrated on the origins of the Cold War and alliance politics. See, however, K.E.Eriksen's survey "Norge i det vestlige samarbeidet", pp. 167-281, in T.Bergh & H.Ø.Pharo eds., Vekst og Velstand (Oslo, 1981, 2. ed.) particularly pp. 260-262; for a historiographical survey of Norwegian Cold War literature, see H.Ø.Pharo, "The Cold War in Norwegian and International Historical Research," pp. 163-189 in Scandinavian Journal of History, 1985, vol. 10, no. 5.
2. H.M.Lange, "European Union: False Hopes and Realities," pp. 441-450, Foreign Affairs, 1949-50; H.M.Lange, Norsk utenrikspolitikk siden 1945 (Oslo, 1952), pp. 170-173; H.M.Lange, "Norsk syn på Europas samling" (Christian Michelsens Institutt, Bergen 1950).
3. K.E.Eriksen, op.cit. in Vekst og velstand, pp. 176-186.
4. O.Riste, "The Genesis of North Atlantic Defence Cooperation: Norway's "Atlantic Policy" 1940-1945", National Defence College, Norway (NDCN), Occasional Papers, no. 2, 1981; O.Riste, "Functional Ties - A Semi-Alliance? Military Cooperation in North-West Europe 1944-47", NDCN, no. 6, 1981; O.Riste, "Isolationism and Great Power Protection", NDCW, no. 2, 1984; O.Riste, "Frå integritetstraktat til atompolitikk: Det stormaktsgaranterte Norge 1905-1983", NDCW, no.2, 1983; see also the standard work on the government-in-exile by O.Riste, Londonregjeringa, 2 volumes, (Oslo, 1973, 1979).
5. K.E.Eriksen, op.cit. in Vekst og velstand, pp. 176-186;

- H.Ø.Pharo, "Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction: Norway Faces the Marshall Plan", Scandinavian Journal of History, no. 1, vol. 1, 1976, pp. 128-130.
6. Ibid; O.Riste, "Frå integritetstraktat til atompolitikk", pp. 11-13; O.Riste, "Was 1949 a Turning Point? Norway and the Western Powers 1947-1950", in O.Riste ed., Western Security: The Formative Years (Oslo, 1985).
 7. O.Riste, "Isolationism and Great Power Protection"; and "The Genesis of North Atlantic Defence Cooperation."
 8. O.Riste, "Frå integritetstraktat til atompolitikk"; and K.E.Eriksen op.cit. in Vekst og velstand, pp. 176-186.
 9. Norwegian European policies have been analyzed in a "hovedfag" dissertation by Nils A.Røhne with particular reference to the Council of Europe: "Norske holdninger til europeisk integrasjon 1940-1949 (Oslo, 1986). I draw heavily on his work in this section, particularly as regards the third force and the Council of Europe; see also K.E.Eriksen, DNA og NATO (Oslo, 1972), pp. 19-28.
 10. O.Riste, "Frå integritetstraktat til stormaktspolitikk."
 11. See N.A.Røhne, op.cit.; and H.Ø.Pharo, "Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction," pp. 128-130.
 12. O.Riste, "Functional Ties - A Semi-Alliance", p. 11.
 13. H.Ø.Pharo, "Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction", pp. 128-130.
 14. See N.A.Røhne, op.cit.; Arbeiderbladet, 12 December 1946.
 15. See N.A.Røhne op.cit.
 16. Ibid; and Arbeiderbladet 22 June 1946.
 17. K.E.Eriksen op.cit. in Vekst og velstand; H.Ø.Pharo, "Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction."
 18. See N.A.Røhne, op.cit.; note 17 above; and M.Skodvin, Norden eller NATO (Oslo, 1971), pp. 20-89.
 19. H.Ø.Pharo, "Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction"; M.Skodvin, Norden eller NATO, pp. 35-36.
 20. Ibid., pp. 93-122; H.Lie, Skjebneår 1945-50 (Oslo, 1985), pp. 260-307, for a participant's excellent description and analysis of the events. Lie's book may be read with great profit by anyone

- working on this period.
21. From a Norwegian point of view, see the article by K.E.Eriksen and M.Skodvin, "Storbritannia, NATO og et nordisk forbund", Internasjonal Politikk, no. 3, 1981; see also H.Lie, op.cit., pp. 235 ff.
 22. Ibid; and N.A.Røhne, op.cit.
 23. See also K.E.Eriksen and M.Skodvin, "Storbritannia, NATO og et nordisk forbund."
 24. N.A.Røhne, op.cit. The evidence for this is somewhat flimsy, but the circumstantial and the modest direct evidence seem to point in this direction.
 25. H.Ø.Pharo, "Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction", pp. 128-129.
 26. Ibid.
 27. O.Riste, "Frå integritetstraktat til atompolitikk."
 28. Festskrift til Arne Ordning (Oslo, 1958) p. 140.
 29. O.Riste, "Isolationism and Great Power Protection"; and "Frå integritetstraktat til atompolitikk."
 30. H.Ø.Pharo, "Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction"; K.E.Eriksen, DNA og NATO, pp. 19-71.
 31. H.Ø.Pharo, "Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction."
 32. Ibid; and H.Ø.Pharo, "Domestic and International Implications of Norwegian Reconstruction", EUI Working Paper no. 81, January 1984, p. 20.
 33. M.Skodvin, Norden eller NATO, pp. 170 ff.
 34. Ibid., pp. 209-288.
 35. R.Tamnes, "Norway's Struggle for the Northern Flank, 1950-1952", in O.Riste, ed., Western Security, pp. 234-240.
 36. See N.A.Røhne, op.cit.
 37. Ibid.
 38. Ibid.
 39. Ibid.
 40. A.Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951 (London, 1984), p. 251.
 41. H.Ø.Pharo, "Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction", p. 145.
 42. Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Archives, UD 44.3/4, vols. I-VII; for


- the first two delegates, the vice-chancellor of the Norwegian agricultural college and the director of price controls, I.Mork og R.Semningsen, see UD 44. 3/4, I, Kgl. res., 5 March 1948.
43. UD 44.3/4,I, Extract from minutes, foreign ministers' meeting in Oslo, 23-24 February 1948.
 44. UD 44.3/4,II, Report from meeting in Copenhagen, 2-3 June 1948; see also ibid., report from meeting 24 April 1948.
 45. UD 44.3/4,III, E.Brofoss to Foreign Ministry, 7 December 1948; ibid., E.Brofoss to Foreign Ministry, 28 December 1948; ibid., Draft agreement, dated 4 March 1949; ibid., J.Melander, memorandum for L.Evensen, Minister for Industry, 8 March 1949.
 46. This tension is evident throughout these files, also in the press clippings available; see also UD 44.3/4,II, report from Dannevig and Ludvigsen, 2-3 June 1948; ibid., IV A, memorandum by O.Solli, 20 October 1949.
 47. Ibid., memorandum by O.Solli, 20 October 1949.
 48. Ibid., manuscript for speech in Copenhagen by H.M.Lange, 26 October 1949; information on EPTA from "hovedfag" dissertation in progress.
 49. Ibid., memorandum by O.Solli, 7 December 1949; ibid.,V, H.M.Lange to G.Rasmussen, 16 March 1950; ibid., memorandum from Stockholm meeting, 17-18 April 1950, by O.Solli.
 50. UD 44.3/4, VII, memorandum by O.Chr.Malterud, 1 February 1950; ibid., J.Melander to O.Chr.Malterud, 10 February 1950; ibid., memorandum by W.G.Solberg, with annexes for H.M.Lange, 14 March 1950.
 51. Ibid., J.Melander, memorandum for H.M.Lange, 24 April 1952.
 52. Ibid., F.Vogt to Foreign Ministry, 29 April 1952.
 53. See N.A.Røhne, op.cit.
 54. A.S.Milward, op.cit., pp. 316-317.
 55. UD 44.3/5,I, H.M.Lange, memorandum dated 4 November 1949.
 56. UD 44.3/5,IV, D.Juel to A.Skaug, 30 May 1950; ibid., A.Skaug to D.Juel, 2 June 1950.
 57. UD 44.3/5,III, report from the first meeting of the Anglo-Scandinavian Committee, 1 April 1950.

58. File 44.3/5 contains a large number of such discussion papers.
59. UD 44.3/5,IV, A.Skaug, memorandum for the foreign minister, 20 July 1950.
60. UD 44.3/5,V, J.Melander to A.Skaug, 12 June 1951; ibid., memorandum by F.Jacobsen, 9 June 1951.
61. The hopes entertained are reminiscent of those being entertained over the possibility of a third force, and over the possibility of continued bridgebuilding. In retrospect the elements of wishful thinking stand out.
62. Norwegian historians have become increasingly interested in Norwegian policies towards and within international organizations, and even more so in the study of Norwegian foreign policy behaviour. I have greatly benefitted from discussing these questions with Olav Riste and Rolf Tamnes at the Research Centre for Defence History in Oslo, as also with Knut Eriksen and Geir Lundestad at Tromsø University. Riste's book on the London government must be the starting point for any study of the operational mode of the Norwegian foreign ministry in particular and the Norwegian government in general. Rolf Tamnes has recently published several articles where he takes up such issues. See also Geir Lundestad's thought-provoking essay, "Nasjonalisme og internasjonale i norsk utenrikspolitikk: Et faglig-provoserende essay." (Nationalism and Internationalism in Norwegian Foreign Policy: A Historical-Provocative Essay), Internasjonal Politikk, no. 1, 1985, with English summary. In addition there are a number of relevant "hovedfag" theses, the most recent one on Norway and Cocom. "Norges deltakelse i Vestblokkens økonomiske eksportkontroll overfor Østblokken 1948-53." (Norway's Participation in the Strategic Export Control of the Western Bloc against the Eastern Bloc) Oslo, 1986, by Tor Egil Førland.

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