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THE STATES OF NATIONAL ELITES AND THE  
STABILITY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN  
81 NATIONS, 1950-1982.

G. Lowell Field  
University of  
Connecticut

John Higley  
Australian National  
University

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BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)

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European University Institute

Badia Fiesolana

I - 50016 San Domenico (FI)

Italy

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This article theorizes that there is a determinate relationship between states of national elites and the stable or unstable conditions of national political institutions. Four basic states of national elites, their origins and their persistence, are treated as comprising a theoretical construct which can be used to explain observable continuities and changes in institutional conditions. Eighty-one countries constituted the universe in which the theory could have been expected to operate between 1950-1982, and each country is classified according to its observable institutional condition(s) and its apparent elite state(s). Countries which represent the limiting cases for each category are discussed in some detail. Only eight countries are found to have exhibited a change in institutional condition, and there is substantial evidence that, consistent with the theory, in each of them a particular kind of elite transformation preceded this institutional change. Overall, the persistence of institutional conditions and elite states in 73 countries and the specific changes which occurred in the remaining eight appear to be at odds with explanations of institutional stability/instability which utilize more conventional non-elite or international variables. The theoretical and policy implications of this observation are discussed.



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It has been widely noted that key aspects of scientific theories are subject only to indirect verification. They contain terms, which are usually designated as constructs, whose definition is neither complete nor empirically applicable in a direct way (Gibbs, 1972, p.125). Verification proceeds by checking for the logical consequences of the postulates, propositions and other statements which such constructs generate (Kemeny, 1959, p.96). Evidence to suggest the plausibility of constructs is marshalled, but it remains necessary to confirm some of their most important properties and effects through observations of the phenomena with which they are ostensibly associated (Przeworski and Teune, 1970, pp.100-104). A principal reason for the non-cumulative empiricism that is found in many areas of social science is the failure to develop and test theories in this way. Prevaillingly, social scientists have been content to state empirical generalizations on the basis of statistically significant correlations between variables that are all more or less equally observable and directly measurable (Willer and Webster, 1970).

The field of elite studies is a case in point. Although there has been an outpouring of research on elites in recent years (Putnam, 1976), where they have not been merely trivial the results of this research have been prosaically descriptive and theoretically non-cumulative (Zuckerman, 1977). The basic problem is that few of the behavioral dynamics of elites can be observed and measured directly or fully. Not only do elites in many countries simply resist such observation and measurement (cf. Wilhelm, 1980; McDonough, 1981), but the survey and other research techniques available today are often too expensive or too superficial to capture the subtle complexities and to penetrate the routine secrecy of much elite behavior. While it may be premature to conclude that the data necessary to a relatively comprehensive delineation of elites are permanently beyond our grasp, it is likely that progress will depend mainly on treating

elites as a theoretical construct whose properties and effects can only be verified indirectly.

This article theorizes about a determinate relationship between states of national elites, which comprise one aspect of an elite construct, and the observable stability or instability of national political institutions. We postulate that, within a defined universe, institutional stability or instability depends on the particular state of a country's national elite. Stability or instability persists until there is a transformation in this state, after which a new institutional condition emerges. However, transformations in the states of national elites appear to depend on rare, historically contingent circumstances which permit elite initiatives and elite reorganizations. This means that changes in the stability or instability of political institutions are much less influenced by socioeconomic variables (e.g. levels of development, urbanization, education), sociopolitical variables (e.g. mass attitudes, political culture and political participation) or international variables (e.g. location in the world-system) than has commonly been thought. The implication for policy is that efforts to foster stable political institutions must focus on bringing about circumstances in which appropriate elite transformations might occur.

We begin by considering the principal features of an elite construct as it pertains to a general theory of elites and politics. Next we link this construct to observable conditions of institutional stability and instability. We then define and analyze a universe, consisting of 81 nation-states between 1950-1982, in which the postulated relationships between states of elites and institutional conditions could be expected to hold. Finally, we discuss some of the theoretical and policy implications of our analysis.

#### An Elite Construct

The term "elite" is now widely agreed to refer to those persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national policies individually, regularly and seriously. Thus the term

subsumes strategic position-holders in a variety of organizations ranging from business enterprises to trade unions, from the military to the media, and from various "established" political parties and interest groups to assorted "dissident" or "radical" movements whose leaders affect national policies mainly through resistance and negation (Parry, 1969, p.13; Merritt, 1970, p.105; Giddens, 1973, p.120; Dye, 1976, p.6; Putnam, 1976, p.14). To identify elites empirically the strong tendency in recent studies has been to supplement an organizational-positional identification with snowball sampling and network analysis to ensure comprehensiveness (Kadushin, 1968; Bonilla, 1970; Barton et al., 1973; Higley et al., 1979; Moore, 1979; Hoffmann-Lange, 1982).

This is where scholarly agreement largely ends, however. The theoretical status of elites is as much up for grabs today as it was when Pareto, Mosca and Michels were writing. Elites do not comprise a recognized construct (analogous, for example, to the constructs of social class and "the state") in theories which seek to explain major political variations among countries. We have elsewhere inquired into the ideological and meta-theoretical reasons for this (Field and Higley, 1980); here we want to examine certain key features of an elite construct.

The basic rationale for utilizing an elite construct in any general political theory is the idea that elite structure and behavior vary independently of non-elite and international conditions and influences, and that this independent variation of elites has determinate effects on central political processes and outcomes. To encapsulate this, an elite construct must first conceptualize the different states which national elites take in modern societies. Recent research on the extent of structural integration/fragmentation and of value consensus/dissensus within national elites (see the studies summarized by Putnam, 1976, pp.107-132) has pointed to something like the following conceptualization:

Disunified elites: Integration and consensus are absent and most elite persons consequently perceive government executive power to depend on one elite faction's personalized access to military and police forces. Competition

among elite factions is ruthless, and widespread or sustained cooperation among them is out of the question.

Imperfectly unified elites: Integration and consensus do not extend to all major elite factions and there is a clear disjunction between a large, electorally dominant faction or coalition of factions, which possesses substantial internal integration and consensus, and a somewhat smaller "radical" faction, which is openly hostile to the larger grouping, but which regularly fails to obtain enough support to gain full executive power (Field and Higley, 1978).

Consensually unified elites: Integration and consensus are sufficiently extensive so that, while elite factions regularly and publicly express conflicting policies and ideologies, they consistently refrain from pushing their partisan differences to the point of violent conflict. Apparently, there is an underlying value consensus, involving an unwritten code of elite conduct (Prewitt and Stone, 1973, pp.151-155; Di Palma, 1973, pp.10-13), which is sustained by an elite interaction structure that is broadly satisfactory to all major factions (Higley and Moore, 1981).

Ideologically unified elites: Integration and consensus are apparently so comprehensive that all elite factions publicly profess the same ideology and consistently conform their policy statements to the ideologically-rationalized policy lines laid down by the most senior officials (Brzezinski and Huntington, 1963, pp.17-56; Lindblom, 1977, pp.237-275).

As explained below, each of these states of national elites is associated with a distinctive condition of institutional stability or instability. Countries located within a specific universe (also discussed below) may thus be classified according to the state of their national elite and their institutional condition. But if it is to constitute an explanatory device, an elite construct must also conceptualize the ways in which the states of national elites vary independently of non-elite and international influences. This means that contentions about the origins and persistence of the various elite states must be incorporated.



To take the question of origins first, an elite construct must specify the kinds of circumstances in which elite states are created and transformed. Although the open-endedness of ongoing historical processes, and therefore the possibility of future novelties, prevents any complete or final enumeration of such circumstances, the political history of the last four centuries (i.e., since modern nation-states first emerged) suggests that they are few in number and highly special in character.<sup>1</sup>

The state of disunity originates in the severe conflicts and enmities which usually precede or at least accompany the formation of sovereign nation-states. In this respect it is the initial state which national elites normally take. Thus the first eight European nation-states to emerge at the end of the medieval period -- Denmark, England, France, Portugal, Russia, Scotland, Spain and Sweden<sup>2</sup> -- began with disunified elites. Similarly, most nation-states which later came into existence -- for example, all the Latin American countries, Austria, Italy and Germany -- had disunified elites at their outset. Although the state of elite disunity can originate in transformations of the three other elite states, historical data suggest that most transformations have been from this state to the three other states.

The state of imperfect unity originates in the realization by "conservative" and "moderate" elite factions in a disunified elite that there is a reliably non-radical electoral majority at their disposal and that they no longer need to use crude force and repression in order to protect their interests. Given the continuing radicalism of other elite factions, it is enough for the conservative and moderate factions to follow roughly democratic practices to win

<sup>1</sup>To describe and document the circumstances which have actually occurred is beyond this article's scope. We have attempted to do this in our Elites and Western Power (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983). Here we merely characterize the circumstances and allude to their occurrence in various countries.

<sup>2</sup>From their independence in the 1580s until 1814, the United Provinces, which comprised what we now know as the Netherlands, had a much looser territorial integration than is suggested by the term "nation-state".

and hold governmental power. Examples are Norwegian elites once the radical Labor Movement began to emerge after 1884, an altogether similar situation among Danish elites at the introduction of cabinet responsibility to parliament in 1901, as well as Italian and Japanese elites from the early post-World War II years.

The state of consensual unity seems to originate in three circumstances only: (1) The factions in a disunified elite may deliberately negotiate a settlement of their major disputes if their internal organization permits negotiation and if they have a sufficient incentive (such as the inconclusive outcome of a civil war and the prospect of its resumption) to do so. Examples are the settlements negotiated by English elites in 1689, by Swedish elites in 1809, and by Mexican elites in the early 1930s. (2) If the native or settler elites in a colonial territory have had considerable opportunity to practice moderate, more or less representative politics in colonial governments or in the structures of large independence movements, they may emerge as a consensually unified elite upon gaining national independence. Examples are the elites of Holland and some of the other United Provinces in throwing off Spanish rule, American elites before and during the War of Independence, and, more recently, New Zealand, Canadian, Australian, South African, Irish, Philippino, Indian and Israeli elites. (3) The smaller "radical" faction in an imperfectly unified elite may gradually moderate its radicalism enough to win national elections, to form governments and to be accepted as a no longer threatening political alternative to the larger, previously dominant faction or coalition. Examples are the peaceful acceptance of Socialist-dominated coalition governments in Norway and Denmark during the 1930s.

Finally, the state of ideological unity originates in the victory of a radical egalitarian elite faction during the levelling revolutions that sometimes occur in predominantly peasant societies (the Russian Bolsheviks in 1921, the Chinese Communists in 1949), in the victory of a radical anti-egalitarian faction

during the counter-revolutionary circumstances that sometimes occur in largely industrialized societies (the Italian Fascists in 1926, the German Nazis in 1933), or by a country which already has such an elite imposing it on other countries which it conquers in warfare (Eastern Europe and North Korea after World War II).

This overview suggests that transformations in the states of national elites do not occur as a consequence of systematic variations in non-elite or international conditions. Instead, they occur in contingent and rare circumstances which enable elites to alter their previous relations or which permit one faction to eliminate all its competitors. The one partial exception is the transformation from the disunified to the imperfectly unified state, for which the existence of a non-radical electoral majority (and therefore, presumably, a relatively high level of industrialization and prosperity) seems to be a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition.

The contentions that there are basically only four states of national elites and that transformations from one state to another occur only in contingent and rare circumstances imply a third contention. This is that each elite state strongly tends to persist over time regardless of other changes in a country's socioeconomic and sociopolitical makeup. Here too, the open-endedness of history prevents any flat statements. But the contention is quite consistent with the modern historical record. Down to 1950, we can find only three clear instances in which disunified elites transformed themselves into consensually unified elites (England 1689, Sweden 1809, and Mexico about 1933), and we find only four similarly clear instances of transformations from the disunified to the ideologically unified state (Russia 1921, Italy 1926, Germany 1933, and China 1949). Apart from those countries which gained independence with consensually unified elites (e.g. the United States, Canada), the state of elite disunity persisted nearly everywhere else from the time of nation-state formation. Conversely, if changes in elite states stemming from defeats in

international warfare are put outside the universe (as will be done presently), down to 1950 we can find no cases of a transformation from the consensually unified or ideologically unified states to another elite state. In short, all three states of national elites display a marked persistence once they are created. Only the state of imperfect elite unity seems to be less persistent, although this is still a fairly recent phenomenon and there are comparatively few cases on which to base a judgement. Even then, the imperfectly unified state persisted for several decades in Norway and Denmark, and it has persisted throughout the postwar period in Italy and Japan (discussed below).

To summarize, an elite construct incorporating the contentions we have set forth is potentially a powerful explanatory device. The four states of national elites, the contingent, eminently political, circumstances in which they originate, and their marked persistence comprise a construct whose cogency is an attractive alternative to many competing explanations of major variations among political systems. We now want to pursue this potential by linking the construct to one such variation, the stability and instability of national political institutions.

#### Elites and Political Institutions

Political institutions are the formal organizations and procedures through which the processing of political demands and allocations is intended to occur in a society (Huntington and Dominquez, 1975, p.47). Their core consists of the executive, legislative and judicial bodies, the agencies and the procedures of government that are prescribed by constitution or by custom. Institutional stability is indicated by the prolonged absence of irregular seizures or attempted seizures of governmental office by force (e.g. coups, uprisings, revolutions) and by the absence of any common expectation that such seizures are likely to occur. Institutional instability is indicated by the recent occurrence or widely expected occurrence of such seizures and attempted seizures. To avoid legalistic arguments,

we are inclined to interpret the emergency and other measures which incumbent chief executives sometimes take in order to extend their tenures in office as not indicating institutional instability. In such situations, instability is indicated only when other elite factions retaliate by mounting attempts to unseat the incumbent by force.

We postulate that each of the four states of national elites is reliably associated with a distinctive condition of institutional stability or instability. Where the state of disunified elites exists, politics are punctuated by violent grabs for power and by repressions of defeated groups with little or no regard for institutional patterns and procedures. Institutions are merely used to strengthen and weaken the positions of warring elite factions. Consequently, their pattern oscillates suddenly and unpredictably from "democratic" to "dictatorial" or vice versa. Even where a particular institutional pattern is quite long-lasting, perhaps extending over several decades, it is widely seen among elite persons as incapable of surviving a major political crisis, and such a crisis is regarded as inevitable.

In earlier times the institutional pattern that was usually associated with disunified elites was a strictly traditional monarchy. This included a "court" comprised of most elite persons who were not out of favor and therefore not in hiding or exile. Politics consisted mainly of intrigues aimed at using the monarchical power for sectional or personal interests. This institutional pattern must not be confused, however, with that of so-called "crowned republics" such as England after 1689 and Sweden after 1809, in which the monarch is clearly seen as less than sovereign by most elite persons. The latter institutional pattern has usually been a concomitant of consensually unified elites.

Because of the discrediting and decline of hereditary monarchy, strictly traditional monarchies are no longer the principal institutional pattern associated with disunified elites. Instead, this elite state is now linked with a variety of patterns, including some that are formally representative and more or less democratic. However, the key feature of all these patterns is that

ultimate de facto power resides in the military. Elites and other informed observers are aware that some military faction is likely to seize power if policies do not please military leaders. In fact, the pattern most frequently associated with disunified elites in modern conditions is that of avowed rule by a military officer or junta. One military coup frequently follows another without any real change in this pattern occurring.

By contrast, where the state of imperfectly unified elites exists, the repeatedly demonstrated electoral dominance of conservative and moderate elite factions strongly discourages irregular seizures of power that would obviously fly in the face of a majority of voters. At the same time, such actions are unnecessary for the elites who command this majority. Institutions are thus stable and generally representative-democratic in pattern. However, the dissidence and radicalism of the smaller elite faction is frequently manifested in large-scale strikes, demonstrations, riots and other actions which protest or seek to sabotage government policies. As a result, the stability of institutions is widely felt to be precarious and it is seen to depend, occasionally or frequently, on the use of emergency powers, the temporary imposition of martial law, and on other departures from representative-democratic procedures.

Where the state of consensually unified elites exists, politics are characterized by restraint, compromise, and by at least tacit elite cooperation to conceal, distort and otherwise de-fuse potentially explosive conflicts. Elites regularly invoke institutional legalities and procedural niceties to keep the lid on them. The institutional condition is one of marked stability, as indicated by the conspicuous absence of coups d'etat and other irregular seizures of power. Executive office is transmitted peacefully either at the expiration of regular terms or when the incumbent dies or resigns.

The institutional pattern associated with consensually unified elites is some version of a representative republic, with or without a monarchical, but non-sovereign, head. However, the degree of effective representative government varies considerably. For long periods the suffrage may be withheld

from most citizens and political institutions may remain the club-like preserve of the major elite factions. But under propitious economic conditions the restrained politics carried on by consensually unified elites tends to open the way to rather high degrees of representative government based on universal suffrage. An exception is where some basic ethnic conflict leads to the refusal of a dominant ethnic group to grant the suffrage and other rights to a subordinate group.

Finally, where the state of ideologically unified elites exists, the insistence on ideological and policy conformity results in a sharp centralization of elite interaction in a single party or organization, and this strongly inhibits the formation of powerful anti-system factions. There is, consequently, a high degree of institutional stability in the sense that overt seizures of power by force seldom (if ever) occur. But the pretense that there is only one "correct" ideological solution to policy dilemmas tends to generate a "cult of personality" and this in turn contributes to intense behind-the-scenes jockeying and fighting between different personalities and cliques in which losers are often destroyed. The state of the elite does not permit much reform of institutions in a representative-democratic direction.

We have now linked each of the four states of national elites to a distinctive institutional condition. Readily available historical and contemporary accounts of political events can be used to identify the institutional condition that obtains in a country. But the state of a country's national elite cannot be identified so straight-forwardly. Only an elaborate investigation of elite structure and behavior can sometimes uncover persuasive direct evidence of an elite state. For assorted political and practical reasons, however, such investigations cannot be carried out in most countries, and they are of course wholly unavailable for historical analysis. Verification of the postulated relationships between elite states and institutional conditions therefore depends on evidence that bears out those contentions in the elite construct which deal with the origins and persistence of elite states. That is, the

postulated relationships can only be verified indirectly by showing that the construct's logical consequences accord with observable continuities and changes in the institutional conditions of many countries.

#### Classification of 81 Nations, 1950-1982

A theory purporting to explain variations in institutional conditions in terms of variations in the states of national elites will, like any theory, be valid only within a specified universe. The theory we advance applies to nations which met the following three criteria during all or most of the period 1950-1982:

1. At least de facto independent of external political control by 1970:

The condition of political institutions in colonies and other dependent territories can presumably be explained only by reference to elites located in the imperial nations which rule them. This forces the exclusion of 18 colonies, territorial dependencies and secessionist states (e.g. Angola, Bangladesh) which did not achieve de facto independence until after 1970 and in which, as a result, the basic states of elites and institutional conditions have had little time to emerge. Also excluded under this criterion are the Russian satellite countries of Eastern Europe (plus Mongolia) in which elites tend to see their power as existing at the sufferance of Russian authorities who have demonstrated a willingness to intervene with force if local political trends go against their desires (Mlynar, 1979).<sup>3</sup>

2. Territorial integrity for most or all of the period: In countries experiencing

<sup>3</sup> Obviously, the politics of all countries are influenced in varying degree by external political authorities, whether these are agencies such as the International Monetary Fund or foreign intelligence apparatuses such as the C.I.A. and the K.G.B. The location of the threshold beyond which external interference deprives a country of at least de facto independence is debatable. We locate it beyond the point where such interferences are sporadic and ambiguous in their impact and at which elites apparently see their power as directly shaped by a foreign country's willingness to intervene with military force.



prolonged civil war or territorial insurgency political institutions do not have a national reach and changes in them are effected mainly by military victories or defeats. This describes the situations of Chad, Kampuchea, Lebanon, Laos, Pakistan and Vietnam during much of the period under review, and it forces the exclusion of these six countries. However, countries whose territorial integrity was only briefly interrupted (e.g. South Korea 1950-1953, Nigeria 1967-1970, Nicaragua 1978-1979) need not be excluded. Similarly, changes in institutional conditions resulting from the transformations of elites following defeats in international warfare (e.g. the reorganization of German, Italian, Austrian and Japanese elites at the end of World War II) constitute ad hoc interruptions of the relationships on which the theory focuses and must be placed outside the universe in which it operates.

3. Population size and/or occupational differentiation compatible with the articulation of national elites by at least 1960: In countries with populations of less than one million and/or economies that are almost entirely agrarian (i.e., less than five percent of the work force outside agriculture) social and political organization tends to run along kinship and other ascriptive lines. Political power is often located in a leisured class or, where such a class is absent, in the citizenry as a whole. Very few persons devote their full-time attention to commanding complex bureaucratic organizations and to affecting national policies on the basis of such organizational power. Elites in the defined sense are thus not clearly present and political institutions tend to be indistinct (Middleton and Tait, 1958; Cohen and Middleton, 1967). There is also the practical difficulty that information about the politics of such countries is usually sparse. These considerations force the exclusion of 50 small and/or almost entirely agrarian countries (e.g. Liberia, Malta, Somalia, Zaire).

Eighty of the 169 countries and territories listed in the Political Handbook of the World 1980 are excluded by these criteria. Data sufficient to determine the eligibility of another eight countries could not be found, and they must also be excluded. It is quite possible, of course, that further social change and research will reduce the number of exclusions significantly. But for the moment we are left with 81 countries in which the hypothesized relationships between states of national elites and the stability or instability of political institutions could be expected to operate between 1950-1982.

In what follows, we classify countries according to their observable institutional condition(s) and the apparent state(s) of their national elites during these 32 years. We rely on a variety of sources, from newspaper reports of political events which we have recorded in country files over the years, through compendia such as Facts on File and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, to studies by individual scholars, though we will cite only the last source. Space limitations permit us to discuss in any detail only those countries which seem most difficult to classify and which may therefore be regarded as the "limiting cases" for each category. The countries in which a change in institutional condition occurred, and which comprise especially crucial tests of the theory, will be discussed at slightly greater length. However, it should be obvious that this brief treatment of a sweeping range of political phenomena must necessarily be somewhat provisional. It would not be surprising if specialist knowledge of particular countries might prove some of our classifications wrong. But we see no alternative to plunging in and trying for a first approximation since country specialists cannot be expected to utilize and perhaps improve our classifications until they are persuaded that the scheme merits their attention.

Countries with unstable institutions and disunified elites throughout the period.

The following 40 countries appeared to have unstable political institutions and disunified national elites between 1950-1982 or for that portion of the

period (indicated in parentheses) during which they met the criteria for inclusion:

Afghanistan (until 1979)	Honduras	Saudi Arabia
Algeria (from 1962)	Indonesia	Senegal (from 1960)
Argentina	Iran	Sierra Leone (from 1961)
Bolivia	Iraq	South Korea
Brazil	Jordan	Spain
Burma	Libya (from 1951)	Sudan (from 1956)
Chile	Madagascar (from 1960)	Syria
Dominican Republic	Morocco (from 1956)	Taiwan
Ecuador	Nepal	Thailand
Egypt	Nicaragua	Turkey
El Salvador	Panama	Yemen Arab Republic
Greece	Paraguay	Yemen P.D.R. (from 1967)
Guatemala	Peru	
Haiti	Portugal	

In seven of these countries -- Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Nepal and Saudi Arabia -- power was concentrated in a traditional monarch for most or all of the period. Other elite factions sought to dislodge these monarchs through assassinations, coups and uprisings. In Afghanistan, Iran and Libya anti-royalist factions eventually prevailed and established military or theocratic regimes which then engaged in wholesale repression of their opponents. However, monarchs in Jordan, Morocco, Nepal and Saudi Arabia survived efforts to displace them by executing, imprisoning or otherwise forcibly containing their opponents. In all seven countries the form and functioning of political institutions depended strictly on the ability of one or another elite faction to maintain or gain ascendancy by force.

Except that a monarch played little or no role, unstable institutions and elite disunity were equally evident in at least 30 of the remaining 33 countries listed. Where governmental power in these countries was not overtly in the hands of the military for most of the period (e.g. Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Guatemala, Indonesia, South Korea, Sudan, Thailand), it was lodged in "presidential

monarchs" (e.g. Nasser and Sadat in Egypt, the Duvaliers in Haiti, the Somozas in Nicaragua, Stroessner in Paraguay, Senghor in Senegal, Chiang Kai-shek and son in Taiwan) or in factions of various "revolutionary" fronts and parties (e.g. the FLN in Algeria, the Baath Party in Iraq and Syria, the NLF in Yemen P.D.R.), both of the latter arrangements being directly dependent on military support. In all these countries it was fairly obvious that competing elite factions were regularly engaged in efforts to overthrow the currently dominant faction(s) by force. Institutions were consequently highly unstable and only Taiwan, which was in the grip of an extremely tight dictatorship, escaped at least one coup or other irregular seizure of power by force during the period. Popularly elected governments succeeded each other for a substantial portion of the period in just five of the 30 countries: Brazil, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece and Turkey.

Unstable institutions and disunified elites were less evident in three remaining countries: Chile, Portugal and Spain. It is at least arguable that other classifications could be applied to those elites and institutions during part of the period under review. In this respect the three countries constitute limiting cases, and it is necessary to analyze them briefly.

Chile: Before the bloody coup of 1973, Chile was credited with one of the longest periods of non-violent politics and uninterrupted representative government in Latin American history, that is 40 years. Although considerable power was concentrated in the presidency, as has been usual in Latin American governments, legislative, judicial and civil service bodies, as well as numerous political parties, had real importance. Between 1932 and 1970 nine presidents succeeded one another in accordance with constitutional procedures. Chilean institutions had at least the appearance of those that are associated with consensually unified elites. Nevertheless, this appearance belied an underlying state of elite disunity and institutional instability. Like France during the Third Republic, Chile's political quiescence was only accidentally long-lasting.

Virtually from the country's inception in 1817, power had been concentrated in a distinct landed oligarchy which operated a long string of authoritarian governments, beginning with the installation of a military junta in 1829. Elite disunity was subsequently evident in an attempted coup and an unsuccessful insurrection during the 1850s, in a brief civil war in 1881, in the formation of a strong revolutionary socialist party in 1912, in a military coup in 1924, and in an essentially military regime which ended in much political upheaval during 1931-1932. Thus the period of political peace that ensued after 1932 was not based on any prior unification of the national elite. An extreme right-wing faction centering on elements of the military and on the former military ruler, Ibañez, existed during the 1950s. The underlying disunity of elites was also evident in the postwar resurgence of the Socialist Party, which advocated a revolutionary road to power, and in the imprisonment of Communist Party leaders between 1948 and 1958. In the words of one specialist, the configuration of Chilean politics during the decades after 1932 was actually one of "polarized pluralism" which gave rise to a "pervasive feeling of permanent crisis" (Valenzuela, 1978, pp.8, 19).

It should therefore have come as no surprise that once one of the more extreme elite factions, in this case a coalition of the Socialist and Communist parties led by Salvador Allende, gained government office, the underlying state of elite disunity would quickly become manifest. Failing to obtain a majority of votes in the 1970 elections, Allende was confirmed as president by Congress only after he agreed to support a constitutional amendment which guaranteed civil liberties and democratic procedures. His government immediately began to redistribute incomes, greatly expand public sector spending, and nationalize parts of the private sector. It increasingly tolerated acts of revolutionary violence, such as land seizures by peasant bands. These and other actions brought the historic enmities among Chilean elites to a boil. After attempts to reach compromises with Allende failed, center and right-wing factions in effect asked the military to remove him (Valenzuela, 1978, pp.98-106). Allende

was killed, along with many of his supporters, in the coup of September 1973. The military dictatorship that followed abolished the constitution and eliminated, through executions and imprisonment, nearly all publicly dissident elite persons and their organizations.

Portugal: The concentration of power in a traditional monarchy until its overthrow in 1910, the intense factionalism of a chaotic republican regime that was terminated by military revolt in 1926, and the persistence of a basically military dictatorship (although headed publicly by two civilians, Salazar and Caetano) until its overthrow by military coup in 1974, clearly indicated a state of elite disunity and a condition of institutional instability throughout Portugal's modern history. What is at issue is whether this is still the case today.

The left-leaning Armed Forces Movement, which seized power in 1974, set up an interim junta and allowed constituent assembly elections to take place the following year. By that time serious divisions within the military leadership were apparent. Left-wing parties failed to win a majority of votes in the 1975 elections and their democratic credibility was tarnished when leftist military units staged an unsuccessful uprising later in the year. Since 1976 Portuguese politics have been pacific and governmental power has been contested and held in accordance with parliamentary procedures. But durable government coalitions have been conspicuously absent and elections have been frequent.

In the elections of 1976, 1979 and 1980 right-of-centre parties belonging to the Democratic Alliance steadily increased their electoral support and controlled a majority of parliamentary seats after 1979. Support for the Socialist Party declined and that for the Communist Party fluctuated around the 15 percent mark. It is therefore possible that essentially conservative elite factions are coming to control enough electoral support to ensure their continued political dominance without resort to irregular seizures of power. On this reading, the state of the elite may be changing from disunity to imperfect

unity, and Portugal's unstable institutions may therefore be acquiring a precarious stability. However, the continued importance of the constitutionally-prescribed but non-elective Council of the Revolution, the body of military officers established in 1974 to "supervise" the country's transition to "socialist democracy", indicates that power is still substantially concentrated in the military elite and that, for the moment, institutions are best classified as unstable and the elite as disunified.

Spain: A traditional monarchy, which had survived chaotic politics during the nineteenth century, and which had degenerated into a straight-forward military dictatorship during the 1920s, ended with the monarch's exile in 1931. The long-standing disunity of Spanish elites was then manifested in a turbulent republican interlude ending in a bitter civil war during which military forces led by General Franco conquered the country. Franco consolidated his victory in an exceptionally thorough-going dictatorship which lasted until his death in 1975. Often described as a fascist totalitarian regime, the character of Franco's dictatorship raises the question of whether the state of Spanish elites was ideologically unified or disunified, and therefore of whether the stability of institutions was real or merely apparent during most of the period under review.

For reasons that have most famously been given by Linz (1964), the state of Spanish elites during Franco's hegemony actually fell somewhat short of ideological unity. Franco's political apparatus, the Falange, never became sufficiently inclusive of all elite position-holders or sufficiently coherent ideologically to stifle the public expression of skeptical, sometimes even dissenting, views about policy questions by center and right-of-center elite factions. The Falange was more an appendage of elite power than the principal vehicle for its organization. Moreover, it was always apparent that deeply opposed elite factions and sentiments were in existence underground. As in Japan during the 1930s, the intensive repression of intact left-wing forces

indicated that the state of the national elite remained disunified despite Franco's hegemony. Clear manifestations of institutional instability could therefore be expected once Franco's hold on power was gone.

After Franco's death, King Juan Carlos I ascended to the throne. Despite the restrictive features of the institutional structure which Franco left behind him, the king and various political leaders managed to hold general elections in 1977 and 1979 and to have a democratic constitution adopted by popular vote in 1978. Right-of-center parties won a majority of parliamentary seats and confronted a large Socialist Party and a small Communist Party in opposition. Much extreme right-wing hostility towards the new regime emerged, however, and military revolt was widely seen as a distinct possibility, while terrorist actions (not all of them perpetrated by Basques seeking independence) were frequent. In early 1981 a military coup was actually attempted but failed. Thus the disunified state of the Spanish national elite remains unchanged, and political institutions are basically unstable.

Countries with stable institutions and consensually unified elites throughout the period.

The following 25 countries appeared to have stable political institutions and consensually unified elites between 1950-1982 or for the relevant portions of this period:

Australia	Malaysia (from 1963)	South Africa
Canada	Mexico	Sri Lanka
Costa Rica	The Netherlands	Sweden
Denmark	New Zealand	Switzerland
India	Norway	Tanzania (from 1961)
Ireland	The Philippines	Tunisia (from 1956)
Israel	Rhodesia (until 1979)	The United Kingdom
Jamaica (from 1962)	Singapore (from 1965)	The United States
		West Germany

In nearly all these countries elite factions regularly and publicly expressed opposing policies and ideologies and were associated with numerous competing



parties, interest groups and other partisan organizations and movements. With very few exceptions, however, conflicts among elites and their supporters were restrained and moderate, and irregular seizures of power by force were very widely viewed as unlikely, almost unthinkable events.

Where it has been carried out in these countries, research has uncovered evidence of an underlying elite consensus on existing institutional arrangements and on informal rules of political conduct: in Australia (Higley et al., 1979), Canada (Presthus, 1973; Ornstein and Stevenson, 1981), the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1968; Eldersveld, 1981), Norway (Higley et al., 1976), Sweden (Anton, 1980), Switzerland (Kerr, 1974), the United Kingdom (Putnam, 1973), the United States (McClosky, 1964; Barton, 1974, 1980), and West Germany (Wildenmann, 1971). Although less investigated, an integrated structure of elite interaction that probably supportive of this consensus has also been traced; in Australia and the United States (Higley and Moore, 1981), Canada (Presthus, 1973), Israel (Weingrod and Gurevitch, 1976), Norway (Maktutredningen, 1982), Sweden (Anton, 1980) and West Germany (Hoffman-Lange et al., 1978).

At least 14 of these countries had stable representative democratic institutions throughout the period. Although the exact institutional forms varied as between cabinet and presidential, unitary and federal systems, there was a uniform pattern in which legislative and executive power passed peacefully and on the basis of regular popular elections between competing parties and factions. Civil liberties and other constitutional guarantees were reliably observed, and political dissidence rarely went beyond non-violent, lawful demonstrations and protests.

But the consensually unified state of national elites permits several variations in elite organization, and it is not everywhere associated with the degree of representative democracy that Americans or Swedes or New Zealanders have come to regard as the 'natural' shape of politics. Thus the consensual unity of national elites in at least four countries involved the operation of

a single omnibus political party which monopolized government offices and which afforded all major elite factions channels of influence. This arrangement kept political institutions immune to irregular seizures of power by force, but it also made representative democratic processes rather perfunctory. We have in mind the integration of Mexican elites in the P.R.I. and its political hegemony throughout the period (Purcell and Purcell, 1980), the dominance of Lee Kuan Yew and the People's Action Party in Singapore from the country's inception in 1965 (Bedlington, 1978), the similar dominance of Nyerere and the T.A.N.U. party (after 1977 the Revolutionary Party) in Tanzania since independence in 1961 (Pratt, 1978), and the hold which Bourguiba and the Destourian Socialist Party have had on Tunisian politics since 1956 (Stone, 1982). Although the governments in these countries are probably correctly thought of as somewhat authoritarian, the stability of political institutions, the absence of any large anti-system elite factions, and the absence of a single ideology or policy position to which all elites must publicly adhere, indicate that the four national elites are best classified as consensually unified.

In four countries with ethnically divided populations elites also appeared to be consensually unified and institutions were stable, even though keeping the lid on potentially explosive ethnic conflicts or maintaining one ethnic group's dominance involved substantial limitations on the practice of representative democracy. After independence in 1963, elites in Malaysia managed to contain severe divisions among Malay, Chinese and Indian population segments and to operate a weakly consolidated federal political system in rough accord with democratic procedures learned under British tutelage. However, efforts to limit the Chinese community's influence have pointed towards political hegemony by the National Front coalition, and outbreaks of ethnic rioting (most notably in 1969) plus local insurgencies have resulted in temporary suspensions of parliamentary government (Means, 1976). Likewise, in Sri Lanka a national elite that is based on many interlocking kinship and caste relations but which

is publicly divided on ideological and policy questions gives evidence of underlying consensus (Jupp, 1978: pp.44-49, 332-369). Accordingly, and in spite of somewhat extreme policy conflicts among elites, power has passed peacefully between a more conservative and a more radical faction or coalition in a series of eight elections which have usually been won by the faction then in opposition. During 1971, however, a very severe revolt by young radicals, who were mainly of rural Sinhalese extraction, was repressed only through draconian measures and with the logistical support of a variety of foreign powers.

Within the politics of the dominant white populations of South Africa and, until 1979, Rhodesia, the state of national elites was consensually unified and institutions were stable. Different factions regularly and publicly opposed each other but appeared to share an underlying consensus about the rules of the (white) political game. Accordingly, power passed, or was expected to pass, peacefully among successive chief executives, the civil liberties and rights associated with representative democratic politics tended to be observed within the dominant ethnic groups, and irregular seizures of power by discontented elite factions were regarded as distinctly unlikely. But when measured by the political situations of their entire populations, both national elites obviously operated highly authoritarian regimes.

Finally, the stability of political institutions and the consensually unified state of national elites are open to more question in three countries -- India, Jamaica and the Philippines -- which may therefore be treated as the limiting cases for this classification:

India: Between 1947 and 1969 all major elite factions colluded to keep the Congress Party thoroughly dominant in national politics. The organizational manifestation of the elite's consensual unity thus resembled that of Mexican elites. Mrs Gandhi became prime minister in 1966 and presided over an increasingly fragmented political system and population. In June 1975 she

assumed what amounted to dictatorial powers, even to the extent of imprisoning some of her political rivals. Though technically (under our scheme) not an irregular seizure of power, this action comprised such a break with the Indian tradition of elite cooperation as to suggest the onset of elite disunity (Kleiman, 1981). However, Gandhi then held parliamentary elections in March 1977 and was defeated. Normal government processes were restored by a weak coalition of her opponents, and this coalition exacted few reprisals for their previous repression. Apparently, most elite factions wanted to return to the pre-1975 arrangement. The Janata coalition disintegrated over the next two years and Gandhi, now leading her own loyalists in the Congress Party, won the parliamentary elections of January 1980. She has governed since in accordance with the informal code of conduct and governmental practices characteristic of the pre-1975 period. Despite the dramatic hiatus of 1975-1977, which stemmed in no small part from the growing ethnic, religious, regional and other divisions of the Indian population, the consensually unified state of the national elite appears to have been maintained, and Indian political institutions have remained stable.

Jamaica 1962-1982: Since independence in 1962, Jamaican politics have increasingly involved serious disorders and repressive measures. A wide ideological and policy gap appears to separate the elite factions associated with the Labour Party and those centering on the People's National Party (PNP). Acts of violence between the two sides, such as routinely occur where elites are disunified, have been relatively frequent. Nevertheless, the major elite factions have cooperated to contain explosive racial issues, governmental power has continued to depend on parliamentary support, and there is evidence that the two major parties and factions are still disposed to negotiate constitutional questions (Stone, 1981). In the 1980 elections a PNP government was displaced by a Labour Party government. There is thus no clear indication that the state of the national elite is other than consensually unified, and political institutions continue to be stable.

The Philippines: Elites have been preoccupied with putting down various communist, ethnic and regional insurgencies virtually since the attainment of independence in 1946. Practices learned under American tutelage and associated with the consensually unified state of elites allowed power to pass peacefully, on the basis of party competition and popular elections, between six presidents, the last of whom, Marcos, was re-elected in 1969. In the face of renewed and continuing insurgencies, Marcos assumed dictatorial powers during 1972-1973, instituting a new constitution and engineering a referendum which extended his presidential tenure indefinitely. Marcos's subsequent imprisonment or exile of numerous opponents, his party's use of strong-arm tactics to influence elections and referenda, and his continuation of martial law until 1980 strongly resemble the measures followed where elites are disunified. However, various elite factions publicly express disagreements with the Marcos government and none has mounted a serious effort to seize power by force. Possibly, the fear of territorial disintegration is uppermost for the national elite, to the point where all major factions are prepared to tolerate, more or less indefinitely, Marcos's relatively unbridled rule.

Countries with stable institutions and ideologically unified elites throughout the period.

When Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Mongolia are excluded on the ground that they have not been de facto independent of foreign control, the following six countries appeared to have stable political institutions operated by ideologically unified elites between 1950-1982:

Albania	North Korea	U.S.S.R.
China	Romania	Yugoslavia

Dating from the victories of radical-egalitarian elite factions in conditions of revolution and/or civil war (i.e., U.S.S.R. 1921, Albania and Yugoslavia 1945, China 1949) or from a foreign power's elevation of such factions to political

supremacy (i.e., Romania 1946, North Korea 1946),<sup>4</sup> elites in these countries have espoused a single ideology in their public utterances and have been organized in sharply centralized "vanguard" parties that effectively penetrate all important societal spheres. The only direct study that has been carried out, that of the Yugoslav elite during 1968 (Barton et al., 1973), describes a uniformity of ideological view and a centralization of elite interaction that are broadly consistent with this characterization.

Where this state of elites exists, factional conflicts occur covertly within the party and state apparatus and are usually won by those incumbent in the uppermost party positions. Defeated factions and their supporters are normally eliminated. The tenure of the uppermost leaders therefore tends to be long, and elite factionalism comes to the fore mainly upon their deaths. Though it is common to speak of coups and attempted coups (e.g. the dismissal of Khrushchev in 1964), what is usually meant is the jockeying of individuals and small cliques for ascendancy, rather than one faction's outright seizure of governmental power by force. Because of its tight organization, such full-blown coups rarely, if ever, occur where a national elite is ideologically unified. None has clearly occurred in the six countries under review, and, consequently, their political institutions can be classified as stable throughout the period.

If there are any limiting cases in this category, they are Yugoslavia and China. A sharply decentralized federal system built on deep ethnic-regional divisions within the Yugoslav population has promoted an increasing amount of factionalism within the national elite. Down to 1982 this continued to be offset by the monopoly position of the League of Communists at all levels of the political system. However, it is conceivable that centrifugal ethnic-regional forces will at some point produce territorial disintegration and thereby set the

<sup>4</sup>It is doubtful that Romania and North Korea were de facto independent of Russian control during the early part of the period. From about 1960, however, both countries have maintained substantial autonomy within the communist bloc.

country outside our theoretical universe. In China pronounced factionalism within the national elite followed the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Several reversals in the fortunes of individual leaders culminated in the dismissal and arrest of the so-called Gang of Four. This was evidently a major dispute over power and policy (Dittmer, 1980) which gave rise to public disturbances in Shanghai and some other areas. It was followed by a brief interlude when party control was publicly questioned by a relatively small number of people in Peking. Sometime before the Tenth Party Congress in 1978, however, the faction identified with Teng Ziao-ping consolidated its hold on power and began to enforce uniform elite and cadre support for its revisionist program of "the Four Modernizations". Tendencies towards elite disunity during 1976-1977 were reversed, the state of ideological unity persisted, and institutions remained stable.

Countries with stable institutions and imperfectly unified elites throughout the period.

Political institutions were also stable, although rather more precariously, in two countries whose elites appeared to be imperfectly unified between 1950-1982. They are:

Italy: Elite factions associated with the Christian Democratic Party and with other centrist and right-of-center parties have had an uninterrupted hold on national government offices from the first postwar elections in 1948. During the earlier part of this period communist and socialist factions comprised an irreconcilable left wing. By the 1960s, however, the Socialists had moderated their position enough so that they could sometimes participate in Christian Democratic governments. Communist party, trade union and intellectual elites were left to cope with the repeatedly demonstrated existence of a firm anti-communist electoral majority in national politics.

The communist elites gradually repudiated much of their traditional doctrine and practice and, during the 1970s, they began to seek an "historic

compromise" with the Christian Democrats. But this tendency towards consensual unity among the principal elite factions was offset by the emergence of an especially fanatic and violent radicalism among disaffected communist intellectuals and their youthful supporters. As a consequence, the highly disruptive left-wing strikes, protests and riots of the 1950s and 1960s were to some extent replaced during the 1970s by a wave of mainly left-wing terrorism. Throughout the period the obvious electoral dominance of center and right-of-center elites prevented attempted seizures of power by extreme right-wing and left-wing factions, and political institutions remained stable. But the continuing ideological polarization of elites has made for notably ineffective government, political stalemate, and widespread uncertainty that political institutions are capable of surviving a serious crisis (Di Palma, 1977).

Japan: The state of Japanese elites before World War II was disunified and institutions were unstable. Power was concentrated in a traditional monarchy, the military, and in right-wing political and business families. During the 1930s in particular, left-wing elites were suppressed and a "politics by assassination" culminated in the military revolt of 1937. Under post-war occupation by the United States most right-wing extremists were eliminated, the monarchy was reduced to a symbolic role, the military was disbanded, and the principle of parliamentary sovereignty was imposed.

From the start of postwar independence in 1952, factions centering on the Liberal Democratic Party, which failed to obtain parliamentary majorities only in the 1976 and 1979 elections, have been dominant. Elites associated with the fairly large Socialist Party and the smaller Communist Party have comprised a radical left wing throughout the period. The relative strength and radicalism of these left-wing factions ensured continuing political turbulence involving serious anti-government strikes and disorders and a limited amount of political terrorism (Pempel, 1977, pp.281-287; Tsurutani, 1977, pp.176-211). Although some communist and socialist elite factions gradually moderated their



radicalism during the 1970s, others maintained their intransigent opposition. Thus the state of Japanese elites was imperfectly unified throughout the period and political institutions, though free from irregular seizures of power, had a somewhat precarious stability.

Countries exhibiting changed institutional conditions and elite transformations during the period.

Elite transformations and associated changes in institutional conditions appear to have occurred in eight countries between 1950-1982. During 1957 and 1958 the long-standing disunity of Colombian and Venezuelan elites was transformed into consensual unity. In a less clear-cut fashion, disunified French elites became imperfectly unified during the early 1960s and, probably, consensually unified some twenty years later. In Cuba the state of elite disunity was replaced by that of ideological unity during 1959. On the other hand, consensually unified elites in Nigeria and imperfectly unified elites in Uruguay became disunified in 1966 and 1973 respectively. Finally, Belgian elites went from imperfect unity to consensual unity in about 1960 and Austrian elites underwent a similar transformation half a dozen years later, in about 1966. In all cases, the pre-existing instability or stability of political institutions changed fairly promptly according to the kind of elite transformation that had taken place. We must briefly summarize these significant events.

Colombia: Unstable institutions and elite disunity were apparent in a long series of civil wars during the nineteenth century. However, elites associated with the Conservative and Liberal parties accepted each other's periods of governmental ascendancy relatively peacefully between 1910 and the late 1940s, although strictly competitive elections occurred only twice during those years (Wilde, 1978, pp.29-32). The reform measures of Liberal governments after 1930 increasingly frightened the Conservatives, who began to take reprisals against the Liberals upon winning the presidency in 1946. In 1948 the assassination of the Liberal leader, Gaitán, ignited a great outbreak of partisan violence.



Conservative efforts to repress the Liberals led to the Rojas Pinilla military dictatorship which was instituted by coup d'etat in 1953 and which ended when the military overthrew him in 1957 and set up a temporary junta. Clearly, institutional instability and elite disunity persisted to this point.

During 1956 and 1957, however, leaders of the two traditional sides of Colombian politics met privately, initially in Spain, and worked out a plan, called the National Front, for the strict sharing of power between Liberals and Conservatives over the next 16 years (Wilde, 1978, pp.58-62). Embodied in a formal declaration and ratified by plebiscite, the arrangement called for an equal distribution of seats in all important governmental bodies (both legislative houses, the cabinet, departmental and municipal councils), and also, under a provision added in 1959, the alteration of the two traditional parties in the presidency itself. Elections continued within the Liberal and Conservative parties for seats in these bodies and, within the party whose turn it was, for the presidential nomination. During the next 16 years the two sides did in fact alternate in the presidency and otherwise abide by the agreement, although the Conservative presidential nominee in the 1970 election, Pastrama Borrero, barely withstood a populist challenge by the former dictator, Rojas Pinilla. Starting that year, the system of parities agreed to in 1957 was gradually phased out, also by agreement. Since 1974 presidential elections have been "free" of the National Front restrictions. However, the Liberal leader, Turbay, who only narrowly won the presidency in 1978, agreed to observe the spirit of the National Front in view of his small margin of victory.

It appears, then, that Colombian elites effected a transformation from the disunified to the consensually unified state in 1957. This did not lead immediately to a complete change in Colombian political life. Substantial violence continues down to the present, although much of this violence apparently derives from a lucrative traffic in narcotics shipments to the United States. The important point is that since 1957 the national elite has shown a constant

tendency to avoid a breakdown of the bargain struck in that year. Although factions within the Liberal and Conservative parties occasionally opposed the National Front system, these factions seem to have changed their minds once they neared government office. Similarly, speeches conveying the most intransigent positions have often been followed by the speakers' agreements to do what they said they would never do. Taking this bombastic style of Colombian politics into account, the elite behavior patterns of the last 25 years have been consistent with the state of consensually unified elites, and it is the case that formerly unstable institutions have been highly stable.

Venezuela: Unlike their Colombian counterparts, Venezuelan elites had virtually no experience in operating representative political institutions prior to the 1940s. A series of military leaders had ruled the country from independence in 1830. One leader, Gomez, had been the effective ruler from 1908 until his death in 1935. During the confused mingling of military rule and tentative representative politics which followed, a populist and somewhat socialist elite faction, Democratic Action (AD), emerged and eventually wielded substantial power in a short-lived civilian-military junta led by the AD leader, Betancourt, between 1945-1948. However, the military, fearing too rapid social change, overthrew this junta and exiled the AD leadership. Power in the military regime which ensued came to be concentrated in Perez Jimenez, who ruled corruptly, dictatorially, and inefficiently from 1952 until 1958. Clearly, the state of the national elite was, and had always been, disunified, and political institutions were unstable.

The Jimenez dictatorship gave rise to much discontent among major elite factions. In December 1957 leaders of the three main political parties (AD, COPEI, URD) met in New York City with representatives of important Venezuelan business interests. The businessmen agreed to support a system of representative government in return for an assurance by the political leaders that issues would be kept moderate and that a direct attack on entrenched power would be avoided (Blank, 1973, pp.26-28). On this basis, a revolt supported by most elite factions

overthrew Jimenez in January 1958 and a call for elections was issued. Sporadic resistance by right-wing military groups was eventually suppressed. Late in 1958 political party leaders agreed formally that, regardless of who won the elections, the new government would be a coalition. Betancourt won and managed to serve out his full term despite a left-wing insurgency and various splits and tensions within the AD and coalition ranks.

Five presidential elections have subsequently been held. Both leading parties, the AD and COPEI, have won and duly taken office. Political institutions have been stable ever since the elite settlement of 1957-1958, an event which constituted an elite transformation from the disunified to the consensually unified state (Levine, 1978).

France: The instability of political institutions was indicated by periodic alternations between monarchical and republican regimes during the hundred years after the Revolution and by the crisis-ridden Third and Fourth Republics of this century. A pattern of deep ideological conflict between right-wing and left-wing elite factions before, during, and for long after the Revolution suggests that the state of the national elite was never other than disunified. Although a generally conservative electoral majority was probably in existence by the start of this century, the traditional revolutionary rhetoric and anti-authoritarian attitudes of most political activists tended to conceal this basic feature of twentieth-century France.

In 1958 a military rebellion in Algeria that threatened to extend to the mainland opened up the clear prospect of civil war because left-wing elites could be counted upon to organize resistance to a military coup. As a way out of the crisis, de Gaulle, an ambiguous figure in terms of traditional French political style, was allowed by general elite consent to take office as prime minister. While modifying the constitution in a presidential direction (and becoming president) without suppressing political liberties, de Gaulle mobilized a conservative electoral majority which supported him in a series of pacificatory

measures and constitutional changes in subsequent plebiscites and elections. Although its specific support for de Gaulle was partly motivated by pragmatic considerations, the fundamentally conservative character of this majority was clearly evident in the sweeping victory which Gaullist forces won over the left in the parliamentary elections which followed the 1968 student uprising. De Gaulle resigned the following year when a referendum about essentially peripheral institutional changes was lost. Nevertheless, the pattern of strong, conservative presidential government with wide electoral support persisted for another 11 years.

Although it can be given no precise date, a transformation in the state of the national elite from disunified to imperfectly unified occurred during the years immediately following de Gaulle's ascendance in 1958. From at least the November 1962 elections, when the Gaullists won an absolute majority in the National Assembly, center and right-of-center elite factions were clearly dominant electorally so long as left-wing factions continued to espouse sharply egalitarian programs and goals. However, the stability of political institutions was precarious. Various elite factions continued to question the legitimacy of existing institutions (Brown, 1969), and some of them encouraged, or acquiesced in, periodic mass protests and demonstrations of considerable size and vehemence.

The electoral dominance of center and right-of-center elites eventually brought about a modification of the radical position taken by left-wing elites. Manifested initially in the behavior of Communist Party leaders, who showed considerable moderation in their clear, if unavowed, support of de Gaulle against student radicals in 1968 and in subsequent, inconspicuous municipal politics, it was also indicated by the Communist Party's adoption of "Euro-communist" doctrines in the late 1970s. More important, however, was the startling growth of the Socialist Party, whose modifications of many of the French left's historic associations led to a sweeping Socialist victory in the 1981 presidential and parliamentary elections and to a massive influx of new

personnel in left-of-center elite circles. The repute of the new Socialist elite was quite different from that of the Communist leadership, whose dominance of the left was now supplanted. Thus it seems likely that the French elections of 1981, followed by the Mitterrand government's generally placatory and cautious behavior, amount to a further transformation of the national elite, from imperfectly unified to consensually unified. On this reading, French political institutions should be more solidly stable in the years immediately ahead than they have been during the period of the elite's imperfect unity.

Cuba: The only period of plausibly representative politics in Cuban history -- eight years -- ended in 1952 when General Batista seized power for a second time by coup d'etat. Gradually losing the support of moderate elite factions, Batista maintained himself in office with highly repressive measures until he was forced to flee the country on the last day of 1958. Down to this point the Cuban elite had always been disunified and political institutions were clearly unstable.

From 1956 a guerrilla movement led by Fidel Castro was in the field. Initially only one of many anti-Batista movements, the Castro forces' eventual pre-eminence was the result of luck, the accidental elimination of rivals, the support or forbearance of elites disenchanted with Batista, and the withdrawal of American military aid to the Cuban government in 1958 (Dominquez, 1978, pp. 123-133). As Batista's army disintegrated, the Castro forces marched on Havana and seized power on January 1, 1959.

With their own military forces in substantial control of the country, Castro and his lieutenants dissolved Congress, disbanded political parties, exiled several hundred thousand Cubans, thoroughly reorganized governing bodies, and collectivized large parts of the economy. By 1962 power was sharply centralized in an essentially totalitarian party, the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations. In substance, Castro's victory in a civil war replaced a disunified national elite with an ideologically unified one. Although they have

been modified frequently, Cuba's political institutions have been immune to irregular seizures of power ever since this elite transformation.

Nigeria 1960-1980: Initially there were indications that the state of the multi-ethnic national elite which took over from British rulers at independence in 1960 was consensually unified. On the basis of long British tutelage in representative politics, elite factions cooperated with considerable smoothness to operate a complex federal system and to transform Nigeria into a republic during the first half-dozen years of independence. However, ethnic, regional and religious conflicts at the popular level eventually tore the national elite apart, and the country's stable political institutions became unstable.

The most acute problem was the pervasive success of the Ibo peoples, who were natives of the Eastern region, as a modernizing and competitive force throughout the federation. The feudalistic Arab culture of the North and the distinctly stratified culture of the West produced widespread anti-Ibo feeling. In January 1966 Ibo military officers rose up and killed several Northern political leaders, including the prime minister. Although apparently not a participant in this mutiny, the military commander, an Ibo, judged it necessary or expedient to assume dictatorial power. Six months later a military coup by Northern officers overthrew and killed the Ibo dictator amid widespread massacres of Ibo people living in the North. After attempts by the Northerners to limit Ibo influence, the Ibo-dominated Eastern region seceded as Biafra. The war of secession which followed involved much carnage and starvation, and in 1970 Biafra surrendered and was re-incorporated into the federation.

Since sometime before the initial coup d'etat in 1966 the state of the national elite has been disunified. The faction in control of the military regime which won the civil war was overthrown by another military faction in 1975, and the leader of the latter group was assassinated the following year. Between 1976-1978, however, the military allowed and encouraged protracted negotiations among civilian elites aimed at a return to civilian government.

New parties and party alliances were forged and these tended to play down ethnic and regional rivalries. Elections were held in 1979 and a civilian president, Shagari, took office, albeit only after a serious constitutional crisis over the acceptability of his margin of electoral victory. During this crisis all important elite factions appear to have avoided the mass mobilizations which would have enflamed the dispute (Joseph, 1981), and this restraint probably reflected a desire in the national elite to recreate the state of consensual unity which existed before 1966. But the severity of sub-national divisions, the extent of elite factionalism, and the readiness of the military to again arbitrate Nigerian politics are persuasive indicators that the state of the elite remains disunified and that institutions are still unstable.

Uruguay: A series of rural uprisings, a civil war, a succession of military regimes, and finally a revolt that entailed much bloodshed indicated that the state of the national elite was disunified and that the institutional condition was one of instability until at least 1904. At that time there were two broad elite factions centering on two political parties. The Colorados were based largely on city support and tended to be anti-clerical and liberal-progressive in ideology. The Blancos tended to dominate most rural areas and were highly traditional in outlook. The Colorados managed to dominate government from 1904 until a Blanco victory in 1958, during which time they established an elaborate welfare state which satisfied urban voters and was at least tolerable to rural landowning interests, even though ranching and agriculture were carrying the weight of the rising living standards in urban areas. Blanco leaders participated in the system mainly through various deals which offered them a limited share of representation and political power. For the most part they made little attempt to compete seriously in national elections. But the high standard of living in Montevideo prevented the rise of forces more leftist than the Colorados, while the Blancos remained free to address hierarchical and, during the 1930s, even fascist appeals to their followers.



This peculiar arrangement is probably best classified as comprising an imperfectly unified elite from 1904 until the military take-over in 1973. Especially during the earlier part of the period, the political system was doubtfully democratic, and institutions were only precariously stable (as demonstrated by the irregular actions of incumbent presidents at the outset in 1903-1904 and again in 1942). By and large, however, the entrenched elite factions were prepared to observe institutional procedures, as indicated by the importance of institutional reforms which compelled presidents to share executive power with a bipartisan elected executive council between 1919-1933 and which abolished the presidency in favor of such a council between 1951-1966 (cf. Weinstein, 1975).

Eventually, however, the shameless patronage system on which the imperfect unity of the elites depended destroyed managerial competence and work discipline in the country's numerous state enterprises. Together with low export prices for beef and other rural produce from the mid-1950s onwards, this meant that the economy could no longer sustain the welfare state benefits and high living standards previously shared by a large urban middle class and a rancher aristocracy. By the mid-1960s, an intransigent and radical urban guerrilla movement, the Tupumaros, was in existence, a trade union federation had formed, and a bloc of parties well to the left of the Colorados was emerging. A series of make-shift economic measures and political arrangements during the late 1960s proved ineffective, and in 1972 the new Colorado president, Bordaberry, engineered a general mobilization of troops to crush the Tupumaros. Although it allowed Bordaberry to remain in office, the army assumed responsibility for government during 1973, dissolved Congress, disbanded the trade union federation, outlawed the new left-wing parties, and arrested or exiled numerous political leaders. In 1976 the military deposed Bordaberry, established a junta and designated the next president. But by 1973, when the military terminated the long dominance of the two traditional parties and repressed left-wing elite factions, the state of the national elite had reverted from imperfect unity to disunity. From that

time institutions which had been precariously stable since early in this century became clearly unstable.

Belgium: A case can be made that, consonant with the absence of irregular seizures of power in Belgium's modern history, the national elite has been consensually unified from 1830 when the country became independent of foreign rule (Zolberg, 1978). However, the frequency of serious political crises and the long electoral dominance of essentially conservative elite factions and parties, the Liberals and the Catholics (now the Social Christians), over a clearly leftist faction, the Socialists, are probably best interpreted as indicating that the Belgian national elite was only imperfectly unified down to about 1960. From their emergence in the 1880s, the Socialists were unable to form a government in their own right and could only hope to achieve some measure of power in coalition with either the Liberals or the Catholics. With their egalitarian programs and goals thus permanently stymied, Socialist elites were inclined to organize or encourage bitter strikes, demonstrations and riots to protest government policies. Although political institutions were stable, their operation was frequently enveloped in such harsh ideological clashes (Lorin, 1965).

During the 1950s the ethnic consciousness of the Flemish and Walloon regions increased as a result of the newly apparent numerical superiority, more rapid modernization, and greater prosperity of the Flemish. In the winter of 1960-61 widespread strikes and protests broke out against the burden allegedly placed on the working class by government austerity measures in the wake of Belgium's loss of its Congo colony. Class-based and left-wing in focus, these disruptions conformed initially to the pattern of frustrated outbursts with which leftist elite factions had long been associated. On this occasion, however, the character of social protest changed in mid-stream and became mainly a manifestation of Wallonian ethnic defensiveness against increasing Flemish power. This soon provoked Flemish protests against the advantages which the

French-speaking Walloons had previously enjoyed. Within a few years all three traditional parties split into distinct ethnic organizations and a number of new regional parties and movements emerged.

By blanketing the traditional class-oriented radicalism of left-wing elite factions, these events appear to have facilitated a transformation of the national elite from the imperfectly unified to the consensually unified state. Henceforth factional and party divisions strongly tended to run along ethnic rather than class lines. However, the elite factions associated with the three traditional parties increasingly strove to contain the resurgence of regional divisions (Mughan, 1983). Gradually, these factions reached agreement that a restructuring of political institutions amounting to "federalization without federalism" was necessary (Zolberg, 1977). By itself, this elite consensus and unity could hardly be expected to assuage ethnic rivalries or to prevent the country's eventual breakup. But the elite transformation which occurred after 1960 largely erased the threat to institutional stability which the old left-right antagonisms had comprised for many decades.

Austria 1955-1970: As indicated by the severity of conflicts between socialist and non-socialist factions, the national elite was deeply disunified during the interwar period. However, the existence of a highly authoritarian regime after 1934, annexation by Germany in 1938, and Allied "liberation" and postwar occupation destroyed or discredited the more extremist elite factions. Nevertheless, at the end of postwar occupation in 1955 the factions associated with the two parties that had been electorally dominant before 1934, the Socialists and the People's Party (formerly the Social Democrats and the Christian Socialists), feared a resumption of the conflicts and disorders of the interwar years. They therefore agreed to continue the Great Coalition they had formed under occupation on the understanding that they would share all government offices proportionately and that the most central elite persons would settle all controversial issues in private, rather than agitating them before the

electorate. Although the People's Party won all parliamentary elections over the next ten years, this arrangement was continued until 1966 (Steiner, 1972, pp.409-416).

The pattern of Austrian politics between 1955-1966 is best interpreted as indicating an imperfectly unified national elite in the sense that moderate and somewhat conservative elite factions apparently perceived that there were other, dissident elite groups capable of making trouble. To keep these other groups at bay, the two main factions cooperated closely with each other. But in 1966 the People's Party undertook to govern alone and the Socialists assumed the function of an opposition. As became fully apparent in 1970 when the socialists formed a minority government and in 1971 when they won a parliamentary majority, a smooth transition to competitive two-party electoral politics took place without arousing the old elite antagonisms (Steiner, 1972, pp.417-419). The evident solidity of this political pattern in the years after 1966 indicates that a further change in the state of the national elite -- to consensually unified -- occurred at about that time. Given these postwar states of the national elite, Austrian political institutions have been stable throughout the period.

#### Discussion and Conclusions

We have summarized a substantial amount of evidence to the effect that four states of national elites were associated with four institutional conditions in a large number of countries between 1950-1982. The institutional conditions which prevailed in these countries are readily verifiable matters of public record and we think that our classification of them is relatively straight-forward. However, our judgements as to the states of elites are more open to argument, and we do not claim to have proved directly that the elite state(s) attributed to each country actually existed. This is because the data that would constitute such direct proof are by and large unavailable. It follows that we cannot claim

to have demonstrated empirically the determinate relationship between elites and institutions which we postulated at the outset. Rather, the states of elites and their influence on institutional conditions remain part of a construct which can only be verified indirectly.

Two aspects of the construct provide means for indirect verification. The first is the contention that the four states of elites are ordinarily highly persistent. Transformations from one state to another occur only in extraordinary circumstances which allow appropriate elite initiatives. The logical consequence of this contention is that the institutional conditions linked to the different elite states are also highly persistent. Until an elite transformation occurs, each institutional condition ordinarily persists regardless of other changes in a country's socioeconomic, sociopolitical or international circumstances.

The recent political histories of most of the countries in our universe accord with this prediction. We observed no change in the institutional stability or instability of 73 of the 81 countries examined between 1950-1982, and we noted that in most of these countries no change had occurred for very long periods before 1950. Institutional conditions persisted despite the fact that the period before and after 1950 was one of immense economic, social and international change. There is thus a strong inference that institutional conditions are rooted in some relatively immutable dimension of politics. We think that this dimension is the self-perpetuating character of different elite states.

The other aspect of the construct which facilitates indirect verification is its specification of the circumstances in which various elite transformations can occur. If it is true that changes in institutional conditions are a consequence of transformations in the states of national elites, then where a change in institutional stability or instability is observed one should find evidence of the special circumstances in which the relevant elite transformation must have taken place shortly before. Thus in the eight countries which displayed a change in institutional conditions during the period, we scrutinized immediately preceding

events for evidence of the circumstances which would have permitted the appropriate elite transformation.

In Colombia and Venezuela, where clearly unstable institutions suddenly became stable at the end of the 1950s, we found circumstances that probably enabled the major elite factions to negotiate, voluntarily and deliberately, a settlement of their long-standing conflicts and to engage in markedly more cooperative and consensual relations after 1957-1958. In Nigeria and Uruguay, on the other hand, institutions that had previously been stable (albeit for only a short time in Nigeria and only somewhat precariously in Uruguay) were suddenly overthrown by the military in 1966 and 1973 respectively. In both countries we found circumstances (severe ethnic-regional cleavages in Nigeria, serious economic decline in Uruguay) that probably made the pre-existing states of elites no longer viable. Thus the coups that marked the onset of unstable institutions were the end points in a progressive fragmentation of Nigeria's consensually unified elite and Uruguay's imperfectly unified elite.

The sudden shift in Cuban institutions from endemic instability to stability after 1959-1960 had its roots in essentially revolutionary circumstances which enabled a radical elite faction to triumph over other factions and to create an ideologically unified national elite. In France, the noticeably greater institutional stability of the 1960s and 1970s can be traced to circumstances surrounding the Algerian debacle which allowed the imperfect unification of a previously disunified elite. De Gaulle was able to consolidate and repeatedly demonstrate a conservative electoral majority. This rendered left-wing factions more or less impotent so long as they retained their radicalism, and it permitted a coming together of previously fragmented center and right-wing factions in a durable political coalition. By 1981, however, the party configuration and radicalism of the left had changed enough so that a Socialist-dominated government was no longer seen as deeply threatening to a majority of French voters. Thus the 1981 elections probably mark a further transformation of the national elite, from imperfectly unified to consensually unified. Finally,

the immunity of Belgian and Austrian institutions to instability or even to harsh left-right clashes after about 1960 and 1966, respectively, began in circumstances which were propitious for full consensual unifications of imperfectly unified elites. In Belgium the rise of ethnic-regional consciousness eclipsed socially radical positions, while in Austria a decade of careful political management by moderate factions showed that radical groupings no longer comprised a serious force that had to be defended against.

In all eight cases, then, changes in institutional conditions appear to have originated in sets of circumstances which approximate those specified by the elite construct as propitious for the particular elite transformations which would bring such changes about. When added to the elite transformations and subsequent changes in institutional conditions during earlier historical periods to which we have alluded (i.e., England, Sweden, Mexico, Denmark, Norway, Russia, Italy, Germany), these eight cases help to comprise a respectable body of evidence for the idea that elite transformations are a prerequisite for changes in institutional stability and instability. In sum, the political record of the last 32 years is consistent with two aspects of the elite construct: (1) institutional conditions persist failing transformations in the states of national elites; and (2) circumstances propitious for particular kinds of elite transformations precede observed changes in institutional conditions.

The theory we advance has several implications which deserve mention. First, it raises questions about the causal importance of many non-elite or international variables that are commonly employed to explain institutional stability and instability. These questions are apparent in the lack of correspondence between the classification of countries generated by the elite construct and the classifications derived from non-elite or international explanatory variables. Each of the four categories in our classification contains countries which are situated at different levels of socioeconomic development and in different parts of the world-system (cf. Wallerstein, 1974). Each category also contains countries with widely discrepant economic orders, stratification

systems, political party systems, ethnic and other sub-national cleavage patterns, political cultures, political histories, and so on. The implication is that none of these often-used explanatory variables is systematically related to variations in institutional stability and instability.

Yet it would be a mistake to interpret our theory as holding that non-elite and international variables have no impact on institutional conditions. On the contrary, they impinge on institutional conditions in at least the following ways:

1. Ethnic, religious, linguistic or other population divisions that have a clear geographic, regional basis may bring about elite transformations and changes in institutional conditions. This happened in Nigeria and Belgium, and it is a real possibility in India, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, and Yugoslavia.
2. Among the effects of international warfare (including organized insurgencies that are effectively supported by foreign powers) may be elite transformations and changed institutional conditions. There was no clear example of this in our 1950-1982 universe, but the outcomes of wars and insurgencies were clearly basic to the creation of new elite states and institutional conditions in Russia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Albania, Yugoslavia and China earlier in this century.
3. A key feature of the circumstances which enable factions in a disunified elite to negotiate a settlement and transform themselves into a consensually unified elite is a low level of political mobilization among non-elite population segments. Elites are thereby relatively free to alter their partisan stances and to form new alliances. This describes the situation of English, Swedish and Mexican elites (and non-elites) at the times of their transformation, while specialists on Colombian, Venezuelan and Austrian politics whom we have cited believe that substantial elite autonomy greatly facilitated the elite settlements which occurred in those countries.



4. Imperfectly unified elites originate only where the existence of a conservative electoral majority can be repeatedly demonstrated. This probably requires a population which is located at a relatively high level of affluence, bureaucratization and industrialization, in which a majority of voters has a stake in resisting radical egalitarian proposals (e.g. Norway, Denmark and Belgium from early in this century; Italy, Japan and France from early in the postwar period).
5. Spreading prosperity, bureaucratization and other aspects of continued socioeconomic development may well be necessary to the maintenance of an imperfectly unified elite and to its eventual transformation into a consensually unified elite. This is suggested by the Uruguayan elite's reversion to disunity under the strains of protracted economic decline, and by the abatement of left-wing radicalism, allowing a full unification of the elites, amid steadily more benign economic conditions in Austria and France.

Beyond these specific non-elite and international influences on the relationship between elites and institutions, it is almost always the case that elites need popular support for their actions. To obtain this support, they must make their appeals conform to the political orientations and interests of the population segments they seek to mobilize. This ordinarily limits what elites can and cannot do. It is, moreover, a principal reason why states of national elites are so persistent. For elite transformations necessarily involve reorganizing the relations between elite factions and their non-elite supporters, a process that is always so difficult and dangerous for elites that they will avoid it in the absence of highly propitious circumstances and compelling incentives.

What are the main policy implications of this analysis? The promotion of stable political institutions that function along representative democratic lines has long been a goal of American and other western countries' foreign policies towards the Third World and towards a number of more developed but

still politically unstable countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece. The means used have varied, but they have often involved aid programs intended to create mass conditions that are ostensibly more favorable to political stability and democracy (Packenham, 1973).<sup>5</sup> They have also entailed entreaties and pressures to hold elections, cease the repression of political opponents, inculcate democratic beliefs among the masses, and generally to follow the institutional practices of liberal democracies.

It is not much of an exaggeration to say that western foreign policies have been completely unsuccessful in this respect. As we have seen, unstable or precariously stable political institutions have changed into reliably stable ones in only a handful of countries during the past 32 years. In none of these countries was this change the result of the western policies we have in mind, while the change that occurred in Cuba was hardly what the western countries themselves had in mind. Meanwhile, previously stable institutions became unstable in Nigeria and Uruguay, two countries that are typical of those towards which such western policies have been directed. In most non-western countries institutional stability has been conspicuously absent or it has been a temporary, fleeting phenomenon that has been followed by further periods of military rule or some other form of dictatorship.

Our theory identifies a key reason for this failure of western policy. The United States and other western countries have concentrated on bringing about conditions which appear to have no systematic bearing on institutional stability, let alone on the practice of representative democratic politics. The one condition that does seem to have such a bearing, the state of a national

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<sup>5</sup>For example, in his "Crusade for Freedom" speech at Westminster in June 1982, President Reagan presaged a new American program to channel funds, possibly through the Democratic and Republican parties, in order to "foster the infrastructure of democracy -- the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities..." in countries that are less than democratic (Vital Speeches of the Day 48: p.549).

elite, has gone unnoticed. Thus a main implication of our theory is the desirability of reorienting western policy away from its concentration on non-elite conditions and towards a focus on elite structure and behavior.

But beyond this, the theory's policy implications are largely negative in the sense that the strongly self-perpetuating character of the states of national elites probably does not allow much manipulation by foreign countries. At least, it is difficult to imagine how, through economic coercion or diplomatic maneuvers, a country like the United States could bring about the rare, historically contingent circumstances that are propitious for transforming the state of elite disunity into one of the two states that are compatible with institutional stability and representative democratic government. It is even more difficult to imagine how countries like the U.S. could then nudge all elite factions, including various radical groups, into reaching the settlements and unwritten understandings that constitute such transformations. Not only would such efforts probably exacerbate existing elite disunity in the country in question, but they would risk creating serious political backlashes in the western countries themselves.

In the last analysis, the theory advanced here implies that there is little that western countries can do to promote institutional stability around the world. Instead, they ought to terminate many of the policies and measures they are currently pursuing in this regard. In so far as these policies and measures create unrealistic expectations about what is possible or likely in the politics of many countries, they are harmful. A related implication is that western countries ought to guard against mistaking temporary periods of institutional stability for the achievement of permanent stability. If one cannot find in a country's recent political record persuasive evidence that an elite transformation has occurred, then any current condition of stability is unlikely to survive the next serious political crisis. Western policies not based on this lamentable premise are likely to prove counter-productive when

the regime in question is eventually overthrown and its successor seeks revenge for previous, misguided western involvements. Finally, if the theory is valid then the foreseeable political future of most of the world is likely to be one of continuing political instability and violence. Because there is little they can do about this, western countries will have to be much more explicitly concerned with defending their own liberal democracies in a world where most nations are illiberal, undemocratic and politically unstable.

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