EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

E U I W O R K I N G P A P E R No. 102

THE POSITION OF CENTRAL CONFEDERATIONS IN THE NATIONAL UNION MOVEMENT

A ten-country comparison

by

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Printed in Italy in May 1984

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper I will discuss one element of the structural conditions or organisational properties underlying "neo-corporatism": i.e. the organisation of trade unions. In particular, I am concerned with the position of central peak associations or national confederations within the national trade union movements. (1)

Why national union confederations? Trade union confederations are the "most comprehensive element" in a nation's trade union structure (Windmuller, 1975). They tend to behave as what Mancur Olson has called "encompassing organisations" (Olson, 1976, 1982). This can be seen as a function of both their relative size and the likely heterogeneity of their composite membership. Like large unions, confederations cannot easily disregard the externalities of their behaviour, nor can they hope to get away with "free-riding" behaviour as a small union organisation in a decentralised system with many dispersed actors and little mutual trust can. Unlike such small actors they cannot expect to benefit from the "important advantage of being unimportant" (A. Marshall). Consequently, union size may be expected to have a positive effect with respect to, if not the union's willingness to adhere to, for example, wage restraint and incomes policies, at least the observance of such policies (von Weiszacker 1978, Tarantelli 1984). Heterogeneity, which normally should increase with size, adds to this effect. Hetergenous unions and union confederations, comprising memberships with different positions and statuses in the economy and labour market, tend to be more broadly aggregative in their demands. One group's gains may be another group's losses. Hence, if they want to avoid their own organisational disintegration, they are bound to convince their member-groups to re-define their interest in terms of

"collective goods" that can benefit all, or most, at the same time. According to Olson, economic growth is the most typical of such goods:

> "We should expect that organisations representing relatively specialized, narrow, or local interests, would tend to be less inhibited about growth-repressing policies than broader organisations. The highly specialized craft union, for example, will find that, though its featherbedding will have the 'external diseconomy' of reduced national output and will even typically reduce the aggregate earnings of the factors of production in the industry in which its members are employed, its own members bear such a minute cost that the featherbedding may still be attractive. An organisation that represents all of the workers, or all of the firms, in an industry, will have reasons to be somewhat less restrictive". (Olson 1976, 34)

This would apply to national confederations even more:

> "A union that represented all manual workers in a country, or an organisation that represented all major businesses, or a political party that represented all of some broad social group, such as the 'working class', would 'internalize' so much of the 'external diseconomy' of a growth reducing policy that it is likely to do almost as much to promote economic growth as to prevent it". (Ibid.)

Philippe Schmitter has pointed at the same possibility of national peak associations, that is, to offset the normal properties of interest-group action, its tendency being to specialize in the furtherance of one rather limited interest. A national union confederation especially when internally structured by industrial unions and closely linked to a large class-based party,

> "...may internalize a considerable range of interests, e.g., workers, consumers, taxpayers, pensioners, etc., and hence be expected to weigh up and moderate claims within its organizational structure rather than pass them on to external political processes". (Schmitter 1981, 15)

Trade union confederations are associations of associations. Normally, they have no direct individual members as unions do, but their members consist of union organisations. May they, given size and heterogeneity, be inclined to "take a somewhat less parochial view than the narrow associations of which they are composed" (Olson 1982, 50), they may all the same lack the internal

unity and authority vis-à-vis these member-associations to arrive at coherent policies. So, we should treat the internal unity and the authority over affiliates, respectively the ability to take binding decision on their behalf, as important variables.

The possibility of a national union confederation to coordinate and control its affiliates will also be affected by the number of affiliates and the equality of these affiliates in terms of size and resources. If the number of affiliated unions is small, the confederation's control capacity tends to be high, simply because many are more difficult to control than few. However, the smaller the number of affiliates, the larger each of them will be, and the larger an affiliate the more power and resources it will have. In other words, it is likely to be less dependent on the confederation. One would expect that the control capacity of a confederation would be impaired most when some of its affiliates are large and the remainder numerous, small and dependent.

Frequently, a nation's union movement is represented by more than one peak association of trade unions. Their division may have different reasons and consequences (see: infra). Other things being equal, the reasoning followed above may be expected to apply better to a united national confederation, comprising all possible sections of the working class, than to a divided group of confederations, better to non-competing than to competing confederations, more to confederatoins that are largely representative than to confederations which are threatened by old or new outside competitors.

Most of the variables specified so far will be recalled from Schmitter's original definition of a corporatist system of interest-intermediation: singularity, representational monopoly, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered, functionally differentiated, compulsory, state recognized or licensed (Schmitter 1979, 13). This definition had the advantage that it focussed on a

set of observable, institutionally distinctive traits of interest representation. In this definition, two dimensions are combined: recognition and control by governments on the one hand, and the structure of the system of interest intermediation on the other. As Lehmbruch has noticed, the emphasis is on the latter (Lehmbruch 1982, 5). Indeed, the definition suggest a co-variation of the dimensions "organisational participation in government" and "structure of the system of interest intermediation". There are good theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that the co-optation of organisations into government bodies enhances the tendency towards representational monopoly and hierarchical structure, but one could conceive of a reverse relationship as easily. The same might be argued for the co-variation with yet another dimension of "corporatism". Often corporatism is referred to as "concertation", i.e. arrangements, deals or exchanges in which the participating associations become co-responsible for policy-formation and capable of exercising control over the behaviour of members (Lehmbruch 1982, Crouch 1982, Schmitter 1983). Usually, the argument has been that "concertation" presupposed a highly structured system of interest intermediation, but some evidence suggests an incremetalist relationship the other way round.

It seems appropriate to consider these as empirical questions and to measure the dimensions involved independently. This implies the construction of theoretically informed and valid indicators as well as establishing the appropriate data base. Lehmbruch has rightly pointed to the fact that in the field of interest intermediation, we are in a much less privileged position compared to electoral and party research, in which a rich data base of official electoral statistics and survey research exists. As interest intermediation is often weakly and less uniformly institutionalized, the difficulties of access may be considerable and the data far more heterogeneous

and fragmentary. Frequently, the information given is outdated and measured at only one point in time, and, across countries, not even the same point in time (e.g. Von Beyme 1977). Considering the important changes in organizational structures and practices in, for instance, a number of British and German unions, which took place in the relatively short period of fifteen years (Undy et al. 1981, Streeck 1982), this "static" treatment of data is even inappropriate with respect to the most "systematic" and "hard-to-change" dimension of corporatism: the organisational structure of the system of interest intermediation.

The first purpose of this paper is to develop a set of multi-dimensional indicators measuring the position and strength of national confederations of trade unions within the wider trade union movement. In doing so, I will disentangle the different dimensions involved in what is usually called the "centralisation" of the trade union movement. My basic idea is that we should distinguish between three sets of organisational properties:

- the first relates to the horizontal integration of the national trade union movement: singularity, monopoly, unity and non-competitiveness;
- the second dimension relates to the vertical or hierarchical integration of the national trade union movement, i.e. centralisation of decision-making proper;
- finally, I want to distinguish a third dimension, related to both horizontal and vertical integration, i.e. organisational concentration.

Each of these dimensions or sets of organisational properties can be measured through multiple indicators. However, only some aspects can be measured rigorously by means of purely quantitative data that vary over time:

e.g., associational monopoly, union density, number of unions, equality of affiliates. For some aspects, such as staff-member ratio, strike payment, etc., data are harder to acquire, less precise and of a more 'static' character. In order to arrive at theoretically meaningful, composite indexes, we are bound to evaluate and to weigh differences. The commensurability of, indeed, complex configurations may depend upon employing rather weak levels of measurement (Headey 1970, Lehmbruch 1982).

In the following I will discuss twenty national confederations of trade unions in ten West European countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and West Germany. All these confederations are peak associations, that is, they have other associations, i.e trade unions, as their members. Secondly, they are national organisations, in principle covering the whole national territory. Thirdly, they organize throughout the national economy, comprising several sectors of industrial and economic, privately or publicly organized activity. (2) In 1980 the twenty confederations discussed in this paper had a combined membership of about 38 million persons or 87.4% of all unionized workers in the ten countries considered.

The data have been gathered through national and international statistical sources, union statistics, union rulebooks and other union sources, monographs on trade unions and trade union movements and some additional interviews. The sources have been documented in "Dimensions of Union Growth in Western Europe" (Visser 1984), to which a bibliography of national and international sources used has been added.

In its present state, this paper aims first of all at the construction of a set of indicators and the presentation of a comparative data-set. In a later stage, data and indicators will be more clearly applied to theory and hypothesis-testing. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that the paper only

deals with the position of national confederations of trade unions, that is, one focal organisation in the wider organisational action set of which each national trade union movement is composed. finally, the indices proposed do not "measure" societal corporatism - as has been suggested in some of the older literature (cf. Wilensky 1976, Schmitter 1982) - but only one element underlying corporatism. One would also need to consider the other side, that is the structure of interest representation of business (Schmitter & Streeck 1982, Schmitter 1983).

FOOTNOTES

(1) The empirical research on which this paper is based has been conducted during my stay at the European Univeristy Institute in Florence and is closely related to the international comparative project on Business Interest Organizations, directed by Philippe C. Schmitter anb Wolfgang Streeck. An earlier draft has been presented at the Fifth Summer School on Comparative Politics (Florence, 20 June - 16 July, 1983). I have benefitted from the many comments of its participants. In particular, I wish to express my gratitude to Colin Crouch, Peter Farago, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Walter Jansen Heytmeijer, Suzanne Lindholm, Marino Regini, Bill Roche, Michele Micheletti, Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter. Of course, the final product is, for better or for worse, my sole responsibility.

(2) These are all organisations of which unions are members. Not included are "bargaining cartells", etc., which frequently exist between unions, affiliated to the same or to different confederations, within the same sector fo the economy: e.g., the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions and similar bargaining coalitions in other sectors, such as textiles, in the United Kingdom, the Federativ-Verbandes des Personals oeffentliche Verwaltungen und Betriebe in Switzerland, the Algemene Centrale van Overheidspersoneel and similar christian union coalitions in the public sector in the Netherlands, the "bargaining cartells" between unions in the Scandinavian countries, etc.

I. ASSOCIATIONAL MONOPOLY and UNITY

This dimension has four aspects that need to be considered: (a) unity (b) internal fragmentation, (c) associational monopoly, and (d) external competition.

(a) Unity

In some countries only one central peak association exists or predominates, whereas in other countries two or more such national centres exist. If "pluralism" of national union centres prevails, we are interested in the types of relationships between them: do they compete for membership and or influence, are they politically, ideologically and/or organisationally adverse to each other, do they ignore each other (recruiting and representing members in different areas of the economy), or do they cooperate? These are some of the possibilities that presumably depend to a large extent on the type of cleavage which determines the division of a national trade union movement predominantly arises. An important consideration is to what extent the domains of membership of these organisations overlap. One would expect that the more confederations (that is to say: their affiliated unions) recruit members among the same categories of wage earners (defined by sector of the economy, skill-level, status, regional, cultural, ethnical, linguistic criteria etc.), the more likely competition between these confederations will be high. In this sense, it makes a difference whether the division between two confederations is demarcated by

occupational status, or whether it is of a more diffuse nature, for example arising from different political views and allignments. Competition for membership is likely to be related to competition for influence vis-à-vis employers and the state, although one can have competition for influence without competition for members.

The division of a national trade union movement may arise from several sources:

--Religious cleavages have often lead the basis for the creation of seperate national union confederations, each of which identifies itself with a particular and distinct set of beliefs. This division is predominant (but weakened) in the Netherlands, and explains a part of the divisions found in Switzerland. Before 1933 and 1934 respectively, this was the main dividing line in the German and Austrian trade union movement.

--Different political and ideological views and affiliations are the second main source from which a divided trade union movement arises, as in the cases of Italy and France.

> In most cases these two divisions somehow go together. The political division in the French trade union movement has also religious components, at least up to 1964 (formation of the CFDT). In Italy it undoubtedly has strong religious origins. Of course the reverse is also true, religious divisions often go together with different political views and allignments, not surprisingly, since the party system in Western Europe is to a large extent based on the same cleavage. Nevertheless, I still think it meaningful to distinguish between these two types of division within a nation trade union movement, since they are related to quite different inter-organisational consequences. A trade union movement predominantly divided by religion, in

which each confederation captures a part of the workforce that is distinct by religious identity and, therefore, relatively closed as area of recruitment for competing confederations, may find it easier to cooperate at the level of confederations, of which each is granted its own domain and internal autonomy, than a movement which is split politically. An example of this is provided by the three Dutch confederations (catholic, protestant and social-democratic), that - after the immediate post-war challenge of a "Doorbraak" or de-pillarization had proven to be ephemerical - found it quite easy to agree and, what is more, to implement a "non-competition pact", as they found it equally easy to cooperate with one another on virtually all policy matters but one: the educational activities that were supposed to foster the own identity. Headey, in his 1970-article on trade union centralisation makes more or less the same point. Although he does not directly deal with unity of the trade union movement, he rightly observes that inter-confederal cooperation is most difficult to obtain when the split is political. In this form, however, his statement comes near of being tautological. Thus, Headey limits "political divided" to those cases where one of the major union centres is communist, which he then assumes to be equal to "competitive militancy". From this it follows that "where a communist confederation exists (...) it seems unlikely that a wage policy would be accepted" or any form of cooperation between confederations be viable. Though we should not exclude other types of political divisions (e.g , between liberal, centrist or social-democratic oriented confederations), neither assume "competitive militancy" to be an exclusive property of communist trade union centres, it does seem to me a reasonable proposition that inter-confederal coopertion is likely to be of a more strained nature when the split is mainly political. The reason being that a political division by its very nature entails a rather geneneralized and diffuse competitiveness. (e.g., the perpetious difficulties in maintaining a "Federazione unitaria" between the three Italian confederations, and the rather short-lived and partial cooperation between the CGT and the CFDT in France).

--A third type of division is associated with <u>conflicting organisational principles</u>: organisation of unions according to craft/skill-level/occupation/status <u>versus</u> organisation according to industrial sector. Historically, this issue has played a major role in almost all countries. The last major example of this leading to two seperated confederations could be found in the United States before the merger of the AFL (craft based) and the CIO (industrial unionism) in 1955. With the expansion of industrial unionism,

especially since World War II, this source of conflict - known as the classical Organisationsfrage - has lost much of its troubling character, although it still plays an important role within many confederations. I return to this point shortly, that is in relation with the internal fragmentation of trade union confederations. The only actual but, indeed, minor example of a seperate craft-based confederation is the YS in Norway, founded in 1977 and comprising both manual and non-manual craft unions (if we neglect the even smaller "federations" of craft unions still existing in some older industries, particularly textiles, in the U.K.).

--More important has become a fourth source of division, which can be seen as a modified version of the third type: the division based on status and occupational differences, particularly between manual and non-manual occupations. This difference accounts for the existence of independent confederations of white collar employees, managerial staffs and civil servants in Sweden (TCO, SACO-SR), Denmark (FTF, AC), Norway (AF, YS), West Germany (DAG, DBB, ULA), Netherlands (RMHP), Switzerland (VSA) and France (CGC-CFE, FEN). Almost everywhere these confederations, some of them may be better described as a loose federation of white collar unions, came into existence in response to the existing "general" confederation which organized indistinctively blue and white collar workers. In general they are of a much younger age. With the exception of the Austrian and German confederations OGB and DGB that were founded after the last world war (but in fact they were reconstitutions of much older confederations) and a number of confederations that came into existence by breaking away from older confederations (in Italy the

CISL and the UIL, in France the FO and the CFDT), all the manual workers and general confederations date back to the turn of the century, and some even long before that. The oldest are the Britsh TUC (1868) and the Swiss SGB (1880), followed by the French CGT (1895) and the three Scandinavian LO's (just before the turn of the century), with the Dutch NVV (1905) and the Italian CGIL (1906) closing the queue. The protestant and catholic confederations were all formed between 1900 and the end of World War I. The white collar union confederations, with the exception of the Swiss VSA which was founded in 1920, are more recent inventions: TCO and SACO (Sweden, 1944 and 1947, respectively); CCC (France, 1945); DAG, DBB, ULA (West Germany, 1945, 1950 and 1951 respectively, but here again there had been forerunners), FTF (Denmark, 1952) and a proliferation of smaller white collar confederations (or union coalitions) since the 1970s.

The occupational division is likely to be associated with lower levels of inter-confederal conflict in so far as each one is specializing in recruiting one category of employees: for example, in Sweden between the LO and the TCO; in Denmark between the LO, the FTF and the AC; or in Switzerland between the SGB and the VSA. But the typical situation is that we have on the one hand a general confederation organizing all employees, manual as well as non-manual, and on the other hand a smaller confederation which specializes in organizing only the latter category of employees, which means that the two organisations compete in this domain of white collar occupations.

--A fifth source of division in national trade union movements is

related to regional (cultural, ethnical, linguistical) differences. Among the countries considered, only in Switzerland this accounts for a seperate confederation, the Fédération Romande des Employés (Canada and Belgium present major cases of this division). (2)

--Had we included countries like Canada and Ireland in our comparision, yet another dividing line in the trade union movement would be discovered: between unions affiliated to national and unions affiliated to international confederations that have their headquarters abroad. In Canada, unions affiliated to confederations with headquarters in the USA represented still 49% of the total union membership in 1976. In the Irish Republic, unions affiliated to British confederations accounted for 15% of the total membership in 1979.

Table 1 visualizes the presence of divisions in the national trade union movements. I have omitted the two dimensions (national/international and craft/industrial unionism) that did not occur.

Table 1: divisions between central peak federations of trade unions

	political	religious	occupational	regional
Austria	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	0	0	(1)	0
West Germany	0	0	1	0
Norway	0	0	1	0
Sweden	0	0	2	0
Denmark	0	0	2	0
Italy	2	0	0	0
Netherlands	(1)	2	1	0
Switzerland	1	1	1	1
France	2	1	1	0

1 = minor
2 = major
() = emerging or, to some extent, present

I will briefly discuss each country:

Austria is the only case in which - since 1945 - only one central peak organisation exists: the Oesterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund. The OGB has established a singular position: although in majority socialist, it transcends all political and religious divisions existing in Austria. OGB-membership equals total union membership in Austria.

United Kingdom: the Trade Union Congress is in fact the only central peak federation of trade unions organizing wage and salary earners throughout all sectors of the economy. Despite being closely tied to the Labour Party, many originally independent unions of white collar employees and civil servants have joined the TUC during the past two decades. The TUC is not the only confederation, though. Next to the TUC the Department of Employment lists some 43 "confederations" operating in the U.K. Some are more readily recognized as trade unions pur sang, though they formally have

adopted a federal structure. Some are just joint bodies or bargaining coalitions of either craft unions in particular sectors of the economy (e.g. textile, printing & papermaking) or professional employee unions (March 1979, ACAS 1981). Although many unions have still remained outside the TUC, they are generally the very small ones:

Table 2: number and average size of unions in U.K., 1950-1979.

year	number of TUC unions	average size	number of independ. unions	average size	share TUC in total membership
1950	186	42.085	546	2.676	84.3%
1960	183	43.958	481	3.338	83.7%
1970	142	70.438	401	2.955	89.4%
1975	111	99.423	359	2.758	91.8%
1979	109	111.629	347	3.671	89.6%

West Germany: the position of the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) is in many respects similar to that of the Austrian OGB. Also founded in the direct aftermath of the World War II as a unitarian confederation - transcending all religious, polilical and occupational divisions that had existed in Germany before 1933 -, it has been largely successful in maintaining this position. But unlike the Austrian OGB it has to face competition by some rival confederations that have considerable sectoral importance. The most important ones are the Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft, re-founded in 1945 as a hereditor of white collar unions that had existed before 1933 and organizing mainly non-manual workers in the private sector (Angestellten), and the Deutsche Beamtenbund, founded in 1950 as an confederation of unions of civil servants (that is,

those who have a special status in terms of job tenure, pension rights etc.) While it is questionable whether the DAG can be regarded as a proper confederation, the DBB certainly is. Both organisations entertain cooperative relationships between them, but compete with the DGB for 40.9% and 10.2% respectively of the workforce (1980). We know much less about the Union Leitender Angestellte which was founded in 1951 as a confederation of four unions organizing managerial staffs. The ULA is thought to represent some 30,000-40,000 members (mid-1970s). Finally, along religious/political lines a very minor split exists since the foundation - in 1955 - of the conservative-catholic Christliche Gewerkschaftsbund which is estimated to comprise a relatively stable membership between 200,000 and 260,000 members. The CGB has 18 affiliated unions, the most important being the Deutsche Handels- und Industrie-angestellten Verein with about 60,000 members.

Table 3: shares of minor confederations in German union membership

	% shares in: total union membership			manual	Anngestellte		Beamte	
	DAG	DBB	CGB	CGB	DAG	DHV	DBB	CGB
1950	4.1	2.2	-	-	35.4	-	35.4	-
1960	5.9	8.5	2.5	ca. 1.0	37.3	4.4	50.7	9.0
1970	5.7	8.9	3.0	ca. 1.0	30.6	4.0	48.1	9.1
1980	5.2	8.6	3.1	ca. 1.0	22.3	2.8	44.7	9.2

Norway: Norway is the fourth country in which the trade union movement is to a large extent represented by one central peak

organisation: the Landesorganisasjonen i Norge (LO). Like the OGB, DGB and TUC, the Norwegian LO organizes workers throughout the economy. No politically rival confederations exist. But in the past decennium some rival confederations based on occupational and status distinctions have been founded and gained importance: the Akademikerners Fellesorganisasjon (1974) and the Yrkesorganisasjonen Sentralforbund (1977). The AF organizes mainly academics and professional employees, the YS mainly white collar employees but also some skilled (craft based) manual worker unions (particularly in the oil industry). Unlike the DGB and the TUC, the LO has been relatively unsuccessful in keeping pace with the growing unionization of white collar employees. Its share in total membership has declined from 85.6% in the mid-1950s to 67.8% in 1980, among non-manual workers from 48.7% in 1965 to 38.2% in 1980. Although both AF and YS are still small in terms of membership (in 1980 they represented 9.6% resp. 9.0% of all union members in Norway), they have established a position among non-manual workers (now about half of the Norwegian labour force) that equals that of the LO (the AF represents 19.1%, the YS 17% of the unionized non-manual employees in 1980).

Sweden and Denmark present cases where the trade union movement is clearly split at the confederal level along occupational (manual/non-manual) lines. The Danish and Swedish LO's organize non-manual union members as well, but since long there have been relatively strong confederations of white collar employee unions next to these general confederations.

Denmark: the Landesorganisationen i Danmark (LO) recruits both manual and non-manual workers in the private and public sector. However, higher graded white collar employees, civil servants and professional employees tend to adhere to other organisations. The Faellesraedet for Danske Tjenestemands -og Funktionaer-organisationer (FTF), a central organisation of white collar unions, was founded in 1952 and represents an important part of the unionized white collar employees. It occupies the space in the middle of the domain of white collar employees, between - at the lower end - the LO and - at the higher end - the Central Organisation of Professional Employees (AC). This Akademikernes Centralorganisation was founded in 1972 (its direct predecessor, the AS, a coalition of professional employee unions, dates back to 1962). In Denmark one finds a rather strict demarcation along occupational, or should one better say, educational lines. Given one's occupational training and educational credentials, the union to which one adheres is also determined. Since 1973 there exists an agreement on recruitment and cooperation between the LO and the FTF that is fairly well observed. Similar arrangements exist with the AC.

Next to these confederation, a fourth organisation, the Hovedorganisation for Arbejdleder -og Tekniske Funktionaerforeninger i Danmark (Faellesrepraesentationen) (FR), recruits supervisors and technical staffs. Since its foundation it has a rather stable membership, recruiting in a domain of its own. Like the AC, the FR comprises self-employed members as well. In the public sector, lastly, some "cartells" exist: CO-I for the

lower-graded public employees (the so-called "silvercords") in which both LO and FTF affiliates as well as some independent unions cooperate, CO-II for the higher-graded state functionaries (the "goldcords") through which a number of FTF-affiliates arrange their bargaining activities. CO-I and CO-II date back to 1909; a similar bargaining cartell for teachers' unions (mainly within the FTF), the so-called Learernes Centralorganisation (LC), was founded in 1975.

Table 4 shows the decline of the LO-share in total union membership due to the increasing unionisation of white collar employees. Note, however, that since the early Seventies the LO has managed to stabilize its share

Table 4: shares of LO, FTF and AC in total Danish union membership

	LO	FTF	AC
1950	84.5		
1955	80.9	7.1 (1953)	
1960	80.1	12.0	
1965	77.3	-	
1970	73.5	15.0	
1973	72.9	15.7	3.3
1975	71.6	16.1	3.2
1980	71.1	15.6	4.0

AC-share: without self-employed members
The FR represent less than 2% of the total membership.

Sweden: Although the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions, the Landesorganisationen i Sverige (LO) is in principle open to both blue collar and white collar workers, it has never been successful in recruiting the latter category. Only in one particular sector - commerce - it recruits the majority of (low graded) non-manual workers. Some of its unions (insurance, musicians, state and

municipal employees) do include some white collar employees, but the majority of its "industrial sector" unions comprise only manual workers. The bulk of the white collar workers in Sweden is organized in unions affiliated to the second largest organisation, the Tjanstemannens Centralorganisation (TCO), founded in 1944. Between the LO and the TCO little competition exists; they cooperate closely and their membership domains are fairly well demarcated. The LO faces almost no competition. Only few unionized manual workers have remained outside the LO. The older syndicalist confederation, Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation (SAC), founded in 1909, has a declining membership like the independent union of dockers (HBT). The TCO, however, faces competition from a confederation of civil servants and professional employee unions, the Statstjanstemannens Riksforbund (1917) and Sveriges Akademikers Central Organisation (1947), which merged in 1974 (SACO-SR) The latter organisation has tried to move into the TCO-domain by lowering its admission rules, sometimes with success. The TCO tries to secure itself through a close cooperation with the LO, excluding the SACO-SR from certain political avenues of access to political decision-making. But this has recently led to dissent within the TCO, causing the breaking away of two (one very large) unions recruiting higher paid professional employees (SALF). In 1979 these two unions tried to establish a fifth confederation, but it was refused recognition. To sum up, inter-confederal relationships in Sweden have so far been characterized by little jurisdictional conflict, the domains being fairly strictly demarcated by occupational and educational boundaries. Recently, conflictual tendencies, both with respect to member-recruitment and wage-policy,

have become manifest in, particularly, the domain of higher-paid white collar employees.

Table 5 shows fairly well the long-term decline of the LO's share in total union-membership, concommittent with the shift from manual to non-manual occupations in the Swedish economy and the growing unionization of the latter category (from 16% in 1930 to 70% in the late 1960s).

Share of confederations in total union membership

	LO	TCO	SACO-SR	SAC	(SALF)
1950	79.2	16.7	2.7	1.2	
1960	77.0	18.9	3.8	0.9	
1970	67.2	26.5	5.0	0.9	
1980	60.7	39.8	6.4	0.5	(2.6)

Among the non-manual union members the SACO-SR and SALF hold a combined share of just over 20% in 1980.

In the remaining group of countries, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy and France, the national trade union movements are characterized by traditionally deep-rooted political and religious cleavages, to which occupational (and in the case of Switzerland) regional divisions have added themselves. Each country, however, presents a rather different picture. For instance, during the past decennium confederal relations in the Netherlands are moving towards a Swedish-like pattern. The Italian and French patterns of division, to whatever extent they may have been similar in the past (as they are usually treated in textbooks), have in the past fifteen years become very dissimilar.

Netherlands: Since its origins the Dutch trade union movement has been divided along religious lines. After the establishment of the general federation of trade unions, the Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen (NVV), in 1905, the unions organizing catholic and protestant workers established their own confederations as well: the catholics in a Bureau of Roman-Catholic Union Federations (1919), later the Nederlands Katholiek Vakverbond (1964); the protestants in the Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (1909). Unlike Austria and West Germany, this religious division re-emerged completely unchanged after the World War II, the only change being much closer cooperative relationships between the three. In 1944-45, when part of the Dutch territory was liberated from the German troops, a new confederation, the Eenheids Vakcentrale (EVC), was founded in the liberated area. Its original objective was to establish a unitarian trade union centre anchored on factory-based unions replacing the occupational and, partly, industrial unions that had existed prior to 1940. After the re-establishment of the three traditional confederations, and after it had failed to merge with the NVV, the EVC became more and more tied to the Communist Party. The EVC has been refused recognition by employers and the state and in fact, not being represented in the post-war corporatist institutions, it could not succeed in becoming the fourth (syndicalist) centre in the Dutch trade union movement. Though it had been as large as the NVV in 1945-46 and had still 160,000 members, mainly manual workers, in 1950, it declined rapidly and dissolved itself in 1958. Another, rather small confederation with a conservative-liberal orientatation, the Nederlandse Vakcentrale (NVC), founded in 1929 and mainly representing technical and

managerial staff, also survived only until the early 1960s.

Contrary to the pre-war period, NVV, NKV and CNV operated in close cooperation through the Council of Trade Union Centres (Raad van Vakcentrales). Apart from a short interruption from 1954 to 1958, when the Dutch catholic bishops urged catholics to leave socialist and communist organisations, threatening to withold religious services from defectants (with remarkably little success, though), this cooperation lasted until the mid-1970s. The process of de-confessionalisation since the 1960s, which particularly affected the catholic confederation, has probably been the strongest force behind the endeavours to come to one, unitarian confederation. In the mid-fifties, the catholic and protestant confederations still represented one-half of total trade union membership. In 1975 their share fell to slightly over one-third. During the same period the NVV improved its share from 30% to 40%.

When, finally, the protestant confederation (CNV) decided not to join the other two, NVV and NKV formed in 1976 a federation of confederations between them. The Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (FNV), became recently - in January 1982 - a fully-fledged confederation. At present, all the affiliated unions have now also merged. As a consequence of this process towards greater unity, the relationships with the CNV have become more conflictual. All existing joint ventures have been broken up. The CNV is becoming more and more a confederation of white collar unions, especially since some former independent catholic unions (teachers, military personnel, police) joined it.

Table 6: Non-manual trade union membership as percentage of total membership, by confederation, 1950-1982.

	in NVV	in NKV	in CNV
1950	20.7	18.4	26.5
1960	24.9	18.3	31.7
1971	24.3	17.7	27.9
1977	27.7	10.8	37.5
1979	31.1	11.2	42.0
1981	---- 25.8	-- -	42.1
1982	26.2		49.0

In 1975 a new confederation of white collar unions, the Raad voor Middelbaar en Hoger Personeel (RMHP), was born. The former NKV-union of supervisors and lower management, that had left the catholic confederation because it opposed the federation with the NVV, joined this new confederation to become its largest affiliate. In 1981 6.6% of all union members in the Netherlands were members of unions affiliated to the RMHP. Of the non-manual union members this percentage amounted to 14.7%.

The axis along which the Dutch trade union movement is divided has gradually transformed in an occupational (manual/non-manual) and political one. Consequently, inter-confederal relationships are becoming more conflictual.

Italy: The split in the Italian trade union is almost purely of a political nature, although it may have, at least in its origins, some religious aspects too. After the long night of fascisme, the Italian trade union movement was reconstituted in a unitarion fashion (Pact of Rome 1944). In the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) the main political parties worked together (communists, socialists, christian democrats and

republicans). However, this period of unity did not last long. In 1947-48 the christian democrats and the social democrats/republicans broke away and constituted their own confederations: the Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL), the Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL) respectively. The CGIL became entirely tied to the communist and socialist parties, the former party having a firm majority. Until the end-1960's relations with political parties were very tight and competition between the confederations severe. Only since the early 1970's the three confederations started to cooperate and formed a "Federazione unitaria CGIL-CISL-UIL" (Firenze 1972); the linkages to the party system have been weakened accordingly. Many affiliated unions co-operate now closely through federative structures. The original objective of merging into a unitarian trade union centre has not been realized, though, and during the past three, four years tensions between the three confederations have been growing.

The cooperation between the three major confederation had a stabilizing effect on their relative shares in total membership:

Table 7: membership shares of Italian confederations

	CGIL	CISL	UIL
1950	68.7	18.6	12.7
1955	65.5	21.3	13.2
1960	54.1	28.2	16.0
1965	51.2	33.7	15.1
1970	50.7	34.8	14.5
1975	51.7	35.3	13.0
1980	48.9	35.1	16.0

Outside the three big confederations some independent unions, affiliated to the so-called "autonomous" confederations (CISAL,

CISNAL, the latter of which is connected with national-fascist ideology), exist but it is difficult to assess their numerical importance. In some sectors, particularly private and public services (banking, transport, health, education), they have some strongholds (going up to 30% of total membership in these particular sectors).

Switzerland presents, probably together with France, the most fragmented picture. Here we find five (recently: four) confederations at the national level and one at the regional level. Historically, the major split seems to be religious: next to the non-religious Sweizerischer Gewerkschaftsbund (SGB), the oldest and largest confederation, a catholic and a protestant confederation were founded at the end of World War I: the Christlich-Nationale Gewerkschaftsbund (CNG) and the Schweizerischer Verband Evangelischer Arbeitnehmer (SVEA) respectively. The SVEA went broke in 1982 and is now defunct; it recommended its membership to join the "catholic" CNG. In comparision to the SGB these two organisations are rather small (the SGB accounts for about half of the Swiss union membership, the CNG for 10%, the SVEA for little less than 2%). Over the past decennia their relative shares have remained close to constant, indicating a low degree of competition. However, the traditional "Zersplitterung der Kraefte" of the Swiss union movement is not exhausted with this predominantly religious cleavage. There exists still a conservative-liberal confederation, the Landesverband Freier Schweizer Arbeitnehmer (LSFA), connected with the liberal party, that opposes itself to the social democratic outlook of the SGB. It accounts for no more than 2.6% of the total

union membership. Slightly more union members are represented through a regional confederation, the Fédération Romande des employés. Of far more importance is the confederation of white collar unions, the Vereinigung Schweizerische Angestelltenverbaende, in 1980 accounting for 16.6% of Swiss union membership (but 45% of all unionized white collar employees).

Despite the high degree of fragmentation, the inter-confederal relationships seem to be quite co-operative. Stability seems to be the general feature of the Swiss trade union system. Each confederation recruits members in its own "niche", for example the SGB seems to leave the white collar employees in the private sector completely to the VSA. The shares of each confederation in total union membership have changed remarkably little, the only confederation which shows a slight increase is the VSA, due to the growing number of non-manual union members. With respect to collective bargaining and representation of members' interests in the political area the confederations and their affiliated unions entertain co-operative relationships, in some cases also with independent unions. A case in point is the Federativ Verbandes des Personals oeffentliche Verwaltungen und Betriebe through which seven SGB-unions in the public sector cooperate with three independent public sector unions. All confederations enjoy recognition and representational rights in the Swiss political system (the so-called "Vorparlementarisches Verfahren").

In France we find the most divided and conflictual trade union system. We can count five to six national trade union centres of importance. The division is predominantly political, but religious

and, especially, occupational aspects play an additional role. The oldest and largest confederation, still accounting for over one-third of French union membership, is the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT). It is closely tied to the communist party, a minority is connected to the socialist party. In 1947-48 part of the CGT, opposing communist dominance, broke away and formed the CGT-Force Ouvrière (FO). The catholic confederation, the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC), founded in 1919 and refounded directly after the liberation of France, experienced a major split in 1964 when a large majority decided to followed the decision to de-confessionalize and subsequently joined the new established Confédération Française Democratique du Travail, which later developed a radical socialist ideology and is now second largest. The relationships between all these confederations are highly conflictual. There was a short interval of relative peace between 1972 and 1977-78 when the CGT and CFDT cooperated in some fields in the context of the "Programme Commun" between the Left parties. But apart from being only partial, this cooperation never excluded, nor weakened the incentives of ungoing compition for membership.

Relations with the Confederation of technical and managerial staffs, the Confédération Générale des Cadres, recently reconstituted as the Confédération Française d'Encadrement - this organisation originated in the 1936-37 during the Popular Front period and was also re-founded in 1945 - are equally strained. CGT, CFDT and CGT-FO have tried to answer the growth of the CGC by forming their own unions of managerial staffs (at odds with their formal committment to the principle of "industrial unionism"), but as it seems with

only modest success. In the sector of education an independent federation of teachers unions, the Fédération Nationale de l'Education (FEN), originally belonging to the CGT but avoiding the political split of 1947 by constituting itself as an independent federation, has established a quasi-monopoly. This has not prevented other confederations, particularly the CFDT, of trying to establish their own teachers' unions. Finally, we should mention the so-called "autonomous" confederation, the Confédération des Syndicats Libres, which is not important numerically, but has some important strongholds at firm level (particular in the automobile sector at Peugeot and Citroen). In 1980 the CFTC represented between 4% and 5% of total French union membership, the CGC-CFE represented about 8% and the FEN over 10%. Independent unions are believed to organize no more than 2% to 3 %. However, the three "big" confederations - CGT, CFDT and FO - hold a smaller share in total membership in 1980 than they did in 1970, 1960 or 1950. This is almost totally due to the continuous decline of the CGT. The high degree of inter-confederal competition can be read from the data on the relative shares of each of the three confederations in their combined membership:

Table 8: membership distribution between the three major French confederations

	CGT	CFDT	FO
1950	80.2	9.6a	10.2
1955	69.6	15.2a	15.2
1960	66.1	18.5a	15.4
1965	63.3	20.4b	16.3
1970	57.0	22.8	20.1
1975	53.6	25.9	20.5
1980	49.0	25.9	25.2

a = CFTC; b = CFTC + CFDT in 1964.

The same tendencies are revealed by the data on elections for the French enterprise councils: a steady decline of the CGT, a strengthening of the CFDT until the mid-1970's; at the same time an increasing vote-share for "non-union" and "other-union" representatives (see: data in Visser 1984).

To sum up, with respect to unity of national trade union centres we can establish three, maybe four types:

1. a highly divided trade union movement in which three or more national trade union centres exist. This applies to the cases of France and Switzerland, but with the important distinction that in France inter-confederal relationships are highly competitive and conflictual, whereas in Switzerland they are not.

2. a divided trade union movement in which two to three national poles exist, but in which competition between these centres is to a large extent limited. This applies certainly to the cases of Denmark and Sweden, and to a lesser extent to the Netherlands and Italy (since the early 1970's).

3. a unified trade union movement in which only one national centre or central peak federation exists or is largely dominant. Austria is the most pure example of this, but it applies as well to the U.K., West Germany and Norway, although one might argue that particularly in the case of Norway there is a retarded development towards a Danish- and Swedish-like pattern.

(b) Internal fragmentation

So far I have discussed unity between confederations of trade unions. A further aspect is their internal unity, that is within each confederation. Like unity between confederation, internal unity is an important organisational condition with respect to the capacity of a trade union movement to co-ordinate its policies together with other actors in the industrial relations system. The greater the homogeneity of the organizational principles on which the confederation is built and the internal unity of its political culture, the less difficulties it will have in arriving at and implementing a common policy. This organizational and political homogeneity should not be confounded with the heterogeneity of membership composition referred to earlier.

In priciple, all sources of division regarding the relationships between confederations can also contribute to internal competition. I will however concentrate on what I see as the two main sources of internal disunity and fragmentation. That is (1) competition between unions affiliated to the same peak association, and (2) political factions existing within confederations and their affiliated unions.

The main source of internal competition and fragmentation relates to inter-union competition arising from overlapping domains of membership. The more the domains of membership of the affiliated unions are neatly demarcated, the less space for competition will exist. This is very strong related to "industrial unionism" as a principle of union organisation, since demarcation by economic sectors tend to minimize disputes over recruitment and bargaining rights. An additional point is that thus defined domains, particularly if large, are less subject to change than domains defined by levels of skill, occupational status and the like. Size and stability of recruitment domains and bargaining territories tend to be inversely related to inter-union strife.

Inter-union competition is never completely absent, not even between industrial sector unions. New industrial branches, such as nuclear energy, aluminium production, etc , upset old boundaries, once neatly drawn, and may give rise to membership disputes. Unions in industrial sectors, such as textiles, clothing, mining, etc., experiencing a decline of employment and membership may become eager to move into what they perceive as expanding areas, through mergers

or otherwise (HUGHES 1967, UNDY et al. 1981). Some sectors, especially those outside the traditional manufacturing industries, may be hard to define and each demarcation may and, occasionally, will be contested. In particular the "service" sector and the "public" sector of the economy in general can, as the evidence from different countries shows, be demarcated in many different ways. This being said, it is still to be expected that inter-union competition will be minimized when union domains are demarcated by broad economic or industrial sectors. Consequently, in the majority of cases conflicts will be confined to bordeline-cases only. The incentives for inter-union competition will be highest, however, if unions recruit wage- and salary-earners according to different, often strongly conflicting, organisational principles. That is, in a situation in which craft unions, white collar unions or general unions claim the same domains as industrial sector unions.

Of all countries, only in West Germany, with the post-war reconstruction of the DGB, the principle of "industrial unionism" has fully been instituted. However, the price of this strict application in the DGB has been the foundation of a rival union centre of white collar employees, the Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft (DAG). The DAG, which is not a proper confederation but really a catch all white collar union, has been refused the affiliation to the DGB in spite of its repeated requests, because it was and is unwilling to submerge its membership in the white and blue collars organizing sectoral unions of the DGB. Within the DGB and between its sectoral unions some domain conflicts, of small magnitude, do actually exist. (BAIER et al 1981, STREECK 1982).
The structure of its Austrian counterpart, the OGB, comes close to the realisation of industrial sector unionism. However, in 1945 the OGB did exempt white collar employees in the private sector of the economy from organizing themselves in sectoral unions together with blue collar workers. So, the OGB-affiliates are industrial sector unions except for one big catch all white collar union, the Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten (GPA), that crosscuts industrial and service sectors. Thus far, there seems to have been little inter-union

conflict between the ÖGB-affiliates, but in recent times some manual worker unions in stagnating or even declining manufacturing sectors have become increasingly concerned about loosing members to the expanding GPA (TRAXLER 1982).

In the Netherlands, a reorganisation of union membership domains according to the industrial principle was decided upon by the three main confederations, NVV, NKV and CNV, in 1950. Only the NVV succeeded in a full implementation, in the course of which a union of technical engineers was expelled in 1952. Industrial unionism was realized in the protestant CNV as well, but at a much slower pace. Resistence came from within the catholic confederation. The KAB, in 1964 renamed NKV, never succeeded in integrating its white collar union in industry in sectoral unions comprising white and blue collar employees. Its white collar union in industry left the NKV in 1974, at the eve of the confederal decision to federate with the NVV. Since the early 1970s there hase been a wave of mergers between unions into "multi-industrial" or "conglomerate" unions in all three confederations. For example, unions in textiles, metalworking, electronic and chemical production, as well as miscellanous industries, merged in one conglomerate union (Industriebond). In the public sector the same process gave rise to one general "public employee" union, comprising blue and white collar employees of the central and local government as well as parts of public industry and state-subsidized services (e.g , health and social security, universities, post office workers, central and local government, gas, water and electricity workers, all public transport except railways, custom office employees). In the 1970's jurisdictional conflicts between unions belonging to the same confederation occurred frequently, for instance between the Industriebonden and the unions in the food processing industry, or between unions who have tried to invade the poorly organized private service sector (TEULINGS et al. 1984). Open conflict, however, has remained the exception.

The Swiss trade union confederations, in particular the SGB and CNG, are committed to the principle of "industrial unionism" as well. But there are many exceptions to the rule, especially in the public sector and some older trades such as printing. The SGB has showed to be manifestly impotent in reorganizing its affiliates. Moreover, white collar employees in the private economy, e.g , manufacturing, construction, banking, insurance and commerce, if organized at all, have remained almost completely outside the unions affiliated to the SGB and the CNG (HOPFLINGER 1980).

In Sweden the LO took already as early as 1906 the decision to reorganize its affiliates in industrial sector unions. But it has taken more than sixty years to implement this decision. According to one author, in 1908 nearly one-half (46%) of all LO-members were organized in industrial unions. In 1953 this proportion had risen to 78%, in 1975 to 85% (KORPI 1978). On the other hand, with few exceptions, most notably the minor syndicalist confederation SAC and the union of managerial employees (SALF) that recently became independent, Swedish

trade unions have traditionally confined themselves to their original domains and there have been few whose membership "has straddled across more than one sector of industry" (BAIN & PRICE 1980: 139). Of course, in comparision with other countries, one has to consider that the Swedish union movement, like the Danish one, was already vertically divided in an early stage. So, a typical industrial union in Sweden comprises only either the manual workers (if belonging to the LO) or the non-manual employees (if belonging to the TCO) in that particular industry, unlike there counterparts in, say, Germany or the Netherlands.

The Norwegian LO adopted the "industry" principle in 1923, but it is still far less implemented than in the Swedish LO. The Norwegian LO is composed of a relatively large number of small unions which are partly based on occupational distinctions. Within the LO inter-union conflict seems to be contained, however, in particular because collective bargaining takes place through relatively stable and well-defined bargaining cartells in which groups of unions cooperate.

The Danish LO has never been able to convince its affiliates to restructure themselves according to demarcation by broad economic sectors, let alone to impose such a principle upon them. Indeed, several LO-congresses have taken decisions in favour of industrial unions, for instance in 1967 when it was decided to create 9 industrial unions, or in 1971 when this decision was repeated but modified to the effect that white collar employees were exempted and got the permission to maintain or create their own union structures, as in the Austrian case. In the Danish LO we still find a mixture of craft- or occupational unions (e.g., the metalworker's union, LO's third largest affiliate), general workers' unions (such as the female workers' union or the largest LO-affiliate: the general union of unskilled manual workers), and industrial or sectoral unions. There have repeatedly been conflicts between, for instance, the metalworkers' union and the general unions over the policies to be adopted by the LO, especially regarding wage policies and central agreements with employers and governments. However, overt inter-union conflict seems to be somewhat counteracted by the existence, like in Sweden and Norway, of "bargaining cartells".

In the United Kingdom the same mixture of different union types exist within the TUC, but in this case this has always been associated with perpetious conflicts between unions with respect to recruitment and bargaining rights. Though the TUC encourages union-mergers and, in fact, many mergers have taken place since the law was changed in 1964, inter-union competition has remained quite strong. Despite "Briddlington" agreements and the like, the TUC does not seem empowered to authoritatively settle disputes between its affiliates, certainly not when any of its larger and potent affiliates is involved.

Different is the situation in Italy and France. In both countries the unions affiliated to the general confederations are organized by sector. In Italy this has been realized with

respect to agriculture, the manufacturing industries and construction. Recently a proces of mergers ("accorpomento") has been initiated in all three confederation in order to realize a rationalized sectoral structure in the private and public services as well. In France sectoral demarcation has always been mixed with occupational unionism ("syndicalisme du metier") and factory unionism ("syndicats d'usine"). Although officially committed to "industrial unionism", this does seem to have little significance in France. Despite recent initiatives towards union-mergers (in the CFDT and FO), a large space for inter-union competition still exists.

With respect to political factionalism the best indicator is whether or not stable political factions, related to the party-system, are allowed and do in fact exist within confederations. Additionally, one would like to know to what extent competition between these factions exist, whether or not this competition is institutionalized or - instead - of a more open and conflictual type and related to different views on the confederation's policies, open leadership contests,, etc. Of the ten countries discussed in this paper, open and recognized political factionalism within confederations exists only in Austria, Italy and France. It can be argued, however, that within the TUC inter-union competition has changing political aspects as well (Hyman 1983, Undy et al. 1981). All the four political parties are represented in the Austrian OGB and allowed to form their own factions. Competition between these factions is however to a high degree institutionalized and the leadership of the SPO (the socialist party) hardly ever contested. Although the linkages between confederations and political parties in Italy have weakened in the early 1970's, factions (parties and party-wings) are known to exist in all confederations and do affect their actions. At the leadership-level of each confederation a complicated balance between the party-factions is maintained, with co-optation playing

an important role. Thus far, open contests appear to have been avoided. An even more complicated political balance is attempted to be upheld within the "Federazione unitaria CGIL-CISL-UIL". In the French confederations, particularly in the CGT and the CFDT, factions based on political parties and party-wings, but perhaps even more important, between such partisan factions and those who oppose the strong ties to political parties, play a considerable role. They make themselves felt in union conferences, leadership contests and, occasionally, open opposition to confederal policies.

Most typically inter-union conflict is caused by overlapping membership domains and competitions for members, or by party factionism. There are other causes as well: unions often compete for influence within their confederation, one reason being that they represent different sectors and groups of the workforce and, accordingly, have different perceptions of the confederal policies to be pursued. In the near future an increasingly important source of division, within industrial sector unions, might be one based on company-structures, firm-size and regional location, but the impact on confederal structures and policies is yet difficult to predict.

Already dilineating itself - at least in some countries and within some confederations - is a division between affiliated unions representing employees in either the private or public sector of the economy. Public employee unionism has grown at a fast speed, especially since the early 1970's, whereas the older manual unions in manufacturing, which originally had founded the confederation and shaped its outlook and policies, are often confronted with

stagnating and even declining membership. Today's trade union movements in Western Europe are less and less predominated by manual workers defending their interests against private capital. The post-war period, but particularly the 1970's, show a conspicuous increase of white collar unionization in both the private and public parts of the economy. As can be seen from Table 9 on the next page, white collar employees, privately and publicly employed, now amount to between two-fifth and one-half of all unionized wage- and salary-earners. Generally, their proportion in total confederal membership is somewhat lower, since a considerable part of the growth of white collar employment has benefited independent unions and newly established union centres. I return to this shortly. It should also be noted, that the variation in the proportion of white collar employees in total confederal membership is, obviously, related to the existence or non-existence of an established confederation of white collar employees.

Table 9: non-manual union members as a proportion of total membership

	1950	1960	1970	1980
Austria	41.4 ('52)	44.6 ('63)	48.3 ('72)	52.9 ('78)
Denmark	27.6 ('55)	29.6	39.2	48.6
LO	14.1 ('55)	16.7	20.9	30.1
FTF	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Norway	-	31.6 ('65)	35.6	47.2
LO	-	18.7 ('65)	20.9	26.0
Netherlands	29.4	36.7	37.4	44.9 ('81)
FNV				26.2 ('82)
NVV	20.7	24.9	24.3	
NKV	18.4	18.3	17.7	
CNV	26.5	31.7	27.9	49.0
Sweden	24.8	30.2	37.6	44.2
LO	6.6	8.5	8.5	8.9
TCO	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
West Germany	25.0 ('51)	31.8 ('61)	36.0 ('71)	42.1 ('81)
DGB	16.7 ('51)	19.4 ('61)	24.2 ('71)	32.0 ('81)
U.K.	23.4 ('51)	26.7 ('61)	33.2 ('71)	40.3 ('79)
TUC	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	-	30.4	34.1	37.0
SGB	-	4.3	5.4	6.7
CNG	-	-	-	5.0
VSA	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

No information available for Italy and France.
The figures for the SGB and the CNG are estimates and should be read with caution.

As with respect to the division manual/non-manual, the emergence of public employee unionism, which can be seen as part of the white collarization process mentioned above, has changed the composition of most confederations as well. About one-third, on average, of all members of the main European union confederations are employed in the public sector (central and local government, public services and industries). In all confederations, with the only exception of the Danish LO, among the three largest affiliates is now one potent public employee unions.

One can only speculate about the impact of this changes on the internal confederal unity and the confederation's capacity to arrive at a common policy. In the past, possibilities of conflict seem to have been attenuated by the acceptance of the wage leadership of the main unions in manufacturing, in particular the metalworkers. In some countries the technique of indexing the salaries of public employees to the main collective agreements in the private sector was used to the same effect. As long as the relatively high rate of economic growth permitted this routine, without making the wage-leading unions feel too restrained in their bargaining activities, there was little reason for both private and public sector unions to quarrel. But with rising public deficits and governments that want to cut high inflation rates, private sector unions have increasingly expressed their unhappiness with traditional policies that may turn them into hostages and, at any rate, limit their bargaining freedom to a considerable effect. On the other hand, many public employee unions have learned to use the traditional strike weapon and have shown to become more militant in

recent times. In the face of the deep and protracted economic recession of the late seventies, in particular hitting the employment prospects in manufacturing, unions in the private sector may adhere, with whatever reluctance, to "privatization" policies. As a consequence one would expect confederal policies to become torn apart between their public and private sector affiliates. In recent years there have been some indications of internal tensions which may be seen in this perspective. But is difficult to tell in advance where, so to speak, the threshold lies and where peak associations become dominated by their public employee unions. Certainly, their numerical importance, in both absolute and relative terms, in vertially all confederations has fastly increased, especially in the 1970's as Table 10 clearly shows. From 1960 to 1980 the proportion of public employees in confederal membership has gone up, on average, from one-fourth to one-third, but there remain remarkable differences between confederations and across countries.

Table 10: public employee members as a proportion of total membership

	1960	1970	1980
United Kingdom			
TUC (1)	39.0 (1948)	46.9 (1974)	43.7 (1979)
Netherlands			
FNV	-	-	34.2 (1981)
NVV	21.4	28.2 (1971)	37.6 (1979)
NKV	14.4	13.7 (1971)	20.5 (1979)
CNV	27.8	35.0 (1971)	50.8 (1981)
Sweden			
LO	-	27.0	33.3
TCO	-	46.0	52.5
Norway			
LO	23.3	26.1	32.9 (1979)
Austria			
OGB	27.3 ('62-'65)	29.7 ('70-'73)	32.2 (1978)
West Germany			
DGB	26.1	26.8 (1961)	29.0 (1981)
Switzerland			
SGB	25.2	26.2	25.6
Italy			
CGIL	7.5	10.0	15.5
CISL	31.6	27.7	26.9
UIL	-	22.2	23.5
Denmark			
LO	-	-	10.1
FTF	-	-	57.8

(1) including mining, nationalized steel industry excluded; calculated for the total union membership (including non-TUC) in the U.K.
No information available for France.

(c) Associational Monopoly

Associational monopoly refers to the share the major confederations have in the total aggregate union membership in a country. As such,

it is an easy quantifiable concept. Of course, this is only one aspect of monopoly. One could also think of the number of collective agreements negotiated by affiliated unions compared to the total number of collective agreements. Or the number of seats they occupy in representational bodies and committees. Given the problem of finding good comparative data on these aspects of confederal monopoly, I have confined myself to membership representation only.

In Table 11 I have summarized this aspect both per confederation and per country, showing the confederal share's from 1950 to 1980. We observe that in all countries seven out of every ten members are represented through the major confederations. In some countries this is even 9 out of every 10 members: Austria (where the OGB maintains a complete monopoly), Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and, close to it. Denmark, Remarkable is also the position the German DGB holds on its own, in particular if we look at its decline during the first ten years of its existence. Though associational monopoly has remained at a high level, in some countries we observe a marked decline, in particular if we look at the oldest, largest and most general confederations such as the LO's in the Scandinavian countries, to a lesser extent the SGB and the three Dutch confederations taken together, and more dramatically the CGIL and the CGT, although the two cases are quite different. It appears that the closer cooperation between the Italian confederation in the 1970's contributed to the CGIL's success in stabilizing its relative share.

Table 11: Associational Monopoly of Major Confederations, 1950-1980
(% shares of confederations in total union membership)

country	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	average '70-'81
Austria:								
ÖGB	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
United Kingdom:								
TUC	84.3	84.8	83.7	85.9	89.4	91.8	89.6	90.2
West Germany:								
DGB	93.7	94.2	82.5	82.0	82.4	83.4	83.1	83.0
Norway:								
LO	-	85.6	83.4	81.6	79.2	72.6	67.8	73.8a
Sweden								
LO	79.2	77.0	75.3	71.2	67.2	62.8	60.7	62.9
TCO	16.7	18.9	20.1	23.3	26.5	31.3	29.8	30.1
	96.0	95.9	95.3	94.5	93.7	93.9	90.5	93.0
Denmark								
LO	84.5	80.9	80.1	77.3	73.5	71.6	71.1	72.3a
FTF		7.1	12.0	-	15.0	16.1	15.6	15.9a
			92.1		88.5	87.7	86.7	88.2
Italy								
CGIL	65.3	59.0	48.7	47.4	48.2	49.1	46.0	48.0
CISL	17.7	19.2	25.4	31.2	33.1	33.5	33.0	33.3
UIL	12.1	11.9	14.4	14.0	13.8	12.4	15.0	13.6
	95.0	90.0	90.5	92.5	95.0	95.0	94.0	95.0
Switzerland								
SGB	-	-	57.6	55.1	52.5	50.8	49.3	50.8
CNG	-	-	11.2	12.1	12.1	12.2	11.9	12.0
VSA	-	-	14.4	15.7	15.9	16.0	16.6	16.3
			83.2	82.9	80.5	79.0	78.8	79.1
Netherlands								
NVV	32.9	37.9	35.9	36.0	36.9	40.0	42.0	40.3
NKV	25.5	29.6	29.6	37.8	26.2	21.1	18.2	21.6
CNV	13.4	16.3	16.2	15.7	15.7	13.3	17.1	15.2
	71.8	83.8	81.7	79.5	78.8	74.4	77.2	77.1
France								
CGT	74.7	61.5	58.4	53.5	44.1	40.8	36.4	39.9
CFDT	9.0b	13.5b	16.0b	17.2c	17.7	19.7	19.2	19.1
FO	9.5	13.5	13.6	13.8	15.6	15.7	18.9	16.6
	93.2	88.5	86.6	84.5	77.4	76.0	74.3	75.6

(a) = average 1970-1980; (b) = CFTC; (c) = CFDT+CFTC in 1964.

If we compare associational monopoly with regard to manual and non-manual union membership seperatedly, we see that the problem for most general confederations has been to keep pace with the growing unionization of non-manual employees. Most confederations have succeeded in maintaining a virtual monopoly with respect to union oranization of manual workers:

Table 12: Associational Monopoly Manual Labour, 1950-1980
(% shares of major confederations in total manual union membership)

	1950	1960	1970	1975	1980
Sweden					
LO	98.4	98.7	98.5	98.9	99.1
West Germany					
DGB	100.0	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5
Norway					
LO	-	-	97.2	97.4	97.1
Denmark					
LO	-	96.3	94.8	95.8	96.7
Netherlands					
FNV	-	-	-	-	81.2d
NVV	36.9	42.7	47.0a	51.5b	51.4c
NKV	29.5	38.2	33.8a	30.6b	28.6c
CNV	14.0	17.5	17.4a	16.0b	18.0d
	80.4	98.4	98.2a	98.1b	99.2d
Switzerland					
SGB	-	76.0	73.4	71.8	71.9
CNG	-	14.3	16.2	16.6	16.5
		90.3	89.6	88.4	88.4

(a) = 1971; (b) = 1977; (c) = 1979; (d) = 1981.

Figures for the UK, Italy and France are not available. We may assume that in the UK the TUC represents between 95% to 100% of all manual union members. The three Italian confederations reach about the same level. In the Italian case a disaggregation by broad economic sector is possible: the three major confederations hold a quasi-monopoly in industry and agriculture. My guess for France would be that the CGT, CFDT and FO together account for about 90% of all manual union members. Most of the other confederations in France (apart from the small CFTC and the "syndicats libres") recruit non-manual employees.

If we now turn to non-manual workers we see not only much lower levels of associational monopoly, but also more variety from country to country. Contrary to the quasi-stability we could observe with respect to manual workers, we see that the confederal representation of non-manual workers is far more fluctuating. This may be a good indicator of competition, to which I return below.

Table 13: Associational Monopoly Non-Manual Labour, 1950-1980

confederation	1950	1960	1970	1975	1980
West Germany					
DGB	63.0a	48.9b	54.0	60.5	61.8
Sweden					
LO	21.0	21.2	15.3	13.0	12.2
TCO	68.0	66.4	70.4	74.0	67.4
	89.0	87.6	85.7	87.0	79.6
Denmark					
LO	-	41.5	38.9	41.8	44.0
FTF		40.6	38.2	35.8	32.1
		82.1	77.1	77.6	76.1
Norway					
LO	-	48.7c	46.5	39.9	38.2
Switzerland					
SGB	-	8.2	8.3	8.3	8.9
CNG	-	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.5
VSA	-	47.5	46.3	45.6	45.0
		57.7	56.6	55.9	56.4
Netherlands					
FNV	-	-	-	-	34.4d
NVV	23.1	24.4	25.2e	26.3f	29.2g
NKV	16.0	14.7	12.1e	5.0f	4.6g
CNV	12.1	13.9	11.2e	12.8f	16.0d
	51.2	52.0	48.5	44.1	50.4d

(a) = 1951; (b) = 1961; (c) = 1965; (d) = 1981; (e) = 1971; (f) = 1977; (g) = 1979.

If my earlier assumptions regarding the share of the TUC and the major Italian and French confederations among manual workers are correct, then it would follow that the TUC represents about 80% of all non-manual union members, the three Italian confederations between 80% and 90% and the three French centres between 50% and 60% (this estimates are based on their shares in total aggregate union membership and the distribution between manual and non-manual union membership in these countries; in the cases of Italy and France

this estimates have to be taken with caution, since figures on non-manual union membership are scarsely available).

(d) External competition

To what extent do the national trade union centres face external competition by independent union organisations? External competition is more or less the reverse of associational monopoly. But it does make sense to give it some seperate consideration in order to draw a more complete picture of the position of the major trade union centres in a given country. If their constituent unions are repeatedly or increasingly challenged by successful outside compititors, union confederations will have a more difficult job in co-ordinating their affiliates. This seems to me an important variable: outside competition is often cited as the reason why an affiliate does not go along with a centralized confederal policy, or sees itself forced to break away from such a policy once it has been decided upon by the peak association.

As an indicator of external competition one could look at the position of "independent" unions or federations of unions, in particular, their share in union membership in particular sectors of the economy. This would require a further disaggregation of union membership and a comparision of the position of the unions affiliated to the major confederations with that of "independent" unions at the sectoral level. A reasonable proxy could be to look at the different growth rates, that is, whether independent unions show an above average growth of membership. This one could combine

with information about the age of such unions. One would expect relatively young (new) unions to be aggressive in order to establish themselves firmly. Although some data have been collected, I have yet not been able to compile comparative data for the ten countries considered. For this reason I restrict myself to a less strict measure, that is external competition with respect to non-manual workers. As the tables on associational monopoly showed, outside competition for manual workers is almost absent (though a sectoral analysis could show that in some areas it is relevant), whereas "independent" unionism among white collar employees is far more wide-spread. One could also look at the "public sector" separately. As a general rule, the position of the major confederations is stronger in the private sector than in the public sector, but stronger among public employees than among non-manual workers (private + public). The latter fact is accounted for by the monopoly position the large confederations usually hold among manual workers in the public sector (in particular: postal services, railways and other public transport).

The strongest external sectoral competition can be observed in Norway, directly followed by France. The share of the Norwegian LO among non-manual union members has declined rapidly and now over 50% of the unionized white collar employees are organized independently from the LO. A further indication of competition is that some LO-affiliates have recently left the confederation. In the public sector the LO represents still a constant (since 1965) share of 65% of all unionized public employees. The French confederations face strong competition from the CFE, which presumably organizes the majority of the unionized "cadres" in the French industry and service sector. They face heavy competition in the public sector as well.
Less but still high external competition is felt by the major Dutch, Swiss and German confederations. Since the 1960's the share of the three Dutch confederations among non-manual union

members has constantly declined and only recently they have succeeded in establishing a feeble majority. Switzerland shows a more stable pattern, with few white collar employees unionized anyway. In Germany the DGB faces strong competition from both the DAG and the DBB, with growing success if we look at the DGB's share in non-manual union membership (from under 50% in 1960 to over 60% in 1981). In these three countries the major confederations have established a higher share among union members in the public sector: 70.8% by the DGB (1981), 65% in the Netherlands (1981, FNV and CNV together) and close to 60% in Switzerland (1980, SGB plus CNG).
In Sweden, the UK and Italy about 4 out of 5 non-manual union members are reprented by the major confederations, in Denmark slightly less. In the public sector they represent even higher shares (9 out of 10 in Denmark and Sweden, somewhat less in Italy and the UK). Relations with independent unions are very conflictual, though, in Italy and the UK.
The position of the Austrian OGB - it goes almost without saying - differs from all others by its complete monopoly and lack of external competition.

Now I want to draw together the four dimensions of associational monopoly and unity by constructing one indicator.

Indicator: a compound score of (a) unity or division of national trade union movement (number and relationships between main central peak federations), internal fractionalism in national trade union confederation(s), (c) percentage of trade union members represented by major confederation(s), and (d) competition by independent unions.

definitions:

(a) Associational Unity

1 = highly divided national trade union movement: three and more national trade union centres, with conflictual relationships

3 = divided national trade union movement: two or three national trade union centres with co-operative relationships

5 = unified national trade union movement: one national trade union centre

(b) Internal Factionalism within union centres

0.5 = heavy factionalism within confederation(s), along political lines between stable and competing factions within the confederation, and/or demarcation-desputes between affiliated unions accompanied by competition for members

1.5 = moderate factionalism within confederation(s), stable political factions do exist but competition is small and institutionalized, and/or some demarcation disputes between affiliates does exist

2.5 = no factionalism within national confederation(s)

(c) Associational Monopoly

= percentage of total union members represented by major confederations, average 1970-1980/81

(d) External Compitition by independent unions

0.5 = strong sectoral competition by independent unions, representing more than 50% of union membership among non-manual employees and/or in the public sector

1.5 = moderate sectoral competition by independent unions, representing about 20% of union membership among non-manual employees and/or in the public sector

2.5 = no sectoral competition

Table 14: ASSOCIATIONAL MONOPOLY and UNITY

country	(a) unity.	+ (b) fragm.	+ (d) compit.	x (c) monop.	= compound score	rank-order
Austria	5	1.5	2.5	100.0	90.0 (90.0)	1 (1)
West Germany	5	2.5	1.0	83.0	70.6 (70.1)	2 (4)
Sweden	3	2.5	2.0	93.0	69.8 (71.5)	3 (2)
UK	5	0.5	1.5	90.2	63.1 (54.4)	4 (6)
Denmark	3	2.0	2.0	88.2	61.7 (64.5)	5 (5)
Norway	5	2.5	0.5	73.8	59.0 (70.9)	6 (3)
Italy	3	1.0	1.5	95.0	52.3 (31.7)	7 (9)
Netherlands	3	2.0	1.0	77.1	46.3 (49.0)	8 (7)
Switzerland	2	2.0	1.0	79.1	39.6 (41.6)	9 (8)
France	1	1.0	0.5	75.6	18.9 (26.0)	10 (10)

Between brackets I have added the scores (computed by applying the same method) and the respective rankorders for 1960.

compound score = (a + b + d) . c

The trade union movements in Austria, West-Germany and Sweden are highly unified and have maintained a high degree of representational monopoly as well. The union movements in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway and Italy form an intermediate group. The union movements in the Netherlands, Switzerland and France come out low.

A comparision with 1960 shows that the Norwegian LO suffered a significant loss in its monopoly over the trade union movement in that country during the two decades that followed, whereas the TUC and in particular the Italian confederations improved their positions considerably.

ORGANISATIONAL CENTRALISATION

By organisational centralisation is meant the extent to which trade union organisations are federated or joined into strong central bodies at the national level with substantial executive and representational powers capable of negotiating with central employers associations and of dealing with governments on behalf of their members. This aspect has received the most attention in the literature. The possibility of confederations to co-ordinate their members' behaviour (that is, their affiliates) and to exercise authority over them is very central to the question whether a national trade union movement will be able to engage in or to sustain incomes policies, trade-offs with central employers associations and governments, etc. So, central to the investigation of organisational centralisation is the relationship between confederations and their constituent national unions, in particular, whether a confederation can exercise authority over their affiliates, take binding decisions on their behalf, represent them vis-a-vis others etc. This point has rightly been stressed by Windmuller (1975, pp.91-92) in his critique of the loose usage of the terms "weak" and "strong" with regard to confederations. Organisational centralisation as used in this context should not be confused with "olicharchic rule" in general, with questions like whether or not the confederation is run autocratically, to what extent union leaders are subject to regular elections for office, etc.

It should be recalled that virtually everywhere confederations are federations of autonomous union organisations. Whatever organisational power, rights of representation, and internal authority a confederation has acquired, normally these powers, rights and authority are delegeted to them by the constituent unions. Usually, it are the unions who negotiate collective agreememements with employers and sign them. Direct participation of confederations in collective bargaining, let alone signing collective agreements, is very much the exception to the rule. The only really exceptional case I know of is the Austrian OGB, which has been constituted as an organisation of which the national unions are more or less functional subdivisions instead of constituent affiliates. In Austria one is member of the OGB and not of one of its fifteen unions. It is the OGB that directly receives the membership dues and exerts complete financial control over its unions (the so-called Finanzhoheit). The OGB distributes a part of its income to its unions, instead of the other way round as is usual in all other confederation. And although it are the unions which formally negotiate and sign contracts with employers, the OGB retains far-reaching powers in this crucial field too.

One way of measuring the "empowerment" of a confederation is to look at the voting procedures and the distribution of votes among affiliates, the allocation of tasks between unions and confederations, the task-specialisation within the confederation, etc. Another important point of investigation would be whether or not confederations have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of their affiliates (definition of membership domains,

admission rights, voting procedures, bringing about mergers settling inter-union disputes, etc.). Undoubtedly, the most crucial area of confederal interference is that of union-management bargaining. Are the central peak associations empowered to intervene in collective bargaining processes, i.e. to vet and coordinate the bargaining activities of their affiliates? This is more than just asking whether or not they have the (constitutional) right of doing so. The main point is whether or not they possess the means in terms of sanction power vis-a-vis their affiliates, of strike control, of human and material resources, etc.

There are several forms through which a national confederation can be involved in pay bargaining and may co-ordinate and control the bargaining activities of its members (ILO 1973, OECD 1979). Direct bargaining by confederations and/or complete dependency of union-bargaining on the approval by their confederations is the most far-reaching form of confederal bargaining authority, but exceptional. Until 1963 this has been the case in the Netherlands, at present only the OGB has retained such powers. A second, slightly weaker form is found when confederations negotiate binding central agreements that leave only a circumscribed space for union-bargaining. This has been practiced in Norway and Sweden, but in Sweden with increasing difficulties as it seems. Some examples we find in Denmark in the 1970's but with significant interruptions, in the Netherlands in 1972 and, in a much weaker sense, in 1982. Central, interconfederal agreements have been reached in Italy as well (for example in 1975, in 1977 and, most recently, in January

1983), and although they considerably affect pay bargaining, these agreements are not strictly binding with respect to sectoral- and company-level bargaining in the Italian three-tier system of collective bargaining.

Intermediate forms of confederal control over union-bargaining reside in internal control mechanisms. Presumably the most important of these is a confederal procedure of ratification of union negotiated contracts, especially if it replaces direct member-control and voting procedures within the unions (as is the case in the Swedish LO and was the case, until 1972, in the Dutch NVV). Other internal controls can be exercised by wage guidelines and through the coordination of the union demands before (and during) the bargaining process (in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, to a moderate extent also in Italy and West-Germany). The timing of contract-renewals is very important, which makes it also possible that one large union plays de facto this co-ordinating role through its wage-leadership (e.g., the cases of the German I.G. Metall and the Federazione Lavoratori Metalmeccanici in Italy). With regard to all these forms of confederal involvement in pay bargaining it is important to distinguish between regular, institutionalized and repeated confederal involvement and ad-hoc interventions in crises, as was very much the case in Great Britain between 1973 and 1977, or in Italy in January 1983. If the former condition applies, it is indeed very likely that "authority gravitates from national unions to national centres" (WINDMULLER 1975, p.98).

In all other cases there is no confederal control in the strict

sense. Of course it may still be the case that union bargaining decisions are still relatively centralised, but now on the level of the individual unions (or groups of unions). Surely, it does make a difference whether national union officials or plant representatives bargain. Confederal coordination and intervention will almost certainly be more difficult in the latter

case.

To sum up, a direct measurement of centralisation of the trade union movement at the top level involves a set of indicators by which we measure the degree to which the peak associations are empowered to steer, to control and to coordinate the behaviour of their affiliates, in particular the external relationships the affiliates are engaged in, of which union-management pay bargaining must be considered the most crucial and critical one. We must identify organizational properties, characteristics of the organization pertaining to the relationship between the confederations and its affiliates, that can explain behavioral outcomes. In other words, one should not bring observations with respect to bargaining behaviour or "action" variables into the indicator, if the indicator is meant to explain such behavioral outcomes.

Given the present state of the research and the incomplete data-set, I limit myself in the following to the rather indirect measurement

of organisational centralisation that was proposed by HEADEY. He used an additive index based on the central confederation's powers over bargaining and strikes, its financial resources and the size of its staff. In the following I will use this indicator, suggest some changes, and add, correct and update data.

(a) Level of collective bargaining for pay

The level at which pay bargaining usually takes place is an indirect indicator of confederal power over union-bargaining. It can be argued that there exists a rough correspondence between high organisational centralisation and the prevalence of national over sectoral, and of sectoral over regional, in plant and workplace bargaining respectively (BLYTH 1979, p.75). In his 1970 article, HEADEY has proposed to take the level of pay bargaining as an indicator for union centralisation, his hypothesis being that "national level negotiation is a pre-requisite for significant confederation intervention". "It seems unlikely", he continues, "that any confederation, (....) could hope to coordinate the numerous agreements produced by sub-national bargaining. It would be an organisational impossibility." (HEADEY 1970, p.421). It is not fully clear what HEADEY exactly meant by "national level". At some points in his text - when he actually rates the different countries according to this indicator - he seems to define it as national bargaining across sectors as opposed to bargaining by sector of the economy (or, simply, union bargaining). Elsewhere he seems to mean national as opposed to sub-national, that is regional

or plant and workplace bargaining. It seems to me important to distinguish between the two cases. It is only the second case which leads to the "numerous" agreements which are almost impossible to co-ordinate by any confederation. My second point would be that it is important to distinguish between the level at which bargaining takes place and the type of union officials who participate in this bargaining (CLEGG 1976). One can have bargaining at the regional level but conducted by national union officials, as is the case in West-Germany. The same applies to the company bargaining in some large firms in the Netherlands that do not participate in sectoral agreements. In Italy too, national union officials are involved in plant bargaining, especially since the latter half of the 1970's. This differs from the situation in which regional- or plant-level bargaining processes remain basically under control of regional or workplace representatives or in which negotiation decisions are shared between national officials and plant representatives (U.K., France and, to some extent, Italy).

I think it makes sense to weigh this indicator by the impact of collective pay bargaining in the national economy. This impact is somehow measured by the proportion of the dependent labour force which is unionized (union density rate). From the extent to which the workforce is organized in unions we can gather some idea about the impact of union bargaining. Of course, as a rule collectively bargained agreements extend beyond the unionized part of the workforce. Several devices exist by which, legally or otherwise, agreements are extended to the non-organized workforce and, less frequently, to non-organized employers. Nevertheless, union density

rates still are a good comparative measure for the difference of the impact of collective bargaining across countries.

Table 15: Union density rates 1950-1980

	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	average '70-'81
Sweden (a)	67.7	70.8	73.0	74.9	73.6	79.5	87.7	80.8
Denmark	51.9	54.3	59.6	60.8	64.0	68.9	78.9b	68.8b
Norway (c)	58.5d	61.4e	61.5	62.5	61.8	60.5	63.8	60.4c
Austria	62.7	63.9	63.5	63.0	62.1	58.5	58.4	59.1f
U.K.	44.1	44.5	44.2	44.2	48.5	51.0	53.2	51.4
Italy	45.8	39.4	26.5	27.4	33.1	42.4	43.3	40.5f
Netherlands	39.0	37.4	38.7	37.4	37.5	40.1	38.8	39.2
West-Germany	33.1	37.2	37.1	36.5	36.3	37.9	38.7	37.9
Switzerland	-	-	30.3	-	29.2	33.4	33.5	32.1
France	-	-	19.8g	19.6	23.3	23.1	20.2	22.5

Union density rates = union members as percentage of "potential membership", i.e. wage & salary earners plus unemployed; calculated by excluding pensioners, small farmers, self-employed etc. from union membership data. (for definitions and data: VISSER 1984)

(a) = density rates for Sweden before 1970 are overstated, since pensioneers could not be excluded from reported membership data; (b) = 1979, average 1970-1979; (c) = density rates till 1970 overstated, average calculated for 1972-1980; (d) = estimate; (e) = 1956, (f) = average 1970-1980; (g) = 1962.

The other measures of organisational centralisation are (b) confederal control over strikes, (c) confederal staff resources, and (d) confederal financial resources.

(b) Confederal control over union strike decisions

Central strike control can undoubtedly be considered the most potent sanction a confederation has in order to make its affiliated unions conform with its policies. With respect to strike control we should

distinguish between strike funds and strike rules. A confederation holding a significant part of the strike funds is very much in the position of controlling its affiliates with respect to strike behaviour. Although it ought to be said that it may affect smaller affiliates, with little or no funds of their own, more than big and strong affilates. One should, therefore, also look at rules regarding strike decisions: Does the confederation have a veto-right? Must it be consulted before unions can call a strike? Must strike decisicions be notified to the confederation? Does this affect all strikes or only particular ones (for instance, when two affilates are involved)? Or are the affiliates completely autonomous with regard to calling or ending a strike, instead? Of course, strong formal powers of a confederation in this field are likely to be warranted by at least some confederal share in strike funds affecting the actual strike pay. Where no confederal funds exist it is very unlikely that formal powers - would they be written in the confederation's constitution - do mean a great deal. This applies even stronger in the case of countries (Italy and France) in which unions generally do not have strike funds at all. Here, strike decisions will, effectively, be very de-centralised and dispersed.

Only in four countries - Austria, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands - confederations have a significant share in the strike funds to sustain their constitutional powers vis-a-vis unions. In Austria all strike funds are centralized in a confederal fund and the OGB's control over strike decisions is near to absolute. In the other

three countries the confederations hold about 25% of the strike funds. In Norway and Sweden, confederal control with respects to union strike calls is clearly present: in the Netherlands the confederion's power has eroded during the 1970's, in particular when larger unions are involved. Nonetheless, it still is important whether or not the confederation approves of a strike call of one of its affiliates, since its financial support may, in the case of the FNV, amount to 2/3 of the actual strike pay.

In the other countries the central peak associations do not seem to possess the power to support strikes with confederal funds, resp. to withhold their affiliates from calling a strike. The information on this aspect is, however, far from complete and up-to-date. Moreover, the non-availability of confederal strike funds does not preclude them from exerting pressure on their affiliates. The point is that they lack effective sanction power if they would not succeed in convincing their affiliates by other means.

In the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, West Germany and, to a lesser degree in Switzerland, national unions have built up strike funds of considerable strength and, generally, decide on strike pay at their national headquarters. In the case of Denmark, West Germany and Switzerland, however, the peak associations do not have a share in strike funds and have no formal or effective power to call, prevent or end strikes. In the UK, unions hold only very modest strike funds and neither the unions nor the TUC have effective power with respect to strike decisions. In Italy and France strike funds are the exception, although the FO and - recently - the CFDT have tried to create some "solidarity funds", with little success it seems. In both countries conferations and

their affiliated unions exert little effective strike-control.

The second-best guide as regards the powers a confederation has vis a vis its affiliates, is to look at the resources they have at their disposal. In particular, the size of its staff and its financial means. The number of staff working at the confederation's headquarter compared to the staff employed by their unions and the share of the total membership dues allocated to the confederation compared to the share of national unions should indicate the amount of power a confederation has acquired vis-a-vis its affiliates. Of course, the absolute number of confederal staff and amount of finances it commands is in itself important, since staff and money stand for services, benefits, reserves, research, training and education, publicity, lobbying, etc. But it is rather difficult to compare these assets in absolute terms. Actually, the preferable indicator would be to see whether one (or more) affiliate(s) have a larger staff and dispose of larger financial means than the confederation itself. This would most clearly the direction of the resource-dependency relationships between a peak association and its member associations. However, given the lack of comparative information on union staffs and revenues, I have restricted myself to a more loose and indirect level of measurement.

In the following overviews of confederal staff and financial

resources I do in effect repeat the indicators used by Headey: staff at confederal headquarters per 100,000 members, and confederal share in union revenue from member-contributions. I have improved upon the data as much as I could, given the scarce data available. Most confederations have also considerable staffs at regional and local levels, but staff at headquarters seem to me the best measure of centralisation vis-a-vis affiliates. Confederations and individual unions may have other sources of revenue as well, for instance, revues flowing from employers, governments, public industries, etc., but the reallocation of member dues, usually collected by the affiliates, between confederations and its constituent unions seems to me the relevant indicator as to the degree of empowerment affiliates are willing, or forced, to submit to the peak association.

Table 16: Confederal staff resources

	total union staff (ratio to members)		staff at confed. headquarters per 100.000 members		
Netherlands					
FNV	1: 450	(1981)	20	(1981)	
(NVV)	(1: 480)	(1971)	(22)	(1967)	
(NKV)	(1: 530)	(1971)	(16)	(1967)	
CNV	1: 517	(1971)	14	(1967)	
Norway					
LO	1:1350	(1976)	11	(1969)	
Austria					
OGB	1: 889	(1980)	10	(1969)	
Italy					
CGIL	1: 814	(1976)	ca. 15	(1976)	
CISL	1:1206	(1974)	?	(1974)	
UIL	1: 557	(1976)	?	(1976)	
France					
CGT	1:7500	(1980)	ca. 10	(1980)	(a)
CFDT	1:6000	(1980)	ca. 12	(1980)	(a)
FO	1:9000	(1980)	ca. 6	(1980)	
Sweden					
LO	1: 680	(1960's)	6	(1969)	
TCO	?		10	(1975)	
Denmark					
LO	1: 900	(1960's)	9	(1976)	
FTF	?		7	(1976)	
West Germany					
DGB	1: 876	(1976)	4	(1969)	
Switzerland					
SGB	?		3	(1978)	
CNG	?		?		
VSA	?		?		
United Kingdom					
TUC	1: 3300	(1976)	1	(1976)	

(a) includes union officials at confederion's headquarter; the staff resources of the CGT and CFDT are, therefore, largely overstated.

First of all, one is struck by the large difference in the staff-membership ratio's across countries. Especially, the low ratio's for France and the United Kingdom commend attention. Secondly, the data on staff on headquarters, whatever improvement they need, do show three groups: powerful confederations (the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Austria and Italy, as far as the CGIL is concerned), a middle group (consisting of France, Denmark and, perhaps, West Germany) and weak confederations (Switzerland and the United Kingdom).

Table 17: Confederal financial resources

	union dues as % of workers' earnings	% share allocated to confederation
Austria		
OGB	ca. 1 %	81.5 % (1978)
Sweden		
LO	ca. 2 %	18.4 % (1972)
TCO	?	?
Norway		
LO	ca. 1.3%	18.0 % (1973)
Netherlands		
NVV	ca. 1.5 %	15.0 % (1975)
NKV	ca. 1 %	16.0 % (1975)
CNV	ca. 1 %	18.5 % (1974)
West Germany		
DGB	ca. 1 %	12.0 % (1972)
Denmark		
LO	ca. 1.5 %	10.0 % (1978)
FTF	?	?
Italy		
CGIL	0.7-1.0 %	8.9 % (1974)
CISL	0.4-1.0 %	8-10 % (1974)
UIL	0.4-1.0 %	8-10 % (1974)
France		
CGT	0.6 %	8.3 % (1977)
CFDT	0.7 %	11.9 % (1977)
FO	?	9.0 % (1977)
Switzerland		
SGB	?	3-6 % (1978)
CNG	?	?
VSA	?	?
United Kingdom		
TUC	0.5 %	1-2 % (1977)

Calculated without contributions to union locals, the confederal shares are not including confederal strike funds (in the case of the French CFDT they could not be excluded, but this is of minor importance).

As far as the financial strength of the confederation vis-a-vis its affiliates is concerned, the Austrian OGB is an outstanding case, as has been mentioned earlier. So is the TUC at the other end of the scale. The SGB and, presumably, the other Swiss confederations as well, are weak in this sense too.

Organisational Centralisation

Indicator: a composite score of (a) confederal power to engage or to intervene in collective pay bargaining, measured by the level at which collective pay bargaining usually takes place and the impact of union bargaining in the national economy, (b) involvement of confederal, or national union officials in pay bargaining, (c) the confederal power to call, prevent, end or prevent strikes, (d) to maintain a large staff, and (e) to collect dues from affiliates.

definitions:

(a) level at which bargaining for pay usually takes place

5 = national, economy-wide bargaining
3 = bargaining at sectoral level (or by large regional units), restrictions to plant- and workplace bargaining
1 = local, plant- and workplace bargaining (sectoral bargaining, if existing, does not set strict boundaries)

This is weighted by the union density (average 1970-1980/1), indicating the impact of collective bargaining in the economy.

(b) involvement of confederal, or national union officials

2.5 = direct involvement of confederal officials
1.5 = pay negotiations conducted by and under control of national union officials
0.5 = pay negotiations to considerable degree conducted and controlled by shop floor lay members

(c) strike control

2.5 = confederal strike funds only
1.5 = limited confederal funds
0.5 = no confederal strike funds

(d) confederal staff
= number of staff at headquarter per 100.000 members

2.5 = 15 and more
1.5 = about 10
0.5 = about 3 or less

(e) confederal dues income
= percentage of dues of affiliates transferred to the confederation

2.5 = 25% and more
1.5 = about 10%
0.5 = less than 5%

Table 18: ORGANIZATIONAL CENTRALIZATION

	(a)	x density rate	+ (b)	+ (c)	+ (d)	+ (e)	= total score	rank-order
Austria	5	0.591	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.5	12.5	1
Norway	5	0.604	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	11.5	2
Sweden	4	0.804	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	11.2	3
Netherlands	3	0.298	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.0	8.6	4
Denmark	3	0.688	1.5	1.0	1.5	1.5	7.6	5
West Germany	3	0.376	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.5	6.1	6
Italy	2	0.405	1.0	0.5	2.0	1.0	5.3	7
Switzerland	3	0.321	1.5	1.0	0.5	0.5	4.4	8
France	1	0.225	1.0	0.5	1.5	1.0	4.2	9
United Kingdom	1	0.514	1.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	3.0	10

ORGANISATIONAL CONCENTRATION

Organisational concentration has two dimensions: organisational concentration proper or the number of unions affiliated to a central peak associations, and membership concentration, i.e. the percentage of the total confederal membership represented by a given number of affiliates (ESTEY 1966, WINDMULLER 1981).

The number of unions is related to the capacity of a confederation to coordinate its affiliates. One would assume that the lesser the number of affiliates the greater the internal unity and the greater the capacity to arrive at a common policy will be. There exists a direct relation to internal fragmentation: the lesser the number of affiliates, the lesser the probability that they collude over jurisdictional conflicts. Organizational concentration is also directly related to size, which in turn relates to organisational centralisation: bigger unions will find it easier to economize their resources, to maintain professionalized staffs, etc. However, a small number of affiliates is not per se an indicator for organisational centralisation at the confederal level, which is our concern here. Larger and more powerful affiliates may find it easier to resist attempts by their confederations to control an coordinate union behaviour. It is of importance to treat this in relation to membership concentration and equality of size of the affilates (see infra).

In Table 19 the available data on union concentration is presented. We see that in four countries (Austria, West Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands), each confederation has between 12 and 18 affiliates. In these countries the trade union movement is clearly most concentrated. Sweden comes near to this (20 to 24), Italy is the only other country in which the average number of affiliates per confederation is less than 30 unions. The confederations in Norway, Denmark and France have still a higher number of affiliates. The TUC, in this respect too, presents a clearly different picture.

More interesting, perhaps, is the general trend towards union concentration in the twenty years under consideration. The exceptions are being found in countries in which already a high degree of concentration had been achieved in an earlier stage, as a deliberate outcome of the post-war reconstitution (Austria and West Germany), or as a consequence of long-standing fragmentation in a small country like Switzerland. The other exception to the general trend is France, although there are recent signs that this may change in the near future. It is also interesting to see that union concentration in Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark is a phenomenon of the 1970's, whereas in Sweden the big changes took place in the 1960's. In the UK union concentration (through mergers) took off after 1964, in Norway the process is not confined to a particular period and, at any rate, of a very gradual nature.

It would be interesting to know whether this trend is only a post-war trend, whether it also occurred among the so-called "independent" unions and the smaller confederations, or - inversely - whether the concentration process in the main peak associations has stimulated a proliferation of independent union bodies,

particularly among white collar sections of the work-force.

Table 19: number of affiliated unions

	1958	1968	1980
Austria			
OGB	16	16	15 (since 1978)
West Germany			
DGB	16	16	17 (since 1978)
Netherlands			
FNV			18 (since 1981)
NVV	21	20	(15) (1975)
NKV	23	21	(9) (1975)
CNV	24	24	15 (since 1981)
Norway			
LO	43	38	33 (1978)
Switzerland			
SGB	15	15	15 (1980)
CNG	10	13	13 (1976)
VSA	10	12	12 (1980)
Sweden			
LO	43	27	24 (1981)
TCO	37	?	20 (1981)
Denmark			
LO	69	57	37 (1981)
FTF	38	?	35 (1981)
Italy			
CGIL	?	38	23 (1983)
CISL	?	41	32 (1983)
UIL	?	32	28 (1983)
France			
CGT	?	42	38 (1980)
CFDT	?	29	24 (1980)
FO	?	32	30 (1980)
United Kingdom			
TUC	186	155	109 (1979)

Organisational concentration entails membership concentration. The average size of the affiliated unions has increased, far more than is accounted for by the growth of union membership in the countries considered (except for the OGB, DGB, SGB and CNG). This development was strongest in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, and - only recently - in Italy.

In Table 20 I have brought together some information on membership

concentration. The percentage of members represented by the first 10 affiliated unions gives a rough impression of the degree of membership concentration. From this data one can get also a first impression of the inequality between the affiliates in terms of size. The equality of affiliates is relevant in so far that a large difference in size between the affiliates, and in particular a predominant position of one (or two) affiliates, is often hampering the development of a strong confederal authority vis-a-vis its affiliates in general. W.Galenson, for instance, has suggested that the difference in centralisation between the Norwegian and Danish LO may be explained by the dominance of one large unions (on its own accounting for over one-third of the LO-membership) in the Danish LO, whereas the Norwegian LO was composed of a large number of relatively equal and small unions (GALENSON 1968). Other examples of this can be found in the DGB (the metalworkers' union), the Dutch NVV (especially since the amalgamation of a number of industrial unions in a conglomerate union in 1972). The table on membership concentration is followed by one in which some picture of the degree of inequality between affiliates can be drawn (Table 21). From grouped data I have computed the coefficients of variation in union size for each confederation. The smallest differences are found in the Austrian OGB and the Norwegian LO. Interestingly, for very different reasons, a small but relatively equal number of affiliates belonging to the OGB but a large and relatively number of affiliates belonging to the LO. So, we are concerned with two dimensions: number of affiliates and equality of size in terms of members and, presumably, power resources. The overall indicator of organisational concentration, finally, should measure both

dimensions. The lower the value (number of affiliates x equality of affiliates), the higher the degree of unions concentration. The values are presented in Table 22, which shows clearly three groups of countries: Austria, Switzerland, West Germany and the Netherlands with a highly concentrated union movement, an intermediate group to which Norway, Sweden and Italy belong, and, finally, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom, countries in which the main union confederations are still made up out of numerous and unequal actors.

Table 20: Membership Concentration
Percentage of confederal membership organized in largest, five largest and ten largest affiliated unions, 1958, 1968 and 1980.

	1958			1968			1980		
	(1)	(1-5)	(1-10)	(1)	(1-5)	(1-10)	(1)	(1-5)	(1-10)
Switzerland									
SGB	29.8	81.0	96.6a	28.9	79.8	-	28.8	81.5	96.7 ('80)
CNG	32.2	88.9	100.0a	-	-	-	32.2	84.6	98.3 ('76)
VSA	59.1	95.8	100.0a	53.2	93.0	99.3b	51.8	94.7	99.3 ('80)
Netherlands									
FNV							26.7	80.7	97.0 ('82)
NVV	19.1	64.2	90.1	19.8	70.2	92.6	26.8	90.1	97.8 ('78)
NKV	14.7	55.9	79.6	19.5	62.0	83.6	37.8	91.1	100.0 ('78)
CNV	18.3	69.2	89.4	21.7	73.6	91.8	27.3	75.3	97.0 ('82)
Austria									
OGB	18.3	61.2	89.6	18.5	65.3	90.2	20.4	70.0	91.6 ('80)
West Germany									
DGB	28.5	67.9	83.6	31.9	69.3	90.0	33.0	68.5	89.8 ('81)
Sweden									
LO	18.0	46.5	64.8	20.1	55.4	70.4	25.2	70.3	87.7 ('81)
TCO	25.4	56.7	67.6	-	-	-	28.0	70.8	92.8 ('81)
Denmark									
LO	34.3	63.6	83.6	27.7	67.7	80.6c	26.9	72.3	87.1 ('80)
FTF	-	-	-	20.1	51.7	62.4c	21.1	54.7	69.2 ('80)
Italy									
CGIL (d)	27.9	69.7	-	17.8	61.8	83.2	17.1	63.5	85.2 ('78)
CISL (d)	18.3	48.8	-	12.8	45.8	-	17.0	54.1	70.0 ('78)
UIL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway									
LO	12.0	46.0	70.0	13.7	47.6	69.9	18.5	54.9	74.7 ('78)
United Kingdom									
TUC	15.2	47.8	60.9	16.3	44.0	61.2	14.4	43.9	59.7 ('81)

(a) = 1960; (b) = 1965; (c) = 1973; (d) = calculated without pensioners; data on France not available.

Table 21: Inequality of affiliates

	year	total deral membership (a)	largest affiliate (a)	average size of affil. (a)	coeff. of var. (b)
Austria					
OGB	1980	1.661.000	339.000	111.000	0.84
Norway					
LO	1978	728.000	132.000	34.500	0.93
Switzerland					
SGB	1980(c)	429.000	124.000	29.000	1.17
CNG	1976	107.000	34.000	8.000	1.14
VSA	1980	145.000	75.000	12.000	1.67
West-Germany					
DGB	1981	7.958.000	2.626.000	468.000	1.25
Netherlands					
FNV	1982	1.066.000	274.000	57.000	1.30
CNV	1982	342.000	93.500	23.000	1.06
Italy					
CGIL	1978(c)	3.545.000	606.000	148.000	1.12
CISL	1978(c)	2.411.000	410.000	63.000	1.31
UIL	1978(c)	1.066.000	-	38.000	-
Sweden					
LO	1981	2.141.000	539.500	89.000	1.38
TCO	1981	1.062.000	297.000	53.000	1.30
Denmark					
LO	1980	1.278.000	344.000	34.500	1.91
FTF	1980	280.000	59.000	8.000	1.35
United Kingdom					
TUC	1981	11.000.000	1.584.000	108.000	2.09
France					
CGT	1980	1.400.000	320.000	37.000	-
CFDT	1980	740.000	-	24.000	-
FO	1980	720.000	-	31.000	-

notes: (a) rounded off figures
(b) calculated from grouped data (4 categories)
(c) pensioners etc. excluded from calculation

Table 22: composite indicator of ORGANISATIONAL CONCENTRATION
= number of affiliates x inequality of affiliates
(weighted per country according to relative size
of confederations)

	number of affiliates	inequality of affiliates	weighted average	rankorder
Austria				
OGB	15	0.84	12.6	1
Switzerland			17.4	2
SGB	15	1.17	17.6	
CNG	13	1.14	14.8	
VSA	12	1.67	20.0	
West-Germany				
DGB	17	1.25	21.3	3
Netherlands			21.5	4
FNV	18	1.30	23.4	
CNV	15	1.16	15.9	
Norway				
LO	33	0.93	30.7	5
Sweden			31.0	6
LO	24	1.38	33.1	
TCO	20	1.30	26.0	
Italy			32.2 (b)	7
CGIL	23	1.12	25.8	
CISL	32	1.31	41.9	
UIL	28	-	-	
Denmark			66.0	8
LO	37	1.91	70.7	
FTF	35	1.35	47.3	
France (c)			-	9
CGT	38	-	-	
CFDT	24	-	-	
FO	30	-	-	
United Kingdom				
TUC	109	2.09	227.8	10

notes: (a) In order to calculate the averages per country the relative share in membership of each confederation has taken into account. For example, in Switzerland:
SGB : CNG : VSA = 0.6 : 0.2 : 0.2 = 1
Thus: 0.6x17.6 + 0.2x14.8 + 0.2x20.0 = 17.5

(b) I have assumed the inequality of UIL-affiliates to lie somewhere between the value for the CGIL and CISL

(c) The French confederations combine very large and very small affiliates.

Some final remarks

As announced in the introduction, this paper limits itself to the discussion and construction of indicators, as well as to the presentation of comparative data. As such, this still needs further improvement, in particular with respect to the indicators and data on union centralisation proper. As a next step one needs to study the main union organisations (affiliates) and their relationships with the confederations in order to arrive at a more complete picture. Furthermore, it seems necessary to study these phenomena in a dynamic way and, more than the presented data allow us to do, to account for the variance over time.

Intended as a contribution to the development of a comparative data-base on union confederations, and improving, I hope, the data referred to in the literature on union centralisation and neo-corporatism, I have deliberately not embarked upon the discussion about causal links. Actually, what one really wants to know is, how certain organisational properties of national union movements came into existence in the first place, how they have been maintained or, in some cases, changed, how they relate to the organizational structures of employers' associations, governmental bureaucracy, industrial relations and legal interventions. Next, a set of questions about how such organisational properties relate to union behaviour (preference for certain types of bargaining, wage

differentials, strike behaviour, incomes policies, etc.). This will be the subject of follow-up studies, in particular with regard to union employment policies. For a start, it seemed necessary to give a purely descriptive picture of the national union movements in Western Europe. A reassumption of the devolopment, during the past two decades or so, of the central peak federations of trade unions, both in terms of centralisation and of unity & monopoly, can be found in the graph on the next page.

Finally, there remains the troublesome question of the combination of the three multiple indicators proposed. Which theoretically meaningful and empirical valid relations exist between confederal centralisation, organisational concentration and representational monopoly and unity? As can be seen from the table that follows, quite a few incongruences remain. High confederal centralisation relates definitely to high organisational concentration, but the reverse is not always true (Switzerland, West Germany). The question arises, whether organisational concentration is a functional alternative for centralisation at confederal level, allowing some major union affiliate to coordinate, without the use of central authority, the movement as a whole? Clearly, centralisation and representational monopoly and unity depart in many cases. Both in the relatively unified Norwegian movement, but with a low degree of representational monopoly, as in the pluriform Dutch confederations, we find at the same time very centralised centres. So, a highly centralized and concentrated confederation may only represent a (declining) part of the labour force. One

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would, therefore, be misled if one would infer too much with respect to the capacities of control and coordination existing in a national union movement by only looking at these confederations, as especially competition by outside union-centres seems a strong force to upset any centrally agreed or commonly established policy. The United Kingdom, finally, presents a rather clamorous inverse case, that is to say, a seemingly highly monopolized and representational confederation may lack all the organisational resources and the degree of concentration necessarry for any control over its constituent parts.

Table 23: comparision of three rankorders

	centralisation	concentration	monopoly & unity
Austria	H (1)	H (1)	H (1)
Sweden	H (3)	M (6)	H (3)
Norway	H (2)	M (5)	M (3)
West-Germany	L (6)	H (3)	H (2)
Netherlands	M (4)	H (4)	L (8)
Denmark	M (5)	L (8)	M (5)
Switzerland	L (8)	H (2)	L (9)
Italy	L (7)	M (7)	M (7)
United Kingdom	L(10)	L(10)	M (4)
France	L (9)	L (9)	L(10)

rho (centralisation : concentration) = 0.56 (sign. at 0.05 level)
rho (centralisation : unity & monopoly) = 0.48 (sign. at 0.1 level)
rho (concentration : unity & monopoly) is almost zero and insignificant.

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