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ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

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The European Policy Unit

The European Policy Unit, at the European University Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to continue the development of the European University Institute as a forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual research projects on topics of current interest to the European Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable to Community policy-making.

One of the continuing research interests of the Policy Unit is the ongoing process of institutional reform in the European Communities. Dr. Wessels' paper represents an effort to lay some theoretical foundations for the strategy to be followed in the wake of the Dooge Report and the European Parliament's Draft Treaty on European Union.

Further information about the work of the European Policy Unit can be obtained from the Director, at the European University Institute in Florence.
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Die Strategie entnimmt die zu untersuchenden Mittel und Zwecke nur aus der Erfahrung.

(Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 19. Auflage, Bonn 1980, S. 294)


Die Politik bedeutet ein starkes langsames Bohren von harten Brettern mit Leidenschaft und Augenmass zugleich... Alle geschichtliche Erfahrung bestätigt, ... dass man das Mögliche nicht erreichte, wenn nicht immer wieder in der Welt nach dem Unmöglichen gegriffen worden wäre, aber der, der das tun kann, muss ein Führer sein und nicht nur das, sondern... auch ein Held ... Welche beides nicht sind, müssen sich wappnen mit jener Festigkeit des Herzens, die auch dem Scheitern aller Hoffnungen gewachsen ist, jetzt schon, sonst werden sie nicht im Stande sein, auch nur durchzusetzen, was möglich ist. Nur wer sicher ist, dass er icht daran zerbricht, wenn die Welt, von seinem Standpunkt aus
gesehen, zu dumm oder zu gemein ist für das, was er ihr bieten will..., nur der hat den "Beruf" zur Politik.

Of Crocodiles, Sharks and Skunks:
How to reach the Holy Grail of European Union

To assess the utility and feasibility of various strategies for institutional reform of the European Communities is a risky business: the goal "European Union" is in a misty future and there are diverging and controversial interpretations of what the institutional set-up of a European Union (whatever this means) should look like. For the sake of simplicity, four institutional models are identified in this paper, of course with the reservation that a "simple" cost-benefit analysis of different strategies is not possible even with the aid of models.

The academic debate about how to reach the Grail is - compared with research on policy areas and institutions of the Communities - in a rather early and inconclusive stage. This paper suggests certain conceptual ingredients of "strategy" and identifies nine different strategies so far pursued or discussed; these approaches, however, are not clear-cut alternatives, but might be used simultaneously or in subsequent periods.

Methodological traps abound: in analysing the relative feasibility and utility of each alternative path, we have to draw
lessons from unresearched history, with the risk of sticking to overly simple analogies, and to rely on political science analysis - also known for the imperfect state of the art - with the danger of deterministic fallacies.

This paper presents some theses with preliminary conclusions on different strategies. The major argument: The crucial factor for further steps towards reform will be the perception of a few national leaders that an overall package deal will serve their political goals - even against the resistance of the national welfare establishment. In a system of "cooperative federalism", where the major actors are involved with both national and European responsibilities, the political support for "radical" strategies (a "saut qualitatif" in terms of transferring competences to a new European level) is small. Neither are challenges from the world outside Europe necessarily a mobilizing force.

Conclusions from this analysis are not encouraging. Major internal or external crises excluded, the most feasible strategy would be to build up a new core area, though the utility of a really new, different, more efficient and more democratic institutional set-up is at best open to debate and the cost - in terms of destroying the existing Community framework - high. The core-area approach can also be employed as a tactic to induce the
hesitant to jump on a leaving train. Resignation about our distance from the Holy Grail, however, should not discourage political activities: perceptions and interest constellations can be subject to surprising changes. Academic analysis, though gloomy, cannot predict the future; but it might help politicians to evade some traps.

1. THE DEBATE ON INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES

1. A neglected field of integration studies

The academic and political debate on integration strategies - compared with the discussion on the institutional legal forms and policy areas of a European Union - was and is underdeveloped. Though it is generally accepted that initiatives for a "relance europeenne" need to be pursued and implemented by some kind of political strategy, there are few academic works that assess the relative utility of different options. The various permutations of actors/forces (taking and pursuing the initiative for reform) procedures (of preparing, pursuing and implementing projects) and legal forms (of implementation) are manifold and rarely evaluated and categorized.(1)
In the political debate, proposals for integration strategies quite often boil down to clichés, blaming the lack of "political will" or the present "intergovernmental" - as opposed to "supranational" - character of the Communities, (2) and fall back on familiar recipes for reform, such as producing "pressure" through self-imposed obligations via artificial/arbitrary timetables (e.g. the Werner plan, the EMS resolution 1978, the final clause of the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart) or founding committees (Vedel, three wise men, Genscher/Colombo follow up, Spaak II) which generally serve as an alibi for postponing decisions and at the same time creating the image of "activity": "Paralysis by analysis" is an often employed tool.

A major problem for these debates on strategy is the lack of a commonly defined or generally accepted goal of European integration or its institutional structure. The concept of a European Union is kept vague on purpose; thus it is not possible to analyse a goal-instrument relationship in which the alternative ways to one specific, clearly set goal could be assessed with some form of academic cost/benefit analysis. (3) The selection among different strategies is thus directly linked to a specific interpretation of a European Union and its institutional characteristics. Academic research, therefore, must always present and analyse different variations of goals and strategies.
The debates in both academic and political circles have been intensified by the Genscher/Colombo, the Crocodile Club initiative and the Dooge Committee. Spinelli's (at least early) "radical" shift away from the government/bureaucracy complex as major actors to a "coalition" of parliaments induced a new wave of conceptual reflection about bits and pieces of strategies, many already floating around since the beginning of the integration process. The major part of this paper is devoted to revisiting basic assumptions of different strategies for institutional reforms. Theses on the integration process are based on the methodological assumption that an assessment of integration strategies cannot be limited to a narrow view on Community institutions as they work, but need to include the environment in which Community strategies have to operate. (4)

2. Methodological fallacies - cliffs ahead in a stormy sea or how to minimize the danger of falling in a methodological trap

a) Three risks

Reflections on integration strategies cannot be separated from their inherent methodological problems. Indeed, given the imperfect state of our art, some methodological assumptions must be made. Some faulty assumptions commonly confusing debate on European integration, however, can be identified. They include
the fallacies of historical analogies, the unreflected use of earlier "lessons"; the deterministic fixation, as a consequence of overly rigid "feasibility approaches"; and voluntaristic activism, deriving from a "political necessity" approach.

Fallacies deriving from historical "lessons"

Successes like the Spaak Committee and failures like Spinelli's Congress of the European People are quite often transposed into the present: "What worked then will work again..." Or: Because the heads of government have always failed we need alternative strategies.

Taking up Hegel's view that history is always right, successes are given a higher "moral" weight than failures; thus, what has succeeded in the history of European integration becomes sacrosanct and petrifies into a doctrine. The Monnet or Spaak method of integration and strategies are thus sometimes turned - contrary to what those persons perhaps believed themselves - from a useful strategy for a certain political constellation into a general rule which is taken out of its historical context.

Historical processes and persons are turned into myths which are contrasted with the rather miserable reality of today. The "great fathers" of European integration history, the Messina
conference (which apparently was rather inconclusive (5)), and the Spaak Committee (see the Fontainebleau Communiqué) are invoked to put some kind of moral pressure on present-day politicians to act with the same courage and in the same direction. As long as these myths are used only to motivate politicians to act more forcefully for integration, they are not necessarily harmful; as soon as they become master-plans or models from which a deviation is considered as a sin, however, they can block constructive policies.

Linked with the mystification of historical success as an incentive or as a master plan is the doctrinalization of once-accepted principles for institutional reforms, e.g. the formula of returning to the "original institutional equilibrium of the Treaties" or of retaining the national veto for "vital interests". Without analysing the conditions in which these principles were developed and their respective usefulness in different situations, the insistence on using them again becomes an obstacle to evaluating present actions and preparing those for the future. Even if it were proved that deviation from such a principle was dysfunctional at a given time in Community history, a return to the paradise of the past generation might be equally dysfunctional if paradise has meanwhile changed its character. Without an analysis of the major factors determining successes and failures
in the past and comparing them with the present constellation, historical analogies can thus be misleading and dangerous.

Strategies for European Union in the second half of the eighties thus run the risk of relying on superficial assessments of strategies that were developed in the immediate post-war period. Myths also invite "revisionist" critics,(6) who destroy not only overrated success but tend to underestimate the influence of the once overestimated factors.(7)

Another trap historical lessons present for strategists is interpreting history only from the perspective of today's need, pointing at lost opportunities. For example, it is sometimes claimed that if we had only followed the Fouchet plan, even in its most intergovernmental form, we would be much better off today. But this view does not take into account the constellation of the time and might lead to a policy of using each possible step forwards without any assessment of different strategies open and disregarding the utility of fighting for a better solution than those which seem politically feasible.

Another methodological foible of current discussion on strategies is classification of historical periods of the Community in a way that seems obvious at first sight, but may not be meaningful for present-day strategy. How useful is it for
different kinds of strategies to refer to a "Europe of the second generation" as long as you do not make clear for what purpose and along which lines you distinguish among "generations"? Using different events and categories, you could easily establish a classification with at least two, three, or four "generations" of Europeans.(8) Even with more sophistication it might be difficult to use these classifications, as different "generations" are working together in one ball game at the same time (e.g. from Spinelli to Fabius). Dahrendorf's classification of a First, Second and Third Europe (9) is more elaborate, but it has clear shortcomings in explaining present day-developments in which the policies of several periods intermingle or collide. Weiler (10) has pointed to the "parallelism" of intergovernmentalization in decision making with increasing supranationalism in decision implementation.(11)

Traps of a feasibility approach

The (useful and necessary) practice of analysing the present political constellation with reference to basic factors and structures (e.g. the perseverance of the "nation state" or the tensions of economic divergences) quite often leads explicitly or implicitly to viewing the status quo as the only possible product of historical developments.
As in other fields, "historical trends" are quite often extrapolated into the present and future and thus turn into rigid strait-jackets. For example, we witness over the past decades an increased involvement and weight of national governments and bureaucracies, leading some to assume implicitly that this intergovernmentalization is a "natural"(!) and "logical" (!) development, which can and should not be counteracted. Without looking at the basic factors of this trend, e.g. the welfare state dimension (see below) and analysing its persistence, such extrapolations of a "visible" flow of events in a certain direction leave us unprepared for possible underlying structural changes.

The future is then quite often equally "determined" by these factors, leaving no real space for political manoeuvres by political actors. Their activities can only hasten or slow down the inbuilt dynamics of an historical process. The inherent danger of certain feasibility studies is thus political resignation.

Again: This approach can lead us to base our strategies for building the European Union and its institutions on past rather than on future constellations.
Problems of the "political necessity approach"

The methodical trap of the political necessity approach is to start the debate on strategies by analysing the shortcomings of the present world we live in. Thereupon, a European program leading us to the Holy Grail is sketched. Implementation is then left to politicians, who are supposed to reach these goals by mobilizing the "political will" which is supposed to flow naturally from the fact that the program reflects the most rational way to solve the problems ahead and will thus be supported by all men of "good will". Consequently, the path to this paradise can be paved e.g. by clear landmarks or binding timetables. Only a political leader is needed to convince citizens of the usefulness of the program. On the whole, it is a technocratic approach dependent on intellectual insight and expertise - Plato's philosopher king reborn for European integration. This approach leads to political activism based on an intellectual analysis of what needs to be done, without analysing the constraints of a pluralistic, conflict-ridden society.

b) The plea for "educated guesses"

The risks of such methodological fallacies are often seen and reflected upon. Nevertheless, the debate on integration
strategies runs too often into such traps, reducing the ability of theory to guide policy. Given these risks, should we refrain from all use of history and systematic analysis developing instead "pragmatic" concepts which better fit present-day realities and avoid the political and intellectual deviations caused by historical doctrines, oversimplified extrapolations or utopian timetables? There are several problems with this quite often preached pragmatism.

Political decision-makers as well as academic observers draw explicitly (as noted above) or even more often implicitly from their personal experiences or at least from their personal interpretation of Community history. "Pragmatism" then, quite often means unreflected conclusions from limited experiences and a distorted set of facts consolidated into an "ideology" about what should be done and how it should be done. As Keynes pointed out, those who claim to be pragmatic base their actions on "outmoded theories". History is part of political life. What we need is not to exclude it (which in any case is impossible) but to exploit it more thoroughly for our strategies. Reflection, thus, should serve as a "mind opener".

An exploitation of history should be based on sound social science methods. From Popper, we know that a verification of causal theories in a complex social world is impossible;
falsifications, however, are highly useful to refute theses and theories not sufficiently explaining reality. From academic research, we know how difficult it is to identify relevant variables (factors) and, in particular, to isolate them from additional factors; the "ceteris paribus clause" is difficult to keep,(13) so we always run the risk of overestimating the influence of one factor (e.g. the personality of decision makers or the perennial national interests) and of underestimating other factors, like the compatibility of economic and political structures (or vice versa). At the same time, inclusion of all possible and potential factors in the debate on strategies is practically impossible and/or too costly in terms of time, money and energy.

For the debate on strategies, we should therefore highlight the possible impact of certain factors. In this vein, I propose to define a series of theses, or hypotheses, that will help define the limits of realistic integration strategies. In more extended research, these theses could be tested in case studies. In this paper, the theses should just serve to stimulate discussions. Debate will not and cannot find the one and only "truth" about how and why strategies for progressing towards European Union fail or succeed, but hopefully we can point out some oversimplifications and work out "probabilities". We can aim at least for "educated guesses" superior to some of the presently propagated views.
Factors helping to understand certain successful or unsuccessful approaches to European Union can then be identified as crucial elements for strategies to pursue. Thus, if we find out that package deals among member governments are the most crucial factors for steps ahead (see below), then we would recommend not spending time only on identifying the best integration steps with the interest of member governments. Second-best options in terms of a purely technical solution should then be considered as political optima solutions presently outside the area of compromise among the crucial actors' political interests. This paper thus starts from the methodological approach that "feasibility" (political potential and constraints) and "goal-achievement" are two criteria which need to be examined for developing strategy.

In accepting both criteria, it would be a mistake to first describe the ideal world, the paradise, and only then try to find ways to achieve it. Quite often, the train then is already on a completely wrong track, from which it cannot be moved. Right from the beginning, both the feasibility and the goal achievement aspect must be discussed together.

By using this methodological device, it is assumed that within a set-up of historical and economic factors political action can change reality. (14)
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION - A VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS AIM

1. Of bits and pieces floating around

The term "European Union" is - for political reasons - deliberately kept vague. Like the term "integration", it bears different meanings for different political forces. The work "Union" itself refers to various concepts in different languages. The "unionist" forces in early integration history were strong defenders of intergovernmental cooperation, stressing national sovereignty against federalists demanding transfer of sovereignties.

In Community history itself, the term "European Union" is only one among several for "more efficient and democratic European institutions", for achieving more "unity", more "common" policies, a new "federal" constitution, etc. The Rome Treaty refers in its preamble to an "ever closer union among European peoples"; the Fouchet discussions turned around a "political Union". The Paris Communiqué of 1972 is more comprehensive but likewise does not define a clear goal. The formula "converting, ... in absolute conformity with the signed Treaties, all the relationships between Member States into a European Union" is vague about the institutional forms and policy contents of the new entity and even contradictory. Later definitions by Tindemans and the three wise
men stressed essential principles (like solidarity), new tasks and detailed institutional and procedural proposals. The European Council "welcomed" those reports by underlining at the same time different lines of further work (like "consolidating" and "developing" the "acquis communautaire" on one hand and "best use" of possibilities for cooperation methods on the other hand).(19)

The European Council's latest attempt to define the European Union, in the Solemn Declaration, and by the EP, in the draft treaty on the European Union, show few signs of a significant convergence on the meaning of European Union and its institutional set-up, though certain extremes on the federal as well as the intergovernmental side were excluded.

For a debate on strategies, this ambiguity reduces the "value-free" or "neutral" character of the advice academics can give. The definition of the goal is already part of the strategy and must therefore take "strategical" considerations into account.

2. Four models as possible institutional goals of a European Union

Though we do not dispose of one specific politically legitimised and/or generally agreed-upon definition of an institutional set-up which could serve as our goal, four models can be identified (20) for discussion.
(1) In a "presidency" model, the European Council disposes of the "supreme power", acting above and outside the Community system. The intergovernmental character might be reinforced by a political secretariat for the heads of government, reducing the role of the Commission and the Council Secretariat. The Council, in practice, would turn into a high-level Coreper, guaranteeing at least the legality of actions. The European Parliament might have a teaching function with some kind of moral authority. Here European Union follows the concept of a "l'Europe des Patries".

(2) In the "reinforced Community" model, the relations between existing Community bodies are made more efficient:

* the European Council turns de jure into the Council on the level of the heads of government;
* the Council decides by majority voting;
* the Commission exercises its initiative and implementation function more forcefully, its position being reinforced by majority voting in the Council;
* the European Parliament increases its power of control (with sanctions), but does not get more deeply involved in the legislative decision-making process.
This European Union concept returns to the "original" equilibrium of the Treaty.

(3) The "dual" model is characterized by the co-decision-making power of the Council and Parliament of the Union, both of which have to agree - with different forms of majority - to legislative and budgetary acts, to treaties and to the composition of the Commission. The institutional concept of this dual model is based on two legitimacies: the national one and a direct European one.

(4) The "parliamentary federation" set-up is characterized by the supremacy of the European Parliament, which elects the government and has the final say in legislative and budgetary acts. The Council becomes a second chamber with some more rights in special "domaines" réservés" like foreign affairs.

The institutional models of the European Union do not necessarily determine the strategy with which the respective set-up is to be achieved, i.e. one concept might be pursued with different strategies; or one strategy might serve different models. Nevertheless, we could expect to find a certain correlation between the institutions which are to play a principal role in the final set-up on one hand and the actors who are the dominant political force in a strategy on the other. Furthermore,
as some models - at least the dual and the federal - would need
legal implementation in the form of a treaty or a constitution,
the "strategical requirements" are by far higher: For a "saut
qualitatif" the strategy must be capable of inducing more radical
change than in the case of progress "à petits pas".

III. STRATEGIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM - AN ATTEMPT AT
CLASSIFICATION

1. Conceptual ingredients

Besides the ambiguity and diverging interpretations of the
goal, the vagueness of what is called "strategy" contributes to
the difficulties in the academic and political debate. Quite
often strategy is used synonymously for "program", "policies" or
"goals". For our purpose, it is useful to identity the following
elements as essential parts of the concept of "strategy".

a) The actors in different stages

* Who is pushing for an initiative? A respectable personality
like Monnet; a group of influential advisers; an "élite"
group like the European Movement; the representatives of the
European people in the European Parliament or in the national
parliaments?
* Who is the "catalyst" needed to make a decision on the procedure for a serious follow-up? The heads of government in the European Council; national parliaments?

* Who are the political actors/forces who are the object of the initiative, i.e. who are supposed to legitimize and implement the decisions? National governments in the European Council, national parliaments, or Community institutions?

* Who are the actors who need to be engaged for political support? Parties, pressure groups, national parliamentarians?

b) Procedures and legal mechanisms

* What kind of procedures are used for taking the initiative? Informal, even secretive channels or formal, open treaty provisions (Art. 236)?

* What kind of legal/procedural form is aimed at as a result of the initiative? Declarations that are not legally binding, like that of Stuttgart or the reports on EPC, a treaty, or even a constitution?

c) The modalities
* What is the content of the initiative? Is it of a broad overall nature including both several sectors of activities and an overall institutional change (e.g. the draft treaty for a European Political Community, Draft Treaty of the European Parliament), does it enumerate several areas of activity without any specific institutional changes, like the Werner report and the Paris 1972 summit; does it concentrate on a few policy sectors like coal and steel, monetary integration or on a few key institutional sectors like the European Council, or European Political Cooperation? Does the initiative thus stress institutional reforms or concrete problem solving?

* How detailed is the initiative? Is it a carefully drafted and detailed document (like the Draft Treaty on European Union); more a general statement of major points leaving details open (e.g. the 1972 summit), or the outline of a few central topics to which others can be added (like the Monnet plan or the Giscard/Schmidt initiative on the EMS)?

* How carefully are the explanations drafted and presented to different forces - just a reference to the gloomy situation of Europe as raisonnement or more explicitly in terms of the specific interest of the actors who are to legitimize and implement the initiative?
* From what kind of "dynamic mechanisms" is the strategy supposed to draw its strength, e.g. inbuilt economic rationales of large markets, the economic self-interest of involved circles of the society, package deals among interests of different countries/nations, the democratic will of the European people, or external threats?

A debate on this kind of an integration strategy needs to be based on some kind of "positive theory" explaining why and how the process of integration develops. Thus the validity of different integration theories plays a crucial role for the success of an integration strategy. The lamentable situation of general integration theories (21) increases the problems of recommending a successful strategy.

2. Some types of strategies

The enumerated elements of strategies can be mixed in numerous combinations. Judging, however, from attempts so far and from the academic and political debate, our considerations should concentrate on several types of strategies:

(1) The "statesmen" strategy stresses the role of the political leader,(22) who needs to be convinced in informal, secretive, high-level contacts. The modalities should be drafted to fit
the personal characteristics and political style of the leading personalities. The character of the final product should be non-binding or - at least - the national parliaments should enter the scene only at the end. The probability is high that this strategy will mainly be used for a presidency model of a European Union. The process should also exclude as far as possible "interdependent outsiders" like the Commission, the EP, etc.; if this is not possible, they should be allowed to play only a secondary role as "experts". The "political will" of the real "European statesman" emerges as the basic dynamic of this strategy.

(2) In the "conference" strategy (23), national governments follow formal procedures either according to Art. 236 of the Rome treaty or by intergovernmental conferences aside from treaty provisions. Community bodies would be officially consulted about a first version of the text. Expert committees and national bureaucracies play an eminent role. The final product consists of a treaty to be ratified by national parliaments. Such a strategy should mainly achieve basic changes towards a dual or federal model. The inherent "dynamics" are the constitutional procedures involving all formally concerned actors. It presupposes a wide consensus among political forces.
(3) The "coalition of parliaments" strategy identifies the parliaments as major actors, with the European parliament in the conceptual and political lead. As the dynamics of the strategy turn on democratic/parliamentary "revolt" against the bureaucratic network, procedures are to be based on parliamentarians besides the usual and formal negotiation machinery of governments. The final product will be a treaty reinforcing the role of the EP in a dual or federal model of a European Union.

(4) The "revolutionary" strategy sees all "existing" political actors (also parties and national parliaments) as defending their own status quo within the existing political system; this strategy looks for a mobilization of the "mass" by an "avant-garde" leading to a European "constituante" really representative of the European people. The final product will be a federal constitution.

(5) In a "directoire" strategy, only the statemen of major (= larger = more powerful) countries agree on steps forward because only they feel "historical responsibilities" in a worldwide context and can develop the energy (lacking in other governments) for taking bold decisions. The major decisions will be taken in personal summits of those heads of government. Other countries will be pure "decision takers"
which are confronted with "submission" to the agreement by the "principal nations" (27) or exclusion from the "inner circle". The final product will probably give the leaders of the major countries a dominant role. (28)

(6) A "core area" strategy (29) propagates more integration for all those countries prepared to join - the assumption is that this circle will consist of the original member countries (= core area). The others will either follow the lead into a more integrated system or exclude themselves. The dynamic is based on the higher degree of shared interests and of common integration goals among those countries. The final institutional product is open to debate, as this concept is proposed by actors with different institutional concepts ranging from a bi- or multilateral presidency model (Weidenfeld) to a dual model of six countries (Draft Treaty of the EP).

(7) The multi-tier or "abgestufte" integration strategy (30) tries to combine a flexible implementation of generally (= unanimously) agreed policies by some countries with stability in the overall institutional framework and help for those countries which have difficulties in following the others' lead. As for institutional reforms, this strategy needs more consideration.
(8) The "problem solving" or "scope enlargement first" strategy downplays the importance of institutional reforms. Some members of this school esteem the present formal decision-making decision-implementation structure as generally sufficient for solving the problems ahead of Europe,(31) some want to exclude the more controversial institutional issues from the agenda, as they might be a nuisance for concrete problem solving; some hope that broadening the scope of activities treated by the Community will finally induce, as "spill over", (32) an institutional reform. In all three variations of this school it is assumed that problem solving irrespective of the institutional structure is the major drive for more integration. Institutional reforms are at best a by-product if not even a tactical nuisance. The flexibility of procedures within the established framework is given highest priority. The product in institutional terms is the status quo, with adaptations and additions.

(9) The "l'Europe à la carte" strategy,(33) stresses the priority of problem solving irrespective of detrimental institutional consequences for the existing Community.(34) Institutional engineering is at best the task at the end of a period free of institutional and legal strait-jackets.
These strategies are not mutually exclusive; most of them are even quite often pursued at the same time or at least consecutively in a trial and error process. However, strategies cannot be switched arbitrarily. According to the relative utility of different ingredients, initiatives must be planned, priorities set regarding which actors to address and which procedures to employ, and coherence established between dynamic forces and procedures and actors.

IV. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATION FACTORS OR: WHO IS TO BLAME FOR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES?

1. The role of different groups of actors

Progress towards more institutional integration has so far come as parts of package deals among national interests as perceived by the political leadership in power, mainly heads of governments. These leaders were strong enough to sway opponents or overcome national political obstacles. (35) Or, to state the argument the other way round with Spinelli: initiatives failed because the national governments (in the last decade: the European Council) were unable to reach an agreement.
This thesis needs some explanation:

a) Steps towards a European Union did not follow a master-plan conceived from an "idealistic" European point of view requiring "only" technical and legal implementation. Rather, piecemeal engineering with at most medium-term perspectives dominated. Schneider pointed out the concrete political interests dominating in the fifties. (36) Milward even states that his findings about the period up to 1951 "flatly contradict" the prominent role of European "idealism" based on war-time experiences (37) as they are elaborated by the work of Lipgens. (38)

There is also no inherent, historical deterministic force moving European society into a European federation; "the process of integrations is (not a) thread woven into the fabric of Europe's political destiny". (39)

Furthermore, functional necessities furnish no means for automatic implementation or at least no push strong enough to solve problems across national frontiers. Successes in integration attempts are thus not caused by the absence of national interests and/or the orientation of political actors towards an optimal European model, (40) but by a congruence or at least compatibility of national interests.
b) Institutional reforms were parts of an overall package in which the scope-widening to deal with certain concrete problems was the engine to set the train in motion. Pure institutional engineering did not attract strong support. On the other hand, progress towards European Union was not based on a "pure" package deal among "national" interests at a given moment. For lasting progress, structures, procedures and forms had to be included which out-last the original package. Scope enlargement as such is not sufficient to guarantee success.

Necessary conditions for a lasting success were thus twofold: satisfaction of political needs for the political top and the creation of lasting structures and procedures. The institutional structures themselves were also quite often the result of compromises or package deals, but they had an inbuilt potential to start a process that would go beyond the original package deal.

It was Monnet's chef d'oeuvre to combine exactly those two elements in his CSCE plan. Indeed, the mastery of his plan is that it can be perceived both as a master plan for European unification and an optimal strategy for French or German national political recovery. (41)
The structures which were created did not replace the nation state as the major political agency with a new European system run by independent bodies; the decisions on institutions established rules and procedures for accommodation or coexistence of different, even diverging, national economic policies inside and outside the groups. Form and character of the "institutionalization of interdependence"(42) is a major factor deciding the failure or success of initiatives (see also Thesis 17 and 20).

c) "National interests" are not "fixed", dictated by history and geography. To a large degree, the perception of national leaders about the policies in one sector and in the overall framework defines the national interest in a given moment.(43) These perceptions of national interests are not necessarily based on a "narrow self-interest",(44) but might also derive from some enlightened self-interest disregarding tangible short-term costs for the sake of more, although less certain, medium-term benefits.

The perception of national interests was not only a function of actual political needs but also of the "vision" of political leaders (coming from a national environment) about the role which their respective countries should play in Europe and the world; thus, for a debate on the perception of
heads of governments it is necessary to analyse in which medium-term direction they want to move their country in the light of alternatives open to them. How far costly compromises are accepted for the sake of establishing a reliable framework depends on that vision of the future. The more Community policy is reduced to a management of the status quo (45) instead of creating potential future benefit, however, the more the short-term view of "national interests" dominates. If you cannot sell a compromise as "good for the future of your children", then you are induced or even forced to control the concrete distribution of costs and benefits of a package deal.

This thesis also implies that the perception of national interests by political leaders in steps towards European Union does not necessarily derive from "good" or "bad" attitudes toward integration on the part of the responsible heads of government, but on how European strategies serve different policy goals at the same time:

- to maintain or strengthen internal power by winning general points vis-à-vis the electorate through selling specific policies with a European label (only possible in those countries with a generally positive attitude vis-à-vis
integration (see thesis 3) and by putting internal opposition forces in a difficult position;
- foreign-policy goals like achieving some kind of equal status (for the FRG in the Monnet plan, for Ireland in the EMS, etc.) or gaining or reserving a large status in international affairs (as for the FRG and the UK in the creation of EPC (46));
- supporting internal and external economic policies (as for France in the Monnet plan (47));
- establishing a historical reputation as a "European statesman". Thus, referring to the perception of national leaders does not imply that the achievement of progress was necessarily conditioned by having only "good Europeans" at the top of each national government. Strong pro-integration attitudes were not a necessary prerequisite for success. Again: Decisive was the overall political concept and the assessment of ways to gain points in an internal power struggle. If progress in Europe becomes instrumental to the political strategies of several leaders at the same time, then preconditions are good. Thus, certain "integration cycles" can be discerned which are caused by political cycles in member countries.

In this context, the formula of the "political will" is dangerously often used to "explain" successes or failures
without a more profound analysis. The formula of the "political will" develops quite often into an empty category which - when present - is seen as a deus ex machina favouring initiatives, and - when absent - explains "easily" the lack of progress. Thus, recourse to "political will" becomes a truism which quite often prevents a closer look at reality. It is necessary to research the nature of a political constellation which might explain why "political will" is present or absent and in which direction it will work.

d) The perception of national leaders is vital, a necessary but not sufficient precondition for success. The political leaders must also be able to implement the ideas and sell compromises in the national setting. Steps forward were always accompanied by battles in the national arena about the usefulness of the Community for a given interest. The "power" of leaders is of high importance. Thus, it is not sufficient to analyze only the perception of political leaders but the national political context, the power relationships among political and societal forces.(48) The political leadership is part of a political system in and through which the head of government has to operate. Especially for institutional reforms, strong resistance must be included in the analysis. The "national interest" is then the outcome of the national
decision-making process - the battle in the capitals (49) - with the head of governments in a pivotal though not necessarily dominant position when European initiatives are the object of negotiations.

e) This concentration on the role of political leadership does not imply that major statesmen have to create and initiate all plans and initiatives by themselves; these might and quite often are prepared by the bureaucracy,(50) by single personalities like Monnet, or by groups of experts. It is perhaps quite indicative for this thesis that plans might "float" around for some time before being picked up by a political leadership that perceives them as useful in a given moment. In the seventies and eighties, however, compared with the early fifties, the political leadership needs to be involved more extensively.

If this thesis is valid, the strategies stressing the role of the "statesman" look more promising than e.g. the parliamentary coalition strategy - though we should be careful not to rely on the naive versions of "political will". The conference approach can then only be a complementary part of an overall strategy. The institutional out-come will be more likely to be a presidency or a reinforced Community model than a dual or parliamentary federation model.
A necessary but not sufficient precondition for a successful package in the Community deal has been a French/German agreement on the major ingredients of the package.

This thesis implies or is based on following assumptions and lessons:

a) An initiative by one of those countries without an early understanding with the partner country did not work (see the Erhard Initiative from 1964, see Genscher/Colombo Initiative, see the French memoranda on the “espace social et industriel”).

b) A common French/German initiative proved quite often successful in the Community because the positions of the other countries were in the middle ground between those of France and Germany. Thus a French/German agreement would not be detrimental to the interests of the "rest" of the Community.

c) The rest of the original members recognized the crucial importance of a French/German understanding. Though perhaps complaining about a certain style of policy-making, they did not object to a special relationship. Furthermore, the initiatives of those two countries normally were brought into
the Community framework at an early stage. The inherent tendency towards a bilateral hegemony or directoire was counterbalanced by an appropriate use of Community channels.

d) Other countries could veto the French/German package, but not substitute it. Thus, they have the blocking power to prevent French/German plans but the impact of initiatives of their own is significantly smaller than a French/German understanding. The entry of new countries like the U.K. increased the frequency and strength of vetos but did not lead to new constellations of dynamic driving forces.

e) There was and there is not necessarily a close identity or growing convergence of interests between France and the Federal Republic. Achieving consensus between Germany and France has always been difficult. Failure of quite a lot of initiatives can be explained more by French/German désaccord than by the "nuisance" power of other members. Though differences about policy contents and institutional forms were frequent among the two, at the end of the bargaining battle, there was often a specific drive by both of them to make a compromise for the sake of a stable Community, which was perceived by all post-war leaders of both countries as a "vital" interest. This basic attitude vis-à-vis the system as such has not been demonstrated by the U.K. so far.
f) Of major importance for progress is therefore that the "political cycles" of the two national leaders coincide in terms of political strength and motivations. The results of The Hague 1969, Paris 1972 and 1974, Brussels 1978 and Milan 1985 (?) indicate that the success rate for Community strategies are following a "business" cycle mainly determined by the power of those two leaders.

As a driving force the will of the European people has been of secondary importance.(51)

No initiative was successful because the "people" forced their leaders to pursue certain pro-integration initiatives. Those initiatives which relied too much on "la volonté générale" as an instrument "against" governments failed. This thesis assumes:

a) Citizens' general pro-European attitude is not unimportant. It may serve as a "permissive consensus"(52) which gives political leaders a certain freedom to manoeuvre, making it difficult for opposition forces to attack them. A general pro-European attitude is a positive factor if and when leaders seek to "sell" their initiative and establish themselves as
"statesman of historical and European rank". Thus, if this pro-European attitude in a country is non-existent or waning the statesman's room to manoeuvre and incentive to take and support initiatives are reduced, as they no longer form part of an overall political strategy in the internal power struggle (see Thesis 1).

b) Positive results of opinion polls like the Eurobarometer should not be ignored: the potential for stronger European actions can be discerned, but if those actions are not taken, no government leader will fall. Looking at studies about how voters decide about the party of their preference in elections, European initiatives seldom played a decisive role. Institutional technicalities especially do not arouse a popular reaction, as the dominant issues of the last election campaign for the European Parliament (1984) have demonstrated again. This implies that European initiatives were not crucial for political survival, maintenance of political power or winning political power.

If this thesis is valid, appeals to the "people" will be futile. The revolutionary strategy thus would find no dynamic backing.
Political parties inside and outside Parliaments have played no major role in driving their leaders to strong actions, especially not in the field of institutional reform, not even since the cooperation of parties in the European-wide party groupings has intensified.

a) One reason might be that winning elections is the crucial function of all parties: As elections were not decided on the ground of taking or leaving European initiatives (see Thesis 3), parties did not "fight" for a European programme. This argument does not exclude that parties were concerned with European questions, but they perceived them in "normal" times as of limited utility for winning elections. Catch-all parties do not like to be on the negative side of a widespread attitude on any issue; thus they preferred in most member countries to pronounce themselves as pro-European without making this a basic, crucial issue of e.g. the party leadership and programme.

b) A second more speculative reason for a certain passivity of major parties refers to a perhaps instinctive drive of parties to conserve power in their hands. Initiatives to transfer powers to a European level might have been viewed as a
reduction of their own influence - irrespective of European party groupings in or outside the European Parliament.

From both arguments, the inconsistency between general pro-European declarations on one side and reluctance to undertake concrete actions on the other side can be explained. The pro-European statements appeal to a broader public - the hesitance to make specific commitments reflects a self-protection of competences typical of political organizations.

If this thesis is valid, the parliamentary coalition strategy will lack a crucial part of its dynamic. Expectations that Europe-wide party "federations" will provide a major impetus for integration may need to be drastically reduced.

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National parliaments on their own have so far played no major role beyond activities of the party groups inside the Parliaments.
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Non-partisan initiatives, e.g. for the direct election of the European Parliament, were of limited value. Reasons might be:

a) The often-quoted loss of competences of national parliaments (54) have not induced a revolt against national governments
and bureaucracies. Rare outcries about insufficient information and participation (55) are muted (except in Denmark) by the "normal" interplay between the (majority) party(/ies) within the government and quite often by informal consultation procedures with national administrations.

b) Like parties, parliaments might be reluctant to give up powers, even if these exist only "on paper", to some other body, even if this is democratically elected. Thus, the assumption of the parliamentary strategy that there is a natural "alliance" of parliaments against national governments and bureaucracies seems less valid than the thesis that national parliamentarians might prefer the existing—albeit perhaps mainly informal— influence on at least their government (which they can vote out of office) and their bureaucracy (to which they have direct access) to a perhaps formally more democratic control of Community policies by a European Parliament where their influence is comparatively marginal. A "dual" or even a "parliamentary federation" model is thus not a logical consequence of national parliaments' reaction to their loss of competences.

Interest groups (including trade unions) so far have concentrated their sometimes strong engagement on specific points. Their
general pro- and anti-European attitude is - like public opinion - of limited help or hindrance to initiatives for the institutional reform of a European Union.

Again, as with parties: hopes for a dynamic role of political, social and economic groups (the "forces vivantes") should be buried, if this thesis is valid.

National bureaucracies do not show a persistent pattern. Though they tend to conserve power in their own hands and to distrust initiatives, bureaucracies in most member countries contained pro-integration coalitions, perhaps not majority coalitions but of considerable strength. (56)

The often quoted position that "national bureaucracies, although they have to take their place as major political actors in the process and were indeed much more important to it than theory suggests, are deplorably ill-equipped for such a task (of long term calculations about gains and losses) trained as they are to distill with the greatest possible accuracy forecasts about calculable short-term consequences"(57) does not seem to be confirmed by historical evidence. Confronted with major
initiatives, there were in most member countries also battles within national bureaucracies which were sometimes won by those who perceived Community progress as a positive factor. Furthermore, political leadership could – if it wanted to – constrain bureaucracies to implement its plans. Thus, bureaucracies as such are not necessarily the foes of any integration strategies. However, a strategy which is clearly directed against any bureaucracy might be confronted with strong opposition. It is therefore necessary for dynamic strategies to look for supporting forces also within bureaucracies.

The European leadership (High Authority, Commission, European Parliament) was instrumental in raising topics, including enduring procedural elements in the package deals, and providing new ideas. However, their part in getting an initiative off the ground and in implementing it were limited (see the Jenkins initiative for the EMS, the Thorn contribution to the Stuttgart and the Fontainebleau package).

Thus, if follows that the power of reforming the institutional system from within the system is limited. (58)
Independent personalities (like Monnet or presidents of the European Movement) could play a vital part in inducing heads of government to take up an initiative and to suggest - out of their insights and personal contacts - constructive package deals. Unless, however, they are really close to the heads of government, their influence is marginal. Due to the increasing bilateral and multilateral tête-à-tête of politics the utility of such a role has decreased.

From this thesis it follows that new attempts to emulate Monnet's Action Committee are - compared with the original attempt - of clearly reduced utility.

We should be careful not to compartamentalize political actors too much into single groups of actors, e.g. parties; we must be aware that there are "clusters" or networks of actors of different groups: Those clusters of, e.g., certain political leaders, parliamentarians, parties (or wings of parties), interest groups and civil servants are of considerable importance and stability. What is needed is a dynamic coalition across different groups of actors.
If we assume for a moment that Theses 1-9 are a valid starting point we can deduce additional theses concerning strategic modalities and procedures which - at least at first glance - do not seem to be contradicted by past experiences.

2. Modalities - how to drag political leadership into the battle

Successful initiatives for European Union should at their inception clearly indicate the major aims without fixing the details too early.

The central package deal behind the initiatives should be clear to the national political leadership, but the programme should leave enough field for manoeuvre and supplementary ideas. It has proved vital that a locomotive of interest be put on the rails. Thus, the Draft Treaty of the EP might already be too fully developed and too complex in details.

In the next phase, that of concertation, it proved to be necessary that the political leadership make a strong commitment, not necessarily a strong personal involvement, by a mixture of complementary steps:
* being involved directly in the crucial points;
* entrusting personal representatives who are really in close contact with political leadership drawing up detailed plans,
* giving the responsible bureaucratic institutions some freedom to manoeuvre with clear political aims.

Successes have been based on an intensive interplay of political leadership and the administrative apparatus. If one part is lacking, failure is rather likely.

Generally not successful, at least in phases after an initiative had been taken, were attempts to install high-level independent expert groups or wise men. Their intellectual capacity as such is not sufficient to generate a driving force for integration.

In the finalization of the written agreement, intensive involvement of the political leadership in the central details is indispensable.

"Technical" details cannot only be left to the "experts" because in the controversies over details basic political
differences are reflected. The common distinction between political decision "in principle" and the "technical" implementation by civil servants has proved to be quite often artificial and to increase only the problems of finalization.

For ratification or implementation again the political leadership needed to get involved in lobbying in the national arena. No initiative worked as such.

Agreements not requiring ratification are preferable because they involve less engagement of the political leadership inside their countries.

The sensibility at home is less high and the political costs are lower when national leaders do not need to sell their product. At the same time, when the obligations stemming from legal agreements are higher, the control of follow-up by the national political leadership is reduced.
Ambiguity in the texts can be helpful in arguing the case to different circles.

The controversy about the "liberal" (used as an argument in the ratification in Bonn), and the "social" character of the Rome treaties (used as an argument in the Assemblée Nationale), for example, helped the Treaty pass, but such ambiguities can create controversy later on (which might still be preferable to having no steps forward at all). Water-proof drafting with no ambiguities quite often means standstill. It is necessary, however, to include procedures (legal or otherwise) for resolving disputes over different interpretations.

3. The dynamics of integration

a) The national environment: The withering away of original integration functions

Theses 1-15 try to draw lessons from previous attempts to achieve institutional progress - thus, they can run the risk of falling into the trap of historical analogies. The following theses try to explain the observed behavioural patterns of political actors by analysing the "system" or the "environment" in
which the actors operate; these, therefore, are subject to the possible traps of the feasibility approach.

Major original functions of the integration process for Member States have been either fulfilled or have lost in importance. New functions are highly important but do not necessarily lead to institutional reforms.

In the post-war period the six original EC members used "integration" as a means of pursuing at the same time:

* national emancipation from war-time defeat and post-war restrictions,
* support of their own economic growth after war-time devastation,
* recovery of a say in international affairs in formal as well as in power terms,
* a new "regime" of rules and codes of conduct to manage the growing interdependence,(61)
* a "working peace system" in a larger sense than just the absence of war, including forms of peaceful, democratic and legal conflict resolution, guaranteeing human and civil rights etc.
These partly overlapping functions of the Community — compatible, though not necessarily identical in the original member countries — have largely been materialized — partly due to factors outside direct Community policies — partly due to different forms of integration. The emancipation function has passed for most countries into a historical reminiscence; the establishment of a "working peace system" has been largely achieved; to maintain it is highly important, though from national points of view no dramatic improvement of this system is needed.

For supporting economic growth — in the mid-eighties this means an increase in competitiveness and reduction of unemployment — for keeping or re-establishing a regime for managed interdependence (partly with new issues like ecology) and for maintaining or regaining a say in international affairs, European policies are still of major importance. In pursuing these goals through Community channels, however, the urge for major institutional initiatives might be weaker.

For the "newcomers", most of the original functions — at least for those with different World War II experiences — were of no major importance. Thus, the passing of time and addition of new members led indeed to a new "generation" of politicians, for which steps towards a European Union did and do not play a major
role in the future development of their country, as they did for some of the "founding fathers".

This downgrading of the importance of the original functions is due not only to progress in integration; where major steps towards political union failed, like the European Defence Community or the Fouchet plans, other solutions, like NATO or European Political Cooperation, have fulfilled at least some of the original needs for the member countries. Failures to achieve more steps forward reinforced also the tendencies of the economically and politically "successful" West European States to reestablish and confirm themselves as major actors and consequently perceive concrete Community policies in narrower utilitarian terms of direct costs and benefits. (63) This reduced the propensity to make a larger investment into projects of the European Union as such and increased the propensity for package deals of an ever-increasing complexity and "technicality" (see also Thesis 1). The reluctance of new members to take bolder initiatives and the withering away of certain functions for the original members have led to the result that the institutional initiatives get a rather low priority on national agendas.

Piecemeal engineering with scope enlargement not substantially altering the institutional status quo will thus remain the dominating pattern if this thesis is valid. It also
follows that a core-area strategy might not benefit from too much drive from the original six member countries - or at least that simple analogies to the fifties might be treacherous.

The role national political systems play in modern welfare (service) states is strongly established and resists attempts at replacement or downgrading by an independent European system.

Since the post-war period, the EC member countries have developed into fully fledged welfare systems with party competition and increasing neocorporatism in which approximately half of the GNP is spent through governments (on different levels) and through public agencies (like social security etc.). National governments have become the central object of intensive lobbying for distribution and redistribution. They are made responsible for the "pursuit of happiness". Thus the whole national structure of policy-making has been oriented towards the national capital. It is no more so much national sovereignty in security and legal terms as such which gives the national political system its legitimacy, but the different "service functions" it performs for its citizens. Though the national government does not dispose of all the instruments necessary to fulfill these service functions in the most efficient way (thus the need to cooperate beyond
national frontiers), the citizens address their expectations and give their support primarily to the national system which he or she is familiar with.

The dilemma between the most efficient level of problem solving on one side (which, for many political issues, is the Community) and the established national political system - which evokes some traditional loyalties - is not likely to be solved in favour of pure problem rationality. The disposition of political forces in major Community countries to replace the role of the national system in these service functions to a large extent by a different, new and unfamiliar (European) system is low. The resistance of the whole political system to a large political change of functions is thus considerable. (64) Though the welfare state has and is suffering multiple crises, none of them has stirred up a broad political move towards more European integration.

The European Community and various cooperative policies were more a help for nation states in keeping and strengthening their salience than a sign of the nation state "withering away". (65) Major crises might undermine the legitimacy of a national system by "overloading" it and demonstrating its incapacity. Given a level of stability in the national political system, however, any progress towards "European Union" will mainly be possible as an
extension - not a downgrading - of the nation state. From this analysis, we would expect a constant scope enlargement. As to the institutional side, those systems are preferred which give political representatives of the national welfare state a decisive say. A presidential or a reinforced institutional model seems more adapted to this system than a dual model.

Divergences in the economic performance and the heterogeneity of economic policies have grown (or have at least not been considerably reduced), thus keeping the potential costs of giving up national control high.

With the help of the EC, the economic performance of all the original member countries has improved. The distance among them in some crucial terms, like international competitiveness, inflation rates, external balance, and regional equilibrium, however, has not really been bridged. With increasing membership, economic performance will further diverge in a Community of Twelve; We can expect a general interest in a common market and common internal and external economic policies, but there was and will be more controversy about the substance of these policies. Beside divergences in interests - due to different economic positions in the international "division of labour"(66) - the
"philosophies" and instruments used for economic policies are still quite different, though perhaps less divergent in their real impact than might appear.

Looking at this situation, it can be assumed that institutional reforms towards a European Union by replacing or downgrading national instruments are not likely, since most member governments expect that new common policies run by independent bodies of the European Union will not as adequately suit their problems and philosophies as their national ones. Loss of formal control over instruments that are vital for national economies and crucial for winning national elections will not be easily accepted. Furthermore, as the CAP demonstrates, loss of one instrument is likely to be compensated by creation of others to fine-tune economic policies according to the needs perceived at the national level.

This thesis does not exclude that all member countries have a vital interest in pursuing Community policies, but this strong potential interest is restrained by the "uncalculable" risks of giving up the ultimate responsibility - even if national instruments have less impact than a genuine European policy.

In such situations, economic booms can facilitate the implementation of plans, as happened with the ECSC and the Rome
treaties. If all economies grow, divergences are less embarrassing and the budget available to make side payments in favour of institutional steps is larger. In times of economic crisis, the costs of integration are more obvious and more painful, so the propensity for institutional reform is reduced.

If this thesis is valid, we would expect that if it is necessary to strengthen the institutional set-up those (intergovernmental) forms are preferred which leave the major influence to national governments. Such an analysis supports the utility of a multi-tier or a core area approach of "like-minded" countries of the same economic level.

b) The Community environment - restraints of a "cooperative federalism"

By a constant evolution of the institutional structure (though within clear limits) as well as by enlarging the scope of policies pursued by the Community, the Community institutions and related bodies have created an "acquis" which at the same time reduces on one side the options open and on the other side constantly creates opportunities and pressures for further developments.
With the institutions created by the Paris and Rome treaties, with some reform of the original division of powers (especially establishing the budgetary powers of the EP), with institutional adaptations and amendments like Coreper and the European Council, with parallel developments like EPC and EMS, the structure of policy-making has gone through several evolutionary phases; historical plans are thus often outdated as experiences gained over the last three decades are building up their own "acquis"; the potential for institutional "pioneering" is reduced.

The scope of policies pursued in the Community and in related fora like EPC and the EMS have also increased considerably over the years. Most areas vital to national policies are in some way or other touched by Community deliberations, legislation and action; in this sense, national policies have been "Europeanized" - however, the effectiveness by which these problems are tackled on the European level is generally assessed as inadequate - as most political forces are ready to agree.

The felt "disequilibria" of these policies and dynamic spill-overs (not necessarily an "automatischer Sachzwang" à la Hallstein) push for more democratic and more efficient institutional set-ups. The growing imperfections of the political system of the EC have increased the claim for institutional reforms. The imperfections of the institutions and the
insufficient policies are thus a constant source for new initiatives towards a European Union, though many forces which articulate the need for reform are at the same time corner-stones of the status quo.

Steps and strategies towards a European Union are not only influenced by the growing number of activities and the increased variety of institutional machinery but by the evolution of the Community into a system of "cooperative federalism",(67) increasing the "double role" of national decision-makers and reducing the field for manoeuvre of the EP.

By the term "cooperative federalism" we mean the "pooling" and "mixing" of national sovereignties with Community competences. In a system of cooperative federalism two levels (in our case the Community and the national) are not clearly separated in terms of their areas of action. By contrast, the traditional notion of federalism implies that each level operates on its own without taking into account the other level. In a cooperative federalist system, both levels share in the responsibility for problem solving. As neither has adequate legal competence and material instruments to tackle the challenges they face. This strong tendency to overstep clear vertical separations of power (in
federal states and in the Community) develops from the tasks of modern welfare states in an interdependent world. Thus, the evolution of the Community into a system of a cooperative federalism results from a dilemma. On one hand, governments see the need to enlarge the scope of Communities' activities to fulfil their service function better (see Theses 16 and 17); on the other hand, they are reluctant to give up control over their policies (see Theses 17 and 18).

The term "cooperative federalism" is used to mark - more clearly than other terms like "intergovernmentalization" or "regime" used to describe at least part of the same phenomena - the close links between several governmental levels and to put the analysis of the Community development into some comparative perspective. Strategies for a European Union thus must take into account not only the increased activities and the higher density of the institutional network but also this specific character of the Community system.

A major consequence of this process is a gain of power by the government (68) in all its major functions: policy determination, policy execution and policy control. At least in formal terms, parliaments are the losers; governments and bureaucracies are in a permanent process of "transnational" negotiation, the result of which cannot normally be overruled by the national or the European
Parliaments, without endangering the whole compromise. (69) The strengthening of administrative actors by the functional necessity of transnational cooperation on a permanent basis, however, does not lead to a "technocratic rule". (70) The administrative and political representatives of the Member States are part of "policy clusters" - policy networks which are formed by the close interaction of interested members of parliaments, the political leadership in government, interest groups, academics and the civil servants. The national positions being negotiated in Brussels are thus normally not just "bureaucratic" inventions by civil servants - "out of touch with the political reality in their country" - but reflect in most cases the consensus among the concerned national élites on certain topics (this analysis would explain the relative inertia of parliaments and parties referred to in Theses 4 and 5).

In such a system, the major national actors are becoming aware of their responsibilities for both levels. National decision-makers in the European Council and in the Council perceive the need to keep the Community system as such going, and not only when they are holding the Presidency; an output failure on the Community is clearly seen as having direct repercussions for the national service function.

The institutional system of the Community, as it has developed over the seventies and early eighties has gained in
stability and strength by the involvement of nearly all major national actors. The institutional build-up since the fifties is assembling nowadays nearly all decision-makers in regular intervals; the late-comers were the heads of government in the European Council. Deficits, however, exist in the parliamentary circles. Except for the European party associations, which are neither complete nor very relevant, parliamentary leaders outside the governments do not dispose of a regular European-wide network - this deficit has been reinforced by the nearly total reduction of dual mandate in the European Parliament. This loss of influence has not led to a strong revolt as many expected, partly, as explained above, because parliamentarians are integrated into informal policy networks in which they keep an ultimate veto power on national policies.

The intensive involvement of national decision-makers - caused by and reinforcing at the same time the interdependence of the national and the Community levels - reduces the room for manoeuvre as the national systems control Community activities in nearly all phases.

In terms of institutional strategies for a European Union, we can conclude from these characteristics of the Community system that we are faced with a dilemma for our strategies: if we want to pursue a strategy which is viable and acceptable in member
countries, we need to base those steps on a majority of forces in parliaments, bureaucracies and interest groups who, however, basically support the present system of shared responsibilities and are, in institutional terms, mainly status quo oriented. Those forces are generally not interested in a structural reform which would reduce their influence and control over Community policies. On the other hand, if we want to achieve a step beyond the status quo, which seems necessary to solve the problems ahead in a rational and democratic way, we lack the political forces to give those steps enough weight.

c) The international environment - unity by external "coercion"?

The simple hypothesis that "the stronger the external challenges, the more easily steps towards a European Union are taken" can be regarded as refuted.

The history of the Community demonstrates that, in all steps and projects towards more institutional integration, the international environment played and plays a major though not persistent role (71) - not always leading towards faster agreement and more rapid implementation of initiatives. In times of crisis, member governments quite often search for "coalitions" with
countries outside the Community. Those attempts are induced or strengthened by a "divide-et-impera" policy of third countries (like the Arab countries after the 4th Middle East war). For major institutional pushes the external challenges have not (yet?) proved strong enough. Furthermore, in times of crisis there is a reflex to fall back on known national systems or on partners you can trust - thus reinforcing tendencies towards a "directoire" or a core area.

In the history of the Community, the international "power game" has usually offered a premium for a "European coalition". This premium was and is quite often offset by the fear of losing national freedom of action and by some successes in a rather loose system of European cooperation.

The result of this trade-off between more say in international affairs on one hand and the reduction of formal sovereignty on the other hand is a double strategy of member countries leading towards "parallel Community activities"(72) in many sectors of international affairs. The member countries have common and coordinated forms of foreign economic (e.g. Lomé) and diplomatic (EPC) policies at the same time that they retain their own national policies. Institutionally, national instruments were
not replaced but diversified. The collective strategic dependence on the USA has acted as a brake on development of closer unity in foreign policy and defence matters.

The economic interdependence of the European welfare systems has made cooperation imperative not only inside the Community but also outside in Western fora.

The need to bargain with partners like the USA, Japan and Third World countries has provided incentives for closer common action but did not prevent "direct" actions of member countries, for example in the IMF or in Western summitry. If Theses 21 to 22 are valid, then neither the diplomatic/security position of Europe nor economic interdependence offer - at least at present- strong incentives for institutional reforms.

V. CONCLUSIONS - A CORE AREA STRATEGY AS SOLUTION OR RESIGNATION?

After this look into the past and the present, we need to look into the future at how far the conditions responsible for the utility of a certain European strategy will persist or change. We
need to analyze how far new or reinforced challenges will lead to constructive packages breaking up the present institutional "impasse" in the system of "cooperative federalism".

Besides looking into the crystal ball, we could work with "scenarios" in which alternative evolutions in the national, Community and international environments are assembled. Thus, if we expect a long-term economic recession, the propensity of the Community of Twelve either to collapse or wither away is high. Then different institutional models and different strategies should be pursued than in times of economic boom.

For the sake of our discussion, however, we assume that the theses presented above have a certain degree of validity for medium-term evolution of the status quo. From these analyses and assessments some suggestions for institutional strategies can be drawn.

*(1)* Package deals with scope enlargement and institutional reforms should not be planned in the medium term on only one "voie royale", e.g. certain institutional reforms or one crucial area of activities like the EMS or the "espace industrielle". Perceptions of the political leadership caused by political pressures might change in a short time. Various "locomotives" for integration strategies should be tested by trial and error. However, at a
given moment, a rather simple "give and take relationship" with elements of institutional reforms in a crucial position should be presented.

**(2)** Package deals among all Member States which would enlarge scope and the institutional framework are difficult to identify in the present situation. The asterixes in the Dooge report are just an additional indicator that some countries are not prepared to offer concessions. In a Community of Ten or even Twelve some form of constructive compromises among countries on a different position in the international division of labour, of different degrees of European awareness and diverging conceptions for institutional reforms will make dynamic package deals with scope enlargement and strengthening of the institutional structure difficult.

Given this analysis of the missing preconditions for institutional reforms, new forms of integration have been proposed in which the numbers of participants are limited. The above-mentioned strategies of l'Europe à la Carte,(74) differenzierte Integration,(75) "abgestufte Integration" (or l'Europe à plusieurs vitesses) à la Brandt and with variations à la Tindemans,(76) l'Europe à géométrie variable,(77) the abgestufte Integration à la Grabitz(78) or a new "core group" being "threatened" as much by Mitterand and Kohl as by the Draft Treaty of the European
Parliament (Art. 82) (and apparently attempted in part with the "revival" of the WEU), all start from the assumption that smaller circles of member countries will agree more readily on ambitious steps forward to solve problems in common. They differ about the forms by which the rest of the countries should "participate" in the common project or be led back into the "club" of advanced European circles. Stressing mainly the "scope enlarging" dimension, most of these concepts do not deal with the implications for the institutional set up of a European Union.

***As a strategy for reforming the existing institutions, those concepts could serve:

* as a means of keeping the status quo by allowing institutional mechanisms which - like the "multiple bilateralism" of Community countries (i.e. the regular bilateral meetings of some heads of governments) - might be outside the institutional orthodoxy but perhaps necessary to keep the institutional framework working; (79)

* to enlarge the scope outside the Community in a strict sense - for example in the EMS - thus reducing the pressure on Community institutions;
To offer some kind of Community-oriented fallback position in case the overload on the Community institutions leads to a break-down.

To use these concepts as a tactical element for a strategy towards a new institutional set-up, the dynamic governments must be prepared to go ahead alone.

The "tactical device" concept is based on the belief that reluctant countries will not want to stay outside an inner, more dynamic circle which they might have to join later under less favourable terms - as was Britain's experience after not entering the EEC club early enough. The inner core area must, however, be prepared to go ahead if the other countries call its bluff. Thus, the utility of these concepts as tactical instruments will ultimately depend on their utility as a strategy.

On the utility to a Community of Ten/Twelve of those concepts in achieving some kind of different institutional set up:

a) The slightly varying concepts of a multi-tier community as a "non-permanent exception but unlimited in time" in which all countries agree on a common concept, some however delaying implementation for "objective" reasons (see e.g. Art. 35 of the Draft Treaty on European Union) and especially
supported by the Community to reach the common standard, will not serve as a strategy for a major institutional drive towards a European Union. They might be useful for enlarging the scope of common activities, as happened with the EMS (though in that case the third element - that of special aid - was not given to the non-implementing countries). Major institutional reforms would not garner even an agreement in principle by all members. Secondly, it is difficult to conceive of procedures in which some members would not - at least not actively - participate. The utility of "abgestufte Integration" as a strategy for institutional reforms in the direction of a European Union is therefore limited to an early stage of drawing new areas of activities into some kind of common (though imperfect) integration framework.

b) The strategy of "l'Europe à la Carte" - "that is common policies where there are common interests without any constraint on those who cannot join them"(81) - opens the possibility for a multiplicity of parallel approaches which - at least implicitly - defy any kind of coherent institutional framework. Scope enlargement without at least some kind of rules will not help institutional steps forward; they are a danger to existing institutions but do not offer institutionally sound alternatives.(82)
c) More promising is a strategy based on new (= old?) core areas. Institutional reforms and scope enlargement could be pursued in a coherent way. In a smaller circle of those with similar interests who are willing to go ahead with integration, the subjective and objective preconditions are met to a higher degree than in other constellations. Before jumping on this train, however, several warnings have to be raised:

A core area can only be implemented without major legal problems if the scope is limited to areas outside Community competences - e.g. security policies or a technology agency. (83) If countries want to establish an inner circle covering also policies which are within Community competences - Art. 82 of the Draft Treaty does imply such a procedure - the constitutional problems of getting out of the existing Treaty obligations are immense. (84)

Furthermore: to create a package deal for a core area (see Thesis 1) implies that there are enough interests which can be combined in a constructive way. The French/German understanding was seen as crucial for these packages (see Thesis 2). An analysis of interest constellations is, however, not too promising. Strong French interests for "new policies" in the middle of the eighties (espace industrielle
et sociale, mercantilistic trade policies, more use of the ECU, espace sociale, prevention of German "neutralism") (85) are met with reluctance from the German side, whereas its major interests in an open world trading system, more common security and foreign environmental protection (acid rain) (86) might not meet the priorities of the French side. (87) In some areas, German interests converge more with British interests. On the institutional questions, as well, few constructive elements for a French/German package appear to exist. Some agreements for improving the efficiency of the existing Community might be possible. Although package deals are regularly put together by different priority sectors, some common starting points must be present as a locomotive. The Draft Treaty of the European Parliament includes some offers to all member countries but in the debate, so far, no "locomotive" of interests has been set in motion. In many areas of the Draft Treaty, French/German controversies may make agreement difficult.

From this analysis of interest constellations we can tentatively deduce that core-area strategies will not be easily implemented even if the original members can get rid of the "nuisance countries".
Even when deciding for a core-area strategy (though with the expectations that others will jump on the bandwagon), relations with the rest of the Community countries must be put in some framework, as this is in the interest of all countries involved; thus, the room to manoeuvre for a core-area European Union, in terms of exclusive areas of activities and institutional autonomy, is limited.

Conclusion: The attractiveness of this strategy might be relatively high, but the probability of achieving a more democratic and more efficient model by this route is low. The costs of the core-area strategy will, moreover, be high as the existing EC-framework will suffer from attempts in that direction. The strategy of reaching institutional progress towards European Union by a core-area approach should therefore be seen as a last resort.

At the end of this exercise in comparing different strategies in terms of their feasibility for reaching (different) institutional models, the results lead us to a certain resignation. The resistance to institutional change by the involved welfare systems is considered to be surmountable only by package deals which serve important interests affecting the political top of the Member States. Specific package deals of this type cannot be easily identified, even in a core area.
However, preconditions regarding changes in this constellation are difficult to identify. The hope that perceptions of the political top about the necessity of institutional reforms (to deal effectively with the problems ahead) will converge should not be buried.
Notes

1. See as a few examples: Hans-Peter Schwarz, Europa föderieren - aber wie: Eine Methodenkritik der Europäischen Integration, in: Lehbruch u.a., Demokratisches System und politische Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München 1971; Ralf Dahrendorf, Plädoyer für eine Europäische Union, München 1973, especially pp. 75-85, in which he criticizes the "functional logic" (Sachlogik) à la Hallstein and the "procedural logic" (Verfahrenslogik) à la Spinelli and proposes his third Europe; see also Ralf Dahrendorf, A Third Europe? Third Jean Monnet Lecture, Florence, 26 November 1979; Wolfgang Wessels, Die Integrationsstrategie des Tindemans Berichts, in: Heinrich Schneider, Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), Auf dem Weg zur Europäischen Union, Bonn 1977, pp. 219-238; Heinrich Schneider, Rudolf Hrbek, Die Europäische Union im Werden, in: Hans von der Groeben, Hans Moller (Hrsg), Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer Europäischen Union, Vol. 1, Die Europäische Union als Prozess, pp. 227-334. The authors analyze different forms of a "saut qualitatif" and of integrational incentives. Their conclusion (p. 344): From within the political/institutional system (endogenous factors) few chances for integration steps can be expected but the system would be able to react constructively to "exogenous" challenges. A comparison with "strategic" elements of different European initiatives is presented by Alterio Spinelli in: European Parliament, Committee on Institutional Affairs: Selection of texts concerning institutional matters of the Community from 1950 to 1982 (quoted from now on: Committee on Institutional Affairs, Selection of texts). No assessment of different approaches is given, however, as is appropriate for such a compilation. See also national strategies for European integration (e.g. Commissariat Général du Plan, Quelle stratégie Européenne pour la France, Paris 1983, in which the French/German axis was accentuated) and strategies of the European Parliament (e.g. the contributions by Jacqué and Hänisch, in: R. Hrbek, J. Jamar and W. Wessels, Parliament Européen, Bilan et perspectives 1979-1984, Bruges 1984, and Jean Paul Jacqué, Roland Bieber, Vlad Constantinesco and Dietmar Nickel, Le Parlement Européen, Paris 1984; in both works and the parliamentary strategies of "petits pas" and "saut qualitatif" are debated).

2. See e.g. Mauro Ferri, Foreword, Committee on Institutional Affairs, Selection of texts.

3. See for a debate on these questions Hans Möller, Untersuchungswege, Methodenfragen, Ergebnisse, in: Groeben
und Möller (Hrsg.), Die Europäische Union als Prozess, op. cit., pp. 159-189.

4. See also Schneider/Hrbek, Die Europäische Union im Werden, op. cit., p. 435.


7. I see this danger in the highly interesting conclusions by Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, London 1984, in particular pp. 491-502; his contributions are however quite useful to underline some of the theses presented below.


9. See his Jean Monnet Lecture, op. cit.


12. See e.g. the draft proposal by Pfennig und Luster for a European Union.


14. This assumption is based on works like that of Gramsky and Popper demonstrating possible impacts of political strategies.

15. When "rediscovered" by Pompidou at the Paris Summit 1972, the French President himself did not give any precise definition when asked explicitly by the then German Foreign Minister,
Walter Scheel, according to Scheel in an interview with the author of this article.


17. See Möller, Untersuchungswege, Methodenfragen, Ergebnisse, op. cit., p. 162.

18. See Pierre Gerbet, La construction de l'Europe, Paris 1983, p. 60, and Schneider, Leitbilder der Europapolitik, op. cit., pp. 193-216; the controversy was characterized by the slogan "union - not unity".


22. See for the elements of this strategy among others the British memorandum on European policies and its proposals for confidential meetings of the head of governments and the French philosophy behind the European Council.

23. Proposals for this strategy are coming from orthodox circles.

24. See the original Spinelli proposals.

25. These ideas are especially presented by some members of the Italian branch of the Union of European Federalists, see for example Andrea Chiti-Batelli, Le Problème de l'Union politique Européenne vue par un fédéraliste "a part entière", XXIXème Table Ronde des Problèmes de l'Europe, Bonn, 2./3. April 1976, p. 17.

26. See repeated remarks from French presidents.

27. See for this term report on behalf of the four research institutes on Western Security Karl Kaiser, Winston Lord, Thierry de Montbrial, David Watt, Western Security, What has changed - What should be done?, London 1981.

29. See Article 82 of the Draft Treaty.


31. See e.g. the Danish position in the Dooge report.

32. See for the expectations the neofunctionalist school.


34. Dahrendorf, op. cit. is here ambiguous.


37. See Milward, The reconstruction of Western Europe, op. cit., p. 492.


40. See also Rudolf Hrbek/Wolfgang Wessels, Nationale Interessen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Integrationsprozess, in: Rudolf Hrbek/Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), EG-Mitgliedschaft: ein vitales Interesse der Bundesrepublik Deutschland?, Bonn 1984, p. 31.

41. Milward, The reconstruction of Western Europe (p.494), reduces the ambiguity between "European" and "national" functions to a one-sided relationship: "the validity of ECSC ... did not be so much in their vaunted supra-nationality as..."
in their extranationality - that they were created as an arm of the nation states to do things which could not otherwise be achieved”.

42. Milward, The reconstruction of Western Europe, op. cit., p. 474.

43. E.g. the monetary establishment of the Federal Republic was against the creation of the EMS; it perceived its regulations as against monetary stability (one of the "highest" national interests in the FRG). Chancellor Schmidt perceived the EMS from a different Atlantic and European perspective.

44. This is suggested by Milward, op. cit., p. 492.

45. See for this notion Wolfgang Wessels, Der Europäische Rat: Stabilisierung statt Integration, Bonn 1980, p. 341.

46. See for an analysis of how some political leaders assessed the EC as part of an overall strategy, von der Groeben's description of de Gaulle's policy in the early sixties, op. cit., p. 193-196.

47. See for an analysis of how far the Schuman/Monnet Plan served French economic and foreign policy interests Schneider, Leitbilder der Europapolitik, op. cit., p. 364, and Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951, pp. 362-421, and in summarizing the major arguments p. 474 and 475: "The Schuman Plan was called into existence to save the Monnet Plan" (for French economic recovery).

48. See for this especially Rudolf Hrbek, Heinrich Schneider ..., Politische Union im Werden, op. cit.

49. See Wallace, Negotiation, Conflict and Compromise, op. cit., p. 69.

50. Milward, The reconstruction of Western Europe, op. cit., p. 492.

51. See for the ECSC, Milward, The reconstruction of Western Europe, op. cit., p. 495, for the EEC see Küsters, op. cit., pp. 441-443.

52. See for this notion Ronald Inglehart, in: Leon N. Lindberg, Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration, Theory and Research, Cambridge (Mass.) 1971, p. 16.

53. See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann Gerhard Herdegen, Die öffentliche Meinung, in: Werner Weidenfled, Wolfgang Wessels,


56. See for the active role of pro-European bureaucrats the works by the neofunctionalists inspired by Ernst B. Haas who saw the dynamic process of integration mainly based on civil servants and experts from interest groups until de Gaulle demonstrated in the view of Haas the impact of the "politicians of the market-place". See for personal experiences, Hans von der Groeben, op. cit., p. 46-47.

57. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, op. cit., p. 500.

58. See Schneider/Hrbek, Die Europäische Union im Werden, op. cit., p. 344.

59. See Helen Wallace, Negotiation, Conflict and Compromise, op. cit., p. 47.


61. See Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, op. cit., p. 500.

62. See Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, op. cit., p. 493, who stated as historical evidence "that when specific and well defined economic and political problems were resolved, there would be no further momentum from the national interest towards any further stage of economic or political integration".

63. See e.g. von der Groeben, Aufbaujahre, op. cit., pp. 337-362.
64. Milward (The Reconstruction of Western Europe, op. cit., p. 493) even states in a theatrical way "the process of integration is (not) a thread woven into the destiny of all highly developed capitalist nation states".


67. The origins and the different connotations of the history of this term are described in: Max Frenkel, föderalismus und Bundesstaat, Band 1, Föderalism Schriften des Forschungs instituts für Föderalismus und Regionalstrukturen, Nr.14, Bern 1984, pp. 123-128.

68. Heinrich Schneider (Europäische Union durch das Europäische Parlament: Zur Initiative des institutionellen Ausschusses, in: Integration 4/1982, p. 1533, and Der Vertragsentwurf und der Föderalismus, 1/84, (Anmerkung 9) employs the category of "gubernative" functions (Karl Löwenstein) for this kind of role.

69. This kind of phenomenon in the case of the Federal Republic has been studied by Fritz W. Scharpf, Fritz Schnable und Bernd Reissert, Politikverflechtung: Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus, Kronenberg 1976. Their findings are useful to develop some kind of analogous theses for the Community.

70. See the respective declarations by De Gaulle and the work by Scharpf, op. cit.

71. See e.g. for the acceptance of the Rome Treaties, Küsters, Die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, op. cit., p. 420.

72. The term was coined by John Pinder.

74. Dahrendorf, A Third Europe, op. cit.


76. Scharrer, Abgestufte Integration, op. cit., p. 6-12.


80. See for this definition Weinstock, Abstufung als Realität und Chance, op. cit., p. 381.


82. This assessment might not be fair to Dahrendorf, as he himself proposes institutional changes, especially the election of the commission by the Parliament, but I see inconsistencies between his conception of l'Europe à la carte and his institutional proposals.

83. See for this notion Weidenfeld, Eine unmögliche Sache neu versuchen. Wie könnte eine europäische Union neu entstehen?, op. cit., p. 6.


85. See Commissariat Général du Plan, Quelle Stratégie européenne pour la France, op. cit.

86. See Hrbek, Wessels (ed.), EG-Mitgliedschaft: ein vitales Interesse der Bundesrepublik Deutschland?, op. cit.

87. See Chancen und Grenzen eines deutsch-französischen Tandems, report on a French/German conference on that subject in: Integration 2/34, pp. 117-120.
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