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Prospects For International Migration
From And Within Eastern Europe

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Introduction

During the recent years a concern has been growing in Western Europe, and in particular in the EC countries, over the massive influx of foreign migrants. This concern is to some degree a reaction to the observed increase in the number of immigrants and asylum-seekers during the 1980s. However, it reflects primarily the existence of pressures that are building-up and that may not be easily brought under control.

First of all, demographic disparities between the North and the South have reached ever greater proportions. As reports of the 9th IOM Seminar on Migration indicate, in order to absorb the new entrants onto their labour markets, the less developed countries will have to create in the next twenty years, a number of new jobs greater than the total present stock in the developed countries (International Organization for Migration, 1990). This is far above any realistic target, to say the least. The continuing rapid population growth in the South coincides with the stagnation, and a projected contraction of population numbers throughout Western Europe, and, in spite of local unemployment and low female labour participation rates, with a constantly growing demand for skilled labour in the major industrial countries. This occurs at the time of increasing income and welfare disparities between the North and the South, as well as rapid improvements in communication, that speed-up the rise of human aspirations and expectations on the global scale.

Parallel to these developments, the disintegration of the Soviet Block, and then of the Soviet Union itself, has opened the question of massive international East-West migration. A liberalization, followed by the elimination of exit restrictions in several countries of Eastern Europe, has already generated a size-
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able migration wave in the late 1980s. The implementation of the "passport for everybody" policy in Russia, and perhaps other post-Soviet republics, as foreseen for 1993, will provide a new strong stimulus to emigrate, in particular, when ethnic tension, unemployment, and a general decrease in living standards evolve in accordance with a pessimist scenario.

Finally, the progress in the integration of Western Europe, now in full swing, brings some anxiety to the question of immigration. Along with the elimination of border controls within the EC, Western Europe may be perceived an easy target for undocumented, illegal migration. Also, the most permissive policies, such as the German asylum law, may soon become de facto European standards for the admission of aliens.

The present paper focuses on the role of selected migration factors, and the resulting emigration propensities that are likely to prevail during the 1990s in Eastern Europe and in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The IOM report quotes estimates of future emigration from the former USSR ranging from 2.5 to 50 million (International Organization on Migration, 1990, p.4). Such an extremely wide spectrum of estimates has its source in the high degree of uncertainty concerning future political and economic change, but it also exposes the scarcity of studies on patterns and determinants of international East-West migration.

Factors and correlates of International migration

Migration across the Iron Curtain was a perennial feature of the post-Second World War order in Europe. Its magnitude fluctuated considerably over time, following the rhythm of political change. The flow of East Germans via West Berlin to West Germany since the early 1950s, of Hungarians into Austria after 1956, and of Czeches and Slovaks after 1968, provided classical illustrations of the problem. The emigration from Poland during the 1980s has been accounted for more recently (Korcelli, 1991). Few data are available concerning the former Soviet Union. A revealing recent report by Smirnov (1990) estimates the total number of emigrants at 1.2 million between 1946-1990, including 0.7 million in the last five years.

All these movements (except for migration from Poland in the late 1980s) took place under more or less stringent restrictions on exit, and, typically, when temporary openings existed in the international East-West borders. Therefore, data concerning these flows represent a very limited basis for any projections of future migration flows. When attempting to make such projections it is necessary to refer instead to general concepts pertaining to human migration.
For the purpose of this discussion one can identify four rules governing spatial mobility of the population. The first rule concerns the demographic pressure upon land and other local resources and refers to such indicators as the rate of population growth and its age composition. In the age category of 20-29 years, the propensity to migrate is normally several times higher than the mean migration rate. Hence, a large cohort, once it enters the early adulthood, tends to generate a wave of migration, internal (rural-urban and interregional), international, or both.

The second rule ascribes the directions and volume of population movements to the disparities in incomes and living standards between regions, as well as among nations. The third rule assumes a degree of complementarity to exist between internal and international migrations. It namely claims that the scale of emigration is inversely related to the absorptive capacity of urban labour markets in a given country.

Finally, the fourth rule which seems to account for a very substantial part of East-West migration over the past several decades, refers to political and ethnic aspects of population mobility over space. Boundary shifts, boundary openings, and political and social unrest, which are often interrelated phenomena, invariably result in waves of human migration, frequently involuntary, and involving ethnic minorities in the first place.

These four rules fall naturally short of summarizing the wide spectrum of migration hypotheses (see: Clark, 1987, for a concise overview) but they allow us to speculate about future East-West migration using a few alternative, and at least partially complementary approaches. Demographic determinants of migration have mainly been exposed in the literature on interrelations between population and economic development (see, for example: United Nations, 1981). Rogers and Castro (1981) quantified the interdependence between migration and age of the population. Income differentials have traditionally been at the core of economic migration models, both of the macro (see, for example: Greenwood, 1978) and micro (see: Todaro, 1976) type.

The interdependence between internal and international migration has never been studies in a greater detail, although some authors (Jenkins, 1977; Korcelli, 1991a) have pointed out its potential role in explaining observed migration patterns. At last, what is here considered as political and ethnic factors of international migration can partly be subsumed under the so-called primary even hypothesis (Choguill, 1983) which refers to sudden adverse changes, such as war or natural disaster.
Eastern Europe: no longer one region

With these four rules, or hypotheses at hand, let us now briefly examine the incentives to emigrate, that are likely to exist in the major sending countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union throughout the 1990s.

The first observation due to be made is that the East can no longer be treated as one of the geopolitical regions of the world. Within Eastern Europe proper, the three countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have emerged as a separate subregion (called sometimes the Vyshegrad Triangle), usually defined as East-Central Europe. Their specific position vis-a-vis the rest of Eastern Europe is reflected in the membership in the Council of Europe as well as their status of associates regarding the European Community. As it will be shown later, this division can also be traced with respect to the patterns of international migration.

The remaining countries of Eastern Europe (other than the post-Soviet states), are by no means a homogeneous group, although they are generally characterized by a much earlier, compared with the countries of East-Central Europe, phase of transition towards market economy.

Within the territory of the former Soviet Union one can distinguish (as of early 1992) at least four geopolitical groupings: (a) the Baltic States, determined to join East-Central and Western Europe as quickly as possible, (b) Georgia and Armenia with their historical and cultural links to the Mediterranean basin, (c) the predominantly Slavic countries of Russia, Belorussia and the Ukraine, and, (d) the post-Soviet Central Asia, now drifting towards the Islamic World.

Out of all countries of Eastern Europe, Poland contributed the largest number of emigrants during the 1980s. The outflow of the population was particularly large during 1980-1981 and 1987-1989, when more than a half of the estimated 800 thousand people emigrated to the West. The Federal Republic of Germany accounted for well over 50 percent of all emigrants, the United States for about 20 percent, and Canada for about 12 percent. The pace of emigration has slowed down notably since 1990, and one can forecast its volume in the current decade to be no more than one-half of what it was during the 1980s (see: Korcelli, 1991). Recent sociological studies suggest a gradual turn of attitudes among the Polish population, favouring temporary moves abroad over permanent migration. Factors that will continue to stimulate out-migration (including temporary leaves) are mainly of demographic nature. Namely, owing to high birth rates as observed between 1975-1984, the number...
of young people entering the labour market will be particularly large (over 2 million) during the 1990s.

One should not expect a major emigration wave to originate in Hungary or Czechoslovakia during the present decade, or thereafter. The two countries, with their ageing populations and relatively vital economies, may suffer from a brain drain which they have already experienced in the past. However, in terms of the numbers of potential emigrants their contribution will probably be very small when compared to that of other East European countries.

Much bigger sources of potential international migration are to be found in South-Eastern Europe, in Romania and other post-communist states of the Balkan, countries which are still to undergo major political and economic transformations en route to democracy and market economy. The exodus of Albanians in 1991 provides a drastic example of what can still happen in the region. The war in Yugoslavia has already resulted in large displacements of the population. Nevertheless, such crisis developments are unlikely to occur throughout the whole region at one time. The case of Albania is rather marginal in the sense of its rapid demographic growth combined with backwardness and political and cultural isolation. A considerable proportion of the undoubtedly large migration to be expected in South-Eastern Europe during the 1990s will be contained within the region. These population transfers may mainly involve members of ethnic minorities migrating to their external homelands. Some of the migratory flows will definitely spill over the regions boundaries, particularly to Hungary, Italy, Germany and Austria.

The volume of this migration would be extremely difficult to predict; basically, it should not exceed tens of thousand on the annual basis. Its timing will be probably very irregular, as such population movements are mainly responsive to political and ethnic factors, i.e. the primary events.

**Emigration from the post-Soviet States**

While referring to the countries of the former Soviet Union one should begin with a caveat concerning our ability to perceive the nature of migration patterns in the so-called Soviet Central Asia. One way to proceed is to assume that the region would increasingly exhibit the social and political features prevailing in the Middle East. In this case the international migration originating in the region could be treated within the framework of South-North migration.

Alternatively, one can claim that previous and still dominant political and economic links with the former Soviet heartland will draw such migration into the
orbit of East-West population movements. The latter hypothesis would imply a rather explosive combination of high emigration propensities characteristic of post-communist societies, with the huge demographic momentum typical of many Third World countries.

For the sake of the present discussion we shall assume the former situation to prevail and hence focus on possible migration from Russia and the other European parts of the former Soviet Union. The sheer size of the population involved, and the complexity of problems ahead leave little doubt as to the dominant role of the region in the East-West migration during the 1990s. How can its volume be estimated with the help of the four hypotheses that were outlined earlier in this paper?

The main component of population growth in the former Soviet Union was a very high population fertility in the Asian (including the Transcaucasian) republics. This, in fact, was considered an issue by many Soviet demographers. Russia as well as other republics in the European part of the Union were in a fairly advanced stage of demographic transition already during the 1970s, only a decade or so behind some countries of Western Europe. This situation is not likely to change to any significant degree during the 1990s, although the population number in the generally mobile category of 20-29 years will increase relative to its present size. Nevertheless, the role of demographic factors may be interpreted as one restraining rather than stimulating the tendency towards population emigration from Russia and the other post-Soviet states in the European part.

Advanced demographic ageing characterises the urban, as well as the rural population in the region. Many of its parts, including some among the most fertile agricultural lands, have for decades experienced a serious depletion of the rural population, in fact, a far-reaching rural depopulation. This has been the outcome of state policies (based on ideology) favouring extensive urbanization and industrialization with its inefficient use of manpower. The low level of incomes and a poor access to services in the rural areas have greatly contributed to rural-urban migration.

These trends, however, may be discontinued in the near future. If privatisation of farmland becomes a reality, the labour demand in agriculture will increase considerably, at least in a short and mid-term. At the same time, many cities and towns, with their declining, state-owned industries, will lose their attractiveness from the point of view of prospective migrants. The net result of these anticipated changes will probably consist in a serious decrease of internal labour-motivated migration. As one of our hypotheses suggested, such a situa-
tion tends to be conducive to an increase in emigration propensity on the part of the urban population in particular.

Some segments of the post-Soviet urban labour markets seem to be especially vulnerable when confronted with the rules of market competition, including the foreign one, as well as with a large scale disarmament. The relevant occupational categories include scientists and engineers employed in innumerable institutes and R & D centres, both in the civilian and the military sector. The case of nuclear experts, lured by some of the LDCs, has recently received a broad press coverage. A less widely known fact is that some 800 scientists and 8000 engineers already came to the United States, among the total of 50 thousand immigrants from the Soviet Union in 1980.

One refers here to a large and generally mobile category of workers, often equipped with universally recognized skills and knowledge, and perhaps the one most fully aware of the existing disparities in living standards and income levels at the international scale.

These, of course, are not the kinds of immigrants that decision makers in Western Europe are mainly concerned about. The potential high migration wave, it is believed, might occur as a result of possible calamities such as war and famine, and would involve people in a sort of random way, irrespective of their profession, age, or economic status. The likelihood of such "primary events" taking place seems however somewhat exaggerated. The main dividing lines in the post-Soviet societies are no longer the class conflicts that led to civil wars and revolutions in the past. The main divisions are now between various national and ethnic groups, as well as between different interest and power groups. Such divisions tend to generate violent conflicts, as their already have, but primarily on a local, perhaps a regional level. Consequently, the resulting migration of the population may also be largely confined to the local and regional scale.

This rule does not apply to those national and ethnic minorities whose homelands are external to the former Soviet Union. The freedom to leave, once granted, becomes in itself a major incentive to emigrate, as it has been the case of the Jewish minority (which has accounted for a large share of all emigrants so far) and to some extent the Greek minority. Any further deterioration of living conditions, any real or perceived danger will tend to increase rapidly the propensity to emigrate on the part of the populations involved. One should refer here first of all, along with the Jewish, to the German, and subsequently the Polish minority groups, the size of which is estimated at about 2 million each. The utmost confusion surrounding the issue of the German population, now living mostly in eastern Russia and Kazakhstan, may only accelerate their emi-
migration to Germany in the near future. The series of "invitations" extended to this minority group to resettle into the Koenigsberg district, the middle Volga region, and then to the Ukraine (and the Crimea) expose the lack of stability and of predictability with regard to the national and ethnic questions in the post-Soviet states.

Poles, the other large minority, have been scattered throughout the whole territory of the former Soviet Union, but more than half of them live in the neighbouring Lithuania, Bielorussia, and the Ukraine. Once these former Soviet Republics gained sovereignty some tension and prejudice has re-emerged, mainly in Lithuania, where the local Polish population predominates in the area immediately adjacent to the capital of Vilnius (in Polish - Wilno). Such developments may lead to a selective at least migration of Lithuanian Poles to Poland.

When group-specific migration propensities are plotted against measures of socio-economic status, such as income, the resulting function often assumes a U-shape (see: Urzua, 1981). This interdependence exposes the socio-economic mobility behaviour of the relatively successful, and the survival behaviour on the part of the poorer and less educated members of the society. This bimodality concept helps us to understand why, according to many authors, the newly arrived migrants tend predominantly to join the ranks of the urban unemployed, while other sources indicate that they fare actually better than the average urban residents.

As it has been argued throughout this section, emigrants from the former Soviet Union are likely to represent primarily the first of the two types, their capital consisting of knowledge, national affinity to an external homeland, or, frequently, both. Those at the other end of the spectrum will most often choose or have to stay, the situation which may not necessarily endanger their very survival. To put this in other words, one can expect emigration from the post-Soviet states to continue to be highly selective, involving professional - the universally mobile category; as well as members of major national minorities. In fact, these two categories tend to overlap to a certain extent.

We may also witness migration, mostly of a temporary character, of semi-skilled persons seeking employment abroad, mostly in the informal sector of the economy, in construction and petty trade. However, the majority of the potentially mobile population groups in the former Soviet Union will try to make the best use of opportunities at home. These, after all, may not be far below of what was experienced in the past. If privatisation of collective and state farms gets a real start within the next few years, the observed downward trend in the level of welfare may even be discontinued. The above considera-
tions lead us to an estimation of the size of emigration from the former Soviet
Union in the range of several hundred thousands a year, rather than the often
mentioned several-million a year, during the 1990s.

To the post-Soviet states, such a selective migration can imply not so much a
loss of the demographic potential, as a very considerable loss of talent, knowl­
edge, and enterpreneurship - a typical brain drain in fact. It can also lead to a
greater national and ethnic homogeneity. On the other hand, as an effect of
emigration the imminent urban unemployment together with the perennial
housing shortage (aggravated along with the withdrawal of the Soviet army
from Eastern Germany and Poland) may be somewhat relieved, at least on a
temporary basis. The potential inflow of remittances should also be mentioned
in this context.

International Migration within Eastern Europe and the Former
Soviet Union

Despite of the polarization processes that have been going on within Eastern
Europe, the countries of the former "Socialist Block" have basically retained
the mutual visa-free travel arrangements. When combined with the liberaliza­
tion of passport policies and travel permits, this has led to a tremendous ex­
pansion of the volume of traffic across national borders.

Perhaps the largest-scale phenomenon of this kind is the inflow of population
from the former Soviet Union to Poland. It has grown, in terms of the number
of border crossings, from 1.7 million in 1988 to 4.3 million in 1990 and 7.6
million in 1991. With the alleged travel purposes being mostly tourism and
visiting family members, the large majority of newcomers carry on small scale
trade. Every major city in Poland, and many smaller towns as well, feature
semi- permanent "Russian markets" where goods such as tools, toys and glass­
ware, often hard to buy in the countries of origin, are offered at comparatively
low prices. The earnings, exchanged for clothing or hard currencies, are
shipped back across Poland's eastern border.

A big majority of such visits take a few or several days only. The movement is
mainly of a circulation type, involving repeated trips by a relatively limited
number of individuals. However, with numbers growing over time, a surplus
of approximately 140 thousand entries over the number of departures, has ac­
cumulated since the beginning of 1991. It is estimated that about 70 thousand
people from the post- Soviet states have taken jobs in the informal sector,
mostly in construction and agriculture. Hence, although on a rather small scale,
Poland is following the example of Italy and Spain, where a sizeable unem-
ployment is accompanied by immigration, with immigrants establishing themselves in those segments of the labour markets where they face a rather small competition on the part of the local residents.

Illegal crossing to Western Europe has not been the purpose of the inflow to Poland of people from the former Soviet Union. This is a "speciality" of Romanian subjects (many of whom are Roma), who accounted for 8676 out of the total of 11786 aborted attempts to cross the Polish western border. Citizens of the post-Soviet states do, however, get involved in other forms of criminal activity while in Poland.

Immigration per se from the former Soviet Union has so far been small. Some 12 thousand Soviet citizens have received permanent residence status (a majority of those who applied) by September 1991 (Bernatowicz, 1991) and only a handful have claimed asylum rights in Poland. The number of immigrants, mostly Poles or of Polish origin, is expected to grow in the near future. Policies are considered granting a special resettled status to former Polish subjects and their descendants.

Population movement from the post-Soviet states to Poland represents just one aspect of the extremely complicated, observed as well as potential migration flows in Eastern Europe. The immigration of ethnic Hungarians from Romania to Hungary, of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey, and the most recent refugee flows caused by the war in Yugoslavia mark some of the problems that are far from being resolved. In terms of volume and distances, however, these movements will certainly be overshadowed by future migration within the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The present-day population geography of the post-Soviet states reflects the long and violent history of colonization, forced resettlement and deportations, not to speak of the arbitrary boundary design between the former, Union and autonomous republics. The revival of the national consciousness which is now witnessed over this huge territory generates a number of claims and counter-claims of which the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is just a most tragic example.

Each of the peripheral, former Soviet republics contains a considerable Russian population minority, its biggest absolute number (12 million) living in the Ukraine, and the highest share among the total population (over 40 percent) in Kazakhstan. In turn, members of every nation and ethnic group from the former Soviet Union and beyond are to be found in Russia's large cities and in Siberia. One can hardly imagine a complete reshuffling of the population map of what used to be the Soviet Union in accordance with the principle
of territorial ethnic homogeneity. Nevertheless, even partial adjustments of this kind would generate massive population transfers. These, rather than emigration to Western Europe and North America are likely to be the largest migratory movements involving the post-Soviet states during the next twenty years or so.

Implications for Western Europe

In a study carried out at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg (Austria), Wolf et al. (1988) experimented with a range of assumptions that represented departures from observed recent demographic trends. In their alternative population development scenarios for Europe the authors incorporated several major "surprises" (one at a time), such as a new baby-boom around the year 2000, a rapid fall in fertility rates, a decrease in mortality owing to a "magic drug", a major AIDS epidemics, and a new wave of immigration - one million arrivals annually from 1995 to the year 2004. As it turned out, the short-lasting dramatic events such as a baby-boom or an immigration wave, do not lead to abrupt shifts in the path of population change, while moderate but steady changes in basic demographic parameters tend to generate very big differences among the alternative futures.

Hence, the immigration of up to several million people (which is our best guess) from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to Western Europe by the beginning of the next century, or even up to 13 million (as estimated by the Eurobarometer study), would have no dramatic implications for Western Europe's demographic development. These figures are actually smaller than the number of foreign migrants (estimated at 14 million; see: Mackensen, 1991) living in the major immigration countries of Central and Northern Europe at the beginning of the 1980s.

One can assume that owing to the advanced ageing of the population and the relatively rapid pace of economic and political transformations in the East, the large-scale emigration to the West would be a temporary, rather than a persistent phenomenon. While the peak of the emigration wave from East-Central Europe occurred during the 1980s, the main phase of emigration from the post-Soviet states may take place during the mid- and late 1990s.

In case of a large fraction of potential emigrants from the former Soviet Union Western Europe will likely serve as an intermediate destination en route to North and Latin America, and the Middle East. Although less important in demographic terms, the immigration in the size range suggested above may have major impact in many spheres of economic,
social, and political life in Western Europe. Since skilled labour and professionals account for a considerable share of all newcomers, the long-term economic implications are likely to be highly positive.

Aside from permanent migration, the next years will certainly witness an intensification of commuting and weakly travel across the former East-West boundaries. Trips for trading and shopping, which are now the dominant type of cross-boundary contacts, will be increasingly replaced by commuting to work, education, and trips for leisure purposes. During the 1980s the freedom to travel abroad combined with an arbitrary structure of domestic prices in Poland created a massive influx of Polish “trading tourists” to Germany and Austria. The more recent movement from the former Soviet Union to Poland is basically a replication of this phenomenon.

At the same time, the continuing (although much smaller than earlier) differences in prices of some consumer goods (such as food, cigarettes and clothing), have been generating a stream of weekly shoppers from Germany to Poland, their number amounted to 9151 thousand in 1991. Owing to a gradual equalization of prices and the liberalization of tariffs, such large-scale movements may soon shrink considerably, or rather yield to more stable, functional relations across the border. In this context two regions in Central Europe deserve a special attention.

One of these is the Vienna-Bratislava area. The Slovak capital city of 400 thousand inhabitants will probably be quickly drawn into the sphere of influence of its four times bigger neighbour situated only 60 kms up the Danube river (the distance from Bratislava’s major residential suburb of Petrzalka to Schwechat, the Vienna international airport, is 44 kms, ten times shorter than to the Prague airport). The daily flow of commuters from Bratislava to Vienna, already noticeable, is likely to grow rapidly in the near future, with more and more people willing to take advantage of coupling the higher wages on the Vienna labour market, with the considerably lower housing costs in the residential districts of Bratislava.

Another region of potential intense interactions across the border is one focusing on Berlin. The redevelopment of the city in anticipation of the transfer of capital functions from Bonn will certainly exert a great influence upon the whole area situated along the lower Oder river. Specific future development plans include an expansion of the seaport of Szczecin (Stettin), and of the city of Frankfurt a/Oder, where a new European University is expected to emerge, attracting students from both Germany and Poland, in addition to a number of other countries.
The countries of East-Central Europe, i.e. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will perform the role of a zone of transition between Eastern and Western Europe during the 1990s. This function may become strongly manifested in all questions of international migration. While some migration from the region to Western Europe (Germany and Austria in particular) will continue, it may be increasingly compensated for by immigration into the region, originating in the rest of Eastern Europe, in particular the post-Soviet states and Romania. An increasing number of migrants, perhaps a sizeable share indeed, will enter East-Central Europe with an intention to move further on to the West. Therefore, migration and entry policies followed by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary vis-a-vis third countries, should be of direct concern and interest to the EC and other West European countries.

Conclusions

International East-West migration in Europe will be a conspicuous phenomenon during the 1990s, although it will probably not attain the scale of a really massive population movement.

The main potential migration origins are to be found in the post-Soviet states, the emigration from which will probably be increasing until the later part of the decade. Conversely, in the case of the countries of East-Central Europe the peak phase of emigration seems to have already passed.

Migration from Eastern Europe to Western Europe and the Americas will continue to be selective, characterized by a high proportion of educated people and members of ethnic minorities among the migrants.

One can also anticipate a rapid increase in the magnitude of international migration among the countries of Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union. If the "high" forecasts (20 million or so migrants in Europe by the year 2000) are to be fulfilled, they are likely to apply primarily to this category of population movements.

Some regions situated in the former peripheries between Eastern and Western Europe are certain to experience a rapid increase in the intensity of travel and traffic, as a consequence of the growing economic and human interaction across the international borders.
References


During the last few years, the gradual liquidation of the Soviet regime and the breakup of the Soviet state have institutionalized and transformed migration flows from and among the territories of the Soviet Union and its emerging successor states. Although the distinction between emigration and internal migration has been sharpened by the progressive "internationalization" of formerly internal flows, we retain it here as an organizing principle, beginning with a discussion of two main topics, and then addressing "internal" flows.

I. Emigration from the Soviet Union and its successor states has been more fluid than one might deduce from the attention devoted and sensational headlines of the last two years, warning of the imminent inundation of Western Europe. Not only is the size of the outflow still, at this writing, quite modest, but the time-scale in the composition of the outflow, and the array of destinations, is not as asymmetrical as in the extreme. If the opportunity to emigrate has been among the most valuable, it has also been among the most unequally distributed, possibly the Soviet Union and its successor states. Emigration has been limited, in effect, to a small group of nationalities and destinations.


During the last few years, the gradual breakdown of the Soviet regime and the breakup of the Soviet state have intensified and transformed migration flows from and among the territories of the Soviet Union and its emerging successor states. Although the distinction between emigration and internal migration has been blurred by the progressive "internationalization" of formerly internal flows, I retain it here as an organizing principle, beginning with a discussion of out-migration, and then addressing "internal" flows.

I. Emigration from the Soviet Union and its successor states has been much more limited than one might think from the alarmist rhetoric and sensationalist headlines of the last two years, warning of the imminent inundation of Western Europe. Not only is the size of the outflow still, at this writing, quite modest, but the ethnonational composition of the outflow, and the array of destinations, have been asymmetrical in the extreme. If the opportunity to emigrate has been among the more valuable, it has also been among the most unequally distributed, goods in the Soviet Union and its successor states. Emigration has been limited, in effect, to a small group of nationalities and destinations.

1 Dept. of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, 264 Haines Hall, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1551. This paper was commissioned for the Conference on International Migration and the Security and Stability of States, held at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, December 5-6, 1991, and it will be published in book form in a volume resulting from that conference. I would like to thank Myron Weiner, Director of the Center for International Studies, for permission to use it in this Working Paper series. I would also like to thank Scott Bruckner for his research assistance and comments on early drafts.

2 Throughout the paper, emigration refers to migration from the Soviet Union and its successor states to other states; it does not include migration among Soviet successor states, which will be discussed separately.
For the most part, emigration has consisted of movements of ethnic affinity to external national homelands. This means, above all, Germans and Jews, who comprised about three-fourths of all Soviet emigrants in 1990, while making up only 1.2% of the Soviet population. Some 150,000 Germans (out of a total of 2 million Soviet Germans recorded in the 1989 census) and 200,000 Jews (out of 1.45 million reported in the census) emigrated in 1990 (Chesnais 1991b, p. 6).

The exodus of Germans and Jews—similarly privileged, in an irony of history, by their immigration and citizenship rights in external homelands—continues, at this writing, at high levels. The German government, in an effort to stem the flow, and to preserve the centuries-old German presence in Russia, has been urging restoration of the autonomous Volga German Republic, which was abolished in 1941 when Germans were deported en masse to Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and Siberia. Some Russian officials support the idea, hoping that a restored Volga Republic could retain German economic skills and energies and serve as a magnet for German investment from abroad. But the proposal has met strong resistance from current residents (mostly Russians) of what used to be the Volga Republic; at this writing, restoration seems unlikely. Even if the republic were restored, this would scarcely staunch the exodus. Not only is Germany's fabled prosperity a powerful lure; but the outflow tends to become self-sustaining: as more and more friends and family members leave, the attractions of remaining are diminished.

Nor is the exodus of Jews likely to abate, even without the lure of anything like Germany's fabled prosperity, and despite the quotas that now limit immigration.

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3 A German Interior Ministry official recently estimated ethnic German immigration from the Soviet Union at 13,000 per month (more than 150,000 per year); and representatives of the Soviet German community said that between 600,000 and 1 million Soviet Germans were in the process of applying to leave (Los Angeles Times, Nov. 9, 1991).

4 Germans first settled the lower Volga frontier region of the Russian state in large numbers in the 1760s, attracted by the lands, subsidies, religious autonomy, fiscal privileges, and service exemptions granted for this purpose by Catherine II (Koch 1977, pp. 6ff).

5 Los Angeles Times, Nov. 9, 1991.


7 In a further irony of history, some Soviet Jews have been lured by Germany's fabled prosperity, seeking to emigrate to Germany rather than Israel, and placing the German government in a quandary, from which it seems to have extricated itself by allowing only
to America, the true promised land for most Soviet Jews. While emigration has declined from its dizzying peak of a year ago, it continues at historically high rates. Sporadically but frighteningly resurgent antisemitism—nourished by the anxieties, miseries, and dislocations of political and economic breakdown (or, optimistically, "transition")—will continue to feed the emigrant stream.

Besides Germans and Jews, several other nationalities may come to participate in migrations of ethnic affinity to external homelands. The major groups, their populations in the Soviet Union in 1989, and the fraction of the population listing the language of the group as its native language are as follows:8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Population (1989)</th>
<th>Percent listing as native language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>group language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>1,126,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>437,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>379,000</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>358,000</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>172,000</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>146,000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These groups differ in pattern of settlement, degree of rootedness, and intensity and form of identification with their respective cultural nationalities and external homelands. And the homelands differ in economic and cultural attractiveness and limited Jewish entry, citing—in yet a further ironic twist—its obligation to Israel to justify restricting the entry of Jews.

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8 Population figures are from the 1989 census, as reported in Anderson and Silver 1989, pp. 621-622. The language data for 1989 are not available to me at this writing, so I have calculated them from the 1979 census, as reported in Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR (1984), pp. 71-73.

9 Counted separately in the Soviet census from Moldavians. As part of an effort to incorporate Bessarabia (which became, for the most part, the Soviet republic of Moldavia) firmly into the Soviet Union, the regime insisted that Romanian and Moldavian were distinct nationalities founded on distinct languages (to support this linguistically groundless assertion, the regime imposed the Cyrillic alphabet on Moldavia; one of the early demands of the Moldavian national movement was for a return to the Roman alphabet). Almost all Soviet Romanians live in the Ukraine. There are also some 300,000 Moldavians living in the Ukraine, mostly in Chersonvitz and Odessa oblasts (Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR 1984, pp. 102, 104, 106), which were allocated some portions of the Bessarabian territories (and northern Bukovina) annexed from Romania in 1940.
in political readiness to grant them preferential immigration and citizenship status. Based on the fragmentary information available to me at this writing, a few sketchy observations can be made about these reservoirs of potential emigrants, focussing on Poles, the largest and most diverse group.\footnote{Polish experts in Poland estimate the number of Soviet Poles in the Soviet Union at between 2 and 4 million-figures far exceeding those of the Soviet census (Gasior 1990, p. 11). The figures given in the next paragraph on regional distribution and linguistic Russification are from Gasior (1990) and from Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR (1984).}

Ethnic Poles are represented in substantial numbers (60,000 or more) in six successor republics: Byelorussia (417,000), Lithuania (258,000), Ukraine (219,000), Russia (94,000), Latvia (60,000), and Kazakhstan (60,000). Except in Lithuania, where 85% of Poles gave Polish as their native language, the Poles are highly assimilated linguistically; in most republics only 10-15% of the Poles said Polish was their native language. Yet since they have assimilated to other Slavic languages (Byelorussian, Ukrainian, and Russian), loss of Polish as native language, or even as second language, would not impose insurmountable barriers to emigration, although it might restrain it to some degree.

Rootedness is another variable. Most Soviet\footnote{For convenience, I retain "Soviet" as a geographic term. Thus "Soviet Poles" designates Poles living in the territories formerly comprising the Soviet Union.} Polish communities are old and established; but the Poles in Kazakhstan are mostly collectivization-era and wartime deportees from western regions. Yet the bearing of rootedness on migration to Poland is uncertain. One might think that the Poles of Kazakhstan, being less rooted, would be more likely to emigrate. My hunch, however, is that their greater isolation from Poland and weaker integration into westerly migratory networks will make them less likely to emigrate. In my view, demands for permanent resettlement in Poland, of which there are almost none at present, are likely to be preceded by a good deal of exploratory temporary labour migration, and that Poles in Lithuanian, Byelorussian, or Ukrainian districts immediately adjoining Poland will therefore be over-represented among both migrant workers and eventual resettlers. On this hypothesis, proximity to Poland and integration into networks of information concerning opportunities in Poland would over ride the migration-inhibiting effect of rootedness.

Ethnic conflict in the successor states may have an independent bearing on Polish migration patterns. Conflict between rival ethnonational claims may be strongest in Lithuania, given historically antagonistic Polish-Lithuanian relations and the
self-conscious, organized, corporate form of the Polish presence in Lithuania. Yet ethnic conflict does not automatically engender increased emigration, even when an external homeland is available. Conceivably, by strengthening group cohesion, ethnic conflict might work to restrain emigration. Not all modes of conflict are migration-engendering. Much depends on the mode of conflict - whether it is militarized or otherwise violent, for example, or whether it leads to the enduring economic, political, or cultural subordination of one group.

Much depends, finally, on the policy of the Polish state. Two years ago, the Mazowiecki government proposed granting Soviet Poles dual Soviet and Polish citizenship and facilitating repatriation to Poland (Gasio 1990, p. 15). Yet in the context of economic dislocations and increasing Polish concern about non-Polish migration from Soviet successor states, it seems unlikely that the Polish government will seek in the immediate future to encourage Soviet Poles to migrate. On the other hand, it seems equally unlikely that it will turn back those who do arrive, whether to work or to settle.

Research on migration patterns among Soviet Poles could prove fruitful. The fact that Poles are scattered in a number of different successor states, both proximate to and distant from Poland, and exhibiting greater (Lithuania) and lesser (Byelorussia) degrees of ethnonational tension, together with the great range of variation in the language, history, organizational forms, boundary mechanisms, and economic and social characteristics of the Polish communities make this a particularly rich case for comparative study of the complex dynamics of what I have rather too summarily called migrations of ethnic affinity in a setting in which political, economic, and ethnocultural aspects of the migratory process are so closely intertwined.

We can deal much more briefly with the other potential groups of resettlers to external homelands. A substantial exodus has already begun among Soviet Greeks: 10,000 in 1989, an estimated 20,000 in 1990 (Chesnais 1991b, p. 8). The Finnish government is quietly accepting Soviet Finns as immigrants (but not, apparently, Soviet Karelians, despite the large number of Karelians in Finland). Transcarpathian Hungarians, compactly settled in a single Western Ukrainian district adjacent to Hungary, are the most territorially concentrated of the groups we are considering. They are also the most nationally "intact" group; 95% of them give Hungarian as their native language, while the figures for the other groups range from 29% to 68%. The Hungarian government does not encourage their immigration (nor that of the much larger groups of ethnic Hungarians in Romanian Transylvania, Slovakia, and the Serbian province of Voivodina); but it
has been accepting those who do arrive. I have not yet encountered reports con­
cerning the migration of Soviet Koreans, Bulgarians, or Romanians to their re­
spective homelands, nor concerning the policies of the homeland governments on
the issue.12

Except for Germans and Jews, and the rather different case of Armenians,13 emi­
grations of ethnic affinity from the Soviet area are only now beginning to de­
velop. Apart from Germany and Israel, no homeland has an explicit "laws of re­
turn" like those of Germany and Israel, publicly guaranteeing immigration and
citizenship rights. Yet none, as far as I know, has refused entry to its co-ethnics. The slow development of these potential migrations is not surprising; it does not
mean they will not assume much greater amplitude later on. Migration networks
always take time to develop; after all, when Soviet gates were thrown open in the
late 1980s for Germans and Jews, these nationalities were able to respond quickly
in part because preceding, albeit smaller, emigration flows over decades had built­
up extensive migration networks.

In my view, the economic and political dislocations accompanying the breakdown
of the regime and the breakup of the state will greatly intensify the demand for
emigrations of ethnic affinity. This will put pressure on other external homelands
besides Germany and Israel to grant "their" people preferential immigration and
citizenship status. And it will sharply increase the value, to successor state citizens,
of what might be called "most favored nationality" status - by which I mean an
internal nationality (German, Jewish, Greek, etc.) that entitles one to, or at least
increases the chances of receiving, immigration and citizenship privileges in an
external homeland.14 This in turn will induce successor state citizens who do not

12 In view of the political and economic conditions in Bulgaria and Romania, the absence of
movement to these homelands is scarcely surprising. The case of Soviet Koreans is more
intriguing. The majority of Koreans, deported en masse in the 1930s to Central Asia, do not
live in the Far East but in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. This dispersion, and attendant linguistic
Russification, disproportionately affecting younger generations who might otherwise have
been inclined to emigrate, may have left many Koreans too cut off from Korea for emigration
to be plausible.

13 Although Armenians do not have an external homeland, their emigration, too, is a migration of
ethnic affinity, for their large diaspora abroad facilitates their emigration. In 1990, Armenians
comprised the third largest group of emigrants, after Jews and Germans. The Baltic
nationalities and Ukrainians also have large diasporas abroad that could support emigration
networks through family reunification, sponsorship, and so on.

14 The concept of most favored nationality was suggested to me by David Laitin's (1991, p. 143)
notion of "most favored lord."
formally have most favored nationality status, yet who have some connection to an external homeland, to re-identify with one of the favored nationalities. Given high rates of assimilation and intermarriage on the part of most of the Soviet nationalities who have external homelands, the boundaries delimiting these nationalities are by no means sharp; and the number of persons with some connection to the nationality far exceeds the number officially possessing that nationality in their internal passports or officially professing it to a census-taker. There is therefore considerable room for re-identification with a most favored nationality for purposes of emigration. This leads to the paradoxical result that emigrations of ethnic affinity, by inducing ethnic re-identification, may increase rather than decrease the reservoir of co-ethnics remaining in Soviet successor states.

Almost all migration is economically conditioned in one way or another, and the Soviet emigrations of ethnic affinity are no exception. But whatever the role played by economic considerations in prompting individual migrants to leave, we should not lose sight of the fact the flows are channelled, activated, indeed made possible only by specific immigration and citizenship policies on the part of the receiving states. I have characterized these states as external "homelands" of their Soviet co-ethnics. But "homeland" is a political, not a cultural category; homelands are constructed, not given. A state becomes a "homeland" by deciding to recognize (or, in a more aggressive variant, to claim) citizens of another state as...
its own. Becoming a homeland is an act of civic self-definition. To become a homeland is to become, virtually if not (yet) actually, the state of and for a group that is culturally rather than territorially bounded. It is to recast the criteria of membership and belonging, to inflect citizenship in an ethnocultural direction.

It might be argued that nothing could be more natural than for a state to open its doors to its co-ethnics. Yet while there may be good and even compelling reasons for doing so, it is not always wholly innocent and unproblematic. When a group is in urgent need of a home state to provide protection and guarantee basic rights, the case is clear. This has been one justification for the Israeli Law of Return; it was also the initial justification, although it can scarcely serve as a continuing justification, for its German analog. Nor is an open-door policy for co-ethnics problematic when they are the only ones waiting at the gates. But when crowds of strangers, many of them in urgent need of refuge, clamor for admission, then policies of automatic citizenship for co-ethnics become more difficult to justify. It is awkward, for example, for Germany to argue at one and the same time that "the boat is full," that it is being overwhelmed by asylum-seekers, and at the same time to have admitted well over a million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union since 1988 (not including resettlers from the former East Germany).

Moreover, to recognize as citizens, or potential citizens, a portion of the citizenry of another state can create tensions between the states. It may lead the other state to regard that portion of its citizenry as citizens of questionable loyalty, and to condemn the homeland state for meddling in its internal affairs. Hungary, with 3 million co-ethnics in neighboring states, and long suspected by those states of la-

19 Technically, in order to be eligible for immigration and automatic citizenship, the ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union must qualify as Vertriebene, that is, as persons "driven out" of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union because of their German Volkszugehörigkeit (ethnocultural nationality). But law and administrative practice have defined Vertriebene in the broadest possible terms to include virtually all ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, irrespective of the actual circumstances of their emigration. What began, then, as a transitional legal provision intended to grant a secure legal existence to millions of ethnic Germans who were quite literally Vertriebene, driven out of their homes and homelands, became something quite different: an open door to immigration and automatic citizenship for ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This invitation has been taken up by more than two and a half million persons since 1950, half of them in the last few years; at this writing, the influx continues, albeit at a slower pace than in 1989-1990, when three quarters of a million arrived.
tent territorial revisionism,\textsuperscript{20} is in a particularly delicate situation. The nationalist-populist government has made known its concern for the Hungarian minorities abroad, and some officials have claimed that the government regards itself as the representative of all Hungarians in the region. But it seems unlikely that the government would formally redefine its citizenry to include, even in potential or virtual form, Hungarians in neighboring states. First, increasing unemployment makes it reluctant to encourage immigration. Second, while nationalists urge state recognition and support of the Hungarians abroad, they do not seek to encourage their immigration to Hungary. Rather, they seek to maintain and strengthen the Hungarian communities in neighboring states, possibly with a view to future border revisions. Finally, publicly granting automatic immigration and citizenship rights to ethnic Hungarians while moving to adopt at the same time both a generally restrictive immigration policy and a universalistic procedure for political asylum could pose awkward problems for the government. On the other hand, public opinion might make it difficult for Hungary (and other potential "homelands") to turn away or expel co-ethnics.

What we are likely to see in the near future, in my view, is an ad hoc response to the increasing demand for emigrations of ethnic affinity. Without publicly declaring themselves to be homelands for their co-ethnics, receiving states will nonetheless tacitly grant them preferential immigration and citizenship status.

Besides migrations of ethnic affinity to external homelands, I should note in passing two further possible types of ethnically conditioned migration across the external borders of the former Soviet Union. I am unaware of any such movements currently taking place, but one can imagine circumstances in which they could be significant. The first is movement of transborder peoples with no autonomous homeland polity in any state, including Gypsies (262,000 in the Soviet Union in 1989), Uighurs (also 262,000), and Kurds (153,000). The second is movement of transborder peoples with Soviet homelands that are now being upgraded to independent states. The titular nationalities of most southern-tier ex-Soviet republics have substantial numbers of co-ethnics in other states. There are millions of Azeris in northern Iran; there are Tadjiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks in northern Afghanistan; and there are Kazakhs and Uzbeks in Sinkiang province of China. Cross-border flows in both directions could be significant in these regions, where states have long competed to secure the loyalties and shape the identities of their transborder peoples (Matuszewski 1985, pp. 87ff).

\textsuperscript{20} The Hungarian minority in Danubian Europe dates from the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which reduced Hungary to less than one-third of its pre-war extent (Macartney 1937).
Clearly, it is not emigrations of ethnic affinity that have been causing such anxious concern in westward states in the two years. Groups with external ethnic homelands comprised only about 2% of the total Soviet population in 1989.21 Their migration will be channelled to their respective external homelands. Moreover, with the important exception of Jews, the targets of resurgent antisemitism, the groups with external homelands are not centrally involved in the ethnonational conflicts that are raging in Soviet successor states. Unlike some other Soviet nationalities, they are not likely to have to flee ethnic violence. They can emigrate at a more leisurely pace. Their migration patterns will be determined - and can be controlled - by their respective ethnic homelands.

Westward concern focuses, rather, on the prospect of massive and uncontrollable migrations outside the swelling but manageable streams of ethnic resettlers. It centers on the Slavic core populations of the European part of the former Soviet Union: Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Russians. These nationalities, it should be emphasized, are scarcely emigrating at all at present, though a certain number are working in eastern Poland. It is the potential for large flows, rather than any current flows, that worries the states to the west.

In evaluating that potential, I would stress the importance of the "East-East" component of westward emigration from Soviet successor states. It is not the well-buffered states of Western Europe, but the front-line states of East Central Europe, that will absorb the brunt of westward flows. Poland will occupy a special position in these flows. Hungary and Czechoslovakia have only short land borders with a single province of the Western Ukraine; and Romania, although it has a much longer border with Western and Southern Ukraine as well as with its incipient sister state of Moldova, is scarcely an inviting destination in its present condition of economic and political turmoil. Poland, by contrast, shares a long land frontier with Lithuania, Byelorussia, Ukraine, and even Russian Kaliningrad oblast. And despite abundant economic hardships of its own, Poland appears to be a much more inviting destination than Romania for Soviet Slavic migrants.22 The numbers are certainly manageable at present, but Polish officials worry about the potential for much larger flows. They and officials of other front-line states are

21 This figure does not Moldavians, who have an internal homeland as well as the neighboring external homeland of Romania.

22 Here I mean Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, not the Soviet Poles discussed above. In practice, however, given the high rates of linguistic assimilation on the part of Poles residing in the Soviet Slavic republics, the distinction may not be very sharp.
understandably concerned about their weak administrative infrastructures in the domain of immigration control, and they are seeking to build them up quickly.

In 1990 and 1991, much was made in the West European press about the introduction of a new legal framework governing Soviet travel and emigration - as if the enactment of such a measure would suddenly open the floodgates and trigger a mass exodus. In fact, the legal framework does not appear to be the key variable. In May 1991, the Supreme Soviet approved a law guaranteeing the right to leave, but it delayed full implementation of the measure until January 1, 1993. Yet throughout the late Gorbachev era, barriers to exit lie less in legal provisions, the enforcement of which was intermittent at best, than in the absence of hard currency; in the great difficulty involved in paying for international travel with rubles; and in the absence (for the Slavic groups, with the partial exception of Ukrainians) of extensive networks abroad that would facilitate migration.

In Western European countries, buffered by distance and outfitted with well developed structures of immigration control, concern about Soviet immigration appears greatly exaggerated. The networks that could facilitate Soviet inflows are not (yet) in place; and refugee flows that might result from a massive breakdown of public order, to the extent that they spill out of the Soviet area at all, will be of much greater and more immediate concern to the front-line states of East Central Europe.

Three propositions sum up the discussion so far. (1) Ethnic affinity appears to be more important than ethnic conflict in driving emigration to extra-Soviet destinations. (2) Refugee flows produced by the politicized ethnic conflict or ethnic violence will be concentrated inside the (former) Soviet area. (3) The impact of

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23 The provenance of asylum-seekers in Germany vividly illustrates the importance of integration into migratory networks. In the first half of 1990, more than 10,000 Yugoslavs applied for political asylum, compared with 500 Soviet citizens (Chesnais 1991a, p. 14). In proportion to population, this meant Yugoslavs were filing at rates more than 200 times their Soviet counterparts. By 1990, the primary reason for this was no longer formal barriers to exit. Soviet foreign travel had surged to an estimated 3.5 million trips in 1990, a tenfold increase over 1986 (Chesnais 1991b, p. 6). Instead, this disparity reflected the gap between Yugoslavs' longstanding integration, and Soviets' lack of integration, into Western European migratory networks.

24 This is not to say that it is ethnic affinity that drives individuals to emigrate. They may be motivated economic or other concerns. My point is that political recognition of the claims of ethnic affinity generates specific migration paths and opportunities, structured along the lines of ethnic affinity.
Political Dimensions of Migration from and among Soviet Successor States

Emigration from the Slavic heartlands will be felt by the front-line states of East Central Europe, not by the well-buffered states of Western Europe.

II. Of greater importance, in my view, than the mainly westward emigration flows from former Soviet territories are the actual and potential migration flows within those territories. Apart from the already large but well-channelled flows to Germany and Israel, westward migrations and emigrations will take some time to develop. Even if, as seems likely, economic conditions continue to deteriorate, and ethnonational antagonisms to intensify, the weakness of networks, the physical distance separating most post-Soviet citizens from westward states, the shortage of hard currency, and the extremely limited supply of ruble-priced transportation to westward states will impede the rapid swelling of westward migratory streams. Truly convulsive migrations, occurring even in the absence of developed networks, would probably remain "internal." 25

"Internal" flows, of course, are not what they once were. The final collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of incipient successor states-enjoying varying and rapidly changing, degrees of *de jure* recognition and *de facto* independence-have "internationalized," to varying degrees, what previously counted as "internal" migration. This has implications not only for the future but also, as it were, for the past. It has delegitimized past migrations, transforming yesterday's internal migrants, secure in their Soviet citizenship, into today's international migrants of contested legitimacy and uncertain membership. In so doing it has raised the specter of vast migrations of ethnic unmixing, of displacements on a scale unseen since the great upheavals of the Second World War and its aftermath.

The ethnodemographic potential for large-scale displacements is considerable. Some 65 million ex-Soviet citizens live outside the bounds of their "own" ethnic polity. Roughly 10% of these 65 million belong to the groups with external homelands that we have already discussed. 26 The remaining 90% do not have external homelands; and only a small minority belong to national groups with strong ties to large external diasporas (a circumstance that could facilitate emigration).

25 Even in Yugoslavia, most refugee flows from the civil war have remained "internal," i.e., within what used to be Yugoslavia, despite proximity to Western Europe and high degree of integration into Western European migratory networks. The forces working to limit the westward spillover of refugee flows would be much stronger in the Soviet case.

26 Calculated from census results reported in Anderson and Silver (1989), pp. 621-622.
ethnic unmixing occurs on a large scale, it will occur largely within the territory that comprised the Soviet Union.

Two preliminary points should be made about migrations of ethnic unmixing. First, ethnic unmixing is not unprecedented in the Soviet setting. Selective migratory unmixing has been occurring in certain Soviet regions for some time. For three decades, for example, there has been substantial net migration of Armenians from Georgia and Azerbaijan to Armenia, and a modest net migration of Azeris from Georgia and Armenia to Azerbaijan. For these nationalities, the refugee flows of the last few years, following the outbreak of Armenian-Azeri ethnic violence in 1988, have only reinforced a long-term trend towards ethnic unmixing in Transcaucasia (Silver 1983, p. 377; Anderson and Silver 1989, pp. 638-640).

More importantly, Russians, too, had begun emigrating from certain peripheral regions even before the explosion of nationalist protest in recent years. The centuries-old trend of Russian migratory expansion into non-Russian areas steadily has slowed and, in some cases, reversed itself during the last three decades. There was a substantial net Russian outflow from Georgia and Azerbaijan during each of the last three intercensal periods (1959-70, 1970-79, and 1979-89), and from Armenia in the last intercensal period, during which there was also a net outflow of Russians, for the first time, from Moldavia, Kazakhstan and each of the Central Asian republics. And even though net Russian immigration continued, during the last intercensal period, to the Baltics and the Slavic west (Ukraine and Byelorussia), the rates of such Russian in-migration have been declining in each of these republics except Lithuania.

Second, not all unmixing is necessarily conflictual. In some cases, it may be positively desired. The Baltic states, for example, actively seek the repatriation of the remnants of their deportee populations from Siberia. And there is no indication that the gradual outmigration of Russians from Transcaucasia or Central Asia before the intensification of national conflict in the late 1980s involved serious conflicts or dislocations.

Yet while unmixing is neither new in the Soviet context nor necessarily conflictual, both the vast scale of the potential unmixing in the aftermath of imperial collapse and its connection to intensifying ethnonational conflict distinguish recent and prospective migrations in the disintegrating Soviet Union and its successor states from earlier instances of ethnic unmixing.

27 Anderson and Silver (1989), pp. 640-642. Anderson and Silver calculate Russians' net intercensal migration rates as a percentage of Russian population at the earlier census.
The group most centrally concerned by the potential large-scale unmixing of populations is the vast Russian diaspora. That diaspora is the product of four centuries of state-sponsored migration, beginning in the mid sixteenth century, when conquest of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates permitted Russian peasant settlement to expand into the fertile black earth zone heretofore controlled by hostile Turkic nomads, and continuing through the postwar decades of the twentieth century, when the political reincorporation of the Baltics was followed, in Estonia and Latvia, by the massive importation of Russian workers. Throughout these four centuries, the eastward, southward, and (more recently) westward dispersion of Russians from their initially small region of core settlement has been intimately linked to the expansion and consolidation of the Russian state and its Soviet successor. It has comprised one of the greatest episodes of colonization in human history (Raeff 1971; Pipes 19xx, pp. 13-16; Bennigsen and Wibmush 1978).

As a result of this prolonged history of state-sponsored out-migration, some 25 million ethnic Russians live in non-Russian republics, comprising 18% of their total population. There is a substantial Russian presence in every corner of the former Soviet union. Only in Armenia is their share of the population less than 5%. It is 22% in the Ukraine, 30% in Estonia, 34% in Latvia, and 38% in Kazakhstan (Anderson and Silver 1989, p. 628). These figures concern only persons identifying themselves as ethnic Russians in the 1989 census. Since Ukrainians and Byelorussians, lacking cultural facilities in their own languages, have tended to assimilate to Russians when they leave their home republics, the Russophone and Russified presence in the peripheral republics is even more weighty than these figures suggest.28

Besides the 25 million Russians outside the Russian republic (RSFSR), more than 10 million Russians live in non-Russian autonomous formations inside the RSFSR. Here, the Russian presence is the product of a still longer history of colonization. The Russian republic is a microcosm (if the word can be applied to anything so vast) of the Soviet Union. It is an enormously complex federal state riven with ethnnonational tension. Within its borders are 16 "Autonomous Republics" and 15 lower-level autonomous formations, each formally designated by an ethnonym as the polity of and for a particular nationality (or in some cases nationalities). In

28 One caveat should be added here. The growth of national awareness and assertiveness may have reversed, or at least arrested, the tendency of non-Russians to assimilate to Russians when outside their own republic. This tendency has provoked the ire of Ukrainian nationalists, for the Ukraine was "losing" a substantial fraction of its own large diaspora population through a variety of assimilatory processes including linguistic Russification, intermarriage, and ultimately ethnic re-identification.
general, the Russian presence is stronger (in proportion to population) in the autonomous formations in the RSFSR than in the non-Russian republics. In 1979, Russians were the largest nationality in 9 of the 16 autonomous republics and an absolute majority in 6 of them; they were an absolute majority in 12 of the 15 lower-level autonomous formations. But even if we leave out of consideration the autonomous formations in which Russians form an absolute majority, on the grounds that their demographic dominance makes their induced or forced migration less likely, this still leaves more than 5 million Russians living as minorities in autonomous formations.29

If diaspora Russians are especially concerned by the transformation of what was previously defined—legally, culturally, and politically—as internal migration into what is now defined as international migration, and by the associated challenges to their citizenship status, it is not only because they are the largest, and among the most mobile, of Soviet nationalities—the Soviet Union's "true nomads," as they have been called (Carrère d'Encausse 1978, p. 72). It is also because they have the most to lose. Until recently, Russians in the peripheral republics and in the autonomous formations of the RSFSR enjoyed distinct privileges and advantages. These included Russian-language schools, newspapers, and other cultural facilities and access to desirable jobs throughout the Soviet Union without having to learn the local language.30 They also included less tangible advantages such as the security of belonging to the Soviet Union's dominant nationality.

As the Soviet Union careened toward disintegration in the last few years, however, the legal, cultural, political, and psychological position of the Russian diaspora changed in fundamental ways. What was formerly an advantage—identification with the ruling center and mastery of the statewide "language of interethnic communication"—became a liability, as Russians were more openly identified with Soviet misrule and oppression, and as the incipient successor states began to promote their own languages. Schooling in the local language has been expanded at the expense of Russian-language schooling. Knowledge of the local language has been proposed as a requirement for employment and citizenship. And relatively few Russians know the local languages: figures range from less than 5% in

29 Figures on national composition of autonomous formations in the RSFSR are calculated from 1979 census results, as reported in Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR (1984), pp. 76-88. 1989 census figures on ethnic Russians in non-Russian autonomous formations in the RSFSR are not available to me at this writing.

30 This kind of institutionalized cultural support was unavailable for members of other nationalities living outside their own republics.
Central Asia to a high of only 38% in Lithuania (Anderson and Silver 1989, p. 647). Russian-language street signs have been removed, and local storekeepers and officials may pretend not to understand when addressed in Russian. Voting rights, in some cases, have been restricted to long-term residents, excluding recent immigrants, usually Russians. Anti-Russian sentiments have been openly articulated by some nationalist groups. Russians have come to face the prospect of losing their privileges, their jobs, their right to vote or to own property, their sense of security, in some instances even their right to reside in the territory.

Yet just as the various non-Russian nationalisms differ substantially in their aims, methods and programs, so too the response of the Russian diaspora to these peripheral nationalisms will vary. Emigration from non-Russian territories is only one of an array of possible responses. Other possible responses include individual assimilation, or at least acculturation, to the dominant local population, and collective mobilization for equal civil rights, for special cultural or linguistic rights, for territorial political autonomy, for secession, or for the restoration of central control.

The extent of Russian out-migration in the aftermath of imperial collapse will vary across republics and over time. A first set of factors that will determine its extent includes ethnodemographic variables such as the size, concentration, and rootedness of the Russian populations in the territories in question, as well as the trajectory of these variables over time. Where the Russian population is small, scattered, or weakly rooted, and especially when it is also rapidly shrinking, the prevailing response to local nationalisms is likely to be emigration, together with a certain amount of apolitical individual acculturation or assimilation. A large, concentrated, and deeply rooted Russian population, on the other hand, is more likely to remain in place and engage in collective political action. Rootedness may be the key variable here. It can be conceived as attachment to the territory in which one lives, as expressed in resistance to moving even in the face of inducements or pressures to move. Duration of residence obviously contributes to rootedness - not only how long a given individual or family has resided in the territory, but also how long the community has existed. Ties to the land also contribute to rootedness: rural settler populations are ordinarily more deeply rooted than purely urban settlements. Among Russian diaspora communities, rootedness may be greatest in northern and eastern Kazakhstan31 and in the eastern and southern Ukraine;32 it is probably weakest in the purely urban settlements of Central Asia.

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31 Already in 1911, 40% of the population of an area roughly approximating the northern two-thirds of present-day Kazakhstan were peasant colonists from European Russia (Pierce 1960, 36).
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A second set of factors has to do with the character of the non-Russian nationalist movements and the terms on which the incipient nation-states accept Russians as permanent members of their polities. The crucial variables here are the extent to which the local nationalisms are anti-Russian (or become anti-Russian, now that there is no longer any point in being anti-Soviet), and the extent to which the rewritten rules of the political game in the new nation-states - especially those bearing on the language of education, the language of public life, the criteria of citizenship, and the rights of permanent residents who are not granted, or do not seek, citizenship in the new republics - impose cultural, economic, or political costs on the local Russian populations.

A third factor is the texture of everyday life for Russians in the newly nationalized peripheral republics. Actual or feared violence will stimulate out-migration from weakly rooted Russian communities, and it will stimulate demands for restoration of central control, or for territorial autonomy, in deeply rooted Russian communities. Informal hostility towards Russians, even without the threat of violence, may have the same effects. Anti-Russian attitudes and practices are likely to be particularly important in Central Asia, given the high degree of segregation between Russians and indigenous nationalities and the more classically colonial character of Russian domination there. The great question mark is Kazakhstan, where the same segregation and colonial situation exists, yet where the Russian settler population is much more deeply rooted, dating from massive rural colonization in the late nineteenth century. Russians in Kazakhstan might be compared with French settler colonists in Algeria, while Russians in the cities of Central Asia might be more aptly compared with urban Europeans in colonies without deeply rooted European rural settlements.

A fourth set of factors likely to condition the Russian response to non-Russian nationalisms concerns the possible economic or political advantages,33 balanced against cultural and psychological costs, that might induce Russians to remain in a successor state despite anti-Russian sentiment and nationalistic language and citizenship legislation. This might be the case in the Baltic states, which have brighter

p. 137). By contrast, only 6% of the population of the remaining parts of Russian Central Asia (today's southern Kazakhstan, plus the four Republics of Central Asia proper) were Russians (ibid.).

32 In 1897, ethnic Russians comprised 12% of the population of the nine Ukrainian provinces of the Russian empire, and a much higher fraction of the population in the industrialized Donets region and elsewhere in southern Ukraine (Magocsi 19xx, commentary to Map 18).

33 By political advantages I understand here greater security or stability.
prospects for economic integration into Europe, and brighter prospects for maintaining public order and establishing liberal institutions.

A fifth set of factors concerns the orientation and policies of the incipient Russian state toward the various communities of diaspora Russians. This includes policies toward immigrants and refugees from the peripheral republics in matters of citizenship, immigration, and relocation or integration assistance (housing, employment, etc.). These policies may differ for different groups of actual or potential resettlers; diaspora Russians, in other words, may have differential resettlement opportunities. Designated refugees from particular peripheral territories, for example, might be granted preferential access to scarce housing.

Besides these "domestic" policies toward immigrants and refugees, we also have to consider Russian "foreign policy" initiatives vis-à-vis the peripheral republics, seeking either to forestall repatriation to Russia or, if repatriation cannot be forestalled, to regulate it. Russia might seek to prevent a potentially destabilizing massive influx of Russians by negotiating, on a reciprocal basis, favorable conditions for the diaspora communities in matters of citizenship and cultural facilities. In a harsher mode, it might engage in coercive diplomacy or even intervene with military force to reassert central control (albeit Russian, not Soviet) over all or part of a refugee-producing peripheral republic, say a hypothetically radically nationalist Kazakhstan.34 In general, differential policies of the Russian state toward the various diaspora communities may differentially affect the propensity of diaspora Russians to emigrate.

On the basis of these considerations, we can expect sharply differing rates of migration to Russia on the part of different diaspora groups. Migration may well be the dominant Russian response to non-Russian nationalisms in Central Asia (excluding Kazakhstan) and Transcaucasia. The Russian population of Central Asia, although large, is exclusively urban and not deeply rooted; and it faces probably the greatest informal hostility from the indigenous nationalities; the Russian population of Transcaucasia is small and rapidly shrinking. Already during the 1980s, there was substantial Russian emigration from Central Asia and Transcaucasia (Anderson and Silver 1989, p. 641),35 and the rate of emigration has increased sharply in the last two years. Russian out-migration rates are likely

34 On coercive diplomacy, see Weiner 1991, p. 56.

35 In the case of Georgia and Azerbaijan, there has been net Russian out-migration in each of the last three intercensal periods.
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to be much lower from areas with territorially concentrated and historically rooted Russian populations such as the eastern and southern Ukraine, northern and eastern Kazakhstan, Moldavia east of the Dniester, and northeastern Estonia. There, we are more likely to see collective political responses on the part of Russians to non-Russian nationalisms. Elsewhere in the Baltics, comparatively bright medium- and long-term economic prospects, together with concessions to the Russian population negotiated by the Russian state, may keep out-migration rates down, at least on the part of the more established part of the Russian communities.36

This means that of the twenty-five million Russians in the non-Russian republics, only a small fraction - if nonetheless a large group in absolute numbers - is at high risk of being induced or forced to flee to Russia in the next few years. The Russians most likely to resettle in Russia are those in Central Asia (3.3 million in 1989) and Transcaucasia (780,000).37 This pool of potential migrants amounts to less than 3% of the total population of the RSFSR. In principle, the resettlement in Russia of even a substantial fraction of this migrant pool might benefit the RSFSR. For decades, Soviet demographers and economic planners have been concerned about rural depopulation in central Russia and about labour deficits in areas of the RSFSR targeted for development projects. In practice, however, it will be difficult for the state to steer resettlement in accordance with demographic and economic needs. The migration to Russia in the next few years of a substantial fraction of Central Asian and Transcaucasian Russians would place a significant strain on the Russian state, which, in the throes of economic crisis, and having no experience with immigration or refugee flows, is completely unprepared to handle a substantial influx of resettlers or refugees.

36 Russian migration to and from the Baltic republics has involved large in-migration and out-migration flows, with figures reporting net in-migration flows concealing the relatively large gross outflows (for the Baltic states generally see Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, p. 206; for detailed figures on Latvia see Dreifelds 1991, pp. 52-53; for detailed figures on Estonia see JPRS-UPA-90-014, March 22, 1990, p. 61). While established Russians are unlikely to leave in large numbers in the near future, the ordinary outflow of short-term migrants will probably continue. And since the Baltic states are implementing restrictive immigration policies, future inflows of Russians will drop sharply. As a result, the Baltic states would experience modest net out-migration of Russians in the next few years even if no Russians were to leave in response to the nationalization of life in these states.

37 Since considerable outmigration of Russians has occurred since the census of January 1989, the Russian communities are already smaller than indicated by these figures. However, substantial fractions of other nonindigenous nationalities residing in Central Asia may have become so assimilated to Russians that, should they leave Central Asia, they might choose to migrate to Russia rather than to "their own" nominal republic.
These problems, though, would pale into insignificance by comparison with those posed by a massive Russian exodus from the core areas of Russian settlement in the non-Russian republics, namely Ukraine and Kazakhstan, home to 11.3 and 6.2 million Russians, respectively, in 1989, accounting for 70% of the total Russian diaspora. With large, territorially concentrated, and historically rooted communities in these republics, I have suggested, Russians are unlikely to leave in large numbers unless (1) government policies and popular practices in Ukraine and Kazakhstan take on a much more sharply anti-Russian orientation than they have at present and (2) intensifying ethnonational conflict is militarized or otherwise linked with actual or threatened violence. Although there is no immediate prospect of this occurring, it remains, unfortunately, a real possibility, given the tremendous historical suffering of Ukrainians and Kazakhs at the hands of the Soviet state, with whose projects Russian settlers - at least in the case of Kazakhstan - can be all too easily identified.

Besides the tremendous economic problems it would entail, large-scale resettlement of Russians from Ukraine and Kazakhstan to Russia might well be politically destabilizing. Especially if Russians were forced to flee these territories in response to sharply anti-Russian state policies or instances or threats of violence, the refugees could form core constituencies for radical Russian nationalists committed to recovering control of what they could present as "historically Russian" territories. In other instances, displaced and dispossessed refugees have provided constituencies for extreme nationalist parties and programs.38

Russians, of course, are not the only national group that may experience forced or induced migration as a result of the restructuring of the political landscape in the wake of the Soviet collapse. I have dwelt on the Russian diaspora because it is by far the largest group residing outside its own national territory, and because its transformation from dominant state-nationality to beleaguered national minority is particularly dramatic. But many other Soviet nationalities may be - and in some cases already have been - caught up in politically governed migrations. Escalating ethnonational conflict has already produced major refugee flows in Transcaucasia, where perhaps half a million Armenians and Azerbaijanis have been forced to flee; Meskhetian Turks have fled from ethnic violence in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan; more recently, in response to the Georgian military crackdown in South Ossetia, Ossetians have been fleeing into North Ossetia. Besides such instances of "escape from violence," there are a number of other politically gov-

38 On the role of Hungarian refugees from territories lost after World War I as constituencies for radical nationalist parties, see Mocsy 1973.
erned migration flows. Perhaps the most significant is the migration of more than 100,000 Crimean Tatars - one of the nationalities deported by Stalin, and never formally allowed to return to their homeland - to the Crimea in the last few years, where they further complicate the already complicated ethnodemographic landscape (the population of the Crimea is 70% Russian, but the has belonged to the Ukraine since 1954).

III. The political dimensions of Soviet "internal" migration can be studied both prospectively and retrospectively. In this paper, I have adopted a prospective approach, considering the migrations of ethnic unmixing that may be generated by the collapse of the Soviet multinational state and the reconfiguration of political authority along national lines. A fuller discussion would include also a retrospective analysis of the political causes and consequences of earlier migrations of ethnic mixing that were generated by the construction and consolidation of the Soviet state and its Russian predecessor.

Retrospective and prospective analyses intersect in the present: for the political consequences of past migrations of ethnic mixing are among the political causes of present and future migrations of ethnic unmixing. Thus, for example, resentment of past Russian immigration as a form of colonization or an agency of de-nationalization may nourish ethnonational exclusiveness or informal hostility that, in the increasingly nationalistic political environments of the successor states, may increase Russians' propensity to emigrate.

Yet the link is not automatic. The perception of past immigration as a threat to security or stability will not necessarily engender future emigration to undo that threat. The conditions that engender migratory unmixing are distinct from those that lead states to experience immigration as a threat to security or stability. This is suggested by the experience of Estonia and Latvia. Here, to a greater extent than elsewhere in the Soviet Union, massive postwar immigration of Russians engendered deep fears of "national extinction." Latvians' share in the population of Latvia was reduced from 77% in 1939 to 52% in 1989, Estonians' share in Estonia from over 90% to 61% (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, p. 272; Anderson and Silver 1989, p. 628). During the same period, the Russian share rose from

39 In 1945, after the wartime murder of Jews and resettlement of Germans, Latvians' and Estonians' shares were larger still; they have been tentatively estimated at 83% and 94% respectively (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, p. 272).
about a tenth to about a third of the population in both republics. The small size of these nationalities (there are fewer than 1.4 million Latvians in Latvia, and fewer than a million Estonians in Estonia), together with their highly developed national consciousness, made them particularly sensitive about immigration, particularly inclined to view it through the prism of potential de-nationalization. In the other major regions of Russian migrant settlement - Eastern and Southern Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Kirgizia - national consciousness was much less developed.

By 1989, Latvians were a minority in six of the seven largest cities of Latvia. They comprised scarcely more than a third of the population of Riga, which is not only the capital, but by far the largest city, accounting for a third of the total population; and they comprised a mere 13% of the population of Daugavpils, the second-largest city (Dreifelds 1991, pp. 54-55). The weak and declining ethnographic trajectory of the titular nationality here and in Estonia gave some credibility and resonance to the hyperbolic and irresponsible rhetoric of some intellectuals and politicians - warning of cultural "extinction," "annihilation," even "genocide." 40

As a result, migration and citizenship issues have been a central and continuous pre-occupation of independence movements in these republics (Brubaker, forthcoming). Autonomous republic-level citizenships have been discussed, proposed, and in some cases instituted in other successor states; but nowhere has citizenship been the object of as much sustained discussion and heated controversy as in the Baltics. Only in Latvia and Estonia does it appear, at this writing, that a substantial fraction of the Russian immigrant population will be excluded from citizenship.

To a greater extent than elsewhere in the Soviet Union, then, Russian immigration was regarded in Latvia and Estonia as a threat to the security and stability, broadly understood, of the nation and the national polity. National radicals have vigorously denounced Russians as colonists and illegal immigrants and demanded that citizenship be granted only to those meeting stringent conditions of language.

40 These hyperbolic claims, bellied by the very cultural vigor that supported the remarkably strong mass nationalist movements in the Baltics, are found not only on the extremist fringe of the political spectrum. In Latvia, for example, the Popular Front has been the mainstream nationalist movement, while extremist national radicals have been based in the Citizens’ Congress, an alternative parliament denying the legitimacy of the Supreme Council and claiming to be the legitimate organ of the still-existing Republic of Latvia. Yet the author of a 1990 paper entitled "The Latvian Nation and the Genocide of Immigration," Maris Plavnieks, is Chairs of the Popular Front’s Committee on Immigration (Dreifelds 1991, p. 43).
residence, and loyalty. Yet while recovery of statehood will enable Estonia and Latvia to limit further Russian immigration, massive Russian outmigration seems unlikely. Although Russians in Estonia and Latvia face resentment, they do not fear violence. And while many recent immigrants may leave, most of the more settled Russian immigrants will seek to stay, drawn to Estonia and Latvia both by the brighter economic prospects of these republics and by a developing sense of identification with the polity. Ethnonational conflict is more likely to lead them to mobilize to assert collective rights than it is to induce emigration.

The development and dissolution of the great multinational Russian-Soviet state offers an extraordinarily rich field for the study of the political determinants and consequences of migration. Here I have only addressed a few aspects of a complex and multifaceted problem. A comprehensive discussion would begin by analyzing the central role played by state-sponsored migration in the formation, expansion, and consolidation of the Russian state. This involved two distinct types of population flows - the movement of Russians (and other Slavs) into every corner of the expanding Russian and Soviet state; and the punitive or preventative deportation of groups felt to endanger the security of the state (including, most spectacularly, the eight national groups deported in their entirety, mainly from the North Caucasus, by Stalin, but also large numbers of persons from the western borderlands. Both types of flows were decisively (in the second case exclusively) governed by political causes. And both engendered widely ramifying (and largely unintended) political consequences. Intended to consolidate the regime, Soviet-era migrations rendered it, in some respects, more vulnerable. Intended to help weld Soviet nationalities into a new historical entity, the "Soviet people," they instead reinforced ethnic antagonisms and made the ethnodemographic landscape even more intractably intermixed than it was before.

If politically governed migrations were central, for four centuries, to the construction and consolidation of the Russian and Soviet states, they will be equally central, in the coming years and probably decades, to the dissolution and reconfiguration of political authority in the wake of the Soviet collapse. The migratory dynamics Myron Weiner has identified in post-colonial South Asia may well characterize population flows in post-Soviet Eurasia as well. While international migrations in the developed world have tended to increase ethnic heterogeneity, migrations in post-Soviet Eurasia, as, on balance, in post-colonial South Asia, will involve ethnic unmixing. And as in South Asia, the overall tendency will be "to more clearly define who is and who is not a citizen in a region of the world where historically borders were not clearly demarcated" and where migration patterns
showed "little or no regard for national boundaries or legal conceptions of citizenship" (Weiner 1991, p. 59).

Post-Soviet Eurasia faces what is likely to be a protracted period of political reconfiguration, involving simultaneously the reconstitution of political authority, the redrawing of territorial boundaries, and the "restructuring of populations." These multiple reconfigurations are sure to entail considerable migration, possibly on a scale unseen since the aftermath of the Second World War. In seeking to understand the probable dynamics of such flows, we would do well to study migration patterns in other ethnonationally mixed post-imperial settings. While making due allowance for contextual differences, we might well study in comparative perspective the links between domestic ethnonational conflict, inter-state relations, and migration patterns in the successor states to the Ottoman and Habsburg empires as well as in post-imperial South Asia. The lessons would be sobering but not, unfortunately, irrelevant.
References


The Future Of International Migration To Western Europe

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The future of immigration to Western Europe is far from clear. It is not preordained and will be shaped by a multitude of variables, some of which are unforeseeable and others of which are in unpredictable realms of human agency. Yet it is certain that international migration will greatly affect the future course of Western Europe and its foreign relations. That certainty is inscribed in the demographic imbalances between Western Europe and its international environment, the wage differentials for agricultural work in places like Vaucluse and Kabylie, which are about as great today as they were during the colonial period, and in the settlement of millions of immigrants in Europe largely after World War II. Arguably, there is no more important issue on the horizon of Europe than the immigration question.

In the space of several decades, international migration in Western Europe, in the idiom of international relations, has gone from low to high politics. Not too long ago, immigration was still largely seen as an adjunct to manpower policy. As something that could be increased or decreased in light of labor market needs. It generally was not seen as a matter of great import to analysis of Western European politics or the foreign relations of Western European states. By 1990, however, the asylum-seeker issue and a number of other developments had catapulted immigration concerns to the forefront of domestic and foreign policy agendas across Western Europe. Today, much talked about scenarios for the future of immigration to Europe range from apocalyptic, Spenglerian-type visions

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1 This observation was made by John Rudy at a Foreign Service Institute conference on Europe and the Maghreb, August 13, 1991.
The Future of International Migration to Western Europe

of a Europe submerged by uncontrollable waves of international migrants\(^2\) to equally democratically frightening notions of a Fortress Europa, a Europe of draconian immigration controls and hermetically-sealed borders\(^3\). In order to present a more plausible assessment of the future of immigration to Western Europe, it first seems necessary to explain why the domestic and foreign policy saliency of immigration issues increased so dramatically in recent years. This seems imperative because the future of immigration to Europe will be greatly influenced by the relatively novel significance attached to immigration issues at the highest levels of government. Finally, top policy makers are taking immigration questions seriously and they are coming to appreciate the limitations of unilateral approaches to immigration questions as well as the multiple linkages between immigration and other foreign and domestic policies. This new understanding is belated, but it is extremely significant to the future of immigration to Europe. There may still be grounds to expect Western European governments and the European Communities to succeed in managing the enormous immigration-related challenges of coming decades in a fashion consistent with democratic and humanitarian principles.

Towards the high politics of immigration in Western Europe

The terms high politics and low politics gained prominence in scholarly debates of the 1970s when students of international relations differed on fundamental assumptions about their field of inquiry. Proponents of high politics were traditional realists who assumed that the key analytical questions of the field pertained to peace and war between nation-states. Sovereign states and their policies, particularly their foreign and national security policies, were seen as the appropriate focus of students of international relations. Proponents of low politics, on the other hand, assumed that transnational actors like multinational companies also could greatly influence world politics like sovereign states and they attached greater significance to social and economic processes linking various societies. While the lines of demarcation between proponents of high politics and low politics were never incontrovertible, it seems obvious that international migration was a matter of low politics. International migration clearly was a transnational phenom

\(^2\) A movie has popularized the idea of possible mass migration to Europe from the South. In *L’Europe submergée*, the late Alfred Sauvy contrasted the demographic decline of Western Europe with the demographic explosion in the Third World. See A. Savvy, *L’Europe Submergée*, (Paris: Dunod, 1987).

\(^3\) The Fortress Europa notion originated in debate over international economic policies. It then was borrowed, as it were, and used to refer to restrictive immigration policies.
nomenon in that it affected at least two societies and it was assumed not to affect the questions of high politics.

This perhaps overly schematic characterization of how international migration was apprehended by differing schools of analysis should not obfuscate an important point. The transformation of immigration issues from low to high politics did not occur overnight. A long learning process was involved. And international migration was always a matter of some significance to understanding the domestic and foreign politics of most Western European states. Its significance, however, was generally mis- or under appreciated. The history of the international relations of international migration in the Western European context is not widely known. Yet one can make a plausible case that an international regime pertaining to international migrants to Western Europe has long existed. Foreign labor issues have long been important concerns in the bilateral relations of many Western European states. There was a confluence of five principal factors, some long term others occurring only in the late 1980s, that largely explain the higher profile, indeed urgency, attached to immigration-related policy by 1990. It is difficult to rank order these factors in terms of their significance.

The most obvious was the dramatic increase in asylum applications in the 1980s. By 1990, virtually all Western European states had revised their asylum policies with a view toward discouraging "frivolous" applications by presumed economically motivated migrants and had considerably increased resources allocated to asylum adjudication. Despite these measures, asylum applications continued to rise as did asylum-related expenditures to the point that several key European states, most notably Germany and Switzerland, began to balk at their treaty commitments. The erosion of public support for asylum policies in Western Europe threatened maintenance of the international refugee regime elsewhere and prompted the multilateral cooperation and coordination that led to the EC's Dublin Agreement with regard to asylum applications adjudication in June of 1990.

The political transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and the removal of many physical and legal barriers to emigration also accounts for the new salience.


5 Jonas Widgren, The Asylum Crisis in the OECD-Region. (Geneva: UNHCR, November 1990)
of immigration issues in Western Europe. Euphoria over the collapse of the wall was quickly followed by panic over the specter of mass migration from states formerly dominated by communist parties. As understanding of the economic di­vide separating Europeans grew as did appreciation for the potential for ethnic violence and refugee-generating political instability, greater emphasis was placed on the need to formulate Western European policies that would abate or channel immigration. Immigration abatement became a key concern in Western European thinking about its relationship to those societies long dominated by communist parties.

The movement towards creation of a Single European Market also helped propel immigration issues and concerns to the top of foreign policy agendas. Immigration, of course, lies outside the ambit of the Treaty of Rome. And the legal status of resident aliens from non-EC states in EC member states is not di­rectly affected by the Single European Act. However, some have argued that it would be incongruous to exclude legally resident aliens from non-EC states from the freer mobility within the EC6. Moreover, plans to remove frontier barriers to the movement of goods, workers, services, and capital within the European Communities will make it more difficult to stymie unauthorized alien entry at in­ternal frontiers. And the prospect for enhanced freedom of movement has en­couraged a tendency for greater coordination and cooperation in immigration-re­lated matters between EC member states. Immigration concerns have also figured prominently in negotiations between the EC and the large number of states seek­ing entry into the EC. Swiss negotiations with Brussels, for example, have in­volved extensive exchange of views about Swiss seasonal labor policy.

A fourth factor pushing immigration issues into the limelight has been a growing appreciation of the seriousness of integration questions facing European states with substantial foreign-born and resident alien populations. Relatively little thought was given to integration during the halcyon years of foreign worker re­cruitment. But since the recruitment curbs, major efforts have been made to pro­mote immigrant integration. On the whole, an assessment of these post-1970 inte­gration policies would be mixed as the results have been insufficient in may re­spects. A syndrome of housing problems, educational barriers, discrimination, and high unemployment continues to affect many immigrant communities7.


Festering resentments occasionally explode into protests. Meanwhile, in several Western European countries, anti-immigrant political parties have gained strength. Domestic political measures are such that Western European leaders and statesmen can no longer ignore the ramifications of external developments for immigration. French policy towards Algeria, for example, is inextricably bound up with multiple immigration policy concerns ranging from the dreaded scenario of a Muslim fundamentalist regime in Algeria that would spark massive emigration to France⁸ to possible effects of French foreign policies vis-à-vis the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis upon volatile relations between North Africans and the majority population in France⁹. In Western European states with significant Muslim immigrant minorities, integration issues appear more complex than elsewhere.

Fifthly, Western European states have increasingly turned to diplomacy to grope for solutions to immigration dilemmas because of their growing appreciation of the limited capacity of democratic states to regulate international migration. Border enforcement, employer sanctions, legalizations and temporary foreign worker policies are characteristic strategies to reduce or prevent illegal alien entry, employment and residency. Since roughly 1970, most Western European states have developed a substantial legal and administrative capacity to curb illegal immigration. These strategies have tangible results and benefits, but they are insufficient in and of themselves. They must be complemented with foreign policy initiatives which hold out a prospect for immigration abatement through development and improvement of the quality of life in the areas of massive emigration. Between 1985 and 1990, a certain optimism that internal control measures could stem the tide of illegal immigration was replaced by growing pessimism as to the efficacy of that control strategy in light of palpably surging illegal immigration.

In the literature on international relations, phenomena generally could be pegged as either falling into the realm of high politics or low politics. The case of international migration to Western Europe suggests that the phenomenon that once was generally understood as a matter of low politics can undergo a transformation and, evolve or accede, as it were, into the realm of high politics. The observation, for example, that Western European immigration policies have significant national security policy implications seems self-evident today whereas a relatively


short time ago such an assertion would have been regarded by many as preposterous.

Both objectively and subjectively, then, the question of international migration to Western Europe has changed considerably since say 1970. Objectively, the durable presence of millions of immigrants has altered the landscape of Western European societies and politics making immigration policy a far more complex, important and difficult question than it once was. Many of the trends and situations that give rise to international migration, which often were discernible back in 1970, have since evolved. The gap in living standards and perceptions of quality of life between Western Europe and much of its international environment has grown as have demographic imbalances. Meanwhile, the political situation in much of the Third World has worsened while international migration has become a steadily more available option due to improvements in international communication and transportation. Most importantly, the thick web of transnational human, economic and political relations which already by 1970 had made international migration partially autonomous from (or impervious to) governmental regulation has progressed. Transnational family, village, and regional networks are more extensive and developed in the 1990s than they were in 1970.

Subjectively, Western European understanding of international migration has undergone a revolution of sorts. Libraries overflowing with books and theses on immigration bear witness to the progress made in scholarship. Strategies of depoliticization of immigration issues such as once analyzed by Gary Freeman are no longer viable. Political parties now have immigration experts and stands on immigration issues help or hurt candidates at the polls. Catherine Wihtol de Wenden has identified the mid-1970s as a watershed period in French politics in that once marginal immigration issues became central concerns for French politicians at about that time. The era of the high politics of immigration should have begun in the later 1960s or early 1970s. But it took several additional decades for Western European governments to begin to give international migration the top priority attention it long deserved.


Marc Miller

Can the high politics of immigration enable Europe to cope with international migration in coming decades?

The growing saliency of immigration-related issues can be attributed, in part, to the inadequacy of past policies. But what will be the shape of policies to come and do they stand a realistic change of regulating international migration? Analysis of recent manifestations of the high politics of Western European immigration provides some clues as to the future of immigration to Western Europe. This evidence does not square well with either the Fortress Europa notion or the Spenglerian-like vision of a Europe overrun by migrants. Instead, it would appear more reasonable to expect a comprehensive and long-term effort to bring international migration under an acceptable level of governmental control through a combination of foreign policy initiatives and reinforced domestic policies. There will be a great deal of continuity in Western European immigration policies of the future in addition to changes that hold out a reasonable long-term prospect for achievement of a politically acceptable measure of immigration control.

Integration policy will remain the bedrock of Western European immigration policies of the future. Severe integration problems are the principal legacy of the guestworker recruitment era. The severity of the integration problems facing many, but certainly not all, legally-resident aliens means that Western European governments and the EC will face several more decades of growing expenditures and public and private efforts to integrate legally-resident aliens.

The Fortress Europa scenario is fundamentally flawed because it does not recognize the irreversible results of the past two decades of integration policies. Groups like the National Front seek to compress or undo the legal rights gained by immigrants. It is virtually inconceivable that the status of legally-admitted aliens could be changed in a retrograde fashion. hence, it doesn't make much sense to speak of a Fortress Europa of draconian policies towards aliens. Legally-admitted aliens will continue to benefit from a full panoply of rights, including the right of family reunification, and further improvements seem reasonable to expect as Western European governments will seek to reinforce not undo integration policies. Family reunification rights mean that Western Europe's borders will be no more hermetically-sealed in the future than they were following the recruitment curbs. The notion of closing the borders has not only been nonsensical for politicians and analysts to bandy about, it is illegal and contrary to human rights.

13 This observation is based on a recent study and subsequent report by a team of experts including G. Callovi and W.R. Boehning.
A key question to be resolved involves the status of resident aliens from non-EC countries in the Single European Market. On the one hand, the elimination of remaining barriers to free movement of labor, etc., could become a powerful additional incentive to naturalization. All legally resident aliens from non-EC countries within the EC theoretically can benefit from the reform through acquisition of citizenship in a member state of the EC. Ease of naturalization, of course, varies significantly from one EC member state to the next. Greater harmonization of naturalization and citizenship laws with a view toward reducing barriers to the acquisition of citizenship would be one way to enhance integration, although naturalization or possession of citizenship alone does not guarantee integration. The plight of Black Britons provides ample evidence that citizenship possession does not preclude significant integration problems.

There is concern, of course, that maintenance of the status quo with regard to resident aliens from non-EC countries will only deepen alienation and widen the integration gap that so desperately needs to be closed. Thus a political initiative that would respond to many of the concerns raised in an important recent paper by W.R. Boehning and J. Werquin cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, political passions surrounding immigration issues in several EC member states are such that chances for a measure greatly improving say the access of legally resident Turks in Germany to employment in France appear remote.

The primacy of integration concerns in Western European immigration policies of the future has as a corollary the virtual impossibility of massive recourse to foreign worker recruitment on a scale similar to that of the 1960s. Western European governments will have a difficult enough time employing poorly educated second and third generation immigrants and other poorly educated or low-skilled workers. The first responsibility of Western European governments will continue to be towards their citizens and resident aliens. Their second order of responsibility will be toward citizens and perhaps resident aliens of fellow EC member states. Only when labor market needs arise that cannot be met by national and European labor markets could legitimate consideration be given to recruitment of foreign labor. And there will always be political controversy as there virtually is never consensus that foreign workers need to be recruited.


15 See footnote 6.
There nevertheless is some potential for limited recruitment of foreign labor in the Western European future. One German study of future EC labor market needs foresaw a large shortfall of workers, on the order of five million jobs that could not be filled by projected internal supply\textsuperscript{16}. Labor shortages were seen as likely to develop unevenly with some member states, particularly France, seen as continuing to face prolonged high rates of unemployment. Generally speaking, implementation of the Single European Market will promote economic growth and create jobs. Most of the jobs created will require skilled or highly skilled labor. Implementation of the Single European Market is not expected to give rise to a great deal of inter-EC member-state mobility by low-skilled workers. Rather highly-skilled and professional level workers are expected to be the principal beneficiaries of the elimination of remaining barriers to freedom of movement.

The likelihood of an excess supply of low-skilled workers in some EC member-states combined with the evolution of the Western European labor market to the benefit of employment prospects for professional-level employees makes resumption of massive legal recruitment of unskilled or poorly qualified manual workers unlikely. Western European states will continue to welcome highly skilled and professional level workers as they have in the past. These immigrants, in Boehning’s terms, are "highly invisible" and do not pose an integration problem\textsuperscript{17}.

Several Western European states have, however, evidenced a willingness to reopen labor recruitment "windows" in the context of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. France and Germany, in particular, have signed a number of bilateral labor agreements with Central and Eastern European states, specifically Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. These agreements include provisions for recruitment of trainees, contract workers and other employees whose residency rights, and other rights, are quite limited due to the temporary and conditional nature of their employment in the EC member-state\textsuperscript{18}. In many respects, signature of these agreements came as a surprise in that they would appear to risk re-inventing the

\textsuperscript{16} Heinz Werner related the conclusions of this study at the Center for Migration Studies Legal Conference in March of 1991.


\textsuperscript{18} Based on interviews in 1990 and 1991.
guestworker wheel. But overriding foreign policy considerations prevailed and the recruitment windows were opened as experiments.19.

Thus a new period of labor recruitment has begun. Most of the Central and Eastern Europeans have been or will be recruited as contract workers, frontier workers or as trainees. In addition, visa restrictions have been lifted for citizens of several former-Warsaw Pact states. The 1991 agreement between the Schengen-group EC member states and Poland abolished visa obligations for Poles wishing to travel to the Schengen area. The quid pro quo, however, was that Poland agreed to cooperate and accept back its nationals who violated the terms of their entry to the Schengen area by overstaying visas and working illegally. Poland also agreed to take back third country nationals who transit to the Schengen area and subsequently violate immigration rules. Thus the bilateral agreements to permit limited labor recruitment were tied to immigration control efforts and to broader foreign policy initiatives towards selected states undergoing the transition from socialist to capitalist economies and from communist rule to Western-style democracy.

The scenario of mass migration from Central and Eastern Europe is taken very seriously in Western Europe. After all, about two million persons emigrated from the former Eastern bloc area in 1990. Most of these individuals, however, were ethnic minorities - Jews going to Israel, Greeks to Greece or Germans to Germany. This ethnic migration is quite different from the unwanted and uncontrollable migration sometimes conjured up. And, it is finite. There are several reasons why Western Europe is unlikely to be submerged by hordes of migrants from the East.

First, the demography of several Central and Eastern European states is not dissimilar from that of Western European societies. It is above all the Soviet Union and Romania that would appear to be capable of producing large numbers of emigrants. Moreover, Romanian and Soviet emigrants would have to transit states like Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Western European states will endeavor to create a kind of immigration-related *cordon sanitaire* as states like Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have a vital interest in immigration control. They would be the most adversely affected say by the breakdown of political order in the USSR.

Second, illegal immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe do not generally possess the family and village networks which enable many aliens say from Turkey or North Africa to evade immigration controls and find employment. There are substantial populations of Central and Eastern European descent in a number of Western European states but, except for the substantial refugee populations of recent decades, these populations generally have had little contact with homelands since the interwar period. The presumed paucity of networks available to Eastern Europeans will limit their ability to emigrate.

Western European states are attempting to foster political stability and economic development in Central and Eastern Europe through a variety of policies. Only time will tell whether these policies can help bring about conditions which would help keep Eastern Europeans at home. Signature of the European Convention on Security and Cooperation is supposed to create a mechanism ensuring respect for human rights and, as complemented by economic development, maintenance of at least minimal living standards throughout Europe. This mechanism eventually should reduce asylum-seeker flows from Central and Eastern Europe and render adjudication of claims by persons originating from that area unproblematical. There will be no legal grounds for asylum if ECSC ensures respect for human rights.

There is also some prospect for trade and investment policy initiatives by Western European states and the EC towards Eastern Europe which might reduce migratory pressures. The chances of states like Hungary or Czechoslovakia acceding to full membership in the EC appear extremely remote over the short to medium term. However, some intermediary steps, including elements of a free trade-like approach, cannot be ruled out. The fundamental problems blocking Eastern and Central European entry into the EC are concern over the cohesiveness of the EC and the huge gap between Western and Eastern European economies. In the best scenario, it would take twenty years for the most advanced Central and Eastern European economies to reach levels comparable to those of Spain and Portugal today. Trade and investment policies historically have been difficult to manipulate for emigration abatement purposes. That leaves foreign economic assistance tied to emigration-abatement goals as a strategy. There may be some potential for

20 Address by Georges Tapinos to the Salzburg Seminar, April 1991.
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genuine abatement in such a strategy, but there is little or no empirical evidence of such results23. Foreign economic assistance like the labor recruitment windows will be linked to cooperation between states in regulating international migration. Western European states undoubtedly will attempt to foster international cooperation in immigration matters through the carrot of economic assistance.

A great unknown in the future of international migration to Western Europe concerns the relationship between migration from Central and Eastern Europe and that from the traditional emigration zones of the Mediterranean littoral. Already French farmers in the Vaucluse are looking to Poland for workers to replace a dwindling supply of Spaniards. Emigrating from Central and Eastern Europe is sometimes portrayed as preferable to North African immigration because of the enormous political tensions endemic to North African immigration. Similarly, there is some fear in Turkish communities in Western Europe that they will be economically displaced or otherwise adversely affected by the new emigration from the East. Such fears probably are misplaced as they seem to presume either that Western European governments will purposively seek to substitute new migrants for the established ones or that Western European states are incapable of regulating international migration. Neither assumption would appear warranted. While Western European states possess only a limited capacity to regulate international migration, that capacity is ample, consequential and demonstrable. There is every reason to believe that Western European governments will devote more resources and energy to domestic-side immigration control measures than in the past.

Before turning to the second pillar of future immigration policies - domestic control policies - more should be said about the high politics of trans-Mediterranean immigration. As in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, diplomatic initiatives aimed at promoting economic development and political stability, in part out of concern over the migratory potential of North Africa, are likely. They also will probably include a mixture of trade, investment and economic assistance policies. There also may be limited foreign worker recruitment primarily for agriculture, construction, hotels and restaurants or households. But such recruitment would be so politically controversial that it almost certainly would be very limited, if permitted at all. It is illusory to regard massive foreign labor recruitment as a solution either to Western Europe's demographic graying, to the demographic imbalance between Western Europe and the Third World or to the

massive unemployment in North Africa that most likely will expand rather than contract in coming decades.

Immigration has long been a key concern in France’s relations with the Maghreb\textsuperscript{24}. Italy, Spain and France have been encouraging Euro-Maghrebi dialogue on a broad spectrum of issues. The perceived growth in the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa, as evidenced in the 1990 Algerian elections, has lent an air of urgency to this dialogue. Already in 1990 there was some evidence of middle-class Algerians moving to France out of fear of life under a fundamentalist regime\textsuperscript{25}. The French in particular view maintenance of non-fundamentalist regimes as a vital interest and this dictates a maximum of attention and resource allocation to measures that will foster socio-economic development and political stability in North Africa. Emigration from North Africa is sometimes portrayed as functioning as a political safety valve. Emigration doubtlessly has relieved un- and underemployment as well as provided exit to political dissent. Remittances from overseas emigrants play a vital economic function in North Africa\textsuperscript{26}. At the same time, emigration has long permitted political opposition to operate much more freely across the Mediterranean than at home. Like Turkish authorities alarmed by manifestations of Turkish Islamic fundamentalism in Western Europe, North African governments have long had to contend with political opposition manifested above all in emigrant communities in Western Europe. It is not self-evident that emigration has a politically stabilizing effect on the political systems of countries of emigration over the long run.

There doubtlessly will be advocacy of resuming labor recruitment from North Africa for a host of labor market, demographic and strategic or national security reasons. But there will be intense political opposition to such advocacy and there is little evidence that foreign labor recruitment policies can realize the goals for which they are advocated. The prudent middle course between resumption of large-scale foreign labor recruitment and policies that would undermine regimes in North Africa is maintenance and further development of integration policies.

\textsuperscript{24} See, for example, Mark J. Miller, "Reluctant Partnership: Foreign Workers in Franco-Algerian Relations, 1962-1979", \textit{Journal of International Affairs} 33:2, 1979, pp. 219-237.

\textsuperscript{25} Interviews with IREMAM immigration specialists in Aix-en-Provence, May, 1990.

Such policies provide for family reunification and may work against the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism over the long run. Leveau and Kepel have demonstrated the diversity of Islam in France\textsuperscript{27}. Kepel's thesis that the settlement of immigrants by the mid-1070s was the precondition to a re-affirmation of Islam amongst France's three million or so immigrants of Islamic background probably can be safely extended to Western Europe's six million immigrants of Islamic background\textsuperscript{28}. Islamic affirmation obviously does not necessarily involve adhesion to Islamic fundamentalism, itself a very diverse phenomenon. There is reason to believe that integration problems enhance the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism amongst some Western European Moslems. But most Muslims in Western Europe do not appear to identify with Islamic fundamentalism. Successful integration policy can be expected to dampen the appeal of anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism in Western Europe and the homelands. Draconian policies aimed against legally resident immigrants would be politically counterproductive both in Western Europe and North Africa.

The second pillar of future immigration policies in Western Europe will continue to be a panoply of internal or domestic policy measures aimed at preventing illegal immigration, residency and employment. Such measures include enforcement of employer sanctions and border controls as well as legalization. control of illegal immigration became an important concern for most Western European governments in the early 1970s. However, the results of internal control measures are difficult to measure and evaluate. Somewhat paradoxically, measures like enforcement of employer sanctions are regarded as both necessary and insufficient. As previously indicated, the perception that measures like employer sanctions enforcement and legalization were insufficient have contributed to the high politics of immigration, but that does not mean that Western European governments will abandon such policies in favor of an alternative approach to prevention of illegal migration.

The evolution of employer sanctions enforcement, legalization policy and other dimensions of the Western European quest for immigration control have been analyzed at great length elsewhere\textsuperscript{29}. In brief, legalization policies have only been


\textsuperscript{29} A book-length manuscript entitled \textit{Quest for Control} co-authored by Phil Martin and partially supported by the GMFUS is nearly completed.
Marc Miller

partially successful in that residual illegal immigrant populations remain and there is considerable evidence that the policies serve to attract additional illegal immigrants hoping to qualify for legalization or who replace the legalized aliens in the labor force. Legalization policies are difficult to implement and have been plagued by counterfeit documents and other forms of criminality. Legalization policies, however, have had limited beneficial results as they have legalized the status of tens of thousands of illegal aliens who once faced the discriminations inherent in illegal status. Despite its many drawbacks, there often appears to be no alternative to legalization as a humane solution to irregular alien status.

Enforcement of employer sanctions also has faced many hurdles. Most Western European states have laws punishing illegal employment of aliens and have revised these laws and reinforced enforcement of the laws since 1970. While it is impossible to measure illegal alien employment in Western Europe, the phenomenon has progressed rather than regressed since 1970. However, it would probably be far more pervasive in the absence of laws prohibiting and punishing it. Enforcement of employer sanctions has had a limited deterrent effect in Western Europe. And it is important to stress that Western European states possess a far greater capacity to punish illegal alien employment in the 1990s as compared to 1970. Incremental efforts to refine employer sanctions enforcement will continue in the future. There is some chance that the question of an EC directive concerning illegal immigration will be revisited as the French government has unofficially requested reopening the question closed by mainly British objections to employer sanctions. Interestingly, the British now consider their laws punishing harborers of illegal migrants as an employer sanction although that legal provision has only rarely been used to punish employers in the past.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose?

Integration of resident aliens and control of illegal immigration have been objectives of many Western European states since the mid-1970s. What genuinely is new is the priority attached to these objectives in the 1990s and the redefinition of immigration as a foreign policy and domestic policy concern. There is a long, if insufficiently known, history of international, multilateral and bilateral cooperation and conflict over international migration issues involving Western Europe.

30 Based on a 1991 interview with a high-ranking EC official who requested anonymity.

31 This is based on a discussion with Robert Niblett of the Overseas Labor Section in April of 1991.
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The high politics of immigration in the 1990s will be conditioned by that long history. Hence, the likelihood of a great deal of continuity in Western European immigration policies of the future. One hesitates to use policies instead of Western European immigration policy, because there will have to be closer immigration policy coordination (if not harmonization) in the future than in the past. The Single European Market renders such coordination and cooperation imperative despite the quite dissimilar immigration histories of many Western European states.

Western European states will continue to receive significant numbers of illegal immigrants over the foreseeable future, but the governmental capacities to curb illegal migration and employment developed since 1970 should be able to keep the phenomenon within politically acceptable bounds if there is tangible progress towards a truly comprehensive approach to immigration control. Western Europeans have never seen employer sanctions, frontier controls or legalizations as one-shot panaceas. There has long been an awareness that immigration was a complex question connected to global issues. Now that awareness is being increasingly manifested in the bilateral and multilateral relations of Western European states a development that augers well for a comprehensive approach to immigration policy. It is the reconceptualization of trade, investment and foreign policies in terms of their likely effects upon international migration that provides some grounds for optimism that Western Europeans will cope with the formidable challenges certain to be posed by international migration in coming years.

The future of immigration to Western Europe, however, is cloudy at best. Many top Western European immigration policy administrators are deeply pessimistic about the future of immigration. They fear that international developments and policy changes since the mid-1980s have eroded the progress made toward immigration control over the 1975 to 1985 period. The vision of a Europe submerged by uncontrollable waves of international migrants is the extreme expression of such pessimism whereas the vision of a Fortress Europa is its extreme antidote. Paradoxically, the former vision appears to underestimate the capacity of democratic states to regulate international migration whereas the former exaggerates that capacity in a democratic setting.
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