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of Linguistic Demands  
in European National Movements**

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# The Social Interpretation of Linguistic Demands in European National Movements

by Miroslav Hroch

The modern nation-forming process in Europe followed two typologically different paths. This contribution will deal with just one of these, namely that taken by non-dominant ethnic groups, the one which constituted organized and deliberate efforts at achieving the status of a fully developed nation, in all its attributes. This process is illustrated by comparison with the contrasting, more important and better known type of nation-forming process, which was based on the state-nation that had been developing since the Middle Ages<sup>1</sup>.

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1 On the general concept of the nation-forming process, see: M. HROCH, 'From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation. The Nation-building Process in Europe', *New Left Review*, 198, April 1993, p. 3-19.

I prefer to use the term *national movement* to characterize these projects rather than the nebulous and misleading term of "nationalism". The 'missing attributes' of a full national existence consisted of three features: a national literary language and culture, political autonomy (or in some cases, independence), and a social position equal with the ruling nation in terms of social structure and the division of wealth.

Three distinctive groups of goals and demands, corresponding to these three 'deficits', can be identified in the programme of European national movements:

- 1.—The creation of a national community, which would be equal to the ruling one, and which would also include a completed social structure (*i.e.* a structure sufficient for the creation of its "own" ruling classes);
- 2.—The achievement of some kind of self-administration, initially in the form of local or territorial autonomy, and ultimately (but not everywhere) the realization of independence;
- 3.—The improvement—or even the establishment—of a national high culture based on the written national language, and the use of that language within the territory inhabited (or claimed) by the members of the non-dominant ethnic group.

There are of course some transitional cases, where completion of a full national existence was marked by only two missing attributes, and where the national programme was limited to just two groups of demands. To give one example: the Magyar national movement developed under the conditions of a full social structure, corresponding to a given stage of economic development.

Certain other irregularities and differences have to be taken into account, above all the very different timing of the groups of demands made by the various national movements. We also have to distinguish between the relative importance of linguistic, social

or political demands during the different phases of national movements:

- Phase A where a small group of intellectuals devoted themselves to scholarly enquiry into the language, history, traditional culture and so on, of the non-dominant ethnic group;
- Phase B where a new range of activists emerged, who now began to agitate for their compatriots to join the project of creating a fully-fledged nation;
- Phase C where a majority of the population responded to the patriotic call and formed a mass movement; during this Phase C, the full social structure of the nation would usually come into being, and political differentiation begin to emerge.

In examining the strength of the linguistic and political programme produced during the 'B Phase' of different national movements, we can distinguish two types:

- 1) National movements where *political demands dominated Phase B*, accompanied by weaker and / or later developed linguistic and social demands, as was the case in the Polish, Norwegian, Irish, Greek and Scottish national movements;
- 2) National movements *dominated by linguistic and cultural demands* during their Phase B, with political demands following later, during Phase C. This was true of almost all national movements, except those belonging to the first type.

Even if a significant majority of national movements preferred to make linguistic demands in their Phase B, they did not define themselves exclusively in terms of a common language. They did not prioritise the linguistic argument because it was the only goal of which they could conceive, but because they regarded these demands as the most urgent.

This paper does not pretend to explain the nation-forming process in all its complexity, nor to discuss the concept of a nation.

Its aims are instead limited to an interpretation of the demands and programmes elaborated by the protagonists within the national movements, and most attention will be given to linguistic demands, their structure and the role played by them in the nation-forming process.

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When trying to explain and interpret the extraordinarily important role played by language in so many different national movements, it is first of all necessary to remember that language was not something that existed "outside" of time and space. We have to begin with a consideration of the chronological and territorial dimensions to the role played by language during the centuries preceding the emergence of modern national movements in the 19th-century.

Too many current theories of "nationalism" ignore the fact that language difference had been perceived to be a criterion of diversity since the Early Middle Ages<sup>2</sup>. During the 9th and 10th centuries, the linguistic difference between "Franci" and "Germani" or "Teutoni" was more or less self-evident, and we know that conflicts occurred between groups and individuals based on differences in language. It is possible to find the term *amor linguae*, and mention of a *laudatio* for the popular tongue, or reflections on the role of the language, as for example, "*ex linguis gentes, non ex gentibus linguae exortae sunt*"<sup>3</sup>. In this last

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2 The best contributions on this problem have been published in Central Europe, and in Germany in particular; for bibliographical information, see: O. DANN (Hg.), *Nationalismus in vorindustrieller Zeit*, (München, 1986).

3 See: W. SCHLESINGER, 'Entstehung der Nationen' (p. 57 ff.), and K. H. REXROTH, 'Volkssprache und werdendes Volksbewusstsein im Ostfränkische Reich', (p. 296 ff.), in: H. BEUMANN and W. SCHRODER, (continues on next page)



instance, the inspiration of the "Tower of Babel" is clearly evident<sup>4</sup>.

The linguistic argument was used in politics, even though not as a central one, and many examples of this happening can be seen in both the West (France, Flanders, Wales, and England), and the East (Poland, Bohemia, Hungary)<sup>5</sup>. During the Middle Ages, language became important as a component of identity, but the primary criterion was that relating to the state and its political institutions, such as the Diet<sup>6</sup>.

The emergence of the absolutist state constitutes the territorial dimension to the prehistory of our problem. We can observe absolutist policy—in so far as it deals with questions of language—in two different ways: *from above* (from the perspective of the state and its government), and *from below* (from the perspective of the region, the provincial elites or even, of all its inhabitants).

The absolutist principle of homogenization sooner or later involved issues of language. From the perspective of an absolutist state and its ruling elites, it was irrelevant whether or not the linguistic homogenization of a territory, which they regarded as being on the periphery of the state, concerned dialects of languages spoken in other states, dialects of the ruling state-language, or even regions with a tradition of their own literary, printed language.

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*Nationes. Aspekte der Nationenbildung im Mittelalter*, (Siegmarining, 1978).

- 4 A. BORST, *Der Turm von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen* [1.-4.], (Stuttgart, 1957-63).
- 5 E. LEMBERG, *Nationalismus I.*, (Hamburg, 1964);-J. ARMSTRONG, *Nations before Nationalism*, (Chapel Hill, 1982);-A. D. SMITH, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Oxford, 1986).
- 6 ARMSTRONG, *Nations*, p. 279.

Historians cannot pretend to solve the problem of identifying the boundaries separating high languages from dialects, nor those between dialects belonging to different high languages, during the centuries preceding the emergence of linguistic codification. However, it can be provisionally suggested that the use of a "print-language" (B. Anderson) within the territory of an absolutist state seems to be a sufficient criterion for distinguishing the written language from dialects, patois and so on<sup>7</sup>. It is significant that medieval literary languages which did not become state-languages (or which lost that status) disappeared, or became marginalized during the period of absolutist rule (as was the case with Norwegian, Catalan, Czech and Welsh).

The cleavage between rural speech and the norms of the nationally accepted, 'high' written language used by the power elites was interpreted by enlightened aristocrats as being indicative of the degeneracy of the "vulgar" speakers. Dialects were sometimes used for the amusement of the elites, who were "marking their superiority over the lower classes"<sup>8</sup>. This attitude partially changed during the 'Age of Revolution' and was reversed during the 19th-century, when patriots turned dialects into objects for admiration.

Generally, the Revolutions took over the homogenizing attitude of the absolutist state, as is indicated by the campaign against patois during the French Revolution and the stance of the German Left towards Slavic languages during the Revolutions of 1848-49. Nevertheless, two important differences suggest that the times were changing radically:

1) Absolutist attitudes were based on the concept of a homogeneous state, whereas revolutionary politics were based on the concept of the nation as an organic body, usually incarnated in the

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7 B. ANDERSON, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, (London, rev. ed., 1991), p. 45.

8 E. HAUGEN, *The Scandinavian Languages*, (London, 1976), p. 361 ff.

state: this 'personality-nation' should only use one language, because the use of any other language would weaken the state.

2) Revolutionary homogenization did not aim to preserve old mentalities and traditional values, but on the contrary, the use of a unified language was regarded as an instrument for the "*reproduction de l'homme nouveau*" and as a "*réformation des structures mentales*"<sup>9</sup>.

This perspective 'from above' needs to be completed by a consideration of the *perspective from below*, i.e. from the periphery. Homogenizing state policy affected many areas of life on the periphery, and its linguistic aspect was only one of many, and perhaps not the most important. Absolutist, centralist measures provoked opposition and discontent in almost all provinces, but the strength and success of this opposition was not the same everywhere<sup>10</sup>, and the arguments used by provincial representatives against centralism were also quite different. It would in fact be an exciting task for future research to make a comparative analysis of responses by the peripheral nobility and bourgeoisie to the centralist challenge. Given the current state of research in this area, we can only present here a few examples to illustrate the extreme diversity of reactions.

The centralist policy of the Prussian state did not meet with any significant opposition amongst the Sorbian population in Lusatia, or on the part of Polish speakers in Upper Silesia. The linguistic homogenization attempted by Joseph II, however, provoked a strong reaction from the Hungarian and Belgian Estates, and a moderate one from the Bohemian, with all of them partially

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9 P. BOURDIEU, *Ce que parler veut dire. L'économie des échanges linguistiques*, (Paris, 1982), p. 31. The "linguistic terror" accompanied the political one, see: J.-Y. LARTICHAUX, 'Linguistic Politics During the French Revolution', *Diogenes* 97, 1977, p. 65 ff.

10 W. BLOOM, *Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations*, (Cambridge, 1990), p. 143.

expressing their opposition in linguistic terms. Russian centralism did not provoke any opposition amongst the population who spoke Ukrainian dialects, but on the other hand did produce a strong reaction in the Baltic Provinces, amongst local landlords and the German-speaking elites<sup>11</sup>.

When looking at the role of linguistic developments within the first, medieval stage of the nation-forming process, we can often distinguish two opposing trends: one tending towards an assimilation of ethnic groups, the other maintaining, and perhaps strengthening, ethnic diversity. The first, "Western" trend relates above all to France and England, and the second, "Eastern" one to the three Empires—Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman. Why were these Empires unable to assimilate their various populations? There are usually two basic answers to this question: it is argued that firstly, whilst the nation-state was able to assimilate marginal ethnic groups, this was not true of the multi-ethnic Empires, and secondly, that the ruling elites in the Empires did not try hard enough to assimilate and homogenize the population.

Neither answer is incorrect, but they are unable to fully explain the general phenomenon. We also have to look for more profound reasons, which can be found in five groups of factors:

- 1) The *level of economic integration* and economic growth during the Early Modern period was higher in France, England and the Netherlands than in the rest of the continent. It was only economic growth that enabled people from the periphery to achieve a higher level of prosperity, by migration into the core area and assimilation.

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11 Originally, they argued in the name of the regional identity of the Baltic Provinces, but changed this into a German one during the 19th century.

2) Uneven economic development also influenced the level of social communication: in the more advanced countries, communication functioned at a higher level, and the ruling state language was the dominant language of communication, as it constituted the language of 'progress'.

3) The comparatively uneven level of *administration* in the Western, and Eastern absolutist systems.

4) Assimilation was more effective where the ruling elites did not use ethnic difference as a social barrier. There was no effective assimilation in societies where ethnic groups were *strongly marginalized* and isolated as an 'out-group' by the ruling elite (e.g., in the Ottoman Empire, or Baltic states).

5) The *importance of time* cannot be neglected: whereas the process of assimilation in the West had already begun within the feudal system, the Eastern Empires emerged much later, and thus their attempts at assimilating ethnic groups did too. In the Habsburg Empire, this process really only began during the 18th-century, and in Russia during the 19th-century, so the period available for assimilation was much shorter. This was nonetheless also a question of social formation, as well as chronology: assimilation had a better chance of success under feudal society, as it was more difficult to assimilate peasants after their liberation than it had been before.

The linguistic situation under Eastern late absolutism can be characterized as three types of *diglossia without bilingualism* (following the model of Joshua Fishman)<sup>12</sup>:

- 1.—Where elites spoke a high version ("H"), and the general population spoke a local version ("L") of the same language, the relationship can be described as "H - L";

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12 J. FISHMAN, *Language in Sociocultural Change*, (Stanford U.P., 1972), p. 135 ff.

- 2.—Where elites spoke an “H”-language and the population partly spoke an “L”-language, and partly a dialect belonging to another language (“L\*”), the relationship can be given as: “H - L - L\*”;
- 3.—Apart from the “H”-language, another print-language (“H+”) was used within the territory of the state, which was obviously accompanied by a corresponding (“L+”)-language.

Even though the absolutist state neglected these differences, they determined the point of departure for the early stages of national movements and the structure of their programmes.

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The above arguments have tried to suggest and illustrate to what extent national development—the *nation-forming process*—is a *distinctively older phenomenon than the modern nation and nationalism*: any interpretation of modern national identity cannot ignore the peculiarities of pre-modern national development, or degrade it to the level of a mere myth.

The collective phenomena coming under the general heading of linguistic programmes cannot simply be analyzed as a homogeneous and unchanging complex of attitudes. In practice, they consisted of five stages, which emerged gradually and cumulatively, that is to say that the intensifying level of demands did not cancel out previous ones, but usually integrated them into the new programme, even if sometimes in a modified form. Unless we differentiate between these various levels and locate them within the concrete historical context of each national movement, any generalizations about the linguistic programmes will only cause confusion.

I.—In the first stage *the language is celebrated and defended*.

All kinds of arguments were used to support its claim to be accepted into the family of high languages—its aesthetic value, its ability to express all manner of feelings or convey information, its historical merits; but celebrations of this type were in no way specific to non-dominant ethnic groups. A “*défense*” of the French language was published in France in 1549 by the bishop Jean du Bellay<sup>13</sup>.

During the second half of the 18th-century, defences of the German, Magyar, Czech, Slovak and Greek languages appeared. Chronologically later, but still coming during the same Phase A, nostalgic celebrations of the national language were written in Wales, Brittany and Flanders. All of these celebrations had one feature in common: they always concerned languages that had a Medieval or Early Modern tradition of literary activity.

During the emergence of Phase B, language celebrations turned into a fashionable form of agitation in almost all national movements, and from then on, language became a part of the national message. However, these celebrations had a different function from their former one, because they were primarily addressed towards their own ranks. Members of the non-dominant ethnic group were encouraged to love and defend their language—as one Czech *dictum*, published in 1824 in a translation from the German, put it: “Who does not love his language, is an enemy of his own fatherland”.

Related to this shift in the audience for national agitation, it is necessary to include a general proviso. National demands were generally targeted in two opposite directions: (i) “*upwards*”, towards the state administration, local authorities, educated

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13 A. DUPRONT, ‘Sémantique historique et analyse de contenu : culture et civilisation’, in: M. CRANSTON and P. MAIR (eds.), *Langage et politique*, (Bruxelles, 1982), p. 86 ff.

ruling elites, etc.; (ii) "downwards", towards their own peer group, trying to mobilize the members of the non-dominant ethnic group for participation in patriotic activities.

This dual perspective—from below and from above—was variable, and we have to take that into account when analyzing the structure of all the different types of national aims.

II.—The second stage: *language planning and codification*.

This was an intrinsic part of cultural standardization<sup>14</sup>. Before codification was achieved, the language existed both as a group of dialects and also as a "print-language", which already began to influence linguistic norms in the decades before the literary language was codified. These norms were based on the experience of the production of a print-language, and on the terms used in administration, trade relations, and public life. "Language planning" included a simultaneous process of linguistic organization, popularization and standardization<sup>15</sup>—it would have been paradoxical to celebrate a vague complex of spoken dialects, without having a unified orthography or distinct language borders. But language planning was not just limited to cultural standardization: it also fulfilled an important social function and purpose. It was the only way of clearly distinguishing one's own national group, *i.e.* of drawing a clear and comprehensible border between the in-group and out-group, particularly where there was a fluid transition between related dialects<sup>16</sup>.

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14 E. GELLNER, *Culture, Identity and Politics*, (Cambridge U.P., 1987), p. 24;—P. BOURDIEU, *Ce que parler veut dire*, p. 29.

15 J. A. FISHMAN, *Language and Nationalism. Two Integrative Essays*, (Rowley / Mass., 1972), p. 61.

16 B. B. KHLEIF, 'Insiders, Outsiders and Renegades: Towards a Classification of Ethnolinguistic Labels', in: H. GILES and B. SAINT-JACQUES (eds.), *Language and Ethnic Relations*, (Pergamon, 1979), p. 159 ff.;—F. BARTH, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, (Bergen, 1969), p. 8 ff.



Learned linguistic disputes had emerged almost everywhere during Phase A, accompanied by the publication of grammar books and dictionaries, but the research of individual scholars was something altogether different from the evolution of a generally accepted codification. Voluntaristic decisions about codification and attempts to “create” a new literary language were usually unsuccessful. Codification was generally related to the previous development of linguistic norms and occurred as a result of long-term, and often very heated, scientific discussions. The central—but by no means the only—topic of discussion and controversy tended to be whether the modern language was to be based on its older, printed (literary) form or on the current spoken language<sup>17</sup>.

The timing of language standardization varied greatly and reflected the asynchronical character of national development in different parts of Europe. The Czech and Magyar languages were codified during the first decades of the 19th-century, whilst the codification of Slovak, Serbo-Croatian and Slovene came around the middle of the century. During the second half of the century, Finnish, Estonian and Latvian were codified, followed after 1900 by the Lithuanian and Ukrainian languages<sup>18</sup>.

This second stage in the linguistic programme was primarily directed towards the ethnic group itself, defined as an in-group, and offered a unified way of writing and speaking.

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- 17 R. AUTY, 'The Linguistic Revival Among the Slavs of the Austrian Empire 1780-1850: the Role of Individuals in the Codification and Acceptance of New Literary Languages', *Modern Language Review*, LIII, 1958, p. 392 ff.
- 18 A. SCAGLIONE (ed.), *The Emergence of National Languages*, (Ravenna, 1984).

III.—The third stage: *the intellectualization of the national language.*

This was closely connected to the earliest attempts at codification, and usually, worked against it—learned discussions on linguistic matters were unable to prevent the patriots concerned from improving their literary creativity, even though they were using different linguistic norms. As in the second stage, progress was rather asynchronical.

The development of literary creativity, as expressed in the evolution of different genres, occurred quite independently of this asynchronical course, and its pattern can be summarized as follows: *a)* the earliest form of intellectualization was represented by journals and educational literature; *b)* poetry, and translations from foreign literatures—above all from that of the ruling nation; *c)* the collection and imitation of folk-songs; *d)* the writing of theatre pieces; *e)* the writing of short stories or tales, which was the archetypal prose genre of Phase B, with novels being written more commonly during Phase C; *f)* the language of scientific literature tended to be the last to be improved, 'invented' or included in the national culture.

Some of the later national movements doubted if it was necessary to advance from the first sequence on to the higher ones, suggesting that the remainder could be filled in by translations. In one extreme example, a few national leaders in Russian Ukraine recommended—as late as 1905—using the newly codified literary language exclusively for the writing of educational literature, journals and light novels for popular consumption<sup>19</sup>.

In comparing national and regional identities, it could be asked at this point to what extent the model of genres outlined above

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19 G. SHEVELOV, *The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (1900-1941): its State and Status*, (Harvard U.P., 1989), p. 98 ff.

could also be used in the case of the development of regional cultures within the territory of larger national cultures.

IV.—The fourth stage: *introducing the language into the schools.*

The codified literary language could only fulfil its social mission once it had been mastered by the members of the non-dominant ethnic group—it had also to be “consumed” by them, even if under conditions unlike those of a “free market”. Patriots developed several modes of transmitting the language, which differed according to local traditions and the level of social organization achieved during Phase B. These included popular song-festivals (as in Estonia, Wales or Latvia), different forms of dancing (as in the Czech, Magyar and Catalan cases), reading circles (almost everywhere), cafés and so on. Nevertheless, the most powerful instrument for language dissemination was undoubtedly the schools.

The central demand put forward at this stage was for the “nationalization” of schools<sup>20</sup>, which was directed both “upwards” towards the ruling state administration, and “downwards” towards members of the same ethnic group:

- a) state-authorities were to permit and support schools where children would be instructed in their mother tongue, or—at the very least, and as a provisional compromise—where they could learn it;
- b) where such schools existed, parents were asked to send their children for instruction in their mother tongue, rather than to schools where the ruling state-language was the means of instruction.

In this way, the struggle for national schools became an effective component within national mobilization during Phase B, though

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20 E. BALIBAR and I. WALLERSTEIN, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, (London / New York, 1991), p. 98 ff.

its effects went much deeper. Introducing the new language of instruction into school education was the only way of strengthening the ties which bound together the members of the nation-to-be. The importance of these schools thus exceeded that of supplying the needs of communication: through linguistic education, the school created a "*communauté de conscience*". The children not only learned the emerging literary language there, but also an ability to describe, observe and perceive reality in the same, or nearly the same, way<sup>21</sup>. From this point of view, an ambiguous situation was created in the school systems of the multi-ethnic states possessing one ruling nation, such as Germany or Russia. Both the ruling elites and the patriotic movements tried to use linguistic education in formulating their understanding of the world, society and national identity.

The results achieved during this stage of national demands depended on the attitude of the state administration to a greater extent than at previous stages. Some states, such as the Habsburg Empire or Sweden, permitted the use of local languages as the language of instruction in elementary schools even during the period before the emergence of Phase B. By contrast, other national movements were helpless against the all—powerful unilingual state education policy—this was true for Ukrainians and Lithuanians in Russia, or Slovaks in Hungary after 1870.

The fourth stage produced an important change in the character of the linguistic programme: *it entered the field of politics*. The struggle for "national" schools continued into Phase C as well, and in so far as this occurred under constitutional conditions, it became a part of political disputes, and was discussed by political representatives at all levels.

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21 G. DAVY, *Éléments de sociologie*, (Paris, 1950), p. 233;—P. BOURDIEU, *Ce que parler veut dire*, p. 32.

V.—The fifth stage: *the realisation of the full equality of languages.*

The most advanced stage in the linguistic programme was achieved when national leaders asked for the introduction of their language into the administration, courts of justice, the postal system, the railways, trade and politics. If this stage was reached at all, it was achieved during Phase C, but the complexity and radicalism of demands, as well as their results, differed chronologically and spatially even more than in all the previous stages. The most successful example was the Magyar national movement in the Compromise of 1867, whilst the Czechs advanced to some degree of linguistic equality in the Czech-speaking territories of Bohemia and Moravia, and similar results were achieved by the Croatians. In Russia, only the Finns were to achieve a degree of success, before the last wave of Russification at the end of the 19th-century. The Flemish in Belgium also achieved a measure of equality, but the majority of national movements remained unsuccessful during the fifth stage of linguistic demands.

In cases where the fifth stage was successful, two levels of demands can be observed, corresponding to two ways of interpreting linguistic equality. The first concerned the equal use of both the ruling state-language and the minority language within the ethnic territory of the emerging small nation. The second step formulated the demand that only the language of the local inhabitants should be permitted within the ethnic territory, limiting the use of the state-language to contacts between the provincial and central administration. Escalation of conflicts of this kind only occurred in a few cases: the Czechs, Croatians, Finns and even the Flemish, created a model which was later accepted by almost all national movements<sup>22</sup>.

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22 The Magyar claims for a unilingual Hungary after 1867 illustrate the ambiguities in the escalation of linguistic demands.

The same question could also be posed the other way round: why did the ruling elites even try to defend the primacy of their language on the territory of the non-dominant ethnic group, where this language was neither used nor known? The crucial point was that the call for the equality of languages in administration and political life endangered the monopolistic position of the state elites in this area<sup>23</sup>.

Naturally, linguistic demands entered the field of politics during the fifth stage and were included in the political programmes of national movements, and furthermore, were also included within their *social programmes*. Sooner or later, the call for full linguistic equality turned into a struggle for positions in the administration. The newly-created Czech, Croatian and Finnish elites observed with growing indignation the continuing occupation of well-paid positions by elites belonging to the ruling state-nation. In these circumstances, the call for linguistic equality expressed much more than just national prestige or a symbolic value: it contributed to the emergence of a nationally significant conflict of interests. These kinds of conflicts were an intrinsic part of the nation-forming process, and have been analyzed in another context<sup>24</sup>.

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- 23 One of the founders of the Czech political programme asked in 1848:  
"What good will freedom of speech and the press bring us, if our language is henceforth to be excluded from administration and public life? This will once again put the ruling power into the hands of a small group of privileged individuals."
- 24 See: M. HROCH, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, (Cambridge, 1985), Conclusion.

The second part of this paper deals with the social interpretation of linguistic programmes. We may well regard all these linguistic quarrels as infantile, or be ironic about the "artificiality" of new languages, but we cannot ignore the political and social importance of this phenomenon, which requires an historical explanation. Any such explanation should keep in mind the long-term historical dimension to the nation-forming process in Europe: was the correlation between the primacy of the linguistic programme and the development of the social structure of purely marginal significance?

As far back as the Middle Ages, language was accepted as an instrument of group solidarity, though not everywhere and only by a rather limited part of feudal society: either those who, *a*) were in power and could use language as an argument for their aims and goals, directed both at their neighbours and their own population; or *b*) occupied a particular place in the system of communication—priests and later, in certain circumstances, merchants and even craftsmen.

For the most part, the mass of the rural population accepted as part of their fate the linguistic rules of the game that came from above. Spontaneous changes in the spoken language were conditioned by the need for survival, communication, or state interests, but this changed with the process of absolutist homogenization mentioned above. Opposition to homogenization only rarely used linguistic arguments, mainly in the Habsburg Empire. This opposition had one feature in common: a social background formed by the nobility and part of the clergy, who were defending the remnants of medieval privileges. They originally used linguistic arguments as a cover for their more important particularist political and social interests. Only in Hungary—where this kind of aristocratic opposition immediately stimulated the emergence of Phase B—did the switch from the linguistic to a political programme occur. In all other states apart from the Habsburg

monarchy, the non-dominant ethnic groups accepted linguistic centralism with remarkably little resistance, *e.g.* Catalans under Bourbon absolutism, Norwegians under Danish rule, Ukrainians under both Russian and Habsburg rule, and so on. The social explanation for this seems to be quite clear: all these ethnic groups lacked a cohesive elite that was interested in political opposition to absolutist homogenization.

As a result of this development, most of the European national movements started their Phase B later, in the situation of a (just recently introduced) linguistic homogeneity within the administration of a state ruled by established elites, speaking and reading the state-language.

It is not the aim of this paper to explain why Phase B started, as this is a change which should be analyzed in all the complexity of its cultural, economic and socio-psychological context. Here, we can only outline some of its more important aspects. The emergence of national agitation was connected to important processes of modernization, which produced feelings of social, intellectual, and sometimes even political and moral, crisis. These changes stimulated a *need for some kind of new group solidarity and identity*, and produced dissatisfaction among educated members of the non-dominant ethnic group, who were motivated in part by the impression that the linguistic homogenization introduced by the absolutist state brought no benefits to the group to which they belonged<sup>25</sup>. On the contrary: they did not participate in any upward social mobility from the periphery to the centre, and they noticed that the increasing contacts with the linguistically different administration were becoming ever more difficult. Under these circumstances, they accepted the idea of defining their nation-to-be primarily in terms of its language.

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25 W. BLOOM, *Personal Identity*, p. 143.



We can see that—in certain circumstances—their linguistic demands were usually successful. Even if it occurred before a full consensus on codification had been achieved, once a literary language had become established, *language—as an expression of national identity—could not be substituted* by anything else (there is no empirical evidence of any such case). This became even less possible at a later stage, after the transition to Phase C, as language had by then become a spiritual possession belonging to the masses.

In analyzing this occurrence, we first have to compare the other options available to the patriotic movement, which might have constituted *an alternative to the national language*. Was it possible to form a new identity in another way, without creating a new national language? In a very few cases, there was an alternative: the Flemish could choose a Dutch identity, Slovaks a Czech one, whilst the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs were encouraged to accept Illyrism—all without success. In all cases an alternative existed, that of accepting linguistic assimilation, without relinquishing the new national identity, though there appear to be only two examples of this choice actually being made—the Irish and the Scottish cases<sup>26</sup>. However, these are such singular instances, that we can regard them as exceptions, rather than as a model for other national developments. The Swiss case is also exceptional, and is often recommended as an ideal solution to national problems, but none of these exceptions can really be accepted as cogent alternative models.

We have to acknowledge the fact that in some circumstances, *there was no alternative to the linguistic national programme*. The most important factor is illustrated by the remarkable

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26 The Irish case proves that there was no need for a new "H"-language, when the attempt to create it starts in the situation of a successful Phase C, and in a society where only a small minority were "L"-speakers.

correlation between national movements prioritising linguistic demands during Phase B and the existence of an incomplete social structure within the non-dominant ethnic group, and this is something that needs interpretation.

After the literary language had become established, its acceptance or non-acceptance by the members of the nation-to-be became a matter of specific "market-relations". Here, it is necessary to ask who the audience for this message was, *i.e.* which social groups and classes were meant to become the "consumers" of the new literary language, as a particular form of commodity?<sup>27</sup>

Contemporary sociolinguists argue that changes in the usage of language (and the acceptance of a new literary language was a change of this type) can be interpreted as "the speaker's response to large-scale social processes"<sup>28</sup>. They also stress the need to take account of social conditions in research on shifts in language. Even if we follow this methodological approach, we still have to solve the central problem of how to explain the above-mentioned correlation between incomplete social structures and linguistic programmes during Phase B.

The problem cannot be solved simply by quoting J. G. Herder. Naturally, his arguments are often cited, but he was not some kind of "Eastern thinker"<sup>29</sup> existing in isolation from the West. Nor should the importance of J.-J. Rousseau or German philosophers, such as Fichte or Schelling, be forgotten<sup>30</sup>. As an objection to these arguments, it can be asked why it was that the

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27 P. BOURDIEU, *Ce que parler veut dire*, Chap. 1.

28 M. MARTIN-JONES, 'Language, Power and Linguistic Minorities: the Need for an Alternative Approach to Bilingualism, Language Maintenance and Shift', in: R. GROLO (ed.), *Social Anthropology and Politics of Language*, (London / New York, 1989), p. 118.

29 There are parallel thinkers in the West as well, *e.g.* H. Wergeland in Norway during the 1830s, or T. Davies in Ireland during the 1840s; -J. FISHMAN, *Language and Nationalism*, p. 48.

30 A. COHLER, *Rousseau and Nationalism*, (New York / London, 1970).

middle classes should have been more attracted to their (usually rather complicated) formulations, than were the ruling elites of national movements possessing a full social structure<sup>31</sup>.

Another standard explanation emphasizes *the influence of romanticism*. This can be partially accepted, in so far as it relates to the protagonists of those national movements in which Phase B started earlier, during the first half of the 19th-century. This relationship cannot, however, be interpreted simply as being the one-sided impact of romanticism; it was instead a coexistence based on common roots. Both romanticism and the search for a new national identity tried to respond to the great crisis of legitimacy and social change, which had been provoked by the dissolution of the old feudal society, with its stable and transparent ties<sup>32</sup>. The upholder of these new values—the nation—had to be defined by stable and unchangeable features: language came to be of unique importance, as a stable and easy way of defining such ties.

A new concept of *the nation as a personalized body* emerged, based on this very coexistence and interconnection, and this metaphor was soon transformed into a basic conception, whereby the ethnic group was internally defined as “us”. When seen as a personality, the nation could therefore naturally only use one literary language, just as it could only incorporate one common past into its “memory”. The life of this personality-nation and its dissimilarity and differentiation from other nations, logically depended on the successful spread of the national language; if that failed, the personality-nation would “die”. Being in fear of their nations’ death provoked in the leaders of national movements

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31 The explanatory capacity of K.W. Deutsch’s model is also fairly limited: certainly, the growing importance of language is conditioned by more intense communication, but why were the lower and middle classes more strongly attracted to linguistic demands than the better educated elites?

32 E. J. HOBSBAWM, *The Age of Revolutions*, (London, 1973), p. 312 ff.

during Phase B feelings analogous to those of fear for the loss of a loved person, or even of their own death. In this line of reasoning, every enemy of the new national language logically became a potential "killer" of the nation, and incidentally, this sense of being in danger not only characterized national movements during Phase B, but formed one of their key stereotypes, sometimes right up to the present day.

The success of Phase B cannot be explained just by reference to the enthusiasm of the patriotic leaders, their mentalities and so on. It is necessary to take into account the ordinary members of the non-dominant ethnic group—the audience, whose decisions and behaviour played the crucial role in the nation-forming process. At this point, we do not need to ask why the patriotic leaders made linguistic demands, but why the "masses" accepted it.

Our point of departure is *the growing need for communication*, resulting from economic growth and the advance of innovations in the field of administration. With improving communication, a growing number of individuals became literate and receptive to the standardized presentation of information, and the volume and quality of language use was raised to a new level, in a similar way to what happened in school education.

However, it would be misleading to understand educational changes solely as an increase in literacy in its narrowest sense (knowledge of reading and writing). Oral education in the schools also attracted an increasing number of children aged ten years and over, the age when children can start to learn to think abstractly, not just in linguistic terms, but also in terms of an *ability to understand* phenomena such as the nation. Language could only take on the new qualities corresponding to the needs of communication through this new category of "operational

individuals" (G. Stokes)<sup>33</sup>. At the same time, it was only these operational personalities who were able to imagine large social groups or communities, such as the nation<sup>34</sup>, and understand that this group (as a personalized body) has similar needs, relationships and a common consciousness with other members of the community<sup>35</sup>.

For the growing number of individuals who achieved this degree of education, literacy became their "real entrance-card to full citizenship and human dignity"<sup>36</sup>. Nevertheless, this "entrance-card" was accessible only to those whose mother-tongue corresponded to the state-language, the one which also played the dominant role in the education of operational individuals. Expressed in the sociolinguistic terms used above, rapid social change and the growing communication between "H"- and "L"-speakers made the diglossia dysfunctional. State institutions tended to make individuals monolingual in a language other than their mother-tongue, with the result that school children who spoke an "L\*" -language at home increasingly became bilingual. For the first time, this new challenge produced an ambivalent response, which on the one hand accentuated the advantages of the newly-mastered state-language, and on the other, attempted to replace the "foreign" state-language with an "elaborated version" of their "own pre-industrial tongue"<sup>37</sup>.

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33 G. STOKES, 'Cognition and the Function of Nationalism', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, IV, 1974, p. 533 ff.

34 From this perspective, we can understand more easily the term "imagined communities", as used by B. Anderson.

35 H. WEILENMAN, 'The Interlocking of Nation and Personality Structure', in: K. W. DEUTSCH and W. J. FOLTZ (eds.), *Nation-Building* (New York, 1966), p. 37 ff.

36 E. GELLNER, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Oxford, 1983).

37 J. FISHMAN, *Language in Sociocultural Change*, p. 148;—The first trend was directed towards the monoethnic state, the second at two nations defined by different languages.

The actual historical conditions were nevertheless not as harmonious as envisaged by Fishman's model. The "H"- and "L\*" -languages were "not only separate but also unequal", and so the degree of freedom of choice for "L\*" -speakers should not be over-emphasized<sup>38</sup>. It was unusual for all members of a non-dominant ethnic group to become bilingual. On the contrary, the majority did not, and had to communicate with authorities and individuals whose "H"-language was only partially understandable to them. Coming from an inferior social *stratum* and at the same time using an inferior "L\*" -tongue, they ended up in the position of 'inferior human beings', with all the feelings of humiliation accompanying that situation. In such circumstances, language naturally played a specific role in their understanding of the world.

Again, we can imagine two responses to this situation: either they would feel ashamed of their inferior "L\*" -tongue and try to adopt the superior "H"-language and assimilate, or they would feel a growing animosity towards the ruling "H"-speakers and be *receptive to the call for a new literary language*, corresponding or being fully understandable to their mother tongue.

However convincing this model may appear, there are two objections to it, which need answering:

1) The situation of linguistic inferiority described above had existed since the Middle Ages, without having caused any noticeable national mobilization amongst the mass of "L\*" -speakers. So of what precisely did the difference consist? It had been part and parcel of the feudal system that individuals were unequal since from the moment of their birth; just as they were born serfs, so they were born as "L\*" -speakers, and this was accepted as a given reality. The process of modernization contributed to the spread of a new concept of human dignity and

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38 M. MARTIN-JONES, *Language*, p. 109 ff.

equality, and at the same time, a growing number of the members of the non-dominant ethnic group achieved an elementary level of education and / or became independent participants in a system of market relations. For these people, the medieval structure of unequal social relations was no longer self-evident.

2) Why would this unequal social situation come to include the need for the formation of a new ethno-linguistic, national identity? Why did assimilation fail as a solution? The alternative to assimilation was far from being dependent on individual decisions; *access into the ranks of the ruling nation was not automatic everywhere*. As long as the number of individuals with a higher education increased, and exceeded the (limited) amount of "acceptable" individuals moving from the lower linguistic strata to the centre, they could not be absorbed into the state elite, even if they adopted the ruling state-language and changed their identity: they remained an out-group (the Irish are a good example of this). The national agitation of Phase B offered to the educated individuals among them the opportunity to create a new in-group based on a common language, all of whose members could be equal and hope for better opportunities for social advancement without having to assimilate<sup>39</sup>. This prospect was at least more appealing than that of remaining an assimilated periphery. Even if we take into consideration the fact that in many European states differences between centre and periphery strengthened regional identities, this was not usually the case where the differences between the periphery and state-elites were not only regional and social, but also linguistic.

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39 G. STOKES, *Cognition*, p. 536.

Using these observations on the effects of modernization, we can return to the question of *the correlation between an incomplete social structure and the charisma of language*. The explanation can be summarized into three points:

1) As modernization proceeded, vertical social mobility increased, but did not create equal opportunities for all individuals. This was the case where the remnants of feudal conditions and mentalities impeded social advancement, even for those members of the non-dominant ethnic group who became bilingual: *the more difficulties they had in moving from the lower to the higher classes, the more significant the association between the language they spoke and the social position they occupied*<sup>40</sup>.

This relationship seemed to be less important where: a) the non-dominant ethnic group had a 'full' social structure, *i.e.* it possessed its own elites, and b) Phase B started under the conditions of developed capitalist society. In both these situations, difficulties in social advancement could scarcely be explained other than by social conditions.

2) Let us suppose that we are observing an advanced social situation which made vertical social mobility possible for everyone who managed to learn the state language. Becoming bilingual was nevertheless not just a matter of financing school education: it was also related to *the individual's linguistic aptitude*, which does not necessarily correspond to their intelligence quotient. In addition, it was connected to the intellectual level at which the mother-tongue was heard at home, as this was a precondition for any later ability to express abstract concepts. Even if their linguistic aptitude were the same, however, the results of linguistic instruction could differ according to

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40 G. WILLIAMS, 'Language Group Allegiance and Ethnic Interaction', in: H. GILES and B. SAINT-JACQUES (eds.), *Language and Ethnic Relations*, p. 58.



the social environment from which children came<sup>41</sup>. Many historical examples testify to this situation, as was observed by contemporaries during Phase B<sup>42</sup>.

3) An incomplete social structure also had its impact on political culture. The national agitators of Phase B came predominantly from the lower strata of the population and addressed their appeals to the same strata. Whether this primarily related to small artisans and craftsmen, as in Bohemia, or farmers, as in Lithuania and Estonia, it always *involved social groups and classes, who at the time Phase B emerged, possessed neither political experience nor political education*; in fact, it was these very concerns that motivated patriotic leaders. The members of the non-dominant ethnic group needed to define group characteristics, which could be recognized in the easiest possible way<sup>43</sup>. They were hardly likely to become inspired by (or identified with) a programme of civil rights and political liberty. "Freedom" for a peasant meant freedom from feudal oppression, while freedom of speech, association and so on, remained an uninteresting idea<sup>44</sup>. Linguistic group-characteristics were basically closer and more understandable to the lower classes.

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41 See, among others: G. H. MEAD, *Mind, Self and Society*, (Chicago, 1934), p. 135 ff.; E. HAUGEN, 'Bilinguals Have More Fun', *Journal of English Linguistics*, 19, 1986, p. 106 ff.; J. HERMANN, 'Bilingualism Versus Identity', *Multilingual Matters*, 43, 1988, p. 227 ff.

42 In a memorandum of 1832, leading Czech patriots argued that Czech-speaking young men only attained a mechanical knowledge of subjects taught in schools where German was the (obligatory) language of instruction, and that their German was insufficient for better jobs or university studies. On the other hand they were unable to use their mother-tongue either, because they had not learnt its written form.

43 H. WEILENMAN, *The Interlocking of Nation*, p. 37.

44 Analyzing the semantics of the French *Cahiers de doléances*, A. DUPRONT demonstrates that the only form of "culture" familiar to peasants, was the "culture des champs" - agriculture [*Sémantique historique*], p. 87.

Recognizing these characteristics, the structure of the national programme implicitly accorded language the highest value, and passed this on to subsequent generations, even though they later earned a better political education, under changed conditions.

We have seen how linguistic demands became integrated into the political programme. Even during Phase C, this made them for several decades the most effective means of articulating different group conflicts within the advancing modern society, though this did not necessarily mean that in these conflicts, the language of the non-dominant ethnic group represented a "progressive" trend. Quite the reverse: it was sometimes used during Phase B as an anti-modern argument, expressing the fears of an old middle class (or part of it) that felt threatened by modern industrial development.

After analyzing the reasons for the priority of linguistic demands during Phase B, we have to ask why they retained *such an important position in the national programme during Phase C as well*, when the social structure of the national group was completed, and political experience became a part of everyday life. The answer to this question concerns the most striking social, political and socio-psychological peculiarities of national movements.

*Unequal opportunities for social advancement did not disappear with the transition to Phase C.* Even if the social structure of the new nation was sooner or later completed during this phase, the inferiority of the lower-middle classes did not disappear. During the preceding Phase B, these classes only became partially and gradually aware of the fact that their inferior social position was connected to differences in language, but this link was more fully experienced with national mass-mobilization. In other words, the inferiority of the non-dominant ethnic group, which had been identified by the patriotic leaders in Phase B as a disadvantage that was to be expected, changed during Phase C into a disadvantage that was actually experienced, and thus influenced

the spread of linguistic demands, which were understood as a substitution for, or supplementation of, social ones.

As mentioned above, the linguistic programme entered the arena of politics during its fourth and fifth stages: it could be used as an argument in political disputes with the ruling state-elites, and also as an argument in the internal political disputes among the national leaders themselves. *Anyone who intended to become a successful politician, had to support linguistic demands: to propose compromises or concessions with the ruling state-nation in linguistic matters was tantamount to political suicide.* Under the conditions of political differentiation existing during Phase C, both liberals and clericals, and even agrarians and most socialists, included linguistic demands in their political programme. Nevertheless, this did not mean that linguistic demands determined the structure and dimension of all political goals.

We often find one new political aim that was closely linked to linguistic demands: a modified understanding of *the equal rights of languages*, which emerged during Phase C. National leaders defined the ethnic territory of their nation as a territory where their own language was to be the dominant one, a demand which seems in part to be a response by the lower middle classes to their experience of social disadvantage<sup>45</sup>. This demand obviously caused a sudden escalation of the political struggle, and it is precisely at this moment that it becomes appropriate to use the term 'nationalism', and that it takes on a real interpretative value.

The socio-psychological factors were more complex and heterogeneous, the most prominent among them being the *feeling that the existence of the emerging nation was endangered* by the loss of its language. This was a sentiment that had survived from

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45 E. J. HOBBSAWM, *Nations and Nationalism since 1789*, (Cambridge, 1990), p. 116 ff.

Phase B, where it had been well-founded, and had then been carried on into the mass movement, where it became a fiction or myth. Both intellectuals and politicians continued to believe that their language would become extinct, unless they paid careful heed to linguistic demands.

This myth could only seem convincing to the broader public if it were combined with other psychological features. The most important of these seems to have been the fact that "contrastive self-identification" (J. Fishman), which for centuries had been a typical pattern of behaviour limited to the ruling classes, came to be something generally accepted by a growing number of the members of the emerging nation during the transition to Phase C<sup>46</sup>. Complementary to this development was the tendency of operational individuals to feel comfortable and satisfied in a community, if it was based on a common interest in language<sup>47</sup>, though this could obviously only be the codified, standardized one, as using a correct high language formed part of the self-image of educated participants in Phase C<sup>48</sup>. The emerging elite of the nation acquired prestige from the correct use of their literary language, and by exerting pressure on the co-members of the national movement to use this literary language, they were able to *encourage a 'disciplinisation' of the nation*.

However, even when standardized, intellectualized and used by a part of the elites, the new language still had a lower status than the ruling state-language—Russian, German or later, Magyar. Given that the status of the national group was also determined by the prestige of its language, the protection and upgrading of this language likewise became *a matter of prestige*<sup>49</sup>. This issue also involved the struggle to introduce the equality of languages

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46 J. A. FISHMAN, *Language and Nationalism*, p. 54.

47 G. STOKES, *Cognition*, p. 537.

48 P. BOURDIEU, *Ce que parler veut dire*, p. 64 ff.

49 G. WILLIAMS, *Language*, p. 62 ff.

into administration and public life, and in this situation, language therefore became “highly ideologized”<sup>50</sup>, which helps explain why the whole of the nationally mobilized population—and not just the emerging elites—accepted and supported the symbolic value of their language, as a pillar of the newly-formed ethno-national community<sup>51</sup>. This was still the decisive criterion for belonging to the group, and for distinguishing between “Us” and “Them”. Simultaneously, language retained the highly emotional potential that it had possessed since Phase B: it could serve not only as an instrument of social communication, but also as an “outlet for intense feelings”<sup>52</sup>. It would, however, be an exaggeration to suppose that the symbolic significance of language generally prevailed over its actual use<sup>53</sup>.

Lastly but by no means least, language became a *criterion of the equality of all citizens* under the conditions of a modern, constitutional civil society and capitalism. It was inherent in the principles of this modern society that each citizen should learn the standardized language and use its spoken version, thus suppressing the dialect form, at least in the public sphere<sup>54</sup>. Since the language of the newly-formed nation was standardized, intellectualized and even accepted by the state authorities, learning and using it was also understood as a specific form of expressing civil rights.

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50 J. A. FISHMAN, *Language and Nationalism*, p. 61.

51 J. A. ROSS, ‘Language and the Mobilization of Ethnic Identity’, in: H. GILES and B. SAINT-JACQUES (eds.), *Language*, p. 10.

52 O. JESPERSEN, *Mankind, Nation and Individual from a Linguistic Point of View* (Oslo, 1925), p. 5; J. A. ARMSTRONG, *Nations*, p. 242.

53 E. J. HOBSBAWM, *Nations*, p. 116 ff.

54 E. GELLNER, *Culture*, p. 17.

The aim of this paper has not been to present a general "theory" of the nation-forming process as a whole. It has instead concentrated on one particular and important problem: why was the significance of linguistic demands so "disproportionately" high in most European national movements? Our explanation has suggested that linguistic demands and their success cannot simply be interpreted as a result of the voluntaristic activities of a small group of ambitious intellectuals. Even if these individual factors cannot be ignored, the extraordinary appeal of the linguistic programme was founded in deep-rooted transformations in society and mentalities.

Comparative research on the empirical data has shown that the primacy of linguistic demands was not a general feature of all national movements, even if it was characteristic of the majority. *The primacy of linguistic demands in Phase B correlated with the social structure of the non-dominant ethnic group at the given stage of social and economic development.* This correlation can be summarized in two sentences:

- 1.—Where the social structure was obviously incomplete, the programme of the national movement was dominated by linguistic and cultural demands, while the political programme was formulated later, during Phase C.
- 2.—Where the social structure of non-dominant ethnic groups included members of the ruling classes when on the threshold of its Phase B, the national movement's programme consisted of predominantly political goals, accompanied by social and linguistic ones.

In other words: *the importance of linguistic demands was inversely proportional to the participation of ruling classes in the B Phase of national movements.*

This was not an accidental correlation, but a causal one. Under given social circumstances, the nascent national movement had no alternative other than to emphasize linguistic demands during its Phase B. For important social and psychological reasons, the language fulfilled a non-linguistic, supra-communicative function

in the national movement, and later also influenced the political programme that emerged during Phase C.

The choice of a linguistic programme and linguistically defined nation was the response of a more or less peripheral population—the non-dominant ethnic group—to the challenge of modernization. In the general crisis of legitimacy and the feudal system, educated members of this group began to sense their inferiority because of their linguistic difference. Their success—the acceptance of their message by the general population—was primarily conditioned by factors other than just linguistic and cultural ones: above all, the structure of social communication and vertical mobility, and *the intensity of nationally significant conflicts of interest*. In this “linguistic” type of national movement, language played a substitutional role in expressing nationally significant conflicts of interest.

This paper steers clear of the temptation of defining the nation by language, or of constructing a monocausal linguistic explanation for the success of national movements. Independent of agreement or disagreement with the explanation presented here, it cannot be disputed that language played an important role as a factor in the foundation of national consciousness and national traditions, nor that it ranked very high in the system of values of the majority of national movements. It became a symbolic expression of strategies of exclusion. In comparing the emergence of national and regional identities, it can be seen that the role played by language related more specifically to the *national* identity, and can be regarded as one of the features which distinguished between these two types of identity.







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