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Language, Collective Identities and Nationalism in Catalonia, and Spain in General

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Table of Contents

A. Historical foreword

B. A linguistic panorama of Spain

C. Language and collective identities in Catalonia

D. Conflicting identities and political patterns

E. Language and nationalist ideologies
   (The politics of language and identity in Catalonia)

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A. Historical foreword

The Iberian Peninsula is home to two of Europe’s longest-standing modern states. They came into being at the end of the 15th century as the ‘Reconquest’ ¹ of Iberian territories by the Christian monarchies reached its conclusion, putting an end to an Arab-Muslim presence in the Peninsula that had stretched over nearly

¹ This term is an obvious euphemism, loaded with ethnocentric overtones, which simplifies historical occurrences which unfolded over seven or eight centuries! The concept ‘Reconquest’ does little justice to the complexity of historical facts. However, it is difficult to find an alternative term which concisely synthesizes the long-term developments which—it must be said—do reveal a certain pattern and continuity.
eight centuries. These two emerging polities were definitively consolidated in the 16th century, a period during which both of them experienced a rapid transoceanic expansion and established far-reaching colonial trade routes and empires under the auspices of the Lusitanian and Castilian monarchies.

Portugal is a paradigmatic example of a nation state, due both to its internal ethno-cultural homogeneity and the centuries-old stability of its borders, following its establishment as an independent political entity. The compact nature of the Portuguese polity is clearly expressed at the linguistic level. With the exception of certain minor dialectical variations, for centuries the only language spoken throughout this territory has been Portuguese. The language and the polity itself both have medieval origins. The Galician-Portuguese entity split in two at a time when the Christian frontier was being pushed southwards. The Portuguese polity achieved independence from its Asturian and Leonese neighbours about half way through the 12th century, before its southward territorial expansion was completed. In contrast, parts of what is now Galicia—as well as the Kingdom of León—turned their gaze eastwards and eventually aligned themselves with the Kingdom of Castile, by means of specific treaties and dynastic unions.

The trajectory of the Spanish polity is less straightforward than that of Portugal, being the result of a more convoluted historical process. The Kingdom of Castile-León was the axis around which a genuinely ‘Hispanic’ monarchy (i.e. one with an undoubted hegemony in the Peninsula) was established at the beginning of the Modern Age. Yet, it never really became—even at

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the height of its military and political power—a ‘nation’ in the
strict modern sense of the term; that is to say an institutionally
well integrated and socio-culturally homogeneous polity. The
Kingdom of Castile comprised a conglomerate of old kingdoms
and peninsular seigniories, each with its own institutions and
political-cultural profile. There was, however, a powerful
monarchy at its helm which was to become the true driving force
behind its southerly territorial expansion. Castile culminated its
centuries-long expansion with the capture of Granada in 1492. In
the euphoria brought about by the incorporation of the Kingdom
of Granada into her Crown, the Catholic Queen Isabel succumbed
to Christopher Columbus persistent proposals and embarked
Castile on a whirlwind transatlantic adventure and a subsequent
quest for global power.

The enormity of the task which the discoveries of Columbus
opened up for Castile—particularly if we consider the lean
material and human resource base of the Kingdom—left little time
or energy for domestic issues; unless they involved the collection
taxes and duties necessary to sustain the imperial effort, either
from the Queen’s own Castilian subjects or from those of the
other confederated kingdoms when their respective institutions
agreed to pay the contributions demanded of them. In reality, no
one in the Court of Castile—or at least no one before Count Duke
of Olivares 3—seems to have been particularly anxious to
promote a consistent policy of integration and heightened
cohesion (a sort of ‘nation-building’ policy if you wish) in the
metropolitan realm. Priority at the time was given to constructing
a strong state and a powerful monarchy, capable of ruling over a

3 On the other hand, the Machiavellian inspiration of Count-Duke of
Olivares’ policies—which shows more clearly in the proposals put
forward to the King in a famous and widely cited report, ostensibly
with the aim of outlining how to attain a more homogeneous nation
under his sceptre—are to modern eyes quite disturbing and politically
and morally unedifying!
vast empire with territories in three continents. The Spanish case is thus characterised by the early establishment of a powerful bureaucratic state, and in retrospect by the neglect and failure in the building of an integrated nation ⁴.

The third main protagonist in the Peninsula was the Aragon, encompassing the former Kingdom of Valencia and the Principality of Catalonia. The Pledge of Caspe of 1412 was instrumental in bringing together the constituent parts of the Kingdom of Aragon. Later on, the marriage of Isabel, Queen of Castile, and Fernando, King of Aragon, brought about the alliance of these two major peninsular entities. Yet, this was to take the form of a purely dynastic union, a confederation of kingdoms which maintained mutual independence. The specific institutions of the constituent entities remained largely intact. Each of them retained legislative, fiscal and political autonomy. To the north, the old Kingdom of Navarre became a part of the Crown of Castile in 1515, even though maintaining its specific institutions and privileges. Moreover, from 1580 to 1640, King Philip II of Hapsburg became—by dint of dynastic and hereditary chances—the King of Portugal, as well as of many other kingdoms and principalities in the Peninsula and elsewhere in Europe.

The tremendous power apportioned by its colonial possessions made Castile the hegemonic actor in the Iberian Peninsula, and a very important one in Europe, at least throughout the 16th century. The Kingdom of Aragon, however,

⁴ On this particular issue, see J.H. Elliot’s works on Hapsburg Spain and specifically on the Conde-Duque de Olivares. Also very useful and enlightening is the historical synthesis worked out by Juan J. Linz ‘Early state building and late peripheral nationalisms against the state: The case of Spain’ in S.N. Eisenstadt, S. Rokkan eds. Building States and Nations Beverly Hills, Ca: Sage, 1973, pages 33-59. The best known philosophical and political interpretation—and no doubt the one provoking most controversy—about Spain’s historical lack of articulation as a modern nation is in: José Ortega y Gasset La España invertebrada Madrid, 1922.
excluded from the Atlantic adventure, fell into an ever sharper economic and political decline—a decline already observable from the mid fifteenth century—and found itself overshadowed by Castile, which became the true power base of the Monarchy. The Spanish monarchs soon saw themselves playing big global politics, and domestic issues came a poor second to the demands of ruling a vast empire. Thus, by accentuating its absolutist strategies—first and foremost in the realm of Castile proper—the Monarchy effectively built a powerful bureaucratic state apparatus which served as the backbone of a vast empire. Yet, in the end it failed to construct a well integrated and articulated polity overall, a modern nation.

What has so far been said by way of a summary contains arguable historical simplifications. In fact, some important events during the 16th century reveal the determination of the Monarchy and the state to more tightly unify and homogenise the Peninsular kingdoms. The same year of the conquest of Granada and the start of the Atlantic adventure, Isabella and Fernando agreed to sign the decrees presented to them by their respective bureaucrats ordaining the forcible conversion of the Spanish Jewry on threat of exile from Sefarad. Later on, during the reign of Philip II, the policies of the Consejo de Castilla led to persecutions, displacements and deportations of the moorish populations that had remained in Iberia after their masters had been defeated and driven back to their north-African and Arab ‘homelands’. Under Philip III the remaining moriscos—about three hundred thousand in all—were eventually expelled from beautiful Al-Andalus.

Moreover, potential heterodox and restless subjects had to be kept under close watch. Thus, the *Santa Inquisición* was established, as a tool for pursuing ideological and religious uniformity and political conformity. The establishment of the Inquisition reveals a neat convergence of the interests of Church and State, which is quite disturbing. These policies aimed at excluding the internal Other were to a certain extent driven by anxiety on the part of the Monarchy over the machinations of the enemy within, in conspiracy with its powerful enemies without. Doubtlessly they were also fuelled by internal strife and the ambition of the powerful within the state apparatus to attain political objectives by the exclusion of potential competitors. In its turn, the Monarchy found justification for its policies in the need to pursue transcendental ends such as preserving Western Christianity from its heathen enemies and building a more tightly integrated kingdom.

In any case, the aforementioned measures of exclusion of the internal Other and enforced ideological-religious uniformity—justified by evoking the primordial interests of the the State and those of a self-appointed Catholic Monarchy—have to be judged against the background of more general circumstances and events taking place in Europe and the Mediterranean at the time: the onset of the Reformation in Central Europe (and the Counter-Reformation organised as a sort of antidote); the Turkish threat in the Mediterranean; and the acute political and ideological rivalries between the various monarchies, striving for hegemony on European soil.

With the establishment of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain at the beginning of the 18th century—following a War of Succession in which other European powers were involved, given the strategic interests at stake—certain ‘nation-building’ policies (to continue using this quite misleading term) acquired more prominence than ever before. These policies were of French import and, to a certain extent, the product of enlightened inspiration. They were implemented in a renewed impulse to
attain a greater degree of administrative, institutional and cultural integration of the diverse entities which constituted the Spanish metropolitan state. As part of this effort to renew the basis of the nation-state, the rebellious Catalan elites—who had sided with the pretender from the House of Austria in the War of Succession—suffered retaliation and were stripped of some of their powers. Thus, the Constitutions which formed the basis of Catalonia’s political autonomy were abolished—although the Principality was allowed to maintain some of its common and civil law institutions—and the Catalan language was excluded from the administration, the judiciary and education, and other public spheres.

The exclusion of the vernacular language from the public sphere, which undoubtedly affected its literary and erudite development, doesn’t seem to have had too adverse an effect on the development of the spoken language, the living language of the people. This is at least a plausible hypothesis, since the ‘public sphere’ was surely only of marginal importance in common people’s lives at the time. In this latest respect, the educational laws passed in the mid nineteenth century by liberal-revolutionary regimes (most notably the Moyano Bill of 1857) doubtlessly posed more of a threat to the survival the Catalan language, as well as the other ‘regional’ minority languages. In this legislation, which aimed at establishing a system of compulsory schooling throughout the national territory, it was ruled that Castilian would become the sole language of instruction. These political and administrative measures would have had a devastating effect on the languages other than Castilian were it not for the utter inefficiency of the Spanish state and successive governments.

Political and ideological inspiration for the above mentioned measures was once again coming from the other side of the Pyrenees. Yet, be it for better or for worse, Spain is not quite like France, nor can Madrid as a capital city compare with Paris! Besides, the winds of Romanticism and those billowing the sails of renascent nations (that is, nations in the sense of peoples) started
to blow strongly across the lands of Central Europe at the time. Thus, a number of revivalist movements in favour of the vernaculars and the recovery of regional traditions set on the Spanish peripheries. The most important one caught on among the Barcelona elites around the middle of the century. This movement was eventually labelled the Renaixença, a rebirth of Catalan culture, language and political consciousness. The Catalan Renaixença, which placed great emphasis on the recovery of the vernacular —first for literary purposes, later on in education and all other spheres of life—, received a strong impulse due to important changes occurring throughout the region. A new vigour was apparent in the economy and in industry, in contrast with a largely backward interior Spain, largely dependent on agriculture. The Romanticist ideals, and similar revivalist movements taking place elsewhere in Europe at the time, provided intellectual and political inspiration. The Catalan language thus became a banner which served as a powerful symbolic representation of the aspirations of the successful industrialists and the political and cultural elites in their orbit.

Meanwhile, poor old Spain as a whole was going downhill fast. At the very beginning of the nineteenth century it had been shamefully invaded by the armies of Napoleon, a drunken puppet king put on the throne (Napoleon’s brother). As it happened, there was some patriotic pride and strength left, though. People all over Spain raised up against the invader and drove it back north of the Pyrenees. The task left behind was for the political classes to

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collect and reassemble the pieces of a rundown state. Further misfortunes were in store, however, since the same ideals that inspired the afrancesados liberals at home, were also setting on fire the imagination of creole elites from Cartagena de Indias down to Buenos Aires. In addition, these elites were receiving political inspiration from their neighbour to the north. One by one, the American colonies declared themselves independent nations, breaking away from the metropolitan ‘motherland’. By the end of the nineteenth century, Spain had been brought to its knees and made to retreat to more domestic preoccupations by an emerging nation state that was to become the most powerful of its time, the United States of America. With the loss of the last Caribbean colonies, political misery, moral decadence and intellectual obsession with the fate of the nation took hold on the barren mesetas of central Iberia.

A dispirited, decadent and powerless Spain could hardly manage to hold together its constituent entities anymore. Profound economic, social and cultural cleavages separating centre from periphery —as well as maintaining the distance between a heterogeneous mélange of elites entrenched in their privileges and the increasingly impoverished rural and urban lower classes—made it extremely difficult to hold the fold together. The choir of centrifugal voices was ever growing, more strongly from the northeastern periphery. Political strife, outbursts of violence, dictatorship and open war was the result. The politically turbulent years of the turn of the century witnessed hopeful political developments in Catalonia in what concerns political devolution. The Mancomunitat de Catalunya was established in 1914. Yet, this limited experiment in political self-management did not last long. Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship put an end to it in 1923.

The fall of the dictatorship and the establishment of the Second Republic raised high hopes in Catalonia as in the rest of progressive Spain. But they were again frustrated by the military rebellion against the legitimate government of the Republic that
provoked a war. The outcome of the Civil War (1936-39) was the installation in Spain of a dictatorial regime and, turning to what concerns us here, the most aggressive measures in Spanish history against the minority languages, and Catalan in particular. These measures were part and parcel of a fully-fledged attempt to build a definitively unitarian, uniform and monolithic nation state (in short, a totalitarian state) in all spheres. The ideological wings of Francoism —as well as the iron wings of its armies—were pushed on by the cold winds which blew strongly from Central Europe at the time. But the tragedies awaiting Europe were about to make those of Spain look small by comparison. All in the name of a greater nation, a purified race, total justice and absolute truths. In short, the game of nation-states competing for an ever increasing share of power carried to its most terrifying ‘logical’ conclusion.

Fortunately, the strength of certain social realities sometimes foil the attempts of those who, using the harshest and most violent means, try to eradicate them. After the dictator’s death, and once the transition to democracy was under way, the realities of Spain’s diversity and plurality powerfully burst forth once more, perhaps more strongly than ever before. The crisis of legitimacy which the Spanish state underwent during the return to a monarchical regime and democracy, unleashed a variety of centrifugal forces. In certain peripheries of the country, these forces rallied mainly under the banner of political autonomy and nationalism, in a tremendous struggle for restitution, identity and political dignity. The emergence of these strong centrifugal forces presented a serious threat to the viability of the new regime and of the State itself. In this respect, the wide political consensus reached in the elaboration and approval of the Constitution of 1978 was a solid cornerstone on which democratic institutions would develop, putting the transition process on a steady track. The Constitution and the consensus that made it possible acted as a brake on the centrifugal tendencies by giving the state renewed legitimacy.
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 fully recognises political and cultural regional diversity. Section VIII lays down the bases for a new territorial organisation of the state and, in the famous Article 3 of the Preamble, one finds the legal provisions that recognise and provide for the development of linguistic pluralism in particular. Thus, the transition from an authoritarian-dictatorial to a democratic regime saw a fundamental parallel transformation of a centralist and monolithic state into one that is considerably decentralised and pluralistic. Aspirations to uniformity were replaced by tolerance and an express institutionalisation of cultural diversity. What could be considered a basic weakness—that is, the problematical political articulation and territorial integration of the Spanish polity due to complex historical, geographical, economic and cultural factors—has been made into a virtue, a plural and decentralised system, in this new historic era. The results are more than remarkable, although the process of reorganisation of the state along the lines mentioned has not been culminated yet.

The comparative historical failure of Spain as a nation-state—if, for example, we compare it with the French paradigm—can be largely explained by its specific political and dynastic history. Nevertheless, other factors which help explain Spain’s lack of internal cohesion should also be taken into account. What I have in mind are various geographical, macroeconomic and sociological factors. In this respect, I find the concept of ‘lines of cleavage’ to be particularly useful. Cleavages—whether they be of an economic,

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7 In a recent article in El País (24 de febrero 1994) Jordi Solé Tura, one of the persons directly involved in the drafting of the 1978 Constitution, evokes the process which allowed for a broad consensus, that was reflected, for example, in the wording of the articles concerning the status of Spanish and the other languages. This consensus was maintained at the regional level during the drafting of the Catalan Statute and the Law of Linguistic Normalisation. In his analysis, Solé Tura points out what were the reasonable limits which the legislators wanted to impose on the delicate issue of linguistic diversity.
sociocultural, political or religious nature—are complexly interwoven, they overlap and may eventually reinforce one another. This concept, developed by Stein Rokkan and associate researchers, has been applied extensively by Juan J. Linz in his studies into the Spanish case. Fundamental differing interests between centre and periphery, and non-congruence in the location of economic potential and political power, are no doubt factors of great explanatory value for the Spanish case, notwithstanding the specific importance of cultural and linguistic diversity. However, since the more specific object of this essay is to describe and analyse the 'language issue' in its basic coordinates, and to highlight its current implications in the Spanish political arena, the brief historical outline presented above has to suffice. I will now comment on basic facts concerning languages in Spain.

B. A linguistic panorama of Spain

The sociolinguistic panorama of contemporary Spain is highly complex. At the regional level, that is to say, in those autonomous communities having 'a language of their own' different from Castilian or Spanish proper, the situation is no less complex since each has its own characteristics and peculiarities. In what concerns the Catalan language, present for centuries in a large area along the north-eastern Mediterranean littoral and the Balearic Islands, the panorama is similarly intricate. Due


9 On this issue, see: Peter A. Gourevitch 'The reemergence of “peripheral nationalisms”: Some comparative speculations on the spatial distribution of political leadership and economic growth' Comparative Studies in Society and History, 21: 303-22.
primarily to sociological and demographical circumstances, the situation at the core of the Catalan-speaking area—that is, the Principat de Catalunya, whose historical boundaries correspond with those of the present autonomous community of Catalonia—is also complex. The heterogeneity of the sociolinguistic panorama—which has become more pronounced over recent decades due to social and geographical mobility—contrasts sharply with the pseudo historical simplifications so beloved of and useful to the ideologists of the various nationalist groups which compete for a larger share of power in the Iberian arena.

The aim of this paper is to highlight the complexities of the issue of language in Spain today, to describe in detail relevant empirical data, and to analyse the political implications of the matter. Indirectly, this would help in setting a framework for the evaluation of the significance of ‘linguistic normalisation’ and language planning policies implemented by certain regional autonomous administrations since their establishment. Attention will be focused at this stage on the case of Catalonia and on the policies adopted by the Generalitat de Catalunya government. Moreover, the overlapping of language planning with more general cultural and educational policies, will also be studied. Such policies—which might perhaps be labelled ‘nation-building’ policies—have been adopted over the last fifteen years or so by a number of regional governments in Spain in the context of a generalised ‘devolution’ process. To a certain extent, this paper could be taken as being a first contribution for a systematic evaluation of Juan J. Linz’s work in the light of what has happened since he wrote it. I have more specifically in mind a long essay written in the threshold of the transition, at the end of which he made a set of projections, full of insight and discernment, concerning the issue of language in a future democratic Spain10.

10 Juan J. Linz ‘Politics in a multilingual society with a dominant world language: the case of Spain’ J.G. Savard; R. Vegneault, eds. (continues on next page)
Twenty years ago, Juan J. Linz bemoaned the lack of thorough empirical evidence on the issue of minority languages, which was all the more surprising bearing in mind its importance. Fortunately, this empirical lacuna has subsequently been remedied. The first available census data on minority languages is that derived from the questions on the use of Catalan that appeared in the 1975 mid-term census of municipalities in the province of Barcelona. In 1981 the census offices in the four Catalan provinces coordinated their efforts with those of the National Statistics Institute and produced Spain’s first linguistic census properly speaking, which derived from a few questions made on the knowledge of the Catalan language. Five years later, the autonomous communities of Valencia, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country and Navarre emulated the Catalan initiative, carrying out their own linguistic censuses on the knowledge of the vernaculars in their respective territories. In the last population census of 1991 the government of the Autonomous Community of Galicia also decided to include a number of questions about knowledge of the Galician language in its territory.

Since the data from the most recent censuses is not yet generally available, except in summaries, a full picture of Spain’s linguistic panorama will have to be drawn using data from the 1986 census and estimates where this is not available. The existence of an exhaustive report, commissioned by the European Commission and written by professor Miquel Siguán (which has subsequently been published in book form) spares me the task of

presenting all the relevant figures in detail. Instead, I shall summarise them 11.

In global figures, 41 percent of the Spanish population over the age of two lives in the six autonomous communities whose statutes of autonomy—in accordance with constitutional principles—are defined as having a ‘language of their own’ (i.e. where historically and currently, to a lesser or greater extent, a language other than Castilian—or Spanish—is spoken; the exact wording varies). In a region by region analysis, Miquel Siguán gives global data on the proportion of inhabitants who can be considered to be ‘native speakers’—that is, who have as their ‘mother tongue’—the respective regional languages (these are estimates) and census data on the proportion of inhabitants who speak, read and write the same proficiently 12.


12 The fact that these terms are transcribed in brackets is to mark their equivocal character. They should not be taken as implying a value judgement or specific theoretical position concerning the sociolinguistic issues that revolve around them. On the contrary, the intention is to use them in a neutral way, eliminating as far as possible any misunderstanding of the technical or semantic issues involved. This is difficult to achieve since, in many cases, for example, individuals learn the two languages in parallel, the regional language and Castilian, perhaps one from each of the parents. Additionally, one must take into account other factors related to the ubiquitous presence of Castilian in these regions, more so in some than others. Areas where the vernacular is the sole spoken language are, in fact, very limited or non-existent, if we look at the last few decades. The most recent sociolinguistic surveys suggest that, in none of these regions, the percentage of individuals speaking only the vernacular is higher than 5 percent. This is the case even when the most stringent criteria are applied. Due to historico-political circumstances, the population of these regions are more proficient and literate in Castilian than they are in the respective regional language. The question to what extent and under what circumstances one or the other language is used complicates the issue considerably. Unfortunately, few properly
In Galicia (where forecasts and estimates based on the census of 1985 are used, since no linguistic census proper was carried out that year) approximately 55 percent of the population has Galician as their first language or ‘mother tongue’; although 90 percent understand it and speak it with a reasonable degree of proficiency. 45 percent of the population have Castilian as the first or ‘mother tongue’. The percentage of those who manifest they speak the language has raised to 91.4 percent in 1991.

Basque is not spoken throughout the entire territory of Navarre. The *Ley Foral del Vascuence* defines municipalities in the extreme north-west as ‘Basque-speaking’; a number of municipalities around the city of Pamplona and in the extreme north-west as ‘of mixed language’; and the southern half of the region (the most highly populated part), as well as the central eastern zone, as ‘Castilian-speaking’. The waves of migration to the city from the farthest reaches of the region make of the capital city a specific case apart. Taking all these circumstances into account, only 10 percent of the region’s population can be considered Basque-speaking. In Basque-speaking areas, the percentage of individuals who speak the language reaches 85 percent, though. These figures have all been taken from census data. The percentage of those who know the language in the region overall, that is to say, those who can speak in Basque, sociolinguistic surveys have been carried out so far. The void is, however, being filled. In 1993, the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas carried out a macrosurvey in each of the regions where a language other than Castilian is spoken. Data from this survey will be included and commented upon later on in this essay. For its part, the Basque government commissioned in 1991 a sophisticated and ambitious survey which covered the whole region on both sides of the Pyrenees where Basque has been traditionally spoken. Finally, the project sponsored by the Royal Galician Academy, the Sociolinguistic Map of Galicia project, merits mention; but it has not been finished yet.

13 Xunta de Galicia, Summary of the 1991 Census.
increases to 12-15 percent (depending on the level of proficiency required) \(^\text{14}\). If one adds 'quasi euskera speakers' to these who are labelled as 'euskera speakers' the percentage raises to 16.4 percent, in 1991 census figures \(^\text{15}\).

Throughout the territory of the Basque autonomous community, which is not entirely Basque-speaking either, 20.5 percent of the population 'speak Basque at home or are of Basque mother tongue' and 74 percent Castilian. Census data reveals that among the latter there are a considerable percentage of native Basques whose links with the region date back generations. In the region as a whole 25 percent are competent in the use of the Basque language. In contrast, 58 percent of the population have no knowledge whatsoever of Basque. This percentage has diminished to 53.9 percent in 1991 census figures \(^\text{16}\). Although no census data is available on the knowledge of Castilian, the sociolinguistic surveys and other sources of empirical evidence show that this language is understood and spoken—with a greater or lesser degree of fluency—by practically the entire population \(^\text{17}\).

Euskera (Basque) speakers—a language which is also spoken in some French municipalities on the other side of the


\(^{15}\) Gobierno de Navarra. Summary of the 1991 Census.

\(^{16}\) EUSTAT (Instituto Vasco de Estadística). Summary of the 1991 census.

Pyrenees—have to deal with the considerable handicap presented by the dialectical variations of their language. Certain dialects differ so much from each other that native inhabitants of neighbouring valleys can sometimes barely understand each other when using them. There is also the problem of the intrinsic difficulty of the Basque language for those who do not have it as their mother tongue, since it does not belong to the Indo-European family of languages. As is the case in Galicia, the grammar, vocabulary and syntax of Euskera is yet to be fully standardised. In both these autonomous communities, this technical issue carries certain political overtones; the same is true for Valencia, but for different reasons.

Catalan is spoken, in its various dialectical forms, in three different autonomous communities: Catalonia, Valencia and the Balearic Islands. A narrow strip of territory belonging to the neighbouring autonomous community of Aragon is also Catalan speaking. Equally, Catalan has been spoken in the regions bordering Catalonia on the other side of the Pyrenees (mostly in the southern part of the Roussillon region) and—in a slightly archaic form—in the town of Alguer, Sardinia, due to the fact that a large Catalan colony settled in the town in the 14th century. In a small municipality of the Catalan Pyrenees, the Val d’Aran, a language or dialect of Gascon origin is spoken 18.

In the Balearic Islands, it is estimated that 64 percent of the population can be considered ‘Catalan speakers’. The percentage of those who are competent in the use of Catalan is higher. In the 1986 census 70.8 percent declare that they speak the regional language; surprisingly, five years later this percentage has

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18 For the first time a linguistic census of this local language was made in 1991, applying the same methodology as for the Catalan language census. See: Cens de Població 1991. Vol. 8 Cens Linguístic. Dades comarcals i municipals Generalitat de Catalunya, Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya, març 1993, pags. 167 y ss.
lowered to 66.7 percent. It might be due in part to the establishment of new residents from foreign countries in the islands. Only 9.9 percent, in 1991 figures, most of them recent immigrants from other parts of the Peninsula or foreigners, do not understand Catalan at all.

In the autonomous community of the País Valencià, where Catalan is not spoken uniformly throughout all its territory, it is estimated that 40 percent of the population speak Catalan ‘at home or as their mother tongue’. Census data shows that 49.5 percent of individuals in 1986 say that they are competent speakers of Catalan and 22.9 percent state that they do not understand it. In 1992 survey figures a substantial improvement in the knowledge of the regional language shows: 60.5 percent declare they speak it, and only 15.5 percent say they do not understand it. Once again, it is implicit that, both in the Balearic Islands and in Valencia, those whose first language or mother tongue is not Catalan have Castilian as their first or family language, and that practically everybody understands and speaks Castilian, regardless of their knowledge of the regional language.

The complexities of the sociolinguistic panorama in Catalonia can be largely attributed to demographic and migratory factors, i.e. the fact that about 50 percent of the population is not native to the region but rather consists of first or second generation immigrants who are Castilian speaking peoples. According to Miquel Siguán’s estimates, in 1986, 51 percent of Catalonia’s inhabitants were of Catalan mother tongue. At that time only 9.5 percent of the population did not understand Catalan, though.

A very positive factor in Catalonia has been the capacity demonstrated by an important proportion of non-native people

19 Govern Balear. 1991 linguistic census.
recently settled in the region to progressively assimilate the Catalan language. The extraordinary advances made in the knowledge of the Catalan language over the last decades is proof of this; even if we allow that these figures also reflect the enormous effort made on the part of the autonomous institutions to implement ‘linguistic normalisation’ policies since 1980. Data from the last population census in 1991 confirms the tendency of Catalan to regain ground, particularly among young people. This is doubtlessly more directly linked to the progressive introduction of Catalan in the classroom—both as vehicular language and as second language—at various levels of the educational system. Although this circumstances only date back to the beginning of the 1980’s, when administrative control over educational and cultural matters in the region was ‘devolved’ to the Generalitat government.

The figures so far commented upon serve to give a broad outline of Spain’s sociolinguistic panorama, which was identified as complex in the first paragraphs of this chapter. It is certainly not sufficient to explain away the situation in terms of certain

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21 In the foreword to the book quoted in the last footnote, the director of the Statistical Institute of Catalonia summarises the dimensions of this increase over the past five years: ‘93.8 percent of the population has declared that they understand Catalan... thus, the fraction of the population who do not understand Catalan has diminished to 6.2 percent from 9.4 percent in 1986. What is more, 68.3 percent of the population can speak Catalan, a four percent increase since 1986 when this figure stood at 64.2 percent. Particularly noteworthy are developments in the province of Barcelona (where the Castilian speaking population is concentrated), where there has been a five percent increase, higher than the Catalan average. The categories most indicative of literacy, such as ‘know how to read’ and ‘know how to write’ have shown considerable increases over the last five years and reflect the impact of schooling in Catalan, especially among young people. 67.6 percent of the population now know how to read Catalan as compared to 60.7 percent in 1986. As regards the percentage of those who know how to write in Catalan, this stood at 31.6 percent five years ago and has now risen to 39.9 (in 1991)’.
supposedly linguistically homogeneous regions with a language of their own sitting on the periphery, in contrast with a Castilian-speaking ‘rest of Spain’ which would be similarly homogeneous, linguistically speaking. This being the case, Spain could be likened to Belgium or Switzerland in this respect; but it should be clear by now that the situation is not quite the same. Important complexities exist at the level of each region, each case having its own peculiarities and specific circumstances. Thus, the linguistic ‘problem’ of Spain, or of any of the nationalities and regions it encompasses for that matter, cannot be resolved by applying simple political or technical formulas and remedies. Evoking the examples of other countries within Europe or elsewhere in favour of one solution or another can do more harm than good if this is not accompanied by an in-depth knowledge of the specificities of each case.

C. Language and Collective Identities in Catalonia

In Catalonia, language is a key element in the construction of collective identities and boundary delimitation. In the complicated demolinguistic circumstances described in the previous chapter—perhaps precisely as a result of this—the regional language has become the most potent symbol of Catalan identity, and doubtlessly the most emotion-charged one. No wonder it has been converted into a fundamental tool for the mobilisation of primordial loyalties and political will. However, as is the case with all dominant and primary symbols, it operates as much at an implicit as an explicit level, as we will see further on.

What most calls the attention of the lay observer, as well as professionals of sociolinguistics, is the seemingly paradoxical fact that, despite its status as a minority language, excluded from public administration, totally banished from the educational system during the decades of Francoism, it has not only emerged from such circumstances in relatively good shape, but also (in
Catalonia at least) with a higher social status than Castilian, its historical competitor, one of the most widely-spoken languages in the world and the dominant language in Spain. The citizens of Catalonia in general, including a majority of non-autochtonous residents, have been shown to have a very positive attitude towards the Catalan language. This might be a crucial factor in accounting for the rapid progress made in its knowledge and use since 1975, the year for which the first reliable figures are available on the situation the language in the Principality.

It must be underlined, however, that data derived from the various Spanish regional linguistic censuses refer exclusively to knowledge of the vernacular languages (Catalan, in this case), and not to the patterns of its use nor to the rules of adaptation or seams of conflict apparent in its interaction with Castilian. In such a strongly bilingual context as that of Catalonia, the above factors are nevertheless of crucial importance. Thus, in order to grasp their meaning and evaluate the practical consequences, we must make recourse to other investigative methods and different sources of empirical evidence, such as sociological and sociolinguistic surveys.

In 1983, I personally carried out a survey which covered sociolinguistic and other issues pertaining to collective identities and intergroup stereotypes in an area of Catalonia which all indicators show to be the most ‘catalanised’ from an

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ethnolinguistic point of view. Further on, I will comment on some data on the knowledge of, patterns of use of, and attitudes towards the Catalan language derived from this survey. The advantage of a survey is that it allows one to work with complex variables, generally not available in census databases, in order to attain a well balanced understanding of the prevailing circumstances in each case, such as the variable ‘ethnolinguistic identity of the interviewee’. In addition, there are many other basic variables such as sex, age, level of formal education, the origin of the parents, or the political affiliation of the interviewee which can also be taken into account. The limitation of surveys is that they treat only a sample of the population, instead of the entire population, as is the case with censuses. As a result, data derived from sociological surveys cannot be used in analyses of geographical distribution of characteristics or phenomena; additionally, there is the fact that surveys rely to a greater extent on the mere opinion of the interviewee than do censuses.

I shall start with a brief commentary on data pertaining to knowledge of the vernacular in the area studied in the above mentioned survey. Practically all the interviewees classed as autochthonous—that is to say, those whose parents were born in Catalonia and whose mother tongue is generally Catalan—speak the vernacular with no difficulty. However, not all of these are able to read in the language so easily, and only 32.3 percent know how to write in it. At the root of this high rate of illiteracy in the mother tongue—a personal hindrance as well as a strong cause of grievance against the persons and institutions perceived to be or have been responsible for such a serious anomaly—is doubtlessly the imposition of Castilian as the sole language of instruction at

24 The area of the survey includes the seven counties of the province of Girona, plus the counties of El Solsonès and La Segarra in the province of Lleida. See: Andrés Barrera-González. La dialéctica de la identidad en Cataluña Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1985, chapter 4 and appendix 6.
all levels of the educational system during the Francoist dictatorship (1939-1975).

The data pertaining to the interviewees classed as non-autochthonous—first or second generation immigrants, whose mother tongue is Castilian or Spanish—surely contrasts with that of the autochthonous interviewees, although not to the extent that one might have expected. Thus, 88.7 percent of individuals classed as non-autochthonous for the purposes of this area study stated that they understood spoken Catalan; what is more, 45.2 percent held that they could express themselves in this language, 37.7 percent that they could read it and finally 8.4 percent that they could even write in it. This data confirms the findings from census sources that highlight the existence of a remarkable process of linguistic integration on the part of immigrants. This has occurred despite very unfavourable circumstances, namely, the type of educational system which prevailed in Spain until 1978, as well as the socioeconomic conditions and settlement patterns affecting the immigrant population, particularly in the metropolitan area of Barcelona.

25 Catalonia is one of the most industrialised regions of Spain, which underwent a small-scale and specific ‘industrial revolution’ in the 19th century, in contrast to the rest of Spain, with perhaps the exception of the Basque Country. Since the end of the 19th century industrial and economic growth have attracted contingents of immigrant workers. Thus, between 1950 and 1975, a total of 1,393,000 people from other Spanish regions settled in Catalonia. For the most part, these were individuals with low or no professional qualifications who found employment in the manufacturing industries. For its part, the autochthonous population, at least during the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, had a very low fertility rate. In consequence, the growth of the economy, particularly during the boom years, depended heavily on an influx of immigrants from outside the region. The demographer Anna Cabré considers that the low fertility rate among the autochthonous population, along with the massive influx of immigrants, are characteristics of what she terms ‘the Modern Catalan System of Reproduction’ (See: Anna Cabré Les (continues on next page)}
Data from the 1983 survey shows that the linguistic assimilation of immigrants is relatively more favoured at the level of the local community than the neighbourhood (neighbours tend

generacions catalanes, 1870-1970 Unpublished doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1987). However, according to this author, the most striking and peculiar aspect of the ‘Catalan System of Reproduction’ is the way in which these waves of immigrants have been assimilated not only from a sociodemographical, but also from a cultural point of view, despite Catalonia’s status as a minoritary and peripheral culture, and a regional entity which had been subordinated in a nation state in which it did not play a politically dominant role, that is, a polity lacking political and institutional instruments which could be put to use to achieve these ends.

Other less optimistic authors, of a less tolerant disposition, viewing the situation from a perspective which is more strongly nationalist, even ‘ethnicist’ (or racist), draw very different conclusions from the same facts. They see in the low fertility rate of the autochthonous population, combined with extraregional mass immigration, a serious threat to the permanence of the Catalan etnos. One of the most characteristic propounders of this argument is Josep A. Vandellós in his book Catalunya, poble decadent Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1985 (1935), who was director of the Statistical Service of the Generalitat de Catalunya during the Second Republic.

In an obvious, oblique reference to the thesis of J.A. Vandellós, Anna Cabré concludes her demographic analysis of the Catalan cohorts with thought-provoking commentaries, in her characteristic witty and vitalist tone: ‘We were not decadent, we were a people who had found a particular way of doing things, which had demographic implications’. This particular way of doing things in Catalonia consisted in making recourse to ‘adoption’ instead of ‘natural reproduction’ to meet the demands of demographic growth. The ‘problem of immigration’ crops up continually in the discourse, frequently implicitly rather than explicitly, of nationalist circles. This is understandable in the light of its great political significance. By way of illustration, see: J.M. Ainaud et al Immigració i reconstrucció nacional a Catalunya Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill/Editorial Blume, 1980; or the book written by the current President of the Generalitat, which carries an evocative title: Jordi Pujol La immigració, problema i esperança de Catalunya Barcelona: Nova Terra, 1976. Also: Marc A. Vila Les migracions i Catalunya Barcelona: El Llamp, 1984. Carlotta Solé Catalunya: societat receptora d’immigrants Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Catalans, 1988.
to be recent immigrants like themselves), and at the level of the neighbourhood more than in the family. At the time, the workplace was not a locus that facilitated immigrants’ linguistic incorporation. A point of great importance would be to analyse what happens in the case of families of ethnolinguistically mixed couples. This extremely interesting question has yet to be studied in sufficient depth and detail, although instruments already exist that would permit such a research endeavour.

Ten years later, in 1993, a similar survey to the one described above, applied by the Centre for Sociological Studies (CIS’93) to a representative sample of the population of the whole Catalan region yielded the results which I will now summarise. 99.5 percent of the interviewees were competent in spoken Castilian; while those competent in spoken Catalan were less, 73.7 percent. The discrepancy is more marked in what concerns ability to write in these languages: 93.3 percent state that they are able to write in Castilian, whereas only 40.5 percent are capable of writing in Catalan. Cross-tabulation with the variable ‘mother tongue of the interviewee, or language spoken at home when a child’ allows for a better informed analysis of the data 26.

26 With regard to what concerns us here, the ‘mother tongue or language spoken at home’ variable is of crucial importance. I shall therefore describe the different values assigned to it. The langfami variable has four values or basic categories: ‘O’ Interviewees that just understand Catalan (22.1 percent of the sample) or who don’t even understand it (an additional 4.1 percent); ‘A’ Interviewees who state that Catalan is their mother tongue or the language spoken at home (‘the language that was spoken at home during your childhood’), or Catalan speakers for our purposes (40.1 percent of the sample). ‘B’ Interviewees that state that their mother tongue or the language spoken at home when they were children was Castilian, or Castilian speakers, who are nevertheless competent speakers of catalan (27.8 percent of the sample). ‘C’ Interviewees who state that their mother tongue or the language spoken at home was both Castilian and Catalan, or bilinguals in the strict sense of the term, and most of whom were born in Catalonia to ‘mixed’ couples (4.6 percent of the sample). Lastly, a (continues on next page)
Perhaps the most significant information that can be drawn from cross-tabulation analysis at this stage is that which refers to the interviewees in category ‘B’ (individuals whose mother tongue is Castilian but who also speak Catalan): 78 percent of these are also able to read in Catalan, and 40 percent are able to write in it. This data shows that, effectively, knowledge of Catalan is making progress among the non-autochthonous inhabitants of the region. In this respect, the data which I will now mention is more conclusive and significant, since it shows changes in individuals’ linguistic identity (as accounted for by self-perception) clearly in favour of the Catalan *ethnos*: 25 percent of those in category ‘B’ and 86 percent of those in category ‘C’ (see, footnote #26) identified themselves—notwithstanding their mother tongue being Castilian—as ‘more Catalan speakers than Castilian speakers’. In contrast, only 3 percent of category ‘A’ interviewees (individuals who had Catalan as the first or mother tongue) now perceive themselves to be ‘more Castilian than Catalan speakers’.

Needless to say, the progression pointed out is gradual and slow, which does not satisfy those who look at it from narrow nationalist perspectives. Professionals of sociolinguistics, however, take this type of evidence as a very positive indicator and one that is quite surprising—given the prevalent circumstances—since changes in language use have to be measured in terms of the pass of generations, rather than in calendar years or decades. But who among the politicians, what partisan political organisation, is prepared to let one or two generations pass before harvesting the electoral fruits of their labour?

Data from the 1983 survey relating to the everyday use of Catalan brings to light some serious anomalies or incongruences.

remaining 1.1 percent have a mother tongue other than Castilian or Catalan, but these will not be taken into account due to the lack of statistical relevance in their numbers.
The mother tongue of 96 percent of the interviewees classed as autochthonous was Catalan; and this was the language mainly used by them in everyday spoken communication. (It is important to bear in mind that circumstances are generally favourable in the area where this particular survey was carried out, in sharp contrast with the metropolitan area of Barcelona, which was not included). However, only 14.3 percent of them had attended primary schools where the main spoken language in the classroom was effectively Catalan, although even in these schools the text books were mostly in Castilian. A small minority, 1.7 percent of the sample, had been privileged enough to attend primary schools where Catalan was the language of instruction. These last were schools run by the Generalitat during the Second Republic or private institutions during the second phase of Francoism when repressive measures were slackened and Catalan came to be somehow tolerated in the public sphere.

Despite adverse circumstances—in particular, the imposition of a Castilianised, repressive and absurd educational system throughout Spain, all the more absurd for those with a mother tongue other than Castilian—by 1983 a number of individuals had overcome, by dint of their own effort, the anomaly of an enforced illiteracy in their own language. At that time, 13.9 percent of the interviewees in the area of reference stated that they read in Catalan more frequently than in Castilian; 45.9 percent said that they used the two languages indistinctly; and 39.8 percent that they mainly used Castilian. As regards to writing, 34.4 percent of the autochthonous individuals said that they used Catalan rather than Castilian (personal letters, notes... i.e. a very limited use for the majority of them); 17.7 percent used both languages indistinctly; and 45.9 percent Castilian exclusively.

Concerning the patterns of everyday use of both languages, the CIS'93 survey is an abundant and very rich source of information, since it is intended precisely for the study of these sort of issues, which in a truly bilingual context such as Catalonia so interest the sociolinguist. However, this is not the appropriate
time nor place to comment in detail on such data. I would like only to make some very general observations about it. When looking at the tables, one is first struck by the fluid nature of the current situation in Catalonia. It is one which is open, and tremendously complicated. In this fluid and complex setting, Catalan is clearly gaining ground in all areas despite, as I mentioned before, the rather unfavourable de facto circumstances still prevailing. As regards to communication within the family, as is to be expected, there is a great degree of fixedness. A similar pattern is revealed in the case of married couples, although it is slightly more fluid. But if we turn to differences between generations, the findings are more interesting and significant. A considerable strengthening of Catalan is apparent if we look at the language spoken by the offspring of interviewees among themselves. Thus, for example, 36 percent of children of couples formed by individuals classed in category ‘B’ speak primarily Catalan to each other. A similar but less marked pattern is apparent in what concerns the language used by parents classed in category ‘B’ and, to a greater extent, those classed in category ‘C’ (mixed marriages), in their interactions with their children.

The opinions and manifest attitudes of the interviewees point to a potential inversion of the prevalent anomalous usage patterns concerning the two languages present in Catalonia, in the not too distant future; particularly if one takes into account the political and educational changes which were only beginning to take shape at the time when the first survey was carried out 27. I am referring to the introduction of Catalan as the vehicular language in primary schools and its present high profile in the mass media. An overwhelming majority of autochthonous Catalans of the area studied in 1983 were in favour of mainly using Catalan in schools. Additionally, the interviewees stated

that they would prefer (an extraordinary testimony to their personal commitment and political determination) to read and write in Catalan, to a greater extent than they in fact did and—doubtlessly—to an extent over and above their actual capabilities at the time.

As regards the public use of the two languages present in Catalonia, those interviewed in 1983 were also strongly in favour of the recatalanization of public life; be it by means of proposals for the exclusive use of Catalan in certain spheres or for a parity between Catalan and Castilian. On this point, the contrast in the opinions of the autochthonous and non-autochthonous is significant. A large majority of the former were in favour of mainly or exclusively using Catalan in the hypothetical circumstances put forward to them in the survey (and more specifically, an overwhelming majority wanted Catalan to be used for street names). Nevertheless, a considerable proportion were of the opinion that both languages should be used indistinctly, above all in the case of official documents (43.2 percent) and advertisements (36.1 percent). In contrast, a majority of non-autochthonous believed that both languages should be used indistinctly in all the suggested circumstances; except in the case of street names!: 56.6 percent of them felt that these should be in Catalan exclusively.

Judging by my own personal experience during fieldwork, I would say that people are, in fact, much more accommodating in the day-to-day interactive use of the two languages than what their replies to the questionnaire might suggest. This leads one to ponder on the limitations and artificiality of the survey as an instrument of research. What these opinions do express, though, is a strong desire for events to take a more ‘natural’ turn in the near

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28 Data is taken from the survey carried out by myself in 1983, which is presented in detail and extensively commented upon in: Andrés Barrera-González La dialéctica de la identidad, pags. 331-342.
future, in order to restore their dignity as Catalans, speakers of a neglected language. As has been the case with so many other issues in Catalonia’s recent history, an acute conflict exists between desire and reality. Catalans have long been tormented by radical Hamletian dilemmas (*Catalunya infelix*, was the title of a treatise whose author I no longer remember); and this affects the common citizen with a certain level of political consciousness as much as it does elites 29. The radicalisation of public opinion and the intensification of conflict over the question of language, along with other issues related to the longed-for political and cultural ‘reconstruction’ of Catalonia, is partly due to the dissemination of propaganda from the fora and new democratic institutions in which—even at the time when the first survey was carried out—nationalist ideologies already prevailed 30. Continuous prejudice against Catalonia and all things Catalan, ignorance and misunderstanding, and propagandistic attacks on the part of certain sectors of the media and the political class from elsewhere in Spain accounts for another good part of the responsibility in this intensification of conflict 31.

29 This conflict is expressed in even more dramatic tones, for example, when more radical issues, which touch upon the future of Catalonia as a ‘nation’ are discussed. See: A. Estradé, M. Treserra *Catalunya Independent? Anàlisi d’una enquesta sobre la identitat nacional i la voluntat d’independència dels catalans* Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill, 1990, in particular chapters 3 and 4.

30 *Convergencia i Unió*, the nationalist coalition led by Jordi Pujol, won a majority in the first autonomous elections held in 1980, after the Statute of Autonomy was passed. In subsequent elections, including the last ones held in 1992, *Convergencia* won by absolute majorities.

31 Ethnolinguistic conflict concerning Catalonia and the language issue has reached ever high levels in Spain since mid 1993, when the nationalists in office in the Generalitat decided to give their support to the minority socialist government in Madrid, thus opening a new phase in the relations between centre and periphery in Spanish politics, which carried with it profound political and constitutional implications. Extraneous elements which cropped up later on—serious charges of corruption and political scandals of all sorts, which 

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As regards opinions and preferences, I will now comment on some additional data, this time taken from the CIS’93 survey. Ten years after the first survey was carried out, there are two new factors in the Catalan arena which have to be taken into account. The first is the introduction of Catalan as language of instruction at all levels of education, and principally in primary and secondary schools, following the ‘devolution’ of administrative competence in this domain to the Generalitat. The second is the existence of two television channels which broadcast exclusively in Catalan: TV3 since 1984 and Canal 33 since 1988. Both are publicly owned and administered by the Generalitat. Thus, there is abundant availability of television programmes in both languages, although perhaps not a wholly balanced one in terms of broadcasting hours 32.

Interviewees showed the following preferences. Those classed in category ‘O’ prefer to watch TV either in Castilian (61 percent) or in both languages indistinctly (36.5 percent). Interviewees in category ‘A’ prefer viewing TV in their own language, Catalan (60.5 percent), or in both languages indistinctly (32 percent). Interviewees in category ‘B’ state that they watch programmes irrespective of the language in which they are broadcast (62.2 percent), others (22.5 percent) prefer to view in Castilian and 15.1 percent in Catalan. Category ‘C’ interviewees were used by the opposition parties for launching sweeping and relentless attacks on the socialists and its Catalan ‘accomplices’—has considerably muddled, to worrying extremes, the political atmosphere.

32 In any case, broadcasts in Catalan and in Castilian, taken globally, have an approximately balanced following, as has been shown by numerous audience studies carried out in recent years. Since 1994 there is a new important actor in the media scene: the municipal administration of the city of Barcelona—under the continuous control of the Catalan socialists—have decided to launch its own municipal-metropolitan owned TV channel: Barcelona Televisió. This has been interpreted by some as a challenge to the nationalists virtual monopoly of TV broadcasting in Catalan in the territory of Catalonia.
are roughly divided down the middle between preferences for programmes ‘in Catalan’ (47.8 percent) and ‘in either language’ (45.6 percent). The market, as well as viewers preferences, are nearly evenly divided between the vernacular and Castilian.

On a level which reflects more personal commitment and a certain potential for division ‘along ethnic lines’, interviewees revealed the following preferences with respect to choice of friends. 34 percent of individuals classed in category ‘O’ prefer to socialise with people who speak the same language as themselves; the same was true of 33.5 percent in category ‘A’ and 10.5 percent in category ‘B’. In category ‘C’, 28 percent prefer friends who speak Catalan and 6.5 percent those who speak Castilian. However, the most predominant attitude is one of openness and tolerance, interviewees refuse to take the ethnolinguistic label into account when choosing their friends. Individuals classed in category ‘B’ are most emphatic in their refusal to take this factor into account (81.5 percent), roughly 65 percent of individuals from each of the other categories also feels the same way.

Interviewees’ opinions on the use of the two languages present in the area in schools are of particular relevance at the moment, given the current controversy surrounding the issue and its intrinsic importance. 86 percent of individuals classed in category ‘A’, 68 percent of those in category ‘B’ and 88.5 percent in category ‘C’ (less important in quantitative terms), in other words, the vast majority of interviewees, are in favour of a primary school system where Catalan is the vehicular language. This is taken to mean primary schools where classes are given in Catalan and in which Castilian would have no more than a complementary status, either as an obligatory or a voluntary subject. Category ‘O’ is the only one where a majority (62.5 percent) are in favour of schools using Castilian in the classroom, rather than Catalan (37.5 percent). The same opinion is shared by 12.5 percent of individuals in category ‘A’, 32.5 percent of those in category ‘B’ and 11.5 percent in category ‘C’. The public consensus over this fundamental issue of educational policy is quite high:
school education should be in Catalan, the regional language. However, this should not be allowed to obscure the proportions of people from the various categories who want their children to be taught in Castilian, especially so in the light of the direct implications of this issue as concerns fundamental rights of the individual, and in this case, paradoxically, the rights of a minority within a minority.

The above-mentioned consensus on the topic of school education is not so apparent in replies to the question: ‘If you had to go to an official body in order to attend to some business, in which language would you prefer to be addressed, Castilian or Catalan?’. A majority of interviewees in category ‘A’ (73 percent) and ‘C’ (58.5 percent) preferred Catalan. On the contrary, Castilian was the preferred option for individuals in category ‘O’ (80 percent). Category ‘B’ individuals did not perceive the language of the bureaucracy as a problem, and the majority of them (56.5 percent) replied ‘I don’t mind’. Considerable proportions of interviewees in categories ‘A’ and ‘C’ adopt the same attitude of indifference or coldness towards an equally cold bureaucracy. What is evident is that there is little open support for Castilian in this domain (with the exception of the above-mentioned category ‘O’ interviewees): only 25 percent in category ‘B’, 4.5 percent in category ‘C’ and 4 percent in category ‘A’ would prefer to be addressed in Castilian in a bureaucratic context. Unlike the vernacular, Castilian does not arouse great emotion or loyal enthusiasm, despite its still ubiquitous presence in the region. Once again, this provokes reflection on the chasms between reality and desire in Catalonia, the force of practical circumstances and personal and collective will-power orientated to the future.

Language doubtlessly plays an extremely important role in the shaping of Catalan identity. However, when the interviewees are asked the question (so befitting of the artificiality of sociological surveys!) ‘Who is Catalan?’—in other words, what criteria have to be fulfilled for a person to be considered
Catalan—language surprisingly slips into second place. When the interviewees are placed in this particular scenario, other factors come into the forefront. We will now look at their replies, in some detail, firstly from the 1983 survey. When asked in the form of an open-ended question, 29.4 percent of the autochthonous individuals firstly answered ‘those born in the region’; plus an additional 2.8 percent of them who mentioned this in second place. However, if we look at the total number of times each factor was mentioned—two were taken into account, the two that were mentioned or that were most emphasised by the interviewee in his ‘open’ answer to the question—a purely subjective or voluntaristic factor, rather than birthplace, heads the list: ‘whoever feels Catalan, whoever wants to be’ (42.1 percent of times mentioned). The other factors mentioned frequently were the following: ‘those who value Catalonia and all things Catalan’ (28.8 percent) and ‘those who speak Catalan’ (28.3 percent).

In contrast, the non-autochthonous individuals emphasised the following factors, in order of importance: ‘those who were born in Catalonia’ (56.3 percent), ‘whoever feels and wants to be Catalan’ (33.1 percent), ‘anyone who lives and works in Catalonia’ (20.6 percent) and ‘those who value Catalonia and all things Catalan’ (21.3 percent). Only 16.5 percent of non-autochthonous individuals mention the need to speak Catalan. In a global comparison of the replies of autochthonous inhabitants and immigrants, one notes that while the former dwell upon the individual’s will and the sentiments of the person, and only mention birthplace in second place, the latter reverse the order of priority of these two factors. On the other hand, the autochthonous individuals in the sample consider it quite important, though not essential, that the person speaks the vernacular; while the immigrants do not put so much emphasis on this point, stressing instead a factor related directly to their own situation, namely ‘to live and work in Catalonia’.

In another question, closed-ended this time, the interviewees were asked to express an opinion on the importance that they
attributed to ten preselected factors (which approximately corresponded with those mentioned ‘spontaneously’ by them in the preceding open-ended question) in relation to a hypothetical claim to ‘catalananness’. At this point in the interview, the autochthonous individuals discreetly relegate to sixth place the birthplace factor; in other words, this is not of decisive importance to them. Instead, they once more lay emphasis on factors related to the individuals’ will, and their actions which are proof of that will, to be accepted as Catalan (‘all those who want to be considered Catalan and who behave accordingly should be so considered’). They also stress, if to a lesser extent, the need for the person to speak Catalan, as well as a rather passive and ill-defined requisite ‘that the person adapts to Catalan customs’.

Not such a sharp contrast is apparent in the non-autochthonous individuals’ replies to this last question. This group places similar emphasis, if moderately, on the following factors: ‘to value all things Catalan’, ‘to wish to be Catalan’, ‘to defend all things Catalan’, ‘to have been born in the region’ and ‘to adapt to local customs’. The factor, which one may consider as rather circumstantial, of ‘living and working in Catalonia’ is to the immigrants equally important or more so than the ability to speak the regional language, although they do not place strong emphasis on either of these two factors.

Turning to the two questions in which the interviewee was asked to express an opinion about the constituent elements of the Catalan *ethnos*, it would be perhaps most interesting to see to what extent variables such as age, level of formal education and political affiliation influence the replies given. The age variable has a considerable influence on the global demands made by that person. The older the interviewee is, the more demanding he or she is when faced with a hypothetical claimant to ‘catalananness’. On this point, we should take into account the way in which replies are influenced by the lack of ‘resonance of relevance’ to interviewees of certain rather abstract and artificial questions; in addition to mere comprehension of it—and doubtlessly this
diminishes with age—which also has a bearing on the answers given. In general, the younger interviewees evidently grasp the ‘meaning’ of questions better, as well as the expectations of the interviewer! They are also more discriminating in the scoring questions, a more significant and marked grading is apparent in their replies. For the younger interviewees, being Catalan has more to do with the individual’s will, sentiment and a behaviour which might be taken as testimony to it. In contrast, the older interviewees, although they also emphasise these factors, place more stress on requisites over which the hypothetical claimant to ‘catalanness’ has no control: ‘to have been born in Catalonia’, ‘to be born to a Catalan family, to have Catalan forefathers’, ‘to have Catalan as mother tongue’. The replies of the middle-aged interviewees are similar to those of the young interviewees, if a little less clearly defined.

The **level of education** variable has a similar but not identical effect to that of age. Thus, for example, the global exigency of interviewees vis-à-vis the hypothetical claimant to ‘catalanness’ increases with level of education, as it does with age, although it does so for different reasons. Thus, while those with the highest level of formal education prioritise the subjective factor ‘to want to be Catalan and become assimilated’, and minimise the importance of having ‘Catalan parents or grandparents’, the interviewees with the lowest level of formal education stressed the subjective notion ‘to value all things Catalan’, and thought that voting or not voting for ‘Catalan’ (that is, nationalist) political parties was unimportant. As the level of formal education of individuals increases, there is a marked decrease in the importance attributed to factors over which the claimant has no control, such as birthplace and autochthonous ancestry. The comment made concerning ‘resonance of relevance’ and mere intelligibility of the question posed, depending on age, also applies to the level of formal education variable: those with a higher level of formal education are more discriminating than those with less formal education, although they express this in a less radical way than the younger interviewees. Of course, it happens that the
younger interviewees are generally also more educated, and they therefore manifest in their answers the combined effect of the two variables.

If we look at the voting preference or political affiliation variable, one observes that those who vote for parties perceived as being more Catalanist or nationalist are more demanding with respect to the requisites: ‘to speak catalan’, ‘to want to be Catalan, to become assimilated’, ‘to adapt to Catalan customs’ and ‘to value all things Catalan’. Supporters of parties with less pronounced nationalist leanings place more emphasis on the factors outside the candidate’s control, such as ‘to have been born in Catalonia’ or ‘to have Catalan parents or grandparents’. As one would expect, the national self-identification variable exerts similar influence to that of voting preference, since there obviously exists a previous strong correlation between the two. Overall, the observed congruence between self-identification and voting preferences and level of ethnic demand is quite significant. The political-ideological factor is shown to be of decisive importance in determining ethnic attitudes.

The replies to an analogous question in the CIS’93 survey are in agreement with those to the 1983 survey 33. Perhaps one of the most significant things revealed in the answers to this question in the CIS’93 survey is that, of the six factors put forward to the interviewee, ability to speak the regional language is relegated to fourth position. 49 percent of individuals in category ‘O’, 61.5 percent in category ‘B’ and 67 percent in category ‘A’ consider that it is necessary to speak Catalan in order to be accepted as such. In

33 However, it is difficult to compare the two sets of data due to the rather different formulation of the question in the CIS’93 survey. The interviewee was asked ‘Now, tell me if you consider each of the following conditions as necessary for a person to be considered Catalan’ (and a list containing six sentences or factors is shown to the interviewee, who has to reply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to each one of them in turn).
a way which corresponds to the answers obtained in the 1983 survey, people in the three largest categories stressed to a greater extent than the others factors which are dependent on personal choice, as for example ‘to want to become Catalan’: 93 percent in category ‘A’, 91 percent in category ‘B’ and 79.5 percent in category ‘O’ considered that a person should primarily have a positive attitude to become Catalan in order to be accepted as such. The voluntaristic, non-adscriptive factors—more in line with what would be implied in the concept of *demos*, rather than that of *ethnos*—tend to be stressed.

The same patterns in the global degree of exigency—dependent on the variable ‘mother tongue or language spoken at home when a child’—obtain in all six options presented to the interviewees in the 1993 survey, except one. That is to say, individuals classed in category ‘A’ are consistently more demanding, next in line come those in category ‘B’ and, at a considerable distance, those in category ‘O’. The degree of global exigency is lowered in line with the objective circumstances of the interviewees. Obviously they think of themselves as potential claimants to ‘catalanness’ and want easy access to it, to be included and not excluded from the Catalan *demos*.

The artificiality and limitations of sociological surveys as instruments for researching such elusive and ambiguous issues as these should put us on our guard when interpreting the results that they yield. However, in general terms, these indicators are in keeping with the conclusions that one can draw using more qualitative techniques, as, for instance, those put into effect during an extended period of fieldwork *in situ*... To present here the

34 For a word of caution on the fiability of sociological surveys or opinion polls, see: Pierre Bourdieu ‘L’opinion publique n’existe pas’ in *Questions de Sociologie* Paris: Minuit, 1980.
relevant 'ethnographic' evidence collected during fieldwork would be too long-winded, though 35.

By way of conclusion, I would like to point out two things. Firstly, the lack of correspondence which has already been pointed out between the implicit and explicit levels pertaining to the representation and expression of collective identities, particularly as regards the role ascribed to the ethno-cultural and language elements. Secondly, I believe that attention should be drawn to the fact that a strong emphasis is laid upon 'civic' values rather than 'ethnic' or racist ones, when defining collective identity at the regional-national level. In short, Catalonia is conceptualised more as a *demos* than as an *ethnos*. This hypothesis is strongly corroborated by the interviewees' replies taken in full context, in the frame of the survey's interview itself or elsewhere in more ethnographic approaches. The individuals interviewed prioritise factors which belong to (roughly speaking!) the *ius solis* sphere, more than those which would belong in the *ius sanguinis* sphere. Stress is placed more on values of citizenship that are befitting of an open society than ethno-racial ones characteristic of a closed society. That is, citizenship taken in the modern 'republican' sense of the concept 36. One could carefully consider to what extent political discourse, from the different quarters of the political spectrum, corresponds or makes violence in each case to the attitudes and representations prevalent among the citizenry.

Whatever be the case, the ethno-linguistic factor is not emphasised by common people in explicit discourse, despite its unquestionable importance at the cognitive, implicit level. In my opinion this is so because the interviewees (and Catalan people in

35 The ethnographic evidence has been presented elsewhere, alongside a more detailed analysis of part of the quantitative data which here appears in summarised form: Andrés Barrera-González *La dialéctica de la identidad... op cit* pags. 321-331.

general, in as far as individuals in the sample might be considered to represent them) are fully aware of the fact that to do so would mean excluding a high percentage of the population who are in all other respects fully entitled to Catalan citizenship. However, emphasising more immaterial factors related to the individual’s attitudes, will, and sentiment—in short, the personal disposition of claimants to ‘catalanness’ as regards to all that being Catalan is taken to imply—, interviewees manifest a very tolerant attitude towards a hypothetical full integration of these ‘other Catalans’ into the Catalan demos in a not too distant future 37. Adopting a less open and tolerant attitude would effectively run the risk to provoke the severance of Catalan society in two distinct ethnolinguistic social categories, and their potential confrontation along socioeconomic and politico-cultural cleavage lines. This is a scenario which the larger political parties in Catalonia have always been anxious to prevent becoming a reality. The consensus at the political-partisan level—often put, in later times, under considerable strain, due to pressure coming from radical nationalistic and other political quarters inside and outside Catalonia—is a reflection of a strong de facto and admirable consensus previously existing on these issues at the level of common citizenry.

D. Conflicting identities and political patterns

Individuals become effectively incorporated into a complex network of identification references by ascription or through cumulative sociopolitical interaction. This could be represented by means of an identification matrix, or as in a series of horizontal

37 The concept was invented, and later on adopted as part of popular lore, by Francisco Candel Els altres catalans Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1964.
layers. With regard to the eco-territorial dimensions of collective identities, a schema of concentric circles might be a more appropriate form of representation. Through the diverse processes of socialisation and enculturation, individuals acquire a sense of belonging and, given the circumstances, feel compelled to express some degree of loyalty to all those collective categories and territorial entities to which they have become ascribed throughout their life course.

Territorial entities, specifically, can be assembled hierarchically. They nest in each other, which allows for a simultaneous or parallel expression of loyalty to all of them. When, at a certain level of the socioterritorial hierarchy, simultaneous expressions of loyalty are felt to be 'logically' incongruent or politically incompatible—because both entities are seen as exclusive of each other, competing for the same niche in the matrix—conflict then arises. Needless to say, these are not static phenomena but intrinsically dynamic, variable through time and space, and linked to specific global circumstances. The analysis of discourse makes it very clear that construction and deconstruction of collective identities is, by its very nature, bound by circumstance.

Ethnonationalisms or peripheral nationalisms, however we might wish to label these historical and sociological phenomena, can be construed as examples of the sort of incompatibility or conflict of loyalties described above in the abstract. No conflict would arise just because individuals feel Catalan, no matter how strongly, as long as that sentiment is not founded to any significant degree on a simultaneous rejection of a sense of Spanishness, on a level higher up the hierarchy of nested territorial categories.

If we now move on to thinking not in naked logical, but in historical terms, we will easily conclude that a smooth assemblage of social or territorial entities can very seldom be attained. It is more likely that in concrete historical circumstances competition will arise for limited material and political resources, whether
they are real or just perceived as such. For we tend to look at this competition in terms of zero-sum or limited-good games logic. That is, sociopolitical actors usually take the arena in which economic and political competition happens to be a stationary rather than an inflationary universe. On the other hand, it so happens that collective identities are worked out as much in opposition to as in solidarity with each other, which applies as much to simple segmentary societies as to larger and complex ones, at any of their socioterritorial levels. In short, conflict erupts when one entity encroaches upon another’s political field, or is perceived as having encroached upon it historically. Such conflict manifests itself in a competitive struggle for the same ecopolitical niche.

Let us now look briefly at the dynamics of this type of conflictive process. Writing about collective identities in Spain at the local level, the ethnologist Caro Baroja makes use of the concept of sociocentrism. Sociocentric discourse revolves around praise of the virtues of the group to which one belongs and loathing of the real or imaginary shortcomings of the rival neighbouring ones. Villagers, in this case, attempt to enhance what they perceive as their ethical and moral strengths by contrasting them with the perceived weaknesses of the neighbouring village groups, which are exaggerated and made into a caricature. The logic and dynamics of this kind of discourse, crude but appallingly effective, and in specific historical

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circumstances frighteningly so, springs from three basic practical beliefs 39:

a) That the worthy things are those which belong to Us;
b) In contrast, what belongs to Them is worthless and despicable;
c) And, worst of all is that which belongs to our closest neighbours.

Sociocentrism or exacerbated localism, as in the case of most ‘ethnonational’ identities, operates by the unfolding of two complementary impulses: a drive or impulse of homology towards the inside of the group, and a drive of differentiation towards outside groups, in keeping with Caro Baroja’s terminology. These two practical coexisting impulses prove useful in highlighting what we think we share or have in common with individuals categorised as being members of the in-group; and in parallel, what sets us apart from individuals categorised as being members of out-groups. In functionalistic terms, we also know that group identity is enhanced through a process of dialectical juxtaposition of outgroups on the same structural level. Thus, sociocentrism can be understood as a variant of a more universal phenomenon, namely ethnocentrism. The fact that ethnocentric attitudes, and the concomitant prejudices and stereotypes about the external Others, are so widespread is maybe due to a sort of universal human urgency to feel that one is right, and somehow morally superior to those around oneself 40. Moreover, we have got to trust that our reality model or world view, and the ways of doing

39 Julio Caro Baroja ‘El sociocentrismo de los pueblos españoles’ en Razas, pueblos y linajes Madrid: Istmo, 197?

40 There are also important implications at the level of economic and social interaction. For ethnic boundaries, which are maintained in spite of systematic exchanges across them, might serve important functions at the social, political and economic level. On the uses of the frontier, see the classic work by Fredrik Barth, ed. Ethnic groups and boundaries... op cit (Introduction by F. Barth)
things (ethics, morals) that spring from it, are basically correct, good and proper. Thus, the struggle for identity unfolds on two levels simultaneously, between two poles 41: a positive impulse which increases the sense of belonging and participation of individuals in the life of the in-group, and an impulse in the opposite direction which stresses differentiation, exclusion and eventually aggression towards individuals perceived as being members of rival out-groups, the external ‘Others’.

In my research I have studied the workings of collective identities at different levels of sociopolitical interaction, and specifically at the different levels on the socioterritorial scale. And surely it can be observed that basic parallels exist in this respect at the local and the regional or national level. I will here refer only to findings concerning the ethnoregional level, though. In carrying out the 1983 sociological survey, I paid specific attention to the analysis of the role played by prejudice and stereotypes in enhancing in-group identity and a sense of cohesiveness. It was found that for Catalans self-assertion as such goes with, or implies, the following:

a) An overestimation of ethical and moral values attributed to the Catalan *ethnos* as compared to those attributed to other ethnoregional out-groups. This comes as no surprise, since we have already made reference to the universality of ethnocentric attitudes. It is worth mentioning, though, the high rate of self-esteem shown by Catalans as an ethnonational group.

b) The most negative stereotypes are used against those ethnoregional out-groups that are perceived as being the greatest rivals or competitors in the Spanish political arena. That is, people from Madrid and, for different, complex reasons, people from the region of Valencia, despite the fact that they share a language and

a good part of their history. The consistently unfavourable stereotypes and prejudiced opinions expressed against these regional out-groups reflect the perception of the existence of tension and conflict in their mutual relationships. At the same time, prejudice might act as justification for an estranged or hostile de facto attitude and behaviour towards them.

c) Stereotypes serve the useful purpose of drawing clear-cut boundaries between the dialectically opposed ethnocultural groups, increasing the sociocultural distance that is perceived as setting them apart. Objective or imaginary differences in values, idiosyncrasies, ideologies, etc. are emphasised and manipulated to achieve this end.

d) Expressions of ‘solidarity across ethnic boundaries’ can sometimes be observed at work, in favour of those out-groups which are perceived as being similarly in conflict with the ‘common enemy’, the centralist Spanish state, reified in the national capital city Madrid. This, from the Catalan perspective, applies mainly to Basques, and to a lesser extent to Galicians as well.

e) A positive, neutral or only slightly negative stereotype is construed in relation to those regional out-groups which are not perceived as posing a threat in any way. This reflects a relationship free of tensions, sometimes favoured by sheer geographical or sociopolitical distance.

All these strategies of differentiation and in-group identity assertion serve the purpose of drawing clear-cut boundaries at the symbolic-political level, particularly where not much of an objective boundary really exists. Indirectly, they also serve the functional purpose of enhancing a sense of internal ‘ethnic solidarity’ and compactness, assuming that the members of the sociocultural category concerned have so many things in common. In short, at work is an effort aimed at giving a homogeneous image of the in-group and establishing clear cut boundaries differentiating it from out-groups. This might serve to justify estrangement, hostile attitudes and eventually violence against
those taken as ‘Other’ in opposition to ‘Us’. Blind in-group solidarity is thus shown to be an inescapable need somehow, a sort of moral and political imperative imposed upon the individual, the more so in the context of perceived threats to the integrity of the in-group, which at a certain stage does not matter whether they are real or imaginary anymore.

Yet, stereotypes and prejudice are not articulated with the same intensity and consistency by every individual of the in-group. Many might even actively resist sharing those prejudices and stereotypes. Nevertheless, they characteristically permeate the social body. They dominate public opinion and attitudes in the group as a whole. In times of crisis (a period of weakness or break up of the encompassing polity and/or interethnic strife) strong evidence exists which shows how easily prejudices can spread throughout and dominate the attitudes and actual behaviour of the group as a whole, giving way to hostility and violence against all the members of perceived enemy out-groups indiscriminately.

As generalised phenomena, collective identities (ethnic and national identities would be specific forms of collective identity) cannot be reduced nor confined to their economic or sociological constituent elements, whatever we might take them to be. Consciousness of being or belonging is of the utmost importance. Consciousness of belonging partially derives from historical ‘objective’ fact—redefined or recreated in every circumstance—, particular shared world views and idiosyncrasies, and cultural specificities. That is, a degree of ‘ethnic’ substantive content ought to exist. However, all this would have to be mobilised by political will in specific historical circumstances, so as to become an active collective identity. Beyond that, for a forthright ethnonationalist movement to become a political actor, a consistent ideology and a political agenda has to be articulated. Moreover, for such a movement to be successful, an opportunity has to arise to seize power from the centre that has been monopolising it so far. Roughly speaking, this is analogous to that conceptual distinction that is made in marxian terms—which might be considered a little
old-fashioned nowadays—between class in itself and class for itself. But let us now proceed to analyse the Catalan case as one such ethnonationalist phenomenon.

As I mentioned before, my primary interest at the time of carrying out field research in 1980-83 was to analyse how collective identities are defined in discourse. Moreover, I tried to measure the extent to which those feelings of belonging to an entity named Catalonia were widespread and how strong they were. To that end—and as a complement to a prolonged period of in situ fieldwork—I carried out a sociological survey. One of the questions, in open-ended format, put to the interviewees was: ‘Imagine that you are now in a foreign country. What would you say if someone is to ask you: “where are you from”? ’ Here are the results, in percentages, differentiating the answers of autochthonous Catalan speakers (category ‘A’) from those of Castilian-speaking immigrants (category ‘B’):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>* Category ‘A’</th>
<th>** Category ‘B’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Catalonia, Catalan</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Catalonia, Spain (both)</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From ‘near Barcelona’</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Spain, Spanish</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = 400) (n = 288) (n = 101)

* Autochthonous, of Catalan mother tongue  
** First and second generation immigrants, of Castilian or Spanish mother tongue

Being in a hypothetical foreign country many autochthonous Catalans often show a strong urge to identify themselves as such, so as to try to avoid being categorised as Spanish—as would logically be expected in that context—, a national label which they
feel uneasy about. This motivation is heightened because many of them, as they will readily tell you, have experienced how hard it is having to work against established national categories and the prejudices and stereotypes they carry with them. In short, their consciousness of belonging to an entity named Catalonia is asserted more effectively *vis à vis* those entities on the level of established nation-states (implicitly showing what their political aspirations are); and in dialectical opposition to the political entity that encompasses them and somehow denies their becoming a distinguishable entity in turn, an independent whole 42. In their answers to this open-ended hypothetical question, interviewees often go on to explain that, in any case, what they would like to stress to their interlocutors, with their atypical hypothetical answer, is the fact that they are a different people, not quite like the rest of the Spaniards.

Writing about the emergence of new states in the colonial periphery, Clifford Geertz points out that ‘new states are abnormally susceptible to serious disaffection based on primary attachments’ (those derived from kinship, religion, language, or distinctive cultural traits) 43. In many respects, this has been

42 Thus, the Government of the Generalitat de Catalunya felt perfectly justified in spending hundreds of millions on a publicity campaign in the run-up to the Olympic Games ’92, which was carried in several major international newspapers and magazines, to educate the world (and obliquely the domestic fold as well) concerning the existence of an entity known as Catalonia, which must stand by itself. The motto of that publicity campaign was: ‘Where is Barcelona?’ [printed on a physical map of the Iberian Peninsula] ‘In Catalonia, of course’ [phrase now standing below a print with the boundaries of Catalonia highlighted, against the background of the same physical map]. Needless to say, this publicity was well reported in the Spanish press and media, eliciting an uproar of criticism and even outrage. The Generalitat authorities had in this way an indirect confirmation of their conviction that symbols are shares with a good political return, thus worth investing in.

proved valid also in the case of some old European states—with constituent units that display differential ethnocultural compositions, and that are badly integrated due to cleavages of different character and perceived differing interests—, showing how resilient primordial feelings and loyalties can be. Following Geertz’s argument, I am making a distinction between the concept of primordial loyalties and that of civic attachments.

Thus, we will observe that in the case of Catalonia primordial sentiment does not correspond to the boundaries of the established nation-state, at least regarding a sizable proportion of the population. There exists a very noticeable split in primordial sentiment among many Catalans which strongly affects the shape of their civic attachments. To many individuals, their assertion as Catalans conveys a weakening, even a plain rejection at times, of a simultaneous identification as Spanish. In more general terms, less loaded politically, one cannot be fully Catalan and Spanish at the same time. A number of individuals perceive that both entities compete for the status of nation, and are thus judged incompatible, since a nation cannot be ultimately subordinated to another. And in the last instance, there is no doubt where primordial loyalties would lie for many people.

In two open-ended questions I asked interviewees for a personal appraisal of the entities ‘Catalonia’ and ‘Spain’: ‘What is Catalonia/Spain for you?’ An overwhelming majority of the individuals interviewed gave very positive appraisals of Catalonia, quite independently of their having Catalan or Spanish as their mother tongue, that is, independently of their ethnocultural identity. Nevertheless, autochthonous interviewees often replied emphatically, their appraisals of Catalonia being generally not just positive but emotionally-charged. The consensus beyond ‘ethnolinguistic boundaries’ concerning Catalonia, did not hold when they were asked to make an appraisal of the entity Spain. The answers were now neatly
contrasted along the ethnolinguistic boundary:

39.8% of autochthonous interviewees (category ‘A’) and 75.5% of non-autochthonous (category ‘B’) gave positive replies

21.7% of autochthonous interviewees (category ‘A’) and 4.7% of non-autochthonous (category ‘B’) gave negative replies

Having made a detailed statistical analysis of the data gathered with these two open-ended questions, the following conclusions can be drawn: It is the youngest, and also the oldest, those with higher levels of formal education and those aligning themselves with nationalist political parties (this last, of course, is close to a meaningless tautology!) who reject the concept of Spain more radically, manifesting in higher proportions that they have negative or indifferent feelings towards it. That is, they do not show a great deal of political loyalty towards the nation-state. This contrasts with a generally favourable attitude and strong primordial loyalty manifested towards the nation, that is Catalonia: age, formal education and political alignment having no noticeable bearing in this respect. It would be interesting to thoroughly investigate to what extent these attitudes, feelings and opinions might have changed after ten years of coexistence in a fully democratic Spain. But, again, it would be too laborious to do so at this stage. I will only briefly comment on some additional data derived from two analogous questions put in the CIS’93 survey.

The problem with the two relevant questions in the CIS’93 survey is that—apart from their being closed-ended instead of open-ended questions—, there exists a lack of correspondence in the formulation of both the questions and the options given the interviewee to choose from in each of them, that about the respective autonomous community and the one about Spain. This
is potentially a strong biasing factor 44. Nevertheless, here are the relevant results. Catalonia is considered ‘a nation’ by 46 percent of individuals in category ‘A’, as well as 32.5 percent in category ‘C’; but only 13 percent in category ‘B’ and ‘5’ percent in category ‘O’ choose that definition of Catalonia. 51.5 percent of individuals in category ‘O’ choose the now debasing characterisation of Catalonia as ‘a region of Spain’; as well as 27 percent of individuals in category ‘B’, but only a handful of people in categories ‘A’ (11 percent) and ‘C’ (8.5 percent) do so. The aseptic, matter-of-fact definition of Catalonia as ‘an autonomous community’ is preferred by 40.5 percent of individuals in category ‘B’, 33.5 percent of individuals in category ‘O’, 22.5 percent in category ‘A’ and 22 percent in category ‘C’. The more ambiguous option, as to what interviewees might take it to mean (although I think it is mostly a positive-affective appraisal), phrased as ‘a people with a language of their own’, is chosen by 37 percent of individuals in category ‘C’, 20.5 percent in category ‘A’, 19.5 percent in category ‘B’ and only 9.5 percent in category ‘O’. The contrast shown in the options chosen by individuals of the different ‘ethnolinguistic’ categories is quite sharp. Catalonia means very different things for different people.

And what about Spain? Those options which seem oriented to elicit a positive appraisal, by way of an enticing definition of the

44 I wonder whether those responsible for the elaboration of the questionnaire were consciously or unconsciously looking for a chance to bridge the ‘scandalous’ gap, which regularly appears in sociological surveys of this nature, in the goodwill shown by the interviewees towards the nationality and the nation-state, since the formulation of the question related to Spain would in principle seem to be intended to produce a bias in favour of this entity. If that was the intention, I am not sure that they have succeeded in their machinations!, at least in what concerns the Catalan sub-sample. It is, in any case, an example of poor standards of professionalism. Fortunately, this does not apply to the the formulation of the rest of the questions in the questionnaire, nor to the project as a whole, which is a remarkably good one (notwithstanding this little blunder!).
entity (see, footnote #44), collect quite disappointing results (tricky, isn’t it?; there may be a problem of resonance of relevance here, which has foiled the intentions of some anonymous amateur sociologist; or was he a masked enemy of Spain, in fact?). A very proper civic definition of Spain as ‘the state of which I am a citizen’ is preferred by: 17.5 percent of individuals in category ‘A’, 15 percent in category ‘B’, 10 percent in category ‘O’ and only 4.5 percent in category ‘C’. More disappointing results were in store for the two options that I take as being the most irritatingly biased, compared to the formulation of options in the previous question on Catalonia. ‘A nation of which I feel a member’ (in contrast with the dry phrase: ‘a nation’) is chosen by 11.5 percent of individuals in category ‘B’, 8 percent in category ‘A’, 7 percent in category ‘C’ and 5.5 percent in category ‘O’. ‘Something special, a product of History, which unites those of us who live here, and that I would not know how to define’ (heavens!) is the option chosen by a mere 6.5 per cent of individuals in category ‘A’, 4.5 per cent in category ‘C’, 2.5 per cent in category ‘B’ and 1.5 per cent in category ‘O’ (they must have been put off by the vacuous pomposity of the paragraph!). The answers of interviewees to this question, as it were, cluster around the two remaining options. The matter-of-fact definition of Spain as ‘a State comprised of several nationalities’ is chosen by: 54.5 percent of individuals in category ‘C’, 49 percent in category ‘A’, 22.5 percent in category ‘B’ and 7.5 percent in category ‘O’. The vague option, but surely positive-affective definition in this context, of ‘my country’ is preferred by: 75.5 percent of individuals in category ‘O’, 48 percent of individuals in category ‘B’, 29.5 percent in category ‘C’ and only 19 percent in category ‘A’.

It is evident, again, that Spain means very different things for different people (notwithstanding the awkward machinations of certain sociologists!). In any case, we have been shown that the ‘ethnocultural (linguistic)’ factor is a very powerfully discriminative variable in this respect that is, in the particular case
of Catalonia. Statistical analysis consistently shows the existence of strong correlations between national identification indices and the ‘ethnocultural’ factor. It is never wholly clear, though, who have ultimately won a battle fought over meaning, concepts and symbols. In the regional context that occupies us now, it seems that Catalonia so far has the upper hand, in this peculiar emotive-symbolic battle with Spain, at this historico-political moment. Nonetheless, one should be aware that symbols follow their own winding paths, hidden to a common person’s sight, and that they might suddenly emerge into the open with a powerful thrust, taking by surprise many who were complacently sitting on the Pandora’s box to which they thought they had the key.

Next to the question commented on above, I asked the interviewees in northeastern Catalonia, in 1983, to state more explicitly which was the label that they thought might better correspond to their feelings concerning ‘national self-

45 The above mentioned correspondence is not so strong and consistent in the case of the Basque Country, though. And interestingly enough, the correlation is very weak, almost non-existent, in another two of the cases studied in the CIS’93 survey: Galicia and the País Valencià. A thorough analysis of the results of this survey along the lines referred to here is made in the second of the papers presented at the European Forum, confirming this striking contrast between Catalonia and Euskadi on one hand, and Galicia and País Valencià on the other, as to the determining and explanatory value of the ethno-linguistic factor.

46 I am sure that many were taken aback in Catalonia by such a sudden reappearance of unmistakeable signs of strong Spanish nationalist or patriotic pride, which they might have thought well buried, on Catalan soil at least, when the Olympic stadium in Barcelona was flooded with an astonishing sea of Spanish flags on the occasion of the soccer final, when Spain’s team defeated Poland’s. And this happened right at the time when so many crucial battles had been won for Catalonia in the same arena, having to do with the use of Catalan as one of the official languages and the prominent place accorded to other primary Catalan symbols throughout the 1992 Olympic Games ceremonies.
identification’, choosing among five given possibilities, in a close-ended question. These are the results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Category ‘A’</th>
<th>Category ‘B’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just Spanish</td>
<td>0.7 %</td>
<td>44.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Spanish than Catalan</td>
<td>1.4 %</td>
<td>13.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As much Spanish as Catalan</td>
<td>19.4 %</td>
<td>30.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Catalan than Spanish</td>
<td>39.8 %</td>
<td>7.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Catalan</td>
<td>38.8 %</td>
<td>2.8 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = 400) (n = 294) (n = 106)

It can be observed that a marked contrast is apparent between the replies of autochthonous individuals and those of first and second generation immigrants to the region. For most of the former, strong identification as Catalans completely overshadows, even negates, their expected simultaneous identification as Spanish. In analysing the influence of several main independent variables, I found again that it is the youngest (and the oldest), those with higher levels of formal education and those aligning themselves with nationalistic political parties (a rather tautological correlation) who overemphasise their identity as primarily or exclusively Catalan. (Notwithstanding the unresolved methodological quandary of to what extent a simple question in a sociological questionnaire is appropriate to research such a complex issue!). Whatever be the case, a major breach occurs in the logical argument of simultaneous ascription to the nested socioterritorial categories (the identification matrix: for a fair proportion of autochthonous Catalans, simultaneous loyalty to Spain and Catalonia is not possible). The dilemma is solved by choosing to pay primordial loyalty to their ‘lesser’ nationality over due ‘civic’ loyalty to the common nation-state.
The reasons explicitly given, when asked, for this rejection or denial of emotional-political attachment to the nation-state are several. Namely, the suppression and persecution suffered by Catalan culture and language after 1939; the entrenched certainty of having been discriminated against by the Spanish Centralist Administration in all circumstances; the deep feeling that as Catalans they are viewed with envy and enmity by other Spaniards. Current and historical facts, real or imaginary, are brought forward as undeniable and absolute arguments to demonstrate the misfortunes that belonging to the Spanish state has brought upon Catalonia, thus justifying political estrangement and a longing for greater autonomy, and eventually a explicit desire for political independence from Spain 47.

The results of the 1983 survey, carried out in northeastern Catalonia, are basically consistent with those derived from the majority of similar surveys carried out since 1980, and based on a sample of the whole region. Let us look at some results from the most recent one, CIS’93.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cat. ‘O’</th>
<th>Cat. ‘A’</th>
<th>Cat. ‘B’</th>
<th>Cat. ‘C’</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only Spanish</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Spanish than Catalan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As much Spanish as Catalan</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Catalan than Spanish</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Catalan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = 1007) (n = 259) (n = 394) (n = 269)(n = 46)

We have to bear in mind that in the CIS’93 survey a regional sample was taken, whereas in that of 1983 only the northeastern corner of Catalonia was sampled. Besides, a more complex categorisation of the ethnocultural variable has been worked out in the former—based on the language the interviewees declared as their ‘mother tongue’—in contrast with the dichotomous one used in the latter (see footnote at the beginning of chapter C for a description of the four categories). In any case, this particular question is a device with which some sort of ‘national self-identification’ is intended to be measured. No matter how artificial the question might be, it is a fact that most of the interviewees find it somehow relevant and give a reply to it; or to be more precise, they choose one from among the options put to them.

The more complex categorisation of the last variable allows for a more subtle analysis of its interaction with the ‘national self-identification’ variable. Overall, one can observe that, again, a very strong correlation with the ethnolinguistic variable is revealed in the Catalan case. Non-autochthonous individuals who have no command of spoken Catalan identify themselves in a greater proportion as ‘only Spanish’ (48 percent), only 4.5 percent choosing options where the label Catalan overshadows that of Spanish. Quite a different pattern is revealed in the case of first and second generation immigrants who have gained a command of spoken Catalan (category ‘B’): 51.5 percent identify themselves as ‘as much Spanish as Catalan’, 27.5 percent opt for the labels in which Spanish overshadows Catalan, and 21 percent the opposite option. This category of individuals seem to see themselves as having a dual identity. Autochthonous individuals and the offspring of mixed marriages (categories ‘A’ and ‘C’ respectively) choose to identify themselves as primarily or even exclusively Catalan in overwhelming proportions.

Turning to the analysis of how certain factors correlate with the ‘national self-identification’ variable, consistent patterns emerge, not only in the surveys commented upon here but many
others of an analogous character carried out since 1980 in Catalonia 48. The strongest correlation always obtains with the 'ethno-cultural-linguistic' factor. Next in importance seems to be the gender factor: women identify preferably with Catalonia in significantly higher proportions than men. Younger people as well as the older generation identify more strongly with Catalonia than middle-aged individuals. The level of formal education positively correlates with a leaning towards the Catalan pole in the 'national self-identification' scale.

Regarding the evolution of this ad hoc 'national self-identification' index over time, we should firstly point out the remarkable consistency and stability of the patterns that emerge in surveys carried out in Catalonia from 1983 to 1993. Notwithstanding the basic stability of the pattern, one can observe that a certain polarisation has taken place. A number of individuals who ten years ago identified themselves as 'as much Spanish as Catalan' choose to move either to the Spanish pole or, in greater numbers, towards the Catalan pole 49. This is congruent with the evolution of voting patterns in Catalonia over the same period of time, which show a consolidation of the hegemony of the center-right nationalist coalition CiU, as well as a significant advance of the radical center-left nationalist party ERC.

Nonetheless, we should be wary of establishing a straightforward, superficial and simplistic link between the 'ethnocultural' factor, political ideology and voting behaviour. Overall, there is definitely a strong statistical correlation in this

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49 A summary of results derived from surveys carried out by the CIS from 1984 to 1988 has been collected and analysed in Ramon M. Canals et al L’electorat català... op cit, esp. chapter VI.
case yet the relationship could be a little more indirect than one might take it to be. Thus, it is clear that for a majority of interviewees the choice of one or the other label, from the Spanish to the Catalan pole, has to do primarily with sentiment and identity, with no straightforward political implications. Analysing carefully how such a fundamental factor as gender intervenes here, proves just that. Women, we have pointed out, preferably identify in a significantly higher degree than men with Catalonia. Yet, at the same time, indices of political-partisan disinterest, of abstention in elections, and lack of explicit articulation of political options, etc. are consistently higher among women. In the last instance, we would have to take into account differences in the outlook of women and men towards the outside world, and the sub-universe of politics specifically, contrasts in their values system, and different socialisation patterns, to account for the identified contrast between women and men in what concerns 'national self-identification'.

But we must return to our point of departure, after a relevant detour, to confirm: sentiment and self-identity strongly correlate with voting behaviour in Catalonia at this historical moment. Individuals who lean towards the Spanish pole in the 'national self-identification' scale tend to vote for 'Spanish'

No doubt should remain on this point. The correlation is so strong in this case that there is not much to do by way of further statistical analysis (although it is of course interesting to look at the data in detail). Nonetheless, just because a strong statistical correlation appears, does not mean to say that it is proof of the existence of a necessary and full relationship. Besides, the correlation works for the Catalan case, yet it does not do for analogous cases such as those of Galicia and Pais Valencià, as pointed out earlier on in this chapter. Reflections on the limits of sociological surveys as tools of research—commented upon elsewhere—surely apply here. See: F. Pallarès, R.M. Canals, M.R. Virós 'Els eixos de competència electoral' in L'electorat català... It is also imperative to put under close critical scrutiny the global theoretical models devised for making sense of empirical data.
parties such as Partido Popular, CDS or PSC/PSOE; whereas individuals who lean towards the Catalan pole vote for ‘Catalan’ parties CiU, ERC, PSUC (IC/IU), PSC/PSOE, in this order of preference. Among the latter, women prefer the center-right moderate nationalist CiU to a greater extent than men. The inverse pattern, as regards gender, is apparent in relation to ERC, a center-left, radical nationalist party 51.

The Catalan Statute was approved at the end of 1979. A few months later the first elections to the Catalan Parliament in this new democratic era were held. The center-right nationalist party CiU obtained 27.7 percent of the vote. ERC, a centre-left party which is more radically nationalist, gained 8.9 percent of the vote. The hopes of an electoral victory on the part of the parties of the traditional left were dashed in these elections, as the voting patterns shifted considerably in comparison with the previous Spanish general elections of 1979. This shift led to CiU’s share of the vote increasing from 16.1 percent in the G-79 general elections to 27.7 percent in the A-80 regional elections. In contrast, the PSC’s 29.2 percent in the G-79 general elections fell to 26.6 percent in the A-80 autonomous ones. Incidentally, this was the first clear sign of an electoral phenomenon—of key importance in the political panorama of Catalonia—which was to recur in subsequent elections: the shifting electoral loyalties of a significant (and decisive) section of the electorate, depending on the type of election held: national or regional. This is what political scientists

call the 'shifting vote' or 'dual vote' \textsuperscript{52}. We will return to this most important and significant issue later on.

Steady growth of the nationalist vote has been apparent in Catalonia since the first democratic elections held in Spain in 1977. This growth has been at the cost of parties of the left and, to a lesser extent, the conservative 'Spanish' parties, disparagingly referred to from self-identified nationalist quarters as 'partidos sucursalistas' (that is, mere Catalan 'branches' of Spanish parties). The general evolution of voting patterns in Catalonia can be better illustrated—for the purposes of this paper—by contrasting the percentage of the vote won by the expressly defined nationalist parties, the centre-right CiU and the centre-left ERC \textsuperscript{53}, against the vote of the most successful party that does not fall neatly into the nationalist category \textsuperscript{54}: the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC), linked to the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party (PSOE), yet fairly autonomous in its relations with party headquarters in Madrid.

\textsuperscript{52} A detailed and in-depth analysis of this phenomenon, which manifests itself so neatly in Catalonia, and with such decisive political consequences, has been recently carried out by José R. Montero and Joan Font 'El voto dual: lealtad y transferencia de votos en las elecciones autonómicas' in R.M. Canals et al L'electorat català... op cit, pags 183-215. See, also: Andrés Barrera-González La dialéctica de la identidad... op cit, apendix 3.

\textsuperscript{53} As with the data commented upon in the previous paragraph, percentages of the effective vote will be given, rather than percentages of the electoral census.

\textsuperscript{54} There are other important parties, such as the Partit Socialist Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), the communist left, and Partido Popular de Cataluña, the Catalan section of the Spanish conservativy right, etc. Yet, for the purposes of this paper and for the sake of the specific argument to be developed, I did not think it necessary to take into consideration the electoral results of these other political parties.
Evolution of the nationalist vote in Catalonia:

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<td>32.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
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<td>ERC</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>47.5</td>
<td>41.8</td>
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Sources:
Generalitat de Catalunya, sumario estadístico elecciones en Cataluña 1977-1993
The Catalan electorate has voted the PSC into power—by a comfortable majority—in all the general, municipal (the Barcelona town council in particular) and European elections held in Catalonia from 1977 to 1993. Although since the general elections of 1982—in which it won an overwhelming majority of the vote (45.2 percent), in line with its national counterpart, which won by an absolute majority and subsequently came to power in Madrid—the PSC’s lead over the CiU has been gradually eroded in these type of elections as well. This is doubtlessly linked to the PSOE’s decline at the national level. However, the same electorate has consistently voted Convergencia i Unió to victory in the elections to the Catalan regional parliament. CiU won its first victory in the first regional elections, celebrated in 1980, although it was only by a margin of five percent. At that point, the Catalan socialists, frustrated by their unexpected defeat, turned down the formal invitation to enter a coalition government with the nationalists of CiU—perhaps thus sealing their political fate with respect to the government of the Generalitat. In this way, and despite its parliamentary minority, CiU was able to govern in Catalonia for the next four years.

Two years after PSOE’s crushing victory in the national elections, and that of its Catalan counterpart, the PSC, in Catalonia (who won 45.2 percent of the valid votes, the highest ever in any election), the nationalist coalition CiU retorted with greater rotundity in the elections to the Catalan Parliament of 1984. CiU saw its share of the vote increase from 22.2 percent in G-82 to 46.6 percent in A-84, while the PSC’s vote diminished by 15 points, from 45.2 percent to 30.0 percent.

As well as leaving in the sole hands of the nationalists of CiU the building from scratch of the Generalitat’s administration at this crucial stage! This decision of the Catalan Socialists is widely considered today as shortsighted and a very grave mistake, from which profound consequences on the character of the Catalan autonomous administrative apparatus have derived.
This extraordinary shift in the vote, which swept the nationalists to victory, can be explained by the dual vote phenomenon, which was most clearly evident at work in the A-84 regional elections. The other extremely important factor to account for CiU’s victory by an absolute majority was the oscillation in electoral participation. In general terms, abstention in Catalonia—as well as in the rest of Spain—has increased notably since 1982 (although a noticeable recovery in participation levels occurred in the general elections of 1993). However, abstention in Catalonia is always 12 to 15 percent higher in each regional election by comparison with the general elections that immediately precede them. This growth in abstention rates has negatively affected the PSC to a much greater extent than the other parties. In contrast, it works in favour of the nationalist parties, particularly CiU, because the support for the latter is stable and loyal. Consequently, the absolute number of votes for CiU does not need to increase in regional elections for its share of the effective vote to rise considerably, thus allowing them to stay at the helm of the Catalan government to the present day. Since 1980, and more so since 1984, the CiU nationalists have reaped the benefits of these striking electoral phenomena, which are so pronounced and characteristic of the Catalan electorate.

Dual voting patterns—and oscillations in abstention rates—recurred with the same clarity in the A-88 regional elections as in comparison with the G-86 general elections; and again in the 1992 regional elections as compared with the G-89 general elections. Perhaps the ‘wisdom’ of the Catalan electorate lies in having clearly understood, and acted upon this knowledge consistently, that one of the basic principles of a stable democracy is the sharing and division of power. Thus, the Catalan electorate consciously (if we judge by the evidence) or intuitively aims at placing the PSC socialists in charge at the local-municipal level (the city of Barcelona, the municipalities in its industrialised periphery and other large towns in Catalonia) and the CiU nationalists in charge at the regional level.
The fact that the Socialists win a majority of votes in the Catalan constituencies when representatives to the Spanish and European parliaments are being elected, tells us who practises dual voting or exercises to a greater degree their right to abstention on certain occasions. These voters are essentially located in the left and centre-left sections of the political field, and are surely first or second generation immigrants from the other Spanish regions. The autochthonous part of the electorate, on the other hand, do not change their political loyalties or differentially abstain to the same degree 56.

As well as indirectly illustrating the strength of the shifting vote phenomenon, the cross-tabulation of the ‘ethnolinguistic-cultural’ variable with that of voting allegiance corroborates (in the 1983 as well as the CIS’93 sociological surveys) the interpretation referred to above. Thus, looking at the CIS’93 data, the shifting vote figures—which have to be taken grosso modo, bearing in mind the nature of the source—indicate the following: 9 percent of voters in category ‘O’—the majority of whom regularly vote for the PSC—switch their vote to CiU in regional elections, in which 3 percent more of them abstain 57. Individuals in category ‘B’ (who currently vote for the PSC, although a considerable proportion also support CiU, and even 2-3 percent of them vote for ERC) behave similarly to category ‘O’ voters: in the 1992 regional elections 10 percent switched their vote to CiU, 2 percent

56 More on this in: J.R. Montero, J. Font ‘El voto dual: lealtad y transferencia de votos en las elecciones autonómicas’ en R.M. Canals et al L’electorat català...

57 The measured oscillation is that which occurs between the general elections of 1989 and the regional elections of 1992, always taking as reference the information provided by the interviewees themselves concerning their vote.
to ERC and 5 percent opted for abstention. A proportionately much higher percentage of individuals, 13 percent of them, in marginal category ‘C’ (who currently give their support in similar proportions to CiU and the PSC, as well as 6.5 percent for IC/IU, and 2-4 percent for ERC) switch their vote to CiU in the regional elections; an additional 2.5 percent switch to ERC; finally, these voters do not abstain in greater proportion in regional elections, in fact quite the opposite happens, since there is 2 percent less abstention. Lastly, 5 percent of category ‘A’ individuals (autochthonous)—the vast majority of whom vote generally CiU or ERC—switch their vote to CiU; 4 percent switch to ERC; and two percent more abstain in the regional elections as in comparison with the previous general elections.

In conclusion, this is an extraordinary phenomenon, which shows a considerable portion of the Catalan electorate to be taking decisions with surprising consistency. What is more, those decisions are decisive in determining the composition of the Catalan political panorama and, specifically, the government of the autonomous community. The slogan of these ‘other Catalans’ could well be: ‘We leave the governing of Catalonia to the Catalans (the autochthonous, the “true” Catalans!).’ So, if this interpretation is correct, even only partly so, we have before us an extraordinary phenomenon which we could name electoral incantation, since the above-mentioned argumentation, which in

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58 The patterns of electoral abstention here analysed *grosso modo* using survey data are congruent with the well documented fact that abstention in Catalonia is noticeably higher in regional elections than in general elections, even higher than in local elections. Percentages of electoral abstention are relatively higher: in the metropolitan area of Barcelona and the industrial belt around the city of Tarragona, among individuals in the age group 26-40 years old and among those who have only a low level of formal education. Which clearly identifies who they are: mostly first and second generation immigrants from other regions of Spain. See: Joan Font ‘Som dos milions: els abstencionistes a les eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya de 1988’ in *L’electorat català*...
its most superficial form seems solidly logical, hides a fundamental fallacy. For the PSC is a party which is as much nationalist-oriented on many key issues as CiU or ERC might be; and equally autochthonous in any case. The majority of the PSC leaders—nearly all of them in the top ranks of the party—are native Catalans with unquestionable Catalan credentials. However, nearly 50 percent of its voters are non-autochthonous residents. The PSC carries the immigrant vote. This factor, which should work in this party’s favour, has become—due to nationalist rhetoric and political demagogy—an insurmountable weakness in regional elections. The nationalists, particularly those from CiU, have won outright the battle of the symbols and implicit meanings, by means of nationalist rhetoric which is simultaneously simplistic and extremely subtle. They have managed to monopolise the name of Catalonia and the strong emotions and primordial loyalties which it evokes. In contrast, the PSC socialists have failed to mobilise a large sector of its ‘natural constituency’ in regional, Catalan elections, since they have themselves fallen foul of the above-mentioned nationalist rhetoric and simplifications, manipulated with more dexterity and success by their political rivals.

E. Language and nationalist ideologies
(The politics of language and identity in Catalonia)

All societies tend to develop a language, or at least a certain way of speaking, for themselves which binds more tightly its constituent parts and, on binding them, they are separated from others...

Political societies or States have also understood the incomparable value of possessing a language which provides union and cohesion for its members, separating them from others. It follows that, when such an outcome does not occur naturally, because the frontiers of the State do not coincide with the boundaries of a linguistic unit, they go to great lengths in order to attain the desired unity of speech, by violence if
necessary. In this way they promote the expansion of one language, that which they adopt as official, and fiercely combat the others until they are corrupted and push them into extinction.

For the same reason, peoples who resist absorption by other peoples, no sooner they feel the necessity to assert their individuality, to proclaim their personality, than they cling on to their linguistic unity as a redeeming principle and the foundation of their rights. ‘Language is nationality itself’—said the Hungarian patriots midway through the last century, echoing the affirmation of the first German patriots. Language is nationality, have proclaimed in their turn all renascent peoples. (Enric Prat de la Riba, 1906)59

In addition to being a remarkable political figure and president of the Mancomunitat de Catalunya during the first three years of its existence, Enric Prat de la Riba (1870-1917) was one of the intellectuals who most contributed to articulating a nationalist doctrine for Catalonia. The book which contains his main essays on the theme, entitled La nacionalitat Catalana, has been a considerable influence on all subsequent nationalist thought.

German Romanticism was doubtlessly one of Prat de la Riba’s main sources of inspiration and, in the central European events of his time, he found numerous examples which served to illustrate his arguments and place the Catalan case in the wider European context. Prat de la Riba was convinced that Catalonia’s problems were of a similar nature to those being experienced by Ireland, Hungary, Poland, Flanders and so many other European nations or nationalities who were clashing with powerful and intrusive neighbours in their struggle to attain full political and cultural autonomy. The theme of language occupies a preeminent

position in his writings. From one of his essays I have selected the paragraphs which introduce this section. Here, Prat de la Riba succinctly and forcefully points out—in a line of argument whose ultimate implications he was perhaps himself not aware of—the basic principles which guide the political actions, offensive or defensive, of nationalist movements of either side in relation to language. In effect, language can become, in certain historical circumstances, a primary foundation for collective identity beyond its proper function as a tool for communication, truly a political weapon.

The language issue is a highly sensitive issue in regional and national politics in Spain today. And it is perhaps the single greatest concern for the Generalitat government. It dominates the political arena in Catalonia. In fact, the Catalan language and its status in regional life has always been one of the main themes running through the writings of political thinkers and patriots in every walk of life, at least since the Renaixença revivalist movement took a hold in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Renaixença first started as a cultural and literary movement—against a backdrop of remarkable industrial success and economic prosperity in the region—that laid strong emphasis on the recovery of the vernacular as a means of expression in literature and the arts. From these beginnings, it gradually developed into a fully-fledged regionalist and, later on, openly nationalist movement 60.

60 Josep M. Fradera’s Cultura nacional en una societat dividida Barcelona: Curial, 1992 is the latest and one of the most interesting historical-interpretative accounts of these developments. For a follow up of some of the arguments in the debate, although in quite a different key, see: Enric Ucelay da Cal Imatge, cultura i política en l’etapa republicana (1931-1939) Barcelona: La Magrana, 1982. But see also the more comprehensive: Horst Hina Castilla y Cataluña en el debate cultural, 1714-1939 Barcelona: Península, 1986.
The crucial importance of the issue of language was something which did not escape the attention of those who took part in the drafting of the Constitution in 1978, intended as the basis for a renewed Spanish State. Consequently, a great amount of political energy was invested in the hunt for a formula which would be appropriate to lay the foundations for a reasonable solution in the future to this sensitive issue, in the new democratic era which was then commencing. The agreed on formula, which as such expresses the desire to attain a balance between the various political parties involved, is contained in article 3 of the Preamble. In broad terms, it establishes the official status of Castilian throughout Spanish territory, as well as the ‘co-official’ status of the various other languages in the territories of the respective autonomous communities where they are spoken.

Language has an equally high profile in the Statutes of each of the autonomous communities where a language different from Castilian is spoken. Thus, in article 3 of Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy, the ‘co-official’ status of Catalan and Castilian—in accordance with the constitutional imperative—is established. In section 4 mention is made of the respect and protection to which the Aranese language is entitled—Aranese being a dialect of Gascon spoken in a small area in the north-west of the region. Finally, all the above-mentioned autonomous communities have subsequently passed ‘linguistic normalisation’ laws of their own, so that linguistic planning policies could be put into effect.

The Law of Linguistic Normalisation (LLN) was passed by the Catalan Parliament on the 6th of April, 1983. In laying down the basic principles regarding the status of the two languages present in Catalonia, this law necessarily evokes those of higher

61 Jordi Solé Tura, one of the persons who participated in the drafting of the Constitution, recalls in a recent article (El Pais, 24 February 1994) the circumstances in which certain basic agreements were reached, which are relevant to the current linguistic debate.
rank on which it is based: The Statute of 1979 and the Constitution of 1978. The LLN is aimed at promoting normalisation in the use of the Catalan language throughout the territory, especially as regards to the public and official spheres where the Generalitat government has taken administrative control in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of Autonomy: culture, education, the state-owned media, and local and regional administration. In a tenacious attempt to stretch the Constitution to its limits—in favour of the recovery of Catalan in the public sphere—this law takes full advantage of the relative ambiguity of constitutional concepts regarding the issue of language, in a way which results in the pseudo-legal term ‘own language’ overshadowing the concept of ‘official language’, which has a clearer legal definition. The implicit political objective is to make Catalonia’s ‘own language’, Catalan—which, at the time the law was drawn up, was still in a clearly inferior position as regards to its use and presence in public spheres—into the ‘standard language’ or de facto main language throughout the territory of the Autonomous Community of Catalonia. The interpretation can be pushed no further as it cannot become the only official language due to the provisions made in the Constitution, which declares Castilian to have full ‘co-official’ status in the autonomous communities with a language of their own, and the duty of every Spanish citizen to know it.

As is reflected in its preamble, the explicit objective of the LLN is to stimulate ‘the normalisation of the use of the Catalan language throughout Catalan territory’. (To restore it) ‘to its rightful place as Catalonia’s own language is the unquestionable right and duty of the Catalan people’. The LLN provided the legal framework for a far-reaching and complex plan of ‘normalisation’ of the regional language to be put into effect. As regards to the specific legal uses that can be made of the ‘own language’ concept, I will provide two examples which touch upon two fundamental areas. ‘Catalan, as Catalonia’s own language, is also the language of the Generalitat and of the Catalan territorial Administration, of Local Administration, and of all
other public corporations that pertain to the Generalitat.’ (art. 5.1). ‘Catalan, as Catalonia’s own language, is also the language of education at all levels.’ (art. 14.1). However, an important point is made in the next paragraph which gives explicit legal support to a fundamental right established in the Constitution: ‘Children have the right to receive their early instruction in their usual language, be it Catalan or Castilian.’ However, the contents of the rest of the article underline the fact that this right is understood to be subsidiary, since it has to be expressly demanded by the pupil concerned or by his or her parents or legal guardians. By default, school children of Catalonia will in principle receive their education in the Catalan language in all those institutions that depend administratively on the Generalitat, which at present are all those within the territory of the autonomous community.

In order to fully grasp the significance and the political implications of laws, and of this one in particular, it is of the utmost importance to look at them in context. In this regard, the letter of the law is, in principle, a reflection of the particular balance of power which prevails at the particular time and place in which it was passed. The more generic implicit political meaning of the law, as well as its practical application, can, however, veer significantly away from its literal content. Authorities other than the legislators who created it are responsible for the application of the law. On the other hand, its implementation takes place in contexts where the balance of political power might potentially be very different from that in which the law was passed. Therefore, we should turn our attention to events immediately before and after the passing of the law, to day-to-day politics and to the doctrine and ideology which inspires and drives it. In this way we can draw a fuller picture of what the law signified and signifies in relation to what concerns us here.

The issue of language—and, to a large extent, the overall ‘national reconstruction’ programme in Catalonia—revolves around two basic themes: a) the restitution of Catalan to its
rightful place, after the decades of persecution and banishment from public life under Franco; b) the cultural and linguistic integration or assimilation of the immigrant, Castilian-speaking population—currently about 50 percent of the total population—in order to avoid the polarisation of the citizenry into two ‘communities’ that are ethnolinguistically different. The former theme amounts to a political and moral right which very few would call into question. The second is more problematical. Yet, the moral and political dilemma is solved from a nationalist standpoint by evoking an essentialist concept of the nation:

‘The thesis behind this article is that, if practically all the children of immigrants are not assimilated before they reach the end of their schooling, the survival of the Catalan language will be increasingly threatened from within, from the very heart of the Principality—the industrial belt around Barcelona’ 62. And if the language dies, the nation will disappear: ‘I take recovery of the Catalan language to be fundamental to the future survival of the Catalan people’ 63 [language is nationality itself, as Prat de la Riba would have pointed out!]. In this way: ‘linguistic integration is the tribute which every immigrant has to pay to the country that receives him…’; and bearing in mind ‘the scarce or non-existent education with which (immigrants) arrive on our soil (Catalonia)’ 64 … this is the least they could do!

The link between this essentialist concept of the nation which provides the primary basis of legitimacy, and the justification of political and administrative measures which would have to be implemented to achieve the above-mentioned objectives consists

63 Miquel Strubell i Trueta op cit pág. 27.
64 A.M. Badia i Margarit ‘Llengua i immigració: de la dictadura a la situació actual’ in VVAA Immigració i reconstrucció nacional a Catalunya Barcelona: Blume, 1980, pag. 69-70.
in the 'principle of territoriality'. Citing cases such as those of Belgium, Switzerland or Québeconfers unquestionable political weight on this principle: 'I adopt and depart from a premise based on the territorial integrity of language, that is to say, that over and above personal considerations, the language of the territory (spoken for more than ten centuries, the author mentions at another point) must be the only official language, notwithstanding the linguistic rights of the temporary or recently arrived immigrant' 65.

And to continue with the doctrinal argument along the same lines: [The future government of Catalonia will dispose of two key instruments in the] 'recatalanisation of the country, which finds support in a conception of the hegemony of Catalan culture (in the territory of Catalonia): education and the mass media'... Considering that 'the Catalan national programme will be unviable if a scission occurs between communities' [that are and would remain ethnically, culturally and linguistically differentiated]. In any case: 'Normalisation should be taken to mean the hegemony of Catalan culture within the historical territory of Catalonia and the reestablishment of a cultural koiné (community) throughout all Catalan countries.' 66 [i.e. all regions where Catalan is spoken: Els Països Catalans].

One of the events which left a deep impression on those who were watching closely Spain’s transition to democracy—and no doubt the post-Francoist political establishment in Madrid in particular—was the massive demonstration which filled the streets of Barcelona on the Eleventh of September, 1977 (in Catalanist epic mythology, the National Day of Catalonia). Nearly one and a half million people from all parts of the region took part, waving thousands of senyeres (the Catalan flag), demanding democratic rights and political autonomy for

65 Miquel Strubell i Trueta op cit pàgs 15, 73.
66 J.M. Ainaud et alii Immigració i reconstrucció... pàgs. 20 y ss.
Catalonia. Sixteen days later a decree from the Spanish government reinstated the Catalan Generalitat.

On the 23rd of October, the president in exile of the Generalitat, Josep Tarradellas, was received in Barcelona by a fervent multitude as the president of the restored Catalan polity. From the balcony of the Palau de la Generalitat, his voice trembling with emotion, he pronounced the famous words: Ciutadans de Catalunya, ja sóc aquí, per a treballar! [Citizens of Catalonia, I’m back and ready to set to work!]. This was rapidly incorporated into Catalan mythography as: Catalans!, ja sóc aquí, [Catalans, I’m back!], a stock phrase which has acquired assertive nationalist connotations—in the way it is used, if not in its literal sense—which do not correspond exactly with the words and the political meaning intended by the President! Whatever be the case, President Tarradellas soon put into effect his plan of appointing a provisional government based on a wide coalition, in which the entire political spectrum was represented: socialists and communists included.

The year 1978 saw the drafting and finally the passing of the new Constitution. In Catalonia a fundamental debate unfolded in parallel to that concerning the Constitution. The first draft white papers of the future Statute of Autonomy started to circulate among the headquarters of the political parties, and the debate was known to public opinion through the press. Meanwhile, a series of decrees of the Spanish government and the Generalitat gradually provided administrative and legal provisions which enabled Catalan to be introduced into the educational system. Use of Catalan in the press, radio and television also increased progressively. The first newspapers to be published entirely in Catalan also appeared in the first phase of the transition: Avui in Barcelona, Punt Diari in Girona, as well as a myriad of small, local weeklies throughout the entire region. The debate surrounding Catalonia’s political freedom, collective identity and
particularly the issue of the language was widely discussed during this period 67.

Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy was passed by an overwhelming majority in the referendum held on the 25th of October, 1979 and came into effect two months later. Five months later the first general elections to the Catalan Parliament were held in which a relative majority of the vote was won by the nationalist coalition Convergencia i Unió (CiU) led by Jordi Pujol. The establishment of an autonomous parliament and government heralded a new era in Catalan politics, one in which new measures—which were administratively and legally of a superior rank to those of the previous phase—were implemented without hindrance in the course of 1980. A Linguistic Policy Department was established, as well as an Office for the Normalisation of the Official Use of the Catalan Language, and the Catalan Sociolinguistics Institute. The Generalitat government took firm control of the linguistic planning policy, at all levels, financing with public money all types of private initiatives as well as those run by local entities, with the aim of reinstating Catalan to its rightful place and of making up for lost ground, particularly as regards to the social and public use of the language.

In this phase of the transition, the publication in 1979 of a manifesto-like article on the state of Catalan and its foreseeable future, which rapidly won great renown in catalanist circles, triggered with a certain acrimony the political debate on the issue 68; the more academic debate had already been tabled in

67 In Albert Balcells Història del nacionalisme català, dels orígens al nostre temps Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 1992 a detailed account is given of social and political developments during the transitional period. In the report written by J. Webber, M. Strubell The Catalan Language... págs. 91 y ss, there appears a detailed chronology on progress made in the institutionalisation of the Catalan language.

books such as the ones cited above. The *Els Marges* article stirred up the controversy about identity and language in Catalonia, introducing irredentist elements—and a catastrophic vision—which were disturbing at the time. The authors of this manifesto considered that the increased legitimacy given by the new Constitution to the Spanish State in the emerging democracy—new-born and still fragile—presented more of a threat to the survival of the Catalan language (and, therefore, the Catalan nation itself) than the previous dictatorship had. Under the dictatorial regime—it was argued—it was at least easier to rally together unanimously under the banner of resistance. Reading this manifesto leads one to reflect on the extent to which a culture on the defensive, transfixed by fear, takes refuge in secure and comforting fundamentalist positions 69.

The publication of the *Els Marges* manifesto contributed to firmly place the issue of language on the political agenda. From then on it occupied a prominent position in the agitated and emotive debate on the urgent need to proceed to the ‘national reconstruction’ of Catalonia 70. Language was thus converted into the most powerful weapon or political instrument in the hands of the nationalists, for better or for worse. Certain initiatives on the part of the enemies of Catalan nationalism, clumsy or at least with a bad sense of timing, fuelled the controversy and helped to impose an irresistible political dimension on the language debate. As an example, I would like to refer here to the so-called ‘Manifesto of the 2300: for equal language rights in Catalonia’, which was signed by a number of people who identify themselves as ‘intellectuals and professionals who live and work in

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70 For a follow up of the line of argument and some politico-philological considerations on the future of the Catalan language, see, for example: M. Prats, A. Rafanell, A. Rossich *El futur de la llengua catalana* Barcelona: Empúries, 1990.
Catalonia’, a catch-phrase with semantic and political overtones that only a close observer of the Catalan scene can grasp.

This Manifesto is said to have been signed in Barcelona on the 25th of January, 1981, although it was made public later on, right after the attempted ‘coup d’Etat’ of 23rd of February! In any case, it provoked a similar degree of outrage as that caused by the publication of the manifesto-like Els Marges article, although of a different nature indeed, in nationalist circles and beyond among the general public in Catalonia. The Manifesto of the 2300 implicitly responds to the Els Marges article, and the political position of the 2300 is clear: ‘There is actually no democratic justification for proposals to make Catalan the sole official language of Catalonia’. In support of this opinion they invoke the letter and the spirit of the Constitution and Catalonia’s own Statute of Autonomy, and remind the reader of certain fundamental social realities, namely the presence of immigrants who constitute nearly half of Catalonia’s population and whose mother tongue is Castilian, not Catalan. The manifesto goes on: ‘Our concern does not stem from an anti-Catalan stand or prejudice, but from an appraisal of events which have been taking place for some time now (sic), in which rights such as those pertaining to the public and official use of Catalan and Castilian, to the right to be educated in one’s mother tongue and to not be discriminated against for reasons of language … are not being respected.’ And further on: ‘(We are) not against the learning of Catalan and the use of this language by those who so wish, but rather we oppose those who aspire to substitute—as a matter of principle—the language of all Castilian speakers for Catalan...’ 71.

71 In the line of argument opened up by the Manifiesto de los 2.300, adopting a rather disordered and emotional approach, see: Azahara Larra Servet [the pseudonym carries the message!] Extranjeros en su país Madrid: Ediciones Libertarias, 1992. It has to be pointed out, though, that this author is now referring to events which might have already happened and been experienced, after several years of
A candid appraisal of the *Manifesto of the 2300* gives one the impression that it draws reasonable and well-argued points, which it does. However, uncertainties arise over its interpretation when we consider the specific conjuncture in which it appeared. In fact, it consists more than anything else of a premature judgment over intentions, a set of premonitions, an *a priori* condemnation of excesses yet to be committed. These excesses could not have been committed, even though such actions may have been suggested by the ideologies of certain nationalist groups, since the reinstated *Generalitat* and the administration put under trial in the Manifesto had only taken power a few months before. Additionally, if we take into account events and comments made by certain individuals in the press, some of whom had signed the document, multiple alternative interpretations of the Manifesto crop up, and implicit politically partisan overtones override the literal message of the Manifesto itself: the message is carried by the context!

Whatever be the case, what we can observe at work are ‘collectives’ of self-appointed intellectuals on both sides of the implementation of the policies of ‘linguistic normalisation’ in Catalonia. As a counterpoint, look at the opinions of someone involved in the ‘normalisation’ process: Josep M. Aymà *Allò que no se sol dir de la normalització lingüística* Barcelona: Empúries, 1992. A phlegmatic, undramatic and sharply critical approach to the issues involved is adopted in: Jesús Royo *Una llengua és un mercat* Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1991. Returning to the other camp in the politico-cultural debate, though in Galicia now, there is another passionate testimony, by way of a denunciation of nationalist excesses relating to ‘normalisation’ of the use of the Galician language: Manuel Jardón *La normalización lingüística, una anormalidad democrática* Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1993. Finally, a balanced historical and philological interpretation of the Castilian language (the object of all sorts of absurd symbolic and political aggressions from the nationalist periphery) in its role as a truly peninsular *lingua franca* and a *koiné* for the Iberian peoples, at least at some important crossroads in Iberia’s turbulent history: Angel López-García *El rumor de los desarraigados. Conflicto de lenguas en la Península Ibérica* Barcelona: Anagrama, 1985.
ideological divide, who fall over themselves to recast widespread preoccupations—loaded with deep emotion and memories—felt by the majority of the citizenry into a political problem. In fact, a problem is created where none existed, only deep sentiment and primordial emotions rooted in people’s memories. It is difficult to see which is worse, whether the delirious excesses of reason alienated by ideology and sectarianism, or the rash pragmatism of political leaders who unscrupulously use any instrument at hand to increase and maintain the power they have acquired. Irresponsible and disproportionate actions and statements—in a foolish action and reaction dialectic—combine with cloaked ambition and provoke controversies which unavoidably acquire a confrontational dimension 72.

The challenge thrown down by the Manifesto of the 2300—whether intentional or not, this can only be ascertained by asking each of the signatories—was quickly taken up by the nationalists, backed by important sectors of public opinion stirred by reports in the press. In the heat of the moment—and as a result of much more important events 73—an exacerbated and very militant

72 The evocative concept of schismogenesis here comes to mind (see, for example: G. Bateson (1936) Naven Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1958).

73 Most important of all, the attempted military coup d’État of 23rd of February 1981, and the anti-autonomist policies on the part of the Madrid government which were indirectly brought about by it. The Manifiesto de los 2.300 was published in the Madrid press on 12 March 1981, a few weeks after the coup, adding new elements of ambiguity and lack of opportuneness to it. The events of 23-F—and the political withdrawal it caused in Madrid, with very negative effects on the process of devolution to the autonomous communities already under way—no doubt contributed to increase exacerbation on the part of nationalist sectors in Catalonia and elsewhere. It would be interesting to investigate to what extent such political exasperation was indirectly driven by fear raised by the above-mentioned events. A fear which is interiorised and indirectly revealed in heightened radicalism and rigid fundamentalist attitudes, irredentist overtones in discourse, etc. But this line of interpretation is clearly out of place here (But, see for (continues on next page)
nationalist movement emerged that rallied around the banner raised by ‘Crida a la Solidaritat, in defence of the Catalan language, culture and nation’. The Call for Solidarity movement initiated and largely led a resounding campaign, often with the barely hidden support of high Catalan institutions, already under the control of the CiU nationalists. One of the culminating events of the campaign was the Som una Nació (‘We are a Nation’) festival held in the CF Barcelona stadium on the 24th of June, 1981. The stadium overflowed with people, symbols and flags, nationalist slogans, rituals to exorcise the enemy without and its supporters and sympathisers within, messages proclaiming absolute truths concerning the nature of the nation.

In parallel to the political agitation, still centred around the Crida a la Solidaritat but well supported by various nationalist groups, a campaign was waged to raise awareness about the language issue and the situation of Catalan in particular. This was subsidised by the Catalan Generalitat and carried out with the collaboration of local bodies and all types of civic associations and support groups. The resulting ‘Campaign for Linguistic Normalisation in Catalonia’, drawn up to perfection and organised by advertising experts, quickly gained the widespread backing of local Catalan institutions, was received positively by the Catalan citizenry and doubtlessly was decisive in raising awareness on the situation of Catalan as well as the need to change certain habits forcibly acquired during the decades of political suppression and official and officious subordination of Catalan to Castilian 74.

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74 See relevant articles from the book by Miquel Strubell i Trueta Llengua i població... Also, K. Woolard Bilingualism and the Politics... especially chaps. 4, 5, and 6.
The slogan of the campaign: *El Català, cosa de tots*, the character created to put across the message, *La Norma*, along with revived slogans like: *En Català, si us plau* became enormously popular and passed into the mythological treasure chest of a renascent Catalonia, which longed for the full recovery of its specific language. On its various levels, and employing different instruments (some neatly democratic, others maybe in the fringe) the process of ‘linguistic normalisation’—the cornerstone of the Catalan ‘national reconstruction’ programme—progressed on a wave of civic support which, in turn, was propelled by strong political determination based on a wide partisan consensus. Inevitably, there have been instances of excess and patterns of behaviour of doubtful legitimacy 75.

One of the aims of the above-mentioned campaign was, in the words of the director general of Linguistic Policy, to create a favourable environment for the linguistic normalisation policies on the *Generalitat’s* agenda, which were due to be systematically implemented once the Law of Linguistic Normalisation was passed. The aim was also to create a positive attitude towards the law itself (which was already being debated in the Catalan Parliament) on the part of the public, in order to ensure that it did not become irrelevant as a result of poor public support once it was passed. If these were the objectives of this imaginative campaign, then it could be said that it was a great success, its results surely exceeding expectations 76.

Since the time the LLN was passed by the Catalan Parliament in 1983—with the full support of all parties except a

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75 I refer, for example, to the excessive zeal and the occasionally inquisitorial style of some of the ‘normalisation’ officials appointed by the *Generalitat*, which led them to be known in some quarters with the derisive label of ‘linguistic commissars’. See: Azahara Larra Servet *Extranjeros en su país* op. cit.

few minor groups—the Generalitat has meticulously implemented a far-reaching ‘normalisation’ plan, of a wide political and administrative scope. The figures of the linguistic censuses of 1986 and 1991—to cite neutral indicators—are clear proof of the success of such policies, reflecting, as they do, the spread of the knowledge of the regional language among the population. The headway made by Catalan during this period, as the language of instruction in public education institutions (now under the administrative control of the the Generalitat), in the mass media and in cultural activities, etc. has also been decisive. The progress made as regards its social uses and in the non-public spheres is also undeniable, although it is much more difficult to measure and evaluate 77.

On a symbolic level—which, as everyone should know, is of transcendental importance!—the 1992 Olympic Games celebrated in Barcelona provided a great opportunity, of which full advantage was taken, to promote the status of the Catalan language vis à vis a truly international audience. Catalan was one of the official languages of the Games, the first in which messages and information were announced over the loud speakers and the one in which key personalities began their speeches (the president of the IOC, for example, himself a Catalan). The symbols of Catalonia: the colours of the flag, the unofficial ‘national anthem’ Els Segadors, the ‘national dance’ the sardana—ensign par excellence of Catalan culture and folklore—were conspicuous throughout the Games’ opening ceremony.

Public areas in towns throughout Catalonia were bedecked with Catalan flags, as were many balconies in Barcelona. The youth sections of CiU and ERC, along with those who rallied around the Crida a la Solidaritat banners, took advantage of the

77 See: Miquel Siguán La España plurilingüe op. cit. chapter 4.1; J. Webber, M. Strubell The Catalan language, progress towards normalisation... op. cit.
occasion to carry out their own agitation and propaganda campaigns, primarily with the aim of attracting the attention of the cameras and the international media. With this intention in mind, banners with the slogan *Freedom for Catalonia* (originally in English) were hoisted high at every occasion, with apparently no preoccupation about the probable incongruence of this, given the circumstances.

The rapid progress made in the ‘normalisation of the Catalan language’ process is admired by sociolinguistic experts, who can view the case dispassionately since they are distanced from it 78. In some nationalist circles, however, this is judged insufficient. Thus, radical nationalists harp upon the dangers of a reversal in the process, and demand that consistent legal and institutional pressure continue to be exerted to ensure the dominance of Catalan at all levels throughout the region, as soon as possible.

It seemed that the storm had somehow lulled a little after the successes on the occasion of the Olympic Games, when, suddenly, another linguistic battle whipped up the waters yet again. This new storm was triggered by the ‘linguistic immersion’ educational policies and plans of the Conselleria d’Educació of the Generalitat de Catalunya to implement them more widely and with increased momentum following the initial ‘experimental’ stage. These ‘linguistic immersion’ policies and techniques have been put into practice in Catalan schools over the last three or four years, especially in the towns of industrial belts around Barcelona and Tarragona, with the aim of achieving a rapid and radical linguistic assimilation of school-age children from Castilian-speaking families in Catalonia. The policy entails teaching children fully in Catalan from the very beginning of their primary school education.

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At this point, a group of parents of Castilian-speaking families, invoking the constitutional right to choose the language in which their children are taught, launched a protest campaign against the above-mentioned policies of the Generalitat at the beginning of the 1993-94 academic year, and lodged formal complaints with the administration and with the courts which culminated in the case being taken to the Catalan Territorial High Court in Barcelona, and later on to the Spanish Supreme Court in Madrid. Following deliberations on the complaint brought forward by the parents, the Supreme Court decided to open a case against the LLN itself, and address it to the Constitutional Tribunal, as it considered some of its articles might be unconstitutional \(^{79}\). The Catalan High Court, in turn, considered in its sentence that the LLN was perfectly within the bounds of the Constitution, whereas some aspects of its application by the Generalitat’s administration infringed the LLN law itself \(^{80}\).

On the 23rd of December 1994 the Constitutional Court pronounced its own sentence on the issue. This sentence is basically in line with what the Catalan Territorial High Court had previously sentenced. Thus, it reaffirms the constitutionality of the law, yet it makes detailed juridical considerations as to the proper interpretation of some of the articles subject to controversy. Moreover, in replying to some of the arguments worked out by the Generalitat in its appeal, the Constitutional Court unambiguously rejects the idea that it is the Government (that of the Generalitat in this case) who makes all decisions concerning the language to be used for the teaching of children at each of the educational

\(^{79}\) A previous action brought against this law and taken to the Constitutional Tribunal, led to two of its sections, of lesser importance, being declared null and void.

\(^{80}\) In the *El País* educational supplement on the 8th of March 1994 a thorough overview was published on the controversy surrounding the Generalitat’s pretensions to forge ahead with the ‘linguistic immersion’ program during this academic year and the legal action taken by the above-mentioned parents’ association against it.
institutions under its responsibility, and not the individual pupils or their parents on their behalf. And by explicitly invoking basic constitutional principles and the rights of the individual as established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, grants the individual pupils—or the parents on their behalf—the right to choose the language in which they are to be taught at every level of the educational system.

Events related to this latest language controversy—significantly centred on the Catalan case, with only references in passing to the other autonomous communities where similar problems obtain—have been thoroughly reported by the press in Barcelona and Madrid. As a result, the debate becomes wider and new elements are introduced which fuel the controversy and add an undeniable political-partisan dimension to the whole issue, which is in part understandable in the light of the fundamental principles involved. On their part, the parents who brought the complaint forth insist that their fundamental and constitutional rights are respected, and denounce the practices of the Generalitat’s administration and the nationalist ideologies behind them: ‘Territories don’t have a language of their own, people do, and we have the right to an education for our children in our “own language” (in an obvious sibylline reference to a beloved concept on the part of Catalan linguistic authorities)’. In the middle of this controversy, a draft version of proposed new Law of Linguistic Normalisation was leaked to the press. It had been drawn up by the Generalitat Government and sent to the parliamentary groups as a preliminary step in the process that would eventually lead to it being passed in the Catalan

81 It would be too long-winded to make reference to all the open letters, manifestos and counter-manifestos signed and made public by individuals and public institutions from one and the other side of the field, in relation to this politico-linguistic controversy, so I will only make reference to the essentials of the matter.

Parliament. The explicit objective of this new bill was to ‘give new impetus to the linguistic normalisation process’, the first stage having been successfully concluded. In the introduction to the bill, mention is made of the necessity to uphold the right of every citizen ‘to use the official language of their choice in their dealings with the Catalan public administrations, and to be dealt with in the same’. The general objective is to ‘increase the social use of Catalan’. Moreover, article 14 of the new law would specifically aim at giving full legitimacy to the linguistic immersion policies mentioned earlier on, thus implying that Catalan, ‘as Catalonia’s own language’, would be the sole language used at all levels of education. This article would replace that of the 1983 LLN which expressly recognises the right of every citizen to receive an education in their own first language, as indicated by the pupil or by his or her parents.

The implicit political aim of the proposed new law would doubtlessly be the full catalanisation of the educational system at all levels, by more thoroughly relying on the ‘principle of territoriality’ and giving fuller legal status to the ambiguous concept ‘own language’. Another core principle of the new law would be the introduction of what is referred to as ‘positive normalisation enactment measures’, that is to say, positive discrimination measures in favour of Catalan—justified by its status as a minority language which would still be in need of institutional support due to its weaker position in its day-to-day interaction with Castilian. These measures would be analogous to the affirmative action policies implemented in the USA by the Democrats during their period in power in the seventies, aimed at overcoming ethnoracial inequalities in North American society. Such are some of the political principles behind the proposed new law, which would introduce pro-Catalan language policies thoroughly subsidised with public money; the obligation for public and private companies to comply with certain ‘minimum quotas’
in their cultural productions and activities in Catalonia; and, equally, sanctions against all companies or public agencies who infringed the ‘normalising’ precepts of the law 83.

A key element on this most recent language controversy—which mainly affects Catalonia, as it has been pointed out already—is one of great political transcendence for the whole of Spain. Namely, the start of a hitherto unheard of collaboration between the Catalan nationalists in office at the Generalitat and the socialists in office at the Spanish Government—of which certain politicians and important public figures in other autonomous communities feel quite jealous, launching all sort of attacks against what they consider an opportunistic political pact contra natura. When the socialists lost their parliamentary majority in the general elections of 1993, Felipe González turned to the Catalan CiU and the Basque PNV nationalists for support, even going as far as to offer them a place in government. The political implications of this fundamental choice doubtlessly run deep, and surely were not overlooked by those who made it at the time.

The outcome was, however, that neither nationalist party accepted the offer of entering the Spanish government, although they did provide—and have since then provided, particularly CiU—the parliamentary support required by Felipe González to form a new government and to pass the annual budget. In exchange for this parliamentary assistance, the Catalan nationalists have secured concrete concessions—regarding, for instance, the direct assigning to the Generalitat of a proportion of an important direct tax, the IRPF, as a way of advancing towards

83 The draft white paper drawn up by the Generalitat was published in El Pais newspaper on the 10th of November, 1993, pp 21-23. It seems by now that this legislative project has been put aside indefinitely, perhaps waiting for a more favourable political climate to be brought forth to Parliament for its consideration and approval.
greater levels of self-financing of the autonomous government—; as well as firm promises to open up a broad debate on economic policy, the financing of the autonomous administrations, and further devolution of powers to them. In other words, a highly significant negotiation having to do with core issues that will affect the nature of regional governments—and the Generalitat’s in particular—and, consequently, the future constitution of the Spanish State itself 84.

In congruence with this new phase in the life of the Spanish polity and the redrawing of the institutional basis of the State, the President of the Senate summoned the Presidents of all the autonomous governments to take part in a special session to discuss on the ‘state of the art’ concerning the autonomous administrations, ways to proceed towards the culmination of the processes of devolution, and specifically the constitutional routes open to convert the Senate into a properly territorial chamber. In his speech the President of the Spanish Government Felipe González clearly set an agenda for the desirable culmination of ‘devolution’ to the autonomous governments—that is, of those processes of great scope initiated with the approval of the Constitution in 1978, which will gradually bring about a radical change in the territorial organisation of the State. Thus solving, he points out several times in his speech, the ‘centuries-old’ problem of the territorial ‘vertebración’ (integration, articulation) of Spain—and this is one of many obvious echoes in his speech of Ortega y Gasset’s political ideas. In his turn, the President of the Generalitat Jordi Pujol starts his speech by making a pedagogic

84 Although quite reluctantly in the beginning, it now seems that the Basque Government—led by the nationalists of the PNV—will also take part in what is starting to look like some sort of ‘consociationalist’ negotiation process with the Spanish Government in Madrid. Unfortunately, the very serious political scandals which have come to full light lately, have considerably muddle the waters and put in jeopardy the carrying of these promising political developments to its proper culmination.
effort to explain to his audience what is the true nature of the Catalan nationality: its roots in history, culture (language would be paramount in this respect), and a profound sense of identity. He sets his own agenda for ‘devolution’, pointing out to basic claims and interests at stake for Catalonia. And on several occasions he insists on the need to view Spain as what in reality is: a plurilingual, pluricultural and plurinational entity.

An important element of the negotiations between the Spanish Government and the Catalan Generalitat has to do with the Generalitat’s wish to have a greater say in the drawing up of European policy and direct participation in decision making processes in the European arena. This will eventually imply to be allowed direct representation in various institutions and representative bodies of the European Union. Doubtlessly, the gaze of Catalonia is increasingly directed to Europe, since it is aware that it is at the European level, as much as within Spain itself, that its economic future lies and will be decided, along with its political aspirations to become a distinct entity. However, this notion that Catalonia’s ‘national’ problems can only be definitely solved in the European arena, in heading towards a ‘Europe of the peoples’, ‘of the nationalities’ ... or ‘of the regions’—what does the label matter, anyway!—is by no means new and, in fact, has long been present in Catalan nationalist political thought and doctrine. Such political philosophy and expectations are also shared by illustrious thinkers in other parts of Iberia—the ‘regenerationist’ school of thought, for example—, and others who are more difficult to categorise, who were convinced that Europe is also the most convenient ‘solution’ for Spain as a whole 85.

85 See, for example, José Ortega y Gasset Europa y la idea de nación (original edition appeared in the Revista de Occidente, 1966).
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