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Boundaries and Identity: Immigrants in Europe

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Boundaries and Identity:
Immigrants in Europe

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BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)
The nation-state is a highly institutionalized project of the modern world. This project is celebrated by transnational ideologies and organizations such as the UN and UNESCO, which render a world comprised of sovereign and equal "nations" organized within spatially configured political units. The nation-state model entails a territorial relationship between the individual and the state. It assumes exclusionary boundaries and state jurisdiction over a culturally defined population within these boundaries.

The assumed affinity between the state (a bounded territory) and a nation (a bounded culture/identity) is more and more difficult to maintain in the postwar period. Territory and identity, two main components of the nation-state project, are increasingly decoupled, much due to four major transnational trends:

1) increasing international flows of peoples and cultural forms that create a fluidity of identities across territories and borders;

2) increasing dispersion and sharing of authority among transnational, national, and local political entities, breaching the link between sovereignty and national territory, which is most clearly seen in the gradual unfolding of the European Union;

3) an intensifying discourse of "plurality" and "diversity" (as opposed to "homogeneity" and "unity") that legitimates the pronunciation of "differences" and encourages "distinct cultures and traditions" both within and across national borders. This trend is closely connected to the massive decolonizations in the postwar era, and the consequent codification of "different but equal cultures" (and "otherhood") through transnational agencies such as the UN and UNESCO, a development much contributed by the discipline of anthropology. In turn, the amplified discourse of otherness authorizes previously excluded societal groups.

to advance claims and contest the accepted notions of boundaries (e.g. women, environmentalists, regional and linguistic minorities, indigenous movements, immigrants).

4) an increasing disassociation of the two major components of modern citizenship, identity and rights, which legitimizes the claims of residents (citizens or not) on the state while allowing them to be members of diverse cultural collectives (Soysal 1994). The citizenship rights of individuals are being redefined as universal human rights in a larger system. Identities, in contrast, are still perceived as particularized and bounded.

All these trends complicate the assumed affinity between territory and identity (state and the nation). As the sovereign nation-state loses its legitimacy as a totalizing institution and the old categories that attach individuals to nationally defined status positions blur, identities proliferate and become more and more expressive. Identity emerges as an ever pervasive and meaningful discourse of participation, and is enacted as a symbolic tool for creating new group solidarities within and beyond national bounds. As such, it becomes a universal category (that everyone should have an identity, the core definer of their selfhood) and affords the means for participation in public sphere and mobilizing resources in the national and world polities.

On the other hand, identities are less and less affixed to distributory mechanisms or status categories in the national polity. They are increasingly decoupled from membership rights. They have exogenous standing, and are (formally) constructed in response to wider ideologies legitimizing pluralism within the modern polity. The dissociation of identities from rights and predefined status boundaries, not only generates much arbitrariness in identity categories, but also induces a degree of fluidity in acquisition and attribution of identities. Despite this movement toward fluency and normalcy of identities, still much of the institutionalized identity discourse, both popular and scholarly, is informed by the nation-state model, thus tends to naturalize identities as essential and fixed.

This paper is an inquiry into immigrant identities in Europe as instructed by the aforementioned transnational trends that make an identity discourse salient in the postwar era. My goal is to reveal the underlying assumptions and understandings of immigrant identities as reflected in official policy language, public political discourse, and the (self-) representations of immigrants themselves. I particularly focus on the constructions of "difference" and "plurality" in specific institutional and policy contexts, and definitions of the immigrant identity through these contexts. I also consider the analytical consequences of such public formulations by providing examples from immigrant communities in various European host countries, whose experience challenges the taken-for-granted assumptions of the public (identity) discourse.
The category of "immigrant" in Europe is an ambiguous one. In the postwar era, massive decolonization, labor market demands in Europe, and political cleavages in the third world brought waves of immigrants to European host-states. These immigrants were drawn from the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. The Mediterraneans (Italians, Spanish, Portuguese, and Greeks, with the exception of Turks) are now rarely thought of as immigrants, given their "European origin." The term "immigrant" mostly refers to the people of "distant" lands and cultures "not like ours." The advent of the European Community further complicates the categories of immigrant and problematizes the "integration of alien cultures."

**Affinities of Culture and Territory**

Whether the nation-state project has been historically successful or not, the assumption of closure of culture by territory still dominates the official (and scholarly) discourse and policy as regards immigration and immigrants. This assumption constitutes the central premise of most international migration regimes. Immigration and alien acts (as well as passports, id cards, and visas) are in principle designed to protect the "integrity of the nation and territory," by constructing the dichotomy of national citizens and aliens.

The assumed affinity between culture and territory specifies "discontinuous lands and identities" which are fixed in space (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, Herzfeld 1992, Malkki 1992). Within this conceptual frame, the host-country national identity and culture are imagined to be unitary and anchored in European land. The variety of distinct cultural styles and configurations within national borders is invisible to such imagination. Thus, France becomes the land of the French and French culture; Bretons, Basques, Catalans (and Parisians!), despite their efforts to maintain a distinctiveness, are readily undermined. In a similar fashion, immigrants are assigned to be the natural carriers of their "own culture"--the culture of the country they come from. For instance, immigrants who come from Turkey, with a Turkish passport, are identified as "Turk" and become the

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2 There are about 15 million immigrants in Europe who are foreigners in their countries of residence, meaning they do not have a formal citizenship status. Only 5 million of these foreigners are European Community nationals; the remaining hold the citizenship of a non-European Community country. Turks are the largest foreign group in the European host countries; they constitute 24.4 percent of all foreigners, followed by Algerians (10.3 %) and Moroccans (9.7 %).

3 Among others, these authors provide a compelling critique of the scholarly practice of territorializing national cultures and identities, and the resulting analytical problems. In Anthropology, cultures are discretely territorialized; in Sociology, societies become discontinuous along nation-state borders.
representatives of the "Turkish culture." Lost in this case are people who accentuate their Kurdish or Alevi identity, even though a growing number of "Turks" in Europe identify themselves as "Kurds" or "Alevis."

Much of the discursive and policy practice of the European states, in response to the new waves of migratory flows, reflects this unquestioned affinity between territory and culture. On the one hand, the existence of immigrants, but more importantly the "cultures" that they bring with them, generates a presumed threat to (European) national integration and culture. European states, while invoking human rights discourse and extending inclusive rights to their foreign populations, concomitantly appeal to national identities to reify their own existence (Soysal 1994). Several European states (notably, France and Britain) have been reconsidering their national identities, mostly with defensive sentiments (Asad 1990, Feldblum 1990).

On the other hand, the discursive practice of equating culture with territory presents itself also in the official ideologies and policies of "multiculturalism," which emerge as the solution to the "integration problems" of immigrants. In the postwar era, parallel to the intensifying world-level discourses of diversity, Europe has increasingly appropriated an "ethos of pluralism," which implicate not only women, regional identities, and youth subcultures, but also the immigrant groups, especially since the 1980s (Schmitter Heisler 1992). In some European countries the discourse of plurality is accompanied by elaborate state policies and institutional structures. Thus, the states emerge as active agents to construct and, at the same time, to incorporate plurality.

Within this context, the core of identity politics and practice (plurality as a "threat" or "emancipation") is one of classification of immigrant groups and their cultures as "ethnicities." Policies of plurality, while accentuating cultural difference, at the same time, reify and essentialize corresponding ethnicized distinctions. Immigrant cultures are defined as bounded, fixed cultures, traced back to territorial origins. "Unique" symbols and traits of immigrants, brought from the "homeland," become codified as national/ethnic markers.

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4 Asad (1990) astutely argues that it is the politicization of immigrant identities and traditions that is perceived as a potential "threat"--not the existence of diverse cultures and identities as such--and that creates the new anxiety and discourse on national identities. In that sense immigrant identities are not unique; nonimmigrant identities, such as the Autonomen in Germany, who act to defy the established norms and institutions, are also perceived as a threat to social cohesion and national integration.

5 Not surprisingly, most scholars who want to study Turks in Germany research "back to the origins and the pure forms." They study Islam and Turkish culture in the "Turkish village," usually in a monolithic form; that is, immigrant culture is viewed as undifferentiated, static, and peasant. For a critique of this scholarly practice in the "guestworker literature," see Caglar (1990).
My position is not that there is no identifiable or "unified" cultural configurations advanced by immigrants, or by any other group for that matter (cf. Asad 1990). I am, rather, critical of the scholarly and political practice that locates any such configuration unproblematically within a nationally defined territory, thereby naturalizing them (see Malkki 1992), or treats ethnic identities as self-evident features of individuals or groups. Immigrant groups themselves invoke the elements of "homeland culture" around which they mobilize and assert identity. Here, however, I believe that it is political agendas and classificatory processes that select elements to encode immigrant cultures.

**Official Ethnicities, Random Categories**

In the 1980s, plurality, specifically its multiculturalist variant, has emerged as one of the remedies in immigration politics to incorporate the "foreign" and "different." European host states show variation in the ways in which they understand multiculturalism and in the extent to which they employ this approach. In countries like Sweden and the Netherlands, whose polity is already organized around rights and membership of corporate groups, the state actively tries to incorporate immigrants as collectivities, through specific group-oriented measures, programs, and institutions. In practice this translates into mother-tongue education in schools for immigrant children, ethnic radio and television broadcasting, as well as support (financial or otherwise) for ethnic associations. In polities, where membership is organized around individuals and their rights, on the other hand, collectively-oriented incorporation policies are much less common. So, in France, where collective groups are delegitimized in favor of an unmediated relationship between the individual and the state, ethnic or religious categories are not officially recognized. However, even in France, the "expression and representation of migrants in a multicultural France" are incorporated into the policy language (de Wenden 1987).

Much of the multicultural policy is elaborated around official classification, and hence the construction, of immigrant ethnicities. These classifications are primarily aimed at recognizing differences and generating policies and institutions geared towards the "special needs" of immigrant groups, needs which are assumed to arise from their prescribed cultural traditions, and which are defined as necessarily incompatible with host-society cultural frameworks.

To be acted upon at the level of state bureaucracy and policy, the official taxonomy has to be simple, thus manageable (Douglas 1986, Herzfeld 1992). Simplicity, on the other hand, comes at the expense of diversity; culture is equated to ethnicity as timeless traditions anchored in homelands. As is apparent

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in the following statement of the Berlin Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs, traditions become an indispensable part of immigrant identity: "The underlying concept from which the Senate proceeds ... is that for many non-nationals, adherence to tradition represents a necessary component of the integration process. For only if one is secure in the knowledge that one's cultural identity is unchallenged can one have the inner self-assurance to open oneself up to an alien environment" (1985:9).

The cultural complexity offered by immigrants is beyond the taxonomical capacity of the official. Official taxonomies create random ethnicities. In Sweden, for instance, immigrant groups are defined as ethnic groups on the basis of their homeland; when they reach a certain number of members (1000 to be exact), they are incorporated as ethnicities by the state to a central funding scheme. As such, immigrants from Turkey living in Sweden constitute a single ethnic category and are officially categorized as "Turks." But these same immigrants may come from regions with little in common as far their "tradition" goes; they may have different languages, different religious practices, foodways; they may not intermarry (as in the case of Alevi and Sunni muslims); and they may pursue opposing political ideals and agendas (often exclusionary and dominating). These differences however do not prevent them from being categorized together officially as one ethnicity.

In the Netherlands, the official "ethnic minorities policy" specifies the following categories: Moluccans, residents of Surinamese and Antillean origin, Turks, Moroccans, South Europeans, gypsies, and refugees. The interesting point about these categories is that not all of them have "ethnic/national" origin; but nevertheless they are defined and organized as such vis-a-vis the state and its policies. In this context "ethnic" is not cultural, but functional. Chinese and Pakistanis, for example, are excluded from the ethnic classification, since "they are assumed to have no problems with their participation in Dutch society" (Rath 1988:628).

In Britain, the 1976 Race Relations Act provides protection for "ethnic groups" against discrimination. During the proceedings of a court case which sought to determine whether Sikhs qualified as an ethnic group within the jurisdiction of the Act, the following characteristics were suggested for a working definition of "ethnic": a shared history, a cultural tradition of its own (family and social customs and manners), a common geographical origin, a common language, a common religion (different from the surrounding community), and being a minority or being an oppressed group.7 As Asad (1990) points out, these characteristics would define the Scots, the Welsh, and the Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, none of which however are legally categorized as

7 Cited in Asad (1990:469).
ethnic. More amusingly, an earlier version of the Race Relation Act (1968) enters the following caveat: "... people wholly or mainly educated in Britain are to be treated as members of the same racial group regardless of colour, race, ethnic, or national origin."8

The arbitrariness of the official categorization is also ingrained in the inconsistencies of multicultural policies. In the Netherlands, the state financially supports the Islamic associations of Turkish immigrants, on the grounds that "religious organizations are a very natural form of 'self-organization' for people coming from cultures with a strong religious base" (emphasis added).9 This reasoning ignores the fact that religious organizations of this sort have not always been part of "Turkish tradition," and are unconstitutional in Turkey.10 On the other hand, Islamic organizations of Pakistanis or Palestinians are not supported since these communities are not officially considered to be ethnic minorities. The classification also undermines the sectarian divisions within Islam, such as the Alevi of Turkey, who "traditionally" do not participate in mainstream Islamic organization and praxis.

The same discourses have a currency among immigrants themselves. The ethnic boundaries marked by official categorizations feed back to the "sense of difference," thus to solidified boundaries (Wallman 1978:210). Immigrant groups are compelled to revel in themselves as ethnicities, to accentuate their uniqueness, and to claim rights and resources associated with ethnic status. Thus, Chinese and Pakistanis in the Netherlands press for recognition by the state as ethnic groups (Rath 1988). And Turkish Islamic associations and left-oriented Turkish political organizations, who otherwise are rivals, join under the same umbrella organization of "Turks" vis-a-vis the Dutch state.

All these arbitrariness in identity that I exemplified follow from the fact that they are officially constructed, either to anticipate social problems or accommodate pluralistic disposition of wider ideologies. The identity categories created have exogenous and functional standing rather than being inherently attached to specific status positions--such as race and class, even though they might overlap with lower class positions as in the case of many immigrant groups (Rath 1993). Also, they are more or less decoupled from distributory mechanisms--political and social rights, even though they might be developed in

8 Quoted in Wallman (1978:203).


10 Following the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, all religious organizing was banned. Mosques, the places of worship, are normally founded and regulated by the state; a government level office, headed by an appointed high cleric, is in charge of handling religious matters, including mosque organizations.
association with group specific policies and institutions.\textsuperscript{11} Yet, because they are official and have an exogenous standing, they are made clear symbolically by accentuating boundaries and performing difference.

**Representations of "Difference" and "Plurality"**

Official taxonomies standardize ethnicities around recognizable, exotic attributes of the homeland culture (in contrast to the host culture)—cuisine, folklore, crafts, dress styles, religion and customs.\textsuperscript{12} Such presentations of ethnicity as homeland culture are actively maintained by the host-state policies and public discourse. The Berlin Senate, for example, has a yearly budget to "foster the cultural traditions of Berlin's non-national population groups," through international food festivals, dance performances, concerts, and theater events. The Senate also publishes and distributes a series of pamphlets on each immigrant community in Berlin—Turks, but also Hugenots, Africans, Vietnamese, Koreans, Italians, Latin Americans, and East European Jews—presenting origins and "fundamental aspects" of their cultures.\textsuperscript{13} Immigrant organizations also actively take part in representation of their cultures through standardized "ethnic" activities.

The ethnic attributes are codified as unique markers of immigrant identity and they become important agents of symbolic boundary creation.\textsuperscript{14} Discourse and practice of ethnicized plurality fix these markers as carriers of single apparent meanings—hence identities—failing to acknowledge the multiple referentiality of markers and hiding the "inconsistencies of meaning ascribed to 'difference'" (Wallman 1978:201). Once codified, these markers become powerful symbols

\textsuperscript{11} Attempts to map cultural identities onto political rights or onto a division of labor become suspicious and undesirable (e.g., separatist movements, racial apartheid, or religious demands that would violate the structural notions of gender equality).

\textsuperscript{12} These categories, and the cultural traits they specify, acquire a current and extensive usage in public discourse in identifying the "ethnic" as opposed to the "native." In a recent tourist guide, London was depicted in the following regional categories: the West End, the City, the River & Docklands, Local London, and Ethnic London. The affluent Chelsea and Kensington districts are listed under local London, whereas Brixton and Eastend, advertised as two main areas "to visit for ethnic culture," obviously do not qualify for local (Time Out 1990).

\textsuperscript{13} See, for example, the following publications by the Office of Foreigners' Affairs: "Die Ehre in der turkischen Kultur--Ein Wertsystem im Wandel"; "Kontinuitat und Wandel: Aspekte türkischer Kultur"; "Der Islam und die Muslime: Geschichte und religiöse Traditionen"; "Italianer in Berlin: Alle Wege führen nach Rom--manche von Rom nach Berlin," and "Vom Kommen und Bleiben: Osteuropäische jüdische Einwanderer in Berlin."

\textsuperscript{14} On the creation of symbolic boundaries, see Lamont 1992 and Wallman 1978.
appropriated by a wide range of actors and narratives, from bureaucracy to the media, and from scholars to immigrants themselves.

The headscarf, for example, is one of the most commonly invoked marker of Turkishness, whether as a symbol of the "unfit" culture of immigrants, or as a celebration of "diversity." Let me give some examples of how difference is presented, and thus constituted, through headscarves in visual narratives.

The wearing of the headscarf covers a wide range of purposes and meanings in Turkey, ranging from an ordinary usage of protection to religious observance (see Delaney 1994, Meeker 1976). In Europe, however, it is a highly charged symbol of Turkish "traditional" religious lifestyle. As such, headscarves in Germany ironically cluster Turkish, Greek, Yugoslav, and Rumanian Gypsy women as "Turks" or "Muslims." In a 1991 New York Times article on "Europe's immigrants," the caption of the accompanying photograph read as follows: "In Berlin last summer, a Turkish mother and child begged on a street" (see exhibit 1). Any observer on the streets of Berlin that summer, willing to look beyond the immediate appearances, would know that there was no "Turkish" mother "begging" on the streets. Neither were there Kurdish, Yugoslav, Greek, Spanish, or Portuguese mothers. What the photograph captured was a Rumanian Gypsy woman and a boy asking for money—a fairly common scene for a while after the unification of the Germanies.15 Besides the Rumanian Gypsies, whose temporary but colorful presence contested the puritan morals of the middle-class, many punks and homeless German citizens also asked for money on the streets. The New York Times article conveniently drew on the equation of headscarves and Turkish women. The imagery of "poor Turks" constituted the ethnographic present of the New York Times article, even though "Turkish immigrants begging on the streets" were not ethnographically present.16

The inconsistency in the meanings ascribed to headscarves and the tone of "difference" they construct are reflected in the following two photographs, as well (exhibits 2 and 3). The first photograph is taken from a photo-exhibit on Berlin's immigrant community by the Museum for European Migration.17 The photo shows the Commissioner of the Foreigners' Affairs herself talking to Turkish girls

15 After the unification, many Rumanians, as well as other Eastern Europeans, temporarily came to Berlin, some visiting, some shopping, and some seeking refugee status.

16 Moreover, the imagery of "poor Turks" is at obvious odds with their economic status in Germany. According to a recent report, there are about 35 thousand small businesses owned by Turks, employing 125 thousand workers and with a gross income of 30 billion DM. The savings of Turkish immigrants in German banks amount to 30 billion DM. One in every thirteen Turkish families owns the house that they live in (Sen 1988).

17 The exhibition was titled "Muslime in Berlin," and was sponsored by the Berlin Institute for Comparative Social Research and Haus der Kulturen der Welt.
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and women who are wearing headscarves. The text accompanying the photo is a celebration and promotion of the "diversity" of Berlin's immigrant cultures. In this case, the headscarf is a medium for "difference" to be acclaimed. Consider however the next photograph (exhibit 3) which is taken from Der Spiegel. The Spiegel article is about immigrant youth gangs in Germany and one of the accompanying photographs shows Turkish women on an outing in a Berlin-Kreuzberg park. The caption reads: Ein Soweto an der Spree? (A Soweto by the Spree river?) In this case, the headscarf is a medium for "difference" to be reprimanded and contained. The difference symbolized in headscarves invokes the unfit, the uncontrollable, and the violent.

Yet another meaning ascribed to the headscarf is in oblivion in these two pictures, the meanings given by immigrants themselves. In one such meaning, the wearing of headscarves and veiling is redefined as political expression and is defended as one of the most basic rights of individuals. In 1989, the issue of Islamic scarves erupted into a national crisis and debate in France, when three North African students were expelled from school for insisting on wearing their veils in class. The affair revived concerns about the "laicism principle" of the French state, the definition of freedom of religion in the public school system, and the questions of the integration of immigrant communities. During the debates, the head of the Great Mosque of Paris declared the rules preventing wearing scarves in school to be discriminatory on the grounds of individual rights. His emphasis was on personal rights, rather than religious traditions or duties: "If a girl asks to have her hair covered, I believe it is her most basic right" (Le Monde 1989). In this case, the immigrant identity, as indexed by the headscarf, is authenticized by the very categories and language of the host society.

Fluid Boundaries, Shared Social Spaces

By essentializing ethnicities and containing them within territorial boundaries, the institutionalized identity politics not only disguises the possible pluralities in categories and multiplicity of meanings, but also the emerging modes of identity. When recognized, these new identities are defined as "pathologies" (see Caglar 1990, Malkki 1992, L. Soysal 1994). The discrete boundedness of home and host cultures is assumed so much as natural that any apparent deviation is considered to be abnormal. The language employed in referring especially to the second-generation immigrants is a case in point: "they

18 The Office of the Foreigners' Affairs of the Senate of Berlin is a unit responsible for implementation of the Senate's immigrant policy, which "envisions a multicultural Berlin" and develops policies around it. The commissioner, as the head of this office, holds regular monthly visits with the Turkish community as part of their policy of "reaching out" to the immigrant community.
are neither here nor there" (normally, they should be either in Germany or in Turkey); "they are neither Germans nor Turks" (normally, they should be either one of them). In the abundant literature on the gastarbeiter, it is customary to problematize the immigrant youth as "torn between two worlds" and "growing up in two cultures," manifested as "inevitable identity crisis" (Caglar 1990, L. Soysal 1994). This metaphor of "in-betweenness" carries with it a sense of distortion of "authentic" cultures or identities. By not belonging to either one properly, immigrants violate the "true" boundaries of cultures; thus their identities are not genuine, complete, and wholesome.

The images that accompany the metaphor of in-betweenness always juxtapose the "modern" with the "traditional." This is so even when the images are presented as a celebration of pluralities. Consider the following photographs, one of which was included in the same photo-exhibit on Berlin's immigrant community by the Museum for European Migration, and the other is a widely-distributed, "multicultural" post-card (exhibits 4 and 5). What we immediately "see" are images that do not "naturally" hold together on a dichotomous axis of modern and traditional--they are rather "strange" and "out of place": three scarved young Turkish women in a pop music band (exhibit 4); a "properly" dressed (according to Islam) "Turkish" girl and a "properly" dressed (according to weather) "German" girl playing on the street (exhibit 5). What is ordinary in a Kreuzberg-Berlin setting becomes extraordinary in an exhibition catalog or in a cultural artifact. In the photos, the "modern" categorically contradicts and sustains the prescribed images of the "traditional."

My point here is not that these images fail to portray the multiplicity in Berlin's cultural landscape. On the contrary, they do so quite effectively. However, the multiplicity of cultural configurations which they present are still bounded and fixed. The normalcy of interaction across assumed boundaries and identities are not recognized. Neither is the non-existence of boundaries a possibility. The common social space shared by the two girls is lost at the expense of celebrating their "national traditions" and "cultural difference."

The fluid social spaces that immigrants develop by living in and experiencing "alien lands" are not accessible through the dominant conceptual frameworks of identity politics. Thus, Berlin-Kreuzberg becomes a Turkish ghetto, rather than a shared social experience by various immigrant groups, German workers, artists, intellectuals, alternatives, and punks. Turkish youth becomes lost in the spatial distribution of "in-between" cultures without a proper "authentic" identity, even when they refer to themselves as "authentic" Berliners. When a Spiegel article quotes Turkish youths' claim to authenticity in Berlin, it nevertheless fractions their identity: "They maybe half Turkish and half Kurdish but they are total Berliners" (Spiegel 1994).

The second-generation immigrants--beurs, turks living in urban centers and actively organized in local associations--negotiate and map collective identities
which are dissociated from cultural citizenship. If they do, they invoke Islamic identity not necessarily as a traditional identity but primarily as a political one, most often than not legitimized and formulated on the basis of fundamental individual rights. They reconstruct religious symbols (veiling, for instance) as political expressions and defend them on the grounds of human rights. Membership in a Muslim community is advanced as a quest for political participation and serves as a "functional entry" into the sphere of host-country politics (Feldblum 1993).

More importantly, second-generation immigrants appropriate their identity symbols as much from global cultural flows as host or home country cultural practices. As "youth subcultures," they are increasingly part of the global (Hannerz 1992, Hebdige 1979, Willis 1990), in many ways bypassing the national or traditional. Thus, it should not come as surprise that Turkish immigrant youth listen to rap music as much as (if not more than) they listen to Turkish sarki or German Lied. Or that the immigrant "youth gangs" adopt names in English: Two Nation Force, Cobras, Bulldogs, 36 Boys (36 referring to the Kreuzberg's zip code). Or that their graffiti on Berlin walls much replicates the much acclaimed styles of New York.

It should not even come as surprise that the Berlin government itself actively promotes the incorporation of immigrant youth as part of global youth cultures. In 1994, the Berlin government--along with various business corporations, popular radio stations, and social service organizations--sponsored a two-month-long youth festival. STREET '94, one in many of its kind, specifically targeted the immigrant youth. The festival was organized around art exhibitions, workshops on graffiti writing and rap music (with invited graffiti artists from New York, Paris, and London), and screening of movies such as Menace II Society and Boyz in the Hood. Within this picture, a Turkish rap group named "Islamic Force" does not sound out of place or incoherent. Neither does the motto of the SREET '94 festival, "To Stay Is My Right." It is an assertive claim to a place and belonging, much dissociated from the boundedness of cultural spaces.

The attribution of categorical inauthenticity and anomaly to immigrant identities is a pronouncement of the culture-territory equation. And as the affinity between the state and nation becomes blur, there is even more emphasis on identities that fix themselves in bounded land and culture. In a "europe" of irresolute boundaries, obscured nation-state borders, and persistent migratory influx, "nativeness" and "otherness" all become confined to the limits of territory.

The nation-state model enforces cultured spaces and cultured identities onto our debates and conceptualizations. Belonging assumes identity, and identities are encapsulated in cultures. We do not entertain the idea that many cultural processes may take place whether individuals identify with them or not; or that cultural commonalities may not necessarily give rise to identities.
Immigrants share and participate in many aspects of host/home country (or global) social spaces and cultures, but still advance diverse identities. For identities, embedded in the saliency of wider discourses of plurality, constitute legitimate categories to which immigrant groups refer to initiate resources and around which strategize their claims for rights.

The territorialized nation-state model, as a source for identity, remains to be transcended. Otherwise we are bound to narrate anomalies in immigrant identities and tangle in cultured exercises that do not work.
Notes

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