



**Department of Political and Social Sciences**

**What is Democracy to Citizens?  
Understanding Perceptions and Evaluations of  
Democratic Systems in Contemporary Europe**

**Mónica Ferrín Pereira**

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of  
Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute

Florence, November 2012



EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE  
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## Abstract

The object of this thesis is Europeans' orientations to democracy. It is argued in this dissertation that an important variable has been missed in the literature, namely, citizens' cognitive support for democracy. By including this concept in the analysis of Europeans' support for democracy, a number of aspects which had been much uncertain until now are inspected. First, conceptual clarification of support for democracy is possible, by distinguishing different types of orientations to democracy. Second, and from an empirical perspective, classical indicators of support for democracy are examined, in order to assess for validity. Interesting results have emerged from the analysis:

1. Determining the structure and the levels of affective support for democracy in Europe. The classic churchillian indicator ('democracy best') overstates levels of affective support for democracy in Europe. The structure of affective support for democracy is in fact not homogeneous across Europe, but differs substantially from one group of countries to the others.
2. Mapping types of democrats across Europe. There are different types of democrats across Europe, depending on their cognitive orientations to democracy. These are not evenly spread within each country, but there is correspondence between the structure and levels of affective support and the predominant type of democrats in a country.
3. Studying why people are dis-satisfied with democracy in Europe. The congruence hypothesis (*are citizens' orientations to democracy meaningfully related among them?*) is tested. Most citizens are indeed fairly congruent: cognitive and affective supports have an impact on the evaluations of their democratic systems. As such, not only is it possible to determine some of the causes of dis-satisfaction with democracy, but also to claim that the indicator of satisfaction with democracy does reasonably well as a measure of general support for the performance of the regime.



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## Acknowledgements

I thought for the first time about citizens' orientations towards democracy some years ago, while I was attending an ECPR Conference. Some of the most renowned academics on the field of democracy had joined in a symposium to discuss about democratic quality. While sitting there listening to these well-known scholars, I started to ask myself what a qualified democracy meant to me. I realized very soon, yet, that I was not able to separate what I expected as a citizen from what I believed as a young political scientist. The type of democracy I would defend theoretically was in fact identical to the type of democracy I would like to live in. And a natural question came up: but how do the other citizens want democracy to be? And immediately after: why not asking them what they think a democracy is? This was the very beginning of this project.

Five years after, I can say that the enterprise has been worth, even if I have not been completely able to satisfy my curiosity. Along the route, many people have helped me to find my way. I am particularly grateful to Hanspeter Kriesi, who believed in my project twice, enough to convince the scientific committee of the European Social Survey to introduce a new module on citizens' orientations to democracy. I am in debt with the whole team that supported my project for the European Social Survey: Sonia Alonso, Mark Franklin, Braulio Gomez, Pedro Magalhães, Radek Markowski, Wolfgang Merkel, Leonardo Morlino, Mariano Torcal, Alexander Trechsel, and Bernard Wessels. The application would not have been successful without their help.

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## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Democracy: government of the people, by the people and for the people

The study of democracy is nothing new, and the word itself is probably among the most cited in political science. Google Scholar, for example, returns no less than 43 million entries on a search on 'democracy'. Nonetheless, interest in democracy is by far decreasing. In almost any university which specialises in social and political sciences, there is a research centre devoted to the study of democracy. Not only this, but the major international organisations allocate a large portion of their budget and their time to democracy. In reality, it is to believe that democracy is inspected under many lenses. With such a widespread interest in the word democracy, what is it that remains to be studied? Most notably, the people.

Although many researchers have studied people's orientations towards democracy, there is much that remains unknown. For example, what do people understand by democracy? And by 'qualified democracy'? How do people evaluate their democracies? Or, alternatively, what are the criteria which guide peoples' evaluations of democracy? Some efforts have been made to answer these questions, yet there is much still to be learned about citizens' understandings and evaluations of democracy. This is my main interest and the objective of this thesis.

Few studies have been explicitly devoted to the *word* democracy, from the point of view of citizens, which makes this study of interest in and of itself. Most scholarly work has been focused on a set of attitudes which clearly relate to democratic orientations (confidence in political institutions, social trust, etc.); but research on more specific orientations towards democracy, namely, understandings, or evaluations of democracy is far less common. This is particularly the case in the European context, since the most complete surveys on citizens' orientations towards democracy have been conducted in new or developing democracies.

Second, this thesis subscribes to a fundamental trend in the literature on democratization and public opinion on democracy: the civic culture literature or – from a different perspective – political systems theory. The relationship between citizens' orientations to democracy and the stability of their democratic systems is mentioned in

the text constantly, although slightly reframed. In this study, I reconsider the classic concept of congruence between demand and supply – or between culture and structure, from an individual perspective: are citizens' attitudes towards democracy congruent?

Lastly, the present study makes a strong case in that democracy without the people is no democracy at all. Citizens are the 'consumers' of democracy, and are best placed to determine how they would like democracy to be, and to evaluate how it is functioning. Knowing about citizens' understandings and evaluations of democracy does not only tell us about levels of support for democracy, but also about citizens' views on democratic quality. At a last stance, we are informed about the necessary reforms to be implemented in a democracy, according to the citizens.

## **1.2 How people view democracy?**

The title of this section recalls that of a book published in 2008 (Diamond and Plattner 2008). Like much of the writing on this topic, it takes in most emerging democracies in the world, represented in the Globalbarometer survey (<http://www.jdsurvey.net/gbs/gbs.jsp>). Less attention has been paid to Europeans' understandings of democracy<sup>1</sup>, except for the recent interest in the relatively new democracies from the former U.S.S.R. Consequently, Europeans' orientations to democracy are still relatively unexplored. It has generally been assumed that all Europeans define democracy as liberal representative. It has not been proven, though, that Europeans share a common understanding of democracy. An Italian, for example, could conceivably have a different vision of democracy than someone from the United Kingdom, given that the history of the two countries ran very separate paths in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the idea of democracy was matured in Europe.

Apart from the historical background, recent literature highlights a growing trend of dissatisfaction and disaffection among Europeans. Increasingly, European citizens seem to be more dissatisfied with the way democracy is performing in their countries, and have less confidence in their political institutions. In the streets, mass demonstrations across Europe show people's discontent with their representative

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<sup>1</sup> An exception is the Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy Project (see van Deth, Montero and Westholm 2006), which has been very inspiring in this research.



democratic systems. Citizens protest against the lack of responsiveness and representativeness in their democracies, seriously questioning the legitimacy of representative democracy. Within this context it is extremely important that we know about citizens' understandings and expectations of democracy, as well as how they evaluate it, as these might have a significant impact on Europeans' disaffection and dissatisfaction with their democratic regimes.

Despite the importance of these latter developments, there is no systematic study of Europeans' orientations to democracy. For this reason, Europeans are the focus of this thesis. In this thesis, indeed, I am interested in surveying whether citizens' understandings of democracy are uniform across Europe.

### **1.3 Public opinion on democracy and democratic stability**

In the 1960s, a group of scholars were of particular importance in the study of the stability of the political system as a function of citizens' orientations towards it (Almond and Verba 1963; Easton 1965; Eckstein 1966). Although the sources of political regimes' stability had been considered before, no attention had been paid to the impact of the masses on democratic stability. This group of scholars introduced therefore an important innovation in the field of democratic research: they linked citizens' attitudes towards the system to the form and durability of the political system.

The congruence thesis between supply and demand and between political culture and political structure has had an enormous impact on the literature on democracy. Many scholars have engaged with this argument as part of their studies (among others, Sniderman, 1975; Putnam 1993; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Gibson, 1997; Nevitte 1996; Inglehart, 1997; Pettigrew, 1998); whereas some others have questioned its veracity (e.g Reisinger 1995; Norris 1999; Seligson 2002). Even if nowadays there is no widespread consensus on the necessity of congruence between supply and demand (following the Eastonian conceptualization), or between political culture and political structure (in the words of Almond and Verba), to ensure the stability of a democracy, it is true that research on citizens' support for democracy has become a major trend in political science.

Consensus on the concept of support for democracy has not yet been reached. This, in turn, is translated into empirical uncertainty on how support for democracy is to be

measured. Conventionally, two types of indicators have primarily been used to measure citizens' support for democracy. On the one hand, measures of citizens' affection for democracy (to what extent they 'like' democracy). On the other, citizens' levels of satisfaction with the functioning of their democracies. From the point of view of the congruence argument as phrased by Almond and Verba (or Easton), it is assumed that the more people who like democracy as a political regime, or the more who are satisfied with its functioning, the more stable is the democracy. It is not certain, however, that the people's likes and dislikes of democracy are a symptom of support for democracy; and it is even less certain that satisfaction with democracy unmistakably reflects support for democracy. For example, a citizen might claim to like democracy as a political regime, but she might not like the type of democracy in which she lives or she might be politically disaffected. Also, someone might affirm that she is not satisfied with her democratic regime; however, it is not possible – with this single indicator – to recognize the aspect of her democratic regime with which she is dissatisfied. Critically, if these two types of indicators do not accurately measure levels of support for democracy, it is questionable whether we can estimate the relationship between supply (political structure) and demand (political culture) – or congruence.

These critiques (to the concept of support for democracy, and the indicators which have been used to operationalize it) provide the basis for the theoretical discussion in this thesis. Through an extended re-conceptualization of political support, I have attempted to answer several of the questions raised in the previous paragraph. Firstly, to ascertain what type of democracy – if any – is supported by Europeans. Secondly, to understand which referent is used by Europeans to evaluate their own democracies. Thirdly, to determine the aspects of their democracies about which Europeans are most dissatisfied. Fourthly, to test for the congruence of Europeans' orientations to democracy. In order to answer all these questions, a new dimension of political support is needed: citizens' cognitive support for democracy.

#### **1.4 The voice of the people**

Surveys are important in determining public opinion, and public demands. Not only are they a source of explanation and improvement of the social sciences, but they are effective in identifying what people want and how they want it. However, and despite a large body of academic research in the field, most investigations into the quality of

democracy have been addressed without taking into account the opinions of citizens. Little is known, therefore, about what has to be improved according to citizens.

The inclusion of the citizens as experts of the audit of a democracy has been questioned. Citizens are said to have a great variety of opinions, and it has been argued that they lack the necessary sophistication to correctly assess the quality of democracy (Beetham 1994). However, previous studies highlight that citizens' ignorance has been overstated and that they could constitute an important source for the evaluation of democracy (Vargas Cullel and Iazzetta 2004). Even if the meanings which citizens attribute to democracy are manifold, surveying their opinions on the quality of democracy provides us with a very useful tool with which to assess the health of a democracy. This is not to say that citizens' auditing should displace the more theory-based measures of the quality of democracy, rather that it should complement them. With regard to the stability of democratic systems, surveying citizens can serve two purposes. Firstly, it provides better estimate of citizens' satisfaction with the democratic system, as surveys are a very precise thermometer of citizens' feelings. Secondly, surveying citizens may provide with crucial knowledge which would enable us to improve democracies and increase levels of public satisfaction. We know, in fact, what citizens perceive has to be improved in a democracy.

Relatively few projects have incorporated the general public as an auditor of the quality of democracy (for example, Vargas Cullel and Iazzetta 2004; Fortes, Palacios, Vargas-Machuca 2009; Magalhães 2009). The majority of studies still rely on the traditional indicator of satisfaction with democracy (see above) to assess citizens' views on the quality and the functioning of democracy. Besides the important limitation underlying this question, the use of this single indicator restricts the information on how qualified a democracy is from the point of view of the individual, and impedes the fundamental incorporation of citizens' opinions in the measurement of the quality of democracy.

In an attempt to improve data in the field, I have applied, together with a group of scholars<sup>2</sup> for a new module of the European Social Survey. The forthcoming round (round 6) of the European social survey will hence include a new module of 'Europeans' understandings and evaluations of democracy', which is the first European-based module on citizens' attitudes to democracy. This new instrument, which unfortunately will only be available at the end of 2013 (well after the completion of this thesis) will

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<sup>2</sup> Hanspeter Kriesi, Leonardo Morlino, Pedro Magalhães, Sonia Alonso, Mark Franklin, Bernard Wessels, Mariano Torcal, Braulio Gómez, Alexander Trechsel, Radek Markowski, and Wolfgang Merkel.

make available incredibly rich data on the views of democracy in Europe. For the first time, Europeans' voices will be heard on how they expect democracy to be, and how well they consider their democracies are working.

### **1.5 Plan of the dissertation**

This thesis has been divided into 6 chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 contain the theoretical background and the guiding theoretical framework. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 empirically test the theory outlined in previous chapters.

Chapter 2 introduces the topic of the dissertation with a brief review of the literature on public opinion on democracy. In order to provide a foundation for subsequent theoretical discussion, the organization of this chapter is based on previous empirical findings, with specific reference to their shortcomings. Each section is dedicated to a set of indicators normally used to measure support for democracy: the classic churchillian indicator – democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government –; the indicator of satisfaction with democracy; and the less frequent indicators about citizens' understandings of, or expectations towards democracy. Only in the last section is the relationship between the various types of orientations towards democracy – or congruence – introduced.

Chapter 3 presents the over-arching concepts and theory of the thesis. Special emphasis is placed on the need to incorporate the cognitive dimension in the study of support for democracy. In this chapter, I first define democracy, following Collier and Mahon's conception of radial category (Collier and Mahon 1993). The concept of democracy which is used throughout this thesis is composed of eleven attributes. More importantly, citizens' orientations to democracy are separated into affective, cognitive, and evaluative support for democracy. Lastly, the notion of congruence is introduced and defined as the meaningful relationship between affective, cognitive, and evaluative support, and satisfaction with democracy. In the following chapters each type of support is studied empirically.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to the empirical study of affective support for democracy. In this chapter, I revise the classic churchillian indicator of support, together with additional indicators of affective support for democracy. First, from the point of view of structure, I analyse whether there is a single structure of affective support across Europe (do all

Europeans have a similar understanding of affective support), and try to explain why there are differences across countries. Second, from the point of view of the levels of affective support, I try to explain differences in levels of affective support for democracy within different groups of countries.

In chapter 5, cognitive orientations to democracy are the object of analysis. The radial category of democracy is used at the individual level to determine whether Europeans have similar conceptualisations of democracy; in other words, whether citizens' understandings of democracy are uniform across Europe. The relationship between affective and cognitive support for democracy is also examined.

Chapter 6 is devoted to the relationship between affective, cognitive, and evaluative support, and satisfaction with democracy. The aim of this chapter is to test the congruence hypothesis. After an extensive discussion on how to empirically formulate the congruence hypothesis, three alternative tests are provided. First, an indirect test of congruence is provided by means of the World Values Survey 2005-2008, in which the relationship between democratic performance and citizens' evaluations is tested, depending on the type of democrats and the structure and level of affective support. Second, I test the relationship between Central and Eastern Europeans' cognitive and evaluative support, and satisfaction with democracy. Finally, I test the congruence hypothesis for Russia and the United Kingdom, paying attention to each of the attributes of democracy.

Chapter 7 concludes, with a collection of the main findings of the thesis, and some reflections on future research.



## CHAPTER 2 PUBLIC OPINION ON DEMOCRACY UNDER INSPECTION

### 2.1 Introduction: support and democracy, two challenging concepts

Citizens must want to live in a democracy if the democratic system is to be stable or to consolidate. This maxim is the point of departure for a significant portion of the work on citizens' attitudes towards democracy. The presumed link between the form and stability of a democracy, and the demands which citizens make to their democratic systems has in fact shifted the attention of political scientists towards people's orientations to the political systems. From the 60's onwards, many researchers have engaged in the study of public support for democracy.

Although it has been the subject of much scholarly work since the early 60's, conceptual consensus on support for democracy is far from achieved. Not only does democracy remain one of the most contested concepts in political science, but the notion of support has proven difficult to capture, both theoretically and empirically. From a theoretical point of view, the initial Eastonian concept of support (Easton 1965) has been repeatedly reviewed (see, for example, Norris 1999; Dalton 2004; Montero and Torcal 2006). From an empirical perspective, it remains to be established that the indicators which have been used to measure support for democracy are accurate.

This chapter reviews some of the literature on support for democracy. It is divided into four sections; the first three of which describe a single indicator of support for democracy, while the last addresses the relationship between the different types of support<sup>3</sup>. This early distinction provides the basis for chapter 3's theoretical discussion.

### 2.2 Is democracy the best form of government?

Apparently simple enough, gauging support for democracy requires only that people be asked whether they like or dislike democracy. After Churchill's famous quote, '*It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.*' (Speech in the House of Commons, 11

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<sup>3</sup> Although not explicitly mentioned in the text most of the literature mentioned in this chapter has also dealt with other political attitudes: political confidence, political efficacy, etc., considering them as part of political support. However, I have deliberately chosen to focus on three types of indicators in this revision of the literature, as these are the main object of analysis in the following chapters.

November 1947), many citizens around the world have been asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that “democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government”. This indicator has been broadly used to measure levels of support for democracy.

Most studies show that support for the proposition that democracy is the best possible system is high, irrespective of the status of democracy in a country. Diamond, for example, confirms this in a study of 26 countries spread all over the world (Diamond 1998). Klingemann arrives at a similar conclusion in a study of 34 countries in 1994 (Klingemann 1999); and more recently, Inglehart has asserted that almost the 80% of the population of the world considers that democracy is the best possible political system (Inglehart 2003). The findings of these studies are consistent across Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the United States (Bratton and Mattes 2000; Lagos 2003; Dalton 2004; Montero and Torcal 2006; Shin and Wells 2005). If we accept that this panorama is true, it would suggest that democratic stability, and consolidation is ensured across the globe. However, support for democracy is not confined to democracies. This might seem puzzling at first, as one would expect a strong correlation between levels of support for democracy and the quality of a functioning democratic system of government.

In reality, and in spite of the apparent consensus that ‘democracy is the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996: 5), there is greater variation in levels of support for democracy than is normally assumed. Firstly, there are differences across regions. In 2000, acceptance of democracy in the European Union was much broader than in other regions of the world. Support for democracy in Latin America for the same year, for example, was 22% lower than in the countries of the European Union (Lagos 2003: 169).

Secondly, there are differences within regions. In Europe, for instance, two types of variation exist. On the one hand, there are differences between old and new democracies<sup>4</sup>. Support for democracy in new Eastern democracies is 28% lower than in Western Europe (Lagos 2003). On the other hand, there are differences within the “new” democracies, as well as within the “old” democracies. Although there is little popular endorsement of undemocratic alternatives among the former communist countries, there is still much variation. 44% of the Ukrainians prefer authoritarian forms

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<sup>4</sup> Democracies of the second wave of democratization seem to be on the level with old democracies (for Spain, Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997; for Greece and Portugal, Diamond 1998).



of government, whereas Czech Republicans exhibit more pro-democratic leanings (only 18% are in favour of autocratic systems) (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998: 110; see also Mishler and Rose 1999). Similar patterns are present in Latin America (Lagos 2003), and Asia (Rose, Shin and Munro 1999; Chu et al. 2008)<sup>5</sup>.

What do these figures indicate? First of all, reported levels of support require more nuanced analysis, due to the variation in support for democracy across countries. A more in depth examination is needed of the effective levels of support for democracy around the world and its relationship with the stability of the political system.

In addition, even if little theoretical discussion has emerged on the differences between expressed support for democracy as the best system of government, and support for a set of democratic principles, there is an incipient debate on the need to incorporate both dimensions into the analysis of political support (Klingemann 1999; Shin and Wells 2005). Critics point to the lack of meaning of this indicator, arguing that people's support for democracy, as documented in surveys, is not underpinned by a clear understanding of democracy on the part of the public, but rather is driven by social desirability. In other words, citizens display strong support for democracy because they feel they are expected to do so (Canache 2006). Consequently they exaggerate levels of support for democracy (Gilley 2006). Others have questioned the use of this indicator in democratic and non democratic countries alike, arguing that "idealist measures of political support do not discriminate well between established democracies and incomplete regimes" (Mishler and Rose 2001: 305).

Another criticism is that expressed support for democracy actually reflects a desire for Western income levels and living standards, rather than support for democracy as a political system (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). In instances where citizens exhibit high levels of support for democracy without a corresponding level of support for basic democratic principles, *overt support* does not reflect "real" support for democracy. As Inglehart has pointed out, this poses a potential problem for the stability of a democratic regime: "Overt support for democracy seems a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic institutions to emerge. Unless mass pressures for democracy are present, power-hungry elites are unlikely to give publics the power to remove them from office. Today, overt support for democracy is widespread among publics throughout the world. But favourable attitudes toward the general idea of democracy are not sufficient. For

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<sup>5</sup> See Chu et al. (2008) for a variation on levels of support for democracy in Latin America, Africa, Arab World and Asia 2003-2007.

democratic institutions to survive in the long term, they need a mass culture of tolerance, trust, participatory orientations, and emphasis on self-expression, and reasonably high levels of subjective well-being.” (Inglehart 2003: 52). There is the need, therefore, to incorporate support for the principles of democracy, as “a society’s real demand for democracy becomes manifest in the extent to which its people’s outspoken demand for democracy is tied to democratic values.” (Welzel and Klingemann 2007: 9).

Democracy appears to be associated with a diversity of ideas depending on the region or the country. For example, in Latin America, although levels of support for democracy are relatively high, there is less agreement on the basic principles of a democratic system. High levels of support for democracy as a system coexist with *non-democratic* attitudes such as the right of the government to break the law to solve problems (Lagos 2003). In contrast, support for democracy as an ideal in Europe is mostly related to the rejection of authoritarian forms of government (Dalton 2004).

In line with these critiques, two main questions still need to be answered: (1) is support for democracy truly widespread among the people? and (2) What form of democracy (if any) do they support? These are dealt with in chapters 4 and 5.

### **2.3 Satisfaction with democracy**

The diagnosis of citizens’ levels of satisfaction with democracy presents a gloomier picture. In fact, characteristics of satisfaction with democracy differ strongly from those presented in the previous section for the Churchillian indicator: (a) levels of satisfaction with democracy are generally much lower than support for the idea that democracy is the best possible system; (b) there is a great deal of variation across countries with regard to their levels of satisfaction with democracy; and (c) levels of satisfaction with democracy in each country oscillate significantly over time.

Dogan adds two more dimensions to the characteristics of *dissatisfaction*: the structure of dissatisfaction, and the profile of the dissatisfied (Dogan 2005). From the point of view of the *structure* of dissatisfaction, a list of characteristics is given: (a) it is not a temporary phenomenon tied to a particular situation, but rather a persistent phenomenon over the last 3 decades; (b) it is an international disenchantment, a discontent which tends towards the chronic; (c) it is structural in the sense that it concerns most of the important institutions; (d) it has a rational tonality, not an

ideological nature. From the point of view of the *profile* of the dissatisfied, he states that dissatisfaction is more frequent among the youth, the middle class and the educated (Dogan 2005).

These characteristics have been repeatedly outlined in the literature via longitudinal and cross-national studies. As early as 1997, Montero, Gunther, and Torcal showed the fluctuating character of satisfaction with democracy, in line with citizens' evaluations of the economic and political situation, in the newly democratized Spain (Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997). These findings were confirmed in the 90s by Klingemann in a international analysis which spanned the continents. Contrary to his expectations, there were no significant differences across the different regions and types of democracies, but rather strong variation within all the groups (Klingemann 1999). Similar findings have been published by Dalton (1999, 2004), and Pharr and Putnam (2000) in Europe; and by Lagos in 6 different regions: European Union, Africa, East Asia, India, Eastern Europe and Latin America (Lagos 2003).

What does this imply with regard to the stability of the democratic system? Most authors agree that high levels of dissatisfaction with democracy neither imply a lack of legitimacy of the system, nor increasing attempts in the population to destabilize the regime. Pharr and Putnam found "no evidence of declining commitment to the principles of democratic government or to the democratic regimes in our countries. On the contrary, if anything, public commitment to democracy *per se* has risen in the last half century." (Pharr and Putnam 2000: 7). Dogan, in turn, explains that "The available American documentation shows that a pluralist democracy can become accustomed to a lack of confidence in institutions, that the mistrust of citizens can become chronic, that political regimes can persist in spite of the loss of confidence of a large part of the citizenry, that democracy can continue to function in spite of persistent dysfunctions, that it can continue to live as to some people suffering, from a chronic illness. Forty years of surveys attest to this loss of confidence but not of legitimacy." (Dogan 2005: 4). Others interpret the dissatisfaction as a sign of apathy and disenchantment to which there is no easy solution (Montero and Torcal 2006). In contrast, there are those who see high levels of dissatisfaction with democracy as a symptom of democratic health, as it expresses levels of discontent with the current regime and therefore represents the opinion of well informed citizens on the (mal)functioning of democracy (Norris 1999).

These different interpretations of the same phenomenon lead to very different conclusions: either we are dealing with a healthy democracy, or with an unhealthy

political regime. In most countries, however, low levels of satisfaction with democracy, which in some cases have been consistently low for decades, do not seem to engender problems for the stability of the system. In the long run, however, low levels of satisfaction with democracy could erode democratic legitimacy, especially in new democracies (Power and Jamison 2005: 56). From this point of view, a better understanding of what it is that the indicator of satisfaction with democracy measures would seem to be essential. This corresponds to a second objective of this thesis. Chapter 6 is entirely devoted to satisfaction with democracy, and is an attempt to clarify this ambiguous indicator.

## **2.4 What democracy do they support? What are they dissatisfied with in their democracies?**

A forgotten aspect in the literature on public opinion on democracy relates to knowledge (what is it? what are its main constituents?), preferences (what type of democracy do people prefer?), and/or expectations towards democracy (how do people expect democracy to work in practice?). However, there have been some efforts to include these types of orientations in the study of public opinion on democracy.

As early as the 1960s, Prothro and Grigg (1960) designed a study to deal with public tolerance and adhesion to basic principles of democracy in the US. The results of this study were surprising: members of the general public expressed strong support for democratic principles in the abstract, but were far less supportive when applying these principles in practice. These findings were regarded as fixed for many decades, as later studies had confirmed this tendency among people to compromise themselves with abstract principles, but not to accept their application in practice (McClosky 1964; McClosky and Zaller 1984).

High levels of support for democratic principles were also identified in Europe (Kaase 1971; McDonough, Barnes and Pina 1986), even in those countries which had recently democratized after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992; Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992; Selingson and Booth 1993; Weil 1993; Dalton 1994; Klingemann and Hofferbert 1994; Reisinger et al. 1994; Rose and Mishler 1994). Whitefield and Evans, offered a more nuanced analysis of these findings, as they observed a slight decrease in the normative commitment to democracy among Russian citizens between 1993 and 1995 (Whitefield and Evans 1996).

In roughly the same period, some scholars began to make a distinction between different *types of democrats* or *supporters*. Kornberg and Clarke's study on Canada for example, outlines four different conceptions of democracy, related to four different areas: security, opportunities, elections-capitalism, and equal influence of the groups (Kornberg and Clarke 1994). Thomassen finds two different dimensions of support for democracy in the Netherlands: the liberty vs. the equality dimension (Thomassen 1995).

The German case constitutes an interesting laboratory in which to study whether citizens have different conceptions of democracy (see also Biryukov and Sergeev 1994). "It is a fundamental assumption of our analysis that, due to socialization in the former German Democratic Republic, East German citizens can be expected to prefer a model of democracy different from that of the unified Germany. This is one reason why the East German population can be expected to have a more sceptical attitude towards the governing institutions of the unified Germany." (Fuchs 1999: 124). Fuchs assumes that West Germans will prefer a liberal model of democracy, while East Germans will favour the socialist system. In reality, West Germans do indeed prefer the liberal conception of democracy, whereas East Germans are more comfortable with values such as equality and the communist model, and less at ease with Federal Germany's notion of democracy. The differences between East and West Germans were subsequently confirmed by Hoffertbert and Klingemann (Hoffertbert and Klingemann 2001). Easterners ascribe more importance to the protection of socio-economic conditions, even if they generally share the same conception of democracy in terms of values and processes.

Mishler and Rose employ a different strategy in their study of former communist countries in that they ask people to compare democracy with the communist regimes of the past (Mishler and Rose 2001: 315). They find many differences among the countries they analyse. In some countries, people are clearly more comfortable with democratic ideals, while in others there is less sympathy for the new regime and its new values. Based on their attitudes towards old and new regimes, they draw a classification of "democrats". Although they come at the issue from a different perspective, Jaško and Kossowska have similar findings for the Polish case (Jaško and Kossowska 2008). In their work, they identify more than one representation of democracy (Welfare state, State of Law, Authoritarian state).

The results are also interesting for Africa, Asia and Latin America. Bratton and Mattes find that there are basically two types of support for democracy in Africa, depending on citizens' inclinations toward democracy: instrumental support vs. intrinsic support (Bratton and Mattes 2000). This was later reported by Inglehart and Welzel, who find differences between instrumental and intrinsic support, depending on the meaning individuals attribute to democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Although without any specific conceptualization, Lagos' finds similar patterns in Latin America (Lagos 2003). A similar classification has been developed by Baviskar and Malone in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Guatemala: *means democrats* and *ends democrats* (Baviskar et al. 2004).

Sarsfield and Schedler distinguish instead six types of democrats: Liberal democrats, Intolerant democrats, Paternalistic democrats, Homophobic democrats, Exclusionary democrats, and Ambivalent non-democrats (Schedler and Sarsfield 2005). Sarsfield employed a more deductive approach to the analysis of conceptions of democracy in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Even if his results are not conclusive, these "clearly confirm the need to use multiple indicators to measure orientations towards democracy." (Sarsfield 2009: 17).

Shin, Dalton and Jou provide a clear analysis on differing conceptions of democracy, by means of the Globalbarometer (Shin, Dalton and Jou 2007). Their findings are unequivocal on two points: (1) individuals do think about and have a conceptualisation of democracy; (2) individuals focus mainly on values such as freedom or liberty, rather than on economic outputs. Recently, Diamond and Plattner compiled a book including many of these works, based on the new data available from Globalbarometer (Diamond and Plattner 2008). The conclusions seem clear: citizens understand democracy differently.

These studies are critical to the study of citizens' orientations to democracy, as they cover an aspect which is largely excluded: citizens' understanding of the precise nature of democracy. There is a great deal to learn from their findings, although it should be pointed out that they are geographically limited, and generally based on case-studies in developing/new democracies. Only rarely, have scholars included consolidated democracies in their research (probably because it was assumed that democracy is conceptualized identically in consolidated democracies). Moreover, previous research has predominantly had only aimed at describing the different types of democratic

supporters. There is undoubtedly much that is still to be explored with regard to citizens' understandings and expectations of democracy, especially within the European context.

## **2.5 Orientations towards democracy, congruence and stability**

To return to the first sentence of this chapter, *democratic stability is only possible if the people support it*, (or) if there is congruence between supply and demand. This is one of the main premises on which most studies on public opinion on democracy are based – either to validate this thesis or to reject it – and it has resulted in a proliferation of writings on this topic. However, research in the field has not equally prompted the need to test a former link which precedes in the chain of relationship between demand and supply (or between political culture and structure, in the words of Almond and Verba 1963): the link between citizens' orientations to democracy. Although there has been some discussion on the need to test the relationships assumed at the aggregate level with individual data (Selingson 2002), the individual level of analysis remains unexplored and little is known about people's understandings of democracy, and how these translate into evaluations or demands towards the political regime. Nevertheless, the non-existence of a relationship between the different attitudes towards democracy at the individual level would have important implications for the solidity of the congruence thesis at the aggregate level. Indeed, if this relation does not hold at the individual level, the congruence hypothesis is ineffective at the macro level, as individuals – for example – would be showing satisfaction or dissatisfaction, independently of how democracy is working in their countries. As a result, “collective” signals of dissatisfaction are no longer an indicator of citizens' demands or stress, in line with more recent literature (Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Dalton 2006; Montero and Torcal 2006). More crucially, measures of people's support for democracy are irrelevant in explaining the stability of a system, and the link between micro and macro levels of analysis is put into question. Let us illustrate this by way of an example.

Let us think about an individual A who is strongly concerned about what she perceives is a lack a transparency in her political system, in view of the fact that she regards transparency as being of paramount importance in a democracy. Let us now consider two possible scenarios and their effects on the relationship between citizens' demands and the democratic outcomes: (1) the individual A is congruent (A's orientations<sup>6</sup> to

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<sup>6</sup> From now on, *orientations* refer to the classification introduced in chapter 3: cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations.

democracy are inter-dependent among them); and (2) the individual A is not congruent (A's orientations to democracy are inter-dependent among them). In scenario (1), because she is congruent and the system is not performing according to her expectations, she will voice dissatisfaction. As dissatisfaction is voiced, the system would have to react to readjust to the demands of individual A if support and stability are to be maintained. In that case, therefore, there is a relationship between people's demands (micro level) and the system's supply (macro level). Take now scenario (2). In scenario (2), as individual A is not congruent, she will not voice dissatisfaction. Therefore, the system will not be aware that individual A is demanding more transparency and, accordingly, will not make any effort to adjust to the demands of the public. In that case, the existence of a relationship between the micro and the macro levels is impossible and, as a consequence, the system is not able to adjust to people's demands (as these do not correspond to factual demands).

This example raises the idea that a prerequisite for the existence of a relationship between supply and demand is that the relationship between citizens' orientations to democracy is also true at the individual level. More clearly, another relationship needs to be tested at the individual level, if the congruence thesis is to be validated or rejected: the relationship between the different orientations to democracy, with a strong emphasis on citizens' cognitive orientations to democracy.

Until now, there have been few attempts to assess whether or not there is congruence among citizens' orientations to democracy. The general argument is that citizens' expectations play a relevant role in their evaluations of the political system. For example, citizens' evaluate the performance of the institutions taking as a referent how they think they *should* be performing; if their institutions are performing according to their ideal standards, their evaluations are positive, and vice-versa. Although the broad claim is clear, empirical testing has been rather scarce and, typically congruence between expectations and evaluations has been taken for granted. In fact, this type of analysis has mainly been applied in psychology. Psychological studies have repeatedly focused on the consistency between mental structures and beliefs and personal attitudes and behaviour. The main premise of the consistency argument is that there is coherence (consistency) between beliefs and actions. Otherwise, when there is no coherence between beliefs and actions, individuals are confronted with what has been called *cognitive dissonance* (Festinger 1957). As the political and social phenomena are extremely complex, this line of research remains underdeveloped in political science.



Although this is a concept which might be applied to many political attitudes<sup>7</sup>, the difficulties inherent in testing consistency in political attitudes has meant that this mechanism has generally been taken for granted or tested indirectly.

As for examples which observe the relationship between citizens' orientations to democracy indirectly, Anderson and Guillory indirectly distinguished between two groups in society – political winners (those who have voted for the ruling party) and losers (those who have not voted for the ruling party) – in their evaluations of democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997). 'Winners' are generally more satisfied with the way democracy works, because they believe their demands are better heard by the party in government for which they voted. In contrast, 'losers' are generally less satisfied with democracy, as they perceive that their views are not taken into account by the government. This negative evaluation of the 'losers', however, depends on the political system in which they live. Indeed, 'losers' who live in a consensual system tend to be more satisfied than 'losers' who live in a majority system. This reflects the existence of congruence between their preferences ("to be heard") and their evaluations of democracy.

In line with this thesis, Fuchs tells about "normative models of democracy because they set out certain principles of how a democracy *ought* to be [through the primary and secondary socialization processes]. Such normative expectations are directed at the democratic institutions of one's own country, and if citizens consider them to be fulfilled they evoke convictions of legitimacy in the system." (Fuchs 1999: 125). However, this relationship is then inferred for the case of East and West Germany, because his analyses (lower levels of support for democratic values in East Germany) do not adequately verify that there is a relationship between expectations and evaluations. Other studies returned to this issue, with surprisingly the same results (Fuchs, Roller and Wessels 1997; Rohrschneider 1994, 1996; Roller 1994; Weil 1996). Apparently, Eastern German citizens are strongly supportive of democratic values in abstract, but rather sceptical about capitalist values (McIntosh and McIver 1992; Whitefield and Evans 1996). There were therefore two different conceptions of democracy between East and West Germans when Germany was unified, and these differences in part explained the different evaluations of the democratic system.

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<sup>7</sup> An example comes from the literature on vote behaviour. It is clearly a question of congruence or consistency to vote for a party which one identifies with. Similarly, those who identify with the party in government tend to evaluate better the government.

A similar argument is developed by Dennis and Owen with regard to the system of representation: “Our core hypothesis is that public dissatisfaction with politics and government is connected fundamentally to popular perceptions about the political process and representation. In a fully operative democracy, people are likely to have developed the firm expectation that they have the right to be heard, and that officials should be responsive to their needs and take action. If people have come to feel that their own needs, wants, interests, concerns, values, or demands are not being effectively represented in the policy process, then no matter how felicitous the nature of system outputs is perceived to be, popular resentment likely will result.” (Dennis and Owen 2001: 401). In spite of this precise hypothesis, they have not been able to fully test it. On the one hand, they assume that representation is the unanimous priority among the citizens (avoiding other important elements of procedural democracy, such as transparency in the decision-making, for example). On the other hand, they assume the existence of congruence between expectations and evaluations. In their model, they do not predict levels of satisfaction with the political system, as a function of the congruence between expectations and evaluations of the political system. However, they introduce an important element which is rarely taken into account in the analysis of political satisfaction – satisfaction with democratic representation.

In line with the above, Grimes introduces the fairness of the decision-making process as a new element in explaining political confidence and political behaviour through the congruence hypothesis (Grimes 2006; see also Ulbig 2002; Tyler, Casper and Fisher 1989). According to Grimes, there is a sequence in citizens’ minds which occurs before they evaluate or choose to act in a concrete way. “In that sequence, citizens take note of and evaluate decision processes in terms of their own latent or explicit conceptualizations of fairness in decision making. Evaluations of decision-making processes then affect the citizen’s overall assessment of the institution hosting the decision process, and also affect his or her willingness to accept decisions issued by the institution. If citizens judge decision processes to be unfair and the decision institution to be less legitimate, they may see fit to contest, or simply attempt to circumvent or evade decisions.” (Grimes 2006: 286). By taking as a test-case the decision-making process concerning the administration of the Swedish railways, she finds that the perceived fairness of the decision-making process affects the levels of confidence in the Swedish National Rail Administration and the willingness to comply with its decisions. Even although she observes relatively solid results, the test is still indirect, as she assumes that the principal preference for all citizens is the fairness of the political system, and does not take other possible preferences into consideration.

Recently, further studies have dealt with citizens' preferences with regard to political decision-making processes in relation to other orientations. Floss reflects on which the adequate indicators are to measure process preferences, motivated by the fact that some studies have focused on the importance of process preferences as a predictor of citizens' confidence in political institutions (Floss 2008). Based on the discrepancy theory she draws "on a relational definition of confidence as an attitude that is based on the relationship between perceptions of political realities and citizens' preferences." (Floss 2008: 2). However, she does not develop the analysis further and the paper is limited to the selection of good indicators for measuring process preferences.

As has already been stated, direct testing of the congruence thesis is rare, partially due to a lack of data. However, some projects have been able to test this relationship directly. As early as the late 1960s, Patterson, Boynton and Hedlund tested the proposition that congruence between perceptions and expectations of the legislature implied higher levels of support for the legislature in Iowa (Patterson, Boynton and Hedlund 1969; see also Mezey 1979; Hibbing and Patterson 1994). Data were particularly appropriate for this test, as respondents were asked about: the expected/perceived influence of certain agencies; and the expected/perceived characteristics of the legislators. This group of authors provides valuable and direct evidence of the importance of the congruence between preferences and perceptions in evaluations of the political system.

Subsequently, Kimball and Patterson adopted the same method in order to assess the impact of congruence between expectations and perceptions on the evaluations of the United States' Congress (Kimball and Patterson 1997). "Our argument is elementary. Citizens carry with them expectations, however rudimentary, about political institutions, Congress in particular, and about processes taking place within Congress. Such expectations may develop in the form of fuzzy images of the institution as a whole, arise from very partisan or ideological perspectives, biases, and distortions, focus on particular institutional actions or events, or concern the characteristics or attributes of the institution's members. [...] For some citizens, Congress lives up to expectations, but for many there is a discrepancy, or gap, between what they think Congress ought to be like and what they believe it is like. This relative mismatch of the prototype to perceived reality contributes to citizens' beliefs that Congress is doing a poor job, cannot be trusted, is run by the wrong kinds of people, or passes misguided laws and is responsible for bad public policies." (Kimball and Patterson 1997: 701-2). Although

based on the characteristics of the members of Congress rather than on the characteristics of Congress itself, their results clearly show that congruence between expectations and perceptions matter when explaining approval of Congress. Their results are robust: the congruence thesis is stable, even when controlling for other significant factors (party identification and appraisals of President Clinton and the respondent's own member of Congress directly influence evaluations of Congress).

Similarly, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse arrive at the same conclusions when analysing the effect of citizens' expectations on the levels of satisfaction with the government and levels of compliance with the outcomes of government (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; see also Higgins 1987; Moretti and Higgins 1990). Americans appear to be congruent in their evaluations: the more their expectations towards the process are fulfilled (the smaller the gap)<sup>8</sup>; the better their evaluation of the government. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse explore their argument further by attempting to substantiate whether political evaluations are equally affected by expectations towards the outcomes as expectations towards the inputs. Their results reinforce their previous findings. Although both outputs (the policy gap between respondents and the parties – how ideologically distant the citizens are from the parties) and inputs (the process gap between respondents and the parties – how distant the citizens are from the parties in terms of expectations towards the decision-making process) affect the approval of the government, compliance is only affected by the inputs (the process gap). This has an important implication. Citizens' thinking is much more complex than previous writings have assessed. They are not only congruent, but they are also able to distinguish between different objects. As such, they will not approve government if its policies stray too far away from their own preferences. However, they will be compliant with policies they do not agree upon, as long as they feel that the decision-making process has been fair.

## **2.6 Conclusions: Public Opinion and Stability**

We have seen in this chapter that, from the 1960s onwards, support for democracy has been under constant examination. However there remains a distinct lack of consensus both on its conceptualization and its operationalization. Critically, there is not agreement on the nature of the relationship between citizens' support for democracy and the

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<sup>8</sup> The extent to which the expectations are fulfilled is measured as the difference between their expectations towards the decision-making process ('how much they expect to participate in the decision-making process') and their perception of the decision-making process ('how much they actually participate in the decision-making process'). It is what they call the *gap between respondent's preferences for the process*.

stability of their democracy. A diagnosis of public opinion on democracy around the world with the available indicators reveals that the picture is unclear, as levels of support vary from country to country, and continent to continent. It is not clear that either approval of democracy as an ideal, or satisfaction with democracy accurately account for citizens' *real* support for democracy. To give an example, it is not obvious that a person who affirms that democracy is the best possible system is definitely committed to the idea of democracy. Just as importantly, generalized support for the idea of democracy does not necessarily generate a reservoir of legitimacy, which ensures long-term democratic stability.

As such, from the point of view of the stability of the democratic system, the analysis of these two indicators in itself is not sufficient to determine whether a particular democracy offers more potential stability than another. On the one hand, acceptance of democracy as the best system is widespread, irrespective of the quality of democracy in a country. On the other hand, satisfaction with democracy seems to be strongly dependent on economic and political outcomes, and varies significantly over time.

All this points to the necessity to incorporate a third type of support among citizens' orientations to democracy: the cognitive dimension of support. In the next chapter, I propose a more comprehensive approach to the study of citizens' support for democracy, which I believe offers a better understanding of how and why people support democracy. Within this theoretical framework, a special role is given to citizens' understandings and expectations of democracy.



## **CHAPTER 3 A THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT OF CITIZENS' ORIENTATIONS TO DEMOCRACY**

### **3.1 Introduction: the call for the cognitive dimension of support**

As has already been pointed out, this work addresses a relatively new aspect in the study of public opinion on democracy: the cognitive dimension of support. The next paragraphs summarize the ideas which have been outlined in previous chapters, and the principal motivations behind this study of people's knowledge and expectations of democracy.

From a descriptive point of view, knowing about citizens' understanding and expectations of democracy is critical to ensuring an inclusive map of people's orientations towards democracy. First of all, it provides information on people's knowledge about democracy. It is a basic requirement of any democratic system that citizens participate in the decision-making process. However, a basic minimum knowledge of the political system is needed in order for an individual to be politically active. Introducing a cognitive dimension into the analysis of people's orientations to democracy allows us to assess how knowledgeable people are about their democracies. Which is to say, to what extent they have the necessary tools to participate in politics.

Secondly, it enables us to better apprehend the classical eastonian idea of support for democracy, both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, support is broadened and clarified when we also consider the cognitive dimension. Empirically, in-depth testing of two classical indicators of support (democracy is best and satisfaction with democracy – see chapter 2) is possible by means of this additional dimension. In line with the recent critiques and findings described in chapter 2, we need to avoid the assumption that democracy is understood equally by all citizens in all countries. The cognitive dimension of support is fundamental in this regard. Not only is it possible to discern the different types of democracy (if any) which are supported by people, but it is also possible to recognize the different models of democracy citizens have in mind when they evaluate their own 'real' democracies. Third and related to this, is that we can directly assess what a qualified democracy is, according to the citizens.

From an explanatory point of view, this cognitive dimension has the potential to play a decisive role in explaining satisfaction with democracy. Although many factors have been named as determinants of satisfaction with democracy, an elemental cause has not yet been tested: *what people want from democracy*. It seems straightforward that what one wants from an object will clearly influence the way one evaluates it, and consequently, the general levels of satisfaction with this object. The cognitive dimension of support is introduced as part of an extensive model of citizens' orientations towards democracy, in order to clarify the relationships between the different orientations, but also to better understand the causes of (dis)satisfaction with democracy.

### **3.2 Objects and orientations in a democracy: a re-conceptualization**

This section begins by addressing the definition of democracy, probably the most contested concept in political science. First, democracy is placed as an object of the political system and defined. Once the political object has been defined, the three different types of support are then presented. Special attention is given to the cognitive dimension of support, as the main conceptual contribution of this chapter.

#### **3.2.1 Democracy as an object of the political system**

Based on the early work of Easton (1965) and later reformulations of his work by Norris (1999) and Dalton (2004), we first approach the concept of democracy as an object of the political system. Easton identified three different objects in the political system: the political community, the regime and the authorities. The political community is understood as "That aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labour." (Easton, 1965: 177). The regime is divided into three sub-objects: (a) the regime as values and principles, which "impose constraints on the purposes for which the energies and resources of the system may be committed." (Easton, 1965: 194); (b) the regime as norms and procedures, which are those "norms that specify the way in which members of a system are expected to behave in political life." (Easton, 1965: 200); and (c) the regime as structure, which is defined as a stable set of roles that "consist of regularized patterns of behaviour and expectations about the way in which the occupants of particular positions in society will behave and of how others ought to behave toward them." (Easton, 1965: 206). Finally, authorities are defined as "The occupants of the authority roles." (Easton, 1965: 212).



This distinction is crucial for this study in that it situates democracy as an object of the political system, the regime. Democracy can be understood as a regime based on certain principles and values, regulated through norms and standardized procedures, which takes form through a specific set of structures. These three elements appear to have different levels of abstraction, from principles and values to the more concrete structures and institutions of the system (Norris, 1999). We might however expect that a particular selection of a set of principles and values will strongly correlate with concrete manifestations of these principles in terms of norms or structures (see discussion below). The first concern, then, is to define democracy as a *set of principles and values*.

There have been myriad discussions on what democracy is and how it should be defined (see, for example, Schmitter and Karl 1991). Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between normative and empirical studies, although such studies are typically conducted simultaneously. Both normative and empirical studies on democracy might take two different optics: on the one hand, to determine what a democracy is, both in theory and in practice (that is, to establish whether a country is a democracy or whether it is not); and on the other, to assess theoretically what a qualified democracy is, and empirically how a particular democracy qualifies according to a set of parameters. In both normative and empirical studies, there is a great variation in the concept of democracy, which ranges from minimalist to maximalist definitions, depending on the number of attributes. A minimum democracy requires universal adult suffrage and recurring, free, competitive and fair elections (Przeworski, 1999). A more comprehensive approach encompasses other attributes of democracy, such as: (a) minimum levels of welfare, income, conditions of life, etc; (b) high levels of political and economic equality; or (c) extensive mechanisms of participation available to the public (an example of a broad conception of democracy which includes all of them can be found in O'Donnell 2004).

Due to the complexity of the concept of democracy and the particularity of the level of study – **the citizens** – a particular approach has been used to define the concept of democracy: the Collier and Mahon's conception of 'radial category' (Collier and Mahon 1993). *Radial categories* are based on a "central subcategory" (or "primary category") which is an ideal type and contains all the possible attributes of the concept. "Noncentral subcategories" (or "secondary categories") are variants of the "central subcategory". They are constituted by some attributes of the primary category – not by all of them –, but they do not necessarily have the same attributes as the other

“noncentral subcategories” (Collier and Mahon, 1993: 848)<sup>9</sup>. Thus, the *radial category of democracy* allows for considering any possible conception of democracy a citizen might have. To give an example, it may be the case that an individual thinks about democracy as constituted by a unique attribute. If we consider democracy as conforming to a specific definition that comprises five attributes – in a Sartorian way –, this individual would not be considered to understand what democracy is, because she is not taking into account all of the constituent attributes of a democracy. However, if we apply Collier and Mahon’s conception of radial category, we are able to identify the particular ‘secondary category’ that the citizen has in mind when defining democracy.

In fact, this approach is particularly useful to tap citizens’ cognitive orientations to democracy (see the next section). *Firstly*, we cannot conclude that a citizen who considers that democracy implies some form of authoritarian government is defining *democracy*. We need to restrict citizens’ understandings of democracy within a theoretical frame that enables us to distinguish a citizen who is referring to democracy from one who is not. In other words, a theoretical definition of democracy is needed. *Secondly*, citizens’ conceptions of democracy may be even more diverse and broader than in the academic sphere, especially if we take a comparative perspective<sup>10</sup>. It becomes therefore particularly problematic to ‘choose’ a ‘true’ definition of democracy, which accurately describes the cognitive orientations to democracy of *all* Europeans. The *radial category of democracy* is required, in order to be able to account for the various conceptions of the citizenry.

The *radial category of democracy* considered in this thesis is composed of 11 principles or attributes (Table 3.1)<sup>11</sup>. The selection of these attributes has been driven by a careful review of several theoretical definitions of democracy<sup>12</sup>. I propose that any theory of democracy can be classified according to this definition<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> A similar approach has been developed by Saward: “Together, these six questions make up the dimensions along with different visions of democracy vary; they represent a set of issues on which any self-respecting purveyor of a model or theory of democracy will take a position. Would-be innovative theories may, for example, shift emphasis within a dimension, downgrade the importance of any one dimension and highlight the importance of others, or fundamentally reinterpret how a given dimension ought to be understood.” (Saward 2004: 16).

<sup>10</sup> Not only this, but citizens might think of democracy in rather contradictory terms. For example, individuals may define democracy through conflicting values, or may support some democratic principles at the same time that they reject others.

<sup>11</sup> This selection coincides also with the theoretical model of the new ESS module ([http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=321:round-6-rotating-modules&catid=116:questionnaire&Itemid=388](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=321:round-6-rotating-modules&catid=116:questionnaire&Itemid=388) ).

<sup>12</sup> Although the meaning of each of these attributes can vary from one theory to another, it is the emphasis on a particular attribute that is important in our classification. For example, *representation* has been employed in the different theories with rather contradictory meanings. Some of them place the emphasis on representation as the delegation of power to the representatives, who govern on behalf of the people.

Table 3.1 Democracy as principles and values

Attributes	Meaning
Rule of law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Enforcement of legal norms. It basically connotes the principle of supremacy of law, that is the <i>Ciceronian legum servi sumus</i>, and entails, at least, the capacity, even if limited, of authorities to enforce the law, and to have laws that are non-retroactive and in public knowledge universal, stable, predictable and unambiguous.” (Morlino 2009: 34).</li> <li>• Protection of the citizens in front of the state, and the protection of the citizens against each others.</li> <li>• <i>Rule of law</i> affects transversally all the other dimensions.</li> </ul>
Competition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existence of free and fair elections</li> <li>• Competitive nature of the electoral system (alternative parties; fairness of the campaign; number of competing parties, type of election, etc.)</li> </ul>
Vertical accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mechanism through which the people control their representatives, and the obligation of the representatives to answer for their political decisions when asked by citizens. In liberal democracies, vertical accountability is mostly equated to elections.</li> </ul>
Horizontal accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Obligation of the elected political leaders to ‘account’, to be responsible, to answer for their political decisions to other institutions or collective actors that have the expertise and power to control the behaviour of their governors.” (Morlino 2009: 37).</li> <li>• Capacity of each of the institutions to control and sanction the other institutions (balance of powers)</li> </ul>
Representation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incorporation of political preferences into decision-making</li> <li>• Mechanism by which elected politicians act as representatives of the public (either delegate model of representation or trustee model of representation by delegation or trustee)</li> </ul>
Responsiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “The capacity to satisfy the governed by executing its policies in a way that corresponds to their demands”. (Morlino 2009: 41).</li> </ul>
Transparency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complete, free and unbiased transferring of information from the political institutions to the citizens and from one political institution to the other.</li> <li>• Publicity or informational openness of the political process through the media</li> </ul>
Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Entire set of behaviours, be they conventional or unconventional, legal or borderline <i>vis-à-vis</i> legality, that allows women and men, as individuals or group, to create, revive or strengthen a group identification or try to influence the recruitment of and decisions by political authorities (the representative and/ or governmental ones) in order to maintain or change the allocation of existing values.” (Morlino 2009: 39).</li> </ul>
Freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guarantee of individual, civil and political rights and liberties</li> <li>• It is also a transversal dimension.</li> </ul>
Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Political Equality</i> ensures that all citizens have equal opportunities to participate politically in a society, equal opportunities to access the law, and receives equal treatment in front of the law and the political institutions. It is a transversal principle.</li> <li>• <i>Social Equality</i> makes reference to the social and economic equality, as a process through which social differences are removed and people gradually become socially equal.</li> </ul>
Welfare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Set of social rights that ensure a minimum standard of living to the population (mostly, education, health and housing).</li> <li>• Promotion of the development of the personal welfare, encouraging self-criticism and other possible forms self-realization.</li> </ul>

These attributes are not closed categories which do not relate to each other. Rather, as has been stated in the table, some of the principles are transversal to the others. Without the existence of rule of law, for example, it is mostly impossible that elections can be run freely or that horizontal accountability can be performed. However, there is

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Others depict a negative vision of representation, which is meant to lower representation and bring back power to the people. Even if apparently concentrating on representation, we can easily classify them: (a) the first one places more emphasis on the attribute of representation; and (b) the second one specifically addresses the attribute of participation, as a negation of representation.

<sup>13</sup> Only one dimension has not been included in the list, from the National Centre for Competence and Research’s (NCCR) Democracy Barometer for Established Democracies. It is the “effective power to govern” (Bühlmann et al. 2008: 21).

no previous evidence that citizens' conceptions of democracy are hierarchical, and therefore no hierarchy has been established *a priori* between the different attributes<sup>14</sup>. In addition, some attributes are likely to be in tensioned with others. This is the case, for example, with *representation* and *participation*, as an increase in participation will inevitably result in a decrease in representation. Likewise, in the case of *freedom* and *equality*, there is a tension between the complete freedom of the individual and actions of the state aimed at ensuring social equality – a similar contradiction, might be said to exist between *rule of law* and *welfare*. From the point of view of the citizens, it is of considerable interest to observe whether they perceive these contradictions at all or whether they have a more comprehensive conception of democracy, where all principles coexist.

Table 3.2 provides an example, in which different theories are classified according to the radial category of democracy. 'X' in the table means that the attribute is an important feature in each of the theories. A minimalist perspective (Przeworski 1999), for example, emphasizes the rule of law and the existence of free, fair and competitive elections. As applied to the citizens (and as we will see in more detail later on), we are able to investigate on the different cognitive orientations to democracy.

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<sup>14</sup> This is in fact one of the main critiques to the strategy of Collier and Mahon. Moller and Skaaning, for example, invalidate this strategy because the resulting classification is too vague and does not reliably specify whether a country is a democracy or not (Moller and Skaaning 2011). These critiques only apply to the macro level of analysis. For this reason, and because others have successfully applied Collier and Mahon's strategy at the micro level, I have adopted the concept of radial category (Schedler and Sarsfield 2005; Carlin and Singer 2011).

Table 3.2 The concept of democracy as principles and values and theories of democracy

	Przeworski <sup>1</sup>	Dahl <sup>2</sup>	Diamond and Morlino <sup>3</sup>	O'Donnell <sup>4</sup>	IDEA <sup>5</sup>	NCCR <sup>6</sup>
Rule of law	X	X	X	X		X
Competition	X	X	X	X	X	X
Vertical accountability			X	X	X	X
Horizontal accountability			X	X	X	X
Representation					X	X
Responsiveness			X	X		X
Transparency				X	X	X
Participation		X	X	X		X
Freedom		X	X	X	X	X
Equality		X*	X*	X**		X*
Welfare				X		

\* Political equality.

\*\* Political and social equality.

Source: <sup>1</sup>Przeworski 1999; <sup>2</sup>Dahl 1971; <sup>3</sup>Diamond and Morlino 2005; <sup>4</sup>O'Donnell 2004; <sup>5</sup>Beetham et al. 2008; <sup>6</sup>Bühlmann et al. 2008.

### 3.2.2 Orientations: Cognitive, affective and evaluative support

Democracy provokes different reactions among people. They may like it or not; they may think it performs well or not; etc. Two sources are combined here in the conceptualization of the different orientations to democracy: the classic distinction of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations (Parsons and Shills 1962; Almond and Verba, 1963; but also in psychology, (see Ajzen, 2005)); and the concept of support developed by Easton (1965). According to *Almond and Verba*, an orientation “refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships. It includes: (1) ‘*cognitive orientations*’, that is, the knowledge of and beliefs about the political system, its roles, its inputs, and its outputs; (2) ‘*affective orientations*’, or feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance; (3) ‘*evaluational orientations*’, the judgments and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standard and criteria with information and feelings.” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 14).

*Easton* defines support as a situation where “We can say that *A* supports *B* either when *A* acts on behalf of *B* or when he orients himself favourably toward *B*. *B* may be a person or a group; it may be a goal, an idea, or institution.” (Easton, 1965: 159). The objects of support, already mentioned in the previous section, are the political community, the political regime and the political authorities.

Table 3.3 merges both perspectives. *Cognitive support for democracy* covers the cognitive orientations towards democracy, that is, *what democracy is or is expected to be*. *Affective support for democracy* represents the affective orientations towards the regime. Put in other words, affective support for democracy reflects *whether democracy is liked or not*, which can be equated to the Eastonian concept of diffuse support: “Reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate inputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants.” (Easton, 1965: 273). *Evaluative support for democracy* refers to citizens’ evaluations of their democratic system: *how democracy is perceived as performing*. Evaluative support has much in common with specific support, in words of Easton: “Wherever the input of support can be closely associated with the satisfactions obtained from specific classes of output, I shall designate it as specific support.” (Easton, 1965: 268). The combination of Easton’s and Almond and Verba’s theoretical framework gives a single new category – ‘cognitive support for democracy’. The concept of support has been widely used in the literature either as affective or evaluative orientations, but it has rarely been employed as related to knowledge or expectations. And, even if in the early 1960’s there was an intuitive understanding that cognitive orientations needed to be studied, few attempts have been made until now to include this type of orientation in the analysis of public opinion on democracy.

Table 3.3 The three types of support for democracy

Object of analysis	Type of orientations		
	Cognitive orientations	Affective orientations	Evaluative orientations
Political community			
Regime: democracy	Cognitive support for democracy	Affective support for democracy	Evaluative support for democracy
Political authorities			

Source: own elaboration, based on Almond and Verba 1963 and Easton 1965.

It is worth noticing in table 3.3 that the distinction within the three sub-objects or the political regime as presented by Easton is avoided. Ideally, citizens should have a particular understanding of each of the sub-objects in a democracy, different levels of affective support for each of those sub-objects, and should evaluate each of the sub-objects differently. However, it is also true that only if democracy as an idea is meaningful to the citizens – if they know what it is – can they meaningfully express affective or evaluative support for it. In addition, it is predictable that people’s understandings of democratic principles and values strongly determine their ideas about the development of these principles through norms and structures. It seems

contradictory that someone identifies the existence of freedom as a basic feature in a democracy, but at the same time does not consider a set of norms that ensure civil and political rights to be important. For this reason, it is difficult to disentangle the three sub-objects of the democratic regime, as the settling of a particular principle necessarily derives from a particular set of structures and norms. This perspective does not contradict Norris's classification of the different objects of the political system, from diffuse (idea of democracy) to specific support (evaluations of the institutions, etc) (Norris 2009). Instead, it is complementary and allows for a higher mobility from the principles to the particular manifestations of these principles in a democracy.

The study of the cognitive orientations as related to the political system is not new (see chapter 2), but there has been no systematic analysis of this type of support and its relationship with affective and evaluative support. From early times, differences in the understanding of democracy among citizens have been implicitly assumed by many scholars. For example, Easton argues that "... there is little reason to believe that members of the system perceive the ideals, procedures and norms of the regime even in broadly similar terms." (Easton, 1965: 297). However, as Klingemann has pointed out, "Political systems, and in particular democracies, that are ineffective in meeting public expectations over long periods of time can lose their legitimacy, with consequent danger to the regime. As broad theoretical assertions, at a high level of abstraction, this chain of reasoning is largely accepted by systems analysts and democratic theorists alike. But operationalization and measurement of concepts, as well as sufficient historical and comparative data to test the key linkages, have proved largely elusive." (Klingemann 1999: 32-33). In response to this claim, I attempt to study citizens' orientations to democracy more systematically.

But what is cognitive support really about? Cognitive support for democracy includes the whole range of cognitive processes an individual develops in relation to the democratic object. First of all, it includes knowledge about democracy; but also expectations to or preferences for democracy. Let us take an example. A knows about democracy and she understands that democracy is a political regime where there is freedom and elections. According to A's conception of democracy, in any country which is classified as a *democracy* elections are run and there is a high degree of freedom (freedom of the press, freedom of speech, etc.). In other words, A expects that a democracy comprises these two attributes. It might also be the case, however, that A thinks that both attributes are components of a democracy, but that she thinks the existence of freedom is the most valuable characteristic – she has a strong preference

for the existence of freedom. In this case, A expects that a democracy is comprised of both elections and freedom, but confers special importance to the principle of freedom. Cognitive support, therefore, includes citizens' orientations to democracy in which the cognitive dimension plays a major role<sup>15</sup>.

Still, more problematic from an empirical point of view is whether in fact, citizens are able to know or expect anything at all from democracy. Much has been written on the incapacity of the citizens to have a clear understanding of what the political system and politics in general are about. Since Converse developed his well-known concept of 'non-attitudes' (Converse 1964), there has been much debate on the capacity of people to think about and participate in politics (for example, MacKuen and Rabinowitz 2003; Saris and Sniderman 2004). Recent evidence, however, is less pessimistic with regard to citizens' orientations to democracy. Not only is there evidence that most people have some idea of what a democracy is, but citizens seem to have different expectations as to how a democracy should be (Bratton and Mattes 2000; Hoffertbert and Klingemann 2001; Baviskar et al. 2004; Schedler and Sarsfield 2005; Shin, Dalton and Jou 2007; Carlin and Singer 2011; etc.). Based on these assumptions, it is possible to study citizens' cognitive orientations to democracy<sup>16</sup>.

### 3.2.3 The relationship among cognitive, affective, and evaluative support for democracy

The theoretical distinction between the three types of orientations presented in the previous section does not imply that they are independent of one another. On the contrary, one can presume that the way an individual understands democracy will determine whether she likes it or not, and also how she evaluates the democratic system in which she lives. Figure 3.1 shows the expected relationships between the three types of orientations described in the previous section. Although all types of

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
<sup>15</sup> An additional difficulty to the study of cognitive support is that it might be non-static, and context dependent. On the one hand, the system may be performing better than ever before, but performance may still fall far short of citizens' expectations. Citizens' might have increased their expectations as the system was performing better. Or changes in the system may have affected citizens' preferences, because they have learned to live in this new system. On the other hand, it is not the same to have been living in a democratic country the whole life than having been living in authoritarian countries. Expectations may vary greatly from one context to the other.

<sup>16</sup> Bartels articulates this clearly "The problem is not, as Converse's (1970) 'non-attitudes' terminology might suggest, that there is 'no there there'. Rather, it is that the structure of attitudes – and, at a deeper level, the cognitive mechanisms by which they are constructed and expressed – do not happen to endow attitude expressions with the nice properties of global coherence and consistency that would allow them to play the role of preferences in existing versions of liberal democratic theory. The middle ground between *nonattitudes* on one hand and *preferences* on the other is broad indeed – and it seems to be where the action is." (Bartels 2003: 56).



support are expected to be related, some of the arrows are thicker, representing a stronger relationship in this direction.

Figure 3.1 The relationship among types of support for democracy



In the model above, cognitive support is expected to affect both the levels of affective support and the evaluations of democracy. First, it is necessary to understand what an object is – and what one expects from it, before knowing whether one likes it or not. Besides, it is difficult to evaluate an object without any standard against which to compare it, that is, without having any expectations on what form this particular object should take or how it should perform. A direct relationship is predicted, therefore, from cognitive to affective and evaluative support. The dashed-lines in the figure represent a plausible inverse relationship, from affective and evaluative support to cognitive support. Yet the sign of the relationship is not easily predictable. On the one hand, for example, negative evaluations of democracy could lower the expectations to democracy because of the perceived incapacity of the democratic system to fulfil the initial demands. But bad evaluations could also make people more demanding of their democracies. On the other hand, levels of affective support for democracy could be high independent of the cognitive dimension, because of the perception of democracy as a moral good.

With regard to the relationship between affective support for and evaluations of democracy, previous literature has stated that the performance of the regime is likely to affect the regime’s legitimacy – or the level of affective support for democracy (e.g. Fuchs and Roller 1998; Klingemann 1999; Fuchs 2006, etc.). As such, good evaluations of the democratic system might reinforce the level of affective support for democracy; and, conversely, bad evaluations might endanger the level of affective support in a democracy. The inverse relationship only holds in a particular case: when levels of affective support are low. Indeed, the most probable scenario is that someone will give a bad evaluation of her democracy if she does not like to live in a democratic

system. The relationship between these two types of support, however, is far from clear, as levels of support are typically high, independent of the levels of satisfaction with democracy (see chapter 2).

#### 3.2.4 Satisfaction with democracy: what type of orientation? The role of congruence in explaining satisfaction with democracy

As noted earlier, one of the indicators most commonly used to measure support for democracy is satisfaction with democracy<sup>17</sup>. It is not yet fully clear that this indicator in fact reflects support for democracy. Canache, Mondak and Seligson, for example, arrive at very pessimistic conclusions, and recommend avoiding its use in research on public opinion on democracy (Canache, Mondak, Seligson 2001). Among other things they are critical of the fact that respondents are asked about their satisfaction with the democratic regime without being provided any basis of reference. As a result, the question may be interpreted very differently not only among respondents, but also across countries and over time. They assert that “these empirical characteristics limit the capacity of analysts to derive meaningful inferences from the study of this item and that, until clarification of the measurement issue is obtained, progress in identifying predictors of democratic stability will be slowed.” (Canache, Mondak and Seligson 2001: 506). However, others have responded to Canache et al’s critiques by arguing that “the satisfaction with democracy measure is a reasonable (albeit imperfect) indicator that we can use to test our theories. Hopefully, we will be able to develop even better indicators later that can then help to validate the research that has been done with this indicator” (Anderson n.d: 10, see also Linde and Eckman 2003 for similar conclusions).

In spite of the debate over its suitability as an indicator, satisfaction with democracy continues to be widely used (Norris 1999; Dalton and Shin 2006; Fuchs 2006; Chu et al. 2008; Diamond and Plattner 2008; etc.). The vast majority of surveys on public opinion have incorporated this item in their questionnaire and there are rich longitudinal data on levels of satisfaction with democracy in most parts of the world. In light of this, it seems more fruitful to try to understand what this item measures, rather than to reject it as invalid. This section comes precisely at the core of this discussion, and attempts to

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<sup>17</sup> Exact wording of the item is: On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? The answer categories vary from an 11-point scale to a 4-point scale (completely dissatisfied, dissatisfied, satisfied, completely satisfied).

better understand what satisfaction with democracy does in fact measure, as well as to assess why some people claim to be more (dis)satisfied with democracy than others.

In psychological, sociological, and marketing studies, satisfaction is a commonly used concept. For example, in the study of well-being, satisfaction is defined as a 'summary of evaluations of how well one likes something.' (Veenhoven 1996: 1). Or, in the study of satisfaction with private and public goods and services, 'satisfaction is generally taken to mean an evaluative attitude towards some object or experience' (James 2007: 108). Marketing studies, for example, have defined consumer satisfaction as "a function of both expectations related to certain important attributes and judgements of attribute performance" (Martilla and James 1977: 77). It is assumed that the importance given to an object, weights the evaluation given to this same object. Satisfaction, according to these disciplines, appears to be a compendium of several attitudes or orientations. But, can we expect the same in relation to democracy?

I argue here that satisfaction with democracy measures a special type of support: the overall support for democracy<sup>18</sup>. Why *overall*? On the one hand, *overall* refers to the combination of the three types of orientations presented in the previous section: affective, cognitive, and evaluative. On the other hand, *overall* relates to the concept of democracy, and is comprehensive of the different parts in a democracy – from democracy as values and principles to the performance of the several aspects in a democracy. From this perspective, the concept of congruence, already addressed in the previous chapter, acquires a principal role.

The concept of congruence was first used by Eckstein (1961) to refer to the congruence between authority patterns in government and authority patterns in society. Subsequently, both the civic culture (Almond and Verba 1963) and the systemic (Easton 1965) approaches have theorized on the relationship between how the political structure is (system) and what the citizens want (support). In line with these theories, the stability of a democracy is measurable in terms of the degree of congruence between political structure and political culture, or between inputs and outputs. In other words, only if citizens support democracy is it predictable that a democratic system will endure. While the relationship between the *macro* structure (or the regime) and the *micro* culture (or citizens' support) has been exhaustively tested, much less attention has been paid to the way citizens' orientations are related among them and how these

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<sup>18</sup> A similar idea can be found in Clarke, Cornberg and Dutt 1993; and with slight modifications in Fuchs 1999; and Klingemann 1999.

are translated into demands to the political system. More intriguingly, when citizens' orientations to democracy are considered all together, there are important inconsistencies, depending on the type of support. Therefore, I propose here a new lecture of congruence at the individual level, which combines the three types of support for democracy described above.

If satisfaction with democracy measures overall support for democracy (and citizens are congruent), we would expect that the three types of support are interrelated among them, and each of them plays an equally important role. First, democracy has to be liked if there is to feel any satisfaction at all – affective support. Second, democracy has to be well evaluated – evaluative support; and third, democracy has to be well evaluated according to citizens' cognitive support – that is, understandings, expectations or preferences to democracy. Also importantly, satisfaction with democracy ought to be determined by affective, cognitive and evaluative support *for democracy*. In other words, democracy should be the object of (dis)satisfaction. If not, and levels of satisfaction with democracy are not dependent on citizens' affective, cognitive and evaluative support for democracy, but instead relate to other objects which are not clearly related to democracy, satisfaction with democracy cannot be used as a valid indicator of overall support for democracy<sup>19</sup>.

This is major critique to the political culture literature and the use of satisfaction with democracy as an indicator. In fact, if there is no congruence at the micro level (between citizens' orientations to democracy), congruence between the political structure and the political culture – or between inputs and outputs – is highly questionable. In such a situation, citizens' expressions of stress/support are formed independently of the inputs provided by the political system. Because of this, the democracies cannot react to citizens' demands, and adjustment between inputs and outputs is difficult to reach. All in all, this places in doubt the validity of this indicator as a measure of support for democracy.

Applied to the study of citizens' orientations to democracy, congruence is to be interpreted as follows. Firstly, individual *A* must 'like' to live in a democracy if she is to

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<sup>19</sup> A possible critique to this argument is that most people simply express levels of satisfaction independently of how well they evaluate its different components, and how they think a democracy should be. This would not imply, however, that the expressed levels of satisfaction with democracy do not reflect levels of support for democracy, as they might collect a general impression on the state of democracy. Although this can be plausible in some cases, I retain that satisfaction with democracy should be related to the perception of the performance of the regime to be considered a measure of general support for the performance of the democracy.

express any level of satisfaction with democracy at all (see section 3.2.3). Secondly, A must evaluate her democratic country according to her ideal model of democracy. The more the country conforms to her democratic ideal, the better should be the evaluations; and accordingly, the higher her level of satisfaction with democracy. Simply put, there is congruence among citizens' orientations to democracy if the following hypothesis is confirmed (see chapter 6 for a more concrete specification):

*H<sub>congruence</sub>: There is congruence if cognitive, affective, and evaluative supports are meaningfully related to satisfaction with democracy*

Interestingly enough, if this hypothesis is confirmed, we are able to offer an answer to the two main shortcomings in the study of public opinion on democracy. On the one hand, we can ascertain with more confidence whether 'satisfaction with democracy' can be used as an indicator of overall support for democracy, as previous literature has suggested. On the other hand, if citizens are congruent, it is possible to identify the reasons why people are (dis)satisfied with their political regimes: more specifically, what it is that people think needs to be improved in their democracies? Ultimately, this study allows for a better understanding of the indicator of satisfaction with democracy.

### **3.3 Modelling types of support, types of democrats and satisfaction with democracy: research design**

In this section, the different elements defined above are combined into a more comprehensive model, which encompasses the different types of orientations and findings of the previous literature in the field. The models are presented in their ideal form, although it is rarely possible in practice to include all variables. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider them all from a purely theoretical perspective.

#### **3.3.1 Do they 'like' it: types and levels of affective support for democracy**

Chapter 2 has provided a short review of some of the studies which have incorporated the study of the classic churchillian item of 'democracy best'. In line with the literature, I have also identified this indicator as a measure of affective support for democracy, which I investigate extensively in chapter 4. Two objectives are pursued in this chapter: (1) to assess whether the churchillian indicator is a valid measure of affective support

for democracy, comparable across Europe (both in terms of types and levels of support); and (2) to explain differences in affective support for democracy across Europe.

In general, explanations of *affective support for democracy* can be divided into two groups: the socialization thesis and the performance thesis (Figure 3.2). The socialization hypothesis points to the importance of the context of socialization in shaping democratic attitudes. More specifically, it has been argued that the more a person experiences democracy, the greater the probability that she will affectively support democracy as a system (Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997). Results are not always consistent in ex-communist countries, where levels of affective support for democracy were already relatively high by the 1990s. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer offer a more nuanced analysis of the previous hypothesis by introducing the evaluative dimension: “support for the regime is initially shaped by early socialization and then evolves continuously throughout adult life as initial beliefs are reinforced or challenged by later experiences. In so far as recent performance reinforces early socialization, political values will be relatively stable, but in so far as there are major changes or shocks in the performance of government, attitudes will change considerably.” (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998: 117-8). Initial evaluations of the ex-communist regime are, they argue, reinforced through continuous experiencing of the new regime<sup>20</sup> (see also Mishler and Rose 2001). In line with the previous literature it can be said that:

*H<sub>affective-1</sub>: the longer an individual has lived under a democratic regime, the higher will be her level of affective support for democracy*

The performance theory has been widely employed in a variety of contexts (Dalton 1994; Kunioka and Woller 1999; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Diamond 1998; Lagos 2003; Chu et al. 2008; among others). There is disagreement, however, on the importance of economic and political factors in explaining levels of support for democracy. While some scholars attribute exclusive significance to economic factors, others only ascribe significance to political factors. In spite of these debates, Finkel, Humphries and Opp state that “the regime’s performance on these dimensions [economic and political outcomes] is crucial in the development and solidification of

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<sup>20</sup> Other studies, however, maintain that high levels of support for democracy when the wall fell were due to the demonstration effect of Western regimes (Weil 1993; Roller 1994; Dalton 1994; Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992; Evans and Whitefield 1995) and to the failure of communism (in Finkel, Humphries and Opp 2001).


support in emerging democracies.” (Finkel, Humphries and Opp 2001: 340). In line with their reasoning:

*H<sub>ffective-2</sub>: the better the evaluations of the political regime, the higher the level of affective support for democracy*

In the model, the relationship between expectations of democracy and affective support for democracy is also specified. There is very little literature on the relationship between citizens' expectations and support, and whether there are differences in the understanding of democracy between supporters and non supporters of democracy. The few studies which have dealt with this typically find that there is usually a correspondence between support for democracy and endorsement of democratic ideals (Rose, Shin and Munro 1999; Welzel and Klingemann 2007). It seems probable that the more one knows about democracy (this is also closely linked to levels of political sophistication), the more she will support democracy. It is difficult to predict, however, that a person with a particular conception of democracy will be more supportive of democracy than another person with a different idea of democracy. For this reason, the hypothesis remains vague at this stage, and will be further developed according to the results of the empirical analysis (chapter 5).

*H<sub>ffective-3</sub>: there is a relationship between cognitive support for democracy and affective support for democracy*

Figure 3.2 Explaining affective support for democracy



### 3.3.2 Cognitive support: types of democrats

In spite of the first approximations in the literature of people's understandings of democracy, theory has rarely considered democracy from the point of view of citizens and, therefore there is no exhaustive inventory of what we could call *types of democrats*. Relying on the concept of democracy outlined in section 3.2.1, I apply the strategy proposed by Collier and Mahon (1993) in an attempt to classify types of democrats. The approach is mostly inductive, as there is no previous evidence on which clusters of democrats should be formed.

Table 3.4 presents an example of the strategy followed in order to identify the different types of democrats. In the table, the first column comprises the 11 attributes of democracy. An 'X' in the table indicates that an individual or group of individuals gives special importance to a particular attribute or set of attributes. For instance, an electoral democrat is a person who thinks of democracy mostly in terms of the rule of law and the existence of elections and competition; while a direct democrat places special emphasis on participation, freedom and equality. These are presented here merely as examples, and ones which are unlikely to be found in the empirical analysis. Results depend on



the number of variables or attributes included in the survey. Chapter 5 presents empirical analysis for different datasets, in order to be as comprehensive as possible with the available data.

Table 3.4 Example of types of democrats


	Electoral democrat	Social democrat	Direct democrat
Rule of law	X		
Competition	X		
Vertical accountability			
Horizontal accountability			
Representation			
Responsiveness			
Transparency			
Participation			X
Freedom			X
Equality		X	X
Welfare		X	

Source: own elaboration.

As an understudied orientation towards democracy, there is no specific literature on the reasons why people think of democracy differently. Only a few studies have incorporated the study of types of democrats or types of expectations (see for example, Schedler and Sarsfield 2005; Carlin and Singer 2011), but not all of them aimed at explaining why people expect different things from democracy or why they belong to one or another type of democrat. Carlin and Singer, for example, focus mainly on socio-demographic indicators, measures of political sophistication and ideology to explain the differences between types of democrats (2011). This is largely what is included in the next model (Figure 3.3). No specific prediction is described yet.

*H<sub>cognitive</sub>: socio-demographic indicators, levels of sophistication and ideology affect people's ideas of democracy*

Figure 3.3 Analysing differences across types of democrats



### 3.3.3 Explaining satisfaction with democracy: the congruence hypothesis

The congruence hypothesis is introduced in this model. However, alternative explanations are also presented in the model in order to control for them. These are listed below and represented in figure 3.4, although it is not possible to test for all of them simultaneously.

#### (1) *The performance of the system – outputs*

The first explanation refers to the performance of the system – the *outputs* – both in terms of economic and political performance. Satisfaction with the political system is expected to increase if the economy is doing well – both objectively and subjectively. At the macro level, some factors have been tested: levels of unemployment (Lipset and Schneider 1983; Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; McAllister 1999); sudden changes in inflation and unemployment (Miller and Listhaug 1999); GDP (McAllister 1999); or changes in welfare gains (Gilley 2006). At the micro level, however, the relationship is clearer, and the better the perceived state of the economy, the higher the satisfaction with democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Mishler

and Rose 2001; McAllister 1999; Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn 2000; Power and Jamison 2005)<sup>21</sup>.

*H<sub>satisfaction-1</sub>: the better the perceived situation of the economy, the higher the satisfaction with democracy.*

Political outputs are also said to affect the people's satisfaction levels with their political system. Therein is the assumption that if citizens are dissatisfied with the policies produced by the system, there are higher levels of distrust with the institutions of government – political confidence – (Miller 1974; Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975; Huntington 1981; Lipset and Schneider 1987, Miller and Listhaug 1999) and that implementing policies which are demanded by citizens will increase satisfaction with democracy (Listhaug 2006). Complementary studies on political trust have investigated trust as a function of assessments of an institution's substantive output, and whether that output advances or infringes upon individual personal welfare (e.g., Orren 1997). As Ulbig notes: "This tradition suggests that when people get what they want they do not care how they get it" (Ulbig 2002: 793).

At the aggregate level, no strong relationship has been found between particular political conditions and satisfaction with the political system. McAllister, for example, showed that life expectancy has no significant effect on institutional confidence, and only primary and secondary schooling have a weak effect (McAllister 1999: 197). Results are slightly more consistent at the individual level, when outputs with less of a link to social welfare are taken into account. Gilley found that democratic rights (as measured in the liberty scores by Freedom House) affect levels of legitimacy of the state. The degree of freedom the political system provides (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Mishler and Rose 2001), the perceived fairness of the outcomes among groups (Miller and Listhaug 1999; Rothstein 2009), or the perceived levels of crime (Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn 2000) appear to strongly affect levels of satisfaction with the political system.

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<sup>21</sup> There are several critics of the studies that include economic factors as explanatory factors of satisfaction with the political system. Firstly, with regard to the objective economic indicators, it is often said that the degree of economic development is typically an accurate reflection of the quality of a democracy in a country. Generally, the most democratic countries are wealthy nations. As there is such a strong correlation in both parts of the equation, there is a problem of endogeneity. The same critics are found in relation to subjective indicators of satisfaction with the economy and satisfaction with democracy. Secondly, although satisfaction with democracy seems to react more strongly to short-term fluctuations than to structural features of the economy (and this is why the relationship is much more significant at the individual level), it is often difficult to count on longitudinal data to test this dynamic relationship.

*H<sub>satisfaction-2</sub>: the greater the satisfaction with the outputs of the government, the greater the satisfaction with democracy*

### *(2) Party identification and Ideology*

Because some people voted for the party which is governing at any one time, and others did not, there are always losers and winners in a country. People who voted for a governing party are almost by definition more likely to believe that the government is interested in and responsive to their needs (see, Citrin and Green 1986; Kornberg and Clarke 1994; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Dogan 2005). Winners systematically have higher levels of confidence in political institutions (Norris 1999). Anderson and Tverdova also find that satisfaction with democracy appears to be clearly related to the citizens' position in society as winners and losers: winners tend to be more satisfied than losers (Anderson and Tverdova 2001). Political sympathies with political leaders and political identity also tend to increase confidence in political institutions (Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Hetherington 1998).

*H<sub>satisfaction-3</sub>: voters of the party in government will be more satisfied with democracy than voters of opposition parties*

### *(3) Social Capital*

The fourth factor is *social capital* (Uslaner, 1999; Putnam, 2000). There are two main perspectives on the definition of social capital. The structural approach remains primarily functional and defines social capital as a resource (Coleman 1988). The cultural approach instead defines social culture as a set of attributes: informal networks or informal sociability, participation in associations or formal sociability, social trust, and reciprocity norms (Putnam 1993). It is this last perspective on social capital which has been mainly used as a determinant of democratic satisfaction. Following the cultural approach, there is a parallel development of social capital (people with more social networks have more trust in each other) and satisfaction with democracy (Putnam 2000).

However, the direction of the causality has rarely been questioned, although there is evidence which supports both directions: from social capital to satisfaction with democracy; and from satisfaction with democracy to social capital (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Foley and Edwards 1996; Tarrow 1998; Newton 1999). Others argue that the relationship is bidirectional; that levels of social capital increase satisfaction with democracy, and in turn, satisfaction with democracy increases levels of social capital

(Newton 2001). There are even those who assert that there is no such relationship, that social and political trust are not necessarily related, and may not be closely related at all in any given place or at any given time (Craig 1993; Orren 1997; Mishler and Rose 2001; Gilley 2006).


*H<sub>satisfaction-3</sub>: the higher the level of social capital, the higher the satisfaction with democracy*

*(4) The congruence hypothesis*

There is no need to repeat the arguments presented in section 3.2.4, but the hypothesis is restated here.

*H<sub>congruence</sub>: There is congruence if cognitive, affective, and evaluative supports are meaningfully related to satisfaction with democracy*

Figure 3.4 Explaining satisfaction with democracy




### 3.3.4 The relationship between the different types of support and the context

The final model (figure 3.5) introduces a variable which is of key importance in the study of public attitudes towards democracy: the context. We might expect, for example, that citizens' preferences for democracy will be different, depending on the country they live in. For example, it is probable that citizens of old democracies will have different visions of democracy than those living in new democracies. Or that individuals coming from ex-communist countries will have a different conception of democracy than those who have been living in a country with a liberal-democratic tradition. At the same time, the object being evaluated (democracy) is different in each context. Therefore, the same type of democrat will be satisfied or dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy depending on the country in which she lives; or will evaluate each of the attributes differently depending on the context.

Due to the context-dependent variations in both the independent and the dependent variables, contextual variables are included as an important part of the explanation. However, no set of hypotheses have yet been formulated with regard to the context. Rather, there is a list of elements which have been included in the literature in the study of public opinion on democracy (some of the already named) (a) Economic variables (GNP, Income inequality, level of industrialization, etc.); (b) Characteristics of the democracy (Indexes of democracy; numbers of years under democratic regime; type of democracy); (c) Institutional variables (parliamentarian vs. presidential system, type of electoral system, types of participation allowed in the country, etc); and (d) Cultural variables (predominant religion, communist vs. liberal tradition, territorial region to which they belong, etc.).

Figure 3.5 The influence of the context



### 3.4 Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to clarify the concepts and theoretical assumptions which will be tested empirically in this thesis. Most of the concepts which have been examined have been the subject of academic scrutiny for decades. For this reason, this theoretical part is most likely among the main contribution of this thesis. It remains to be seen in the next chapters whether these theoretical assumptions help us to explain the reality.





## CHAPTER 4 AFFECTIVE SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY: TYPES AND LEVELS OF SUPPORT IN EUROPE

### 4.1 Introduction: is democracy the only game in town?

If the daily news is to be believed, it seems that most people around the world want democracy. This is obviously a generalisation but it is partially supported by empirical studies, as referred to in chapter 2. Yet, previous assessments on the levels of support for democracy have been roundly criticised in recent years. Critics have attacked the assumption that affective support for democracy can be captured by a single indicator. Some scholars have claimed that citizens' supposed levels of support for democracy reflects the type of question which is asked, and does not reliably measure effective levels of support for democracy (Inglehart 2003; Canache 2006). In addition, others have pointed out that affective support for democracy needs to be operationalized with more than one indicator, because of its multidimensional nature (Carlin and Singer 2011). Critics have also questioned whether a single measure of affective support for democracy is comparable across countries, independently of the quality of democracy or the way citizens understand democracy in each country (Mishler and Rose 2001; Schedler and Sarfield 2005). The implications of these critiques for the study of affective support for democracy are critical. The first and most important implication is the need for reported levels of support to be reassessed, as prior estimations may be inaccurate. In other words, the claim that democracy is the 'only game in town' (Linz and Stepan 1996) needs to be re-examined.

Recently, there have been some attempts to 'correct' the standard measures of support for democracy by means of other indicators (Klingemann 1999; Haerpfer 2008; Dalton and Shin 2006; etc.). However, it has not been empirically proven that the 'corrected' measures of support apply in all countries. This chapter addresses these problems. Taking one of the classic indicators of support for democracy as the point of departure, it aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of affective support for democracy in Europe. Specifically, it aims to: (1) investigate whether and why affective support for democracy is (not) homogeneous across Europe; (2) assess levels of affective support in Europe and explain differences among individuals; and (3) examine whether the classical Churchillian indicator can be used to state and compare levels of affective support for democracy across Europe.

The data used for this purpose comes from the European Values Survey (EVS) 2008-2009, which surveyed 47 European countries<sup>22</sup>. This survey is the most recent and by far the most complete in terms of geographical coverage for the study of affective support for democracy in Europe.

#### 4.2 Churchill and Linz: Two Classic Indicators

Two standard indicators have been widely used to study the sources and consequences of democratic support: the Churchillian indicator and the Linzian indicator. The first indicator draws on Churchill's quote 'democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.' (Speech in the House of Commons, 11 November 1947), and is worded:

*Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government.*

The Linzian is based on Linz's theory that in the event of democratic breakdown, elites and citizens display loyalty, disloyalty, or "semi-loyalty" to the democratic regime:

*With which of the following statements do you mostly agree (a) 'Democracy is always preferable to any other form of government, (b) 'In certain circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic government', or (c) 'To someone like me, a democratic or non-democratic regime makes no difference'<sup>23</sup>.*


Analysis of both indicators generally suggests that democracy is broadly supported around the world, as most people tend to report agreement with the statement that 'democracy is better than any other form of government'. Figure 4.1 shows levels of affective support in Europe, according to the Churchillian indicator.

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<sup>22</sup> Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Cyprus, Northern Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Macedonia, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and Kosovo. Except from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, all of them will be considered in the analysis

<sup>23</sup> Because it has been mostly applied to democratic breakdown, this item is generally not used in the European context, and only the Churchillian item is available for Europe (for studies using the Linzian item see, for example, Lagos 2003; Shin and Wells 2005).

Figure 4.1 Churchill's item\* of affective support for democracy



\*Exact wording of the item is: *I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each of them? a. Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government. The item has been reversed so that 1 means "disagree strongly" and 4 means "agree strongly". Data presented in the graph are the means for each of the countries.*

Source: EVS 2008-2009

This figure reinforces the idea that levels of affective support for democracy are high across Europe, as the mean of all countries is above the mid-point 2. If this measure is taken in isolation as a guide to support for democracy, we can say that democracy enjoys strong support in Europe. However, there is some variation across countries, as levels of support vary from 3.75 in Denmark to 2.92 in Moldova. Most Western countries tend to be above the mean, while Central and Eastern countries are predominantly below the mean. There are also some surprising results. For example, Kosovo is situated above France, Germany, and Finland – three established democracies – in the graph. Does this mean that Kosovars are more engaged with the idea of democracy than the Finnish? Just as interesting, levels of affective support for democracy in Belgium are only slightly higher than levels of affective support in Albania. An inevitable follow-up question to these results is to ask whether the data represented in the figure reflect *real* levels of affective support, or these are a reflection of the item which has

been employed. To answer this question, we need to take into account other alternative measures in the analysis of affective support for democracy.

### 4.3 The Structure of Affective Support for Democracy in Europe

#### 4.3.1 Churchill and other measures

The European Values Survey 2008-2009 includes seven other indicators which, by face validity, can be used to measure affective support for democracy. Three of them belong to the same battery as Churchill's item, whereas the other set of questions have been introduced immediately before in the questionnaire (table 4.1). These items can be classified as measuring different aspects of affective support. With regard to the first group, support for democracy as an ideal is measured. The fifth item – *Pol.sys: democracy* – measures whether the respondent wants to have a democracy in her own country. The last group of items accounts for rejection of autocracy in the country.

Table 4.1 Other measures of affective support for democracy

Introduction	Item	
I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each of them?	Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government ( <i>Democracy better</i> )	<b>Support democracy ideally</b>
	In democracy, the economic system runs badly ( <i>Outcome: economy</i> )	
	Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling ( <i>Outcome: indecision</i> )	
	Democracies aren't good at maintaining order ( <i>Outcome: order</i> )	
I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?	Having a democratic political system ( <i>Pol. sys: democracy</i> )	<b>Support democracy in country</b>
	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections ( <i>Pol. sys: leader</i> )	<b>Reject autocracy in country</b>
	Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country ( <i>Pol. sys: experts</i> )	
	Having the army rule the country ( <i>Pol. sys: army</i> )	

Source: EVS 2008-2009.

These items are extremely helpful in attempting to gauge affective support for democracy. Firstly, they are, by face validity, alternative formulations of the same concept, which enable us to better understand what it is that the classic Churchillian question does in fact measure. Secondly, some of the items include the word democracy in their formulation, while others don't. Because items containing the word democracy have been largely criticised for increasing social desirability (and therefore reported levels of affective support; see section 4.1), it is extremely interesting to

observe the relationship between these two different items. Thirdly, support for democracy is studied at different levels of abstraction. While the first set of items asks about democracy as an ideal, in abstract, the second battery refers to democracy in one's own country. According to previous literature, we would expect levels of support to be different depending on whether people are asked about democracy in general or democracy as it relates to their own country (Fuchs 2006).

These or similar indicators have already been used to correct the classic Churchillian indicator: "Klingemann (1999), Shin and Wells (2005) and others emphasize that outspoken democratic preferences are meaningless unless they go together with a rejection of authoritarian alternatives to democracy." (Welzel and Klingemann 2007: 3). However, it has not been clearly specified under which conditions the Churchillian item needs to be corrected, or whether corrections are needed in all countries (an exception is Ariely and Davidov 2010). In this section, therefore, I test: (1) whether all these items belong to a latent concept of affective support for democracy; (2) whether there is a single dimension of autocracy-democracy as previous analyses have assumed (Inglehart 2003; Welzel and Inglehart 2006; Dalton and Shin 2006; etc.); and (3) whether the concept is comparable across countries.

Table 4.2 presents data for all eight indicators. Important differences are visible at a glance. Three items enjoy significant support (*Democracy better* 3.32; *Pol. sys: democracy* 3.30; and *Pol. sys: army* 3.41), while the others are all below 3. Notably, there is little support for *Outcome: indecision* (2.52) and *Pol. sys: experts* (2.38). The observed differences indicate, again, that the Churchillian indicator may be misleading as a measure of affective support for democracy. Clearly, depending on the indicator which is chosen, levels of affective support for democracy can vary significantly (from 3.41 to 2.38). This would seem to be particularly problematic when the aim is to compare across countries, as the variation is even greater. In the next section, therefore, all indicators are included in the analysis.

Table 4.2 Other measures of affective support: means

	Item	Mean*	S.D.
Support democracy ideally	Democracy better <sup>1</sup>	3.32	0.68
	Outcome: economy	2.75	1.04
	Outcome: indecision	2.52	0.92
	Outcome: order	2.78	0.80
Support democracy in country	Pol. sys: democracy <sup>2</sup>	3.30	0.74
Reject autocracy in country	Pol. sys: leader	2.86	0.77
	Pol. sys: experts	2.38	0.81
	Pol. sys: army	3.41	0.81

\*Minimum value=1, and maximum value=4

<sup>1</sup>Item reversed: 1 "disagree strongly" and 4 "agree strongly".

<sup>2</sup>Item reversed: 1 "very bad" and 4 "very good".

Source: EVS 2008-2009

#### 4.3.2 The heterogeneity of affective support for democracy in Europe


It is reasonable to assume that respondents who support democracy as an ideal will also support democracy as a form of government in their own countries, and will reject any other form of autocratic regime (the same has been suggested by Klingemann 1999, and Shin and Wells 2005). If this is true, there should be a single concept of affective support for democracy, comprising all of the indicators presented above. Confirmatory Factor Analysis is a very useful technique which can be applied to test this assumption. It allows us to test the strength or coherence of latent structures, identifying the degree of association among them, and representing these relationships graphically. In addition, it enables us to know which model (or structure) better fits the data and whether this model is comparable across countries (Brown 2006: 49-53).

Before presenting the results of the analysis, some comment on the technique is required. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was performed to test the initial model for each country separately as suggested by Byrne (2004; see also Brown 2006). The software used is AMOS, with Maximum Likelihood, and data imputed through stochastic regression. The same test has been performed with different methods and imputation procedures and results remain unchanged<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> There are no differences in the results either if data are imputed by stochastic regression or Bayesian imputation. Nor do results change substantially with non-imputed data, with the exception that CMIN/DF performs much better for non-imputed data, because this measure of fit is greatly affected by the number of cases. Imputation with stochastic regression has ultimately been chosen as it seems to deal better with ordinal variables (imputation for Bosnia, North Cyprus and Romania could not be performed with any of the methods). Although normality is violated in many cases, the results provided by ML do not vary substantially from the results of the asymptotically free distribution method – particularly indicated for cases of non-normality – and therefore ML has been chosen (CFA results with the asymptotically free distribution method are available on request).

With regard to the results, the initial assumption that all indicators belong to a single latent concept of affective support for democracy is not confirmed. The model does not fit the data in any of the countries (Annex 1), according to Brown's rule of thumb<sup>25</sup> (2006). CFI and TLI do not reach acceptable figures, and loadings for some of the indicators do not attain the recommended .35. In addition, the standardized regression weight of three items (*outcomes: indecision*; *outcomes: order*, and *outcomes: economy*) is very high as compared to the others, which suggests that these are more closely related among them. Figure 4.2 presents the initial model for the entire sample of countries.

Figure 4.2 Initial model: a single latent concept of affective support for democracy




	$\chi^2$	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
All countries	22374,838***	20	,139	,062	,754	,656

Because the model fit is weak both when applied to individual countries and collectively to the entire group, the initial model has been modified according to residuals and modification indices. Analysis of the residuals suggests that there is a stronger relationship between some of the indicators than between others. The concept of

<sup>25</sup> Browns recommendations to retain a model are: SRMS  $\leq$  0.08; RMSEA  $\leq$  0.06; CFI  $\geq$  0.95; TLI  $\geq$  0.95; CMIN/DF  $\leq$  4; Standardized Residuals  $\leq$  2; Modification indices  $\leq$  4; Error variance always positive; Standardized estimators  $\leq$  1, if loading in a single factor; Standardized estimators at least  $\geq$  0.40. I have followed these recommendations for the selection of all models except for CMIN/DF  $\leq$  4 (when analysis is performed with non-imputed data, this value is within the acceptable limits), which is strongly affected by the sample size. As for the standardized estimators, I have relaxed the recommendation to at least  $\geq$  0.35, in order to make comparison among such a big group of countries easier (see also Davidov 2010).

affective support for democracy would be formed by several sub-concepts, a distinction which seems also to be supported by the theory: approval of democracy (ideal and in country); rejection of autocracy; and democracy's ideal outcomes (Figure 4.3). This distinction is neither driven by the different wording of the indicators (having the word democracy in the formulation) nor by the different framing (democracy as an ideal or democracy as a form of government in one's own country). Consequently, we need to reject the assumption that there is a single continuum of autocracy-democracy.

Figure 4.3 The sub-concepts of affective support for democracy



The new model better fits the data in most countries<sup>26</sup>, indicating that the changes are both substantially and empirically meaningful<sup>27</sup>, and is consistent with previous findings (Ariely and Davidov 2010). CFA reveals, however, that the structure of affective support for democracy differs across Europe, as model fit is not adequate in all countries. Again by looking at residuals and modification indices, I have ended up with five models of affective support for democracy, which allow for classification of almost all the countries

<sup>26</sup> In some cases, the changes suggested by the analysis of modification indices and residuals were not followed, as model fit was still adequate without these changes. I have not improved the models either by linking the errors which were more strongly related, so that comparison across countries was simpler. For this reason, in some cases modification indices and residuals remained slightly higher than is normally accepted (modification indices and residuals for each country available on request).

<sup>27</sup> It could be argued that the model reproduces the order and structure of the questionnaire, as it tends to group items which are part of the same battery in the questionnaire. However, the model also groups two items which belong to different batteries of questions. In fact, it might be the case that *Democracy better* and *Pol. Sys.: democracy* are together in the model because they include the word democracy and ask about it in the affirmative, in line with previous critiques on the use of a single question containing the word democracy to measure support for democracy, because of social desirability (Schedler and Sarsfield 2005). This reinforces the idea that the Churchillian indicator alone cannot adequately capture levels of effective support for democracy.



in the sample. Comparability of the different models within each group has been tested following the steps proposed by Brown (2006) and Davidov (2010)<sup>28</sup>: (1) to test the model separately in each country and group the countries according to the model that better fits their data; (2) to simultaneously test of equal form for each group (identical factor structure); (3) to test the equality of factor loadings for each group; and because I am mostly interested in the structure of the concept of affective support for democracy, (4) to test the equality of latent factor variances and covariances for each group. The tests performed are very demanding with the data, so that I can assume country-comparability<sup>29</sup>.


Group 1 includes Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (high comparability, see footnote 8); and Cyprus, Denmark, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, and Lithuania (medium comparability, see footnote 8). In this group of countries (Figure 4.4), a latent concept of affective support is formed by the three sub-concepts (approval of democracy; rejection of autocracy; and democracy outcomes). All eight items are included in the model, and weight reasonably well in each of the sub-concepts.

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<sup>28</sup> I have followed Chen (2007) and Saris, Santorra and van der Veld (2009) recommendations for comparability. As a general rule, Chen 2007 recommends for metric invariance test that if differences in CFI are  $>.01$ , for  $\Delta RMSEA >.015$ , and  $\Delta SRMR$  are larger than  $>.03$ , invariance should be rejected. According to Saris, Santorra and van der Veld (2009), only meaningful deviations should be considered as violations of invariance.

<sup>29</sup> In some cases, adding a particular country to a group makes model fit slightly worse. However, because the first test is well passed in all groups, I still maintain them in the group, to make comparison easier. In any of the cases, model fit is not dramatically violated (see Annex 1), and I have always followed the more restrictive rule of CFI and  $TLI >.95$ . In the text, it is indicated whether comparability across countries is very high – which means that variations of the measures of fit when adding a new country to the group enters the limits recommended by Chen – or medium, which means that variations of one or more of the measures of fit when adding a new country are slightly higher than recommended by Chen (2006). For these cases, I have followed Saris, Santorra and van der Veld (2009), so that more flexibility is allowed.


Figure 4.4 Affective support for democracy: Group 1



Group 2 includes Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine (high comparability); Austria, Belarus, Croatia, Latvia (medium comparability). Even if the structure of affective support is very similar to Group 1 (Figure 4.5), one of the variables is dropped in this model, *Pol. sys: experts*, because standardized coefficient is smaller than .35<sup>30</sup>. Within this group of countries, having experts (and not elected politicians) governing the country is not perceived as an autocratic form of government.


<sup>30</sup> Standardized coefficient of *Pol. sys.: experts* for all countries is .17. Country by country: Austria: 0.26; Belarus: 0.12; Belgium: 0.29; Bosnia: 0.33; Bulgaria: 0.20; Croatia: 0.06; Czech Republic: 0.30; Estonia: 0.20; Germany: 0.30; Hungary: 0.04; Montenegro: 0.25; Poland: 0.02; Serbia: 0.31; Slovakia: 0.02; Slovenia: 0.14; Russia: 0.32; Ukraine: 0.28.

Figure 4.5 Affective support for democracy: Group 2



There is no latent concept of affective support for democracy in the last three groups, but only weak relationships between the sub-concepts. Group 3 comprises Greece, Macedonia, and Turkey. Group 4 comprises Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia; and group 5, Albania, Kosovo, Moldova, and Romania. This last group is notably different, as only one sub-concept partly satisfies the measures of goodness of fit: *democracy outcomes* (this is again consistent with Ariely and Davidov 2010, who find fewer problems of comparability across countries with this sub-concept). These are presented in Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6 Affective support for democracy: Groups 3, 4, and 5




	$\chi^2$	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
Group 3	893,234***	17	,056	,028	,974	,957
Group 4	323,109***	11	,046	,012	,988	,977
Group 5	,000	0	,555	,000	1,000	

A final group of countries does not adjust to any of these models: Northern Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and North Cyprus. In Portugal, Northern Ireland and Northern Cyprus a variable needs to be dropped: *Pol. sys: army*, but no common model is attained for these three countries (a latent concept of affective support for democracy is found in Northern Ireland, but not clearly in Portugal, and the relationship between the sub-concepts is actually negative in Northern Cyprus). In Switzerland, a different variable needs to be dropped: *Outcome: indecision*. And, for the Spanish case, the model fits relatively well, but standardized coefficients are low (below .35) for some of the items. A more in-depth analysis would be needed to resolve whether differences in these countries are due to error measurement, or reflect instead different structures of support. For the present chapter, they have been omitted from the analysis, because a comparative analysis is not feasible.

Geographical proximity seems to play an important role in the shaping of the type of affective support for democracy in Europe. This is clearly seen in figure 4.7. In fact, geographical proximity seems also to be related to the complexity of the structure of affective support, from highly structured to very unstructured. The labels for each of the groups do, with some exceptions, reflect the geographical proximity and the level of complexity: group 1 is called Western Europe (WE) or three-level full set; group 2, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) or three-level reduced set; group 3, Mediterranean east Europe (MEE) or two-level full set; and group 4, the Balkans (BE) or two-level reduced set. Group 5 does not correspond to any geographical area (Romania, Moldova, Albania, and Kosovo, RMAK or outcome reduced).

Figure 4.7 Different types of affective support for democracy across Europe



The previous paragraphs show that affective support for democracy is not homogeneous across Europe. This has important implications with regard to the measurement of levels of support, as the use of the single Churchillian indicator is proven to be misleading. It is particularly problematic in countries where there is no

latent concept of affective support for democracy, as there is no correlation between the Churchillian item and the other indicators of affective support. In addition, the use of the Churchillian figure is not recommended for countries where a latent concept of affective support for democracy exists. Indeed, reported levels of support might not be accurate in this group of countries either. Although the findings presented in this section are highly dependent on the variables which are included in the model, this chapter provides a good justification for the consideration of additional items in the study of affective support for democracy, and argues against simply comparing the Churchillian item across countries.

#### **4.4 Different types of support, different contexts**

Differences in Europeans' notions of affective support for democracy have so far not been thoroughly investigated. There is little research on which types of affective support exist, and why these are different across Europe. Accordingly, this section is largely exploratory.

Of major interest is whether different structures of affective support for democracy imply a different degree of democratic awareness; in other words, whether some types of supporters are more pro-democratically oriented than others. The relationship between affective and cognitive support is studied in the next chapter, and is not addressed here. The purpose of this section is to define the characteristics of each of the different groups of countries; to observe whether some particular contextual characteristics influence the way people support democracy. Alternative explanations of affective support for democracy have already been introduced in chapter 3 (section 3.3.1). However, these have mostly been used to explain levels of support, not to explain why people endorse a particular type of affective support. In addition, attention has mostly been devoted to the individuals and the reasons why people support democracy, with less attention given to the aggregate levels of support. Yet, it is possible that the same factors that influence levels of affective support among individuals will also have an impact on how people structure affective support in a country.

Two main hypotheses have been developed in the literature to explain levels of affective support for democracy among individuals: the socialization and the performance hypotheses. At the aggregate level, these factors all refer to characteristics of the context: the number of years a country has been a democracy; the

predominant values in a country; and the quality of the democratic system. This is the context in which citizens develop their orientations to democracy in general, and to their democratic system in particular. In other words, it is the context where they get socialized. It is therefore predictable that these contextual elements will equally determine the type of affective support which is shared by the inhabitants of a specific country. At the very least, there should be some correlation between the characteristics of a country and the type of support in that country. I propose that there are three main characteristics which can be expected to affect citizens' orientations to democracy in a country: democratic experience, values, and economic and educational performance.

With regard to democratic experience, it seems straightforward that experiencing the object of support is of greatest importance in determining whether one likes it or not. In that sense, it is predictable that stability and durability of a democracy will affect the way citizens support democracy. But the performance of democracy also seems to be essential in shaping the structure of affective support. More in particular, the way one experiences the principal democratic institutions – the elections – might have a significant impact how affective support is understood in a country. To put it in other words, the type of electoral system in a country could also affect citizens' understandings of affective support.

Where values are concerned, three variables are taken into consideration: membership to the European Union, the communist legacy, and the predominant religious denomination in a country. The European Union, for example, has been 'founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities' (Article I-2, of the Treaty of the European Union). Belonging to the EU means sharing this set of values as part of the same community. It would be expected, then, that members of the EU would have reached a common structure of affective support for democracy. A similar outcome might be predicted for the communist legacy. On the one hand, a different set of values was shared under the communist regime (Biryukov and Sergeev 1994; Simon 1998). On the other hand, the process of change from communism to democracy might have provoked different reactions from the citizens, which might well affect how they have structured their affective support for democracy in the aftermath of transition (Hofferbert and Klingemann 2001; Loewenberg, Mishler, and Sandborn 2010; Moritz 2010). The EVS took place 20 years after the communist breakdown, which makes it especially interesting in order to see whether there are residual effects of communism. A similar argument is behind the religious explanation. Religion has been

considered by some scholars as a component of the post-materialist values (Inglehart 1993; Welzel and Inglehart 2006). According to this thesis, religious denomination is strongly connected to the type of values which dominate in a given society, and to citizens' orientations to democracy.

The last two characteristics are aimed at controlling for other contextual variables, which may only indirectly affect citizens' types of affective support for democracy: economic performance and levels of education. All three variables are presented in table 4.3 (see Annex 1 for a description of each of the variables).

Table 4.3 Summary of characteristics

	<b>Characteristic</b>	<b>Operationalization</b>
Democratic experience	Democratic longevity	Mean of the number of years the group of countries has been democratic (durable, Polity IV)
	Democratic performance	Index of democracy Vanhannen 2002, and Index of democracy Economist Intelligence Unit 2006
	Type of electoral system	Percentage of countries in each group for each type of electoral system (majoritarian, proportional, mixed), as described by Golder 2005
Values	European Union	Mean of the number of years the group of countries has been member of the EU
	Communist experience	Percentage of countries in each group with a communist past
	Predominant religion	Percentage of reported religious denomination within each group in EVS 2008-2009
Other contextual variables	Education	Mean of reported level of education in each group of countries in EVS 2008-2009 (scale from 1 to 6)
	Economic performance	GDP per capita 2005 (World Bank and OECD)

The analysis of these variables is presented in table 4.4. The entries correspond to the means of the variables in each of the groups. Significant coefficients of multinomial regression are signalled in bold (analysis is performed separately for each independent variable)<sup>31</sup>. Results suggest that there is a relationship between the contextual characteristics and the type of support within each of the groups. Specifically, Western Europe is composed of a group of countries where democratic systems have been the most stable, and also where democracy performs the best (or the quality is higher). This is strongly correlated, also, to the number of years these countries have been members of the European Union (for the correlations among all variables, see Annex 1). In this group of countries the percentage of Protestants is also much higher than in the other groups. Central and Eastern Europe is mostly defined through the communist variable. Most countries in this group (80%, and 87% if Germany is coded as ex-communist),

<sup>31</sup> It is not possible to compute a single model with all variables, because these are strongly correlated among them (see Annex 1).



have a communist legacy, which is strongly correlated to their shorter democratic experience (and lower quality of democracy), and recent membership of the EU. The same is true for the Balkans, even if democratic development in these countries is weaker than in CEE. There seems to be no relationship, however, between the type of electoral system in a country and the structure of affective support, as there are no significant differences across groups of countries. Instead, apart from the length and quality of their democratic systems, Mediterranean East Europe, and the Romania and Albania group are primarily differentiated by religion from the other groups of countries, with Muslims and Orthodox Christians predominant.

Table 4.4 Profiles of the types of support

	Western Europe	Central and Eastern Europe	Mediterranean east Europe	The Balkans	Romania – Albania Group
Years of democracy <sup>1***</sup>	<b>63.90</b>	21.90	22.30	<b>2.00</b>	11.00
Index of democracy <sup>2</sup> 2002***	<b>34.63</b>	29.15	26.60	21.50	<b>17.13</b>
Index of democracy <sup>3</sup> 2006***	<b>8.78</b>	7.24	6.72	5.78	6.49
Type of electoral sys: majoritarian <sup>4</sup>	14.29	0	0	-	0
Type of electoral sys: proportional <sup>4</sup>	71.43	71.43	66.67	-	66.67
Type of electoral sys: mixed <sup>4</sup>	14.29	28.57	33.33	-	33.33
EU membership <sup>5**</sup>	<b>27.10</b>	11.00	9.30	0.00	0.50
Communist experience <sup>5***</sup>	<b>7.10</b>	80.00 <sup>a</sup>	<b>33.30</b> <sup>b</sup>	100.00	100.00
No religion <sup>6*</sup>	<b>22.21</b>	33.53	<b>3.67</b>	31.33	<b>11.50</b>
Catholic <sup>6*</sup>	34.93	37.20	0.33	6.33	3.75
Protestant <sup>6*</sup>	<b>30.71</b>	6.20	0.00	0.33	0.50
Muslim <sup>6*</sup>	0.93	1.60	<b>39.00</b>	15.67	<b>30.25</b>
Orthodox <sup>6**</sup>	7.50	18.40	<b>56.00</b>	43.67	<b>50.75</b>
Other religion <sup>6</sup>	3.07	2.27	0.00	0.67	1.50
Education <sup>6**</sup>	3.17	3.22	<b>2.47</b>	3.04	2.96
GDP per capita <sup>7</sup>	362,895,146	567,025,266	<b>29,506,869</b>	187,226,493	141,995,454
<b>Number of countries</b>	14	15	3	3	4

\*significant differences at  $p < 0.05$ , \*\* significant differences at  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* significant differences at  $p < 0.001$  (ANOVA)  
 In bold, significant coefficients of multinomial regression run for each of the variables separately. Category of reference is Central and Eastern Europe. See Annex 1 for complete results.

<sup>a</sup> Germany has been coded as non ex-communist. If it is coded as ex-communist, 87% of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have a communist experience.

<sup>b</sup> Coefficient is only significant if Germany is coded as communist.

Source: <sup>1</sup> own elaboration, based on Marshall and Jagers 2002

<sup>2</sup> Vanhanen 2005

<sup>3</sup> Kekic 2007

<sup>4</sup> Golder 2005

<sup>5</sup> own elaboration

<sup>6</sup> European Values Survey 2008-2009

<sup>7</sup> World Bank, OECD

Although we cannot simply assume that there is a relationship between the characteristics shown above and the type of support within each group of countries, there are some reasons to believe that a correlation exists. Specifically, the differences

within types of support seem to be particularly related to differences between large democratic experience vs. small democratic experience; and between communist past vs. non-communist past. Regarding the first, it is not surprising that the longer the democratic experience (and higher the quality of democracy), the more structured and consistent the type of support for democracy among the citizens. In Western Europe, in fact, the type of affective support is more comprehensive to all sub-concepts (approval of democracy, rejection of autocracy, and democracy outcomes), but also to all forms of autocracy (government by the army, strong autocratic leadership, and government by non-elected experts). In this sense, democratic experience has surely reinforced attitude strength to democracy among Western Europeans (as one of the basic features of attitude strength is knowledge (Bizer et al. 2004)).

With regard to the communist experience, a number of studies have dealt with the question of how post-communist democracies have managed to develop public support among the citizenry after the breakdown of communism. Some studies have specifically addressed the differences in types of support between ex-communist regimes and Western countries (Thomassen 1995; Finkel, Humphries, and Opp 2001; Hoffertbert and Klingemann 2001). Results from this section indicate that differences still persist between ex-communist and non-communist countries. In Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans in particular (the two groups of countries where the percentage of ex-communist countries is bigger, with the exception of the Romania-Albania group), government by non-elected experts is not perceived as contradictory with a democratic system. Reisinger and Miller provide a plausible justification for this “Most commonly stressed, however, in the context of the prospects for democratization, is the ‘authoritarian’ strain in Russian tradition. This authoritarian outlook consists of a respect for strong leadership and a fear of disorder or anarchy” (Reisinger and Miller 1994: 188). Although Central and Eastern Europeans might have learned to reject other autocratic forms of government<sup>32</sup>, support for a technocratic government still seems part of their political culture. This tendency may even have been reinforced by the recent adhesion of these countries to the EU and the necessity to take over the *acquis communautaire*.


Germany provides an excellent case-study with which to test whether differences of types of support between Western, and Central and Eastern Europe are reproduced in a country which has been partitioned artificially into two parts. CFA for the two separate

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<sup>32</sup> Haerpfer finds, for example, that support for authoritarian regimes has decreased in most ex-communist countries included in their sample from the period 1996 to 2002 (Haerpfer 2008: 421)

samples – Western and Eastern Germany – has been performed in order to check whether the structure of affective support is the same in West and East Germany. The results are not yet conclusive (Figure 4.8). On the one hand, West Germany classifies within the Western Europeans (standard coefficient of Pol. sys.: experts is just above the limit .35), in which all variables and sub-concepts form part of the latent concept of affective support for democracy. On the other hand, rejection of the government by non-elected experts is not part of the concept of affective support for democracy in East Germany, as in the case of Central and Eastern Europe. However, the model does not perform well either, as there is not a single latent concept of affective support for democracy (the standardized coefficient of approval of democracy is above 1 – variance negative). In spite of this, it seems clear that democratic experience promotes a more comprehensive structure of affective support. Similarly, in former communist bloc countries there appears to be some reluctance to reject authoritarian forms of government.

Figure 4.8 The type of support in West and East Germany



Lastly, a few words on the predominant religious denomination. Previous studies have referred to the religious factor as a main predictor of other political and democratic attitudes. Van Beek, for example, signals the importance of religion in Turkey, for example, and the difficulties this country has encountered in secularizing the political realm. For most Turkish, any political orientation is strongly affected by religious attitudes. Religion is in fact an inseparable part of life, which is indistinguishable from politics (van Beek 2010). In two of the groups of countries where there is no latent

concept of affective support for democracy, there are a large percentage of people who affirm to be Muslims. Although we cannot conclude that these two elements are directly correlated, it is undeniable that religion can play a role in shaping citizens' orientations to democracy, especially if it is present in all aspects of life (see also Inglehart and Welzel 2005). In parallel, van Beek refers to Protestantism – the predominant religion of Western European countries – as the motor which has promoted democratic development and culture in Europe (van Beek 2010).

It remains to be seen whether a specific type of support relates to a specific type of democracy. In chapter 5, the two types of support – affective and cognitive – are included in the analysis, in order to know whether some types of affective support are more 'democratic' than others.

#### **4.5 How much support? And why?**

We have seen that the types of affective support for democracy are not homogeneous across Europe. It is now interesting to observe whether there is a relationship between the types and the levels of affective support for democracy, as well as to try to explain why there are differences in levels of support among people.

The results obtained in the previous sections point to several problems regarding the levels of affective support in Europe.. The first is that in three of the groups analysed above, there is no latent concept of affective support. It is not possible, therefore, to have a definite measure of the levels of support in these countries. For these groups of countries, only the levels of support for each of the sub-concepts of affective support for democracy can be estimated. The second problem is that a comparison between levels of support in the Western and Central and Eastern European groups is not straightforward. Since one of the variables is missing from the latent concept of affective support for Central and Eastern European countries, it is not clear that we are comparing the same object, although factorial scores are quite similar for the two groups<sup>33</sup>. For this reason, I will treat each of the groups separately in this chapter, using factorial scores provided by CFA in the analysis<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> Factorial scores range from -1.91 to 1.65 for WE and from -1.72 to 1.66 for CEE. Standard deviation is .41 for WE and .40 for CEE. Means are reported in table 4.5.

<sup>34</sup> Correlation between the factorial scores and the composite index of all variables in the model is .79 in Western Europe and .74 in Central and Eastern Europe. Correlation between the factorial score and the weighted composites of all variables in the model is .79 in Western Europe and .77 in Central and Eastern Europe.

#### 4.5.1 Western, and Central and Eastern Europe

Table 4.5 presents levels of affective support in Western and Central and Eastern Europe. In the table, an additional column has been added, where factor scores have been rescaled into an 11-point scale to enable easier reading. Levels of affective support vary widely both across and within groups. In Western Europe, countries with higher levels of support are Denmark, Sweden and Norway; and those with the lowest are Lithuania<sup>35</sup>, Great Britain, Ireland and France. In Central and Eastern Europe, Austrians and Germans are the most supportive, while Ukrainians and Russians have lower levels of affective support for democracy.

In table 4.5, a third column includes also the classic Churchillian indicator presented at the beginning of this chapter, to compare with the factorial scores of affective support. Although there is some correspondence between factor scores and the Churchillian item in the extremes of both groups, the relationship is less clear in the middle of the scale (correlation is .51 for both groups at the individual level). As already anticipated, the Churchillian indicator does not seem to be accurate in assessing levels of affective support for democracy.

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<sup>35</sup> This can be an indication of why it is an outlier within the group of Central and Eastern countries. Lithuanians seem to have a comprehensive structure of affective support, but their levels of support still remain low.

Table 4.5 Levels of affective support for democracy in Western, and Central and Eastern Europe

Western Europe	Factor score	Rescaled**	Churchill	Central and Eastern Europe	Factor score	Rescaled**	Churchill
Denmark	0.23	10.0	3.75	Austria	0.21	10.0	3.55
Sweden	0.12	7.5	3.53	Germany	0.19	9.5	3.38
Norway	0.09	6.8	3.69	Belgium	0.05	5.8	3.31
Cyprus	0.07	6.4	3.63	Estonia	0.04	5.5	3.09
Iceland	0.05	5.9	3.35	Slovak Republic	0.04	5.5	3.19
Italy	0.04	5.7	3.48	Croatia	0.02	5.0	3.13
Malta	0.04	5.7	3.37	Czech Republic	0.00	4.5	3.14
Finland	0.02	5.2	3.36	Hungary	-0.01	4.2	3.03
Luxembourg	-0.02	4.3	3.52	Slovenia	-0.01	4.2	3.08
Netherlands	-0.07	3.2	3.32	Poland	-0.03	3.7	3.13
France	-0.10	2.5	3.43	Belarus	-0.04	3.4	3.14
Ireland	-0.10	2.5	3.16	Latvia	-0.11	1.6	3.02
Great Britain	-0.10	2.5	3.22	Bulgaria	-0.12	1.3	3.09
Lithuania	-0.21	0.0	3.10	Russian Federation	-0.12	1.3	2.98
				Ukraine	-0.17	0.0	2.98
Mean*	-.001	5.3	3.4		.001	5.1	3.1

\*Means are statistically different at  $p < 0.05$

\*\*Rescaled factor scores (11-point scale).

Source: European Values Survey, 2008-2009

In spite of the factor scores having a very similar range and standard deviation in both groups of countries (see footnote 12), we cannot affirm with certainty that levels of support are lower in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe (even if the difference between the means is statistically significant). A simple strategy which enables us to know whether levels of support are higher in one group or the other is to classify the respondents into low, medium, and high supporters. Table 4.6 indeed suggests that there is a correlation between the structure and the levels of support. Almost 50% of interviewees from Central and Eastern Europe have low levels of affective support for democracy. The figure is much lower in Western Europe (36.6%), a difference which is statistically significant. Differences are also statistically significant between the two groups of countries with regard to the higher levels of support. Country by country, differences are even more pronounced, as in all but two countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Austria and Germany), the group of respondents which prevails is those with low levels of support. Levels of affective support for democracy in Western Europe seem to be higher than in Central and Eastern Europe<sup>36</sup>. At first sight, then, there is an association between the type and the levels of affective support. In

<sup>36</sup> Because the number of items which constitutes each of the models of affective support for democracy varies between the two groups, one could argue that lower levels of support in Central and Eastern Europe are an artefact [is this the word you need?]. However, because the classification of low, medium and high supporters was created after the factor scores had been rescaled into 11-point scales, there is no reason to believe that results are affected by the number of variables included in each of the models.

other words, the way people support democracy seems to influence how much they support it. What then are the other factors that have an effect on levels of affective support for democracy?

Table 4.6 Percentage of respondents by levels of affective support for democracy

	Western Europe (%) <sup>a</sup>	Central and Eastern Europe (%) <sup>a</sup>	Diff % <sup>b</sup>
Low support (0-4) <sup>c</sup>	36,61	46,63	10,02*
Medium support (5) <sup>c</sup>	33,54	30,81	2,73*
High support (6-10) <sup>c</sup>	29,85	22,56	7,29*

\* Differences significant at  $p < .05$

<sup>a</sup> Individual level data, % of respondents in each of the levels of affective support

<sup>b</sup> Difference (in absolute terms) of the percentage of respondents in each of the groups of countries

<sup>c</sup> 11-points rescaled measure of support is divided into 3 groups: low support – from 0 to 4; medium support – 5; and high support – 6 to 10 (rescaled factor scores).

A set of possible explanations of levels of affective support for democracy has already been introduced in chapter 3: the socialization hypothesis and the performance hypothesis. As for the socialization hypothesis, an independent variable has been introduced in the model which measures the number of years an individual has lived under a democratic regime (see Annex 1 for detailed list of the independent variables). It is probable that the longer a person has lived in a democratic regime, the higher will be her level of affective support for democracy (see, for example, Mishler and Rose 1999; 2001). Regarding the performance hypothesis, *Evaluation political regime* counts as subjective evaluations of the political system, or evaluative support. As described in chapter 3, I expect that better evaluations of the political regime are positively correlated to higher levels of affective support for democracy (e.g. Finkel, Humphries and Opp 2001)<sup>37</sup>. Also at the individual level, other controls are displayed in the regression model, which relate to levels of sophistication (education and political interest), and socio-economic characteristics (sex, age and income).

Contextual variables are also included in the models. On the one hand, because separate analysis is done for Western, and Central and Eastern Europe, contextual variables are already controlled for *a priori*. Just as a reminder, Western Europe is basically constituted – with some exceptions – by countries with stable and qualified democracies, which have been members of the EU for an extended period of time. Central and Eastern Europe, by contrast, is composed of relatively new and less

<sup>37</sup> As already mentioned in chapter 3, this relationship is however problematic, since affective support might also affect citizens' evaluations of their democracies. It is in fact questionable whether someone who does not support democracy affectively, will evaluative positively her democratic system. I maintain here evaluative support as the independent variable, as it is the most frequently used in the literature.

qualified democracies, new members of the EU, and, with the exception of Belgium and Austria, former communist countries (if we consider Germany as an ex-communist country). On the other hand, the model controls for the index of democratization of the country<sup>38</sup> (the Vanhanen index of democracy; Vanhanen 2005). There are two different expectations as coming from this variable. Firstly, it is predictable that objective evaluations of democracy will play a similar role as subjective evaluations of democracy on levels of affective support. Accordingly, one would expect that the more democratic a country is, the higher will be the level of affective support in this country. Secondly, this variable provides a rudimentary test of congruence between political structure and political culture (or between supply and demand). In line with Inglehart (2005), one would expect that there are higher levels of affective support (a measure which has been corrected in previous stages and is used as dependent variable) in contexts where democracies are of better quality. If this holds, we can partially assume that there is congruence between political culture and political structure.

Results are presented in table 4.7. There is very low variance at the country level (around 4% both in Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe), which is a reflection of internal homogeneity of the two groups. In spite of this, multilevel regression estimates are also provided. Despite most hypotheses being confirmed by the data, there are interesting differences between the two groups of countries.

The performance hypothesis is confirmed for both groups of countries, and it is in fact one of the main explanations of affective support for democracy in this model. The better the people evaluate their political regimes – evaluative support – the higher is their support for democracy as an ideal – affective support. Both Western, and Central and Eastern Europeans are sensitive to the performance of their democracies. There are manifest differences between the two groups, however, with regard to the other variables introduced in the model. Firstly, the socialization hypothesis is not equally confirmed in Western, and Central and Eastern Europe: while the effect is positive and significant in Central and Eastern Europe, it is not significant in Western Europe (it only reaches significance in multilevel analysis). The longer one has lived in a democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, the more likely her levels of affective support will increase. Instead, affective support for democracy in Western Europe is independent on the number of years a person has experienced democracy. Interestingly, *democratic experience* is amongst the most important explanations of affective support for

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<sup>38</sup> All variables considered in section 4.4 are strongly correlated among them, and it is impossible to include more than one in the model simultaneously.



democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, together with the levels of evaluative support.

Secondly, the variables related to political sophistication (education and political interest) have a stronger impact on levels of affective support in Western Europe, than in CEE. Lastly, democracy quality (index of democracy) has distinct effects in each of the two groups of affective support. As such, there is a positive and significant correlation (in fact, the bigger effect in magnitude) between the index of democracy and levels of affective support for democracy in Western Europe; while there is no relationship between this independent and the dependent variable in Central and Eastern Europe. This indicates that there is more congruence between political culture and political structure in Western Europe, than in Central and Eastern Europe.

Table 4.7 Results: explaining levels of affective support for democracy in WE and CEE

Dv: Factorial score of affective support	Western Europe			Central and Eastern Europe		
	Robust cluster estimate <sup>a</sup>		Multilevel	Robust cluster estimate <sup>a</sup>		Multilevel
	$\beta$	beta	$\beta$	$\beta$	beta	$\beta$
Constant	0.308*** (0.044)		Fixed effects 0.302*** (0.042)	0.412*** (0.020)		Fixed effects 0.377*** (0.029)
Sex	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.006	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.009	-0.002** (0.001)
Age <sup>i</sup>				-0.0003*** (0.0000)	-0.044	-0.0002*** (0.0000)
Income	0.006*** (0.001)	0.073	0.005*** (0.0004)	0.009** (0.003)	0.080	0.005*** (0.0005)
Education	0.008*** (0.003)	0.107	0.010*** (0.0004)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.070	0.011*** (0.0004)
Political interest	0.019*** (0.002)	0.153	0.018*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.072	0.008*** (0.0005)
Experience democracy (years)	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.037	0.0003*** (0.0000)	0.001** (0.0004)	0.145	0.0004*** (0.0000)
Evaluation political regime	0.006*** (0.002)	0.121	0.006*** (0.0002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.142	0.008*** (0.0002)
Index of democracy	0.003** (0.001)	0.134	0.003** (0.001)	0.0000 (0.0007)	0.002	0.001 (0.001)
Variance components						
Country level			0.0005 <sup>b</sup> (0.0002)			0.0005 <sup>c</sup> (0.0001)
Individual level			0.011 (0.0001)			0.013 (0.0001)
N (level 1)	41,193		41,193	55,587		55,587
Number of groups (level 2)			14			15
R <sup>2</sup>	0.12			0.08		

Regression column entries are robust cluster estimates. Multilevel column entries are maximum likelihood estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> Individuals clustered by countries

<sup>b</sup>  $\chi^2_{,7df}=3527.74$ ;  $p<0.01$

<sup>c</sup>  $\chi^2_{,8df}= 2572.18$ ;  $p<0.01$

<sup>i</sup> Age has been omitted from the model for Western Europe, as it is strongly correlated with the number of years an individual has been living in a democratic regime.

\*\*\*  $p<0.01$ , \*\*  $p<0.05$ , \*  $p<0.1$

These findings have contradictory implications. With regard to the length of democratic experience, it might well be the case that Western Europeans neither increase nor decrease their levels of affective support as they become older – this is in fact what this variable measures in Western Europe, as most countries are stable democracies –, but have more stable levels of affective support along their lives, which are partly dependent on their levels of education and political interest. From this perspective, the socialization hypothesis – framed as the number of years one has experienced democracy – seems not to be valid, once democracy has been consolidated. Within

Central and Eastern countries, by contrast, experiencing democracy (irrespective of quality) increases the citizens' levels of affective support for democracy. Most likely, new democracies do not obtain automatically the reservoir of affective support (Easton 1965) which legitimizes them as democracies. It is by gradually learning about democracy, and evaluating its performance, that levels of affective support increase within this group of countries. This is more clearly seen, as age still has a residual negative and significant effect on levels of affective support, even after controlling for the number of years a person has lived in a democracy. In truth, in Central and Eastern Europe, people who have only lived in a democratic system (or were still children at the time of democratic transition) are more likely to support democracy affectively, than older people who have also lived under the communist regime. It is probable, therefore, that levels of affective support for democracy will be pushed up in Central and Eastern Europe as countries there develop as democracies. Not only this, but congruence between citizens' orientations to democracy might also increase in the long run, and the objective performance of democracy (index of democracy) become part of the determinants of affective support for democracy. In chapter 6, I explore more in depth the relationship between affective, cognitive, and evaluative in this group of countries.

#### 4.5.2 Mediterranean East countries, the Balkans, and the Romania-Albania group

As seen above, there is a group of countries for which there is no latent concept of affective support for democracy. Specifying how much they do in fact support democracy is therefore not possible, because support for one of the sub-concepts is independent from support for the other sub-concepts. This means, not only that the classic Churchillian indicator is not a valid way of measuring affective support for democracy in these countries, but that we need to think of an alternative strategy to account for levels of affective support for democracy. Table 4.8 shows the factor scores for each of the sub-concepts in this group of countries.

Table 4.8 Factor scores: approval, rejection, outcomes

Group	Country	Approval	Rejection	Outcomes
Mediterranean East Europe	Greece	0.16	0.62	0.01
	Turkey	-0.05	-0.20	-0.03
	Macedonia	-0.07	-0.30	0.05
	<b>Mean</b>	<b>.004</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>.004</b>
The Balkans	Bosnia	-0.04	0.06	0.04
	Montenegro	0.04	-0.01	0.01
	Serbia	0.00	-0.06	-0.05
	<b>Mean</b>	<b>-.002</b>	<b>-.002</b>	<b>-.003</b>
Romania- Albania group	Albania			0.03
	Moldova			-0.25
	Romania			-0.17
	Kosovo			0.37
	<b>Mean</b>			<b>-.002</b>

But what does it mean that respondents support a particular sub-concept and not the others? Does it matter whether they support a sub-concept, if they do not support the others? Is there a sub-concept that better captures the concept of affective support for democracy? In the following tables, the regression model presented in the previous section is reproduced for each of the sub-concepts of affective support (except that the quality of democracy is not included, due to the low number of countries). Analysis is performed separately for each group of countries (table 4.9).

The results are puzzling. Not only are the hypotheses rejected in most cases, but there is no consistency on the effects of the independent variables across sub-concepts and groups of countries. For example, socialization has a very different effect depending on whether approval of democracy, rejection of autocracy, or democratic outcomes is taken as the dependent variable in Mediterranean East Europe. The pattern of relationships between socialization and the dependent variables is also completely different if we compare across regions.

What do these results mean? To start with, because there is no latent concept of affective support for democracy at the aggregate level, it is not possible to distinguish the people who do in fact support democracy, from the people who don't. More precise analysis at the individual level of types of supporters would be needed to solve this problem. Also, because there is no consistent pattern of relationships between any of the independent variables predicted by the literature and the three dependent variables, it is difficult to assume that these concepts are able to tap affective support for democracy within these groups of countries. In the next chapter, more information is

provided on the types of democrats predominant in these countries, with a view to assessing whether other alternative indicators might help us to more accurately identify who the supporters of democracy are.

Table 4.9 Results: explaining levels of approval of democracy, rejection of autocracy, and democratic outcomes in MEE, BE, and DE

VARIABLES	Mediterranean East Europe				Balkan Europe				Romania-Albania group					
	Approval	beta	Rejection	beta	Outcomes	beta	Rejection	beta	Outcomes	beta				
Sex	0.003 (0.012)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.039 (0.047)	-0.025 (0.014)	-0.023 (0.014)	-0.025 (0.014)	-0.032* (0.008)	-0.033 (0.005)	0.022** (0.005)	0.020 (0.0106)	-0.012 (0.0106)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.015 (0.015)
Age <sup>d</sup>	0.001 (0.001)	0.029 (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)	0.069 (0.001)	-3.37e-05 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.022 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.023 (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.043 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Income	0.035* (0.009)	0.076 (0.009)	0.085 (0.050)	0.100 (0.012)	0.023 (0.012)	0.033 (0.039)	0.032 (0.039)	0.033 (0.015)	0.083** (0.015)	0.080 (0.033)	0.052 (0.033)	0.043 (0.033)	0.001 (0.015)	0.001 (0.015)
Education	0.022*** (0.001)	0.081 (0.001)	0.081** (0.010)	0.158 (0.008)	0.022 (0.008)	0.054 (0.022)	0.010 (0.022)	0.025 (0.003)	0.038*** (0.003)	0.083 (0.010)	0.025 (0.010)	0.048 (0.010)	0.016 (0.021)	0.016 (0.021)
Political interest	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.038 (0.013)	0.004 (0.019)	0.006 (0.027)	0.005 (0.027)	0.007 (0.023)	0.024 (0.023)	0.045 (0.023)	0.021** (0.004)	0.036 (0.004)	0.029 (0.022)	0.044 (0.022)	0.010 (0.016)	0.012 (0.016)
Experience democracy (years)	0.007* (0.002)	0.175 (0.002)	0.026* (0.007)	0.337 (0.007)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.036 (0.005)	0.007 (0.008)	0.020 (0.005)	-0.040** (0.005)	-0.106 (0.005)	-0.031* (0.008)	-0.071 (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.003)	-0.297 (0.003)
Evaluation political regime	0.002 (0.005)	0.013 (0.005)	-0.019 (0.010)	-0.058 (0.016)	0.001 (0.016)	0.005 (0.016)	0.023 (0.010)	0.117 (0.007)	0.000 (0.007)	0.00 (0.007)	0.028 (0.015)	0.110 (0.015)	0.039 (0.017)	0.129 (0.017)
Constant	-0.246* (0.051)	-0.895** (0.114)	-0.032 (0.127)	-0.032 (0.127)	-0.032 (0.127)	-0.167 (0.137)	-0.167 (0.137)	-0.113** (0.021)	-0.113** (0.021)	-0.160 (0.133)	-0.160 (0.133)	-0.146 (0.076)	0.146 (0.076)	0.146 (0.076)
N	13,728	13,728	13,728	13,728	13,728	10,614	10,614	10,614	10,614	10,614	10,614	14,793	14,793	14,793
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.15	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.14	0.14	0.14

Entries are robust cluster estimates (individuals clustered by countries). Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## 4.6 Conclusions

The findings of this chapter make for interesting reading. Firstly, there are different types of affective support across Europe, which generally correspond to different geographical areas. Secondly, levels of support for democracy are not equal across Europe. These two findings put into question the use of the classic Churchillian indicator as a means of measuring affective support for democracy. This indicator may be devoid of significance if not studied in combination with other measures of support, or alternatively, with measures of cognitive support. In the following chapter, these two types of support are combined.

Also of major importance is what appears to be a relationship between types and levels of affective support for democracy. Where the structure of affective support for democracy is more comprehensive and stable, levels of support tend to be higher. The distinction is clear among Western European, and Central and Eastern European supporters of democracy. The structure of support also seems to affect how levels of support are influenced by socialization, performance of democracy, and political sophistication. Whereas living in a democracy seems to be fundamental to increasing levels of affective support for democracy, within the groups of countries where the type of support is less comprehensive (and where democracy has not been lasting for long), it is immediately supported in stable democratic systems, and the type of support is much more comprehensive.

Lastly, measuring levels of support within the countries where there is no clear structure of affective support is problematic. In this sense, these difficulties point to the need to incorporate the cognitive dimension of citizens' orientations to democracy into the study, in order to really understand the significance of these indicators.





## **CHAPTER 5 COGNITIVE SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY: TYPES OF DEMOCRATS IN EUROPE**

### **5.1 Introduction: people know**

In the study of public opinion on democracy, two ideas have generally been taken for granted. The first is that people know relatively little about democracy. The second is that, regardless of how much they know, there is a shared understanding of democracy among the people. In line with recent scholarly work (Bratton and Mattes 2000; Baviskar and Malone 2004 ; Sarsfield 2009; Carlin and Singer 2011, etc.), I am motivated here by the contrary assumptions that citizens do in fact know what democracy is (even if this varies according to political sophistication); and that democracy is not similarly understood. Cognitive orientations to democracy are therefore the object of study of this chapter.

Among the findings presented in chapter 4, are those which point to the heterogeneity of citizens' orientations to democracy – across and within countries –,with regard to both the types and the levels of affective support for democracy. In view of the fact that affective orientations to democracy are not fixed, one would also expect that cognitive orientations to democracy will vary accordingly in Europe. This proposition is investigated in this chapter, whose specific aims are as follows:(1) describe citizens' cognitive orientations to democracy; (2) learn about the patterns – if any – of citizens' cognitive support for democracy – or defining types of democrats; and (3) study whether there is a relationship between citizens' cognitive and affective support for democracy.

A lack of adequate data, however, presents a major obstacle to the fulfilment of these objectives. Although both the Churchillian and the satisfaction with democracy items are included in most surveys on people's attitudes towards democracy, very few of these surveys have incorporated cognitive orientations. Moreover, nearly all the surveys which do include measurements of cognitive orientations to democracy have been conducted in new or transition democracies (for example, the Latinobarómetro in Latin America, the Asiabarometer in Asia, the Post-Communist Citizen survey in ex-communist countries; etc.). Research on Europeans' cognitive support for democracy is scarce, which makes it very difficult to conduct exhaustive analysis of the types of

democrats in Europe. For this reason, two datasets have been used, which have been developed in a similar point in time in Europe: the last wave of the World Values Survey (WVS 2005-2008); and the internet-based survey EU-profiler 2009<sup>39</sup>. Although it is not possible to map with complete exactitude types of democrats with the available data, analysis of these two alternative sources may yet provide us with a relatively comprehensive picture of Europeans' cognitive support for democracy.

## 5.2 Cognitive support for democracy: how to measure it?

A recurrent problem in the study of citizens' cognitive support for democracy is finding adequate data. It can be equally problematic establishing whether or not available items can be used to operationalize cognitive support for democracy. Indicators included in surveys which measure citizens' orientations to the different aspects of a democracy typically register importance or salience of a set of attributes<sup>40</sup>. These are the indicators which I will use in this chapter, for a number of reasons.

Firstly, these items ask specifically about democracy (that is, how important a particular attribute is *for democracy*). As obvious as this may seem, democracy must be the overarching framework in which the different attributes are situated. If this is not expressly stated, respondents may not consider the different attributes in terms of their relevance to the democratic system<sup>41</sup>. Secondly, these items can be set, by face validity, as measures of one of the 11 attributes of democracy described in chapter 3 (radial category of democracy). Although not all of the 11 attributes are included systematically in any of the surveys used here, these provide the public with an array of options as regards what the important features of a democracy are. And thirdly, the answers required from the respondents are primarily of a cognitive nature. Respondent A, for example, is asked about the importance of *freedom of speech* for democracy. In the first place, A needs to understand what *freedom of speech* means. In other words, A needs to be familiar with the notion of freedom of speech, or at least to have a vague idea of to what it refers. Otherwise A is not able to assess the relevance of this attribute

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<sup>39</sup> The EU-Profiler is a Voting Advice Application (VVA) conducted for the elections to the European Parliament in 2009. After the VVA was completed, respondents were asked to reply to an extra questionnaire. This extra questionnaire included 5 items which asked about salience of 4 attributes of democracy.

<sup>40</sup> The wording of these items is generally: *How important is it for democracy that...* (EU-Profiler, Pilot ESS) or *Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy* (WVS).

<sup>41</sup> Pre-test and pilot studies of the new module for the round 6 of the European Social Survey reveal, that it is basic that the democratic frame is provided to the respondents so that they think in terms of what is more relevant *for democracy*.

for democracy. In the second place, once *A* has recovered the set of cognitions she has about freedom of speech, she is able to consider whether and to what extent freedom of speech is associated to democracy, in her view. Answering these questions therefore requires a strong cognitive effort<sup>42</sup>.

The use of these indicators, in addition, is particularly apposite when applying the strategy of Collier and Mahon, introduced in chapter 3. According to their logic, different combinations of the attributes of democracy are expected to produce different types of democrats. Empirically – with the available indicators in the analysed surveys – different combinations of ‘important’ attributes among the respondents are also expected to produce different types of democrats. To give an example:

**Respondent A** thinks social equality and welfare are very important attributes of democracy, but thinks all other attributes are much less important. He might be called a **Social Democrat**.

**Respondent B** thinks rule of law and elections are very important attributes of democracy, but thinks all other attributes are much less important. He might be called a **Liberal Democrat**.

As already stated in chapter 3, we cannot find in the literature a systematic schema of the existing *types of democrats* in Europe. For this reason, the analysis conducted here is mostly inductive, as it is probably fruitless to test for as many types of democrats as there are possible combinations of attributes (a similar strategy is used by Schedler and Sarsfield 2005; and Carlin and Singer 2011). Cluster analysis is the method which has been chosen for the analysis of the two datasets selected in this chapter.

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<sup>42</sup> The affective component cannot be separated from this process either, especially in the assessment of importance of a particular attribute. However, it is the cognitive process which is more strongly emphasized here.

## 5.3 Sample 1: WVS 2005-2008

### 5.3.1 Cognitive support and types of democrats

The World Values Survey 2005-2008 has been conducted in 20 European countries<sup>43</sup>, and includes 5 attributes of the radial category of democracy (see chapter 3): Rule of law, Participation, Competition, Equality, and Welfare (see below). Even if the wording of some items is problematic<sup>44</sup>, and their classification in any of the attributes of democracy only cautiously sustained, WVS data remain valid for the study of cognitive support for democracy.

#### The attributes of democracy: WVS 2005-2008

Introduction: Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means 'not at all an essential characteristic of democracy' and 10 means it definitely is 'an essential characteristic of democracy'.

Attribute: **Rule of law**

"Religious authorities interpret the laws" (*WVS\_rule religion*)

"The army takes over when government is incompetent" (*WVS\_rule army*)

"Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression" (*WVS\_rule rights*)

"Criminals are severely punished" (*WVS\_rule criminals*)

Attribute: **Competition**

"People choose their leaders in free elections". (*WVS\_elections*)

Attribute: **Participation**

"People can change the laws in referendums". (*WVS\_referendums*)

Attribute: **Equality**

"Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor" (*WVS\_social equality*)

"Women have the same rights as men" (*WVS\_political equality*)

Attribute: **Welfare**

"People receive state aid for unemployment" (*WVS\_unemployment*)

"The economy is prospering" (*WVS\_economy*)

<sup>43</sup> Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine. The items which are used in this chapter have not been asked in Italy, and therefore this country has been excluded.

<sup>44</sup> For example, *WVS\_rulereleg* and *WVS\_rulearmy* are more related to the type of regime which is preferred than to a particular attribute of democracy. They are under Rule of law, because they make reference to the control of non-elected rulers. *WVS\_rulecrim* is also problematic, because of the negative formulation of protection of integrity. Lastly, *WVS\_economy* is only hardly interpretable as measuring welfare.

Table 5.1 summarizes each of the indicators (*WVS\_rule religion* and *WVS\_rule army* have been reversed, see footnote in the table). As can be seen, even if the mean of all items is greater than 5, there are more than 3 points of difference between the attribute which is given more importance (political equality) and the attribute which is given less importance (social equality). Cognitive support for equality varies greatly, therefore, depending on whether it is political or social equality; which shows that not all attributes are associated to democracy with identical strength. It is also interesting to note that there is significant variation in the importance given to each of the attributes across countries. The difference between maximum and minimum values across countries is greater than 4 for some of the attributes (*WVS\_economy* and *WVS\_rule criminals*), which indicates that the understanding of democracy might also vary across countries.

Table 5.1 Attributes of democracy in WVS

	Mean	s.d.	Min. country	Max. country	Diff. (max-min)
<i>WVS_political equality</i>	9.04	1.81	8.28	9.85	1.57
<i>WVS_elections</i>	8.78	1.94	8.15	9.70	1.55
<i>WVS_rule rights</i>	8.37	2.13	7.52	9.40	1.88
<i>WVS_referenda</i>	8.16	2.26	7.06	9.08	2.02
<i>WVS_rule religion*</i>	7.81	2.63	6.05	9.37	3.32
<i>WVS_unemployment</i>	7.79	2.33	6.31	8.84	2.53
<i>WVS_economy</i>	7.65	2.48	5.48	9.50	4.02
<i>WVS_rule criminals</i>	7.53	2.74	5.24	9.31	4.07
<i>WVS_rule army*</i>	7.41	3.01	5.54	8.86	3.32
<i>WVS_social equality</i>	6.60	2.78	4.61	7.57	2.96
<b>Mean</b>	7.66				

Minimum value: 1; Maximum value: 10

\* These items have been reversed: 1= 'that religious authorities interpret the law/ the army takes over is an essential characteristic of democracy' and 10='that religious authorities interpret the law/ the army takes over is not at all an essential characteristic of democracy'

Source: *World Values Survey 2005-2008*

Aside from these differences, there are two attributes about which there is more agreement all over Europe: political equality and elections. These two attributes have the highest means in all European countries but 4<sup>45</sup>, and also the lowest standard deviation. Perceptions on the importance of these two attributes seem to be homogeneous across Europe, which is of particular interest. In their critique of the concept of radial category, Moller and Skaaning (2010) make a strong case for the hierarchical nature of the concept of democracy. At the top of their hierarchy are the existence of competitive elections and civil liberties. As already explained in chapter 3,

<sup>45</sup> These countries are Russia, Romania, The Netherlands, and France.

no hierarchy has been assumed within the attributes of the radial category of democracy, as there is no previous evidence that citizens understand democracy as a hierarchy<sup>46</sup>. Data from WVS seem to suggest, however, that citizens consider some of the attributes in a democracy – political equality and elections – as an essential precondition for democracy while some others are more variable, and might be more dependent on their particular conceptions of democracy. Although this is not entirely consistent with the thesis of Moller and Skaaning, it may well be true that citizens also have a hierarchical understanding of democracy, in which certain attributes are clearly at the top of the hierarchy (hereafter ‘core attributes’). That this hierarchy is consistent across Europe, with some exceptions, is nothing less than astonishing<sup>47</sup>. The existence of such a hierarchy, however, does not argue against the use of the radial category of democracy and further classification in types of democrats. Even if respondents accord extreme importance to political equality and elections, there is no homogeneity with respect to the other attributes, and therefore classification is still possible.

As stated above, the analysis performed in this chapter is mostly inductive, because it is hard to determine *a priori* which types of democrats are to be found. Cluster analysis<sup>48</sup> suggests that there are two clusters (table 5.2)<sup>49</sup>. Interpretation of these clusters is relatively straightforward. There is a cluster of respondents (cluster 2) who tend to give strong support for all attributes of democracy but two – the majority of respondents, 67.5%; while respondents of cluster 1 give less importance to all items in general (there is no difference between the two clusters, however, in *WVS\_rule army* and *WVS\_rule religion*). The distinction between these two clusters mirrors the existence of a scale of democratic support. However, neither factor analysis nor principal components analysis are conclusive on the uni-dimensionality of cognitive support (see Annex 2). On the one hand, factor loadings of some of the items are very low, indicating that these do not belong to the same dimension. On the other hand, the

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<sup>46</sup> Data from Globalbarometer (<http://www.jdsurvey.net/gbs/gbs.jsp>), for example, in which an open-ended item on the meaning of democracy is available (*To you, what does democracy mean?*), are not conclusive either. Even if freedom and civil liberty is the attribute which is mentioned by more people, results are not systematic. Perhaps a different coding of the answers provided by the respondents would lead to more similar results. No further investigation has been done on this point, as no European country is included in the Globalbarometer.

<sup>47</sup> It has been confirmed in previous studies that people “do, in fact, make consistent, hierarchically-organized, choices across values. And, to the extent that some individuals do not exhibit fully-ordered value preferences, it is due to low levels of political sophistication, rather than substantively-motivated difficulties in making the choices” (Jacoby 2006: 3). However, it has not been shown that there is a kind of established hierarchy at the country level on which values should prevail against others.

<sup>48</sup> K-means clustering because of the large sample. Stopping rule: Calinski. Random seed fixed at observation 1000. Analysis performed with centered means.

<sup>49</sup> The same results are obtained for cluster analysis in each of the countries separately, also if another method is used (Wards method). There are 4 exceptions for which a different solution is provided: Switzerland, Turkey, Russia, and Germany. Because interpretation of dendograms seems to be still satisfactory if we consider two clusters, these countries are retained in the analysis.

number of factors varies depending on the country. The existence of a single scale is not supported by Mokken analysis either. The results of cluster analysis therefore seem slightly imprecise and unsatisfactory, since they only reflect the distance between the more and less demanding citizens of democracy.

Table 5.2 Two clusters of cognitive support

	<b>Cluster 1 Low support</b>	<b>Cluster 2 High support</b>
WVS_rule religion*	7.69	7.86
WVS_rule army*	7.39	7.42
WVS_rule rights	6.76	9.15
WVS_rule criminals	5.17	8.67
WVS_elections	7.52	9.38
WVS_referenda	6.70	8.87
WVS_political equality	7.93	9.57
WVS_social equality	5.14	7.31
WVS_unemployment	6.08	8.62
WVS_economy	5.44	8.72
<b>N</b>	6,572	13,625
<b>%</b>	<b>32.54</b>	<b>67.46</b>

Entries are the means of the attributes in each of the clusters.

Minimum value: 1; Maximum value: 10

\* These items have been reversed: 1= 'that religious authorities interpret the law/ the army takes over is an essential characteristic of democracy' and 10='that religious authorities interpret the law/ the army takes over is not at all an essential characteristic of democracy'

It may be the case, nonetheless, that this apparent uniformity within the clusters of high and low supporters is artificial, and that there are instead differences with regard to the attributes which are given more and less importance. Given that none of the data-reduction techniques mentioned above delivers satisfactory results with regard to the uni-dimensionality of cognitive support, a new step is envisaged. Cluster analysis is performed for each of the initial clusters in order to ascertain whether the clusters are truly homogeneous internally<sup>50</sup>. Even if 'double-cluster' analysis is not an orthodox strategy – and one would expect that the initial clusters acceptably group the respondents – it proves to be valuable in this case, in which there is a high degree of social desirability among the respondents, which makes it difficult to apprehend the significance of the differences between the low and the high supporters.

Table 5.3 presents results of the new cluster analysis. Two new sub-clusters are found within each of the initial clusters, which confirm the previous expectation that these are not internally homogeneous. These results are also supported by linear discriminant

<sup>50</sup> K-means clustering because of the large sample. Stopping rule: Calinski. Random seed fixed at observation 1000. Analysis performed with centered means.

analysis (see the last row in the table), as almost 90% of the cases are correctly classified by ‘double-cluster’ analysis in all sub-clusters<sup>51</sup>. Interesting differences appear within each of the initial clusters.

Table 5.3 Cluster analysis of each initial cluster

INITIAL CLUSTERS	cluster 1		cluster 2	
‘DOUBLE-CLUSTER’	sub-cluster 1 Procedural democrats	sub-cluster 2 Indifferent democrats	sub-cluster 3 Demanding democrats	sub-cluster 4 Autocratic democrats
WVS_rule religion	9.11	6.43	8.87	5.81
WVS_rule army	8.95	6.01	9.29	3.62
WVS_rule rights	7.99	5.68	9.25	8.96
WVS_rule criminals	4.30	5.94	8.46	9.10
WVS_elections	9.22	6.02	9.54	9.07
WVS_referenda	7.86	5.67	8.89	8.83
WVS_political equality	9.27	6.75	9.68	9.36
WVS_social equality	5.01	5.26	7.11	7.72
WVS_unemployment	6.41	5.78	8.51	8.84
WVS_economy	4.96	5.87	8.54	9.09
<b>N</b>	<b>2,989</b>	<b>3,378</b>	<b>8,658</b>	<b>4,253</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>17.3</b>	<b>45.2</b>	<b>22.2</b>
<b>Linear discriminant analysis</b>	<b>% of cases correctly classified</b>			
	sub-cluster 1	sub-cluster 2	sub-cluster 3	sub-cluster 4
	87.3%	88.7%	90.9%	92.6%

Entries are the means of the attributes in each of the sub-clusters.

Last row shows the percentage of cases correctly classified by cluster analysis, according to linear discriminant analysis.

**Sub-cluster 1** identifies a group of respondents for whom a set of attributes is particularly relevant: political equality, and elections, and as a consequence, the non intervention of non-elected institutions in parliamentary decisions (all items above the mean). To the contrary, respondents of this sub-cluster accord less importance to the other attributes, especially those pertaining to social equality, welfare, and rule of law based on strong punishment. Because this group of individuals typically emphasize the procedural aspects of democracy, they can be called *procedural democrats*.

**Sub-cluster 2** corresponds to the people who tend to rate low all attributes of democracy (all items below the mean). These are called the *indifferent democrats*. At the other extreme, is **sub-cluster 3**, which groups the respondents who tend to over-emphasize all attributes, without any distinction (all items above the mean). Their idea of democracy encompasses all attributes, as they give strong support for all of them.

<sup>51</sup> 100% of the cases are correctly classified if Kth-nearest neighbour discriminant analysis is performed (Euclidian distance).



These are called the *demanding democrats*, and are the largest cluster among the Europeans.

Lastly, **sub-cluster 4** includes the respondents who tend to accord importance to all dimensions with the exception of two of the items classified under the rule of law: rule by the army and rule by religious authorities. Although this group of respondents is supportive of all attributes of democracy, they also accept the participation of non elected actors in the decision-making process. For this reason, this cluster is named the *autocratic democrats*. Table 5.4 summarizes the main characteristics of the four sub-clusters.

Table 5.4 The types of democrats

Attribute	Item	Procedural democrats	Indifferent democrats	Demanding democrats	Autocratic democrats
<b>Rule of law</b>	WVS_rule religion	+	-	+	-
	WVS_rule army	+	-	+	-
	WVS_rule rights		-	+	+
	WVS_rule criminals	-	-	+	+
<b>Competition</b>	WVS_elections	+	-	+	+
<b>Participation</b>	WVS_referenda		-	+	+
<b>Equality</b>	WVS_political equality	+	-	+	+
	WVS_social equality	-	-	+	+
<b>Welfare</b>	WVS_unemployment	-	-	+	+
	WVS_economy	-	-	+	+

These results reveals the existence of different types of democrats across Europe. Also interestingly, no contradiction is perceived among the different attributes of democracy by the major cluster of respondents – demanding democrats – as these expect democracy to provide them with ‘all’ that a democracy can provide. In contrast, tensions exist between some of the attributes in one of the sub-clusters: the procedural democrats. For this group of respondents, support for procedural attributes of democracy is clearly in conflict with support for social or welfare attributes –the outcomes. These findings have important implications with regard to the study of affective support for democracy. People who affirm to support democracy as a political system may have a very different understanding of the type of democracy they support. More critically, having a particular understanding of democracy – belonging to a particular type of democrat – might well affect how and to what extent we support democracy as a political system. This is examined in more detail in the following section.

### 5.3.2 The relationship between cognitive and affective support for democracy

There has been little investigation into the relationship between cognitive and affective support for democracy (one of the few examples is Schedler and Sarsfield 2005). Consequently, the analysis conducted in this section is mostly exploratory. In the analysis, I combine the findings from chapter 4, both on the structure and the levels of affective support for democracy, and the results presented in the previous section<sup>52</sup>. The relationship between affective and cognitive support has been already phrased in chapter 3:

*H<sub>affective-3</sub>: there is a relationship between cognitive support for democracy and affective support for democracy*

From this perspective, what is of most interest is to ascertain whether inhabitants of a country where there is a particular type of affective support are more pro-democratically oriented than inhabitants of a country where the type of affective support differs. However, it is also of interest to observe whether a certain type of democrat is more likely to be present in any given country, in relation to the structure and levels of affective support for democracy. Following the results of the analyses from previous pages, we can now outline a more refined hypotheses. On the one hand, we have identified two core attributes of democracy: *political equality* and *elections*. We would expect that affective support for democracy is affected by the strength of citizens' support for these two core attributes of democracy. In particular, a positive relationship is expected between cognitive support for the core attributes of democracy and affective support for democracy. It is expected that there will be a correlation between the more people are engaged with the two basic principles of democracy in a country and higher levels (and structure) of affective support:

*H<sub>affective-3.1</sub>: the higher the level of cognitive support for the core attributes of democracy in a country, the more structured and the higher should be the levels of affective support for democracy in this country*

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<sup>52</sup> Even if the period of fieldwork differs from the two surveys included in this section (the European Values Survey fieldwork was conducted in 2008-2009, while the World Values Survey fieldwork was conducted in 2005-2008), these are close enough to be compared (see Annex 2 for fieldwork in each of the countries).

On the other hand, several types of democrats have been identified who differ with regard to the importance given to all the attributes of democracy. At the aggregate level, we would expect that there is a correlation between the predominant type of democrat in a country and the structure and level of affective support in this country. Specifically:

*H<sub>affective-3.2</sub>: the more demanding the predominant type of democrat of democracy in a country, the more structured and the higher should be the levels of affective support for democracy in this country*

The relationship between affective and cognitive support is therefore analysed from these two different perspectives in the following pages. The analysis is performed only at the aggregate level, as data come from two different datasets (EVS 2008-2009 and WVS 2005-2008). In light of this, I also expect the results to be more robust<sup>53</sup>.

Table 5.5 shows the relationship between the different groups of affective support and respondents' cognitive support for the core attributes of democracy. As can be seen in the table, there are significant differences among the groups of affective support. Even if the relationship is not perfect, Western Europeans tend to have a higher level of support for the two core attributes than the other groups, as one would expect (affective support is more structured and levels are also higher). The Romania-Albania group, however, breaks this pattern, with very high levels of cognitive support for the core attributes.

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<sup>53</sup> Some checks have also been performed at the individual level, however, to ensure that results are consistent (see pages 99 and 100 of this chapter).

Table 5.5 The relationship between the core attributes of democracy and the types of affective support

	Political equality <sup>b***</sup> (means)	Elections <sup>b***</sup> (means)
Western Europe <sup>a</sup>	9.13	8.71
Central and Eastern Europe <sup>a</sup>	8.96	8.82
Mediterranean east Europe <sup>a</sup>	8.77	8.52
The Balkans <sup>a</sup>	8.61	8.38
Romania-Albania group <sup>a</sup>	9.10	9.04
No model <sup>a</sup>	9.10	8.79

\*\*\*differences statistically significant at p<.001

<sup>a</sup>Groups of affective support – chapter 4 (page 53)

Western Europe: Cyprus, Finland, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden

Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Russia, Ukraine

Mediterranean East Europe: Turkey

The Balkans: Serbia

Romania-Albania group: Romania, Moldova


No model: Spain, Switzerland

<sup>b</sup> Means of cognitive support for political equality and elections (min=1; max=10)

Source: <sup>a</sup>EVS 2008-2009 (chapter 4) and <sup>b</sup>WVS 2005-2008

This can be seen more clearly in figure 5.1. In the figure, the two core attributes are taken into account: when the means of the two core attributes are below the mean, a country belongs to the category of 'low cognitive support'; when only one of the core attributes is below the mean, a country belongs to the category of 'medium cognitive support'; and when the two attributes are above the mean, a country belongs to the category of 'high cognitive support'. The figure represents the proportion of countries of the different groups of affective support in each of the categories of cognitive support.

Figure 5.1 A classification of types of affective support and cognitive support for the core attributes of democracy



<sup>1</sup> The two core attributes (elections and political equality) are both below the mean

<sup>2</sup> One of the two core attributes (elections or political equality) is below the mean

<sup>3</sup> The two core attributes (elections and political equality) are above the mean

Source: EVS 2008-2009 and WVS 2005-2008

As can be seen in the figure, countries from Western and Central and Eastern Europe are spread along the three grades of cognitive support, signifying that there is not a strong correlation between the type of affective support and the level of support for the core attributes. Differences are clearer, however, with regard to the other types of affective support – no latent concept. In all but one of the countries (Romania) of Mediterranean East Europe, the Balkans, and the Romania-Albania group, levels of cognitive support for the core attributes of democracy are low. Even if this group of countries is relatively under-represented in the WVS, it is of interest that three out of four are in the category of 'low cognitive support'. This may help to explain why affective support for democracy is less structured within this groups of countries. It seems that a lower level of engagement with the core attributes of democracy does indeed imply a lower capacity with which to structure affective support for democracy.

The relationship between the levels of affective support and the strength of support for the two core attributes of democracy is presented in table 5.6. Categories of levels of affective support have been created in line with the rescaled measures of CFA factor scores (see page 65, chapter 4; comparison of scores can be found in Annex 2). When a country's level of affective support is below 5.0, it has been classified as 'low

affective support'; when the country's level of affective support is between 5.0 and 5.5, it has been classified as 'medium affective support'; and when it is above 5.5, a country enters the category of 'high affective support'. I have also differentiated between the groups of countries for which there is no latent concept of affective support and the countries where no model could be estimated. The results suggest that there is a correlation between levels of cognitive support for the core attributes of democracy and levels of affective support. In fact, the higher the level of cognitive support for the core attributes of democracy, the higher the level of affective support for democracy, which confirms the initial hypothesis.

Table 5.6 The relationship between the core attributes of democracy and the levels of affective support

	Political equality <sup>b***</sup> (means)	Elections <sup>b***</sup> (means)
No latents <sup>1a</sup>	8.90	8.76
Low affective support <sup>2a</sup>	8.91	8.55
Medium affective support <sup>3a</sup>	9.20	8.76
High affective support <sup>4a</sup>	9.29	9.19
No group <sup>5a</sup>	9.16	8.86

\*\*\*differences statistically significant at p<.001

<sup>1</sup> No latent concept of affective support for democracy; Countries: Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Turkey

<sup>2</sup> Levels of affective support < 5.0; Countries: Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Russia, Ukraine.

<sup>3</sup> Levels of affective support ≥ 5.0 and < 5.5; Countries: Finland

<sup>4</sup> Levels of affective support > 5.5; Countries: Cyprus, Germany, Norway, Sweden

<sup>5</sup> No model estimated; Countries: Spain, Switzerland


<sup>b</sup>Means of cognitive support for political equality and elections (min=1; max=10)

Source: <sup>a</sup>EVS 2008-2009 and <sup>b</sup>WVS 2005-2008

Figure 5.2 provides a visual representation of the relationship between levels of affective and cognitive support. In the figure, the means of the two core attributes are again taken into account (see footnotes above). The strength of the correlation is sustained by the picture. Countries where levels of affective support are low, generally have low or medium levels of cognitive support for the core attributes of democracy. By contrast, in countries where levels of affective support are medium or high, levels of cognitive support for the core attributes are high. There are two outliers: Cyprus and Romania. In Romania, there is no latent concept of support, but citizens are still very supportive of these two attributes. In Cyprus, levels of support are very high, but their preferences for the two attributes are below the mean. It might be the case, that Romanians are satisficing, and exaggerating their levels of cognitive support for the two core attributes. In addition, Cyprus's level of affective support is 6.4, the lowest

from the group of high affective support, which may partially explain why their level of cognitive support for the core attributes is lower than expected.

Figure 5.2 A classification of levels of affective support and cognitive support for the core attributes of democracy



<sup>1</sup> The two core attributes (elections and political equality) are both below the mean

<sup>2</sup> One of the two core attributes (elections or political equality) is below the mean

<sup>3</sup> The two core attributes (elections and political equality) are above the mean

<sup>a</sup> No latent concept of affective support for democracy

<sup>b</sup> Levels of affective support < 5.0.

<sup>c</sup> Levels of affective support ≥ 5.0 and < 5.5

<sup>d</sup> Levels of affective support > 5.5

<sup>e</sup> No model estimated

Source: EVS 2008-2009 and WVS 2005-2008

These figures all suggest that there is a relationship between cognitive support for the core attributes of democracy and affective support, and moreover that these two core attributes might enable us to differentiate between strong and weak supporters of democracy. In itself, this finding justifies the incorporation of cognitive orientations into the study of public opinion on democracy.

But, is there also a relationship between types of democrats and affective support for democracy? Table 5.7 presents the percentage of each of the types of democrats by

groups of countries – or types of affective support<sup>54</sup>. As can be seen in the table, although each type of democrat is present in each group of countries, the distribution is different across these groups. In Western Europe, *demanding democrats* are the largest cluster. The second largest group in Western Europe are the *procedural democrats*. *Demanding* and *procedural democrats* comprise almost 70% of the respondents in Western Europe. *Demanding democrats* are also the cluster with a stronger presence in Central and Eastern Europe (almost 50% of respondents). 23% of the respondents, however, are *autocratic democrats*. Similar clusters are found in the Romania-Albania group, although the proportion of *autocratic democrats* is larger (39%). A completely different pattern is found in Mediterranean East Europe (although only Turkey is in the sample), as more than 50% of the respondents are *autocratic democrats*. Finally, there are three important clusters in The Balkans: *demanding democrats* (40%), *autocratic democrats* (29%), and *indifferent democrats* (23%).

Table 5.7 The relationship between the types of affective support and the types of democrats

	Western Europe <sup>a</sup>	Central and Eastern Europe <sup>a</sup>	Mediterranean East Europe <sup>a</sup>	The Balkans <sup>a</sup>	Romania-Albania group <sup>a</sup>	Total
<b>Procedural democrats<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>26.3</b>	10.6	5.4	7.9	5.2	15.3
<b>Indifferent democrats<sup>b</sup></b>	18.9	16.6	18.7	<b>23.1</b>	13.6	17.3
<b>Demanding democrats<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>40.9</b>	<b>49.9</b>	25.2	<b>39.7</b>	<b>41.9</b>	45.2
<b>Autocratic democrats<sup>b</sup></b>	13.9	22.9	<b>50.7</b>	<b>29.2</b>	<b>39.3</b>	22.2
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Measures of association: Pearson's  $\chi^2$  significant at  $p < .001$ .

<sup>a</sup>Groups of affective support – chapter 4 (page 53)

Western Europe: Cyprus, Finland, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden

Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Russia, Ukraine

Mediterranean East Europe: Turkey

The Balkans: Serbia

Romania-Albania group: Romania, Moldova

<sup>b</sup> Entries are percentage of respondents.

Source: <sup>a</sup>*EVS 2008-2009* and <sup>b</sup>*WVS 2005-2008*.

Table 5.7 indicates two things. First, that *demanding democrats* have a greater presence than other types of democrats across all groups of countries except Mediterranean East Europe (but this is somehow artificial, as only Turkey is included in the sample). Second, that other types of democrats seem to be more specific to different groups of countries. This is the case for *procedural democrats* in Western Europe; *autocratic democrats* in Mediterranean east Europe (and also in The Balkans and the Romania-Albania group); and *indifferent democrats* in The Balkans. Although it

<sup>54</sup> Frequencies are given for column and not for cell, because most respondents concentrate in Western and Central and Eastern Europe and therefore the percentage of respondents in these groups predominates. For this reason no differences are perceived in cell percentages are presented.



is not completely determined by the structure of affective support for democracy predominant in the country, there seems to be a correlation between the type of democrat and the type of affective support.

The relationship between the types of democrats and the levels of affective support is presented in table 5.8. Again, there seems to be a correlation between the levels of affective support and the types of democrats. In fact, *autocratic* and *indifferent democrats* have a stronger presence in countries where levels of affective support are low, or where there is no latent concept of affective support for democracy. Also, where levels of affective support are medium or high, two types of democrats are present in greater numbers: *demanding* and the *procedural democrats*.

Table 5.8 The relationship between levels of affective support and the types of democrats

	No latent <sup>1a</sup>	Low affective support <sup>2a</sup>	Medium affective support <sup>3a</sup>	High affective support <sup>4a</sup>	Total
<b>Procedural democrats</b> <sup>b</sup>	1.5	5.6	1.6	6.8	15.4
<b>Indifferent democrats</b> <sup>b</sup>	4.3	9.3	0.9	3.0	17.6
<b>Demanding democrats</b> <sup>b</sup>	9.3	16.4	2.3	15.1	43.2
<b>Autocratic democrats</b> <sup>b</sup>	10.2	10.1	0.6	2.9	23.8
<b>Total</b>	25.3	41.3	5.5	27.9	100.0

Measures of association: Pearson's  $\chi^2$  significant at  $p < .001$ .

<sup>1</sup> No latent concept of affective support for democracy; Countries: Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Turkey

<sup>2</sup> Levels of affective support  $< 5.0$ ; Countries: Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Russia, Ukraine.

<sup>3</sup> Levels of affective support  $\geq 5.0$  and  $< 5.5$ ; Countries: Finland

<sup>4</sup> Levels of affective support  $> 5.5$ ; Countries: Cyprus, Germany, Norway, Sweden

<sup>b</sup> Entries are percentage of respondents.

Source: <sup>a</sup>EVS 2008-2009 and <sup>b</sup>WVS 2005-2008

According to these results, the hypotheses have to be nuanced. High levels of cognitive support are in fact related to high levels of affective support, but not all attributes play an equal role. *Procedural democrats*, for example, are more present in countries where levels of affective support are high. However, procedural democrats do not support all attributes of democracy equally, as was outlined above. Nonetheless, levels of affective support in countries where this type of democrat prevails are among the highest (see figure 5.2). Conversely, having low cognitive support for some of the attributes of democracy does not imply a low level of affective support for democracy, unless these affect the core attributes of democracy (elections and political equality, in this case). Variations in levels of cognitive support for the other attributes of democracy reflects instead different understandings of democracy, which do not necessarily entail lower levels of affective support for the democratic system.

Of particular interest, though, is the finding that each type of democrat is present in each group of countries, irrespective of the type and the levels of affective support. For example, *demanding democrats* are the largest cluster in each group of affective support, but one (Mediterranean East Europe). There are two possible implications of this finding. On the one hand, the large number of *demanding democrats* across countries – independently of the type or level of affective support for democracy – could mean that citizens are gradually learning about democracy and becoming more demanding of it. In the long run, this reservoir of cognitive support could reinforce democratic legitimacy and improve the quality of democracy in these countries. From this point of view, learning and experiencing democracy seems to be of fundamental importance in increasing the number of cognitive supporters of democracy, while simultaneously displacing less-democratic views (for example, the *autocratic democrats*). A preliminary analysis of the relationship between affective and cognitive support at the micro level points to this idea (see Annex 2). For demanding democrats ‘it is [statistically more] important to live in a country which is governed democratically’, independently of the structure or the level of affective support in their country.

On the other hand, it is questionable whether having a majority of demanding democrats is a sign of social desirability, rather than of effective cognitive support for all attributes of democracy. As with the classic Churchillian item (see chapter 4), it could be the case that respondents simply affirm to support all principles of democracy, without really embracing these principles in practice. If this was the case, reported levels of cognitive support would also be meaningless. This is more likely to occur among the less politically sophisticated, a group which is less able to identify the attributes of democracy.

In chapter 3, a general hypothesis referred to the relationship between cognitive support and political sophistication. In this chapter I introduce here a single test on the effect of the levels of education on the types of democrats. If the above critique on social desirability is true, levels of education should not discriminate between types of democrats. Table 5.9 (multinomial regression analysis), however, shows that it is not the case, and that *demanding democrats* (the reference category) are significantly more educated than *indifferent* and *autocratic democrats*, although they are less educated than *procedural democrats*. Although the social desirability effect cannot be definitely rejected, there are indications that preferences also have an important role in shaping citizens’ ideas of democracy.

Table 5.9 The relationship between types of democrats and education: individual level

	Procedural democrats	Indifferent democrats	Autocratic democrats
Education	0.131** (0.064)	-0.144*** (0.049)	-0.141** (0.058)
Constant	-1.630	-0.405	-0.162
N	2,970	3,359	4,252

Total N= 19,158

Reference category for the equation is 'demanding democrats'. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for 19 clusters (countries); \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

#### 5.4 Sample 2: EU-Profiler 2009

As mentioned above, the EU-profiler is a singular survey, as it was collected as part of a Voting Advice Application for the 2009 elections to the European Parliament (for a general description of the dataset, see Trechsel and Mair 2011). For this reason, the sample is biased: it is mainly composed of young, educated males (see Annex 2); and response-rate differ greatly across countries. Because people included in the sample tend to have high levels of political knowledge and political interest, it is probable that results coming from the analysis of this data are also biased. For example, particular conceptions of democracy may have emerged which would have not appeared in a representative random sample. In spite of this, this data provides a unique opportunity to further investigate whether political sophistication is the best determinant of citizens' cognitive orientations to democracy. In other words, it is interesting to see whether the conceptions of democracy of the more politically engaged are significantly different from those of the general population. In this section only the types of democrats are described, as the number of respondents is very different from one country to another.

A set of variables on cognitive orientations has been included in the extraquestionnaire of the EU-Profiler (see below). These ask about four different attributes of the radial category of democracy (see chapter 3). By face validity, the items can be easily assigned to one of the attributes<sup>55</sup>.

<sup>55</sup> Because it does not clearly refer to the increase of forms of participation in a democracy, however, Pr\_internet has not been included in cluster analysis, even if data on this item are also provided for the different types of democrats.

### The attributes of democracy: EU-Profiler 2009

Introduction: In your view, how important is it for democracy that... '0' means not at all important and '10' means extremely important.

Attribute: **Rule of law**

...everybody is equal before the law and has equal chances to access the courts?  
(*Pr\_equal rule of law*)

Attribute: **Competition**

...elections should be free and fair? (*Pr\_elections*)

Attribute: **Representation**

...governments do what is right even if this is against the wishes of those people who voted for it? (*Pr\_representation*)

Attribute: **Participation**

...citizens are regularly able to decide about political issues through referenda?  
(*Pr\_referenda*)  
...new technologies (the Internet etc.) should be employed to facilitate political participation? (*Pr\_internet*)

Table 5.10 shows the data for all of the variables which were included in the EU-Profiler 2009. Interestingly, some patterns similar to the WVS results come into view. Among the respondents of the EU-Profiler, there is strong consensus that two attributes are basic in a democracy: equality before the law and elections. These two attributes have the highest means and the lowest standard deviation. In addition, means' differences across countries are very small (less than 1 point in both attributes). Again, it seems that citizens have a hierarchical vision of democracy, in which some of the attributes have primacy over others. Of special relevance is that the core attributes are the same for both samples, even if the EU-Profiler sample is biased towards the more politically sophisticated. As for the other attributes, the means are lower than for the core attributes, and variations within and across countries are larger, indicating that there is no agreement on these being essential characteristics of a democracy. These results lend a great deal of support to the findings of the previous section.

Table 5.10 Attributes of democracy in EU-Profiler 2009

	Mean	St. Dev.	Min. country	Max. country	Diff. (max-min)	N
Pr_elections	9.75	1.25	9.24	10.00	0.76	22,582
Pr_equal rule of law	9.64	1.04	9.21	9.93	0.72	22,688
Pr_referendums	7.23	2.87	6.01	8.79	2.78	22,563
Pr_representation	6.72	2.87	4.33	8.67	4.34	22,315
Pr_internet	7.59	2.52	5.34	9.00	3.66	22,472

Source: EU-Profiler 2009

The results of the cluster analysis<sup>56</sup> are worthy of note. Firstly, and in all probability because of the educational bias of the EU-profiler, initial clusters do clearly distinguish between different types of democrats. They do not simply partition the sample between the more and the less supportive of the different attributes of democracy. In fact, there is no cluster which identifies the *indifferent democrats*, as with the WVS sample. As was outlined in the previous section, indifferent democrats are significantly less educated than demanding and procedural democrats. Three clusters are identified, which are easily labelled (table 5.11)<sup>57</sup>. Cluster 1 is called the *demanding democrats* – with the same characteristics as the same type in section 5.3. Cluster 2 includes the group of respondents who accord more importance to representation than to participation through referendum. They are called the *trustee democrats*. Cluster 3 comprises the *participatory democrats*, who prefer direct participation over representation.

<sup>56</sup> K-means clustering because of the large sample. Stopping rule: Calinski. Random seed fixed at observation 1000. Analysis performed with centered means.

<sup>57</sup> First, cluster analysis has been performed for the whole sample. In a second step, hierarchical cluster analysis has been performed for each country separately with the Wards' linkage method, retaining three clusters. These clusters proved to be the same as the initial ones, except for a few cases. The three clusters have been kept, however, because of the big differences in the number of respondents within each country. Results have also been confirmed by Linear Discriminant Analysis: more than 99% of the cases is correctly classified according to discriminant analysis for clusters 1 and 2, and 97% for cluster 3.

Table 5.11 Types of democrats – EU-Profiler

	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3
	Demanding democrats	Trustee democrats	Participatory democrats
Pr_elections	9.76	9.66	9.66
Pr_equal rule of law	9.87	9.67	9.79
Pr_referendums	8.70	<b>3.97</b>	8.83
Pr_representation	8.50	7.20	<b>3.22</b>
Pr_internet	7.99	7.33	7.26
<b>N</b>	9365	7074	5718
<b>%</b>	42.27	31.93	30.09

Up until this point, the results are surprisingly similar to the WVS' findings, even if both the items included in the survey and the sample differ greatly between the surveys. Not only are there two core attributes of democracy which are equivalent in the two samples, but one of the types of democrats is predominant in both samples. No further analysis will be conducted in relation to the types and levels of affective support, because it is not possible to proceed with so few cases in some of the countries. For purely descriptive purposes, table 5.12 presents data of the distribution of each of the types of democrats within each type of affective support and each country.

Table 5.12 Percentages of types of democrats by country

	Demanding democrats	Trustee democrats	Participatory democrats	Total
<b>Western Europe</b>	<b>38.6</b>	32.4	28.9	100
Cyprus	<b>44.4</b>	26.7	28.9	100
Denmark	19.6	31.4	<b>49.0</b>	100
Finland	31.5	<b>36.1</b>	32.4	100
France	<b>33.9</b>	32.7	33.3	100
Ireland	<b>37.2</b>	28.2	34.6	100
Italy	<b>61.8</b>	20.8	17.4	100
Lithuania	31.8	28.8	<b>39.4</b>	100
Luxembourg	25.6	<b>37.2</b>	<b>37.2</b>	100
Netherlands	23.7	<b>46.3</b>	30.0	100
Malta	<b>58.3</b>	33.3	8.3	100
Sweden	22.4	34.9	<b>42.7</b>	100
UK	25.1	<b>43.7</b>	31.1	100
<b>Central and Eastern Europe</b>	<b>39.0</b>	34.6	26.4	100
Austria	<b>36.3</b>	<b>36.3</b>	27.3	100
Belgium	35.4	<b>39.6</b>	25.0	100
Bulgaria	<b>58.6</b>	20.6	20.8	100
Croatia	<b>35.7</b>	28.6	<b>35.7</b>	100
CzechRepublic	<b>39.4</b>	37.6	23.0	100
Estonia	<b>38.5</b>	<b>38.5</b>	23.1	100
Germany	<b>39.0</b>	33.4	27.6	100
Hungary	30.2	28.7	<b>41.0</b>	100
Latvia	<b>52.9</b>	5.9	41.2	100
Poland	<b>41.1</b>	40.5	18.3	100
Slovakia	26.9	<b>38.5</b>	34.6	100
Slovenia	28.3	<b>47.2</b>	24.5	100
<b>Mediterranean East Europe</b>	<b>47.7</b>	35.3	17.0	100
Greece	<b>56.8</b>	16.1	27.0	100
Turkey	<b>46.1</b>	38.5	15.4	100
<b>Romania-Albania group</b>	<b>59.8</b>	24.3	15.9	100
Romania	<b>59.8</b>	24.3	15.9	100
<b>No model</b>	<b>51.9</b>	19.8	28.3	100
Switzerland	<b>59.6</b>	14.0	26.3	100
Spain	<b>53.8</b>	18.5	27.7	100
Portugal	<b>42.0</b>	26.6	31.3	100

Source: EU-Profiler 2009

## 5.5 Conclusions

The main conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that Europeans do indeed have different understandings of democracy, which is to say that there are different types of democrats across Europe. Therefore anyone interested in investigating public opinion on democracy, will need to incorporate citizens' cognitive orientations to democracy in the study. Even in Europe, people have different ideas about how a democracy should be, and, despite the fact that a comprehensive analysis of the different types of European democrats will not be possible until the European Social Survey data

becomes available, the findings of this chapter provide a step forward in this direction. The consistency of the results from both the WVS 2005-2008 and the EU-Profiler 2009 – two very different datasets – also gives a strong indication that we are following the right path.

Contrary to more pessimistic assumptions, citizens' conceptions of democracy are not chaotic, but rather appear to be structured in the sense that they recognize a group of core attributes which are *sine qua non* for a democracy. As in some political theories, citizens do seem to have a hierarchical notion of democracy, in which some attributes are accorded more importance than others. Again, the results are consistent across the two datasets which have been analysed in this chapter. The respondents to both the World Values Survey and the EU-Profiler identify 'political equality' and 'elections' as the core attributes of a democracy, even if cognitive support for these two attributes is very much dependent on levels of education (indifferent democrats – the cluster of respondents whose level of cognitive support for these two core attributes is lower – are generally the lowest educated). A longer list of attributes would be needed to ensure that the hierarchy of democratic attributes is constant, but also that 'political equality' and 'elections' are truly the core attributes.

However, there are indications that these two attributes are indeed of particular importance. Firstly and most importantly, they enable us to discriminate between strong and weak affective supporters of democracy across countries. At the aggregate level, the more the citizens of a country support these two core attributes, the higher the levels of affective support, and the more structured the idea of affective support for democracy in this country. If nothing else, cognitive support for democracy seems to be essential in determining not only who supports democracy, but also what type of democracy they support. Although this chapter has only presented a rudimentary analysis to test for the relationship between cognitive and affective support at the individual level, a more in-depth study is the logical next step and the next outcome of this research.

Lastly, context also makes a difference with regard to the relationship between types of democrats and affective support for democracy. Types of democrats are not evenly distributed across the different groups or the different levels of affective support. Rather, affective support is highly correlated to the type of democrat which predominates in a country. Procedural democrats, for example, are more present in countries where levels of affective support for democracy are very high, with the



exception of Germany. This has important implications for the next chapter and the test of the congruence hypothesis: if citizens have different conceptions of democracy, and the structure and levels of affective support vary accordingly, it is probable that these will also have an impact on citizens' evaluations of their democracies. The substantiation of such a hypothesis is the object of the following chapter.



## CHAPTER 6 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AFFECTIVE, COGNITIVE AND EVALUATIVE SUPPORT: TESTING CONGRUENCE

### 6.1 Introduction: congruence, the role of cognitive support


In a democratic context, democratic performance is said to strongly affect citizens' levels of support for democracy. A good democratic performance is expected to increase levels of evaluative support (improve people's evaluations of the democratic system), which, in turn, will increase people's affective support for democracy. Yet, the role of cognitive orientations towards democracy within this process has not thus far been addressed by scholars. It has been argued in chapter 3, that cognitive orientations need to be incorporated into the study of public opinion on democracy in order to fully understand why and how people support democracy affectively, and why and when people are satisfied with democracy. In this chapter, therefore, the three types of support are brought into play, firstly to test the congruence hypothesis, and secondly to evaluate whether the classical indicator of satisfaction with democracy is useful as a measure of overall support for democracy.

Let us first refresh our minds on the idea behind the concept of congruence. Figure 6.1 depicts the relationship, which is explained in more detail in the following lines. First of all, there is congruence if affective support and satisfaction with democracy are positively related: we would expect that someone will be satisfied with democracy only if she likes democracy. Otherwise, if a person does not support democracy affectively, there is more likelihood that she will not be satisfied with democracy<sup>58</sup>.

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<sup>58</sup> No predictions are done so far on the relationship between cognitive and evaluative support and satisfaction with democracy in situations in which there is no affective support for democracy, except that it should be diverse from the one which is specified here as congruence.

Figure 6.1 The congruence hypothesis



Second, it is predictable that good evaluations of the different parts in a democracy should be correlated with high levels of satisfaction with democracy; and vice-versa, bad evaluations of democracy should be correlated with low levels of satisfaction with democracy. However, if a person is to have congruent orientations to democracy, this relationship – between evaluative support and satisfaction with democracy – should be mediated by cognitive support. The assumption is that a bad evaluation of a certain attribute of democracy will not equally affect levels of satisfaction with democracy, either if one thinks this attribute is a basic characteristic of democracy or if one thinks that this attribute does not really matter in a democratic system. In other words, levels of satisfaction should be higher for individual A, who perceives that her democratic system conforms to her idea of democracy (she evaluates very well the attributes of democracy which are very important for her), than for individual B, who perceives that her democratic system does not conform in any way to her idea of democracy. Coming back to the hypothesis proposed in chapter 3, we can say that an individual is congruent, therefore, if the 3 types of orientations are meaningfully inter-related between them:

*H<sub>congruence</sub>: There is congruence if cognitive, affective, and evaluative supports are meaningfully related to satisfaction with democracy*

Which is better specified as:

*H<sub>congruence</sub>: **If democracy is supported as an ideal (affective support): the greater the consistency between the levels of cognitive support for each of the attributes of democracy and the evaluations of each of the attributes of democracy (OR the better the evaluation of the attributes (evaluative support)***

*which are considered the most important (cognitive support)), the higher the levels of satisfaction with democracy*

This hypothesis is tested in this chapter. Proving that the congruence hypothesis holds will not only provide evidence that people have congruent orientations to democracy, but will also verify that the indicator of satisfaction with democracy is adequate for measuring overall support for democracy. Furthermore, if the latter is true, we will be able to identify the aspects of democracy which need to be improved in each country in order to increase democratic support.

A common problem in the preceding chapters is the lack of adequate data on Europeans' attitudes to democracy. This is also the case in the current chapter, in which I have used different datasets to test the congruence hypothesis. Specifically, the World Values Survey 2005-2008 data has been used to test whether or not there is congruence between supply or macro level (objective indicators of the performance of democracy), and demand or micro level (citizens' evaluations of their democracy), depending on the type of democracy which is preferred by the citizens (section 6.3). Congruence at the individual level (among citizens' orientations towards democracy) is tested by means of the PEW Global Attitudes Survey 2009 for a sample of ex-communist countries (section 6.4); and the pilot data from the Round 6 of the European Social Survey, which was collected in Russia and the United Kingdom (section 6.5).

## **6.2 How to measure congruence?**

As already pointed out in chapters 2 and 3, few studies have envisaged testing of congruence at the individual level. For this reason, it is not clear how the different constituents of the congruence hypothesis should be operationalized. In political psychology, for example, Fishbein (1967) and later on Fishbein and Azjen (1975) developed the expectancy-value model. It is their view that attitudes are a function of belief expectancy and evaluations. This has also been applied to marketing studies, which have defined consumer satisfaction as "a function of both expectations related to certain important attributes and judgements of attribute performance" (Martilla and James 1977: 77). It is assumed that the importance given to an object, weights the

evaluation given to this same object. As such, the greater the importance given to an object, the greater the weight of this object in the overall score of satisfaction<sup>59</sup>.

$$S_{ij} = \text{importance}_{ij} * \text{evaluation}_{ij}$$

*Importance<sub>ij</sub>*: importance of object<sub>j</sub> by individual<sub>i</sub>

(1.1)

*Evaluation<sub>ij</sub>*: evaluation of object<sub>j</sub> by individual<sub>i</sub>

Alternatively, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse provided a measure of the gap between expectations and evaluations as the absolute difference between citizens' expectations with regard to a particular attribute (of an institution, for example), and citizens' evaluations of this attribute (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; see also Patterson, Boynton and Hedlund 1969; Kimball and Patterson 1997). They argue that the bigger the gap, the lower is the approval of the government.

$$G_{ij} = |\text{expectation}_{ij} - \text{evaluation}_{ij}|$$

*Expectation<sub>ij</sub>*: expectation towards object<sub>j</sub> by individual<sub>i</sub>

(1.2)

*Evaluation<sub>ij</sub>*: evaluation of object<sub>j</sub> by individual<sub>i</sub>

As applied to satisfaction with democracy, each of the formulae has several strengths and weaknesses. Where **1.1** is concerned, its theoretical definition does not fully stand for  $H_{\text{congruence}}$ , as differences between the reality and the ideal are not considered, and cannot be measured. In  $S_{ij}$ , it is not possible to identify the relationship between the importance and the evaluation of an object. From a theoretical point of view, therefore, it is not entirely adequate. **1.2** seems more appropriate, as it allows for a better estimation of the degree of consistency between expectations and evaluations for each individual, or the differences between the ideal and the real.

However, from a mathematical point of view **1.1** is the recommended option. It is in fact a basic mathematical property that only identical terms that contain the same variable or group of variables can be added or subtracted. Yet in psychological and sociological studies, the two terms included in the equation are said not to be identical<sup>60</sup>. Instead, evaluations are supposed to be 'assessments of discrepancy between perceptions of how-life-is, with notions of how-it-should-be' (Veenhoven 1996: 33). In that sense, the


<sup>59</sup> Also, spatial theory of voting uses a similar formula to describe different evaluations of candidate alternatives. This model expresses the evaluations of alternatives as a weighted sum of their attribute valences (for example, Davis, Hinich, and Odershook 1970).

<sup>60</sup> The two terms are said to be alike if one term measures expectations as to how an attribute should be, and the other measures evaluations of how and attribute is.

multiplication gives the weighted sum of the differences from the ideal for all items. It is difficult to ascertain, however, if the same process applies to citizens' orientations towards democracy, since the object to be evaluated is much more complex than a specific service or object. To give an example, political equality might be experienced in many different forms and through many different institutions in a political system. The individual, in her evaluation of political equality (*how politically equal are citizens in my country?*), needs to recover information about all the different parts in a democracy to evaluate a quality which is relatively abstract. This looks rather different than being asked to evaluate a TV one has recently purchased or a political candidate who we know by her name and face.

In addition, there are different implications with regard to the attributes which should affect the overall levels of satisfaction, depending on how we define the relationship between cognitive and evaluative support. For example, classic importance-performance analysis – IPA – (Martilla and James 1977) is based on a graphical representation of importance and evaluation items. The two-dimensional chart is divided into 4 quadrants (Figure 6.2). In this model it is assumed that, the higher the importance, the greater the contribution of a particular attribute to the overall level of satisfaction. The two zones where there should be a stronger intervention on the part of the provider are the two upper quadrants: *concentrate here*, and *keep up the good work*. In those zones, consumers' evaluations of the product are either very bad (*concentrate here*) or very good (*keep up the good work*); whereas the importance they give to each of the attributes is very high. With regard to (1.2), a diagonal line depicts situations in which satisfaction is attained, whereas the zones above and below this line are regions of dissatisfaction. The closer the position of the individual to the line, the higher should be the level of satisfaction. The space between the dotted lines represents the zone where levels of satisfaction should be higher.

Figure 6.2 Different impact of the attributes on satisfaction



Source: Martilla and James 1977 and own elaboration

There are both advantages and disadvantages in framing the relationship between cognitive and evaluative support either as an interaction or as a subtraction. Yet, a combination of both formulae might help to partially solve the theoretical and mathematical problems described above. In fact, (1) we cannot be sure that evaluative items do not measure the distance from the ideal, even when related to democracy<sup>61</sup>; nor (2) can we say that importance items are fully equivalent to expectations, as conceptualized by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001). It might well be that someone

<sup>61</sup> Information from cognitive interviewing of the European Social Survey pre-test and pilot of the new Round 6 is not precise in this respect. Although it is clear that respondents refer to reality when answering the evaluation items (For example, from the agency in charge of fieldwork in the UK: "Question C42 caused many problems for a lot of respondents due to a widespread lack of knowledge about the subject. Many found this difficult to answer as they didn't know what the situation was currently, i.e., whether immigrants are or are not allowed to vote."), no information is available on the process that transforms respondent's judgements into a particular evaluation. Analysis of the data does not allow for a definite conclusion either. On the one hand, a majority of respondents provide a normative evaluation which is in accordance to their preferences. On the other hand, however, there is not a clear pattern on the relationship between standard evaluations and preference items, as it changes both across countries and across items. In addition, correlations between expectations and evaluations also differ greatly across countries and items.



thinks referendums are a very important attribute in a democracy, without truly expecting that these can be implemented in her country. Using the interaction term to operationalize the relationship between cognitive and evaluative support precludes such problems, as these two assumptions are avoided.

However, the interaction alone does not adequately account for the relationship between cognitive and evaluative support. In this regard, the graphical representation of the two formulae helps us to solve this problem. In Figure 6.3, the two graphs displayed above have been overlapped to represent the relationship between cognitive and evaluative support for democracy. The figure shows that there is some coincidence between the two models. The critical zones – where levels of satisfaction with democracy should be lower – for both models partly match. As for the gap (1.2), critical zones mostly fall in the upper-left and the lower-right quadrants; the zones which are farther from the diagonal line. One of these critical zones overlaps almost entirely with the IPA region ‘concentrate here’ (1.1), which is the most problematic according to this model. Also interestingly, the diagonal line (1.2) divides the screen in two zones: A, where cognitive support is higher than evaluative support; and B, where cognitive support is lower than evaluative support.

Figure 6.3 Overlapping  $S_{ij} = importance_{ij} * evaluation_{ij}$  and  $G_{ij} = |expectation_{ij} - evaluation_{ij}|$




Figure 6.3 suggests that the relationship between cognitive and evaluative support might be better understood if the two models are combined. In fact, the IPA model (1.1) only allows for modelling a relationship between cognitive, and evaluative support and satisfaction with democracy, which we assume is exactly the same independently of

where an attribute is placed on the graph. Yet it seems plausible that the effect is different depending on the nature of the relationship between cognitive and evaluative support. More specifically, it is reasonable to think that the effect of the interaction on levels of satisfaction with democracy differs either if cognitive support is higher than the evaluative support or if cognitive support is lower than the evaluative support<sup>62</sup>. By combining both the interaction and the subtraction, we are able to distinguish between these two possibilities. Regarding our object of analysis – satisfaction with democracy – we would expect that the effect of the interaction between cognitive and evaluative support on satisfaction with democracy is stronger when cognitive support > evaluative support. It is indeed reasonable to assume that citizens will be more attentive to the performance of the attributes which they consider are the most important in a democracy (or that better represent their idea of democracy)<sup>63</sup>. In contrast, the effect of the interaction on satisfaction with democracy is expected to be smaller (or inexistent) when cognitive support < evaluative support. The resulting formula, therefore is<sup>64</sup>:

$$\text{satisfaction with attribute}_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{cogn}_{ij} * \text{eval}_{ij}) + e; \text{ conditional on dirgap}_{ij}$$

$\text{cogn}_{ij}$  = cognitive support for attribute<sub>j</sub> by individual<sub>i</sub>

$\text{eval}_{ij}$  = evaluative support for attribute<sub>j</sub> by individual<sub>i</sub>

$\text{dirgap}_{ij}$  = direction of the gap: negative when  $\text{cogn}_{ij} < \text{eval}_{ij}$ ; and positive when  $\text{cogn}_{ij} > \text{eval}_{ij}$

The overall score of satisfaction is denoted as (see Figure 6.4):

$$\text{satisfaction with democracy} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \sum (\text{cogn}_{ij} * \text{eval}_{ij}) + e; \text{ conditional on dirgap}_{ij}$$

$\text{cogn}_{ij}$  = cognitive support for attribute<sub>j</sub> by individual<sub>i</sub>

$\text{eval}_{ij}$  = evaluative support for attribute<sub>j</sub> by individual<sub>i</sub>


$\text{dirgap}_{ij}$  = direction of the gap: negative when  $\text{cogn}_{ij} < \text{eval}_{ij}$ ; and positive when  $\text{cogn}_{ij} > \text{eval}_{ij}$

<sup>62</sup> This has been tested empirically by using only the subtraction, and I have found that the relationship between the gap and satisfaction with democracy is different, depending on whether the gap is negative or positive. While the relationship is always negative between the gap and satisfaction with democracy when cognitive support is higher than evaluative support, the relationship is less stable and changes from one attribute to the other when cognitive support is lower than evaluative support.

<sup>63</sup> It is also possible that attributes which are given very little importance also have an impact on levels of satisfaction with democracy. For example, in the European Social Survey pilot most people tend to disagree with the idea that immigrants should be able to participate in elections. If this is something an individual has a strong preference about, she will probably be very dissatisfied with democracy if she perceives that her political regime is providing for too much immigrant participation.

<sup>64</sup> An alternative form is  $\text{satisfaction with democracy} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{cogn}_{ij} - \text{eval}_{ij}) * \text{cogn}_{ij} + e$ ; but the interaction has been preferred due to numerous critiques to the use of the subtraction.

Figure 6.4 Two possible relationships between cognitive and evaluative support



### 6.3 WVS 2005-2008: an indirect test of congruence

Unfortunately, no large cross-national study has included a battery of items on both cognitive and evaluative support for a number of attributes of democracy. It is therefore not possible to test the congruence hypothesis for a large sample. For this reason, an indirect test is provided by means of the WVS 2005-2008, taking as a point of departure results from previous chapters.

In this section, I re-examine the classic relationship between supply – the political regime – and demand – the individuals, and test congruence of citizens' orientations to democracy. In order to test for congruence, four variables are combined: (1) the

classification of types of democrats provided in chapter 5 (section 5.3); (2) the Vanhanen's index of democratization (Vanhanen 2000; 2005)<sup>65</sup>; (3) an indicator of citizens' evaluations of the degree to which their country is governed democratically<sup>66</sup>; and (4) the types and levels of affective support described in chapter 4 (sections 4.3 and 4.5).

### 6.3.1 Cognitive support, the quality of democracy, and evaluations of democracy

Two different tests are carried out in this section. First, the relationship between objective performance of democracy and evaluations of democracy is observed (is there congruence between democratic supply and democratic demand?). Second, the relationship between cognitive support, the performance of democracy (index of democratization), and citizens' evaluations of democracy is analysed. With regard to the first, if citizens perceive the performance of their democracies accurately, there should be a relationship between indices of democratization (or how well a democracy performs) and citizens' evaluations of the quality of democracy in their country: the better the performance of democracy in a country (index of democratization), the better its citizens should evaluate their democracies. In other words, there should be a positive relationship between democratic supply and demand.

Table 6.1 shows the results of multilevel regression analysis. The dependent variable is citizens' evaluations of their democracies; and only an independent variable has been included: the performance of democracy or index of democratization. Results suggest that there is congruence between supply and demand, as the effect of the index of democratization on citizens' evaluations of their democracies is positive and significant (variance at the country level is 21%; 5% of the variance is reduced when the index of democratization is included as independent variable). The higher the index of democratization (or the better the performance of democracy), the better are the evaluations of the respondents. Apparently, citizens are well aware of the state of their democracies, and evaluate them consistently.

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<sup>65</sup> The same models have been run with data from the NCCR Democracy Barometer and the results are generally equivalent (correlation between the 2 indices is .64,  $p < .05$ ). I have used here the Vanhanen's index of democratization, because data are missing for some of the countries included in the sample in the NCCR Democracy Barometer.

<sup>66</sup> The indicator of satisfaction with democracy has surprisingly not been included in WVS 2005-2008, and this item is used as a proxy. Correlation between this indicator and satisfaction with democracy in the ESS pilot is .76 ( $p < .05$ ). The exact wording of the item is: "And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is 'not at all democratic' and 10 means that it is 'completely democratic'; what position would you choose?"

Table 6.1 The relationship between democratic performance and citizens' evaluations of democracy

DV: evaluation of democracy	Model 1
Constant	3.825*** (0.857)
Index of democratization	0.0778*** (0.0273)
Variance components	
Country level	0.862 <sup>a</sup> (0.281)
Individual level	4.367 (0.042)
N (level 1)	21,868
Number of groups (level 2)	19

Entries are maximum likelihood estimates.


Robust standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup>  $\chi^2_{1,df} = 3851.33$ ;  $p < 0.01$

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

As for the test of congruence, we cannot, with data from WVS, estimate the degree of correspondence between citizens' cognitive support for the different attributes of democracy and their evaluations of these same attributes. We know from chapter 5, however, that there are different types of democrats: *procedural democrats*, *indifferent democrats*, *demanding democrats*, and *autocratic democrats*. According to the congruence thesis, one would expect that different understandings of democracy imply differences with regard to citizens' evaluations of democracy, because their political systems would adjust differently to their ideals of how a democracy should be. In theory, different types of democrats have a different position in the graph presented above (figure 6.5). *Demanding democrats* would be situated in the two upper quadrants, while *indifferent democrats* are placed in the two lower quadrants. It is not possible to know exactly where *procedural* and *autocratic democrats* would be placed, as both have high levels of cognitive support for some attributes, but low levels for some others. However, we would expect them to be situated at a point somewhere below the *demanding democrats*.

Figure 6.5 Demanding and indifferent democrats



Depending on the theoretical position of the types of democrats in the graph, we can predict that the way they evaluate their democracies will be different. Because *demanding democrats* are placed in the two upper quadrants of the graph ('concentrate here' and 'keep up the good work'), we would expect that these types of democrats are more sensitive to the performance of their democracies in their evaluations. In fact, this group of respondents places strong emphasis on all attributes in a democracy. It is probable that they are more affected by the performance of all the attributes in a democracy. In other words, a bad performance of the different attributes of democracy should be much more penalized, and vice-versa, a good performance should be much more rewarded. The impact of the index of democratization on the evaluations is therefore expected to be stronger for *demanding democrats* than for *indifferent democrats*. By extension, one would expect that the effect is stronger for the *demanding democrats* than for all the other types.

The results of this indirect test are presented in table 6.2 (multilevel analysis). Model 1 introduces cognitive support (the types of democrats) as the unique independent variable. In model 2, the independent variables are the index of democratization, the types of democrats, and the interaction term between the two. In the two models, the reference category is the *demanding democrats*. Even if no relationship was predicted between the types of democrats and citizens' evaluations of democracy, model 1 shows that *demanding democrats* evaluate their democracies significantly better than other types of democrats, with the exception of the *autocratic democrats*. This is surprising, as there is no reason to believe that a particular conception of democracy increases levels of satisfaction with democracy.

Of greatest interest, however, is model 2. Model 2 confirms that the effect of the performance of democracy – index of democratization – is dependent on cognitive support, or the types of democrats. Compared to other types of democrats, democratic performance has a stronger effect on *demanding democrats'* evaluations of democracy (although the coefficient is not statistically significant for procedural democrats)<sup>67</sup>. When all the attributes of democracy are important for an individual, it seems to matter more how democracy performs. It is also noteworthy that *autocratic* and *indifferent democrats'* evaluations of democracy are higher when their democracies perform worse, which indicates that democratic performance is irrelevant for citizens who are less demanding of democracy.

Table 6.2 The relationship between types of democrats, democratic performance, and citizens' evaluations of democracy

DV: evaluations of democracy	Model 1	Model 2
Constant	6.293*** (0.252)	3.415*** (0.819)
Index of democratization		0.097*** (0.026)
Type democrat <sup>c</sup> : indifferent democrats	-0.446*** (0.043)	1.022*** (0.177)
Type democrat <sup>c</sup> : procedural democrats	-0.086* (0.046)	0.080 (0.220)
Type democrat <sup>c</sup> : autocratic democrats	-0.060 (0.041)	0.415*** (0.160)
indifferent democrats <sup>c</sup> #index democrat.		-0.051*** (0.006)
procedural democrats <sup>c</sup> #index democrat.		-0.006 (0.006)
autocratic democrats <sup>c</sup> #index democrat.		-0.016*** (0.005)
Variance components		
Country level	1.201 <sup>a</sup> (0.391)	0.765 <sup>b</sup> (0.257)
Individual level	4.262 (0.0438)	4.238 (0.045)
N (level 1)	18,920	17,997
Number of groups (level 2)	19	18

Entries are maximum likelihood estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup>  $\chi^2_{3df} = 3995.94$ ;  $p < 0.01$

<sup>b</sup>  $\chi^2_{7df} = 2580.65$ ;  $p < 0.01$


<sup>c</sup> Reference category: demanding democrats

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

<sup>67</sup> This might be due to the fact that this type of democrats has a procedural understanding of democracy and the Vanhanen's index of democracy basically measures democratic performance in terms of competition and participation, which are clearly procedural attributes.

Figure 6.6 shows that the relationship between the index of democratization and individual evaluations of democracy is positive and significant for all types of democrats. However, the effect of the quality of democracy is much weaker for the *autocratic* and *indifferent democrats'* evaluations of democracy, particularly in the latter case. Democratic performance, thus, does not have an equal impact on citizens' evaluations of their democracies, but the strength of the impact depends on the levels (and type) of cognitive support.

Figure 6.6 The relationship between democratic performance and citizens' evaluations of democracy, by types of democrats



### 6.3.2 Cognitive, affective, and evaluative support, and the quality of democracy


It is reasonable to presume that one has to like democracy, if one is to be satisfied with its functioning. As such, we inspect here whether affective support mediates in the relationship between cognitive and evaluative orientations. Unfortunately, the WVS sample does not allow us to control for all the types of affective support described in chapter 4, as there are not enough countries in each group. In the analysis, it is only



possible to test congruence among the Western, and Central and Eastern European types of affective support. For the same reason, levels of affective support have been divided into two groups: group 1 contains the countries where levels of affective support are low or there is no latent concept of affective support; group 2 is composed of the medium and high affective supporters.

In figures 6.7 and 6.8, an additional variable has been included in the model: the type of affective support for democracy. Figure 6.7 represents graphically the impact of the index of democratization on respondents' evaluations of their democracies in Western European countries. Figure 6.8 shows the same for Central and Eastern Europeans. Because the number of countries is small in both groups, OLS regression with errors clustered by country has been conducted estimates can be found in Annex 3.

Figure 6.7 The relationship between democratic performance and evaluations of democracy, by types of democrats: Western Europe\*




\*Western Europe: Cyprus, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom

Interestingly, the results are different in each group of countries. With regard to Western Europeans, the relationship between the index of democratization and respondents' evaluations of democracy is positive and significant for all types of democrats. However, in Western Europe, it is not the *demanding democrats'*

evaluations of democracy which are most strongly affected by the performance of their democracies. Within this group of countries, it is in fact the *procedural democrats* who evaluate their democracies more according to their performance (the difference is statistically significant).

Nonetheless, the initial expectations are partially confirmed in Central and Eastern Europe. Within this group of countries, democratic performance has a stronger effect on citizens' evaluations of democracy among the *demanding democrats*, although differences are only statistically significant with regard to the *autocratic democrats* (see Annex 3). In fact, the relationship between the index of democratization and respondents' evaluations of their democracies is negative for this last type of democrats: the better their democracies perform, the worse they evaluate their democratic regime.


Figure 6.8 The relationship between democratic performance and evaluations of democracy, by types of democrats: Central and Eastern Europe\*



\*Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Ukraine.

Figures 6.9 and 6.10 incorporate the level of affective support into the original model (levels of affective support have been defined as in chapter 5; see Annex 2). Figure 6.9 shows the impact of democratic performance on citizens' evaluations of their democracies in countries where there is no latent concept of affective support or levels of affective support, whereas figure 6.10 depicts the same relationship in countries where levels of affective support are medium or high. The two figures display results from OLS regression with errors clustered by country (see Annex 3).

Figure 6.9 The relationship between democratic performance and evaluations of democracy, by levels of affective support: no latent and low\*




\*No latent and low affective support: Bulgaria, France, Moldova, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom

The relationship between democratic performance and citizens' evaluations varies depending on the levels of affective support. The relationship changes across types of democrats in countries where levels of affective support are low or there is no latent concept of affective support, even if the differences are not statistically significant in the model (see Annex 3). In fact, differences are not statistically significant because the effect of the index of democratization on respondents' evaluations is very weak in countries where there is no latent concept or low levels of affective support for democracy. In general, therefore, people who live in countries where levels of affective

support are low tend to be more sensitive to the performance of democracy in their evaluations. In the graph, we can clearly see, however, that *procedural democrats* are the cluster of respondents who are more affected by the performance of their democracy in their evaluations; and the relationship is again negative for *autocratic democrats*.

In contrast, all types of democrats are more homogeneous in countries where levels of affective support are medium or high: the relationship between democratic performance and citizens' evaluations is always positive and significant and only *autocratic democrats* are significantly different from the *demanding democrats*. Citizens of this group of countries depend more on the performance of their democracies when assessing evaluations, independently of the type of democrat they are.

Figure 6.10 The relationship between democratic performance and evaluations of democracy, by levels of affective support: medium and high\*



\*Medium and high affective support: Cyprus, Germany, Finland, Norway, Sweden

These findings lead us to the following conclusions: although *demanding democrats* are better able in general to define their evaluations depending on the objective quality of their democracies, this affirmation is no longer sustained if we control for the type

and level of affective support. As such, in countries where affective support is more structured, but especially where levels of affective support are very high, all types of democrats tend to evaluate their democracy according to its performance. In these countries, there is more homogeneity among all types of democrats in the way they react to the performance of their democracy, independently of how much they demand from democracy (except for the *procedural democrats* in Western Europe or the *autocratic democrats* in countries with medium or high affective support). In contrast, in countries where affective support is less structured or levels of support are low, the relationship between supply and demand is more dependent on the type of democracy an individual prefers. This is particularly the case for the *autocratic democrats*, for whom the relationship between the index of democratization and their evaluations of democracy is negative.

In light of this finding, there are two possible repercussions with regard to congruence. The first is that, in general, citizens' seem to provide an accurate evaluation of the performance of their democracies, as there is correspondence between an objective measure of democratic performance and their own evaluations. In addition, the more demanding the citizens (*demanding democrats*) are, the stronger the effect of democratic performance on their evaluations. This is a sign of congruence. Secondly, and more puzzlingly, this relationship is less clear when affective support is considered, since the relationship between objective performance and subjective evaluation is not stable. *Demanding democrats* are not systematically more strongly affected by the performance of democracy in their evaluations across the different contexts – or structures and levels of affective support. But, does this mean that citizens' orientations are incongruent? This is not fully clear from the analysis. On the one hand, the relationship between the index of democratization and citizens' evaluations of democracy differs from one context to the next. Particularly if we take into account the levels of affective support for democracy, the relationship between supply (democratic performance) and demand (democratic evaluation) is stronger in countries where levels of affective support are medium or high. Congruence between supply and demand (or between what the political regime offers and what the citizens want) is therefore higher in contexts where the idea of democracy is well entrenched. On the other hand, at the micro level, even if there is not a perfect correspondence between the type of democrat and the strength of performance-evaluation relationship, this relationship is systematically weaker among *indifferent* and *autocratic democrats* – the less demanding democrats – in most contexts presented above. Accordingly, even if the

results cannot be taken as definitive, they seem to indicate that to some extent citizens' orientations to democracy are congruent.

#### **6.4 PEW, a test of congruence: Central and Eastern Europe**

In 2009, 20 years after the breakdown of communism, PEW Global Attitudes conducted a survey in some of the ex-communist countries, aimed at observing the state of these new democracies. Eight countries were surveyed: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. All these countries but one (Lithuania) were classified as being in Central and Eastern Europe, with regard to the type of affective support they endorse, although we have also seen that their levels of affective support vary greatly from one country to the next. In this section, therefore, I will be testing congruence for a group of countries with a very specific set of characteristics: they are all new democracies, which have a communist past, and generally a lower quality of democracy than the Western Europeans.

The selection of this sample and questionnaire is purely utilitarian, as it is the only survey which has included items both about cognitive and evaluative support for a number of attributes of democracy. Nonetheless, it provides an interesting case-study, especially 20 years after the fall of communism, since it allows us to observe how these new democracies have succeeded in modelling citizens' orientations to democracy. Are citizens also congruent in new democracies?

Two sets of items on different attributes in a democracy are extremely valuable in the PEW questionnaire.<sup>68</sup> In the first set of items, respondents were asked 'How important is it for you to live in a country where \*\*\*attribute\*\*\*?'. In the second, respondents were asked to evaluate the same attributes: 'Does \*\*\*attribute\*\*\* describe our country very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all?'. Five of the attributes of the radial category of democracy described in chapter 3 have been included: rule of law, competition, freedom, equality, and welfare (see Annex3 for specific wording).

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<sup>68</sup> Although these data are extremely valuable, there are several aspects which need to be mentioned. First of all, the questions do not specifically ask about 'democracy', but about the characteristics of 'a' country. However, because all of them (except economic prosperity) refer to attributes of democracy, these can still be used as measures of peoples' cognitive support and evaluations of their democracies. Second is that not all attributes of democracy are present, and therefore possible causes of dissatisfaction might be omitted from the analysis. Third is whether economic prosperity is in fact a measure of the welfare attribute or not. This indicator is included in the analysis, because it has been shown in chapter 5 that a particular type of democrats – the *demanding democrats* (which has a strong presence in Central and Eastern Europe) gives much importance to welfare.

Table 6.3 presents data for these items (see Annex 3 for data for each country). The following observations are of note. Firstly, cognitive support is very high with regard to all attributes except one – *control of the military*. Evaluative support, by contrast, is much lower for all attributes, except for *freedom of religion*, and varies greatly from one country to the other (as do the qualities of these democracies). Secondly, there is correspondence between the attributes with higher levels of cognitive support and the attributes with lower levels of evaluative support: economic prosperity and political equality. This might indicate that there is a relationship between cognitive and evaluative support in two different ways: (1) the greater the importance of an attribute, the more demanding people are of the performance of this same attribute and therefore the more likely they are to evaluate this attribute badly; or (2) the worse an attribute is perceived to perform, the greater the importance this attribute acquires for a citizen. Cognitive and evaluative support for both *economic prosperity* and *political equality* are, in fact, negatively correlated.

Table 6.3 Cognitive and evaluative support: the attributes of PEW

	Cognitive support		Evaluative support	
	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.
Economic prosperity	3.67	0.62	1.92	0.97
Political equality	3.61	0.68	2.15	1.02
Elections	3.40	0.74	2.71	0.99
Freedom of press	3.40	0.74	2.66	0.90
Freedom of religion	3.40	0.77	3.31	0.77
Freedom of expression	3.32	0.77	2.76	0.90
Control of the military	2.92	0.95	2.52	0.92
<i>All</i>	3.39	0.75	2.22	0.92

Thirdly, *economic prosperity* is the attribute which is most strongly supported, a result which calls into question the existence of core attributes of democracy among citizens, since it is not clear that economic prosperity can be directly linked to the concept of democracy (see footnote 9). This might be due to the fact that the item does not ask about democracy, but about the importance of a particular attribute *for a country*. The economy is clearly one of the main concerns of the people, and therefore it is not surprising that it emerges as the most important characteristic in the country. Fourthly, and related to this, is that the four-point scale format may have inflated levels of cognitive support for all attributes of democracy, which makes it difficult to assess which of these attributes – if any – can be considered a core attribute, as we did in chapter 5. Not only this, but two of the four attributes of democracy included in the

questionnaire (if we do not consider economic prosperity) have been defined as core attributes in chapter 5: political equality and elections. As freedom was not part of the WVS questionnaire, it might be the case that this is also part of the core attributes. Factor analysis reveals in fact that there are two separate dimensions, one for cognitive support and the other for evaluative support, and this is also confirmed by Mokken scaling (see Annex 3)<sup>69</sup>. There is significant homogeneity, therefore, among citizens' orientations for all the attributes of democracy included in PEW. For this reason, I have decided to create two composite indices: one for cognitive support (Cronbach's alpha=.79) and another for evaluative support (Cronbach's alpha=.74). These are presented in table 6.4.

Table 6.4 Composite indices of cognitive and evaluative support for democracy

	Cognitive support		Evaluative support	
	mean	s.d	mean	s.d
Bulgaria	23.62	3.87	15.98	4.55
Cz Republic	23.92	3.40	18.46	3.90
Hungary	24.34	3.52	16.56	3.35
Lithuania	22.46	4.34	16.38	4.35
Poland	23.33	3.98	18.54	4.34
Russia	22.28	3.97	17.63	4.88
Slovakia	21.84	4.83	18.01	4.17
Ukraine	22.85	4.36	15.41	4.84
<b>All</b>	<b>23.06</b>	<b>4.13</b>	<b>17.14</b>	<b>4.46</b>

#### 6.4.1 Cognitive and evaluative support, and satisfaction with democracy

The test of congruence is performed in several steps, which correspond to the different models in table 6.5. First, I observe the relationship between each of the components of the equation introduced in section 6.2 (cognitive and evaluative support), and satisfaction with democracy (Models 1 and 2). Second, I introduce the interaction between the two elements, conditional on the relationship between the two: either cognitive support is higher than evaluative support (Model 3), or cognitive support is lower than evaluative support (Model 4). As can be seen in the table, the number of cases in each of the two situations differs greatly (800 respondents whose cognitive support is lower than their evaluative support; 6349 respondents whose cognitive support is higher than their evaluative support). Clearly, citizens are far more

<sup>69</sup> Results are consistent across all countries, with only a few exceptions. Results are available on request.



demanding of their political regimes than they are positive in their evaluations. Models have been estimated with OLS regression, with standard errors clustered by country<sup>70</sup>.

Table 6.5 indicates that there is no relationship between cognitive support and satisfaction with democracy. However, there is a relationship between evaluative support and satisfaction with democracy. The better the evaluation of the different attributes of democracy, the higher the level of satisfaction with democracy. This is a sign of congruence, as the evaluations of the different parts of democracy affect the general levels of satisfaction with democracy.

Table 6.5 The relationship between cognitive and evaluative support, and satisfaction with democracy


DV: satisfaction with democracy	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3 Cogn.<eval.	Model 4 Cogn.>eval.
Constant	2.079*** (0.148)	1.202*** (0.132)	1.298** (0.517)	1.641*** (0.368)
Cognitive support	0.005 (0.008)		0.043 (0.053)	-0.025 (0.019)
Evaluative support		0.057*** (0.010)	0.036 (0.028)	0.043 (0.025)
Cognitive#Evaluative			-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)
N	7,719	7,712	800	6349
R-squared	0.00	0.09	0.03	0.11

Standard errors adjusted for 8 clusters (country) in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

In contrast, in models 3 and 4, where an interaction term has been introduced between cognitive and evaluative support, there are no significant effects either when cognitive support is higher than the evaluations, or when it is lower. Figures 6.11 and 6.12, however, which represent the marginal effects, show a different picture for both situations. In figure 6.11, where cognitive support is lower than evaluative support, marginal effects are generally insignificant, indicating that evaluations have a similar impact on levels of satisfaction, independently of the importance given to all democratic attributes. Even if it is not statistically significant, it is of interest that the relationship between the interacted term and satisfaction with democracy is negative (whereas the effect is positive if we only take into account the evaluations).


<sup>70</sup> The same models have been estimated with ordinal logistic regression with very similar results.

Figure 6.11 Marginal effects: cognitive support < evaluative support



In figure 6.12, we can see that cognitive support has an impact on evaluative support: the higher the levels of cognitive support, the stronger the effect of evaluative support on levels of satisfaction with democracy. Even if the effect seems rather small (as the confidence interval is large), it seems that the hypothesis is initially confirmed. Satisfaction with democracy is indeed dependent on both cognitive and evaluative support, but, as anticipated, the effect is only visible when cognitive support is higher than evaluative support. This is particularly relevant, as the majority of cases are positively gapped. This would apply, therefore, to the majority of the population, but does it equally apply to all levels of affective support for democracy?

Figure 6.12 Marginal effects: cognitive support > evaluative support




#### 6.4.2 Cognitive, evaluative, and affective supports, and satisfaction with democracy

An item is used from the PEW questionnaire in order to operationalize affective support for democracy<sup>71</sup>. Although it is a single item, there is large correspondence between this item and levels of support in EVS (correlation at the macro level is .90,  $p < .05$ ). In addition, this item is also correlated to cognitive support, as levels of cognitive support are higher among the respondents who prefer a democratic form of government than among those who would rather rely on a strong leader (see Annex 3).

Figures 6.13 to 6.16 represent the marginal effects of evaluative support on satisfaction with democracy conditional on cognitive support for two groups of respondents: the respondents who support democracy affectively as an ideal (figures 6.13 and 6.14); and the respondents who do not support democracy as an ideal (figures 6.15 and 6.16). The four figures show that the relationship between cognitive and evaluative support, and satisfaction with democracy is dependent on affective support (see Annex 3 for all estimates).


<sup>71</sup> The wording of the item is: 'Some feel that we should rely on a Democratic form of government to solve our country's problems. Others feel that we should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems. Which comes closer to your opinion?'

Figure 6.13 Marginal effects: when there is affective support for democracy and cognitive support < evaluative support



Among the group of respondents who support democracy as an ideal (figures 6.13 and 6.14), there is a relationship between cognitive and evaluative support, and levels of satisfaction with democracy. On the one hand, evaluative support decreases as respondents become more demanding - when the gap is negative (cognitive support is lower than evaluative support – figure 6.13). On the other hand, and according to the congruence hypothesis, evaluative support increases as levels of cognitive support grow - when the gap is positive (cognitive support is higher than evaluative support – figure 6.14). The more demanding the citizens are with regard to the democratic system, the stronger the effect of their evaluations of democracy on satisfaction with democracy.

Figure 6.14 Marginal effects: when there is affective support for democracy and cognitive support > evaluative support



However, the effect disappears when there is no affective support for democracy, either if cognitive support is lower than evaluative support (Figures 6.15), or if cognitive support is higher than evaluative support (Figure 6.16). For citizens who do not like to live in a democracy, there is no relationship between cognitive and evaluative support, and satisfaction with democracy.

In the light of these results, the congruence of citizens' orientations to democracy is confirmed for the Central and Eastern European countries included in the sample, at least with regard to the attributes considered in this section. The more demanding the citizens are of democracy, the greater the impact of the evaluations on their satisfaction with democracy, *if they support democracy affectively*. In addition, congruence is only stable, when cognitive support is higher than evaluative support. In other words, the relationship between cognitive, evaluative, affective support and satisfaction with democracy is strongly dependent on the nature of the relationship between cognitive and evaluative support.

Figure 6.15 Marginal effects: when there is NO affective support for democracy and cognitive support < evaluative support





Figure 6.16 Marginal effects: when there is NO affective support for democracy and cognitive support > evaluative support



## 6.5 ESS: two case-studies, United Kingdom and Russia

In the European Social Survey pilot for Round 6, 49 items were asked to respondents about their attitudes towards the 11 attributes of democracy described in chapter 3. For each attribute and each sub-concept of the attributes, respondents were posed questions on their cognitive and evaluative support. In addition, preference questions have been formulated for 6 of the sub-concepts, because of their special nature. Some of these items will be removed from the final questionnaire, because they proved to be problematic (the questionnaire is available in Annex 3)<sup>72</sup>. For this reason, only the items which will be included in the final questionnaire will be used here, in order to avoid difficult interpretations. With regard to the sample, data was only collected in Russia and the United Kingdom, two very different contexts, which makes the test of congruence especially interesting. While Britain is an enduring and stable democracy, Russia's democratic credentials are far less solid. In addition, chapter 4 has revealed that these two countries belong to different groups, with regard to the structure of affective support for democracy. Russia belongs to the Central and Eastern European type of affective support, whereas the UK is part of the Western European group. Levels of affective support, as described in chapter 4, are low in both countries.

We have already seen in the previous section that Central and Eastern Europeans' orientations to democracy seem to be congruent. The ESS pilot, however, allows for a more detailed approach to the differences between these two countries, as the list of attributes of democracy is enlarged. However, the results from this section need to be approached with caution because of the small sample size, and the preliminary stage of the questionnaire. For this reason as well, analyses remain mostly descriptive in this section.

Table 6.6 presents the data for all items retained from the pilot. In both countries, cognitive support for most of the attributes is very high, as the mean for both countries is above 8.5. Standard deviations are also generally smaller with regard to cognitive support than with regard to the evaluations. There are important differences, however, in the evaluations, as Russians tend to evaluate almost all attributes much worse than the British (the means 4.1 and 6.1 respectively). *A priori*, this is consistent with lower ratings of the quality of democracy in Russia, as compared to the UK, which indicates

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<sup>72</sup> Items dropped from the questionnaire: normative items; some preference items; and some evaluation items, because these were too difficult for respondents and the levels of don't know were too high. Also evaluation items have been reformulated so that they coincide with the preferences of the respondent.

that there is some congruence between supply and demand. With regard to the core attributes, these are not easily identified, as the means are very high for all attributes. It remains to be seen whether this is a particularity of these two countries, or if the list of core attributes needs to be enlarged.

Table 6.6 Cognitive and evaluative support in the ESS pilot

Attribute	Item	UNITED KINGDOM				RUSSIA			
		Cognitive support		Evaluative support		Cognitive support		Evaluative support	
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Rule of law	Equality of law	9.1	1.5	5.5	2.8	9.3	1.4	2.9	2.5
Competition	Elections	9.2	1.7	7.7	2.2	8.8	1.9	4.2	2.7
	Alternative parties	7.7	2.5	5.3	2.5	8.2	2.2	5.4	2.6
	Opposition free	8.4	2.2	8.0	2.1	8.1	2.3	5.3	2.7
Vertical accountability	Vertical accountability	8.9	1.9	6.1	2.9	9.1	1.5	3.1	2.8
Horizontal accountability	Horizontal accountability	9.0	1.8	6.3	2.7	8.9	1.6	3.5	2.6
Representation	Representation minorities	8.3	2.1	7.2	2.3	7.6	2.7	4.1	2.6
Transparency	Transparency government	9.0	1.5	4.2	2.3	9.0	1.4	4.5	2.6
	Transparency media	8.7	2.1	5.9	3.0	8.9	1.7	4.6	2.7
Participation	Deliberation	8.3	2.3	5.5	2.5	8.4	2.2	5.0	2.5
Freedom	Freedom media	8.0	2.5	7.4	2.5	8.6	1.8	4.7	2.8
Welfare	Protection poverty	9.0	1.5	4.6	2.5	9.3	1.4	2.4	2.2
	Mean all	8.6		6.1		8.7		4.1	

Although there is a strong correlation between all the items<sup>73</sup>, in this test, each of the attributes will be examined separately. It is of interest to see where these are placed in the graph, and whether the position of the different attributes determines their relevance in explaining levels of satisfaction with democracy.

### 6.5.1 Cognitive, affective and evaluative support

Again, congruence is tested gradually. I will begin this section by reflecting on the relationship between cognitive and evaluative support, before going on to include affective support in the analysis.

The relationship between cognitive and evaluative support is not the same in Russia as it is in the United Kingdom (table 6.7). The relationship between cognitive and evaluative support is positive and significant for all attributes but one (*protection poverty*) in Britain. In Russia, by contrast, the greater the importance given to a

<sup>73</sup> Factor analysis is not conclusive on this point, as there is not a clear separation between cognitive and evaluative support.



particular attribute, the worse the evaluation of this attribute (except for *representation of minorities*). Not only is there a negative relationship between cognitive and evaluative support for most attributes in Russia, but the attributes which are accorded greatest importance by the majority of Russian interviewees are, with some exceptions, also those with the worst evaluations<sup>74</sup>. This pattern is completely reversed in Britain, although the relationship is weaker at the macro level.

Table 6.7 The correlations between cognitive and evaluative support

Item	United Kingdom	Russia
Equality of law	0.06	-0.16*
Elections	0.37*	-0.13*
Alternative parties	0.06	0.09
Opposition free	0.51*	0.07
Vertical accountability	0.14*	-0.19*
Horizontal accountability	0.09	-0.16*
Representation minorities	0.44*	0.23*
Transparency government	-0.08	-0.04
Transparency media	0.13*	-0.00
Deliberation	0.14*	0.01
Freedom media	0.48*	-0.00
Protection poverty	-0.15*	-0.12*

\*p<.05


With regard to the relationship between cognitive, affective, and evaluative support, the following item is used to operationalize affective support: “*How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? Choose your answer from this card where 0 is not at all important and 10 is extremely important*”. In order to observe the relationship between affective, cognitive and evaluative supports, a single cut has been made in the original variable, which divides the sample in two parts: part 1 includes respondents whose levels of affective support are below the mean; and part 2 includes respondents whose levels of affective support are above the mean. Figures 6.17 and 6.18, give a graphical representation of the relationship between the three types of support in Russia and the UK. Three axes have been depicted in each of the graphs:  $A_{xy}$  represents the mean of the scale;  $B_{xy}$  represents the mean of cognitive and evaluative support in each country;  $C_{xy}$  represents the diagonal line in which cognitive support equals evaluative support.

<sup>74</sup> The same relationship has been found in the previous section, with PEW data from ex-communist countries.

The position of the different attributes changes significantly depending on levels of affective support, both in Russia and Britain. The changes, however, are more visible in the British case, and affect both evaluations and cognitive support. As levels of affective support increase, levels of both cognitive and evaluative support are significantly higher for most attributes. The exception to this general rule are *protection of poverty* and *transparency of the government*.

Figure 6.17 The relationship between cognitive, affective and evaluative support:


United Kingdom



The differences between the two groups – the low and high affective supporters – are more subtle in the Russian case. Although cognitive support increases for most attributes among Russians, evaluations remain practically unchanged from one group of affective support to the other. Evaluative support for some of the attributes decreases dramatically, for example in the case of horizontal and vertical accountability.

Figure 6.18 The relationship between cognitive, affective and evaluative support:

Russia



As first sight, there appears to be a relationship between the three types of support, although the relationship is different in Russia than it is in the UK. While the three types of support increase simultaneously in Britain, only cognitive support increases systematically when levels of affective support for democracy are higher in Russia. But this, again, might be related to the lower quality of the Russian democracy, as it might well be that as Russians' expectations of democracy increase, their evaluations become more negative, since they are more critical judges of their democratic system. This would explain why there is a negative correlation between cognitive and evaluative support among the Russians.

6.5.2 Cognitive and evaluative support, and satisfaction with democracy

The same model which was presented in section 6.4.1 for the PEW data are reproduced here for each of the attributes of democracy (OLS regression analysis). The results of this analysis are given in detail in the annex 3, and table 6.8 presents a summary. In the table, the sign of the regression coefficient is informed (in bold when it is significant), together with the explained variance of the dependent variable – satisfaction with democracy – for each of the attributes. Unfortunately, the number of

respondents for whom cognitive support is lower than evaluative support is very small (something which is consistent with PEW data), and therefore results are only reported for the cases in which cognitive support is higher than evaluative support<sup>75</sup>. The results suggest that the relationship is the inverse of that predicted in Russia in some coefficients, while the relationship is only slightly significant in the United Kingdom.

Table 6.8 The interaction between cognitive and evaluative support on satisfaction with democracy

	United Kingdom		Russia	
	coefficient*	r <sup>2</sup>	coefficient*	r <sup>2</sup>
Elections	Positive	0.26	Negative	0.34
Deliberation	Negative	0.05	<b>Negative</b>	0.13
Alternative parties	Positive	0.08	Positive	0.17
Freedom opposition	Negative	0.08	<b>Negative</b>	0.16
Transparency media	Positive	0.03	<b>Negative</b>	0.24
Freedom media	Negative	0.04	<b>Negative</b>	0.19
Representation minorities	Negative	0.19	Positive	0.22
Equality of law	Positive	0.26	<b>Positive</b>	0.28
Protection poverty	Positive	0.21	Positive	0.12
Horizontal accountability	Positive	0.22	Negative	0.30
Transparency government	<b>Positive</b>	0.24	<b>Negative</b>	0.21
Vertical accountability	Positive	0.11	Negative	0.25

\*Significant coefficients in bold

Contrary to expectations, although the interaction effect of cognitive and evaluative support on satisfaction with democracy is positive for most attributes in the UK, it is predominantly negative in Russia (this is confirmed by the interpretation of the marginal effects<sup>76</sup>). For most attributes, in Russia, the higher the cognitive support, the more negative the effect of the evaluations on levels of satisfaction with democracy. Why is it that the relationship is the inverse of that which was expected in Russia? Does this indicate that Russians are much less congruent than the British?


Figure 6.19 represents the attributes which have a stronger impact on levels of satisfaction with democracy. A dotted line has been added, which places the mean of satisfaction with democracy in each country. If we examine the attributes which have a stronger impact on levels of satisfaction with democracy (either in the predicted or in the inverse direction), we can see that it is indeed attributes accorded greater importance by the British which have the strongest impact on levels of satisfaction with

<sup>75</sup> The test has been performed, however, also for the other cases – cognitive support lower than evaluative support. With a few exceptions, neither the interaction nor the marginal effects are significant when cognitive support is smaller than evaluative support, partially confirming the initial hypothesis.

<sup>76</sup> These are not presented here, but are available on request.

democracy in this country. In the Russian case, these attributes are spread along the graph. It is also interesting to note that the mean of the evaluations in Russia almost overlaps with the levels of satisfaction with democracy. This may explain why the Russians seem less congruent than the British in their orientations to democracy, or at least between cognitive, evaluative support and satisfaction with democracy. Indeed it seems that Russians' evaluations of the different attributes of democracy provide by themselves an adequate summary of their levels of satisfaction with democracy, which is less dependent on the importance they accord to each of these attributes. I can think of two possible explanations for this. On the one hand, it might be the case that Russians have less defined and structured orientations to democracy than the British. This would be related to the novelty of their democratic institutions and the lower quality of these, as compared to the British. On the other hand, it may be precisely because they perceive that the quality of their democracy is very low that they reshape their cognitive orientations: either increasing the levels of cognitive support or changing their conception of democracy to one which better fits with their day-to-day reality. In this sense, it might be the case that in some countries satisfaction with democracy has strictly an evaluative nature.

Figure 6.19 The attributes which have a stronger impact on levels of satisfaction with democracy



## 6.6 Conclusions

Thus far, the results are not fully convincing, as congruence of citizens' orientations to democracy is not equally sustained in all contexts. In spite of this, there are strong indications that citizens are more congruent than the literature on public opinion would suggest. Not only are supporters of democracy more consistent in their understanding of democracy (they have a *more* democratic understanding of democracy), but they are more aware of the qualities of their democracies than was previously thought, and accordingly they are better at evaluating their political systems than had been believed. In addition, satisfaction with democracy is related (although not exclusively) to citizens' cognitive and evaluative support; a relationship which is also dependent on the type and levels of cognitive support.

The relationship is not confirmed for the Russian case, however, where different patterns emerge. Even if this small sample cannot be considered as fully representative of the Russians, it has been worthwhile in view of the particularities of the Russian case. Congruence is not fully rejected for this case, as affective, cognitive and evaluative supports are inter-related. It is the form of the relationship, however, which varies with regard to the preceding tests, as cognitive and evaluative support are negatively related to satisfaction with democracy. This may well be a consequence of the state of democracy in Russia, and the general discontent among the public, which would inverse the relationship between cognitive and evaluative support. In this context, because democratic performance is much lower, the evaluations of the different parts in a democracy is what matters the most in determining levels of satisfaction with democracy. And this is precisely, because evaluations decline as levels of cognitive support increase. This would also explain why most attributes have a stronger impact on levels of satisfaction with democracy than in the UK, as it is the performance of democracy, in general, which needs to be improved.

How, then, is the initial question to be answered? In any given case, satisfaction with democracy is strongly determined by the evaluations of the different attributes, which advocates for the evaluative nature of satisfaction with democracy. However, in some contexts, it is the evaluations of the most important attributes, which have a stronger impact on levels of satisfaction with democracy. Not only this, but the effect of the interaction of cognitive and evaluative support on satisfaction with democracy is highly dependent on whether there is affective support or not. As such, satisfaction with

democracy – because it is affected by the three types of support – might perform reasonably well in some countries as a measure of overall support for democracy.





## CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS

### 7.1 On the objectives of the thesis

In this thesis I have tried to deal with one of the most complex concepts in political science – citizens' perspectives on democracy. I wanted to understand how the general population conceptualizes democracy. Although I was convinced from the beginning of the need to learn about citizens' understandings of democracy, It was not clear to me at that early stage, how 'what democracy means to citizens' should be integrated into the study of citizens' orientations to democracy, as this type of orientation had rarely been taken into account so far. One of the main objectives and contributions of this thesis, therefore, has been to develop a theoretical framework for the study of citizens' orientations to democracy. Within this framework, understandings of democracy is the key element.

Aside from my own interest in the question, learning about citizens' understandings of democracy enables us to respond to some of the criticisms which were raised against previous research into this topic. The literature review provided in Chapter 2 reveals that there are two assumptions in public opinion studies on democracy, but that these assumptions have rarely been scrutinized or tested empirically. Firstly, it is generally understood that most citizens tend to approve of democracy as the ideal system of government, although they are typically far less satisfied with the functioning of their democratic regimes. This general observation has led to the conclusion that democracy (as an idea) is widely approved among the people, and hence a legitimate political regime. However, this assumption entails the further assumption that people who approve of democracy as an ideal also approve of the type of democracy in which they live. Not to say, that it is rarely envisaged whether people who report that they like democracy do have a 'democratic' conception of democracy. In extreme cases, it may be that individuals claim to approve of democracy, while at the same time rejecting the existence of elections. If we are to fully understand such apparent contradictions, it is essential to address the issue of citizens' understandings of democracy.

Secondly, it is claimed that citizens' levels of satisfaction with democracy reflect their overall support for their democratic regimes. A further belief is that citizens have certain standards with regard to how a democracy should be, which they use to report their

levels of satisfaction with the performance of their democracies. This assumption has typically been taken for granted, even though previous studies have pointed to the fact that satisfaction with democracy is explained by a number of factors, for example political identification, which appear to be entirely unrelated to regime performance, and citizens' expectations towards democracy. If the assumption were true, satisfaction with democracy cannot reliably be used as a measure for citizens' overall support for democracy. Again, this problem can only be overcome if citizens' understandings of democracy are taken into account.

In short, by incorporating citizens' understandings or expectations of democracy into the study of public opinion on democracy, we are able to offer responses to three questions, which have heretofore remained unanswered: (1) What type of democracy is supported by citizens?; (2) What is the referent citizens use to determine whether they are satisfied or not with the functioning of their democracies?; and in relation to this (3) What are the aspects of their democratic regimes with which they are not satisfied? These are the three main research questions which have guided this research, in which a theoretical framework has been constructed to which provide for empirical answers to those questions.

The classic Eastonian concept of support for democracy is of greatest importance in the theoretical framework (Easton 1965). Although it has been repeatedly debated and questioned, few scholars have systematically included citizens' understandings of democracy as a component of political support (see, for example, Fuchs and Roller 1998). As many others before, I have also departed from the concept of political support in this thesis, and do provide a re-conceptualization of support for democracy, in which I have integrated citizens' understandings of democracy.

Support for democracy, as described in chapter 3, is composed of three elements: affective support, cognitive support, and evaluative support. Within this schema, *cognitive support for democracy* refers to the whole range of orientations which require a strong cognitive effort on the part of the citizen. This can be in the form of knowledge, understanding, but also in relation to the process through which knowledge and understanding are translated into expectations, preferences, etc. *Affective support for democracy* represents the affective orientations towards the regime. Put simply, affective support for democracy reflects *whether or not democracy is 'liked'*. *Evaluative support for democracy* refers to citizens' evaluations of their democratic system: *how democracy is perceived as performing*. Within this last type of orientation, satisfaction

with democracy is thought as a special form of support, since it is supposed to provide a measure of citizens' overall support for their democracies.

Affective, cognitive, and evaluative support are not taken in isolation, but much emphasis is placed on how they inter-relate. It is a fundamental aspect of the theoretical argument that citizens' orientations to democracy can only be understood if the three types of support, and the relationships between them, are considered. The congruence hypothesis clearly outlines how affective, cognitive, and evaluative support are inter-related. Congruence simply means that citizens are coherent when they think of democracy. More specifically, the congruence hypothesis predicts the following relationship among the different types of support. Affective support determines whether there is a link between cognitive and evaluative support, *and* satisfaction with democracy. It is presumed that someone who does not like democracy as an idea will probably be indifferent to how her democracy is performing. However, if a citizen approves of democracy as an ideal, it is probable that the more her democratic system conforms to this ideal, the better will be her evaluations of that system, and the greater her satisfaction with the functioning of her democratic regime. If this relationship holds, we can assume that citizens' orientations towards democracy are congruent. In other words, we can affirm that the congruence hypothesis holds.

The test of the congruence hypothesis is not only useful to our understanding of how the three types of support are inter-dependent, but also ensures that the classic relationship between supply (what is provided by the political regime), and demand (what citizens demand from democracy) can be estimated. In fact, only if expressed levels of support for democracy (by an affirmation that citizens either 'like' or are satisfied with democracy) meaningfully refer to 'democratic' conceptions of democracy, or to 'evaluations' of democracy, can we consider them as representing citizens' demands.

Through chapters 2 and 3, I have confirmed the advantages of including cognitive support in the study of citizens' orientations towards democracy. In the following chapters, I have tried to apply this theoretical model to the European context, in order to test whether it can be sustained empirically. The main findings are presented in the next section.

## 7.2 What has been found?

Indirectly, one of the conclusions of this thesis is that available data neither allows for an exhaustive analysis of the type of democracy which is demanded by the Europeans, nor for a satisfactory test of the congruence hypothesis. In an attempt to partly solve the problem of the lack of data for Europe, I have combined several datasets in the three empirical chapters (4, 5, and 6): the European Values Study 2008-2009 (EVS); the World Values Survey 2005-2008 (WVS); the EU-Profiler 2009; the PEW Global Attitudes Project 2009; and the pilot data for the next Round 6 of the European Social Survey (ESS). The use of these different datasets have helped to somehow overcome the limitations from the data perspective. As such, my dissertation also provides some insight into the use of these different datasets for the measurement of citizens' orientations to democracy and the problems associated with each of them.

In spite of the lack of data, there are some promising findings, which correspond to the initial expectations. Most importantly, different analyses suggest that cognitive support for democracy has empirical relevance with regard to three different aspects: (1) how democracy is understood by the Europeans; (2) what type of democracy is supported by the Europeans and how; and (3) how congruent Europeans' orientations towards democracy are.

*How democracy is understood by the Europeans.* The findings from chapter 5 reveal that Europeans do not have one single idea or concept of democracy. Several types of democrats are identified, depending on how citizens cluster in relation to the importance they give to the different attributes of democracy (democracy has been defined in chapter 3 as a radial category – following Collier and Mahon 1993 – composed by 11 attributes). *Demanding democrats*, the largest cluster in the results of the World Values Survey and the EU-Profiler, think all attributes of democracy are equally important. For this group of respondents, democracy encompasses both procedural aspects, and social outcomes. They have a *thick* conception of democracy. The *procedural democrats* (only in the WVS) have a liberal conception of democracy, as they emphasize only the procedural elements in a democracy (elections, political equality, and rule of law). *Indifferent democrats* (only in the WVS) are the cluster of respondents who tend to accord low importance to all attributes of democracy; they seem to be indifferent to the idea of democracy. *Autocratic democrats* (only in the WVS) support all attributes of democracy, but they reject a basic feature in a democratic system: the rule that decisions can only be taken by elected

representatives, and never by the military or the religious authorities. Lastly, *trustee democrats* (only EU-Profiler) favour representative democracy; whereas *participatory democrats* (only EU-Profiler), as their title suggests, prefer a more participatory version of democracy.

One of this thesis's most interesting findings, as outlined in chapter 5, is that most Europeans seem to have a hierarchical conception of democracy. There is agreement among Europeans that political equality and elections are two essential characteristics in a democracy, and this has been corroborated both in the data from the World Values Survey and that of the EU-profiler, despite these datasets having a very different sampling (the WVS has a representative sample, while the EU-Profiler is an internet survey with a strong bias towards young, educated males). Most respondents from both surveys (and all countries) refer to these two attributes – political equality and elections – as the core characteristics of a democracy, while there is not agreement on other attributes of democracy (social equality, welfare, participation, etc.). It is not possible with the available data to ascertain that political equality and elections are the only two core attributes, and nor is data from the ESS pilot conclusive on this point. However, collectively the data provides an indication that there is general consensus among Europeans on what the basic characteristics of a democracy are.

*What type of democracy is supported by the Europeans and how.* It is a widespread belief that most people support democracy as an ideal. This thesis shows, however, that Europeans support different conceptions of democracy. Crucially, this thesis also finds that conceptions of democracy are correlated to the way affective support is structured in a country, or to the general levels of affective support in the same country. Let us first review the findings on affective support.

Chapter 4 provides a re-assessment of the classic churchillian indicator (*Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government*), which is generally used to measure affective support for democracy. It is shown that this item is not comparable across Europe, but rather that there are different structures of affective support. Five groups of countries have been identified, depending on how affective support is structured: Western Europe (WE), Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Mediterranean East Europe (MEE), The Balkans (BE), and the Romania-Albania group (RMAK). In Western and, Central and Eastern Europe, there is a latent concept of affective support for democracy, which comprises three sub-concepts: approval of democracy, rejection of autocracy, and democratic outcomes. However, in the other

three groups of countries, there is no latent concept of affective support for democracy, which makes the use of the classic churchillian indicator to assess levels of affective support in these groups of countries particularly problematic. Within this group of countries, a citizen who affirms that *Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government*, does not necessarily reject alternative – and autocratic – forms of government.

These findings have important implications with regard to the study of affective support for democracy. On the one hand, it is made clear that the classic churchillian indicator does not accurately account for affective support for democracy. Other indicators are needed to fully assess whether someone likes democracy or not. On the other hand, levels of affective support for democracy across Europe need to be subject to more nuanced analysis, as these are not as high and homogeneous as was traditionally thought.

Coming back to the relationship between affective and cognitive support, chapter 5 shows that Europeans' conceptions of democracy (or types of democrats) are correlated to the structure and level of affective support in a country. It is particularly relevant that cognitive support for the core attributes of democracy (political equality and elections) are extremely helpful in discriminating between the different structures and levels of affective support. Indeed, in countries where cognitive support for these two core attributes is higher, affective support tend to more structured, or levels of affective support higher. In contrast, there is lower support for the two core attributes of democracy in countries where the structure of affective support is less well defined, or there are low levels of affective support.

This all indicates that incorporating cognitive support in the study of citizens' orientations to democracy helps to identify more clearly those who support democracy and those who do not. Moreover, it reveals that the different types of democrats are not spread equally across the different groups of countries. For example, in Mediterranean East Europe, The Balkans, and the Romania-Albania group, the predominant cluster of democrats are the *autocratic* and *indifferent democrats*. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the structure of affective support is not fully determined in these groups of countries, as most people still tend to think of democracy in authoritarian terms, and are largely indifferent to it. The quality of democracy seems to play an extremely important role in shaping citizens' orientations to democracy.

Chapter 5 reveals in fact that democratic experience seems to play an important role in shaping both cognitive and affective support for democracy. It is in the healthiest (and older) democracies that levels of cognitive support for the two core attributes is generally higher, and therefore where affective support is most structured, and levels are higher. This has been most clearly seen with regard to the levels of affective support for democracy. Indeed, in Western Europe (where levels of affective support are generally higher, and affective support is also more structured), individual levels of affective support for democracy depend greatly (apart from evaluative support) on *political sophistication*. The higher the levels of education or the political interest of the citizens, the more they tend to support democracy. Democratic experience, for this group of countries, is in no way related to their levels of affective support. By contrast, in Central and Eastern Europe, levels of affective support are intrinsically linked to democratic experience, both with regard to the quality and the number of years one has been living in a democracy. As such, the better an individual's evaluation of her political regime and the longer she has been living in a democracy, the higher her level of affective support tends to be. Socialization, in this group of countries, seems to be very important in shaping both affective and cognitive support, which suggests that democracy is probably best 'learned' by experience.

*How congruent Europeans' orientations towards democracy are.* An understanding of cognitive support for democracy is also necessary if we are to accurately test whether citizens are congruent or not. It has been argued in this thesis that classic measures of citizens' orientations to democracy are only valid if there is congruence among the different types of support. On the one hand, someone who does not like democracy will probably not be satisfied with the manner in which it is functioning. On the other hand, satisfaction with democracy can only be considered as a measure of support if it is related to cognitive and evaluative support; that is to say if citizens' demands of democracy correspond to their evaluations on the functioning of the different attributes of a democracy. For the time being, the congruence hypothesis has only been partially substantiated, mainly because of a lack of adequate data. In spite of this, findings suggest that this is a hypothesis which warrants further investigation with appropriate data in the future, since it may provide valuable insight into how citizens understand, and perceive democracy.

Three tests were performed in chapter 6 to test the congruence hypothesis. Firstly, a test on the relationship between supply (or democratic performance) and demand (or Europeans' evaluations of their democratic system) shows that *demanding democrats*

tend to be more affected by the performance of their political regime in their evaluations of democracy. In other words, the more a person demands from democracy, the more she is aware of the functioning of her democracy in her evaluation of that democracy. However, this pattern is not stable if we control for the structure and the level of affective support in the country, as the relationship between democratic performance and individuals' evaluations of their democracies changes greatly (depending on the type of democrat they are, and the structure and level of affective support in a country). What can be concluded from this test is that, in general, there is more congruence between supply and demand among all types of democrats in countries where affective support is more structured or its levels are higher. It can also be asserted that *autocratic* and *indifferent democrats'* evaluations of their democratic systems are less related to the objective performance of democracy, particularly in contexts where affective support is less structured or levels of affective support are lower. In itself, this can be interpreted as a sign of congruence.

Secondly, congruence between cognitive, affective, and evaluative support was tested, as well as satisfaction with democracy in Central and Eastern European countries. The results indicate that Central and Eastern Europeans have congruent orientations to democracy. It is shown in chapter 6, that cognitive support has an impact on the effect of evaluative support on satisfaction with democracy. In other words, the higher the levels of cognitive support among Central and Eastern Europeans, the stronger the effect of evaluative support on levels of satisfaction with democracy; or, when citizens genuinely care about an attribute of democracy, the evaluation of this attribute has a bigger impact on levels of satisfaction. Of particular interests is the finding that this relationship only holds when there is affective support, and when cognitive support is higher than evaluative support.

Thirdly and finally, preliminary analysis was carried out with the ESS pilot data for Russia and the United Kingdom. The results of this test are contradictory, especially in the Russian case. In Russia, there is a relationship between citizens' orientations to democracy, but the direction is the inverse to the predicted. As such, as citizens increase their cognitive orientations, their evaluation becomes increasingly negative. Although this analysis was carried out with a small sample and a pilot questionnaire, these findings suggest that congruence may apply differently in different countries, a proposition which warrants more in-depth investigation in the future.



### 7.3 What comes next? Implications and future research

It has been shown that the study of cognitive support provides new insight into citizens' orientations to democracy. Not only does it enable us to distinguish between supporters and non-supporters of democracy, but it provides us with clearer answers to the titular question: *What is democracy to citizens?* In addition, it enables us to more fully understand the concept of support for democracy, and assists in the evaluation of whether people are congruent or not.

The congruence hypothesis could not be comprehensively tested with the available data. There are signs, however, that Europeans tend to have congruent orientations towards democracy. More importantly, it seems that the context is highly significant in determining how citizens shape and structure different types of support. This thesis has described two scenarios with four different outcomes with regard to citizens' orientations to democracy. On the one hand, a more stable set of orientations towards democracy is generally produced in contexts where democracies are well established, and score highly in the indices of democratic performance. On the other hand, less stable or congruent orientations seem to be produced in new democracies or ones which perform less well. These two scenarios have different implications with regard to how democratic support is to be studied, and on the consequences for the stability of democracy.

In older (and more qualified) democracies, most citizens tend to have a positive view of democracy (their levels of cognitive, and affective support are higher; there is also more congruence in general between supply and demand; and evaluative support tends also to be higher). It seems that citizens take democracy for granted and no longer question themselves about its benefits. In Western Europe in particular, it seems that democracy has become a moral good. There are two possible outcomes of this situation, which have found support in this thesis. The first possible outcome is that congruence among citizens' orientations towards democracy is higher, as citizens have acquired a stable set of orientations to democracy. We have seen in chapter 5 that it is in countries where levels of affective support are relatively high that citizens are more supportive of the core attributes of democracy, and also where the *demanding* and *procedural democrats* prevail. Within this group of countries, because the quality of their democracies is generally high, what seems to matter most in determining whether citizens' orientations towards democracy are congruent or not, is political sophistication. The procedural democrats are the more educated group, and therefore

the group best able to clearly identify the attributes which characterise democracy in their ideal model of democracy. Accordingly, increasing standards of education is likely to increase congruence of citizens' orientations to democracy.

The second possible outcome in old (and more qualified) democracies is that citizens become gradually less reflective with regard to democracy, as they have become accustomed to it. In that sense, they may become more passive (as democracy is a moral good), which means that they tend to be positive in general towards democracy, regardless of how it is performing, or how they would like a democracy to be. This passivity may explain why, as described in chapter 6, Western Europeans and citizens who live in countries where levels of affective support are medium or high are very homogeneous. The relationship between democratic performance and their evaluations of democracy does not change a great deal across types of democrats, as one would expect. In this case, citizens' orientations towards democracy seem to be largely determined by the context.

In new (and less qualified democracies), the picture with regard to citizens' orientations is more uneven. However, as these are relatively new democracies, we might expect that citizens are gradually learning more about democracy. This has been seen, for example, in chapter 4, as levels of affective support increase the longer a person has been living in a democratic system. Again, there are two possible outcomes in new and less qualified democracies. The first possible outcome is that citizens will become more congruent in the long run. It is possible that the relationship which was found in chapter 6 between cognitive, affective, and evaluative support, and satisfaction with democracy in Central and Eastern Europe becomes stronger in the future.

The second possible outcome is that the democratic experience is negative. In other words, democracy in these countries may be performing badly. In this context, not only does learning about democracy become more difficult, but citizens are likely to perceive that democracy is a bad thing. In such a situation, it is more difficult to develop 'democratic' attitudes, which is certainly what explains the relatively high presence of *autocratic democrats* in countries where the quality of democracy is low (chapter 5). For this reason, it is more probable that cognitive orientations do not relate equally to evaluative support and satisfaction with democracy. This, for example, would be the case for the Russian example in chapter 6, in which the relationship between evaluations and satisfaction with democracy becomes more negative as cognitive support increases. However, the study of cognitive support is of great interest also

within this group of countries. Knowing about cognitive support allows indeed for a more complete understanding of the referent which citizens of less qualified democracies use to evaluate their democracies. In other words, we can better assess the meaning of their 'satisfaction with democracy'.

These two situations and four possible outcomes do raise in fact four different research questions, which have not been completely answered in this thesis. With the 6<sup>th</sup> Round of the European Social Survey, however, these and many other questions can be answered, as it will provide with the adequate instrument to measure the different types of support: affective, cognitive, and evaluative support (and satisfaction with democracy). Therefore, even if this thesis remains empirically unfinished at this stage, I hope that theoretically, it provides the point of departure for a more definitive analysis with the European Social Survey data.



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## ANNEX

## ANNEX 1: CHAPTER 4

Tables A1.1 Goodness of fit and estimates of the initial model (all variables form a latent concept)

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>ALBANIA</b>	262.822	20	.113	.055	.760	.664

	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader <--- Support	5.500	2.013	2.732	.006	.357
pol.sys.:experts <--- Support	-1.040	.620	-1.678	.093	-.079
pol.sys.:army <--- Support	4.907	1.780	2.756	.006	.401
pol.sys.:democracy <--- Support	4.310	1.567	2.751	.006	.389
outcome: indecision <--- Support	6.501	2.316	2.807	.005	.592
outcome: order <--- Support	7.466	2.653	2.814	.005	.654
outcome: economy <--- Support	7.241	2.570	2.817	.005	.697
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.107

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.005	.003	1.418	.156
e1	.389	.018	21.645	***
e2	.943	.046	20.577	***
e3	.789	.036	21.688	***
e4	.571	.028	20.208	***
e5	.474	.023	20.318	***
e6	.356	.021	17.303	***
e7	.340	.022	15.533	***
e8	.253	.018	13.947	***

St. residual cov.	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.577	.000						
outcome: indecision	1.555	.930	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-.225	.024	-2.452	.000				
pol.sys.: army	-.855	-.176	-2.319	2.306	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-.907	-.349	-2.813	-.712	4.718	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-.550	.260	-3.184	1.484	6.892	5.203	.000	
democracy better	-1.103	-1.034	-.149	7.352	.383	1.281	-1.554	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy <---	outcome: indecision	7.339	.069	pol.sys.:army <---	outcome: indecision	7.135	-.091
outcome: indecision <---	outcome: economy	5.092	.067	pol.sys.:army <---	pol.sys.:democracy	6.840	.088
outcome: indecision <---	pol.sys.:democracy	11.391	-.095	pol.sys.:experts <---	outcome: indecision	7.993	-.110
outcome: indecision <---	pol.sys.:army	10.221	-.081	pol.sys.:experts <---	pol.sys.:army	22.462	.166
outcome: indecision <---	pol.sys.:experts	14.263	-.089	pol.sys.:experts <---	pol.sys.:leader	27.306	.145
outcome: indecision <---	pol.sys.:leader	19.046	-.088	pol.sys.:leader <---	outcome: indecision	12.624	-.155
pol.sys.:democracy <---	outcome: indecision	7.832	-.087	pol.sys.:leader <---	pol.sys.:army	57.784	.297
pol.sys.:democracy <---	pol.sys.:army	6.737	.072	pol.sys.:leader <---	pol.sys.:experts	32.296	.206
pol.sys.:democracy <---	democracy better	66.957	.299	democracy better <---	pol.sys.:democracy	54.949	.202

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>AUSTRIA</b>	598.831	20	.159	.049	.793	.710



Regression weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys: leader	<--- Support	2.494	.224	11.148	***	.607
pol.sys: experts	<--- Support	.903	.146	6.168	***	.220
pol.sys: army	<--- Support	1.847	.164	11.233	***	.621
pol.sys: democracy	<--- Support	1.493	.150	9.951	***	.460
outcome: indecision	<--- Support	2.213	.201	10.989	***	.583
outcome: order	<--- Support	2.945	.245	12.033	***	.804
outcome: economy	<--- Support	2.713	.226	12.013	***	.797
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.377

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.050	.008	6.129	***
e1	.300	.013	23.279	***
e2	.529	.025	21.504	***
e3	.793	.033	23.757	***
e4	.270	.013	21.314	***
e5	.413	.018	22.847	***
e6	.473	.022	21.801	***
e7	.235	.015	16.007	***
e8	.210	.013	16.369	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	.058	.000						
outcome: indecision	1.855	1.264	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-.965	.558	-2.915	.000				
pol.sys.: army	.104	-.194	-3.506	-2.074	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	1.116	-1.364	2.984	-5.809	-.215	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-1.147	-1.026	-2.610	1.673	5.675	3.827	.000	
democracy better	-1.129	-.203	-.344	12.154	-2.192	-4.686	-.469	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: indecision	15.422	.073	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: indecision	24.913	-.095
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	4.732	.037	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	8.334	-.064
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	5.984	-.042	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	65.909	.143
outcome: economy	<--- democracy better	5.126	-.060	pol.sys.:army	<--- democracy better	9.078	-.082
outcome: order	<--- outcome: indecision	7.542	.054	pol.sys.:experts	<--- outcome: indecision	9.582	.096
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:experts	7.430	-.050	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	36.100	-.219
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:leader	5.042	-.041	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	15.791	.114
outcome: indecision	<--- outcome: economy	6.850	.073	pol.sys.:experts	<--- democracy better	23.411	-.216
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	14.919	-.113	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: indecision	13.271	-.097
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:army	22.769	-.152	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	5.225	.071
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:experts	14.820	.089	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	63.680	.270
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:leader	12.553	-.082	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	25.819	.125
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: indecision	12.024	-.079	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	181.750	.305
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:army	6.139	-.072	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:army	6.051	-.061
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	44.998	-.142	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:experts	26.407	-.092
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	200.851	.464				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>BELARUS</b>	288.169	20	.123	.042	.773	.682

Regression weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader	<--- Support	1.251	.208	6.021	***	.301
pol.sys:experts	<--- Support	.299	.150	1.990	.047	.077
pol.sys:army	<--- Support	1.237	.194	6.370	***	.334
pol.sys:democracy	<--- Support	.601	.134	4.487	***	.195
outcome:indecision	<--- Support	2.480	.302	8.223	***	.708
outcome:order	<--- Support	2.714	.328	8.271	***	.739
outcome:economy	<--- Support	2.333	.283	8.245	***	.721
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.317

Variates	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.042	.010	4.295	***
e1	.375	.018	20.389	***
e2	.657	.032	20.459	***
e3	.623	.030	21.001	***
e4	.511	.025	20.310	***
e5	.384	.018	20.809	***
e6	.257	.017	14.901	***
e7	.257	.019	13.678	***
e8	.212	.015	14.417	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.538	.000						
outcome:indecision	.069	1.238	.000					
pol.sys.:democracy	1.314	-1.574	-2.518	.000				
pol.sys.:army	1.990	-1.303	-2.550	1.039	.000			
pol.sys.:experts	-.286	-.556	1.739	-2.707	2.620	.000		
pol.sys.:leader	.159	-.331	-2.116	1.634	6.595	-.230	.000	
democracy better	-.526	-.237	-.845	9.835	.611	-4.239	1.608	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	4.765	.061	pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	101.790	.327
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:army	11.341	.078	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: economy	4.848	.081
outcome: order	<--- outcome: indecision	5.782	.066	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: indecision	7.941	-.096
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	7.496	-.086	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:experts	7.945	.087
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:army	5.338	-.060	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	50.829	.204
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- outcome: order	4.980	.057	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	7.383	-.114
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	16.489	-.124	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:army	6.918	.092
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:army	17.523	-.106	pol.sys.:experts	<--- democracy better	18.109	-.175
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:experts	7.740	.068	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: indecision	5.264	-.088
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:leader	11.953	-.078	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	49.391	.255
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: indecision	6.772	-.076	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	110.632	.347
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	7.683	-.073	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:experts	20.483	-.119

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>BELGIUM</b>	422.180	20	.121	.046	.756	.659

Regression weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader	<--- Support	1.725	.171	10.082	***	.453
pol.sys:experts	<--- Support	.577	.102	5.680	***	.196
pol.sys:army	<--- Support	.959	.103	9.343	***	.392
pol.sys:democracy	<--- Support	1.113	.109	10.232	***	.467
outcome:indecision	<--- Support	1.590	.148	10.742	***	.522
outcome:order	<--- Support	1.867	.162	11.550	***	.648
outcome:economy	<--- Support	1.888	.164	11.499	***	.637
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.392

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.073	.011	6.431	***
e1	.400	.016	24.392	***
e2	.837	.035	23.638	***
e3	.607	.024	25.770	***
e4	.368	.015	24.391	***
e5	.322	.014	23.430	***
e6	.491	.022	22.485	***
e7	.350	.018	19.002	***
e8	.380	.020	19.404	***

St. Residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	2.147	.000						
outcome:indecision	2.771	2.986	.000					
pol.sys.:democracy	-2.095	-1.493	-2.799	.000				
pol.sys.:army	-1.634	-1.665	-4.999	3.435	.000			
pol.sys.:experts	-2.370	-.548	-.627	-2.228	3.686	.000		
pol.sys.:leader	-1.703	-1.931	-1.944	1.932	3.987	5.873	.000	
democracy better	-2.311	-3.685	-2.734	8.200	4.768	-.237	2.810	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: order	11.110	.079	pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	96.142	.227
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: indecision	17.571	.094	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: indecision	32.355	-.116
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	9.842	-.090	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	15.149	.102
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:army	5.847	-.068	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:experts	16.980	.087
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	11.749	-.080	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	20.373	.074
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	6.476	-.046	pol.sys.:army	<--- democracy better	28.917	.131
outcome: economy	<--- democracy better	11.691	-.092	pol.sys.:experts	<--- outcome: economy	5.994	-.065
outcome: order	<--- outcome: economy	11.538	.076	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	5.259	-.076
outcome: order	<--- outcome: indecision	21.258	.100	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:army	14.365	.122
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	5.204	-.063	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	36.537	.125
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:army	6.315	-.068	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: economy	4.251	-.066
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:leader	8.663	-.051	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: order	5.476	-.077
outcome: order	<--- democracy better	30.924	-.144	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: indecision	5.399	-.073
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- outcome: economy	13.036	.090	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	5.274	.092
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- outcome: order	15.188	.100	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	22.177	.183
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	12.689	-.111	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	47.010	.221
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:army	39.806	-.191	pol.sys.:leader	<--- democracy better	11.014	.124
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:leader	6.102	-.048	democracy better	<--- outcome: economy	7.049	-.058
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- democracy better	11.905	-.100	democracy better	<--- outcome: order	17.955	-.096
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: economy	6.609	-.051	democracy better	<--- outcome: indecision	9.675	-.066
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: indecision	11.485	-.066	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	86.329	.254
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:army	16.869	.099	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:army	28.913	.143
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	6.922	-.053	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:leader	10.117	.054
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	5.395	.036				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>BOSNIA</b>	769.663	20	.176	.081	.679	.551

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader <--- Support	2.292	.419	5.474	***	.347
pol.sys.:experts <--- Support	.456	.200	2.281	.023	.077
pol.sys.:army <--- Support	2.067	.380	5.446	***	.340
pol.sys.:democracy <--- Support	1.418	.286	4.957	***	.252
outcome:indecision <--- Support	4.130	.676	6.110	***	.853
outcome:order <--- Support	3.309	.552	6.000	***	.622
outcome: economy <--- Support	3.819	.626	6.104	***	.808
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.190

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.458	.000						
outcome:indecision	.324	.058	.000					
pol.sys.:democracy	-.126	1.421	-.699	.000				
pol.sys.:army	-.298	1.365	-1.279	-3.504	.000			
pol.sys.:experts	-.750	-1.346	.920	-11.416	6.542	.000		
pol.sys.:leader	-.800	.267	-.617	-.003	9.673	5.085	.000	
democracy better	-.874	.304	-.476	16.754	.381	-6.200	-2.329	.000

Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change
outcome: indecision	<---	pol.sys.:army	10.986	-.052	pol.sys.:experts	<---	pol.sys.:army	43.122	.185
outcome: indecision	<---	pol.sys.:experts	5.265	.036	pol.sys.:experts	<---	pol.sys.:leader	26.048	.132
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	pol.sys.:army	13.340	-.095	pol.sys.:experts	<---	democracy better	38.713	-.203
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	pol.sys.:experts	140.645	-.314	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:army	110.119	.311
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	democracy better	303.478	.523	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:experts	30.034	.166
pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	14.263	-.112	pol.sys.:leader	<---	democracy better	6.322	-.086
pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:experts	49.401	.196	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	293.562	.453
pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:leader	109.410	.263	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:experts	40.123	-.159
pol.sys.:experts	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	131.268	-.348	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:leader	5.682	-.054

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>BULGARIA</b>	266.055	20	.125	.052	.854	.796

Regression Weights:		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader	<--- Support	.921	.138	6.669	***	.300
pol.sys.:experts	<--- Support	.237	.089	2.672	.008	.104
pol.sys.:army	<--- Support	.545	.103	5.293	***	.222
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- Support	.907	.125	7.248	***	.338
outcome:indecision	<--- Support	2.286	.210	10.893	***	.875
outcome:order	<--- Support	2.279	.210	10.833	***	.843
outcome: economy	<--- Support	1.968	.186	10.568	***	.759
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.396

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
Support	.091	.017	5.438	***	
e1	.490	.025	19.310	***	
e2	.782	.040	19.540	***	
e3	.467	.024	19.770	***	
e4	.520	.026	19.663	***	
e5	.579	.030	19.459	***	
e6	.145	.014	10.339	***	
e7	.192	.015	12.411	***	
e8	.259	.016	16.007	***	

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	.182	.000						
outcome:indecision	-.066	.178	.000					
pol.sys.:democracy	-.598	-.934	-.459	.000				
pol.sys.:army	-.427	-.090	-.495	1.219	.000			
pol.sys.:experts	.143	-.027	.159	-.904	-2.329	.000		
pol.sys.:leader	.450	-.810	-.499	2.466	5.842	4.633	.000	
democracy better	-.340	-1.104	-.104	9.990	1.658	-3.017	1.582	.000

Modification indices				M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices				M.I.	Par Change
outcome: order	<---	pol.sys.:democracy		4.589		-0.049	pol.sys.:experts	<---	pol.sys.:leader	21.750	.123
outcome: order	<---	democracy better		6.585		-.062	pol.sys.:experts	<---	democracy better	9.230	-.097
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	pol.sys.:leader		7.046		.078	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	6.830	.103
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	democracy better		116.482		.388	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:army	38.106	.265
pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:experts		5.746		-.090	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:experts	23.885	.226
pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:leader		36.279		.168	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	123.118	.347
pol.sys.:experts	<---	pol.sys.:army		5.495		-.077	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:experts	11.051	-.122

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>CROATIA</b>	546.099	20	.152	.054	.688	.563

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader <--- Support	1.519	.226	6.710	***	.325
pol.sys.:experts <--- Support	.088	.131	.670	.503	.022
pol.sys.:army <--- Support	1.322	.194	6.817	***	.336
pol.sys.:democracy <--- Support	1.233	.183	6.730	***	.327
outcome: indecision <--- Support	2.764	.325	8.515	***	.773
outcome: order <--- Support	2.608	.308	8.461	***	.714
outcome: economy <--- Support	2.209	.266	8.292	***	.626
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.286

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
Support	.034	.008	4.380	***	
e1	.378	.016	23.343	***	
e2	.661	.029	23.152	***	
e3	.514	.021	23.934	***	
e4	.465	.020	23.089	***	
e5	.430	.019	23.141	***	
e6	.174	.013	13.441	***	
e7	.221	.013	16.359	***	
e8	.256	.013	19.439	***	

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.711	.000						
outcome: indecision	1.046	.441	.000					
pol.sys.:democracy	-1.652	-.019	-.916	.000				
pol.sys.:army	.033	-.454	-1.663	.262	.000			
pol.sys.:experts	1.142	-.483	2.068	-8.630	-.842	.000		
pol.sys.:leader	.058	-.121	-1.726	-.595	11.157	3.352	.000	
democracy better	-1.703	.232	-1.046	12.410	-.659	-7.000	-1.815	.000

Modification indices				M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices				M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<---	pol.sys.:democracy		5.429		-.054	pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:leader	145.984	.287
outcome: economy	<---	democracy better		5.712		-.060	pol.sys.:experts	<---	outcome: indecision	4.282	.067
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	outcome: economy		4.941		.051	pol.sys.:experts	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	74.519	-.264
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	pol.sys.:army		10.797		-.068	pol.sys.:experts	<---	pol.sys.:leader	11.246	.083
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	pol.sys.:experts		15.651		.082	pol.sys.:experts	<---	democracy better	49.031	-.231
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	pol.sys.:leader		11.577		-.059	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:army	144.491	.404
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	democracy better		4.194		-.048	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:experts	12.892	.122
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	pol.sys.:experts		85.581		-.253	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	172.558	.347
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	democracy better		178.524		.408	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:experts	54.428	-.189

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>CYPRUS</b>	354.910	20	.158	.062	.795	.714

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader	<--- Support	2.985	.398	7.502	***	.679
pol.sys:experts	<--- Support	3.423	.469	7.306	***	.605
pol.sys:army	<--- Support	3.833	.506	7.579	***	.714
pol.sys:democracy	<--- Support	1.317	.224	5.887	***	.344
outcome:indecision	<--- Support	3.095	.419	7.392	***	.635
outcome:order	<--- Support	3.347	.448	7.478	***	.668
outcome:economy	<--- Support	3.210	.428	7.498	***	.677
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.322

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
Support	.033	.008	3.925	***	
e1	.286	.016	17.937	***	
e2	.344	.023	15.203	***	
e3	.667	.041	16.230	***	
e4	.465	.032	14.506	***	
e5	.425	.024	17.868	***	
e6	.467	.029	15.869	***	
e7	.457	.030	15.377	***	
e8	.402	.026	15.233	***	

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	2.194	.000						
outcome: indecision	4.904	<a href="#">2.673</a>	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	1.234	.366	-1.620	.000				
pol.sys.: army	-1.979	-1.544	-1.944	-.013	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-2.460	-2.583	-1.862	-1.936	3.755	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-2.164	-.794	-2.824	.269	2.381	2.632	.000	
democracy better	-.930	.025	-1.761	3.572	-.405	.112	1.681	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: order	12.442	.102	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: economy	11.914	-.116
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: indecision	61.153	.233	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: order	7.214	-.085
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:army	10.372	-.087	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: indecision	11.227	-.109
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	15.168	-.100	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:experts	41.252	.181
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	12.175	-.115	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	17.257	.150
outcome: order	<--- outcome: economy	12.093	.113	pol.sys.:experts	<--- outcome: economy	12.339	-.135
outcome: order	<--- outcome: indecision	17.590	.133	pol.sys.:experts	<--- outcome: order	13.558	-.134
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:army	6.105	-.071	pol.sys.:experts	<--- outcome: indecision	6.948	-.099
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:experts	16.199	-.110	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	6.829	-.125
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- outcome: economy	53.755	.238	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:army	29.215	.184
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- outcome: order	15.908	.123	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	14.136	.156
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	5.186	-.092	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: economy	12.246	-.099
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:army	8.592	-.084	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: indecision	20.408	-.124
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:experts	7.507	-.075	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	15.112	.097
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:leader	17.834	-.148	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	17.480	.099
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- democracy better	6.094	-.122	pol.sys.:leader	<--- democracy better	6.390	.109
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	4.539	-.053	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	14.684	.115
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	14.983	.174				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>CZ REPUBLIC</b>	683.688	20	.159	.065	.721	.610

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader	<--- Support	1.204	.116	10.354	***	.392
pol.sys:experts	<--- Support	.845	.100	8.421	***	.295
pol.sys:army	<--- Support	.614	.075	8.165	***	.283
pol.sys:democracy	<--- Support	1.143	.101	11.351	***	.455
outcome:indecision	<--- Support	1.864	.131	14.202	***	.753
outcome:order	<--- Support	1.619	.120	13.533	***	.649
outcome:economy	<--- Support	1.697	.120	14.085	***	.729
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.442

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.745	.000						
outcome: indecision	.873	3.069	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	.105	-2.316	-2.732	.000				
pol.sys.: army	.300	-2.276	-3.562	2.873	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-1.716	.033	1.422	-3.585	-.262	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-1.404	-1.868	-2.775	3.906	12.117	5.669	.000	
democracy better	.485	-2.914	-2.978	10.659	2.175	-.595	2.840	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	8.485	-.051	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: order	5.923	-.056
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	5.874	-.039	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: indecision	14.674	-.090
outcome: order	<--- outcome: indecision	23.531	.111	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	9.283	.070
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	11.761	-.077	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	164.434	.242
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:army	10.801	-.086	pol.sys.:army	<--- democracy better	5.316	.059
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:leader	7.493	-.051	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	14.598	-.116
outcome: order	<--- democracy better	18.538	-.108	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	36.352	.150
outcome: indecision	<--- outcome: order	36.331	.126	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: order	4.555	-.068
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	25.968	-.106	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: indecision	10.268	-.103
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:army	41.314	-.155	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	19.308	.139
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:experts	6.611	.047	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	182.282	.494
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:leader	26.077	-.087	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	39.946	.175
outcome: indecision	<--- democracy better	30.680	-.128	pol.sys.:leader	<--- democracy better	10.193	.112
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: order	7.749	-.071	democracy better	<--- outcome: order	12.004	-.080
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: indecision	11.083	-.085	democracy better	<--- outcome: indecision	12.867	-.083
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:army	11.154	.098	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	154.424	.283
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	17.388	-.092	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:army	6.277	.066
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	20.928	.095	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:leader	10.858	.062
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	157.143	.352				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>DENMARK</b>	304.304	20	.105	.040	.736	.631

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader	<--- Support	2.026	.238	8.522	***	.399
pol.sys:experts	<--- Support	1.883	.242	7.790	***	.341
pol.sys:army	<--- Support	.564	.072	7.788	***	.341
pol.sys:democracy	<--- Support	.781	.094	8.346	***	.384
outcome:indecision	<--- Support	2.453	.255	9.602	***	.523
outcome:order	<--- Support	2.232	.234	9.524	***	.511
outcome:economy	<--- Support	1.993	.207	9.611	***	.524
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.391

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.029	.005	5.856	***
e1	.159	.007	23.003	***
e2	.624	.027	22.883	***
e3	.777	.033	23.668	***
e4	.070	.003	23.670	***
e5	.102	.004	23.109	***
e6	.461	.023	20.348	***
e7	.406	.020	20.656	***
e8	.302	.015	20.308	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	1.984	.000						
outcome: indecision	2.607	2.954	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-1.408	-1.099	-1.782	.000				
pol.sys.: army	-1.644	-2.937	-2.438	3.703	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-2.816	-1.525	-2.038	-1.104	3.047	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-2.280	-1.900	-1.512	-.782	4.073	8.943	.000	
democracy better	.287	-1.086	<u>-1.615</u>	5.318	.496	-.732	-1.228	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: order	6.688	.057	pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:army	17.394	.136
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: indecision	11.580	.070	pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	36.059	.127
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:army	4.418	-.123	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: order	10.528	-.033
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	12.964	-.063	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: indecision	7.267	-.025
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	8.598	-.056	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	16.527	.088
outcome: order	<--- outcome: economy	6.498	.075	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:experts	11.151	.027
outcome: order	<--- outcome: indecision	14.395	.090	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	20.021	.039
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:army	13.684	-.249	pol.sys.:experts	<--- outcome: economy	9.693	-.121
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:leader	5.791	-.053	pol.sys.:experts	<--- outcome: indecision	5.079	-.071
outcome: indecision	<--- outcome: economy	11.542	.107	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:army	11.153	.298
outcome: indecision	<--- outcome: order	14.767	.105	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	96.518	.286
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	5.220	-.134	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: economy	6.903	-.092
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:army	9.689	-.224	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: order	4.785	-.067
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:experts	6.771	-.056	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	21.502	.375
outcome: indecision	<--- democracy better	4.294	-.097	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	103.643	.247
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: indecision	4.120	-.023	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	36.406	.200

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>ESTONIA</b>	323.646	20	.119	.035	.767	.674

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader <--- Support	1.154	.170	6.792	***	.299
pol.sys.:experts <--- Support	.603	.137	4.413	***	.168
pol.sys.:army <--- Support	.670	.115	5.834	***	.239
pol.sys.:democracy <--- Support	1.360	.163	8.355	***	.438
outcome: indecision <--- Support	1.894	.200	9.473	***	.625
outcome: order <--- Support	1.930	.201	9.611	***	.665
outcome: economy <--- Support	1.814	.186	9.748	***	.725
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.352



Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
Support	.050	.010	5.174	***	
e1	.353	.016	22.088	***	
e2	.679	.030	22.418	***	
e3	.623	.027	22.934	***	
e4	.370	.016	22.698	***	
e5	.390	.018	21.358	***	
e6	.279	.015	18.148	***	
e7	.235	.014	16.893	***	
e8	.148	.010	14.483	***	

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	.354	.000						
outcome: indecision	1.379	.126	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-.992	-1.578	-.818	.000				
pol.sys.: army	.146	-1.563	-1.394	.306	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-.104	-.697	.810	-.500	2.972	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-.419	.759	-2.895	.535	6.736	1.245	.000	
democracy better	-3.224	1.014	-2.036	10.463	.525	-1.814	1.319	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: indecision	6.630	.052	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:experts	9.527	.072
outcome: economy	<--- democracy better	32.011	-.123	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	49.107	.152
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	6.010	-.058	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:army	9.171	.117
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:army	5.572	-.062	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: indecision	9.757	-.117
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- outcome: economy	4.462	.066	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	51.307	.291
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:leader	16.876	-.084	democracy better	<--- outcome: economy	13.093	-.119
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- democracy better	8.455	-.081	democracy better	<--- outcome: indecision	5.138	-.062
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	147.168	.376	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	132.524	.306

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>FINLAND</b>	294.386	20	.132	.031	.802	.723

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader <--- Support	1.254	.115	10.928	***	.526
pol.sys.:experts <--- Support	.989	.109	9.046	***	.408
pol.sys.:army <--- Support	.730	.077	9.472	***	.433
pol.sys.:democracy <--- Support	1.131	.097	11.689	***	.582
outcome: indecision <--- Support	1.270	.104	12.175	***	.622
outcome: order <--- Support	1.284	.106	12.079	***	.613
outcome: economy <--- Support	1.199	.097	12.353	***	.638
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.555

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
Support	.109	.015	7.488	***	
e1	.246	.014	17.381	***	
e2	.451	.025	17.730	***	
e3	.537	.029	18.721	***	
e4	.254	.014	18.556	***	
e5	.274	.016	17.018	***	
e6	.280	.017	16.367	***	
e7	.299	.018	16.513	***	
e8	.230	.014	16.067	***	

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	1.474	.000						
outcome: indecision	2.776	1.504	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-1.182	-1.480	-1.423	.000				
pol.sys.: army	-.286	-.485	-1.453	-1.475	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-1.678	-2.009	.936	-.303	2.002	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-1.179	.065	-1.993	-.359	5.724	2.184	.000	
democracy better	-1.840	-.849	-1.897	6.722	-1.918	.595	-.592	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: order	4.945	.060	pol.sys.: democracy	<--- democracy better	84.648	.306
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: indecision	17.594	.115	pol.sys.: army	<--- pol.sys.: experts	5.347	.053
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.: experts	5.928	-.056	pol.sys.: army	<--- pol.sys.: leader	44.581	.156
outcome: economy	<--- democracy better	7.513	-.085	pol.sys.: army	<--- democracy better	5.035	-.069
outcome: order	<--- outcome: economy	4.613	.072	pol.sys.: experts	<--- outcome: order	5.372	-.089
outcome: order	<--- outcome: indecision	4.768	.068	pol.sys.: experts	<--- pol.sys.: army	5.179	.109
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	4.542	-.069	pol.sys.: experts	<--- pol.sys.: leader	6.253	.085
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.: experts	7.890	-.073	pol.sys.: leader	<--- outcome: indecision	6.611	-.095
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- outcome: economy	16.794	.134	pol.sys.: leader	<--- pol.sys.: army	51.833	.323
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- outcome: order	4.879	.065	pol.sys.: leader	<--- pol.sys.: experts	7.507	.085
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	4.310	-.066	democracy better	<--- outcome: economy	6.082	-.074
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.: army	4.266	-.075	democracy better	<--- outcome: indecision	6.429	-.070
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.: leader	8.276	-.074	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	79.681	.258
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- democracy better	7.581	-.094	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.: army	6.215	-.083
pol.sys.: democracy	<--- outcome: order	4.187	-.058				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>FRANCE</b>	583.714	20	.144	.051	.742	.639

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.: leader <--- Support	1.284	.137	9.393	***	.360
pol.sys.: experts <--- Support	.783	.113	6.939	***	.237
pol.sys.: army <--- Support	.740	.083	8.891	***	.331
pol.sys.: democracy <--- Support	1.269	.116	10.951	***	.472
outcome: indecision <--- Support	1.997	.159	12.526	***	.654
outcome: order <--- Support	2.544	.195	13.023	***	.768
outcome: economy <--- Support	2.030	.161	12.580	***	.663
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.403

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
Support	.069	.010	6.865	***	
e1	.354	.014	24.655	***	
e2	.757	.030	24.965	***	
e3	.705	.028	25.589	***	
e4	.305	.012	25.146	***	
e5	.385	.016	23.995	***	
e6	.366	.018	20.611	***	
e7	.308	.020	15.688	***	
e8	.361	.018	20.331	***	

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	.360	.000						
outcome: indecision	1.381	1.755	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-.099	-1.654	-3.490	.000				
pol.sys.: army	-2.030	-.734	-1.974	2.409	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-.412	-1.602	-.228	-1.039	3.907	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-1.372	-.909	-1.632	1.374	5.790	9.071	.000	
democracy better	-1.910	-1.131	-3.502	13.024	2.685	-1.623	.094	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: indecision	4.825	.049	pol.sys.: democracy	<--- pol.sys.: army	8.136	.085
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.: army	9.206	-.093	pol.sys.: democracy	<--- democracy better	240.502	.415
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.: leader	4.241	-.039	pol.sys.: army	<--- outcome: economy	4.980	-.042
outcome: economy	<--- democracy better	8.328	-.079	pol.sys.: army	<--- outcome: indecision	4.705	-.041
outcome: order	<--- outcome: indecision	13.475	.083	pol.sys.: army	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	6.855	.057
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	10.820	-.084	pol.sys.: army	<--- pol.sys.: experts	17.705	.074
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.: experts	9.265	-.064	pol.sys.: army	<--- pol.sys.: leader	39.200	.102
outcome: order	<--- democracy better	4.895	-.061	pol.sys.: army	<--- democracy better	8.458	.068
outcome: indecision	<--- outcome: economy	4.683	.048	pol.sys.: experts	<--- pol.sys.: army	16.475	.159
outcome: indecision	<--- outcome: order	7.977	.058	pol.sys.: experts	<--- pol.sys.: leader	88.916	.232
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	27.585	-.134	pol.sys.: leader	<--- pol.sys.: army	40.329	.261
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.: army	8.441	-.089	pol.sys.: leader	<--- pol.sys.: experts	98.304	.276
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.: leader	5.818	-.046	democracy better	<--- outcome: economy	4.859	-.045
outcome: indecision	<--- democracy better	27.116	-.143	democracy better	<--- outcome: indecision	16.303	-.083
pol.sys.: democracy	<--- outcome: order	4.238	-.041	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	218.563	.347
pol.sys.: democracy	<--- outcome: indecision	18.250	-.093	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.: army	9.123	.085

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>GERMANY</b>	382.338	20	.111	.034	.833	.766

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.: leader <--- Support	.978	.081	12.039	***	.395
pol.sys.: experts <--- Support	.672	.083	8.092	***	.249
pol.sys.: army <--- Support	.304	.038	8.067	***	.249
pol.sys.: democracy <--- Support	1.033	.070	14.797	***	.519
outcome: indecision <--- Support	1.520	.093	16.292	***	.601
outcome: order <--- Support	1.546	.088	17.532	***	.687
outcome: economy <--- Support	1.534	.087	17.690	***	.701
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.557

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
Support	.117	.011	10.248	***	
e1	.260	.011	23.677	***	
e2	.605	.023	25.748	***	
e3	.794	.030	26.659	***	
e4	.163	.006	26.662	***	
e5	.338	.014	24.312	***	
e6	.477	.021	22.748	***	
e7	.312	.016	20.121	***	
e8	.285	.015	19.566	***	

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	1.205	.000						
outcome: indecision	2.121	.695	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-1.320	-.975	-3.343	.000				
pol.sys.: army	-2.204	.288	-3.589	.614	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-1.153	-1.680	2.144	-.665	1.171	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-1.475	-1.766	-.609	2.699	8.966	5.902	.000	
democracy better	-1.489	-.675	-1.158	6.319	1.416	-1.003	-1.019	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: order	4.457	.043	pol.sys.: democracy	<--- pol.sys.: leader	11.297	.063
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: indecision	13.208	.066	pol.sys.: democracy	<--- democracy better	64.395	.206
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	4.919	-.051	pol.sys.: army	<--- outcome: economy	5.415	-.033
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.: army	12.483	-.132	pol.sys.: army	<--- outcome: indecision	14.240	-.046
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.: leader	5.843	-.045	pol.sys.: army	<--- pol.sys.: leader	87.769	.117
outcome: economy	<--- democracy better	6.369	-.064	pol.sys.: experts	<--- outcome: indecision	5.085	.061
outcome: order	<--- outcome: economy	4.212	.045	pol.sys.: experts	<--- pol.sys.: leader	38.060	.170
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.: experts	6.847	-.046	pol.sys.: leader	<--- outcome: order	4.133	-.055
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.: leader	7.889	-.054	pol.sys.: leader	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	9.368	.093
outcome: indecision	<--- outcome: economy	9.469	.079	pol.sys.: leader	<--- pol.sys.: army	100.184	.496
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	21.920	-.132	pol.sys.: leader	<--- pol.sys.: experts	43.420	.148
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.: army	23.533	-.223	democracy better	<--- outcome: economy	4.105	-.038
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.: experts	8.399	.061	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	69.517	.171
pol.sys.: democracy	<--- outcome: indecision	18.258	-.078				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>GREECE</b>	454.456	20	.131	.047	.767	.674

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.: leader <--- Support	1.857	.592	3.140	.002	.179
pol.sys.: experts <--- Support	2.913	.887	3.285	.001	.213
pol.sys.: army <--- Support	2.541	.756	3.361	***	.238
pol.sys.: democracy <--- Support	.243	.284	.857	.391	.027
outcome: indecision <--- Support	10.838	2.936	3.692	***	.823
outcome: order <--- Support	7.907	2.153	3.673	***	.641
outcome: economy <--- Support	10.334	2.799	3.692	***	.824
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.114

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.004	.002	1.850	.064
e1	.314	.013	25.025	***
e2	.428	.017	24.925	***
e3	.732	.029	24.853	***
e4	.441	.018	24.790	***
e5	.330	.013	25.086	***
e6	.231	.018	12.666	***
e7	.369	.017	21.452	***
e8	.207	.017	12.540	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.295	.000						
outcome: indecision	.376	-.173	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-.116	.296	-.993	.000				
pol.sys.: army	-.767	2.154	-1.600	1.242	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-1.208	1.388	-.956	.736	8.680	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-1.114	1.663	-1.417	3.464	<b>8.488</b>	9.654	.000	
democracy better	-.949	1.519	-.300	12.021	2.087	.860	2.797	.000

Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<---	pol.sys.:experts	7.227	-.049	pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:experts	80.888	.193
outcome: economy	<---	pol.sys.:leader	6.088	-.059	pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:leader	77.300	.249
outcome: economy	<---	democracy better	4.360	-.059	pol.sys.:army	<---	democracy better	4.669	.072
outcome: order	<---	pol.sys.:army	9.106	.080	pol.sys.:experts	<---	pol.sys.:army	79.765	.316
outcome: order	<---	pol.sys.:leader	5.370	.063	pol.sys.:experts	<---	pol.sys.:leader	98.566	.361
outcome: order	<---	democracy better	4.447	.068	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	12.466	.114
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	4.663	-.063	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:army	74.987	.234
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	pol.sys.:army	12.552	-.087	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:experts	96.963	.208
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	pol.sys.:experts	4.447	-.040	pol.sys.:leader	<---	democracy better	8.128	.093
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	pol.sys.:leader	9.689	-.078	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	146.706	.333
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	pol.sys.:leader	12.011	.084	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:army	4.427	.049
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	democracy better	144.622	.345	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:leader	7.944	.067
pol.sys.:army	<---	outcome: order	5.085	.054					

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>HUNGARY</b>	433.394	20	.126	.047	.811	.736

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader	<--- Support	1.410	.180	7.823	***	.333
pol.sys.:experts	<--- Support	.257	.115	2.235	.025	.069
pol.sys.:army	<--- Support	.817	.117	6.979	***	.271
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- Support	1.081	.146	7.416	***	.301
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- Support	2.882	.284	10.138	***	.760
outcome: order	<--- Support	2.901	.286	10.158	***	.772
outcome: economy	<--- Support	2.926	.287	10.185	***	.790
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.306

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.045	.009	5.184	***
e1	.437	.017	25.071	***
e2	.720	.029	24.958	***
e3	.621	.024	25.587	***
e4	.379	.015	25.197	***
e5	.529	.021	25.090	***
e6	.274	.015	17.956	***
e7	.259	.015	17.360	***
e8	.233	.014	16.327	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecisi3n	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.471	.000						
outcome: indecisi3n	.083	1.259	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	1.152	-1.619	-2.276	.000				
pol.sys.: army	.188	-.279	-2.758	1.939	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-.388	1.047	.985	-6.207	-2.009	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-.096	-.650	-1.588	2.534	9.719	1.455	.000	
democracy better	1.419	-1.903	-2.435	11.201	3.107	-2.549	1.876	.000

Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	5.182	.047	pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	4.142	.046
outcome: economy	<---	democracy better	7.876	.064	pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:experts	4.417	-.046
outcome: order	<---	outcome: indecision	7.019	.053	pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:leader	104.201	.194
outcome: order	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	9.097	-.064	pol.sys.:army	<---	democracy better	10.633	.080
outcome: order	<---	democracy better	12.583	-.083	pol.sys.:experts	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	38.758	-.178
outcome: indecision	<---	outcome: order	6.579	.053	pol.sys.:experts	<---	pol.sys.:army	4.059	-.069
outcome: indecision	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	16.827	-.089	pol.sys.:experts	<---	democracy better	6.538	-.080
outcome: indecision	<---	pol.sys.:army	24.475	-.127	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	7.451	.085
outcome: indecision	<---	pol.sys.:leader	8.278	-.053	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:army	109.439	.387
outcome: indecision	<---	democracy better	19.285	-.104	pol.sys.:leader	<---	democracy better	4.089	.069
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	outcome: indecision	6.100	-.062	democracy better	<---	outcome: order	4.292	-.048
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	pol.sys.:army	4.234	.065	democracy better	<---	outcome: indecision	7.019	-.061
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	pol.sys.:experts	43.119	-.168	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	142.101	.288
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	pol.sys.:leader	7.254	.061	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:army	10.914	.095
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	democracy better	141.546	.347	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:experts	7.302	-.063
pol.sys.:army	<---	outcome: indecision	8.678	-.063					

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>ICELAND</b>	144.327	20	.098	.024	.837	.772

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader <--- Support	1.031	.146	7.069	***	.380
pol.sys.:experts <--- Support	.647	.132	4.915	***	.241
pol.sys.:army <--- Support	.309	.059	5.260	***	.261
pol.sys.:democracy <--- Support	1.045	.121	8.607	***	.516
outcome: indecision <--- Support	1.319	.143	9.239	***	.591
outcome: order <--- Support	1.280	.132	9.700	***	.665
outcome: economy <--- Support	1.140	.120	9.496	***	.629
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.482

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.079	.014	5.600	***
e1	.260	.016	16.107	***
e2	.496	.029	16.939	***
e3	.534	.030	17.597	***
e4	.103	.006	17.528	***
e5	.237	.015	15.731	***
e6	.255	.017	14.623	***
e7	.162	.012	13.004	***
e8	.156	.011	13.876	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	.730	.000						
outcome: indecision	.588	2.011	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-1.248	-1.154	-1.205	.000				
pol.sys.: army	.131	-.403	-2.102	.419	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	.135	-2.339	.055	-.198	.839	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-.908	-1.810	-.650	2.753	3.747	3.667	.000	
democracy better	-.382	-.580	-2.254	4.105	.159	1.435	-.250	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: order	<--- outcome: indecision	10.480	.092	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	15.495	.066
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:experts	12.600	-.084	pol.sys.:experts	<--- outcome: order	6.052	-.132
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:leader	7.822	-.065	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	14.622	.146
outcome: indecision	<--- outcome: order	8.303	.114	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: order	4.253	-.108
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:army	8.044	-.182	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	9.605	.154
outcome: indecision	<--- democracy better	9.772	-.115	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	17.302	.354
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	11.800	.091	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	16.550	.153
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	26.827	.179	democracy better	<--- outcome: indecision	7.748	-.093
pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: indecision	4.943	-.045	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	25.229	.184

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>IRELAND</b>	311.967	20	.165	.078	.793	.710

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader <--- Support	.695	.097	7.160	***	.346
pol.sys.:experts <--- Support	.604	.101	5.979	***	.285
pol.sys.:army <--- Support	.520	.070	7.469	***	.362
pol.sys.:democracy <--- Support	1.039	.091	11.392	***	.590
outcome: indecision <--- Support	1.184	.088	13.497	***	.741
outcome: order <--- Support	1.285	.089	14.360	***	.820
outcome: economy <--- Support	1.135	.082	13.780	***	.765
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.620

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.241	.032	7.479	***
e1	.386	.026	14.738	***
e2	.858	.053	16.056	***
e3	.994	.061	16.182	***
e4	.432	.027	16.016	***
e5	.486	.032	14.982	***
e6	.277	.021	13.081	***
e7	.193	.018	10.775	***
e8	.221	.018	12.542	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	.120	.000						
outcome: indecision	1.567	.769	.000					
pol.sys.:democracy	-.930	-.646	-1.800	.000				
pol.sys.:army	-1.193	.071	-1.543	.003	.000			
pol.sys.:experts	-.509	-.622	-1.155	.179	2.055	.000		
pol.sys.:leader	-.519	-.853	-2.355	1.408	4.975	8.070	.000	
democracy better	-1.348	-.507	-1.630	5.860	2.038	.285	1.261	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: indecision	9.704	.090	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	29.558	.158
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:army	4.582	-.068	pol.sys.:army	<--- democracy better	5.130	.082
outcome: economy	<--- democracy better	6.657	-.073	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:army	4.703	.133
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- outcome: economy	8.657	.100	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	72.470	.373
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	10.303	-.092	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: indecision	6.840	-.134
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:army	6.807	-.092	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	29.109	.308
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:leader	15.767	-.100	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	76.130	.338
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- democracy better	8.584	-.092	democracy better	<--- outcome: indecision	5.721	-.085
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: indecision	6.402	-.101	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	69.271	.270
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	64.580	.317	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:army	7.761	.111
pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:experts	5.017	.062				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>ITALY</b>	266.661	20	.108	.028	.846	.784

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader	<--- Support	1.641	.140	11.682	***	.545
pol.sys.:experts	<--- Support	.933	.128	7.301	***	.279
pol.sys.:army	<--- Support	.918	.088	10.398	***	.448
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- Support	1.048	.092	11.365	***	.518
outcome: indecision	<--- Support	1.635	.133	12.287	***	.601
outcome: order	<--- Support	1.613	.127	12.743	***	.651
outcome: economy	<--- Support	1.501	.119	12.663	***	.642
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.480

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
Support	.078	.011	7.321	***	
e1	.260	.012	21.062	***	
e2	.497	.025	20.218	***	
e3	.803	.036	22.527	***	
e4	.261	.012	21.390	***	
e5	.233	.011	20.592	***	
e6	.368	.019	19.227	***	
e7	.275	.015	18.035	***	
e8	.250	.014	18.289	***	

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	.017	.000						
outcome: indecision	.061	.021	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-.027	-.012	-.038	.000				
pol.sys.: army	-.022	-.005	-.045	.019	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-.020	-.022	.002	.003	.016	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-.034	-.012	.000	.022	.047	<u>.069</u>	.000	
democracy better	-.009	-.015	-.041	.068	.028	-.015	-.017	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: indecision	32.603	.126	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: economy	5.112	-.056
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	11.202	-.099	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: indecision	15.219	-.083
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:army	7.779	-.082	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	4.711	.062
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	8.385	-.058	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	13.530	.070
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- outcome: economy	28.957	.164	pol.sys.:army	<--- democracy better	9.971	.087
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	15.156	-.137	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	9.065	.099
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:army	20.571	-.158	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: economy	6.525	-.089
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- democracy better	16.594	-.139	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	16.024	.159
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: economy	8.274	-.068	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	12.883	.087
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: indecision	12.603	-.072	democracy better	<--- outcome: indecision	12.893	-.076
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:army	5.296	.062	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	63.062	.228
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	67.495	.218	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:army	10.472	.092

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>KOSOVO</b>	324.637	20	.111	.052	.805	.860

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader	<--- Support	4.479	1.520	2.947	.003	.282
pol.sys.:experts	<--- Support	2.671	.922	2.898	.004	.244
pol.sys.:army	<--- Support	2.430	.860	2.826	.005	.207
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- Support	2.334	.807	2.893	.004	.241
outcome: indecision	<--- Support	9.311	3.015	3.088	.002	.874
outcome: order	<--- Support	9.348	3.030	3.085	.002	.786
outcome: economy	<--- Support	8.185	2.654	3.084	.002	.762
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.094



Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.006	.004	1.545	.122
e1	.632	.025	24.896	***
e2	1.301	.053	24.596	***
e3	.632	.026	24.686	***
e4	.742	.030	24.758	***
e5	.495	.020	24.692	***
e6	.150	.013	11.431	***
e7	.303	.017	17.681	***
e8	.273	.014	18.926	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.484	.000						
outcome: indecision	-.081	.324	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	2.391	-1.272	-.577	.000				
pol.sys.: army	2.900	-1.174	-1.135	2.534	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	1.019	-.509	-.462	-4.115	9.809	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	.827	.199	-.441	2.526	-3.776	-.376	.000	
democracy better	-2.775	2.372	.304	2.008	-6.698	<u>-.146</u>	-.050	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	17.252	.094	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	6.763	.088
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:army	25.146	.093	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:experts	101.384	.301
outcome: economy	<--- democracy better	22.589	-.098	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	15.039	-.080
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	5.600	-.058	pol.sys.:army	<--- democracy better	47.175	-.211
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:army	4.726	-.044	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	18.223	-.133
outcome: order	<--- democracy better	18.902	.096	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:army	103.458	.262
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:army	9.937	-.052	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	7.049	.119
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: economy	6.330	.063	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	15.730	-.147
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:army	6.889	.060	democracy better	<--- outcome: economy	7.819	-.078
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	18.190	-.104	democracy better	<--- outcome: order	5.712	.061
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	6.865	.044	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	4.073	.063
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	4.317	.052	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:army	45.339	-.173
pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: economy	9.057	.092				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>LATVIA</b>	317.887	20	.125	.044	.726	.617

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader <--- Support	.785	.210	3.733	***	.159
pol.sys.:experts <--- Support	.615	.183	3.352	***	.139
pol.sys.:army <--- Support	.877	.191	4.583	***	.212
pol.sys.:democracy <--- Support	1.377	.234	5.891	***	.339
outcome: indecision <--- Support	2.673	.379	7.050	***	.652
outcome: order <--- Support	3.063	.429	7.140	***	.758
outcome: economy <--- Support	2.557	.362	7.062	***	.661
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.270

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.031	.008	3.690	***
e1	.392	.018	21.203	***
e2	.735	.034	21.570	***
e3	.595	.028	21.614	***
e4	.505	.024	21.424	***
e5	.452	.022	20.847	***
e6	.299	.018	16.220	***
e7	.214	.018	11.817	***
e8	.261	.016	15.928	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.089	.000						
outcome: indecision	.818	.607	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-.387	-1.050	-1.689	.000				
pol.sys.: army	.918	-.240	-3.131	2.030	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-1.082	-.555	.924	.580	3.056	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-.982	-.697	-.855	2.519	3.933	4.221	.000	
democracy better	-1.934	.037	-2.966	11.656	3.692	-1.275	3.248	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- democracy better	8.414	-.082	pol.sys.:army	<--- democracy better	14.481	.136
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	4.091	-.052	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:army	9.573	.107
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	6.327	-.069	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	18.264	.124
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- pol.sys.:army	21.126	-.124	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	6.567	.100
outcome: indecisi3n	<--- democracy better	19.179	-.132	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	15.985	.154
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:army	4.831	.067	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	18.405	.154
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	7.417	.070	pol.sys.:leader	<--- democracy better	10.908	.142
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	159.734	.432	democracy better	<--- outcome: economy	4.245	-.062
pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: indecision	10.583	-.105	democracy better	<--- outcome: indecision	9.976	-.090
pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	4.388	.068	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	150.654	.353
pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:experts	9.896	.094	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:army	15.037	.110
pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	16.399	.108	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:leader	11.619	.081

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>LITHUANIA</b>	348.470	20	.150	.051	.778	.689

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader <--- Support	.947	.177	5.340	***	.243
pol.sys.:experts <--- Support	.768	.150	5.104	***	.229
pol.sys.:army <--- Support	.878	.136	6.477	***	.315
pol.sys.:democracy <--- Support	1.607	.183	8.776	***	.545
outcome: indecision <--- Support	2.086	.219	9.545	***	.688
outcome: order <--- Support	2.371	.239	9.926	***	.808
outcome: economy <--- Support	2.165	.219	9.887	***	.790
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.393

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.057	.011	5.080	***
e1	.313	.017	18.464	***
e2	.817	.043	18.903	***
e3	.606	.032	18.929	***
e4	.398	.021	18.728	***
e5	.349	.020	17.568	***
e6	.277	.018	15.727	***
e7	.171	.014	11.854	***
e8	.161	.013	12.632	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.156	.000						
outcome: indecision	1.618	.029	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-.824	.480	-1.792	.000				
pol.sys.: army	-.353	-.924	-2.736	2.523	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-.578	-.699	1.369	-2.699	4.952	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-.844	.431	.309	-2.264	3.536	6.669	.000	
democracy better	-1.621	.683	-3.951	7.413	5.416	-.598	-1.525	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy <---	outcome: indecision	12.274	.084	pol.sys.:army <---	pol.sys.:democracy	7.406	.091
outcome: economy <---	democracy better	10.427	-.092	pol.sys.:army <---	pol.sys.:experts	27.860	.155
outcome: indecision <---	outcome: economy	7.513	.088	pol.sys.:army <---	pol.sys.:leader	14.218	.095
outcome: indecision <---	pol.sys.:democracy	8.114	-.085	pol.sys.:army <---	democracy better	33.661	.224
outcome: indecision <---	pol.sys.:army	17.372	-.132	pol.sys.:experts <---	pol.sys.:democracy	7.880	-.115
outcome: indecision <---	pol.sys.:experts	4.260	.054	pol.sys.:experts <---	pol.sys.:army	26.248	.223
outcome: indecision <---	democracy better	37.116	-.210	pol.sys.:experts <---	pol.sys.:leader	47.507	.214
pol.sys.:democracy <---	outcome: indecision	5.585	-.074	pol.sys.:leader <---	pol.sys.:democracy	5.596	-.113
pol.sys.:democracy <---	pol.sys.:army	9.994	.107	pol.sys.:leader <---	pol.sys.:army	13.500	.186
pol.sys.:democracy <---	pol.sys.:experts	11.287	-.095	pol.sys.:leader <---	pol.sys.:experts	47.882	.291
pol.sys.:democracy <---	pol.sys.:leader	7.953	-.068	democracy better <---	outcome: indecision	20.395	-.131
pol.sys.:democracy <---	democracy better	87.658	.348	democracy better <---	pol.sys.:democracy	69.975	.249
pol.sys.:army <---	outcome: indecision	8.861	-.097	democracy better <---	pol.sys.:army	36.262	.190

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>LUXEMBOURG</b>	480.516	20	.139	.057	.719	.607

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader <---	Support	1.423	.189	7.533	***	.323
pol.sys.:experts <---	Support	1.032	.158	6.528	***	.259
pol.sys.:army <---	Support	.780	.103	7.609	***	.328
pol.sys.:democracy <---	Support	1.356	.153	8.850	***	.439
outcome: indecision <---	Support	2.188	.222	9.876	***	.592
outcome: order <---	Support	2.625	.254	10.346	***	.737
outcome: economy <---	Support	2.259	.222	10.171	***	.664
democracy better <---	Support	1.000				.352

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.053	.010	5.470	***
e1	.375	.016	23.304	***
e2	.925	.039	23.500	***
e3	.786	.033	23.842	***
e4	.268	.011	23.466	***
e5	.408	.018	22.542	***
e6	.472	.023	20.123	***
e7	.308	.021	14.957	***
e8	.344	.019	18.028	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	.600	.000						
outcome: indecision	2.564	1.007	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-.881	-.995	-3.368	.000				
pol.sys.: army	-2.058	-.161	-3.870	3.137	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-2.200	-1.487	1.278	-.379	3.366	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-3.505	.292	-1.525	1.230	4.949	8.321	.000	
democracy better	-.965	-2.048	-3.638	10.898	4.691	-.329	.888	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy <---	outcome: indecision	16.701	.090	pol.sys.:army <---	outcome: indecision	17.936	-.076
outcome: economy <---	pol.sys.:army	9.758	-.108	pol.sys.:army <---	pol.sys.:democracy	11.595	.073
outcome: economy <---	pol.sys.:experts	10.961	-.068	pol.sys.:army <---	pol.sys.:experts	13.169	.060
outcome: economy <---	pol.sys.:leader	28.280	-.099	pol.sys.:army <---	pol.sys.:leader	28.583	.080
outcome: order <---	pol.sys.:experts	6.984	-.055	pol.sys.:army <---	democracy better	25.735	.118
outcome: order <---	democracy better	13.646	-.107	pol.sys.:experts <---	outcome: economy	5.432	-.077
outcome: indecision <---	outcome: economy	13.398	.100	pol.sys.:experts <---	pol.sys.:army	12.446	.167
outcome: indecision <---	pol.sys.:democracy	21.375	-.139	pol.sys.:experts <---	pol.sys.:leader	76.037	.222
outcome: indecision <---	pol.sys.:army	27.438	-.204	pol.sys.:leader <---	outcome: economy	14.755	-.139
outcome: indecision <---	pol.sys.:leader	4.254	-.043	pol.sys.:leader <---	pol.sys.:army	28.439	.275
outcome: indecision <---	democracy better	24.374	-.161	pol.sys.:leader <---	pol.sys.:experts	80.045	.276
pol.sys.:democracy <---	outcome: indecision	15.910	-.089	democracy better <---	outcome: order	5.291	-.051
pol.sys.:democracy <---	pol.sys.:army	13.202	.127	democracy better <---	outcome: indecision	16.314	-.086
pol.sys.:democracy <---	democracy better	159.768	.369	democracy better <---	pol.sys.:democracy	143.673	.304
pol.sys.:army <---	outcome: economy	5.117	-.044	democracy better <---	pol.sys.:army	26.350	.169

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>MACEDONIA</b>	431.332	20	.144	.059	.755	.657

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader	<--- Support	1.331	.206	6.465	***	.298
pol.sys.:experts	<--- Support	1.686	.216	7.802	***	.434
pol.sys.:army	<--- Support	2.078	.258	8.045	***	.470
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- Support	.948	.146	6.499	***	.300
outcome: indecision	<--- Support	2.739	.302	9.081	***	.752
outcome: order	<--- Support	2.244	.260	8.647	***	.592
outcome: economy	<--- Support	2.645	.290	9.108	***	.771
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.323

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.048	.010	4.687	***
e1	.415	.019	21.619	***
e2	.882	.041	21.724	***
e3	.592	.028	20.986	***
e4	.736	.036	20.700	***
e5	.439	.020	21.713	***
e6	.278	.019	14.720	***
e7	.452	.023	19.259	***
e8	.231	.017	13.847	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.180	.000						
outcome: indecision	.600	.186	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	.317	-.067	-.258	.000				
pol.sys.: army	.265	1.017	-1.798	-3.075	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-.467	-2.060	-.477	-3.728	5.664	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-1.742	-.167	.028	-2.618	2.513	6.451	.000	
democracy better	-1.221	1.636	-.026	12.818	-2.984	-1.721	-1.755	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	11.037	-.061	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	8.749	.084
outcome: economy	<--- democracy better	5.468	-.062	pol.sys.:army	<--- democracy better	12.377	-.145
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:experts	7.777	-.074	pol.sys.:experts	<--- outcome: order	5.835	-.073
outcome: order	<--- democracy better	4.774	.072	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	18.241	-.154
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:army	11.231	-.067	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:army	43.116	.169
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:army	10.806	-.072	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	54.602	.188
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	15.842	-.099	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	7.726	-.121
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	7.743	-.060	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	7.201	.083
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	185.866	.426	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	47.321	.243
pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: indecision	4.944	-.078	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	189.462	.411
pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	13.102	-.146	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:army	10.406	-.069
pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:experts	45.400	.221				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>MALTA</b>	506.61	20	.162	.063	.795	.713

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader	<--- Support	1.798	.158	11.378	***	.529
pol.sys.:experts	<--- Support	1.382	.147	9.431	***	.396
pol.sys.:army	<--- Support	1.524	.130	11.761	***	.561
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- Support	.866	.094	9.244	***	.385
outcome: indecision	<--- Support	1.965	.143	13.728	***	.789
outcome: order	<--- Support	1.769	.132	13.349	***	.731
outcome: economy	<--- Support	1.748	.128	13.646	***	.775
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.474

Variaciones	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.078	.011	7.118	***
e1	.270	.013	20.476	***
e2	.651	.032	20.103	***
e3	.803	.038	20.868	***
e4	.396	.020	19.835	***
e5	.337	.016	20.912	***
e6	.184	.012	15.209	***
e7	.214	.012	17.165	***
e8	.159	.010	15.760	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	.241	.000						
outcome: indecision	2.073	.125	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	.007	-1.125	-.987	.000				
pol.sys.: army	-1.906	.233	-2.017	1.856	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-2.031	-1.422	-.787	-3.425	4.217	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-1.920	-.290	-1.810	-1.271	4.733	9.581	.000	
democracy better	-1.981	.630	-1.289	8.043	2.733	-1.592	.888	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: indecision	18.998	.093	pol.sys.: army	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	5.646	.081
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.: army	13.897	-.073	pol.sys.: army	<--- pol.sys.: experts	29.210	.118
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.: experts	14.530	-.058	pol.sys.: army	<--- pol.sys.: leader	38.157	.139
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.: leader	13.859	-.058	pol.sys.: army	<--- democracy better	12.523	.128
outcome: economy	<--- democracy better	14.335	-.095	pol.sys.: experts	<--- outcome: economy	5.508	-.111
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.: experts	5.661	-.041	pol.sys.: experts	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	14.639	-.181
outcome: indecision	<--- outcome: economy	20.658	.116	pol.sys.: experts	<--- pol.sys.: army	22.763	.187
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.: army	17.017	-.088	pol.sys.: experts	<--- pol.sys.: leader	116.901	.339
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.: leader	13.455	-.062	pol.sys.: leader	<--- outcome: economy	6.347	-.109
outcome: indecision	<--- democracy better	6.626	-.070	pol.sys.: leader	<--- outcome: indecision	5.666	-.093
pol.sys.: democracy	<--- pol.sys.: army	4.348	.053	pol.sys.: leader	<--- pol.sys.: army	35.917	.215
pol.sys.: democracy	<--- pol.sys.: experts	14.467	-.075	pol.sys.: leader	<--- pol.sys.: experts	141.203	.332
pol.sys.: democracy	<--- democracy better	80.579	.293	democracy better	<--- outcome: economy	6.006	-.068
pol.sys.: army	<--- outcome: economy	6.761	-.088	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.: democracy	90.109	.263
pol.sys.: army	<--- outcome: indecision	7.614	-.085	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.: army	10.785	.075

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>MOLDOVA</b>	447.824	20	.147	.069	.687	.561

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.: leader	<--- Support	4.215	2.014	2.093	.036	.343
pol.sys.: experts	<--- Support	3.469	1.686	2.057	.040	.261
pol.sys.: army	<--- Support	3.716	1.817	2.046	.041	.244
pol.sys.: democracy	<--- Support	1.259	.739	1.704	.088	.101
outcome: indecision	<--- Support	10.014	4.696	2.133	.033	.729
outcome: order	<--- Support	9.558	4.485	2.131	.033	.677
outcome: economy	<--- Support	10.231	4.796	2.133	.033	.750
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.077

Variaciones	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.004	.004	1.069	.285
e1	.685	.031	22.211	***
e2	.543	.025	21.407	***
e3	.668	.031	21.788	***
e4	.885	.040	21.849	***
e5	.627	.028	22.184	***
e6	.360	.025	14.519	***
e7	.439	.026	16.582	***
e8	.331	.024	13.540	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.251	.000						
outcome: indecision	.236	.228	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	1.513	1.386	-1.690	.000				
pol.sys.: army	.491	.711	-1.878	1.483	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	-1.085	-1.349	1.187	-6.447	.886	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	-.001	.082	-.944	-3.829	1.671	5.745	.000	
democracy better	-.522	1.413	-.908	15.650	2.052	-1.111	-3.282	.000

Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<---	pol.sys.: democracy	7.328	.073	pol.sys.: army	<---	democracy better	4.543	.077
outcome: order	<---	pol.sys.: democracy	4.375	.061	pol.sys.: experts	<---	pol.sys.: democracy	45.368	-.222
outcome: order	<---	pol.sys.: experts	4.258	-.057	pol.sys.: experts	<---	pol.sys.: leader	36.286	.201
outcome: order	<---	democracy better	4.537	.060	pol.sys.: leader	<---	pol.sys.: democracy	17.134	-.124
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	pol.sys.: democracy	8.155	-.079	pol.sys.: leader	<---	pol.sys.: experts	38.831	.175
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	pol.sys.: army	10.334	-.073	pol.sys.: leader	<---	democracy better	12.584	-.102
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	pol.sys.: experts	4.146	.053	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.: democracy	246.704	.519
pol.sys.: democracy	<---	pol.sys.: experts	42.118	-.193	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.: army	4.243	.056
pol.sys.: democracy	<---	pol.sys.: leader	14.864	-.124	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.: leader	10.860	-.111
pol.sys.: democracy	<---	democracy better	248.005	.478					

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>MONTENEGRO</b>	358.829	20	.129	.050	.848	.787

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight	
pol.sys.: leader	<---	Support	1.220	.197	6.204	***	.282
pol.sys.: experts	<---	Support	.585	.143	4.081	***	.152
pol.sys.: army	<---	Support	1.244	.193	6.433	***	.303
pol.sys.: democracy	<---	Support	1.298	.187	6.945	***	.357
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	Support	2.929	.341	8.584	***	.876
outcome: order	<---	Support	3.018	.353	8.538	***	.821
outcome: economy	<---	Support	2.516	.296	8.508	***	.795
democracy better	<---	Support	1.000				.280

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.043	.010	4.288	***
e1	.505	.023	22.316	***
e2	.738	.033	22.312	***
e3	.619	.027	22.501	***
e4	.658	.030	22.268	***
e5	.493	.022	22.130	***
e6	.111	.009	11.843	***
e7	.189	.012	15.639	***
e8	.158	.009	16.919	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.460	.000						
outcome: indecisi3n	.443	.053	.000					
pol.sys.: democracy	-1.008	.868	-.705	.000				
pol.sys.: army	.490	.541	-.879	-2.131	.000			
pol.sys.: experts	.233	-.595	.201	-2.324	-.306	.000		
pol.sys.: leader	.692	-.283	-.975	.178	5.168	5.676	.000	
democracy better	-2.067	1.821	-1.444	12.447	.882	-1.480	.965	.000

Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<---	democracy better	15.302	-.074	pol.sys.: army	<---	pol.sys.: democracy	5.116	-.077
outcome: order	<---	democracy better	14.119	.079	pol.sys.: army	<---	pol.sys.: leader	29.973	.156
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	pol.sys.: army	5.804	-.038	pol.sys.: experts	<---	pol.sys.: democracy	5.560	-.077
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	pol.sys.: leader	7.079	-.040	pol.sys.: experts	<---	pol.sys.: leader	33.130	.159
outcome: indecisi3n	<---	democracy better	15.507	-.071	pol.sys.: leader	<---	pol.sys.: army	29.534	.173
pol.sys.: democracy	<---	pol.sys.: army	5.358	-.060	pol.sys.: leader	<---	pol.sys.: experts	35.428	.202
pol.sys.: democracy	<---	pol.sys.: experts	6.319	-.070	democracy better	<---	outcome: economy	4.917	-.076
pol.sys.: democracy	<---	democracy better	182.535	.405	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.: democracy	171.489	.389

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>NETHERLANDS</b>	399.928	20	.124	.042	.744	.641

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader	<--- Support	1.531	.156	9.807	***	.428
pol.sys.:experts	<--- Support	1.093	.123	8.894	***	.366
pol.sys.:army	<--- Support	.757	.082	9.219	***	.387
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- Support	1.174	.112	10.504	***	.485
outcome: indecision	<--- Support	1.524	.134	11.339	***	.574
outcome: order	<--- Support	1.349	.117	11.529	***	.600
outcome: economy	<--- Support	1.077	.099	10.907	***	.524
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.436

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.073	.011	6.796	***
e1	.311	.014	22.584	***
e2	.763	.034	22.690	***
e3	.564	.024	23.389	***
e4	.238	.010	23.176	***
e5	.327	.015	21.846	***
e6	.346	.017	19.998	***
e7	.237	.012	19.290	***
e8	.223	.011	21.130	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	.956	.000						
outcome: indecision	.860	3.764	.000					
pol.sys.:democracy	.501	-1.905	-1.401	.000				
pol.sys.:army	1.323	-1.844	-3.474	.897	.000			
pol.sys.:experts	-3.060	-.815	.502	-3.660	2.821	.000		
pol.sys.:leader	-1.724	-.496	-1.923	-1.546	3.514	8.140	.000	
democracy better	-.737	-2.495	-1.825	8.556	.349	-1.206	-1.178	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	15.006	-.068	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: indecision	15.670	-.078
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	4.822	-.032	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:experts	10.043	.056
outcome: order	<--- outcome: indecision	29.425	.114	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	15.704	.058
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	7.313	-.062	pol.sys.:experts	<--- outcome: economy	11.725	-.135
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:army	6.652	-.073	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	16.685	-.136
outcome: order	<--- democracy better	12.355	-.085	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:army	9.799	.129
outcome: indecision	<--- outcome: order	27.447	.155	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	81.971	.204
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:army	21.933	-.159	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: economy	4.080	-.093
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:leader	6.796	-.048	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: indecision	5.130	-.081
outcome: indecision	<--- democracy better	6.128	-.072	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	16.593	.197
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: order	5.645	-.066	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	88.776	.299
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	19.810	-.094	democracy better	<--- outcome: order	8.803	-.080
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	109.660	.287	democracy better	<--- outcome: indecision	4.681	-.049
pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: order	4.433	-.045	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	101.212	.252

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>NORTH CYPRUS</b>	128.449	20	.127	.052	.735	.630

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader	<--- Support	1.233	.701	1.758	.079	.142
pol.sys.:experts	<--- Support	.536	.494	1.087	.277	.073
pol.sys.:army	<--- Support	2.167	.944	2.294	.022	.266
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- Support	1.763	.793	2.223	.026	.240
outcome: indecision	<--- Support	5.125	1.951	2.627	.009	.670
outcome: order	<--- Support	5.764	2.183	2.640	.008	.789
outcome: economy	<--- Support	4.745	1.801	2.634	.008	.717
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.163

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.011	.008	1.332	.183
e1	.385	.030	12.827	***
e2	.772	.060	12.851	***
e3	.562	.044	12.904	***
e4	.649	.051	12.656	***
e5	.537	.042	12.710	***
e6	.339	.035	9.819	***
e7	.211	.032	6.657	***
e8	.224	.026	8.759	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.: democracy	pol.sys.: army	pol.sys.: experts	pol.sys.: leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.344	.000						
outcome: indecision	.883	-.059	.000					
pol.sys.:democracy	-.076	.345	-1.361	.000				
pol.sys.:army	-.202	.761	-1.645	.420	.000			
pol.sys.:experts	-.937	.282	1.147	-1.366	-.184	.000		
pol.sys.:leader	-.465	.845	-1.719	1.360	2.665	4.163	.000	
democracy better	-.877	1.230	-1.831	4.986	1.346	-4.834	-2.438	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: order	<--- democracy better	6.282	.124	pol.sys.:experts	<--- democracy better	23.527	-.317
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	4.165	-.095	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	7.290	.156
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:army	6.123	-.104	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	17.769	.270
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:leader	6.538	-.101	pol.sys.:leader	<--- democracy better	6.097	-.189
outcome: indecision	<--- democracy better	7.441	-.152	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	25.729	.229
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	26.761	.332	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:experts	24.153	-.222
pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	7.777	.140	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:leader	6.145	-.095
pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	17.446	.193				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>NORTH IRELAND</b>	167.820	20	.171	.079	.667	.534

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader	<--- Support	1.228	.353	3.479	***	.303
pol.sys.:experts	<--- Support	1.015	.321	3.167	.002	.264
pol.sys.:army	<--- Support	.679	.228	2.972	.003	.242
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- Support	1.411	.356	3.961	***	.376
outcome: indecision	<--- Support	2.080	.415	5.015	***	.678
outcome: order	<--- Support	2.216	.434	5.108	***	.737
outcome: economy	<--- Support	2.218	.431	5.146	***	.774
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.363

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.052	.019	2.671	.008
e1	.344	.032	10.805	***
e2	.778	.071	10.946	***
e3	.717	.065	11.018	***
e4	.386	.035	11.054	***
e5	.631	.059	10.769	***
e6	.265	.030	8.763	***
e7	.215	.028	7.705	***
e8	.172	.025	6.863	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.:democracy	pol.sys.:army	pol.sys.:experts	pol.sys.:leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	-.067	.000						
outcome: indecision	.662	.525	.000					
pol.sys.:democracy	-.340	.051	-1.241	.000				
pol.sys.:army	-.634	-.079	-1.389	.661	.000			
pol.sys.:experts	.450	-1.711	-.996	-.987	3.304	.000		
pol.sys.:leader	-.440	-.892	-1.135	.527	2.743	7.219	.000	
democracy better	-1.086	.484	-1.840	5.066	2.364	.872	1.918	.000



Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>NORWAY</b>	350.598	20	.126	350.598	.799	.719

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader	<--- Support	1.315	.100	13.113	***	.543
pol.sys.:experts	<--- Support	.882	.092	9.573	***	.365
pol.sys.:army	<--- Support	.592	.055	10.684	***	.416
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- Support	1.109	.077	14.479	***	.632
outcome: indecision	<--- Support	1.335	.105	12.751	***	.522
outcome: order	<--- Support	1.473	.108	13.651	***	.576
outcome: economy	<--- Support	1.471	.108	13.649	***	.576
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.589

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.116	.013	9.116	***
e1	.219	.011	19.143	***
e2	.481	.024	19.925	***
e3	.589	.027	21.761	***
e4	.195	.009	21.378	***
e5	.216	.012	18.215	***
e6	.553	.027	20.226	***
e7	.510	.026	19.385	***
e8	.508	.026	19.387	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.:democracy	pol.sys.:army	pol.sys.:experts	pol.sys.:leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	3.466	.000						
outcome: indecision	4.165	4.124	.000					
pol.sys.:democracy	-1.265	-1.184	-2.550	.000				
pol.sys.:army	-1.536	-1.564	-2.033	-.065	.000			
pol.sys.:experts	-.900	-.622	.255	-2.502	2.004	.000		
pol.sys.:leader	-2.412	-1.620	-1.622	.317	3.064	5.832	.000	
democracy better	-1.814	-2.658	-2.543	5.232	1.116	-1.901	.438	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: order	22.508	.128	pol.sys.:army	<--- outcome: indecision	5.498	-.038
outcome: economy	<--- outcome: indecision	31.936	.152	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:experts	5.222	.039
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:army	4.213	-.099	pol.sys.:army	<--- pol.sys.:leader	12.533	.060
outcome: economy	<--- pol.sys.:leader	10.780	-.093	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	7.884	-.113
outcome: economy	<--- democracy better	6.195	-.101	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:army	4.916	.111
outcome: order	<--- outcome: economy	22.514	.128	pol.sys.:experts	<--- pol.sys.:leader	42.278	.191
outcome: order	<--- outcome: indecision	31.325	.151	pol.sys.:experts	<--- democracy better	4.521	-.089
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:army	4.366	-.101	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: economy	10.024	-.082
outcome: order	<--- pol.sys.:leader	4.868	-.063	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: order	4.525	-.055
outcome: order	<--- democracy better	13.303	-.148	pol.sys.:leader	<--- outcome: indecision	4.463	-.055
outcome: indecision	<--- outcome: economy	28.478	.148	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:army	15.486	.183
outcome: indecision	<--- outcome: order	27.925	.146	pol.sys.:leader	<--- pol.sys.:experts	55.494	.204
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	10.852	-.133	democracy better	<--- outcome: economy	6.398	-.045
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:army	6.514	-.127	democracy better	<--- outcome: order	13.735	-.066
outcome: indecision	<--- pol.sys.:leader	4.280	-.060	democracy better	<--- outcome: indecision	12.337	-.062
outcome: indecision	<--- democracy better	10.652	-.136	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:democracy	54.328	.191
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- outcome: indecision	14.153	-.068	democracy better	<--- pol.sys.:experts	6.591	-.048
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- pol.sys.:experts	12.942	-.068				
pol.sys.:democracy	<--- democracy better	61.174	.211				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>POLAND</b>	366.826	20	.128	.044	.747	.645

Regression Weights			Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader	<---	Support	1.180	.169	6.982	***	.312
pol.sys.:experts	<---	Support	-.218	.131	-1.671	.095	-.059
pol.sys.:army	<---	Support	.865	.143	6.054	***	.252
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	Support	1.297	.160	8.107	***	.409
outcome: indecision	<---	Support	2.175	.231	9.433	***	.611
outcome: order	<---	Support	2.750	.280	9.812	***	.743
outcome: economy	<---	Support	2.437	.250	9.738	***	.703
democracy better	<---	Support	1.000				.351

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.046	.009	5.169	***
e1	.324	.015	22.016	***
e2	.589	.026	22.250	***
e3	.617	.027	22.976	***
e4	.505	.022	22.531	***
e5	.381	.018	21.588	***
e6	.362	.019	18.687	***
e7	.279	.020	13.926	***
e8	.278	.018	15.728	***

St. residuals	outcome: economy	outcome: order	outcome: indecision	pol.sys.:democracy	pol.sys.:army	pol.sys.:experts	pol.sys.:leader	democracy better
outcome: economy	.000							
outcome: order	.467	.000						
outcome: indecision	.060	1.731	.000					
pol.sys.:democracy	-1.540	-.946	-1.238	.000				
pol.sys.:army	.699	-2.029	-3.615	2.066	.000			
pol.sys.:experts	-1.054	-.101	.765	-.924	1.433	.000		
pol.sys.:leader	.234	-2.070	-1.919	1.932	9.526	2.018	.000	
democracy better	-1.181	-1.971	-2.239	9.442	4.407	.642	4.209	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change		
outcome: economy	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	6.545	-.070	pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:leader	99.023	.271
outcome: order	<---	outcome: indecision	11.298	.085	pol.sys.:army	<---	democracy better	21.230	.167
outcome: order	<---	pol.sys.:army	13.326	-.096	pol.sys.:experts	<---	pol.sys.:leader	4.093	.061
outcome: order	<---	pol.sys.:leader	14.122	-.089	pol.sys.:leader	<---	outcome: order	5.131	-.069
outcome: order	<---	democracy better	12.972	-.114	pol.sys.:leader	<---	outcome: indecision	4.335	-.065
outcome: indecision	<---	outcome: order	6.688	.065	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	4.309	.073
outcome: indecision	<---	pol.sys.:army	24.750	-.135	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:army	103.717	.331
outcome: indecision	<---	pol.sys.:leader	7.062	-.066	pol.sys.:leader	<---	pol.sys.:experts	4.629	.065
outcome: indecision	<---	democracy better	9.702	-.102	pol.sys.:leader	<---	democracy better	20.369	.178
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	pol.sys.:army	5.432	.062	democracy better	<---	outcome: order	4.893	-.050
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	pol.sys.:leader	4.779	.053	democracy better	<---	outcome: indecision	6.183	-.058
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	democracy better	114.650	.342	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	107.313	.272
pol.sys.:army	<---	outcome: order	4.623	-.060	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:army	23.085	.116
pol.sys.:army	<---	outcome: indecision	14.505	-.110	democracy better	<---	pol.sys.:leader	21.147	.101
pol.sys.:army	<---	pol.sys.:democracy	4.676	.070					

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>PORTUGAL</b>	415.234	20	.160	.057	.629	.481

Regression Weights			Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys.:leader	<---	Support	3.778	1.869	2.021	.043	.239
pol.sys.:experts	<---	Support	2.586	1.332	1.941	.052	.183
pol.sys.:army	<---	Support	4.227	2.055	2.057	.040	.283
pol.sys.:democracy	<---	Support	1.030	.705	1.461	.144	.081
outcome: indecision	<---	Support	9.591	4.490	2.136	.033	.710
outcome: order	<---	Support	10.067	4.712	2.137	.033	.715
outcome: economy	<---	Support	9.761	4.568	2.137	.033	.722
democracy better	<---	Support	1.000				.088

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.003	.003	1.072	.284
e1	.366	.019	19.652	***
e2	.665	.034	19.340	***
e3	.543	.028	19.493	***
e4	.579	.030	19.182	***
e5	.450	.023	19.659	***
e6	.256	.019	13.247	***
e7	.273	.021	13.031	***
e8	.247	.019	12.777	***

St. residuals	outcome:economy	outcome:order	outcome:indecision	pol.sys:democracy	pol.sys:army	pol.sys:experts	pol.sys:leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome:order	-.344	.000						
outcome:indecision	.073	.797	.000					
pol.sys:democracy	2.500	-1.994	-2.120	.000				
pol.sys:army	.709	-.223	-1.990	3.184	.000			
pol.sys:experts	-.266	-.006	-1.678	-1.955	2.530	.000		
pol.sys:leader	-.308	-1.503	-.385	1.574	4.333	9.155	.000	
democracy better	1.721	-.840	-2.419	13.412	3.450	-1.235	.693	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:democracy	17.455	.128	pol.sys:army	<---	outcome:indecision	4.570	-.082
outcome:economy	<--- democracy better	8.280	.098	pol.sys:army	<---	pol.sys:democracy	11.253	.138
outcome:order	<--- pol.sys:democracy	10.767	-.105	pol.sys:army	<---	pol.sys:experts	7.121	.098
outcome:order	<--- pol.sys:leader	6.278	-.064	pol.sys:army	<---	pol.sys:leader	20.927	.150
outcome:indecision	<--- pol.sys:democracy	11.863	-.106	pol.sys:army	<---	democracy better	13.213	.165
outcome:indecision	<--- pol.sys:army	10.831	-.086	pol.sys:experts	<---	pol.sys:army	6.696	.087
outcome:indecision	<--- pol.sys:experts	7.529	-.076	pol.sys:experts	<---	pol.sys:leader	87.587	.296
outcome:indecision	<--- democracy better	15.447	-.134	pol.sys:leader	<---	pol.sys:army	20.290	.167
pol.sys:democracy	<--- outcome:economy	6.321	.084	pol.sys:leader	<---	pol.sys:experts	90.316	.374
pol.sys:democracy	<--- outcome:order	4.022	-.065	democracy better	<---	outcome:indecision	5.931	-.074
pol.sys:democracy	<--- outcome:indecision	4.548	-.072	democracy better	<---	pol.sys:democracy	181.603	.435
pol.sys:democracy	<--- pol.sys:army	10.227	.097	democracy better	<---	pol.sys:army	12.023	.095
pol.sys:democracy	<--- democracy better	181.367	.535					

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>ROMANIA</b>	318.827	20	.123	.057	.742	.639

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader <--- Support	1.373	.364	3.768	***	.196
pol.sys:experts <--- Support	1.459	.372	3.921	***	.214
pol.sys:army <--- Support	2.652	.567	4.677	***	.374
pol.sys:democracy <--- Support	.510	.237	2.153	.031	.086
outcome:indecision <--- Support	4.360	.867	5.027	***	.643
outcome:order <--- Support	4.924	.974	5.058	***	.718
outcome:economy <--- Support	4.758	.940	5.063	***	.739
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.185

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.017	.007	2.569	.010
e1	.474	.022	22.029	***
e2	.789	.036	21.997	***
e3	.745	.034	21.943	***
e4	.728	.034	21.151	***
e5	.591	.027	22.221	***
e6	.452	.026	17.156	***
e7	.383	.027	14.351	***
e8	.315	.024	13.368	***

St. residuals	outcome:economy	outcome:order	outcome:indecision	pol.sys: democracy	pol.sys: army	pol.sys: experts	pol.sys: leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome:order	-.398	.000						
outcome:indecision	1.257	-.327	.000					
pol.sys:democracy	-.263	1.322	-2.124	.000				
pol.sys:army	-1.000	2.101	-2.602	.031	.000			
pol.sys:experts	-.472	-.570	.521	-3.048	.294	.000		
pol.sys:leader	-.343	-.047	-1.814	-3.665	4.911	6.518	.000	
democracy better	-1.077	1.092	-.690	11.600	1.732	<u>-.741</u>	-3.348	.000

Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change
outcome:economy	<--	outcome:indecision	5.950	.058	pol.sys:army	<--	outcome:indecision	8.653	-.093
outcome:order	<--	pol.sys:democracy	4.816	.064	pol.sys:army	<--	pol.sys:leader	29.291	.165
outcome:order	<--	pol.sys:army	13.002	.089	pol.sys:experts	<--	pol.sys:democracy	9.851	-.112
outcome:indecision	<--	pol.sys:democracy	9.246	-.092	pol.sys:experts	<--	pol.sys:leader	45.110	.204
outcome:indecision	<--	pol.sys:army	14.640	-.097	pol.sys:leader	<--	pol.sys:democracy	14.108	-.138
outcome:indecision	<--	pol.sys:leader	6.836	-.067	pol.sys:leader	<--	pol.sys:army	25.456	.155
pol.sys:democracy	<--	outcome:indecision	4.565	-.059	pol.sys:leader	<--	pol.sys:experts	44.687	.214
pol.sys:democracy	<--	pol.sys:experts	9.379	-.085	pol.sys:leader	<--	democracy better	11.781	-.139
pol.sys:democracy	<--	pol.sys:leader	13.560	-.099	democracy better	<--	pol.sys:democracy	140.532	.337
pol.sys:democracy	<--	democracy better	135.832	.406	democracy better	<--	pol.sys:leader	11.715	-.083
pol.sys:army	<--	outcome:order	5.718	.074					

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>RUSSIA</b>	201.681	20	.105	.042	.825	.756

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader <-- Support	.727	.125	5.835	***	.253
pol.sys:experts <-- Support	.280	.101	2.779	.005	.113
pol.sys:army <-- Support	.755	.112	6.716	***	.300
pol.sys:democracy <-- Support	1.127	.118	9.581	***	.499
outcome:indecision <-- Support	1.670	.149	11.230	***	.705
outcome:order <-- Support	1.496	.136	11.010	***	.664
outcome:economy <-- Support	1.316	.121	10.870	***	.643
democracy better <-- Support	1.000				.473

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.108	.017	6.269	***
e1	.376	.020	18.419	***
e2	.837	.042	19.801	***
e3	.658	.033	20.144	***
e4	.624	.032	19.610	***
e5	.414	.023	18.139	***
e6	.306	.022	13.904	***
e7	.308	.020	15.170	***
e8	.267	.017	15.729	***

St. residuals	outcome:economy	outcome:order	outcome:indecision	pol.sys: democracy	pol.sys: army	pol.sys: experts	pol.sys: leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome:order	-.102	.000						
outcome:indecision	.138	1.569	.000					
pol.sys:democracy	-.838	-.540	-1.767	.000				
pol.sys:army	1.444	-.805	-1.341	.617	.000			
pol.sys:experts	.642	-.399	-.725	-.931	4.680	.000		
pol.sys:leader	.184	-.874	-.336	-.237	5.141	2.668	.000	
democracy better	-.163	-2.142	-.541	6.749	-1.722	-1.402	-.849	.000

Modification indices				M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices				M.I.	Par Change
outcome:economy	<---	pol.sys:army	4.405	.050	pol.sys:army	<---	pol.sys:leader	29.905			
outcome:order	<---	outcome:indecision	6.573	.071	pol.sys:experts	<---	pol.sys:army	22.280			.162
outcome:order	<---	democracy better	11.044	-.103	pol.sys:experts	<---	pol.sys:leader	7.238			.081
outcome:indecision	<---	outcome:order	7.744	.083	pol.sys:leader	<---	pol.sys:army	28.862			.209
outcome:indecision	<---	pol.sys:democracy	9.063	-.089	pol.sys:leader	<---	pol.sys:experts	7.735			.110
outcome:indecision	<---	pol.sys:army	4.851	-.059	democracy better	<---	outcome:order	6.961			-.079
pol.sys:democracy	<---	outcome:indecision	5.070	-.068	democracy better	<---	pol.sys:democracy	66.450			.244
pol.sys:democracy	<---	democracy better	69.478	.281	democracy better	<---	pol.sys:army	4.179			-.055
pol.sys:army	<---	pol.sys:experts	24.670	.170							

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>SERBIA</b>	547.863	20	.158	.068	.765	.671

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader <--- Support	.676	.101	6.710	***	.243
pol.sys:experts <--- Support	.014	.075	.187	.852	.006
pol.sys:army <--- Support	.800	.107	7.446	***	.275
pol.sys:democracy <--- Support	.757	.082	9.178	***	.363
outcome:indecision <--- Support	1.833	.132	13.884	***	.829
outcome:order <--- Support	1.840	.134	13.723	***	.790
outcome:economy <--- Support	1.743	.128	13.645	***	.775
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.445

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.108	.015	7.074	***
e1	.436	.020	22.041	***
e2	.783	.034	22.766	***
e3	.543	.024	23.011	***
e4	.839	.037	22.690	***
e5	.406	.018	22.417	***
e6	.164	.012	13.811	***
e7	.219	.014	16.019	***
e8	.217	.013	16.735	***

St. residuals	outcome:economy	outcome:order	outcome:indecision	pol.sys:democracy	pol.sys:army	pol.sys:experts	pol.sys:leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome:order	-.599	.000						
outcome:indecision	.570	.389	.000					
pol.sys:democracy	-1.440	.434	-1.313	.000				
pol.sys:army	.756	-.078	-1.331	-1.768	.000			
pol.sys:experts	-.535	.317	.736	-7.398	3.983	.000		
pol.sys:leader	1.066	-.199	-1.637	-.457	9.972	9.114	.000	
democracy better	-.349	.021	-1.498	11.197	.782	-3.664	<u>-.150</u>	.000

Modification indices				M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices				M.I.	Par Change
outcome:economy	<---	pol.sys:democracy	7.160	-.063	pol.sys:experts	<---	pol.sys:democracy	54.735			-.245
outcome:indecision	<---	pol.sys:democracy	8.850	-.066	pol.sys:experts	<---	pol.sys:army	15.863			.095
outcome:indecision	<---	pol.sys:army	8.773	-.047	pol.sys:experts	<---	pol.sys:leader	83.071			.226
outcome:indecision	<---	pol.sys:leader	13.117	-.060	pol.sys:experts	<---	democracy better	13.425			-.113
outcome:indecision	<---	democracy better	11.986	-.071	pol.sys:leader	<---	pol.sys:army	107.113			.297
pol.sys:democracy	<---	pol.sys:experts	64.445	-.216	pol.sys:leader	<---	pol.sys:experts	89.079			.350
pol.sys:democracy	<---	democracy better	151.458	.331	democracy better	<---	pol.sys:democracy	166.305			.389
pol.sys:army	<---	pol.sys:experts	17.371	.160	democracy better	<---	pol.sys:experts	17.356			-.117
pol.sys:army	<---	pol.sys:leader	109.382	.325							

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>SLOVAKIA</b>	674.059	20	.185	.049	.657	.520

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader	<--- Support	.782	.098	7.940	***	.325
pol.sys:experts	<--- Support	.020	.083	.240	.810	.009
pol.sys:army	<--- Support	.304	.066	4.609	***	.172
pol.sys:democracy	<--- Support	.924	.095	9.760	***	.435
outcome:indecision	<--- Support	1.869	.146	12.812	***	.753
outcome:order	<--- Support	1.865	.147	12.724	***	.736
outcome:economy	<--- Support	1.625	.128	12.728	***	.737
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.462

Variiances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.093	.014	6.827	***
e1	.342	.017	20.478	***
e2	.480	.023	21.264	***
e3	.499	.023	21.863	***
e4	.281	.013	21.709	***
e5	.340	.016	20.674	***
e6	.247	.017	14.882	***
e7	.273	.018	15.575	***
e8	.206	.013	15.544	***

St. residuals	outcome:economy	outcome:order	outcome:indecision	pol.sys:democracy	pol.sys:army	pol.sys:experts	pol.sys:leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome:order	-.471	.000						
outcome:indecision	1.234	1.437	.000					
pol.sys:democracy	-1.219	-1.022	-2.812	.000				
pol.sys:army	-1.390	-.393	-3.642	4.212	.000			
pol.sys:experts	1.600	-.028	-.510	-.257	-.733	.000		
pol.sys:leader	.093	-1.847	-2.187	2.540	13.087	-2.615	.000	
democracy better	-1.145	-1.065	-2.981	12.118	3.846	-.730	5.283	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome:economy	<--- outcome:indecision	5.614	.052	pol.sys:democracy	<--- democracy better	197.091	.410
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:democracy	4.616	-.055	pol.sys:army	<--- outcome:indecision	13.982	-.085
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:army	5.531	-.073	pol.sys:army	<--- pol.sys:democracy	18.489	.114
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:experts	7.213	.063	pol.sys:army	<--- pol.sys:leader	178.071	.313
outcome:economy	<--- democracy better	4.118	-.051	pol.sys:army	<--- democracy better	15.431	.102
outcome:order	<--- outcome:indecision	7.575	.070	pol.sys:experts	<--- pol.sys:leader	6.838	-.082
outcome:order	<--- pol.sys:leader	10.120	-.083	pol.sys:leader	<--- outcome:order	4.127	-.060
outcome:indecision	<--- outcome:economy	6.114	.068	pol.sys:leader	<--- outcome:indecision	5.799	-.072
outcome:indecision	<--- outcome:order	8.284	.069	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:democracy	7.529	.096
outcome:indecision	<--- pol.sys:democracy	26.852	-.148	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:army	196.475	.591
outcome:indecision	<--- pol.sys:army	41.371	-.221	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:experts	7.819	-.090
outcome:indecision	<--- pol.sys:leader	15.551	-.100	pol.sys:leader	<--- democracy better	32.645	.196
outcome:indecision	<--- democracy better	30.548	-.155	democracy better	<--- outcome:indecision	13.346	-.094
pol.sys:democracy	<--- outcome:indecision	11.295	-.086	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:democracy	204.701	.429
pol.sys:democracy	<--- pol.sys:army	23.011	.172	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:army	19.948	.161
pol.sys:democracy	<--- pol.sys:leader	8.493	.077	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:leader	38.246	.164

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>SLOVENIA</b>	334.182	20	.120	.037	.723	.612

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader	<--- Support	1.625	.189	8.620	***	.408
pol.sys:experts	<--- Support	.309	.114	2.720	.007	.100
pol.sys:army	<--- Support	.608	.103	5.881	***	.236
pol.sys:democracy	<--- Support	1.219	.143	8.515	***	.399
outcome:indecision	<--- Support	1.676	.163	10.308	***	.604
outcome:order	<--- Support	1.711	.165	10.385	***	.620
outcome:economy	<--- Support	1.608	.157	10.237	***	.591
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.415

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.052	.009	5.994	***
e1	.248	.012	21.343	***
e2	.686	.032	21.436	***
e3	.490	.021	23.300	***
e4	.325	.014	22.824	***
e5	.405	.019	21.534	***
e6	.252	.014	17.618	***
e7	.243	.014	17.126	***
e8	.248	.014	17.996	***

St. residuals	outcome:economy	outcome:order	outcome:indecision	pol.sys:democracy	pol.sys:army	pol.sys:experts	pol.sys:leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome:order	.699	.000						
outcome:indecision	1.748	2.275	.000					
pol.sys:democracy	-1.748	-1.785	-2.489	.000				
pol.sys:army	-.990	-2.431	-2.333	1.864	.000			
pol.sys:experts	-1.349	.667	.139	-3.441	.027	.000		
pol.sys:leader	-1.163	-1.291	-2.083	2.717	7.492	4.287	.000	
democracy better	-1.341	-1.776	-2.504	8.757	2.095	-.088	<a href="#">1.675</a>	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome:economy	<--- outcome:indecision	6.291	.065	pol.sys:democracy	<--- pol.sys:leader	9.546	.067
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:democracy	5.893	-.057	pol.sys:democracy	<--- democracy better	99.243	.360
outcome:order	<--- outcome:indecision	11.734	.089	pol.sys:army	<--- outcome:order	6.505	-.071
outcome:order	<--- pol.sys:democracy	6.723	-.061	pol.sys:army	<--- outcome:indecision	5.984	-.067
outcome:order	<--- pol.sys:army	12.007	-.097	pol.sys:army	<--- pol.sys:leader	61.036	.150
outcome:order	<--- democracy better	6.689	-.078	pol.sys:army	<--- democracy better	4.772	.069
outcome:indecisión	<--- outcome:economy	6.528	.069	pol.sys:experts	<--- pol.sys:democracy	12.017	-.106
outcome:indecisión	<--- outcome:order	11.185	.089	pol.sys:experts	<--- pol.sys:leader	18.651	.101
outcome:indecisión	<--- pol.sys:democracy	12.422	-.085	pol.sys:leader	<--- outcome:indecision	5.864	-.099
outcome:indecisión	<--- pol.sys:army	10.528	-.092	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:democracy	9.654	.115
outcome:indecisión	<--- pol.sys:leader	8.726	-.054	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:army	72.154	.373
outcome:indecisión	<--- democracy better	12.628	-.108	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:experts	23.449	.178
pol.sys:democracy	<--- outcome:economy	4.063	-.065	democracy better	<--- outcome:order	4.331	-.051
pol.sys:democracy	<--- outcome:order	4.258	-.065	democracy better	<--- outcome:indecision	8.577	-.072
pol.sys:democracy	<--- outcome:indecision	8.254	-.090	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:democracy	101.446	.225
pol.sys:democracy	<--- pol.sys:army	4.413	.071	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:army	5.702	.063
pol.sys:democracy	<--- pol.sys:experts	14.939	-.109				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>SPAIN</b>	199.227	20	.094	.034	.805	.726

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader	<--- Support	1.585	.147	10.792	***	.545
pol.sys:experts	<--- Support	.942	.129	7.289	***	.306
pol.sys:army	<--- Support	.981	.093	10.579	***	.525
pol.sys:democracy	<--- Support	.992	.096	10.378	***	.507
outcome:indecision	<--- Support	.600	.106	5.651	***	.226
outcome:order	<--- Support	1.461	.133	10.967	***	.564
outcome:economy	<--- Support	.802	.111	7.208	***	.301
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.512

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
Support	.090	.013	7.136	***	
e1	.254	.013	18.903	***	
e2	.536	.029	18.188	***	
e3	.777	.036	21.512	***	
e4	.229	.012	18.644	***	
e5	.257	.014	19.007	***	
e6	.601	.027	22.012	***	
e7	.413	.023	17.738	***	
e8	.581	.027	21.544	***	

St. residuals	outcome:economy	outcome:order	outcome:indecision	pol.sys:democracy	pol.sys:army	pol.sys:experts	pol.sys:leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome:order	-.477	.000						
outcome:indecision	5.845		.000					
pol.sys:democracy	-.873	-.918	-1.048	.000				
pol.sys:army	-1.323	-.035	-3.109	.388	.000			
pol.sys:experts	.927	-.252	1.553	-2.751	-.336	.000		
pol.sys:leader	-.382	.052	.147	-1.864	2.896	3.903	.000	
democracy better	.797	.953	-.381	4.860	-1.777	-1.990	<u>-2.985</u>	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome:economy	<--- outcome:indecision	38.963	.190	pol.sys:experts	<--- pol.sys:leader	17.836	.136
outcome:indecisión	<--- outcome:economy	36.797	.186	pol.sys:experts	<--- democracy better	4.625	-.103
outcome:indecisión	<--- pol.sys:army	10.507	-.141	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:democracy	6.126	-.104
pol.sys:democracy	<--- pol.sys:experts	11.669	-.062	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:army	14.871	.169
pol.sys:democracy	<--- pol.sys:leader	5.631	-.046	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:experts	25.650	.135
pol.sys:democracy	<--- democracy better	37.977	.177	pol.sys:leader	<--- democracy better	15.738	-.166
pol.sys:army	<--- outcome:indecision	15.329	-.079	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:democracy	38.389	.176
pol.sys:army	<--- pol.sys:leader	14.195	.069	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:army	5.155	-.068
pol.sys:army	<--- democracy better	5.295	-.063	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:experts	6.181	-.045
pol.sys:experts	<--- pol.sys:democracy	8.827	-.142	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:leader	14.625	-.073

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>SWEDEN</b>	274.319	20	.126	.033	.824	.753

Regression Weights		Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader	<--- Support	1.497	.122	12.300	***	.630
pol.sys:experts	<--- Support	1.349	.129	10.487	***	.493
pol.sys:army	<--- Support	.748	.073	10.210	***	.475
pol.sys:democracy	<--- Support	1.090	.092	11.809	***	.588
outcome:indecision	<--- Support	1.192	.106	11.198	***	.542
outcome:order	<--- Support	1.400	.114	12.253	***	.626
outcome:economy	<--- Support	1.056	.091	11.669	***	.577
democracy better	<--- Support	1.000				.548



Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.108	.014	7.457	***
e1	.252	.014	17.681	***
e2	.369	.022	16.449	***
e3	.614	.034	18.260	***
e4	.208	.011	18.419	***
e5	.243	.014	17.139	***
e6	.370	.021	17.752	***
e7	.329	.020	16.526	***
e8	.241	.014	17.299	***

St. residuals	outcome:economy	outcome:order	outcome:indecision	pol.sys:democracy	pol.sys:army	pol.sys:experts	pol.sys:leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome:order	2.742	.000						
outcome:indecision	3.389	2.474	.000					
pol.sys:democracy	-1.590	.010	-.665	.000				
pol.sys:army	-1.276	-2.242	-2.555	-1.241	.000			
pol.sys:experts	-1.754	-1.690	.302	-.870	3.104	.000		
pol.sys:leader	-1.648	-1.494	-1.962	-.365	5.119	2.985	.000	
democracy better	-.466	-.334	-1.903	4.576	-1.137	-1.535	-.239	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome:economy	<--- outcome:order	14.231	.094	pol.sys:democracy	<--- democracy better	39.744	.194
outcome:economy	<--- outcome:indecision	21.109	.117	pol.sys:army	<--- outcome:order	7.515	-.062
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:democracy	4.718	-.066	pol.sys:army	<--- outcome:indecision	9.561	-.071
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:experts	5.565	-.048	pol.sys:army	<--- pol.sys:experts	13.965	.069
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:leader	5.145	-.053	pol.sys:army	<--- pol.sys:leader	39.225	.134
outcome:order	<--- outcome:economy	16.134	.146	pol.sys:experts	<--- outcome:economy	4.704	-.104
outcome:order	<--- outcome:indecision	12.946	.109	pol.sys:experts	<--- outcome:order	4.426	-.082
outcome:order	<--- pol.sys:army	10.380	-.136	pol.sys:experts	<--- pol.sys:army	14.380	.210
outcome:order	<--- pol.sys:experts	5.937	-.059	pol.sys:experts	<--- pol.sys:leader	13.819	.137
outcome:order	<--- pol.sys:leader	4.895	-.062	pol.sys:leader	<--- outcome:economy	5.904	-.094
outcome:indecision	<--- outcome:economy	19.540	.166	pol.sys:leader	<--- outcome:order	4.954	-.070
outcome:indecision	<--- outcome:order	10.570	.100	pol.sys:leader	<--- outcome:indecision	8.259	-.092
outcome:indecision	<--- pol.sys:army	10.781	-.143	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:army	54.836	.331
outcome:indecision	<--- pol.sys:leader	6.662	-.074	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:experts	18.761	.111
outcome:indecision	<--- democracy better	6.104	-.093	democracy better	<--- outcome:indecision	6.179	-.064
pol.sys:democracy	<--- outcome:economy	4.845	-.068	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:democracy	36.265	.184

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>SWITZERLAND</b>	208.393	20	.100	.038	.809	.733

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader <--- Support	1.614	.167	9.639	***	.477
pol.sys:experts <--- Support	.629	.133	4.715	***	.188
pol.sys:army <--- Support	.669	.074	9.012	***	.427
pol.sys:democracy <--- Support	.875	.100	8.791	***	.411
outcome:indecision <--- Support	.137	.101	1.359	.174	.052
outcome:order <--- Support	1.782	.159	11.222	***	.662
outcome:economy <--- Support	1.829	.161	11.389	***	.705
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.466

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.068	.011	6.456	***
e1	.245	.013	19.515	***
e2	.601	.031	19.375	***
e3	.732	.034	21.418	***
e4	.137	.007	19.951	***
e5	.256	.013	20.110	***
e6	.472	.022	21.682	***

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
e7	.276	.018	15.297	***
e8	.230	.017	13.678	***

St. residuals	outcome:economy	outcome:order	outcome:indecision	pol.sys: democracy	pol.sys: army	pol.sys: experts	pol.sys: leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome:order	1.765	.000						
outcome:indecision	-1.333	1.031	.000					
pol.sys:democracy	-1.280	-1.287	.523	.000				
pol.sys:army	-.666	-1.104	.519	.565	.000			
pol.sys:experts	-2.039	-1.523	1.001	-.928	2.701	.000		
pol.sys:leader	-.961	-.782	2.107	-.044	2.367	7.575	.000	
democracy better	-.284	-1.161	-2.300	5.491	-.003	-1.685	-.727	<u>.000</u>

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome:economy	<--- outcome:order	10.198	.083	pol.sys:army	<--- pol.sys:leader	7.578	.039
outcome:economy	<--- outcome:indecision	4.786	-.058	pol.sys:experts	<--- outcome:economy	4.428	-.087
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:democracy	4.777	-.071	pol.sys:experts	<--- pol.sys:army	7.687	.190
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:experts	11.374	-.070	pol.sys:experts	<--- pol.sys:leader	60.550	.247
outcome:order	<--- outcome:economy	8.494	.083	pol.sys:leader	<--- outcome:indecision	6.233	.095
outcome:order	<--- pol.sys:experts	5.273	-.051	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:army	8.185	.184
outcome:indecision	<--- pol.sys:leader	4.458	.054	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:experts	81.142	.272
outcome:indecision	<--- democracy better	5.313	-.092	democracy better	<--- outcome:indecision	7.294	-.066
pol.sys:democracy	<--- democracy better	39.710	.191	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:democracy	43.045	.198
pol.sys:army	<--- pol.sys:experts	9.537	.044				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>TURKEY</b>	1149.275	20	.190	.090	.712	.597

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader <--- Support	4.717	1.017	4.638	***	.379
pol.sys:experts <--- Support	3.994	.868	4.601	***	.353
pol.sys:army <--- Support	5.406	1.145	4.722	***	.459
pol.sys:democracy <--- Support	1.451	.376	3.856	***	.168
outcome:indecision <--- Support	7.720	1.597	4.836	***	.729
outcome:order <--- Support	9.060	1.867	4.853	***	.843
outcome:economy <--- Support	8.877	1.829	4.853	***	.846
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.131

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.006	.003	2.428	.015
e1	.372	.013	27.928	***
e2	.861	.032	27.300	***
e3	.724	.026	27.404	***
e4	.710	.026	26.880	***
e5	.469	.017	27.879	***
e6	.340	.015	23.031	***
e7	.216	.013	16.642	***
e8	.203	.012	16.401	***

St. residuals	outcome:economy	outcome:order	outcome:indecision	pol.sys: democracy	pol.sys: army	pol.sys: experts	pol.sys: leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome:order	.314	.000						
outcome:indecision	.568	.171	.000					
pol.sys:democracy	-.209	.270	-1.889	.000				
pol.sys:army	-.950	-.052	-2.555	2.516	.000			
pol.sys:experts	-1.177	-2.051	-1.122	-3.066	8.053	.000		
pol.sys:leader	-2.403	-1.538	.733	.541	7.176	17.542	.000	
democracy better	.554	.744	-4.097	17.535	3.353	-2.426	-3.246	.000

Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change
outcome:economy	<--	pol.sys:army	5.422	-.034	pol.sys:army	<---	democracy better	14.802	.135
outcome:economy	<--	pol.sys:experts	7.881	-.043	pol.sys:experts	<---	outcome:order	5.331	-.058
outcome:economy	<--	pol.sys:leader	33.252	-.080	pol.sys:experts	<---	pol.sys:democracy	10.986	-.104
outcome:order	<--	pol.sys:experts	23.237	-.075	pol.sys:experts	<---	pol.sys:army	77.484	.201
outcome:order	<--	pol.sys:leader	13.221	-.052	pol.sys:experts	<---	pol.sys:leader	364.673	.413
outcome:indecision	<--	pol.sys:democracy	9.078	-.069	pol.sys:experts	<---	democracy better	6.868	-.092
outcome:indecision	<--	pol.sys:army	18.186	-.072	pol.sys:leader	<---	outcome:economy	7.600	-.077
outcome:indecision	<--	democracy better	42.431	-.169	pol.sys:leader	<---	pol.sys:army	63.303	.199
pol.sys:democracy	<--	pol.sys:army	6.577	.047	pol.sys:leader	<---	pol.sys:experts	373.761	.504
pol.sys:democracy	<--	pol.sys:experts	9.748	-.059	pol.sys:leader	<---	democracy better	12.605	-.137
pol.sys:democracy	<--	democracy better	317.776	.502	democracy better	<---	outcome:indecision	17.270	-.075
pol.sys:army	<--	outcome:indecision	9.524	-.078	democracy better	<---	pol.sys:democracy	313.691	.393
pol.sys:army	<--	pol.sys:democracy	8.354	.090	democracy better	<---	pol.sys:army	11.503	.055
pol.sys:army	<--	pol.sys:experts	87.328	.222	democracy better	<---	pol.sys:experts	6.015	-.042
pol.sys:army	<--	pol.sys:leader	69.610	.180	democracy better	<---	pol.sys:leader	10.772	-.050

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>UK</b>	526.452	20	.156	.055	.725	.615

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader <-- Support	1.213	.103	11.771	***	.486
pol.sys:experts <-- Support	.698	.091	7.675	***	.287
pol.sys:army <-- Support	.810	.075	10.876	***	.437
pol.sys:democracy <-- Support	1.184	.091	13.027	***	.563
outcome:indecision <-- Support	1.102	.080	13.756	***	.616
outcome:order <-- Support	1.129	.079	14.340	***	.664
outcome:economy <-- Support	.975	.074	13.267	***	.580
democracy better <-- Support	1.000				.555

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.145	.017	8.546	***
e1	.324	.016	19.809	***
e2	.688	.033	20.734	***
e3	.784	.035	22.197	***
e4	.403	.019	21.225	***
e5	.436	.022	19.680	***
e6	.288	.015	18.695	***
e7	.233	.013	17.481	***
e8	.272	.014	19.399	***

St. residuals	outcome:economy	outcome:order	outcome:indecision	pol.sys:democracy	pol.sys:army	pol.sys:experts	pol.sys:leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome:order	2.021	.000						
outcome:indecision	4.600	3.179	.000					
pol.sys:democracy	-2.109	-1.866	-2.844	.000				
pol.sys:army	-2.537	-1.585	-2.839	1.713	.000			
pol.sys:experts	-2.729	-.766	-.864	-2.717	2.839	.000		
pol.sys:leader	-1.766	-.764	-2.048	.021	4.738	7.052	.000	
democracy better	-2.537	-2.344	-3.117	8.539	2.095	.509	-.222	.000

Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices		M.I.	Par Change
outcome:economy	<--- outcome:order	7.972	.075	pol.sys:democracy	<--- pol.sys:experts	12.396	-.082
outcome:economy	<--- outcome:indecision	40.554	.161	pol.sys:democracy	<--- democracy better	130.963	.362
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:democracy	8.364	-.062	pol.sys:army	<--- outcome:economy	8.938	-.095
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:army	11.644	-.083	pol.sys:army	<--- outcome:indecision	11.275	-.100
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:experts	13.010	-.067	pol.sys:army	<--- pol.sys:democracy	4.061	.051
outcome:economy	<--- pol.sys:leader	5.720	-.043	pol.sys:army	<--- pol.sys:experts	10.683	.072
outcome:economy	<--- democracy better	12.073	-.087	pol.sys:army	<--- pol.sys:leader	30.607	.118
outcome:order	<--- outcome:economy	10.205	.083	pol.sys:army	<--- democracy better	6.062	.073
outcome:order	<--- outcome:indecision	25.672	.123	pol.sys:experts	<--- outcome:economy	8.515	-.127
outcome:order	<--- pol.sys:democracy	8.634	-.061	pol.sys:experts	<--- pol.sys:democracy	8.429	-.101
outcome:order	<--- pol.sys:army	5.929	-.057	pol.sys:experts	<--- pol.sys:army	9.108	.119
outcome:order	<--- democracy better	13.583	-.089	pol.sys:experts	<--- pol.sys:leader	56.389	.220
outcome:indecision	<--- outcome:economy	44.516	.187	pol.sys:leader	<--- outcome:economy	4.733	-.091
outcome:indecision	<--- outcome:order	22.015	.130	pol.sys:leader	<--- outcome:indecision	6.428	-.099
outcome:indecision	<--- pol.sys:democracy	16.909	-.092	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:army	32.992	.217
outcome:indecision	<--- pol.sys:army	16.123	-.102	pol.sys:leader	<--- pol.sys:experts	71.295	.244
outcome:indecision	<--- pol.sys:leader	8.527	-.055	democracy better	<--- outcome:economy	11.414	-.098
outcome:indecision	<--- democracy better	20.244	-.118	democracy better	<--- outcome:order	10.032	-.091
pol.sys:democracy	<--- outcome:economy	8.050	-.096	democracy better	<--- outcome:indecision	17.436	-.114
pol.sys:democracy	<--- outcome:order	6.492	-.085	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:democracy	128.649	.264
pol.sys:democracy	<--- outcome:indecision	14.825	-.122	democracy better	<--- pol.sys:army	7.467	.072
pol.sys:democracy	<--- pol.sys:army	5.091	.069				

Model fit	X2	df	RMSEA	RMR	CFI	TLI
<b>UKRAINE</b>	241.347	20	.122	.054	.848	.787

Regression Weights	Non std. Regression weight	S.E.	C.R.	P	St. regression weight
pol.sys:leader <--- Support	.503	.101	5.000	***	.206
pol.sys:experts <--- Support	.096	.092	1.046	.296	.042
pol.sys:army <--- Support	.457	.082	5.548	***	.231
pol.sys:democracy <--- Support	.960	.092	10.386	***	.487
outcome:indecision <--- Support	1.662	.121	13.767	***	.775
outcome:order <--- Support	1.612	.117	13.797	***	.779
outcome:economy <--- Support	1.582	.114	13.900	***	.793
democracy better <--- Support	1.000				.537

Variances	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Support	.170	.023	7.296	***
e1	.419	.024	17.828	***
e2	.965	.051	19.094	***
e3	.900	.047	19.242	***
e4	.630	.033	19.054	***
e5	.504	.028	18.162	***
e6	.312	.023	13.756	***
e7	.286	.021	13.610	***
e8	.250	.019	13.037	***

St. residuals	outcome:economy	outcome:order	outcome:indecision	pol.sys:democracy	pol.sys:army	pol.sys:experts	pol.sys:leader	democracy better
outcome:economy	.000							
outcome:order	.075	.000						
outcome:indecision	-.080	.929	.000					
pol.sys:democracy	-.331	-1.985	-.314	.000				
pol.sys:army	.619	1.189	-2.380	-.886	.000			
pol.sys:experts	-.245	-1.405	1.220	.854	2.697	.000		
pol.sys:leader	-.277	-1.078	-.011	1.294	3.005	5.586	.000	
democracy better	.183	-1.151	-1.461	7.079	.997	-1.945	1.303	.000

Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change	Modification indices			M.I.	Par Change
outcome:order	<---	pol.sys:democracy	14.967	-.107	pol.sys:army	<---	outcome:indecision	6.225	-.083
outcome:order	<---	pol.sys:army	4.852	.061	pol.sys:army	<---	pol.sys:experts	7.749	.086
outcome:order	<---	pol.sys:experts	6.563	-.061	pol.sys:army	<---	pol.sys:leader	9.639	.091
outcome:order	<---	democracy better	5.169	-.067	pol.sys:experts	<---	pol.sys:army	7.289	.115
outcome:indecision	<---	pol.sys:army	18.970	-.125	pol.sys:experts	<---	pol.sys:leader	31.263	.194
outcome:indecision	<---	pol.sys:experts	4.837	.054	pol.sys:leader	<---	pol.sys:army	9.515	.137
outcome:indecision	<---	democracy better	8.126	-.087	pol.sys:leader	<---	pol.sys:experts	32.808	.218
pol.sys:democracy	<---	outcome:order	6.196	-.078	democracy better	<---	pol.sys:democracy	80.120	.271
pol.sys:democracy	<---	democracy better	73.631	.299	democracy better	<---	pol.sys:experts	5.662	-.062

Tables A1.2 Goodness of fit and internal comparability withing the 5 groups of affective support

<b>GROUP 1: Western Europe</b>	<b><math>\chi^2</math></b>	<b>df</b>	<b>RMSEA</b>	<b>90%CI</b>		<b>RMR</b>	<b>CFI</b>	<b>TLI</b>
Finland <sup>HC</sup>	121.18***	17	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.98	0.97
France <sup>HC</sup>	206.90***	17	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.97	0.96
Iceland <sup>HC</sup>	78.98***	17	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.98	0.97
Ireland <sup>HC</sup>	127.18***	17	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.99	0.98
Italy <sup>HC</sup>	174.76***	17	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.98	0.96
Norway <sup>HC</sup>	119.63***	17	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.98	0.97
Sweden <sup>HC</sup>	106.75***	17	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.99	0.98
UK <sup>HC</sup>	230.82***	17	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.96	0.98
Equal form (HC)	1166.19***	136	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.98	0.97
Equal loadings (HC)	1601.57***	171	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.97	0.96
Equal covariances of latent factors (HC)	1903.31***	185	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.97	0.96
Denmark <sup>MC</sup>	156.78***	17	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.96	0.94
Luxembourg <sup>MC</sup>	343.63***	17	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.02	0.95	0.92
Malta <sup>MC</sup>	371.58***	17	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.02	0.97	0.95
Netherlands <sup>MC</sup>	261.50***	17	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.93	0.96
Lithuania <sup>MC</sup>	404.60***	17	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.96	0.93
Cyprus <sup>MC</sup>	162.68***	17	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.98	0.96
Equal form (all countries)	2866.95***	238	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.97	0.95
Equal loadings (all countries)	4974.25***	303	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.95	0.94
Equal covariances of latent factors (all countries)	5771.29***	329	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.94	0.93
<b>GROUP 2: Central and Eastern Europe</b>	<b><math>\chi^2</math></b>	<b>df</b>	<b>RMSEA</b>	<b>90%CI</b>		<b>RMR</b>	<b>CFI</b>	<b>TLI</b>
Belgium <sup>HC</sup>	136.59***	11	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.98	0.95
Bulgaria <sup>HC</sup>	31.91***	11	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	1.00	1.00
Czech Republic <sup>HC</sup>	164.72***	11	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.98	0.97
Estonia <sup>HC</sup>	138.80***	11	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.98	0.96
Germany <sup>HC</sup>	172.11***	11	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.98	0.97
Hungary <sup>HC</sup>	147.54***	11	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.98	0.96
Poland <sup>HC</sup>	138.36***	11	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.96	0.98
Russia <sup>HC</sup>	72.73***	11	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.99	0.98
Slovakia <sup>HC</sup>	155.20***	11	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.98	0.97
Slovenia <sup>HC</sup>	42.17***	11	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.99	0.99
Ukraine <sup>HC</sup>	116.87***	11	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.99	0.98
Equal form (HC)	1316.98***	121	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.99	0.97
Equal loadings (HC)	1962.40***	161	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.98	0.97
Equal covariances of latent factors (HC)	2702.02***	181	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.97	0.96
Austria <sup>MC</sup>	365.97***	11	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.02	0.96	0.93
Belarus <sup>MC</sup>	216.17***	11	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.01	0.93	0.96
Croatia <sup>MC</sup>	41.94***	11	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01	1.00	0.99
Latvia <sup>MC*</sup>	131.82***	11	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.98	0.95
Equal form (all countries)	2072.88***	165	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.97	0.98
Equal loadings (all countries)	3249.89***	221	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.96	0.97
Equal weights of latent factors (all countries)	4685.09***	249	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.95	0.96
<b>GROUP 3: Mediterranean Europe</b>	<b><math>\chi^2</math></b>	<b>df</b>	<b>RMSEA</b>	<b>90%CI</b>		<b>RMR</b>	<b>CFI</b>	<b>TLI</b>
Greece <sup>MC</sup>	165.18***	17	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.98	0.96
Macedonia <sup>MC</sup>	214.42***	17	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.97	0.96
Turkey <sup>MC</sup>	536.08***	17	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.03	0.97	0.95
Equal form (all countries)	915.672***	51	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.97	0.95
Equal loadings (all countries)	1487.641***	61	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.95	0.94
Equal covariances of latent factors (all countries)	1933.085***	67	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.94	0.92

<b>GROUP 4: The Balkans</b>	<b><math>\chi^2</math></b>	<b>df</b>	<b>RMSEA</b>	<b>90%CI</b>		<b>RMR</b>	<b>CFI</b>	<b>TLI</b>
Bosnia <sup>HC</sup>	143.25***	11	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.98	0.97
Montenegro <sup>HC</sup>	120.88***	11	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.99	0.98
Serbia <sup>HC</sup>	118.24***	11	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.99	0.98
Equal form (HC)	382.37***	33	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.99	0.98
Equal loadings (HC)	663.25***	41	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.98	0.96
Equal covariances of latent factors (HC)	724.84***	47	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.97	0.97
Georgia <sup>MC</sup>	119.74***	11	0.11	0.09	0.13	0.03	0.94	0.89
Equal form (all countries)	513.71***	45	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.98	0.97
Equal loadings (all countries)	835.24***	57	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.97	0.96
Equal covariances of latent factors (all countries)	919.74***	65	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.97	0.96

<b>GROUP 5: Romania-Albania group</b>	<b><math>\chi^2</math></b>	<b>df</b>	<b>RMSEA</b>	<b>90%CI</b>		<b>RMR</b>	<b>CFI</b>	<b>TLI</b>
Albania <sup>HC</sup>	.000	0	0.42	0.39	0.45	0.00	1.00	
Kosovo <sup>HC</sup>	.000	0	0.66	0.63	0.69	0.00	1.00	
Moldova <sup>HC</sup>	.000	0	0.50	0.47	0.53	0.00	1.00	
Romania <sup>HC</sup>	.000	0	0.48	0.45	0.51	0.00	1.00	
Equal form (all countries)	.000	0				0.00	1.00	
Equal loadings (all countries)	20.99***	6	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.02	1.00	0.99
Equal covariances of latent factors (all countries)	85.42***	9	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.98	0.97

**Legend**

HC: High comparability  
MC: Medium Comparability  
All countries: measures of fit for all countries of the group  
\*\*\*p<.05

Tables A1.3 Description of macro variables

Variable	Description
Democratic experience: <b> durable, Polity IV (Marshall and Jagers 2002)</b>	The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three point change in the p_polity score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). In calculating the p_durable value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline “year zero” (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the p_durable variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs.
Democratic experience: <b> Index of democracy (Vanhanen 2000, 2005)</b>	This index combines two basic dimensions of democracy – competition and participation – measured as the percentage of votes not cast for the largest party (Competition) times the percentage of the population who actually voted in the election (Participation). This product is divided by 100 to form an index that in principle could vary from 0 (no democracy) to 100 (full democracy). (Empirically, however, the largest value is 49.)
Democratic experience: <b> Index of democracy Economist Intelligence Unit 2006 (Kekic 2007)</b>	The index of democracy is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped into the five following categories. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of these variables: <b> eiu_cl</b> Civil Liberties Civil liberties include freedom of speech, expression and the press; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly and association; and the right to due judicial process. <b> eiu_dpc</b> Democratic Political Culture The Democratic Political Culture index measures the extent to which there is a societal consensus supporting democratic principles. <b> eiu_epp</b> Electoral Process and Pluralism This category is based on indicators relating to the condition of having free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of political freedom. <b> eiu_fog</b> Functioning of Government The Functioning of Government category is based on indicators relating to e.g. the extent to which control over government is exercised by elected representatives, the capability of the civil service, and the pervasiveness of corruption. <b> eiu_pp</b> Political Participation The Political Participation index measures among other things the adult literacy rate, the amount of women in parliament, and the extent to which citizens freely choose to elect representatives and join political parties.
Democratic experience:	This variable describes the type of electoral system of each country, as defined by Golder (2005): majoritarian, proportional, and mixed.
Economic performance: <b> GDP (WB, OECD)</b>	GDP converted to constant 2005 international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the US dollar has in the United States.

Source: Teorell, Jan, Marcus Samanni, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein. 2011. The Quality of Government Dataset, version 6Apr11. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>.

Tables A1.4 Correlations among macro variables

	Index of democracy-Vanhanen	Index of Democracy EIU	Years of democracy	Years Membership EU	Communist experience	Education
Index of democracy-Vanhanen	1					
Index of democracy-EIU	<b>0.7465***</b>	1				
Years of democracy	<b>0.5429***</b>	<b>0.6145***</b>	1			
Years membership EU	<b>0.4809**</b>	<b>0.4527**</b>	<b>0.4144**</b>	1		
Communist experience	<b>-0.6385***</b>	<b>-0.6603***</b>	<b>-0.7186***</b>	<b>-0.5775***</b>	1	
Education <sup>1</sup>	0.1964	0.1094	0,1174	-0,0145	0.2471	1
Protestant	<b>0.4752**</b>	<b>0.5784***</b>	<b>0.5025***</b>	0,0513	<b>-0.4217**</b>	<b>0.4418**</b>
Orthodox	<b>-0.3948*</b>	<b>-0.4949**</b>	<b>-0.3925*</b>	<b>-0.3206*</b>	<b>0.3875**</b>	0,0373
No religion	0.1439	0.0963	0,0357	0,2904	0,1506	<b>0.3238*</b>
Catholic	0.1121	0.1792	0,105	0,2947	-0,1275	-0,2702
Muslim	<b>-0.3381*</b>	<b>-0.4011*</b>	-0,2297	-0,2514	0,006	<b>-0.3822*</b>
Other religion	0.2104	0.3042	0,2315	0,1511	-0,2135	0,1093
GDP per capita (WB)	-0.1241	-0.3016	-0.1419	-0.0720	0.3207*	

<sup>1</sup>No significant correlations in the cells which have been omitted.

\*significant differences at p<0.05, \*\* significant differences at p<0.01, \*\*\* significant differences at p<0.001



Tables A1.5 Multinomial analysis

VARIABLES	Western Europe	Central and Eastern Europe	Mediterranean East Europe	The Balkans	Romania-Albania group
Yearsdem	0.0798*** (0.0259)		0.00210 (0.0420)	-0.660* (0.362)	-0.159 (0.105)
Constant	-3.173*** (1.068)		-1.656 (1.129)	3.288* (1.856)	1.018 (1.456)
Observations	39	39	39	39	39
van_index	0.180** (0.0824)		-0.0794 (0.113)	-0.238 (0.203)	-0.376** (0.190)
Constant	-5.817** (2.675)		0.603 (3.137)	3.329 (4.696)	7.091* (4.101)
Observations	36	36	36	36	36
eiu_iod	1.817*** (0.645)		-0.362 (0.513)	-0.790 (0.711)	-0.485 (0.500)
Constant	-14.72*** (5.233)		0.923 (3.572)	2.515 (4.437)	1.735 (3.412)
Observations	36	36	36	36	36
YearsEU	0.0369* (0.0197)		-0.00681 (0.0420)	-7.120 (752.9)	-0.533 (0.381)
Constant	-0.736 (0.516)		-1.540** (0.750)	-0.397 (0.708)	-0.260 (0.668)
Observations	39	39	39	39	39
Communist	-3.951*** (1.222)		-2.079 (1.384)	15.98 (3,404)	15.98 (2,948)
Constant	1.466** (0.641)		-0.405 (0.913)	-17.36 (3,404)	-17.08 (2,948)
Observations	39	39	39	39	39
Norelig	-4.518* (2.605)		-29.39* (16.39)	-0.775 (3.788)	-11.56** (5.666)
Constant	1.176 (0.805)		1.915 (1.199)	-1.358 (1.357)	1.066 (1.066)
Observations	39	39	39	39	39

VARIABLES	Western Europe	Central and Eastern Europe	Mediterranean East Europe	The Balkans	Romania-Albania group
Catholic	-0.206 (1.119)		-128.3 (100.5)	-6.147 (5.645)	-10.41 (9.135)
Constant	0.00512 (0.548)		0.702 (0.893)	-0.612 (0.792)	-0.121 (0.744)
Observations	39	39	39	39	39
Protestant	4.654* (2.382)		-1,418 (101,898)	-73.65 (85.35)	-48.83 (54.93)
Constant	-0.758 (0.482)		-0.591 (0.690)	-0.863 (0.735)	-0.676 (0.665)
Observations	39	39	39	39	39
Muslim	-11.28 (17.49)		18.35* (10.16)	15.73 (10.13)	17.60* (10.10)
Constant	0.0661 (0.420)		-2.992*** (0.994)	-2.319*** (0.803)	-2.445*** (0.823)
Observations	39	39	39	39	39
Orthodox	-2.151 (1.843)		3.255* (1.953)	2.293 (1.870)	2.836* (1.721)
Constant	0.191 (0.427)		-2.777** (1.148)	-2.297** (0.961)	-2.265** (0.930)
Observations	39	39	39	39	39
Otherrelig	7.400 (11.62)		-1,763 (289,131)	-94.77 (78.75)	-15.90 (32.14)
Constant	-0.264 (0.479)		0.148 (0.754)	-0.542 (0.881)	-1.034 (0.759)
Observations	39	39	39	39	39
education	-0.357 (1.073)		-4.050** (1.826)	-1.429 (1.772)	-1.950 (1.580)
	1.071 (3.448)		10.19** (5.193)	2.862 (5.485)	4.711 (4.829)
Observations	39	39	39	39	39
WB_gdpc	-2.54e-08 (1.85e-08)		-1.14e-07* (6.67e-08)	3.65e-08 (2.60e-08)	1.48e-08 (2.46e-08)
Constant	0.728 (0.680)		0.613 (1.074)	-3.428** (1.634)	-2.239* (1.289)
Observations	38	38	38	38	38

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A1.6 Independent variables: individual level analysis

Sex	Dichotomous variable. 0=women; 1=men
Age	Interval variable (range to 0 to 99)
Income	Interval variable (\$)
Education	<p>What is the highest level you have completed in your education?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0. Pre-primary education or no education</li> <li>1. Primary education or primary stage of lower secondary education</li> <li>2. Lower secondary education</li> <li>3. (Upper) secondary education</li> <li>4. Post- secondary non- tertiary education</li> <li>5. First stage of tertiary education</li> <li>6. Second stage of tertiary education</li> </ol>
Political interest	<p>How interested would you say you are in politics?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Not at all interested</li> <li>2. Not very interested</li> <li>3. Somewhat interested</li> <li>4. Very interested</li> </ol>
Experience democracy	<p>Number of years a person has lived in a democracy by 2009. Democracy is defined as of Polity Duration. (range from 0 to 70)</p>
Evaluation political regime	<p>People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad and 10 means very good.</p>
Index of democracy	<p>Index of democracy 2002 Vanhanen (range from 26.6 to 44.2)</p>



**ANNEX 2: CHAPTER 5**

Table A2.1 Factor analysis of attributes of democracy: WVS 2005-2008

	<b>N=19,278</b>
	<b>Factor 1</b>
<b>Eigenvalue</b>	<b>2.685</b>
<b>Factor loading</b>	
WVS social equality	0.3548
WVS rule religion	0.1120
WVS elections	0.6513
WVS unemployment	0.5661
WVS rule army	0.0700
WVS rule rights	0.6818
WVS economy	0.5806
WVS rule criminals	0.5137
WVS referendums	0.5768
WVS political equality	0.6320

\*Method: principal factors.  
**Source: WVS 2005-2008**

Factor analysis by country – significant differences:

- Norway, Sweden, and Serbia have 2 distinct factors instead of 1
- Other factors which have low factor loadings in several countries: WVS rule criminals (Great Britain, Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland), WVS referendums (Netherlands, Romania), WVS economy (Switzerland, Germany), WVS unemployment (Slovenia, Romania). All factors have low loadings in Spain.

Table A2.2 Mokken analysis of attributes of democracy: WVS 2005-2008

Scale: 1

Item	Obs	Difficulty P(Xj=0)	Observed Guttman errors	Expected Guttman errors	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.	H0: Hj<=0 p-value	Number of NS Hjk
dem_ppref	19278	0.0000	366417	5.7e+05	0.35823	117.3744	0.00000	0
dem_election	19278	0.0000	306189	5.0e+05	0.38614	124.4940	0.00000	0
dem_polequal	19278	0.0000	272188	4.6e+05	0.40212	125.8236	0.00000	0
dem_ruleright	19278	0.0000	320232	5.5e+05	0.41298	135.3427	0.00000	0
dem_welfaid	19278	0.0000	376929	5.9e+05	0.35725	116.4242	0.00000	0
dem_welfeco	19278	0.0000	375889	6.2e+05	0.39006	127.0779	0.00000	0
dem_rulecrim	19278	0.0000	436446	6.6e+05	0.34166	111.1507	0.00000	0
Scale	19278		1227145	2.0e+06	0.37648	227.1142	0.00000	

Scale: 2

Item	Obs	Difficulty P(Xj=0)	Observed Guttman errors	Expected Guttman errors	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.	H0: Hj<=0 p-value	Number of NS Hjk
dem_rulerelig	19278	0.0000	90443	1.5e+05	0.39199	53.6711	0.00000	0
dem_rulearmy	19278	0.0000	90443	1.5e+05	0.39199	53.6711	0.00000	0
Scale	19278		90443	1.5e+05	0.39199	53.6711	0.00000	

There is only one item remaining (dem\_socequal).

Table A2.3 Year of fieldwork WVS 2005-2008 and EVS 2008-2009

Country	WVS	EVS
Britain	2006	2009
Bulgaria	2006	2008
Cyprus	2006	2008
Finland	2005	2009
France	2006	2008
Germany	2006	2008
Moldova	2006	2008
Netherlands	2006	2008
Norway	2008	2008
Poland	2005	2008
Romania	2005	2008
Russia	2006	2008
Serbia	2006	2008
Slovenia	2005	2008
Spain	2007	2008
Sweden	2006	2009
Switzerland	2007	2008
Turkey	2007	2009
Ukraine	2006	2008

Table A2.4 Classification of countries by levels of affective support EVS 2008-2009

Classification	Western Europe	Factor score	Rescaled (0-10)	Classification	Central and Eastern Europe	Factor score	Rescaled (0-10)
High levels of affective support	Sweden	0.12	7.5	High levels of affective support	Germany	0.19	9.5
	Norway	0.09	6.8		Slovenia	-0.01	4.2
	Cyprus	0.07	6.4		Poland	-0.03	3.7
Medium levels of affective support	Finland	0.02	5.2	Low levels of affective support	Bulgaria	-0.12	1.3
Low levels of affective support	Netherlands	-0.07	3.2		Russian Federation	-0.12	1.3
	France	-0.10	2.5		Ukraine	-0.17	0.0
	Great Britain	-0.10	2.5				

Table A2.5 The relationship between types of democrats and levels of affective support: individual level

	Types of affective support					Levels of affective support			
	WE	CEE	MEE	BE	RMAK	No latent	Low affective support	Medium affective support	High affective support
Indifferent democrats <sup>1</sup>	-2.051*** (0.121)	-1.659*** (0.189)	-1.419*** (0.119)	-2.051*** (0.185)	-1.462** (0.107)	-1.565*** (0.264)	-1.601*** (0.232)	-2.406*** (0.126)	-1.604*** (0.160)
Procedural democrats <sup>1</sup>	-0.320** (0.101)	-0.453* (0.202)	-0.0940 (0.184)	-1.214*** (0.273)	-0.738** (0.0470)	-0.694 (0.318)	-0.276 (0.258)	-0.512*** (0.106)	-0.115 (0.101)
Autocratic democrats <sup>1</sup>	-0.582*** (0.0755)	-0.647** (0.213)	-0.375*** (0.0944)	-0.326* (0.172)	-0.239 (0.0449)	-0.143 (0.0773)	-0.544*** (0.129)	-0.360** (0.146)	-0.366*** (0.0385)
Constant	9.549*** (0.0648)	8.830*** (0.367)	9.526*** (0.0771)	8.281*** (0.112)	8.764** (0.226)	8.797*** (0.234)	8.807*** (0.321)	9.371*** (0.0673)	9.522*** (0.115)
Observations	6,609	6,136	1,192	924	2,171	4,287	7,016	947	4,782
R-squared	0.223	0.078	0.116	0.129	0.057	0.080	0.084	0.283	0.135

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Entries of columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 9 (WE, CEE, RMAK, No latent, Low affective support, High affective support) are robust cluster estimates (individuals clustered by countries). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>1</sup>Reference category: demanding democrats

Dependent variable: 'How important is it for you to live in a country which is governed democratically' (1-10)

Table A2.6 Socio-demographics of EU-Profiler 2009

Variable		male	female	
Sex		66.3%	33.7%	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	41.58	14.91	14	99
Education	5.66	1.26	1	7





## ANNEX 3: CHAPTER 6

Table A3.1 The effect of democratic performance on respondents' evaluations of democracy: types of democrats and type of affective support

DV: evaluations of democracy	WE <sup>1</sup>	CEE <sup>2</sup>	MEE <sup>3</sup>	RMAK <sup>4</sup>
Index of democratization	0.0230 (0.0562)	0.111 (0.0893)		
Type democrat <sup>5</sup> : indifferent democrats	-1.742 (1.589)	1.402 (1.309)	0.347 (0.217)	-0.0497 (0.140)
Type democrat <sup>5</sup> : procedural democrats	-2.882*** (0.274)	1.739 (1.375)	-0.650** (0.324)	-0.222 (0.205)
Type democrat <sup>5</sup> : autocratic democrats	-1.193 (0.952)	3.781* (1.686)	0.378** (0.181)	0.0171 (0.108)
Indifferent democrats <sup>5</sup> #index democrat.	0.0194 (0.0478)	-0.0579 (0.0344)		
Procedural democrats <sup>5</sup> #index democrat.	0.0837*** (0.00791)	-0.0566 (0.0388)		
Autocratic democrats <sup>5</sup> #index democrat.	0.0249 (0.0272)	-0.147** (0.0554)		
Constant	6.499** (1.829)	2.194 (2.881)	5.809*** (0.147)	5.520*** (0.0759)
Observations	6,582	6,064	1,175	2,126
R-squared	0.071	0.044	0.011	0.001

Entries are robust cluster estimates, individuals clustered by countries.

<sup>1</sup>Western Europe: Cyprus, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom

<sup>2</sup>Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Ukraine.

<sup>3</sup>Mediterranean East Europe: Turkey

<sup>4</sup>Romania-Albania group: Romania, Moldova

<sup>5</sup>Reference category: demanding democrats

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A3.2 The effect of democratic performance on respondents' evaluations of democracy: types of democrats and levels of affective support

DV: evaluations of democracy	No latent and low <sup>1</sup>	Medium and high <sup>2</sup>
Index of democratization	0.0294 (0.0260)	0.316*** (0.0581)
Type democrat <sup>3</sup> : indifferent democrats	0.308 (0.433)	1.259 (2.617)
Type democrat <sup>3</sup> : procedural democrats	-0.348 (0.550)	-0.913 (2.443)
Type democrat <sup>3</sup> : autocratic democrats	0.946 (0.659)	4.128* (1.524)
Indifferent democrats <sup>3</sup> #index democrat.	-0.0127 (0.0167)	-0.0621 (0.0689)
Procedural democrats <sup>3</sup> #index democrat.	0.0203 (0.0214)	0.0282 (0.0655)
Autocratic democrats <sup>3</sup> #index democrat.	-0.0398 (0.0251)	-0.117** (0.0394)
Constant	4.823*** (0.559)	-4.184 (2.322)
Observations	10,232	5,715
R-squared	0.009	0.084

Entries are robust cluster estimates, individuals clustered by countries.

<sup>1</sup>No latent or low level of affective support for democracy: Bulgaria, France, Moldova, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom

<sup>2</sup>Medium or high level of affective support for democracy: Cyprus, Germany, Finland, Norway, Sweden

<sup>3</sup>Reference category: demanding democrats

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A3.3 Items of cognitive and evaluative support in PEW 2009

Attributes	Wording
Rule of law	<p>COGNITIVE SUPPORT                      *How important is it for you to live in a country where the military is under the control of civilian leaders? (<i>Control of the military</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATIVE SUPPORT:                      *Does “<i>the military is under the control of civilian leaders</i>” describe our country very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all? (<i>Control of the military</i>)</p>
Competition	<p>COGNITIVE SUPPORT                      *How important is it for you to live in a country where honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties? (<i>Elections</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATIVE SUPPORT:                      *Does “<i>honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties</i>” describe our country very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all? (<i>Elections</i>)</p>
Vertical accountability	Not available
Horizontal accountability	Not available
Representation	Not available
Responsiveness	Not available
Transparency	Not available
Participation	Not available
Freedom	<p>COGNITIVE SUPPORT                      *How important is it for you to live in a country where you can openly say what you think and can criticize the state/ government? (<i>Freedom of speech</i>)                      *How important is it for you to live in a country where you can practice your religion freely? (<i>Freedom of religion</i>)                      *How important is it for you to live in a country where the media can report the news without (state/government) censorship? (<i>Freedom of press</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATIVE SUPPORT:                      *Does “<i>you can openly say what you think and can criticize the state/government</i>” describe our country very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all? (<i>Freedom of speech</i>)                      *Does “<i>you can practice your religion freely</i>” describe our country very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all? (<i>Freedom of religion</i>)                      *Does “<i>the media can report the news without (state/government) censorship</i>” describe our country very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all? (<i>Freedom of press</i>)</p>
Equality	<p>COGNITIVE SUPPORT                      *How important is it for you to live in a country where there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way? (<i>Political equality</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATIVE SUPPORT:                      *Does “<i>there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way</i>” describe our country very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all? (<i>Political equality</i>)</p>
Welfare	<p>COGNITIVE SUPPORT                      *How important is it for you to live in a country where there is economic prosperity? (<i>Economic prosperity</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATIVE SUPPORT:                      *Does “<i>there is economic prosperity</i>” describe our country very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all? (<i>Economic prosperity</i>)</p>

Table A3.4 Cognitive and evaluative support in PEW 2009, by country

	COGNITIVE SUPPORT								
	Bulgaria	Czech Rep	Hungary	Lithuania	Poland	Russia	Slovakia	Ukraine	Mean
Economic prosperity	3,83	3,77	3,80	3,70	3,55	3,63	3,38	3,68	3,67
Political equality	3,76	3,75	3,75	3,50	3,59	3,63	3,33	3,61	3,61
Elections	3,52	3,46	3,67	3,24	3,44	3,23	3,26	3,39	3,40
Freedom of press	3,50	3,62	3,48	3,41	3,46	3,15	3,27	3,35	3,40
Freedom of religion	3,48	3,25	3,54	3,33	3,56	3,31	3,31	3,39	3,40
Freedom of expression	3,48	3,33	3,57	3,19	3,42	3,15	3,17	3,26	3,32
Control of the military	2,85	3,10	2,97	2,82	3,05	2,89	2,78	2,87	2,92
Mean	3,49	3,47	3,54	3,31	3,44	3,28	3,22	3,36	3,39
	EVALUATIVE SUPPORT								
	Bulgaria	Czech Rep	Hungary	Lithuania	Poland	Russia	Slovakia	Ukraine	Mean
Economic prosperity	1,66	2,10	1,34	1,61	2,17	2,40	2,19	1,90	1,92
Political equality	1,68	1,92	3,08	1,87	2,39	2,35	2,02	1,88	2,15
Elections	2,47	3,32	2,48	2,57	3,06	2,57	3,14	2,04	2,71
Freedom of press	2,55	2,66	2,41	2,66	2,93	2,65	2,85	2,53	2,66
Freedom of religion	3,26	3,56	3,26	3,32	3,31	3,28	3,36	3,12	3,31
Freedom of expression	2,89	2,97	2,30	2,63	2,82	2,89	2,75	2,84	2,76
Control of the military	2,47	2,58	2,57	2,50	2,83	2,52	2,54	2,16	2,52
Mean	2,42	2,73	2,49	2,45	2,79	2,67	2,69	2,35	2,22

Source: PEW 2009

Table A3.5 Factor analysis of cognitive and evaluative support in PEW 2009

	N=5764	
	Factor 1	Factor 2
Eigenvalue	<b>2.813</b>	<b>2.108</b>
<b>Cognitive support</b>		
Freedom of expression	<b>0.5845</b>	-0.2051
Elections	<b>0.6415</b>	-0.2337
Political equality	<b>0.5991</b>	-0.2973
Control of the military	<b>0.4274</b>	-0.1037
Freedom of press	<b>0.6066</b>	-0.1873
Freedom of religion	<b>0.5241</b>	-0.1600
Economic prosperity	<b>0.5712</b>	-0.3007
<b>Evaluative support</b>		
Freedom of expression	0.3356	<b>0.5076</b>
Elections	0.3378	<b>0.5742</b>
Political equality	0.1472	<b>0.5211</b>
Control of the military	0.2958	<b>0.4933</b>
Freedom of press	0.2985	<b>0.6037</b>
Freedom of religion	0.3458	0.1722
Economic prosperity	0.0676	<b>0.5145</b>
*Method: principal factors.		
Source: PEW 2009		

Table A3.6 Mokken analysis of cognitive and evaluative support in PEW 2009

Scale 1: cognitive support

Item	Obs	Observed Difficulty P(Xj=0)	Expected Guttman errors	Expected Guttman errors	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.	Number H0: Hj<=0 p-value	of NS Hjk
dem_rulecivorder5764		0.0000	12869	19429.35	0.33765	52.9135	0.00000	0
dem_freedreliq5764		0.0000	11145	17848.22	0.37557	62.7040	0.00000	0
dem_freedmedia5764		0.0000	9805	17268.46	0.43220	72.1772	0.00000	0
dem_freedex 5764		0.0000	9790	17245.61	0.43232	70.7289	0.00000	0
dem_elect 5764		0.0000	9318	17196.09	0.45813	76.4980	0.00000	0
dem_ruleequal 5764		0.0000	8528	15410.82	0.44662	70.6857	0.00000	0
dem_welfec 5764		0.0000	7915	14085.57	0.43808	67.6903	0.00000	0
Scale	5764		34685	59242.07	0.41452	125.1536	0.00000	

Scale 2: evaluative support

Item	Obs	Difficulty P(Xj=0)	Observed Guttman errors	Expected Guttman errors	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.	Number H0: Hj<=0 p-value	of NS Hjk
ev_welfec 5764		0.0000	15157	23204.01	0.34679	51.7874	0.00000	0
ev_ruleequal 5764		0.0000	14883	24024.64	0.38051	56.9953	0.00000	0
ev_rulecivorder5764		0.0000	13916	22559.81	0.38315	58.4292	0.00000	0
ev_elect 5764		0.0000	13874	24301.66	0.42909	66.2742	0.00000	0
ev_freedex 5764		0.0000	13737	22392.21	0.38653	59.2528	0.00000	0
ev_freedmedia 5764		0.0000	12721	22532.88	0.43545	67.3787	0.00000	0
Scale	5764		42144	69507.61	0.39368	103.7755	0.00000	

There is only one item remaining (ev\_freedreliq).

Table A3.7 ANOVA: affective support and levels of cognitive support

	Levels of cognitive support (index of cognitive support)		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Respondents with NO affective support for democracy	22,81	4.09	3562
Respondents with affective support for democracy	23,64	3.78	3895

Analysis of variance					
	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	1293.95726	1	1293.95726	83.80	0.0000
Withing groups	115118.308	7455	15.4417583		
Total	116412.265	7456	15.613233		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(1) = 23.4834 Prob>chi2 = 0.000

Table A3.8 The impact of the interaction between cognitive and evaluative support on satisfaction with democracy – PEW 2009

VARIABLES	When there is affective support		When there is NO affective support	
	cognitive<evaluative	cognitive>evaluative	cognitive<evaluative	cognitive>evaluative
Evaluative support	0.0692* (0.0317)	0.0345 (0.0409)	0.0198 (0.0404)	0.0521 (0.0466)
Cognitive support	0.0793 (0.0447)	-0.0403 (0.0317)	0.0132 (0.0761)	-0.0114 (0.0326)
Evaluative support#cognitive support	-0.00288 (0.00170)	0.00136 (0.00190)	-0.000416 (0.00328)	4.14e-06 (0.00236)
Constant	0.823 (0.494)	2.185** (0.698)	1.708* (0.834)	1.379* (0.661)
Observations	364	3,179	363	2,750
R-squared	0.042	0.112	0.007	0.061

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A3.9 Questionnaire of the Pilot for the European Social Survey Round 6 new module on Europeans' attitudes to democracy

Attributes	Wording
Rule of law	<p>IMPORTANCE How important do you think it is for a democracy that the courts treat everyone the same? (<i>Equality of law</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION To what extent do you think the courts in [country] treat everyone the same? Choose your answer from this card where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely.</p>
Competition	<p>IMPORTANCE How important do you think it is for a democracy that national elections are free and fair? (<i>Elections</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION To what extent do you think national elections in [country] are free and fair? Choose your answer from this card where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely.</p> <p>IMPORTANCE How important do you think it is for a democracy that different political parties or candidates offer clear alternatives to one another? (<i>Alternative parties</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION Using this card, please tell me how much you think each of the following statements applies in [country]. The different political parties or candidates in [country] offer clear alternatives to one another. 0 Not at all 10 Completely</p> <p>IMPORTANCE How important do you think it is for a democracy that opposition parties are free to criticise governments? (<i>Opposition free</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION Opposition parties in [country] are free to criticise the government.</p>
Vertical accountability	<p>IMPORTANCE How important do you think it is for a democracy that governments are voted out of office when they do a bad job? (<i>Vertical accountability</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION How likely do you think it is that governments in [country] would be voted out of office if they did a bad job? Please use this card where 0 is extremely unlikely and 10 is extremely likely.</p>
Horizontal accountability	<p>IMPORTANCE How important do you think it is for a democracy that the highest court is able to stop the government acting beyond its powers? (<i>Horizontal accountability</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION To what extent do you think the highest court in [country] is able to stop the government acting beyond its powers? 0 Not at all 10 Completely</p>

<p>IMPORTANCE How important do you think it is for a democracy that the rights of minority groups are protected? (<i>Representation minorities</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION Using this card, please tell me how much you think each of the following statements applies in [country]. The rights of minority groups in [country] are protected. 0 Not at all 10 Completely</p> <p>PREFERENCE Countries differ in whether their governments are generally formed by a single party or by two or more parties. Which <b>one</b> of the statements on this card describes what you think is generally better for a democracy? Would you say that...<u>In a democracy governments should generally be formed by:</u> A single party Two or more parties</p> <p>IMPORTANCE And how important do you think it is for a democracy that governments are generally formed by [a single party / two or more parties]? (<i>Type representation</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION Do you think governments in [country] are formed by two or more parties too rarely or too often?*</p> <p>PREFERENCE Which <b>one</b> of the statements on this card describes what you think is better for a democracy? Would you say that... <u>In a democracy:</u> Governments should only follow the demands of the majority Governments should take into account the demands of minority groups as well</p> <p>IMPORTANCE How important do you think it is for a democracy that governments [do not take / take] into account the demands of minority groups? (<i>Subject representation</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION To what extent do you think governments in [country] take into account the demands of minority groups as well as following the demands of the majority? 0 Not at all 10 Completely</p>	<p>Representation</p>
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<p>PREFERENCE Sometimes governments disagree with public opinion on what is best for the country. Which <b>one</b> of the statements on this card describes what you think is generally better for a democracy? Would you say that... <u>In a democracy, governments should generally:</u> Change their policies and plans in response to public opinion Stick to their policies and plans regardless of public opinion</p> <p>IMPORTANCE And how important do you think it is for a democracy that governments generally [change / stick to] their policies and plans when they disagree with public opinion? (<i>Responsiveness citizens</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION When governments and public opinion in [country] disagree on what is best for the country, do you think governments change their policies or plans too rarely or too often?*</p> <p>PREFERENCE Sometimes governments disagree with business on what is best for the economy. Which <b>one</b> of the statements on this card describes what you think is generally better for a democracy? Would you say that... <u>In a democracy, governments should generally:</u> Change their policies and plans in response to business demands Stick to their policies and plans regardless of business demands</p> <p>IMPORTANCE And how important do you think it is for a democracy that governments generally change / stick to] their policies and plans when they disagree with business demands? (<i>Responsiveness business</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION When governments and business in [country] disagree on what is best for the economy, do you think governments change their policies or plans too rarely or too often?*</p> <p>IMPORTANCE In general, governments consider the needs of their own country. How important do you think it is for a democracy that governments <u>also</u> consider the needs of other countries in Europe? (<i>Responsiveness EU</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION In general, governments consider the needs of their own country. Do you think governments in [country] <u>also</u> consider the needs of other countries in Europe too rarely or too often? Use this card where 0 is far too rarely and 10 is far too often.*</p> <p>IMPORTANCE How important do you think it is for a democracy that the media provide citizens with reliable information to judge governments? (<i>Transparency media</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION The media in [country] provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government.</p> <p>IMPORTANCE How important do you think it is for a democracy that governments explain their decisions to voters? (<i>Transparency government</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION How well do you think governments in [country] explain their decisions to voters? Use this card where 0 is extremely badly and 10 is extremely well</p>	<p>responsiveness</p> <p>transparency</p>
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<p>IMPORTANTANCE</p> <p>How important do you think it is for a democracy that voters talk about political issues before deciding how to vote? (<i>Deliberation</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION</p> <p>How much do you think voters in [country] talk about political issues before deciding how to vote? Please use this card where 0 is not at all and 10 is a great deal.</p> <p>PREFERENCE</p> <p>Using this card, please tell me who you think should generally have the final say on the most important new laws in a democracy. Would you say that... <u>In a democracy the final say on the most important new laws should generally be given by:</u></p> <p>Parliament</p> <p>People - by voting on them directly in referendums</p> <p>IMPORTANTANCE</p> <p>And how important do you think it is for a democracy that [Parliament / the people generally [has / have] the final say on the most important new laws? (<i>Type participation</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION</p> <p>In some countries people generally have the final say on the most important new laws by voting on them directly in referendums. Do you think this happens too rarely or too often in [country]? Use this card where 0 is far too rarely and 10 is far too often.*</p> <p>PREFERENCE</p> <p>Which <b>one</b> of the statements on this card describes what you think is better for a democracy? Would you say that... <u>In a democracy:</u></p> <p>Immigrants should get the right to vote in national elections <u>even if they are not citizens of that country</u></p> <p>Immigrants should get the right to vote in national elections <u>only when they become citizens of that country</u></p> <p>IMPORTANTANCE</p> <p>How important do you think it is for a democracy that immigrants get the right to vote in national elections [even if they are not / only once they become] citizens of that country? (<i>Immigrants vote</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION</p> <p>How difficult or easy do you think it is for immigrants to get the right to vote in national elections in [country]? Use this card where 0 is far too difficult and 10 is far too easy.*</p> <p>PREFERENCE</p> <p>There are differing opinions on whether or not everyone should be free to express their political views openly in a democracy, even if they are extreme. Which <b>one</b> of the statements on this card describes what you think should happen in a democracy? <u>In a democracy:</u></p> <p>Everyone should be free to express their political views openly, even if they are extreme</p> <p>Those who hold extreme political views should <u>not be free</u> to express them openly</p> <p>IMPORTANTANCE</p> <p>And how important do you think it is for a democracy that those who hold extreme political views [are / are not] free to express them openly? (<i>Freedom speech</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION</p> <p>To what extent do you think people in [country] are free to express their political views openly, even if they are extreme? Use this card where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely.</p> <p>IMPORTANTANCE</p> <p>How important do you think it is for a democracy that newspapers are free to publish news or criticisms, even if they are damaging to governments? (<i>Freedom media</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION</p> <p>Newspapers in [country] are free to publish news or criticisms, even if they are damaging to the government.</p>	<p>participation</p>
<p>freedom</p>	

Equality	<p>IMPORTANCE How important do you think it is for a democracy that the differences in income between the rich and the poor are not too large? (<i>Social equality</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION Do you think the income differences between the rich and poor in [country] are too small or too large? Use this card where 0 is far too small and 10 is far too large.*</p>
Welfare	<p>IMPORTANCE How important do you think it is for a democracy that governments protect all citizens against poverty? (<i>Protection poverty</i>)</p> <p>EVALUATION To what extent do you think governments in [country] protect all citizens against poverty? 0 Not at all 10 Completely</p>

\* Normative evaluations

0 All importance items have an 11-point scale: 0 'not at all important' 10 'extremely important'. The same with evaluation items.

Table A3.10 The impact of each attribute on satisfaction with democracy – ESS

	UK	Russia	UK	Russia	UK	Russia	UK	Russia	UK	Russia	UK	Russia	UK	Russia
Ev: Elections	0.444 (0.708)	1.015** (0.446)												
Cog: Elections	-0.0745 (0.382)	-0.0129 (0.171)												
Int: elections	0.0142 (0.0727)	-0.0471 (0.0469)												
Ev: deliberation			0.468 (0.462)	1.585*** (0.457)										
Cog: deliberation			0.197 (0.190)	0.210 (0.200)										
Int: deliberation			-0.0258 (0.0496)	-0.137*** (0.0492)										
Ev: Alternative parties					0.210 (0.376)	0.180 (0.436)								
Cog: Alternative parties					-0.0255 (0.163)	-0.335* (0.201)								
Int: Alternative parties					0.0115 (0.0412)	0.0245 (0.0469)								
Ev: Opposition free							1.080 (0.736)	1.321*** (0.396)						
Cog: Opposition free							0.582 (0.407)	0.0614 (0.168)						
Int: Opposition free							-0.0856 (0.0761)	-0.105** (0.0422)						
Ev: Transparency media									0.0147 (0.598)	1.192*** (0.393)				
Cog: Transparency media									-0.0340 (0.272)	0.0194 (0.146)				
Int: Transparency media									0.0168 (0.0623)	-0.0752* (0.0412)				
Ev: Freedom media											0.308 (0.652)	1.568*** (0.359)		
Cog: Freedom media											0.0117 (0.337)	0.101 (0.131)		
Int: Freedom media											-0.00982 (0.0688)	-0.128*** (0.0380)		
Ev: Representation minorities													0.960* (0.550)	0.452 (0.302)
Cog: Representation minorities													0.431 (0.296)	-0.146 (0.101)
Int: Representation minorities													-0.0549 (0.0582)	0.00717 (0.0333)
Constant	1.796 (3.638)	1.807 (1.636)	2.468 (1.700)	0.394 (1.818)	4.089*** (1.477)	4.904*** (1.842)	-2.082 (3.770)	1.510 (1.537)	5.014* (2.582)	1.602 (1.368)	3.873 (3.091)	1.181 (1.210)	-1.175 (2.670)	3.249*** (0.855)
Observations	385	372	380	375	380	375	386	371	384	386	385	383	377	340
R-squared	0.257	0.344	0.052	0.127	0.085	0.169	0.080	0.158	0.034	0.240	0.041	0.192	0.188	0.224

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1