EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

EUI Working Paper **SPS** No. 2004/19

**Explaining Public Support for
European Integration in Eight Member States:
the Role of National Pride, European Identity,
Nationalism and Xenophobia**

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Article Title: Explaining Public Support for European Integration in Eight Member States: the Role of National Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Xenophobia

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Word Count: 7899 (including endnotes and references but not tables/figures)

Abstract: The national traditions dimension to explaining support for European integration is of burgeoning interest amongst social scientists. I develop a socio-psychological model of support and investigate the impact of national pride, European identity, nationalism and xenophobia for European Union respondents surveyed in the International Social Survey Programme 1995 National Identity dataset. The results confirm that racist respondents and those with a strong sense of national rather than European identity are less likely to support European integration. Furthermore, there is a negative relationship between nationalism and support in the data, while national pride is shown to be related positively to support for integration.

Introduction

The post-war formation of the European Communities was an undeniably elite-minded project. A historian of this period might give prominence to visionary statesmen or political entrepreneurs such as Schuman and would doubtless also be minded to stress the role of a wider class of policy-makers, administrators and economic interests in the United States of America and the governments of the 'Original Six'. However, from a long list of biographies, memories and histories one notable actor is absent: the general public, whether in the form of a pan-European consciousness, as a significant national or pan-national political party or movement or even in a more radical, revolutionary guise.

This initial pattern of events is adopted in many of the International Relations-based theories of European integration, where the main determinants of the direction and pace of integration are policy-makers and institutional actors, so that only a limited role is assigned to the mass public. Writing in the neo-functionalist tradition, Lindberg and Scheingold notably characterise the public as providing a 'permissive consensus' on European integration, allowing policy-makers to proceed unchecked (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). There is, however, a strong case for the public as an influence on integrative developments through the media of referenda, elections and opinion polls. Significantly, many theorists now allocate the public a greater role: public displays of contrition from Ernst Haas, a prominent neofunctionalist scholar who in early variants of his theory strongly criticised the use of public opinion surveys (Haas, 1975), and an increasing domestic politics element to many realist theories of integration have been joined by later approaches such as multi-level governance, which take a more heterogeneous stance towards actors in the European Union (EU) decision-making process.

This recognition of the role of the public in (theories of) European integration has spurred interest in explaining variation in mass support for integration. In this article I start from the

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premise that existent theories of support for European integration, not least those adopting a utilitarian approach, cannot explain all variation in support. I develop a model of support for European integration based on socio-psychological theories of identity where I hypothesise that respondents holding nationalist or racist attitudes or with a more national than European sense of identity will be more likely to be hostile towards the EU, as it can be thought of as an 'outgroup'. National pride is included in the analysis, although I do not anticipate a link between pride and support on the basis that there is no necessary conflict between pride in the nation and support for the EU. The impact of these factors is tested on individual-level data measuring support for the EU among eight European Union member states using International Social Science Program (ISSP) 1995 National Identity survey data. The results of a logit model of support are presented at the pooled and country level and demonstrate that a relatively national identity, nationalism and xenophobia do indeed partially explain mass attitudes towards the EU. Contrary to expectations, national pride is shown to be positively related to support for integration, and I submit that this may be due to changing conceptions of nation identity so that a European component is often now incorporated.

This article has a further six sections. In the first of these a typology of theories of support for European integration is put forward and the main theories discussed while the second develops a model of support for integration based on the socio-psychological literature. In the next section the model and choice of data is explained. In the following two sections, the findings from the statistical analysis of the ISSP data are presented at the pooled and country level. In the last selection I draw on the results of the statistical analysis to draw some conclusions regarding public opinion towards European integration.

Public Support for the European Union

In order to better characterise the existent literature in the field I distinguish between explanations of support based on national level variables and individual level variables. A further utilitarian/affective distinction can also be drawn. This utilitarian/affective dimension draws on Easton's approach to a respondent's evaluation of a political object, where specific (utilitarian) responses are thought of as being rational and political system

output-related, while diffuse (affective) responses are more value-based, generalised and affective (Easton, 1965).

Utilitarian explanations of public support for the EU predominate in the literature. In the national level category some of the more sophisticated empirical research shows net EU budget receipts and especially the level of intra-EU trade to be significant in explaining cross-national support (Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 1997; Gabel, 1998). Individual level utilitarian theories of support have focused on the individual payoffs for occupational groups such as farmers and fishermen that benefit disproportionally from the EU budget (Bosch and Newton in Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995). Yet utilitarian approaches cannot explain all variation in support; for instance, Eichenberg and Dalton include dummy variables in their regression analysis for those countries whose patterns of support, in the words of the authors, depart significantly from the general model. The effects of these so-called 'national traditions' dwarf the impact of the economic variables (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, p. 522; see also Gabel, 1998, p. 134).

Affective explanations of support have tended to focus on the impact of social cleavages, the primary of which relates to Inglehart's distinction between two value-orientations: materialists and postmaterialists, where the former give priority to material factors such as physical security and the latter are more directed by the need for belonging and intellectual fulfilment which the EU allegedly provides (Inglehart, 1977). There is, however, little empirical support for the resultant hypothesis that the more post-materialist the value-climate the higher we can expect support for integration to be (Janssen, 1991). Other authors have addressed the impact of political allegiance, sex, age and religion on support for integration (Nelson and Guth, 2000; Nelson and Guth, 2003; Ray, 1996).

In the remainder of this article I focus on the individual level, affective dimension to support, the different facets of which form a burgeoning area of interest amongst social scientists. Several theorists have argued on the basis of cognitive and social psychological approaches that individuals' perceptions of national government performance inform their opinions on the EU (Franklin, Marsh *et al.*, 1994; Franklin, Van Der Eijk *et al.*, 1995). Specifically, Anderson argues that in the absence of knowledge and information on the part of citizens about the EU 'proxies', in this case national governments, are used to evaluate the EU (1998;

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Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Kritzinger, 2003). Citizens who are satisfied with their national governments are more likely to support the EU. Other researchers have pursued the link between feelings of national identity and support for the EU or one its policies, typically Economic and Monetary Union (Carey, 2002; Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001; Müller-Peters, 1998; Christin and Trechsel, 2002). Finally, McLaren focuses on the link between hostility towards minorities and support for the EU (2002; see also Carey, 2002). I build on this research by developing a model of support for integration based on socio-psychological theories of identity that examines the role of national pride, national identity, nationalism and xenophobia in explaining attitudes towards the EU. I engage with all three of the facets of the national traditions dimension to EU support outlined above using the ISSP 1995 National Identity survey data, which contains an unprecedented number of detailed questions on the subject areas at hand. Moreover, there is very little literature that successfully links nationalism to support for integration. Müller-Peters shows that EU respondents holding nationalist attitudes are less likely to be in favour of the EURO (1998). Yet it is clear that attitudes towards the EURO are not concomitant with attitudes towards integration. So, the results are presented at the country and pooled level for all the countries included in the survey data.

A Socio-Psychological Model of Support for European Integration

Social identity theory refers to a body of social psychological research into inter-group relations. The key insight provided by this theory is that the act of social categorisation by itself, seemingly a purely cognitive division of persons into groups, is often sufficient to produce discriminatory behaviour in favour of the 'in-group' over the 'out-group'. An individual applies this categorisation process in social interaction for similar purposes as in basic perceptual activity, namely as a

> "system of orientation for *self-reference*, creating and defining the individual's place in society. [It is] Individuals' 'self-definition in a social context…" (Oakes, Haslam *et al.*, 1994, p. 81).

There are many different forms of in-group to which an individual might belong or identify with, including nations, religions and races. For many of these groups, individual members may never know, meet or hear of their fellow members. Nowhere is this truer than for the

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nation, famously described by Anderson as an 'imagined community' (1983, p. 15). National outgroups are analogous to the concept of the 'Other' current in some continental philosophy and International Relations writings (Neumann and Welsh, 1991). Europe's Others are frequently constructed as territorially defined entities (America; Russia; Turkey; Asia), but also as the continent's own past of wars and nationalist rivalries (Risse, 1998, p. 12).

Social identity theory assumes that commonness between group members is accentuated by difference with regard to other communities. Group members establish 'positive distinctiveness' using stereotypes or a collection of attributes believed to characterise the members of a particular social group. While this concept does not necessarily imply bias we can see with regard to nationalism and xenophobia that stereotypes can also serve political and ideological functions.

Self-categorisation theory builds on social identity theory, where the principle of meta-contrast is used to suggest that categorisation is a dynamic, context-dependent process, determined by comparative relations within a given context (Oakes, Haslam *et al.*, 1994, p. 95). A given set of items is more likely to be categorised as a single entity to the degree that (inter-group or in-group) differences within that set of items are less than the differences between that set and others (intra-groups or out-groups) within the comparative context. The meta-contrast principle incorporates the intuition that group identities are both multiple and relative.

From this brief overview I hypothesise that respondents with a relatively European sense of identity will be more supportive of integration than those who retain a purely national orientation, where both identities constitute types of in-group belonging. This assumes that respondents link the idea of Europe with the specifics of the European Union. Lest this appear obvious, it would certainly be revealing if a relatively European sense of identity and support were shown not to be linked. Secondly, the strength of any relationship is useful appraising different affective explanations of support.

Focusing on the interrelationship between European and national identities, rather than one or the other in isolation, captures the insight from self-categorisation theory that people hold

multiple identities. However, national pride can be defined as an absolute measure of attachment to the nation as an in-group, so that the term is roughly synonymous with patriotism, or love of country[i]. On the basis that national pride is a measure of belonging, multidimensional and non-exclusive in nature I hypothesise that there is no link with support for the EU.

We can assume that nationalists, as for instance with patriots, identify strongly with the nation to which they belong. The difference is that nationalists profess a specific ideology regarding the distribution of political power. Gellner highlights that for nationalists the legitimacy of the state is provided by the cultural unit, that is, the nation. He writes

> "Nationalism is a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social bond. Whatever principles of authority may exist between people depend for their legitimacy on the fact that the members of the group concerned are of the same culture...." (1997, p. 4)

I hypothesise that, all other things being equal, higher levels of nationalist sentiment nationalists are linked with lower levels of support for the EU as the EU undermines the sovereignty of nation-states and allows other national groupings a measure of influence in domestic policy-making. Against this, some theorists have argued that the EU has strengthened the nation-state (see Milward *et al.*, 1992; Moravcsik, 1994). Moreover, there is a distinction between nationalist sentiment and the state. In the ISSP data Spain and the United Kingdom are clear examples of states that contain recognised, stateless nations within their confines and I separate out the statistical results by minority nation (Catalonia, the Basque Country, Scotland and Wales). Here it may be that the EU is seen as an ally in achieving statehood for 'post-sovereignty' nationalists from certain minority nations, either because the EU functions as a prop for nation-states or for the quite opposite reason that European integration has contributed to the demise of centralised nation-states (Lynch, 1996, p. 14). Other stateless nations may be more ambivalent towards the EU, possibly the result of historic traditions emphasising pactism, accommodation and shared authority (Haesly, 2001). A third 'hard-line' option is that minority nationalism and European integration are incompatible, on the grounds that European institutions undermine state sovereignty.

Finally, racists are understood to be predisposed towards certain 'races' while at the same time consigning other such units to out-group status. I take the view that racists will be less

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likely to support the EU because of its association with influxes of members of the out-groups that they are hostile towards ('perceived threat'). Certainly the free movement of persons forms a key part of the 1985 Schengen Agreement, incorporated into the EU framework from May 1999 as a protocol to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, and the 1986 Single European Act's focus on an internal market. More fundamentally, a cosmopolitan value system underpins the whole EU project: Article O of the Treaty of the European Union states that any European state may apply to become a member of the Union.

Operationalisation of Model Variables

I select the ISSP 1995 National Identity survey, comprising cross-national, individual level data collected over a single time period. Relative to the Eurobarometer survey this data set is particularly successful in measuring the concepts being tested here and contains a broad, representative sample of European Union member states (Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Spain). The combined data is weighted by population so as to allow EU-wide conclusions to be drawn from the eight countries in question.

Relative Identity is operationalised using a single scale constructed from two measures of closeness to one's country and Europe by subtracting responses to these two questions. Combining the two questions allows us to capture respondents' attachment to multiple territorial foci. So, this is not an absolute measure of European or national identity but a relative measure, where a respondent might hold, say, a relatively European, national or mixed European/national identity. The full question texts and coding strategies for this and other concepts are available in section A.1 of the Appendix and Table 3 in the main text.

National pride is operationalised using a series of ten questions that address a respondents' pride in different aspects of his or her country. Given the number of questions taken I employ exploratory factor analysis. The final, rotated solution is shown in table 1.

Table 1 Factor Analysis of National Pride (1995 ISSP)

Are you proud of…?	Political Pride	Cultural Pride
Way democracy works	.73	.11
Political influence in the world	.65	.30
Economic achievements	.64	.19
Social security system	.68	.04
Scientific achievements	.36	.42
Sports achievements	.17	.63
Arts achievements	.08	.62
Armed forces	.24	.56
History	.09	.62
Fair treatment of groups	.55	.26
Eigenvalue	3.77	1.58
Percentage of Explained Variance	37.70	15.81
Cronbach's alpha	0.77	0.71
Chi-squared Goodness of Fit (df)	1430.11 (26)	

Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood; Rotation method: Varimax

Variables are constructed from the two distinct factors that emerge, with the first group of factors (questions (3)-(6)) seemingly referring to a more political dimension to national pride while the second highlighted group (questions (8)-(11)) appear to refer to a more cultural element. Questions (7) and (12) load to a sizeable extent on both factors and so are not allocated to one or the other latent factor. These findings are confirmed by Müller-Peters who extracts two factors from a very similar battery of questions in a pan-European survey (1998, p. 709), while Almond and Verba also distinguish between political and non-political pride on very similar lines (1963, p. 65)[ii].

Nationalism is operationalised by constructing a Likert scale from the three questions that appear a valid measure of the moral self-righteousness dimension of nationalist sentiment, with an emphasis on international rather than domestic sovereignty concerns.

The ISSP survey offers a number of questions broadly covering xenophobic and racist attitudes, without it being entirely clear which of the two concepts is being tapped, or both. For these questions the outgroups mentioned are 'immigrants', 'refugees' and simply 'groups'. I thus argue that xenophobic attitudes are most likely being tested, although it is worth noting that in every one of the EU 12 except Belgium and Luxembourg the number of non-EU foreigners as a percentage of the total population was greater than the number of EU foreigners as a percentage of the population in 1992 (Melich, 1995). I perform a factor analysis on these questions with the results presented below.

Table 2 Factor Analysis of Xenophobia and Racism (1995 ISSP)

Question	Xenophobia	Factor 2
Help minorities to preserve traditions	.16	*.84*
Maintain traditions or adapt in society	.17	.39
Immigrants increase crime	*-.64*	.12
Immigrants good for the economy	*.56*	.21
Immigrants take jobs away from people	*-.60*	.10
Immigrants bring new ideas/culture	*.59*	.19
Refugees should be allowed to stay	*.48*	.22
Number of immigrants should be increased	*.68*	.25
Eigenvalue	3.20	1.10
Percentage of Explained Variance	39.94	13.73
Cronbach's alpha	0.78	0.52
Chi-squared Goodness of Fit (df)	505.70 (13)	

Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood; Rotation method: Varimax

The first latent variable extracted is used to construct the xenophobia variable, where all items and not just those highlighted in bold are included (mean = 0.00; variance = 0.75; range = 5.48). The other extracted factor is ignored in this research because of the weak eigenvalue and poor reliability, doubtless partially due to the poor factor loading of question (17)[iii].

A dependent variable is chosen that asks respondents whether or not they 'benefit' from the European Union, thus inviting respondents to evaluate the EU in relatively utilitarian terms. Testing for the impact of affective factors on integration using this dependent variable can only increase our confidence in the importance of any statistically significant affective results[iv].

A limited number of socio-economic control variables are also added to the model as the ISSP survey allows. Because of missing data for some of the EU member states subjective social class, political affiliation and income are only included in the relevant country-level analyses. For ease of reference the coding and summary description of the variables included in the models are summarised in table 3 below.

Table 3 Variable Coding (1995 ISSP)

VARIABLE	DESCRIPTION
Dependent/Independent Variables	
National Pride	Factor analysis scale [mean = 0.00; variance = 0.78 (political pride), 0.71 (cultural pride); range 4.77 (PP), 4.88 (CP)]. Levels of pride increase positively with variable score
Nationalism	Variable split into quartiles derived from Likert scale (scored from 3-15). Levels of nationalism increase positively with variable score [mean = 2.55; variance = 1.14]
Minority Nationalism	1=Favours unitary position 2=Holds separatist attitudes. Data on Ireland initially missing; coded to 1.07. Interaction variables created for Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Basque Country by combining minority nationalism response with regional origin of respondent as appropriate
Xenophobia	Factor analysis scale [mean = 0.00; variance = 0.75]. Xenophobia increases with variable score
Support for European Integration	Bivariate scoring - either pro/anti-integration or attitude/non-attitude holding. 1=Pro-European or attitude holder respectively
Control Variables	
Sex	1=Male, 0=Female
Age	From 14 to 96 years. Coded as cohorts (1 - ≤29;2 - 30-39; 3 - 40-49; 4 - 50-59; 5 - 60+)
Education	Coded from 1-7 (1 – no education; 2 – incomplete primary; 3 – primary completed; 4 – incomplete secondary; 5- secondary completed; 6 – incomplete university/semi-higher; 7- university completed). Some national variations apply.
Country dummies	With Spain as the omitted country.
Religion	Coded from 1-3 (1 - Protestant and Lutheran respondents, 2 - Roman Catholic, 3 - No religion professed). Categorical variable, with no religion as the base category.
Occupation	ISEI coding from 16 to 90. Occupational status increases with score. Data missing for GB, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands (coded to the mean of 43.5).
Occupation Dummy	1=no occupation data available, 0=occupation data available
Farmers	1=Agricultural worker; 0=non-agricultural worker
Income	Coded as quintiles (1-5). This is a measure of a respondents' relative income where higher value equals greater wealth. Italy data missing
Political Affiliation	Coded from 1-6 (1 – Far left; 2 – Left, centre left; 3 - Right, conservative; 4 – Far right; 5 – Other, Don't Know; 6 - Centre, liberal). 'N/A' and 'answer-refused' coded system-missing. Categorical variable, Left being the omitted category. No data for Italy.
Subjective Social Class	Coded from 1-7 (1 – LC; 2 – WC; 3 - LMC; 4 - Don't know; 5 – UMC; 6 – UC; 7 - MC). Categorical variable. Middle class is the base category. No data for GB or the Netherlands.

Methodology and Pooled Results

I test the model outlined above using pooled ISSP 1995 National Identity data weighted by population. The bivariate response category of the dependent variable favours the use of logit regression techniques. I present the abridged results of the logit models in table 4 below. The full regression model is presented in table A.2 in the Appendix.

Table 4 1995 ISSP Impact on Support of the Independent Variables (abridged)

		b			Odds ratio
Political Pride		0.49		**	1.64
	(	0.05	)		
Cultural Pride		0.21		**	1.24
	(	0.05	)		
Identity		0.46		**	1.58
	(	0.04	)		
Nationalist Attitudes		-0.12		**	0.89
	(	0.04	)		
Minority Nationalism		-0.40		**	0.67
	(	0.10	)		
Basque Country		-0.50		*	0.61
	(	0.21	)		
Catalonia		0.48		**	1.61
	(	0.14	)		
Scotland		0.46			1.59
	(	0.26	)		
Wales		0.29			1.34
	(	0.26	)		
Racist Attitudes		-0.64		**	0.53
	(	0.05	)		
Constant		-7.53		**	0.00
	(	1.03	)		
Number of Cases		4990			
Pseudo R^2		0.21			
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)		1235.65	(25)		

Note: Entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below.

Calculations correct to 2 decimal places

** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)

* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)

Xenophobia, nationalism and European identity act as predicted while the national pride hypothesis can be rejected. Minority nationalists also seem less likely to support European integration; the Basques in particular display strong nationalist sentiments while the more receptive feelings of many Catalans might be interpreted as a 'post-sovereign' approach to nationality. The model fits the data reasonably well, correctly predicting at least 75% of cases in the samples, while the χ^2 statistic is strongly significant.

One can gauge the explanatory power of the key independent variables by noting the effect of their inclusion on the logit model. In table 5 I present three logit models, the first with only the country dummies included, the second model with the main independent variables added, the third model being the standard logit results presented above. To allow one to compare the log likelihood results between models, I keep the number of cases constant between models by excluding those cases not included in the standard logit model.

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Table 5 1995 ISSP Independent variable impact on country dummies

	Country dummies only			Country dummies + main variables			Standard Model		
	b		Odds ratio	b		Odds ratio	b		Odds ratio
		*			*				
Germany	0.90	*	2.46	1.02	*	2.78	1.05	**	2.85
	(0.09)			(0.12)			(0.15)		
					*				
Great Britain	0.14		1.15	0.42	*	1.52	0.33	*	1.39
	(0.10)			(0.12)			(0.16)		
Austria	-0.18		0.84	-0.32		0.73	-0.29		0.75
	(0.18)			(0.20)			(0.21)		
		*			*				
Italy	2.15	*	8.61	3.12	*	22.69	2.99	**	19.82
	(0.11)			(0.14)			(0.15)		
		*			*				
Ireland	2.28	*	9.77	2.09	*	8.09	2.30	**	10.00
	(0.40)			(0.41)			(0.42)		
		*			*				
Netherlands	1.36	*	3.91	1.24	*	3.47	1.20	**	3.30
	(0.18)			(0.20)			(0.22)		
Sweden	-0.09		0.91	0.12		1.13	0.02		1.02
	(0.20)			(0.22)			(0.25)		
Number of Cases	4990			4990			4990		
Log Likelihood	-2593.22			-2297.10			-2284.57		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	618.34 (7)			1210.58 (17)			1236.65 (25)		
Pseudo R^2	0.11			0.21			0.21		

Note: Entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below.

Calculations correct to 2 decimal places

** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)

* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)

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From the increases in log likelihood between models it appears that the key independent variables are good predictors of support compared to the other variables included. The control variables do not add much value to the model, and only occupation and the occupation dummy are statistically significant (see table A.2 in the appendix). We can thus reject Inglehart's hypotheses that that younger generations will be more pro-European both because of the link between affluence and education, which leads to higher levels of political skills, and because of post-war socialisation against nationalism. Similarly, the impact of farmers on integration appears muted.

Observing the inter-country differences in support, one of the original spurs for investigating affective approaches to integration, we see that the inclusion of the explanatory variables in the second model seem if anything to have increased the coefficients for the four statistically significant country dummies in the first model. However, given that the inclusion of the key independent variables improves the overall model, I suggest that this can be explained by the more or less equal effect of nationalism *et al.* on each country, so that the relative differences in support still remain. In the case of Great Britain, controlling for the key independent variables reveals a significant country dummy coefficient that was not apparent before[v].

To provide a more intuitive measure of independent variable impact one can translate logit regression coefficients into expected or predicted values of the dependent variable, with the additional benefit of a measure of uncertainty around this mean result, using the simulation methodology of King, Tomz and Wittenberg (1998). On this approach one approximates the mean of the dependent variable through drawing simulations of the parameters of the model estimated from their asymptotic sampling distribution. In CLARIFY, the Stata add-in which allows one to apply simulation techniques to data, I apply the default number of draws (1000). I then set the characteristics of an average respondent from the standard logit model: age, sex, education, religion and the ISEI occupation variables are set to their modal values (giving a 40-49 year old female, Roman Catholic respondent, with an incomplete secondary school education). I remove the country dummies and assume that the farmer and ISEI dummies are set to 0, with the occupation variable set to the mean. As more or less continuous variables, political and cultural pride, European identity, nationalism, minority nationalism and xenophobia are set to their means, while it is assumed that the average respondent is neither Basque, Catalan, Scottish nor Welsh. The variables are then varied

individually by small increments, and probability and 95% confidence intervals plotted against the variable score. Data points that represent a one standard deviation shift either side of the mean independent variable score are marked with a circle. Where the mean is not more or less 0 (-0.65 for figure 3 and 2.55 for figure 4), this data point is marked on the x-axis. We can see the results in figures 1 to 5 below. All the data points are statistically significant, and make use of aggregate weighted data.

Figure 1 Probability of Support Integration by Political Pride Score (1995 ISSP)

Figure 2 Probability of Supporting Integration by Cultural Pride Score (1995 ISSP)


Figure 3 Probability of Supporting Integration by European Identity Score (1995 ISSP)

Figure 4 Probability of Supporting Integration by Nationalism Score (1995 ISSP)

Figure 5 Probability of Supporting Integration by Xenophobia Score (1995 ISSP)

The charts show the positive effect of political and cultural pride on support to be rather similar, while relative Europeanness has the strongest effect on support of all the variables. For nationalism and xenophobia, the percentage negative change in support from a standard deviation change in the independent variable is similar in each case, as well as being roughly the same as the equivalent figures for political and cultural pride.

Another interpretation of the figures above concerns the variation in responses for a one standard deviation change in support either side of the mean. That is, in figure 4 a one standard deviation shift in nationalism covers almost the entire response spectrum, so that there is far less consensus amongst respondents than, say, concerning xenophobia. So, it appears that there is considerable variation in nationalist attitudes relative to the other concepts. Certainly, this fits with the notion that nationalism is a quite contested concept; by contrast, even if there are a small number of extreme racists in many societies, most people do not share their views.

Turning to reflect further on the rejection on the hypothesis that pride in one's country and support for integration are positively linked, it may be that pride is really tapping into system legitimacy, so that the results here add to the debate concerning satisfaction with democracy and support for integration (Anderson, 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Kritzinger, 2003). However, while one might understand pride in the 'way democracy works' in a country (question (3)) as a measure of system legitimacy it is unclear why this is the case for pride in, say, a country's 'achievements in the arts and literature' (question (9)). I instead propose that the relationship reflects the degree to which national identity now incorporates a European component. This chimes with the work of Risse *et al.*, who argue that pro-European changes in citizens' identities often find their outlet in a realignment of attitudes towards national or regional symbols and institutions (1999). That is, one does not expect to find the emergence of a common European identity overcoming national identities, but rather the evolution of collective European identities in addition to and strongly related with nation-state and regional identities. This approach nevertheless implies a more long-standing and dynamic causality than I am able to model here so that this appears a useful area for further research.

Country Level Results

The country-level permutations from the pooled data are presented in table A.3 in the Appendix, where the models include subjective social class, income and political affiliation where data permits (see table 3 for more details).

We can see that the pooled findings are broadly confirmed, with political pride, European identity and xenophobia significant for most of the eight countries. Italy is the only country in which neither political nor cultural pride is significant. However, nationalism is only significant in Great Britain, and cultural pride is only significant in the Netherlands and Austria. On reflection, the negative, insignificant cultural pride coefficient for Great Britain is not anomalous if one considers that Britain is the only country in which nationalist attitudes are significant. Could it be that pride in sport, history, the armed forces and so forth may have acquired nationalist connotations in Britain, just as has pride in one's currency (Routh and Burgoyne, 1998)? Moreover, the finding that nationalism is only significant in Great Britain shows that, for Austria and Sweden, both relatively new entrants to the European Union in 1995 and with extremely low levels of support for membership, nationalism would not seem like the decisive factor in explaining support. At least for Sweden, a more decisive factor is surely the debate over welfare state reform (Goldmann and Gilland, 2001). This is evidenced by the strong impact of far left respondents (categorised in the survey as Green Party supporters) and especially Conservatives on support (see table A.2).

Sweden and Italy are the only countries in the survey where minority nationalism is significant. The coefficient is strongly negative in both cases: for Italy the anti-integration minority nationalists in question might be Lega Nord or perhaps the rather less numerous real national minorities in Italy, in Trentino-Alto Adige, Val d'Aosta and Fruili-Venezia-Giulia. For Sweden, the only minority nationalist voter block would seem to be the Scanians. Although, it might seem surprising that minority nationalism is not significant in Great Britain or Spain, the dummy variables for Catalonia and the Basque country do achieve significance in the pooled model, suggesting that while the difference in support derived from residing in either of these regions is not significant within Spain, where

Question 25 reveals that support for the EU is fairly lukewarm (55%), at the EU level this difference does become significant (mean - 71%).

The control variables displayed in table A.3 of the Appendix are not of core theoretical interest and indeed goodness-of-fit tests suggest that the controls themselves do not add much to our understanding of support. Nonetheless, we can see that in Italy females are more likely to be pro-European than males, while the lower one's education, the more likely one is to support integration. For Germany older males tend to be more likely to support integration. It is not possible to discern from a single-period dataset whether this is a life cycle or cohort effect. Spain is the only country in which farmers have a significant impact on support for integration. Counter-intuitively, farmers are far less likely to support integration than non-farmers. One possible explanation is the bias of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) towards northern European foodstuffs. Recent expenditure by the EAGGF on olive oil constitutes only 6.6% of total spending (Spain is the world's largest producer of olive oil) while 43% is spent on arable crop support (Official Journal of the European Communities C 349, 1999, p. xii).

Conclusion

In this article I demonstrate that existing explanations of support for European integration can be usefully complemented by the affective variables political and cultural pride, nationalism and above all European identity and xenophobia. In some instances these findings confirm the existing literature in the field: McLaren (2002) and Carey (2002) point to the importance of perceived threats to identity from other cultures while Trechsel (2002) and Carey (2002) highlight national identity as an explanatory factor. The results, however, breaks new ground in identifying the importance of political and cultural pride and as distinct from the 'proxy' approaches of Anderson (1998) *et al.*, the role of nationalism and the relative explanatory power of all these affective variables through their consideration in one model. Additionally, the ISSP National Identity dataset acts as a useful check on the validity of findings which up until the present have typically relied on the Eurobarometer survey series.

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Caveats to these results include the lack of (especially economic) control variables, and to this we can add the lack of comparison over different time periods that is a particular strength of the Eurobarometer surveys. One might also add the opinions may well have changed since 1995, the date of the execution of the survey. It is to be regretted that the ISSP survey does not include other European countries renowned to be jealous of sharing their sovereignty with Europe such as Denmark, or even such countries that have not joined the Union as yet where concerns over sovereignty might readily be seen as a reason why.

One of the implications of the results presented herein is that given the high percentage of Europeans who openly declare themselves to be racist and the strength of the xenophobia coefficient in the standard model such attitudes are a clear obstacle towards increased support for the EU[vi]. This is a tonic to the oft-heard argument that the best way to increase support for European integration is to further a European identity. Moreover, while relative European identity does have a powerful effect on public support such Europeans are few in number[vii], while the findings concerning national pride suggest that 'Europeanisation' proceeds through the alteration of national identities rather than the superimposition of a European identity. Nevertheless, while the positive relationship between political and cultural pride and support for European integration could be a manifestation of Risse *et al.*'s expectation that national identities adapt themselves in the face of changing perceptions of Europe, confirmation of this must await further research. Finally, the body of evidence concerning the impact of affective factors (and public opinion more generally) would suggest that theorists of regional integration start to integrate these findings into their work.

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[i] Many scholars miss this understanding of national pride as conceptually distinct from other affective variables. Carey includes a Eurobarometer question on national pride in a measure of national identity (2002, p. 394). Charillon and Ivaldi (1996) and Dogan (1994) use national pride questions in the Eurobarometer and World Values Survey data as indicators of nationalism.

[ii] A possible criticism is that this measure attracts selective responses, or respondents who are in themselves only interested in science, sport and so on. I argue that national identity necessarily takes as its content individual dimensions of national pride, so that there is a national identity or pride component to discrete activities, institutions, symbols and traditions. Nevertheless, one can test for this possibility by performing a logit regression using the variables from the final model on two dummy variables created from political pride (question (3)) and cultural pride (questions (8)) where 'don't know' and 'can't choose' responses are coded one, and all other responses are coded zero. For reasons of brevity the results are not displayed, although in both cases women are significantly more likely not to hold an attitude. One should remember, however, that response rates are high overall; the lowest figure for the pride questions is 89 per cent. There 'selective' responses might instead be explained by response trends amongst non-attitude holders and I do not take this matter further here.

[iii] Because of the similarity between the four independent variables it is helpful to know the correlations amongst these various measures: Political (PP), Cultural Pride (CP) (0.13**); PP, National Identity (NI) (-0.06**); PP, Nationalism (Nat) (0.22**); PP, Xenophobia (R)(-0.18**); CP, NI (-0.17**); CP, Nat (0.35**); CP, R (0.12**); NI-Nat (-0.17**); NI-R (-0.09**); N-R (0.28**). Factor analysis of the questions used for the independent variables reveal four underlying factors that appear to correspond with political and cultural pride, identity and nationalism.

[iv] As a simple check on the validity of the dependent variable the aggregate level analysis is repeated using as dependent variable a question measuring respondents' desires to either unite fully or preserve one's country's independence from the EU. The results are similar. Nevertheless, I choose not take this question as the principal dependent variable as it fails to differentiate the sentiments of respondents who are anti-EU from those who are broadly pro-EU but are not in favour of the closer form of union implied in the question. Data is also missing for Germany and Sweden.

[v] The dummy variable coefficients are calculated with reference to the omitted variable, in this case Spain. Altering the omitted country variable does not substantially change the findings.

[vi] According to the European Commission report 'Racism and Xenophobia in Europe' the cumulative percentage of those declaring themselves to be 'quite' or 'very' racist is 33 per

cent for the European Union as a whole (Brika, Lemaine, Jackson, 1997). For the ISSP data the results are no less startling. 41.7 cent of all respondents 'agreed' or 'agreed strongly' with the statement that immigrants take jobs away from people, while only 6 per cent of all respondents believed that immigrant numbers should be increased either 'a little' or 'a lot'. For both these two questions, the mean response was statistically significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed test).

[vii] Only 429 of 9802 cases are coded as relatively pro-European (scoring between 1-3 on the -3 to 3 question scale).

Appendix

A.1 Operationalisation of Model Variables

Relative identity

"How close do you feel to…? (Very close, close, not very close, not close at all, can't choose/don't know)"

      (1) Your country

      (2) Europe

A single scale constructed from two measures of closeness to one's country and Europe by subtracting responses to these two questions. To do this the 'can't choose/don't know' category is coded as missing, and the remaining responses to question (1) coded from 1 to 4, where 4 refers to 'very close' feelings towards one's country. Question (2) is coded from –1 to –4, where –4 refers to 'very close' feelings towards Europe. In this way, a single scale is constructed from 3 to –3, where –3 captures greater attachment to the nation than Europe, and 0 implies equal attachment to Europe and the nation.

National Pride

"How proud are you of (R's country) in each of the following?" (Very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud, not proud at all, can't choose/don't know)

      (3) the way democracy works.

      (4) its political influence in the world.

      (5) its economic achievements.

      (6) its social security system.

      (7) its scientific and technological achievements.

      (8) its achievements in sports.

      (9) its achievements in the arts and literature.

      (10) its armed forces.

      (11) its history.

(12) its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society .

The responses to the three questions are coded from one through four, where four signifies the most proud response ('agree strongly') and the 'can't choose/don't know' responses are dropped.

Nationalism

"How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly)"

> (13) "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the people in (R's country)."
>
> (14) "Generally, (R's country) is a better country than most other countries."
>
> (15) "People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong."

A Likert scale running from three to fifteen is constructed from the questions, higher scores indicating higher levels of nationalist sentiment (mean = 2.55; variance = 1.14). This is then transformed into more easily-interpretable quartiles. The internal reliability of the three questions is a reasonable 0.68 (Cronbach's Alpha). To account for minority nationalist attitudes I take include following measure, as well as interaction variables for respondents that choose response (2) to this variable and reside in Wales, Scotland, Catalonia or the Basque country respectively:

(16) "Which of the two statements comes closer to your own view?

> It is essential that (R's country) remains one (nation/state/country).
>
> Parts of (R's country) should be allowed to become fully separate if they choose to."

As this question is not asked in Ireland I replace Irish missing cases with the average score (1.07 or a little over 6 per cent of respondents) of the two other countries in the ISSP survey, Austria and the Netherlands, with no separatist movements to speak of.

Xenophobia

(17) "Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into larger society. Which of these views comes closer to your own?

> It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions.
> It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society."

"How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?" (Agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly)

> (18) "Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions."
> (19) "Immigrants increase crime rates."
> (20) "Immigrants are generally good for (R's country's) economy?"
> (21) "Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in (R's country)."
> (22) "Immigrants make (R's country) more open to new ideas and cultures."
> (23) "Refugees who have suffered political repression in their own country should be allowed to stay in (R's country)?"

(24) "Do you think the number of immigrants to (R's country) nowadays should be...?" (Increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, reduced a lot).

Dependent Variable

(25) "Generally speaking, would you say that (R's country) benefits or does not benefit from being a member of the European Union?" (Benefits, Does not benefit, Have never heard of the EU, Don't Know/Can't choose)

I recode the dependent variable so that only positive and negative responses remain, where the 'Don't Know' or 'Have never heard of' survey responses might represent

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either non-attitudinal responses or balanced, middle-way responses from those who have carefully weighed up both sides of the integration argument and cannot come down on either side. I note that the dependent variable so constructed varies for all cases with support being markedly higher in some countries than others, from 91 per cent support for integration in Italy to 47 per cent support in Austria.

Table A.2 1995 ISSP Impact on Support of the Independent Variables (Pooled Data)

		b			*Odds ratio*
Political Pride		0.49		**	1.64
	(	0.05	)		
Cultural Pride		0.21		**	1.24
	(	0.05	)		
Identity		0.46		**	1.58
	(	0.04	)		
Nationalist Attitudes		-0.12		**	0.89
	(	0.04	)		
Minority Nationalism		-0.40		**	0.67
	(	0.10	)		
Basque Country		-0.50		*	0.61
	(	0.21	)		
Catalonia		0.48		**	1.61
	(	0.14	)		
Scotland		0.46			1.59
	(	0.26	)		
Wales		0.29			1.34
	(	0.26	)		
Racist Attitudes		-0.64		**	0.53
	(	0.05	)		
Germany		1.05		**	2.85
	(	0.15	)		
Great Britain		0.33		*	1.39
	(	0.16	)		
Austria		-0.29			0.75
	(	0.21	)		

	b			Odds ratio
Italy	2.99		**	19.82
	(	0.15	)	
Ireland	2.30		**	10.00
	(	0.42	)	
Netherlands	1.20		**	3.30
	(	0.22	)	
Sweden	0.02			1.02
	(	0.25	)	
Age	0.03			1.03
	(	0.03	)	
Sex	0.08			1.08
	(	0.08	)	
Education	0.02			1.02
	(	0.03	)	
Religion (Protestant)	0.12			1.13
	(	0.11	)	
Religion (Catholic)	0.13			1.14
	(	0.12	)	
ISEI score	0.02		**	1.02
	(	0.00	)	
ISEI dummy	0.22		*	1.25
	(	0.11	)	
Farmers	-0.32			0.73
	(	0.29	)	
Constant	-7.53		**	0.00
	(	1.03	)	
Number of Cases	4990			
Pseudo R^2	0.21			
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	1235.65		(25)	

Table A.3 1995 ISSP Impact on Support of the Independent Variables (Country-level Data)

	Germany			GB			Austria		
	b		*Odds ratio*	*b*		*Odds ratio*	*b*		*Odds ratio*
Political Pride	0.43	**	1.54	0.89	**	2.43	1.06	**	2.89
	(0.16)			(0.29)			(0.26)		
Cultural Pride	0.20		1.23	-0.37		0.69	0.56	*	1.75
	(0.14)			(0.28)			(0.25)		
Identity	0.40	**	1.49	0.60	**	1.82	0.67	**	1.96
	(0.13)			(0.21)			(0.20)		
Nationalist Attitudes	0.02		1.03	-0.52	*	0.59	-0.03		0.97
	(0.12)			(0.23)			(0.20)		
Minority Nationalism	-0.53		0.59	-0.19		0.83	0.58		1.78
	(0.31)			(0.42)			(0.59)		
Scotland	-			0.11		1.12	-		
				(0.59)					
Wales	-			0.12		1.13	-		
				(0.52)					
Racist Attitudes	-0.87	**	0.42	-0.98	**	0.37	-0.71	**	0.49
	(0.15)			(0.25)			(0.20)		
Age	0.20	*	1.22	-0.01		0.99	0.08		1.08
	(0.09)			(0.18)			(0.15)		
Sex	0.55	*	1.74	0.69		1.99	-0.03		0.97
	(0.24)			(0.43)			(0.36)		
Education	0.03		1.03	0.24		1.27	0.42		1.52
	(0.10)			(0.17)			(0.24)		
Religion (Protestant)	-0.03		0.97	0.94	*	2.57	0.79		2.20
	(0.27)			(0.45)			(0.98)		
Religion (Catholic)	-0.14		0.87	1.00		2.72	0.05		1.05
	(0.30)			(0.61)			(0.45)		
ISEI score	0.02	*	1.02	-			-0.01		0.99
	(0.01)						(0.02)		
ISEI dummy	-0.23		0.79	-			0.46		1.59
	(0.25)						(0.44)		
Farmers	0.01		1.01	-			-0.36		0.70
	(0.60)						(0.73)		
Income	-0.14		0.87	-0.23		0.79	0.40	*	1.49
	(0.09)			(0.16)			(0.17)		

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	Germany			GB		Austria	
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	0.27		1.31	-		-	
	(0.56)						
Political Affiliation (Centre)	0.74		2.09	-0.07	0.93	-1.04	0.35
	(0.42)			(0.54)		(0.82)	
Political Affiliation (Right)	0.91	*	2.48	-0.38	0.69	-0.96	0.38
	(0.43)			(0.54)		(0.84)	
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-0.29		0.75	-		-	
	(0.71)						
Political Affiliation (Other)	0.53		1.70	-0.40	0.67	-	
	(0.90)			(0.75)			
Sub. Class (Lower)	-0.27		0.76	-		-0.30	0.74
	(0.58)					(0.91)	
Sub. Class (Working)	-			-		-	
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-0.06		0.94	-		-0.71	0.49
	(0.26)					(0.47)	
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-			-		-	
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-0.57		0.56	-		-0.12	0.89
	(0.32)					(0.49)	
Sub. Class (Upper)	-0.64		0.53	-		-	
	(0.92)						
Constant	-0.01		0.99	1.85	6.33	-2.22	0.11
	(0.89)			(1.48)		(1.72)	
Number of Cases	637			225		258	
Pseudo R^2	0.16			0.29		0.27	
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	114.62 (24)			87.49 (17)		94.29 (20)	

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	Italy		Ireland		Netherlands	
	b	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*
Political Pride	-0.01	0.99	0.88 **	2.42	0.50 **	1.64
	(0.17)		(0.26)		(0.18)	
Cultural Pride	0.21	1.24	0.49	1.63	0.37 *	1.45
	(0.22)		(0.27)		(0.15)	
Identity	0.19	1.21	-0.28	0.76	0.64 **	1.90
	(0.15)		(0.20)		(0.14)	
Nationalist Attitudes	-0.05	0.95	-0.36	0.70	0.02	1.02
	(0.14)		(0.21)		(0.11)	
Minority Nationalism	-0.91 **	0.40	-		-0.41	0.66
	(0.31)				(0.39)	
Racist Attitudes	-0.69 **	0.50	-1.42 **	0.24	-0.26	0.77
	(0.18)		(0.25)		(0.15)	
Age	-0.13	0.87	-0.13	0.87	0.00	1.00
	(0.10)		(0.15)		(0.08)	
Sex	-0.75 *	0.47	0.01	1.01	-0.39	0.68
	(0.30)		(0.41)		(0.22)	
Education	-0.29 **	0.75	0.03	1.03	0.18 *	1.20
	(0.11)		(0.17)		(0.08)	
Religion (Protestant)	-		-7.04	0.00	-0.16	0.85
			(24.12)		(0.31)	
Religion (Catholic)	0.57	1.77	-6.85	0.00	-0.54	0.58
	(0.69)		(24.09)		(0.28)	
ISEI score	-		0.02	1.02	-	
			(0.02)			
ISEI dummy	-		-0.24	0.79	-	
			(0.56)			
Farmers	-		0.29	1.33	-	
			(0.76)			
Income	-		0.11	1.11	0.18 *	1.20
			(0.16)		(0.08)	

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	Italy			Ireland			Netherlands		
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-			-			-0.99	*	0.37
							(0.42)		
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-			-0.34		0.71	-0.04		0.96
				(0.91)			(0.33)		
Political Affiliation (Right)	-			6.55			0.28		1.33
				(39.72)			(0.34)		
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-			-			-0.18		0.83
							(0.64)		
Political Affiliation (Other)	-			-0.15		0.86	-0.48		0.62
				(0.37)			(0.29)		
Sub. Class (Lower)	-			0.73		2.07	-		
				(1.26)					
Sub. Class (Working)	-			0.19		1.21	-		
				(0.45)					
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	0.48			-0.92		0.40	-		
	0.56			(0.47)					
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-			-0.02		0.98	-		
				(1.13)					
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	0.42			-0.52		0.60	-		
	0.42			(0.86)					
Sub. Class (Upper)	1.41			5.85			-		
	1.10			44.93					
Constant	5.46	**	235.52	8.63		5600.47	1.45		4.25
	(1.15)			(24.12)			(0.78)		
Number of Cases	731			584			592		
Pseudo R^2	0.11			0.22			0.12		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	46.75 (13)			74.01 (21)			75.40 (23)		

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	Spain		Sweden	
	b	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*
Political Pride	1.14 **	3.12	0.48 **	1.62
	(0.20)		(0.18)	
Cultural Pride	0.29	1.34	0.27	1.31
	(0.20)		(0.18)	
Identity	0.42 **	1.52	0.83 **	2.30
	(0.14)		(0.15)	
Nationalist Attitudes	-0.12	0.89	-0.21	0.81
	(0.13)		(0.14)	
Minority Nationalism	-0.26	0.77	-1.24 **	0.29
	(0.44)		(0.45)	
Basque Country	-0.57	0.56	-	
	(0.44)			
Catalonia	0.41	1.51	-	
	(0.28)			
Racist Attitudes	-0.35	0.71	-0.25	0.78
	(0.20)		(0.15)	
Age	-0.02	0.98	0.06	1.07
	(0.10)		(0.09)	
Sex	0.28	1.33	0.31	1.36
	(0.26)		(0.26)	
Education	-0.08	0.93	0.04	1.04
	(0.10)		(0.11)	
Religion (Protestant)	5.89		0.32	1.38
	22.25		(0.29)	
Religion (Catholic)	0.07	1.07	-0.49	0.61
	(0.45)		(1.47)	
ISEI score	0.03 *	1.03	-	
	(0.01)			
ISEI dummy	0.11	1.12	-	
	(0.32)			
Farmers	-2.50 *	0.08	-	
	(1.21)			
Income	0.19	1.21	0.06	1.06
	(0.12)		(0.09)	

	Spain			Sweden		
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	4.18		65.60	-1.60	*	0.20
	(14.96)			(0.74)		
Political Affiliation (Centre)	5.10		163.92	0.53		1.70
	(14.96)			(0.39)		
Political Affiliation (Right)	5.22		185.00	1.40	**	4.07
	(14.96)			(0.43)		
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-			-		
Political Affiliation (Other)	4.41		82.64	0.29		1.34
	(14.96)			(0.42)		
Sub. Class (Lower)	0.77		2.15	0.50		1.65
	(0.66)			(0.89)		
Sub. Class (Working)	-0.24		0.79	-0.68	*	0.51
	(0.33)			(0.31)		
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	0.35		1.42	-		
	(0.41)					
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-			-1.38	*	0.25
				(0.67)		
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-0.40		0.67	0.91	*	2.48
	(0.65)			(0.41)		
Sub. Class (Upper)	5.63			-0.67		0.51
	14.98			(0.95)		
Constant	-5.53		0.00	1.44		4.21
	(15.00)			(1.00)		
Number of Cases	397			426		
Pseudo R^2	0.27			0.25		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	125.95 (26)			149.85 (21)		

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