Politics on the margins of government

A comparative study of Green parties in governing coalitions

Conor Little

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute

Florence, March 2014
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Abstract

Since the mid-1990s, Green parties have participated in 24 governing coalitions in stable democracies, both from within cabinet and as external support parties in parliament. Despite their similarities, these parties' experiences of coalition have been diverse. This thesis seeks to explain variation among these cases in respect of three outcomes: Green parties' attainment of senior ministerial positions at the moment of government formation; their retention of cabinet office over time; and their electoral outcomes at the end of their spell in coalition. It finds that environmental factors were consistently important for producing these outcomes, but that under many conditions, variation in Green parties' attributes and strategies also played a role. To explain variation in office attainment outcomes, the thesis makes use of an explicitly conjunctural theory that has been developed in the study of support parties. The set of causal factors identified by this theory provides a basis for identifying pathways to high and low office attainment outcomes that are that are empirically consistent and theoretically coherent. In studying office retention outcomes, it develops a framework based on parties' incentives to maximise their electoral and governmental outcomes within a dynamic and institutionally variable setting. It provides a first explanatory account of variation in parties' tenure, identifying a number of pathways to the end of a party's time in office. Finally, the thesis builds on the literature on postincumbency electoral outcomes to identify several paths to post-coalition electoral success and failure. In particular, it suggests that the relatively 'soft' electoral base of Green parties in coalition is an important factor in their losses and that defection from coalition can be electorally beneficial only under restrictive conditions. It identifies a strong tension between office-seeking success and electoral success that presents these parties with especially 'hard choices'.

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Now, it is time to look to the future. This thesis is dedicated to Catherine, with love.
Chapter 1 Introduction

This thesis begins with a recent development in party politics. Having emerged as parties of protest and opposition across advanced industrial democracies in the 1970s and 1980s, Green parties began to support governments at the national level in the 1990s. In the past two decades, some Green parties have been represented in government by senior ministers and others have supported governments from outside cabinet. Leaving opposition to support government is an important milestone for these parties, presenting them with new opportunities and challenges (Müller-Rommel 2002, pp.3-6; Deschouwer 2008, pp.3-4; see also Pedersen 1982, pp.6-8). It also has broader significance. It marks party system change (Mair 2006) and it has led to changes in public policy (Poguntke 2002b, esp. pp.139-141; Jensen and Spoon 2011; Evrard 2012; see also Knill et al. 2010; Bomberg and Carter 2006).

This recent development presents a puzzle. Green parties, which are similar in their organisation, ideology and strategic style, have experienced markedly different outcomes in governing coalitions. In some cases, they have met with modest success, while in others, they have experienced obvious failure. This has prompted researchers to highlight the challenge of explaining variation in their outcomes (e.g., Buelens and Hino 2008, p.160). A number of studies have begun the work of describing and explaining this variation (see esp. Müller-Rommel and Poguntke eds. 2002; Rihoux and Rüdig eds. 2006).

This thesis aims to build on these contributions to answer the following question: why did these similar parties, entering a new strategic context, experience diverse outcomes? Its secondary concern is with Green parties’ influence over these outcomes. Did variation in their attributes and strategies matter or were these small, marginal and inexperienced parties simply the victims and beneficiaries of circumstance? What role, if any, did they play in determining their outcomes, and under what conditions?

It addresses these concerns in three extended papers, each of which aims to explain variation in a different set of outcomes: Green parties' attainment of government office (Chapter 2); their retention of government office over time (Chapter 3); and their electoral outcomes at the end of their time in coalition (Chapter 4). Each paper is largely self-contained, presenting its own theoretical framework and situating its contribution in the broader literature on the

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1 In the sense that it is used in this thesis, the term ‘governing coalition’ is rooted in legislative behaviour (i.e., support for the government in the legislature) rather than membership of the executive (see de Swaan 1973, p.1 for a similar usage; see also discussion below, p.7).
outcome in question. The concluding chapter (Chapter 5) summarises the main findings of the three empirical chapters and addresses the implications of these findings for research on political parties and for the parties themselves.

In this introductory chapter I address four preliminary tasks. First, I highlight the potential analytical implications of studying Green parties and I establish a premise upon which the thesis rests: that Green parties in governing coalitions are similar in important respects. Second, I identify the cases of Green parties in governing coalitions that are covered by the thesis. Third, I discuss the implications of selecting office attainment, office retention and post-coalition electoral results as the outcomes of interest. Fourth, I provide a short description of the general approach to the analyses and some specific methods that are used, paying particular attention to the methods used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.

1.1 Green parties in governing coalitions: similar and distinctive

This thesis aims to make contributions not only to the sizeable sub-literture on Green parties (for recent reviews, see Spoon 2006, Rihoux and Rüdig 2006 and O'Neill 2012), but also to the broader literatures on office attainment, office retention and electoral outcomes. Studying Green parties in governing coalitions has implications for contributing to these broader literatures. The first of these implications is potentially positive: Green parties' similarities may allow us to identify with greater confidence the causes of variation in the dependent variables of interest (Przeworski and Teune 1970, pp.32-24; Seawright and Gerring 2008, pp.304-306). The second implication is potentially negative. While the primary aim of the study is to explain variation among cases of Green parties in governing coalitions from the mid-1990s to 2013, developing a basis for generalising these explanations other cases is an important secondary aim. Insofar as Green parties are unrepresentative of other parties in governing coalitions, it becomes more difficult to generalise findings concerning these parties with confidence and thus to contribute to these broader literatures. I treat these two points – similarity and representativeness – in turn.

Green parties have many commonalities. They emerged to represent new concerns and they developed their electoral bases in similar circumstances (Inglehart 1977, esp. Ch.8, 1990; Müller-Rommel 1985, p.491; Hino 2012, pp.168-169; see also Mair and Mudde 1998,
pp.215-216). Their similarity (and further, their collective distinctiveness) has been reflected in categories such as 'new politics' (Poguntke 1987), 'left-libertarian' (Kitschelt 1988) and 'amateur-activist' (Lucardie and Rihoux 2008) parties, of which they have been the archetype. Other researchers have simply observed that membership of the Green party family is easier to identify than membership of other new party families (Mair 2002, p.136; Ennser 2012, p.157).

While they are far from identical, Green parties' collective similarity is evident in their party organisation, their ideology and their strategic style. Although their party organisations have changed over time (e.g., Frankland et al. eds. 2008; Bolleyer 2010; Rihoux 2006; Poguntke 2002b, pp.136-137), they have maintained not only their similarity to one another, but also many aspects of their original organisational characteristics, such as modest levels of professionalisation, collective and amateur leadership structures and a strong role for activists in policy-making and candidate selection (Rihoux and Frankland 2008, pp.266-271; see also Poguntke 1993, esp. Ch.8). Many have continued to adhere to distinctive organisational norms such as gender parity (Caul Kittilson 2006, pp.51-52 and Ch.10). In terms of organisational size and success, too, these parties display limited variation. In the electoral and parliamentary arenas, they have almost uniformly remained minor parties (Mair 1991; Mair 2001; Spoon 2011, p.5). Several Green parties have bucked the trend of falling party membership, albeit from a relatively low base (Delwit 2011; cf. Rihoux and Frankland 2008, p.270).

Recent analyses of expert survey and manifesto data, as well as case studies, show that Green parties are relatively homogenous not only on environmental policy, but also on a range of other 'new politics' issues (Spo0 2009, 2011; Carter 2013; Talshir 2002; Ennser 2012). Bomberg (2002) found evidence for ideological convergence among Green parties through moderation and broadening of their policy profile in the context of Europeanisation. The conditions for convergence have developed further, with common European Parliament election campaigns being one tangible outcome (Drugan 2004, pp.294-295; see also Bomberg 1998, Ch.4; Bomberg and Carter 2006). Furthermore, many of the Green parties that emerged in Central and Eastern Europe have developed policy profiles that are substantively similar to their longer-established sister parties (Hlousek and Kopeček 2010, pp.83-84).

By focussing on this set of parties in what is for them a new context, this study narrows the
variation on important organisational and ideological attributes which, in turn, influence parties' goal structures (Pedersen 2012). These goal structures have shifted over time. The most important strategic change for Green parties has come with the increased priority of party goals that are distinct from policy advocacy and influence. They have given more weight to the goal of increasing their political representation (Spoon 2009 p.617; Spoon 2011). This has brought them away from the politics of protest, campaigning and direct action (see Poguntke 1993, Ch.9) and towards more conventional party strategies. As part of this increased electoral focus, they have strategically 'repackaged' policy and have broadened their policy agenda. At the same time, they have maintained their existing policy priorities and core values (Burchell 2002, pp.151-154) and their informal ties with New Social Movements (Rihoux and Frankland 2008, p.264).

The Green parties that have participated in coalition are even more homogenous than the wider party family (see e.g., O'Neill 2012, p.178; Rihoux and Frankland 2008). Approaching coalition, these parties have also had in common their relative inexperience of national government (Drugan 2004, p.296) and, consistent with their small size and outsider status, all have joined coalition as junior partners (see Bartolini 1998, p.52): they have been parties on the margins of government (see also discussion at p.49, below).

These shared characteristics also make Green parties in governing coalitions substantively interesting. Coalition has raised questions concerning party effectiveness (see Deschouwer 1994) in the presence of Green parties' common characteristics. Can these parties, with internally democratic party organisations, close relationships with single-issue activists and a strong tradition of opposition and protest succeed in coalition (see e.g., Maor 1995, 1998)? Their entry into coalition confronts their histories of steady, slow electoral growth with the costs of governing. For parties that have allegedly under-achieved electorally (Mair 2001) and in office-seeking (Dumont and Bäck 2006), their performance in this new context is intriguing.

Many of their shared characteristics also make Green parties distinctive (see e.g., Spoon 2009, 2012; Ennser 2012; Carter 2013; Rihoux et al. eds. 2008). Their distinctiveness raises questions about how representative they are of other parties in governing coalitions and therefore it is likely to have implications for our capacity to generalise findings about Green parties in governing coalitions. In this respect, the implications of studying Green parties are
drawn out most fruitfully in relation to individual outcomes. Whether and how Green parties are (un)representative of other parties and the sets of parties to which findings concerning Green parties might be generalised may be quite different in a study of office attainment outcomes than in the study of electoral outcomes, as these outcomes are influenced by different factors. Therefore, the potential implications of studying Green parties for generalisation are drawn out in each chapter (Subsection 2.3.1, Subsection 3.3.1 and Section 4.2) before the cases are examined empirically. The prior expectations identified by these discussions concern the effects of Green parties’ attributes on the outcome, with reference to existing knowledge concerning Green parties and other parties that share their characteristics. In summary, these prior expectations tend to suggest that Green parties will achieve lower office attainment, office retention and electoral outcomes than comparable parties. However, these expectations are far from unambiguous, as our systematic knowledge of the effects of their attributes on the specific outcomes in question is limited, in some instances severely (e.g., in relation to office retention).

This discussion of prior expectations is complemented by a further discussion of the possibilities for generalisation at the end of each chapter (in Sections 2.7, 3.6 and 4.6). This discussion takes into account new information identified in the chapter that may tend to further inform prospects for generalisation. This new information includes descriptive observations concerning the cases and the explanations identified by the analysis. Of course, if some explanations are generalisable, the question remains as to which other cases they can be generalised to. In each discussion of generalisation, I seek to identify the breadth of the potential generalisation: the type of case to which generalisation of the causal patterns identified seems most promising. This depends, in part, on the extent of our knowledge about the broader population of cases and about the nature of the explanations produced by the analysis (Seawright and Gerring 2008, p.296).

1.2 Green parties in governing coalitions, 1993-2013
As of August 2013, 14 Green parties have participated in governing coalitions on 24 occasions in 13 stable parliamentary democracies (Figure 1.1). There have been more cases of

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2 They also refer to elements of their environment that may be correlated with Green parties in governing coalition, but the main focus is on party attributes.
Green parties in governing coalitions than radical right parties (Mudde 2013, p.5) or radical left parties (Olsen et al. eds. 2010; Dunphy and Bale 2011). The cross-national breadth of this development, which has occurred within a relatively short period, is striking. Indeed, these cases do not exhaust the number of Green parties in governing coalitions. However, the study excludes a number of potential cases due to the context in which they took place, the nature of the party in question or the nature of the party's relationship with the government. This has the effect of further accentuating the cases' similarity, consistent with the overall case selection rationale (see p.2, above).

This is a study of Green parties in governing coalitions in stable parliamentary democracies. We may expect that important aspects of the context in which a party operates – not least a small party – have considerable causal potential in relation to their outcomes. Limiting the scope of the study to stable parliamentary democracies is supported by findings that the outcomes of coalition have been produced by quite different determinants under conditions of political transition than in stable democracies (see Rüdig 2006 on Green parties' electoral outcomes; see also Döring and Hellström 2013 on government formation). More generally, transition in Central and Eastern Europe was characterised by considerable electoral volatility (see e.g., Barreiro 2008, pp.24-25) and fluidity in party identities and elite affiliations. For this study, the most important empirical implication of adopting this criterion is to exclude a swathe of cases that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe during the early- and mid-1990s.

This increases the contextual homogeneity of the cases, reduces the number of potential confounding factors and provides additional confidence that each chapter is comparing 'like with like' (Sartori 1970, pp.1035-1036; Mair 2008a, p.177; see also Van Deth ed. 1998).

To identify Green parties, this study takes Rihoux and Rüdig's (2006, p.S7) working definition as its starting point: “parties with a predominantly ecological orientation that are or were recognised by or affiliated to the European Federation of Green Parties (since 2004: the European Green Party).” The first criterion (“a predominantly ecological orientation”)
excludes the Latvian Green Party, which has had considerable success in attaining and reattaining government office but is substantially distinct from other Green parties (see Auers 2009 for details). The second criterion means that the Socialist People's Party in Denmark, an Observer Party in the European Greens since 2008, is included in the study. It further extends to cover Green parties in New Zealand and Australia, which are evidently mainstream members of the Green party family (see e.g., Dann 2008).

The cases covered include not only parties in cabinet, but also members of governing coalitions that did not attain cabinet office: support parties. In supporting the policies and the survival of a government, these parties are members of the government's broader governing coalition: they form part of a “more or less permanent coalition that ensures acceptance of all or almost all government proposals” (De Swaan 1973, p.85; see also Pridham 1986, pp.16-17; Laver 1986, pp.33-37; Laver and Schofield 1990, p.67; Baron 1991, p.138; Laver 2006, p.128). Although they are lesser-studied than their partners in cabinet (see Subsection 2.2.3, below for a review), support parties are nonetheless important. Consider that approximately one-third of cabinets control a minority in parliament and that minority government is predominant in some countries (e.g., Strøm 1990b, p.58; Gallagher et al. 2011, p.434; Arter 2008, p.231). Each of these minority governments need external support of some kind. In Strøm's (1990b, p.95) data, 11% of governments had highly institutionalised external support arrangements with at least one party.

Among Green parties, I identify nine cases of support parties in six countries. Most of these cases approximate the relatively demanding criteria for being part of a coalition (De Swann 1973, p.85, see above), for being an 'external support' party (Strom 1990b) and for Bale and Bergman's (2006b) concept of 'contract parliamentarianism'. These include the cases that occurred in Sweden (1998-2002 and 2002-2006) and New Zealand (1999-2002, 2002-2005 and 2005-2008) (see Bale and Bergman 2006b, esp. pp.433-437 for details of these

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5 The second criterion (and indeed the first) excludes Iceland's Left-Green Movement, in government from 2009 until 2013, and the Danish Red-Green Alliance, a support party to the Danish government since 2011.

6 Strom (1990b, pp.61-62) identifies external support relationships as being characterised by negotiation before the government is formed and “an explicit, comprehensive and more than short-term commitment to the policies as well as the survival of the government”. A similar, but not identical concept, 'contract parliamentarianism' is characterised by a written agreement with a support party that is available to the public and that “commit[s] the partners beyond a specific deal or a temporary commitment” (Bale and Bergman 2006b, p.424). Other specifications of support party status suggest that the party's necessary-ness for the formation or survival of the government is an important characteristic (Bergman 1995, p.29; Bartolini 1998, p.49). The present study does not attempt to resolve these broader questions concerning the definition or identification of support parties. However, these criteria provide points of reference for the discussion that follows.
arrangements). The recent case of the Australian Greens' support agreement with a Labor government (2010-2013) is a further clear case of an external support arrangement in the mould of 'contract parliamentarianism' (Greens/ALP 2010).

Three further cases of support parties are included in the study. They occurred in Italy (1993-1994), Slovakia (1998-2002) and the Netherlands (May to September 2012). While these cases may have lacked the duration (in the Dutch case) required by Strom (1990b) or the written agreement (in the Italian case) required by Bale and Bergman (2006b), these parties supported both the policies and the survival of their governments.8

In 1993, the Italian Greens were allocated a senior ministerial position in Carlo Azeglio Ciampi's cabinet (1993-1994), but the party withdrew and its minister, Francesco Rutelli, resigned from government after one day, along with the PDS and its three ministers. Rutelli's resignation was accepted on 4 May, after Ciampi spent six days trying to bring the PDS and the Greens back into the government (Parlamento Italiano 2013; Pasquino and Vassallo 1995, pp.68-69; also Dietz 2004, p.275). Nonetheless, the Greens and the PDS abstained on the vote of investiture, thereby effectively supporting the government, which needed a relative majority (Ignazi 1994, p.349; Freedom House 1994, p.325). Both parties showed “a benevolent attitude and concrete support” during Ciampi's seven months in office (Pasquino and Vassallo 1995, p.61; see also Hopkin and Ignazi 2008, p.47; Rhodes 1995, p.130; Bull 1996, p.165). The Greens' goodwill towards Ciampi was still evident at the end of the government's life in the contribution by their parliamentary leader, Gianni Mattioli, to the debate on the motion of no confidence that brought down the government in January 1994 (Parlamento Italiano 1994, pp.22341-22343). The electoral alliance that the Greens joined for the general election that followed aimed for considerable continuity with the outgoing prime minister's policies and would have accepted his reappointment (Bull 1996, p.167).

In 1998, the Slovak Greens were part of the five-party electoral coalition that took the lead in government formation. The party held a junior ministerial position (Deputy Minister for the Environment) for the duration of its four years in coalition, the chair of the legislative

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7 Although the Australian Greens ended the partnership based on the Brown-Gillard agreement in February 2013, they continued to offer support on issues of confidence and supply in the months that followed. Therefore, their support status is considered to have extended beyond the end of the written agreement (Figure 1.1, below).

8 The study excludes arrangements such as the New Zealand Greens’ Memorandum of Understanding with the National Party in 2008 on home insulation, which did not imply support for the government's survival or support for a wide range of policies (Miller and Curtin 2011, p.113).
environment committee and other positions (Kopeček 2009, pp.128-129). Consistent with
t heir treatment in this study, various country studies (Kopeček 2009; Malová and Učeň 1999)
and cross-case analyses (Rüdig 2006) have considered them to be part of the governing
coalition. One such study lists them as part of the “incumbent government” (Bakke and Sitter
2013, p.215).

In 2012, the support of the Dutch Greens (GroenLinks) was needed to see through a broad
package of spending cuts and tax increases. They supported these measures in exchange for
increased environmental spending and taxation (Grünell 2012; RNW 2012), thereby delaying
elections and extending the Rutte government's life until September 2012 (Otjes and Voerman
2013, pp.164-165; European Green Party 2012a, 2012b). While the duration of the support
period was short, the weighty and wide-ranging substance of the support relationship was set
out explicitly in a written five-party agreement (the 'Spring Agreement'), which was published
and presented to parliament in late May (KPMG 2012).

The cases covered include periods during which Green parties supported caretaker
governments, such as Jan Fischer's government in the Czech Republic from 2009 to 2010 and
Mark Rutte's caretaker government in the Netherlands in 2012. They also include short
periods of 'continuation caretaker' governments during the government formation process
following the post-coalition election (Conrad and Golder 2010; also Laver 2003 p.25). While
the general idea of a caretaker government suggests that they are apolitical, weak or
constrained (Laver and Shepsle 1994, pp.291-292), Conrad and Golder (2010, p.133, fn.13;
see also Hanley 2013, p.4) observe that there is little systematic empirical evidence to this
effect and that some caretaker governments are charged with making important policy
changes. Both the Fischer and Rutte caretaker governments are good examples of this: the
former lasted almost fourteen months and undertook increasingly weighty policy initiatives
(Hanley 2013, p.26) and the latter was charged with seeing through a wide range of budgetary
measures during its four months as a caretaker government (Grünell 2012).
Figure 1.1. Green parties in governing coalitions (August 2013)
Finally, cases of Green parties in governing coalition are defined within the bounds of the electoral cycle: they are approximately bookended by pre- and post-coalition general elections. This establishes further contextual homogeneity between the cases, as parties pursue their goals within a cycle of parliamentary democracy. In stylised form, this means that opportunities to realise parties' goals occur in a particular sequence: office and policy goals, then electoral goals, then office and policy, and so on. This case definition shares its emphasis on general elections with most definitions of a government (see Damgaard 1994 and Müller, Bergman and Strøm 2008 for reviews; cf. Lijphart 1984, pp.80-81). The empirical implication of this criterion is illustrated in Figure 1.1 by the German Greens, amongst others: their participation in consecutive coalitions in 1998-2002 and 2002-2005 is treated as two cases.

1.3 Outcomes

This thesis focuses on explaining variation in three aspects of these parties' outcomes: office attainment at the beginning of their time in coalition, office retention (for those parties that do attain office) and their electoral outcomes at the end of their time in coalition. Actors' outcomes "are not given a priori" (Lake and Powell 1999, p.10) and these outcomes encompass only some aspects of Green parties' experiences in coalition. While examining these three outcomes can give only a partial account of Green parties' experiences and performance in coalition, they promise to highlight important aspects of these cases.

As this thesis aims to specify the role of these parties in producing outcomes, it selects outcomes that correspond to party goals. Attaining office and winning votes (or seats)\(^\text{11}\) are well-established party goals (Riker 1962, pp.32-33; Downs 1957, p.11, pp.30-31). Contributions to the literature on party goals and related issues consistently include these

\(\text{9}\) The labels 'post-coalition election' and 'pre-coalition election' are simplifications. Often, coalitions have not technically terminated by the date of the election, as governments often stay in office during the election (Laver 2003; Conrad and Goldner 2010). Likewise, the 'pre-coalition' label is one of convenience: in the case of France, the government coalition is often assembled after the presidential election and before the legislative election. These labels are simply intended to identify the elections that occur towards or after the end of the coalition's electoral cycle and the elections that occur around the beginning of the coalition's life.

\(\text{10}\) Unlike these definitions, however, a change in prime minister or in party composition of the governing coalition does not mark the end of a case. In most cases studied here, changes in partisan composition (i.e., party turnover) are minor. The most pronounced example is that of the Czech Greens participation in coalition (2007-2011), during which the second-largest party (the Social Democrats) joined the coalition in 2009 and a non-partisan prime minister (Jan Fischer) took office.

\(\text{11}\) The important distinction between vote- and seat-seeking is discussed briefly in Subsection 4.3.2.
goals (Sjöblom 1968; Schlesinger 1975; Reisinger 1986; Strøm 1985, 1990a; Deschouwer 1994; Harmel and Janda 1994; Strøm and Müller 1999). For policy-seeking parties, they are mainly instrumental goals (see also Deschouwer 1994, p.183). The study of outcomes that correspond to instrumental goals corresponds to new perspectives on new parties that look beyond the outcomes that they value intrinsically (e.g., policy advocacy or influence in the case of Green parties) (Bolleyer 2008, p.17, p.20; Bolleyer et al. 2012).

It also speaks to Green parties' strategic turn towards prioritising representation in legislative and governmental bodies (p.4, above) and promises to highlight a key tension between achieving their goals in the governmental (or coalitional) arena and achieving their goals in the electoral arena. Together, systematic, cross-case analysis of these outcomes may offer a 'way in' to examining other party outcomes in these arenas (such as policy influence in the coalitional arena) or in other arenas (such as intra-party democracy or organisational cohesion in the organisational arena).

The three outcomes examined in the chapters that follow are encompassing in one sense: they cover the full cycle of participation in coalition from formation to the post-coalition election. Electoral outcomes provide a time horizon within which parties pursue their goals (Strøm and Müller 1999, p.9; Bergman 1995, p.94) and office retention is an explicitly dynamic outcome for parties in government. This, at least informally, creates the building blocks for a dynamic analysis of party outcomes in coalition, linking individual processes and incorporating anticipation of future events (Druckman 2008). The chapters include, for example, an examination of the effects of parties' prospects in the governmental and electoral arenas on their defection from coalition (in Chapter 3) and the effect of their success in attaining cabinet office at the beginning of the coalition on their electoral outcomes at the end of it (in Chapter 4).

In each empirical chapter, I argue that a case-oriented analysis of Green parties can make some modest contributions to the relevant outcome-specific literature. The analyses of office attainment in Chapter 2 build on a literature that has produced significant analytical successes in the form of the proportionality regularity ('Gamson's Law'), but which remains faced with theoretical shortcomings in its understanding of that regularity and by empirical puzzles that are specific to small parties (e.g., the mean overcompensation of small parties and the existence of support parties). Chapter 3 opens up new ground by examining an important
outcome – time in office – that has received remarkably little attention. Finally, Chapter 4 addresses the specific challenge of explaining variation among Green parties in respect of their post-coalition electoral outcomes (Buelens and Hino 2008, p.160) and contributes to knowledge concerning the role of support party status and other factors in producing these outcomes.

The three outcomes examined here are also chosen for pragmatic reasons. Specifically, in the governmental arena, office outcomes are empirically more tractable than policy outputs and therefore they allow the analyses to take advantage of intermediate-\(n\) methods. It is to these methods that I next turn.

1.4 A note on methodology

In each chapter, an explanatory framework is developed, deriving a number of hypotheses (Sections 2.4, 3.3 and 4.4). For the most part, the analyses use secondary data, such as published case studies and election reports, but they also draw on contemporary accounts (e.g., newspaper articles), opinion polls and other authoritative sources of data. The data are analysed using a number of techniques, at times in combination. This section introduces the analytical techniques used in the analyses of office attainment outcomes (in Chapter 2) and electoral outcomes (in Chapter 4). In particular, it introduces some concepts and terms used in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).\(^{12}\)

1.4.1 Analytical techniques used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4

The analyses in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 follow a broadly similar procedure. First, they explore statistical relationships between the independent variables of interest and the outcome. This provides an initial indication of whether the hypothesis is supported. In some instances, this also informs the selection of individual indicators in subsequent stages of the analysis where there are multiple potential indicators (e.g., economic indicators in Chapter 4). Bivariate tests are followed by multivariate analyses in the form of a series of OLS regressions.

Although they produce informative results, these statistical tests are, for the purposes of this study, preliminary, and I interpret the results as being indicative rather than definitive. This is,  

\(^{12}\) The approach used in analysing office retention outcomes in Chapter 3 is discussed in Section 3.5.1.
first, because the sample of parties examined by these chapters is not representative of a wider population of parties that can be identified *a priori*. These parties were deliberately selected because of their common characteristics some of which make them distinctive (see Section 1.1, above). As I am not using a representative sample, I cannot meaningfully make use of measures of statistical significance as a tool for generalisation. Second, the small number of cases (a maximum of 24 in Chapter 2 and 20 in Chapter 4) also prevents me from taking advantage of some of the main strengths of statistical analyses. It leads to an increased likelihood of Type II error (i.e., false negatives) with the result that it is difficult to find with confidence that the null hypothesis should not be rejected. Therefore, while measures of statistical significance are reported, the main emphasis in interpreting outputs is on coefficient size (the size of the mean effect or the strength of correlation) and multivariate analyses are used as a means of descriptive summary. Nonetheless, these statistical tests provide information that qualitative analyses do not, and this information contributes to the evaluation of hypotheses. For example, a crisp-set QCA (csQCA) does not account for the scale of electoral successes and failures, while a relatively simple quantitative analysis does (Chapter 4).

This first stage in the analysis is complemented in both chapters by QCA. This is selected not just due to the limitations of statistical methods in the context of this project, but also for its own important strengths. QCA provides an alternative means of conducting multivariate analysis with analytical strengths that differ from those of statistical analysis, on the one hand, and case studies, on the other (for recent articulations of and developments in QCA, see especially Ragin 2008a; Rihoux and Ragin eds. 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012; for applications in studies closely related to this one, see Dumont and Bäck 2006; Rihoux 2006; Buelsens and Hino 2008).

QCA is a set-theoretic method. Rather than measuring correlations, it identifies set relations. When used for explanatory purposes, set-theoretic methods facilitate the detection of conditions that are necessary or sufficient for the outcome and for detecting the individual components of those conditions.¹³ Necessity and sufficiency are characterised by specific set relations. Necessary conditions are in superset relation to the outcome (‘if there is no X, there

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¹³ These components of sufficient and necessary conditions are INUS and SUIN conditions. An INUS condition is “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” (Mackie 1965, p.245). A SUIN condition is “a sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome” (Mahoney 2008, p.419).
is no Y'). Sufficient conditions are in subset relation to the outcome ('if X, then Y'). In common with other methods, in order for a causal relationship to be inferred, there must be a persuasive theoretical account that links the causal condition and the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp.57-58). As necessity and sufficiency are fundamental concepts in causality (Mahoney 2008), the capacity of QCA to detect them is one of its important strengths.

QCA is a case-oriented, qualitative method. In practical terms, it allows researchers to cover a larger number of cases than case study techniques. However, it is not a methodological panacea. While it can be combined with case analyses (as it is in Chapter 2 and, to a lesser extent, in Chapter 4) it does involve a trade-off between scope and depth. The analyses in this thesis do not achieve the same depth as, for example, case study contributions to Müller-Rommel and Poguntke (eds. 2002). It also has its own limitations, such as difficulties in incorporating causal conditions with limited variation (Rihoux and de Meur 2008, p.45; see Subsection 4.5.2 for an example of this) and incorporating time.14

One of the strengths of QCA is that, like other qualitative methods, it can accommodate causal complexity: conjunctural causation (i.e., interactive effects), equifinality (i.e., multiple paths to one outcome) and causal asymmetry15 (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p.78, pp.84-89; Ragin 2008a, Ch.10). As one of the thesis's concerns is the effects of party attributes and strategies on their outcomes, it is logical that these should be analysed in conjunction with important non-party (environmental) conditions (see also Deschouwer 1994, pp.181-183). In addition, QCA allows for an exploratory approach to conjunctural causation, as it explores the set-theoretic relationship between each combination of causal conditions and the outcome. This contrasts, for example, with linear-interactive models, which require specification of interaction terms ex ante. This makes it well suited to exploring the main causal conditions of interest in Chapters 2 and 4. Equifinality has been detected in existing explanatory accounts of Green parties' electoral outcomes in government (Rüdig 2006; see also Buelens and Hino 2008) and it is implicit in the separate literatures on the office attainment outcomes of support parties and cabinet parties (see Section 2.2).

14 This is one of the reasons that Chapter 3 adopts a different methodological approach than the other empirical chapters.

15 Causal asymmetry means that X's causal role in relation to Y does not have implications for ~X's (i.e., the absence of X's) causal relation to Y (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p.81).
While the intermediate number of cases of Green parties in governing coalitions that is now available is not a strong argument for using QCA as such, it does provide considerable diversity in the combinations of causal conditions that characterise cases. As of August 2013, Green parties have entered ten more governing coalitions since the latest set of comparative studies of Green parties in government (Rihoux and Rüdig eds. 2006) were carried out (Figure 1.1). The political contexts in which Green parties have entered coalition have also diversified considerably, with Green parties entering coalition for the first time in five countries (the Czech Republic, Ireland, Australia, Denmark and the Netherlands). Cases have also occurred again in countries in which Green parties had already been in coalition, in Italy, Finland and France. Several new cases occurred during a period of economic crisis. This study takes advantage of the number of cases now available and the diversity among those cases to build on previous analyses of Green parties in government and on existing knowledge concerning each of these outcomes. Next, I describe the main steps in the process of carrying out the QCA analyses of the cases that feature in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.

1.4.2 Steps in the analysis

1.4.2.1 Set calibration
As a set-theoretic method, QCA involves the calibration of sets that represent the outcome and causal conditions. Sets represent qualitative differences between cases. Set calibration, which involves establishing what membership and non-membership in a set comprises, is necessary before set membership values can be assigned to cases. Both chapters devote some attention to this task. These thresholds can be established using prior theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence (Ragin 2008a, Ch.5; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp.32-41). This prior knowledge allows for the identification of criteria (or 'thresholds') for full membership and full non-membership in a set. Individual cases are then compared against these thresholds to establish their set membership value. I calibrate sets using theoretical knowledge (e.g., for the set of electoral gains in Chapter 4) and using empirically-derived knowledge concerning the wider population of small parties in coalitions (e.g., for several fuzzy-sets in Chapter 2).17

16 In this study, these steps were carried out with the aid of the fsQCA 2.0 software (Ragin et al. 2006).
17 Calibrating fuzzy sets (carried out in Section 2.4) further requires establishing intermediate levels of membership in the set between full- and non-membership, including a 'point of maximum ambiguity' which is equidistant from full membership and full non-membership in the set. In doing so in Chapter 2, I use the 'direct method' of calibration developed by Ragin (2008a, Ch.5). This fits the case-specific data to a logistic function that is anchored by thresholds of membership, non-membership and maximum ambiguity, which are identified ex-ante. I identify these thresholds using information from a larger data set on a similar set of parties in coalition. To my knowledge, this marks a minor methodological innovation in set calibration.
1.4.2.2 Analysing set relations
After calibrating sets representing the outcome and the causal conditions, I carry out the
analysis in a number of steps. First, I examine the superset (necessity) and subset (sufficiency)
relations between each of individual causal conditions and each of the outcomes. 18 Each of
these tests produces a consistency coefficient (a measure of how consistent a set relation is
with the empirical evidence) that provides a basis for assessing whether a condition is
singularly necessary or sufficient for the outcome. The consistency coefficient reflects the fact
that set relations, even if highly regular, can be imperfect, but that even imperfect set relations
may inform assessments of necessity and sufficiency. 19 This analysis also produces a
coverage coefficient. It is only meaningful to interpret coverage coefficients if they relate to a
consistent set relation. The coverage of subset (sufficiency) relations is an indicator of the
empirical importance of a sufficient condition. The coverage of necessity relations refers to
the relevance (or non-trivialness) of the necessary condition: whether it is a condition that is
technically necessary (no X, no Y) but is also present on many other occasions when the
outcome is not present (Ragin 2008a, pp.60-63). An example of a necessity relation that lacks
relevance is the necessity of air (a causal condition) for the formation of a new political party
(the outcome). Air is also present on many occasions when new parties are not formed.

Second, I turn to relations of sufficiency between configurations of causal conditions and
each of the outcomes. Using the Truth Table Algorithm, the analysis aims to detect
configurations of conditions that consistently led to the outcome. The analysis may identify
one or more configurations of conditions ('pathways') that are sufficient for (i.e., in subset
relation to) the outcome (i.e., if the configuration of causal conditions is present, then the
outcome is present). Together, these configurations are a solution term. Both individual
configurations and the overall solution term are associated with consistency coefficients
indicating their theoretical 'fit' with the data and coverage coefficients indicating their
empirical importance.

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18 As set-theoretic tests cater for causal asymmetry (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p.78, p.112), each set of
analyses involves separate tests for high outcomes and low outcomes. Therefore, each chapter effectively
seeks to explain two outcomes: high office attainment outcomes and low office attainment outcomes in
Chapter 2 and vote gains and vote losses in Chapter 4.

19 In the case of single causal conditions, a consistency threshold of 0.9 is conventionally used to determine
whether the statement of necessity or sufficiency should be accepted. For analyses of sufficient
configurations, the consistency threshold is lower, at 0.8, and should not be below 0.75 (see Ragin 2008a,
Ch.3; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p.129; for an example of an analysis of singularly sufficient
conditions, see Lilliefeldt 2012, p.202). There is no threshold for coverage coefficients.
1.4.3 Differences between Chapter 2 and Chapter 4
Although the analytical processes used are similar, Chapters 2 and 4 also differ in important respects. First, they use different variants of QCA: Chapter 2 uses fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), while Chapter 4 uses crisp-set QCA (csQCA). The choice of crisp- or fuzzy-sets is based on the nature of the information available for calibrating the outcome and the hypothesised causal conditions. In some instances, a set can be relatively easily dichotomised using prior theoretical knowledge (e.g., the distinction between electoral success and failure in Chapter 4) and thus lending itself to csQCA, while in others, it is more difficult to identify the threshold between high and low outcomes (e.g., the amount of ministerial office attained by small parties in coalition in Chapter 2). In Chapter 2, fuzzy set calibrations are available to calibrate non-dichotomous concepts (both the outcome and several causal conditions). I follow best practice in using these fuzzy sets where they are available (Ragin 2008, pp.138-141; Wagemann and Schneider 2012, pp.191-192). In Chapter 4, most of the concepts used (the outcome and the causal conditions) can be dichotomised relatively easily and fuzzy-set calibrations are not available, so csQCA is used.

Second, each of the chapters approach model-building and testing in QCA differently. In Chapter 2, I test a specific configuration of conditions suggested in the literature, while in Chapter 4, I take two causal conditions as core conditions and I test a series of models by adding conditions. In Chapter 2, I undertake extensive robustness tests, given that the calibrations of the outcome and the causal conditions are not derived from obvious facts, while in Chapter 4, the same issues surrounding calibration do not generally arise, with the exception of one set of causal conditions (the distinction between good and poor economic conditions).

Third, case-specific analyses have a different role in the two chapters. In Chapter 2, I examine individual cases that strongly typify the configurations of causal conditions detected for further analysis in order to establish whether causal conditions present in the pathways to office attainment outcomes had the hypothesised effect. In Chapter 4 (and also in Chapter 2), cases that appear to contradict the causal pathways detected and cases that were not covered by those pathways receive some closer attention.

Notwithstanding these differences, and indeed the differences in approach between these chapters and Chapter 3, each empirical chapter presents a case-oriented cross-case analysis of Green parties in governing coalitions. The next chapter focuses on an important aspect of
these parties' outcomes at the beginning of their time in coalition: their office attainment outcome.
Chapter 2 Green parties' office attainment outcomes

2.1 Introduction
A party's office attainment outcome upon the formation of a coalition is of fundamental importance for its experience and achievements thereafter. Once settled, parties' allocations tend to be stable, as they are underpinned by a negotiated equilibrium: if a party accepts three senior ministerial positions at government formation, it will tend to hold these three positions for the duration of the coalition.¹ Achieving office attainment goals at the time of government formation also provides a basis for achieving policy goals throughout a party's time in coalition: the more ministerial office a party holds, the more policy it can influence. This is reflected in the office-seeking behaviour of policy-seeking parties.² In the literature on party government, parties' policy influence is assumed to be proportionate to their weight in the coalition (e.g., Cusack 1997, pp.381-382; Knill et al. 2010, p.311). For parties entering coalition, then, government formation is indeed a “crucial moment” (Bäck et al. 2011, p.442) and office attainment a crucial outcome.

Some Green parties in coalition have met with considerable office-seeking success. In Denmark, for example, the Socialist People's Party, with 8.9% seat share in parliament, secured six senior ministerial positions in 2011, including a traditionally prestigious portfolio (Foreign Affairs). Many others, however, have been considerably less successful. In 2002, the New Zealand Greens, with 7.5% seat share in parliament, did not attain any seats at the cabinet table, despite supporting the government.

This chapter aims to answer the following questions about the office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions. Under what conditions have Green parties achieved high office attainment outcomes, like in Denmark? Under what conditions have they achieved low outcomes, like the New Zealand Greens? Did their attributes and strategies influence their outcomes? How far can conventional explanations of portfolio allocation take us in explaining these outcomes?

¹ This is acknowledged in the literature on ministerial careers, in which it is generally accepted that in coalitions it is party leaders who make decisions concerning hiring (and firing) representatives of their respective parties within the boundaries of negotiated coalition agreements (Dowding and Dumont 2009, p.9).
² It is also reflected in their own assessments of how to influence policy. In a report for the Swedish Green think tank, for example, former Swedish Green MEP Per Gahrton and Angela Aylward (2010, pp.23-24) insist that the degree of success in office attainment is crucial for policy influence.
Building on the concept of "bargaining position" developed by Torbjörn Bergman (1995) to explain the existence of support parties and minority governments, this chapter provides the basis for a theoretically consistent account of coalition bargaining by Green parties in governing coalitions that is more coherent and empirically rich than existing explanations of portfolio allocation. Among 24 cases of Green parties in governing coalitions, it identifies three principal pathways to low office attainment outcomes and two principal pathways to high office attainment outcomes. In each, party attributes and strategies play a role, suggesting that these parties' outcomes are not simply determined by the circumstances in which they find themselves. However, environmental factors are very important, not least the collective seat share of the parties with which the Green party is coalescing.

The account developed in this chapter contributes to developing an improved understanding of bargaining for office, especially as it applies to small parties. It illustrates the potential value of integrating support parties into coalition studies and it demonstrates the value of cross-fertilisation between two distinct literatures (on portfolio allocation and on support parties) that, until now, have developed quite separately.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it highlights some outstanding puzzles in the study of parties' office attainment outcomes (Section 2.2). Second, it provides a description of the office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions (Section 2.3). Third, it discusses the assumptions that are made in the analysis, sets out three hypotheses and describes the main causal conditions identified by those hypotheses (Section 2.4). Fourth, in Sections 2.5 and 2.6, it tests each hypothesis. Finally, it discusses its findings and their implications (Section 2.7).

2.2 Approaches, findings and puzzles in the study of office attainment

2.2.1 Coalition bargaining for office: one process, two literatures
Parties' office attainment outcomes are directly addressed by two quite dissimilar literatures. These literatures focus on mutually exclusive outcome values. The portfolio allocation literature deals with aspects of portfolio allocation among parties in cabinet (i.e., parties that end up in cabinet at the end of the bargaining process). It focuses on cases in which the party's office outcome is greater than zero, comprising at least one senior ministerial position. This
literature consists mainly of large-\textit{n}, cross-national studies of parties in cabinet since 1945. The \textit{support parties} literature explains failures to attain office by parties that support governments and, indeed, why they support these governments at all. It focuses on cases in which the party attains no senior ministerial position. It has a more limited empirical scope, consisting of theoretical and formal studies as well as single-country and cross-national comparative case studies. There are no studies of which this author is aware that span this boundary and seek to systematically explain office attainment outcomes among the full set of parties supporting governments (i.e., cabinet parties and support parties).\footnote{There is of course a third relevant literature on parties' accession to government (see e.g., Dumont et al. 2011 for a recent review; Döring and Hellström 2013; Dumont and Bäck 2006 on Green parties' accession to government) and the closely-related question of which government emerges from the formation process. While this literature does aim to predict which parties get into government and which parties are excluded, it does not distinguish the parties that remain in opposition from the parties that support the government but are not represented at the cabinet table. Accounting for support parties may make a small contribution to bridging some gaps in this literature, which still struggles to explain most government formations in Western Europe (Martin and Stevenson 2001, pp.47-48; Dumont et al. 2011, p.11).}

The absence of a 'unified' literature on the office attainment outcomes of all parties in governing coalitions may be explained by a small number of fairly prosaic factors. First and most importantly, this omission is consistent with the difficulties that scholars have encountered in identifying support parties and gathering data on them (Lijphart 1984, p.60; Damgaard 1994, p.199). Second, as support parties are generally viewed as being important for the ongoing maintenance of cabinets rather than for cabinet formation (see e.g., Strøm 1990b, Ch.4), the tendency to ignore them might result from the 'Hollywood bias' identified by Müller and Strøm (2000, pp.591-592), whereby coalition studies have focussed on the making and breaking of coalitions and not on what happens in between. Third and more speculatively, the considerable analytical success of the portfolio allocation literature (see review, directly below) may have convinced researchers that little remains to be discovered in the study of office attainment outcomes (Warwick and Druckman 2006, p.658). This past success, along with the goal of doing cumulable research and the relatively high costs of collecting data on support parties may have encouraged researchers to continue to exclude support parties from their studies.

2.2.2 \textit{Portfolio allocation}

In some respects, the literature on portfolio allocation is one of the most successful in the study of politics. Drawing on on Gamson's (1961, p.376) assumption that participants in a coalition would expect others to seek a share of the total payoff that is proportional to their
contribution of resources to the coalition.\textsuperscript{4} Browne and Franklin (1973) hypothesised that a party's contribution to a coalition, in terms of parliamentary seats, would be proportional to its share of ministerial posts and they identified a close-to-perfect proportional relationship. The strength of this relationship was described by the authors as “quite surprising, if not staggering” (Browne and Franklin 1973, p.460). Further studies have consistently produced findings of proportionality between parties' seat contributions to coalitions and their portfolio allocation (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Browne and Frendreis 1980; Schofield and Laver 1985; Budge and Keman 1990; Warwick and Druckman 2001; Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Warwick and Druckman 2006; Verzichelli 2008). Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of the strength of this relationship ($r = 0.94$). The proportionality finding is robust when weightings, based on portfolios' or ministries' importance, are incorporated into the measurement of office payoffs (Warwick and Druckman 2001; Warwick and Druckman 2006, esp. p.649). Indeed, Warwick and Druckman (2006) find that the relationship is stronger when portfolios are weighted. The finding is also robust across a wide range of countries: Druckman and Roberts (2008) find that the Western European pattern is reproduced in what they describe as “more advanced” Central and Eastern European countries.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{4} Gamson (1961, p.376) states his 'general hypothesis' as follows: “Any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition”. By “resources”, Gamson meant seats or votes (Warwick and Druckman 2006, p.661, f.11).

\textsuperscript{5} For Druckman and Roberts (2008, p.542), these “more advanced” countries are identified by their “closeness to the West, the economic challenges they face and their communist legacies”. They are Czechoslovakia (pre-1995), the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia.
Figure 2.1. *Seat contributions and office attainment outcomes of parties in cabinet coalitions*

As an empirical regularity, the proportionality finding has few rivals in political science (Laver 1998, p.7). However, as an explanation of office attainment outcomes, it suffers from an important shortcoming: it lacks an adequate theoretical basis (Warwick and Druckman 2006, p.660; Bäck et al. 2009, pp.13-14). Some researchers have suggested that there is simply a norm of proportionality to which the parties adhere and that this produces proportional outcomes (e.g., Laver and Schofield 1990, p.173). This explanation rests on the assumption that parties seek a fair (proportional) outcome rather than seeking to maximise their office attainment outcome. This assumption has not been well-specified or elaborated (Bäck et al. 2009, p.14) and in its simple form, it lacks plausibility. Corresponding to this theoretical deficit, we lack information on the mechanisms that underpin the allocation of senior ministerial office. This is exacerbated by the paucity of data on the process of office allocation. For example, Druckman and Roberts (2008, p.549) acknowledge quite frankly that
“like all prior work, we do not have information on how parties actually bargain”. Likewise, Golder et al. (2012, p.428) observe that:

The problem is that almost nothing substantive is written on how parties actually bargain over who gets into government and what policy should be implemented. One reason for this is that analysts are seldom party to the secretive backroom dealings that underpin the typical government formation process.

Notwithstanding strong empirical regularities, then, we have a poor understanding of why portfolio allocation outcomes so regularly approximate proportionality.

Bargaining theories are a well-established means of providing a theoretical and mechanical basis for explaining office attainment outcomes. Concepts of bargaining power rest on the assumption that parties are office-seeking and, in contrast with the idea that parties are motivated by ‘fairness’ in negotiations, bargaining theories are plausible and theoretically coherent. They take into account advantages that occur in bargaining, most commonly the pivotality of a party for forming a winning coalition, but also the advantage enjoyed by formateur parties (Warwick and Druckman 2006, p.636; Bolleyn 2007). Their theoretical plausibility is arguably their greatest asset (Bartolini 1998, pp.46-47). Empirically, bargaining power is quite different from seat contributions. Smaller parties, on average, tend to have proportionally more bargaining power than seat share, and larger parties less (see e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 2005, p.555; Warwick and Druckman 2006, p.652, p.657). Most significantly for this literature, bargaining theories predict that widespread proportionality should not occur (Cox and Carroll 2007, p.301).

While bargaining power accounts for more of the variance in portfolio allocation than parties' seat contributions in some countries (Schofield and Laver 1985; Laver and Schofield 1990, p.176), bargaining theories remain faced with the fact that, most often, parties with relatively high bargaining power accept a proportional divvy-up of ministerial offices (Warwick and Druckman 2006, p.660; Bäck and Dumont 2007; De Winter and Dumont 2006, p.181). Bargaining power variables do not perform as well as the seat contribution variable in

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6 See Hazell and Yong (2012) for a rare study of the inner workings of a coalition, including its formation. See also Bäck et al. (2009) and Andeweg et al. (eds. 2011) for process-oriented studies of coalition formation.

7 The appeal of bargaining explanations is even reflected in the work of the theoretical ‘grandfather’ of the proportionality regularity: Gamson (1961, p.374, p.379) acknowledges that “one may be able to influence the decision more than his resources would warrant through his strategic position” and he shows that some extant findings in coalition research supported this idea.
multivariate models. The contribution of bargaining power to the explanatory power of such models, over and above the seat contribution variable, is “microscopic at best” (Warwick and Druckman 2006, p.654, pp.657-658). Bargaining power indices have also been criticised in theoretical terms. While the idea of parties seeking office may be intuitive, the most frequently-used measures of parties' bargaining power, such as the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indexes clearly ignore important elements of the context in which parties bargain, such as actors' preferences and political constraints (Bartolini 1998, p.47; Verzichelli 2008, p.246).

The idea that *formateur* parties (which are frequently larger parties) have a bargaining advantage due to their agenda-setting power is an important element of some bargaining theories (e.g., Baron and Ferejohn 1989). This idea appears to be challenged, albeit indirectly, by the second major empirical finding (the first being proportionality) in the portfolio allocation literature: that of small party overcompensation (Browne and Franklin 1973; Bueno de Mesquita 1979, p.71; Warwick and Druckman 2006, p.647; see also Figure 2.1). Researchers have suggested various explanations for this: small parties' increased likelihood of being pivotal to the formation of a government; the small marginal cost of concessions for large parties; the attraction for larger parties of bargaining on an ongoing basis in cabinet with smaller rather than larger partners; or a convention of giving small parties a 'critical mass' of office (Browne and Franklin 1973, p.461; Budge and Keman 1990, pp.128-131; Bäck et al. 2009, p.29; see also Verzichelli 2008, pp.247-250). The direct evidence for *formateur* advantage is mixed. Ansolabehere et al. (2005) have shown a net advantage for *formateur* parties. However, Bueno de Mesquita (1979 p.71) found that prime ministers' parties were undercompensated and Warwick and Druckman (2006, pp.653-654, p.658) found that, consistent with the finding of small-party bias, *formateur* parties are in fact undercompensated.

While a clear disjuncture between bargaining theories and empirical findings in the portfolio allocation literature persists, efforts to understand portfolio allocation have sought to reconcile the proportionality regularity with a plausible theory of bargaining and parties' motivations. Some researchers have developed the idea that proportional outcomes provide a focal point for parties and that this reduces the costs of negotiation (Browne and Rice 1979, pp.70-71,

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8 Laver and Schofield (1990, p.172) point out that the first and second of the explanations for small party bias listed here are consistent with observing a reduction (to nothing) of small party overcompensation in larger (more multi-party) coalitions, consistent with Browne and Franklin's findings (1973, p.464).
pp.84-86; see also Browne and Frendreis 1980, pp.767-768; Verzichelli 2008, p.242). In the first study to empirically examine this hypothesis, Bäck et al. (2009) find that the mechanism at work in two cases of proportional portfolio allocation (Sweden in 1976 and Germany in 1994) more closely resembles a bargaining process than adherence to a norm of proportionality. They suggest that proportional outcomes may occur as a result of a “distributive bargaining convention” that serves either as a convenient fallback position when negotiations based on universal office-maximisation are deadlocked or as a tacit understanding between parties in order to avoid unnecessary conflict and the costs that go with it (see Young 1996, pp.105-106; also cited in Bäck et al. 2009). In this light, proportionality is a focal point used for selecting equilibria and reducing transaction costs, and, ultimately, allowing mutual gain (Bäck et al. 2009, esp. p.28). Notwithstanding this important recent study and the extant analytical success of the literature to which it adds, there is clearly room for research that adds to our understanding of parties' office attainment outcomes so that theoretically and empirically consistent accounts of bargaining over cabinet offices can be developed.

2.2.3 Support parties
The relatively widespread existence of support parties (see p.7) is a puzzle and it is one that should be central to the study of coalition bargaining. Why do some members of governing coalitions fail to attain office? The existence of support parties is puzzling because it violates the minimal expectation that parties will attain office in exchange for their support for a government. This expectation is consistent with the assumption that parties are office-seeking, which underpins both bargaining theories and expectations of proportionality that dominate the study of portfolio allocation. It has been addressed in a specialised literature on support parties and the survival of minority governments (e.g., Strøm 1990b, Ch.4; Bergman 1995, Ch.8; see also Laver and Schofield 1990, pp.70-88). These parties have received less attention than their coalition partners in cabinet and the literature has remained separate from the portfolio allocation literature (see p.23, above, for some possible explanations of this). Nonetheless, there are reasons to expect that cross-fertilisation between these literatures may be fruitful. The central reason is that the literature on support parties focuses on the same process as the portfolio allocation literature (the coalition bargaining process) and the same

9 Strøm (1990b, p.7) identifies the other important aspect of this puzzle: “Why would any party agree to support the government legislatively if it gets no portfolios in exchange?” As the outcome of interest in this chapter is office attainment within coalitions, I focus on explaining the failure to attain office.
dependent variable (parties' office attainment outcomes), albeit a distinct value of this dependent variable (zero office, rather than outcomes that are greater than zero). Including support parties in the study of portfolio allocation thus promises an account of office attainment that is empirically more complete than existing studies of portfolio allocation. Moreover, adopting a wider comparative scope may shed further light on support parties' outcomes. Theoretically, the quite different approaches taken in these literatures can inform one another and, in particular, may help to bridge the theoretical deficit in the portfolio allocation literature.

Systematically explaining support parties' existence remains a work in progress. In 2002, Bale and Dann (p.349) suggested that “we neither know nor understand very much about the motives, behaviour, treatment and fate of support parties”. They highlighted existing claims that support parties represented a lacuna in coalition studies (Pridham 1986, pp.16-17; Müller and Strøm, 2000, p.591); and they observed that, until recently, research on support parties was “only suppositional, if significant” (Bale and Dann 2002, p.349).

A review of the literature on support parties confirms this assessment. Early analyses of support parties invoked a wide variety of explanations for their existence: Browne (1982, pp.346-348), for instance, identified three paths to minority government (and support party status) under normal political conditions: where the main parties have a monopoly on power (he provides the examples of Switzerland, Austria and Denmark before 1973); where support parties are excluded because they are mistrusted; and where parties exclude themselves in order to realise short term gains by – for example – avoiding being in government during recessions. Pridham (1986, pp.16-17) suggests that the attraction of influence without responsibility may explain support parties' motivation, while “a calculated refusal to share power” may explain government parties' success in refusing to admit putative partners to government (he provides the example of Fianna Fáil in Ireland). He also suggests other, more general factors may drive the establishment of these arrangements: the goal of bridging ideological differences between parties; party history or ideology; and mutual recognition of an over-riding national interest.

Much of this early work focussed on the motivations of support parties and on caretaker governments. For example, in the process of describing categories of minority governments and how they come about, Powell (1982, pp.142-144) refers to the putative support party's
preference for a temporary caretaker minority government over alternative governments; their support for a minority caretaker government because it is “easier” (implicitly, that it avoids the transaction costs of cabinet coalition negotiations); because it is “customary” in political cultures in which cabinet coalitions are not considered acceptable; or because they support particular government policy initiatives. Powell provides select examples to illustrate these situations. To explain 'extreme' parties' abstention from government, Luebbert (1986, p.87, pp.236-238) also focusses on support parties' preferences, arguing that the policy compromises involved may put party leaders at risk of de-selection and, therefore, makes avoiding government a prudent choice.

Strøm's (1986, esp. pp.588-599; see also Strøm 1990b, p.237) account of minority government emphasises support parties' apparent “power shyness” in Scandinavia, which is reflected in their proclivity to become support parties rather than cabinet parties.¹⁰ Strøm argues that this can be explained by three factors: i) parties in Scandinavia are future (i.e., election) oriented, at least partly because they are disciplined, consensus-oriented, loyal and policy-seeking organisations operating within a stable and predictable environment; ii) party leaderships are sensitive to electoral losses because elections occur frequently and are highly competitive; and iii) parties are able to influence policy from outside of government, supported by a committee structure in which they can specialise in specific policy areas and parliamentary procedures that tend not to discriminate against them. His account of power-shyness is consistent with Pridham's 'influence without responsibility' explanation and Browne's idea that parties will aim to avoid electoral punishment for being in government, described above. This perspective, focusing on support parties' incentives, continues to be influential. Recent case studies of minority government in Andeweg et al.'s (eds. 2011) volume reflect this in their focus on the incentives and motivations of support parties (Narud and Strøm 2011 on Bondevik II in Norway, esp. pp.68-69, p.74, pp.76-77; Reniu 2011, esp. pp.122-125; although cf. Müller 2011, which includes a broader overview of extant explanations).

Other accounts, however, have placed a greater emphasis on the government party's (or parties') capacity to exclude support parties from government. Strøm (1990b, p.51) himself highlights the distinction between exclusion from government driven by core coalition parties

¹⁰ See Bergman's (1995, pp.168-169) observations on Strøm's (1990b) emphasis on coalition avoidance by support parties.
and voluntary abstention by marginal parties. Sened's (1996, pp.360-361) formal model of coalition formation highlights the possibility of exclusion from cabinet by a dominant party. Building on this distinction and on his own work on the conditions facilitating minority government, Bergman's account (1995) shifts the explanatory focus from small parties' motivations and incentives to government parties' capacity to exclude support parties from cabinet while retaining their support in parliament. He argues that, in Sweden, the exclusion of support parties – rather than their voluntary abstention – provides a better explanation of their existence. He reasons that negative parliamentarism (i.e. the absence of a requirement for a vote of investiture) provides an environment in which minority governments can be sustained by making it costly for opposition parties to oppose a proposed government: in the context of negative parliamentarism, the party must credibly threaten to vote against that government in order to oppose it. Where it cannot credibly threaten to do this, its bargaining position is weakened. In a chapter that he describes as “exploratory rather than definite”, he illustrates this using a formal model and case studies of two Swedish support parties (Bergman 1995, pp.168-169).

Recently, the literature has developed further, with empirical studies of support arrangements in Denmark, Sweden and New Zealand integrating both the 'exclusion' and 'abstention' perspectives. In the growing body of work on Danish support arrangements, Green-Pedersen (2001, see esp. p.64) observed that Danish minority governments since the mid-1990s were strong because, in the context of Denmark's ideological space, where centre-right governments are not supported by left parties, no other feasible government existed that a majority (or that the support party) would have preferred. Shifting legislative accommodations have been facilitated by the Danish party system, which has developed such that, first, 'wing' parties have become more coalitionable and more policy-oriented and, second, new governing strategies involving shifting coalitions have become acceptable and have been facilitated by a growth in the number of parties (Green-Pedersen 2001, pp.65-66). Also drawing on evidence from Denmark, Christiansen (2003) shows that challenger parties remained outside cabinet because core parties were reluctant to invite them to join cabinet due to policy differences and because the costs of a standing arrangement are greater than the costs of issue-by-issue bargaining (see also Laver and Shepsle 1996).

Several recent studies have analysed support party arrangements in Sweden (Aylott and Bergman 2004, 2011), New Zealand (Bale and Dann 2002) and in both of these countries
(Bale and Bergman 2006a, 2006b; Bale and Blomgren 2008). In summary, their main findings are threefold. First, consistent with Bergman's (1995) account, support parties tend to be excluded by government parties rather than abstaining from government, and this is facilitated by the absence of a requirement for a formal investiture vote (negative government formation rules). Second, in this context, these parties' organisational and ideological attributes and their medium-term aspiration to enter government lead to a 'captive' status, in which they are unwilling to oppose a centre-left government. Third, if and when decisions to enter government arise, there may be good reasons for them to avoid entering government, and this has been known to drive support parties' decisions, albeit in a small minority of cases.

Bale and Dann's (2002) case study of the New Zealand Greens in the period 1999 to 2002 indicates that that party was excluded from government: it was simply not invited to join Helen Clark's cabinet. Nonetheless, the authors contribute to the discussion on the motivations of support parties. Had the Greens been invited to join, they point to three factors that may have made them 'power-shy': an anti-office ideology; electoral and organisational cost-benefit calculations; and institutional and environmental features that inform these calculations, such as majoritarian norms in the electorate, the party's position in the party system and its potential for policy influence from inside cabinet compared to policy influence from outside cabinet.

Aylott and Bergman (2004; 2011) find that a conjunction of a decentralised, policy-oriented party organisation and negative parliamentarism in Sweden prevented the Swedish Greens from achieving their goal of cabinet office, despite its holding the median legislator in Sweden's left-right policy space (Aylott and Bergman 2004; Aylott and Bergman 2011, esp. p.44, ff.56). While their account highlights the role of the Green Party's organisation and goals in constraining its coalition options (e.g., preventing it from positioning itself as a credible pivotal party (Aylott and Bergman 2011, p.60)), it emphasises their exclusion by the Social Democrats rather than their 'power-shyness'.

Bale and Bergman (2006b, pp.429-431) identify negative government formation rules as a factor that facilitated the exclusion of support parties in both New Zealand and Sweden. Moreover, in Sweden, they highlight the fact that parties can expect to influence government

11 Indeed, the Social Democrats' efforts to exclude the Greens in 2002 appears to have gone as far as threats to suspend cooperation with them at subnational levels of government if they did not agree to support party status at the national level (Aylott and Bergman 2011, fn.8 citing an account given by Green Party co-spokesperson Maria Wetterstrand in 2008).
from the outside and that societal and media norms have adapted to minority government. On the other hand, Bale and Blomgren (2008, p.91, p.96) point to some instances of support parties where support party status resulted from caution on the part of a fragile new party (e.g., United Future in New Zealand in 2002) and, consistent with the 'abstention' account of support parties' existence, they observe that support party status has indeed helped the New Zealand Greens to avoid deep internal conflicts, as they face little pressure to moderate their ideology as a support party. However, they also observe that, despite the risks associated with entering government, parties that end up with support party status still bargain for ministerial office in the short term, and that the medium-term motivations for supporting a government is “to demonstrate responsibility” and to build a basis for entering government at future formation opportunities (Bale and Blomgren 2008, p.91, p.102).

2.2.4 Responses to lacunae in explanations of office attainment outcomes
In summary, there are at least two broad lacunae in our knowledge about the office attainment outcomes of parties in governing coalitions. First, there is a disjuncture between theory and evidence. Theories of portfolio allocation are premised on bargaining within a coalition, but this does not tally with the observed, proportional outcome. We do not have a good understanding of how portfolio allocation works and, to date, there is a relatively small amount of evidence for a theoretical perspective that can reconcile bargaining and proportionality (Bäck et al. 2009). Therefore, questions concerning the mechanisms that underpin portfolio allocation and the conditions for a high and low office outcomes have not yet been resolved.

A second set of open questions cuts across both the analysis of portfolio allocation and support parties. They relate specifically to the office attainment outcomes of small parties in coalitions. In descriptive terms, how would findings in the portfolio allocation literature – especially small party overcompensation – change if all coalition members (not just cabinet parties) were included in the analysis? Is it possible, for instance, that mean small party overcompensation is an artifice of case selection (i.e., the exclusion of support parties from the study of portfolio allocation), rather than from small parties' disproportionate bargaining power? Further, what explains variation in office attainment outcomes among small parties in governing coalitions? When disproportionately high outcomes do occur for small parties, how can we explain these outcomes? In the case of support parties, studies have been limited to
very small numbers of cases. Can a comparative analysis with a broader scope shed further light on their office attainment outcome?

In the analyses that follow, I offer three responses to these lacunae. The first response is to vary the empirical scope of the study relative to both existing studies of portfolio allocation and support parties. The cases covered encompass support parties and cabinet parties, allowing comparisons to be made between them. On the one hand, using an intermediate number of cases allows for more far-reaching cross-case comparison than existing studies of support parties and, on the other, it covers fewer than traditional studies of portfolio allocation, facilitating qualitative, case-oriented (albeit not in-depth) research to complement the large-\(n\) research that predominates in this literature.

This empirical scope provides a basis for the second response: the cross-fertilisation of explanations for small parties' office outcomes between the two literatures that have addressed this outcome. I bring a theoretical framework from the study of support parties into the study of Green parties' office attainment outcomes.

The third response is to use a case-oriented method (QCA) in conjunction with a most similar systems design (see Section 1.1). This responds to recent work in both literatures that has called for a case-oriented approach to office attainment outcomes (De Winter 2002, pp.205-206; Bale and Bergman 2006a). Moreover, by examining a range of small parties in coalition, including support parties, it responds to the more specific suggestion that the field should move in the direction of case-oriented research on deviant (non-proportional) outcomes (Bäck et al. 2009, p.29; see also Dumont et al. 2011).

2.3 The office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions

2.3.1 Green parties and office attainment: prior expectations
The clear regularities identified by existing research on portfolio allocation allows us to identify a subset of parties with an outcome-relevant attribute to which Green parties clearly belong: small parties in coalition. As small parties, they will typically receive relatively small office attainment outcomes (see Figure 2.1, above). Other findings in the literature may nuance this expectation. The finding of small party overcompensation would suggest that they
are likely to receive greater-than proportional outcome on average (Browne and Franklin 1973; Warwick and Druckman 2006, p.647). On the other hand, small (or new) parties may be particularly risk averse (Bolleyer 2008, p.22; Bale and Blomgren 2008, p.91, p.96; Bale and Dann 2002) and therefore prefer support party roles more frequently than other parties and small parties may be regularly faced with strongly office-oriented coalition partners, which may reduce their outcomes (Dumont and Bäck 2006).

Expectations concerning whether and how Green parties are expected to be distinct from other small parties in coalition in respect of office attainment are less well-developed. The literature suggests, on the one hand, that Green parties will receive lower outcomes because they are not office-seeking parties (Bale and Dann 2002, p.350); because they may be captive parties, positioned to the left of the social democrats and subject to internally democratic processes during coalition formation (Aylott and Bergman 2011); because as policy outliers, they will be more difficult to include in cabinet (Sened 1996); because they have tended to join larger coalitions (Rihoux and Rüdig 2006, pp.S8-S9, Poguntke 2002b, p.139; see also Browne and Franklin 1973, p.464); and because, as parties that are relatively new to government, they may be less trusted than other parties and therefore excluded from office (see also Browne 1982, pp.346-348). On the other hand, as policy-oriented parties, they will have a strong incentive to gain cabinet office as a means to influencing policy and may therefore be strongly office-seeking (Müller and Strøm 1999, p.6); insofar as they can position themselves centrally in a party system, they can bargain with more than one potential partner (Bolleyer 2007; although see also Poguntke 2002b, p.138); and as parties with preferences that are tangential to potential partners, they may be easier to include in coalition (Falcó-Gimeno 2012b). In summary, expectations concerning how Green parties may deviate from those of other small parties in respect of office attainment are ambiguous and some Green party characteristics (e.g., their policy profile) are associated with contradictory expectations. Overall, the balance of expectations derived from the literature is negative: cases of Green parties in coalition should be 'more difficult' cases of high outcomes and 'more likely' cases of low outcomes. However, the extent to which they are (un)representative of the wider population of small parties in coalition is not entirely clear.
2.3.2 Measuring the office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions

The literature on portfolio allocation has been marked by progress in the measurement of the dependent variable as it has incorporated the varying importance of ministerial positions (see esp. Druckman and Warwick 2005; Druckman and Roberts 2008) and their subjective value for different parties (Bäck et al. 2011). However, in measuring the office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions, I do not seek to take advantage of these innovations due to the considerable analytical costs and limited benefits of using them in the context of this study.

There are two sets of reasons for this choice. The first set of reasons relates to potential limitations associated with Druckman and Warwick's (2005) measure, particularly when the scores for multiple portfolios or ministries are combined. The combination of these portfolios or ministries tends to result in the systematic over-estimation of the office attainment outcomes of holders of multiple portfolios (Bright et al. 2012, pp.14-15). Furthermore, Druckman and Warwick's scores are designed to refer to the period 1945-2000. We can anticipate some problems with transposing these scores to cabinets that exist after this period (more than half of the cases of Green parties in coalition). At the very least, we would expect that the validity of the measures will decline if they are applied to later years, particularly where there is innovation in portfolio naming and in the configuration of ministries. While these kinds of error may be acceptable for the purposes of a large statistical analysis, they risk distorting the measurement of outcomes in a predominantly case-oriented analysis.

Second and more importantly, some features of the cases selected for this study suggest that the benefits of weighting ministerial positions may be limited and that simpler measures of office attainment might be used with some confidence. Green parties' near-uniformity in attaining a particular portfolio when they enter government (the environment portfolio in their case) appears to be exceptional (cf. Browne and Feste 1975; Budge and Keman 1990). At the time of writing, they had received the environment portfolio, often coupled with other policy areas, in twelve of the fourteen cabinets in which they participated. The Finnish Greens' participation in government from 2007 and the French Greens' participation in

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12 It is comparable to the strongest pattern of qualitative portfolio allocation detected in the literature: Agrarian parties' tendency to attain the agriculture portfolio approximately 85% of the time (Browne and Feste 1975, p.548; Budge and Keman 1990, p.102). More recent work has also provided evidence that supports the idea that party family membership has explanatory power in relation to the allocation of specific ministries (Bäck et al. 2011, p.449). It is notable that the consistency with which Green parties receive the environment portfolio seems, at least superficially, to be inconsistent with Laver and Shepsle's (1996) prediction that the median party on each policy dimension will receive the relevant ministry.
government from 2012 provide the only instances of cabinets in which a Green party participated but did not supply the environment minister (see Appendix A for more details). Even more uniformly, Green parties have failed to attain the objectively weighty positions of prime minister or finance minister. Moreover, we can expect that Green parties' subjective valuation of individual ministries is considerably more homogenous than that of a random selection of parties from the wider population, thus reducing the benefits of weighting ministerial positions according to the parties' subjective preferences.

Due to these potential costs and limited benefits of using weighted measures of Green parties' office outcomes, this analysis uses an unweighted measure of office attainment outcomes: the proportion (expressed as a percentage) of senior ministerial positions held by the party. Unweighted measures of office attainment outcomes have been used extensively in the study of portfolio allocation and they continue to be used in contemporary studies (e.g., Browne and Franklin 1973; Verzichelli 2008). I measure the parties' office attainment outcomes on the first day of their support for the government, building on the assumption that portfolio allocation upon government formation is indeed crucial (p. 21, above). The data on Green parties appear to bear out this assumption: more often than not, they keep the same number and type of ministerial positions throughout their time in coalition.

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13 In Druckman and Warwick's (2005) data, the notional 'mean portfolio' is located at 1; those that are half as important as the mean portfolio are located at 0.5; those that are twice as important are located at 2. In their data, the Prime Minister and Finance Minister had portfolio salience scores of 2.24 (min = 2; max = 2.75) and 1.63 (min = 1.27; max = 2.01), respectively. Across fourteen countries the environment portfolio received a mean score of 0.83 (min = 0.5; max = 1.33).

14 The exception to this rule is the case of the Italian Greens in 1993. I code them as a support party (see description above, p. 8).

15 The cases covered by this study have (until June 2013) involved 44 senior ministerial appointments (see Appendix A for details). Office allocations were not entirely stable over time due to reshuffles, portfolio reconfigurations, resignations and dismissals. There were some changes in the types of ministries held by Green parties, but very few. In Italy, the Greens gave up the Environment Ministry and took Agriculture and they exchanged Equal Opportunities for EU Policy in 2000. In Germany, the party gave up Health and took on Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture in 2001. There were also relatively few changes in the number of ministries held by these parties. Some parties lost ministerial positions mid-term: in Finland in 2002, they lost a ministry (albeit just before they defected from government) due to a ministerial rotation deal with the Swedish People's Party and in the Czech case the party was reduced from four ministers under Prime Minister Topolánek to two under Prime Minister Fischer due in part to a large party (the Social Democrats) joining the coalition. Others made small gains: in Italy in 1999 and in Finland in 2000 they gained a position mid-term. General stability in portfolio allocations persisted despite more widespread turnover in ministerial personnel: in Italy, Pecoraro-Scaino replaced Ronchi in 2000; in France, Cochet replaced Voynet in 2001; in Germany, Künast replaced Andrea Fischer in 2001; in Belgium's Agalev, Tavernier replaced Advoet in 2002; in the Czech Republic, all ministers were replaced at least once and the Greens' representation was reduced from four ministers to two when Fischer's caretaker government took office; in Finland, Sinneamaki replaced Cronberg in 2009; and there have been two changes to date in the ongoing Danish case.
The office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions are detailed in Table 2.1. Green parties supporting governments have attained cabinet office in 15 of 24 cases. The mean number of ministerial positions held by these parties is 1.25 (s.d. 1.51) and the mean office share is 7% (s.d. 8). Among the fifteen cases of parties in cabinet, they have received a maximum of six ministers (the Danish case in 2011) and an average of two (s.d. 1.46). More often than not, Green parties in cabinet received just one minister. They received a minimum of 3.7% office share (Italy in 2006); a maximum of 26.1% office share (Denmark in 2011); 11.2% on average (s.d. 7.4); and less than 7% more often than not. As well as the Danish case, other cases with relatively high outcomes include the two German cases and the Czech case (see Figure 2.2; see Table 2.1 for details).

There are clear party-specific (or national) patterns in the outcomes. In Sweden and New Zealand, there are multiple cases (two and three, respectively) and in both of these the outcome is the same over time: the parties do not attain cabinet office. Likewise, in France and Germany, the outcomes are similar over time: one senior ministry for the French Greens in 1997 and 2012 and three for the German Greens in 1998 and 2002. In Italy, the outcome was similar in 1996 and 2006 (one ministerial position at formation) and in 1993, the party was offered one ministerial position, but ultimately rejected it.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case id</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Support begins</th>
<th>Lower house seats %</th>
<th>Number of ministers</th>
<th>Cabinet positions %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITA 1993</td>
<td><em>Federazione dei Verdi</em></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>28/04/1993</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 1995</td>
<td><em>Vihreä liitto</em></td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>13/04/1995</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA 1996</td>
<td><em>Federazione dei Verdi</em></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>17/05/1996</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA 1997</td>
<td><em>Les Verts</em></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>04/06/1997</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE 1998</td>
<td><em>Mijöpartiet de Gröna</em></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>07/10/1998</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER 1998</td>
<td><em>Bündnis 90/Die Grünen</em></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>27/10/1998</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLO 1998</td>
<td><em>Strana Zelenych</em></td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>30/10/1998</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 1999</td>
<td><em>Vihreä liitto</em></td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>15/04/1999</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWZ 1999</td>
<td><em>Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand</em></td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>10/12/1999</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEC 1999</td>
<td><em>Ecolo</em></td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>12/07/1999</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAG 1999</td>
<td><em>Agalev</em></td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>12/07/1999</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWZ 2002</td>
<td><em>Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand</em></td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>15/08/2002</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE 2002</td>
<td><em>Mijöpartiet de Gröna</em></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>21/10/2002</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER 2002</td>
<td><em>Bündnis 90/Die Grünen</em></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22/10/2002</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWZ 2005</td>
<td><em>Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand</em></td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>19/10/2005</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA 2006</td>
<td><em>Federazione dei Verdi</em></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>17/05/2006</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE 2007</td>
<td><em>Strana Zelenych</em></td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>09/01/2007</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 2007</td>
<td><em>Vihreä liitto</em></td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>19/04/2007</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRE 2007</td>
<td><em>Green Party/Comhaontas Glas</em></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>14/06/2007</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS 2010</td>
<td><em>The Green Party of Australia</em></td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>14/09/2010</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 2011</td>
<td><em>Vihreä liitto</em></td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>22/06/2011</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNK 2011</td>
<td><em>Socialistisk Folkeparti</em></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>03/10/2011</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD 2012</td>
<td><em>GroenLinks</em></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>23/04/2012</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA 2012</td>
<td><em>Europe Ecologie/Les Verts</em></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>16/05/2012</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Sonntag (2013); EJPR Data Yearbooks; official websites for recent cases. Both the Czech and Slovak Green parties are called *Strana Zelenych*. Number of ministers refers to the number of individuals in senior cabinet ministries. Junior ministers are not included. Belgian State Secretaries are not included. Italian ministers ‘Senza Portafoglio’ are included. The Green-nominated Czech minister Karel Schwarzenberg is included.
Figure 2.2. The office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions

2.3.3 Green parties' outcomes: high or low?
These measures of office attainment outcomes allow us to identify which Green parties attained more office and which attained less. But were their outcomes high or low? Clearly, no Green party received a large share of office in absolute terms. In only one case did a party receive even one quarter of the ministerial offices distributed. At the same time, there is important variation between cases: it would not be reasonable, for instance, to suggest that the parties in the Danish, Finnish and Swedish cases received similar outcomes.
Establishing whether outcomes were high or low involves establishing membership in the sets of high and low office attainment outcomes. The first step towards this, as outlined in Section 1.4, is the calibration of these sets. For Green parties' office attainment outcomes, there is no clear, theoretically-informed distinction between a high and low office outcome.\footnote{One potential theoretically-informed distinction between a high and low office outcome: inclusion and exclusion from cabinet. This calibration fails to capture the important variation between parties in cabinet that received very low office share (e.g., in the Italian case in 2006) and those that received considerably higher office share (e.g., in the Danish case in 2011). As a result, I do not use it as a primary measure of the outcome. However, it is examined as an alternative outcome later in the chapter (see Appendix F, p.121).} However, there is information available about the outcomes of similar parties in government coalitions. I use this information – specifically, the distribution of office attainment outcomes in a larger data set of parties of a similar size to Green parties – to calibrate sets of high and low office outcomes.\footnote{This is not, therefore, 'data-immanent' calibration, which is flawed (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p.33-35), but rather is calibration based on a data set that is independent of the cases being analysed. This author is unaware of any existing studies that use a large, independent data set as an external benchmark for the calibration of fuzzy sets. Therefore, this chapter, as well as addressing a substantive problem, introduces a minor methodological innovation in QCA.} The resulting set calibration provides a basis for carrying out fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analyses with a view to making inferences about causal pathways to high and low office outcomes (see discussion in Section 1.4). However, it also serves a simple, descriptive purpose: it puts these outcomes in context, allowing us to compare the outcomes of this small subset of parties with those of other similar parties.

As Green parties in governing coalitions have had a maximum size of nine percent seat share in the lower house of parliament, I compare the cases of Green parties in coalition with other parties in coalition with up to nine percent seat share that are included in Warwick and Druckman's (2006) data set on parties in government coalitions. After excluding any parties that were in coalitions involving Green parties,\footnote{This ensures that the larger reference data set is independent of the cases being studied. I excluded 35 parties in 8 coalitions for this reason. Warwick and Druckman's data set does not cover New Zealand, the Czech Republic or Slovakia, which are covered by my study. Nor does it cover cases of single-party minority governments that relied on support parties (e.g., Sweden 1998). I make an assumption that it provides a reasonably good approximation of the distribution of office to small parties in stable democracies. An alternative approach would be to focus on the subset of countries that are covered by the current analysis (thereby excluding Austria, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway and Portugal). However, the difference in the distribution of the outcome between this subset and the full data set is minimal: the 5th and 95th percentile values are the same; the median value for the parties in the subset of countries is 11.8% (compared to 11.1% for the full data set). As becomes evident from robustness tests described in Appendix F, a difference of this magnitude does not change the substantive results in any appreciable way.} 240 cases in 150 coalition governments remain. These parties are not just similar to Green parties in governing coalitions in the range
of their seat share; upon closer examination, it is clear that the *distribution* of seat shares within this range is also similar (Figure 2.3).\(^\text{19}\)

![Figure 2.3. Density functions for the seat share of small parties (≤ 9% seat share) in government and Green parties in governing coalitions](image)

For the purpose of calibrating the outcome sets for this analysis, there is an important group of cases missing from Warwick and Druckman's (2006) data set: support parties. In order to simulate their presence in the data for the purpose of describing the distribution of the outcome, I assume that each minority government represented in the data set (n=32) is supported by one support party with a seat share of nine percent or less.\(^\text{20}\) Therefore, I add 32

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\(^{19}\) A two-sided t-test assuming equal variance shows that the difference in their mean size (Green parties = 4.84; others = 4.94) is not statistically significant (*p*=0.66). Their median values are also similar: 4.9% and 4.7%, respectively.

\(^{20}\) Thirty-two coalitions represent 21.3% of the coalition governments in the data. This is roughly consistent with the proportion of minority governments in the broader population: Gallagher et al. (2011, p.434) record 17.3% of governments as having minority status in the period 1945-2010 in seventeen countries. Some of these coalitions will have been supported by support parties larger than nine percent, thus falling outside the data set; others will have been supported by more than one small party; and some majority governments may
cases of 'simulated' support parties to the data, each with an office attainment outcome of zero. Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of ministerial office in this data set of 272 observations (240 parties in cabinet plus 32 support parties).

![Graph showing distribution of ministerial office](image)

*Figure 2.4. Share of ministerial office for 240 small parties in government and 32 support parties (n=272)*

To calibrate the sets of high and low office attainment outcomes, I use Ragin's (2008a, Ch.5) 'direct method' of calibration. Using a logistic function, the 95th and 5th percentiles of the distribution of these 272 cases are set as thresholds that are close to full membership and full

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21 In doing so, I am making an assumption that support parties’ parliamentary seat shares are distributed in roughly the same way as cabinet parties’ seat shares. From what we know of small support parties, there is little to suggest that their size will differ systematically from small cabinet parties. There is at least some indication – among the cases of Green parties in governing coalitions studied here, at least – that they are similar. A two-tailed t-test assuming equal variance shows that the difference in the mean seat share between Green support parties and Green cabinet parties is not statistically significant (p=0.49). To take account of the possibility that the set of support parties may include many tiny parties that become support parties partly because they do not have adequate seat share to merit receiving a ministerial position, I undertake a one-tailed t-test assuming equal variance (to test the hypothesis that support parties are smaller); it too indicates that the differences are not statistically significant (p=0.24).
non-membership, respectively, of the set of small parties (≤9% seat share) with a high office attainment outcome. These thresholds are at 26.3% and 0%, respectively. Thus, parties with 26% of office share or greater will have approximately full membership in the set of small parties with high office outcomes and support parties will have approximately no membership in the set of small parties with high office outcomes. In order to set a threshold of maximum ambiguity – the point at which a case is equally in and out of the set – I look to the central tendency of the data set. I select the median (11.1%) rather than the mean value (11.7%) due to its robustness to outlying values. Note, however, that this distinction is not sufficiently clear to calibrate a crisp set of high and low office outcomes.

The transformation of the office share variable into the set of high office outcomes for the cases covered by this study is illustrated by Figure 2.5. Using this calibration, the Danish case effectively has full membership of the set of high office outcomes, with a set membership value of 0.95. There are 19 cases that are more out than in the set of high office outcomes. Among these, nine of them – the cases of support parties – have a set membership values that are close to zero (at the location of the Dutch case in Figure 2.5). Other cases that come close to full non-membership include the Italian cases (0.05 in 1993, 0.15 in 1996 and 0.12 in 2006), the two earliest Finnish cases (0.18), the French cases (0.17 and 0.23) and the Belgian cases (0.23). There are five cases that are more in than out of the set of high office outcomes. These are the Irish case (0.61), the German cases (1998 = 0.82; 2002 = 0.88), the Czech case (0.9) and the Danish case. The most recent Finnish case (2011 = 0.46) is located closest to the threshold of maximum ambiguity. While cabinet size varies, it is sufficiently homogenous that this calibration effectively orders cases by the number of ministerial positions received by the party (see Table 2.2). Thus, this threshold means that any Green party with one position or fewer was more out than in the set of high office outcomes, while those with three or more positions were more in than out. Cases in which two ministerial positions were attained span the point of maximum ambiguity.

For the analyses that follow, the set of low office attainment outcomes is the negation of the set of high office outcomes. Therefore, support party status is close to full membership of the set of low office attainment outcomes, while 26.3% office share is close to full non-

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22 The logistic function does not permit values of exactly zero. I examine the effect of changing these values to exactly zero in the course of robustness tests later in Appendix F (p.120).

23 An alternative measure of the outcome that has the effect of making a distinction between receiving one position and two or more positions is one of a number of alternative measures that is used to test the robustness of the main analysis in Appendix F (p.119).
membership of the set of low office attainment outcomes. Membership of the set of low office attainment outcomes can be easily read off cases' membership scores for the set of high office attainment outcomes.

Figure 2.5. Office share and membership in the set of high office outcomes for Green parties in government coalitions \( n=24 \), with a selection of cases labelled
Table 2.2. Outcomes, membership scores in the set of small parties with high office outcomes and the number of ministerial positions attained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case id</th>
<th>Office attainment outcome (% ministerial office)</th>
<th>Set membership*</th>
<th>Number of cabinet ministers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DNK 2011</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE 2007</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER 2002</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER 1998</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRE 2007</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 2011</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 2007</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEC 1999</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAG 1999</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA 1997</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 1999</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 1995</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA 2012</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA 1996</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA 2006</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD 2012</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWZ 2002</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWZ 1999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLO 1998</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS 2010</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWZ 2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWE 1998</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWE 2002</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA 1993</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Membership in the set of small parties with high office outcomes.

Substantively, the comparison inherent in this calibration indicates that Green parties have done rather poorly compared to other parties of a similar size in coalition, consistent with the weight of expectations set out in Section 2.3.1. Very often, they have attained less office than the median small party in the larger data set.\textsuperscript{24} It is striking that only 5 of the 24 cases have values greater than 0.5 in the set of high office outcomes. The skewed outcome (also evident in Table 2.2) has methodological implications, as it can lead to illogical inferences in QCA. In the analysis of low office outcomes, it may allow X and \(\neg X\)\textsuperscript{25} to both be sufficient for a low

\textsuperscript{24} Even when restricted to a comparison of Green parties in cabinet (n=15) and small parties in cabinet (n=240), Green parties do not fare well: the median small party in cabinet attained 11.8% office share (mean = 13.3%), while the median Green party in cabinet attained 6.7% office share (mean = 7%).

\textsuperscript{25} X and \(\neg X\) stand, respectively, for the presence and absence of a single causal condition or a configuration of
office outcome and necessary for a high office outcome (this is a logical contradiction). In the analysis of high office outcomes, it would allow X and ~X to be necessary for a high office outcome and sufficient for a low office outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp.246-248). I propose to address this in two ways: first, I examine the results carefully for these illogical statements. Second, I perform robustness tests involving different calibrations of the outcome that mitigate its skewedness. These tests indicate that the results remain substantively similar even when the outcome is less skewed towards negative outcomes (Appendix F).

2.4 Explaining the office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions

The remainder of this chapter aims to explain variation in the outcomes attained by Green parties in governing coalitions and, more broadly, to contribute to the explanation of office attainment outcomes. First, I describe the strategic setting in which Green parties attain office. This derives a set of assumptions that, for the cases that are being analysed here, are plausible. They contribute to defining the scope conditions to which any explanations that build upon them can be generalised. Second, drawing on the literature on portfolio allocation, I set out the two hypotheses that have traditionally been associated with office attainment outcomes, I describe the variables that they specify and I calibrate them as sets in preparation for a set-theoretic analysis. Third, I set out the main hypothesis of interest: the 'bargaining position' hypothesis, adapted from Bergman's (1995) work on support parties and minority governments. This involves a conjunction of four causal conditions, which I describe and calibrate as sets.

2.4.1 The strategic setting: the core parties, the marginal party and the office attainment process

The analysis that follows is built on a framework that consists of the elements of the strategic setting in which Green parties attain high and low office outcomes. The framework rests on assumptions concerning the key actors, their goals and the process of attaining office. These assumptions, I suggest, are generally valid for the cases under consideration. The benefit of making these assumptions is that they allow relatively parsimonious yet accurate analysis.
They reduce the number of actors and interactions, thereby limiting the complexity of the strategic setting. The analytical cost of making these assumptions comes in the form of generalisability: the findings can only be generalised with any degree of confidence to strategic settings that satisfy these assumptions.

In summary, the assumptions are as follows:

1. **There are two key actors. They are the core of the coalition consisting of one or more parties (henceforth 'the core parties') and a marginal party (i.e., the Green party).** They are separate (rather than nested) actors. The core of the coalition consists of one or more parties, led by the putative prime minister. It is effectively a *formateur* (see Strøm 1990b, pp.28-29). The Green party, in this study, is almost invariably a marginal party: a party that is the last-invited or is clearly peripheral to the coalition, by way of a combination of its small size, its policy position (being an outlier) and its relative lack of experience in coalition (or, more specifically, in coalition with the putative partners).  

2. **Each of these actors – the core parties and the marginal party – pursue both office and policy.** In doing so, the core parties aim to construct a majority that surpasses the threshold established by government formation rules.

3. **The marginal party's attaining office involves the core of the coalition making an offer and the marginal party accepting that offer.** The core parties can choose whether or not to offer ministerial positions to the marginal party in exchange for their support, while the marginal party can choose whether to accept or reject that offer only after the offer is made. As acceptance of an offer is not possible if that offer is not made, the core parties have a pre-eminence place in this process.

The elements of the strategic setting – the core parties, the marginal party and the institutional context (i.e., the rules surrounding government formation) – are illustrated in Figure 2.6.

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26 The concept of the 'marginal party' used here is more specific than Strøm's (1990b, pp.28-29) concept, which simply indicates a party that may be invited to join a coalition.
For Green parties in governing coalitions, the idea that the Green party is a marginal party is empirically plausible in 23 of the 24 cases covered by this analysis. There are two types of situation in which the party's distinctiveness from the set of core parties is clear. First, the nine cases of support parties are clearly marginal. Even within these broader parliamentary coalitions, they have tended to be outsiders compared to other larger and more experienced support parties (see e.g., Pierre and Widfeldt 1999, p.516 on the Swedish Greens in 1998 and Bale and Blomgren 2008, p.100 on the structure of policy conflict in the Swedish coalitions). Second, in the two-party coalitions covered by the analysis – in Germany in 1998 and 2002 – the Greens were not *formateur* parties and therefore they were the last-invited to the coalition. The remaining thirteen cases demand some more detailed empirical examination in order to establish the plausibility of this assumption. Drawing on evidence concerning these parties' marginal roles, Appendix B shows that this assumption is borne out in most of these cases. In summary, the only case in which the party was not a marginal party was the recent case of the Socialist People's Party in Denmark.\(^\text{27}\)

\(^{27}\) The possible implications of this exception for the empirical analysis are discussed further in the context of the paths to high and low office outcomes identified in Section 2.6. In two other cases – the Italian cases in 1996 and 2006 – the party was marginal but not the outermost party in the coalition.
The core parties aim to construct a majority that, at the very least, satisfies the rules surrounding government formation. In doing so, they aim to exclude other parties from office if possible. There are two main reasons for this. First, the core parties will prefer more office to less office. This implies that the core parties will seek to minimise office concessions to other parties while receiving their support to the point of excluding them from cabinet (Riker 1962, pp.32-33; see also Dumont and Bäck 2006, p.549). A second reason to believe that the core parties will seek to avoid taking on partners in government is that the core parties are also policy-seeking and therefore they will seek to minimise their policy concessions. This can best be achieved with shifting, issue-by-issue coalitions, rather than the continuous partnership that sharing cabinet positions implies (Laver and Shepsle 1996; Strøm 1990b, p.110; Bäck et al. 2011, p.450). More particularly, they will wish to “evade binding themselves to a preference outlier and preserve more freedom of adjustment in the other direction if circumstances should change” (Christiansen 2003, p.10).^28

I assume that the marginal party, too, is policy-seeking and office-seeking. In the case of Green parties, their policy-seeking orientation is well-established. This suggests that they will seek office as a means to achieving policy gains. However, it also implies that, where an offer of office is not forthcoming, the party may be willing to support a government that produces policy closer to its position than an alternative government. This is borne out in existing case studies of support parties (e.g., Aylott and Bergman 2011).

The assumption that the marginal minor party is office-seeking is supported by evidence from cases of Green parties in governing coalitions. Where the party accepts an offer of office, it is clear that it is, to some extent, office-seeking. Whether support parties in fact sought office may be called into question, however, and it has been in the broader literature on support parties (see review, esp. p.29). If a party does not seek office, then this should lead to its absence from cabinet, as it may refuse offers of cabinet office. Green parties have been commonly portrayed as policy-seeking parties that do not value office, at least not as an end in itself. Therefore, I examine this assumption empirically in order to rule out the absence of an office-seeking orientation as a cause of support party outcomes. In summary, the evidence

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^28 Other factors, such as electoral considerations and even trust may enter into the core parties' calculations (see e.g., Powell 1982; see summary of support party literature above). Dumont and Bäck (2006) find that one of the factors that is associated with Green participation in cabinet is the mainstream left party's perception that the Green party is an electoral threat. However, electoral factors are less proximate to the government formation process than office- and policy-seeking and trust may be considerably more variable than office- and policy-seeking goals, and therefore less easy to make assumptions about.
suggests that in all of the instances in which Green parties became support parties, they were indeed office-seeking (see Appendix C for details). This is consistent with recent empirical studies that have suggested a reassessment of Green parties’ goal orientations (Dumont and Bäck 2006; Spoon 2009). Thus, the assumption that each of the parties at the centre of this study are office-seeking as well as policy-seeking appears to be valid.

Building on this strategic setting, I test three hypotheses concerning the office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions. Each hypothesis involves one or more causal factors. For each causal factor, I describe the operationalisation of its underlying variable, the calibration of the relevant set and the distribution of variable values and set membership scores among Green parties in governing coalitions. The first two hypotheses are derived directly from the literature on portfolio allocation. Hypothesis 1 concerns the party's seat contribution to the coalition and Hypothesis 2 concerns the party's bargaining power in parliament. There are several good reasons to test these hypotheses. First, neither the necessity nor the sufficiency of these factors for office outcomes have been tested before, despite the strength of the correlational results produced in the literature on portfolio allocation. Second, some small parties seem to deviate somewhat from the general proportionality pattern and bargaining power has been suggested as a potential explanation for this deviation. Third, neither of these hypotheses have been tested using data from a set of coalition parties that includes support parties. We might expect that this will alter the results considerably. Fourth, such is their prominence in the literature that no study of office attainment outcomes can ignore them; at the very least, they provide a baseline against which to compare other explanations.

The set of factors that forms the basis for Hypothesis 3 were developed by Torbjörn Bergman (1995) in an effort to explain the exclusion of support parties from office. Unlike the seat contribution and bargaining power perspectives, this framework has been less-used and has never been used to explain cabinet parties' office outcomes. This hypothesis forms the basis for a theoretically coherent and empirically consistent set of explanations for high and low office outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions.

29 A perfectly proportional relationship suggests that the causal condition is both necessary and sufficient for the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp.85-86).
2.4.2 The seat contribution hypothesis

H1. If the Green party supplies a coalition with a high (low) proportion of the
classification's seats, then it will receive a high (low) office attainment outcome.

Drawing on one of the strongest empirical regularities in political science (ff. 23, above), this
hypothesis suggests that where a party's seat contribution is high, its office attainment
outcome will likewise be high, and where it is low, its office attainment outcome will be low.
While this regularity is poorly-theorised, perhaps the most plausible causal mechanism
involves proportionality being a focal point that reduces transaction costs in the bargaining
process (see esp. Bäck et al. 2009).

The party's contribution to a coalition is the proportion of the coalition's seats that is
accounted for by that party. The coalition's size is measured on the basis of coalition members
(including external support parties) in the lower house of parliament. The mean size of a
coalition that included a Green party is 56.9% seat share (s.d. 7; median 54.3%), including
Green parties with a mean seat share of 4.8%. For Green parties in governing coalitions, their
contribution has ranged from 1.3% of the coalition's seat share (Australia in 2010) to 18% of
the coalition's seat share (Germany in 2002). Their mean contribution is 8.6% (s.d. 4.5;
median 8.4%). In all cases, they are junior partners.

To evaluate this hypothesis, I examine the statistical relationship between a party's seat
contribution and its office attainment outcome; the proportionality of the outcomes in each
case; and the set-theoretic relationships between the sets of high and low seat contributions
and the sets of high and low office outcomes. To calibrate the set of small parties with high
seat contributions, I use Warwick and Druckman's (2006) data on small parties (≤9% parliamentary seat share; n=240). These data provide only an imperfect standard against
which parties' seat contributions can be calibrated because, as a result of excluding support
parties, it lacks data on the true size of full governing coalitions and, thus, the true seat
contributions of individual parties to those coalitions. To bring Warwick and Druckman's data
closer to the distribution of small party seat contributions to full governing coalitions, I draw
on data from the set of small parties in majority cabinets (n=191), on the assumption that most

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30 This is a broader definition of coalition than is conventionally used in the study of portfolio allocation within
cabinets. Among Green parties in coalition, the size of most coalitions are unaffected by this broader
definition, but on average, it makes coalitions' seat shares larger by 4.5 percentage points.
governing coalitions, when support parties are included, are majority coalitions. Within this reduced data set, this set of parties has a coalition contribution share of 2.44%, 8% and 15.36% at the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles, respectively. I calibrate the set of high seat contributions using the 'direct method' and using these values as the lower threshold, the maximum-ambiguity threshold and the upper threshold, respectively.

The transformation of the seat contribution variable to the high seat contribution fuzzy set for the population of Green parties in government coalitions is illustrated in Figure 2.7. The Danish case in 2011 and the German case in 2002 have almost full membership (0.98) of the set of high seat contributions. Fifteen cases are more in than out of the set of high seat contributions and ten cases are more out than in. Those that come close to full non-membership include the Australian, French and Slovak cases. Notwithstanding the low values associated with the Australian and Slovak cases, support parties are found throughout the distribution of set membership values and they have set membership values of up to 0.93 (the New Zealand Greens in 2002). The case of the Finnish Greens in 1999 falls closest to the point of maximum ambiguity, with a set membership value of 0.49. For this analysis, the set of low seat contributions is the negation of the set of high seat contributions. Thus, a seat contribution of 2% equates to approximately full membership of the set of low seat contributions, while 16% equates to approximately full non-membership of the set of low seat contributions.
Figure 2.7. Seat contribution and the set of small parties with high seat contributions, with a selection of cases labelled

2.4.3 The bargaining power hypothesis

H2. If the Green party has high (low) bargaining power, then it will receive a high (low) office attainment outcome.

The process of bargaining provides a theoretically plausible account of how parties interact in the pursuit of office (see p.26, above). Bargaining power has been estimated in a variety of ways (see Laruelle and Valenciano 2008; Felsenthal and Machover 1998; Felsenthal and Machover 2005 for overviews). The Banzhaf measure and the Shapley-Shubik index are “by far the most important and most widely used” measures (Felsenthal and Machover 1998,
p.211; also Felsenthal and Machover 2005, p.15). The Banzhaf measure represents the likelihood of a coalition arising in which an actor can be pivotal to the legislature's decision.\textsuperscript{31} In its normalised form (the 'Banzhaf index'), the Banzhaf measure counts these situations for each actor as a proportion of all decisive votes, such that all actors' scores sum to 1. The Shapley-Shubik index measures the proportion of voting sequences in which an actor is pivotal (Felsenthal and Machover 1998, Preface; Felsenthal and Machover 2005; Bartolini 1998, pp.46-47; Warwick and Druckman 2006, pp.644-645).\textsuperscript{32} Each of these measures assume that all coalitions are possible and are equally likely to occur (Strøm 1990b, p.109; Bergman 1995, p.167; Felsenthal and Machover 2005, p.4).

For the purpose of this analysis, I use the party's normalised Banzhaf index value to measure its bargaining power in parliament. I multiply the index by 100 for ease of interpretation.\textsuperscript{33} At the minimum score (0), the party is not needed for any of the possible winning coalitions among the parties in parliament; at the maximum score (100), it is the only party needed in any possible winning coalition. I select the normalised Banzhaf index as the primary measure of bargaining power for a number of reasons. As this analysis requires a measure of the party's bargaining power that expresses its power relative to other parties in the bargaining context and that is comparable across bargaining contexts, it seems intuitive to select a relative (normalised) measure of bargaining power, rather than an absolute measure (e.g., the absolute Banzhaf measure).\textsuperscript{34} More prosaically, I set aside the Shapley-Shubik measure due to its empirical similarity to the normalised Banzhaf index for the cases in question.\textsuperscript{35}

The case in which a Green party had the least bargaining power (0.85 on a scale of 0 to 100) was the French Greens in 2012; the case in which the party had the greatest bargaining power

\textsuperscript{31} This is identical to the Penrose measure, developed in 1946 (see Felsenthal and Machover 2005).
\textsuperscript{32} For the calculation of bargaining power values here, I use the programs available at Leech and Leech (2013) and Mendoza and Reich (2013). I use data on the distribution of seats in the lower house of parliament from Manow and Döring (2012).
\textsuperscript{33} I likewise multiply Warwick and Druckman's (2006) Banzhaf index measure by 100.
\textsuperscript{34} One of the main disadvantages that appears to be associated with the normalised Banzhaf score – that, counterintuitively, when the majority rule varies, the actors' powers do not change – is moot here, as the majority rule is assumed to be 50% + 1 in all calculations of the parties' power (Felsenthal and Machover 2005, p.11). This assumption is, of course, not always warranted, but unlike the assumption that the coalition requires a relative majority, it does provide a fixed point at which a quota can be identified, which is necessary for the calculation of the index.
\textsuperscript{35} They are correlated positively and very highly ($r=0.99$) and in only three cases (New Zealand in 2002; Ireland in 2007; and France in 2012) is the difference between the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index greater than one point on a 100-point scale; the greatest difference in any individual case is less than 2.5 points. The absolute and relative Banzhaf values are also very similar: for Green parties in governing coalitions, the absolute and relative Banzhaf values correlate at 0.98. The Shapley-Shubik index and the absolute Banzhaf measure correlate at 0.96 for this set of cases.
was the German Greens in 2002, scoring 33.3. The mean bargaining power of Green parties supporting governments was 6.8 (s.d. 6.7; median 5.7). Support parties' bargaining power scores are distributed across a relatively wide range of values from 0.9 (the Slovak Greens in 1998) to 11.9 (the New Zealand Greens in 2005). In these data, Banzhaf scores correlate moderately and positively with seat contribution, but they are some considerable distance from being perfectly correlated (n=24, r=0.61, p<0.01).

To calibrate the set of small parties with high bargaining power, I use the distribution of Banzhaf index scores among the small parties (≤9% seat share) in Warwick and Druckman's (2006) data set (n=240). The 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles of the distribution are located at 0, 4.4 and 15.4, respectively. This calibration will necessarily be imperfect insofar as support parties (which are not included in Warwick and Druckman's data set) have systematically different bargaining power to small cabinet parties. However, no data source of which this author is aware includes this information for support parties and there appears to be no obvious way to correct for systematic differences. Nor is there any strong indication in the data on Green parties that support parties' bargaining power is systematically different to the bargaining power of parties in cabinet. The difference in their mean values (6.2 for support parties and 7.2 for cabinet parties) is small and is not statistically significant, according to a one-tailed t-test assuming unequal variance.

The transformation of the Banzhaf index value to a fuzzy set for the set of cases within the scope of this study is illustrated by Figure 2.8. Using this calibration, the German case in 2002 effectively has full membership (~1.0) of the set of high bargaining power. Exactly half of the cases are more in than out of the set of high bargaining power and half are more out than in. Those that come close to full non-membership include the French Greens in 2012 (0.08 set membership value), the Slovak Greens in 1998 (0.08) and the Italian Greens in 1996 (0.16). The case of the Swedish Greens in 2002 (0.48) falls closest to the point of maximum ambiguity. For this analysis, I calibrate the set of low bargaining power as the negation of this set. Thus, a score of 0 equates to approximately full membership of the set of low bargaining power, while a score of 15.4 equates to approximately full non-membership of the set of low bargaining power.

36 This value is logically the upper limit of bargaining power values for small parties. Six parties of the 240 small parties in Warwick and Druckman's data have this value.
2.4.4 Bergman's 'bargaining position' hypothesis
The third hypothesis to be tested is based on the multifaceted concept of 'bargaining position' developed by Bergman (1995) in an effort to explain the exclusion of coalition members from government and the frequency of minority governments in Sweden. Bergman explicitly contrasts this approach with bargaining power indices and deliberately adopts a different label. His approach arguably retains the theoretical plausibility that bargaining theories provide, while promising to provide a somewhat fuller account of coalition bargaining than bargaining power indices. Case studies of support parties have explored this approach further with some success (e.g., Aylott and Bergman 2004, 2011; Bale and Bergman 2006a, 2006b), but to this author's knowledge, it has not been tested systematically using an intermediate (or large) number of cases. Nor has it been used to explain high office attainment outcomes among small parties in government, as it has been applied in the literature on support parties.
For the purposes of the present project, an initial statement of Hypothesis 3 might read as follows:

*If the Green party has a strong (weak) bargaining position, then it will receive a high (low) office attainment outcome.*

However, a more fully specified version of this hypothesis must take account of the multiple facets of strong and weak bargaining positions identified by Bergman. According to his account, “The bargaining position of a party varies because of (1) the party's relative share of the seats in parliament, (2) the overall distribution of seats, (3) and the party's location in policy space. The specifics of the government formation rules is the fourth (4) element of a party's bargaining position” (Bergman 1995, p.167). These elements can be classified as environmental attributes (the distribution of seats and the government formation rule) and party attributes (the party's size and the party's position). In the subsections that follow, I describe the expected impact on the party's bargaining position of each of these four factors (see Table 2.3 for a summary), their operationalisation as variables and their calibration as sets for the purpose of set-theoretic analysis in the form of QCA.

### Table 2.3. Summary of expectations associated with the elements of 'bargaining position'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal condition</th>
<th>Expected outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low office outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental conditions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation rule</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of seats</td>
<td>Large proto-coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party attributes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party seat share</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party's position</td>
<td>Closed coalition strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.4.4.1 The government formation rule: positive or negative?
Government formation rules should affect the bargaining position of marginal parties and core parties. The more demanding the rules, the more the core parties will need the support of
a marginal party in order to attain office. As a result, government formation rules affect the likelihood of the core parties being able to acquire support without conceeding office (and thus form a minority government) (Bergman 1993; Martin and Stevenson 2001, p.48).

Bergman (1993, p.58) identifies four extant configurations of government formation rules that can affect the balance of power between the parliament and the government at government formation in parliamentary democracies. They are as follows, in declining order of difficulty for core parties: positive-absolute formation rules, where the core parties must mobilise an absolute majority of MPs to vote for it in an obligatory investiture vote; positive-relative formation rules, where the core parties must mobilise a relative majority of MPs (i.e., a majority of those present who do not abstain) in an obligatory investiture vote; negative-avoid countermajority formation rules where the government must ensure that an absolute majority is not mobilised against it; and purely negative formation rules, where there is no vote on government formation.\textsuperscript{37} Of the countries covered by this study, Germany and Belgium had positive-absolute rules during the periods covered and Finland, Slovakia, Ireland, and the Czech Republic and Italy had positive-relative rules. Sweden had a negative-avoid countermajority rule and New Zealand, Denmark, Australia, the Netherlands\textsuperscript{38} and France had negative rules (Bergman 1993; De Winter 1995; various EJPR Data Yearbook entries).

While the order of these categories in terms of the difficulty they present for core parties in forming a government is quite clear, there is no evident theoretical or empirical basis for assigning specific fuzzy-set membership values to these categories. However, there is a clear qualitative distinction between positive and negative formation rules: “the distinction between positively formulated rules [whereby a vote of investiture is required]... and negatively formulated rules [where it is not]... is the most important” (Bergman 1993, p.58). Under negative parliamentarism, it is easier for a minority government to take office (as they need not face an investiture vote) and core parties can acquire tacit support without having to demand that a marginal party votes for its investiture.

All else being equal, I expect positive formation rules to strengthen the bargaining position of a marginal party and weaken the position of the core parties, while negative formation rules strengthen the position of the core parties and weaken the position of the marginal party. I

\textsuperscript{37} These labels (in italics) are my invention and are simply as a means of referring to the distinctions made by Bergman. See also De Winter (1995, pp.134-136).

\textsuperscript{38} De Winter (1995, p.134) acknowledges that the Netherlands is a 'border case', as there is a strong convention that governments should be supported by parliament.
code the formation rule as a binary variable and as a crisp set (negative = 0, positive = 1). Positive government formation rules are present in fourteen cases, four of which are positive-absolute and ten of which are positive-relative. Negative government formation rules are present in ten cases, of which two are negative-avoid countermajority and eight are simply negative.

2.4.4.2 The 'overall distribution of seats' as proto-coalition size
The 'overall distribution of seats' is of course intuitively important, but is not measurable without losing at least some information about that distribution. For the purpose of this study, an adequate measure of the 'overall distribution of seats' would capture a large part of this aspect of the Green party's environment and it would have a plausible theoretical link to the outcome.39 While Bergman (1995, pp.169-186) presents two case studies to illustrate the role of 'bargaining position' in the emergence of support parties, he provides few clues as to how he means the 'overall distribution of seats' to be operationalised and measured. The clearest reference to the overall distribution of seats in Bergman's case studies is to the seat share of the 'core' of the coalition: the Social Democratic Party in Sweden in 1985 (Bergman 1995, p.173).40 The measure used by the present study follows Bergman by including the core's size as an important element of the distribution of seats, but also draws on the broader literature on support parties and on the assumptions set out in Subsection 2.4.1.

If coalition bargaining over office attainment outcomes is a sequential process that occurs between a formateur core party (or parties) and (for the purpose of this study), a marginal Green party, in which the core of the coalition has a pre-eminent place (Strom 1990b, pp.28-29; Bale and Bergman 2006b p.439; see Subsection 2.4.1; see also pp.30-32, above), then the following aspects of the 'overall distribution of seats' should be important for the outcome: the seat share of the core, the seat share of the Green party and the seat share of potential coalition partners other than the Green party (the core's 'outside options'). The seat share of the marginal Green party (the 'support party' in the terms of his analysis) is specified separately in Bergman's 'bargaining position' concept (see Table 2.3, above) and in the present analysis (see

39 There are of course various measures that fulfil the first criterion, but not the second. For example, the Effective Number of Parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) in parliament would capture one aspect of the full distribution of seats. However, its link to the outcome is, a priori, considerably more tenuous (although see Verzichelli 2008, pp.247-250). The requirement for theoretical relevance is related to what Blau (2008) calls a 'teleological' approach to measurement.

40 The importance of the core party's size is also implicit in his second case study, in which the Swedish Liberal Party in 1978 is the core party.
the subsection that follows, below). Therefore, I operationalise the 'overall distribution of seats' in terms of the core's seat share and the seat share of its outside options. Collectively, I describe the core and its outside options other than the Green party as the 'proto-coalition'. The size of the proto-coalition is the sum of the core's seat share and the seat share of their 'outside options'. In the terms of Subsection 2.4.1, these factors should influence the size of the core's offer (including whether it makes an offer) and whether the marginal party accepts that offer. If the core is large or if it has a large set of outside options, then it will be in a stronger bargaining position. If the core is small or if it has a small set of outside options, then it will be in a weaker bargaining position.

The size of the proto-coalition is estimated by subtracting the Green party's seat share from the coalition's seat share. This measure has the advantage of incorporating a large and theoretically important part of the 'overall distribution of seats'. Its focus on coalition size is also consistent with existing literature on Green parties' bargaining position in coalition, which has emphasised the importance of coalition size or type (Poguntke 2002b, p.139; Rihoux and Rudig 2006, pp.S8-S9). At the same time, the measure is imperfect: it provides only an estimate of outside options, as not all viable outside options may be included in the coalition. This shortcoming is partly mitigated by the case studies carried out in Subsections 2.6.3 and 2.6.4 as part of the QCA. They examine these outside options in more detail.

The smallest proto-coalition covered by this study was associated with Gerhard Schröder's second coalition in Germany in 2002, with 41% seat share. The largest were Carlo Azeglio Ciampi's coalition in Italy in 1993, at 69.5%, followed by Paavi Lipponen's first Finnish coalition in 1995 (68%). The mean proto-coalition seat share among is 52.1% (s.d. 7.5). More often than not (albeit marginally), the proto-coalition was of a size of less than or equal to 50%; the median cases were the Swedish proto-coalition in 2002 (49.9%) and the Australian proto-coalition in 2010 (50%). Proto-coalition size correlates negatively with the Green party's Banzhaf index value, as we would expect ($r = -0.52$, $p < 0.01$).

I expect that the party will attain higher (lower) office outcomes when the proto-coalition is small (large). I calibrate the set of small proto-coalitions as follows. First, I attain information on a set of similar coalition situations in which small parties find themselves. As all governing coalitions in which Green parties have been involved were majority coalitions (when their cabinet members and support parties are included), I use Warwick and Druckman's (2006)
data on majority coalitions as a point of reference. There are 191 cases of small parties in majority coalitions (i.e., 191 similar coalition situations) in their data set. Second, I calculate what these coalitions would look like if they lacked a party of the size of the Green parties being studied here. To do so, I subtract from each of these coalitions the average size of a Green party that has been in a governing coalition (4.84% seat share). The result is a data set that simulates the distribution of 'proto-coalition' size in majority coalitions. At the fifth percentile, these cases are associated with proto-coalitions with a seat share of 34.7%; the median value is 53.3%; and, at the 95th percentile, the largest proto-coalitions have 80.1% seat share.41

The transformation of the proto-coalition size variable to the set of small proto-coalitions for the set of cases within the scope of this study is illustrated by Figure 2.9. In most cases, Green parties have joined small proto-coalitions: of the 24 cases, 15 are more in than out of the set of small proto-coalitions. Eight of these have a fuzzy-set membership score of 0.8 or greater. The case of Schröder's proto-coalition in Germany in 2002 and Thorning-Schmidt's in Denmark in 2011 have fuzzy-set membership of 0.99 in the set, closely followed by cases from New Zealand in 2002, Germany in 1998 and the Netherlands in 2012 (each with membership values of 0.97). The cases that come closest to full non-membership of the set are the proto-coalitions at the core of Ciampi's coalition in 1993 (0.08) and Lipponen's large 'Rainbow' coalitions of 1995 (0.1) and 1999 (0.16). The case closest to the point of maximum ambiguity is the Finnish case in 2011 (0.47). I calibrate the set of large proto-coalitions as the negation of the set of small proto-coalitions.42

41 An alternative calibration of the set of small proto-coalition is binary: whether the proto-coalition (the coalition net of the Green party's seats) has an absolute majority of seats. According to this measure, the Greens were 'needed' for a majority in 13 of the 24 cases. At the extremes – in very large or very small proto-coalition – we can be more confident about whether the Greens were needed or not, but many proto-coalitions fall between these extremes: proto-coalitions in eleven of the cases fall between 45% and 55%. Aside from cases of very large or small proto-coalitions, a binary calibration may be problematic: some proto-coalitions may have ready alternatives to the Greens' support; in other situations, the requirement for a majority may be something less than an absolute majority; in others still, the government may believe that it 'needs' the Greens in order to compensate for the likely defection of individual MPs or other small parties; or the absence of the Greens might have knock-on effects for other necessary elements of the coalition. If we are to sacrifice the nuance of a fuzzy set for the clarity of a crisp set, it would be preferable to do so on firmer conceptual grounds. In summary, we cannot say with confidence that the majority status of the proto-coalition indicates precisely whether the Green party is 'needed'. An alternative fuzzy-set calibration of the sets of large and small proto-coalitions that uses 50% as a threshold of maximum ambiguity is used to test the robustness of the results in Appendix F (p.121).

42 See Table 2.15 in Appendix D for an overview of the outcome and each causal condition used in this chapter that is calibrated using Warwick and Druckman's (2006) data as a source of external reference points.
Figure 2.9. Proto-coalition size and membership in the set of small proto-coalitions, with a selection of cases labelled

2.4.4.3 The marginal party’s seat share
For Green parties in governing coalitions, seat share in the lower house has ranged from 0.67% (Australia in 2010) to 9% (Germany in 2002). The mean seat share is 4.84% (s.d. 2.4; median 4.9%). While some parties that were excluded from cabinet were very small (e.g., in Slovakia in 1998 and Australia in 2010), others were among the largest Green parties to have supported a government: in the three New Zealand cases, for instance, the party's seat share ranged between 5% and 7.5% and in the Dutch case, the party had 6.7% seat share. On the other hand, some parties that entered cabinet were rather small: the Irish, Czech, Italian and French parties each had less than 4% seat share.

I calibrate the set of small parties with a high seat share using Warwick and Druckman's data on 240 parties in coalition that had seat shares of 9% or less (n=240). The distribution of seat share among these parties is similar to that of Green parties in governing coalitions (see p.42).
The 5th and 95th percentile of the distribution are at 1.43% and 8.67%, respectively and the median value is 4.74%.\textsuperscript{43}

The transformation of the party seat share variable to the set of small parties with high seat share is illustrated by Figure 2.10. Using this calibration, the Danish Socialist People's Party in 2011 and the German Greens in 2002 effectively have full membership (0.96) in the set, with approximately 9% seat share. There are eleven cases that are more out than in the set of large parties, and thirteen cases that are more in than out of the set. Those that come close to full non-membership include the Australian Greens in 2010 (set membership of 0.02, with less than 1% seat share), the French Greens in 1997 (0.05; 1.39%) and the Slovak Greens in 1998 (0.08; 2%). At 0.52 set membership (4.9% seat share), the case of the Swedish Greens in 2002 is closest to the point of maximum ambiguity. I calibrate the set of small parties with low seat shares as the negation of the set of small parties with high seat shares.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{43} The distribution is only slightly different if we examine small parties in majority coalitions only: the 5th percentile remains the same; the median is 5%; and the 95th percentile is 8.78%.

\textsuperscript{44} Of course, Green parties' seat shares and the proto-coalition's size are not independent; together, these elements occupy almost 57% of a parliament's seats, on average. Despite this, they are not entirely complementary and both can be large, as in the case of the Finnish Greens in 2007 and Ecolo in 1999, or both can be small, as for the Italian Greens in 1996 or the Czech Greens in 2007. The proto-coalition's size correlates negatively, but moderately, with Green parties' size (r = -0.35; p = 0.09), showing that, despite being part of the same system, these values are far from being fully dependent on one another.
2.4.4.4 Party positioning as coalition strategy

Bergman's (1995, Ch.8) 'bargaining position' concept includes the idea that party positioning matters for the existence of support parties. This idea has been developed in models of government formation that incorporate parties' policy-seeking goals (for a review, see Laver and Schofield 1990, ff.97; see also e.g., Laver and Shepsle 1996; Bartolini 1998, 2000, ff.379). Within the literature on support parties, too, Bergman and his colleagues have emphasised the role of the median legislator in a unidimensional policy space (Aylott and Bergman 2004, p.10; Bale and Bergman 2006b, esp. pp.426-430; see also Christiansen 2003).

I follow these studies in using Green parties' positions to explain their office attainment outcomes. However, I use the party's position in relation to coalition strategy instead of its policy position. Coalition strategy concerns the range of parties with which the Green party is available to coalesce. In a stylised legislature with three parties (a Left party, a Right party and a Green party, which we assume is a minor party), the Green party's coalition strategy can be open to both Left and Right; closed to one or the other; or closed to both. In principle, the
more open is a party's coalition strategy, the stronger is its bargaining position. At one extreme, if a party seeks office but refuses to coalesce with any other parties, then it will not attain office. If it will share office with any other party, then, all else being equal, it strengthens its bargaining position and maximises its chances of attaining office.

I use coalition strategy instead of policy position for a number of reasons. First, in the literature on support parties, measures of policy position leads to some puzzling results. Aylott and Bergman (2011, p.44) observe that, in 1998 and 2002, the Swedish Greens held the median legislator, yet did not manage to enter cabinet. At the same time, other researchers have found that inter-party strategy is a proximate and important predictor of coalition formation (e.g., Bale, Boston and Church 2005 on electoral coalition strategy). Second, coalition strategy, in the limited case of parties in coalition, deals with a single issue – whether the party is open to coalescing with a smaller or larger set of actors in the party system – and is thus inherently unidimensional. This makes it a simpler concept than policy position and it allows us to examine parties' positions on coalition even in contexts with multidimensional (or imperfectly unidimensional) policy spaces (see e.g., Aylott and Bergman 2011, pp.53-55). Third, coalition strategy is arguably more proximate to the outcome than the party's policy position: it is a better indicator of whether the small party is available to bargain with others – and therefore blackmail core parties – than is the party's policy position. Moreover, a party's coalition strategy does not always accord with its position in relation to other parties. For example, in the Czech Republic in 2006, the Green Party was more distant from its preferred coalition partner in left-right policy space than from its less-preferred partner (MRG 2014). Fourth, coalition strategy is encompassing: it takes into account policy positions, along with other considerations. If, in terms of its policy position, a party is too distant from another party to form a coalition, then this will be reflected in its coalition strategy.

Finally, coalition strategy is relevant to broader debates about party systems and the future and nature of Green parties. It is relevant on a theoretical level, as it is consistent with recent reconceptualisations of 'party systems' that focus on coalitional patterns (Mair 2006) and therefore with debates concerning the impact of new parties on party systems. For Green parties, it is also relevant on a strategic level: it reflects a real strategic choice that faces these parties. The general importance of position for Green parties was observed by Mair (2001, p.107; see also Poguntke 2002b, p.138). This is illustrated, for example, by a dilemma that has
faced the German Greens: whether to open their coalition strategy to the centre-right. Coalition with the Christian Democrats has occurred in Hamburg (from 2008 to 2010; see Jou 2009) and the Saarland (from 2009 to 2012; see Petersohn 2012). The German Greens' co-chairman Cem Özdemir suggested that the Greens should not rule out governing with the Christian Democrats (The Local, 2011) and the issue continued to receive considerable attention before the German general election in 2013 (e.g., Abedi 2013; Rüdig 2013).

As all of the Green parties covered by this analysis entered coalition, we can assume that none of them had a position that was entirely closed to coalition. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, coalition strategies are either 'open' (to both major parts of the party system) or 'closed' to one part of it. In a party system that tends towards bipolarity (e.g., Italy after 1994, Slovakia in 1998, France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland), identifying a minor party's coalition strategy is relatively straightforward: the party will either be open to both 'poles' or closed to one pole. In party systems with a less clearly developed bipolar structure (e.g., in Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Italy before 1994), I suggest that an open coalition strategy is present when the party is open to coalition with parties holding two-thirds of the seats in the lower house of parliament. While this threshold is arbitrary, it sets a relatively high bar for the identification of an 'open' strategy.

Public commitments to govern with specific parties or to rule out specific parties are important indicators of coalition strategy. However, the party's stated coalition strategy should also be credible; if it is not credible, then it will have little effect on the party's bargaining position. For example, in 2002, the Swedish Greens claimed to be open to coalition with the 'bourgeois' parties as well as the Social Democrats. This was not credible and ultimately the party backed down from this position (Aylott and Bergman 2004; Aylott and Bergman 2011, p.53, ff.56, p.59). Likewise, the Australian Greens promised in 2010 that they would engage with both major parties and their leader aimed to appeal to voters from right and left (Bita 2010; also cited in Williams 2011). However, this was not credible: their support for a Labor government “was never in doubt” and was manifested in a nationwide 'preference deal' with Labor (Williams 2011, p.325, p.319). Thus, open strategies (or, indeed, closed strategies) are such only if they are credible.45

45 In order to address the possibility that the Swedish strategy in 2002 and the Australian strategy in 2010 were in fact 'open' strategies, and as a robustness test, I re-run the analyses, recoding their strategies as 'open' (see fn.68 below).
Among Green parties in coalition, fourteen cases were characterised by closed coalition strategies. In bipolar systems, I infer a closed coalition strategy where there was nationwide pre-election cooperation between the party and its intended coalition partners (see Golder 2005, p.652 for a definition; in this study, examples include cases in France, Germany, Denmark, Italy after 1994 and Slovakia in 1998) and where the party was irrevocably committed to one bloc, or at the very least, could not credibly present an open coalition strategy (e.g., in the cases in Sweden, New Zealand and Australia). Ten cases were characterised by open coalition strategies. In Ireland in 2007, the Greens did not rule out cooperation with any party, so I code their coalition strategy as being open. Where a two-bloc system of coalition formation was less developed, the Belgian Green parties and the Finnish Green Party were open to coalition with a wide range of parties when they joined their coalitions (Poguntke 2002b, p.138; see Paastela 2002, pp.22-23 and Nousiainen 2000, p.270 on Finland). The Czech Greens, the Dutch Greens and the Italian Greens in 1993 also had open coalition strategies (see Deets and Kouba 2008, pp.817-819; Hanley 2013 on the Czech Republic). Notably, there was no variation in Green parties' coalition strategies within countries with multiple cases over time (Finland, France, Germany, New Zealand and Sweden). The exception in this regard is Italy, where the Greens were open to coalition with over parties holding over 70% of the seats in 1993, yet closed to coalition with the centre-right bloc in 1996 and 2006. This change can be attributed to the reconfiguration of the Italian party system.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case id</th>
<th>H1</th>
<th>H2</th>
<th>H3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DNK 2011</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE 2007</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER 2002</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER 1998</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRE 2007</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 2011</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 2007</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA 1997</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEC 1999</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAG 1999</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 1999</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 1995</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA 2012</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA 1996</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA 2006</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWZ 2002</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD 2012</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWZ 2005</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWZ 1999</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE 2002</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE 1998</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS 2010</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLO 1998</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA 1993</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2.4.4.5 Hypothesis 3 reformulated**

Thus, Hypothesis 3 features four causal conditions, the set membership values of which are summarised in Table 2.4, along with those associated with the outcome and with Hypotheses 1 and 2. Taken in isolation, the elements that make up the 'bargaining position' concept may not be strong predictors of coalition bargaining outcomes. However, this set of factors in conjunction with one another may provide a more fully specified account of office attainment than the more parsimonious 'proportionality' or 'bargaining power' accounts, identifying theoretically coherent pathways to high and low outcomes. The bargaining position concept also carries with it the possibility that the role of the party can be specified separately from that of its environment. A more highly specified version of Hypothesis 3 than the general formulation set out above (p.58) might read:

*H3. If a Green party has a large (small) seat share; if the proto-coalition has a*
small (large) seat share; if the Green party has an open (closed) coalition strategy; and if there is a positive (negative) government formation rule, then the Green party will receive a high (low) proportion of cabinet seats.

A narrow interpretation of Hypothesis 3 would allow for the identification of a single configuration of four conditions (a positive formation rule, a small proto-coalition, a large seat share and an open coalition strategy) that we expect to be lead to a high office outcome and, conversely, the absence of each of these factors that we expect to lead to a low office outcome. Yet there are many other configurations (fourteen other configurations of the four conditions) that are also of interest. For some configurations, we have specific expectations. For example, Bergman (1995, p.168) identifies a interactive relationship between formation rules and proto-coalition size. In general terms, we might also expect that, simply due to their greater apparent causal potential, the environmental factors (the formation rule and proto-coalition size) will play a more important role than party attributes (i.e., size or coalition strategy). However, for many specific configurations, we do not have specific expectations. QCA allows us to explore the outcomes associated with these configurations.

2.5 Analyses: Conventional explanations of portfolio allocation

The analysis proceeds as follows. First, I confront the two 'conventional' explanations of parties' office attainment outcomes from the portfolio allocation literature with data from 24 cases of Green parties in governing coalitions. I use simple quantitative methods and case-oriented (including set-theoretic) methods. For the third hypothesis, analysed in Section 2.6, I primarily use fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis due to its conjunctural nature.

2.5.1 Seat contribution

Table 2.5 presents some simple statistical analyses of Green parties' office attainment outcomes.\footnote{See Section 1.4 for a discussion of the role of statistical significance in these analyses.} Green parties in governing coalitions have received less-than-proportional office outcomes on average and more often than not (on 16 of 24 occasions). In a bivariate regression, seat contribution has relatively weak explanatory power ($r^2 = 0.18$) (Column 1, Table 2.5). This is partly explained by the inclusion of support parties, which are, by definition, undercompensated in relation to their contribution to governing coalitions.
Traditional analyses of portfolio allocation have a different scope (cabinet coalitions only) and, following from this, they use a different independent variable (the party's cabinet contribution, rather than its contribution to the broader governing coalition). Focussing on the Green parties in cabinet (Column 2) and their contribution to cabinet (Column 3), the results change considerably. Over 40% of the variance in the outcome is explained by their seat contribution. Green parties in cabinet tend to be overcompensated, on average, but their median compensation tends to be proportional (or less-than-proportional), suggesting that mean overcompensation in the case of Green parties has been driven by a minority of more highly overcompensated parties. Within cabinets, seat contribution appears to play a role that is broadly comparable to its role in a larger data set of small parties in cabinet (compare Column 3 and 4), even if Green parties' overcompensation pales in comparison to that of other small parties. Office attainment appears to increase proportionally, but in each of these models (Columns 2, 3 and 4), this is added to a substantial intercept value, indicating overcompensation.

Any analysis of portfolio allocation – not least one that focuses on small parties – must take account of the 'lumpiness' (or granularity) of office shares. Parties' seat contributions to a coalition and parties' potential office shares should only occasionally match exactly. That is to say, it is rare that a party that contributes 6.7% of the seats to a coalition can be allocated exactly 6.7% of the office goods: as office goods are 'lumpy' they will either receive more or less than their proportional share. Where those office goods come in 'lumps' of a minimum of, say, 5% (one position in a twenty-member cabinet), a rounding convention would need to be used. We might expect that a party contributing 6.7% in this situation would receive only 5% office share; if it contributed between 7.5% and 12.4%, it would receive 10% of the seats, and so on.
Table 2.5. Seat contribution and office attainment outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of seat contribution:</th>
<th>Coalition contribution</th>
<th>Cabinet contribution</th>
<th>Coalition contribution, adjusted for lumpiness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difference between % contribution and % office share (y-x)</td>
<td>Mean (s.d)</td>
<td>2.1 (5.5)</td>
<td>1.9 (5.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation proportional to party contribution (y/x)-1</td>
<td>Mean (s.d)</td>
<td>0.33 (0.85)</td>
<td>0.31 (0.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation between seat contribution and office outcome</td>
<td>0.46**</td>
<td>0.68***</td>
<td>0.7***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bivariate regressions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.67***</td>
<td>0.67***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat contribution</td>
<td>0.82**</td>
<td>1.08***</td>
<td>1.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s.e.)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for small parties in cabinet (column 4) is from Warwick and Druckman (2006).
NA = not calculated for these observations because some denominator values are 0.

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
Office goods may attain their lumpiness, in part, from the institutional order (e.g., constitutionally specified limits on the numbers of ministers) and partly by the decisions of the incoming prime minister, who may be able to alter the number (or importance) of ministerial positions (Verzichelli 2008, p.253, p.255; see also Mershon 2002, p.37). Some researchers have suggested that lumpiness may account for disproportional outcomes (e.g., Budge and Keman 1990, pp.128-131; Warwick and Druckman 2001). While Warwick and Druckman (2006, p.647, revising Warwick and Druckman 2001, pp.638–641) show that small-party bias cannot be fully accounted for by 'lumpiness', they do find that it has some effect.

In order to take into account the lumpiness of ministerial office for this analysis, I estimate the amount of office that the party could have expected to attain, given the number of ministerial positions in the cabinet, the party's contribution to the coalition and ordinary rounding conventions, whereby a party contribution would be rounded up or down to the nearest unit of ministerial office. For Green parties in coalition, cabinet size varied from 13 ministers in the Dutch cabinet in 2012 to 27 ministers in the Italian cabinet in 2006. The mean cabinet size in the 24 cases covered was 19 ministers.

If disproportionalities are accounted for by lumpiness, then allowing for this lumpiness should enhance the explanatory power of the seat contribution variable. Rather than strengthening the explanatory power of models presented in Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.5, however, this makes them considerably weaker and more distant from proportionality (compare Columns 1 and 5 and Columns 2 and 6). Taking into account the lumpiness of ministerial office, I also examine proportionality on a case-by-case basis (Figure 2.11). Taking into account the lumpiness of office, 10 of the 24 cases display proportional outcomes. Nine of these are cabinet parties and one is the case of a very small support party (the Australian Greens in 2010). As might be expected, the other eight cases of support parties are instances of undercompensation. Five cases of cabinet parties display apparent overcompensation. The Czech Greens provide the most pronounced case of overcompensation, followed by the Danish Greens, the Irish Greens, the German Greens in 1998 and the French Greens in 1997. 47 There was only one instance of a Green party in cabinet that appears to have been undercompensated, after 'lumpiness' is taken into account: Ecolo in Belgium in 1999.

47 Spoon (2011, p.73) explains the French Greens' attainment of one ministry (rather than none) in 1997 as a "thank you" from the Socialists for their electoral cooperation.
Turning briefly to set-theoretic relationships between the set of high outcome parties and the set of parties that made a large seat contribution to their coalition (see Table 2.6), a high seat contribution is clearly not a necessary condition for a high office outcome: it does not reach the conventional consistency threshold of 0.9. The consistency of this relationship is reduced, in particular, by three cases. These are the Green parties in the Czech Republic in 2007, Ireland in 2007 and France in 1997, each of which made relatively small contributions to their coalitions, yet received relatively high office outcomes. Nor does a small seat contribution come close to being a necessary condition for a low office attainment outcome. With regard to the hypothesised relationships of sufficiency, a high seat contribution is quite clearly not
sufficient for a high office outcome, while a low seat contribution is likewise not sufficient for a low office outcome.  

Table 2.6. Superset (i.e., necessity) relations of seat contribution and bargaining power sets with the outcome set

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions tested</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large seat contribution</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small seat contribution</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High bargaining power</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low bargaining power</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See p.17 for a note on consistency and coverage.

2.5.2 Bargaining power
Among Green parties in governing coalitions, the strength of the relationship between bargaining power and office outcomes is moderate, at best, and explains little of the variance in the outcome (Column 1 in Table 2.7, below). The relationship is stronger – and the explanatory power higher – among Green parties in cabinet (Column 2), which appear to be broadly similar to the wider population of non-Green small parties in cabinet (Column 3). Using the absolute measure of Banzhaf power (discussed in Section 2.4.3, above) makes little difference, although it does make the mean effect of a one unit increase in bargaining power considerably smaller (Column 4 and 5).

---

48 Using De Morgan’s law, inferences about subset (i.e., sufficiency) relations can be made from the coefficients associated with superset (i.e., necessity) relations, such as those displayed in Table 2.6. If the presence of condition x is necessary for outcome y, then the absence of x is sufficient for the absence of y (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p.82). As none of the conditions (including their negations) set out in Table 2.6 are necessary for the outcomes, the absence of these conditions is logically not sufficient for the outcome. While examining singularly sufficient outcomes does not make use of the full potential of QCA, I follow Lilliefeldt (2012, p.202) in using a high threshold (0.9 consistency). Although the consistency value for the sufficiency relation between a low seat contribution and a low office outcome is relatively high, it does not surpass this threshold.
However, it is possible that these results are driven by an outlying case with high bargaining power and a high office outcome (Germany in 2002). To examine the robustness of the results to this possibility, I run two bivariate regressions that exclude this case (Column 6 and 7). They produce considerably weaker results, indicating that it is a statistically influential case and further casting doubt on the capacity of bargaining power to explain variation in office attainment among these cases. Indeed, the analysis of Green parties in governing coalitions that excludes this case (Column 6) produces an $R^2$ statistic of just 0.02.

An analysis of set-theoretic relations (Table 2.6, above; see also fn. 48) does not indicate that high bargaining power is either necessary or singularly sufficient for a high office outcome. In this instance, the cases that violate the necessity relation are the Czech case, the Finnish case in 2007, the Danish case in 2011 and the French case in 2012. Nor does it indicate that low bargaining power is either necessary or singularly sufficient for a low office outcome.

Consistent with previous studies on the full range of parties in government, this analysis indicates that, although bargaining power has better established theoretical foundations than the proportionality hypothesis, it has weaker explanatory power. This weakness manifests itself in a number of ways. First, there are parties that had relatively weak bargaining power, but which nonetheless got into cabinet, including the French, Italian, Finnish and Czech cases. Second, there are many parties that had relatively high bargaining power (e.g., in New Zealand and Australia) but which failed to get into cabinet. Support parties, then, are a further empirical challenge to bargaining power-based explanations: evidently, their exclusion from cabinet cannot be explained on the basis of especially low values on bargaining power indices. Third, the statistical relationship that is observed initially appears to be driven by the German case in 2002, where the party had a high bargaining power value and a relatively high outcome. Fourth, having a high (or low) bargaining power value does not appear to have a consistent set-theoretic relation to the high (or low) outcome.

2.5.3 Summary
The main conventional explanations of portfolio allocation do a modest job of explaining variation in office attainment among Green parties in governing coalitions. As in the broader literature on portfolio allocation, seat contribution outperforms bargaining power as a potential explanation of variation in the office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions. However, its overall performance is only fair, not least when its weak
theoretical foundations are considered. The relationship between bargaining power and variation in Green parties' office outcomes is quite weak. In set-theoretic terms, neither high nor low seat contribution or bargaining power appears to be either necessary or sufficient conditions for high or low outcomes. A closer examination of cases indicates that when the lumpiness of office is taken into account, Green parties in cabinet have tended to be overcompensated on average, albeit relatively modestly, while support parties have in almost all cases been undercompensated. Most cases are not characterised by proportionality. Next, I turn to the third hypothesis, which provides a richer set of explanations.
Table 2.7. Bargaining power as a predictor of office attainment outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Green parties in governing coalitions</th>
<th>Green parties (≤9% lower house seat share) in cabinet</th>
<th>Excluding Germany 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure of bargaining power:</th>
<th>Standardized Banzhaf value</th>
<th>Absolute Banzhaf value</th>
<th>Standardized Banzhaf value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlation between bargaining power and office outcome</td>
<td>0.45**</td>
<td>0.58**</td>
<td>0.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s.e.)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interception</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.33**</td>
<td>9.55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bivariate regressions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bargaining power (s.e.)</th>
<th>0.54** (0.23)</th>
<th>0.53** (0.2)</th>
<th>0.63*** (0.07)</th>
<th>0.33** (0.15)</th>
<th>0.34** (0.14)</th>
<th>0.51 (0.42)</th>
<th>0.99** (0.42)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.33**</td>
<td>9.55**</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.95**</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>5.08*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for small parties in cabinet (column 3) from Warwick and Druckman 2006.

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
2.6 Analyses: Bergman's bargaining position concept

This section begins with a brief statistical analysis of the relationship between the four independent variables identified by the bargaining position concept and the outcome (Subsection 2.6.1). However, as there is little that a linear-additive model using a small number of observations can tell us about what is an inherently conjunctural concept, I turn to set-theoretic methods to gain further insights and to explore the configurations of conditions presented by the 'bargaining position' hypothesis. First, I examine superset (i.e., necessity) relations between each of the four causal conditions (and their negations) and the high and low office attainment outcomes (Subsection 2.6.2). Then I move to examine configurations of conditions that appear to have been sufficient for high outcomes (Subsection 2.6.3) and low outcomes (Subsection 2.6.4). In order to probe further the role of the conditions identified, I examine one or two cases that strongly typify each pathway. The selection of these individual cases follows a variant of the 'diverse cases' method, as they are cases that exemplify different causal paths (Seawright and Gerring 2008, pp.300-301). In the course of these analyses, several robustness tests are performed and these are supplemented by further robustness tests in Appendix F. Section 2.7 discusses the empirical results, compares them with the conventional explanations and teases out their implications.

2.6.1 Statistical analyses

Three of the four independent variables implicated by the bargaining position concept display moderate correlations with the outcome, each in the expected direction. Coalition strategy displays only a weak bivariate correlation (Table 2.16 in Appendix E). The strongest bivariate correlation by some distance between the independent variables is the positive relationship between government formation rules and coalition strategies (r=0.54).

A multivariate regression model (see Table 2.17 in Appendix E) indicates that, when the other factors are held constant, the variables have the following mean effects:

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49 I perform analyses of necessary conditions for both high and low outcomes before proceeding to sufficiency analyses because of the importance of necessary conditions of an outcome for the sufficiency analysis of its negation, in terms of ensuring that necessary conditions are not excluded during logical minimisation; that they are not contradicted by statements of sufficiency; and so that they might supplement theoretically-informed directional expectations (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp.200-209).
positive formation rules are associated with a mean increase in the party's office attainment outcome of over 8% (p=0.02) over negative formation rules;

- a 1% increase in proto-coalition size is associated with a reduction in the office attainment outcome of an average of 0.6% (p=0.02).

These environmental factors are the only variables that display a statistically significant relationship in this model. In addition, the party attribute variables point in the expected direction:

- a 1% increase in party size, is associated with a mean increase of 0.69% in the the party's office attainment outcome;

- an open coalition strategy is associated with a mean increase of 1.69% in the outcome over a closed strategy.

These four variables together account for 37% of the variance. This compares favourably with any of the models presented thus far that have aimed to explain variation in the outcomes of the full set of Green parties in governing coalitions (i.e., Models 1 and 4 in Table 2.5; Models 1 and 5 in Table 2.7, above). These results might be taken as a general indication that Bergman's theoretical suggestions, albeit modified as they are here in their various operationalisations, are generally well-founded. However, and particularly in a relatively small set of cases that is not randomly selected, it can tell us relatively little about the effects of these factors' interactions or about necessary and sufficient conditions for high and low office outcomes (see discussion, Section 1.4).

2.6.2 Necessary conditions for high office outcomes and low office outcomes
An analysis of superset relations between the four causal factors identified by the 'bargaining position' (or 'Bergman') hypothesis and the outcome shows that none of these conditions are singularly necessary for a low office outcome or sufficient for a high outcome. Most are not singularly necessary for a high office outcome nor sufficient for a low outcome. None of the conditions are functionally equivalent, so I do not investigate the necessity relations between their union and the outcome.

---

50 Variance inflation factors for this model remain relatively close to 1, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem. The highest coefficients are for proto-coalition size (1.83) and coalition strategy (1.89).
Table 2.8. Superset (i.e., necessity) relations for high and low office outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions tested</th>
<th>Outcome: High office outcome</th>
<th>Low office outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive formation rule</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative formation rule</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small proto-coalition</td>
<td><strong>0.98</strong></td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large proto-coalition</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large seat share</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small seat share</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open coalition strategy</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed coalition strategy</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needed for majority</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not needed for majority</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See p.17 for a note on consistency and coverage.

However, there is one exception (highlighted in Table 2.8): the presence of a small proto-coalition exhibits a superset relation with the presence of a high office outcome. This set relation exceeds the conventional threshold for the consistency of necessity relations (0.9). In other words, a small proto-coalition appears to be a necessary condition for a high office outcome: *without a small proto-coalition, there is no high office outcome* (see the empty top-left quadrant of Figure 2.12).

A corollary of small proto-coalitions being necessary for high office outcomes is that a large proto-coalition appears to be singularly sufficient for a low office outcome: *if there is a large proto-coalition, then there is a low office outcome* (see the left-most half of Figure 2.12).

Figure 2.12 also illustrates that even if it appears to be a necessary condition for a high office outcome, a small proto-coalition is not singularly sufficient for a high office outcome. While a

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51 Figure 2.12 is an ‘X-Y’ plot. If all cases are south of the diagonal, this indicates a fully consistent superset (necessity) relation between the causal condition and the outcome. If all cases are north of the diagonal, this indicates a fully consistent subset (sufficiency) relation. If all cases were located on the diagonal, this would indicate a condition that was necessary and sufficient for the outcome (see e.g., Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p.67, p.76).
number of cases characterised by a small proto-coalition had high membership in the set of high office outcomes (box A in Figure 2.12, containing German cases in 1998 and 2002, the Danish case in 2011 and the Czech case in 2007), a small proto-coalition was associated with a low office outcome in other cases (box B in Figure 2.12, containing the three New Zealand cases, the Swedish case in 2002, the Australian case in 2010 and the Italian cases in 1996 and 2006).

![Figure 2.12. A highly consistent superset relation between 'small proto-coalition' and 'high office outcome'](image)

The very strong (i.e., highly consistent) set-theoretic relationship that characterises these relations is underpinned by the fact that only three cases – the Finnish cases in 1995, 1999 and 2011 – contradict the set relation, and that they do so by very small margins. However, the apparent necessity relation between small proto-coalitions and high office outcomes for Green parties in governing coalitions must be interpreted with some circumspection. The
conventional measure of the relevance of necessary conditions ('coverage') is relatively low at 0.44 (see Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p.146). The 'relevance' coefficient of this result according to Schneider and Wagemann's (2012, p.236) alternative measure is also relatively low, at 0.48. Both of these coefficients suggest that the necessary condition may be an artifice of the relatively low membership in the outcome (see discussion on p.46) and relatively high membership in the causal condition,\(^{52}\) effectively increasing the chances of cases falling below the diagonal in Figure 2.12. In substantive terms, this may be interpreted as a caution that future cases and alternative data sets with more balanced membership in both conditions may reveal paths to high office outcomes that do not include small proto-coalitions.

Despite these doubts, there remain strong theoretical reasons to link this causal condition with the outcome and it remains striking that, while some cases of large proto-coalitions are associated with low office outcomes, no Green party in coalition that faced a large proto-coalition achieved a high office outcome (i.e., the top-left quadrant of Figure 2.12 is empty); this is consistent with one of the general expectations set out in Hypothesis 3 that small proto-coalitions would be associated with high office outcomes. The highly consistent relation may be regarded as a tentative indication that small proto-coalitions are important, if not definitively necessary, for high office outcomes. As we see in the next subsection, small proto-coalitions do appear to play a key role in configurations of conditions that are sufficient for high office outcomes.

2.6.3 \textit{Sufficient conditions for high office outcomes}

The four causal conditions give rise to sixteen rows in a truth table \((2^4 = 16)\), representing sixteen ideal-typical configurations of causal conditions (Table 2.9). Among the set of 24 Green parties in governing coalitions, ten of these rows are populated by between one and five cases each (i.e., the corner of the property space that they each represent is populated by cases that have a membership value of greater than 0.5). Six rows are not populated by cases. Notably, one of these six unpopulated ('logical remainder') rows comprises all of the conditions included in the hypothesis (a positive formation rule, a small proto-coalition, a large seat share and an open coalition strategy): no case has yet occurred that presents the combination of all of these conditions (i.e. has a membership value of greater than 0.5 for each of the causal conditions). The other five rows that are not populated by cases contain

\(^{52}\) Just as skewed membership in the outcome may give rise to problems (p.46, above), skewed membership in the causal condition can also be a problem (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp.246-247).
only one or two of the hypothesised causal conditions. When the outcome values of each case are taken into account, a consistency value is calculated for each row that expresses the extent to which the configuration is consistent with the statement of sufficiency (i.e., the extent to which it is in a subset relation with the outcome).

An analysis of sufficiency using the Truth Table Algorithm logically minimises these rows, identifying a solution comprising two configurations of conditions associated with a high office outcome (i.e., two 'paths' to this outcome) (Table 2.10). Together, they provide a highly consistent solution (consistency = 0.93) that covers two-thirds of the outcome. The two paths do not overlap. Each of the conditions identified in the paths are INUS conditions (insufficient but necessary parts of unnecessary but sufficient conditions) (Mackie 1965; see also Mahoney 2008, esp. pp.418-420).

53 In performing this analysis, I am presented with the choice of prime implicants for two rows of the truth table. The first row that is covered by more than one prime implicant is Row 4: a positive formation rule, small proto-coalition, a large seat share and a closed coalition strategy (see Table 2.9). This row is populated by the two German cases, in 1998 and 2002. The second row that is covered by more than one prime implicant is Row 3: a positive formation rule, small proto-coalition, small seat share and open coalition strategy. This is populated by the Czech and Irish cases. For each of these, the choice is between four prime implicants: a) small proto-coalition, open coalition strategy, small seat share; b) positive formation rule, closed coalition strategy, large seat share; c) positive formation rule, small proto-coalition, open coalition strategy; d) positive formation rule, small proto-coalition, large seat share. Prime implicants should be selected using substantive and theoretical knowledge (Ragin 2008b, p.69). In theoretical terms, c) and d) are superior, as they do not contain factors that contradict the theoretical expectations set out thus far. Based on case knowledge, it appears that large seat share (d) almost certainly mattered for the German cases, while open coalition strategy (c) mattered in the Czech Republic and, to a lesser extent, in Ireland.

54 Table 2.10 displays the 'conservative' solution (i.e., the solution that uses only the data available and does not make simplifying assumptions concerning the logical remainder rows of the truth table). The intermediate solution (not shown; consistency 0.88) retains the two main conditions, but simplifies the difference between the two paths to being either a large seat share or an open coalition strategy. Together, they provide increased coverage to 0.74 of the outcome. In other words, it renders a marginal gain in general coverage and parsimony within the paths, but at the cost of consistency. No other advantages are apparent. Intermediate solutions run the risk of using untenable assumptions and overlooking logical remainders (see Schneider and Wagemann, Ch.8). I follow Schneider and Wagemann's (2012, p.162, p.166) suggestion that solutions that do not rely on simplifying assumptions should be called the 'conservative' solution rather than the 'complex' solution, as they may not be less complex than non-conservative solutions.
Table 2.9. Truth table and consistency values for high office outcomes based on fuzzy-set data matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Positive formation rule</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Number of cases with membership &gt; 0.5 in this ideal type</th>
<th>Cases with membership &gt; 0.5 in this ideal type</th>
<th>Raw consistency</th>
<th>Is row deemed sufficient for high office outcome?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1 1 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 1 1 1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>FIN 1999, FIN 2007, FIN 2011, BEC 1999, BAG 1999</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1 0 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CZE 2007, IRE 2007</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1 0 0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GER 1998, GER 2002</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 1 1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NLD 2012</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 1 1 0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>DNK 2011, NWZ 1999, NWZ 2002, NWZ 2005, SWE 2002</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 0 0 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>FIN 1995, ITA 1993</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 0 0 0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ITA 1996, ITA 2006</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 1 1 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 0 0 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 1 1 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 0 0 0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>FRA 1997, SWE 1998, AUS 2010</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SLO 1998</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 0 0 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 0 1 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>FRA 2012</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Row = ideal type configuration of conditions

LR = logical remainder (i.e., the configuration of conditions has not occurred; no cases have membership of > 0.5 in that ideal type configuration).
Table 2.10. Paths to high office outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Conservative solution</th>
<th>True logical contradictions</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Cases that typify the path (with path membership scores)</th>
<th>Cases not covered by the solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Positive formation rule<em>small proto-coalition</em>large seat share* closed coalition strategy + Positive formation rule<em>small proto-coalition</em>small seat share*open coalition strategy</td>
<td>0.93 None</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>Germany 2002 (0.96,0.88) Germany 1998 (0.85,0.82)</td>
<td>Denmark 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Positive formation rule<em>small proto-coalition</em>small seat share*open coalition strategy</td>
<td>0.93 None</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>Czech Rep. 2007 (0.83,0.9) Ireland 2007 (0.73,0.61)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See description of model structure in the text.

* indicates 'and'; + indicates 'or'.

Membership scores in configurations follow the format (x, y) where x is membership in the configuration of causal conditions and y is membership in the outcome.

See p.17 for a note on consistency and coverage.

As we might expect, given that a small proto-coalition displays a consistent superset relation with the outcome (see previous subsection), that condition appears in both of these configurations. The other environmental condition that is expected to be associated with high office outcomes – a positive government formation rule – is also present in both configurations.

The first path to high office outcomes involves a relatively large Green party and a closed coalition strategy in conjunction with these two environmental conditions. I label this the 'large party' path.\(^{55}\) It covers 0.28 of the outcome and is populated by the German cases. This

\(^{55}\) Of course, these are not the only parties with large seat share, and several parties with large seat share received a low outcome. This label – and other path labels identified hereafter – are meant as a shorthand, rather than as a full summary of the causal conditions in the path or a 'shortcut' to generalisability.
path is typified most strongly by the German case in 2002.\textsuperscript{56} The configuration of conditions in this path reflects important aspects of this case. First, the positive government formation rule – which, in addition, required an absolute majority to invest the government – set a high bar for government formation, increasing the prospect of the Social Democrats needing the Greens. Second, the 2002 election resulted in relatively few seats for the core of the coalition (the Social Democrats, with 41.6% seat share) and only one alternative coalition option (a grand coalition).\textsuperscript{57} The CDU/CSU had almost as many seats (41.1%) as the Social Democrats, making them a highly unattractive coalition partner from both an office- and policy-seeking perspective, as well as one that would displease Social Democrat voters considerably more than continued coalition with the Greens. Third, the Green Party's relatively large size was crucial: the coalition was “rescued by an unexpectedly good performance by the Greens” (Poguntke 2003, p.962). This fits my theoretical expectations concerning the role of these three factors.

One of the conditions that characterised the German case in 2002 (and in 1998) – a closed coalition strategy – was not expected to be associated with a high office outcome. In this case, the Greens doing a deal with the Christian Democrats was quite out of the question, given their commitment to continue in coalition with the Social Democrats (and, indeed, the ideological and electoral incentives that motivated this strategy). All the same, had the Greens been open to coalition with the Christian Democrats, it is conceivable that they might have extracted a higher price from their coalition negotiations, all else being equal. However, all else is unlikely to have been equal: given the electoral benefits that they derived from their commitment to coalition with the Social Democrats (see p.195, Chapter 3 for more), it is likely that they would have found themselves with considerably fewer seats and therefore in a much weaker bargaining position. Thus, a closed coalition strategy contributed, in this situation, to a stronger bargaining position.

The second path, in contrast, involves a small Green party and an open coalition strategy in conjunction with the two environmental conditions (positive formation rule and small proto-coalition). I label this the 'small party' path to high office attainment outcomes. It covers 0.38 of the outcome and is typified by the Czech case and the Irish case. Of these two cases, the

\textsuperscript{56} I measure the strength of 'typification' by taking the minimum value of the case's membership in the configuration of causal conditions and its membership in the outcome.

\textsuperscript{57} Neither the PDS (with 0.3\%) nor the FDP (with 7.8\%) (nor even the unlikely combination of those two parties) could deliver a majority for the Social Democrats.
Czech case typifies the configuration most strongly. What role did these factors play in this case? First, as in the German cases, a positive formation rule meant that government formation was demanding (albeit without an absolute majority requirement in this case). Second, the proto-coalition was clearly short of a majority. Outside of small minority governments,\(^{58}\) the Civic Democrats had two options: coalition with the small Christian Democrat party and the Greens, supported by defections of individual MPs from the Social Democrats (or the Communists), or grand coalition with the Social Democrats (Hanley 2013, pp.7-8). A grand coalition was unattractive, both from an office attainment perspective (the Civic Democrats would have had to concede considerable office share) and from a more general policy and political perspective: at the time, relations between the largest parties were very poor (Hanley 2013, fn.21). Therefore, without the Greens, the Civic Democrats could not have formed anything other than a grand coalition or a much smaller minority government that would have relied on external support. They were a crucial marginal partner for the proto-coalition that consisted of the Civic Democrats and Christian Democrats. This crucial role was reflected in the Greens being rewarded disproportionately (see Figure 2.11, above) with four ministries and some significant policy concessions (Deets and Kouba 2008, p.819).

Third, consistent with my theoretical expectations, it is plausible that their small size weakened them: had they received a couple more seats at the 2006 election, they would have been in a stronger position. Thus, small size, as such, appears to have played no active role in their high outcome. The path does illustrate that it is possible for relatively small parties to receive relatively high office outcomes.

Did the party's open coalition strategy really strengthen their position by increasing its viable coalition options? In the Czech case, coalition with the Civic Democrats represented the Green Party's preferred option and, given that they had categorically ruled out joining a coalition that was supported by the Communists (Deets and Kouba 2008, p.818), while maintaining an otherwise open coalition strategy (i.e., open to the Social Democrats), it was their only option if they wanted to enter government after the election in 2006. Thus, openness in the specific sense of being open to a less-preferred coalition (with the Social Democrats) seems not to have put the Czech Greens in a stronger position in this situation.\(^{59}\)

\(^{58}\) Various other minority government formations (Civic Democrats and Christian Democrats; Civic Democrats alone; or Social Democrats and Christian Democrats) were discussed during the formation process, but they fell significantly short of a majority, and so needed the cooperation of other parties, which was not forthcoming (Linek 2007, p.935).

\(^{59}\) However, it is not far-fetched to speculate that the medium-term prospect of a centrally positioned Green
Nor did an open coalition strategy lead to a situation in which the Green Party could choose between two alternative coalitions in the Irish case. However, an open coalition strategy was in this case crucial for their entry into government, as the only viable coalition option was the Greens' less-preferred option.\(^6^0\) The fact that they were open to a less-preferred coalition allowed them to enter government. While the Greens were not necessary for the formation of the government, the leadership of the main government party had a strong preference for coalition with the Greens in order to renew the ten-year old coalition's image and, more importantly, to stabilise the coalition, not least after an election campaign in which the Prime Minister was the subject of corruption allegations. Thus, an open coalition strategy was clearly a necessary part of the Irish Greens' pathway to government in 2007. The openness of the party's coalition strategy beyond its preferred partners only became an 'active ingredient' in the Irish Greens' entry into government; it appears to have had few short-term implications in the Czech case.

Neither path covers cases of high office outcomes in systems with negative government formation rules. Indeed, there is only one such case in the data and it is not covered by either of the paths. This is the case of the Socialist People's Party (SF) in Denmark in 2011, with a high outcome (membership of 0.95 in the set of high office outcomes). This case is characterised by a negative formation rule, a small proto-coalition (0.99 set membership value), a large seat share (0.96 set membership value) and a closed coalition strategy. It presents a puzzle: it has much in common with the other cases in Row 6 of the truth table, which are characterised by the same configuration of conditions, but its outcome was radically different. In these other cases – three New Zealand cases and the Swedish case in 2002 – the parties attained the lowest possible office outcome, becoming support parties.\(^6^1\) Why was the SF's outcome so markedly different?

In the terms of the bargaining position concept, it is notable that the SF had very strong membership in two fuzzy sets: the size of the proto-coalition (which was very small, at

\(^{60}\) Some tentative attempts were made to form an alternative to the Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat-Green Party coalition in Ireland in 2007. The leader of the main opposition party, Fine Gael, telephoned the leader of the Green Party to ask him to act as an intermediary in talks with Sinn Féin with a view to forming a broad anti-Fianna Fáil coalition (Irish Times 2009). However, these attempts were not credible (to the extent that they were not acted upon by the Green Party) and so did not strengthen the party's bargaining position.

\(^{61}\) Of the populated truth table rows, it also appears to have much in common with Row 5 populated by the Dutch case (where the party had an open, rather than a closed strategy) and Row 12, populated by the cases of France in 1997, Sweden in 1998 and Australia in 2010. All of these cases display low office outcomes.
42.5%) and the size of the party (which was relatively large, at 8.9%). Together, and in the context of Denmark's well-defined left-right political space, which made the prospect of the SF participating in a cross-bloc government remote, these features made the party crucial for the Social Democrats if they were to attain office. It had notably stronger membership in these sets than in the other four cases in Row 6, with the partial exception of the New Zealand Greens in 2002, and it appears to have much in common with the 'large party' path described above.

Perhaps most importantly, the distinguishing feature of the Danish case is that it is the only Green party in a governing coalition that was clearly part of the core of emergent coalition, rather than being a marginal party (see discussion above at Subsection 2.4.1). Notably, this occurred in the presence of a very small putative prime ministerial party: the Social Democrats had suffered its worst election result in over a century in 2007, winning 25.1% seat share (Bille 2008) and they performed even worse in 2011. This weakness in its main partner may have allowed the SF, as an ideologically proximate party to the Social Democrats, to develop a more central role for itself in the coalition formation of 2011. It may also signal an important scope condition for the application of the 'bargaining position' concept, which, consistent with the framework set out in Subsection 2.4.1 may be applicable only to parties that are towards the outermost edge of coalition. In this case the 'Red-Green Alliance' occupied this position. It became a support party.

A further motivation for the SF to take up this more central role may have stemmed from its unfolding electoral prospects: the party was rewarded in opinion polls for shifting towards the centre after 2007 and it doubled its vote in the 2009 European Parliament elections (Bille 2010, pp.952-953). Meanwhile, the margins of the party system were becoming even more competitive as support for the Red-Green Alliance strengthened, reducing the incentive for the SF to remain in that position. Finally, and additionally, the party's high outcome may also be explained by way of compensation for policy concessions made to the third cabinet party, the Social Liberals (see Kosiara-Pedersen 2012, p.422).

2.6.4 Sufficient conditions for low office outcomes
In the truth table produced for the low office outcome (Table 2.11, p.93), the row with which we might associate strongest expectations (Row 1) is populated by one case – France in 2012 – which was characterised by a low office outcome (0.17 fuzzy set value; one ministerial
position out of nineteen). The configurations associated with the four 'bargaining position' conditions appear to perform particularly strongly for the identification of paths to a low office outcome. A first analysis of sufficient conditions for low outcomes detects a highly consistent solution (consistency = 0.97) that covers almost four-fifths of the outcome (coverage = 0.78). The solution contains three paths which do not overlap (Table 2.12).

The first and largest path (coverage = 0.43), which I label the 'small captive party' path, consists of cases in which the party has a small seat share and a closed coalition strategy. This path is exemplified by Australia in 2010, France in 1997 and 2012, Slovakia in 1998, Italy in 1996 and 2006, and Sweden in 1998. The case with the strongest membership in this path is the Australian case. The party was extremely small in the lower house and, despite the efforts of its leader, it did not have a credible open coalition strategy (see fn. 16, above). The party did not gain ministerial office despite a number of conditions that suggested that it was in a powerful position: the Labor Party was in a weak position, having lost seats and needing the support (tacit or active) of four of the six MPs elected outside of the major parties, two of which announced that they would support the centre-right; in an election campaign in which climate change had been unusually salient, the Greens had won a relatively large vote share (13.1%) in elections to the lower house and had strengthened their position in the powerful upper house, making Labor dependent on their support. Ministerial positions were clearly not out of the question for MPs from outside the major parties: one of the Independent MPs (Rob Oakeshott) was offered a ministerial position (an offer he declined) (Williams 2011; see also Mackerras 2011). The fact that these factors all pointed towards a strong bargaining position

62 The two truth tables displayed here (Table 2.9 and Table 2.11) have effectively the same content in their leftmost columns, although their rows are ordered differently. Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p.191) advise creating separate truth tables for the outcome and the absence of the outcome.

63 In the analysis of low office outcomes, I am presented with the choice of two prime implicants for one row (Row 15 in Table 2.11, populated by the Dutch case). The row is characterised by a negative formation rule, a small proto-coalition, a large seat share and an open coalition strategy. The prime implicants are a) negative formation rule and open coalition strategy or b) a large seat share and an open coalition strategy. Both prime implicants include a factor (open coalition strategy) that is contrary to theoretical expectations. The first option (a) includes one factor (negative formation rule) that is expected to be associated with the outcome, while the second option includes no such factor, so I choose the former as a prime implicant.

64 The intermediate solution (not shown; consistency 0.97) only marginally increases coverage (0.79). It mostly creates overlap among the paths by enlarging the second path from 0.3 coverage to 0.48 coverage. These paths are: 1) Small seat share and closed coalition strategy (coverage 0.48), with no additional typifying cases; 2) Large proto-coalition (coverage 0.47), additionally typified by Slovakia 1998 and France 2012; 3) negative formation rule and open coalition strategy (coverage 0.06), with no additional typifying cases. There is no obvious advantage to be gained by adopting the intermediate solution.

65 Bale and Bergman (2006a, p.193) describe a captive party as one that is “unwilling to jeopardise the formation of a centre-left government lest they let in a conservative alternative or appear as a destabilizing force.” Therefore, it is invariably a party with a closed coalition strategy.
for the Greens, and yet they did not attain a ministry, suggest that either the factors that characterise this path (small seat share and a closed strategy) were particularly strong or that there were other factors at play. More generally, the cases that typify the path involve both positive formation rules (Slovakia 1998, Italy 1996, Italy 2006) and negative formation rules (France 1997, Sweden 1998, Australia 2010), and both small proto-coalitions (France 1997, Sweden 1998, Australia 2010, Italy 1996, Italy 2006) and large proto-coalitions (Slovakia 1998).

The second path, which I label the 'surplus party' path, features a positive formation rule, a large proto-coalition and an open coalition strategy. It covers 0.3 of the outcome and is typified by cases in Finland (1995, 1999, 2007, 2011), Belgium (both cases in 1999) and Italy in 1993. It involves both large and small Green parties. We expected two of these factors – positive formation rules and open coalition strategies – to be associated with high, rather than low, office outcomes for Green parties. The causal condition in this path that appears to have explanatory power in relation to the low office outcome is the large proto-coalition. This is consistent with this condition's identification as being a potentially singularly sufficient condition for a low office outcome (Subsection 2.6.2, above). It is illustrated by two cases covered by this path. It is also is consistent with the finding that small parties in larger (more multiparty) coalitions tend not to be compensated as generously as small parties in smaller coalitions (Browne and Franklin 1973, p.464; see also Laver and Schofield 1990, p.172).

The case with the strongest membership in this path was the Italian case in 1993, closely followed by the Finnish case in 1995.66 The Italian case, which involved the resignation of the party's sole ministerial appointee after one day, appears at first sight to be a case of 'powershyness', in the context of its main ally's (the PDS's) exit due to internal conflict over the decision to support the government. However, even had the party decided to keep its single ministerial appointment, it would still have received a low office outcome, so this powershyness does not fully explain the outcome. The most important element appears to have been its very weak bargaining position on the margins of a large proto-coalition.

66 I view the Finnish case as the more significant case in this path, given the instability surrounding the Italian proto-coalition described on page 8, above.
Table 2.11. Truth table and consistency values for low office outcomes based on fuzzy-set data matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Negative formation rule</th>
<th>Large proto-coalition</th>
<th>Small seat share</th>
<th>Closed coalition strategy</th>
<th>Number of cases with membership &gt; 0.5 in this ideal type</th>
<th>Cases with membership &gt; 0.5 in this ideal type</th>
<th>Raw consistency</th>
<th>Is row deemed sufficient for low office share?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>FRA 2012</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>FRA 1997, SWE 1998, AUS 2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SLO 1998</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>DNK 2011, NWZ 1999, NWZ 2002, NWZ 2005, SWE 2002</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>FIN 1995, ITA 1993</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ITA 1996, ITA 2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>LR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>FIN 1999, FIN 2007, FIN 2011, BEC 1999, BAG 1999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CZE 2007, IRE 2007</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GER 1998, GER 2002</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NLD 2012</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>LR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Row = ideal type configuration of conditions
LR = logical remainder (i.e., the configuration of conditions has not occurred; no cases have membership of > 0.5 in that ideal type configuration)
Table 2.12. Paths to low office outcomes (first model: consistency cutoff 1.0)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Conservative solution</th>
<th>True logical contradiction</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Cases that typify the path (with membership scores)</th>
<th>Cases not covered by the solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Small seat share* closed coalition strategy + Positive formation rule* large proto-coalition*open coalition strategy +</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>Australia 2010, (0.98,0.95) Slovakia 1998 (0.92,0.95) France 2012 (0.84,0.83) Italy 2006 (0.89,0.88) Italy 1996 (0.88,0.85) France 1997 (0.95,0.77) Sweden 1998 (0.54,0.95) Italy 1993 (0.92,0.95) Finland 1995 (0.9,0.82) Finland 1999 (0.84,0.82) Belgium (Agalev) 1999 (0.62,0.77) Belgium (Ecolo) 1999 (0.58,0.77) Finland 2007 (0.58,0.57) Finland 2011 (0.53,0.54)</td>
<td>Sweden 2002 New Zealand 1999 New Zealand 2002 New Zealand 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Positive formation rule* large proto-coalition<em>open coalition strategy + Negative formation rule</em> small proto-coalition * large seat share * open coalition strategy</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Negative formation rule* small proto-coalition * large seat share * open coalition strategy</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>Netherlands 2012 (0.81,0.95)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See description of model structures in the text.

* indicates 'and'; + indicates 'or'.

Membership scores in configurations follow the format (x, y) where x is membership in the configuration of causal conditions and y is membership in the outcome.

See p.17 for a note on consistency and coverage.

In Finland in 1995, a coalition of the Social Democrats, the Conservatives and the Swedish People's Party would have been large enough to survive comfortably without additional support. Nonetheless, Lipponen “coaxed the Greens and the radical left to accept government responsibility” (Nousiainen 2000, p.269) after a disappointing election result for the smaller party (Paastela 2008, p.67). This had the effect of weakening the opposition (which consisted
largely of the Centre Party), thus contributing to the coalition's capacity to dominate politics (Jungar 2011, pp.141-142). Gahrton and Aylward (2010, p.8) suggest that Lipponen wanted the Greens in government “for balance” in the broad coalition. The key factor in determining the party's low office outcome appears to be the very large size of the coalition in conjunction with the Greens' marginal status.

This case also suggests that, in the presence of a large proto-coalition, the positive formation rule may have had no active role in determining the outcome. The other factor identified in this path – the Green party's open coalition strategy – may have been largely a function of the structure of the party system in these cases, rather than an active factor in determining the low outcome. Marginal office-seeking parties in these systems may have an open coalition strategy of necessity. Closed strategies, where a marginal party is open to some coalitions, may have unpredictable and particularly undesirable effects for these parties' office-seeking outcomes, excluding them from broad coalitions. It may be the case that institutional or cultural factors in each of these systems produced both the positive formation rule, the non-bipolar party system and other incentives and opportunities to create large coalitions (see e.g., Deschouwer 2009, esp. pp.151-157). In summary, the set relation suggested by the results in Subsection 2.6.2 – that a large proto-coalition is potentially singularly sufficient for a low office outcome – may provide a more plausible (and parsimonious) explanation than the complex configuration identified by this path, and these large proto-coalitions, in turn, may be developed under a range of particular institutional and cultural conditions.

The third path has coverage of just 0.04. It involves negative formation rule and a small proto-coalition and a Green party with a large seat share and an open coalition strategy. It is exemplified only by the Netherlands in 2012. On the one hand, this path may be trivial, as its coverage is very low. It is also a peculiar configuration in theoretical terms, in the sense that only one of the conditions in it – a negative formation rule – is expected to be associated with a low office outcome. However, there are some reasons to believe that this third path may in fact be a theoretically important path, or that it may be more empirically important than it seems at first sight.

First, there is the possibility that it may indicate a lesser-populated path to low office outcomes that a study of a larger number of cases may populate more heavily. While this

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67 It is not alone in this respect: Row 12 in Table 2.11, which is heavily populated with cases of low outcomes, also features only one of the sets (large proto-coalition) that we expected to be associated with that outcome.
cannot be verified within the bounds of this study, this possibility makes it interesting as a potential path to low outcomes in contexts where these conditions exist. Second, and following from the discussion of the coalition strategy of the Swedish Greens in 2002 (see fn.16, above), it is not far-fetched to suggest that the present calibration of the Swedish Greens' coalition strategy may suffer from a problem of measurement error. If this is the case, then the Swedish case joins the Dutch case in Row 15 of the truth table and the third path to low office outcomes becomes larger and, thus, less trivial.\footnote{The conservative solution to this alternative model in which the Swedish coalition strategy is recoded as 'open' is almost identical to the conservative solution of the original model set out in Table 2.12. The Swedish case joins the Dutch case as an example of the third path, albeit with very weak membership (0.52) in that corner of the property space, increasing slightly the coverage of that path to 0.07. However, the coverage of the first path falls and the coverage of the solution as a whole remains the same (as does the consistency). The intermediate solution again offers only marginally improved coverage. One other coding of coalition strategy that might be called into doubt is that of the Australian case. With both the Swedish case of 2002 and the Australian case recoded, the major difference is that the third path becomes more parsimonious, losing one condition (large seat share) and increases in coverage to 0.15, now covering the Australian case and providing the Swedish case with a strong membership score (0.8). The overall solution, however, does not cover additional cases; nor is its coverage much higher (0.8). Most importantly, perhaps, is that it stretches the concept of a credibly open coalition strategy to include two cases to which its application is dubious.}

The third and most important reason to pay attention to the Dutch case emerges when we turn to deal with the cases that are not covered by the solution produced by the model in Table 2.12: the three cases involving the New Zealand Greens and the case of the Swedish Greens in 2002. These cases are substantively similar to the Dutch case. They are characterised by a negative formation rule; a small proto-coalition and a large seat share, like the Dutch case, and differ only in their closed coalition strategy. Coalition strategy is arguably the most manipulable causal condition in the configurations examined here: while it is difficult for a party to change institutional rules, the size of the proto-coalition that it faces, and its own size, it is easier for it to change its coalition strategy.

Revisiting the truth table (Table 2.11, above), we observe that the row that these cases occupy, along with the Danish case in 2011, is Row 6. This row produces a consistency value of 0.79. This is a borderline but potentially acceptable consistency value, according to conventional measures of the consistency of sufficiency relations, which stipulate that consistency thresholds are not be admissible below 0.75 (see Section 1.4). There is a substantial gap until
the next highest consistency score (0.63 for Row 13).\footnote{On the importance of these gaps, see Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p.185). They advise a lower bound of 0.75 consistency (p.289). They also advise that solutions should always be run using two different consistency thresholds to test for robustness (see also Ragin 2008a, p.144). This was not possible in the analysis of the high office outcome, as there was only one viable (≥0.75 consistency) threshold available in the data, but it is possible for the analysis of the low office outcome.} One response to this is to run a modified model, treating Row 6 as being consistent with a statement of sufficiency.\footnote{Another, more radical response, also drawing on case knowledge of the Danish case (see discussion in Subsection 2.6.3) is to exclude the case, suggesting that it is beyond the scope of the study. This has the effect of making Row 6 clearly consistent with a statement of sufficiency. This leads to a result that is nearly identical to the second model, below, with solution coverage of 0.86, but without the Danish case as a logical contradiction.}

This modified second model (Table 2.13) produces first and second paths that are identical to those in the first model. The third path (which featured only the Dutch case in the first model) loses one condition (open coalition strategy) and now covers the Dutch case and the four cases that were not covered by the first model (Sweden in 2002 and the three New Zealand cases). The Danish case becomes a logical contradiction in this path and largely accounts for its relatively low consistency score (0.82) and the overall solution's reduced (but still high) consistency score (0.92). The overall solution coverage is increased to 0.86, reflecting the absence of cases that are not covered. The first and the third path now overlap somewhat, but the cases typified by these paths are mutually exclusive, as the first path features a small seat share and the third a large seat share. According to our theoretical expectations, the third path might be read as follows: despite a small proto-coalition and despite the Green parties having a large seat share, the core parties were able to exclude them in the context of a negative formation rule. It seems to reinforce Bergman's (1993, 1995) findings concerning the important effects of a negative formation rule.\footnote{The intermediate solution in this instance produces three paths: a small seat share in conjunction with a closed coalition strategy, a small proto-coalition, or a negative formation rule is sufficient (consistency 0.89); coverage is considerably higher at 0.95.}
Table 2.13. Paths to low office outcomes (second model; consistency cutoff 0.78)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>True logical contradictions</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Cases that typify the path (with membership scores)</th>
<th>Cases not covered by the solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Conservative solution</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>Austria 2010, (0.98, 0.95) Slovakia 1998 (0.92, 0.95) Italy 2006 (0.89, 0.88) Italy 1996 (0.88, 0.85) France 2012 (0.84, 0.83) France 1997 (0.95, 0.77) Sweden 1998 (0.54, 0.95)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2    | Adequate number of parties   | 0.98         | 0.3 0.3        | Italy 1993 (0.92, 0.95) Finland 1995 (0.9, 0.82) Finland 1999 (0.84, 0.82) Belgium (Agalev) 1999 (0.62, 0.77) Belgium (Ecolo) 1999 (0.58, 0.77) Finland 2007 (0.58, 0.57) Finland 2011 (0.53, 0.54) | None |

| 3    | Negative formation rule     | 0.8          | 0.24 0.12      | New Zealand 2002 (0.89, 0.95) Netherlands 2012 (0.81, 0.95) New Zealand 1999 (0.7, 0.95) New Zealand 2005 (0.54, 0.95) Sweden 2002 (0.52, 0.95) | None |

See description of model structures in the text.

* indicates ‘and’; + indicates ‘or’.

Membership scores in configurations follow the format (x, y) where x is membership in the configuration of causal conditions and y is membership in the outcome.

See p.17 for a note on consistency and coverage.

The case with the strongest membership in the third path is that of the New Zealand Greens in 2002. The central role of the negative government formation rule is borne out in existing studies of the New Zealand cases and the Swedish cases (Bale and Bergman 2006b; Bale and Blomgren 2008; Aylott and Bergman 2011, esp. p.44, ff.56). While situation-specific factors, such as the dispute between Labour and the Greens on the release of genetically modified organisms in 2002 may have increased the chances that they would not enter government (and

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therefore would not attain a high office outcome) (Bale and Blomgren 2008, p.87; Bale 2003, p.141-142; see also Church and McLeay 2002), the structural driver of these low outcomes appears to be the negative formation rule. This account can be further enriched by findings from case studies which showed that the formation rule operated in conjunction with the party's ideological and organisational features, producing a 'captive' status among these larger Green parties (e.g., Aylott and Bergman 2011, esp. p.44, ff.56). However, it is notable that this extension of the explanation does not apply to the Dutch case, in which the Greens supported a government of the centre-right.\footnote{For an explanation of the difference in the outcome between the majority of cases in the third path and the logical contradiction case in this path (the Danish case), see discussion on p.89. In the Dutch case, the outcome may also have been driven by the unusual nature of the coalition, with the prospect of lasting only a few months.}

These results (for both high and low outcomes) are subject to further robustness tests which are described in Appendix F, involving alternative calibrations of the outcome and the most important causal condition (the size of the proto-coalition). In summary, none of these alternative calibrations produce solutions in which the paths identified are not in subset relation to the paths in the main models: they do not produce substantively different results. Indeed, in most cases, the paths produced are substantively identical to those produced by the main analysis. Alternative calibrations result in variations in the parameters of fit associated with each model, but these are minor.

2.7 Discussion

This chapter set out to answer two questions. First, under what conditions have Green parties in governing coalitions achieved high and low office outcomes? A secondary aim was to examine whether variations in these parties' attributes and strategies influenced their outcomes. Did they make a difference or were they the victims and beneficiaries of circumstance? It set out to answer these questions in the context of literatures that, despite some analytical successes, do not provide a full understanding of parties' office attainment outcomes. The portfolio allocation literature's findings are characterised by a strong empirical regularity in need of a theoretical foundation, which is only just now being identified empirically (Bäck et al. 2009). The support parties literature, in the meantime, is less well-established and its empirical scope has been relatively limited.
The chapter examined two sets of explanations. The first was a pair of conventional explanations that invoke seat contributions and bargaining power and have been developed in the literature on portfolio allocation within cabinet coalitions. The second was Bergman's (1995) 'bargaining position' concept that has been developed in the study of support parties. Each set of explanations was examined in relation to the office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions, including support parties.

It observed the relative weakness of conventional approaches to explaining the outcomes of this particular set of parties. In terms of explanatory power, the four elements of Bergman's bargaining position concept perform more strongly than seat contribution or bargaining power. The weakness of these explanations is exposed most clearly in cross-case set-theoretic analyses. I show that, within the scope conditions of this study, a high seat contribution to a coalition is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for a high office attainment outcome. This is illustrated clearly by cases of relatively large support parties. Nor is a low seat contribution necessary or sufficient for low office attainment outcomes. The same applies to bargaining power. Moreover, theoretical deficits – the relative lack of theory that has been developed to explain proportionality and the lack of contextual sensitivity of bargaining power – undermine their explanatory power.

Drawing on Bergman's theory, I identified four factors that might explain parties' office outcomes. Two of these – the government formation rule and the size of the proto-coalition – were 'environmental' factors and two – party size and coalition strategy – were party attributes. I investigated the role of these factors at a number of levels including their mean effects, their presence in pathways to the outcome and their role in individual cases that typified these pathways. The analyses detected several configurations of these conditions that were sufficient for high and low office outcomes. Together, they provide some indication that Bergman's theory is useful for understanding office attainment outcomes in governing coalitions beyond its original application to explaining support party status.

There are several paths to Green parties' high and low outcomes. Within these paths, the analyses showed that environmental factors were very important. The size of the proto-coalition was evidently important for parties' office outcomes in statistical, set-theoretic and case-specific analyses. Although it cannot be interpreted as a necessary condition for reasons related to the distribution of the outcome among the cases studied (see p.83), there is a
strikingly consistent superset relation between the presence of small proto-coalitions and high office outcomes. The presence of a small proto-coalition clearly plays a key role in both of the pathways to high office outcomes identified in the analysis. This is consistent with theoretical expectations and with the general concept of bargaining.

Large proto-coalitions too appear to have played an important role in at least some low office outcomes. Both the analysis of singular sufficiency and a case-specific analysis of the second ('surplus party') path to low office outcomes detect this key role. This observation has precedents in the literature on portfolio allocation: Browne and Franklin (1973, p.464) observed the 'relative weakness' effect in which small parties were overcompensated by less in larger coalitions and Verzichelli (2008, pp.247-250) explains lower disproportionality in surplus cabinets with the fact that small parties cannot be pivotal in these situations.

The important role of proto-coalitions reinforces and appears to justify the emphasis by Bergman (1995) and other recent empirical studies (see Subsection 2.2.3) on the motivations, bargaining power and behaviour of the core, main party in the first instance, rather than the motivations of the marginal support party. It recalls Bale and Bergman's (2006b, p.439) observation:

Party-related explanations for contract parliamentarianism need to begin with the large governing... parties and only then turn to the small parties themselves. This is because, whatever abstract theories suggest about the incentives small parties may have for remaining out of government, what really stops them taking office... is the lack of interest their larger counterparts have in having them there!

In this respect, the fact that Green parties were office-seeking parties (Subsection 2.4.1), even where they ended up being support parties, is significant. If these cases are representative of support parties in this respect (or if they are cases in which the parties are least likely to be office-seeking), this provides a further indication that an emphasis on the support party's 'power-shyness' may be misguided in many cases and that the more recent emphasis on the capacity of larger parties to exclude them from cabinet is a potentially more fruitful line of inquiry.

The important role of proto-coalitions also has implications for further work on small parties' office attainment outcomes. First, the role of small proto-coalitions presents a promising line
of inquiry for future explanations of marginal parties' high office outcomes. The question of whether the presence of a small proto-coalition is a necessary condition for a high office outcome for a small party may be addressed more adequately when other sets of parties in coalition are analysed, specifically those with outcomes that are less skewed than Green parties in coalition. It is evident from existing data (Warwick and Druckman 2006) that these small parties do exist and that Green parties' outcomes are not representative in this respect.

With regard to large proto-coalitions, further work is required on their antecedent causes, which might be incorporated into future explanations. From the presence of Belgium, Finland and pre-1994 Italy in the 'surplus party' path to low outcomes, it appears plausible that there is a wide range of conditions under which these large proto-coalitions might arise. The equifinal nature of this outcome is also evident in existing literature on the causes of surplus coalitions (e.g., Gallagher et al. 2011, pp.426-428 for an overview). Further research on this question may follow along the lines of recent case-specific investigations into the formation of surplus coalitions (Dumont et al. eds. 2011; see Volden and Carrubba 2004 for a different approach).

Government formation rules are a second set of environmental factors that appear to have played an important role in the office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions. Positive formation rules are present in both of the paths to high office outcomes, featuring in four of the five cases of high office outcomes among Green parties in coalition. The negative formation rule, which is a well-established factor in the study of support parties and minority governments (Bergman 1993, 1995; Bale and Bergman 2006b; Bale and Blomgren 2008; Aylott and Bergman 2011; also Martin and Stevenson 2001) clearly facilitated low office outcomes, even where there was a small proto-coalition and a relatively large Green party (Path 3 in Table 2.13). While this merely corroborates the findings of existing case studies (see pp.31-33), it identifies one ostensibly quite different case in this path (the Netherlands in 2012). More generally, the solution highlights that this is not the only path to low (including support party) status: there are clearly other paths to low office outcomes that may or may not involve a negative formation rule (i.e., Paths 1 and 2: the 'small captive party' path and the 'surplus party' path).

Not all Green parties have been equal when joining coalitions: party attributes appear to play an important role, particularly in conjunction with proto-coalition size. Both cross-case and case study analysis shows that large party size clearly played a key role in the German Greens'
relatively high office outcomes (and also in the case of the Danish SF), even if the second, 'small party' path to high outcomes shows that smaller parties can attain high outcomes too. This conjunction of a small proto-coalition and a relatively large Green party find resonance in Dumont and Bäck's (2006, p.S53) study of government accession by Green parties in parliament, in which they observe a relationship between Green parties in parliament entering government and their having electoral fortunes opposite to those of the main left-of-centre party (which is often the core of the proto-coalition). Notably, the 'bargaining position' model includes all of the information that is necessary to calculate the party's proportional seat contribution to cabinet (H1), but in a disaggregated form (as proto-coalition size and as party size).

Party size features in the paths to low office outcomes too in a contradictory, but not illogical, way. In the first ('small captive party') path to low office outcomes, small size in conjunction with a closed coalition strategy appears to produce a low office outcome, up to and including support party status. On the other hand, large party size is a feature of the third path to low office outcomes. In this path, its role, if any, was to make the parties useful coalition partners (but not office-holding coalition partners) for the core parties. The presence of a Swedish case in each of these paths (albeit with weak membership in both) may suggest that these paths have quite a lot in common.

Coalition strategy is associated with results that shed some light on the contradictory strategic relationships that exist between Green parties and their larger potential coalition partners. On the one hand, a closed coalition strategy led to a stronger bargaining position in some circumstances (e.g., Germany); on the other, an open coalition strategy did not lead to a pivotal position in either the Czech or Irish case, even if in the latter it did facilitate the party's accession to government. The role of open coalition strategies in driving high outcomes is inconsistent: while an open coalition strategy was present in the second path to high office outcomes (the 'small party' path), its active role is not evident in the Czech case. In the Irish case, an open strategy was important for entering government and, thus, for achieving a modestly high office outcome. Again, a set of cases that were less skewed towards low outcomes would allow for further investigation of this positional variable.

While nominally, coalition strategy is a party attribute, open coalition strategies in party systems that are not strongly bipolar (e.g., Belgium, Finland) may be more plausibly a result
of party system structure than of party choice. Whether this kind of 'openness' can truly be represented as an 'open' coalition strategy that can leverage the party's bargaining position is questionable and this is a causal condition that may need to be revisited in future research. Future analyses may include party system type and coalition strategy as separate causal conditions.

The basis for the explanations produced by this chapter lies in an attempt to generalise a concept developed for the study of support parties ('bargaining position') to a wider range of parties, including Green parties in cabinet. To what extent – and to which other parties – might this chapter's findings be generalised? One set of limitations on their generalisability may be found in the assumptions upon which the explanations produced by the chapter are constructed. These explanations assume that the parties being studied are marginal, office-seeking and policy-seeking (Subsection 2.4.1). The generalisation of this chapter's findings beyond cases with these characteristics would require the utmost caution. For example, parties that are not office-seeking may be subject to quite different explanations of low office outcomes than are identified here. The fact that the analysis shows that the Danish case, in which the SF was not a marginal party, does not fit the explanations identified by the analysis, may indicate that the explanations will not travel well to non-marginal parties. If Green parties grow at the expense of mainstream left parties, future opportunities to be part of the core of proto-coalitions will be more likely to arise, placing them in a similar position to the Danish SF and potentially outside the scope of the explanations offered here. In addition, the calibration of sets upon which the explanations are premised applies to parties with up to 9% seat share. This, in conjunction with what we already know about the correlation between party size and portfolio allocation, should lead to considerable caution in generalising beyond parties of this size.\(^\text{73}\)

Beyond these considerations, the generalisability of these findings hinges on Green parties' representativeness of wider sets of comparable parties. Further to Section 1.1, which highlighted general commonalities among Green parties, this chapter highlighted further commonalities among Green parties in respect of office attainment that may make them distinctive and, thus, somewhat unrepresentative of small parties (Subsection 2.3.1). On balance, this derived a general expectation (albeit not an unambiguous one) that Green parties

\(^{73}\) It is worth noting, however, that in terms of party size, the scope of Bergman's (1995) study was wider than small parties; indeed, one of the empirical examples of support parties that he draws on in Chapter 5 of his study is the Swedish Social Democrats in 1978.
would seek office less effectively than other small parties. These negative expectations received some support in the comparison of Green parties in cabinet with other small parties in cabinet. The median Green party in cabinet attained 6.7% office share and the median non-Green party of a similar size attained 11.8%. (Whether they attain support party status any more often than other parties is an open question.) Further, in analysing the proportionality of Green parties' outcomes, it showed that Green parties in cabinet, while overcompensated on average, have been overcompensated by substantially less than other small parties (p.71, above).

An important set of explanations of low office outcomes may also point to some Green party peculiarities. Their frequent 'captive party' status plays a major role in their outcomes. Captivity is present in two of the paths to low outcomes (the 'small captive party' and 'large captive party' paths). While we do not know the extent of 'captivity' in the wider population of small parties, it seems clear that Green parties – as participatory organisations often positioned to the left of a social democratic party – have provided optimal conditions for this to occur (Aylott and Bergman 2011). Moreover, the findings of this chapter indicate that captivity occurs even in the absence of negative parliamentarism. Further work may revisit the scope conditions of this finding to examine whether it is restricted to parties (like Green parties) with participatory organisations or whether it extends beyond these parties. Speculatively, we might expect many other small parties in coalition (e.g., far left and far right parties) to be captives too, even where they lack participatory organisations. If so, the occurrence of 'captivity' is unlikely to be a uniquely Green pathway and may be found among other parties. Furthermore, the explanations of high outcomes identified here – including such factors as small proto-coalitions – appear to point to a logic that could operate for many small, marginal, office- and policy-seeking parties.

Indeed, some observations made in the course of the chapter indicate that Green parties may be more representative of the wider population of small parties in coalition than the literature (see Subsection 2.3.1) might suggest. First, in common with most other parties, they are clearly office-seeking (contra e.g., Bale and Dann's 2002 suggestion). This rules out one explanation for low outcomes: that they simply did not seek office. Second, they have been in a wider range of coalitions and bargaining positions than previous studies have been able to observe. Specifically, they have mostly been members of coalitions that have had small proto-coalitions at their core (see p.62). Nor do they appear to have lower mean bargaining power
scores than other parties of their size in majority coalitions. By bringing new cases into the analysis, this updates and modifies earlier observations by Poguntke (2002b) and Rihoux and Rüdig (2006). Thus, while larger coalitions (and the weaker bargaining positions with which they are associated) clearly still play a role in the 'surplus party' path to low office outcomes, Green parties have bargained in the context of a wide range of proto-coalitions. Third, while some Green parties have the potential to position themselves centrally for coalition bargaining (and while they have succeeded in doing so in some cases), this has very seldom strengthened their bargaining position. Thus, Green parties’ potential centrality (insofar as it exists) may not make them particularly unrepresentative of radical left and radical right parties, which tend to lack this potential. Thus, Green parties and explanations of their office outcomes are less distinctive than elements of the existing literature would suggest and therefore may be less unrepresentative of small or new parties than expected.

Tentatively, then, it may be possible to explore the effects of 'bargaining position' and the specific causal pathways identified by this chapters' analyses in the context of a wider range of marginal, small or new parties' office attainment outcomes. Focussing on a particular type of case (and strategic setting) characterised by small, (at least minimally) office-seeking parties that support governments, but that are outside of the core of the coalitions (the 'proto-coalition'), which consists of other office-seeking parties may derive further paths to high and low outcomes and may corroborate the accounts of high and low office attainment outcomes detected in this analysis.

Overall, the use of the 'bargaining position' concept allows a structured cross-case analysis that contributes to the development of the qualitative and configurative analysis of coalition formation and portfolio allocation. Rather than being a challenge to the proportionality finding (or bargaining power approaches), it systematically probes a subset of cases, some of which are clearly deviant (e.g., support parties and overcompensated parties), as recommended by recent literature (Bäck et al. 2009).

The study has modestly expanded our systematic knowledge about support parties. It also shows paths to support party status other than those revealed in extant case studies of Swedish and New Zealand support parties. Those paths involve ostensibly weaker parties in Slovakia and Australia (though see the description of the Australian case, p.91, above). More generally, the analysis has aimed to demonstrate the value of integrating the study of support parties into
analyses of coalitions. Empirically, there appear to be commonalities between some support parties and weak cabinet parties (e.g., in the small captive party path to low office outcomes). At the theoretical level, it has brought a concept from the support party literature into the study of cabinet parties. Indeed, an analysis of absence from cabinet indicates that 'bargaining position' better explains variation in office outcomes than it does support party status, the outcome for which it was originally designed (see p.121 in Appendix F).

The analyses of the seat contribution hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), while it does not produce strong results, does provide some insights. It indicates that small party overcompensation is a mean, but not a median phenomenon. It also provides initial indications that including support parties might account for some of that mean 'bias' within coalitions. In effect, this suggests that small party overcompensation may be at least partly an artifice of selection bias: the selection for analysis of parties in cabinet rather than parties in coalition, as such. Whether this is borne out in the general population of parties can only be discovered using large data set of coalition parties that includes support parties.

One of the obstacles to further systematic and comparative enquiries is, without doubt, the lack of such data. Thus, empirical testing of hypotheses concerning support parties that were developed in the 1980s and 1990s, while it has produced important knowledge, has progressed relatively slowly and the empirical studies that do exist have been restricted to single countries or to very small numbers of cases. This analysis has not addressed this data deficit, but it has highlighted the potential gains from doing so. This is a task that may derive significant analytical rewards, not least in the study of smaller parties in governing coalitions and the study of minority government.

Another data deficit that remains concerns 'process' data on coalition formation and portfolio allocation (Dumont et al. 2011, pp.2-3; Druckman and Roberts 2008, p.549; Golder et al. 2012, p.428). A configurational analysis provides greater (although not total) insight into the process of coalition formation and portfolio allocation than seat contribution (or even bargaining power) analyses. However, it also has limitations. More in-depth studies, particularly of the office attainment outcomes of parties in cabinet may derive process data insights into the mechanisms that drive the proportionality regularity and that produce cases that deviate from it. These findings provide a framework, in the form of multiple paths, in which to situate in-depth case studies selected according to the 'diverse cases' method of case
selection (Seawright and Gerring 2008, pp.300-301). This is a supplement to the proportionality framework that has already been used for case selection in the study of portfolio allocation (Bäck et al. 2009).

The chapter has also made some ancillary contributions that do not derive directly from the central research question. One such contribution is methodological; the other situates Green parties in relation to other parties. In methodological terms, it contributes in a minor way to the development QCA by presenting a new approach to calibrating sets and, specifically, to implementing Ragin's (2008a, Ch.5) direct method of calibration. This approach is only feasible under particular circumstances, where a large, independent data set is available for the relevant variable and where analysing such a data set would not derive greater benefits, perhaps due to the absence of key observations (e.g., support parties) or the non-availability of data on key independent variables (e.g., coalition strategy).

By situating Green parties' office attainment outcomes in relation to other parties, the chapter also contributes to a vein of the literature on Green parties. The finding that the office attainment outcomes of Green parties in cabinet are low and are closer to proportionality (rather than overcompensation) than other small parties is consistent with previous findings regarding these parties' modest outcomes. Taken together with Mair's (2001) observations concerning their failure to fulfil their electoral potential, Bäck et al.'s (2011, p.467, fn.28) suggestion that policy-seeking cabinet parties tend to underperform and Dumont and Bäck's (2006) observations on the slowness of Green parties to accede to government, this paints a picture of a set of parties that have, at least by these standards, underperformed.
2.8 Appendix A

Table 2.14 Green party senior ministers to June 2013

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<th>Country / case id</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Portfolio(s)</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Days in office</th>
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<td>03/10/11</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ida Margrethe Meier-Auken</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>03/10/11</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Sonntag 2013; EJPR Data Yearbook; Finland (2013); case studies (see text). Appointments made after a case begins are indented. Ongoing = ongoing as of June 2013.
2.9 Appendix B

Were Green parties in governing coalitions marginal parties, distinct from the core of those coalitions? Evidence from the cases, excluding support parties and two-party coalitions.

Belgium. In Belgium in 1999, the Socialist and Liberal parties had a close relationship in advance of the election, having agreed to share power (Fitzmaurice 2004, p.148), while the Green parties were somewhat outside this core of the coalition. More generally, Fitzmaurice (2004, p.149) suggests that the Greens in 1999 fell outside of the set of six “core koalitionsfähig parties”. Evidence for the Green parties' outsider status also arises from the end of the Belgian coalition in 2003, when the Socialists and Liberals intended to continue their coalition without the Greens, if possible (Rihoux et al. 2003, p.904).

Czech Republic. Deets and Kouba (2008, p.815) describe the Czech Greens as “the surprise kingmakers”. Hanley (2013, p.7), on the other hand, suggests that their alliance with the Civic Democrats and the Christian Democrats was not unexpected. Either way, compared to the other small party in the coalition, they were outsiders: the KDU-CSL had been in eight cabinets since 1990 and had held the office of Prime Minister in 1998 (Manow and Döring 2012), whereas the Greens had not won even a parliamentary seat until 2006. Moreover, coalition with the Greens was a last resort in a constricted political space: poor relations between the leaderships of the Civic Democrats and the Social Democrats “ruled out” a grand coalition; negotiations on a minority government to be tolerated by the Social Democrats had broken down; and the Christian Democrats would not countenance a minority coalition supported by the Communists (Hanley 2013, p.8).

Finland. In Finland, the coalition formation of 1995 took place with the Social Democrats, the Swedish People's Party, the National Coalition Party and the Left Wing Alliance. The Green Party was the smallest party in the coalition after a disappointing electoral result (Sundberg 1996, pp.326-327). The National Coalition Party (Conservatives) and the Swedish People's Party had substantial governmental experience, including in the previous government. The fact that these parties were not targeted by the Social Democrats during the election campaign (unlike the Centre Party, which had been the largest party in the previous government)
(Sundberg 1996, p.325-326), perhaps indicated that the Social Democrats intended to work with these parties in the next government, establishing a core of sorts. The marginal status of the Greens is indicated by the fact that Lipponen “coaxed the Greens and the radical left to accept government responsibility” (Nousiainen 2000, p.269) alongside the other parties in the coalition.

The 1999 coalition formation in Finland was identical in partisan terms to the 1995 formation (Sundberg 2000). Further indications for the parties' respective core and marginal positions in the coalitional system arose from subsequent events. First, it seems that, in 2002, the government was not sufficiently concerned about the Greens' potential defection to halt its plans for a new nuclear plant; this may be an indication of their marginality. Second, after the election in 2003, the Swedish People's Party was included in the coalition, even though it had lost seats and was not necessary for the coalition's majority. This was, according to Sundberg (2004, p.1004) a surprise for the party and indicates their status as a party of government.

In Finland in 2007, the Green party was not the smallest party in the new coalition. However, it was a much less natural partner to the centre-right parties than the other small coalition partners: the Christian Democrats and the Swedish People's Party (on the latter's status as a part of the core of the coalition during formation, see Sundberg 2008, pp.969-971).

David Arter's description of the long process of government formation in Finland in 2011 tells us something of the Greens' status:

    The initial expectation was that, notwithstanding an inevitably tortuous route, a majority coalition of KOK [the Conservatives], SDP [the Social Democrats] and PS [the True Finns] would eventually be hammered out.... Unexpectedly ‘losing’ the PS rattled the SDP and, looking over its left shoulder and doubtless fearing an electoral backlash from future government cuts, it pressed for VAS [the Left Alliance] to be included in the coalition negotiations. Katainen concurred and ultimately (a first round of protracted negotiations collapsed) just before midsummer a new and, with Christian Democratic involvement, even more multi-coloured version of the Finnish trademark rainbow coalition was formed, which had the backing of 126 in the 200-member legislature. Even so, the enhanced rainbow cabinet was, as Soini observed dismissively, a ‘government of losers’ (Arter 2011, p.1294).
The Greens were 'on the outside' of this coalition in another sense: they were clearly to the left of the coalition on libertarian-authoritarian issues, particularly in comparison with their Christian Democratic partners (Arter 2011 p.1294).

France. In France in 1997, the Communists and the Greens were not part of the core of the coalition (Ysmal 1998). Furthermore, the Communists were arithmetically necessary for the formation and survival of the government, while the Greens were not. Therefore, the Greens can be reasonably portrayed as being the 'last-invited' members of the coalition.

In 2012, the Greens remained on the periphery of the coalition. As a result of their electoral pact, Hollande selected a Green minister before the parliamentary elections despite the possibility that the government would not require the support of the Greens. However, the Greens were clearly the outermost partners. Approaching the second round of the parliamentary elections, “the main question was whether the Socialist Party [with its close allies] could gain an overall majority on its own or whether it would need the support of other parties such as the EELV” (Kuhn 2013, p.107). Ultimately they did manage to achieve this, with a majority of 54.4% before the Greens were counted (ibid., p.97). The Greens also seemed to fare poorly compared to the other minor party in cabinet – the Parti Radical du Gauche – indicating that they were in some way junior to it. Despite their weaker electoral position, the PRG gained a more important senior ministry than the Greens (Little 2012; Kuhn 2013, p106; Murray 2013, pp.209-210).

Ireland. In Ireland in 2007, the Green Party, while it negotiated directly with Fianna Fáil only, was effectively negotiating with both Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats. The two parties had been in government for ten consecutive years, and despite the latter having suffered what turned out to be a terminal defeat (leaving it with only two MPs at the 2007 General Election), it was joined to the coalition by Fianna Fáil before the Greens. A few non-party MPs notwithstanding, the Greens were clearly the outermost partner in the coalition.

Italy. The Italian cases provide two partial exceptions to the emerging pattern of the Green party being the outermost party in the coalition, but the party was clearly still marginal. This
lack of clarity is partly caused by the unusually large number of small parties in the Italian party system (Conti 2008). At the formation of the Italy's governing coalition in 1996, the Greens were the smallest party in the coalition (Ignazi 1997, p.419). However, the Communists (Rifondazione), notwithstanding their electoral pact with the Ulivo coalition, were arguably further to the periphery of the coalition by virtue of their support party status and their strategy of challenging the government on a range of issues (Ignazi 1997, p.421; Ignazi 1999). In this case, then, the Greens may not have been the most peripheral coalition partner.

In 2006, the Greens had campaigned as part of L’Unione, presenting a common programme with other parties of the left. The Democratici di Sinistra and the Margherita, as the Ulivo electoral coalition, formed the core of the coalition and the Rifondazione (6.6% seat share in the lower house) was clearly larger than the several small parties in the coalition. On this occasion, the Greens were not the smallest (non-regional) party in the coalition. The UDEUR had that distinction and their ultimate defection in 2008 might be viewed as evidence that they were more peripheral than the Greens. Moreover, the PdCI, with which the Greens ran as part of a coalition in the Senate election, did not get a position in the cabinet and may therefore also be viewed as more peripheral than the Greens (Ignazi 2007). In both of the Italian cases, the Greens' position can be summarised as being peripheral but not the outermost party in the coalition.

Denmark. The Danish case in 2011 appears to be the one clear exception to the assumption that the Green party and the core parties would be distinct, as the Green party in this instance was arguably close to the core of the government formation, leaving other parties on the periphery. Despite the fact that the Socialist People's Party had “no history of aspiring to government office”, unlike the Social Liberals (Kosiara-Pedersen 2012, p.420, p.417), the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party (i.e., the Greens) began to work together more closely after the 2007 election. They presented a joint tax policy in January 2009 and a joint programme on 11 May 2010. The Social Liberals opted out of these joint policies (Bille 2011, p.957; Bille 2010, p.949). While the Social Liberals were consistently supporters of Thorning-Schmidt for Prime Minister, they also publicly made an agreement with the Conservatives during the campaign that, irrespective of which government took office, they
would cooperate in parliament (Kosiara-Pedersen 2012, p.417, p.419). The minority government was also supported by the Red-Green Alliance, as a support party.

2.10 Appendix C

Were Green parties that became support parties office-seeking parties? Evidence from the parties.

*Australia (2010).* In Australia, there is some evidence that the Greens were an an office-seeking party in 2010. Green leader Bob Brown's (ultimately unsuccessful) efforts to maintain a credible open stance towards both centre-left and centre-right during the 2010 campaign (Bina 2010; Williams 2011) show an ambition for office, even if this is driven, in turn, by policy-motivations. The Tasmanian Greens entered cabinet at state level in April 2010 and, more generally, Dann (2008, p.191) observes that there is no fundamentalist ('fundil') element in the Australian Greens.

*Italy (1993).* The fact that the Italian Greens were an office-seeking party is reflected in the fact that they did in fact accept ministerial office, albeit only for one day. Soon afterwards, in 1996, they attained a senior ministry.

*The Netherlands (2012).* In the Netherlands, GroenLinks prepared for entering government prior to the election in 2010, not least by initiating discussion among its members through its party publications (e.g., GroenLinks 2010). Analysing their 2010 manifesto, Van der Heijden's (2010, p.1004) observes that “the party desperately seeks to be taken seriously as a potential government coalition partner”. After the 2010 general election, the informateurs spent some time investigating the possibility of a coalition between the VVD, PvdA, D66 and Green Left and recommended in his report on 25 June that coalitions involving several parties, including the Greens, be investigated further (Lucardie and Voerman 2011; Van Holsteyn 2011, p.417). Finally, the party's roots, in the merger of several parties that had gone some way down the road of professionalisation, suggests that it would be more office-oriented than most new parties (Lucardie 2008).
New Zealand (1999, 2002, 2005). In New Zealand, the Green Party – or important elements in it – wanted to participate in government. By 1999, “especially at the leadership level, thoughts of potential coalition [i.e., government] ha[d] begun to enter the equation” (Bale and Wilson 2006, p.399) and “a sizeable group in the Party – and one which included the co-leaders – was increasingly taken with the possibility that the Greens, rather than the ailing Alliance, might become the natural partner for Labour after the next election”, with the party initiating internal discussions on the possibility of entering government (Bale 2003, p.141). By 2005, the Greens clearly wanted representation at the cabinet table (Geddis 2006, p.813). This is also evident in the increasing formality of the inter-party agreements reached in New Zealand, and in the fact that the Greens have accepted junior government offices, such as government Spokesperson on Energy Efficiency as part of those arrangements. Finally, the high policy influence differential between government and opposition in New Zealand implies that, for a policy-seeking party, attaining office should be a high priority.

Slovakia (1998). That the Slovak Greens' were “greatly dissatisfied” with their lot following the formation of the Dzurinda government in 1998 – they received a junior rather than senior ministerial position – indicates that they too were an office-seeking party (see Kopeček 2009, p.128).

Sweden (1998, 2002). Burchell (2008, pp.154-155) observes that losing national representation in the early 1990s created the conditions for the acceptance of “a more traditional party organization” within the Swedish Greens and that they may have experienced less pressure to diverge from traditional party goals due to the relative conservatism of the Swedish environmental movements. Like the New Zealand Greens, the Swedish Greens attained junior (in this case advisory) positions in government ministries from 2002 to 2006. More recently, a strong office-seeking orientation is evident in a recent report drawn up for the Swedish Green Party's think-tank, Cogito, on potential government entry in 2010 (Gahrton and Aylward 2010).74

74 Per Gahrton was a Green MEP during the Swedish Greens' two spells in Social Democrat-led coalitions.
2.11 Appendix D

Table 2.15. Fuzzy-set calibrations using Warwick and Druckman's (2006) data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Warwick and Druckman (2006)*</th>
<th>Percentile</th>
<th>5th</th>
<th>50th</th>
<th>95th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reference group (subset of observations)</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office attainment outcome</td>
<td>240 parties of ≤9% seat share in 150 governments + 32 support parties</td>
<td>Unweighted share of ministerial office</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set description: The set of small parties with a high (low) share of ministerial office.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>Seat contribution</td>
<td>191 parties of ≤9% seat share in 118 majority governments</td>
<td>Seat contribution to coalition</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set description: The set of small parties contributing a high (low) share of seats to a coalition.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>Bargaining power</td>
<td>240 parties of ≤9% seat share in 150 governments</td>
<td>Standardised Banzhaf index value</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set description: The set of small parties with high (low) bargaining power.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3</td>
<td>Proto-coalition size</td>
<td>191 parties of ≤9% seat share in 118 majority governments</td>
<td>Coalition’s seat share minus 4.84%</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set description: The set of small (large) proto-coalitions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3</td>
<td>Party seat share</td>
<td>240 parties of ≤9% seat share in 150 governments</td>
<td>Party’s seat share in parliament (lower house)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set description: The set of small parties with a high (low) parliamentary seat share.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
Each set is negated for the analysis of low office attainment outcomes.
See text for reasons for reference group selection for each set.
* Modifications to Warwick and Druckman's data are detailed in the table.
2.12 Appendix E

Preliminary quantitative analyses of the 'bargaining position' variables

Table 2.16. Bivariate correlations between the dependent variable and the four independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Office share (%)</th>
<th>Positive formation rule</th>
<th>Size of proto-coalition (% seat share)</th>
<th>Green party size (% seat share)</th>
<th>Open coalition strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office share (%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive formation rule</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of proto-coalition (% seat share)</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green party size (% seat share)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open coalition strategy</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.17. OLS regression model for 'bargaining position'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>29.118** (13.398)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive formation rule</td>
<td>8.046** (3.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proto-coalition size</td>
<td>-0.593** (0.239)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green party size</td>
<td>0.691 (0.647)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open coalition strategy</td>
<td>1.688 (3.618)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sigma</td>
<td>6.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. R-squared</td>
<td>0.367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>4.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
Non-standardised coefficients
Standard errors in parentheses
2.13 Appendix F

Additional robustness tests

There are three main types of robustness tests in QCA, involving alternative calibrations of outcome and causal condition sets (in particular alternative calibrations that change the 0.5 threshold); alternative consistency levels for truth table rows; or the addition or removal of individual cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p.285, pp.287-288). Several robustness tests have been performed and were described in the text of Subsections 2.6.3 and 2.6.4. Alternative consistency levels have been explored (the second model for low outcomes); a model has been run without the Danish case (fn.70); and alternative codings of the Swedish Greens' coalition strategy in 2002 and the Australian Greens' coalition strategy in 2010 have been explored (fn.68).

In this Appendix, I explore further robustness tests that incorporate alternative calibrations of the outcome and an alternative calibration of one important causal condition (membership in the sets of small and large proto-coalitions). For each, I examine robustness in two respects: whether (and how much) it changes parameters of fit (consistency and coverage values) associated with the model and whether it produces solution terms that are not in a subset relation with the original solution terms (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p.286). The baseline models for comparison are the 'high outcome' model (Table 2.10) and the modified, second model for low office outcomes (Table 2.13).\footnote{Consistent with my practice to this point, the prime implicants that are most consistent with theoretical expectations are chosen for each of the models that are described in this Appendix.}

More support parties. In calibrating the sets of high and low outcomes (Subsection 2.3.3), I modified the reference group of cases by adding a set of 32 support parties in order to approximate the distribution of office outcomes within governing coalitions (as opposed to cabinets). I did so on the assumption that each minority government represented in the larger data set (n=32) was, on average, supported by one support party with a seat share of nine percent or less. Of course, it is possible that these minority governments were supported by more than one support party of that size. In order to test the robustness of this calibration, I recalibrate the outcome using a different assumption: that the minority governments in the
data set were supported by three support parties each (i.e., 96 support parties overall). This recalibration sets the threshold of maximum ambiguity considerably lower, at 8.5% office share, and has the effect of making the threshold fall between ≤1 and ≥2 ministers for the cases in our data (cf. Table 2.2). At the level of individual cases, it has the effect of pushing two Finnish cases, in which the party won two ministerial positions, over the 0.5 threshold towards being more in than out of the set of small parties with high office outcomes.

Using this outcome calibration, the conservative solution for high office outcomes produces the same two paths, populated by the same four cases, as the main model in the analysis. The consistency score is slightly higher (+0.04 at 0.97); the coverage score is somewhat lower (-0.06 at 0.6). The complex solution for low office outcomes produces the same paths as the main analysis. The overall consistency value is somewhat lower (-0.05 at 0.87) and the coverage value is approximately the same. The main difference is that two cases – Finland 2007 and Finland 2011 – become true logical contradictions (albeit weak ones with membership in the outcome of 0.43 and 0.41, respectively). Thus, this recalibration of the outcome has very little effect on the main results.

**Support parties at zero.** One potential objection to the outcome, as calibrated in the main analysis, is that support parties' outcomes, which are logically the lowest possible, are calibrated to 0.95 membership in the set of low office outcomes, rather than full membership (and 0.05 membership in the set of high outcomes, rather than zero). This is an artifice of the calibration procedure (see fn. 22). Do the results change when these outcomes are set at zero?

For high outcomes, the paths detected are substantively identical. The conservative solution has slightly increased coverage (+ 0.03 at 0.69) and slightly reduced consistency (-0.02 at 0.91). For the analysis of low outcomes, the conservative solution is effectively identical to the main analysis.

**Alternative calibration of outcome, using the mean value rather than the median as the point of maximum ambiguity.** One of the features of the method of fuzzy-set calibration introduced

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76 Initially, I included only 64 support parties. However, this meant that the median was 10%, placing one of the Finnish cases directly on the point of maximum ambiguity. This is problematic for QCA. Including 96 cases provides a greater 'stress test' of the model and avoids this drawback.

77 A counter-argument to this objection might suggest that the 0.05 value might recognise minor subministerial office gains achieved by support parties.
in this chapter is that it uses an empirically informed point of maximum ambiguity: the central
tendency of a variable in a larger data set. I use the median value (see discussion at
Subsection 2.3.3), but the mean might also be used. I re-run the analysis using the mean value
of the outcome (11.7%) rather than the median value (11.1%) as a point of maximum
ambiguity. In the analysis of high outcomes, the consistency value falls marginally and
coverage values rise marginally, but the solution is effectively the same as the main model. In
the analysis of low outcomes, the solution remains almost identical to the main model.

*Alternative calibration of small and large proto-coalition, using 50% as the threshold of
maximum ambiguity.* The size of the proto-coalition appears to be a very important causal
condition for the outcome according to the analyses in Section 2.6. Arguably, the calibration
of proto-coalition size might be informed not just by the central tendency of a larger data set
but by another piece of knowledge about coalition formation: that, very often, it requires the
support (tacit or active) of more than 50% of MPs (see fn. 41, above). I test the robustness of
the models using an alternative calibration of proto-coalition size that uses 50% as the point of
maximum ambiguity rather than the median value in a larger data set (53.3% in this instance).

The 'high outcome' solution is similar to the main model. Its consistency is identical and
coverage is slightly lower (-0.03 at 0.63). The second path to high outcomes is typified only
by the Czech case and not by the Irish case. In substantive terms, this more restrictive
calibration of the set of 'small proto-coalitions' may thus provide a sharper focus on cases in
which that condition was more likely to have played a more crucial role (see discussion of
these cases in Subsection 2.6.3). The 'low outcome' solution is very similar to the main model.
Coverage is slightly lower (-0.06 at 0.8); consistency is slightly higher (+0.03 at 0.95); and
the Irish case appears to contradict the second path, although weakly.

*Alternative outcome*

*Absence from and presence in cabinet.* An alternative outcome – absence from cabinet – is
interesting in two respects, even if it is not strictly a 'robustness' test. First, absence from
cabinet was the focus of Bergman's (1995 and subsequent) work in the literature on support
parties. He suggested that these factors could help to explain parties' exclusion from cabinet.
Does the 'bargaining position' concept provide explanations of support party status, the
outcome that it was designed to explain? Second, presence and absence from cabinet are inherently interesting outcomes because of the undoubted qualitative difference between being in and out of cabinet. Reisinger (1986, p.559) observes, “a party is usually better off just being in [cabinet] than not being in it. The difference between having one portfolio and two may be trivial.”

An analysis of support party status as an outcome detects only one path to the outcome (consistency = 1.0; coverage = 0.09), which is typified by only one case (the Dutch case in 2011). Thus, as operationalised here, it appears to do a very poor job of explaining absence from cabinet. Curiously, it appears to do a better job of explaining presence in cabinet among Green parties in governing coalitions. It produces three paths to high office outcomes. The first path (consistency 0.93; raw coverage 0.25) involves a positive formation rule, a small proto-coalition and a closed coalition strategy and is typified by the two German cases and the Italian cases in 1996 and 2006. The second path (consistency 0.93; raw coverage 0.31) involves a positive formation rule, a small proto-coalition and a small seat share and is typified by the Czech case, the Irish case and the Italian case in 1996. The third path (consistency 0.97; raw coverage = 0.25) involves a positive formation rule, a large proto-coalition, a large seat share and an open coalition strategy and is typified, albeit fairly weakly, by the Finnish cases in 1999, 2007 and 2011 and the Belgian cases in 1999. An intermediate solution merges the first two paths and makes the solution formula more parsimonious.
Chapter 3 Surviving in government. Green parties and office retention

3.1 Introduction

Time is valuable. It takes time to make and influence policy. It takes time to achieve less high-minded goals, such as enjoying the perquisites of office. For these reasons, parties seek not only to attain office, but to retain it too. In spite of this, and in contrast to parties' office attainment outcomes (see Chapter 2), parties' office retention outcomes have received scant attention. This chapter sets out the case for studying parties' office retention outcomes (their 'time in office'). It establishes a framework for explaining variation in these outcomes among Green parties in government and it puts this framework to work in the study of twelve cases.

It finds that, while several Green parties have defected from government, they have not been the destabilising forces or short-lived coalition partners that some accounts of small, policy-seeking, inexperienced parties in government would suggest. A comparison of twelve complete cases of Green parties in government indicates that the electoral and governmental prospects of both prime ministers' parties and Green parties play an important role in determining Green parties' office retention outcomes. It also highlights that other institutional and organisational factors need to be integrated into the explanation. The analysis identifies two paths to Green party defection among parties that have little to lose (with very low governmental and electoral prospects) and among parties that have much to lose (high electoral prospects) and it suggests that the relationships between several Green parties and their main coalition partner was characterised by electoral dependence, which provided a strong incentive for Green parties not to defect. It also describes the conditions under which early elections have taken place in these cases, relating them to the prime ministers' parties' electoral and governmental prospects.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it highlights the general neglect of parties' office retention outcomes, despite considerable attention being devoted to closely-related subjects, such as cabinet duration and ministerial tenure (Section 3.2). It argues that this omission is surprising because parties' time in office is important, distinct from other more commonly

1 A party's 'time in office' is a general term that refers to the outcome that this chapter focuses on. A party's 'office retention outcome' carries the additional connotation that spending time in office is one of the party's goals. In this chapter, these terms are used interchangeably.
studied outcomes and consistent with the concerns that underpin the main body of literature on parties' office outcomes (i.e., portfolio allocation). Second, it describes the office retention outcomes of twelve cases of Green parties in government, showing that despite the fact that four have defected, they do not seem to bear out expectations that Green parties are particularly destabilising or short-lived partners in government (Section 3.3). Third, I set out a framework for explaining these parties' office retention outcomes. This framework draws on existing literatures on strategic parliamentary dissolution and defection from government and is constructed around the governmental (i.e., policy and office) prospects and electoral prospects of two key actors: the prime minister's party and the Green party. Fifth, I set about testing the hypotheses derived from this framework by examining the twelve completed cases in which Green parties have held cabinet office. I describe the development of causal conditions over time and I integrate these descriptions into a cross-case analysis. I conclude with a discussion of the findings, the implications of these findings for the theoretical framework, and an agenda for the study of parties' office retention outcomes.

3.2 Parties' office retention outcomes

In this section, I establish that parties' time in office has been neglected while the time in office of other actors has received increasing attention. I suggest that this is incongruous with the obvious importance of parties' time in office and with the theoretical bases on which the literature on parties' office outcomes is explicitly built. I conclude the section by identifying some important contributions that the study of parties' time in office can make to the study of parties and coalitions.

3.2.1 The study of time in government

Insofar as parties' time in office has received attention, this has taken place in two literatures: the literature on ruling parties and the literature on dominant parties. The literature on ruling parties focuses on the duration of parties' control of the political chief executive's office.2 It has sought to examine the effects of regime type (presidential or parliamentary) and electoral systems (majoritarian or proportional) on the durability of these ruling parties' time in office.

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2 Controlling this office is, for Maeda and Nishikawa (2006), the defining feature of a ruling party. See p.140 and Subsection 3.5.3.1 for further elaborations of this concept in the context of the framework set out in this chapter.
(Maeda and Nishikawa 2006; Nishikawa 2012). Most recently, Hall and Nishikawa (2013) have examined the effect of ruling party stability on economic performance.

The literature on dominant parties, meanwhile, has used time in office as a criterion for identifying dominance. Templeman (2010, pp.5-8) identifies duration in power as “the key feature of dominance”. For example, Pempel (1990, pp.3-4) identifies a party's time “at the core of a nation's government over a substantial period of time, not simply for a few years”, as a “crucial” condition for single-party dominance. Several recent studies have identified dominance using the threshold of 20 consecutive years' control of the chief executive office (Magaloni 2006, p.36; Greene 2007, p.12; see also Templeman 2010, p.11). While these studies serve to highlight the importance of time in office, they focus on only a small minority of parties in government.

Outside of these two literatures, comparative studies of parties' time in office are few and far between. Bartolini (1998; 2000, pp.364-366; also pp.375-391) describes Socialist parties' total time in government over 49 years (1918 to 1966) and he incorporates time in office into his measure of 'governmental power'. Keman (2011) compares the time spent in office by parties that held a plurality of legislative seats and parties that held an ideologically central position from 1970 to 2005. Notwithstanding these exceptions, studies of parties' outcomes in government have largely ignored parties' time in office, focusing instead on their office attainment outcomes at government formation (see Chapter 2).

At the same time, the general importance of the time spent in government by a variety of individual and collective actors is widely recognised. There is substantial and growing research on the office retention outcomes of these actors. This development has been fuelled by the increasing use of duration models (i.e., event history analysis) in political science (Box-Steppensmeier and Jones 1997). The growing literature on government ministers, in marked contrast to the literature on parties in government, has been concerned primarily with time in office (Bakema 1991; Dewan and Myatt 2007; Berlinski et al. 2007; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008; Dowding and Dumont eds. 2009; Berlinski et al. 2010; Jäckle 2011; see Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2010 for ministers in presidential democracies; see Fischer et al. 2012 for a recent review).³ This literature focusses on outcomes including

³ While the present argument identifies a deficit in the study of time in office in the literature on parties' office outcomes, Bright et al. (2012) argue that the study of office-seeking individuals (ministerial careers) suffers from a complementary deficit in the study of ministerial importance.
the tenure of ministers in individual cabinets (e.g., Berlinski et al. 2007; Berlinski et al. 2010), individuals' consecutive tenure in cabinet (e.g., Jäckle 2011) and the time spent in cabinet over the course of a ministerial career (e.g., Bakema 1991). There are also a number of studies of individuals' tenure in specific offices, mainly political chief executive offices (Bienen and Van de Walle 1991; Alt and King 1994, pp.200-209; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2000; Clark et al. 2011), but also the office of foreign minister (Quiroz-Flores 2009).

The time spent in government office by some collective actors, such as cabinets and coalitions, has also received considerable attention. There is an extensive literature on cabinet duration (see Laver 2003 for a review; see especially King et al. 1990; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999; Saalfeld 2008, 2009, 2010). Maeda and Nishikawa (2006; see also Nishikawa 2012), in testing the robustness of their findings concerning partisan control of the chief executive's office, examine the duration of control of government by a relatively stable coalition of parties.4

3.2.2 Parties' time in office: a surprising omission
The apparent neglect of individual parties' office retention outcomes is surprising for at least three reasons. First, parties' time in office is important. Second, parties' time in office is empirically distinct from the office retention outcomes of other actors, such as ministers or cabinets. Third, its omission appears to be inconsistent with the theoretical basis on which the study of parties' office outcomes has been developed. In the subsections that follow, I elaborate each of these arguments in turn.

3.2.2.1 An important outcome
Even if it is not widely studied, the importance of parties' office retention outcomes is widely acknowledged. Parties' occasional failure to retain office is an important feature of democracy (Przeworski 2011, p.169). Office retention is a central party goal (Dalton et al. 2011, pp.226-227) and important party payoffs (office and policy) accrue over time (Franchino 2009, pp.3-4). Diermeier et al. (2008, p.485) use the analogy of an 'income stream' to illustrate the importance of a party's office retention outcome: “while parties are in government, they receive an income stream from holding portfolios and so forth; the longer the expected duration, the bigger the total [expected] income stream”. This 'income stream' does not just encompass the private benefits of office: every day in office also represents an opportunity to

4 See Maeda and Nishikawa (2006, pp.361-362, p.371) for measurement details. See Strom (1985, p.744), Mair (2007, fn.6; also Keman 2011) for alternative approaches to measuring turnover; see also Sartori's (1976, p.139) concept of 'peripheral turnover'.
influence government policy. Indeed, it is possible that substantial time in office may be required to achieve any policy goals at all (Rose 1971, p.406), given the importance of policy inheritance and path dependence for the policy outputs of parties in government (Rose 1990; Pierson 2000).

3.2.2.2 A distinct outcome
Parties' time in government office is empirically distinct from other actors' time in office and from parties' other outcomes. The study of parties' time in cabinet, ministerial survival and cabinet duration are similar in many respects. Each of these literatures focus on the retention of senior government offices by a set of actors that, empirically, are nested or overlapping (e.g., ministers in parties; parties in cabinets). However, the outcomes that they seek to measure and explain are quite distinct. The empirical distinctiveness of cabinet duration and ministers' time in office, for example, is well-established (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2004; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008; see also Laver 2003, pp.26-27). Likewise, parties' time in office is distinct from coalitions', cabinets' and ministers' time in office. This is evident, first, at the conceptual level. When a minister representing a party leaves government, this does not necessarily mean that the party leaves government and the termination of a cabinet due to elections, a change of prime minister or a change of party composition (Müller et al. 2008, p.6) does not necessarily mean that its parties leave government. There are several examples of ministerial spells in office ending without parties' leaving government in the short history of Green parties' participation in government (see Appendix A, above, p.109). There are also several examples of Green parties remaining in office between elections through several new cabinets (e.g., in Italy from 1996 to 2001). To borrow Carol Mershon's (1996, p.549) phrase, transitory cabinets can be staffed by permanent partisan incumbents and parties in government can be staffed by transitory ministers.

Parties' time in office is also quite obviously distinct from parties' other office outcomes (e.g., the share of positions that they hold). Consider the following hypothetical cases. Party A spends ten days in cabinet holding the positions of Minister for Finance and Minister for Agriculture. Party B spends 1000 days holding the same offices. The existing literature on office outcomes, focussing as it does on the distribution of office in a cabinet-formation bargaining arena (see Subsection 2.2.2; see also below), treats these parties' office outcomes as being equal. Within the scope of these studies, which focus on coalition bargaining, this is quite legitimate. However, it does beg the question as to why parties' time in office has
received so little attention as a distinct outcome. Comparing party outcomes A, B and C in Figure 3.1 illustrates this problem. If we measure only the weight of the offices held, then $A > B = C$. If we measure the party's office outcome as time in office, then $A < B < C$.

![Diagram](image)

*Figure 3.1. Time-in-office and office outcomes*

### 3.2.2.3 Time in office and the literature on parties' office outcomes

The neglect of parties' time in office is also surprising given the origins and theoretical bases of the literature on parties' office outcomes. The study of parties' office outcomes has been developed in the context of two related theoretical concerns. These are the “background concepts” (Adcock and Collier 2001, p.530), which allow analyses to pass the “so what?” test (Gerring 2001, pp.113-115). The first concern is with parties' control over policy. In this context, parties' office outcomes matter because they lead to control of government policy: the
more office that a party attains, the more government policy it can control. The second theoretical concern is with parties' success in coalition bargaining: office outcomes matter because they indicate success in bargaining.

Browne and Franklin's seminal contribution to the literature on parties' office attainment outcomes provides a clear example of a study that explicitly situates the importance of its dependent variable in these terms. On the one hand, they situate the value of parties' office outcomes explicitly in relation to their importance for influencing government policy (Browne and Franklin 1973, pp.453-454). On the other hand, they examine these office outcomes at one moment in the government lifecycle; that is, they measure portfolio allocation upon cabinet formation, in the context of pre-coalition bargaining, where portfolio allocation is understood as an indicator of bargaining success.

The literature on parties' office outcomes has followed Browne and Franklin's theoretical lead. First, it has adhered to and developed the idea that policy control is an important background concept for indicators of office outcomes. It routinely justifies its focus on office outcomes with reference to their value for policy influence (e.g., Druckman and Warwick 2005, pp.18-19; Verzichelli 2008, p.237). The share of ministerial positions continues to be regarded as a strong predictor of parties' relative influence on government policy (Warwick and Druckman 2006, p.660, fn.1).

At the same time as maintaining their concern with policy control, the literature follows Browne and Franklin in a second respect. It continues to focus, almost exclusively, on parties' office outcomes as bargaining outcomes at one point in time: portfolio allocation upon coalition formation. Following from this, the implicit analytical model used for the measurement of office outcomes is non-cooperative bargaining in which office outcomes derive from a zero-sum game (Budge and Keman 1990, p.11). Office share is still regarded as being clear indicator of coalition payoffs that circumvents the complexities of measuring parties' policy payoffs (Bäck et al. 2011, p.441; see Laver and Schofield 1990, pp.186-193). Moreover, the strength of the regularity that Browne and Franklin (1973) revealed and that

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5 There are partial exceptions to this 'policy value' approach. Bueno de Mesquita (1979) situates the value of office payoffs in the context of electoral payoffs. Effectively, however, this is quite close to the traditional 'policy importance' approach, as he suggests that policy salience is the most important intermediate step towards the electoral outcome (Bueno de Mesquita 1979, p.63). Browne and Feste (1975) situate their study in terms of satisfying extra-parliamentary clientele groups; however, policy control is clearly instrumental for this outcome too.
subsequent studies have replicated lends credence to the idea that the share of ministries is a valid indicator of parties' bargaining outcomes.

Notwithstanding the analytical success of their study, Browne and Franklin were not satisfied that their measure of office outcomes adequately addressed their dual theoretical concern. Starting with the title of their article – 'Aspects of coalition payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies' (my emphasis) – they made it clear that their treatment of coalition payoffs was not exhaustive. They selected their indicator of office outcomes on the basis of data availability: it was “the only [coalition] payoff to parties which is at all well documented” (Browne and Franklin 1973, p.456). While their measure is still widely used (e.g., Verzichelli 2008; see Chapter 2 of this thesis), recent studies also share their view that measures of office outcomes remain incomplete (Warwick and Druckman 2006, p.636).

Driven by its dual concern with bargaining outcomes and policy control, the literature has, with varying degrees of comprehensiveness, scope and sophistication, followed through on Browne and Franklin's concerns. In doing so, it has focussed on variation in the importance of ministerial portfolios, thus developing sophisticated, weighted measures of office outcomes that improve their validity as predictors of policy control and indicators of bargaining success. Druckman and his colleagues have produced what is, to date, the 'gold standard' of office outcome measures (Druckman and Warwick 2005; Druckman and Roberts 2008). They provide measures of ministerial importance as proportions (multiples) of a notional 'average' minister in each of twenty-six countries. Their data combine several desirable properties that other measures do not match: they are measured on an interval scale; they have a relatively broad cross-national scope; they are country-specific; they almost fully cover the range of ministerial positions that existed during the period; and they are derived from multiple expert opinions (Druckman & Warwick 2005, pp.20-21). While the data also lack some important properties, such as party or party family-specificity and time-specificity within the 55 years covered (Druckman & Warwick 2005, p.22; Warwick & Druckman 2006, p.649) they are, at present, unrivalled.

Paradoxically, these advances serve to highlight an important disjunct in the literature's concern with parties' control of policy and the scope of its focus on office outcomes. Newly developed measures explicitly take into account one factor that matters for
parties' control of policy (i.e., the importance of the portfolios attained) while ignoring another. This other factor is parties' time in office.

Parties' time in office has been largely ignored within the study of parties' office outcomes for a number or reasons. The empirical successes of the existing literature on office outcomes that focuses on portfolio allocation may be one of these reasons. Just as the strength of the regularities found by Browne and Franklin may have inhibited further efforts to explain portfolio allocation (Warwick and Druckman 2006, p.658; Bäck et al. 2011, p.443), it may too have inhibited alternative measurements of parties' office outcomes.

Second, coalition studies has been markedly static in its approach to measuring outcomes: studies of coalition behaviour tend to examine a single coalition process at one point in time (Druckman 2008, p.479; see also Laver 1986, pp.33-34). Consistent with this static approach, the empirical focus of cabinet studies has been on formation and termination and little about what happens in between (Müller et al. 2008, p.9). In response to this concern, Druckman (2008, esp. p.480) argues for a more dynamic approach to coalition studies, focussing on linkages between coalition processes. The study of parties' office-outcomes over time and the development of the causal conditions over time would clearly lay a basis for this dynamic analysis.

Third, there may be 'technical' reasons for the marginalisation of parties' time in office. As the subfield has focussed on the cabinet as a boundary for its units of analysis, and as cabinets are defined partly by their party composition, all parties will, by definition, spend the same amount of time in office within the bounds of a given cabinet. Therefore, within an individual cabinet, there is no variation to explore, making it uninteresting for researchers who study parties in office within these relatively narrow temporal boundaries. Studying parties' time in office helps us to examine payoffs over time beyond individual cabinets. This recalls Laver's (2003, p.37) provocative challenge to the cabinet survival approach to government change:

Although new independent variables have been regularly added to [data sets that are used for analyses of government termination], typically justified on an ad hoc basis, very little serious thought has been devoted to the units of analysis, operational definitions, and raw data sources that underlie the entire structure of

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6 Whether this is a cause or effect of ignoring parties' time in office is, of course, an open question.
7 In all mainstream definitions of a cabinet, a party entering cabinet is sufficient for a new cabinet and a party exiting cabinet is sufficient for the end of a cabinet.
Fourth, time in office may have been excluded because it does not take the form of a classic 'payoff'. Unlike the party's office attainment outcome, time in office is not the result of a one-off bargaining round in a zero-sum and constant-sum game. This does not mean, however, that time in office is not a payoff. Gamson (1961, p.374) identifies a payoff as “[t]he reward which accrues to any participant or group of participants from a decision”. Browne and Franklin (1973, p.453) define coalition payoffs as “resources which are distributed among coalition partners and used by them to advance their individual goals”. Time in office fits these descriptions: it is a resource that is distributed among coalition partners and used by them to advance their goals and it is the result of a decision or a series of decisions. In Reisinger's (1986) typology of payoffs, it can be classified as a non-simple variable-sum payoff. It is also consistent with the idea of 'bargaining', which need not refer to zero-sum competition (Schelling 1960, pp.4-5; also cited in Maor 1992, p.101). Furthermore, a fuller picture of parties' outcomes may open up possibilities for better-understanding parties' actions: in Laver and Schofield's (1990, p.165) words, “we must evaluate the distribution of coalition payoffs in the same basic currencies that motivate the actors”. Time in office is one such currency.

### 3.2.2.4 Parties' office retention outcomes: a summary

To summarise: I suggest that scholars of parties in government might begin to study parties' time in office. Time in office is distinct and it is important, both intuitively and in the terms that underpin the extant literature on parties' office outcomes. Despite this, virtually no studies have tried to systematically and comparatively measure or explain parties' time in office. I speculate that there are a number of good reasons for this and some of these correspond to broader contributions that the study of parties' time in office can make, beyond filling an important lacuna in the literature.

Finally, it is important to point out that the data for studies of parties' time in office are readily available. In Appendix G, I present a first descriptive analysis of parties' office retention outcomes in 34 countries between 1944 and 2012. Given the early stage of development of the study of parties' time in office, I integrate bivariate descriptive analyses of these data with the discussion of expectations concerning the effect of causal conditions on parties' office retention outcomes in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Next, I turn to examine the office retention
outcomes of a small subset of similar parties – Green parties in government – and to construct a framework that allows us to explain variation in these outcomes.

3.3 The office retention outcomes of Green parties in government

This section summarises some of the expectations in the literature concerning Green parties' office retention outcomes, situating them in relation to other parties and thus drawing out some of the potential implications of studying the office retention outcomes of Green parties. It then describes the office retention outcomes of those parties.

3.3.1 Green parties an office retention: prior expectations

As parties' office retention outcomes are so little-studied (see Subsection 3.2.1), our prior expectations concerning the effects of case attributes (including party attributes) on parties' outcomes are considerably more speculative and less firmly-grounded in existing evidence than prior expectations concerning office attainment outcomes or electoral outcomes. There are some expectations in the political science literature and further afield that Green parties will be more prone to defection from cabinet than other parties and that, as a result, their tenure in office will be shorter (Brancati 2005, fn.3; Gahrton and Aylward 2010, p.17). However, most of the expectations developed here are drawn from more general studies and are associated with the expected effects of characteristics that distinguish Green parties from other parties, including their inexperience in national government, their relatively strong policy-orientation, their internally participatory decision-making structures and their small size.

Green parties entering government have had little experience in government at the national level (Drugan 2004, p.296). Of the twelve cases examined in this chapter (see Table 3.1 for an overview), the parties were in government for the first time in eight cases, for the second time in three cases and in only one case (Finland 2007-2011) was a Green party in government for the third time. As relatively inexperienced parties, they may be inadequately prepared for the organisational strain of being in government (Bolleyer 2008). Certainly, there is some evidence to suggest that inexperience counts against political parties when it comes to their electoral outcomes (Buelens and Hino 2008). With regard to office retention outcomes, inexperience may contribute to unsuccessful bargaining with coalition partners or poor
internal political management, leading to intra-party dissent, poor strategic decision-making and the premature termination of their participation in government.

Parties with a strong policy orientation may also be more inclined to leave government early or may otherwise contribute to government instability. Brancati (2005) finds some evidence to support this argument in the case of regionalist parties: cabinets containing these parties have terminated early more frequently than the cabinets that do not contain them. He suggests that this is partly due to these parties' inability to compromise to the same extent as other parties, as their policy position is their main source of electoral support (Brancati 2005, p.148). Brancati (2005, fn.3) speculates that Green parties' 'single-issue' focus may likewise reduce their ability to compromise and, thus, the stability of the governments in which they participate (see also Schofield and Sened 2006, pp.3-4; Warhurst 2012; Mackerras 2012). The nature of Green parties' policy focus – if it is on issues of principle rather than on 'pragmatic' issues (e.g., short-term economic management) that require rolling policy changes and compromise – may also make compromise more difficult for these parties (Tavits 2007).

Some researchers have suggested that parties with decentralised or participatory decision-making processes are more likely to be less durable in government. May (1973, esp. pp.144-146) suggests that middle-ranking party activists are more ideologically extreme than party elites; in parties that give more power to these middle-ranking elites, we may expect greater unwillingness to compromise on policy. Panebianco (1988, p.219) argues that the less institutionalised party in a coalition will be more likely to become unstable and to break with the coalition. Lupia and Strom (1995, p.651, p.659) suggest that internally democratic parties impose bargaining costs on themselves and their coalition partners, providing the example of the Irish Labour Party. In a report for the Swedish Greens' think tank, Gahrtion and Aylward (2010, p.17) acknowledge that there is a general expectation that Green parties, due to their being more decentralised than other parties, will also be less durable in cabinet. Certainly, Green parties have come into conflict with activists as a result of being in government (Poguntek 2002b, pp.142-143).

Small parties may be more likely to break with their coalition partners. One explanation for this is that the opportunity costs of leaving government (in terms of policy and office foregone) are lower for these parties, which typically gain lower office and policy benefits from coalition than larger parties (Warwick and Druckman 2006). Another is that smaller
parties are aware that they are punished more heavily than their coalition partners (Font 2001; Buelens and Hino 2008; Van Spanje 2011; see Chapter 4 for a review) and that their electoral punishment may have severe, and even existential, implications for them. Moreover, they are aware that, as organisationally young parties, their electoral base is vulnerable (Bolleyer 2008, p.22) and, insofar as they present themselves as 'anti-party' parties, they may be particularly vulnerable to anti-incumbent voting (Mair 2001; see Chapter 4). There is some evidence from German Land coalitions that in, coalitions with more than two partners, small parties are more likely than large parties to leave early (Klecha 2011 cited in Sturm 2013, p.2). This idea also receives some prima facie support from a descriptive analysis of a larger data set on survival in government (Figure 3.2; see Appendix G for details of the data set). After three years in government, for instance, over 60% of larger parties have survived, while less than 45% of small parties have managed to do so.

![Figure 3.2. Party tenure in government by party size (lower house seat share) in 34 countries, 1944-2012 (n=970)](image-url)

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Some experts and practitioners share these expectations concerning the reliability and durability of Green parties in government.⁸ Even so, not all of these expectations are clear-cut. Inexperience may lead to poor decisions, but these poor decisions need not invariably lead to premature exit from government; they may also lead to their continued participation. Decentralising decisions concerning accession to government within a party may help to ensure that important party members are 'on board' for the venture, thus stabilising the party's position in government; decentralisation may also allow parties to accommodate dissent while continuing in government, rather than excluding dissenting members (Maor 1998); and decentralising the decision to leave government may allow individuals and groups (within the parliamentary party or within the wider party) to veto or delay decisions to defect (see evidence of these delays in the Irish case in e.g., Boyle 2012, Ch.13 and Ch.14). Consistent with Maor's (1998) hypothesis, recent empirical findings in the cabinet duration literature show that effective mechanisms of intra-party delegation and accountability, rather than coercive mechanisms, such as the power of whips, “reduce and delay discretionary cabinet terminations” (Saalfeld 2009, p.184).

A descriptive analysis of the wider pool of parties in government offers only weak support for the idea that parties with stronger policy orientations will be less likely to survive in government (Figure 3.3). It indicates that parties on the right or left tend to have a lower rate of survival than parties in the centre at most stages of a coalition government, but this difference is small and, significantly for a study of Green parties, is generally less marked for parties of the left than parties of the right.

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⁸ The idea that Green parties are unreliable is, of course, an assumption that Green parties' rivals are also happy to foster. It contributes to Green parties seeking to build their reputation for responsibility (e.g., Bale and Bergman 2006a, p.206).
Figure 3.3. Party tenure in government by party left-right position in 34 countries, 1944-2012 (n=1074)\textsuperscript{9}

Further, Bäck et al. (2011, p.467) suggest that the allocation of portfolios to parties that value those portfolios highly will lead to “more durable, less conflict-ridden coalitions. Government and individual ministers' time in office may thus be affected by decisions taken at the time of coalition formation to allow partners to fill in the ministerial positions they preferred or rather to frustrate some partners” (see also Laver and Shepsle 1996, Ch. 10). Green parties have generally received portfolios that correspond to their core policy agenda (e.g., Minister for the Environment; see p.36 and Appendix A, above, for further details) and we may expect that this would increase the opportunity costs of defection for them.

Overall, these prior expectations are somewhat speculative as they are not supported by an established literature on parties' time in office. On balance, however, they suggest that Green

\textsuperscript{9} This measure is constructed using ParlGov's 'left_right' measure (Manow and Döring 2012). This is the mean value of several expert surveys (Castles and Mair 1983, Huber and Inglehart 1995, Benoit and Laver 2006 and CHESS 2010). I use the full data set (all legislatures, n=1134) and there are 69 missing values (therefore n=1074). For the purpose of this description, I categorise the lower quartile on left-right values as 'Left', the upper quartile as 'Right' and other observations as 'Centre'.

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parties will tend not to survive in government as long as other parties, which are perhaps more experienced, more willing to compromise, more centralised or larger. Green parties may be a 'more difficult' case of survival in government.

3.3.2 Green parties' office retention outcomes
A party's time in office during a legislative period begins when at least one representative of the party takes up a senior ministerial office. It ends when the party's representatives leave cabinet or when the cabinet changes after a general election (see Section 1.2 for a more detailed discussion). At the time of writing, there are twelve completed cases of Green parties that spent some or all of a legislative period in cabinet in seven countries: Finland (1995-1999; 1999-2002; 2007-2011), Italy (1996-2001; 2006-2008), France (1997-2002), Germany (1998-2002; 2002-2005), Belgium (two Green parties, 1999-2003), the Czech Republic (2006-2010) and Ireland (2007-2011).

Green parties that entered cabinet spent a little more than three and a half years (1340 days) in office during a legislative period, on average. The median value was slightly less than four years (1425 days). The case in which a Green party had the longest spell in office was the Italian Green Party, which lasted more than five years (1851 days) in cabinet between the 1996 and 2001 general elections, under several prime ministers and in coalition formations that included several marginally different constellations of parties. A later Italian case also provides the minimum value in the data: the shortest tenure was that of the Italian Greens, with less than two years in office (720 days) between 2006 and 2008. This latter case, which ended as the result of early elections being called, highlights an important point: it is not just Green parties that determine their own time in government. We cannot assess the contribution of Green parties to their duration in cabinet without taking into account several other factors. In the next section, I set out a framework that incorporates the main factors that we might expect would explain variation in Green parties' time in office.
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 2006-2008</td>
<td>10/04/2006</td>
<td>17/05/2006</td>
<td>14/04/2008</td>
<td>06/05/2008</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic 2007-2010</td>
<td>03/06/2006</td>
<td>09/01/2007</td>
<td>29/05/2010</td>
<td>29/03/2010</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Manow and Döring 2012; EJPR Data Yearbooks.

3.4 A framework for explaining minor parties' office retention outcomes

Whether a party remains in government for a short or long period is influenced by institutions, contextual factors and specific key actors, including the party itself. This section sets out a framework for explaining variation in minor parties' time in office.\textsuperscript{10} It identifies the gateway events associated with the end of minor parties' time in government and the key actors and

\textsuperscript{10} While the purpose of this framework is to provide a basis for explaining variation in Green parties' office retention outcomes, it could, in principle, refer to the office retention outcomes of any non-prime ministerial party. In addition it incorporates some considerations that are more likely to arise for minor parties (see esp. Subsection 3.4.4). The use of the term 'minor parties' is not meant to imply that findings made using this framework concerning Green parties are somehow automatically generalisable to these other parties.
institutions that precipitate these events. Centrally, it specifies the role of these key actors' prospects in precipitating the end of minor parties' time in office. This derives testable hypotheses concerning pathways to the early termination of minor parties' time in office. Throughout, it highlights important differences between minor parties and ruling parties with regard to office retention outcomes.

3.4.1 Actors, institutions and gateway events
A party's time in government can end in a number of ways: its resignation from cabinet, the dismissal of its ministers, early elections or scheduled elections. These are the 'gateway' events to the end of a party's time in office. The timing of these gateway events determines the timing of the end of the minor party's time in office. The key actors that influence the office retention outcomes of minor parties in government are the party of the prime minister (henceforth 'the ruling party') and the minor party itself. Both are rational actors who aim to hold office and influence policy in the governmental arena (i.e., to secure governmental benefits) and to secure electoral benefits in the electoral arena. Both prefer prospective benefits that are associated with certainty to prospective benefits that are uncertain. The importance of these actors for the minor party's office retention outcome stems from their central role in precipitating the gateway events that mark the end of its time in office.

Table 3.2. Key actor strategies and outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Strategy/event</th>
<th>Minor party in government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruling party</td>
<td>Continue</td>
<td>Minor party continues in office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>Minor party out of office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fail*</td>
<td>Minor party out of office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Failure refers to unplanned (i.e., non-strategic) failure by the ruling party to maintain its majority in parliament. See text for details.

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11 This term is borrowed from Maeda and Nishikawa (2006) who use it to identify the party holding the chief executive office (see p.124, above). I use it to identify the party of the prime minister. For the purpose of this framework, I assume that the prime minister effectively leads the ruling party.

12 While the focus on two key actors is clearly a simplification, this is quite common in the closely-related literature on parliamentary dissolution. Balke (1990) treats the government as unitary, with the power to dissolve parliament. Strom and Swindle (2002, p.578) include three players in their model: the prime minister with proposal power, a pivotal coalition partner, and the head of state with veto power. The specification of 'key actors' is an important characteristic of the 'analytic narratives' approach, along with the specification of goals, preferences and institutions (see e.g., Levi 2003, p.9; see Subsection 3.5.1, below, for more on the approach used).
The alternative to continuing in office for each of the key actors is to defect (Table 3.2). Defection is marked by the end of cooperation between coalition partners. A defector party is “a party that has not adhered to the coalition agreement, which is understood to include a promise to cooperate and to seek compromise until the end of the term” (Tavits 2008, p.496).

For minor parties, withdrawal from cabinet is the main indicator of defection. In relation to the outcome in which we are interested, then, the minor party is a 'decisive actor' (Strøm 1995, pp.62-63), whose decision is sufficient (but not necessary) for the end of their time in office.

'Defection' by the ruling party takes two main forms. First, the ruling party can 'defect' from its partnership with the minor party by dismissing the minor party's ministers from government. This seems unlikely, if the coalition is an equilibrium (see Section 3.4.2, below) and given that the ruling party can often choose to dismiss individual ministers rather than losing the support of an entire party. That said, incidents of prime ministers effectively dismissing entire parties are not unknown (see e.g., Dumont et al. 2009, p.139 on Belgium). Second, and most importantly, the ruling party can directly and indirectly influence the timing of elections. Prime ministers are very often central formal players in the early dissolution of legislatures and from this position their parties can influence election timing directly (Strøm and Swindle 2002, pp.576-577; Woldendorp et al. 2000, p.44; Warwick 2012, p.266; also Subsection 3.5.3.2, below). The ruling party can also influence election timing in less direct ways. It may be able to influence other formal decision-makers in the process, such as the head of state. As a large or influential party in parliament, the ruling party can also aim to contrive situations in which its coalition fails, no alternative coalition may be formed and early elections are called. In relation to the minor party's office retention outcome, the ruling party is usually, at the very least, a 'powerful' (or 'privileged') actor, defined as an actor “whose actions may affect the payoffs of other players but whose consent is neither sufficient nor necessary for dissolution” (Strøm and Swindle 2002, p.579; see also Strøm 1995, pp. 62-

13 In addition to withdrawal from cabinet, Warwick (2012, p.266) includes parties that “b) challenged the government in such a way that caused the government itself to collapse, or c) voted against the government in a confidence motion” in his operationalisation of defection. I acknowledge this definition, but I leave this as an open empirical question whether they are empirically distinct forms of defection. Withdrawal from cabinet is almost always accompanied by withdrawal from the governing coalition. One temporary exception occurred in January 2011, when the Irish Green Party agreed to support the government's Budget for a week after their ministers had resigned from cabinet. A second question that arises in the literature is that of mutual defection. Tavits (2008, p.498) operationalises defection in a somewhat broader way than Warwick: if a coalition breaks down as a result of parties failing to cooperate, she codes both as defectors. Warwick (2012, p.266), on the other hand, categorises these parties as 'disputers' rather than defectors. My approach is closer to Warwick's: I count the first-mover – the party that leaves the coalition first – as a defector.
or, for the purpose of this study, for the end of the minor party's time in office. This key distinction between the ruling party and other parties is also evident in data on the wider population of parties in government: prime ministers' parties appear to survive in government for longer than other parties (Figure 3.4).

![Graph showing party tenure in government by prime ministerial status in 34 countries, 1944-2012 (n=970)](image)

*Figure 3.4. Party tenure in government by prime ministerial status in 34 countries, 1944-2012 (n=970)*

Finally, some instances of coalition failure in parliament that lead to the end of a minor party's time in government are not orchestrated by the ruling party or precipitated by the minor party. They are unplanned, forced changes and they represent a failure of the ruling party to

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14 The ruling party can also defect by simply resigning from government and moving into opposition, just like a minor party. This may or may not lead to the minor party's exit from cabinet, depending on whether the ruling party can be replaced with other coalition partners. We can expect that ruling party defections are typically accompanied by other changes, such as early elections, which are much more closely linked to the minor party's exit from office. Therefore, I subsume this type of ruling party defection in the concept of seeking early elections.

15 Note, though, that this does not control for their position, but it may also be a result of attributes that allowed them to attain that position (such as size and centrality).
maintain sufficient support for its coalition. They typically result from a third set of parliamentary actors (MPs or party groups) changing their strategy by withdrawing their support for the ruling party's coalition in conditions where this support cannot be replaced. The identity of this third set of MPs cannot be specified *ex ante*. Therefore, unlike the minor party or the ruling party, I cannot identify them as 'key actors'. Their capacity to bring down a government and to precipitate early elections is likely to be highly contingent, depending on the powers of the house of parliament of which they are a member (although cf. Druckman and Thies 2002, p.769) and rules concerning votes of confidence, as well as their size, the size of the coalition and the capacity and willingness of other MPs to replace them.

3.4.2  *The logic of parties' prospects in coalition*

In contrast to the one-shot, zero-sum game of bargaining over office outcomes that occurs at the beginning of a coalition's life, parties' office retention outcomes are produced cooperatively over time. While conceptualising the production of time in office as a series of regular decisions to continue in coalition would cleave closely to the process, this approach is not usually tractable in empirical terms, given researchers' limited access to these repeated decisions. A more parsimonious way of conceptualising the production of parties' time in office is to assume that the government that is formed at the outset represents an equilibrium.\(^\text{16}\) This perspective assumes that actors are forward-looking, taking into account foreseeable events when the government is formed (e.g., certain inter-party policy conflicts), and that the government should only fall when it is subject to changed circumstances or new information (Laver and Shepsle 1996, p.61; Laver 2003, pp.33-34; see also Lupia and Strøm 1995, p.649, Warwick 2012, p.263). The explanation of parties' time in office from this point of view is less an explanation of their continuation in office than an explanation of the timing of their exit from office. All else being equal, the minor party's time in office continues indefinitely; short of an obligatory, routine election, only changes in key actors' incentives to defect should bring it to an end.

The general implication of taking this 'equilibrium' perspective is that empirical analyses of parties' time in office should aim to detect new circumstances and new information that feed

\(^{16}\) “An equilibrium cabinet, once it is formed, stays formed because no political actor with the ability to act in such a way as to bring down the cabinet and replace it with some alternative has the incentive to do so. Conversely, no actor with the incentive to replace the cabinet has the ability to do so. Thus we expect an equilibrium cabinet to be stable, remaining in place until a change in the external environment transforms either the incentives of some pivotal actor or the ‘pivotalness’ of some actor already possessing the appropriate incentives” (Laver and Shepsle 1996, p.61).
into key actors' decision-making processes. Having identified the key actors (ruling parties and minor parties) and their goals (governmental benefits and electoral benefits), we can identify the information that is relevant to their decisions. This is information concerning their future governmental benefits (their governmental prospects) and their future electoral benefits (their electoral prospects). When the prospective benefits (governmental and electoral) of these parties' continued partnership in office are outweighed by the prospective benefits of defecting, they will defect. As a result, the impact of events is dependent on contextual factors that shape the party's prospects (see e.g., Lupia and Strom 1995) and the party's beliefs about those prospects. This includes contextual information (e.g., how long until the next election?), policy- or office-specific information (e.g., how likely is it that the party can achieve its governmental goals?) and electoral information (e.g., the party's standing in the polls). It may also include information concerning other actors' strategies or intentions. For example, if a minor party believes that a ruling party will seek early elections, then this reduces the minor party's governmental prospects. Therefore, we might expect strategic interaction to feature in this setting (Strøm and Swindle 2002, p.576). Thus, I expect that the key empirical antecedents of 'gateway events' that lead to the end of a party's time in government will be developments that change the governmental or electoral calculus of the key actors. Specific indicators are discussed in more detail in Subsection 3.5.1, below.

The logic of parties' prospects is illustrated by Figure 3.5. At any given point in time, a party has both electoral and governmental prospects. These prospects are short-term (up to and including the next election) and medium-term (after the next election) (see Strøm and Müller 1999 for a similar distinction between short- and long-term party goals). The more time that remains until the next election, the greater are the short-term governmental prospects of a party in government. Given an equilibrium coalition, short-term governmental prospects are relatively certain: all else being equal, parties can expect to continue holding office and pursuing their policies until the next scheduled election.\(^\text{17}\) Parties will wish to avoid incurring the opportunity costs of leaving office early, but as that election approaches, short-term governmental prospects – and the opportunity costs associated with these prospects – decline.

\(^{17}\) Under normal conditions (i.e., where the actor's policy-making and office-holding capacity remains the same as envisioned at the time of formation), I suggest that a threshold for 'low governmental prospects' might be set at three months or less remaining in government. However, there are situations (some are described below) where a party's office-holding and policy-making prospects are constrained by new circumstances in parliament or elsewhere; this may reduce their governmental prospects unexpectedly, even if they may have more than three months remaining in government.
Short-term electoral prospects, on the other hand, may concern a party's electoral *trajectory* or its electoral *standing*. They are typically characterised by greater uncertainty than short-term governmental prospects. Where a party has sufficient information to predict its electoral *trajectory* (lines a or b in Figure 3.5), it will give priority to this over information about its electoral *standing* (points c or d), all else being equal. However, parties will rarely have sufficient information to be certain about their electoral trajectory (Balke 1990, p.203; Kayser 2005, p.19). In particular circumstances, certainty about a party's electoral trajectory may arise from anticipated events, such as impending scandals, a deteriorating (or improving) economic situation or changes in the intensity of political competition. If a party is certain that its electoral prospects can only decline (line b), then this is an incentive to seek an early election (Balke 1990, pp.212-213). If, on the other hand, a party is certain that its electoral prospects can only rise (line a), then this is an incentive to delay the next election.

In the absence of sufficient information about its future electoral trajectory, a party will rely on information about its current standing (e.g., points c or d) relative to its last general election result (point 'SQ') as a short-cut to estimate whether its prospects of electoral growth at an election would be high (above SQ, e.g., point c) or low (below SQ, e.g., point d). This distinction between prospective gains and prospective losses is important for the evaluation of parties' electoral success and failure (Narud 1996, p.487) and, presumably, for their self-evaluation. Uncertainty – perhaps combined with some knowledge of the habitual bases of voting behaviour (see Chapter 4) or, simply, regression to the mean – allows parties to hope, when their electoral prospects are low, that they might improve and it forces them to worry, when their prospects are high, that they will disimprove.
Paradoxically, high prospects (point c) and declining prospects (line b) are functionally equivalent for the purposes of informing a party's decision to defect, as are low electoral prospects (point c) and rising prospects (line a). If a party's electoral prospects are high – if they promise an improvement on their present seat share – or if they are certain to decline (even from a low level), then the party may seek an election in order to realise these electoral prospects, rather than risk losing them over a longer period (Laver 2003, p.35). On the other hand, a party will want to avoid realising its prospects when its electoral prospects are low or if they are certain to rise, and it may seek to avoid an election in the expectation that, with time, its electoral prospects will change for the better. That said, information about a party's current standing (points c and d) is more readily available than information about their future
trajectory (lines a and b) and we can expect that most parties in most situations will need to rely on the former. Where the latter is available, however, it will be given priority, as it, by definition, provides the party with more information about the future. Thus, if electoral prospects are low and certain to fall or high and certain to rise, they are categorised according to their trajectory, rather than their standing, as this is what we expect parties to take into account.

Beyond the next election, medium-term electoral and governmental prospects are typically uncertain. An election and coalition negotiations necessarily intervene before the party can realise its medium-term governmental prospects. In multi-party systems, a party's electoral success is a weak predictor of its joining the next government (Mattila and Raunio 2004). I therefore assume that, unless they are particularly clear, medium-term prospects are heavily discounted.  

The general idea that parties integrate these prospects into a cost-benefit calculus is supported by findings in the literature on parliamentary dissolutions that show that parties that expect large benefits from an election and little utility from their existing offices are most likely to call early elections (Lupia and Strøm 1995; see also Balke 1990) and by comparative empirical findings which show that strategic dissolution is considerably more likely towards the end of the parliamentary term (Diermeier and Stevenson 2000, pp.637-639; Strøm and Swindle 2002, p.586, p.588; see also Diermeier and Stevenson 1999; Warwick 2012, p.270). However, it should be noted that actors may also integrate and instrumentalise their prospects in inventive ways. For example, Lupia and Strøm (1995, p.649, p.655) point out that good electoral prospects may be used as a bargaining chip within coalitions (i.e., to leverage a party's governmental prospects). Likewise, they may use their governmental prospects to make promises or set agendas such that they leverage their electoral prospects.

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18 Some studies of strategic parliamentary dissolution have integrated medium-term office-seeking considerations. For example, Strom and Swindle (2002, p.584, p.587) find that the longer the anticipated new legislature relative to the remaining time in the current legislature, the greater is the incentive to call new elections. More generally, temporal discounting – the idea that payoffs are more valued in the present than in the future – has been introduced in some bargaining models (Falcó-Gimeno 2012a).

19 On the other hand, Warwick’s (2012) recent findings that the electoral results and medium term office outcomes obtained by parties that dissolve legislatures and defect from coalitions do not differ from (i.e., are not better than) other parties and that the timing of their actions does not indicate a (well-informed) trade-off between the costs of early termination and benefits at and after the next election.
3.4.3 The ruling party's prospects

Even if ruling parties and minor parties follow the same general logic in their decision-making, they do so from different positions. Perhaps the most important difference between these parties is that the ruling party tends to have greater access to influencing the timing of elections than their coalition partners. Their formal powers are described empirically in Subsection 3.5.3.2, below.  

Expectations concerning the ruling party's decision-making calculus are set out in Table 3.3. Where governmental prospects are high and electoral prospects are low, the ruling party will continue in office in the hope of regaining electoral ground (cell b). Where governmental prospects are high and electoral prospects are high (cell a), the former will trump the latter because they tend to be associated with greater certainty (see p.144, above) and, as a result, the ruling party will continue in office.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ruling party's electoral prospects</th>
<th>Ruling party's governmental prospects</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High*</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>a. Continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low*</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>b. Continue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The outcomes in the cells refer to the minor party's time in government (whether it continues or ends).

* For the purpose of this table, high electoral prospects = above the status quo (or likely to fall); low electoral prospects = below the status quo (or likely to rise). See text, p.146 on functional equivalence.

Where the ruling party has low governmental prospects and low electoral prospects, it will seek to continue in office in the hope (or expectation) that its electoral prospects will rise (cell d). Where the ruling party has low governmental prospects and high electoral prospects, it will seek an election (cell c). This marks a first path to early dissolution (Path 1.1). This expectation can be expressed as follows:

20 A second ruling party-specific characteristic – that the ruling party might take account of the wider coalition's electoral prospects as well as its own, with an eye to its own governmental prospects in the medium term – is discussed in Subsection 3.5.3.1, below (see also Mershon 1996, p.538).
H1. If the ruling party's governmental prospects are low and its electoral prospects are high or certain to decline, then it will seek early elections.

There is also a second path to dissolution (Path 1.2). Where the ruling party has no ('zero') governmental prospects as a result of an unplanned failure to maintain its majority in parliament, then it will be forced to leave government and, possibly, to face elections (cells e and f). An election is considerably more likely when the ruling party's prospects are low (and the opposition's prospects are high; cell f), while either an election or government alternation may occur if its electoral prospects are high (and the opposition's prospects are low; cell e). Either of these sets of conditions are likely to result in the termination of the minor party's time in office. I assume that the ruling party's failure to maintain its coalition results from changes in the incentives for minor parties or groups of MPs, who eventually defect from the coalition. I examine these minor actors through the lens of their governmental and electoral prospects. However, as the identity of these actors is not obvious in advance (see p.142, above), this will be examined inductively.

3.4.4 The minor party's prospects

Withdrawal from cabinet is one strategy – arguably the most significant strategy – that minor parties in government consider deploying to improve their electoral prospects. Gallagher et al. (2011, p.454) describe the logic of minor party defection as follows:

as the next election appears on the horizon, junior coalition partners begin to calculate ways in which they might leave the cabinet and force an election on terms that will put them in the best light possible. Thus coalition partners may begin actually looking for 'deal-breakers' that can form the basis of their next election campaign, thereby destabilizing the government.

The electoral benefits of defection, however, are not at all clear. While Buelens and Hino (2008) have tentatively suggested that new parties may benefit from conflict with their coalition partners, Warwick's (2012) recent study found no evidence for the beneficial effects of defection (see also Chapter 4). However, he does highlight the aim of renewing a party's image that may accompany such a strategy: “As disillusionment among [activists] becomes apparent, party leaders may become increasingly willing to enter a period in opposition in
order to rebuild the party's reputation – even if there is no clear idea of whether, when, or how well it will pay off” (Warwick 2012, p.279).

All defections are associated with conflict, as they involve, by definition, a party breaking a promise to cooperate and seek compromise until the end of the term (Tavits 2008, p.496, cited above). For descriptive purposes, it is possible to distinguish between three ideal-typical scenarios in which a party may decide to defect. These scenarios are distinguished by whether an election is imminent\(^{21}\) and, if not, whether the party's defection will precipitate an election (Figure 3.6). More than one of these scenarios may occur over the course of a minor party's time in government. The different strategic scenarios have implications for the degree and type of conflict entailed by a defection. We might expect Scenario 2 to involve most conflict, as it is a 'consequential' defection, bringing about an early election. Scenario 1, when defection takes place in the shadow of an imminent election, and Scenario 3, when a defection does not precipitate an election, ought to be associated with less inter-party conflict. Scenario 3 is also associated with an opportunity for the minor party to 'decontaminate' its image and rebuild for a period in opposition, while the other two scenarios involve an election within a short time.

\(^{21}\) For present purposes, we might consider 'imminence' as being equivalent to the period of 'low short-term governmental prospects' before an election: about three months (see fn.17, above).
In each of these scenarios, a similar logic of governmental and electoral prospects will operate. A minor party's short-term governmental prospects will, all else being equal, decline with time until the next scheduled election. Its medium-term governmental prospects – after the next election – may be heavily dependent on a cooperative relationship with its current coalition partner. If this is the case, then the minor party might be disinclined to imperil these prospects by leaving the government early. Several empirical findings concerning the development of relationships between parties suggest that their caution might be justified. In studying one type of inter-party coalition – legislative accommodations in the Danish parliament – Christiansen (2003, p.12) observes the role of medium-term coalition prospects in deterring defections. Parties breaking with the norm of compliance with legislative accommodation agreements lose “huge amounts of goodwill. The party risks being ostracized and left out from upcoming negotiations not just regarding the one issue of the broken
legislative accommodation but also regarding many other issues”. In a cross-national study, Tavits (2008) shows that parties that have fallen out in coalition are less likely to coalesce again, precisely because former coalition partners punish defectors. Likewise, Warwick (2012, p.273) shows that, where defection does not cause an election, defectors are unlikely to be part of the replacement government. Parties – like Green parties – that generally depend on one major party or bloc for access to government (Mair 2001, p.107; see also Subsection 2.4.4.4, above, on Green parties' coalition strategies) – and parties that are last invited to a coalition (see Subsection 2.4.1, above) – should be even more sensitive to the potential medium-term impact of defection on their governmental prospects.

The basic logic of minor parties' electoral prospects is similar to that of ruling parties. They, too, will calculate whether their electoral prospects are high (or certain to decline) or low (or certain to improve). Minor parties' low electoral prospects, as well as occurring in their ordinary form (high or low), can take two additional forms. One of these – electoral dependence – is qualitatively distinct from high or low prospects; the other – the prospect of zero seats – is a subset of low office outcomes.

Minor parties, more than ruling parties, may need to take account of their electoral dependence on some or all of their coalition partners: is the party electorally viable outside of coalition with one or more of its coalition partners? Small parties are more susceptible to being dependent on their coalition partners for electoral success – and even for their continued presence in parliament – than larger parties. In some countries, the electoral system compounds that dependence. Therefore, before making a decision on exiting government, these parties will ask whether this might remove a vital electoral support. In sum, electoral dependence and medium-term governmental dependence may mitigate a minor party's tendency to defect from a coalition.

Elections may be more risky for minor parties than for larger parties. Due to their size, an election is much more likely to pose a threat to a minor party's representation in parliament. Small changes in vote share, not least in conjunction with legal and effective electoral thresholds created by the electoral system (see Taagepera 2002), can mean the end of the party's presence in parliament. In combination with the vulnerabilities detailed in Subsection 3.3.1, this means that minor parties are more likely to find themselves in a position where their electoral prospects are effectively zero (i.e., where they are likely to get approximately
zero seats). According to the logic of the framework set out thus far, this is an unusual position, as they have increased certainty about the trajectory of their electoral prospects: they cannot disimprove further.

Table 3.4 sets out the expectations about minor parties' behaviour in the presence of high (or certain to decline) electoral prospects, low (or certain to rise) electoral prospects, 'dependent' electoral prospects (regardless of whether they are otherwise high or low) and 'zero' electoral prospects, in conjunction with high and low governmental prospects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minor party's electoral prospects</th>
<th>Minor party's governmental prospects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Zero'</td>
<td>Continue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The outcomes in the cells refer to the minor party's time in government (continue or end).

* For the purpose of this table, high electoral prospects = above the status quo (or likely to fall); low electoral prospects = below the status quo (or likely to rise). See text, p.146 on functional equivalence.

The second hypothesis follows from this. This hypothesis sets out expectations concerning the conjunction of prospects that may lead to defection.

H2. If the Green party's governmental prospects are low and its electoral prospects are high (or certain-to-decline) and are not dependent on electoral coalition with its government coalition partners, the party will defect from government.

This describes a third path (2.1) to defection. It is notable that the path to defection described by this hypothesis seems likely to be fully consistent with only one scenario (Scenario 1) outlined in Figure 3.6, which is associated with high conflict.

A final consideration when examining both ruling parties and minor parties' decisions is the potential for strategic interaction between the ruling party, the minor party and other potential
defectors in the context of limited information about these actors' intentions. The expectation of any type of termination by one actor (ruling party- or defector-driven) that will lead to an election may provoke pre-emptive defection by the other. This can be characterised as a breakdown in trust between key actors that resembles a prisoner's dilemma where an inability to communicate is substituted by an unwillingness to do so. While I do not formalise a hypothesis or distinct pathway concerning this situation, I do examine the cases of early termination for this dynamic.

3.4.5 Scheduled elections: paths to 'institutional terminations'
A third hypothesis describes the path to the end of a party's time in government that is traveled by parties that survive the defection risks described above.

\[ H3: \text{If the party survives other risks, then the duration of the maximum period remaining until the next obligatory general election will approximate the party's time in office.} \]

As discussed in Section 1.2, an election approximates the end of a party's time in office. Conditional upon their survival of other defection risks, then, parties' time in office is ended by obligatory scheduled elections: elections that takes place at the end of the legislature, rather than taking place early. Thus, the timing of scheduled elections clearly matter for the tenure of parties in government. In the wider population of parties in government, the direct effect of variation in the Constitutional Inter-Election Period (CIEP) is evident in Figure 3.7 (see also Table 3.13 and Figure 3.14). The shorter is the maximum inter-election period, the greater is this 'direct effect' (i.e., it affects a higher proportion of parties).
Figure 3.7. Party tenure in government by Constitutional Inter-Election Period in 34 countries, 1944-2012 (n=1134)\textsuperscript{22}

However, the 'maximum period remaining until the next obligatory general election' is not only a function of the CIEP. First, it is determined by maximum time until the next election – which is, in turn, determined by the rules concerning obligatory elections – net of any delays in entering government. These rules have indirect effects on the outcome – through their reducing governmental benefits and presenting events at which electoral prospects are realised – but they can also have the direct effect of ending the party's time in office.

Delays in joining the cabinet after an election effectively reduce the maximum period that a party can spend in office (see Conrad and Golder 2010; Diermeier and Van Roozendaal 1998).

\textsuperscript{22} Any further inferences from this figure, beyond the fact that the CIEP has an important influence on parties' tenure, need to be treated with caution due to the small number of countries that have three-year terms (Australia and New Zealand) or five year terms (five countries). The 'tail' on the four-year line is accounted for by the Dutch governing parties (CDA and PvdA) in the period 1989-1994 and the Portuguese governing party (PS) in the period 2005-2009.
These delays may result from an alternative government having formed first, from prolonged bargaining or from effective restrictions on the speed with which a new government may take office. Rather than simply using the maximum inter-election period as an indicator of the maximum possible time in office, then, I calculate the effective maximum pre-election period from the day that the party takes office. This is the maximum inter-election period less the post-election delay in a party attaining office.

Second, after a general election, a party's time in office may end quickly. However, if there is a delay in forming the next government, the party – and its coalition – may remain in office (Laver 2003, p.25). Thus, the delay in forming the next government can add to a party's time in office. For instance, a general election took place in Ireland on 25 February 2011; the Fianna Fáil cabinet left office on 9 March and the new Prime Minister was invested on the same day. These delays will give rise to (often minor) discrepancies between the effective maximum pre-election period and parties' tenure in office.

3.4.6 Summary: paths to gateway events
This section has suggested that a number of factors contribute to determining minor parties' office retention outcomes (their time in office). These factors in conjunction create several paths to the end of a minor party's time in office. Each of these paths (except the path concerning ruling party failure) are associated with hypotheses concerning ruling party defection (i.e., seeking early elections), minor party defection (i.e., withdrawing from government) and with the timing of scheduled elections. The timing of these gateway events determines the time that the minor party spends in government. Parties that experience 'premature' gateway events (early elections or defection) will have shorter time in office, although how much shorter depends on the timing of these events. These paths to the end of a minor party's time in office are summarised in Table 3.5.

The governmental and electoral prospects of two key actors – the minor party itself and the party of the prime minister (the ruling party) – are at the centre of this framework. Their prospects vary, both between cases and over time within cases. The framework highlights areas that it does not fully account for, such as the identity and role of a third set of parliamentary actors in coalition failure, which will be examined inductively. It also descriptively identifies possible pathways to minor party defection which would not be consistent with main hypothesis concerning minor party defection. Thus, while Subsection
3.3.2 described Green parties' office retention outcomes, this section (3.4) has set out a framework to explain the events that determine variation in those outcomes. In the next Section, I confront the framework with data from twelve cases of Green parties in government.

Table 3.5. Summary: paths to the end of a minor party’s time in office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Path and gateway event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Early election, driven by ruling party's (low) governmental prospects and (high or certain-to-decline) electoral prospects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Early election, precipitated by ruling party failure to maintain its coalition as a result of other parliamentary actors' decisions to defect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Minor party leaves office, driven by (high or certain-to-decline) electoral prospects and (low) governmental prospects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>None of the other pathways occur; timing of scheduled election determines minor party time in office.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For hypothesis wording and other details, see subsections immediately above.

3.5 Analysis: prospective benefits, institutions and Green parties in government

3.5.1 Data and methodology
As parties' prospects are likely to vary over the course of its time in office, using a method that can take into account time-varying causal conditions within cases is necessary. Event history analysis is one set of methods that can account for time-varying covariates (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Mills 2011). However, with a small number of cases that are deliberately selected, statistical analysis loses many of its advantages. An alternative approach is to employ between- and within-case analysis using narrative techniques focusing on sequence and timing. This has affinities with the 'analytic narratives' approach, combining rational choice assumptions (as set out in the framework in the previous section) and narrative case study techniques (Bates et al. 1998; Levi 2003). It also has much in common with process-tracing methods (see e.g., Collier 2011a and Collier 2011b; George and Bennett 2005; Bennett 2010). It has the added benefit of allowing a relatively detailed first examination of
an outcome (minor parties' office retention outcomes) that has not been systematically studied in the literature (see Subsection 3.2.1) and it allows for inductive discovery as well as hypothesis testing. It represents a step in the direction of examining the mechanisms underpinning coalition instability in a more detailed and case-specific manner, as called for by Grofman and Van Roozendaal (1997, p. 447; see e.g., Sturm 2013). At the same time, in covering a dozen cases, this analysis cannot reach the level of depth and detail that is usually associated with process tracing or analytic narrative case studies. The framework may provide a useful shortcut to understanding these cases through a cross-case analysis, but it will not provide a full or thick description.

The analysis draws mainly on secondary sources of data in order to make inferences about the governmental and electoral prospects of key actors during their time in government. The primary indicator of their short-term governmental prospects is their remaining time in office. However, these prospects may also be influenced by other factors that alter their capacity to achieve their policy goals or to hold office. Indicators of key actors' electoral prospects include the results of mid-term and second-order elections; opinion poll data (in conjunction with information about effective and legal electoral thresholds); conditions that may shape the public's vote choice (e.g., economic conditions, competition from new parties); and the degree of conflict between the party and its core supporters. I also rely on expert judgements in studies of individual elections and parties, drawing on election reports and case studies in scholarly journals, the European Journal of Political Research Data Yearbook and other sources.

The empirical analysis proceeds as follows. Subsection 3.5.2 sets out the context in which the Green party joined government, with particular regard to the central institutional parameter in the framework (the timing of obligatory elections) and it identifies the gateway event that led to the end of the party's time in office in each of the cases. Subsections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 describe, for ruling parties and Green parties, respectively, the development of their prospects and key elements of the institutional setting. For the ruling party, it describes its powers with regard to seeking early elections in each case; its governmental prospects; and its electoral prospects. For the minor party, it describes its governmental prospects and its electoral prospects.
At the end of each of these subsections, I bring the data together in a cross-case analysis that addresses the hypotheses set out in Section 3.4. In doing so, I also incorporate evidence from a small number of events that occurred during 'shadow cases' (Levi-Faur 2003, pp.13-14). These are positive instances of the events that are being studied (e.g., dissolution, defection) that fall outside the set of core cases. There are three 'shadow' instances of early elections being called: New Zealand in 2002 during a coalition in which the Green Party was a support party; the Czech Republic in 2009 after which the decision to call elections was unexpectedly annulled by the courts; and Ireland in 2011, after the Greens had already defected from government. There are two shadow cases of minor party defection: the case of a support party (the New Zealand Greens) in conflict with the Labour government in May 2002, which led to their walking out of parliament and the episode within the case Irish Greens in government when the announced their planned defection in November 2010.

In the context of a limited number of 'core' cases, they provide additional confirming or disconfirming evidence and are used to examine whether the paths that led to this event are similar in a wider set of similar cases. Some of these 'shadow' events are drawn from the set of Green parties in governing coalitions that did not enter cabinet (e.g., Prime Minister Helen Clark's dissolution of the New Zealand Parliament in 2002); others are drawn from events that occurred beyond the bounds of the core case (e.g., Prime Minister Brian Cowen's dissolution of the Irish Parliament in 2011 after the Green Party had defected); others still are functionally equivalent events that occurred during a 'core' case (e.g., the decision to dissolve the Czech Parliament in 2009, which was later unexpectedly annulled by the courts or the effective defection of the Irish Greens in November 2010 before their eventual defection in January 2011).

3.5.2 Maximum available time in office and gateway events
The maximum period in office that a party can look forward to consists of two elements (see Subsection 3.4.5). The first of these is the time remaining until the next election. This is, by definition, the legally-defined maximum inter-election period (the 'maximum legislative period') net of any delays in the party acceding to government since the last election. In three

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23 Levi-Faur (2003, fn.4) highlights Vogel's (1996) use of shadow cases, which he describes as 'mini-cases'. For the purpose of this analysis, I contrast 'shadow' events with 'core' events. Seawright and Gerring (2008, p.294) refer to them as 'background cases' in case study research.

24 A similar shadow case – that of the Australian Greens ending their agreement with the Australian Labor Party in February 2013 – occurred too late to be integrated with this analysis.
countries (four cases) the maximum legislative period was five years; in four countries (eight cases) it was four years (see Table 3.6). Delays in joining the government after an election ranged from 3 days (the French Greens in 1997) to 220 days (the Czech Greens in 2006-2007). However, these two cases were unusual. Ten of the twelve parties entered cabinet after a short delay of between three and five weeks. The second element is the delay in forming the next government, during which the party may remain in office. In no case was the post-election caretaker period during which the party remained in office longer than a couple of months. In the cases in which the parties had defected and in France, the parties did not spend any time in office after the election – indeed, they left office before the election. In four cases, the party remained in office for about one month after the election and in three, the party stayed in office for about two months.

In only five cases (Finland 1999-2002; Germany 2002-2005; Italy 2006-2008; Czech Republic 2007-2010; and Ireland 2007-2011) is there a substantial discrepancy between the time until the next election when the party joined the government and the time spent in office by that party. Two of these cases – Germany in 2005 and Italy in 2008 – were effectively ended with an early election. Three others (the Finnish, Czech and Irish cases) resulted from cases of minor party defection. One other case of minor party defection – Ecolo in Belgium in 2003 – occurred close to an obligatory election, but did not curtail the party's time in office by more than a few weeks. The remaining six cases ended with a routine ('scheduled') election. No terminations occurred due to the dismissal of an entire party and none occurred due to the departure from coalition (without early elections) of the ruling party. Notably, in countries with more than one complete case of a Green party in government (Finland, Italy, Germany, Belgium), the minor party's time in office has ended both 'on time', with scheduled elections (Finland 1995-1999 and 2007-2011; Italy 1996-2001; Germany 1998-2002; and the Flemish Greens [Agalev] in 1999-2003) and early due to actor-driven terminations (Finland 1999-2002; Italy 2006-2008; Germany 2002-2005; and the Wallonian Greens [Ecolo] until their defection in 2003). How did these gateway events come about? What explains their timing? I turn now to examine each of the key actors.
Table 3.6. Gateway events and time in government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gateway event</th>
<th>Maximum legislative period (years)</th>
<th>Delay before party joins government (days)</th>
<th>Time until the next scheduled election when the party joins government (years)</th>
<th>Post-election caretaker period (days)</th>
<th>Time in office (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland 1995-1999</td>
<td>Scheduled election</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 1996-2001</td>
<td>Scheduled election</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 1997-2002</td>
<td>Scheduled election*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 1998-2002</td>
<td>Scheduled election</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland 1999-2002</td>
<td>Minor party defection</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (Ecolo) 1999-2003</td>
<td>Minor party defection</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (Agalev) 1999-2003</td>
<td>Scheduled election</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 2002-2005</td>
<td>Early election</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 2006-2008</td>
<td>Early election</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic 2007-2010</td>
<td>Minor party defection</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland 2007-2011</td>
<td>Scheduled election</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland 2007-2011</td>
<td>Minor party defection</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The presidential election precipitated cabinet turnover. However, this was part of the election cycle (parliamentary elections quickly followed) so is treated as a scheduled election.

Sources: Manow and Döring 2012; EJPR Data Yearbooks; Gallagher et al. 2011.

3.5.3 The ruling party: prospects and powers

3.5.3.1 Identifying the ruling party

In the twelve cases of Green parties in government, there were eleven governments (the two Green parties in Belgium, Agalev and Ecolo, were in the same coalition). In most cases, identifying the ruling party (i.e., the party of the prime minister) is straightforward. In Belgium from 1999 to 2003, the ruling party was the Liberals (VLD) with Guy Verhofstadt as Prime Minister; in Finland from 1995 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003, the ruling party was the
Social Democrats (SDP) with Paavo Lipponen as Prime Minister and from 2007 to 2011, it was the Centre Party (KESK), with Matti Vanhanen as Prime Minister until mid-2010 and Mari Kiviniemi thereafter; in France from 1997 to 2002, the ruling party was the Socialist Party, with Lionel Jospin as Prime Minister; in Germany from 1998 to 2002 and from 2002 to 2005, the ruling party was the Social Democrats (SPD) with Gerhard Schröder as Chancellor; and in Ireland from 2007 to 2011, the ruling party was Fianna Fáil (FF), with Bertie Ahern as Prime Minister until mid-2008, succeeded by Brian Cowen who held office until early 2011.

In Italy, identifying the ruling party was somewhat more complicated. Prime Minister Romano Prodi (1996-1998) was a member of the second-largest cabinet party (the Italian Popular Party [PPI]); Prime Minister D'Alema (1998-2000) was a member of the Democrats of the Left (DS); and Prime Minister Amato (2000-2001) identified as an independent within the coalition (Ignazi 1997, 1999, 2001). From 2006 to 2008, Prime Minister Romano Prodi did not formally identify with one of the individual parties (DS and La Margherita) that made up his coalition over the other (Ignazi 2007, p.998). In each of these coalitions, given the bipolar structure of competition, I focus on the prospects of the left coalition more broadly, particularly its largest parties.

The Czech Republic, too, presents a somewhat unusual situation. From 2007 until 2009, the ruling party was the Civic Democrats (ODS), with Mirek Topolánek as Prime Minister. However, from 2009 to 2010, a non-partisan technocrat, Jan Fischer, led a government that was supported by the Civic Democrats, the Social Democrats (ČSSD) and the Greens. It is clear from detailed accounts of the coalition that the main supporting parties (the Civic Democrats and the Social Democrats) had considerable control over key government decisions. Even more importantly, it transpired that the votes of both parties were needed for a parliamentary dissolution (Hanley 2013). Therefore, for this latter period in the Czech case, I treat both of these parties as ruling parties and I examine the prospects of each.

3.5.3.2 The ruling party's institutional powers
One of the assumptions that underpins the framework is that ruling parties have a privileged institutional position. Ruling parties' 'defections' from coalition take the form of seeking early elections and, potentially, dismissing a minor party from government. In the cases covered here, the ruling parties had substantial, if variable, powers in these respects. Although they vary, the prime minister's formal powers tend to be substantial in decisions to dismiss individual ministers (Dowding and Dumont eds. 2009; Table 3.7). This is the case even in
France and the Czech Republic, where the president has substantial powers (Czech Republic 2009; e.g., Falvey 2012; Lopatka and Hares 2012). In France, this has been especially true during periods of cohabitation: while the President can still veto dismissals, the Prime Minister has considerable power in these decisions (Kam and Indridason 2009, p.41).  

In four of the seven countries covered by this analysis (Belgium, Finland, Germany and Ireland), accounting for eight of the twelve cases, prime ministers are the central players in parliamentary dissolution, together with a weak head of state (Table 3.7). This provides the ruling party with the capacity to influence election timing using their formal position. Even in the countries in which the prime minister is not the central player in calling early elections, (s)he can influence the decision through formal and informal channels. Where the head of state is of the same party (e.g., in the Czech Republic from 2007 to 2009), this may provide a channel of influence or a convergence of interests between key actors in the process. Even in France, the Prime Minister has a consultative role, even if the President has an effective monopoly on dissolution powers. The ruling party may also use its size and influence to construct a parliamentary majority to vote in favour of dissolution (or to orchestrate a vote of no-confidence that will lead to a dissolution).

25 Article 62 of the Czech Constitution states that, “The President of the Republic shall... appoint and recall the Prime Minister and other members of the Government and accept their resignation”. Article 74 states that, “The President of the Republic shall recall a Member of Government if the Prime Minister proposes so.”
26 Kam and Indridason cite Elgie’s (1993, p.50) account of the Mitterand/Chirac cohabitation as an illustration.
27 The expectation that the Italian president should be above party politics is worth noting in the context of the present study. Notably, Strom and Swindle (2002, p.587, p.588) find that variation in the powers of the Head of State appears to have little or no mean effect on early dissolution.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PM: substantial formal powers of dismissal?</th>
<th>Dissolution</th>
<th>Other information on dissolution</th>
<th>Can the parliament dissolve itself?</th>
<th>Must the government resign if it loses a vote of confidence?</th>
<th>Special no-confidence requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Cabinet with non-partisan HoS</td>
<td>Other options: Cabinet with Parliament; constitutional amendment.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>HoS unilateral</td>
<td>PM with 'partisan' HoS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not during first year of legislature</td>
<td>HoS unilateral</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>PM with 'partisan' HoS</td>
<td>HoS unilateral</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not during last six months of presidency**</td>
<td>PM with 'partisan' HoS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>HoS unilateral</td>
<td>PM with 'partisan' HoS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>HoS unilateral</td>
<td>Not during last six months of presidency**</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dismissal: Country studies in Dowding and Dumont (eds. 2009)
Dissolution: Strom and Swindle (2002); Czech Republic data from PARLINE (2013)
Dissolution by parliament: Gallagher et al. (2011, p.415)
Confidence rules: Gallagher et al. (2011, p.415); Deschouwer (2009, p.180)
* See text
** This occurred from November 1998 to May 1999.

3.5.3.3 The ruling party’s governmental prospects
Table 3.8 identifies the various levels of governmental prospects that ruling parties passed through during their time in government in the cases covered by this chapter. All ruling parties set out with high governmental prospects at the outset of their coalition, as each had constructed a coalition of sufficient size for it to attain office and had the prospect of a
considerable period (between 3.4 and 5 years) in which they could hold office and make policy until the next scheduled elections.

Several of these parties passed through periods of low short-term governmental prospects, either routinely, as these scheduled elections approached, or non-routinely (two cases: Germany in 2005 and Ireland in late 2010), as they encountered new obstacles to their office-holding or policy-making capacity. In Germany in mid-2005, there was over a year remaining until the next obligatory federal elections, but successive defeats in regional (Land) elections had led to a situation in which the government coalition had did not have full control of any votes in the Bundesrat, and so was facing the prospect of having its policies blocked (Poguntke 2006, p.1110). This occurred because the government had lost a string of regional elections, leaving it facing an opposition majority in a powerful upper house. In addition, Wüst and Roth (2006, p.443) suggest that Schröder acted with an eye to his party's medium-term governmental prospects, hoping that an early election would forestall a coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Liberals. In the Irish case, governmental prospects were low in late 2010 because of the expected defection of individual MPs and because of the announcement by the Green Party in November 2010 that it would withdraw its support for the government within weeks, thus depriving it of its majority (see Little 2011, pp.1305-1307).

Finally, several parties passed through a period during which they had effectively zero governmental prospects. The six ruling parties that reached scheduled elections also reached a point where they had effectively no short-term governmental prospects because of these elections. In Italy in 2008, one ruling party reached a point at which it had zero governmental prospects before scheduled elections, having failed to maintain its support in parliament. The coalition failure that produced these governmental prospects resulted from the defection of two small parties – Clemente Mastella's UDEUR and Lamberto Dini's Liberal Democrats – on a confidence vote in the upper house. These defections were driven, in turn, by the government coalition's poor electoral prospects and, in the case of Dini, policy disagreement on pension reform and an offer to join the centre-right opposition's electoral lists. They were also motivated by matters that were even more fundamental to their political survival: Mastella's wife was, at that time, the subject of a judicial inquiry into corruption and he

28 In the Irish case, the government also had no electoral prospects, but this occurred after the Green Party withdrew from coalition in January 2011, so falls outside of the core case. This is a ‘shadow’ instance of zero prospects and is dealt with further in Subsection 3.5.3.5, below.
claimed that he had not received sufficient support from the government on this issue (Wilson 2008, p.217). Ignazi (2009, p.998) observes that he “perceived that his political future would be better served by abandoning the centre-left coalition and joining the opposition”. In the context of a small governing coalition in a powerful upper house and a strongly polarised party system, these defections were sufficient to reduce the ruling party's governmental prospects to zero.

### Table 3.8. Ruling parties' short-term governmental prospects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ruling party's short-term governmental prospects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All eleven ruling parties when they joined government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* One case – Finland in 2002 – ended before the ruling party approached an obligatory election.
** Six cases also reached zero prospects routinely; these are encompassed by the 'low' category.

### 3.5.3.4 The ruling party's electoral prospects

During the eleven legislative periods covered by the twelve cases of Green parties in government, the ruling party's electoral prospects were generally high throughout one case (Belgium 1999-2003). They were clearly low for seven ruling parties during most of their cases. In one case – Finland in the period 1999-2002, the ruling party's electoral prospects appear ambiguous. The ruling party's electoral prospects were mixed in other cases: they went

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29 As it turned out, this belief appears to have been mistaken: UDEUR was not accepted as a partner in either coalition ahead of the election, leading the party to withdraw from the election and Mastella to resign from parliament (Wilson 2008, p.219).
through periods of high prospects and low prospects. They were high (France 1997-2001 and Germany 2000-2001) or certain to decline (Germany 2004-2005) for parts of these cases and low in other parts of the same cases (France 2002; Germany 1999 and 2002; Germany 2002-2004). This section organises the description of cases according to which prospects predominated *towards the end of the case*. It describes, first, the cases in which the ruling party had generally high (or certain-to-decline) prospects towards the end of the case and, second, the cases in which the ruling party generally low or ambiguous prospects towards the end of the case.

**Table 3.9. Ruling parties' electoral prospects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ruling party's electoral prospects</th>
<th>Low (or certain-to-rise)</th>
<th>Ambiguous</th>
<th>High (or certain-to-decline)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Finland 1995-1999</td>
<td>Finland 1999-2002</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy 1996-2001</td>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium 1999-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy 2006-2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>France 1997-2001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland 2007-2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany 2000-2001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Czech Republic 2007-2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>Certain-to-decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland 2007-2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany 2004-2005*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France 2002*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany 1999, 2002*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany 2002-2004*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Part of a case. These cases feature 'mixed' electoral prospects. Dates are indicative. See text for details. None of the cases appear to cover situations in which the ruling party was certain that its electoral standing would rise.

*High (or certain-to-decline) or ambiguous electoral prospects*

*Belgium, 1999-2003.* The electoral prospects of Guy Verhofstadt's Liberals (VLD) were positive, notwithstanding a stagnating economy, spending cuts of €1.5bn in 2002 and the bankruptcies of the national airline, Sabena, and technology company Lernout and Haupsie (Rihoux 2002, esp. p.921, p.926; Rihoux et al. 2003, pp. 905-906; Fitzmaurice 2004, p.146). The government and each of its parties (with the exception of the Green parties) approached the election with high approval ratings (Fitzmaurice 2004, p.146). These prospects were
realised in 2003 in what was the Liberals' most successful election (Rihoux et al. 2004, p.953).

A number of explanations have been offered for the Liberals' positive electoral prospects. The coalition was large and therefore faced a small and weak opposition that could not provide a credible alternative government. According to Fitzmaurice (2004, pp.148-149), the opposition parties “seemed unready for government again and were unable to land any real punches on the coalition.” The Liberals used their position in government strategically, achieving core party policies (such as tax cuts) and providing patronage to supporters (Rihoux et al. 2004, p.953; see also Rihoux et al. 2003, p.906). The party attracted several politicians from the disintegrating Volksunie party (Fitzmaurice 2004, p.149). Finally, it had an able leader in Verhofstadt (Rihoux et al. 2004, p.953).

Germany, 2002-2005. The SPD's electoral prospects were low during Gerhard Schröder's second term as Chancellor (Figure 3.8), but they also appeared likely to decline further during the latter part of the government. The party had continued to suffer defeats in Land elections and opinion polls suggested that the Red-Green coalition could not win a general election (Poguntke 2006, p.1110; Wüst and Roth 2006, p.439). By 2005, it appears that Schröder believed that the SPD's electoral prospects were likely to deteriorate further. One source of this belief was increasingly formidable competition from the left. The party was particularly vulnerable to these competitors, given its pursuit of labour market reforms, not least the Hartz IV reforms that came into effect in 2005. Inside the party, “the left/labour wing of the SPD was in almost open rebellion” (Sloam 2006, p.141). Outside the party, the Alternative for Work and Social Justice (WASG) that formed in January 2005 and was led by former SPD chairman Oskar Lafontaine posed a serious threat to the SPD (Sloam 2006, pp.141-142; Poguntke 2006, p.1110-1113). In May 2005 (when the early election was called), it emerged that part of the SPD's left wing was preparing to defect to the WASG (Wüst and Roth 2006, p.442). Such was the perceived threat from the left that the SPD concentrated primarily on competing with it rather than with the Christian Democrats (Sloam 2006, p.142). Sloam (2006, pp.141-142; see also Poguntke 2006, p.1113) suggests that the intention of calling an early election was to pre-empt the rise of the left and, more specifically, to hold an election before the WASG and the PDS could form an electoral alliance. In addition to these rather
convincing prospects of further deterioration in the SPD’s position, Schröder had reason to be confident in his ability in a campaign environment, even if day-to-day politics was not producing positive electoral indications (Wüst and Roth 2006, p.442).

![Graph showing vote intention (%) over time](image)


Figure 3.8. Germany, October 2002 to September 2005

**Low or ambiguous electoral prospects**

*Czech Republic, 2007-2010.* In the Czech Republic during the Topolánek government (January 2007 to early 2009), the ruling ODS party had low electoral prospects (Figure 3.9). The Prime Minister in office from May 2009 until the parliamentary elections in May 2010, Jan Fischer, was non-partisan and despite being highly popular (Haughton et al. 2011, p.395; Hanley 2013, p.13) he did not contest these elections. The electoral prospects of the ODS

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31 This figure and similar figures that follow in this subsection include information on the previous result and opinion poll standing of the Green party as well as the level of the electoral threshold. This information is discussed below in Subsection 3.5.4.2, where Green parties’ electoral prospects are described.
deteriorated as they supported Fischer's government. The prospects of the other major party that supported Fischer's government, the ČSSD, were also low, having fallen sharply after they joined government. New parties challenged both ruling parties during this time: the Party of Civic Rights (SPOZ), which was led by a former ČSSD leader, Miloš Zeman, competed with the ČSSD (but ultimately fell short of the electoral threshold). The largest challenges came from TOP '09, which put pressure on the Civic Democrats (ODS) and the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), and the Public Affairs party (VV) appealed to Green voters and those who had not turned out to vote in 2006 (Haughton et al. 2011, p.399; see Figure 3.9). The negative prospects of the ODS and the ČSSD were reflected in the election results: together, the two major parties won the smallest aggregate vote share (less than 50%) since 1992 (Haughton et al. 2011, p.398).

![Figure 3.9. Czech Republic, September 2006 to May 2010](source: CVVM (2010)).

**Figure 3.9. Czech Republic, September 2006 to May 2010**

**Finland, 1995-1999.** The electoral prospects of Paavo Lipponen's Social Democrats (SDP) were low throughout his first term in office. The party performed poorly in the European
Parliament election of 1996 (the first ever in Finland) (Sundberg 1997, p.360). Despite economic growth for the years from 1995 to 1999 standing at an average of almost 5%, unemployment, although declining, stood at approximately 11% as the election approached (Arter 2000, p.180). The SDP's negative prospects were borne out in their electoral results. Despite the coalition being deliberately constructed to limit credible opposition and to limit incumbency losses (Jungar 2011 pp.141-142), Lipponen's party lost 5.4% of the vote and 12 seats and Lipponen himself lost votes in his Helsinki constituency, coming in second to the leader of the Conservatives (Arter 2000, p.182; see also Sundberg 2000).

Finland, 1999-2002. During the Finnish Greens' second spell in office, the ruling party's electoral prospects appear to have been ambiguous. For much of its time in office, the SDP managed to maintain its support among the public (Figure 3.10). However, like in 1999, unemployment, at 9%, was the coalition's “Achilles heel” (Arter 2003, p.155). Notwithstanding this, the Social Democrats made an electoral gain at the general election of 2003 (from 22.9% to 24.5% of the vote) – the first time since 1983 that they had made electoral gains after a spell in power – but lost two seats and, ultimately, the Prime Minister's office. Lipponen doubled his vote in Helsinki and regained his position at the top of the poll in the constituency (Arter 2003, p.153).
Fig. 3.10. Finland, April 1999 to May 2002

\[ \text{Source: YLE (2013). Monthly opinion polls by Taloustutkimus. Effective threshold derived from Taagepera (2002).} \]

\text{Finland, 2007-2011. The Matti Vanhanen government (2007-2010) was beset by troubles that contributed to the Centre Party's (KESK) poor electoral prospects. It faced several controversies: conflict with nurses in 2007 over pay; revelations in 2009 about state owned companies financing candidates; “constant tabloid coverage” of the prime minister's personal life; and pressure on Vanhanen to resign over political donations, starting in September 2009 (Arter 2011, p.1286, pp.1291-1292; Helsingin Sanomat 2009). In Finland in the months before the 2011 election, the Centre Party's electoral prospects remained low despite the improved stability provided by the change in Prime Minister (to Mari Kiviniemi) in 2010.} \]
Perhaps most significantly, the True Finns – a party that had received only 4.1% of the vote in 2007 – was mounting a formidable electoral challenge to the established parties (Figure 3.11) in the context of increased cynicism about mainstream politicians and rising anti-immigrant and anti-Swedish sentiment (Sundberg 2011, p.968). They benefitted from increased public disaffection with the European Union – including disaffection among the Centre Party's core rural support base – as the country provided a contribution of €741m to the EU's loan to Ireland in late 2010. The True Finns' capacity to realise their electoral prospects was evident at the European Parliament elections in 2009: they won 9.8% of the vote, up from 0.5% in 2004 (Rannanpää 2010). At the general election in 2011, they grew from 4% to 19% vote share, and from 5 seats to 39, while the government parties lost 27 seats. The Centre Party vote share fell from 23.1% to 15.8% and it won 35 seats, down from 51 (Sundberg 2010; Arter 2011, esp. pp.1289-1292).32

32 It is possible that the Centre Party may have had sufficient information to know that its electoral prospects were certain to decline, as well as being low, particularly during the period in which its short-term
France, 1997-2002. In France, the Socialist Party's electoral prospects were positive for most of Lionel Jospin's term as Prime Minister. However, they declined during the final months. The regional elections of March 1998 delivered broadly similar results to the 1997 parliamentary elections. While it did not achieve a majority in most regions, the left gained seats in regional councils due to electoral alliances (Ysmal 1999, pp.389-390). The government parties did well at the European elections in 1999 (Ysmal 2000). Jospin remained popular throughout most of his term as Prime Minister. In January 1998, 59% of respondents to a SOFRES poll said that they had confidence in his leadership; 63% in December 1998; 63% again in December 1999; 57% in January 2001; and 52% in December 2001 (Ysmal 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002).

However, indicators of the Socialist Party's electoral prospects were not entirely positive and they deteriorated sharply just before the presidential and parliamentary elections. The Socialists and the Communists performed poorly in the municipal elections of March 2001, having been outflanked by some extreme left candidates whose voters did not transfer to their lists in the second round (Ysmal 2002, p.957). The clearest indications of Jospin's poor electoral prospects came only when the legislative elections were already imminent. Public confidence in Jospin fell steadily from 51% in February 2002 to 40% at the time of the presidential election, in late April (SOFRES 2002). Most significantly, in the presidential election, Jospin was excluded after the first round on a vote share of 16.2% (Ysmal 2003, p.951). Fifty-eight percent of respondents to an IPSOS poll in May 2002, after the re-election of Jacques Chirac as President, said that they thought that cohabitation – and, by implication, Jospin's and the Socialist Party's incumbency – would be ‘a bad thing’ (Ysmal 2003, pp.953-954). These poor prospects were confirmed by the result of the legislative elections in June: collectively, the left went from 44% in 1997 to 36% in 2002, albeit with the Socialists maintaining their vote share at the same level as 1997 (Ysmal 2003, p.954).

governmental prospects were low (the final months of the legislative term). Like the German SPD in 2005, they too were subject to increased competition from a party (the True Finns) that appealed to their traditional support base. However, it is important to note that events that the party would not have foreseen (unlike the shift in public opinion or the rise of the True Finns) and therefore did not plan for, such as the request for the government to contribute to a multilateral loan to Ireland, also played an important role in their declining electoral prospects. In-depth case study is required for more certainty concerning the placement of this case and, specifically, the party's beliefs concerning its trajectory over these months. In the absence of more substantial evidence that the party foresaw its decline, it remains classified as a party that had low (rather than certain-to-decline) electoral prospects.
Germany, 1998-2002. During Schröder's first government, the SPD went through three
distinct phases of negative and positive electoral prospects. Within six months of taking
office, the government had lost its lead in the opinion polls (Pulzer 2003, p.153; see Figure
3.12). Throughout its time in office, government parties' control of Land governments
decayed. The SPD's loss of Land governments included the loss of more than eight percent
of the vote in North-Rhine Westphalia in September 1999 (Pulzer 2003, p.154). In the
European Parliament elections in 1999, the SPD lost seats and votes, while all of the
opposition parties except the FDP, which did not reach the electoral threshold, made gains
(Poguntke 2000).

Fortunately for the SPD, its main rivals experienced serious difficulties from late 1999. The
Christian Democrats endured a drawn-out party funding scandal in late 1999 and throughout
2000 (Poguntke 2000, p.394; Poguntke 2001, p.309). As a result, by early 2000, the SPD had
recovered in opinion polls (see Figure 3.12) and the Christian Democrats had fallen behind it
by ten percentage points. The SPD managed to maintain its support and its lead for two years
“as one malfeasance after another of the CDU was paraded before an amazed public.” (Pulzer
2003, pp.154-155). As a result of the Christian Democrats' weakness, the SPD's prospects
were reasonably positive a year before the election, with Edmund Stoiber's hesitancy in
announcing his intention to stand as a candidate for Chancellor an indication of that weakness
(Poguntke 2003, p.957; Pulzer 2003, p.155).

In the crucial pre-election months during 2002, the SPD's electoral prospects waned.
Poguntke (2003, pp.957-960) identifies several factors that, during 2002, can only have made
the Chancellor, the Social Democrats and the government parties less appealing: party finance
and corruption scandals in Cologne and Wuppertal (see also Pulzer 2003, p.156);
unemployment figures at a four-year high in June; the collapse of a state-rescued building
company; the removal of the chairman of Telecom; the dismissal of the Defence Minister and
former party leader over accepting gifts and fees from a Christian Democratic public relations
consultant; and an airmiles scandal involving MPs from both government parties. In addition,

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33 Government-controlled Bundesrat votes numbered 31 in late 1998, 23 in late 2000, 20 in late 2001 and 16 in
May 2002; opposition-controlled Bundesrat votes grew from 16 in late 1998 to 35 in May 2002 (Poguntke
votes and Land governments must vote as a unit. National legislation that affects the rights and obligations of
the Länder requires an absolute majority of votes (Poguntke 2001, p.309).
Pulzer (2003, p.156) highlights a survey of educational attainment that placed Germany 21st among 32 advanced economies and which ranked SPD-controlled Länder below CDU/CSU-controlled Länder. Having renewed its leadership, the CDU took the lead in opinion polls and won the Saxony-Anhalt Land election in April 2002, gaining more than fifteen percent of the vote, while the SPD lost sixteen percent. Two months before the election, the SPD's electoral prospects were distinctly negative and government alternation looked likely.

![Graph showing vote intention in Germany from 1999 to 2002.](image)

**Figure 3.12. Germany, October 1998 to September 2002**

*Ireland, 2007-2011.* In Ireland, Fianna Fáil's electoral prospects were decidedly negative (Figure 3.13; Little 2011, p.1305). At the 2007 election, the Fianna Fáil party had received almost 42% of the vote. After the government guaranteed the liabilities of the Irish banks in September 2008, opinion polls placed it at between 20 and 30 percent. Consistent with these opinion polls, the party performed very poorly at the European Parliament elections and local elections in 2009: they won approximately one quarter of the vote, coming second in nationwide elections for the first time since the 1920s (Quinlan 2010, p.297; Quinlivan and
Weeks 2010; Little et al. 2010). From September 2009 to November 2010, opinion polls placed the party at a minimum of 17% and a maximum of 27% and after the government's application for a multilateral loan from the EU and the IMF in November 2010, its rating ranged between 12% and 18%. It also suffered a number of defections and retirements during this time (see Little 2011, pp.1305-1306). Ultimately, these negative prospects were borne out, with the party winning just 17.4% of the vote – less than half of its vote share in 2007 – and losing almost three-quarters of its seats in the lower house of parliament.

![Graph](image)

*Figure 3.13. Ireland, June 2007 to January 2011*

*Italy, 1996-2001.* In Italy, the government parties did poorly in the 1999 European Parliament elections (Ignazi 2000, p.441); they lost the regional elections in 2000 (prompting Prime Minister D'Alema's second resignation); and they lost the support of the Church and Confindustria (the industrialists' association) (Ignazi 2001). The left coalition polled poorly and the result of the general election in 2001 bore out these poor prospects: core elements of
the coalition – the Democratici di Sinistra (DS) and La Margherita – lost 5.1% and 2.7% of the vote, respectively (Ignazi 2002, p.992).

Italy, 2006-2008. The Prodi government's opinion poll ratings were very low within months of taking office in May 2006 (Ignazi 2007, p.1004) and in 2007 and 2008, there were multiple indications that the prospects of the main coalition parties were poor. These poor electoral prospects were reflected in events surrounding the fall of his government, including Prodi's proposal for a bipartisan 'transition government' following his defeat in a vote of confidence (Wilson 2008, p.216; Ignazi 2009, p.998), in an attempt to forestall elections; the opposition's rejection of that proposal; and the motives of the defectors from his coalition (see description above, p.165).

### 3.5.3.5 Ruling parties, prospects and early elections: summary and analysis

There are two patterns evident in the description of outcomes and gateway events in Subsections 3.3.2 and 3.5.2. First, it is notable how rarely the outcome (the end of the minor party's time in government) was driven by ruling party failure or defection. In the eleven coalitions covered in this study, two ended with early elections.\(^\text{34}\) Second, the ruling party's role in ending the minor party's time in government was limited to calling early elections or to a 'failure' to maintain its coalition. Other forms of ruling party defection – dismissing the minor party or ruling party withdrawal from the coalition without early elections – were absent, consistent with the assumption that coalitions are constructed in equilibrium.\(^\text{35}\) In examining paths to ruling party-driven terminations, then, this section focuses on explaining two types of events: voluntary and non-voluntary early elections. Before examining the two paths to early elections identified by the framework among core and shadow cases, I briefly examine the relationship between parties' prospects and *continuation* in government.

When ruling parties had high short-term governmental prospects, they tended not to defect. Indeed, none of the eleven ruling parties examined here sacrificed high governmental benefits

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\(^{34}\) By way of approximate comparison, in Ström and Swindle's (2002, p.586) study of early elections between 1960 and 1995 in 18 countries, 47% of elections occurred early (i.e., before 95% of the previous legislative term had passed). While Ström and Swindle provide country-by-country data, little can be inferred from this by way of descriptive comparison with more recent cases, not least because of important institutional and political changes that have occurred in these countries (e.g., Belgium, Finland, Italy) during the period of their study.

\(^{35}\) The relative stability in portfolio allocation over time notwithstanding substantial turnover of individuals further supports this idea (see Appendix A).
in order to precipitate an election (or to otherwise end its time in cabinet). This is consistent with cells a and b of Table 3.10. It reflects both the value of these prospective governmental benefits to the party and, more generally, the validity of the assumption that their coalitions were constructed in equilibrium.

Given the findings of the literature on postincumbency electoral losses (see Chapter 4 for a review), the fact that ruling parties tended to have low electoral prospects is not surprising. Having low electoral prospects gave many ruling parties a good reason not to seek early elections, even when they had low short-term governmental prospects (cell d in Table 3.10). Not seeking early elections gave these parties time to work towards improving their electoral prospects while realising their remaining short-term governmental prospects. In instances of ambiguous electoral prospects – e.g., during the case of the Finnish Social Democrats in 1999-2002 – the party's continuation in government might be explained by a preference for relatively certain governmental benefits to small and highly uncertain electoral benefits in the event of an early election. In summary, it is not difficult to explain why most ruling parties did not seek early elections in terms of short-term governmental and electoral prospects: they aimed to realise their short-term governmental benefits by remaining in government and in most cases they sought to avoid realising low electoral prospects.

There is only one instance of a ruling party successfully seeking an early election: the German SPD in 2005. At first sight, it seems that it belongs in cell b, with high governmental prospects (at the time that it called the election, there was substantial time remaining until the next scheduled election) and low electoral prospects (it was polling substantially below the vote share that it received in 2002). On closer examination, it seems that this episode belongs instead in cell c, with low governmental prospects and electoral prospects that, while low, also seemed certain to decline. The SPD's low governmental prospects stemmed from changes in the composition of the upper house (Bundesrat) as a result of Land elections. It faced a hostile majority in a powerful upper house and, therefore, the prospect of considerable difficulty in pursuing its policies. Being blocked in parliament may have ultimately threatened the Chancellor's office-holding prospects, if not the office-holding prospects of the party itself.36

The timing of Schröder's decision to call the election – immediately after the government lost

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36 Wüst and Roth (2006, p.442) point to the cases of Helmut Schmidt in 1982 and Ludwig Erhard in 1966 as historical precedents.
control of its last *Land* government – further supports the idea that this was, in part, a response to its weak position in the upper house.

While its electoral prospects were indeed low, the SPD also had an unusual degree of certainty about its future downward electoral trajectory due to emerging electoral competition and increasing internal party conflict, in the context of regular feedback from regional elections. The prospect of policy deadlock in parliament may have been seen as a further electoral liability. The timing of calling the election coincided with significant new information concerning its electoral prospects: the news that part of the SPD's left wing was prepared to defect to the WASG and negative electoral feedback from North-Rhine Westphalia, an SPD stronghold since the 1960s that accounts for more than one fifth of the population. Thus, with the SPD's low governmental prospects and certain-to-decline electoral prospects, the conditions are consistent with those set out in Hypothesis 1 (and cell c in Table 3.10).

While instances of both the outcome and the combination of causal conditions specified by Hypothesis 1 were rare, there is some further supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1 in the only instance of a voluntary early election among the 'shadow' cases. The conditions surrounding Helen Clark's dissolution of the New Zealand parliament four months early on 11 June 2002 also appear to match the conditions specified in the hypothesis: Labour's short-term governmental prospects were low and its electoral prospects were high. As they approached the final four months of the legislative term, their main coalition partner (the Alliance) broke up. Cooperation with the Greens, a support party, was becoming more difficult: the party was refusing to grant sufficient parliamentary time for the government's legislative programme and it had committed itself to voting against lifting a moratorium on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), while Labour wanted to lift the moratorium and to depoliticise the issue of GMO release by establishing an independent regulatory regime. According to Vowles (2003, p.1038), “Given... the tantalising prospect of perhaps being able to bypass the Greens in the next Parliament, Clark took the plunge”. At the same time, opinion polls were promising an overall majority for Labour, thus holding out the possibility of very high medium-term governmental prospects. These electoral prospects were likely, if not certain, to decline, as economic forecasts were negative (Vowles 2003, pp.1036-1037; Church and McLeay 2003). In other words, Clark sought to realise her high and likely-to-decline electoral prospects and high post-election governmental prospects.
### Table 3.10. Ruling parties' prospects and outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ruling party's short-term governmental prospects</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Zero (fail)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High or certain-to-decline</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. <em>Continue</em> Belgium 1999-2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. <em>Continue</em> Italy 2006-2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. <em>End</em> Belgium 2003</td>
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<td>d. <em>Continue</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>e. <em>End</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Low or certain-to-rise</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. <em>Continue</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. <em>Continue</em> Italy 1998-1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. <em>End</em> Italy 1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. <em>Continue</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>e. <em>End</em> Italy 2008 (non-routine zero governmental prospects)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Finland 1999-2002</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Germany 2000-2001</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Finland 2007-2011</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Czech Republic 2006-2010</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Ireland 2007-2010</strong></td>
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</table>

Cells correspond to Table 3.3, p.148. The predicted outcomes in the cells refer to the minor party's time in government (continue or end).

'Core' cases only. 'Shadow' episodes are described in the text.

Dates are indicative. See text for details.

Low governmental prospects ≈ 3 months, all else being equal, as per fn.17, above.

* See text, p.146 on functional equivalence: in cases where electoral *trajectory* is clear, parties give it priority over information concerning their electoral *standing*.

** Electoral prospects of the Finnish SDP from 1999 to 2002 appear ambiguous. See text, p.171.

However, not all cases that met the conditions set out in Hypothesis 1 (i.e., that occupied cell c) ended with an early election. In Belgium in 2003, the ruling party clearly had high electoral
prospects at the same time as having low short-term governmental prospects, but did not seek early elections to realise these electoral prospects. Within the logic of the framework, there may be two reasons for this. First, the Liberals' electoral prospects were so high, and such was the configuration of the coalitional system, that their medium-term governmental prospects were also high: approaching the election, there was little doubt that they would lead the next government (Fitzmaurice 2004, p.151). In the case of the SPD in 2005, by way of contrast (and despite the prospect of a grand coalition) there was considerably more at stake: the SPD might have lost not only the Chancellorship, but also its place in the next government had it allowed the legislative term to run its course. Second, unlike Schröder in 2005 (and unlike Clark in 2002), the Belgian Liberals had no indication that they would be on a downward electoral trajectory in the months during which they would have had low short-term governmental prospects. Therefore, they may have perceived that there was not much to be gained electorally by calling an early election or to be lost by allowing the legislative term to run its course. One implication of this latter point may be that a belief that the party's electoral prospects will decline during months of low short-term governmental prospects is a necessary part of the configuration of conditions for a party to call early elections, and that high electoral prospects are not sufficient. This conclusion is, however, necessarily tentative, given the small number of cases.

A second set of cases that remain unexplained are those in which the ruling party failed to maintain sufficient support in parliament (cells e and f). This was anticipated by the framework, but was not formalised in an hypothesis (see p.142 and p.149 above). Under what conditions did the ruling party fail to maintain its parliamentary support, thereby encountering a situation in which it had 'zero' governmental prospects? In particular, how did the relevant actors' electoral and governmental prospects contribute to this situation arising?

There is one only episode during a core case – the Prodi government in early 2008 – in which the ruling party's failure to maintain its majority in parliament led to early elections. The ruling party's electoral prospects played a key role in determining the specific defections (of the Liberal Democrats and UDEUR) that led to the government's collapse (see p.165 and p.178, above for a more detailed description). Combined with a polarised party system, their low electoral prospects also contributed to the absence of alternative partners to replace the defecting parties in the Senate (Wilson 2008, p.216) and to the clear preference of the opposition for an early election (rather than an alternative government). Antecedent
institutional factors, such as the presence of a responsible upper house and the relatively proportional electoral system by which it was elected (in conjunction with the distribution of votes in 2006), also set the scene for its failure, producing a vulnerable government majority. Finally, external events such as the corruption inquiry into Minister Mastella's wife played a role in destabilising that vulnerable government.

There are two episodes of early elections resulting from ruling parties failing to maintain their majority in 'shadow' cases. These episodes share some important characteristics with the Italian case. In Ireland in 2011, it was the Green Party's defection that ultimately forced the Prime Minister to seek an early election. The ruling party's low governmental prospects played a role in this defection: in the context of a harsh upcoming Budget and the Greens' announcement in November 2010 (after the country joined in an EU/IMF programme) that they would leave government in early 2011, the government was not expected to survive more than a few weeks. Moreover, it undoubtedly had reduced policy-making capacity due to the conditions attached to the EU/IMF loan. Its low electoral prospects also played a central role in leading to this early election. That the government was dependent on the Greens was largely a result of several defections by the ruling party's MPs from the coalition. These defections were at least partly motivated by the party's poor electoral prospects, which in turn stemmed from an unprecedented economic crisis. The ruling party's low electoral prospects – and the opposition parties' correspondingly high prospects – also contributed to the certainty that the ruling party could not construct an alternative coalition, given the incentive that the opposition had to seek an election to realise its prospects. Finally, had the ruling party's prospects not been so bleak, it is unlikely that the Prime Minister would have attempted the unpopular cabinet reshuffle that ultimately precipitated the Greens' defection and early elections (Little 2011, p.1307).

The defection of MPs leading to early elections being called is also found another shadow case: the breakdown of the Topolánek government in 2009. The government fell in March after the opposition barely attained an absolute majority in a vote of no-confidence with the

37 Unlike in the Italian case in 2008 or in the Irish case in 2011, the failure of the Topolánek government in March 2009 did not lead immediately to elections. However, it did lead within a couple of weeks to a formal and public agreement between the parties that supported the 'caretaker' government of Jan Fischer to call elections through a constitutional amendment (Hanley 2013, p.9). This agreement was honoured, but a nonpartisan MP (who had been elected as a ČSSD MP) complained to the Constitutional Court that the attempted dissolution had not been carried out under the conditions set out in the Constitution. The Court upheld this complaint in September 2009 and cancelled the planned elections (Linek and Lacina 2010, p.945).
help of defecting Green and ODS MPs. The defecting Green Party MPs had disputed policy compromises made by the party in government. Their departure from the party also followed poor second-order election results which, along with opinion polls, indicated low electoral prospects for the party (see p.193 above). Two ODS deputies also defected. These defections had their roots in a factional dispute within the ODS: after a blackmail scandal in September 2008, MP and senior party figure Vlastimil Tlustý was asked to resign by Prime Minister Topolánek, leading to his voting against the government on legislation. They may also have been fuelled by the ODS's low electoral prospects, which were compounded by the global economic crisis, and by the establishment of the new Libertas.cz party as an alternative platform for these MPs (one that they made use of unsuccessfully in 2009) (Euobserver.com 2009; Hulpachová 2008, 2009). Thus, in the defections from the Topolánek government, low electoral prospects were present, as was factionalism based in policy or personal disputes.

While they are each unique, these three episodes of ruling party and coalition failure (Italy in 2008, the Czech Republic in 2009 and Ireland in 2011) have some features in common: each featured a government with a small majority in a responsible house of parliament. In each case, the ruling party's electoral prospects were low and the mainstream opposition's electoral prospects were correspondingly high. Finally, each case had idiosyncratic characteristics, such as a corruption inquiry in Italy; the EU/IMF intervention and the botched reshuffle in Ireland; and factionalism based variously on policy differences and other personal conflict in the Czech Greens and the ODS. These structurally vulnerable governments were shaken by a wide range of events.

There are also similarities between Italy in 2008 and Germany in 2005. Together, they highlight that governmental prospects are not always a simple function of time remaining until the next scheduled election: they also depend on the party's capacity to maintain sufficient parliamentary support. Both highlight the potentially important role of powerful upper houses of parliament, which in one case threatened the ruling party's governmental prospects and in the other ended their time in government. This threat emerged partly because electoral arrangements that did not mirror those that surrounded elections to the lower house. In the Italian case, the electoral system was different; in the German case, the timing was different (and this was complicated by voting rules in the upper house). Moreover, the key role of the ruling party's electoral prospects (whether certain-to-decline or low) is evident in motivating the ruling party, potential defectors and potential alternative partners in opposition.
Together with the shadow cases, other conditions that make failure more likely are also highlighted: small majorities, economic crisis, fragmented coalitions or factionalism within parties and 'events'. These observations broadly tally with the findings of the literature on cabinet duration (e.g., Saalfeld 2008).

The third set of conditions that deserve attention are not covered by the cases above. There are clearly conditions that would have prevented a ruling party located in cell c (i.e., with the motivation to call an election) from calling an early election, where it simply did not have the capacity to call an early election (see Table 3.7 for more details). For example, in Italy, the President is expected to act independently of the ruling party in calling elections. In France, Lionel Jospin, as a 'cohabiting' Prime Minister, with Jacques Chirac as President, had little power to successfully seek an early election, had he wanted to do so. This case highlights that these powers may be contingent on the party having access to a head of state that is willing to influence election timing in their favour: it is not wholly a function of institutional rules, but also of party political configurations. The case of the Czech Republic where the ODS's Vaclav Klaus was President highlights the fact that shared party membership does not automatically lead to shared interests and informal influence on election timing: Klaus was not at one with the ODS leadership on a range of issues (Hanley 2013, pp.8-9, fn.27, fn.31). In summary, ruling parties' powers are variable and that this needs to be incorporated into explanations of parties' time in office, even if the mean effect of the powers of the head of state has been shown to be statistically insignificant in previous research (Strøm and Swindle 2002).

3.5.4 The Green party's prospects

This subsection describes, first, the development of the short-term governmental prospects of Green parties in government and second, the development of their electoral prospects and available electoral strategies (i.e., whether they were in a position to precipitate an election or not; Scenarios 2 and 3 in Figure 3.6, p.151) over the course of each case. Then it brings these elements together in a cross-case analysis of Green party defections from government with the aim of explaining variation in these parties' defection from office.

3.5.4.1 The Green party's governmental prospects

The Green parties covered by this chapter have held between one and four positions at the cabinet table (see Section 2.3 for more details). Among Green parties in cabinet, the amount of time that they could have possibly spent in office from the start of their membership of
cabinet (until the next scheduled election) also varied, from 3.4 years in the Czech case to 5 years in France (see Table 3.6). However, this variation is limited: in all cases, they have been junior partners and all had a potentially substantial period in office ahead of them when they joined government.


Green parties' governmental prospects also declined due to factors other than time until the next scheduled election (i.e., in non-routine ways). In the case of the German Greens in 2005, their governmental prospects declined as the government faced increasing difficulties in parliament and once Schröder called an early election. In Italy, the government's policy-making capacity as a whole declined under the d'Alema and Amato cabinets: this had implications for the Greens' capacity to achieve their policy goals (Biorcio 2002, p.53). In the Czech Republic in 2009-2010, the Greens were sidelined in cabinet, going from four ministers under the Topolánek cabinet to two under Jan Fischer (Hanley 2013). In Ireland in 2010, a crumbling government government majority, combined with the policy restrictions imposed by conditions attached to the EU-IMF loan in late 2010, meant that policy goals were compromised and the government was unlikely to see out its full term (Little 2011). In Finland in 2002, the Greens lost one of their two ministers under a ministerial rotation deal agreed at the outset of the coalition (Sundberg 2003, p.941).

3.5.4.2 The Green party's electoral prospects and available electoral strategies

The electoral prospects of Green parties in government have varied, both between cases and over time within cases (Table 3.11). Only in the three Finnish cases did their prospects appear

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38 In the other case that ended in an early election (Italy 2006-2008), it is less clear whether the Greens' governmental prospects could have been described as being 'low' during any substantial period or whether they went from being high in 2007 (with several years left in government) to being low in early 2008, as the coalition failed in parliament.
to be generally positive and independent of electoral cooperation with their coalition partners. This was also the case for parts of the Czech and the second German case, although in both instances, high electoral prospects occurred during periods in which the parties' governmental prospects remained substantial (i.e., it was relatively early in their government's term). In three cases (France 1997-2002, Italy 1996-2001 and Italy 2006-2008), electoral prospects were overshadowed by the fact that Green parties were heavily dependent on an electoral coalition: electoral coalition appeared to be a necessary condition for their continued presence in parliament, for positive electoral prospects and for medium-term (post-election) governmental prospects, regardless of whether the party's prospects were low (as in Italy) or high (as in France).39 In eight cases, Green parties in government had low electoral prospects during their time in government, especially during the crucial latter years of the parliamentary term; in a couple of instances (Ireland in 2010-2011; Czech Republic in 2009-2010), their prospects of winning any seats in parliament were close to zero. In the case descriptions that follow, I group the cases into three broad categories, depending on the party's prospects towards the end of the case: Green parties with high electoral prospects, Green parties with low electoral prospects (including zero electoral prospects) and Green parties that had high or low electoral prospects, but were also heavily dependent on their coalition partners. I describe each of these in turn.40

39 I have added a 'partially dependent' category to Table 3.11 to reflect the electorally profitable relationship that the German Greens maintained with the SPD, described further on p.195, below.
40 Clear instances of cases in which a party was certain that its prospects would decline or rise do not occur in these cases. Therefore, I have simplified headings and tables to reflect this. Within each of the three subsections (high, low, dependent), cases are organised in alphabetical and then chronological order.
### Table 3.11 Green parties' electoral prospects

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Dependence on coalition partner</th>
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<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland 1995-1999</td>
<td>Belgium (Ecolo) 1999-2003</td>
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<td>Finland 1999-2002</td>
<td>Belgium (Agalev) 1999-2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic 2007-2008*</td>
<td>Czech Republic 2008-2009*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partially dependent</td>
<td>Germany 1998-2002</td>
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<td>Germany 2002-2004*</td>
<td>Germany 2004-2005*</td>
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* = period that covers part of a case
Dates are indicative. See text for details.

**High electoral prospects**

**Finland 1995-1999.** In the late 1990s, the Finnish Greens appeared to have unambiguously positive electoral prospects. The parties in Lipponen’s cabinet had a good European Parliament election in 1996 (Sundberg 1997, p.360). Despite some internal friction resulting from adaptation to the compromises involved in the coalition (Paastela 2002, pp.24-25), the Greens won 7.6% of the vote, up one percentage point on their performance in the general election, and one seat. In the 1996 municipal elections, the party received 6.3% of the vote, marginally less than their vote share in the general election in 1995 (6.5%) and the previous municipal elections in 1992 (OSF 2013). This modestly positive experience of incumbency followed a disappointing general election in 1995, which they had contested from opposition.

At the same time, they were not in a position to realise these positive prospects by precipitating an election: the Greens held 4.5% of parliamentary seats, while the government parties controlled 72.5% (Sundberg 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). The party's positive prospects were reflected in the result of the general election itself in 1999: it won eleven seats,
up from nine and doubled its vote in Helsinki. It was their best result since their founding (Arter 2000, p.183).

*Finland 1999-2002.* The Finnish Greens' electoral prospects remained positive during their second spell in a Lipponen-led government and were especially so in 2001 and early 2002 (see Figure 3.10, p.172). In the European Parliament election just three months after the general election in 1999, the party had won 13.5% of the vote and two seats of sixteen, albeit with turnout at only 30% (Sundberg 2000). In the municipal elections of 2000, they won 7.7% of the vote, an improvement on 1996 and marginally ahead of their general election result in 1999 (7.3%). From September 2000 until their exit, they did not poll below 11% (YLE 2013). Again, they were clearly not in a position to precipitate elections by defecting and so to capitalise on these prospects: the government parties controlled 70% of parliamentary seats and the Greens 5.5% (Sundberg 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). Even on 24 May 2002, at the vote on the controversial proposal to build a fifth nuclear power plant, the government (without the support of the Greens and other government MPs) had a comfortable majority of 107 to 92 (Sundberg 2003, p.940).

From this position of high electoral prospects, it seemed certain that these prospects would decline after the parliament approved a proposal to build the country's fifth nuclear power plant.41 Paastela (2008: 68-69) claims that this would “create a credibility gap for the party” and Sundberg (2003, p.940) suggests that, “To stay loyal [to the government] could be hard to explain to their electorate”.

*Finland 2007-2011.* Despite the defection of one MP (Merrikukka Forsius) to the Conservatives in February 2008 (Arter 2011, p.1285; *Eduskunta* 2009, p.8), the Greens' electoral prospects were somewhat positive halfway through the legislative term (see Figure 3.11, p.173). They had had a positive municipal election result, winning 8.9% of the vote (OSF 2013). In the 2009 European Parliament elections, the Greens received 12.4% of the vote (up 2% on 2004) and two seats (a gain of one seat) (Sundberg 2010, p.965). Other

41 That said, the Greens had already supported a decision in May 2001 on a new nuclear fuel reprocessing facility (Gaherton and Aylward 2010, p.8). As early as 1991, Osmo Soininvaara, who led the party between 2001 and 2005, had suggested that the Greens may have to compromise on nuclear policy (*Vihrea Lanka* (party newspaper) 21 March 1991 cited in Paastela 2008, pp.65-66).
government parties and the main opposition party, the Social Democrats, did poorly. Amidst these positive prospects, there were at least two negative indications. First, the Greens' decision to remain in government while it decided to build two new nuclear power plants in Spring 2010 (albeit voting against this in parliament) “haunted” the party (Sundberg 2011, pp.968-969; see also Arter 2011, p.1287). Second, its opinion poll standing declined slowly over its final 18 months in government. However, despite this decline the party's opinion poll figures remained above their 2007 result and it was clear that parties both in opposition and government were losing potential voters as the True Finns grew (YLE 2013). In response, the Greens sought to adapt to and benefit from an electoral environment in which the True Finns were in the ascendant by portraying themselves as their “fiercest opponents” (Yla-Anttila 2012, p.153). Finally, although the government's majority was smaller than in other Finnish cases (above) at 60.5% and while the Greens' contingent in parliament was bigger (7.5%), they were not in a position to precipitate elections to realise their generally positive prospects. Even setting aside the Greens and the Swedish People's Party, the two largest government parties had a majority (Sundberg 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011).

Low electoral prospects

Most Green parties in government had negative electoral prospects most of the time (indeed, most of them realised these prospects; see Subsection 4.3.3, below) and some faced the prospect of losing representation in parliament.

Belgium (Agalev) 1999-2003. In 2003, Agalev received 2.5% of the vote (down 4.5 percentage points since 1999) and lost all representation in parliament. The party had good reasons to believe that it had poor prospects. It communicated poorly from government. Buelens and Delwit (2008, p.87) suggest that the media presented an image of “disagreement, chaotic decision making and hesitating ministers in front of the cameras”. Their failure to communicate was particularly damaging in a conflict-ridden government coalition in which the media was a key battleground (Rihoux et al. 2001; Rihoux et al 2002, p.920; Van Assche 2003, p.4). As a result, the media and the party's traditional allies in the new social movements were critical of the party and they became easy targets (“punchbags”) for other parties (Rihoux 2004, p.950).
The party also became involved in high-profile controversies on issues that were dear to their core supporters. In August 2002, Magda Alvoet was replaced in cabinet by Jef Tavernier after it emerged that as Deputy Prime Minister, she had allowed the sale of machine guns by a Belgian company to Nepal, thus breaching a law that prohibited sales of arms to countries in a civil war. The guns were shipped at the end of 2002 (Rihoux et al 2003, pp.904-905). Core Green voters may also have been affected during 2002 by the conflict within the government majority over warheads stored at a military base in Kleine Brogel, which attracted dissent in parliament and demonstrations at the site (Rihoux et al. 2003, p.906).

At the same time, the party appears to have believed that it had moderately poor, rather than dire, electoral prospects. This perception of moderately poor prospects is consistent with Agalev's electoral results during this period. It won 300 seats (up from 229) in the local elections in 2000, despite only marginally increasing its mean vote share and performing poorly in large cities (Buelens and Deschouwer 2002, p.130). Such was the party's confidence in its core support that, in Autumn 2002, it voted for the establishment of a new electoral threshold.42 Hooge et al. (2006, p.362) observe that Agalev believed that its electoral prospects were low, but moderately so, rather than threatening its presence in parliament. Opinion polls taken in the month before the election suggested that Agalev would lose about a third of its 7% vote share (rather than, as it transpired, twice as many votes as this). Van Assche (2003, p.4) too suggests that both Green parties were aware that their prospects were negative but neither believed that they were so strongly negative: Agalev “remained unconcerned about this threat [to their representation in parliament] right up until polling day, probably hoping that their 'underdog' position would rescue them in the end.” Buelens and Delwit (2008, p.87) describe their result in 2003 as “stunning”.

Belgium (Ecolo) 1999-2003. At the general election in 2003, Ecolo received 3.1% of the vote (down 4.3 percentage points since 1999). It retained four seats in the lower house.

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42 Prime Minister Verhofstadt proposed the reform in October 2001. It was agreed in cabinet by April 2002. It involved new electoral thresholds of 5% at the level of individual province-constituencies. The new threshold was higher than the previous effective threshold in six of the nine provinces. Hooge et al.’s (2006, pp.358-359, p.363) analysis of the mechanical effects of the electoral thresholds indicates that, while overall the effects of the threshold were small, Agalev was the biggest loser. Had the thresholds not been in place, it would have won two seats (rather than zero) in the Chamber of Representatives, in Antwerp and East Flanders, and one seat (rather than zero) in the Senate. The mechanical effects of the new system did not affect Ecolo's result. Moreover, they suggest that the psychological effects of the institutional change were negligible (i.e., that voters did not strategically avoid small parties because of the new thresholds).
Notwithstanding a successful local election result in 2000, in which the party won 459 seats (up from 185) and entered governing coalitions in 35 municipalities (Buelens and Deschouwer 2002, p.130), Ecolo's electoral prospects were generally negative.

The party suffered from chaotic and conflictual internal politics from the outset of their participation in government: the party's participation in federal, community and regional governments was approved by only ‘reluctantly’, with just over 60% of 685 voting members approving their accession to federal government (Buelens and Delwit 2008, p.80; also Delwit and Hellings 2003, p.40). The members voted against entering government in the Brussels region and refused to allow its chief negotiator, Jacky Moraèl, to become Deputy Prime Minister. Despite the objections of Green ministers and the outgoing Federal Secretariat, they elected an 'anti-participationist' party executive (Federal Secretariat). This negatively affected relations within the party and the party's effectiveness in government (Buelens and Delwit 2008, p.80). More generally, collective leadership and mandatory term limits – and therefore rotation – was enforced: the leadership changed four times during the party's time in government (Gahrton and Aylward 2010, pp.6-7).

While focussing on internal problems, the party failed to communicate with voters or to convince them of its competence in government. Buelens and Delwit (2008, pp.80-81) draw a psychological analogy, describing the party as “depressed” throughout its time in government. They describe the party's efforts to communicate its actions in government as 'painstaking' and dependent on vague concepts, in contrast to the successful communications efforts of other government parties. These failures occurred at a time when the value that the Greens added to government was a salient issue, given its coalition partners' preference to exclude it from the next government (Rihouex et al. 2003, p.904).

In both Belgian cases, the parties may have precipitated a governmental crisis had they defected together. At investiture, the six-party Belgian coalition held 62.7% of the parliamentary seats. Ecolo held 7.3% of parliamentary seats (6.7% after a defection of one MP to become an Independent in October 2001) and Agalev held 6%. The defection of both could have precipitated a governmental crisis, but not necessarily an election: it may have been possible to find other partners from among the Christian parties and elements of the disintegrating Volksunie (Fitzmaurice 2004, p.149). The defection of one of the parties may
have put pressure on the other to follow suit, although it is notable that when this transpired in 2003 upon Ecolo's defection, Agalev did not leave government.

*Czech Republic 2007-2010.* The Czech Greens' standing in opinion polls during the early part of the Topolánek cabinet was stable and relatively high. However, two sharp declines in quick succession in late 2008 and early 2009 meant that support for the party fell below 5% (i.e., below the level of the electoral threshold) and remained consistently at that level, indicating that its prospects of winning seats were effectively close to zero (Figure 3.9, above, p.170; Deets and Kouba 2008, p.820; Linek 2011, p.951). In October 2008, the party failed to win any seats in elections for the Senate and it lost representation in regional government following which two of its MPs – Olga Zubová and Vera Jakubková – left the parliamentary party while agreeing to vote with the government.

Throughout the Topolánek government (January 2007-March 2009), which had a tiny majority in parliament (see further description in Chapter 2, p.88), it seemed likely that the Green Party's defection would have precipitated elections. Indeed, when some government MPs (including some Green MPs, but not the party itself) defected in 2009, this led to an election being called for October 2009 (albeit one that was unexpectedly cancelled; see fn.37, above).

For the later part of the Green Party's time in government during the time Fischer cabinet, the government's majority was much more comfortable (the ODS had 74 seats; the ČSSD had 81 seats). Therefore, the Green Party's exit was not expected to precipitate an election during Fischer's government, and nor did it when the party defected in March 2009. However, its electoral prospects remained very low, clearly threatening its representation in parliament.43 During this period, new competitors for the Green vote – not least TOP '09, led by former Green-nominated minister Karel Schwarzenberg – emerged rapidly, coinciding with a further deterioration of the Green Party's standing in opinion polls (Figure 3.9, p.170).

Much of the electoral decline from the start of their time in government could be attributed to internal problems due to conflict over policy and organisational issues (Linek 2011, p.951). Indeed, divisions in the Green Party (along with divisions in other parties) led to the fall of the Topolánek cabinet, when Zubová and Jakubová changed their affiliation to Independent and

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43 Ultimately, they won 2.4% of the vote in 2010, down 3.9 percentage points from 2006 (Linek 2011, p.948).

One of the issues upon which Greens were divided – and on which the party came into conflict with its core supporters – was the siting of a radar for a US antimissile shield. It was both generally unpopular (with 68% of the public against it) and unpopular among Green supporters (85% against). In mid-2008, the party's position was that it would support it if approved by the EU and NATO and controlled by one of these organisations. The Vice-Chair for International Affairs, Petr Štěpánek, opposed the siting of the radar, but lost a re-election race for his position to Ondřej Liška in February 2007 (Deets and Kouba 2008, pp.819-820). Matej Stropnický, a critic of leader Martin Bursík, was elected Deputy Chair of the national council in May 2007. He organised demonstrations against the antimissile shield and opposed what he saw as the party's move to the right (O'Shea 2007). The party was also divided on organisational matters. Stropnický criticised the centralisation of power in the party. In October 2007, Bursík, after refusing to defend Dana Kuchotvá as Minister of Education against criticism over failures in applications for EU education funds, then suggested that he could replace her without consulting other party actors (Deets and Kouba 2008, p.820).

**Germany 1998-2002.** The Greens' electoral prospects looked rather poor throughout the lifetime of Schröder's first government (see also discussion of general government popularity, above, p.175), meaning that their modest success in the general election was “unexpected” (Poguntke 2003, p.962). Throughout their spell in government, the Greens struggled to pull the same figure as they had achieved in at the 2002 general election, spending most of the time beneath it, near the 5% electoral threshold (see Figure 3.12, p.176). The European Parliament election in 1999 was a setback for the party: they lost half of their fourteen seats and two-fifths of their votes compared to 1994 (Poguntke 2000). These electoral prospects had consequences at regional level: Green involvement in Land governments dwindled from four governments in 1998 to two at the beginning of 2002 as the party's vote share declined. They lost votes in fifteen regional elections after their entry into government (Poguntke 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002a, 2003; Rüdig 2006, p.S128; Rüdig 2002, p.104).

44 The party had also suffered a sharp decline in support ahead of the election in 1998 (Arzheimer and Klein 1999, p.32, p.38).
The party also found itself displeasing its core supporters. Due to the party's support for the bombing of Kosovo in 1999, it “suffered from an enduring loss of credibility in the pacifist camp” (Poguntke 2000, p.394). The transportation of nuclear waste, overseen by a Green minister, also saw them confronting erstwhile supporters (Poguntke 2002a, p.959; see also Rüdig 2002, pp.97-98). The Greens' determination to stay in office – and the problems that this was causing within the party and among its core supporters – was exemplified by the unusual arrangement made for the parliamentary votes on German involvement in Afghanistan, in November 2001, with some voting for and others against (Poguntke 2002a, p.962). Further, Green MP Cem Özdemir was involved in a controversy concerning the private use of publicly-funded airmiles in 2002 (Poguntke 2003). Ahead of the 2002 election, the loss of young voters was seen to be a major problem for the party (cf. Rüdig 2002, p.104).

These negative prospects may have been mitigated somewhat by the fact that the party's leading candidate Joschka Fischer was the country's most popular politician (Frankland 2008, p.25, p.33-34; see also Poguntke 2003, p.960) and by the fact that other small parties encountered difficulties: the FDP's deputy chairman, Jürgen Mölleman, resigned after distributing an anti-Israel leaflet; the PDS had been caught up in the airmiles controversy, which led to the resignation of Gregor Gysi, its “major electoral asset” (Poguntke 2003, p.960).

In what turned out to be a highly-personalized campaign the Greens mounted a campaign to attract SPD voters' list vote with the slogan 'a second vote is a Joschka vote' and ultimately benefited considerably from strategic voting (Leihstimmen) as the SPD's partner of choice (Poguntke 2003, p.960; Rüdig 2002, p.105). In 2002 (and in 2005), the Greens received almost a third of their votes from individuals whose primary identification was with the SPD (Wüst and Roth 2006, p.455; Poguntke 2003, p.962). What they could not have foreseen – and what played a major role in delivering their 'unexpected' result – was the strength of Schröder's campaign, on the back of flooding in Central Europe and the Iraq crisis (Poguntke 2003, p.962).

Despite the government's narrow majority (51.5% of seats in the lower house\textsuperscript{45}), Poguntke (2002b, p.138) suggests that a Green Party defection would not have dislodged Schröder from the position of Chancellor. While the SPD had few viable alternative partners during the early

\textsuperscript{45} This continued until November 2001, when one SPD MP resigned from the Parliamentary Party over votes on Germany's role in Afghanistan (Poguntke 2002a, p.962). This reduced the government's seat share slightly.
stages of the government, it had kept its coalition options open in 1998. Although the CDU/CSU, in crisis in the middle stages of the legislative term (see p.175 above), may not have been an attractive partner and the SPD's members favoured the Greens (Poguntke 1999, pp.399-400), it was quite conceivable that the SPD would seek support from the CDU/CSU or the FDP in the event of a Green defection.

Germany 2002-2005. For their first couple of years in government, the Greens' electoral prospects were reasonably positive. This was evident in their relatively strong showing in opinion polls for much of their time in government (see Figure 3.8, p.169) and a very good European Parliament election in 2004, winning 11.9% of the vote (up 5.5% on 1999) and almost doubling their seats to 13. This popularity was aided by strategic moves, such as Fischer's defiance of US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld in early 2003 on the invasion of Iraq and was supported by their confidence in their ability in a campaign environment (Wüst and Roth 2006, p.443; see above).

However, the German Greens' electoral prospects were not entirely positive during their second spell in government. This was particularly the case from late 2004, two years before the scheduled election date in 2006. Joschka Fischer and Green Minister of State Ludger Volmer were implicated in the 'visa affair' in from 2004 onwards, when they were accused of facilitating organised crime and mass immigration by relaxing requirements for temporary visas in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia from 2000 until 2003. Volmer resigned and Fischer, who was slow to deal with the accusations, lost his most-popular politician ranking in German public opinion for the first time in three years in February 2005 (Deutsche Welle 2005; Hawley 2005). Their opinion poll standing declined from late 2004, dipping below their 2002 result in early 2005 (Figure 3.8). The rise of the PDS/WASG meant increased competition from the left.

The Greens may have precipitated an election during this period had they defected. Again the government majority in the lower house was narrow during this case (50.7%). The Greens held 9.1% of the seats, while the SPD held 41.6% (Poguntke 2002a). The only alternative available to the SPD that could deliver a majority was a grand coalition. However, in this

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46 The PDS was too small to provide it with a majority and was untested as a coalition partner (even at regional level, until 1998); the CDU/CSU chose to return to opposition; and the FDP was not open to negotiations (Poguntke 1999, pp.399-400).
situation, the Christian Democrats may have chosen to go to the polls early in order to realise their own relatively high electoral prospects.

Ireland 2007-2011. During most of their first two years in government, from June 2007 to April 2009, the Green Party's opinion poll ratings varied between four and nine percent, generally above their general election result of 4.7%, and consistent with polls before the general election (Figure 3.13, p.177). During this early period, the party was not needed for the government to deliver a majority and was therefore not in a position to precipitate an election.

By 2009, the Green Party's support became essential for the government to achieve majority (see Little 2011, pp.1305-1306), leading to a renegotiation of the government programme later that year. Had the party defected, it is likely that an election would have taken place. Before the European Parliament and local elections of June that year, the party's standing in opinion polls dropped markedly, and only once in the period from mid-2009 to the end of January 2011 (encompassing 31 opinion polls in Figure 3.13) did it poll as high as 5%. The European Parliament and local election results themselves were very poor for the Greens. It won its lowest vote share in a nationwide election since 1992 (Quinlan 2010, p.297). A former Green MEP ran as an Independent in the European Parliament elections and, while she performed poorly, she won more votes (after second and subsequent preferences were distributed) than the Green Party's candidate in Dublin. As the general election campaign got underway in early February 2011, the party began to poll as low as 1% and during that electoral campaign, it never polled higher than 3%. Considering that its retention of six seats in 2007 had been close-run when its support was approaching 5% and that the national effective threshold in Ireland is 2.3% (Taagepera 2002), the prospect of retaining any seats at these levels were poor; its electoral prospects were not just low, but they were close to zero.

Cases in which the Green party was heavily dependent on its coalition partners

Some parties were heavily dependent on their coalition partners for electoral success and even for survival in parliament. This was the case in Italy – where the party had generally low electoral prospects during both of its spells in government – and in France, where its electoral prospects were generally high.
Italy 1996-2001. It is possible that the Italian Greens' defection from cabinet might have precipitated an election or government alternation. In a strongly polarised system, the government's majority in the lower house was 51.5% in 1996 (including support from the Rifondazione Communista) and it remained marginal throughout the legislative term, despite the expanding number of parties in successive governments. The Greens contributed six seats (2.5%) to the majority (Ignazi 1997, 1998, 1999). It was also fragile, as it was frequently challenged on policy by its Communist support party, which brought down Prodi's government in 1998 (Ignazi 1997, p.421; Ignazi 1999); in 1999, D'Alema resigned (for the first of two times) to prevent further challenges from the Democrats (Ignazi 2000). The Amato government was invested in April 2000 with the support of 51.3% of MPs in the lower house (Ignazi 2001).

Even if they could have precipitated an election, the Italian Greens were faced with both low electoral prospects and the clear prospect of being electorally dependent on their coalition partners as they approached the election in 2001. Biorcio (2002, p.59) summarises the Greens' situation as follows: “Since 1994, the survival of the Greens in parliament has been totally dependent on the possibility of joining the centre-left alliance”. In 1996, their lower house seats were won due to Green candidates running as part of the Ulivo coalition (Ignazi 1997; Biorcio 2002, p.44). Again in 2001, they participated in electoral coalitions. One coalition in which they participated – the Girasole with the Social Democrats (SDI) – failed, falling well below the 4% electoral threshold (gaining 2.2% vote share) and again Green representatives only managed to re-enter parliament as candidates for the Ulivo coalition. The cooperative and constructive strategy pursued by the party for much of the early part of the government (1996-1999) reflected this dependence (Biorcio 2002, pp.44-45).

Had the Greens developed strong electoral support while in government and an organisation that could fight a successful electoral campaign, they may have developed prospects that were independent of their larger partners. However, there was little sign of this happening. During its time in government, the party alienated many of its core supporters. Relations with environmental NGOs deteriorated and factionalism inside the party increased when the party supported the government's participation in the war in Kosovo. By mid-1999 the party lost the support of the Legambiente (Biorcio 2002, p.44, p.52, p.58). In 2000, the Greens were openly divided on which portfolios to seek in the Amato cabinet. Public opinion on the party's
ministers and leader was unenthusiastic (Biorcio 2002, p.48, p.56). Indeed, at times the party's organisational integrity was in question. Party leaders resigned in 1996 (Ripa di Meana) and in 1999 (Manconi), heralding abrupt changes in strategy. Despite extensive reforms in the first years of their governmental participation, considerable membership growth, and efforts to broaden their electoral appeal, organisational development “was mainly virtual”: by 1999 the Greens experienced reduced membership participation, greater factionalisation and they remained a single-issue party in the eyes of the public (Biorcio 2002, p.49, p.51, p.58).

The European Parliament elections of 1999 brought the Greens their worst result since the founding of Federazione dei Verdi in 1991, winning 1.8% of the vote, compared to 3.2% in 1994, and losing one seat (Biorcio 2002, p.52; Ignazi 2000). In the regional elections of 2000 – in which the party ran independent lists – their 2% vote share was an improvement on 1999, but still indicated low electoral prospects, as it was considerably below the party's general election showing in 1996 (Newell 2000). The result of the general election in 2001 confirmed these indications: the government parties performed poorly and the Greens lost vote share (0.3%) and several seats (Ignazi 2002).

Italy 2006-2008. Had the Greens defected, the government would have lost its slim majority in the upper house (Ignazi 2007). Again, however, the Italian Greens were heavily dependent on their coalition partners in 2008, albeit under a different electoral system. That system made two strategies available to the party. As an independent party, it would need to obtain an unprecedented 4% vote share in the election to the Chamber and 8% in its election to the Senate. As part of an electoral coalition, it had a better chance of retaining representation. The coalition would have to win 10% of the vote (20% for the Senate) and at least one of its parties would have to win 2% of the vote. Within such a coalition, in order to win seats, the party would have to win a minimum of just under 2% of the vote (3% in the case of the Senate) (Ignazi 2007, p.999). If the coalition failed to reach 10% (20% in the Senate), but the party was to receive at least 4% (8% in the Senate), it could still attain seats. Thus, the electoral incentive to approach an election as part of a coalition – and not to defect from a governing coalition that contained potential partners – was strong for a party that had polled only 2.1% in 2006. In the event, the coalition in which the Greens participated failed in spectacular fashion (Ignazi 2009).47

47 This was followed in 2009 by the Greens losing both MEPs (Carter 2010, p.300).
France 1997-2002. In France, the Greens' electoral prospects were reasonably positive. After a mediocre regional election in 1998, it was “[t]he main victor” of the European Parliament election in 1999, winning unprecedented 9.7% of the votes and more than 10% seat share, having won no seats in 1994 (Boy 2002, p.74; see also Ysmal 2000). Boy (2002, p.74) attributes this to low turnout (52.3%) and to the personality of Dany Cohn-Bendit, who headed the Green list. Such was the party's confidence in its electoral prospects that in 1999, it announced that it would run its own candidates in the 2001 municipal elections, where possible, rather than running in cooperation with the Socialists (Ysmal 2000, p.389). These elections too produced fairly positive results for the Greens. In January 2001, facing into the crucial final 18 months before the 2002 election, the Greens were highly regarded by the wider public. According to a SOFRES poll (cited by Boy 2002, p.74), 51% had a “good opinion” of them, compared to 55% for the Socialists and approximately 33% for the Communists and the centre-right parties.

Notwithstanding these positive electoral prospects, the party also faced the prospects of being heavily dependent on its coalition partners for survival in the National Assembly. In 1997, it had adopted a common programme with the Socialists and Communists (Ysmal 1998, pp.399-400; Faucher 2004; Knapp 2006, p.209). Boy (2002, p.74) suggests that the Greens would have had a “minimal electoral presence” were they to have withdrawn from their coalition with the Socialists. They were also dependent on their alliance with parties of the left for increased financial resources and the prospect of forming a parliamentary group in the National Assembly. With the legislative elections imminent, the presidential election of April and May 2002 registered an increase in support for the Greens – Noël Mamère received 5.3% of the vote, an improvement on Dominique Voynet's 3.3% in 1995 – but also confirmed their small electoral size (Ysmal 2003, p. 951). Their results in the parliamentary elections in June were mixed: the Greens grew their vote marginally to 4.4% (up 0.8 percentage points), but won only three seats (down 5 since 1997), despite obtaining 57 constituencies in which the Socialists agreed not to field candidates (double the number that they had been able to obtain in 1997) (Villalba 2008, p.45, Ysmal 2003). Had they wished to precipitate elections, they would have been unable to do so without cooperation from other parties, as they held only 1.4% of seats in the lower house, while the government as a whole held 53.8% (Ysmal 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001). Overall, although the Greens could oppose the government on specific
policies (Ysmal 1999, p.393; Ysmal 2000, p.389; Ysmal 2002, p.957), they were unlikely to defect.

3.5.4.3 Green parties, prospects and defections: summary and analysis
Of the twelve complete cases of Green parties in government, four have defected (the Finnish Greens in 2002, Ecolo in Belgium in 2003, the Czech Greens in 2010 and the Irish Greens in 2011). Set in a broader context of existing data concerning defections from government, this appears to be a relatively high proportion: in Tavits's (2008, p.499) study, approximately 15% of parties in government in 18 countries (including some Central and Eastern European countries) were coded as 'defectors'. However, our main concern is not with the occurrence of defection: rather, it is with variation in the party's time in government. The timing of most Green parties' defections has meant that they had little or no impact on the government's duration, on election timing or, in most cases, on their own time in office. In two of the four cases – in Belgium and in the Czech Republic – defections took place when an election date had already been set for the near future (two weeks and two months, respectively). In Finland, the defection occurred a considerable time (approximately ten months) from the scheduled election date, thus shortening the party's time in office, but it did not influence the timing of that election. In only one case – in Ireland in 2011 – did the party's defection precipitate an early election. However, given the circumstances in which it took place, it was plausibly one of several triggers that would have done so during that period.

Short-term governmental prospects appear to be an important incentive not to defect. Like ruling parties, Green parties tended to exhaust their governmental prospects. Even in the four cases of defection, only one occurred when the party had substantial governmental prospects (the Finnish Greens in 2002). 48 The other three defections occurred when the Green parties' short-term (and indeed medium-term) governmental prospects were very low. 49 Clearly, however, low governmental prospects were not sufficient for defection: in six other cases (Finland 1995-1999 and 2007-2011, Italy 1996-2001 and 2006-2008, France 1997-2002 and

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48 In this case, it occurred just after the Greens lost one minister in a ministerial rotation deal with the Swedish People's Party. However, there is no evidence that this development motivated their defection and the individual who had held the position (Osmo Soininvaara, who had been Minister for Health) opposed leaving government (Paastela 2008, p.66).

49 It is notable that in these four cases in which the Greens defected, they had either one or two senior ministers. None of them could be described as having a 'high' office outcome (see Chapter 2). Moreover, in the Czech case, their governmental prospects had been reduced on the formation of the Fischer cabinet, as they were reduced to two ministers (from four).
Agalev in Belgium 1999-2003) Green parties passed through these periods of low short-term governmental prospects (i.e., time from the expected end of their office and policy payoffs) without defecting from government.

Like ruling parties, the electoral prospects of Green parties in government were typically low, providing an additional reason to remain in government or, at least, a reason not to precipitate an election. Only in the three Finnish cases – and in parts of some other cases – did the party have plausibly positive electoral prospects. In the French case too the party had high prospects, but only as part of its coalition: had it defected, it would have faced negative electoral consequences.

Heavy electoral dependence on coalition partners for representation in parliament is a feature in three cases overall, with partial dependence (or at least an electorally profitable relationship) evident in the German cases too. The party did not defect in any of these cases. Some degree of obvious dependence in bipolar party systems is associated with non-defection in five cases of eight in which the minor party did not defect. These short-term electoral dependencies are also associated with governmental and electoral dependence in the medium-term (after the next election).

To what extent can the conjunction of low governmental prospects and high electoral prospects (which were not heavily dependent on coalition partners) explain defections, as specified in Hypothesis 2 (Path 2.1)? The conjunction of causal conditions specified by the hypothesis was itself very rare: it arguably existed for the Finnish Greens in 1999, at the end of their first spell in government and, perhaps less clearly (due to their high-but-waning electoral prospects) for the Finnish Greens in 2011. This is a result of limited diversity among the cases that is consistent with the scarcity of parties in government with high electoral prospects (see also Chapter 4).

Briefly, none of the instances of defection are fully consistent with Hypothesis 2. In three of the four cases of defection (Ecolo in Belgium in 2002; the Czech Greens in 2010; and the Irish Greens in 2011), the party's governmental prospects were low (consistent with Hypothesis 2), but their electoral prospects were also low or zero. In the other case of defection (Finland in 2002), the party had high electoral prospects (consistent with Hypothesis 2), which may have been certain-to-decline had it continued in government after the country's fifth nuclear power plant had been approved, but it appeared to have substantial governmental
prospects. Moreover, it had to weigh its decision against plausible medium-term governmental prospects, making it arguably less likely to defect.\textsuperscript{50} In the terms of Hypothesis 2, this leaves us with a puzzle: if these parties lacked either low governmental prospects or high electoral prospects, why did they defect from government? Examining the cases gives rise to at least two sets of answers, which may be complementary.

One set of explanations may be found in the justifications provided by each of the parties upon their defection from government: each party justified its defection it in terms of substantive conflict with its coalition partners. The Finnish Greens cited the government's decision to build a fifth nuclear power plant; 	extit{Ecolo} cited the issue of night flights over Brussels\textsuperscript{51}; the Czech Greens cited disagreement with government policy on energy and specifically in relation to a large coal-fired plant (Pruněřov) (Hanley 2013, pp.10-11; Cameron 2010); in the case of the Irish Greens, the party cited a general “lack of communication and... breakdown in trust” with the ruling party and the need for an election to provide political legitimacy after the EU/IMF loan was agreed (Green Party 2010; Green Party 2011). It is possible to take these explanations at face value: Gahrton and Aylward (2010, p.17), for example, suggest that the Belgian and Finnish exits were the result of “substantive political disagreement between the Greens and the government majority”. These substantive conflicts no doubt affected the party's electoral prospects (had they stayed in government, they would have lost credibility) and they were also an indicator of problematic issues in the governmental arena.

However, major policy conflicts in which Green parties were defeated also occurred in other cases and these were not sufficient for the party to defect (see e.g., Poguntke and Müller-Rommel eds. 2002). While policy disagreements and conflict may have played a role, and at least offered a way of communicating the parties' exits, I suggest that the conditions in which these occurred, articulated in terms of electoral and governmental prospects, provide a fuller account which highlights many similarities between the cases.

\textsuperscript{50} Sundberg (2003, p.940) highlights that the defection “could be turned against the Greens in the next cabinet coalition negotiations after the 2003 parliamentary elections” and that the party needed to consider this. Subsequent events lend some support to this idea: at the next formation opportunity, the Greens were not invited to rejoin, but the Swedish People's Party, who expected to be left out of the coalition led by the Centre Party and the Social Democrats on the basis of their size and their electoral losses, were invited to join: “in a surprise move, the Swedish People's Party was included with two seats [ministerial positions], The party had lost three seats and saw their inclusion as a lotto victory.” (Sundberg 2004, p.1004). This appears to support Tavits' (2007) finding that defectors are punished by their former coalition partners.

\textsuperscript{51} Ultimately, it was the withdrawal of their senior minister's competencies in this policy area by the Prime Minister that triggered the defection (Fitzmaurice 2004, pp.151-152).
These common characteristics in three of the four defections were: low short-term governmental prospects, zero medium-term governmental prospects, very low or zero electoral prospects and, to a greater or lesser extent, a destabilised or damaged party organisation. By their final months in government, the Czech and Irish Greens were clear cases of parties with approximately zero electoral prospects. Ecolo’s prospects (in its view) were somewhat higher than this but in this case there is no doubt that its prospects were low. Having zero or very low electoral prospects had implications beyond the next election. It meant that the parties had effectively zero medium-term governmental prospects: if a party got zero (or close to zero) seats, its chances of being part of the next government would be minimal. Therefore, it did not have to concern itself with its dependence on its coalition partners for a place in the post-election government.52

Second, the parties had low short-term governmental prospects: it is no accident that three of the four defector parties defected close to an election (i.e., effectively in Scenario 1). Combined with low governmental prospects, very low electoral prospects meant that the parties had little to lose by trying a new electoral strategy. They had almost exhausted their governmental benefits and their electoral prospects could only improve. With an election clearly in prospect, and participation in government clearly having failed as an electoral strategy, defection to opposition was a last throw of the dice. Fitzmaurice’s (2004, p.152) account of “one explanation” of Ecolo’s exit on the issue of night flights – that “it offered the Greens an elegant and electorally useful porte de sortie, given that in any case they faced electoral losses and exclusion from Verhofstadt II” – is consistent with this interpretation.

Third, having zero electoral prospects contributed to existing intra-party stresses: Hanley describes the Czech Greens as “disintegrating”; Ecolo had chaotic internal politics; the Irish Greens, too, had incurred heavy organisational costs. This explanation would suggest that exit might be used as a means of stabilising the party or that, at the very least, in a situation where the party has ‘zero’ electoral prospects and low governmental prospects, its behaviour may be unpredictable, as per Warwick’s (2012, p.279; cited above, p.149) suggestion that parties will defect in the presence of intra-party and reputational problems, but without a clear expectation that it will be sufficient for electoral gains.

The Finnish Greens' defection cannot be explained in terms of low governmental prospects or low electoral prospects: they had substantial time remaining in government, they had high

52 Notably, there are no parties that had zero electoral prospects and did not defect.
electoral prospects and they even had the possibility of participating in the next government. However, it is also plausible to suggest, following at least two other studies (Sundberg 2003, p.940; Paastela 2008, pp.68-69), that had they continued in government, their electoral prospects would have been 'certain-to-decline'. Thus, they had a lot to lose by staying in government: the gap between the party's electoral prospects outside of coalition and its (counterfactual) prospects after remaining inside the coalition was substantial. Indeed, it is possibly better-explained by the goal of avoiding decline than that of seeking to realise high prospects. As there was no prospect of the party precipitating an election by leaving government, the former account is more plausible. In this instance, the 'policy conflict' explanation is most plausible, but the decision was also consistent with the logic of electoral prospects: the party sought to avoid reputational and electoral damage and a decline in its electoral prospects relative to its current prospects, as well as seeking gains relative to the status quo.

Among the shadow instances of Green party defection, one is comparable to the Finnish Greens: in May 2002, the Greens walked out of parliament in protest at Prime Minister Helen Clark's proposed legislation to lift the moratorium on the commercial release of GMOs later that year (Bale 2003, p.142; Church and McLeay 2002, p.9). 53 Like the Finnish nuclear dispute, this was an established core issue for the Greens. The New Zealand Greens had less time until a scheduled election and they were a support party that was presumably enjoying lower governmental benefits. Like the Finnish Greens, their electoral prospects were relatively high at the time.

In summary, there appear to be two broad paths to defection, neither of which match the conditions set out in Hypothesis 2. It was under these conditions – where Green parties in government had a lot to lose (high prospects and a core policy conflict) or nothing to lose (zero prospects, along with varying degrees of organisational stress) that defections occurred.

A final factor that I suggested could contribute to decisions to defect or dissolve was the belief that the other actor would precipitate an election in order to gain an electoral advantage (see p.153 at the end of Subsection 3.4.4). Among the four core cases of defection (or indeed in the

53 This was followed by “an aggressive newspaper advertising campaign that suggested her government was keen to introduce GE by stealth onto the nation’s supermarket shelves and dinner tables.” (Bale 2003, p.142) and a torrid campaign, marked by allegations of a government cover-up of illegal GMO cultivation published (though not authored) by a candidate on the party's list and counter-allegations of a 'dirty tricks' campaign (Church and McLeay 2002, pp.13-14).1 They gained 1.7 percentage points in vote share.

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one case of an early election that was called by the ruling party), there are none that were precipitated by mistrust between the ruling party and the Green party. However, there are instances of mistrust between the minor party and government MPs. Ireland in 2010-11 is an instance of the former. This dynamic is reflected in Eoin O'Malley's (2011, p.1005) description: “The party’s decision to pre-announce the election [i.e., its defection in November] caused real concerns that the independent and some Fianna Fáil TDs (MPs) supporting the Government would withdraw their support and Ireland would fail to pass a budget.” Among the shadow cases of defection, there is an instance of mistrust between the prime minister and the Green party in government. Jack Vowles (2003, pp.1037-1038) suggests that “the real reason” for Helen Clark's early election in New Zealand in 2002 was that she did not trust the Greens to continue supporting her government.

Green parties in exactly half of the twelve cases survived in government until scheduled elections without defecting and without early elections being called. These cases were the Finnish Greens' first coalition, from 1995 to 1999 and their third coalition, from 2007 to 2011; the Italian Greens' coalition from 1996 to 2001; the French Greens' coalition from 1997 to 2002; the German Greens' first coalition from 1998 to 2002; and the Flemish Greens' (Agalev's) participation in coalition from 1999 to 2003. Two of these cases occurred in contexts in which the legislative term was five years and four cases occurred in contexts in which the term was four years. Clearly, among parties that survive other risks, institutional termination fully accounts for the end of the party's time in office and their time in office matches closely the maximum time available within their respective national institutional frameworks, consistent with Hypothesis 3. In some cases (e.g., the first Finnish case), the coalition appeared sufficiently stable that it would have lasted an additional year had the institutional context allowed.

It appears that institutional rules concerning the maximum duration of the parliamentary term had important direct and indirect effects in some cases. In two cases of defection – the Czech and Belgian cases – impending elections at the end of the parliamentary term appear to have affected the parties' governmental prospects and this may have played an important role in driving their defection. There were no cases in which the party's electoral prospects were high and its departure would have precipitated an election. This illustrates limited diversity in the situations covered.

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3.6 Discussion

With few exceptions, parties' time in office has been ignored, despite its importance (not least for the parties themselves), the ready availability of data (see Appendix G) and a general increase in attention devoted to other actors' office retention outcomes. This omission is all the more surprising when the theoretical concerns of the existing literature on parties' office outcomes – which include its potential for policy influence – are examined. This chapter has provided a first integrated analysis of parties' time in government, bringing together work from the study of parliamentary dissolution and the study of defection from coalitions. It has been limited in its scope, focussing on the outcomes of a set of parties with similar organisational and ideological characteristics.

The analysis examined twelve cases covering a cumulative 45 years of Green parties in government. It has shown that there were a number of gateway events to the end of Green parties' spells in government. These were early elections (either precipitated by the ruling party or by another actor), the defection of the Green party from government or, in the absence of these events, a scheduled election at the end of the legislative term. By comparing cases, it has identified some important causal conditions that have underpinned the timing of these events, as well as their occurrence. It has identified three cases (Finland 1999-2002; Germany 2002-2005; Italy 2006-2008) in which Green parties' time in office was substantially reduced by a gateway event. Table 3.12 identifies pathways to the end of Green parties' time in government (both hypothesised and detected). While some paths are associated with substantially shortened tenure for Green parties (e.g., paths 1.1, 1.2, 2.3), the most important path to Green party defection tends to occur when elections are already imminent (path 2.2).

In two cases, Green parties' time in office appears to have been substantially shortened as a result of early elections. One of these early elections (in Italy in 2008) was forced by the parliamentary opposition; the other (in Germany in 2005) was voluntary, albeit driven by the prospect of governmental deadlock and electoral decline. In the case of early elections voluntarily called by the ruling party, the conditions present appear to cleave to the framework set out in Section 3.4 (specifically, Hypothesis 1): the SPD had certain-to-decline electoral prospects and low governmental prospects. There is substantial evidence from within the case that this drove the decision to call the elections and these conditions are also present in the case the only shadow case of voluntary dissolution (in New Zealand in 2002). In the case of
the 'forced' early election in Italy, a particularly vulnerable government met with external shocks or events that cannot be incorporated systematically into an explanation, other than by assuming that such shocks will occur. Despite quite different institutional settings, these conditions are repeated in two shadow cases. One of the themes that emerges from the analysis is the similarity between the conditions surrounding 'forced' and 'voluntary' early elections. This suggests that both may occur under similar structural and institutional conditions, which in turn reduce the governmental prospects of parties in government.

Closer examination of ruling parties' incentives and capabilities in these and other cases highlights that early elections are not simply determined by electoral and governmental prospects. In the case of ruling parties, their decisions to call early elections also require the ruling party to have the institutional and political capacity to call early elections. This is not a constant, but rather varies with institutional and political conditions. Ruling parties' medium-term prospects may also need to be taken into account (e.g., in Belgium in 2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H</th>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Early election, driven by ruling party's (low) governmental prospects and (high or certain-to-decline) electoral prospects.</td>
<td>Germany 2005, (New Zealand 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Early election, precipitated by ruling party failure to maintain its coalition as a result of other parliamentary actors' decisions to defect.</td>
<td>Italy 2008, (Ireland 2011), (Czech Republic 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Minor party leaves office, driven by (high or certain-to-decline) electoral prospects and (low) governmental prospects.</td>
<td>None.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Minor party leaves office with high governmental prospects and high (or certain-to-decline) electoral prospects.</td>
<td>Finland 2002, (New Zealand 2002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three pathways correspond to hypotheses. Three do not: pathway 1.2 (see Table 3.5 and text) and pathways 2.2 and 2.3 (which were detected inductively). For hypothesis wording and other details, see Section 3.5. Shadow instances are in parentheses.
In four cases, Green parties' time in office was ended by their own defection. In these four cases, two paths are evident: in one, they had little to lose by changing strategy and in another they had much to lose in electoral terms by continuing in government. The first path (path 2.2 in Table 3.12), in which three of the parties that defected had low prospects (including two that had 'zero' prospects) suggests that the prospect of going backwards over the threshold of representation is distinctive and that it matters for parties' decisions; in electoral terms, aiming for a conflict dividend may be a last throw of the dice. (However, to anticipate the findings of Chapter 4, defection in these circumstances appears not to have produced the desired outcomes.)

In the second path (path 2.3), represented only by the Finnish case, the prospect of electoral decline was clearly present. Certainty of a downward trajectory in electoral prospects approaching an election, while rare, appears to be an important condition for both ruling parties (e.g., the SPD in 2005) and other parties (e.g., the Finnish Greens in 2002) that deserves closer investigation and more careful specification such that it can be more clearly identified empirically. It may help to begin to resolve the puzzle presented by Warwick (2012): that ruling parties tend to lose seats (albeit somewhat fewer than other parties), even when they choose the election date by calling elections early. Identifying perceptions of certainty, especially in cases where it does not lead to action, would seem to require further in-depth study. These routes to defection potentially complement standard, conflict-based explanations of defection, but they provide a stronger theoretical underpinning.

This path is also important because, along with the two cases of early elections, which were beyond the Green parties' control, it is one of the few gateway events that substantially shortened a Green party's time in office (relative to a scheduled election). By way of contrast, the gateway events in path 2.3 occurred in the shadow of an election, as the party's time in office was about to come to an end and therefore had little effect on party tenure.

Another important pattern that emerges from the analysis is that electoral dependence appears to be a major and relatively widespread deterrent to defection and thus helps to ensure that Green parties remain in government for longer. No Green party that was dependent on its coalition partner for votes defected from coalition. This further reinforces the argument that parties make decisions on defection at least partly on the basis of an electoral logic.
Perhaps the least-examined aspects of each of these cases is the organisational dimension. Clearly, each of the three parties in the first path to defection had incurred heavy organisational costs. In the Finnish case, the organisational costs that would have been incurred had the party continued in government are difficult to specify. These aspects of defection are worthy of further in-depth analyses. It may be the case that considerations of organisational cohesion or the goal of pleasing activists plays a role in defection decisions (Warwick 2012, p.279).

Institutions that set the maximum period between elections (in conjunction with delays in entering government) clearly matter for the duration of Green parties' time in office, conditional on the party surviving in office until the date that they specify for the next election. They also have an indirect effect, reducing parties' short-term governmental prospects as they approach the next scheduled election. Finally, strategic interaction and cycles of mistrust occurred, but are not evident as a key driver of dissolution or defection in these cases, nor as factors that shortened Green parties' time in office.

In sum, parties' electoral and governmental prospects do appear to play important roles in these decisions and in their timing, but not always in the way envisaged by the theoretical framework set out in Section 3.4. They also appear to play a role in parties' continuation in government, with parties clearly joining governments to gain governmental benefits and remaining there at least partly because of depressed electoral prospects that they wish to avoid realising. Warwick's (2012, p.280) finding that defectors and disputers do not end their time in office with any degree of certainty about their future electoral outcomes appears to be supported.

Further refinements of the framework and its core concepts are possible. It is clear from this study that parties' governmental prospects do not always decline in a linear way and this highlights an assumption that may need to be revised. Biorcio (2002, p.53), for example, notes that the D'Alema and Amato cabinets had less policy-making capacity than the Prodi cabinet, thus compromising the Italian Greens' policy prospects during the 1996-2001 period. In a couple of cases, the Greens' governmental prospects arguably increased marginally during their time in government, with the appointment of new members of cabinet (e.g., Laura Balbo as Minister for Equal Opportunities in Italy in 2000). In other cases (Finland in 2002), the party lost a minister. Further focus on the management of policy timing within coalitions may
also be an avenue worth pursuing, if ruling parties delay delivery of other parties' policy until the end of the coalition.

Overall, however it seems that the framework outlined here provides a useful set of core assumptions that allow us to examine the rationality of the actors' decisions and to identify instances of behaviour that is, in these terms, puzzling. Parties' electoral and governmental prospects within an assumed equilibrium appear to be important for the gateway events that end minor parties' time in office. The concept of 'governmental prospects' has the advantage of plausibly representing the prospects of both office- and policy-seeking parties. The framework's specific provision for minor-party specific conditions (such as electoral dependence and zero electoral prospects) appears to be justified. Both electoral dependence and zero prospects, which are more likely to be experienced by minor parties in government, appear to play a distinct role in the cases examined.

Can we generalise from findings about Green parties' office retention outcomes to other parties? And which subsets of parties represent the most promising set of cases for generalisation? Clearly, as assumed by the framework and indicated in the course of the analysis, non-prime ministerial parties occupy a qualitatively distinct position from prime ministers’ parties. Crucially, they do not have access to the same institutional powers and informal power as prime ministerial parties. Thus, while aspects of the analysis may form a basis for further studies of ruling parties' office retention outcomes, the analysis as a whole should only be generalised to parties that do not hold the position of prime minister.54

The prospects for generalisation depend in part on the extent to which the explanations of variation in Green parties' office retention outcomes depend on distinctive Green party characteristics. The characteristics of the paths to the termination of Green parties' time in government identified in this chapter suggest that Green parties’ distinctive characteristics (discussed in Subsection 3.3.1) played a role in the timing of their exit from government, but only under specific conditions.

First, their strong policy orientation appears to have played a number of roles. Having a strong policy profile appears to have played a role in producing low electoral prospects (see Chapter 4, Subsection 4.4.2 for a more detailed discussion). Consistent with this, most Green

54 Further, it is worth noting that each of these parties started in government with substantial potential time in office of between 3.4 and 5 years. Given the decisive role of scheduled elections, the explanations produced may not apply equally to parties who enter government with less potential time in office.
parties in government, most of the time, had negative prospects as government disappointed their supporters in opposition. These negative electoral prospects had ambiguous and contradictory effects with respect to the outcome (the party's time in government). On the one hand, in conjunction with their small size and electoral vulnerability (Bolleyer 2008), it ultimately put some parties in a desperate electoral situation, making defection at least as profitable as any other course of action (e.g., Ecolo in Belgium, the Czech Greens and the Irish Greens). On the other hand, the negative electoral effects of their strong policy profile provided a strong incentive for Green parties to remain in government to avoid realising their negative electoral prospects.

Green parties’ policy orientations were relevant in at least two more contradictory ways. The nature of their typical policy orientation (to the left of social democracy in most cases), in conjunction with electoral institutions and party strategy, put many parties in a dependent relationship with their coalition partners, leading to them staying in coalition. This is perhaps the most widely important characteristic that is typical of Green parties and which may be less prevalent in wider populations of comparable parties. Moreover, in some cases, their strong policy-orientation, combined with their holding salient portfolios, appears to have extended their time in government. This was certainly a factor that influenced the Irish Greens' decisions in late 2010 (Boyle 2012 on the Irish Greens; see Bäck et al. 2011). These parties’ strong policy profile also created the opportunity for ‘principled defection’ in Finland (and also in the shadow case of New Zealand in 2002) and provided other parties with reasons for leaving coalition (e.g., Ecolo in 2003). Thus, the simple expectation that the nature or strength of Green parties' policy orientation would shorten their time in government seems to be misplaced. The effects of this distinctive characteristic appear to have been contingent and diverse and in many cases it appears to provide strong incentives to stay in office.

Second, the effects of Green parties’ participatory organisations, too, appear to have been somewhat contradictory. In some cases they appear to have shortened their time in government (e.g., Ecolo in 2003), although in other cases their distinctive way of doing business delayed exit (e.g., Ireland in 2010-2011: see Boyle 2013, Ch.12 and 13). It is also plausible (but requires in-depth study to demonstrate) that the requirement for endorsement of accession to government by the wider party helped to legitimise and presumably stabilise the party in government, at least through its early years. This may be reflected in the stability of these parties through that period. These contradictory indications, which apply to different
periods in a party's time in government, suggest that the effects of participatory organisations may be time-dependent over the course of a case.

Third, whether these organisations’ lack of experience in government may have shortened their time in office is difficult to assess without, perhaps, an analysis a larger number of cases. Among the cases of Green parties in government, those that had more than one spell in government (Finland, Italy, Germany) did not seem to behave differently or receive better outcomes than less experienced parties.

Overall, the implications of case selection and the indications for generalisation are more complex and ambiguous than prior expectations (Section 3.3.1) seemed to indicate. However, it is worth noting that several of the factors that played an active role in causing Green parties to have a shorter time in government are not uniquely Green; they are factors that are typical of small, policy-oriented parties. Beyond the suggestion that generalisation should be restricted to non-prime ministerial parties, this may be the most fruitful direction to look for the pathways detected here. The distinction between electoral dependence and relative electoral independence seems crucial.

Further work can develop our understanding of parties' office retention outcomes. Gateway events (early elections and defections) are relatively uncommon. Some combinations of causal conditions, too, are rare or have simply not occurred, leading to limited diversity among cases. This can be addressed through further comparative work using larger data sets, such as the data set described in Appendix G. With more cases, more variables can be systematically controlled for rather than being identified after the fact. Clearly, a method that examines the conjunctural (interactive) effects of causal conditions is desirable. The analytical tools for this are available both within duration models and other methods (e.g., QCA). Building on the framework and observations set out in this chapter, any duration model will need to take account of 'competing risks' that threaten parties' time in government and due to the multi-level structure of the data, it may be appropriate to use frailty models (Mills 2011, Ch.8, Ch.10).

More generally, while this study has examined parties' time in office between elections, it is also possible to study parties' time in office over different periods: parties' consecutive spells in office may be one of the most interesting, given the wide variation that is evident (see Appendix G), although traversing as it does elections and government formation
opportunities, it is clearly a complex proposition. This data can also provide a basis for studying the office retention outcomes of subsets of parties, such as successful (but often not dominant) parties (see Table 3.14 in Appendix G).

On the other hand, this is a relatively broad cross-case account and it would benefit from in-depth case studies. In particular, the assumption that parties are unitary actors should not prevent investigation into internal processes. For example, the Finnish defection in 2002 occurred only after intense internal debate (Paastela 2008) and the Irish defection occurred after a series of meetings over a relatively long period, in which the parliamentary party's consensual decision-making norms seem to have played an important role (Boyle 2012). The general complexity revealed by this study, as well as the important role of actors' beliefs and perceptions, and the role of timing, warrants deeper case studies. In-depth studies might focus on cases displaying particular conditions. In particular, more work might be done on parties that have very low or effectively zero electoral prospects and how this may reinforce the organisational costs of government (and vice versa). Relatively rare events, such as strategic dissolution (e.g., Germany in 2005) or defection when governmental prospects remain high (e.g., the Finnish Greens in 2002) could also bear further close study.
3.7 Appendix G

A data set: parties' time in office in 34 democracies, 1944-2012

The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate that data on parties' time in government is readily available and to describe the data that is used for some descriptive analyses in the course of the chapter. In doing so, I describe parties' time in office within two contexts: the entire period covered by the data, focussing on the 'most successful' office-seeking parties and within legislatures (i.e., legislative periods between elections).

The data set includes all parties in government from the first election in or after 1944 to the last election before mid-2012 in 34 democracies. These countries include fifteen West European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom); five South European countries that democratised later (Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Portugal and Spain); ten Central European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia); and four non-European countries (Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand). All of the countries with the exception of Switzerland are parliamentary democracies (Müller et al. 2003, p.4). Overall, the data set covers 479 legislatures and 280 different parties, comprising 1143 observations (i.e., a party in government during a legislature). Countries that consistently feature large multi-party coalition governments (e.g., Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland) are represented by considerably larger numbers of observations than other countries, especially countries that tend to have single-party governments. Countries that have a long history of free and fair elections tend to have more observations than those with shorter post-war democratic histories (see Table 3.13).
Table 3.13. Cross-national overview in order of average party tenure per legislature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>First legislature begins</th>
<th>Legislatures (n)</th>
<th>Unique parties in govt. (n)</th>
<th>Obs: parties in legislature (n)</th>
<th>Average tenure per party in govt. per legislature (years)</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>CIEP (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Full data set: 479 legislatures, 280 unique parties, 1143 observed parties, Average tenure per party in govt. per legislature: 3.0 years, Std. Dev.: 1.3 years

* 5 years since 2008
** 4 years since 2007

Data: Manow and Döring (2012)
CIEP (Constitutional Inter-Election Period) data:
Gallagher et al. (2011); Woldendorp et al. (2000); Álvarez-Rivera (2013)
Drawing on this data set, Table 3.14 shows the most successful office-holding parties – those that have held office for more than 40 years since 1944 – measured by their cumulative tenure over the entire period. Clearly it does not take account of the shorter periods of democracy in many countries and therefore effectively focuses on nineteen long-established democracies.

Table 3.14. Parties that have spent more than 40 years in government, 1944-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cumulative tenure (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative People's Party</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss People's Party</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Democratic Party</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Switzerland</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Social People's Party</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish People's Party</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence Party</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Party</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fianna Fáil</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian People's Party</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Labour Party</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Progressive Party</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Party for Freedom and Democracy</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party of Australia</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party of Australia</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand National Party</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Democratic Party</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Social Union</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dependent variable measures the tenure of parties' in government during each inter-election period ('legislature'). This measure of tenure also includes periods after the election but before the first post-election government takes office, identified by Conrad and Golder (2010) as 'continuation caretaker' periods and by Laver (2003, p.25) as démissionné.

The mean tenure of a party in government is three years; the median is slightly higher at 3.2 years. The shape of the Kaplan-Meier curve in Figure 3.14 hints at both the important role of institutions and the predominance of four-year maximum terms in modern democracies, with
a sharp drop in the proportion of parties that continue in government after this point. However, parties' tenure spans the full range of periods from just 28 days (for four Norwegian parties in the Lyng cabinet in 1963) to over five years (Malta's Labour Party in the 1980s). The rate of failure appears to accelerate as time in government advances, as indicated by the slightly convex shape of the curve up to four years.

![Graph showing party tenure in government between elections in 34 countries, 1944-2012 (n=1134)](image)

*Figure 3.14. Party tenure in government between elections in 34 countries, 1944-2012 (n=1134)*

Mean tenure varies by country, ranging from two years to more than four years. Clearly, mean tenure is positively correlated with the Constitutional Inter-Election Period (CIEP) (Figure 3.4). Bivariate analyses indicate that it also appears to be associated with party size, prime ministerial status and, less markedly, ideological orientation (Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.7).
For future analyses, further refinements are needed in the data set, taking account of non-consecutive periods in office during a single legislature and time-varying covariates, such as periods during which party does and does not supply the prime minister during an individual legislative period. It would also need to take into account not just the maximum inter-election period but, more precisely, the maximum time that a party joining government at time \( t \) could possibly spend in government. This kind of variable is available in existing data sets (Andersson et al. 2012) but is also easily calculated. Using event history analysis would allow it to use data from unfinished, right-censored cases. As in the study of ministerial tenure (Fischer et al. 2012) there may be a number of dependent variables of interest. Researchers may be interested in parties' consecutive spells in office, their tenure under particular prime ministers, or other periods. The ready availability of this data provides a first step in these directions.
Chapter 4 Electoral outcomes: when do coalitions eat their Greens?

4.1 Introduction
As parties of opposition in the 1980s and 1990s, Green parties’ electoral support base grew, albeit slowly and to a modest size. Their mean vote share in Western Europe increased steadily from 2.1% in 1979 to 6.1% in 2003 (Spoon 2011, p.41); they gained votes more frequently than other parties (Buelens and Hino 2008, p.159); their growth was cross-nationally consistent (Gallagher et al. 2011, p.251; see also Mair 2002, p.136); and once they passed the threshold of representation, they tended not to go back over it (Müller-Rommel 2002, p.5). Individual parties experienced setbacks (see e.g., Jahn 1993) and the decline of Green parties was forecast from time to time (e.g., Mair 2001, p.103), but the broader story has been one of persistence, incremental growth and stabilisation in the electorate (Richardson 1992, p.20; Dolezal 2010).

What happens when this story of persistence and growth meets the new challenges presented by participation in governing coalitions? To date, Green parties have contested post-coalition general elections on 20 occasions and their outcomes have varied widely. This chapter aims to explain why these similar parties in similar strategic contexts (i.e., coalition) have experienced different post-coalition outcomes. Why do some Green parties in coalition gain votes while others lose? Do the attributes and strategies of these small, marginal parties matter for their outcomes? It draws on theory and existing findings on the cost of governing and electoral behaviour to explain this variation.

It identifies pathways to success and failure at post-coalition elections marked by configurations of their pre-coalition electoral results, incumbency, conflict with rival parties and economic conditions. It finds that, in the short-term, the main problem facing these parties is the retention of voters that have not habitually voted for the party and that this problem appears to be accentuated by coalition membership. However, it also finds that these parties are not just victims (or beneficiaries) of circumstance: their success in entering cabinet and the degree of conflict that they enter into with other parties matters too, if only under particular conditions.

1 Spoon's (2011) survey covers parties in eighteen countries.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it summarises existing comparative studies of the electoral outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions and sets out prior expectations concerning the representativeness of cases of Green parties of other parties in coalition in respect of their electoral outcomes. Second, it specifies its measure of post-coalition electoral outcomes and it describes Green parties' post-coalition electoral outcomes. Third, it turns to existing theory and findings on electoral behaviour and the cost of governing for potential explanations and, fourth, it tests the hypotheses derived from these literatures using statistical techniques and crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). It concludes with a discussion of its findings; the strategic implications for these parties; and the extent to which the findings might be generalised. It also describes the medium-term trajectories of these parties: has coalition marked a turning point in the Greens' electoral history?

4.2 Green parties meet governing coalitions

If the story of Green parties in opposition was one of steady growth, joining governing coalitions promised a new set of challenges. Drawing on the extant literature on the cost of governing, Green parties in governing coalitions would be expected to lose vote share and, indeed, more vote share than other parties. Green parties first joined governing coalitions in the 1990s when the cost of governing was high and rising (Narud and Valen 2008, pp.380-381). They have not held prime ministerial or presidential positions from which they could manipulate the electoral cycle, putting them at a relative disadvantage (see Nannestad and Paldam 2002, pp.27-28; see also Table 3.7, above). In government, small parties, newly governing parties and anti-establishment parties lose more vote share than other parties (Font 2001; Buelens and Hino 2008; Van Spanje 2011; see Section 4.4.2 for a fuller review). While less is known about the electoral implications of support party status, existing studies indicate that it too has negative electoral implications (Bale and Bergman 2006a, esp. pp.199-200; Bale and Blomgren 2008, p.102; cf. Miller and Curtin 2011).

Existing work on Green parties' electoral outcomes seem to support these expectations. As Green parties began to participate in governments, Peter Mair (2001, p.107, p.111) suggested that their electoral outlook was bleak: participating in government would preclude them from continuing to represent anti-party sentiment, thus triggering a “natural limit” to their growth (see also Poguntke 2002b, p.144). Likewise, the nature of Green parties' policy goals may also
make compromise, and therefore coalition, difficult. If Green parties' policy focus is perceived by voters to be on slow-changing or static issues of principle rather than on dynamic 'pragmatic issues' (e.g., short-term economic management), then perceived policy change by Green parties should be electorally damaging (see Tavits 2007). To make matters worse, policy-making in the face of emergent problems often cannot be governed by the participatory intra-party processes to which these parties and their members subscribe. Coalition may disappoint Green party activists in this respect. Overall, Green parties may be “fair weather” organisations that are poorly designed for the rough and tumble of coalition (Hooghe et al. 2010, p.946).

In an early assessment of the electoral challenges faced by Green parties in government, Thomas Poguntke (2002b, pp.142-143) observed the gap between activists' expectations and policy-making in contemporary coalition government:

Incumbency has put Green parties at loggerheads with their own core constituency. Given the inevitably slow pace of policy change in national politics (frequently involving EU-wide changes), movement activists are bound to be disappointed. By their very nature, those who are active in new social movements tend to be single-issue oriented and to call for fast and radical change. This is the very antithesis to national coalition government constrained by European-wide regulations.

Poguntke (2002b, p.143, p.144) suggested that electoral success would be the result of a difficult balancing act between “loyal co-operation” and “opposition in government”. Consistent with this suggestion, Wolfgang Rüdig's (2006, see esp. pp.S147-S148) study of seven cases of Green parties in cabinet in Western Europe identified two paths to electoral success, one of which involved an 'opposition in government' strategy, maintaining “as much distance as possible” from the responsibilities of government. The second path to success – the 'new Greens' strategy, typified by the German Greens – involved tying the party closely to government, reaping a publicity dividend, sharing in the government's electoral fate, and possibly benefiting from strategic voting.

In passing, Rüdig (2006, p.S135) suggested that the 'opposition in government' path may also fit cases of support parties, which fell outside the scope of his study. However, Bale and Bergman's (2006a, see esp. pp.199-200) study of Green support parties in Sweden and New
Zealand cautioned that these parties too are faced with serious electoral challenges. Participating in coalition as a support party consumed their resources, compromising their capacity to communicate with voters, and coalition partners were formidable rivals for positive media attention. Media coverage was contingent on inter-party conflict, but Green parties were constrained on this front: their weak strategic position meant that they had a strong interest in maintaining a working relationship with their coalition partners for the next coalition-formation opportunity; they needed to appear 'responsible' to voters (building a "reputation for constructive cooperation" [ibid., p.206]); and they lacked experience in adversarial decision-making.

Thus, the factors influencing Green parties outcomes are consistent with accounts of the electoral outcomes of small, newly governing and anti-establishment parties. Can we expect Green parties to be representative of this wider set of heavily-punished small or newly governing (or even anti-establishment) parties in coalition? The indications from the existing literature are contradictory. First, their outcomes, as described in the literature, display wide variation (Poguntke 2002b, pp.141-144; Rüdig 2006, p.S147; Buelens and Hino 2008, p.160; the section that follows provides an account of these outcomes to date). This improves the chance of them being representative of a wider set of cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008, p.301). Second, there are some reasons to believe that Green parties may receive more positive outcomes than other parties: their history of steady (if slow) crossnational growth distinguishes them; some of them have become more distant from the 'newly governing' category and, arguably, the anti-establishment category over time; and one analysis of their outcomes indicated that, on average, they have been more positive than other newly governing parties (Buelens and Hino 2008, based on seven cases of Green parties in government). Third, several expectations indicates that Green parties' outcomes might be more negative than comparable parties. The mechanisms by which negative outcomes are produced are likely to be at least as strong as in cases of comparable parties in coalition: many Green voters ought to be deeply disappointed with the transition from policy-oriented opposition to the compromises of government; Green parties' lack of resources (Frankland et al. eds. 2008) should exacerbate their electoral vulnerability; and their viable electoral strategies may be severely limited (Bale and Bergman 2006a, pp.199-200). Moreover, there are some indications that their vote base is 'soft' (Mair 2001; Miraglifiotta 2013).\footnote{These specificities are discussed at greater length as the hypotheses are set out in Section 4.4.}

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Green parties may have some claims, if not to representativeness, then at least to diversity in respect of their outcomes. On balance, however, and based on what we already know about these parties and outcomes, they appear to be 'more difficult' cases of post-coalition electoral success and 'more likely' cases of post-coalition electoral failure.

4.3 The electoral outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions

4.3.1 Cases
Since Rüdig's (2006) study was published, cases of Green parties in governing coalitions have continued to accumulate. By August 2013, Green parties had entered ten more governing coalitions and they had contested seven more post-coalition elections. There are twice as many cases available now as when Rüdig performed his analysis. Moreover, Rüdig's suggestion that support parties and cabinet parties might be compared has not yet been taken up: doing so brings together eight cases of support parties with twelve cases of Green parties in cabinet. In sum, eleven Green parties in ten countries have contested 'post-coalition' elections to the lower house of parliament on 20 occasions between 1994 and 2011. All but one of these elections took place in the period from March 1999 to September 2012 (Table 4.1).

4.3.2 Measuring post-coalition electoral outcomes
A party's electoral outcome at a given point in time is its share of an electoral good (usually votes cast or seats available). Between two points in time (such as a pre- and post-coalition election), a party's electoral outcome is measured as the change in party's electoral share. Within these parameters, there are a number of ways in which parties' electoral outcomes can be measured. For the purpose of the analyses that follow, I focus on explaining variation in the percentage point gains and losses in parties' vote share at general elections to the lower house of parliament. This measure reflects general practice in the study of parties' electoral outcomes and particularly the study of parties' postincumbency electoral outcomes (see Powell and Whitten 1993, pp.393-394). Taking into account the main available alternatives,

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3 See fn.9 in Chapter 1 on pre- and post-coalition elections.
4 For an exception, see Barreiro (2008), who measures electoral outcomes as the vote as a share of the electorate. There are of course other outcomes that result from elections, such as party funding. While important, they are arguably more contingent and less central to electoral competition or democratic linkage than votes or seats.
there are at least three choices involved in selecting this measure: the choice of general elections to the lower house of parliament rather than other elections; the choice of votes rather than seats; and the choice of absolute percentage point change rather than change relative to party size (i.e., proportional change).

**Table 4.1. The electoral outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pre- and post-coalition election years</th>
<th>Vote gain (pct pt)</th>
<th>Seat gain (pct pt)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federazione dei Verdi</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1992-1994</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vihreä liitto</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1995-1999</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federazione dei Verdi</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1996-2001</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Verts</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1997-2002</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miljöpartiet de Gröna</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bündnis 90/Die Grünen</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strana Zelenych (Slo)</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vihreä liitto</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1999-2002</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecolo</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agalev</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2002-2005</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miljöpartiet de Gröna</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bündnis 90/Die Grünen</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2002-2005</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federazione dei Verdi</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strana Zelenych (Cze)</td>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vihreä liitto</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party/Comhaontas Glas</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Green Party of Australia</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vihreä liitto</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialistisk Folkeparti</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GroenLinks</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe Écologie / Les Verts</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: PARLINE (2012); EJPR Data Yearbooks; Manow and Döring (2012); Kopeček (2009); Biorcio (2002). Table refers to period to August 2013.
Although some existing studies of Green parties in government have used sub- and supranational election results to make tentative inferences about parties' postincumbency outcomes when national election results have been unavailable (e.g., Pogunke 2002b; Boy 2002; Rüdig 2002; Buelens and Deschouwer 2002), there are good reasons to focus on national elections to the lower house of parliament where possible. The electoral link between voters and national parliament is central in parliamentary democracies (Müller et al. 2003) and the lower house is generally the most important source of resources for inter-party bargaining. Although the countries studied in this chapter include those with powerful upper houses (e.g., Germany, Italy), regional governments (e.g., Belgium, Germany, Italy), presidents (France) and a supranational parliament (EU member states), second-order elections nonetheless present considerable problems of comparability (Rüdig 2006, p. S149, fn. 4). Moreover, elections to the lower house are not just comparable: as they are approximately sufficient (but not necessary) for the end of a case of a party in a governing coalition to occur (see Section 1.2, above), these lower house elections tend to occur in a similar context for Green parties in coalition, usually around the end of their time in coalition. Therefore, studying these results helps to narrow contextual variation relating to election timing, which can influence electoral results (see e.g., Schmitt 2005, pp. 651-652, p. 662).

The second choice involves focussing on votes rather than seats. It is widely acknowledged that parties are generally most interested in gaining seats, which are pursued both for their own sake and as a means to achieving office-seeking and policy-seeking goals (e.g., Rose and Mackie 1983, p. 116; Spoon 2011, p. 73; Jensen and Spoon 2011, p. 101; see Warwick 2012 for a recent study that focuses on seat share gains). Notwithstanding the strong arguments for focussing on seats, I use vote outcomes – an instrumental goal for parties (Strom and Müller 1999, p. 9; Sjöblom 1968, pp. 81-82) – in order to shorten the chain of causation by excluding the mechanical effects of electoral institutions. In the context of a small number of cases, this reduces the number of variables that intervene in the production of outcome. This is also a pragmatic decision taken in light of the features of the cases at hand: among the 20 cases covered by this analysis, the direction of seat share change and the direction of vote share change – which is the key distinction between outcomes in the crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analyses carried out in Subsection 4.5.2 – differs only in the case of the French Greens in 2002 (Table 4.1).

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5 This is apparent from the literatures on portfolio allocation (see Warwick and Druckman 2006; Verzichelli 2008 for reviews) and parties' influence on government policy (see Mair 2008b; Gray 2008 for reviews).
Third, I focus on percentage point change in vote share (‘electoral gain’), rather than proportional change in the party's vote share. This has been used as a dependent variable for most studies of the electoral effects of incumbency (e.g., Rose and Mackie 1983; Powell and Whitten 1993; Müller and Strom 2000; Narud and Valen 2008). However, at least one recent study of new parties in government has focussed on proportional gains and losses, effectively comparing parties' outcomes while controlling for their size (Buelens and Hino 2008, ff.160). Admittedly, electoral gain does not capture the full import of a result for the party itself. Two parties can experience the same electoral gain (loss), but it can mean something very different for each party, depending on their respective pre-election shares. A proportional measure of electoral change addresses this deficit by measuring losses and gains relative to the pre-election size of the party.⁶ However, it has both theoretical and technical limitations. In itself, it does not convey information about the wider importance of an outcome, beyond its importance for the party as an organisation seeking electoral growth. It can also produce extreme values for very small parties that attain small gains or suffer small losses (e.g., -100% or +300%) and it is not possible to attribute growth values for parties with zero electoral share at the previous election, as it is impossible to calculate a proportion of zero. Finally, when calibrated as crisp sets of loss and gain (see QCA in Subsection 4.5.2), proportional and absolute measures are identical.

4.3.3 Green parties' electoral outcomes
The idea that coalition would present an electoral challenge for Green parties appears to receive support from the outcomes detailed in Table 4.1: Green parties in coalition have lost votes more often than they have gained (on twelve of twenty occasions; median = -0.4 percentage points) and they have lost votes on average (mean = -0.9 percentage points; s.d. = 2.1). This compares to a mean gain of 0.85% for Green parties in opposition in these countries (n=40; see Appendix H for details). In five cases of Green parties in coalition – the Slovak Greens in 2002, the Flemish Greens (Agalev) in 2003, the Italian Greens in 2008, the Czech Greens in 2010 and the Irish Greens in 2011 – the parties were driven back over the threshold of representation, losing all of their seats in the lower house of parliament. Participating in governing coalitions has been associated with frequent and sometimes heavy losses for Green parties.

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⁶ This measure – electoral growth – is the difference between the party's pre-election share and its post-election share, as a proportion of its pre-election share.

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However, their outcomes have been far from uniform, ranging from heavy losses (a maximum loss of -4.5 percentage points vote share for the Flemish Greens in 2003) to modest gains (a maximum gain of 1.9 percentage points vote gain for the German Greens in 2002). Indeed, there appears to be a marked divergence in Green parties' electoral outcomes after they participate in governing coalitions: the standard deviation of vote gains (losses) at the pre-coalition election is 1.5; at the post-coalition election, it is 2.4. Such variation in electoral outcomes among similar parties in similar strategic settings prompted Buelens and Hino (2008, p.160) to suggest that “[t]here will need to be explanations for the fact that some [Green parties] are able to increase their vote share after governing, while others are (sometimes severely) beaten”. The analyses that follow set out to take up that challenge, drawing on a number of potentially complementary hypotheses suggested by the literatures on voting behaviour and the electoral cost of governing.

4.4 Explaining the electoral outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions

4.4.1 Implications of studying short-term electoral change
Examining gains and losses in the vote share of Green parties in governing coalitions between a pre- and post-coalition election has several general implications that are relevant for the explanation of those outcomes. Some of these are relatively straightforward. The strategic setting involves voters and parties. Therefore, the hypotheses set out in the subsections that follow build on what we know about these actors. This is reflected in the focus on established findings on the cost of governing (Hypothesis 1) and the habitual bases of voting (Hypothesis 2). Parties are involved in a competition for vote share, which is a zero-sum game: when one party gains vote share, others lose. The zero-sum nature of this game logically means that the performance, strategies and attributes of other parties will be important for any given party's outcome. This is reflected in particular in Hypothesis 3, on the position of major rival parties.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of the outcome with implications for its explanation is that it involves measuring and explaining change over a short period of two to five years (Table 4.1), rather than long-term electoral change or cross-national variation in vote share. Many studies of Green parties' electoral outcomes point to a number of typically slow-changing structural factors that help to explain the emergence and long-term growth of Green
parties, as well as cross-national variation in their electoral support. These factors include the emergence of new values as new generations are socialised (e.g., Inglehart 1977, 1990) or the 'cognitive opportunity structure' (Jahn 1993); high levels of prosperity and security, which lead to more attention being given to higher-order issues (e.g., Dalton 1988, pp.81-82); and variation in political opportunity structures, including electoral institutions (e.g., Kitschelt 1988, pp.196-197; Jahn 1993; Redding and Viterna 1999; for recent reviews, see O'Neill 2012 and Hino 2012). The broader literature on electoral behaviour also points to slow-changing factors – voters' sociodemographic status, values and ideology – as the main determinants of voter preferences and vote choice (Van der Brug et al. 2007, pp.177-178; Van der Eijk and Franklin 2009, p.199-207). While they are undoubtedly important, many of these broad structural factors will have remained approximately constant during the short periods examined by this study. In other words, roughly similar value structures, levels of security and institutions will pertain at both the pre-coalition election and the post-coalition election. Insofar as these slow-changing factors have independent effects on the party's outcome, these effects ought to remain stable between the pre- and post-coalition election and, therefore, they are largely set to one side for the purpose of the analysis that follows. The hypotheses developed here, therefore, focus on short-term factors.

4.4.2 Office-holding
Does the successful pursuit of office compromise the pursuit of votes? There are some reasons for parties in cabinet to be optimistic: policy-driven parties can deliver for their policy-oriented voters and attaining ministries that help them to achieve this may mitigate incumbency losses (Bäck et al. 2011, p.449; though cf. Poguntke 2002b, pp.142-143). If coalition helps these parties to build their reputation for 'responsibility' among voters (Bale and Bergman 2006, p.206), then cabinet membership should be particularly useful in this regard. Coalition membership also provides higher visibility (Rüdig 2006, p.S146; Font 2001

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7 Although Rüdig (2006) seems to suggest that environmental salience may be an important (even necessary) condition for Green parties' postincumbency success, it is not clear from his account of the data on this issue that it plays a major role. With regard to the environment, there is evidence of a certain amount of homogeneity among the populations of the countries studied here. In a survey conducted in late 2007, between 96 and 99 per cent of the respondents in each of the countries studied covered by this chapter (with the exception of Ireland, at 91%) said that they believed that the environment was either very important or fairly important. The variation in those believing it was very important was greater, ranging from 88% in Sweden to 47% in Finland (Eurobarometer 2008, p.11). Note, however, that responses to this type of question may not validly measure actors' positions on the environment (see Gemenis et al. 2012).

8 For one set of factors – economic conditions – there is a strong case that there has been rapid change as a result of the financial and economic crisis of 2008 onwards. This is at least partly accounted for by taking into account economic conditions (see Hypothesis 4, below).

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p.88), which is often in short supply for small parties. Consistent with these expectations, Hooghe et al. (2010, esp. p.946) report positive incumbency effects for Green parties in local government in Belgium and they attribute this to policy impact and visibility.

However, the bulk of the empirical evidence points in the opposite direction: Nannestad and Paldam (2002, p.17, p.22) observe that “[f]ew facts are so robust” as the electoral cost of governing for parties; it is “a basic fact” (emphasis in original). For voters, “being in government is arguably the most natural trigger of [vote-]switching” (Gomez 2012, p.116). Four findings in this literature are particularly relevant for this study.

First, parties have lost votes more frequently after being in cabinet than they have gained. Parties in government have lost votes between 62% (Müller and Strom 2000, pp.588-590) and 65% (Buelens and Hino 2008, p.159) of the time (see also Narud 1996, p.491). Second, they have lost vote (and seat) share on average after being in cabinet. Van Spanje (2011) reports that, in contexts with low clarity-of-responsibility and two-party coalitions, parties lose 1.65 percentage points; this is closer to 2 percentage points for parties in three-party coalitions (see also Warwick 2012, p.269, p.278 on seat share; Van der Brug et al. 2007 on voter preferences).

Third, postincumbency losses have become increasingly large and frequent over time. Green parties began participating in government when the cost of governing was high and rising. The increasing cost of incumbency has been borne out by successive studies (Rose and Mackie 1983, p.130; Nannestad and Paldam 2002, p.26), with one contribution describing an “obvious and powerful” trend of increasing incumbency losses since the 1950s which accelerated in the 1980s (to 3.4 percentage points from 2.1 percentage points in the 1970s), and again in the 1990s (6.3 percentage points) (Narud and Valen 2008, pp.380-381). Recent election results do not suggest that this trend has abated (Mair 2011; see also Dalton et al. 2002 on volatility).

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9 This compares with gaining votes 51% of the time in opposition (Buelens and Hino 2008, p.159).
10 These studies of incumbency costs at the level of individual parties are remarkably rare, but they are supported by many more studies that take outgoing governments as their unit of analysis (Rose and Mackie 1983, pp.124-125; Strom 1990b, pp.123-129; see also Strom 1985; Nannestad and Paldam 2002, p.21; Narud and Valen 2008, pp.378-381; Barreiro 2008, p.41). On the basis of an examination of postincumbency outcomes for Dutch and Norwegian parties, Narud (1996, p.489) argues that, because of diverse outcomes within coalitions, “it is entirely incorrect” to treat the coalition as the unit of analysis for the purpose of measuring parties' incumbency losses.
The fourth important set of findings is that small, anti-establishment and newly governing parties incur greater losses than other parties. Font (2001) shows that small parties in subnational governments in Spain tend to be particularly disadvantaged; Van Spanje (2011, pp.616-617) shows that anti-establishment parties in government lose more votes than other parties in government; and Buelens and Hino (2008, p.159, p.171) show that newly governing parties (parties in cabinet for the first or second time) lost votes at 74% of postincumbency elections.\footnote{Consistent with these findings, Warwick (2012) shows that prime ministers’ parties lose fewer votes than other parties in government.} Each of these studies suggests that the gap between a strong ideological profile, with its attendant expectations, and the realities of government cause these parties electoral difficulties (Buelens and Hino 2008, p.171; Van Spanje 2011, pp.609-610; see also Font 2001, p.88; p.92; though cf. Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012). Thus, while the findings are not quite as deterministic as Chancellor Merkel's assessment that “The little party always gets smashed” (Eaton 2013), this does not seem to be too far off the mark. Moreover, it is possible that, given the strong tendency for Green parties to receive at least one ministerial position that is closely related to the core of its agenda (the environment ministry), that this may further sharpen this confrontation between expectations and outputs or, as Burchell (2002, pp.171-172) suggests, may contribute to preventing the parties from broadening their policy profile and electoral appeal.

Does support party status, on the other hand, provide some protection from negative incumbency effects? In contrast to the extensive study of incumbent parties' outcomes, there has been little systematic cross-national study of the post-coalition electoral outcomes of support parties, comparing them to either opposition parties or to cabinet parties. In his study of minority government, Strøm (1990b, p.237) identifies the possibility that rejecting cabinet office may be used as an electoral strategy by party leaders who are aware of the cost of incumbency. In their recent study of support arrangements in New Zealand, Miller and Curtin (2011) identify various shades of support party status as arrangements that some parties have sought to use strategically in order protect themselves from electoral losses. On the other hand, Bale and Blomgren (2008, p.102) conclude that support party status “seems to offer no protection” from electoral punishment in Sweden and New Zealand (see also p.224, above). In the absence of broad cross-national studies of this question, we might infer from the mechanisms that appear to underpin incumbency effects – i.e., the interplay between
governmental responsibilities and supporters' expectations – that they should be mitigated for these parties. Hypothesis 1 is as follows:

**H1. If a Green party has been in cabinet during the past legislative term, then it will experience greater electoral losses (smaller gains) than a Green party that has been a support party.**

I will explore three additional variants of this hypothesis. First, the effect of a party's presence in government at the time of the election will be examined: voters may have short memories, treating former cabinet parties as if they were opposition parties, and they may even reward early defection. Existing evidence concerning the relationship between inter-party conflict, defection and electoral outcomes is inconclusive (see Buelens and Hino 2008, p.164; Narud and Valen 2008, p.387, p.397; Warwick 2012, esp. p.278). Second, voters may punish parties proportional to the amount of office that they hold. However, this hypothesis appears to be inconsistent with established findings concerning small parties in government and, when tested, has gained little support (Narud 1996, p.490; Font 2001, p.77, p.85; Buelens and Hino 2008). Third, if voters punish parties for being in cabinet, they may punish them even more if they have been in cabinet for a long time. The evidence is mixed: Nannestad and Paldam (2002, p.21) find that governments lose considerably more vote share after four or more years in office (6.12 percentage points on average) compared to two to four years in office (2.5 percentage points). However, if this results from the government's capacity to manipulate the electoral cycle in the earlier years (Nannestad and Paldam 2002, pp.27-28), it is a relative advantage that will rarely be available to Green parties in coalition. Moreover, recent research that uses parties as the unit of analysis does not find support for this hypothesis (Van der Brug et al. 2007, pp.175-177, p.190; Van Spanje 2011; see also Warwick 2012, p.270; although see Gomez 2012, pp.136-137).

4.4.3 **Voter habituation**

Parties that enter governing coalitions often do so on the back of a particularly good election result (Van der Brug et al. 2007, p.17). This has a downside: individuals who have voted for a party only at that general election, but not at previous elections, are less likely to be loyal to the party in future elections than the party's long-standing voters. Butler and Stokes (1969, pp.55-58) found that voters became 'immunised' against defection over several elections. More recently, Gomez (2012, Ch.3) has found that repeatedly voting for a party increases the
gap between the individual's preference for that party and alternative parties. In addition to changing voter preferences and thereby indirectly influencing voter behaviour, he finds that repeatedly voting for a party also reinforces voter loyalty directly, through habituation. Consistent with Butler and Stokes' findings, the 'inertia' effects of habituation accumulate over time.12

Therefore parties that gain new voters (who may have voted for them for the first time) are more likely to lose voters, as at least some of them will be weakly habituated. In conjunction with the new, challenging context, pre-coalition electoral gain appears to be a recipe for post-coalition voter defection. Existing studies of parties in government suggest that they do indeed find it difficult to hold on to recently 'converted' voters (Font 2001, p.83; Buelens and Hino 2008, p.166). The fact that these new voters are weakly habituated into voting for any party also means that the stakes of keeping these voters are rather high, as they are relatively available.

Green parties in particular may be likely victims of voter defection. Voters tend to have weaker preferences for small parties than for large parties (Van der Brug et al. 2007; Van der Eijk et al. 1996, p.400, E.P. 4.2.2 and Ch.20). Green voters may tend to be younger and therefore more weakly habituated; they may be more highly educated, more particularised and therefore more critical (Franklin and Rüdig 1995, p.425; for recent analyses of the age of Green voters, see e.g., Williams 2011, p.322 on Australia; Yla-Anttila 2012, pp.153-154 on Finland). In a recent analysis of Australian voters, Miragliotta (2013, p.707) finds that “Greens supporters are not habituated to the same extent as voters for mainstream parties”. Moreover, if Green parties are generally poor at capitalising on their electoral potential (Mair 2001), this may be reflected in their success in retaining voters.

H2. The more vote share a Green party in coalition has gained at the pre-coalition election, the more vote share it will lose at the post-coalition election.

It is possible – if less obvious – that this mechanism will work in the opposite direction: if a party enters coalition after an exceptionally poor electoral result, its next result may tend to revert towards a 'normal' level, as it draws back in its erstwhile voters who are weakly attached to other parties. Although this is a considerably weaker expectation, it is also examined in the analyses that follow.

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12 For a review of potential mechanisms that produce behavioural inertia, see Gomez 2012, pp.79-82.
4.4.4 The position of a major electoral rival

When electoral competition is a zero-sum game, the position, behaviour and outcomes of other parties matter. The smaller a party, the greater is the importance of other parties for its outcomes. This has been recognised in the literature on small, new parties (see e.g., Müller-Rommel 1990, pp.225-228; Rüdig 2006, p.S144; Meguid 2005, 2008; see Hino 2012, p.3). While all parties are potential rivals, Green parties' large, ideologically close rivals should be particularly important for the electoral outcomes of small parties in governing coalitions (Spoon 2011). These large, ideologically close parties – Green parties' 'major electoral rivals' – are in a position to use their greater resources to fish from the same pool of potential voters as Green parties. On the other hand, the supporters of these major electoral rivals also represent a large pool of potential Green party voters.

The coalitions in which Green parties have participated can be classified as orthodox (with their major electoral rival) or unorthodox (leaving their major electoral rival outside coalition). Given the strong effect of incumbency on electoral outcomes (see Hypothesis 1, above), and given that much political competition is shaped by conflict between government and opposition, the governing status of their major rival ought to be important. If the rival party is in the coalition with them, it remains a formidable competitor (e.g., Bale and Bergman 2006a), but it is constrained by its responsibility to govern and its complicity in government policy. If the rival party is not in the coalition, it can take advantage of the constraints that the Green party faces and, as a credible alternative for at least some Green voters, it can capitalise on the inevitable policy compromises and failures of the party in coalition. There is evidence from individual cases that Green parties are targeted by their major electoral rivals in these situations. For example, in Ireland between 2007 and 2011, the

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13 However, the post-coalition outcomes of other parties are not an appropriate independent variable, as they occur simultaneously with the outcomes of the party of interest, and they are complementary to it (contra Buelsens and Hino 2008).

14 There is some evidence for vote-switching to rival parties in the literature on postincumbency outcomes. Coalition partners, which are often ideologically close, very often do not share the same fate (Rose and Mackie 1983; see also Narud 1996, p.489). Buelsens and Hino (2008 p.166, p.172) suggest that new parties in government appear to be involved in a “zero-sum game” for votes and that the electoral failure of their coalition partners (who were usually their major rivals) is a necessary condition for the electoral success of new parties in government (see Van der Brug et al. 2007, p.183 for similar, if less deterministic, ideas).

15 This may not always be the same as entering coalitions led by the centre-left. For example, in Slovakia, the major political conflict was pro- vs anti-Meciar. The Greens went into an ‘orthodox’ coalition with the anti-Meciar component (Kopeček 2009).

16 With regard to the structure of voter preferences, the argument set out here is a simplification of Gomez's (2012, p.94) finding that most voters have one alternative party in mind, making the additional assumption that in the case of the Green party voters, this alternative is the Green party's large, ideologically proximate rival.
Labour Party deliberately and successfully targeted the typical Green voter, producing, for example, a climate change bill that was an attempt to signal that it could represent these voters better than the Green Party in government.\footnote{Conversely, Green voters often defect from the major centre-left party, as in Australia in 2010 (Williams 2011, p.323).}

In addition, leaving a close electoral rival out of coalition means coalescing with a less-close rival, and voters may find it difficult to support a party that is in a coalition that is distant from their policy preferences. In one of these two ways – through voters being attracted by a major rival in opposition or repelled by coalition with an ideologically distant partner – the nature of the coalition (orthodox, with its major electoral rival, or unorthodox, without its major electoral rival) may drive voter defection from the Green party.

\textit{H3. If the Green party's major rival is not in the coalition, then the Green party in coalition will lose votes.}

\subsection*{4.4.5 The economy}
While the economy is only one set of factors that influence voting behaviour, its performance and information about its performance plausibly affects voters' choices by motivating self-interested voting and, more commonly, sociotropic voting (Van der Brug et al. 2007, p.179, p.181). Unemployment appears to affect governments' electoral outcomes (Narud and Valen 2008, p.381, p.384) or centre-left governments only (Van der Brug et al. 2007, see esp. pp.173-174). Support for centre-right governments appears to be negatively affected by inflation (Van der Brug et al. 2007, see esp. pp.173-174; Narud and Valen 2008, p.381, p.384). Green parties may be particularly vulnerable to poor economic conditions, given that they often emerged in conditions of prosperity (Kitschelt 1988, pp.204-205).\footnote{The notion that Green party voters are 'post-materialist' voters runs counter to this expectation.} Much as voters support parties of the left when they feel that they can 'afford' left-of-centre policy (Van der Brug et al. 2007), they may likewise view Green parties as a luxury option. Insofar as Green voters are 'protest' voters, they will be more likely to use elections as \textit{ex post} mechanisms of accountability, thus amplifying the importance of retrospective voting on policy outcomes, such as economic conditions.\footnote{Andeweg and Thomassen (2005) find that this is the case for \textit{List Pim Fortuyn} voters (though not for \textit{GroenLinks} voters) in the Netherlands.}
At the same time, the nature of the relationship between the economy and small parties in governing coalitions is not at all clear and this must moderate our expectations. Van der Brug et al. (2007, pp.173-179, p.184, p.190) find that economic voting effects are not apparent for small parties. In a downturn, the largest party usually loses, but the second-largest gains more often than not (Van der Brug et al. 2007, p.183). Parties of the finance minister are most severely affected by poor economic conditions (Narud and Valen 2008, p.381, p.384), but Green parties have never held this office. Rüdig (2006, pp.S137-S138, p.S146) suggests that the state of the economy is not a determining factor for the electoral outcomes of Green parties in government. Nor has it been established whether economic outcomes affect support parties whose status, presumably, further blurs the clarity of the lines of responsibility that might attach to them. Therefore, our expectations concerning the effects of the economy are weak.

\[ H4: \textit{If the economy performs poorly (well), then the Green party in coalition will lose (gain) votes.} \]

\textbf{Table 4.2. Overview of hypotheses}

\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
H1. If a Green party has been in cabinet during the past legislative term, then it will experience greater electoral losses (smaller gains) than a Green party that has been a support party. \\
H2. The more vote share a Green party in coalition has gained at the pre-coalition election, the more vote share it will lose at the post-coalition election. \\
H3. If the Green party's major rival is not in the coalition, then the Green party in coalition will lose votes. \\
H4: If the economy performs poorly (well), then the Green party in coalition will lose (gain) votes. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\[ \text{Van der Brug et al. (2007) also find that economic voting does not occur in low clarity-of-responsibility contexts. If we follow Royed et al. (2000, esp. p.678; cf. Powell and Whitten 1993), who use coalition government as an indicator of low-clarity context, then all of the cases within the scope of this study occur within low-clarity contexts. Whichever measure of clarity-of-responsibility we use, there appears to be limited heterogeneity between contexts covered by this study.} \]
The hypotheses concerning the electoral outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions are summarised in Table 4.2. Within a given case, these factors typically occur in a particular sequence. First, a party will gain or lose vote share before entering coalition (H2). Second and third, they will enter a coalition either with or without their major electoral rival (H3), and will either become a cabinet party or a support party (H1). Fourth, towards the end of their time in office, the economic conditions that may influence their electoral fate will occur (H4). At the end of this sequence, they will gain or lose votes at the post-coalition election. The four hypotheses are potentially complementary. Moreover, they may act in conjunction with one another, producing non-additive effects. Consistent with the approach set out in Section 1.4, the analysis proceeds in several steps: first, I examine the statistical relationships between these variables, within the limits of the small number of cases available and, second, I explore the conjunction of these causal conditions using crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

4.5 Analyses

4.5.1 Statistical analyses

H1: Office outcomes. The twelve Green parties in cabinet (median -0.85 percentage points; mean -1.23 percentage points) have attained markedly poorer outcomes than support parties (median +0.1 percentage points; mean +0.5 percentage points [pp.]). The poor record of Green parties in cabinet is striking: they have gained votes on only four occasions out of twelve and they have not not gained votes since 2003.

None of the three variants of this hypothesis (see p.233, above) receive support. The difference between parties that were in cabinet (n = 8) and those that were not in cabinet at the time of the election (support parties and defector parties; n = 12) is contrary to expectations. This can be attributed to the poor performance of parties that defected from cabinets before the election. In three of these four cases – the Wallonian Greens (Ecolo) in 2003 (-4.2 pp.), the Czech Greens in 2010 (-3.9 pp.) and the Irish Greens in 2011 (-2.9 pp.), the parties sustained sizeable losses. A party's share of ministerial office does not appear to be related to electoral

21 Given that QCA (applied in Section 4.5) is poorly adapted to detecting the sequence in which events lead to an outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp.263-264), a framework that incorporates a broadly pre-established order of causal conditions provides a stronger basis for interpreting results and reconstructing a causal pathway to the outcomes.

22 Both have performed more poorly than Green parties in opposition (see Appendix H).
outcomes, either for all parties in coalition (n = 20; r = -0.16; p = 0.51) or for parties in cabinet only (n = 12; r = -0.06; p = 0.86). Nor is time in office related to electoral outcomes (r = -0.08, p = 0.75). Contrary to the hypothesis, this relationship appears to be positive (r = 0.3, p = 0.34) among parties in cabinet.

H2: Voter habituation. Using aggregate data on parties' vote share, the observable implication of this hypothesis is a 'gravitational effect': what goes up at the pre-coalition election comes down at the post-coalition election (and vice versa, parties that lose at the pre-coalition election may attract back their old voters at the post-coalition election). The correlation between pre-coalition vote gain (loss) (mean +0.9 pp.; median +0.45 pp.) and post-coalition vote gain (loss) is negative and strong (r = -0.67; p < 0.01). The slope of the regression line indicates a relationship that is close to proportionality (coeff. = -0.94; intercept = -0.14).

There is one notable outlier, with relatively high pre-coalition and post-coalition gains: the New Zealand Greens in 2002. This may be explained by technical reasons. In the absence of party-specific data (as they were competing as part of another party [Alliance]), I allocated the New Zealand Greens 2.5% vote share in 1996 (the penultimate pre-coalition election for this case). This reflects a) their seat share in parliament (3 of 120 seats) and b) their share of seats within the Alliance (3 of 13 seats), which won 10.1% in the list system and 11.3% in SMP constituencies. While this appears to be a reasonable solution, it potentially understates their vote share in 1996 and therefore it potentially overstates their pre-coalition gain in 1999, at the pre-coalition election. When this case is excluded, the correlation rises to -0.83 (p < 0.001) and the slope of the best fitting line when this case is excluded is -1.15 (intercept = -0.2) (i.e., it is greater than proportional).
Figure 4.1. Vote gain (loss) at the pre- and post-coalition elections

H3: Rival parties. Following Spoon (2011) and case studies (e.g., Miragliotta 2013, esp. p.718), I identify the Green party's major rival as the mainstream centre-left party. Since 2007, some Green parties appear to have moved from their strategic position to the left of social democracy and have started cooperating with parties of the centre-right, leaving their major electoral rivals (and traditional allies) in opposition. It comes as little surprise that the Green parties' major rivals are outside coalitions involving Green parties in only four cases out of twenty: in the Czech Republic from 2007 to 2010, when the Social Democrats were in opposition\(^{23}\); in Ireland from 2007 to 2011, where the Labour Party was in opposition; in

\(^{23}\) The Social Democrats were part of a caretaker government that held office for a period before the election in 2010; they were not part of the non-caretaker government in which the Greens participated from 2007 to 2009.
Finland from 2007 to 2011, where the Social Democrats were in opposition; and in the Netherlands in 2012, where the Labour Party and the Socialist Party were in opposition. In all of these cases, the party lost votes, recording a mean loss of 3.1 pp., compared to a mean loss of 0.41 pp. for parties that went into coalition with their rivals (p<0.01). While this is striking, the number of cases is very small and these four cases have occurred during a period of international financial and economic crisis, a set of potentially confounding factors.

**H4: The economy.** I examine the relationship between Green parties' post-coalition electoral outcomes and three indicators of economic conditions: inflation, unemployment and GDP growth. These indicators refer to periods immediately preceding the post-coalition election (following e.g., Whitten and Palmer 1999; Van der Brug et al. 2007; Van Spanje 2011, fn.10).24 This assumes that voters are most responsive to proximate economic conditions. There are no strong or statistically significant bivariate relationships between these economic indicators and the electoral outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions. The correlation between economic growth is positive, as expected, but weak (r = 0.23; p = 0.33); the correlation between unemployment and vote gain is very weak (r = 0.04; p = 0.88); and the correlation between inflation and vote gain is weak and, contrary to expectations, positive (r = 0.14; p = 0.55). There is no visual sign of a curvilinear relationship that we might observe if voters objected both to rates of inflation that were too high and rates of inflation that were too low.

What are the mean effects of each of these variables, holding other variables constant? I begin the multivariate analysis of the outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions with a series of OLS regressions (Table 4.3). The first model includes three variables: membership of cabinet (a dummy variable), pre-coalition electoral gains (losses) and the absence of the party's major electoral rival from coalition (a dummy variable). All three coefficients point in the expected direction and together they account for just less than half of the variance in vote gain among Green parties in governing coalitions. This model indicates that, for every percentage point vote gain at the pre-coalition election, the parties lost an average of 0.76 percentage points of the vote at the post-coalition election. Parties that left their major rival

24 All data are sourced from the OECD's statistical archive (OECD 2013). For GDP, I use 'Quarterly National Accounts. B1_GE: Gross domestic product - expenditure approach. GYSA: Growth rate compared to the same quarter of previous year, seasonally adjusted' for the last full quarter preceding the election. For unemployment, I use annual unemployment rate data from the OECD's Labour Force Statistics for the last full year before the election. For inflation, I use quarterly data from 'Consumer Prices - MEI. Consumer prices - All items. Percentage change on the same period in the previous year.'
outside the coalition appear to lose 1.73 percentage points more than other parties. Cabinet parties lost only 0.23 percentage points more, on average, than support parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td>-1.59*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote gain at pre-coalition election (pp.)</td>
<td>-0.76***</td>
<td>-0.8***</td>
<td>-0.7**</td>
<td>-0.94***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major rival outside the coalition</td>
<td>-1.73*</td>
<td>-1.59*</td>
<td>-1.71*</td>
<td>-1.3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.9)</td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
<td>(0.9)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In cabinet</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.7)</td>
<td>(0.7)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share at e-2 (%)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.26*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sigma</td>
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<td>1.49</td>
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<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. R-squared</td>
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<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>6.65</td>
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<td>4.68</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistical significance (p): '***' 0.01; '**' 0.05; '*' 0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses
Non-standardised coefficients

I control for economic growth in the second model. It is associated with small mean gains (0.2 pp. for each percentage point in growth), but it adds little to the explanatory power of the model. In Model 3, I control for party size at the penultimate pre-coalition election, as larger parties may have a higher capacity to retain voters during their time in coalition. This adds almost nothing to the explanatory power of the model and is associated with a small coefficient: for each 1% vote share at the penultimate pre-coalition election, the party
manages to gain (or retain) 0.2 additional percentage points in vote share, on average. Other coefficients do not change much in Models 2 and 3, although the effect of vote gain at the pre-coalition election becomes more modest.

In Model 4, I drop a case that involves imputed data for its pre-coalition election (see p.239, above). This boosts the model's explanatory power – the adjusted R-squared rises to 0.73 – and it brings the relationship between pre-coalition gains (losses) and post-coalition losses (gains) close to mean proportionality (coeff. = 0.94; p < 0.01). It reduces the mean effect of leaving the rival party outside coalition and, contrary to expectations, it produces a small, positive coefficient for cabinet incumbency.25

These analyses give rise to several observations. First, the mean effect of incumbency, insofar as it exists, appears to be smaller than expected. Second, the mean effect of unorthodox coalition (leaving the Green party's major rival outside cabinet) is fairly large. This effect remains large when economic growth and party size is controlled for. While controlling for economic growth cannot definitively rule out the possibility that these effects were in fact caused by the economic crisis, it does take a step down that path. Third, the mean effect of economic growth is weak, as expected.

Fourth, and most strikingly, these models highlight the considerable explanatory power of pre-coalition vote gains. This is worthy of further examination: is it really caused by voter habituation or might it simply be a statistical artefact resulting from a mechanical regression to a 'normal' level of vote share (i.e., 'random noise') that affects all parties electoral results? There are at least two responses to this challenge, one of which is conceptual, the other empirical.

In conceptual terms, even if they represent a regression to some kind of 'normal' level for the parties, these post-coalition losses remain losses, with important political and strategic implications for these parties. They are substantial losses (and gains) and they are part of the variance to be explained, not just a statistical oscillation that we can relegate to the error term.

An empirical comparison of Green parties in coalition with a set of similar parties – those same Green parties in opposition – suggests that there is something more than 'noise' going on among this set of parties. Regressing an interaction term comprising coalition membership

25 Variance inflation factors (VIF) remain very close to 1 for all variables in all models. The VIF of vote gain at the pre-coalition election rises to a maximum of 1.34 when historic vote size is introduced.
and previous vote gains (losses) on these parties' electoral outcomes produces estimates that indicate that the effect of previous gains on subsequent losses is modified by coalition membership (Figure 4.2). Green parties in opposition have not experienced the corrections in their vote share of the same magnitude as Green parties in coalition, indicating that the relationship that is apparent among Green parties in coalition is not some kind of 'noise' that invariably affects all parties' results.

When Green parties have made a loss at the previous elections (on the left-hand side of Figure 4.2), they have tended to make gains at the subsequent election, whether they spend the intervening period in opposition or in coalition. 26 However, when they have made a gain at the previous election, their subsequent result seems to have depended on whether they were in coalition or in opposition. For parties in opposition, the predicted value is statistically indistinguishable from zero for prior gains of greater than 1.5 percentage points and in the case of smaller gains it is positive (i.e., it predicts a further gain). For parties that make a gain and then enter coalition, the predicted value is clearly negative, even at low values (< 1 percentage point) of vote gain. 27 In summary, previous gains have a much stronger negative association with subsequent results for Green parties in coalition than for Green parties in opposition (see Appendix H for details of this and related analyses). The pattern is not simply an artefact of 'random noise' that affects all parties.

26 The mean gain for Green parties that entered coalition on the back of vote losses was generally higher than those of Green parties that entered opposition after losing vote share, albeit not statistically distinct (as the confidence intervals overlap heavily). To examine the possibility that the relationship is driven by 'high-gainers' in coalition, I run a model (Model 3) in Appendix H that examines only parties that gained at the previous election. The same pattern is still present among that subset of parties.

27 In the model illustrated by Figure 4.2, a gain of 2.2 pp. is associated with a clear loss of between 1.1 pp. And 3.1 pp. (predicted value: a gain of 2.1 pp) for parties in coalition. For parties in opposition, a gain of 2.2 pp., in contrast, is associated with a further gain of 0.3 pp., on average (even if this predicted value is indistinguishable from zero when confidence intervals are taken into account).
Figure 4.2. The effect of previous electoral gains (losses) on subsequent losses (gains) for Green parties in coalition and Green parties in opposition (Model 1 in Appendix H)

Overall, the bivariate analyses and the models in Table 4.3 provide a useful summary of the mean effects of several variables of interest. However, the small number of cases means that Type II errors (i.e., false negatives) are more likely and, as the cases are not randomly selected, it is not possible to take advantage of the full inferential power of statistical analyses. Moreover, it is plausible that these factors will act in conjunction and may modify one another's effects to produce non-additive effects, as they are integrated into individuals' voting behaviour. We can acquire a richer understanding if we explore these interactions. This can be achieved through a linear-interactive model (see Brambor et al. 2006; Kam and Franzese 2007), but only if sufficient degrees of freedom are available for the interaction terms and
their constituent terms. For the small number of cases available here, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) offers an approach to doing this.

4.5.2 Set-theoretic analyses

I calibrate crisp sets that represent the outcome and the selected causal conditions. For the outcome (post-coalition vote gain) and for one causal condition (pre-coalition vote gain), the threshold between gaining and losing votes is zero. This simple distinction between winning and losing has been used before in intermediate-\(n\) analyses of parties' electoral outcomes in government (e.g., Narud 1996).\(^{28}\)

For economic conditions, the psychologically important barrier between economic growth and economic contraction is one possible threshold at which to dichotomise a crisp set. However, this presents us with a problem of limited variation (Rihoux and de Meur 2008, p.45): less than one-third of cases are characterised by contracting economies. Arguably, recession is not the only psychologically important barrier for voters; economies growing at under 1% may be considered to be stagnant. This calibration is broadly consistent with theories of grievance asymmetry (see Van Spanje 2011) and with Van der Brug et al.’s (2007) findings that rewards and punishments for economic performance are indeed asymmetrical.\(^{29}\) In order to take this into account and to avoid the problem of limited variation, I calibrate the crisp set of poor economic conditions as economic growth of less than 1% and good economic conditions as economic growth above 1%. I vary this threshold upwards in a robustness test described on p.254, below.

Two other potential causal conditions face similar problems of limited variation and therefore should not be incorporated in the QCA. Only four cases are characterised by the rival party being in opposition (see p.240 for details) and only five cases are characterised by a defection from coalition. These included the Finnish Greens in 2002, Ecolo in Belgium in 2003, the Czech Greens in 2010 and the Irish Greens in 2011 (see Chapter 3 for details). They also include the New Zealand Greens, whose acute conflict with Labour over the release of GMOs in 2002, culminating in a walkout from parliament, was the functional equivalent of a

\(^{28}\) In examining gains (losses) of parties in 44 cabinets in the Netherlands and Norway, Narud (1996, p.487) observes that: “Concerning individual parties, I make no distinction between landslide winning and losing and simply winning and losing. Obviously there is a major quantitative difference between losing a single seat and losing, for example, 20 seats. However, with so few cases to analyse we must focus on the qualitative difference between winning and losing.”

\(^{29}\) Average annual economic growth in the EU 15 during the period covered by this study was 1.8%. Own calculations, OECD (2012) data.
defection. Notwithstanding their rarity, these conditions have something in common: both entering an unorthodox coalition and defection from a coalition are characterised by acute conflict between the Green party and a larger rival. Therefore, they also provide a basis for the formation of a higher-order concept that represents the set of parties that were in acute conflict with a large rival party (a coalition partner or a major electoral rival) before the post-coalition election. In set-theoretic terms, this is represented by the union (logical 'or') of the set of defector-parties and the set of parties that entered coalition without their major electoral rival. Extending the logic of Hypothesis 3, I expect that acute conflict will be associated with vote loss as the small party is targeted by any major rival. Seven of the twenty cases feature such conflict.

Table 4.4. Summary of set membership values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Set</th>
<th>Vote gain at pre-coalition election</th>
<th>In cabinet</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Poor economic conditions</th>
<th>Vote loss at post-coalition election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITA 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLO 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWZ 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAG 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEC 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWZ 2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER 2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWZ 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRE 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4.5.2.1 Necessary and singularly sufficient conditions
None of the causal conditions introduced in these models appear to be singularly necessary for post-coalition vote losses or vote gains (Table 4.5). Nor is there evidence for highly consistent subset relations (i.e., singular sufficiency see fn. 48, Chapter 2 for more on the logic of inferring subset relations from superset relations). Notably, the set-theoretic relation that comes closest to the relevant consistency threshold of 0.9 is between pre-coalition vote gain and post-condition vote losses, even if it clearly falls short of that threshold.

**Table 4.5. Superset (i.e., necessity) relations for vote loss and vote gain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions tested</th>
<th>Analysis of Necessary Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome: Vote loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consistency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In cabinet</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in cabinet</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-coalition vote gain</td>
<td>0.833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-coalition vote loss</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth &gt; 1%</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth &lt; 1%</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict (defection or unorthodox coalition)</td>
<td>0.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The absence of conflict</td>
<td>0.583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See p.17 for a note on consistency and coverage.

4.5.2.2 Sufficient conditions for post-coalition vote share loss
In order to identify the configurations of conditions that are sufficient for vote losses, I examine a series of QCA models. Notwithstanding the possibility of making simplifying assumptions in order to address the problem of limited diversity, it is desirable that, at least in principle, the cases might populate each possible configuration of causal conditions. Therefore, for the analyses that follow, I limit the number of causal conditions in any one model to a maximum of four ($4^2 = 16$). Due to their theoretical and apparent empirical importance for the outcome, I always include two causal conditions in the models: pre-coalition vote gain and cabinet membership. In Model 1, I add the set of poor economic
conditions (< 1% GDP growth). In Model 2, I replace the set of poor economic conditions with the set of 'conflict'. In a Model 3, I add both 'conflict' and economic conditions.

In the first model (incorporating economic conditions), all eight possible configurations of conditions have occurred among Green parties in governing coalitions: limited diversity is not a problem. In the second model, none of the cases feature a party that has entered coalition on the back of an electoral loss and then entered into acute conflict with a large rival; this means that two of the eight configurations implied by the model have not yet occurred. This limited diversity is also reflected in the largest (four-condition) model (Model 3) in which four rows are 'logical remainder' rows which have not yet occurred among Green parties in governing coalitions.  

The solutions produced by these models (Table 4.6) reflect the strong association between pre-coalition gains and post-coalition losses already detected in bivariate and multivariate analyses. Pre-coalition vote gain is present in all solutions and in all paths to post-coalition vote loss that form part of the solutions. Together, they feature three paths to vote loss (i.e., three configurations of conditions that appear to be sufficient for vote loss). One path (gain*cabinet) – or a subset of that path (gain*cabinet*~conflict in Model 3) – appears in all solutions. Another path (gain*~economy) appears in two solutions (Model 1 and Model 3). A third path (gain*~conflict) appears in one solution (Model 2) and a subset of this path (gain*cabinet*~conflict) appears in Model 3. The Model 3 solution is a subset of the Model 1 solution. I assess these solutions by examining their consistency with the data (whether and how they are contradicted by some cases); their consistency with theoretical expectations; and their coverage of cases that exhibit the outcome.

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30 See Appendix I for truth tables referring to the 'fullest' (i.e., four-condition) models for vote loss and vote gain. Limited diversity in the smaller models can be read from these tables.

31 See Table 4.6 for notation.
Table 4.6. Vote loss solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Raw consistency</th>
<th>Logical contradictions</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Cases covered</th>
<th>Cases covered by all (both) paths</th>
<th>Cases not covered/typified by the solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>gain~economy + gain<em>cabinet</em></td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1 None</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>Netherlands 2012; Italy 1994</td>
<td>Germany 2005; Czech 2010; Ireland 2011</td>
<td>Italy 2001; Italy 2008; Slovakia 2002; New Zealand 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>gain*cabinet</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>Finland 2003</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>*Agalev 2003; Ecolo 2003; Finland 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>gain~conflict + gain<em>cabinet</em></td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>Sweden 2006</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>Italy 1994; Slovakia 2002; New Zealand 2005</td>
<td>Germany 2005; *Agalev 2003</td>
<td>Italy 2001; Italy 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>gain*cabinet</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>Finland 2003</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>*Ecolo 2003; Finland 2011; Czech 2010; Ireland 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>gain~economy + gain<em>cabinet</em> ~conflict</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>Netherlands 2012; Italy 1994; Czech 2010; Ireland 2011</td>
<td>Germany 2005</td>
<td>Italy 2001; Italy 2008; Slovakia 2002; New Zealand 2005; Finland 2011; *Ecolo 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>gain<em>cabinet</em> ~conflict</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>*Agalev 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

gain = pre-coalition vote gain; cabinet = cabinet membership; economy = economic growth > 1%; conflict = defection or unorthodox coalition

~ indicates the negation of a condition (i.e., 'not'); + indicates 'or'; * indicates 'and'.

Coefficients are rounded to two decimal points.

All are conservative solutions, which do not rely on simplifying assumptions.

See p.17 for a note on consistency and coverage.
**Vote loss: solution consistency.**

Model 3 is perfectly consistent in set-theoretic terms, while Models 1 and 2 give rise to 'logical contradictions' that compromise their consistency (0.89 and 0.82, respectively): the case of the Finnish Greens in 2003 (in Models 1 and 2) and the case of the Swedish Greens in 2006 (in Model 2). In these cases, the causal conditions are present, but the outcome is not. How can these logical contradictions be explained? The Finnish Greens entered coalition on the back of vote gains in 1999 and yet still made gains at the post-coalition election in 2003. Although they saw their electoral prospects rise during their time in government (see p.189, above, for details), their post-coalition electoral result may be at least partly attributed to the circumstances surrounding their defection from coalition in 2002. Most importantly, it was driven by a major inter-party policy conflict that was easily comprehensible to Green voters: the decision to construct a fifth nuclear power plant in Finland.

This case can be contrasted with other cases of defection in Belgium in 2003, in Ireland in 2011 and in the Czech Republic in 2010, each of which are covered by paths (1.2 and 2.2) that the Finnish case contradicts. Their defections were justified on the basis of policies in which they were already implicated (the multilateral 'bailout' loan in Ireland) or which were not major and easily-comprehensible (policy regarding a coal-fired power station in the Czech case; a cabinet reshuffle in Ireland; night flights over Brussels in the Belgian case). Gahrton and Aylward (2010 p.20, p.26) contrast the Finnish case with the relatively minor issue of night flights in the case of Ecolo in Belgium, observing that voters in Belgium did not perceive this to be a sufficiently serious issue to justify a crisis in government. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, unlike the Finnish case each of these were last-minute defections from coalition under conditions of serious internal strife (Ecolo in Belgium) or very poor electoral prospects (the Irish Greens; the Czech Greens), and therefore could be attributed by voters to strategic or organisational factors (see Subsection 3.5.4.2, above, for further descriptions).

The Finnish case is also similar to the only other defector-party to gain votes: the case of the New Zealand Greens in 2002. They came into conflict with their coalition partner over an easily-comprehensible environmental policy (i.e., 'green') issue: the release of genetically modified organisms. This resulted in the party walking out of parliament, receiving increased support in opinion polls and, after a torrid election campaign, gaining votes (Church and
McLeay 2002; Bale 2003). Thus, the nature of the Finnish Greens' defection – and its qualitative distinctiveness from several other defections – helps to explain why they achieved an unusual outcome, even if variation in the data is not sufficient to include this condition in a QCA.

A second case emerges as a logical contradiction in a path that features pre-coalition gains and the absence of conflict in the solution to Model 2 (Path 2.1). This is the case of the Swedish Greens in 2006. Like the case of the Finnish Greens in Model 1 and Model 2, they shared the causal conditions in a pathway, but not the outcome. This might be explained by the fact that the crisp set calibration of the Swedish Greens' pre-coalition vote gain obscures the fact that it was, by any standards, tiny: only 0.1 of a percentage point. Therefore, this case may be considered as one that does not fit Path 2.1 and therefore does not contradict it.

If we accept the substantive explanation for the 'logical contradiction' status of the Finnish case in 2003 and the technical explanation for the Swedish case in 2006, differences in consistency scores between the solutions are mitigated entirely and they do not provide a basis for discriminating between solutions.

Consistency with theoretical expectations: plausible pathways to vote loss?

There are several paths in Table 4.6 that are fully consistent with the direction of our theoretical expectations: both paths in Model 1 (gain*~economy and gain*cabinet); the second path in Model 2 (gain*cabinet); and the first path in Model 3 (gain*~economy). There are two pathways that appear to contradict some of our expectations. Both of them involve the absence of conflict with coalition partners leading to vote losses. One is Path 2.1 (gain*~conflict) and the other is Path 3.2 (gain*cabinet*~conflict). How might the absence of conflict (i.e., the absence of defection and the absence of orthodox coalition) contribute to vote losses? It is not clear what mechanism might lead to this outcome. Therefore, solutions that involve it (Model 2 and 3) are, on the face of it, somewhat less useful than Model 1, which is consistent with our expectations.

Vote loss: solution coverage

The solutions in Table 4.6 cover between half and three-quarters of the cases that feature the outcome (vote loss). Several cases are not covered by one or more of these solutions. Can these outcomes be explained? The cases of the Italian Greens in 2001 and 2008 are not

32 More specifically, how could it cause vote losses first, for parties that had gained votes and entered coalition and, second, for parties that had gained votes and entered cabinet?
covered by any of the solutions. The Italian cases fall outside these paths because, instead of gaining vote share before entering coalition, they lost vote share. These losses were marginal (-0.2 pp. in 2001 and -0.1 pp. in 2008); therefore, they might be considered to come extremely close to being covered by all of these solutions. While this helps to lend support to all solutions, it does not discriminate between them.33

Model 2 provides greater coverage (0.75) than Model 1 (0.67). This difference in coverage is accounted for by the cases of the New Zealand Greens in 2005 and the Slovak Greens in 2002, which both fall outside of the solution to Model 1, but are covered by Model 2. Can their exclusion from Model 1 be explained? The New Zealand Green Party was a relatively large support party in coalition with its major rival in good economic conditions. The obvious extenuating circumstance was the unusual way in which it achieved its pre-coalition gain – a 'high quality' defection from coalition in 2002 (see p.251, above) – which, followed by an unexpected return to that coalition, perhaps made it difficult to sustain these gains in 2005. The party's difficulties may have been exacerbated in the context of a close and highly competitive election campaign involving “an increasingly extravagant policy auction” that marginalised smaller parties (Geddis 2006, pp.810-811). This narrative appears to be broadly consistent with the path that covers it in Model 2 (gain*-conflict).

The Slovak Green Party gained a small amount of vote share (0.4 pp.) before entering coalition as a support party and contested its post-coalition election under conditions of economic growth. Soon after entering coalition, the party's opinion poll ratings dropped to close to zero; it replaced its leadership in 1999 and in 2001, with little positive effect; it won zero regional seats out of 400 in 2001; and it failed to conclude negotiations on a pre-election alliance with other parties of the centre and left. In 2002, it competed as an independent party without a hope of reaching the 5% electoral threshold (Kopeček 2009, pp.128-130). This narrative is not a good fit for the path that covers it in Model 2 (gain*-conflict); nor, for that matter, does it come close to fitting the paths in Model 1. The Slovak case is perhaps best explained outside of either of these models.

In summary, Model 1 appears to be more theoretically plausible than Model 2, given the unspecified role of the absence of acute conflict (i.e., the absence of defection or unorthodox

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33 As Model 1 is superior to Model 3 in terms of coverage and – quite possibly – plausibility; and as Model 2 contains a path that is a superset of Model 3's distinctive second path, I confine the discussion of coverage to Models 1 and 2.
coalition) in vote loss, even if Model 2 covers the case of the New Zealand Greens in 2005 while Model 1 does not. As the plausibility of the explanation is more important than coverage – and as it means that we do not need to rely on a 'technical' explanation of a logical contradiction (Sweden in 2006) – Model 1 appears to offer the best solution: pre-coalition vote gains and either cabinet membership or poor economic conditions appear to have been sufficient for vote losses for Green parties in governing coalitions and, thus, explain vote losses in many cases of Green parties in coalition. In order to test the robustness of Model 1 in relation to the calibration of poor economic conditions, I vary the threshold from 1% (which is a rather low estimate of economic stagnation) to 3%; the resulting solution does not change (not shown).

4.5.2.3 Sufficient conditions for post-coalition vote share gains
To detect pathways to vote gain among Green parties in coalition, I again use models built on expectations concerning vote gain at the pre-coalition election, cabinet membership, economic conditions and acute conflict. They are identical to the models used to examine vote share losses: all models include pre-coalition gain and cabinet membership conditions. In Model 1, I add economic conditions; in Model 2, I add 'conflict'; and in Model 3, I add both. As a result, they feature the same limited diversity as the 'loss' models.

Each of the solutions produced by these models are perfectly consistent in set-theoretic terms: their paths to vote gain feature no logical contradictions (Table 4.7). Each have in common a path that features pre-coalition vote losses followed by support party status (~gain*~cabinet). This path – and its subset in Models 2 and 3 (~gain*~cabinet*~conflict) – covers the New Zealand Greens in 2008 and the Swedish Greens in 2002 (even if their gain in 2002 was marginal [0.1 pp.]) and it is consistent with the direction of theoretical expectations.

---

34 The task of distinguishing which path best fits cases covered by more than one path is not a central aim of this analysis. In the preferred model (Model 1), prior theoretical expectations lead us to believe that Path 1.1 offers a stronger explanation. However, in the case of Ireland, which experienced a severe economic downturn, it may be best explained by Path 1.2.
Table 4.7. Vote gain solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Raw consistency</th>
<th>Logical contradictions</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Cases covered</th>
<th>Cases covered by both paths</th>
<th>Cases not covered by the solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

gain = pre-coalition vote gain; cabinet = cabinet membership; economy = economic growth > 1%; conflict = defection or unorthodox coalition

~ indicates the negation of a condition (i.e., 'not'); + indicates 'or'; * indicates 'and'.

Coefficients are rounded to two decimal points.

All are conservative solutions, which do not rely on simplifying assumptions.

See p.17 for a note on consistency and coverage.

At first sight, Model 3 appears to produce the superior solution, given that, all else being equal, it covers an additional case. Its second path (Path 3.2), featuring pre-coalition gain,
followed by cabinet membership, an election fought in the context of a growing economy and acute conflict with major rivals or former coalition partners (in this case the latter) covers the New Zealand Greens in 2002. This path features two terms that are not consistent with theoretical expectations. First, it features pre-coalition electoral gains. This might be explained by the nature of the data available for this party's pre-coalition gains in 1999 (see fn.26, above). Notably, pre-coalition gains is dropped from this path in the 'intermediate' solution (i.e., a solution that makes plausible counterfactual assumptions to mitigate the problem of limited diversity). 35 Second, it features 'conflict', which we expected to be associated with vote losses, rather than vote gains. In conjunction with other conditions, it seems to be associated with gains. 36 However, a caveat needs to be entered here: as we saw from the analysis of this case of defection compared to other cases, the quality of the New Zealand Greens' defection in 2002 – on a major, easily-comprehensible issue, before its electoral prospects declined – appears to qualify this. Parties may not just need acute conflict, but rather a particular type of acute conflict in order to win vote gains. This is a potentially important qualitative distinction.

There are several cases of vote gain that are not covered by the solutions in Table 4.7. Like the New Zealand Greens in 2002, the vote gains of the Finnish Greens in 2003 might be explained by virtue of their defection from coalition (see p.251, above). The absence of the Swedish Greens in 2006 from Paths 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1 might be explained by its marginal membership in the set of pre-coalition vote gains (see p.252, above). Were it classified as not having pre-coalition vote gains, it would be covered by the first path in each of the solutions in Table 4.7.

Three instances of post-coalition vote gain after participating in cabinet – the Finnish Greens in 1999 (+1.2 pp.), the French Greens in 2002 (+0.8 pp.) and the German Greens in 2002 (+1.9 pp.) – are less easily explained. One potential explanation that emerges from existing case studies refers to the general popularity of these governments or the success of their election campaigns. In Finland in 1999, the size and general popularity of the incumbent coalition and the weakness of the opposition (Jungar 2011 pp.141-142) may help to explain

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35 The 'intermediate' solution to Model 3 simplifies the second path to: ~cabinet*economy*conflict. However, it offers no improvement in terms of coverage.

36 In Model 3, we see both the presence and the absence of a condition contributing to an outcome, depending on its conjunction with other conditions. This displays a key strength of QCA. However, in this instance, given that there is no mechanism that can account for these conjunctions within the existing theoretical framework, it appears to cast further doubt on the role of ‘conflict’, as such.
the Greens' success. In France in 2002, the main factors may have been the government's general popularity (despite Jospin's failed presidential bid), combined with a moderately successful 'opposition in government' strategy by the Greens (Ysmaal 2003). In Germany in 2002, on the other hand, the party's electoral success was unexpected (Rüdig 2002, p.101, pp.104-105; Poguntke 2003, p.962) but was at least partly driven by a popular leading candidate, an opposition beset by scandals, a strong campaign by the Chancellor and the possibility of split-ticket voting (Poguntke 2003; Wüst and Roth 2006, p.455; Frankland 2008, p.25). Finally, it is notable that, in all of the cases of vote gain – both covered and uncovered – the rival party was in coalition (indeed, in cabinet); it 'looks like' a necessary condition for vote gains, even if its limited variation does not allow it to be included in the models. In this sense, these cases resemble Rüdig's (2006) 'new Greens' path to post-coalition electoral success, albeit one that is contingent on a popular government as well as other factors.

4.5.2.4 Summary of set-theoretic analyses
The set-theoretic analyses identify two configurations of conditions that are sufficient for vote losses and two that are sufficient for vote gain. Case analyses suggest explanations for outcomes in some other individual cases. The paths to vote loss begin with a pre-coalition vote gain, followed by either cabinet membership or a poorly performing economy. This solution (Model 1 in Table 4.6) leaves the New Zealand Greens' vote loss in 2005 and the chaotic experience of the Slovak Greens to be explained in other terms. The former may be explained by the unusual circumstances that surrounded its pre-coalition election. The latter may be in some way a marginal case, either due to the party's characteristics (being small and young), its organisational problems or the political environment in which it operated.

The main path to vote gain begins with pre-coalition vote loss, followed by support party status and the absence of defection or unorthodox coalition. A second path involves support party status, good economic conditions and conflict, albeit in the form of defection that is clearly driven by a major, easily-comprehensible policy issue. Indeed, this type of defection – which also helps to explain the vote gains of the Finnish Greens – may be a decisive factor, even if its occurrence has been so rare that it cannot be incorporated into the QCA. This solution is less successful than the vote loss solution, as it leaves many cases uncovered. While one can be explained in terms of 'high-quality' defection (Finland in 2003) and another by its marginal non-membership in the first path to vote gain (Sweden in 2006), others are not fully explained. However, these important residual cases may constitute a variation on Rüdig's
(2006) 'new Greens' strategy: committing the party to a continuation of a coalition and sharing in its electoral success.

The importance of the pre-coalition result as an INUS condition is apparent throughout all of the analyses, even if it is neither singularly necessary nor singularly sufficient for either of the outcomes. This corroborates the results of the statistical analyses. Cabinet membership appears to be associated with vote losses and support party status does appear to provide some protection from the cost of governing, despite the relatively small mean effect that was evident in multivariate analyses. Economic conditions, too, appear to play a role, albeit only in producing vote losses, consistent with theories of grievance asymmetry. The concept of acute conflict appears to require further investigation and refinement. Its inclusion produced some counterintuitive findings (with the absence of acute conflict being associated with vote loss in some solutions) and case-specific analyses indicate a major qualitative distinction between acute conflict that arises from defections that are 'too little, too late' and those that occur on a major, easily-comprehensible green policy issue.

4.6 Discussion

If the story of Green parties in opposition was one of incremental electoral gains, then the story of Green parties in governing coalitions – and government – appears to be one of losses that are frequent and sometimes large, leading in some cases to their exclusion from parliament. More specifically, Green parties' outcomes after being in cabinet have been fairly abject and recent outcomes have been particularly negative. This lends some support to Mair's (2001) suggestion that governing and Green parties do not mix well.

However, their outcomes have also been diverse and if we compare Green parties with the broader population of new or newly governing parties, we may still ask, following Buelens and Hino (2008, p.160) why Green parties do relatively well in coalition compared to far right or far left parties. The frequency of their losses (12/20 in governing coalitions or 8/12 in cabinet) is still less than the 74% identified among new parties in government by Buelens and Hino (2008). Their mean loss (-0.9%) – even that of parties that have been in cabinet (-1.23%) – is less than the mean cost of governing for parties in coalition (about 2 percentage points),

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not to mention the electoral cost for anti-establishment parties, which is considerably higher, at approximately 5% (Van Spanje 2011, p.625).

What accounts for variation among Green parties in governing coalitions? The paths identified by Poguntke (2002b) and by Rüdig (2006) find some resonance in more recent cases, but this chapter, building on a broader literature, has also uncovered some novel causal relationships. The parsimonious evaluation of the Irish Green Party's fate offered by its leader in March 2011 appears to travel rather well:

   One. We were in government. Two. We were in government with Fianna Fáil. Three. We were in government with Fianna Fáil during the worst recession in the State. It made our challenge insurmountable. (John Gormley quoted in McGee 2011).

Incumbency, the economy, and relations with other parties all appear to play a role in deciding the fate of Green parties in governing coalitions. Importantly, Green parties in coalition are not simply victims and beneficiaries of circumstance: their attributes and strategies have a bearing on their outcomes.

First, the most striking individual finding is the role of weak voter habituation in the electoral losses of Green parties in governing coalitions. This mechanism appears to fit the strong regularity that is apparent in all of the analyses conducted. It is consistent with the finding that changes in parties' vote share is, most of the time, associated with slowly-changing factors such as sociodemographics and individuals' values (Van der Brug et al. 2007, pp.177-178). It is also consistent with the incrementalism and electoral under-achievement that Mair (2001) alleged in Green parties' electoral outcomes. For the parties in coalition, the retention of new supporters appears to be their main electoral challenge, and the more that they have gained before entering coalition, the greater is this challenge. Combined with the observation that young voters are more likely to defect than older voters, and that voter inertia accounts for much of this difference, this implies that retaining young voters is the most difficult – and potentially rewarding – task for parties between elections (Gomez 2012). Green parties may do well to assess the robustness of their own electoral base before entering coalition, particularly given the younger age profile of their supporters. Many of those that have done reasonably well – in Finland, Germany, Sweden and New Zealand – had relatively large and long-established bases of electoral support.

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This analysis highlights the value of recent studies on voter behaviour (Gomez 2012) for interpreting party-level patterns of vote loss and gain. However, the habituation mechanism in the cases studied here, while difficult to confirm, could bear a more direct study, using individual-level data on voters.

Second, while the mean effect of cabinet membership appears to be small, it also appears to be part of an important pathway to vote losses, while support party status appears to be part of two pathways to vote gains. In other words, there does appear to be a tension between the pursuit of office and the pursuit of votes (Strøm and Müller 1999, p.9). To date, Green parties have ended up in support party positions as a result of their major partner's decision to exclude them from cabinet, rather than their own choice (see Chapter 2, above, esp. Appendix C). Might it be electorally prudent for them to opt for support party status under some circumstances?

Third, the conditions for electorally profitable defection from coalition (as in Finland in 2002 and New Zealand in 2002) appear to be very restrictive and are clearly not within these parties' control. In addition, they may need to consider the possible effects of defection on the likelihood of being invited to coalesce with the same partners again if their defection brings down the government (Tavits 2008, see esp. p.503). When Green parties enter coalition, they should not count on defection being readily available as an electoral strategy.

The fourth finding relates to Green parties' coalition strategy. Mair (2001, p.107) observed that the Greens' strategic position, to the left of social democracy, was one of their major weaknesses. He went further, linking this weak bargaining position to their continued electoral marginality.

[T]hey now find themselves with a role which, at worst, is little more than that of a radical ginger group to the left of Social Democracy and which, at best, is oriented towards pulling their larger neighbour in a more green direction. In other words, they have traded independence for dependence, autonomy for influence. For these reasons also they are likely to remain electorally marginal in future.

The present analysis indicates that Green parties' strategic position is indeed important. However, unlike Mair, it suggests that there is a trade-off, rather than complementarity, between their bargaining strength and their electoral position, at least in the short-term.
This is a key current question for the Greens (Rüdig 2013). In the wake of the 2009 general election in Germany, Joschka Fischer acknowledged that the German Greens would represent 'middle Germany' within the German left (Fischer 2009b). On foot of that article, I asked him during a question and answer session at the University of Bologna whether he believed that the logical implication of this was that the Greens would open up their coalition strategy to both left and right. He paused before saying that his personal history was that of a 'Red-Green' and that, as he had stepped back from politics, he did not want to tell the party what it should do. However, he observed that with the establishment of the Left Party with which the Green Party cannot compete directly on the left, the Greens “would have to open up more to the centre” and that moving to a more open coalition strategy was “risky, but that is the definition of life” (Fischer 2009a). While representing central voters might be a useful bridging point to a stronger, more central bargaining position and to coalition with parties outside of their traditional camp, it appears that unorthodox coalition has been electorally costly for the Greens and so might be treated with some considerable circumspection. This is not (or not only) because of the parties with which they would coalesce and the compromises that this entails, but also because of the electoral effects of leaving important electoral rivals outside the coalition tent, free to target their voters.

Can these findings be generalised to other small parties in governing coalitions? Green parties may be more or less prone to some of the conditions that mark the paths to vote loss and vote gain. The discussion in Section 4.2 (and further discussion in Section 4.4) indicated that, while Green parties in governing coalitions were diverse and therefore potentially representative of newly governing or small parties in terms of their outcomes, they were, on balance, more likely to be subject to negative post-coalition outcomes than comparable parties. Although the aim of this chapter has not been to compare Green parties with other parties, these prior expectations can be updated somewhat in light of the chapter's analyses.

Descriptively, Green parties' mean losses in governing coalition (and, more narrowly, in government) are markedly smaller and less frequent than those of far right or far left parties in government (Buelens and Hino 2008, p.160; see also Van Spanje 2011). This indicates that, although their outcomes have been diverse, they may be more positive and, in this sense, unrepresentative of new parties in general. At the same time, Green parties are possibly 'more likely' cases of the explanations identified, particularly those of vote loss. Green voters may be more likely to be weakly habituated than voters for other small parties (see discussion,
p.234, above). Unorthodox coalition – which shows a large mean effect – may also be more likely for Green parties, insofar as they are better positioned than some other parties (e.g., far right or far left parties) to take up a central or ‘open’ coalition strategy. The effects of these distinctive features may limit generalisation. However, the effects of their distinctive characteristics are not uni-directional: due to their clear policy-orientation, they may be more likely to make a successful, ‘principled’ defection and subsequently make electoral gains. If they have lower office-orientation, they may be better able to tolerate support party status, which under certain conditions, has consistently led to vote gain. Moreover, the fact that they are ‘more likely’ to be the subject of low voter habituation (or the effects of unorthodox coalition) does not mean that these explanations should not be tested for other parties: they are supported by a powerful logic and clear empirical regularities. While distinctive characteristics of their cases may somewhat bias their outcomes or causal paths, the factors that appear to drive their outcomes in coalition (e.g., having weakly habituated voters) are far from unique among parties in governing coalitions (or beyond).

Looking beyond the scope of this study, a further outstanding question relates to Green parties’ electoral progress after their first post-coalition election. Participation in governing coalitions has not led to the general medium-term decline suggested by Mair (2001). There are three main groups of parties. First, there are parties that have failed to grow, recover or re-enter parliament after losing votes at their post-coalition election. The Italian Greens hit their peak vote share in national elections in 1992 (2.8%) and managed to remain above 2% (but below 3%) until their disastrous election in 2008 (0.6%). The Slovak Greens have not recovered from their low vote share (1%) in 2002. Both of these parties are outside parliament and remain dependent on electoral coalitions for any prospect of re-entering. On the other hand, the French Greens, also dependent on electoral coalitions, have managed to break new electoral ground (5.5% vote share) in 2012.

Second, the Belgian Green parties managed to recover by 2007, not to their exceptional pre-coalition levels (which was inflated by the 1999 dioxin crisis), but rather to their previous vote share and, in the case of Ecolo, to somewhat above that. Whether the Irish, Dutch and Czech Greens can emulate these recoveries after their heavy post-coalition defeats remains to be seen; they will be attempting to build their recoveries on weaker historic support bases than the Belgian parties.
Third, there are parties which, despite occasional losses in coalition, have continued to make progress: the German Greens (10.7% vote share in 2009); the Swedish Greens (7.3% in 2010); the New Zealand Greens (11.1% in 2011); and the Finnish Greens (8.5% in 2007, before losing 1.2% in the 2011 election). Each of these, notably, were relatively large parties before entering coalition. Thus, the electoral outcomes of Green parties after coalition have retained some of their diversity and the progress of these parties – with the exception of the New Zealand Greens' breakthrough in 2011 (+4.4%) (see Edwards and Lomax 2012) – continues to be marked by the kind of painstaking incrementalism that Mair (2001) observed in the 1980s and 1990s.

While the habitual nature of voting appears to make a major contribution to explaining these parties' post-coalition losses, it may also explain why these losses did not turn into abandonment and long-term decline: voters, being only loosely attached to other parties, appear to return to several of these parties after their post-coalition punishment was administered. The electoral effects of coalition may be a case of catching a bad cold, rather than a terminal illness. Recent research suggests that new parties may even derive organisational strength from participating in coalition (Bolleyer et al. 2012).
4.7 Appendix H

Is the inertia effect 'random noise'?

The aim of this analysis is to use aggregate party-level data to assess the plausibility of the claim that the observed pattern of vote losses (gains) after vote gains (losses) is simply a statistical artefact ('noise') common to all parties, as the party's vote share tends to revert to a 'normal' level after an exceptionally high or low result. This proposition rivals Hypothesis 2, which suggested that, for Green parties in coalition, previous vote gains will be associated with present vote losses as the former are associated with the party having larger numbers of new-found, weakly habituated voters who are likely to defect from the party in coalition.\(^{37}\) If it is the case that this is just noise, then the extent of this noise should be similar for parties contesting elections after being in opposition and for parties contesting elections after being in coalition. To investigate this possibility, I compare Green parties in coalition to a set of cases that ought to be similar to them in many respects: those same Green parties in opposition. I examine the electoral results of the twelve Green parties examined in this chapter. Table 4.8 identifies the parties, as well as the periods and numbers of elections covered by the data set.

The dependent variable is the party's gain (loss) in vote share, measured in percentage points. Values on the dependent variable are not available for the first election in a series of results. This excludes 12 observations from the initial data set of 84 parties-at-elections. Likewise, values for one of the two independent variables – gain (loss) in vote share at the previous election – is available only at the third and subsequent election in any series. Therefore, twelve further observations are excluded from the main analysis, leaving 60 parties-at-elections that have data for both the dependent and independent variables: they include 40 cases of Green parties that contested an election after being in opposition for the duration of the previous legislative period and 20 cases of Green parties that contested an election after having been in coalition during the previous legislative period.

\(^{37}\) Hypothesis 2 likewise predicts that Green parties that enter coalition on the back of an electoral loss are likely to make gains at the post-coalition election as it attracts its former voters, who are weakly attached to their new party, back to them. However, the expectations associated with this are weaker (see p.234, above).
Table 4.8. A data set on twelve Green parties’ electoral results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>First year from which data is drawn</th>
<th>Number of elections covered during full period**</th>
<th>Period covered by the analysis**</th>
<th>Elections covered by the analysis*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (Agalev-Groen!)</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>9 (1)</td>
<td>1987 - 2010</td>
<td>7 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (Ecolo)</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>9 (1)</td>
<td>1987 - 2010</td>
<td>7 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>2010 only</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>8 (3)</td>
<td>1991 - 2011</td>
<td>6 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
<td>2002 - 2012</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>9 (2)</td>
<td>1987 - 2009</td>
<td>7 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6 (1)</td>
<td>1989 - 2011</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>7 (3)</td>
<td>1994 - 2008</td>
<td>5 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>8 (1)</td>
<td>1998 - 2012</td>
<td>6 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1996***</td>
<td>6 (3)</td>
<td>2002 - 2011</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
<td>2002 - 2010</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>9 (2)</td>
<td>1988 - 2010</td>
<td>7 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>84 (20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60 (20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The number of post-coalition elections is in parentheses.
** These are the periods for which data is available on both the dependent and independent variables.
*** See p.239, above, on the imputation of New Zealand Greens' vote share in 1996.

Data: Manow and Döring (2012), supplemented by case-specific sources cited in Table 4.1.

Germany includes the combined results of East and West for the 1990 election. For the Slovak Greens, I substitute the 1992 regional election for the the 1994 election at which the party was part of HZDS.

It is possible to make some descriptive observations before moving to the main analysis. Green parties have tended to make gains at elections during the period covered. Of the 60 parties-at-elections covered, the mean gain for a Green party at an election is 0.26 percentage points (pp.) (s.d. = 2.06; median = 0.26 pp.). There is a marked difference in the results of Green parties when they are in coalition and when they are in opposition. The mean gain for Green parties in opposition is 0.85 pp. (s.d. = 2.06; median = 0.63 pp.) while after being in coalition, Green parties tend to lose vote share (mean = -0.93 pp.; s.d. = 2.1; median = -0.4 pp.; see also Subsection 4.3.3).
Gains at the previous election and gains at the next election are negatively correlated at -0.43 (p < 0.01). The correlation between previous gains (losses) and subsequent losses (gains) for Green parties in opposition is -0.34 (p < 0.05); for Green parties that have been in a governing coalition during the legislative term, the correlation is considerably stronger (r = -0.64, p < 0.01). This large difference provides a first indication that the relationship between parties gaining new voters at a previous election and losing voters at a subsequent election is stronger for parties in coalition than parties in government.

To examine whether equal amounts of 'noise' are common to both coalition parties and opposition parties, I run a linear-interactive model, regressing an interaction term of coalition membership and previous election result (and its constituent terms) on Green parties' electoral outcomes. The resulting coefficients, displayed in Table 4.9, are not meaningful in isolation, but can be used to calculate predicted values of current electoral gain for opposition and coalition parties over a range of values of previous electoral gain, as well as confidence intervals for these predicted values. The results for Model 1 in Table 4.9 are displayed in Figure 4.2 and are described briefly on page 245, above.

In Model 2, I drop the case of New Zealand in 2002, as the data for the 'previous gain' independent variable is imputed (see p.239). This makes the relationship between previous gains and current gains stronger (see also Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2 in Subsection 4.5.1) and the results of coalition parties that gained at the previous election and opposition parties that gained at the previous election even more distinct.

Finally, in Model 3, I attempt to investigate whether the slope of the line that represents Green parties in coalition is driven by parties that lose votes at the pre-coalition election and then gain votes at the post-coalition election, or whether the relationship is driven by the main mechanism proposed here: the defection of voters that the party has recently gained (represented by cases of previous gain, on the right side of the figure). In order to do so, I examine the cases in which the party has gained vote share at the previous election (n=37) in isolation. The marginal effects calculated from Model 3 show that the relationship still obtains: Green parties that gained vote share at the previous election lose considerably more of that vote share in after being in coalition than after being in opposition. Partly due to the small sample size, the confidence intervals of the two sets of parties (in coalition and in opposition) overlap for many of these estimated values. However, at a previous vote gain of
approximately 1.5 and approximately 3.5 percentage points, there is a clear difference, without overlapping confidence intervals.

In summary, the effect of previous gains (losses) on subsequent losses (gains) is greater for Green parties in coalition than for Green parties in opposition. 'Noise' cannot account for this difference. However, an explanation that takes account of weakly habituated voters in what is (for the party) a more demanding strategic context of coalition can do so.

### Table 4.9. Linear-interactive models (raw coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2 (without New Zealand 2002)</th>
<th>Model 3 (pre-election gainers only)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.97***</td>
<td>0.97***</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote gain at previous</td>
<td>-0.3**</td>
<td>-0.3**</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>election (pct pts)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition member (0/1)</td>
<td>-1.02**</td>
<td>-1.07**</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>(1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction term</td>
<td>-0.63**</td>
<td>-0.84***</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(pregain x postcoalition)</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sigma</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. R-squared</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>10.57</td>
<td>14.55</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistical significance (p): "*** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
Non-standardised coefficients
4.8 Appendix I

Truth tables

Table 4.10. Truth table and consistency values for vote loss outcomes (Model 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Cases covered</th>
<th>Raw consistency</th>
<th>Is row deemed sufficient for vote loss?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-coalition vote gain</td>
<td>In cabinet</td>
<td>Acute conflict</td>
<td>Poor economic conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LR = logical remainder (i.e., the configuration of conditions has not occurred)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Pre-election vote loss</th>
<th>Support party</th>
<th>Absence of acute conflict</th>
<th>Good economic conditions</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Raw consistency</th>
<th>Is row deemed sufficient for vote gain?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SWE 2002</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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LR = logical remainder (i.e., the configuration of conditions has not occurred)
Chapter 5 Conclusions

This thesis set out with the aim of explaining variation in the office attainment, office retention and electoral outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions. Its secondary concern was with specifying these parties' role (if any) in producing these outcomes. In this concluding chapter, I summarise the main findings of the thesis and I discuss the implications of these findings in the form of general, overarching conclusions; directions in which the findings might be generalised; and important and potentially rewarding areas for further research.

5.1 Summary of main findings

This study has produced a number of findings. For each of the three outcomes examined, I summarise the main findings.

5.1.1 Office attainment

1. The office attainment outcomes of parties in coalition is addressed in two distinct literatures on portfolio allocation and support parties. However, both cabinet parties and support parties participate in the coalition bargaining process.

2. While all Green parties in coalition have been junior partners, there has been important variation in their office attainment outcomes. Many of these cases deviate from the norm of proportional portfolio allocation: there have been cases in which relatively large Green parties attained low outcomes (including cases of support parties) and other cases in which relatively small Green parties attained high outcomes.

3. Conventional explanations of portfolio allocation do a relatively poor job of explaining variation in office attainment outcomes of Green parties in governing coalitions, at least partly due to their failure to account for support parties. These conventional explanations are also problematic for reasons that are unrelated to support parties, such as their failure to provide an adequate understanding of of the proportionality regularity.
4. Green parties are not only policy-seeking parties. They seek office too. Support party status) is not explained by an aversion to taking office on the part of these parties.

5. Almost all Green parties in governing coalitions, with the exception of the Danish Socialist People's Party, have been on the margins of their respective coalitions. There are important differences among these cases of marginal parties in coalition that have influenced their office attainment outcomes. The most consistently important of these relate to differences in the environments in which they seek office. Of these environmental factors, the size of the 'proto-coalition' (the aggregate size of the core parties and other marginal parties in the coalition) is the most important. Party systems without strong bipolar patterns of competition constitute special cases that produce large proto-coalitions, thereby weakening Green parties' bargaining positions. Cases of Green parties' high office attainment outcomes, meanwhile, have taken place in the context of positive formation rules and small proto-coalitions.

6. Many Green parties have been 'captive parties'. Some of these are small, but others are relatively large. Large Green parties have found themselves in a 'captive' position in the context of negative government formation rules.

7. Although environmental factors have been important for Green parties' office attainment outcomes, variation in Green party attributes (size) and strategy (coalition strategy) has at times played an active, if contingent, role in producing their outcomes.

5.1.2 Office retention

8. Parties' time in office (their office retention outcomes) has received very little attention, despite its evident importance, its consistency with the background concerns of the existing literature on parties' office outcomes and the ready availability of data and methods to analyse these outcomes.

9. Although several Green parties have defected from government, they have rarely (only once) shortened their time in office by any substantial period. On two occasions, difficulties encountered by the prime minister's party in parliament led to the Green party's time in office being shortened. Institutions that establish election dates in conjunction with delays in entering office have also influenced variation in Green parties' time in office.
10. A focus on electoral and governmental incentives for prime ministers' parties and Green parties does not fully explain the end of Green parties' time in government. Organisational factors (internal conflict in parties) and configurations of institutional factors (rules concerning government dissolution) need to be taken into account.

11. Green parties have defected from government in four of twelve cases, but these defections have tended not to cause wider political instability. In one case (Finland in 2002), this defection did not influence the timing of the general election that followed. In another case (Ireland in 2011), it did, but there were several other factors that plausibly would have precipitated an early election had the Greens not done so.

12. Situations in which a Green party would have been able to defect and realise high electoral prospects in the short-term have been very rare.

13. Several Green parties were electorally dependent on their coalition partners, providing a strong incentive for the parties to remain in office. None of these parties defected from coalition.

14. Neither prime ministers' parties nor Green parties tended to defect (i.e., call an early election or leave the coalition, respectively) when they had substantial time remaining in government. The incentive not to defect may have been bolstered by the fact that many had poor electoral prospects.

15. There were important similarities in the situations of three of the four Green parties that defected. In each case, they had little to lose: their electoral prospects were low or very low and an election was imminent. The defection of the Finnish Greens in 2002 was distinctive, coming as it did a considerable time before scheduled elections and in the context of a major inter-party conflict on an established 'Green' policy issue.

16. The prime minister's party that was forced to face an early election (in Italy in 2008) and the prime minister's party that chose to face an early election (in Germany in 2005) were both structurally vulnerable. Both were weak in a powerful upper house that was not electorally congruent with the lower house and these structural factors interacted with external events.

17. Certainty about the future trajectory of a party's electoral prospects appears to be rare. However, when a party in government is certain that its trajectory is downward until
the next election, this appears to be a powerful motivation to defect or call early elections. In the only case of a prime minister's party calling an early election, that party had an unusual degree of certainty concerning the trajectory of its electoral prospects until the next election. It also had low governmental prospects due to difficulties with maintaining sufficient support in parliament. These conditions also occurred in a shadow instance of a prime minister's party calling early elections. In the only case of Green party defection when substantial time in government was remaining, the party had the clear prospect of electoral decline relative to its high standing in opinion polls had it remained in government.

5.1.3 Electoral outcomes
18. We know less about support parties' post-coalition electoral outcomes than cabinet parties' post-coalition electoral outcomes.

19. There is a very strong relationship between gaining (losing) votes at a pre-coalition election and losing (gaining) votes at the post-coalition election. This does not appear to be accounted for by 'random noise', as the effect differs for Green parties in opposition, including among those with which we associate the strongest theoretical expectations: parties that gained votes at the previous election. I argue that, rather, it is the result of weakly habituated voters abandoning Green parties in the difficult electoral environment of coalition. In other words, the effect of a 'soft' support base is modified (amplified) by coalition membership.

20. There are initial indications that unorthodox coalition is associated with heavy electoral losses for Green parties. However, to date there have been only four cases of Green parties in unorthodox coalition, all of which occurred during the economic crisis that began in 2008.

21. The best explanations of vote share loss after coalition are offered by the conjunction of pre-coalition vote share gain with poor economic conditions or cabinet membership. This indicates that two conditions that are not associated with strong effects in multivariate statistical analyses do play a role is causing the outcome as INUS conditions.
22. Support party status and vote loss at the previous election appear to play a role in some parties' post-coalition vote gains. In general terms, the models presented account less well for vote gains by Green parties in coalition than vote losses.

23. For electoral purposes, there appears to be an important difference between 'high quality' conflict (including defection) on a major, easily comprehensible issue, some considerable distance from a likely election (like in Finland in 2002 and New Zealand in 2002) and defection in the shadow of an election, where the party's electoral prospects are low, and which can therefore be attributed by voters to electoral or organisational exigencies.

5.2 Implications

The three empirical chapters add to the literature on Green parties and the smaller body of work on Green parties in government. However, each chapter is explicitly oriented towards making a wider contribution to outcome-specific literatures, including the substantial literature on office attainment (both portfolio allocation and support party status), the very small literature on parties' time in office and the well-established literature on parties’ post-coalition electoral outcomes. Although each of the chapters is presented as a self-contained study drawing on its own framework and approach, there are clear connections between them from which three sets of general conclusions can be drawn.

The first set of conclusions arises from the previous chapters' contributions to answering the general questions posed in Chapter 1. Why did these similar parties, entering a new strategic context, experience diverse outcomes? Setting aside specific explanations that are both set out in individual chapters and summarised above, the most general conclusion to be drawn from the answers provided to this question is that explanations of the outcomes of Green parties in coalition are characterised by three aspects of causal complexity. First, there are multiple paths to individual outcomes. This is evident in the results of Chapters 2 and 4 and in the multiple paths to gateway events that characterise the end of these parties' time in office (Chapter 3). Second, in several of these pathways, the effects of individual causal conditions are modified by the presence of other causal conditions. In particular, the effects of parties' strategies and attributes are contingent on other, environmental, conditions. Third,
explanations can be asymmetrical: explanations of success do not mirror explanations of failure. Compare, for instance, the explanations of high and low office attainment outcomes in Chapter 2. This causal complexity suggests that future work on parties' outcomes may benefit from using theories that provide for (or even assume) this complexity and methods that can accommodate it. Indeed, if causal complexity is present in explanations of the outcomes of this small set of 'most similar' cases, we might expect that in any wider and more heterogeneous set of cases, it will be more prevalent.

Did variation in Green parties' attributes and strategies influence their outcomes or were they simply the victims and beneficiaries of circumstance? Within each of the analyses, environmental conditions play a very important role. This is reflected in the importance of proto-coalition size (and, in turn, party system structure) and government formation rules for Green parties' office attainment outcomes; the importance of institutions and prime ministers' parties for their office retention outcomes; and the role of weakly habituated voters in their electoral outcomes. Thus, these parties' outcomes are often driven by circumstances that, once they enter coalition, are largely beyond their control.

However, variation in these parties' attributes and strategies is not irrelevant. For example, coalition strategy was important for Green parties' office attainment outcomes in both Germany and Ireland, even if in these cases it was different strategies in different circumstances that produced broadly similar outcomes (see Chapter 2, esp. pp.87-89). Choosing to enter cabinet, for instance, played an important role in producing negative electoral outcomes for parties with 'softer' electoral support bases (Chapter 4). Some other instances of the influence of Green parties on their own outcomes are are more isolated, but are also important demonstrations of the effects of party agency: the defection of the Finnish Greens in 2002, with implications for both its office retention outcome and, arguably, its electoral outcome, is one such instance.

A second set of general conclusions relates to the relationships between parties' goals and the strategic dilemmas that arise from these relationships (Bollever 2008, p.19; Müller and Strøm eds. 1999). Panebianco (1988, p.207) highlighted the concept of the political party operating in multiple arenas at the same time: “They [arenas] are like gambling tables at which the party plays and obtains resources – in accordance with its performance – the resources it needs to function.” For Green parties in coalition, there has been tension between these goals and these
arenas: office-seeking success at coalition formation quite often negatively affects electoral outcomes. On the other hand, if these parties had opted for support party status, this too would have come with costs. In the case of the New Zealand Greens, for example, Miller and Curtin (2011, p.124) surmise that the support arrangements which have contributed to the Greens' electoral resilience – relative to other small coalition parties in that country – "has been at the price of significant policy gains".

Mair (2001) pointed to the Greens' strategic position as one of their major weaknesses (see quote above, p.260). Their positional dilemma is driven by the tension between office (and policy) goals and electoral goals (as well as, perhaps, the goal of organisational cohesion). Chapters 2 and 4 highlight that this remains a problem for these parties and that their relationships with coalition partners are both cooperative and competitive. Informed by recent developments in Green parties' coalition strategies, the findings of this thesis indicate that attempts to place themselves centrally in party systems appear to have been accompanied by limited benefits in terms of office attainment, and heavy electoral costs. Chapter 4 and parts of Chapter 3 highlight the electoral logic that may keep Green parties wedded to their traditional partners in many countries and which will ensure that the positional question remains a difficult one for these parties.

While the tension between office and electoral goals is the main dilemma that is directly highlighted in this thesis, it also highlights other important inter-goal relationships. There is tension between the same goals at different points in time: in the short term, there is a tension between pre-coalition and post-coalition electoral success. Moreover, the anticipation of future outcomes drives present behaviour: electoral and governmental prospects drive parties' behaviour in government, including defection (and non-defection).

A third set of general conclusions stem from ancillary aspects of the analyses, specifically the comparison of Green parties and other parties. The elements of a wider comparison that are present in the preceding chapters indicates that this is a a set of parties that has been less successful than others in seeking office and votes (see Mair 2001; Dumont and Bäck 2006). Chapter 4 suggests that any relative post-coalition electoral advantage specific to Green parties that was apparent in previous analyses (Buelens and Hino 2008) may have been eroded. However, an updated analysis, taking into account recent electoral volatility and its effects on other parties would be required to confirm this. In addition, the comparison with
Green parties in opposition establishes that coalition is very clearly a more challenging electoral context for these parties than opposition. In Chapter 2 the calibration of fuzzy-sets and bivariate statistical analyses of the relationship between seat contributions and office attainment outcomes showed that Green parties had attained relatively little office compared to other parties. Were this comparison to be developed further, it might take into account the size of the proto-coalitions that parties were joining, given the apparent importance of this condition for the outcome.

There are at least three directions in which the generalisability of the thesis's main findings might be explored empirically. The first direction is outward: by examining a wider pool of junior coalition partners. This is the direction that has been discussed in each of the empirical chapters. While some problems encountered by Green parties in coalition may have been exacerbated by their own peculiar characteristics, the findings of this thesis suggest that they are mainly driven by more generic conditions that may apply to a wider range of similar parties. In this respect, the prospects for generalisation are positive. However, to build on the specific explanations set out in this thesis, there are indications in the theoretical frameworks and empirical analyses that further scope conditions apply: the explanations of office attainment outcomes assume that the party is a marginal party; the explanations of office retention outcomes assume that it is, at least, not a prime minister's party; some aspects of the explanations of post-coalition electoral outcomes – e.g., the role of a 'major electoral rival' – seem to assume that it would apply to junior coalition partners only. Further, the positional elements in these theories may be peculiar to parties that are not typically centrally placed in their party systems.

A second direction for exploring the generalisability of these findings is vertical: they might be applied to Green parties (and other similar parties) at other levels of government. Although national government may be in Poguntke's (2002b, p.134) words a “different ball game”, it may be possible to generalise through the examination of subnational governments. Increased data availability on parties in subnational government are may make larger subnational comparisons more feasible, following existing studies (e.g., Downs 1998; Font 2001; Sturm 2013; Hooghe et al. 2010; Folke 2010).

The third direction relates to using the findings from the explanation of Green parties' office outcomes as a basis for explaining variation in their influence on government policy outputs.
(i.e., exploring the generalisability of these findings to other outcomes). The importance of policy in the terms of this thesis is evident: Green parties are policy-seeking parties and it is primarily policy gains against which they weigh the prospective costs of coalition. The concept of bargaining position (with modifications made for, e.g., the relevant institutional rule) may provide the basis for a framework for explaining variation in Green parties' policy influence. The study of junior coalition partners' policy influence remains a difficult enterprise, beset by problems of measurement. However, it does remain a core question in the study of party government. It may be that it is through the accumulation of case studies that incremental gains will be made in this area (e.g., Evrard 2012; contributions to Müller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002; see also Bomberg and Carter 2006).

Finally, this thesis points to two broad areas in which new research can make a valuable contribution to the study of coalition and political parties. The first relates to support parties. Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 demonstrate the value of integrating the study of support parties with the study of parties in cabinet. This thesis has done this on a theoretical level by transferring theory from the literature on support parties and using it to explain the outcomes of a broader set of marginal parties in coalition (Chapter 2) and by simply comparing a small set of support parties and cabinet parties. To this author's knowledge, no comprehensive cross-national survey of support parties exists and it seems that this leaves an important gap in the data resources available for studying parties coalition. Moving beyond the study of parties in cabinet to study all coalition partners and following up on recent case study work on support parties with broader data collection efforts would enhance the study of coalition politics. This may help to resolve certain puzzles in the literature on cabinet parties (such as mean small party overcompensation in portfolio allocation). It suggests a larger data collection project on these parties, which is not without difficulties (Lijphart 1984, p.60; Damgaard 1994, p.199).

However, the literature on support parties has developed detailed criteria for support parties' identification – and for the classification of different levels of support – and this provides a strong basis for data collection (Strøm 1990b; Bale and Bergman 2006b; Miller and Curtin 2011).

The second area relates to the study of parties' time in office. Given that the tenure of so many other political actors (individual and collective) has been studied, there are several advanced and methodologically sophisticated literatures that can inform the systematic and empirical study of political parties' time in office. Large-\(n\) studies could systematically more variables
than the small number of cases examined in Chapter 3, potentially accommodating the institutional and contextual complexity observed in those cases. Chapter 3 provides some indications of the directions in which such studies might proceed. However, case study analyses will no doubt be necessary to complement statistical analyses, not least to provide information on party leaders’ perceptions of their prospects and accounts of their decisions.
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