



Clandestine Circulation:
Social Reproduction in the Shadow of the State

Martyn Egan

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Florence, December, 2014

European University Institute
Department of Political and Social Sciences

Clandestine Circulation:
Social Reproduction in the Shadow of the State

Martyn Egan

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Examining Board

Prof. Olivier Roy, European University Institute (Supervisor)
Prof. Donatella della Porta, European University Institute
Prof. Johannes Hjøllbrekke, University of Bergen
Dr. Reinoud Leenders, King's College London

© M.P. Egan, 2014

No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without
prior permission of the author

Summary

How should social science conceptualise the informal exchange of illicit favours in the context of the modern state? And what relation does such exchange have to the reproduction of the social structure? This thesis presents a new framework for the analysis of such phenomena based upon the theoretical methodology of Pierre Bourdieu. Using Bourdieu's conceptual tools of habitus, field and capital, the kinds of informal exchange typically analysed through the paradigms of clientelism, corruption, or "informal institutions" are reconstructed as a new research object - the clandestine circulation of capital - and related to the broader "economy of practices" necessary to reproduce the social structure.

In a considered development of Bourdieu's initial use of the term (which related to the clandestine circulation of cultural capital), the thesis demonstrates how the clandestine circulation of other forms and guises of capital can also subvert the normative intentions of merit and equality implicit in the formal institutions of the modern state. The thesis reconciles and expands upon various of Bourdieu's theoretical writings to develop a theory identifying both the objective resources of such circulation and the principles structuring it as a social practice.

This new theory is then applied in detail to the field site of urban Beirut (the capital of Lebanon), and specifically in relation to the phenomenon of *wasta* (an Arabic word used to refer to all kinds of social influence). Through a detailed empirical study of the field site, the thesis attempts to demonstrate how clandestine circulation operates as a mechanism for the transformation and accumulation of capitals, and hence comes to play a determinant role in the reproduction of the social order, in a manner intimately connected to the specific nature of the Lebanese state.

Contents

Summary	iii
List of Figures	ix
List of Tables	xi
Map of Beirut	xiii
Acknowledgements	xv
Note on Language and Transliteration	xvii
Preface	xix
1 Introduction	1
I The Research Problem	11
2 Concept Formation	13
2.1 Clientelism	17
2.2 Corruption	24
2.3 Theories of the State	33
2.4 Institutional Theory	41
2.5 Conclusion	48
3 A New Research Object	53
3.1 A Relational Approach	54
3.2 New Conceptual Tools	63
3.3 A New Object: Clandestine Circulation	73
3.4 The Research Questions	77
3.5 Scope and Limitations	78

4	The Field Site	81
4.1	Lebanon	81
4.2	Beirut	85
4.3	The Structure of Inequality	87
4.4	Social Insecurity and <i>Wasta</i>	92
II	Theoretical Outline	103
5	The Genesis of Clandestine Circulation	107
5.1	The <i>State Effect</i>	107
5.2	The Genesis of the State	110
5.3	The Forms of Capital	113
5.4	The State as Capital Trajectory	116
5.5	The Emergence of Clandestine Circulation	121
5.6	“State Thought” and Clandestine Circulation	125
5.7	Conclusion	129
6	Clandestine Circulation in Practice	133
6.1	Reproduction Strategies	133
6.2	<i>Blat</i> , <i>Guanxi</i> and <i>Wasta</i>	138
6.3	The Economy of Practices	152
6.4	Habitus and Body Hexis	159
6.5	Position Takings and Social Space	170
6.6	Conclusion	173
III	Lebanon: A State of the Field	175
7	The First Moment	179
7.1	Specifying Lebanon’s <i>State Effect</i>	180
7.1.1	The Lebanese Educational System	181
7.1.2	Inheritance Laws and Property Rights	189
7.1.3	The Lebanese Labour Market	204
7.1.4	The Monopoly of Violence (Symbolic and Physical)	213
7.2	Capitals and Dominant Capital Structures	220
8	The Second Moment	227
8.1	The Social Space of <i>Wasta</i>	228
8.2	The Structure of Habitus	249
8.3	Clandestine Circulation in Lebanon	275
9	Conclusion	283

A Appendix on Methodology	295
A.1 Questionnaire for Structured Interviews	297
A.2 List of Interviews	301
A.3 Coding and Analysis	305
Glossary of Bourdieusian Terms	313
Bibliography	317


List of Figures

4.1	Distribution of Consumption in Lebanon (2004-2005)	90
5.1	State Formation as Capital Trajectory	119
5.2	“State Thought” and the Constitution of the Different Social Libidos in the ‘Reason of State’	128
6.1	Clandestine Circulation from the Perspective of Reproduction Strategies and Mechanisms	135
7.1	Lebanese University Graduates by Age Cohort, % (2009)	182
7.2	Rate of Inscription in Lebanese School System (1991-2012)	183
7.3	Lebanese Students in Private Schools (free and fee-paying) by Age Cohort, % (2007)	185
7.4	Real Estate as Power Relations: Property Rights and Hysteresis of the <i>State Effect</i>	200
7.5	A Tale of Two Cities: Hysteresis and Reconversion	205
8.1	MCA of Respondents’ Use of <i>Wasta</i> : Space of Practices and Position-takings	236
8.2	MCA of Respondent’s Use of <i>Wasta</i> : Cloud of Individuals and Objective Categories	237
8.3	Structure of Misrecognition in Use of <i>Wasta</i>	250
8.4	Clandestine Circulation, Misrecognition, and Reproduction Strategies: Analysis of Respondent 13/7	258
8.5	Schema of Varying Networks of Social Capital, Respondents 13/7 and 13/1	266

List of Tables

1	Common Shifts in Lebanese Dialect	xvii
4.1	Lebanese Citizens' Subjective Class	89
4.2	Comparing Corruption in Lebanon and Jordan (2013, %) . . .	93
5.1	The Guises and Forms of Capital	117
6.1	The Forms of Clandestine Circulation as "Ideal Types"	158
8.1	Statistics for Principal Dimension Contributions by Active Category	234
8.2	Squared Correlations of Individuals in Principal Dimensions .	241
8.3	Summary of Third Axis	247
A.1	Coded Dataset of Structured Interviews	309
A.2	Statistics for Column Categories in Standard Normalization .	310

Map of Beirut



(source: Google Earth)

Key:

A - Ras Beirut (west Beirut region)

B - Clemenceau neighbourhood

C - Place de l'Etoile (BCD)

D - Gemmayze and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods (east Beirut region)

nb - The highlighted area marks the extent of Solidere's domain

Acknowledgements

Although the finished product has changed markedly, my first debt regarding this thesis is to Simon Orth and Dimitris Papadimitriou, whose advice in helping craft my research proposal led to it being accepted for the EUI PhD programme. Si in particular has been a good friend for many years, and I benefitted greatly from his tips on how to survive a PhD.

At the EUI in Florence I must thank in particular Teije Donker, who not only provided solidarity and consolation to a fellow non-EU specialist, but was also kind enough to teach me how to use \LaTeX , and to lend me his Arabic keyboard, which I have still not returned. Also at the EUI, I must thank Trajche Panov for reminding me on a number of occasions that three interviews does not constitute a sample. Thanks also to the many other friends and colleagues at the institute for their mutual support over the years, including in particular Mathias Möschel, Guido Tintori and Ashley McCormick.

In Lebanon I owe a great deal of thanks to a great many people - some of whom must unfortunately remain nameless. At the LAU, where I was fortunate to be hosted as a visiting scholar, Tamirace Fakhoury and Paul Tabar are two friends who offered their hospitality, help and (not least) valuable insight into my research. To Paul in particular I owe a great deal of thanks for his selfless assistance in conducting a large number of the structured interviews, compensating for my remedial *diraji*. Without his help this thesis would have stood upon much shakier empirical ground, while his broader interest in my research was a rare moment of encouragement in a difficult time, and offered a great deal of insight. An article-length collaboration featuring some of the themes of this thesis and based on the structured interviews will hopefully be forthcoming shortly. I also wish to thank the German Orient Institut Beirut, and in particular Dr Thomas Scheffler, for inviting me to present my research. Thanks also to Julie Davidson (whose

work on poverty in Lebanon is one of the few to adequately address that subject), and to Priyan Khakhar, who allowed me to collaborate during his own presentation on *wasta*, from which I gained much insight. To Tom Mather I also owe a great deal of thanks for keeping me sane, and for teaching me a number of puns concerning shipping.

More than anyone else in Lebanon, I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Ronnie Chatah. Friend and erstwhile flatmate, I profited from his hospitality, his patience, and his unyielding (though not uncritical) love of Lebanon, and especially his city, Beirut. I was fortunate enough to be present at Ronnie's inaugural walking tour of the city in 2009, and in the course of the four years which it ran it was my privilege to see it grow and evolve. It opened my eyes to a number of factors which became crucial to this thesis, not least regarding Beirut's built environment (the first example in Clemenceau used in the empirical chapter is a case in point).

To my supervisor, Olivier Roy, I owe a debt of gratitude for his support and patient guidance. My thanks also to the members of my defence jury, Professor Donatella della Porta, Professor Johannes Hjellbrekke and Dr Reinoud Leenders, for their comments and suggestions. Professor Hjellbrekke in particular I must further thank for the workshop on GDA which he was kind enough to teach at the EUI, and from which I gained a great benefit. I am also grateful to the administrative staff at the SPS Department, particularly Maureen Lechleitner, for all their help and assistance.

Finally, and most importantly, thanks to my friends and family for their support and patience through the often gruelling process of completing a PhD thesis, particularly those who came out to visit me while I was in Florence - Rod MacFarlane and Rachel Horne, Sam Elliot, Ben Gage, Andy MacDowall, and Cherie Hannam. I thank my parents for their love, support and encouragement throughout this process, as throughout all my endeavours. Above all, to Maria Grazia, who has had to endure a lot over the past four years, but without whose love I would have given up long ago, this thesis is dedicated.

Regarding all the assistance and insight I received, all errors and omissions which remain are entirely my responsibility.

Note on Language and Transliteration

Lebanese dialect differs substantially from modern standard Arabic. Generally speaking, Lebanese dialect as spoken in Beirut effects certain vocal shifts as detailed in table 1 below. Further, vowels tend to shift from *a* to *ɜ* - hence ‘lubnan’ (Lebanon) is typically pronounced ‘libnen’.

Given the socially-conditioned nature of heteroglossia in Lebanon, I have tried in this thesis to represent as faithfully as possible the actual idiom used by respondents in the interview context. In general, then, when referring to interview material I transcribe words as they were spoken, and I make use of the commonly understood diacritics of an underdot for velarised consonants (ṣ, ḍ, ṭ) and also for pharyngeal ha (ħ), and a left half ring ‘a for ayn to distinguish it from hamza, for which I use an apostrophe.

I make a distinction for words such as *wasta* which through their notoriety have been widely latinised, and for which it would seem not only overly worthy to transliterate as *wāsita*, but also encourage unwelcome associations by linking the word to its classical or elevated root, which can reinforce a timeless conception of such phenomena which empirical analysis does not bear out. Similarly, when using terms of an almost purely academic nature (such as ‘*aṣabiyah*’, which derives from the usage of Ibn Khaldun) I apply the classical transliteration.

Table 1: Common Shifts in Lebanese Dialect

<i>initial</i>	<i>becomes</i>
qaf ق	hamza ء
tha ث	sin س, ta ت
tha ذ, za ظ, dod ض	zay ز
dod ض	jim ج

Preface

This thesis attempts to demonstrate how the illicit exchange of favours may, in certain conditions, become a mechanism for the reproduction of an unequal society.

It seeks to do so through the application of a Bourdieusian theoretical framework, in which the same question may be rephrased in a somewhat different manner. How, in a social space supposedly reproduced through the objectified, institutionalised mechanisms of the modern state, can a principle of reproduction based upon the elementary mode of domination, and in particular the circulation of embodied social capital, become determinant in the reproduction of part or all of that space?

Answering this question has involved considering several related issues, not least the paradigms of corruption and clientelism. Part of my contention in this thesis is that the prevailing academic construction of these research objects has come to represent a hurdle which must first be overcome in order to engage in a truly objective analysis of such phenomena. As such, this thesis proposes a new framework of analysis: the clandestine circulation of capital.

This new approach finds its roots in a perhaps unexpected place: the reproduction of inequality within the French educational system. Bourdieu's analysis of the ways in which inequalities based upon inherited cultural capital came to be both reproduced and legitimated through this system prompted him to describe the process as "clandestine circulation". This thesis deepens Bourdieu's concept of clandestine circulation, and extends his mode of analysis to include other forms and guises of capital, the intention being to offer a 'new way of thinking' about the problem of informal and illicit exchange in the modern state.

To develop this new way of thinking further the field site of Lebanon - and, more specifically, the Lebanese capital, Beirut - was chosen for extended

analysis. As such, the thesis may be read in part also as a study of Lebanon; it may also be read, in part, as a study of the phenomenon of *wasta*, a concept - or at least a word - familiar across much of the Arab world.¹ However, I would emphasise in both cases the qualification “in part”: it has not been my intention at any point to make a contribution to the regional studies canon. Rather, I have sought to find examples of the general within the particular. In this sense, the use of a single field site is intended to provide greater empirical depth to what are extremely complex phenomena.² I have, however, included further case-studies from within the literature to add both greater robustness and generalisability to my theoretical claims.

Concerning structure, the organisation of this thesis reflects the nature of the argument being made. It is not intended to recreate, *ex post*, the scientific method of the research process (an approach I believe to be generally unsuitable for the social sciences). For information regarding the research method, an elaboration may be found in the appendix,³ the body of the thesis is rather given over to a thorough explication of the argument.

This emphasis is derived from the centrality of theory, and in particular Bourdieusian theory, to the thesis. Locating one’s work within a Bourdieusian framework offers, I believe, certain advantages which are not to be discounted. Among them is the chance to integrate quite different aspects of human behaviour (both social and individual) within a unified theoretical framework. However, I freely acknowledge that such a choice is not without cost. As a framework, it tends toward exclusivity and - to its detractors - claims an unmerited exhaustivity in terms of explanatory power.

Regarding the first point, it is not my intention in this work to “trans-

¹I should emphasise that no empirical claims regarding *wasta* as an instance of clandestine circulation beyond the Lebanese context are made in this thesis. Indeed, it is perhaps well to recall here the warning of Leca and Schemeil (1983, p. 461):

Les mêmes mots ne se retrouvent pas dans tout le monde arabe ou se retrouvent avec des sens différents selon les régions; le mot change de sens et de valeur dans le temps; le sens commun ne se donne pas immédiatement, il est lui-même construit par l’informant quand celui-ci fait appel à sa mémoire et à son idéologie, par l’informateur au second degré qui interprète ce discours pour le chercheur, enfin par le chercheur lui-même quand il travaille sur documents[...]

²See Flyvbjerg (2006) for a defence of investigating a single, paradigmatic case in detail.

³As distinct from the praxeology (or methodological philosophy) driving the thesis, which is given special consideration in chapter 3, owing to its important role in reconstructing the research object.

late” Bourdieu into other academic niches; concerning the second, neither shall I Bowdlerise the theory by restricting my use of it to certain elements. This latter “bits and pieces”⁴ approach - whereby enterprising academics appropriate concepts such as *habitus* or *field* without a care for their status as elements within a unified theory - has done much to discredit Bourdieu in wider academic circles.⁵ To be sure, Bourdieusian theory does not lend itself well to the sort of theorising of the “middle-range”; I do not, however, see this as a failing.

Nonetheless, two points must be acknowledged: using a particular theoretical approach does not absolve the researcher from engaging with the broader universe of research covering the same field; and theoretical sophistication should not be an excuse for theoretical obfuscation.

It is with these points in mind that the thesis is organised. On the one hand, I engage with the existing literature in those fields related to the research object so as to emphasise the *distinctive utility* of Bourdieusian theory, and the differing approach to concept formation it entails. Second, as this thesis makes its own addition to that theoretical tradition, a separate theoretical exegesis serves to highlight the *original contribution* of the thesis to the field of Bourdieusian theory.⁶ Finally, as a practical theory (that is, one derived from observation in the field, and concerning a scientific object with an existence in social reality) a section devoted to the *operationalisation* of the theory within the field site (urban Beirut) is included as a separate element.

Thus, the main contribution of the thesis may be seen as falling broadly into three sections. The first section outlines the contours of the research,

⁴The same expression is also used by Wacquant (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 4).

⁵Indeed, in relation to the study of practices similar to *wasta*, both Ledeneva (1998) (*blat*) and Smart (1993) (*guanxi*) have attempted the partial integration of Bourdieusian concepts, with results which I would consider, by extension, to be limited (see chapter 6).

⁶At this point I should add that specialists in Bourdieusian theory may feel I have drawn too freely from across what was a constantly evolving body of work. While it is true that Bourdieu’s use of concepts evolved over time (see Wacquant’s discussion in Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 6)), to my knowledge Bourdieu did not repudiate any of his prior findings, but rather considered all his concepts as, to some extent, intermediate propositions. Certainly, I do not attempt a complete reconciliation of all competing terms and uses within this thesis; in developing my own theory however, and in order for that theory to capture as much as possible the totality of clandestine circulation (in both structures and practices), I have at times been obliged to attempt to reconcile certain concepts (for instance social libido, interest, *illusio*, symbolic force) whose true relation to each other, and to the related concepts of field, habitus and capital, remains somewhat obscure.

including the research problem, and places particular emphasis on concept formation, highlighting the different existing literatures relating to the research object, before proposing a new formation based upon Bourdieusian praxeology. This section also includes a justification of the field site, urban Beirut. The second section consists of a detailed exposition of the theoretical contribution of the thesis, while the third section provides an empirical elaboration of the field site. Although serving discrete functions, these two sections are intended to closely complement each other. The thesis ends with a conclusion summarising the main findings of the research.

Clandestine Circulation
Social Reproduction in the Shadow of the State

Chapter 1

Introduction

Some years ago, while living an itinerant existence in Beirut, I was told a rather commonplace anecdote. As often happens, what at first seemed a mundane and insignificant little story somehow lingered in the back of my mind, slowly pushing itself forward over time until, eventually, it came to dominate my thinking.

It concerned a young Lebanese woman, a qualified professional who had lived almost all her life in Paris, and who had returned to Beirut in her late twenties to rediscover something of her heritage. Being well-qualified, finding work did not prove difficult for her; yet in order to practice her profession legally in Lebanon, her French qualifications needed to be validated by the relevant Lebanese ministry. Which is where the fun began.

She proceeded by doing things as one would in France: calling the ministry; discovering the correct procedure; filling in the necessary forms; copying the correct documents; certifying the copies; delivering everything to the ministry; calling the ministry to check on progress; calling again; faxing the ministry more documents; calling the ministry; calling again; and again; and again. Eventually, in her exasperation she told her mother all her troubles, to which she replied: “Why, of course; we need to find you a connection.”

And so, acquaintances were called and enquiries made. Presently, a contact in the relevant ministry was found, and an appointment set.

When the time came, the ministry contact - a mid-ranking female administrator - was effusive in her welcome, and most apologetic for all the inconvenience which had been caused. She reassured the young professional that everything would be done to expedite the procedure, and that she need

not have any further worries. Grateful - though slightly baffled - the professional thanked the bureaucrat, shook hands and made to leave. It was then that the bureaucrat's face darkened, and the last thing the professional heard as she walked out of the door was the slam of a drawer in the bureaucrat's desk behind her.

When she returned home, the professional told her mother what had happened, to which she rolled her eyes, saying - "now we'll have to send someone else to sort it out." It was at this point that the professional, as she was recounting the story to me, must have noticed I was looking a little puzzled. "I was supposed to go behind the woman's desk and drop the bribe in the drawer before I left," she told me. Oh, I said, really? "I mean, it's *wasta*, you know?" she said, although she sounded a little unsure. And then she told me something else, which is what stayed with me. "I mean, I knew I was supposed to do it, and I wanted to do it, and I knew as soon as I heard the drawer slam that it meant she wouldn't help me. But it just felt weird. I mean, going behind someone's desk and dropping money in it?"¹

The episode came to linger in my thoughts because of the challenge it seemed to present to some of the assumptions which govern academic understandings of phenomena such as corruption, bribery and clientelism. In the case of the young professional, it was for her entirely rational (in the sense of maximising her utility) to bribe the bureaucrat. She knew this. The bureaucrat also knew this. In this case, the professional also knew what was expected of her, in the sense of the appropriate manner of paying the bribe. Everything pointed toward a successful outcome for both parties. And yet the result was a 'botched bribe' - a *faux pas* in the etiquette of corruption which would necessitate a good deal of additional labour to set right.

Speaking of a similar 'botched bribe' in the context of northern India, Gupta noted that "[t]he 'practice' of bribe giving was not, as the young men learned, simply an economic transaction but a *cultural practice* that required a great degree of performative competence" (Gupta, 1995, p. 381, emphasis mine). Certainly, in the case of the young professional, conscious knowledge of the role was not enough; "being" Lebanese in this context required an almost pre-reflexive understanding of the part needed to be played to effect

¹As the exchange upon which this anecdote is based took place before the commencement of my field work (and indeed my doctoral studies), I have relied upon memory and a minimum degree of licence to reconstruct it.

the desired outcome.

In this sense, a ‘rational’, calculating approach to the situation may even have proved a hinderance - for in what respect does it make sense to describe the act of giving a bribe as a simple act of coordination between rational actors? In their study of corruption in *tangentopoli*-era Italy, Della Porta and Vannucci concluded by describing corruption as “an emergent normative system” (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999, pp. 249-255) - wherein many of those implicated claimed “to have had no choice when paying or receiving bribes; to have been nothing more than *victims* of a ‘system’ that imposed its ‘will’ upon them” (*ibid.*, p. 249). Describing the “tranquil and unembarrassed atmosphere” (*ibid.*, p.250) that prevailed in that system, Della Porta and Vannucci seem ultimately to echo the findings of Gupta -

There are no negotiations or demands; no suspicions or worries arise. To conclude the transaction successfully with a minimum of risk, it is sufficient to follow the *etiquette* of corruption. (*ibid.*, p. 250)

Through the course of my research, I began to think more deeply about this ‘etiquette’ of corruption, and how far removed it seemed from the predominately rational models constructed by academics to explain such phenomena. How does such an etiquette emerge? For Della Porta and Vannucci, the answer was to quote Hayek, and claim “the spontaneous evolution of rules of conduct” (*ibid.*, p. 250). Such social norms are, according to Elster, “individually useful in that they help people to economize on decision costs. A simple mechanical decision rule may, on the whole and in the long run, have better consequences for the individual than the fine-tuned search for optimal decision.”²

While describing *why* such rules may be ‘useful’ to the *individual*, note that Elster’s account falls short of explaining *how* they actually emerge. One may well understand the rational choice reticence: if such norms are indeed ‘social’, then this suggests a *social process* is involved in their generation. In this sense, simply describing their utility to the individual bears the same relation to proper explanation as describing that my left foot is for standing on does to the theory of evolution. There is, though, an even deeper lacuna deriving from this approach: by using the framework of methodological

²As quoted in Della Porta and Vannucci (1999, p. 252)

individualism to describe the functioning of such ‘rules’ we commit a gross act of distortion regarding the forces in play. Transforming ‘victims’ into freely transacting actors is ultimately to replace coercion with an imagined voluntarism.

Hence, it is the search for a *social* explanation of such ‘etiquette’ which forms the basis of this thesis. How does it emerge? How does it evolve over time? How does it persist, despite efforts to expose and eradicate it? And, at root, how should we best conceptualise it? For if such practices are indeed ‘rule-bound’, what does it mean to follow a rule that is unwritten, involves varying expectations, and generates varying strategies?

Most importantly though, this thesis is about how such ‘norms and regularities’ (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 65) as govern the exchange of illicit favours may relate to the production of the broader social structure, and in a manner quite at odds with the ‘official’ intentions of the state. If such ‘etiquette’ is not the product of a conscious voluntarism; if it leads to regularised outcomes which are, by their nature, unequal; then what role does it play in the (re)production of the social structure, and in particular, to the reproduction of inequality? Not only the young professional’s botched bribe, but the constant act of living day by day in Lebanon and witnessing the varying stratagems employed - sometimes to get ahead, sometimes just to get by - provoked such a mode of enquiry.

In particular, the ubiquitousness of *wasta* - a word never far from one’s lips when needing to explain how certain things must be done - led me to think deeply about such modes of regulation, in terms both of their subjective ambiguity and their apparent autonomy from the ‘formal’ rules of the state. As Alena Ledeneva noted of *blat* in Soviet Russia - everyone in Lebanon *knows* what *wasta* is, but finds it difficult to *define*. No-one, least of all academics,³ seems able to agree what does or does not constitute *wasta*, let alone whether it is a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing; instead, rather like pornography for Justice Stewart,⁴ we suffice with a kind of lay Bayesianism - “I know it when I see it”.

Wasta, like *blat* in Russia, *guanxi* in China, and no doubt countless other culturally-specific terms, operates as a kind of etiquette: for the informal

³Compare, for example, the title of Al-Ramahi (2008) - “Wasta in Jordan: A Distinct Feature of (and Benefit for) Middle Eastern Society” - with Mohamed and Hamdy (2008) - “The Stigma of Wasta”.

⁴See Gewirtz (1996) for an overview.

exchange of favours and benefits; for the subversion of public interests to private ones; for the mobilisation of influence. It is thus both a practice and a disposition toward practice, and hence has an existence at once both objective and subjective - that is, in the performance of certain acts and the power relations they engender, and in the attitudes and points of view which such practices provoke as social phenomena. To fully understand an 'etiquette' such as *wasta* thus entails taking seriously both aspects of its existence: i.e., as regularity of practice and ambiguity of norm. It involves going beyond catch-all definitions of corruption, where outcome and motive are viewed as synonymous (and hence the bad-faith of actors is taken for granted), and instead taking seriously (though not necessarily believing) those actors who say "*wasta* is not the same as a bribe".

Thus, in addressing these issues, it is a guiding principle of this thesis that the research object must be reintegrated within the larger order of social practices of which it forms a part. The real is relational (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 3), and it is only by properly reflecting on the relation of the 'etiquette' governing corruption - "synthesising both norms and regularities", to quote Bourdieu - to the totality of the principles of regulation existing in a society, that its true *modus operandi* may be adequately grasped, and its broader effects unveiled. One man's bribe is another man's gift; nepotism is a 'favour' between friends. As we shall see, reducing the complexity of such practice to a singular viewpoint (as academic models frequently do) involves the loss of precisely that quality which gives practice its most significant social effects.

It would be a mistake, therefore, to say that this thesis is about corruption. It is rather about "the different modes of existence of the principles of regulation and the regularity of different forms of practice" (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 65). It is about, in particular, those modes of regulation which persist in spite of the state, or in the state's shadow, and which go against the supposed normative principles of the state's rules. In order to grasp the operation of such principles however, I believe what is first called for is a new conception of the research object itself - that is, of our scientific assumptions about the very thing being studied. The nature of the task in hand is perhaps best described by Wittgenstein:-

Getting hold of the difficulty *deep down* is what is hard. Because it is grasped near the surface it simply remains the difficulty it was. It has to be pulled out by the roots; and that involves

our beginning to think in a new way. The change is as decisive as, for example, that from the alchemical to the chemical way of thinking. The new way of thinking is what is so hard to establish. Once the new way of thinking has been established, the old problems vanish; indeed, they become hard to recapture. For they go with our way of expressing ourselves and, if we clothe ourselves in the new form of expression, the old problems are discarded along with the old garment. (Wittgenstein, 1977, p. 48)⁵

It is the aim of this research to get hold of the difficulty *deep down*; to come to a new way of thinking which no longer views corruption, bribery, clientelism and the informal exchange of favours as separate, bounded phenomena, but which reintegrates them within a general science of practices and power relations running contrary to the formal norms of the state. An economy, to borrow a phrase from Bourdieu, of “clandestine circulation” (Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 255) - in which symbolic goods play as much of a role as material ones.

In doing so, the thesis thus seeks to provide answers to the following interrelated questions:⁶

- *How is clandestine circulation to be defined according to Bourdieuian theory, and how is it positioned in relation to existing academic literature on similar practices?*
- *How is it to be theorised in terms of emergence, effects, and variance?*
- *How should it be conceptualised in relation to the state, the social order, and the everyday practices of social agents?*
- *How can it be best observed in the field, and its potential effects on the (re)production of the social order discerned?*

In seeking to address these questions the thesis proceeds in the following fashion. The first section concerns “getting hold of the difficulty” - that is, it addresses how best we should conceptualise the research object. I begin in chapter 2 by reviewing the various academic literatures which have at

⁵Also quoted in Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 1).

⁶The research questions briefly stated here are elaborated in more detail at the end of chapter 3, following the reconstruction of the research object.

different times attempted to grasp some aspect or other of the social reality under consideration, and to relate it to the broader social structure. In doing so, I seek to draw attention to what I believe to be some of the strengths and shortcomings of these different approaches, and to demonstrate the emerging utility of a “new way of thinking” - that is, a new approach toward constructing the research object.

I introduce this new approach in chapter 3, beginning with the specific methodological philosophy (or praxeology) upon which it is founded, before elaborating the new research object - clandestine circulation - it entails. In the process, I try to highlight the contribution I believe such a new conceptualisation offers, and the ways in which it builds on prior approaches. Having thus positioned the research, I then recap in greater detail the research questions which arise from this new object, and which guide the work that follows, as well as the scope and limitations of the thesis. Finally, this first section concludes with a chapter introducing the field site, urban Beirut, including a brief justification for its suitability as an empirical case study.

The second part of the thesis presents the main theoretical contribution of the research. Having outlined clandestine circulation as a research object in part one, in this section I seek to integrate it within a robust Bourdieusian theoretical framework, addressing in the process a number of the research questions arising at the end of chapter 3. In particular, the theoretical outline attempts to explain: how clandestine circulation may emerge from within processes of state formation (and by extension, how we must conceive of the state in order to capture such processes); how it may function as a mode of reproduction of the social structure; and how clandestine circulation is itself structured as a social practice. In the process of outlining this theory of clandestine circulation, I make reference to commonalities and differences with some of the prior academic approaches mentioned in chapter 2, as well as establishing where my own theory differs from other contemporary Bourdieusian scholarship. Having outlined what I consider to be the main elements of the theory, I then conclude this section by presenting some of the key heuristic tools which emerge from it, and which guide the empirical analysis that follows.

The third part of the thesis consists of an empirical analysis of clandestine circulation in practice in the field site of urban Beirut, and is divided into two chapters, corresponding to the two research ‘moments’ of Bour-

dieusian praxeology. Together they represent a ‘state of the field’, whereby the theoretical framework developed in part two is applied to material gathered from field work. In this section I attempt to prove that the principles of clandestine circulation outlined in the theory section can be seen in action in the Lebanese context, and serve not only to structure practice, but in doing so to play a significant role in reproducing the social order. The thesis then concludes with a chapter summarising the main findings and contributions, as well as potential directions for future research.

Finally, it should be noted that sections 2 and 3 are not intended to be read as indicative of a deductive research model in the theory-testing mode. The division between theoretical and empirical is a purely structural one, intended to highlight the separate contribution of the thesis in each area. Rather, an outline of the research methodology (in the practical sense) which guided this project may be found in the appendix, alongside a list of respondents, a sample of the questionnaire used to conduct the structured interviews, and data relating to coding and analysis of results.

Part I

The Research Problem

In order to construct a model of the game, which will not be the mere recording of explicit norms, nor a statement of regularities, while synthesising both norms and regularities, one has to reflect on the different modes of existence of the principles of regulation and the regularity of different forms of practice[...]

Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words

Chapter 2

Concept Formation

Interestingly, every Russian knows what *blat* is, but finds it difficult to define

Alena Ledeneva, Continuity and Change of Blat

The academic attempt to systematise personalistic social phenomena such as the informal exchange of favours, support, goods or even money has always created conceptual difficulties. Even when located within supposedly “primordial” societies, conceptualising such exchanges presents an intellectual challenge, falling as they do precisely on the fault line between micro and macro phenomena - that is, highly personalistic practices which are nonetheless to be found reproduced throughout society. As a result, they often lead to broad structural effects which seemingly create the very conditions which cause them - a puzzling endogeneity often explained away as ‘recursive’.

When such behaviour continues even in the midst of societies where exchange is supposedly governed by principles of Weberian rationality regulated by the modern state, the challenge to classify and explain such phenomena (now typically rendered ‘illicit’, depending on their context) becomes still harder, particularly for teleological theories of social development. Why does such behaviour persist in some contexts, but apparently not in others? And how does it relate to the social structure?

By way of an introduction to the problem, let us return briefly to the anecdote of the young professional. How might we best conceptualise it? One way of looking at the situation is as follows. We have a citizen in

need of certification by the state in order to legally practice her profession. However, when proceeding through formal channels, she is unable to obtain the necessary certificate. Instead, a personal connection is sought - in this case, through the additional intermediation of an unseen broker or brokers. Beyond a personal connection, however, it would seem that the exchange of money - a bribe - is also required to successfully complete the procedure. For some reason though (a failure of communication, a misunderstanding, or perhaps even a deeper cause), the bribe is not paid. And so the deadlock continues.

Such a specification immediately throws up a host of questions. Why is the bribe not paid? Indeed, why can it not even be named? The *expectation* of the bribe (on both sides) suggests the existence of some kind of a norm which differs from the proper procedure, from the formal rules, of the state. Where did that norm come from? And, if it is widespread, what are its effects? Is it the same as that (seemingly vague) expression, *wasta*, mentioned by the professional? How do we explain the role of personal connections in this context, and are they more significant than the formal relations (citizen, public servant) supposedly specified by the state for such interactions? If so, why?

While far from capturing the full scope of the research object, such anecdotes and the questions they pose are nonetheless useful in demonstrating the breadth of the conceptual framework necessary to properly study that object *as a totality (or unity) of practice*.¹ That is, a conceptual framework able to identify the different theoretical elements of which the research object consists, and to explain how they relate to each other. Only then are we able to build generalisable hypotheses which may in turn explain cause and effect at the broader social level.

Within the existing literature, four different (though in some cases, related) fields each offer a partial framework for conceptualising this episode. To begin with, the basic exchange relation (or relations) have been extensively theorised in the academic literature on *clientelism* (which includes works in the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, political science and even economics). However, whereas the framework of clientelism may enable a

¹See Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 26-27), “sociology must be a *total science*. It must construct “total social facts” (Mauss) that preserve the fundamental unity of human practice across the mutilating scissures of disciplines, empirical domains, and techniques of observation and analysis.”

detailed conceptualisation of the *form* of exchange, and in particular its relation to the broader social structure, as a theoretical paradigm it tends to be weak in explaining the *formation* of power relations upon which the exchange depends (which are either exogenous, in which case requiring an additional theoretical paradigm to explain them, or endogenous, in which case creating ontological difficulties).

Second, the literature on *corruption* - while in some cases overlapping with clientelism - tends to do a somewhat better job of theorising the resources being exchanged, as well as (in the bureaucratic setting) the objective power relations (and hence the limitations) determining the outcome of such exchanges. However, studies of corruption frequently leave obscure or unsaid the subjective nature of the exchange involved, in the specific sense of the (often varying) *symbolic* force attaching to such exchanges. For example, a bribe and a ‘favour’ carry quite different subjective weight, and even a bribe may be seen in more or less instrumental terms; yet in order to account for such differences we must be able to theorise the relation of norms to laws, of informality to formality, and hence the possibility that “normative systems” may carry more coercive force than written rules.

In order to capture the contingency of such norms, or perhaps their embeddedness within the supposed formality of the Weberian state, we must turn thirdly to *theories of the state, state formation and state development*. Such theories provide a rich conceptual framework for explaining the emergence of normative concepts such as bureaucratic rationalism (and associated concepts such as formality and informality), as well as their historical contingency, and their relation to other normative systems such as kinship or friendship. However, as macro theories they tend to move in teleological fashion, and frequently lack the capacity to capture the micro-exchanges upon which much of the logic of this episode seems to depend, and in which a clash of norms and rules, mediated power and misunderstanding, figure prominently.

In this sense *institutional theory*, which focusses precisely on these aspects of micro-exchange, may help to uncover some of the principles guiding such encounters, in particular how they emerge and how they persist. Indeed, an institutional approach has already been applied in many of the literatures mentioned above, and in recent years the *informal institutions* research agenda has attempted to conceptually marry the clash of formal

rules and informal norms which seems to predominate in cases such as ours. However, the informal institutions approach still suffers from some basic epistemological flaws, conflating the separate existence of norms, written rules and statistical regularities under a singular, deterministic logic which owes much to methodological individualism.

It is my argument that none of these frameworks or paradigms provides, on its own, sufficient scope for fully grasping the complex social phenomena under consideration, and reconciling them within a single research object. As a result, research conducted within these paradigms has failed to capture the full relation of these phenomena to the broader social structure. The purpose of this first section therefore is to demonstrate the emerging utility of a different conceptualisation, founded upon the methodological philosophy advocated by Pierre Bourdieu. Such an approach (or praxeology), I argue, does enable us to grasp the totality of practices involved in such phenomena, as well as the theoretical unity of the various elements relating to those practices, and hence their potential relation to the (re)production of the social order. The reconceptualisation of the research object which follows from such a process I have chosen to call *clandestine circulation*, a term originating in Bourdieu (1986b, p. 255), and which (with further elaboration) I believe offers the potential for substantial theoretical gains.

This section is therefore divided into three chapters. First, in this chapter I discuss the various literatures relating to the four frameworks highlighted above. In doing so, I hope to draw out from each some important aspects relating to the conceptualisation of the research object, while also demonstrating the limitations which each approach places on such a broader conceptualisation. In the second chapter, I introduce the most salient features of Bourdieusian praxeology, as a means both for reconciling those previous insights, and overcoming the limitations associated with them. Having introduced this new approach to concept formation, I then outline the new conceptualisation of the research object - clandestine circulation - which it entails, hence laying the ground for the theoretical outline which follows in the second part of the thesis. The final chapter in this section introduces the field site, urban Beirut, and explains its suitability as a case study for clandestine circulation.

Finally, before proceeding it should be emphasised here that the review of the various literatures which follows in this chapter also constitutes

in itself an important aspect of Bourdieusian praxeology, corresponding to the “reflexive return” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 42) in scientific research. Such a process requires that we analyse “the organizational and cognitive structure of the discipline” in order to unearth its “epistemological unconscious” (*ibid.*, p. 41), and hence provide a more objective foundation for new scholarly enquiry.²

2.1 Clientelism

The paradigm of *clientelism* has proved particularly enduring across a number of social science disciplines as a means of conceptualising, in the aggregate, the practice of personalistic exchange between individuals (or even groups), generally involving power relations. The intellectual standing of clientelism has waxed and waned over the years, depending to a large extent on its capacity to be integrated within the dominant theoretical model(s). From this, it may also be easily understood how the shortcomings of clientelism as a paradigm have also tended to closely mirror those of the broader theoretical approaches to which it has been put to serve.³

While patron-client relations had been studied in a variety of contexts prior to the 1960s,⁴ it was only toward the end of that decade that a separate theoretical paradigm of clientelism began to properly emerge. Ambiguity clouded the subject from the onset. Indeed, the term ‘clientelism’ itself seems to have emerged only slowly from the shadows of its older sibling ‘patronage’, with which it was to remain for a long time after almost synonymous.⁵ Among early contentions within the literature were arguments

²“What has to be constantly scrutinized and *neutralized, in the very act of construction of the object*, is the collective scientific unconscious embedded in theories, problems, and (especially national) categories of scholarly judgement” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 40). Such reflexivity, we may add, differs strongly from the narcissistic reflexivity of the subject *on* the subject favoured in certain schools of ethnography and anthropology (with which Bourdieu is often, unfortunately, confounded) (*ibid.*, pp. 36-46).

³Indeed Leenders (2004c, p. 33), following Clapham (1982), argues clientelism is merely a medium-range concept that only gains explanatory power “when placed within or complemented by a broader approach”.

⁴For a thorough bibliography of the early field of patron-client relations see Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980, p. 43)

⁵Tarrow (1967) seems to have been among the first to use the term academically, apparently translating it directly from the Italian *clientelismo*. Powell (1970, p. 416) was probably the first to prefer the term ahead of patronage, which he seems to restrict only to *vertical* ties within the political system. Roniger (1983) has noted that both patronage and clientelism are ultimately derived from the Latin terminology for Ancient Roman

over whether patron-client relations should be defined as purely dyadic or also triadic (that is, including brokers);⁶ whether they involved only individuals or also groups;⁷ whether they were freely entered into or coercive; and binding or non-binding.

Within Europe, initial theorisations of the patron-client nexus were strongly flavoured by anthropological studies, first of the Italian *mezzogiorno*, and then the wider Mediterranean;⁸ while in the US, Latin America and South-East Asia were more often the starting point.⁹ Although culturally quite different, these regions nonetheless shared the questionable distinction of being defined by academia as ‘under-developed’. Once established, this correlation between clientelism and under-development frequently led - either implicitly or explicitly - to clientelism being placed in some type of *causal* relation (either as an independent variable or a theoretical paradigm) to explain this seemingly paradoxical condition.

As Kaufman (1972) - who provides a useful summary of this early approach - noted, when wedded to the emerging theory of dependent development, clientelism suggested “an essentially rational component in behaviors which, from other perspectives, might be viewed as extreme cases of culturally-induced irrationality”; in other words, patron-client relations could be seen as “rational coping devices by which low-status actors maximize their security within a hostile environment” (*ibid.*, p. 286). This *functional* emphasis on patron-client relations may be seen clearly in some of the earliest theoretical works, both in political science (e.g., Powell) and

practices.

⁶Foster (1963, p. 1281) argued that patron-client relations are only dyadic, and thus the overlapping of networks has “no functional significance.” Boissevain (1966, p. 25) disagreed, and saw the addition of brokers as the only reason we can speak of “a *system* of patronage”. Lande (1973), who proved influential in the US, followed Foster, while later economic models of corruption rely on triadic principal/agent theories (e.g., Rose-Ackerman (1975), Della Porta and Vannucci (1999)).

⁷Political scientists such as Scott (1972) and Lande (1973) were happy to extend patron-client relations to “quasi-groups” in bargaining for particularistic goods in the political sphere. Anthropologists following the original theories of Simmel (1950) and Mauss (1954) have been more reticent to extend the relation beyond individual, personal relations.

⁸For examples of the former see in particular Boissevain (1966), and Pitt-Rivers (1954) (whence the famous expression “lop-sided friendship”), while the latter is best exemplified by Gellner and Waterbury (1977)

⁹See Scott (1972) and Lande (1973) for the latter; for the former, Wolf (1956) was one of the first to take Latin America as an example. It should be noted however that the differing foci hardly represent exclusive categories: for example Tarrow (1967), an American academic, also looked extensively at Italy.

anthropology (e.g, Boissevain). Such an approach created theoretical problems though, not least regarding the endogeneity of clientelist practices to the environments that spawned them. As Boissevain noted, “It is obvious that many of the conditions which give rise to the need for protection, and hence patronage, are simply the result of the successful operation of the patronage system” (Boissevain, 1966, p. 30).¹⁰ In the face of such endogeneity, the supposedly ‘rational’ basis of clientelist behaviour becomes perilously thin. Boissevain, perhaps the first to address this shortcoming, would speak for many in falling back on *culture* as the ultimate explanation - “Patronage is, to a very large extent, a self-perpetuating system of belief and action grounded in the society’s value system” (*ibid.*, p. 30).¹¹

A further difficulty with the functionalist approach was that, given patron-client ties could be found at various stages of socio-economic development, in order for the argument to hold it would need to be proven that these ties could be functional at each of these stages. In a highly synthetic argument, Lemarchand and Legg (1972) placed clientelist (or “clientage”) systems within a teleological framework related to the wider structural variables at given stages of development. Essentially treating patron-client ties as a superstructure (or sub-system) of the deeper socio-economic structure, Lemarchand and Legg seemed to demonstrate that patron-client ties changed according to the degree of development, moving from “affective” lord-vassal ties in feudal systems, to the eventual “pragmatic”, “official” ties between state employees, political parties and group representatives in industrial polities.

In this scenario, clientelism could remain ‘functional’ in a number of respects: it could foster the “severance of familistic or kinship ties and their replacement with more universalistic loyalties”, thus acting as an “agent of modernisation” (*ibid.*, p. 170).¹² Alternatively, clientelism could enable the maintenance of “social and political equilibrium” (*ibid.*, p. 172) in the midst

¹⁰See also Lemarchand and Legg (1972, p. 158), who note the “process of circular causation that links clientelism to the political and socioeconomic environment. Thus, if there is any plausibility to the argument that clientelism develops out of the sense of generalized insecurity that presumably exists in so-called “stateless” or segmentary societies, it is equally reasonable to view both insecurity and clientelism as by-products of the development of state structures.”

¹¹See also Powell (1970, p. 423), who speaks of environments “Where the political culture is a *carrier* of patron-client patterns of behaviour” (emphasis mine.)

¹²According to Lemarchand and Legg, this represents the ‘anthropological’ view.

of inequality - enabling the elite to extract a surplus without the breakdown of social order, and acting as a “functional alternative to the [welfare] state” (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972, pp. 156-162). A third possibility as to how clientelism may be functional is provided by Weingrod (1968), who relates party-directed patronage to the integration of the state (thus making institutionalised patronage different to personalistic patron-client ties, a distinction we will return to.)

Hence, in more ways than one clientelism could be made to serve a function within a teleological theory of state development, whereby societies progress through different ‘ideal’ types - moving from personalistic ties to universalism, and from feudal to industrial polities, via the mid-point of ‘patrimonial’ systems. And if clientelism should be found to persist despite a society reaching the ‘end’ stage of ‘industrial polity’, the reason could only be that “modernization is discontinuous” (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972, p. 168).

Unfortunately however, as academic studies moved beyond the narrow confines of the developmentalist paradigm, it became apparent that there was not always a clear-cut relation between socio-economic development and clientelism: to be sure, modernisation could prompt older forms of clientelism to evolve, but, particularly as the curtain was lifted on the inner workings of the Soviet Union, it became equally apparent that entirely new forms of patron-client relations could emerge *as a result* of modernisation.¹³ Thus, the early academic focus on the teleological-functionalist role of clientelism - doomed to die out with the modernisation of society - came to suggest either selection bias, or even wishful thinking.¹⁴

In the absence of a teleological narrative in which to place clientelism, scholars began instead to pay more attention to patron-client relations in

¹³Early reports of patron-client relations in the Soviet Union began to emerge in the late 1950s (see for example Berliner (1957) and Crankshaw (1956)), however it was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s that serious academic studies into the organisation of these relations were conducted (see Lomnitz-Adler (1988, pp. 49-52), who provides a summary focussing in particular on the work of Altman (1983)). The informal exchange of favours in the Soviet Union (known as *blat*) forms an important part of this study, and will be addressed in detail in the theoretical section. More recently Collins (2006) has shown how post-Communist transition in central Asia also led to a resurgence in clan-based clientelism.

¹⁴See Theobald (1992) for an obituary of the teleological-functionalist argument and an attempt to explain the persistence of clientelism despite modernisation - Theobald’s arguments in turn incorporate elements of institutional theory, which will be covered in the section below.

their own right as *a specific form of exchange*. Graziano (1976) was, like Lemarchand and Legg, interested in the potential for a conceptual framework that could unite personalistic peasant-notable relations with the kinds of “horizontal” clientelism operating between (categorical) groups that prevailed in some modern party-political systems. Drawing on the previously mentioned works of Scott (1972) and Lande (1973) concerning dyadic ties, Graziano expanded this framework by synthesising the theories of the sociologist Georg Simmel¹⁵ with the increasingly fashionable approach of Mancur Olson (1971) on the rationality of collective action, and finally with the “exchange paradigm” developed by Homans (1958) and Blau (1964).

Graziano’s innovation was to argue that clientelism represented a specific form of dyadic *direct* exchange - that is, a personalistic exchange in which the benefits are limited to the individuals involved. As a form of exchange it is therefore in contrast to *indirect* exchange, which (following Homans and Blau) should be mediated by some form of social norm leading to the generation of a *group* benefit. Graziano argued that Olson’s theory of the “selective incentives” of collective action (i.e., that a part of all collective action must involve the provision of individual benefits) was simply another way of describing this direct exchange within groups.

The benefit of Graziano’s specification of clientelism is that it enables a general model of clientelist exchange to be developed which can encompass both individual and group structures, and which is predicated on the notion of a personalistic (i.e., self-interested) benefit. Contrary to previous approaches, this model was able to define clientelist exchange *against* other kinds of exchange based on the type of *symbolic force* it generated. Thus, whereas dyadic direct exchange may generate individual obligations and loyalties, because it does not generate group benefits it cannot lead to the development and institutionalisation of *legitimate authority* within a society. It is therefore opposed not to group exchange *per se*, but to the specific form of group exchange which generates intrinsic benefits, such as group expectations of common rights (Graziano, 1976, p. 167). Furthermore, according to Graziano it is the absence of this latter exchange which *prevents the accumulation of capital* in a society, understood in Homans’ sense as the greater

¹⁵It is interesting that Graziano made note of how Scott and Lande both ignored Simmel (p. 153), yet Graziano himself seems unaware of Lemarchand and Legg’s work, which did (if only cursorily) draw on Simmel.

tendency toward actions leading to a deferred reward (Graziano, 1976, p. 169). In other words, rather than being a super-structural effect generated by environmental (or ‘deep’) structural variables, clientelist exchange can itself be responsible for the presence or absence of structural features in a society.

Graziano’s approach to concept formation owed much to Sartori (1970). On the one hand, this enabled him to break out of the functionalist impasse - to discard from the clientelist paradigm purely cosmetic similarities, while beginning to identify previously unseen structural commonalities by carefully synthesising elements from several different theoretical perspectives. On the other hand, the necessity of always moving up and down the ladder of abstraction, of placing conceptual elements in a fixed relation reduced to a single dimension, does not always allow the full force of those relations to be captured. In particular, Graziano placed the symbolic forces generated by the different forms of exchange in a teleological relation akin to the Weberian *gemeinschaft/gesellschaft* paradigm - i.e., where societies move from one ‘ideal’ type to the other. Missing from Graziano’s analysis was an awareness of the frequently messy *simultaneous existence* of direct and indirect exchange - of personal and public loyalties rubbing side by side and frequently clashing. In viewing subjective categories from the fixed, mono-dimensional perspective of the scholastic gaze,¹⁶ the ambiguities upon which so much of practice rests were hidden from view, as were the profits accruing to those able to skilfully transform and transact the different symbolic forces which concentrate at different intersections in society.

The study of clientelism thus moved on from functionalist and developmentalist approaches and instead towards seeing patron-client relations as - in the words of Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980) - “a distinct mode of regulating crucial aspects of institutional order: the structuring of the flow of resources, exchange and power relations and their legitimation in society” (*ibid.*, p. 49). This “institutional” approach saw in clientelism “a part or manifestation of the central mode of regulation of the flow of resources and processes of interpersonal and institutional exchange and interaction in a society or a sector thereof” (*ibid.*, p. 49). That is, rather than a simple structural emanation of the social order, clientelism was now seen as part of the order of practices necessary to *produce* that social order, and indeed to

¹⁶Bourdieu’s elaboration of this phenomenon is outlined in the next chapter.

reproduce it in a regulated fashion.

This institutionalist way of thinking would take different directions - each hinted at by Graziano. Whereas Eisenstadt and Roniger (*ibid.*) followed the more sociological route, drawing upon Mauss (1954) and Levi-Strauss (1969),¹⁷ others would instead follow the more economic route prefigured by Olson, and given greater articulation by North (1990).¹⁸ Still others, rejecting the voluntarism of neo-institutionalism, would follow Neo-Marxist or Gramscian approaches, highlighting the role of clientelist exchange in reproducing the class structure, and also the hegemonic aspects of patron-client relations.¹⁹

Limiting ourselves here to the first of these directions, what Auyero (1999, p. 330) refers to as the “clientelist impasse”²⁰ was quickly reached. Transforming clientelism into a mode of regulation begged the question as to in what sense clientelism itself could be said to exist. Rather than escaping the larger epistemological divide which separated the (phenomenological) subjectivism of Lemarchand (1972) from the (structuralist) objectivism of Powell (1970),²¹ these works were condemned instead to oscillate endlessly between the two, finding the generative principles of clientelism either in “a syndrome of norms and role expectations located *within* the personality systems of *individual actors*” (Kaufman, 1972, p. 288, emphasis mine), or in “an ‘objective’ power and exchange relationship” which is grounded more in the larger structural processes at work in a society - namely, state centralization and market expansion (Powell, 1970, p. 413).

The problem was ultimately the rigorously ascriptive nature of the scholastic vision used to define the various elements relating to the patron-client exchange - a monolithic perspective capable of identifying correlations and

¹⁷Graziano (1976) drew upon Mauss’s work concerning the gift, which would also be fundamental to the development of Bourdieu’s theory of practice (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 3-15). Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980) argued that their approach differed from Graziano’s, but in fact there is remarkably little difference between their conception of ‘generalized’ and ‘specific’ exchange, and Graziano’s ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ exchange.

¹⁸See the edited volume of Piattoni (2001) and Grzymala-Busse (2007); Robinson and Verdier (2002) offer a more economic approach.

¹⁹See in particular Bodeman (1988).

²⁰Auyero includes older works such as Lande (1973) and Gellner and Waterbury (1977) in this impasse, yet this seems unfair. In terms of a ‘dead-end’ in clientelist research I would limit the period to between Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) and Roniger and Günes-Ayata (1994)

²¹See Kaufman (1972, p. 288) - although he does not recognise the distinction as such (he calls it a ‘levels of analysis’ problem.)

oppositions (such as clientelism/social exchange vs. bureaucratic rationalism/indirect exchange), yet incapable of capturing the generative principles (or mechanisms) responsible for these relations, and hence their *full force*. Instead, such accounts would frequently become bogged down in sterile structure/agency debates, or would slip from analysis into sermonising.²²

Hence, as a mode of academic enquiry clientelism fell somewhat out of fashion. Instead, the phenomena it encompassed came steadily to be absorbed by different approaches. In the sense of clientelism as a “mode of regulating crucial aspects of institutional order” we find it returning to the academic agenda under the *informal institutions* approach, which will be dealt with in the institutional theory section below. In another sense, however, the contrasting symbolic force which Graziano observed between direct and indirect exchange, and in particular the role of the latter in instituting *legitimate authority*, meant that clientelist-type exchanges were increasingly prone to being constructed from the (negative) perspective of that legitimate authority, otherwise known as the state. Hence we turn now to the academic study of corruption.²³

2.2 Corruption

Corruption has been a subject of philosophical enquiry at least since Aristotle, capturing the attention of political thinkers including Cicero, Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau.²⁴ However, whereas classical approaches toward corruption tended to view it in secular terms as the decay of an entire political system from its ideal type (in the Aristotelian sense, from monarchy to tyranny, aristocracy to oligarchy, and ‘timocracy’, or constitutional government, to democracy),²⁵ modern academic approaches have focussed

²²A good example of this problem may be found in Roniger (1994, p. 15), who argues in the academic optative that “In view of the persistence of patronage in modern democratic polities, [i]t might be in the public interest to recognize it, demanding that it be exercised openly, and as such that it be subject to public evaluation and accountability.” There is no sense of awareness that the symbolic force responsible for generating the clientelistic exchange may in fact preclude the possibility of such an exchange being publicly evaluated. The same lack of theoretical insight may also be found in Günes-Ayata (1994).

²³A third direction of research on clientelism, the relational approach, has also emerged in recent years, and includes Auyero, 1999; Auyero, 2000; Auyero, Lapegna, and Poma, 2009, as well as Rutten (2006) and Berenschot (2010). This approach will be dealt with in the following chapter on Bourdieusian praxeology.

²⁴See Friedrich (1972, pp.127-141) for a brief historical overview.

²⁵Aristotle (1926) VIII. x. 1-6

instead on the behavioural aspect of corruption: that is, as the deviation of an action from a particular norm.²⁶

Indeed, perhaps the most commonly cited definition of corruption in modern academia - that of Nye (1967) - is of this type, and defines corruption as “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (*ibid.*, p. 419). The public/private distinction is a crucial one, as while opinions vary over whether corruption is necessarily immoral, illegal, or even entirely undesirable,²⁷ most accounts seem to accept that the violation of a *public duty* lies at the core of corruption.²⁸

According to Nye, corruption thus includes: “bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgement of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses)” (*ibid.*, p. 419). The inclusion of nepotism is significant: it suggests that patron-client relations, when conducted under the guise of the modern, rational state, are a form of corruption - involving as they do the substitution of universalistic criteria (“merit”) for ascriptive, personalistic criteria. Also significant is what Nye’s definition does *not* include: “behaviour that might nonetheless be regarded as offensive to moral standards”, and also “any consideration of whether the behaviour is in the public interest” (*ibid.*, p. 419).²⁹

These exceptions, as well as the title of the article from which Nye’s definition is taken - “Corruption and Political Development” - tell us some-

²⁶The distinction is also noted by Johnston (1996) and Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002, pp. 3-6).

²⁷Bardhan (1997, p. 1321), for example, argues that “not all illegal transactions are corrupt, nor are all instances of corruption or bribery illegal.” Concerning varying normative attitudes to corruption, see Johnston (1986). More recent constructivist approaches (such as Pardo (2004b), Anders and Nuijten (2007) and Graaf, Wagenaar, and Hoenderboom (2010)) will be dealt with below, as they no longer attempt to define corruption in a singular, absolute sense.

²⁸Even recent expansionary projects in the realm of anti-corruption seem to accept the *sine qua non* of public duty for definitional purposes. See Sampson (2005, p. 121), who notes that Transparency International have expanded their definition of corruption to include ‘the abuse of *entrusted power* for private gain’.

²⁹Regarding the latter point, according to Nye to include the effects of corrupt behaviour within the definition would make analysing the relation between corruption and development difficult.

thing regarding the transformation which the modern study of corruption had made in relation to classical approaches. Whereas classical political thinkers considered corruption as the antithesis of development, and indeed as homologous to physical or moral corruption (and hence a kind of decay), academics such as Nye wondered if a degree of public corruption - i.e., the subordination of public duty to private interests - might not in fact be functional in certain contexts in *developing* the state: encouraging capital formation, elite integration, and even improving government capacity (Nye, 1967, p. 419-421).³⁰

This developmentalist perspective (to be found also in Leys (1965) and Scott (1969)), despite its functionalist overtones, nonetheless served to highlight (often implicitly rather than explicitly) the historicity of the very concept of ‘public interest’ - that is, the normative values which corrupt behaviour is supposed to go against. In contrast to the ‘moralising’ approach of earlier scholarship such as Wraith and Simpkins (1963) - who used purple prose to describe “the scarlet thread of bribery and corruption” and the “jungle of nepotism and temptation” to be found in the colonies³¹ - Leys emphasised the contingency of normative standards regarding this ‘public interest’, not least in the history of the ‘civilised’ West. Recalling the apparent decline of corruption in Britain during the 19th century, Leys argued that society did not “pass from a corrupt condition to a very pure one; rather it passed from one set of standards to another, *through* a period in which behaviour patterns which were acceptable by the old standards came to be regarded as corrupt according to the new” (Leys, 1965, p. 227). It wasn’t corruption which changed, so much as the perception of what constituted the ‘public interest’.

The somewhat fungible nature of the norms underpinning perceptions of corruption thus presented a problem. When studying corruption empirically, whose standards should one apply to define corrupt behaviour? As Leys noted, the moralists could hardly be faulted because “near the heart of [their] concern is the idea that the public interest is opposed to anything that heightens *inequality*”; yet as Leys observed, “we also have to ask *how far equality and development are themselves compatible ideals*” (*ibid.*, p. 220,

³⁰It should be noted that Nye also lists potential costs of corruption in the development process.

³¹Wraith and Simpkins, cited in Leys (1965, p. 216)

emphasis mine). Such potential contradictions between ends and means was the specific reason why Nye limited his own definition of corrupt behaviour to the deviation of a public *role* (rather than the more general public *interest*). Yet such an academic sleight of hand simply shifts the burden of blame (so to speak) onto the bureaucrat or civil servant, and implies that Weberian bureaucratic rationality is itself an absolute, rather than contingent, set of norms.

This deeply normative aspect of corruption means that its formation as an academic research object has been particularly sensitive to broader historical forces. The standard taxonomy of Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002, p. 7-9) divides academic approaches to corruption into three categories: Nye's limited public office definition; Friedrich's broader public interest approach; and 'market-centred' definitions (in which norms are not clearly articulated, and individuals simply act to maximise their utility.)³²

While Heidenheimer and Johnston do not attempt to contextualise these divergent trends, Zinn (2005, p. 230-231) offers some useful observations, noting that during the 1960s and 1970s "an academic division of labour was consolidated", whereby political scientists would focus on "the 'political' side of corruption as a problem of the implementation and functioning of democratic institutions in 'complex' societies", while forsaking the sorts of issues which (with the exception of Scott (1972)) "attracted the interest of anthropologists of patronage."³³

Zinn maintains that, following this division (and the gradual petering out of patronage as a field of anthropological interest during the 1980s), "a discursive transformation" took place within academia. By the 1980s and 1990s, although many of the societies which were once the object of ethnographic studies on patronage had joined the ranks of (imperfectly) 'developed' states, some of the behavioural aspects associated with patronage in those societies nonetheless persisted (as noted in the previous section). Ac-

³²We may include under such 'market-centred' approaches the works of Rose-Ackerman (1975), Acemoglu (2001) and Dreher and Schneider (2009), as well as some aspects of Della Porta and Vannucci (1999). Leenders (2004c, p. 14-28) gives a detailed overview of this approach, sub-dividing the economic approach into New Political Economy, rent-seeking, New Institutional Economics, and Principal-Agent models.

³³As an aside, we may note that this 'division of labour' finds its precise correlation in the changing use (in English) of the terms 'clientelism' and 'patronage', with the former coming to be applied exclusively by political scientists to behaviour within the Western context, and the latter generally used by anthropologists in relation to developing countries.

ording to Zinn, rather than continuing to be studied under the framework of patronage, instead “the most negative features of these social interactions are now described as ‘corruption’, which has itself become an important heuristic device for the analysis of ‘problematic’ development or persistent underdevelopment,” (Zinn, 2005, p. 230-231).

An empirical survey of the academic topicality of corruption tends to support this thesis. Walsh (2005, p. 172) notes (uncritically) that “Publishing output [on corruption] remained well below fifty books per year until the mid 1970s. In 1990, a dramatic rise in output began that peaked in 2000, when 287 books in English were published. Although output has declined in recent years, it is still twice that of the pre-90’s era.” Such a timeline neatly ties together a boom in corruption studies with the collapse of communism and the reintegration of the former Eastern bloc into the global capitalist economy.

In the absence of a competing vision for economic development, ‘anti-corruption’ seems to have emerged under the ‘good governance’ umbrella as a useful paradigm through which to analyse Second and Third World economies, and (perhaps) to bind them more readily to the Washington consensus.³⁴ Sampson (2005, p. 116), for example, has noted how “Anti-corruption” is viewed by some in the Third World as “a political tactic to keep Third World recipient countries in line, as the latest incarnation of the [World] Bank’s structural adjustment programme.”

The academic reconstruction of ‘patronage’ as ‘corruption’ may also be seen, in this light, as part of the broader discursive move towards the so-called ‘criminalization of the state,’ (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 1999; Bayart, 2004; Botte, 2004): a means by which practices such as the privatisation of government services in Third World states may be justified on the basis of sound policy, something which Briquet and Favarel-Garrigues (2010, pp. 1-15) have argued is even being extended to the West.

Thus, rather than a neutral, disinterested research object, constructed with the intention of empirically observing an element of social behaviour, the study of corruption came to reflect aspects of the more complicated relationship between knowledge and power (and hence, ultimately, the state).

³⁴Theobald (1999, p. 498-499) also comments on this tendency, while adding that “At a more sophisticated level, the theory of the neo-patrimonial state is in danger of following the same logic [...] achieving little more than describing a salient feature of social organisation in a context of underdevelopment.”

In the attempt to overcome such normative issues, two broad approaches have recently evolved. On the one hand (and in common with clientelism, as we have already noted), the “market-centred” approaches mentioned by Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002) and pioneered by Rose-Ackerman (1975) have been refined and deepened through the addition of an institutionalist perspective, as popularised by North (1990). The second strand of literature is less easily grouped within a single paradigm; yet one may nonetheless find a unifying principle in the shared sense that corruption itself is no longer regarded as a discrete, bounded object. Interpretivist, post-structural, relational and constructivist approaches all stress the contingency of the norms relating to the perception of corruption, as well as the importance of symbolic (i.e., ‘non-rational’) elements in the constitution of corruption as a social practice.

Dealing first with those works influenced by the New Institutional Economics (NIE), the normative dilemma is dealt with essentially through suppression. The framework of methodological individualism and its goal of utility maximisation are instead used as the theoretical lodestone, with actors assumed to be equally predisposed toward corruption, and corruption itself dependent upon the institutional setting. Although such a conceit presents problems, these works have nonetheless proved valuable in capturing some of the varying constraints different institutional environments place upon the potential for corrupt behaviour, as well as the different *resources* for corruption which these configurations offer.

The roots of this approach may be traced back as far as Rose-Ackerman’s first contribution on *The Economics of Corruption* (Rose-Ackerman, 1975), whereby varying probabilities for corruption were postulated on the basis of differing institutional configurations (without yet being described as such).³⁵ It is not until the late 1990s however that NIE-style approaches came to be applied to the issue of corruption in a systematic way. In particular, Della Porta and Vannucci (1999) defined corruption as a sub-set of the principal-agent problem (*ibid.*, p. 17), whereby the principal is the state, and the configuration of the political system creates the ‘resources of corruption’ - e.g., political rent, restricted information, as well as subsidiary markets

³⁵Rose-Ackerman would also cite (in passing) Williamson’s work on vertical integration (Williamson, 1971), which prefigured the rehabilitation of Coase’s theory of transaction costs that would prove so important to the NIE school.

such as (criminal) protection for the enforcement of corrupt contracts (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999, pp. 33-67).³⁶ More recently, Leenders (2004c) has demonstrate how the broader structural features of institutional design (in the sense of Ostrom (1990)) may contribute to the emergence of elite corruption.

The psychological implications of rationality however remain an issue, as the mechanisms responsible for generating normative structures such as bureaucratic rationality remain unaddressed.³⁷ Indeed, recent attempts to integrate corrupt transactions within Williamson's later theories of incomplete or 'relational' contracting (Williamson, 1985), and its connection to the problems of trust and reputation, have (perhaps unwittingly) highlighted such limits of rational choice.³⁸

These become readily apparent in attempts to 'rationalise' the competing claims of friendship or kinship with those of public office - a common problem when attempting to define corruption, given the frequency with which actors will deny the corruptness of an act, arguing instead that it was a 'favour', or that they were otherwise compelled through bonds of friendship, kinship or other alternative normative systems. The intractability of these different sets of norms - and the absence of voluntarism implied - results in a theoretical impasse for these NIE-style approaches not so dissimilar to that which faced clientelism. As Lambsdorff and Teksoz (2002) demonstrate, such an impasse can only be resolved in two ways: either vague imprecations in the academic optative ("Friendship belongs to the private sphere of a public servant and should not overshadow his duties"), or a false inversion of symbolic and normative codes ("friendship allows to camouflage a bribe as a gift, obfuscate the quid pro quo, allow reciprocity even years after a favor has been given and thus helps to enforce a corrupt agreement")(ibid., p. 18).

In contrast to the problems of methodological individualism, several new research trends have emerged in recent years which have sought to contex-

³⁶See also Rose-Ackerman (1999), who analysed corruption from a (quasi) institutionalist perspective in the separate fields of economics, politics, and culture, albeit in a less thorough-going way.

³⁷See also Collier (2002), whose attempt to synthesise (institutional) structure with (constructivist) agency seems to lend further weight to Theobald's critique mentioned above, resulting in a schema of institutional configurations and corruption which is rather more descriptive than explanatory.

³⁸See Lambsdorff and Teksoz (2002) and Schramm and Taube (2002), followed by an edited volume by Lambsdorff, Taube, and Schramm (2005).

tualise corruption as a social practice, including the discourse which surrounds it. While reflecting a variety of different approaches, these trends are nonetheless united by the fact that they no longer consider corruption itself to be a bounded, discrete object, but rather a product of the interaction of larger structural forces and discursive practices. Friedrich (1972) was among the first to take a constructivist approach toward corruption as a historical concept. His theory regarding the evolution of a ‘public interest’ was however enlarged somewhat by Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996), who also took into account the reverse side of the coin: the evolution of ‘anti-corruption’ - that is, of the different ideologies which emerged, and the different worldviews they reflected, concerning the nature of corruption and the best means to combat it (*ibid.*, p. 18-28).

At more or less the same time, anthropologists such as Gupta (1995) and Lomnitz-Adler (1995) were placing corruption within an interpretivist framework which emphasised the discursive nature of the phenomenon, and its particular relation to popular conceptions of the state and state power. Building on these insights, an edited volume by Haller and Shore (2005) on the anthropology of corruption included both the earlier-mentioned contribution of Sampson regarding the ‘projectisation’ of anti-corruption, as well as research by Rivkin-Fish on the evolution of social attitudes toward ‘unofficial payments’ in post-Soviet Russia. Within the field of legal anthropology, the edited volume of Pardo (2004a) also drew attention to the frequently contested boundary between legality and illegality, morality and immorality with regard to perceptions of corruption. While the interpretivist approach contains certain limitations,³⁹ it nonetheless highlights the frequently contested nature of supposedly corrupt exchanges, and the less than clear-cut normative framework in which they take place.

Perhaps the most encouraging developments however have been those recent works which have attempted to integrate insights from relational and critical sociology into the study of corruption. Working from both an anthropological and legal pluralist perspective, Anders and Nuijten (2007) offer a comprehensive framework for the analysis of corruption. By attempting to move beyond “binary oppositions” (*ibid.*, p. 11) such as law and corruption, Anders and Nuijten attempt to demonstrate what they see as “the

³⁹These limitations will be addressed below in the section on Bourdieusian praxeology, yet see Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 9-10).

hidden continuities between the law and its opposite” (Anders and Nuijten, 2007, p. 11). Such an approach involves first and foremost a reintegration of the norms governing corruption with the historical processes responsible for their formation (and in particular the emergence of the state). Anders and Nuijten identify a number of theoretical perspectives which can assist in this task, including de Sousa Santos’ “interlegality” (Santos, 1995), which focusses on “the interrelation between norms and actual practices” (Anders and Nuijten, 2007, p. 13), as well as Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of “state thought” (Bourdieu, 1999) - that is, the problem of transcending social categories which have themselves been constructed by the state. Similarly, de Graaf (2007) has suggested that Bourdieu’s relational sociology could be the methodological foundation for a new ‘contextual’ theory of corruption - a suggestion repeated in de Graaf, Maravic, and Wagenaar (2010), yet without much by way of concrete application.

Arguably, the thread which unifies these latest developments is an enlarged conception of corruption as a research object. Whereas NIE-style approaches tended to take for granted that corruption should be studied purely as a dependent or independent variable (i.e., what causes corruption? What are its effects on efficiency equilibria or growth?), constructivist, relational, interpretivist and critical approaches take a wider view, best summarised by Anders and Nuijten (2007, p. 2): “The study of corruption cannot be an end in itself but should rather be a field of inquiry to understand power relations in society at large. Even the pettiest forms of corruption reflect structural power relations.” It is indeed this relational approach - attempting to reintegrate corruption and the norms governing it with the production of unequal power relations - which informs the theoretical basis for this thesis, and which will be expanded upon in the next chapter.

However, if we are to study such structural power relations objectively, it follows that we must look beyond the narrow paradigm of corruption, and address the larger historical forces responsible for the different normative and symbolic systems governing them. Hence, we turn now to theories of the state, and in particular to the question of how we theorise the existence of the state in relation to the research object - that is, as a social fact, providing both the context or backdrop for illicit exchanges, as well as the very symbolic categories (through normative frameworks of legality and bureaucratic rationality) by which such exchanges are first defined as illicit.

2.3 Theories of the State

It is safe to say that the state constitutes a wide field of enquiry in the social sciences. Thus, in seeking to apply theories of the state to the work of conceptualising the research object, it is perhaps wise to begin by recalling the advice of Hay and Lister (2006, p. 10), and to ask, what precise analytical purchase the concept of the state may offer us in the analysis at hand.⁴⁰

Given that we are interested in personalised exchanges and their relation to the reproduction of the social structure *in the context* of the modern state, an adequate theory of the state will of itself naturally be necessary to any explanation. More specifically, any such theory must be capable of accounting for the state as a *social fact* - that is, as a force structuring both the (unequal) organisation of society, as well as the behaviour of individual agents within society (through their perceptions and dispositions).

Such a force is of course contingent. It is the product of a historical trajectory - the formation of the state - itself driven by (historical) mechanisms. In this section we will thus review some of the theories regarding the mechanisms driving state formation as a historical process, insofar as these relate to the production (or entrenchment) of a determinate social structure.

Just as important though is the role of the state (as a historically constituted force) in structuring the dispositions and perceptions of social actors. Many of our most basic categories of thought are a legacy of the normative force of the state (including, not least, how we perceive ‘the state’ itself). In particular, antonyms such as ‘legal/illegal’, ‘formal/informal’, and ‘written/unwritten’ - all fundamental to our academic understanding of personalised exchange - are themselves intimately bound up with the process of state formation, whereby the state comes to be both defined by its legitimacy, and, through its symbolic power, abrogates the authority to determine the legitimacy of all other things (as we have seen already through the changing definition of the ‘public interest’ in relation to corruption.)

To begin though, we should acknowledge that there is no true consensus

⁴⁰Hay and Lister themselves cite two ‘elements’ concerning the analytical usefulness of the state as a concept: institutional contextualisation (i.e. the state structuring the “pattern of opportunities and constraints” faced by actors), and historical contextualisation (the persistence of the state “as an institutional ensemble” over time) (Hay and Lister, 2006, pp. 10-13). However, the distinction between these two ‘contextualisations’ seems underdeveloped, and (in my opinion) is much better theorised by Bourdieu, as we will see below.

as to what the state is. By far the most famous definition - that of Weber⁴¹ - is notable as much for what it leaves out as for what it contains. According to Weber, “Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends,” because the variety of ends to which political associations have been put are too various. Rather, “one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it” - i.e., the monopoly of (legitimate) physical force.

This rather procedural definition of the state at least has the analytic virtue of avoiding purely normative explanations.⁴² Indeed, in some cases theorists following in Weber’s trail have proceeded to discard almost all normative baggage associated with the state, and have seen in the process of state formation little more than a byproduct of the concentration of violence, extraction and accumulation. Tilly (1985) took this disenchanting analysis to its extreme (yet logical) conclusion by explicitly comparing war making and state making to organised crime:

Power holders’ pursuit of war involved them willy-nilly in the extraction of resources for war-making from the populations over which they had control and in the promotion of capital accumulation by those who could help them borrow and buy. War making, extraction, and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state making. Power holders did not undertake those three momentous activities with the intention of creating national states - centralized, differentiated, autonomous, extensive political organizations. Nor did they ordinarily foresee that national states would emerge from war making, extraction and capital accumulation. (*ibid.*, p. 172).

Tilly’s description of the *process* of state formation corresponds quite closely to Weber’s, in the sense that he attributes no specific ‘ends’ (or intentions) to that process, other than the self-interest of ‘power holders’ in extracting and accumulating capital. For Tilly though, *legitimacy* is something of a canard or game of bad faith. The legitimacy of rulers to exercise

⁴¹Weber (1946) - the state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”.

⁴²‘Pluralism’, for example, is described by Smith (2006, p. 21) as both “one of the most dominant frameworks” and also “curiously non-theoretical”, based as it is on a rather normative understanding of the role of the state.

violence becomes ‘credible’ ([ibid.](#), p. 173) (rather than truly ‘legitimate’) as a function of the gradual disappearance of rivals and the centralisation of command structures.

Tilly’s theory of state formation has the advantage of avoiding teleological or functionalist explanations: the modern nation state emerges as a contingent and arbitrary product of the gradual concentration of physical violence, extractive capacity, and capital accumulation within specific organisations over a given territory. A similarly unromantic account of state formation is provided by North, Wallis, and Weingast ([2009](#)), who view the history of state formation through two paradigms: limited and open-access orders. In limited-access orders, overt violence is converted into privileged interests through the creation of stable rents (the appropriation of which is limited to those same privileged groups). Such limited-access orders represent the majority of states through human history (which North, Wallis and Weingast call “natural states”). “Open entry” states, by contrast, are sustained by competition rather than rent creation, and hence are characterised by institutions such as free markets and civil associations.

Rather like prior studies of corruption, which identified the emergence of norms of ‘public interest’ alongside the modern state, North, Wallis and Weingast argue for the importance of impersonal norms to open-access states. They also emphasise the need for ‘permanently lived organisations’, as providing the necessary continuity and amplification for such norms. In this sense (as Bates ([2010](#)) also notes) they are treading ground already familiar to students of Olson ([1971](#));⁴³ their conclusions concerning the relation of impersonal norms to open organisations and economic growth (as opposed to ascriptive norms, kinship or client groups, and limited growth) also closely echo Graziano ([1976](#)).

Both Tilly’s somewhat coy use of ‘power holders’ to describe those benefiting from state formation, and North, Wallis and Weingast’s preference for ‘social order’ (rather than class), are understandable techniques to distance their theories from (functionalist) Marxist approaches which, variously, saw the state as either the repressive arm of the bourgeoisie, an instrument of the ruling class, an ideal collective capitalist, or a ‘factor of cohesion’ within

⁴³As Bates ([2010](#), p. 754) also notes, their assumptions concerning “open-access” states fall squarely in the pluralist tradition, without addressing the notable criticisms recently made of that school.

the social formation.⁴⁴

However, while Marxist theories of the state were indeed functionalist, they did at least (eventually) take seriously the subjective element of domination which is implied in the continued exercise of *legitimate* violence - considerations largely absent in the previously-mentioned theories. As Hay (2006, p. 69) summarises, the question Marxist theorists of the state eventually had to pose was, what gives capital the capacity to reproduce and reassert its dominance over time despite its inherent contradictions?

Early Marxist theory (beginning with Engels) argued that the superstructure (the state and ‘cultural forms’) produced, through the effect of ideology, a ‘false consciousness’ - that is, a contradiction between objective social existence and the subjective understanding of that existence.⁴⁵ However, early Marxist theorists restricted the existence of this ‘false consciousness’ purely to the bourgeoisie: the proletariat laboured under no such illusions.

It was not until the twentieth century that Lukacs and Gramsci extended the idea of false consciousness to the working classes (and indeed society as a whole).⁴⁶ For ideological communists such as Gramsci, Marxist theory needed to be expanded to explain the failure of the proletariat to rise up and seize the means of production for themselves. Indeed, rather than seeking to overthrow capitalism, many members of the proletariat fought to defend and maintain it. For Gramsci, the answer could only be that, in some cases, capitalist domination was exercised indirectly, through subjective *hegemony*, rather than direct force.

To account for this hegemonic form of domination, rather than limiting the state to its (overtly) repressive apparatus, Gramsci saw it more broadly as “something reflected in the social relations between all members of society” (Eyerman, 1981, p. 46). Hence, he saw institutions and organisations of ‘civil life’ - such as the church, the media - no less than the formal insti-

⁴⁴This taxonomy is taken from Hay (2006, pp. 60-62).

⁴⁵For an overview of the theoretical development of false consciousness see Eyerman (1981, p. 44).

⁴⁶Lukacs’ approach (technically the first) was developed further by the Frankfurt school. False consciousness is not presented in quite so functionalist a manner as Gramsci and the structuralist Marxists, but rather is seen as “a form of consciousness produced in the very life practices of capitalist society” (*ibid.*, p. 49). The more benign implications of this theoretical approach eventually work themselves out in Habermas’ theories of communicative action and the public sphere.

tutions of the state, as engaged in producing *legitimate domination* through the effects of ideology.⁴⁷

This broad-based understanding of the state usefully deepens Weber's definition by problematising the question of *how legitimate rule is produced*, particularly in societies which seem to be based upon large, structural inequalities. It includes within the state all those mechanisms which serve to legitimate the authority of the state (*qua* determinate social order), and it takes seriously the concept of legitimacy itself - as being more than simply the credibility of physical force, but rather that adherence to a particular social order (in the sense of a deep-rooted, psychological acceptance of it as 'natural') which states seem able to produce.

Gramsci's concept of hegemony would be developed further by French 'structuralist' Marxists such as Louis Althusser, who divided the institutions responsible for producing such subjective domination into various 'ideological state apparatuses' (ISAs), which included not only the church and the media, but also political parties, the educational system, and even the family (Althusser, 1971). Such a conceptualisation effectively extended the state (in the classical Marxist sense of the repressive apparatus of the ruling classes) into all aspects of society and the social order.

Pierre Bourdieu objected to such reasoning as merely "*fonctionnalisme du pire*",⁴⁸ observing that one learns nothing of a mechanism when it is interrogated purely according to its functions (Bourdieu, 2012, p. 19). By conceiving of the state in functional terms as a kind of *diabolus in machina* or executive arm of the ruling classes, any objective structure involved in the reproduction of the larger social order (and, by extension, its particular form of inequality) becomes, for Althusser, an ideological arm of the state. In such fashion agency is removed from social actors, and granted instead to an omnipotent state.⁴⁹

Such limitations aside, Althusser is at least useful in his manner of posing questions. Recalling Marx's observation that "every child knows that a social formation which did not reproduce the conditions of production at the

⁴⁷Gramsci defined hegemony as first and foremost a 'pedagogic relation' (*rapporto pedagogico*) (Gramsci, 2007, p. 1331-32). See also Gramsci (*ibid.*, p. 1636-38, 1566).

⁴⁸See Bourdieu (2012, p. 18-19).

⁴⁹Bourdieu cited this tendency as a further example of the functionalist fallacy, which slips too easily from the academic model constructed to explain reality to reality itself, in the process creating of society a 'dead structure of "empty places"' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 19), which lacks a generative mechanism for the effects it describes.

same time as it produced would not last a year” (Althusser, 1971, p. 1), he argued that a successful social formation must not only reproduce the *means* of production, but also the *relations* of production (*ibid.*, p. 22). While his own, functionalist, solution (the ISAs) is untenable, the question itself still stands: through what mechanisms does the state reproduce the social formation of which it is the organising principle, such that the (unequal) relations upon which that formation is based remain legitimate?

Such a question follows on naturally from Weber’s initial definition. For if the state represents a ‘human community’ (in Weber’s terms), then one must assume that such a community has a determinate structure (whatever it may be). Reproducing that community is not merely a question of reproducing its physical needs, but also the power relations through which those needs are sufficed. Such relations, as we have seen, are not simply produced and reproduced through overt coercion, but are rather produced and reproduced as (subjectively) *legitimate*. For this reason Bourdieu (1998, p. 40) extended Weber’s definition of the state to include the monopoly not only of legitimate physical violence, but also *symbolic* violence - that is, the creation of sufficient consent such that the structure of relations upon which the state rests appears *natural*.

This symbolic aspect of the state is fundamental to any academic understanding of its *modus operandi* as a ‘social fact’ - i.e., that which produces the very norms of “public interest” against which personalistic exchange is frequently defined - and taking it fully into account leads us in a number of different directions. First of all, it implies (as Mitchell (1999, p. 76) has noted) that the state exists at two levels: as both a ‘material substance’ of institutional arrangements and political practice, and a ‘public imagery’ of ideological constructs.⁵⁰

In Mitchell’s view, “the phenomenon we name ‘the state’ arises from techniques that enable mundane material practices to take on the appearance of an abstract, nonmaterial form” (*ibid.*, p. 77). What Mitchell calls the “state effect” is thus this very tendency for the state to be viewed as an apparently autonomous entity, whereas in practice “the boundary of the state (or political system) never marks a real exterior. [T]he line between

⁵⁰Bourdieu (1998, p. 40) makes the same observation: “If the state is able to exert symbolic violence, it is because it incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity, in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought.”

state and society [...] is a line drawn internally, within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a certain social and political order is maintained” (*ibid.*, p. 83).⁵¹

For Mitchell, this apparent autonomy of the state (i.e. as the appearance of an autonomous *structure*) was the product largely of a historical process grounded in attempts to represent it (and in particular, its economy) *statistically*.⁵² In the very act of observing and measuring other abstractions such as the economy, the ‘state’ comes to constitute both itself and the thing it sees in a subject/object relationship (*ibid.*, p. 94).

While undoubtedly grasping important aspects of the state as an object of study (and avoiding the functionalist trap of Althusser and others), Mitchell’s theory nonetheless has its limitations. His description of the *process* of state formation (understood now as both an objective and subjective phenomenon) is primarily Foucauldian, in that he argues we should address the state as “an effect of mundane processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, supervision and surveillance, and representation that create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society or state and economy” (*ibid.*, p. 95). However (as Wacquant notes of Foucault)⁵³ there is *no mechanism* driving these “mundane processes”: that is, no theory which can explain why agents of the state should be motivated to so organise themselves, and to produce such representations. There is, in brief, no understanding of the emergence of the state - both objectively and as a subjective “effect” - as a dynamic, relational process, involving social actors with specific interests.⁵⁴

The “state effect” is nonetheless a valuable conceptual tool to avoid

⁵¹In this sense, Mitchell’s theory of the state effect also comes close to de Sousa Santos’ theory of “abyssal lines” in Western thinking, as “a system of visible and invisible distinctions, the invisible ones being the foundation of the visible ones” (Santos, 2007, p. 1). The concept of abyssal lines and its relevance to the current research will be elaborated further in the theoretical section.

⁵²The same conclusion is drawn by Scott (1998), who argues that this particular mode of “seeing” by the state is the cause of many of the world’s present troubles.

⁵³See Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 25) - “[Foucault] lacks the dispositional concept of habitus to link the objective structures bequeathed by history to the historical practices of agents and, therefore, a mechanism to account for the social patterning and objective meaning of strategies.”

⁵⁴We may also add, as an aside, that the absence of a relational, strategic understanding in Mitchell’s concept of the “state effect” results in a failure to account for the role of the academic field (as a dominated fraction of the field of power) in helping to *produce* this very “state effect”. See Bourdieu (1990d), Bourdieu (1990b, p. 140-149).

falling into the substantialist error of Skocpol (1985) and others - that is, of viewing the state as an autonomous actor or institution in and of itself. In such approaches the state is all too readily treated merely as a “machinery of intentions” (Mitchell, 1999, p. 82) (one thinks in particular of rational choice institutionalism and other approaches associated with methodological individualism). As Mitchell notes, in this way the state/society divide is all too easily ‘mapped’ onto other popular antonyms such as subjective/objective, ideological/material, and even meaning and reality (*ibid.*, p. 82).⁵⁵

Rather than seeking to attribute volition to an abstract concept such as the state, we should instead enquire into the historical processes which produce the appearance of characteristics such as volition, autonomy and determinacy. As Bourdieu (1985, p. 118) notes, “our perception and our practice, especially our perception of the social world, are guided by practical taxonomies, oppositions between high and low, masculine (or manly) and feminine, etc.” Given that it is the state (or perhaps more accurately, “the state effect”) which seems to lie on the ‘other side’ (in the sense of de Sousa Santos’ “abyssal lines”)⁵⁶ of many of the oppositions most relevant to classifying our research object - one thinks of oppositions such as private interest/public interest, formal and informal, written and unwritten - then accounting theoretically for the emergence of those oppositions through the historical processes of the formation of the state (indeed, as subsidiary aspects of the “state effect”) would seem paramount in enabling us to address the contrasting (and often contradictory) symbolic aspects of personalistic exchange in the modern context.

Turning now from the macro-processes responsible for the normative context of our research object, we come to the logic governing the micro-exchanges which constitute it as an everyday social practice. If such exchanges (as later studies of clientelism claimed) are a mode of regulation, or ‘etiquette’ in the words of Della Porta and Vannucci, then what principles could govern them, given that they are supposedly ‘informal’, and cut against the formal, rule-bound nature of the state’s laws? Hence, in the fol-

⁵⁵As we shall see in the next section, the recent informal institutions research agenda has readily absorbed and reified the “state effect” by attributing to the “machinery of intentions” of the state the monopoly of producing ‘formal institutions’. By contrast, the non-state (i.e. society) has a matching, mirror-image machinery of its own producing ‘informal institutions’. In this way, the “state effect” - the illusion of autonomy - has spread even to analysis of the non-state.

⁵⁶See Santos (2007, p. 1-2), which is elaborated further in the first theory chapter.

lowing section we address institutional theory, and see what epistemological implications there may be in considering the research object as a rule-bound social practice.

2.4 Institutional Theory

I am inclined to think that, in the social sciences, the language of rules is often the refuge of ignorance.

Bourdieu (ibid., p. 118)

Individuals do not transact in a vacuum. This much is clear. Social interactions are often constrained in such a way as to enable expectations to be formed about another’s behaviour. Equally, when interactions lead to regularised outcomes which can be observed, we tend to assume that some kind of a covering rule, or regularity, is governing them.

Such lines of reasoning have deep roots in the social sciences.⁵⁷ In recent years, however, several new approaches have emerged which take the study of such rules and regularities as their primary focus, under the category of *institutions*. Following Hall and Taylor (1996), three such schools are generally accepted as forming this “New Institutionalism”: Historical Institutionalism (HI); Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI); and Sociological Institutionalism (SI).

If we return to the idea of an ‘etiquette’ governing corruption, bribery and the informal exchange of favours, then these New Institutionalisms would seem particularly relevant in helping to specify such an ‘etiquette’: where it comes from; how it constrains or enables certain behaviour; how it relates to other rules; and what kind of social outcomes it may lead to. Indeed, as we have seen, in both clientelism and corruption there has already been a ‘turn’ in recent years toward such institutionalist approaches. Most

⁵⁷In their influential overview of New Institutionalism, Powell and DiMaggio (1991) trace these roots as far back as Durkheim’s precept to “treat social facts as things”. It is interesting to note that Bourdieu (1989, p. 14) made reference to the same quote, attributing it to the objectivist tradition in social science which seeks to explain social life through “deep causes which lie outside of consciousness” (another Durkheim reference). The issue of *consciousness* however (with respect to the degree to which agents are conscious of the rules they are following) is a deeply vexed issue in institutional theory, and one to which we will return.

recently a new research programme has emerged which would seem particularly suited to addressing such an object as the ‘etiquette’ of personalistic exchange: the *informal institutions* agenda, dealing with “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 727).

However, these approaches - and in particular, the informal institutions agenda - contain certain epistemological shortcomings which I believe limit their usefulness in conceptualising (and hence explaining) the phenomena in question. In this section I therefore provide a brief summary of the main contributions of the various institutional theories, and the ways in which they relate to the research object, with the goal of elaborating some of these shortcomings. This latter undertaking is intended especially to highlight the utility of a Bourdieusian (i.e., relational) approach, an elaboration of which follows in the next chapter.

The different institutionalisms identified by Hall and Taylor each emerged, in relative isolation from one other, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Despite some recent attempts to find common ground,⁵⁸ each maintains a fairly distinct view of what constitutes an institution. Such differences are a reflection not only of a deep epistemological divide concerning the (theoretical) determinants of practice, but also of the differing research interests of each school, which have played perhaps the most significant role in forming attitudes and concepts regarding the way institutions function.

In the case of historical institutionalism, this research agenda has tended to focus on the kind of ‘big picture’ analysis of states popularised by the earlier structural-functionalist school. States are viewed as complete macro systems of interacting parts which follow varying trajectories.⁵⁹ In RCI, by contrast, research has tended to focus on the procedural rules of individual organisations, such as the US Congress or the European Commission, to see how such rules structure strategic interactions and informational flows, and enable collective action problems to be overcome.⁶⁰ Sociological In-

⁵⁸Including Hall and Taylor (1996) and the edited volume of Katznelson and Weingast (2005) (which focuses exclusively on reconciling RCI with HI). Constructivism, which has entered mostly through international relations, offers a potentially fruitful point of engagement between all three schools, yet has so far been applied in only a limited way (See Wendt (1999), Culpepper (2008), and Hay (2008)). Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (2004, pp. 239-242) also attempt an intriguing reconciliation of RCI and SI approaches.

⁵⁹Cf. Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 6). In this sense, Steinmo (2008) places HI in the same vein of enquiry as Polanyi (1944) and Skocpol (1979).

⁶⁰See Riker (1980) for the seminal text on the US Congress, and Tsebelis (1994) for a

stitutionalism meanwhile has followed a more practice-oriented approach, which seeks to reintegrate culture into the terms of organisational analysis, and explain why certain organisations take on particular institutional (and symbolic) forms.⁶¹

What, then, constitutes an institution for each school? In HI, institutions are conceived of broadly, as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 6). In HI, a change in the configuration of such institutions may lead to *unexpected consequences* elsewhere in the institutional order, while ‘critical junctures’ frequently create *path dependency*, constraining future outcomes and limiting the potential direction of institutional change.⁶² How, precisely, do institutions influence behaviour in this approach? HI can be rather agnostic in this regard.⁶³ Hall and Taylor (*ibid.*, p. 7-8) argue in favour of two different approaches: the ‘calculus’ approach, whereby institutions provide a greater or lesser degree of certainty about the future behaviour of actors, thus altering expectations; and the ‘cultural’ approach, whereby actors behave less in a strategic than a sufficing manner, and institutions serve to structure an individual’s worldview.

In this sense, HI straddles the ontological divide which separates RCI approaches to institutions from Sociological Institutionalism. The ‘cultural’ approach, for example, chimes with the cognitive or practice-oriented models of human action favoured by SI, whereby institutions provide not just the formal rules, procedures or norms, “but the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action” (*ibid.*, p. 14). Hence, in SI institutions guide human action according to a ‘logic of social appropriateness’ rather than an instrumental calculus (Campbell, 1998).⁶⁴

The ‘calculus’ approach, by contrast, resembles RCI presumptions of

similar approach to the European Parliament.

⁶¹See for example Meyer and Rowan (1977).

⁶²See Thelen and Steinmo (1992) and Steinmo (2008) for an overview, and Collier and Collier (1991) for the concept of critical juncture.

⁶³See Steinmo (2008, p. 126); this ‘agnosticism’ likely results from HI’s origins as an inductive method.

⁶⁴The SI approach to institutions shares some similarities with Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus*, as noted by Powell and DiMaggio (1991). However, *habitus* is a much more rigorous conceptual tool than the idea of an institution in SI, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.

individuals as *utility maximisers*, and institutions as structuring *strategic interactions* between individuals with *fixed preferences*. The antecedents to this mode of reasoning are to be found in the New Institutional Economics (NIE),⁶⁵ and in particular in the *transactions costs* approach pioneered by Coase (1937), resurrected by Williamson (1971), and then applied to the development of political institutions by North (1990).

While the NIE approach to institutions frequently mirrors the inductive agnosticism of HI (happily confounding norms and regularities), RCI tends to be more thorough-going in its embrace of instrumentalism. Hence, whereas North, for example, defined institutions as “regularities in repetitive actions [...], customs and rules that provide a set of incentives and disincentives for individuals” (North, 1986, p. 231), Ostrom (1986), by contrast, was more specific, describing ‘rules’ (rather than institutions) as “potentially linguistic entities [...] that refer to prescriptions commonly known and used by a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent relationships” (*ibid.*, p. 5). Such rules not only define *positions*, they also structure the *sequence* of strategic interactions, as well as provide prescriptions about which actions and outcomes are *required, prohibited or permitted* (*ibid.*, p. 5). For Ostrom, rather than directly affecting behaviour, rules instead affect the structure of a situation in which actions are selected. Hence “rules can be formally represented as relations, whose domain are the set of physically possible variables and their values, and whose range are the values of the variables, in the situation under analysis” (*ibid.*, p. 7). They are thus separate from “physical laws” and “behavioural laws” (*ibid.*, p. 22).

We see from Ostrom’s definition that RCI favours a deductive/functionalist approach to institutions. As Hall and Taylor note, Rational Choice Institutionalists typically “begin by using deduction to arrive at a stylized specification of the functions that an institution performs. They then explain the existence of the institution by reference to the value those functions have for the actors affected by the institutions” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 13). Academic debate thus tends to revolve around “whether the functions performed by the institution at hand are specified correctly” (*ibid.*, p. 13).

As many critics of the functionalist approach have noted,⁶⁶ it relies ulti-

⁶⁵Mentioned earlier in relation to corruption.

⁶⁶See the previously mentioned Kaufman (1972, p. 304-305) (who references Flanagan and Fogelman (1967)) in relation to functionalist accounts of clientelism, and Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 19) (who reference Bates (1988)) with regard to the RCI iteration of this

mately on an heroic assumption: that of almost perfect human instrumentality and intentionality, enabling one to deduce the cause of a thing purely from the effect (or function) it produces. On the one hand, such assumptions encourage a form of voluntarism as the motivating factor behind human action;⁶⁷ while on the other hand, the assumption that actors always negotiate efficiently (hence producing a Nash equilibrium) can lead to difficulties in explaining institutional change.⁶⁸

Whereas this ‘functionalist fallacy’ is to some extent sustainable when dealing with the formal institutional rules of organisations (particularly places such as legislatures which involve highly stylised strategic interactions), it becomes harder to maintain when dealing with the kind of ‘unwritten rules’ which structure much of social life, and which relate most closely to the object of interest in this research. The reason is hinted at in Ostrom’s ontologically uncomfortable definition of rules as “potentially linguistic entities”. Such a construction appears aimed at acknowledging that, indeed, not all ‘rules’ are written down; yet, as RCI requires actors to be perfectly cognisant of the rules constraining them, it must follow that they therefore *could* be written down (or otherwise communicated) if need be. Hence they are *potentially* linguistic.⁶⁹

Such a sleight of hand is easy to maintain when one is focussed primarily on correctly specifying outcomes in highly formal scenarios; yet when it comes to so-called *informal institutions* the task is somewhat harder.

The study of informality is by no means novel, and it overlaps with much material covered in previous sections. Lomnitz-Adler (1988) was among the first to address informality as a specific quality, noting that “informal modes of exchange” often emerge “within the interstices of the formal system” as a product of bureaucratic modernism. However, she was also careful to emphasise that “Informal activities are *socially embedded transactions* that obey a *symbolic-cultural logic* that differs from (and often clashes with) economic rationality or the formal ideology of the state” (*ibid.*, p. 43, emphasis mine). The study of informal *institutions*, by contrast, emerged gradually

fallacy. See also Bourdieu (2012, p. 19) - “on n’apprend rien sur le mécanisme quand on s’interroge seulement sur les fonctions”.

⁶⁷Although see Knight (1992) for an attempt to integrate unequal power relations

⁶⁸More recently both RCI and HI have turned to emergent or evolutionary explanations for institutional change. See Steinmo (2010) and Blyth et al. (2011) for HI and Heritier (2007, p. 10-11) for RCI.

⁶⁹See Carey (2000) for a literalist approach to overcoming such a problem.

from the mid-1990s, beginning with economic analyses⁷⁰ before becoming incorporated within social science around the turn of the century.⁷¹

In this approach, informal institutions are “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 727); they are thus opposed to ‘formal’ or ‘officially sanctioned’ rules, to which they stand in a fixed relation that can be either complementary, substitutive, accommodating or competing (*ibid.*, p. 728).

We see from this model that the informal institutions approach effectively ‘reverse-engineers’ the logic of unwritten rules from that of written ones. The result is an ontology which treats the two classes of phenomena as equivalent, constructing a binary vision of reality which is divided into formal and informal. This not only tends toward the reification of formal rules, it also means that informal institutions must possess the same attributes as formal ones, namely: means of communication; autonomous enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms; and clear intentionality (as evinced by the shared expectations of actors concerning the constraints they face).

Yet does this approach reflect the reality of such informal practices, or capture their most important aspects? For instance, Helmke and Levitsky specifically discount “informal behavioural regularities” from analysis, due to the fact that they may not be in open conformity with “an established rule or guideline”, may not be visibly enforced by “some kind of external sanction”, and (presumably) may not be actively communicated among participants (*ibid.*, p. 727). Rather, they argue that “not all patterned behaviour is rule-bound or rooted in shared expectations about others’ behaviour” (*ibid.*, p. 727). Thus, removing one’s hat in church is an informal institution, whereas removing one’s jacket in a restaurant is simply a behavioural regularity (*ibid.*, p. 727).

The limitations of such an approach are self-evident. It corresponds in effect to ‘spontaneous sociology’: taking for granted those ‘commonsense’ categories of perception which agents have of the social world and simply reproducing them in analysis - begging the question as to how such categories are themselves produced.⁷² Meanwhile, any such behaviour which

⁷⁰Such as Assaad (1993) and Stiglitz (1999).

⁷¹See Pejovich (1999), Lauth (2000), Helmke and Levitsky (2004), and more recently Holger (2009) and Etzold et al. (2009).

⁷²The implications of such ‘spontaneous’ analysis are dealt with more thoroughly in the

does not fall under the “shared expectations” of actors is dismissed as simply “patterned”, rather than rule-bound.

The informal institutions agenda thus throws into particular relief an issue which (to some extent) concerns all the New Institutionalisms, which are united in taking a substantialist approach towards institutions themselves. That is, institutions, as rules or regularities, are treated as ontologically bounded research objects, which stand in a causal relationship to social outcomes (typically, as the independent variable).

This approach has its strengths; yet it also invariably leads to an implicit reification of institutions, *qua* rules and regularities, as empirical *things*. Such an approach can rapidly fall into what Bourdieu termed “the scholastic fallacy”:⁷³ making of individual practice the mere execution of a model built by the analyst. To be sure, institutionalism always offers an objectivity of the second order,⁷⁴ by making of institutions the reference rules or scripts which become the basis for strategic action. Yet, by subsuming norms, reference rules and regularities under a single category, we make a fundamental error concerning the generative principles of action. Rather, social science must have an understanding of the social game which is sufficiently nuanced, as Bourdieu notes, to synthesise both norms *and* regularities, and to take account of all the different possible principles of regulation. The problem is perhaps best summarised by Wittgenstein:

What do I call ‘the rule by which he proceeds’? - The hypothesis that satisfactorily describes his use of words, which we observe; or the rule which he looks up, when he uses signs; or the one which he gives us in reply when we ask what his rule is? - But if observation does not enable us to see any clear rule, and the question brings none to light? - For he did indeed give me a definition when I asked him what he understood by ‘N’, but he was prepared to withdraw and alter it. So how am I to determine the rule by which he is playing? He does not know it himself. - Or, to ask a better question: What meaning is the expression ‘the rule by which he proceeds’ supposed to have left to it here?

next chapter.

⁷³This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter; for an outline see Bourdieu (1990c, p. 30-41).

⁷⁴See Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 9).

(Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 38-9)⁷⁵

Wittgenstein’s observation finds its echo in the empirical observation made by Ledeneva concerning *blat* which frames this chapter - i.e., that everyone knows what it is, but finds it difficult to define. Instead of accounting for this indeterminacy, institutionalist approaches all too frequently crush it. Rather than a parsimonious conceptual tool,⁷⁶ an institution is all too frequently the unchallenged reproduction of a taken-for-granted representation of the social world - a “layman’s term” which, according to Durkheim,⁷⁷ it is the first principle of sociological research to repudiate. By confounding the separate existence of norms, reference rules and regularities within a single analytical category, we fail to grasp the fundamental difference between the subjective and objective existence of the principles of regulation. Having failed to grasp this divide at the initial moment of analysis, it becomes impossible to reintegrate the two within a complete “model of the game”, and hence to place practice in the correct causal relation to broader (social) effects.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter attempted to chart the progress of the current state of the art in conceptualising personalistic exchange within the modern state, and how it can be related to the (re)production of the broader social structure. In doing so, I aimed to draw out some of the most pertinent conceptual and epistemological problems relating to this particular research object, as well as (in the words of Bourdieu) the ‘epistemological unconscious’ underlying the discipline. It is possible to draw certain conclusions from our overview.

First, it seems a well-established principle that phenomena of personalistic exchange are closely related to the *structure of inequality* within a given society, because (as Eisenstadt and Roniger observed) such forms of exchange mark “a distinct mode of regulating crucial aspects of institutional order: the structuring of the flow of resources, exchange and power relations and their legitimation in society” (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1980, p. 49).

⁷⁵Also quoted in Bourdieu (1990c, p. 39).

⁷⁶The phrase is taken from Wacquant’s description of Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts such as field, habitus and capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 5).

⁷⁷See Bourdieu and Wacquant (*ibid.*, p. 11, n. 22).

Equally clearly, such forms of exchange are closely related to the presence or absence of certain *symbolic forces* in a society. According to Graziano, the institution of legitimate authority is itself the product of indirect exchange (i.e., exchange which generates a group benefit, and hence the expectation of common rights). Such exchange embeds the concept of deferred reward, and hence ultimately contributes to *the accumulation of capital* in a society. Thus, the principle of a ‘public interest’, which in the Western context emerged alongside the modern, bureaucratic state in the nineteenth century, can also be seen as a product of the institutionalisation of such indirect exchange.

However, if personalistic exchange is indeed a *mode of regulation* which has a structuring effect upon a society, how do other types of exchange emerge which might compete with it? As we have seen with the various institutional theories, explaining the emergence of new institutions becomes problematic when institutions themselves are explained according to *functionalist* criteria. If a given mode of exchange is functional in a given social context, then change must come either from exogenous criteria (the punctuated equilibria model), or else be somehow inherent within the model (as in recent so-called ‘evolutionary’ approaches) - begging the question as to which mechanisms are responsible for such change.

Moreover, experience demonstrates that, rather than a smooth transition from Weberian *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft* systems, in many parts of the modern world *both* types of exchange often survive in messy coexistence, with some individuals even thriving in entrepreneurial positions by exploiting the potential for arbitrage between the differing regulations of these two normative ‘markets’.

The principle conceptual difficulty concerns the epistemological status of regulation itself. If personalistic exchange is indeed a ‘distinct mode of regulation’, that is, distinct from other kinds of regulation, and in particular from the formal regulation of the state, then precisely *how* does it regulate behaviour? What does it mean, exactly, to follow a rule that is unwritten?

It is at this point that we must consider the question of rules as categories of academic explanation, and their affinity to the production of formality as a part of the “state effect” noted by Mitchell. For instance, the formal, indirect exchange which leads to the generation of a ‘public interest’ is highly conducive to a certain form of legalistic analysis, i.e. that which reduces

regularity in outcomes to the simple operation of a *rule*, which then takes on the character of a law.

However, such a mode of analysis misses entirely the fact that, if legitimate authority is a product of indirect exchange, then the state itself (*qua* legitimate authority) is also, to a large extent, a product of the institutionalisation of such exchange - that is, of the historical processes of codification and formalisation which convert the benefits of such exchange into legal rights.

It follows that, if Weber's maxim concerning the state is true, then laws make states (rather than the other way around), in the sense that the power of form (*vis formae*) is a broad symbolic power to define that which is legitimate, which includes *both* that which is moral *and* that which is logical; the normative *and* the rational.⁷⁸ Thus, rules that describe social reality are embedded in the same historical processes (codification, canonisation, etc.) as those that define appropriate normative outcomes.

Ultimately, this means that -

...to get to the bottom of the enterprise, one must pose in all its generality the question of the social conditions necessary for those activities of codification and theorisation, and the social effects of *theoretical* activity, of which the work of the social scientist itself represents a *particular form*.⁷⁹

Which is to say that, studying informal, personalistic, direct exchange according to the same epistemological perspective as formal, codified exchange - i.e., that of a rule - amounts to reproducing such exchange through the (negative) vision of the state. The effects of such a mode of analysis may vary. On the one hand, the state perspective can be reproduced in the normative construction of the research object itself - thus, as Zinn noted, 'clientelism' easily becomes 'corruption'. On the other hand, the state perspective may be reproduced in second-order theoretical abstractions - that is, in the mode of analysing the object, leading to a kind of 'spontaneous' or

⁷⁸As Bourdieu notes, "*la vis formae est toujours une force à la fois logique et sociale*" (Bourdieu, 1986a, p. 43). See also Bourdieu (1985, p. 115, emphasis mine) - "One needs to construct a theory of the work of formulation and codification, on the properly symbolic effect which the codification produces. *There is a connection between juridical formulas and mathematical formulas.*"

⁷⁹Bourdieu (1986a, p. 44), my translation.

‘common sense’ sociology of the type which encourages Helmke and Levitsky to disavow ‘informal behavioural regularities’ when they are not in open conformity with an ‘established rule or guideline’.

How do we analyse such norms as govern personalistic exchange, taking account of the existence of the state and its ‘public interest’, without simply reproducing the vision of the state? And how do we explain regularities that are not the product of explicit rules? Moreover, how do we overcome the debilitating academic antinomy between structure and agency (which has bogged down institutionalism as surely as it bogged down clientelism), and uncover instead generative principles (or mechanisms) for social practices - principles which are able to relate such practices back to the production of the social structure in a non-functionalist manner? To address these issues, we turn now to the new conceptualisation of the research object, and the research methodology which informs it.

Chapter 3

A New Research Object

As the previous chapter attempted to demonstrate, prior academic modes of thinking about personalistic exchange in the context of the modern state have produced some important theoretical insights, including a number of commonalities across different fields. Yet these approaches also have their limits, which I attempted to demonstrate were as much a product of epistemological problems in how the research object is conceptualised, as of purely theoretical shortcomings concerning causal inferences. Equally, where relevant I also attempted to highlight new directions in research which offer a way beyond such limits.

In this chapter I attempt to engage both with those shortcomings and new directions by proposing a new research design based upon the *relational* sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. I begin by outlining the key features of this approach (or praxeology), and how it differs in its conceptualisation of research objects from some of the approaches already mentioned. In particular, I introduce some of the “conceptual tools” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 5) used by this method to construct objects. I then proceed to outline the new conceptualisation of the research object particular to this thesis - the clandestine circulation of capital - which I believe the Bourdieusian approach necessitates. Having attempted to outline this “new way of thinking” (to paraphrase Wittgenstein), I then conclude the chapter by outlining in greater detail the new ‘problems’ or research questions (both theoretical and empirical) which this conceptualisation prompts, and which it will be the business of the remainder of this thesis to address. As part of outlining the research questions, I also include a brief section on the scope and limits of the research.

3.1 Breaking with the Scholastic Gaze - A Relational Approach

As we have seen, up to this point the prevailing trend within the social sciences has been to construct the phenomenon of personalistic exchange in the context of the modern state according to certain (relatively) discrete categories. Clientelism and corruption, for instance, are both bounded research objects used to describe specific social practices as they relate to other bounded objects, such as the state.

By framing practice in such a way, it becomes possible to place such objects as variables in a causal relationship, and hence to ask research questions about social causality. Yet this begs the simple question, driven at by Wittgenstein: are the analytical categories we use to describe practice necessarily the same as the generative principles which explain it? Or do they rather merely reflect some artefact created by our relation to that practice as observers? Or (which is perhaps worse) are they categorisations determined instead by the power relations operating on us as members of the academic field?

Both of these concerns are repeatedly raised by Pierre Bourdieu in those works which form the theoretical underpinning of his methodological approach. On the one hand, he argues, there is the epistemological fallacy produced by the “scholastic gaze” - i.e., that which, situated at an artificial remove from practice, constructs objects without accounting for its own (privileged) relation to them.¹ Being removed from the immanent necessity of practice, the researcher may create of practice an object of study, yet this epistemic posture - of “being able to withdraw from the world so as to think it” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 49) - may lead the researcher to misidentify the generative principles of practice:

Projecting his theoretical thinking into the heads of acting agents, the researcher presents the world as he thinks it (that is, as an object of contemplation, a representation, a spectacle) as if it were the world as it presents itself to those who do not have the leisure (or the desire) to withdraw from it in order to think it.

¹See Bourdieu (1998, pp. 127-140), and Bourdieu (1990d), and also the introductory sections to earlier works, Bourdieu (1977, pp. 1-9, 16-30.), and Bourdieu (1990c, pp. 25-51).

He sets at the origin of their practices, that is to say, in their ‘consciousness’, his own spontaneous or elaborated representations, or, worse, the models he has had to construct (sometimes against his own naive experience) to account for their practices. (*ibid.*, p. 51).

By failing to reflect on his relation to practice (and the perspective *upon* practice which it affords), the analyst may fall into one of two fallacies: either the subjectivist, which projects *into* the social agent the capacity to freely determine those symbolic categories or “representations” through which he perceives the social world; or else the objectivist, which makes of the social agent a kind of automaton, mindlessly fulfilling the model brought to light by the analyst, all the while unbeknownst to himself.²

Beyond this epistemological fallacy of the scholastic gaze, there is also the “epistemological unconsciousness” produced by the academic field to contend with. The effect of this “collective scientific unconsciousness embedded in theories, problems, and (especially national) categories of scholarly judgement” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 40), may result in categories of analysis which reflect the symbolic stakes at play within the academy, rather than a truly objective representation of social practice. As a member of the scholastic field, the researcher is engaged not merely in acts of (objective) classification, but also in classification *struggles*, i.e. struggles over categories of perception in which the social agents inhabiting the (academic) field have a specific interest in defending or defeating - “Systems of classification constitute a *stake in the struggles* that oppose individuals and groups in the routine interactions of daily life as well as in the solitary and collective contests that take place in the fields of politics and cultural production” (*ibid.*, p. 14).³

We can see the effects of these two problems in some of the prior conceptualisations of the research object we have previously encountered. For example, the endless oscillation in studies of clientelism, which variously located the generative principles of the phenomenon either in “a syndrome of norms and role expectations located *within* the personality systems of *indi-*

²See Bourdieu (2000, pp. 135-142), and especially p. 135: “To understand practical understanding, one has to move beyond the alternatives of thing and consciousness, mechanistic materialism and constructivist idealism”.

³See also Bourdieu (1989).

vidual actors” (Kaufman, 1972, p. 288, emphasis mine) or in “an ‘objective’ power and exchange relationship” grounded in the larger structural processes at work in a society (Powell, 1970, p. 413). Equally, the “*fonctionnalisme du pire*” (Bourdieu, 2012, p. 18-19) implicit in Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses, which endows these structures “with the ability to ‘act’ in the manner of historical agents” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 8), is likewise guilty of the same “scholastic fallacy” - constructing a model of practice *against* the commonsense experience agents have of it, only to then reconstitute practice as the mere mechanical execution of that model.

Nor are these problems restricted to the structural-functionalist approaches of the 1960s and 1970s; rather, they have tended to recur across paradigms and through different periods.⁴ We have seen, for example, how academic interest in corruption surged in recent decades in correlation with the fall of communism and the preeminence of Washington consensus-inspired paradigms such as “good governance”. The tendency to take a policy-oriented approach toward the phenomenon (i.e., constructing it as a discrete dependent variable whose likelihood as an outcome is conditioned by other variables) tends to reify the “spontaneous” representation of it given by (interested) social agents - in effect to ‘unask’ what corruption *is*, in order to ask ‘how is it caused?’.

When presented with such ‘commonsense’ categorisations of practice, it is no surprise that, in treating with personalistic exchange, social science came eventually to favour epistemological approaches predicated on the subject. In a 180° turn from the structural-functionalist approach, rational choice placed the *subjective* representations of the social agent (in the sense of his fixed preferences and propensity toward maximising his utility) as the generative principle of practice. In the case of rational choice institutionalism, this subjective basis was modified by the superimposition of an objectivity of the second order in the form of ‘common knowledge’ rules (hence the emphasis on the communicability of institutions).⁵ However, the elevation

⁴As Bourdieu notes (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 179, emphasis mine), such an eventuality is to be expected - “There are antinomies [...] which are devoid of any meaning and have been destroyed a thousand times in the course of scientific history. But they can easily be brought back to life and - this is very important - *those who revive them gain great profits from doing so.*”

⁵See Culpepper (2008) for an example of the theoretical implications of this imposition of an objective order *above* a subjective (the precise opposite to Bourdieu’s approach, as outlined below). Culpepper’s “Common knowledge events” are an attempt to maintain

of ‘*homo oeconomicus*’ to the status of a universal subject is in its way little different to the totalising principle behind structural-functionalism: placing the privileged relation to practice enjoyed by the analyst in the causal driving seat, in either passive or active mode.⁶ The definitive example of this tendency in the rational mode is provided by Piattoni (2001), who considers clientelism and patronage as “always a question of choice” (*ibid.*, p. 2) - that is, “quid pro quo relations, ruled by *economic principles*”, the “real nature” of which “is somewhat obscured by its being *projected externally* as a personal and almost affective relationship” (*ibid.*, p. 11, emphasis mine).

Even some recent attempts to break with these academic conventions have proven limited - and ultimately served to reproduce the same antinomies. Rivkin-Fish (2005), for instance, provides an example of the interpretivist approach toward the phenomenon of corruption - that is, attempting to analyse it as a socially-constituted practice, rather than merely an independent variable. Yet by limiting her theoretical analysis simply to the representations agents make of their own practice, she is incapable of accounting for *systemic variations* in those representations, thus presenting her with illogical ‘paradoxes’ that must be reconciled through *ex post* justifications, and leaving her unable to identify any underlying mechanism that might generate such practices.⁷

the absolute volition necessary for rational choice, by suggesting that the intersubjective categories upon which core preferences are based are the emergent product of a (conscious) process of negotiation.

⁶As Bourdieu notes, the lack of epistemological vigour in rational choice approaches enables its proponents to variously offer *either* mechanistic *or* subjectivist explanations:

It is not unusual for the advocates of ‘rational action theory’ to claim allegiance alternately, in the same text, with the mechanist vision, which is implied in their recourse to models borrowed from physics, and with the teleological vision, each being rooted in the scholastic opposition between pure consciousness and the body-as-thing [...] It is thus possible for them to explain the rationality of practices, indifferently, by the hypothesis that agents act under the direct constraint of causes that the scientist is able to identify, or by the apparently quite opposite hypothesis that agents act with complete knowledge of the situation [...] and are capable of doing by themselves what the scientist does in their place in the mechanist hypothesis. (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 139)

⁷See, for example, the case of ‘Valya’ (Rivkin-Fish, 2005, pp.47-49) who, when asked whether it was ‘appropriate’ for her to pay a bribe to the doctor, “answered immediately and without ambivalence: ‘oh, definitely, [...] we have to get over that Soviet nonsense that people should work for free. I feel that I *should* pay, I have the money, and so it’s right that I pay for their professionalism and time.’” For Rivkin-Fish, while there may be a “paradox” regarding the “unofficial way” in which Valya makes such a payment

How does one overcome such problems in the process of conducting research? According to Loïc Wacquant,⁸ The works of Pierre Bourdieu offer the researcher in social science “not a theory *stricto sensu* so much as a sociological *method* consisting essentially in a *manner of posing problems*, in a parsimonious set of conceptual tools and procedures for *constructing objects* and for transferring knowledge gleaned in one area of inquiry into another” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 5, additional emphasis mine).

For Bourdieu, the “false antinomy” of objectivist and subjectivist approaches does not originate simply in the epistemic posture engendered by the academy; rather, such antinomies find their correspondence in the fact that social structures themselves lead a “double life”,⁹ the paradox of which is captured by Pascal: “By space the universe comprehends and swallows me up like an atom; by thought I comprehend the world.”¹⁰ That is, the researcher must contend with the fact that the social world is an object of knowledge perceived by social agents, yet *as* social agents, we are ourselves also objects of knowledge produced by that world. We both construct the world and are constructed by it, and any true account of social practice must be able to reconcile this innate recursiveness; otherwise, it is doomed to locate the generative principles of practice in incomplete accounts predicated either on structure or agency.

In order to account for this “intrinsically double reality of the social world” (*ibid.*, p. 11), Bourdieu proposed an epistemological posture - or

(going through an intermediary rather than the “official channels”), given that “the official framework of fee-for-service health care [...] is perceived to reflect the continuing injustice of Russian bureaucratic institutions”, it is in fact less “ethically problematic and unjust” for her to simply give an unofficial payment. This emphasis on representations (above and beyond objective power *relations*) leaves her however unable to account for the doctor who could graciously accept a bribe/gift from one (socially equal) patient, while scornfully disdaining the bribe/gift of another (socially inferior) patient shortly after (Rivkin-Fish, 2005, pp.56-60). This episode and its implications are discussed in greater detail in the second theoretical chapter.

⁸See *The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu’s Sociology* (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, pp. 2-59), which remains the best general overview of Bourdieu’s sociological approach, and which I have tended to favour in this section for the introduction of key concepts due to its greater clarity in comparison to some of Bourdieu’s own writings.

⁹As Bourdieu notes, “these [academic] antinomies are enormously costly to demolish *because they are inscribed in social reality*” (*ibid.*, p. 179, emphasis mine).

¹⁰A favourite aphorism for Bourdieu taken from the *Pensées* (348), and quoted in Bourdieu (2000, p. 130). He goes on to add his own gloss: “The world encompasses me, comprehends me as a thing among things, but I, as a thing for which there are things, comprehend this world. And I do so (must it be added?) *because* it encompasses and comprehends me.”

“third-order knowledge”¹¹ - which he called “genetic structuralism”:¹² a methodology which translates the two forms of scientific knowledge captured by subjectivism and objectivism into different research ‘moments’ in a unified theory of practice.

The approach entails two levels of analysis: on the one hand, we attend to the “objectivity of the first order” - that materiality of things, of structures, in which we ourselves participate and form a part, and which is governed by “the *distribution of material* resources and means of appropriation of socially scarce goods and values (species of capital, in Bourdieu’s technical language)” (*ibid.*, p. 7). Following this there is the “objectivity of the second order,” in the form of “systems of *classification*, the mental and bodily schemata that function as *symbolic* templates for the practical activities - conduct, thoughts, feelings, and judgements - of social agents” (*ibid.*, p. 7). As Wacquant explains:

The resulting *social praxeology* weaves together a “structuralist” and a “constructivist” approach. First, we push aside mundane representations to construct the objective structures (spaces of *positions*), the distribution of socially efficient resources that define the external restraints bearing on interactions and representations. Second, we reintroduce the immediate, lived experience of agents in order to explicate the categories of perception and appreciation (*dispositions*) that structure their action from inside. (*ibid.*, p. 11)

However, these two ‘moments’ of analysis do not carry the same epistemological weight, as Wacquant makes clear:

It should be stressed that, although the two moments of analysis are equally necessary, they are not equal: epistemological priority is granted to objectivist rupture over subjectivist understanding. Application of Durkheim’s first principle of the

¹¹See Bourdieu (1977, pp.1-9)

¹²The label “genetic structuralism” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 14) was applied by Bourdieu to his approach only relatively late in his career. He also favoured the term “constructivist structuralism” or “structuralist constructivism” (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 14) to indicate both stages of the ‘double reading’ necessary for scientific enquiry. Other terms used to describe Bourdieu’s approach include “reflexive sociology” (the title of Bourdieu and Wacquant’s methodological primer (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992)), and practice theory (See Bourdieu (1977)).

“sociological method,” the systematic rejections of preconceptions, must come before analysis of the practical apprehension of the world from the subjective standpoint. *For the viewpoints of agents will vary systematically with the point they occupy in objective social space.* (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 11, emphasis mine).¹³

To emphasise: a complete account of social practice requires the analyst to integrate *both* the objectivist *and* subjectivist modes of analysis. Only by doing this can the analyst recover the complete truth of practice from the partial truths which each mode reveals. However, while the analyst recognises that at the level of generative principles the objective and subjective exist in a dialectic relationship (each both producing and being produced by the other), when it comes to a practical methodology for *analysing* such structures, epistemological precedence *must* be given to the objectivist ‘moment’ of constructing the (objective) relations of agents in **Social Space**. That is: positions before dispositions.

A ‘break’ with commonsense notions and constructions about the social world, achieved through analysing the distribution of “socially efficient resources”, is thus the necessary first step. The *objective social space* which such a mode of analysis uncovers may then be used as a basis for locating the varying (subjective) dispositions of social agents. This *modus operandi* is both possible and necessary owing to perhaps the key “foundational hypothesis” (to again borrow from Bourdieu and Wacquant (*ibid.*, p. 12)) of Bourdieu’s methodological approach:

There exists a correspondence between social structures and mental structures, between the objective divisions of the social world - particularly into dominant and dominated in the various fields - and the principles of vision and division that agents apply to it. (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 7)¹⁴

This idea of a correspondence between social and mental structures be-

¹³As already noted, this is precisely the opposite of the approach advocated by rational choice institutionalism, which conversely constructs a second objective order *after* the subjective.

¹⁴Also quoted in Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 12). See also Bourdieu and Wacquant (*ibid.*, pp. 12-15) for how Bourdieu’s theory differs from Durkheim’s thesis of the correspondence between cognitive and social structures.

comes feasible only once we transcend the substantialist mode of analysis which both objectivism and subjectivism favour, and instead accept a mode of analysis based upon the primacy of *relations*. Dispositions, far from being the product of an individual's volition, are in fact linked to the distribution of socially efficient resources in a given society. Yet, in order to visualise such a distribution (and thus the correspondence between objective resources and subjective dispositions), one must do away with the substantialist vision of 'society' as a structure (or structures) - "a seamless totality integrated by systemic functions" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 16) - and instead consider it as a *social space* consisting of various relatively autonomous *fields*. The perceptions and dispositions which constitute a particular social agent's subjective *habitus* are the product of occupying a determinate position within that social space (i.e. within one or many fields). *Field* and *habitus* are thus both *relational* concepts:

A field consists of a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power (capital), while habitus consists of a set of historical relations 'deposited' within individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation, and action. (*ibid.*, p. 16)

Both habitus and field "designate bundles of relations" (*ibid.*, p. 16), and the two concepts are further relational in the additional sense that "they function fully *only in relation to one another*" (*ibid.*, p. 19). Thus, in place of the antinomy of structure and agency, we have instead the historical processes of *objectification* of structures in the form of fields, and their *embodiment* in the form of habitus. It is through this dialectic of objectification and embodiment (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 87-95) that the *structured* structures of habitus and field come to function also as *structuring* structures (hence the label "genetic structuralism"). Thus, in contrast to the "dead structure" and "empty places"¹⁵ of traditional structuralist approaches, Bourdieu emphasises fields as *spaces of play*, in which agents engage in struggles over specific stakes, employing the *improvisatory* quality of habitus. Instead of

¹⁵Bourdieu's description of Althusserian structuralism, which can equally be applied to all structuralist approaches. See Bourdieu and Wacquant (*ibid.*, p. 19) and Bourdieu (2012, p. ref).

their actions being governed by rules,¹⁶ social agents follow strategies,¹⁷ whose means and ends are adjusted to probabilities governed by the objective resources available to them through their position in social space.

By reconciling, on the one hand, the two forms of academic knowledge as separate ‘moments’ in a unified mode of analysis (or ‘praxeology’), and on the other, the “double life” of social structures into the relational concepts of *habitus* and *field*, Bourdieu argues we may better fulfil the true task of sociology: “to uncover the most profoundly buried structures of the various social worlds which constitute the social universe, as well as the ‘mechanisms’ which tend to ensure their reproduction or their transformation” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 7). In this research, I hope to make use of Bourdieu’s methodological approach to uncover the deeply buried structures which perpetuate the phenomenon of personalistic exchange in the context of the modern state, and to identify the ‘mechanisms’ which link this practice to the reproduction of the broader social structure. Before doing so however, it becomes necessary - through the initial break with commonsense - to call into question even the initial categories of analysis,¹⁸ and to reconstruct the research object according to the relational approach proposed by Pierre Bourdieu. It now falls to explain in more detail the specific “conceptual tools” through which - following the Bourdieusian method - that reconstruction is effected.

¹⁶“It is important finally to emphasise that the lines of action engendered by habitus do not, indeed cannot, have the neat regularity of conduct deduced from a normative or juridical principle” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 22).

¹⁷Though it should be emphasised that Bourdieu does not intend, by “strategy”, a necessarily *conscious* adjustment:

“The language of strategy, which one is forced to use in order to designate the sequences of actions objectively oriented towards an end that are observed in all fields, must not mislead us: the most effective strategies, especially in fields dominated by values of disinterestedness, are those which, being the product of dispositions shaped by the immanent necessity of the field, tend to adjust themselves spontaneously to that necessity, *without express intention or calculation*. (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 138)

¹⁸A difficulty alluded to by Bourdieu himself when attempting to define the state - which, he noted, is an object which stands a good chance of having produced the very structures of conscience through which we perceive it (Bourdieu, 2012, p. 13). Hence, the need for a new ‘metalanguage’ to break with such categories of thought (*ibid.*, p. 19).

3.2 New Conceptual Tools

In the previous section the case was made for an epistemological approach which unites objectivism and subjectivism, structure and agency, in a single method predicated on the primacy of *relations*. By way of justifying this approach, reference was made to some of the epistemological weaknesses of prior conceptualisations of the research object. In this section, I introduce the conceptual tools advocated by Pierre Bourdieu in constructing new objects designed to overcome such weaknesses - an approach which involves, in the words of Loïc Wacquant quoted above, “push[ing] aside mundane representations” in order to first construct the objective structures bearing upon interactions and representations, before reintegrating the subjective categorisations of agents into these structures. The purpose of this section is twofold: on the one hand, to provide an introduction to concepts that will be referred to extensively in the theoretical chapters, and on the other, to demonstrate the utility of such tools in comparison with other methods. Having outlined these different tools, I then proceed in the next section to apply them in (re)constructing the research object.

The two most fundamental tools in Bourdieusian praxeology have already been mentioned: habitus and field (which we may extend to include the larger concept of social space). A third, capital, has also been mentioned in passing. Further key concepts to be introduced in this section are: **Illusio**, **Misrecognition**, **Doxa**, and **Symbolic Violence**. It should be emphasised that these concepts (like the methodology which prompted them) are *relational*: they function only in relation to each other as part of a unified theory of social practice. Applying them individually without care for their status as parts of a larger unified theory will thus render any derived analysis meaningless.

Habitus is “an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted”; as such, it “engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions, and no others” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 95). It is a “practical sense”, enabling one “to act as one ‘should’ (*ô s dei*, as Aristotle put it) without positing or executing a Kantian ‘should’, a rule of conduct” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 139); moreover, “being the product of incorporation of the structures and tendencies of the world,” the habitus makes it possible

“to adapt endlessly to partially modified contexts”, and to engage “in a practical operation of quasi-bodily *anticipation* of the immanent tendencies of the field” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 139).

For Bourdieu, this notion of habitus - opposed to both the “mechanism” of structuralist approaches and the “finalism” of rational choice (*ibid.*, p. 138) - “restores to the agent a generating, unifying, constructing, classifying power, while recalling that this capacity to construct social reality, itself socially constructed, is not that of a transcendental subject but of a socialized body, investing in its practice socially constructed organizing principles that are acquired in the course of a situated and dated social experience” (*ibid.*, p. 136).

As a concept in Bourdieusian theory, habitus predates field, yet the section of *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Bourdieu, 1977) which introduces habitus nonetheless emphasises the *dialectic* of objectification and embodiment: the habitus which is embodied is the product of the internalisation of systems of classification and objective relations which have an existence in external reality (and not simply in the ‘shared representations’ agents may make of that reality).

Field is thus the name given to the objective configuration of those relations, as they pertain to a specific *interest* or social game. Fields, as spaces of play, produce their own *logic*, such that “the external determinations that bear on agents situated in a given field [...] never apply to them directly, but affect them only through the specific mediation of the specific forms and forces of the field, after having undergone a *re-structuring* that is all the more important the more autonomous the field, that is, the more it is capable of imposing its specific logic, the cumulative product of its particular history” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 105). In other words, “a field is a patterned system of objective forces (much in the manner of a magnetic field), a *relational configuration endowed with a specific gravity* which it imposes on all the objects and agents which enter in it” (*ibid.*, p. 17).

To emphasise once again that the determinations engendered by an objective field are more than simply the ‘shared representations’ of the subjectivist or phenomenological approaches, Bourdieu makes clear that fields comprise “systems of relations that are *independent* of the populations which these relations define” (*ibid.*, p. 106, emphasis mine). Thus, the notion of field “reminds us that the true object of social science is not the individual”

- rather, individuals exist as social *agents* “and not as biological individuals, actors, or subjects”. Social agents are “socially constituted as active and acting in the field under consideration by the fact that they possess the necessary properties to be effective, to produce effects, in this field. And it is knowledge of the field itself in which they evolve that allows us best to grasp the roots of their singularity, their *point of view* or position (in a field) from which their particular vision of the world (and of the field itself) is constructed” (*ibid.*, p. 107).

In analysis, a field is composed of two ‘moments’ - first, that of “the objective structure of the relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions” which compose that field, and second, the “*prises de position*” (position-takings, subjective stances) taken by those agents, i.e. “the structured system of practices and expressions” (*ibid.*, p. 105) which agents exhibit in a field. Whereas the second moment - that of practices and expressions - falls under the realm of habitus, the first moment - an agent or institution’s position in the objective structure of the field - is governed by the volume of *capital* specific to that field possessed by the agent or institution.

Capital may be understood, for the purposes of analysis, as “socially efficient resources”. It is a fully relational concept, in the sense that any socially efficient resource is a store of social value (and a marker of social position) only in the sense that other social agents and institutions *recognise* it as such. The tendency for social agents to give value to the specific kinds of social resources produced by a given field is an effect of the *illusio*, or social libido (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 76-79) - the sense of investment in, or attachment to, a given social game.¹⁹ This sense of being invested in the social game is far-removed from the idea of a freely-contracting rational actor or *homo oeconomicus*; rather, to take part in the game is to be fully drawn into its determinacies -

“The perpetual motion which runs through the field does not stem from some motionless prime mover [...] but from the struggle itself, which is produced by the structures of the field and in

¹⁹The concept of *illusio* was a relatively late refinement in Bourdieu’s theory, replacing the more general term ‘interest’ (see Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 6, n.10)). According to Bourdieu, “one of the tasks of sociology is to determine how the social world constitutes the biological libido, an undifferentiated impulse, as a specific social libido” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 78).

turn reproduces its structures, i.e. its hierarchies. It springs from the actions and reactions of the agents, who, short of opting out of the game and falling into oblivion, have no choice but to struggle to keep up or improve their position in the field, i.e. to conserve or increase the specific capital which is only created within the field. In so doing, each one helps to subject all the others to the often intolerable constraints arising from the competition. In short, no one can take advantage of the game, not even those who dominate it, without being taken up and taken in by it” (Bourdieu, 1981, p. 307-308).

According to Bourdieu, “in highly differentiated societies, the social cosmos is made up of a number of such relatively autonomous social microcosms, i.e., spaces of objective relations that are the site of a logic and a necessity that are *specific and irreducible* to those that regulate other fields” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). Delineating the limits of a given field is frequently a difficult proposition, owing to the fact that such limits are “always a stake in the field itself” (*ibid.*, p. 100); yet, rather than thinking of fields as discrete, bounded entities, Bourdieu invites us to consider them as centres of mass exerting an influence on agents and objects within or near them.²⁰ As well as the various specific and irreducible relations which comprise individual fields, there is also the *field of power* - a “meta-field”, “not situated on the same level as other fields [...] since it encompasses them in part” (*ibid.*, p. 18, n. 32) - in which the rate of conversion between all forms of authority (capital) is established.

The *totality* of these effects of influence within a given social continuum comprises *social space*, and it is an agent’s position in social space (a function of the structure and volume of his capital) which structures the habitus that determines both his own practice and his interpretation of others’ practice. In turn, the practical logic, or ‘sense’, of habitus tends toward the pre-reflexive reproduction of those structures (categories of perception, systems of classification, etc.) which constitute the social space in which it was formed.²¹ This “implicit collusion” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 145) be-

²⁰See Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 100): “We may think of a field as a space within which an effect of field is exercised, so that what happens to any object that traverses this space cannot be explained solely by the intrinsic properties of the object in question. The limits of the field are situated at the point where the effects of the field cease.”

²¹See Bourdieu (2000, p. 144): “Habitus constructs the world by a certain way of ori-

tween objective and embodied structures, field and habitus, “is the basis of a practical, mutual understanding, the paradigm of which might be the one established between members of the same team, or, despite the antagonism, all the players engaged in a game” (*ibid.*, p. 145). It is “an immediate agreement in ways of judging and acting which does not presuppose *either the communication of consciousness, still less a contractual decision*” (*ibid.*, p. 145).

In this sense, the practical logic of habitus is far removed from the assumptions which underly institutionalist approaches. Rather than consciously following an expressly communicable rule, or a norm or ‘decision rule’ which holds the weight of a juridical law, the habitus engages in a regulated improvisation: the product of a bodily comprehension formed through consistent exposure to the structure of relations bearing down upon the agent as a result of his position in social space, which conditions the agent to actions consistent with a deontic modality of *appropriateness* within the given field, rather than the necessity of unmediated determinations. Indeed, the re-structuring effect of field often converts the necessities apparently revealed by the objective moment of analysis into seemingly paradoxical practices that go against the (objective) ‘interest’ of the agent: as Bourdieu was fond of repeating, the logic of practice is not the logic of logic.

In contrast to the Bourdieusian approach (which we may call ‘complex relationalism’, taking as it does a highly differentiated view of social relations), in which the improvisations of habitus in the *struggle* to reproduce positions within a field or fields produce a *perpetual motion* (Bourdieu, 1981, p. 307), most institutionalist approaches instead describe *static* relations, wherein a rule defines a fixed position in a single dimension - a substantialist logic lacking generative principles.²²

The fundamental difference in the vision of the social world which each approach implies can perhaps best be captured through the quantitative tools which each tends to favour. A given part of social space may be represented visually through the methods of multiple correspondence analysis

enting itself towards it” - a bodily, non-conscious orientation akin to that of the athlete involved in sport; an *anticipation*, which avoids making of practice a “Cartesian discontinuity of successive moments” (*ibid.*, p. 144).

²²See the previously quoted statement of Ostrom: “rules can be formally represented as relations, whose domain are the set of physically possible variables and their values, and whose range are the values of the variables, in the situation under analysis” (Ostrom, 1986, p. 7)

(MCA) or, more recently, geometric data analysis (GDA). Through the use of carefully designed questionnaires reflecting both the objective and subjective moments of analysis (that is, capital structure and position takings), it becomes possible to derive eigenvalues which may be used to locate the position of agents and their practices in a low dimensional space (the coordinates of which are described according to the volume and structure of capital).

In correspondence analysis “the statistical procedures readily follow from the mathematical theory, which carries the burden of proof” (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2004, p. 8). Not only does this represent, in the words of Le Roux, “a fantastic saving in intellectual investment”, it is also a method which remains “impervious to the expectations and prejudices of researchers”,²³ and from which patterns or structures latent within the data naturally emerge.²⁴ By contrast, data-fitting techniques such as regression analysis begin from the assumption of a fixed relation between two or more variables to which data are then fitted (assuming either a linear, curvi-linear, quadratic or other type of fixed relation), the goal being to demonstrate correlations (and imply causal relations) between pre-selected variables.²⁵

Bourdieu provided a powerful example of his relational mode of analysis in *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Bourdieu, 1984).²⁶ In this work, he was able to demonstrate a statistical correlation between artistic taste (a position taking) and social background (capital structure, or position in objective relations); furthermore, however, he was able to demonstrate not only that artistic taste varied consistently according to the amount of capital possessed by an agent, but also according to

²³Benzecri, quoted in Le Roux and Rouanet (2004, p. 10).

²⁴As Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux (2000, p. 8) note, Bourdieu’s use of MCA (rather than, for example, regression analysis) amounted to more than simple preference, and was indeed closer to an elective affinity. As Bourdieu himself makes clear - “I use Correspondence Analysis very much, because I think that it is essentially a relational procedure whose philosophy fully expresses what in my view constitutes social reality. It is a procedure that ‘thinks’ in relations, as I try to do it with the concept of field.” (from the Foreword to the German edition of *Le Métier du Sociologue*, quoted in Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux (*ibid.*, p. 8)).

²⁵See also Lebaron (2003, p. 564 n.24) on this comparison.

²⁶The famous diagram (p. 122-123) is in fact heuristic and not statistical: it consists of a synthesis of different MCAs brought together in a single social space. Improvements in statistical methodology and computing power however have now made such analysis feasible within a fully statistical representation (see Hjellbrekke, Le Roux, and Korsnes (2007) for a recent example).

the *structure* of that capital - that is, whether it was primarily economic or cultural.

Through this work and other empirical research like it, Bourdieu attempted to demonstrate his principle hypothesis: that mental structures and social structures are intrinsically linked, and thus that an agent's habitus is the product of occupying a determinate position within the social structure - a position, that is, determined not only by membership of a given field or fields, but also further triply determined by the volume (i), and structure (ii) of capital possessed by the agent at given historical moments (trajectory, iii).²⁷

According to Bourdieu, a given social practice should therefore be understood as a product of the interaction of these three basic theoretical elements of habitus, capital and field, as represented by the formula:

$$[(\text{habitus})(\text{capital})] + \text{field} = \text{practice}^{28}$$

The relation between an agent's position in social space and his practice brings us to the second 'moment' of Bourdieusian analysis: that of the analysis of subjective (or symbolic) structures, which is in turn fundamental to understanding Bourdieu's theory of domination. Bourdieu developed the concept of *misrecognition* to explain the symbolic transformation of relations which occurs within specific fields. For Bourdieu, while the initial moment of analysis may uncover the objective "truth" of a particular practice (that is, in its relation to the broader structure of inequality in a given field), by

²⁷These three dimensions are initially specified in Bourdieu (1984, p. 108).

²⁸Bourdieu (*ibid.*, p. 101). Not everyone is convinced by this neat synthesis of field, habitus and capital. Warde (2004), for instance, argues that, rather than representing a theoretical unity, Bourdieu's early preoccupation with practice (of which habitus forms the key theoretical component) and later interest in field mark a rupture which cannot be easily reconciled. For Warde, Bourdieu's attempt to reconcile these different elements within the above formula stands as an impenetrable testament to the broader theoretical inadequacies of the transitional work (*Distinction*) from which it is taken (*ibid.*, p. 4). However, Bourdieu surely intended his formula to be understood as an expression of a logical (rather than mathematical) relation: i.e., that practice can only be 'made sense of' when it is considered as a product of both the *improvisatory* nature of habitus and the *constraints* on that habitus resulting from differences in the availability of socially efficient resources (capital). The interaction of these factors must then be considered *in relation* to the field in which they are located, not only because practices exist in relation to other practices (and may therefore change their signification in accordance with changes in the state of the broader field), but also because the field itself exerts a structuring effect on agents and objects passing through it.

neglecting the additional *symbolic force* associated with such practice, the objective mode of analysis also destroys the logic particular to practice - that is, the mechanisms which make such unequal structures so persistent by tending to naturalise their very arbitrariness.

As already mentioned, the “collusion” previously referred to between habitus and field, wherein each both structures and is structured by the other, serves to mediate external determinacies into a specific practical logic - a deontic modality of *appropriateness*, which structures action not according to the absolute necessities of human existence, but toward the immanent necessities of the field. The state of being ignorant to the arbitrariness of such necessities - of ‘forgetting’, if one likes, the act of being in the game whilst playing the game, of being ‘caught up’ in the game - is *doxa*: the social world become self-evident.

And yet the maintenance of *doxa*, or rather of a *doxic modality* between habitus and field, between agents and the social space which they inhabit, is not the product of a blind obedience to an established order.²⁹ Rather, in the same way that fields serve to mediate external determinacies into forms specific to the logic of the field, so too the objective inequalities revealed in the first moment of analysis are frequently mediated by the field into new forms, primarily as *symbolic struggles* over *symbolic capital*.³⁰ It is the stakes in these symbolic struggles, and the *symbolic force* they generate, which tend to prevent the opportunity for agents to entertain the kind of *radical doubt* which would be necessary to unveil the objective structure of inequalities to which they are subject. This collusion between habitus and field, between agents and the unequal social space they inhabit, in effecting the perpetuation of domination, is called *symbolic violence*.

Symbolic violence, according to Bourdieu “is the *violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity*” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 167). As Bourdieu explains:

[s]ocial agents are knowing agents who, even when they are sub-

²⁹In this sense (though not only) Bourdieu differs from Marxist-inspired theories of domination such as false consciousness and hegemony. C.f. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 106 n. 59): “At the core of Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic domination is the notion that ideological legitimation (or “naturalization”) of class inequality [i.e. *doxa*] operates via a correspondence which is effected only between systems [i.e. fields]. It does not require that cultural producers intentionally endeavor to mask or to serve the interests of the dominant [...]”.

³⁰See in particular Bourdieu (1989).

ject to determinisms, contribute to producing the efficacy of that which determines them insofar as they structure what determines them. And it is almost always in the “fit” between determinants and the categories of perception that constitute them as such that the effect of domination arises. [...] I call *misrecognition* the fact of recognising a violence which is wielded precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such. (*ibid.*, p. 167-168)

Thus, an exchange carried out within the context of a field is not a simple transaction, but carries with it an additional *symbolic force*.³¹ It is this force which binds agents to the logic of the field, and to the logic of the capital produced by that field (which becomes in turn a *symbolic*³² capital); it is also this force which generates the illusion that places agents in an ‘enchanted’ relation to the (unequal) structures of the field, and causes them to be misrecognised. The exchange of symbolic goods, and the constraints imposed upon such exchange by the differing logics of particular fields, reveals, in the final analysis (that is, that which reincorporates the subjective with the objective), nothing less than a *symbolic economy* - a “general science of the economy of practices” in which “profits in one area are necessarily paid for by costs in another” (Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 254).³³ The “universal equivalent” in this economy is nothing other than “labor-time” - “and the conservation of social energy through all its conversions is verified if, in each case, one takes into account both the labor-time accumulated in the

³¹See Bourdieu and Passeron (1990, p. 4): “Every power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations.”

³²On this point concerning symbolic capital, it is useful to quote a short passage from *Pascalian Meditations*, which clarifies a good deal of potential ambiguity: “Every kind of capital (economic, cultural, social) tends (to different degrees) to function as symbolic capital (so that it might be better to speak, in rigorous terms, of the *symbolic effects of capital*) when it obtains an explicit or practical recognition, that of a habitus structured according to the very structures of the space in which it has been engendered.” The next sentence is very important in clarifying an ambiguity in relation to Bourdieu’s earlier use of the term in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Bourdieu, 1977): “In other words, symbolic capital (male honour in Mediterranean societies, the honourability of the *notable* or the Chinese mandarin, the prestige of the celebrated writer, etc.) is not a particular kind of capital but what every kind of capital becomes when it is misrecognized as capital [...] and therefore recognized as legitimate” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 242).

³³Bourdieu adds here that the “concept of wastage has no meaning in a general science of the economy of practices” owing to a principle which is “the equivalent of the principle of the conservation of energy”.

form of capital and the labor-time needed to transform it from one type into another” (Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 254) - that is, to transform both the capital itself, and the symbolic force which causes agents to misrecognise it. In such a way, the observation made by Graziano (1976) concerning the varying effects of direct and indirect exchange can be incorporated into a non-deterministic theoretical framework capable both of explaining their differing social genesis (in the sense of generative principles) and their continued coexistence.

Before moving on, it is worth mentioning at this point certain critiques of Bourdieu, which tend to advance the criticism that his theory is “reductionistic and deterministic”, and which typically do so by emphasising one ‘moment’ of the research process above the other. Alexander (1995), for instance, argues that Bourdieu’s conceptual tools of habitus and field are materialist throwbacks to Marxist theory, which allow no space for the creative role of subjective agency - the “voluntaristic, self- or value-generated dimension of critical change” (*ibid.*, p. 148).

While there will always be genuine academic disagreement as to whether objective structures should underpin subjective representations, or vice versa, the weakness of such criticisms lies in their somewhat stylised approach to Bourdieu’s theory. Alexander, for instance, addresses each of Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts in turn and in isolation, rather than considering them in a comprehensive, relational manner. Thus, his criticism of Bourdieu’s theory of field (*ibid.*, pp. 157-164) lacks an appreciation of the role of (symbolic) capital in determining a field’s internal logic, hence providing precisely “the disjunctive tensions yet simultaneous interdependencies” which he claims to be lacking (*ibid.*, p. 163).

Rather, as Lebaron (2003, p. 558) notes, the central problem of Bourdieu’s theory was captured by his former collaborator Jean-Claude Passeron (1982), and lies in “the question of the limits of the analogy” between material, economic concepts such as capital, interest, markets, etc. and the *symbolic* domains to which Bourdieu proceeds to apply them. As Lebaron emphasises, the problem is *not* because such an analogy is “sometimes empirically inadequate (and useful as such) as Passeron thinks”, but “because any economic term can be understood in either a restrictive or a ‘generalized’ meaning”. Thus, the kind of “strictly monetary or quantitative evaluations” which apply to the *economic* use of such terms is too restrictive for the gen-

eralised use Bourdieu puts them to - a point further emphasised by the fact that, when referring to capital in the purely economic sense, Bourdieu uses the (otherwise redundant) construction “economic capital” to emphasise this distinction (Lebaron, 2003, p. 562).

As Lebaron notes, Bourdieu’s project amounts to an *economic sociology*, which, rather than reducing all human action to ‘profit-seeking’, seeks instead to apply a generalised economic mode of analysis to the symbolic order. Indeed, the antecedents to this mode of analysis within Bourdieu’s own career were born out of confrontation with economists, and a desire to challenge the prevailing economic discourse, rather than seeking to reinforce it (*ibid.*, p. 563).³⁴ This “double move”, as Lebaron describes it, involved *both* “the economicization of his analysis of the symbolic order and the symbolic explanation of the foundations of economic reality” (*ibid.*, p. 563).

Having briefly outlined the main conceptual tools in the Bourdieusian approach, and their relation to each other as part of a unified theory, we begin to come near to the issues at the heart of the thesis. To expand further, we proceed now to the new formulation of the research object.

3.3 A New Object: The Clandestine Circulation of Capital

As Bourdieu noted, “in order to construct a model of the game [...] one has to reflect on the different modes of existence of the principles of regulation” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 65). This chapter has so far advocated a mode of analysis in which the principles of regulation are no longer considered as autonomous rules or norms, but are rather seen as the product of an interaction between the social structures of field, capital, and habitus, with each of these in turn being the product of a contingent social genesis.

How do we use such conceptual tools to conceive of the regulated exchange of favours in the context of the modern state? And what can such a mode of analysis contribute to our understanding of the *generative principles* that lie behind such practices? Further, will such tools enable us to

³⁴See also Lebaron (2001) for a historical overview of Bourdieu’s role in this regard as part of a long French sociological tradition in confronting the discipline of economics, involving Durkheim, Simiand and Halbwachs.

relate these practices to the larger order of social practices of which they form a part, and hence (in a determinate way) to the reproduction of the social structure?

The first and most significant break effected by Bourdieusian praxeology is to view the research object as a form of *circulation* of socially efficient resources, each the product of a field of specific relations producing their own symbolic force. The unequal accumulation of these resources (species of capital) is the principle through which inequality is (re)produced within a social space. Hence, the totality of mechanisms for the unequal accumulation of capital can be considered as representing a determinate mode of domination.

Writing in *The Logic of Practice* (Bourdieu, 1990c), Bourdieu distinguished between two principal modes of domination: “Social formations in which relations of domination are made, unmade and remade through *personal interactions* contrast with those in which such relations are mediated by *objective, institutionalized mechanisms*” (*ibid.*, p. 130, emphasis mine). According to Bourdieu, the principal difference between these two modes lies in *the degree of objectification of capital* (*ibid.*, p. 130).

To paraphrase, in Bourdieusian theory *personal interactions* contrast with *objective, institutionalised mechanisms* as distinct modes of domination, and the principle determining such difference is the degree of objectification of capitals (socially efficient resources) which each mode reproduces. In *The Forms of Capital* (Bourdieu, 1986b), Bourdieu describes capital as existing in three forms: embodied, objectified and institutionalised. Thus, we may conclude that personal interactions circulate (and reproduce) embodied capitals, while objective, institutionalised mechanisms circulate (and reproduce) objectified and institutionalised capitals.

At the beginning of the *The Forms of Capital*, Bourdieu proposed the development of *a general science of the economy of practices* to “establish the laws whereby the different types of capital (or power, which amounts to the same thing) change into one another” (*ibid.*, p. 247). Hence, rather than a strict teleology (in which domination evolves gradually from one mode to the other), Bourdieu seems to invite us to consider the theoretical principles through which other mechanisms may evolve that would enable social agents to circulate and accumulate the different forms of capital produced by each mode of domination.

In particular, in the final lines of the same work Bourdieu noted - almost as an aside - that “the more the official transmission of capital is prevented or hindered, the more the effects of the *clandestine circulation* of capital [...] become determinant in the reproduction of the social structure” (*ibid.*, p. 255, emphasis mine). By clandestine circulation, Bourdieu intended those instances when the dominant saw their (highly objectified) capital structure threatened by changes to those “objective, institutionalized mechanisms” - that is, mechanisms for the “official transmission of capital” typically guaranteed by the state - and thus sought to shift their capital into less objectified forms through “reproduction strategies capable of ensuring better-disguised transmission, but at the cost of a greater loss of capital, by exploiting the greater convertibility of the types of capital” (*ibid.*, p. 255).

This brief reference to the clandestine circulation of capital came to form the theoretical inspiration for this thesis. When thinking about personalistic exchange in the context of the modern state, and how it might relate to the reproduction of the social structure, the concept of clandestine circulation seemed to offer the beginnings of a rigorous framework through which to construct a new research object.

The *clandestine circulation* of capital, being opposed to those mechanisms for the “official” transmission of capital, yet still capable of maintaining (albeit at the cost of a greater loss of capital) an unequal distribution of capital, presents an objective paradigm through which practices of both clientelism and corruption can be studied and evaluated as a part of the broader reproduction strategies within a given social space.

Further, given (as mentioned in the previous section) that different capitals produce varying *symbolic forces* that adjust the habitus of agents toward their accumulation, such a conceptualisation also offers a framework through which mechanisms for the circulation and accumulation of capital can be *differentiated* according to the symbolic forces associated with them.

In asking *how* clandestine circulation may first emerge and then become determinant in the reproduction of the social structure, we are thus in effect asking how (under what conditions) the mode of domination associated with personal interactions may function as a form of symbolic violence for the reproduction of part or all of a social space otherwise reproduced through objectified mechanisms. This involves identifying the capitals involved, the specific mechanisms through which they are circulated, and the symbolic

force produced.

Establishing “the laws” through which such a mode of circulation may operate is thus the object of this thesis. It involves thinking in terms of the interplay of habitus, field and capital, which produces regulated practices that are neither the result of an entirely conscious strategy, nor serving to fulfil a teleological function in a larger social ‘system’. Practice, that is, which while arbitrary in its outcomes, is nonetheless historically contingent in its genesis.

The decision to integrate Bourdieusian praxeology in this manner to create a new research object represents an original contribution both to studies of personalistic exchange and Bourdieusian theory. Previously, research has been conducted which has chosen to integrate restricted elements of Bourdieu’s approach. Rutten (2006), for example, refers to a “habitus of clientelism”, without relating this to any of the generative principles within Bourdieu’s theory (or even referring directly to Bourdieu at all). The previously-mentioned works of Auyero (1999, 2000, et.al. 2009) make reference to Bourdieu’s relational approach, yet in a somewhat naive sense: the ‘client’s point(s) of view’ are neither reintegrated within an objective structure (social space), nor related to the agent’s habitus, or indeed viewed as misrecognised; rather, Auyero’s primary concern seems to be normative - to ‘rescue’ clients from the scholastic point of view by returning to them their own perspective, an approach Bourdieu would have considered phenomenological.

Likewise Berenschot (2010) attempts to integrate the Bourdieusian concept of field within the study of clientelist practices in India, and in particular their relation to the state; however, his application of Bourdieu’s framework makes no reference to the symbolic aspects of domination. In her study of Soviet-era *blat*, Ledeneva (1998) attempts to apply the Bourdieusian concept of misrecognition to explain the varying symbolic forces surrounding such exchanges, yet she misconstrues Bourdieu’s theory of practice: rather than relating misrecognition to the symbolic forces acting upon agents within a field, she avoids concepts such as field and habitus, and instead applies a rational choice framework to misrecognition, seeing agents as following specific ‘strategies’ of misrecognition in order to disguise their exchanges (*ibid.*, p. 65). When related to the study of corruption, the application of Bourdieusian praxeology is even more limited, and has thus far been presented

primarily in the form of research agendas (see Graaf (2007) and Anders and Nuijten (2007)).

More promising is the contribution of Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley (1998), who applied the concepts of capital and habitus to post-Communist transformation in Eastern Europe, and noted the variations in dominant capital structures underlying different regime types (*ibid.*, p. 23). While their observations concerning the *trajectory* (*ibid.*, p. 45) of these capital structures, and their effects on agents' habitus, reflect in some respects a similar approach to mine, their research object (transition) is quite different, and their level of analysis much more macro; they also make no reference to the important distinction between embodiment and objectification which (as I will argue in the theory chapters) forms the basis of clandestine circulation. Thus, the decision to address personalistic exchange in the context of the modern state through the prism of clandestine circulation is a project which finds its only correspondence in the works of Bourdieu himself, and in particular those relating to the state (of which the collected lectures *Sur L'Etat* (Bourdieu, 2012) are the most comprehensive).

3.4 The Research Questions

Having outlined the new research object, it is now possible to define in greater detail the research questions which will inform the theoretical and empirical work which follows.

- Definition and Theory:
 - *What is clandestine circulation? (Defined according to Bourdieusian conceptual tools)*
 - *How does it emerge? (In relation to the genesis of social space)*
 - *What are its effects? (In terms of social reproduction)*
 - *How can it vary? (In the sense of the capitals involved)*
- Clandestine Circulation and the State:
 - *How do we conceptualise the state in relation to clandestine circulation?*
 - *How does the genesis and nature of the state affect the type and extent of clandestine circulation?*

- Historical Genesis:
 - *How do changes in the structure of social space affect clandestine circulation?*
 - *Through what historical processes does clandestine circulation become more or less determinant as a mode of reproduction?*
- Clandestine Circulation as Practice:
 - *How does clandestine circulation function at the level of practice; what principles regulate it?*
 - *How is such practice embodied in the dispositions of habitus?*
 - *What are the factors limiting such circulation?*
- Observing Clandestine Circulation:
 - *How can clandestine circulation be studied in the field? (Conceptual tools and measurement)*
 - *What are the socially efficient resources involved, and how do we recognise them?*
 - *How do we account for ambiguity and indeterminacy with regard to clandestine circulation?*
 - *How do we reconcile theoretical constructs with 'folk terms' such as *wasta*?*

3.5 Scope and Limitations of the Research

As mentioned earlier in both the preface and the introduction, this thesis attempts to provide a contribution on three different levels: conceptual (of which this first part has been the primary contribution); theoretical (of which the next part will be the primary contribution); and empirical (of which the third part is the primary contribution).

In terms of an original contribution based upon research conducted in the field, the thesis is limited to the study of a single case, that of urban Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. The decision to restrict fieldwork to a single case was based upon the demands of the methodology chosen. In his own large-scale works, Bourdieu most frequently limited himself to a single, highly detailed

case study. *Distinction* (Bourdieu, 1984), for instance, was limited to the structure of cultural consumption within France, while *The State Nobility* (Bourdieu, 1996) was limited to the study of the French higher education system; equally, theoretical works such as *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Bourdieu, 1977) and *The Logic of Practice* (Bourdieu, 1990c) used fieldwork conducted in Algeria as the basis for producing generaliseable hypotheses concerning the predicates of social action.

In each of these cases, the use of a single case study was justified by the nature of the conceptual tools developed by Bourdieu, whose purpose, as Wacquant emphasises, is “for transferring knowledge gleaned in one area of inquiry into another” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 5). Indeed, one might even argue that a comparative research design within the Bourdieusian framework presents particular difficulties, as the relational approach of Bourdieu denies the simple transferral of objects from one case to another, but rather requires for each case the construction of a social space, the identification of power relations, and the location of objects within the structure of those relations - a very laborious process which can be easily undermined through the unthinking “borrowing” of objects from one case to another.³⁵

Hence, the purpose of the case study in this thesis is to provide a detailed empirical demonstration of the theoretical framework outlined in chapters 5 and 6. I prefer “demonstrate” to “test”, as I do not wish to mislead the reader into assuming that a hermetic division occurred in the process between building the theory, generating causal hypotheses, and testing these in the field. While such a post-positivist method - and its allied goal of falsification - may be of value in certain fields of social research, I believe that in qualitative sociology it is too easily subverted. Rather, in epistemological terms the research model followed in this thesis was largely abductive (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009), and may be understood as a research programme (Lakatos, 1978), in which the postulates of Bourdieusian theory represent the “hard core”, and the development of a theory of clandestine circulation the “protective belt”.³⁶

Thus, the *theoretical framework* of clandestine circulation was conceived

³⁵Consider for example the role of money, which can vary significantly from one social space to another, being in some cases a taboo in gift exchange, and in others highly esteemed (as noted by Kipnis (1996, p.294) in the case of China).

³⁶See also Burawoy (1989) for a defence of the research programme as against falsificationism, through an analytical comparison of practical examples of the two.

with generaliseability in mind, as the references to phenomena such as *blat* and *guanxi* in the following chapters demonstrate. Applying this theoretical framework to a specific empirical field site however requires constructing the social space of that site, and in particular the structure of relations within it. This produces knowledge which is *not* directly transferrable, and insofar as a social space may vary even within the same country, claims relating to the specific structure of relations made with regard to the field site (Ras Beirut) *cannot* be considered as directly transferrable beyond it (for example, to Tripoli, or within Beirut, to Dahiyeh) *without* first applying the same work of constructing the social space of that new site.

To emphasise again: the theoretical framework of clandestine circulation is intended to be generaliseable, in the Bourdieusian manner, through the transferability of concepts; the detailed investigation of the field site is an example of the practical application of that framework, and its results cannot be transferred or generalised without first going back to and applying the same framework. The role of the case study thus lies in demonstrating the utility of that theoretical framework in producing useful knowledge about social phenomena in an empirical setting, rather than in testing (in a falsifiable sense) the theoretical framework itself, *per se*.³⁷

A final observation concerns the scope of the thesis. In order to address the most important aspects of the research question I considered it necessary to focus the empirical section on the current state of the field in Beirut, in order to properly explore the complexity of the structures and practices involved. It was therefore not possible to provide a separate examination of all the historical processes responsible for the particular genesis of Lebanese social space, in particular in terms of the trajectory of dominant capital structures and the historical emergence of specific forms of clandestine circulation. Such analysis is included within the theoretical section from the perspective of similar kinds of clandestine circulation in other contexts. Moreover, where possible I have indicated within the empirical section those historical trends which I believe to have been most significant in the Lebanese context, in keeping with the mode of analysis developed in the theoretical chapters.

³⁷ Again, see Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009, p.) - “Standard scientific methods maximize all sorts of important values, such as logical coherence and rigor, but they do a poor job when it comes to the decisive purpose of human cognition: the efficient and efficacious production of useful knowledge”.

Chapter 4

The Field Site

I think that *wasta* exists everywhere in the world. It's just that in some parts of the world it's for elites, for example [...] where here it's available for everyone.

Informant, Lebanese male
university student, early 20s

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general introduction to the field site chosen as the empirical case study for this research, urban Beirut. It thus serves a double purpose as both an overview and a justification, and while observations of a historical and empirical nature are made, it contains no claims of a causal nature. All claims of a substantive and original nature relating to the field site are made in the empirical section (chapters 7 and 8).

The chapter begins with an outline of historical factors which have shaped Lebanon (and Beirut in particular), and then proceeds to outline some of the most salient features of contemporary Lebanese society, in terms both of socio-demographic structure and social practices. The chapter attempts to demonstrate how these factors provide a compelling opportunity for empirical observation of the research object, *clandestine circulation*, through the application of a transferrable theoretical framework.

4.1 Lebanon

The Republic of Lebanon is a small state located on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. It borders Syria to the north and east, and Israel to

the south (a state which the Lebanese government does not recognise). It has a land mass of 10,452 sq. km (the smallest in continental Asia), and a population of 5.5 million (2009).¹

Geographically, Lebanon is dominated by the mountain range which bears its name, and which begins at the Syrian border in the north, running parallel to the coast for some 170km (almost the entire length of the country). To the east of the Mount Lebanon range and running parallel to it is the narrow Bekaa valley, while to the east of the Bekaa is the Anti-Lebanon range, which marks the border with Syria. The presence of these two ranges within Lebanese territory leads to a high level of precipitation by regional standards (661mm in 2009 according to the World Bank),² providing the country with much greater water security than its neighbours. The Lebanese capital, Beirut, is located roughly halfway along the coast on a knuckle-like promontory, and as such follows an east/west axis (in contrast to the largely north/south orientation of the rest of the country). The city and its suburbs have a population of around 2 million (35% of the total population).

The modern Republic of Lebanon has endured a complicated nativity, a fact well reflected in its equally complex social structure. The geographical scope (not to mention political constitution) of Lebanon has been extremely discontinuous: from 1516 until 1920 the territories currently constituting the modern republic formed part of the Ottoman Empire, and were regularly redivided into different administrative structures.³

According to Traboulsi (2007, pp. 3-23), the history of modern Lebanon as a polity begins with the Emirate of Mount Lebanon in the 1520s, established following the Ottoman conquest of Syria in 1516. During this period the Druze Ma'an family were appointed *mültezim* (tax-farmers) of the Shouf (the part of the Mount Lebanon range to the south of Beirut). This was a common means employed by the Ottomans for bringing a degree of imperial

¹Population figures are taken from the Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics unless otherwise stated.

²See <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.PRCP.MM> (accessed 15/11/2013).

³The brief synopsis of Lebanese history which follows draws chiefly from Traboulsi (2007) and Salibi (1988). The former follows a more materialist, the latter a more constructivist approach to Lebanon's historical development. More recent works, such as Makdisi (2000) and Weiss (2010), have filled in notable gaps regarding, respectively, European colonial influences and the often over-looked role of the Shia. For the purposes of the current overview however, I consider Traboulsi and Salibi to be adequate guides.

control to mountainous or desert regions. Following the apparent success of the Ma'ans in this task one of their number, Fakhr al-Din, was in around 1590 appointed *Emir* (or *Sanjak-bay*) of the two *sanjaks* of Beirut and Sidon (the latter of which included Mount Kisrawan to the north of Beirut).

This marked the first point when the two mountains were administered under the same authority, and despite the misadventures of Fakhr al-Din (he was exiled to Tuscany before eventually being executed by the Ottomans in 1635),⁴ the Shouf and Kisrawan would become steadily more integrated - particularly as the Druze landlords of the Shouf increasingly encouraged the Maronite Christians of Kisrawan to emigrate to work in the nascent silk industry established by Fakhr al-Din.

However, as Salibi (1988, p. 65) emphasises, it was not until the early decades of the nineteenth century that the whole of the Lebanon range came to be referred to locally as a unity. Following the massacres of 1860 (in which the Druze expelled many Maronites from the Shouf, killing between 900 and 2,000 in the village of Deir al Qamar (Traboulsi, 2007, p. 34)), the European powers intervened to demand a special status for Mount Lebanon, granted by the Sublime Porte in 1861.

For the first time the northern and southern parts of the Lebanon range were integrated into a single, semi-autonomous *mutasarrifiya* (the first subdivision of a *wilaya*, or province); however, the piecemeal nature of Lebanon's integration was demonstrable from the fact that Beirut continued to lie *outside* the borders of the *mutasarrifiya* of Mount Lebanon. Rather, the thriving port became the capital of its own coastal *wilaya* in 1887, stretching to encompass Latakia in the north and Nablus in the south, and yet cut off from these territories by the *mutasarrifiya* which now completely encircled it.

Already the future Lebanese capital was beginning to function as a key site of capitalist integration between Europe and the Syrian hinterland. This tension between Beirut (and in a more general sense the whole of the Lebanese coast) as a site of European (capitalist) exploitation, and the mountains as a site of European (religious) protection, established a division within modern Lebanon between cosmopolitanism and sectarianism that endures to this day, and which continues to find its expression within the very

⁴For an account of the fascinating life of Fakhr al-Din, including his stay in Renaissance Florence, see Gorton (2013).

institutions of the Lebanese state. For example, the (Sunni) Prime Minister's office is located in the former Ottoman *Saray* in the heart of downtown Beirut, while the (Maronite) Presidential Palace is to be found outside of the centre in Ba'abda, formerly part of the old *mutasarrifiya*.⁵

From 1920 (following the defeat of Ottoman Turkey in World War I) Lebanon came under the administration of France thanks to a League of Nations mandate, a position bolstered by secret wartime negotiations with the British formalised in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. In a similar move to British policy in Palestine (where, following the Balfour Declaration, it had become a declared intention of the colonial authorities to create "a homeland for the Jews"), the French set about partitioning Lebanon from Syria, ostensibly in order to protect the minority interests of the local Christian population.

The French decided, however, that the territory of the former *mutasarrifiya* would be insufficient to sustain an independent state, and therefore annexed additional territory to create a "Greater Lebanon". The new territories included not only Beirut and the coastal cities of Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre, but also the Bekaa valley and parts of the Anti-Lebanon range. Indeed, the annexed territories contained a greater population than Mount Lebanon (380,000 to 330,000), including large numbers of Shia and Sunni Muslims who were largely pro-Syrian or pan-Arab in sympathy, as well as greater financial resources than the *mutasarrifiya* - resources which were soon monopolised for the benefit of the Mountain (Traboulsi, 2007, p. 81).

The Republic of Lebanon was thus established in 1926, with a slim Christian majority, and a large number of citizens at best apathetic to their new state, and at worst openly hostile to it. The new republic remained under French tutelage until 1943, when independence was formally declared in the midst of the Second World War. In order to strike an agreement acceptable to all sides however, prior to independence the National Pact was signed. This agreement (which does not carry the force of law) is in effect Lebanon's true constitution, as it doles out positions in the country's administration according to a strict sectarian formula; there are 18 officially recognised

⁵According to the National Pact (Lebanon's informal constitutional agreement for dividing government offices along sectarian lines) the Prime Minister of Lebanon must be a Sunni Muslim (a community typically established in Lebanon's coastal towns), while the President must be a Maronite Christian (a community historically associated with the mountain).

religious communities in Lebanon.⁶

Since then Lebanon has endured mixed fortunes: during the 1950s and 1960s it was a fashionable and wealthy regional entrepôt, functioning as banker to the newly rich oil states of the Gulf. Large inequalities flourished however, and the commanding heights of the economy were controlled by a relatively small clique (*ibid.*, pp. 115-120). Moreover, Lebanon harboured a large, poorly integrated community of Palestinian refugees, who had fled their homeland in 1948, and who lived in camps administered by their own political representation, the PLO. Growing tensions between the PLO and the Maronite-dominated Lebanese administration eventually escalated into a brutal civil war (1975-1990), which split the country in two along largely sectarian lines which ran straight through the middle of the capital, Beirut. Since 1990 Lebanon has technically been at peace with itself; yet it has struggled to establish its autonomy from more powerful neighbours (being occupied by Syria between 1976 and 2005), and has remained riven by sectarian divisions and insecurity.

4.2 The Field Site: Urban Beirut

As already mentioned, Beirut is the capital of Lebanon and by far its largest city, with an official population of around 2 million underestimating the extent to which the coastal and mountain regions surrounding the city are absorbed within its economy.

The city has had an intriguing history. Most likely founded as a settlement in Phoenician times, it achieved prominence from the third century onwards as a (Latin) centre of Roman law, in what remained a predominately Hellenic region.⁷ However, while Beirut's prominent role in the development of the Justinian Code was to have important ramifications in the later history of European jurisprudence, Roman Beirut was largely wiped out by a catastrophic earthquake in 551.

In the centuries that followed (save for an interlude of some 170 years during the crusades) Beirut fell firmly within the orbit of the Islamic world.

⁶For the record, these are: Alawite, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Assyrian, Chaldean (Catholic), Coptic, Druze, Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Isma'ili, Jewish, Latin Catholic, Maronite, Protestant, Sunni, Shia, Syriac Catholic, and Syriac Orthodox.

⁷The establishment of the Roman colony of Berytus (either in 27 BC or by Agrippa in 14 BC with veterans from the Second Triumvirate Wars) gave the city a special status in Roman Syria under the *ius italicum*. See Kassir (2010, pp. 42-55).

While no longer playing so important a political role, Beirut nonetheless seems to have maintained its strategic importance as both a trading post and shipyard. Under the Ottomans it initially held a subsidiary role to Sidon as the principle Damascene port, yet in the nineteenth century the city's population exploded (from between 4,000-6,000 to more than 100,000) as port activity flourished and Beirut became the principle port of Syria.

Beirut's unexpected transformation was a strange (and perhaps fated) echo of its Roman origins, as the modern coastal city became the key site of European economic and cultural penetration of the Arab world. The construction of a new port by Ibrahim Pasha (son of Muhammad 'Ali, ruler of Egypt) during that dynasty's brief period of suzerainty (1831-1841) certainly helped matters, as did Beirut's later promotion to capital of the *wilaya* of Sidon in 1842. Beirut was also chosen (alongside Bursa and Adrianople) as a 'model city' by the Ottoman administration during the Tanzimat reforms (Hanssen, 2005, p. 33-34).

Yet of equal importance were the various missions which accompanied the West's economic expansion in the region. Beirut was chosen as the site for both the first Protestant and Catholic universities in the Middle East, with the Syrian Protestant College (later the American University of Beirut) founded in 1866, and the Université Saint-Joseph opening nine years later under the joint auspices of France and the Holy See. These two seats of higher learning were in addition to the dozens of smaller mission schools which opened in the same period, and which were to result in the Lebanese bourgeoisie's famous trilingualism and which - in the thesis of Antonius (1938) - contributed greatly to the broader cultural and political renaissance in the Arab world in the late 19th century.

Beirut was to change still further in the 20th century. Not only did its position as capital of the new Lebanese Republic attract waves of substantial urban migration, but the city would also find its communal structure significantly transformed. While historically home to large communities of Sunni Muslim and Greek Orthodox, with smaller numbers of Maronite and Druze, both the Armenian Genocide during WWI and the Arab defeat in 1948 were to create large new communities of Armenian and Palestinian refugees. Added to these were large numbers of Shia Muslims migrating to Beirut from the south and the Bekaa to work in the new industries which sprang up after WWII. By the 1960s these different communities - living

in both camps and suburbs - had formed a ‘poverty belt’ of some 400,000 inhabitants (of a population of around one million) which ringed the city (Traboulsi, 2007, p. 161).

The growing contradictions of Lebanon’s liberal, open markets controlled by a powerful elite and the relative poverty of the rest of the population became increasingly difficult to reconcile in the run-up to the civil war. As Traboulsi notes, “while successive waves of migrants from the rural areas crammed into shantytowns and squats and ravaged entire suburbs”, Beirut also contained no fewer than 40-50,000 empty luxury apartments - the product of rampant speculation from Gulf sheikhs and wealthy émigrés (*ibid.*, p. 160).

When it came in 1975, the civil war would see the relatively mixed sectarian geography of the city divided firmly into Christian east and Muslim west, with much of the historic centre falling along the infamous ‘green line’ between the two. The degree of destruction and disorganisation created by the war was substantial, and its effects are still very much visible to this day. The two urban hubs of Hamra to the west and Ashrafieh to the east continue to display the vivid signs of unregulated expansion encouraged by the war years, while the redeveloped ‘Beirut Central District’ (BCD, often simply called ‘Solidere’ after the private company charged with redeveloping it) contains all the hallmarks of empty luxury which marked pre-war Beirut, except to a vastly greater extent. The southern suburbs (often referred to as *ḍaḥīyeh*, a word meaning simply ‘suburb’ in Arabic) have meanwhile become the tightly-controlled strongholds of the (armed) Shia political movements *Hezbollah* and *Amal*.

4.3 Socio-demographic Characteristics: the Structure of Inequality

Data on Lebanon are notoriously poor;⁸ official government statistics are unreliable, private polling companies often use suspect methodology, and

⁸As one respondent (a research officer in an anti-corruption NGO) described the situation: “the figures in Lebanon are really points of view”. In his opinion, the Lebanese government’s statistics agency has been “sabotaged” by vested interests - “like many of the public administrations it’s over-staffed where you don’t need staff and it’s very seriously under-staffed where you need the staff. And this is done to the benefit of the private sector, which is the same as the people who own, who are, the government.”

datasets generated by NGOs and international agencies (such as the United Nations) tend to lack the necessary detail to draw precise conclusions. Data presented here have thus been chosen for primarily illustrative purposes, and clearly erroneous data have been rejected. I have also tried, where possible, to present data from a number of different sources, in the hope that the general trend may be better discerned, and individual errors more easily compensated for.

At first glance, and particularly in comparison with its neighbours, Lebanon seems relatively prosperous. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), GDP per capita at purchasing power parity is US\$15,986 (World Economic Outlook, 2012). This compares favourably with Egypt (US\$6,594), Jordan (US\$6,002), and Syria (US\$5,041, 2010 figures). Lebanon also scores relatively highly in human development indicators, with a score of 0.745 in the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index (HDI) for 2012, putting it in 72nd place overall. Lebanon's score is well above the global average (0.694), which is itself above the Arab average (0.652), and falls only slightly below the standard for high human development (0.758).

In subjective terms, the Lebanese also seem to have a relatively evenly distributed class structure (table 4.1). As the figures (taken from a UNDP study) show, in Lebanon as a whole around two-thirds of the population define themselves as either "middle class" or "middle class to poor", with around a quarter defining themselves as poor, and around 5% placing themselves at either extreme ("financially comfortable" or "hopeless"). Within Beirut there is a significantly larger percentage defining themselves as "middle class" (almost half of the sample), and fewer defining themselves as "poor". The subjective figures for Beirut seem to be supported by the UNDP's own objective findings, which recorded a "very low prevalence of extreme poverty (below 2%) and overall poverty (5% to 8%)" in the capital, as opposed to high levels of poverty in the south and north (UNDP, 2007, p. 47).

While the statistics seem to demonstrate that Lebanon is a relatively wealthy nation, with high levels of human development and (in Beirut at least) comparatively low levels of poverty, closer examination of the data reveals high degrees of inequality. As the UNDP's figures illustrate (figure 4.1), consumption in Lebanon is heavily skewed toward the top two deciles,

Table 4.1: Lebanese Citizens' Subjective Class

	Lebanon	Beirut	(difference)
Financially comfortable	4.78%	5.07%	+0.29
Middle class	31.21%	44.79%	+13.58
Middle class to Poor	33.84%	34.02%	+0.18
Poor	24.93%	11.85%	-13.08
Hopeless	5.24%	4.27%	-0.97

Source: UNDP ([ibid.](#), p. 23)

which account for 43.55% of total expenditures. Indeed, the UNDP most likely *underestimates* the extent of economic inequality within Lebanon, as its findings are based on a combination of its own survey data and government household budget data. Such methods (reliability aside) are poor at capturing extreme concentrations of wealth, a fact well illustrated by the UNDP's estimates of the GINI coefficient in Lebanon. At only 0.361 for all Lebanon (0.341 for Beirut),⁹ the UNDP found inequality in Lebanon to be "comparable to other middle-income countries", and "much lower" than Latin America ([ibid.](#), p. 43).


However, the UNDP based its GINI measurement on per capita *consumption* at average national prices.¹⁰ Regardless of reliability of data, such a method accounts neither for inequalities in *income* nor *wealth*. A better measurement of the long-term structure of economic inequality can be garnered from a GINI coefficient extrapolated from this latter category.¹¹ *Credit Suisse*, a financial services company, publishes a report on patterns of global wealth every year through its research arm. The GINI coefficient produced by *Credit Suisse* is designed precisely to capture those instances of extreme concentrations of wealth which are otherwise missed by panel surveys. In the two most recent reports (2012 and 2013), Lebanon's GINI ranks (respectively) as the 5th and 4th highest in the world, at 0.857 (2012)

⁹See UNDP (2007, p. 44). The GINI coefficient is a measure of inequality, with 1 representing perfect inequality, and 0 perfect equality.

¹⁰It is interesting to note that the usual sources for comparative GINI figures (such as the World Bank) do not contain entries for Lebanon.

¹¹The advantage of using wealth over income for deriving a GINI coefficient is not merely that it accounts for the accumulated assets of individuals and families, but that it also better captures the extent of economic capture by the extremely rich, whose nominal income from year to year may, by comparison, be relatively small.

Figure 4.1: Distribution of Consumption in Lebanon (2004-2005)



Source: UNDP ([ibid.](#), p. 109)

and 0.863 (2013).¹² In either year the only nations to score higher are the off-shore tax havens of Belize and St. Kitts and Nevis, and the former Soviet republics of Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In data extrapolated from the *Credit Suisse* findings, Lebanese business magazine *Executive* estimated that 48% of Lebanon's private wealth of \$91bn is held by 0.3% of the population (8,900 individuals),¹³ a disparity further emphasised by the difference between mean wealth per adult (\$30,868 in 2013) and median wealth per adult (\$6,076).

As well as extreme inequalities in wealth, Lebanese society also demonstrates extremely low levels of social mobility. While objective data on social mobility in Lebanon are nonexistent, Panizza and El-Khoury (2001) have

¹²See Credit Suisse Research Institute (2012, pp. 93-97) and Credit Suisse Research Institute (2013, pp. 98-102).

¹³See <http://www.executive-magazine.com/millionaires-own-half-lebanese-wealth/> (accessed 15/11/2013). The *Executive* findings are a further argument against using panel data to derive GINI coefficients: almost half of Lebanon's wealth would appear to be concentrated in a percentage of the population so small it would not be captured by normal confidence intervals under assumptions of regular distribution. Such a concentration of wealth is further supported by analysis of Lebanese bank deposits, where half of accumulated bank deposits (\$62bn) are concentrated in 0.8% of accounts (fewer than 500). See <http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/how-lebanese-banks-are-getting-rich-citizens-expense> (accessed 10/07/2014).

applied a proxy developed by Dahan and Gaviria (2001)¹⁴ to the Lebanese Population and Housing Survey conducted between 1994 and 1996 to develop an estimate. Their results showed that social mobility in Lebanon was “similar to the levels of the most unequal Latin American countries” (Panizza and El-Khoury, 2001, p. 16), and almost three times as high as the US (*ibid.*, p. 12), with 55% of the variance in socioeconomic failure explainable by household-specific factors.¹⁵ They also found that mobility is highly dependent on economic status, with poor households having “extremely low levels of social mobility”, and rich households having levels of social mobility comparable to those in the US (*ibid.*, p. 13).¹⁶

The extreme extent to which wealth and opportunity in Lebanon has apparently been captured by a narrow elite is one of the principle objective criteria making Beirut such a compelling case study for *clandestine circulation*. In countries with a high incidence of poverty it is by no means unusual to see relatively small elites place themselves in rent-capturing positions. However, what is especially intriguing about Lebanon (and specifically Beirut, where Lebanese economic activity is to a large extent concentrated) is the degree to which wealth has been captured in a highly developed, ostensibly democratic society with a relatively large middle class. Neither has the country’s prolonged civil war affected matters (war being, according to the recent thesis of Piketty (2014), one of the chief mechanisms for leveling inequalities in wealth). Indeed, when Lebanon is compared to nearby countries of a similar size and level of human development, the contrast is particularly stark: according to *Credit Suisse* (2013) Georgia, which has a population of 3.2 million and a HDI score the same as Lebanon (0.745 in 2012) has a wealth-derived GINI of 0.680; while Jordan (population 3.9m, HDI 0.700) has a GINI of 0.659.¹⁷

¹⁴The index is based on intergenerational schooling mobility, and enables social mobility to be estimated without needing to rely on longitudinal data.

¹⁵It should be noted that Panizza and El Khoury designed their dataset to examine variations in social mobility between different religious groups, and hence excluded data from Beirut (which did not contain disaggregated data). However, their results controlled for urban/rural areas, and did not find any difference in social mobility between the two.

¹⁶Panizza and El-Khoury (2001) use an index of social mobility - P - originally derived from Robinson (1950), as corrected by Kremer and Maskin (1996), which gives a value of between 0 and 1, with a higher value indicating family background plays a more important role. Lebanon scored 0.55, well above the Latin American average of 0.49, and 0.20 for the US (Panizza and El-Khoury, 2001, p. 10-12).

¹⁷It is worth including the World Bank GINI figures of both for purposes of comparison with the *Credit Suisse* figures. The World Bank GINI coefficient is derived primarily from

Whatever the mechanisms which have enabled the Lebanese elite to place themselves in such successful rent-capturing positions, they have not been overcome by economic, educational, or political development, but rather appear more entrenched than ever. Indeed, the only counterparts to the Lebanese kleptocracy seem to be either the post-Soviet oligarchies of Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, or tax-haven enclaves of the global elite such as Belize and St. Kitts and Nevis. As we shall see, the former cases in particular share further affinities with Lebanon, not least in *blat*-like practices which follow a similar logic to Lebanese *wasta*.

However, this is not to suggest that extreme wealth capture should be considered as the dependent variable of this thesis; rather, I consider the extreme concentration of wealth and opportunity within Lebanon to be merely the most visible symptom of a complex of inequalities, the production and reproduction of which can be best captured through the paradigm of *clandestine circulation*.

4.4 Social Insecurity: Corruption, Clientelism and *Wasta*

The last, and strongest, justification for choosing Lebanon concerns the well-noted prevalence of corruption, clientelism, cronyism and nepotism, all of which seem to be instrumental in reproducing the particular structure of inequality noted above, and which contribute to a social fabric in which the public interest is notable chiefly by its absence.

Table 4.2 compares perceptions of corruption in Lebanon with nearby Jordan,¹⁸ a fellow Levantine Arab nation which - as mentioned previously - shares a similar level of human development and population to Lebanon, but has a GDP per capita almost one-third the size. The results demonstrate a stark contrast: whereas only 12% of Jordanians surveyed considered corruption to have increased “a lot” in the previous two years, in Lebanon the figure was 61%; 71% of Lebanese surveyed considered public sector corruption to

household survey data, and is based upon “income or consumption” as opposed to wealth, leaving it open to the same criticisms as the UNDP data. The latest figure for Georgia is 0.413 (2008), and for Jordan 0.354 (2010). See <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI> (accessed 15/11/2013).

¹⁸Data available at <http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=lebanon> and <http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=jordan> (accessed 21/05/2014); sample = 1,000 for each country.

Table 4.2: Comparing Corruption in Lebanon and Jordan (2013, %)

		- -	-	-/+	+	++
Overall Level ^a	Leb	2	3	10	24	61
	Jor	5	13	44	27	12
Public Sector ^b	Leb	1	1	5	22	71
	Jor	4	10	25	31	30
State Capture ^c	Leb	1	3	7	39	50
	Jor	6	24	37	28	5
Anti-Corruption ^d	Leb	1	11	11	29	48
	Jor	7	21	22	31	19

^a“Over the past two years, has the level of corruption in this country/territory changed?” decreased a lot; decreased a little; stayed the same; increased a little; increased a lot

^b“To what extent do you think corruption is a problem in the public sector in this country/territory?” not a problem at all; not really a problem; a slight problem; a problem; a serious problem

^c“To what extent is this government run by a few big entities acting in their own best interests?” not at all; limited extent; somewhat; large extent; entirely

^d“How effective do you think your government’s actions are in the fight against corruption?” very effective; effective; neither effective nor ineffective; ineffective; very ineffective

(Source: Transparency International)

be “a serious problem”, against 30% in Jordan; 89% of Lebanese considered their government to have been captured either “entirely” or to a “large extent” by vested interests, against 33% in Jordan; and 77% of Lebanese considered government anti-corruption strategies to be either “very ineffective” or “ineffective”, against 50% in Jordan.

The same survey also attempted to disaggregate perceptions of corruption according to individual institutions; in Lebanon, however, lack of faith in public institutions appears to be relatively uniform: the ‘best’ scoring institutions were the military and NGOs, which ‘only’ 63% of respondents considered to be either corrupt or extremely corrupt; by contrast, 69% considered the judiciary to be corrupt or extremely corrupt, and 68% political parties and parliament. Public servants (68%), doctors and health professionals (68%) and the education system (67%) did not escape censure, while even religious bodies were considered corrupt by 65% of respondents.

Comparing these scores with Tunisia,¹⁹ we find a much greater contrast across institutions: only 14% of Tunisians believe the military to be corrupt, rising to 33% for NGOs and health workers, 40% for parliament, 49% for civil servants, and 56% for the judiciary. Indeed, the only public institution in Tunisia to score higher in terms of perceptions of corruption than its Lebanese counterpart is the police force (69% to 65%) - hardly surprising considering the role of the police in attempting to suppress the Tunisian revolution in 2010/11.

This generalised lack of trust in Lebanon's public institutions sits alongside a more widespread sense of insecurity. When interviewing young people from three low-income communities about their perceptions of trust, Khawaja et al. (2006, p. 1310) discovered that 86% agreed with the statement "one must be vigilant and cautious when dealing with people", with a significantly *higher* percentage in the predominantly Lebanese neighbourhoods of Hay el Sellom and Naba'a (92.9% and 95.7% respectively) than the Palestinian neighbourhood of Burj el Barajneh (72%).

These figures are supported by Hanf (2007, p. 7), who noted that distrust in general in Lebanon had risen from 78% in 2002 to 84% in 2006, with no statistically significant differences across religious communities.²⁰ By contrast, Hanf noted that, over the same period, "the increase in trust in members of the same religious community is nothing less than spectacular", with the figure jumping from 20% in 2002 to 41% in 2006 (*ibid.*, p. 8).

This return to sectarian solidarity is also observed by Yassin (2012), who found in focus groups held with young Beirutis that "symbolic boundaries" between sects were substantial, and frequently predicated on anxiety and fear. A closer analysis of the statistics in Khawaja et al. (2006) seems to bear out a similar conclusion: nearly all measures of trust were higher in Burj el Barajneh than Hay el Sellom and Naba'a. As Khawaja et al. (*ibid.*, p. 1312) note, such higher levels of solidarity (despite higher relative deprivation in the Palestinian community) "might be a direct result of experiencing economic and political exclusion in the mainstream Lebanese society". By

¹⁹None were available for Jordan, and Tunisia represents the next best regional comparison in terms of population size, economy and human development. Figures for Tunisia may be found online at <http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=tunisia> (accessed 21/05/2014).

²⁰Hanf's precise question was "You should always be careful. You cannot trust the people you live or work with."

contrast, the more homogenous sectarian profile of Hay el Sellom (“99.9% Muslim” according to Khawaja et. al.) compared with Naba’a (“77% Christian”) may explain why levels of trust in the former were generally higher than the latter.²¹

At the qualitative level Das and Davidson (2011, pp. 323-332) discovered a similar situation in the mixed neighbourhood of Karm el Zeitoun.²² They reported that “perceptions regarding social connectedness within the community vary quite significantly”, with older residents in particular comparing the current situation negatively with that existing prior to the war. As one resident noted: “The neighbours were better before. [Now] people talk a lot about each other and I don’t like this.” Similarly, a female from the minority Muslim community claimed that, despite there being “no racism”, nonetheless “you can’t depend on your neighbours for help. They stand and look at each other.” In general, Das and Davidson noted that “the social capital²³ that residents have tends to come from smaller geographically defined areas within Karm el Zeitoun”, compared with a “lack of strong relationships on a wider community level”.

Rising perceptions of corruption, falling levels of generalised trust, and an apparent retreat to sectarian solidarity appear to be symptoms of a much broader sense of alienation within Lebanese society, further manifested in the decline of civic values of coexistence and in the physical deterioration of public space. Khalaf (2012, p. 139-143), for example, discusses at some length Lebanon’s current ‘anomie’ which, following Durkheim, he defines as “a social state in which society’s norms can no longer impose effective control over people’s impulses”, and in which the Lebanese “rather than being released from their prewar excesses, have discovered insatiable desires for extravagant consumerism, acquisitiveness and longing for immoderate forms of leisure and sterile recreation” (*ibid.*, p. 139-140). Khalaf notes that -

Even the ordinary courtesies and decencies, a modicum of attention to the needs and expectations of others, are overlooked, often with callous indifference [...] Queuing for one’s turn, waiting

²¹38.8% of respondents in Naba’a claimed they could trust “no-one”, as against 26.7% in Hay el Sellom (Khawaja et al., 2006, p. 1310).

²²Found in east Beirut and more or less adjacent to Naba’a.

²³In the Putnam sense.

in line, geniality, showing some deference to those in need of assistance, are all readily neglected [...] Reckless driving, strident and boisterous street conduct, deafening car horns, excessive smoking and littering in public spaces and the violation of ordinances regulating public hygiene and civil conduct are much too apparent. They are also committed with much bravado, swaggering display of defiance and vain machismo. (Khalaf, 2012, p. 139-140)

While something of a Jeremiad, Khalaf's observations are to a large extent echoed by Seidman (2012), who in his description of the neighbourhood of Hamra describes a "crippling civic indifference and paranoia" (*ibid.*, p. 12) - an "almost studied indifference to others", which seems the antithesis of the 'civil inattention' theorised by Goffman (1963) to describe civic coexistence in mid-century USA. Similarly Yassin (2012, p. 216) concludes that young Lebanese live in a state of "coexistence without empathy", restricting their social trust to "a small circle of relatives and close friends", and confining their social mixing to 'banal' spaces which carry little meaning beyond their primary function of "shopping, leisure or work" (*ibid.*, p. 212).

The spatial and topographical effects of Lebanon's 'anomie' - briefly touched on here by Yassin - are quite profound and extensive, and certainly represent the most visible aspect of the country's current predicament. Seidman, for instance, notes how in Hamra "A cityscape dotted with empty lots, deserted squares, abandoned buildings, vacated galleries and cinemas, and the commercialization of almost all common areas underscores a deteriorating public space" -

Sidewalks suddenly break off, forcing pedestrians to walk on the street or a dirt walkway [...] Many streets lack any green space [...] there are no traffic lights, and while there are stop signs, no one obeys them. Cars routinely ignore one-way directional traffic rules; motor scooters and motorcycles freely move between crowded streets and sidewalks; parking space is expanded by using sidewalks [...] (Seidman, 2012, p. 9)

Environmental degradation and the widespread ineffectiveness of planning regulations have also been a recurring theme in Khalaf's research;²⁴

²⁴See for example Khalaf and Kongstad, 1973; Khalaf, 1985; Khalaf, 1993. In *Lebanon's*

however, these effects are by no means consistent across Beirut's urban environment. Rather, recent research from Fawaz, 2009a; Fawaz, 2009b, Krijnen and Fawaz (2010), and Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh (2012) has analysed how broader inequalities in power are deeply implicated in the production of space in contemporary Beirut.

In particular, the 'informalization' of decision-making, coupled with the relative absence of the state in regulating construction, has benefitted capital at the expense of the general population. For instance, in the informal settlement of Hayy el Sellom, Fawaz (2009a, p. 101-102) noted that, despite severe problems relating to structural soundness and the failure of developers to meet contractual obligations, only eight cases had been brought to court in a complex of 1,500 housing units - and indeed, all of the eight cases were raised by absentee landlords (rather than residents), many of whom lived abroad.

By contrast, Krijnen and Fawaz (2010) have noted how, in the case of high-end developments (which can command a price of up to \$10,000 per square metre), not only were new regulations such as the 2004 Building Law "drafted by a handful of developers" (*ibid.*, p. 123), but exemptions pushed through in the 1990s to promote investment meant that local municipalities seldom had a say in the issuing of building permits for such developments (*ibid.*, p. 123-124).

The result is an even more pronounced discrepancy than that noted by Traboulsi, between, on the one hand, the (largely empty) "high-end" developments of global capital, and on the other, the over-crowded, often poorly-maintained and under-serviced neighbourhoods of the general population. The clearest expression of the former is found in Solidere, where the complete liquidation of prior holdings (and their conversion into corporate stock) has created a satellite of global capital in the middle of the city: a privatised space where development is carried out under a separate legal framework to the rest of Beirut, and where public order is monitored by private security contractors.

Beyond Solidere, by contrast, Beirut's neighbourhoods tend to remain divided between the varying sectarian militias - save for isolated islands of

Predicament, Khalaf claims that not more than 7% of Lebanese built environment has been constructed according to predetermined physical planning (Khalaf, 1987, p. 235), while his reflections on pre-war planning are a useful rejoinder to anyone who might consider the current situation to be purely a product of the civil war (Khalaf, 1993, pp. 18-18).

state security around government institutions or the homes of prominent politicians.²⁵ Unlike Solidere, these spaces remain under the hold of pre-existing planning, tenancy and inheritance laws, the unequal application of which conspires to create an urban landscape of extreme paradox: crumbling tenements from the 1920s and 1930s are wedged between vacant lots and 20+ storey condominiums of dubious legal provenance.

Alongside “old rent” (which can, like rent control in New York, be passed down through generations), the issue of Lebanon’s complicated inheritance laws means that ownership of some older properties in these neighbourhoods may be divided among dozens of heirs spread throughout the world, with no resolution (and hence repair or redevelopment) possible without a joint agreement. Court cases concerning such properties - i.e. abandoned, with multiple owners, or involving “old rent” - may typically drag on for years without resolution, while the perceived absence of order and structure within state institutions requires applicants either to accept the deadlock or resort to alternative measures.

In all such cases involving interactions with the state or society in general, the principal which makes the ultimate difference - that is, between an individual’s opportunities and his or her ability to capitalise on them - is *wasta*. Much more so than the formal rules of the state (which may be at best obscure and at worst used as an active barrier), *wasta* becomes the etiquette necessary to successfully resolve difficulties.

For instance, in the struggle between landlord and tenant under the “old rent” system, each side may resort to various tricks to try to gain an advantage. In the case of one tenant in the neighbourhood of Gemmayze,²⁶ an attempt by the landlord to buy out and redevelop the property was apparently foiled through a *wasta* in the Ministry of Culture. Despite many much older buildings in the neighbourhood being bulldozed every year to make way for new condominiums, the Ministry of Culture designated this

²⁵For a geographical representation of Beirut’s various “security zones” see Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh (2012, p. 178). One might further add that, alongside the dubious legal status of militias and private security firms, unlicensed ‘private valet’ companies have also sprung up in Beirut’s popular nightlife destinations. Often having the appearance of a legitimate operation, including uniformed staff, these companies essentially commandeer the street and extort protection money from drivers to use public parking spaces. See chapter 7 on the *qabaday* phenomenon.

²⁶A predominately Christian neighbourhood bordering the east of BCD, and which falls outside of the remit of Solidere.

particular house a protected building, preventing any work from being carried out on it, and granting the tenant an effective stay of execution on his lease.²⁷

Landlords, by contrast, may often resort to vandalising their own properties: blocking drains or sabotaging power supplies in an attempt to force out the legal tenants. Alternatively, one sure way of obtaining a resolution is to offer the tenants a share of the proceeds from the sale of the land for redevelopment; in such instances, delay typically revolves around haggling over the precise share of the proceeds. At any stage of the process, either side may seek recourse to *wasta*: either in the form of social contacts (a stock of capital deriving from personal prestige which an individual may attempt, more or less successfully, to mobilise on his own or another's behalf) or, in a more transparently 'corrupt' manner, a paid 'go-between' or 'fixer', whose role it is to 'get things done', to free up the sclerotic bureaucratic machinery.

This tendency for power relations predicated on the unequal distribution of *wasta* to determine outcomes - as opposed to the legal specification of such relations as defined by the state - penetrates almost all aspects of Lebanese society, and has enabled massive predation by the Lebanese elite. In his recent work on corruption in the Lebanese state, Leenders (2012) - while not directly referring to such practices as *wasta* - describes extensive corruption, bribery, fraud and cronyism in, among others, the health sector (including the importing of forged pharmaceuticals), the management of publicly-owned corporations such as Middle East Airlines and the Port of Beirut, the energy sector (specifically price-fixing through importers cartels), quarrying, and reconstruction and development (including the awarding of contracts for road works and waste management, and most significantly in the setting up of Solidere and the Council for Development and Reconstruction).

In common with much other recent research, Leenders has understandably tended to focus on the legacy of the civil war, the consequent breakdown of the Lebanese state, and the post-Ta'if political settlement in explaining such outcomes;²⁸ however, older research, as well as more recent historically-

²⁷Interview 12/2.

²⁸As well as the aforementioned *Spoils of Truce* see also Leenders, 2004c; Leenders, 2004a; Leenders, 2004b, as well as Gebara (2007). See Hamdan (2012) for a recent overview of the state of the Ta'if settlement.

minded reviews, have demonstrated that such problems also long pre-dated the war. For instance Khalaf (1968), Farsoun (1970), Johnson (1986) and Hamzeh (2001) demonstrated the historical dimensions (and extensiveness) of Lebanese clientelism, while Traboulsi (2007, pp. 115-119) makes it clear that nepotism and cronyism were defining characteristics of the early development of the Lebanese state. Furthermore Makdisi (1996, p. 26), Dib (2004, p. 290) and, most recently Baumann (2012, p. 134), have all noted how post-war trends in political leadership all tended ultimately to revert back to the “politics of the past”, in Makdisi’s words.

In light of these various factors, Lebanon presents an ideal case for in-depth analysis of clandestine circulation, and for addressing in an empirical context a number of the research questions outlined in the previous chapter. Before this, however, we turn to the theoretical model which will guide such analysis.

Part II

Theoretical Outline

The more the official transmission of capital is prevented or hindered, the more the effects of the clandestine circulation of capital [...] become determinant in the reproduction of the social structure.

Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital

Overview

This outline attempts to define a theory of clandestine circulation, and how it may function as a mode of reproduction of the social structure in opposition to the official perspective of the modern state. In particular, it seeks to explain the *conditions* in which clandestine circulation may emerge, and how it operates in practice at the level of objective and embodied structures (social space and habitus).

The outline is thus divided into two chapters: the first (following Bourdieusian praxeology) deals with objective structures, and traces the particular genesis of social space necessary for clandestine circulation to emerge, and the effect of different configurations on the potential for clandestine circulation. The second chapter then looks at embodied structures: in particular, how specific mechanisms of clandestine circulation manifest themselves in agents' reproduction strategies, and how they operate at the level of habitus to transform and accumulate different capitals.

The first chapter begins by introducing a break with “state thought” (Bourdieu, 1999) - that is, with accounts of practice predicated upon principles of vision and division (such as corruption) which form part of the categories of perception through which the state constitutes the social world. Rather than thinking like the state, one must instead treat the state as a social object, and seek to theorise its effects as arbitrary, historically contingent factors structuring social space.

This process involves reconstituting the genesis of the state (in terms both of objective and subjective structures) as a *historical trajectory of the legitimate, dominant capital structure*. In the Western context, it is argued that this trajectory can be understood according to Bourdieu's distinction between the different forms of capital: the Western *state effect* moves from a mode of domination predicated upon mechanisms for the reproduction of embodied capitals (‘the King's House’), to one predicated upon mechanisms

for the reproduction of objectified and institutionalised capitals ('the Reason of State'), while the dominant guise of capital moves from social to cultural. By expressing this trajectory as a dimension within social space, it becomes possible to specify the *state effect* as a contingent structuring factor which, in conjunction with transformations to the field of power, determines the likelihood (and form) of clandestine circulation to emerge as a mode of reproduction.

The second theoretical chapter analyses clandestine circulation at the level of practice - specifically as manifested through agents' *reproduction strategies*. The chapter attempts to theorise the different forms of clandestine circulation which may emerge, the factors limiting such circulation, and the variable appropriation such circulation may entail (hence having the potential effect of reproducing the given structure of inequality in a social space). To assist in this task, three instances of clandestine circulation are analysed: *blat*, *guanxi* and *wasta*.

The chapter continues by relating clandestine circulation to Bourdieu's conceptualisation of a *general science of the economy of practices*, in which the total labour required to convert capitals is a product of the symbolic force associated with them. Not only does this wider economism constitute a structuring principle of clandestine circulation, it also enables such practices as constitute clandestine circulation to be linked to the broader structure of social space, through the dispositions embodied in agents' habitus.

The chapter concludes by discussing the complexity of the second-order effects produced by clandestine circulation, in the sense of variations in agents' subjective misrecognition of such practices, and the implications of such effects on empirical analysis in the field.

Chapter 5

The Genesis of Clandestine Circulation

5.1 From “State Thought” to the *State Effect*

Any analysis which seeks to incorporate, as part of its object, effects relating to the modern state, must begin by acknowledging that many of the analytical categories associated with such analysis are themselves the product of what Bourdieu termed “state thought” (Bourdieu, 1999). That is, when dealing with the state, we are dealing with an object which stands a good chance of having produced the very structures of consciousness through which we perceive it (Bourdieu, 2012, p. 13).

One sees most clearly the effects of this process in the construction (in the form of research objects) of those practices most antithetical to the logic of the state. As we have seen, modern definitions of corruption (such as Nye’s public office, or Friedrich’s public interest) differ substantially from their classical antecedents. Whereas for Aristotle corruption could only be understood in terms of the degeneration of a complete political system, in modern definitions the state stands above corruption as, (in Bourdieu’s words) Leibniz’s God - “*qu’il est le lieu géométrique de toutes les perspectives antagonistes*” (ibid., p. 16).¹

¹ “*who is the geometric locus of all antagonistic perspectives*” (author’s translation). In Bourdieu (1989, p. 22) it is translated “the geometral locus of all perspectives”. In their recent intellectual history of political corruption Buchan and Hill (2014) dispute that the difference between the two conceptions (degeneration and public office) represents a historical ‘shift’, but is rather an ‘oscillation’, with even ancient definitions of corruption including an understanding of the subversion of public office for private gain. However, even Buchan and Hill conclude that these two conceptions became definitively separated

Even the language typically used to describe the state betrays the legacy of this process. For when we speak of ‘the state’, we should not mean anything other than the sum total of agents charged with perceiving the state, whose perceptions have been formed through the institutions of the state, and who struggle over the means to obtain an advantage within those institutions. The language of the state however is both singular and deterministic. As Bourdieu noted, it encourages the structural functionalism of a Parsons, or the “*fonctionnalisme du pire*” of an Althusser, where the state is either *deus* or *diabolus in machina*, executing its will through a conscious voluntarism (Bourdieu, 2012, p. 18).

However, to overcome such a legacy requires an instrument of analysis able to objectify the state, and to chart its genesis in both objective and subjective structures. As Hay and Lister (2006, p. 14) observe - “[...] if theorists of the state are not to reproduce its mythology, they must give rather more attention to the processes through which the state is conceived of on the one hand, and the relationship between such conceptions and the institutions, processes and practices of the state on the other.” To put it another way, analysis of the state must recognise that -

“If the state is able to exert symbolic violence, it is because it incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity, in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought. (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 40)

What is thus required is a means of distinguishing “state thought” (the contingent and arbitrary principles of vision and division embodied in habitus that have emerged through the state’s historical genesis), from what we might call the *state effect* - the contingent, arbitrary manner in which ‘that thing we call the state’ (to borrow from Bourdieu) structures a given social space.²

The first step in this process of objectivisation is to recognise that “state thought” - as a system of classification of the social world - operates through

by the end of the 18th century, with the individual subversion of a public office for private gain viewed as distinct from the (moral) degeneration of an entire political system - a development which surely confirms the present argument (Buchan and Hill, 2014, pp. 170-171).

²This use of the term “state effect” should not be confused with that of Mitchell (1991), whose meaning is rather closer to Bourdieu’s definition of “state thought”.

the production of a practical taxonomy (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 118) which, in the Western context at least, tends to distinguish social practice according to its relation to what Bourdieu described as “the interest in disinterest” (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 35-63). This ‘paradoxical’ interest in a general, rather than specific, good may be considered equivalent to Friedrich’s definition of the “public interest”, and, in the study of clientelism, to Graziano’s conception of the legitimate authority emerging from the institutionalisation of indirect (as opposed to direct) exchange, or the ‘generalised’ interest described by Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980).

In accordance with this taxonomy, practices may be legal or illegal, depending on whether they conform to the laws of the state; the economy may be formal or informal, depending on whether it is measured and taxed by the state; and that which is ‘good’ may be either public or private - the social appropriateness of each being confined to those parts of social space defined as either interior or exterior to the state.

What such a taxonomy produces, in the sense of an ordered system for interpreting the social world, is the very first thing which must be overcome in order to succeed in an objective analysis of precisely those practices which *go against* that ordered system. The nature of the challenge is perhaps best grasped by de Sousa Santos’ conception of “abyssal lines” -

Modern Western thinking is an abyssal thinking. It consists of a system of visible and invisible distinctions, the invisible ones being the foundation of the visible ones. The invisible distinctions are established through radical lines that divide social reality into two realms, the realm of “this side of the line” and the realm of “the other side of the line.” The division is such that “the other side of the line” vanishes as reality, becomes nonexistent, and is indeed produced as nonexistent. (Santos, 2007, p. 1-2)

Many of the state’s most significant effects (in the sense of arbitrary, contingent outcomes which could not exist *without* the state, however we choose to define it) are, owing to the system of classification produced through “state thought”, frequently placed on the other side of such an “abyssal line”, and seen instead as an *absence* of the state. Wacquant (2008), for example, has demonstrated how the black ghetto of Chicago - a product of state planning policy - reproduces a form of inequality which is instead

(mis)recognised as the ‘fault’ of the people living there. In the same way, explanations predicated on state ‘weakness’ typically take for granted assumptions of state *strength* themselves derived from the perspective of the state - that is, of what the state would have itself be.³ The possibility that those malaises most firmly embedded within a society may require, for their reproduction, effects deriving from the state - and hence, indicating in a sociological sense a ‘strong’ state - is, through the practical taxonomy of “state thought”, rendered ‘unthinkable’.

Unveiling the abyssal lines which constitute “state thought” (what Bourdieu would describe as its *doxa*, and what Anders and Nuijten (2007, p. 11) described as the “hidden continuities between the law and its opposite”) is however insufficient. Rather, what must be unveiled is the genesis of those objective structures responsible for enabling the state to have *effects* (objective and subjective) in the first place - including, as one element of those effects, the production of “state thought”. This ‘new way of thinking’ (as Wittgenstein says) will then enable us to shift our analysis from corruption (a product of state thought), to the clandestine circulation of capital - a product of the *state effect*.

5.2 Bourdieu and the Genesis of the State

According to Bourdieu,⁴ the emergence of the state in the Western context occurred as a corollary to the gradual *concentration and objectification of capitals* within the household of the dominant ruler,⁵ represented symbolically by the transition from the ‘King’s House’ to the ‘Reason of State’ (or ‘*Raison d’Etat*’).

In the ‘King’s House’, accumulation initially followed the logic of social relations, and was limited accordingly; the ‘Reason of State’ however follows the logic of a universal interest, and thus constitutes “a field of forces and a field of struggles oriented towards the monopoly of the legitimate manip-

³See Bhuta (2012) for a critical assessment of the emergence of “state fragility” as a developmental paradigm reflecting power relations.

⁴See *Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field* (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1999) and *From the King’s House to the Reason of State* (Bourdieu, 2004) for an elaboration of Bourdieu’s theory of the genesis of the state. *Sur L’Etat* (Bourdieu, 2012) collects his various lectures on the state.

⁵“The state is the *culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capitals.*” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 41, emphasis in original).

ulation of public goods” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 16). As a corollary, within the ‘Reason of State’ the field of power is no longer dominated by a royal court, but by a *bureaucratic field* driven by the seemingly paradoxical *illusio* of an “interest in disinterest”.

For Bourdieu, the emergence of this disinterested *illusio* occurred as a result - at least in the French case - of struggles for power (that is, effects of field) taking place *within* the King’s House, where the labour of domination gradually came to be divided between hereditary and non-hereditary principles - that is, between nobles and clerks. The ‘universal’ interest emerged (according to Bourdieu) as a *fictio juris* (juridic fiction) within these non-hereditary agents of the state, who monopolised the symbolic profits accruing from the monopolistic control of public goods (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 35-63; Bourdieu, 2004, pp. 31-34).

This gradual process involved a “series of infinitesimal and yet all equally decisive inventions”, including “the bureau, signature, stamp, decree of appointment, certificate, register, circular, etc.”, all of which ultimately led “to the establishment of a properly bureaucratic logic” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 31). As such, while contingent, there was nothing necessary about the transition.

The principal difference between the two models would seem to conform with the distinction noted by Bourdieu in earlier works between *the two fundamental modes of domination*. According to Bourdieu -

The principle of the pertinent differences between the modes of domination lies in *the degree of objectification of capital*. Social formations in which relations of domination are made, unmade and remade in and through personal interactions contrast with those in which such relations are mediated by *objective, institutionalized mechanisms*. (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 130, emphasis mine)⁶

“Elementary forms of domination” are predicated upon “the direct domination of one person over another” (*ibid.*, p. 129). According to Bourdieu, such forms of domination do not, typically, contain within them the principles of their own reproduction, but must rather be “kept up by nothing less than a process of continuous creation” (*ibid.*, p. 130), whereby the dominant “ties” the dominated to him through gifts, services, time and obligations.

⁶This distinction is repeated in Bourdieu (1994, p. 8).

This “soft” domination requires a “personal” price - the labour of repressing economic interests into personal ties. When combined with “objective obstacles linked to the weakness of the means of production”, this additional labour was probably sufficient “to hinder or even forbid the concentration of material capital”. As Bourdieu notes of Kabylia (the field site in Algeria where he developed many of his early theories), such limitations meant that “It was no doubt exceptional [...] to order a man to ‘stop getting any richer’,” (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 128).

The necessity for the “circular circulation” of goods and favours to bind individuals and groups - from which “the legitimation of power arises as a symbolic surplus value” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 195) - thus initially limited the extent of material accumulation through the constant labour required to legitimate and reproduce power relations.⁷ This constant labour differs from the latter mode of domination by the absence of any mediation through *objectified mechanisms*, which “automatically ensure the reproduction of the established order” (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 129). As Bourdieu observes:

Objectification in institutions guarantees the permanence and cumulativeness of material and symbolic acquisitions which can then subsist without the agents having to recreate them continuously and in their entirety by deliberate actions [...] because the profits provided by these institutions are subject to differential appropriation, *objectification also and inseparably tends to ensure the reproduction of the structure of the distribution of capital.* (*ibid.*, p. 130, emphasis mine)

Applying this transition to Bourdieu’s model of state formation, we see that within the field of power the embodied, social relations corresponding to the ‘King’s House’ gradually gave way to the institutionalised, bureaucratic relations corresponding to the ‘Reason of State’, while beyond the field of power the reproduction of (unequal) distributions of capital moved from a constant, uncertain labour to an automatic process, in which the structure of that unequal distribution came to be embedded in the very institutions of the state - the school system, the bureaucracy, even physical institutions such as

⁷According to Bourdieu, this process of circular circulation moves in an unbroken progression from symmetry to asymmetry of exchange, converting economic capital into symbolic capital, and producing relations of dependence that have an economic basis, but which are disguised under a veil of moral relations (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 122-123).

the distribution of public housing. In the process, a decrease in “objective obstacles” resulted in a greater capacity for the overall accumulation of capital. A correlate of this process was the emergence, within the field of power, of the bureaucratic field. This cadre of public servants maintained a monopoly over public goods which was legitimised through the logic of a *public interest*: an “interest in disinterest” defined *against* the personal interest of the King’s House.

The coterminous transition from elementary to objectified modes of domination, and from a ‘specific’ to a ‘generalised’ interest (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1980) legitimising the field of power, thus suggests a causal relation between mechanisms of domination and the *symbolic forces* which legitimate them. To interrogate this link further we must turn to another transition which will be fundamental to the understanding of clandestine circulation: the transformation in the *form* of capital through which domination is effected in each model - from embodied, to institutionalised.

5.3 The Forms of Capital

As we have already observed, according to Bourdieu “the principle of the pertinent differences between the modes of domination lies in the degree of objectification of capital”. What though, in theoretical terms, does such a basis of difference as ‘the degree of objectification of capital’ consist in?

It is at this point that a common misreading concerning Bourdieusian theory must be addressed. In *The Forms of Capital* (Bourdieu, 1986b), Bourdieu proposed that the understanding of social inequality be governed not only by an assessment of the amount of economic capital possessed by an agent, but also by the extent and type of social and cultural assets which he or she may draw upon. Indeed, he proposed these latter two be considered as separate types of capital: that is, *social capital* and *cultural capital*.

This initial division of capital, allied with the title of the larger work, has led to a confusion concerning the theoretical labour performed by Bourdieu’s conceptualisation. To clarify: the division of capital between social, cultural and economic *does not* relate to the form of capital; rather, social, cultural and economic capital are different *guises* of capital, a distinction relating to the *field* in which a capital is produced. The distinction between the *forms* of capital rather relates to the different states in which those capitals may

be rendered. Of these, Bourdieu mentions only three: *embodied*, *objectified*, and *institutionalised*.⁸

In many respects, the distinction between the different forms of capital relates to the same dialectic of embodiment and objectification which runs throughout Bourdieu's work. Embodied capitals follow a logic of inalienability which, "like the acquisition of a muscular physique or a suntan [...] cannot be done at second hand" (Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 248). Objectified capitals, by contrast, are "transmissible in [their] materiality" (*ibid.*, p. 250), holding an alienable value which is guaranteed by the symbolic appreciation of a wider field (for example, the cultural field). Finally, institutionalised capitals are, according to Bourdieu, a specific form of objectification (*ibid.*, p. 247) tending to be legally guaranteed by the state and thus "formally independent of the person of their bearer" (*ibid.*, p. 250).

This latter form of capital is, in Bourdieu's words, "a form of objectification which must be set apart because [...] it confers entirely original properties" (*ibid.*, p. 247). Given the affinities which run throughout Bourdieu's works, we may attribute these "original properties" to certain effects of the state: institutionalised forms of capital are, generally speaking, guaranteed by the state; they are thus products of the same genesis responsible - in the context of the 'Reason of State' - for the emergence of the "interest in disinterest" and "state thought". They are also that form of capital through which objectified mechanisms reproduce the social structure.

To give an example of the interplay between forms and guises of capital, and the relation of each to the labour of reproduction, we may turn to Bourdieu's analysis of the cultural field within *The Forms of Capital*. According to Bourdieu, embodied cultural capital takes the form of "what is called culture, cultivation, Bildung" (*ibid.*, p. 248); it can only be acquired through a personal investment in time and effort, which presupposes sufficient economic capital to offset such an investment. However, "because the social conditions of its transmission and acquisition are more disguised than those of economic capital, it is predisposed to function as symbolic capital, i.e., to be unrecognised as capital and recognised as legitimate competence, as authority" (*ibid.*, p. 249), and hence - according to Bourdieu - to play a sig-

⁸The initial specification is found in Bourdieu (1986b, p. 247). This important distinction has been overlooked by some scholars, most noticeably in the case of Smart (1993), who curiously goes on to reinvent the same distinction.

nificant role in reproduction strategies⁹ (for example, matrimonial markets), where economic capital is “not fully recognised” (*ibid.*, p. 249).

Embodied capital, we may therefore argue, is the first step in the emergence of an autonomous field - that is, a field in which power relations are not determined purely by overt coercion, but rather are misrecognised as “legitimate competence” or “authority”.¹⁰

Objectified cultural capital, by contrast, takes the form of “material objects and media, such as writings, paintings, monuments, instruments, etc.” (*ibid.*, p. 250). Such goods may be possessed (and transmitted) materially, yet Bourdieu also makes clear that full possession presupposes also the symbolic means to consume such goods (i.e. embodied cultural capital). Thus, objectified cultural capital may make the acquisition of embodied cultural capital a more secure process, without doing away entirely with the need to invest time and effort in its acquisition. This added security of objectified cultural capital is, it may be argued, a product of the mode of domination it emanates from:

Cultural capital in its objectified state presents itself with all the appearances of an autonomous, coherent universe which, although the product of historical action, has its own laws, transcending individual wills. (*ibid.*, p. 250)

This “autonomous, coherent universe”, we may argue, is none other than the cultural field itself. Thus, as fields increase their (objective) autonomy *vis à vis* other fields, so too the capacity of such fields to materialise profits in the form of objects with a commonly agreed-upon value also increases.

Finally, cultural capital in its institutionalised form, according to Bourdieu, takes the shape of academic qualifications. Such capital is guaranteed by the state, and has an autonomy from its bearer sufficient that such gains as represented by its acquisition may be held securely - as opposed to the simplest embodied cultural capital, which “is constantly required to prove

⁹The analysis of reproduction strategies will form an important part of the next chapter, where they will be explained in greater detail.

¹⁰At this point it is worth noting that it is highly unlikely pure overt coercion ever constituted the basis of an actual power relation. As Bourdieu notes: “The logical construct of a power relation manifesting itself nakedly has no more sociological existence than does the logical construct of meanings that are only cultural arbitrariness [...] There is no power relation, however mechanical and ruthless, which does not additionally exert a symbolic effect.” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990, p. 10-11).

itself” (Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 251). Thus, we may see that, by the time a capital has been institutionalised, it has reached the stage where not only is it produced by an autonomous field, but that field is itself dominated by an autonomous entity or institution - typically the state, which exercises a *symbolic violence* that acts as the ultimate guarantor of all distinctions.

We may note that, while the emergence of the different forms of capital must occur in a teleological fashion - from embodied to objectified to institutionalised, owing to the complexity of the social structures which produce and guarantee them - the emergence of a new form of capital does not presuppose the complete disappearance of its antecedent stage. Rather, as we may see with cultural capital, in the complete system of strategies of **Social Reproduction** each form of capital may play its role. Thus, in the case of institutionalised cultural capital, the complete labour of reproduction presupposes a prolonged investment in embodied cultural capital (which, as Bourdieu notes, also typically continues to gain its recognition through the school system), an investment which is naturally made more secure through further investment in the right objectified cultural capitals (museum visits, the number of books at home, etc.), which is eventually converted into an academic qualification - enabling in turn a further conversion in the labour market, which ultimately enables a material profit to be drawn, and a higher integration in social space (*ibid.*, p. 251).

5.4 The Genesis of the State as Capital Trajectory

If we accept that the pertinent distinction between the modes of domination relates to the degree of objectification of capitals, and if we accept further that the pertinent distinction between the degree of objectification of capitals relates to the relative autonomy and regulation of the fields which produce them, then we may present the degree of objectification of capitals not only as a trajectory running through each guise of capital, but also as a trajectory, in and of itself, running through social space, the correlate of which is none other than the process described by Bourdieu concerning the genesis of the state - the transition from the ‘King’s house’ to the ‘Reason of State’.

Table 5.1 attempts to demonstrate this trajectory across the different

Table 5.1: The Guises and Forms of Capital

<i>GUISES</i>			<i>FORM</i>
Economic	Social	Cultural	
Labour, Time	Obligations	Talent	<i>EMBODIED</i>
Money	Social Goods	Cultural Goods	<i>OBJECTIFIED</i>
Property Rights	Titles; Positions	Qualifications	<i>INSTITUTION- ALISED</i>

time ↓

guises of capital.¹¹ In each case, as the fields producing the different guises of capital gain greater autonomy, the capacity for value to be objectified in a recognised hierarchy of objects distinct from their bearers increases. The ultimate form of objectification - that which bears the highest legitimacy - is institutionalisation: capital produced within a field that is regulated by an entity claiming a symbolic monopoly over significations.¹²

The distinction between the different forms of capital and their practical role in the reproduction of the social structure will be discussed in the next chapter. At this point however I wish to emphasise the connection between the increasing capacity of the field of power to objectify capitals (generally under the auspices of ‘that something we call the state’), the *absolute* volume of capital which can be accumulated, and the logic governing this mode of domination. In other words, in the Western context we can visualise the

¹¹References to specific guises and forms are drawn from *The Forms of Capital* (Bourdieu, 1986b). For institutionalised social capital, I take Bourdieu’s initial specification (titles of nobility) as referring to institutionalised social capital under the logic of the ‘King’s House’. For institutionalised social capital under the logic of the ‘Reason of State’ I modify the proposal of Denord et al. (2011), who consider board positions, membership of organisations, etc. as instances of *objectified* social capital. Following Bourdieu’s own specification (i.e., that objectified capitals are “transmissible in [their] materiality”, and that institutionalised capitals are (rather) “formally independent of the person of their bearer”) I would consider such forms of social capital to be institutionalised. I rather consider what I have labelled ‘social goods’ to represent social capital in its objectified form. These may be thought of (in the sense of symbolic capital in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Bourdieu, 1977)) as objectified status markers recognised within a given social space. They thus bear some relation to objectified cultural capital. Finally, we must also make reference to *inherited* social capital (also mentioned by Bourdieu and Denord et. al.), which will be referred to in the empirical chapters owing to its effects in the field, and which may be understood as a form of embodied social capital which is passed on to agents through the family structure (or household).

¹²On struggles over this specifically symbolic power of ‘consecration’ - making such distinctions legitimate - see Bourdieu (1989, pp. 21-24). The implications of such struggles for the clandestine circulation of capital are discussed in the following section.

genesis of state formation as a trajectory of the dominant, legitimate capital structure in social space.¹³

Figure 5.1 demonstrates this trajectory (and the structure of social space in which it occurs), in a manner which will be recognisable to those familiar with the model of social space proposed by Bourdieu in *Distinction* (Bourdieu, 1984). As with *Distinction*, the vertical (y) axis represents the *total volume* of capital of agents or objects in social space. In contrast to the *Distinction* model, however, the horizontal (x) axis represents a division based not on different *guises* of capital, but rather different *forms*. The axis moves from embodied (on the right) to institutionalised (on the left), and should be understood as a trajectory (hence also including objectified capitals as an intermediary stage).


In the ‘King’s House’ domination is effected through mechanisms of ‘circular circulation’. The limitations of such mechanisms act as a barrier to the overall volume of capital which can be accumulated within the field of power, and further restrict that capital to certain forms and guises. However, with the gradual emergence of institutionalised mechanisms for the reproduction of capital, not only are the prevailing forms of capital (i.e. objectified, institutionalised) more securely reproduced, but the absolute volume of capital which can be accumulated through such mechanisms also increases. As the dominant capital structure (that is, the capital structure relating to the field of power) shifts from embodied to objectified and institutionalised capitals,¹⁴ so too the logic governing that field also shifts, from the *specific* interest of the ‘King’s House’, to the *generalised* interest (the ‘interest in disinterest’) governing the bureaucratic ‘Reason of State’.

Were it possible to add a third axis, we might also see that the dominant capital structure in most Western contexts further shifted from institutionalised *social* capital (titles of nobility), to institutionalised *cultural* capital (qualifications), a further transition to which we will return. Ultimately,

¹³This mode of analysis fits within Bourdieu’s own conception of the analysis of social agents (and, by extension, all social objects) within the broader structure of social space. Writing in *Distinction* (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 108), Bourdieu argued that “endeavouring to reconstitute the units most homogenous from the point of view of the conditions of the production of habitus [...] one can construct a space whose three fundamental dimensions are defined by *volume of capital, composition of capital, and change in these two properties over time (manifested by past and potential trajectory in social space).*”

¹⁴Without, it should be added, these prior forms ever entirely disappearing (the axis represents the *dominant*, rather than sole, form of capital).

Figure 5.1: State Formation as Capital Trajectory



State formation as a trajectory of the dominant legitimate capital structure in social space, illustrating the varying configurations of the most important dimensions in each case (absolute volume of capital, degree of objectification, trajectory).

the field of power in much of Europe became a bureaucratic field, able to concentrate enormous volumes of capital through objectified mechanisms.¹⁵

The benefit in presenting state formation as a capital trajectory within social space lies in the possibility it provides for conceptualising the *state effect* as a contingent, arbitrary product whose social genesis can be traced. Hence, if we are to objectify the *state effect* - understood as the totality of the social effects of ‘that something we call the state’¹⁶ - then it should be as a social object akin to the habitus. That is, the effects produced by the state - the *state effect* - are akin to the effects produced by the habitus, in

¹⁵It may be noted that Graziano (1976), in his observation concerning the limits to the accumulation of capital under direct exchange, is essentially making the same point. As noted in the previous section however, without the additional theoretical framework provided by the Bourdieusian conceptual tools of field, capital and habitus he lacks a mechanism to account for this transition from direct to indirect exchange.

¹⁶That is, rather than analysing the ‘state’ *per se* - a product of “state thought”.

the sense that they consist of *perceptions* (“state thought”) and *dispositions* (the tendency to accumulate certain types of capital) which are themselves determined in a relational sense, a sense structured according to a position in social space defined by those three dimensions.¹⁷

Thus, if we encompass within the *state effect* all those mechanisms for the production of legitimate domination - through both the reproduction of capital and the production of symbolic adherence - we will find that the specific nature of those mechanisms (the form and guises of the capitals being reproduced; the nature of the doxa produced) is the legacy of a historical trajectory *within* the field of power, and the field of power *within* larger social space. It is thus arbitrary, in the Weberian sense that it serves no determined end, and in the Bourdieusian sense that it produces no determined symbolic force. It may therefore, depending upon that trajectory, equally produce either a specific interest (in the case of the ‘King’s House’), or a generalised interest (in the case of the ‘Reason of State’).¹⁸

Further, the *state effect* itself structures social space (in the sense of a *structuring structure* - a structure which has been structured and in turn structures other social objects) by favouring the accumulation of certain capital structures, the transformation of certain forms and guises of capital, and the privileging of certain trajectories over others. This in turn has contingent effects on the habitus of social agents, such that the *state effect* - while contingent for its genesis upon the historical trajectory of the field of power - is nonetheless also the producer of its own determinisms.

In particular, the *state effect* may produce effects of *hysteresis*. For instance, changes in the field of power (e.g. bifurcation of capital structures and trajectories) may not be met with corresponding changes in the *state effect*, owing to the nature of the logic of formalisation.¹⁹ Likewise, changes in the *state effect* - in the sense of new or different mechanisms for accumulation, and the logics attendant upon them - may also meet with the

¹⁷It is important to add that this comparison of the state effect with the *effects* produced by habitus should not be mistaken for an attempt to advocate a ‘habitus of the state’: such a project would merely reify those tendencies, noted earlier in the chapter, of “state thought” to produce the state as a kind of transcendent, historical agent.

¹⁸In this sense the *state effect* may be considered in similar terms to the pedagogic action (PA) outlined in *Reproduction* (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990), in particular to those propositions outlined in 1.2, 1.2.1, and 1.2.2. concerning the arbitrariness of the cultural arbitrary imposed by such a PA.

¹⁹See the conclusion to the section on concept formation, and also Bourdieu (1986a).

embodiment of prior iterations of the *state effect* embedded in the habitus of social agents (in the sense of established norms of behaviour, an eventuality which will be elaborated upon in the next chapter).

5.5 The Emergence of Clandestine Circulation

Presenting the genesis of the *state effect* as a trajectory of the legitimate, dominant capital structure allows analysis to overcome precisely those assumptions (embedded within “state thought”) concerning the *inevitability* (or necessity) of such a genesis. Rather, in examining particular instances of hysteresis of the *state effect* (and in particular, hysteresis in “state thought”), we reveal a process driven by the generative principles of field and capital.

We may see the effects of this process in the example previously mentioned in chapter 2 concerning the evolution of attitudes toward corruption in 19th century Britain. According to Leys, rather than an objective increase in corrupt behaviour, society passed “*through* a period in which behaviour patterns which were acceptable by the old standards came to be regarded as corrupt according to the new” (Leys, 1965, p. 227).

Here, hysteresis constitutes the continuing embodiment, in the habitus of certain agents, of an earlier *state effect* adjusted toward the circulation and accumulation of a determinate capital structure, in a period in which struggles within the field of power were diverting the trajectory of the dominant capital structure toward a new configuration, and hence a different interest or *illusio*.

This same transition in doxa is captured by Collini (2011), who observes that -

One of the most fascinating yet elusive aspects of cultural change is the way certain ideals and arguments acquire an almost self-evident power at particular times, just as others come to seem irrelevant or antiquated and largely disappear from public debate. In the middle of the 18th century, to describe a measure as ‘displaying the respect that is due to rank’ was a commonplace commendation; in the middle of the 19th, affirming that a proposal contributed to ‘the building of character’ would have been part of the mood music of public discourse. (*ibid.*, p. 9)

The ‘self-evidence’ (or doxic modality) attributed to measures displaying “the respect that is due to rank” in the mid-18th century related principally to that category of “state thought” produced by a *state effect* adjusted toward the reproduction of a (hierarchically ordered) *institutionalised social capital*. By contrast, a century later “state thought” had progressed toward measures favouring the institutionalisation of *cultural capital* (‘building of character’), suggesting a *state effect* now adjusted toward the reproduction of this new capital structure.

Hence, in the interim between these two points, the principle of circulation through social capital (running from embodied to institutionalised), which had previously dominated transactions within the field of power, would have come to be usurped by the type of objectified, institutionalised mechanisms (generally predicated on institutionalised *cultural capital*) described by Bourdieu. This suggests a bifurcation *within* the field of power, between agents whose habitus remained adjusted toward the dispositions and interests of the prior structure, and those whose interest was rather adjusted toward the new.

According to Bourdieu (1989, p. 23), “the struggle over classifications is a fundamental dimension of class struggle”. In the sense that the struggle for dominance between nobles and bureaucrats *within* the field of power increasingly took on (through the effects of field) the form of a *class struggle*, accusations of corruption represented not only varying doxa (in the sense of a tendency to misrecognise certain transactions differently as either ‘favours’ or ‘corruption’, depending upon one’s habitus and position in social space), but also *position-takings* - that is, stakes in the struggle for dominance within the field of power.

Thus, far from being a teleological movement, the transition from the ‘King’s House’ to the ‘Reason of State’ involved a clash of agents with contrasting interests: either in the ‘specific interest’ of circular circulation, or the ‘universal interest’ of objectified, institutionalised mechanisms. The norm of a ‘public interest’ which emerged out of these struggles was thus the dominant logic of the (newly) dominant class.

In the Western context, however, the emergence of this logic was embedded not merely in the transition from a mode of domination predicated on embodied capitals to one predicated on institutionalised capitals; rather, there was a *double* shift involving first the transition from hierarchical, *em-*

bodied social capital to hierarchical, *institutionalised* social capital; and then from *social* capital to *cultural* capital (in both cases hierarchical and institutionalised).

The first transition may be recognised by the increasing elaboration of systems of titles and court etiquette, whereas the second may be recognised by the transition from a system of reproduction effected through the inheritance of positions and titles (and hence laws of inheritance), to one effected through the acquisition of qualifications (and hence the educational system).²⁰ In the Western context, these two movements (toward greater institutionalisation and toward cultural capital) are equally inseparable from the emergence of that particular symbolic force known as the public interest - a force which, while never entirely reducible to economic interests, is nonetheless attributable to the historical effects of material struggles within the field of power.

It is in the context of this double transition that we must read Bourdieu's initial specification of clandestine circulation, which deserves quoting in full. According to Bourdieu -

[e]very reproduction strategy is at the same time a legitimation strategy aimed at consecrating both an exclusive appropriation and its reproduction. When the subversive critique which aims to weaken the dominant class through the principle of its perpetuation by bringing to light the arbitrariness of the entitlements transmitted and of their transmission (such as the critique which the Enlightenment *philosophes* directed, in the name of nature,

²⁰This transition is described explicitly by Bourdieu in *Stratégies de Reproduction et Modes de Domination* (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 7) as a “struggle” between two principles of reproduction:

“toute la longue période de transition de l'État dynastique à l'État bureaucratique est marquée, tant en France qu'en Angleterre, par la lutte entre ceux qui ne veulent connaître et reconnaître que les stratégies de reproduction à base familiale (les frères du roi), fondées sur les liens du sang, et ceux qui invoquent les stratégies de reproduction bureaucratiques (les ministres du roi), fondées sur la transmission scolaire du capital culturel.”

(“The long transition from the dynastic state to the bureaucratic state [i.e. the ‘King’s House’ to the ‘Reason of State’] is marked, both in France and England, by the struggle between those who wish to know and recognise strategies of reproduction based on the family (brothers of the king), founded on bloodlines, and those who invoke strategies of bureaucratic reproduction (the ministers of the king), founded on the school transmission of cultural capital.” author’s translation.)

against the arbitrariness of birth) is incorporated in institutionalized mechanisms (for example, laws of inheritance) aimed at controlling the official, direct transmission of power and privileges [i.e. capital], the holders of capital have an even greater interest in resorting to reproduction strategies capable of ensuring better-disguised transmission, but at the cost of greater loss of capital, by exploiting the convertibility of the types of capital. Thus, the more the official transmission of capital is prevented or hindered, the more the effects of the clandestine circulation of capital in the form of cultural capital become determinant in the reproduction of the social structure. As an instrument of reproduction capable of disguising its own function, the scope of the educational system tends to increase, and together with this increase is the unification of the market in social qualifications which gives rights to occupy rare positions. (Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 255)

Thus, Bourdieu seems to argue that the archetypal instance of clandestine circulation (which we must assume holds only for the French and English, or at best Western European, cases) is precisely that shift effected *from* a mode of reproduction predicated upon hierarchical institutionalised social capital, *to* a mode of reproduction predicated upon hierarchical institutionalised cultural capital, owing to the capacity for the new institutionalised mechanism of reproduction (the educational system) to *disguise* that same correlation between social background and qualifications which it tends to reproduce.²¹ From Bourdieu's work on the French school system (specifically *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990) and *The State Nobility* (Bourdieu, 1996)) we can judge that

²¹It is at this point that a distinction should be made between the clandestine circulation of capital and the related Bourdieusian concept of *reconversion* strategies (see Bourdieu, Boltanski, and de Saint Martin (1973), Bourdieu (1994, p. 8) and de Saint Martin (2011)). According to de Saint Martin (*ibid.*, p. 436), reconversions "imply a move of some sort in the social field", and further "also imply the relinquishing or loss of the former type of resource, a form of break with one's inheritance, the disappearance of former resources and their recomposition on different bases." Hence, the secular transition from reproduction based upon institutionalised social capital to institutionalised cultural capital may represent (when conducted within and by a particular class or class fraction) an instance of reconversion. By contrast, in this case clandestine circulation relates to the (continuous) reproduction of a position in social space through the disguised transmission of embodied cultural capital into institutionalised cultural capital through the educational system.

the ‘clandestine’ or hidden element of this circulation is the degree to which (as mentioned earlier) the embodied cultural capital recognised (and hence institutionalised) by the educational system is, to a large extent, merely a transformation of that which is inherited through the household.²²

Perhaps most fundamentally, the transformation in institutionalised mechanism (from inheritance laws to the educational system) for the reproduction of the “exclusive appropriation” of the elite ensured that the symbolic force associated with the universal interest was maintained: the *misrecognised* conversion of embodied cultural capital to institutionalised cultural capital enabled holders of that capital to claim their position based upon the principle of *merit* (rather than inheritance) - hence in Bourdieu’s terms functioning as a *legitimation* strategy as well as a reproduction strategy. We may argue that this effect of misrecognition is essentially what enables these particular mechanisms for the reproduction of the social structure to remain doxic, despite the significant degrees of inequality which they enable.

5.6 “State Thought” and Clandestine Circulation

Thus, if we accept that there exists a relation between the different symbolic forces embedded within “state thought” (in the sense of the different *illusio* of the ‘specific’ and ‘generalised’ interests), and the historic genesis of the *state effect* (in the sense of the dominant capital structure), then it must also hold that the ways in which *transformations* between the different species of capitals are *misrecognised* will also be determined according to that same objective, historical genesis.

To elaborate: we see that at each stage of its development, the dominant capital structure of the field of power produces a logic and an interest - a logic, that is, favouring a certain mode of accumulation (involving certain kinds of power relations, capitals and mechanisms), and an interest (or perspective) which defends that mode of accumulation against all others. The articulation and defence of this interest in turn becomes a symbolic *point*

²²A point also emphasised by Bourdieu: “one must always guard against reducing the opposition between the two modes of reproduction to that between the family and the State. Rather, the difference consists in a management of reproduction strategies conducted entirely through the family, and one in which the family makes a certain [additional] use of the education system in reproduction strategies” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 10, author’s translation).

of honour for agents engaged in struggles within and between the different fields.²³

Figure 5.2 presents these different interests in the form of *social libidos*, and illustrates their current constitution in Western “state thought” - that is, in the context of the modern ‘Reason of State’. The social libido of the ‘specific’ interest (which initially constituted the logic of the ‘King’s House’) is represented as the “other side” of an abyssal line, owing to the fact that the *embodied* capitals typically associated with this libido (social or cultural) are frequently *unrecognised* with regards to their role in social reproduction (that is, when their circulation is primarily restricted to the household, and their basis as a principle of difference is disguised through legitimate mechanisms such as the educational system).

As we have seen, the ‘specific’ interest is produced through the elementary mode of domination: that is, through principles of reproduction based upon embodied capitals, typically taking the form of favours and obligations, and constituted in the form of affective relations. Its point of honour revolves around reciprocity: agents must defend particularly against charges of ingratitude or instrumentalism. In the sense that modern “state thought” constitutes this ‘specific’ interest, it is typically not through opposition, but rather *absence*. The informality of the social is a space lacking the *vis formae* (Bourdieu, 1986a, p. 43), the structure or formality, of the state. Indeed, the legitimate (legal) monopoly over the reproduction of this interest is, generally speaking, given over to the household - now typically understood (and officially reproduced) in the most minimal sense.

When it *is* recognised, clandestine circulation between the two sides of this abyssal line is typically classified as nepotism (that is, when *embodied* or *inherited* social capital is converted into positions in the economic, cultural or political field, without first undergoing an intermediary transmission through an objectified mechanism, such as the educational system, to legitimate it).²⁴ However, the capacity for such conversions to be recognised

²³The ‘point of honour’ (*nif*) is referred to in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Bourdieu, 1977) and *The Logic of Practice* (Bourdieu, 1990c) as the locus toward which challenges and ripostes are addressed in Kabylia society. I extend the idea here to refer to the locus of any symbolic system of interests (i.e. the ‘universal’ interest; the ‘specific’ interest; the profit motive).

²⁴Bourdieu also seems to imply that nepotism and favouritism are the legacy of this specific interest carried over into the domain of the modern state. See Bourdieu (1994, p. 10): “l’État issu d’un tel processus d’éradication de tout vestige de liens naturels - qui

as nepotism or favouritism tends to decline in proportion to the extent to which such capitals are supported by a concomitant investment in the *institutionalised* capitals which - in the ‘Reason of State’ - legitimise otherwise arbitrary social distinctions. Hence, the abyssal line also represents the manner in which the ‘specific’ and ‘generalised’ interests tend to co-exist within the same habitus without contradiction, owing to the fact that ‘the logic of practice’ seldom presents agents with those contradictions revealed by theory, but rather enables the complementary mobilisation of both *embodied* and *institutionalised* capitals in reproduction strategies (an aspect of practice which will be elaborated upon further in the next chapter).²⁵

The second, *visible* line divides the ‘self-interest’ or profit-motive of the economic field, from the ‘universal’, ‘public’ or ‘generalised’ interest (typically manifested in fractions of the cultural field), and is the *opposition* through which modern “state thought” tends to distinguish the division of legitimate interests within the field of power.²⁶ The delineation of these spaces (often referred to, for example, as the public or private ‘sectors’ to emphasise their limits) is enforced through the state’s monopoly of symbolic violence. Conversions are strictly regulated, and clandestine circulation between the two lines is recognised and prevented through *legal* injunctions against bribery, embezzlement, graft, etc.

It is clashes between the point of honour of these logics which tend to dominate public discourse: the “individual” against “the state” representing orthodoxy on the ‘private’ side of the line; and “public” against “private” interests representing orthodoxy on the ‘public’ side. The distinction is thus the homology produced by “state thought” to represent the current bifurcation within the field of power - that between economic and cultural capital (institutionalised in both cases) - a categorisation which also neatly


survivent malgré tout dans le népotisme et le favoritisme [...]” (“*The state issuing from such a process of eradication of all vestiges of natural relations - which survive nonetheless in the form of nepotism and favouritism [...]*”) author’s translation.

²⁵In particular, we may note that the ‘Reason of State’ tends to restrict the legitimate expression of the elementary mode of domination to the domain of the household, which (being also to a significant extent regulated by the state) is the domain in which the transmission of inherited capitals and their subsequent conversion remains doxic. See the following chapter on reproduction mechanisms and reproduction strategies for further analysis on this point.

²⁶This division between economic and cultural fields equates with that presented by Bourdieu in *Distinction* (Bourdieu, 1984) and further refined in *Social Space and Symbolic Power* (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 1-13). The transition from a social/cultural to a cultural/economic capital distinction is also noted in Bourdieu (1994, p. 10).

maps onto the dominant structuring factor of contemporary politics, the left/right divide. The form of relations through which these two interests are constituted also differs substantially: the ‘generalised’ interest is constituted (as Graziano (1976) and Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980) demonstrated) by relations based upon the expectation of common rights, such as manifested among (and between) citizens and the state; the profit motive, on the other hand, requires the constitution of *market relations* between agents which (despite the assumptions of classical economists) are also the product of a determinate social genesis.²⁷ Both forms of relation (and hence the libidos associated with them) are the product of that mode of domination relating to objectified and institutionalised mechanisms.

Figure 5.2: “State Thought” and the Constitution of the Different Social Libidos in the ‘Reason of State’



²⁷As Polanyi (1957), and more recently Graeber (2011) have demonstrated.

In the sense that “state thought” (in the mode of the ‘Reason of State’) represents both a logic and a set of interests, the constitution of alternative mechanisms for circulating the various species of capital *through* this logic represents in itself a stake in the struggle for domination. While everything points towards the continuation of prior mechanisms for the circulation of capital under the auspices of the ‘Reason of State’ (as Bourdieu’s example of the various transformations undergone by cultural capital attests), the mechanisms themselves stand to be recognised or misrecognised differently according to, on the one hand, the role they play in the reproduction of the dominant capital structure, and on the other hand, the extent to which they encroach upon the point of honour of the logic of the dominant class.

As we have seen, this point of honour is itself determined by the capital structure of the dominant class; or, to be more precise, *divisions* within the capital structure of the field of power serve to structure the articulation and expression of those interests deemed to be *legitimate*, and most importantly the specific *domains* in which those interests may be legitimately brought to bear - that is, the domain of the “official transmission” of the various capitals. In the context of modern “state thought” in most Western contexts, struggles between these capital structures thus tend to fall upon the definition of the boundary of the *visible* line which divides the ‘generalised’ interest from the profit motive. Thus, in most cases the current configuration of the field of power results in the *other* division - that between the ‘generalised’ and the ‘specific’ interest (which previously represented one part of the fundamental division in the struggle within the field of power in the transition from the ‘King’s House’ to the ‘Reason of State’) - disappearing across an abyssal line, and hence - in the Western context - favouring the emergence of forms of clandestine circulation (typically within the restricted domain of the household) predicated upon that ambiguity.

5.7 Conclusion

Rather than a smooth transition from *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft*, from the circulation of embodied capitals to the objectified reproduction of institutionalised capitals (the ‘legitimate’ historical trajectory embedded within “state thought”) everything points instead toward *the simultaneous presence of various different mechanisms for the accumulation and transformation of*

capitals, coexisting in lesser or greater harmony depending upon the contingent nature of a given *state effect*, and the degree to which the articulation of logics and interests produced by “state thought” enables such modes of circulation to be misrecognised.

The clandestine circulation of capital is thus understood - at the objective level - as the tendency for part or parts of social space to be reproduced according to principles of difference (forms and guises of capital) which exceed that domain of their legitimate expression - through mechanisms for the “official” transmission of capital - as otherwise constituted by “state thought”.

In seeking to establish which specific principles of difference may become determinant in the clandestine reproduction of a given social space, the first ‘moment’ of analysis must therefore identify three things: the dominant capital structure(s) within the field of power, including its historical trajectory; the *objective* structure and genesis of the *state effect*, in the sense of the specific mechanisms for the “official transmission of capital” (to quote Bourdieu); and third, the *subjective* structure and genesis of the *state effect*, in the sense of the specific structure of “state thought” existing within a given social space: producing and recognising different interests, constructing the domain of their legitimate expression, and simultaneously ‘un’-recognising other interests. This third task is undoubtedly the most complex, as the *objective* constitution of the various social libidos within a given social space may differ substantially from their idealised constitution by “state thought” - the difference between the two being indeed the space within which clandestine circulation, as a misrecognised mode of reproduction, typically thrives.

Having analysed the genesis of the objective structures necessary to specify the social space of clandestine circulation, as well as the interests and logics which such structures produce, the next chapter seeks to analyse the different iterations of clandestine circulation at the level of practice, including the principles which structure such circulation, and their embodiment in agents’ habitus. This will involve extending the model of social reproduction developed thus far to the analysis of agents’ specific *reproduction strategies* (Bourdieu, 1994), and the relation of such strategies to the *reproduction mechanisms* (i.e. mechanisms for the “official” transmission of capital) of the *state effect* - themselves further defined according to their

role in regulating the complete labour of social reproduction.

Chapter 6

Clandestine Circulation in Practice

6.1 Reproduction Strategies and Clandestine Circulation

Reproduction Strategies, mentioned in passing in the previous chapter, are understood as the specific order of practices necessary for agents to reproduce their capital structure within a given social space. Taken together, these strategies constitute a *system* (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 6), and according to Bourdieu, systems vary in accordance with the same two modes of domination outlined in the previous chapter - elementary or institutionalised (*ibid.*, p. 7). It follows that, in systems characterised by the institutionalised mode of domination, agents' reproduction strategies will be articulated in relation to the structure of objectified, institutionalised *reproduction mechanisms*. Reproduction strategies are therefore the expression, in practice, of agents' responses to a given *state effect*.

Bourdieu developed a taxonomy of reproduction strategies and reproduction mechanisms which he derived from the analysis of highly diverse societies at varying stages of social development (*ibid.*, pp. 5-7). In this taxonomy, reproduction *strategies* are divided into four "grand classes": biological investment (further subdivided into 'fecundity' and 'prophylactic' strategies, to either reduce or increase potential offspring and inheritors); succession strategies; educational strategies; and investment strategies (further subdivided into social investment, matrimonial strategies, symbolic in-

vestment and sociodicy¹). Reproduction *mechanisms* are also divided into four classes: the labour market; inheritance laws; property rights; and the educational system. Figure 6.1 summarises these strategies and mechanisms, and relates them both to clandestine circulation and the broader dialectic of embodiment and objectification.

As mentioned in passing in the previous chapter, Bourdieu did not see the general evolution of social reproduction as moving from one system wholly dependent on the family to another wholly dependent on the educational system (or, we may reason by extension, institutionalised mechanisms in general), but rather as moving from “a purely familial management of the problems of reproduction, to a familial management which makes a certain use of the school system [or, by extension, all institutionalised mechanisms] in its reproduction strategies” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 10, author’s translation).


This remains an important distinction, because (as was also observed in the previous chapter) there is no reproduction strategy which does not involve to some extent the putting to use of embodied or inherited capitals in the work of reproduction. Rather, what is specific to *clandestine* circulation is the manner in which those institutionalised reproduction mechanisms tend to be subverted, enabling the (disguised) reproduction of a principle of difference based upon inequalities in such embodied or inherited capitals, rather than the normative principles of merit and equality implied by the ‘universal’ (or generalised) interest associated with modern “state thought”.

Analysis of the clandestine circulation of capital *as practice* thus requires identifying, in each context, the specific reproduction strategies through which such circulation occurs, and how those strategies interact with the institutionalised reproduction mechanisms of the *state effect*, which should (supposedly) regulate such circulation.

For example, it was noted in the previous chapter that changes to inheritance laws in 18th and 19th century Europe (particularly in the French case) pushed elite reproduction from strategies predicated on inheritance laws to strategies predicated on the educational system. This transformation involved the adoption of reproduction strategies favouring a much greater investment in embodied (and by extension, inherited) *cultural* capital, of the type which could gain official recognition within the educational system

¹*Sociodicy*, by analogy with theodicy, is intended by Bourdieu to mean the justification of society.

Figure 6.1: Clandestine Circulation from the Perspective of Reproduction Strategies and Mechanisms



(and hence be converted into institutionalised cultural capital).

By extension, we may argue that - over the same period - within the *total labour* of reproduction, those strategies favouring a *symbolic* investment in inherited and embodied *social* capital (and which thus relied upon mechanisms corresponding to the elementary mode of domination) tended to become less important, as agents increasingly came to rely on institutionalised, bureaucratic hierarchies of distinction predicated on the possession of institutionalised cultural capital (again the product of changing reproduction mechanisms) in which concepts such as family honour were less involved.

For instance, the transformation and decline in duelling in 19th century Britain as a symbolic means of establishing masculine honour tends to support such a hypothesis. Shoemaker (2002, p. 537) notes how, before declining entirely, duelling ceased to become a *public* display of honour, and was instead restricted to a (private) self-confirmation of one's own courage.² This in turn suggests a declining need for agents to publicly protect their status through the principle of 'circular circulation' (challenges to masculine honour being in many respects the equivalent to gift exchange, see Bourdieu (1977)), relying instead on institutionalised principles of distinction.

The most relevant axes for differentiating clandestine circulation as practice are thus the specific guise and form of capital through which agents connect their reproduction strategies to the reproduction mechanisms of a given *state effect*. To the extent that such strategies represent a *system*, systems may vary according to whether social, cultural, or indeed economic capital is the favoured guise, and whether the form of capital is purely embodied, inherited (that is, also pertaining to the household), or to some extent objectified. Indeed, whereas in some cases reproduction strategies may be predicated on the clandestine conversion of embodied or inherited capitals *into* institutionalised capitals (as in the case of France), in others, clandestine circulation may involve, to some extent, the creation of embodied social capital *from* institutionalised or objectified capitals (as in the cases of *blat*, *guanxi* and *wasta* below).

For example, strategies involving the conversion of (objectified) economic

²That is, representing the same transition from "the respect that is due to rank" to "the building of character" noted by Collini, and relating in a Bourdieusian framework to the transition from a *state effect* predicated on the institutionalisation of social capital to cultural capital.

capital into institutionalised capitals such as property rights (for example in the paying of bribes to state officials, typically relating to inheritance or property laws) may, when such conversion forms a necessary part of agents' reproduction strategies, be considered as a form of clandestine circulation. Equally, the conversion of embodied or inherited social capital into institutionalised social capital (for example, in securing a position in the labour market) may also be considered as a form of clandestine circulation, when the effect of such strategies is the reproduction of a form of inequality within the labour market predicated upon the variable possession of embodied or inherited social capital.

Through such a methodology it becomes possible not only to distinguish between specific forms of clandestine circulation (in terms of capitals circulated), but also to determine the extent to which different parts of social space are reproduced through such means, as well as the *variable* appropriation such circulation may entail. Indeed, as Bourdieu noted, in the sense that every reproduction strategy aims at consecrating "an *exclusive* appropriation and its reproduction", we can conclude that it is the variable efficacy with which agents may circulate capital through such strategies which enables them to function as mechanisms of domination.

To give an example of such variation: within the same social space some agents may employ embodied or inherited social capital (in the form of favouritism or nepotism) as a reproduction strategy with regard to a given reproduction mechanism (e.g. the labour market), while other agents may employ economic capital (in the form of bribery) to the same end. When taken together, such differences in agents' strategies may correspond to *systemic* differences relating to entire classes of agents and covering whole fractions of social space, and hence representing a *structuring feature* within that space. Furthermore, the variable efficacy of such differing modes of circulation (in the sense of the varying rates of conversion - or loss - which they enable) may have the effect of reproducing a determinate structure of inequality within that space.

Finally, it should be noted that the objectified, institutionalised reproduction mechanisms of a given *state effect* may themselves vary. The contingent nature of that effect (both in time and across space), and also the equally contingent division of the legitimate social libidos (between the 'generalised' interest, the profit motive, and the 'specific' interest), may result in

reproduction mechanisms whose impact varies within the same social space, and which tend to favour different capitals (and hence interests) above others.

In all cases however, the possible configurations of a given system of reproduction strategies will remain determined by the genesis of the social space which it in turn serves to reproduce, and which has, as one of its objective structures, the specific configuration of the reproduction mechanisms of the *state effect*. In keeping with a Bourdieusian understanding of practice, reproduction strategies should not, therefore, be considered as the product of “a conscious and rational intention”, but rather as “the dispositions of *habitus*, which tends spontaneously to reproduce the conditions of its own production”. Reproduction strategies thus fall within the broader *dialectic* of embodiment and objectification (as figure 6.1 illustrates). Such a mode of analysis does not preclude agents employing conscious strategies, so long as we remain aware of the primacy of the dialectical relationship between embodied and objectified structures.³

6.2 *Blat*, *Guanxi* and *Wasta*: Clandestine Circulation through Social Capital

Perhaps the best means of demonstrating the complex interplay of forces involved in clandestine circulation *as practice* is by analysing some specific examples of social spaces which came to be reproduced through such mechanisms: Soviet and post-Soviet Russia (through *blat*); the People’s Republic of China (through *guanxi*); and varying parts of the Arab world⁴ (principally through *wasta*).⁵

³As Bourdieu notes, “Reproduction strategies engendered by the dispositions toward reproduction inherent in the *habitus* may be doubled by conscious strategies, individual and sometimes collective, that, being almost always inspired by a crisis in the established mode of reproduction, do not necessarily always contribute to the realisation of the ends envisioned” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 6, author’s translation).

⁴It should be noted, once again, that the thesis does not presume a simple correspondence between all the varying uses of *wasta*. As I will try to emphasise, not all practices described by agents as *wasta* can be considered as representing the clandestine circulation of capital (in the sense that they sometimes constitute part of the “official transmission” of capital envisioned through a given mode of “state thought”), while in some contexts similar practices are referred to by different terms (see the extract from Leca and Schemel (1983, p. 461) in the preface).

⁵Several prior (typically paired) comparisons of these different practices exist, using a variety of frameworks. They include Hutchings and Weir (2006), who compared *guanxi*

The case of *blat* in the Soviet Union is especially pertinent, and stands as a useful riposte to all such analyses of similar phenomena (usually in non-European contexts) which attribute purely culturalist explanations to their emergence, function and perpetuation.

According to Ledeneva (1998, p. 11), *blat* was “an old word which developed a new meaning at the beginning of the Soviet era”, when it came to refer to the ‘economy of favours’ which emerged in the interstices of the Soviet planned economy. Scarce goods were increasingly “obtained”, rather than bought, and agents would attempt to circumvent the inadequacies of the state distribution system by drawing upon their personal connections - exchanging gifts and favours, and subverting their ‘official’ positions in the bureaucracy or the planned economy to reward friends and contacts. By the 1950s so-called ‘blatmeisters’ had emerged able to skillfully negotiate (and profit from) the hidden byways of this informal economy (*ibid.*, p. 27), while the very functioning of the Soviet industrial system came increasingly to rely on the capacity of *tolkachi* (‘pushers’) to informally barter goods and services (Belova, 2001). As the British journalist Edward Crankshaw noted of the late Stalin period: “the key-word, the most important word in the language, was *blat*”.⁶

As this informal economy of favours spread throughout the Soviet system, *blat* became arguably the determinate mode of reproduction, coming to be used for a wide variety of purposes including “obtaining foodstuffs, housing, promotion at work and influencing official decisions” (Ledeneva, 1998, p. 23). Such goals corresponded closely with Bourdieu’s taxonomy of reproduction strategies.⁷ For instance, the possession and use of scarce sym-

and *wasta* as “traditional modes of interpersonal connections” and studied their varying impact on business culture; Brandstaetter (2011), who compared *wasta* and *guanxi* as “informal institutions”; and Smith et al. (2011), who considered the cultural specificity of *guanxi* and *wasta* (along with Brazilian *jeitinho* and British “pulling strings”) as “indigenous ways of achieving influence”. Michailova and Worm (2003) compared *blat* and *guanxi* from a social network perspective (again in terms of business impact); Hsu (2005) considered *blat* and *guanxi*, in the context of cultural “tools”, as independent variables explaining the varying response to market reforms in Russia and China; Ledeneva (2008) attempted a similar comparison, however placing *blat* and *guanxi* (as “informal practices”) more in the position of a dependent variable in relation to the different pace of reform in each context. Finally Schlumberger (2004, p. 249) (briefly) compared *blat* with *wasta* in his work on patrimonial capitalism in the Middle East, considering the two to be essentially equivalent.

⁶Crankshaw (1956), quoted in Fitzpatrick (2000, p. 168). Berliner (1957) was also among the first in the West to note the phenomenon.

⁷A complete taxonomy of *blat* uses is provided by Ledeneva (1998, pp. 27-33).

bolic resources (both for oneself and for entertaining others) demonstrates an elevated position in social space, and thus corresponds to symbolic and social investment; obtaining healthcare and other related services is a biological investment strategy; while accessing improved childcare, schooling, and eventually job opportunities for offspring corresponds to educational investment and succession strategies.

According to both Fitzpatrick and Ledeneva, it was only during the Soviet period that such a profound reliance on the use of informal networks for these purposes emerged. Rather than “mere survivals from the past” (as official Soviet thinking would have them) “it was only in the Stalin period that such [*blat*] networks spread throughout society and became an important associational form”; in Fitzpatrick’s view, *blat* was thus “a product of the Stalinist distribution system itself, a compensatory function of the regime of chronic scarcity and elimination of the legal market introduced at the end of the 1920s” (Fitzpatrick, 2000, p. 178).

Blat was indeed the mechanism or means through which the social penetrated the bureaucratic;⁸ however, it would be wrong to consider these non-economic aspects of *blat* as merely “a form of sociability” (*ibid.*, p. 179), or as a purely functional solution to problems of Soviet market coordination. Rather, power relations were fundamental to the exercise of *blat*, as two popular sayings noted by Ledeneva emphasise: “one person was sentenced for taking a nail while the other smuggled by lorries”, and “the one with connections is punished by reprimand, the one without - by the Criminal Code” (Ledeneva, 1998, p. 78).

In Bourdieusian terms, the reproduction mechanisms of the Soviet *state effect* were adjusted toward the legitimation and reproduction of institutionalised social and cultural capital - the former represented by positions in the bureaucracy, party or state distribution system, the latter by academic qualifications. By contrast, those same reproduction mechanisms *prevented* the variable possession of economic capital from emerging as a principle of social difference. In the sense that “the more the official transmission of capital is prevented or hindered, the more the effects of the clandestine circulation of capital [...] become determinant in the reproduction of the

⁸Ledeneva (1998, p. 46) notes that “the embeddedness of *blat* in both formal institutions and informal relations constitutes its essential nature”, while according to Fitzpatrick (2000, p. 177) “Soviet informal distribution mechanisms tended to convert every formal bureaucratic transaction into a personal one”.

social structure”, it is evident that the conversion of resources accruing to agents through the institutionalisation of social capital (i.e. in the form of their *institutional* position in the bureaucracy, party or distribution system) came to play the role of differentiation that would otherwise be assumed by economic capital. Thus, access to *blat*, or rather the efficacy with which one could use *blat*, was determined according to the variable possession of this form of institutionalised social capital - what Bourdieu has elsewhere called “the political type of social capital” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 16).

Clandestine circulation in the form of *blat* thus involved the subversion of the institutionalised mechanisms of the Soviet *state effect* to agents’ (or class of agents’) particular reproduction strategies. *Blat* involved the conversion of the *institutionalised* social capital (“political” capital) deriving from agents’ positions in the bureaucracy, party or distribution system, to the *embodied* social capital vested in personal relations, which could then be reconverted into a principle of difference.

Over time, the variable possession of the embodied social capital accumulated through *blat* could (through succession strategies adjusted to this end) be inherited by offspring and converted back into institutionalised social capital through an elevated insertion in the labour market; the principle difference now being that the reproduction of that institutionalised capital was subordinated to the variable possession of embodied social capital, and the logic associated with it.

By extension, inequalities in embodied capital clearly came to function as a limiting factor in agents’ reproduction strategies, with those possessing lower quantities of such capital disproportionately punished for attempting strategies ‘above their station’ (a tendency expressed in the two sayings noted above, and labelled “suspended punishment” by Zonoviev⁹).

In this way, variable possession of embodied social capital came to represent not merely an objective inequality, but also power relations bearing the symbolic effects of field - hence structuring social space and producing determinate effects in agents’ habitus. Specifically, agents whose habitus had been formed in parts of social space dominated by such capital had a ‘feel for the game’ which could be entirely lacking in others. As one of Ledeneva’s respondents noted:

⁹See Ledeneva (1998, p. 77).

I was brought up with principles. I can't tell you how many opportunities I missed [...] When I was a peoples' deputy I [...] knew those people who were engaged in all this [i.e., blat]. And the fact that I did not use them made me even less respected. But those days I understood everything literally, believed in every slogan [...] But the nomenclatura people I met did not pay me any respect for that. They respected those who made them feel powerful and helpful. [I] felt I couldn't [engage in blat]. Not because I was honest, just silly. *I simply didn't know the rules of the game.* (Ledeneva, 1998, p. 98, emphasis mine).

According to Ledeneva (*ibid.*, p. 217), this respondent was a “teacher of the elite school, [...] intelligentsia background”. In Bourdieu's reasoning, the absence of economic capital as a principle of difference in Soviet social space (and the subsequent elevation of political capital to this role) served to emphasise a distinction based instead upon rivalries between academic and political capital (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 17).¹⁰ The effects of this division, in terms of habitus, are evident in the respondent's account of her attempt to transition from one side of this division to the other: “I simply didn't know the rules of the game”.

The social game in question - in which one gains respect not for ‘understanding literally’ the strictures of Soviet “state thought”, but rather for making one's superiors feel “powerful and helpful” - appears to correspond to the social libido (the ‘specific’ interest) produced through the elementary mode of domination. What the respondent appears most keen to emphasise however is that playing such a game was not a question of conscious volition, but rather of possessing the right disposition. As with the Lebanese professional in the introductory chapter, *knowing* a thing to be necessary was not the same as being able to (physically) do it. In this sense, the attempted transition of the agent from a field defined by academic capital (elite schools) to one defined by political capital (people's deputy of the local Soviet (Ledeneva, 1998, p. 217)) was ultimately thwarted owing to her inability to adapt to the dispositions necessary to succeed in the new field: principally, an adjustment to reproduction strategies involving the conver-

¹⁰In the sense that political capital corresponds to a form of institutionalised social capital, and academic capital to institutionalised cultural capital, we may thus abbreviate the cleavage to a social capital/cultural capital division.

sion of such political (i.e. institutionalised social) capital to embodied social capital.

In sum, despite the normative pretensions of Soviet “state thought”, the actual principles of reproduction within a significant part of Soviet social space became, within only a few decades of the October Revolution, largely determined by the variable possession and circulation of embodied social capital. Moreover, agents were able to reproduce that capital through reproduction strategies corresponding to the elementary mode of domination, including, as a significant aspect of that domination, a subversion of the social libido of the ‘generalised’ interest to the ‘specific’ interest. This was in spite of the existence of institutionalised reproduction mechanisms which, by contrast, were themselves often subverted to the defence of the ‘specific’ interest, through the varying application of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence - or “suspended punishment”.

The same analysis may be extended to the practice of *guanxi* in the People’s Republic of China. According to Yang (1994), who studied the phenomenon in the 1980s, *guanxi* “developed in the midst of the Cultural Revolution and then spread rapidly until it met up with the money economy of the 1980s when it declined in some areas of life but found new breeding ground in others” (Yang, 2002, p. 463).

Like *blat*, “the *guanxi* gift economy [...] served in many ways as a substitute for market relations, which were severely curtailed by the redistributive and planned economy of state socialism” (Yang, 1994, p. 320). Early uses of *guanxi* also seem to compare closely with *blat*, principally the obtaining of scarce goods and services through the informal exchange of favours. However, with the expansion of market relations, the uses to which *guanxi* were put changed. Yang attributes a functionalist explanation for such a shift -

As previously scarce items such as televisions, train tickets, restaurant seats, lean meat and nursery school space are now easily available through the market, ordinary people have less need to practice *guanxi*. It is in the world of business where entrepreneurs and managers still need to engage with what remains of the state economy, with official controls over state contracts, access to imports, bank loans, favourable tax incentives, access to valuable market information and influential persons, and exemptions from troublesome laws and regulations. It is here that

guanxixue [*guanxi* practice] finds nurture in the new economy.
(Yang, 2002, p. 464)

Similarly to Ledeneva and Fitzpatrick, Yang concludes that it is the formalism and over-rigidity of the state which created *guanxi*. “*Guanxixue* came to prominence in China in the middle of the Cultural Revolution as a way for people to separate themselves from the extreme state-saturated order” (*ibid.*, p. 468). Indeed, at times Yang even presents *guanxi* as a kind of salvation - from both statism and capitalism: “horizontal *guanxi* bonds create a fabric for reconstructing civil society after state fragmentation of social bonds” (*ibid.*, p. 475), whereas “when *guanxi* is adapted to capitalism, money loses its independence because money itself must be mediated by symbolic capital, which is only gained through generosity” (*ibid.*, p. 475).

Extending this theme, Yang tries to draw a fixed distinction between *guanxi* and instrumental practices such as corruption or bribery, emphasising the importance of “*renqing*” (human feelings)¹¹ to the practice of *guanxi* - “[...] there is a difference between *guanxi* and corruption or bribery. *Guanxi* places much more emphasis on *renqing* and the long-term obligations and bond of the relationship than the material interest exchanged, whereas in bribery or corruption, the social relationship is a means, not an end, of the exchange” (*ibid.*, p. 465).¹² However, she also notes that, as *guanxi* comes increasingly to be used in the business domain, “the explicit material monetary calculations and the scale of monetary values transacted transforms *guanxi* into the order of corruption” (*ibid.*, p. 465).

Kipnis (1996) also attempted to emphasise a distinction between more and less “instrumentalized” *guanxi*, again articulated - it would seem - according to its distance from the state, with rural *guanxi* assumed as innately less instrumental than urban *guanxi*. However, as with Yang and also Smart (1993) (who analysed *guanxi* in Hong Kong), Kipnis seemed to have difficulty establishing a firm line between instrumental and non-instrumental *guanxi*, admitting “sometimes I would be confused” by a respondent’s failure to clearly distinguish between friendship and economic exchange in such

¹¹As translated by Kipnis (1996, p. 285).

¹²Interestingly, in her initial work on *guanxi*, Yang appears to distinguish between *guanxi* and *renqing* (as noted by Kipnis (*ibid.*, p. 285)), viz. - “The art of *guanxi* seems more masculine because, unlike traditional rural-derived *renqing*, it has emerged in a historical postrevolutionary context [...]” (Yang, 1994, p. 320).

practices (Kipnis, 1996, p. 298).¹³

While focussing on agents' accounts of practices (and in the process tending to reproduce their normative categories), these anthropological-style approaches seem relatively less interested in the propensity for *guanxi* to function (like *blat*) as a *variable means of appropriation*, whose efficacy appears less determined by the form of exchange (i.e. instrumental, affective, or something between the two) than the power relations (and class position) of the agents involved.

For instance, Kipnis (*ibid.*, p. 299-300) describes two weddings in the same village, the first involving a peasant family with low educational attainment (although the groom was described as "popular in the village"), the second a family of teachers (where the bride was a college graduate). In the first case, around 60 people gave a total of 350 yuan in gift-money, while in the second approximately 90 gave more than 1,200 yuan. When asked why people had given so much in the latter case, respondents would say the bride's father (a retired teacher) "handled his *guanxi* with others especially well", or alternatively that they were "just repaying him in the same amounts that he had given them on various earlier occasions".¹⁴

Kipnis had previously described the village in which these exchanges took place ("Fengjia") as having "a relatively equal distribution of wealth". Accordingly, he argued that "Fengjia's socioeconomic situation certainly influenced the tenor of gift giving there. A less egalitarian village would reveal greater class tensions in patterns of *guanxi* management" (*ibid.*, p. 290).

Given that he had thus already discounted Fengjia's *guanxi* practices as having any relation to the (re)production of inequality, Kipnis was thus obliged to account for the large (and apparently class-based) inequality revealed by the two weddings' varying gift-money in purely functionalist terms: "It appears that those whose work necessitated social networks outside of the village (such as [...] the teacher whose daughter's marriage is discussed above) were more likely to have this sort of expansive style [in *guanxi* ex-

¹³At one point Kipnis even asked several respondents to "help me resolve the differences" between statements which appeared to equate handling *guanxi* well with achieving an economic return in gifts equivalent to what one had already paid out. The respondents "pointed out that there really was not any difference" (Kipnis, 1996, p. 300).

¹⁴Again, when enquiring about how these two comments could be reconciled, Kipnis was told "there really was not any difference": practical logic in action.

change] than peasants whose work kept them involved mainly in village and family social networks” (Kipnis, 1996, p. 302-303).

If anything, this tendency for *guanxi* to function as a variable (and increasingly exclusive) means of appropriation grew more pronounced with time. As already mentioned, market reforms in 1980s China saw *guanxi* practices ‘shift’, both in terms of domain (from a widespread, “everyday” practice to the more limited field of business and state interaction) and in degree of instrumentality. In this respect it is useful to compare contemporary *guanxi* with the supposed ‘evolution’ of *blat* following the fall of communism. In the case of post-Soviet *blat*, the “shock-therapy” introduction of market relations resulted in a rapid reconfiguration of social space. As one of Ledeneva’s respondents pithily remarked, “Market conditions have changed personal relationships and ruined many friendships” (Ledeneva, 2000, p. 190). Where once the exchange of favours would suffice, money now became determinant, as another respondent made clear -

Now if some questions are to be solved ‘by *blat*’, via acquaintances, they imply, hint or even tell you directly how much it is going to cost. The deal, they say, has to be ‘greened’ [colour of US dollar] or ‘crocodiled’. Therefore, everything which used to be by *blat* now takes the form of bribery, all sorts of bribery. (*ibid.*, p. 211)

According to Ledeneva, “the extent of post-Soviet reforms have changed informal practices so much that *blat* has almost lost its relevance as a term” (Ledeneva, 2008, p. 118); in China, by contrast, the “partial and relatively slow” introduction of market reforms has favoured the emergence of “a *guanxi* culture [...] in business-government realms” (*ibid.*, p. 131).

Differences in the evolution of *blat* and *guanxi* seem to fit within a Bourdieusian framework. In the case of *blat*, the rapid disintegration of the Soviet state prompted agents to pursue “one-off”, conscious reconversion strategies which, combined with the loss of the state’s monopoly of symbolic violence and the rise in parallel structures of organised crime, favoured an increase in the kind of instrumental exchange which tended to destroy the “sociality” underlying prior *blat*. The relative endurance of power relations in the Chinese case, by contrast, seems to have favoured the continuation of *guanxi* as a form of clandestine circulation - that is, as a form of disguised

reproduction based upon continuing resources (see previous chapter).

In both cases though, the introduction of economic capital (and reproduction mechanisms associated with such capital - specifically, property rights) as an additional dimension structuring social space resulted in a rapid shrinking of the extent of that space reproduced through both *blat* and *guanxi* - specifically to the more elite fractions. Thus (in a manner perhaps contrary to the benign, interpretivist conclusions of Yang and Kipnis) there resulted a *rising efficacy* for both as a variable means of appropriation among those agents still able to rely on such mechanisms.¹⁵

The final case study concerns *wasta*, and more generally those forms of circulation which tend to reproduce intermediate, ‘traditional’, social formations, above the level of the household yet below the universalism of the state.

As we have seen with both *blat* and *guanxi*, the principle of differentiation which formed the basis of the socially-efficient resources (capital) upon which they were dependent was related to positions in the bureaucracy, party, or state-run distribution system; thus, in terms of reproduction mechanisms, both *blat* and *guanxi* were principally the products of the state organisation of the labour market.

In the case of parts of the Middle East and Central Asia (including post-Soviet Central Asia), forms of circulation similar to both *blat* and *guanxi* have come to predominate, yet based however on principles of solidarity in (apparent) contrast to the state, and the state’s reproduction mechanisms: clans, tribes, sects, etc.

One such form of circulation is *wasta*, an Arabic word used throughout the Levant and much of the Gulf to refer both to a useful contact or intermediary, or in a generalised sense to the store of contacts and informal favours upon which an agent may draw (hence, agents may refer interchangeably both to “a *wasta*” and “having *wasta*”).

Wasta has been studied from the late 1960s onwards, beginning with Ayoub (1966) who examined it ethnographically within the context of conflict resolution in a Lebanese village, and Khalaf (1968), who, although not referring directly to the term *wasta*, nonetheless included unmistakable as-

¹⁵Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley (1998) note a similar transition (in terms of capital structures) in the case of post-Soviet transition in Eastern Europe; however, they do not incorporate implications arising from Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the forms of capital, or the articulation of domination through reproduction mechanisms.

pects of the *wasta* system in his examination of the impact of “primordial ties” on contemporary politics within Lebanon.

In keeping with the functionalist approach to clientelism popular at the time,¹⁶ *wasta* was initially treated primarily as a structural emanation of the social order. It performed socially integrative functions that could be placed within a teleological framework leading to the eventual emergence of the modern state.

A partial exception to this approach was Huxley (1978), who saw in Lebanese *wasta* “a process which can function as a reward traded in social exchange” (*ibid.*, p. 116). In particular, Huxley distinguished between reciprocated *wasta*, which led to “mutual relationships”, and non-reciprocal *wasta*, which led to “power relationships” (*ibid.*, p. 115). This was arguably the first attempt to take a socially-differentiated approach toward *wasta*, and its potential role in (producing) the structure of inequality. In particular, Huxley’s observation that “informants belonging both to the upper class and the younger subgroup tended to find economic senses of meaning” for *wasta*-like transactions (as opposed to affective meanings) was a significant - though under-explored - finding, suggesting (within a Bourdieusian framework) that *wasta* involves varying power relations and different effects of misrecognition depending upon agents’ position in social space.

Another approach to highlight the role of power relations in *wasta* was Johnson (1986), who in his study of *Class and Client in Beirut* applied a materialist, neo-Marxist critique to Lebanese clientelism, and treated *wasta* as a particular mechanism of “clientelism as a system” (*ibid.*, p. 97). More recently Hamzeh (2001) and Makhoul (2004) have both rehabilitated *wasta* for the clientelist paradigm, with Hamzeh in particular defining *wasta* as “the ability to attract a client group and attain access to a power broker” (Hamzeh, 2001, p. 170). However, these somewhat structuralist interpretations of *wasta* (that is, as a super-structure or second-order manifestation of deeper-lying class relations) tend to underplay its affective or emotional aspects (as Johnson (2001, p. 5) himself has acknowledged), and can reduce it to a somewhat instrumental exchange relation. Moreover, such approaches

¹⁶See the previously mentioned works by Boissevain (1966) and Weingrod (1968) on networks of patronage and clientelism in Sicily and Sardinia. Indeed, in the edited volume of Gellner and Waterbury (1977) on *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, contributions by all three authors were to be found together alongside a chapter by Farrag (1977) on “*wastah*” among Jordanian villagers.

fall into the structure/agency trap previously noted by Kaufman (1972, p. 288). In either reading, there is no mechanism to account for how practices such as *wasta* emerge and then “evolve” (rather than die out) with the changing structure of class relations.

In contrast with the USSR or the People’s Republic of China, the Arab societies in which *wasta* is prevalent have always included a significant role for market relations;¹⁷ while *wasta* sometimes plays an additional role in obtaining scarce (material) goods, in some contexts its ubiquity spreads to incorporate every reproduction strategy, as Farsoun elaborates -

One needs a *wastah* in order not to be cheated in the market place, in locating and acquiring a job, in resolving conflict and legal litigation, in winning a court decision, in speeding governmental action and in establishing and maintaining political influence, bureaucratic procedures, in finding a bride [...] (Farsoun, 1970, p. 270).

While precise *wasta* usage varies from place to place (and agent to agent), it nonetheless tends to be considered as the continuing manifestation of a principle (or structure) of group solidarity opposed to the state: be it the tribe, the sect, or something between the two.¹⁸ Yet how convincing is such

¹⁷The extent of market relations has varied over time and space: Lebanon, for instance, has consistently followed a *laissez-faire* economic system (notwithstanding national ownership of some utilities, and state-granted monopolies in some industries); Syria and Egypt, by contrast, passed through periods of ‘Arab’ socialist rule, which typically involved the nationalisation of many industries and a system of extensive subsidies for common goods. Jordan and Saudi Arabia, by contrast, while always following an essentially free-market orthodoxy, nonetheless kept many large industries and utilities within state ownership, and tended to subsidise housing, energy and food to a greater or lesser extent. From the 1970s onwards (following various current account crises) most non-oil Arab economies, starting with Egypt, began pursuing “*infitalah*” (“opening-up”) reforms aimed at some degree of liberalisation and the expansion of market relations. In the past decade these reforms have (arguably) even begun reaching oil economies such as Saudi Arabia, where subventions in fields such as housing have been markedly reduced. See Richards and Waterbury (2008) for a general overview, and Hinnebusch (1993) and Hinnebusch (1995) for, respectively, discussion of “*infitalah*” reforms in Egypt and Syria.

¹⁸See, for example, Farsoun (1970, p.270) in reference to Lebanon - “The *wastah* system is generalised in the society and performs important functions within the family and clan as well as outside it.” Also Al-Ramahi (2008, p. 36) and Ronsin (2010, p. 2) in reference to Jordan - *wasta* is “a personal exchange system between members of society that is entrenched in the tribal structure of the country”, and “modern use of *wasta* is a combination of both tribal practice and modernization.” Barnett, Yandle, and Naufal (2013) meanwhile apply a transaction costs approach in which they consider the tribe “as a firm” (Bardhan, 1997, p. 44), and *wasta* as a tribal norm which remains functional

an analysis? In the cases of both *blat* and *guanxi*, we have seen the emergence of forms of clandestine circulation which rely upon the transmission of embodied social capital and which were entirely the product of transformations in the *state effect*. As Roy (1996) has demonstrated, the permanence of supposedly pre-modern solidarity groups within the context of the modern state is, rather than a manifestation of the weakness of the state, always “the effect of a recomposition by the state factor”, giving such groups “a complex relation with the state, far from its negation.” In all cases, the state is the “unsurpassable horizon of political recompositions” (*ibid.*, p. 5, author’s translation).

In treating of the persistence or resurgence of patronage politics in the Middle East and Central Asia, and the supposedly “traditional” solidarity groups upon which such patronage is based, Roy argues that we are dealing not with timeless or unchanging social objects, but rather *a type of relation to politics* (*ibid.*, p. 6). Following the 14th century Arab political scientist Ibn Khaldun, Roy uses the Arabic word *‘aṣābiyah* - which can be translated as “solidarity” - to describe this relation, and he demonstrates that the ‘modern’ *‘aṣābiyah* “emerge from *the virtual disappearance* of the sociological structures of the traditional society (village, tribal and even ethnic)” (Roy, 1994, p. 274, emphasis mine). Rather, in instances where modern *‘aṣābiyah* takes the *form* of traditional solidarity groups (i.e. tribes, etc.), such a development is the product of a *retraditionalization*: that is, modern groups, reconstituted by the state, which define themselves “with reference to the codes” of the traditional *‘aṣābiyah* (*ibid.*, p. 274).¹⁹

We may argue - in keeping with the framework thus far developed - that the type of relation which characterises *‘aṣābiyah* groups is the product of a mode of circulation predicated on the dominance of institutionalised and embodied social capital.²⁰ In this sense, there are clearly instances where the reproduction mechanisms of the *state effect* can be said to *actively en-*

through processes of state development. While most accounts seem to accept that “new” *wasta* need not be always and everywhere a product of tribal relations, the tribal structure is still typically viewed as the originator or carrier of such practices (see also Cunningham and Sarayrah (1993) and Kilani and Sakijha (2002)).

¹⁹Roy notes the same tendency in post-Soviet Central Asia (Roy, 1996), which Collins (2006) also studies.

²⁰This would seem especially the case in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, where as Roy notes “the reformation of these [solidarity] groups has nothing to do with monopolizing the state apparatus [for economic gain] for the state coffers are empty, and the holding of prebends quite meaningless” (Roy, 1994, p. 276-77).

courage such circulation, in that they both produce (*qua* institutionalise), and discriminate according to the possession of, such capitals.²¹ Whether intentional or not, the recomposition which results is the same. Hence, as Roy notes, modern *‘aṣabiyah* “may be formed initially on a modern sociological foundation (the new intelligentsia as opposed to the old families, for example)” (*ibid.*, p. 272), or they may be formed through possession of the state apparatus (Roy, 1996, p. 12); in either case, the basis of their power comes to be reconstituted into embodied social capital through the elementary mode of domination, in a manner similar to *blat*.

In these cases we may say that the *state effect* - in the sense of the capacity for the field of power to produce domination through reproduction mechanisms adjusted toward the objectification (and concentration) of the various capitals - more closely approximates that of the ‘King’s House’ than the ‘Reason of State’: that is, domination is both less objectified and dependent upon the reproduction of social (rather than cultural) capital. In most cases, this transformation of the mode of reproduction tends to follow on from a crisis in the prior, established mode as a result of the effects of decolonisation: in both the Middle East (France and Britain) and Central Asia (the Soviet Union), the concentration and objectification of capitals achieved through the colonial state was maintained through external enforcement. The end of that enforcement, and the absence of domestically-sited mechanisms sufficient to continue such concentration and objectification within and through the state - in the sense both of the means of economic and cultural production - ensured that the circulation of social capital was thus more likely to emerge as the determinant principle of differentiation.

We should therefore be careful to distinguish between social spaces in which reproduction based upon the circulation of social capital is a legitimate principle (that is, an ‘official’ form of circulation encouraged by the reproduction mechanisms of the *state effect*), and those in which it is a *clan-destine* form of circulation. To be sure, there are circumstances in which distinguishing between the two is far from clear cut; however, it is easy to see similarities between the mode of domination produced in Jordan - where the Hashemite monarchy reproduces a form of tribalism subordinate to the

²¹Saudi Arabia and Jordan in particular may be considered as examples of societies in which the *state effect* (in the sense of reproduction mechanisms) and “state thought” (in the sense of the legitimate expression of the varying social libidos) actively encourage such a mode of circulation.

state - and that produced in a former Soviet Republic such as Tajikistan - where, as Roy (1994, p. 276-280) demonstrates, the renewal of localism and the emergence of new “kolkhoz apparatchiks” as notables is a continuation of the collective system and apparatus established by the Soviets (albeit under the ‘specific’ interest, and motivated by a crisis in accumulation). These cases may be contrasted (for example) with Lebanon and Syria, where *wasta* is not embedded in any particular ‘traditional’ solidarity group,²² but rather - in a way similar to *blat* and *guanxi* - involves a subversion of the ‘official’ reproduction mechanisms of the *state effect*.²³ In all cases, however, it is the *state effect* which plays the determinant role in structuring such circulation, regardless of the (culturally arbitrary) format in which such circulation is manifested (at the level of practice) and misrecognised (at the level of structure).

6.3 Clandestine Circulation and the Economy of Practices

As the various examples discussed have demonstrated, the clandestine circulation of capital may take a variety of different forms depending upon the particular genesis of a given social space, and the contingent *state effect* structuring that space. Not only may clandestine circulation vary according to the *guise* of capital transacted (primarily cultural in the case of France, and social in the cases detailed above), but also according to the *form* of capital employed.

For instance, in the initial French and British cases detailed by Bourdieu, the transmission of inherited and embodied cultural capital was aligned to reproduction strategies restricted in their scope to the household (specifically parents to children), and aimed at a final conversion into institutionalised cultural capital. By contrast, in the Soviet case the conversion of political (or institutionalised) social capital to embodied social capital (and hence to other scarce socially-efficient resources) entailed reproduction strategies

²²I do not consider instances of *wasta* derived from power obtained through the consociational political system to represent an ‘official’ form of circulation, though others may disagree.

²³Again, the distinction is not always absolute: in Jordan several accounts have commented on “new” *wasta* which does not rely upon tribal solidarity; such developments underline the fact that, in dealing with practices of informal exchange, one should be wary of reifying ‘folk terms’ as consistent social objects.

which made use of much more extensive social links, and a principle of reproduction based upon the elementary mode of domination.

As a result, the prevailing form of capital circulated in each case also tended to involve different effects of *misrecognition*. In the case of France, the clandestine circulation of cultural capital within the household tended to defend a point of honour predicated on the ‘universal’ or ‘generalised’ interest, corresponding to the principle of merit. By contrast, examples involving the extensive clandestine circulation of embodied social capital beyond the household tended (though not universally)²⁴ to defend a point of honour predicated on the ‘specific’ interest, corresponding to the obligations of friendship (for horizontal relations), or the feelings of power and helpfulness (for vertical relations). At times, however, such circulation appeared to be entirely disenchanting, with agents following purely instrumental goals.

To account for this variance, and grasp its significance as a factor structuring clandestine circulation, we must integrate a theoretical principle deriving from Bourdieu’s proposal of a *general science of the economy of practices*.

According to Bourdieu, practice constitutes an economy, in which the conversion of capital follows general principles of conservation similar to those exhibited by energy in the physical sciences:

In accordance with a principle which is the equivalent of the principle of the conservation of energy, profits in one area are necessarily paid for by costs in another (so that a concept like wastage has no meaning in a general science of the economy of practices). The universal equivalent, the measure of all equivalences, is nothing other than labour-time (in the widest sense); and the conservation of social energy through all its conversions is verified if, in each case, one takes into account both *the labour-time*

²⁴For instance, the 1950s Harvard Project (as quoted in Fitzpatrick (2000, p. 167)) noted that “If the principles of *blat* were recorded in terms of participants, they would likely coincide with the Moral Code of the Communist, the most important principle of which was ‘One is a friend, comrade and brother to another’.” This variation in terms of misrecognition (which also includes those agents with an entirely disenchanting view of *blat*) is considered by Lovell, Ledeneva, and Rogachevskii (2000, p. 59) as proof that the *blat* misrecognition “game” was “incomplete”. Variations in misrecognition concerning clandestine circulation are undoubtedly the hardest aspect of practice to grasp, and Lovell et.al. are not helped by failing to apply the concept in a relational manner. This distributed nature of misrecognition regarding clandestine circulation is in fact a function of the prevailing structure of social space, as we shall see.

accumulated in the form of capital and the labour-time needed to transform it from one type into another. (Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 254, emphasis mine.)

Such a conception of practice is extremely useful in identifying the constraints structuring the conversion of capital in a given social context. However, it is only analytically useful if we are able to adequately specify of what, precisely, ‘social energy’ consists.

In this sense, we must turn to one of Bourdieu’s earliest works on the concept of social reproduction:

Every power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, *adds its own specifically symbolic force* to those power relations. (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990, p. 4, emphasis mine.)

This “symbolic force” can be understood as “the symbolic strengthening of power relations (*rappports de force*) that is implied in the recognition by the dominated of the legitimacy of domination” (*ibid.*, p. 5). Thus, when we consider any *symbolic* capital²⁵ *qua* ‘social energy’, we must distinguish between the *power* represented by that capital (in the sense of its utility as a socially efficient resource) and the *symbolic force* associated with it, which legitimises that power and tends to conceal the power relations which are the basis of its force.²⁶

The additional symbolic force associated with (symbolic) capital is what lends to practices of clandestine circulation a wider economism. That is, analysis of the *total labour* involved in the clandestine circulation of capitals reveals not merely the labour-time accumulated in the capitals themselves,

²⁵Symbolic, that is, in the sense discussed in chapter 3 in relation to “the symbolic effects of capital” noted by Bourdieu in *Pascalian Meditations* (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 242).

²⁶In the interests of avoiding more theoretical complication than is strictly necessary, the symbolic force described by Bourdieu in *Reproduction* is understood as essentially equivalent to the *illusio* binding agents to a field, and the interest, or social libido, which makes social games ‘worth the candle’. The distinction between the different terms results, no doubt, not only from the general evolution in Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, but also the analysis of the different research objects from which they emerged. Thus, it is perhaps best to think of the symbolic force as what emerges (in terms of habitus) from possession and circulation of symbolic capital; when constituted into subjective position-takings (through effects of field) this force takes the form of a specific social libido.

but also (through the *additional* labour-time required to transform such capitals), the precise nature and strength of the symbolic force associated with those capitals, which must also be conserved if the power relations which are the basis of their force are to maintain their ‘social energy’ - that is, to remain misrecognised.

The implications of this principle to the study of clandestine circulation are profound. It suggests that agents are constrained not by ‘reference rules’ or cultural norms, but according to the interest generated by the capitals which they possess. The symbolic force associated with capital is thus the principle which limits and determines a given practice of clandestine circulation, and structures it in relation to the broader configuration of power relations within social space.

The contribution of such a mode of analysis may be grasped most clearly when considering those forms of clandestine circulation predicated upon the elementary mode of domination - i.e. involving the misrecognised exchange of gifts and favours - and particularly in comparison with theoretical approaches which tend to reduce the significance of such exchange to a purely *communicative* function.

In such analyses, agents will have succeeded in increasing their *guanxi*, *blat* or *wasta* provided they are capable of correctly communicating the appropriate form or expression of their gift or favour; by extension, rejection of a gift, or failure to return an obligation, is typically considered as evidence of no more than an agent’s lack of ‘performative’ skill.²⁷

In reality, while there is always an *additional* necessity to observe symbolic codes concerning the correct form or expression of exchange (itself a culturally arbitrary factor), the social significance of such exchange lies in the production or reproduction of power relations, whose existence or po-

²⁷This focus on the primacy of agency or ‘performative’ competence in determining the outcome of an exchange may be found, in one form or another, in various theoretical approaches. Smart (1993, p. 394), for example, though purportedly working in a Bourdieusian framework, argues that “the distinguishing feature of gifting is found more in the kind of performance involved than in the character of the social relations implicated in the exchange”. Similarly, Gupta (1995, p. 381) has argued that paying a bribe in India was not simply an economic transaction, but “a cultural practice that required a great degree of performative competence”. Rivkin-Fish (2005, p. 59) seems likewise to emphasise a phenomenological understanding of exchange in post-Soviet Russia, whereby “subtle distinctions in the way objects were presented became signifiers for the kind of exchange being conducted.” Regarding rural *guanxi*, Kipnis (1996, p. 286) framed his research question specifically as “what does the gift communicate about the *guanxi* in question?”, focusing on “how gifts speak”.

tential existence transcends the specific gift or favour itself. As Bourdieu noted -

To reduce to the function of communication - albeit by the transfer of borrowed concepts - phenomena such as the dialectic of challenge and riposte and, more generally, the exchange of gifts, words, or women, is to ignore the structural ambivalence which predisposes them to fulfil a political function of domination in and through performance of the communication function. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 14).

The “structural ambivalence” of an exchange is precisely that indeterminacy arising from its position in an open-ended sequence. That is, any single exchange between two agents takes its meaning not only from the sum of all previous exchanges between them, but also stands to be reinterpreted on the basis of future responses. As was noted in the previous chapter, it is this *dialectic* of challenge and riposte through which economic capital is converted into symbolic capital, and through which relations of dependence (which in the initial analysis have an economic basis) come to be misrecognised under a veil of moral relations, such that they can no longer be reduced to a purely economic basis (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 122-123).

The “circular circulation” of gift exchange - functioning as an elementary mode of domination - thus represents the *additional labour* through which the (enduring) symbolic force of the ‘specific’ interest is established, which in turn strengthens the power relations which bind agents under a veil of (misrecognised) moral relations. Reducing any one part of that circulation to a single act of communication - i.e., to an act in which all the information necessary to comprehend the significance of such exchange is included within the form of the exchange itself - is thus to destroy the enduring nature of the forces generated through such exchange, and hence to create of such exchange the possibility of a simple, reversible transaction, adjusted toward a specific goal, and having as a result a corresponding finality.²⁸

While it is true that such purely instrumental exchanges do occur, the problem with a mode of analysis predicated on a purely communicative understanding of exchange is that it lacks analytical principles by which to

²⁸Thus Smart (1993, p. 393), for example, may conclude: “Obligation is always potential: once it has been used, it does not exist anymore.”

discriminate between such exchanges. Rather, it is only by analysis of the additional labour undertaken by agents (manifested in their reproduction strategies) that the objective determinacies bearing down on such circulation - and hence structuring it - can be ascertained.²⁹

Such determinacies naturally transcend the mere “structural ambivalence” of a given exchange between two agents considered in relative isolation. Rather, in social spaces in which power relations exist within relatively stable systems of objective relations - i.e. fields - the complete structure of determinacies bearing down upon a given interaction will be a broader function of an agent’s position within that space. Such determinacies will thus tend to constrain or enable clandestine circulation to certain conversions, involving certain capitals and following certain reproduction strategies.³⁰

Table 6.1 attempts to summarise - in the broadest sense possible - the different objective determinacies structuring the varying forms of clandestine circulation which we have thus far encountered. In each case, the dominant inequality through which clandestine circulation is effected (in the sense of socially-efficient resources) is the product of a contingent division within the field of power reproduced through a determinate *state effect*. In each

²⁹An example of such principles in operation can be found in the related concepts of *mianzi* (face) and *ganqing* (feeling) in Chinese society, as described by Kipnis (1996, p. 307) -

“without a preexisting relationship, unrelated rural families lacked *mianzi* to face each other and allow *ganqing* to flow. Hence intermediaries must be used. By establishing obligations that took time to fulfill, the extensive giving at the beginning of relationships created a period of indebtedness during which flows of *ganqing* could begin. In this sense such giving created *mianzi*, which in turn acted as a starting point for *guanxi*. After the establishment of affinal *guanxi*, the intermediaries could be bypassed.”

As described here, *mianzi*, *ganqing* and *guanxi* are almost the exact correlates of (respectively) symbolic force, power relations and symbolic capital. Needless to say, in such a system the form or communication function of the gifts exchanged is coincidental in comparison with the importance of the structure of objective determinacies (i.e. the relative position of the two families in social space) which determines the possibility of such exchange establishing power relations.

³⁰Empirical justification for such an approach is provided by Denord et al. (2011), who note that:

“the potential conversion of social capital into other forms of capital is of particular interest. Our results may hint at *diverging conversion tendencies*: that institutionalised social capital may, relatively speaking, be more readily converted into economic capital than into cultural capital, but that the capacity for capital conversion also varies according to the agents’ capital composition.” (*ibid.*, p. 105-106, emphasis mine)

case a specific reproduction mechanism of that *state effect* tends to become dominant in the allocation of resources which forms the basis of the underlying inequality. Finally, practices of clandestine circulation (in the sense of the additional labour undertaken by agents) tend to be structured in each case toward the defence of a different point of honour or principle of legitimation - the exception being forms of direct domination which produce no additional symbolic force (hence leading to disenchantment) and where the additional labour may be considered in terms of the coercion required to extract a surplus.³¹

The table describes such forms as “ideal types” - that is, as reflecting absolute structuring principles which in practice are inevitably more complex. The intention of presenting the various forms of clandestine circulation in such a way is to encourage a mode of empirical analysis in which clandestine circulation is considered in a *relational* sense. That is, a given social space may feature all or none of these forms of clandestine circulation, and each to varying degrees, depending upon the extent to which different fractions of that space are structured according to the divisions noted.

Table 6.1: The Forms of Clandestine Circulation as “Ideal Types”

Dominant Inequality	State Effect	Dominant Mechanism	Point of Honour
Embodied Cultural	Cul/Eco + Soc -	Educational System	‘Generalised’ Interest
Embodied Social	Soc/Cul + Eco -	Labour Market	‘Specific’ Interest
Economic	Soc/Eco + Cul -	Property Rights; Inheritance Laws	Profit Motive; Disenchantment

The table also demonstrates how changes in the *state effect* can generate new forms of clandestine circulation, which (owing to affinities produced through the improvisatory nature of habitus) may result in the appropria-

³¹Such an outcome implies a commensurate weakening in the state’s monopoly of overt violence, in much the same way that clandestine circulation through the elementary mode of domination entails a weakening in the state’s monopoly of *symbolic* violence.

tion of ‘folk terms’ (such as occurred with *guanxi* and *wasta*) to cover such practices. It is only objective analysis however which reveals that such circulation represents a new “exclusive appropriation”, the result of changes to the underlying mode of production, for instance through the institution of reproduction mechanisms producing market relations and leading to the emergence of an economic field.

Having outlined the general principle of the economy of practices, it now falls to demonstrate how this principle (*qua* structuring principle or limiting factor) is mediated - at the level of practice - through the dispositional nature of agents’ habitus.

6.4 Habitus and Body Hexis

The habitus, as “an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted”, and which, as such, “engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions, and no others” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 95), is the mechanism through which the objective economism implied in the conversion of capital manifests itself in the regularised dispositions of agents.

Thus, rather than the product of a conscious strategy or reference rule, the *practice* of clandestine circulation is the result of the acquired dispositions of habitus.³² As noted in chapter 3, such dispositions follow a *deontic* logic of appropriateness, in which habitus adjusts to “the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation” (*ibid.*, p. 78). Such adjustment is frequently pre-reflexive, and manifests itself physically in an agent’s body *hexis* - “in the form of a pattern of postures that is both individual and systematic, because linked to a whole system of techniques involving the body and tools, and charged with a host of social meanings and values” (*ibid.*, p.

³²See specifically Bourdieu (1998, p. 97) -

One can only account for all double behaviours, without duplicity, of the economy of symbolic exchanges by abandoning the theory of action as the product of an intentional consciousness, an explicit project [. . .] Most human actions have as a basis something quite different from intention, that is, acquired dispositions which make it so that an action can and should be oriented toward one objective or another without anyone being able to claim that that objective was a conscious design.

87).

In the sense that the varying forms of clandestine circulation are the result of differences in the objective configuration of power relations within social space, the habitus - being the sum of the durable power relations deposited within an agent on the basis of his or her trajectory through such space - will produce practices adjusted to the logic of that space, and will assess the objective potentialities inherent in a given situation according to the logic of the power relations which structure it.

In the sense that reproduction strategies are both the expression of habitus and one of the principle means through which habitus is reproduced (owing to the dialectic of objectification and embodiment), transformations to the various reproduction mechanisms are thus one of the key objective means through which the *state effect* may restructure agents' (or class of agents) habitus toward the accumulation of different capital structures (specifically institutionalised capitals over embodied capitals, and cultural over social capital).

Thus, changes to reproduction mechanisms of the *state effect* may attempt to place limits on strategies favouring the production and reproduction of embodied social capital (and hence the 'specific' interest), and to effectively constrain such strategies to the domain of the immediate household, understood in the most minimal sense (i.e. the direct kinship of parents and offspring). Such limits typically take the form of legal and statutory instruments, which tend to recognise and privilege this particular structure (through the design of inheritance and property laws, legal status, welfare entitlements, etc.) By contrast, the state may *disfavour* the reproduction of more extensive affective social structures (for instance clan, tribal, sectarian, or other affective/fictive kinship groups) by mechanisms to limit the transmission of capital through such groups, or by disproportionately increasing the cost (in the sense of the labour involved) of such transmission.³³

Of course, in the sense that fields are always fields of struggles and not

³³Cunningham and Sarayrah (1993, p. 68), for instance, notes that "the modern wasta" in Jordan is typically both more educated and less trusted by his clients. He has "an apartment rather than a house, which makes it difficult for him to provide a place for village relatives to sleep". The result would appear to be a less affective, more instrumental wasta/client relation, which in turn favours the concentration of power in bureaucratic rather than tribal structures. One sees in such trends the gradual evolution in modes of domination, owing to transformations in the underlying labour required to sustain affective relations.

“dead structures and empty spaces”, such transformations to reproduction mechanisms will always be met with the improvisatory responses of habitus, in the form of novel changes to former reproduction strategies, aimed at defending as much as possible the agent’s pre-existing capital structure (and hence investment). Kipnis (1996, p. 296, 311), for instance, notes in passing that attempts by the Chinese Communist Party to end arranged marriages (which in Bourdieusian typology would amount to changes in the reproduction mechanisms concerning inheritance) resulted in the creation of an “invented tradition” of scheduled visits by the fiancé to her future husband’s family. Such visits represented an additional labour in a household’s matrimonial strategies, yet served to preserve the elementary mode of domination underlying such strategies, which required the establishment of ‘face’ (*mianzi*) between the two families: a symbolic force which would bind their future relations and serve to increase their joint store of embodied social capital.³⁴

Nonetheless, when the transition from one capital structure to another - effected through alterations to the reproduction mechanisms of the *state effect* - coincides with transformations in social space conforming to class or class fraction divisions (as noted in the previous chapter), then the incentive to adopt or adapt reproduction strategies to favour the accumulation of such new capitals is at its strongest.³⁵

Thus, reproduction mechanisms conforming to the mode of institutionalised domination, and favouring the reproduction of such domination through institutionalised cultural capital, may indeed serve to produce a social space in which the varying social libidos are constituted according to the principles of division corresponding, more or less accurately, to their idealised construction by “state thought”. In such instances, the function of *sociodicy* produced by the *state effect* (that is, by the varying mechanisms responsible for constituting the various social libidos, which tend to limit their expression to certain explicit domains) will favour the *doxic* - or “taken-for-granted” - reproduction of the social structure.

³⁴See also Bourdieu (1986a) on the relation between laws and habitus, and Bourdieu (1990a) on the selective implementation of laws according to specific effects of field.

³⁵Bourdieu noted this tendency (and indeed studied it intensively) in his native Béarn, where changes in matrimonial strategies (provoked by transformations in the underlying social structure) rendered the sons of agricultural landowners ‘unmarriageable’ (Bourdieu, 2007).

Indeed, such *sociodicy* is perhaps most effective when it is at its most (apparently) passive. For example, as previously mentioned, in the ‘Reason of State’ clandestine circulation is arguably more easily effected when it is limited to the domain of the nuclear family which, in such a system, is the only remaining sub-structure through which the mode of reproduction corresponding to the elementary mode of domination may be legitimately expressed (and hence, in effect, holds a monopoly on this mode of domination). Thus, the circulation of embodied capitals within the household (both cultural and social) remains a legitimate reproduction strategy, endorsed by both the subjective constitution of “state thought”, and the objective reproduction mechanisms of the *state effect*.³⁶

By contrast, in cases where the historical trajectory of the *state effect* (and the corresponding field of power) has not resulted in the concentration and objectification of capitals within the institutions of the state, the state is unlikely to enjoy the monopoly of symbolic violence implied by “state thought”, specifically in the sense of the *objective* constitution of the varying social libidos - that is, in terms of their distribution in the habitus of agents - assumed by “state thought”. In this sense, adjusting agents’ habitus to the *actual* logic of a space (in the sense of the structure of the social libidos constituting it, which determines the *appropriate* action in a given situation, above and beyond what might be considered the ‘optative’ or ideal logic otherwise implied by “state thought”), becomes in itself one of the most important reproduction strategies - understood within the Bourdieusian typology as strategies of *sociodicy* (a form of investment strategy).³⁷

With regard to clandestine circulation, the most important of these ‘compensating’ effects of sociodicy (in the sense of legitimising or delegitimising certain strategies in certain domains) are undoubtedly achieved within the household, in the sense that the household - tending (within the ‘Reason of State’) to maintain the legal monopoly over the elementary mode of domination, as previously mentioned - may reinforce or undermine any further

³⁶The same observation holds for the (legitimate) reproduction of more extensive solidarity groups (tribes, clans, etc.) in systems corresponding to the logic of domination in the ‘King’s House’.

³⁷This form of adjustment through strategies of sociodicy is no doubt what has encouraged the recent academic vogue for uncovering “unwritten rules”; in reality, while serving to adjust agents to the ‘actual’ constitution of social space, such strategies never represent a principle of sufficient regularity to constitute a ‘rule’, but serve rather to provide a ‘feel for the game’.

effects of sociodicy subsequently attempted within institutions of the state.

Indeed, to the extent that state institutions may modify or alter an agent's dispositions (i.e. toward those reflecting an embodiment of the 'generalised' interest), it would seem necessary *either* that such dispositions reflect (and hence redouble) tendencies already implicit in household strategies of sociodicy,³⁸ *or* that the symbolic violence wielded through such institutions be greater than that of the household.³⁹

Hence, where the reproduction strategies of a given class fraction are adjusted toward the circulation of cultural capital, sociodicy within the household will tend to reinforce those dispositions finding favour in the educational system, through "a sort of ontological complicity" (Bourdieu, 1981, p. 306) which fits positions with dispositions, and links the 'generalised' interest constituting that fraction's point of honour to the 'generalised' interest of "state thought".

By contrast, Serre (2012) has noted that in contemporary France possessors of what she terms "school capital" (*capital scolaire*) find it difficult to adapt to a mode of work 'regulation' perceived as "*copinage*" (roughly translatable as 'favouritism' or 'cronyism') (*ibid.*, p. 10). *Copinage* - which, like *blat*, *wasta* and *guanxi* consists of reproduction strategies predicated on the circulation of embodied *social* capital - implies a quite different set of dispositions (and hence habitus) to those involving cultural capital. The result is thus a class of agents who, like Ledeneva's respondent, lack the necessary dispositions to succeed at *copinage*.

³⁸See Bourdieu (1981, p. 312) (and also Bourdieu and Passeron (1990, pp. 191-2))-

Some of the most characteristic features of the conduct of junior officials - a tendency towards formalism, fetishism about punctuality, strict adherence to regulations, etc. - are far from being a mechanical product of bureaucratic organization. They are in fact the manifestation, within the logic of a situation particularly favourable to its implementation, of a set of dispositions that also manifests itself outside the bureaucratic situation and which would be sufficient to predispose the members of the petty bourgeoisie to practice the virtues demanded by the bureaucratic order and exalted by the ideology of 'public service': probity, meticulousness, rigour and a propensity for moral indignation.

³⁹For instance, in *Men and Machines* (Bourdieu, 1981, p. 313), Bourdieu mentions "barracks, prisons, concentration camps" as the *extreme* forms of those state apparatuses or "totalitarian institutions" which have "*the physical and symbolic means of restructuring earlier habitus*" (emphasis mine). However, Bourdieu also makes clear that such eventualities are the product of a shift from "the ordinary functioning of fields as fields of struggle towards limiting-states, which are perhaps never reached, in which all struggle and all resistance to domination have disappeared, so that the field hardens and contracts [...]"

The investigations conducted by Hjellbrekke, Le Roux, and Korsnes (2007) and Denord et al. (2011) into the precise structure of the field of power in Norway seem to add further support to the distributed nature of such dispositions.⁴⁰ They note that “low volumes of social and personal educational capital constitute a structural opposition to high volumes of both inherited social and cultural capital”, suggesting a division between “newcomers” and “established field agents” (*ibid.*, p. 88). For newcomers, they hypothesise that “social capital (in Bourdieu’s sense) *is the concrete basis* of political and organisational capital, which is also defined by a specific type of symbolic capital (or public notoriety). It helps to compensate for the relative lack of educational-cultural and economic assets, which dominate among the other fractions of the elites” (*ibid.*, p. 105, emphasis mine). It would seem probable therefore that “newcomers”, lacking both in institutionalised cultural capital and the dispositions associated with such a capital profile, profit rather from dispositions adjusted to the conversion of embodied social capital into political and organisational capital (a kind of institutionalised social capital).

In all cases, the dispositions of agents (whether they manifest themselves in pre-reflexive strategies or the “conscious strategies” provoked by changes in the established mode of reproduction) will be a reflection of the particular conditions in which the habitus generating those dispositions was constituted, as adjusted to the current state of the field. As Bourdieu notes:

“[...] practices can be accounted for only by relating the objective *structure* defining the social conditions of the production of the habitus which engendered them to the conditions in which this habitus is operating, that is, to the *conjuncture* which, short of a radical transformation, represents a particular state of this structure” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78).

In relatively stable spaces, this ontological complicity between dispositions and (objective) positions will structure practice fairly precisely toward the most efficient conversion strategies, in which the total labour undertaken is no more and no less than that needed to conserve the social energy associated with a given capital structure.

⁴⁰They also attribute the nature of such distribution to “the long-term institutional trajectory of the country” (Denord et al., 2011, p. 105), suggesting a genesis which may equally be integrated within the model proposed in the previous chapter.

For example, the rising salience of unpaid internships in western Europe can be seen as a relatively novel form of clandestine circulation which, in the sense of “a legitimation strategy aimed at consecrating both an exclusive appropriation and its reproduction”, seems a disposition adjusted to the protection of the symbolic force associated with the ‘generalised’ interest, even at the cost of an objectively less efficient conversion than simple *copinage* or “pulling strings”.⁴¹

By contrast, as we shall see in the next chapter, in social spaces where the state’s monopoly over symbolic violence is limited and incomplete (and where, by extension, the concentration of capitals within the state is also at best partial), specific strategies of sociodicy may emerge within households which have the effect of further undermining and degrading the legitimacy of the state (in the sense of the state’s ‘public interest’), through dispositions encouraging the payment of bribes or the use of connections. Indeed, such strategies are especially notable when placed within the *total* order of strategies of sociodicy effected within such households, whereby (owing to the precise configuration of objective reproduction mechanisms) alternative strategies may simultaneously encourage the cultivation of the ‘generalised’ interest in other domains (for instance the labour market or the educational system). Again, the ‘efficiency’ of such strategies can only be revealed by relating the habitus producing them to the particular constitution of symbolic forces within that sector of social space, as manifested in the determinate structuring of an agent’s point of honour.

The exception(s) to this economism which eventually prove the rule are

⁴¹Which is to say, as the relative value of institutionalised cultural capital declines (owing to an inflation in the number of agents possessing degree-level qualifications - representing in Bourdieu’s terms a change in the established mode of reproduction), the rate of conversion of such capital in the labour market also falls, reducing its effectiveness as a means of ensuring “an exclusive appropriation” in the labour market. However, rather than reverting directly to *copinage* (that is, a direct conversion of inherited or embodied social capital to a position in the labour market) a disguised form of circulation has emerged, whereby agents pass through an intermediate stage (or stages) of unpaid employment. The cost of absorbing such a long period of labour without income, as well as the social connections necessary to obtain the best opportunities, tends to render such practices a variable means of appropriation. However, the capacity for such placements to be misrecognised as demonstrating experience and commitment (both according to the point of honour of the ‘generalised’ interest) also renders them an effective legitimation strategy for certain fractions of the field of power. A notable exception to this case is Italy, where *fare un posto* and *raccomandazione* (i.e. direct conversion) remains widespread, if rarely openly acknowledged - a product, no doubt, of the Italian state’s historically weak monopoly of symbolic violence.

to be found in instances where the ontological complicity between habitus and field has broken down, owing either to changes in the mode of reproduction, or the destabilising of habitus through (for instance) migration. As Bourdieu notes:

Habitus is not necessarily adapted to its situation nor necessarily coherent. It has degrees of integration - which correspond in particular to degrees of ‘crystallization’ of the position occupied. Thus it can be observed that to contradictory positions, which tend to exert structural ‘double binds’ on their occupants, there often correspond destabilized habitus, torn by contradiction and internal division, generating suffering. Moreover, even if dispositions may waste away or weaken through lack of use (linked, in particular, to a change in social position or condition), or as a result of heightened consciousness associated with an effort of transformation (such as the correction of accents, manners, etc.) there is an inertia (or *hysteresis*) of habitus which have a spontaneous tendency (based in biology) to perpetuate structures corresponding to their conditions of production. As a result, it can happen that, in what might be called the Don Quixote effect, dispositions are out of line with the field and with the ‘collective expectation’ which are constitutive of its normality. This is the case, in particular, when a field undergoes a major crisis and its regularities (even its rules) are profoundly changed. In contrast to what happens in situations of concordance when the self-evidence linked to adjustment renders invisible the habitus which makes it possible, the relatively autonomous principle of legality and regularity that habitus constitutes then appears very clearly. (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 160)

Hysteresis of field or habitus is immediately recognisable through the effects of destabilisation it produces. Tabar, Noble, and Poynting (2010, p.170-173), for instance, have examined the effects of a radical displacement in producing a “tormented” ethnic habitus among Lebanese migrants in Australia, a phenomenon which Noble (2013) demonstrates may clearly manifest itself in body *hexis*.⁴² Likewise, we have already seen one case of

⁴²See the description of “Michael”, who gives the same speech in two languages, with

destabilised habitus in relation to an attempted change of social position in Soviet Russia; in the case of post-Soviet *blat*, the destabilisation of Soviet social space (and the rapid assimilation of market relations) clearly favoured those agents (such as *tolkachi*) whose prior dispositions most closely approximated those of market relations;⁴³ by contrast, those agents lacking such dispositions (being, for instance, more accustomed to affective exchange) quickly found the space of *blat* had shrunk to exclude them.

Effects of hysteresis can also account for ‘misfirings’ of habitus, such as the “botched bribe” of our opening anecdote. Bourdieu describes habitus as “the durably installed principle of regulated improvisations”, which “produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78).

In this sense, the case of the young professional demonstrates a ‘false conjuncture’ between habitus and situation, the result of a discrepancy between the objective conditions of the site of embodiment of habitus (France), and the objective potentialities inscribed in the bureaucratic situation (Lebanon). As a principle of regulated improvisations, the professional’s habitus could produce only those dispositions ‘appropriate’ to the demands of the situation as they would otherwise be inscribed in the French field - where, it must be said, the capacity of the bureaucratic field to enforce a monopoly of symbolic violence on behalf of the ‘universal’ interest of “state thought” is considerably greater than in Lebanon. The *inertia* expressed in the professional’s physical inability to pay the bribe is thus the continuing embodiment, in body *hexis*, of the symbolic force associated with her capital structure: a capital structure acquired in a different social space, and thus producing a different ‘feel for the game’.

The regulating principle of habitus - enabling an improvisation which tends to reproduce the conditions of its production - is thus the mechanism through which the clandestine circulation of capital produces its most significant effects: specifically, the variable means of appropriation through which

radically varying *hexis* (Noble, 2013, pp. 341-343).

⁴³The advantage (in terms of dispositions of habitus) for such agents is also noted by Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley (1998), while McDermott (2007) applied a similar analysis (using Putnam-style social capital) to the ability of managers of firms to negotiate transition in the Czech Republic.

such circulation tends to reproduce a particular structure of inequality. As the durable embodiment of the unequal power relations existing objectively in social space (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 16), habitus will produce dispositions regulated according to the affinities and oppositions structuring that space.

For instance, as Denord et.al. make clear in the Norwegian case, “more autonomous fields seem to be characterized by more internal patterns of social capital accumulation, which we have called ‘endogamy’” (Denord et al., 2011, p. 105). This suggests that, as well as an “integrating principle” (*ibid.*, p. 105) (and hence tending to maintain the overall legitimacy of that elite), the clandestine circulation of social capital can also (and perhaps more significantly) function as a means for limiting the progress of “new-comer” fractions, and ensuring that the dominant position of “inheritors” is reproduced.

Far from a conscious exclusion, such endogamy is most effectively achieved through the affinities of habitus formed through occupation of the same fraction of social space. Rivkin-Fish (2005) seems (perhaps without realising) to demonstrate these same affinities - and the variable means of appropriation resulting from them - in the cases of ‘Valya’, ‘Sonia’ and ‘Liudmila’, and their differing degrees of success in attempting to improve their standard of maternity care in post-Soviet Russia (a biological investment strategy).

Of the three, both ‘Valya’ and ‘Sonia’ were able to obtain an improved service, the first through a combination of affective and instrumental exchange (one doctor was a friend, the other a contact to whom she paid an additional fee), the second through purely affective means (Rivkin-Fish noted only that she gave her doctor a waffle to have with her tea after the consultation). The third, ‘Liudmila’, despite offering more substantial gifts than ‘Sonia’ to the same doctor, nonetheless received a cold and perfunctory examination.

While (as already mentioned) Rivkin-Fish appeared to attribute the different responses to the *form* in which the varying gifts were made, a more plausible explanation is the broader structure of power relations within which they were nested. Both ‘Valya’ and ‘Sonia’ shared the same class condition as the doctor;⁴⁴ ‘Liudmila’, on the other hand, had pulled strings

⁴⁴In the case of ‘Valya’, her Soviet-era background was one of relatively high cultural capital (her parents were both engineers), while she herself had two degrees and had

through the former head of department, and on first meeting the doctor informed her she was “financially well-off”, asking “how much do we need to pay you? [...] just tell us how much it’ll cost. We can afford anything” (*ibid.*, p. 57). The doctor later explained to Rivkin-Fish that such a strategy left her not wanting to “reach out” to ‘Liudmila’ - an apt expression, which serves to emphasise the *distance* (in terms of capital structures) between the doctor’s institutional cultural capital and the economic capital of ‘Liudmila’, which evidently resulted in the doctor interpreting the latter’s request as an attempt at overt, vertical domination, and hence a challenge to her (professional) point of honour.

Even in situations involving an apparently instrumental use of clandestine circulation, the unequal structure of power relations can be reproduced through the effects of endogamy manifested in the affinities of habitus. Xin and Pearce (1996, p. 1652), for instance, quote an informant admitting that “I hired X, a high school graduate, with his father’s connections in mind” - connections which enabled him to avoid a potentially expensive government audit. In such cases class position and the dispositions of habitus become inseparable aspects of clandestine circulation: employee “X” ‘fixed’ the situation through a 2,500 yuan ‘allowance’ (equivalent to half a year’s salary for a middle manager), which he presumably passed on (or shared) with the auditors. Like the *blatmeisters* of Soviet Russia, or the *simsars* of Lebanon, the disposition to pay a bribe is thus inseparable from an affinity relative to those receiving the bribe, which is ultimately sufficient to render this form of clandestine circulation (as others) a variable means of appropriation.

established “a highly successful business in the import sector” with her husband. In this sense, following the fall of the Soviet Union ‘Valya’ pursued a successful *reconversion strategy* into the economic field. However, her continuing sense of affinity (*qua* class position) with physicians as fellow *professionals* is demonstrated through her justification for paying a “bribe” - “I feel that I *should* pay, I have the money, and so it’s right that I pay for their professionalism and time” (Rivkin-Fish, 2005, pp. 48-50). Such justification is the product of hysteresis (or inertia) within habitus of a prior *state effect*. ‘Sonia’, as a former pharmacy student whose acquaintances “did not consist of highly placed specialists or bureaucratic power brokers”, had an even closer affinity.

6.5 Position Takings and The Social Space of Clandestine Circulation

The relational nature of the dispositions structuring clandestine circulation brings us to the final (and most complex) aspect of practice: the second-order effects (in the sense of agents' subjective accounts) produced by such circulation. As various attempts to analyse such phenomena have demonstrated, a fundamental ambiguity clouds such practices, confounding simple categorisations. Agents frequently disagree over what does and does not constitute such practice; who engages in it; the degree of coercion involved; the degree of reciprocity; and the degree of instrumentality. In the case of *guanxi*, *blat* and *wasta*, such ambiguity has filtered into the theoretical accounts of such practices produced by analysts, with normative assumptions regarding the redistributive effects of such circulation mirroring agents' varying misrecognition, resulting in particular in exchanges misrecognised under the 'specific' interest tending to be viewed in benign terms (e.g. Yang (2002, p. 475) and Kipnis (1996, p. 302-303)).

Such fundamental ambiguity is evidently the product of the varying extent to which practices of clandestine circulation are misrecognised, and the symbolic form which such misrecognition takes. As we have seen, misrecognition - as a contingent effect of the symbolic force which binds power relations - will vary depending upon the character of the relations involved in a given social practice, and the form and guise of capitals involved. In the sense that power relations are not merely embedded within habitus, but also objectified within fields, we can therefore conclude that the degree and form of misrecognition displayed by agents will, to some extent, be a contingent product of their position in social space.

However, any direct correspondence between position (in social space) and position-taking (on practice) is complicated by a number of factors, which originate in the distinction between clandestine circulation as objective practice and clandestine circulation as *comment-on-practice*; that is, between clandestine circulation as the dispositions engendered by habitus, and clandestine circulation as the position-takings reflexively produced by habitus. This distinction, and its implications, require further elaboration.

First, it is understood that agents typically restructure their accounts of practice to place themselves in the 'best light' (a variant on the 'biological

fallacy'). As we saw in chapter 3, in such a way the determinants of practice (i.e. the dispositions of habitus) are *ex post* reconstituted into conscious agency, which is then provided with a motive. The precise nature of such a motive may be useful in determining the agent's immediate 'point of honour' in a given practice (that is, the nature of the power relations between two agents): however, in the sense that a given practice of clandestine circulation may be misrecognised under the *specific* interest, the constitution of this 'point of honour' may not undergo any consistent variation according to an agent's position in social space.

This is because, while embodied social capital varies in terms of its *efficacy* depending upon an agent's overall capital structure (as Bourdieu noted in *The Forms of Capital* (Bourdieu, 1986b)) the symbolic force generated by such capital will not vary according to the same matrix, in the sense that the 'specific' interest is generated between affective relations (friends, relatives) which are typically consistent across social space, and produced through an elementary mode of domination whose symbolic effects (unlike institutionalised domination) are relatively autonomous from the distributional effects of field. Thus, regardless of their position in the broader structure, agents will typically view their own acts (when conducted under the 'specific' interest) as the duties of family or friendship, or alternatively (when lacking symbolic force, and coming closer to overt coercion) as a necessity forced upon them by the constraints of a broader system.

The second important implication is that the objective practice of clandestine circulation - as the product of the dispositional sense of habitus - represents a class *condition*. Hence, the objective probability of agents engaging in practices of clandestine circulation will vary according to the extent to which the part of social space they occupy is reproduced through such means, as will the efficacy with which such forms of circulation function as a means of variable appropriation.

Clandestine circulation as comment-on-practice, however, is the product of the perceptions of habitus, and is thus the product of a class *position* - a position-taking articulated in relation to other position-takings.⁴⁵ It is thus likely to depend, at any given time, on the state of the broader structure of

⁴⁵This distinction - described by Wacquant as "pivotal" - Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 6) between class condition and class position was initially made in Bourdieu (1966); its relative absence in *Distinction* (Bourdieu, 1984) was in turn to become Elster's chief criticism of that work (Elster, 1981).

power relations within and between fields existing in social space, and the (sometimes arbitrary) symbolic articulation of the varying points of honour constituted by those relations. The restructuring effects of field being what they are, it is thus entirely feasible that a given class or class fraction may take a strong *position* (in the system of position-takings) against a practice which, by virtue of that class's *condition* within social space, is in fact a vital constituent of its reproduction strategies (and hence frequently manifested in the dispositions of habitus of agents deriving from that class).

Thus, for instance, Guthrie (1999) based his conclusions on the (supposedly declining) relevance of *guanxi* in China's new capitalist economy on formal, two-hour interviews conducted with members of the new managerial class at their factories. As Yang (2002, p. 461) noted in her critique of Guthrie's work, this methodology entirely failed to take account of "*guanxi*'s association in public discourse with the grey areas between proper and improper behaviour and with getting around rules and regulations", making it something that "few people would admit to publicly" - particularly, one imagines, managerial members of the rising middle class speaking in a formal interview setting. What Guthrie thus captured was the position-taking of a particular fraction within China's new field of power toward a given social object; what he did not capture was the propensity of that fraction to make use of *guanxi* as a practice.

Similarly, the previously mentioned example of *copinage* from Serre (2012) demonstrates not simply the varying *dispositions* manifested within a class fraction adjusted toward the clandestine circulation of cultural capital, but also, no doubt, a *position-taking* by that class fraction toward other classes perceived as lacking their 'generalised' interest (and hence having opposing points of honour).

Analysis of these second-order effects and their distribution is thus the most complex aspect of clandestine circulation, and the reason behind the frequent academic labelling of such practices as "paradoxical". Indeed, position-takings of agents toward clandestine circulation may alternately vary according to whether such circulation is treated as the agent's practice, as objective practice, as practice restructured into folk terms such as *blat* and *wasta*, or as practice restructured according to "state thought" (such as corruption or patronage) - the difference in each case being the particular point of honour which such comment-on-practice is addressed toward.

It is thus naïve to expect any *direct* correspondence between an agent's position in social space, the extent to which that position is reproduced through clandestine circulation, and an agent's subjective attitude toward the practice of clandestine circulation (as revealed through interview). Nor, indeed, is the elaboration of a precise structure of such misrecognition even necessarily desirable, given that there is no theoretical reason why mechanisms of clandestine circulation should need to produce their own effects of sociodicy (i.e., that such circulation only produces its effects provided it is successfully misrecognised by agents - hence an absence of misrecognition implying a less effective mode of circulation).

Rather, what is necessary is for analysis to relate agents' misrecognition - in particular, as demonstrated through the additional labour (or lack of it) revealed *in practice* by their reproduction strategies - to the mechanisms responsible for constituting the various social libidos in a given social space. That is, in the sense that misrecognition of clandestine circulation is a distributed phenomenon, the distribution it reveals will not necessarily be the propensity toward using such mechanisms, or indeed the extent to which such mechanisms are responsible for reproducing a given agent's capital structure, but rather the underlying distribution of the symbolic forces which - when reconstituted into the dispositions of habitus - structure the potential domain of such circulation, and the forms it will take.

6.6 Conclusion

The purpose of this section of the thesis has been to present a general theory of the clandestine circulation of capital, structured according to the research questions outlined at the end of chapter 3.

First, clandestine circulation was itself defined (according to Bourdieu's conceptual tools, and in a manner consistent with Bourdieusian theory) as *the tendency for part or parts of social space to be reproduced according to principles of difference (forms and guises of capital) which exceed that domain of their legitimate expression as otherwise constituted by the 'official' transmission of capital conceived through "state thought"*. This circulation was then distinguished according to different forms, and the emergence of these forms related to the particular genesis of a given social space. Charting this genesis involved expanding upon Bourdieu's conceptualisation of the

state, and in particular the *effect* of different processes of state formation on the capital structures and interests of the field of power.

Clandestine circulation was then analysed at the level of *practice*, in order to determine the factors structuring (and limiting) it, and the potential effects of such circulation in terms of the *variable means of appropriation* such circulation typically entails. Clandestine circulation was identified as manifesting itself in agents' *reproduction strategies*, and as involving the subversion of specific *reproduction mechanisms* of the state as the basis of an exclusive appropriation.

Analysis then demonstrated the economism underlying such circulation as a result of the varying symbolic forces produced by the circulation of symbolic capitals. This economism, it was argued, manifests itself in the form of the additional labour embodied in the dispositions of agents' habitus. Finally, the ambiguity of such practices as typically constitute the clandestine circulation of capital was considered as a second-order effect related to the broader structure of social space, and the implications of this ambiguity to the empirical study of clandestine circulation were briefly considered.

Having thus outlined the general theory of clandestine circulation, it now falls to demonstrate these principles in action. The following section thus presents a detailed investigation of the clandestine circulation of capital in the particular case of Lebanon.

Part III

Lebanon: A State of the Field

One good way of understanding what *wasta* is, is when you describe the lack of it. When you say somebody doesn't have *wasta*, the poor fellow is doomed. He will get nowhere.

Informant, Lebanese businessman,
50+

Overview

This section presents the results of an empirical investigation into the field site of urban Beirut. The purpose of this investigation is to demonstrate how the principles elaborated in the theoretical section of the thesis can be found structuring agents' practices in an empirical context.

The section is divided into two chapters, each constituting one of the two research 'moments' of Bourdieusian praxeology, as outlined in chapter 3. The first moment consists of an elaboration of the most important objective structures constituting Lebanese clandestine circulation: the *reproduction mechanisms* of the Lebanese *state effect*, and the socially-efficient resources (species of capital) produced through those mechanisms, which in turn structure Lebanese social space.

Having outlined these objective structures, the next chapter then addresses the second research moment, which deals with practices and representations. The different forms of Lebanese clandestine circulation are analysed through an investigation of agents' *reproduction strategies*. In particular, the chapter attempts to demonstrate how clandestine circulation represents a *structured* phenomenon. Strategies - and hence habitus - vary according to an agent's position in social space, and the ways in which agents misrecognise such circulation differs according to the *point of honour* produced by their capital structure.

Through this process the attempt is made to uncover both the objective effects of clandestine circulation on the reproduction of Lebanon's social structure (in terms of the variable appropriation which such mechanisms enable), as well as the factors structuring that circulation (in terms of the structure of the varying symbolic forces, as revealed through agents' additional labour, which adjusts them toward specific strategies and practices).

Chapter 7

The First Moment

In keeping with the mode of analysis proposed in the conceptual and theoretical chapters, the empirical analysis of Lebanese clandestine circulation undertaken here begins with an evaluation of the objective structures responsible for producing the socially-efficient resources (species of capital) which form the basis of such circulation. In accordance with the model developed in chapters 5 and 6, those structures are understood as consisting of the *reproduction mechanisms* of the *state effect*, divided into *the educational system*, *the labour market*, *property rights* and *inheritance laws*. Given the interrelation of the latter two, for the purposes of this chapter they will be treated together.

Furthermore, given the importance of *sociodicy* to clandestine circulation, in the sense of the precise constitution of the varying social libidos and the domain of their legitimate expression, the evaluation of the Lebanese *state effect* also takes into consideration the degree to which the state is able to maintain *the monopoly of legitimate violence* - understood in both the symbolic and physical sense. When considered together, such analysis is intended to provide an idea of the subjective structure of Lebanese “state thought”, in the sense of the structuring of the domain of the various social libidos, and the objective limitations to the generalised interest.

Having dealt with these aspects of the Lebanese *state effect*, the first moment of analysis concludes by specifying the most important socially-efficient resources in Lebanese social space which derive from them, in the form of species (forms and guises) of capital, and - following on from this - the dominant capital structures within that space.

7.1 Specifying Lebanon's *State Effect*

As Leenders (2012, p. 8) has noted, few researchers consider the Lebanese state, or take it seriously as a research object. Why spend time enumerating laws and bureaucratic structures, when they do not come close to describing the true structuring principles of practice?

The answer, as already outlined in the theoretical section, is that the state - as a social fact - produces social effects, whether or not those effects match the normative criteria assumed by "state thought". In analysing the Lebanese *state effect*, it is these effects which we are attempting to grasp.

This may indeed involve enumerating laws which are honoured purely in the breach, or organisations existing only on paper (the Lebanese state railway, for example, employs 350 people; there are no functioning railways in Lebanon).¹ The purpose, however, is not to reproduce "state thought", but to demonstrate how such institutions - laws, organisations - structure practice, specifically when they function as *reproduction mechanisms* which play a role in the production and distribution of socially-efficient resources, and which form the objective bases of clandestine circulation. Thus, examples are given - e.g. the higher education system, civil marriage, rental laws, migrant labour - which trace how regulations are implemented (or not) *in practice*, and thus contribute to the variable appropriation of capital. Such analysis is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to capture the overall dynamics of the field.

In the sections which follow the Lebanese *state effect* is therefore specified precisely inasmuch as it presents an object (or objects) that must be negotiated by agents with respect to their *reproduction strategies*. The mode of analysis thus follows that outlined in chapters 5 and 6. The goal is to reach the point where the most relevant socially-efficient resources structuring Lebanese social space (and hence Lebanese clandestine circulation) are identified, and related to the precise *reproduction mechanisms* of the Lebanese *state effect* responsible for them.

Elaborating the precise nature of the Lebanese *state effect* also, inevitably, entails addressing Lebanon's sectarian system. Sectarianism in Lebanon has been dealt with exhaustively,² and it is not my intention here

¹See <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/15778> (accessed 08/07/2014).

²For an overview of the literature see Weiss (2009).

to engage with, or contribute to, that literature. Rather, I address sectarianism purely from a sociological perspective as it relates to clandestine circulation: that is, what effect does Lebanon's particular system of sectarianism have on the production and distribution of socially-efficient resources, and specifically through the organisation of reproduction mechanisms? In this way I hope to avoid reifying sectarianism, without ignoring the very real effects which the sectarian system has, as a social fact, and as a structured structure, on the organisation of agents' reproduction strategies.

7.1.1 The Lebanese Educational System


Statistical data produced by the government, while lacking in some areas and inconsistent in others, nonetheless afford us a fairly clear picture of the general structure of the Lebanese educational system, and (to a lesser extent) its role in the transition to the labour market.

The first, general trend to note is the high number of university graduates, particularly among younger Lebanese. Figure 7.1 illustrates this feature, and especially the recent, sharp rise in graduates: among those below the age of 30, between half and one-third now hold a degree, while among those over 30 the figure falls steadily with age, from just over 20% to around 10% for those close to retirement.

The sharp rise in young graduates does not, however, appear to conform with the structure of demand for graduate-level qualifications in the Lebanese labour market. A recent report by the government's Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) measures professional and managerial positions (in both public and private sectors) as representing, respectively, only 14% and 12% of the workforce (Yaacoub and Badre, 2011). While the occupational divisions used by CAS might include graduate-level jobs in other categories (for instance "technicians and associate professionals"), it would nonetheless seem that the current Lebanese educational system produces many more graduates than the labour market can absorb. This argument is further supported by levels of unemployment among graduates: at 29.7% (2007) of the total unemployed, their representation is almost double that in the general population (15.4%).³ Indeed, many young Lebanese graduates

³See CAS (2007, p. 225, 272). By comparison, those with only elementary education are 22.3% of unemployed, and 28.6% of the total; intermediate 23.2% and 21.6%; and secondary 19.6% and 16.2%.

Figure 7.1: Lebanese University Graduates by Age Cohort, % (2009)



(Source: CAS)

- unable to be absorbed by the domestic labour market - are often obliged to emigrate to the Gulf states to find work.⁴

At one level, this recent trend toward a larger number of graduates has evidently reduced the ‘conversion value’ of a degree within the Lebanese labour market - that is, as a principle of distinction enabling an exclusive appropriation for a given class or class fraction. As such, the declining importance of the university, and by extension of institutionalised cultural capital, as an investment strategy sufficient of itself to enable social reproduction, is similar to the situation in western Europe as previously recounted in the theoretical section.


As with western Europe, this development is no doubt contributing further to a significant reliance on social capital as a principle of distinction.

⁴See MPC Team (2013) and American University of Beirut and Hariri Foundation for Sustainable Human Development (2009).

Yet attempts to draw a simple correspondence between such developments in the Lebanese educational system and those in Europe or the US would miss much of the specificity of the Lebanese system, and in particular the long-term effects of that system's particular structure (*qua* reproduction mechanism) on Lebanese social space.

Indeed, a statistical representation of the Lebanese educational system which differentiates purely according to a hierarchy of the highest qualification obtained will miss the most important division structuring that system: namely, that existing between specific institutions, and above all between the public and private provision of education.

Figure 7.2: Rate of Inscription in Lebanese School System (1991-2012)



(Source: El Amine, Adnan “Déclin de l’enseignement public au Liban”, séminaire IFPO, 19/02/2013)

As figure 7.2 demonstrates, the raw number of Lebanese students educated by the Lebanese state is a declining minority. Rather, the majority of students are educated in private schools, the majority of which are fee-paying, and which are run by a variety of domestic or foreign religious groups, charitable organisations and private companies.

The private provision of education (especially according to sectarian criteria) has a long history in Lebanon, pre-dating the founding of the Republic, and protected by article 10 of the Lebanese constitution.⁵ Indeed, the provision of free or subsidised education through charitable foundations continues to be a significant source of sectarian patronage for the Lebanese political elite, with many established families in the varying sects able to offer discounts or even free places in the schools they control.⁶

Whereas private schools are prized for the higher standard of education they provide students, public schools, by contrast, tend to be valued chiefly for the secure jobs they provide in the labour market. Public teaching posts (particularly in Beirut) fall under the patronage of the sectarian political elite, and as such, laws relating to public schools have favoured a “policy of deprofessionalisation”, in which some applicants are excused from passing the application process, or of requiring teacher training, while others are allowed to apply without holding qualifications (Nimer, 2013). This heavy politicisation of appointments has led to a paradoxical inflation in the number of public teachers at the same time as student numbers enrolled in public schools have declined. Thus, the public teaching system currently enjoys a student/teacher ratio of 7:1, against a much higher 13:1 in the private sector. The latter, however, nonetheless still manages to significantly outperform public schools in terms of exam performance (Blom Investment Bank, 2014, p. 16).⁷

The public/private division within the Lebanese education system has assumed the characteristics of a variable means of appropriation, a fact most clearly seen through an examination of geographical variation in the structure of that division. The reliance on the private sector increases according

⁵This states that: “Education shall be free insofar as it is not contrary to public order and morals and does not affect the dignity of any of the religions or sects. There shall be no violation of the right of religious communities to have their own schools provided they follow the general rules issued by the state regulating public instruction.”


⁶For instance, respondent 12/3 recounted how she and her siblings had benefitted from discounted private schooling through a family connection to the owner, a former government minister. Likewise, both Johnson (1986) and Baumann (2012) have noted how control of the Sunni Maqasid foundation (and its schools) enabled za’im families such as the Salam to exercise patronage within their communities. In general, obtaining a (private) school place for children was a major preoccupation among respondents, with most alluding to some attempt to use family, personal or professional connections in this process.

⁷According to the same Blom report, in 2013 88.3% of students passed their year in private schools, falling to 77.2% in public schools.

to the relative wealth of a region, with inscription rates reaching 75.4% in the municipality of Beirut, and 72.9% in Mount Lebanon - the wealthiest parts of the country - while falling to only 44.1% in “the most damaged South” (an area including Nabatiyeh, Sour and Bint Jubayl).⁸

Further proof of this trend is found in the strong fall-off in recourse to private education as students pass through the system.⁹ Figure 7.3 illustrates this phenomenon, which seems to suggest that the value of the private system as a means of distinction *increases* through secondary and tertiary education, as fewer and fewer households choose (or can afford) to invest in private education.

Figure 7.3: Lebanese Students in Private Schools (free and fee-paying) by Age Cohort, % (2007)



(Source: CAS (2007, p. 218))

This tendency can be explained if we consider the public/private divide as the result of two distinct strategies: on the one hand, the weakness of

⁸The figures may be found in the Survey on Living Standards (2007) produced by the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS, 2007, p. 219).

⁹The Lebanese educational system is based upon the French model. The primary cycle covers six grades, followed by the brevet (3 grades) and the baccalaureate (3 grades). See <http://www.mehe.gov.lb/equiv/english/page/lebanese-curriculum.html> (accessed 04/07/14).

the public system tends to encourage the highest percentage possible of households to invest in private education at the earliest stages, to ensure their child's mental development is not unduly retarded by poor teaching in the public sector. However, the efficacy of the private system in this regard represents a diminishing return the older the child becomes, particularly if younger children within the household also come to reach school age, and hence present their own claim for early intervention on the household's scarce resources.

By contrast, the efficacy of the private sector to act as an arbitrary means of *social* differentiation (that is, above and beyond any biological effect on mental development) increases precisely as (and, by extension, because) its biological effect declines. Households which can afford to maintain the expense of privately educating their offspring (not to mention the great variation within and between different private schools) above and beyond the early intervention favoured by the large majority of households, stand to have that investment recognised (or better, *mis*recognised) as a legitimate principle of differentiation, and hence as part of a variable means of appropriation for scarce resources within both the tertiary education sector and (eventually) the labour market.

Indeed, the importance of maintaining this educational *trajectory* becomes clearest when we consider the structure of the tertiary sector. While it has already been noted that over half of Lebanese below the age of 25 now possess a university degree, variation in quality within Lebanese higher education is marked.

As of 2014, the Lebanese Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) recognises 42 universities in Lebanon: 31 private universities, 10 private university institutes (such as business, technical or religious colleges), and 1 public university (the Lebanese University, or LU). As might be expected, there is a distinct hierarchy within this list. The oldest universities, as mentioned in chapter 4, are a legacy of the 19th century cultural penetration of the Levant by Europe and the USA, and as such predate the establishment of the Lebanese Republic itself. In this respect, the American University of Beirut (AUB, founded in the 1860s) and the Université Saint-Joseph (USJ, founded in 1875) continue to hold the most prestige for (respectively) the Anglophone and Francophone communities, with the Lebanese American University (LAU, founded in 1924) also falling within

this category.

The public Lebanese University (founded in 1951) is also - in comparison with the remaining private universities - relatively well-regarded, although, as Kassir notes, since the civil war it has to some extent been “deliberately sacrificed in favour of the reinvigorated forces of confessionalism and mercantilism” (Kassir, 2010, p. 545), with the geographical division of faculties into different branches reducing sectarian intermixing, and hiring practices similar to those noted in the public school system reinforcing political clientelism.

With over 70,000 students enrolled, the Lebanese University represents around 40% of the Lebanese total. By contrast, the AUB (8,000 students, of which 6,000 Lebanese), the LAU (8,000, of which 6,500 Lebanese) and the USJ (12,000, no nationality figures) between them account for 28,000 students - only 14% of the total. While there are no recent figures available which precisely break down the role of these private institutions on elite reproduction in the Lebanese labour market, there is no reason to assume that matters have changed markedly from historical trends. As Traboulsi (2007, p. 163-164) notes,¹⁰ before the civil war a graduate of the AUB could expect to earn a starting salary of 2,000 Lebanese lira (ll), a graduate of USJ ll 1,500, and a graduate of LU ll 600. Similarly, Kassir (2010, p. 500) observes of the same period that the profile of LU students was drawn exclusively from the working and lower-middle classes, while “the curriculum offered no professional outlets other than teaching and government service.”

From the perspective of its functioning as a reproduction mechanism, the most significant aspect of this legacy of private dominance within the higher education sector is the relative autonomy of the most dominant institutions from the domestic bureaucratic field. The AUB, for instance, was initially registered (in 1863) with the New York State Education Department, and has in recent years reaffirmed its autonomy by achieving accreditation from the (US) NEASC and MSCHE; the USJ, meanwhile, was historically accredited by the French government and the Holy See, while in recent years it has maintained its autonomy through accreditation from the (French) AERES; the LAU is also accredited by the NEASC, while other private universities have attempted (with greater or lesser success) to achieve accreditation from similar overseas bodies, including the (British) BAC.

¹⁰The figures are originally found in Gordon's *Fragmented Nation*.

This practice has essentially limited the Lebanese state to a historically subordinate role in the regulation (and hence production) of institutionalised cultural capital. Whereas the state has awarded itself a minimal role (through statute) in ‘licensing’ private universities, in practice this involves no responsibility in assessing the quality of education provided, and no sanctioning mechanisms for poor performance. Indeed, it is perhaps telling that the AUB describes the degrees it awards as being merely “recognised” by the Lebanese state through its equivalence committee (a technical body whose role it is to determine the correspondence - or rate of conversion - between the varying qualifications awarded in Lebanon and overseas). Such institutions thus represent a principle of reproduction more or less autonomous of transformations within the domestic field of power, and - in the sense that they represent the most dominant mechanisms for the institutionalisation of cultural capital, and hence pertain to the *state effect* - a continuing legacy of colonialism within the Lebanese state.

Such autonomy, as we shall see, has the important effect of ultimately limiting the unification of the *point of honour* of the degree-holding bourgeoisie, such that the generalised interest deriving from the institution awarding institutionalised cultural capital (the university), does not necessarily carry forward to the identification of such an interest with the institution supposedly regulating such capital (the state).

Indeed, we may go further and argue that, in the absence of an organic link unifying these two interests to the point of honour of a specific fraction of the elite, even the urge towards the accumulation of institutionalised cultural capital may become a game of bad faith. Hence, the trend toward ‘purchasing’ essays prevalent among some students in Beirut’s leading private universities suggests the absence (at least among some fractions of the elite) of a taboo concerning the direct conversion of economic capital into institutionalised cultural capital.¹¹

¹¹According to local media, essay-writing companies freely advertise on campus in Hamra. See <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/May-17/217365-students-buy-assignments-as-semester-ends.ashx> (accessed 04/08/14).

7.1.2 Inheritance Laws and Property Rights

As already mentioned, the interconnectedness of inheritance laws and property rights (chiefly through the justice system) means it is easier to discuss them concurrently within the same section.

The first observation that should be made about the Lebanese legal system is that it is structured according to a division between religious and civil competences, and that - from the perspective of reproduction mechanisms - the boundary of this division falls (dependent upon sect) precisely between the regulation of inheritance and the regulation of (real) property rights.¹²

Thus, for Muslims all matters pertaining to personal status (marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance and wills) are dealt with by religious tribunals; for non-Muslims (i.e. Jews and Christians), inheritance and wills fall under civil jurisdiction (Mallat, 1997, p. 31). Further, whereas Muslim judges (both Sunni and Shia) are employees of the state, Christian ecclesiastical courts are separate, and indeed Catholic churches also have an extra-territorial right of appeal to the Vatican Rota (*ibid.*, p. 31).¹³

The historical precedent for this bifurcation dates back to the Ottoman period, and the subsequent way in which the Ottoman *millet* system was incorporated into the French mandate. For current purposes, it is sufficient to investigate through what mechanisms this bifurcation is perpetuated, and what are its social effects.

According to the Lebanese constitution (article 7), “all Lebanese shall be equal before the law. They shall equally enjoy civil and political rights and shall equally be bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction”. Such an article would imply a constitutional basis for citizens to have recourse - if so desired - to a civil personal status law. Indeed, during the French mandate those who did not belong to one of Lebanon's 18 officially-recognised religious communities were subject to civil law in

¹²See Comair-Obeid (2003, p. 234) (in reference to Beirut Court of Appeal, Tenth Division: judgement No. 235/2003, delivered 19th February 2003), regarding a decision on the civil judicial competence over a dowry (*mahr*) given in the form of a real property: “This decision is important as it distinguished between matters relating to personal status, which are for Islamic religious courts' jurisdiction, and matters relating to real property, which are for the judicial courts' jurisdiction. The criteria of this distinction is the registration in the Real Estates Register. The said registration had a constituent effect resulting in changing the *mahr* into a real property which will then be under the judicial courts' jurisdiction.”

¹³See also Shehadeh (1998) for an analysis of this dual system from the perspective of the rights of women.

personal status issues.¹⁴ However, article 9 of the constitution also adds that “the state in rendering homage to the God Almighty [...] guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, shall be respected.”

Tension between the rights of individuals and the rights of communities (religious or otherwise) is by no means unique to Lebanon; what is important to note is the way in which such tensions are worked out in practice. In this sense, in the legal categories pertaining to personal status, membership of a religious community *de facto* precedes an individual’s membership of the *civil* community: that is, in practice Lebanese citizens are born into a given religious community, to whose personal status code they are subject; if a Lebanese wishes to access his or her right to a *civil* jurisdiction over personal status, he or she must first deregister as a member of that community.¹⁵

Such a right has always been a legal grey area, and indeed until a circular issued by then Interior Minister Ziad Baroud in February 2009, there was no practical means by which Lebanese could officially leave their sect. However, even once deregistered there is the further problem that (in most areas) Lebanon lacks a civil legal code pertaining to personal status. Thus, citizens who deregister, while no longer beholden to their (prior) sectarian personal status code, are left without another to take its place, and hence in a sense *extra legem*.¹⁶ As one respondent (who had undertaken this procedure) noted: “Baroud legitimised removing the sect. But we were demanding *qanoun badl alhaq shakhṣiyan* - civil status law. Why? They only legitimised our removal of the sect. By doing so we became not citizens, we became like the Bedouins [sic] of Kuwait. Because you do not have legal status if you remove your sect.”¹⁷

The practical implications of this state of affairs on the production of socially-efficient resources are far-reaching, and are perhaps best demon-

¹⁴The specific instrument is decree 60 L.R. of 1936 (see <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18204> and <http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/civil-marriage-lebanon-time-now>, accessed 08/07/2014) which also forms the basis of the sectarian domination of personal status for those *with* a sect.

¹⁵Further proof for the subordinate nature of civil rights to sectarian status may be found from proposals which occasionally surface for introducing a right to civil personal status under the category of a “19th sect” (see for instance <http://qifanabki.com/2009/02/13/a-nineteenth-sect/>, accessed 08/07/2014).

¹⁶That is, as a subject beyond the scope of the law, or not regulated by the law, rather than ‘outlaw’.

¹⁷Respondent 12/4.

strated through the case of civil marriage - or rather, the continuing *de jure* absence of civil marriage.

As it stands, marriage is regulated domestically entirely through the sectarian religious tribunals, with the (civil) state limiting its role to registration. This means, in practice, that Lebanese who wish to marry outside of their sect must travel to a third country (typically Cyprus) where they can perform a civil wedding service. Upon returning to Lebanon the newly married couple can then have their marriage *de facto* recognised by the state by registering it with the public administration; however, there is no *de jure* recognition, in the sense that issues pertaining to inheritance (for Muslims) and divorce (for all sects) continue to be covered by the religious personal status code, meaning that Lebanese who marry through this method risk legal limbo in the future.

On two occasions (in 1998 and 2011) draft laws were submitted to the Lebanese parliament proposing a law on civil marriage; on both occasions however, (owing chiefly to the sectarian basis of Lebanese politicians' power) the law failed to pass - indeed, on the second occasion it was not even debated.¹⁸

In 2012, however, Kholoud Sukkarieh (a Sunni Muslim) and Nidal Darwish (a Shia Muslim), following the recommendation of their lawyer, took advantage of Baroud's 2009 circular to cancel their sectarian registration, and then applied to marry through a civil notary under decree 60 L.R. of 1936. They eventually found a notary willing to perform such a procedure in November. However, the civil servants responsible for registering the marriage within the public administration were not willing to set a precedent, and so forwarded the case to the Minister of the Interior, Marwan Charbel.¹⁹

Sukkarieh and Darwish's marriage quickly established a precedent for other couples, with a further ten civil ceremonies being held throughout 2013.²⁰ However, it also exposed deep rifts in a political landscape already on the verge of complete rupture.²¹ In January 2013 the Lebanese President,

¹⁸See <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jan-10/243642-civil-marriage-is-legal-in-lebanon-experts.ashx> (accessed 08/07/2014).

¹⁹See <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/04/20134309242619227.html> (accessed 08/07/2014).

²⁰See <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18204> (accessed 08/07/2014).

²¹Prime Minister Najib Mikati would resign in March 2013 following violence in Tripoli resulting from the Syrian conflict. His proposed successor, Tammam Salam, would ultimately require 10 months to form a new cabinet acceptable to all political

Michel Sleiman, announced his support for the couple, and for a law on civil marriage. In response, a few days later Lebanon's (Sunni) mufti, Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Qabbani, issued a *fatwa* (legal judgement) declaring that "any Muslim official, be they an MP or a minister, who supports the legalization of civil marriage, even if it is optional, is an apostate and outside the Islamic faith."²² Qabbani's announcement was followed by further opposition from the Higher Shiite Council.

As the debate began to take on the contours of Lebanon's political divisions, the Interior Ministry attempted to quash the issue by saying it had been referred to the Ministry of Justice's advisory panel and rejected; in response, the Minister of Justice, Shakib Qortbawi, announced he was aware of no such decision having been taken.²³ With nowhere else to turn, and likely in the knowledge that the Christian community (from which, as a member of Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, he was drawn) was heavily in favour of civil marriage, Charbel announced in April 2013 that he had approved Sukkarieh and Darwish's marriage contract. However, he added that he did so only on the proviso that the couple retain their sectarian status, and follow the personal status law of their sects when it came to matters of "inheritance, divorce and children" - in the process explicitly rejecting the "19th sect" argument.²⁴

Such a lukewarm endorsement was all the encouragement needed for the Lebanese public administration to drag its heels. Of the 10 further civil weddings conducted in 2013, none had been ratified by the beginning of 2014.²⁵ This was in spite of a ruling in late 2013 by the Ministry of Justice's Higher Committee for Consultations which stated that public notaries (i.e. members of the civil judiciary) were entitled to uphold the marriage of Lebanese citizens, provided they did not belong to a sect, or had removed their sectarian affiliation from official documents. This ruling was further underlined in January 2014, when the Higher Committee declared

factions. See <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/15/us-lebanon-government-idUSBREA1E07S20140215> (accessed 09/07/2014).

²²See <http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/death-sentence-civil-marriage> (accessed 08/07/2014).

²³See <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/01/21/261735.html> (accessed 09/07/2014).

²⁴See <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/Apr-26/215101-charbel-insists-civil-marriage-couple-keep-sects.ashx> (accessed 08/07/2014).

²⁵See <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18204> (accessed 08/07/2014).

in a conference that, under article 9, Lebanese had a constitutional right to civil marriage. Meanwhile in December 2013 (by then caretaker) Minister of Justice Shakib Qortbawi announced that the Legislation and Advisory Committee was preparing (yet another) draft law on civil marriage.²⁶

In the continuing absence of such a law, however, the current *ad hoc* nature of civil marriage in Lebanon perfectly suits the maintenance of the status quo. The right of citizens to a civil procedure is not explicit, and those who pursue a civil marriage still risk remaining *extra legem* with regards to other elements of personal status law. Thus, the case of civil marriage demonstrates how, even in reform, the dominance of the sectarian system tends to be reproduced rather than weakened, and that the Lebanese *state effect* - despite containing within its constitution formal legal principles pertaining to the regulation of reproduction mechanisms according to universal principles - nonetheless produces a legal order which abides by the principle of the supremacy of the sect in regulating personal status, and hence those reproduction mechanisms relating to inheritance. The continuation of such a system helps to ensure that institutionalised *social* capital - in the form of sectarian membership - as opposed to *cultural* capital, remains the principle structuring factor produced by the Lebanese *state effect*, as will be elaborated further in the section on capitals and dominant capital structures which concludes this first research moment.

From personal status we turn to property rights - a field which, although falling under civil jurisdiction, nonetheless remains intimately linked (both in historical development and contemporary practice) to the sectarian legal order.

The right to own property in Lebanon is constitutionally guaranteed, both in the preamble (F) and article 15, and is governed by the Real Property Ownership Code of 1930 (Decree no. 339);²⁷ however, despite the image often promoted of Lebanon as a *laissez-faire*, low regulation economy (the “Switzerland” of the East), in practice the right to property - or more specifically, the right of usufruct over real property - is severely circumscribed,

²⁶See <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jan-10/243642-civil-marriage-is-legal-in-lebanon-experts.ashx> (accessed 08/07/2014).

²⁷See Leenders (2012, p. 108), who quotes article 228 concerning the right to register property ownership, which derives from either 1) inheritance, 2) gifts and wills, 3) continuous and uninterrupted possession, 4) right of priority between neighbours, 5) passage of time, and 5) voluntary contracts.

a result both of determinate factors in the historical development of legal ownership in Lebanon, and effects of hysteresis in the Lebanese *state effect*, owing chiefly to the legacy of the Civil War.

To identify such effects it is first necessary to distinguish between mechanisms regulating real property and those regulating the ownership of liquid assets, such as cash and equities. Dealing with liquid assets first, the most significant instrument for such regulation within a given state is typically the fiat currency. In the case of Lebanon, the plight of the Lebanese lira may thus be seen as indicative of the wider imperfect monopoly of violence - both symbolic and physical - of the Lebanese state, both during the period of the Civil War and in its aftermath. The lira suffered high inflation on several occasions between 1975 and 1990, but it was a short period of hyperinflation after the end of the war, in 1992, which led to its value declining to the present level of 1,500 to the dollar, having been fewer than 4 to the dollar as recently as 1983.

Such hyperinflation has many knock-on consequences, not least in terms of hysteresis (or inertia) regarding real property. With respect to liquid assets, however, the effect has been to completely dollarise an economy already highly dependent on Federal Reserve policy. As a result, the Lebanese Central Bank has emerged as the sole mechanism for ensuring the external credibility of the Lebanese economy (through its defence of the dollar peg), and is in fact perhaps the only Lebanese public institution to maintain a reputation for probity.²⁸

The Lebanese state's limited monopoly of violence in matters fiscal is arguably further demonstrated by the legal regulation of liquid assets, where Lebanese governments have consistently favoured a light touch approach, which began during the emergence of Beirut as an Ottoman-era entrepôt dominated by a mercantile elite, and reached its zenith with the Banking Secrecy Law of 1956 (modelled on the Swiss law). Taxation, when it is applied, is relatively low: payroll tax rises from 2% to 20% depending on income; personal income from dividends and interest is not taxed (and the Banking Secrecy Law would at any rate make collection impractical); and capital gains are taxed at 10%.²⁹ From the perspective of variable appro-

²⁸See Leenders (2012, pp. 225-230) on this "anomaly" of the Central Bank, and Dib (2004) for a general overview of the role of the Central Bank.

²⁹See <http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dtt1-tax-lebanonhighlights-2014.pdf> for a summary (accessed 10/07/2014).

riation, it should be noted that Lebanese banks are known for offering preferential interest rates to well-connected individuals, at the expense of the unconnected.³⁰

Turning from liquid to fixed assets, we come to the subject of the regulation of real property. Some of the effects of Lebanon's system of (real) property rights were dealt with in chapter 4 (particularly in terms of the production of urban space), where reference was especially made to the rental system, and the distinction between 'old' rent and 'new' rent. In the sense that rights to fixed assets represent an institutionalised form of economic capital (as noted in chapter 5), it is this form of ownership which - being the most objectified - is arguably also the most susceptible to transformations in the *state effect*.

Indeed, analysis of real property rights in the aftermath of Lebanon's Civil War presents an ideal case study of hysteresis (or inertia) of the *state effect*, and specifically how such hysteresis can manifest itself not only in transformations to agents' reproduction strategies, but also *physically* in the production of urban space, as agents resort to strategies which employ more elementary modes of domination.

Lebanese law divides the ownership of a property into 2,400 shares (*ashum*).³¹ Given that for many sects inheritance follows a system of reserved portion (in the sense that specific family members are entitled to a fixed share of the deceased's estate), ownership of properties may over time become divided between a large number of individuals. As a result of the Civil War, during which many hundreds of thousands of Lebanese emigrated, or went "missing", the status of many properties became obscure. Alterations, including all but the most cosmetic repairs, may only be carried out on damaged buildings with the consent of *all* owners; however, with the whereabouts of so many people unknown, and Lebanon's dysfunctional expropriation laws restricting the use of eminent domain,³² it is still not un-

³⁰See <http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanons-biggest-banks-raise-interest-rates> (accessed 10/07/2014). Respondent 13/3 also reported having been offered a higher rate of interest by a student's mother attempting to curry favour.

³¹See Fawaz (2009a, p. 105) and Ghazzal (2012, p. 5).

³²Indeed, so ineffective are the laws that many Lebanese are under the impression there is no provision for eminent domain in Lebanon (see for instance the case of the Ouzai Highway). The relevant expropriation law is in fact 58/91, which provides for an Expropriation Commission to judge on the basis of individual projects, and award compensation.

usual to find ruined, apparently abandoned buildings across Beirut to this day.

Moreover, the present dysfunctional system produces its own perverse incentives. For instance, respondent 12/2 noted that in the building he was renting it was impossible to obtain a permit to repair the collapsed roof. 79% of the building's shares were owned by the landlord, but the remaining 21% were dispersed among perhaps a dozen other individuals. As the respondent said, "nobody knows who they are or where they are, and we even got a letter from the *mukhtar* in the area saying that he does not know who they are or where they are. Everyone thinks they're in Argentina. But even with that letter they wouldn't grant us the permission to do the construction." The result is a thriving market in bribery, with a terracotta *ardameet* roof costing around \$10,000 in bribes "because it's so visible". Not having such resources, the respondent settled instead on "kind of a crappy roof" of corrugated concrete boards, laid at weekends and during the night to avoid attracting the attention of opportunistic police. Nonetheless, members of the *mukhabarat* "snuck up" on them during repairs, and the respondent was forced to pay "a couple of thousand dollars" in fines - perhaps only half that sum being 'official'.

A further idiosyncrasy of the Lebanese system is that, owing to the Tenancy Law of 1944, ownership of a property *does not guarantee* the right of usufruct. Rather, the 1944 Law allowed for tenancy to be automatically 'prolonged' (*tamdid*), a trend further embedded by the 1974 Law (Ghazzal, 2012, p. 3-4). In practice, this limited the ability of landlords to recover their property, unless they could demonstrate an urgent need (typically relating to "family necessity" - that is, needing to personally occupy the property). If such a need could be demonstrated to the satisfaction of a civil judge, the landlord would then be required to provide compensation to the tenant for the inconvenience of having his contract terminated (*ibid.*, p. 4).

The most recent attempt to change this situation occurred in 1992, when a new rental law was passed which allowed "open contracts", in which renewal beyond three years was not automatic (*ibid.*, p. 6-7). The 1992 law did not, however, address the issue of existing contracts, which could be inherited from one generation to the next, and which had not increased in line with the hyperinflation of the Civil War and post-Civil War period. As a result, by the early 1990s many tenants were in the position of paying pep-

percorn rents on properties they could only be evicted from if they were paid compensation measured at the market rate of the property.³³ There are still estimated to be upwards of 150,000 families in Beirut living in properties under such 'old' rent agreements.³⁴

As with court-ordered compensation, the law governing inheritance (estate) tax is calculated on the basis of the market value of the property. Thus, for those who inherit older buildings with 'old' rent tenants, the costs of inheritance (between 12% and 45% of the property's market value) may far exceed any potential benefit in terms of rental income. Rather, in order to obtain a rent at market value (and thus offset the cost of inheritance tax), the inheritor would have to pay compensation in addition to the inheritance tax - both assessed at current market rates.

In such cases the recourse to clandestine methods to reduce or obviate either or both burdens (estate tax and compensation) is hardly surprising. Landlords may resort to sabotaging their own property to force out tenants, or use a combination of *wasta* and bribery to reduce the Ministry of Finance's assessment of the property's value (and hence reduce the estate tax).³⁵

Such a situation presents an ideal case of hysteresis (or inertia) of the Lebanese *state effect*. Three distinct mechanisms - one regulating the right of usufruct to a property, one regulating the cost of tenancy, and one regulating the exchange value of the Lebanese lira itself - altogether represented a particular mode of objectified domination at a given historic state of the field; that is, a composite mechanism through which a given part of a determinate structure of power relations was able to reproduce itself, by enabling the regulated transfer and accumulation of capital.

Hysteresis occurs, however, when one part of such a mechanism displays greater inertia with respect both to changes in the larger field and change

³³Ghazzal (2012, p. 7), for example, gives a typical example of a three-bedroom apartment in west Beirut originally leased in 1971 for \$4,000 a year. By 2011 the rent (not adjusted for hyperinflation) has fallen to the equivalent of \$1,282 a year. The landlord (who lived in the US) eventually regained the right of usufruct by arguing family necessity and paying the tenant court-awarded compensation (*ta'wid*) of \$355,250, equivalent to 35% of the (current) market value of the property. The proprietor then agreed a new 1-year contract with the tenant at market value (\$35,000 a year). The case took three years to reach a verdict.

³⁴See <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2014/06/lebanon-new-rent-law-change-demographics-beirut.html#> (accessed 29/07/14).

³⁵As noted by several older respondents who had inherited properties.

in the other parts (which may in turn be more responsive to the field). In keeping with the model developed in chapter 5, currency is considered a form of *objectified* economic capital, whereas property and tenancy rights are both *institutionalised* capitals - a form of objectification which, as Bourdieu noted, must be set apart owing to its special properties. Institutionalisation - as a function of the *vis formae*, the symbolic power of codification of the state - is in fact more prone to inertia than simple objectification. Specifically, whereas the value of the lira is set by the market, the 'value' of the rights to usufruct and tenancy (in the sense of the relative degrees of appropriation each allows) represent a state of power relations *fixed* within a codified legislative document.

It is the inertia of these latter two mechanisms, in light of the hyper-volatility of the former, which has transformed the functioning of the *total* reproduction mechanism governing property rights (understood in a composite sense) from a relatively stable, objectified system, to an unstable, dysfunctional system.

Such hysteresis in an objectified mechanism of domination does not (need it be said) necessarily result in the end of such domination; rather, where underlying power relations remain stable, it may instead prompt new strategies for reinforcing them. Thus, in the case of real estate, the dysfunctional condition of the objectified reproduction mechanism of the Lebanese *state effect* has led agents to resort to reproduction *strategies* involving more elementary modes of domination. Specifically, the clandestine circulation of embodied capitals - particularly through *wasta*, but also through physical intimidation and other methods - has emerged as one of the principal means through which agents attempt to regain the initiative, and thus reinforce social distance.

Such a resort to elementary modes of domination leaves clear traces on the physical environment. If the urban landscape represents (among other things) the physical distribution of the different species of capital - and hence the state of power relations - then figure 7.4 clearly demonstrates a particular instance of this reversion to a more elementary mode of domination in light of the hysteresis noted above.

The location of the buildings is the fashionable Clemenceau district of west Beirut (location of the Central Bank, and lying between Hamra and BCD). Clemenceau is home to some of Beirut's few remaining historic build-

ings, as well as several of its most prominent politicians. The terraced building on the left is one such building, and has been restored by a prominent Beirut family. Under the new rent regime, the market value for each apartment is in the region of \$10,000 per calendar month.³⁶ The building on the right, by contrast, is occupied by 'old' renters, and its poor condition is testimony to the fact that its landlord derives no benefit from it in its current state, and on the contrary has an incentive to let it fall into ruin, so that its tenants will be eventually forced to vacate.

Given this state of objective relations, of chief interest is the curious construction in the centre of the image: it serves no other purpose than to prevent tenants of the building on the right from having a view onto the balconies of the building on the left. While the first two floors of the construction dissimulate as to its true purpose (the first seems to be a garage, the second a faux terrace), by the third floor there can be no further doubt: it is simply a wall. In the context of the current state of the field, this structure thus represents an objectification of the unequal power relations prevailing between the two sets of agents - landlord and old-renters; and further, in the sense that securing permission to build such a wall would have doubtless required the deployment of significant social capital, we can consider the construction as in a sense representing the objectification of such social capital, by means of clandestine circulation.

In other cases, hysteresis of the *state effect* produces perverse incentives for tenants to act against what would ordinarily be their own interest. In January 2012, for instance, 27 people were killed in Antakli, east Beirut, when their building collapsed. Two months later, an engineering survey commissioned by the landlord of a neighbouring building allegedly discovered cracks in its foundations. There were two types of tenants in this building: those on fixed contracts under the new rental law, and 'old' renters on indeterminate contracts. When members of the Internal Security Forces and the Beirut Municipality arrived to evacuate the building, those on new rent contracts (and hence not entitled to compensation) left willingly, while those on 'old' rent refused, instead raising funds to carry out their own survey, and going as far as to directly lobby the governor of Beirut to let them stay.

For the 'old' rent tenants, the landlord's decision to have the building surveyed was merely the latest strategy to try to evict them from their

³⁶Based upon information from an informant.

Figure 7.4: Real Estate as Power Relations: Property Rights and Hysteresis of the *State Effect*



Hysteresis in the *state effect* (specifically between the reproduction mechanisms covering rights over real and liquid property) may result in new strategies to reinforce social distance, and hence make the effects of domination more explicit. The sole purpose of the construction in the centre of this image is to prevent tenants of the building on the right (old rent) from seeing onto the balcony of the building on the left (new rent). *Clemenceau, Beirut* (author's photograph).

homes without awarding them compensation, allowing him to demolish the five-storey building and replace it with a lucrative high-rise condominium. As one tenant complained to the local press “This land is worth millions of dollars and they want us to evacuate our houses without receiving any compensation ... we will not leave until another report comes up with the same conclusion”. For the landlord, however, his motivation was further sharpened in light of the fact that, following the earlier collapse of the neighbouring building, its owners were afterwards charged with causing the death of the occupants.³⁷

The contrast between objectified and elementary modes of domination is most clearly evident in the physical difference between those spaces still covered by the prior, dysfunctional system of reproduction mechanisms, and thus exposed to effects of hysteresis (Hamra, Ashrafieh, etc.), and those spaces governed by an entirely new system of reproduction mechanisms (BCD).

The series of transformations to legal rights and bureaucratic structures which facilitated the redevelopment of downtown Beirut is described in detail by Leenders (2012, pp. 58-64, 101-116, 209-216), Baumann (2012) and Balanche (2012). In brief, during a lull in early fighting in 1977 the Lebanese government passed Legislative Decree no. 5 authorising the creation of the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), a body exempt from usual government oversight (particularly by the Central Inspection Board of the Civil Service), which would replace the Ministry of Planning in rebuilding war-damaged Beirut.

It was not to be until 1991 when the conclusion of the Civil War would allow rebuilding to start in earnest, and the CDR was resurrected as the primary government vehicle for the task. Law 117 of 1991 gave the CDR powers to “solicit, negotiate, and secure reconstruction funding from foreign sources, issue treasury bonds, and finance infrastructure projects carried out by a private real estate company in charge of rebuilding downtown BCD” (Leenders, 2012, p. 102). This “private real estate company” was *Solidere* - an acronym of *Société Libanaise pour le développement et la reconstruction de Beyrouth* (Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut) - which was formed in 1994.

³⁷See <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Mar-03/165371-residents-of-ashrafieh-building-resist-evacuation.ashx> (accessed 21/07/14).

The CDR/Solidere division is a perfect example of an attempt to produce that ‘visible’ distinction (noted in chapter 5) between public and private interests. In the case of the reconstruction of Beirut, this ‘visible’ distinction, a product of “state thought”, served to push the ‘invisible’ distinction which in fact constituted the reconstruction project - that between the general interest and the *specific* interest - to the other side of de Sousa Santos’ ‘radical line’: that is, to be “produced as nonexistent” (Santos, 2007, p. 1-2), to be unrecognised.

Thus, not only was the CDR exempted from inspection by the CIB, but appointments bypassed the Civil Service Board. As a result, “senior CDR personnel were primarily drawn from [Rafik] Hariri’s personal entourage and his business contacts” (Leenders, 2012, p. 105). Hariri - the Sunni Prime Minister who had made his fortune in Saudi Arabia through his construction firm Oger - also secured substantial shares in Solidere, and ensured he had the same powers of patronage over senior appointments (the chairman and general manager, for instance, was recruited from Oger).

Having achieved a monopolistic position in terms of institutional structures (doing away with both government oversight and private competition), CDR/Solidere was empowered to liquidate all prior property rights within the BCD area.³⁸ They achieved this through quasi-judicial “appraisal committees” which, despite being composed of public judges, were not (according to the Higher Justice Committee) part of the judiciary - being paid for instead by Solidere. The decisions of these committees allowed no remedy at law (they could in effect only be reconsidered by similar committees), while those property owners not wishing to have their holdings absorbed by Solidere were required to sign onerous recuperation contracts with Solidere, which were frequently denied for spurious reasons (*ibid.*, p. 108).³⁹

Indeed, as Leenders has demonstrated, the whole process of liquidating property in downtown Beirut was not so much legal as having the *appearance* of legality.⁴⁰ The result was the transformation of practically all property

³⁸The area of land covered by Law 117 is highlighted in the map at the beginning of the thesis; Solidere received a further 291,800 square metres of land on the “New Waterfront” - a landfill comprising the (now processed) former Normandy rubbish dump - in lieu of payment for providing public infrastructure and utilities in BCD.

³⁹It should be noted that the only legal exceptions to the Solidere ascendancy were religious buildings.

⁴⁰The final registration of ownership transfer in the Land Registry, for instance, was pushed through in the absence of a law by a minister bearing no responsibility for such

rights in the BCD area from the complex 2400 share system of real property rights covered by a mix of civil and religious law, to Solidere "A" shares, tradable on the Beirut and London stock exchanges, and listed in dollars.⁴¹

From the perspective of the present analysis, two things about this process and its effects should be noted: first, not only did the updating of institutionalised reproduction mechanisms, *vis à vis* property rights, enable an objectified mode of domination to be reinstated within the BCD area (in stark contrast to the hysteresis prevailing beyond BCD), but second, such a process also constituted a one-off *reconversion strategy*, which transformed the capital structure of agents and the state of power relations within this particular domain of the field.⁴² As noted in the theoretical chapters, such reconversion strategies are almost always *conscious* strategies, inspired by a crisis in the established mode of reproduction (Bourdieu, 1994, p.6); as such, they do not entail the same degree of misrecognition as might be expected to prevail in a reproduction strategy the product of habitus working in sympathy with the established conditions of the field - hence, the significant degree of corruption and clientelism associated with this process.

Thus, mechanisms and power relations were both re-objectified through the same process, with a result which is visually apparent even to the casual observer - as figure 7.5 demonstrates. Land outside of BCD remains under the prior system of reproduction mechanisms, and development is haphazard and sporadic, requiring clandestine methods to succeed.⁴³ This discontinuity in reproduction mechanisms between land lying inside and outside of BCD manifests itself in the physical attributes of the built environment,

matters (Leenders, 2012, p. 113).

⁴¹Solidere stock is divided into two classes: "A" shares are the liquidated property rights of former owners, while "B" shares represent the working capital raised through the company's IPO.

⁴²Leenders, Baumann and Balanche all seem to concur in the judgement that the reconstruction of BCD favoured an emerging class against a declining one. Leenders (2012, p. 214) notes that 'Harirism' - "was as much directed against small ownership and middle-class capitalists as it was hostile to state institutions", while Baumann (2012, p. 128-129) talks of 'new contractors' such as Hariri belonging to a faction of the "transnational capitalist class". Balanche (2012, p. 155-158) meanwhile makes the contrast between a global/local class division, with BCD becoming a secure zone for a global elite. The general conclusion would seem to be that the transformation of capitals resulted in the prior middle-class property owners' position declining.

⁴³One informant involved in a civil society organisation promoting green spaces noted that large tower developments (of the kind seen in 7.5) typically required arranging to meet with a local politician "for coffee", where a bribe of \$20,000 would be paid to ensure planning permission.

and illustrates the geographical variance of the *state effect*, in the sense of the varying capacity of the state - across space as much as across time - to objectify domination.

A final effect of this reconversion strategy must also be considered, which has the added advantage of bringing us to our last reproduction mechanism. Which is to say, re-objectification of domination through property rights had the effect of pushing clandestine circulation within BCD towards the exploitation of a different reproduction mechanism: the labour market, and hence (as already noted) to the *specific* interest. Ultimately, the awarding of positions within CDR/Solidere - conforming as it did to the specific rather than the generalised interest - came to follow the familiar pattern of devolving into a socially-efficient resource within the field of power, hence representing an elementary mode of domination, with positions awarded on the basis of (embodied) social rather than (institutionalised) cultural capital.⁴⁴ Evidently, this transformation in the dominant mechanism from property rights to labour markets, and from institutionalised to elementary modes, favoured the interests of the newly dominant class fractions - the ‘contractor bourgeoisie’ and the warlords - and came at the expense of fractions which had previously enjoyed a more elevated position in the field of power (e.g. middle-class professionals, property-owners). We will now investigate more closely the general structure of this mechanism.

7.1.3 The Lebanese Labour Market

The allocation of positions within the Lebanese labour market, as well as the general structure of the division of labour, does not follow a unified, singular system. Rather, in this section I aim to demonstrate some of the most important mechanisms and structuring principles within the labour market, particularly as they relate to contingent features of the Lebanese *state effect*, and their translation into resources wielded (and struggled over) within the field of power.

Some of the more pertinent of these principles have been touched upon in the section relating to the Lebanese educational system, in particular the

⁴⁴This tendency was confirmed by a respondent (12/1), who noted “I know quite a few people who work at Solidere [...] and everybody who works at Solidere tells me there are people who work there who nobody knows what they do, because they’re not skilled, they have no purpose, but they happen to be the niece or nephew of someone who’s quite senior at the company, or some minister or something.”

Figure 7.5: A Tale of Two Cities: Hysteresis and Reconversion



a) *Clemenceau*. Brand new condominiums (in apparent breach of zoning laws) share an urban environment with rundown and seemingly abandoned shells. The gaps between the towers are empty lots - after landowners have demolished the previous building, they rent out the space as parking while waiting to secure sufficient capital to build their own high-rise (author's photograph).



b) *Place de l'Etoile, BCD*. The centre of renovated Beirut is a tightly policed security zone, where all prior capital holdings were liquidated and reconsolidated, and reconstruction carried out under the aegis of a private company, Solidere (author's photograph).

high level of unemployment among university graduates (and the subsequent requirement for many to emigrate to find work), and the tendency for public sector positions to be “allocated” by Lebanon’s sectarian-based political elites - a tendency which, in the case of Solidere, we have seen equally obtains in some parts of the (supposedly) private sector.⁴⁵

We may deepen this picture somewhat by examining the structure of the labour market in greater detail. According to the International Labour Organisation’s modelled estimate, the labour force participation rate in Lebanon is 47.2% (2012). This compares favourably with fellow Arab nations such as Jordan (41.3%), and indeed is similar to Tunisia (47.5%);⁴⁶ however, two caveats should be added: first, the ILO’s model records participation as significantly higher than the most recent statistics available from CAS (which place participation at 39%, or 1.1m people),⁴⁷ and second, labour force participation in the Arab world is low by global standards, owing principally to low levels of female participation. Thus, Lebanon’s figures are 12.5 points lower than the OECD average of 59.7%, and according to CAS only 18.5% of women participate in the labour force (representing 24% of the total, according to the World Bank (Robalino and Sayed, 2012)). Labour force participation is also heavily skewed toward low productivity jobs (35% of wage employees and 61% of self-employed) and the informal sector (50% are wage employees or self-employed).

Close examination of the statistics reveals that the Lebanese labour market presents high barriers to entry for young people. Youth unemployment is 34%, and first-time job seekers with no formal qualifications can expect to spend an average of 16 months unemployed. This period diminishes, however, according to the level of qualification: for graduates the average period is 10 months, whereas for graduates of elite universities the period is often much shorter.⁴⁸ Such a correlation suggests that institutionalised cultural capital continues to play a strong role in determining the speed (and level)

⁴⁵Leenders (2012, pp. 231-241) indeed characterises Lebanon as a state of *muhāsasa*, or ‘allotment’ state, in which “fierce struggles over the building of state institutions coexist with an utter disregard for the universal application of bureaucratic rules”, and where the spoils system dominates every official appointment.

⁴⁶ILO statistics are available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.ZS/countries/LB-JO-TN-OE?display=graph> (accessed 23/07/14).

⁴⁷See CAS (2007, p. 239), table 79-b.

⁴⁸See Robalino and Sayed (2012, p. 2) and American University of Beirut and Hariri Foundation for Sustainable Human Development (2009, p. 35).

of integration within the labour market - a factor which in turn suggests at least the partial functioning of that synchronicity between educational systems and labour markets previously described by Bourdieu as representing an objectified mode of domination.

However, to the extent that such synchronicity may also represent an underlying mechanism of *clandestine circulation* (in the sense of the possession of institutionalised cultural capital merely obfuscating deeper inequalities in embodied cultural, or even social, capital) it is important to examine other factors contributing to labour force integration. In particular, various sources attest to the importance of social capital in finding work. For instance, the CAS survey on living standards asked participants to list all methods they had used in trying to find work: whereas only 4.3% had used the national (state) hiring office, 71.5% admitted to asking help from relatives and friends - a number exceeded only by those who presented themselves directly at the employer's office (80.5%), which no doubt also implies the use of social capital in at least some instances (CAS, 2007, p. 282). Such figures are supported by research conducted by Kasparian at the USJ, which suggested 68.1% of all salaried first-time employees obtained their positions as a result of family or personal contacts.⁴⁹ It should be noted that the predominance of family ties in the Lebanese labour market is further reinforced at all levels by the prevailing corporate structure: 85% of businesses are family-owned small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and 93.5% have fewer than 10 employees (American University of Beirut and Hariri Foundation for Sustainable Human Development, 2009, p. 22,24).

While the use of social capital in the private sector may seem relatively unstructured (that is, relying upon affinities of kinship or friendship, which nonetheless - in terms of varying efficacy - express deeper structural inequalities in social space), the use of social capital in the public sector follows a structure which is much more formally apparent.

By comparison with the regional average, public sector employment in Lebanon represents a relatively low share of the total; as of 2007, the public sector accounted for 15.7% of total employment, or 4.7% of the total population (175,991 people). As previously noted when discussing the educational system, the sectarian spoils system dominates appointments to the public

⁴⁹As quoted in American University of Beirut and Hariri Foundation for Sustainable Human Development (*ibid.*, p. 25).

sector. This is despite article 12 of the Lebanese Constitution, which states that every Lebanese has the right to hold public office, and that “no preference shall be made except on the basis of merit and competence, according to the conditions established by law”. In practice, however, the post-Ta’if division of power between a ‘troika’ of (Maronite) president, (Sunni) prime minister and (Shia) speaker of parliament⁵⁰ merely reinforced the tendency already inherent within the Lebanese political system, dating back to the National Pact of 1943, to allot all senior positions on the basis of a sectarian quota (despite the commitment to dismantling political sectarian contained within Ta’if).

The precise mechanism through which the political class effects this patronage is - perhaps surprisingly - an under-researched phenomenon, as indeed is the extent to which sectarian preference has penetrated the public administration. To give an indication of how the system functions in practice it is worth considering the case of the Lebanese University. Between October 2001 and July 2014, the government failed to appoint any permanent deans to the university’s faculties. In their growing absence, the university council’s powers were transferred to the LU president and the education ministry, which - as noted by local press - crippled the institution’s independence.⁵¹ As one respondent (13/2) who had run unsuccessfully for the position of dean in one of the LU faculties during this period noted, elections were completely politicised, and candidates who were not *mad’aum* (politically supported) stood no chance of succeeding.

Negotiations to end the deadlock and push through the official appointment of 19 new deans are highly revealing of the underlying dynamics of Lebanon’s current system of public appointments. As the *Daily Star* reported -

Th[e] breakthrough came after Speaker Nabih Berri held intensified contacts with Kataeb Party leader Amine Gemayel and Free Patriotic Movement head Michel Aoun. Initially, the Kataeb Party and the FPM had demanded that a Maronite figure loyal to them replace Pierre Yared, the acting dean of the Faculty

⁵⁰It should be emphasised that the novelty of Ta’if was in a more equal division of power between these three offices, not the division *per se*: the top three posts had been divided between these sects from 1943.

⁵¹See <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jul-25/265084-lebanese-university-bill-finally-approved.ashx> (accessed 25/07/14).

of Medicine. Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt had insisted instead that Yared, a Greek Catholic, remain in his post. In the end, a compromise was reached, by which Yared stayed in his post and was made a fully-fledged dean, in return for the PSP allowing the Kataeb Party to choose someone to fill the position of the dean of the Faculty of Tourism and Hotel Management. The Kataeb Party was also allowed to choose two of its followers to fill the academic seats on the LU Council.⁵²

The political horse-trading over positions demonstrates the extent to which sectarian status has become determinant in public appointments. It is not simply the case that candidates must be loyal to a given party, they must also fulfil the (unwritten) sectarian criteria for that position; and whereas changes to the party allegiance of a post may provoke imbalances within the closed circle of political power, changing the same post's sectarian criteria risks provoking grievances that spill over into the wider political domain. The complexity of the system verges on the baroque: thus, in the example given above a Druze leader (Jumblatt) takes the cause of the Greek Catholic community against the (Roman Catholic) Maronite community, which is itself split between the Kataeb and the FPM (who in this case seem to have overlooked their immediate political quarrels to unite behind a Maronite candidate). The successful compromise saw the Maronite faction instead awarded a less prestigious faculty, and the Kataeb two seats on the LU Council (it is unclear what, if anything, Aoun was able to achieve in compensation).

In such cases it is impossible to consider either the sectarian system as autonomous from (and hence determining) the structure of political clientelism, or on the contrary the system of political clientelism as autonomous from (and hence determining) the system of sectarian allotment. Rather, the two exist in a recursive, highly iterated relationship, whereby the PSP may simultaneously represent both an over-arching Druze interest and (owing to the presence of a reserved Greek Catholic seat in Jumblatt's stronghold of Aley) a minor stake in the Greek Catholic interest, which may at times trump that of the 'Christian' (yet Maronite-dominated) Kataeb and FPM parties - the latter of whom also, incidentally, holds two Greek Catholic

⁵²See <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jul-25/265084-lebanese-university-bill-finally-approved.ashx> (accessed 25/07/14).

seats, in the Metn and Jezzine.

Nor is this spoils system restricted to the most senior positions in the public administration. Rather, despite the continued existence of the Civil Service Board, it is widely acknowledged that acceptance in almost any position in the public administration requires political *wasta* of one kind or another. Thus, one respondent (13/6) related his family's attempts to obtain a place for him at the military academy, where it would have been necessary to pay an intermediary \$20,000 to \$50,000 (depending on the number of other applicants from his sect) to obtain a place. This fee (the majority of which would have gone to a senior political figure representing the respondent's sect) would have exempted the respondent from 3 of the 4 required tests. Success, however, was still not guaranteed, so the respondent refused the offer.⁵³ Likewise, as a log-rolling side-deal to the LU dean agreement the various parties also agreed to the conversion of 1,100 contract professors to full-time posts (enabling the professors to benefit from monthly salaries and inclusion in the government's social security fund); prior to the conclusion of the agreement in 2013 one informant who was working as a contract professor noted that recruitment to full-time positions at the LU was also heavily dependent on the same system of political/sectarian quotas.

Alongside the domestic spoils system - which tends, as with *blat*, to subvert the objective mode of domination of a merit-based system to the elementary mode of domination of a client-based system - one must also consider the role of migrant labour within Lebanese society. While skilled migrant workers from Europe and North America constitute a small but significant minority of foreign workers,⁵⁴ the most significant impact in socio-economic terms comes from unskilled, semi-skilled and domestic (i.e. household) migrant labour.

In these latter categories there is a distinct geographical and gender

⁵³Another respondent (13/9) revealed that he had attempted to become a civil defence firefighter. His family had good relations with a former Minister of Interior, who frequented the family's restaurant, and whom they had helped in his electoral campaign. However, when the respondent went to the Minister with his father and two uncles to ask for support, the Minister responded that he "didn't dare recruit your son, because I'm scared of X (a prominent figure in the Shia political community)". While the family were supporters of X's political party, they were not members or militia fighters, and such jobs were allegedly reserved for those people.

⁵⁴Less than 1% of first-time work permits issued in 2010 according to CAS and the Ministry of Labour. See http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/Excel/SYB/SYB_2010/1.%20Residents%202010.pdf (accessed 28/07/14).

structure to migrant labour. As Chalcraft (2009) has demonstrated, a great deal of Lebanon's unskilled and semi-skilled labour in fields such as construction, agriculture, retail and industrial production is supplied by the long-term circular migration of Syrian males. Arriving at an accurate number of such workers is complicated by the porous regulatory framework governing Syrian labour migration;⁵⁵ Chalcraft however quotes several different sources, the more credible of which give a figure varying from around 100,000 to 250,000 in the late 1990s (*ibid.*, p. 147). To this figure can also be added another 20-30,000 Egyptian workers (who follow a more rigorous permit regime, and are hence more easily quantified), suggesting a conservative total of around 300,000 low and semi-skilled migrant workers - equivalent to around 36% of the male Lebanese labour force.⁵⁶

Such large numbers of migrant workers from a poorer, neighbouring country have had the effect of both driving down wages and increasing the capacity for capital accumulation (via wage exploitation) among certain fractions of the Lebanese elite. Chalcraft provides numerous examples of both these cases,⁵⁷ and the situation has no doubt been amplified further by the recent outbreak of war in Syria, and the large influx of refugees in Lebanon.

A similar picture presents itself - across the gender divide - in the field of domestic labour. However, whereas female Syrian workers once constituted a small though significant share of the Lebanese migrant labour force, since the 1970s their numbers have fallen (*ibid.*, p. 21), as Lebanese have shifted toward other markets to satisfy their demand for household labour.

Indeed, CAS/Ministry of Labour figures show that almost 87.7% of all first-time work permits issued in 2010, as well as 73.3% of renewals, were for female domestic workers, or *domestiques* as they are typically known in Lebanon. The most prominent sending countries for this type of labour are the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Ethiopia. To judge from official statistics (based on work permits issued), there are in the region of 150,000 such domestic workers in Lebanon;⁵⁸ however, the true number is

⁵⁵A bilateral labour agreement was signed between Lebanon and Syria in 1994 to bring some structure to what was previously a more-or-less "open door" system (Chalcraft, 2009, p. 141); however, in practice the regulation of Syrians at border transits remained haphazard (*ibid.*, p. 146).

⁵⁶834,697 persons in 2007 according to CAS (CAS, 2007, p. 239).

⁵⁷See Chalcraft (2009, pp. 158-161, 179-183, 188-192).

⁵⁸Jureidini (2010, p. 143) estimates 160,000 based on his own research in 2005/06.

again difficult to ascertain, as a significant proportion of female domestic workers - as many as 20% according to estimates by Jureidini - ‘disappear’ from the system to work free-lance without official papers.⁵⁹

The rationale for doing so is clear: such women are brought to Lebanon under the *kafala* sponsorship system, in which employers typically pay a recruitment company to bring a migrant worker into the country, and then act as a guarantor for his or her work permit. Migrant workers under this scheme are thus “tied” to their sponsor for the period of their contract, and can only change employer with their sponsor’s permission. As might be expected, such a system is ripe for abuse: of Jureidini’s sample of 458 domestiques, 87% had had their passports confiscated by their employer, and 35% were not allowed to leave the house where they worked (International Labour Organisation, 2005, p. 8). Even more grave is the high incidence of death among migrant domestic workers, with Human Rights Watch reporting 95 deaths between January 2007 and August 2008, including 40 suicides and 24 through falling while trying to escape (Das and Davidson, 2011, p. 315). In 2012 Alem Dechasa, an Ethiopian domestic worker, committed suicide shortly after having been filmed being savagely beaten outside the Ethiopian consulate in Beirut by the brother of the head of the recruitment agency which brought her to Lebanon.⁶⁰

The prevalence of such extreme and elementary domination exercised over female domestic workers in Lebanon suggests some form of pathology attached to this type of power relation. Indeed, several informants noted that even among households with relatively modest income, keeping a live-in *domestique* was seen as an important signifier of social status. This commodification of human life into a form of objectified symbolic capital is demonstrated most starkly by the dimensions afforded to such workers in the current production of domestic space: the “servant’s room” advertised in most modern Lebanese apartments is typically a windowless box measuring no more than 2 metres by 2.5.⁶¹ Nor does the officially-mandated commodification of women end with domestic workers: among the more esoteric categories of profession deemed acceptable for short-term work permits is

⁵⁹See Das and Davidson (2011, p. 313-315) and International Labour Organisation (2005, p. 8) (drawn from Jureidini’s research).

⁶⁰See <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17598437> (accessed 28/07/14).

⁶¹See <http://www.dw.de/abuse-hardship-for-migrant-workers-in-lebanon/a-17626130> (accessed 28/07/14).

that of 'artist' - code for prostitute - which the General Security uses in regulating the migration of women, typically from Eastern Europe, who work on three to six-month contracts in the sex trade centred on Ma'amaltein.⁶²

The final point to be noted about the Lebanese labour market concerns the presence of what might be called subsidiary spaces of violence. The high fragmentation of Lebanon's political system into varying sectarian factions, coupled with the privatisation of certain aspects of the state's domain (*vis à vis* Solidere in particular), has redoubled a tendency always present within Lebanon, in which violence has been concentrated in non-state bodies. Although objectively expressed through the division of labour within Lebanese society (in the sense of militias, security firms, etc. and the agents who comprise them), the phenomenon itself relates theoretically more to the monopoly of violence (or rather, its absence) held by the Lebanese state. It will thus be discussed in this connection in the following section.

7.1.4 The Monopoly of Violence (Symbolic and Physical)

The final aspect of the Lebanese *state effect* to be dealt with concerns the character and extent of its monopoly of violence, understood in the Bourdieusian sense as both physical and symbolic.

Beginning with physical violence, there are three principle dynamics to be noted: first, the incomplete monopoly - and fragmentation - of the state's disciplinary structures (including both the armed forces, the police and the criminal justice system); second, the competing disciplinary capacity of sectarian militias; and third, the 'privatisation' of elements of the state's monopoly of violence to private security groups.

These categories represent dynamics in the sense that they are not discrete, bounded trends, but rather interrelated tendencies. Thus, the incomplete monopoly of the state's disciplinary structures lies not merely in the presence of *external* competitors (in the shape of militias), but also in their internal fragmentation, owing to the divided loyalties of the varying branches, and indeed of the individual members constituting them.⁶³ In the

⁶²See <http://www.executive-magazine.com/society/prostitution-the-business-of-sex> (accessed 28/07/14) for the dynamics of the Lebanese sex industry.

⁶³For instance, following the conclusion of the Civil War several thousand former militia members were integrated into Lebanon's security apparatus (Picard, 1999, p. 7), with some of these apparently still owing their chief loyalty to their former warlord (Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh, 2012, p. 181). This preference for integrating competi-

same sense, the ‘privatisation’ of elements of the state’s monopoly of violence is manifested in the private policing of public space, which is carried out not only by ‘legitimate’ security companies (in the sense of those holding quasi-legal contracts), but also by purely opportunistic bodies, such as those ‘valet parking’ companies which illegitimately occupy popular sections of town, and extort money from drivers to park on public streets.

The Lebanese state’s physical monopoly of violence is maintained by four principal structures: the Internal Security Forces (ISF), the country’s police force, which follows the structure of a military gendarmerie; the General Security (SG), which is responsible for domestic intelligence (including the monitoring and regulation of foreign nationals in Lebanon); the State Security (ST), a second, smaller intelligence agency; and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which also includes military intelligence. Together, these four agencies have around 90,000 employees.⁶⁴

In practice, the institutional capacity of Lebanon’s armed forces is insufficient to maintain a functional monopoly of violence from external or even internal threats. The LAF played practically no role in defending Lebanon during the 2006 war with Israel, and in operations to end fighting against the jihadist militant group Fatah al Islam at the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr el Balad in 2007, the army was only able to secure victory by jury-rigging its small fleet of helicopters to drop bombs.

This limited capacity to enforce the state’s monopoly of violence is further compounded by internal divisions within and between security forces. According to Lebanese law, the ISF and the SG should fall under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry, while the ST is under the joint jurisdiction of the Prime Minister and President, and the LAF (including military intelligence) falls under the jurisdiction of the Defence Ministry and, ultimately, the President. In practice however, as Nashabe (2009, p. 6) notes, the ISF

tors to the state’s monopoly of violence within state institutions continues to manifest itself, with caretaker PM Najib Mikati proposing in 2013 that armed Sunni militants in Tripoli be integrated into the ISF (see <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17684> accessed 01/08/14).

⁶⁴Precise figures are difficult to obtain. However, CAS (2007, p. 269) reports that 93,374 individuals obtain health insurance through the armed forces and internal security forces. Nashabe (2009, p. 8) gives the actual number of security forces employees (i.e. ISF, SG and ST) as 32,330 for 2009, which would suggest the strength of the LAF to be around 60,000. This figure is consistent with estimates produced by the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, and is a more realistic figure than the 130,000 suggested by some websites and publications.

falls under the patronage of the Sunni Prime Minister, and hence is typically led by a Sunni Muslim; the SG falls under the patronage of the President, and is typically headed by a Shia Muslim or Maronite Christian; the ST is under the patronage of the Shia Speaker of Parliament, and is typically headed by a Shia; and the LAF falls under the patronage of the President, with a Maronite Christian always Commander.

The limited extent to which the state's disciplinary apparatus is able to enforce a unified monopoly of physical violence is mirrored by the similarly limited extent to which the wider bureaucracy (including the security apparatus) is able to enforce a monopoly of symbolic violence, in terms of an adherence to the *raison d'Etat*.

For instance, the subordination of Lebanon's security forces to the logic of its sectarian political structure has had severe implications for the capacity of such institutions to constitute or represent a unified *raison d'Etat*. Not only do the different agencies engage in duplication and turf wars over competencies,⁶⁵ but they also win the variable support of external patrons,⁶⁶ and have become plagued by corruption and *wasta* (*ibid.*, p. 4).

As an example, one informant told how a cousin caught in possession of recreational narcotics avoided serious charges thanks to his mother's use of *wasta* with a government minister. Another acquaintance of the informant was less lucky: when a friend with a well-connected father was caught in possession of marijuana, the father decided that he and all his friends needed 'teaching a lesson' - and so the informant's acquaintance was held in custody for 3 weeks (including a week at Roumieh), despite the police having no evidence against him. Needless to say, his own parents' attempts to use *wasta* were foiled by the superior connections of the friend's father. Indeed, such problems even reach into the criminal justice system, with the same informant noting that a well-connected family member whose son was caught in possession of hard narcotics was able to use *wasta* to continue delaying the trial until a sufficiently corruptible judge could be found.

Another extremely common field of petty corruption concerns the awarding of driving licences. Among the various informants and respondents in-

⁶⁵For instance, Nashabe (*ibid.*, p. 5) notes that in 2005 the ISF developed its own intelligence agency in competition with both the SG and the ST.

⁶⁶The US, for example, refuses to provide military backing for the LAF beyond basic equipment, but has provided 450 Dodge Chargers to the ISF (see <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Article.aspx?id=246515> accessed 01/08/14).

interviewed below the age of fifty, not one appeared to have obtained their driving licence through entirely legitimate means, with bribes or influence used (particularly by parents) to either ensure a pass or to avoid having to take the test entirely. Indeed, one respondent (13/10) admitted to going against his father's will and trying to take the test without paying a bribe or using *wasta*, only for the examiner to use a trick question to fail him; when the respondent returned with his father (a well-connected individual), the examiner was profuse in his apologies, and the second exam passed without further incident.⁶⁷

In virtually every field of bureaucracy similar stories were told, with either connections or bribes used to speed up processes or obtain a more favourable result.⁶⁸ One respondent who worked for a company associated with the Beirut port (12/1) revealed a highly structured system of bribes and side payments to government officials, with the company issuing receipts for bribes and keeping a record of unofficial payments. On one occasion company employees even received a small cash bonus of \$100 when the bribe for the government auditor arrived at \$2,000 lower than anticipated. Similarly, two separate informants whose families had construction businesses noted that it was often cheaper and more secure to pay a bribe than to go through the official registration procedure. One informant even noted that his family had obtained Lebanese passports through the intervention of a powerful politician.⁶⁹

⁶⁷As the respondent described it, the second occasion “*ma mitl exam, ‘atkon il diftar ghadi fa’a*” (it wasn’t like an exam, he gave you the paper with no regard to the rules).

⁶⁸An anti-corruption NGO, *Sakker el Dekkeneh* (“close the shop”) recently produced a satirical video highlighting this very tendency. In the video a young Lebanese man enters *dekkenet el balad* (“the national store”), in which forged IDs, exam papers, degree certificates, etc. are all for sale. The young man chooses his document, and even pays a bribe to an employee to skip the large queue in front of the cash desk. However, just before paying a local warlord enters (complete with *qabaday* bodyguards) and pushes past everyone, leaving the young man to cry out in frustration at the all-pervading corruption in Lebanon (in which he himself has of course been complicit). A *dekkenet el balad* was in fact opened by *Sakker el Dekkeneh* in May 2014 in the Gemmayze neighbourhood, to raise awareness of their anti-corruption campaign. See <https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/547427-dekkenet-al-balad-opens-in-gemmayze> (accessed 04/08/14).

⁶⁹As the objectification of citizenship rights, there can be no more heavily-freighted symbol of the *raison d’Etat* than the passport. In the case of Lebanon, the ambiguity of citizenship laws means that the awarding of citizenship frequently falls under the patronage of political figures. In the case of the informant mentioned here, the offering of political support was ultimately sufficient to obtain a passport (the first politician they approached had by contrast asked for money). In another case, a well-connected informant was able to benefit from a naturalisation decree signed by the president himself. By contrast, Lebanese

Such petty corruption was typically explained away as a result of low levels of pay among public sector workers. Regardless of the explanation offered, however, the outcome is a clear absence in the capacity of the civil state to enforce symbolic adherence to its own rules and procedures. Indeed, Monroe (2011), in her research on mobility in Beirut and the 'chaos' of traffic, noted a paradoxical attitude among many Lebanese regarding the state: while lamenting its absence as the cause of such chaos (with the familiar refrain of "*mafee dowleh*" - "there's no state"), they also considered "irreverence toward forms of state authority [...] as a way one could express Lebaneseness" (*ibid.*, p. 105).

Lack of trust in the state and its institutions thus produces situations in which disobeying the state is often considered as *more* legitimate than following its rules. One respondent (13/9) related how he was stopped by the police in Hamra one morning for driving without wearing a seat belt.⁷⁰ In response the respondent threatened to beat the policeman, and the intervention of the respondent's employer (a retired army major) was needed to de-escalate the situation. When asked why he had behaved in such a way, the respondent replied that if he were the son of an officer or *mad'aum* he would have been let off, but as a normal citizen they would have given him a ticket - "if the law operates for all people, I am under the law. If not, I will use *wasta*."⁷¹

In the absence of an effective monopoly of physical and symbolic violence by the state, competing bodies enforce their own claims to adherence. Foremost among these are of course the sectarian and political-affiliated militias, a number of which have survived from the Civil War period, and some of which (for instance, those affiliated to the Druze community) can be traced back in some form several centuries. For the purposes of the present analysis it is not necessary to analyse in too great detail specific factions; rather, it is more important to grasp the overall dynamic of these parallel structures.

women who marry non-Lebanese are still denied the right to automatically pass on their Lebanese citizenship to their children, who indeed must be registered as resident foreign nationals and pay a residency visa.

⁷⁰Most likely this episode occurred during then Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud's crack-down on driving offences in September 2008 (see <http://old.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsDesk.nsf/0/775c3eafdbfecedc22574eb001183a9>, accessed 04/08/14).

⁷¹It is important to add (for reasons of habitus relating to *qabaday*-type agents) that the respondent in question clarified by saying that he would use *wasta* only to get himself out of jail after having first used physical coercion (as in the case detailed) to solve a problem.

As Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh (2012) have demonstrated, Beirut is divided into various ‘security zones’, the geographical location of which correspond to “the constructed and perceived threats that face particular political and economic interests and powerful social groups who are able to mobilise and leverage a visible security presence” (*ibid.*, p. 180). These interests correspond not simply to public buildings (ministries, military bases, embassies, etc.) or the residences of public figures (ministers and politicians), but also to private developments (such as Solidere) and the sectarian or political delineation of neighbourhoods. And whereas public officials may play a role in guarding some or all of these loci (depending upon the specific threat), private and sectarian interests are never far away.

Indeed, as already mentioned some public agents (in particular those assigned to political figures) are selected according to their individual loyalty to specific politicians; on other occasions, it is the militias belonging to political or sectarian groups which have the most visible presence in a neighbourhood - typically indicated, as Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh (*ibid.*, p. 182-183) note, by the presence of men sat on plastic chairs around an *arguileh* water pipe.

Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh (*ibid.*, p. 188-189) specifically contrast the fragmented security order in Beirut to that produced in the name of a “common good” - or public interest. “Those who can leverage the most muscled argument win, poignantly showing not only the expected disregard for a common good but actually the absence of a claim forwarded in the name of a ‘common good’ that justifies the deployment of security”. Rather, “like capital, security has become one more form in which existing social hierarchies are consolidated and/or challenged and new ones imposed” (*ibid.*, p. 191).

In this social hierarchy, it is evidently the specific interest adhering to sectarian groups which maintains the real monopoly of violence, as demonstrated by the events of May 2008, in which sectarian conflict briefly returned to the streets of Beirut. The “May events” (as they came to be known) resulted from the anti-Syrian March 14 cabinet’s attempts to curtail Hezbollah’s private telecommunications network. In the fighting which followed, several of the private security companies employed to protect certain (mostly Sunni) politicians emerged as “militias in disguise” (*ibid.*, p. 189). While the generalised interest or public good supposedly represented

by the official security of the state stood by, the sectarian and political militias of pro-Syrian March 8 battled the “privatised” militias of March 14. The result was a humiliating defeat for March 14, with the profit motive proving no match for the specific interest.

The most important conclusion to draw from such analysis concerns the effect on social space of this fragmented monopoly of violence. The widely-remarked phenomenon of the *qabadayat* - or local strongman - has, according to Kassir (2010, p. 233-234), been a feature of Beiruti life at least since the 19th century, when the “territorialization of communal rivalry was all the more easily accomplished as the phenomenon of gang conflict [...] began to take its place within a clientelist system” (*ibid.*, p. 234). The *qabaday*, according to Johnson (1986, pp. 82-96), became a major feature of the prevailing clientelist system in Lebanon prior to the Civil War. The word “had positive connotations and was used to describe a man who conformed to a particular code of honour and was brave, physically strong, quick-witted, and possessed of supposedly masculine virtues,” however, “it also had negative implications of bullying and aggressive behaviour” (*ibid.*, p. 83).

It is my contention that the failure of the Lebanese state to concentrate and monopolise both physical and overt violence within its institutions has encouraged the perpetuation of what might be called a subsidiary space of bodily, symbolic capitals. The phenomenon of the *qabadayat* is nothing more than the manifestation, in a corps of agents, of the continued demand for an independent capacity to exercise physical violence - that is, a capacity not associated with the generalised interest of the state, and not produced (and hence regulated) through its institutions. In its way, the *qabadayat* phenomenon is thus little different to the reversion to parallel, non-state structures of violence (such as mafia and organised crime) which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. While simplistic functionalist explanations for such developments should be avoided, it is nonetheless the case that - in the absence of a *state effect* able to monopolise the use of violence - structures capable of enforcing a more limited adherence (in both a temporal and geographic sense) will emerge making use of more elementary modes of domination, and principles of circulation involving the embodied capitals of “supposedly masculine virtues”.

7.2 Capitals and Dominant Capital Structures

The structure of Lebanon's reproduction mechanisms - while formally aspiring to the objectified mode of domination of the modern, bureaucratic state, predicated upon institutionalised cultural capital - in fact tends to facilitate a mode of domination predicated on the clandestine circulation of embodied social capital. It does so by virtue of the fact that the institutionalisation of a form of (horizontal) social capital - the sect - remains the dominant state capital. Institutionalised cultural capital, by contrast, is on the one hand subordinate to this institutionalised social capital (in the sense of the convertibility of capitals within the public labour market), and on the other hand, tends to be regulated by non-state or foreign entities (in the sense of the most dominant qualifications and institutions).

This latter aspect is significant: the state, whose inertia in the face of overwhelming popular support for the erosion of the present mode of domination (as demonstrated by the case of civil marriage) can represent nothing other than the desire of those agents in the most dominant positions to maintain the monopoly of this principle of regulation, and their monopoly over it, is yet entirely unconcerned by an absence in the monopoly of symbolic violence in the regulation of institutionalised cultural capital. Moreover, the ease with which the Civil Service Board has been neutralised and circumvented, as indeed have all such similar institutions charged with safeguarding the conversion between institutionalised cultural capital and positions in the state labour market, further demonstrates that within the political and bureaucratic fields institutionalised cultural capital is not the principle resource through which power is reproduced.

Such an observation is not intended to dismiss the importance of qualifications within the Lebanese field of power, and indeed the important role of the educational system as a reproduction mechanism. Rather, it is to give institutionalised cultural capital its due place in the hierarchy of capitals within the field of power: namely as a dominated capital, subordinated not merely by a political elite which reproduces itself through the circulation of social capital (as was also the case with *blat* and *guanxi*), but by a *state effect* whose symbolic violence is focussed upon the maintenance of objectified reproduction mechanisms which (re)produce institutionalised social capital as the legitimate principle of differentiation.

At the same time, however, as such mechanisms reproduce this principle of domination (and hence a dominant fraction within the field of power whose capital structure is predicated upon maintaining the monopoly of the clandestine circulation of such capital), there are other, subordinated mechanisms producing dominated fractions whose social libido is indeed adjusted toward the accumulation and reproduction of institutionalised cultural capital (again, just as with the USSR and the nomenklatura/intelligentsia divide). And yet, as we have seen, it should not be assumed that the point of honour of such a fraction will correspond to the structure of the generalised interest as understood in the French or British contexts. Rather, the relative inhibition with which economic capital and institutionalised cultural capital may be transformed tends to suggest that the particular constitution of reproduction mechanisms produced by the Lebanese *state effect* does not generate a strong opposition between the profit motive and the generalised interest.⁷² Further, the dominated position of cultural capital within the field of power (specifically *vis à vis* social capital) means that, even within those fractions adjusted toward the accumulation of institutionalised cultural capital, reproduction strategies may nonetheless entail the extensive clandestine circulation of social capital, albeit in a less structured mode to that prevailing in the political field.

Thus, it is more appropriate to describe the Lebanese *state effect* as producing a *hybrid* mode of domination - one which incorporates reproduction mechanisms predicated upon the institutionalisation of both social *and* cultural capital, and which results in the coexistence of both elementary *and* objectified modes of domination - often within the same institutions.

For instance, the educational system performs a double role within the complete system of reproduction mechanisms of the Lebanese *state effect*. On the one hand, it fulfills the 'classical' model of objectified domination - i.e., enabling social reproduction through the clandestine circulation of embodied or inherited cultural or social capital to institutionalised cultural capital in the form of qualifications (as initially described by Bourdieu in

⁷²Such a hypothesis may be further strengthened by the suggestions of the Civic Influence Hub - a group of elite Lebanese businessmen led by Farid Chehab - who propose the solution to Lebanon's political dilemmas through the formation of a 'Council of Wisdom', the qualification for which is the successful accumulation of wealth. See <http://www.thecihlebanon.org/>, <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/11322> and <http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/blue-gold-project-deceitful-plan-commodify-water-lebanon> (accessed 05/08/14).

the cases of France and the UK). On the other hand, it is also clear that the educational system performs a role in the reproduction of Lebanon's system of political capital (*qua* the clandestine circulation of institutionalised social capital to embodied social capital): posts in the educational system become a resource (via the labour market) to be allocated by the political elite, and thus favour the reproduction of a more elementary mode of domination within the field of power.

Broadly speaking, the division of these two functions follows a public/private divide, with private educational establishments most dominant in the conversion of cultural capital, and public establishments most dominant in the conversion of social capital. The distinction, however, is one of preponderance: that is, it would be incorrect to say that public schools are not also engaged in the labour of converting cultural capital, and that private schools are not also beset by nepotism.

The important conclusion to make from this observation - rather than the reification of a largely imaginary 'public/private' division - regards the division in dominant capital structures (and hence reproduction strategies) which such a dual system implies: that is, between agents whose standing in the social order is dependent on the continued existence of more elementary mechanisms for the reproduction of domination, and others who rely more heavily on objectified mechanisms.

This bifurcation - again equivalent in many senses to the *nomenklatura*/*intelligentsia* divide in the USSR - is yet complicated by the degree of *hybridisation* produced by the relatively uniform demands of certain fields. For instance, the tremendous, secular increase in demand for higher education means that agents whose trajectory places them more on the "nomenklatura" side will not necessarily be marked by an absence of institutionalised cultural capital; nor, given that dealing with the public administration is unavoidable, will agents on the "intelligentsia" side necessarily be lacking in close social ties and the wherewithal to use them instrumentally.

Rather than a deep social cleavage, we must think instead in terms of preponderance: the declining tendency for some agents to take certain social games seriously, or the tendency to invest more heavily in strategies adjusted toward certain reproduction mechanisms rather than others. Thus, while a majority of agents may invest in university degrees, the propensity to 'cheat' (by paying for essays, etc.) will vary; equally, while all agents are likely to

employ strategies to 'get round' bureaucracy, the nature of those strategies (be they employing a *simsar* or go-between, threatening violence, using *wasta*), as well as their relative efficacy, will again vary according to capital structures.

One important adjustment - again following the principle of preponderance - is arguably the increased importance within Lebanese social space of what was identified in the theoretical chapters as *objectified social capital*, in the shape of a hierarchy of goods, services, practices, etc. which demonstrate the social position of the agent in question. Darkened car windows, personalised mobile phone numbers, special licence plates, the possession of a domestique, the visible consumption of luxury goods - all of these form a relational hierarchy in which those Lebanese with the habitus adjusted to their possession struggle and compete, frequently investing scarce economic resources in an attempt to demonstrate an elevated position. Such practices typically occur within spaces or fractions sharing certain characteristics, as was demonstrated, for instance, in the case of *blat*, where the tendency to employ embodied social capital in strategies of symbolic investment had the similar effect of objectifying such hierarchies.

In the case of Lebanon, we may hypothesise that hysteresis in many of the historic objectified modes of domination, and the countervailing prevalence of embodied modes of domination - specifically those modes involving the clandestine transformation of institutionalised capitals to embodied capitals - has produced this tendency toward the brute objectification of social hierarchies in the form of such scarce goods and practices. As noted in chapter 5, such objectification represents the intermediate state in fields (that is, before the regulation of capitals by a separate entity, tending to ensure the secure transmission of such gains as constituted by capital). In the case of Lebanon, the recourse to objectified capitals may thus represent the regression (or hysteresis) in the capacity of the state to institutionalise capitals through (at various times) some or all of its reproduction mechanisms. Such elaborate investment strategies no doubt also act as a limiting factor for many agents in the accumulation of capital, a factor which appears to bear out Graziano's observation concerning the varying implications of direct and indirect exchange, and which unifies that theory with Bourdieu, in the sense of the additional labour involved in legitimising such capitals as a principle of difference, which ultimately serves to limit the accumulation of

capital.

Indeed, we may go a step further and argue that hysteresis in the Lebanese *state effect* has even produced (or perhaps better, reinforced) a subsidiary, relatively autonomous space of bodily capitals - in the sense, that is, of the increased tendency toward certain kinds of objectification of the body itself. In the absence of the state's monopoly of violence, parallel structures (militias, private security organisations, even valet parking companies) have emerged composed of agents whose reproduction strategies have encouraged them to invest in their (physical) bodies as instruments of coercion and domination, in a manner not dissimilar to organised crime in post-Soviet Russia. Across the gender divide, the mirror image of this objectification of the body is arguably found in the significant market for female cosmetic surgery - an objectification of the female body in keeping with the dominated position of women within Lebanese social space (as reflected, among other things, by their low participation in the labour market).

Given such complexity within the structure of objective resources, how to integrate the second research moment of agents varying dispositions and strategies? In seeking to relate the position-takings and practices of agents to their objective position within a social space governed by the variable possession of socially-efficient resources such as those prevailing in the Lebanese context, it is necessary to measure agents' responses *across* the differing reproduction strategies they have undertaken, and to relate them to the reproduction mechanisms (and hence capitals) involved in such strategies. The *point of honour* revealed from such analysis will then have the effect of illustrating the state of relations within the field of power (much as attitudes to corruption in 19th century Britain), and the dominant mechanisms (above all of clandestine circulation) favoured by each in the reproduction of their position.

Perhaps the strongest measure of the importance of such a nuanced approach is the larger rupture - in terms of practices and position-takings - revealed through a comparison of agents whose habitus was not formed in Lebanese social space. These "destabilised" habitus, being unadjusted to either the particular or the uniform demands of varying fields, highlight most clearly the extent to which some forms of clandestine circulation have become the norm within Lebanon, and have produced adaptations to habitus adjusted accordingly.

Thus, in the second research moment which follows the attempt is made to reconstruct the social space of Lebanese clandestine circulation, specifically by analysing the reproduction strategies of individual agents, and comparing these both to their subjective position-takings and the objective resources they possess. In doing so, the role of the different forms of clandestine circulation within the total order of practices necessary for agents to reproduce their social position is revealed, as well as the varying constitution of the different social libidos which enables such circulation to be misrecognised, in accordance with a given agent's point of honour.

Chapter 8

The Second Moment

Having outlined the general system of objective structures constituting Lebanese social space - in the sense both of the dominant socially-efficient resources structuring that space, and the reproduction mechanisms producing such resources - we turn now to the second research moment, which is concerned with the analysis of the second-order effects of that space: specifically, the dispositions and position-takings manifested in the habitus of agents through their occupation of a determinate position within a space structured by such properties.

As noted in the theory section, from the perspective of the analysis of clandestine circulation the relevant second-order effects are those which manifest themselves in agents' *reproduction strategies*, in the form of the disposition toward specific practices, and the accumulation of certain capitals. Further, analysis of agents' misrecognition, as demonstrated through the additional labour (or lack thereof) revealed through such practices, can be used to determine the underlying distribution of the varying symbolic forces across social space, which in turn structure the potential domain of clandestine circulation, and the precise forms it will take.

The goal of such analysis is to reveal clandestine circulation as a *structured* phenomenon: that is, one related to the broader structure of power relations prevailing within a given social space, and enabling the unequal reproduction of that space through the variable - or even exclusive - appropriation of scarce, socially-efficient resources.

Thus, this second research moment is arranged in such a fashion as to enable the investigation of that structure, through the analysis of agents' practices and position-takings. We begin by using data gathered through

structured interviews of agents to produce a graphical, relational representation of the space of their practices and position-takings. The dimensions structuring this space are then interpreted in light of the qualitative data provided by the same interviews, to give an indication of the underlying factors differentiating agents.

The analysis is then deepened by a series of structured comparisons of specific agents' habitus, chosen according to the positions occupied by them within the space revealed in the first section, but with an additional emphasis on the varying efficacy of their strategies in reproducing the objective resources they possess. Reproduction strategies are compared and contrasted, as well as the varying misrecognition demonstrated by agents toward the different reproduction mechanisms of the *state effect*, as outlined in the previous chapter. In this way, the contrasting *point of honour* of different agents is reconstituted, and, when added to the other data regarding capital structures and practices, is used to uncover the underlying structure of Lebanese clandestine circulation, in the sense both of a structured disposition to certain practices, and of a variable means of appropriation of scarce, socially-efficient resources.

8.1 The Social Space of *Wasta*

As a socially-constructed object, *wasta* enjoys a double life: it exists both as practice (i.e. in the objective sense, as disposition), and comment on practice (i.e. in the subjective sense, as position-taking). Thus, in the same way that the definition of corruption in 19th century Britain became a stake in the larger struggles within the field of power (as was noted in the theory section), so too the definition of *wasta* - what it does and does not constitute, and how it is normatively evaluated - will reflect in some sense the state of power relations within the Lebanese field.

Further, in the sense that the dispositions of habitus, as manifested in agents' *reproduction strategies*, will reflect the demands of the particular position (and trajectory) in social space occupied by an agent, then the analysis of agents' practices should also reveal a distribution which in some respects conforms to the state of power relations within the field.

To examine this hypothesis, a sample of agents living or working in the Ras Beirut neighbourhood was interviewed concerning their practices and

position-takings. Ras Beirut (lit. “tip of Beirut”) is a populous and relatively diverse district in the western tip of the city, extending to the western and northern shores of the area indicated on the map at the front of the thesis.¹ The neighbourhood includes two historic private universities - the LAU and the AUB - as well as a relatively mixed sectarian population (in comparison with neighbouring districts), and owing to these factors is considered comparatively cosmopolitan and liberal, particularly in the Hamra area.

The neighbourhood was selected chiefly for pragmatic purposes of respondent access; in comparison to other potential sites within Beirut its class and income profile is likely to be above the average (although there are no disaggregated statistics within the Beirut municipal area to compare directly), and a high percentage of the population is also relatively transient. However, it is by no means an isolated or atypical community within the city, and indeed offers a good concentration of middle-class residents dividing along the standard capital composition dimension (cultural/economic). Regarding generalisation beyond the immediate environment of urban Beirut, it is worth bearing in mind that a number of respondents formed part of the transient population of Ras Beirut, or indeed lived elsewhere; thus, the greater limitation on generaliseability is not so much the geographical representativeness of the field site, as the social representativeness of the sample, a matter which is considered in more detail in the Appendix on Methodology.

The interview was structured according to the division of reproduction mechanisms and socially-efficient resources outlined in the previous chapter, with agents asked to describe any occasions in which they had needed to call upon the help of others, either for themselves or on behalf of a third party, in each of the relevant domains. Further, agents were asked questions regarding the nature of their social connections and social activities, and also a series of questions relating to their objective resources (qualifications, occupation, parents’ occupation, household status, etc.). Finally, agents were given the opportunity to speak freely about their thoughts on *wasta*, and were particularly asked whether they thought it was a good or bad thing, and if it was a necessity or a choice. For a complete discussion of

¹The precise boundaries of Ras Beirut are as far as Ain El Tine in the south, proceeding north to include Snoubara, Jounblat and Ain Mreisse. Technically Dar Mreisse along the northern coast (which includes Ain Mreisse is a separate quarter; most Beirutis however would include it in the general heading of the Ras Beirut area.

this process, including the sample, a copy of the structured questionnaire, a justification of the questions asked, and a table of coded results, see the Appendix on Methodology at the end of the thesis.

A final observation concerns the sample used to construct this initial space. This was relatively small and focussed (14 individuals), owing to the greater demands required by the structured interview format. Further subjective data were gathered at other stages in the fieldwork process, both from prior interviews not conducted using the same structure, and group events conducted in a less structured manner (and from which only limited objective data could be obtained). Data from these have been used elsewhere in the thesis, but have been excluded from the current section, owing to the fact that they were not obtained using the same treatment, and hence would weaken the robustness of the analytical method applied.

In keeping with Bourdieusian praxeology, data gathered through the structured interviews were coded according to a distinction between objective and subjective categories, with the latter further divided between practices and position-takings. Categories for practices were determined according to four domains, corresponding to the labour market, the educational system, and two relating to the state: ‘fiscal’, understood as practices involving the state bureaucracy which relate to inheritance and property rights; and ‘violence’, understood as practices relating to those forces of the state responsible for maintaining the monopoly of violence (i.e. army, police, general security). Agents were coded according to whether they admitted, denied, or did not mention using connections or favours within each domain.²

Owing to the small size of the sample, coding categories for position-takings on *wasta* initially presented some difficulty. In the structured interview sample all respondents considered *wasta* to be negative in some respect, with the majority (nine) considering it to be corrupt, and a minority (five) prepared to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ *wasta*, but nonetheless tending to view even ‘good’ *wasta* as the least worst option in a bad system.

After further careful analysis and comparison between agents’ responses, however, a dimension began to emerge regarding the degree of autonomy

²The final category, ‘did not mention’, should not be disregarded as a simple “junk” category. Rather, because all respondents were prompted extensively for each domain, such ‘silence’ may indicate either a purposeful demurral, or alternatively a lack of familiarity with the social game.

or coercion which agents expressed regarding their own relation to *wasta*. For instance, when asked whether he chose to use *wasta*, one respondent (13/4) answered firmly that he was *obliged* to use it, and denied he had any choice in the matter, describing it as a “shameful” thing (*she‘ mukhzee*) and “the summit of corruption” (*qummat al fasad*) - adding that “the Lebanese citizen, the state is forcing him to engage in corruption”.

In a similar way, another respondent (13/3) went so far as to describe *wasta* as a good thing - *despite* being corrupt - as it represented a “necessary evil” which “protects us from the government”.³ What links her response to 13/4 is the sense of *absolute necessity* associated with *wasta* - that individuals are obliged to rely upon it for survival: “it is absolutely necessary [to use *wasta*] to put your foot in”, “I think it has to do with surviving”. Perhaps the strongest expression of this tendency was found in respondent 13/10, who emphasised that he *hated* using *wasta*, because it is shaming to ask a favour and to be made to feel small.⁴ Sometimes, however, “you *really* have to use it”.

In contrast to these extreme expressions of necessity, several respondents described a level of need less expressive of domination and coercion, and which seemed to allow for a greater degree of autonomy. For instance, respondent 13/14 claimed he would only use *wasta* “as it relates to my position” - “if I do something wrong, I might ask a politician to fix it. [...] Sometimes *mukhtars* make mistakes, and even a small mistake they can take the stamp away from you.” This description of a purely hypothetical situation was tempered by an emphasis on autonomy: “I am not *masnoud* [supported, or backed by a political party], I rely on people’s love. Of course, I have connections and all the politicians know me. That’s why I don’t feel scared [i.e. in need of protection].”

Similarly, respondent 13/9 claimed that “the only conditions I would ask for *wasta* are if I went into a fight and sent [the other person] to hospital, or shot him,” while 13/8 said he “prefers to go to the state and there is no *wasta*. But sometimes they treat you unfairly and the one with *wasta*

³The description of *wasta* as a “good thing” by this particular respondent is a strong argument against using simple value judgements to position respondents. In this case, the respondent’s particular academic specialisation doubtless encouraged her to consider *wasta* from a more objective perspective. Ultimately, however, she is making the same point as the previous respondent, which is that *wasta* is a necessity.

⁴“*ma bħibb at maħaj, la wallat kilmi zaghiri.*”

is treated better.” In such situations, “if I need it [i.e. *wasta*], I would be obliged to look for anyone who could oblige interest.” This sentiment was shared by respondent 13/7, who claimed that “I only use the *wasta* where no other way is possible”.

An even greater expression of autonomy came from those agents who described *wasta* more in terms of choice - of being able to choose when and when not to use it. Respondent 13/6 initially responded that he would never use *wasta*, before correcting himself to add that “sometimes you need to use it”. For instance, “when applying for a job, if I’m qualified I’ll use it to ensure. If I’m not I won’t. Better to use *wasta* to get a job than stay at home unemployed.” Equally, respondent 13/2 admitted that she would be prepared to use *wasta* “if it doesn’t hurt anyone else”, but that she would “stop at a certain point when what I need it for would hurt someone else”.

Evidently, the ability to apply some sort of moral code to when one does or does not use favours and connections implies a greater degree of autonomy or freedom of action. The most extreme example of such freedom of action came from respondent(s) 13/13,⁵ who described the use of *wasta* arising from the Sunni *mukhtar*’s political position as a form of charity: “he wouldn’t do something against the word of God, mark this down please. He wouldn’t use *wasta* to hurt someone. Only for charity [*aḥsan*].”

The final category concerned those agents who refused all connection with *wasta* whatsoever. At the mildest end of this spectrum (and indeed overlapping somewhat with the ‘choice’ category) was respondent 13/1, who chose to distinguish between *wasta* and ‘*khidme*’ (favours). Whereas for her *wasta* was a necessity, because “you are told, if you don’t do it this way, there’s no way you can get through”, she herself denied ever needing to use such *wasta*. Rather, she described occasionally *choosing* to ask for a favour, principally to save time - “usually because I choose to, and partly because I need to, when I don’t have time, and it’s taking way too much time, and way too long, and it’s not gonna work out. So this is when I use the *khidme*.” Respondent 13/5 also distinguished between *wasta* and *khidme*, adding “may God put us [i.e. his family] in a position not to need anyone”. He described *wasta* as a problem of “backwards” countries, adding “I know Europe. That’s why I dream to live there. You don’t need anyone,

⁵The Sunni *mukhtar*’s brother and father, interviewed in the *mukhtar*’s office.

and no-one needs you.”⁶

Having thus coded the respondents’ position-takings accordingly, a multiple correspondence analysis was performed on the resulting dataset.⁷ The use of a small, qualitative sample as the basis for performing an MCA should be considered as an experimental method. The purpose of its inclusion here is to create the rudiments of a spatial (i.e, relational) representation of the factors structuring Lebanese clandestine circulation as a social practice. Unlike, for example, regression analysis (in which data are fitted to a model), MCA is simply a means of diagonalising a matrix (to borrow the phrase of Benzécri): thus, provided categories have been chosen with a clear theoretical justification, and are not structurally weighted toward certain questions (for example, binary or ‘dummy’ variables will have a greater weight than questions involving four or five potential answers), then the MCA will reveal the structure inherent in the data, as opposed to the extent to which data fits a pre-determined hypothesis. That being so, the MCA included here is used as a frame or guide for a deeper qualitative investigation of respondents’ interview responses.

Table 8.1 presents the contribution of the different active categories for the first three dimensions revealed by the MCA, i.e. those for which principal inertia⁸ meets the criteria of being greater than the average of variables/categories ($16/5=3.2\%$). Categories whose contribution to a given dimension was greater than $1/k$ (i.e. 0.0625) are included in bold, and ranked accordingly.

The first thing to note concerns the contribution of the three dimensions

⁶Indeed, 13/5 emphasised his opposition to *wasta* by providing an anecdote from his younger years - “the only time in my life when I used *wasta*, and it was a big lesson for me”. He had used a family contact to arrange a meeting with the then prime minister at the Serail. When eventually his turn came, the prime minister came out of his office and said “follow me”. He took him to the toilet and then asked “what can I do for you my son?” The respondent said nothing and left. Such an experience would seem to chime with the view of other older respondents (such as 13/4) who saw *wasta* as “shameful” - a quite literally debasing experience in which you are shown to be dominated by those more powerful than you.

⁷For the coded dataset and a complete table of summary statistics for the two retained dimensions of the MCA, see the Appendix on Methodology.

⁸Inertia is an expression of variance within a table: the higher the inertia, the greater the data within the table varies. In MCA the inertia is divided according to principal axes (or dimensions), which are eigenvalues that represent, in descending order, the best one-dimensional fit of the cloud of properties (see Le Roux and Rouanet (2010, p. 39). They have thus tended to be used in Bourdieusian analysis to reveal latent variables, such as (for instance) cultural capital in the case of *Distinction*.

Table 8.1: Statistics for Principal Dimension Contributions by Active Category

Category	dim 1 (46.10%)			dim 2 (24.45%)			dim 3 (8.55%)		
	Coord	Ctr	Rank	Coord	Ctr	Rank	Coord	Ctr	Rank
<i>Wasta</i>									
Never	-0.321	0.003	-	1.419	0.057	-	1.398	0.064	7th
Choose	1.374	0.108	5th	1.150	0.076	6th	0.055	0.000	-
Need	-1.015	0.074	7th	-0.327	0.008	-	-1.495	0.140	3rd
Abs need	0.075	0.000	-	-1.933	0.160	2nd	-1.407	0.085	5th
<i>CCEdu</i>									
no mention	1.143	0.112	4th	0.298	0.008	-	0.556	0.026	-
denial	-1.143	0.075	6th	1.285	0.094	4th	-0.343	0.007	-
yes	-0.572	0.019	-	-1.731	0.171	1st	-0.491	0.014	-
<i>CCLab</i>									
no mention	1.007	0.044	-	-1.045	0.047	-	1.690	0.122	4th
denial	-0.374	0.020	-	0.643	0.059	-	-0.130	0.002	-
yes	0.722	0.007	-	-3.296	0.155	3rd	-3.772	0.203	2nd
<i>CCStFisc</i>									
no mention	2.609	0.194	1st	0.825	0.019	-	0.665	0.013	-
denial	-1.429	0.117	3rd	0.166	0.002	-	-0.288	0.005	-
yes	0.062	0.000	-	-0.289	0.010	-	-0.022	0.000	-
<i>CCStViol</i>									
no mention	1.686	0.162	2nd	-0.206	0.002	-	-0.895	0.046	-
denial	-0.683	0.033	-	1.040	0.077	5th	-0.978	0.068	6th
yes	-0.666	0.032	-	-0.875	0.055	-	1.694	0.205	1st

to total inertia: the first dimension represents 46.1% of total inertia, the second represents 24.45%, and the third represents 8.55%, making a cumulative total of 79.11%. The fourth and fifth, by contrast, are each below 1% (and hence the 3.2% threshold for interpretation). A much greater degree of variance is thus projected by the first dimension, suggesting it captures the most fundamental division structuring the data; the second axis remains significant however, and (as we shall see), captures an important division in its own right. The third, by contrast, captures less than a fifth of the inertia of the first, and would thus appear to be a second order axis.

Regarding contributions, the first axis is most strongly defined by the categories ‘no mention’ in both state domains, followed by ‘deny’ in the fiscal/bureaucratic state domain, ‘no mention’ in the education system, and the category ‘choose’ for position-takings on *wasta*. Concerning the second

axis, the most significant contributing categories are those of ‘admit’ in the education system and the labour market, and the category of ‘absolute need’ for *wasta*. For the third axis, the most significant contributions are ‘admit’ for the state violence and labour market categories, followed by ‘needing’ to use *wasta*.

To deepen the analysis, figures 8.1 and 8.2 provide a projection of the two most significant dimensions divided according to the format recommended by Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux (2000), i.e. between a space of properties (figure 8.1) and a space (or cloud) of individuals (figure 8.2, which also includes the objective properties for reference).

The analysis begins with figure 8.1, which places the active properties (i.e., those categories whose weights have contributed to the construction of the two dimensions) in relation to each other. As previously mentioned, in keeping with a Bourdieusian mode of analysis the active properties are those categories relating to practices and position-takings. Other categories relating to objective properties (gender, age, occupation, educational attainment) were included as supplementary questions (see Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux (*ibid.*, p. 9)) - that is, they do not participate in the construction of the space (in terms of weights), but nonetheless have a position within the space as constructed by the active properties. These objective properties are included in figure 8.2, alongside the individual respondents’ positions.

Turning to the distribution of properties, we see first that there is a distinction between the distribution of categories for practices and that of position-takings: whereas practices are grouped in looser or tighter clusters according to denial, acceptance or not mentioning, the position-takings for *wasta* are distributed across the whole space. The general structure of this grouping (i.e. clusters for practices and broad distribution for position-taking) is in fact a product of the design of the questionnaire: four questions with three exclusive categories and one question with four exclusive categories. However, the specific distribution of categories and the shaping of clusters is the result of the structure of individual responses.

Comparing the distribution of position-takings with practices is useful: ‘never’ using *wasta* is - as might be expected - closely associated with denying participating in *wasta*-like practices; by contrast, not mentioning *wasta*-like practices is clustered closest to the position-taking of ‘choose’ - that is, to

Figure 8.1: MCA of Respondents' Use of *Wasta*: Space of Practices and Position-takings




Figure 8.2: MCA of Respondent's Use of *Wasta*: Cloud of Individuals and Objective Categories




Figure 8.1 dimensions

those who see *wasta* as a choice rather than a necessity. The categories for admitting to using *wasta*-like practices, meanwhile, are found closest to the position-takings of ‘need’ and ‘absolute need’.

Thus, in general terms the MCA tells us that those who admit to using *wasta*-like practices tend to associate *wasta* itself with varying degrees of necessity and compulsion, rather than with a free choice. By contrast, those who associate *wasta* with a degree of agency are less likely to either admit or deny making use of such practices themselves, but rather to demur, or to speak in generalised terms. Finally (as might be expected), those who deny being involved in *wasta*-like practices are also most closely associated with firmly dissociating themselves from *wasta* in general.

This interpretation can be deepened by analysis of the distribution of the different domains in which *wasta* may be used. To aid in this analysis, *structuring factors* have been drawn around the category clusters to give an indication of the general shape of their distribution.⁹ Thus, we see that the cluster representing the space of denial is both quite tightly grouped and equally distributed between the two principle axes. By contrast, the space of admission and the space of not mentioning are both more loosely grouped and tilt toward specific axes.

From this we may determine that there is limited variance in terms of denial of *wasta*-like practices (that is, an agent who denies using *wasta* in one sphere of life is likely to deny using it in all spheres); when it comes to admitting to using *wasta*-like practices, however, there is a clear structure: admitting to using such practices within the state proper (in terms of both fiscal/bureaucratic domains and security forces) is positioned most closely to the space of denial, whereas admitting to using *wasta*-like practices in the domains of education and the labour market are both significantly *further* away from this space. Similarly, among those who don’t mention, education and the labour market are closer to the denial space than both state domains respectively.¹⁰

I would argue that this structuring of categories demonstrates Bourdieu’s

⁹See Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux (2000, p. 9). A more typical use of such structuring factors is to group individuals; for the purposes of the present analysis however, it is the structure of categories which is of immediate interest.

¹⁰The inversion of ordering between ‘no mention’ and ‘admit’ categories *vis à vis* the two state domains is also to some extent an artefact of the questionnaire design, in the sense that such single option responses are correlated.

principle of the symbolic force associated with symbolic capital in action, and in particular the additional labour associated with the conversion of successfully misrecognised capitals. Put simply, the greater proximity to the general space of *denial* of the two categories of *admission* specifically representing the state domain, reflects the limited misrecognition associated with the clandestine circulation of capitals in such contexts.¹¹ In this respect, admitting to the clandestine circulation of social or economic capital in the state domain (bureaucratic or security) is not so different to denying using it, which suggests that the “cost” of doing so - understood in terms of the additional labour of misrecognition to maintain the symbolic force associated with such capitals - is low. By contrast, the symbolic force associated with the educational system and the labour market (that is, as reproduction mechanisms producing a legitimate principle of differentiation) is sufficiently greater, such that it pushes the categories representing the admission of clandestine circulation in those contexts into a more extreme position *vis à vis* the general space of denial. This observation will be expanded upon further in the analysis of the practices of individual agents.

Moving to the second figure, analysis of the cloud of individuals and supplementary categories (here objective data such as age, gender, educational attainment and employment) can be used to deepen, and in some respects qualify, insights gained from the cloud of position-takings and practices, and in particular to interpret which specific qualities the two axes are distinguishing between.

First, the objective categories are quite closely clustered around the centre, suggesting that few of the objective categories coded in interview correlate strongly with the structure of differences recorded in subjective position-takings.¹² There are however some exceptions. First, educational attainment: the baccalaureate is opposed to higher degrees, with the former associated with the space of denial, and the latter the space of “no mention” (between “choose” and “absolute necessity” in position-takings). Next, occupation: working for a private corporation is associated with the space

¹¹Again, this is due to the fact that MCA is a *relational* mode of analysis: it positions categories (here, practices) which are more closely related closer together, and categories which are less related (or even unrelated) further apart.

¹²It should be noted here that the scaling of the two diagrams varies slightly, owing to some individual agents occupying more extreme outlying positions. The dimensions of figure 8.1 are highlighted in figure 8.2 for reference. The different scaling does not affect the conclusion regarding the clustering of objective categories.

of denial, and is opposed to working within a family business (associated with the space of admission and necessity) or academia (associated with not mentioning and absolute necessity). Finally age: those over 60 are more likely to deny using *wasta* than those below; meanwhile, those below 35 are distinguished from those above according to the second axis *vis à vis* 35 to 59, and both the first and second *vis à vis* over 60.¹³ It should be further noted that most of these objective categories seem to describe a structure of difference captured most strongly by the first dimension, with less difference captured by the second.

To add insight to this distribution we move to the analysis of the structure of individual positions. By analysing the differing backgrounds (trajectories) and current situations (positions) of the various agents, it is possible to hypothesise what kind of objective difference each dimension may be capturing. Table 8.2 provides a list of the squared correlations of individuals for the first and second dimensions, which gives an indication of the quality of fit between an agent's position as projected in that dimension, and his or her complete profile. Agents are ranked according to degree of correlation, with those passing the threshold of $1/k$ in bold (the first dimension featured 8 individuals passing this threshold, the second 9).

Turning to the interpretation of agents' specific positions, the more significant x-axis appears to distinguish between established (or stable) agents, and those in a position of rupture.¹⁴ Thus, on the left hand (negative) side of the axis we find in the furthest positions the security guard (13/9), the Orthodox *mukhtar* (13/14) and the three retired company workers (13/5, 13/8 and 13/4) - all five of these individuals having also a squared correlation above $1/k$ in this dimension.

What unites these agents is their position of stability within their respective trajectories: the retired workers may be considered as having, in a sense, completed their trajectory, and to be no longer involved in the day-to-day exigencies of the field; the security guard, in finding a comfortable job at a private university which affords him and his family financial stability and health insurance, has likewise insulated himself from many of the uncertainties of the wider field; while the Orthodox *mukhtar*, having in his earlier

¹³Academia, correlating as it does precisely with the educational category "higher education", is not shown in the diagram.

¹⁴That is (to emphasise) it *does not* reflect a power hierarchy, either within specific fields or in social space in general.

Table 8.2: Squared Correlations of Individuals in Principal Dimensions

Ind.	1st dim		2nd dim	
	sq corr	rank	sq corr	rank
1	0.069	8th	0.05	10th
2	0.008	14th	0.209	5th
3	0.056	9th	0.794	1st
4	0.127	7th	0.047	11th
5	0.223	5th	0.296	2nd
6	0.033	11th	0.115	6th
7	0.01	13th	0.004	14th
8	0.142	6th	0.079	8th
9	0.306	3rd	0.011	13th
10	0.038	10th	0.211	4th
11	0.02	12th	0.260	3rd
12	0.873	1st	0.015	12th
13	0.592	2nd	0.105	7th
14	0.235	4th	0.064	9th

life sustained a potentially damaging rupture to his trajectory (his father died when he was young, leaving him unable to afford to attend university and obtain an expected degree), has nonetheless corrected that trend and, in becoming *mukhtar*, recovered the recognition within the cultural/political field which he believed to be his birthright.¹⁵

By contrast, those agents in the centre of this dimension may be understood as being in transition: perhaps their trajectory is established but only in the initial stages, and hence uncertain (such as the young degree students 13/7, 13/11, 13/10 and 13/6); or perhaps they are further along their trajectory but, due to the struggles and uncertainties within their particular field, they continue to feel insecure (such as the two female professors, 13/2 and 13/3). It should be noted (in support of this transitional argument)

¹⁵This sense of regained position (and the previously ruptured trajectory it implies) was immediately apparent in interview: when asked about his educational attainment, the *mukhtar* said he had obtained the upper baccalaureate - itself not a low qualification considering his age (60), and the structure of the cohort effect in Lebanese educational attainment demonstrated in the previous chapter. He immediately added however that he had “self culture”, and was careful to associate himself with family members who had achieved esteemed positions in medicine and academia. This diligence toward institutionalised forms of cultural capital was neatly summarised in an anecdote he described (off the record), which revolved around his displeasure at a renowned private cultural institution not treating his office of *mukhtar* with sufficient respect, by sending a low level delegation to deal with him over a matter of symbolic importance.

that all 6 agents in this position have a low squared correlation in the first axis - suggesting their transitional nature leaves them a relatively 'loose fit' within this dimension.

Moving further across, we find those agents whose trajectory has taken them in a perhaps unanticipated direction (such as the Sunni *mukhtar*'s family 13/13, who came from a modest background), or who are perhaps in transition to a different trajectory (such as 13/10, the younger brother who seemed more inclined toward civil society or public engagement than his older brother, and indeed than their family business background, would perhaps suggest). The most extreme cases of such "rupture" are of course those agents who have entered the field late, having perhaps grown up or spent most of their lives in a different social space, and who thus experience a sense of alienation within the Lebanese field - the "disrupted" habitus described by Bourdieu. Agents 13/6, 13/1 and 13/12 fit this category, with 13/12 (the male professor in his mid-60s) the most extreme case, and thus to be found at the furthest extent of the dimension.

The y-axis is somewhat harder to articulate. In the previous diagram, this axis distinguished between, on the one hand, those who never use *wasta* or choose to use it, and on the other, those who felt they needed or absolutely needed to use *wasta*. In the sense of having a recourse to *wasta* as practice, it is also this dimension which most strongly distinguished between the space of denial and the space of admission. Considering the responses of agents, this axis seems to contrast at different points between defensiveness and reflexivity; between agents possessing a point of honour which the line of questioning followed by the interview provoked them to defend, and those who felt comfortable in a degree of frankness; it also seems to reveal a distinction between autonomy and coercion - between agents who feel they can 'take or leave' *wasta* and the obligations it implies, and those who feel they have no other choice.

Thus, when this distinction is interpreted in light of the first axis, it would seem to suggest a division structured around two or three related factors: the quality of an agent's *investment* in the particular field or social game in which they are found; the extent of *misrecognition* an agent displays toward the use of *wasta*; and the degree of *reflexivity* they display toward analysis of their own motives or position within the broader social game.

One reason such an axis is so difficult to interpret is the covariance

these different factors will naturally hold according to an agent's position along the first axis - that is, according to the *stability* of an agent's position in the field. The nature of this covariance can be grasped by analysis of the structure of position-takings toward *wasta*, which is expressed in both dimensions. Whereas the first dimension is structured according to the degree of exigency (more stable positions being more likely to completely disregard *wasta*, or take a certain distance from it by restricting its use only to necessity, while more ruptured positions are either more likely to see in it the requirement of absolute necessity to maintain a position, or choice in advancing a position), the second dimension distinguishes more directly between agents who are relatively autonomous from the struggles of the field ('never', 'choose') and those caught up in them (characterised by varying degrees of necessity).

Thus, the combination of these two dimensions produces four principle poles, which tend to elide into each other at their extremes. It is perhaps better, therefore, to interpret this second axis in light of the first, and to speak in terms of *quadrants* of space.

For instance, the top left quadrant would seem to indicate a space of "exit", occupied by agents whose relative stability is coupled with a lack of interest, or indeed a reflexive distancing, from the necessities of the social game - agents whose stability has perhaps encouraged them to withdraw from the social game, and who are hence *stable* and *disengaged*.

It is thus in this space that are to be found the two retirees who most distanced themselves from *wasta* (13/5, who dreamed of living in Europe, and 13/8, who claimed that "nothing would oblige me to use *wasta* except if the matter concerns health [...] I consider it to be wrong"); likewise, respondent 13/9 (the security guard), who claimed that as a result of his position within the university (which provided health insurance for the whole family) he "didn't need *wasta* any more". Alongside this objective distance from necessity should also be added a subjective preference for maintaining balanced relations (*tawazan*) - indeed, the respondent added that he had turned down an invitation to a cousin's wedding at a prestigious hotel precisely because he couldn't afford a sufficiently expensive present, and "I don't like to be put down".¹⁶

By contrast, further down on the left side of the second axis we find

¹⁶"*ma bħibb ħuħuh waħa*".

agents in positions which might be deemed *stable* and *engaged* - that is, whose stability enables a degree of security or perhaps even reflexivity, but who have not withdrawn from or rejected the social game. The Orthodox *mukhtar* 13/14, for instance, is still very much engaged, yet from a position of stability, while the two young male students most likely to stably reproduce their parents' social trajectory (13/11 and 13/7) are also found in this space. Also in this quadrant is respondent 13/4, the retired draftsman, who was more equivocal concerning the use of connections, and showed himself more open to using them to help others. Indeed, after the recorder had been turned off he recounted in detail two particular instances in which he had paid significant bribes to both civil and religious officials with regards to inheritance and property rights.

On the right side of the axis, we find that the upper quadrant is occupied predominantly by respondents who had experienced some form of hysteresis (typically having spent their formative years outside of Lebanon), and hence display some form of disengagement - or even unfamiliarity - with the 'rules of the game', such as derives from occupying a position of rupture. Hence, this quadrant may be described as *in rupture* and *disengaged*. Respondent 13/1, for instance (who grew up in Nigeria), described herself as having difficulty in managing reciprocity in social exchange: she would offer help freely - "sometimes I feel I overdo it" - but at the same time be reticent in asking favours for herself - "even though I have this expectation, I still don't do it [...] I hold myself back [...] I offer help more than I request [and] I'm very careful how I request." Similarly, respondent 13/6 (who grew up in the US), mentioned his general opposition to *wasta*, while also recounting several occasions in which the opportunity to gain an advantage through bribes or connections had presented itself. On such occasions the willingness to consider such methods, coupled with the wariness of being cheated which eventually resulted in turning them down, suggests not so much a moral or ethical opposition as a less developed 'feel for the game' (i.e. less confidence in being able to play it well).

Alternatively, such disengagement as represented by this quadrant may be the result not of hysteresis but of occupying a privileged position within the social order, enabling an agent to engage in *arbitrage* between capitals and fields. For instance, the Sunni *mukhtar's* family (13/13) is, in structural terms, similarly placed to the *blat meister* or *tolkachi* in Soviet Russia: com-

ing from a relatively modest background, they have risen to a position where they are able to benefit from converting political capital to social capital, and vice versa - choosing to see in this privileged ability the operation not of domination but rather the principle of charity (*aḥsan*).

Finally, moving to the lower right quadrant we find agents who are both *in rupture* and *engaged*. While this is the least populated quadrant (thus perhaps demonstrating the strong tendency of habitus toward reproduction), this interpretation may be demonstrated through a comparison of respondents 13/6 and 13/10, who are opposed on the second axis while occupying ostensibly the same position on the first. To draw out this distinction it is useful to contrast their respective experiences in taking their driving test: whereas 13/6 decided to pay extra to make his exam “secure”,¹⁷ 13/10 went specifically against his father’s wishes to try to pass the test *without* paying an additional bribe or using connections. We may argue that 13/10 did not so much lack a feel for the game (he knew very well what was required), but was rather expressing his specific form of *engagement*: that is, his interest in a form of civic engagement approximating the generalised interest - an interest also manifested in his earlier involvement in overseas volunteering, his general opposition to *wasta*, and his preference for merit. Such a form of engagement nonetheless places him in a position of rupture *vis à vis* his anticipated trajectory, hence his position on the first axis further to the right of his brother (13/11, who had admitted unrepentingly that his father had used a contact at the Ministry of Education to have a teacher take his school exam for him), and in more or less the same position as 13/6. We may thus consider this quadrant as occupied by agents in more transitional positions, or perhaps in less stable positions within fields where struggles are more pronounced (such as, arguably, respondent 13/3).

In a similar mode to the comparison of respondents 13/6 and 13/10 (who occupied corresponding positions on the first axis and opposing positions on the second), we may further our interpretation of the effects of covariance by contrasting respondents 13/12 and 13/9, who occupy corresponding po-

¹⁷Respondent 13/6 took his licence in Nabatieh (southern Lebanon), owing to the fact that then Interior Minister Ziad Baroud had imposed a 3 month ban on driving exams in Beirut due to corruption. He paid ll 500,000, as opposed to ll 450,000 for a “non-secure” test (the official cost should have been in the region of ll 300,000). Interestingly, he then tried to take a female friend to the same examiner, who refused to examine her as she was a Sunni - another indication perhaps of the respondent’s less developed ‘feel for the game’.

sitions on the second and opposing positions on the first. Both are to a mild extent disengaged from the struggles of the field, yet the quality of their disengagement varies radically: whereas 13/9 (the security guard) is disengaged by choice, having sought out a stable position in an international institution that would protect him from the exigencies of struggles within the field, the US professor is disengaged by disposition: that is, he lacks a ‘feel for the game’, the result of occupying a ruptured position, in turn producing a “destabilised” habitus.¹⁸

The final observation to make concerning the distribution of individuals relates to the opposition uncovered between agents who might otherwise be expected (based purely upon their occupation) to hold similar positions within the two dimensions. There are essentially two such cases: the two female professors (13/2 and 13/3) and the two *mukhtars* (13/14 and 13/13), the first of whom are predominately separated by the second axis (though also in a more limited sense by the first) and the latter of whom are separated predominately by the first axis (though again to a lesser extent also by the second). Such results may seem initially surprising (particularly in light of the relatively close grouping of, for example, the retirees and the students); however, they serve to remind us that the positions and practices of agents are not determined purely by their occupation (which is a poor proxy for expressing all the possible variations in capital structures and trajectory), but are rather the product of their complete social history, as embodied in habitus and objectified in a determinate trajectory in social space.

Before concluding this section it is worth briefly discussing the third axis, and how it may contribute to our understanding of the principles revealed by the first two axes. Table 8.3 summarises the axis by presenting the main categories and individuals contributing to it (i.e. those whose contribution or squared correlation is greater than 1/k), and lists them in order from left to right on the factorial plane.

As can be seen, the third axis distinguishes strongly between those who admit to using *wasta* in the labour market, and those who admit to using

¹⁸For instance, 13/12 noted several instances of uncertainty regarding the appropriate way to proceed in social interactions which mingled the general and specific interests. On one occasion a student brought him an expensive gift for having allowed him to resit a paper on compassionate grounds; the professor faced the dilemma of accepting the gift and then feeling obliged to award a high grade, or refusing the gift and offending the student (and his family). Ultimately he accepted the gift and awarded a low grade.

Table 8.3: Summary of Third Axis

Cat/Ind.	coord	ctr/sq corr	rank
Lab. Mark (admit)	-3.772	0.203	2nd
4	-3.532	0.155	4th
5	-3.469	0.149	5th
Wasta (never)	-1.495	0.064	11th
Wasta (abs. need)	-1.407	0.085	7th
State viol. (admit)	1.694	0.205	1st
14	2.342	0.068	9th
9	2.499	0.078	8th
7	3.749	0.175	3rd

it in the domain of the state monopoly of violence, with the individual fitting this axis the most being respondent 7, who is placed closest to the latter and furthest from the former. This will prove an important finding, as the following section on habitus elaborates more clearly the particular nature of respondent 7's dispositions and position-takings regarding these two categories. Thus, despite being a second order axis, the third axis nonetheless provides useful information which can aid in the interpretation of the social space of clandestine circulation, and it is also worth adding that it is in *this* axis (i.e., the one most strongly opposing the state and the labour market) that the squared correlation of respondent 7's profile is highest - having been relatively low in the first and second axes.

To conclude this section of the analysis, we have seen through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, interpreted in light of the theoretical categories developed previously, that both agents' dispositions *and* position-takings vary consistently according to their objective situation along two axes. Thus, it would seem that both the disposition toward *wasta*-like practices and position-takings toward *wasta* are (at least to some extent) a *structured phenomenon*. Further, according to our interpretation of these two axes revealed by MCA, the structuring principles according to which both practices and position-takings vary are the *stability* of an agent and the quality of their *engagement* within their given field.

The most obvious manifestation of these axes falls within the natural life course of individual agents: thus, agents begin in a position of low stability but high engagement (being motivated to succeed in whichever field they

are struggling in), and gradually move to a position of greater stability but less engagement. Indeed, this is the trajectory demonstrated by the distribution of age cohorts across the two axes (which follow an upward, left-leaning curve). Such a distribution suggests that (endogenous) agents naturally tend to rely more heavily on strategies of clandestine circulation the younger they are in order to establish themselves within the field, and also tend to see in such strategies the imperatives of necessity, rather than a free choice. As agents grow older, it would also appear they are more likely to distance themselves from such practices, despite perhaps still requiring to make use of them, particularly as regards the inheritance of property. The exception to both cases would appear to be those agents somehow in positions of rupture (either by disposition or choice), and who, in the most extreme positions of arbitrage, see in such circulation principles of charity which reflect positively upon themselves - a clear expression of the specific interest, and the elementary mode of domination.

It is clear, however, that age should not be understood as the 'independent variable' which constitutes or explains an agent's position on the stability index (and hence his or her tendency to rely on the clandestine circulation of capital). Rather, 'stability' must be understood as the product of those more general properties structuring Lebanese social space, as described in the previous chapter, *some of whose effects* are also expressed through the function of age.

It should also be noted that, while such analysis is highly useful in revealing the general distribution of practices and position-takings relating to clandestine circulation, as well as the underlying dimensions structuring such a distribution, the axes revealed through the analysis of practices and position-takings *do not* position agents within an objective power hierarchy (in the sense of the absolute volume of capital possessed by respondents in relation to each other). This is owing to several factors, not least the fact (noted in the theory chapter) that the subjective effects of misrecognition associated with an agent's own practices are frequently autonomous from the distributional effects of field.

Thus, the relational analysis of practices and position-takings presented here may reveal the disposition toward practices of clandestine circulation, and variation in the types of clandestine circulation practiced (in the sense of the reproduction mechanisms they relate to), as well as the general, re-


lational structure of misrecognition relating to such practices. It does not reveal, however, the varying extent to which specific agents objectively benefit from such clandestine circulation as a means of appropriation, above and beyond the similar strategies of less fortunately placed agents.

Rather, to achieve such a goal we must reintegrate the insights gained on the distribution of practices and position-takings to the objective resources possessed by agents within a hierarchical social space. Such an analysis may be effected as part of the more detailed comparison of specific agents' habitus which follows on from this section. The aim of such structured comparisons is thus to deepen the insights gained from this preliminary, relational investigation of clandestine circulation, and to reveal the implications of such structuring at the level of objective resources, in terms of the distribution (and efficacy) of particular strategies, the manner in which they are misrecognised, and the varying appropriation resulting from them.

8.2 The Structure of Habitus

In seeking to analyse in detail agents' habitus regarding clandestine circulation, it is useful to begin with an agent who may be considered to represent a good point of comparison with respect to all others. Turning once more to the distribution of respondents revealed in figure 8.2, we find that the respondent occupying the most central position in relation to both axes is 13/7. We thus begin with an analysis of his habitus, in terms both of the precise nature and efficacy of his reproduction strategies (relating to the dispositions of habitus) and of the point of honour reconstructed through his responses (relating to the position-takings of habitus, and the specific constitution of the social libido produced by the objective configuration of social space).

Respondent 13/7 is a 21-year-old male political science graduate of an elite (private) Lebanese university. Prior to university he had been privately educated at a preparatory school, and at the time of interview he was preparing to undertake a graduate degree in law in Europe (for which he had received offers from several different universities). His father is a relatively well-connected shop owner in *Ras Beirut*, and his mother is the country director of a significant international organisation in a nearby Arab country. He has one older brother who works in a leading Middle Eastern

Figure 8.3: Structure of Misrecognition in Use of *Wasta*

law firm, which he himself hopes to join after completing his studies. He has studied in France and also undertaken internships in prestigious international organisations. He holds a Lebanese diplomatic passport by virtue of his mother's status. He has a relatively closed social circle of around 8 friends, and doesn't like "a lot of strangers partying with us".

Figure 8.3 is an enlargement of the specific portion of space occupied by respondent 13/7, and is intended specifically to illustrate his relation to the structure of the distribution of categories for admitting to using *wasta*-like practices. Also included as a reference are the two respondents 13/11 and 13/10 (both male students at the same university), and the two closest position-takings regarding *wasta* ('need' and 'absolute need').

The first thing to note concerns the positioning of respondent 13/7 relative to the categories of clandestine circulation in the various reproduction mechanisms. He is closest (and indeed equidistant) to the two categories relating to the state, more distant from the category relating to the education system, and furthest from the category relating to the labour market. He

is also closer to the ‘need’ category than ‘absolute need’ regarding position-takings on *wasta*. By contrast, respondents 13/11 and 13/10 are both closer to ‘absolute need’, and regarding practices 13/10 is more or less equidistant from all domains, while 13/11 is relatively close to clandestine circulation in the education system (reflecting his aforementioned lack of reticence in admitting to cheating during his exams), somewhat close to clandestine circulation in the state security apparatus, and further (and equidistant) to clandestine circulation in the state bureaucracy and labour market.¹⁹

These apparently minor differences in fact reflect a substantial difference in terms of the precise constitution of each respondent’s *point of honour* - that is, the point or perspective they must defend or promote, as revealed through interview. This point of honour, as discussed in the theory section, is nothing more than the structure of misrecognition resulting from a habitus involved in the accumulation and transformation of capitals in a determinate position of a particular social space. Any such position will produce its own social libido, the constitution of which will vary according to the forms and guises of capitals necessary to be transacted through the reproduction strategies which accord to that position, and to the broader state of relations within and between fields which results from the distribution of such capitals across the totality of social space. In the case of older agents, their point of honour may also be the product of a social libido embedded in a habitus reflecting a *prior* historical state of such relations (the ‘Don Quixote’ effect, as Bourdieu described it) - habitus being also the embodiment of history.

Thus, what figure 8.3 demonstrates is the varying point of honour of the three respondents 13/7, 13/10, and 13/11 as it relates to clandestine

¹⁹It is important to note that the scaling of the second (y) axis on figure 8.3 has been curtailed, which gives the impression of respondent 13/10 being closer to clandestine circulation in the labour market than he in fact is. While 13/10 is - paradoxically - closer to the ‘admit’ categories for the education system and labour markets than he is for the two state domains (having in reality admitted to using clandestine circulation in the latter and not mentioned it in the former), this is owing to the stronger contribution of ‘absolute need’ as a category in the second axis, a category in which respondent 13/10 is contained. However, rather than weakening the argument for the use of MCA to position respondents, the case of respondent 13/10 in fact strengthens it, as it has positioned him in a substantially different space to respondent 13/7, despite their coded responses differing in only two categories (‘absolute need’ as opposed to ‘need’ in *wasta* position-taking, and ‘no mention’ as opposed to ‘deny’ regarding clandestine circulation in the labour market). As we have seen, such a positioning is both justified and more than borne out when considering 13/10’s ‘ruptured’ trajectory. It reminds us, however, that MCA presents a structure of *relations* that must be interpreted, rather than variables which determine causality (Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux, 2000, p. 7).

circulation in the Lebanese context. Specifically, what it demonstrates *vis à vis* respondent 13/7 - the respondent who is also, according to the structure revealed by MCA, the agent occupying the mean or most typical position in this social space of clandestine circulation - is a point of honour adjusted toward the defence of the general interest (i.e. the principal of merit) as it pertains to the (private) labour market and educational system, and toward the denigration of the same interest as it pertains toward the institutions of the state. It is furthermore a point of honour which considers in *wasta* not the utility maximising preferences of a free choice, but the structurally determined constraints of necessity.

Turning to the interview itself, we see such an analysis entirely borne out. When asked how he would describe *wasta*, rather than immediately providing a normative judgement, the respondent instead emphasised its *importance* -

How would you describe wasta? Is it good, bad? I think if it could be abolished, totally abolished for everyone, I think that would be better for everyone. But since it is not? But since it is not I think it is of vital importance in Lebanon. To survive? Yes, but the ideal picture would be no wasta at all, it's based on merits and qualifications, everything would work, and everyone should be under the law. So, but, er, due to the circumstances that we live in in Lebanon, I think it's of vital importance.

The positioning of an 'ideal picture' based on merit and qualifications and the rule of law is of course an idealised expression of the generalised interest. The respondent identifies himself with such an interest without committing himself to its normative implications, emphasising instead the "circumstances that we live in". Indeed, he later repeats this justification when asked the question in a more pointed way (one designed specifically to confront the point of honour associated with the generalised interest) -

So, in that context you wouldn't call it a corrupt thing, because it's a needed practice, like I mean you can't do without it in Lebanon. [Slightly uncertain] It is a corrupt thing. Er, I'm sure it is corrupt, and it's part of what makes the corruption in Lebanon so large. But, er, due to the circumstances, because everyone

has *wasta*, and without *wasta* stuff would be very hard to do. In circumstances, er. I think that is important.

This denial of agency is emphasised again toward the end of the interview, when the interviewer addresses a question directly toward the respondent's point of honour - his *own* behaviour:

Ok. So, whenever you used wasta, did you use it because you needed to, or because you chose to? No, it was because I needed to. I told you earlier, I only use *wasta* when, in times where no other way is possible.

The degree of insistence here (answering 'no' to an open question; emphasising "I told you earlier") is indicative of the degree of pressure under which the interviewer has placed the respondent's point of honour. Despite the fact that all the instances in which the respondent had referred to using *wasta* had seemed to imply a considerable amount of agency or choice (as will be demonstrated below), the respondent *must* emphasise the coercive, dominating aspect of the *system* in which *wasta* occurs, in order to defend the symbolic force associated with his capital structure. Indeed, this insistence even goes so far as a denial that use of such *wasta* implies in any way a form of power:

Alright, and normally when you use wasta - you already I think answered this question but I'll ask again - is your wasta a friend, family member [etc.] No, it's usually one of my parents, or one of my friends who has his dad, or his connections, but not personally. It's neither my dad not [sic.] mom personally nor my friends. They personally don't have power in their lives.

Again, the respondent begins his answer to this open-ended question with a negation, emphasising his opposition to the (perceived) implication, which (from the rest of his response) we must believe to be the insinuation that he or his family form an integral part of the *wasta*-system which he has previously described, and in doing so benefit from it. The effort to emphasise such a distance even takes curious semantic proportions: the word 'personally' (associated with the specific interest) is used three times, each as a negation. Indeed, on three earlier occasions in the interview he

uses the same word in relation to himself to emphasise his own distance from such practices (whilst simultaneously recounting his role in them): “I personally don’t know anyone”; “I personally don’t know anyone that I’m maintaining a connection with to keep my *wasta* going”; and, “I only use the *wasta* when. . . in times where no other way is possible, one of my parents or one of my friends who has his dad or has connections but. . . *not* personally.”

Why does respondent 13/7’s point of honour take such contours? As noted above, his background places him within a relatively elite fraction of the bourgeoisie: not only has he been privately educated all his life, but his parents are also prosperous and well-connected. Regarding his own investment strategies, he was proud of having worked as a coach and volunteer for several years, something which he said was “now very useful for my CV”, and despite the head of the organisation where he interned being a friend of his mother, he insisted that such a connection did not benefit him, and that he “just applied” after the organisation had visited his school. Thus, in terms of his background and current trajectory, respondent 13/7 is evidently possessed of a habitus adjusted toward the accumulation of institutionalised cultural capital.

On the other hand, his inherited position and trajectory have also equipped him with a significant volume of embodied social capital, in the sense of the quality of social relations upon which he can draw for assistance. When asked to describe his social circle, he claimed to have around eight or nine close friends, the majority of which (six) he had attended school with. When asked if he made any special effort to maintain certain relationships, particularly with powerful or well-connected people, he claimed there were no particular individuals he maintained good relations with simply for the sake of “keep[ing] my *wasta* going”, although he would like to keep a good relationship with his brother’s employer (who is also a friend of his mother), to potentially get a job after his graduate degree.

However, despite this disavowal of any instrumental motivation regarding his social relations (be it even for necessity), and indeed despite an apparent emphasis on the opposite - i.e. of making no special effort to keep such friendships going - it is clear that these relations furnish him with a useful stock of social capital. For instance, one friend’s father works in the customs department at the airport, which enabled him to get excess baggage through for free on his trip to France, and another’s father is a brigadier in the police

- a connection he considered might be helpful in the future.

It is interesting, indeed, that both the respondent and his friends appear able to draw fairly freely on each other's parents to deal with problems or smooth the way - functions which would ordinarily be considered as *wasta* by most objective observers. Indeed, the most spectacular examples of such assistance are provided by the respondent himself when asked if he had ever been in a position to help anyone. In one case he told how his girlfriend was stopped by the police at a checkpoint, where they were "being very rough on her because she forgot her driving licence". The respondent was able to solve the problem by making a call to his father, who used his connections in the police to have her released. A second case was even more notable: a friend had been involved in a car accident under the influence of alcohol, causing a significant amount of damage. The friend asked the respondent's help, and his father was able to intervene to prevent the friend from being tested for alcohol by the police - hence enabling him to claim on the insurance for the damage.

When asked why he had provided such help, the respondent answered "first of all, because he asked me to, and he's a very close friend. Second of all, because the accident was obviously very expensive. . . to fix the car it was obvious that a lot of money needed to be put in, so if he had been caught that he had been under the influence of alcohol he wouldn't have gotten the amount from the insurance company." Such justifications are obviously expressive of the specific interest, which in this case clearly trumped the contrasting claims of the rule of law, otherwise expressive of the generalised interest.

It is interesting to contrast the varying degrees of misrecognition across the different domains in which this generalised interest may be expressed. Whereas the respondent was careful to emphasise that his parents' connections had played no role either in the transition to the labour market (his mother's friendship with both the head of the agency he interned in and the company at which his brother works being for him in no way the determinant factor), or in the legitimacy of his institutionalised cultural capital, when it came to the more specific domains of the state (the security and bureaucratic/fiscal apparatuses), the respondent displayed no compunction whatsoever in admitting either to employing affective relations, or indeed the more brute effects of vertical or economic domination in order to achieve

the desired result.

While the use of the father's connections to assist his friends would fall under this former category of affective relations (and hence involve a degree of misrecognition under the specific interest), the respondent also gave examples of the latter, more overt domination in other of his dealings with the state, which involved no such misrecognition. For example, it became apparent that the family has for a long time (some 25 years) employed a driver as a kind of all-purpose factotum. The respondent described this person as "my driver", in a manner expressive of a similar kind of objectification to the domestique phenomenon noted in the previous chapter. Whenever the respondent received a parking ticket, he would give it to the driver, who would take it to someone and "cancel" it.²⁰ When pressed further, the respondent (who seemed uninterested in the precise mechanism) said that the driver's son worked in the *mukhabarat* (intelligence), and that this probably had something to do with it.

Indeed, the complete absence of a generalised interest associated by the respondent with the apparatus of the state is confirmed by his account of the process behind acquiring his driving licence. According to the respondent, "my mom has some principles that she doesn't break"; hence, she would not allow him to drive before his 18th birthday. Two days after, however, she simply paid off the relevant agency, without even obliging him to go through the charade of taking the official exam. The somewhat jarring juxtaposition between bribing a government agency to obtain a licence and nonetheless being a person of unbreakable principles appears to hinge on the ambiguity contained in the word "some": his mother has some principles; they have nothing to do with the state.

In total, in the course of being interviewed respondent 13/7 mentioned 8 specific instances of clandestine circulation, understood in the restricted sense of the use of economic or social capital (the clandestine circulation of cultural capital being already implied in the agent's academic trajectory). Figure 8.4 provides a spatial representation of this use of clandestine circulation in the total labour of social reproduction. It attempts to integrate five perspectives: symbolic forces (misrecognition); capitals; power relations; reproduction mechanisms (relating to the specific structure of the Lebanese *state effect*); and reproduction strategies.

²⁰The initial arabic expression used was 'zbouta', or 'adjust'.

Each specific instance of clandestine circulation has been positioned within this space, and is numbered accordingly: 1 refers to the mother's role in obtaining a position for her son(s) in the labour market (implied by her social relation to the owner of the company); 2 refers to her role in obtaining the internship (again implied by her social relation to the head of the organisation); 3 has not yet been mentioned, and refers to the mother's use of her office to obtain extra seats for the respondent's graduation; 4 refers to the respondent's father helping his girlfriend at the checkpoint; 5 refers to the respondent's father helping his friend after the car crash; 6 refers to the respondent using his friend's father to obtain extra baggage allowance at the airport; 7 refers to the cancelled parking tickets; and 8 refers to the driving licence.


The space is organised hierarchically, from strategies of greatest importance in reproducing the respondent's position in social space (closer to the centre), to those of least importance (closer to the periphery); the most relevant agents and groups of agents are then positioned according to their role in this labour (again with the most important closest to the centre, and the least important toward the periphery).²¹ The arrows identify the specific capitals circulated (and reproduced) between and by the respondent and the agents in these various labours, and the particular power relations or social structures that relate the respondent to the agent(s) in question.

The brackets toward the bottom of the figure indicate the approximate bounds of the different reproduction mechanisms within this space. According to the structure of the Lebanese *state effect*, for this particular agent both the labour market and the educational system are regulated by reproduction mechanisms which fall outside of the formal institutions of the state; they are thus indicated as lying within *a space of capitals institutionalised by the economic field* (e.g. private universities, private corporations, etc.)

Those remaining reproduction mechanisms falling within formal state institutions (and hence *the space of capitals institutionalised by the state*) are labelled according to the typology used in the MCA of state fiscal and

²¹It should be noted in this respect that agents are positioned according to their *most* important role - for instance, the respondent's mother also assisted the respondent obtaining his driving licence by paying off the examiner, a labour which would fall somewhere in the periphery; however, it is unlikely she would have done this personally, and her much more fundamental role in integrating her son in the labour market ultimately positions her closest to the centre.

Figure 8.4: Clandestine Circulation, Misrecognition, and Reproduction Strategies: Analysis of Respondent 13/7



security apparatus. They thus include interactions with the bureaucracy and with those institutions responsible for maintaining the state's monopoly of violence (or the '*raison d'Etat*'). For respondent 13/7 this includes the avoidance of fines, the circumvention of bureaucratic regulations concerning car registration, driving tests, circumventing police or army checkpoints, etc. though not (considering his low age) mechanisms relating to inheritance laws and property rights. In this sense, the driving licence may be considered as something of a proxy, requiring as it does a similar kind of bureaucratic interaction.

The dashed circles delineate the general space of specific *reproduction strategies* within the total schema, and thus overlap both varying reproduction mechanisms and varying social relations. While succession strategies and educational strategies (being of greatest importance to this respondent) are closest to the centre and match closely with the labour market and the educational system, less important strategies are both further out and of a more vague extent. In the case of clandestine circulation involving the police or customs, such practices (while occasionally seeming mundane) are nonetheless included within the broader context of reproduction strategies owing to the symbolic value accorded to the circumvention of such rules: the ability (or inability) to avoid bureaucratic entanglements (i.e., the extent to which the symbolic and actual violence of the state does or does not apply to them) serves to position agents hierarchically, and is hence expressive of the possession of social capital, as was seen in the theoretical chapters in the cases of *blat* and *guanxi*. In this sense it is also worth comparing respondent 13/7 to the Orthodox *mukhtar* (13/14), who described using a *simsar* to deal with the public administration not to save time, but because "it's not nice for someone like me to do it myself". This shared desire of both respondents to maintain social distance from the state bureaucracy contrasts markedly with, for instance, the security guard (13/9), who seemed to take pride in handling such matters personally. It would thus appear to relate more particularly to the point of honour of elite agents, and specifically those adjusted toward the accumulation of cultural capital.

Finally, the shading indicates the degree of misrecognition (or conversely, the strength of the symbolic force) of the capitals involved. Once again this moves from weakest at the periphery to strongest at the centre (represented by the respondent's "point of honour" in the very centre).

A very cursory analysis of the figure thus reveals that the lowest misrecognition (and the weakest symbolic force) corresponds to the area of space represented by the capitals and reproduction mechanisms of the state. Here, when reproduction involves the assistance of a parent, such assistance does not even require post-facto justification, whereas assistance provided by non-family members (even if corresponding to the broader household) is stated in terms of more or less naked domination (“my driver”), with neither justification offered nor any attempt to describe the relation in affective terms. It is here also that the clandestine circulation of economic capital may occur, the enabling factor being the low symbolic force attached to capitals institutionalised by the state.

As we move closer to the centre, we gradually enter the territory of social and symbolic investment - that is, strategies geared toward the maintenance of a circle of useful friends and the gathering of symbolic resources with a value in the wider symbolic market. It is in this somewhat intermediary space - that is, between relatively unimportant and absolutely fundamental strategies - that agents invest in the kind of practices that will position them as possessors of high levels of embodied social capital, and which thus tends to lead toward the *objectification* of such social capital in a market of objectively trivial yet symbolically meaningful goods and practices. While respondent 13/7 mentions relatively few such examples (the excess baggage being a rather mundane instance), for other respondents of his age and background it is in this space that would be found strategies for gaining access to (and being seen in) the most fashionable nightclubs, or (among slightly older respondents) maintaining, for example, a car with smoked windows, which requires sufficient *wasta* to overcome the inevitable police checkpoints and *mecanique* inspections.

As the figure demonstrates, the respondent’s strategies (capitals exchanged and contacts called upon) vary according to the degree of importance which each practice holds in the total labour of reproduction; further, the degree of misrecognition demonstrated by the respondent also varies according to the same measure. Analysis of the interview revealed that practices could be positioned along a matrix moving from least important (practices related to convenience and prestige) to most important (practices related to the protection of capitals/status and, most critically, reproducing an advanced level of insertion in the labour market). Misrecognition is,

naturally, found to be at its strongest the closer one approaches strategies related to the reproduction of the respondent's core capital structure. In this case, as the respondent is expecting to transition from the university to an elevated position in the labour market - specifically, a role in the same leading commercial law firm as his brother - it is here that the greatest misrecognition is displayed. It is also here that the labour of reproduction is most circumscribed within the household: there would appear to be a complete reliance on the mother's social or professional connections to effect this transition.

For respondent 13/7 "*wasta*", it would seem, includes only those practices of clandestine circulation falling within the middle, transitional part of this diagram: i.e. 4, 5 and 6. These were practices involving either the father or friends' fathers, and involving the reproduction mechanisms or security apparatus (relating to the monopoly of violence) of the state. These practices generally had to do with prestige or protection, and were in most cases capable of being presented as altruistic. By contrast, clandestine circulation closer to the core reproduction strategies was entirely misrecognised, while clandestine circulation at the most peripheral positions (and which tended to involve the state bureaucracy and the subversion of the state's monopoly of symbolic violence) was unrecognised, i.e. seen as purely doxic or taken-for-granted.

The specificity of such a habitus produced within the social space of Lebanese clandestine circulation can best be evoked through comparison with an agent whose habitus was formed outside of such a space, and who has subsequently had to adjust to the demands of the Lebanese field. The effects of hysteresis which emerge from this adjustment can be used in a comparative sense to highlight all those aspects of the smooth functioning of a habitus in its natural environment which often become 'taken-for-granted' by the agent - and hence missed by the analyst - as well as the comparatively greater efficacy of reproduction strategies employed by endogenous habitus.

For current purposes the best point of comparison is arguably respondent 13/1, a (Lebanese) female research assistant in her early thirties who was raised in Nigeria and educated to graduate level in the US. At the time of interview she had been living in Lebanon for four years with her mother and sister, and was working part-time at a private university. Her social circle is quite small (around ten people), acquired mostly through "random

meet-ups” via other friends, or through “volunteering and activism”. In contrast to 13/7, who claimed he could call on all eight of his close friends in difficulty, respondent 13/1 believed there was only one such person she could call on.

In terms of dispositions and attitudes respondent 13/1 differs from 13/7 in a number of important respects - particularly when considering the otherwise quite similar nature of their objective positions, in terms of family background and educational attainment.

For instance, the families of both respondents employ a male driver as a general factotum. However, whereas for 13/7 “my” driver was referred to dismissively, for 13/1, “our” driver is described in more human terms as “there to help my mum, to not have her deal with everything.” According to the respondent, having such a recourse “sort of became part of our lifestyle” - “our driver is always available as a mechanism to ease the process of doing something that would otherwise take a long time.” In contrast to respondent 13/7 though, she seemed somewhat embarrassed by this situation, and even slightly resentful at the limitation to her autonomy which it occasionally implied:

The driver, because he got so used to his role, decided that it’s ok to take the car and wash it without my permission. So I got really mad and I told him, from now on if you want to take the car and go and do service, tell me where you do it and how you do it, and I will do it.” Such defiance has its limits however, as the respondent admitted: “I realised very quickly that’s not going to be possible *whatsoever*, because there’s already a way of doing things. And as right as he is, I am too busy, and it’s a privilege and it’s wonderful actually when you have someone to help you out with this.

This tension between the awareness that “there’s already a way of doing things” from which she implicitly benefits, and a desire to maintain some autonomy or independence regardless, was a constant theme for this respondent, and arguably reflects aspects of destabilised habitus. For instance, when the respondent began having problems with her electricity bill she refused the driver’s offer of assistance, despite the fact that “there’s always an offer” for such help. Instead, she “got to know” a woman on the

5th floor of her building, and through her fixed the problem with the head of the building.

This preference for autonomous action is indeed strongest when it regards close family, from whose benign (if perhaps overbearing) assistance she claims to have consciously withdrawn. With her father still working in Nigeria, the male family presence in Lebanon is represented by two uncles, who are the individuals (alongside her mother) whom she would call upon with significant problems. However, she emphasised that in this respect both her sister's and her mother's connection was stronger (they had both remained in Lebanon for longer), while she rather chose to define herself *against* such connections: "I think my parents would know more about these cases [i.e. *wasta*-like practices] than I would, only because I've pulled myself away from... and my connection to my uncle is not as strong as, let's say to a friend or to the driver, who has helped us since we were kids".

This distancing from family relations, and especially their use for instrumental ends, was emphasised twice by the respondent. On the other occasion she introduced a further distinction regarding her own use of such connections: "personally, my connection is not that strong, and I'm more focussed on not using those tools unless it's like soft tools. I don't use the hard tools."

This distinction between "soft" and "hard" tools was, upon further questioning, revealed to be equivalent to the one she had previously made (noted in the previous section) between *wasta* and *khidme* (a favour or service). For 13/1 *khidme* falls under the category of acceptable assistance, and an examination of the definition of such assistance is particularly useful in drawing out the distinction with 13/7. For instance, when asked if her family or friends had ever helped her with regard to finding work, she corrected an earlier statement that her parents might talk to someone they know on her behalf to the more neutral role of "spreading of information" - "my dad will just keep his eyes open". She also emphasised that her own career path was sufficiently different to her father's that he could be of little direct help to her. Rather, when it came to her own career "everything has been done on my own through acceptance [i.e. of a formal application]".

Even assistance from a friend in finding a job was described in similar terms: "I spread the word and a friend of mine basically sent me an e-mail and told me 'hey I have a job for you at X for editing and writing'." The

friend forwarded an e-mail, and she obtained the post after being interviewed by the head of the organisation. Again, without it being made clear, the implication is that the friend had no direct influence in her receiving the job, but had rather assisted through the “soft tool” of “spreading of information”.

Indeed, the respondent’s discussion of her social connections and the kinds of assistance upon which she has called remind strongly of Granovetter’s “strength of weak ties” theory (Granovetter, 1973) - itself arguably reflecting the social dispositions of habitus within highly institutionalised structures. In this sense, the respondent’s preference for diffuse ‘networking’ strategies reflects her conscious identification with the US model of professional relations, and the continuing embodiment, within habitus, of a *state effect* in which institutionalised capitals are more heavily relied upon. Indeed, at one point in the interview (while attempting to define *wasta*) the respondent directly contrasted Lebanon with the US - explicitly identifying herself with the latter at the expense of the former:

[a]s opposed to in the US, you know *wasta* quote unquote exists if you want to see it in a good term, but we call it connections, we call it making the extra effort to ensure your application is taken into consideration. So when I think of *wasta* I see it as a very negative Lebanese overdone form.

Indeed, in contrast to 13/7, respondent 13/1’s point of honour identifies much more strongly with the generalised interest *in all domains* - including those of the state. Thus, when describing her driving test she was the only respondent to voice disapproval at having benefitted from the corrupt system, and emphasised that her parents bribed the examiner without her knowledge:

My parents ended up - interestingly behind my back because I would have refused it - to pay off the driver who’s teaching me, in order to ensure that if I make a tiny mistake they won’t have to cancel it off [and repeat the test].


The attempt to both distance herself from (“behind my back”) and downplay the significance of (“tiny mistake”) this event is expressive of the unification of the generalised interest within the respondent’s point of honour - that is, between not only qualifications awarded by the educational system,

but also those awarded by the state. In much the same way that the young Lebanese professional mentioned in the opening anecdote was physically unable to bribe a bureaucrat (expressive of the same unification through the effects of body *hexis*), respondent 13/1 is subjectively unable to associate herself with the conscious subversion of this generalised interest. Again, as with the young Lebanese professional, we must assume these effects of habitus to be the result of *hysteresis* - the continuing embodiment of subjective categories arising from earlier (and more determinant) exposure to the differing configurations of reproduction mechanisms and social libidos of a contrasting *state effect*. This is particularly so when one considers the fact that no other endogenous respondents - whatever their other attitudes - felt the need to apologise for the corrupt manner in which they had obtained their driving licence.

Not only does respondent 13/1 differ from 13/7 in terms of her subjective attitude toward social relations, she also seems to differ from him objectively in terms of social capital. It has been mentioned earlier that 13/1 struggled to manage reciprocity among her friendship group (admitting that she felt she held herself back from asking favours of others, while being too quick to offer assistance herself). A close comparison of the nature of both respondents' social capital (in the sense of the effectiveness with which each uses the social resources available to them in the labour of social reproduction) in fact demonstrates significant differences in habitus - differences which are arguably attributable to respondent 13/1's late entry into the Lebanese field. These differences render her apparently less capable (or less willing) to leverage her social relations toward instrumental ends relating to her reproduction strategies - even when accounting for the effects of misrecognition associated with such usage.

As figure 8.5 illustrates, while the quality of social resources upon which respondents 13/1 and 13/7 may draw upon does not radically vary (they are from a similar, relatively elite background, have a family employee to call upon, and well-connected relatives), the use which they make of these *potential* resources differs radically. For instance, it seems 13/7 and his peer cohort rely less upon direct, small favours among each other than 13/1, who noted several instances of '*khidme*' (as she defined it) among her friendship group. Rather, for the kind of reproduction strategies (specifically labour market integration) for which 13/1 relies upon the 'networking' or 'soft tools'

Figure 8.5: Schema of Varying Networks of Social Capital, Respondents 13/7 and 13/1



(such as ‘spreading of information’) among her friendship group, 13/7 relies more directly upon the misrecognised (and, in the terminology of 13/1, ‘harder’) assistance of close kin relations. By contrast, 13/1 mentions specifically pushing away from the use of such ‘hard tools’,²² and in particular it would seem she lacks the bridging connection to other, older and well-connected individuals which 13/7 and his peer cohort are able to access, through the mutual assistance of each other’s parents.

Hence, as figure 8.5 demonstrates, respondent 13/7 has in effect much greater embodied social capital than respondent 13/1: not in the sense that the quality of his social relations is significantly greater, but in the sense that the dispositions both of his own and his peer group’s habitus enable those relations to be put to much more effective use in the labour of social reproduction. In effect, respondent 13/7’s network of social relations forms a dense cluster of mutually reinforcing ties, drawing upon kinship, economic and social links to achieve concrete advances in the social game, and tending to exclude the entry of newcomers.

By contrast, 13/1’s destabilised or “tormented” habitus (Tabar, Noble, and Poynting, 2010) consciously limits her use of social connections to the “soft tools” of *‘khidme’*: she is much less inclined to use social or kinship relations for purely instrumental ends, and demonstrates no interest whatsoever in the kind of intermediary strategies of symbolic investment in objectified social capital which might position her to others as potentially useful. Rather, quite the opposite: her habitus is adjusted toward the maintenance of *weak* ties among professional networks (hence she mentions buying flowers for the sister of a friend who had given birth, and who was very much involved in the activist community, admitting “I might have done it for that [...] to keep that connection”), and most lamenting the fact that her current work does not provide her with a business card to exchange with potential contacts (the business card expressing a form of institutionalised social capital). She is also more adjusted toward what might be described as ‘institutionalised’ forms of social activities: activism and volunteering - themselves the expressions of an impulse toward the generalised, rather than

²²Indeed, if the driving licence story is to be believed it would seem her family are only able to use such ‘hard tools’ behind her back - which also demonstrates in a more general sense the extent to which some agents may indirectly benefit from clandestine circulation while subjectively distancing themselves from it (and hence the importance of distinguishing between position-takings and practices in the labour of social reproduction).

the specific, interest.

The result for respondent 13/1 is a mode of integration within Lebanese social space which positions her - both objectively and subjectively - in a peripheral position: as a self-defining member of the 'activist community', and someone who, perhaps making a virtue of necessity in the manner noted by Bourdieu (1990c, p. 54), distances herself from the "very negative Lebanese overdone form" of social relations. It is important to note that a minor, though significant, portion of Lebanese social space exists to support such position-takings, and is occupied by what might be considered a disaffected fraction of the cultural elite. However, as ever it is important to distinguish practices from position-takings: although respondent 13/1 has found a (subjective) home for herself within this fraction of space, the limited (objective) success with which she pursues her strategies of advancement within it is arguably the result of the mis-firings of displaced habitus - a habitus ill-adjusted to the *general* requirements of Lebanese social space, which express themselves to some extent even in the most peripheral positions, and which prompt reproduction strategies which make extensive use of the clandestine circulation of social capital even among significant holders of institutionalised cultural capital, such as 13/1.

Having established these differences marking habitus exogenous or endogenous to Lebanese social space, and of the varying efficacy in terms of social reproduction to which these differences lead, what of variations in habitus produced *within* that social space? The objective positioning of respondents 13/10 and 13/11 *vis à vis* 13/7 has already been noted in passing. In light of the further discussion of respondent 13/7's point of honour, and the specific nature of his reproduction strategies, it is useful now to directly compare these agents' habitus.

Respondents 13/10 and 13/11 are brothers from a coastal town in southern Lebanon. They are aged 19 and 23 respectively, and are both junior students in business at an elite private university in Beirut. They share the same social circle of around a dozen close friends, with whom (like 13/7) they claim to make no special effort to maintain their relationship; however, they did emphasise that these friends "support each other for everything", and also made reference to a greater use of small favours among each other than had 13/1. They have no additional nationality, and mentioned only one relative who worked abroad (a cousin).

The brothers' father is a well-connected businessman, employing around 200 workers in a factory based in their home town, while their mother does not work. They also have two other brothers, aged 22 and 13, and the three older brothers live together in a rented apartment in Beirut. The family has strong connections with a local political dynasty (the father is *radac*, or milk brother, to a former local MP), and during the resistance (against Israel) they would hide weapons in the family home - something which seems to have earned the family significant local prestige.

It is clear from analysis of their interview responses that respondents 13/10 and 13/11 differ in small but substantial ways from 13/7, while also differing from each other in ways which perhaps reflect a growing divergence in trajectories. The most substantial difference evidently concerns capital structure: while all three respondents are attending the same elite university, this coincidence arguably has more to do with the secular tendency, noted in the previous chapter, toward higher education as a uniform reproduction strategy across the elite - that is, no longer marking a divide between specific capital structures. Rather - again, as noted in the previous chapter - differences in capital structure are more accurately discerned by the level of individual investment which agents demonstrate toward the educational system, and the extent to which such investment is misrecognised.

In this sense, it is clear that respondents 13/11 and 13/7 in particular are opposed. Whereas respondent 13/7's habitus was evidently adjusted toward the accumulation of institutionalised cultural capital, and tended to *misrecognise* those strategies of clandestine circulation associated with such accumulation, respondent 13/11 by contrast had been suspended from university for two years for poor grades and attendance, and had also noted during interview that he had failed 7th, 8th and 9th grade (brevet); indeed, he freely admitted that he only passed the brevet because his father asked a contact at the Ministry of Education to 'look after' him during the exam. Thus, for several papers he was allowed to copy the answers, while for maths a teacher was brought in who sat the exam for him.

Equally, there was evidence that - in contrast to 13/7 - the wider family had a weaker affinity with the private educational sector than the state administration. Although in common with the majority of the Lebanese the brothers were privately educated, respondent 13/11 was nonetheless forced to take his exams as an auditor (that is, not in the name of the school),

while they noted that a cousin had previously failed in his attempts to obtain a place for his daughter at a prestigious private school in Beirut. According to the brothers this was due to a lack of political backing, with another friend apparently having enjoyed success following the support of a leading Shia politician. However, another respondent (13/2) believed her own eventual success in obtaining a place for her children at a prestigious private school in Beirut had more to do with affinities of class (i.e., as a professional academic), having previously failed at a different school when attempting to use *wasta*.

Indeed, it was clear that what power or influence the family had within the private school they attended was not related to the misrecognised affinities of a shared capital structure (as would seem to have been the case with respondent 13/7), but rather the somewhat more disenchanting dominance arising from economic power.²³ The brothers recounted how - owing to the fraudulent behaviour of an employee at the school - the school had owed their father a significant amount of money through his business; it seems he gained significant influence by not taking them to court for the debt, and instead allowing the money to be paid back over a period of time.

Their father's business background indeed seems to be the factor most distinguishing the two brothers from respondent 13/7; despite 13/7's own father being a (small) businessman, much more determinant in that respondent's core reproduction strategies appeared to be the mother's orientation toward the liberal professions, which seems to have prompted that respondent's greater and more consistently misrecognised investment in institutionalised cultural capital. By contrast, the two brothers clearly identified their father's power with the economic field, and with a much less institutionalised form of *symbolic* capital - they described him as having "charisma", of not needing to use politicians, and of the business community dictating more than politicians in Lebanon.

Widespread awareness of their father's wealth and power seems at various times to have caused unwelcome attention for the brothers, with both noting that teachers and fellow students had attempted to go through them to make use of their father's connections, or even to obtain money. The need to manage such attention seems to have contributed toward a habitus much

²³Compare the example of the effects of varying class affinities demonstrated by Rivkin-Fish (2005) in the post-Soviet healthcare system, as noted in chapter 6.

more attuned toward the potentially instrumental uses of social capital, and particularly the need to take a nuanced approach toward social relations.²⁴ As respondent 13/10 noted (who seemed more sensitive to attempted opportunism) “half the talk of Lebanese is lying, like ‘my dear’, or ‘my life’, or ‘my brother’.”²⁵ When faced with an ambitious teacher looking for his father’s patronage, 13/10 preferred to dissimulate. He didn’t tell his father that the teacher had asked his help to secure a promotion, but when asked by the teacher he said he had. Why? “I don’t like such things, and neither would my father.” The respondent was aware that in failing to do so “my relation with the teacher changed, he became against me,” but appeared to accept these consequences calmly.

His brother, by slight contrast, seemed more attuned (in keeping with his somewhat differing trajectory) to the potential for *losing out* in the *wasta* game: that is, to being exposed to shame or ingratitude after having ventured one’s assistance - “if someone asks you for *wasta*, later he needs to do something for you in return. If he’s able to and he doesn’t do it, it’s as if he steps on you and keeps on walking - who are you? you’re alone, he doesn’t know you.”²⁶ For him, *wasta* is like a “sword” - “it can help you and damage you”.

While aware of this potential for damage, 13/11 also seemed more open than his younger brother to maintaining a useful network of contacts: “I prefer to have open contacts with all, not just one. You always need these connections in case you’re in trouble.” Such connections inevitably involved the public administration, with the brothers admitting to using a *simsar* to avoid dealing with bureaucracy, and to using the family business to exchange favours with the police - “at the end of the day it’s like one for one - *khidme khidme*”. At the same time though the older brother was careful to firmly

²⁴This seems to coincide with the trend noted by Huxley (1978, p. 115) during his research on *wasta* in Lebanon before the Civil War (and mentioned in the theoretical section). Huxley found younger and more elite respondents “tended to find economic [rather than affective] senses of meaning” for *wasta*-transactions, which in a Bourdieusian framework suggests lower misrecognition, and a tendency (no doubt embedded in habitus) to distinguish more clearly between instrumental and non-instrumental exchange.

²⁵A slight paraphrase of “*Nuṣf al ḥaki libnani innu kazzab, miṭl ḥabibi wa khayyi wa . . . yukoun tatkon innu ṣarṭak she’ bit-ṣarifuh aw minak aṣ ṣirdak, kill al ṣalmak ya ḥabibi aw ḥayati aw khayyi.*”

²⁶“*iza inta ṭalibit minak waṣta . . . ṣam ’iltil al waṣta, bil ma bi’a lazim b’adeen ṣamilak she’ fee yadkon izayyah innu ṣatoul, biṭlub minak she’ wa ana bil akher, biṣluḥ mart ay ḥa’ wa d’aeen ṣam yud’ais, ṣam yud’ais ṣalaikon, meen inta? ma ḥaddak ma ṣarifak.*”

distinguish between such connections and friendship, noting for example that he was closer friends with the son of a political rival than with the son of their ally. Finally, in keeping with the much lower misrecognition which this respondent attached toward institutionalised cultural capital, it would seem that among his close circle of friends were some who assisted him with his university work.

Thus, in contrast to respondent 13/7, both brothers appear more sensitive toward inequalities that may arise through the elementary mode of domination - that is, through the unequal circulation of embodied capitals. They not only appear to directly engage in more of such circulation themselves, but they are also aware of the importance of emphasising and maintaining *social distance* through such exchange: in particular of not wanting to be made to feel small, but also in some sense of wanting to distinguish themselves, horizontally, from other elite fractions.²⁷

In keeping with this tendency, and in contrast with respondent 13/7, it would seem that the two brothers invest more heavily in the kind of intermediate strategies involving objectified social or symbolic capital identified previously, with a corresponding reliance on clandestine circulation to accumulate and maintain such capitals. Thus, the younger brother noted using his father's connections to extricate himself from a police checkpoint, where he had been stopped for having smoked windows on his car; equally, the older brother noted how they relied on their cousin's *wasta* to go, usually once a month, to an elite nightclub. The cousin maintained his *wasta* there through paying extravagant tips (for instance \$100 for valet parking), and the brothers were able to benefit vicariously from such largesse to boost their own social standing, for instance by reserving tables and obtaining admission for girls below the age of 18.

However, in keeping with the double-edged nature of *wasta* noted by 13/11, such strategies of symbolic investment are not without their own risks: the brothers noted how on one occasion they had attempted to broaden their intimate social circle by inviting three new girls along to join them at the club. At the end of the evening when the (rather large) bill came, the newcomers refused to contribute. As 13/10 recalled "normally we pay for girls, but the way they said it - *ma mu'awadeen yidfa'a*" - 'we're

²⁷As respondent 13/11 described his family (in English) - "we are simple people, we treat people simple. I hate to be sophisticated and false."

not accustomed to paying'. As ever, the logic of challenge and riposte associated with embodied capitals and elementary domination carries with it the greater risk of failure and loss.

Such differences in subjective attitudes and objective practices between the two brothers and respondent 13/7, while occasionally subtle, nonetheless reveal a reliance on contrasting reproduction strategies, and hence an investment in different capitals and different forms of clandestine circulation. As we have seen, respondent 13/7 is adjusted toward the accumulation of institutionalised cultural capital, and toward an integration in the labour market in a skilled professional role. His own and his family's strategies of clandestine circulation are thus adjusted toward this core goal, with subsidiary and more peripheral strategies assisting in maintaining an elevated position in social space more generally. The two brothers, by contrast, are evidently more adjusted toward the economic and political fields, and toward the reproduction of their father's elevated position in both. This evidently entails a greater reliance on symbolic and social investment strategies, as the core capital structure in both fields would appear to rely more heavily on embodied social and symbolic capital (as outlined in the previous chapter), and less heavily on institutionalised capitals of whatever guise. Such variations in trajectory and capital structure would thus appear to be the cause of the differing points of honour exhibited by the respondents: while all three were opposed to 13/1 concerning their lack of identification of a generalised interest with the specific reproduction mechanisms associated with the state, respondents 13/7 and 13/11 were by contrast more subtly opposed, with the latter's commensurately reduced identification with the generalised interest in the domains of the educational system and the labour market demonstrating his different capital structure, and particularly his substantially reduced reliance on institutionalised cultural capital.

A structured, focussed comparison of respondents' practices and position-takings across the various strategies they must engage in can thus reveal both the specificity of habitus adjusted to the *general* requirements of Lebanese social space, as well as variance *between* habitus according to specific trajectories within that space. In this light, the clandestine circulation of capitals is revealed not as a singular phenomenon (as might otherwise be implied by the spontaneous or unthinking transposition of a folk-term such as '*wasta*' into a theoretical concept), but rather as a complex, structured phenomenon,

involving not only a wide variety of practices, but also significant variation in misrecognition, depending upon the precise manner and extent to which such circulation relates to the reproduction of an agent's core capital structure.

8.3 Conclusion: Clandestine Circulation in Lebanon

The investigation of Lebanese clandestine circulation conducted in this empirical section has attempted both to identify specific reproduction strategies which make use of such circulation, and to differentiate those strategies according to the position of agents within a relational social space. The underlying intention has been to demonstrate clandestine circulation as a *structured* phenomenon - structured, that is, in two senses: first, in the sense that clandestine circulation relates to reproduction strategies which are themselves the response of habitus to the configuration of objective reproduction mechanisms and socially-efficient resources structuring Lebanese social space; and second, in the sense that the nature of such reproduction strategies varies (in terms both of the strategies themselves and the efficacy with which they are employed as variable or exclusive means of appropriation) according to the positioning of agents within that social space.

It has also attempted to demonstrate that the principles structuring clandestine circulation - including, but not limited to, the phenomenon of *wasta* itself - are thus not to be understood or explained theoretically according to the utility maximising preferences of rational actors, or as the adherence to an 'unwritten rule' or informal institution, still less to the precepts of culture when understood as a timeless 'value-system'. Rather, the analysis has attempted to proceed on the basis of the precepts laid out in the first two sections of the thesis, a basis neatly summarised by Bourdieu:

In order to construct a model of the game, which will not be the mere recording of explicit norms, nor a statement of regularities, while synthesising both norms and regularities, one has to reflect on the different modes of existence of the principles of regulation and the regularity of different forms of practice. (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 65)

At the level of 'principles of regulation', it was demonstrated how the reproduction mechanisms of the Lebanese *state effect* produced an objective social space structured according to the variable possession of specific species of capital. The precise structure of those reproduction mechanisms, coupled with the incomplete monopoly of symbolic and physical violence of the Lebanese state, created the objective conditions for the *clandestine*

circulation of such capitals. Next, at the level of ‘the regularity of different forms of practice’, it was demonstrated how the need to reproduce these objective resources encouraged agents toward specific *reproduction strategies*. These strategies indeed involved varying forms of clandestine circulation; however, both practices and position-takings toward such practices were revealed to be *structured*, with the two principle dimensions of such structure identified as the *stability* and *engagement* of agents within their given field.

How do these dimensions relate to the objective structuring principles of social space identified in the first empirical chapter? In the theoretical section it was hypothesised that clandestine circulation may take different forms according to the guises of capital involved: i.e., the clandestine circulation of cultural capital may be used as a variable means of appropriation as readily as the clandestine circulation of social or economic capital, depending ultimately upon the specific configuration of reproduction mechanisms. The most relevant dimension structuring clandestine circulation *in general*, however, regarded the *form* of capital: the factor unifying the varying types of clandestine circulation being always translations of capital along an axis moving from embodied to objectified to institutionalised, or *vice versa*.

We have seen in the first empirical chapter how variance in the Lebanese *state effect* - understood as the capacity of “that something we call the state” to institutionalise capitals, and in doing so to successfully maintain the monopoly of physical and symbolic violence - produced differing strategies of clandestine circulation, strategies so apparent as to be identifiable even at the objective level through traces left in the built environment. Empirical analysis in this chapter has arguably demonstrated that, in social spaces such as Lebanon, where the institutionalisation of capital is variable and may differ radically across time and space, the effects of such institutionalisation as a dimension structuring clandestine circulation are expressed more at the level of field (and in terms of correspondence *between* fields), than at the level of individual agents within a larger social space (i.e. as an expression of their individual capital structures).

The axis of stability can thus be seen as the translation of these broad effects of institutionalisation (or lack thereof) to the level of individual agents, as *restructured* by the effects of field. As such it reflects variously both the stability of agents within their given field, and the relative stability of fields within social space - factors which may in some sense be understood as

proxies for the general capacity of the various reproduction mechanisms to institutionalise capital. Some caution is however necessary here, as it may equally be the case that a (relatively) stable field is reproduced through embodied or even objectified capitals (as is arguably the case with the political field and aspects of the economic field). In this case, the interest (and misrecognition) generated through such kinds of stability will of course be quite different, approximating more closely that of the 'King's House' than the 'Reason of State'.

At any rate, it is vital to note that the dimensions revealed through MCA analysis reflect those which are most relevant in positioning individual agents in a general space of *practices and position-takings* toward clandestine circulation. The MCA does *not*, in other words, produce a hierarchical social space structured according to the possession of objective resources; rather, in a space of practices and position-takings, agents possessing quite different volumes (and even guises) of capital might be found close to each other, owing to the fact that the necessities of the different field struggles they are engaged in provoke similar responses in terms of habitus.

Thus, in order to make sense of the significance of the distribution of these subjective structures at the level of the distribution and reproduction of objective resources, it was necessary to reintegrate them into the *first* moment of analysis. It is at this point that the detailed analysis and comparison of individual respondents' habitus and capital structures proved most useful: only through such analysis can agents' positions within an objective hierarchy (understood in terms of the volume and structure of their capital) be related to the use of clandestine circulation within their individual reproduction strategies. In this sense, not only were agents endogenous to Lebanese social space revealed to have markedly differing habitus to exogenous agents, but the diversity of strategies of clandestine circulation which Lebanese agents engaged in were revealed to be both highly complex and involving a variety of different capitals and reproduction mechanisms, as analysis of respondent 13/7 in particular demonstrated.

Thus, in the total labour of social reproduction, the objective configuration of Lebanese social space encourages agents to invest in a hierarchy of different strategies of clandestine circulation, including those of peripheral, intermediate and core importance. Moreover, the specific hierarchy of those strategies, as well as the misrecognition which agents exhibit towards

the varying forms of clandestine circulation which constitute such strategies, will vary according to the agent's point of honour (expressing his or her core capital structure as it relates to the wider state of relations in social space).

In the same spirit, it is important to distinguish in terms of analytical significance between the *absolute recourse* to clandestine circulation, and the *efficacy* of such circulation for different agents. While there is evidently some room for individual skill (in the sense of an agent's 'feel for the game') in determining the extent to which the successful application of such strategies will result in the appropriation of capital (as would appear to have been the case with the Sunni *mukhtar*, for instance), it is also apparent that the capacity for such strategies to serve as a variable or exclusive means of appropriation is much more readily effected by those already possessing higher volumes of such socially-efficient resources.

It is also clear that the ultimate appropriation which such established agents will secure will be of a different nature, and tend toward different types of misrecognition, than that of the *parvenu*. For instance, while the political capital secured by the Sunni *mukhtar* is misrecognised as charity under the specific interest, and hence involves a conversion into embodied *social* capital, for the Orthodox *mukhtar*, his strategies are adjusted much more strongly toward the conversion of such political capital into embodied *cultural* capital. Thus, his office provokes in him a kind of pride which rebounds on his established family name, and does not encourage the same justification through charitable impulses.²⁸ For respondent 13/7, of course, the most important strategies of clandestine circulation are entirely misrecognised through the generalised interest, as the legitimate conversion of institutionalised cultural capital (in the form of qualifications) to institutionalised social capital (in the form of an elevated position in the labour market). Finally, for the two brothers, an additional investment in objectified social or symbolic capital (in the form of a conversion of social or economic capital into a visible hierarchy of goods and practices), helps to enhance, and thus secure the misrecognition of, the more charismatic embodied social capital which - alongside economic capital - would appear to be the basis of their father's elevated position.

²⁸Indeed, when given the opportunity to identify himself or his office with such charitable impulses, the Orthodox *mukhtar* specifically identified himself *against* such motivations: "it's a shame to say it, but there are some people who can't afford certificates, and I pay for them [...] it doesn't mean the role of the *mukhtar* is charity."

To conclude, therefore, the study of clandestine circulation in the Lebanese context has revealed a complex and complicated system of practices and position-takings, but one which nonetheless yields some of its complexities to a mode of analysis structured around the two research moments of Bourdieusian praxeology. In particular, I hope it has been possible to demonstrate that the complete labour of social reproduction (and hence, at the aggregate level, of social domination) is seldom effected either through the exclusive use of objectified mechanisms, or the exclusive reliance on elementary modes of domination. Rather, in the struggle between agents within social space to maintain or obtain an advantage, the convertibility of the different forms of capital can offer a permanent advantage within the social game, provided that the dispositions of habitus exist to take maximum advantage of that convertibility, and to shape from it mechanisms of clandestine circulation which assist in its exclusive appropriation.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

This thesis began with an observed paradox: by what principles can practice be regulated, when it is consistently opposed to the normative (and legally expressed) intentions of the modern state? From this first question arose a second: if there are indeed principles regulating such practices, what might their *effects* be, in terms of the reproduction of an unequal social order?

To answer these questions as comprehensively as possible, the thesis was designed according to the research methodology proposed by Pierre Bourdieu. This involved, essentially, three steps: a reappraisal of concepts, the development of a new theory, and the application of that theory to an empirical setting.

First, in chapter 2 a conceptual analysis was undertaken of the epistemological foundations of current academic reasoning concerning the research object. This analysis challenged the “epistemological unconscious” lying behind certain academic categories, in order to lay the foundations for the *radical break* in conceptual reasoning which followed.

Four research paradigms in particular were examined: clientelism; corruption; state formation; and institutional theory. The strengths and weaknesses of each approach were identified, and in some cases compared and contrasted. It was argued in particular that the same or similar questions ultimately arose within each paradigm, typically concerning the ultimate predicates of social practice. What does it mean to follow a rule?

In chapter 3 the attempt was made to resolve these problems by reassessing them from the perspective of a Bourdieusian conceptual framework. This framework consisted essentially of a *relational* approach to human social practice, involving the ‘conceptual tools’ of *habitus*, *field* and *capital*, and

a division of the research process into two ‘moments’ - objective resources, and the ‘second-order’ objectivity of symbolic systems of classification.

The new research object which arose from this break was termed *clandestine circulation*, and was based upon the understanding that agents engage in struggles over the accumulation of socially-efficient resources. These struggles are the expression of habitus adjusted not only toward the symbolic appreciation of such resources (in the sense of their *social libido*), but also toward the ‘feel for the game’ necessary to compete for them. The “dead structure” of rule-bound approaches is thus replaced with the “improvised regularity” (or regularised improvisation) of the strategies of habitus, and the level of analysis shifts from the specification of functions to the investigation of the genesis of the objective and subjective structures which regulate such circulation, and their distribution in terms of systems of more or less stable *relations*.

Following an overview of the empirical field site in chapter 4, chapters 5 and 6 were devoted toward the elaboration of the implications of this new approach within a rigorous Bourdieusian framework. In chapter 5 the historical genesis of the objective and subjective structures responsible for the emergence of the ‘public’ (or *generalised*) interest were traced, and considered in light of the *historical trajectory of the dominant capital structure* within social space. The analysis focussed in particular on the historical transition of the mode of domination (within the western context) from one predicated on the possession of embodied, social capital, accumulated through the elementary mode of domination, to one predicated on the possession of objectified and (eventually) institutionalised cultural capital, accumulated and reproduced through an objectified mode of domination based upon *institutionalised* mechanisms - specifically the educational system. The *state effect* - the social effects of the state, and hence the object through which the state should be analysed - was thus understood as the structuring effect produced on social space by the specific configuration of these mechanisms, in terms both of the production and distribution of objective resources (forms and guises of capital) and the production and distribution of symbolic categories (the varying social libidos).

In chapter 6 the implications of this historical genesis were considered in light of contemporary social practice, with the units of analysis in particular shifted toward the dialectical relation between *reproduction mechanisms* (a

product of the *state effect*) and *reproduction strategies* (a product of habitus adjusted toward the *state effect*). It was suggested that, depending upon the dominant division of capital structures produced by a given *state effect*, different strategies of *clandestine circulation* may emerge within different fractions of social space. Alongside the clandestine circulation of embodied or inherited cultural capital to institutionalised cultural capital (the initial specification provided by Bourdieu in the case of France and the UK), the clandestine circulation of embodied or inherited social capital, as well as economic capital, were also theorised, with empirical examples considered in the forms of *blat*, *guanxi* and *wasta*.

Following this analysis of the objective structures determining the form of clandestine circulation, the thesis shifted toward a consideration of the subjective factors (in the sense of symbolic categories) structuring and limiting clandestine circulation *in practice*. In particular, the *symbolic force* associated with misrecognised capitals was proposed as the principle factor both structuring and limiting the practice of clandestine circulation - a factor expressed through the *additional labour* performed by social agents to protect that force. It was hypothesised that in instances where misrecognition is lower (and hence the symbolic force associated with capital less great), the clandestine circulation of capital would require significantly less additional labour; by contrast, the higher the symbolic force, the greater the labour (in terms of denying the material nature of such exchange). The theoretical section concluded by considering the *structural* implications of this misrecognition, in terms of the distribution, within social space, of position-takings relating to the different forms of clandestine circulation, and in particular the special care which must be taken in relying on such position-takings when undertaking empirical research.

The thesis then moved on to the elaboration of these theoretical principles within the empirical context of Lebanon, and specifically the Lebanese capital Beirut. The basic history and social structure of Lebanon was outlined in chapter 4, including the widespread prevalence of social practices which would fall under the remit of clandestine circulation, and a highly unequal social order which would appear to be reproduced according to the appropriation enabled through such circulation. Chapters 7 and 8 thus attempted to relate the principles outlined in the theoretical section to the empirical context of high inequality, low mobility, corruption, and social

insecurity outlined in chapter 4 - including (but not restricted to) the phenomenon of *wasta*.

The empirical analysis (following Bourdieusian praxeology) was divided into two research ‘moments’. Chapter 7 covered the first ‘moment’ of objective structures, understood in the context of clandestine circulation as beginning with the precise configuration of *reproduction mechanisms* of the Lebanese *state effect*. These reproduction mechanisms were considered in the sense both of producing a determinate hierarchy of socially-efficient resources (forms and guises of capital), as well as a subjective (or second-order) objectivity of systems of symbolic classification - considered in the sense of the symbolic force associated with the different species of capital, and the domain of their legitimate transformation.

It was seen in particular how the Lebanese *state effect* produces a *hybrid* mode of domination, in which the division of capitals within the field of power leads to varying forms of clandestine circulation. Similarly to the case of Soviet *blat*, the sectarian political system produces a form of *institutionalised social capital*, which is conducive to being transformed into an exclusive means of appropriation owing to the fact that - unlike institutionalised cultural capital - it is not reproduced through an objective hierarchy of merit, but rather through the reproduction of a non-hierarchical system of communal division.

The fundamental importance of this principle to the dominant fraction of the field of power is demonstrable through the specific reproduction mechanisms over which it maintains the fiercest monopoly: the sectarian system of *inheritance laws* is robustly defended from encroachment by any civil principle of social reproduction (i.e. in the form of civil marriage), whereas the *educational system* - *qua* principle of reproducing institutionalised cultural capital - is neglected or ignored, except when of use within the sectarian spoils system as a co-opted principle for reproducing institutionalised social capital in the form of permanent posts. The neglected character of the educational system is further emphasised by the fact that - as a principle for reproducing institutionalised cultural capital - the monopoly of symbolic violence (in the sense of legitimating the qualifications awarded) is held by foreign regulatory bodies, with the most elite institutions being accredited by US and French agencies.

The structure of reproduction mechanisms within the Lebanese context

also leads to the failure to produce a unification of the generalised interest (or public interest) within the point of honour of the dominated fraction of the field of power (i.e. that fraction of the bourgeoisie identifying its interest in the accumulation of cultural capital). In other words, the private regulation of institutionalised cultural capital, and its separation from the *raison d'Etat*, tends toward the degradation of the state's capacity to enforce its monopoly of symbolic violence. In this way it becomes possible for members of the bourgeoisie to, for instance, justify acts as 'principled' despite going against the state, and in more general terms to consider principled action as autonomous of the state - thus leading to strategies of household sociodicy (particularly demonstrable in the case of acquiring driving licences) that also encourage offspring to denigrate the state's symbolic legitimacy (which is after all autonomous to the reproduction of their core capitals).

Furthermore, the failure of the Lebanese state to concentrate the accumulation of capitals within its own reproduction mechanisms - and hence to establish an objectified mode of domination - has resulted in the prevalence of intermediate modes of objectification *not* regulated by the state. In this sense, the high salience of objectified symbolic or social goods - forming a hierarchy of recognition among agents adjusted toward their accumulation - results from the same underlying causes as the continued existence of the *qabadayat* phenomenon - a hierarchy of objectified violence, of bodily and symbolic capitals, autonomous of the state.

What sociologists such as Khalaf (2012) cite as symptoms of Lebanon's 'anomie' - a lack of respect for public space and the norms of civic interaction, coupled with a corresponding predilection for kitsch and conspicuous consumption - can thus be understood as the responses of habitus to a social environment in which, first, the generalised interest has no firm objective basis, and second, mechanisms for the institutionalised reproduction of hierarchy have been eroded (a trend further emphasised by the redistributive outcomes of the reconstruction of BCD, which seem to have favoured political and *parvenu* economic capital against established cultural and economic capital). In such conditions, the expression of hierarchy through what might be called 'brute' objectification can be seen as the expression of a *state effect* which has devolved toward a more elementary mode of domination.

The additional investment required by such strategies, and the corresponding reduction in accumulation which they presuppose, would seem to

unify the Bourdieusian model of domination with Graziano's observations concerning the developmental effects of clientelism: namely, that such forms of social relations *reduce* the accumulation of capital within a society, in the sense of limiting the capacity for actions with a delayed reward. Such effects must be understood in the aggregate however, as it is obvious that the structure of social relations within Lebanon also enables *some* agents to accumulate capital in spectacular fashion. Again, the *hybrid* nature of the Lebanese *state effect* is the most important factor: the imperfect capacity to concentrate capitals should not be taken to imply the complete *absence* of such a capacity. Rather, as was seen in chapter 8, successful social reproduction in Lebanon requires a habitus adjusted toward strategies capable at various points of taking advantage of *both* objectified *and* elementary modes of domination.

Chapter 8 thus attempted to analyse in greater detail the specificity of these various reproduction strategies, and in particular their *structured* nature, as the expression of habitus adjusted toward the varying demands of Lebanese social space. It was here that comparative analysis of structured interviews was used to construct a relational space of practices and position-takings toward clandestine circulation, and specifically *wasta*. This analysis revealed that the key factors structuring agents' general propensity toward clandestine circulation was the degree of *stability* within their given field, and the level or quality of their *engagement* with the social game. It was argued that the first of these dimensions could be understood as demonstrating empirically the main principle structuring clandestine circulation as outlined in the theoretical section: i.e., the distinction between the two fundamental modes of domination, and between capital structures adjusted toward embodied or institutionalised capitals.

In keeping with a Bourdieusian mode of analysis predicated on the effects of *field*, it was thus appropriate that empirical analysis should reveal that the effects of the institutionalisation of capital as a dimension structuring clandestine circulation as a social practice were expressed most strongly in terms of the correspondence between fields, rather than at the more aggregated level of social space as a whole (i.e. with agents possessing more embodied capital being opposed to agents possessing more institutionalised capital).

In a similar way, it is also possible to see how the second dimension re-

vealed through analysis - *engagement* - equally corresponds with principles elaborated in the theoretical section, particularly those relating to the symbolic dimensions of clandestine circulation. Agents with a greater degree of *engagement* were more likely to admit to using strategies of clandestine circulation, but in a way that emphasised *necessity* or *absolute necessity*. The close proximity of these practices and position-takings would seem to support the hypothesis that the *symbolic force* associated with successfully misrecognised capitals leads agents to see their actions (or such kinds of actions in general) much more strongly in terms of immanent necessity. Again, empirical analysis shows the effects of clandestine circulation are expressed much more strongly in terms of the correspondence of fields (i.e. agents in corresponding positions within different fields, rather than within social space as a whole); necessity is thus the expression of the restructuring effects of field, whereas agents who express more autonomy (denying using *wasta* or seeing in it a degree of choice or agency) are much less firmly embedded and 'taken-up' by the struggles of field.

Finally, the second moment of practices and position-takings was reintegrated into the first moment of objective structures through a detailed analysis of agents' habitus and capital structures. The varying efficacy of practices, as well as variations in reproduction strategies, were considered according to agents' core capital structures, and hence their position in wider Lebanese social space. Although with the data available it was not possible to visually represent the precise structure of that space, it was nonetheless possible to identify clear structural differences in strategies between agents.

It was demonstrated in particular that agents endogenous to Lebanese social space shared certain characteristics across reproduction mechanisms which served to distinguish them from agents exogenous to that space, in particular regarding those mechanisms most closely associated with the *raison d'Etat*. Closer analysis of the reproduction strategies of agents from within Lebanese social space further revealed a distinction between those whose strategies were more adjusted toward the accumulation of institutionalised cultural capital, and those more adjusted toward the accumulation of economic and political capital, which in turn corresponded to the core division within the field of power identified in chapter 7.

In particular, not only did the strategies employed by agents vary, but the degree of misrecognition which agents attributed toward their own practices

differed according to the relation of such strategies toward the reproduction of their core capitals. In the case of agents adjusted toward the accumulation of political and economic capital, such differences were expressed in terms of their attitude toward social relations, specifically through a heightened sensitivity to the potential for social exchange to produce unequal power relations and effects of domination. Agents adjusted toward the accumulation of institutionalised cultural capital meanwhile tended to display greater misrecognition toward the clandestine circulation of capital within the domains of the educational system and the labour market.

Returning to the research questions which guided this thesis, I believe that the combination of theoretical and empirical analysis summarised above has managed to successfully address the main points raised concerning clandestine circulation as a social phenomenon. In particular, the elaboration of clandestine circulation provided in the theoretical chapters has served to define and differentiate it as a social practice according to the capitals and reproduction mechanisms involved, and to trace its genesis in terms of the emergence of the state, as well as transformations to the dominant capital structure(s) within the field of power. It has also been demonstrated how particular features of a given *state effect* may make clandestine circulation more or less determinant in social reproduction, as mechanisms of variable or exclusive appropriation emerge to take advantage of the convertibility of capital within specific reproduction mechanisms. Moreover, *hysteresis* of the *state effect* was also demonstrated as a frequent factor in determining the emergence of clandestine circulation (or, in times of greater crisis, reconversion strategies), as agents attempt to defend their previously accumulated capital, or to take advantage of new possibilities for accumulation.

Turning to the general implications of this research, the thesis has, I believe, provided a contribution in three main areas: conceptual, theoretical and empirical.

In conceptual terms, I hope to have demonstrated the utility of applying a Bourdieusian framework to the study of the informal exchange of illicit favours in the context of the modern state. In particular, I hope that the reconceptualisation of the research object which I have undertaken has enabled the mitigation of those effects of “state thought”, in terms both of normative assumptions and academic categorisations, on the study of practices which ‘go against’ the state (as identified in chapter 2). By extension,

I hope instead to have developed a mode of analysis which - to paraphrase Anders and Nuijten (2007) - rather than simply reifying such practices by treating them as a dependent variable, may instead reflect the structural power relations implied in even the pettiest forms of corruption. The application of Bourdieusian conceptual tools attempted here - presaged by both Anders and Nuijten, as well as Graaf (2007), yet with little by way of prior rigorous application - has thus hopefully demonstrated their potential for developing “new ways of thinking” about the phenomena of corruption, clientelism and informal exchange within the context of the modern state, and to consider these in relation to the total order of practices necessary for agents to reproduce their position in the social order.

At the theoretical level, the thesis has hopefully also made a specific contribution to the field of Bourdieusian theory, in particular by highlighting the somewhat under-theorised role of the convertibility of the *forms* (rather than guises) of capital, the limiting factors to such convertibility, and their potential role in social reproduction. It is true that Bourdieu himself set the example for such a line of research through his initial specification of the clandestine circulation of cultural capital. However, post-Bourdieu, the tendency within research has, unfortunately, erred toward the fragmentation of the unified concepts of field, capital and habitus. It has thus been a main preoccupation during the writing of this thesis to ensure that the theory of clandestine circulation which I proposed would remain consistent with *all* the conceptual postulates underlying Bourdieusian praxeology. At times this has proved laborious, and indeed it resulted in a number of dead-ends owing to my own mistaken readings; I do not consider the theory contained within this thesis to be by any means the final word on the matter, but I do at least hope I am currently wrong in the right ways.

Finally, at the empirical level the thesis has hopefully contributed in some way to the analysis of Lebanese society, and in a manner which does justice to its complexities. I never wished to write a thesis about Lebanese sectarianism (a subject which has been more than amply dealt with in the literature), but I hope that the focus on the concrete effects of the Lebanese state contained within this thesis has presented a new way of thinking about Lebanon, which takes seriously the problem of sectarianism, yet without reifying it. Indeed, reading through the empirical chapters again I found it striking the extent to which the sectarian system, which plays such a role

in structuring the objective resources available to Lebanese, plays yet so peripheral a role in their day-to-day reproduction strategies, other than as a fact of life to be unsentimentally worked around. In this sense, Lebanese political sectarianism would seem to be not so different to Soviet communism or, in central Asia, post-Soviet neo-clanism (as analysed by Collins (2006)): a structuring feature of the *state effect* whose primary importance lies not in its ideological content, but (in the words of Roy) of encouraging a particular relation to the political. That relation, as we have seen, lies mainly in the objective resources which it produces and circulates: embodied social capital, which becomes the basis of institutionalised political capital. In such cases, the affective group structure which the political system reproduces is less important than the power relations through which it produces them. If such power relations in the Lebanese context are less than totally dominant, it is only because both economic capital and institutionalised cultural capital exist in sufficient quantities to act as alternative socially-efficient resources, hence leading (as mentioned previously) to a *hybrid* mode of domination - each with its own mechanisms of clandestine circulation.

The last comment concerns omissions and potential directions for future research. For a fully comprehensive empirical account of clandestine circulation in a specific empirical context, it would have been preferable to include a section charting the historical genesis of the field. This would have involved tracing not only the development of the *state effect* as a variable over both time and space, but also the dominant capital division(s) structuring the field of power. In this way it would have been possible to demonstrate how reproduction strategies developed over time, and how the monopolisation of different reproduction mechanisms became more or less important for different class fractions at different points. The clandestine circulation of capital could then be seen more clearly as a historically (rather than culturally) contingent set of practices, relating to transformations in the *state effect* more generally. While it was possible in the theoretical section to trace some of these processes in the other contexts discussed, in the case of Lebanon it was only possible to give a fairly limited indication of the historical genesis of the field in chapters 4 and 7. I hope, however, that the decision to pay greater attention to the nuances of the contemporary state of the field has nonetheless been vindicated in terms of the greater level of detail such analysis was able to provide.

Appendix A

Appendix on Methodology

The material upon which the empirical sections of this thesis were based was obtained during three periods of field work totaling around five months, and was further informed by the experiences and contacts I had acquired whilst living in Lebanon between 2008 and 2009, as well as other visits I subsequently made before commencing my PhD.

In keeping with a theory-building research design, research methodology was initially shaped toward a more generative model, involving explorative methods such as semi-structured interviews, group events, participant observation and analysis of media and other secondary material. These data were used to establish a speculative model of the structuring principles relating to clandestine circulation within the Lebanese context.

Upon returning to the field half-way through my third year, the same explorative methods were again used, but this time in conjunction with structured interviews targeted toward gathering information from specific positions in social space.

These interviews were divided into three sections: the first to gather objective data (such as age, gender, educational attainment, etc.); the second to capture elements of practice and subjective attitudes toward personalised exchanges; and the third to capture position-takings (*prises de position*) specifically concerning *wasta*. A copy of the question sheet is included in this appendix alongside a list of all recorded interviews (including those conducted during the first stage of field work). Interviews were primarily conducted in Arabic, with my research collaborator Professor Paul Tabar acting as lead interviewer (in some cases alone).

Reliability

It should be emphasised that the use of traditional sociological methods (such as interviews) in the study of phenomena such as clandestine circulation is more than usually fraught with difficulty. Not only are individuals often reticent to talk about such matters, but more significantly the power relations between interviewer and respondent can become determinant in shaping responses - particularly in a formal, recorded interview environment. To be frank, sometimes people lie. The tendency to shape one's answers in order to position oneself in the best light is not unheard of in qualitative research, but in dealing with practices which bear directly on the respondent's *point of honour* it was not unusual to find respondents contradicting themselves, or stating things contrary to what both they, and the interviewer, knew to be true.

Thus, a distinction should be emphasised between the methodology used to build a general picture of the research object (in terms of social practices), and that used to measure individual agents' position-takings and practices for the purposes of building a social space - a distinction equivalent to the first and second moments of Bourdieusian praxeology respectively.

Concerning the structured interviews (which represented the latter), analysis of interview material was weighted against the knowledge that as interviewers both myself and Paul Tabar would - as academic researchers - be considered by respondents as possessing high levels of institutionalised cultural capital. Further, the formal interview setting naturally produces responses that will differ from more informal, off-the-record settings. Hence, responses to our questions often took on the character of position-takings in relation to our own (supposed) positions, and to the academic field in general. While being sensitive to such factors can not compensate for a deliberate untruth or misrepresentation, considering responses in a relational sense and in light of the methods used in the first moment can nonetheless help reveal the general structure of misrecognition.

Through combining these various methods in a manner consistent with Bourdieusian praxeology, I believe it has been possible to present a fairly accurate qualitative model of the social space of Lebanese clandestine circulation, and to demonstrate in a nuanced, differentiated manner the particular effects which clandestine circulation can have on the reproduction of a given social structure.

A.1 Questionnaire for Structured Interviews

A Objective Data (Field)

1. Age
2. Gender
3. Educational attainment (highest qualification; school attended)
4. Occupation
5. Family occupation -
 - (a) Father's occupation
 - (b) Mother's occupation
 - (c) Spouse's occupation
 - (d) Children's occupation
6. Nationality -
 - (a) Primary citizenship
 - (b) Second citizenship?
 - (c) Family members abroad?
 - (d) Time spent abroad?
7. Languages spoken
8. Own/rent property?
9. Transport: Own car/use *servis* [taxi] or public transport?

B Practice and Strategies (Habitus, dispositions)

1. Have you ever needed to call on help from someone for something... (*see what is volunteered, and then prompt in order*) :-
 - (a) *Family/Children*: Education? *e.g. admission to a particular school; asking for a reduction in school fees*; Healthcare? *e.g. treatment in a hospital*
 - (b) *Household/Bureaucracy*: Problems with property? *e.g. old rent, construction permits, etc.*; *Driving licence? Fines (or legal problems)?* Government services? *e.g. paying fees, registration of a new property, etc.*
 - (c) *Work*: Finding a job? Winning new business? *e.g. contracts, etc.*

For each case ask also:

- i. *who helped (nature of relation)*
 - ii. *any expectation in return (money, gift, future obligation)*
 - iii. *motivation (absolutely necessary; to speed things up; purely optional)*
2. Have you ever been in a position to help others? *Ask in particular:*

- (a) *Who (family; friends; clients)?*
 - (b) *How often?*
 - (c) *In what way? (Explain in details)*
 - (d) *How do you feel about it?*
3. *Number and quality of social relations:*
- (a) Roughly how many people do you know socially?
 - (b) What efforts did you make to have these connections?
 - (c) If you ever needed help, how many friends do you think you could call on?
 - (d) Are there some relationships you feel you *need* to maintain (for example politicians, businessmen, bureaucrats, police, army) to get by or to avoid future problems? Why?
4. *Time invested on social capital:*
- (a) In the last six (to twelve) months, how many and what kind of social events have you taken part in? (e.g. weddings, funerals, etc.)
 - (b) What did they involve? (gifts, meetings, wreaths, etc.)

C Subjective position-takings concerning wasta (Habitus, perceptions)

1. How would you describe wasta? *Include:*
 - (a) Is it a good thing or a bad thing?
 - (b) Is it like a favour?
 - (c) Is it corrupt?
 - (d) Is it selfish or self-interested?
2. Do you use wasta personally? What for? If no, are there any situations that would force you? If so, which?
3. If you do use wasta, is it because: you need to; you choose to?
4. If you do use wasta, is your wasta:
 - (a) a friend?
 - (b) a family member?
 - (c) a patron or superior (e.g. a politician, leader, etc.)?
 - (d) a business associate or acquaintance (i.e. less than a friend)?

Note on Questionnaire

The questionnaire was designed according to material gathered during the first stage of field work regarding the objective structures and socially-efficient resources which constitute the major oppositions within Lebanese social space. The majority of these are self-explanatory, and would hold for most developed economies: age and gender, educational attainment, occupation (and the occupation of other family members), and a proxy to determine economic assets (“do you own or rent your apartment/house?”).

Three further objective determinants were also included derived from experience of the Lebanese field: nationality (including most importantly any additional citizenship, any family members abroad, and any time spent abroad); languages spoken; and mode of transport most commonly used. In the first case, not only does Lebanon have a history of high rates of migration, but the presence of family members overseas, or a second passport, or having obtained qualifications from a foreign university, can all be important factors in modifying an agent’s position in social space, as discussed in the empirical chapters. Likewise, the (successful) acquisition of French and/or English remains a key indicator of cultural capital, and is used by agents to position themselves and others. Mode of transport was considered as a measure of autonomy, however within the sample it did not ultimately constitute a significant opposition.

The second part of the questionnaire was designed to examine agents’ practices and dispositions, specifically in relation to their reproduction strategies. For this section it was intended to avoid prior mention of the term *wasta*, however in practice this was seldom possible. However, the section was nonetheless interested in capturing the precise dynamics of clandestine circulation as they applied to different agents, rather than their position-takings.

To encourage agents to be as open as possible, questioning in this section was presented in a neutral, even altruistic manner (“have you ever needed to call on help from someone for something..?”), and typically began with assistance solicited on behalf of another (family or children, for example). For each respondent, an attempt was made to cover all the various reproduction strategies to which *wasta* may be applied (education, health, bureaucracy, business, etc.) as well as proxies for the different types of relations (and hence capitals) involved. Respondents were also asked whether they had

ever used connections to help another. To complete this part of the profile, some general questions about the number and quality of social relations were also asked (to determine type and structure of social capital).

Finally, a third section was designed to discover specific position-takings about *wasta* itself as a social practice. Is it a good thing or a bad thing? Is it corrupt? In this section *wasta* was referred to specifically, and agents asked directly whether or not they used it, the extent to which they felt compelled to use it, and the types of social relations which qualify as a *wasta*.

Owing to constraints presented by specific respondents (some were reluctant to proceed with questioning in certain directions), not all areas could be covered in every interview; in general however, respondents were given the opportunity to give as complete a record as possible of their practices and opinions. In a few limited cases respondents subsequently revealed information off-the-record which contradicted their on-the-record statements. Such contradictions were interpreted in a manner in keeping with Bourdieusian precepts on position-taking and misrecognition.

A.2 List of Recorded Interviews and Group Events

As noted above, fieldwork was divided into three periods, with the first two periods being for primarily explorative and generative purposes, and the third involving more targeted data collection for the purposes of structured comparison. In the first and second periods interviews were carried out entirely by myself, in either English or (less commonly) Arabic, and followed a semi-structured format in which respondents were asked primarily about their experiences of *wasta*, as well as some subsidiary information concerning their objective background (occupation of parents, academic qualifications, etc.) In these initial periods of fieldwork two larger-scale discussions (involving 15-30 participants) were also recorded, in which discussion was guided toward attitudes about *wasta*.

In the third period of fieldwork the structured questionnaire presented above was used to interview a limited, targeted sample of respondents, considered as occupying exemplary positions in social space. These interviews were held in either Arabic or English (sometimes both), and were generally conducted (for language purposes and reasons of informant access) by my research partner Professor Paul Tabar of the Lebanese American University, in some instances with my participation.

The sampling method for determining respondents was based on a combination of heuristic and pragmatic considerations. As already mentioned, owing to the nature of the research object, pre-existing power relations between interviewer and respondent may significantly affect the outcome of an interview. To begin with, I thus chose interview respondents who were either known to me or who could be introduced to me through a contact, believing such a method might achieve greater openness. Toward the end of the second fieldwork period some respondents (the *mukhtars* in particular) were - in the absence of intermediary contacts - approached "cold". In general, while a prior relation or link to a respondent may have some bearing on the quality of the material gathered, I believe that the more significant effects of the respondent's habitus (as a reflection of his or her position in social space) emerged, to a greater or lesser degree, regardless.

Once the general outline of the questionnaire had been established, and the broad principles structuring the social space of clandestine circulation hypothesised, a list of 'ideal type' respondents was drawn up based upon the

positions such agents were assumed to occupy (i.e., their capital structure) in that space. The list was relatively broad, and included businessmen, professors, bureaucrats, teachers, students, labourers, *qabadayat*, *simsars*, and *mukhtars*.

The list was not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to guide the selection of respondents. Ultimately, it was not possible to find respondents matching every position in the list, however gaps in some areas (businessmen, lawyers, bankers) could be filled to some extent through the position-takings noted in the group sessions. Other weaknesses in the achieved sample are a bias toward male respondents and a limited representation of the most heavily dominated fractions.

These weaknesses aside, it is my strong belief that the study of practices of clandestine circulation requires quality rather than quantity in terms of data gathering. As Yang's critique of Guthrie (1999) demonstrated (Yang, 2002), a methodology with "all the trappings of scientific sociological method, complete with elaborate sampling techniques and statistical charts and graphs" was entirely undermined by a failure to attend to something as simple as context.

Finally, the list below includes only those interviews or group events/public discussions which were recorded and followed a structured format. It does not include the much greater number of meetings with informants which were conducted on an informal basis, and which often yielded the greatest (and ironically most reliable) insight in terms of anecdotal accounts of clandestine circulation as a social *practice*. While some such encounters took place before the commencement of my PhD studies, all those which occurred during the course of my field work were annotated in a field diary.

First and Second Periods (February - April 2012)

Recorded Interviews:

1. 10/03/12 (English)
Manager, Shipping Firm, male, 30 (expatriate) (12/1)
2. 12/04/12 (English)
Small Business Owner, male, mid-30s (expatriate, married to Lebanese) (12/2)
3. 16/04/12 (Arabic)
Teacher (private school), female, late-20s (12/3)
4. 17/04/12 (English/Arabic)
Senior Research Officer, anti-corruption NGO, male, late-20s (12/4)

Recorded Group Events:

1. 13/03/12 (English)
British Business Council Meeting, Presentation on *Wasta* by AUB Professor, present: 20-30 Lebanese and expatriate businessmen and women of mixed ages.
2. 23/04/12 (English)
Lecture on *Wasta* given by author to mixed group of social science faculty and students, present: 15-20 men and women, Lebanese, other Arab and expatriates.

Third Period (April - May 2013)

1. 25/04/13 (English)
Research Assistant (part-time), female, 32 (13/1)
2. 25/04/13 (Arabic)
Professor (state university), female, 44 (13/2)
3. 26/04/13 (English)
Professor (private university), female, 52 (13/3)
4. 28/04/13 (Arabic)
Draftsman (retired), male, 69 (13/4)
5. 29/04/13 (Arabic)
Manager, Liban Post (retired), male, 78 (13/5)
6. 02/05/13 (Arabic/English)
First year BSc Student (private university), male, 20 (13/6)

7. 02/05/13 (English)
Final year BA Student (private university), male, 21 (13/7)
8. 02/05/13 (Arabic)
Accountant (retired) and company owner, male, 60 (13/8)
9. 04/05/13 (Arabic)
Security Guard, male, 43 (13/9)
10. 07/05/13 (Arabic/English)
Younger brother, Junior Student (private university), male, 19 (13/10)
11. 07/05/13 (Arabic/English)
Older brother, Junior Student (private university), male, 23 (13/11)
12. 07/05/13 (English)
Professor (private university), male, 66 (expatriate) (13/12)
13. 11/05/13 (Arabic)
Sunni Mukhtar's brother (and father), male, 45 (13/13)
14. 13/05/13 (Arabic/English)
Greek Orthodox Mukhtar, male, 60 (13/14)

A.3 Note on Coding and Analysis

Interview material was coded according to objective (capital structure) and subjective (position-taking) categories, with a further analysis extracting data relating to practices (i.e., in which situations did the respondent discuss using social connections?)

The extracted (qualitative) data was then used to create a simple contingency table, following the individuals by categories format. A number of preliminary multiple correspondence analyses were then run on these data, with different types of coding (in the sense of qualitative categories) explored. In keeping with Bourdieusian methodology, for all MCAs objective data were included as supplementary questions (Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux, 2000, p. 9), with only data on position-takings and practices used to construct the space.

The final table on which the MCAs used in this thesis were based is included below, and reflects a balance between theoretical and methodological concerns. In particular, it is important when using MCA analysis to include questions with roughly the same number of categories, in order to prevent those with fewer categories playing a too determinant role in the construction of the space.

Thus, the relatively small sample of respondents (by statistical standards) precluded any coding which attempted too nuanced a distinction within categories. Moreover, in some categories the relative uniformity among respondents prevented them from being used as effective measures of difference. Rather, categories were chosen on the basis of a good distribution among respondents, allied to a firm theoretical justification. Categories which remained important but which were of a binary nature and somewhat skewed (gender being a good example) were added as supplementary variables.

Thus, age was coded in three groups, roughly corresponding to three general stages in agents' reproduction strategies: below 35 (acquiring one's place in the labour market, typically requiring the intervention of inherited social capital); 35-59 (establishing one's own family; progressing in the labour market; dealing with inheritance of economic assets); and above 60 (retirement, affording a different perspective on the previous strategies and also, in respect to hysteresis of the *state effect* within the Lebanese context

resulting from the civil war, potentially a habitus conforming to a prior state of the field). These groups were fairly evenly distributed among the sample.

Educational attainment was coded in 4 categories: “low” (signifying below baccalaureate); baccalaureate; degree; and higher degree. The sample was skewed somewhat toward those with degrees and higher degrees. Owing to the nature of historical changes in Lebanon, education level is also strongly correlated with age such that, for instance, a baccalaureate obtained in the 1960s or 1970s represented (at the time) a similar position to that of a degree now.

The decision was made to code occupation in three categories: “corporate”, to represent a large organisation (public or private sector) not owned by the respondent’s family; “family” to represent a family-owned business; and “academia”. There were several reasons for this: on the one hand, some respondents had worked in several fields; on the other, coding those who were currently students produced a very strong correlation with the category of “degree” in educational attainment. Hence, students were re-coded according to their current, likely future or desired future occupation as indicated in the interview.

Position-takings on *wasta* were reduced to a single question with four categories, related (in theoretical terms) to the *specific* perspective, i.e. “under what condition would you use *wasta*”, or “do you use *wasta*?” Coding this dimension proved difficult, as respondents would position their own practice selectively (typically along the lines of “there are two kinds of *wasta*; I would only ever use the good kind”). Nonetheless, a division among four categories covered the majority of responses fairly well: never, representing a complete disavowal of the practice (which, given that this question was asked toward the end of interviews was perhaps not unsurprisingly limited to only two respondents); responses emphasising an element of choice (either to save time; providing the respondent had the right qualifications; as an act of charity, or providing it would not hurt another); responses emphasising being obliged to use *wasta* or needing to use it; and responses emphasising a rare recourse based only on absolute necessity. The latter two categories were disambiguated following the large number of respondents who indicated some degree of necessity. In one case the response was inferred based upon the respondent’s own description of his practice.

Finally, data were extracted from the interviews based upon the par-

ticular strategies for which respondents admitted using *wasta* or *wasta*-like practices. These were divided into varying domains (education, labour market, bureaucracy, police, prestige, health) and coded according to whether the respondent admitted to using *wasta* or social connections, denied using them, or made no reference. A number of MCAs were performed on these data. Taking into account the theoretical relation of the varying domains to the nature of the Lebanese *state effect* (in the sense of reproduction mechanisms and sociodicy), it was ultimately decided to include four questions: the labour market, education, and two kinds of state (fiscal/bureaucratic and public order).

In presenting the results of the MCA geometrically the two most important dimensions were used, representing 70.55% of total inertia; statistics relating to the MCA (which was run using STATA) are included below. Owing to the limitations of STATA in visually representing MCAs, coordinate data was exported to MS Excel to create the charts used, with structuring factors applied manually. In light of the extreme position of individual 13/3 on the second axis, the analysis was rerun excluding observations relating to that individual. The results primarily altered the constitution of the second axis, with not mentioning *wasta* in the labour market, admitting in using *wasta* in the domain of state violence, and denying in education and state violence now the principal contributors to that dimension. Total inertia fell to 0.379, while the percentage of inertia for the first axis rose to 59.37%, and for the second fell to 19.77%. The results did not radically alter the stability of the overall space however, with the same distribution of the various clusters apparent, and the same positioning of individuals along the axes.

This application of MCA to a small, qualitative dataset is somewhat experimental (see Habib et al. (2012) for a similar instance in the field of architecture), and was intended purely as an interpretive aid to a theory-driven model: that is, the MCA enables the structure of the information derived from interviews to be demonstrated visually, and in particular to place specific respondents in spatial relation to one another. This information was then used to conduct further analysis of the interview material, and to compare and contrast practices and position-takings *not* included in the MCA.

As chapter 8 has hopefully demonstrated, the utility of such a method in drawing out structural oppositions (in terms of practices, position-takings

and their objective correlates) is invaluable, and indeed the two principle dimensions revealed through MCA ultimately corresponded (though with interesting modifications) to hypotheses I had originally generated concerning the dimensions structuring clandestine circulation during my first period of fieldwork. It goes without saying, however, that no claims are made regarding the *statistical* significance of the MCA.

Table A.2: Statistics for Column Categories in Standard Normalization

Categories	overall			dimension 1			dimension 2		
	mass	quality	%inert	coord	sqcorr	contrib	coord	sqcorr	contrib
Wasta									
Never	0.029	0.503	0.031	-0.321	0.044	0.003	1.419	0.459	0.057
Choose	0.057	0.818	0.083	1.374	0.597	0.108	1.150	0.222	0.076
Need	0.071	0.587	0.061	-1.015	0.556	0.074	-0.327	0.031	0.008
Abs need	0.043	0.671	0.059	0.075	0.002	0.000	-1.933	0.669	0.160
CCEdu									
no mention	0.086	0.822	0.065	1.143	0.793	0.112	0.298	0.029	0.008
denial	0.057	0.901	0.064	-1.143	0.539	0.075	1.285	0.361	0.094
yes	0.057	0.804	0.063	-0.572	0.137	0.019	-1.731	0.667	0.171
CCLab									
no mention	0.043	0.653	0.048	1.007	0.415	0.044	-1.045	0.237	0.047
denial	0.143	0.837	0.028	-0.374	0.326	0.020	0.643	0.510	0.059
yes	0.014	0.501	0.083	0.722	0.042	0.007	-3.296	0.459	0.155
CCStFisc									
no mention	0.029	0.785	0.120	2.609	0.745	0.194	0.825	0.040	0.019
denial	0.057	0.780	0.069	-1.429	0.774	0.117	0.166	0.006	0.002
yes	0.114	0.370	0.007	0.062	0.030	0.000	-0.289	0.340	0.010
CCStViol									
no mention	0.057	0.757	0.100	1.686	0.751	0.162	-0.206	0.006	0.002
denial	0.071	0.638	0.054	-0.683	0.286	0.033	1.040	0.352	0.077
yes	0.071	0.427	0.066	-0.666	0.223	0.032	-0.875	0.204	0.055
age									
below35	0.357	0.130	0.287	0.306	0.054		-0.502	0.077	
35 to 59	0.286	0.077	0.209	0.348	0.077		-0.004	0.000	
above 60	0.357	0.363	0.216	-0.584	0.260		0.505	0.103	
sex									
male	0.786	0.047	0.199	-0.143	0.037		0.102	0.010	
female	0.214	0.126	0.273	0.524	0.099		-0.373	0.027	
Edu									
low	0.214	0.043	0.251	-0.181	0.013		0.378	0.030	
bacc	0.143	0.714	0.344	-1.849	0.654		0.770	0.060	
deg	0.357	0.079	0.287	-0.189	0.020		-0.440	0.059	
hdeg	0.286	0.951	0.233	1.296	0.947		-0.118	0.004	
Occupation									
family	0.357	0.256	0.224	0.401	0.118		-0.594	0.138	
academia	0.286	0.951	0.233	1.296	0.947		-0.118	0.004	
corp	0.357	1.330	0.287	-1.438	1.185		0.688	0.144	
respno									
1	0.071	0.119	0.492	1.014	0.069		1.182	0.050	
2	0.071	0.218	0.492	-0.353	0.008		2.427	0.209	
3	0.071	0.850	0.492	0.911	0.056		-4.727	0.794	
4	0.071	0.174	0.492	-1.378	0.127		-1.151	0.047	
5	0.071	0.519	0.492	-1.825	0.223		2.886	0.296	
6	0.071	0.148	0.492	0.703	0.033		1.801	0.115	
7	0.071	0.015	0.492	-0.392	0.010		-0.349	0.004	
8	0.071	0.221	0.492	-1.456	0.142		1.490	0.079	
9	0.071	0.317	0.492	-2.137	0.306		0.565	0.011	
10	0.071	0.249	0.492	0.749	0.038		-2.438	0.211	
11	0.071	0.280	0.492	-0.546	0.020		-2.706	0.260	

12	0.071	0.888	0.492	3.611	0.873	0.648	0.015
13	0.071	0.697	0.492	2.973	0.592	1.718	0.105
14	0.071	0.299	0.492	-1.873	0.235	-1.347	0.064

supplementary variables: age sex Edu Occupation respno

Glossary of Bourdieusian Terms

(Symbolic) Capital Capital, in the Bourdieusian mode of analysis, is understood in the general sense as any socially-efficient resource. In order for capital to function as a socially-efficient resource however, it must be recognised by social agents as having value, which is why Bourdieu tends to speak in terms of *symbolic* capital, or the *symbolic effects* of capital - that is, capital which is recognised as legitimate. Capital in its most elementary form is human labour time, but it may pass through symbolic transformations (through the effects of domination and field) to take on different *forms* and *guises*. The forms of capital are embodied, objectified and institutionalised, which refer in broad terms to how objectively a socially-efficient resource may be possessed and transmitted; the guises of capital are many, but the most significant are economic, cultural and social. All guises of capital are typically produced by a specific field, with the exception of social capital, which is relatively irreducible to a specific field, but tends to be produced by all fields and forms of social relations, and has a multiplier effect on the efficacy of the other guises of capital possessed by an agent.

Doxa The state of correspondence, or homology, between external, objective structures (field, social space) and internal, subjective structures (habitus, *illusio*) such that what would otherwise be seen as arbitrary in the social world takes on the appearance of self-evidence. Importantly, doxa does *not* imply blind obedience to the established order, but rather the mediation of objective inequalities into symbolic struggles over symbolic capitals.

Field “A patterned system of objective forces (much in the manner of a magnetic field), capable of producing its own logic among the agents engaged within it.” Fields *re-structure* objective, general necessities into specific forms of power relations, interests (*illusio*), and resources (capitals), such that “the external determinations that bear on agents situated in a given field [...] never apply to them directly”. They

are spaces of forces and struggles, specifically opposed to the ‘dead structures’ approach to domination of structuralists such as Althusser.

Habitus The perceptions and dispositions of a socialised agent. “A set of relations ‘deposited’ within individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation, and action.” It is understood as resulting from an agent’s occupation of a particular position and trajectory within social space.

Illusio In order for social agents to accept the demands placed upon them by a given field, they must be ‘caught up’ in its specific logic. ‘Illusio’ is the name given to the interest produced by fields (and, by extension, capitals) which makes them ‘worth the candle’ for the agents engaged in them.

Misrecognition The transformation of objective power relations into symbolic relations. For instance, a given power relation may be considered as successfully misrecognised when the objective inequality underlying it is denied (in good faith) by the parties involved. While the concept of misrecognition is dependent upon accepting a mode of analysis predicated on the existence of an objective, material basis to all inequality, it does not contain any implicit normative or moral judgement regarding the nature of affective relations. It is frequently confounded with the (functionalist) Marxist concept of false consciousness, with which it in fact has almost nothing in common.

Reproduction Mechanisms The system of mechanisms for regulating social reproduction which prevails in a particular social structure. Reproduction mechanisms tend to be regulated by the state (where such a thing exists), or by whatever principle constitutes the legitimate social or political order. They fall under four classes: inheritance laws, the labour market, property rights and the educational system.

Reproduction Strategies The system of strategies deployed by the prevailing minimal social unit (i.e. typically the family, however it is constituted) in order to reproduce or advance its position within the broader social order. They fall under four classes: biological investment, succession strategies, educational strategies, and investment strategies.

Social Reproduction The tendency for a general structure of objective power relations and symbolic representations to reproduce itself. Given that in Bourdieusian theory fields comprise “systems of relations that

are *independent* of the populations which these relations define”, social reproduction *does not* necessarily imply that the same families or individuals must reproduce their position in the social order; rather, Bourdieusian theory allows for the fact that - being engaged in field struggles - individual agents and families will rise and fall in the social order.

Social Space A relational framework for understanding and illustrating the different effects of field (including capitals and power relations) prevailing in a given, theoretically-defined context. The concept of social space is primarily heuristic, enabling as it does different agents, social practices and dispositions to be placed in a geometrical relation to one another. A social space must be constructed through theoretically robust criteria, and can be visually represented through multivariate statistical methods such as geometric data analysis (GDA).

Symbolic Violence “The violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity”. It is a fundamental tenet of Bourdieusian theory that the ‘fit’ between objective structures and mental structures can produce durable inequalities, precisely because such inequality becomes unrecognised or taken for granted. As Bourdieu noted “I call *misrecognition* the fact of recognising a violence which is wielded precisely inasmuch as one [i.e. the agent involved] does not perceive it as such”.

Bibliography

- Acemoglu, Daron (2001). "Inefficient redistribution". In: *American Political Science Review* 95.3, pp. 649–661.
- Al-Ramahi, Aseel (Mar. 2008). "Wasta in Jordan: A Distinct Feature of (and Benefit for) Middle Eastern Society". In: *Arab Law Quarterly* 22.1, pp. 35–62.
- Alexander, J.C. (1995). "The Reality of Reduction". In: *Fin de Siecle Social Theory: Relativism, Reduction and the Problem of Reason*. Verso.
- Althusser, Louis (1971). "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)". In: *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. Ed. by Louis Althusser. January 1964. Monthly Review Press, pp. 127–186.
- Altman, Jochanan (1983). "A Reconstruction Using Anthropological Methods of the Second Economy of the Soviet Georgia". PhD thesis. Middlesex Polytechnic, Enfield, England.
- American University of Beirut and Hariri Foundation for Sustainable Human Development (2009). *Higher Education and Labor Market Outcomes in Lebanon*. Tech. rep.
- Anders, Gerhard and Monique Nuijten (2007). "Introduction". In: *Corruption and the Secret of Law: A Legal Anthropological Perspective*. Ed. by Monique Nuijten and Gerhard Anders. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 1–26.
- Anechiarico, F. and J.B. Jacobs (1996). *The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Antonius, George (1938). *The Arab Awakening*. London: H. Hamilton.
- Aristotle (1926). *Nicomachean Ethics*. Loeb. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.

- Assaad, Ragui (June 1993). "Formal and informal institutions in the labor market, with applications to the construction sector in Egypt". In: *World Development* 21.6, pp. 925–939.
- Auyero, Javier (1999). "From the Client's Point(s) of View: How Poor People Perceive and Evaluate Political Clientelism". In: *Theory and Society* 28.2, pp. 297–334.
- (2000). *Poor People's Politics*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Auyero, Javier, Pablo Lapegna, and Fernanda Page Poma (Aug. 2009). "Patronage Politics and Contentious Collective Action: A Recursive Relationship". In: *Latin American Politics and Society* 51.3, pp. 1–31.
- Ayoub, Victor (1966). "Resolution of Conflict in a Lebanese Village". In: *Politics in Lebanon*. Ed. by L. Binder. New York.
- Balanche, Fabrice (2012). "The Reconstruction of Lebanon or the Racketeering Rule". In: *Lebanon After the Cedar Revolution*. Ed. by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr. London: Hurst and Company, pp. 145–162.
- Bardhan, P (1997). "Corruption and development: a review of issues". In: *Journal of Economic Literature* 35.3, pp. 1320–1346.
- Barnett, Andy, Bruce Yandle, and George Naufal (June 2013). "Regulation, trust, and cronyism in Middle Eastern societies: The simple economics of wasta". In: *The Journal of Socio-Economics* 44, pp. 41–46.
- Bates, R. H. (June 1988). "Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism". In: *Politics & Society* 16.2-3, pp. 387–401.
- (2010). "A Review of Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast's *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*". In: *Journal of Economic Literature* 48.3, pp. 752–756.
- Baumann, Hannes (2012). "The 'New Contractor Bourgeoisie' in Lebanese Politics". In: *Lebanon After the Cedar Revolution*. Ed. by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr. London: Hurst and Company, pp. 125–144.
- Bayart, Jean-Francois (2004). "Le Crime Transnational et la Formation de l'Etat". In: *Politique Africaine* 93, pp. 93–104.
- Bayart, Jean-Francois, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou (1999). *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Belova, Eugenia (2001). "Economic Crime and Punishment". In: *Behind the Facade of Stalin's Command Economy: Evidence from the Soviet State and Party Archives*. Ed. by Paul R. Gregory. Hoover Institution, pp. 131–158.

- Berenschot, Ward (2010). "Everyday mediation: The politics of public service delivery in Gujarat, India". In: *Development and Change* 41.5, pp. 883–905.
- Berliner, Joseph (1957). *Factory and Manager in the USSR*. Cambridge (MA).
- Bhuta, Nehal (2012). "Governmentalizing Sovereignty : Indexes of State Fragility and the Calculability of Political Order". In: *Governance by Indicators: Global power through quantification and rankings*. Ed. by Kevin E. Davis, Angelina Fisher, and Sally Engle Merry. Vol. 1976. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 132–164.
- Blau, P. (1964). *Exchange and Power in Social Life*. New York: Wiley.
- Blom Investment Bank (2014). *The Lebanon Brief*. Tech. rep. 868, pp. 1–19.
- Blyth, Mark et al. (May 2011). "Introduction to the Special Issue on the Evolution of Institutions". In: *Journal of Institutional Economics* 7.03, pp. 299–315.
- Bodeman, Michael (1988). "Relations of Production and Class Rule: The Hidden Basis of Patron-Clientage". In: *Social Structures: A Network Approach*. Ed. by B. Wellman and S.D. Berkowitz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boissevain, Jeremy (1966). "Patronage in Sicily". In: *Man* 1.1, pp. 18–33.
- Botte, Roger (2004). "Vers un Etat illegal-legal?" In: *Politique Africaine* 93, pp. 7–20.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (July 1966). "Condition de classe et position de classe". In: *European Journal of Sociology* 7.02, pp. 201–223.
- (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1981). "Men and machines". In: *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-Sociologies*. Ed. by Karen Knorr-Cetina and Aaron V. Cicourel. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 304–17.
- (1984). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Harvard (MA): Harvard University Press.
- (1985). "From Rules to Strategies". In: *Cultural Anthropology* 1.1, pp. 110–120.
- (1986a). "Habitus, code et codification". In: *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 64.1, pp. 40–44.
- (1986b). "The Forms of Capital". In: *Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education*. Ed. by J.E. Richardson. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 241–58.

- Bourdieu, Pierre (1989). "Social space and symbolic power". In: *Sociological theory* 7.1, pp. 14–25.
- (1990a). "Droit et passe-droit". In: *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 81, pp. 86–96.
- (1990b). *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (1990c). *The Logic of Practice*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (1990d). "The scholastic point of view". In: *Cultural anthropology* 5.4, pp. 380–391.
- (1994). "Stratégies de reproduction et modes de domination". In: *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 105.1, pp. 3–12.
- (1996). *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (1998). *Practical Reason*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (1999). "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field". In: *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*. Ed. by George Steinmetz. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 53–75.
- (2000). *Pascalian Meditations*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (2004). "From the King's House to the Reason of State: A Model of the Genesis of the Bureaucratic Field". In: *Constellations* 11.1, pp. 16–36.
- (2007). *The Bachelors' Ball*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (2012). *Sur l'Etat*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, Luc Boltanski, and Monique de Saint Martin (1973). "Les stratégies de reconversion". In: *Social Science Information* 12.5, pp. 61–113.
- Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean-Claude Passeron (1990). *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. 2nd. London: SAGE.
- Bourdieu, Pierre and Loïc Wacquant (1992). *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (Feb. 1999). "On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason". In: *Theory, Culture & Society* 16.1, pp. 41–58.
- Brandstaetter, Thomas (2011). "Informal Institutions , Personalism and Organisational Behaviour in the Arab World and China (Wasta and Guanxi)". In: *Journal of Regional Development* 3.1.
- Briquet, Jean-Louis and Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, eds. (2010). *Organized Crime and States: the Hidden Face of Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Buchan, Bruce and Lisa Hill (2014). *An Intellectual History of Political Corruption*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Burawoy, Michael (1989). "Two methods in search of science Skocpol versus Trotsky". In: *Theory and Society* 18.6, pp. 759–805.
- Campbell, JL (1998). "Institutional analysis and the role of ideas in political economy". In: *Theory and society* 27.3, pp. 377–409.
- Carey, J. M. (Sept. 2000). "Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions". In: *Comparative Political Studies* 33.6-7, pp. 735–761.
- CAS (2007). *Survey on Living Standards*. Tech. rep. Beirut: Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics.
- Chalcraft, John (2009). *The Invisible Cage: Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Clapham, C.S. (1982). *Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State*. Burns and Oates.
- Coase, R.H. (1937). "The Nature of the Firm". In: *Economica* 4.16, pp. 386–405.
- Collier, David and Ruth Collier (1991). *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Collier, MW (2002). "Explaining corruption: An institutional choice approach". In: *Crime, Law and Social Change* 38, pp. 1–32.
- Collini, Stefan (2011). "From Robbins to McKinsey". In: *London Review of Books* 33.16, pp. 9–14.
- Collins, Kathleen (2006). *Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Comair-Obeid, Nayla (2003). "Lebanon". In: *Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law*, pp. 231–241.
- Crankshaw, Edward (1956). *Russia Without Stalin: the Emerging Pattern*. London.
- Credit Suisse Research Institute (2012). *Global Wealth Databook 2012*. Tech. rep. October.
- (2013). *Global Wealth Databook 2013*. Tech. rep. October.
- Culpepper, Pepper D. (Jan. 2008). "The Politics of Common Knowledge: Ideas and Institutional Change in Wage Bargaining". In: *International Organization* 62.01, pp. 1–33.
- Cunningham, Robert and Yasin K. Sarayrah (1993). *Wasta: the hidden force in Middle Eastern society*. Westport: Praeger.

- Dahan, Momi and Alejandro Gaviria (Apr. 2001). "Sibling Correlations and Intergenerational Mobility in Latin America". In: *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 49.3, pp. 537–554.
- Das, Rupen and Julie Davidson (2011). *Profiles of Poverty: The Human Face of Poverty in Lebanon*. Mansourieh: Dar Manhal al Hayat.
- de Saint Martin, Monique (Aug. 2011). "Towards a dynamic approach to reconversions". In: *Social Science Information* 50.3-4, pp. 429–441.
- Della Porta, Donatella and Alberto Vannucci (1999). *Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Denord, François et al. (Feb. 2011). "Social capital in the field of power: the case of Norway". In: *The Sociological Review* 59.1, pp. 86–108.
- Dib, Kamal (2004). *Warlords and Merchants: The Lebanese Business and Political Establishment*. Reading: Ithaca Press.
- Dreher, Axel and Friedrich Schneider (Sept. 2009). "Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis". In: *Public Choice* 144.1-2, pp. 215–238.
- Eisenstadt, SN and Luis Roniger (1980). "Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange". In: *Comparative studies in Society . . .* 22.1, pp. 42–77.
- (1984). *Patrons, Clients, and Friends*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elster, Jon (1981). "Snobs: Review of *La Distinction: Critique Sociale du Jugement* by Bourdieu, P". In: *London Review of Books* 3.20, pp. 10–12.
- Etzold, B et al. (2009). "Informality as agency - negotiating food security in Dhaka". In: *Die Erde*.
- Eyal, Gil, Ivan Szelenyi, and Eleanor Townsley (1998). *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe*. London and New York: Verso.
- Eyerman, Ron (1981). "False consciousness and ideology in Marxist theory". In: *Acta Sociologica* 24.1, pp. 43–56.
- Farrag, Amina (1977). "The wastah among Jordanian villagers". In: *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*. Ed. by Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury. London: Duckworth, pp. 225–238.
- Farsoun, Samih (1970). "Family Structure and Society in Modern Lebanon". In: *People and Cultures of the Middle East*. Ed. by Louise E. Sweet. New York: Natural History Press.

- Fawaz, Mona (June 2009a). "Contracts and Retaliation: Securing Housing Exchanges in the Interstice of the Formal/ Informal Beirut (Lebanon) Housing Market". In: *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 29.1, pp. 90–107.
- (Sept. 2009b). "Neoliberal Urbanity and the Right to the City: A View from Beirut's Periphery". In: *Development and Change* 40.5, pp. 827–852.
- Fawaz, Mona, M Harb, and A Gharbieh (2012). "Living Beirut's Security Zones: An Investigation of the Modalities and Practice of Urban Security". In: *City & Society* 24.2, pp. 173–195.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila (2000). "Blat in Stalin's Time". In: *Bribery and Blat in Russia: Negotiating Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s*. Ed. by Steven Lovell, Alena Ledeneva, and Andrei Rogachevskii. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Flanagan, William and Edwin Fogelman (1967). "Functional Analysis". In: *Contemporary Political Analysis*. Ed. by James C. Charlesworth. New York: Free Press, pp. 72–86.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (Apr. 2006). "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research". In: *Qualitative Inquiry* 12.2, pp. 219–245.
- Foster, George M (1963). "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan, II: Patron-Client Relationship". In: *American Anthropologist* 65.6, pp. 1280–1294.
- Friedrich, Carl J. (1972). "Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective". In: *The Pathology of Politics: Violence, Betrayal, Corruption, Secrecy and Propaganda*. New York: Harper & Row, pp. 127–141.
- Friedrichs, Jörg and Friedrich Kratochwil (2009). "On acting and knowing: how pragmatism can advance International Relations research and methodology". In: *International Organization* 63, pp. 701–731.
- Gebara, Khalil (2007). *Reconstruction Survey : The Political Economy of Corruption in Post-War Lebanon*. Tech. rep. Beirut and London: The Lebanese Transparency Association.
- Gellner, Ernest and John Waterbury, eds. (1977). *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*. London: Duckworth.
- Gewirtz, P (1996). "On 'I Know It When I See It'". In: *The Yale Law Journal* 105.4, pp. 1023–1047.
- Ghazzal, Zouhair (2012). *The Case of Low Rents in Contemporary Beirut: A Case Study of a Leased Property Recuperation*.
- Goffman, Erving (1963). *Behavior in Public Places*. New York: Free Press.

- Gorton, T.J. (2013). *Renaissance Emir: A Druze Warlord at the Court of the Medici*. London: Quartet Books.
- Graaf, Gjalt de (2007). "Causes of corruption: Towards a contextual theory of corruption". In: *Public Administration Quarterly* 31.1.
- Graaf, Gjalt de, Patrick von Maravic, and Pieter Wagenaar (2010). "Introduction". In: *The Good Cause: Theoretical Perspectives on Corruption*. Ed. by Gjalt de Graaf, Patrick von Maravic, and Pieter Wagenaar. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, pp. 13–20.
- Graaf, Gjalt de, Pieter Wagenaar, and Michel Hoenderboom (2010). "Constructing Corruption". In: *The Good Cause: Theoretical Perspectives on Corruption*. Ed. by Gjalt de Graaf, Patrick von Maravic, and Pieter Wagenaar. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, pp. 98–114.
- Graeber, David (2011). *Debt: the first 5000 years*. New York: Melville House.
- Gramsci, Antonio (2007). *Quaderni del Carcere (The Prison Notebooks)*. Ed. by Valentino Gerratana. Torino: Einaudi.
- Granovetter, MS (1973). "The strength of weak ties". In: *American journal of sociology* 78.6, pp. 1360–1380.
- Graziano, Luigi (1976). "A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Clientelistic Behavior". In: *European Journal of Political Research* 4, pp. 149–174.
- Grzymala-Busse, Anna (2007). *Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Günes-Ayata, Ayse (1994). "Clientelism: Premodern, Modern, Postmodern". In: *Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society*. Ed. by Luis Roniger and Ayse Günes-Ayata. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 19–28.
- Gupta, A (1995). "Blurred boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the imagined state". In: *American ethnologist* 22.2, pp. 375–402.
- Guthrie, Douglas (1999). *Dragon in a Three-Piece Suit: The Emergence of Capitalism in China*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Habib, Farah et al. (Sept. 2012). "Correspondence Analysis: A New Method for Analyzing Qualitative Data in Architecture". In: *Nexus Network Journal* 14.3, pp. 517–538.
- Hall, PA and Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996). "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms".

- Haller, Dieter and Cris Shore, eds. (2005). *Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives*. London: Pluto Press.
- Hamdan, Amal (2012). "The Limits of Corporate Consociation: Taif and the Crisis of Power-Sharing in Lebanon since 2005". In: *Lebanon After the Cedar Revolution*. Ed. by Ave Knudson and Michael Kerr. London: Hurst and Company, pp. 39–59.
- Hamzeh, A. Nizar (2001). "Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends". In: *Middle Eastern Studies* 37.3, pp. 167–178.
- Hanf, Theodor (2007). "E pluribus unum? Lebanese opinions and attitudes on coexistence". In: *Lettres de Byblos* 14.
- Hanssen, Jens (2005). *Fin de Siecle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hay, Colin (2006). "(What's Marxist about) Marxist State Theory?" In: *The State: Theories and Issues*. Ed. by Colin Hay, Michael Lister, and David Marsh. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 59–78.
- (2008). "Constructivist Institutionalism". In: *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Ed. by R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 56–74.
- Hay, Colin and Michael Lister (2006). "Introduction: Theories of the State". In: *The State: Theories and Issues*. Ed. by Colin Hay, Michael Lister, and David Marsh. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–20.
- Heidenheimer, Arnold J. and Michael Johnston (2002). "Introduction". In: *Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts*. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction Publishers, pp. 3–14.
- Helmke, G and S Levitsky (2004). "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda". In: *Perspectives on Politics* 2.4, pp. 725–740.
- Heritier, Adrienne (2007). *Explaining Institutional Change in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hinnebusch, RA (1993). "The politics of economic reform in Egypt". In: *Third World Quarterly* 14.1, pp. 159–171.
- (1995). "The political economy of economic liberalization in Syria". In: *International Journal of Middle East* 27.3, pp. 305–320.
- Hjellbrekke, Johs, Brigitte Le Roux, and Olav Korsnes (2007). "The Norwegian field of power anno 2000". In: *European Societies* 9.2, pp. 245–273.
- Holger, Albrecht (2009). "How Do Regimes Work? Formal Rules and Informal Mechanisms in Middle Eastern Politics". In: *Democracy Build-*

- ing and Democracy Erosion: Political Change North and South of the Mediterranean*. Ed. by Eberhard Kienle. London: Saqi, pp. 230–247.
- Homans, GC (1958). “Social behavior as exchange”. In: *American journal of sociology* 63.6, pp. 597–606.
- Hsu, Carolyn L. (Sept. 2005). “Capitalism without contracts versus capitalists without capitalism: Comparing the influence of Chinese guanxi and Russian blat on marketization”. In: *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38.3, pp. 309–327.
- Hutchings, Kate and David Weir (2006). “Guanxi and wasta: A comparison”. In: *Thunderbird International Business* 48. February, pp. 141–156.
- Huxley, Frederick C. (1978). “Wasita in a Lebanese context: social exchange among villagers and outsiders”. PhD thesis. Ann Arbor.
- International Labour Organisation (2005). *Awareness Raising Workshop on the Situation of Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon*. Tech. rep. Beirut: International Labour Organisation.
- Johnson, Michael (1986). *Class and Client in Beirut: the Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840-1985*. London: Ithaca Press.
- (2001). *All Honourable Men: the Social Origins of War in Lebanon*. Oxford: The Centre for Lebanese Studies and IB Tauris.
- Johnston, Michael (1986). “Right & wrong in American politics: Popular conceptions of corruption”. In: *Polity* 18.3, pp. 367–391.
- (1996). “The search for definitions: the vitality of politics and the issue of corruption”. In: *International social science journal*.
- Jureidini, Ray (July 2010). “Trafficking and Contract Migrant Workers in the Middle East”. In: *International Migration* 48.4, pp. 142–163.
- Kassir, Samir (2010). *Beirut*. Berkeley (Cal): University of California Press.
- Katznelson, Ira and B.R. Weingast, eds. (2005). *Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kaufman, RR (1972). “The patron-client concept and macro-politics: prospects and problems”. In: *Comparative studies in Society and History* 16.3, pp. 284–308.
- Khalaf, Samir (1968). “Primordial ties and politics in Lebanon”. In: *Middle Eastern Studies* 4.3, pp. 243–269.
- (1985). “Social Structure and Urban Planning in Lebanon”. In: *Property, Social Structure and Law in the Modern Middle East*. Ed. by Ann Elizabeth Mayer. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
- (1987). *Lebanon’s Predicament*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- (1993). “Urban Design and the Recovery of Beirut”. In: *Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction*. Ed. by Samir Khalaf and Philip S. Khoury. Leiden: Brill, pp. 11–62.
- (2012). *Lebanon Adrift: From Battleground to Playground*. London: Saqi.
- Khalaf, Samir and Per Kongstad (1973). “Urbanization and Urbanism in Beirut: Some preliminary results”. In: *From Madina to Metropolis; Heritage and Change in the Near Eastern City*. Ed. by L. Carl Brown. Princeton: The Darwin Press, pp. 116–49.
- Khawaja, Marwan et al. (Sept. 2006). “Distrust, social fragmentation and adolescents’ health in the outer city: Beirut and beyond.” In: *Social science & medicine (1982)* 63.5, pp. 1304–15.
- Kilani, Sa’eda and Basem Sakijha (2002). *Wasta: The Declared Secret*. Amman: Jordan Press Foundation.
- Kipnis, Andrew B. (1996). “The Language of Gifts: Managing Guanxi in a North China Village”. In: *Modern China* 22.3, pp. 285–314.
- Knight, Jack (1992). *Institutions and Social Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kremer, Michael and E Maskin (1996). “Wage inequality and segregation by skill”.
- Krijnen, Marieke and Mona Fawaz (July 2010). “Exception as the Rule: High-End Developments in Neoliberal Beirut”. In: *Built Environment* 36.2, pp. 245–259.
- Lakatos, Imre (1978). *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, Markus Taube, and Matthias Schramm, eds. (2005). *The New Institutional Economics of Corruption*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Lambsdorff, Johann Graf and Sitki Utku Teksoz (2002). “Corrupt Relational Contracting”.
- Lande, CH (1973). “Networks and groups in Southeast Asia: some observations on the group theory of politics”. In: *The American Political Science Review* 67.1, pp. 103–127.
- Lauth, Hans-Joachim (Dec. 2000). “Informal Institutions and Democracy”. In: *Democratization* 7.4, pp. 21–50.
- Le Roux, Brigitte and Henry Rouanet (2004). *Geometric Data Analysis: from Correspondence Analysis to Structured Data Analysis*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- (2010). *Multiple Correspondence Analysis*. London: SAGE Publications.

- Lebaron, F (2003). "Pierre Bourdieu: Economic models against economism". In: *Theory and Society* 32, pp. 551–565.
- Lebaron, Frédéric (2001). "Bases of a Sociological Economy: From Francois Simiand and Maurice Halbwachs to Pierre Bourdieu". In: *International Journal of Contemporary Sociology* 38.1, pp. 54–63.
- Leca, Jean and Yves Schemeil (1983). "Clientélisme et patrimonialisme dans le monde arabe". In: *International Political Science Review* 4.4, pp. 455–494.
- Ledeneva, Alena (1998). *Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2000). "Continuity and Change of Blat Practices in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia". In: *Bribery and Blat in Russia: Negotiating Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s*. Ed. by Stephen Lovell, Alena Ledeneva, and Andrei Rogachevski. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- (Jan. 2008). "Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China". In: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50.01, pp. 118–144.
- Leenders, Reinoud (2004a). "In Search of the State: The Politics of Corruption in Post-War Lebanon".
- (2004b). "Nobody Having too Much to Answer for: Laissez Faire, Networks, and Postwar Reconstruction in Lebanon". In: *Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited*. Ed. by Steven Heydemann. New York and Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 169–200.
- (2004c). "The Politics of Corruption in Post-War Lebanon". PhD thesis. SOAS.
- (2012). *Spoils of Truce: Corruption and State-Building in Postwar Lebanon*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Lemarchand, Rene (1972). "Political clientelism and ethnicity in tropical Africa: Competing solidarities in nation-building". In: *The American Political Science Review* 66.1, pp. 68–90.
- Lemarchand, Rene and K Legg (1972). "Political clientelism and development: A preliminary analysis". In: *Comparative Politics* 4.2, pp. 149–178.
- Levi-Strauss, Claude (1969). *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Leys, C (1965). "What is the Problem about Corruption?" In: *Journal of Modern African Studies* 3.2, pp. 215–230.

- Lomnitz-Adler, Larissa (1988). "Informal exchange networks in formal systems: a theoretical model". In: *American Anthropologist* 90.1, pp. 42–55.
- (1995). "Ritual, Rumor and Corruption in the Constitution of Polity in Mexico". In: *Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology* 1.1, pp. 20–47.
- Lovell, Stephen, Alena Ledeneva, and A.B. Rogachevskii, eds. (2000). *Bribery and Blat in Russia: Negotiating Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s*. London: St. Martin's Press.
- Makdisi, Ussama (1996). "Reconstructing the nation-state: The modernity of sectarianism in Lebanon". In: *Middle East Report* 200, pp. 23–26.
- (2000). *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon*. Berkeley (Cal): University of California Press.
- Makhoul, J (2004). "Intercessory wasta and village development in Lebanon". In: *Arab studies quarterly* 26.June 2004, pp. 1–17.
- Mallat, C (1997). "The Lebanese legal system". In: *The Lebanon Report*.
- Mauss, Marcel (1954). *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*. London: Cohen and West Ltd.
- McDermott, G. A. (June 2007). "Politics and the Evolution of Inter-firm Networks: A Post-Communist Lesson". In: *Organization Studies* 28.6, pp. 885–908.
- Meyer, JW and Brian Rowan (1977). "Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony". In: *American journal of sociology* 83.2, pp. 340–363.
- Michailova, Snejina and Verner Worm (Aug. 2003). "Personal Networking in Russia and China:" in: *European Management Journal* 21.4, pp. 509–519.
- Mitchell, Timothy (1991). "The limits of the state: beyond statist approaches and their critics". In: *The American Political Science Review* 85.1, pp. 77–96.
- (1999). "Society, Economy, and the State Effect". In: *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*. Ed. by George Steinmetz. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 76–97.
- Mohamed, Ahmed Amin and Hadia Hamdy (2008). "The Stigma of Wasta". Cairo.
- Monroe, Kristin V (2011). "Being Mobile in Beirut". In: *City & Society* 23.1, pp. 91–111.

- MPC Team (2013). *MPC - Migration Profile: Lebanon*. Tech. rep. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.
- Nashabe, Omar (2009). *Security Sector Reform in Lebanon*. Tech. rep. January. Arab Reform Initiative.
- Nimer, Maissan (2013). “Liban: “Misère” de l’école publique”. In: *Carnets de l’IFPO*.
- Noble, G. (May 2013). “‘It is home but it is not home’: habitus, field and the migrant”. In: *Journal of Sociology* 49.2-3, pp. 341–356.
- North, Douglass C. (1986). “The New Institutional Economics”. In: *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* (. . . 142, pp. 230–237.
- (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- North, Douglass C., J.J. Wallis, and B.R. Weingast (2009). *Violence and Social Orders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nye, JS (1967). “Corruption and political development: a cost-benefit analysis”. In: *The American Political Science Review* 61.2, pp. 417–427.
- Olson, Mancur (1971). *The Logic of Collective Action*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Ostrom, Elinor (1986). “An agenda for the study of institutions”. In: *Public Choice* 48.1, pp. 3–25.
- (1990). *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Panizza, Ugo G. and Marianne El-Khoury (2001). “Social Mobility and Religion: Evidence from Lebanon”. In: *SSRN Electronic Journal* 202.
- Pardo, Italo, ed. (2004a). *Between Morality and the Law: Corruption, Anthropology and Comparative Society*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- (2004b). “Introduction: Corruption, Morality and the Law”. In: *Between Morality and the Law: Corruption, Anthropology and Comparative Society*. Ed. by Italo Pardo. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 1–18.
- Passeron, Jean-Claude (1982). “L’inflation des diplômes: remarques sur l’usage de quelques concepts analogiques en sociologie”. In: *Revue Française de Sociologie* 23.2, pp. 551–584.
- Pejovich, Svetozar (1999). “The effects of the interaction of formal and informal institutions on social stability and economic development”. In: *Journal of Markets and Morality* 2.2. Ed. by Kartik Chandra Roy and Jorn Sideras, pp. 164–181.

- Piattoni, Simona, ed. (2001). *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Picard, Elizabeth (1999). "The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias". Oxford.
- Piketty, Thomas (2014). *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Pitt-Rivers, J.A. (1954). *The People of the Sierra*. New York: Criterion Books.
- Polanyi, Karl (1944). *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. New York: Rinehart.
- (1957). "The Economy as Instituted Process". In: *Trade and Market in the Early Empires*. Ed. by Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg, and Harry W. Pearson. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.
- Powell, JD (1970). "Peasant society and clientelist politics". In: *The American Political Science Review* 64.2, pp. 411–425.
- Powell, Walter W. and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds. (1991). *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Richards, Alan and John Waterbury (2008). *A Political Economy of the Middle East*. 3rd. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Riker, WH (1980). "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions". In: *The American Political Science Review* 74.2, pp. 432–446.
- Rivkin-Fish, Michele (2005). "Bribes, Gifts and Unofficial Payments: Rethinking Corruption in Post-Soviet Russian Health Care". In: *Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives*. Ed. by Dieter Haller and Cris Shore. London: Pluto Press, pp. 47–64.
- Robalino, David and Haneed Sayed (2012). *Republic of Lebanon Good Jobs Needed: The Role of Macro, Investment, Education, Labor and Social Protection Policies ("Miles")*. Tech. rep. 76008. World Bank.
- Robinson, JA and T Verdier (2002). "The political economy of clientelism". In: *Political Science*.
- Robinson, W S (June 1950). "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals". In: *American Sociological Review* 15.3, p. 351.
- Roniger, Luis (1983). "Modern Patron-Client Relations and Historical Clientelism". In: *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie* 24.1, pp. 63–95.
- (1994). "The Comparative Study of Clientelism and the Changing Nature of Civil Society in the Contemporary World". In: *Democracy, Client-*

- telism, and Civil Society*. Ed. by Luis Roniger and Ayse Günes-Ayata. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Roniger, Luis and Ayse Günes-Ayata, eds. (1994). *Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Ronsin, Caroline (2010). "Wasta and state-society relations: the case of Jordan". In: *Revue Averroes* 3, pp. 1–7.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1975). "The Economics of Corruption". In: *Journal of Public Economics* 4, pp. 187–203.
- (1999). *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rouanet, Henry, W. Ackermann, and Brigitte Le Roux (Jan. 2000). "The Geometric Analysis of Questionnaires: the Lesson of Bourdieu's *La Distinction*". In: *Bulletin de Méthodologie Sociologique* 65.1, pp. 5–18.
- Roy, Olivier (1994). "Patronage and Solidarity Groups: survival or reformation?" In: *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*. Ed. by Ghassan Salame. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 270–281.
- (1996). "Groupes de solidarité au Moyen-Orient et en Asie centrale". In: *Cahiers du CERI* 16.
- Rutten, Rosanne (June 2006). "Shame and Worker Activism: Emotional Dynamics in Face-to-Face Encounters". In: *Qualitative Sociology* 29.3, pp. 353–372.
- Salibi, Kamal (1988). *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Sampson, Steven (2005). "Integrity Warriors: Global Morality and the Anti-Corruption Movement in the Balkans". In: *Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives*. Ed. by Dieter Haller and Cris Shore. London: Pluto Press, pp. 103–130.
- Sandholtz, Wayne and Alec Stone Sweet (2004). "Law, politics, and international governance". In: *The Politics of International Law*. Ed. by Christian Reus-Smit. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 238–71.
- Santos, B De Sousa (1995). *Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition*. London: Routledge.
- (2007). "Beyond abyssal thinking: From Global Lines to Ecology of Knowledges". In: *Review* XXX.1, pp. 1–66.
- Sartori, G (1970). "Concept misformation in comparative politics". In: *The American Political Science Review* 64.4, pp. 1033–1053.

- Schlumberger, Oliver (2004). "Patrimonial Capitalism - economic reform and economic order in the Arab world". PhD thesis. Eberhard-Karls Universität Tübingen.
- Schramm, Matthias and Markus Taube (2002). "The Institutional Economics of legal institutions , Guanxi , and Corruption in the PR China". In: *Corruption: Its Realities in Asia*. Ed. by J. Kidd. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Scott, James (1969). "Corruption, machine politics, and political change". In: *The American Political Science Review* 63.4, pp. 1142–1158.
- (1972). "Patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia". In: *The American Political Science Review* 66.1, pp. 91–113.
- (1998). *Seeing Like a State*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Seidman, S. (Mar. 2012). "The Politics of Cosmopolitan Beirut: From the Stranger to the Other". In: *Theory, Culture & Society* 29.2, pp. 3–36.
- Serre, Delphine (2012). "Le Capital Culturel dans Tous Ses états". In: *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 1.191-192, pp. 4–13.
- Shehadeh, LR (1998). "The legal status of married women in Lebanon". In: *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30.4, pp. 501–519.
- Shoemaker, Robert B. (Nov. 2002). "the Taming of the Duel: Masculinity, Honour and Ritual Violence in London, 1660-1800". In: *The Historical Journal* 45.03, pp. 525–545.
- Simmel, Georg (1950). *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*. Ed. by Kurt H. Wolff. Glencoe (Il): Free Press.
- Skocpol, Theda (1979). *States and Social Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1985). "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research". In: *Bringing the State Back In*. Ed. by PB Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–43.
- Smart, Alan (1993). "Gifts, bribes, and guanxi: A reconsideration of Bourdieu's social capital". In: *Cultural anthropology* 8.3, pp. 388–408.
- Smith, Martin (2006). "Pluralism". In: *The State: Theories and Issues*. Ed. by Colin Hay, Michael Lister, and David Marsh. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 21–38.
- Smith, P. B. et al. (Jan. 2011). "How Distinctive Are Indigenous Ways of Achieving Influence? A Comparative Study of Guanxi, Wasta, Jeitinho,

- and ‘Pulling Strings’”. In: *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 43.1, pp. 135–150.
- Steinmo, Sven (2008). “Historical Institutionalism”. In: *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective*. Ed. by Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 118–138.
- (2010). *The Evolution of Modern States: Sweden, Japan and the United States*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1999). “Formal and Informal Institutions”. In: *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective*. Ed. by P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin. Washington D.C.: World Bank, pp. 59–68.
- Tabar, Paul, G. Noble, and Scott Poynting (2010). *On Being Lebanese in Australia: Identity, Racism and the Ethnic Field*. Beirut: Lebanese American University Press.
- Tarrow, SG (1967). “Political dualism and Italian communism”. In: *The American Political Science Review* 61.1, pp. 39–53.
- Thelen, Kathleen and Sven Steinmo (1992). “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”. In: *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics*. Ed. by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–32.
- Theobald, Robin (1992). “On the Survival of Patronage in Developed Societies”. In: *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie* 33, pp. 183–191.
- (1999). “So what really is the problem about corruption?” In: *Third World Quarterly* 20.3.
- Tilly, Charles (1985). “War Making and State Making as Organised Crime”. In: *Bringing the State Back In*. Ed. by P.B Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 169–191.
- Traboulsi, Fawaz (2007). *A History of Modern Lebanon*. London: Pluto Press.
- Tsebelis, George (1994). “The power of the European Parliament as a conditional agenda setter”. In: *American Political Science Review* 88.1, pp. 128–142.
- UNDP (2007). *Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon*. Tech. rep., pp. 132–156.
- Wacquant, Loïc (2008). *Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Walsh, Mary Jane (2005). "Guide to Locating the Literature on Corruption". In: *Civil Society and Corruption: Mobilizing for Reform*. Ed. by Michael Johnston. Lanham: University Press of America, pp. 171–199.
- Warde, Alan (2004). "Practice and field : revising Bourdieusian concepts". Manchester.
- Weber, M (1946). "Politics as Vocation". In: *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Ed. by CW Mills and HH Gerth. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 77–128.
- Weingrod, A (1968). "Patrons, patronage, and political parties". In: *Comparative studies in Society and History* 10.4, pp. 377–400.
- Weiss, Max (2009). "The Historiography of Sectarianism in Lebanon". In: *History Compass* 7.1, pp. 141–154.
- (2010). *In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi'ism and the Making of Modern Lebanon*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Wendt, Alexander (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williamson, O.E. (1971). "The vertical integration of production: market failure considerations". In: *The American Economic Review* 61, pp. 112–123.
- (1985). *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting*. London.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958). *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford.
- (1977). *Culture and Value*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wolf, ER (1956). "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico". In: *American Anthropologist* 58.6, pp. 1065–1078.
- Wraith, Ronald and Edgar Simpkins (1963). *Corruption in Developing Countries*. London.
- Xin, KK and JL Pearce (1996). "Guanxi: Connections as substitutes for formal institutional support". In: *Academy of management journal* 39.6, pp. 1641–1658.
- Yaacoub, Najwa and Lara Badre (2011). *Statistics in Focus: The Labour Market in Lebanon*. Tech. rep. Central Administration of Statistics.
- Yang, MM (2002). "The resilience of guanxi and its new deployments: A critique of some new guanxi scholarship". In: *The China Quarterly* 170.170, pp. 459–476.
- Yang, MMH (1994). *Gifts, Favors and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

- Yassin, Nasser (2012). "Sects and the City: Socio-spatial Perceptions and Practices of Youth in Beirut". In: *Lebanon After the Cedar Revolution*. Ed. by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr. London: Hurst and Company, pp. 203–217.
- Zinn, Dorothy Louise (2005). "Afterward - Anthropology and Corruption: The State of the Art". In: *Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives*. Ed. by Dieter Haller and Cris Shore. London: Pluto Press, pp. 229 –241.