INTERACT – RESEARCHING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS’ INTEGRATION AS A THREE-WAY PROCESS - IMMIGRANTS, COUNTRIES OF EMIGRATION AND COUNTRIES OF IMMIGRATION AS ACTORS OF INTEGRATION

Corridor Report Germany

Agnieszka Weinar
Jan Schneider

INTERACT Research Report 2015/02
INTERACT
Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

Research Report
Corridor Report
INTERACT RR2015/02

Corridor Report Germany

Agnieszka Weinar *
Jan Schneider **

* European University Institute and Carleton University
** Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration (SVR) GmbH
INTERACT - Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

In 2013 (Jan. 1st), around 34 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) were currently living in the European Union (EU), representing 7% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a passive, process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working together to build a cohesive society.

Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: first, where they come and second, where they now live. While integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants interact with their home country.

INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to support their rights).

INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued by EU member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way?

A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done.

INTERACT is co-financed by the European Union and is implemented by a consortium built by CEDEM, UPF and MPI Europe.

For more information:
INTERACT
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI)
Villa Malafrasca
Via Boccaccio 151
50133 Florence
Italy
Tel: +39 055 46 85 817/892
Fax: + 39 055 46 85 755
Email: mpc@eui.eu

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/
Abstract

In this report we analyse the differences and similarities between the Turkish and Russian immigrants in Germany at the destination but also between the two countries of origin in order to assess their integration outcomes. We investigate the following question: what is the impact of the country of origin (Russia and Turkey) on integration outcomes in Germany? We found that the migrating groups have different characteristics (flows and stocks) and each group has been subject to a different entry policy, including different rights and obligations. In fact, the structural and policy factors at the destination are the key elements that influence the success of integration or failure of migrants. As regards the impact of the country of origin, understood as policies and practices targeting diaspora for better integration, it is negligible so far. The diaspora policies do not support integration. On the contrary, they aim at re-focusing migrants’ attention back to the country of origin. This policy can have positive ramifications for integration outcomes, e.g. when it supports Turkish migrants’ cross-border business activities or enhances Russian-language proficiency among the diaspora so that they can later on use it in international business environment. As our report shows, there is an important group of actors on various levels of governance that work to improve the final outcome. In the case of migrant organizations and organizations helping migrants in Germany, they form an additional arm of integration policy. Being close to migrants and having intimate knowledge of their integration needs, they focus on topics and fields of action that are most relevant for a successful migration story. They also form the most tangible bridge between the origin and destination.

Keywords: migrant integration, German integration policy, Turkish diaspora, Russian diaspora, diaspora engagement policy

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to acknowledge the work of Anne Unterreiner, currently a post-doc researcher at Science-Po, Paris, on earlier versions of this draft.
# Table of contents

1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 7

2. Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 8

3. Immigration flows to Germany originating in Turkey and the Russian Federation .............. 9
   3.1 Recent migration from Turkey and the Russian Federation ............................................. 12

4. Institutional and policy framework of integration in Germany ........................................... 16
   4.1 Retrospect I: Integration without integration policy in the era of foreign labour recruitment .. 17
   4.2 Subsidiary actors of integration: Local administrations, welfare organisations, trade unions .. 17
   4.3 Retrospect II: Inclusive pathways for ethnic German resettlers ..................................... 18
   4.4 Establishment and coordination of integration policies ................................................... 19
   4.5 Promotion of integration as a Federal task ...................................................................... 20
   4.6 Towards universalist integration policies? ..................................................................... 22
   4.7 Recent policy changes ................................................................................................. 23
   4.8 The role of migrant associations .................................................................................. 24

5. Emigration and diaspora policies of Russia and Turkey .................................................... 26
   5.1 Emigration policies ....................................................................................................... 26
   5.2 Diaspora policies ......................................................................................................... 28

6. Integration trends of Turkish and Russian migrants in Germany .................................... 33
   6.1 Integration indexes ........................................................................................................ 33
   6.2 Integration data compared ............................................................................................ 34

7. The role of the associations supporting migrants’ integration in Germany ....................... 40

8. Main conclusions ................................................................................................................. 44

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 45
1. Introduction

This corridor report is a publication of the INTERACT Project, co-financed by the European Union and implemented at the European University Institute. The project aims to study the integration of third-country nationals as a three-way process involving immigrants, the countries of emigration, and the countries of immigration as actors of integration. The reference to integration as a “three-way process” reflects the European Commission’s departure from a vision of integration as a strictly two-way process. The Commission now acknowledges that countries of origin can also play a role in support of the integration process (European Commission 2011a and 2011b).

Concretely, the INTERACT project looks into ways that governments and non-governmental institutions in origin countries make transnational bonds a reality. The central context of the project is the changing global environment in which migration to the EU takes place. At present, migrants are people who face the challenge of integration while constantly communicating with their networks back home (and around the world). They come from diverse places with which they often stay in touch on daily basis.

Following the logic of the research design, the relatively recent development of active diaspora and emigration policies in many countries of the world is central to our analysis. In addition, the impact of non-state actors which deal with migrants on the implementation of these policies and on their integration in the EU has not yet been studied.

By a corridor, we mean a pair of countries: one origin and one destination. The corridors have been chosen to allow for cross-country comparison, both at the destination and origin. The proposed approach allowed the comparison of different corridors that share either a common origin or a common destination, and with it, an analysis of the impact of the countries of origin on integration at various destinations as well as a comparison of various migrant communities at the same destination. The aim is to disentangle and further hypothesise the role of the communities of origin and its variations according to the destination.

Germany is an important immigration country in the European Union. It receives a major share of the total flows into the EU as well as intra-EU migrations. In 2013, net migration to Germany was well above 400,000, its highest level since 1993.¹

The two most prominent groups of non-EU migrants in the country come from Turkey and Russia. Both groups represent different migratory realities on various levels.

At the destination, different welcoming policies apply since Turks come mainly as immigrant workers or as family members of workers, and Russians come as a part of the German ethnic stream or as asylum seekers. The social context at the destination also matters: Turks come to a society that is very different ethnically and culturally, while migrants from Russia land in a not-so dramatically different ethnic and cultural reality. While new Turkish immigrants come to join already heavily stigmatised communities of Turkish ex-guest workers, who stayed in Germany after 1974, Russians are a part of a broader Aussiedler community, which has not the same image among German population.

But the differences also appear at the origin. Turkey is a close EU ally, with a history of EU ties and a will to join the block. Turkish migrants coming to Germany, however, are from various ethnic groups within Turkey. Many of them are in fact Kurds, who are in opposition to the Turkish state. The diversity of Turkish migrants is reflected in the way the Turkish state relates to its migrants abroad and

especially to those in Germany. Russia perceives the EU as a competitor on the European continent. Russian-speaking *Aussiedler* have also not necessarily come to Germany from Russia proper, but rather from ex-Soviet republics. Nevertheless, the Russian state claims a cultural affinity with these emigrants based on language.

In this report we will analyse the differences and similarities between the two groups at the destination but also between the two countries of origin in order to assess the integration outcomes of Turkish and Russian migrants in Germany. We will investigate the following question: what is the impact of the country of origin (Russia and Turkey) on integration outcomes in Germany? To what extent does the support of Turkish and Russian emigration and diaspora policies influence the integration efforts of the German receiving State?

In order to address this question, the paper develops as follows. First, we give a general overview of migration trends from Turkey and Russia to Germany and thus show differences between the two groups. Second, we examine the integration policies at work that concern the two groups, taking into account various migration categories that are relevant in each case (family reunification, refugees etc.). Third, we engage in a discussion of emigration and diaspora policies and their possible links to populations in Germany. We will seek evidence of bilateral cooperation in this regard. Finally, in the fourth section we discuss the empirical findings.

2. Methodology

The report is based on three different data sources (data triangulation): an analysis of the legal and political frameworks; a quantitative analysis; and a survey.

The analysis of the legal and analytical frameworks was divided by country of origin and destination. In the countries of destination (EU28) we analysed the integration policy framework; in the countries of origin (55 non-EU countries) we analysed emigration and diaspora policy frameworks. The main questions asked concerned main stakeholders, policy actors, policy discourses, and legal frameworks. For the quantitative analysis we built a synthetic index of integration which allows a comparison of the level of integration of migrants in EU Member States by dimension and by migration corridor (Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti 2015). To this end, a set of integration indicators were identified for each dimension, drawing on relevant national datasets. Using the Principal Component Analysis technique, the number of such indicators was reduced and replaced with a smaller number of new variables. These new variables (principal components) explain the maximum amount of variation among the performances of different immigration corridors, considering the three domains separately. On this basis, a synthetic index that allows the ranking of the immigrant corridors within each dimension was created. The main indicators building up the main three indexes were:

Labour market integration index

- Employment rate
- Unemployment rate
- Activity rate
- Over-qualification rate

Education integration index

- Highest educational attainment
- School enrolment rate at age 15-25
- School enrolment rate at age 25-35
Citizenship integration index

- Citizenship acquisition rate
- % of naturalised citizens of the total born-abroad population (2013 data)

The indexes rank the corridors based on the level of integration by assigning numbers from 0 to 1. The higher the rank, the better the integration. In the corridor reports, the index is calculated without taking into account the gap between migrants and natives. It should be interpreted whereby the higher the index, the better the performance of that corridor compared to the other corridors.

The INTERACT survey was an exploratory survey conducted between December 2013 and September 2014. The survey targeted civil society organisations working in 82 countries (28 EU countries of destination and 54 countries of origin with more than 100,000 migrants residing in the EU). Any organisation dealing with migrant integration in one of the eight dimensions (labour market, education, language, social interactions, religion, political and civic participation, nationality issues, housing) could take part in the survey. Respondents could choose between one and three integration dimensions in which their organisation was active. The survey was translated into 28 languages and over 900 responses were collected online and over the phone. Although the exploratory character of the survey does not allow one to make generalisations about the whole population of civil society organisations, it sheds light onto how these actors’ activities impact migrant integration between the origin and destination. However, the survey does much more than just map these activities in the comparative context. It also shows how organisations perceive states of origin and their policies in the context of the day-to-day reality of incorporating migrants into the receiving society. In this report, only information pertaining to Russian and Turkish migrants in Germany is presented.²

3. Immigration flows to Germany originating in Turkey and the Russian Federation

Even though migration studies have long focused on the Gastarbeiter who arrived from the 1960s in Germany, it would be inaccurate to state that Germany is a “new immigration country”. From the 19th century to the early 1900s, there have been mass movements of people to and from what is now Germany, due to emigration from impoverished regions such as Eastern Prussia and immigration to developing industrial areas (e.g. Ruhr). In 1910, there were 1.2 million foreigners in Germany (half of whom were from Austria-Hungary), an increase of 509.3% since 1871. Also, in the aftermath of two world wars, the shifting of the German state borders caused significant migration flows of German refugees and returnees. In the 1960s they represented 18% of the inhabitants of West Germany (9.4 million). In addition, around 4 million people from Eastern European countries migrated to East Germany during the Cold War, based on the German policy of ethnic return.

At that time, both German states faced serious labour shortages and needed additional workers in their fast growing economies. They thus introduced guest-worker programmes (see Table 1). Turkey was one of the countries with the largest number of guest workers in West Germany.

² For more information, please refer to the forthcoming INTERACT survey report.
Table 1 Bilateral agreements on guest workers
(Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Other Western European countries</th>
<th>Other neighbouring countries</th>
<th>Communist countries</th>
<th>Other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


Even though the Gastarbeiter policy officially ended in 1973, labour migration continuously constituted a significant share of foreign immigration, particularly since the end of the 1980s. At the time, the general recruitment ban was eased and selected groups were allowed for labour migration through ministerial regulations. In 1990, an “ordinance on exemptions from the recruitment ban” (Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung) was adopted (and altered several times in the following years, according to labour market needs). Inter alia, it covered seasonal and contract workers, specialty cooks (chefs), and household aids. Furthermore, the ordinance unconditionally allowed for the immigration of researchers and qualified workers with special skills, as long as their admittance would be “in the public interest” of the country.⁴ However, most labour migration concerned low-skill occupations; for example in 2005, 320,383 permits were granted to seasonal workers and assistants of showmen (Özcan 2007). In addition, from 1 August 2000 until 31 December 2004, close to 18,000 “green cards” were issued for skilled workers in information technology (Özcan 2007).⁵

Turkish migrants are traditionally considered Gastarbeiter par excellence and Russian immigrants to Germany, ethnic Germans. However, the picture is more complicated, even in historical perspective.

As showed in detail by Sirkeci and his colleagues, Turkish migration outflows were a result of labour migration in the 1960s, then family reunification in the 1970s-1980s, refugees and asylum seekers in the 1990s, and irregular migration in the 2000s (Sirkeci, Cohen, and Yazgan 2012). Between 1999 and 2003, 12% of asylum seekers were from Turkey, 81% of whom were Kurds (Özcan 2007). This last migration flow can be explained by the repression of Kurds in the 1980s-1990s.

---
³ Initially the workers came primarily from COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries; later immigrants also came from Algeria, Cuba, Mongolia, Angola, and China (Elsner and Elsner 1994). However, while these agreements were governed more strictly than their West German counterparts with regard to rotation and the return and non-admittance of family members, the resulting scope of immigration was much smaller than in the FRG, with less than 100,000 “contract workers” residing in Eastern Germany in 1989.
⁴ Section 5, Nos. 1 and 2, Verordnung über Ausnahmeregelungen für die Erteilung einer Arbeitserlaubnis an neueinreisende ausländische Arbeitnehmer (Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung).
⁵ In 2005, a new immigration law came into force, consolidating the various exceptions from the recruitment ban within a new Residence Act and a revamped ordinance for employment. It is important to note that the EU Blue Card for highly-skilled employment was incorporated into German regulations only in 2012.
The immigration of populations from Russia to Germany is to a large extent linked to the past settlement of “Germans” within the Russian Empire. There were 2.4 million Germans living in the Russian Empire in 1914 (Ingenhorst 1997, 31). To open the door to the return of German minorities after World War II, the West German state adopted a broad definition of German nationality in its 1949 Constitution. In 1953, a special legal base, the so-called Federal Expellees Act (Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz – BVFG) came into force regulating the admittance of several million expellees and refugees, who had dwelled in formerly German territory in Eastern Europe. To this day, following several amendments, the BVFG governs the immigration, distribution, and integration of ethnic German repatriates and their dependents. In addition, people identifying themselves as Jewish could also migrate to Germany, both to the Democratic Republic (GDR) and then to unified Germany, as “Kontingentflüchtlinge”.

Figure 1 below illustrates the decreasing trend of ethnic migrations to Germany. Since 2007, less than 5,000 ethnic Germans (including spouses and descendants) have immigrated to Germany from the Russian Federation. It was just above 1,000 in 2012, while the number of Russian nationals entering stood at almost 19,000.

Figure 1. Inflows of ethnic Germans to Germany, 1992-2013

Source: Bundesverwaltungsamt (BVA, Federal Administrative Office), Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees).

---

6 Art 116 of the Constitution states:

(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, a German within the meaning of this Basic Law is a person who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within its boundaries as they existed on 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant of such a person.

(2) Former German citizens who between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945 were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds, and their descendants, shall on application have their citizenship restored. They shall be deemed never to have been deprived of their citizenship if they have established their domicile in Germany after 8 May 1945 and have not expressed a contrary intention.

7 Between April and October 1990, between 2,500 and 5,000 Soviet Jews migrated to East Germany. By the time the law that deemed Soviet Jews Kontingentflüchtlingen came into effect (1991), approximately 8,500 of them had come to Germany (Harris 1998: 129).
In 2013, 2,427 ethnic Germans came to Germany, 1,307 of which were from the Russian Federation. This number reflects a longer trend that started in 2006, when the official ethnic migration policy was phased out. We can now safely assume that majority of Russians migrating to Germany since 2006 have not been ethnic Germans.

As a consequence of differentiated immigration paths, the total stock and characteristics of the migrants originating in Turkey and the Russian Federation differ significantly.

Table 2. People with a migrant background* residing in Germany and the share of foreign-born among them, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality at birth</th>
<th>People with a migrant background holding a foreign nationality in 2011</th>
<th>People with a migrant background holding German nationality in 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Share of foreign-born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,714,240</td>
<td>50.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>1,318,130</td>
<td>76.50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The population with a migration background are defined by the Federal Statistical Office as (A) all persons with a non-German nationality at birth who have immigrated into the territory of today’s Federal Republic of Germany after 1949; (B) all foreigners born in Germany (C) all persons born in Germany who have at least one parent who belongs to category (A) or (B).


3.1 Recent migration from Turkey and the Russian Federation

In March 2014, out of 7,731,958 foreigners (non-nationals) who were registered in the Central Register of Foreigners, 20% were born in Turkey and 2.8% in the Russian Federation. These numbers reflect a differentiated policy towards the two groups: a higher number of ethnic Germans born in the Russian Federation reside in Germany but they receive German citizenship at entry and thus are not registered as foreigners. This data issue can be remedied by using micro-census data. According to this source, in 2012 there were 1,490,000 migrants born in Turkey and 991,000 migrants born in Russia living in Germany.

Also, in 2013, 19,256 Turkish nationals (5.3% of the total immigration) and 27,120 Russian nationals (7.4% of the total immigration) entered Germany and obtained residence permits for various purposes (see Table 3 below).

Table 3. Top residence purposes and residence titles issued to Turkish and Russian nationals in 2013 (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Settlement Permit</th>
<th>Education/ Studies</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Humanitarian Reasons*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>19,256</td>
<td>7,987</td>
<td>2,362</td>
<td>1,696</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>6,966</td>
<td>1,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19,569)</td>
<td>(7,930)</td>
<td>(2,224)</td>
<td>(1,687)</td>
<td>(1,575)</td>
<td>(7,332)</td>
<td>(1,031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>27,120</td>
<td>15,537</td>
<td>257 (334)</td>
<td>1,954</td>
<td>1,307</td>
<td>4,108</td>
<td>9,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17,338)</td>
<td>(10,828)</td>
<td>(2,518)</td>
<td>(1,594)</td>
<td>(3,926)</td>
<td>(3,856)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Non-EU nationals</td>
<td>362,984</td>
<td>155,512</td>
<td>4,719</td>
<td>42,206</td>
<td>33,621</td>
<td>56,046</td>
<td>92,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(268,688)</td>
<td>(114,483)</td>
<td>(2,532)</td>
<td>(44,411)</td>
<td>(35,332)</td>
<td>(43,558)</td>
<td>(42,979)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes the Duldung and other forms of protection.

Source: Central Register of Foreign Nationals (BAMF 2014, own calculations)
Both groups of migrants enter Germany through the family reunification channel but this is more relevant in the case of Turkish newcomers. In 2013, 36% of the entrants coming from Turkey fell in this category, in contrast to 15% of those coming from the Russian Federation. The longer-term trend confirms the importance of this channel of migration for both groups, albeit with varied patterns (Figure 2 below).

Figure 2. Family reunification, 2006-2013

![Family reunification chart](image)

Source: BAMF 2014.

Turkish and Russian immigrants have consistently been the top two groups applying for family reunification. It must be noted, however, that many of the Russian applicants are related to ethnic Germans. The trends show that Turkish family reunifications have been gradually decreasing, while Russian trends reveal more increases, especially coinciding with the financial crisis.

Both groups also have different trends with regard to whom they bring to Germany (see Fig. 3 below). In 2013, men married to German nationals dominate the Turkish family reunification pattern. This can be explained by a cultural tradition, according to which a Muslim woman can only marry a Muslim man. It also shows the greater attractiveness of the prospect of marrying a female who is a German national rather than a female who is a foreigner in Germany (1,807 to 700). In contrast, immigrant men from Turkey bring over their spouses more often than men with German citizenship (1,763 to 1,177), however the difference is not striking. Russian family reunification patterns are more traditional, with a clear prevalence of females immigrating to join a spouse (2,451 to 401), and with a dominance of spouses of both sexes immigrating to join a German national (2,315 to 537).
Another important migration channel is employment (for more details see Section 3 of this report). The important feature of labour migration from Russia is that over 60% of people coming to Germany for work are women.

Table 4. Entry for employment purposes, 2008-2013, by country and sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>1,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of women</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>1,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of women</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>1,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of women</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continues)
Table 4. Entry for employment purposes, 2008-2013, by country and sex (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>% of women</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>% of women</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>% of women</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BAMF 2014.

Russian permit holders are featured more often than Turkish among the highly-skilled and EU Blue Card holders (447 to 134) in 2013. They also entered the country more often as self-employed and professionals (77 cases in 2013 to 33 cases of Turkish nationals). However, in both groups low-skilled and middle-skilled workers dominate, with 54% of Russian and 22% of Turkish nationals getting permits for work requiring no skills in 2013.

As regards further differences in migration patterns, Russian nationals enter Germany seeking international protection much more frequently than Turkish nationals. In fact, it is the most important reason for immigrant entry in the case of Russian Federation. Turkey is no longer an important country of origin for asylum seekers coming to Germany. 2013 was the second year in a row in which Turkey, with less than 3,600 asylum seekers, did not make it to the top ten countries of origin. On the contrary, German authorities saw a five-fold increase in applications from Russian Federation (from 3,202 to 14,887 applications, see Fig. 4 below). 95% of the applicants were Muslims, which suggests Chechen asylum seekers. In 2013, 6,993 Russian nationals were granted permits-to-stay that are issued to asylum seekers, while only 1,109 Turkish nationals obtained these.
Most immigrants, both Russians and Turkish, settle in three federal states: Nordrhein-Westfalen (25.7%), Bayern (17.1%), and Baden-Wuerttemberg (17.1%). Eastern federal states of Germany are home to less than 1.4% immigrants. The spatial patterns are important for integration outcomes, as in the case of Germany, where integration policies depend on the federal states (Länder).

### 4. Institutional and policy framework of integration in Germany

The current legal and institutional framework of integration in Germany has several sources and involves a plethora of actors, including both public administration and civil society organisations on different levels of the Federal State. While the establishment and explicit promulgation of “integration policy” at the national government level occurred only recently, dating to the Immigration Law of 2005, specific policies have been in place even before 2005 which fostered the inclusion of particular migrant groups into German society.

At present, migrants from the Republic of Turkey and from the Russian Federation (or other successor states of the Soviet Union) belong to a variety of status groups. Namely, a large share of those with Russian roots are ethnic German resettlers and their descendants (Aussiedler or Spätaussiedler), who were privileged immigrants and automatically became citizens upon arrival, disposing of an elaborate system of measures that fostered integration up until the 1990s. On the contrary, the majority of persons with a Turkish background have a history that dates back to the peak of labour migration to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, which included subsequent family reunions and the so-called second and third generations. Thus, in the light of the German citizenship law, which was dominated by the principle of an “ethnic nation” up until 1999 (jus sanguinis), a significant proportion of Turkish-origin migrants reside in Germany as denizens, more than 55 percent of whom are Turkish nationals (see previous Section 3). As “regular” non-EU nationals, there was no comprehensive integration policy available to them for the greater part of post-World War II German migration history. Eventually, migrants from Turkey and Russia were included in other distinct categories such as asylum applicants, recognized refugees, or students. The following sections provide an overview of German policies and institutions – both current and former – for immigrant integration, with particular emphasis on migrant groups from Turkey and the Russian Federation.
4.1 Retrospect I: Integration without integration policy in the era of foreign labour recruitment

The underlying idea of the German *guest-worker model* of the 1950s and 1960s was the establishment of a flexible system of temporary labour migration, which could be controlled easily by the ministerial bureaucracy and which could react to the changing demands of particular sectors such as agriculture and mining, without constituting permanent immigration (see Herbert 2001: 202ff.; Steinert 1995: 220ff.). Labour recruitment was strictly limited to those for whom there were jobs available – mostly low-wage, non-prestigious, and unattractive jobs – and migration was strictly temporary. In the early 1960s, it was rarely possible to extend permits beyond one or two years, despite persisting demand. Following industry criticism, this *rotational model* was diluted: in 1971, when already more than half a million Turks lived in Germany on the basis of a bilateral agreement, the German government made it possible to extend the residence titles of foreigners, thus marking the basis for a subsequent consolidation of their right to stay and reunite with their families (see Münz, Seifert and Ulrich 1999: 48ff.). However, in public discourse and policy, Germany was not perceived as a country of immigration and therefore, *integration* was not part of the rhetoric; if at all, “partial accommodation for a temporary stay was all that was needed” (Heckmann 2003: 52). The bilateral agreements as such did not contain any measures geared at integration and it took until the second half of the 1960s to install a *Steering Group on Foreign Labour Migrants* within the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, representing all political levels, churches, welfare organisations, and trade unions, which began discussing issues such as language training, housing and accommodation issues, and representation in the workplace in a coordinated manner (see Schneider 2010: 122ff.).

The recruitment ban of 1973 yielded contrary effects, as migrant workers feared that they would not be allowed to re-enter Germany if they went home, and instead remained and sought to bring their families. Thus, the foreign population grew from less than 4 million in 1973 to almost 4.5 million in 1980. While *guest workers* became foreign residents (see Martin 1998), official policy – on the Federal as well as on the *Länder* level – did not accept that Germany had established immigrant settlement and refrained from any attempt to foster integration. On the contrary: the Parliament passed the “Act on Promoting the Return of Foreign Nationals”, which came into force on 1 December 1983. Returning foreign nationals could receive early reimbursement of monies dedicated to a statutory pension fund or federally subsidised mortgage savings plan, or set aside for savings. Above all, unemployed workers of certain nationalities could take advantage of financial return assistance for each family member in case they permanently left Germany. The law had a lesser quantitative effect than originally assumed and was discontinued.

4.2 Subsidiary actors of integration: Local administrations, welfare organisations, trade unions

Instead, integration took place at the local levels and at the workplace; through the trade unions, in which foreign workers participated equally from the beginning, a reform of the Industrial Constitution Law was undertaken in 1972. It granted non-German workers passive voting rights in the works committees, where, together with their German colleagues, they were able to co-decide policies within large companies. Local labour and political administrations pursued a pragmatic approach to integration through the provision of housing, the erection of foreigners’ political representation within municipal advisory councils, and by financing educational and labour support facilities for migrant youth as well as social counselling structures for different migrant groups, under the auspices of the large welfare organisations. While the church-based organisations *Caritas* and *Diakonie* provided care and support measures for the primarily-Christian labour migrants from Southern Europe, the Workers’ Welfare Association (*Arbeiterwohlfahrt*) provided these services for (mostly Muslim) foreign workers and their families from Turkey and the Maghreb (Radtke 1997: 252), as early as the 1960s. Later on, 

---

8 In the years following the military coup in 1980, the Turkish-origin community in Germany grew further through the arrivals of asylum seekers, particularly with the rise of the Kurdish conflict.
regular federal subsidies for social counselling turned out to be the first module to promote integration established by the Federal Government. However, a prerequisite for the pragmatic approach to integration was the fact that foreign migrants were able to comprehensively participate in the German system of social security from the very beginning of their employment (Heckmann 2003). “Migrants were included as part of the general labour market policy of the German welfare state and not as part of an explicit integration policy – even though their inclusion proved to be the most relevant decision pertaining to the integration history of the labour migrants of the 1960s and 1970s and their families” (Bommes and Kolb 2012: 117).

4.3 Retrospect II: Inclusive pathways for ethnic German resettlers

The rationale for the immigration of ethnic German resettlers (Aussiedler), as in other countries with ethnic or religious diaspora migration such as Israel, uses *jus sanguinis* as an ascriptive criterion that qualifies a person for “return” or “home” migration. The admitted resettlers (since 1993 “late resettlers”) are persons of German descent from the successor states of the Soviet Union and other former states of the Warsaw Pact. Ethnic Germans, in the aftermath of World War II, had been persecuted in these regions, and even several decades after the war’s end, they were substantially disadvantaged in some cases. Provided that repercussions of this discrimination persist today, victims and their family members who are not considered ethnic Germans themselves can also be admitted to Germany within the framework of a special reception procedure. Through the issuance of a certificate confirming their status as “late resettlers”, they are awarded German citizenship by law (the Federal Expellees Act). While in the first decades of immigration Aussiedler came primarily from Eastern European countries that formerly comprised German territories, it was only in the late 1980s and after the fall of the Iron Curtain that “Soviet Germans” or “Russian Germans” were able to move to Germany in significant numbers.

Table 5. Federal Measures for the inclusion of ethnic German resettlers (1976-1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of integration</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language Acquisition</td>
<td>Extensive language courses for all demographic groups, including workforce, retirees, and home-maker family members (women)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Youth/Education                | Measures targeting all young Aussiedler between 6 and 30 years of age for up to 30 months (Federal budget entitled Garantiefonds):  
                                    - language support  
                                    - school/homework aid  
                                    - vocational training aids  
                                    - social, cultural, and recreational activities |
| Social establishment/compensation | Federally subsidised low-interest loans to start one’s own household;  
                                     Equalisation of burdens through state subsidies covering lost households and a general compensation (according to the Equalisation of Burdens Act) |
| Vocational/Labour Market        | Facilitated recognition of qualifications and certificates acquired in foreign countries;  
                                    Referral into employment, taking into account personal qualifications (according to the Employment Promotion Act);  
                                    Financing of special retraining and advanced education measures |

(continues)
Table 5. Federal Measures for the inclusion of ethnic German resettlers (1976-1992) (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of integration</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employment</td>
<td>Start-up aids for entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low-interest loans for self-employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Privileges for enterprises run by Aussiedler in public tenders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own non-exhaustive compilation based on Haberland (1994), IB (1995), and other sources.

Unlike in the case of foreign workers, an elaborated infrastructure for integration had been set up for Aussiedler from the beginning. Beyond the immediate granting of German citizenship, ethnic Germans and their spouses and children had benefitted from a comprehensive and coordinated package of support measures and financial aid since 1976, which formed a pathway to social, educational, vocational, and linguistic inclusion (see Table 5). Originally, they could receive unemployment benefits. This benefit was capped and a (much lower) “inclusion” aid was introduced in 1990. Furthermore, pensions were paid to the retirees according to German assessment criteria, since the countries of origin did not provide pension-schemes for emigrants. After leaving the initial Aussiedler reception centre, transitional homes were financed through Federal, Länder, or municipal budgets.

After the collapse of regimes in Eastern Europe: the influx of ethnic Germans skyrocketed in an almost parallel development to a major increase of asylum seekers and civil war refugees, putting severe strains on the Federal, Länder, and municipal integration budgets. Despite the fact that the measures for inclusion were severely curtailed after 1992, Aussiedler remained a privileged immigrant group for whom a distinguished system of integration continued to exist until the Immigration Law came into force in 2005, when rights associated with integration were largely approximated for the major immigrant groups.

4.4 Establishment and coordination of integration policies

Both the migration crisis of the early 1990s and the fact that the process of “nation building” had come to an end (by means of the German reunification) posed serious challenges to the German differentialist model of integration (see Brubaker 1992). No longer was there a legitimation of the notion of ethno-exclusive migration and of Germany being a non-immigration country (kein Einwanderungsland). It was not until 1999 that the coalition government of Social Democrats (SPD) and the Green Party introduced draft legislation for a fundamental reform of citizenship law, introducing jus soli elements and the possibility for children born to foreigners in Germany to hold two citizenships. Furthermore, two migration-related topics came up in public discourse at the turn of the millennium. The first was the demographic ageing of the German population and the associated risks for social security systems, should that development not be buffered by immigration; and the second was employer associations and stakeholders in information and communication technology pushing the issue of labour shortages onto the agenda, lobbying for a more liberal approach to admitting qualified labour from non-EU countries.

The Federal Government adopted a “green card”, a new recruitment scheme starting in August of 2000, allowing only temporary work and residence permits for up to 20,000 high-skilled specialists from non-EU countries in areas such as the IT sector. A significant share of green card holders applied from Turkey and the Russian Federation – up until 31 December 2004, when the green card was transferred into “regular” immigration legislation – thus marking the onset of increased skilled migration from these countries. Despite the fact that the German green card, unlike its American counterpart, did not promise permanent residence, the green card provided momentum to a politicised

---

9 Of a total of 13,041 foreign IT specialists who were granted first-time work permits between 1 August 2000 and 31 December 2004, Russian nationals accounted for 785 (6.0%) and Turkish nationals for 442 (3.4%).
migration discourse. Thus, Chancellor Schröder and Interior Minister Schily appointed an Independent Commission on Migration to Germany. It was tasked with developing concrete recommendations for future immigration policy and presenting a concept of integration. The Commission concluded in 2001 that Germany should prepare for permanent immigration and that it should develop a coordinated policy aimed at integration, acknowledging that the former policy of ‘pragmatic improvisation’ had led to significant successes. However, the absence of a systematic and comprehensive approach was deemed responsible for difficulties in integrating immigrants into the host country (ICM 2001: 195).

4.5 Promotion of integration as a Federal task

The 2004 immigration law contributed to the goal of reorganizing and clarifying responsibilities for integration measures assigned to the different governmental levels within the German body politic. One task was to overcome the rather rigorous differentiation of target groups such as labour migrants, refugees, and ethnic Germans in favour of a needs-based approach. For the first time, specific measures to promote integration were enshrined in legislation: integration courses with defined standards, uniform migration counselling (merging the former foreigners’ social counselling and the Aussiedler social counselling), and the establishment of a programme on integration, all to be carried out by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF) through a special integration department.

Thus, migrant workers, self-employed persons, family members, persons entitled to asylum, refugees (as defined by the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees), Jewish immigrants, as well as ethnic German resettlers all have a legal claim to participate in an integration course. Its goal is to support migrants in integrating into economic, cultural, and social life by imparting sufficient knowledge of the German language. The course generally consists of 600 teaching units of German language instruction and 60 hours of orientation instruction on everyday knowledge of topics such as rights and obligations, democracy, history, culture, and everyday customs. Immigrants with additional advancement needs (e.g. parents, women, youth) may take a course of up to 900 teaching units. In individual cases, attendance of integration courses may amount to a total of 1,245 hours.

However, integration remains a political task with multiple vertical competencies. Responsibilities for integration policy, with different legal and political definitions, exist at Federal, Länder, and local levels. For instance, the responsibility for education and the school system – undoubtedly the most pivotal sphere with regard to young immigrants’ opportunities and thus a powerful integration tool – is fully under the auspices of the Länder. Although the sixteen Federal States are intent to agree on common guidelines in the field of education, particularly within the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs, “it is no exaggeration to say that in Germany there are basically sixteen different school systems” (Bommes and Kolb 2012: 125) with varying approaches to foster the integration of immigrant students or pupils with migrant backgrounds. For instance, not all Federal States cater for mother-tongue instruction in schools; in some Länder, Turkish consulates offer classes in the afternoon; only very few Länder also cover the Kurdish language. The different integration-related tasks of the three government levels are partly distinct from one another, yet still overlap in some areas (see Table 6).

---

10 Implementation and delivery continue to follow the principle of subsidiarity. For instance, integration courses are offered by the local community colleges (Volkshochschulen) and a range of third-sector organisations.

11 See Sections 43-45 and 75 of the Residence Act. The Federal Integration Programme is coordinated by the BAMF and regularly involves representatives of the Länder, the municipalities, integration commissioners from all state levels, trade unions, industry associations, and religious organisations. Its focus is on language acquisition, labour market integration, integration through education, and social integration.
### Table 6. Competencies for integration-related policy areas within German Federalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal (National) Government</th>
<th>State Governments (Länder)</th>
<th>Municipal Governments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Following the 2004 Immigration Act, the promotion of integration was centralised, transferring authority from the Federal States to the Federal Government in the following areas:</td>
<td>The Federal States are responsible for the administration and implementation of national legislation and have their own specific legislative competencies:</td>
<td>Local municipalities are part of the administrative organisation of the Federal States, serving as implementing authorities. But they also practice municipal self-governance:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Integration courses for immigrants</td>
<td>• Exclusive legislation in Education Policy (School and University)</td>
<td>• School Maintenance and Financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Migration Advisory Service for adult immigrants (Federal Ministry of the Interior)</td>
<td>• Naturalisation authority (implementation of citizenship law; naturalisation courses shall be offered for preparatory purposes)</td>
<td>• Organisation of Child and Youth care institutions (e.g. kindergarten and crèche)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Youth Migration Service (Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth)</td>
<td>• Adopting laws specifying the national framework legislation on child/youth care (e.g. early child care in kindergarten)</td>
<td>• Cultural services or general social advisory services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Federal level has legislative responsibilities for a number of other policy areas, which may have direct or indirect effects on migrant integration:</td>
<td>• Implementation of school-based vocational training</td>
<td>• Urban development and municipal housing (Main supporting scheme, funded by the Federal Government and the States; “Urban Districts With Special Development Needs – The Social City“)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Citizenship law (Non-EU nationals may obtain citizenship after a legal stay of 8 years)</td>
<td>• Recognition of Foreign Professional Qualifications (for most professions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anti-Discrimination (General Equal Treatment Act, Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency)</td>
<td>• Freedom to adopt additional laws or regulations fostering integration (e.g. diversity in public administration)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social Code (most labour/welfare legislation, including frame legislation for child/youth care)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recognition of Foreign Professional Qualifications (for some professions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: non-exhaustive own compilation based on SVR (2012) and other sources.

The political structures dealing with the formulation and implementation of integration policies at Federal and Länder levels are quite complex. In fact, the scattered institutional responsibilities may evade a coherent and concept-oriented policy with clear goals. The lack of strategy and coherence has been obvious for many years; as early as 1978, then-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt appointed the first Federal Commissioner for the Integration of Foreign Workers and their Families with the explicit task
of supporting the further development of integration policy and fostering better coordination of integration measures between the different actors. However, the Office of the Commissioner was largely ignored by the mighty Federal Ministries and remained a toothless tiger until it was endorsed with a better budget, more personnel, and a higher political rank following the 1998 elections (see Schneider 2010: 128ff., 139, 255). Following the adoption of the new integration policy in 2004, the Federal Government initiated a number of exchange processes, such as six National Integration Summits (2006, 07, 08, 10, 12 and 13) and the collaborative development of a National Integration Plan in 2007, which included all vertical government levels, industry and trade unions, welfare organisations, and migrant associations. The Integration Plan was supplemented by a National Action Plan on Integration in 2011. These two initiatives were the most promising signs of progress towards better cooperation and coherence of integration policies. However, project collaboration turned out to be rather difficult as the Federal Government claimed the lead in many areas that touched Länder competencies (Bendel 2014: 6; SVR 2012: 67). Meanwhile, most of the 16 Federal States have issued reports or conceptual papers, which serve as reference points for their integration policies, but only a few have decided to adopt participation and integration laws (see Roth and Gesemann 2014: 53ff.).

4.6 Towards universalist integration policies?

Over the past 15 years, there has been a clear trend towards “streamlined” and extended integration policies for the various migrant groups when it comes to measures such as language courses or counselling structures. The special treatment of ethnic Germans was for the most part abandoned and now all migrants benefit largely from the same public integration measures, whether they come from Turkey, the Russian Federation, or any other non-EU country; whether they migrate for the purpose of labour, family reunion, or education; or whether they are granted protection. However, several groups whose stay is deemed temporary are excluded from integration classes, including asylum seekers and persons with exceptional leave to remain (toleration despite the obligation to depart), as well as the so-called contract workers. Contract workers are employees of companies in EU member states or non-EU countries which have their registered office abroad, and who are permitted to work on temporary contracts in Germany on the basis of a bilateral agreement. After applying for and being issued a special contract-worker card while still living abroad, contract workers receive a residence permit through the local German Foreigners Office upon arrival, which is limited to the time that is pre-defined in the contract (a maximum of 4 years applies). Turkey is one of the few non-EU countries with whom Germany has such an agreement. However, the number of Turkish contract workers is currently down to a few hundred per year.

Despite the multiple forums of exchange and cooperation, policies beyond the Federal level still vary greatly, also with regard to concrete measures taken.

A negative example was the so-called Muslim-Test introduced by the State Government of Baden-Wuerttemberg in 2006: an interview guideline in order to scrutinize Muslim candidates for citizenship (a majority of whom were Turkish nationals), aimed to verify their adherence to democracy and the constitution and to confirm their support of more specific social norms such as tolerance of

12 This looks quite different when it comes to legal questions concerning access to the territory of Germany and labour market participation status. Thus in Germany, like in many other countries, non-EU nationals with a certain nationality may rely on a greater set of rights (or face fewer obligations) than others, including such rights and obligations that may affect their individual abilities to integrate.

13 These groups also receive reduced basic welfare and health services according to the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act. “Tolerated” foreigners (in German: Duldung) have a very weak status, as they are legally obliged to leave the country while their deportation is temporarily suspended. At the end of 2013, a total of 94,504 foreigners lived in Germany with Duldung status, 4,950 (5.2%) of whom were Turkish nationals and 4,247 (4.5%) Russian (see Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache [printed paper] 18/1033 of 3 April 2014: 25; available on: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/010/1801033.pdf [Accessed 29 December 2014]).
homosexuality (Michalowski 2011: 764). Despite the fact that the test was extended to non-Muslim migrants following protests, it was considered discriminatory and was discontinued after a change of government in 2011.

A few Länder, e.g. the State of Hamburg and the State of Rhineland-Palatinate, have taken a firm stance in an effort to increase the number of naturalisations in order to foster integration through large campaigns aimed at people who fulfil the minimum lawful residence requirement for German citizenship. In general, there is a tendency to improve integration policy coordination amongst the Länder. Besides the well-established Standing Conference of the Federal States’ Ministers and Senators of the Interior (IMK), which has been regularly debating any important home affairs issue at the top-level since 1954, the Federal State Ministers responsible for integration have also started to convene regularly since 2007, in an attempt to improve policy and institutional coherence in areas such as “a culture of welcoming”, the recognition of foreign qualifications and certificates, or migrant counselling services.  

4.7 Recent policy changes

A number of quite recent changes in public policy have the potential to have strong impacts on the conditions for the integration for immigrants from non-EU countries and for their offspring, particularly with regard to communities with Turkish roots.

a) In April 2012, an Act to Improve the Assessment and Recognition of Professional Qualifications Obtained Abroad entered into force. It creates a general legal entitlement to an assessment procedure for foreign professional qualifications that are equal to the same or similar qualifications or certificates in Germany. The act eases the inclusion of migrants into Germany’s regulated labour market, thus facilitating their integration into society. The act also broadly nullifies the connection between employment and German citizenship, since applications can also be submitted from abroad. However, for a significant number of professions, the Federal Land needs to adopt separate recognition laws at the state-level, a process which has proceeded at a slow pace (see SVR 2014: 143ff.).

b) In July, 2014, the German parliament adopted legislation that allows young people of migrant backgrounds, who were raised in Germany and who are in possession of a dual citizenship, to keep both nationalities upon reaching legal age. Hitherto, these young adults would have had to opt for one nationality between ages 18 and 23 (the so-called option scheme), which marked the strongest constraint to the jus soli legislation for children born to foreigners residing in Germany, in force since the year 2000. In particular, second-generation migrants with a Turkish background will benefit from the 2014 law, since Turkey is by far the most important country of origin for parents whose children were previously affected by the option scheme (42% of all those born as “children of foreign parents” after January of 2000, which comprises approximately 200,000 young adults; see Worbs 2014: 72, 74).

c) On 10 July 2014, the EU Court of Justice ruled that requiring a basic knowledge of the German language as a condition for granting a visa for the purpose of reunification of spouses of Turkish nationals residing lawfully in Germany is contrary to EU law, because it is incompatible with the ‘standstill’ clause of the Association Agreement with Turkey. Since 2007, foreign spouses of most non-EU nationals living in Germany have had to demonstrate basic command of the German language prior to being granted entry. Proof of language ability is waived for dependents who are nationals of 

---


15 Case C-138/13 (Naime Dogan vs. Bundesrepublik Deutschland).
certain countries. These countries, whose citizens also benefit from visa-free travel to Germany, include Australia, Israel, Japan, Canada, and the United States – but not Turkey or the Russian Federation. Officially, the language requirement is supposed to foster integration and prevent forced marriages; yet, due to its selectivity, the German “pre-departure integration strategy” is strongly opposed by migrant organisations as being discriminatory and constituting an instrument for restrictive migration control (Groenendijk 2011). At the end of July 2014, following the ECJ judgement, the Federal Foreign Office issued a circular decreeing that German consulates in Turkey may not decline a visa application solely because a language test has not been completed. Despite the fact that is still mandatory to prove appropriate language skills, this ministerial decree will most likely facilitate the migration of spouses from Turkey, at least to some degree.

4.8 The role of migrant associations

Beyond the concrete integration-related legislation, policies, and measures provided for by the German government and bureaucracies on the different federal levels, a number of other actors may affect (either positively or negatively) the integration of migrants from Russia and Turkey. These actors include political and societal institutions in the countries of origin (see Section 5 below on diaspora policies), as well as non-state actors in Germany such as industry and trade unions (agreeing on their respective frameworks for integration and cultural diversity in the workplace); universities and research organisations (trying to improve the conditions for attracting and retaining foreign students and researchers by fostering a culture of welcoming); welfare organisations; foundations; and other third sector organisations.

Increased attention has also been paid to the role of associations founded and administered by migrants themselves. For many years, migrant organisations in Germany were scrutinized by research that attempted to determine whether their existence and activities would foster integration or, on the contrary, yield disintegrating effects (Pries 2013). However, the parameters changed after the Immigration Act of 2005 came into force and after several high-level consultations and concept papers on integration in subsequent years. Meanwhile, migrants have been accepted as socio-political interest groups whose formation and governance is subsidised and whose representatives are nominated for advisory bodies or consultative fora such as the Integration Summits, the German Islam Conference, or the working groups to develop both a National Integration Plan and a National Action Plan on Integration.

As regards the major countries of origin, out of the roughly 16,000 “associations of foreigners”, approximately 11,000 can be regarded as associations dominated by people of Turkish origin (Pries 2013, citing 2001 data). Furthermore, many of these Turkish organisations keep up strong ties with their countries of origin: “in fact it is rather difficult to find an organisation, which does not deal with the political agenda of the country of origin or which does not represent a distinct position towards the Turkish Government and its foreign policy (Sezgin 2010: 224; own translation). There are more than 20 umbrella organisations alone, most of which focus on fostering integration, although not exclusively. For instance the “Turkish Community in Germany” (Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland e. V.) has become a firm voice in almost all integration debates. It was only recently that the association lobbied for the adoption of a Federal Law for the Inclusion and Participation of Migrants.16

The spectrum is not as elaborated among the associations of Russian-origin migrants. This can be attributed primarily to the fact that for the most part, as ethnic German immigrants, migrants from Russia or the Soviet Union were in a privileged situation, lacking the need to fill gaps and lobby for support and integration or to establish a strong interest representation. On the contrary, it was the established German Welfare organisations competing with concepts and project proposals for

---

integration measures to cater for the needs of Aussiedler, particularly since the late 1980s (see Hunger and Metzger 2011: 58). The central political interest organisation representing ethnic Germans since 1958 is the Association of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen). As an umbrella lobbying organisation, it comprises 20 different national kin associations (Landsmannschaften), such as the Federation of German Compatriots from Russia (Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Russland) for those Aussiedler from the ex-Soviet states. These kin associations consider their role to be interest representation. They include cultural associations as well as social support organisations that provide integration measures, among other things.

With a focus on trade and entrepreneurship, migrant business associations sometimes take over integration-related tasks as well, particularly with regard to labour market integration, anti-discrimination, diversity, and inter-culturalism. There is well established spectrum for both countries of origin, with organisations such as the Federal Association of German-Russian Entrepreneurs (Bundesverband Deutsch-Russischer Unternehmer e. V.), the Russian-German Entrepreneurs’ Association (Russlanddeutscher Unternehmensverband e. V.), the Association of Turkish Entrepreneurs and Industrialists (Verband Türkischer Unternehmer und Industrieller in Europa e. V.), the Turkish-German Chamber of Commerce and Trade (Türkisch-Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammer) and the Association of Turkish-European Entrepreneurs (Bund Türkisch-Europäischer Unternehmer e. V.).

In addition to these, migrant associations and cooperative networks with specific agendas have been established, e. g. to support the educational attainment of their communities, both in the formal and non-formal educational sector. Parents’ associations are becoming more and more meaningful in this context, as the average performance gap between migrant and mainstream pupils in public schools is still huge, particularly among Turkish-origin youth. For instance, the Federation of Turkish Parents’ Associations (Föderation Türkischer Elternvereine in Deutschland e. V.), serves as an umbrella interest-representation organisation for all Turkish parents’ associations, fostering education, schooling, and general youth advancement for young Turkish-origin migrants. Similarly, as an umbrella organisation for a number of regional or local parents’ associations, the Federal Association of Russian-Speaking Parents (Bundesverband russischsprachiger Eltern e. V.) takes a stand for equal educational opportunities, competitiveness, and bilingualism for Russian-speaking children and youth in Germany.

In the aftermath of the 2011 National Action Plan on Integration, the associations have been valued more and more as an important leverage for successful integration. In 2013, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees started a new line of funding, providing ten promising migrant organisations with overhead monies for structural development for three years, including the Association of Russian-Speaking Parents, the Federation of Turkish Parents’ Associations, and the Turkish Community in Germany. This funding can begin to counter a widespread problem among migrant organisations in Germany: the issue of the under-financing of their branch offices, which can never be sufficiently endowed through project funding and which has hindered them from becoming a true competitor alongside the established large German welfare associations (for a more thorough analysis of the role of Turkish and Russian migrant associations in integration, see Section 7).

However, the various integration policy provisions within Germany and the spectrum of state and non-state actors are not the only elements shaping integration outcomes. The influence of the country of origin should also be taken into account. And not surprisingly the policies of the countries of origin affect some groups of emigrants more than others.
5. Emigration and diaspora policies of Russia and Turkey

In this section, we will briefly discuss the emigration and diaspora policies of Turkey and Russia. We will examine possible clashes or convergences between the integration policy of Germany and the emigration and diaspora policies of these countries.

5.1 Emigration policies

As already discussed in the introduction to this report, the emigration policies of these states deal with all forms of regulations on outward mobility, be it facilitating such movements (e.g. agreements on preferential mobility) or making them more difficult (e.g. through exit restrictions) or less desirable (e.g. retention strategies). Turkey and the Russian Federation represent two different approaches to emigration and to outward mobility in general.

Russia inherited a history of the Soviet approach to migration: until late 1980s, the USSR regulated internal mobility (this also included forced internal migration) and established barriers to exit through the control of travel documents. Hence the emigration from Russian territory under communist rule happened mainly through defection. At present, internal migration in Russia is still regulated but international emigration is not. The Russian Federation does not actively encourage emigration for labour purposes. In the 1990s, the country experienced a large outflow of people: between 1.5 and 2.5 million people emigrated from Russia. This phenomenon pushed the Russian government to adopt a more active stance. One of the policy reactions was a limited interest in the emigration of highly-skilled researchers, even if their numbers were not dramatically high: conservative estimates set the number of researchers who emigrated in the period 1993-96 at 7,000 (Graham and Dezhina 2008), while other estimates vary from between 20,000 to 40,000 (Ganguli 2014). Nevertheless, the main policy goal of these times was to counteract “brain drain.” Currently there is a consensus among political forces in Russia on the matter of emigration policies: the only supported policy should be the policy of return. The policy focuses on two groups: sootechestvenniki (compatriots), i.e. Russian-speakers with an ethnic Russian identity living in post-Soviet states, as well as highly-skilled Russians. The interest in return must be also understood in the context of the severe depopulation of Russia.

Turkey has had a different approach to emigration in the 20th century. From the early part of the 20th century’s mass expulsions of non-desired ethnic groups (Greeks, Armenians), it evolved over the next fifty years into a labour-force sending country. It experienced a period of active emigration policy, sending workers abroad in the 1950s and 1960s. The policy then focused on the circulation of the workforce between Turkey and the Western European countries, which was implemented by dedicated institutions. In that period, the focus was on sending workers as well as on taking care of returning ones. As of the late 1970s, after the closure of labour recruitment programs by destination countries such as Germany (see Section above), Turkish authorities changed their strategy: the focus on emigration management turned into diaspora policy (see below). Thus, contemporary emigration from Turkey, which continues, is not seen as a life-threatening phenomenon. It is perceived rather as a welcome promise of remittances and stronger international ties.

Turkey is also among the top senders of asylum seekers to the European Union (41,000 in 2013, over 10,000 of whom are in Germany, mainly of Chechen origin). The Russian government has been slow to deliver policies that could limit this particular outflow (COM 2013: 40). It is worth mentioning that Chechens are not the target group of Russian emigration and diaspora policies.

Turkey has had a different approach to emigration in the 20th century. From the early part of the 20th century’s mass expulsions of non-desired ethnic groups (Greeks, Armenians), it evolved over the next fifty years into a labour-force sending country. It experienced a period of active emigration policy, sending workers abroad in the 1950s and 1960s. The policy then focused on the circulation of the workforce between Turkey and the Western European countries, which was implemented by dedicated institutions. In that period, the focus was on sending workers as well as on taking care of returning ones. As of the late 1970s, after the closure of labour recruitment programs by destination countries such as Germany (see Section above), Turkish authorities changed their strategy: the focus on emigration management turned into diaspora policy (see below). Thus, contemporary emigration from Turkey, which continues, is not seen as a life-threatening phenomenon. It is perceived rather as a welcome promise of remittances and stronger international ties.

Turkey is also a major sender of asylum seekers, many of whom have Kurdish ethnicity (see Section 2 above). This group’s situation in Turkey has had a clear push effect and thus has encouraged emigration. As in the case of the Chechens in Russia, this group is not necessarily a target of emigration and diaspora policies, which at present are quite developed in Turkey. Turkey, however, has had a very recent history of politically-motivated emigration. Some social and political movements which were banned, oppressed, or stigmatized in Turkey, have continued their activities in the
European Union. Different emigration paths have created heterogeneous Turkish migrant communities in the destination country.

The two countries’ current approaches to emigration have several similar features. In both cases, the emigrants go predominantly to the European Union. Mobility policies at the destination are of a particular sort: they are a mix of supranational and national level prerogatives. Short-term mobility (up to 90 days) as well as the rights of residents are regulated by EU laws while long-term mobility and access to the labour market is the domain of individual EU member states. This particular constellation of mobility policies pushed both countries to engage in facilitating the mobility of citizens through both bilateral and EU-level agreements.

On the EU level, Russia and Turkey have negotiated two types of agreements: general agreements governing the countries’ relationship with the EU and specific visa-facilitation agreements.

Table 7. Overview of EU-level agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Association Agreement</th>
<th>Partnership and Cooperation Agreement</th>
<th>Visa-liberalization Agreement</th>
<th>Visa-facilitation Agreement</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Signed in 1963 includes special treatment of Turkish nationals in the EU labour market and with respect to visas</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Under negotiation since 2013</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Signed in 1994, includes special treatment of Russian nationals</td>
<td>Under negotiation in the framework of the Four Common Spaces (currently frozen)</td>
<td>Signed in 2007</td>
<td>Four Common Spaces (signed in 2003) is the policy replacing European Neighbourhood Policy in the Russian case</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the European Union in 1963 (the so-called Ankara Agreement of 1963). The agreement and its protocols gave a broad range of rights to Turkish nationals with respect to the circulation of workers, which enhanced their mobility. These rights have been further elaborated and codified through the rulings of the European Court of Justice – in fact, the cases of Turkish nationals in the area of employment rights have been one of the most crucial for the development of this area. Turkish nationals who are legally employed in an EU member state for four years are not bound by the work permit assigned to one employer, as is the case with other non-

---

17 E.g. judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-1/97 Birden (1998) ECR I-7747; judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-294/06 Payir, 24 January 2008.
EU nationals. The same right is granted when they work for three years in one sector – they can then change employers in that sector. They are also entitled to obtain a working-visa extension if they work in one EU member State for longer than a year. Moreover, a Turkish national legally employed as an *au pair* is recognized as a worker with full rights. Thanks to these special provisions, Turkish nationals have a certain priority of employment before other non-EU nationals. Such ease of employment positively influences mobility and emigration.

Russian nationals do not have such special treatment inscribed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU (of 1994). The only mention of migrant workers is within the context of securing their equal rights with EU workers.

Both countries have special procedures facilitating the entry to the EU (Turkey – on the basis of its Association Agreement, and Russia – its visa facilitation agreement). Both have been negotiating visa liberalisation with the EU (however, in the case of Russia the negotiations have been stopped due to the Ukrainian crisis).

Turkey will be soon part of the EU social security coordination mechanism thanks to its above-mentioned Association Agreement and candidate country status. Russia has secure relevant provisions in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA): family members of Russian workers are entitled to a family allowance and all periods of work by Russian citizens in different EU Member States add up and count towards their seniority.

As regards bilateral relations, currently neither Turkey nor Russia has any active recruitment agreements as countries of origin. Indeed, they are now both major host countries for foreign workers. But bilateral agreements exist regarding issues such as taxation or the portability of rights.

Historically, Turkey has had a number of labour migration agreements with several Western European countries, including Germany (1961), as opposed to the USSR, which did not send the workers to the West. At present neither of the two countries has a functioning bilateral agreement on labour migration with an EU member state in the sense of sending workers abroad. Turkey and Germany, however, signed an agreement on posted workers in 1991 (Section 4). The agreement establishes the rules governing the employment of such workers, including their rights – however, this remains an agreement that only allows temporary postings.

The emigration policies of both countries differ significantly: Turkey represents a more active state, seeking more mobility with more rights for its citizens and being successful in finding the right way to implement this through EU-level agreements and processes. Russia, on the other hand, has been a reluctant emigration player, focusing more on returnees. The differences derive from different historical contexts and different migratory dynamics. Consequently, the two countries have different approaches to diaspora policies.

### 5.2 Diaspora policies

As explained in the Introduction, diaspora policies focus on ties with the population settled abroad. It is important to underline once more here that such policies do not limit themselves to emigrants, but often target also their descendants, who may be already dual citizens.

Both the Russian Federation and Turkey have developed diaspora policies and engaged in diaspora-building activities. The countries are in a sense very similar: both are authoritarian regimes which inherited multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies from which they built a nation, including extraterritorial membership. Their approach to diaspora policies differs, however.

**Russian Federation**

The Russian Federation developed its diaspora policy under Vladimir Putin’s rule. The prevailing ideology of re-building the Russian empire, a sentimental vision of the Soviet past, as well as a perception of Russian identity as inherently Orthodox, conservative, and Russophone influences the
way the diaspora-building is proceeding. The main focus of the policy is the promotion of Russian language and culture among Russian-speaking communities abroad. Ethnicity (e.g. Russian Germans or Russian Jews) is not the primary point of reference. In this logic, the policy concerns the Aussiedler in Germany, for example. Following the same logic, Russian citizenship is not considered an ultimate sign of belonging to the wider Russian community. The first language a person speaks is the marker of belonging.

The general policy framework concerning Russians abroad covers two main directions – the establishment and the maintenance of cultural ties with Russians and Russian-speakers residing all over the world. The term “diaspora” or “emigrant” is never used in policy discourse; instead, the concept of “compatriots” is used. This linguistic choice reflects an idea that all Russian-speakers form a community which has very strong and stable ties with Russia. Importantly enough, these ties are predominantly of a cultural and ideological character. Russia has not been interested in developing diaspora policies with economic or political relevance. Russia is a relative newcomer to diaspora policy and thus the need to create a sense of community through language and culture among various ethnic groups and various types of migrants has been a very important component of its diaspora-building exercise. More utilitarian diaspora-engagement practices, such as economic engagement, are still to follow.

Consequently, the diaspora policies are built first and foremost to communicate the ideological and cultural messages of the Russian government and its institutions. They also promote the idea of return. The policies are framed by four main policy documents: the Foreign Policy Concept,\(^{18}\) Federal Law No. 99 on compatriots abroad,\(^{19}\) Federal Law No. 62 on Russian Federation citizenship,\(^{20}\) and the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No.637.\(^{21}\) The first three define the relationship with Russians and Russian-speakers abroad, while the fourth focuses on the return-to-Russia policy.

The Foreign Policy Concept lays down overall principles of communication with Russians abroad. In fact they are limited to a) the protection of the rights and interests of compatriots living abroad and b) raising the status of the Russian language in the world. Point a) especially has been used in different contexts by Russian authorities, even at times to justify territorial aggression (e.g. annexation of Crimea in 2014).

Federal Law No. 99 on compatriots abroad provides a definition of compatriots and also presents a framework for relations between the Russian Federation and Russians abroad. It defines the basis of the relationship: the protection of human rights of compatriots, possible contributions to the Russian economy, and collaboration in the areas of culture, language, religion, and education.

Federal Law No. 62 on the citizenship of the Russian Federation defines the conditions for obtaining, keeping, and losing Russian citizenship. A recent amendment of this law, adopted after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, introduced a special express path to citizenship for Russian-speakers who do not live on Russian territory, but were born in the post-Soviet countries. Such people get Russian citizenship after they renounce their previous citizenship. Also, as of 1 August 2014, Russian citizens must inform Russian authorities if they have double citizenship – the failure to do so is a criminal offence.

The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 637 lays down the rules for the resettlement of compatriots to the Russian Federation. The resettlement program targets Russians and

---

\(^{18}\) Amended version of 2013.

\(^{19}\) Of 1999.

\(^{20}\) Amended in 2014

\(^{21}\) Of 2006.
Russian-speakers who live in the former Soviet states.\textsuperscript{22} According to the latest census, this group amounts to 18 million people. However if one considers the relatively old average age of persons in this group and their low propensity to move to Russia, only ca. 7 million are potential returnees. Nevertheless, the government has developed official structures, most notably specialized departments in \textit{Rossotrudnichestvo}\textsuperscript{23} and information structures\textsuperscript{24} to implement the program. Currently \textit{Rossotrudnichestvo} has representatives in more than 100 countries, including all countries from where potential returnees originate. Its activities, apart from the popularization of the resettlement program, include the promotion of Russian language and culture among Russians and Russian speakers abroad.

One of the instruments of this promotion is the international broadcasting of TV and radio channels in Russian. The Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communications financially supports the non-commercial partnership “International Association of Russian-language broadcasters” which gathers over 70 radio stations in 29 countries (including Germany).

Interestingly enough, Russian authorities do not officially support the establishment of independent Russian diaspora organizations abroad, giving support instead to existing cultural organisations. They also back the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, seeing it as a useful tool of ideological influence on the diaspora. This policy has a direct impact on associations dealing with migrants originating in Russia. They are predominantly associations promoting Russian culture and language; rarely are they pioneers of integration in the destination country. Some elements of spontaneous peer support can be found through the Orthodox Church, which serves as a meeting and information point for Russian emigrants. In short, the government policy supports high-end cultural diplomacy but neglects day-to-day support for emigrant communities.\textsuperscript{25}

\textit{Turkey}

In the Turkish policy discourse, Turks abroad are not referred to as emigrants, but as “expatriates.” This term, which conveys the notion of belonging to Turkey, is misleading, especially considering the recent history of politically motivated emigration (e.g. after the \textit{coups d’états} and political unrest of the 1980s). It also reflects the primary focus of the diaspora policy – the Turks living in Germany. Germany is the country with the largest Turkish community, which also has difficulties with naturalisation (see Section 4 above).

After a period of diaspora policies in the 1980s and 1990s which focused solely on return and treated the diaspora as an economic resource, since the early 2000s Turkish governments have been engaged in a structured diaspora-building. This policy has two main axes: identity building through religious and cultural activities and support for the institutionalisation of communities abroad. The government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in particular, has put a large emphasis on the last aspect, in hopes that the Turkish diaspora will become one of the three most powerful in the world by the centennial anniversary of the Turkish Republic (i.e. by 2023). The Prime Minister himself has actively supported segmented integration in destination countries, particularly in Germany, and has called

\textsuperscript{22} Persons in this group are not considered “emigrants” by the policy, but rather national minorities outside national borders.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Rossotrudnichestvo} (Russian Collaboration), the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation.

\textsuperscript{24} The work of this program is presented on the internet portal “Russian century”, which is coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available on: http://www.ruvek.ru/?module=pages&action=view&id=13 [Accessed 29 December 2014].

\textsuperscript{25} Events in Ukraine in 2014 unveiled another policy axis: military intervention abroad in cases in which the rights of Russian-speaking minorities are at risk.
assimilation a crime against humanity. Baser (2014) enumerates the following goals of the new policy:

- strengthen political, cultural, and economic ties with the Turks abroad;
- use various mechanisms to promote Turkish culture abroad;
- establish and develop relations with kin and relative communities abroad such as Azeris, Uyghur Turks, Iraqi Turkmens etc.:
- provide support and funding for culture-related activities of Turkish organizations in Europe;
- attract Turkish diaspora entrepreneurs back to Turkey and encourage them to invest in Turkey;
- enhance activities to encourage economic development in Turkey and make it one of the world’s biggest economies.

In order to implement the new policy, a series of institutional solutions has been put in place by Erdogan’s government, coordinated by the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities.

Religious and cultural identity is overseen by several governmental institutions. Religious participation is championed by the Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Affairs. Turkish culture is promoted by the Yunus Emre Institutes, two of which are located in Germany (Berlin and Köln). Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) has also broadened its worldwide coverage.

A particular form of belonging has been established with the introduction of so-called Blue Card (Mavi Kart 2012). This special legal status has been conceived in large part for emigrants and their descendants who are obliged to renounce Turkish citizenship during the naturalisation process in the country of destination. The card gives a wide range of socio-economic rights to its holder and some political rights (excluding voting rights). The General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs is in charge of the implementation of the Blue Card procedures.

The Foreign Relations and Workers Abroad Services General Directorate was founded under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security in 2001 to identify employment opportunities, prepare workforce agreements, and organize inspections of the workplaces established abroad.

The Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities was established in 2010. Its aim is to create economic links with Turkish and kin communities (e.g. Iraqi Turkmens or Azeris). Its activities are business related and intended to strengthen entrepreneurship that is relevant to Turkey in these communities.

Advisory and High Committees for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad monitor and report the challenges faced by Turkish emigrants to the Turkish Parliament.

Interestingly enough, the Turkish government recognizes the benefits of integration (not assimilation) for diaspora engagement. Accordingly, well-integrated citizens are thought to have a greater impact on the home economy and to function as better advocates for the home country than badly integrated ones. The official governmental “Integration and Active Participation Concept” obliges all relevant institutions to work towards the goal of supporting the integration of Turkish nationals abroad. These institutions focus on six main axes of activities:

a. Political participation – encouraging Turkish nationals to actively participate in political life and the civil society of the destination country.


b. Fight against discrimination and Islamophobia – bilateral discussions on the governmental level to counteract these phenomena in a joint manner.

c. Unemployment – encouraging Turkish nationals to learn the language of the host country and participate in continued skills training.

d. Turkish NGOs abroad – encouraging Turkish nationals to establish NGOs in their destination country.

e. Education and Turkish language courses – cooperating with host countries to appoint teachers of Turkish language and culture (currently over 1,700 worldwide), trained in Turkey.

f. Religious support – providing imams to destination countries (currently almost 1,300 worldwide).

It is interesting that the last two points in particular receive considerable support from Turkey. However, they are also the two that are least related to integration outcomes in Germany.

Table 8. Main axis of diaspora policy: the Russian Federation and Turkey compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language and Culture</td>
<td>Governmental network of the Russian Centres for Science and Culture (operated by Rossotrudnichestvo).</td>
<td>Yunus Emre Institutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>No governmental institution; support for the Russian Orthodox Church</td>
<td>Yes, through the Turkish Islamic Association of Religious Affairs [DITIB], present in 17 countries worldwide; over 900 chapters/subsidiary associations in Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organising diaspora (e.g. support for associations)</td>
<td>Yes; support for cultural activities.</td>
<td>Yes; intensive support for all types of activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights for the diaspora</td>
<td>Voting rights for Russian citizens living abroad, including external voting.</td>
<td>Voting rights for Turkish citizens living abroad, including external voting. Limited political rights for Blue Card holders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and social rights in the country of origin for non-citizens and descendants</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (Blue Card)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for returnees</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship of non-residents</td>
<td>Dual citizenship tolerated, but legally allowed only in the case of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. As of 2014 – obligation to inform authorities about possession of another passport.</td>
<td>Dual citizenship allowed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Integration trends of Turkish and Russian migrants in Germany

Integration of the two groups into German society can be measured across the main dimensions of integration. We focus on three dimensions for which the most reliable and robust data has been obtained, both in qualitative surveys and in quantitative data collection. These are: access to citizenship, education, and labour market integration.

6.1 Integration indexes

The final comparison of Turkish and Russian-born migrants in Germany is well illustrated by the integration indexes. As already stated in Section 2, the labour market integration index was developed based on the following indicators:

- Employment rate
- Unemployment rate
- Activity rate
- Over-qualification rate

The education integration index was developed based on the following indicators:

- Highest educational attainment
- School enrolment rate at age 15-25
- School enrolment rate at age 25-35
- % of international students at age 20-24

The citizenship index was developed based on the following indicators:

- Citizenship acquisition rate
- % of naturalised citizens of the total born-abroad population (2013 data)

Figure 5. Integration indexes for Germany-Turkey and Germany-Russia corridors

Source: Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti 2015.
Immigrants born in Russia seem to fare better in each dimension of integration. However, a detailed analysis of the individual indicators can show us a more complex and nuanced picture.

6.2 Integration data compared

Acquisition of citizenship

Naturalisation is one of the most common indicators of integration. It is the moment when immigrants become part of a community and obtain equal rights, but also become bound by equal obligations. The table below illustrates the trends (Table 9) in the cases of Turkish and Russian immigrants in Germany.

Table 9. Citizenship acquisition for non-nationals* in Germany, data for 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Naturalisation, total</th>
<th>Average age in years</th>
<th>Average duration of stay in years</th>
<th>Former citizenship retained</th>
<th>Naturalisation potential utilised**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>27,970</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>4,892 (17.5%)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>2,784</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>898 (32.3%)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total naturalisations in 2013</td>
<td>112,346</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>55,800 (49.7%)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The numbers refer to both the immigrant population born abroad and to children of immigrants born in Germany. Data for Russian nationals excludes ethnic Germans and their families.

** The percentage of people who chose to naturalise out of the total population eligible to naturalise before passing the naturalisation test.

First, it is important to notice that more Turkish immigrants (or their children born in Germany) apply for German citizenship than Russians. This is clearly related to eligibility criteria (see Section 3 above): there are more Turkish migrants who have stayed in Germany for more than 10 years and more young Turks born and brought up in Germany. For the same reasons, the average age of naturalized Turks is much lower than that of Russians. Also, it is clear that the average stay of naturalized Turks is longer, ca. 20 years, which reflects the requirement that young people born in Germany until recently had to choose their citizenship when they reach 23 years of age. As regards dual citizenship, Russian-born migrants (stock) who acquired German citizenship are 85% ethnic Germans. Out of all Russian nationals (not necessarily born in Russia) who are not ethnic Germans and who naturalized in 2013, over one third kept Russian citizenship, even if it was not clearly encouraged by the Russian state; on the contrary, double citizens are treated with suspicion. In contrast, very few Turkish-born migrants hold German citizenship. Out of all Turkish nationals who naturalized in 2013, only 17.5% kept Turkish citizenship, shedding doubts on the effectiveness of the policies of the Turkish government to encourage and promote dual citizenship.

When compared with the data on average naturalizations of the foreign-born, Russian numbers increase drastically, since ethnic Germans are taken into consideration.

Table 10. German nationality among the foreign-born, stocks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Share of foreign-born with the nationality of destination</th>
<th>Share of foreign-born without the nationality of destination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-born</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-born</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German-born</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), wave 2012; Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti 2015.
In the case of access to citizenship, Russian migrants in general have better education indicators than Turkish migrants. They are more likely to be enrolled in school between ages 15-25. They also outperform native Germans in this regard. Russian immigrants are also twice as likely as Turkish immigrants to be enrolled in educational institutions between ages 25-35.

**Figure 7. Education indicators, %**

The same pattern is visible when comparing indicators of the tertiary-educated in the migrant population. Russian migrants tend to have a four-times greater share of tertiary-educated persons than Turkish migrants and a slightly higher share than in the German population.

The differences are related to the education systems in the country of origin: Russia has a higher share of secondary and tertiary-educated persons in its total population than Turkey: in 2011 the share of secondary-educated in Russia and Turkey was 94% to 18%, respectively; and tertiary-educated, 53% to 14% (OECD 2011).

The pattern thus reflects the impact of the country of origin on skill levels. Clearly the Russian score is high here, even when compared to the German population, and in contrast to the Turkish population. Russian migration is clearly a skilled one. However, educational attainment does not entirely translate to better achievements in the labour market.

**Labour market integration**

Contrary to the previous indicators of integration, the labour market outcome of the Russian migrants seems to be more problematic. What comes to light is a clear gap between the migrants (from Turkey and Russia) and the majority group (see Figure 8 and Table 11 below).

In general, Russian immigrants have a higher unemployment rate than Turks. However, due to the fact that women from Russia are more active in the labour market, overall they have a higher share of participation in the labour force than Turks. Still, it is lower than the natives. Russian-born immigrants also have a high over qualification rate, which is the same for Turkish migrants.

If these results could be expected in the case of regular migration flows, in the specific case of Russian-born immigrants, given their relatively high skill levels, they are disappointing. They can be
explained by the specific policies covering ethnic Germans, who entered the country in the 1990s. The unemployment rate for Russian-born immigrants is a consequence of protective welfare policies and an unselective policy that disregards labour matching. As a consequence, the mismatch is so large that the migrants born in Russia cannot make up for it even in the presence of strong performance in other integration measures (high share of naturalizations) or a strong country-of-origin effect (high educational attainment).

Figure 8. Labour market indicators, %

Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), wave 2012; Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti 2015.

Not surprisingly, Russian immigrants have more students among their inactive population than do Turkish migrants. This is related to the fact that on one hand Turkish youth is less represented among students, but on the other – that many Turkish students have some form of employment.

Table 11. Inactivity rates in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Share of students</th>
<th>Share of retired</th>
<th>Share of other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-born</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-born</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German-born</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), wave 2012; Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti 2015.

Interestingly enough, Turkish migrants, although faring worse in educational attainment, manage to occupy skilled positions more often than Russian migrants (see Table 12 below). This can be explained by the fact that Russian women workers migrate more (comprising over 60% of the flow of Russian workers) and suffer the typical gender gap. Also, Russian nationals come as asylum seekers and thus they do not have the opportunity to put their skills to use. Both groups, however, fare worse than natives, as their ratios of higher-skilled employment are nearly four times lower than lower-skilled, while in case of Germans higher-skilled occupations are more often held than lower-skilled.
Table 12. Employment according to skill level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>ORIGIN</th>
<th>Share of employees with occupation ISCO 1, 2 and 3</th>
<th>Share of employees with occupation ISCO from 4 to 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>81.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), wave 2012; Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti 2015.

Also, Russians seem to come to Germany to take jobs in manufacturing more often than the Turks. It is a reverse trend to the guest-worker image of Turkish migrants. Turks tend to work in services more often than Russians (but still less than Germans) – and this can also explain their occupational levels (higher-skilled than Russians).

Table 13. Employment by sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>ORIGIN</th>
<th>% of employed in agriculture</th>
<th>% of employed in manufacturing</th>
<th>% of employed in services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), wave 2012; Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti 2015.

Turkish migrants also have higher dynamics as regards self-employment. They are more often self-employed than Russians and even Germans. This is a well-known adjustment mechanism of ethnic populations to adverse conditions in the labour market. However, it must be kept in mind that we are discussing migrants who decided to open up a business when already in Germany, changing their employment status. New arrivals on self-employment visas are more represented among Russians, who have enough capital to invest (see Section 3 above). Russians, however, are more often employees than the natives – this can be explained by the primary sector of their employment, i.e. manufacturing.

Table 14. Share of self-employment, stocks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>ORIGIN</th>
<th>% of self-employed</th>
<th>% of employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>97.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), wave 2012; Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti 2015.
All in all, the quoted data clearly shows that integration depends primarily on the policies of the destination country and the characteristics of the migrants. It is not clear from this analysis if the policies of the country of origin matter. In fact, the findings show contradictory results.

It seems that the choice of dual citizenship is not merely a combination of two sets of policies: of the country of origin and destination. In the German context, where dual citizenship is allowed only in some exceptional cases, the effects of the citizenship policies of Turkey and Russia have adverse effects, respectively, on the Turkish and Russian nationals naturalized in Germany. There is no positive effect of the Turkish policies that encourage dual citizenship, nor a negative effect of the discouraging policies of Russian government. Turkish nationals seem to follow the German law and opt for mono-nationality, while Russian nationals prefer to disregard both German and Russian regulations to obtain two passports.

As regards educational attainment, the policies of the country of destination might be more relevant. It is true that the country of origin is crucial to shaping the educational context of migration. But it is also true that the country of destination creates conditions for this educational attainment to flourish. For reasons of simple policy intervention, which, for example, supports the education of ethnic Germans more intensely than other migrants, Russian-born immigrants find it easier to attend schools and universities than Turkish nationals.

The labour market is the real test of integration, as it is the key channel of migration and the most important tool for insertion into society. It is true that the specific cases of Turkish and Russian immigrants are quite difficult to compare. On the one hand, at the destination the condition they begin their integration differ not so much according to nationality but as to the category of immigrant who comes (see Section 4). The effect of the country of destination is also important as regards closeness or openness to foreign workers, especially those who are visibly different. On the other hand, the policies of sending countries also focus on some groups and not others: e.g. labour-market related policies designed by the Turkish government, including bilateral agreements, which concern all Turkish nationals, while the policies of the Russian government concern only those Russian-born who are not ethnic-Germans. We can see some level of impact of the country of origin when considering the legal framework for Turkish workers in the EU, and thus also in Germany. It might be that this legal framework improves their labour market outcomes. But there are also some other factors that may influence it, related mainly to the country of destination context (need for specific skills, feminization of some occupations or vice versa, working welfare system) or to migrant characteristics (sex, age, length of stay in the country). The effect of the country of origin can be best discerned when discussing, for instance, the development of transferrable human capital at home (transferable skills), which in the case of Turkish and Russian migrants is proxied here by educational attainment rates at home.

The indicators reflected above show us a story of the limited impact of official policies of the country of origin on the integration of migrants in the destination country. The role of the support measures provided by civil society organizations can shed more light on the role of the communities of origin in bridging the gap.
7. The role of the associations supporting migrants’ integration in Germany

As already explained in Section 2 above, the survey results should be considered purely exploratory, not representative. The answers we received reflect opinions on migrant integration expressed by survey participants and as such cannot be subjected to sophisticated statistical analysis. In this section we will focus on the answers that bear relevance for the main topic of this report, i.e. relations with the countries and communities of origin.

Thirty-seven organisations catering for the needs of Turkish immigrants in Germany answered the survey compared with 17 that were helping Russian immigrants. In both cases these were mainly associations: 73% in the Turkish case and 85% in the Russian case. Most answers came from medium-large organizations helping between 151 and 601 migrants a year, and from large organizations assisting over 601 migrants a year.

The organizations admitted to operating in various domains of integration: in the case of associations supporting Turkish immigrants, the main areas were political participation, education, labour market integration, and language support. In the case of organizations working with Russian immigrants, the main domains of intervention were language support, social interactions, and education. No Russian-oriented organization surveyed worked on religion, compared with 12 organizations that worked with Turkish migrants in this area.

Figure 9. Main domains of activity of organisations supporting migrants from Russia and Turkey, compared

Source: INTERACT Survey results.

We will now trace the answers received the survey questionnaires that were most popular among respondents. These focused primarily on the three main dimensions discussed in the previous statistical section.

Labour market integration

Turkish migrants receive support in labour market integration mainly in the form of job matching. Associations offer information about vacancies open to Turkish migrants in Germany and in this sense complement the German state employment services. They also offer information about the legal framework in Germany, which helps migrants navigate the institutional framework of the country. In
addition, they get involved in training support for job seekers. Interestingly enough, organizations working with Turkish migrants seemed to be more specialized than those working with Russian migrants. However in both cases, the vast majority stated that the biggest impact they have on integration outcomes is, in fact, finding a job for a migrant at their destination. They also very occasionally work on bridging country of origin and destination work experience, e.g. by promoting skill-matching or recognition of qualifications obtained in the home country.

**Figure 10. Main type of activity in the area of labour market integration of organisations supporting migrants Russia and Turkey, compared**

The respondents widely agreed that the policies and support of the country of origin governments have negligible impacts on the employability of migrants abroad (this was very clear in the case of Russian migrants). Slightly more importance was given to the work of associations in the country of origin, presumably due to their support for migrant worker rights. Interestingly enough, pre-departure programs were not considered relevant by associations working with Turkish migrants but were deemed more important by those working with Russian migrants. This might reflect the character of migration: the majority of Turkish immigrants do not have access to pre-departure programs, while some portion of Russian migrants migrate as ethnic Germans, with pre-departure support that organizations knew about.

**Language**

Communities of origin have a clear impact on language acquisition among the children of immigrants. Kinship, visits to Turkey or Russia, media, and cultural activities all enhance non-German language skills. According to the respondents, more Russian-speaking than Turkish-speaking children learn the language of their country of origin through foreign language schools. Turkish seems to be more often
spread by interactions with community of origin, while in the case of Russian it is more institutionalized. In both cases, the country-of-origin sponsored schools seem to have very limited effect on language acquisition for a simple reason: there are no such Turkish or Russian schools in Germany. However, participation in activities organized by other dedicated associations that are sponsored by the country of origin (e.g. cultural institutes) seems to have a large impact on language skills.

The language of the country of origin is also a needed skill that helps migrants establish themselves in the labour market. They use it in several sectors of commercial activity, most prominently as teachers and translators/interpreters. Turkish and Russian is also frequently used in tourism and in multinational companies. In all these cases this use was more relevant for Russian-speakers than for Turkish speakers. Turkish seems to be used more frequently in cultural activities and in the places of worship.

This duality reflects the different status of Russian language versus Turkish, the former being the language of a European economic powerhouse and the *lingua franca* of over 250 million people east of the EU border, while the latter is still viewed as a non-European language enclosed in an ethnic enclave, only recently elevated by international economic interests to commercial use by the country of destination. As regards support by the origin country, Russian has for decades been taught and promoted by Soviet and Russian governments, while Turkish language learning has only very recently been supported by the Turkish government.

**Social interaction**

Organizations working with Russian migrants have a conservative profile with respect to their focus on the country of destination. They organize a limited number of Russian cultural activities, primarily events in Germany for the members of the local diaspora. To a lesser extent they do organize activities such as trips and cultural tours for migrants and German nationals together (but when they do, it is mostly for ethnic Germans coming from Russia). On the contrary, organizations supporting Turkish migrants social interactions, offer a whole array of activities, ranging from events in Germany to mentoring programmes. These organizations reported activities that attempted to bring German nationals and immigrants together.

When asked about the extent to which policies relating to social life and implemented by the country of origin impact integration outcomes in Germany, our respondents chose to differ. Russian-oriented organisations praised the Russian government’s efforts and saw its engagement as positive or at most ambiguous. Turkish-oriented associations see the engagement of the Turkish government in this domain as having purely negative effects. This knowing that 30% of these respondents were not aware of any relevant policies in this field. This can be however explained by the fact that many organisations working on social interactions are not strictly speaking “migrant associations” and thus do not necessarily focus on Turkish migrants only. Thus they do not pay a lot of attention to the Turkish state priorities and initiatives.

**Political Participation**

The different role organizations play in this domain is striking. The respondents helping Russian migrants rarely get involved in this domain of integration in the first place. When they do, they tend to support their clients in a rather narrow area, i.e. giving information about the political rights of migrants in the destination country. By contrast, Turkish migrants have wide support to exercise their political rights in various ways: the associations provide information about political participation rights both at the destination and origin; the associations get involved in organizing external voting for migrants (i.e. voting in Turkish elections in Germany); they also support immigrants in electoral campaigns in German elections. To a lesser extent they engage in lobbying activities in the country of destination. It is important to note, however, that the majority of their activities support formal political and civic participation.
Both types of organizations rarely support activities in the countries of origin, either with funding or political action. Also, respondents working with Turkish migrants do not generally collaborate with any well-defined political force in Germany, while those working with Russian migrants do. However, some specific activities are in fact implemented in collaboration with both German and Turkish civil society organizations, and to a lesser extent with governmental bodies and political forces. In the case of the Russian-oriented associations, the element of cooperation with the country of origin is almost absolutely absent.

It is notable that the respondents to the survey clearly expressed the view that the civic and political participation of migrants in the country of destination has a positive impact on their integration across various dimensions. Active citizenship beyond one’s group seems to be the best way forward towards integration: it builds social ties and networks and provides immigrants with a sense of attachment.

**Access to nationality**

Turkish and Russian passports carry different weight in the world and in the European Union. They also are attached to two legal frameworks that mutually reinforce each other. Organisations supporting Russian migrants have not answered this questionnaire. The Turkish-oriented ones did answer, but unfortunately not in large numbers. Those who answered told us that the main reason that Turks keep their passports is to have the opportunity to vote in Turkey and to keep their property rights. All other reasons are secondary. It is notable that the Turkish passport was not seen as an asset in Germany.

**Residential integration**

Establishing one’s home in a place is an important indicator of integration. Organisations tend to support immigrants in their quest for housing, but mainly through advice. This advice is needed, since immigrants largely invest in housing from their own private means. They either have savings or sell real estate in the country of origin to boost their chances of obtaining a place to live. In fact, Turkish migrants seem to rely more on individual support than Russian migrants, who sometimes get support from their community in their hometown (private loans). In both cases, neither the country of origin and its financial institutions nor the country of destination and its financial institutions have any visible impact on home ownership among migrants.

It is also important to note that in the case of Turkish migrants, the Turkish state and Turkish institutions (public and private) are seen as actively shaping migrant neighbourhoods, e.g. through the establishment of mosques, consulates, cultural centres, or schools. This interference is not seen positively by many of the respondents to our survey.
8. Main conclusions

In this report we have attempted a comparative analysis of two corridors: Germany-Turkey and Germany-Russia. The migrating groups have different characteristics: while Turkish migrants used to be guest workers in Germany, at present they come as family members. Migrants from Russia, on the other hand, arrived as ethnic Germans and their families until 2006. Both groups also have an important refugee subgroup: Kurdish for Turkey (in the 1980s) and Chechens for Russia (since 1990s). The difference in the characteristics of flows is reflected in the different characteristics of stocks, as each group has been subject to a different policy, including different rights and obligations. In fact, the structural and policy factors at the destination are the key elements that influence the success of integration or failure of migrants.

The impact of the country of origin, understood as policies and practices targeting diaspora for better integration, is negligible so far. The diaspora policies, at least in the case of Turkey and Russia, do not support integration. On the contrary, they aim at re-focusing migrants’ attention back to the country of origin. This policy can have positive ramifications for integration outcomes, e.g. when it supports Turkish migrants’ cross-border business activities or enhances Russian-language proficiency among the diaspora so that they can later on use it in international business environment.

As the above experiences of Turkish and Russian immigrants in Germany indisputably show, the main impact of the country of origin lies in the human capital the person brings to the destination. This conclusion may be a cliché, but it needs to be repeated: overall, the better the conditions in the country of origin and the better the position of the migrant at the point of departure, the better integration outcomes are upon arrival.

We should not think, however, that we face a predetermined outcome when the conditions at departure and arrival are not that favourable for a migrant. As our report shows, there is an important group of actors on various levels of governance that work to improve the final outcome. In the case of migrant organizations and organizations helping migrants in Germany, they form an additional arm of integration policy. Being close to migrants and having intimate knowledge of their integration needs, they focus on topics and fields of action that are most relevant for a successful migration story. They also form the most tangible bridge between the origin and destination. As we observed, however, not many of them actually use the support of the country for origin in their pro-integration work, e.g. the funding for integration measures comes from the destination country, while the country of origin usually focuses on home-bound skills and activities. None of the organizations have advocated for a pre-departure training of migrants and there is no evidence of pre-departure support given in the country of origin. But as we already observed, many activities may have unaccounted-for consequences, such as using the skills that are relevant for the country of origin to build a better employment future in the country of destination.
Bibliography


Michalowski, I. 2011. Required to assimilate? The content of citizenship tests in five countries. *Citizenship Studies*, 15, nos. 6-7: 749-768.


