Corridor Report on Belgium
The case of Moroccan and Turkish Immigrants

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INTERACT Research Report 2015/03
INTERACT
Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process -
Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of
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The case of Moroccan and Turkish Immigrants

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INTERACT - Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

In 2013 (Jan. 1\textsuperscript{st}), around 34 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) were currently living in the European Union (EU), representing 7\% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a passive, process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working together to build a cohesive society.

Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: first, where they come and second, where they now live. While integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants interact with their home country.

INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to support their rights).

INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued by EU member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way?

A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done.

INTERACT is co-financed by the European Union and is implemented by a consortium built by CEDEM, UPF and MPI Europe.

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Abstract

This report compares two important corridor migrations to Belgium in order to better understand the variation in several dimensions of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants’ integration – in particular, labour market, education and citizenship. It is based on an original methodology combining three different data sources (an analysis of the legal and political frameworks, a quantitative analysis, and a survey). It aims to test the INTERACT project’s main hypothesis which conceives of integration as a three-way process. This report provides insight on integration from the immigration country perspective but also from the countries of origin; it appraises the impact that Turkey and Morocco may have on the integration of their migrants in Belgium. The main findings are the following. Firstly, the countries of origin may have an impact on integration when emigration starts. Secondly, countries of origin may have a positive or negative impact on some integration dimensions (citizenship) but no obvious impact on others (education and labour market). In their efforts to maintain and develop links and to protect migrants’ rights abroad, countries of origin can thus facilitate integration, but indirectly.

Key words: Belgium, Turkey, Morocco, diaspora, immigration, integration, Turks, Moroccans

Acknowledgments

We are grateful for helpful comments from Agnieszka Weinar, Anne Unterreiner and Sona Kalantaryan on earlier drafts of this paper.
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1. Introduction

1.1 Migration and integration trends in Belgium

Belgium has been an immigration country since the 1920s onwards. At present, the country has a total population of 11,099,554, approximately 10.76% of which are migrants.\(^1\) The larger numbers of migrants (more than half) are from European member states, especially Italy, France and the Netherlands. The largest migrants groups in the non-EU foreign population, however, are the Moroccans (83,271) and Turks (37,989).\(^2\) Since the beginning of the 2000s, the influx of Moroccan and Turkish migrants has been proportionally smaller than the percentages of these nationalities in the existing population (Martiniello at al. 2010). Moroccans and Turks are diversely settled in the three federated regions of Belgium. The latter are more numerous in Flanders, whereas the Moroccans live mainly in the Brussels-Capital Region even though their numbers have decreased overall since 2002 (Martiniello and Rea 2002; Martiniello et al. 2010).

Belgium had internal labour migration before World War II, in particular from Flanders to Wallonia. Immigrants also came from neighbouring countries to work in Belgium. At that time, immigration was hardly regulated and immigrants arrived somewhat spontaneously. In 1946, Belgium started an active immigration policy by signing a bilateral agreement with Italy in order to recruit temporary migrant workers for its coal mines. After a serious accident which caused the death of many miners, mostly Italians, the Italian government decided to stop emigration to Belgium and put an end to the agreement. In order to respond to employer demand, the Belgian government signed new agreements with other countries from Southern Europe. In contrast with other European countries such as the United Kingdom, Belgium never opted to recruit migrant workers in its former colonies in Africa (Lesthaeghe 2000: 4). In the 1960s, other agreements were signed beyond Europe, in particular with Morocco and Turkey. The mid-1970s oil crisis led Belgium and other European countries to stop active recruitment of low-skilled workers. However, immigration continued through the right of family reunification which was granted to the migrant workers who opted to settle in Belgium. Turks and Moroccans are the first major Muslim groups to immigrate to Belgium. In 1974, Belgium became the first European country to officially recognize Islam (Khoojinian 2004: 114). This recognition is important because it permits financing for Islamic worship and the organization of Islamic courses in public schools.

Given the permanent character of this immigration, which had been originally been thought to be temporary, the Belgian government began to develop a policy in the 1980s that was oriented towards these immigrants in order to encourage their integration into society (Wets 2006: 93). It set up the Aliens Law of 15 December 1980 (a law regulating the access to the territory, the sojourn, the settlement and the removal of foreigners). Belgium was also among the first signatories of the Schengen Convention in 1985 and modified its immigration law accordingly. Since the mid-1980s, Belgium experienced a new phase of growing migration, a trend common to other European countries (Martiniello et al. 2010). Moreover, another category of migrants came into the foreground at the end of the 1980s and gained importance throughout the 1990s, namely asylum seekers (Bousetta, Gsir, and

\(^1\) Population on 1 January 2013 – 1,195,122 foreigners – source: National Register and General Direction of National Statistics (Vause 2014: 94). In this report, we mainly use the term “migrant”, in keeping with the INTERACT project’s focus on first generation migrants. However, Belgian statistics all refer to foreign nationality rather than migration. For instance, the percentage 10.76 refers to foreign nationals generally; many are first generation migrants, but some can also be second generation. Moreover, this figure does not include immigrants who became Belgian by naturalisation.

\(^2\) As mentioned in the previous note, these figures refer to Moroccan and Turkish nationals on 1 January 2013 (National Register and General direction of National Statistics).
Coming mainly from Eastern Europe but also from Africa and Asia, asylum seekers and refugees contributed to the diversification of the Belgian migration landscape. From the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s, immigration trends show the arrival of some important new streams from countries such as Poland, Romania, China and India (Martiniello et al. 2010). Family reunification and asylum have been the main motives of immigration to Belgium in the last decades. Others have consistently been student migration and work migration (legal migration for skilled and particularly for highly skilled workers and irregular migration for low-skilled migrant workers).

Since the beginning of the 2000s, Belgium has also constantly readjusted its immigration and asylum policy according to European laws on immigration and asylum. The 6th institutional reform of the Belgian state provides for the transfer of migration competencies such as labour migration from the federal level to the communities and regions, which are able to develop their specific policies. The regions set their own migration criteria for access to their specific labour markets, while the issuance of residence permits remains a federal responsibility. Finally, migration, integration and asylum issues have remained high in the political agenda during all these years.

In the last decade, Belgian migration law has been modified with regard to specific objectives such as combating the fraudulent misuse of the right to family reunion and procedures for international protection and humanitarian regularizations; combating forced marriage; and accelerating the asylum procedure and promoting the voluntary return of migrants (EMN 2014). Accordingly, various measures have been implemented. The most important for Moroccan and Turkish migration are those related to family migration, such as the new Law on family reunitification from 8 July 2011, which entered into force on 22 September 2011. This law introduced an income requirement for the sponsor in Belgium who wants to be joined by his/her family. In order to fight misuse of family reunification, which could abuse the legal and social protection system, in 2013 the Belgian government also adopted measures targeting marriages and legal cohabitations of convenience (ibidem). These strong measures have been accompanied by an information and awareness campaign against forced marriage. The migrant groups who were particularly targeted have been Moroccans and Turks, as well as Algerians and Tunisians. Moroccan and Turkish migrants are also concerned about the law of 4 December 2012 which modifies the Belgian nationality code, and which entered into force on 1 January 2013. Indeed, this law provides stricter conditions for access to nationality. Among other things, foreigners must know a national language and must be integrated.

In Belgium, integration policies are the purview of the federated entities. Flanders (both the merged region and community governments), the Walloon region and the Brussels-Capital Region have each developed their own integration policy according to their debates and objectives regarding the management of cultural diversity. Moroccan and Turkish migrants were the first migrants targeted by these policies. For several years, Flanders has had a compulsory integration programme targeting newcomers. More recently, two other regions have also developed integration programmes for new migrants but without obligations. New Moroccan and Turkish migrants are thus differently affected by integration programmes, depending on the region in which they settle.

1.2 Methodology and report structure

The objective of this report is to compare important corridor migrations to Belgium in order to better understand the variation regarding several dimensions of immigrant integration. A corridor means a pair of countries: one origin and one destination. Here, the two countries of origin are Morocco and Turkey. The proposed approach allowed us to compare both corridors to a common destination, Belgium, and to analyse the impact of Turkey and Morocco on the integration of their migrants in Belgium. This report provides insight on integration from the immigration-country perspective but also from the countries of origin. The main hypothesis of INTERACT is to conceive of integration as a three-way process and to see how countries of origin may influence the integration of emigrants in the country of destination. This report thus tries to understand the impact of emigration and particularly
the diaspora policies of Morocco and Turkey on the integration of Moroccan and Turkish migrants in Belgium.

The report is based on three different data sources (data triangulation): an analysis of the legal and political frameworks; a quantitative analysis; and a survey. The analysis of the legal and analytical frameworks was divided by country of origin and destination. In the countries of destination (EU28), the integration policy framework has been analysed; in the countries of origin (55 non-EU countries), emigration and diaspora policy frameworks have been scrutinized. The main questions asked concerned main stakeholders, policy actors, policy discourses and legal frameworks. For the quantitative analysis, a synthetic index of integration was built. It allows a comparison of the level of integration of migrants in EU Member States by dimension and by migration corridor. To this end, a set of integration indicators were identified for each dimension, drawing on relevant national datasets. Using the Principal Component Analysis technique, the number of these indicators was reduced and replaced with a smaller number of new variables. These new variables (principal components) explain the maximum amount of variation among the performances of different immigration corridors, considering the three domains separately. On this basis, a synthetic index that allows the ranking of the immigrant corridors within each dimension was created. The main indicators used to build up the main three indexes were:

Labour market integration index

- Employment rate
- Unemployment rate
- Activity rate
- Over-qualification rate

Education integration index

- Highest educational attainment
- School enrolment rate at ages 15-25
- School enrolment rate at ages 25-35
- Percentage of international students at ages 20-24

Citizenship integration index

- Citizenship acquisition rate
- Percentage of naturalised citizens of the total born-abroad population (2013 data)

The indexes rank the corridors based on the level of integration by assigning numbers from 0 to 1. The higher the rank, the better the integration. In the corridor reports, the index is calculated without taking into account the gap between migrants and natives. It should be interpreted whereby the higher the index, the better the performance of that corridor compared to the other corridors (Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan, and Bonfanti 2015).

The INTERACT survey was an exploratory survey conducted between December 2013 and September 2014. The survey targeted civil society organisations working in eighty-two countries (twenty-eight EU countries of destination and fifty-four countries of origin with more than 100,000 migrants residing in the EU). Any organisation dealing with migrant integration in one of the eight dimensions (labour market, education, language, social interactions, religion, political and civic participation, nationality issues, housing) could take part in the survey. Respondents could choose between one and three integration dimensions in which their organisation was active. The survey was translated into twenty-eight languages and over 900 responses were collected online and over the
phone. Although the exploratory character of the survey does not allow one to make generalisations about the whole population of civil society organisations, it sheds light onto how these actors’ activities impact migrant integration between the origin and destination. However, the survey does much more than just map these activities in the comparative context. It also shows how organisations perceive states of origin and their policies in the context of the day-to-day reality of incorporating migrants into the receiving society. In this report, only information pertaining to Moroccan and Turkish migrants in Belgium is presented.3

The first part of the report provides an overview of Moroccan and Turkish migration into Belgium since the signature, fifty years ago, of the bilateral agreements first between Belgium and the Kingdom of Morocco and second, between Belgium and the Republic of Turkey. Temporary labour migration and first family-migration characterized the period of 1960-1974. The following period from 1975 onwards is characterized by family migrations and other migrations. In the second part of the report, the legal and political frameworks of both countries of origin and the country of destination are scrutinized. Belgian integration policies are described according to the level of authority on which they depend (federal state, region or community). Then emigration and diaspora policies implemented by Morocco and Turkey are examined. The third part explores the integration trends of Turkish and Moroccan migrants in Belgium along several dimensions of integration: labour market, education, citizenship and civic and political participation, and housing. This part is based on the INTERACT quantitative analysis (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015) and also on the available literature. The next part aims to explain the factors of the integration trends. In the final section, some conclusions are sketched regarding the impact of Morocco and Turkey on the integration of their emigrants in Belgium.

2. Immigration trends of Moroccans and Turkish people into Belgium

2.1 Temporary labour migration and first family-migration (1960-1974)

The organized migration of Moroccans and Turks to Belgium dates back fifty years to the signature of bilateral agreements between Belgium and Morocco on 17 February 1964 and then with Turkey on 17 July 1964 (Moniteur belge 1977a; 1977b). Since the end of World War II, Belgium had a critical need for manpower to rebuild the country and in particular, to work in the coal mines. After the recruitment of Italian workers in the immediate post-war period, followed by Spaniards and Greeks, Belgian authorities continued to look after new migrant workers. In the beginning of the 1960s, Belgium was in an economic boom and a tight labour market. The Belgian authorities became lax about the implementation of the 1936 law (Martens 2004: 252).4 This law required employers to get an employment authorization based on national worker-shortages, and required foreign nationals to obtain a labour permit prior to working and on the basis of which a sojourn permit might be granted (ibidem). At that time, Belgian authorities tolerated a form of irregular immigration by Moroccans and then later Turks, who spontaneously came to work without prior authorization. The employers, in particular the coal federation Fédéchar, pressured the government for a sufficient labour force to insure coal production. At the same time, estimates of the population decline in the Wallonia region, according to the Sauvy and Delpérée Reports published in 1962, encouraged the Belgian authorities to try to organize a massive recruitment of workers beyond Southern Europe. The two new bilateral agreements helped to frame the immigration of workers and their families from Morocco and Turkey.

However, it would be wrong to think that Moroccan and Turkish immigration started exactly after the signing of these agreements. Actually, they had already begun in the early 1960s, due to the high demand for labour in European industries – and in particularly in Belgium, in the coal mines – but also

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3 For more information, please refer to the forthcoming INTERACT survey report.

4 The Royal Decree n°285 of 31 March 1936.
due to socio-economic and political developments in Morocco and Turkey. The fact that the authorities of the countries of origin supported emigration cannot be neglected (Lievens 1999). Moroccan authorities had contacted the Belgian government to propose Moroccan workers for Belgian coal mines as early as 1957 (Frennet-De Keyser 2004b: 216). Turkey, with its surplus of labour linked to the mechanization of agricultural work, had already signed a bilateral agreement with Germany in 1961 to allow migration (Bayar, Ertorun, and Kisacik 2004). In 1963, the Turkish government established a five-year plan to facilitate emigration to other countries (*ibidem*). Morocco also sought to facilitate emigration from some underdeveloped rural areas such as the Rif, where the lack of resources had led the population to revolt (Aziza 2004). In that case, encouraging emigration was due to both economic and political reasons as the population of these areas were mainly Berbers, who had a difficult relationship with the dominant Arab-speaking population (Lesthaeghe 2000:19).

The Moroccan presence in Belgium pre-dated Turkish immigration. Aside from the turn of the century when Moroccans were asked to take part in World War I, there had also been a circulation of Moroccan workers between the French coal mines and the Belgian coal mines of Borinage and the Liège region (Bare 2004) since 1920. During World War II, Moroccan soldiers took part in battles in Belgium such as the Battle of Gembloux (Atouf 2004). In 1960, there were 461 Moroccans in Belgium (Schoonvaere 2013). Immigration increased due to favourable economic conditions. In the 1960s, in addition to workers, some Moroccan opponents to the Moroccan regime found asylum in Belgium. Thus in the early 1960s, a spontaneous and individual Moroccan labour immigration had already begun, given the laissez-faire policies of the Belgian authorities. The bilateral convention established with Morocco is based on the model of previous bilateral agreements that Belgium signed with Italy, Spain and Greece. In the agreement with Morocco, however, the costs of transportation of migrant workers is born by the employers instead of the Belgian state. The primary aim of the bilateral convention was to supervise and accelerate immigration. However, according to some, the majority of Moroccans kept coming to Belgium spontaneously rather than through the organized recruitment channels (Frennet-De Keyser 2004b).

Turkish immigration began in Europe in the early 1960s, and in Belgium, in 1963 with the development of a spontaneous immigration of individual workers from certain Turkish cities (Bayar 1992; Schoonvaere 2013). Turkish emigration is related to the modernization of agriculture that pushed many rural people onto the roads of internal migration. Once in the Turkish cities, some of these migrants then travelled to Western Europe and particularly to Germany which had set up a system of guest workers with Turkey beginning in 1961 (Wets 2006: 85). Since the 1960s, the Turkish government organized emigration and established an Office of Labour and Recruitment of Workers (*ibidem*). In addition to this official channel of emigration, some Turks migrated with the support of relatives or co-villagers who preceded them. In July 1964, a bilateral agreement was signed between Turkey and Belgium in order to organize the recruitment of Turkish migrant workers. This agreement seems to be similar to the Moroccan agreement, however it is different. The agreement organized Turkish immigration to the Belgian mining industry with quotas (Khoojinian 2007: 19). The agreement was negotiated by both Belgian and Turkish authorities and it is more complex than the Moroccan one because it has a protocol relating to various social aspects of the life of Turkish immigrants. For instance, this protocol included some provisions regarding access to social housing (art. 7). In addition, the agreement signed with Turkey allowed the grouping of dependent parents if the Turkish migrant could prove particular circumstances and support for the parents (Nys 2002: 335).

The immigration policy implemented in Belgium via the 1964 bilateral agreements to attract migrant workers as well as the continued tolerance of irregular immigration was influenced by factors internal to Belgium (by a population decline and labour demand in certain economic sectors) as well as by external factors such as competition with neighbouring countries for a foreign labour force. The

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5 This was not the case for the agreement with Morocco, which would be completed by a technical cooperation agreement in 1965 and a social security agreement in 1968.
bilateral agreements particularly aimed to attract Moroccan and Turkish workers to Belgium. That is why unlike the bilateral agreements of this type established by neighbouring countries such as France or Germany, they included specific provisions to attract and stabilize Moroccan and Turkish workers in Belgium. These attractive conditions consisted of opportunities for family reunification after three months of work for Moroccans and after just one month for Turks, and the provision of adequate housing (Gsir and Meireman 2005: 5). Family life was presented as suitable for the well-being of workers; it was considered a means to keep the workers in Belgium as well as a way of resolving the demographic decline. Since 1964, Belgian authorities, in collaboration with employers, have invited Moroccan and Turkish workers to come and live in Belgium with their families. An additional measure was implemented to facilitate family reunification. In 1965, a Royal Decree allowed the reimbursement of half of the travel expenses of a Moroccan wife who joined her husband with their minor children, provided that the latter were at least three years old (Frennet-De Keyser 2004a). From 1964, 10% of Turkish migrants were women. This proportion grew yearly to reach 35% in 1966 (Schoonvaere 2013: 34). Finally, with these two bilateral agreements, the Belgian authorities aimed not only to attract a labour force (Turkish and Moroccan migrant workers) but also to ensure the reproduction of the labour force (Turkish and Moroccan migrant women) (Ouali 2004a: 27).

These bilateral agreements framed an important part of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the 1960s. However, individual Moroccan and Turkish migrants continued to arrive in Belgium as before the agreements. Coming as “tourists” when there were shortages, they were welcomed to work because they were cheaper and could obtain work permits afterwards. These migrants came directly from Morocco and Turkey, but not exclusively; some of them came from France or other neighbouring countries. In addition, Moroccan workers in Belgium were also poached by German and Dutch firms (Frennet-De Keyser 2004b: 237).

Moroccan and Turkish migrant workers were first employed in the coal mines, but not exclusively. Both bilateral agreements pertained to extractive industries as well as to other employment sectors: metallurgy, foundry and construction. The work in these sectors was characterized as hard, dangerous and painful. Beside the mining industries, the main sectors of employment were the metal industry and construction but also increasingly tertiary sectors such as transport and services (Lesthaeghe 2000: 4). Both Moroccan and Turkish migrant workers could obtain a work permit unrestricted to particular sectors after three consecutive working years, provided they were with their family (otherwise it was after five years).

As soon as these bilateral conventions were signed, the needs for workers in the coal mines progressively diminished. In the following years, deteriorating economic conditions and increased unemployment led to a progressive policy of changes: first, less flexibility regarding spontaneous migration and second, no new working permits issued in a time of high unemployment and a reinforced law on migrant workers (Schoonvaere 2013: 34). These restrictive measures drastically reduced Moroccan and Turkish labour immigration in 1965 and 1966 (ibidem). Nevertheless, clandestine immigration kept going on. From 1969 to 1974, one can again observe spontaneous Turkish immigration for jobs in the wood industry in South Belgium and in construction (Bayar et al. 2004). Due to the economic recession, in August 1974 the Belgian government decided to stop all active recruitment of migrant workers. Simultaneously, an amnesty to regularize irregular migrant workers was organized the same year. Around 8,420 applications, mostly from Moroccan and Turkish migrants, were submitted and 7,448 were accepted (EMN 2005: 106).
2.2 Family migration and other migrations (1975-2014)

Figure 1. Immigration flows from Morocco and Turkey to Belgium (1991-2011)

Sources: Vause 2014; Perrin and Schoonvaere 2011; SOPEMI 1999.

After the official closure of labour migration, Turkish and Moroccan immigrant workers settled in Belgium, joined by their spouses and minor children or sometimes by their dependent parents, in the case of Turks. This period of family reunification for the first generation of Turkish and Moroccan migrant workers lasted until the mid-1980s. Afterwards, a period of family formation or marriage migration began. Turkish and Moroccan immigrants married a spouse in Turkey or Morocco, who then also immigrated to Belgium. The number of Moroccan and Turkish women increased during this period of major family reunification.

During the last three decades, Turkish immigration tended to grow yearly even though this was not the case in several particular years (1988, 1994, 1997) (Schoonvaere 2013: 37). Moreover, Moroccans and Turks are the two nationalities in Belgium receiving the highest numbers of sojourn permits for family reunification reasons (Lodewycks et al. 2011: 23). The next figure provides an overview of Moroccan and Turkish entries for family reasons from 2008 to 2013. In comparison with other foreigners in Belgium, Turks and Moroccans mainly enter Belgium for family reasons; in 2011, they received 65% and 71% of these kinds of sojourn permits, respectively (Vause 2014: 62). In 2008, Moroccan and Turkish migrants represented 40% of the total number of migrants admitted in Belgium for family reasons. Nevertheless, they progressively diminished and in 2013 represented only 23% of the migrants admitted for family reasons.
Since the end of the 2000s, a new type of family migration has been the arrival of old Turkish people who have joined their children living in Belgium (Manço 2012: 3). The bilateral agreement signed with Turkey in 1964 provided an article allowing family reunification for dependent parents.

While most immigrants during this long period came from Turkey and Morocco through family reunification, others also came as workers, students, asylum seekers, irregular migrants or as persons who overstayed their visa and became clandestine. The tables below give an overview of the different categories of inflows in the last years. The numbers of both Turkish and Moroccan highly skilled workers has risen. From 2010, some Moroccan and Turkish researchers were also admitted but in the table 1 they are included in the numbers of highly skilled workers. Residence permits are granted for other remunerated activities. Finally, Moroccan and Turkish workers who received a first sojourn-permit for work represent, on average, 7% of the migrants admitted in Belgium for work.

Table 1. Sojourn permit for work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Total (M &amp; T)</th>
<th>Total (all foreigners)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HQ/R</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Tot.</td>
<td>HQ/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. HQ/R = highly qualified workers and researchers; O = other remunerated activities.
Source: Eurostat 2014.

The number of Moroccan and Turkish students is more fluctuant during this period and in particular declines for Moroccans. Moroccan and Turkish students represented around 15% of the total number.
of foreigners admitted for education purposes in 2008. However, this figure has declined to less than 10% in the last couple of years.

Table 2. Sojourn permit for studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Total (M &amp; T)</th>
<th>Total (all foreigners)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>6,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>7,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>5,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>5,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>5,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>5,902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat 2014.

In contrast with other motives for migration, asylum claims from Turkish people are twelve times more likely than from Moroccans, as shown by the following graph. The main reason is that they include Kurdish people from Turkey, who are fleeing political persecution in Turkey or conflicts between the Turks and Kurds.

Figure 3. Asylum claims of Moroccans and Turks in Belgium between 1988-2013

Source: EMN 2012 (Immigration Office); Eurostat 2008-2013.
The Table 3 below presents the number of sojourn permits granted to Moroccans and Turks from 2008 to 2013, mainly for humanitarian reasons: refugee status, international protection, subsidiary protection and also for unspecified reasons.

### Table 3. Sojourn permit for other reasons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total (M &amp; T)</th>
<th>Total (all foreigners)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>SIP</td>
<td>Res.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>418</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,280</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>439</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>869</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: SIP = Status of International Protection, refugee, subsidiary protection, other humanitarian reasons; Res. = residence only; unsp. = unspecified reason.
Source: Eurostat 2014.

Figures regarding irregular migrants are always difficult to establish. During the period 1998-2004, 10,560 Moroccan and 5,856 Turkish migrants were intercepted because they were “illegal” immigrants or asylum seekers (whether or not their application was subsequently rejected) (EMN 2005: 33). During the regularization campaign of January 2000 (the law dates from 22 December 1999), of the 37,152 applications (concerning around 50,000 migrants), 4.7% of applications were from Turks and 14.5% from Moroccans (EMN 2005: 105).

Finally, prospective trends regarding emigration from Turkey to the European Union indicate that at least two dynamics are at stake: one focusing on labour migration needs in relation to the European demographic decline, and the other, on Turkish needs to modernize its economy from the perspective of adhesion to European Union (Akagul 2008: 334). In the case of Morocco, the first dynamics is also at stake.

### 3. Institutional and policy framework

#### 3.1 Integration policies in Belgium

The bilateral agreements with Morocco and Turkey included some elements regarding the integration of Moroccan and Turkish migrant workers in Belgium. Nevertheless, the employers rather than the Belgian state were in charge of migrant integration during the 1960s and 1970s (Gsir and Meireman 2005: 2). The first and most decisive element was labour market integration for Moroccans and Turks when they were admitted for work. The agreements included also other elements of integration. They provided Moroccan and Turkish workers with the same social rights and working conditions as Belgian workers (social security, family allowances). They allowed them to be joined by their family members, who were also granted the right to work under certain conditions. Regarding several aspects, the Turkish agreement was more complete than the Moroccan one. It included family allowances for children still residing in Turkey (art. 10). While in both agreements the provision of migrant housing relied mainly on employers, who provided community housing, Turkish workers were allowed to enjoy social housing benefits (art. 7) through the annexed protocol of the Turkish agreement. There was even a promise to grant them a room reserved for prayers in the phalansteries (art. 18 of the protocol). The bilateral agreement with Turkey also encouraged employers to organize language classes (art.7). The only element regarding socio-cultural integration for Moroccan workers was that
they were allowed not to work on public holidays observed in Morocco (art. 16). Nevertheless, the implementation of these socio-cultural integration elements was not easy. For example, language classes were mainly focused on teaching migrant workers technical vocabulary for coal mines (Khoojinian 2007: 7). In addition, the sojourn was a condition of the work permit and thus all stakeholders thought that immigration was for the most part temporary. Even though measures were taken to settle the migrants, they aimed above all to favour migrant workers stability at work place. The rationale of Belgian authorities and employers was first and foremost economic, supporting profitability rather than the integration of new populations into Belgian society.

Before turning to the development of a genuine political integration of migrants by the Belgian government, three elements need to be underlined. First of all, as mentioned above, after ending active labour recruitment, the Belgian government organized an amnesty in 1974, which allowed the regularization of mainly Moroccan and Turkish clandestine migrant workers. This amnesty can definitely be considered a one-shot integration measure. Secondly, in the same year – and this is particularly important for both Turks and Moroccans immigrants, who were mainly Muslim – Islam was officially recognized as a Belgian religion. The following new school year, public schools had to offer Islamic classes, and under the supervision of Belgian and Turkish authorities, teachers were sent to Belgium to provide these classes (Khoojinian 2004: 114). Thirdly, the issue of political participation by foreigners emerged quite early in Belgium. It is important to remember that in Belgium, voting is compulsory. At the end of the 1960s, the first consultative bodies for immigrants were created in Wallonia. They were established by some of the political parties such as the socialist party, and were considered transitional measures to full voting participation (Lambert 1999). Between 1968 and 1975, around thirty consultative bodies of this type were created in Belgium (ibidem). Both Turkish and Moroccan migrants participated in the consultative bodies for immigrants offering to some migrants a significant first experience of political participation in Belgium. Indeed, once naturalized, some of the Moroccan migrants from the consultative bodies became involved in politics and were elected at the local level (ibidem). The question of granting voting rights to immigrants, at least at the local level, has been sharply discussed in Belgium. The Belgian local elections of 2000, in which European foreigners (in accordance with European law) would be allowed to participate, brought the issue of voting by non-EU foreigners back to the fore. This was particularly critical for Moroccan and Turkish migrants who, in many cases, had been residing in Belgium for longer periods than EU citizens. After long and heated debates, the Belgian Constitution (art. 8) was modified in 1998 in order to allow foreigners to vote at local elections. Nevertheless, as the new Electoral Law had not yet been approved, non-EU foreigners could not participate in the 2000 local elections (Lambert 1999). It was only in 2004 that Turkish and Moroccan migrants residing legally in Belgium for at least five years could participate for the first time in local elections.

The Belgian integration policy started in the mid-1980s with the awareness of the sustainability of immigrants – mainly Turks and Moroccans – and the acceptance of their settlement (Rea 2003). The two first milestones of the integration policy created in 1984 were the new nationality code introducing jus soli elements (mentioned above), and the creation in 1988 of the Royal Commissariat for Immigrant Policy, which would be in charge of defining the Belgian integration policy. The latter was created in reaction to the rise of the extreme-right in Flanders (Jacobs 2004: 245). In its first report (1989), the Royal Commissariat defined integration as (a) assimilation where public order requires it, (b) respect for Belgian society’s fundamental principles, (c) respect for cultural diversity (CRPI 1989: 38-39). This definition influenced integration policies in Flanders and Wallonia as described below. The Royal Commissariat was replaced in 1993 by the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, an autonomous public service agency at the federal level. Its mission was to ensure follow-up to the Royal Commissariat’s integration policy, to fight against racism and other types of discrimination and to administer the Impulse Fund for Migration Policy, created in 1991. This fund aims to sustain social integration projects targeting people, prevent discrimination and promote intercultural dialogue. It should be noted that 75% of the available funds must target projects located in the five largest cities in the country and their agglomerations (Antwerp, Brussels, Charleroi, Gent.
These cities are places where many migrants live, particularly Moroccan and Turkish migrants in various distributions (see below). Another instrument, Urban Policy, which targets zones rather than immigrants and specifically aims to support integration, was set up in 1999. This federal policy supports urban renovation initiatives in large cities in order to improve the socio-economic situation. The federal policy had three main axes: facilitating access to Belgian nationality, fighting racism and fighting social inequalities (Rea 2003: 124 quoted by Mandin 2014: 3).

Aside from the federal level, other levels of governance have developed their own discourses and policies on immigrant integration, due to several constitutional reforms in Belgium. The communities (Flemish, German-speaking and French-speaking) have jurisdiction over so-called “person-related matters” such as immigrant integration. In 1994, the French-speaking community transferred its competencies in immigrant integration to two territorial entities: the Brussels-Capital Region and Wallonia. Integration policies in Flanders and Wallonia are based on two decrees, respectively the Minorities Decree signed by the Flemish government in 1998 and the Decree on the integration of foreigners or persons of foreign origin signed in 1996 by the Walloon government. Finally, in 2012, the various governments (federal state, regions and communities) decided to cooperate and to transform the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism into the Interfederal Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Federal Centre of Migration. The first has a scope of competencies which have been enlarged to include the Regions and Communities. The second is a federal centre which aims to provide expertise on migration and related questions.

Flanders

In Flanders, where community and regional institutions are merged, a policy targeting migrants developed progressively in the 1990s. The rationale of this policy was to recognize ethnic minorities and their cultural identities, and to encourage migrant associations to self-organize. The Flemish integration policy is also based on the assumption forged by Flemish nationalist history that original cultural identity is a vector of emancipation (De Smet 2012: 4). In 1995, the Flemish government adopted the basis of the Flemish minorities’ policy. This integration policy is threefold: firstly, the “emancipation policy” of legal “allochthonous populations” (migrants, refugees and nomads) calls for their participation in Flemish society as full citizens. Secondly, the reception policy for newcomers who arrive, for example, in the context of family reunification, aims to familiarize them with society and with the Belgian and Flemish institutions and authorities (see infra, the inburgering policy). Thirdly, the assistance policy aims to provide assistance to undocumented migrants in cases of emergency. In 1998, the Minorities Decree (minderhedendecreet) defined precisely five target groups of the minorities’ policy, namely: the so-called allochthonous (when at least one parent is born abroad), refugees, travelling groups, non-Dutch-speaking foreign newcomers and undocumented migrants (Jacobs 2004: 285). The Ethno-cultural Minorities Forum (Minderhedenforum) ensured communication between the target groups and organizations. The Minorities Decree recognized migrant associations and proposed concrete measures to promote their participation (Carewijn and Ouali 1998). At the beginning of 2002, fourteen regional associations were recognized, including three Turkish migrant associations and two Moroccan ones.

The Flemish policy is inspired by the Dutch integration policy, based on the recognition of ethnocultural groups (Carewijn and Ouali 1998). But the Flemish system does not explicitly recognize particular ethnic groups, even though this is often the case in implementation. In addition to this multiculturalist approach, a more assimilationist approach was initiated at the end of the 1990s and further developed in the 2000s. With the Decree on Flemish civic integration policy, the government developed an inburgering policy for newcomers. Since 2004, all new immigrants arriving in Flanders 6 http://www.diversitybelgium.be/impulse-fund#Doelstellingen%20van%20het%20Impulsfonds, visited on 31 March 2014.
must participate in a civic integration programme (*inburgeringstraject*). The Flemish authorities designed eight welcome offices to welcome and accompany newcomers. They are located in Antwerp, Gent and in five Flemish provinces. One is also in Brussels (see *infra*). The civic integration programme targets adult foreigners who come to Flanders to reside for a long period. As the target group also includes migrants who became naturalised citizens of Belgium and migrants with at least one parent who was not born in Belgium, Turkish and Moroccan newcomers (but also Belgians with a Turkish or Moroccan background) may have to sign a civic integration contract and follow the integration programme. It is compulsory for the first groups and available to the latter. The Flemish authorities have also underlined that this programme is compulsory for newly-arrived ministers of religion in a local church or religious community that is recognised by the Flemish authorities. Since Islam is also recognized and as Turks andMoroccans are the largest Muslim communities in Belgium, this measure particularly applies to imams from Turkey and Morocco. The integration programme is a programme of individual training and coaching. Depending on the needs of the migrant, the training program may have up to three components: Dutch as a second language, social orientation (practical information about living in Belgium and Belgian institutions) and vocational guidance. The Flemish Centre for Minorities (*Vlaams Minderheden Centrum*), which since 2010 has been renamed the Intersection Migration-Integration (*Kruispunt Migratie-Integratie*), supports the reception desks. Reception desks also work in collaboration with other Flemish institutions such as the Flemish Office of Employment and Professional Training, Dutch Language Houses, etc. Failing to attend a mandatory civic integration programme can result in administrative fines.

In the strategic plan of the Flemish policy on minorities “living together in diversity, in an active and shared citizenship (2004-2009)”, the Flemish government affirms that everyone needs to participate in society in accordance with each other. Furthermore, each person has to contribute to society through his or her own efforts and work, to respect the rights and fundamental freedoms and standards laid down in the Constitution as well as the laws and decrees, and to avoid exclusion or discrimination of others on ethnic, religious or cultural grounds. The emphasis is on social cohesion and the responsibility of citizens regardless of their origin. In the last plan, 2009-2014, the Ministry of Integration announced subsequent civic integration programmes but also the need for evaluation and efficient coordination with other policies such as employment. In 2013, a new integration Decree was approved which planned the establishment of an Integration Agency (Mandin 2014: 5).

Influenced by the Dutch policy, Flanders developed a hybrid policy combining both elements of multi-culturalist and assimilationist approaches (Jacobs 2004: 288). The multi-culturalist stance is characterized by the minority policy which recognizes ethno-cultural minorities, the Minorities Forum and the recognition of cultural diversity, whereas the civic integration programmes rely on a more assimilationist approach aiming at cultural homogeneity.

**Wallonia**

In contrast with Flanders, the French-speaking and Walloon governments have been reluctant to recognize ethnic minorities (Jacobs 2004: 282). In Wallonia, there was not, strictly speaking, an integration policy targeting immigrants. The Walloon authorities instead developed policies targeting specific deprived areas. Immigrant integration is embraced in the broader policies of social action developed by the Walloon General Direction of Social Action and Health. These policies targeted the disadvantaged classes but especially served immigrants in certain neighbourhoods. Priority was given to the fight against social exclusion through priority education areas, priority actions areas and positive discrimination measures. Furthermore, in 1998, the French Community adopted the “Affirmative Action” Decree (*Décret Discrimination positive*), which called for support for schools where pupils had weak socio-economic backgrounds. The Decree aimed to promote equal opportunities among pupils. Its implementation showed that the schools receiving support were mainly schools where the majority of pupils had immigration backgrounds, in particular second and third generation Turkish and
Moroccan children. New young Moroccan and Turkish migrants also benefit from the Decree as soon as they go to these schools.

A noteworthy measure aiming at immigrant integration in Wallonia was the Decree on the integration of foreigners or persons of foreign origin adopted in 1996 by the Walloon government. This Decree was the consequence of institutional change and not the result of a political or societal change (De Smet 2012: 4). It came from the policy transfer of the French-speaking Community to the Walloon Region where integration was not on the political agenda (ibidem). The target group of the Decree is quite wide as it includes both foreign nationals and Belgians with a foreign background. However, irregular migrants are out of its scope. The Walloon Decree aimed to keep public authorities and associations active on integration matters. It established and sponsored Regional Integration Centres in several Walloon cities (Charleroi, La Louvière, Mons, Namur, Liège, Verviers and Tubize). These centres aimed to support the integration of immigrants and people of foreign origin. Among other things, they organized actions to promote intercultural relations, trainings, interpreter services, job coaching etc. At the beginning, they worked quite autonomously without real coordination and without a real Walloon integration policy. For a couple of years, they have been supported by the DISCRI platform, which aims to ensure better communication and transversal actions. The point is that they are very locally anchored, working closely with local authorities and local associations. These centres are supported by the General Direction of Social Action and Health which also promoted associations and projects focused on immigrant integration. Partially contesting the Walloon integration policy, the regional integration centres advocated to modify the Decree in order to redefine the objective of the integration policy, which should, according to them, aim to support “an intercultural society based on diversity management” (Torrekens et al. 2014: 31). The Decree was modified in 2009, but without meaningful changes in terms of integration objectives.

In Wallonia, the integration measures were mainly conceived for long-established migrants and their offspring (Torrekens et al. 2014: 26). They particularly concerned Moroccan and Turkish migrants as they have been the major groups coming from non-European countries. Since 2012, a project targeting newcomers has been at top of the political agenda. In March 2014, the Walloon Parliament adopted the Decree establishing integration programmes (parcours d’intégration) for new immigrants. One of the central issues dividing the debates was its compulsory character. In the end, only one part of the integration programme was made compulsory. Within three months of arrival in a Walloon town, each newcomer must attend a reception module comprised of information on the rights and duties of each person residing in Belgium as well as an individual interview in order to assess their social needs (skills, diplomas, credential recognition and needs identification). After completing this module, the newcomer receives a certificate; migrants who do not attend, however, face fines. Three other modules of the integration programme are not compulsory. They consist of French language courses, citizenship training and socio-occupational orientation. The Regional Integration Centres are in charge of implementing these new integration programmes.

Finally, in Wallonia, the integration of immigrants has not been conceived of in a very interventionist way, as in Flanders, and the government has instead opted for a “laissez-faire assimilationist policy” (Adam 2013: 554). With regard to policy implementation, the Walloon government gave significant manoeuvring room to civil society (particularly to associations dealing with integration issues, which were not specifically immigrant associations). After the 1996 Decree, it also gave wide autonomy to the Regional Integration Centres. The study by Torrekens and her colleagues (2014) revealed that the way integration is approached varies among the several Regional Integration Centres – from an approach influenced by the French Republican model to an approach recognizing and valorising fundamental rights for all (including cultural and religious rights) (Torrekens et al. 2014: 32-33). Turkish and Moroccan migrants have obviously been the beneficiaries of the Wallon integration measures. As mentioned above, they were also the main target groups since they were the main long-established migrants from countries which did not join the European Communities, and since the Decree focused their offspring.
Brussels-Capital Region

The Brussels-Capital is a bilingual region created in 1989. It is a small area (161 km²) which includes 19 municipalities, one of which is Brussels (called the City of Brussels). In this region, the integration policy has various faces because it is supported, on the one hand by the Flemish Community Commission (Vlaamse Gemmeenschapcommissie), and by the French Community Commission (Commission Communautaire Française) on the other. The Flemish Community Commission’s objective was to promote integration in the Flemish community, particularly through Dutch courses. In Brussels, it relied on the Flemish minorities policy. But it also developed its own policy on minorities with three objectives: empowerment, hospitality and support for irregular migrants. To achieve its policy, it collaborated with the Integration Regional Centre Foyer in Brussels. Furthermore, in 2004, the Flemish government implemented civic integration programmes in the Brussels-Capital Region, as it did in Flanders. The only difference is that in Brussels, civic integration programmes are not compulsory. They are implemented by the Brussels Reception Agency for Integration (BON).

Secondly, the French Community Commission developed inclusion and cohabitation policies including the social inclusion of residents living in deprived areas, and cohabitation and integration programmes to improve relations between local communities. It also supported the Brussels Centre for Intercultural Action. This association has four main activities: trainings on inter-culturality, information on immigration (in particular through the publication of a magazine (l’Agenda Interculturel), cultural dissemination and support for the self-organization of immigrant populations. Since the social cohesion Decree of 13 May 2004, in force since 2006, the Brussels Centre for Intercultural Action is also in charge of its implementation. An objective is welcoming newcomers, which includes support for actions aimed helping them to learn French as a foreign language.

Moreover, since the 1990s, the government of the Brussels-Capital has developed neighbourhood revitalization and housing renovation policies. Since Turkish and Moroccan migrants in particular have lived in certain municipalities and neighbourhoods in the Brussels-Capital which are both highly ethnically segregated and deprived, they have been targeted by these policies. These various policies have consisted of: first, Security Contracts set up in 1992 which aim to prevent delinquency; second, the Neighbourhood Contracts established in 1994 for the rehabilitation and renovation of vulnerable neighbourhoods; and third, in 1998, Shopping Area Contracts aimed at revitalizing commercial districts. Employment policies were also implemented through nine Local Missions for Employment (Missions locales pour l’Emploi) in order to include certain populations, including Turkish and Moroccan ones, into the labour market. These institutions are located in communes of Brussels where there are significant populations of Moroccans and Turks, such as Schaerbeek, Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, Anderlecht and Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode.

Integration and citizenship

At the federal level, the acquisition of nationality has been considered a fundamental tool of integration since the mid-1980s when the Royal Commissariat for Immigrant Policy started to set up guidelines for the integration of immigrants (Gsir et al. 2005: 7). Becoming Belgian was considered as a political solution for becoming fully part of Belgian society. Dual citizenship has been also allowed. Accordingly, the nationality law changed several times, particularly in the 1990s but also in 2000, in order to facilitate the acquisition of Belgian nationality. Conditions such as “the desire to integrate”, which were difficult to objectively measure, have been dropped and the acquisition of nationality has mainly been based on duration of residence and the jus soli principle. These reforms obviously favoured the acquisition of Belgian nationality both by Moroccan and Turkish migrants (see figure below). The number of Moroccans and Turks progressively decreased following the changes in the law during the 1990s and the 2000s.
However, a recent change in the Belgian nationality code, adopted in December 2012 and entered into force in January 2013, critically restricted the acquisition of nationality by extending the residence requirement to a minimum of 5 years and reintroducing detailed integration conditions (the knowledge of one of three official languages, and the definition of social integration as holding a diploma, completing a vocational training or having continuous work for a defined period of time). At this stage, it is still too early to evaluate the consequences of these changes. As Martiniello and Adam (2013) have underlined, the integration programmes are implemented in accordance with these language requirements and proof of integration (Martiniello and Adam 2013: 89). This new nationality code could thus particularly impact the implementation integration programmes in Brussels and Wallonia where language classes are not compulsory.

Finally, even though integration measures and policies are developed at different levels of the state with more (Flanders) or less (Wallonia) interventionism by authorities (Adam 2013: 555), the latest developments show a trend of approaching new migrants with increasingly assimilationist views. Moreover, Belgian integration policies are closely linked to the evolution of Belgium as a federal state, to the history of national minorities (in particular for Flanders) and to the vision that federated entities have of their future (Flanders’ interests in becoming an independent state).

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7 Law of 4 December 2012 modifying the Belgian Nationality Code in order to make the acquisition of Belgian nationality neutral from an immigration perspective. 14 January 2013 Royal Decree implementing the Law of 4 December 2014.
3.2 Emigration/diaspora policies of Turkey and Morocco

Turkish emigration and diaspora policies

From the very beginning of emigration to Europe, Turkey demonstrated interest in its emigrants and even in potential emigrants when it concluded a bilateral agreement with Belgium. As mentioned before, Turkish authorities negotiated specific provisions for their nationals with the Belgian government (Frennet-De Keyser 2004: 249). The Turkish government encouraged labour emigration for several reasons. Reducing unemployment was obviously an important objective and the prospect of remittances from Turkish migrants, another (Bayar et al. 2004: 358). Moreover, as labour migration was perceived as be temporary migration, the Turkish government also expected that once they returned to Turkey, migrant workers trained in European industries would support Turkey’s development and modernization (Manço and Manço 1992: 19). Accordingly, the Turkish authorities organized emigration to Belgium through the Turkish Employment Service (Is ve Isci Bulma Kurumu), which was in charge of recruiting emigrant workers and meeting Belgian demand (ibidem). Moreover, Belgian and Turkish authorities were in close contact during the first years of the bilateral agreement implementation.

There is an interesting tool to mention here because it was created specifically to foster the integration of Turkish migrant workers in Belgium and there was no equivalent for other migrants groups in Belgium such as Moroccans. This tool was an informational newsletter intended for Turkish immigrant workers: the Bulletin of Turkish Workers (Bulletin des Travailleurs Turcs – Türk İşçileri Bülteni) which was published from 1964 to 1970 (Khoojinian 2007: 521). The first Turkish migrants, who arrived in the Belgian coalmines, were unhappy with their working conditions especially since they were neither prepared nor informed of the drudgery that awaited them. They were also dissatisfied with their living conditions (ibidem). As they frequently stopped working or quit their jobs, employers addressed their complaints to the Turkish Embassy (ibidem). The Belgian Ministry of Labour, in collaboration with the Belgian Coal Federation and the Turkish Embassy, decided to edit and freely distribute this monthly newsletter published in Turkish, but also in French and Dutch for the employers (ibidem). This newsletter included information not only about working rules, holidays, advice on food, clothes, children’s education, etc. but also about events such new Turkish family arrivals, births, deaths, new mosques, etc. (Khoojinian 2007: 526). It was appreciated by the workers (ibidem). Beginning with the first newsletter, the tone was set with a message from the Turkish Ambassador inviting the workers to learn the language, have good relations with their neighbours, solve conflicts peacefully and respect their employers (ibidem). This communication tool specifically aimed to encourage Turkish migrants’ integration in Belgium but from a perspective of profitability between both Turkey and Belgium. The Bulletin also contained information related to Turkey (Khoojinian 2007: 548). The Bulletin for Turkish Workers was initially intended for Turkish miners but very quickly it was also gradually distributed to Turkish migrants employed in other sectors (Khoojinian 2007: 532). It strongly promoted family reunion and worker stabilization in the Belgian economy while simultaneously relaying messages from the Turkish embassy promoting Turkish identity and encouraging remittances (Khoojinian 2007: 546). Serving the interests of both the Belgian and Turkish governments, the Bulletin contributed to the integration of Turkish migrant workers in Belgium.

In the 1980s, realizing that the settlement of Turkish emigrants had become permanent, the Turkish government became keen to maintain close ties but with the aim of monitoring and improving living conditions for “definitive” migrants (Karcı Korfalı 2014: 2). First, the Dual Citizenship Law adopted in 1981 encouraged Turkish emigrants to naturalize in their new country of residence. Emigrants were required to inform the Turkish government about their acquisition of new citizenship in order to not lose Turkish citizenship (Keyman and İçduygu 2003). Second, the new Turkish Constitution of 1982 provided a specific article including emigrants in government responsibilities: “The Government takes measures to ensure the family unity of the Turkish citizens working in foreign countries, to educate
their children, to meet their cultural needs and to provide social security, to protect their link to the motherland and to facilitate their coming back” (Art. 62). Moreover, in 1987 Turkey applied for access to the European Economic Community and was officially recognised as a candidate for full membership in 1999. It has been recognized that the Turkish diaspora in Belgium and more generally in the European Union could play a significant role in the European integration process (Bozarslan 2001).

In 1995, a measure called the Turkish Pink Card Procedure (called Blue Card since 2009) was created to ensure political and social rights in Turkey for Turkish migrants who had lost their Turkish nationality because they acquired the nationality of their new resident country. This “privileged non-citizen status” provided Turkish migrants and their offspring with rights equivalent to those of Turks residing in Turkey, except for voting rights (Kadirbeyoğlu 2007: 133). Accordingly, Turkish migrants could acquire property, operate businesses, be eligible for inheritance and reside and work in Turkey (ibidem).

Moreover, two important institutions were established in 1998 in order to engage with emigrants abroad. Firstly, the Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad (Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu), composed of elected Turkish emigrants and Turkish officials, aims to develop socio-integration policies for Turks or Turkish Blue Card holders abroad by assessing their needs. Secondly, the High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad (Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Üst Kurulu) elaborates policies for Turks abroad, under the presidency of the Turkish Prime Minister. Finally, the creation in 2010 of the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı) tops the government’s systematic approach to emigration. This new government department coordinates services for Turkish citizens living abroad and in particular, in the two aforementioned committees. It is organized into seven departments, of which Citizens Abroad (defining the government diaspora engagement strategy) and Public Relations and Communication (supporting NGOs established by Turks abroad) are especially important. Finally, beginning in 2012, this body has been publishing a quarterly newsletter in Turkish to remind immigrants abroad about their Ottoman past and to strengthen their sense of belonging.

Turkey has also signed bilateral agreements against double taxation and social security agreements with several countries including Belgium to ensure emigrants’ socio-economic rights in both countries. Moreover, Turkey allows Turkish adults (18 years old or older) living abroad (including those who hold dual citizenship) to vote in general and presidential elections and for referendums in Turkey. They are also allowed to stand for election. Voting is possible through regular or electronic mail, in the consulates or at the borders, depending on the type of election in the residence country.

Ties between Turkish emigrants abroad and Turkey are also maintained through other bodies targeting specific socio-cultural aspects of Turkish migrants abroad. Firstly, regarding religious practices, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which disseminates official information about Islam in Turkey, has been sending imams and Islamic teachers to Europe since the 1970s. These teachers have supported Turkish migrants’ mobilization and the creation of Turkish organizations (Kanmaz 2003). They have also promoted a Kemalist and nationalist ideology to support the return of Turkish migrant workers (ibidem). In the 1980s, in several countries, the Turkish government initiated the establishment of the Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Affairs, which has become the largest Turkish diaspora organization in Europe. In Belgium, it is the Belçika Turk Islami Diyanet Vakfı, established in Brussels in 1982 (El Battiui, Nahavandi, and Kanmaz 2004: 19). It receives teachers trained and funded by the Turkish government and manages almost half the Turkish mosques in Belgium (Kanmaz 2003). Other Turkish mosques reveal the religious diversity of the Turkish population, although the majority are Sunni Muslims. One third belong to the political-religious movement Milî Görüş and the others to various mystic Islamic movements such as Süleymanci, Cemaat-i Nur/Nurcu or Nakşibendi and finally to the Alevi (El Battiui et al. 2004: 20). Secondly, in order to promote culture abroad, Yunus Emere Institutes were created in the 2000s in order to ensure
Turkish language classes for young generations of the Turkish population abroad. The Turkish Ministry of Education also sends Turkish teachers abroad and the Turkish Culture Programme provides Turkish language classes at school. Moreover, a number of Turkish private schools were opened abroad under the roof of the Gulen Movement. Thirdly, several migrant organizations have been set up in Belgium by the Turkish population. This is the case of Eyad, the House of Turkey, created in the mid-1990s and established in the heart of the Turkish neighbourhood in Brussels. This organization of Turkish shopkeepers was originally a hometown-association whose actions favoured the Emirdag district, from where many Turkish migrants originate. Eyad’s agenda progressively extended to support the participation and integration of Turkish migrants, in particular women and their offspring. Its activities include French classes. Over time, this Turkish organization has targeted a broader public including Belgian and other migrant populations.

Finally, an important and diversified network of Turkish organizations developed in Belgium which kept close ties with Turkey without necessarily being initiated by the Turkish government. At least until the end of the 1980s (Kanmaz 2003), the organizations developed according to political and ideological cleavages in Turkey, such as right and left or secular and practicing Muslims. After that, the civic participation of Turkish migrants was influenced by second generation Turks born in Belgium, who took Belgian society as a model rather than focusing on the country of origin of their parents (ibidem). The new generation of Turks helped to open the agenda of former Turkish-migrant organizations. New organizations have been created such as women’s associations or multi-cultural associations rather than exclusively Turkish ones (ibidem).

Moroccan emigration and diaspora policies

When Morocco signed the 1964 bilateral agreement with Belgium, government interests were quite similar to those of the Turkish government. Morocco wanted to reduce unemployment, bring in currency through expected remittances, contribute to financing domestic investment and furthermore to support modernization and development with the expected return of trained Moroccan workers (De Haas 2007: 13; Brand 2010: 132). Another interest was political, aiming to “mitigate rebellious tendencies in several Berber areas” such as the Rif area (De Haas 2007:10). Morocco’s main interests were economic; the main issue for Morocco was not sending emigrants abroad but having a profitable workforce (Frennet-De Keyser 2003). The bilateral agreement between Belgium and Morocco was above all an economic agreement (Brand 2010: 131). As already mentioned, the agreement provided very few elements regarding Moroccan migrant workers’ living conditions. This demonstrated one the one hand that Moroccan authorities had little interest in emigrants and on the other hand, that Belgian government interests dominated (Frennet-De Keyser 2003 and 2004a). In order to implement the bilateral agreement, an Emigration Office was created in 1964 inside the Moroccan Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Brand 2010: 131).

Nevertheless, the Moroccan authorities were not totally indifferent to Moroccan migrant workers abroad – far from it (Ouali 2004a: 49). As mentioned earlier, the bilateral agreement signed with Belgium lacked certain elements. In the 1960s, a question arose about family allowances for the children of Moroccan emigrant workers who were still residing in Belgium. Consequently a social security agreement was signed in 1968. Another agreement on technical cooperation was also concluded in 1965 for the purpose of development cooperation. While Moroccan authorities cared about yearly remittances, and encouraged the creation of bank branches abroad (in particular the Banque Centrale Populaire) (De Haas 2007: 16), beginning in 1973, they also set up a network of government-controlled migrant associations called Amicales which were in charge of controlling the socio-cultural and political activities of Moroccan emigrants (Ouali 2004a: 50). From the 1960s to the

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1980s, these Moroccan associations reminded Moroccan emigrants of their duty of allegiance and respect to Morocco (*ibidem*). Already in 1962, when King Hassan II ascended the throne, he reiterated that all Moroccans were his subjects and were thus subject to royal authority, including Moroccans abroad (Brand 2010: 132). Furthermore (and this is an important difference with Turkey), according to the Moroccan constitution, Islam is the religion of the state and the Moroccan King claims his legitimacy as a descendant of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. Political allegiance thus overlaps with religious allegiance, whereas in the Republic of Turkey, secularism is the basis of the Turkish constitution.

The first sign of Turkey’s engagement of Moroccans abroad as citizens rather than subjects happened in the mid-1980s. For the 1984 general elections, the electoral law provided five new seats for deputies who were representatives of Moroccan emigrants (Brand 2010: 133). This change of approach in the Moroccan diaspora policy was also reflected by a new appellation for emigrants: Moroccans Residing Abroad (De Haas 2007). The Moroccan government has progressively realized various changes regarding the Moroccan population abroad such as permanent settlement, the loss of identity, distance from Moroccan culture and integration in host societies (Ouali 2004a: 50). During the 1990s, specific Moroccan institutions were set up to develop a Moroccan diaspora policy. In 1990, the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad was created in order to strengthen ties with Moroccans abroad. This private organization, despite its mandate from the government, had six priority domains regarding Moroccans abroad: education, cultural exchange, sports and youth, legal and social assistance, economic development and cooperation and partnership (Agunias 2009: 16). The main activities of the Hassan II Foundation consist of facilitating summer holidays in Morocco for Moroccan emigrants and posting Moroccan teachers of Arabic and Moroccan culture to immigration countries (De Haas 2007: 24).

The Ministry of the Moroccan Community Abroad was created in 1990 (Brand 2010: 134). However, it was suppressed a few years later and its competencies were transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (*ibidem*). After several institutional changes, the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad was re-established as an independent ministry in 2007 (Desiderio 2014). The *Bank El Amal* was also created in 1989 in order to help Moroccans residing abroad to finance investment projects in Morocco. In 1993, a Royal Decree created a Ministerial Delegate for the Prime Minister Responsible for Moroccan Residents Abroad in order to provide specific resources to emigrants, such as banking resources, diaspora tax information, investment advice, customs and transportation information, etc. (Agunias 2009: 10). Finally, the discourse developed by the Ministerial Delegate set the tone of the new diaspora policy, which was described as threefold: a socio-cultural dimension aiming to improve the knowledge of Moroccans abroad through programmes created by the Hassan II Foundation’s Observatory for the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad;

* This network of experts, researchers, academics and Hassan II Foundation partners was finally created in 2002 in collaboration with the IOM (Agunias, 2009 : 16 ; Ouali, 2004a : 50).

actions to help emigrants maintain ties with the “motherland”; and finally the promotion of the image of Morocco among the young generation (Ouali 2004a: 50).

In the 2000s, Moroccan policy continued to be oriented towards the protection of Moroccans abroad. The four-year plan for economic and social development (2000-2004) took into account Moroccan residents abroad and underlined the importance of identity and belonging, and ties between Morocco and the Moroccan diaspora abroad; the government objective was to strengthen relations in order to avoid migrant integration in the destination country (Brand 2010: 134). One element, which is quite different from the Turkish approach, concerns dual citizenship and political rights. Until the early 1990s, Morocco used to actively and strongly discourage its citizens abroad from acquiring nationality (or voting or integrating in any way) in the countries of destination (De Haas 2007: 19). Nevertheless, since the 1990s, it has encouraged dual citizenship and integration (while, of course, promoting ‘homeland’ connections). This is part of a broad shift in strategy and policy towards
emigrants, which was emphasized with the ascension of Mohammed VI in 1999. Since the last reform of the Moroccan code of nationality in 2005, article 6 now says: “a child born of a Moroccan father or a child born of a Moroccan mother is a Moroccan citizen”. This change was a consequence of the reform of the Moroccan Family Code (Mudawanna) (De Haas 2007). Moreover, between the ages of 18 and 20 years old, the concerned child can submit a request to the Ministry of Justice to keep the nationality of the other parent. Dual citizenship is tolerated in this case. In the same year, the right to vote and to be elected was also granted to Moroccans abroad. This right was reaffirmed in the new Moroccan Constitution in 2007. Nevertheless, in the first elections in which Moroccans residing abroad could finally vote, the implementation of the right was quite limited because only proxy votes were authorized (Ait Madani 2014).

The Agency for Skills and Employment Promotion (Agence Nationale des Promotions de l’Emploi et des Compétences – ANAPEC) was created in 2005 under the supervision of the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training. Through its department ANAPEC International, it manages job offers coming from abroad and offers a platform to match Moroccan workers with international, and in particular European, job offers. Moreover, it includes a space for Moroccan residents abroad, supporting their efforts to find a job or to develop a business in Morocco.10

Ties between Morocco and Moroccan migrants in Belgium are also sustained through different organizations and through Moroccan unions and political parties (Saïdi 1997). In the 1970s, Moroccan migrants created organizations in Belgium in order to help migrant workers but also in order to maintain links with their place of origin from a return perspective. Moroccan migrant organizations progressively diversified their objectives from social and labour claims to identity and cultural claims and finally integration demands (Ouali 2004b: 311). Some organizations were created independently from the Moroccan government, in particular those criticizing the Moroccan state, such as the Association of Moroccans from Belgium for the Defence of Human Rights (created in 1991). Non state-actors such as mosques and broadcasts or websites such as Wafin have also developed links with Moroccan migrants. The latter was a portal that was particularly active in the 2000s, which specifically aims to bridge Morocco and Moroccan migrants in Belgium.

In 2003, Morocco also adopted a law on immigration, irregular emigration, and the entry and sojourn of foreigners. With European support, it has also developed a policy to more strictly control irregular emigration to Europe and to increase border controls. Finally in 2013, a migration and mobility partnership was signed between Morocco and the European Union. Belgium was one of the nine European Member States involved in this mobility partnership, which aims to provide mobility measures such as visa facilitation for some categories of Moroccan migrants. One objective of the partnership is to improve the information available to qualified Moroccan citizens on employment, education and training opportunities available in the EU. Another objective is to support the integration of Moroccan migrants who regularly visit an EU Member State.

Integration in Belgium from Turkey and Morocco perspectives

At the beginning of the labour migration to Belgium, both Morocco and Turkey had an instrumental view of emigrants who were supposed to serve their economic interests in the short term by disappearing from the mass of unemployed, in the midterm by sending remittances and even in the long term by returning with European professional experience and investing in their home country. Thus both Moroccan and Turkish governments shared the same objectives even though they did not engage in the same way with Belgian authorities to protect worker interests. Turkey was more proactive in this respect. Even though the bilateral agreement signed with Morocco was a relatively late post-immigration framework, because many Moroccan migrants had already entered Belgium on

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individual basis as “tourists”, the Moroccan government did not demonstrate a particular interest in ensuring them specific rights and living conditions in Belgium.

After the end of the massive labour migration, there were no specific institutions or measures in Turkey (from an emigration point of view) regarding education or language courses to support integration in Belgium. Even though French is among the foreign languages provided in the curricula in Turkey, pupils tend to prefer English. From an informal point of view, there has been evidence of chain migration between Turkey and Belgium since the beginning of mass migration. Potential emigrants can thus benefit from Belgian Turks’ experiences and advice before departing and also upon arrival. In Morocco, the situation is different as the French language is a heritage from French colonization and is still broadly present not only in schools and universities but also in the media. There is also chain migration between Morocco and Belgium, including opportunities for potential emigrants to benefit from Belgian Moroccans’ advice during the entire migration trajectory.

After the closure of Belgium’s official borders in August 1974, both Morocco and Turkey gradually realized that their emigrants who went to Belgium would rather settle there than come back and that they needed another approach. For both cases, several authors have underlined that this shift in approach is illustrated by a change in the way they referred to these emigrants (Ouali 2004; De Haas 2007; Brand 2010). Instead of “migrant workers”, they became “citizens abroad”. Both Turkey and Morocco understood their interests in maintaining ties with these sources of remittances, and could also better serve their respective political interests from where migrants resided. Nevertheless, this report shows that they developed measures oriented to their diaspora in quite different ways. Turkey has certainly been more quick to consider the importance of the diaspora and has been more proactive, whereas Morocco, despite the huge number of Moroccans in Belgium, was slower and perhaps less efficient (see the voting rights implementation, for example). Turkish diaspora policy may also be influenced by Turkey’s prospects for EU membership. The relations between Morocco and the EU are different and limited to the development of mobility partnerships.

From the 1960s to the early 1980s, no major contradictions appear between the Belgian government and Turkey’s efforts to maintain links with emigrants. During this period of labour migration, both Turkish and Moroccan migrant workers were seen as temporary migrants who were expected to return to Turkey or Morocco. During the 1980s, it was realized that migrant workers had in fact settled and that (from the perspective of the destination country) integration policies had been progressively designed. As mentioned previously, except for the last reform of the nationality code, the Belgian federal government has always favoured integration through the acquisition of Belgian nationality. Turkey allowed dual citizenship quite early. Thus many Turkish migrants residing in Belgium hold both nationalities. The Turkish population have seemingly organized themselves according to the principle of ethnic solidarity. Turkish migrants have tended to live in neighbourhoods where there are high concentrations of co-ethnics. The Turkish population has also tended to favour endogamous marriages rather than inter-ethnic ones. Turkish migrants have created a dense network of associations, hometown associations and mosques, supported by the Turkish government and other institutions like the Gülen Movement or the media. Indeed, the Turkish government developed a diaspora policy aiming to foster ties with migrants as well as nourish and strengthen the feeling of belonging to the Turkish or even Ottoman identity, briefly national identity. The Moroccan government has also been keen to maintain close ties with Moroccan migrants and to foster their sense of identity and belonging to Morocco. However, since the change of king in 1999, it seems that the Moroccan authorities have shown more openness toward multiple allegiances and political integration abroad.

In Belgium, different integration policies developed according to the region. Turkish migrants complied with the Flemish Minorities policy developed in Flanders and the Brussels-Capital Region when they self-organized. Indeed since the mid-1990s, the self-organization of minorities has been highly promoted and was considered a means of emancipation by the Flemish government, which is also anxious to organize self-mobilization (Kanmaz 2003). Most Turkish organizations in Flanders are
now federated under Flemish structures and funded by Flemish authorities \((\text{ibidem})\). This development helped Turkish organizations to get over political and religious cleavages coming from their country of origin and to instead focus on migrants’ common difficulties and interests when living in Belgium \((\text{ibidem})\). 

Finally, Turkish migrants do not constitute a homogeneous group; some may be in opposition to the regime or ruling authorities of Turkey and are organized accordingly. Therefore, the Turkish government has adopted various actions depending on the different characteristics of the diaspora, in particular with regard to Kurdish emigrants, whom they have tried to control and track in Belgium, even in collaboration with Belgian authorities (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). In other words, Turkey tried to protect the rights of Turkish emigrants abroad if they adopted the Turkish nationalist ideology (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). This may also be the case for Moroccan migrants, as some of them have been in opposition to the Moroccan regime and have denounced it for human rights violations.

4. Integration trends of Turkish and Moroccan migrants in Belgium

In this part, the integration of Turkish and Moroccan migrants is analysed according to different dimensions: the labour market, education, citizenship and civic and political participation and finally, residence and housing. Almost each section takes into account the data produced in the framework of the INTERACT statistics analysis and the available literature regarding the studied dimension. The INTERACT quantitative analysis is based mainly on the national Labour Force Survey and, in the case of Belgium, runs a Principal Component Analysis for seven priority EU member states and seven priority countries of origin (here Turkey and Morocco are also called migration corridors). Given the list of origin-destination integration indicators, the Principal Component Analysis methodology allows us to create synthetic indexes of integration which take into account the weight of each indicator to explain the phenomenon. By using these weights, a synthetic index can be constructed for each dimension: labour market, education etc. for each migration corridor. Here below, the presented indexes are the normalised values of integration measures, which are calculated based on the set of initial indicators that are explained for each studied dimension. The indexes rank the corridors based on the level of integration by assigning numbers from 0 to 1. The higher the rank, the better the integration.

**Table 4. Integration Index in Belgium: a comparison between Moroccan and Turkish immigrants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moroccan immigrants</th>
<th>Turkish immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Market Integration Index</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Integration Index</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship Integration Index</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015.

4.1 Labour market integration

The INTERACT analysis reveals that the labour market integration index differs between Moroccan and Turkish migrants. It takes into account the following labour market indicators to calculate the labour market integration index: employment and unemployment rates, and the activity and over-qualification rates. The index is respectively 0.14 for Moroccan migrants and 0.26 for Turkish migrants, indicating better integration into the labour market for the latter.
Within the Belgian working population, according to the quantitative analysis based on the Labour Force Survey, 86.3% workers are employed and 13.7% are self-employed. Migrant populations also have a higher share of employed workers (90.8% Moroccans and 81.9% Turks). However in this case, there are twice as many self-employed Turkish migrants than Moroccan migrants (18.1% Turks and 9.2 Moroccans). The figure below shows that the share of unemployment is higher among the migrant population in comparison with natives, but also that it is higher among Moroccan migrants than among Turkish migrants.

Table 5. Employment versus unemployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
<th>Labour force</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015.

The data produced by INTERACT also shows the distribution of Moroccan and Turkish migrants in the various sectors of the labour market. Both populations are dominant in the service sector, as is the Belgian native population. However, Moroccan migrants work more in this sector than Turkish migrants, with a respective share of 78% versus 67%. In manufacturing sector, it is the reverse; there are more Turkish migrants (33%) than Moroccan migrants (22%). Finally, 1% of Turkish migrants work in agriculture, but no Moroccan migrants do. However, the distribution of both Turkish and Moroccan migrants regarding their occupational levels, as defined by ISCO classification, is quite similar. Indeed, 17% of Moroccans and 16.2% of Turks occupied high-qualification occupations (ISCO 1, 2 and 3) versus 46.2% Belgians. In lesser-qualified occupations (ISCO 4 to 9), they are dominant in a very similar trend: the Belgian population occupied 53.8% of these occupations, whereas Turks occupied 83.8% and Moroccans, 83%.

During the active recruitment period, both Turkish and Moroccan migrants were integrated into the labour market. They worked in coal mines, in particular in the bottom of the mines, and afterwards, they were orientated to other sectors that had been abandoned by Belgian workers. They were thus confined to hard, dirty and dangerous occupations (Rea 2006). After 1974, the context of high unemployment made it difficult for second-generation migrants to enter the labour market (Frennet-De Keyser 2004a: 343). Both Turkish and Moroccan migrants were in disadvantaged positions in the Belgian labour market. Nevertheless, “Turkish immigrants in Belgium are more likely than any other group to be blue-collar workers, earning less than the Belgians or other migrant groups. They are mainly situated in industry and the service sector, and are heavily represented in agriculture and horticulture, metallurgy and the waste processing industry” (Wets 2006: 95). According to Manço (2012), 45% are employed, with more than half in low-qualified jobs; 9% are self-employed whereas only 4% of Moroccans are self-employed (Manço 2012: 6). In response to unemployment pressures and to difficulties accessing the labour market, some immigrants have opted for self-employment (Wets 2006: 96). In the last decades, the number of businesses owned by Moroccan and Turkish migrants, such as grocery stores, bakeries, snack bars and restaurants has doubled (ibidem). Finally, there are also important differences between men and women regarding access to the labour market. Forty-four percent of Turkish migrant women are active in the labour market versus 23% of Moroccan migrants (Manço 2012: 6).
4.2 Education

The INTERACT education integration index was calculated on the basis of several indicators (highest educational attainment, school enrolment rate at ages 15-25 and at ages 25-35, percentage of international students at ages 20-24). Regarding this last indicator, the number of students coming from Morocco and Turkey are quite similar; the average numbers for 2005 to 2012 are respectively 122 and 112. The education index is higher in the case of Moroccan migrants, indicating that they better integrate in terms of education than Turkish migrants, who have a very low index of only 0.03 versus 0.17 for Moroccan migrants.

The share of tertiary-educated is quite different for Moroccan and Turkish migrants. It is two times higher for Moroccan migrants (10.8%) than for Turkish migrants (5.6%). The gap for Turkish migrants is thus even larger in comparison with the Belgian population, 28.3% of whom are tertiary-educated. Accordingly, the data on school enrolment shows different enrolment rates among the populations studied. These rates are different according to the age cohort. For the Belgian population between 15 and 25 years old, the rate of enrolment is 66%. For Moroccan and Turkish migrants, it is lower. And there is an important difference between the two corridor migrations: only 31% of Turkish migrants are enrolled versus 53% of Moroccans. At ages 25-35, only 4% of Belgians are enrolled, which is the same for the Turks. Eight percent of Moroccans tend to attend school even when they are older. Furthermore, it appears that Moroccan and Turkish students do not follow the same field of studies except for technical studies (29.4% for both). The figure below shows that social sciences are the preferred field of study for Moroccans and Turks. This is different for the Belgian population, which prefers technical studies. The field of health-related studies is comprised of only 12.3% Moroccans and no Turks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of studies</th>
<th>Moroccans</th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Belgians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sciences</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015.

Turkish and Moroccan migrant workers who came through the bilateral agreements in the 1960s and the 1970S were characterized by low levels of education (Neels and Stoop 1998). Nevertheless, there were “fewer men without formal education in the Turkish community than in the Moroccan community” (Neels and Stoop 1998: 7). This difference is due to different histories in the education system of the countries of origin (ibidem). In Turkey, attending elementary school has been compulsory since the foundation of the republic in 1923. In Morocco, a national system of education started only after independence in 1957 (ibidem). The Turkish and Moroccan migrant women had an even lower education (Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003: 10). After 1984, only 2% of Turkish and Moroccan male migrants who arrived in Belgium did not have an education (Neels and Stoop 1998: 7). The children of Turkish and Moroccan migrant workers in Belgium were oriented differently in secondary school; the former chose technical and vocational training whereas the latter focused on general education leading to higher education (Neels and Stoop 1998: 6). Ouali also highlighted the fact that since the beginning of the 1980s, but particularly since the 1990s, the daughters of Moroccan migrant workers attained high levels of education (Ouali 2004: 45). However, access to university differs between children of Turkish and Moroccan backgrounds, with 10-11% of Turks accessing university and 25-30% of Moroccans (Manço 2012: 6).
Most Moroccan and Turkish migrants who arrived in Belgium during the last four decades were motivated by family reasons and came principally for the purpose of long-term residence. Less than 10% came for work. A very small share came for studies and even fewer received protection for humanitarian reasons. For the latter, Turkish migrants received more permits than Moroccan migrants because some of them belonged to the Kurd minority and sought protection in Belgium. Table 7 provides the average number of residence permits issued by the Belgian authorities during three years, according to the motive of migration. It shows that more than half of Turkish and Moroccan migration to Belgium is relatively permanent migration (family, asylum) rather than temporary (work, studies).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Issuing</th>
<th>Turkey (permits + %)</th>
<th>Morocco (permits + %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>21,013</td>
<td>46,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remunerated activities</td>
<td>3,411</td>
<td>5,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>1,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee status</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiary protection</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
<td>11,530</td>
<td>23,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36,764</td>
<td>77,506</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat, MPC Team own calculation.

4.3 Citizenship, civic and political participation

The INTERACT citizenship integration index is obtained according to two indicators: the citizenship acquisition rate and the percentage of naturalised citizens out of the total born-abroad population (2013 data). In the case of Turkish migrants, the citizenship integration index indicates the maximum score (1.0). For Moroccan migrants, it is only slightly lower at 0.93. These findings confirm what was explained above. At the federal level, the Belgian integration policy has relied heavily on citizenship acquisition; several changes in the nationality codes have facilitated access to citizenship. Both Turkish and Moroccan migrants have benefited from the facilitated access. However, as mentioned already, the Turkish government has been formally encouraging Turkish migrants to naturalize as Belgians since 1981, when it authorized dual citizenship. This was not the case for the Moroccan government. In the case of the Royal Kingdom of Morocco, Moroccan migrants were discouraged from obtaining another nationality. In addition, King Hassan II never stopped stressing the political—and even religious—link between himself, the King of Morocco, and his Moroccan subjects, even though they were abroad. Both political and religious allegiances were requested from Moroccan migrants. This was not as much the case for Turkish migrants, with whom Turkey maintained cultural links. Even though Turkish religious organizations also took care of maintaining religious links, it is clear that for Turkish migrants there was not this overlapping allegiance.

Since the signature of the bilateral agreements, Moroccan and Turkish migrant populations never stopped growing: eight out of ten immigrants coming from North Africa are Moroccan (Vause 2014: 41). The Moroccan population has always been larger than the Turkish population. In the 1990s, the number of Moroccans migrants residing in Belgium reached its peak of 140,000 persons (Bousetta 2010: 9). In the same period, the number of Turkish migrants peaked at approximately 90,000 and then decreased and stabilized around 40,000 (Manço 2012: 1). In order to understand the variation of numbers, it is important to take into consideration the process of naturalization. As of 1984, the new

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11 The following figures are based on nationality (and not on ethnic background). They give an account of the number of Turkish and Moroccan nationals. As soon as they are naturalized as Belgians, immigrants appear only as Belgian in the National Register.
nationality code introduced the principle of jus soli (Wets 2006: 94). Children from a Belgian mother and a Turkish or Moroccan father are therefore Belgian. During the 1990s (in 1992, 1995, and 1998), several changes in the Belgian Nationality Code aimed to facilitate access to Belgian nationality and simplify the procedure. They allowed second and third-generation migrants (notably Turks and Moroccans) to acquire Belgian nationality automatically. During this decade, 60% of the foreigners who acquired Belgian nationality were Moroccan or Turkish (SOPEMI 1999: 112). The number of naturalized Moroccans and Turks has increased since mid-1990s, with around 3,000 to 4,000 Turks obtaining Belgian nationality each year (Manço 2012:1). In 2000, the naturalization procedure was simplified again and the required duration of residence was shortened to three unbroken years instead of five; moreover, after seven years of residence, any foreigner with a permanent residence permit could obtain Belgium nationality (Wets 2006: 94). During the last decade (2001-2013), the number of Turkish nationals progressively decreased from 58,027 to 37,989 due to easier access to nationality (Vause 2014: 94). The number of Moroccan nationals also decreased during the same period from 106,840 to 83,271; however, since 2010 it has been growing slightly (Vause 2014: 95). As mentioned above, if one takes into account the number of Moroccans and Turks who are naturalized, the stock of these populations is larger. These figures do not take into consideration the number of Turks and Moroccans who obtained refugee status or those who are undocumented.

Because they can obtain Belgian nationality, Turkish and Moroccan migrants are entitled to full citizenship rights. They can thus participate in all Belgian elections and they must even vote, since voting is compulsory according to Belgian laws. In 1988, the first person of Moroccan origin was elected in municipal elections in Antwerp (Ouali 2004: 45). In local elections in 2000, seventy-two candidates of Moroccan origin, out of eighty-nine persons of non-European origin, were elected (ibidem). Turkish migrants seem more civically active than Moroccan migrants; for instance, 42% of Turkish migrants were members of an ethnic association whereas only 29% of Moroccans were members of an association in 2011 (Manço 2012:6). Moroccans tend to participate in multi-cultural associations as opposed to ethnic or hometown associations like the Turks (ibidem). The civic and political participation of Turkish migrants is oriented towards homeland politics, whereas Moroccan migrants seem more interested in local politics (Manço 2012: 6). Accordingly, political parties from the origin country play less of a role for Moroccan migrants than for Turkish migrants (Bousseta and Martiniello 2003).

4.4 Residence and housing in the Belgian regions

Both Moroccan and Turkish migrants in Belgium came from specific geographic regions of Morocco and Turkey at the time of their early arrivals. Despite this, their origin regions have diversified; there are still significant flows coming from certain regions due to the phenomenon of chain migration. Moroccans have come mainly from the Rif region, in particular from the Nador Province and the Al Hoceïma Province (Ouali 2004a). They have also come from the Souss region. More than half of Turkish migrants originated in the Central Anatolian provinces and, in particular in Afyon (which included a large group from Emirdağ), Eskisehir and Kayseri (Wets 2006: 93). Both populations originated in rural areas or the countryside in Morocco and Turkey but settled mainly in urban areas in Belgium. After living in the accommodations near the coalmines (in the phalanstères taken over by employers), many of them ended up in deprived zones of the city centres (Frennet-De Keyser 2004a: 344).

Moroccan and Turkish migrant workers immigrated first to Wallonia. At the beginning of the 1960s, around 60% of the foreigners lived in Wallonia. They moved to other regions and to cities such as Brussels, Antwerp and Gent in Flanders. They were also well implanted in the Flemish province of Limburg, but the Moroccans left after its economic decline whereas the Turks stayed in Limburg (Frennet-De Keyser 2004a: 342). In the 1990s, the distribution was more balanced between the three regions with 35% in Wallonia, 31% in the region of Brussels and 31% in Flanders for the year of 1998 (Lepage 2001: 11). However, it is important to note that regarding the population of each region, the

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weight of foreign population can be different. In 1995, the foreign population represented 29% of the total population in Brussels, 11.4% in Wallonia and 4.8% in Flanders, which is the more populated Belgian region of the three (ibidem).

Furthermore, both the Moroccan and Turkish populations are not spread over the entire Belgian territory even after fifty years of immigration history. Indeed, more than half of them live in no more than ten communes of the 589 of Belgium. They have stayed in the industrial belt where were the coalfields were located. They are also very present in the region of Brussels. Sixty percent of the Moroccans live in the Brussels-Capital Region. Forty-five percent of them are located in the City of Brussels, Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, Schaerbeek, Anderlecht, Saint-Josse-ten-Noode, Saint-Gilles and Forest (Bousetta 2010: 10). In Flanders, they live in the cities of Antwerp and Mechelen and in Wallonia, they are located in Liège and its suburbs (ibidem). More than half of Turkish migrants settled in Flanders in Genk, Gent and Antwerp (Manço 2012: 2-3). A quarter of them live in the Brussels-Capital Region and in particular in the City of Brussels and in the municipalities of Saint-Josse-ten-Noode and Schaerbeek. Finally, another quarter lives in Wallonia, particularly in Liège and Charleroi (Manço 2012: 2-3). Turkish migrants tend also to choose their residence in neighbourhoods where there are already concentrations of Turks (Manço 2012: 6).

Finally, access to ownership developed differently for Turks and Moroccans. It appears that 52% of Turkish households are owners of their housing in Belgium and 61% also have a house in Turkey, whereas only 30% of Moroccans own their house in Belgium but like Turks, they tend to have a house in Morocco (60%) (Manço 2012: 6; Saaf, Sidi Hida, and Aghbal 2009: 21). This difference in ownership can be explained first because, as mentioned above, the bilateral agreement with Turkey had a provision to facilitate access to social housing. Consequently, many Turks living in social housing could finally buy their home. Secondly, attitudes of Turkish migrants regarding mortgage loans were different from Moroccan migrants, who did not want to infringe upon the Islamic principle of prohibiting usury or interest (Kesteloot 2006). In other words, given the high housing prices, in particular in the Brussels-Capital Region, Moroccans rented rather than bought their housing.

Before ending this section, it is important to reiterate that neither Moroccan nor Turkish migrants in Belgium constitute homogeneous groups, even though during mass labour migration, they tended to be low-educated young male migrants coming from rural areas. Both groups have progressively diversified in terms of gender, age, qualifications, ethnicity and also regions of origin. Turkey migrants are, however, more diversified in terms of ethnicity, religion and culture. They include Kurds, Muslims and Christians, but also Sunnis, Shiites, Alevi and Yazidis (Wets 2006: 93; Godfirmon 2012). The Kurds from Turkey numbered around 35,000 in Belgium (Godfirmon 2012: 46) and the Alevi, around 16,000 (El Battiui et al. 2004: 20). Both Moroccan and Turkish migrants generally have a Muslim background but practice differently. In Belgium, Moroccan and Turkish mosques have been developed. Moroccan and Turkish migrants also compete within the legal body representing Muslims in Belgium (Exécutif des musulmans de Belgique).

Furthermore, during the guest workers period, more of the Turkish migrant workers who came to Belgium were already married, compared to Moroccan migrant workers who tended to be single. Both populations have a preference for endogamous marriages. Ninety-three percent of Turks living in Belgium are married to other Turks, who are generally new Turkish migrants (Manço 2012: 6). Moreover, one out of four got married to a family member (cousin); this is higher than for the Moroccans (ibidem). Eighty-six percent of Moroccans living in Belgium got married to other Moroccans, only a quarter of whom are new migrants (ibidem). Only 8.5% of Moroccans have married native Belgians (Saaf et al. 2009: 21). Turkish migrants also seem to have a stronger sense of belonging to Turkey; 78% of them identify themselves first as Turks (Manço 2012: 6). In contrast, a large portion of Moroccan migrants tend to identify with a religious identity; 60% identify themselves first as Muslim (ibidem).
5. Explanatory factors of integration trends

This part of the report is based on the qualitative survey run by the INTERACT team in Belgium. The qualitative survey targeted civil-society-organization volunteers or employees dealing with migrants in Belgium. It consisted of phone interviews with resource persons in organizations working with migrants. These interviews were based on pre-established questionnaires and were carried with twenty-seven organizations working mostly with Turkish migrants and with twenty-four organizations mostly working with Moroccan migrants. Most of them were non-profit associations (twenty-one among Turkish-oriented respondents and eighteen among Moroccan-oriented ones). Only two governmental organizations working mainly with Turkish migrants participated in the survey and three working with Moroccans. In order to give to each respondent the opportunity to develop the integration dimension for which s/he had specific expertise, the respondent was asked during the interview to choose to develop from one to three specific dimensions of those mentioned above.

The following graphs show which dimensions were mostly developed by the Turkish-oriented and Moroccan-oriented associations that completed the questionnaire.

Figure 5. Turkish-oriented associations

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12 The other participants were: one international organization and one religious institution as far as the Turkish-oriented associations are concerned; two Trade Unions and one religious institution among the associations mainly working with Moroccan migrants.

13 This means, for example, that fifteen associations have indicated the domain of education as the domain (or one of the domains) within which they realise their activities.
In spite of several differences in the distribution of Turkish and Moroccan associations’ activities within this range of dimensions, it appears that the labour market constitutes a crucial issue that both groups deal with. This could lead one to assume that in Belgium, there is a shared perception of the need for interventions carried out at the civil society level. In fact, these two groups of populations are overrepresented in the statistics concerning unemployment in Belgium. In addition, as labour market integration is the first subject addressed by Moroccan-related associations, this can indicate that Moroccan migrants are more concerned about unemployment than Turkish migrants are (see integration indexes above). The other two dimensions in which most associations intervene are education (Turkish-oriented organizations) and political and civic participation (Moroccan-oriented associations). This data highlights the fact that two other priority issues are associated with each of the two groups, and these are issues that pertain to different dimensions of the integration process. Actually, education matters (including the issuance of credential recognition by Belgian institutions) are directly linked to the insertion of migrants into the labour market. Indeed, economic participation is a crucial concern for associations. Political and civic participation, however, is not considered a basic need even though it is perceived as integral to the definition of migrants’ active status within the political and civic dynamics occurring in the countries of immigration and emigration.

Regarding other dimensions, both Turkish and Moroccan-oriented organizations intervene less in religious and residential integration issues than in the above-mentioned issues. The reason for this could lie in the fact that these two dimensions are supported by other kinds of social structures. Religious institutions such as mosques or churches are active in religious issues whereas migrants address residential concerns to national or federal institutions.

A transversal consideration of the different sections of the survey helps to identify three main directions to undertake in the analysis of the collected data: firstly, the implementation and impact of the policies of Morocco and Turkey on integration in Belgium; secondly, the impact of civic society organizations’ actions dealing with migrants from Morocco and Turkey in Belgium; and finally, the impact of other factors.

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14 The employment-search services are relevant but they do not constitute the first task of associations, which are mainly focused on providing information and strengthening occupation – skills matching.
5.1 Implementation and impact of the policies of Morocco and Turkey on integration in Belgium

As seen above, both Turkey and Morocco have developed policies in order to maintain economic, cultural and political links with their diaspora abroad. Two questions can be addressed here: to what extent do Moroccan and Turkish policies impact integration in Belgium, according to associations? And to what extent do Moroccan and Turkish organisations in the country of origin participate in the activities of Moroccan and Turkish-oriented associations in Belgium?

The survey results show that associations are quite doubtful about the impact of countries of origin on integration in Belgium. Regarding the question of labour market integration, which is one of the dimensions most developed by associations, both Turkish and Moroccan-oriented associations believe that associations in the country of origin do not have a serious impact on migrants’ employment in Belgium. The results are more balanced regarding governmental policies and the initiatives of Turkish or Moroccan authorities. Turkish-oriented associations seem to give relatively more importance to these governmental policies than Moroccan-oriented associations do. However, interestingly enough, both Turkish and Moroccan-oriented respondents strongly consider official pre-departure programs to be relevant to integration in the Belgian labour market. This result is quite intriguing because Belgium did not implement pre-departure programs abroad, unlike other European countries such as the Netherlands. Thus, it is difficult to assess whether respondents were referring to Turkish and Moroccan pre-departure programs or whether they recommend the implementation of such programs.

Regarding social interactions (among migrants but also between migrants and non-migrant populations), it is interesting to underline that for a significant part of the respondents (nearly half of them), the impact of countries of origin is not visible. Some of them felt that Turkish and Moroccan policies regarding social interactions did not exist, and other answered that they did not have information about such policies. For the respondents who identified an effect of country-of-origin policies on the social relations of immigrants in Belgium, this effect was variably assessed. They sometimes insisted that these policies had a positive impact, but a significant portion of them felt that the policies had both positive and negative impacts on migrants’ social interactions. Turkish-oriented associations saw the country-of-origin influence slightly more positively than Moroccan-oriented associations did.

Few respondents addressed the question of migrants’ residential integration in Belgium. However, for those who did, it seems that country-of-origin organizations have had an impact on the local environment of migrants; the respondents perceived support from Turkish and Moroccan organizations (governmental or not) in local associations such as schools, official representations, religious institutions or cultural centres in certain areas where significant migrants populations are settled. This result seems very coherent with the diaspora policies of Turkey and Morocco, which target specific socio-cultural aspects of migrant life. Both countries developed policies in order to keep contact with their diaspora abroad. Some of those policies (in particular in the field of culture and religion) were focused on the countries of destination. For example, half of the Turkish mosques in Belgium are managed by the Dyanet. Other political-religious movements linked with Turkey are also represented (such as Milli Görüş, for example). Turkey also sent Turkish teachers abroad to run Turkish language schools.

While the impact of the countries of origin regarding integration in Belgium was variously assessed, respondents clearly felt that the political and civic participation of immigrants in their country of origin has had a positive impact on integration in the destination country. Both Turkish and Moroccan-oriented associations saw positive impacts on political and civic participation in Belgium as well as on the social relations of immigrants. A positive impact was noted for religious practices and school performance. Turkish-oriented associations also felt that there had been positive effects on labour market integration, access to nationality and residential integration. Regarding those three aspects of integration, Moroccan-related associations were more balanced in their responses.
The survey also offers an overview of the way in which Turkish and Moroccan organizations are considered active partners by associations in Belgium. This aspect is explored with respect to civic and political participation. As regards the partnerships built by Turkish and Moroccan-oriented associations in Belgium, the interesting result is that partnerships with organizations of the country of destination are much more promoted than partnerships with countries of origin, regardless of the kind of organization (governmental institution, political parties, NGOs, etc.) involved. However, this result has to be considered carefully, as some authors found significant differences in the civic and political participation of Turkish and Moroccan migrants in Belgium. Turkish migrants are more oriented toward homeland politics whereas Moroccan migrants seem more interested in local politics. Furthermore, political parties from the countries of origin play less of a role for the latter than for the former (see above, Manço 2012; Bousetta and Martiniello 2003).

5.2 Impact of civic society organizations’ actions dealing with migrants from Morocco and Turkey in Belgium

The first input which gives us insight about the impact of the actions of civic society organizations dealing with Moroccan and Turkish migrants in Belgium consists of the number of people who contacted the associations during 2013. This data also allows us to identify the average dimension of the organizations reached by the survey. In most cases, both groups of associations have been contacted by more than 601 migrants during the last year: fifteen Turkish-oriented associations out of twenty-seven and fourteen Moroccan-oriented ones out of twenty-four, thus proving that they are large associations. This information, together with the fact that eleven other Turkish-oriented associations and ten other Moroccan-oriented associations have been classified as medium-large or medium size organizations by reason of the number of migrants who contacted them,15 confirms that associations are conceived as important intermediators in certain dimensions of Turkish and Moroccan migrants’ integration process in Belgium.

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15 This means that they have been contacted by between 151 and 600 migrants (medium-large size) or between 31 and 150 (medium size). Only one Turkish-oriented association which was identified as small (it is contacted by a maximum number of thirty migrants each year) has participated to the survey.
As seen above, civic organizations were particularly focused on the labour market. In particular, both groups of associations found that they had the greatest impact on the employment status of immigrants by working on the occupational-skills matching issue: six Turkish-oriented and eight Moroccan-oriented associations dealt with this matter. Three associations for Turkish migrants and four for Moroccan migrants offered interventions to help migrants with their search for employment. Only one from both groups helped migrants to improve wages. These responses correspond to the fact that the main activity of both Turkish-oriented and Moroccan-oriented associations (nine out of twelve in the first group, eleven out of seventeen in the second group) is lobbying for credential recognition. This activity responds to migrants’ skills being found insufficient for certain jobs. The non-correspondence between the levels of education attained in the country of origin and the typology of jobs in the country of destination is often a problematic issue in Belgium. The reason for this situation lies in the long and expensive administrative procedures of diploma recognition. Another important action implemented by associations (seven Turkish-oriented and ten Moroccan-oriented ones) to overcome this difficulty consisted of providing information about legal frameworks and the institutional setting in Belgium. It can be assumed that migrants, while trying to improve their labour market integration, can benefit from acquiring information about which legal instruments could facilitate or oppose their actions and which institutions they can rely on for their integration. Services offered by organisations (see graph below) include help obtaining information about available jobs and was implemented by five Turkish-oriented and eight Moroccan-oriented organizations.

16 All the data included in this paragraph (b) comes from certain subsections of the survey where multiple answers were possible. This explains the fact that in some cases, the sum of the numbers of associations that implemented certain actions exceeds the total number of associations that filled out the sections discussed.
Keeping in mind the results obtained related to the labour market dimension, there is another interesting correspondence with regard to education dimension activities, which are the main work of the associations working with Turkish migrants. In fact, ten out of fifteen Turkish-oriented associations working in the education domain provided homework assistance and eight of them offered services informing immigrants about study opportunities abroad. It seems that both actions aimed at providing migrants with a Belgian or at least a European degree in order to avoid constraints in labour market integration that could be caused by a diploma obtained in the country of origin. Furthermore, another action consisted of lobbying institutions in the destination country to sustain the recognition of diplomas delivered in the countries of origin. But this lobbying is implemented in a lesser extent (by four Turkish-oriented organizations).
Only a few of the Moroccan-oriented associations intervened in education, as seen above. These few associations mostly informed immigrants about study opportunities abroad (four associations out of six). Other activities implemented in this area consisted of organizing summer schools for children of immigrants and providing homework assistance (three associations in each case). Such activities contribute to enhancing (and perhaps differentiating) the existing education assistance provided by civic society.

Another dimension explored by the survey and strictly linked to education is that of language. In this case, Moroccan-oriented associations also intervened in this area less than Turkish-oriented ones. In spite of the fact that Moroccan migrants often acquired French language skills before migrating, teaching immigrants the official language of the destination country constituted the most implemented action (by four associations out of eight). This intervention is also relevant for Turkish-oriented associations: seven out of twelve dealt with this task. Teaching migrants the language of the country of origin was ranked equally among the tasks of organizations that work primarily with Turkish migrants (a total number of three). Other services offered by both groups of associations included translation (one Moroccan-oriented and four Turkish-oriented associations). The organizations also intervened by lobbying institutions in the destination country to teach the language of the country of origin, and institutions in the origin country to teach the language of destination country (a total of three Turkish-oriented and two Moroccan-oriented associations). This data proves that associations felt that it was important to implement a set of actions to ensure a double linguistic competence for migrants, thus recognizing the relevance of this skill.17

Actions are implemented to intervene with respect to the social interactions among immigrants (whether they both come from the same country of origin or come from different ones) and between immigrants and non-migrant groups. Both groups of associations mainly organized cultural, sport or entertainment activities and cultural visits in Belgium (respectively eight and six Turkish-oriented associations out of ten; and five and five Moroccan-oriented associations out of nine). For Turkish-oriented associations, the organization of visits and exchanges of European citizens to their country of origin was also relevant (for five of them), while for the Moroccan-oriented ones, providing mentoring programs was relevant (three associations). A consistent number of Turkish-oriented associations (six) stated that they also offered some additional services in the domain of social interaction, other than those mentioned in the survey.

A last dimension regarding the impact of the actions of civic society organizations on migrants’ integration is civic and political participation. A higher number of Moroccan-oriented associations intervene in this domain compared to Turkish-oriented associations. However, for both groups, the most relevant actions consist of providing information on immigrants’ civic and political rights and duties in the country of destination (five out of eight Turkish-oriented associations and nine out of eleven Moroccan-oriented ones). For Moroccan-oriented organizations (seven of them), an important action also consisted of advocating with politicians in the country of destination, a task which was also undertaken by Turkish-oriented associations but to a lesser extent (by three of them). Moroccan-oriented associations also participated in a greater number in demonstrations, protest marches, boycotts and strikes in the country of destination (five of them, compared to two Turkish-oriented organizations). A wide range of other actions were implemented, such as giving economic support to migrant organizations, participating in the organisation of external voting by migrants (especially by Turkish-oriented associations) or supporting electoral campaigns for immigrants in the country of

17 This corresponds to something which is more deeply analysed in the following paragraph, which is the implementation by different actors of certain actions that are aimed at giving migrants the opportunity to continue using their language of origin (or giving their children the opportunity to learn it). For example, through bilateral agreements with countries of origin, the French community of Belgium implemented a program called Openness to Languages and Cultures (OLC). Schools which choose to participate can propose language courses given by teachers from partner countries outside the school schedule. Both Turkey and Morocco are partners of this program.
destination (especially by Moroccan-oriented associations), but the precise number of organisations implementing these other actions is not known. This data highlights the fact that both groups of associations perceived a need concerning the civic and political participation of immigrants, mainly with regard to their rights and duties in the country of destination.

The next section analyses some other factors considered relevant in migrants’ integration process by underlining how individuals themselves put in place a set of strategies – which may or may not rely on association activities – in order to find a better place in the social context in which they live.

5.3 Impact of other factors

During the survey, respondents were also asked to share their perception of migrant practices and strategies regarding several dimensions of integration. Two main dimensions appeared to be relevant domains within which migrants try to acquire a proper status both in the country of destination and the country of origin. These dimensions are nationality and language.

As seen above, Moroccan and Turkish migrants in Belgium have a high citizenship-integration index as both populations have benefited from the facilitated access to citizenship, which was encouraged by the Belgium federal government (even if the two countries of origin developed different attitudes regarding naturalization abroad). The Turkish government formally encouraged migrants to naturalize after its recognition of dual citizenship. At the same time, policies were implemented to keep cultural links with the diaspora. In contrast, the Moroccan state tried to discourage Moroccan migrants from obtaining another nationality abroad.

Since Turkey and Morocco allow dual citizenship (under different conditions), respondents felt that migrants tended to keep the passport of their country of origin when they naturalized. Turkish and Moroccan-oriented associations seemed to feel that keeping the passport from the country of origin was much more of an asset than having a passport from the country of destination. This was particularly the case for Moroccan migrants. In fact, Turkey also developed an alternative status (the blue card) for Turkish migrants who lost their nationality of origin, in order to maintain specific rights for them in Turkey. In this context, abandoning the nationality of origin can be seen as less problematic for Turkish migrants. According to the respondents, keeping the passport is also strongly linked to a sentimental attachment that migrants have with their country of origin. In comparison, maintaining political rights in the country of origin was perceived as less relevant.

Another reason mentioned in the survey, and which probably explains the choice of migrants to keep the passport from their country of origin when they naturalized, is the opportunity to benefit from property rights in the homeland. The opinions of the two groups of associations about this aspect diverged. Most Turkish-oriented ones found it important, while Moroccan-oriented associations did not take a significant shared position. It can be assumed that Turkish migrants perceive that their access to property rights in Turkey could be compromised by the loss of their nationality of origin, while this is not the case for Moroccans.

The issue of transmitting the nationality of origin to migrants’ children born in Belgium was taken into consideration in the survey. The majority of both groups of associations recognized the importance of this question. This factor could be linked to sentimental reasons that, as seen above, appear to stem from a desire to maintain a double belonging and also to benefit from an additional value in the country of origin. This desire was perceived to be felt by migrants both for themselves and their children.

Regarding the cultural dimension of integration (and in particular the learning of the language of origin), kinship, religious organizations and media were considered to be the principal vehicles well before schools were. Oral communication with relatives – taking place both in the country of destination and when travelling to the country of origin – and particularly television, even if not explicitly mentioned in the survey, were described by associations as crucial ways of transmitting
language skills. Schools also seem to play a role but to a lesser extent and outside the national curricula. However, teaching the native language is not a competence exclusive to private schools or schools established by other countries. Belgian public schools also provide such courses as extracurricular studies. According to respondents, the language skills of migrants can be an asset in several activity sectors, such as cultural production, import/export, diplomatic missions and religious organizations. In contrast, those language skills seem to be less valued in sectors such as teaching or multi-national companies, where apparently the knowledge of French, followed by English, is considered more useful.

A third dimension which could be analysed as a possible domain within which migrants deploy a set of integration strategies is residential integration. Nevertheless, only two Turkish-oriented associations and one Moroccan-oriented association partially worked in this dimension and were able to give some information about the actions of migrants in this domain. What is particularly apparent from data concerning Turkish-oriented associations is that Belgian banks are the only source of funding that migrants use to secure housing in Belgium.

6. Main conclusions

Two bilateral agreements for temporary labour migration initiated significant flows of Moroccan and Turkish migrants to Belgium. However, they were negotiated differently. In both agreements, the interests and objectives of the country of destination were the same. This was not the case for the countries of origin, however. Obviously Morocco and Turkey encouraged emigration and expected remittances and the return of their emigrants along with new professional skills. But the government of Turkey demonstrated a greater interest in the protection of Turkish migrant workers’ interests. Specific provisions were thus included in the bilateral agreement between Belgium and Turkey, such as the possible family reunification of dependent parents and access to social housing. A first key finding is that bilateral agreements, and more broadly emigration/immigration policies, constitute a basis for differentiated integration between migration corridors.

Furthermore, a second key finding is that the countries of origin may have an impact on integration from the beginning, when emigration starts. The Turkish and Moroccan association survey shows that respondents consider official pre-departure programs to be relevant to integration in the Belgian labour market. Furthermore, a mobility partnership has been signed recently involving Belgium and Morocco. It aims in particular to improve the information available to qualified Moroccan citizens on employment, education and training opportunities available in the EU. Another objective is to support the integration of Moroccan migrants who regularly visit an EU Member State. It is too early to assess the implementation of this mobility partnership for Belgium. But it can be considered an immigration agreement between both origin and destination countries that takes integration dimensions into account from an early stage. This impact, however, has to be articulated with the immigration policy of the destination country which can grant specific rights.

The report shows that migration patterns seem similar for both Moroccan and Turkish migrants. They started with temporary labour migration that ended in permanent settlement, followed by family and marriage migration through a similar mechanism of chain migration. Nevertheless, it also shows different patterns of integration. The integration index was particularly obvious regarding two closely related dimensions: labour market and education.
Table 8. INTERACT integration index for Belgium: Moroccan vs. Turkish immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moroccan immigrants</th>
<th>Turkish immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Market Integration Index</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Integration Index</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015.

First of all, neither of the two groups has been well integrated into the labour market or in education. One could expect that accurate integration in education would go hand in hand with efficient integration into the labour market, but the results are far from that. Even though Moroccan migrants seem better integrated in education, they are less integrated into the labour market. Turkish migrants, however, who seem very weakly integrated in education, are almost twice as integrated into the labour market. The explanations are structural. Indeed, the Belgian labour market is highly segmented and Turkish migrants are employed in sectors where a low level of education is required (Wets 2006). Furthermore, in order to combat unemployment, Turkish immigrants have opted for self-employment by opening ethnic businesses, among other things. The share of tertiary-educated is two times higher for Moroccan migrants (10.8%) than for Turks (5.6%), and the segmented labour market may also highlight the fact that educated Moroccans have difficulty accessing positions that match their qualifications.

What can the impact of the countries of origin be, given these specific results? Since the end of active labour recruitment in 1974, few new migrants have come from Morocco and Turkey to work. Or more precisely, most Moroccan and Turkish migrants who legally entered Belgium during the four last decades were admitted for family reasons. Less than 10% came for work, a very small share came for studies and even fewer obtained protection for humanitarian reasons. In other words, this dominant migration channel does not really allow the countries of origin to try to have an impact on integration in the labour market, as in the case of bilateral agreements for labour migration. But the qualitative survey showed that labour market integration is a critical issue, and that organizations oriented towards both Turkish and Moroccan migrants are active in this particular field of integration. Another key finding is thus that countries of origin may have no impact on certain integration dimensions such as education and the labour market in the destination country. In this case, integration relies instead on other key elements, namely the opportunity structures available in the destination country and migrants’ capacity for mobilization.

The citizenship integration indexes demonstrate a high rate of acquisition of Belgian nationality for both Moroccan and Turkish migrants with respective scores of 0.93 and 1. One can infer that in this particular dimension, integration succeeded because (until recently) the federal Belgian government considered the acquisition of Belgian nationality to be a major tool of integration. Belgian integration policy was developed accordingly, facilitating access to Belgian nationality for foreign residents. Nevertheless, the recent change in the Belgian nationality code reveals a shift in approach; nationality acquisition is now used to recompense integration. Here the slight differences between the two groups could be attributed to the different attitudes of the countries of origin regarding dual citizenship. Indeed, Turkey allowed and promoted the acquisition of citizenship from the new country of residence earlier than Morocco. Moroccan authorities have been more reluctant and were slow to accept dual citizenship. Until the early 1990s, they used to actively and strongly discourage their citizens abroad from acquiring nationality (or voting or integrating in any way) in the countries of destination (De Haas 2007: 19). Thus it seems that for some specific dimensions of integration, the countries of origin may have a positive or negative impact. In this case, the dimension is citizenship. This is not a surprise, as with the acquisition of new citizenship there lies a risk of loosened links with emigrants.
The country of origin may then demonstrate opposition to dual citizenship and dual allegiance (as Morocco did for a while). Or on the contrary, the country of origin may bet on the permanence of links with emigrants despite an additional citizenship (Turkey).

To conclude, both Moroccan and Turkish governments have been inclined to protect their economic and political interests through a growing engagement with Turkish and Moroccan migrants in Belgium. At the beginning of the mass migration to Belgium, they mainly supported the economic dimension of integration in the Belgian labour market. They expected remittances from temporary migrant workers and they also hoped that their migrants would acquire new skills that the Moroccan and Turkish economies could benefit from. After the end of migration recruitment in the mid-1970s, other dimensions of integration were progressively taken into account. Turkey, earlier than Morocco, encouraged the legal and political integration of Turkish migrants in Belgium through a dual citizenship law in the early 1980s. It is only in the late 1990s that the Moroccan government began to encourage migrants’ political integration. Morocco and Turkey have thus developed legal frameworks and measures that are oriented toward their diasporas in a quite different ways. Turkey has certainly been quicker to consider the importance of the diaspora and has been more proactive, whereas Morocco, despite the huge number of Moroccans in Belgium, has been slower and perhaps less efficient in this respect.

The table below shows the legal and political systems that frame Turkish and Moroccan diasporas abroad, and in this case in Belgium.

| Table 9. State-level framework of emigration/diaspora policies: Turkey vs. Morocco |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| **Legal framework for emigrants/diaspora**       | **Turkey**                                      | **Morocco**                                    |
| Formal and organized structure                   | 2003 Law on the entry and sojourn of foreigners, immigration and irregular emigration |
| **Approach towards emigrants**                   | Controlling, protecting and engaging diaspora   | Controlling, protecting and engaging diaspora   |
| **Main state-actors**                            | - Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities |
|                                                 | - Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad |
|                                                 | - High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad |
| **Socio-economic rights**                        | Blue Card                                      | 1964 Bilateral agreement in force with Belgium  |
|                                                 | 1964 Bilateral agreement in force with Belgium  |
| **Political rights**                             | Right to vote in Presidential election, general election and for referendums |
| **Language and cultural and religious rights**   | - Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Affairs, Belçika Turk Islam Diyanet Vakfi, |
|                                                 | Cultural programmes and language courses. Turkish teachers and imams sent abroad. |
| **Dual citizenship**                             | Actively supported as a tool for integration abroad | Formally forbidden, but increasingly tolerated informally |
Countries of origin can have a significant role in encouraging and accelerating integration in the country of destination or, on the contrary, they can have a significant role in delaying the integration process. The main objectives of both Moroccan and Turkish diaspora policies seem to be to maintain and develop links with their respective diaspora. They want to benefit from Moroccan or Turkish migrants residing in Belgium. The survey results show that associations were quite doubtful about the impact of countries of origin on integration in Belgium. And the INTERACT research also showed that it was quite difficult to measure or even evaluate the impact that countries of origin may have on integration. It would be consistent to recognize that the initial objectives of Turkish and Moroccan diaspora policies are not directly focused on integration in Belgium. Migrant integration can instead be considered an “unstated objective” of diaspora policies (Délano 2010). Nevertheless, engagement to maintain and develop links and to protect Turkish and Moroccan migrants’ rights abroad can be considered a way of empowering migrants. The countries of origin can thus facilitate integration, but only indirectly.
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