INTERACT – RESEARCHING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS’ INTEGRATION AS A THREE-WAY PROCESS - IMMIGRANTS, COUNTRIES OF EMIGRATION AND COUNTRIES OF IMMIGRATION AS ACTORS OF INTEGRATION

Corridor Report on Sweden
The case of Iranian and Turkish Immigration

Francesco Pasetti

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Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

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GRITIM – Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
INTERACT - Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - 
Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

In 2013 (Jan. 1st), around 34 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) were currently living in the European Union (EU), representing 7% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a passive, process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working together to build a cohesive society.

Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: first, where they come and second, where they now live. While integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants interact with their home country.

INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to support their rights).

INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued by EU member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way?

A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done.

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For more information:
INTERACT
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI)
Villa Malafrasca
Via Boccaccio 151
50133 Florence
Italy
Tel: +39 055 46 85 817/892
Fax: + 39 055 46 85 755
Email: mpc@eui.eu

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/
Abstract

This report investigates the integration of Turkish and Iranian immigrants in Sweden. The analytical focus is placed on the complex net of ties between institutional actors’ belonging to destination country and to the country of origin, paying special attention to the role played by the latter, what will be labelled as the “origin effect”. The overall scenario of integration emerging from the analysis appears tangled and complex: both groups show high naturalization rates, but they present significant difficulties as regards inclusion in the labour market and in the educational context. Looking “at origin” allows for identifying crucial element to fully understand these evidences and respective integration processes. Despite the complexity to provide a plain picture of the origin effect – which for each group is ambivalent and strictly related to the actors involved, to the relations among them, and to the migratory historic profile – this corridor report offers new and interesting insights for the study of immigrant integration.

Key words: Immigration, integration, Sweden, Iranians, Turks
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1. Introduction

This corridor report is a publication of the INTERACT Project, co-financed by the European Union and implemented by the European University Institute. The project aims to study the integration of third-country nationals as a three-way process involving immigrants, the countries of emigration, and the countries of immigration as actors of integration. The reference to integration as a ‘three-way process’ reflects the European Commission’s departure from a vision of integration as a strictly two-way process. The Commission now acknowledges that countries of origin can also play a role in supporting the integration process (European Commission 2011a and 2011b).

Concretely, the INTERACT project looks into ways that governments and non-governmental institutions in origin countries make transnational bonds a reality. The central context of the project is the changing global environment in which migration to the EU takes place. At present, migrants are people who face the challenge of integration while constantly communicating with their networks back home (and around the world). They come from diverse places with which they often stay in touch on daily basis.

Following the logic of the research design, the relatively recent development of active diaspora and emigration policies in many countries of the world is central to our analysis. In addition, the impact of non-state actors which deal with migrants on the implementation of these policies and on their integration in the EU has not yet been studied.

By a corridor, we mean a pair of countries: one origin and one destination. The corridors have been chosen to allow for cross-country comparison, both at the destination and origin. The proposed approach allowed the comparison of different corridors that share either a common origin or destination, and with it, an analysis of the impact of the countries of origin on integration at various destinations as well as a comparison of various migrant communities at the same destination. The aim is to disentangle and further hypothesise the role of the communities of origin and its variations according to destination.

Sweden is an important immigration country in the European Union; it is one of the main destinations for migrants, especially refugees. Since new rules on labour migration came into force in 2008, Sweden’s migration policy has been recognized as among the most open and liberal of OECD countries. At the same time, immigrant integration problems keep recurring; the 2013 riots in the suburbs of Stockholm are a recent example.

The current report addresses these matters and the issue of immigrant integration more generally, focusing on specific immigrant groups, namely Turks and Iranians. These are two of the most prominent non-EU foreign communities in the country, which represent two different migratory realities at various levels. At destination, different policies apply as Turks come mainly as immigrant workers or family members of workers and Iranians as refugees. Significant differences also appear at origin. Turkey is a close EU ally, with a history of EU ties and the will to become a new EU member. The same cannot be said of Iran, which has never been a close EU partner, and whose politics targeting expatriates appear to clash with the Swedish integration framework.

In this report we will analyse the differences and similarities between the two immigrants groups at destination, as well as between the two countries of origin in order to investigate their respective processes of integration and integration outcomes. To what extent do Swedish policies on immigrant integration and the emigrant policies pursued by governments and non-state actors from Iran and Turkey complement or contradict each other? What effective contributions do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way? To answer these questions we rely on a data triangulation method of data collection and analysis (see next section on Methodology.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section illustrates the methodology underlying the report and the INTERACT Project more generally. Then a general overview of migration trends from Turkey and Iran to Sweden is given, in order to show similarities and differences between the two groups. Section “4” examines the integration policies established at destination, and the emigration and diaspora policies in the sending countries. Then, relying on synthetic indexes, we provide a quantitative assessment of the integration trends of Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden. These results are addressed in the following section, which offers some explanation grounded in data gathered from the project. Lastly, the report provides concluding remarks about the effect of the country of origin, which has been labelled “the origin effect”.

2. Methodology

The report is based on three different data sources (data triangulation): an analysis of the legal and political frameworks; a quantitative analysis; and a survey.

The analysis of the legal and analytical frameworks was divided by country of origin and destination. In the countries of destination (EU28) we analysed the integration policy framework; in the countries of origin (55 non-EU countries) we analysed emigration and diaspora policy frameworks. The main questions asked concerned main stakeholders, policy actors, policy discourses, and legal frameworks. For the quantitative analysis we use a synthetic index of integration developed in Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti (2015). It allows a comparison of the level of integration of migrants in EU Member States by dimension and by migration corridor. To this end, a set of integration indicators were identified for each dimension, drawing on relevant national datasets. Using the Principal Component Analysis technique, the number of such indicators was reduced and replaced with a smaller number of new variables. These new variables (principal components) explain the maximum amount of variation among the performances of different immigration corridors, considering the three domains separately. On this basis, a synthetic index that allows the ranking of the immigrant corridors within each dimension was created. The main indicators building up the main three indexes were:

Labour market integration index
- Employment rate
- Unemployment rate
- Activity rate
- Over-qualification rate

Education integration index
- Highest educational attainment
- School enrolment rate at age 15-25
- School enrolment rate at age 25-35
- % of international students at age 20-24

Citizenship integration index
- Citizenship acquisition rate
- % of naturalised citizens of the total born-abroad population (2013 data)

The indexes rank the corridors based on the level of integration by assigning numbers from 0 to 1. The higher the rank, the better the integration. In the corridor reports, the index is calculated without taking into account the gap between migrants and natives. It should be interpreted whereby the higher the
index, the better the performance of that corridor compared to the other corridors (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015).

The INTERACT survey was an exploratory survey conducted between December 2013 and September 2014. The survey targeted civil society organisations working in 82 countries (28 EU countries of destination and 54 countries of origin with more than 100,000 migrants residing in the EU). Any organisation dealing with migrant integration in one of the eight dimensions (labour market, education, language, social interactions, religion, political and civic participation, nationality issues, housing) could take part in the survey. Respondents could choose between one and three integration dimensions in which their organisation was active. The survey was translated into 28 languages and over 900 responses were collected online and over the phone. Although the exploratory character of the survey does not allow one to make generalisations about the whole population of civil society organisations, it sheds light onto how these actors’ activities impact migrant integration between the origin and destination. However, the survey does much more than just map these activities in the comparative context. It also shows how organisations perceive states of origin and their policies in the context of the day-to-day reality of incorporating migrants into the receiving society. In this report, only information pertaining to Turkish and Iranian immigrants in Sweden is presented.\footnote{For more information, please refer to the forthcoming INTERACT survey report.}

A final caveat should be made regarding the constraints of data availability. According to the policy of the Swedish national institute of statistics, statistical data accessible outside the country (free of charge) represents a very limited portion of the whole dataset; the majority of accessible data is available only at an aggregated level. For this reason, in order to offer a richer analysis of Iranian and Turkish communities in Sweden, this report has relied on other sources of data (i.e. the Migration Board, or Migrationsverket) and on specific literature focused on such communities. In addition, it is important to take into consideration the fact that the Swedish census only considers specific dimensions, namely: country of birth, citizenship and parents’ citizenship. This makes it very problematic to identify different ethnic/national groups within each community of origin. For instance, within the Turkish community it is not possible to discern between Turks, Kurds, and Syrians (Fredlund-Blokmst 2014), even if we know from the literature (Westin 2003) that the Turkish community in Sweden is equally distributed among these ethnicities. The same problem goes for Iranians. Unfortunately, in this case the literature is not a great help, with most of the studies focusing on Iranians with Muslim backgrounds and leaving other ethnic and religious minorities essentially overlooked (Kelly 2011).

3. Immigration trends of people born in Iran and Turkey to Sweden

3.1 Immigration history of Iranians and Turks into Sweden

Sweden’s modern era of immigration began after the Second World War, and can be described as divided into two distinct periods: the first characterized primarily by labour-force immigration and the second marked by a shift towards refugee and family migration (Bevelander 2004). The former lasted from 1945 to the first half of the 1970s. During this period two different migration trends alternated, both pushed by the expansion of the Swedish economy and the flourishing of its industry: one comprised of skilled migrants coming mainly from Germany and the Nordic countries (during the 1950s), and another of unskilled and low-skilled workers coming from Southern European countries such as Greece and Yugoslavia (during the 1960s) (Envall 2012). In those days, in addition to the foreign labour recruited by major industrial companies, an increasing number of migrant jobseekers started to come to Sweden of their own accord. In order to meet labour demand, Sweden did not set up a guest worker program as other countries did, but instead opted for a policy of permanent
immigration that treated labour migrants like future citizens. This was one of the main results of the cooperation between the government and the trade unions confederation, which agreed that importing cheap labour would not be allowed (Roth and Hertzberg 2010). All of this changed when labour migration was stopped at the end of 1960s. Due to the economic downturn and increased unemployment, the demand for foreign labour declined and migrant worker inflows dropped significantly. Furthermore, the government, pushed by critics, changed the rule governing entrance into Sweden.

The new rules began to apply in 1968 and meant that future work and residence-permit applicants from non-Nordic countries had to apply before they entered the country, while at the same time arranging for both a job and a place to live. This dramatically reduced labour immigration from non-Nordic countries in the following decades (Bevelander 2004: 7).

The beginning of the 1970s marks the start of a new era of immigration in Sweden. The drastic reduction of labour inflows was offset by an increase of refugees and family migration which characterized the second phase modern immigration. These new groups of immigrants were predominantly tied movers and various categories of refugees, and included a greater share of non-European immigrants with migration motives other than work (Bevelander 2004: 8).

Iranian immigration began at end of the 1970s. Until then, there were very few Iranians in Sweden. Most were students who generally planned to return to Iran following their graduation (Kelly 2011). Things changed drastically with the 1979 revolution and then later with the Iran-Iraq war, which led to a large exodus of people. This happened at the same time that traditional destination countries (i.e. the United States, France and the United Kingdom) became increasingly closed to migration inflows, which led Iranian migrants to direct their attention toward Northern Europe and, in particular, toward Sweden (Hosseini-Kaladjahi and Kelly 2012). As already mentioned, the beginning of the second phase of the immigration process in Sweden was characterized by a rapid increase in asylum applicants: from about 3,000 in 1983 to more than 30,000 in 1989. Of these, the great majority had Iranian citizenship: between 1978 and 1991 more than 23,000 Iranian asylum seekers received legal refugee status in Sweden (Almqvist and Hwang 1999). Many of them had been part of the leftist

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2 In Figure 1, taken from Bevelander (2004: 7), immigration is defined as the number of foreign-born people migrating to Sweden. Unless otherwise specified in this report, immigrants are identified as foreign-born people.
opposition at the time of the revolution and found the Swedish socialist model appealing (Hosseini-Kaladjahi 1997). Some had suffered persecution by the Iranian regime and had very strong reasons for applying for asylum; others sought asylum in order to preserve their pre-revolutionary lifestyles or to protect their children (Kelly 2013).

Immigration coming from Turkey followed a different path. It began in the late 1960s with inflows of male labour, pushed by difficult economic situations and high unemployment in Turkey as well as drawn by job opportunities and a flourishing economy in Sweden. Back then, Turkish migrants were a small foreign community in the country, who came primarily from the districts of Konya and Kulu; a few also came from the Istanbul region (Bayram et al. 2009). Although there were some city-born skilled workers among early emigrants, most were rural-born unskilled workers who had first migrated to large cities and then moved to Western Europe (Karci Korfali et al. 2014). Such migration flows were framed within the institutional framework established by the Turkish government in its First Five-year Development Plan (1962-1967), which delineated the “export of surplus labour power” as a component of development policy to support prospective flows of remittances and reductions in unemployment (Icduygu 2008). With the same aim, Turkey signed bilateral agreements on labour recruitment with Western European countries, including: Austria, Belgium, Holland, France, Germany and Sweden (the latter in 1967).

Notwithstanding the original intention of the policymakers, Turkish immigrants admitted on guest-workers schemes settled permanently in western host countries by acquiring permanent resident (and in some cases citizenship status). This was even more the case in Sweden, which unlike other countries, opted for a policy of permanent immigration. Thus, despite the closing of western borders that followed the oil crisis, the Turkish community abroad continued to increase due to family reunification and the admission of asylum seekers as refugees, which became the two dominant forms of entrance into the country. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the channel of admission under refugee status was used predominantly by the Kurdish population, who sought political refuge in Sweden as well as in other European countries, after the insurgency for Kurdish rights was launched in the early 1980s.

3.2 Comparative statistical figures on Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden

As of 31 December 2013, foreign-born residents in Sweden numbered 1,533,493, representing 15.9% of the total population. Three-quarters came from non-EU countries, primarily from Iraq, Iran, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The once-dominant Scandinavians, who composed well over half of Sweden’s foreign-born population in 1960, makes up only one-sixth of it today.

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3 Including people born in Sweden whose parents were born abroad, the overall number of people with a “foreign background” exceeds 2 million, which is equal to 20% of the total population.
Table 1. Top 10 foreign groups, 2013  
(Foreign-born residents and percentage of the immigrant population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>161,129</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>128,946</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>78,175</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>67,211</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>56,804</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>54,221</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>48,987</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>45,676</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>43,198</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>42,523</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Sweden, own elaboration.

Taken together, Iranian and Turkish communities represent more than 7% of the immigrant population living in Sweden: the former constitutes the fourth largest foreign community, with 67,211 individuals, whereas the latter is made up of 45,676 people born in Turkey, ranking at 8th place.

Iranian and Turkish immigrants have followed different migration paths, both in terms of distribution over time (Figure 2), as well as the different channels of entrance that they have chosen (Figure 3).

Figure 2. Foreign-born people in Sweden: Iranian vs. Turkish

* For 1975, foreign-born people were considered the number of aliens with certificates of registration plus the number of aliens with residence permits.  
Source: Statistics Sweden, own elaboration.
On the one hand, Turkish immigration has changed considerably with regard to forms of entry and immigrant status in Europe, shifting from labour migration to family migration and political exile as asylum seekers. On the other hand, Iranian immigration has continued to be comprised primarily of refugees and family migrants who are middle-class and highly educated. As pointed out by the literature, this is related to: i) crucial events that characterize the history of each country, ii) the micro and macro characteristics of these populations, and iii) the specific politico-institutional structures within which their migrations took place (Bayram et al. 2009; Hosseini-Kaladjahi and Kelly 2012; Kelly 2013; Westin 2006).

The groups considered present similar age distributions, with the great majority of both communities concentrated in the range of 25-54 years old, very small percentages of children from 0 to 14 years old (around 3% for both Iranian and Turkish foreign-born persons) and a small percentage of elderly, older than 65 years (equal, respectively, to 7.8% for Iranians and 8.7% for Turks) (Figure 4).
The relationship between the male and female populations is also similar between the two communities, with a slight majority of men: 52.4% for Iranian immigrants and 55.2% for Turkish. This relationship has remained constant over the last ten years, with a small decrease in the proportion of Turkish women (Table 2).

### Table 2. Share of immigrants according to their gender, 2004-2013: Iranian vs. Turkish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Iranian immigrants</th>
<th>Turkish immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
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<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: M = Men; W = Women
Source: Statistics Sweden, own elaboration.

The age distribution between genders approximately follows general patterns for both communities, with the great majority of men and women concentrated in the range of 25-54 years old (Table 3). From a historical perspective, the first inflows were predominately men. Then since the 1990s, the balance between men and women equalled out, mostly as a result of family reunifications (Karci Korfali et al. 2014).

### Table 3. Share of immigrant men and women according to their age group in 2013: Iranian vs. Turkish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Iranian immigrants</th>
<th>Turkish immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to 14</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 24</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 64</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 or +</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tot. | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Note: M = Men; W = Women
Source: Statistics Sweden, own elaboration.

### 4. Institutional and policy framework

#### 4.1 Institutional and policy framework of integration policies in Sweden

Sweden has faced immigration issues since the end of World War II. The attitude of policymakers has changed over time as well, as immigration measures were established according to the evolution of the phenomenon; in particular, during the shift from labour immigration (up until the early 1970s) to refugee and tied immigration (from the 1970s onward). Until the early 1970s there was no proper migration policy, as such; legislators’ main concerns were to fill the labour shortages that characterized the domestic market (Bevelander 2004); to that end, specific actions were put in force, such as the development of immigration offices and the strengthening of Swedish-language education for foreign-born people. It is only in the mid 1970s that comprehensive migration policies were issued, inspired by principles of pluralism and equality between immigrants and the native population. In those days, policymakers were focused on labour market integration (given the need to cope with growing unemployment among foreigners) and refugee management, especially as regards residential integration (to this end a dispersion housing policy was introduced in 1985). For a specific policy

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4 This section relies on the information provided by Andersson and Weinar (2014) on Sweden, along with two internal INTERACT reports on Turkey and Iran.
addressing integration, we have to wait until the creation of the Integration Board in 1998. In line with Swedish legislative tradition the Integration Board pursued the equality between foreigners and natives according to an understanding of integration as a mutual process of adaptation between the host society and incoming immigrants and it inaugurated a concrete area of policymaking which assumed increasing relevance within the governance of migration.

In the current political agenda, integration represents a critical issue. This is linked to several interrelated reasons, such as: i) the urban riots of May 2013, which took place across several Stockholm suburbs with the participation of many immigrant-origin youths and an intense media coverage that strongly impacted public opinion about immigration; and ii) the recent decision of Swedish government to grant a permanent residence permit to all Syrians arriving in the country, which in turn, raised issues about refugee management and burden-sharing among municipalities. These events occurred in a parliamentary landscape that has seen the growing prominence of the Sweden Democrats, a far-right party that taps into currents of xenophobia in the country by pushing for a halt to “mass immigration”. At the same time, it is worth noticing that the last labour immigration law, issued in 2008, was met with harsh opposition from the Social Democrats and trade unions, who accused the law of favouring exploitation and jeopardizing the rights of foreign workers.

All this makes integration a highly prevalent theme in the Swedish political landscape. Issues of segregation, labour market inclusion and provisions for asylum seekers are particularly high on the agenda. These matters are crucial to understanding the underlying rationale of Swedish legislators’ recent policymaking in the area of migration and integration.

**Main actors**

The actual integration policy involves different institutional actors at national and local level. The main institution responsible for the management and implementation of integration policies is the Ministry of Employment. Within this agency, a key role is played by the Minister of Integration, who is directly in charge of integration matters, including: i) the incorporation of new arrivals into the labour market and into society as a whole; ii) the distribution of resources among municipalities for refugee reception; iii) naturalization procedures; iv) urban development. That said, all the different phases of the integration process are managed according to a model of multi-level governance in collaboration with several ministries and agencies:

| Table 4. Institutional actors dealing with integration at a national level |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| **Actor**                        | **Tasks/Policy-areas**          |
| Ministry of Integration          | • New arrivals                  |
|                                 | • Resource distribution for refugee management |
|                                 | • Naturalization procedure      |
|                                 | • Urban development             |
| Ministry of Justice (Swedish Migration Board) | Migration policies (and related administrative matters) |
| Police (reporting to the Ministry of Justice) | Border control and return procedures |
| Migration courts (Migrationsdomstolar) and Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstol) | • Citizenship acquisition  |
|                                 | • Asylum seekers admission      |
|                                 | • Return procedures             |
| County Administrative Boards (Länsstyrelserna) | Reception of unaccompanied minors |
| Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen) | New arrivals |
| Youth Board (Ungdomsstyrrelsen)   | Anti-discrimination (endowing NGOs) |

*(continues)*
Table 4. Institutional actors dealing with integration at a national level (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Tasks/Policy-areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swedish ESF Council (under the Ministry of Labour)</td>
<td>Management of the Social Fund (Socialfonden) and the Integration Fund (Integrationsfonden).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Agency for Education (Skolverket).</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Board on Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen).</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket).</td>
<td>Housing and residential integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassies, consulates and diplomatic agencies</td>
<td>Visa-issuing and related matters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Their actions are complemented at the local level by the measures established by municipalities (kommuner), which contribute in several policy-areas: a) Refugee reception. Due to its voluntary nature, municipalities have taken on this task in an uneven fashion with serious problems concerning a shortage of places for unaccompanied children; b) Labour inclusion. Municipalities provide the civics element of the introduction plan, which is carried out with central state funding. However, since the Public Employment Agency took charge of the new introduction plans, their role in labour market integration has been diminished; c) Provision of Swedish language courses for immigrants (Svenska för invandrare or SFI) and other measures for educational inclusion (while the SFI courses are generally seen to bear results, incentives for student progress were removed since these did not show a marked increase in language performance); d) Support and guidance for housing; e) Specific actions and initiatives targeting youth and children.

Main policy tools

As stated by the Fact Sheet on Integration, published by the former Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, the goal of Sweden’s integration policy is to “ensure equal rights, obligations and opportunities for all, irrespective of their ethnic and cultural background”(Regeringskansliet 2009: 1).

Swedish integration policy has operated along the lines of an empowerment policy that has been generally applied to groups who suffer from social exclusion, discrimination and lack of opportunities. Public education, social welfare benefits, public health services, political participation, interest organizations and active labour market interventions were policies that developed during the course of building the welfare state (Heckmann and Schnapper 2003: 105-134). In effect, these same instruments have been employed for the purpose of immigrant integration; Swedish integration policies rely on the general welfare policies administered by the public sector to a greater extent than in any other European country (Bayram et al. 2009: 91).

To this end, in 2008 the Government launched an integration strategy for the 2008-10 period, driven by seven main objectives: i) to ensure a faster introduction for new arrivals; ii) to create jobs and to stimulate entrepreneurship among foreigners; iii) to get better education results and to achieve greater equality in school; iv) to attain better language skills and to enhance adult education opportunities; v) to deploy effective anti-discrimination measures; vi) to enhance the urban development of districts and suburbs with extensive social exclusion; vii) to share and sustain common basic values. The labour market represents the main focus of Swedish policymakers in the area of integration. After the 2010 decision to speed up the integration of new arrivals, the Public Employment Agency was given the responsibility for coordinating introduction activities. The agency drew up an “introduction plan” to speed up social and labour market integration, as well as an “introduction guide” to help migrants in the first period after their arrival, which asks them to participate in a civic orientation. While participation in the introduction plan is not compulsory, a new benefit is paid to migrants who participate in introduction activities, regardless of where they have settled in Sweden. In addition, a set of different activities has been established to improve job placement for immigrants.
• The “nystartsjöbb” (“new start jobs”) for newly arrived immigrants and the long-term unemployed, under which employers can obtain subventions for hiring foreigners.

• The “prova-på-plats” (“try-place”), which represents a form of structured work experience.

• Support to foreign entrepreneurs and business owners through mentorships, advice and networking.

The labour-market focus of these activities is mirrored by official pre-departure initiatives. In this regard, the role played employers needs to be pointed out; since the last reform in 2008, employers are in charge of skills evaluation in the recruitment process abroad. Migrants’ barriers to international recruitment include the lack of information and language skills as well as a reliance on middlemen. To deal with these matters, the Migration Board is considering the implementation of new measures, including the improvement of its web portal and a search for partnerships with associations based in the countries of origin.

As regards naturalization procedures, the Sweden system allows foreigners with a permanent residence permit, who have lived in the country for at least five years, to apply for Swedish citizenship. Unlike many other European countries, citizenship can be granted regardless of language/knowledge skills.

Swedish for Immigrants (Svenska för invandrare or SFI), the national free Swedish language course offered to immigrants, represents a cornerstone of Sweden’s integration policy, although financial results-based incentives (the “SFI bonus”) have now been removed. Courses, provided by municipalities, are available to immigrants who are older than 16 and possess a residence permit and a Swedish national registration number. Daytime courses usually involve 15-20 hours a week of classroom time, and evening courses about 6 hours a week. Professional specializations are also available.

A law on discrimination entered into force in 2009, and accordingly a new authority, the Equality Ombudsman, was created to ensure that law’s implementation.

In the 2014 Budget, the government launched a new set of policy initiatives on integration.

• Citizenship ceremonies offered in all municipalities in order to “use citizenship as a tool for integration”.

• Tailored training programmes run by Swedish folkhögskolor (adult education establishments), which include language learning.

• An extra fund for measures that fight against xenophobia and intolerance.

• Increased state support for municipalities accepting new arrivals.

4.2 Institutional and policy framework of emigration and diaspora policies of Iran and Turkey

The INTERACT theoretical framework introduces a clear conceptual division between emigration and diaspora policies. Thus, emigration policies are conceived as “all policies that regulate (either facilitating or limiting) outward migration, mobility across countries and possible return” (Unterreiner and Weinar 2014: 12). These policies include bilateral agreements on labour mobility, agreements on the portability of rights or recognition of qualifications, pre-departure trainings, as well as visa facilitations and other legal measures facilitating (or preventing) cross-border mobility. The distinctive feature of such policies is that they do not focus on the permanent settlement of emigrants abroad. In contrast, diaspora policies are “policies that engage emigrants and members of diaspora communities (both organised communities and those comprised of individuals) with their countries of origin, building a sense of belonging and strengthening ties” (Unterreiner and Weinar 2014: 13). In this case, the definition is actor-driven, in the sense that the concrete set of measures and tools addressing the
diaspora community is strictly related to the practices implemented in their country of origin by both state and non-state actors. In this regard, it is worth noting that these policies have two dimensions: collective and individual. The former refers to measures targeting migrants and their descendents as a group (e.g. policies focusing on associations or community schools abroad), while the latter refers to measures targeting migrants as individuals (e.g. electoral law or access to nationality).

Despite such distinctions, which concern two different periods of the migratory process, it is difficult to identify the concrete moment in which the “phase of emigration” finishes and the “stage of permanent settlement abroad” begins. It is worth noticing that emigration and diaspora policies tend to overlap if emigrants do not return to the origin country or settle abroad.

**Emigration policies**

In Iran, there is no single comprehensive legal act that specifically addresses emigration. It is only possible to find scattered legal norms and administrative regulations which govern different aspects of emigration. In general terms, the Iranian government has not encouraged emigration in the past and still does not. Its overriding concern is that of return migration; it provides support for the return of Iranian expatriates. As a result, the majority of Iranian refugees and those who have illegally exited the country can easily return by completing a series of administrative procedures and formalities at an Iranian embassy or consulate. That said, it is worth noting that one of the main objectives set by the Fourth and Fifth Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plans was the adoption of measures to support the dispatch of the labour force abroad. To this end, a comprehensive and strategic legislation is currently under codification. In addition, in order to promote the employment of Iranians abroad and to further support the presence of Iranian experts in foreign markets, a tripartite memorandum was concluded in 2013 between the Ministry of Labour and Social welfare, the Trade Promotion Organisation of Iran and the Iranian Trade Association of International Recruitment Offices.

In contrast, Turkish emigrants rely on an extensive network of actors and political measures which target their interests and needs. Turkey’s systematic approach towards emigration is gradually becoming more visible with the general expansion of emigrants’ political, civic, socio-economic and cultural rights. Still, it should be noted that this approach, and the related institutional and political framework, have undergone a complex transformation over the last decades; this began in the 1960s with the First Five-year Development Plan (1962-1967), which manifested the clear intention of policymakers to export surplus labour power as a crucial tool for development. According to the same rationale, namely to reduce unemployment and increase remittances, bilateral labour agreements were signed with Sweden (1967) and with other Western countries. During this period, the two core institutions regulating the flows of labour migrants were the State Planning Organization (DPT) and the Turkish Employment Service (İİBK). Other relevant bodies included the Ministry of Labour and the Social Security Overseas Branch, the Coordination Committees on the Problems of Workers and Citizens Abroad, the Village Development Cooperatives and the State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank (1975). The action of these bodies found implementation in three main legal measures pursuing economic growth and development: the First and the Second Five year Development Plans (respectively in force from 1963 to 1967 and from 1968 to 1973) and the Law on Housing and Artisan Loans and Lending Money to Workers Abroad (1964). Policies changed in the 1980s, when Turkish permanent settlement in Europe was generally accepted and policymakers’ concerns shifted toward return migration and the integration of the Turkish diaspora abroad. Currently there is no functioning bilateral agreement on labour migration between Turkey and Sweden (in the sense of sending workers abroad).

On the whole, the two countries of origin taken into account present two different institutional frameworks to deal with their respective emigrants: on the one hand, Turkey, which over time has established an active policy to address its emigrants, providing legal channels that favour outflow migration and grant emigrants rights abroad; and on the other hand, Iranian policymakers, who have
been reluctant emigration players, focusing more on the fight against political dissidents and on return migration. Such differences can be linked to different historical contexts and different migratory dynamics. Analogous differences, however, can be found in the domain of diaspora policies.

Diaspora policies

The Iranian government has not yet established a comprehensive and effective policy addressing its diaspora community, which is predominately comprised of people who left the country after the 1979 revolution and the war with Iraq (1980-1989). However during the last decade, some efforts have been centred on the preservation of ties and connections with Iranians living abroad. In 2005, the High Council of Iranian Affairs Abroad was established, which represents the main and most important public body in Iran dealing with Iranian affairs abroad. Initially under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was transferred to the Office of the President during the first mandate of President Ahmadinejad; at that point its structure was enhanced. It now includes seven working groups dedicated to specific tasks (Consulate; Scientific and Education Cooperation; Economics and Trade; Media and Culture; Modern Science and Technology; Judicial and Legal; Religion and Opinion). Other relevant public institutions active in diaspora policies are the Parliamentary Faction in Support of Iranian Nationals Living Abroad and the Department of International Affairs & Schools Abroad, which belongs to the Ministry of Education (the latter is a body in charge of a hundred of Iranian schools abroad).

More generally, it is the area of education, culture and identity perseverance in which is possible to find core actions targeting the diaspora community. The Fourth and the Fifth Development Plan stressed the promotion of Iranian and Islamic identities and the spread of the Persian language. In this regard, a crucial role is played by Iran’s National Elites Foundation, a governmental organization founded in 2005 by approval of the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council of Iran, which aims to support the national talents of Iran’s elite, for instance by funding the travels and movements of Iranian elites abroad.

As for political and social rights, Iranian expatriates have the right to vote in the presidential election and, since 2013, workers have been covered by a retirement plan in addition to disability insurance. This could be interpreted as another sign of increased openness towards emigrants settled abroad. Along the same line, the growing tolerance of dual nationality should be noted. Even if Iranian civil code does not formally recognize dual nationality and requires the repudiation of Iranian nationality as a pre-requisite for acquiring a foreign nationality, the public administration implicitly acknowledges dual nationality at the level of administrative practice; therefore, Iranian citizens are able to preserve their nationality while acquiring a foreign citizenship.

That said, the actions of the Turkish government are more than a step ahead of the Iranian government. A first point to take into consideration is the existence of bilateral agreements on labour migration; Turkey has signed bilateral agreements on double taxation with 80 countries (with Sweden in 1967) and on social security with 28 countries (with Sweden in 1977), allowing the portability of social rights as well as health benefits for both emigrants visiting Turkey and retired emigrants who have returned to Turkey.

An overview of the Turkish diaspora policy over time shows a move from a policy to promote return migration (1960s), to the maintenance of economic and social ties with emigrants (1970s), to the continued institutionalization of monitoring and control of Turkish populations overseas (1980s) and finally, to active state involvement in diaspora policies (1990s and 2000s). In the last two decades, Turkish governments have increased their engagement with emigrants and diaspora communities in host countries: legal and official incentives have been created, monitoring tools have been

5 However, it seems that employees working abroad through individual channels, and not via official recruitment, are not yet covered by such a benefit.
implemented and a diversified set of political measures have been carried out to secure links and to improve their living conditions abroad. At present, there are three major institutions responsible for the creation and implementation of the diaspora policy: i) the Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad, ii) the High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad, which searches and monitors the problems faced by Turkish citizens abroad, and iii) the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities, established in 2010, which is the decision maker in the area of diaspora policy. On the cultural front, the Ministry of Education has representation offices in several countries, including Sweden. Turkish language abroad is taught in line with the “Turkish Language and Culture Programme” which allows Turkish children abroad to benefit from elective Turkish classes in their schools. In addition, according to the decision taken by the Inter-Ministerial Common Culture Association (Bakanlıklararası Ortak Kültür Komisyonu), Turkish teachers and professors are sent to emigrants’ host countries. These teaching professionals usually find work in Turkish Culture Centres (linked to Embassies), in the Turkology Departments of universities or in European schools. As regards the education of Turkish children abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs establishes the number of teaching staff to be sent abroad. Regarding legal services, the General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs is responsible for Blue Card procedures for Turkish nationals who have given up their Turkish citizenship but wish to benefit from rights similar to Turkish citizens. On the media front, the public television channel TRT broadcasts internationally and acts as a tool of communication between Turkey and its emigrants abroad.

As regards the legal aspects of the diaspora policy, three developments deserve attention. The first one is the introduction of dual citizenship (1981) which, conceived as a practical tool of integration, significantly increased the number of Turkish citizens who obtained the citizenship of their host country. The second legal development is the inclusion of Turkish citizens abroad in the 1982 Constitution. The third development refers to the aforementioned Blue Card procedure, which since 1995 has granted political and social rights to migrants who terminated their Turkish citizenship in order to become citizens in their country of residence.

Finally, Turkish emigrants who are 18 or older can vote in general elections, presidential elections and on referendums in Turkey. Turkish citizens (including dual citizens) can also stand in the elections. There are four different modalities by which an emigrant can cast a vote from abroad: by regular mail, at the borders, at consulates abroad, and electronically. At each election, the Turkish High Election Council announces the available vote-casting modalities according to the country and election.

The differences between the states of origin that have been illustrated so far are reflected in the following table, which summarizes their respective systems of legal and political measures targeting emigrants and the diaspora.

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6 Turkish language is also taught at the Yunus Emre Institutes. None, however, have been established in Sweden.
7 Article 62 of the 1982 Constitution noted: “The Government takes measures to ensure the family unity of Turkish citizens working in foreign countries, to educate their children, to meet their cultural needs and to provide social security; to protect their link to the motherland and to facilitate their return”.

Table 5. State-level framework of emigration/diaspora policies: Iran vs. Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal framework for emigrants/diaspora</td>
<td>Formal and organized structure</td>
<td>No formal structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach towards emigrants</td>
<td>Control, protection and empowerment of diaspora</td>
<td>Indifference (feeble recognition of diaspora)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main state-actors</td>
<td>Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities</td>
<td>High Council of Iranian Affairs Abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic rights</td>
<td>Blue Card</td>
<td>Retirement plan ensured in special cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bilateral agreement on Social Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td>Right to vote in presidential election, general election and on referendum</td>
<td>Right to vote in general election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language and cultural rights</td>
<td>Cultural programmes and language courses. Turkish teachers sent abroad</td>
<td>Informal support for the preservation of the Islamic identity abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual citizenship</td>
<td>Actively supported as a tool for integration abroad</td>
<td>Formally forbidden, but increasingly tolerated informally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Integration trends of Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden

When discussing integration, the focus is centred on particular dimensions of the phenomenon, including the labour market, the educational context and citizenship-related issues. To deal with these dimensions, we use different statistical tools which range from simple indicators, traditionally employed in the literature, to more complex tools specifically developed for the INTERACT project; specifically, a synthetic index that relies on a specific set of indicators is elaborated for each dimension of integration: i) a Labour Market Integration Index, ii) an Education Integration Index and iii) a Citizenship Integration Index are calculated (see section on Methodology). The following table illustrates the results of these indexes for Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden.

Table 6. The Integration Index in Sweden:
a comparison between Iranian and Turkish immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iranian immigrants</th>
<th>Turkish immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Market Integration Index</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Integration Index</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship Integration Index</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INTERACT team estimations (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015).

The “scores” of these indexes give us a general idea about the level of integration of the immigrant groups examined. Considering different indexes altogether, the Iranian and Turkish communities show average levels of integration, with the former performing better than the latter (respectively 1.75 and 1.58 points out of 3 points available, which is the sum of the three indexes). However, by taking each
index into account individually, it is possible to have a more precise idea about the integration of these groups.

**Figure 5. Integration trends of Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden, Synthetic Indexes**

As shown in the table, Iranians show a higher level of integration than Turkish immigrants as regards the labour market (0.59 and 0.51) and an even greater difference as regards the educational context (0.34 and 0.17), whereas the latter perform better in terms of access to Swedish citizenship (0.90 and 0.82). Overall, it is worth noting a similarity between these immigrant groups regarding their respective trend of integration: on the one hand, both show a high tendency to acquire the nationality of their country of destination – which is generally believed to be an important factor of immigrant integration – and on the other, they show poor results in education, which on the contrary, illustrates considerable difficulties with the integration process.

Opposite trends include the labour market’s score in which, once again, the groups present interesting similarities with outcomes barely higher than the average threshold. Hereinafter, in order to get a clearer picture of each dimension of integration examined, some specific statistical indicators are taken into account. With the same aim, relevant information about the native population is also included.

As regards labour market indicators, Iranian and Turkish immigrants present analogous results, in particular when we consider respective shares of people categorized according to their economic status. Their active labour forces are similar to each other, equal to 65% and the 62% of their respective populations, which is even comparable to natives’ (63%). Even the labour force compositions are comparable for these groups, with similar shares of employed and employed people.
Yet, it is the latter that raises more concern in terms of integration; in this case the difference with the native population is significant: the unemployment rate is 15.4% for Turkish immigrants in Sweden and 15.6% for Iranians, but approximately 4.3% for the native population.

As regards job characteristics, it is interesting to note that the great majority of these immigrant communities are employed in the service sector.

Table 7. Labour market integration: Employment Type and Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Type and Sector</th>
<th>Iranian immigrants</th>
<th>Turkish immigrants</th>
<th>Swedish natives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of self-employment</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of employees</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.897</td>
<td>0.937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share employed in agriculture</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share employed in manufacturing</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share employed in services</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>0.910</td>
<td>0.770</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Sweden; Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015.

A notable difference concerns the nature of employment. While both the majorities of these groups are employed in relatively low-skilled occupations (employees with occupation ISCO from 4 to 9), their shares differ considerably: 80% of Turkish immigrants and 55% of Iranians fall into this category. This means that 45% of the latter are employed in high-skilled occupations (employees with occupation ISCO from 1 to 3), which is a score comparable to that of natives (46%).
This feature of high-qualifications which characterizes the collective of Iranian-born immigrants is mirrored in the data that relates to the educational context: one third is tertiary-educated. This is a notable fact given that it is a much higher share than among natives, where the number of tertiary-educated is equal to 18%. As regards Turkish immigrants, this figure is halved (9%).

Such a difference concerning the educational profile of Iranian and Turkish immigrants is confirmed by the data on the number of international students from these countries: between 2005 and 2012, approximately 1,125 students born in Iran came to Sweden every year to follow a course of study. The same figure is reduced to 281 international students for those born in Turkey.

These immigrants groups are also different from each other with regard to fields of study. Iranians have been educated primarily in technical studies fields (40%), and Turkish immigrants in humanities (43%). The following table provides more detail about the categorizations of these groups according to the type of study followed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8. Integration into the education context: fields of study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education, Field of study</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share with education in Humanities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share with education in Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share with education in Technical Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share with education in Health-related Studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last dimension of integration taken into account regards access to nationality, which can be viewed as an important factor of immigrant integration into the host country. In this respect, as pointed out by the scores in the aforementioned Citizenship Integration Index, Iranian and Turkish people living in Sweden appear highly integrated, with nearly 1,700 Swedish passports given every year, on average,\(^9\) to each group.

However, despite similar trends regarding access to the nationality of the host country, these Iranian and Turkish immigrants can be distinguished between each other according to the type of residence permit held.

**Figure 8. Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden: a categorization according to the residence permit held**

![Figure 8](image)

Source: Eurostat.

In the light of the figures, the overall scenario of integration appears tangled and complex for the immigrant groups taken into account. If we consider the citizenship dimension, both seem significantly prone to being integrated into the host society. However, the scores concerning education and the labour market highlight significant difficulties. The high rates of unemployment point out significant barriers to becoming integrated into the domestic labour market. As regards the educational context, the situation is even more critical, and the score of the integration index is emblematic in this sense: Iranian-born immigrants have significant problems integrating into the host country’s educational context; this is even more the case for those born in Turkey.

Why is this so? How can this be in Sweden, a country known for its “openness” to immigrants and being at the forefront in the area of integration policies? And, more generally, how is possible to explain the integration process of Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden?

The next section tries to answer these questions, focusing on the complex network of ties between institutional actors belonging to the destination country and to the country of origin, paying special attention to the role played by the latter, which has been labelled “the origin effect”.

6. **Explanatory factors of such integration’s trends**

The picture below attempts to sketch the network of institutional ties between destination and origin countries for the immigrant groups that are included in this report. The differences are obvious and clear-cut. Turkish migrants are able to rely on an extensive network that involves several actors within their country of origin, which pertain to both the state as well as to civil society. Their actions are complemented by those of other actors in the country of destination, to which the country of origin is often linked by agreements and practices. In contrast, Iranian migrants rely on a network with fewer “prongs”, as it is built around civil society organizations.
Despite these differences, both immigrant groups are able to count on a large network of associations and organizations operating in both Sweden and the origin countries. Yet, if on the one hand associations targeting Turkish emigrants in Sweden work in line with the Ankara government, those addressing Iranians abroad tend to operate precisely in opposition to the central government.

Hosseini-Kaladjahi and Kelly (2012) have estimated that there are approximately 125-130 Iranian-focused organizations throughout Sweden, mostly based in Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö and Uppsala. According to Kelly (2011), these organizations aim to meet the social, cultural and political needs of their members. When they started to develop their own associations nearly a decade after their arrival, Iranian emigrants did so largely along political lines, so that many were set up as “cultural” associations, despite their political activities. Many others were created purely for social or for philanthropic reasons. According to key-informants, Iranian associations that are currently active in Sweden deal with many dimensions of integration, especially concerning the labour market, education and language. These associations encourage bonding between Iranians in the diaspora, and make it possible for Iranians to keep their ties to Iran through charitable works (i.e. by making donations to Iranian societies, raising awareness of social issues in Iran) without being overtly political. Their scope, rather than being limited to the Iranian community, is extended to other foreign-born communities and often to Swedish natives as well, according to a conception of integration as a mutual process of adaptation (Moghadam 2014). Another important dimension in terms of integration, which is strictly related to the actions of immigrant associations, is represented by cultural events related to Iranian traditions such as: Eldfest, Melagan, Yalda, Caharsanba-sur and Nowruz. These events represent important occasions for Iranian immigrants to get acquainted and to reinforce
community ties in the host country. At the same time they give Iranians the opportunity to share aspects of their culture within the host society. In this regard it is worth mentioning the Persian New Year, which brings together many Iranians from different ethnic backgrounds in Sweden’s public parks and squares. Such demonstrations of culture and identity seem to be taking on more importance with time, as Iranians have slowly built up the resources and support to mobilize their cause (Kelly 2011 and 2013).

As regards Turkish associations, emigrant solidarity networks based in host countries have been the most visible non-state actors engaged in emigrant-centred activities. Since the mass migration flows of the 1960s, Turkish emigrants have established non-governmental organizations that aim to create solidarity among Turkish expatriates by serving origin towns or villages through provision of services. Today, the first task of emigrant solidarity associations is creating a channel of information among Turkish immigrants in the destination country and between the origin area and people living abroad. Websites established by solidarity networks include news from a town’s people, business advertisements and calls for business partnerships; on the whole, they merge homeland news with news from abroad under the same roof. These non-governmental organizations perform two other important tasks: they create solidarity ties in the destination country and provide a wide range of services for their hometown, such as organizing campaigns for low-income families, providing wheelchairs for disabled people or building libraries for schools and mosques. Activities such as these are organized in cooperation with the local government in Turkey. In particular, one of the main important actors is the Swedish-Turkish National Association (STRF) (Svensk-Turkiska Riksförbundet). Established in 2003, this association includes 15 different entities from nine cities (Stockholm, Malmö, Gothenburg, Varberg, Norrköping, Västerås, Eskilstuna, Linköping and Jönköping) and counts around 3,800 members. Its focus is on Turkish integration into Sweden as well as on the development and promotion of Turkish culture. The Assyrian Federation in Sweden (Assyriska Riksförbundet i Sverige) should also be mentioned. It groups together 28 different associations that work to support the integration and inclusion of Assyrian people (many of whom are immigrants coming from Turkey). This association actively works to represent Swedish-Assyrian interests, to increase awareness and recognition of the genocide of Assyrians and to support the democratic aspirations of Assyria.

The goal of Turkish emigrant-solidarity associations – to provide services to both the emigrants in the host country and to people in their hometowns – fits well with Turkey’s aims for diaspora engagement. The official aim is to maintain and strengthen ties between Turkish emigrants and the state. The social and economic integration of emigrants in the host countries is considered crucial and cultural linkages are understood to be the core of the relationship between emigrants and the home country. In this context, the activities of solidarity associations are in line with the aims of state actors because they keep cultural linkages alive (by creating awareness about responsibilities towards one’s hometown) and favour integration in the host country (through a wide range of activities from language courses to counselling services) (Karci Korfali 2014).10

On the basis of these premises, it is possible to envisage some lines of interpretation in order to understand the Index scores and, more generally, to clarify the integration dynamics of Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden. For clarity of explanation, the subsequent analysis will be divided according to the index’s dimensions: citizenship, work and education. Finally, some concluding remarks concerning the “origin effect” are provided.

**Citizenship**

According to the citizenship index scores, both groups appear highly integrated with regard to the nationality dimension: every year, on average, 1,700 Swedish passports are given to people born in

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10 There is no data on whether emigrant solidarity associations receive funding from the Turkish state.
Iran and to those born in Turkey. Based on the evidence provided by qualitative surveys, it is reasonable to assume that states of origin have a significant “origin effect”. As regards Turkish immigrants, the Dual Citizenship Law (1981) and new policy goals pursued by policymakers in the last decades have had a positive impact on the naturalization process. It is also possible to speak of an “origin effect” with regard to Iranians, even if it follows a different logic. Most emigrants who left the country in the 1980s, as well as in recent years, did so in order to escape from the Islamic regimes that were brought in with the 1979 Revolution. In these cases, the decision to acquire Swedish nationality represents a rupture with the past and with the origin state. This difference concerning the nature and logic of the “origin effect” is confirmed by data regarding onward migration: both Turkish and Iranian immigrants present high rates of onward migration. However while the former tend to return to their home country, the latter are inclined to move onward to other Western countries (Klinthäll 2006, Kelly 2013).

Labour market

Despite average scores for both groups with regard to the labour market integration index, the unemployment rates are especially worrying: 15.4% and 15.6%, respectively, for Turkish and Iranian immigrants. A figure that is even more critical to look at is the unemployment rate for Swedish natives: about 4.3% in 2014. Given the scarcity of data and information, it is difficult to estimate an “origin effect” as regards integration in the labour market. However according to the literature, it is possible to point out different potential drivers of integration for the groups examined. As regards Turkish immigrants, it is reasonable to assume a lack of human capital due to the low level of education that characterizes the majority of them. The same cannot be said for Iranians who, on the contrary, represent the foreign-born community with the highest share of tertiary-educated (even higher than Swedish natives). As pointed out by Kelly (2013), an individual factor related to status can come into play in this case. Following the author’s explanation, it is reasonable to think that many of the tertiary-educated Iranians living in Sweden prefer to take advantage of benefits granted by the Swedish welfare system than accept low-skilled jobs.

Education

As regards the educational context, integration problems are even more pronounced than in the labour market, in particular in relation to Turkish immigrants. The difference between Index scores – 0.34 for Iranians and 0.17 for Turkish immigrants – might be explained on the basis of the aforementioned difference in educational levels. Also in this case, it is hard to identify an “origin effect”, notwithstanding the fact that a lack of agreement between the countries of origin and destination regarding the recognition of educational qualifications surely represents an important barrier for the integration of both immigrant groups. In this regard, an important remark is needed: the Education Integration Index – as with other synthetic indexes elaborated – is sensitive to underlying indicators and to the selectivity of the migrant group considered. Iranians in Sweden, for instance represent one of the more educated groups among foreigners, but score low on this Index. This fact is related to their historical migratory profile, which is essentially comprised of family migrants and political refugees. On the whole, given the scarcity of data and the difficulty of finding relevant information in the literature, it is difficult to come up with a clear picture concerning the “origin effect” in this corridor. The result of such an effect is ambiguous and strictly related to the actors involved, the relations among them and the historic migratory profile. As regards Iranian immigrants, if on the one hand civil society organizations represent a positive factor, on the other hand the central government represents a concrete obstacle for integration in the host country (as pointed out by qualitative surveys). In-depth interviews highlight the “obstructionist” approach followed by the Teheran government, which seems to take advantage of difficulties experienced by Iranians residing in Sweden in order to instigate nationalistic sentiments. In this sense, two competing identity-building processes seem to clash over
the Iranian diaspora community in Sweden: on the one hand the religious and nationalistic process supported by the Iranian government, and on the other a secular and “more open” process fomented by immigrant associations that are active in Sweden. Such centripetal forces seem to have opposite effects in terms of the integration of Iranians. The Turkish case is different, and is characterized by a substantial merging of central administration and organizational interests: both of which aim to promote integration in the countries of destination and strengthen ties with the diaspora community. Still, even in this case, it is difficult to identify an actual “origin effect”. As highlighted by the literature, the policy framework issued by the Turkish government on the one hand favours the socio-economic integration of emigrants into the host society, but on the other, sustains a conservative position on the defence of Turkish culture and language abroad (Bilgili and Siegel 2011).

7. Conclusions

The present report has investigated the process of integration of Iranian and Turkish immigrant communities in Sweden in comparative terms. As highlighted by the statistical indexes and indicators considered, both communities present relevant difficulties in terms of integration (especially as regards the labour market and the educational context). Notwithstanding the importance of migrants’ individual characteristics, this represents a puzzling outcome for Sweden, which is acknowledged as one of the most tolerant and open countries with respect to policymaking in the area of integration. The theoretical approach undertaken points out that the “origin effect” constitutes a crucial dimension for understanding the integration process and integration outcomes. Despite the exploratory nature of this study, which prevents us from offering an accurate and comprehensive analysis of such an effect, interesting insights about the actors and relationships involved have emerged. In particular, these include: a) the historic emigration profile of the origin country; b) the number and typology of actors at origin which are involved in the integration process of emigrants abroad; and c) the mutual relationships between these actors and with actors at destination. Furthermore, it is possible to identify five sub-relationships which seem to play a significant role in determining the magnitude and direction of the overall “origin effect”. These are: 1) the relationship between state-actors at origin and the diaspora community at destination; 2) the relationship between state-actors at origin and at destination; 3) the relationship between state-actors at origin and non-state actors at destination; 4) the relationship between state-actors and non-state actors at origin; 5) the relationship between state-actors at origin and non-state actors at destination.

Thus, Iranian and Turkish immigrant communities represent two opposite and paradigmatic cases in so far as they depict two different configurations of actors and relationships, which allow us to grasp the complex nature of the “origin effect”. These elements are sketched in the following table.
Table 9. The origin effect: actors and their relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historic emigration profile</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugees (and family migrants)</td>
<td>Labour migrants (and family migrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors involved</td>
<td>Few state-actors at origin</td>
<td>Several state-actors at origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Few non-state actors at origin</td>
<td>Several non-state actors at origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several non-state actors at destination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relationships between actors

| 1. Origin state-actors / Diaspora community | Discordance | Concordance |
| 2. Origin state-actors / Destination state-actors | Discordance | Concordance |
| 3. Origin state-actors / Origin non-state actors | Discordance | Concordance |
| 4. Origin state-actors / Destination non-state actors | Discordance | Concordance |
| 5. Origin non-state-actors / Destination non-state actors | Concordance | Concordance |

The Turkish diaspora community relies on a network of state and non-state actors active in both Sweden and Turkey, who share interests and coordinate actions concerning emigrants’ integration. On the contrary, Iranian emigrants can only rely on civil society associations which are active at their destination, and which work and pursue goals in opposition to the Tehran government. Despite different configurations of actors and relationships, the reciprocal dynamics of interactions among the actors involved can lead to analogous effects in terms of integration. Thus, for instance, a convergent attitude on dual nationality between the governments of Stockholm and Ankara, backed by information and the support of civil society, could be conceived as an additional driver underlying the high rate of naturalization among Turks living in Sweden. On the other hand, the similar naturalization rates among Iranians could be related to the historical profile of emigrants (who tend to leave the country in opposition to the central government) in conjunction with the support of NGOs, which tend to favour the integration of the target community at destination (in contrast with the state-actors at origin).

To reframe integration as a three-way process expands the analytical perspective and allows us to consider actors, relationships and dynamics that have been paid scant attention to date. The “origin effect” also adds a degree of complexity to the analysis of immigrants’ integration process in host countries and, at the same time, presents itself as an unavoidable dimension of analysis for future research in this area.
References


