Corridor Report on the United Kingdom
The immigration, emigration and diaspora policies’ effects on integration:
Chinese and Indian Migrants in the UK

Anne Unterreiner

INTERACT Research Report 2015/05
Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

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INTERACT - Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

In 2013 (Jan. 1st), around 34 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) were currently living in the European Union (EU), representing 7% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a passive, process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working together to build a cohesive society.

Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: first, where they come and second, where they now live. While integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants interact with their home country.

INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to support their rights).

INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued by EU member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way?

A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done.

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Abstract

This paper presents the first results of the INTERACT project on Chinese and Indian migrants in the United Kingdom (UK). It is based on the data gathered by the project using a mixed method of data collection and analysis. We identify the policies of the states of origin (India and China) and destination (the UK), their implementation and their impact on migrants’ integration paths in the UK. In this paper, we first present an overview of the evolution of Chinese and Indian migration flows to the UK, and then present the current policy frameworks at both destination and origin, before analysing how they affect the integration trends of Chinese and Indian migrants in the UK. Even though contemporary Indian migrants – and to an even greater extent, Chinese migrants – living in the UK are highly skilled migrants, they do not automatically integrate into British society. Although Chinese migrants are better educated than Indian migrants, fewer hold a British passport, and more are unemployed. The position of Chinese and Indian migrants in British society seems to be the consequence of the combination of the origin and destination countries’ policies. These policies indeed influence current and past migration flows, namely through entry conditions to the UK, and exit policies at origin. In addition, both the year of arrival and the duration of stay impact migrants’ integration. Since the migration flows from India are older than those from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Indian migrants speak better English than Chinese migrants and more often own a home, hold a British passport and identify as British. State policies at destination and origin also affect the way that migrant communities are organized and integrated into mainstream society. Chinese migrants, who in recent years have mainly been students, have more connections with the PRC than Indian migrants do with their state of origin since new Chinese civil society organisations based in the UK have close ties with the Chinese State. These associations are also aware of Chinese migrants’ potential difficulties with integration, and thus try to counterbalance it. Destination and origin policies can thus affect migrants’ opportunity structures differently over time and have both a direct and indirect effect on migrant integration in the long run.

Key words: Immigration and integration policies, emigration and diaspora policies, migrant civil society organisations, migrant integration.

Acknowledgment

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1. Introduction

With 7.8 million migrants living in the country in 2013, the United Kingdom (UK) has among the largest foreign-born populations in the EU, just after Germany (10.2 million) and before France (7.5 million).¹ In the last decade, the UK experienced a high diversification of its migrant population. Among the 1st generation of migrants, Indian and Chinese migrants, which were respectively the 1st and 11th most populous migrant groups in the UK in 2011, are worth comparing. While Indian migration flows became significant after World War II, given that India was part of the British Commonwealth after its independence (1947), the significant migration flows from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are relatively recent, beginning in the 1990s. Differences also appear once we look at the policies in these countries of origin. While the Chinese state still controls its borders, determining both who gets in and who gets out, the Indian emigration policy is much more liberal.

However, migrants from the PRC and India have commonalities. In the UK, earlier migration waves from these two origin countries were characterised by a lower social background. In contrast, the new migrants from these countries are increasingly highly skilled.² At origin, the current policies of India and the PRC also share common threads: they both see migration as being beneficial to the country whether migrants return or keep ties at origin while being abroad. And while neither country recognizes dual citizenship, both the PRC and India give special status to people of Chinese / Indian ancestry, respectively.

Although these groups’ migration flows vary deeply in terms of their past numbers, they currently share similar diaspora policies. Both are also comprised of highly skilled migrants. In this paper, we will thus compare Chinese and Indian migrants’ integration in the UK, in order to understand how it is affected by destination and origin policies. To do so, we used a mixed methods approach. In parallel with a policy analysis, the INTERACT Quantitative team provided descriptive statistics of Chinese and Indian migrants in the UK and built different indexes of integration using a Principal Component Analysis (see Section 4). In addition, nine qualitative interviews were carried out between August and October 2014 with representatives of Chinese organisations based in the UK. These interviews were conducted either face-to-face or over the phone.

The study focuses only on legal migrants born in India or in Mainland China. Migrants of Indian origin who settled in Africa under the British Empire and then migrated to the UK after the independence of colonial African states, and migrants of Chinese origin who settled in South-East Asia (Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.) before relocating to the UK are not studied in this paper.

First, we will give an overview of the migration flows in the UK, especially with respect to Chinese and Indian migrants (Section 2). We will then present the policy framework that can influence migrants’ integration, at both origin and destination (Section 3). Next, we compare the integration of Chinese and Indian migrants living in the UK (Section 4). Finally, we examine whether the combination of destination and origin policies with the actions of civil society organisations helps explain the current integration trends of Chinese and Indian migrants in the UK (Section 5).

¹ Source: Eurostat.
² We focus here on 1st generation migrants from the PRC and India. Past research however frequently used self-declared ethnicity, thus including 1st, 2nd and 3rd generations, the “twice migrants” from Africa (migrants of India to former British colonies in Africa and their descendants) in the Indian case, migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan and Chinese ethnic minorities from South East Asia.
2. Immigration trends of China and India into the UK

Britain has a long story of migration. Recently, from the 1990s on, a shift in the characteristics of migrants occurred: when migrants’ countries of origin were becoming highly diversified, highly skilled migrants increasingly entered the UK. Indian and Chinese migrants are representative of this evolution.

2.1 Migration flows to the UK

Britain, and especially the London area, is an increasingly diverse society in terms of both the size of the migration flows to the UK, and the origin of migrants.

Immigration to England first originated in the British Isles, particularly in Ireland. During the first half of the twentieth century, the UK was a destination for: labour migrants from Ireland (after the Irish Free State was established in 1921); refugees (mainly European Jews) from Eastern Europe before World War One and then from Germany during the inter-war period; and British settlers returning to the UK (Cheung and Heath 2007: 509). Representing 4.3% of the population living in England and Wales in 1951 (1.9 million), individuals born abroad numbered 7.5 million in 2011 and comprised 13% of the resident population in England and Wales. In 1951, the largest flows of migrants to England and Wales were individuals born in Ireland, Poland, India and Germany. Whereas in 2011 (see Table 1), the largest flows of migrants were born in India, followed by Poland, Pakistan, and Ireland (Office for National Statistics 2013).

Over time, the share of migrants within the population residing in the UK increased in every region, and especially between 2001 and 2011 (Office for National Statistics 2012; Krausova and Vargas-Silva 2014; Packwood and Findlay 2014). London appears to be an exception regarding the share of migrants living there (see Figure 1). In 2011, 37% of the residents of this region were born abroad.

Figure 1. Distribution of the resident population born outside the UK in 2011 (in %)

Source: Author’s own illustration based on: data from the Office for National Statistics 2012; Krausova and Vargas-Silva 2014; Packwood and Findlay 2014.
Figure 2. First residence permits of all foreign citizens by reason living in the UK (2008-2012)

As we can see from Figure 2, the majority of recent migrants entering legally into the UK came for non-family reasons. Education was, until 2011, the main type of visa issued to migrants residing in the country. Since labour migration is mainly white collar migration, this data shows that the UK favoured highly skilled migration.

The migration waves vary deeply from one country of origin to the other (Office for National Statistics 2013). In addition, as noted by the Office of National Statistics, migration flows to England and Wales are much more diversified now than 60 years ago: in 1951, the top ten foreign countries of birth represented 60% of all migrants, whereas in 2011 they represented only 45% (Office for National Statistics 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>England and Wales</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>694,148</td>
<td>55,231</td>
<td>37,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>579,121</td>
<td>23,489</td>
<td>19,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>482,137</td>
<td>22,952</td>
<td>7,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>407,357</td>
<td>22,274</td>
<td>4,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>273,564</td>
<td>20,039</td>
<td>4,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>211,500</td>
<td>15,919</td>
<td>3,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>191,183</td>
<td>15,338</td>
<td>2,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>191,023</td>
<td>10,607</td>
<td>2,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>177,185</td>
<td>9,458</td>
<td>2,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>160,095</td>
<td>9,435</td>
<td>2,223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As we can see from Table 1, the foreign-born population is much larger in England and Wales than in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In addition, migration flows seem to be more intra-European in

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3 This can be explained by a stricter policy towards international students from 2011 on (see below).
Scotland, and even more so in Northern Ireland, compared to England and Wales. We will now analyse in more detail the characteristics of migrants from China and India living in the UK.

2.2 Past migration flows from India and China to the UK

The first migration waves from India and China were comprised of relatively low-skilled migrants, and constituted migration from two countries that were highly connected to the UK. India was part of the British Empire, while the main migration flows from present-day China came from Hong Kong, a former British territory.

At origin, the majority of the first migrants from India came from the Punjab, Gujarat, and Kashmir states. The migration flows from this period were chain migrations from specific regions, religious groups, castes and villages (Williams 2013). While 80% of British Sikhs\(^4\) are from the Jullundur District (Punjab), 70% of Indian Hindus and Muslims are from the Gujarat State (Peach 2006: 136). This ethno-religious distinction coupled with a specific local background was imported to the UK. According to Peach (2006), Sikhs are mainly in London, Birmingham and Wolverhampton, while Hindus are in London and Leicester. Chain migration, job opportunities and the housing market influenced the implantation of Indian migrants (Castles 2009: 25) until the 1990s as well as the diversification of Indian migration flows with respect to occupation and place of origin in India.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Indian migrants were typically unskilled single males coming to work in British industries; the Sikhs typically worked in the West Midlands and the Indian Muslims, in the northern industrial cities (Peach 2006: 136). They mainly came from rural areas of Punjab and Gujarat (Williams 2013: 11). Family reunification started after the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 (see below and in appendix). This trend was a result of the 1971 Immigration Act, which prohibited any other cause of migration (Williams 2013: 20). In 1980, the “Primary Purpose Rule” was introduced.\(^5\) And until the mid-1980s, only spouses could benefit from family reunification (Williams 2013: 21).

As with Indian migrants, past Chinese migrants had specific ties to the UK, since until the 1980s they came mainly from Hong Kong. From the 19th century until 1997, Hong Kong was a British Territory. Since then, Hong Kong has become a Special Administrative Region of China. The Hong Kong government enjoys significant autonomy. After the Tiananmen events, an important wave of emigration from Hong Kong took place, leading the British Parliament to pass the 1990 British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act (see below) (Chan and Chan 1997: 123-124). Once in the UK, these migrants were highly represented in the catering industry (Pang and Lau 1998).

The current literature regarding Chinese migrants’ socio-characteristics is very poor (Pang and Lau 1998: 863). Since British statistics focus primarily on ethnic Chinese, they blur together different generations of Chinese, from different regions of origin (the PRC, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia, etc). In addition, recent migrants are mainly students, who have different characteristics than previous Chinese migrants to the UK. Data from past research on Chinese migrants defined ethnically thus does not say much about legal Chinese migrants living in the UK. It is necessary to take into account the characteristics of the migration waves while analysing the integration of both Chinese and Indian migrants.

\(^4\) Within the Indian ethnic group, 45% are Hindu, 29.1% are Sikh, and 12.7% are Muslim (Peach 2006: 141).

\(^5\) According to this rule, marriage could not be used as a cause for admission to the UK. This legislation was softened in the early 1990s after the UK was subject to several condemnations by the European Court of Justice, before being abrogated in 1997 by New Labour (Kofman et al. 2000: 67).
2.3 The characteristics of recent migration flows from India and China to the UK

92% of the international migrants to the UK were living in England in 2011, Indian (94 %), PRC (86%), and migrants from Hong Kong (88%) following the same trend.

Figure 3. Geographic location of migrants from India, the PRC, Hong Kong and all migrants in the UK in 2011 (in %)


Migrants born in India seem to be more concentrated by region than Chinese migrants. 36% of Indian migrants live in London, along with 23% of PRC migrants and 24% of the migrants born in Hong Kong. This concentration seems to be confirmed by their share within local areas. In Leicester, for instance, 11.3% of the population were born in India (Office for National Statistics 2012: 19), whereas migrants from either the PRC or Hong Kong appear to be more widespread. There is no important difference regarding the place of residence of Chinese from the PRC and Hong Kong, except for the fact that 19% of migrants from Hong Kong live in the South East, where only 11% are from mainland China. However, the concentration of Indian migrants is close from the one of the total of international migrants. In addition, since current Chinese migrants are mainly students, Wu noticed a higher concentration of this population around universities: the more universities in one district, the more Chinese students in that area, and in consequence the higher the rate of Chinese students among the Chinese population there (Wu 2014).
In England and Wales specifically, Indian migrants are the largest group of migrants, representing 9.2% of the foreign-born population. Of this group, 23% arrived before 1971, and 38% before 1981 (see Figure 4). In 1951, it was the second largest group of migrants (5.9%). Many were descendants of British settlers. It remained the second largest group between 1961 and 2001, almost doubling in size between 1961 and 1971, and representing 10% of the migrants living in England and Wales in 1971 (Office for National Statistics 2013). According to the 2011 Census, migrants from China (the PRC, excluding Hong Kong) residing in England and Wales were 152,498. China was the 11th most common country of origin of the migrant group that year. Three-quarters of the migrants from Mainland China have arrived in England and Wales over the last decade, mainly due to student migration, which represents 45% of this group (Office for National Statistics 2013). In 2009/10, there were 60,705 international students from China in the UK, making China the principal country of origin for migrants, before India (40,475). 45% of Chinese students studied business and management (compared with 37% of Indian students) (Williams 2012: 4). At the same time, 102,241 migrants from Hong Kong were living in England and Wales in 2011.

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6 When this paper was written, no data on the year of arrival of Indian and Chinese migrants living in Northern Ireland and Scotland was available.

7 They are the 4th largest group (4% of the foreign born population) in Northern Ireland and the second largest group (6.4%) in Scotland.

8 They were 22,000 in 1992, and 48,000 in 2001. In 2011, they were the 10th largest group (1.9%) in Northern Ireland, and the 7th largest (4.2%) in Scotland.
Table 2. Average number of valid residence permits by reason for issuance (2010-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China (Including Hong Kong)</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of permits</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number of permits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reasons</td>
<td>17,098 9.5</td>
<td>102,990 37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education reasons</td>
<td>133,889 74.4</td>
<td>59,740 21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remunerated activity reasons</td>
<td>27,296 15.2</td>
<td>111,467 40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee status</td>
<td>405 0.2</td>
<td>17 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
<td>1,339 0.7</td>
<td>3,159 1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>180,027 100</td>
<td>277,373 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat, MPC Team own calculation

As we can see from the type of residence permits given to Indian and Chinese migrants, Chinese migrants mainly hold temporary visas (74.4% came with a student residence permit), while Indian migrants tend to hold mid-term visas, if not long-term ones (more than ¾ came for family or work reasons). In both cases, the majority are skilled migrants: 89.7% of Chinese and 61.7% Indian residence permit holders came to study or work.

Indian and Chinese students currently comprise the two largest groups of migrants from non-EEA countries.

Table 3. Number of student visas issued to Indian and Chinese nationals (2005-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Indian students</th>
<th>Chinese students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>16,592</td>
<td>18,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>20,579</td>
<td>21,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>22,018</td>
<td>23,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>27,871</td>
<td>27,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>58,158</td>
<td>37,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>42,545</td>
<td>44,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>187,763</td>
<td>172,368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: House of Commons and Home Affairs Committee 2011.

This current immigration trend is in line with migration flows from India since the 1990s-2000s. Students and professionals from diverse regions of India came in significant numbers. At the same time, in 1997, family reunification rules were liberalized and men were allowed to enter the country as husbands, resulting in increased migration on these grounds. However, in 2008, the legislation became more restrictive (Williams 2013: 21).¹⁰

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⁹ European Economic Area.
¹⁰ Language and income requirements and probationary periods were introduced. In addition, the allowable age of a spouse was increased (from 18 to 21) (Williams 2013: 21).
Thus, depending on the migration wave from India under consideration, Indian migrants’ position in the labour market varies widely. The first migrants to come after WWII had manual positions. They were followed by their wives who were either housewives or took the same type of jobs. In contrast, the most recent migrants, who came from the 1990s on, currently work as highly skilled professionals in the service industry, or work part-time in parallel with their studies and are willing to either return to India, or become professionals themselves (Williams 2013: 8).

In the mid-2000s for instance, Indian nationals were the largest group of migrants benefiting from the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP, see below); 60% of Indian work-permit holders entered the UK to get science and technology professions (Somerville and Dhudwar 2010: 40). In 2006 alone, around 81,000 Indian nationals entered the UK as highly skilled migrants or students (Somerville and Dhudwar 2010: 41). However, among Indian nationals who obtained a Tier 1 visa (see below), 62% worked in unskilled occupations, even though they came from well-off families, were highly educated and had studied in the UK (Williams 2013: 11). Current Indian students have the following characteristics. Around ¾ are men. They come predominantly from North and South-West Indian cities, and study scientific or business subjects in England at the postgraduate level (Williams 2012: 6). The importance of student migration from India can be explained both by pull factors in the UK (see below), and push factors from India, namely: the lack of university opportunities in India, the internationalization of higher education and the culture of migration among the Indian middle-class (Williams 2012).

The Chinese migrants, although not as numerous as Indian migrants living in the UK, share this highly skilled profile. The migrants from Mainland China started to arrive in the 1990s. The majority come from the Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces. The student population among them has increased over time, to the point of becoming the main group of migrants from the PRC (Latham and Wu 2013: 38). This phenomenon is due to both push factors – China opening its borders, especially to students, and a limited number of university seats in the PRC – and to pull factors, namely British universities needing international students (see below). These migrants seem to be short-term. In 2011, the mean duration of residence in the UK was 2.1 years, given that half of these migrants arrived a year prior to 2011 or less (Wu 2014: 8).

At the same time, the number of asylum seekers from India and China has been relatively low and seems to be converging. Between 1998 and 2013, the highest number of applicants from India was 2,410 (in 2003). And since 2005, the UK has considered India a safe country, which explains why among migrants from India, asylum seekers have become even scarcer (Williams 2013: 13). Since 2002, the number of applicants who are PRC citizens has been declining, reaching 1,040 asylum seekers in 2013, which was close to the number of applicants (1,145) from India that year.
Thus, the majority of current Indian migrants seem to be highly skilled people. Past research and census data show an important evolution in this population since the 1950s. They currently show good indicators of integration, such as high levels of education. In 2010, 15% of naturalized people were former Indian nationals, thus making them the largest group of immigrants to obtain citizenship by naturalization (Binder 2013), while fewer Chinese migrants tend to naturalize. In 2010, 4% of naturalized people were former Chinese nationals, thus being the sixth group of citizenship to be naturalized (Binder 2013).

Both the past and present migration flows described here and the integration of Chinese and Indian migrants in the UK are shaped by origin and destination policies.

3. Institutional and policy framework

In the past, Chinese (PRC and Hong Kong) and Indian migrants benefited from different entry conditions to the UK and different exit conditions from their countries of origin. In addition, Hong Kong migrants, migrants from Mainland China and Indian migrants were under different legislation based on their nationality. And at origin, they were, and still are, subject to different emigration and diaspora policies. However, the current migrants from both the PRC and India share common brain-gain policy strategies at origin and at destination.
3.1 British integration policies

The British integration policy underwent significant changes during the post-war era. During the 1950s, the British authorities followed a “laissez-faire” (Castles 1995: 300) integration model with respect to the New Commonwealth migrants. Racial tensions led them to implement a new integration model based on stricter entry conditions and the desire to combat discrimination within British territory. In this state of crisis, due to widespread questioning of New Commonwealth integration, the national cohesion model built before WWII and the decline of the Empire, measures following a multi-cultural approach were adopted from the 1960s on (Brighton 2007: 12). This “Race Relations” policy, coupled with a restrictive immigration policy, was the British integration model until 2000, when this approach was questioned, leading to “civic integration” measures. In parallel to adopting these measures, the British state started to progressively target highly skilled migrants, that is to say, students and professionals. This policy had an impact on both Chinese and Indian migrants’ integration in the UK.

From past entry conditions to citizenship laws

The migrations from the New Commonwealth after the Second World War led policy makers to raise the “race relations” issue (see the British Legislative Framework on immigration and citizenship in appendix, Table 7). From the early 1950s, the issue of the migration “of colour” was raised in the political debate, in parallel with a strong extreme-right movement (Lapeyronnie 1993). According to the 1948 Citizenship Act, any subject of the British Crown could enter the UK – that is to say, migrants from both India and Hong Kong. This right was limited in 1962, even though such a decision was against the interests of the British economy, which was in need of larger labour force. This measure led to a restriction of labour migration and an increase in family reunification. As a consequence, Britain focused on ethnic minorities and intergroup relations rather than on economic integration (Lapeyronnie 1993: 140).

After twenty years of restricted entry rights for migrants coming from the New Commonwealth to the UK, the 1981 Nationality Act was passed, which redefined British nationality as well as creating other categories of nationality. According to this Act, British subjects from India would lose their British nationality in the event that they acquired another one. At the same time, according to the 1985 Hong Kong Act and the British Nationality Order (1986), people from Hong Kong were either British Nationals Overseas (BNO), British Overseas citizens (BOC) or citizens of the PRC. The migrants who obtained the right of abode according to the 1971 Act were granted British citizenship in 1983.

From Race Relations policies to civic integration policies

From the 1960s to the early 2000s, anti-discrimination legislation (see Table 8 in the appendix), coupled with strict entry conditions, was supposed to lead the UK close to becoming a peaceful multi-cultural and multi-racial society.

In Britain, nationality was not expected to lead to the integration of migrants and their descendants. The focus rather, was put on “race”: social cohesion was supposed to occur once racial discriminations were totally eliminated (Favell 1998). Pursuant to this goal, laws on interracial relations were passed during the 1960s. Because this legislation targeted direct discrimination, the Race Relations Act of 1976 was passed in order to fight indirect discrimination, creating the administrative framework to achieve this goal; the resulting Commission for Racial Inequality merged into the Equality and Human Rights Commission in 2010. In the 1960s-1970s, schools were active actors implementing this policy, and the idea of a “multi-cultural education” in order to achieve interracial respect and self-esteem at school emerged (Castles 2009: 28).

The multi-cultural approach set up in the UK followed the idea that different groups exist, each with their own identity, and that a single policy addressing these different groups should not be
followed (Modood 2006). This policy has been delegated to local governments and to departments specializing in a specific field of action (Brighton 2007). It is based on collaboration between representatives of ethnic minorities and different public institutions fighting against discrimination. According to Brighton (2007), multiculturalism is of major concern to the central authorities in times of crises such as the Brixton riots of 1981 or the Rushdie affair (1988). At these times, the policy was questioned due to its failure to counter racial discrimination, leading to a lack of integration among the discriminated groups. Similarly, Joppke notes that the last political affirmation of multiculturalism in the UK was in 2000, in a Runnymede Trust report entitled “The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain” (Joppke 2000: 249).

Different events led the British State to reconsider its view of integration. The summer riots of 2001, and the increasing visibility of far-right movements, the 9/11 attacks, the subsequent “war on terrorism” and the 2005 London bombing led policy makers to reconsider the former British model of integration (Castles 2009: 29), and to define a new integration policy called “beyond multiculturalism”. Policy makers still assert that Britain is a multicultural society. However, integration became one of the main goals of the policies implemented from 2000 on. Since 2004, naturalization ceremony takes place (Latour 2007: 111). And since 2005, naturalization has become conditional upon language skills and certain knowledge of British “core values.” In addition, compulsory “citizenship and democracy” courses have been introduced (Joppke 2004: 252). Thus, as highlighted by Joppke, Britain is now aiming at the “civic integration” of its migrants and their descendants.

These policies influenced both who could enter the country and how they could integrate within the country. However, as integration is a long-term process, and as Indian migration flows are older than the ones from the PRC, these policies impact Indian migrants much more than the migrants born in the PRC. Indeed, as we have seen above, ¾ of Chinese migrants arrived between 2001 and 2011, and over half between 2007 and 2011. In parallel with these measures which aim to integrate long-term migrants, including migrants from India and China, it is also essential to analyse British policies towards international students, even though these migrants comprise the majority of new and short-term migrants.

**Attracting international workers and students**

During the 1990s, and especially after the Labour government came to power (1997-2010), the conception of labour migration had been deeply modified. In the context of economic growth in a globalized economy, which led to specific labour force shortages, employers lobbied for an opening of labour migration to fit their needs, while trade unions favoured a state controlled system as opposed to non-regulated illegal migration (Devitt 2012). This consensus led to the 2002 HSMP being replaced by the Point Based System (PBS) in 2008.

The current visa system for migrants (except asylum seekers) out of the European Economic Area is the PBS. Both migrants from India and China must follow this visa application procedure. Depending on the category or “Tier” in which they are in, they must provide proof of various requirements (a job offer, wages, language skills, financial resources, etc). The procedure gives them a certain number of points which may or may not allow them to obtain a visa, depending on the Tier that they are in: high-value migrants (Tier 1), skilled workers (Tier 2), low-skilled workers (Tier 3), students (Tier 4), temporary workers and youth mobility (Tier 5).

At present, the UK strongly favours international student migrants, as it is the second most popular destination OECD country for international full-degree programmes just after the US, and has the most significant share of international students (15%), after Australia (Cerna 2014). These migrants currently hold a Tier 4 visa. To obtain such a visa, the applicants must have a Certificate of Acceptance from one of the 2,372 sponsoring universities (House of Commons and Home Affairs Committee 2011: 6).
The PBS reform occurred while the New Labour was in power (1997-2010). It took into consideration the needs of economic actors in the UK as well as the budget shortages that universities were experiencing.

From 1979 on, international students began to be seen as a source of revenue for universities (Cerna 2014: 16-17). In the 1980s and 1990s, British universities faced significant reforms. The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act multiplied the number of universities while converting former polytechnics managed locally into “new” universities, and increased its power over older universities. At the same time, significant cuts in university budgets led them to look for other sources of funding, including international students (Williams 2012). By the end of the 1990s, international students were expected to “boost export earnings” (Cerna 2014).

Many universities thus developed strategies to attract international students, through their websites, but also through consultancies, fairs abroad and scholarships to foreign students. In India, the promotion of British universities has been well developed by the British Council, overseas campuses and exchange programmes (Williams 2012: 10). Such strategies seem to pay off: international student fees represented £14.1 billion in the UK in 2008-09 (Williams 2012: 18). Their average fee is £8,600 compared to £2,200 for an EEA student (House of Commons and Home Affairs Committee 2011: 8).

Between 2001 and 2008, international students were encouraged to stay in the country and maintain ties with the UK through easy access to a work permit (Cerna 2014: 17). From the PBS implementation on, students had to be sponsored by universities. The right to stay for two years upon graduation (Tier 1) was replaced in 2012 by the obligation to be sponsored by an employer for a highly skilled position (Tier 2). These restrictions for international students explain why this flow started to decrease from 2011 on (see above). One exception to the rule came into force in 2013, allowing PhDs a year to remain in the country to conduct a job search.

The current policy towards international students is not an integration policy as such; it is led by economic imperatives. It might, however, have an impact on the integration of migrants from China and India in the long run. Indeed, it deeply modified migration flows with respect to categories of migrants – the majority are currently highly skilled migrants with diversified places of residence at origin before migration to the UK.

3.2 Indian and Chinese emigration and diaspora policies

We will here focus on the emigration and diaspora policies of India and the PRC. Following Unterreiner and Weinar’s (2014) INTERACT Conceptual framework, emigration policies can be said to frame the mobility of Indian and Chinese citizens across the Indian and Chinese borders, respectively. Diaspora policies, however, are the public policies which aim to create a common sense of “Indianness” or “Chineseness” among people belong to the Indian and Chinese diaspora due to their respective states of origin. As we will see, emigration and diaspora policies are intertwined and shifted at the same time in both India and China.

Emigration and return migration policies

Exit conditions

From the founding of the PRC in 1949 to the opening up of the country and the economic reforms which followed the Cultural Revolution in 1978, emigration was strictly controlled by the Chinese State. Since then, the State has gradually opened its borders, and the conception of “Chineseness”, as we will see below, followed its economic and geopolitical interests (Barabantseva 2005a). Between

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11 Here we do not include ethnic Chinese or Indian people who lived in third countries (Hong Kong, South East Asia, or Africa) before migrating to the UK.
Corridor Report on the United Kingdom
The immigration, emigration and diaspora policies' effects on integration: Chinese and Indian Migrants in the UK

1979 and 2000 over 1,000 laws and regulations were passed regarding emigration and diaspora policies (Barabantseva 2005b: 11). Since dual citizenship is not recognized, immigration policies should also be taken into consideration as they are applied to former Chinese nationals and their descendants.

Since 1978, China has been more and more open to the emigration of its nationals. “The capacity of the potential human and economic capital concentrated outside China has influenced the formulation of the favourable policy of welcoming and assisting future migrants” (Barabantseva 2005a: 16). According to Liu, these reforms have deficiencies. They apply to visas for private affairs, not public ones, and not all private affairs. Some legislative acts contradict others, and the ones executed are sometimes invalid according to Chinese law. In addition, even though the central authorities’ acts are above the local ones, some local authorities adopt regulations contradicting the national legislation (Liu 2007: 159-160). Chinese emigration law is extremely complex, due to the multiplicity of public authorities legislating in this area.

Current emigration policies are open to emigration under the condition that it will be beneficial to the country and will not reduce Chinese power through brain drain or the emigration of State or Party key personnel. Emigration policy thus aims to support brain gain (return migration), and to improve the Chinese position in the geopolitical order (lobbying for the State abroad in order to promote a positive image of the country).

From the 1990s on, China progressively changed its policy towards Chinese students leaving the country to study abroad. The Chinese government started to build strong links with its international students, preferably postgraduates socialized in China with a strong Chinese identity, whereas the objective before was return migration. While in the 1980s these migrants were considered traitors to the Chinese nation under the State’s ideology, over 20 years later student migration became patriotic (Nyíri 2001). In parallel, the Chinese government started to encourage transnational entrepreneurship rather than return migration (Barabantseva 2005b: 15-16).

Compared to China’s heavy legislative framework regarding emigration and the control of the Chinese border, India has much lighter emigration legislation (see Table 10 in appendix), focusing on the rights and duties of its emigrants rather than on exit limitations.

India became independent from the British Empire in 1947. Unless they had acquired another citizenship, people residing in Indian territory were British subjects. Following the 1950 Constitution, they lost this status and became Indian and British Commonwealth citizens.

In the Cold War context, emigrants were viewed as traitors to the Indian nation. The evolution of the conception of the Indian emigrant started in the early 1980s. Now emigrants are seen as agents of development for the country:

“The Indian government’s belief in the development power of migration has pushed it to engage with big business to promote the training of Indians in specific sectors, such as IT, to prepare and export this skilled workforce to [developed] countries, where emigrants learn new skills and earn money, which can be redeployed and contribute to the growth of the Indian industry” (Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010: 16-17).

In parallel, current Indian emigration policy seems oriented towards the protection of the rights of temporary Indian migrant workers, especially in the Gulf countries. Pre-migration training programmes, control of licensed agencies, protection of migrants’ rights abroad (portability of social rights, insurance systems), and help upon return have been implemented for these migrants (Naujoks 2009). Thus, Indian emigration policies focus on labour migration (low and highly skilled), rather than on any other category of emigrants (Thapan 2014).

Both countries are thus actively trying to benefit from emigration. However, contrary to the Chinese government, which is aiming at avoiding brain drain and benefit from brain gain, the Indian
government currently seems to be focusing on the exit conditions of low-skilled labour migrants and remittances, and on the brain gain and remittances from emigration.

Return migration policy

In both countries, dual citizenship is not allowed. However, ethnic Indians and Chinese now enjoy more rights than other foreigners in their respective countries of origin, including an easier return to their country of origin. In China for instance, “ethnic Chinese are much easier given long-term or permanent residency” (Pieke and Speelman 2013: 16).

China seems much more active regarding returnees compared to India. Strictly speaking, return migration for Chinese migrants is not legislated. According to Liu, Chinese citizens who are allowed to return to the PRC are those: who emigrated legally abroad but have integration difficulties abroad and can be supported by their relatives in China; who ask for return shortly after emigration; or who are highly needed in China (Liu 2007: 216).12 China seems rather uninterested in return migration for political, demographic or economic reasons. In addition, the local authorities have a costly legal obligation to integrate returnees into society. Thus, China has instead favoured the integration of its emigrants in their countries of residence (Liu 2007: 222-224). One exception is the Overseas Chinese with important human capital that could be shared with Chinese co-nationals: “Chinese administrations actively recruit overseas graduates and scholars and encourage them to set up businesses or contribute their knowledge, skills and patents to partnerships with Chinese businesses” (Pieke and Speelman 2013: 15).

If China is currently trying to benefit from the brain gain of Chinese nationals’ return migration, India does not seem to have such policy. “[T]he government has been more concerned with securing the investments of the Indian diaspora, than with attracting the return of expatriates themselves” (Giordano and Terranova 2012: 25). However, the increasing rights given to PIO (People of Indian Origin; 1999) and OCI (Overseas Citizenship of India; 2005) on Indian territory could ease their “return” to the country of origin of their ancestors. “OCI grants a lifelong visa and does not require reporting to the police for stays longer than 180 days” (Naujoks 2009)13.

Institutional framework

In the Chinese case, a major issue regarding emigration is the right to leave and enter the territory. Such decisions are taken within the Chinese administration framework. In India (see Table 10 in appendix), on the contrary, strict exit conditions are limited to low-skilled migrants. The issue is thus to inform potential emigrants and provide pre-departure training programmes. Therefore, in India, institutions dealing with emigration and the diaspora seem to be more intertwined than in the Chinese case.

The Chinese State is divided into five levels of governance (see Table 11 in appendix): the “central government, provinces and autonomous regions and municipalities under the central government, municipalities and cities with districts, counties and cities without districts, and townships” (Liu 2007: 276). “Exit and entry administrative functions are distributed across 15 ministerial-level authorities – for immigration, emigration, nationality, border inspection, criminal investigation, household registration, foreign exchange control, and emigration agencies, and further divided into various levels between central and local governments” (Liu 2007: 275-276).

In parallel to state and foundations’ interventions regarding emigration policies, private recruitment agencies have flourished both in China and India. At the end of 2011, there were 1,533 recruitment agencies in India for instance (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs 2012: 36). In China, different types

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12 From 1949 to 1978, candidates for return migration for work purposes were generally told to integrate into their country of residence instead (Liu 2007: 218).

13 In March 2009, the Indian authorities had issued around 400.000 OCI cards, 13% in the UK (Naujoks 2009).
of agencies exist, depending on the emigration purpose: overseas study, private purpose, overseas employment, foreign labour, trade and cooperation, international travel, overseas training at government expense and Sino-foreign joint venture skilled personnel (Liu 2007). In order to avoid abuses of emigration candidates, the Chinese State controls these agencies both at the central and local level. Each agency must have both a Business License of Industry and Commerce and a specific licence provided by the department in charge of controlling them. Most licenses are local licenses (Liu 2007).

Comparing Chinese and Indian emigration policies, we can clearly see the high importance of the regime type, the Indian Government being much more liberal regarding emigration than the PRC State. If the means are different, the purpose of each country is similar: to benefit from emigration. The diaspora policies seem to follow the same goal.

Diaspora policies

China and India share common characteristics regarding their diaspora policies. Their growing interest in their respective diasporas started in parallel to the liberalization of their economies: at the end 1970s – early 1980s for China, and at the beginning of the 1990s for India. In addition, their diaspora policies are framed in order to meet the economic and geopolitical needs of each country. In India and China, the economic growth of the country is supposed to occur through the assistance of its diaspora. And finally, even though they do not recognize dual citizenship, they favour foreign nationals of ethnic Chinese or Indian background in their territories, and now consider them to belong to the diaspora (Lum 2012).

Nationality Rights and rights to vote

From 1912 to 1955, Chinese citizenship was given to any ethnic Chinese. From 1955, dual citizenship was prohibited. Chinese living abroad were strongly encouraged to take the citizenship of their country of residence. At this time, for geopolitical reasons, non-Chinese citizens living abroad were not a target group for the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. At the end of the 1970s, this policy was maintained, but efforts were made to create links with Overseas Chinese in order to obtain remittances and visits from overseas Chinese, whatever their nationality (Pieke and Speelman 2013: 10).

“In the early 1990s a major break from the initial strategy of reliance on overseas Chinese citizens, returnees and their dependants took place, which points to flexible and de-territorial interpretation of citizenship by the PRC” (Barabantseva 2005b: 13). This new definition of “Chineseness” was influenced by the fact that 90% of the ethnic Chinese living abroad were not Chinese nationals (Barabantseva 2005a: 10). In order to increase the Chinese sense of belonging among ethnic Chinese, the Chinese government targeted young people (Barabantseva 2005a: 22). Thus, the State is actively working on the building of a Chinese pro-Beijing diaspora, through its associative network abroad (Barabantseva 2005a: 32). However, this diaspora narrative has two limits: the open conception of “Chineseness” has not been confirmed in Chinese law, and the building of the diaspora by the State targets the Han communities rather than other ethnic groups (Barabantseva 2005a).

Like China, India developed a growing interest in its diaspora once it opened its economy. “[D]iasporic Indians became more useful as agents of trade, investment, and technology” (Naujoks 2009). Second, the Indian Government realized that ethnic Indians could lobby foreign States on Indian interests. Third, the growing economic success of highly skilled Indian migrants and their

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14 Even though this agency system is controlled by the Chinese government, Liu emphasizes the limits of such a system (Liu 2007).

15 In India, the diaspora is supposed to assist the country with its “development”, whereas in China the vocabulary is used refer to its “modernization”.

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descendants was seen, from the mid-1990s on, as a resource that the Indian State could use in its own interests (Naujoks 2009).

Like China, India did not recognize dual citizenship in its 1950 First Constitution. This prohibition was confirmed in the 1955 Citizenship Act. However, once it understood the benefits of an extended conception of “Indianness”, India recognized a specific status for foreign ethnic Indians. In 1999, the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) status was created. PIO cardholders benefit from simplified entry and have rights close to that of NRIs (National Resident of India), with the exception political rights. The rights of foreign ethnic Indians were extended thanks to the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) status (2003 Amendment to the 1955 Citizenship Act). PIOs who are nationals of one of 16 specific countries and who were Indian citizens from 1950 on – or who were eligible to become citizens after 1950 – can become OCIs. In 2005 (Amendment to the Citizenship Act), the OCI status was extended to PIOs from all countries allowing dual citizenship except Pakistan and Bangladesh. Thanks to this status, ethnic Indians can benefit from rights close those of NRIs, except the right to vote. Indeed, since 2010 (Representation of People Amendment Act), Overseas Indians holding an Indian passport can vote. In China, only Chinese citizens are allowed to vote and stand for Chinese elections. And for those residing abroad, these rights are limited to the county level of the people’s congress and below (Liu and Du 2014).

Parallel to these measures regarding nationality and political rights, other measures were taken in both China and in India, in order to create a national sense of belonging to the country of origin.

**Other diasporic measures**

The Chinese government realized the importance of overseas Chinese thanks to various conferences which took place in China in 1977-1978. As a first stage, the Chinese government recognized specific rights of overseas Chinese relatives in the 1982 Constitution and in the 1990 Special Protection Law. In parallel, different institutions were established: the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and its local dependents (OCAO: 1978); the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese and its local dependents (ACFROC; 1978); the quinquennial National Congress of Returned Overseas Chinese and their Relatives (1984); the Chinese People’s Congress Overseas Chinese Commission (CPCOCC; 1983); the Zhigongdang Party; and the Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Barabantseva 2005a: 4-5).

Different policies were implemented in order to give specific rights to overseas Chinese and returnees: university quotas, investment advantages, simplified entry procedures, etc. The OCAO launched a three-year plan on “Developing Motherland and Benefiting/Assisting Overseas Chinese” (2002) for instance, in order to link new migrants with overseas communities, and the latter with China (Barabantseva 2005a, 16). In parallel, different events have been organized for young overseas Chinese: the annual “Summer Camps for Foreign Youths of Chinese Origin on a Root-Seeking Trip to China” (since 2000) and the “Solidarity of Overseas Chinese and Foreign Nationals of Chinese Origin in the New Century” (2000) (Barabantseva 2005a: 24). The first goal of these policies was to gather remittances and donations from Overseas Chinese. However at present, the purpose of these policies is the transmission of human capital and lobbying and the promotion of a positive image of China abroad.

In addition, different programmes have been implemented by the Indian Government in order to strengthen the ties of ethnic Indians with the country. Since 2003, the *Pravasi Bharatiya Divas*, an annual conference on the anniversary date of the return of Gandhi from South Africa, has been welcoming key personnel and politicians from the Indian State, Indian civil society representatives, and overseas Indians (Naujoks 2009). In parallel, specific programmes have been implemented in order to bind ethnic Indians with their country of origin: the Know India Programme (KIP, 2004); the

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16 The ACFROC was suspended from 1956 to 1978.
The main goal of these policies is to encourage both remittances and investment in India from overseas Indians. Remittances procedures were eased from the end of the 1990s on (Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010). “India (…) has prioritised policies to encourage diaspora entrepreneurs and highly skilled individuals to invest in India” (Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010: 20).

Thus, both the destination and origin governments aim to benefit from highly skilled migrant migrations. However, as we will see, this political framework leads to debatable integration trends at destination.

4. Comparing Chinese and Indian migrants’ integration in the UK

The comparison of the integration of migrants from China\textsuperscript{17} and India in the UK is based on statistical data provided by the MPC team. The 2011 Labour Force Survey (LFS)\textsuperscript{18} allowed the MPC Team to identify these migrants and to analyse their socio-demographic characteristics. Additional sources used were: EUDO Citizenship Statistics, UNESCO Statistics, and Eurostat.

In order to enrich the analysis of the level of integration of migrants in EU countries, a synthetic index of integration developed in Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti (2015). This method allows a comparison of the integration level of migrants in EU Member States by dimension and by migration “corridor” (for specific migrant groups in specific countries of destination, see the Introduction). To this end, multivariate analysis strategies, and specifically the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), were applied on raw indicators.

The PCA produces a synthetic picture of the INTERACT dataset by reducing the loss of information, i.e. in terms of explained variance. Specifically, it searches for uncorrelated linear combinations (principal components) of the raw variables (indicators) that capture most information. To create synthetic indexes, the first component is normally used: the PCA extracts the linear weights (loadings) from the data matrix, which are used to build a component from the data. It allows the dataset to be represented as one component, which is a vector made up of numbers that can be conceived as weights of the initial variables. The Principal Component Analysis methodology allows one to obtain synthetic indexes of integration, which take into account the weight of each indicator to explain the phenomenon. The presented indexes are the normalised values of integration measures which are calculated based on the set of initial indicators. The indexes rank the migration sub-populations based on their level of integration by assigning numbers from 0 to 1. The higher the rank, the better the integration. The “Index” is calculated without taking into account the gap between migrants and natives. The “Gap Index” is calculated taking into account the performance of migrants in the country-of-destination context. In other words, we consider whether migrants from a particular country of origin perform better/worse with respect to the native population. The higher the index, the lower the gap between immigrants and natives in that country compared to the other groups.

Synthetic indexes were constructed for the three dimensions of integration that had the most reliable data obtained through quantitative data collection. These are: access to citizenship, education, and labour market integration. These dimensions are amongst the most researched (Jacobs 2013; Nebiler 2013; Vink 2013) and allow one to see origin and destination effects.

\textsuperscript{17}Unless stated otherwise, the data presented here pertains to migrants from the PRC excluding Hong Kong.

### Table 4. INTERACT indexes of integration for the UK (PCA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Labour Market</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Access to citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Index</td>
<td>Gap index</td>
<td>Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti (2015).

These indexes must be analysed taking into account the fact that they are sensitive to the indicators used and the selectivity of the migrant groups: that is to say, in our case, contemporary highly skilled migration from India and the PRC, and especially student migration in the Chinese case.

#### 4.1 Education

The education integration index was obtained based on the following indicators: highest educational attainment, school enrolment rate at ages 15-25, school enrolment rate at ages 25-35, share of international students at ages 20-24. Chinese migrants are especially well off considering this index. The gap between Indian and Chinese migrants or natives can be explained by the introduction of the share of students among the inactive population as an indicator of educational integration. Indeed, former migration flows and current family migration are prevalent among Indian migrants, and therefore only 12.9% of inactive Indian migrants are studying, compared to 83.4% of inactive Chinese migrants and 21.9% of inactive natives (see Table 5). However, if we look at the share of tertiary-educated, both Indian and Chinese migrants outperform the natives.

#### Table 5. Indicators of educational integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of students among the inactive population**</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of tertiary-educated**</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolment rate in formal education (15-25 years old)</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>91.4%</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolment rate in formal education (25-35 years old)</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Working age population.

Sample: Individuals born in the UK, India or China (excluding Hong Kong), working age population, weighted data.

Source: LFS, 2011; Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015.

Thus educational performance seems to be driven by migrant selectivity effects, which could be influenced both by emigration and immigration policies. The same combination of origin/destination policies leads to a different conclusion, however, if we consider labour market integration.

#### 4.2 Labour market integration

The labour market integration index was obtained based on the following indicators: the employment rate, the unemployment rate, the activity rate and the over-qualification rate. In contrast with the education index, in which Chinese migrants outperform migrants from India, Indian migrants are better integrated into the labour market than Chinese. This is due to the fact that Chinese migrants

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19 According to UNESCO, there were on average 52,402 Chinese (including those from Hong Kong) and 28,081 Indian international students yearly in the UK between 2005 and 2012.
have a higher unemployment rate, and are also mainly students. However, due to the policy targeting highly skilled migrants, Chinese and Indian migrants occupy high-ranking positions once they are hired: 52.7% of Indian-born and 46.4% of Chinese-born migrants occupy an ISCO 1-3 position,\(^{20}\) compared to 42.8% of the British born.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>India (76.1%)</th>
<th>China (43.8%)</th>
<th>UK (76.5%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activity rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share employees with highly skilled occupations (ISCO 1, 2 or 3)</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of self-employed</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample: Individuals born in the UK, India or China (excluding Hong Kong), working age population, weighted data.
Source: LFS, 2011; Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015.

Both Chinese and British authorities are focusing on student migration, which seems to have a negative effect on successful labour market entry. Indeed, 13.6% of the active Chinese population is unemployed.

When unemployed, the duration of the job search seemed shorter for Chinese migrants (see Figure 6). One hypothesis is that they find jobs quickly. Another is that among recent graduate students, many are not allowed to stay in the UK. If they do not find a highly-skilled sponsored job, they must leave the country (see above).

Thus, the integration of Indian migrants into the labour market is much better than that of Chinese. Targeting students from China and highly skilled professionals from India in Britain, pushing for

temporary student migration in China, and maintaining close ties with highly skilled emigrants in India has thus led to good labour market integration for Indians in the UK, but to a much more problematic integration for Chinese migrants.

4.3 Access to citizenship

If we take into account a long-term integration indicator, access to citizenship, both Indian and Chinese integration worsen.

As we can see in the PCA (taking into account the citizenship acquisition rate, and the share of naturalised citizens of the total born-abroad population according to 2013 data), Indian migrants have better access to citizenship than Chinese migrants do. However, the Indian share of British citizens is still not high.

Migrants born in India more frequently hold British citizenship (35%) than migrants from the PRC (22%). This phenomenon can still be observed if we look at the recent acquisition of citizenship. The average number of citizenships granted from 2004 to 2008 was 2,778 for China (including Hong Kong) and 13,828 for India.

If we consider access to nationality as an indicator of the integration of Chinese and Indian migrants living in the UK, the picture is thus less optimistic than with the short-term education indicator.

5. Discussion: Explanatory factors of Chinese and Indian migrant integration

As we will see in the following analysis, the combination of origin and destination policies is a key explanatory factor of Chinese and Indian migrant integration in the UK. It explains both who comes and who stays. This selectivity effect affects their education, labour market outcomes and access to citizenship.

The policy frameworks and their evolution, both at destination and origin, indeed impact Indian and Chinese migrants’ opportunities to leave their country of origin, stay in the UK and return back home. Current Indian migrants are coming to the UK for the purpose of family reunion, as highly skilled professionals or as students; the first two categories are mid- and long-term migration, whereas students have more opportunities to migrate back to India or elsewhere. While at present Chinese migrants are mainly students, the majority do not stay in the UK. Up until the end of the 1990s, they were supposed to come back to their country of origin just after graduating (according to PRC state policies). They are now encouraged to participate in the human development of the country from abroad, and to return to the PRC whenever they choose (Xiang 2003).

If we look at the gap between Chinese and Indian migrants regarding their access to citizenship, these findings cannot be explained by different policies at origin. Indeed, neither of these countries allows dual citizenship (see above). One explanation might be that in the past, Indians belonged to the British Empire. Before the 1981 Nationality Act, people born in India were British subjects. This connection also led to important migration flows from India to the UK much before migration from the PRC became significant.

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21 For this indicator, Chinese migrants include Chinese from Hong Kong.
22 LFS 2011, weighted data.
23 As we have seen above, migration flows from Hong Kong are older than those from the PRC. Thus current figures most likely involve migrants from the PRC, excluding Hong Kong.
24 Previous ‘Chinese’ migration flows were actually from Hong Kong, not the PRC.
In parallel with destination and origin policies’ effects and impacts on migration flows, one major explanatory factor of Chinese and Indian migrants’ integration is their year of arrival, and thus their length of stay in the UK. If we look at housing types, for instance (see Figure 7), the year of arrival is essential data. While 64% of Indian migrants living in England or Wales in 2011 owned their own house, only 40% of Chinese migrants did, which is mainly due to their year of arrival.

Figure 7. Tenure of people born in the PRC, India and the UK by year of arrival, living in England and Wales in 2011 (in %)

![Figure 7](image)

Source: Census 2011, own calculation.

The same applies when we look at migrants’ language skills. Although Indian migrants speak better English than Chinese migrants (regardless of their year of arrival), their language difficulties could be an explanatory factor of their integration during previous migration waves. However, the English skills of newer migrants have been better; of those who arrived between 2007 and 2011, only 7.8% of Indian migrants and 16.1% of Chinese migrants spoke English either not very well or not at all.

Figure 8. Language skills of migrants born in India and the PRC living in England or Wales in 2011 (in %)

![Figure 8](image)

Source: Census 2011, own calculations.
Thus in this case, the year of arrival reveals the characteristics of migrants, who at present have a highly skilled profile. English is indeed one of the official languages of the Indian State which is taught at school. And in the PRC, English is taught both in high school and, since 1977, in Chinese universities (Liu and Du 2014). In parallel, since 2010, student migrants need to prove that they have good English skills (close to the GCSE level) at destination (Cerna 2014: 17). These language skills could explain both why students entering the UK both graduate from British universities and reach top-rank positions once they are employed.

The year of arrival alone could explain Chinese migrants’ low access to citizenship; one condition of naturalization is a minimum 5-year residence in the UK. 51% of Chinese migrants and 21% of Indian migrants arrived between 2006 and 2011 (see Figure 4). This is also the main reason why Indian migrants naturalize much more than Chinese. The share of Indian migrants holding British citizenship is more significant than that of Chinese migrants (see above). Thus, one might conclude that this is an effect of past connections between India and the UK. However, once we look at the share of British passport holders living in England and Wales by year of arrival, we could also conclude the contrary, excluding the most recent migration waves (1997-2006). The fact that Indian migrants hold British citizenship more frequently overall is thus a consequence of the size of the group, and of the fact that Indian migration flows are much older than Chinese ones. In addition, in the past, the PRC encouraged its migrants to integrate into their country of destination and take its citizenship. However, since the 1990s, in parallel with the opening of its borders, the PRC redefined “Chineseness” to include its migrants and their descendants in order to help them to keep their ties with China (Nyíri 2001); this could explain their current lower naturalization rate.

**Figure 9. Share of British citizens among migrants born in India and the PRC living in England and Wales, by year of arrival (in %)**

![Graph showing share of British citizens among migrants born in India and the PRC living in England and Wales, by year of arrival.](source)

Thus, origin and destination policies have both direct and indirect effects on Indian and Chinese migrants’ integration in the UK. In addition to their push and pull power over who comes and who stays, these policies differently influence migrant organisations in the UK. Indeed, from the 1970s on, the multicultural British policy towards ethnic minorities supported integration and interaction by the community and its representatives rather than by individuals. Civil society organisations are
consequently major actors of migrant integration, according to the British State. In both the Chinese and Indian case, migrants’ civil society organisations are an old phenomenon (Benton 2003; Vertovec 1995).

Another consequence of the multicultural discourse is the maintenance of “segmentary identities, traditions, and institutions among the Hindu population of Britain” (Vertovec 1995: 147), parallel to the emergence of common Hindu organizations. The existence of different types of organisations is also observed within the Chinese community. Each type is represented in the interviews we conducted in the UK, allowing us to further analyse the position of these Chinese organisations within the Chinese community in the UK, and towards both the Chinese and British States. According to Xiang, there are first the “traditional community leaders”, who tend to “keep a distance from mainstream society” and who strongly feel Chinese without being close to the PRC State (Xiang 2003: 28)\(^2\). Second, there are local civil society organisations with a strong local network which are trying to benefit from state funding at destination. These local organisations emphasize integration and minority-majority mutual understanding as their main goals. Third, “new migrant” organisations with close ties with Beijing emerged in the 1990s (Xiang 2003; Nyíri 2001). These organisations are in charge of maintaining ties between migrants and the PRC, and disseminating the State’s conception of “Chineseness” abroad. In parallel, Confucius Centres were opened abroad by the Chinese State beginning in 2004 (Liu and Du 2014). In contrast, Indian state policy does not seem to structure Indian civil society organisations abroad. “Interviews with Indian migrant organisations show that such organisations either ignore the opportunities offered through the various schemes or declare that they have received no response to their request for support” (Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010: 13). Finally, Chinese student organisations emerged on university campuses in the UK (Wu 2014). They are not necessarily connected to the other organisations. Their main goal is to integrate Chinese students within the campus, in order to avoid individual isolation (sometimes called the “Chinese Phantom” phenomenon), and within the Chinese community and the UK in general. One student organisation’s interviewee, for instance, considers loneliness to be an integration issue. This organisation has actively engaged in measures to deal with it: they organised a dating event for single Chinese students, a lecture on Han Costume (a type of traditional Chinese costume in the Han Dynasty), and the Spring Festival Gala to celebrate the Chinese New Year. This association is also aware of the current situation regarding work visas for Chinese students and is providing information on this issue, as well as organising business training and events. Another one of their primary aims is to serve alumni who intend to work in the UK by creating a platform for them to exchange career information. Thus, some Chinese organisations’ goals are to improve Chinese labour integration in the UK, thus mitigating the effect of the restrictive British policy towards international migrants.

The Chinese community seems much more connected to the Chinese State than the Indian one. This is confirmed by the interviews we conducted. Among the six civil society organizations interviewed, five had either official or personal (through their president) relationships with the Chinese Embassy – even student organisations. One association, for instance, promotes Chinese education in the UK. It distributes free Chinese textbooks and materials to UK schools through its relationship with the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council in China. Whereas another organisation (which had two interviewees) was a traditional organisation of migrants from Hong Kong with more limited ties to the Embassy but which organised events in both China and the UK. This might explain why the Chinese migrants who arrived in the UK from 1981 on, and who currently live in England or Wales, feel less British (or English or Welsh) than Indian migrants (see Figure 10). They also feel less British than older Chinese migrants who arrived in the UK when the Chinese State considered them traitors to the country, and pushed them to assimilate in their country of residence rather than favouring return or transnational ties as it did later on.

\(^2\) Many of them migrated before 1949 or migrated from Hong Kong or Taiwan.
Thus, Indian and Chinese migrants’ national identification might be the consequence of both their duration of stay in the UK and different community structures that are more or less connected to the country of origin.

6. Main conclusions

Even though contemporary Indian and Chinese migrants even more living in the UK are highly skilled migrants, they do not automatically integrate into British society. Depending on the indicator of integration under consideration, one might conclude that one group is better integrated than the other. If we take the example of Chinese and Indian migrants living in the UK, Chinese migrants are better educated than Indian migrants. However, fewer hold a British passport, and more are unemployed.

The position of Chinese and Indian migrants in British society seems to be the consequence of the combination of the origin and destination countries’ policies. These policies indeed affected who came to the UK and who stayed there in the past – and affect who comes and leaves currently. At present, the countries of origin and of destination are in a competition for talent. And in a context of stricter immigration policies, the countries of origin, especially China, are thus relatively more attractive to migrants.

States’ policies at destination and origin also influence the way the migrant community is organized and is integrated into mainstream society. The structure of the Indian and Chinese communities is changing according to migration flows and evolving State policies.

Integration is a long-term process. It is thus essential to consider the changing nature of the policy framework constraining both the mobility and integration of migrants. In addition, it was shown in this paper that both the year of arrival and the duration of stay impact migrants’ integration. Since migration flows from India are older than the ones from the PRC, Indian migrants more often own homes, speak better English, have British nationality and identify as British than Chinese migrants do. Destination and origin policies can thus affect migrants’ opportunity structures differently over time.
and have a direct and indirect effect on their integration in the long run. In addition, civil society organisations can both maintain ties with the country of origin, and try to counterbalance the difficulties of integration in the UK.

Appendix. Legal and institutional framework in the UK, PRC and India

Table 7. British Legislative Framework regarding immigration and citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / Law</th>
<th>Summary of Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905 / Alien Act</td>
<td>Restriction of migrant entries, targeting “undesirable” Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914 / British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act</td>
<td>Deportation or restriction of place of residence for “enemy aliens” living in Britain in wartime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919 / Aliens Restriction Act</td>
<td>Restriction of the rights of aliens residing in Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948 / Citizenship Act</td>
<td>All people residing in the British Empire and Commonwealth are subjects of the British Crown, and are thus allowed to travel everywhere in the Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 / Commonwealth Immigrants Act</td>
<td>Restriction of immigration to specific categories of migrants, such as those with job offers, or families of migrants already residing in the UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 / Commonwealth Immigrants Act</td>
<td>Restriction of immigration to migrants born in the UK, or who have at least one grandparent born there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 / Immigration Act</td>
<td>Replaces the 1919 Act, restriction of immigration to family reunification causes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Primary Purpose Rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 / British Nationality Act</td>
<td>Redefinition of the British citizenship, limited to people born in the UK, and their immediate descendants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 / British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act</td>
<td>50,000 key people from Hong Kong and their descendants were given full British citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 / Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act</td>
<td>Inclusion of the UN Refugee Convention and its Protocol in British domestic law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 / Asylum and Immigration Act</td>
<td>Introduction of the “safe” country concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Abrogation of the Primary Purpose Rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 / Asylum and Immigration Act</td>
<td>Possibility for asylum seekers to enter the country illegally if they present themselves directly to the authorities upon arrival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 / Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act</td>
<td>Creation of accommodation centres for asylum seekers, and an “asylum registration card”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Working Holidaymaker Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 / Asylum and Immigration Act</td>
<td>Increased control of unsuccessful asylum seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 / Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act</td>
<td>Increased control of illegal work in parallel with increased social rights for asylum seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Point Based System (PBS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 Since India was part of the British Empire, Indian residents were not aliens.
Table 8. British race relations and civic integration legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / Law</th>
<th>Summary of Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965 / Race Relations Act</td>
<td>Prohibition of racial discrimination in public spaces, and creation of the Race Relations Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 / Race Relations Act</td>
<td>Prohibition of racial discrimination in housing, employment and public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 / Race Relations Act</td>
<td>Prohibition of racial discrimination in employment, provision of goods and services, education and public services, and creation of the Commission for Racial Inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 / Race Relations Act</td>
<td>Establishes that one of the duties of public institutions is to promote racial equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 / Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002</td>
<td>From 2004 on, every foreigner obtaining British citizenship must attend a citizenship ceremony, during which he/she will take oath of loyalty to the Queen and to all the laws of the United Kingdom. From 2005 on, naturalization is conditional upon language skills, and some knowledge of British “core values,” which can be proved by passing the “Life in the UK citizenship test.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>The “Life in the UK citizenship test” should be passed by all applicants for permanent residence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Major Chinese Emigration Laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / Law</th>
<th>Summary of Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951 / Provisional Measures on Exit and Entry through the National Border of Overseas Chinese</td>
<td>Control of emigration and opening to return migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Creation of the household registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954 -1974 / PRC Constitution</td>
<td>Recognition of the freedom of movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954 / Provisional Measures on the Exit of Aliens in China</td>
<td>Further control on emigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958 / Regulations on Household Registration</td>
<td>Necessity to be registered in order to apply for exit permission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Establishment of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 / Regulations on Passport and Visa</td>
<td>Right to obtain a passport for Chinese citizens with specific qualifications, with strong limitations for those living in the country for public affairs purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 / Law of Nationality</td>
<td>Confirmation of prohibition of dual citizenship, consequently requiring entry visas for ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality, and limiting their rights in the PRC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continues)

27 The specific regulations regarding exit and entry to/from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are not included in this table.
### Table 9. Major Chinese Emigration Laws (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / Law</th>
<th>Summary of Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982 / Constitution</td>
<td>The PRC protects the rights and interests of overseas Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 / Law on the Control of Exit and Entry of Citizens</td>
<td>Exit of Chinese was allowed to any Chinese citizen in principle, under the condition that they obtain a passport, and obtain permission to travel abroad. In case of emigration, the emigrant loses his or her household registration, thus losing many rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Simplification of the exit procedure for private affairs for scientists and IT personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Liberalization of student policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Encouragement of students’ return through the China Scholarship Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Simplified exit procedure for returnees and their families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 / Reiteration of Strictly Forbidding of Sending Young Women to Abroad to Provide Erotic Services</td>
<td>Prohibition of young women’s labour migration for specific work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 / Circular on Issuing Long-term Multiple Entry Visas to Overseas Chinese Students and Professionals (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)</td>
<td>Assistance to returnees entry to the PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 /</td>
<td>Simplification of the exit procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 / Pilot programmes, expanded in 2003 and 2004</td>
<td>Simplification of passport procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 / Circular of Ministries of Education, Public Security and Foreign Affairs on Some AffairsRegarding Fulltime Students Exit China Short-term for Private Affairs</td>
<td>Right of exit to full-time students for private affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Abolition of the necessity to obtain approval from their work unit in order to apply for a passport for employees of the private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Possibility to obtain a residence permit for aliens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 / Passport Law</td>
<td>Standardization of passport procedure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Indian Emigration Legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / Law</th>
<th>Summary of Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983 / Emigration Act</td>
<td>Right and duties of labour migrants protected by the Protector General of Emigrants, and legislative framework for employers and recruitment agencies; low-skilled labour migrants need an Emigration Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 / Passports Act</td>
<td>Conditions to get an Indian passport thus allowing emigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 / Foreign Exchange Management Act</td>
<td>Definition of and Taxation Rules of Non-Resident Indians (NRI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Creation of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 / Amendment to the 1983 Emigration Act</td>
<td>Better identification of emigrants, and control of recruiting agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Scheme for providing legal/financial assistance to Indian women deserted by their overseas spouses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Pension and Life Insurance Fund (PLIF) for Overseas Indian workers with an Emigration-Check-Required passport and who emigrated with a temporary / contract visa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Overview of the public institutions in charge of emigration policies in China

| Ministry of Public Security and its authorised local public security departments | - Exit and entry for private affairs of Chinese citizens  
- Entry, travel and residence of aliens lodged in China. |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its authorised local foreign affairs departments | - Exit and entry for public affairs of Chinese citizens  
- Entry, transit, travel and residence of those lodged outside China. |
| Chinese diplomatic missions, consular offices or other agencies abroad, authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Issue, cancel, revoke and retain, or declare invalid Chinese passports and alien visas. |
| Bureau of Harbour Superintendence or its authorised harbour superintendent departments | Issue, cancel, revoke and retain, or declare invalid seafarer passports. |
| Bureau of Borders Security Check and Administration under the Ministry of Public Security and Border Inspection Stations | Administer exit and entry border inspection |
| Six ministries and their authorized local departments | Administration of emigration intermediary agencies. |
| Communist Party of China and other departments and units | - Examine and approve exit and entry for public affairs  
- Exit and entry of individuals with special status for private affairs. |

Source: Adapted from Liu 2007.
Table 12. Overview of the institutions in charge of emigration policies in India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Functions and Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian Council of Overseas Employment</td>
<td>Inform potential migrants about employment opportunities abroad and implement skill up-grading programmes in order to adapt labour supply to labour demand.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA; 2004) and its Emigration Policy Division (2006) | - Frame the departure flows  
- Provide protection to overseas Indians  
- Enhance the development impacts of the diaspora |
| Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC) and Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) | One-stop-shop for economic engagement, investment and business                           |
| India Development Foundation of Overseas Indians (IDF)                     | - Facilitate diaspora philanthropy  
- Lead overseas Indian philanthropic capital into India’s social development effort. |
| Indian Council of Overseas Employment (ICOE), which became the Indian Centre for Migration (ICM, 2008) | Strategic ‘think-tank’ on matters relating to overseas employment markets for Indians and overseas Indian workers. |
| Global Indian Network of Knowledge (Global-INK)                           | Electronic platform aiming to facilitate transfer of knowledge with the objective of leveraging the expertise, skills and experience of overseas Indians. |
| Prime Minister’s Global Advisory Council                                  | Draw upon the talent of the best overseas Indian minds wherever they might reside       |
| Overseas Indian Centres (OIC) at the Indian Missions                      | Serve as field formations on matters relating to overseas Indians                       |

Source: Adapted from Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010.

References


