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## *Corridor Report on France: the case of Tunisian and Turkish immigrants*

*Author: Lorenzo GABRIELLI | GRITIM,  
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona*

*Editor: Cameron Thibos | Lecturer, Council on International  
Educational Exchange*

The objective of the present analysis is to understand the role of origin country policies and actions in the integration process of Ecuadorian and Moroccan immigrants in Spain.


KEY FINDINGS



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## Tunisian and Turkish immigration in France

A first important element that we have to take in account to contextualise flows of Tunisian migrants to France are the colonial ties connecting the two countries between 1881 and 1957, when the Tunisian Republic was officially declared. These links constitute a key factor in the development of migration flows between the two spaces. Tunisian migration flows to France are further linked to the two World Wars, and primarily World War II, in which the protectorate provided soldiers to the French army and workers for the industries, as well as labour force for the post-war periods. Thus, in comparison with the other Maghreb countries, such as Morocco or Algeria, Tunisian emigration flows to Europe appear later.

The two main periods of Tunisian migration to France come after the country gained independence in 1956, when the flow of Tunisians began to grow ‘anarchically’ until the early 1960s. A second period follows the signature of the “Grandval” bilateral convention on 9 August 1963, which organised the recruitment and the stay of Tunisian workers in France. After this agreement, emigration flows are more structured by the Tunisian government, as well as by France. Between 1969, when the application of the agreement enter effectively in force, and 1972 more than half of state-controlled Tunisian emigration was heading for France.

The oil crisis in the mid-1970s interrupted of formal recruitment, however in the wake of this disruption family reunifications increased, bringing new Tunisians – primarily women – to France. At the

same time, irregular flows start to develop alongside a growing number of Tunisians overstaying their visas. These flows represent the main channels of entry of Tunisian population in the last decades.


In the case of Turkish migration to France, the start of formal flows begins with the bilateral agreement on labour recruitment signed between the two countries on 8 May 1965. This was designed to cover shortages in the French labour market that were not already being filled by immigrants from Spain, Italy and Portugal. In reality, only at the beginning of the 1970s did the French National Bureau of Immigration (OFI) start signing collective recruitment contracts for Turkish workers, assigning them to industrial areas (Alsace, Vosges, Rhône-Alpes) and some rural areas (Auvergne and Limousin).

Family reunification replaced labour migration in 1974 as the main flow of Turkish migrants into France after the oil crisis interrupted the formal recruitment of foreign workers. One of the major effects of this shift was to increase the number of Turkish women in France. It is important to note here that Turkish migration flows to Europe developed later than those coming from the Maghreb.

Of the Tunisian immigrants residing in France in 2008, 25% had arrived at the end of the 1960s. In contrast, the arrival of Turkish migrant in France is more spread out over time. In general, Tunisian migrants arrived earlier than Turkish migrants. While the former mainly arrived between the 1970s and the 2000s, the latter largely arrived between the 1980s and the 2000s.



Figure 1- Evolution of the number of foreigners, 1982-2011



Source: INSEE, Population selon la nationalité au 1er janvier 2011, and Étrangers par région au 1er janvier 2005; MPI Data Hub. 1960-2013

## The policies


The starting point of French integration policy can be placed after the suspension of the recruitment of foreign workers in July 1974. One consequence of stopping formal recruitment was the stabilisation of migrants already present in France, as well as the development of the family reunifications. At this moment, French state action was oriented more to the perspective of the return of immigrants than to their stable integration in France.

Legislative activity on immigration was intense during the 1980s, especially in the areas of entrance and stay of foreigners, the conditions of citizenship eligibility, and the fight against discrimination.

Following the passage of the ‘Bonnet’ law on 10 January 1980 – which introduced deportation as a sanction for the illegal stay – this intense normative production made the legislative framework on immigration evermore complex.

With the family reunifications and the stabilisation of immigrants in France, the policy perspective on foreign population in France changes progressively and integration appears more and more as an issue, even if indirectly. To understand the French approach to integration, it is important to note the ‘assimilationist’ approach of integration policy, not targeting long-term immigrants as recipients of

1 An updated list of multiple existing bilateral agreements is available on the site of the association GISTI. <http://www.gisti.org/spip.php?rubrique135>



specific integration measures. The key element for a good integration of the foreigners into the French society is to accept and respect the basic principles and values of the French republic.

The Interior Ministry puts forward two main tools in the field of the integration policy: the requirement of naturalization and the reception and integration contract. The first pillar of French integration policy is access to French citizenship. The acquisition of French citizenship by those who cannot claim it by either descent or birth depends for the most part on the Interior Minister in charge of naturalizations. The second pillar of the French integration policy is the Reception and Integration Contract (CAI), previewed by the Code of Entry and Stay of Foreigners and Rights of Asylum (CESEDA) of 2004, and compulsory since January 2007. In this framework, learning French represents a clear priority, and several measures have been implemented at the language level.

All nationalities benefit from the same measures at the local and national level, and no immigrant community is targeted by any specific rules because of its nationality. Nonetheless, the regulation of entrance and stay, as well as of access to the labour market, is affected by bilateral agreements<sup>1</sup>. This can indirectly have consequences on the integration of migrants.

Looking at pre-departure measures, the main existing tools towards integration are managed by the OFII, and include an evaluation measure and abroad training (prior to CAI). Those measures are

mainly about language learning, and also concern the beneficiaries the family reunification or the spouse of a French citizen.

Looking at the policy and institutional framework of the two countries of origin analysed in the report, it is necessary to look comparatively at their emigration and diaspora policies, to underline their differences and similarity.

The attitude of Tunisia *vis-à-vis* of the emigration of its citizens has changed over time. Looking at a first period of the emigration, between 1955 and 1963, the government was generally opposed to emigration, due to the risk of losing skilled workers during the creation of a national economy post-independence. After 1963, Tunisian authorities had to address unemployment on the national labour market as well as informal outflows of migrants. This led them to sign bilateral agreements with France (9 August 1963) and later on with other countries. Tunisia created an Office of Professional Formation and Employment (OFPE) in 1967, where a special DG on emigration has the mission to control, at each level, the growing emigration flows.

In general terms, the current Tunisian emigration policy tries to combine two different elements: sending some of its citizens overseas, as well as keeping strong ties between them and their origin country. Looking at recent times, it also has to be noted that the revolution of 2011 in Tunisia, which overthrew the former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, changed the political landscape in the country



deeply, as well as the institutional structures and aims towards Tunisian emigrants.

In the case of Turkey, the policy framework concerning emigration has also evolved in a significant way through time. In the 1960s, in order to decrease unemployment and benefit from remittances as tools of development, the Turkish state promoted emigration through bilateral labour agreements signed with France (1965) and many other European countries. During this early stage of migration flows to Europe in the 1960s, the overall state emigration policy in Turkey was based on facilitating remittance flows and the easy return of labour migrants. Alarmed by the first signs of Turkish permanent settlement in Europe, the Turkish state started to taking measures for encouraging returns to Turkey. During the 1970s, various programs were initiated to channel workers' remittances into employment generating investments. However, these initiatives did not live up to government expectations. In the 1980s, Turkish permanent settlement in Europe was generally accepted. The economic mentality of the state emigration policy was slowly replaced with social, cultural and political measures for integration

abroad. In the 1990s, the Turkish state began institutionalizing the monitoring and controlling the overseas populations. Starting from the 2000s, the state became actively involved by bringing together domestic institutions and representatives of Turks from a wider geography with the main aim to keep cultural ties.

An overview of the Turkish diaspora policy across time shows a policy shift from promoting return migration to keeping economic and social ties with emigrants. This continues with the institutionalization of monitoring and controlling the overseas populations, as well as the state's active involvement with domestic institutions and representatives of Turks abroad.


### Interpreting the integration index

The integration index elaborated about Tunisian and Turkish migrants in France shows differences between the two communities in the three fields considered (Table 1). In all the three fields analysed here, the level of integration of Tunisian immigrants is higher than of Turkish immigrants.

*Table 1 - Level of integration of Moroccan and Ecuadorian migrants in Spain*

ORIGIN	Labour Market		Education		Access to citizenship
	Index	Gap index	Index	Gap index	Index
Tunisia	0.50	0.43	0.21	0.33	0.77
Turkey	0.15	0.12	0.05	0.05	0.41

Source: Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti (2015); note: year of reference 2012, as for the following tables if not explicitly mentioned.



In general terms, it is necessary to note that some of the dissimilarity in integration patterns has to be connected with the particular historical, linguistic and cultural links between Tunisia and France. Some other differences can be linked with the specific time evolution of the two migration flows to France.

Looking at indicators on **labour market**, the pattern of Tunisians in the labour market is more close to that of French nationals than the Turkish pattern is. The share of working-age Turkish migrants who are employed is only 40.4%, versus 51.7% of Tunisians and 64.8% of French. This low share of employed persons among Turkish migrants is due both to a very high number of inactive and unemployed people (respectively 44.3% and 15.3%) compared with both Tunisians (36.9% and 11.3%) and – to a large extent – to French people (28.7% and 6.6%). Concerning the employment type, Tunisians are more often self-employed than Turkish migrants (respectively 20.3% and 15.2%), although both groups are more self-employed than French (only 10.7%).

Concerning the employment of immigrants by sector, Tunisians are more employed in services sector than Turkish migrants, while the latter are more employed in manufacturing. In particular, the share of population employed in the manufacturing and service sectors show significant differences: 22% of Tunisian and 23% of French are employed in manufacturing, versus 52% of Turkish; 77% of Tunisians and 76% of French are employed in services, versus only 46% of Turkish migrants.

Also looking at the type of occupation following the ISCO categories, data show that the pattern of Tunisians immigrants employed in higher occupations is higher than that of Turkish migrants, the majority of whom are employed in lower occupations, and is thus more close to the pattern of the French native population. The share of Turkish employees in higher occupations (ISCO categories 1, 2 and 3) is only 14.3%, while the share of Tunisians is 43% (for French population is 44%). To explain this difference it has to be considered that the share of tertiary-educated Tunisians in France is higher than that of Turks (respectively 18% of Tunisians, and 8% of Turkish immigrants), and that Tunisians have a higher familiarity with French language. Looking at time needed to find employment, data with regard to Turkish immigrants are closer to those of French nationals than those of Tunisians. Turkish immigrants spend a shorter time to find a new job after becoming unemployed. It is very difficult to understand if origin countries and societies play a role in this issue. It is probable that these data are more connected with the main sectors of labour market in which the two communities are employed in France, as well as with the access and the action of migrant social networks in the country.

Looking at the role played by state actors in the countries of origins, the existing bilateral agreements between France and Tunisia (the 1963's "Grandval" bilateral agreement, and the bilateral agreement on residence and work of 1988) appear as possible



explanatory factors for this difference in integration patterns between the two chosen communities, and particularly in the labour market. Looking at differences in the field of the **educational** attainment, Tunisia has again closer pattern to French natives, but it is difficult to assess the impact of origin countries. Regarding the share of population (aged 15-25) enrolled in formal education, both communities show a large distance from the French population pattern: only 30.4% of Tunisians, and 37.6% of Turkish immigrants are enrolled, vis-à-vis 64% of French natives. Looking at the population aged 25-35, Tunisians also show the highest share of population enrolled in formal education: 5.2% of Tunisians, 1.5% of Turks, and 2% of French natives. It is possible that this data has to be linked with the data on the number of international students coming from these two countries. In the period 2005-2012, the annual average number of Tunisian international students going to France was 10,842, while the number of Turkish students stood markedly lower at 2,324.

The fact that Tunisia has a wide use of French language, even if it is not an official language of the country, is important, as are the similarities in the education systems between Tunisia and France, and the larger diffusion of French schools in Tunisia.

In the field of **access to citizenship**, the difference between the two communities are larger. Only 27% of the Turkish immigrants residing in France have the French nationality, vis-à-vis 66% of Tunisians

immigrants in the country. Nevertheless, during the last years the trend of Turkish and Tunisian immigrants granting French nationality has clearly become more equal. The share of naturalization between Turkish immigrants has grown substantially between 1999 and 2004-5, increasing from 15.2 % to 25.7%, even is still lower than the share of Tunisians (40.2 % in 1999, growing to 45.2% in 2004-5)<sup>2</sup>.

The fact that Turkey allowed for dual nationality only after 1981 can explain the lower rate of nationality acquisition compared to the case of Tunisians. The Tunisian code of nationality of 1956, as well as its subsequent modifications, do not require the loss of Tunisian nationality upon the acquisition of another one. It is also possible that the very proactive Turkish policy to maintain link with the emigrants, as well as the trust of emigrants in origin countries and their institutions, has also played a role.

Concerning the role of civil society actors and immigrant organisation, in Turkey and Tunisia as well as in France, their activities towards immigrant integration have a less structural character and can appear to a first view as less relevant. That said, these activities, and particularly those carried on by immigrant organisations in the country of destination, have surely a strong impact in immigrant integration due to their proximity. The impact of these organisations, however, falls outside the scope of this study.

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2 INED - Immigrés par pays de naissance en 1999, and INSEE - Immigrés et étrangers 2004-2005.

## INTERACT

*Researching Third Country Nationals' Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration*

The INTERACT project studies the impact of sending countries on migrant integration. It looks at the ways in which institutions and organisations in origin countries thicken transnational bonds by developing tools to boost financial transfers, maintain cultural heritages, enhance migrant political participation, and protect migrants' rights. It seeks to understand how these efforts impact migrant integration, as well as how origin country policies complement or contradict the integration measures of receiving country governments.

Tel: (+39) 055 4685 817/892

Fax: (+39) 055 4685 – 755

[mpc@eui.eu](mailto:mpc@eui.eu)

The INTERACT project is co-financed by the European Union.  
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