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ITHACA - INTEGRATION, TRANSNATIONAL
MOBILITY AND HUMAN, SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL TRANSFERS

**A survey on
transnationally mobile migrants
ITHACA Research Report N. 5/2015**

Laura Bartolini

Global Governance Programme, RSCAS, EUI



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the European Commission

**EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES**

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ITHACA PROJECT

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The ITHACA Research Project

ITHACA - Integration, Transnational Mobility and Human, Social and Economic Capital

ITHACA studies the links between migrants' integration and their transnational engagement. Migrants engage in transnational mobility for an array of economic reasons as well as emotional or political ties with their country of origin. They develop transnational business, trade, investments, or social and cultural programmes and circulate between their two countries. ITHACA explores the interconnections between the integration process and transnational mobility of migrants and aims to answer three key questions: To what extent, and in what ways, do integration conditions in the country of destination encourage transnational mobility? What are the conditions in the country of origin that may encourage transnational mobility? What type of transfers take place through the transnational mobility of migrants? ITHACA focuses on economic integration and mobility conditions as factors that encourage or prevent transnational mobility.

The ITHACA project is hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou (anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu). The project is funded by DG Home of the European Commission.

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Executive Summary

This Report presents the results of the ITHACA survey on transnationally mobile migrants and returnees (324 interviews) in four EU destination countries – Austria, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom – and five non-EU origin countries – Bosnia Herzegovina, India, Morocco, the Philippines and Ukraine. It addresses the basic characteristics of this purposive, non-random sample, outlining a series of markers of integration, transnational engagement and transnational mobility to understand what type of mobility is more likely to be experienced, under what conditions and for what reasons by both migrants residing in Europe and returnees in their origin country.

The sample has prevalently **urban roots** and was interviewed in some selected cities of the countries participating in the project. Hence, even when speaking of countries of origin and of destination, the discussion is more specifically on localities – cities and neighbourhood – surveyed during the fieldwork.

The **share of surveyed transnational migrants investing** in their destination countries varies between 62% (Filipinos) to 80% (Indians and Bosnians). Conversely, Filipino migrants are those most involved in investment at origin (79%) as compared to Indians (69%), Ukrainians and Bosnians (59-60%) and Moroccans (42%). Returnees are more engaged in investment at origin (65%) than at destination (38%). Interviewees are often engaged in **multiple investments**, either diversifying the risk through many activities – from the purchase of a house to the education of children and the launch of an enterprise – or engaging in multiple locations at the same time.

As regards to **means of transnationalism**, to foster the transnational ties across the borders for both migrants and returnees, we looked at three main indicators of transnational mobility:

- **Physical mobility** measured as the number of times interviewees had travelled between the two countries over the past two years. The number of visits is inversely connected with the average time spent on travel and varies according to the geographical distance, the accessibility of affordable transportation means, the ability of migrants of balancing work holidays, school vacations of children, religious or national festivities etc. Bosnians are by far the most physically mobile group, followed by Ukrainians and Moroccans. On the contrary, the lower frequency of travels of Filipino and Indians migrants confirm the difficulties connected with transoceanic travels. The presence of children at origin is associated with fewer travels for returnees, while migrants tend to travel more if they have invested in either of the two countries – testifying the need of a certain degree of control over lands or activities – or if they are planning to settle back at origin.

- Transnational **monetary remittances**, seen as complement or substitute to the personal visits abroad. Remittances do not seem correlated to travels in our sample, meaning that the regularity in monetary transfers abroad is associated with other factors. The ability and willingness to send money to the origin household or to engage in reverse transfers to support family members abroad are associated with different migration strategies as well as different life-time stages of migrants and returnees. Young individuals from affluent backgrounds who migrated to seek better opportunities and higher quality of life (as many of our sampled Indian migrants) are intrinsically different in their remitting patterns from more typically economic migrants. Interviewed migrants from the Philippines are the most regular in the sample, while Moroccans do not remit (anymore) in half of the cases. Ukrainians often accompany a high level of physical mobility to constant remittance transfers. Transnationally mobile migrants are typically highly-educated, but those who study also abroad are less likely to engage in constant remittances. Overall, economic ability, transnational family connections and having invested at origin are associated with stronger regularity in the remittances. On the contrary, migrants investing in their destination countries are less able (or willing) to remit regularly.
- **Civic mobility** as testified by membership in NGOs or third-sector associations in the destination country. In almost all cases interviewed migrants describe their activities as transnational and multicultural in nature and their engagement in these diaspora or migrant organizations as a way to nurture their emotional and symbolic ties with their origin country. Less common among returnees (25%), civic mobility is more common in the case of Filipinos (77%) and Moroccans (60%).

Our **Transnational Mobility Indexes** (TMI) summarizes physical and monetary (TMI-1) and civic mobility (TMI-2) in a **4-points scale** (1=less mobile, 4=more mobile) multidimensional measure of transnational mobility. Transnational mobility of migrants is associated with the presence of economic investment in either of the two countries, showing the need to engage in a complex mix of distant and personal contacts in order to keep control over the investment made. Among returnees instead, it is associated with a transnational distribution of family members or with having still a primary economic activity at destination for which travelling is necessary. As for the single measures of mobility, Ukrainians and Bosnians seem to be more mobile than the rest of the sample, followed by Filipinos who compensate their lower physical mobility with their strong engagement in monetary transfers and transnational NGOs. Austria proves to be the country of residence for the most mobile migrants in the sample, followed by Spain. Returnees show an average-to-low level of overall transnational mobility in comparison with migrants still residing in Europe.

We found no significant distinction in the economic engagement and in the transnational mobility level by sex and very low difference across ages, lengths of stay and legal status. This might be due to the self-

selection of our sampled migrants, coupled with the relevance of intra-household decision-making processes for most of the interviewees. Almost all migrants in a couple expressed some sort of co-decision and support from their partners, necessary to fruitfully engage in transnational activities while taking care of relationships at the family level. Dual citizenship is associated to investment at destination and hence is a sign of deeper integration, while having a permanent residence permit is more associated with transnational mobility and engagement. Other institutional integration variables also do not seem to have a stable association with more or less transnational mobility. This might be due in particular to the fact that over 70% of the total sample has a long migration experience.

We identify **to two distinct types of migration trajectory and profiles:**

- Young individuals with affluent family backgrounds who moved often as students and seek better opportunities and higher quality of life;
- (More) traditional economic migrants, with middle or high education levels, who migrated to make a better living for themselves and their families.

While wealthier **opportunity migrants** tend to remit less regularly and transnationally engage to maximise revenue or increase their prestige in both location, **necessity migrants** seeks to improve their standard of living and to diversify their activities across borders as an upward mobility strategy. For them, transnational engagement is related to their family obligations and to the possible alternative project of return upon retirement.

Not all our sampled migrants and returnees have a full successful story with regards to entrepreneurial activities or investments either at origin or at destination and some suffered from the enduring economic crisis in Europe. Nevertheless, the described patterns hold regardless of the level of success of the economic activities undertaken and of personal satisfaction over the migration experience overall. Our study shows that migrants who are transnationally mobile and who engage into economic transnational activities are not the best integrated or most successful, nor they are the most dissatisfied with their situation at the destination, and hence engage into some form of reactionary transnationalism to compensate for downward socio-economic mobility at destination.

While younger opportunity migrants receive support from their origin families and decide to migrate before entering in their the family-formation period, for migrants already with a partner and particularly for those with children left behind, decisions regarding migration, integration and transnational engagement are necessarily family decisions in terms of obligations, sources of inspirations or links with either of the two localities. Either for opportunity or for necessity, the transnational engagement and

mobility of all our interviewees is a constituent feature of their **life-time trajectories**, from their origin countries to their European destination and to, eventually, a new re-settlement at the time of retirement.

Keywords

Integration, transnational mobility, remittances, economic investment, Europe, third country nationals

Frequently Used Abbreviations

Countries

AT	Austria
BIH	Bosnia Herzegovina
ES	Spain
IND	India
IT	Italy
MOR	Morocco
PHI	the Philippines
UK	United Kingdom
UKR	Ukraine

Regions

EU28	EU 28 Member States excluding natives
OthEur	Other Europe (includes Bosnia and Ukraine)
NA	North Africa(includes Morocco)
SEA	South and South East Asia (includes India and the Philippines)
RoW	Rest of the World (all other regional groups)

Others

CoO	Country of origin
CoD	Country of destination
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
ISCO	International Standard Classification of Occupations
LFS	Labour Force Survey
TCNs	Third Country Nationals

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1. Introduction¹²

The ITHACA project explores the nexus between integration and socio-economic transnational activities, focusing specifically on the relevance of mobility in this nexus and of the interplay between the conditions and practices in both the countries of origin and of destination. It looks at the links between transnational mobility and the level and depth of migrant integration at destination, and tries to shed some light on the type and frequency of transfers – economic, social and cultural - generated by transnational mobility. As discussed in the concept paper (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2014), it focuses on economic activities which require the migrant to be transnationally mobile, rather than transnational writ large. To address the basic research questions which framed the whole project (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2014, 9–10), we have used multiple research methods, with the aim of combining different kinds of data from different sources.

First, ITHACA conducted a state of the art literature review on integration and transnationalism (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2014; Gropas, Triandafyllidou, and Bartolini 2014) and a quantitative analysis of relevant secondary data (Eurostat open Database and LFS microdata, World Bank Remittance Database, etc.). Then, we probed further through a quali-quantitative survey which was developed to collect the personal experiences of migrants on the issues aforementioned. Moreover a number of interviews with stakeholders in both destination and origin countries have provided further insights and a variety of perspectives on the links between integration and transnationalism and on the role of state and non-state actors in facilitating or obstructing migrant agency.

This Report examines the material collected within the ITHACA project from a quantitative perspective. In the next section, we summarize the most up-to-date available secondary data, in order to set the scene for our empirical study. Section 3 presents the cross-national survey of transnationally mobile migrant interviewed by ITHACA across nine countries, describes the fieldwork and the final sample composition. Section 4 introduces a number of descriptive findings with regards to the level and depth of integration for migrants and returnees, their transnational ties and activities and the means of transnational mobility they mostly make use of. Section 5 engages in the construction of a multidimensional, composite index of transnational mobility (TMI) which leads to our concluding remarks in the final Section 6.

¹ Author would like to express a profound gratitude to all the participants to the ITHACA project – researchers, interviewers and transnational migrants. In particular, she truly thanks Ruby Gropas, Anna Triandafyllidou and Eugenia Markova for the fruitful discussions on concepts and measures to adopt, and ITHACA’s external reviewers Jean-Pierre Cassarino and Jørgen Carling for their critical reading of this work. All shortcomings are the sole responsibility of the author.

² Section 2 is based on data from Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey (2004-2013). The responsibility for all conclusions drawn from the data lies entirely with the author.

2. Quantitative evidence from secondary data

2.1. Indicators of immigrant integration

The discussion of the different notions and concepts of immigrant integration has been addressed in the background papers (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2014; Gropas, Triandafyllidou, and Bartolini 2014) and it is beyond the scope of this paragraph. Instead we focus on available measures of immigrant integration in ITHACA's countries of destination, to highlight some basic patterns of integration, intended as convergence between immigrants and native-born. Comparing integration outcomes at the international level deserves some caution as population characteristics vary widely across countries and any relevant measure is by definition sensible to country-specific socio-economic contexts³. Moreover, even looking only at the European Union and notwithstanding the big and increasing efforts in the harmonization of migration statistics over the past decades (Kraler, Reichel, and Entzinger 2015), any theoretical account of immigrant integration has to be somehow reshaped according to the availability of cross-country comparable data.

Available statistics usually allow distinguishing between foreign-born individuals (qualified by their country of birth) and foreigners (qualified by their nationality). While choosing the country of birth criterion excludes individuals of migrant origin, data based on citizenship are influenced by norms and practices of citizenship acquisition and loss, which show a high degree of variation even within Europe. Following the approach of the European Commission and the OECD in this field (Eurostat 2011; Huddleston, Niessen, and Tjaden 2013; OECD and European Union 2015), we intend immigrant as the foreign-born population. Hence, since ITHACA studies the link between transnational mobility and integration conditions for adult, working age individuals focusing on the so-called 'first-generation' migrants, presented data refers to populations disaggregated by their country of birth⁴.

ITHACA engages into a comparative study of several migration systems (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2014, 26–27), involving four EU destination countries – Austria, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom – and five non-EU origin countries – Bosnia Herzegovina, India, Morocco, the Philippines and Ukraine. In what

³ In other words, we cannot assume that the immigrant population moves towards (or away from) the native-born one as if the native-born situation is fixed over time and similar across countries (Ponzo and Salis 2014).

⁴ At the policy level, and specifically to distinguish between EU and non-EU migrants, the notion of migrants as third-country nationals (TCNs) – hence non-EU citizens residing in the EU – is often recalled. Indeed integration outcomes measured in terms of differences between TCNs and nationals of the EU reporting country tend to be greater than differences between foreign- (non-EU) and native born in a given country, as the acquisition of citizenship is generally associated with longer presence at destination and translates into fully equal rights in all domains. We address the acquisition of citizenship as one of the institutional or civic integration measures.

follows, we show some of the integration measures at our disposal in the areas under scrutiny in ITHACA in order to present a general picture for the overall immigrant population to be compared to the micro-survey evidence presented in Section 4 and 5. Both administrative, census and survey records collected by Eurostat in its online Database and the micro-data that we present for Austria, Spain, Italy and the UK are not originally intended to provide measures of migrant integration. Hence, issues of data reliability and comparability especially for what concerns sample sizes and survey design techniques have to be taken into account (Kraler, Reichel, and Entzinger 2015, 49). In particular, neither the Eurostat online Database nor EU-LFS micro-data provide figures disaggregated by single country of birth, but only for broader regional groupings⁵. Hence, in light of presenting figures to serve as a reference for our empirical study, we used the following groupings:

Regions of birth	Abbreviation
Native	Nat
EU 28 excluding natives	EU28
Other Europe (which includes Bosnia and Ukraine)	OthEur
North Africa (which includes Morocco)	NA
South and South East Asia (which includes India and the Philippines)	SEA
Rest of the World (which aggregates all the remaining regional groups)	RoW

Growing and stabilizing immigrant populations


According to the recent Indicators of Immigrant Integration by OECD and Eurostat (OECD and European Union 2015), ITHACA's countries of destination belong to distinct groups as immigrant destinations, according to the prevalent features of their immigrant population. The UK and Austria are in the group of 'longstanding destinations' (OECD and European Union 2015, 28), the former with a high number of also recent, highly-educated individuals and the latter with a big group of settled low-to-medium educated immigrants. Spain and Italy instead are part of the new destinations with many recent labour migrants, predominantly with a low-education profile.

All four countries show positive trends in the share of foreign-born populations over the total since the beginning of the 2000s. Italy and Spain emerged in particular, doubling or tripling their immigrant population over the past decade. Even though in Spain the increasing trend stopped since 2011, the two southern European countries are rapidly reaching a level of stability of the foreign-born population

⁵ Since 2004, all countries report data on nationality/country of birth applying sub-continental groupings as explained in the EU-LFS Use Guide (Eurostat 2014).


comparable to the one of Austria and UK, as testified by the share of foreign-born working-age population residing in the country since more than 10 years (Figure 2).

Figure 1: Share of foreign-born population over total (%).



Source: Eurostat online Database.

Figure 2: Share of foreign-born working-age pop. residing in the country for more than 10 years (%).




Source: Eurostat LFS microdata, 2004-2013.

Disaggregating data on foreign-born residents allows then perceiving the relative importance of ITHACA selected origins over the total foreign-born population. Figure 3 presents absolute figures for our four European destinations. In each of these, one origin is by far the most represented per total number of residents among those considered in our project (Bosnians in Austria, Moroccans in Italy and Spain, Indians in the UK). Nevertheless, while in the Austrian case the other origins do not reach a minimum of ten thousand residents and in the UK Filipinos only are a second, consistent group, in the Spanish and Italian cases all origins – except for Bosnians – are quite relevant in terms of numbers. Moreover, especially in the case of Italy, the exponential growth of foreign-born residents is also accompanied by the emerging of new origins (Ukrainians) adding to those historically more present (Moroccans, Filipinos).

The tendency to stabilization is also confirmed by the acquisitions of citizenship in each country. Although we are not distinguishing by reason (residence, marriage etc.) and requirements change in all legislations, Figure 4 shows the total number of acquisitions and those represented by ITHACA’s country of origin to give a picture of settlement trends over the 2000s. In 2013 (last year available), the two largest groups in terms of origin to acquire one of the EU28 nationalities have been Moroccans and Indians, the majority of whom acquired respectively the citizenship of Spain and Italy (63% of the total) and of the UK (75%). Moreover, Spain, the UK and Italy are three of the five main EU28 countries in terms of

citizenship acquisitions granted in 2013, representing respectively the 23 21 and 10% of the total in the European Union (Eurostat 2015)⁶.

Figure 3: Foreign-born population, total and ITHACA CoO (thousands) – 2003-2014.




Source: Eurostat online Database⁷.

⁶ In the Austrian case, the peak of citizenship acquisitions by Bosnians was reached in the early 2000s. Also, naturalization is more difficult after 2006 due to newly introduced legislations. In both Italy and Spain the 10-years threshold required for naturalization has been reached instead by a big group of migrants in the end of the 2000s. Moreover, in Spain requirements are favourable for some nationalities more than others (notably, 2 years of residence for Latin Americans and Filipinos).

⁷ Data for Austria are missing for 2010-2011 and 2014, data for UK are missing for 2006-2008.

Figure 4: Acquisitions of citizenship, ITHACA CoO and total (thousands) – 2003-2013.



Source: Eurostat online Database, 2003-2013.

Sketchy portraits of structural integration

As extensively discussed in Gropas, Triandafyllidou, and Bartolini (2014, 20–22), measures of labour market integration represent a fundamental part of the structural (economic) integration indicators we are interested in. Among all possible measures listed in the Zaragoza declaration and following works (Eurostat 2011; Huddleston, Niessen, and Tjaden 2013; OECD and European Union 2015), we selected only some of them to show the level of *access* to the labour market and of the *quality* of jobs for those employed.

In many European countries, the progress in terms of access to the labour market of the immigrant working-age population has been hampered by the financial and economic crisis started in 2007-2008.

Indeed, job losses have been greater among immigrants than the native-born, and foreign-born men have been particularly hit as they are over-represented in sectors more exposed to the crisis (industry, construction). On the contrary, and although they suffered more in terms of deterioration in the quality of jobs (downgrading, more precariousness, lower pays), immigrant women in the service sectors seem to have resisted better to the increase in unemployment rates (Chaloff, Dumont, and Liebig 2012; OECD and European Union 2015).

For a concise presentation of labour market access and job quality situation in our four destinations, Table 1 and Table 2 show the gaps between foreign-born and native working-age individuals (15-64 years), calculated as the difference in percentage points in the unemployment and the inactivity rate, in the share of self-employed workers and in the over-qualification rate⁸.


Table 1: Gap in 2 indicators of labour market access, by origin & CoD, 2013.

CoD	Unemployment rate gap					Inactivity rate gap				
	EU28	OthEur	NA	SEA	RoW	EU28	OthEur	NA	SEA	RoW
AT	3.0	6.5	18.1	5.1	7.9	-1.6	7.5	11.7	8.2	5.3
ES	3.4	19.5	28.3	-0.1	9.0	-7.1	-5.2	0.2	-1.6	-8.0
IT	4.1	6.5	13.1	-1.0	4.6	-8.8	-4.6	0.2	-7.8	-9.9
UK	-1.3	-1.8	-6.6	2.1	2.6	-5.1	8.9	14.3	8.5	5.0

Table 2: Gap in 2 indicators of job quality among employed, by origin & CoD, 2013.

CoD	Self-employment rate gap					Over-qualification rate gap				
	EU28	OthEur	NA	SEA	RoW	EU28	OthEur	NA	SEA	RoW
AT	1.8	-7.7	5.3	-0.8	2.4	3.9	27.3	59.5	24.0	3.8
ES	2.1	-5.0	-7.3	12.7	-4.8	18.6	61.2	32.7	63.9	24.6
IT	-9.9	-11.8	-5.3	-16.9	-4.8	19.6	70.8	70.8	68.4	27.4
UK	-5.1	8.9	14.3	8.5	5.0	12.9	0.3	-11.2	10.5	4.7

Legend: Difference with native employed in percentage points.



Source: author's calculations from Eurostat LFS microdata, 2013.

⁸ The two Tables resemble the approach firstly presented by Eurostat (2011). These differences show only the relative position of immigrants in comparison to native born in a specific place, regardless of the overall economic conditions of a country.


The relative difficulty of immigrants in accessing the local labour market is widespread and immigrants tend to be more unemployed than natives. A relevant exception is the UK, where Europeans (EU28 and other Europe) are less likely to be unemployed than natives⁹. On the contrary, and because they are more likely to be migrants for economic reasons and less likely to be in the country as re-unified migrants, working-age immigrants in Italy and Spain are less likely to be inactive (not working and not looking for a job) in comparison to natives than in Austria and the UK. This is also due to the traditionally high levels of inactivity of natives in southern European countries, especially among women.

With regards to the type of occupations, on average employed migrants tend to have more temporary contracts than natives (not shown here) and similar level of self-employment (which is often connected with a greater level of uncertainty and risks). In our destinations, immigrant workers show a lower level of self-employment everywhere but in the UK. Especially in Italy, natives are distinctively more likely to be self-employed than their immigrant counterparts from any origin. Also, and this is a phenomenon severely increased during the crisis, immigrant workers are everywhere more likely to be over-qualified than natives. Over-qualification, measured as the share of highly-educated workers (i.e. having completed tertiary education, ISCED 5-6) who are employed in low or middle level occupations (ISCO from 4 to 9) is associated with poor recognition of qualifications acquired abroad, with concentration in low-skilled and low-paid occupations and low levels of upward mobility (Quintini 2014, 201; OECD and European Union 2015).

Consistently with the average educational composition of all working-age population, the UK is the only case where over-qualification gap is limited to a 'low' 10-13%. Indeed, although we don't tackle single education indicators here as we don't focus on immigrant children or second-generations, it is anyway worth noting that our European destinations perform quite differently in terms of attraction and/or selection of highly-skilled immigrants. Figure 5 shows the composition of the employed population in each country by education level and region of birth. The UK stands out as the more selective in terms of skills, with an immigrant population even more educated on average than the native population, while Austria prevalently employs immigrants with an intermediate level of education (ISCED 3-4), similar to the composition of its native employed population. More variegated is the situation for migrants in Spain, for which there is a clear distinction in the average education level between European and non-European origins. Italy stands out as the less able to attract and fruitfully use foreign human capital, as it shows the highest gaps in terms of over-qualification between immigrant and natives even having the lowest capacity to receive highly-skilled individuals (Figure 5).

⁹ Calculated gaps for North African immigrants in the UK are to be taken with caution for the small sample size in the microdata.

Figure 5: Composition of employed pop. (15-64y) by education level, region of birth and CoD – 2013.



Source: Eurostat LFS microdata.


2.2. Measure(s) of economic transnationalism

Migrant's contributions to origin countries take many differentiated forms and are associated to different domains of migrant life, in connection with the type and length of the migratory experience as well as with the level of integration at destination at different stages of the migratory process. There is an intense scholarly debate on what type of transfers takes place across national borders (Isaakyan 2015), and even when confining the research lens to the economic sphere a number of transnational behaviours and processes have been described (Levitt 1998; Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller 2002; Guarnizo 2003; Boccagni 2012; Ambrosini 2014; Carling 2014).

Nevertheless, economic transnationalism and transnational mobility are hardly traced by national and international statistics. The lack of reliable data for cross-national comparisons forces our analysis to be focused only on monetary remittances, which are virtually the only transnational act for which comparable data (or estimates) are available worldwide. While some national Central Banks provide data on actual registered in- and out-flows of money through their balance of payment statistics or aggregating administrative records (Banca d'Italia 2015), remittance bilateral flows are instead provided as estimates by the World Bank, which disaggregates data using host and origin country incomes and estimated migrant stocks for the relevant year (for a comprehensive discussion on definitions and measures see Ratha, 2003). Bilateral remittance matrixes are available only for the years 2010-2014 and expressed in

US\$ million¹⁰. Aggregate figures help explaining the macro-economic relevance of remittances in comparison with other financial flows as well as their general tendency to be counter-cyclical, increasing in reaction to shocks at origin (environmental disasters as well as conflicts) and resisting to economic downturns at destination (Ratha et al. 2015). The graphs show some stylized facts on remittance flows between ITHACA destination and origin countries, to set the framework for the micro-evidence collected through the ITHACA survey on remitting practices, the use of flows, the individual burden in terms of share of income devoted to remittances as well as the “balancing acts” (Erdal and Oeppen 2013) between remittances and other economic transnational activities.

Figure 6: Remittance outflows, total and to ITHACA CoO, Millions US\$, 2010-2014.




Source: World Bank Remittance Bilateral Matrix 2014.

¹⁰ Caution should be used when comparing these figures with national sources and Eurostat, as different definitions, methods of aggregation/estimates and national currencies are adopted. For example, trends in remittance flows from Italy to Morocco are significantly different if we take data provided by the Bank of Italy, the Bank of Morocco or the World Bank.


Graphs of Figure 6 show the absolute amount of outflows from each EU countries towards each ITHACA origin country compared to totals. Figure 7 and Figure 8 instead show the amount of remittances as share of total outflows from destination and of total inflows to origins. These three visualizations are useful to gain a sense of not only the absolute size of flows of each corridor but also the relative weight they represent in the total amount of outflows originating from Europe and in the total amount of inflows received by the countries of migrant origin. As for Austria, remittances towards Bosnia represent 10% of all inflows into the country, while contributions to the other four ITHACA origins are marginal. Italian and Spanish remittances towards Morocco are big and sum up to almost 40% of all remittances received by Morocco, notwithstanding the economic crisis which affected migrant workers. In the case of UK, Indian remittances are by far the biggest among the surveyed origins (around 14% of total outflows), but represent only around 5% of all money sent to India, which primarily comes from Gulf countries, Pakistan and the US.

Figure 7: Remittances to ITHACA origins as % of total outflows from ITHACA’s destinations (2014).



Source: World Bank Remittance Bilateral Matrix 2014.

Figure 8: Remittances as % of total inflows coming from ITHACA’s destinations (2014).



Source: World Bank Remittance Bilateral Matrix 2014.

3. A cross-national survey of transnationally mobile migrants

3.1. Rationale of the survey

International comparisons in studies of migrant integration and transnationalism are relatively scarce and often only address one of the two sides of migration corridors. The study of migrants' outcomes at destination and of their transnational engagement with the origin country has been often addressed by and embedded into two distinct fields of research and as two separate objects, depending on whether migrants were observed from the point of view of the receiving or sending country.

The level of economic integration and re-integration of migrants are issues tackled by an extensive literature on labour market integration at destination, the level of utilization of migrant human capital, the development and investment potential of migrants and returnees for their origins and destinations etc. (Black and King 2004; Van Hear and Nyberg Sørensen 2003; Faist 2008; Gropas 2013). As regards to the country of origin's side, different strands of literature engage with the link between migration and development and the contribution of migrants through remittances, diaspora organization and political support, as well as the issue of skills and human capital formation and utilization across countries (brain drain, circulation and gain), which are also dependent upon the level and depth of migrant transnational linkages with their origin country whilst they are abroad (Haas and Fokkema 2011; Cassarino 2004).

Available data are mainly cross-sectional with very few exceptions (such as the MAFE survey¹¹) and are collected at a country level, failing to overcome the strong empirical assumptions of what has been labelled as 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). As discussed in the ITHACA concept paper (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2014), in describing migrant pathways of settlement and transnational connection between their origin and destination context, we should be able to refer to 'localities' rather than 'countries' as the concrete spaces within which migrant agency is displayed and transnational social fields are shaped (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2009). Indeed, some studies try to match data from different sources – from censuses to surveys – on specific topics or single phases of the migration process (settlement and integration at destination; temporary return or circulation between origin and destination; permanent return at origin etc.), so as to build a comprehensive analysis of life-time trajectories. These attempts are demanding in terms of data and of resources to collect them (King et al. 2006).

¹¹ The MAFE project started in 2005 and is coordinated by INED, see <http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/en/>.

The ITHACA survey tries to address the project’s research questions through a multi-sited, cross-country fieldwork which collects data of migrants and returnees and looks at both sides of migration corridors at the same time. Being cross-sectional, the survey also includes some retrospective questions which aim at giving a more complete and time-consistent description of transnationally mobile migrants and their life-course trajectories. Moreover, our sample strategy (see below) produced a selected sample of transnationally mobile and economically active migrants with prevalently urban roots, interviewed in some selected cities of the countries participating in the project. Hence, although in what follows we speak of countries of origin and of destination, our discussion is more specifically on the localities – cities and neighbourhood – which have been surveyed during the fieldwork.


3.2. A cross-national survey at origin and destination

Among the selected destination and origin countries, ITHACA defined some specific corridors in order to compare the impact of different origin countries in the same destination and, vice versa, the specificities of different destinations for migrants of selected origins, as described in Figure 9:

- North Africa-EU migration system –Moroccan immigrants in Italy and Spain;
- Western Balkans-EU migration system – Bosnians in Austria and the UK;
- Eastern Europe–EU migration system – Ukrainians in Austria, Italy, Spain and the UK;
- Asia–EU migration system – Indians and Filipinos in Austria, Italy, Spain and the UK.

Hence, the survey was carried out in all 9 countries in order to capture both transnational mobile migrants residing in Europe at the time of the survey and returnees to their origin countries with still strong (economic) ties with their migration destination.

Figure 9: ITHACA countries of origin and destination



Source: ITHACA’s team.

The fieldwork in all countries was grounded on two questionnaires, designed to reach transnationally mobile migrants and returnees, and relevant stakeholders.

The stakeholders' questionnaire

Through ITHACA's fieldwork our aim was to collect the voice of national, local and regional authorities both at origin and at destination, of diaspora and migrant organizations and NGOs, of trade unions, professional and business associations, as well as relevant banks, financial and political/diplomatic institutions (embassies/consulates). Interviews with stakeholders served as starting point for researchers in all countries to get into the context of each specific migrant communities and/or corridor. Interviews sought to explore the characteristics of transnational mobility and understand whether transnational mobility was mainly an individual choice, part of a collective choice or whether existing integration or re-integration policies have a role in shaping (either supporting or preventing) a successful economic transnational experience. Interviewed stakeholders also shared their views about the advantages and disadvantages of different types of transnational mobility, either from the point of view of the institution they represent or of their country of origin or destination. Finally, stakeholders were often used as key informants and starting points for the snowballing process to reach migrants and returnees¹².

The migrants' questionnaire

a. The structure

The interview's structure intended to grasp both quantitative data and qualitative information from transnationally mobile individuals. The questionnaire was intended for face-to-face interviews lasting around one hour each and administered by interviewers in the language(s) chosen/spoken by the interviewee (either their mother tongue – Arabic, Bosnian, Hindi, Tagalog, Ukrainian – or Italian, Spanish, German, English, French, or a combination of these).


After the entry filters (see below), the questionnaire addressed basic demographic information, the situation before leaving, upon migration and at present, and the economic activities and engagement across the two countries etc. (Figure 10).

The aim of tracing this data at different phases of their migration trajectory was to document how their life-cycle developed along their migration cycle and also register where and what kind of formal or informal human capital had been obtained or accumulated throughout the migration experience, i.e.

¹² Results from stakeholders interviews are not presented here but are addressed more in detail in the Country Reports and the final Comparative Report.

studies and education degrees, language acquisition etc. The questionnaire then concentrated on identifying the economic activities and engagement across the two countries, and it also aimed at registering the motives and intensity of their transnational mobility. Lastly, the questionnaire also intended to capture how the interviewees perceived their migration experience, what they appreciated in their countries of origin and destination and their plans for the future.

Figure 10: ITHACA’s migrant questionnaire.



Source: ITHACA’s team.

b. The target group

Beyond the filter questions regarding nationalities, the general aim was capturing as much as possible migrants who engage in transnational economic activities and who were (physically) mobile. At the moment of defining the fieldwork criteria to guide the interviewers’ job, the profile of transnationally economically active and mobile migrants emerged as to be not very common among the overall migrant population in any of our countries of interest. Hence, we decided to look for migrants who were transnationally engaged and to then investigate whether and to what extent physical (im)mobility between two places was associated with their transnationally activities. Indeed, we expected the intensity of mobility to fluctuate significantly during the life-course of the migrant, at different stages of their migration trajectory, and to depend on time and financial constraints that the person was facing at the time

of the interview. For this reason, we started the fieldwork from the assumption that mobility, although important, is not necessarily defining in terms of the transnational engagement at any time of the migration experience¹³. The desire to be able to travel, return, and visit is certainly shared but almost everyone, but actual physical travel between the two countries varies across time and across different countries, and it can be often presented by migrants themselves as less intense than what initially expected. Thus, given that we did wish to explore the nexus between integration, transnational engagement, transfers and mobility, we decided to maintain a scope wide enough to be able to capture the relevance of mobility from different perspectives¹⁴.

Moreover, although in principle we focused more on first generation migrants born abroad and who had not naturalised in their European destinations (TCNs), in some cases the acquisition of the nationality of the country of settlement emerged during the interview.

3.3. Fieldwork description

As noted in the concept paper (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2014), transnational engagement and mobility concerns a minority of all migrants (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003) and no sampling frame for an analysis of migrants engaging in economic transnational activities as transnational entrepreneurial activities is available (Schunck 2011). A non-probability sample was therefore the only viable option for the fieldwork. The ITHACA team established the preferred quotas of migrants to be reached in each country and from which origin, in order to have at the end groups reasonably balanced by country of origin and of destination. In each country, interviewers made use of information gathered through stakeholders' interviews in order to recruit migrants with the desired characteristics. Alongside this sort of respondent-driven sampling, interviewers also mapped migrant communities' organizations as well as entrepreneurial associations and unions in order to build up a list of useful contacts and entry points. Hence, as far as possible, a snowball process was adopted to the extent interviewed migrants were able and willing to refer to friends and acquaintances of the same nationality and who had to be economically active in multiple localities at one time and possibly transnationally mobile.

¹³ We return to the characteristics and importance of physical mobility in Section 5.3.


¹⁴ In doing so, we slightly departed from the original tight definition of transnational economic engagement and mobility as outlined in the ITHACA concept paper (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2014, 26):

“The ITHACA Project conceptualises transnational mobility as cross border physical movement of migrants for the purposes of economic activity. For this movement to qualify as transnational mobility for the purposes of our research we require that the migrant has travelled back and forth at least twice during the year or at least three times during the last two years. We also require that the migrant engages into some sort of economic activity in both the country of origin and the country of destination”.

Although we kept the entry criteria quite open, the process of identifying transnational migrants with characteristics presented above was extremely challenging as the profile we were seeking is not very common. In some cases, interviewers had to drop a long list of chain contacts because the person eventually referred to did not correspond to the definition outlined above. Moreover, interviewees' diffidence and sensitivity of questions related to economic investments and activities, feelings and attachment to both countries, caused a certain resistance in participating among some of the identified migrants.

The fieldwork in all countries began in July 2014, but the majority of the interviews were conducted in the period between October 2014 and March 2015. The survey was directly coordinated by each partner institution in the countries of destination (European University Institute in Florence, International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in Vienna, the London Metropolitan University in London and the Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid). In addition, national experts in each origin country were responsible for conducting the interviews with returnees who continued to engage in regular transnational activities with their previous countries of residence.

Figure 11: Fieldwork – cities of interviews.




Source: ITHACA's team.

Interviewers gathered responses with printed copies of the questionnaires, notes and, in more than half of the cases, by taping the interviews for further checks, especially for open-ended questions with detailed answers. Figure 12 shows public and private places where interviews took place.

To collect data in an efficient and timely manner, the recorded responses have been uploaded onto an online survey tool (Survey Monkey) between October 2014 and May 2015. The online platform was accessible only to interviewers and to the research team to continuously monitor the formation of the

sample and to adjust its structure as necessary. Interviews on Survey Monkey have been uploaded in English irrespective of the language in which the interview was conducted.

Figure 12: Fieldwork – places of interviews.



Source: ITHACA’s survey.

This allowed us to collect all interviews from all teams in the countries of origin and destination, and to proceed with a centralized data cleaning and mining before starting with the analysis. At the end of the surveying period (June 2015), the online survey platform was closed and the overall dataset was exported and processed in a centralized way before starting with country-level analysis. For this report, STATA has been used as statistical software to produce descriptive statistics and data analysis.

Final Sample Composition

The final composition of the sample disaggregated by country of destination and of origin is presented in Table 3. The total sample is composed by 324 individuals¹⁵: Indians are the more numerous (25%), while Filipinos are the smaller group altogether (12%). As regards to returnees, i.e. migrants interviewed in the origin country and returned after a period spent in one of the four EU countries, we decided to treat them as a separate group as they are likely to differ from their co-nationals who are still living the migration experience. Indeed, they are quite fragmented as they are spread across various countries of origin, but they represent 16% of the overall sample and, after some correlation analysis and checks, we decided that they are closer one another than with their country of origin’s migrant group¹⁶.

¹⁵ From the original dataset we dropped out 3 observations of Moroccans living in the UK and 4 observations of Bosnians living in Italy, which were collected out of pre-set quotas during the fieldwork to help understanding the overall context of migration in these two countries.

¹⁶ We acknowledge the input of all partners and reviewers to better test this choice, which notwithstanding the limitations serve the purposes of the Report more than treating returnees as part of their country of origin group. This in turn would have yield to 5 bigger sub-samples for multivariate analysis, but at the expenses of diluting differences in behaviours (demographic, social,

Table 3: Total sample by country of destination and origin, absolute numbers and shares.
Country of origin

EU country of migration	BIH	IND	MO	PHI	UKR	Ret	Total	Total (%)
AT	33	29	0	0	13	7	82	25.3
ES	0	8	22	10	20	9	69	21.3
IT	0	6	28	10	14	19	77	23.8
UK	12	38	0	19	10	17	96	29.6
Total	45	81	50	39	57	52	324	100.0
Total (%)	13.9	25.0	15.4	12.0	17.6	16.0	100.0	

Source: ITHACA's survey.

Table 4: Demographic profiles, by CoO and returnees(%).

		BIH	IND	MOR	PHI	UKR	Ret.	Total
	Female	48.9	55.6	42.0	71.8	71.9	36.5	54.3
Age	19-29	33.3	12.4	16.0	0.0	22.8	11.5	16.1
	30-49	28.9	34.6	32.0	25.6	31.6	38.5	32.4
	40-49	22.2	25.9	32.0	20.5	26.3	28.9	26.2
	50+	15.6	27.2	20.0	53.9	19.3	21.2	25.3
	Mean (years)	37.4	43.0	39.4	48.3	38.9	42.3	41.5
Edu level	Primary	2.2	0.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	5.8	2.5
	Secondary	46.7	17.3	38.0	30.8	15.8	42.3	29.9
	Graduate	42.2	32.1	26.0	51.3	63.2	23.1	38.9
	Post-graduate	8.9	50.6	28.0	18.0	21.1	28.9	28.7
	Urban place of birth	72.7	77.5	90.0	64.1	70.9	65.4	74.1
Marital Status	Single	40.0	29.6	32.0	18.0	35.1	34.6	31.8
	Married/cohab.	55.6	61.7	66.0	71.8	49.1	65.4	61.1
	Div/Sep/Widow	4.4	8.6	2.0	10.3	15.8	0.0	7.1
	Children (Yes)	44.4	55.6	52.0	82.1	57.9	55.8	57.1
	"Good" or "Very good" financial cond. before migration (self-assessed)	67.5	60.0	22.5	28.2	40.4	36.5	43.9
	Total (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Total (a.v.)	45	81	50	39	57	52	324

Source: ITHACA's survey.

As for their general demographic characteristics, the total sample is almost balanced in terms of sex (54% are women), but there are interesting differences by country of origin. Ukrainians and Filipinos are predominantly female (72%), while women are only 42% of Moroccans and, noticeably, 37% of all returnees. Interviewed migrants and returnees are on average medium- to mature-age individuals: only


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economic) of those who live in Europe and those who don't anymore. Return might be seen as a further phase in the migratory life-time trajectory, but it cannot be assumed as the necessary last step for all current migrants.

Bosnians have a consistent (33%) share of people below 30 years of age, while more than half of all Filipinos have more than 50 years old. Three quarters of the total sample were born in an urban area and almost two thirds are married or cohabiting with a stable partner. Ukrainians and Filipinos show the highest share of divorced, separated or widowed individuals. Moreover, Filipinos have at least one child in 82% of the cases, while the share of migrant parents is lower for Bosnians (41%) and Moroccans (51%).

As regards to their financial condition, our respondents were asked to evaluate and assess it prior to migration. The majority of Bosnians, who mostly moved as asylum seekers considered their condition as good or very good. This was also the case for Indians, who often migrated as highly-skilled middle-class individuals. Ukrainians considered positively their situation in 40% of the cases, while Moroccans and Filipinos assessed their past condition as bad or average in the majority of cases.

Figure 13: Place of education, by country of origin and returnees (%).



Source: ITHACA’s survey. N=324

Table 4 shows how much the sample distribution is skewed toward highly-educated individuals. Only 2.5% has low or no formal education at all, while around 68% has a graduate or post-graduate degree. Indians are the most highly-educated (51% with a post-graduate degree), while among Bosnians and Moroccans secondary education (high schools, vocational schools or colleges) is more frequent (47 and 38% of them respectively). Only about 40% of the total has been trained exclusively in the country of origin. As shown in Figure 13, the majority of migrants – especially among Bosnians, Moroccans and Indians – have studied also abroad, acquiring skills and formal qualifications either in their country of destination or elsewhere. On the other hand, around 60% of all Filipinos and 49% of Ukrainians only received their education at origin.

In the next section, descriptive results are generally presented by country of origin and of destination. We show disaggregated tables and graphs only when a Pearson’s correlation test¹⁷ allow us rejecting the hypothesis of no significant distinction by country.


4. Descriptive results from the survey

4.1. Integration at destination

First migration and time spent at destination

The total length of stay in a country, measured with the number of years since migration, is often taken as a proxy of the level of integration at destination, as family formation and other life-course choices are made while time passes. The majority of our migrants and returnees have left their origin countries more than 10 years ago.

Figure 14: Time since first migration, by country of origin and returnees (%).




Source: ITHACA’s survey. N=324.

In particular, Filipinos show the longest migration experience and the longest presence at destination in the case of Spain and Italy. Indians in Austria and Spain have a longer presence than their co-nationals in the UK and Italy. Moroccans instead have a longer presence in the UK than in Spain and Italy. Length of

¹⁷ The Pearson’s Chi-squared test measures the level of association or independence between pairs of categorical variables. The correlation coefficients are not reported under each table for the sake of conciseness.

stay at destination of Bosnian migrants almost perfectly reflects the timing of the war in the ex-Yugoslavia, while Ukrainians are by far the newest group in all countries, with an average number of years around (often below) 10 years.

Figure 15: Average number of years at destination, by origin and destination (%).



Source: ITHACA’s survey. N=324.


Family and socio-cultural variables

The spatial distribution of relatives and dependents between the country of origin, destination and possibly other third countries, helps understanding the different integration patterns of migrants at destination, distinguishing different stages in migrant’s life and partially explaining the transnational behaviours in terms of visits, remittances or other type of transfers (Bartolini 2015). The presence of relatives at destination is expected to increase through family-reunification processes as long as the migrant settles and establishes a long-term project at destination, which is often mirrored by a decreasing number of dependent persons at origin. In our sample, and consistently with the length of stay presented in the previous paragraph, Filipinos have at least one child living in the country of destination in more than 70% of the cases and a partner in 56% of the cases. Moroccans show the highest share of single and are also less likely to have a partner living at destination. Returnees are sensibly different from migrants in this respect: once they decide to return, this is likely to be associated with a general detachment of the whole family from the destination country and, indeed, returnees are those with the lowest share of dependent individuals overall at destination among all interviewees.

Consistently with the high education level of the sample and with the multi-lingual background for many of the interviewed migrants, the self-assessed average number of language spoken is high (more than 2) even before migration. Moroccans, Indians and Filipinos often studied and used their past colonial language (English or French) before leaving and in addition had more than one mother tongues (Arabic,


Berber, Hindi, Bengali etc.), while older Ukrainians grew up in a Russian speaking environment. At the time of the interview they declared to speak their native language (and in many cases also local dialects), the language of the destination country and an additional European language (English, French, Russian, Serbo-Croat etc.). Thus they set off their migration project with a substantial linguistic capital that they further enriched while in Europe, through the acquisition of an additional language and, often, the improvement of English also for those not residing in the UK.

Figure 16: Migrants and returnees with a partner, children and dependents in CoD (%).



Source: ITHACA's survey. N=324.

Figure 17: Average number of languages spoken, before and after migration, by origin and destination.



Source: ITHACA's survey. N=324.

Migratory plans and strategies interact with the legal framework within which migrants live, integrate at destination and engage in economic activities and transactions. As extensively discussed in McKay, Markova, and Paraskevopoulou (2013), undocumented migration is a constant feature of the segmented

labour markets of all our four EU countries under investigation. Irregularity though, as well as any other migration status, is not fixed and most migrants experience changes in their status during their experience abroad. Table 5 shows the transition matrix between the type of document or visa upon arrival in Europe and the prevalent status while abroad. At the time of the arrival, almost one third of the whole sample entered with a tourist visa or without a visa whatsoever. Most of them regularized during their stay and got a permanent or renewable residence permit. This is in line with the immigration policy of destination countries – especially Italy and Spain – for which regularization through recurrent amnesties is one of the prevalent patterns of immigration (Pastore 2008; Aparicio Gómez and Ruiz de Huidobro De Carlos 2008). Students also represented a good share of all incoming migrants (22%) and they prevalently stayed at destination with temporary or renewable permits. Among those entered for work or family reasons, we found the highest share of permanent residents and acquisition of citizenship.

Table 5: Transition matrix from status at arrival and prevalent status during migration (%).

		Prevalent status while abroad						Total (col)
		Irregular	Temporary	Renewable	Permanent	Citiz.	Not decl.	
Visa / documents at arrival	No need	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.9	7.6	8.3	2.8
	Tourist/no permit	66.7	27.8	22.9	46.7	19.7	33.3	32.1
	Student	11.1	55.6	31.3	9.5	15.2	8.3	22.2
	Family	0.0	2.8	16.7	17.1	22.7	16.7	16.0
	Asylum	0.0	2.8	1.0	7.6	9.1	8.3	5.2
	Citizenship	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.1	8.3	1.5
	Employment	22.2	11.1	26.0	16.2	16.7	16.7	18.8
	Not decl.	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	0.0	1.2
	Total (row)	2.8	11.1	29.6	32.4	20.4	3.7	100.0


Source: ITHACA’s survey. N=324.

To conclude with the markers of cultural and institutional integration, in line with the ‘Zaragoza indicators’ and further extensions (Eurostat 2011; Huddleston, Niessen, and Tjaden 2013), the share of migrants and returnees who declared to have dual citizenship is reported in Figure 18¹⁸. The Filipino group shows the highest share of migrants with dual citizenship, which is consistent with their longer

¹⁸ Indeed, the reported data from migrants seem to be a little high: this is because Indians with OCI report to have double citizenship and because some of the interviewers might have started the process of naturalisation or ‘feel like’ being citizens after many years of residence. In the case of Austria, for example, it is extremely difficult to naturalize as an adult without renouncing to the citizenship of the country of origin.

presence at destination and with the recent change in legislation which allows Filipino nationals to acquire a second citizenship only since 2004 (Vink, de Groot, and Luk 2013). On the contrary, as India does not allow citizens to acquire a second nationality, reported figures consider as ‘dual citizens’ migrants who declare to have the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI). Indeed, OCI does not grant the same rights as full citizenship but it is a sign of recognition for Indians who decided to acquire the nationality of their destination country and want to maintain some sort of legal connection with their origin country. Also the legislation on the acquisition of citizenship at destination matters: in Spain Filipinos are granted the possibility to ask for naturalisation after 2 years of legal residence, while 10 years are required for the other ITHACA nationalities. Overall, the UK seems to host more migrants with dual citizenship than the others¹⁹.

Figure 18: Share of those with dual citizenship (%), by CoO and CoD.



Source: ITHACA’s survey. N=324.


Labour market trajectories and economic integration

Migrants may show successful patterns of upward mobility or persistent barriers to full economic integration during their migration experience, which depends upon their individual characteristics as well as their origin’s (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Münz 2007) and destination’s environments (Dustmann and Frattini 2010). Indeed, the analysis of their occupational attainments between the two countries allows presenting a dynamic picture of their economic integration at various moments of their life-course.

¹⁹ See the country profiles of EUDO Observatory on Citizenship for a complete overview of requirements and modes of acquisition of citizenship in each of our four EU countries: <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/>.

We draw the overall transnational labour market trajectories of migrants and returnees looking at their working conditions before migration, upon arrival at destination and currently (after settlement or return). Interestingly, the domestic and care work is virtually not existing before migration, while becomes the occupation for one fifth of the sample upon migration and decreases over time spent abroad. While the prevalence of people not in employment before migration is due both to unemployment and to people still in education, currently non-employed migrants also includes some retirees. Also other unskilled occupations become more frequent upon migration, to the expense of technical professions (nurses, teachers, IT specialist, etc.), for which the recognition of the qualification acquired abroad might have been a relevant issue, and entrepreneurs. Indeed, owners of small shops, self-employed and entrepreneurs in general disappear at the moment of arrival in Europe to then increase again to around 10%, which signals the need of some time to settle and establish a business after migrating.

Figure 19: Labour market condition before migration, upon arrival at destination and currently (%).





* Not employed includes unemployed and inactive (students/pupils and retirees). Source: ITHACA’s survey.

To complement this picture of all occupations and jobs, we also looked at differences in labour market trajectories by country of origin, with a reduced disaggregation of occupations. Before migration, Bosnians and Moroccans stood as the two groups with the highest share of non-employed individuals, either because still in education or because unemployed (67 and 56% respectively).

Filipinos show the biggest deterioration of occupational conditions upon migration, with almost three quarters of them falling into unskilled jobs, while Indians are less affected by unskilled occupations at any time of observation and are successful in maintaining highly-skilled occupations even at the beginning of their presence abroad. On the contrary, Ukrainians fall from 47% of highly-skilled jobs before migration to a scant 14% at the beginning of migration and are not able to fully recover over time with only 25% of them currently employed in high-level occupations. Independent entrepreneurial activities concern more Moroccans and Indians at the time of the survey (around 15% of them), followed by Filipinos and Ukrainians.

Figure 20: Labour market conditions before migration, upon arrival in CoD and currently, by CoO (%).






* Not employed includes unemployed and inactive (students/pupils and retirees).

Source: ITHACA’s survey. N=324

To be more specific on the current situation, Figure 21 shows the type of contracts at the time of the survey. Self-employment includes, besides entrepreneurs, also those who work, formally or informally, without a dependent/employee relations, from some manual workers in the constructions sectors to cultural mediators, from IT developers to autonomous sellers and retailers. Cross-country differences are visible and significant: self-employment is more frequent among Moroccans, Indians and Ukrainians and only residual among returnees, while Bosnians and Filipinos declared more often to have a long-term contractual arrangement. On the other side, self-employment is much more common among migrants in Spain and Italy than among those in the UK. The UK subsample also shows the highest long-term contract share and the lowest portion of not employed migrants (6%) compared to other destinations.

Figure 21: Type of job at the time of the interview (%), by origin and destinations.




* Not employed includes unemployed and inactive (students/pupils and retirees).

Source: ITHACA’s survey. N=324.


The level and depth of insertion in the labour market and the general economic environment of the context at destination is also indicated by the degree to which migrants join professional associations, trade unions and all other organized groups which aim at collectivizing individual concerns, and provide information, orientation and other supporting services. Filipino migrants stand out in our sample as the most active. As 47% of them are member of a professional chamber or trade union (Figure 22).

Figure 22: Membership in a professional organization or trade union (%), by origin and destination.



Source: ITHACA's survey. N=324

Figure 23: Investment at destination, by origin and destination (%).




Source: ITHACA's survey. N=324

To conclude, economic integration in the receiving societies is also testified by the presence of investments at destination: 75% of migrants and 38% of returnees declared to have made one or more investments at destination. Indians and Moroccans show the highest propensity to invest money in their place of residence (80 and 77% respectively), while the most welcoming and facilitating environments

seem those of the UK and Austria. On the contrary, only 47% of migrants in Italy made any sort of investment there²⁰.

Figure 23 shows the great variation of economic investments at destination: migrants are understandably more engaged than returnees on average, which are more likely to have invested in their education or further formation before going back to their origin countries and less likely to have invested in a business. As regards to housing investments, migrants bought a flat or a house in around 17-16% of the cases, which is a level in line with the rates of home-ownership we can extract from EU-SILC data²¹ (OECD and European Union 2015, 324–325). Migrants are often engaged in more than one type of investment at the same time, which in the majority of cases translates into the purchase of a house or a flat accompanied by either education or an investment in an economic activity.

Figure 24: Type of investment by origin (%), multiple answers allowed.



Source: ITHACA’s survey. N=324.

²⁰ Beyond the well-known bureaucratic problems which make investing in Italy particularly difficult, it is worth noticing that only in the last few years migrant entrepreneurship is being publicly recognized as valuable and increasing. The Money Gram Award for Migrant Entrepreneurs is an example of promotion of role-models. 2015’s edition has been won by a Moroccan entrepreneur residing in Veneto (Daina 2015).


²¹ See the OECD-European Commission Report (OECD and European Union 2015, 324–325) for the more recent data for 2012 and for a discussion on the issue. Everywhere in Europe TCNs are less likely to own the house in which they live than nationals (the gap is wider than 25 percentage points), while EU nationals are slightly closer to nationals.

4.2. Transnational ties and economic engagement

Family at origin

Mirroring what we discussed in the previous paragraph with regards to integration at destination, Figure 25 shows the presence of family members (partners and children only) and of economic dependents in the country of origin. Returnees understandably show the highest share of individuals with dependents at origin. On the contrary, the share of migrants with partners left behind is very low, especially for Moroccans and Filipinos. Filipinos and Ukrainians with children left at origin have almost never a partner there, meaning that children are raised by other family members (often siblings or grandparents).


Figure 25: Share of those with a partner, children and dependents in CoO (%).



Source: ITHACA's survey. N=324.

Intention to settle

Figure 26: Intention to permanently settle, by CoO and CoD (%).




Source: ITHACA's survey. N=324.

Our sample show a high degree of variation also for what concerns the intention to permanently settle in either of the two countries or elsewhere in the future. Although these are desired options for the future and not actual behaviours, the personal and emotional ties with the origin country proves to be stronger than the long time spent at destination: besides about a quarter of undecided interviewees, the majority of migrants wishes to go back to the origin country, particularly in the case of Bosnians, Ukrainians and Moroccans. All migrants prefer on average to eventually settle in their origin countries rather than at destination. Only among those migrated in Italy the distance between the two options is very thin (34.5 vs 32%).

Economic investment

Between 45% (Moroccans) and 79% (Filipinos) of migrants has invested in their origin countries while in Europe. Filipinos and Indians seem even more engaged at origin than returnees overall, while Austria is the residence country which seems to enable the economic transnationalism of migrants the most (Figure 27). More specifically, and in line with the prevalent desire to settle back at origin, migrants first and foremost invest in housing, buying, building or renovating houses for their relatives or in preparation for a possible return after retirement. This investment is nevertheless often accompanied by other more productive ones.

Figure 27: Investment at origin, by origin and destination (%).



Source: ITHACA's survey. N=324.

Fig. 28: Sector of investment (multiple ans., %).





Fig. 29: Earnings in CoO over the past 2 y (%).



Source: ITHACA's survey.

Land and agricultural investments are mainly for self-consumption of relatives at origin, and are quite frequent especially in the case of Filipinos (28%). Business investments range from the setting up of a shop or a trade activity to the participation in businesses already existing and ran by relatives or acquaintances.

As regards to earnings in the origin country, from investment made or from other sources, 60% of all returnees declares to have earned money over the past two years, while the share decreases under 40% for Filipinos, Ukrainians and Indians, and below 20% for Moroccans and Bosnians.

4.3. Means of transnationalism

The long-distance economic relations of migrants with their homelands and of returnees with their past destination country have been extensively studied (Guarnizo 2003). The transnational economic engagement of migrants and returnees, together with their attachment to both their country of current and past residence, are nurtured by and based upon different means of mobility and connections which allow for the creation of transnational fields and spaces between the origin and the destination country.

Physical mobility


Transnational mobility in physical terms was at the core of our research study: we looked for migrants or returnees who also had travelled consistently between the origin and the destination country in the two years prior to the interview. At the end of the fieldwork only a small 8% of the total sample didn't travel at all over the past two years between the origin and the destination country for contingent problems (family-

related, legal documents, economic crisis, conflict at origin). The majority of the sample is actually transnationally engaged and physically mobile between two places on a regular and intense basis.

The number of visits and the average time spent abroad may vary according to the geographical distance between the two countries, as well as to the existence and accessibility of various means of transportation (flights but also cars, buses, trains and ferries). Our data seem to support the idea that shorter geographical distances and cheaper connections make the differences in determining the frequency of visits: Bosnians are by far the more mobile group (78% of them travelled 4 times or more), followed by Ukrainians and Moroccans. Indeed, more than half of interviewed Filipino migrants travelled only once and among Indians the most frequent answer (46%) has been 2-3 times, confirming that transoceanic migrants tend to travel less.

Symmetrically, since overseas migrants tend to concentrate on a fewer number of visits, these last more (from three weeks to more than one month) than visits to Bosnia, which last around seven - ten days. The most intense back and forth movements of Bosnians, Ukrainians and to a lesser extent Moroccans, allow them to often distinguish between business trips and holiday periods with family and friends, while this distinction is less clear cut for Indians and Filipinos. In migrants' description it is evident the effort in balancing work holidays, school vacations of children, religious or national festivities etc. While family issues are the first and ever present reason for travelling, this is almost always accompanied by other motives. Around 60% of migrants also take care of their properties (house or land) and of their economic activities, often pointing to the fact that a long-distance control to their investments is not sufficient for a proper management. The third most common activity among migrants is sorting out bureaucratic issues (22-32%).

Figure 30: Number of travels between CoO and CoD, by CoO (%).



Source: ITHACA's survey. N=324.

Figure 31: N. of travels between CoO and CoD, by CoD (%)






Figure 32: Average time spent on visit (%)



Source: ITHACA's survey. N=324.

Figure 33: Main activities to deal with while on visit (% , multiple answers allowed).



Source: ITHACA's survey. N=324.

Monetary remittances


As discussed in Section 2, transnational monetary transfers to and from migrant's origin country are maybe the most visible and measurable of all transnational activities. At the micro level, they can be understood as the result of a bargaining process of migrants and their origin households, where the demand from family members left behind and from obligations contracted before departure meets the willingness and possibility of migrants to save and remit (for a comprehensive discussion on drivers of economic remittances see Rapoport and Docquier 2005). The study of remittances may shed some light on the intra-household allocation of resources, on the preferences and behaviours of migrants and their counterparts who receive the money, on issues about control and effectiveness of the money sent etc. (Yang 2011; Ashraf et al. 2011). Moreover, one can expect remittances to be complementary to the

personal visits, as migrants are likely to bring money and consumption goods every time they travel, decreasing the need (or the ability, see Carling and Hoelscher (2013)) to also send money whilst abroad.

Let alone the country-level barriers to international monetary flows and the different costs of remitting services (The World Bank 2015), different practices in terms of frequency, amount, type of recipients and purposes are associated with different migration strategies (permanent, circular, temporary), different life-stages (transition to adulthood, family formation or reunification, working-age, retirement), length of migration and type of labour market integration abroad. The complexity of this multifaceted transnational behaviour requires a great deal of attention in the survey design to collect meaningful and comparable data (Brown et al. 2014).

The questionnaire avoided questions on the amount remitted (either per single transaction, in total or as share of disposable income) but provides information on frequency, recipients and main use of the money. The highest share of regularly remitting individuals is observed, after returnees²², among Filipinos (almost 50%), who are those travelling less but also those with longer presence at destination, which confirms findings of previous works on the strength of the commitment to remit among Filipinos (Basa, De Guzman, and Marchetti 2012). On the opposite side, more than half of Moroccan migrants do not remit or ceased to do so in the last two years (53%). Ukrainians, regardless of their travel frequency, are constant in sending money back home in 37% of the cases, a tendency which might be related to the ongoing conflict and consequent economic disruption in the country.

Figure 34: Frequency of remittances, by CoO and Cod (%).




Source: ITHACA's survey. N=324.

²² From the formulation of the question, remitting returnees may send money either to the past destination to some relative still in Europe or to their origin country in the period before return and at the beginning of their presence to intensify relations with family and friends and to progressively transfer activities to the new core residence place.

As regards to the type of remittances' recipients, parents and siblings are more often recalled as those who receive the money and manage it, in line with the results of other micro-surveys (Pastore et al. 2014; Da Silva and Do Ceu 2015). The distinction between recipients and beneficiaries, although not always explicit in migrant responses, is clear when we also look at the uses and purposes of the money transferred: while daily and primary consumption expenditures are covered in half of the cases (food, bills, health care), a consistent 21% of those remitting say that the money goes to the education of younger siblings or children. Quite often (25%) transfers are also devoted to family events and testify the long-lasting emotional ties with the family left behind. While remittances in form of investments are to be read in parallel with the data on transnational investment of the previous section, it is worth noticing that 9% of migrants declares to send money also in the form of donations without an immediate specific use.

Figure 35: Remittance recipients, tot (%). **Figure 36: Purposes of remittances, tot (%).**



NB. Multiple answers allowed.

Source: ITHACA's survey.

It is worth noticing that there is a non-negligible share of migrants who do not remit (anymore), from 10% of Filipinos to 54% of Moroccans. As said, individual economic possibility to save and remit is not enough to explain migrant remitting behaviours: family reunification processes and changing family structures at origin and at destination can increase the economic needs on one side while decreasing pressures and needs on the other. Longer migration experiences are associated with family formation at destination, while at the same time the number of recipients may decrease either due to new outmigration, to the labour market entry of previous dependent member of the family or to the death of older relatives at origin. Moreover, migrants may prefer to complement or substitute remittances with other transnational practices such as with bringing money and presents during personal visits as to reinforce the sense of belonging and attachment while travelling (Bartolini and Castagnone 2015). This can specifically be the case of migrants from geographically close countries and/or who have particularly suffered from the


recent economic crisis (as Moroccans in our sample). On the other side, for those migrated as students and belonging to wealthier families, remitting as a form of constant family support has never been the purpose of migration and they may engage in sporadic transfers for special occasions (as in the case of Indians we surveyed in the UK).

Civic mobility

Beyond physical presence in more than one locality, new forms of engagement and participation are more and more possible as far as new technologies, global media and virtual social networks are developed and accessible both for the migrants and his/her context of origin. Technological developments might also facilitate the long-distance coordination required in many cooperation and development activities and generally helping in building virtual bridges which can substitute to some extent physical mobility and interaction. Indeed, the majority of our selected transnational migrants and returnees are members of or have constant and active relationship with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or third-sector associations in the country of destination. According to their descriptions, in almost all cases these NGOs or associations have a multicultural or a transnational connotation: migrant associations for the support of co-nationals abroad through language courses or legal advice, diaspora networks, NGOs with development project in the origin countries, charities and confessional groups engaged in donations and emergency support in case of floods (Bosnia), typhoons (Philippines) or conflict (Ukraine).

In comparison with other groups studied in ITHACA, Filipinos are overwhelmingly the most engaged in such organizations (77% of them), followed by Moroccans (60%). Understandably, returnees are those less involved in NGOs and transnational organizations at destination (25%).

Figure 37: Member of a NGO, transnational association in CoD (%), by CoO and CoD.



Source: ITHACA’s survey. N=324.

5. Integration, transnational mobility and economic engagement

As highlighted in the previous descriptive section, the survey gathered a tremendous amount of information on migrants and returnees to map their pattern of emigration, settlement and eventually return with questions on conditions and actions before migration, upon arrival and during the experience in Europe.

To explore the relationship between integration at destination, transnational mobility and economic engagement of our selected transnationally mobile migrants and returnees, we proceed with a series of cross-tabulations to test the strength and possibly the direction of the relationship between our measures of transnationalism and a long list of integration indicators. Instead of showing the Pearson's correlation coefficients for all considered pairs of categorical or dummy variables, we show the most significant relationships through the following symbols:

*** = 1% significance ↗ = positive association
 ** = 5% significance ↘ = negative association
 * = 10% significance ↗↘ = nonlinear association

Coherently with the approach we adopted above, we test all bivariate relations for the total sample and for migrants and returnees separately, as we acknowledge that these are two distinct groups with reference to their demographic characteristics, their migration histories in Europe and their transnational choices and behaviours²³. We do not run multivariate regression analysis because of the relatively small sample size. Hence, what we can show is the significance of correlations, without claiming anything specific regarding causality. The list of all variables considered, which is close to what we foresee in Gropas, Triandafyllidou, and Bartolini (2014, 22), is provided in the Annex. Variables are grouped into separated clusters – demography, family and dependent, integration at destination, economic transnationalism and transnational mobility – to facilitate the discussion of results in the next paragraphs.

5.1. Investing here or there: economic transnationalism

In a first block of correlations (Table 6) we try to disentangle the factors which are more strongly associated with the decision to invest in the country of origin or destination. As we found no significant correlation between the variables ‘investment at origin’ and ‘investment at destination’, we might expect that some variables are associated with the fact of investing *per se* (no matter where), while others could be specifically associated with either of the two localities. The distinction between migrants and returnees

²³See Note 16.

produces in general stronger correlations for migrants because of the bigger sample size (returnees are 52 altogether).

Adult migrants with a nuclear family (married and with at least one child) with no significant difference between sexes seem to be more likely to invest at origin, regardless of the place where partner and children live. As for investments at destination, instead, age is not significant, while tertiary educated individuals with family and dependents in Europe are investing more often than migrants with family members still living at origin. Having pursued any type of formal qualification abroad is associated positively with investment at destination and negatively with investment at origin.

Table 6: Correlations for investment at origin and at destination.

	Variable	Investment at origin			Investment at destination				
		Effect	Tot	M	R	Effect	Tot	M	R
Demographics	Age (classes)	↗	***	***					
	Female (Y)					↘		**	
	Tertiary educated (Y)					↗	**		
	Educated also abroad (Y)	↘	**	**		↗	***	***	**
	Financial condition before migr.	↗↘					*		
Family and dependents	Married (Y)	↗	**		*	↘		*	
	Child (Y)	↗	***	***	***				
	Dependent in CoD (Y)					↗	**		
	Partner in CoD (Y)	↗		*		↗	**		
	Child in CoD (Y)	↗	**	**		↗	**		
	Dependent in CoO (Y)	↗	***	***	*	↘	***	**	**
	Partner in CoO (Y)					↘	**		
	Child in CoO (Y)	↗	***	***	***	↘	***	**	**
Integration in CoD	Length of stay (classes)	↗	**	*					
	Dual citizenship (Y)					↗	**	*	
	Prevalent status - citizen (Y)	↗			*	↗	***	**	
	Self-employed (Y)					↗	***	***	
	Prof. / Trade union member in CoD (Y)	↗	*			↗	**		*
	Income prevalently in CoD (Y)	↘		**		↗	***		
	Investment in CoD (Y)								
	Investment in CoD - housing (Y)								
	Investment in CoD - business (Y)								
	Settle = in COD (Y)					↘			*
	Settle = in COO (Y)	↗↘				↗	**	**	
Economic transnationalism	Income prevalently in CoO (Y)					↘	***		
	Income both in CoD and CoO (Y)	↗	**	***					
	Investment in CoO (Y)								
	Investment in CoO - housing (Y)								
	Investment in CoO - agriculture (Y)								
	Investment in CoO - business (Y)								
	Earned money in CoO (Y)	↗	***	***					
Employ others in CoO (Y)	↗	***	***	***	↗			**	
Travels for taking care of property/bus.	↗	***	***	***	↗	***	**		
Transnational mobility	N. of travels(classes)	↗			**	↗	*		
	Remittance frequency (classes)	↗	***	***		↘	**	*	
	NGO member in CoD (Y)					↗	**		

Source: ITHACA's survey.

As for integration dimensions in the context of destination, we found significant positive relations for the sample altogether and for migrants with the act of investing at destination. Longer experiences abroad (length of stay) are associated with more investment at origin, which might be due to the desire to return at older ages.

Investing at origin is coherently correlated with other markers of economic transnationalism, such as earning income from both origin and destination, travelling for taking care of properties and businesses, employing people in their own business.

As for markers of transnational mobility, they show different correlations with the investment at origin and at destination. Returnees who invest at origin are associated with more travels, as if the investment requires to import and use resources (personal or material) from abroad. On the other side, remittances accompany the investment at origin (as a the primary tool for investment, more than direct control through travels) but tend to be less regular among those who are engaged in investment at destination. The civic mobility represented by membership in a transnational or multicultural association is also positively associated with investing at destination.

5.2. Transnational mobility: travels, transfers, engagement

Table 7 presents the correlations' sign and strength for the means of transnational mobility that we described in the previous section with our list of measures of integration and transnational engagement.

Physical mobility, that we codified with the number of travels from/to the country of origin over the past two years, has a non-linear relationship with most of demographic variables: highly-educated individuals and those trained abroad tend to travel rather often (2-3 times) while non-tertiary educated and those who pursued all qualifications at origin are either not travelling or travelling very often (4 times or more). This relation is also to be connected with the descriptives by country of origin showed in Section 4, to consider the interplay between the average education level and the geographical distance of our 5 groups of interest. As for the family composition and transnational distribution between the two countries, the presence of children at destination prevents migrants from travelling a lot, as well as a partner at origin decreases the necessity to travel for returnees. Physical mobility doesn't seem to be connected with traditional indicators of cultural, social and structural institutional integration. Understandably, those who don't want to settle in either of the two countries, migrants who want to settle back at origin and returnees who want to re-emigrate are those travelling more often: the decision or willingness to move again requires personal preparation visits.

The second part of the table, dedicated to remittances, shows quite different and stronger correlation patterns. Older individuals, both migrants and returnees, remit more constantly, while tertiary education being educated abroad as well as good financial conditions before migration are associated with more sporadic transfers: those who migrated to study are not expected to contribute to their origin households but are rather counting on the support of their family of origin. Instead, constant remittance flows are strongly associated with migrants who have already formed a family and who have children or other dependents left at origin.

With regards to integration variables, migrants who acquired the citizenship of the destination country show a mixed relation (they send remittances, but not regularly) while those who have a permanent residence status at destination are more likely to remit with regularity. Constant remittances are associated with having an employment, hence, having the economic possibility to save and transfer money. Migrants who are investing at destination (especially in housing) tend to send less often money abroad, while those who are investing and those who employ others at origin are naturally transferring money more often during the year.

As regards to civic mobile transnationalism, indicated by the involvement in transnational associations, migrant organizations and NGOs, it seems more likely for migrants who do not have children, partner and other dependents abroad. There is a non-linear relationship with both age and length of stay at destination. Moreover, those participating in this type of organizations are less likely to travel, suggesting some sort of compensation for not travelling through emotional and symbolic connections with the migrant diaspora and their context of origin.

Table 7: Correlations for the means of transnational mobility.

	Variable	N. of travels			Remittance frequency				NGO membership				
		Effect	Tot	M	R	Effect	Tot	M	R	Effect	Tot	M	R
Demographics	Age (classes)	↗↘			*	↗	***	***	***	↘↗	*	*	
	Tertiary educated (Y)	↗↘			*	↗↘	*	*		↗	*		
	Educated also abroad (Y)	↗↘			*	↘	***	***					
	Financial condition before migr.	↗	**	**		↘	***	***	*	↘	*	***	
Family and dependents	Married (Y)									↘	**	*	
	Child (Y)					↗	***	***	***				
	Partner in CoD (Y)					↘	*	*					
	Child in CoD (Y)	↘			**					↗	*		*
	Partner in CoO (Y)	↘	***		***					↘	*		
	Child in CoO (Y)					↗	***	***		↘	**		***
	Dependent in CoO (Y)					↗	***	***	***	↘			*
Integration in CoD	Length of stay (classes)									↗↘↗	**	**	
	Dual citizenship (Y)					↗↘	**	*					
	Prevalent status - permanent (Y)					↗	**	**	***				
	Prevalent status - citizen (Y)	↘			*	↗↘	***	***					
	Employed now (Y)					↗	**	*					
	Prof. / Trade U. member in CoD (Y)					↗			*	↗	***	***	
	Income prevalently in CoD (Y)	↘			**	↗	**			↗	***		
	Investment in CoD (Y)	↗	*			↘	**	*		↗	**		
	Investment in CoD - hous. (Y)	↗			*	↘	*	**		↗			**
	Investment in CoD - bus. (Y)	↗	*										
	Settle = No (Y)	↗	**	**									
	Settle = in COD (Y)	↘	**	***									
	Settle = in COO (Y)	↗	*										
Economic transnationalism	Income prevalently in CoO (Y)				**	↗	***	***		↘	***		
	Investment in CoO (Y)	↗			**	↗	***	**					
	Investment in CoO - housing (Y)	↘			***	↗	***	**					
	Investment in CoO - agriculture (Y)									↗	*		
	Investment in CoO - business (Y)	↗	*			↗	*	**					
	Earned money in CoO (Y)					↗↘	*			↗↘	*		
	Employ others in CoO (Y)	↗			*	↗	***	***		↘	**	*	
	Travels for taking care of property/bus.	↗			*	↗↘	**	**					
Transnational mobility	N. of travels(classes)												
	Remittance frequency (classes)												
	NGO member in CoD (Y)	↘			**								

5.3. A multidimensional measure and cross-country patterns of transnational mobility

In our conceptual paper, we proposed to synthesize the multidimensional integration-transnationalism matrix as the one recalled in Table 8 with the construction of a transnational mobility index (Gropas, Triandafyllidou, and Bartolini 2014). Intuitively, this index should be able to summarize the variability of behaviours in terms of transnational mobility, considering information on physical moves, remittance transfers and civic mobility through engagement in transnational association or groups. Once the index is calculated, we can then check its correlations with all the individual, family and integration variables that we have.

Table 8: A multidimensional matrix.

	Means of transnationalism			Transnational mobility index
	Physical mobility	Mobility through transfers	Civic Mobility	
Demography, education and family controls	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-
Socio-cultural integration	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-
Structural Integration	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-
Transnational economic activities	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-

Source: re-adapted from Gropas, Triandafyllidou, and Bartolini (2014, 23).

As we already discussed, the three transnational mobility variables are poorly correlated, which means that they convey different types of information on the migrants and returnees under study. There is an extensive literature on aggregation methods and techniques to build composite indicators (OECD 2008), with some empirical applications in the field of integration and transnationalism (Dekker and Siegel 2013). In our case, as we want to aggregate three categorical variables built upon micro-survey data, we avoid engaging in complex aggregations and weighting techniques, and we proceed with the simplest additive aggregation method, which is the linear summation of weighted and normalized indicators. Hence, we normalized our three categorical variables and we assumed a constant distance between one category and the subsequent one²⁴. Also, for the sake of simplicity, we relied on equal weighting (EW), assuming that the three variables have the same weight in determining our Transnational Mobility Index

²⁴ For example, in the case of travels, we assume that the step between 0 to 1-2 travels is equal to the step between 1-2 and 3+. This is done for the sake of simplicity, but has to be taken into consideration to avoid mis-interpretations.

(TMI), which varies from 1 (less transnational) to 4 (more transnational). To keep separate the effect of civic mobile engagement, we built:

- **TMI-1**, which aggregates transnational mobility and remittance frequency;
- **TMI-2**, which aggregates TMI-1 with civic mobility.

It is worth noticing that, due to sample size and quality of data (categorical, with some re-codification from qualitative responses) and the purposive (non-random) character of our sample, caution should be used when interpreting our results. Table 9 presents the list of integration and economic activity variables for which the correlation with the two indexes was found significant.

Table 9: Correlations for two Transnational Mobility Indexes.

Variable	TMI-1				TMI-2				
	Effect	Physical&Remittances			Effect	Physical & Remittance & Civic			
		Tot	M	R		Tot	M	R	
Demographics	Age (classes)	↘↗	**	*	*	↗	*		
	Married (Y)					↗		**	
	Child (Y)	↗	***	*	**	↗	*	**	
	Tertiary educated (Y)	↘↗		*					
	Educated also abroad (Y)	↘	**	*					
Family and dependents	Partner in CoD (Y)				↗↘	*			
	Child in CoD (Y)	↗					*	**	
	Child in CoO (Y)	↗	**	*					
	Dependent in CoO (Y)	↗	***	***	***	↗	***	***	**
Integration in CoD	Dual citizenship (Y)				↘↗	*	*		
	Prevalent status - permanent (Y)	↗	*		**				
	Self-employed (Y)	↗	**	*					
	Prof./Trade U. member in CoD (Y)				↗	**		*	
	Income prevalently in CoD (Y)	↗	*		*	**		**	
	Investment in CoD - hous. (Y)				↗			**	
	Investment in CoD - bus. (Y)	↗	***	***	***	↘↗	**	**	**
	Settle = No (Y)	↗	*	**					
Settle = in COO (Y)	↗			**	↘↗	**	**	*	
Economic transnationalism	Investment in CoO (Y)	↗	***	***	*	↗	***	***	*
	Investment in CoO - housing (Y)	↗	***	***		↗	**	**	
	Investment in CoO - agriculture (Y)					↗	**	*	
	Investment in CoO - business (Y)	↗	*			↗	*	**	
	Earned money in CoO (Y)	↘			*	↘			**
	Employ others in CoO (Y)	↘↗	***	***		↘↗	***	**	
	Travels for taking care of property/bus.	↗	***	**	***	↗	***	*	**


Source: ITHACA’s survey.

The first columns show sign and strength of correlations with TMI-1. The more transnationally mobile among migrants tend to be adult in their working age and with children, who have dependents (children or other relatives) in their origin country. Self-employment facilitates (or requires) to be more mobile, as well as having investments either at origin (housing or business) or at destination (business). Among returnees instead, mobility is associated with children (still) at destination, with having still an economic interest for which travelling is required or with a primary source of income at destination. Having a permanent status

facilitates mobility. Adding civic mobile engagement in TMI-2, correlations are mostly confirmed. Mobility among our transnational foreign-born migrants and returnees is associated always with adults who have possibly formed a family but remain with an incomplete re-unification process. While investment at origin is associated with more mobility for both migrants and returnees, investment at destination is accompanied by more mobility only in the specific case of investments in business activities for both migrants and returnees (consistent with the setting up of a trade or import/export activity) and for returnees who have invested in housing in their previous country of immigration.


What is more interesting in our sample is that there is no stable association between transnational mobility and sex, cultural and institutional integration (number of languages spoken, length of stay, type of residence status) or structural integration in the labour market (existence and type of employment), which might be due to the purposive nature of our sample and its related self-selection biases.

Figure 38: Transnational Mobility Index-1 by CoO and CoD.



To complete the picture, we check for cross-country differences in the overall transnational mobility, measured through our TMIs. Indeed, the chi-squared tests of association allow us again to distinguish by origin and destination, to disentangle some country-specific pattern of transnational mobility overall. As for TMI-1 (Figure 38), the most mobile profile (score=4) is almost the least common everywhere, while the two intermediate levels (score=2 and 3) are more frequent for all origins and destinations. Nevertheless, Bosnians and Ukrainians appear to be the more mobile in terms of travels and remittances, with Moroccans on the opposite position of showing the highest share of low mobile individuals (score=1). These results are mirrored in the spider graph by destination, where Austria – whose sample is composed by Bosnians, Ukrainians and Indians – appears as the residence of most mobile migrants.

Figure 39: Transnational Mobility Index-2 by CoO and CoD.



Source: ITHACA's survey.

With regards to TMI-2, which summarizes our three selected mobility measures, Ukrainians and Bosnians still prove to be the more mobile in the sample followed by Filipinos for whom the lower physical mobility is compensated by a stronger engagement in transnational organization and migrant NGOs. In this case, Spain follows after Austria as the residence country for migrants engaged at one time in physical, economic and civic mobility.

6. Concluding remarks

This Quantitative Report has presented the results of the survey on transnationally mobile migrants and returnees (324 interviews) for the ITHACA project, in order to answer some of the basic research questions of the project and to complement the Country and Thematic Reports of the project (König et al. 2015; Gonzalez-Enriquez and Martinez Romera 2015; Gropas, Bartolini, and Triandafyllidou 2015; Markova and McKay 2015; Isaakyan 2015; Gemi 2015). We portrayed interviewed migrants and returnees in terms of their integration at destination and transnational engagement in order to shed some light on the different patterns of transnational mobility across Europe. In doing so, we outlined a series of markers of integration, transnational engagement and transnational mobility to understand what type of mobility is more likely to be experienced, under what conditions and for what purposes by both migrants residing in Europe and returnees in their origin country.

The **share of transnational migrants investing** in their **destination** countries varies between 62% (Filipinos) to 80% (Indians and Bosnians). Conversely, Filipino migrants are those most involved in investment at **origin** (79%) as compared to Indians (69%), Ukrainians and Bosnians (59-60%) and Moroccans (42%). Returnees are more engaged in investments at origin (65%) than at destination (38%). UK and Austria seem to be the most favourable environments for economic investments among our European destinations and Austria is also the residence country from where more migrants invest at origin. Looking at correlation coefficients, there is no difference by sex in the propensity to invest at origin, while male migrants are slightly more likely to invest at destination than their female counterparts. Overall, the acts of investing at origin and at destination are neither complementary nor substitute in principles, but variations are connected with personal and family characteristics as well as with the decision to permanently settle in either of the two places. Older ages and longer experiences abroad are connected with an investment at origin, often portrayed as a long-term project of return and re-settlement after retirement, than with investing at destination, for which a tertiary degree and an internationally pursued education might be relevant. Our selected transnationally mobile migrants are often engaged in **multiple investments**, either diversifying the risk through many activities – from housing to children education and to the set-up of an enterprise – or engaging in multiple locations at the same time.

As regards to **means of transnationalism**, to foster the transnational connections and ties across the borders, we outlined three main indicators of transnational mobility. At the core of our research, **physical mobility** measured as the number of times interviewees had travelled between the two countries over the past two years shows a great deal of variation within the sample. The number of visits is inversely connected with the average time spent during each travel and varies according to the geographical distance

as well as to the accessibility of affordable means of transportation, let alone the ability of migrants of balancing work holidays, school vacations of children, religious or national festivities etc. Bosnians are by far the most physically mobile group, followed by Ukrainians and Moroccans. On the contrary, the lower frequency of travels of Filipino and Indians migrants confirm the difficulties connected with transoceanic travels. The frequency of travels also impact the intensity of them, requiring migrants who are not able to separate holidays and business to combine different issues (family and business related) over the same trip. The presence of children at origin is associated with fewer travels for returnees, while migrants tend to travel more if they have invested in either of the two countries – testifying the need of a certain degree of control over invested land or activities – or if they are planning to settle back at origin.

Transnational **monetary remittances** are investigated as a means for transnationalism to complement or substitute the personal visits abroad. Indeed, remittances do not seem correlated to travels in our sample, meaning that the regularity in monetary transfers abroad is associated with other types of conditions. The ability and willingness to send money to the origin household or to engage in reverse transfers to support family members abroad are associated with different migration strategies as well as different life-time stages of migrants and returnees. Young individuals from affluent backgrounds who migrated to seek better opportunities and higher quality of life (as many of our sampled Indian migrants) are intrinsically different in their remitting patterns from more typically economic migrants who migrated out of necessity to make a living for themselves and their families. Interviewed migrants from the Philippines are the most regular in the sample, maybe to balance their less frequent physical presence, while Moroccans do not remit (anymore) in more than half of the cases. Ukrainians accompany a high level of physical mobility to constantly remitting in 37% of the cases. Transnationally mobile migrants are typically highly educated, but those who receive at least part of their education abroad (hence moved as students) are less likely to remit regularly. Overall, economic capability, transnational family connections (especially when children are left behind) and having invested at origin are the three factors associated with stronger regularity in the remittances. On the contrary, migrants who are investing in their destination countries are less able (or willing) to devote part of their earnings to constant transfers back at origin.

As a third element contributing to the overall transnational mobility of our target population, we also considered as **civic mobile transnationalism** the membership in NGOs or third-sector associations in the destination country. Indeed, almost always these are described as having a transnational or multicultural connotation, and testify for the willingness of migrants abroad to nurture their emotional and symbolic ties with their origin country through the participation and engagement in these diaspora or migrant organizations. Understandably, this type of engagement is less common among returnees (25%) than for migrants, especially in the case of Filipinos (77%) and Moroccans (60%).

In the attempt to summarize all the relationships we found between integration, transnational economic engagement and transnational mobility, we built a composite, multidimensional measure of transnational mobility. Our **Transnational Mobility Indexes** (TMI), which summarizes physical and monetary (TMI-1) and civic mobility (TMI-2) in a **4-points scale** (1=less mobile, 4=more mobile), allow us analysing the average directions of correlations between our synthetic measure and the list of integration and economic engagement's variables. In our sample, migrants who tend to be more transnationally mobile overall are adult in their middle-, working-age, who are parents and who have dependents residing in the origin country. Also, transnational mobility is associated with the presence of economic investment in either of the two countries, showing the need to engage in a complex mix of distant and personal contacts in order to keep control over the investment made. Among returnees instead, mobility is associated with a transnational distribution of family members or with having still an economic activity at destination for which travelling is necessary. Ukrainians and Bosnians seem to be overall more mobile than the rest of the sample. Filipinos too have quite high level of TMI-2, as they compensate their lower physical mobility with their widespread engagement in monetary transfers and transnational NGOs and associations. Austria proves to be the country of residence for the most mobile migrants in the sample, followed by Spain. Returnees show an average-to-low level of overall transnational mobility in comparison with migrants still residing in Europe.

It is worth noticing that, both for single measures and for the composite indexes, some control variables which we expected to have a role in transnational mobility do not show any significant relations. In particular, we found no significant distinction in the economic engagement and in the transnational mobility level by sex and very low difference across ages and lengths of stay. The absence of significant gender differences might be due to the self-selection of our sample migrants, coupled with the relevance of intra-household decision making processes for most of them. Almost all migrants in a couple expressed some sort of co-decision and support from their partners, necessary to fruitfully engage in transnational mobility and investments while taking care of relationships at the family (nuclear or extended) level. Education appears a necessary condition for almost all, but not a sufficient one for transnationalism and transnational mobility, as it provides for the necessary human capital to engage in multiple locations and activities at one time. Dual citizenship is associated, if anything, to investment at destination and hence is a sign of deeper engagement and integration. Being neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition, having a permanent status is nevertheless associated with physical mobility and transnational activities while more short-term permits (or even irregularity) prevent a constant transnational engagement. Other institutional integration variables also do not seem to have a stable association with more or less transnational mobility. This might be due in particular to the fact that over 70% of the total sample has a migration experience

longer than a decade: difficulties connected with the mastering of a foreign language or with the transition from a more temporary to a more permanent status have been addressed by our interviewees in the past and do not represent an issue in current times. Also, the survey provides us with some measures of wealth of the origin family (owning a piece of land, a house or a business), but does not tell us anything (quantitatively) about the income level or wealth of migrants and returnees at the time of the survey. As regards to remittance too, we do not have information on the amount remitted, which might vary according to the purposes of the transfers, regardless their regularity.

To sum up, the transnationally mobile migrants surveyed by ITHACA have prevalently urban roots and belong to **two distinct types** of migration trajectory, defined by the combination of individual demographic and socio-economic variables and of conditions at origin and destination. The former concerns young individuals with affluent family backgrounds who moved as students to seek better opportunities and higher quality of life than what was possible to achieve at origin, even when having the money. The latter are more traditional economic migrants, with middle or high education levels, who migrated to make a better living for their families. While wealthier **opportunity migrants** tend to remit less regularly and transnationally engage to maximise revenue or increase the prestige at origin and at destination, **necessity migrants** seeks to improve their standard of living and to diversify their activities across borders as an upward mobility strategy. For these last, transnational engagement is related at the same time to ties and obligations with origin households and to an eventual alternative project to secure a better future and a more secure retirement period upon return.

This distinction is supported also by the **education patterns** of the two groups. Transnationally mobile migrants are highly-educated in general, but those who got their highest degree abroad are less engaged in constant economic support of their origin families. Moreover, while younger opportunity migrants receive support from their origin families and decide to migrate before entering in their the family-formation period, for migrants already with a partner and particularly for those with children left behind, decisions regarding migration, integration and transnational engagement are necessarily family decisions in terms of obligations, sources of inspirations or links with either of the two localities.

What is more interesting, these patterns hold without controlling for, and hence regardless of, the level of **success** of the investment or economic activities undertaken and of personal satisfaction over the migration experience overall. We know from all country reports that not all our sampled migrants and returnees have a full successful story with regards to entrepreneurial activities or investments either at origin or at destination. Moreover, many among interviewees suffered from changes in the economic environment at destination due to the enduring economic crisis, especially in Spain and Italy. Especially among Moroccans, some said they feel an increased attention to transnational movements and connections

in the framework of the global fight against terrorism. Transnationally mobile migrants are *sufficiently* integrated at destination: they have been gone beyond the typical survival and integration needs usually associated with the beginning of the migration experience – language, residence status etc. – but their integration into the labour market is not necessarily uneventful.

Our study shows that migrants who are transnationally mobile and who engage into economic (and also social) transnational activities are not those who are best integrated or most successful, nor are they the most dissatisfied with their situation at the destination or those who feel marginalised and excluded and hence engage into some form of reactionary transnationalism to compensate downward socio economic mobility at destination. Transnational mobility emerges for some as another way – within migration – to improve their economic condition while for others is the explicit strategy to create a viable return at origin upon retirement. Either for opportunity or for necessity, their transnational engagement and mobility is a **constituent feature of the life-time trajectory** of all our interviewees, from their origin countries to their European destination and to, eventually, a new re-settlement at the time of retirement.

Annex

Table 10: List of tested variables.

	Variables
Demographics	Age (classes)
	Female (Yes)
	Tertiary educated (Yes)
	Financial condition before migr. (classes)
	Educated also abroad (Yes)
Family and dependents	Married (Yes)
	Child (Yes)
	Partner in CoD (Yes)
	Child in CoD (Yes)
	Dependent in CoD (Yes)
	Partner in CoO (Yes)
	Child in CoO (Yes)
Dependent in CoO (Yes)	
Integration in CoD	Length of stay in CoD (classes)
	N. of languages spoken now (classes)
	Employed now (Yes)
	Self-employed (Yes)
	Member of prof. org. /trade union in CoD (Yes)
	Dual citizenship (Yes)
	Prevalent status - permanent (Yes)
	Prevalent status - citizen (Yes)
	Income prevalently generated in CoD (Yes)
	Investment in CoD (Yes)
	Investment in CoD - housing (Yes)
	Investment in CoD - business (Yes)
	Wants to settle = No
Wants to settle = in CoD	
Wants to settle = in CoO	
Economic transnationalism	Income prevalently generated in CoO (Yes)
	Income generated in both CoD and CoO (Yes)
	Investment in CoO (Yes)
	Investment in CoO - housing (Yes)
	Investment in CoO - business (Yes)
	Earned money in CoO (Yes)
	Employ others in CoO (Yes)
Travels for taking care of property/bus. (Yes)	
Transnational mobility	Number of travels over the past 2 years (classes)
	Remittance frequency (classes)
	Member of NGO, migrant association etc. in CoD (Yes)

Source: ITHACA's survey.

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