Politics and Watermelons

Cross-Border Political Networks in the Polish-Moldavian-Ottoman Context in the Seventeenth Century

Michał Wasiucionek

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization of the European University Institute

Florence, 26 February 2016
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Thesis Summary

This dissertation addresses the cross-border political networks between members of the Polish-Lithuanian, Ottoman and Moldavian political elites in the seventeenth century (1595-1711). Throughout this period, the Porte and the Commonwealth remained locked in an intermittent rivalry for dominance in the principality of Moldavia, with the Moldavian rulers trying to navigate between the two larger powers. In historiography, these developments are usually interpreted as a policy driven by states’ geopolitical interests, seeing states as homogenous, undifferentiated actors. However, in an interesting twist, each of respective polities experienced the rise of factions and, correspondingly, a devolution of power from the political center towards patronage-based elite networks. By tying these two phenomena, the present study focuses on instances of cross-border patronage that emerged during this period of the long seventeenth century. The main object of this dissertation argues that rather than ‘state interest,’ factional interests and the individual agendas of members of Polish-Lithuanian, Ottoman and Moldavian elites shaped the course of the entangled history. Despite religious, social and political differences, the actors involved were embedded in a complex system of political networks that straddled across territorial and religious boundaries. In doing so, this dissertation focuses on the interlocking peripheries of eastern European empires, directing attention to the relationship between the processes of state formation, political infighting and agency of the imperial periphery in shaping political hierarchies and practices in the three polities throughout the seventeenth century, which cannot be accommodated by state-oriented models.
In Memory of My Grandmothers – Anna and Teresa
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Introduction

As the winter days of December 1639 passed in Istanbul, Romaszkiewicz, the Polish-Lithuanian envoy to the Porte, grew increasingly impatient and frustrated with his Ottoman hosts. Having arrived to the imperial capital with a seemingly uncontroversial mission, he found himself stuck in Istanbul for weeks, in vain requesting a farewell audience from the Porte and letters to King Vladislav IV. The person responsible for this delay, according to the diplomat, was the deputy grand vizier (kaymakam), Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha. While the official argued that an extended stay in Istanbul would allow Romaszkiewicz to get a better grasp of imperial affairs, the latter considered such excuses a smokescreen to hide the kaymakam’s true intentions. The envoy suspected that the real reason for this foot-dragging was the conflict between the Moldavian and Wallachian rulers (voievodes) on the northern fringes of the Ottoman Empire. Mehmed Pasha had his vested interest in the affair and did not welcome Polish-Lithuanian involvement:

“Another week passed, and I kept asking him urgently to let me leave. Meanwhile, he sent the sancak, i.e. the banner, of Wallachia to the voievode of Moldavia; at the same time he stalled me for another three days, which I spent asking even more insistently for the letters. [He told me that the delay] is in order to give a better picture of the state of affairs, but he did it on purpose, so that the Moldavian voievode would take control of Wallachia first.”

In order to exert pressure on the foot-dragging Ottoman official, Romaszkiewicz turned to other dignitaries of the Porte, considered enemies of the kaymakam. Despite their expressed willingness to aid the diplomat, they were unable to prevail over Mehmed Pasha’s influence and the diplomat had little choice but to wait.

Soon, the matters took an unexpected turn, as the news about the outcome of the Moldavian-Wallachian conflict arrived to Istanbul at the end of December. However, they were not what Mehmed Pasha was hoping to hear. In a letter to his friends at the Porte, the Wallachian voievode Matei Basarab, informed them about his victory and a crushing defeat suffered by his Moldavian

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1 "Minął potym i tydzień, upominałem się pilno odprawy, a on natenczas wyprawił sędziuk, to jest chorągiew, na państwo multańskie hospodarowi wołoskiemu, a mnie odprawę odkładał do trzech dnia, do tych dni jam też mu im dalej tym bardziej dokuczał o odprawę. Za tą okazją, abym się lepiej rzeczą przypatrzył i przysłużył, lecz mię umyslnie na to bawił, aby był usiadł pierwje hospodar wołoski na państwie multańskim." Report of Romaszkiewicz, January 12, 1640 in Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego hetmana wielkiego koronnego, 1632-1646, ed. Agnieszka Biedrzycka (Kraków: Societas Vistulana, 2005), 566.
rival, Vasile Lupu. The latter barely managed to evade capture and was forced to seek refuge in the Ottoman town of Ibrail (now Brăila in Romania) with but a handful of his men. On the very same day, Tabanyass Mehadmed Pasha stopped stalling and handed over the letters to Romaszkievicz, bidding him farewell.

Nevertheless, Romaszkievicz had to postpone his departure once again, this time due to torrential weather that hit Istanbul. Forced to remain in the city, he decided to pay the kaymakam one more courtesy visit. As he arrived to the grandee’s residence, the pasha was on his way out, summoned by the sultan. Romaszkievicz was instructed to wait one more time, this time for the official’s return from the palace.

However, Mehmed Pasha never did return. Instead, sultan’s guards appeared and started sealing the palace and detaining members of the pasha’s household. Romaszkievicz, mistaken for one of the kaymakam’s servants, had a difficult time explaining his diplomatic status to the soldiers before finally being released and returning – clearly shaken by the events – to his quarters. Later that day he learned that Tabanyass Mehadmed Pasha had been imprisoned and promptly executed, taking the fall for the Moldavian-Wallachian conflict and its outcome.

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The seventeenth century saw a major shift in the tone of Ottoman-Polish relations. In previous centuries, both the Ottomans and the Poles had striven to preserve peaceful relations and prevent an outbreak of hostilities between them. However, in the seventeenth century tensions escalated, resulting in a series of conflicts that took over a quarter of the century (1620-1621, 1633-1634, 1672-1676, 1683-1699). For many of these outbreaks of violence, the bone of contention between the two imperial actors was the principality of Moldavia. A relatively small polity, along with its twin – Wallachia – routinely found itself squeezed between the two territorial behemoths, with both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Sublime Porte staking their claims to suzerainty. These protracted periods of open war took their toll on the political standing of both the Ottoman Empire and the Commonwealth. While in the sixteenth century both polities were arguably dominant actors in Eastern Europe, by the eighteenth century many considered them spent powers, giving way to Russia, Prussia and the Habsburgs.
The dominant approach in the studies on Ottoman-Polish-Moldavian relations in the seventeenth century has focused on geopolitical aspects of the imperial rivalry, armed conflict and diplomatic interaction. Accordingly, ‘objective’ geopolitical interests of the polities were identified as the underlying causes for the seventeenth-century conflicts. Within this historiographical model, Poland-Lithuania, Moldavia and the Ottoman Empire all appear as political actors in their own right, led by a ‘collective mind of the government’ in pursuit of the state’s objective interests. As a result, the region’s history throughout the seventeenth century is presented through the lens of the state-oriented perspective, where polities-cum-actors interact with each other ‘like balls on a pool table’.

In Eastern European scholarship, this paradigm has often been complemented with the narrative of the ‘Turkish yoke.’ According to scholars espousing this approach, the Ottoman polity, despite its over five-century-long presence in the region, remained irreconcilably ‘alien’ to the local populace, with no middle ground between the state and its subjects. As a result, the Ottoman rule in Southeastern Europe is depicted as a constant struggle of the Balkan peoples against what amounted to a protracted occupation by a foreign power. This perception has long dominated Romanian historiography. While neither Moldavia nor Wallachia experienced direct Ottoman rule, the resistance to Ottoman hegemony in the form of repeated rebellions and appeals to European powers became an integral part of Romanian historical narrative. While this narrative has held much sway in Eastern European historiography, its basic assumptions have come under heavy criticism in recent decades, with scholars from different fields deconstructing many of the underlying concepts and proposing new interpretative frameworks. With Huntington-style ‘clash of civilizations’ approach all but discredited, a new robust body of scholarship has emerged. Emerging from the field

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3 Ibid.
Mediterranean history, new approaches have broken with ‘civilizational’ models, instead focusing on interaction, connectivity and exchange.\(^5\) However, in the case of Eastern and Southeastern European history, these new approaches have had only a limited impact.

In the field of early modern Ottoman studies, recent decades have brought a corresponding paradigm shift, with Ottomanists dismantling the previously dominant assumptions of a general decline of the empire in the early modern period.\(^6\) Once a form of orthodoxy in Ottoman historiography, the ‘decline’ thesis depicted the Ottoman Empire as entering a period of protracted, irreversible and all-encompassing crisis following mid-sixteenth century, increasingly incapacitated by institutional sclerosis, economic difficulties and even moral decline. However, starting from the 1980s, revisionist scholarship has subverted the basic tenets of the paradigm, instead drawing attention to pragmatism, resilience and flexibility of the imperial institutions, which allowed the empire to weather the crises and face new challenges.\(^7\) Admittedly, many ‘classical’ institutions did decline, but this was a sign of transformation and adaptation rather than decay. This new mindset has found its fullest expression in Baki Tezcan’s notion of ‘the Second Ottoman Empire’ in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, qualitatively different from the one of its ‘classical age.\(^8\)

However, the main shift in historiography occurred in the conceptualization of the state its role in the early modern world. Since its emergence as an academic discipline, history has remained intricately interwoven with the nation-state, and Rankean tradition – with its Hegelian undertones – has positioned the state as both the paramount object of research and the main agent of historical change. Such an approach has been by no means restricted to the field of history. However, this state of affairs has come under heavy fire from different quarters, with Wolfgang Reinhard not hesitating

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\(^7\) Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*, 8.

to call the previous approach ‘the obsession of the state.’ In the words of the Portuguese legal historian, Antonio Manuel Hespanha, scholars of early modern history since the 1970s:

“[...] converge in a criticism of state-oriented history of polities, now considered anachronistic: the centrality of body and jurisdiction (as a local and relative legal power in concrete cases) in political doctrine, imagery and practice in the formation of medieval and early modern political bodies; the relevance of »oeconomia« or the management of the household affairs in the political culture of pre-modernity, erasing the distinction between »public« and »private« in the medieval and early modern age; the critique of a formalistic (positivistic) conception of law that ignores the multiplicity and the contextual nature of social regulations.”

This historiographical trend has led to a revision of dominant paradigms concerning the state and state formation. Rather than seeing the state as an entity separate from society, acting upon the latter in a top-down manner in order to impose rational administration, revisionist scholarship presents it as interwoven into social fabric and brings to light the fissures and ad hoc arrangements resulting from a bargaining process between the rulers and their subjects. According to an apt description by André Holenstein, we should think of early modern societies in terms of societas civilis cum imperio, wherein political power was dispersed among numerous social actors rather than concentrated within state structures.

Early modern polities enjoyed neither capacity nor autonomy to remold their societies, even if they would be willing to do so. Within this context, it is obvious that the perception of the early modern state as a homogenous actor with agency and goals of its own is hard to sustain.

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12 “We should be careful not to view the early modern state as detached or isolated from society. Instead of reproducing a distinction between state and society, so typical for modernity since the nineteenth century, we should seriously consider that within a ‘societas civilis cum imperio’, ‘societas’ always appeared in conjunction with ‘imperium’ and vice versa. Society was transfused by a multitude of power relations of political and public character, and political power was at the same time always rooted in specific social situations.” André Holenstein, “Introduction: Empowering Interactions: Looking at the Statebuilding from Below,” in Empowering Interactions: Political Cultures and the Emergence of the State in Europe 1300-1900, ed. Wim Blockmans, André Holenstein and Jon Mathieu (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 6.
Such conclusions cast doubt not only on the internal developments within the confines of early modern polities, but also on the established approaches to ‘international' politics. Living in the age of nation-state as a still-dominant political formation around the world, our experience is one of the “international system of nation-states [which] relies on general acceptance of the fundamental concept that borderlines demarcate national sovereignties from each other spatially and politically.” The cornerstone concept of territorial sovereignty implies not only the division of land surface between particular nation-states, but also distinction between two political spheres: on the one hand, internal politics circumscribed by political boundaries and, while on the other, the world of international affairs and foreign policy, conducted between states. The overlap between internal political sphere and territorial extent is one of the nation-states’ defining features, lending them their cohesion and allowing them to appear as unitary actors in their dealings with the world outside.

However, the dichotomy between ‘inside' and ‘outside' is by no means set in stone, but originates with the concept of sovereignty and depends on the state's ability to enforce and maintain the distinction. As scholars point out, this was not the case in the early modern period. In the words of Dariusz Kołodziejczyk:

"The fetishization of state sovereignty, still apparent in modern historical writing (especially, but not exclusively, in regard to post-Westphalian Europe), is hardly useful if one aims to describe the more nuanced political mosaic that was typical for the early modern world and which did not disappear in 1648."

This opinion also rings in arguably the most state-centered academic discipline – International Relations. For a long time the dominant paradigm in IR studies was a variant of the ‘Realist' school approach, which envisioned actors in the international politics as unitary, homogenous actors, at the same time dismissing the role of internal politics as irrelevant in the international context. However, this also has come under heavy criticism, with the scholars like Daniel H. Nexon, Andreas

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Osiander and Benno Teschke calling for a more historically conscious approach that would take into consideration the characteristics of pre-modern polities in the construction of IR models.15

Against this background, the pervasiveness of state-oriented approach in historiography of seventeenth-century Eastern Europe seems particularly ill-suited. Even by the standards of the time, the polities of the region showed exceptionally ‘low density of stateness’ and, what is even more important, their institutions devolved rather than expanded throughout the early modern period. Indeed, the administrative structures in Eastern Europe were so minuscule as to prompt Orest Subtelny to cast doubt on the very existence of the state in the region during the early modern period:

“With weak rulers, minuscule armies, handfuls of officials, and complete decentralization, seventeenth-century Eastern Europe was in effect a region of stateless societies. [...] To argue that these East European polities were states in the modern or, indeed, in any sense of the word is simply misleading. Nor does calling them weak states solve the problem, for that appellation assumes that power rested, albeit insecurely or incompletely, in a specific type of political organization which, as we have seen, was functionally non-existent in the region.”16

Arguably, the point of view professed by the Ukrainian-Canadian historian is a radical one and remains open to criticism. However, the main question stands: how could the states be weak to a point of inexistence, and, at the same time, hegemonic, unitary actors with their own agency in international politics? The answer is that they could not be both. Even a short list of Polish-Lithuanian political actors engaged in relations with the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire shows that thinking about the Commonwealth as a homogenous actor in foreign policy is a gross misrepresentation:

“The very structure of the Commonwealth triggered an extreme decentralization of foreign relations, especially in regard to its eastern vector. Official or semi-official correspondence with Crimea was maintained in different periods by the


Starosta of Bar, the palatine of Ruthenia, the Crown Grand Hetman, the commander of Kam’janec’, numerous royal or Sejm-appointed commissars, finally Cossack het’mans and colonels, not to mention frontier magnates.\textsuperscript{17}

It would be absurd to assume that all those actors conformed to a unitary ‘foreign’ policy and pursued state objectives, however defined. Instead, the distribution of power and the permeability of political boundaries allowed individual actors to reach beyond the state’s territorial limits and form alternative alliances, independent of the ruler and possibly directed against him. As I will argue, these circumstances contributed to the emergence of cross-border patronage network as an important form of political association, straddling borders of respective polities and binding together actors from different socio-political arenas, with crucial impact on the developments in the region.

As mentioned above, the seventeenth century in Moldavia, Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire witnessed a process of political devolution, whereby power and influence shifted away from formal institutions and rulers themselves towards members of the elite and patronage-based political networks. This ‘rise of the faction’ reduced the ruler from the paramount arbiter in the political affairs to but one of faction leaders, struggling for hegemony in the political arena. Moldavian boyars, Polish-Lithuanian nobles and Ottoman officials increasingly accumulated power, as well as privatized resources, thus becoming the real hegemons of respective polities.

These phenomena have attracted attention of numerous scholars in recent decades, producing both valuable studies of particular factions and sweeping generalizations.\textsuperscript{18} However, in some respects the


scholarship still suffers from a number of conceptual and methodological shortcomings. Most importantly, the studies show a penchant for 'methodological nationalism', which Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller define as "the assumption that the nation/state/society is the social and political form of the modern world". While these scholars refer to the analyses regarding contemporary world rather than the pre-modern one, their comment holds true for the seventeenth century as well. Even the most thorough studies of patronage networks, such as the analysis of Jan Zamoyski’s faction by Wojciech Tygielski, confine their analysis to the boundaries of particular polities. This leads to an apparent paradox: on the one hand, these studies present the weakness of the state vis-à-vis other political actors, while at the same time assume that it was strong enough to police its boundaries and confine political activities within a 'political container'. This comes at the expense of ignoring phenomena that do not fit into state-oriented geography of power:

"Accepting the prevailing paradigm that divides a state’s affairs into internal national matters and international affairs that have to do with state-to-state relations, the history of such trans-border and transnational nation-state building becomes invisible."

This does not mean that scholars have ignored the existence of such cross-border ties altogether. However, such attempts often bring to light a lack of conceptual apparatus and corresponding vocabulary, resulting in continuous reliance on the state as a normative yardstick applied to interpret the phenomena under discussion. For instance, in his analysis of eighteenth-century Lithuanian factionalism, Gintautas Sliesoriūnas identified intensive contacts between particular

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21 Wimmer and Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond," 328.
factions and the Swedish and Russian courts, but at the same time labelled these activities as ‘foreign policy’ (in quotation marks), claiming that they did not deserve an unqualified term, as state-run policy would.\footnote{Gintautas Sliesoriūnas, “Walka stronnictw w przededniu i podczas wojny domowej na Litwie XVII/XVIII wieku,” in \textit{Władza i prestiż: Magnateria Rzeczypospolitej w XVI-XVIII wieku}, ed. Jerzy Urwanowicz (Białystok: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, 2003), 231.} In Ottomanist research on political households, as Palmira Brummett pointed out, we can see a tendency to fetishize small differences and isolate the Ottoman phenomenon from similar developments in the Mediterranean world.\footnote{Palmira Brummett, “Placing the Ottomans in the Mediterranean World: The Question of Notables and Households,” in \textit{Beyond dominant paradigms in Ottoman and Middle Eastern/North African studies: a tribute to Rifa’at Abou-El-Haj}, ed. Donald Quaetert and Baki Tezcan (Istanbul: Center for Islamic Studies, 2013), 86.} In short, even if authors address patronage and faction in their own right, the state often sneaks back into the analysis through the backdoor.

On a practical level of analysis, the specter of the state is similarly present. For instance, Lidia Vlasova, in her analysis of boyar factions in late seventeenth-century Moldavia, on the one hand ascribes ideological content to different orientations – distinguishing ‘pro-Ottoman’ and ‘pro-Christian’ blocs – only to contradict herself by claiming that the boundaries were fluid and driven by individual actors’ self-interest.\footnote{Lidiia V. Vlasova, “Dva napravlennia vneshnei politiki Moldavii i ikh prelomlenie v ee vzaimootnosheniakh s Pol’shei v 80-90-e gody XVII v.,” in \textit{Rossiia, Pol’sha i Prichernomor’e v XV-XVII vv.} (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), 341.} Thus, while scholars often take notice of factional interests, they usually fall back on the state as an explanatory mechanism or interpretative framework.

The present study follows a different route, focusing on the \textit{Außenverflechtung} of the Ottoman, Moldavian and Polish-Lithuanian elites.\footnote{Thiessen, \textit{Diplomatie und Patronage}, 36–7.} Rather than ‘bringing the state back in’ I attempt to ‘provincialize’ it, focusing on individual actors and patronage networks instead. As I will argue throughout the study, such an approach offers us distinctive opportunities to see political structures and mechanisms of cross-border patronage in their own right, rather than through the prism of allegedly ‘objective’ state agency and interests. While vastly differing in their composition, political culture and the context in which they operated, the three elites eagerly entered such relations and used them to further their political agendas.

As I will argue, these cross-border alliances had a crucial impact on a number of developments occurring in Eastern Europe throughout the seventeenth century, including numerous unintended consequences. By establishing personal bonds with allies from other political arenas, the actors were
able to procure resources that would be unavailable to them otherwise. Subsequently, they could repurpose said resources and deploy them in order to enhance their standing in their immediate political environment. As the cross-border patronage ties proliferated, they coalesced into a new geography of power alternative to the territorial model adopted by state-minded scholars. At the same time, the flow of resources within these networks decreased the willingness of the elites to engage in collaboration with the rulers. Finally, the relative attractiveness of cross-border patronage opportunities had significant geopolitical consequences and contributed to the integration of Moldavia and Wallachia into the Ottoman imperial system. In this way, the analysis of cross-border patronage networks and factionalism provides an alternative narrative of Eastern European history in the seventeenth century, focusing on “territorially demarcated and institutionally integrated political entities on the one side and spaces of cross-border interaction, movements and practices on the other.”

In order to uncover these ‘multiple geographies of power’ I fix my vantage point in Moldavia, approaching it as a linchpin in cross-border patronage networks. Admittedly, throughout the seventeenth century the principality remained a political backwater, and its elite had only meager resources at their disposal, when compared to their Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman counterparts. However, the peripheral vantage point can offer us particular insights. Firstly, the small size of Moldavian political arena made it more sensitive to patronage resources being brought from outside, allowing us to better grasp the impact of cross-border networks. At the same time, the Moldavian boyars' position between two greater powers makes it possible to compare the ways in which they interacted with both Polish-Lithuanian nobles and Ottoman officials, elucidating similarities and differences. Finally, the peripheral character of Moldavian elite reduces the risk of adopting a 'state-like' vision and allows us to better understand the situation on the ground.

Throughout the study, I will focus on the cross-border interaction of three social-political elites - Polish-Lithuanian nobility, Ottoman officials and Moldavian boyars - in the course of the seventeenth century. However, in some instances, I included evidence regarding Moldavia's twin principality – Wallachia. This decision is informed by several considerations, the most important

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one being the relative scarcity of archival evidence and its fragmentary nature. This means that important aspects of cross-border patronage ties would have to be left out, if we were to rely only on Moldavian sources. The inclusion of Wallachian cases is an attempt to remedy this difficulty, since both Danubian principalities developed along similar political trajectories throughout the early modern period. Thus, while Wallachian elite does not constitute the subject of the present study, individual case studies will be used as a complementary material to elucidate important features of cross-border patronage, where Moldavian sources fall short.

The chronological limits of the present study are defined by two major reconfigurations of power in the Lower Danube region. In the 1590s, profiting from the turmoil of the Ottoman-Habsburg war (1593-1606), the Polish-Lithuanian authorities revived their long-defunct claim to Moldavia and installed Ieremia Movilă as a client voievode. In turn, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, Poland-Lithuania – after the lackluster military performance in the later phase of the Holy League War (1683-1699) and struck by the ravages of the Great Northern War (1700-1721) – ceased to pose a threat to Ottoman hegemony in the region. At the same time, this year saw the introduction of ‘Phanariot rule’ – a notion I will discuss in subsequent chapters – marking the growing integration of the Danubian principalities into the Ottoman system of governance.

0.1. Methodological Apparatus

Approaching cross-border patronage in any meaningful manner requires addressing different strands of scholarship, be them distinct fields of historiography or methodological approaches, and molding them together into a coherent whole. This is easier said than done, since such a framework should be applicable to all three polities under discussion, their disparate institutional arrangements notwithstanding. Moreover, decades of historical and social research focusing on such concepts as state formation and patronage resulted in a theoretical overload, with an overwhelming number of definitions applied to describe particular phenomena. This, in turn, poses a challenge of unifying and clarifying terminology.

The present section addresses these problems, explaining and calibrating the central concepts employed in this study and positioning them within the existing body of scholarship. I address four basic methodological concepts: state (as well as state formation), patronage, social networks and political arenas.
0.1.1. Unpacking the State and State Formation

The prominence of the state in social sciences and historiography has resulted in numerous attempts to provide an exhaustive definition. The result is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, numerous studies have provided us with a massive body of new findings and contributed to our better understanding of underlying processes. On the other hand, however, it has resulted in a confusion of terminology. As Michael Braddick convincingly argued, much of the controversy regarding chronology of early modern state formation is caused by different understandings of what the term entails.\textsuperscript{27} The sheer number of definitions is overwhelming and molding them into a coherent model poses an even greater challenge.

In his meta-study on the theories of state formation, Patrick Carroll proposed a classification of different approaches to the topic encountered in social sciences and history.\textsuperscript{28} According to him, we can distinguish three major ‘centers of gravity’ (CoGs), each corresponding to a set of questions and theories espoused by the scholars (see Table 0.1.). While by no means flawless, this classification provides us with a ‘road map,’ necessary for addressing particular approaches and evaluating their respective merits and shortcomings.

The first problem we have to address is one of state autonomy, along with related question of the intentionality and teleology of state formation. In older scholarship ‘statebuilding’ has been interpreted as a directed and deliberate process, through which the political center (i.e. the monarch and his court) extended its political control over the periphery, imposing a preconceived blueprint in a top-down manner. Thus, the center engaged in military and economic buildup, cracked down on rival centers of power both within and beyond its domains. According to this approach, state formation was thus a unilinear process, resulting in either success or failure of the center’s deliberate actions.

\textsuperscript{28} Patrick Carroll, “Articulating Theories of States and State Formation,” \textit{Journal of Historical Sociology} 22, no. 4 (2009), 553-603.
### Table 0.1. Centers of Gravity in State Formation Theory According to Carroll (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY-FISCAL COG</th>
<th>AUTONOMOUS STATE COG</th>
<th>CULTURAL COG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAIN PREMISES</strong></td>
<td>Focus on the state as emerging from military organization and fiscal apparatus; state as a tool of the ruling class, lacking autonomy and agency of its own.(^{29})</td>
<td>Focus on the autonomy and agency of the state; state perceived as an autonomous agent, different from larger society.(^{30})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAIN REPRESENTATIVES</strong></td>
<td>Charles Tilly, Perry Anderson, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui</td>
<td>Theda Skocpol, Karen Barkey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, this model has come under harsh criticism by a new wave of historiography, with revisionists pointing out the lack of preconceived state models to be imposed by rulers upon their subjects. In the words of Wolfgang Reinhard, “[n]ot even rulers and certainly not the subjects ever intended to build a state.”\(^{32}\) Instead, as André Holenstein argues, the emergence of the state was in fact an “unintended outcome of interactive processes [emphasis mine –M.W.], which brought about and fostered the emergence of the state.”\(^{33}\)

This change of perception corresponds to other basic tenets of the revisionist paradigm, most importantly the relationship between traditional elites and state formation. Earlier approaches generally perceived the relationship between aristocracy and the state as one of irreconcilable conflict, a logical conclusion if we assume that the process of state formation was imposed from

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\(^{29}\) ibid., 555.  
\(^{30}\) ibid., 558.  
\(^{31}\) ibid., 563.  
\(^{32}\) Wolfgang Reinhard, “No Statebuilding from Below!,” 301.  
\(^{33}\) André Holenstein, “Introduction: Empowering Interactions,” 2.
above. As the state’s ability to extract revenue and project its power grew, the clash with traditional powerholders became inevitable, resulting in either the failure of state centralization or the decline of noble power. However, research has shown that the relationship between central authority and aristocracy was much more nuanced than the simplistic opposition. After all, as Jeremy Black pointed out, the monarchs and aristocracy belonged to the same social milieu, sharing similar values and worldviews.34 At the same time, the growth of bureaucratic apparatus did not necessarily mean a defeat for aristocracy. In many cases, traditional elites played a crucial role in buttressing administrative institutions. Obviously, the relationship between the ruler and his nobles was not always rosy, the Fronde or Louis XIV’s crackdown on parlements providing clear examples of existing tensions.35 Nonetheless, rather than a solid opposition between state apparatus and aristocracy, we find both parties engaged in a complex process involving cooperation, conflict and bargaining.36

This in turn opens the question of the factors shaping the relationship between the central authority, state apparatus and traditional elites. In order to answer this question, we can turn to two metaphors describing early modern polities. On the one hand, we can see them as problem-solving mechanisms, to which individual actors could appeal for protection and support. On the other hand, they constituted joint ventures, whereby members of the elite acted as shareholders in the business of extracting and redistributing revenue.37 It is important to note that these two interpretations are complementary rather than exclusive, and present us with a picture of early modern state as a mechanism of resource procurement and redistribution. As Bartolomé Yun Casalilla points out, these resources should not be understood in narrow economic terms, but rather included various types of social and symbolic capital, such as marriage alliances and offices, all crucial for the political...

35 On the latter topic, see John Jeter Hurt, Louis XIV and the parlements: The assertion of royal authority (Manchester - New York: Manchester University Press, 2002).
36 This can be seen in the case of the seventeenth-century Castile, where the burden of indebtedness of aristocratic estates was remedied by elite’s increasing engagement with the state in the process of exchanging political and economic resources, Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, “The Castilian Aristocracy in the Seventeenth Century: Crisis, Refeudalization or Political Offensive?,” in The Castilian crisis of the seventeenth century: New perspectives on the economic and social history of seventeenth-century Spain, ed. I. A. Thompson and Bartolomé Yun Casalilla (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 277–301. See also Black, Kings, Nobles, and Commoners, 2.
and social reproduction of the elite. Studies by Julia Adams and Guy Rowlands show that these investments were not necessarily realized within a single generation, since temporal horizons of familial strategies often spanned beyond a single lifetime. Thus, at its core, the support of the nobility for new institutions of the state depended on the center’s ability to provide incentives and a credible perspective of future benefits for noble lineages. The more attractive the state was as a resource-procuring mechanism for the elite, the more likely the latter was to get on board with administrative expansion.

However, in this sense, the state was not the only provider; rather, it constituted but one of several resource-procurement channels. If alternative mechanisms offered more opportunities, they could discourage the elite from engaging in state-enhancing enterprises. Moreover, the resources drawn from these networks could be subsequently turned against the ruler.

Thus, convincing the elite to support the institution consisted of two basic dynamics, which can be described as a ‘carrot-and-the-stick’ strategy. The ‘carrot’ included the incentives to cooperate with central authority, by making the latter’s offer more attractive as a mechanism of resource procurement. At the same time, monarchs tried to entice elite loyalty by means of indoctrination and propaganda. On the other hand, the threat of coercion served as the ‘stick,’ deployed in order to cut off elites from alternative channels of resource procurement, especially those straddling political boundaries. Taken together, these two tendencies contributed to the emergence of the ‘container’ model of the nation-state, establishing a dichotomy between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.

Recent scholarship has increasingly embraced the vision of the state in network terms rather than as a territorial entity, a development owing much to the success of Michael Mann’s *The Sources of Social Power*. According to Michael Braddick, we can envision the state as “a coordinated and

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39 ibid., 510. As Rowlands pointed out, the growth of officer corps in France during the reign of Louis XIV was driven largely by the interests of nobility and aimed at accommodating their ‘proprietary dynamic’ imperatives rather than by the need to increase administrative efficiency. Rowlands, *The dynastic state*, passim.
40 Wolfgang Reinhard, “No Statebuilding from Below!,” 300.
territorially bounded network of agencies exercising political power, and this network was exclusive of the authority of other political organizations within those bounds.\footnote{Braddick, \textit{State formation in early modern England}, 9.}

In the present study, I follow a similar approach to the state, conceptualizing it as a circuit of resource procurement and political influence. This approach offers us a number of opportunities in researching cross-border patronage. Firstly, it allows us to treat both the state and the patronage networks on the same level of analysis, as distinct, but nonetheless interconnected channels of resource flows. This is a crucial point, since, as Kerry Ward points out in her study of the Dutch India Company (VOC), officially mandated networks often produced unintended consequences in the form of unofficial networks, with radically different agendas.\footnote{Kerry Ward, \textit{Networks of empire: forced migration in the Dutch East India Company} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 9.} As I will show in following chapters, this holds true for the Eastern European context as well. A considerable share of resources flowing through cross-border patronage networks originated at the intersection of formal and informal ties, and actors habitually used state circuits to expand their cross-border patronage, and \textit{vice versa}. As a result, as Ward pointed out, the resources procured within the state apparatus could ultimately subvert the state.

In sum, the process of state formation can be seen as an expansion (both vertical and horizontal) of its administrative networks, as well as a growing willingness of the elites – and subjects in general – to address these institutions as problem-solvers. This was an undirected process, which included quick fixes and piecemeal responses to particular crises, but its eventual success relied on a combination of redistribution, bargaining, coercion and indoctrination. However, the state as a problem-solving mechanism was not a monopolist, but competed with alternative networks, including those of cross-border patronage.

\subsection*{0.1.2. Patrons, Brokers and Clients}

Just as state formation, 'patronage' is a chameleon-like notion, a result of more than five decades of research in history and social sciences. Entering scholars’ purview in the 1960s, it has been since defined in a variety of ways. At the same time, since patronage is in its core a micro-political phenomenon, these all-encompassing definitions have a tendency to obscure cultural and social
particularities and disregard subjective perceptions of the actors involved." Thus, in order to fully grasp what patronage entailed in cross-border networks of seventeenth-century Eastern Europe, we have to start from a minimal definition of the phenomenon and build upon it, identifying caveats in existing approaches.

On the surface, authors seem to agree on a number of patronage’s basic features. Most of the studies rely – either implicitly or explicitly – on a metaphor of ‘lopsided friendship’, indicating both a dyadic character of the relationship and apparent inequality of actors’ status within social hierarchy. At the same time, patronage is seen as a particularistic, informal and private bond, established and maintained in order to procure necessary resources. In effect, it operates as long as both parties – the patron and the client – perceive the relationship as remunerative enough.

However, as soon as we delve into details, this apparent consensus dissipates. One of the most fundamental divergences in the scholarship is the character of resources exchanged between the parties, with some scholars showing a proclivity towards a more precise classification of contributions by each party. While political scientists tend to focus on ‘vote-for-money’ exchanges and electoral patronage, historians of the early modern period stress the role of loyalty and protection as crucial resources. For instance, according to Sharon Kettering, in the seventeenth-century France:

“[T]he loyalty and service a client owes a patron in exchange for advancement and protection […] A patron is expected to give material benefits because he can do so, while a client offers in exchange more intangible assets of loyalty and service.”

In this respect, her approach coincides with another student of patronage, Wolfgang Reinhard, who identified protection as the basic resource furnished by the patron. As Antoni Mączak pointed out, one can discern disciplinary boundaries, with political scientists focusing on the political influence

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and career advancement, while anthropologists bring to the fore ‘survival clientelism,’ driven by the client’s need to secure livelihood with the patron’s help.\(^47\)

However, such a classification tends to obscure more than it elucidates, artificially limiting the scope of patronage. In a paradoxical manner, to identify roles within a patron-client dyad by associating them with resources provided to the relationship is both too restrictive and too vague at the same time. This becomes clear once we dissect the model provided by Sharon Kettering. Firstly, the assumption that patron is the only one providing material rewards is unfounded. Indeed, as I will show in the following chapters, economic resources were more likely to be furnished by subordinates. This is not to say that patrons did not provide for their clients, but rather to show that different types of resources could flow in both directions. Secondly, ‘an intangible asset of loyalty’ poses similar challenge, since Kettering’s definition suggests that only the client was expected to remain loyal, while his patron was not constrained in this respect. This was not the case, since both patrons and their clients were expected to behave in accordance with intersubjective norms of moral economy. In fact, ‘loyalty’ was no resource at all, but rather an inherent feature of a patron-client relationship.

If the type of resources provided to the relationship does not allow us to identify patrons and clients, how can we address the problem? Most studies seem to treat it as a non-issue, implicitly assuming that identifying superior and subordinate participants in a dyad is self-evident. In some cases, for instance ‘political machines,’ discerning patrons and clients is indeed unproblematic. However, as soon as we approach early modern patronage, the matters become murky. One of the solutions adopted among the scholars is to rely on the actors’ position in formal hierarchies.\(^48\) While structural analysis is necessary to approach patronage networks in any meaningful way, to assume one-to-one correspondence between formal hierarchies and patronage would be misleading. For instance, in Poland-Lithuania, officeholding was the only formal hierarchy that distinguished otherwise legally equal nobility. However, this does not automatically mean that an office-holder enjoyed higher social standing or influence than a noble, who had been denied this privilege. Some powerful magnates remained in opposition to the king, resulting in lack of appointments, despite their

\(^{47}\) Mączak, Klientela, 17–8.

standing in political life of the Commonwealth. This point is even more important in the case of cross-border patronage. Clearly, there was no unitary social hierarchy encompassing Ottoman officials, Polish-Lithuanian nobles and Moldavian boyars. The rules shaping particular arenas differed wildly, and trying to establish whether, say, the palatine of Ruthenia held a higher position than the beylerbey of Özü, would miss the point.

The solution I adopt to overcome this difficulty is to examine not the positions actors occupied within social hierarchies or resources they provided, but rather their behavior within a dyad. If an actor addressed his partner in a way that suggested his inferior position within the relationship, I identify him as a client. This praxeological approach allows us not only to overcome the problem of multiple social and political hierarchies, but also to address particular dyads in their own right, while placing them within larger social context.

Another question that needs to be addressed is the lifespan of patronage ties. The fact that patronage operated on a do-ut-des principle would suggest that the relationship existed for just as long as it was remunerative for the parties involved. This would make patronage similar to corruption. However, as Antoni Mączak pointed out the temporal horizons of bribe-taking and patronage differ significantly. The former is – to put it in game-theory terms – a one shot game and once the transaction took place, both parties can part their ways, with no further obligations to each other. This is possible, since corruption operates along the logic of a market transaction, whereby a certain service is provided in exchange for a pre-established price.

However, patronage relations follow a different pattern, similar to the Maussian logic of gift. It is an open-ended relationship, with no specific conditions set regarding the terms of exchange and neither side is expected to repay the debt immediately. In fact, the constant state of indebtedness is a crucial factor contributing to the longevity of particular dyads. As Antoni Mączak pointed out, by keeping the ‘balance sheet’ in a constant state of disequilibrium, both parties ensured that their partner would have a vested interest in perpetuating the exchange. In many cases, the duration of patronage ties spanned well beyond a single lifetime, as studies by Antoni Mączak show. In some

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49 Mączak, Klientela, 12.
50 ibid.
51 ibid., 14.
cases, it transformed into what the scholar dubbed 'powerful neighbor’s patronage', whereby only one patron operated within an isolated community, becoming the sole dispenser of patronage resources and favors.\textsuperscript{52}

However, not all patronage ties enjoyed such stability: in some cases, they disintegrated relatively quickly. This does not mean that we should dismiss them as too short-lived to qualify as patron-client relations. Actors established them with a particular mindset, and the fact that they failed to live up to the expectations does not change their inherent features. Thus, rather than focusing on the actual lifespan of particular ties, we should turn our attention to the expected duration as seen by the actors involved.

This brings us to another oft-ignored aspect of patronage – its cultural underpinnings and forms of expression. While the instrumental character of ‘lopsided friendship’ would suggest that the actors cared little about the norms of behavior, this was clearly not the case. As numerous scholars have shown, the affective aspect of the bond constituted an important feature of patronage.\textsuperscript{53} Patrons and clients had to conform to intersubjective norms of interaction, customary gestures and patterns of comportment. In fact, this comes as no surprise, since the cultural norms regarding patron-client interaction constituted an integral part of a wider universe of cultural and social values, such as loyalty to the ruler, civic duty or nobleman’s honor.

At the same time, this affective component was not just a sham. Instead, as Javier Auyero has pointed out in his study of Argentinian \textit{favelas}, intensity of the relationship contributed to the emergence of the \textit{doxa} among clients and patrons alike.\textsuperscript{54} According to him:

\begin{quote}
"Giving turns out to be a way in which brokers possess the members of their inner circles. But the same relation does not hold between brokers and those less intimately connected with them. Those with less intimate relationships with\"
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{52}ibid., 18–9.

\textsuperscript{53} An interesting episode involving Georg Fleming, a Saxon bureaucrat turned Lithuanian Grand Treasurer at the beginning of the eighteenth century, illustrates this point. Fleming upon his appointment by King Augustus II, was to establish a royal faction in the Grand Duchy. He approached the task with a distinctly bureaucratic mindset. According to the contemporaries, he recruited clients, assigned them landholdings, put them on the books and sent them away. He barely knew his noble clientele, in most cases did not even care to remember their names, and called upon them only, when he needed their support at the dietines. While the petty nobles welcomed economic resources, they nonetheless frowned upon impersonal approach adopted by Fleming. See ibid., 11.

\textsuperscript{54} Auyero, \textit{Poor people’s politics}, 174.
brokers are able to obtain goods and services when they need them, but they do not always offer loyalty in return.\textsuperscript{55}

As he points out, the viability of the relationship is dependent on the level of affinity and on the degree to which participants naturalized patron-client ties as the basic problem-solving channel of resource procurement.

Thus, the definition of patronage I apply in the present study goes well beyond the minimal requirements set out at the beginning of this section. Throughout the present study, I will use the label of patronage to denote \textit{a particularistic, personal and reciprocal relationship between actors that interact with each other in a way that signifies their unequal status, power and differential access to resources. While the relationship is instrumental in its core, the actors involved nonetheless describe it in affective terms. Its basic purpose is the exchange of resources and services between the patron and the client, which does not adhere to the market-style logic, but instead remains open-ended in terms of both the resources exchanged and the lifespan of the bond itself.}

Two more aspects of patronage relations should be taken into consideration. Firstly, as I have pointed out, patronage is a micro-political phenomenon, occurring between two individuals within a dyad; in contrast, state formation belongs to the sphere of macro-scale analysis. As Robert Kaufman pointed out, the transition between these two levels of analysis creates distinct problems.\textsuperscript{56}

First, large-scale patronage systems are more than just sums of constitutive dyads, and correspondingly are subject to different dynamics.\textsuperscript{57} This is especially true for mass clienteles and networks spanning large distances, where the patron is unable to handle the whole system on his own. This creates a demand for brokers, intermediaries between the apex and the base of the patronage pyramid. According to the definition of Sharon Kettering, a broker can be defined as:

\begin{quote}
“A mediator in an indirect exchange, an agent who does not control what is transferred but who influences the quality of the exchange in negotiating the transfer. He is more than an intermediary or go-between, because he has resources of his own that he can add to the exchange, and he does more than
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{55} ibid., 176.
\textsuperscript{57} ibid., 291.
transmit the negotiations: he can influence them, own manipulating and
lobbying in order to maximize his profits.  

These brokers provide a measure of coordination and trust by bringing together otherwise
disconnected individuals and securing the flow of resources through the network. As Ronald Burt
argued in his outline of social capital theory, brokers are individuals that provide bridging capital:

"[A] structural hole is a potentially valuable context for action, brokerage is the
action of coordinating across the hole with bridges between people on opposite
sides of the hole, and network entrepreneurs, or brokers, are the people who
build the bridges. These network entrepreneurs operate somewhere between the
force of corporate authority and the dexterity of markets, building bridges
between disconnected parts of markets and organizations where it is valuable to
do so. The social capital of structural holes comes from the opportunities that
holes provide to broker the flow of information between people, and shape the
projects that bring together people from opposite sides of the hole."  

Identifying brokers is not an easy task, since the fragmentary character of historical evidence often
obscures their activities. However, their role in bringing different sections of the patronage network
together was indispensable.

Secondly, Kaufman pointed out that the higher level of analysis the less we can rely on patronage as
the only explanatory framework. Instead, we should perceive macro-phenomena as a complex
nexus of different modes of association, such as family ties, confessional and ethnic communities
and administrative structures.  

Thus, when approaching cross-border patronage, we cannot treat
its internal dynamics as an isolated phenomenon, but we need to account for a wider social and
political environment, in which it operated.

In addition, we should also address the relationship between patronage and state formation. In this
respect, we find different schools of thought in existing scholarship. Majority of political scientists
tends to stress the role of patronage in the process of state centralization.  

Historians studying the
early modern period also espoused this approach, emphasizing the centripetal impact of patron-

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client relations. In the words of Sharon Kettering, seventeenth-century French monarchy “used [emphasis mine – M.W.] the nobility of France, great and small, sword and robe, in governing.”

In contrast, many scholars have been more wary, stressing the potential of patronage relations to hinder state centralization and contribute to political fragmentation. In his discussion of Kettering’s argument, Antoni Mączak brought Poland-Lithuania as a counterexample, showing that even if the Commonwealth’s officials acted as patrons, this resulted in fragmentation rather than concentration of power. Having entrenched themselves as intermediaries between the court and the country, magnates actively opposed any attempts at centralization. Thus, in Polish-Lithuanian case, patronage acted as a centrifugal rather than a centripetal force.

These differing outcomes show that the relationship between patronage and state formation is an ambiguous one, and depends on numerous exogenous factors. In some instances, patron-client ties could lead to a centripetal drive, growth of the state and unification of political sphere; in other contexts, they reinforced fragmentation and hindered expansion of formal institutions. Thus, in order to understand the forces at work and the opportunities and constraints under which patronage ties operated, we should turn to other methodological tools – social networks and socio-political arenas.

0.1.3. Social Networks and Socio-political Arenas

As I have mentioned before, in order to analyze the development of cross-border patronage, I have adopted a network approach to both patronage and the state. As a methodological approach stressing connectivity and relational character of social life, social network analysis provides a more than suitable analytical framework. However, this does not mean that the methodological tool is free of shortcomings and limitations.

The main obstacle in applying formal social network analysis to the topic at hand is the character and degree of preservation of the sources. Understandably, such an approach works best when we have at our disposal a clearly delineated and complete set of serial data (such as contracts of sale,
diplomas etc.), which allow for a relatively easy standardization. However, this is not the case. The bulk of information regarding cross-border connections in Eastern Europe is accessible only through chronicles and correspondence, the types of sources that do not easily lend themselves to such treatment. Moreover, the low level of preservation of the sources does not allow us for comprehensive quantitative analysis. As a result, rather than a strict application of the social network analysis statistical apparatus, we are forced to treat the networks as a descriptive tool.

Secondly, as Claire Lemercier has pointed out in her contribution, social networks approach presents a number of potential dangers. According to the scholar, one of the basic pitfalls of the network approach is a so-called ‘Facebook view’ of past social networks, which Lemercier defines as an assumption that actors employed a conscious strategy of networking in order to achieve particular goals. As she points out, network analysis alone cannot produce evidence in this regard; in order to address this question, a scholar has to turn to qualitative analysis instead. This holds true for patronage networks: we cannot assume that every instance of interaction and cooperation reflected a patron-client relationship between the actors.

The third challenge posed by the network approach is the problem of ‘boundary specification,’ i.e. delimiting the object of study. Since social networks are continuous by default, the limits imposed are necessarily a heuristic. This poses a double risk. On the one hand, adopting too-inclusive criteria of selection may result in an explosive growth of the number of individuals and connections. Of course, trying to provide an in-depth study of all social ties is simply impossible, but it also runs the risk of burying crucial information under a heap of redundant data. Since the connections between actors operating within the same arena likely outnumbered the cross-border ones, it would only reinforce the ‘small world’ assumption, leaving us with a hardly-groundbreaking conclusion that people interacted more frequently with those in their immediate vicinity. Instead, a more focused approach is necessary, one that would allow for both uncovering the specificity of cross-border ties and their wider social context. On the other hand, by setting too strict criteria, we run the risk of excluding important information.

66 ibid.
In order to avoid these pitfalls, I decided to posit the instances of cross-border patronage at the center. From there I proceed ‘outwards’, trying to identify other actors involved in the network, taking into consideration especially those that influenced the dynamics of cross-border patronage ties. As I argue, such a boundary specification allows us to analyze the instances of cross-border bonds in detail without ignoring their wider context.

At the same time, Lemercier brings our attention to another possible pitfall in social network research – overestimating the role of network factors, while ignoring other elements structuring social life, such as individual agency and cultural norms.\(^67\) Not all social phenomena can be expressed in purely network terms. Seventeenth-century Eastern Europe was not an ecumenical and egalitarian space, with no social or political borders; differences of creed, status and political allegiance did matter and played an important role in shaping the ways individuals interacted with each other, even if the boundaries were permeable and did not rule out cooperation. To disregard those fault lines altogether would mean to project an idyllic utopia rather than to engage in a meaningful research.

In order to account for these differing contexts, I will employ the concept of socio-political arenas. As is often the case with methodological tools, the label has been applied in a number of ways. However, in the present study, I will follow the metaphor of arena employed by a British anthropologist, Frederick G. Bailey. While Bailey does not provide an explicit definition of the term, we can discern its main features. In short, an arena should be understood as a social space of competition for resources, regulated by a set of intersubjective rules.\(^68\) Each arena has personnel rules, which regulate the qualifications of those able to participate in political life. Other rules structure the ‘rules of the game’ and regulate behavior of particular actors. Finally, resources embedded within the arena constitute the stakes in the competition. For instance, in Poland-Lithuania, officeholding conferred prestige and carried considerable symbolic value, resulting in a fierce competition for appointments. At the same time, personnel rules made nobles the only ones eligible for positions, while excluding plebeians from the race. Clearly, these criteria and accepted norms of political competition varied from one arena to another, shaping individual strategies.

\(^67\) ibid., 21.
The concept of socio-political arenas provides us with a number of advantages. Most importantly, it allows us to accommodate non-network aspects of political and social life without falling back on the concept of state. Unlike the latter concept, the arena metaphor suggests a more nebulous space with porous boundaries, more suitable for the analysis of cross-border interactions. At the same time, it allows us to better tackle the structure of early modern political life. Actors operated within different encapsulated arenas, connected but nonetheless autonomous from state-level political dynamics. For instance, in the Ottoman Empire we can distinguished two central arenas, one associated with inner space of the sultan's palace (enderun) and the ‘outer’ sphere (birun), responsible for imperial administration. Simultaneously, political life in the provinces showed their own dynamics, influenced, but not defined by the center.

This does not mean that actors could move freely between the arenas, or that different arenas held the same value for each actor. Even if an actor was able to enter the competition in multiple arenas, we can assume that his vital interests were tied to one in particular. These ‘primary arenas’ constituted the center of individual political and social activities and the loci where their resources were converted and deployed. Thus, the combination of arenas and networks serves to reconcile two different approaches to space, none of which manages to capture the whole geography of early modern politics. Thus, by connecting the concepts of arenas and networks, I aim to tread a middle ground between a state-oriented approach to early modern politics and the vision of ecumenical world of interconnected networks.

0.2. A Note on the Sources

Approaching Poland-Lithuania, Moldavia and the Ottoman Empire within one study is no easy task and poses a number of challenges. In the seventeenth century, Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire were at their greatest territorial extents. Taken together, they spanned from the Persian Gulf...

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69 ibid., 147.
70 For instance, according to Kaisarios Dapontes, Köprüli Mehmed Pasha made a deal with Kızlar Ağası, according to which the grand vizier would run administrative affairs (birun), while the Chief Black Eunuch would take control of enderun, Kaisarios Daponte, “Kaisariou Daponte Xronografos,” in Cronicarii greci carii au scris despre români în epoca fanariota, ed. Constantin Erbiceanu (Bucharest: Tipografia Cărților Bisericesci, 1888), 3.
72 Thiessen, Diplomatie und Patronage, 15.
73 Muller and Torp, “Conceptualising transnational spaces,” 61.
all the way to the Baltic Sea. This alone accounts for the dispersion of sources throughout Eastern Europe and the Middle East, making it virtually impossible to catalogue them, not to say study, within a lifetime. Linguistic differences only exacerbate the difficulties.

At the same time, tumultuous history of the region took its toll on archives and libraries, as many documents have been lost due to the ravages of war, fire, as well as simple disregard for their historical importance. Thus, for all its sheer number, the sources available to us often fall short of providing us with any sort of complete picture.

In order to trace the phenomena of cross-border patronage, I conducted extensive research in the archives and libraries in the region. These included most importantly the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) in Istanbul, the Main Archive of Ancient Acts (Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych) in Warsaw, the state archives in Bucharest and Iaşi, as well as a number of smaller repositories in respective countries, most importantly in Poland and Romania.

In addition to archival documents, I employ a number of published sources. For all its shortcomings, the nineteenth-century monumental edition of sources, initiated by Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, remains indispensable for addressing the history of the region. The same goes for a more modest editorial project, published by Andrei Veress in the interwar period, as well as standalone volumes of correspondence conducted by important Polish-Lithuanian magnates.

Both official documentation and correspondence, while elucidating important aspects of cross-border patronage, pose specific methodological challenges. Due to their provenance, documents issued by chanceries present us with a sanitized account of events, tailoring their contents to fit ideological concerns of the central power, rather than to depict the conditions on the ground. In this respect, correspondence allow us to dip into the inner workings of patronage ties. However, they also pose a number of difficulties. The biggest obstacle is the state of preservation of the sources and their unequal coverage. Well-preserved and relatively complete family archives, such as Zamoyski Archive, are an exception rather than a rule, and in most cases all we have at our disposal are

'snapshots' elucidating particular ties, often out of context. At the same time, this type of sources is severely lacking for Ottoman and Moldavian officials.

These limitations of archival material mean that we should turn to literary and historical works, including travelogues, chronicles and diaries to compensate for other types of sources. The seventeenth century saw a development of Polish-Lithuanian, Moldavian and Ottoman historiographies, providing us with numerous accounts. However, we should keep in mind that these sources are not without their shortcomings. Firstly, they usually focus on particular political arenas, addressing cross-border relations only marginally. At the same time, they often rely on second-hand information and filter the events through ideological and partisan lens of their authors.

These difficulties notwithstanding, taken together, the sources provide us with a window, through which we can access the realities of cross-border patronage. Even if the evidence is fragmentary and blanks have to be filled with circumstantial evidence and deduction, this does not mean that we are left with a pile of unconnected evidence. Rather, by triangulating and cross-referencing the extant sources, we can discern clear patterns of actors’ behavior in cross-border context.

0.3. The Outline of the Study

The present study consists of two main parts and an introductory section. The first chapter examines the context in which cross-border patronage ties emerged during the seventeenth century. In order to do this, I present political, social and economic developments of the region until the seventeenth century. Subsequently I turn my attention to particular arenas, setting the parameters in which individual actors operated. Finally, I outline the concept of the ‘rise of the faction’ as an umbrella category, which I apply to describe developments in the Ottoman, Polish-Lithuanian and Moldavian political arenas.

With this interpretational framework in place, I turn to substantial analysis of cross-border patronage relations. Part I approaches these ties from a micro-political point of view. In Chapter 2, I explore how political actors formed and maintained their alliances, responding to the challenge of

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providing trust to their networks. Faced with specific conditions stemming from physical distance and cross-border character of their patronage ties, actors creatively adapted their ‘toolkit of faction-building’ in order to ensure loyalty and cooperation of their clients. These efforts suggest that such connections offered access to otherwise unavailable resources, which will be examined in Chapter 3. While transfer of resources by means of cross-border patronage was usually dismissed as mere corruption, I argue that they constituted the bloodstream of a complex circuit of resource procurement and their conversion into different types of capital.

Part II makes a transition from micro-political phenomena to the macro-scale, addressing the impact the cross-border patronage ties had on their wider political environment. In Chapter 4, by using three case studies, I address the problem of factional conflicts, which pitched different cross-border networks against each other, as well as I explore tensions within particular factions. As I argue, a number of such conflicts, habitually ascribed to different perceptions of ‘objective’ state interests, were in fact struggles for resources embedded in particular political arenas. This analysis also sets the stage for the following chapter, which takes a closer look into abortive attempts to annex Moldavia and Wallachia undertaken in the seventeenth century by both Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire. In contrast to previous studies, which explained these projects in terms of geopolitical interests, I argue that both their inception and eventual failure were shaped by factional considerations of particular actors and groups of interest. In Chapter 6, entitled ‘Choosing Ottomans,’ I revisit the eventual outcome of the seventeenth-century political developments and the beginnings of so-called ‘Phanariot system’ in the Danubian principalities. By using the concept of ‘Ottomanization’ as a guiding idea, I argue that Moldavian and Wallachian elites of the eighteenth century were not opposed to further integration into the Ottoman imperial system, which had proven more accommodating for their interest than the Polish-Lithuanian one. However, this association with the Porte did not result in state formation, but rather reinforced the composite character of the Ottoman polity. Finally, in Conclusion, I compare Polish-Moldavian-Ottoman experience with cross-border patronage with wider patterns of elite political behavior, drawing on comparisons with other polities of the early modern world.
Chapter 1. Setting the Context

The emergence of cross-border patronage did not take place in a vacuum. Rather, these networks grew out of the specific conditions of seventeenth-century Eastern Europe. In this chapter, I set the stage for subsequent analysis by identifying factors – both geopolitical and institutional – that shaped the social and political world of Ottoman officials, Polish-Lithuanian nobles and Moldavian boyars. In order to do this, I first address the emergence and structure of the region's political order, paying special attention to the complex nature of Ottoman-Polish-Moldavian relations throughout the early modern period. Subsequently, I turn to an in-depth description of the polities' political arenas and the changes they underwent in the seventeenth century. Finally, I bring together these different threads and propose a concept of ‘the rise of the faction,’ as an umbrella category describing the crucial changes that took place in three respective polities in the course of the seventeenth century.

1.1. Colonization, Raiding and Conquest: The Landscape of Eastern Europe in the Early Modern Period

1.1.1. Origins of the Seventeenth-Century Political Configuration in Eastern Europe

When trying to retrace the origins of the seventeenth-century political map of Eastern Europe, the middle decades of the fourteenth century are a good place to start. It is in this period that two major processes took root, contributing to a general shift in the region's geopolitical landscape. The first of these developments was a gradual disintegration of the Golden Horde, which brought a reversal in the balance of power between the previously dominant steppe powers and their neighbors. A parallel development was the expansion of the Ottoman domains, which catapulted the small Anatolian beylik to the position of a world power.

The Golden Horde was a steppe power that had dominated the Black Sea region since the Mongol conquest in the mid-thirteenth century. However, by mid-fourteenth century, repeated outbreaks of plague, disruption of trade and dynastic infighting started to erode its power. This resulted in the fragmentation of the polity, with different members of Chinggisid dynasty establishing their own khanates and staking their claims to the whole legacy of the Golden Horde. However, as the Horde's

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grip on the region waned, new contenders entered the race to fill the power vacuum. While it was Muscovy that eventually emerged victorious from this scramble for Eastern Europe, by the seventeenth century its involvement in the southern part of the region was still limited. Rather, Hungary, Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania played major roles in the rivalry, with the lands of southwestern Ruthenia constituting both the stage and the prospective prize.

The adoption of Roman Catholicism by the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jogaila (following his baptism, Vladislav Jagiello) and his subsequent coronation as the king of Poland in 1386 brought a rapprochement between these two polities, establishing a dynastic union and setting them on the path that culminated with the Union of Lublin and the formation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569. From then on, the Polish Crown increasingly took over the management of southern policy of the composite monarchy, as the Grand Duchy increasingly turned eastwards, concentrating its forces on the bitter struggle with Muscovy. This development was eventually sealed with the transfer of Lithuania’s southern territories of Kyiv, Braclav and Volhynia to the Crown in 1569.

These developments had a profound impact on the emergence of Moldavia and Wallachia. The waning power of the Golden Horde in the lands along the arc of the Carpathians opened the way for Hungarian expansion beyond the mountains, contributing to the emergence of new political units in the region. Details regarding this process are murky and continue to fuel historical debate. Nonetheless, by mid-fourteenth century, we find the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia as established polities, under the nominal suzerainty of the Crown of St. Stephen. However, the position of the Danubian principalities was precarious from the start. Lagging behind their neighbors in terms of population, revenue and military, the voievodes had to navigate stormy waters and juggle their alliances, playing off Hungary, Poland and the Ottoman Porte against one another in order to maintain relative independence.

As the Golden Horde increasingly succumbed to internal dissent, another Muslim power was beginning its ascendancy to the status of world power. Starting out from a small fiefdom in

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northwestern Anatolia, the Ottoman dynasty entered a period of rapid expansion in Europe and Asia. Temporary setbacks notwithstanding, by the second half of the fifteenth century, the sultans had managed to establish their hegemony in Southeastern Europe and capture its crown jewel, Constantinople. Following this tremendous success, the Porte continued its expansionist drive in Europe in two directions. The main thrust was directed into the heart of the continent, culminating with a decisive victory at Mohács (1526) and subsequent conquest of central Hungary by 1541. To the northeast, the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries saw a gradual transformation of the Black Sea into an 'Ottoman lake,' as the Porte wrested control over Venetian and Genoese colonies in the region and established its suzerainty over the Crimean Khanate.

These conquests had a tremendous effect on the position of the Danubian principalities. The demise of the Kingdom of Hungary deprived voievodes of Moldavia and Wallachia of the means to check Ottoman pressure and forced them to seek rapprochement with the Porte. Wallachia, more exposed due to its geographic position, started paying tribute as early as the beginning of the fifteenth century. The rulers of Moldavia had been able to hold off the Ottoman onslaught for longer, but they too were forced to enter tributary arrangement by 1455. The Ottoman conquests in the Black Sea region and in Hungary only aggravated the situation. Finally, the 1538 campaign, undertaken in order to punish the recalcitrant voievode Petru Rareş and led personally by Sultan Süleyman, resulted in the annexation of the southeastern region of Budjak and firmly established Ottoman control over Moldavia.

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79 There is a great deal of historical debate concerning the nature of the early Ottoman state and underlying causes of its success. For a long time, the dominant paradigm has been the concept of *gaza* initially proposed by the Austrian Orientalist, Paul Wittek. According to him, the key to the rise of the Ottomans was its geographical position at the borders of the Byzantine Empire, which attracted Muslims willing to wage war against the infidels, see Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1938). This explanation has been challenged by Heath Lowry, who instead presented the model of early modern Ottoman state as a 'predatory confederation', see Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*. SUNY studies in the social and economic history of the Middle East. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).


82 Gemil, *Romanians and Ottomans*, 56.
1.1.2. Seventeenth Century Eastern European Realities

If we look at the political map of Eastern Europe in the seventeenth century, we will see the region dominated by three major powers - Poland-Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburgs. While these polities exerted major influence on Eastern European history, they were by no means the only ones to participate in the complex world of seventeenth-century politics. While forced to tread a fine line between their larger neighbors, smaller polities also had a say in regional power configurations, which makes it necessary to look closer at the configuration of power in more detail.

According to an oft-repeated judgment, the Ottoman Empire was a state bound on continued conquest and constant expansion. However, this assumption hardly applies to the Porte's policy in the Black Sea region in the period after mid-sixteenth century. The conquests of Venetian and Genoese trading colonies had given the Ottomans control of the littoral and created a fortified rim along the sea's northern and western coasts. However, there is no indication that the Ottomans wanted to venture further inland, and their strategy aimed at securing the sea from possible incursions. This comes as no surprise, as the poor and sparsely populated territories of the Black Sea steppe hardly constituted an attractive zone of expansion. Moreover, northern campaigns were wildly unpopular among the soldiers, who complained about 'hellish cold', harsh conditions and the lack of booty. Thus, the main duty of the local authorities was to protect the Black Sea and maintain a measure of oversight over satellites of the Porte.

In order to fulfill these duties and coordinate administration, two eyalets were established – one in Kefe on the southern shores of the Crimea, and another one in Özü (today Očakiv in Ukraine). The latter, formed at the end of the sixteenth century in order to coordinate defense against Cossack raids, comprised territories from the Danube Delta to the mouth of Boh in the north. Its geographic

87 Geml, *Țările române în contextul politic internațional*, 10.
proximity to the Danubian principalities meant that the beylerbeys of Özü played an important role in overseeing the voievodes of Moldavia and Wallachia on behalf of the Porte.88 This supervisory role was eased by the fact that many governors-general, unwilling to suffer harsh climate in the isolated fortress on the northern fringes of the empire, preferred to reside in the town of Silistre (now Silistra in Bulgaria), just a short boat ride from Wallachia.

In the light of the limited Ottoman presence in the region, the Crimean Khanate played a crucial role in projecting Ottoman power on the northern shores of the Black Sea. The only successor state to the Golden Horde that managed to survive beyond the sixteenth century, the Khanate entered the Ottoman orbit in the last quarter of the fifteenth century.89 However, the relationship between the Porte and the Giray khans residing in Bahçesaray was in many respects unique. The Girays' military strength and dynastic charisma as descendants of Chingis Khan translated into prestige that was comparable with the Ottoman rulers. As a result, not only were the Crimean rulers exempt from any financial obligations to the Porte, but the imperial treasury even subsidized them in the form of numerous grants and gifts. The khans also played a significant role in the Porte's relations with their northern neighbors of Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy.90 In general, the relationship between the Porte and the Girays was one of mutual benefit: on the one hand, the military might of the Ottoman Empire served as a deterrent against the Khanate's more powerful neighbors; in turn, the khans contributed their troops towards Ottoman campaigns.

The political institutions of the Crimean Khanate preserved main features of the steppe tradition. Despite his dynastic charisma, the khan was not an autocrat, but found himself forced to share power with other members of the dynasty, most importantly with kalga and nureddin, respectively the first and second deputy of the ruler.91 Powerful tribal clans, most importantly karaçı beg families of the Khanate had to be accommodated. Finally, many Nogay chieftains inhabiting the steppe were

88 See for instance the statement of Paul of Aleppo (Bulus b. Makariyos al-Halabi): “[T]he voievode sent a mission to the pasha of Silistre, Siyavuş. [Siyavuş Pasha] is overseeing the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia, and no complaint can arrive to Istanbul without his consent.” Paul of Aleppo, Jurnal de călătorie în Moldova și Valahia, ed. Ioana Fedorov (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 2014), 274.
89 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, 22.
only loosely subordinated to the ruler in Bahçesaray.\textsuperscript{92} This complex system of power-sharing provided a fertile ground for dynastic squabbles and factional infighting, which constituted a constant feature in Crimean political life.

The integration of the Crimean Khanate into the greater Ottoman world resulted in the emergence of the raiding economy, one of the Khanate's most characteristic features. Throughout the early modern period, the imperial world-economy constituted one of the largest slave markets in the world, and the inhabitants of the Khanate were quick to take advantage of the opportunities it offered. Already by the second half of the sixteenth century, the peninsula became a slave-trading hub for the whole empire.\textsuperscript{93} According to the estimates of Polish and Soviet historians, the number of captives taken from Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries reached two million.\textsuperscript{94} In order to protect their domains from devastating raids, Polish and Muscovite rulers paid annual 'gifts' to the khans and other members of the Crimean elite.\textsuperscript{95} While this strategy did not prevent small-scale raiding, it nonetheless ensured that no major campaigns led by the khan would be launched.

In spite of mutually beneficial arrangement between the Porte and the Crimean Khanate, bilateral relations were not always cordial. The khans had their own political objectives, which did not necessarily coincide with the Porte's wishes. For instance, Crimean troops were reluctant to partake in Ottoman campaigns on faraway fronts, especially those against Safavid Persia. Additionally, Istanbul's involvement in the khanate's dynastic affairs caused resentment among the Tatars and in some cases led to open rebellions against the Porte.\textsuperscript{96} These conflicts notwithstanding, the Crimean Khanate remained within the Ottoman orbit and continued to play a crucial role in the system of imperial governance.

The Crimean Tatars were not the only ones to engage in the booming raiding economy. Loose control exercised by Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania over their steppe frontiers created a wide

\textsuperscript{92} Kortepeter, \textit{Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation}, 16.
\textsuperscript{95} Davies, \textit{Warfare, state and society}, 9–10.
swathe of ‘no man’s land’, attracting fugitive serfs and others individuals willing to escape from under the authority of officials and landholders. When colonization of Ukraine in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries pushed the frontier of settlement further into the steppe, this influx only increased. In order to fend off Tatar raiders, such loose communities in the ‘Wild Field’ started to band together for defensive purposes, eventually coalescing into a military organization, known as the Zaporozhian Host. Zaporozhian Cossacks, as they came to be known, operated along the lines of military democracy, electing their officers and commander-in-chief (het’man). As their organization matured and confidence increased, Cossacks started to raid Crimean and Ottoman territories on the Black Sea coast, reaching as far as the outskirts of Istanbul.

For the authorities of the Commonwealth, the rise of Cossackdom posed a number of problems, which they ultimately failed to resolve. Firstly, Cossack and Tatar raiding activity on the borderland put a serious strain on Ottoman-Polish relations. Internally, the unruly, self-assertive and militarily proficient Zaporozhian Host posed a serious challenge to the established social order. The Cossacks increasingly demanded the recognition of their special status and their enlistment on the Commonwealth’s payroll; in turn, Ukrainian landholders saw them as fugitives and rebels, demanding their return to the estates. As a result, the Commonwealth’s policy oscillated between mobilizing Cossacks for war and trying to reduce them to serfdom. The result of these tensions was a series of rebellions in the first half of the seventeenth century, culminating in a massive uprising led by Bohdan Xmel’nyc’kyj, which from 1648 rocked Poland-Lithuania, sending shockwaves throughout the region. In the second half of the seventeenth century, virtually all Eastern European powers became embroiled in the resulting quagmire, with different Cossack leaders and factions allying themselves with the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Poland-Lithuania. Eventually, Russia and the Commonwealth divided Ukraine between themselves in 1667, but the political turmoil continued until the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Protected within the arc of Carpathian Mountains, the Principality of Transylvania emerged from the ashes of the Kingdom of Hungary following its partition in 1541. Initially a vestige of the medieval

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97 ibid., 32–3.
Hungarian monarchy ruled by an Ottoman-backed candidate to the throne, János Zsigmond Szapolyai, the principality took its institutional shape in the 1570s. The elective prince shared power with the diet, comprising three 'nations' (Hungarian nobility, Szeklers and Saxon towns) and four *religiones receptae* (Lutherans, Calvinists, Unitarians and Catholics). While Greek Orthodox constituted majority of the population, they were nonetheless excluded from the political system, and were merely 'tolerated' by the authorities.

While Transylvania was the tributary of the Ottoman Empire, it nonetheless played an important role in regional politics. This influence extended in two directions. In Hungary, the princes continued to challenge Habsburg rule in Upper Hungary, staking their own claims as legitimate heirs to the Crown of Saint Stephen. At the same time, Transylvanian rulers tried to establish regional hegemony by subordinating the voievodes of Moldavia and Wallachia. This latter tendency reached its peak during the reign of Rákóczi princes (1635-1658). However, in his ambitious plans, Prince György Rákóczy II (r. 1648-1658) crossed the line in sand, sparking a violent reaction of the Porte. In response, the Ottoman troops entered the principality, crushing local resistance; westernmost districts were put under direct Ottoman administration. Reduced territorially and politically, the rump principality played a much-diminished role in the second half of the century, until its eventual conquest by the Habsburgs in the 1690s.

As we shift our attention from the sphere of politics towards underlying economic and social structures, the extreme cultural and confessional diversity of Eastern Europe immediately becomes apparent. I have already pointed out the complex interaction between nomadic and semi-nomadic populations of the steppe populations engaged in pastoralism and raiding economy on the one hand, and their sedentary neighbors on the other.

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However, even more striking was the confessional diversity of the region. Religious boundaries cut through political divisions, and virtually all polities comprised sizeable confessional minorities. This necessitated an accommodation of religious difference, with varying solutions put in place, depending on legal and political traditions. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, solidarity of the noble estate prevailed over confessional concerns non-Catholic nobles obtained legal protection from religious persecution, the mindset expressed in the 1573 Constitution of Warsaw.\footnote{Wojciech Kriegseisen, “Toleration, or Church-State Relations? The Determinant in Negotiating Religions in the Modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.” Acta Poloniae Historica 107 (2013): 98.} This practice continued throughout the seventeenth century, despite the rising tide of Counter-Reformation and the growing hegemony of the Catholic Church. In turn, the Ottoman solution to the accommodation of religious difference originated from the basic precepts of Hanafi law. Within this framework, Christian and Jewish subjects were granted a status of protected (zimmi) population, in exchange for a number of restrictions imposed on their everyday lives. Even in Moldavia and Wallachia – relatively homogenous in religious terms – rulers adopted a laissez-faire approach towards religious minorities, especially Armenians and Roman Catholics. Obviously, these practices did not conform to the concept of tolerance as we understand it today, but they nonetheless stood in stark contrast with the more repressive approach adopted by most Western European polities of the time.

Similarly, cultural and linguistic differences provided yet another set of boundary markers. Divergent intellectual and literary traditions meant that there was no lingua franca to ease communication and allow for relatively smooth communication between different communities. In Poland-Lithuania, the nobility considered the knowledge of Latin a prerequisite for participation in the political life, and a failure to master the language was derided by peers.\footnote{A case in this respect was a comment by one of the deputies at the Sejm of February 1668 concerning the lack of skill in Latin shown by one of his colleagues: “A number of deputies requested permission to speak, but the Speaker gave the floor to only one of them, [a deputy] from Podolia. The latter tried to convey something reasonable, but he kept confusing Latin words, since he did not know Latin [well]: instead of *ingredimur* he said *ingredimus*, and *omnis modibus* instead of *omnibus modis*. He took offence since [other deputies] started to make fun of him, even though he had good intentions and called to stop the quarrels with senators.” Diary of the Sejm in February 1668, Warsaw, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (AGAD), Archiwum Prywatne Potockich 322, f. 74.} Obviously, this was not the case in the Ottoman Empire, where Ottoman Turkish, Arabic and Persian reigned supreme, while Moldavian and Wallachian chanceries increasingly abandoned the use of Slavonic in favor of vernacular Romanian. This often resulted in glitches in communication, since qualified translators
were in short supply. The solution frequently adopted in practice was to use vernaculars, which in some cases ran the risk of exacerbating the problems rather solving them.\textsuperscript{106} It seems that at least some individuals had working knowledge of multiple languages, the conclusion validated by the sources.

Finally, a few words should be devoted to the economic features of the region. In general, the region remained relatively isolated from the nascent Western European world-economy. Grain trade, the basis of Polish-Lithuanian economy, did not affect the southeastern provinces of the Commonwealth until the end of the eighteenth century, largely due to the lack of navigable waterways and access to commercial outlets.\textsuperscript{107} Moreover, Tatar and Cossack raids increased economic instability and discouraged involvement in intensive agriculture in favor of cattle ranching, with landholders complementing their revenue with excise dues and feudal rents imposed on serf population. Cattle ranching was also the main branch of Moldavian and Wallachian agricultural economy, exported to meet the demands of the Ottoman urban centers.\textsuperscript{108} Long-distance trade was predominantly one of luxury goods, imported from the Ottoman Empire through Moldavia and Wallachia, although the conflicts contributed to a general decrease in trade and the shift of trade routes to the west.\textsuperscript{109}

1.1.3. Polyvassalage and Conflict: The Outline of Polish-Ottoman-Moldavian Relations in the Seventeenth Century

When we shift our attention from the wider considerations of Eastern European history towards the particular set of ties connecting Poland-Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire and Moldavia, we immediately take notice of their distinct dynamics, rooted in historical precedents, but also in the context of the growing rivalry between the Porte and the Commonwealth. By the beginning of the

\textsuperscript{106} A somewhat amusing case illustrates this point. With the Holy League War in full swing, the Crimean Khan Selim Giray complained to the Prince of Transylvania, Mihály Apafi. According to the khan, despite the fact that the staff of Crimean chancery was able to read in all possible languages, they were unable to translate the prince’s letter, written in Hungarian, Selim Giray to Mihály Apafi, [1686], Bucharest, Direcția Naţională Arhivelor Naţionale – Instituția Centrală (DANIC), Documente turcești 2349.


\textsuperscript{109} Ludovic Demény, "Comerțul de tranzit spre Polonia prin Țara Românească și Transilvania (ultimul sfert al sec. al XVII-lea)," Studii. Revistă de istorie 22, no. 3 (1969): 465–498. I would like to thank Prof. Dariusz Kołodziejczyk for bringing this article to my attention.
seventeenth century these factors, together with Cossack and Tatar raiding activities led to a head-on clash in the Lower Danube region.

Starting from the middle decades of the fourteenth century, the Polish Crown was increasingly involved in Moldavian affairs, trying to establish its influence in the south. The voievodes of Moldavia generally welcomed this development, as they hoped to use Polish protection to counter the pressure exerted by the kings of Hungary. This led the voivode Petru Mușat to swear an oath of fealty to King Vladislav Jagiello in 1387, a political gesture subsequently repeated by numerous rulers of Moldavia throughout the fifteenth century. As Ilona Czamańska pointed out, the status of the Polish vassal did not constitute a serious burden and was limited to performing general duties of ‘assistance and counsel.’

By the end of the fifteenth century, however, this bond all but withered away. The last voivode to perform the act of homage was Stephen the Great in 1485, but this last vestige of Polish suzerainty had little meaning in practice. An attempt to restore Polish influence in Moldavia by means of arms, undertaken by King John Albert in 1497, ended in an ignominious defeat. Nonetheless, the Crown never renounced its suzerain rights to Moldavia. In practice, however, Polish authorities, unwilling to risk an open war with the Sublime Porte, tacitly recognized the status of Moldavia as the Ottoman tributary. However, this left open the possibility to revive the claims in favorable conditions, and throughout the seventeenth century, Polish diplomats in Istanbul repeatedly demanded the recognition of the Crown’s rights.

In comparison with the relatively loose arrangement between the Polish Crown and Moldavia, Ottoman suzerainty proved more lasting and intrusive. The threat of invasion forced the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia to accept their status as Ottoman tributaries in the fifteenth century. In this new capacity, they were obliged to pay annual tribute (harac) to the Porte as a sign of submission,

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111 Czamańska, Mołdawia i Wołoszczyna wobec Polski, Węgier i Turcji, 54.
112 ibid., 292.
113 ibid., 302.
114 ibid., 303–4.
as well as perform a number of duties requested by the Porte.\textsuperscript{115} While these initial obligations were not particularly onerous, throughout the early modern period, the character of the relationship evolved and the balance increasingly shifted in favor of the Porte. Especially in the second half of the sixteenth century, the amount of tribute peaked, bringing the voievodes to the brink of insolvency and prompting them to rebel against the Porte, a matter I will discuss in Chapter 3. At the same time, the appointments to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia increasingly took place in Istanbul, without consulting the local elite of the principalities.\textsuperscript{116} Thus, in order to safeguard their position on the throne and fend off competitors, the rulers appointed their permanent agents in the imperial capital, known as capuchehaias.\textsuperscript{117}

The legal status of Moldavia and Wallachia vis-à-vis the Ottomans has been a matter of considerable controversy among Romanian historians, often driven by ideological rather than scholarly imperatives.\textsuperscript{118} This materialized in a veritable ‘hunt for capitulations,’ instruments of peace issued by the sultan, which would prove once and for all, according to supporters of this approach, that the Ottomans recognized the autonomous (or even independent) status of the Danubian principalities. However, decades of intensive search in the archives bore only modest fruit.

While I address the debate in more detail in Chapter 5, here it is worth mentioning a reinterpretation of Moldavian-Ottoman relations proposed by Viorel Panaite in his works. In a well-evidenced and convincing argument, the Romanian scholar argued that the reason for the absence of Moldavian and Wallachian ‘ahdnames is the fact that such documents have never been issued. Instead, the Ottomans considered the Danubian principalities a conquered territory, while the voievodes were seen as mere tax collectors (haracgüzar) appointed by the sultan.\textsuperscript{119} At the same time, the parameters for de facto autonomy were set by customary arrangements rather than any written documents, and as such were subject to change over time.

\textsuperscript{116}Mihai Maxim, “Țările Române și Imperiul otoman,”, 818–9.
\textsuperscript{118}Maxim, \textit{Țările Române și Înalta Poartă}, 40.
Thus, throughout the seventeenth century, both the Porte and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth staked their claims to suzerainty over Moldavia. On several occasions during the seventeenth century, the voievodes of Moldavia and Wallachia declared themselves vassals of both their imperial neighbors at the same time, a phenomenon that scholars have habitually labelled as the Polish-Ottoman condominium in Moldavia.\footnote{Valentin Constantinov, “Mołdawia w stosunkach międzynarodowych w końcu XVI i na początku XVII wieku,” in \textit{Rzeczpospolita wobec Orientu w epoce nowożytniej}, ed. Dariusz Milewski (Zabrze: InfortEditions, 2011), 10–21, 17.} However, as Taras Čuxlib has pointed out, the notion of condominium as exercised jointly by the two powers is misleading.\footnote{Taras V. Čuxlib, \textit{Kozaky i monarhyy: mižnarodni vidnosyny rann'omodernoi Ukrains'koj deržavy, 1648-1721 rr.}, (Kyiv: Instytut Istorii NAN Ukraïny, 2003), 22.} According to the scholar, Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire and Poland-Lithuania, in exercising their suzerainty, operated independently and often in an open conflict with each other. Thus, the Ukrainian historian proposed ‘polyvassalage’ as a way to describe the situation on the ground. The argument seems convincing and further illustrates the point that even in the periods of apparently peaceful coexistence between the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the tension over the status of Moldavia was present under the surface.

1.2. The Anatomy of Arenas: Institutional Arrangements of Three Eastern European Polities

1.2.1. The Republic of Nobles: Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Seventeenth Century

Concluded in 1569, the Union of Lublin gave birth to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in its seventeenth-century shape. At the same time, it forged a variant of a composite monarchy so peculiar, that it made some scholars doubt whether any kind of comparison with other early modern polities was even possible.\footnote{Antoni Mączak, “Jedyna i nieporównywalna? Kwestia odrębności Rzeczypospolitej w Europie XVI-XVII wieku,” \textit{Kwartalnik Historyczny} 100, no. 4 (1993): passim.} However, the structure of the Commonwealth was a product of a long evolutionary process, including both the dynastic union and the accumulation of privileges by numerous nobility (estimated at 6-8% of the total population). Starting from the second half of the fourteenth century, these two processes converged, resulting in the peculiar arrangement of Polish-Lithuanian institutions, with the nobility’s monopoly on power, consolidation of the ‘second serfdom’ and elective character of the monarchy.
The mid-sixteenth century constitutes a major watershed in these developments, as the Polish middle gentry, boosted by the revenues from the booming Baltic trade, pushed its claims against the narrow elite of the estate, as well as managed to enforce the union between the Crown of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. During the reign of the last Jagiellonian ruler, Sigismund II Augustus (r. 1548-1572), most of Lithuanian institutions were brought in line with those of the Polish Crown, culminating in the act of 1569, which established a federal union between the two polities. The resulting structure retained separate official hierarchies, militaries, treasuries and laws for each constitutive part, while at the same time introducing two common institutions – the elective monarchy and the Sejm.

The extinction of the Jagiellonian dynasty with the death of Sigismund II Augustus in 1572 paved the way for the elective monarchy. The adopted solution was the election of the monarch by all members of the nobility, while imposing a set of restrictions and obligations on the ruler, meant to safeguard the established political order. Should he violate the established privileges, the nobility could invoke the right of resistance, including armed rebellion against the ruler. While the monarch
preserved his discretionary powers to appoint officials, his ability to tailor officialdom according to his own interests was limited by the practice of life-long tenure that crystallized by the end of the sixteenth century. This meant that the king often found himself stuck with appointees of his predecessor, not always on good terms with the new ruler. The seventeenth century was a period of crisis of trust between the king and the nobility, with the latter suspecting the rulers of conspiring to do away with the cherished political system and institute much feared *absolutum dominium*.

The *Sejm* was a showcase of the Commonwealth’s political system, a living embodiment of the *monarchia mixta* as envisioned by the nobility. The ruler was obliged to convene it at least every two years, but in practice political imperatives meant that the frequency of convening the assembly was much higher. The *Sejm*, consisting of the monarch, high-ranking officials in the Senate, and the House of Deputies elected by local assemblies (*sejmiki*), was the linchpin of the political system. As the central institution representing the voice of nobility, it had broad legislative and juridical powers, deciding on a variety of matters, from declaring war and ratifying peace down to personal grievances raised by individual deputies. Decision-making was based on a principle of consensus, and all bills were to be approved without any voiced opposition (*nemine contradicente*). While this requirement encouraged bargaining and compromise, it also made the *Sejm* proceedings cumbersome and created opportunities for obstructing the legislative process, since the failure to resolve a single controversy could undo the legislative work of the whole *Sejm*.

Despite obvious bottlenecks in the procedure, in the first half of the seventeenth century the *Sejm* fulfilled its decision-making function quite effectively. However, the turmoil of the mid-seventeenth century and the growing factionalization of the political scene caused institutional crisis to take root. Starting from the mid-seventeenth century, the practice of *liberum veto* (curtailing the proceedings by a single voice of dissent) increasingly paralyzed the *Sejm*, reaching its peak in the first half of the seventeenth century.

With the *Sejm* increasingly paralyzed, the decision-making shifted towards provincial dietines, which formed the backbone of local political scene and the main arena of political activity for most

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nobles. These local assemblies performed a number of functions, including the election of deputies to the Sejm and to tribunals, passing local regulations, voting taxation and appointing military officers. While this institutional devolution allowed the Commonwealth's political system to face immediate challenges, it also contributed to the emergence of a 'crater-like' structure of power, with authority dispersed both institutionally and geographically, with little coordination between particular bodies.\(^{125}\)

The territories adjacent to Moldavian and Ottoman lands – the palatinates (województwa) of Ruthenia, Podolia, Bracław, Kyiv and Volhynia, had institutional and social peculiarities of their own, which need to be taken into account. These southeastern provinces entered the Polish Crown only gradually: Ruthenia and Podolia were incorporated during the initial phase of the kingdom's eastern expansion in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; in turn, the territories of Ukraine (as it was defined in the early modern period) were ceded to the Crown by the king's fiat in 1569.

This gradual process of incorporation found its expression in the political and institutional makeup of the palatinates. Since Ruthenia and Podolia had become parts of the Polish Crown already in the fourteenth century, their socio-political life was much more in line with that in the central provinces of the kingdom. Many entrenched lineages had migrated from other provinces as early as the Middle Ages, the languages of the chancellery were Polish and Latin and the legal disputes were resolved according to the Polish common law. As a result, local actors were accustomed to the political practices of the Crown, with strong and assertive middle gentry constituting the backbone of the politically active population.

In turn, the Ukrainian provinces had been recently incorporated into the Crown and were only undergoing the process of integration. Local nobility was significantly smaller (ca. 1% of the population), and predominantly Greek Orthodox. Ruthenian remained the official language of chanceries, while the Second Lithuanian Statute was retained as the code of law.\(^{126}\) While the reforms of 1560s introduced legal equality of nobility, in fact they lumped together three different strata: the

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\(^{125}\) Antoni Mączak, “The structure of power,” 121.

princes (*knjazi*), lords (*pany*) and dependent boyars under a single category. The *knjazi*, descending of Ruthenian and Lithuanian dynasties, managed to retain their titles and political influence, despite the protests of the egalitarian-minded Polish nobility. The patterns of political life showed a clear domination of the upper stratum of the noble estate, with petty and middle gentry dependent on the magnates for protection, subsistence and career advancement. As a result, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Ukrainian palatinates were only slowly adjusting to the Crown’s political culture. As Jarosław Stolicki pointed out, even marriage patterns show that divergent orientations of the provinces continued throughout the period.

The Union of Lublin brought a massive surge in population, encouraged by old and new landholders, which pushed the frontier of settlement far to the east. The result was the growth of massive latifundia: for instance, Prince (*knjaz’*) Kostjantyn Vasyl’ Ostroz’kyj at the beginning of the seventeenth century held over 80 towns and 2,760 villages. While the region was far from being an economic powerhouse, it nonetheless provided local magnates with considerable revenue, which secured their position in the political and social life of the Commonwealth.

Additionally, the population of the palatinates was predominantly Greek Orthodox, which resulted in complex and often contentious confessional politics, with tensions growing after the Union of Brest’ (1596) placed the Orthodox Church under the jurisdiction of the Pope, a decision largely rejected by the faithful. At the same time, Catholicization and Polonization of the local elite made major inroads during the seventeenth century, with the most prominent lineages adopting Roman Catholicism in the first half of the century. Confessional tensions contributed to the already-charged political atmosphere, with the opposition to the Union of Brest’ becoming one of the major issues in the Cossack rebellions during the seventeenth century.

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Finally, the position of the palatinates at the southeastern frontier made them vulnerable to Tatar raids. According to Maurycy Horn’s estimates, there were at least 75 Tatar raids into the Commonwealth during the first half of the seventeenth century, but this figure was likely much larger.\textsuperscript{133} The minuscule army of the Crown could not counter this looming danger: the effectives in the first half of the seventeenth century oscillated around 2,000 soldiers, thinly spread across more than 1,000 kilometers of the border. This resulted in the militarization of the countryside and the military accumulation on the part of the local landowners, with private armies reaching considerable proportions. While we lack the sources concerning the overall size of these troops in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, it is generally agreed that their effectives far outstripped the size of royal forces.\textsuperscript{134}

![Figure 1.2. Major latifundia in the southeastern provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the beginning of the seventeenth century (from: Mariusz Kowalski, Księstwa Rzeczypospolitej: państwo magnackie jako region polityczny. Warsaw: IGiPZ PAN, 2013, 136)](image)

\textbf{1.2.2. “The Well-Protected Domains”: the Ottoman Empire}

While the Commonwealth is often presented as an extreme case of political decentralization, the Ottoman Empire seems to lie on the opposite end of the spectrum. Lacking representative

\textsuperscript{133} Maurycy Horn, “Chronologia i zasięg najazdów tatarskich na ziemie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 1600-1647,” Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości 8, no. 1 (1962): 70.

institutions, built along the lines of the ruler’s extended household, administered by sultan’s slaves (kullar), it was frequently depicted as the model case of despotism. A good expression of this sentiment is a report the Polish-Lithuanian ambassador to the Porte, Prince Krzysztof Zbaraski:

“There are— and have always been – only two orders in Turkey, even if subdivided into more grades and categories. The first [estate] is the lord, and the other are his slaves. To the lord belongs absolutum dominium, and from him – as from a divinity on Earth – originate all the fortunes and misfortunes of the whole nation.”

However, the image of the Ottoman Empire as the unmitigated despotism, while a constant trope in older historiography, has been subject to a considerable revision in recent decades. As scholars have pointed out, the traditional narrative of the imperial history relied on the concept of the ‘classical age’, culminating under the reign of Süleyman (1520-1566) followed by a protracted decline that transformed it from a world power into ‘the sick man of Europe’. Instead of looking at the empire as a petrified set of slowly eroding institutions, current Ottoman historiography highlighted the overhaul of imperial institutions, resulting in the emergence of the ‘Second Ottoman Empire’.

What is in the name? In order to address this question, we should first examine the evolution of the Ottoman Empire until the beginning of the seventeenth century. Throughout its early history, the Ottoman polity underwent numerous transformations, the most decisive one being its centralization in the second half of the fifteenth century. This period saw a dynamic expansion of the empire, which in turn allowed sultans to reshape the imperial elite. Entrenched aristocratic families were replaced with sultan’s slaves, handpicked and educated in the palace school. Majority of agricultural resources was claimed by the ruler and divided into prebends (timars) to be distributed among the members of provincial cavalry. The revenue, provided by tax-paying population (re’aya), was redirected to the upkeep of administrative-military class (askerî), fully dependent on the sultan. At the same time, the cohesion of the dynasty was maintained by the

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137 Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, 123; Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire, 238.
practice of fratricide, which ensured ruler’s position as the uncontested leader of the patrimonial state.

Figure 1.3. The Ottoman Empire and its satellite polities in 1609 (from Gábor Ágoston and Bruce A. Masters, eds. *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*. Facts on File library of world history. New York: Facts On File, 2009, 15).

However, by the second half of the sixteenth century, this political edifice began to unravel. As Baki Tezcan argues, the main reason for these changes was the monetization and integration of the Ottoman economy and corresponding social transformations. In order for the Porte to tap into the new sources of revenue, pre-existing system of revenue extraction had to be overhauled. Throughout the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we witness a gradual phasing out of the *timar system* in favor of tax farming (*iltizam*). However, this shift in the form of taxation created unintended...

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139 Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, 11.
social consequences, since it empowered new social actors that subsequently made their way into the askeri class. It also enhanced the influence of Islamic jurists (ilmiyye); previously relatively isolated from the sphere of governance, they entered the central stage of the Ottoman political system.

These developments—the monetization of the economy, the influx of ‘outsiders’ (ecnebi) into the askeri ranks and the political ascendancy of the ulama—reduced the power of the sultan. The ulama even managed to impose their will in the sphere of dynastic succession, as the practice of fratricide effectively lapsed post 1595. Instead, the pattern of succession shifted towards primogeniture, further reducing sultan’s power, since it provided potential rebels with alternative candidates to the throne. In effect, the year 1622 saw the first regicide in Ottoman history, and until 1703 only one sultan managed to retain the throne until his death, others being deposed or killed by rebellious troops.

Rebellion was an increasingly frequent occurrence in Ottoman political life. Kapıkulu troops, the mainstay of the sultan’s patrimonial household, underwent a significant change following the breakdown of boundaries between askeri and re’aya. While previously the Janissary corps had consisted of handpicked slaves levied from among the Christian population of the empire (within the system known as devşirme), the influx of free-born Muslims not only bloated the corps’ size, but also changed their character and goals. Incentives for entering the Ottoman military were not only tied with social advancement, but also provided significant economic opportunities in the form of access to tax farming and trade. Already by the late sixteenth century, the army had become a

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141 Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, 35.
142 ibid., 36–7.
143 Leslie Peirce, *The imperial harem: women and sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 102. As Günhan Börekçi poited out, the lapse of fratricide at the beginning of the seventeenth century was closely connected with the biological crisis of the dynasty, see Börekçi, “Factions and favorites,” 81. However, these exceptions subsequently translated into a new dynastic principle, Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, 63. See also Baki Tezcan, “The question of regency in Ottoman dynasty: The case of the early reign of Ahmed I,” *Archivum Ottomanicum* 25 (2008): 355–6.
144 Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, 185.
powerful coalition with vested financial interests, ready to protect them against the encroachments of the ruler and other political actors by means of arms.145

The standing army was not the only one to utilize rebellion as a political tool; other members of the elite followed suit. As Karen Barkey points out, the Porte had acted as a ‘grand scheduler’ vis-à-vis the elite; by reshuffling appointments according to differential schedules, it prevented the entrenchment of individual members in their posts and ensured the center’s control over appointments.146 In the sixteenth century, this practice of rotation was attractive to the members of both central and provincial elite; timar-holders often willingly gave up their prebends, hoping to receive bigger allotments.147 However, by the late sixteenth century, the fortunes of the provincial askeri class took a turn for worse. On the one hand, the competition for timars increased because of the inflow of ecnebi and individuals sent from central administration to provincial posts; on the other hand, the phasing out of the timar system and the spread of iltizam meant that there were fewer appointments available. By the seventeenth century, the practice of renouncing timars effectively lapsed, as timar-holders came to see rotation as a threat rather than an opportunity.

As timar-holders clung to their shrinking share of revenue, their superiors were not much better off. At the level of governors (sancakbeyş) and governors-general (beylerbeyş), competition for offices gained momentum, with accelerating pace of rotation and longer periods in waiting. This took its toll on the ümeresa’s finances, since even when out of office they were expected to maintain ‘well-outfitted households’ and provide troops for campaigns.148 Thus, in order to supplement their revenue, they became increasingly involved in economic activities, including trade, credit and tax farming.149

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145 ibid., 199. Most of the Janissary rebellions in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were triggered by controversies regarding tax farming, see Börekçi, “Factions and favorites,” 48.


149 ibid., 204.
Faced with these difficulties, Ottoman provincial officials resorted to rebellion to retain their posts. This coincided with a growing level of militarization in the countryside, providing governors-turned-rebels with a ready pool of potential mercenaries, recruited in thousands by the celali warlords. These sekban armies in many respects became ‘rebels without a cause’, trying to force their way into the Ottoman askeri class. Commanders sent to fight these rebels quickly employed similar strategies and formed their own mercenary armies. Once disbanded, these units often turned to banditry, roaming the countryside. The ravages of war and celali rebellion converged with a series of demographic and environmental upheavals, throwing seventeenth-century Anatolia into turmoil.

Faced with these new challenges, the Porte took a lenient approach towards the rebels, bargaining with their leaders and adopting a selective strategy of repression and incorporation into the system of governance. In effect, the act of rebellion against the Porte no longer constituted a point of no return, but rather was one of many stages in the process of negotiations between the rebels and the central authority. Thus, a one-day rebel could overnight become a respected Ottoman official, with some individuals crossing this boundary on multiple occasions.

Thus, the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century was a polity in flux, with deep-cutting social and economic transformations reconfiguring the structure of the political arena. Traditional institutions were repurposed and adjusted to face new challenges. For as tumultuous as it was, the seventeenth century did not mark the Ottoman ‘decline’, but rather a period of adaptation.

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152 ibid., 186.
157 Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*, 64.
1.2.3. Moldavia and Wallachia

The principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia emerged in the fourteenth century, initially as vassals of the Kingdom of Hungary. However, their political systems did not follow the Hungarian model, but rather a Byzantine one, with the ruler (voievode, domn, hospodar) adopting the posture of an Orthodox autocrat. However, in practice his authority was exercised with boyars in the princely council (sfatul domnesc), including high-ranking officials and the hierarchs of the local Orthodox Church. While the council acted primarily as a judicial and advisory body, it nonetheless exerted considerable influence on decision-making process, serving as a link between the ruler and the elite.

Traditionally, the voievodes hailed from dynasties ruling in the principalities since the mid-fourteenth century – Bogdanești-Mușațini in Moldavia and Basarabi in Wallachia. However, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, this dynastic principle had withered away and while some of the voievodes could boast with such a lineage, most of them came from less prestigious backgrounds and were either members of the boyar elite or newcomers from the Ottoman domains. While boyars...
tried to safeguard their right to elect the voivode, throughout the seventeenth century the rulers were increasingly appointed by the Porte, and those chosen by the local elites had to obtain the Ottoman recognition anyway.\footnote{Ștefan Aftodor, “Programul politic al boierimii muntene între tratatul de la Alba Iulia și urcarea pe tron a lui Matei Basarab,” \textit{Istros} 15 (2009): 226.} Starting from the mid-sixteenth century, the competition for the thrones led to a growing pace of turnover and fall from favor often led not only to dismissal, but also to death.

The status of boyar class, the social and political elite of the principalities, has been the subject of an ongoing debate. Prior to any legal attempts to delineate boyars in the eighteenth century, membership in this social stratum was a matter of collective recognition rather than any defining qualities.\footnote{Paul Cernovodeanu, “Mobility and traditionalism: the evolution of the boyar class in the Romanian principalities in the 18th century,” \textit{Revue des Études sud-est européennes} 24, no. 3 (1986): 249; Cristina Codarcea, “Rapports de pouvoir et stratégie de gouvernement dans la Valachie du XVIIe siècle,” \textit{New Europe College Yearbook} 1 (1998-1999): 131–2.} According to Cristina Codarcea, the general criteria for membership in the boyar class were the following: control over serf population, ownership of landed property, office holding, with some scholars considering lineage yet another factor.\footnote{Cristina Codarcea, “Rapports de pouvoir,” 131–2; Sergiu Bacalov, “Boierimea Țării Moldovei la mijlocul secolului al XVII-lea – începutul secolului al XVIII-lea (studiu istorico-genealogic)” (unpublished PhD dissertation, Moldavian Academy of Sciences, 2007), 10–1.} However, it is clear that the relative importance of those elements changed over time, and in the seventeenth century the notion was increasingly associated with office-holders.\footnote{Virgil Cândea, ed., \textit{O epoca de înnoiri în spiritul european} (1601-1711/1716), 2nd edition, Istoria românilor 5 (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 2012), 409.} This lack of clear boundaries meant that Moldavian and Wallachian elites remained relatively open for newcomers, who had managed to marry themselves into local lineages, acquire property and secure official positions.

Romanian scholars identified a major cultural and social reconfiguration of the boyar class in the seventeenth century. According to P.P. Panaitescu, this period saw the rise of new cultural models among the elite: court- and Church-associated literacy in Slavonic language of the sixteenth century gave way to a new tradition of literary and historical production in vernacular, authored by members of the boyar class.\footnote{P.P Panaitescu, \textit{Începuturile și biruința scrisului în limba română} (Bucharest: Editura Academiei R.P.R., 1965), 94.} The material basis was provided by the monetization and commercialization of

\footnote{P.P Panaitescu, \textit{Începuturile și biruința scrisului în limba română} (Bucharest: Editura Academiei R.P.R., 1965), 94.}
Moldavian economy, which in turn encouraged the elite to engage in profitable cattle and grain trade, breaking the traditional economic and cultural hegemony of the voievode's court.

This tied in with yet another development within the boyar class, one that had enormous influence on the political life of the principalities. Starting from the beginning of the seventeenth century, both Moldavia and Wallachia experienced a growing wave of immigration from the territories south of the Danube. These newcomers, described in historiography as ‘pre-Phanariots’ or ‘Greco-Levantines,’ often arrived to the principalities in the voievodes’ entourages. Taking advantage of their ties with the rulers, they managed to secure major positions within administrative hierarchy, pushing away local competitors. Gradually, they entrenched their positions in the principality and established ties with local lineages. Nonetheless, the takeover of offices disenfranchised many local boyars, who in turn responded with violence and contempt against the perceived interlopers. Thus, the elites of the Danubian principalities in the seventeenth century found themselves forced to adapt to new circumstances, stemming from increased social mobility, the monetization of economy and unstable political situation.

1.3. The Rise of the Faction

As one can see from the outline above, the political systems of Poland-Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian principalities varied wildly; so did the composition and legal status of their elites. What could these arenas possibly have in common? Admittedly, trying to establish a common ground for them may seem like extravagant at best and foolish at worst. However, if we take a closer look at the developments of the political practice and the distribution of power within these arenas, we can trace common trends. This becomes apparent as soon as we look at the conclusions formulated independently by scholars working in respective fields:

"The Polish political elite was closely tied to the magnates, who secured either for themselves or for their protégés all of the key offices in the province [...] Perhaps one should not regard the Polish king as head of state so much as the head of his own faction, more or less equal to others.\textsuperscript{166}

"The sultans’ powers became dispersed and contested. Instead of a state understood as one imperial household, power shifted among elite households divided by factional rivalries. Sultans periodically tried to revive the warrior-ruler role as late as the reign of Mustafa II (r. 1695–1703), in his case with disastrous results.\textsuperscript{167}

"[In Moldavia] we find an increasing number of boyars leading their clienteles [...] They were characterized by contemporaries as ‘holders’ of the country, ‘alphas and omegas’, but also ‘the sources of all evil’ of their time, throwing their support behind one or other voievode, depending on their kinship ties or personal interests. Rarely did they face execution for their participation in the schemes against voievodes [...] more often the rulers tried to get rid of them through poison, but with minor success.\textsuperscript{168}

The similarity in the tone and content is striking. It seems that all polities under discussion experienced similar developments in the political sphere, which I label the ‘rise of the faction’. Under this term, I understand a general tendency of the devolution of power and political resources away from the central power and towards patronage-based elite networks. This shared trajectory throughout the seventeenth century provides a crucial context for the emergence of cross-border patronage.

The main characteristic of the rise of the faction was a growing tendency to rely on patronage ties in the sphere of recruitment and career advancement. In all of the arenas under discussion, a position within administration and access to power was a valuable resource – and a scarce one. This is most visible in the case of the Ottoman Empire, where the influx of ecnebi exceeded the capacity of the administration to accommodate their interests and aspirations. Even as the traditional system of recruitment – the devşirme – lapsed, the problem of too many candidates competing for too few positions remained unresolved.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{166} Antoni Mączak, “The structure of power,” 127–8.
\textsuperscript{168} Cândea, O epoca de înnoiri, 276–7.
\textsuperscript{169} Carter V. Findley, “Political culture and the great households,” 75.
In order to remain in power, top officials started to build extended political households in order to secure their positions. Their interests coalesced with those of ambitious upstarts, who tried to advance through the ranks, eventually contributing to the emergence of grandee households, known as kapıs. In their structure, these political structures followed the blueprint set by the imperial household, including kin, servants and clients, bound to their leader by either master-slave ties or patron-client relations of intisap. Both the structure and the purpose of these kapıs were goal-oriented and aimed at increasing the household’s share of power and resources by inserting its members into imperial administration. Indeed, the system proved so successful that by the end of the century it overshadowed other channels of personnel recruitment. A similar phenomenon developed – with certain differences – in Moldavia, where the influx of Greco-Levantines increased the stakes in competition for offices.

The situation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth diverged somewhat from this pattern, since, once appointed, officials tended to hold their posts for life. This gave major powerholders a measure of stability, but did not mean that maintaining extended patronage networks was unnecessary. On the contrary, in order to exert influence, the magnates had to establish their presence at the provincial dietines. This they achieved by captivating local leaders, who in turn influenced the nobility at dietines. From the clients’ point of view, the association with a powerful magnate constituted their main point of access to the royal court. Since officeholding was the only sign of distinction in the absence of titled aristocracy, it constituted an important resource for a nobleman, even if not vested with any real prerogatives. At the same time, patrons could also provide for their clients, providing them with a measure of economic stability.

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171 Hathaway, *The politics of household in Ottoman Egypt*, 65.


The political aspect of patronage tied in with financial considerations. Factional politics operated as an extensive mechanism of revenue procurement and redistribution. In the Ottoman Empire, the increasingly precarious position of the officials led to their involvement in tax farming as means to finance factional activity.\(^{174}\) At the same time, Polish-Lithuanian magnates leased their landholdings to their clients in order to build up their political influence, but also to outsource administrative duties.\(^{175}\) This was no different for the multezims, who divided their tax farms and assigned their clients to collect the revenue.\(^{176}\) In fact, patronage networks constituted both the goal and the means of revenue-raising activities in all three polities under discussion.

Finally, another facet of the rise of the faction was the military. This phenomenon operated on two levels. On the one hand, military commanders used their position to entrench their factions within the officer corps of standing armies, as well as to mobilize rank-and-file to further their interests.\(^{177}\) At the same time, faction leaders recruited troops on their own, which resulted in the buildup of private armies in Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire.\(^{178}\)

Thus, with their military, political and economic capacity, factions constituted an increasingly important factor within all arenas under discussion. This obviously enhanced their position vis-à-vis the state. Since virtually all important actors engaged in faction-building enterprises, the three arenas experienced a scramble for patronage resources between increasingly powerful factional groupings. Unable to break their hold on the political sphere, rulers themselves engaged in their own factional buildup, promoting favorites and increasing the stakes. Thus, we can agree with the three scholars quoted at the beginning of this section: in the seventeenth century, factions emerged as


\(^{177}\) Sokołowski, Politycy schyłku złotego wieku, 24.

main actors within particular political arenas. In the next section, I will focus on how these patron-client relations operated in cross-border context.
PART I
MECHANICS OF CROSS-BORDER PATRONAGE
Chapter 2. Building Bridges, Building Trust: The Toolkit of Patronage Networks

Trust, in politics as well as in everyday life, constitutes a crucial social resource, and one in short supply. Building a viable political faction was not only a matter of ‘networking,’ but also entailed handpicking individuals that would be both capable of performing their tasks and trustworthy. Such reliable partners were not easy to find in the competitive, backstabbing political environment of early modern Eastern Europe. Poor communication and long distances only exacerbated these difficulties, the fact well illustrated in Günhan Börekçi’s description of the ‘grand vizier dilemma’:

“[The grand vizier] had two options in time of war: a) he would remain in the capital and risk losing his post to one of the rival viziers, who were eager to take him down. [...] b) he would take to the field and leave a deputy behind, traditionally the second-ranking vizier, a tactic that entailed the same risk of being undermined by rival viziers during his absence.”

Thus, the only solution to what social scientists call a ‘principal-agent dilemma’ was to rely on trusted clients, who would promote their patron’s interest during his absence. However, this strategy was by no means waterproof, since clients could double-cross their protector for a prospect of a better bargain. In effect, the problem of trust in patron-client relations was an inescapable one for the actors involved. In the present chapter, I will address how patrons and clients engaged in cross-border alliances tried to overcome this challenge.

As Charles Tilly pointed out, we can conceptualize such alliances as trust networks, in which “members’ relations to each other put major long-term collective enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of other network members.” In order to engage in high-stakes endeavors, the members of such networks had to ensure that other participants would not double-cross them. This necessitated the creation of bonding mechanisms, which would ensure loyalty and reduce the risk of defection. In terms of social capital theory, bridging capital had to be complemented with bonding capital in order to make a faction work.

Throughout the seventeenth century, Polish-Lithuanian, Ottoman and Moldavian elites created a number of means designed to provide trust into their patronage networks. Due to differences in

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179 Börekçi, “Factions and favorites,” 186.
181 Burt, Brokerage and Closure, 162.
social structure, political institutions and political culture, the exact contents of those ‘toolkits’ obviously varied from across the political arenas. For instance, ‘political slavery,’ one of most common faction-building tools in the Ottoman Empire, was inexistent in Poland-Lithuania and the Danubian principalities, where personnel rules of the arenas did not allow for inclusion of unfree individuals. That said, we should remember, as Jane Hathaway has pointed out, that the ultimate goal of faction-building enterprises was pragmatic in scope. This means that rather than trying to build, say, ethnically or confessionally homogenous household, patrons and clients were concerned with getting things done, and they accumulated different types of social ties throughout their careers. The result was the composite structure of patronage networks, with different relations established on different principles.

In this respect, cross-border patronage posed a distinct set of challenges. Firstly, physical distance between actors participating in different arenas exacerbated the ‘principal-agent dilemma,’ since difficulties in communication increased the possibility of malfeasance and defection. Secondly, and more importantly, divergent personnel rules and political cultures rendered many tools from respective ‘faction-building toolkits’ inapplicable for this particular ties. Similarly, religious and social differences between respective elites meant that other means of connectivity, such as marriage, were subject to serious constraints. Thus, in order to build durable cross-border ties, actors had to creatively adapt their toolkits.

In addressing the subject, in this chapter I apply the classification of trust-building mechanisms that distinguishes between three umbrella categories. In the first part of the chapter, I investigate the role of kinship and marital alliances; the following section revisits the debate on ‘ethnic-regional solidarities’ in the Ottoman Empire, examining the role of such ties in Ottoman-Moldavian context. Subsequently, I shift my attention to less tangible, but nonetheless important bonds that formed within the context of military service and rebellion, examining the impact of military and social changes on cross-border patronage. Finally, in the last section, I draw on comparison with other regions in the Ottoman Empire and Poland-Lithuania in order to bring to light the creativity and adaptability of cross-border practices.

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82 On the spread of political slavery, see Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*, 65.
2.1. Family Matters

Family, as a primary group *par excellence*, constitutes a natural starting point for the analysis of cross-border patronage. Throughout the early modern period, kinship and marriage constituted the basic mechanism of social cohesion. As Julia Adams and Guy Rowlands have pointed out in regard to seventeenth-century France and United Provinces, thinking in terms of patrimonial lineages was a common practice of the day, shaping everyday lives and political strategies of the elites. In this respect, the elites of the Ottoman Empire, Poland-Lithuania and the Danubian principalities were no different, although the ways in which they operated varied according to different social, religious and cultural norms.

In Moldavian and Polish-Lithuanian cases, one of the characteristic features was the prevalence of partible inheritance, which set them apart from most of European elites. This had a profound effect on the patterns of landholding and family strategies. As Pavel Sovetov argued, this practice created recurrent waves of fragmentation and consolidation of Moldavian estates throughout the early modern period, leading to a rise and fall of numerous boyar families. In Poland-Lithuania, in turn, numerous magnate families tried to prevent the fragmentation of their estates by establishing so-called *ordynacje*, a legal solution that safeguarded indivisibility of landed estates, ratified by both the king and the *Sejm*.

Ottoman elites represented yet another model of family, shaped by Hanafi legal norms and the model provided by sultanic household. The most characteristic feature, which I have already hinted at, was the legal of Ottoman officials as sultan’s slaves (*kul*) and a property of the ruler. This meant that their fortunes could be subject to confiscation (*müsadere*) at any moment, although in the seventeenth century this practice was applied with diminishing frequency. At the same time, while

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members of the sultanic household themselves, Ottoman grandees created – in a fractal-like manner – *kapı* of their own.\textsuperscript{188} This also points out that the status of slave in Ottoman practice did not entail abasement, but rather operated as a form of figurative kinship, creating a familial bond between the slave and his master.\textsuperscript{189}

In the seventeenth century, along with the rise of faction and corresponding changes in the balance of power within the elite, actors from the ruler’s inner circle, including sultan’s relatives and personal servants in the *enderun*, became increasingly involved in the administration of empire. As Leslie Peirce pointed out, this development was an unintended consequence of the consolidation of sultanic household (including his harem) in the inner sections of Topkapı Palace.\textsuperscript{190} In this respect, the most prominent feature of the seventeenth century was the growing role of *valide sultan* (queen mother), as a result of the changing patterns of succession. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, *valide sultans* took over the responsibilities of regents during the ruler’s minority; at the same time, they also developed their own patronage networks, which reached out to the ‘outer’ sphere of imperial administration (*birun*) beyond the confines of the sultanic residence.\textsuperscript{191} The most prominent reflection of these endeavors was the emergence of *damads*, important Ottoman officials married to female kin of the sultan.

However, the political importance of family ties was by no means restricted to the dynasty. As Jane Hathaway noted, marriage strategies and kinship were an integral part of household-building endeavors in Egypt throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For instance, in order to maintain factional cohesion and prevent succession struggles, a practice of ‘inheriting wives’ developed, whereby a wife of the deceased leader married his successor.\textsuperscript{192} Such practices show that marriage alliances and blood ties constituted an important part of the factional toolkit; at the same time, the elite households and family circles also included a number of practices producing fictive kinship, such as political slavery or heraldic adoption. Thus, in order to address the full spectrum of

\textsuperscript{189} Forand, “The Relation of the Slave,” 61; Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*, 65.
\textsuperscript{190} Peirce, *The imperial harem*, 119.
\textsuperscript{191} Peirce, *The imperial harem*, 248; Tezcan, “The question of regency,” *passim*.
family ties and their role in cross-border patronage, we should adopt a more inclusive approach that would account for such bonds.

While family ties constituted the most tangible basis for political cooperation, we should keep in mind that they were subject to social and religious norms that restricted their applicability in cross-border context. The most obvious example of such limitations were rules regarding Christian-Muslim intermarriage. While *shari'a* allows Muslim men to marry Christians, at the same it forbids Muslim women to take non-Muslim husbands. However, among the Greek Orthodox boyars of Moldavia, marrying off daughters to Muslims was frowned upon and could result in social ostracism.\(^{193}\)

Conversion, another way of crossing confessional boundary, posed similar challenges. Living under Ottoman domination, the boyars of Moldavia and Wallachia did not have the means to prevent conversion to Islam by individual members of the estate. In fact, by the seventeenth century, it seems that they had come to terms with this possibility, and some members of the elite even utilized it as a tool to escape the jurisdiction of a hostile voievode. However, the act of conversion meant forfeiting all landholdings and property in the principality and effective exclusion from the political arena. An individual case from Wallachia illustrates this point. When the Wallachian voievode Michael the Brave rebelled against the Porte in 1594, Apostol, his *capuchehaia* in Istanbul, found himself left out in the cold. Since the Ottoman authorities suspected Apostol’s complicity, the unfortunate *capuchehaia* converted to Islam in order to prove his loyalty to the sultan and evade imprisonment. In 1631 we find him again in Wallachian documents, as Kürd Salman Çavuş, trying to reclaim gypsy slaves who had belonged to his father. However, his request was rejected:

> “I searched for the gypsies of my father, *ban* Iane, and I have found them, dispersed, among the gypsies of other boyars. [Thus], I made an appeal to the *divan* in order to reclaim them. But the *divan* ruled that I no longer have any claim to my father’s gypsies, since I had abandoned the [Christian] law.”\(^{194}\)

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\(^{193}\) Krstić, *Contested conversions to Islam*, 66.

Eventually, Salman Çavuş was able to reclaim at least part of his father’s property, but only after reverting to Orthodox faith. While Moldavian and Wallachian sources suggest that he was not the only one to abandon Islam and enter boyar ranks, such decision carried considerable risks, since *shari‘a* defined apostasy as a crime punishable by death. Such individuals clearly preferred to remain under the radar of Ottoman authorities and cannot be seen as an important building block in cross-border patronage networks.

In the case of Moldavians’ dealings with Polish-Lithuanian nobles, religious considerations were of less importance. Cross-confessional marriage alliances had been a constant feature in the Commonwealth’s political and social life. Moreover, a significant portion of the provinces adjacent to Moldavia was still predominantly Orthodox in the seventeenth century. However, this does not mean that Moldavian-Polish intermarriage was uncontroversial. Polish-Lithuanian nobility, proud of their privileges and liberties, tended to look down on their Moldavian counterparts, considering them little more than peasants. This sentiment was expressed in the mid-sixteenth century by Hieronim Otwinowski, who claimed that “there is no nobility in Moldavia, and they have grown accustomed to the fact that one day one can be a goatherd, only to become a grand lord overnight.”

As a result, Polish-Lithuanian nobles’ perception of Moldavian elite was ambiguous. On the one hand, the fact that numerous boyars throughout the seventeenth century received *indigenatus*, a privilege including them into the ranks of the nobility, granted to foreign nobles, suggests that the Commonwealth’s institutions recognized the privileged status of the Moldavian elite. On the other hand, the sentiment of superiority and a thinly veiled contempt for the principality’s elite expressed by Otwinowski suggest that the nobility hardly saw Moldavian lineages as a suitable match. An exception to this rule constituted voyvodal families, since their status as monarchs in their own right allowed them to form marital ties with top echelons of Polish-Lithuanian elite.

As I have mentioned above, biological kinship played only a minor role in the development of cross-border patronage. While individuals straddled the religious boundary in both directions, we know very little about them. This lack of information on their political activity suggests that they never managed to advance their careers.

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995 “Szlachty nie znać, wszyscy są sobie równi i już się temu przyuczyli, że dopiero kozy pasie, wnet mógł być wielkim panem.” Hurmuzachi, Suppl. II/1: 193.
The imperial *ferman* from September 1659 regarding a certain ‘Ali exemplifies what seems to be a typical life course of such individuals.196 According to the document, ‘Ali had been an agent of the Wallachian deputy treasurer, who took flight from the principality to escape punishment for embezzlement. Once in Istanbul, he converted to Islam and married a certain Ayşe, but soon sold all her property, took the money and ran away to Moldavia, where he reverted to Greek Orthodox faith. In response to Ayşe’s petition, the Porte issued an order to the voievode, instructing him to apprehend the culprit and send him back to Istanbul. From what we know, this never materialized. While ‘Ali apparently escaped punishment, he did not seem to hold any important office, neither in the Ottoman Empire nor in Moldavia. On another occasion, the Syrian priest Bulus b. Makariyos al-Halabi (Paul of Aleppo) mentioned a former Janissary from Konya, who had converted to Christianity in Moldavia, with the brother of voievode Vasile Lupu acting as his godfather.97 Again, the fact that we are unable even to establish his name suggests that he had little influence in the political sphere.

Against this background, two Moldavian-Wallachian converts stand out as important political actors. Not surprisingly, both individuals descended from the dynasties ruling in respective principalities, which explains both their successful careers, as well as their prominence in the sources.

The case of Mihnea II, subsequently known as Mehmed Bey, is better elucidated in the sources. A descendant of the Basarab dynasty that had ruled Wallachia since the fourteenth century, he became the voievode in 1577 and, despite temporary setbacks, managed to retain the throne until the beginning of the 1590s, in spite of the growing competition for the throne. However, by 1591, his fortunes took a turn for worse. As Wallachian authors claim, this development was caused by the opposition of the head *capuchehaia* at the Porte, Iane Banul, who actively undermined the confidence of the Ottoman authorities in Mihnea, trying to replace him with another candidate. Facing deposition, and likely execution, Mihnea II set out to Istanbul, where he declared his wish to embrace Islam. According to Wallachian *Cantacuzino Chronicle*, the voievode took this measure in


order to “live a better life” and escape Iane’s schemes.\(^{198}\) As Christine Isom-Verhaaren pointed out, in the early modern period conversion to Islam was a political act and an expression of loyalty to the sultan, which corresponds well with Mihnea’s goals.\(^{199}\) At the same time, it seems that by embracing Islam the voievode was able to not only deflect the threat for his life, but also escape his financial commitments; as Cristian Luca noted, the bailo complained that Mihnea-turned-Mehmed Bey refused to honor his debts to Venetian merchants.\(^{200}\) Following his conversion, the former voievode was appointed as the sancakbey of Niğbolu (now Nikopol in Bulgaria), just across the river from his former principality.\(^{201}\)

‘Turning Turk’ did not mean that Mehmed Bey severed all ties with his previous life. Upon his conversion, he sent his natural son, Radu Mihnea, to Venice, where the youngster was supposed to obtain proper education.\(^{202}\) However, Radu’s Venetian venture did not last long; a rebellion that broke out in Moldavia and Wallachia in November 1594 provided him with new opportunities. Mehmed Bey swiftly recalled his son from Venice in July 1595 and soon Radu Mihnea arrived to Istanbul via Dubrovnik, entering the competition for the Wallachian throne.\(^{203}\)

It is worth noting that in promoting his son to the throne, Mehmed Bey went against the official line of Ottoman authorities. Already in spring 1595, the Porte decided to abolish both Danubian principalities and replace them with direct Ottoman administration. Despite factional squabbles between the grand viziers, Ferhad Pasha and Koca Sinan Pasha, both remained stalwart about the project, a matter discussed in Chapter 5. In a clear contradiction to the Porte’s wishes, Mehmed Bey tried to secure resources and troops to put his son on the throne. He even contacted Polish-Lithuanian authorities, requesting permission to recruit mercenaries in the Crown and promising “gifts and rewards to the soldiers, who would serve his son in Wallachia.”\(^{204}\)

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\(^{198}\) Simonescu, *Istoria Țării Românești, 1292-1692*, 54.


\(^{203}\) Mehmed Bey to Radu Mihnea, 1st June 1595 in Hurmuzachi, XIII, 104.

\(^{204}\) Copie listów tureckich do króla Iego Mci do Warszawy w roku 1596 przyniesionych, Hurmuzachi, Suppl. II/1, 411.
The debacle of the 1595 campaign in Moldavia and Wallachia led the Porte to give up on further attempts to abolish the principalities. This meant that Radu Mihnea’s chances of obtaining appointment increased, and by all indications, the support of his father was his major asset in the successful bid at the Porte. Nonetheless, while appointed to Wallachia already in 1596, he had to wait five more years before entering the principality. Bogged down in a protracted struggle with the Habsburgs in Hungary, the Porte was unable to commit resources to a secondary front, and preferred temporary accommodation with incumbent Michael the Brave.

It was only in 1601 that Radu Mihnea was able to enter Wallachia. However, while some of the boyars were willing to accept the Ottoman appointee, others turned to other contenders, Simion Movilă and Radu Șerban. Lacking troops and defeated on the battlefield, Radu Mihnea spent most of the time in the Ottoman kaza of Yergöğü (now Giurgiu in Romania), unable to take effective control of the principality. Again, the Porte opted for accommodation and recognized victorious Radu Șerban (r. 1601-1611). To make matters worse, Mehmed Bey passed away, seemingly depriving his son of Ottoman support and burying his chances to capture the throne.\textsuperscript{25}

The course of events at first validated this interpretation. In February 1604 the new grand vizier, Yavuz Ali Pasha, detained Radu Mihnea and sent him off to the fortress of Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{26} However, this period of setback was only temporary, and by 1611 Radu Mihnea made a glorious comeback, entering Wallachia at the helm of Ottoman troops and finally ascending the throne. In the years to come, he was to be repeatedly appointed to the thrones of both Wallachia and Moldavia, until his death in January 1626.

On the surface, the success of Radu Mihnea’s bid for the throne had little to do with the patronage of his father. After all, the voievode was able to ascend the throne only in 1611, a decade after his father’s death. However, I would argue that without Mehmed Bey’s support at the early stages of Radu Mihnea’s career, his eventual success would be unlikely. Even if his early attempts were unsuccessful, they nonetheless laid the groundwork for his future career. In order to promote his son, Mehmed Bey clearly established a number of alliances, both with officials at the Porte, as well as with the Greek Orthodox elite of the Ottoman capital. That these ties bore fruit can be seen from

\textsuperscript{25} Ciobanu, Politică și diplomație în secolul al XVII-lea, 33.
\textsuperscript{26} Hurmuzachi, vol. III/2: 281, 284.
Radu Mihnea’s circle of political associates in the Danubian principalities: entering Wallachia in 1611, he was accompanied by a number of Greek clients, which subsequently took over high-ranking offices, clearly a sign of the voievode’s immersion in the world of Istanbul-based elites.\(^{207}\) At the same time, from the perspective of Ottoman officials, Radu Mihnea was similarly a safe bet: young and well connected in Istanbul, he was an attractive client for Ottoman grandees.\(^{208}\) It is hard to imagine that the young voievode would be able to secure this level of support without the assistance of Mehmed Bey.

It is worth pointing out that three half-brothers of Radu Mihnea were less successful and there is no evidence that they ever held any positions within Ottoman administration. In fact, it seems that they remained in their brother’s shadow. Their presence on the Wallachian court was a matter of concern for boyars, who frowned upon favors accorded to the voievode’s Muslim kin.\(^{209}\) Nonetheless, it is clear that they exerted no political influence to speak of, and by 1628 two of them had converted to Christianity and entered a monastery, while the only brother to remain Muslim – Mustafa – lived in Silistre as late as 1636, dwelling in a house built by his father.\(^{210}\)

Another case of a convert exerting political influence is far more obscure. In 1636 Jerzy Kruszyński, the Polish-Lithuanian ambassador to the Porte, encountered serious difficulties, as the kaymakam Bayram Pasha sabotaged Kruszyński’s efforts and refused the diplomat’s request for an audience with the sultan. Trying to break the stranglehold, Kruszyński approached other officials:

> “I look for different ways and turn to other people in order to secure an audience with the emperor. [I approached] mufti Bortanci Pasha, as well as the brother of Palatine of Sandomierz’s wife, who serves in the emperor’s private quarters. Bortanci assured me that my mission would bring death to the kaymakam and that he is willing to assist me, since those two are sworn enemies.”\(^{211}\)


\(^{209}\) Nicolae Iorga, “Fraţii pagâni ai lui Radu Mihnea,” Revista istorică 10, 4-6 (1924): 81.

\(^{210}\) Maria Holban, ed., Călători străini despre Țările Române, (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 1968-2001), vol. 5: 123; Andreescu, “Radu Mihnea Corvin (II),” 130.

\(^{211}\) “Szukam tedy różnych sposobów, aby przez kogo inszego mogłem mieć audiencję u cesarza, tak przez muftiego Bortandzi pasze, jako i przez rodzzonego M.P. wojewódziny sendomierskiej który jest w pokoju u cesarza. Bortandzi mię upewnia przez Serepkowicza, że ta moja legacja przyniesie śmierć kajmakanowi i chce mu posłużyć, bo sobie z dawna nie afecl” Jerzy Kruszyński to Stanisław Koniecpolski, 1st June 1636 in Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 291.
The name Bortanci Pasha clearly refers to Bostan-zade Yahya Efendi, to whom Kruszyński mistakenly ascribes the title of paşa rather than efendi, corresponding to his status as a member of the ilmiyye class. However, the other official interests us here. Unfortunately, neither Kruszyński nor any other source provides us with his Muslim name. Similarly, it is impossible to retrace his career within Ottoman administration. Nonetheless, the crucial piece of information regarding his family ties to Maria Movilă, the wife of Mikołaj Firlej allows us to elucidate the official's background. Furthermore, another Polish envoy, Romaszkiewicz, confirmed this family connection, mentioning that during his mission to Istanbul he conversed with “Constantin, the son of Voievode Ieremia and the brother of Palatine of Sandomierz’s wife, and a confidante of the emperor,” who warned him about a possible Ottoman campaign against the Commonwealth. Thus, it seems clear that the official in question was a son of Ieremia Movilă, the voievode of Moldavia between 1595 and 1606.

Contrary to Romaszkiewicz’s assertion, the Christian name of his collocutor was not Constantin, which suggests that in his interaction with the diplomat, the official used his Muslim name instead. The eldest son of Ieremia Movilă had died in July 1612 after an unsuccessful attempt to recapture the Moldavian throne. However, his mother and younger brothers – Alexandru and Bogdan – fell into Ottoman captivity and subsequently converted to Islam in August 1616. Bogdan soon died, succumbing to an infection following his circumcision. Thus, it becomes clear that it was Alexandru Movilă with whom Kruszyński and Romaszkiewicz conversed.

However, while he maintained close ties with his sisters and members of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility, Alexandru does not feature in any capacity in the affairs of the Danubian principalities, despite the fact that two members of the Movilă dynasty ascended the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia following his conversion: Gavril (r. Wallachia 1619-1620) and Moisie (r. Moldavia, 1630-1631, 1633-1634). While it is risky to draw conclusions ex silentio, the reason for this absence might have been the fact that both voievodes belonged to a different branch of the Movilă family, descending from Ieremia’s brother, Simion. As I will argue in Chapter 4, the two branches of the dynasty had been embroiled in a bitter struggle for the throne following Ieremia’s death. It is possible

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Report of Romaszkiewicz from his mission to Istanbul, 12th January 1640 in Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 575.
that Alexandru, hardly harboring positive feelings towards Simion’s offspring, was unwilling to lend them their assistance.

Thus, despite our intuitions, it seems that relatives participating in different arenas played only a secondary role in the construction of cross-border patronage networks. Few managed to secure prominent positions within their new area of activity, and even then, it is unclear whether they were actively supporting their kin politically. Even in the most salient case of support – that of Mehmed Bey and Radu Mihnea – such protection did not automatically mean success. The fact one of the Movilâs made his way to high-ranking position within Ottoman enderun service did not even amount to that much. It would thus seem that direct support of the kin played a secondary role in cross-border patronage; rather, as in the case of Radu Mihnea, it provided a foothold in the other political arena, which allowed for ‘branching out’ and approaching other prospective patrons.
Figure 2.1. Genealogy of Movilă family.
2.1.1. Marital Ties

In comparison with blood kinship, marital alliances played a much more prominent role in the development of cross-border patronage networks, garnering scholarly attention. This applies especially to Movilă dynasty, which, following its rise to the Moldavian throne in 1595, managed to retain power for over a decade, making ample use of marital alliances to secure Polish-Lithuanian support. While the tumultuous events surrounding the family will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5, here I will focus on the way its members utilized marriage to build cross-border patronage networks.

The origins of Movilăs' association with Polish-Lithuanian elite date back to a period of political turmoil in Moldavia in the 1580s and 1590s. It was in this period that increased financial demands of the Porte and rapid turnover on the throne led to a growing instability of the principality's political arena. This resulted in repeated waves of political emigration, with numerous boyars taking refuge in the Commonwealth to escape hostile voevodes. This was the case of Ieremia Movilă and his younger brothers, Simion and Gheorghe. Since the Movilăs belonged to the inner circle of voievode Petru Șchiopul (1574-1579, 1582-1591), they preferred to seek refuge in the Commonwealth rather than suffer reprisals under his rivals. As a result, the Movilăs sought sanctuary in the Crown territories at least three times in the 1580s and 1590s. Most likely, at the beginning of this period Ieremia established his first contacts with Jan Zamoyski, the Crown Grand Chancellor and the most influential individual in Poland-Lithuania at that time. By the early 1590s, Zamoyski became the patron of Moldavian émigré community in general, and of Ieremia Movilă and Luca Stroici in particular.

Zamoyski's support at this early stage was crucial for Movilă and Stroici's efforts to obtain indigenatus, i.e. inclusion into the ranks of Polish-Lithuanian nobility. This privilege was a prerequisite for acquiring landed property, and therefore was of critical importance for the boyars,
whose landholdings in Moldavia had been confiscated by the incumbent voievode, Aron Tiranul (1591-1592, 1593-1595). However, the procedure of securing *indigenatus* was arduous and complicated. By the end of the sixteenth century, nobility had largely wrested control over ennoblement and *indigenatus* from the king, with the new procedure requiring a recommendation by a dietine and subsequent resolution of the *Sejm*. In effect, in order to secure *indigenatus*, Movilă and Stroici needed a powerful patron that would advance their cause. Zamoyski eagerly took this role upon himself, which resulted in respective privileges being granted by the 1593 *Sejm*.

The role of Jan Zamoyski in the process is reflected in *Sejm* decisions, but also in the coat-of-arms adopted by the Movilă family (see Figure 2.2.). Apart from heraldic symbols of the Movilă family and the Danubian principalities, it also included the emblems of the Chancellor himself (*Jelita*), as well as of Filip Padniewski, the bishop of Cracow and a close associate of Zamoyski.

*Figure 2.2. Coat of arms of Petru Movilă, the metropolitan of Kyiv (1632-1646) and nephew of Ieremia Movilă. It includes the coat of arms of Moldavia (1st quarter) and Wallachia (4th quarter), as well as the coat-of-arms of the Movilă family (2nd quarter) and Zamoyski’s *Jelita* (3rd). (from Petru Movilă, *Trebnyk*, Kyiv 1646)*

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ibid., 356.
In Polish-Lithuanian heraldic tradition, adoption to one’s heraldic clan was, according to Michta, a well-established method of integrating new families into the noble estate. At the same time, it also allowed for creation of a vertical bond between an established lineage and his new clients, the latter adopting the coat of arms of their patrons in a form of fictive kinship. Kasper Niesiecki, an eighteenth-century Polish heraldist, clearly interpreted the adoption of Jelita by Movilăs as a sign of their affiliation with Zamoyski:

“Zamoyski, the Chancellor and Hetman of the Crown, allowed [Movilăs] to use Jelita. When Moldavia was ravaged by both internal dissent and invaded by foreign troops, Zamoyski entered with troops to Moldavia, defeated the enemies, and put Ieremia Movilă on the throne […] It is at that time that Ieremia adopted the Jelita of Zamoyski.”

While Niesiecki’s account of events can create an impression that Ieremia Movilă adopted Jelita only after he ascended the throne, another Polish heraldist, Szymon Okolski, confirms that it occurred, when the Moldavian boyar received indigenatus.

Apart from paving the way for Movilă to acquire landed property in the Commonwealth, his status as a member of Polish nobility brought him other advantages. Most importantly, it enhanced his position among fellow Moldavian émigrés, both in economic and political terms. As Ilona Czamańska pointed out, the 1590s and 1600s saw a number of indigenatus privileges granted to Moldavian boyars. In the words of Lilia Zabolotnaia, this resulted in the emergence of a new type of ‘boyar-indigenus’, all of them promoted by Ieremia Movilă in tandem with Zamoyski.

While Romanian scholars interpret these privileges as an expression of state policy, it is arguably more fruitful to adopt a faction-oriented approach to the phenomenon. It seems that by

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217 ibid., 358.
supporting Movilă’s bid for *indigenatus* and establishing ties of fictive kinship, Zamoyski not only built a patron-client relationship with the Moldavian boyar, but also contributed to the transformation of Moldavian émigré community. With his status as a Polish-Lithuanian noble and close connection with the Chancellor, Ieremia emerged as a broker between other boyars and their ultimate patron. Subsequent promotions to *indigenatus* were a product of this cooperation, with support provided to particular individuals by Zamoyski at Ieremia’s behest. This arrangement allowed for an expansion of Movilă and Zamoyski’s influence among the boyars, transforming a relatively undifferentiated émigré community into a vertical patronage network. At the same time, the division of labor between the two was a key aspect of the system, and Zamoyski’s death in June 1605 showed that Movilă was unable to attend to the system on his own. This became clear in 1607, when the last group of boyars (Lozonschi, Orăș, Balică, Mauroti, and Ureche) was promoted to *indigenatus* upon the request of Ieremia. While the privileges were granted at the Sejm, this decision was vehemently contested by many nobles, who pointed out that no dietine had discussed the matter, and thus the privileges were issued illegally.\(^{223}\)

While Movilă’s fictive kinship with Zamoyski was an important element in Ieremia’s rise to power, marital alliances were of an even greater importance. Ieremia’s marriage with Elizabeta Lozonschi bore him seven children: three sons (Constantin, Alexandru and Bogdan), as well as four daughters (Regina-Chiajna, Maria, Caterina and Ana). Starting from 1603, Ieremia (and after his death in 1606, Elizabeta) conducted a consistent policy of marrying off his daughters to members of Polish-Lithuanian magnate lineages in order to secure their support for male members of the family. As a result, a solid block of Movilă’s in-laws emerged in southeastern palatinates of the Commonwealth, ready to provide political and military support for the dynasty’s interests in Moldavia.

Interestingly, the initiative that led to the first of these marriages did not belong to Ieremia Movilă, but rather to Jan Zamoyski. It seems that after the conclusion of 1600 campaign against Michael the Brave, the Chancellor approached a young Ukrainian *knjaz’,* Myxajlo Vyšnevec’kyj (Polish: Michał Wiśniowiecki), proposing him a marriage with the eldest daughter of the Moldavian voievode, Regina-Chiajna. Apparently, Vyšnevec’kyj was enthusiastic about the idea, but the project was put

on hold, most probably due to young age of the prospective bride. Negotiations resumed at the beginning of 1603 and both parties swiftly reached an agreement. The wedding took place on May 25, 1603, and as a sign of recognition of his efforts, Vyšnevec'kyj and Movilă invited Zamoyski to be a guest of honor. The Chancellor was unable to attend, though, but he sent his envoy to congratulate on the conclusion of the marriage he had helped to arrange.

In order to address the underlying causes for the conclusions of this marriage, we should examine the interests of three parties involved in its conclusion: Zamoyski, Vyšnevec'kyj and Movilă, as well as the context in which the idea was brought up by the Chancellor. As I will argue in Chapter 5, the year 1600 marked both a high point in cooperation between Zamoyski and his Moldavian client, as well as the nadir of their relationship. On the one hand, the Chancellor's military intervention in the Danubian principalities restored Ieremia to the Moldavian throne and installed his brother Simion in Wallachia. At the same time, however, Zamoyski and Ieremia clashed over incorporation of the principalities to the Polish Crown. The rift between them grew to the extent that Zamoyski, disgruntled with his client's behavior, even considered replacing Ieremia with a more malleable voievode. However, since he was unable or unwilling to take such radical steps, the Chancellor was forced to make amends and reinforce Ieremia's allegiance to his patron. It is likely that the idea of Regina-Chiajna's marriage with Vyšnevec'kyj served precisely this purpose.

In the late 1590s Vyšnevec'kyj and Zamoyski's political ties grew stronger, mostly due to their shared hostility to another prominent knjaz' lineage – the Ostroz'kyjs. This magnate family owned one of the most extensive latifundia in the Commonwealth and enjoyed virtual political hegemony in the palatinate of Volhynia. The doyen of the lineage, Prince Kostjantyn Vasyl', was the uncontested leader of the anti-Unionist camp and a prominent patron of the Orthodox Church. At the same time, while he vehemently opposed the Union of Brest', he managed to retain royal favor. As such, the Ostroz'kyjs constituted a powerful enemy for any magnate willing to encroach on their influence in the Ukraine.

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225 Myxajlo Vyšnevec'kyj to Jan Zamoyski, Warsaw, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Zamoyskich 262/5.
As Zamoyski expanded his estates and political influence into the region, he soon found himself pitched against the powerful lineage. While I will address the details of this conflict in Chapter 3, it is worth noting here that in the confrontation Zamoyski in many respects stood at disadvantage. Firstly, unlike the Ostroz'kyjs, the Chancellor was an outsider to the Ukrainian palatinates, which meant not only that he could not fall back on an existing political network in the region, but also that he lacked prestige that the Ostroz'kyjs had enjoyed. Moreover, while his meteoric rise to power in the 1580s made him one of the wealthiest and most powerful political figures in the Commonwealth, in comparison with the knjaz’ family he was still an ambitious upstart rather than a member of a distinguished lineage. These were considerable drawbacks, which had to be remedied in order to check Ostroz'kyjs’ influence. In order to do this, Zamoyski turned to local potentates hostile to Ostrozkyj’s, thus forming a political bloc designed to counter the latters’ power.

Prince Myxajlo Vyšnevec’kyj served this purpose well. His family tree lent him prestige on par with that of Ostroz'kyjs, additionally enhanced by his protection over the Orthodox Church and opposition to the Union of Brest’. He was already well entrenched in the palatinate of Kyiv, with numerous clients at his disposal at the dietines. Most importantly, Vyšnevec’kyj was locked in a struggle with the palatine of Kyiv, Kostjantyn-Vasyl’ Ostroz’kyj. Thus, the knjaz’ in many respects compensated for Zamoyski’s weaknesses in the region, making him a valuable ally for the Chancellor.

Ieremia Movilă also had ample reasons to look forward to the marriage. While his relations with Zamoyski cooled after 1600, the Moldavian voievode was still dependent on the latter’s support to retain the throne. At the same time, Zamoyski’s worsening health and his gradual withdrawal from public life meant that Movilă had to look for a prospective successor in case of the Chancellor’s death. Due to his experience as a career soldier and his extensive possessions in the regions adjacent to Moldavia, Vyšnevec’kyj would fill this role.

From Vyšnevec’kyj’s point of view, the match with Movilăs also served numerous purposes. Obviously, a union with the ruler of neighboring polity added splendor to the family. However, mundane motivations also played a role. Despite the fact that he was one of the greatest landholders

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in the region, Vyšnevec'kyj was in constant financial difficulties and by the beginning of the 1600s he was all but broke and in a desperate need for ready cash. It seems that Chiajna-Regina's lavish dowry helped the knjaz' to remedy his financial problems. At the same time, while his position in the palatinate of Kyiv was strong, he was no match to the Ostroz'kyjs and undoubtedly welcomed the support Zamoyski offered. Moreover, Vyšnevec'kyj – as Ukrainian magnates in general - was only entering the central political arena of the Commonwealth and thus required assistance of more entrenched political figures. With his extensive contacts and political influence, Zamoyski was in a position to smoothen the transition.

Thus, seen from the factional viewpoint, the marriage between Chiajna-Regina and Vyšnevec'kyj was a match made in heaven, serving the interests of the three parties involved. By brokering the arrangement, Zamoyski was able to reestablish a measure of trust within his patronage network and cement his ties with key clients. Vyšnevec'kyj secured the Chancellor's support against Ostroz'kyj and his marriage provided him both with prestige and considerable monetary gain, thus keeping his finances afloat. In turn, Ieremia Movilă reinforced his position by restoring the bond with Jan Zamoyski, while at the same time securing a new patron, whose help would prove crucial in the period following the Chancellor's death. Seen in this light, it becomes clear why the marriage between Chiajna-Regina and Vyšnevec'kyj established a blueprint, which the Movilas would apply in the years to come.

Zamoyski passed away at the beginning of June 1605, his death sending shockwaves across the political scene. This deprived Movilă of a crucial patron and a long-time ally, but at the same time it freed the voievode of factional constraints in shaping his marital policy. This becomes clear in the marriage of his second daughter, Maria, to the Starosta of Felin, Stefan Potocki, in January 1606. The Potockis' rise to power was a meteoric one, owing to their service in the military and skillful handling of political allegiances. While they started out as Jan Zamoyski's clients, they abandoned their patron and defected to the royal political camp as soon as their association with the Chancellor

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227 Czamańska, Wiśniewieccy, 121.
228 Henryk Litwin, “Fakcje magnackie na Kijowszczyźnie 1569-1648,” 52.
became a liability. Since then, they achieved a hegemonic position in the palatinate of Podolia, adopting a hostile attitude to their former patron. It is clear that the marriage between Movilăs and Potockis could not have had Zamoyski’s blessing. However, with the Chancellor dead, Ieremia was no more constrained by his patron’s political interest and could reach out beyond Zamoyski’s circle and extend his patronage network.

Following Ieremia Movilă’s death in June 1606, the management of family affairs was taken over by his wife, Elizabeta Lozonschi, who took full advantage of the possibilities that existing marital alliances offered. The political influence of her in-laws proved decisive in the midst of a dynastic struggle between the offspring of Ieremia Movilă and that of his brother, Simion. Potocki and Vyšnevec’kyj provided crucial political and military support that allowed Elizabeta’s son, Constantin to prevail in 1607 over his cousin, Mihăilaş. Similarly, after Constantin was ousted in 1611 by Ottoman-appointed Ştefan Tomşă II, Stefan Potocki embarked on another campaign to restore his brother-in-law to power. This time the expedition resulted in a dramatic defeat: Potocki was taken captive, while Constantin perished following the battle of Cornul lui Sas (July 13, 1612).

The last attempt to restore Ieremia’s offspring to the Moldavian throne was undertaken in 1615, when Elizabeta appealed to Vyšnevec’kyj and another magnate, Prince Samijlo Korec’kyj, to help his second son, Alexandru, to ascend the throne. In order to convince Korec’kyj, Elizabeta promised him the hand of her third daughter, Caterina, an offer that the magnate enthusiastically accepted. Korec’kyj and Vyšnevec’kyj entered Moldavia in November 1615, installing their young brother-in-law on the throne and holding off Ottoman troops for almost a year. After the initial success, a marriage between Caterina and Korec’kyj was concluded in April 1616. It is interesting to note that

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233 Paweł Piasiecki, Kronika Pawła Piasieckiego, biskupa przemyskiego (Cracow: Drukarnia Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1870), 259.
234 Zabolotnaia, Raporturile dinastice, 161.
Elizabeta tried to delay the wedding, clearly in order to retain leverage in her dealings with Korec'kyj.

According to Charles de Joppencourt, a soldier who took part in the campaign:

"Le Prince Alexandre ne le desiroit pas moins que luy; mais la Princesse mere faisait quelque scrupule sur le temps de Caresme, auquel on estoit lors, et desiroit qu'on differast encore jusques apres la feste de Pasques [...]. Mais le Prince Correcky fit response, que s'il n'y avoit autre difficulte, il se faisoit fort d'en obtenir la dispence du Patriarche, lequel de bonne rencontre s'estoit retire eux a Cochine. A quoy ladite Princesse se condescendit, et s'employa elle mesme pour obtenir ladite dispence. Le Patriarche l'ayant accordee, les espousa luy mesme la Dimanche suivant, qui fut la deuxjesme iour apres la victoire."\(^\text{235}\)

It is clear that, while dependent on Korec'kyj's military support and command skills, Elizabeta was anxious to have a final say in the affairs of the principality and was unwilling to give in to the prince's influence. However, this intra-familial conflict soon became moot as the military situation of Movilăs' took a turn for worse. Eventually, in August 1616 Korec'kyj's troops were forced to surrender to the Ottomans; Korec'kyj, Elizabeta and her sons were taken captive and sent to the Porte. In the Ottoman capital, the prince was thrown into Yedi Kule prison, while the Movilăs converted to Islam and entered sultanic household. Eventually, Korec'kyj managed to escape captivity and returned to the Commonwealth, becoming a popular hero among the nobility.\(^\text{236}\)

The military debacle of 1615-1616 marked the end of Ieremia Movilă's line as candidates to the Moldavian throne; however, it did not end the marital practices of the family and their traditional association with Polish-Lithuanian lineages. During the campaign, the daughters of Ieremia remained in the Commonwealth and thus avoided their brothers' fate. With the hopes to reclaim Moldavian throne shattered, the family became increasingly integrated into the local elite and new marital alliances were formed. In 1620, the youngest daughter of Ieremia, Ana, married the castellan of Sieradz, Maksymilian Przerębski.\(^\text{237}\) Following her spouse's death, she remarried three times: to Jan Sędziwój Czarnkowski, Władysław Myszkowski and, in 1658, Stanisław Rewera Potocki. Similarly, Maria concluded her second marriage with the palatine of Sandomierz, Mikołaj Firlej, after Stefan Potocki passed away.

\(^\text{237}\) Zabolotnaia, *Raporturile dinastice*, 162.
At the first glance, these marriages reproduce the pattern established by Ieremia Movilă and
Elizabeta Lozonschi, being concluded with the most prominent families of the Polish Crown.
However, there were also important differences, the most striking being a shift in their geographic
scope. Throughout their life, both Ieremia and Elizabeta concentrated their efforts on coopting
magnates of the Crown’s southeastern palatinates, adjacent to the principality of Moldavia: Myxajlo
Vyšnevec’kyj in Kyiv, Stefan Potocki in Podolia and Samijlo Korec’kyj in Braclav. However, following
1616 this rule did not apply anymore (see Table 2.1.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Spouse</th>
<th>Date of marriage</th>
<th>Region of spouse’s activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regina-Chiajna</td>
<td>Prince Myxajlo Vyšnevec’kyj, starosta of Ovruč</td>
<td>23th May 1603</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria (1st time)</td>
<td>Stefan Potocki, starosta of Felin</td>
<td>1606</td>
<td>Podolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caterina</td>
<td>Prince Samijlo Korec’kyj</td>
<td>spring 1616</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana</td>
<td>Maksymilian Przerębski, castellan of Sieradz</td>
<td>1620</td>
<td>Greater Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria (2nd time)</td>
<td>Mikołaj Firlej, the palatine of Sandomierz</td>
<td>1632</td>
<td>Lesser Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana (2nd time)</td>
<td>Jan Sędziwój Czarnkowski, castellan of Kamień</td>
<td>ca. 1640</td>
<td>Greater Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana (3rd time)</td>
<td>Władysław Myśkowski, the palatine of Braclav</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>Lesser Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana (4th time)</td>
<td>Stanisław Rewera Potocki</td>
<td>1659</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1. Marriages between the Movilăs and Polish-Lithuanian nobility.

This shift is not difficult to explain, if we take into consideration the ultimate failure of Movilăs’
attempts to reclaim the Moldavian throne. After all, the goal of both Ieremia Movilă and Elizabeta
Lozonschi was to secure the principality for their sons, which caused them to turn their attention to
Ukrainian lineages with substantial means and vested interests in Moldavian affairs. However, the
conversion of Alexandru and Bogdan deprived the strategy of its main rationale. As a result, the
family’s marital strategy was bound to change and adapt to new conditions. It seems that, following
1616, Ieremia’s daughters expanded the geographic scope of their marriage patterns to other regions
of the Commonwealth; in this respect, they began to act as more as members of Polish-Lithuanian
magnate elite rather than Moldavian dynastic offspring. This new strategy materialized as early as
1620, in the marriage of Ana Movilă with Maksymilian Przerębski, an individual with no pre-existing
ties to either Ukraine or Moldavia.
Interestingly, the elaborate marital strategy of Movilăs contributed to the establishment of one more patron-client relationship, albeit only tangentially connected to the dynasty. Miron Barnovschi was a descendant of the Movilă family through his mother, but it seems that this kinship did not translate into political cooperation. In fact, Miron throughout the tumultuous decade of 1610s seems to have associated himself with the Movilăs’ archnemesis, Ștefan Tomșă II. In fact, Polish sources described young Barnovschi as a friend of Crimean Tatars, and vilified him for raiding Polish border regions. In the meantime, the boyar managed to rise through the ranks in Moldavia, and by the death of Radu Mihnea in January 1626 he was elected as the new voievode of Moldavia.

Interestingly enough, despite Barnovschi’s negative depiction in Polish sources, the Venetian bailo in Istanbul, Zorzi Giustinian, described him as being of Polish origin. As Dariusz Milewski rightly pointed out, the reason for this claim was most likely his kinship with the Movilăs, which Barnovschi stressed in his official correspondence once on the throne. While the Polish scholar interprets this rhetorical strategy as an attempt to lay claim to Movilăs’ hereditary rights to the throne, allegedly recognized by the Porte, it is more plausible that the sudden focus on his maternal lineage served mainly internal purposes, as well as his dealings with Polish-Lithuanian elites.

Vyšnevec’kyj and Korec’kyj’s deaths had diminished the importance of the Movilă familial bloc in southeastern territories of the Crown, and it seems that Stefan Potocki was unwilling to cooperate with Barnovschi. In this context, the main role in Barnovschi’s attempt to reconstruct the post-Movilă alliances was accorded to Maksymilian Przerębski, the palatine of Łęczyca and the husband of Ana Movilă. While Przerębski’s primary area of political activity was Greater Poland in the Commonwealth’s northwest, his marriage with Ieremia Movilă’s daughter brought him closer to Ukrainian affairs, motivated mostly by his claim to the dynasty’s property in Poland-Lithuania.
In Przerębski, Miron Barnovschi found an eager ally, who provided him with patronage resources, as well as supported Barnovschi’s attempts to recapture the throne following his removal by the Porte in 1629. It seems that the relationship between the two was strong enough to fuel rumors regarding their close kinship. According to the French ambassador in Istanbul, Philippe Harlay de Césy, the voievode was married to Przerębski’s daughter.\footnote{[Barnovschi] l’estre marié avec la fille d’un Seigneur de Pologne, gouverneur de Camenits sur les frontières de Podolie [...]”Hurmuzachi, suppl. I/1: 232. This line of thought has been followed by some scholars, see Constantinov, “Alianțele dinastice,” 69. However, as Dariusz Milewski has convincingly argued, there is no reason to support such a claim, see Milewski, Mołdawia między Polską a Turcją, 91–3.} At the same time, Kasper Niesiecki noted in his heraldic compendium that he had found an alternative genealogy of the Movilă family, which presented Ieremia Movilă as Barnovschi’s paternal uncle:

“I have come across a different genealogy of this already extinguished lineage, which mentions Ieremia’s fourth brother, by the name Stefan, who had two sons, Michał, who died without offspring, and Bazyli, whose son was Miron, the voievode of Wallachia [sic!].”\footnote{Niesiecki, Herbarz polski, vol. 6: 450.}

However, while there is no evidence to support either paternal descent of Barnovschi from the Movilăs or his marriage to Przerębski’s daughter, we should note that the pattern of cooperation between the two closely followed the example set by Ieremia Movilă and Jan Zamoyski three decades earlier. Przerębski was the main supporter of Barnovschi’s efforts to obtain indigenatus, and his coat of arms, Nowina, was adopted by the voievode as a sign of his loyalty to the patron:

“The voievode of Moldavia, born into a famous lineage of Moldavian origin, used the coat of arms of his ancestors, but in accordance to the custom he adopted Nowina from among the crests of the Crown. [He] was allowed to do so on the permission of Sir Maksymilian, the castellan of Sieradz [...].”\footnote{Diploma of Miron Barnovschi’s indigenatus, 20 February 1629, Warsaw, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Metryka Koronna 177, f. 214r-214v.}

Thus, Miron Barnovschi’s case shows the appropriation of post-Movilă patronage and marital networks by their distant relative. While the voievode did not belong to Movilă faction during the dynasty’s rule in Moldavia, and even sided with their enemies in the 1610s and 1620s, he was nonetheless able to reconstruct their network and use it to further his own political goals. Skillfully playing on his family ties and the interests of his Polish partner, he managed remold his image from...
that of a ‘scoundrel,’ as he had been seen in the 1610s, into a respected heir to the Movilăs’ political legacy.

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Whereas marital alliances concluded between Movilăs and the Polish-Lithuanian magnates have attracted numerous scholars, little attention has been paid so far to a different case of cross-border marriage. In this section, I will address the marriage of Moldavian voievode Vasile Lupu (r. 1634-1653) and his second wife, Caterina Cercheza. While some Romanian scholars discussed the voievode’s project, their interpretations paid little heed to the political context in which it occurred, effectively hollowing the whole affair out of its political content. This is most unfortunate, since, as I will argue, the marriage of Vasile and Caterina constitutes one of the best-documented factional enterprises and a prime example how political actors managed to overcome legal and social restrictions in building cross-border patronage networks.

In late September 1639, the Venetian bailo, Alvise Contarini reported to the authorities of Serenissima a short but heated controversy that divided Sublime Porte’s officials on the matter of Vasile Lupu’s marital plans. According to the Venetian diplomat:

“The Moldavian voievode, after he had become a widower, brought a new bride from Circassia, from a distinguished family and of exquisite beauty. On the way back to Moldavia [she] was detained by the Pasha of Silistre, since, according to the laws of the country, Circassian women, as Muslims, cannot marry Christians.”

A flurry of petitions ensued and in the end, the beylerbey’s decision was overruled by the kaymakam, Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha, who ordered the release of the Moldavian mission and allowed Caterina to continue her journey. As Contarini saw it, this served as just another evidence of the corruption and moral decline of the Ottoman officialdom, since “ne anco le prohibitioni della legge hanno qui forza contra la cupidigia dell’oro.”

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248 ibid.
The interpretation offered by Contarini is simple and straightforward: Vasile Lupu, by choosing as his future wife a Muslim Circassian princess, breached one of the cornerstones of Ottoman public order, which prohibited zimmis from marrying Muslim women. The governor-general of Silistra-Özü reacted, trying to prevent this unlawful union, but his efforts were ultimately futile as he was ordered to step back by his venal superior. As such, the resolution of the conflict would fit perfectly with the perception of the moral decline of the Ottoman officialdom, one of the basic aspects of the long-dominant ‘decline’ paradigm.

However, as soon as we turn to other sources, questions start to mount. Firstly, it is not clear why Vasile would choose to marry a Circassian, an unusual choice for the Moldavian and Wallachian elites in the seventeenth century. Except for Vasile himself, only Constantin Șerban (Wallachian, r. 1654-1658) throughout the period married a bride from the Caucasus. However, whereas the latter’s wife was a freed slave that had arrived to Wallachia via Istanbul, Vasile Lupu made a concerted effort to procure a bride from Circassia.

A second major issue is the apparent haste of the voievode’s actions. According to an inscription in Trei Ierarhii Monastery in Iași, Vasile Lupu’s first wife, Tudoscă Băcioc was alive as late as mid-May 1639. Following her death in summer the same year, Vasile Lupu dispatched his right-hand man, Nicolae Catargiu, to the Caucasus to procure a new bride; by September Catargiu was already on his way back. Thus, all arrangements for the marriage were clearly carried out with lightning speed between mid-May and September 1639. Taking into consideration the distances that the Moldavian mission had to cover, Catargiu had to set out immediately after Tudoscă’s death. This suggests that Vasile Lupu was in such a rush to conclude the marriage that he decided to disregard a customary period of mourning following his spouse’s death.

Finally, the more we examine available sources, the more contradictory portrayal of Caterina emerges. The only pieces of information that all authors agree upon is the bride’s exquisite beauty and her distinguished Circassian lineage. This led most scholars addressing the topic to conclude that Caterina’s physical appearance was the main reason for concluding the marriage. Sorin Iftimi pointed out that Circassian slave women had been famous for their beauty since Byzantine times.

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and, as such, were held in great esteem by the Ottoman elite. According to the Romanian scholar,
Vasile Lupu – noted for using court ceremonial as a political tool – perceived his future spouse as a
‘luxury item’ that would add splendor to his court.

While Vasile Lupu was undoubtedly very conscious of ceremonial and pomp, this argument does
not account for a number of circumstances surrounding the marital project. As I have mentioned
before, there was a clear sense of urgency in Vasile Lupu's actions, which Iftimi's hypothesis fails to
take into consideration. Secondly, if this was the case, why did the voievode and his agent not settle
for a less controversial choice that would not trigger such a heated dispute? Finally, there is strong
evidence suggesting that Caterina’s religious affiliation was a pretext rather than the crux of the
conflict surrounding her marriage.

Let us start with the question concerning Caterina’s religious identity, which, according to Contarini,
triggered the whole affair. In fact, while such allegations resurface in other sources, the Venetian
bailo was the only one to believe them. Majority of the authors addressing the issue had no doubts
that Caterina was a Christian and saw claims to the contrary as a smokescreen, concealing the gist
of the controversy. In this respect, the eyewitness account of a Franciscan monk from Lucca, Niccolò
Barsi, is of special importance. Barsi met Caterina and her Moldavian entourage at Khan Bahadur
Giray’s court in Bahçeşaray and accompanied them to Moldavia. Thus, he was in the eye of the storm,
when the controversy erupted, providing us with a detailed account of subsequent events.

According to Barsi, in Bahçeşaray the Moldavians were well received by the khan, who showered
them with gifts and provided a military escort to protect the bride on her way to the principality. However, soon after the mission left Crimea, they were stopped by a kethüda (agent) of the beylerbey of Özü, Nasuḫpaşazade Hüseyin Pasha, who ordered them to take a detour to Özü in order to meet the Ottoman official. Despite the protests of both Caterina and the Tatar officers entrusted with escort duty, Catargiu, unwilling to escalate tension, conceded and proceeded to the beylerbey's

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251 Niccolò Barsi, “Nuova e vera relazione del viaggio...,” in Holban, Călători străini despre Țările Române, vol. 5, 88; Șerban, Vasile Lupu, 36.
residence, while informing both the voivode and the khan about the turn of events. Once they arrived in Özü, Hüseyin Pasha demanded that Caterina be put under his protection and voiced his opposition to the marriage, explaining that, being a Muslim, she cannot marry a Christian zimmi. In response, Catargiu rejected the allegations and refused to hand over the bride, arguing that it would constitute an insult to his master. Nonetheless, he was unable to prevent the whole mission from being detained in Özü.

At this point, the conflict over Caterina triggered a flurry of petitions to the Porte, with Vasile Lupu (supported by the khan) demanding that the Ottoman authorities exert pressure on the recalcitrant beylerbey. At the same time, a testimony of Greek merchants interrogated at Muscovite border post in Putivl' suggests that the Moldavian voievode was even ready to take up arms against Hüseyin Pasha, if the latter refused to release Caterina.

Barsi's account diverges from Contarini by dismissing the allegation that Caterina was a Muslim as an obvious sham. Instead, he claims that Hüseyin Pasha fell in love with the Circassian and tried to persuade her to adopt Islam, which would make no sense if she had been a Muslim already. In turn, Caterina resisted the pressure, and, in order to make her point, defiantly consumed pork in public. Eventually, an order from Istanbul arrived, in which the deputy grand vizier Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha demanded the release of Caterina, threatening with harsh reprisals in case of non-compliance. Begrudgingly, Hüseyin Pasha complied, releasing the entourage.

Barsi's interpretation of events is confirmed by Evliya Çelebi. The peripatetic Ottoman traveler arrived to Moldavia in 1659, during the reign of Vasile Lupu's son, Ștefanită (r. 1659-1661). In Iaşi, he had a chance to meet Caterina, and gave her short portrayal, providing some new information. According to him:

"The domna is of Circassian origin. Dona Banu [Caterina Cercheza] is the daughter of Derviş Mehmed Pasha's sister, and the mother of Ștefan Bey [Ștefanită Lupu], the incumbent lord of the land. She has remained in her perverted faith. When Derviş Mehmed Pasha was the governor in Syria, he

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252 Niccolò Barsi, “Nuova e vera relazione del viaggio...,” 87.

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appealed to Sultan Murad in order to take her from the hands of Lupu. But Lupu, sparing no expense, managed to keep the bride.\textsuperscript{254}

The fact that Evliya described Caterina as a Christian puts the matter of her confessional identity to rest. At the same time, the Ottoman traveler adds another important piece of information regarding Caterina’s family ties, namely the fact that she was the niece of Derviş Mehmed Pasha, one of the most important political figures in the mid-century Ottoman Empire.

Taken together, the fact that Derviş Mehmed Pasha was Caterina’s maternal uncle and that he was vehemently opposed to the marriage, suggests that the allegations concerning the bride’s religious identity originated with him. In his double capacity as a high-ranking official of the Porte and Caterina’s uncle, he had a legitimate claim to intervene in her niece’s marriage. If, as Evliya noted, Mehmed Pasha wanted to derail the marriage, spreading rumors about her being a Muslim would certainly do the work, and some – for instance Contarini – certainly did believe these allegations.

At the same time, the fact that Caterina was the niece of a high-ranking Ottoman official indicates that there was more to the marriage – and to the bride herself – than meets the eye. It is hard to believe that such experienced and skilled politicians as Vasile Lupu and Catargiu would simply overlook this crucial detail and choose Caterina solely based on her physical appearance.

Barsi’s account brings to light another high-ranking familial connection of Caterina. According to the missionary, the reason why Caterina was well received by Bahadur Giray was that she was a sister of one of the khan’s wives.\textsuperscript{255} Unlike Derviş Mehmed Pasha, however, Bahadur Giray clearly approved of the projected marriage, which again suggests that religion was not the gist of the conflict. Moreover, in his account of the events in Moldavia in the 1650s, Bulus b. Makariyos al’Halabi claimed that in 1653 Vasile Lupu received support from a Crimean wazir, one Şerif Bek.\textsuperscript{256} Contradictory information provided by the Syrian priest does not allow us to establish the identity of this dignitary with any certainty. However, the most plausible case is that the author or subsequent copyists, unfamiliar with the political structure of the Khanate, made a spelling mistake and the remark referred to Şirin Beg, the leader of one of the most powerful clans in the Khanate.\textsuperscript{257} Clearly, it is hard

\textsuperscript{254} Evliya Çelebi, “Seyahatname,” 482.
\textsuperscript{255} Eremia, \textit{Relațiile externe ale lui Vasile Lupu}, 102.
\textsuperscript{256} Paul of Aleppo, \textit{Jurnal de călătorie în Moldova și Valahia}, 489.
\textsuperscript{257} The name of the Beg is spelled as ŞRĪF (š-ːfr), with the final letter bearing much resemblance to Arabic N (n) in the final position. Assuming that the form ŞRĪF was a misspelling or misreading, this would give lead us to read the name in
to believe that Vasile Lupu did not know about Caterina’s familial connections or that they were secondary to her role as a ‘luxury item.’

This brings us to an alternative interpretation of the controversy. In her short article on the topic, Lilia Zabolotnaia pointed out Caterina’s connection to the Crimean khan, theorizing about its importance in the marital project. Unfortunately, she did not provide any additional evidence to support her argument. However, the contemporaries voiced similar opinions. For instance, in September 1639, Crown Grand Hetman Stanislaw Koniecpolski wrote to the king:

“[…] I received a letter from the Moldavian voivode to Your Royal Majesty, which I pass to you. I don’t know if it is the invitation to the wedding, since they bring him a new spouse from Crimea, which indicates, where his affection lies.”

In many respects, Koniecpolski was right, since Vasile Lupu was negotiating a military alliance with Bahadur Giray, directed against the voivode of Wallachia, Matei Basarab. While I address the course of this conflict in detail in Chapter 4, it is important to note here that the Moldavian voivode invaded Wallachia in November 1639, mere two months after the conflict over Caterina. In his attempt to capture Wallachian throne, Vasile Lupu was assisted by a detachment of Crimean troops, which suggests a close connection between the expedition on the one hand, and the marital project on the other.

What is more, Vasile Lupu was not acting alone. His main ally in this endeavor was Tabanıyassı Mehmed Pasha, the same kaymakam who had forced Nasuhpaşazade Hüseyin Pasha to release Caterina and would subsequently play the central role in Vasile’s attempt to oust Matei Basarab. Obviously, he had a vested interest in procuring the khan’s support for the voivode.

question as ŠRIN (شرين). Since the original manuscript has not been preserved, it is quite possible that the copyists transformed the name šrin into more familiar šerif.


“Przyniesiono mi pisanie do K.J.M. od hospodara wołoskiego, które W.M.m.m.P. posyłam. Nie wiem, jeżeli nie inwituje na wesele, bo mu novam sposam z Krymu prowadzą, skąd znać dokąd serce afekt jego ciągnie.” Stanisław Koniecpolski to Piotr Gembicki, September 24, 1639, Cracow, Biblioteka Czartoryskich 136, in Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 551.

Thus, seen from a faction-oriented perspective, Caterina’s affair had little resemblance to the simple, uncontroversial account of the events conveyed by Contarini in his report. At the same time, it also helps to explain the hostile attitude of Derviş Mehmed Pasha. Both he and Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha had started their careers in the same grandee household of El-Hac Mustafa Ağa, the Chief Black Eunuch. There seemed to be a degree of cooperation between the two, with Derviş acting as Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha’s client. It was during the grand vizierate of his colleague that he received his first senior appointments and as late as 1638 he acted as Tabanyassı’s agent (kethüda). However, by the end of the decade, the relationship between Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha and Derviş Mehmed Pasha disintegrated and soon we find the latter as a kethüda of his former patron’s nemesis, Silahdar Mustafa Pasha. While the reasons for this shift are unclear, it is evident that from then on Derviş Mehmed Pasha took a hostile attitude towards Tabanyassı and his allies. Since the conclusion of the marriage was a measure to seal an alliance between Vasile Lupu and Bahadur Giray, it comes as no surprise that Derviş Mehmed Pasha put all his effort to prevent the union from happening.

In dragging his feet and obstructing the marriage, Nasuhpaşazade was clearly acting in favor of Derviş Mehmed Pasha. The fact that the beylerbey of Özü acted against factional interests of the kaymakam also explains the harsh tone of Tabanyassı’s reaction and his threats to execute the official. In the context of 1639, preparing for the major factional confrontation occurring simultaneously in the Danubian principalities as well as the Porte, Tabanyassı and Vasile Lupu wanted to put all pieces of the puzzle in place before making their first move. In response, their opponents did all they could to derail or at least delay the fulfillment of those plans. As I will argue in Chapter 4, they largely succeeded in their efforts.

### 2.2. Ethnic-Regional Solidarities

In his pioneering study published in 1974, Metin Kunt brought scholarly attention to so-called ‘ethnic-regional solidarities’ within the early modern Ottoman officialdom. As he argued, contrary

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263 Hurmuzachi, vol. IV/2, 535.
to previously held assumptions, the system of recruitment into the ranks of the Ottoman elite did not homogenize identities of the members of the askeri class. The system of child-levy (devşirme), whereby non-Muslim boys were levied in the provinces, converted to Islam and educated in the palace school, rather than obliterating other aspects of the recruits’ identity, added another layer to the way they identified themselves. Originating from different parts of the extensive empire, members of the askeri class obviously identified themselves with the polity, but at the same time cultivated their ties with their home communities. Many officials were known for speaking their native languages, as well as sporting traditional vestments from their regions of origin.\(^{265}\)

While these visible markers of the persistence of local identities among Ottoman officials gave the elite a multicultural flavor, the political role of such connections was much greater. As social and spatial mobility in the Ottoman Empire increased exponentially in the seventeenth century, these factors highlighted solidarities of the officials sharing similar regional and ethnic origin.\(^{266}\) These allegiances (known under the term cins) came to constitute one of the factors shaping and consolidating political alliances and intisab relations, allowing new recruits to advance through the ranks of the elite.\(^ {267}\) As Kunt pointed out, during this period we can identify the emergence of two major ethnic-regional blocs: ‘easterners’ hailing from Caucasus, and ‘westerners’ from western Balkans, especially Bosnia and Albania.\(^ {268}\)

As Baki Tezcan noted, these cins solidarities lost much of their seventeenth-century power in the following period. He attributes their relative decline to a changing pattern of personnel recruitment and the influx of freeborn Muslims into the ranks of administration.\(^ {269}\) This went in hand with the rise of civilian bureaucratic segment of Ottoman elite (kalemiyye) – staffed largely by freeborn Muslims – vis-à-vis the military-administrative elite (seyfiyye), a process that reached its peak in the eighteenth century.\(^ {270}\) These changes redrew social and communal boundaries. According to Baki Tezcan, as Muslims increasingly made their way into the ranks of the askeri, the notion of re’aya

\(^{265}\) Kunt, “Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment,” 233–4; Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, 68.
\(^{266}\) Hathaway, A tale of two factions, 163.
\(^{269}\) Tezcan, “Ethnicity, race, religion and social class,” 166–7.
became associated with non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{271} In Tezcan’s opinion, the emergence of ‘Muslim political nation’ led individuals to “lose touch with some of the collectives he or she had been affiliating with and come to essentialize that one particular facet of his or her identity.”\textsuperscript{272} Clearly, this applied to the ethnic-regional identities, too.

Nonetheless, in the seventeenth century \textit{cins} solidarities remained a fact of life and numerous officials often cooperated based on their common origin. At the same time, we can observe changes in the hierarchy of particular \textit{cins} networks. As William McNeill pointed out, the seventeenth century saw a shift within the ‘westerner’ group, with an increasing number of officials of Albanian origin dominating administration and marginalizing previously hegemonic Bosniaks.\textsuperscript{273} As he argued, in the seventeenth century, the Ottoman officialdom experienced a crisis of trust within its ranks, encouraging grandees to rely on Albanian mechanism of \textit{besa} (‘word of honor’) as a surrogate mechanism of providing trust. However, he did not support this thesis with any archival evidence, and his line of argumentation did not find its way into Ottoman scholarship. At the same time, as Antonis Anastasopoulos pointed out in regard to the eighteenth century, despite the fact that majority of Albanians had adopted Islam, they were referred to by Ottoman officials as ‘Albanians’ rather than Muslims, which suggests a sense of their ‘otherness’ in the eyes of other Muslims.\textsuperscript{274}

Interpreting \textit{cins} solidarities is an extremely arduous task, since we lack both ego documents and prosopographical data regarding origins of particular individuals. As a result, the gist of the \textit{cins} concept and the role of ethnicity in the Ottoman Empire remains a contested matter. Most scholars tend to assume that ethnic differentiation was a fact of life, while others argue that geographic origin rather than ethnic identity played a decisive role.\textsuperscript{275} As a result, while many scholars automatically


\textsuperscript{272} ibid., 168.


apply the concept of ethnicity as the basis of cins solidarities, others remain more circumspect in this respect and prefer to talk about a combination of ethnic and regional factors.\textsuperscript{276}

Reasons for siding with the latter approach are manifold. Firstly, the concept of ethnia is a politically charged one and as such should be applied with utmost care. Secondly, since we lack enough information regarding the nature of particular cins solidarities, it is virtually impossible to establish, which factors were decisive in shaping such connections. Thirdly, we should keep in mind the multivalent and flexible character of seventeenth-century identities, and that similar terms could have different meanings depending on social context. For instance, authors such as Mustafa Âli or Evliya Çelebi seem to have distinguished Albanians as an ethnic group, but it is by no means clear if the same label, when applied to Ottoman officials, carried similar meaning.\textsuperscript{277} Evidence suggests that these identities were a matter of construction, and that changing one’s ‘ethnicity’ was relatively commonplace.\textsuperscript{278} Thus, references to common ‘Albanian’ origin could have multiple meanings, and it is extremely difficult to disentangle them.

Same caveats apply to identities that emerged during this period in the Danubian principalities. As I have mentioned before, in the seventeenth century, Moldavian and Wallachian elites experienced a period of turmoil as individuals originating from territories under Ottoman administration increasingly found their way into the boyar class. Faced with the growing competition, local elites constructed a new set of social boundaries and identities, resulting in the emergence of ‘Greek’ and ‘indigene’ (pământean) categories. Older scholarship in Romania tended to conflate those two notions with ethnic or even national identities, but this interpretation has been rejected since. As Bogdan Murgescu argued:

“[D]istinction between ‘indigene’ (pământean) and ‘non-indigene’ [also described as ‘Greeks’ – M.W.] was not based clearly on ethno-linguistic criteria, but instead included also geographical, political and ‘moral’ aspects. This


\textsuperscript{277} Dankoff, The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman, 8–9. Evliya Çelebi in an account of his travel to Tirana, Elbasan and other territories in contemporary Albania, noticed that Albanians (Arnavud) used their own language (giving a number of examples, including a considerable amount of insults), and had their own customs. He also recounted that Albanians visited the mausoleum of Şeyh Jabal-i Alhama in Elbasan, whom they considered their forefather.

\textsuperscript{278} A case in this respect, albeit a later one, is the identity and self-representation of Mehmed Ali, the vali of Egypt. I would like to thank Mukaram Hhana for bringing my attention to this case.
ambiguity was applied by the boyars, allowing them to exclude or assimilate those they considered undesirable [...]

This flexibility and multivalence meant that actors mobilized different aspects of their identities depending on their circumstances. This could also mean that identities were often contested, leading to confusion and sometimes quite paradoxical outcomes. For instance, Lupu Coci (future voievode Vasile Lupu) in 1633 led a rebellion against the incumbent ruler, Alexandru Iliaș, accusing him of favoring the Greeks to the detriment of local lineages. However, when the leaders lost control of the crowd, the rebellion turned into an anti-Greek pogrom and Lupu himself took severe beating since “he was a Greek himself.”

This is not to say that there were no boyars, who would think about themselves as Greeks, and at least in some of them expressed what seems to be their ethnic identity. Nonetheless, the ‘Greek’ label was applied in a specific political context, and did not necessarily reflect actual ethnic or regional origin. As Bogdan Murgescu pointed out, throughout the seventeenth century the term pământean (indigene) was a negative category devoid of any meaning, and applied to differentiate oneself from ‘the Greeks.’ The latter label had a clearly stigmatizing and exclusionary scope in Moldavian-Wallachian political discourse and was used as a political insult. It is clear that this negative connotation did not necessarily reflect the identity of particular individuals, but rather served political purposes of their rivals. Since we lack ego documents for most individuals engaged in patron-client relations, it is impossible to determine, whether calling them ‘Greeks’ was a reflection of their origin or a political insult, thus rendering the term of little value for the present discussion.

At the same time, we find traces of other categories, which do not fit into the binomial opposition between ‘indigenes’ and ‘Greeks.’ Among them, the notion of Albanian (arbănaș) identity looms

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279 Bogdan Murgescu, “Fanarioți și pământeni,” 57.
280 “[Ș]i pre Vasilie vornicul anume că iaste și el den Greci, au zvârlit unul cu un os, și l-au lovit în cap, den care lovitură au fostu Vasilie vornicul multă vreme rănitu.” Costin, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei, 81.
283 Păun, “Pouvoirs, offices et patronage,” 478.
large in the sources throughout the seventeenth century, and sources apply this label to a number of boyars and voievodes.

Obviously, this category of ‘Albanian’ does not fit the binary opposition between ‘Greek’ and ‘indigenes’. At the same time, the label is usually accompanied by the notion of neam. This word of Hungarian origin has several meanings in Romanian, including ‘people’, ‘origin’ and ‘lineage.’ As a result, it poses a similar set of difficulties as cins, since we are unable to determine, whether both these notions referred to ethnicity or geographic origin.

However, as I argue, we do not have to do so in the present study. Rather than trying to dissect the notions of cins and neam into ethnic and regional aspects, I will approach both as reflections of compound ethnic-regional solidarities and focus on their role in cross-border relations. While leaving an unpacked notion at the center of the study may seem unfortunate, but there are sound reasons to do so. Firstly, even while we lack sources that would allow us to establish what constituted the common ‘Albanian’ identity of the actors involved, it is clear that such connections acted as a trust-building mechanism. At the same time, we have to keep in mind that rather than elite identities, the aim of the present study is to establish the role of cins/neam solidarities in cross-border patronage between Moldavia and the Ottoman Empire. Thus, it is not necessary to examine what were the contents of both concepts, but rather if they were mutually intelligible for Ottomans and Moldavians alike. In short, how the ‘Albanian’ identity operated in cross-border patronage relations is more important than what it entailed.

In order to do so, in the first section I analyze the instances, when Albanian identity is invoked in the sources, both Moldavian-Wallachian and Ottoman. By identifying individuals described as Albanians by their contemporaries, it is possible to confirm that both Moldavian and Ottomans applied the ‘Albanian’ label to the same individuals. Subsequently, I trace evidence concerning common Albanian identity as a mechanism of patronage and trust-building by identifying the patterns of political cooperation within this group. The picture that emerges from this analysis is one of a complex and tightly knit patronage network straddling Moldavian and Ottoman political arenas in the middle decades of the seventeenth century.

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284 For instance, Costin, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei, 191.
The first Moldavian voievode to be described in the sources as Albanian, was Vasile Lupu (born Lupu Coci), one of the most accomplished Moldavian rulers in the seventeenth century. The fact that he enjoyed the favor of the Porte throughout most of his unprecedentedly long reign of nineteen years has led scholar to depict him as a representative of the ‘pro-Ottoman’ political orientation, in contrast to an allegedly ‘pro-Christian’ stance of Matei Basarab, the voievode of Wallachia and Vasile’s arch nemesis.\textsuperscript{285} However, recent decades have challenged this approach, presenting Vasile Lupu’s policy in less essentialist terms and showing ebbs and flows in his relationship with the Porte.\textsuperscript{286}

The prominence of Vasile Lupu in seventeenth-century Moldavian history has led numerous scholars to address details of the voievode’s biography, producing different conclusions. This comes as no surprise, since his contemporaries had also produced numerous theories regarding the ruler’s origin and identity. In his preface to a theological treatise against Calvinists published in 1685, the patriarch of Jerusalem Dositheos II Nottaras claimed that Vasile had been born in “an Albanian village (\textit{Alvanitokhorion}) in Mysia, near Tunava, while his family originated from Macedonia.”\textsuperscript{287} At the same time, divergent opinions circulated among contemporaries, with some authors identifying Epirus as the voievode’s homeland.\textsuperscript{288} This confusion continued into modern Romanian historiography. However, beginning from the 1930s, most scholars adopted a theory proposed by Franz Babinger. The eminent Ottomanist, on the basis of oral traditions and archival evidence, identified Lupu’s birthplace as the village of Arbanasi near Razgrad in modern-day Bulgaria, where

\textsuperscript{285} Şerban, \textit{Vasile Lupu}, 121.
\textsuperscript{286} Eremia, \textit{Relaţiile externe ale lui Vasile Lupu}, 237.
\textsuperscript{287} “\textit{Βασιλειου βοεβοδα του Λουπυλου (καταγοζενου απο το Αλβανιτοχοριον οπου κειται εις την Μυσιαν, ητα τυ τε περι τουαβα, και εχοντος το αρχαιτερον αυτου γενοσ, απο της Μακεδονιας).}” Dosotheus II Nottaras, “Procuvântarea făcută de Dosifei, Patriarhulu Jerusalimului, la 1690 în Andrianopol, la cartea refutătoare lutero-calvinilor […],” in \textit{Bibliografia românească veche 1508-1870}, ed. Ioan Bianu and Nerva Modos (Bucharest: Atelierele Socec & Co., 1903-44), vol. 1, 328. While scholars have usually interpreted \textit{Tunava} as Veliko Tynowo in Bulagria, it is also plausible to see the term as a corrupted form of “Danube”.
his father – Nicolae Coci, an official at the court of Wallachian voievode Michael the Brave – had often resided.\footnote{Franz Babinger, “Originea și sfârșitul lui Vasile Lupu,” Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice 19 (1936-1937), passim; idem, Originea lui Vasile Lupu (Bucharest: Imprimeria Națională, 1937).}

In a similar manner, contemporaries and scholars alike applied different ethnic-regional categories to Vasile Lupu. Throughout his life, the voievode appears as a local Moldavian boyar, a Greek and an Albanian, with each of these interpretations garnering support among scholars addressing the topic. The most controversial in this respect was Constantin Șerban’s argument. In his biography of the voievode Șerban argued in favor of Vasile’s ‘true’ Romanian identity, but his interpretation was rejected by other scholars, who claimed that the author was driven by ideological considerations rather than historical evidence.\footnote{Șerban, Vasile Lupu, 26. Cf. Eremia, Relațiile externe ale lui Vasile Lupu, 26–7.} However, it is important to note that, unless essentialized, these multiple identities were not contradictory, but rather reflected the mosaic character predominant at that time. What interests us here is the Albanian aspect of Vasile’s identity.

References to Vasile Lupu as an Albanian abound in the sources. In an anonymous list of Moldavian rulers, composed in Greek in the second half of the seventeenth century, Vasile Lupu appears as “Voievode Vasile, the Albanian” (Βασιλ βοδας ο Αλβανιτης).\footnote{Hurmuzachi, vol. XIII, 338.} A personal acquaintance of Vasile Lupu, Miron Costin, similarly referred to him as an Albanian, followed in this respect by Ion Neculce and Dimitrie Cantemir.\footnote{Costin, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei, 199; Ion Neculce, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei și o samă de cuvine, ed. Iorgu Iordan (Bucharest: Editura de Stat pentru Literatură și Artă, 1955), 119; Cantemir, Descrierea Moldovei, 142.} Most interestingly, at least one Ottoman author also hinted at this aspect of the voievode’s identity. Visiting Moldavia in 1659, Evliya Çelebi provided an enthusiastic description of the voievodal residence in Iași, and explained that Vasile Lupu had contributed the most to its expansion and embellishment. Evliya commented approvingly: “the Albanian infidel, Lipul Bey, has exquisite taste (Arnavud keferesi bir zevk sahibi Lipul bey’dir).”\footnote{Evliya Çelebi, Günümüz Türkçesiyle Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi, 2nd ed., ed. Seyit A. Kahraman and Yücel Dağlı, Edebiyat (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2004-2011), vol. 5/2: 474.} This comment of particular significance, since it shows that the Ottoman official saw Vasile’s identity in a similar manner to the Moldavian and Greek authors quoted above.

Moldavian chroniclers of that time, Miron Costin and Ion Neculce, invoke Albanian identity of Vasile Lupu in the specific context of the patron-client relationship between the voievode and
Gheorghe Ghica, a long-time Moldavian capuchehaia and the future voievode of Moldavia and Wallachia. According to Costin:

“[Gheorghe Ghica], was brought to the court by voievode Vasile, since he was Albanian, of the same origin as [the voievode] [emphasis mine – M.W.], and he held at first petty offices, eventually obtaining the position of Vornic of Upper Moldavia. And having much trust in [Ghica], and upon seeing him a man diligent in all matters and trustworthy, as a capuchehaia should be, Vasile sent him to the Porte as capuchehaia."

Establishing Ghica’s place of origin with any certainty is impossible due to the lack of sources. Again, different claims circulated among contemporaries. Mihai Ban Cantacuzino, an eighteenth-century Wallachian genealogist, claimed that the Ghica family had originated “from the Albanians of Zagora, in the region of Ianina.” Relying on the information provided by Ion Neculce, some scholars have argued in favor of the town of Köprü in Macedonia as the birthplace of the future voievode. However, as I will argue below, this tradition is a later invention and provides us with a confused account of the events. This confusion notwithstanding, all available sources refer to him as an Albanian, which indicates that this aspect of his identity played an important role in his ascendancy.

We know next to nothing about Ghica’s career prior to his arrival to Moldavia and entry into the principality’s elite. According to the sources, he was initially engaged in trade in the 1620s and early 1630s, making a small fortune in the process. Following the enthronement of Vasile Lupu in 1634, Ghica’s career saw a meteoric rise, and soon the boyar was appointed as the Grand Vornic of Upper

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294 “Fiindu de un niam cu dânsul, arbănaș, l-au trasu-l Vasilie vodă la curte și de odată la boerii mai mănunte, apoi la vornicia cea mare de Țara de Gios au agiunsu. Și țindu-l Vasilie vodă de credință, l-au trimis la Poartă capichihaie, vădzându-l și om cunenit la toate și scump, cum să cade hie când capichihăei să hie.” Costin, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei, 191.

295 Mihai ban Cantacuzino, Genealogia Cantacuzinilor, ed. Nicolae Iorga (Bucharest, 1932), 396. See also Elena Ghica, Gli albanesi in Rumenia: Storia dei principi Ghika nei secoli XVII, XVIII, XIX (Florence, 1873); Anastasie Iordache, Principii Ghica, o familie domnitoare din istoria României (Bucharest: Albatros, 1992).


297 Cantemir, Descrierea Moldovei, 142. An anonymous chronicle of Moldavia was produced in the circle of Ghica family in Greek during the middle decades of the eighteenth century and likely contained information on the family’s origin. Unfortunately, the only preserved copy, discovered by Demostene Russo in the metohion of Holy Sepulchre in Istanbul, lacks first 595 pages and contains information on the events starting from the year 1695. See Cronica Ghiculeștilor: Istoria Moldovei între anii 1695-1754, ed. Nestor Camariano and Ariadna Camariano-Cioran, Cronicile medievale ale României 5 (Bucharest: Editura Academiei R.S.R., 1965).

Moldavia. Despite holding this prominent office, he appeared only sporadically among the boyars in the Princely Council, which suggests prolonged periods of absence from the principality in the 1630s. A document issued by Vasile's son, Ion Lupu, provides us with the explanation regarding Ghica's whereabouts during this period. Rewarding the boyar with new land grants in December 1639, Ion stated: "[Ghica] served voievode Vasile and continues to serve [...] my land in Istanbul." Thus, it is clear that throughout the early reign of Vasile Lupu, Gheorghe Ghica acted as the voievode's capuchehaia in Istanbul, a crucial posting that required considerable political skill and trust of the voievode.

That Vasile Lupu had no doubt about the loyalty of his client is corroborated by the latter's second appointment as capuchehaia, which took place in 1652. Forced into an alliance with the Cossacks of Bohdan Xmel'nyck'yj, Vasile Lupu faced a hostile coalition of Transylvania, the Commonwealth and Wallachia, supported by internal opposition in Moldavia. In this context, the voievode entrusted the delicate mission of securing Porte's support. In his capacity as the Moldavian agent in Istanbul, Ghica remained loyal to his patron and in vain tried to secure the Porte's aid for Vasile until the latter was finally ousted from the principality.

Despite Ghica's proven loyalty to Vasile Lupu, the new voievode Gheorghe Ștefan (r. 1653-1658), who had ousted his predecessor with Transylvanian backing, decided to retain the capuchehaia on his post, which clearly shows that Ghica's expertise was held in high regard by his contemporaries. However, in order to ensure the boyar's loyalty, the ruler kept Ghica's son Grigore hostage in Moldavia. As a result, Gheorghe Ghica performed his duties as capuchehaia until Gheorghe Ștefan's deposition by the Porte and, following the latter's fall from power in 1658, he was appointed as the new ruler of Moldavia.  

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299 He was grand şetrar (responsible for approvisation of the court, 1638-1641), grand medelnicer (1643), stolnic (1647) and finally the grand vornic of Upper Moldavia (1647-1652), see Nicolae Stoicescu, Dicționar al marilor dregători din Țara Românească și Moldova (sec. XIV-XVII) (Bucharest: Editura Academiei R.S.R., 1971), 403. If the official named "Kika" (κικα) mentioned in a document from 1624 is the same individual, is not clear, see Stoicescu, Dicționar al marilor dregători, 403; Cernovodeanu, "Știri privitoare la Gheorghe Ghica (I)," 335.


301 "Atunc ense trimițindu Ștefan vodă pre Stamatie postelnicul cu câțiva boieri de țară să-i isprăvască stiag de domnie și aice pre fecioru său, pre Gligorașco, care apoi au fostu domnu în Țara Muntenească, îl trimise în Țara Unguriască, la închisoare. Deci n’au avut ce mai face și împotriva unii țări și audzindu de fecior la închisoare, au stătut și el cu boierii lui Ștefan vodă alătura pre trebile lui Ștefan vodă și au venit și singur cu aga, cările au venit cu stiagul și cu alți boieri în țară. Ștefan vodă socotindu iară aceie care socotise și Vasilie vodă în Ghica vornicul, că este om de capichihăie, neavându
Among the ranks of Moldavian elite in this period, we find another future voievode described as being of Albanian origin – Gheorghe Duca. Again, there is little information concerning the boyar’s family ties or place of origin. The sources indicate that he descended from a poor family in the eyalet of Rumelia, which encompassed most of the Balkan Peninsula. According to an anonymous eighteenth-century Moldavian author:

“Voievode Duca’s was from the Greek lands of Rumelia. When he came to the country [i.e. Moldavia] as a small boy, voievode Vasile brought him to the court, and [Duca] subsequently served other voievodes, eventually becoming a grand boyar.”

In many respects, his career mirrored that of Gheorghe Ghica, although references to his Albanian identity are not as abundant as they were in the case of the latter. Nonetheless, at least some sources identify Duca as an Albanian. Antonio Maria Del Chiaro, a Florentine nobleman who served as the secretary of Wallachian voievode Constantin Brâncoveanu, described Duca as being “di rito Greco, di nazione Albanese. Nacque in un villaggio detto Policiciani.” The anonymous compiler of the chronology of Moldavian rulers also included an entry on Gheorghe Duca, mentioning his Albanian origin.

In this context, it is also worth noting a detailed included in the work of an Ottoman historian, Defterdar Sari Mehmed Pasha. While the author does not mention the voievode’s origin, he refers to Gheorghe Duca’s son, Constantin, by a peculiar name Dukakin-oğlu, absent from other sources.

This form is identical with the one applied by Ottoman authors to a famous Dukagjini lineage ruling northern Albania in the fifteenth century, which following the Ottoman conquest, retained its position, even producing a grand vizier, Dukakin-zade Ahmed Pasha. Gheorghe Duca’s descent from
this powerful lineage is unlikely, especially since the sources claim that his family origin was a modest one. However, it is possible that Duca originated from the Dukagjin highlands near Shkodër in modern-day Albania. However, in contrast to Vasile Lupu and Gheorghe Ghica, these references to Albanian identity of the voievode never appear in the context of cross-border patronage. Thus, I will address Gheorghe Duca’s ethnic-regional identity only tangentially in the present study, focusing on Gheorghe Ghica and Vasile Lupu instead.

The evidence presented above indicates that both Moldavian and Ottoman sources referred to the same individuals as Albanians, which suggests that Muslim and Orthodox authors alike understood and applied the term in a similar manner. In short, ‘being Albanian’ meant more or less the same thing both at the Porte and in the Danubian principalities. Moreover, this label often appears in the context that indicates its role as a basis for political cooperation. In the following analysis, I will trace these bonds, reconstructing the cross-border interactions between Albanian boyars and their counterparts in the Ottoman Empire.

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Arguably, the best starting point for an attempt to reconstruct the cross-border Albanian patronage network is the appointment of Gheorghe Ghica as the voievode of Moldavia in 1658 and its representation in the sources. Unfortunately, Ottoman sources provide us only with the voievode’s name, with no additional information.\(^{36}\) This stands in stark contrast to Moldavian and Wallachian authors, who described the events in detail, providing us with crucial details regarding the political rationale behind the appointment. In this respect, the most important accounts are those of Miron Costin, Ion Neculce and “Comisul Iştoc”. While these sources vary in their depiction of the events, they nonetheless allow us to reconstruct the role of Albanian ethnic-regional solidarities in the political developments between Moldavia and the Porte.

In 1657 the voievodes of Moldavia and Wallachia had mobilized troops to assist the Transylvanian prince, György Rákoczy II, in his campaign against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The expedition not only ended in an ignominious defeat, but also produced a backlash at the Porte. Concerned about the political ambitions of the prince, Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha

\(^{36}\) Ziya Yılmazer, ed., ‘İsa-zade tarihi (Istanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1996), 60.
decided to bring the wayward tributaries back to the fold and summoned the voievodes to Istanbul. Fearing for their lives, the rulers stalled and tried to win over the grand vizier with gifts. However, according to Miron Costin:

“The vizier replied to the voievodes, that even if they filled his house with golden coins, it would be impossible for them not to come [to Istanbul]. If they come, they will be voievodes! And if voievode [Gheorghe] Ştefan would not come, within an hour I will appoint that one’ he said, pointing at Vornicul Ghica, who at this time was the capuchehaia of Gheorghe Ştefan at the Porte. And they say that Vornicul Ghica, upon hearing those words, rushed to kiss the vizier’s robes.”

Gheorghe Ştefan and Constantin Șerban, suspecting that they would face deposition and execution upon their arrival to the imperial capital, chose to rebel and were summarily deposed by the grand vizier, who appointed Gheorghe Ghica as the new ruler of Moldavia.

Costin’s account creates an impression that Köprülü Mehmed Pasha’s choice of Gheorghe Ghica was done on a whim. However, other sources contradict this interpretation, depicting the relationship between capuchehaia and the grand vizier as a particularly close one. The account by Ion Neculce is the most important in this respect. The early eighteenth-century Moldavian author composed his chronicle (covering the years 1661-1743) as a follow-up on Costin’s work. At the same time, Neculce added an introductory section in the form of a compilation of stories regarding earlier events in Moldavia. While the influence of Costin’s work is discernible in many of these short stories, it is clear that Neculce relied on information from other sources, both written and oral. This becomes obvious when we turn to his narrative of Gheorghe Ghica’s rise to power. While Neculce retains the elements of Costin’s account, he takes his own rendition in a different direction, focusing on Ghica’s ties with Köprülü Mehmed Pasha. According to the author:

“Voievode Ghica, of Albanian origin, left his home as a young boy in order to go to Istanbul and find a master whom he could serve. He took with him a young and poor Turkish boy from the island of Cyprus. And as they went to Istanbul,

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307 “[D]omnilor așe au răspunsu vezirul, că ari împiea căte o casă de galbeni de aur, nu poate acestu lucru, să nu vie aice. «Și de vor veni, iară domni vor h! Iară de nu va veni Ștefan vodă, într-un cias o pune pre acesta,» arătându pre Ghica vornicul, carele era capichiaia lui Ștefan vodă la Poartă. Spun de Ghica vornicul, cum au dżis acestu cuvânt vezirul, el au și alergat de au sărat poala vizirului.” Costin, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei, 190.
they told each other many good things: that if they find their fortune, they will take care of each other.\

At some point, the Turkish boy promised Ghica, that if he would ever become a grandee, he would promote Ghica as well. Having promised to support each other, the two boys arrived to the imperial capital, parted their ways, and set out to find powerful patrons.

Eventually, both managed to raise through the ranks. According to Neculce, the Turkish boy attached himself to the household of a powerful official and after a long career reached the rank of pasha. Fortunately, he befriended an unnamed favorite of the sultan, who convinced the ruler to appoint the pasha as the grand vizier in order to curb the disorder in Istanbul.

In turn, Gheorghe Ghica started his ascendancy by becoming the servant of a Moldavian capuchehaia before moving to the principality and engaging in commerce. Narrating subsequent career of the future voievode, Neculce reproduces the account of Costin, highlighting Ghica’s ties with Vasile Lupu and his appointment as the Moldavian agent in Istanbul. There, Neculce’s narrative diverges from that of his main source. Unlike Costin, Neculce presents the meeting between Ghica and Köprülü Mehmed Pasha as a reunion of childhood friends:

“...”

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308 Ghica-vodă, de neamul lui fiind arbănaș, copil tîn ar au purces de la casa lui la Ţarigrad, să-ş găsască un stăpîn să slujască. Şi cu dinsul s-au mai luat un copil turcu, iar sărac, din ostrovul Chiprului. Şi mergînd amîndoi dempreună la Ţarigrad, multe vorbe bune au vorbit: de vor găsi pită, să să caute unul pre altul.”  Ion Neculce, Letopiseţul Țării Moldovei, 119–20.

309 “Deci tîmplându-să atunce, la vremea lui Gheorghii Ștefan-vodă, de au fost la Poartă cu alți boieri, vizirul vădzîndu-l i-au cunoscut cine este. Iar Ghica-vodă nu-l cunoște pre vizirul. Deci vizirul Chiupruliolul au și chemat pre haznatarul lui și i-au dzis în taină: ”Vedzi cel boieriu bătrîn moldovan ce este la Divan? Să-l iei și să-l duci la odaia ta, până s-a rădica
In contrast to Costin, who depicted Ghica as an opportunist eager to ascend the throne and double-cross his master, Neculce presents the boyar in a more positive light. According to him, Ghica vehemently defended Gheorghe Ștefan. In the end, the grand vizier gave in to Ghica’s pleas, but did not resign on his plans altogether:

“The vizier said then: ‘So be it for the moment, but I will not renege on the promise I made to you.’ And subsequently, when Gheorghe Ștefan was summoned to the Porte and he failed to do so, [the grand vizier] appointed Gheorghe Ghica as the voievode of Moldavia.”

While some scholars have accepted this rendition of Ghica’s origin story at face value, a closer examination of its details makes such claim untenable. Firstly, contrary to Neculce’s account, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha was at least twenty years older than the Moldavian voievode; at the time of his appointment, Ghica was around 60 years old, while Mehmed Pasha already in his eighties. Moreover, we know that Köprülü Mehmed Pasha had entered the askeri ranks as a devşirme recruit rather than as a kapı member. Finally, Neculce’s claim that Köprülü Mehmed Pasha’s sobriquet (lakab) indicated his place of origin is simply wrong, since it referred to the grandee’s residence in the Anatolian locality of Köprü. Put bluntly, the details of Neculce’s account do not add up, but this does not mean that we should dismiss it altogether. As Paul Cernovodeanu rightly pointed out, we should approach the narrative as an indication of particularly close ties between the voievode and the grand vizier.

This affinity between Köprülü Mehmed Pasha and Gheorghe Ghica finds its expression in yet another source. In the first half of the eighteenth century, voievode Nicolae Mavrocordat commissioned a compilation of Moldavian and Wallachian chronicles, which is known to us under

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310 On the age of Gheorghe Ghica, born around 1600, see Cernovodeanu, “Știri privitoare la Gheorghe Ghica (1),” 333.

311 Kunt, “Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity,” 236.

312 Cernovodeanu, “Știri privitoare la Gheorghe Ghica (1),” 333.
the title *The Parallel Chronicle of Moldavia and Wallachia*.314 While the compiler introduced little new information, this collection includes an otherwise unknown account of a certain *Comisul Iștoc*, covering the years 1659-1664. According to the author, Iștoc had been a servant of Grigore Ghica, the son of Gheorghe and his successor on the throne of Wallachia (1663-1664, 1672-1674).315

This short account focuses on the first reign of Grigore Ghica in Wallachia, at the same time providing us with some background regarding his path to the throne. According to the author, Grigore Ghica, in order to replace his father on the throne in Bucharest, formed a conspiracy with an influential boyar, Constantin *Postelnic* Cantacuzino, in order to undermine Gheorghe Ghica’s position. The biggest obstacle in this endeavor, the author claims, was the fact that “[Gheorghe] Ghica was very dear to the vizier, since they were both Albanians.”316

As I have pointed out, contemporaries frequently referred to Gheorghe Ghica as an Albanian. The same holds true for Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, and this aspect of the grandee’s identity is often invoked in the context of his patronage ties with other officials. Among Christian authors, Kaisarios Dapontes makes a clear reference to the grandee’s origin.317 Ottoman sources are even more explicit in this respect. In his biographical dictionary of Ottoman grand viziers, Osmanzade Ahmed Taib described Köprülü Mehmed Pasha as *arnavudi* (ارنودي), at the same time pointing out that common origin ("măcanese al-cinsiyet") had formed the basis of an *intisap* relationship between Mehmed Pasha and Grand Vizier Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Pasha in the early 1640s and contributed to Köprülü’s appointment as imperial *mirahor*.318 Another Ottoman author, Silahdar Fındikli Mehmed Ağa, corroborates the claim that the patron-client relationship between the two officials was based on common Albanian origin.319

314 *Letopiseţul Țări Româneşti i a Moldovei de viaţa a preauluminaţilor domni ce au stăpânit întru aceste două țării*, Bucharest, Romanian Academy Library, MS 349. For the description of the manuscript, see I. Crăciun and A. Ilieș, eds., *Repertoriul manuscriselor de cronici interne, sec. XV-XVIII privind istoria României, Croniciile medievale ale României* 1 (Bucharest: Editura Academiei R.P.R., 1963), 117. The fragment was published in 1938, Constantin Grecescu, “Mărturiile comisului Iștoc: un fragment de cronică, 1659-1664,” *Revista istorică română* 8 (1938): 87-94.

315 *Letopiseţul Țări Româneşti și a Moldovei*, f. 61.

316 “Era Ghica Vodă foarte drag veziriului, fiind amândoi arbănași.” ibid., f. 75v.


In turn, we learn from the sources that Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Pasha cultivated *cins*-based ties with another important official at the Porte, Tabanıyassı Mehmed Pasha. The latter was a *devşirme* graduate from Drama, who following his entry into *askeri* ranks, managed to enter the household of a powerful Chief Black Eunuch, Hacı Mustafa Ağa. Clearly, Mustafa Ağa held his client's skills in high esteem, proven by the fact that Mehmed Pasha was sent as the *beylerbey* to Egypt on his first provincial appointment. Egypt was not only the most lucrative province of the empire, but also played a prominent role in the interests of Chief Black Eunuchs, who acted as overseers of extensive pious endowments there. Following his tenure as the *vali* of Egypt, Mehmed Pasha returned to the Ottoman capital and soon was appointed as the grand vizier, a position he was to hold until 1637, undoubtedly supported by Mustafa Ağa. At the same time, Mustafa Naima informs us that the cooperation between Tabanıyassı Mehmed Pasha and Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Pasha was based on the two officials' shared Albanian origin.

What conclusions can we draw from this short survey of Albanian identities among Moldavian and Ottoman elites in the middle decades of the seventeenth century (see Table 2.2.)? Firstly, as I have already pointed out, the fact that at least two individuals are identified by both Moldavian and Ottoman authors as being of Albanian origin, thus confirming the hypothesis that in Moldavia and Wallachia the notion of 'being Albanian' meant more or less the same thing as within the Ottoman political arena.

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320 Quite interestingly, while the position of *kızlar ağası* was staffed by eunuchs from Africa, the origins of Mustafa Ağa are an object of controversy. While in the iconography Mustafa Ağa is depicted as black, Machiel Kiel has pointed out that there is a possibility that Mustafa Ağa was white and had close ties with the region of Ljubinje. Machiel, “Ljubinje: from Shepherd’s Encampment to Muslim Town - A Contribution to the History of Ottoman Urbanism in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” in *Archaeology in Architecture: Studies in Honor of Cecil L. Striker*, ed. Judson J. Emerick and Deborah M. Deliyannis (Mainz: Von Zabern, 2005), 99–104. I would like to thank Günhan Börekçi for bringing this article to my attention.


Table 2.2. Explicit references to Albanian identity of Moldavian and Ottoman political actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Political arena</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vasile Lupu (Lupu Coci)</td>
<td>Moldavian</td>
<td>Ottoman: Evliya Çelebi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moldavian: Miron Costin, Ion Neculce, Dimitrie Cantemir, Dositheos Nottaras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gheorghe Ghica</td>
<td>Moldavian</td>
<td>Moldavian: Miron Costin, Ion Neculce, Dimitrie Cantemir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabanıyassı Mehmed Pasha</td>
<td>Ottoman</td>
<td>Ottoman: Osmanzade Ahmed Taib, Mehmed bin Mehmed ar-Rumi, Mustafa Naima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Köprüülü Mehmed Pasha</td>
<td>Ottoman</td>
<td>Ottoman: Osmanzade Ahmed Taib, Silahdar Mustafa Ağa, Mustafa Naima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moldavian: comis Iştoc, Kaisairos Dapontes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secondly, the authors frequently invoke Albanian identity as the basis of political cooperation and trust between particular individuals engaged in faction-building activities. Table 2.3. provides a list of patron-client relations that contemporary authors explicitly described as rooted in the common Albanian origin of the actors involved.

Table 2.3. Political alliances based on common Albanian origin, explicitly invoked in the sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individuals involved</th>
<th>Political arena</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vasile Lupu - Gheorghe Ghica</td>
<td>Moldavian</td>
<td>Miron Costin, Ion Neculce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gheorghe Ghica – Köprüülü Mehmed Pasha</td>
<td>Moldavian- Ottoman</td>
<td>Ion Neculce, comis Iştoc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Köprüülü Mehmed Pasha – Kemânkeş Kara Mustafa Pasha</td>
<td>Ottoman</td>
<td>Osmanzade Ahmed Taib, Silahdar Mustafa Ağa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemânkeş Kara Mustafa Pasha – Tabanıyassı Mehmed Pasha</td>
<td>Ottoman</td>
<td>Mustafa Naima</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One could argue that these few references hardly create an impression of a tightly knit patronage network. Nevertheless, one should be aware of the limitations imposed by the sources (see Figure 2.3). Seventeenth-century authors tended to utilize normative categories, most importantly confessional boundaries, obscuring the cins/neam-based character of particular ties. Therefore, if we turn to political behavior of the actors, we find a considerable degree of cooperation, even if these ties were not explicitly described as based on shared Albanian origin.
Firstly, throughout the second half of 1630s, Kemâneş Kara Mustafa Pasha and Tabâniyâsi Mehmed Pasha cooperated closely with Vasile Lupu in the latter’s pet project – establishing his family’s reign in both Moldavia and Wallachia. This alliance reached its peak in Lupu’s abortive expedition to conquer Wallachia in late 1639, the conflict, which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 4. Moreover, at this critical juncture, the Moldavian voievode dispatched another Albanian individual, Gheorghe Ghica, to serve as his capucheha in Istanbul, undoubtedly to ensure coordination with Lupu’s patrons at the Porte. Since we know that all these individuals utilized cins/neam solidarities as a faction-building mechanism, it is very likely that this cooperation was based on shared Albanian origin.

A similar pattern of cooperation emerges, when we turn to the six-year tenure of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha as the grand vizier (1656-1661). During this period, the grandee appointed four individuals to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia, with Gheorghe Ghica appointed twice (in 1658 to Moldavia, and in 1659 to Wallachia). Four of these appointments went to the members of Ghica and Lupu families (see Table 2.4.). The only outsider to secure the appointment was Mihnea III Radu. Unlike the others, he was neither an associate of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha nor of Albanian origin, but rather a member of Ken’an Pasha and Atike Sultan’s household, and it is likely that his appointment was a result of a power-sharing arrangement between the two households.325 This outlier case

325 Evliya Çelebi, “Seyahatname,” 482.
notwithstanding, it is clear that by the end of the 1650s, the three families of Albanian origin (Lupu, Ghica and Köprülü) established themselves at the apex of both Ottoman and Moldavian-Wallachian political arenas.

Table 2.4. Appointments to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia during the grand vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha (1656-1661)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principality</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ethnic-regional origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wallachia</td>
<td>1658</td>
<td>Descendant from the Basarab dynasty, member of Ken'an Pasha and Atike Sultan's kapu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>1658</td>
<td>Albanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallachia</td>
<td>1659</td>
<td>Son of Vasile Lupu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>1659</td>
<td>Albanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallachia</td>
<td>1660</td>
<td>Son of Gheorghe Ghica</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This period also saw the entry of the families' second generation into the political scene, which raises the question whether this cins-neam solidarity survived the generational change. By the beginning of the 1660s the 'old guard' of the faction started to die out. In the year 1661 both Köprülü Mehmed Pasha and Vasile Lupu passed away, followed by Ştefaniţă Lupu; finally, Gheorghe Ghica died by January 1667. This left Grigore Ghica and Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Pasha as obvious successors to their fathers. The former had already been the voievode of Wallachia since his father's removal from the throne, while Ahmed Pasha took over the position of the grand vizier following Mehmed Pasha's death in 1661.

There is a degree of continuity between the appointment strategy of Köprülüzade Ahmed Pasha and that of his father (see Table 2.5). The pattern is less consistent than in the previous generation, but it remains obvious that the grand vizier maintained close ties with Grigore Ghica. He also established a long-term relationship with Gheorghe Duca, a former client and possibly compatriot of Vasile Lupu and Gheorghe Ghica, whom he appointed four times during his tenure as the grand vizier.

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326 Cernovodeanu, “Știri privitoare la Gheorghe Ghica (I),” 346.
The appointments to the thrones of Danubian principalities during the grand vizierate of Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Pasha (1661–1676) and their ethnic-regiona origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of appointment</th>
<th>Principality</th>
<th>Appointee</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29/09/1661</td>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>Istratie Dabija</td>
<td>Moldavian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/02/1665</td>
<td>Wallachia</td>
<td>Radu Leon</td>
<td>Greek from Istanbul, son of Radu Iliaş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/1665</td>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>Gheorghe Duca (1st time)</td>
<td>Greek/Albanian (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/05/1666</td>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>Iliaş Alexandru</td>
<td>Descendant of the Moldavian Muşat dynasty, brought up in Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1668</td>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>Gheorghe Duca (2nd time)</td>
<td>Greek/Albanian (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/04/1669</td>
<td>Wallachia</td>
<td>Antonie din Popeşti</td>
<td>Wallachian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/1672</td>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>Gheorghe Duca (3rd time)</td>
<td>Greek/Albanian (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/04/1672</td>
<td>Wallachia</td>
<td>Grigore Ghica (2nd time)</td>
<td>son of Gheorghe Ghica, of Albanian origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/08/1672</td>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>Ştefan Petriceicu</td>
<td>Moldavian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/1673</td>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>Dumitraşco Cantacuzino</td>
<td>Greek from Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/12/1673</td>
<td>Wallachia</td>
<td>Gheorghe Duca (4th time)</td>
<td>Greek/Albanian (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/1675</td>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>Antonie Ruset</td>
<td>Greek from Istanbul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the surface, Ahmed Pasha’s reliance on Grigore Ghica and Gheorghe Duca in governing the Danubian principalities could serve as an argument in favor of the continuity of *cins/neam* solidarities in cross-border patronage. However, this conclusion would be premature, since our sources remain silent on the character of these ties and never invoke the shared Albanian identity as the basis of their cooperation. In contrast to the generation of their fathers, Grigore Ghica and Ahmed Pasha are never referred to as Albanians, and Gheorghe Duca’s Albanian identity is never brought up in the context of cross-border patronage ties. Taking into consideration that we have

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more sources at our disposal for the 1660s and 1670s than for the earlier period, this absence is truly striking.

In order to solve this puzzle, we need to keep in mind that ethnic-regional identities were not set in stone, but changed depending on political and social environment. As Jane Hathaway argued in her fascinating analysis of seventeenth-century factional politics in Egypt, provincial factions of Faqaris and Qasimis operated as a powerful assimilative mechanism, which allowed newcomers from other regions of the Ottoman Empire to integrate themselves into the social and political life of the province. By the second generation, these factional affiliations stripped other identities of much of their earlier political significance:

“Ahmed Bey Bushnaq’s appointment as commander of the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1656 was greeted with suspicion by the Faqaris, who deplored the assumption of authority by an “outsider” (ajnabi). [...] Bosnians were fully incorporated into the Qasimi faction by the following generation. [...] Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab’s Qasimi identity clearly overrode his Bosnian identity, and any traditional enmity toward Circassians such as his fellow Qasimi Ivaz Bey, in the context of Egypt’s military-administrative elite.”

In many respects, this phenomenon also occurred in the case of the cross-border network analyzed in the present chapter. Köprülu Mehmed Pasha, Gheorghe Ghica and Vasile Lupu were in many respects ‘outsiders’ to their immediate political environment. All of them entered Ottoman and Moldavian political arenas at some point in their lives, slowly establishing their position and ascending through the ranks of officialdom. In the course of their careers, they made use of various resources and mobilized different facets of their identity, including their Albanian origin. By cultivating cins/neam solidarities, they were able to enlist support of powerful patrons and hold their network together.

In this respect, their offspring – Grigore Ghica, Köprülü Ahmed Pasha and Ştefaniţă Lupu – was in a different position. They were born and grew up as members of the political elite; they were not ajnabi that had to build their position from the scratch. Köprüüzade Ahmed Pasha grew up in Anatolia and obtained his education at a madrasa; unlike his father, he had no ties to Albania. The same applies to Grigore Ghica and Ştefaniţă Lupu, born and raised as members of the Moldavian boyar

Hathaway, A tale of two factions, 42–3.
class. In these circumstances, they were less likely to identify themselves as Albanians, and *cins/neam* solidarities lost their role as a trust-providing mechanism holding the patronage network together.

This does not mean that the network itself withered away. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the patronage system remained in place after the second generation took over. Gheorghe Duca, Grigore Ghica and Köprülü Ahmed Pasha made ample use of the factional infrastructure their fathers had set up. However, the underlying mechanism of trust-building changed significantly, adapting to new circumstances. As the role of *cins/neam* solidarities diminished, they were discarded as the basis of factional cohesion and replaced with personal affinity and experience of cooperation between respective lineages, better suited for the new generation of its members.

The current state of research on Ottoman households supports such hypothesis. As I have mentioned above, the ultimate goal of faction-building enterprises was pragmatic and individual actors accumulated different socio-political ties in a piecemeal fashion. The result was the *bricolage*-like composition of patronage networks, which included Circassian slaves, local notables, converts etc. *Cins* solidarity was but one of trust-building mechanisms, and could be replaced or complemented with other trust-providing mechanisms.

The actors discussed in the course of the present section were not exception to this rule. While in the present section I isolated *cins/neam*-based patronage ties for heuristic purposes, it is important to keep in mind that every member of the network cultivated a number of political ties built on other principles. For instance, Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha, Köprülü’s right-hand man and Ahmed Pasha’s successor as the grand vizier (1676-1683), was a son of a *timar*-holder living near Köprülü Mehmed Pasha’s Anatolian residence. Another important member of the faction, Siyavuş Pasha, was a Circassian slave. Similarly, some important allies of Tabanyası Mehmed Pasha and Vasile Lupu – such as Hezarpare Ahmed Pasha or Hacı Mustafa Ağa – were not of Albanian extraction, but nonetheless played a crucial role in factional strategy.

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328 “The acquisition of Mamluks was for the Qazdaglıs and other ambitious grandees of the 18th century not so much a programme of ethnic consolidation or the implementation of a slave ethos as a strategy for expeditious household-building.” Hathaway, “The Household,” 63.
As I have demonstrated in this section, the middle decades of the seventeenth witnessed the emergence of a powerful cross-border network based on Albanian identity shared by its members. Through ebbs and flows, the network survived on the political scene for over three decades, reaching the peak of its influence during the grand vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, when three lineages of Albanian origin managed to dominate both Ottoman and Moldavian-Wallachian political arenas. This patronage system managed to survive the moment of generational change and continued into second generation. However, this transition transformed the mechanism of trust-building underpinning patron-client ties. While the cooperation continued, it was no longer based on cins/neam-solidarities, but rather on family tradition and trust forged in repeated instances of cooperation.

**Figure 2.4.** The representation of principal actors discussed in Section 2.2 and their patronage ties to each other. Black vertices represent the actors placed within the Moldavian-Wallachian political arenas, while the white - Ottoman ones. The vectors represent the direction of patronage, flowing from the patron towards the client.
2.3. Military and Rebellion as Conduits for Faction-Building

Ethnic-regional solidarities were not the only ones to emerge during the seventeenth century. Frequent armed conflicts and the emergence of new militarized groups also had a profound effect on the development of cross-border patronage ties. As the armies of the Ottoman Empire and Poland-Lithuania grew in size, they offered more opportunities for employment and career advancement for ambitious individuals. Moreover, in the Ottoman Empire, the boundary between askeri and tax-paying re’aya blurred, allowing the latter to penetrate into the military.

At the same time, the changes in the composition of Ottoman military converged with other social and political developments and brought about a new pattern of interaction between the Porte and imperial periphery. The increasingly precarious of provincial ümera led them to cling to their posts and oppose dismissal, even if it meant rebelling against the central authority. In the center as well as in the provinces, the grandees reached out to the military corps, contributing to the factionalization of the rank-and-file.

Starting from the end of the sixteenth century, the ümera increasingly tapped on a new pool of military personnel, created by a set of demographic, environmental and socio-economic changes that led many peasants to abandon their homesteads and seek employment as mercenaries. These bands of gun-wielding part-time soldiers oscillated between military service and banditry. As a cheap and expendable fighting force, they were readily mobilized by provincial governors, either in service or against the Porte. While the phenomenon started in Syria during the 1580s, it soon spilled over to other regions of the empire, and by the late 1590s and early 1600s, virtually all of Anatolia was rocked by the so-called Celali rebellions, combining disgruntled officials and jobless levends, with the Porte regaining control of the region with utmost difficulty. Even if the tide of celali activity subsided following the 1600s, both low-scale banditry and revolts of provincial governors continued throughout the seventeenth century.

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329 Hathaway, The politics of household, 136; Piterberg, An Ottoman Tragedy, 109–12; Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire, 135–7.
330 Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire, 144.
As Karen Barkey pointed out, these sekbands were in many respects ‘rebels without a cause,’ since they did not aim at overturning Ottoman social and political order, but instead sought inclusion into the ranks of state servants. In its turn, the Porte was not above bargaining with the bandit leaders and recalcitrant officials and preferred negotiation to an all-out crackdown. A new pattern of political culture emerged as a result, whereby the status of a rebel (eşkiya) was reversible and one-day rebel could turn into a respectable governor overnight, with some individuals going back and forth between service to the sultan and rebellion against the Porte.

Thus, in order to analyze the role of military cooperation in building cross-border patronage ties, we address not only military service under the command of central authority, but also its flip side – rebellion and resistance against the political center. As I will argue, both phenomena played a constitutive role in the establishment of patronage networks in the context of Polish-Moldavian-Ottoman relations.

2.3.1. Rebellion: Abaza Mehmed Pasha, Matei Basarab and Miron Barnovschi

In 1629, a group of Wallachian boyars from the westernmost region of Oltenia engaged in a protracted conflict with the incumbent voievode, Leon Tomșa (r. 1629-1632). The voievode was accused of excessive taxation and appointing ‘Greeks’ to the offices in the principality. By October 1630, the relations between Tomșa and the opposition had deteriorated to such an extent that the Oltenians decided to take refuge in the Hăţeg region of Transylvania, where they received only half-hearted political backing from the prince. However, if they hoped that this act of defiance would bring the fall of Tomșa, these hopes did not materialize. The voievode managed to handle the crisis and issued an edict, which paid lip service to the boyars’ demands. At this point, the ranks of the rebels started to shrink, and most of them (including erstwhile leader, Grand Ban Aslan) decided to

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334 While starting from spring 1632 Rákóczi intervened in favor of Matei Basarab at the Porte, this would hardly mean strong support for the candidate. In fact, the Transylvanian prince has sent to his agents in Istanbul letters of support for each candidate that had a chance of obtaining the throne, see ibid., 22.
335 The donation of Leon Tomșa to the monastery of Radu Vodă, March 3, 1632 in Documenta Româniae Historica.: B. Țara Românească, vol. 21 522–5.
return to the principality. This left a group of hardliners, under the leadership of the future voievode Matei din Brâncoveni.\footnote{Nicolae Stoicescu, “Lupta lui Matei din Brâncoveni pentru ocuparea tronului Ţării Româneşti,” Revista de istorie, no. 9 (1982): 987.}

Matei’s political career prior to the rebellion was a lackluster one. While he descended from a powerful lineage with ties to Wallachian Basarab dynasty, and held extensive landholdings, he never managed to obtain any important offices.\footnote{While he obtained the title of \textit{paharnic} (cup-bearer) in 1607, he remained in this minor position for more than 20 years, which is quite surprising, since this position was usually held for short periods of time by young boyars entering the political arena. In 1628, he managed to secure the position of Grand Aga, which was still not among the top ranks in the principality, Nicolae Stoicescu, \textit{Matei Basarab}, 14.} The evidence suggests that Matei remained in his estates in Oltenia, and rarely engaged in political life. Thus, he was an unlikely leader of the rebels and gave little prospect of success, especially after his first attempt to oust Leon Tomșa by force ended in a defeat.\footnote{ibid., 9-10.}

However, by early 1632 the rebels obtained assistance from an unexpected quarter. According to the author of \textit{The Cantacuzino Chronicle}:

“At this point, a certain Abaza Pasha was the governor of the Danubian provinces [Özi-Silistre]. Seeing how the voievodes from among the Constantinopolitan Greeks destroyed and impoverished the country, he decided to bring Matei Aga back from Transylvania and make him the ruler in order to give relief and peace to this unfortunate country. Thus, he sent a priest from Nikopolis [Niboğlu] called Ignatie the Serb, ordering him to come and become the voievode by the will of the Pasha.”\footnote{“Iară pre aceia vreme fiind pre marginea Dunării îspraunice un pașă ce-l chema Abaza pașa, înțelegînd acesta pentru această săracă de țară cum o au spart domnii streini cu grecii țarigrădeni, făcut-au sfați ca să aducă pre Matei aga de la Ardeal, să-l facă domn țării, că de la dinsus vor avea săracii pace și odihnă. Și îndată au trimis la el pre popa Ignatie Sirbul den Necopoe, ca să vie să fie domn țării cu voia pașii.” Simonescu, \textit{Istoria Țării Românești, 1290-1690}, 98.}

Another Wallachian author of the seventeenth century, Radu Popescu, presents a similar account of events, with slight differences in details. According to him, it was not Abaza Mehmed Pasha, but rather Matei himself, who – upon being defeated by Leon Tomșa – addressed Ignatie, a close associate of the pasha.\footnote{Radu Popescu, \textit{Istoriile domnilor Țării Românești}, 94–5.} Based on the existing evidence, it is unfortunately impossible to reconstruct
these initial stages of the alliance between Matei and the Ottoman governor, and the question on whose accord was Ignatie acting remains a mystery.

Nonetheless, it is clear that Abaza Mehmed Pasha in his support of Matei Basarab went against prerogatives and wishes of the Porte. When the contacts between the two were established, Leon Tomșa was still the voievode, and upon his dismissal in summer 1632, the grand vizier appointed Radu Iliaș, the son of the Moldavian voievode. Thus, Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s assistance to Matei Basarab was a clear act of defiance against Ottoman central authorities.

The Venetian bailo in Istanbul, Giovanni Cappello, interpreted the governor’s actions in this vein. According to him, upon receiving the news about Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s support for the rebel, the Porte issued severe orders, ordering the grandee to desist and threatening him with removal and execution. As István Szalanczy, a Transylvanian agent in Istanbul informed the prince, Grand Vizier Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha was pushing for the execution of the recalcitrant governor.

Despite the pressure, Abaza Mehmed Pasha remained stalwart in his support of Matei. In September 1632, the rebel troops crossed into Wallachia, where Matei was proclaimed as the new voievode, adopting the name Matei Basarab. Despite the fact that Leon Tomșa had already left Bucharest, Matei did not advance to the Wallachian capital, but instead went to meet his Ottoman patron in Niğbolu:

“And when Matei met with him [Abaza Mehmed Pasha], the latter conferred him a caftan. And the name of the new voievode was proclaimed [...] The Pasha accorded him heralds, as it is proper for the voievode, as well as sent with him some Turkish soldiers.”

341 “Abbassa, che di presente si trova in commando in Silistria per la depositione del Prencipe di Valachia [...], ha posto in sedia di quel Prencipato, soggetto da lui dipendente, et fin hora lo sostiene, non ostante che dalla Porta sij stato eletto il figliolo del Prencipe Alessandro di Moldavia [...] e terzo giorno fu fatta [...] ispeditione del [...] alquanti capigi perché primo ad Abbassa presenti un ordine di Sua Maesta che contiene che se egli e schiavo del Re, ponghi in Sedia il Principe eletto, e se a questo ordine non obesdisce, gli e ne sij dato un altro, col quale resti privo del carico, e venghi alla Porta molti credono che includi la morte senza dilatione, se Abbassa persiste.” Giovanni Cappello to the Doge, October 18, 1632 in Hurmuzachi, vol. IV/2, 460.

342 István Szalanczi to György Rákoczi, October 4, 1632 in Documente privitoare la istoria Ardealului, Moldovei și Țării Românești, vol. 9, 320.


345 Simonescu, Istoria Țării Romînești, 1293–1693, 100–1.
Having secured Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s support, Matei Basarab advanced to Bucharest, where he prepared to confront the army of his rival, Radu Iliaș, reinforced with Moldavian and Tatar troops. In the fierce battle of Plumbuita in October 1632, Matei decisively defeated the Porte’s appointee and put his forces to rout. However, this victory did not mean that his rule in Wallachia was secure, since the voievode still had to obtain the official recognition of Ottoman authorities.

Matei again turned to Abaza Mehmed Pasha, who immediately wrote to his friends at the Porte, recommending the voievode. He also instructed his Wallachian client to flood the Porte with petitions, where he and his clients would present their grievances against Leon Tomșa and Radu Iliaș. In response, the Porte summoned Matei to the imperial capital, where he would present his case to the divan. After one more meeting with Abaza Mehmed Pasha the voievode complied and in January 1633 arrived to Istanbul, accompanied by numerous supporters.

However, the supporters of Radu Iliaș did not give up and actively tried to undermine Matei Basarab’s position. The Wallachian delegation was kept waiting for weeks before being received at the divan. According to the sources, Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha was complicit in the obstruction. When the voievode was finally received at the divan, the Moldavian capuchehaia, Curt Celebi, “brought Greek and Turkish women, who complained that their brothers, husbands and sons had perished because of Matei.” Only a direct intervention of Sultan Murad IV, no doubt instigated by Abaza Mehmed Pasha and his allies, resolved the matter in Matei’s favor.

Why did Abaza Mehmed Pasha decide to defy the orders of the Porte and support Matei Basarab’s claim to the Wallachian throne? The two individuals never met prior to 1632 and the Wallachian was an obscure political figure for any Ottoman official. It is unlikely that he would be able to prevail over Radu Iliaș or Leon Tomșa, if it was not for the grandee’s support. Thus, it is surprising that Abaza Mehmed Pasha decided to throw his weight behind Matei’s cause and risk being labeled as a rebel.

Trying to explain the grandee’s behavior, we should keep in mind that such situation was nothing new for Abaza Mehmed Pasha, who throughout his career had constantly oscillated between

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346 Radu Popescu, Istoriile domniilor Țării Românești, 96.
347 Simonescu, Istoria Țării Românești, 1290–1690, 104.
rebellion and service to the Porte, eventually becoming arguably the most successful *celali* leader in
the seventeenth century.\(^{348}\) He entered the Ottoman political arena as the officer of his relative,
Canpoladoğlu Ali Pasha, a prominent warlord in Anatolia during the 1600s. When the Porte finally
subdued Ali Pasha, Abaza Mehmed Pasha found a new patron within the Ottoman establishment
and made his name as a provincial governor in the eastern provinces of the empire. However, after
Sultan Osman II was killed in the Janissary revolt in Istanbul (May 1622), the grandee rebelled against
the Porte, taking on the mantle of the sultan's avenger.\(^{349}\) His military prowess and anti-*kul* rhetoric,
popular among the wider circles of Ottoman society, made him a serious threat to the Porte. The
conflict dragged through most of the 1620s, going through periods of open conflict and temporary
arrangements, before Grand Vizier Hüsrev Pasha was finally able to subdue the maverick
governor.\(^{350}\) However, this was not the end of Abaza Mehmed Pasha's tumultuous career, since
Sultan Murad IV, willing to use the grandee's military and organizational skills, decided to pardon
the rebel and appoint him as the *beylerbey* of Bosnia.\(^{351}\) It is thus clear that for Abaza Mehmed Pasha,
rebellion and subsequent bargaining with the central authority were not extreme measures, but
rather a *modus operandi* characterizing his career for over two decades.

Despite rehabilitating Abaza Mehmed Pasha, the sultan at the same time took precautions to ensure
the grandee's loyalty. His subsequent appointments to Bosnia and Özü, rather than to his traditional
area of activity in eastern Anatolia indicate that the Porte tried to cut the maverick governor from
his regional power base and make him fully dependent on the sultan's favor. However, in order to
secure his position against enemies within the Ottoman officialdom, Abaza Mehmed Pasha was in
dire need to reconstruct his patronage network in the new environment.

There is little evidence regarding the pasha's motives in his support of Matei Basarab. Wallachian
chroniclers, generally favorable to the voievode, claimed that Abaza Mehmed Pasha was concerned
about the population of the principality, overburdened with high taxation and financial abuses of

\(^{348}\) Gabriel Piterberg, "The Alleged Rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Paşa: Historiography and the Ottoman State in the


Leon Tomșa’s Greek lackeys. This is hard to believe if we keep in mind Abaza’s career in Anatolia, when his mercenary troops roamed the countryside.

However, if we consider the pressing need of Abaza Mehmed Pasha to build his faction in the region, supporting Matei had a number of distinctive advantages. Firstly, we should keep in mind that Abaza Mehmed Pasha had been appointed to Özü only in 1632 and thus was unfamiliar with local power configurations. By that time, Matei had already proven that he enjoyed at least some support among the Wallachian elite. Moreover, the fact that the future voivode lacked any ties to the Porte constituted an opportunity for Abaza Mehmed Pasha. By providing the voivode with influence in Istanbul, the beylerbey secured Matei’s full dependence and loyalty. Thus, from the perspective of Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s factional interests, his support for Matei made perfect sense.

This hypothesis is further corroborated by another case of Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s patronage in the Danubian principalities. In April 1633, a rebellion in Moldavia led to the deposition Alexandru Iliaș, the father of Matei Basarab’s rival to the throne. Subsequently, the rebel boyars decided to elect a new ruler, calling upon Miron Barnovschi, who had lived in Poland-Lithuania since 1629. Upon receiving the news, Barnovschi rushed to the principality and initiated his efforts to secure the Porte’s recognition. Most importantly, he turned to Matei Basarab and Abaza Mehmed Pasha with a plea to support him in this endeavor. The response was favorable and Miron Barnovschi set out for Istanbul, accompanied by numerous supporters. En route, the Moldavian voivode visited both Matei Basarab and his Ottoman patron, both promising their assistance. However, upon his arrival to the imperial capital, Miron Barnovschi was arrested and subsequently executed on the orders from the Porte.

It is unclear what led to Barnovschi’s execution. The Moldavian chronicler Miron Costin hypothesized that the Porte suspected the voivode, who had spent previous years in the Commonwealth, of collaboration with the Polish-Lithuanian authorities. In addition, the author

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354 Costin, *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei*, 84.
355 Ibid.
356 Pietro Foscarini to the Doge, June 20, 1633, Hurmuaki vol. IV/2, 467.
blamed Lupu Coci (Vasile Lupu), who plotted against the voievode with a number of Ottoman officials.\textsuperscript{358} In contrast, Bailo Pietro Foscarini claimed that the election itself of Barnovschi enraged Murad IV, who saw it as an infringement of his own prerogatives.\textsuperscript{359}

However, some of these explanations should be discarded. Firstly, there was in fact little set apart Miron Barnovschi and his successor, Moise Movilà. After the execution of the former, the boyars were allowed to elect a new voievode according to their liking, which contradicts the rationale given by Foscarini.\textsuperscript{360} At the same time, Moise Movilà was – just like his unfortunate predecessor – a member of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility, and his ties with the Commonwealth were to be proven, when he took flight there less than a year after taking the throne. What set the two voievodes apart was their factional affiliation, namely Miron Barnovschi’s association with Abaza Mehmed Pasha. We can clearly see that Moise Movilà was not Abaza’s man, and the Ottoman grandee was actively trying to remove him from power, eventually causing him to flee to the Commonwealth. While we can only hypothesize due to the lack of evidence, it seems plausible that the reason for the execution of Barnovschi was the factional matter, with powerful enemies of Abaza Mehmed Pasha at the Porte trying to block his patronage buildup in the Lower Danube region.

In his article on Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s political career, Gabriel Piterberg pointed out the career pattern of the former celali leaders:

> “Many of the bandits were recruited and co-opted into the state via the kapıs (households) of high-ranking Ottoman officials following the defeats of the celali armies. Aided by their patrons’ intisap networks, they became officeholders, and some became heads of their own kapıs.”\textsuperscript{360}

In many respects, Miron Barnovschi and Matei Basarab reproduced this pattern. They began their rise to power outside the political establishment. They enjoyed support among sections of the elite, but lacked powerful patrons at the Porte, which would allow them to capture and secure their respective thrones. This created an opportunity for an experienced pasha-turned-rebel-turned-pasha, Abaza Mehmed, who provided this crucial link between the imperial center and peripheral

\begin{footnotes}
\item[358] Costin, Letopiseţul Ţării Moldovei, 84.
\item[360] ibid., 88.
\end{footnotes}
elite. By acting as a patron for both and utilizing his ties to the Porte, he provided them with network resources necessary for their bids for the throne. In his Moldavian and Wallachian policy, Abaza Mehmed Pasha was merely repeating the pattern he had made use of many times during his career in Anatolia, with the difference that it now he acted as a patron trying to legitimize the rebels. Thus, Matei Basarab and Miron Barnovschi’s careers were very much a product of the political culture of the Celali Age and Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s factional interests.

2.3.2. Military Service and Patronage-Building

In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the nexus of military service and cross-border patronage was not a new phenomenon, and throughout the seventeenth century we find a number of Moldavian boyars within the ranks of Polish military. This comes as no surprise, since the main fighting force of the Commonwealth was stationed along the southeastern borders of the Crown, adjacent to the principality. Moreover, Ukrainian and Ruthenian magnates maintained their own armies in order to protect their estates from destructive Tatar raids. Thus, for Moldavian boyars willing to engage in soldiery, Polish-Lithuanian territories offered many opportunities. At the same time, military service put them in contact with local nobility, making the army a fertile ground for the emergence of cross-border patronage ties.

Available evidence indicates that Moldavian boyars eagerly enrolled into Polish units, both in cavalry and infantry. This included two future voievodes - Ştefan Tomșa II and Constantin Cantemir – who served in the Crown’s foot troops during late sixteenth and seventeenth century. However, it is worth noting that neither of them formed patron-client ties with Polish-Lithuanian noblemen. On the contrary, once they ascended the Moldavian throne, they adopted a hostile attitude towards Poland-Lithuania. Polish authors, in turn, treated them with scorn and contempt.

While this may seem surprising at first glance, a look at the social composition of Polish-Lithuanian infantry provides us with an answer to the question. Throughout the seventeenth century, nobility saw this type of service as less prestigious, if not demeaning, and was reluctant to join infantry

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362 Wimmer, Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku, 35.
363 Sokołowski, Politycy schyłku złotego wieku, 24.
364 Aurel Iacob, Țara Moldovei în vremea lui Ștefan Tomșa al II-lea (Brăila: Editura Istros, 2010), 83.
365 Piasecki, Kronika Pawła Piaseckiego, 250.
This disinclination of the nobility to enlist in foot regiments meant that these units offered fewer patronage opportunities. This held true even for the units composed of Moldavian émigrés, kept on King John III’s payroll in the 1680s. While Grigore Hăbăşescu, commander of a Moldavian cavalry squadron in the king’s employ, was an important Moldavian boyar, the infantry commanders were virtually anonymous and never played any political role.

Service in the cavalry offered more opportunities in this respect. As Ilona Czamańska pointed out, Moldavian émigrés often enlisted to serve in the mounted units, which provided them with means of subsistence, but also in hope of returning to the principality. This tendency reached its peak during the Holy League War (1683-1699), when we find a number of Moldavian banners (chorągwie) in Polish service. The most important in this respect was the unit under the command of Grigore Hăbăşescu, paid from the personal treasury of King John III (r. 1676-1696). The soldiers received generous pay and were recruited from among the ranks of Moldavian boyars. At the same time, the king also tried to attract individual boyars from Moldavia, issuing a number of indigenatus diplomas and officer patents to prominent boyars. As Marek Wagner pointed out, the underlying rationale of John III’s actions was political rather than military, as the king was trying to establish his own patronage network in the principality. He was not the only one to do so, since Crown Hetmans also tried to secure their influence in Moldavia, acting independently from the ruler.

Arguably, the most prominent case of this military-based patronage was Constantin Turcul, whose career has been meticulously analyzed by Mariusz Kaczka. This Moldavian boyar entered the ranks of the Polish military and built an extensive set of patron-client relations, cultivating close ties to King John III, Crown Treasurers, as well as subsequent Crown Grand Hetmans, Stanisław Jabłonowski and Adam Mikołaj Sieniawski. Through these patronage ties, Turcul was able to secure a number of privileges, including exemption from custom dues and the office of Pantler of Černihiv.

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366 Wimmer, Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku, 283, 296.
368 "Rejestr ludzi których trzyma prywatny skarb...,” f. 287.
Finally, when in the year 1686 Polish troops occupied northern Moldavia, Turcul was appointed by the king to administer Cernăuți district, a position that reinforced his role as an intermediary between Moldavian boyars and Polish-Lithuanian authorities.\textsuperscript{371}

In this context, it is also important to note the crucial role played by Crown Hetmans in the development of cross-border patronage. Starting from the second half of the sixteenth century, the office grew in importance, accumulating the lion’s share of patronage resources in the borderland.\textsuperscript{372} The Hetmans exerted considerable influence in shaping officer corps, stationing troops for winter, but also intelligence and diplomatic relations with the Commonwealth’s southeastern neighbors.\textsuperscript{373} Moreover, such individuals as Jan Zamoyski, Stanisław Żółkiewski, Stanisław Koniecpolski or Stanisław Jabłonowski belonged to the top echelon of landholders in the Ukraine, adding their own resources to those associated with their office. It is thus not surprising that we find Hetmans as most active participants in cross-border patronage networks.\textsuperscript{374}

The Hetmans’ duties as military commanders have generally led scholars to analyze their patronage of Moldavian boyar as intricately connected with the purposes of defense and intelligence gathering. However, as I will show in the following chapters, their agenda should be interpreted as stemming from the convergence of three intersecting roles: commanders of the Polish Crown’s troops, Ukrainian landholders, and political actors in their own right. In pursuing their goals, the Hetmans made use of both prerogatives tied with their official capacity, as well as other resources, thus blurring the distinction between public and private.

It is also important to note that while the office of Hetman provided the incumbent with competitive advantage against rival magnates, this difference was not absolute. Throughout the seventeenth century, the size of Polish-Lithuanian military was meager, while magnate armies expanded. Unfortunately, we know very little about these private units, and we are unable to establish their

\textsuperscript{371} ibid., 138.
\textsuperscript{372} Przemysław Gawron, Hetman koronny w systemie ustrojowym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1581-1646 (Warsaw: Neriton; Instytut Historii PAN, 2010), 102.
\textsuperscript{373} ibid., 107.
\textsuperscript{374} Kaczka, “Służba wywiadowcza,” 48.
role in forming cross-border patronage ties. Nonetheless, it is plausible that the proliferation of non-state militaries was conducive to the spread of magnates’ ties with Moldavian elites.

2.4. Adapting the Toolkit

What is striking about the strategies of trust-building in cross-border patronage is that they were not particularly novel. Individuals involved in the networks – be they Moldavians, Poles or Ottomans – employed strategies similar to those within respective political arenas. However, this does not mean that there were no differences between those toolkits. Facing particular challenges posed by cross-border patronage, the actors tailored their strategies in order to make these ties work. In conclusion, I would like to draw on comparison with different regions of the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in order to illustrate how the toolkits of faction-building were adapted to serve their purpose.

Relying on the body of research regarding Ottoman households, we can identify a number of faction-building tools utilized by members of imperial and provincial elites. Firstly, an ambitious official could rely on military corps, most importantly Janissaries. Soldiers living in barracks often formed patron-client relations with their officers, giving rise to gangs that provided their patrons with political backing and means of coercion. Such networks could grow to considerable size. As Jane Hathaway pointed out, two Egyptian household that dominated eighteenth-century political life in the province emerged as such military households: the Qazdağlıs had initially consisted of Janissaries from the Anatolian region of Kazdağ, while the Jalfis drew their influence from the ‘Azeban corps.⁴⁷⁵ Similar developments can be observed in the province of Mosul, where barracks-based Jalilis enjoyed comparable influence.⁴⁷⁶ Even in the imperial capital, military gangs played an important role. For instance, we learn that Grand Vizier Mere Hüseyin Pasha owed his position to the pressure exercised by Janissary riff-raff (zorbas).⁴⁷⁷

Military slavery, practiced since the early Islamic period, constituted another component of the household-building toolkit.⁴⁷⁸ In Egypt, the system reached its peak in the period of the Mamluk

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⁴⁷³ Hathaway, The politics of household, 136.
⁴⁷⁶ Khoury, State and Provincial Society, 135–7.
⁴⁷⁷ Piterberg, An Ottoman Tragedy, 109–12.
Sultanate. Following Ottoman conquest in 1517, the practice continued, not as a vestige of Mamluk institutions, but as a reflection of empire-wide trends. In the later decades of Qazdağı hegemony in the province, the system was so entrenched that local authors considered acquiring *mamluks* a foundational moment of any political household.

In his study of local politics in the Syrian town of Hama, James A. Reilly pointed out the role of Sufi networks as a factional tool. According to him, notables often appropriated these networks of mystical religious orders and used them as channels of communication and coordination between different members of political groupings.

Obviously, these strategies were not applicable in the cross-border context, due to confessional differences and the peculiar status of Danubian principalities. Since boyars were Christians, they did not (and could not) participate in networks based on Islamic religious institutions, such as *vakfs* or Sufi orders. Similarly, individual’s status as a slave automatically banned him from entering the free-born Moldavian elite; in turn, the separation between Ottoman and Moldavian military forces meant that there was no chain of command that could be used to set up cross-border patronage ties. This means that in comparison with the traditional toolkit, the grandees found their cross-border toolkit severely restricted.

In turn, Polish-Lithuanian nobles found their toolkit more adaptable. Since the religious gap between them and Moldavian boyars was not as big as it was the case with Ottoman officials, nobility could establish marriage alliances with their Moldavian counterparts. On the other hand, this does not mean that there were no limitations at all. For instance, confessional differences potentially restricted intermarriage to Greek Orthodox nobility, which increasingly adopted Roman Catholicism in the course of the seventeenth century. Another tool, promoting clients to offices and providing them with landed property, was similarly restricted due to nobility’s exclusive access to these resources. Therefore, outsiders, such as Moldavian boyars, could only obtain them through time-consuming and complicated procedure of *indigenatus*. In effect, the Polish-Lithuanian patrons’

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options were far more restricted in the case of cross-border patronage than they were within the political arena.

As I have shown in this chapter, despite the difficulties individual actors did not give up in their attempts to establish viable cross-border patronage ties. Instead, they adapted their respective toolkits and used them—wherever and however they were applicable. The structure of opportunities and obstacles to faction-building enterprises differed between Polish-Moldavian and Ottoman-Moldavian contexts, which resulted in divergent strategies followed by the actors involved. Therefore, in their dealings with Polish-Lithuanian nobility, Moldavian boyars relied on marriage and military service; in turn, when approaching Ottoman officials, they made use of cins/neam solidarities and shared celali experience. The fact that they were ready to go to considerable lengths in order to establish such complex cross-border ties, suggests that the resources available in the networks were attractive enough to merit the effort. In the following chapter, I will address this problem and explain what the actors hoped to obtain from these complicated alliances.
Chapter 3. The Flow of Resources

Obviously, no individual engaged in the arduous task of building a faction just for its own sake. Patronage networks were a dynamic pattern of interactions rather than a static social phenomenon, with their participants trying to achieve their goals and access coveted resources. Thus, in order to understand why the elites went to such lengths in order to build and maintain the networks, it is necessary to take a closer look at the ultimate purpose of such interactions – the resources they could procure from the arrangement and what they were willing to contribute in exchange.

Engaging in such analysis poses two major challenges. The first difficulty is the need to classify a wide variety of resources that flowed through the networks, ranging from smallest gifts to tens of thousands of soldiers. Nonetheless, such a classification is necessary in order not to drown in a flood of particular cases. The second challenge stems from the nature of sources we can mine for necessary information. We have few first-hand reports concerning the content of cross-border patronage ties; we usually learn about the transfers from second- or third-hand accounts of diplomats in Istanbul, comments by other members of the elite, as well as historical works. Due to the frequently covert nature of such exchanges, the authors had to rely on hearsay and rumor, resulting in vague and often unreliable statements. It is a hopeless task to try to determine the volume of cash transfers, if the only information we have is that it was ‘a great sum.’ In other instances, we do not even know what type of resources circulated between particular individuals, since contemporaries only described them as ‘being good friends.’

The complementary challenge the sources pose is the fragmentary character of the evidence. Often, all what we are left with is just a general indication of cooperation between two individuals and a truly homeopathic dose of details. In some cases of decade-long patron-client relationships, we can identify but one exchange of resources that provides us with any information regarding their content. Thus, the exchanges we know about are but a tip of an iceberg, and the frequency of interactions was much higher than the sources suggest, although again it is impossible to know to what extent.

In order to account and conceptualize these flows, it is useful to turn to the concept of social capital proposed by Nan Lin. According to him:
“When certain goods are deliberately mobilized for a purposive action, they become capital. Capital is an investment of resources intended to generate returns. Thus, it is tailored by the actor to meet an organization’s demand. In return, the actor may be rewarded with social (reputation), economic (wealth), or political (power) resources. […] Through social ties and networking, actors gain additional resources of direct and indirect ties.”

This approach to resources, as embedded in social networks and produced by the actors investing in maintenance and expansion of their social capital, provides us with a fitting framework for the analysis of what resources (and how) were deployed in cross-border patronage.

This leads us back to the problem of classifying the resources embedded in exchanges between the Polish-Lithuanian, Ottoman and Moldavian political arenas. In order to do this, I have decided to delineate four categories of capital, presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Types of capital and corresponding resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of capital</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political-military</strong></td>
<td>Power and authority; protection (both political and military); career advancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td>Procurement of economic revenue; access and control of the sources of revenue; credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informational-communicational</strong></td>
<td>Control of information and ability to manipulate it; intelligence; control and management of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>Prestige and reputation; expansion and reproduction of social networks; gifts; civility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, this classification is heuristic rather than reflecting a strict division in reality. For instance, an appointment to the throne of Moldavia provided new ruler with virtually all types of capital listed above.

That said, we should also keep in mind that the procurement of resources through patronage networks did not necessarily mean that the receiver could automatically deploy them in his political arena. More often than not, in order to be effective, such resources first had to be converted. As Bartolomé Yun Casalilla points out, factional organization operated both as a system of procurement

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and conversion of different types of capital. Thus, in order to present a full picture of circulation of resources within cross-border networks, we should pay attention not only to flows, but also to the patterns of capital conversion.

The structure of the chapter reflects this categorization. In the first section, I focus on the role of power, with special attention paid to the mobilization of political and military resources. Subsequently, I move to considerations of economic character, trying to identify various ways in which both land and money were accessed through cross-border patronage. As I argue, the economic realities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire produced divergent concepts of what constituted a valuable asset in the interaction with Moldavian clients. At the same time, I challenge the well-entrenched myth in Romanian historiography, which saw Ottoman officials as opportunistic grafters, taking opportunity from every occasion to extort members of the Moldavian elite. In the third section, I shift my attention to the complex role of patronage in procurement of information and control of communication flows. The following section takes under closer examination social resources and strategies the actors employed in order to improve their reputation, as well as to expand their social networks. In the conclusion, I assess the role of cross-border patronage as a resource-procuring mechanism and its ties to other form of social organization, most importantly to state institutions.

3.1. Political and Military Resources

Due to its high-profile character, the political aspect of cross-border exchanges was of special interest to the contemporaries. Authors often referred to cooperation and protection, when discussing appointments and career advancement of particular individuals or their attempts to fend off competition, using patronage ties to procure both political and military support.

In theory, only a handful of people exercised authority in the matter of appointments. Appointments within the Ottoman officialdom, as well as to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia rested with the sultan, as well as the grand vizier in his capacity as the ruler’s deputy. The voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia in turn had full liberty to handpick their own officials. In Poland-Lithuania, the king

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obviously had full control over appointment policy, but at the same time claimed the right to choose Moldavian rulers. Thus, if we restrict ourselves to the structural approach, the number of people involved in Polish-Moldavian-Ottoman politics would be extremely small, including only five individuals at any given time.

However, such a neat distinction does not reflect reality, and the number of actors involved in the process of appointment was much larger. Additionally, those formally in charge, often played second fiddle in deciding who would fill particular positions. Key officials, powerful magnates and influential palace favorites partook in decision-making by promoting their associates, and frequently overshadowed those, who theoretically had the final say in the matter.

Indicative of this tendency is the exchange of letters between King Vladislav IV and the Grand Crown Hetman, Stanisław Koniecpolski, in fall 1634. Following the conclusion of Polish-Ottoman border conflict, known in historiography as Abaza Pasha War (1633-1634), the king attempted to use peace talks with the Porte in order to promote his candidate to the Moldavian throne. He set his eyes on Nicolae Catargiu, a Moldavian boyar involved in the negotiations. Thus, Vladislav IV instructed the Hetman to relay his orders to the Polish envoy negotiating with the Porte, and to support Catargiu by all means possible.384

Koniecpolski, whose clients had their own claims to the Moldavian throne, did not comply. Instead, he responded to Vladislav, saying that despite his unwavering loyalty to the ruler and willingness to conform to his wishes, he felt obliged to send an envoy to the king in order to explain “what kind of a man [Catargiu] is.”385 Unfortunately, we do not know the content of the report, but it is clear that the information relayed to the king brought the monarch back in line. Five days later, Vladislav wrote to Koniecpolski:

“In regard to Catargiu […] we not only do not wish him to be [the ruler] anywhere in the vicinity of our lands, but he should not even be mentioned in our talks with the Porte. […] We have no doubt that the Cupbearer of Braclav [Jakub Zieliński, the envoy to the Porte – M.W.] will follow your instructions and will see to that if

384 Vladislav IV to Stanisław Koniecpolski, October 4, 1634 in Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 265–6.
385 Stanisław Koniecpolski to Vladislav IV, October 8, 1634 in Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 266.
he would encounter difficulties in the candidature of Moise [Movilă], he would promote in any way possible the latter’s brother Ioan or [Iancu] Costin.”

It is not surprising to learn that all the candidates listed in the letter were clients of Koniecpolski, which leads us to believe, that the Hetman attended to their interests by discouraging the king from supporting Catargiu.

He was not the only one to do so. For instance, Jan Zamoyski, whose patronage over Ieremia Movilă will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, entered Moldavia without king’s permission and single-handedly installed his client on the throne, leaving Sigismund III with little choice but to recognize the fait accompli. The Chancellor’s control over Moldavian policy of the Commonwealth was virtually unchecked and in 1600 the royal envoy to the Porte, Andrzej Taranowski, complained that he had been detained by Zamoyski’s men, upon a suspicion of conducting secret talks with Ieremia’s enemy, Michael the Brave, without the Chancellor’s consent. Clearly, the actual process of decision-making diverged significantly from the theory.

The situation in the Ottoman Empire was no different. In theory, an intimate relationship between the sultan and the grand vizier constituted the backbone of imperial political system, linking the inner household (enderun) with Ottoman administrative apparatus (birun). Ideally, this exclusive bond between the padishah and his deputy limited factional infighting and secured the position of the grand vizier at the apex of imperial administration.

Starting from mid-sixteenth century this ideal, while never fully corresponding to mundane realities, began to unravel. As Ottoman grandees overtook administration through their patronage networks, sultans struggled to enhance their position by promoting favorites (musahibs) from among the Inner Palace personnel and co-opting individual members of the birun. In effect, the boundary between the two spheres blurred, contributing to the emergence of new political flows.

386 Vladislav IV to Stanisław Koniecpolski, L’viv, October 13, 1634 in Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 268.
387 Andrzej Taranowski to Jan Zamoyski, June 13, 1600, Warsaw, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Zamoyskich 701.
This reconfiguration of the Ottoman political arena profoundly reshaped Moldavian-Ottoman patronage networks, since members of the Moldavian elite formed alliances with these newly empowered actors. While the grand viziers managed to retain some of their power and in many instances successfully promoted their clients to the thrones of Danubian principalities, they were no longer the only ones to do so. Illustrative in this respect is a passage from Miron Costin’s chronicle, describing factional configuration at the Porte in late 1630s:

“During the reign of Sultan Murad, all the matters of the empire depended on two men, who were Murad’s musahibs. One was silahdar [silihtar] that is the sword-bearer, who carries the sultan’s sword and mace; the other one was kazlar ağa, who manages the whole imperial household and oversees his women. These two men were in charge of all the imperial affairs, and the vizierate was very weak when compared to them. They say that when the grand vizier happened to meet one of them, he kissed their robes.”

This disconnection between formal hierarchies and actual political influence meant that Moldavian and Wallachian actors had more options in their search for an effective patron at the Porte, and throughout the seventeenth century, we find them associated with officials from all sections of Ottoman officialdom.

A short survey of Matei Basarab’s patronage network in the 1630s provides a good illustration of this trend. As I have pointed out in Chapter 2, Matei’s route to power mirrored that of Ottoman celali warlords, and the voievode owed his success to the protection of Abaza Mehmed Pasha, the beylerbey of Silistre. Following his erstwhile patron’s execution, the Wallachian ruler managed to establish his own patronage network, which allowed him to retain the throne despite many adversities and constant hostility of Vasile Lupu. His patrons were members of different branches of Ottoman administration, including provincial governors (Abaza Mehmed Pasha), dragomans of the Porte (Zülfikar Efendi), Murad IV’s favorite (Silahdar Mustafa Pasha) and bureaucrats of the financial administration (Ruznameci Ibrahim Efendi).

The case of Ibrahim Efendi is particularly instructive, since it shows us the complex network of alliances and patronage spanning across different sections of the Ottoman elite and beyond. As an

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official of Ottoman fiscal administration, Ibrahim Efendi became a favorite of Murad IV. According to the sources, the official played a crucial role in placating the financial demands of Janissary and cavalry units, a matter of utmost importance if we keep in mind that in 1622 a military rebellion had resulted in the first regicide in Ottoman history. According to a Venetian report from January 1637, the affection of Murad IV’s to his treasurer was so great that, when the latter fell ill, the ruler visited him daily and ordered other all top officials of the Porte to follow suit.\textsuperscript{394} When the following year Ibrahim Efendi died, an anonymous informant of Stanisław Koniecpolski reported:

“While the emperor was on his campaign against Babylon [Baghdad], Ibrahim Efendi Ruznameci passed away. His advice was greatly appreciated by the emperor and people often called him Küçük Hunkar. He used to tell the emperor ‘As long as I’m alive, fear not the sipahi and Janissaries.’ The emperor mourned him greatly.”\textsuperscript{395}

Murad IV was not the only one to mourn the official’s death. From a report by Alvise Contarini, we learn that Ibrahim Efendi was not only the ruler’s favorite, but also a patron of Matei Basarab, who thus lost his major protector at the Porte:

“Era [Rusnamagi] tutto protettore del principe di Valacchia, che per questo perderà assai, poco amico del Capitan Bassa, che però resta patrone assoluto del favore serviva a gran rittegno del precipitii del Re, che però saranno più impetuosi.”\textsuperscript{396}

It is thus clear that the rise of favorites in the Ottoman political arena provided alternative routes of access to appointments, allowed Moldavian actors to circumvent a hostile grand vizier. Matei Basarab managed to retain the Wallachian throne throughout the 1630s despite the fact that the grand vizier were allies of Vasile Lupu. Even a grand vizier as powerful as Köprülüzade Ahmed Pasha was unable to exercise full control of the appointments. According to Radu Popescu, in 1664 the grand vizier returned to Istanbul from the Hungarian front only to learn that his client in Wallachia,
Grigore Ghica, had been replaced with Radu Leon.\(^\text{397}\) The grand vizier was furious, but had no choice but to accept the situation.

High-ranking friends were also instrumental in cushioning one’s fall from power. Even if they were unable to prevent their client from losing his position, they could secure both political and physical survival of their less fortunate associate. As I have mentioned in Chapter 2, throughout his long tenure as the grand vizier (1661-1676), Köprülüzade Ahmed Pasha provided continuous support for his two Moldavian clients – Grigore Ghica and Gheorghe Duca. According to the sources, at least on four occasions, the Ottoman official saved their lives, despite serious accusations brought against them.\(^\text{398}\) For instance, both in 1664 and 1673 Ghica faced well-founded accusations of treason and desertion from the battlefield, causing Ottoman defeats, but nonetheless every time his patron at the Porte pardoned him.\(^\text{399}\)

The present account may create an impression that cross-border flow of political resources occurred solely between Ottoman officials and the voievodes of Moldavia and Wallachia. However, boyars were also active in such exchanges, which often allowed them to circumvent hostile voievodes and equalize the field in the principality. One of the most prominent cases of boyar activity in cross-border patronage that of Constantin Postelnic Cantacuzino, one of the most influential Wallachian boyars in the 1650s and 1660s. According to the Cantacuzino Chronicle Cantacuzino was a good friend of Köprüülü Mehmed Pasha and hence was allowed to choose the new voievode by himself in 1660.\(^\text{400}\) His choice was Grigore Ghica, with whom Cantacuzino had made an arrangement, whereby the boyar would retain the final say in the matters of the principality. The correspondence between the two clearly shows that the voievode occupied a subordinate position within the relationship:

> “Since you have left, I have been as if mute and deaf, with no joy [...] I don’t want to contradict you in any matter, and I will give you no advice. I leave all the matters to your judgement and you should act as you see fit [...] I invest all my faith in you and defer to you, since me and you, we are one.”\(^\text{401}\)

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398 Ion Neculce, *Letopisul Țării Moldovei*, 128, 133, 139.
401 „De când te-ai dus dumneata de la mine, am rămas mut și surd, și făr-de om. [...] Eu din cuvântul dumitale nu voui ieși, nici dela mine să aștepi învățătură; că eu las asupra dumitale de toate lucrurile: cum vei scoți așa să faci [...] Foarte să-ți pui poalele-n brâu și să te nevoiești, pentru mine și pentru dumneata, că noi amândoi una sătem”. Mihai ban Cantacuzino, *Genealogia Cantacuzinilor*, 86–9.
This example shows that the access to political resources through cross-border patronage equalized the field for the actors in Moldavian and Wallachian political arenas, at least at the apex of social hierarchy. In effect, faction leaders emerged as virtual kingmakers in the second half of the seventeenth century. This trend culminated in the 1660s and 1670s, when the voievodes of Moldavia and Wallachia were predominantly obscure figures, acting as little more than ciphers for real powerholders. Obviously, more assertive rulers, as well as rival faction leaders, tried to enhance their position, further engaging in cross-border patronage.

This factional buildup contributed to growing connectedness between the political arenas of the Danubian principalities and those of the Commonwealth and the Porte. Since the political resources brought from beyond the confines of the political arena could shift the balance of power, actors had no choice but to follow suit. These individual, *ad hoc* measures had a cumulative effect, reshaping the arenas and political repertoires.

Access to political resources did not mean that decisions were enforceable by a simple administrative fiat. In order to carry out an appointment to the throne or protect one’s clients, actors often had to turn to violent means, mobilizing a fighting force to take effective control of the resources. This poses the question of the role of military resources available through cross-border patronage ties, and their deployment to achieve particular goals.

Accessing Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman military resources was a matter of crucial importance, due to the overall ineffectiveness of Moldavian and Wallachian troops. Throughout the seventeenth century, with minor exceptions, the quality of the principalities’ armed forces was an object of contempt by Polish and Ottoman commanders alike, who deemed them undisciplined, poorly armed and prone to flee from the battlefield. This period witnessed the introduction of military reforms, including the establishment of infantry (*dorobanți*) and cavalry corps (*slujitori*); at the same time, the voievodes increasingly recruited mercenary troops (*seimeni*), a development mirroring the rise of *sekban* in the Ottoman Empire.\(^\text{402}\) However, these attempts to overhaul Moldavian and Wallachian militaries did not change the fact that armies of the principalities lagged behind both

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Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman fighting capabilities. Thus, securing military assistance from abroad was in most cases a decisive factor in the outcome of conflicts in the Danubian principalities.

In mobilizing and accessing the means to wage war, cross-border patronage played a crucial role. Since Michael Roberts' thesis concerning 'military revolution', many scholars saw the growth of state armies as a factor of change that contributed to expansion of state's administrative capacities and political power. However, in his recent contribution to the topic, David Parrott pointed out that monopolization of violence has been an ‘anomalous’ development rather than a rule:

“[T]here is no necessary incompatibility between the growth of the power of the state and the development of a substantial sphere of private military activity; indeed, the latter made possible a robustness and organizational ‘reach’ that would otherwise have been unattainable to government authorities.”

This remark holds true for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century, where the boundaries between private and public military were blurred. In the former case, army command rested with the Crown Grand Hetman (hetman wielki koronny) and his deputy, Crown Field Hetman (hetman polny koronny), as well as their counterparts in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, as I have pointed out, the Hetmans were by no means the only actors in the southeastern provinces of the Commonwealth to wield military resources. Exposed to devastating Tatar raids and Cossack uprisings, the region was inadequately protected by the minuscule Quarter Army of 1,500-5,000 soldiers, spread across vast expanses of the borderland. In effect, local powerholders invested heavily in their own fighting force in order to protect their estates. Mobilization capabilities of individual magnates could be considerable and in some cases superseded the size of the standing army of the Crown, making them an important component of Polish-Lithuanian military presence throughout the region.

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403 For the concept and paradigm of military revolution see Geoffrey Parker, The military revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge University Press, 1996), passim.
405 For the description of Crown Hetmans' position within the administrative system of the Commonwealth in the period, see Gawron, Hetman koronny w systemie ustrojowym, passim.
406 Wimmer, Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku, 37.
407 Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie 1595-1623, 257. This goes along the lines of the general trend of the 'military accumulation' and the growth of private means of violence in the borderland context of the raiding economy, see Baretta and Markoff, “Civilization and Barbarism,” 593.
While their participation in campaigns was crucial for enhancing the effective, their private status meant that they were not subordinated to the Hetmans, but remained under the command of their owners. Thus, in order to tap into these military resources, the Hetmans had to bargain with magnates and coax them into joining the campaign and follow his orders. Moreover, constant arrears and general inefficiency of Polish-Lithuanian fiscal institutions meant that the commanders of the Crown's army were forced to negotiate with their subordinates and pay salaries from their own pockets to keep the units on the front. Therefore, while control over the military gave access to ample resources, it also required considerable inputs, with patronage playing a crucial role in the process of mobilization for campaigns.

Polish-Lithuanian military interventions in Moldavia validate this point. Between 1595 and 1620, troops from the Commonwealth entered the principality on six occasions, supporting different pretenders to the throne (1595, 1600, 1607-1608, 1612, 1615-1616, 1620). While there is a degree of continuity between these military interventions, Polish and Romanian scholars have tended to divide them in two categories. On the one hand, the campaigns led by Jan Zamoyski (1595, 1600) and Stanisław Żółkiewski have been interpreted as state-sponsored affairs, undertaken in order to secure objective geopolitical interests of the Commonwealth in the Lower Danube region. In contrast, scholars treat the campaigns of 1607-1608, 1612 and 1615-1616 as private enterprises, driven by personal ambition of local magnates and often criticized as irresponsible ‘adventurism’.

While I examine the details of these campaigns in the following chapters, it is important to note that the distinction between ‘state-sponsored’ and ‘private’ campaigns dissipates as soon as we look at the makeup of troops. In most cases, they constituted a mix of ‘state-owned’ and private troops. For

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instance, the armies led by Zamoyski to Moldavia in 1595 and 1600 included numerous private units, up to 25 per cent of the total effectives. Moreover, most of the officer corps consisted of Zamoyski’s clients and associates, providing further evidence for the role of patronage in mobilizing military resources. In turn, Stanisław Żółkiewski, embarking on the 1620 campaign in Moldavia, managed to cobble a larger coalition of magnates, including his personal enemies, but this initial success contributed to the lack of discipline and squabbles among commanders, eventually leading to a catastrophic defeat. Thus, private military played an important role in the course of so-called ‘state-sponsored’ campaigns, enhancing the effectives, but also creating tensions between different commanders.

While we know less about the makeup of troops participating in so-called private campaigns, it is clear that the only expedition without any involvement of the Quarter Army was the last one, in 1615-1616. However, as I will show in Chapter 4, the absence of state-owned units from this campaign was a result of a fierce factional conflict between the leaders of the campaign, Princes Myxajlo Vyšnevec’kyj and Samijlo Korec’kyj, and the Field Crown Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, which resulted in the latter denying any military assistance. However, even without state support, the princes were able to mobilize an army of 12,000 soldiers, to install their brother-in-law, Alexandru Movilă, on the Moldavian throne.

When members of the Moldavian elite appealed to their Polish-Lithuanian patrons, they stood a good chance to receive considerable political and military resources, more than they could mobilize within their own arena. At the same time, they were setting in motion a complex mechanism of resource procurement, which included both private resources of the patrons and others, embedded in state institutions. This suggests that we should consider cross-border patronage networks not as an isolated phenomenon, but rather as a part of a complex circuit of resource flows, extending well into respective political arenas.

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Not all Moldavian appeals were successful and produced desired effects. In some cases, the expected support never materialized. Miron Barnovschi’s relationship with Tomasz Zamoyski provides an example of a failed attempt to secure political and military resources. Ousted from Moldavia in 1629 and forced to seek refuge in Poland-Lithuania, the former voievode immediately engaged in a struggle to retake the throne. In order to do this, he approached Zamoyski with a project of the military intervention in the principality, requesting troops and the magnate’s permission to use the town of Jampol as a base of the planned operation. However, Zamoyski proved reluctant to get involved in the projected campaign and instead instructed Barnovschi to refer the whole matter to Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski. In his own letter to the official, Zamoyski expressed his reservations about the plan, and declared that his support hinged on Koniecpolski’s approval. The latter’s response was negative and the project was dropped. Clearly, while Zamoyski was not against the plan per se, he was wary not to alienate the powerful official, and eventually abandoned the plan.

The situation in the Ottoman Empire was not much different. While the imperial revenue-raising system was far superior to that of the Commonwealth and allowed for a much larger standing army, this did not mean that securing military support was a non-issue. Firstly, just like in Poland-Lithuania, Ottoman troops constituted a mixture between state-owned and private units, the latter remaining on grandees’ payroll. Secondly, the Ottoman chain of command was susceptible to conflicting factional interests and issuing an order did not mean its implementation.

In the context of Ottoman-Moldavian cross-border patronage, field commanders and provincial governors frequently obstructed orders received from the Porte. Obedézcase, pero no se cumpla reigned supreme, and officials entrusted with installing a new voievode often dragged their feet. Fazlı Ahmed Pasha, ordered to enthrone new voievode in Wallachia in spring 1658, advanced from Yergöğü (Giurgiu) to the Wallachian capital of Târgovişte so slowly that he covered 140 kilometers.

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414 Tomasz Zamoyski to Stanisław Koniecpolski, January 2, 1630, Warsaw, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Zamoyskich, 890.
415 Milewski, Molдавия между Polską a Turcją, 278-279.
in staggering seventeen days, despite the lack of resistance.\textsuperscript{417} This gave the rebel voievode, Constantin Șerban, time necessary to elude the Ottoman army and retreat with his troops to Transylvania. Fazlı Ahmed Pasha was subsequently executed on the orders of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, but not every grand vizier had enough influence to punish recalcitrant subordinates. Abaza Mehmed Pasha, who, as I have shown in Chapter 2, not only supported Matei Basarab’s cause at the Porte, but even provided him with troops against the wishes of the Porte, managed to escape punishment for his actions.

The Crimean Khanate constituted a special case in this respect. As I have mentioned in Chapter 1, due to their geographic proximity and military resources at their disposal, Crimean khans played an important role in projecting military power of the Ottoman Empire in the Black Sea region. In effect, Ottoman officials often relied on the Tatar rulers to provide their clients with military resources. However, the khans had their own agendas and the grandees had to coax them into following their wishes, and even then it was uncertain if the khan would comply. When Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha tried to secure Gazi Giray II’s participation in an attempt to annex Moldavia and Wallachia in 1595 (an episode I will discuss in detail in Chapter 5), he was forced to agree to appoint the khan’s nephew as the \textit{beylerbey} of Moldavia. Even then, the khan was quick to jump ship when the arrangement with Jan Zamoyski proved more attractive. In other cases, the Crimean rulers paid only lip service to the Porte’s demands. When Köprülü Mehmed Pasha ordered Mehmed Giray IV to send the Tatars in order to help his client, Gheorghe Ghica, the khan complied. However, as Miron Costin noted wryly, “strange help it was, since there were only 300 of them, and not only did they not fight, but they were nowhere to be found when any fighting started.”\textsuperscript{418}

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As Ronald Burt noted, “formal relations are about who is to blame. Informal relations are about who gets it done.”\textsuperscript{419} Moldavian boyars, Polish-Lithuanian nobles and Ottoman officials would certainly agree. Procurement of political resources and military power was a messy affair, involving ‘muddling through’, coaxing, patronage and protection. Since resources available through cross-border


\textsuperscript{418} Costin, \textit{Letopiseţul Ţării Moldovei}, 194.

\textsuperscript{419} Burt, \textit{Brokerage and Closure}, 3–4.
patronage far outstripped those embedded in the local political arena, members of the Moldavian elite eagerly turned to their partners in Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire. By associating themselves with a powerful official at the Porte or a Ukrainian magnate, the boyars could gain a competitive advantage in comparison with their rivals in the principality.

Contrary to the perception often encountered in historiography, these appeals did not enlist support of a disembodied, abstract and internally homogenous ‘Commonwealth’ or ‘Sublime Porte,’ but rather appealed to individuals, able and willing to provide them with necessary political and military resources. Since these resources rested with multiple actors, often in conflict with each other, Moldavian boyars could utilize these fissures to make appeal – and receive assistance – to different centers of power. If a grand vizier allied himself with rival Moldavian faction, one could turn to sultan’s musahib in order to circumvent the hostile official. In turn, when the Hetman was unwilling to provide troops, other magnates could be more forthcoming. Of course, these ties did not guarantee success and sometimes failed to secure the coveted resources. However, when they did, they offered considerable advantage over rivals within the Moldavian political arena. Other boyars had to build their own networks in order to compete for power in the principality.

This bandwagon effect and proliferation of cross-border patronage ties had important consequences, equalizing the arena for those able to build and sustain such networks. This included not only the voievode, but also high-ranking boyars, who could subvert the ruler's position at the apex of the principality's political hierarchy. The second half of the seventeenth century constituted a period of weak voievodes, acting as rubber stamps for powerful ‘kingmakers’ in Moldavia and Wallachia. More assertive voievodes had to turn to cross-border patronage in order to counter the boyars’ influence. In effect, the factional struggle of the Moldavian elite quickly outgrew the confines of the local political arena.

In turn, Ottoman and Polish-Lithuanian patrons had to ‘muddle through’ to keep their end of the bargain. While some of the resources were readily available, others had to be procured from other circuits, including wider patronage networks and state institutions. Many things could go wrong; even more people wished them to go wrong. Rival officials and magnates could deny access to resources. Moreover, those required to carry out the orders could obstruct or openly resist them.
They had to be coopted, coaxed, or coerced in order not to sabotage the enterprise; bargains had to be made and coalitions assembled.

This suggests two major points that I will further explore in this chapter. Firstly, the evidence suggests that we should not see the relationship between, say, a Moldavian boyar and an Ottoman vizier as isolated from other circuits of resource flows, but rather as a point of access to the resources embedded in other political arenas. In order to mobilize resources and transfer them to their clients and/or patrons, the participants in the exchange had to mobilize not only their own resources, but also those of their associates, subordinates and superiors. Thus, rather than constituting a one-off exchange between two individuals, transfer of political and military resources can be seen as a process, which – although initiated within a patron-client dyad – necessitated involvement of multiple actors and circuits of resource flows.

The second observation concerns the interrelationship between cross-border patronage networks and formal institutions. As the analysis has made clear, we cannot speak of the ‘collective mind of government’ or any coherent ‘state-oriented’ purpose. This could lead us to the conclusion that there was little space left for formal institutions and their role was insignificant. However, this would be a gross misrepresentation. As John Scott pointed out, the fact that the decision-making process does not conform to the formal institutions does not invalidate the role of structural features.⁴²⁹ After all, many (although by no means all) of the political and military resources transferred by Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman patrons to their Moldavian clients were available due to official capacities of the actors. A Hetman entering Moldavia could find himself bogged in negotiations with his own soldiers and commanders of private troops, but he nonetheless had access to the military resources because of his official capacity. Thus, rather than seeing formal hierarchies as separate from cross-border patronage networks, we should instead approach them as distinct, but intersecting circuits; resources procured through one circuit could be subsequently deployed in the other. This becomes even more prominent in the following section, which addresses the questions of who paid for this and who cashed the profit.

3.2. Making a Profit: Circulation of Economic Resources

Maintaining a political household constituted a serious financial burden. Patrons had considerable financial obligations, since they were expected to support their clients, mobilize troops and engage in conspicuous consumption. In order to meet these expenses, new economic resources had to be found and tapped in order to keep the factional enterprise viable. In this section, I will examine the financial aspect of cross-border patronage and the role they played as a mechanism of resource extraction and redistribution.421

While cultural and political contacts between Poland-Lithuania and Moldavia have garnered considerable attention among Polish and Romanian scholars, virtually no studies exist on economic flows between the two polities.422 This stands in stark contrast to the prominence of economy in the discussion on Ottoman-Moldavian relations. In Romanian historiography, the Ottoman Empire has been depicted as a bète noir, responsible for economic ills of the region and its subsequent backwardness.423 This coincides with the sway the concept of Ottoman ‘decline’ still enjoys among Romanian historians. The concept of the ‘moral decline,’ as a process of growing demoralization of Ottoman officialdom, features prominently in this interpretation. According to Mihai Maxim, one of the main proponents of this thesis:

“The beginning of the Ottoman decline starting from the last quarter of the sixteenth century, and especially corruption and administrative abuse contributed to the rise of the material and moral price paid by non-Muslims [of the Danubian principalities – M.W.] to maintain their religious identity and their own organization.”424

The most fundamental problem with this argumentation – moral judgement aside – is that it is impossible to prove and self-referential (‘the Ottoman officials took bribes, since they were corrupt, proven by the fact that they took bribes’). Indeed, the volume of economic resources transferred from the Danubian principalities to the Porte increased during the seventeenth century, with a

421 Yun Casalilla, “Reading sources throughout P. Bourdieu and Cyert and March,” 332.
424 Maxim, Ţările Române şi Înalta Poartă, 182.
decreasing share reaching sultan’s treasury. However, even if we see this phenomenon as simple corruption, which, as I will argue in this section, is open to doubt, we need to analyze first the underlying causes for this development. Approaching this topic from a faction-oriented perspective and providing a comparison with Polish-Moldavian patronage networks allows us to present a more complex, but at the same time more convincing, explanation of the dynamics behind cross-border resource flows in the seventeenth century.

3.2.1. Pişkeşization and ‘Shadow Iltizam’

As I have mentioned in Chapter 1, the main financial and legal obligation of the rulers of the Danubian principalities was the payment of annual harac to the imperial treasury. According to shari‘a, the harac constituted a legal obligation of non-Muslim residents (zimmis) of the ‘Abode of Islam,’ and the expression of their subordination to Islamic rulers. In his capacity as a ‘tax-collector’ (haracgüzär) appointed by the Porte, the voievode of Moldavia (as well as that of Wallachia) was to collect a lump sum from the population of the principality and remit it to the treasury in Istanbul.

Its legal and symbolic importance notwithstanding, the harac constituted a crucial channel of cash flows between imperial center and periphery. Its amount was susceptible to fluctuations in the balance of power, as well as financial imperatives of the Porte. Moreover, while a centerpiece in the financial arrangements between the Ottoman center and the principalities, harac constituted one of many principalities’ obligations, including customary gifts (pişkes), and the provisioning of Ottoman capital and the army.

Throughout the second half of the sixteenth century, the amount of tribute demanded from the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia skyrocketed. While in 1538 the voievodes of Moldavia had to pay 10,000 ducats annually, by 1583 this amount grew sixfold. Wallachia’s burden was even heavier, reaching over 100,000 ducats per year (see Figure 3.1. below). This rapid growth outstripped voievodes’ ability to extract revenue from the principalities and, despite parallel expansion of Moldavian and Wallachian fiscal apparatus, by 1593 the voievodes faced insolvency, burdened


426 According to the estimates of Bogdan Murugesu, the level of taxation was around 2 ducats per capita in Wallachia and 1 ducat per capita in Moldavia, Bogdan Murugesu, “Modernizarea” Țării Românești și a Moldovei în secolele
with outstanding debts of over seven million ducats. This financial crisis eventually led the rulers to rebel against the Porte. Tellingly, the first action of the rebel voievodes against the Porte was a massacre of their Ottoman creditors, which can be interpreted as a gruesome way of defaulting on their debts.

Figure 3.3 The amount of annual harac of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania (1500–1828), calculated in ducats. From (Murgescu 2010, 33)

When the Porte finally restored its suzerainty over the principalities after the rebellion and the payment of tribute resumed, the financial obligations of the voievodes were reduced to about one-third of pre-1593 level. This constituted a logical step, since excessive taxation had contributed to the rebellion in the first place, and years of war took their toll on the tax-paying population of the

XVI-XVII: Tipare, particularități, perspective,” in Țările Române între Imperiul Otoman și Europa creștină, Historia (Iași: Polirom, 2012), 305. For the English version of the argument, see idem, “The «Modernization» of the Romanian Principalities during the 16th-17th Centuries: Patterns, Distortions, Prospects,” in Modernizacja struktur władzy w warunkach opóźnienia: Europa Środkowa i Wschodnia na przełomie średniowiecza i czasów nowożytnych, ed. Marian Dygo, Sławomir Gawlas and Hieronim Grala (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo DiG, 1999), 173-184. As Murgescu rightly points out, the unintended consequence of this demand for cash was a crash course of the monetized economy in Moldavia and Wallachia, as the population strived to raise monetary resources to pay their taxes.


principalities. However, despite the fact that the same factors that had contributed to the growth of Moldavian-Wallachian obligations in the late sixteenth century – competition for the thrones and increased demand for cash at the Porte – were still in place throughout the seventeenth century, the amount of harac remained relatively stable and even decreased due to inflation of akçe. The only spikes in the sums demanded from the Wallachian voievodes (in 1632 and 1703) were purely conjectural and owed much to the unstable position of incumbent voievodes, Matei Basarab and Constantin Brâncoveanu, trying to secure their position on the throne.

Trying to explain this tendency, the Romanian Ottomanist Tahsin Gemil attributed the stagnation of tribute to geopolitical concerns of the Porte. According to him, the traumatic experience of the 1594 rebellion sunk deep into the minds of Ottoman officials and discouraged them from increasing the financial burden of the principalities. Since the voievodes could call upon support of their Christian neighbors, it was preferable for the Porte to show moderation in its financial demands.429 In order to prove the point, Gemil juxtaposed the Danubian principalities with Dubrovnik, which did not pose such a geopolitical threat to the Porte. According to Gemil, this led to a doubling of tribute paid by the small city-state and allowed the Ottomans to dictate their own terms without restraint.

However, this ‘geopolitical interpretation’ poses a number of difficulties. Firstly, in clear contradiction to Gemil’s argument, the harac paid by Dubrovnik remained fixed at 12,500 gold pieces throughout the seventeenth century, although Ragusan diplomats and Ottoman officials wrangled over exchange rates.430 Thus, despite different geopolitical standing, both Danubian principalities and the small republic saw their tribute stagnate throughout the seventeenth century, which forces us to look for alternative explanations.

More importantly, we have to keep in mind that harac constituted but one of many forms of financial obligations to the Porte. As Gemil pointed out in another study, in the seventeenth century the relative importance of harac in Moldavian-Ottoman cash flows decreased in favor of pişkeş.431 While until the late sixteenth century these gifts had been of symbolic rather than economic

429 ibid., 1445.
431 Gemil, Țările române în contextul politic internațional (1621-1672), 14–5.
importance, in the following period their economic aspect grew in importance and their monetary value increased significantly. In fact, as Dragoş Ungureanu’s research on Wallachian treasury has shown, by the end of the seventeenth century the pişkeş replaced harac as the single largest channel of cash flows between the Porte and the Danubian principalities, in some years amounting to as much as a quarter of total expenditure.432 Thus, the stagnation of tribute amount was not an effect of Ottoman self-restraint, but rather a reflection of changing structure of financial flows between the center and the periphery.

As I argue, this pişkeş-ization of Moldavian and Wallachian obligations had little to do with geopolitical concerns of the Ottoman elite, but was a product of a larger empire-wide trend. The phenomenon originated at the intersection of three interrelated phenomena: the emergence of grandee households in the Ottoman political arena, transformation of revenue-raising mechanism triggered by the process of economic change, and the rise of cross-border patronage as a crucial circuit of resource flows.

As I have mentioned in Chapter 1, the seventeenth century was a period of devolution of power from the sultan and his household towards grandee households, which overshadowed the ruler in terms of political power. In many respects, this proliferation of kapıs was a product of necessity and a response to increasing instability of the officials’ position due to their falling income and increasing competition for resources. As the time spent in office generally decreased, and periods in between appointments expanded, the officials struggled to increase their chances of winning appointment. This, as Metin Kunt notes, led to expansion of the households:

“There were pressures on Ottoman officials to maintain larger households and employ thousands of troops while at the same time their traditional incomes dwindled. [...] a pasha had to maintain a large household even when he was out of office, for appointments went to those who had a mukemmel kapi - a well-fitted out household.”433

This posed a serious problem. While the revenues that grandees could draw from traditional sources were falling, they found themselves forced to increase their expenses to secure appointments in the future. In order to escape this trap, the officials adapted to the changing conditions and moved to tap into new sources of revenue, including trade, credit and tax farming.

The sources give us numerous examples of officials engaging in different economic activities and often amassing considerable fortunes. For instance, Derviş Mehmed Pasha, one of the most successful entrepreneurs in Ottoman officialdom, was deeply involved in trade and credit during his tenure as the beylerbey of Baghdad. In turn, the Qazdağlı household in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Egypt managed to finance its political ascendancy with revenue from lucrative coffee trade. Other officials used their positions in administration to sell offices. However, the spread of tax farming offered by far the greatest possibilities for financing factional enterprises.

As I have noted in previous chapters, the seventeenth century saw a general overhaul of Ottoman revenue-raising mechanisms. This entailed phasing out prebendal timar system in favor of tax farming (iltizam), better suited for the changing structure of Ottoman economy. While the system was not new and had been applied on a limited scale since the mid-fifteenth century, it gained momentum with the monetization of economy and the emergence of new sources of revenue. Succinctly put, iltizam was an arrangement whereby the rights to collect revenue from particular sources were auctioned off to the highest bidder on a short-term contract. In exchange for downpayment and annual remittance to the Imperial Treasury, the mültezim pocketed outstanding revenue. The iltizam contract could be subdivided, with chunks of revenue redistributed by the contractor among his agents, who performed actual tax collection on the ground. While the

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434 Ibid., 202.
435 Hathaway, The politics of household, 25.
437 Şevket Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 86.
441 Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 87.
contracts were relatively short and subject to competitive bidding, Murad Çizakça pointed out that in many instances members of the Ottoman bureaucracy managed to retain their mukataas for decades, a feat accomplished by not only economic acumen, but political leverage as well.\textsuperscript{443}

Household leaders quickly made use of the opportunities offered by the spread of tax-farming and soon became major players on \textit{iltizam} market. This comes as no surprise, since the structure of patronage networks was well-suited to the demands posed by such enterprises. Upon acquiring a tax-farm, the head of the household subsequently distributed its parts among his clients and associates, who collected revenue on the ground or further subfarmed their respective shares, providing the \textit{mültëzim} with a ready apparatus of revenue extraction. Thus, the relationship between grandee households and tax-farming practices was a symbiotic one. On the one hand, the cost of household building forced Ottoman grandees to become involved in new practices of revenue-raising; on the other, the structure of \textit{kaps} provided them with means to extract revenue from tax-farming. Thus, by the end of the seventeenth century, \textit{iltizam} arrangements came to constitute the financial backbone of the ‘rise of faction’ in the Ottoman Empire.

These developments triggered commodification of offices associated with \textit{iltizam} contracts. As Tom Papademetriou pointed out, the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate, which had been turned into an \textit{iltizam} in the late fifteenth century in order to collect revenue from Church estates, became a principal target of investment for Christian financial elite of the Ottoman capital, transforming it into a predominantly financial institution, subject to competitive bidding.\textsuperscript{443} The competition for the patriarchal seat and increasing demands of the Porte drove the price of appointment up and contributed to a rapid incumbent turnover.

The growing pace of turnover of Moldavian and Wallachian voievodes in the second half of the sixteenth century and simultaneous growth of \textit{harac} show striking parallels with the developments in the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This should come as no surprise, since the role of the voievode as a tax-collector (\textit{haracgüzar}) was not unlike that of \textit{mültëzim}.\textsuperscript{444} In exchange for an advance payment

\textsuperscript{443} Murat Çizakça, \textit{A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships, the Islamic World and Europe with specific reference to the Ottoman Archives} (Leiden - Boston: Brill, 1996), 143–5.

\textsuperscript{444} Papademetriou, \textit{Render unto the Sultan}, 117.

upon their ascension to the throne, the voievodes obtained control of the fiscal apparatus in the Danubian principalities, thus recouping the sums invested in order secure the appointment. Since fierce competition for the throne encouraged competitive bidding, both the advance payments and *harac* went up. Eventually, the costs of securing the throne outstripped the capabilities of the voievodes to make good on the demands of the Porte. In effect, in November 1594 the whole system went down in flames, as the voievodes chose to rebel rather than suffer the burden of debt they could not possibly repay.

In this context, the stability of *harac* throughout the seventeenth century is startling, since the factors that had driven the *harac* up in the previous period were still in place. The competition for the thrones of the principalities remained fierce; the Porte was also constantly strapped for cash, with the Imperial Treasury running deficits throughout the century.⁴⁴⁵ However, these pressures failed to produce similar results in the seventeenth century, which forces us to seek explanation elsewhere.

Again, the answer to this question can be found in the analysis of the *iltizam* contracts. As Murad Çizakça pointed out in his survey of *iltizam* arrangements, a number of tax-farms in the seventeenth-century remained ‘frozen’ at fixed value – or even decreased due to inflation – despite an apparent rise in their tax base.⁴⁴⁶ Unsurprisingly, most of these ‘frozen’ *mukataas* belonged to high-ranking members of Ottoman officialdom. This suggests that the *multezims* utilized their political resources and position in imperial administration to avoid reassessment of their tax-farms, thus increasing their net profit from the contracts. This corresponds well with the developments within the Ottoman political arena, whereby the sultan and his household increasingly lost power to the grandees, who increasingly siphoned off revenue from fiscal institutions towards their own households.

The similar trajectories of Moldavian-Wallachian *harac* and ‘frozen’ *iltizams* provide us with a plausible explanation for the stagnation of tribute in the seventeenth century. Rather than stemming from self-restraint of Ottoman officials concerned with possible rebellion, this stability

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reflected the diminishing role of the *harac* resulting from a growing weakness of the imperial household, overshadowed by Ottoman grandees. The question of how the latter managed to redirect the cash flows from the Danubian principalities brings us back to the problem of *pişkeş* and cross-border patronage.

While resources of the Danubian principalities were undoubtedly attractive for the Ottoman officials seeking to enhance their revenues, tapping into them posed a number of challenges. The major obstacle was the dual character of the position of the voievode, which combined both the duties of tax collector (*haracgüzar*) and the aura of Greek Orthodox ruler. This duality effectively barred Muslim officials from taking control of the revenue-raising apparatus directly. However, cross-border patronage could overcome this difficulty. Ottoman officials, by investing their political resources, they could secure the appointment of their Greek Orthodox proxies to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia. Once their clients took control of the revenue-raising apparatus, they would redirect the monetary flows towards their Ottoman patrons through side payments.447 In the following analysis, I will call this process ‘shadow *iltizam.*’

Within a formal *iltizam* arrangement, the legal basis was a contract between tax collector and the Imperial Treasury (*Hazine-i Amire*). However, since the *mültezim* rarely collected taxes personally, especially in the largest and most lucrative *mukataas*, he habitually delegated the collection of revenue to his agents, either members of his household or local notables. Once the revenue was collected, the agents subtracted their share and remitted the outstanding amount to the *mültezim*. The latter proceeded in a similar manner, paying the lump sum to the treasury, while pocketing the difference.

We can crudely distinguish between two types of financial flows in iltizam relationship – public and private. While the distinction is a heuristic rather than a clear reflection of reality, it is nonetheless useful in our attempt to elucidate the flow of resources. In the case of iltizam, I will apply the label of ‘public’ to the institutional channels that directed resources to the Imperial Treasury, while treating those accruing to the pockets of individual members of the Ottoman elite as private.

In many respects, the arrangement between the Porte and the rulers of Danubian principalities was similar to iltizam contracts. The appointment to Moldavia and Wallachia meant that in exchange for the payment of a fixed harac, the voievode obtained full control over fiscal apparatus in the principality and was able to manage the outstanding revenue the way he saw fit. However, since the ‘contract’ was established directly between the Porte and the voievode, it left no room for Ottoman grandees to partake in the formal channel of economic flows.
However, by promoting their clients to the throne, or by co-opting the incumbent, the Ottoman grandees could short-circuit the monetary flows and redirect them to their own households. As I have mentioned in the previous section, political and military resources the Ottoman officials had at their disposal were very attractive for the Moldavian and Wallachian rulers, providing them with security and protection. By deploying these resources in the Ottoman political arena, the grandees promoted their proxies to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia, which allowed the latter to extract revenue from the principalities. Subsequently, the voievodes remitted a share of revenue to their patrons. This was accomplished by converting the institution of pişkeş from a symbolic expression of subordination into a privatized channel of monetary flows. In turn, the Ottoman grandees utilized resources procured this way to finance their factional enterprises and enhance their position within Ottoman administration (see Figure 3.3).

The behavior of both Moldavian and Ottoman actors suggests that both parties were eager to engage in such arrangements and actively sought prospective partners. For instance, following his patron’s death in 1638, the Wallachian voievode Matei Basarab immediately dispatched his men to Istanbul in order to find a new patron. Upon their arrival to the capital, they were approached by Sultan Murad IV’s favorite, Silahdar Mustafa Pasha, who expressed his willingness to serve as a new friend.
and protector of the voievode. Clearly, both parties seem to have appreciated the benefits of such cross-border arrangements.

One could argue that ‘shadow iltizam’ is just a nicer way to describe rampant graft in corruption. However, despite the scarcity of sources, it is clear that members of the Ottoman elite saw their actions as an investment rather than simple extortion and were ready to contribute their own money in order to promote their clients. For instance, Evliya Çelebi noted that Atike Sultan provided her client, Mihnea III with a sum of 140,000 akçe, necessary for his successful bid for the Wallachian throne.

In some instances, we find indications that Ottoman patrons colluded with their Moldavian clients in siphoning off revenue from the Porte. One of the most interesting episodes in this respect took place in 1672 during the Ottoman campaign against Poland-Lithuania. This major campaign, led by Sultan Mehmed IV and Grand Vizier Köprülüzade Ahmed Pasha, accompanied by over 83,000 troops, posed a serious logistical challenge. Since the route taken by the army led through Moldavia, the incumbent voievode Gheorghe Duca was ordered to supply the troops. While it constituted a formidable undertaking, it also presented the voievode with a singular economic opportunity. During the campaign, the Ottoman army spent over 300 million akçe, foodstuffs constituting around 40 per cent of the expenditure. According to Bogdan Murgescu, Duca monopolized the provisioning and drove a hard bargain, dictating high prices to Ottoman soldiers. However, he crossed the line and both soldiers and boyars brought their grievances to the sultan. According to Ion Neculce, Mehmed IV immediately ordered execution of the voievode, but the grand vizier convinced him that Duca’s removal from the throne would disrupt the campaign. Convinced by Ahmed Pasha’s arguments, the sultan countermanded his orders and removed the

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448 "Il principe di Valachia doppo la morte del Rusnamegi, ch'era tutto suo protettore ha espedito a questa volta un suo agente con desiderio che passasse al campo per procurarsi nuova protettione tra quelli, che di presente rissorgono nel favore. Il Caimecan non ha voluto permetterglielo, offerendosi lui di voler subentrar al Rusnamegi morto nella cura di quel Principe et di quella provintia. Non si sa se questo sia stato motivo di avaritia per i molti provecchi et donativi, che contribuisse quel principe a suoi protettori, o sepure motivo di gelsio accio sotto questo pretesto non venisero spiati gli andamenti del campo, et i piu occulti fini del Re [...]" in Hurmuzachi, vol. IV/2, 500.


453 Ion Neculce, Letopiseţul Ţării Moldovei, 132.
voievode only after the army entered Poland-Lithuania. At the same time, Ahmed Pasha convinced the sultan to spare Duca’s life, and soon reappointed him as the voievode of Wallachia in 1674.

Gheorghe Duca and Köprülü Ahmed Pasha were no strangers and the grand vizier had promoted the voievode throughout his life, saving him from execution at least once before 1672. Moreover, Ion Neculce points out that on the eve of the campaign, Gheorghe Duca had showered the grand vizier with gifts, including textiles of extraordinary beauty. It is highly unlikely that Köprülü Ahmed was unaware of the voievode’s scheme to draw profit from the campaign. It is tempting to ask, whether he did not collude with Gheorghe Duca to milk the treasury, but unfortunately we have no sources to support this hypothesis.

3.2.2. Scramble for Land: the Flow of Economic Resources in Polish-Moldavian Patronage Networks

In contrast to ample evidence regarding cash flows between Moldavian-Wallachian and Ottoman elites, we find little information about similar phenomena in Polish-Moldavian patronage networks. To some extent, this absence can be partly explained by the fact that the Commonwealth exercised weaker control over the principality than the Ottomans did. However, another important factor was the structure of Polish-Lithuanian economy and resulting economic mindset of the nobility.

The bulk of evidence concerning cash flows between Moldavian boyars and their Polish-Lithuanian patrons originated in the period between 1595 and 1605, when Crown Grand Chancellor Jan Zamoyski managed to include the principality into his patronage network. According to numerous sources of Polish provenience, Zamoyski received an annual stipend of unspecified amount from the voievode of Moldavia, Ieremia Movilă. This matter was even brought up during the 1597 Sejm, when the Chancellor’s supporters were forced to defend their patron against the attacks mounted by the opposition:

“At the Chamber of Deputies the first to speak in the morning was Sir Uhrowiecki, the Starosta of Chełm. In a reply to the Podkomorzy of Sandomierz, he said that the Crown Hetman does not take any gifts from the voievode of Moldavia, contrary to what the Podkomorzy had claimed yesterday, in his

454 Ibid., 132.
absence. The latter had argued that it would be better if it was the Commonwealth to receive these gifts rather than private individuals.\footnote{8 marca} \footnote{U posłów najpierwej rano zamiówił się były p. Urowiecki, starosta chełmski, z p. podkomorzem sandomierskim omawiając p. Hetmana koronnego, iż on żadnych upominków od p. wojewody wołoskiego nie bierze, jako wczerę ten to p. podkomorzy, in illius absentia udawał ukazując to, żeby się te upominki lepiej na Rzplą, oddawały, a nie prywatnym osobom. “Dyaryusz sejmu warszawskiego 1597 roku,” in Dyaryusze sejmowe r. 1597, ed. Eugeniusz Barwiński (Cracow: Akademia Umiejętności, 1997), 102.}

The allegations concerning covert payments accruing to Zamoyski were not restricted to the contentious discussions at the Sejm. A careful observer of the Polish-Lithuanian political scene, \textit{Nunzio} Claudio Rangoni shared this view and, when compiling his survey of the Commonwealth’s elite in 1604, discussed this matter at length. According to the papal diplomat, the rumors concerning Zamoyski’s enormous wealth were true, since

“he receives revenue from his estates, which he had expanded through acquisitions and donations. He also receives numerous gifts in the form of cattle and other goods from Ieremia [Movilă], along with money for the special protection he had granted to both him and his brother [Simion Movilă]. He would be receiving double that sum, if Simion was able to hold to the throne of Wallachia, since he had promised to pay several hundred zlotys to the treasury. Many believe that the Chancellor would receive a private revenue, and it is said that due to this the reason why he was so saddened, when the Wallachian throne was taken by someone else.”\footnote{Claudio Rangoni, \textit{Relacja o Królestwie Polskim z 1604 roku}, ed. Janusz Byliński and Włodzimierz Kaczorowski (Opole: Wydawnictwo i Drukarnia Św. Krzyża, 2013), 159.}

If Zamoyski was indeed saddened by the loss of Wallachian revenue, the sums involved had to be much larger than a couple of hundred zlotys, since his annual revenue from other sources went in millions. However, the nunzio was right about the cattle, since we this matter featured prominently in the correspondence between Jan Zamoyski and Ieremia Movilă.\footnote{See for instance Luca Stroicio to Jan Zamoyski, 30th October 1597 in Hurmuzachi Suppl. II/1, 435.}

While it seems that Zamoyski did receive some cash from the voievode, we know little to nothing about the value or frequency of these payments. However, circumstantial evidence suggests that these financial arrangements were haphazard and operated on a hand-to-mouth basis, providing far fewer resources than ‘shadow iltizam’ described in the previous section. Most likely, Zamoyski hoped to entice Ieremia Movilă to pay for the upkeep of troops in Moldavia, but grave financial situation of the voievode meant that the Chancellor had to foot the bill himself. In 1604, unpaid Polish troops in Moldavia mutinied and withdrew to the Commonwealth, refusing to fight unless...
arrears were paid. When Luca Stroici, the Grand Logofăt of Moldavia, tried to borrow money in L'viv, the creditors had so little faith in the voievode’s ability to cover his debts that they detained the unfortunate official. He was eventually released, but only after Stanisław Żółkiewski, Zamoyski’s associate, agreed to act as Movilă’s guarantor. Thus, it is likely that the Chancellor lost money on his involvement in Moldavian affairs.

While Polish-Lithuanian patrons never managed to draw monetary revenue from their cross-border patronage activities, it does not mean that economic considerations were absent from their political strategy. However, in contrast to Ottoman officials, the magnates were interested in agricultural land rather than ready cash.

This preference had its origin in both economic realities of the Commonwealth and the cultural mindset espoused by the nobility. As I have mentioned in Chapter 1, Polish-Lithuanian elite operated in the context of economy dominated by payments in kind and low level of monetization. As economic historians point out, the Commonwealth had no internal market to speak of. The main source of bullion was Baltic trade, but the negative balance of trade meant that a considerable share of coins trickled out to the Ottoman Empire in order to cover trade deficit. Following its peak in the 1610s, the volume of grain trade, a backbone of manorial economy, dwindled, contributing to retrenchment of the local market. This economic crisis was further exacerbated by the political turmoil in the second half of the seventeenth century.

However, as I have mentioned in Chapter 1, southeastern provinces of the Commonwealth constituted an economic backwater even during the period of grain trade boom of late sixteenth-early seventeenth century. The lack of access to commercial outlets of Royal Prussia meant that local landholders relied on excise dues and extensive cattle ranching. While the late sixteenth and seventeenth century brought a rapid population growth due to colonization, this was a quantitative

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458 Circular of Żółkiewski regarding the mediation between Ieremia Movilă and mercenary troops, January 28, 1604 in Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego, kanclerza koronnego i hetmana, ed. August Bielowski, 161–2 (L’viv: Wojciech Maniecki, 1861), 162.


rather than a qualitative change. In such an economic context, land and labor were arguably a relatively safe and risk-averse investment.

Cultural influences also contributed to the nobility's preference for land. By the seventeenth, the ideal of a nobleman as landowner-cum-knight had already taken root. Landholding was a prerequisite to become a full citizen of the Commonwealth, and landed nobility perceived their landless peers with suspicion and often excluded them from social and political life. At the same time, distribution of landholdings among clients constituted an important faction-building tool for top echelons of the Polish-Lithuanian elite. In some cases, the ratio of land allotted to noble clients constituted more than a half of a magnate family's patrimony.

The nobility's interest in expansion of landholdings is prominent in the case of cross-border patronage ties. In a confusing episode from October 1611, which I will address in more detail in the following chapters, Moldavian envoys lodged a complaint with King Sigismund III against the Starosta of Felin, Stefan Potocki. As they stated, Potocki had detained them en route to the royal court and censored their diplomatic instructions, removing all matters he deemed inconvenient. One of the removed grievances touched on the infringements of Polish-Lithuanian nobility and their forceful occupation of Moldavian lands:

“The citizens of the Crown have taken numerous lands in Moldavia, bringing oppression to poor subjects. Thus, [the envoys] are to request from His Majesty the appointment of commissars to resolve these matters.”

According to the boyars, Potocki, Voivode Constantin Movilă's brother-in-law, removed this point, since he was one of the nobles, who had taken possession of landed estates in Moldavia and began to colonize them with his serfs.

At first glance, it seems that the voivode had instructed his envoys to lodge a protest against a relatively recent instance of land grabbing. However, as I will argue in subsequent chapters, this was hardly the case. Firstly, the evidence suggests that Potocki acted in collusion with the voivode and

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his family and he undertook this act of censorship with Constantin’s consent. Secondly, since 1609 Stefan Potocki and his brothers partook in the Polish-Lithuanian intervention in Muscovy, which indicates that the occupation of Moldavian territory had taken place prior to this date, most probably during the 1607-1608 military intervention in the principality.\(^\text{464}\)

In light of the well-evidenced cooperation between Constantin Movilă and Stefan Potocki, it is likely that the source of complaint was not the voievode, but rather Moldavian boyars, who resented Potocki’s illegal control of land in the principality. That the matter remained unreported to the king for a couple of years suggests complicity of the voievode, who tacitly accepted his patron’s expansion into the principality and silenced boyar complaints. Only in autumn 1611, when Constantin’s position grew increasingly unstable, he could no longer alienate the boyars and agreed to include the complaint against Potocki.

It seems that later generations of the family managed to hold to these estates, since a similar complaint, this time against the Palatine of Braclav, Jan Potocki, was lodged with the king by Moldavian voievode, Gheorghe Duca:

> “I received numerous complaints from the citizens of my frontier district of Cernăuți, regarding Sir Jan Potocki, the Palatine of Braclav. [They claim] that, in contravention with pacts and treaties, and in disregard for border markings between my lands those of His Majesty, he occupied my lands and established settlements. I sent my servants to look into the matter and they reported that [Potocki’s] estates extend into my lands; I cannot ignore this. [...] Thus, [my envoys] will ask His Majesty to remove these settlements. [...] The citizens of the Crown are so quick and so eager to engage in land grabbing that they take the land without justice and recourse to courts. Thus, [my envoys] will ask His Majesty to use his authority and demand them to cease such injustices.”\(^\text{465}\)

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\(^\text{465}\) “Po kilkakroć przyszła do mnie skarga obywatelów moich powiatu czerniowieckiego na jego msc p<an>a Jana Potockiego wojewódę bracławskiego, że contra pacta et foedera, nie upatrując granicy i kopców państwo jego k.m.j. moje działących, zajął grątów moich i na onych slobody osadził. Posłałem dla uznania umyślnych swoich, którzy zeznają i twierdzą iż in fundo państwa mego rozpościera się, czego ja zamilczeć nie mogę [...] Uproszać tedy będą jego k. mości, aby te slobody ex alieno zniesione były fundo [...] Tak są skwapliwi obywatele pograniczni państw koronnych i prędzy do zaborów, że zaraz bez requisitiej sprawiedliwości i udania się do sądów zabierają, uproszać będą jego k. mości i to, aby za nastąpieniem powagi i rozkazania nie byli tak skwapliwi do zaborów [...]” Corfus, *Documente privitoare la istoria României – secolul al XVII-lea*, 282.
Another instance of a Polish noble holding landed property in Moldavia is that of the Crown Grand Hetman, Stanisław Koniecpolski. While the official had been a relative newcomer to the southeastern provinces of the Commonwealth and acquired his first estates in the region only in 1628, three years later he was already one of the largest landowners in the palatinate of Braclav, with his latifundia stretching along the borders of Moldavia.\textsuperscript{466} At the same time, he was deeply involved in cross-border patronage networks, acting as a protector for two voievodes of the principality, Miron Barnovschi (1626-1629) and Moisie Movilă (1632-1633, 1633-1634). It seems that during the reigns of these two individuals, he expanded his domains beyond the border and into Moldavia, although we lack any precise information regarding this matter.

However, with the ascension of Vasile Lupu to the Moldavian throne, Koniecpolski influence in the principality suffered a great blow. The relations between the Polish official and the voievode deteriorated rapidly, especially due to Koniecpolski’s continued support for Moisie Movilă. Vasile responded with force, and according to a testimony presented to Muscovite border officials at the post in Putivl’, the voievode raided Hetman’s Moldavian estates.\textsuperscript{467} While no other source refers to those landholdings, it is likely that Koniecpolski had acquired them in a way similar to the Potockis.

This suggests a somewhat different pattern of resource conversion than the one we have encountered in Ottoman-Moldavian cross-border relations. In order to support a prospective client, Polish-Lithuanian magnates mobilized resources – both their own and those embedded in other networks. However, in contrast to the Ottoman-Moldavian system of ‘shadow iltizam,’ the magnates were more interested in political rather than fiscal power of their clients, which would allow them to obtain agricultural land in the principality as a form of fixed capital. As I will show in Chapter 5, this tendency resurfaced in annexation attempts, when nobility pushed for redistribution of land in Moldavia.

Interestingly, Polish-Lithuanian nobility was aware that their dependence on landed estates and serf labor was in many respects similar to economic underpinnings of Moldavian boyar class. This


\textsuperscript{467} Eremia, Relațiile externe ale lui Vasile Lupu, 62–3.
became apparent in 1672, when Ottoman troops managed to conquer Podolia. A local nobleman, Stanisław Makowiecki, in an unsophisticated verse narrated the struggle of the local elite to retain their control of resources in the wake of Ottoman rule. In order to convince the Porte's officials, the Makowiecki and his peers consciously referred to Moldavian precedent:

“When the nobles asked 'bout their villages
So that they can stay there without worries
They were told: you can live in peace,
And keep what you have, as to your liking
But to peasants, you have no right
Makowiecki replied, ‘How are we to live
If we lose our serfs?
For they are on our lands
Clearly the Turks do not know this.’
To this the interpreter: ‘Your words are in vain,
You do not know their laws
As this would be against them
If they let you keep your serfs.’
To that the Vizier: ‘Their effort’s in vain
As the Emperor will not allow it
In Moldavia, they got it through treaties,
Here, we got it with our sword.”

This attitude also informed the approach of Polish-Lithuanian patrons to their Moldavian clients, with the interest in land shaping the structure of economic flows in Polish-Moldavian patronage networks. The preference for land meant that, in comparison with Ottoman-Moldavian cross-border factions, the procurement of economic resources was more cumbersome and generated greater social and political costs in the principality.

The Ottoman grandees, operating within monetized economy, saw their primary interests in ensuring that money would flow from Moldavia to their own pockets. Since ready cash constituted

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468 Szlachta prosili wtoż o swoje wioski / Niech w nich siedziemy bez wszelaki troski / Rzekł nam: spokojnie sobie w wioskach mieszkajcie/Jakie macie pożytki takich trzymajcie/Ale do chłopów nic nie należycie [...]./Rzekł Makowiecki: jako siedzieć mamy/ Kiedy już chłopów swoich postradamy?/ Na naszych gruntach własni chłopi siedzą/ Podobno Turcy o tym znać nie wiedzą / Na to wnet tłumacz: darmo o tym mówisz/ Podobno Prawa ich ty nie rozumiesz / To przeciw prawu właśnie by ich było /Gdy się wam chłopów pod moc pozwoliło/ Rzekł mu w tym Weizer: darmo napierają/ Gdyż po Cesarzu tego nie uznają/ Wołoszech to się przez traktaty stało/ Tu się ich przez miecz z forteçą pobrało.” Stanisław Makowiecki, Relacja Kamieńca wziętego przez Turków w roku 1672..., Warsaw, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Sucha (Zbiorzy Branickich) 168/199, 12. The printed edition of the poem was published by Piotr Borek: Stanisław Makowiecki, Relacja Kamieńca wziętego przez Turków w roku 1672, ed. Piotr Borek (Kraków: Collegium Columbinum, 2008).
a form of liquid capital, it could be procured by means of Moldavian revenue-extracting apparatus and transferred through ‘shadow iltizam’ with relative ease. This mechanism did not require Ottoman grandees to secure direct control over resources embedded within Moldavian political arena. Thus, ‘shadow iltizam’ left room to accommodate the interests of local elite. As landholders and members of fiscal apparatus, the boyars and the voievode were not left empty-handed, but could cut their share from the revenue.

In turn, Polish-Lithuanian nobility’s preoccupation with land in the principality posed a serious threat for Moldavian boyars, cutting deeply into their economic and social interests. In contrast to ready cash, land constituted a form of fixed capital, which made competition between local elite and Polish-Lithuanian newcomers a zero-sum game. Since land was effectively indivisible, there was little possibility to share economic resources between Poles and Moldavians, which – as I will argue in the following chapters – weighed heavily on the outcome of fate of Polish-Moldavian cross border cooperation.

3.3. Information, Communication and Manipulation

While much more elusive than most of the resources flowing through patronage networks, information was nonetheless no less important than cash or political influence. In the age before time-space compression set in, procuring reliable information was an arduous, but nonetheless necessary task for participants in political life. Credibility of sources of information was often subject to doubt, and reports often relied on rumors circulating around; communication was prone to breakdowns and leaks. Moreover, distance, time and lack of public sources of information frequently frustrated attempts to check and verify news.

At the same time, the same limitations made information a scarce and valuable resource, crucial for successful political endeavors. Early access to information offered a considerable competitive advantage and could be decisive in scramble for resources and offices. This necessitated either their constant presence in nodes of information flows, or establishing a network of trusted

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469 Tygielski, Listy - ludzie - władza, 136.
informants, who would report on recent developments. Thus, the process of procuring necessary information forced political actors to engage in patron-client relations.

However, to see the role of patronage in communication as solely a way to procure news would be a gross oversimplification. Rather, controlling communication allowed the actors to manipulate information and spin it according to their political interests. According to Arndt Brendecke, the information flows within the Spanish Empire produced ‘corridors of power’, ‘filled up with people who try to control the communication between the center and the peripheries’. By restricting, denying or scheduling dissemination of news, political actors gained a powerful political tool to shape the minds and actions of others within the political arena. As Filippo de Vivo has shown in his masterful account of political communication in Venice during the Interdict period, the Serenissima’s government, however it tried, was unable to curtail unofficial channels of communication, since such limitations went against the interests of actors and factions in the political arena. Thus, communication and information was a site of factional competition, in which patron-client ties played a crucial role in manipulating and spinning the news.

Procurement and dissemination of news included two interrelated aspects, depending on the intended audience. The Venetian distinction between communicazione and pubblicazione, analyzed by de Vivo, is of particular use here. While pubblicazione was understood as a dissemination of information to the public, communicazione remained within political institutions and was to be kept secret from the outsiders. Actors trying to manipulate information in their endeavors usually applied a combination of these two forms of political communication.

In order to address the relationship between the information and communication circuits and cross-border patronage, I will address three major interrelated topics. Firstly, I discuss the role of patron-client relations in obtaining insider knowledge and procuring reliable information. Secondly, I move to examine the importance of clients in establishing and maintaining communication between individual members of the faction. Subsequently, I address the role of cross-border patronage in

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472 ibid., 37.
manipulating information and staging its dissemination into the general audience. In all three aspects of political communication, Polish-Moldavian-Ottoman ties were crucial for success or failure of factional strategies.

Members operating in political arenas of Poland-Lithuania, Moldavia and the Ottoman Empire espoused different views on how ideal political communication should occur. In this respect, the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were polar opposites. As Sefik Peksevgen pointed out, Ottoman intellectuals saw the ideal of communication between the ruler and the outside world in terms of an exclusive and secretive dyad between the sultan and his grand vizier, with the latter acting as the ruler’s stand-in in administrative matters.473 This isolation of the sultan was to some extent moderated by subjects’ right to deliver petitions (arz) to the ruler, which allowed him to disburse justice and punish corrupted officials.474 In turn, Polish-Lithuanian nobility was highly suspicious of backstage politics and demanded that all matters should be resolved in public.475 The contents of debates between the king and resident senators were subject to Sejm scrutiny, and deputies often protested against restricting access to the proceedings. That said, the actual flow of information differed wildly from the ideals espoused by the elites, and actors in the arena engaged in both secretive communication and disclosure of information to a wider public.

In the case of the Danubian principalities, the role of information as a resource was crucial, including its cross-border aspect. Voievodes were expected to inform the Porte about recent developments in Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy, as well as to keep an eye on the political activity of Crimean khans.476 However, gathering intelligence was not only a burdensome obligation, but a prerequisite for political survival as well. Due to the unstable position of the voievodes and their dependence on developments in the Ottoman political arena, Moldavian and Wallachian kept a number of agents (capucheheaias) in Istanbul.477 As scholars argue, the quality of the Moldavian and Wallachian information network was exquisite: in 1697 the French ambassador was shocked to learn about the

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474 Murphey, Exploring Ottoman sovereignty.
475 Choińska-Mika, Między społeczeństwem szlacheckim a władzą, 127.
477 Condurachi, Soli și agenți ai domnilor Moldovei, 33; Matei, Reprezentanții diplomatici (capuchehăți), 127; Viorel Panaite, “Reprezentanța diplomatică a Țării Românești la Poarta Otomană în epoca lui Constantin Brâncoveanu,” Revista de istorie 41, no. 9 (1988).
conclusion of the treaty of Ryswick from the grand vizier, who had learned about it from the Wallachian voievode.  

The nobility of southeastern provinces of the Crown also had keen interest in procuring information from the Danubian principalities. Their main concern were predatory Tatar raids, which ravaged the Ukrainian palatinates. The meagre size of Polish-Lithuanian military increased the role of military and political intelligence, which allowed Polish-Lithuanian officers and magnates to coordinate defense and protect their estates. The main source of the information were Moldavian agents and officials, which – as it seems – were eager to feed the information to the magnates. For instance, the governor (pârcălab) of Soroca maintained intensive correspondence with agents of Tomasz Zamoyski, and informed them about planned Tatar raids. At the same time, he implored Zamoyski to destroy the letter after reading, a clear sign that he feared possible consequences of his actions. 

This role of the Moldavian elite in procuring information was even more crucial for Hetmans, obliged to defend the borders against the Tatar incursions. While magnates faced the risk of material and human losses due to the slave-raiding activity, Hetman had additional political interests at stake. Since the official was responsible for defending the territory of the Crown, his failure in defeating the raiders would turn the wrath of nobility against him. Conversely, if he managed to obtain a decisive victory, he would be hailed as a hero. For instance, in 1594 Jan Zamoyski was unable to protect Pokuttja from the Crimean troops, which resulted in a wave of criticism at the Sejm, the Hetman being accused of incompetence and even deliberate obstruction.  

Thus, procuring reliable information was a high priority for the Polish-Lithuanian commanders and led them to actively seek cross-border patronage with this purpose in mind. For instance, in a letter to Luca Stroici, one of his major clients in Moldavia, Zamoyski requested the news about possible Tatar raids, as well as an update on the Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic mission to the Porte:

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479  Theodor, pârcalab of Soroca to Tomasz Zamoyski, May 29, 1621 in Documente privitoare la istoria României - secolul al XVII-lea, 196.
“Thank you, my Lord, for your letter. My Lord, please inform me about the news concerning the return of the Crimean khan [from Hungary], as well as about the Castellan of Halycz, His Majesty’s ambassador to the Porte, and about all kind of news coming from Turkey.”

Polish-Lithuanian magnates, including Hetmans, also found cross-border patronage as a crucial source of information on Ottoman military and political activities. During the 1633-1634 ‘Abaza Pasha War’, the Crown Grand Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski maintained intensive correspondence with his client Moldavian voivode Moise Movilă. While the ruler participated in Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s campaign, at the same time he kept Koniecpolski posted about the morale of the Ottoman army and the plans of the grandee. These actions led to Movilă’s dethronement and forced him to seek sanctuary in Poland-Lithuania, where he remained under protection of the Hetman.

Individual Ottoman officials also used their Moldavian clients for similar purposes, sometimes involving them in delicate political matters. For the voivodes and boyars, such endeavors entailed serious risks, especially in case a hostile official intercepted their letters. A most prominent case in this respect led to the removal of Gheorghe Duca from the throne of Moldavia after only a couple months of reign in 1665-1666. According to the anonymous Moldavian author:

“The reason for [Duca’s] dismissal was the following. At this time, the Crimean Khan Selim Giray [clearly a mistake, since the khan at that time was Mehmed IV Giray – M.W.] came under suspicion of betraying the empire. Thus, Köprülü Ahmed Pasha, who was the grand vizier at this time and participated in the siege of Cretan fortress [Candia], instructed Duca to write a letter to the khan, in order to learn if he was indeed harboring evil thoughts against the Porte. Thus, Duca acted upon the order and wrote to Selim Giray with the words of friendship, calling him the emperor and disclosed many secrets in this letter to the khan.”

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482 Moisie Movilă to Stanisław Koniecpolski, September 30, 1634 in Hurmuzachi, Suppl. II/2, 611-612.

While I will discuss this episode in more detail in Chapter 4, it is important to note that the plan backfired, since the beylerbey of Özü intercepted the letters and sent them to the Porte. This resulted in the deposition of Gheorghe Duca and almost brought about his execution, which was averted solely due to the intervention of the grand vizier.

Cross-border patronage also played a crucial role in the organization of the factional communication networks. The postal service was prone to leaks and bottlenecks, and the position of Moldavia on the main route from Istanbul to the Commonwealth meant that rulers of the principality were in a position to facilitate or disrupt communication.

The voievodes’ position at the crucial node of communication channels provided them with ample possibilities to shape the flow and content of information according to their needs. This often took place in collusion with their patrons. Jerzy Kruszyński, the Commonwealth’s ambassador to the Porte in 1636, learned this the hard way, finding himself helpless against a conspiracy of Moldavian voievode Vasile Lupu and kaymakam Bayram Pasha. Kruszyński, a client of Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, had been entrusted with the task of obtaining the replacement of Vasile Lupu with a voievode that would be more favorable to his patron. The diplomat was determined to carry out his orders, since en route to the Ottoman capital, he had engaged in a ceremonial conflict with the voievode. However, from the very outset, Kruszyński encountered obstruction from Bayram Pasha. Despite his efforts, Kruszyński failed to secure an audience with Sultan Murad IV, which he interpreted as the result of collusion between the kaymakam and the Moldavian voievode. Simultaneously, Vasile’s capuchehaias were spreading gossip, casting doubt on the authenticity of Kruszyński’s credentials. When Kruszyński wanted to confirm his diplomatic status and report to Polish-Lithuanian authorities, the Moldavian voievode intercepted the letters. Eventually, the kaymakam prohibited any contact with the Commonwealth, entrusting the capuchehaias of the voievode with enforcement of this restriction.

Kruszyński ended up struggling with the cabal of Bayram Pasha and Vasile Lupu for fifteen weeks, but on his departure from the Ottoman capital, he was convinced that he had managed to reach his

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485 Jerzy Kruszyński to Stanisław Koniecpolski, 26th May 1636 in Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 290.
goal. According to him, the Vasile Lupu's replacement with another voievode was imminent.\textsuperscript{486}

However, he was soon to be disappointed at the meeting with the governor-general of Özü:

\begin{quote}
“I had been certain that I would receive some satisfaction after my treatment in Istanbul, since the \textit{kaymakam} assured me at the farewell that all the matters, and especially those pertaining to Lupu would be entrusted to Kenan Pasha. However, Kenan Pasha with utmost sympathy told me that he did not receive a word in this respect, and furious, at the same hour he sent a letter to the emperor informing him about the duplicity I had suffered.”\textsuperscript{487}
\end{quote}

Despite the professed sympathy of the Ottoman grandee and his own efforts, the mission of Kruszyński was a failure, with Vasile Lupu remaining on the throne. This he achieved by a complex strategy, which combined cross-border patronage, control of communication and the deployment of political resources. By cooperating with Bayram Pasha, Vasile Lupu managed to secure the political resources necessary for restricting the ambassador's freedom of movement and political communication, preventing Kruszyński from reporting to the Commonwealth and securing the audience with Murad IV. At the same time, his agents and Bayram Pasha engaged in the political communication of their own, spreading rumors about Kruszyński's alleged lack of necessary credentials, which further undermined the diplomat's position. Finally, the \textit{kaymakam} pretended to satisfy some of Kruszyński's demands, while failed to act upon these promises, effectively bringing the diplomats efforts to naught.

An even more elaborate case of manipulating communication and information occurred at the Sejm of 1597. The assembly was bound to be a contentious one, due to a number of controversial matters on the agenda. On the one hand, the Long War between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans continued, which required Poland-Lithuania to define its position vis-à-vis the conflict. In 1595, Jan Zamoyski had led Crown troops into Moldavia, replacing pro-Habsburg voievode with the Chancellor's client, Ieremia Movilă. This triggered a wave of criticism both in Poland-Lithuania and abroad, with the Habsburgs and Pope Clement VIII opposing the move. At the same time, the court in Prague tried to entice the Commonwealth to join the Christian League.

\textsuperscript{486} Jerzy Kruszyński to Stanisław Koniecpolski, 17th August 1636 in \textit{Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego}, 312.
\textsuperscript{487} Jerzy Kruszyński to Stanisław Koniecpolski, 6th September 1636 in \textit{Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego}, 324.
The political climate in Poland-Lithuania similarly suggested that proceedings of the Sejm would be far from tranquil. Admittedly, the conflict between Jan Zamoyski and Sigismund III had abated somewhat during the second half of the 1590s and the monarch – preoccupied with the matters of Swedish succession – granted the Chancellor considerable autonomy in southeastern provinces of the Commonwealth. However, the relations remained tenuous and cohabitation rather than the end of the conflict marked the period.\footnote{Tygielski, Listy - ludzie - władza, 268.}

However, confessional matters were bound to be the most explosive issue during the Sejm. In October 1596, the Greek Orthodox hierarchy assembled at the Council of Brest confirmed the subordination of Ruthenian Church to Rome, a move supported by the king and the Orthodox bishops but rejected almost unanimously by lower clergy and the faithful. The opposition to what was seen as a capitulation of the Orthodox Church gained enormous proportions, finding its leader in Prince Kostjantyn-Vasyl Ostroz'kyj, the palatine of Kyiv and a renowned patron of the Eastern Church in Poland-Lithuania.\footnote{Tomasz Kempa, Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski (ok. 1524/1525–1608), wojewoda kijowski i marszałek ziemi wołyńskiej (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 1997); Tomasz Kempa, “Animatorzy współpracy protestancko-prawosławnej w okresie kontreformacji,” in Rzeczpospolita państwem wielu narodowości i wyznań, XVI–XVIII w., ed. Tomasz Ciesielski and Anna Filipczak-Kocur (Warsaw: DiG, 2008), 321–41; Borys A. Gudziak, Crisis and reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the genesis of the Union of Brest (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2001); Kempa, Tomasz. “Kyrillos Loukaris and the Confessional Problems in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century.” Acta Poloniae Historica 104 (2011): 103–128.}

In short, the Sejm was to be a powder keg waiting to explode.

Jan Zamoyski and his faction were deeply implicated in all of these controversies. The Chancellor had undertaken the intervention in Moldavia on his own initiative, a decision contested by the Habsburgs, the Pope and internal opposition. At the same time, his position within the arena meant that he would play a crucial role in the negotiations concerning possible entry of Poland-Lithuania into the Christian League.\footnote{Przemysław Gawron, “Jan Zamoyski, kanclerz i hetman wielki koronny, wobec zmagania turecko-habsburskich w latach 1593–1605/6,” in Polska wobec wielkich konfliktów w Europie nowożytnej: Z dziejów dyplomacji i stosunków międzynarodowych w XV–XVIII wieku, ed. Ryszard Skowron (Cracow: Societas Vistulana, 2009), 23–47.}

Finally, despite being a Catholic ‘dove,’ Zamoyski had thrown his political weight behind the Union of Brest', which gained him hostility among the Orthodox nobles, including Ostroz'kyj.\footnote{Tomasz Kempa, “Konflikt między kanclerzem Janem Zamoyskim a książętami Ostrogskimi i jego wpływ na sytuację wewnętrzną i zewnętrzną Rzeczypospolitej w końcu XVI wieku,” Socjum. Al’manax socjalnej istorii 9 (2010): 82–3.} The conflict between the Chancellor and the Palatine of Kyiv was not
restricted to religious matters, though, but rather stemmed from their political and economic rivalry in the Ukraine, dating back to the first half of the 1590s.

In such a heated political context, Zamoyski embraced a strategy designed not only to defend his position, but also to discredit his enemies, most importantly Ostroz’kyj. The strategy pursued by Zamoyski during the Sejm was multiplex and we find him and his clients in numerous roles during the proceedings. However, the main stage of the factional struggle was the trial of Nikephoros Parasios, a high-ranking official of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, accused of being an Ottoman spy.

Parasios had arrived to the Commonwealth in 1596 in order to galvanize the Orthodox opposition against the Union. In fulfilling this task, he was to act in cooperation with Ostroz’kyj, by that time the obvious leader of the anti-Unionist camp. However, Nikephoros soon encountered serious obstacles to his mission. In April 1596, Ieremia Moivilă, in a letter to Zamoyski, accused the protosynkellos of causing turmoil in Moldavia and spying on grand vizier’s behalf.492 The Chancellor promptly ordered the arrest of Greek official, but Nikephoros managed to escape under protection of Ostroz’kyj. This allowed him to lead a rival council in Brest’, which vehemently rejected the Union and condemned the pro-Unionist hierarchs for insubordination and negligence of their pastoral duties.493 However, the prince had to give in to the pressure of the king and allowed for the trial of Nikephoros at the Sejm of 1597.

The charges brought against the official were grave indeed. They included false claims regarding his status, spying on behalf of the Ottomans, sending letters insulting to the Commonwealth back to the Porte, acting as an intermediary for other spies, scheming to replace the voievode of Moldavia and driving the principality into heavy debt, and entering the Commonwealth without the royal permission.494 In addition, he was also charged with sodomy, including an alleged intercourse with a small boy. Along with him, a servant of Ostroz’kyj, Jani, also faced charges of carrying Parasios’ incriminating correspondence out of the Commonwealth.

492 ibid., 85.
493 Gudziak, Crisis and reform, 240-241.
494 “Dyaryusz sejmu warszawskiego 1597 roku,” 122.
As Tomasz Kempa rightly pointed out, Zamoyski fabricated the charges brought against Nikephoros, and many contemporaries considered the whole trial a farce.\footnote{Kempa, “Konflikt między kanclerzem Janem Zamoyskim a książętami Ostrogskimi,” 85–7.} He also claims that Zamoyski was not after Nikephoros himself, but rather tried to use the trial to attack his main political rival, Kostjantyn-Vasył’ Ostroz’kyj.\footnote{ibid., 86.} With this scope in mind, Zamoyski and his associates had set the stage for the trial in order to do as much damage to Ostroz’kyj’s political influence and prestige as possible. In laying the groundwork and subsequent implementation of the plan, the role of cross-border patronage networks and political communication was indispensable.

Zamoyski and his clients were involved in the trial at every stage. The Chancellor took upon himself the role of attorney, presenting the evidence against the Nikephoros. At the same time, Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, one of Zamoyski’s closest associates, presided the tribunal. In turn, Ieremia Movilă played a key role in the scheme, providing evidence to support the indictment. Moreover, the Moldavian envoys were expected not only to make the accusations credible, but also to disseminate Zamoyski’s interpretation of the events to a wider audience at the Sejm.

According to the account presented at the Sejm, Nikephoros’ activity had been brought to light by Antoni Chrząstowski, the administrator of Szarogród. The nobleman grew suspicious of Ostroz’kyj’s servant, Jani, who claimed to go to Moldavia in order to buy horses for the prince, and searched Jani’s effects. He found four letters written in Greek, which he sent to Ieremia Movilă for translation. Allegedly, the letters were full of insults against the Commonwealth, but, as Tomasz Kempa pointed out, this hardly constituted a proof of espionage.\footnote{Tomasz Kempa, “Proces Nicefora na sejmie w Warszawie w 1597 r.,” in Europa Orientalis. Polska i jej wschodni sąsiedzi od średniowiecza po współczesność: Studia ofiarowane Prof. S. Alexandrowiczowi w 65. rocznicę urodzin, ed. Z. Karpus, Tomasz Kempa and D. Michaluk (Toruń1996), 162–3.} Nonetheless, Ieremia ‘identified’ the author in question as Nikephoros and wrote to Zamoyski, requesting his arrest. In turn, the Chancellor informed the king of the affair and convinced him to demand Parasios’ trial.

As Tomasz Kempa rightly points out, the communication prior to the disclosure of the matter to the king ran exclusively within Jan Zamoyski’s patronage network.\footnote{Kempa, “Konflikt między kanclerzem Janem Zamoyskim a książętami Ostrogskimi,” 85–7.} Chrząstowski, who had seized the letters, was a client of the Chancellor and administrator of his estates. Ieremia Movilă, responsible for translating the letters and formulating charges against Parasios was another associate of...
Zamoyski, who owed his throne to the Chancellor’s protection. In short, Jan Zamoyski and his clients had full control of the evidence against Nikephoros and by extension – Ostroz’kyj. This allowed for a considerable degree of manipulation, both in tailoring the content and in subsequent pubblicazione of the matter at the Sejm.

The presentation of the accusations against Nikephoros was a carefully staged event. It occurred during the audience granted to the Moldavian envoys and the renewal of Moldavian oath of fealty to the king and the Commonwealth:

“After the Holy Mass, the Moldavian envoys presented the contents of their legation, renewing voivode Ieremia’s oath of allegiance and subjection to His Majesty. Then the Greek bishop followed suit in the name of the clergy, Logofăt in the name of the Moldavian lords, and a boyar in the name of the gentry and the common folk. They promised their homage to His Majesty, offering their lives and wealth, as well as a certain number of troops to the Commonwealth. [...] Subsequently, on behalf of the country, they complained about Nikephoros, who was at that time at the court of the Palatine of Kyiv. They claimed that the said Nikephoros was a Turkish spy sent to Moldavia, that under previous voivodes he had contributed to the debts of five million złotys, causing great damage to the people of the land, and that he conspired with the Soltana, the mother of the Turkish emperor. They requested justice to be served.”

These allegations succeeded in drawing attention to the trial, since the deputies demanded the proceedings to be held publicly, a request turned down by Sigismund III. However, it is worth noting that in his introductory address to the Sejm, Zamoyski had not mentioned the matter at all, but rather left its publication to the envoys of Ieremia Movilă. The reason for this division of labor can be deduced from the wider political context of Zamoyski and Movilă, as well as the immediate environment of the Sejm.

We should keep in mind that by 1597 the conflict between the Chancellor and the Ostroz’kyjs was already a matter of public knowledge. At the same time, an attack on Nikephoros, a vociferous opponent of the Union of Brest’, ran the risk of alienating Orthodox nobility. Thus, Zamoyski faced a double danger. On the one hand, his actions could be interpreted as a factional attack on Ostroz’kyj and his allies. Worse still, since the Chancellor was a Catholic supporting the Union, his actions could be interpreted through confessional lens, as an attempt to discredit anti-Uniate opposition.

By presenting the case against Nikephoros through Moldavian envoys, Zamoyski and his faction managed to overcome these two dangers. Ieremia Movilă was a prominent benefactor of Orthodox institutions in the Commonwealth and enjoyed impeccable Orthodox pedigree. At the same time, since he was not a member of the Polish-Lithuanian political arena, he could legitimately claim that he had no vested factional interest other than bringing the culprit to justice.

Moreover, the framing of the accusations within the ceremonial renewal of the Moldavian oath of fealty likely created a more lasting impression. Two aspects are worth noting here. Firstly, the envoys represented all orders of the Moldavian society, which meant that their demand for Nikephoros’ indictment bore an aura of consensus and unanimity, downplaying possible allegations of factional interest. Secondly, Moldavian envoys declared their willingness to serve the king and the Commonwealth, which surely created a positive impression among the noble audience. In this context, their request for justice would more likely meet with the deputies’ approval. Thus, from the point of view of political communication this piece of political theater had a greater impact than an openly factional attack against the Greek ecclesiastic would.

During the proceedings, the Moldavian envoys also played an important role in providing evidence against Nikephoros, in close cooperation with other members of the Zamoyski’s faction. According to some sources, they even prepared their depositions in advance, consulting them with Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, who presided the tribunal.500

Eventually, the tribunal failed to reach a conclusion and the trial was put on hold, never to resume. However, this outcome was by no means a failure of Zamoyski’s strategy. The proceedings provided Zamoyski with a public stage to launch an attack against his political rival. What is more, since Nikephoros was not acquitted, Zamoyski detained the Greek official in the castle of Marienburg, where the protosynkellos remained until his death in 1601, in spite of Ostroz’kyjs appeals for his release.501 Thus, by coordinating and manipulating information and political communication in cross-border context, the Chancellor was able to deal a severe blow to his rival’s influence and

500 J. Abramowicz to Krzysztof Radziwiłł, December 10, 1597 in Seimovaia bor’ba pravoslavnogo zapadnorusskogo dvorianstva s tserkovnoi uniei (do 1609 goda), ed. P. Zhukovich, 746 (Saint Petersburg1901).
prestige. The fact that the charges were based on spurious evidence was secondary to their value as a political resource.

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Analyzing the politics and information management of the ‘North African’ faction, Emrah Safa Gürkan has noted:

“If the early modern Ottoman state was a conglomerate of power groups, then its policy reflected the interests of these groups. Trying to read the decision-making process and strategy formulation independent from the realities of factional rivalries would be to overlook the corporate interests at the heart of Ottoman politics. Those who shaped policy were a far cry from disinterested officials, formulating strategy as a result of careful and objective calculations of long-term strategic objectives.”

This holds true not only for the Ottoman political arena, but applies as well to cross-border political networks. Elites of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian principalities operated within the limits imposed by communication and distance, and the information they could obtain was often fragmentary and liable to distortion, either unintentional or deliberate. This limited access to information, but also created opportunities. Taking control of communication channels by means of patron-client relations made it possible to manipulate information and tailor it to particular needs. This, in turn, allowed actors to influence decision-making in their respective arenas.

Thus, political communication and access to information was not only a matter of procuring information. As Filippo de Vivo pointed out, the idealized vision of the public sphere as an egalitarian site for discussion and communication does not apply to the early modern context, which does not mean that there was no communication or discussion at all. Patron-client relations mediated access to information and factional interests often decided what made into the larger public. Rather than representing an omniscient state at the apex of communication channels, we should instead see the patchwork of actors, with different factional interests, struggling to obtain the information and add a spin on the current events. Accessing and shaping competition required

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503 Vivo, *Information and communication in Venice*, 16, 83.
a considerable input, strategizing and deployment of political resources in order to outsmart competition.

3.4. Letters and Watermelons: Expanding and Perpetuating Patronage Networks
In August 1646, Łukasz Miaskowski, one of the most active political figures of the palatinate of Podolia, received a letter from the Moldavian governor of Soroca, Ștefan. The boyar wished Miaskowski good health and expressed his gratitude for the favors Miaskowski had granted him. At the same time, he discussed a matter, which at first glance did not fit into the narrative of military support, economic exchanges and intelligence gathering:

“As far as the watermelons are concerned [...] due to the great heat they became stretched, but nonetheless I send you a hundred, the best I could find this year, as well as forty melons. While these fruits are modest and of dull taste [this year], I humbly ask you to accept them, my Lord, as a gift from a friend and servant.”

We find another reference to watermelons over a decade later. In a letter to Miaskowski, his servant Wojkuszycki informed the nobleman that he had arrived to Hotin, along with a shipment of fruits from Soroca, most likely a present of the local governor.

While these references can be seen as a curiosity and a proof that Miaskowski was a connoisseur of the said fruit, they show another aspect of the flow of resources through cross-border patronage networks. While small gifts and civilities had little value on their own, they nonetheless played an important role in the development and maintenance of cross-border ties.

Drawing inspiration from anthropological research initiated by Marcel Mauss, scholarship on early modern period has increasingly addressed the topic of gift exchange and its role in early modern social life. These studies bring to light the embeddedness of patron-client relations in practices of gift-exchange, going so far as to claim that patronage was “disguised and governed by the rules and language of courtesy. Gift-giving was an euphemism for patronage, the material assistance and

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504 Corfus, Documente privitoare la istoria României – secolul al XVII-lea, 155.
505 ibid., 130.
protection of a patron. However, in this section, I will address gift-giving in a more restrictive sense, focusing on gifts carrying predominantly symbolic value, expressing affection and durability of the bond between a patron and his client.

These circuits of gift-giving often included banal objects. For instance, Hedda Reindl-Kiel has pointed that bread was a widespread gift within Ottoman patronage networks, distributed among members of a household. It would be misleading to categorize bread distribution in terms of economic flows, since members of grandee households could undoubtedly afford this basic foodstuff on their own. What mattered was the symbolic aspect of bread-giving, which put on display the recipient’s dependence on the patron.

In general, foodstuffs seem to constitute a prominent feature of the gift exchanges between members of cross-border networks. For instance, Moisie Movilă promised his patron, Stanisław Koniecpolski to deliver annually a considerable number of cattle for slaughter in addition to thirteen barrels of wine. At the same time, he also provided him with honey on a yearly basis. As I have mentioned earlier, Jan Zamoyski also received cattle from Ieremia Movilă and his Moldavian clients. In comparison with the vast economic resources controlled by Zamoyski and Koniecpolski, the value of such gifts was hardly impressive; however, as a sign of attachment and affinity, they played an important role.

Some gifts even made it into the pages of contemporary chronicles, which suggests their political significance in establishing a bond between actors from different political arenas. Radu Popescu mentioned in his chronicle that cooperation between Kara Mustafa Pasha and Wallachian boyar, Şerban Cantacuzino, originated with a gift. According to the historian, when in 1660 the Ottoman grandee arrived to Bucharest, Cantacuzino offered him a beautiful horse. Mustafa Pasha loved the present, which – as Popescu argues – brought the grandee and the boyar together, resulting in the establishment of the patron-client relationship.

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509 Eremia, Relațiile externe ale lui Vasile Lupu, 52–3.
510 Luca Stroici to Jan Zamoyski, 29th October 1597 in Hurmuzachi, Suppl. II/1, 435.
511 Radu Popescu, Istoriiile domnilor Țării Românești, 126.
Others turned to literary means in order to celebrate their patrons. As Wojciech Tygielski pointed out, letters addressed to Zamoyski by his clients are replete with wishes of good health and expressions of gratitude. The same applies for the letters authored by Zamoyski’s Moldavian clients. Among eighteen letters sent to the Chancellor by Luca Stroici, majority did not touch upon any specific matter, but rather showed Stroici’s devotion to his patron and expressed concern for the Chancellor’s well-being. In some periods, the boyar wrote to Zamoyski every two days. Feeling that this constant barrage of letters could become annoying for the recipient, Stroici offered his apologies, but in a way that assured Zamoyski of his unwavering loyalty:

“I have heard that my constant letters are tiring and bothersome for you, My Lord, since I do not miss any chance to pass a word for you. I do it, since I am eager to perform any services to you, and since I want to inquire about your well-being. May God bless you and keep you in good health.”

While possibly annoying for Zamoyski, Stroici’s frequent and unsolicited inquiries and civilities were a good omen for the Chancellor, since they showed the boyar’s preoccupation with keeping the channel of communication open and his interest in maintaining the patron-client relationship. At the same time, for Stroici, who was proficient in Polish, the letters offered a perfect opportunity to show his language abilities, no doubt an important aspect in cross-border communication.

While letters authored by Luca Stroici are extraordinary in their quantity, we should consider them as a tip of an iceberg. There are reasons to believe that such exchanges were much more frequent than our sources indicate. Firstly, numerous family archives have been destroyed or dispersed, reducing the number of letters we have at our disposal. Secondly, there are indications that many exchanges of this type were delivered orally. This role of orality can be inferred from the low level of literacy among the Moldavian elite in the seventeenth century. Evidence suggests that many boyars – and some voievodes – were illiterate, which led them to rely on oral communication. Moreover, the ability to write in Romanian did not mean that they would be able to communicate in writing with their Polish-Lithuanian counterparts. For instance, Moise Movilă – undoubtedly literate and

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512 Tygielski, Listy ludzie władza, 162.
513 "Podobna i z molestyją często się W.Mci memu miłościiwemu panu pisaniem swym uprzykrzam, nie opuszczając prawie żadnej okazji, abym się pisaniem swym W.Mci memu miłościwemu panu ozwać nie miał; czynię to chętnym będąc do każdych posług W.Mci mego miłościwego pana, że się często ozymwam z służbami memi, nawiedzając i teraz dobre zdrowie W.Mci mego miłościwego pana, w którym niech pan byg na czasy długie chowa i błogosławi W.M." Luca Stroici to Jan Zamoyski, 29th October 1597 in Hurnuzachi, Suppl. II/1, 435.
able to speak Polish – in 1633 apologized to Stanisław Koniecpolski for writing in Romanian, and explained that he was unable to reach his Polish secretary.514

Conversely, boyars with more intellectual proclivities often used literary works to consolidate their ties with Polish-Lithuanian patrons. For instance, from a letter addressed to Luca Stroici we find out that the boyar had promised to send Jan Zamoyski a manuscript of the chronicle of Moldavia:

„My Lord, I am grateful that you had blessed me with your letter [...] In addition, I urgently ask you to send me the Moldavian chronicle, which you had promised me.”515

This comes as no surprise, since both Luca Stroici and Jan Zamoyski were avid readers and men of considerable intellectual interests. By sending the book to the Chancellor, the boyar undoubtedly showed his cultural interests, enhancing his position in the eyes of the patron.

Miron Costin, a crucial political actor in the late-seventeenth-century Moldavia perfected this strategy. Having spent his youth in the Commonwealth and obtaining education in the Jesuit college in Bar, Costin was fluent in Polish and Latin, which he complemented with literary talent and skill in managing cross-border patronage networks. He maintained an intensive correspondence with the Polish-Lithuanian elite, most importantly king John III (1674-1696) and his close associate Marek Matczyński, to whom he dedicated his historical works on Moldavia, written in Polish.516

Thus, civilities and gifts played an important role in cross-border patronage. They served to keep channels of communication between the patron and his clients open, forestalling the dissolution of individual dyads. They expressed the parties' commitment to future cooperation and thus enhanced their reputation within a dyad. At the same time, they framed the relationship as one of friendship rather than a purely instrumental exchange. However, there were also wider ramifications for gift-giving in patronage relations. As Urszula Augustyniak pointed out, gift-giving enhanced the client's prestige, since it set him apart from paid servants.517 At the same time, by receiving gifts from their

514 Biedrzycka, Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 156.
517 Augustyniak, Dwór i klientela Krzysztofa Radziwiłła, 199.
clients, patron also gained in terms of symbolic capital, signaling his social status to a wider audience.  

At the same time, we can conceptualize the practice of gift-giving as a channel for luxury goods. While from our perspective watermelons hardly constitute a luxury object, we have to keep in mind that this fruit did not grow in the Commonwealth and only rarely featured on a noble's table.  

The same goes for other objects transferred through patronage networks – wine, expensive textiles, horses and foreign books. In a way, these gifts constituted a form of conspicuous consumption espoused by members of early modern elites.

At the same time, even such gifts could undergo conversion and influence political life in a tangible way. As Zofia Zielińska has pointed out, while ‘opinion leaders’ in Polish-Lithuanian dietines were usually bound to the magnates through long-term relations, rank-and-file participants of the dietines were often mobilized through one-off transactions. This middling sort flocked to the assemblies attracted not by hopes of securing an appointment or by interest in political matters, but rather by social events surrounding the proceedings. Thus, in order to satisfy ‘smaller brothers’, the magnates had to hold festivities and attended to their needs. Sometimes, such practices could go awry. For instance, the Volhynian dietine in 1641 ended in a brawl and numerous injuries, because nobles invited by the palatine of Sandomierz, Władysław Dominik Zasławski-Ostrogski, got drunk and started a fight. In spite of such incidents, however, conspicuous consumption constituted a tangible political strategy. While we are unable to determine, whether the watermelons Miaskowski received from Moldavia ended on one of the dietines, they nonetheless illustrate the role of resources flowing through cross-border networks and their subsequent conversion.

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518 Krausman Ben-Amos, The Culture of Giving, 205.
520 Bianca M. Lindorfer, “Cosmopolitan Aristocracy and the Diffusion of Baroque Culture: Cultural Transfer from Spain to Austria in the Seventeenth Century” (PhD dissertation, European University Institute, 2009), 31.
3.5. Procuring and Converting Resources

The circulation and conversion of different types of resources constituted lock, stock, and barrel of the cross-border patronage ties. Contents of such exchanges varied greatly from whole armies to a cart of watermelons. While at first glance they had little in common, these resources constituted an integral part of a multiplex system of exchanges between partners belonging to different political arenas.

While sharing many features with other patronage ties, cross-border relations had peculiarities of their own. Most importantly, since resources were embedded within particular arenas, their relative value varied between different political and social environments. Consider information about possible Tatar raids into Polish-Lithuanian territories. While in the Danubian principalities, such knowledge was relatively widespread and Moldavian boyars were in most cases not directly affected by the slave-raiding expeditions, the value of such information was relatively low. However, for their Polish-Lithuanian patrons, such intelligence was of crucial importance, allowing them to organize defenses and protect their estates. Taking into consideration the scarcity of labor in the Ukrainian palatinates, learning about impending in advance meant averting a considerable economic loss.

Moreover, resources brought through cross-border patronage in some instances could prove decisive for the outcome of political struggles. This was particularly the case in Moldavia, where bringing military and political resources from abroad often tilted the balance of power within the arena. Boyar factions could hardly challenge voivodes by relying solely on their own resources. However, once they managed to find a suitable Polish or Ottoman patron, they posed a serious threat to the ruler. This way, cross-border patronage provided resources, which had a transformative effect on the structure of political arena in the long run.

Taken together, the informational, political and economic resources passing through patronage networks may seem relatively random. After all, is there an obvious connection between the cart of watermelons and several thousand troops ready to take the Moldavian capital? However, this apparent chaos is misleading, since the actors were clearly knowledgeable about the expectations of their partners. Of course, our knowledge of the exchanges is fragmentary and we often know only fragments of the exchanges; nonetheless, these insights allow us to put forward a number of theses concerning the character of this circulation of resources.
Firstly, the resources exchanged were clearly incomparable, due to their disparate character. It is impossible to establish how much a particular piece of information 'was worth' and how did it translate into e.g. military support. In fact, the evidence proves that the relationships were generally open-ended, repayment was not expected immediately and no 'price' was set for particular services.

Secondly, not all resources were readily deployable within the particular arena, but often had to be converted and repurposed to suit the needs of the recipient. This does not mean that they were worth less, but it indicates that they required good coordination between the patron and the client, as well as mastery in handling them.

Thirdly, the analysis uncovered certain divergences between particular relationships and across arenas. The most striking example of these different approaches is the exchange of economic resources, whereby the Polish-Lithuanian nobles were more interested in land acquisition, while the Ottoman officials opted for ready cash. This phenomenon stemmed from the different structure of the economy in each case and as I will discuss in the later chapters, played a significant role in the fortunes of the region.
PART II
FACTIONAL MACRO-POLITICS
Chapter 4. Factional Clashes: Inter- and Intra-Factional Conflicts in Cross-border Patronage

Patronage and factionalism grew out of the highly competitive environment of seventeenth-century politics and conflicts between particular networks were a common occurrence. This holds true for Ottoman-Moldavian-Polish cross-border patronage, as different groups struggled and grappled for access to resources in order to prevail over their competitors. However, historiography, due to its state bias, has generally ignored this aspect. Instead, scholars have tried to identify ‘true’ interests of the state, arbitrarily ascribing the roles of prudent statesmen and their self-serving adversaries. In this respect, an author’s sympathies and antipathies often played an important role, resulting in moral verdicts or even dismissing source evidence as a slander. However, if a conflict broke out, both sides usually justified their actions with the rhetoric of common good. As Michael Braddick has pointed out in his analysis of administrative performance in early modern England:

“The authority of an individual performing an office depended on the presentation of a self that conferred natural authority on them - they presented a front which represented an abstract political authority rather than their individual will.”

Eastern European elites did not differ much from their English counterparts. They utilized the rhetoric of service to the state and concern with a greater good, using it as an ideological weapon against their rivals. As a result, a scholar trying to identify ‘objective’ interests of the state is left with little more than his own judgement and conflicting claims staked by opposing camps. In effect, the attempts to identify ‘state interests’ in factional conflicts often result in a reductionist identification of those who were ‘right’ and those who were ‘wrong’.

In the course of this chapter, I approach the problem in a different manner. Rather than focusing on the state, I analyze factional conflicts in the context of interconnected political arenas and objectives of individual actors. As I argue, rather than reflecting geopolitical concerns of the polity, such

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523 Ciobanu, La cumpăna de veacuri, 9.
conflicts were driven by factional rivalries, with different cross-border patronage networks vying for control over patronage resources embedded in the arenas.

However, it is important to keep in mind that factions were not homogenous actors, but rather coalitions bound together by common interest and interpersonal ties. Thus, approaching them as unitary entities would be a mistake. As James C. Scott and Robert Kaufman pointed out, patronage systems were no groups, but rather quasi-groups, with particular cliques connected vertically to the patron, while not necessarily integrated in horizontal terms.\(^{546}\) This means that the struggle for resources occurred not only between different factions, but within them as well. In extreme cases, this could lead to the breakup of the patronage network into rival camps. Thus, these internal tensions and rivalries should also be accounted for, when approaching cross-border patronage.

In order to elucidate the dynamics of factional conflicts, in the present chapter I focus on three distinct case studies of inter- and intra-factional struggles in the context of cross-border patronage. In the first section, I address the protracted conflict between the voievodes of Moldavia and Wallachia, Vasile Lupu and Matei Basarab, both backed by their Ottoman patrons in the course of the 1630s. While the *locus* of the conflict was in the Danubian principalities, the voievodes’ cross-border alliances with Ottoman officials contributed to the spillover of hostilities into the Ottoman political arena. In the following section, I shift my attention to the process of disintegration of Movilă-Zamoyski faction following the death of its founders. Deprived of the lynchpin that had held it together, the patronage network disintegrated. However, contrary to our intuitions, the faction did not split along the boundaries of respective arenas. On the contrary, two cross-border patronage networks emerged from the ashes, locked in fierce competition both in the Commonwealth and in Moldavia. Finally, the third case study examines tensions present within the Köprülü faction during the second half of the seventeenth century. Having established itself as the hegemonic household in the Ottoman Empire in the 1650s, the Köprülüs’ patronage networks remained virtually unchallenged for decades. However, this domination did not remove tension and rivalry, since different members of the faction coalesced into smaller cliques vying for resources.

4.1. Matei Basarab, Vasile Lupu and their Ottoman Friends: Reframing Moldavian-Wallachian Conflict of the 1630s

In many respects, the age of Vasile Lupu and Matei Basarab constituted the highlight of Moldavian-Wallachian seventeenth-century history. Their unprecedentedly long reigns brought a measure of economic stability and cultural efflorescence. At the same time, however, the two voievodes remained locked in a fierce struggle for power and influence in the region, enlisting assistance of their Ottoman patrons in the process.\(^{527}\)

The rivalry between Vasile Lupu and Matei Basarab has been the subject of numerous studies. However, the scholarship has tended to focus on the Danubian principalities, while underplaying the actors’ connections to the internal politics at the Porte.\(^{528}\) In turn, authors, who position it within wider political context of the time, tend to focus on state interests and geopolitical rivalry rather than individual agendas of the actors.\(^{529}\) According to the established narrative, Vasile Lupu represented a ‘pro-Ottoman’ orientation throughout his reign, whereas Matei Basarab sought support from the Christian polities of the region, most importantly Transylvania.\(^{530}\)

However, as I have pointed out in Chapter 2, both voievodes were engaged in close cooperation with their respective patrons at the Porte, even if their careers and routes to the throne differed significantly. As I will show in the present chapter, cross-border patronage played a crucial role in the escalation of the conflict, at the same time shaping the political strategies of Vasile Lupu and Matei Basarab. Thus, rather than geopolitical or confessional orientations, factional interests underpinned both actions of the voievodes, as well as their Ottoman patrons.

At the time of Vasile Lupu’s ascension to the throne in 1634, there had already been bad blood between him and the Wallachian voievode. According to Miron Costin, Lupu Coci schemes had led

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\(^{528}\) Șerban, “Relațiile politice dintre Țările Române,” passim.

\(^{529}\) Gemil, Țările române în contextul politic internațional, 79.

\(^{530}\) Cândea, O epoca de innoiri în spiritul european, 149.
to the execution of Miron Barnovschi, Matei’s political ally in 1633.\textsuperscript{531} Thus, upon the appointment of Vasile Lupu, the relations between the voievodes remained tense, despite some attempts at reaching a rapprochement.\textsuperscript{532} However, the \textit{détente} proved short-lived, and in May 1635 the conflict between the voievodes escalated. When Matei Basarab was touring the western districts of Wallachia, Vasile Lupu concentrated his troops on the border, prompting the Wallachian voievode to hastily return to Târgoviște. The resolution of the crisis was anticlimactic, since Vasile Lupu decided to send his client, Nicolae Catargiu, to sue for peace.\textsuperscript{533}

Sources provide us with little information regarding this episode, and both the course of events and Vasile Lupu’s motives remain obscure. In his biography of the voievode, Constantin Șerban argued that Vasile tried to force Matei to withdraw his support for pretenders to the Moldavian throne.\textsuperscript{534} However, it seems that Lupu’s actions were not purely defensive in scope. Rather, he tried to oust Matei from the Wallachian throne and establish his own dynasty in both Danubian principalities. This grand political scheme was to inform the Moldavian ruler’s actions at least until the end of the 1630s.\textsuperscript{535}

Much ink has been spilled concerning Vasile Lupu’s dynastic project, with scholars explaining it by personal ambition of the voievode, Romanian struggle for national unity or even plans to restore a Greek Orthodox empire in Southeastern Europe.\textsuperscript{536} At the same time, the scholars pointed out that Vasile Lupu in his ventures enjoyed constant support of key officials at the Porte, which contributed to the juxtaposition in scholarship between him and ‘pro-Christian’ Matei. However, the sources

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{531} Costin, \textit{Letopisețul Țării Moldovei}, 84. For a different interpretation of the events, see Eremia, \textit{Relațiile externe ale lui Vasile Lupu}, 44–8.
\item \textsuperscript{532} Șerban, \textit{Vasile Lupu}, 128.
\item \textsuperscript{533} Eremia, \textit{Relațiile externe ale lui Vasile Lupu}, 57–8.
\item \textsuperscript{534} Șerban, “Relațiile politice dintre Țările Române,” 1942.
\item \textsuperscript{535} “Mam i tę przestrogę od wielkich ludzi, że ta intencja cesarza tureckiego była, aby i multańskiego hospodara a wojewodę siedmiogrodzkiego z państwa zrzuciwszy, na multańskim brata hospodara wołoskiego, nie tylko J.K.M. i Rzeczypospolitej, ale wszystkiemu narodowi chrześcijańskiemu nieżyczliwego, w siedmiogrodzkiej zaś ziemi Betlem Osadziwszy, in hiberna wojsko swe osadził i położył, jedno w Wołoszech, drugie w Multaniech, a trzecie w Węgrzech [...]”Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 341.
\end{itemize}
provide us with a different narrative, depicting both voievodes as engaged in close cooperation with
different individuals at the Porte. According to Miron Costin:

“During the reign of sultan Murad, all matters of the empire depended on two
people, who were companions [musaipi] of the sultan. One was silahdar, which
means sword-bearer, the one carrying the sultan’s sword and mace; the other one
was kızlar ağası, who manages the whole household of the sultan and his women. [...]”
Thus, Matei approached one of these heads of the empire, the Silihdar, with gifts,
while Vasile won over the Kızlar Ağası, and so Vasile and Matei managed their affairs
at the Porte.537

While Costin’s description, in its general lines, conforms to what we know from other sources, the
emergence of these two cross-border factions was a long and complex process of shifting alliances,
involving numerous actors in both political arenas. Fortunately, the prominence and sheer scale of
the conflict between the voievodes attracted considerable attention of the contemporaries, resulting
in a relatively large number of available sources. This allows us to retrace the shifting alliances and
the processes of crystallization and polarization of the cross-border patronage networks.

As I have pointed out in Chapter 2, early in his reign Matei Basarab enjoyed the protection of
governor-general of Özü, Abaza Mehmed Pasha, the same grandee that had been instrumental in
the voievode’s successful bid for the throne. However, in 1634 Abaza Mehmed Pasha was executed,
scapegoated for the outbreak of hostilities with the Commonwealth.538 This turn of events deprived
Matei of his protector and forced him to search for a new ally at the Porte. These efforts soon bore
fruit and by December 1637 the Crown Grand Hetman, Stanisław Koniecpolski, was informed that:

“That rascal Lupu, the Moldavian voievode, sows dissent, slandering the poor
Wallachian Matei to the Turkish Emperor; he claims that the latter has a secret pact
with the Transylvanians and the Poles, and is willing to start a war against the Turks.
The emperor believes Lupu, since the kaymakam [deputy grand vizier] and Silihdar
Pasha are both on Lupu’s side, with the latter paying them handsomely. In turn, the

537 ‘Era la împărăţia lui soltan Murat pre acele vremi toate trebile şi lucrurile împărăţiei pre doi oameni, carii era musaipi
la sultan Murat. Unul silihdar, ce era înluntru, care sluţba este de împărăţiiie foarte aproape, adecă spătar, ce poartă spata
ori buzduganul după împărăţul, al doilea câzlar agga, care este pre toată casa împărăţiască şi pre fete mai mare. Deci,
pre unul de acele capte la împărăţitiie, pe silihtar paşe, îl cuprinseșă Matei vodă cu dârile, iară pre câzlar agga Vasilie vodă
şi eșia isprăvi şi lui Vasilie vodă dela împărăţiiie şi lui Matei vodă, pren chipuri mai sus pomenite.” Costin, Letopiseţul Țării Moldovei, 99.
Wallachian enjoys the support of Ruznameci Efendi, on whom the emperor relies greatly.¹⁵³⁹

As we can see, the map of cross-border alliances depicted by Koniecpolski’s informant differs significantly from Costin’s account. As I have argued in Chapter 2, it seems that following the death of Abaza Mehmed Pasha, Ruznameci Ibrahim Efendi, a member of financial administration and a favorite of Murad IV, took over the latter’s role as the patron of Matei Basarab, while Silahdar Mustafa Pasha at this point was still in Vasile Lupu’s camp.¹⁵⁴⁰

At the same time, information relayed to Koniecpolski allows us to look closer into the ways actors deployed their patronage resources in the context of factional struggle. By manipulating information, and enlisting support of his allies at the Porte, the Moldavian voievode hoped to turn Murad IV against his Wallachian rival. In exchange, he provided the grandees with economic resources extracted from the principality. Meanwhile, Ibrahim Efendi, another favorite of the sultan, tried to protect his client, Matei Basarab, from the political offensive mounted by the Moldavian.

However, the account ignores other important figures in this factional puzzle, including the Chief Black Eunuch and the former Grand Vizier, Tabanyassi Mehmed Pasha. Their absence from the report is not difficult to explain. Kızlar Ağa was a position of considerable power, but its locus remained firmly within the enderun, the private quarters of the sultan. Thus, his influence on the world beyond the confines of the palace, albeit considerable, was nonetheless indirect, exerted through proxies planted within the officialdom.¹⁵⁴¹ This explains why the Hetman’s informants, as well as other diplomats lacking access to the exclusive arena of enderun, generally underplayed the role of the eunuch.

¹⁵³⁹ “Niecnota Lupul hospodar wołoski kłóci rzeczy, nieboraka Mathwieja hospodara multańskiego żle a niecnotliwie udając do cesarza tureckiego, jakoby miał mieć zmowę z Siedmiogrodzianami i z Polaki, chcąc wojnę podnieść przeciwko Turkom, a cesarz temu wierzyc, bo Lupulową stronu trzymają kamakan i Silichtar pasza, bo im dobrze smaruje ręce, a za multańskim Roznamdzi efendi, na którym siela cesarz polega.” Report for Stanisław Koniecpolski, December 26, 1637 in Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 459.

¹⁵⁴⁰ However, it seems that this attachment was not very strong, since in August 1636 Jerzy Kruszyński, identified Silahdar Mustafa Pasha as a supporter of another claimant to the Moldavian throne, Radu Iliaș: “Mam jednak tę wiadomość od swoich tamże z szaraju, że jeszcze Dunaju nie przejadę, Lupuła z państwa zrzucą, aby się cesarz nie zdął, że to invitus na moją czyni instancją. Komu by dano nie mogę pewnie oznajmić W.M.m.m.P. Aleksandrow Raduł najbliższego tego, który suis modis na tam tym placu wspierać nie przepomniął i już privatum za pewne mi udano. Sylichtar paszy promotorowi swemu a kochankowi weliukiem cesarskiemu dziękował, którego sam w Stambole drugim cesarzem zowią.” Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 311–2.

¹⁵⁴¹ Peirce, The imperial harem, 11.
The absence of Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha, the former grand vizier deposed in early 1637, is more startling. However, it is important to note that throughout most of his tenure as the grand vizier, Mehmed Pasha was absent from the capital, conducting campaigns against the Safavids in the east. Once dismissed, he became the main patron of Vasile Lupu, their relationship strengthened by shared Albanian origin (see Chapter 2). The grandee, appointed as the beylerbey of Özü, considered his new position an opportunity to restart his career and, according to the Venetian bailo, “la passata disgrazia non lo turbasse punto, mentre potera duplcarli tutto il perduto.” Cooperation with the Moldavian voievode clearly played a crucial role in these plans, to the extent that Miron Costin claimed that the official actually requested the appointment to Özü in order to help the Moldavian voievode in his dynastic venture.

Soon after the arrival of Mehmed Pasha to the eyalet, the first attempt to remove Matei Basarab took place. In 1637, Mehmed Pasha was entrusted with a cleanup operation following the internal conflict among the Tatars. Starting from the 1610s a powerful Manghit aristocrat, Kantemir, had managed to establish himself as the leader of the Nogays and gain virtual independence from the Crimean khans. The rivalry between Kantemir and the Girays escalated, eventually leading to the invasion of Budjak by the forces of Khan Inayet Giray, who forced his rival to flee to Istanbul. A period of turmoil ensued, and in order to re-establish control, the Porte ordered the execution of both the khan and Kantemir.

Before setting out on his campaign to the Budjak, Mehmed Pasha called upon the voievodes of Moldavia and Wallachia to join his troops in the camp at Baba. However, according to Ottoman authors, this appeal was a ruse to lure Matei Basarab out of the principality and replace him with a relative of Vasile Lupu. The Wallachian voievode learned about the conspiracy and returned to Târgoviște, refusing to participate in the campaign. Unwilling to risk military confrontation and

542 Bailo to the Doge, August 14, 1637 in Hurmuzachi, vol. IV/2, 462.
543 Costin, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei, 130.
544 Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, 130.
546 Costin, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei, 132.
possible losses, Mehmed Pasha decided to postpone his plans and reconfirmed Matei on the throne.547

While in 1637 Matei managed to avoid dethronement, in the following years the tables turned against him, especially since his patron, Ibrahim Efendi, died during the campaign against the Safavids.548 This left Matei exposed to Vasile Lupu's schemes, and forced the Wallachian to search for a new protector at the Porte. According to bailo Alvise Contarini:

"Il principe di Valachia doppo la morte del Rusnamegi, ch'era tutto suo protettore ha espedito a questa volta un suo agente con desiderio che passasse al campo per procurarsi nuova protettione tra quelli, che di presente rissorgono nel favore. Il Caimecan [Silahdar Mustafa Pasha] non ha voluto permetterglielo, offrendosi lui di voler subentrar al Rusnamegi morto nella cura di quel Principe et di quella provintia. Non si sa se questo sia stato motivo di avaritia per i molti provvecchi et donativi, che contribuissse quel principe a suoi protettori, o sepure motivo di gelsio accio sotto questo pretesto non venissero spiati gli andamenti del campo, et i piu occulti fini del Re [...]"549

As I have pointed out in Chapter 2, this episode shows that the practice of cross-border patronage had spread across the Moldavian-Wallachian and Ottoman arenas, creating a demand on both sides for such relationships. At the same time, this episode elucidates the dual character of cross-border patronage. While Contarini's account clearly describes the formation of Matei-Mustafa Pasha dyad as driven by instrumental concerns, in the following years the two were consistently referred to as being friends.

Ibrahim Efendi's death and establishment of the patron-client relationship between Silahdar Mustafa Pasha and Matei Basarab led to the polarization of factional politics in the late 1630s, both in the Danubian principalities and at the Porte. In his dynastic project, Vasile Lupu, relied on

547 Wola i impreza Cesarza J.M. tureckiego w odmianie hospodara J.M. multańskiego, lubo pod te czasy pod pokrywką była, jednakem ja, zapuszczając się w drogę od Porty mnie zleconą, nieco o tem namienił W.M.m.m.P. Jać wprawdzie mea sorte contentus wszegdy zostawał, lecz iż trudno sprzeciwić się nam imperantis nutibus, rad nie rad musialem tam vires movere, gdzie gorące nastąpiło mandatum. Wtym Matfiej wojewoda prawie sceptri sui desperatis rebus sumę niemalą tak Mehmed paszy, jako i inszym do Porty principalioribus posławszy, otrzymał w znowu potwierdzenie na państwie. Mnie zaś kaftan i buławę posławszy nazad powrócić kazano. Teraz jako mię słuchy zachodzą [...]

548 Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 523.

549 Hurmuzachi, vol. IV/2, 500.
assistance provided by Tabanyassi Mehmed Pasha, the governor-general of Özü - soon promoted to the deputy grand vizier - and the Chief Black Eunuch. Grand Vizier Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Pasha, Mehmed Pasha’s ally and fellow Albanian, also supported Vasile Lupu’s claims, although his influence on the course of events was diminished due to his absence from the capital. Moreover, as I have pointed out in Chapter 2, the Moldavian voivode managed to secure an alliance with the Crimean khan, Bahadır Giray (r. 1637–1641), by means of his marriage with Ecaterina Cercheza. Against this powerful coalition, Matei Basarab could muster support of the sultan’s favorite and grand admiral, Silahdar Mustafa Pasha, as well as that of Derviş Mehmed Pasha and Nasuhpaşazade Hüseyin Pasha, Tabanyassi’s successor as the beylerbey of Özü.

This competitive factional buildup between Vasile Lupu and Matei Basarab effectively reduced the room for maneuver for other pretenders to the throne. Leon Tomşa, the former voivode of Wallachia, learned this the hard way, suffering humiliation and torture for trying to secure the appointment:

“The Turkish emperor is careful, and wants to scare of those dogs, who want to request appointment as the voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia. On August 15, Voivode Leon, who claims to be the son of [Ştefan] Tomşa and had been the Wallachian voivode for a couple of years, put considerable effort in order to obtain the Wallachian throne. The emperor ordered his arrest and subjected him to tortures, subsequently parading him around the city on a donkey, with dog intestines mixed with excrements hanged around his neck. He was subjected to utmost humiliation and would rather prefer to lose his head. The others went into hiding like sparrows, and there is a lot of those bastards, but until the incumbent [voievodes] are in power, none will be granted [the throne] in their place.”

It can be argued that the autocratic Sultan Murad IV was unwilling to risk unrest in the Danubian principalities on the eve of the Baghdad campaign, and tried to discourage Moldavian and Wallachian candidates to the thrones. However, it is also clear that the competitive factional buildup by the incumbent voievodes greatly reduced the chances of other claimants.

Hs553 “Obacza się potrosze cesarz turecki, postrachy daje kostrouszkom, którzy się namagają na hospodarstwa multańskie i wołoskie. Die 15 augusti Leo wojewoda Tomsyn syn się zowie, który był kilka lat wojewodą multańskim, starał się z pilnością o multańskie hospodarstwo, którego cesarz rozkazawszy pojmać, pryskowano i po mieście wodzono na ośle posadziedzy, na szyi flaki z plugastwem powieszono. Wielką hańbę odniósł nieborak, wolalby szyję pozbyć, teraz się pochowali jak wróble; siela się było tych bękartów zjawiło, poko nie polowią tych, co teraz trzymają, żadnemu nie dadzą.” Report sent to Stanisław Koniecpolski in Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 512–513. See also Bailo to the Doge, August 29, 1637 in Hurmuzachi, vol. IV/2, 464.
This state of affairs reinforced the respective positions of Matei Basarab and Vasile Lupu in their principalities, but at the same time contributed to the escalation of the conflict. With the departure of Sultan Murad IV on the Baghdad campaign, both factions gained more liberty and the resumption of hostilities ensued, paving the way for the major showdown between the two voievodes and their factions.

As I have pointed out, the controversy over Vasile Lupu's marriage with Ecaterina Cercheza in summer 1639 constituted one of the stages leading up to the conflict. Despite vehement protests by Matei Basarab's allies at the Porte, the Moldavian voievode and Tabanıyassı Mehmed Pasha managed to prevail and bring the marriage to conclusion. However, the dispute over Ecaterina was only a prelude to the attack on Matei and his Ottoman friends that Vasile Lupu launched later that year.

On 2 November 1639, the kaymakam Tabanıyassı Mehmed Pasha issued a set of orders to the voievodes and the officials in the adjacent provinces. The official informed Matei Basarab of his deposition and instructed him to give up his throne without resistance. Vasile's son, Ioan, received the berat appointing him as the new voievode of Wallachia. In his orders to the beylerbey of Özü and Bahadır Giray, Mehmed Pasha demanded their military support for the new appointee. The whole project had been kept in utmost secrecy and meticulously coordinated, catching the experienced bailo Alvise Contarini by surprise. This suggests that the plan had been long in the making, formulated in close cooperation between the kaymakam and Vasile Lupu. It is also clear that Mehmed Pasha mobilized all resources at his disposal in order to provide assistance for his Moldavian client.

However, Matei Basarab did not give up. Having refused to leave the principality, he mobilized his own troops in order to confront Vasile's army. He also received assistance from Silahdar Mustafa Pasha. According to Miron Costin, the sultan's favorite encouraged Matei to oppose the Porte and

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551 "Sotto li z del corrente sono seguite cinque espedizioni da questa Porta, tutte uscite in un medesimo tempo, e con somma secretezza maturate e risolute. Al Vaivoda di Valachia di casa Mathei, huomo attempato, ma corraggioso si sono espedite lettere con l'avviso della sua depositione, essortandolo a ceder di buona voglia quel principato. [...] La terza espedizione si e fatta al Bassa di Slistria con ordine di tener pronte le sue truppe, per entrar nella Valachia insieme con quelle del Vaivoda di Moldavia [...]. La quarta espedizione si e fatta a Tartacan con ordine pur anche essa di haver pronto corpo di truppe [...]" Report of Alvise Contarini, 13th November 1639 in Hurmuzachi, vol. IV/2, 596–7.
instructed him to appeal to Murad IV. The voievode followed this advice and by late November 1639, Alvise Contarini informed Venetian authorities about Matei’s military preparations and a number of petitions (arz) filed at the Porte, deploring Vasile’s actions and demanding the sultan’s intervention.

Petitioning the sultan was a well-established practice in Ottoman political culture, and the petitions written by Matei Basarab and his supporters, published by Aurel Decei, show the authors’ familiarity with this channel of communication and corresponding forms of address. Rather than contesting the appointment of Ion Lupu, Matei fashioned himself as a loyal servant of the Porte and protector of the sultan’s subjects:

“The All-Powerful God knows that none of our men did sin and that in the name of All-Powerful Allah, we are the servants of our felicitous, powerful and benevolent Padishah, the Padishah of the face of Earth. None [of us] even had a thought to betray against his benevolence, gifts and favors; neither did we thought of betraying the faith, state and community nor Muhammad. [We did] it only in order to stop the havoc caused by Lupu and his evil thoughts against the poor [subjects]. This is how this all happened.”

This was a clever rhetorical strategy, which downplayed the fact that Matei had been deposed and was now considered a rebel against the Porte. At the same time, his appeal to the ideological foundations of the sultan’s role as protector of his subjects and upholder of justice meant that the petition could not be simply brushed away. However, in order to achieve its goal, petitioning the sultan had to be complemented with political support provided by Matei’s Ottoman patrons, as well as a display of Matei’s force in the battlefield.

The military confrontation between the two voievodes took place in early December, near Ojogeni in northeastern Wallachia. Matei Basarab managed to surprise Moldavian and Crimean troops and

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553 “Di Valachia sono venuti avisi come quel Vaivoda non vuol ceder volontariamente quel Principato, ma con seguito considerabile si prepara alla diffesa. Per cuprir nondimeno questa sua ribellione, et forse per avanzar tempo, ha mandato qui una quantita di Arz, o siano attestati di tutta nobilta della Provincia et Popoli [...]” Alvise Contarini to the Doge, November 26, 1639 Hurmuzachi, vol. IV/2, 485.


555 “Billâhi teâlâ saadetlü ve azametlü ve adâletlü ve fukara kullarina merhametlü Padişahımız, Padişah’ı ruy’ı zemin hazretlerin en’am ve ihsanları olan nam ve nimetlerine ve din-i devletlerine ve ümmet-i Muhammede ihanet kasi ile gelimneyüb, emr-i Hakka ve fukaranın ah-u zarile ve Lupuluñ derununda merküz olan habaseti ve fukaraya olan fikr-i fasideyi yoluna gelüb, böyle bir hal vaki olmuşdur.” ibid.
obtain a decisive victory, while Vasile Lupu had to flee the battlefield and seek Ottoman protection. Following the battle, the victorious voievode quickly sent the news to his patrons at the Porte along with new petitions deploring the turmoil caused by Lupu's actions.

Vasile's defeat at Ojogeni made Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha and the Moldavian voievode vulnerable, and allowed their rivals to seize the initiative. Silahdar Mustafa Pasha and Matei Basarab soon followed up on their success by filing another complaint by the sultan. According to Costin's account of the conflict, this was a highly staged event. The envoy sent by Matei Basarab to deliver the grievances, approached Murad IV during the hunt and, in a highly dramatic fashion, described the destruction of the principality, blaming Moldavian troops for the suffering of the sultan's subjects. He also implied Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha's responsibility for Vasile's appointment and the resulting turmoil.

Upon hearing the news, the sultan became enraged, since, as the contemporaries claimed, Mehmed Pasha had convinced Murad IV that the change would occur without bloodshed. At this moment, Silahdar Mustafa Pasha intervened, fueling Murad's irritation with the kaymakam:

“The silahdar was anxious not to miss the opportunity to deal with the vizier. Therefore, he rekindled the sultan's rage, and the emperor summoned the vizier and after reproaching him for destroying provinces on his own volition, he ordered him to be killed. And that the vizier received for getting involved in these squabbles between the voievodes.”

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556 Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 566.
557 Decei, “Relaţiile lui Vasile Lupu şi Matei Basarab,” 64.
559 Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 566. In a different account, the role of Silahdar Mustafa Pasha is presented in similar terms: “Le Captaine Bacha prist aussitost l'occasion d'entretenir le Grand Seigneur, luy faisant voir par vives raisons comme le Caimahgan avoit trahi la bonte et facilite de son humeur en lui proposant faussement et meschament le changement d'un nouveau Prince de la Valachye et que le Grand Turc entendant il luy respondit que s'il luy disoit la varite, il feroit estranger son Caimahgan.” Constantin C. Giurescu, “Uciderea vezirului Mohamed Tabani Buiuc, sprijinătorul lui Vasile Lupu,” Revista istorică 12, no. 3 (1926): 102.
560 Costin, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei, 108. About the death of Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha, see also Guboglu, Cronici turcești privind Țările Române, vol. 1: 87.
Thus, the project of Vasile Lupu and Mehmed Pasha backfired, causing the execution of the official. This owed much to the cooperation between Silahdar Mustafa Pasha and Matei Basarab and their skillful handling of resources in a cross-border patronage network. At first glance, it may be surprising that Mehmed Pasha, unmentioned in the petitions of Matei Basarab and the boyars, took the fall. However, the contents of the arz presented to the sultan constituted only a part of the act of political communication. Rather, the grievances served as the basis for an attack, mounted by Silahdar Mustafa Pasha with Matei Basarab’s assistance, against the rival faction.

Following the execution of Tabanıyassı Mehmed Pasha, Silahdar Mustafa Pasha and Matei Basarab moved against his Moldavian client, who barely managed to avoid capture, fleeing from İbrail to Moldavia with nothing his nightgown and slippers. Vasile’s position at this point was critical, since – as the Transylvanian envoy Martin Hárko informed – Matei Basarab, now reappointed as the voievode of Wallachia, was determined to oust Vasile once and for all. Vasile Lupu was so desperate that he even appealed to Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, with whom he had been in abysmal relations. However, Koniecpolski was happy to hear about the voievode’s dire straits:

“The envoys of the voievode, Visternic Catargiu and Grand Spătar Ureche came to me; the gist of their mission was that the voievode, losing faith in Turkish favor, turns himself fully under the protection of Your Royal Majesty, and he gives up the principality of Wallachia forever, willing to come under the protection of Your Majesty.”

Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, 574–5. Interestingly, Miron Costin presents a different account of this attempted capture. According to him, the ağas of Măcin and İbrail acted on their own initiative: “La Brăilă zăbăvindu Vasilie vodă câteva dzile și Matei vodă dedesă știre de olac la pașe îndată, de izbânda sa asupra lui Vasilie vodă. Așe de sârgu lucrul, ori de știrea pașii, ori dentru sine agii de Brăila și de Mecin sfătuia să prindze pre Vasilie vodă, să-l trimață la pașe.” Costin, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei, 105.

Despite the looming danger and the apparent collapse of Vasile Lupu-Tabanıyassı Mehemd Pasha faction, the conflict concluded with an anti-climax, with both Matei Basarab and Vasile Lupu reconfirmed in their principalities. Moreover, by March 1640, the Moldavian voievode managed to restore his position at the Porte and adopted a hostile attitude to the Polish-Lithuanian ambassador to Istanbul, Wojciech Miaskowski.564

This outcome is startling, if we keep in mind that less than two months earlier the Moldavian voievode had faced deposition and possibly execution. What changed in such a short period? The answer to this question brings to light the inherent limitations of cross-border patronage, stemming from physical environment, biological accidents, slow communication and bad luck.

As I have pointed out, Grand Vizier Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Pasha was one of Vasile Lupu’s allies within the Ottoman officialdom. However, in November and December 1639 he was absent from the capital, arriving to Istanbul only twenty days after Mehmed Pasha’s execution. The absence of the grand vizier created a window of opportunity for Silahdar Mustafa Pasha and his allies to mount the attack against their opponents, resulting in the kaymakam’s death and an attempt to capture Vasile Lupu. However, once Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Pasha arrived to Istanbul, his prestige enhanced by the conclusion of peace with Safavid Persia, he managed to salvage the situation and reconfirm Vasile Lupu on the throne565. Moreover, Murad IV’s unexpected death at the beginning of 1640 stripped Silahdar Mustafa Pasha of his influence, and he was soon sent away from the capital and promptly executed on the orders of the grand vizier.566

The factional conflict between Vasile Lupu and Matei Basarab during the 1630s leads us to a number of conclusions. Firstly, seen from the perspective of a single arena, the conflict made little sense. If we focus solely on the military confrontation between the voivodes, we fail to understand the

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564 Baidaus, Politica și diplomația Moldovei, 22.
565 “Il primo Visir arrivo nel procinto dell’ultima mia espedizione seguita sotto li 2. del passato […] Alli agenti di Valacchia che lo hanno riverito, escunsando co la necessita l’accidente passato, ha raspisto: che quel Principe mandi pure il Tributo com’e’ obbligato, e cher per il resti si pensera poi. Alli agenti di Moldavia ha pure in conformita detto che facciano venir il Tributo sudando nel resto, che quel Principe stava troppo bene, e che l’operato da lui non e’ stato che un contratempo per soverchia ambitione.” Hummuzachi vol. IV/2, 489.
motives of Ottoman officials, who supported either one voievode or the other. Similarly, an analysis restricted to the Ottoman political arena would not account for the dynamics behind the conflict, leaving us only with *ad hoc* explanations.

Scholars addressing the conflict have generally relied on corruption and geopolitical interests as explanatory tools. Thus, the narrative goes, the Porte supported Vasile Lupu either out of concern regarding Matei’s ‘pro-Christian’ political orientation or due to lavish bribes handed out by the Moldavian voievode. However, none of these interpretations does justice to the evidence of the sources. There is no indication that the Porte was genuinely concerned about Matei’s loyalty, evidenced by the fact that following the battle of Ojogeni he was promptly restored to the throne, while allegedly ‘pro-Ottoman’ Vasile Lupu faced deposition. If we approach the Porte as a unitary body, there seems to be little consistency in its policy regarding the conflict. In order to explain those shifts, scholars embraced the argument of rampant corruption and ‘moral decline,’ ascribing all decision to the venality of the officials, thus reducing them to Pavlov’s dogs, deprived of any long-term agenda and guided only by their avarice.

Granted, money changed hands throughout the conflict. However, rather than bribes clear and simple, these money transfers formed a part of a complex system of cross-border patronage and factional rivalries. At no point during the conflict, Silahdar Mustafa Pasha seemed to have be driven by monetary gain. Rather, his goal was to bring down the rival faction and deal with his personal enemies at the Porte. Thus, corruption does not provide us with a universal key to understand political conflicts in cross-border patronage.

Secondly, the experience of 1639-1640 conflict show us that no factional enterprise, however meticulously planned and prepared, was devoid of risk. Within short three months of the open conflict, both factions found themselves at the verge of victory and at the brink of an absolute disaster. However, the final outcome was a renewed stalemate, brought about by a set of exogenous factors and pure chance. The plans of Vasile Lupu and his Ottoman patrons were derailed by the voievode’s military ineptitude; in turn, the unexpected death of Murad IV’s denied Matei Basarab and Silahdar Mustafa Pasha total victory. If Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Paşa had arrived to Istanbul, the course of events could have been different. Thus, no matter how much participants in cross-
border patronage tried to safeguard themselves against potential risks, they were unable to remove it entirely.

Finally, it is clear that cross-border patronage, while bread and butter of politics, was not something that actors wanted to wear as a badge of honor. Instructive in this respect is the chronicle of Hasan Vecihi, a secretary of the grand vizier Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Pasha. Due to his position within the grandee’s household, Vecihi undoubtedly had insider knowledge regarding the events. However, his account presents a version of events strikingly different from any other source. According to the author, Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha did not cooperate with Vasile Lupu, but actually planned to remove both voievodes, who had snubbed him during his tenure as the beylerbey of Özü. Clearly sympathetic to the unfortunate grandee, the historian carefully removed any trace of the cooperation between Vasile Lupu and Mehmed Pasha. This shows that despite the ubiquity of cross-border factionalism, it remained something of an embarrassing secret for the actors involved.

4.2. A Faction Breaks Apart: The Decomposition of the Zamoyski-Movilă Faction

The emergence of factional rivalry in the context of cross-border patronage did not always stem from an *a priori* hostility between actors in different arenas. Political instability, unexpected deaths of faction members and changing interests of particular individuals could lead to the decomposition of existing alliances and radical shifts in political configurations, turning erstwhile friends into enemies. As I will show in this section, the careful analysis of one of the most powerful Polish-Moldavian factions shows that at the moment of such a radical change, the cross-border ties often proved more durable than those existing within the political arena (see Figure 4.1.).

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Fig. 4.1. The core of Zamoyski–Movilă faction in the late 1590s–early 1600s. White vertices indicate the actors within Polish-Lithuanian political arena, while black vertices – those in the Moldavian one. Solid lines represent favorable relations between the actors, while dashed ones represent conflictual relations. The vectors indicate patron-client dyads (from patron to client).

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the cooperation between the Moldavian voievode Ieremia Movilă and his patron, Jan Zamoyski, had contributed to the emergence of a powerful cross-border patronage network, which exerted considerable influence in Moldavia as well as in the Commonwealth. While the cooperation between the two individuals had its ebbs and flows (which will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 5), it nonetheless provided a measure of stability in Moldavia until Zamoyski's death in June 1605. Ieremia Movilă passed away the following year. Death of these two individuals opened the problem of political succession at the apex of the cross-border faction.

Both in Moldavia and Poland-Lithuania, the problem of factional succession posed serious challenges, since both sections of the patronage network lacked an obvious and uncontested political heirs to the deceased leaders. Jan Zamoyski's only son, Tomasz, was still a minor in 1605 and therefore unable to take over his father's role as a patron. In order to secure political and economic foundations of his political edifice, the Chancellor had provided guidelines regarding the management of his patrimony. In his will, he appointed his five closest associates as Tomasz's guardians, entrusting them with the management of his estates and patronage network. This joint guardianship included Crown Field Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, the Palatine of Cracow Mikołaj...
Zebrzydowski, the Palatine of Lublin Marek Sobieski, Mikołaj Uhrowiecki and the Bishop of Chełmno (Kulm), Jerzy Zamoyski.\textsuperscript{568}

While in theory this solution was meant to prevent competition between Zamoyski’s associates, the cracks soon appeared nonetheless. Sobieski passed away in November 1605, and Uhrowiecki soon found himself marginalized by his more powerful colleagues. This meant that effective control of the Chancellor’s estate and faction remained in the hands of Žółkiewski, Zebrzydowski and Jerzy Zamoyski, whose interests started to diverge. This process was fueled by increasing rivalry between Žółkiewski and Zebrzydowski, ambitious and powerful politicians willing to claim Zamoyski’s position at the head of the faction.\textsuperscript{569} Disagreements escalated due to Zebrzydowski’s increasingly confrontational attitude towards the king, which eventually led him to declare dethronement of Sigismund III and plunged the Commonwealth into civil war (1606-1608). In contrast, Žółkiewski sided with the royalist camp, although his conciliatory stance failed to impress either the monarch or his opponents.\textsuperscript{570} As Violetta Urbaniak pointed out, by 1608 Zamoyski’s faction in its original form ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{571}

Zamoyski’s death and subsequent decomposition of his faction sent shockwaves across the southeastern provinces of the Crown. While the region remained on the margins of civil war, the problem of succession to Zamoyski constituted a crucial matter, not least due to extensive landholdings and patronage networks that the Chancellor had built in the palatinates. While local political configurations favored Žółkiewski, his claim was by no means uncontested, as local magnate families, previously associated with the Chancellor, moved to fill the power vacuum.\textsuperscript{572} Such families as Korec’kyjs, Vyšnevec’kyjs and Potockis posed a serious challenge to the Hetman’s ambitions, and Žółkiewski’s self-righteousness and irascibility did him no favors.\textsuperscript{573}

At the same time as the struggle between Zamoyski’s former associates was growing in intensity, the Moldavian section of the faction faced a similar succession crisis, caused by the passing away of Jeremia Movilă. His death in June 1606 triggered a competition for the throne between different

\textsuperscript{569} ibid., 39–40.
\textsuperscript{570} Jerzy Besala, Stanisław Žółkiewski (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1988), 178.
\textsuperscript{571} Urbaniak, Zamoyszczyzny bez Zamoyskiego, 57.
\textsuperscript{572} Henryk Litwin, Równi do równych: kijowska reprezentacja sejmowa, 1569-1648 (Warsaw: DiG, 2009), 149–50.
\textsuperscript{573} Besala, Stanisław Żółkiewski, 18.
branches of the dynasty, supported by local boyar factions. At first glance, the eldest son of Ieremia and hiswife, Elizabeta Lozonschi, Constantin, seemed like an obvious candidate. However, he faced competition of his paternal uncle, Simion, the former voivode of Wallachia (1600–1602, 1603). Unable to hold to the throne in Bucharest, Simion hoped to take over his late brother’s throne in Moldavia, and with boyar support, prevailed over his nephew. This contested election contributed to a growing tension between the two branches of the Movilă family and their respective factions within the principality.

According to most scholars addressing this dynastic conflict, the boyars preferred Simion to Constantin due to the latter’s young age and lack of political experience. An alternative interpretation describes Simion’s election as a backlash against the Polish-Lithuanian protectorate during the reign of Ieremia Movilă, depicting the new voivode as representing the pro-Ottoman current in Moldavian politics. However, it seems that the reason for the boyars’ reluctance to support Constantin was a domestic one, namely the mounting opposition against Constantin’s maternal kin. During the reign of Ieremia Movilă, Lozonschis’ influence in the principality had grown significantly, and their aggressive strategy of political and economic expansion – including forceful eviction of other families – alienated many boyars. Since the family’s position would likely increase under the reign of Constantin, Simion provided the opposition with a much-needed alternative to Ieremia’s son.

This political polarization within the principality affected the structure of cross-border alliances. In this respect, Constantin and the Lozonschis enjoyed clear advantage over their rivals, due to their marriage ties with Potocki and Vyšnevec’kyj families (see Chapter 2). Especially the Potockis held much sway at the court of Sigismund III and undoubtedly influenced the king’s decision to support Constantin against his uncle. Eventually, however, Sigismund agreed to recognize Simion as the

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574 On Eliabeta Lozonschi’s political role, see Nicolae Iorga, Doamna lui Ieremia vodă (Bucharest: Carol Göbl, 1913).
577 Spieralski, Awantury moldawskie, 159–63.
voievode on the condition that his reign would not infringe in any way on the dynastic rights of Jeremia's offspring.\textsuperscript{579}

Simion's sudden death in September 1607 reopened the matter of succession and further polarized the political arena. Not only did this short reign failed to bring a \textit{détente} between the opposing factions, but rather brought further escalation of the conflict and galvanized opposition against the Lozonschis. Rumors circulated that Elizabeta had poisoned the voievode in order to pave the way to throne for her son.\textsuperscript{580} The opposition coalesced around the candidature of Simion's eldest son, Mihăilaş, supported by his mother Marghita-Melania.\textsuperscript{581} The result was a double election of Constantin and Mihăilaş, with both voievodes vying for support from the Porte and the Commonwealth. While the former quickly recognized Mihailaş, the king decided to throw his weight behind Constantin. In an attempt to defuse the situation, he offered considerable stipends to Mihăilaş and Marghita in exchange for them giving up their claim, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{582}

We know next to nothing about backstage politics during this conflict. However, it seems that the existence of familial connection between Constantin and his Polish in-laws was decisive in mobilizing Polish-Lithuanian support. In the course of the civil war in the Commonwealth, the Potocki family had contributed greatly to the military success of the king.\textsuperscript{583} Thus, they were in a position to demand royal support for their Moldavian relative. In effect, by October 1607 Sigismund III allowed Jan Potocki and Myxałjo Vyśniowiec'kyj to enter the principality and assigned them 1,500 soldiers from the Quarter Army.\textsuperscript{584} In December, the troops entered Moldavia and in a series of skirmishes forced Mihailaş to flee, installing Constantin on the throne. The ousted voievode tried to

\textsuperscript{579} Ciobanu, "Succesiunea domnească a Moveleștilor," 283.
\textsuperscript{580} Lungu, "Mihăilaş Vodă Movilă și Moldova în anul 1607," 2–3.
\textsuperscript{582} Ciobanu, "Succesiunea domnească a Moveleștilor," 288; Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-atatarskie 1595-1623, 151–2; Czamańska, Wiśniowieccy, 119.
raise a new army in his exile in Wallachia, but soon fell ill and passed away in January the following year.  

Again, many scholars have argued that the conflict between Mihailăș and Constantin reflected deep cleavages within the Moldavian elite regarding the principality's geopolitical orientation. According to this body of scholarship, Mihailăș represented a ‘pro-Turkish’ party among the boyars, while Constantin acted as the champion of pro-Polish boyars. However, the evidence belies such interpretations. Firstly, despite our limited knowledge regarding membership of the factions, we find among Mihailăș’s supporters a number of boyars with strong ties to Poland-Lithuania. The most prominent example was Vasile Stroici, a boyar naturalized in Poland-Lithuania and married to a Polish noblewoman, who served as the commander of the pretender’s forces. It is impossible by any stretch to identify him as programmatically hostile to the Commonwealth. Moreover, following Constantin’s victory and his rival’s death, the family of Simion Movilă sought refuge in Poland-Lithuania, where they were well received by Crown Field Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, who accorded them his estate, Dżadyliv. This suggests that in order to explain the conflict, we should turn away from geopolitical considerations and towards cross-border patronage networks.

The ascension of Constantin Movilă ushered in a period of factional hegemony in Moldavia, exercised by the Lozonschi and Potocki families. As I have mentioned in Chapter 3, Stefan Potocki occupied a swathe of land in the principality, with Constantin’s tacit permission. Moreover, it seems that he was receiving cash payments from the principality. In turn, the Lozonschis took over the management of political affairs in Moldavia, allowing them to aggressively expand their influence and wealth, despite the resentment brewing among the boyars. The opposition particularly reviled

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589 Instruction for the Sejm deputies from the dietine of Volhynia, March 27, 1607 in *Arkiv Jugo-Zapadnoj Rossii* (Kyiv, 1861), 66–81.
Constantin’s maternal uncle, Vasile Lozonschi, who raised his own army of 600 soldiers, using them to extort money and intimidate opponents.\(^{590}\)

While Stefan Potocki and the Lozonschis managed to dominate Moldavian political arena, their hegemony was by no means uncontested. Throughout the years, they had managed to alienate a number of influential boyars, who created their own cross-border ties in order to level the playing field. It seems that for the better part of the reign, these voices of dissent were suppressed, but as soon as Constantin's reign was rendered unstable, cracks began to appear.

In early 1611 the Lower Danube region was again thrown into turmoil, as a result of changes at the Porte, and ambitious policy pursued by Prince Gábor Báthory of Transylvania.\(^{591}\) These developments had an adverse effect on the stability of Constantin Movilă’s reign, since both Báthory and the Porte planned to remove young voievode from the throne. In this context, Constantin dispatched two boyars, Nestor Ureche and Costea Băcioc, to the king in order to request the Commonwealth’s assistance against expected Ottoman invasion.

This led to a confusing episode in which Stefan Potocki, the Starosta of Felin and brother-in-law of the voievode, detained Moldavian envoys, seized their diplomatic instructions, as well as their private letters, and subsequently censored them. Having reached the royal court, the boyars filed a complaint against the magnate, and made an attempt to reconstruct the original contents of their instructions. This fascinating document, which I have referred to in Chapter 3, allows us to retrace what Potocki had tried to conceal from the king and why he attempted to do so.

As I have mentioned in Chapter 3, among the points removed from the instruction we find a complaint regarding Potocki’s illegal occupation of landed estates in Moldavia, and – implicitly – his collusion with the voievode. Other matters that Potocki considered undesirable touched upon political affairs and, at first glance, his alterations make little to no sense. The most startling instance of Potocki’s censorship removed the very purpose of the mission: a plea to the king to provide Constantin Movilă with military support:

\(^{590}\) Czamańska, “Rumuńska imigracja polityczna,” 8.

\(^{591}\) Gábor Báthory to Yusuf Pasha, 29th May 1611 in Documente privitoare la istoria Ardealului, Moldovei și Țării-Românești, vol. 8, 163-5.
“Here was a point, in which we were instructed to ask the His Majesty to appoint a powerful and mighty protector and we were ordered to request [as said protector] Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Stanisław Żółkiewski] – the starosta of Felin removed this matter from the instructions. [...] We had been also instructed to make a plea to the Commonwealth and His Royal Majesty to send the troops to the borders of Moldavia as soon as possible, since we are in great peril. However, the starosta of Felin forbade us to spread such rumors or to bring the matter to the attention of His Royal Majesty. [He claimed that such rumors] are a ruse of those, who with their lies want to bring the Palatine of Kyiv [as the protector of Moldavia].”

At first glance, Potocki’s act of censorship was directed against his brother-in-law’s interests. At least since spring 1611, the position of the voievode had been deteriorating, eventually resulting in his dethronement by the Porte in December. Thus, the information concerning the impending removal of Constantin was not a false rumor, and it is tempting to interpret Potocki’s action as a symptom of paranoia or him losing touch with reality.

However, other instances of censorship suggest that Potocki was neither crazy nor hostile to Constantin Movilă, but rather tried to protect the interests of his Moldavian relatives. Apart of the official instruction, the boyars had also carried boyars’ letters to Sigismund III, which Potocki seized along with the instructions. According to our document, the letters contained a number of grievances and accusations against Elizabeta Lozonschi and her family, most importantly the voievode’s uncle, Vasile:

“Lozonschi, son of the governor of Hotin and brother of queen mother, spoiled by his kin’s support and bad upbringing, committed all kinds all kinds of evil deeds, with no fear of God or honest people; he committed rapes, murders, manslaughter, and seized the villages belonging to the poor folk. Having with him 600 men under his banners and drums, the worst riff-raff, he allocated them winter quarters, persecuting the poor folk, and raided the lands of the Crown; many people witnessed those acts. The elders reproached him for these misdeeds, but he paid them no heed, but instead insulted them even more. Finally, he beat up the Bishop of Roman, who had chastised him, kicking the said Bishop and breaking his teeth with a mace.”

According to this account, outraged boyars appealed to the voievode and his mother, demanding to put an end to Vasile’s misdeeds. Elizabeta, concerned about these events, initially ordered to detain

592 “Tu był punkt w którym nam zlecono prosić o protec tora możnego, potężnego, aby go J.K.M. ziemi wołoskiej dał, i mianować kazano J.M.P. wojewodę kijowskiego, który nam p. starosta feliński wymazał. [...] Mieliśmy to rozkazanie już po instructiej nam posłanej, abyśmy się pilno starali u JKM i Raztej, żeby wojsko jako najprędzej na granice wołoską się pomknęło, gdyż pewnie to niebezpieczeństwo nadchodzi, lecz p. starosta feliński nie każał nam takich plotek siać i do uszu K.J.M. pryzności, praktyczki to są tych p.p., którzy bala muctwy swemi chcą jego m.p. wojewódę kijowskiego zaciagnąć.”Corfus, Documente privitoare la istoria României – secolul al XVII-lea, 57.

593 Ibid.
her brother, but Lozonschi – warned by his brother-in-law, Dumitrache Chirița Paleologul – managed to elude capture. Thus, boyars decided to appeal to the king and request punishment for the voievode’s uncle. However, Elizabeta and her family changed their mind, since they feared that Sigismund III would condemn their kin to death. Thus, they

"set out to get rid of Ureche, Balică and Băcioc, either through poison, slander or force. Lozonschi sent for the Cossacks, hiring them to his service, in order to kill the said boyars; however, the latter managed to intercept the letters. Moreover, because the Lozonschis feared that Lord Palatine [Żółkiewski] would come with his troops and punish Vasile, they approached the starosta of Felin at the Sejm, asking him to prevent the appointment of the Lord Palatine. Instead, they encouraged [Potocki] to take the position for himself. He accepted these requests, despite the fact that during the council proceedings [in Moldavia] it had been decided that the Palatine of Kyiv should be appointed. However, this was thwarted by the Starosta of Felin, who pretended to the king that there is no peril here, and it is all a conspiracy of the Moldavian boyars."504

Thus, in a paradoxical manner, Stefan Potocki, by concealing the gravity of Constantin Movilă’s situation, acted in collusion with the voievode and his clan in order to check the political offensive mounted by the opposition. This suggests that the Lozonschis and Potocki perceived the rival faction as a greater threat to their interests than the Porte, which confirms my argument that their actions were driven by personal interests rather than geopolitical concerns.

It is also surprising to note that the mission of such importance was entrusted to Nestor Ureche and Costea Băcioc, the same boyars that Elizabeta and her family had tried to kill or discredit. However, this can be explained by the difficult situation of the voievode at this point. In the face of impending Ottoman invasion, Constantin could not afford to alienate the top-ranking boyars in the principality. This meant that he had to accommodate at least some of their demands. However, at the same time, such concessions would be detrimental to his clan and political base, the Lozonschis. Thus, the voievode and his mother had to tread a fine line in order to avoid both dangers.

The solution adopted was to pay lip service to the boyars’ demands, while at the same time utilize cross-border patronage networks to control the channels of information and prevent potentially damaging news from reaching the king. In turn, Potocki had a vested interest to partake in the scheme. After all, he was one of the main beneficiaries of the Lozonschis’ domination in Moldavia,

504 ibid.
drawing both economic and political benefits from the relationship. Thus, a shift in the balance of power could damage his interests.

However, as I have pointed out, Lozonschi-Potocki faction was not the only one involved in cross-border patronage. The boyar opposition, in order to break the stranglehold of the voievode’s clan built their own cross-border connections, approaching Potocki’s rival, Stanisław Żółkiewski. In the documents censored by Potocki, Żółkiewski features prominently as a preferred alternative to Stefan Potocki in the capacity of ‘the protector of Moldavia.’ This was no coincidence, since the Hetman had numerous advantages as a prospective candidate for the boyar opposition willing to curtail the Lozonschis’ power. His official capacity as the commander of the Crown’s army, as well as his extensive landholdings in Ruthenia and Ukraine, provided him with political and economic resources matching those of Stefan Potocki. Moreover, at least since 1638 Żółkiewski had been a patron of Simion Movilă’s offspring and thus could provide an alternative candidate to the throne of Moldavia.

Żółkiewski had reasons of his own to move against Stefan Potocki and his Moldavian clients. Since 1607 the Hetman had been locked in a fierce struggle against Potockis, both in Ruthenia and at the court. The Potocki family, profiting from Sigismund III’s favor, increasingly challenged Żółkiewski, trying to subvert his political influence and command over the Quarter Army. The relations between them hit rock bottom during the campaign in Muscovy (1609-1611), when they openly questioned Żółkiewski’s command, with a tacit consent of the king. Thus, for the Hetman, dislodging the Lozonschis in Moldavia would not only constitute not only an opportunity to procure new resources, but would also deal a blow to his enemies in the Commonwealth.

While a clear proof of Żółkiewski’s involvement with Moldavian opposition is lacking, there is some circumstantial evidence suggesting that he was on board with the boyars’ plans. The most important piece of information in this respect is that the grievances eventually reached the king through Hieronim Otwinowski. While Otwinowski was a distinguished diplomat with ample experience in the Ottoman Empire, he was at the same time a client of Stanisław Żółkiewski, whom he informed

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about the Moldavian embassy and its subsequent detention. Only then the information was relayed to the king. Thus, seeing their channels of communication blocked by Potocki and his Moldavian associates, Ureche and Băcioc used cross-border relations with Żółkiewski in order to have their grievances heard by the king.

However, the conflict soon became moot. In November 1611 the Porte appointed Ștefan Tomșa II to replace Constantin Movilă on the throne. Lacking Polish support, the latter had little choice but to withdraw to the Commonwealth. However, this does not mean that the conflict abated. On the contrary, it seems that the removal of Constantin Movilă contributed to the escalation of rivalry between Żółkiewski and the magnates supporting Constantin Movilă, the latter trying to restore their brother-in-law to the throne by force of arms.

Most scholars have depicted Stanisław Żółkiewski as a state-minded official, unwilling to risk the safety of the Commonwealth in unnecessary military adventures, while condemning his rivals as self-serving adventurists. However, evidence suggests that the Hetman was not against military intervention in Moldavia per se; instead, he tried to prevent his factional enemies from succeeding.

This became apparent in the first attempt to restore Movilă dynasty to the Moldavian throne, undertaken by Stefan Potocki in July 1612. Potocki had managed to secure a tacit support of the king and was assigned several units from the Quarter Army to boost his effectives. Interestingly, Żółkiewski participated in the preparations, clashing repeatedly with the Starosta of Felin. At the same time, in his correspondence with his friends, he objected to Potocki’s leadership and the plan of the campaign. Moreover, following the defeat of Stefan Potocki in the battle of Cornul lui Sas (13 July 1612), the Hetman refused to provide any assistance to the defeated troops, instead opting for a treaty with Ștefan Tomșa II. Constantin Movilă died while fleeing the battlefield, while Potocki fell into captivity and was sent by Tomșa to Istanbul. It seems that the reason for the Hetman’s reluctance to send his troops into Moldavia was not entirely due to his unwillingness to enter the conflict with the Porte. While the details are obscure, it seems that Żółkiewski had his own plans.
regarding Moldavia, promoting his own client, Gavril Movilă, Simion’s second son. While this project remained in the shadows for the moment, it manifested itself in 1615.

In summer 1615 a boyar rebellion against Tomșa’s rule broke out, and the voievode managed to thwart it with utmost difficulty. Repressions ensued, but the pro-Movilă émigrés in Poland-Lithuania interpreted the events as a sign of Tomșa’s weakness. This drove Elizabeta Lozonschi to make another attempt to restore the dynasty’s rule in Moldavia. In order to procure military resources necessary to capture the throne for her son, Alexandru, she made an appeal to princes Myxajlo Vyšnevec’kyj and Samijlo Korec’kyj. The magnates responded enthusiastically and mobilized over 12,000 troops for the campaign. In November 1615, the princes entered Moldavia, defeated Ștefan Tomşa and installed Alexandru Movilă on the throne. They also made a futile attempt to secure the Sublime Porte’s recognition of for the new voievode. Whereas Vyšnevec’kyj died in January 1616, Korec’kyj managed to fend off the Ottoman forces until August, when – lacking reinforcements – he was finally forced to surrender and sent to Istanbul, along with his Movilă kin.

During the campaign, Stanisław Żółkiewski adopted an overtly hostile attitude towards the princes and Alexandru Movilă. Not only did he refuse to support Korec’kyj and Vyšnevec’kyj with his own troops, but also actively obstructed their recruitment in the Commonwealth, trying to turn nobles’ sentiments against the magnates. Addressing the dietine of Ruthenia, the Hetman went as far as to depict the campaign as a divine punishment:

“I was hoping, that we can enjoy peace for some time, but as a God’s punishment for our sins a new fire broke out, because of Elizabeta, Jeremia’s widow, and others assisting her in this enterprise. Having heard about recent unrests in Moldavia, she started to scheme to install her son, Alexandru, a child of ten or eleven years, on the throne. [In order to this] she hired together with her friends, a great number of riff-raff.”

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601 Aurel Iacob, Țara Moldovei în vremea lui Ștefan Tomșa al III-a (Brăila: Editura Istros, 2010), 107.
604 Kasper Pepłowski to Samijlo Korec’kyj, August 13, 1616 in Przyczynki do historii domowej w Polsce: (Samuel Korecki, Adam Tarno, Bogusław Rudziński), ed. Władysław Syrokomla (Wilno: A. Ass, 1858), 19; Constantinov, “Bătălia de la Drăgșani,” 14; Besala, Stanisław Żółkiewski, 304–5.
605 “Byłem tej nadzieje, że jakikolwiek czas mogliśmy w pokój wytchnąć, lecz z dopuszczenia bożego za grzechy nasz nowy zapał wzniec się przez dumę Helżbietę, Hieremiową niegdys żonę i innych, którzy jej tego przedsięwzięcia
Żółkiewski’s associates followed suit, and Jan Daniłowicz, the Palatine of Ruthenia, depicted Koreczkyj’s troops as good-for-nothings, causing destruction in landed estates of Ruthenian nobility. At the same time, the Hetman tried to convince nobility that the prince’s actions could cause an Ottoman invasion and would result in the annexation of Moldavia by the Porte. However, despite his efforts, Żółkiewski failed to convince everyone. In December 1615 the dietine of Halyç, while expressing concern about possible Tatar raids, nonetheless declared support for Koreczkyj’s expedition. The prince also enjoyed support of many participants at the 1616 Sejm, who lambasted Żółkiewski for withholding help for Alexandru Movilă.

However, Żółkiewski’s goal was not only to derail Koreczkyj’s plans, but also to promote his own client, Gavril Movilă, to the Moldavian throne. In order to do this, he turned to the Porte. As Koreczkyj’s agent reported to his master, Hieronim Otwinowski, Żółkiewski’s client sent to Istanbul as the Polish-Lithuanian ambassador, intervened at the Porte in favor of Gavril Movilă and his mother, Marghita.

Most scholars have explained Żółkiewski’s actions as driven by state interests. However, this was not how contemporaries interpreted his behavior. Upon Koreczkyj’s surrender, Żółkiewski was universally blamed for the campaign’s failure, and many suspected that his preference for Gavril Movilă had been the true reason for withholding help to the prince. Zbigniew Ossoliński, Hetman’s enemy, wrote in his diary:

pomagają. Oślyszawszy się o tumultach bowiem, które świeżo zjawiły się w wołoskiej ziemi, jęła się krućać, żeby Alexandryzka syna swego, a dziecko w dziesięcio leciech, na hospodarstwo wyprowadzić, zaczynając na to tak sama jako i przyjaçiele swe kupy niemało ludzi swowolnie zebrane.” Circular of Stanisław Żółkiewski in Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego, 243.

“Obawiając się, aby ta kupa ludzi wszystkich nie mała, która swawolnie do Wołoch weszła, czego większego na sobie nie przyniosła, albo więc i sama jakokolwiek zwrócił się nie uczyniła, bo gdy wchodzili w ziemę wołoską doznali siła ludzi a mianowicie ziemia halicka wielkie spustoszenie od nich, tak że tylko w tem różni od Tatar byli, że ludzi nie brał a wsi nie palili.” Circular of Jan Daniłowicz to the nobility of Sanok, December 3, 1615 in Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z archiwum tak zwanego bernardyńskiego we Lwowie, ed. Antoni Prochaska, (1911-1935), vol. 21: 151.

“Enuiron ce temps, le General de l’armée du Roy de Pologne, nommé Zolkelchy, enuyeux de l’honneur que lesdits Princes auoient desia acquis par les victoires qu’ils auoient remportées sur leurs ennemis et d’ailleurs meu de son profit particulier; escriuit par le grand Seigneur, le fils ainé du defunct Prince Simeon, qui s’estoit retire pres de luy, de la
“[The intervention in Moldavia] was a sore point for the Hetman, out of two private motives. From the public [point of view, the expedition] was for the great benefit of the Commonwealth, and the king was ready to give his hand and intercede with the Turkish Emperor to remember his father's privilege and grant the throne of Moldavia to the Movilă’s offspring. [...] Two Hetman’s motives to obstruct the princes were the following: firstly, that he was jealous of their fortune. Secondly, he is a selfish man, always looking for his own profit in Moldavia, and he expected that they would increase once the princes were defeated: he would thus put on the throne his Gavril, the kin of Movilăs, whom he brought up in his entourage.”

Faced with a growing tide of criticism, Żółkiewski and Daniłowicz tried to defend their actions. The latter claimed that he had been unable to help Korec’kyj without prior instructions from the king and the Sejm. However, the accusations were indirectly confirmed by Żółkiewski himself, who publicly reiterated his support for Gavril’s candidacy.

Nonetheless, Żółkiewski still hoped for Gavril’s eventual success in his bid for the Moldavian throne. In summer 1616, the latter set out to Istanbul, hoping to secure the appointment. Cornelius Haga, the Dutch ambassador by the Porte, took notice of the pretender's arrival and estimated that Gavril was likely to ascend the Moldavian throne. However, this hope never materialized, and only in 1618 Gavril was eventually appointed as the voievode of Wallachia. He immediately wrote a letter to Żółkiewski, expressing gratitude for protection the Hetman had granted him and his family.

However, his rule in the principality was ephemeral and it is unlikely that the voievode provided his
patron with any resources. Thus, Żółkiewski’s decade-long struggle to establish his influence in the Danubian principalities failed to produce expected results.

At the same time, Żółkiewski’s fierce conflict with Korec’kyj did not end with a wave of criticism in 1616. Instead, widespread conviction of the Hetman’s complicity in the failure of the 1615-1616 campaign shattered his authority and influence in political life and military affairs. While in 1618 he received promotion to the office of Crown Grand Hetman, Żółkiewski’s control in the army collapsed. This became evident in 1618, when a campaign against the Tatars, despite large-scale mobilization, concluded in an utter failure, largely due to squabbles between commanders:

“We set our camp at Orynin in Podolia [...] Crown Hetman Żółkiewski commands the troops, [but there] is disorder, squabbles and distrust between Ukrainian lords and the Hetman. [The reason for this] is that soldiers suspect that the Hetman, unwilling to see Prince Korec’kyj obtain victory and fame the previous year, but instead desirous to secure them for himself, caused the army that went to fight [in Moldavia] to mutiny, thus leaving the prince to face a bloodbath. In effect, [Korec’kyj] was forced to surrender to the enemy, and he fell into Turkish emperor’s captivity along with the voievode, who – as they say – turned Turk.”

Orynin campaign triggered another wave of criticism directed against Żółkiewski, who faced accusations of incompetence and senility, with some nobles even calling for his removal from the office. In a way, the struggle between octogenarian Hetman and Korec’kyj led to the death of both magnates, when the Commonwealth – now officially – intervened in Moldavia in 1620. The origins of the conflict were complex, including continued Cossack and Tatar raiding activity and the internal situation at the Porte. However, scholars argue that the strategy adopted by Żółkiewski – a preventive strike against the Porte and occupation of Moldavia – was driven by Hetman’s willingness to restore authority and prestige that he had lost in the 1610s. However, the 1620 campaign was an

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618 "Obóz nasz pod Oryninem w Podolu [...] Hetman Koronny Stanisław Żółkiewski, w obozie głową, niezgoda, i nieufność między panięty Ukrainnemi, a Hetmanem, a to zrząd ludzie, się domyśliwają, że jakoby Hetman nieżycząc Księciu Koreckiemu w Wołoskich sławy i zwycięstwa przeszłego roku, sobie ten refiment przywłaszczając, do którego go uprzedził Korecki spraktykował wojsko, które własne kiedy się bić przyszło, odstąpiło go, i na mięsne go jatki wydali, że się musiał w ręce nieprzyjacielowi dostać, i był więźniem Cesarza Tureckiego, z tym Hospodarczykiem, który znać się i poturczyli." Samuel Maskiewicz, "Dyaryusz Samuela Maskiewicza," in Zbiór pamiętników o dawnej Polszcze, ed. Julian U. Niemcewicz (Leipzig: Breitkopf i Haertel, 1839), vol. 2, 301.
619 Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-atatarskie 1595-1623, 214.
620 Besala, Stanisław Żółkiewski, 354.
utter failure. Constant disputes between Żółkiewski and other commanders (including Korec’kyj) and low morale of the troops contributed to a defeat at Țuțora and subsequent annihilation of the Polish army in fall 1620. The Hetman perished on the battlefield, while his deputy, young Stanisław Koniecpolski and Samijlo Korec’kyj both fell into captivity. While Koniecpolski was eventually ransomed in 1623, Korec’kyj was killed in the Ottoman prison of Yedi Kule.

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In her analysis of the 1615-1616 campaign, Ilona Czamańska challenged the established opinion that described the magnates’ Moldavian campaigns as irresponsible adventurism. In turn, she brought attention to the rivalry between the branches of Movilă dynasty and its role in fueling the factional conflict. However, the succession struggle in Moldavia was but one in a complex system of alliances and conflicts that led to the emergence of cross-border factions in the 1610s. Rather than approaching these multiple rivalries in isolation from one another, we should see them as parts of the larger process of decomposition of Zamoyski-Movilă faction in both Moldavian and Polish-Lithuanian political arenas.

Death of Jan Zamoyski and Ieremia Movilă in 1605-1606 created a political vacuum at the core of cross-border patronage network and removed the lynchpin that held the faction together. Since neither had an uncontested political successor able to take over the management of their patron-client ties, their former associates and kin staked their claim and engaged in a fierce struggle for power. The internal rivalry conflict caused the faction to break up into distinct political groupings vying for resources embedded in Polish-Lithuanian and Moldavian political arenas.

However, contrary to our intuitions, the fault lines of the faction did not reflect the boundaries of respective arenas. Instead, two cross-border patronage networks emerged, each including both Moldavian and Polish-Lithuanian members. In Moldavia, the Lozonschis’ aggressive and arrogant policy led other boyars to support Simion Movilă and his offspring against Constantin Movilă and his clan.

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621 Ilona Czamańska, “Kampania mołdawska Samuela Koreckiego,” 139.
However, this conflict was by no means limited to the political arena of the principality, as both factions cooperated closely with their patrons in the Commonwealth. The Lozonschis, having established marital ties with Stefan Potocki and Prince Myxajlo Vyšnevec'kyj – later joined by Samijlo Korec'kyj – initially enjoyed competitive advantage over their opponents and allowed them to establish their hegemony in the principality.

Faced with this powerful coalition, the opposition coalesced into a rival faction, bringing together the enemies of both the Lozonschis' and Potockis' rivals in the Commonwealth. This materialized in cross-border cooperation between Moldavian grand boyars – including Stroici, Ureche, Băcioc and Balică – and Stanislaw Żółkiewski. The Hetman, aspiring to replace Zamoyski in the Ukraine and a sworn enemy of the Potockis, had vested interest in trying to subvert the position of Lozonschi-Potocki familial bloc, and had at his disposal the resources Moldavian boyars needed to challenge the voievode's kin.

Figure 4.2. Polish-Moldavian cross-border patronage networks during the late 1600s-1610s. White vertices indicate the actors within Polish-Lithuanian political arena, while black vertices – those in the Moldavian one. Solid lines represent favorable relations between the actors, while dashed ones represent conflictual relations. The vectors indicate patron-client dyads (from patron to client). The vertical dashed line represents the fault line, along which the faction of Zamoyski-Movilă disintegrated.
Rival branches of the Movilă dynasty constituted the lynchpins of the rival patronage networks. The Lozonschis and their Polish-Lithuanian patrons sided with Ieremia’s offspring, while Żółkiewski and the Moldavian opposition supported the dynastic claims of Simion’s descendants. In their double capacity as potential patrons in Moldavian political arena and clients of Polish-Lithuanian magnates, young Movilăs provided the rival camps with legitimacy and a measure of coordination.

What is particularly striking about the breakup of Zamoyski-Movilă faction is the persistence of cross-border character of successor factions. Since the patron-client relationship between Ieremia Movilă and the Chancellor had provided a crucial connection between Polish-Lithuanian and Moldavian political arenas, it would be logical to assume that the faction would break up along the arenas’ boundaries. However, new patronage networks that emerged from the ashes of Zamoyski-Movilă faction preserved their cross-border character.

This conclusion forces us to revise the state-oriented paradigm still predominant in studies on Polish-Moldavian relations at the beginning of the seventeenth century. As I have argued in the present section, political developments and conflicts were driven by factional strategies and cross-border patronage rather than consideration of state policy. The cleavages within the Moldavian elite did not stem from ‘pro-Ottoman’ or ‘pro-Polish’ orientations of individual boyars, but rather by their familial and factional interests. Similarly, Żółkiewski’s reluctance to support Ieremia Movilă’s offspring had its roots in the rivalry with the Potocki family in Poland-Lithuania. Thus, cross-border patronage and private interest profoundly shaped what modern scholars usually see as ‘foreign policy’ of the state.

4.3. **Factional Tensions: The Köprüülü Household and Intra-Factional Conflicts in a Cross-Border Perspective**

In the second half of the seventeenth century, the Köprülüs managed to elevate their political household to a hegemonic position in the Ottoman Empire. By the time of his death in September 1661, Köprüülü Mehmed Pasha, the kapı’s founder, had cracked down on opposition, restored public order in the Ottoman capital and improved the Ottoman performance in the War of Candia. His accomplishments allowed his son, Köprüülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, to succeed his father as the

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Finkel, *Osman’s Dream*, 255.
grand vizier and provided him with unprecedented security at the apex of Ottoman political life. This allowed the Köprülü to retain their political role until the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Upon his ascension to the grand vizierate Köprülüzade Ahmed Pasha took control of the faction firmly entrenched in imperial administration. His closest associate, Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha was appointed as kapudan paşa, while other clients took over administrative posts throughout the empire. In the Danubian principalities, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha and his son relied on their trusted clients and fellow Albanians: the Ghicas and the Lupus (see Chapter 2). Thus, at the first glance, it would be natural to expect that the triumph of Köprülü household would mark the end of constant infighting within the Ottoman political arena.

However, this was not the case, although the character of the conflicts changed, both at the Porte and in cross-border patronage networks. The hegemonic household experienced a period of internal tensions and rivalries as different cliques within the faction started to compete for resources. While these internal conflicts never led to the household’s breakup, they nonetheless had large-scale consequences, both for the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian principalities.

The first cracks within cross-border section of the faction appeared as early as the grand vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha. The tension appeared as a result of Grigore Ghica’s ambitions. In his late thirties at that time, the beyzade grew increasingly impatient and unwilling to wait for his nomination to the throne. However, by late 1659 there was little room for maneuver, since the positions of the voievodes had already been filled by Köprülü’s clients. Ghica’s father, Gheorghe was transferred from Moldavia to Wallachia to make room for Ștefaniță Lupu, Vasile Lupu’s son. However, these shifts on the thrones already created tensions. As Kaisarios Dapontes noted, Gheorghe Ghica had been dissatisfied about his appointment to Wallachia and agreed only at the behest of another member of the faction, Gheorghe Duca.

This new reshuffling failed to satisfy Grigore Ghica, who remained in Istanbul and soon engaged in an attempt to secure his own appointment to the throne. By early 1660, Vasile Lupu, who acted as

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his son’s representative in the imperial capital suspected that Grigore tried to benefit from Ștefaniță’s unpopularity in Moldavia in order to ascend the throne himself.\textsuperscript{625} However, when confronted about his plans, the beyzade denied such allegations and the conflict subsumed.\textsuperscript{626} Unable to secure the throne of Moldavia, Grigore Ghica redirected his efforts towards replacing his father as the voievode of Wallachia.

In order to fulfill his ambitions, Grigore Ghica had to build a new set of alliances and undermine Köprülű Mehmed Pasha’s trust in Gheorghe. Thus, he soon set out to establish patronage ties with members of Wallachian and Ottoman political arenas. In the principality, he allied himself with a powerful boyar, Constantin Postelnic Cantacuzino, who had his own interest in promoting Grigore to the throne. As I have mentioned in Chapter 3, the arrangement granted Cantacuzino an exceptional position in the principality, since Ghica promised to defer to the boyar in all matters.\textsuperscript{627}

In the Ottoman political arena, Grigore and Cantacuzino established ties with Grand Dragoman of the Porte, Panayiotis Nikoussios. This Greek Orthodox official increasingly exerted influence in the government circles in Istanbul, and was willing to lend his support to Grigore Ghica’s bid for the throne. Having established this new set of political alliances, Grigore Ghica was ready to stake his claim to the throne and reshape the pattern of cross-border alliances in the process.

\textsuperscript{625} Constantin I. Andreescu and Constantin A. Stoide, Ștefaniță Lupu, domn al Moldovei (1659-1661) (Bucharest: Fundația Regele Carol I, 1938), 53.
\textsuperscript{626} Grigore Ghica to Constantin Cantacuzino, Edirne, 22\textsuperscript{nd} February, Arhiva 2, no. 7 (1892): 440-443.
Figure 4.3. The reconfiguration of patronage networks within Köprülü Mehmed Pasha patronage network in 1660–1661. Grey vertices indicate individuals belonging to the Moldavian-Wallachian political arenas, while black vertices represent those belonging to the imperial one. The circle in the upper right reflects the extent of the traditional patronage networks between former members of Kemânkeş Kara Mustafa Pasha – Vasile Lupu faction. The circle in the lower left reflects an alternative patronage network that emerged around Grigore Ghica–Constantin Cantacuzino alliance.

In order to replace Gheorghe Ghica on the Wallachian throne, his son had to drive a wedge between the Wallachian voievode and the grand vizier. According to the account of Comisul Iştoc, he accomplished this by presenting Gheorghe's difficulties in the principality and failure to deliver the principality's tribute on time as the result of the voievode’s deliberate actions. Cantacuzino confirmed these allegations, leading Köprülü Mehmed Pasha to remove Gheorghe Ghica from the Wallachian throne and appoint Grigore in his stead in September 1660.

Thus, Grigore Ghica's bid for the throne contributed to an increasing tension within the patronage network and reshaped the system of factional alliances. At the same time, members of the faction’s 'old guard' started to die out at the beginning of the 1660s. Within a couple of months, Vasile Lupu and Köprülü Mehmed Pasha passed away, soon followed by Ştefanită Lupu. Gheorghe Ghica, who lived out his days in Istanbul, acting as the capuchehaia of his son, died in January 1667.

Grigore Ghica was by no means the only member of Köprülü household, whose ambitions created conflicts within the faction. Throughout his life, Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha, belonged to the...
closest associates of Köprülü family. Son of a provincial sipahi from Anatolia, he grew up in Mehmed Pasha's household and following the family's ascendancy became the grand vizier's right-hand man, serving as kapudan paşa and eventually succeeding Köprülüzade Ahmed Pasha as the grand vizier. At the same time, evidence suggests that Kara Mustafa Pasha was in bad terms with many members of the household, including Köprülü’s Moldavian and Wallachian clients.

These tensions became apparent upon the appointment of Kara Mustafa Pasha as the beylerbey of Özü in 1660, which brought to light hostility between the Ottoman official and the incumbent voievode of Moldavia, Ştefaniţă Lupu. In March 1661, Kara Mustafa Pasha raided the Moldavian port of Galaţi and took three members of the princely council as prisoners, releasing them only following a direct order from the Porte.629 Unfortunately, we are unable to establish the origin of this conflict, but the violent reaction of Kara Mustafa Pasha suggests that the dispute reached considerable proportions.

Soon Kara Mustafa Pasha’s actions led to another conflict within the faction, although this time the difficulties of communication were partly to blame. In the 1660s the ongoing war with Venice and an active lifestyle of Sultan Mehmed IV, who spent most of his time hunting in Rumelia, posed a considerable challenge of coordinating different centers of power.630 This led to the reorganization of the highest administrative offices and the creation of the new post of the Deputy of Imperial Stirrup (rikab-i hümayun kaymakamı), who accompanied the sultan during his hunting trips. As Özgün Yoldaşlar points out, the official in question overshadowed his Istanbul-based counterpart, acting as liaison between the ruler and the administrative apparatus of the empire, which allowed the incumbent to exert considerable influence during the grand vizier’s absence from the capital.631 The appointment of Kara Mustafa Pasha to this newly created post and subsequent departure of Ahmed Pasha for the Cretan campaign gave the former effective control of the imperial affairs, and Kara Mustafa Pasha was all too eager to exercise his prerogatives.

One of the most pressing matters that the Porte had to tackle during this period were deteriorating relations with the Crimean Khanate. In 1664 Khan Mehmed IV Giray had refused to participate in

629 Andreescu, Stoide, Ştefaniţă Lupu, 117.
631 ibid., 57.
the Ottoman campaign in Hungary, and since then the Porte showed increasing concern about the khan’s actions, which eventually resulted in his eventual replacement with a more malleable Adil Giray in March 1666. In early 1666, on the eve of Mehmed Giray’s dethronement, Ottoman officials intercepted incriminating letters authored by the Moldavian voievode Gheorghe Duca and addressed to the khan. This resulted in the immediate replacement of the voievode with Iliaş Alexandru, a scion of Moldavian dynasty born and raised in Istanbul (May 1666).

Romanian historians agree that the removal of Gheorghe Duca was a result of misunderstanding and lack of coordination between different centers of the Ottoman administration. According to Virgil Cândea and Tahsin Gemil, Gheorghe Duca acted on the orders of Köprülü Ahmed Pasha himself, who tried to learn about Mehmed Giray’s true intentions, but neither informed Mehmed IV and Kara Mustafa Pasha about the scheme. This lack of communication had grave consequences for Duca, who was promptly deposed. However, as Moldavian sources indicate, the whole matter was not just a matter of communication failure. According to the anonymous author of *Pseudo-Amiras Chronicle*, upon intercepting the correspondence, Kara Mustafa Pasha:

> "showed the letters to the emperor, since he was Duca’s enemy. Upon seeing what Duca had written to the khan, the emperor became enraged and ordered his removal and execution as a traitor. Duca immediately wrote to the grand vizier, informing him about everything. And he also told the sultan that the letters had been written on the orders of the grand vizier [...] Ahmed Pasha wrote to the emperor, supporting Duca and confirming his innocence, and thus saved Duca from death."

Ion Neculce, who wrote his account in mid-eighteenth century, recounted the story in a different light. According to him, the *kaymakam* was acting in good faith, misled by the true enemy of the voievode, the beylerbey of Özü. Moreover, according to the author, Kara Mustafa Pasha reported the whole affair to Köprülüzade Ahmed Pasha, which ultimately saving the voievode’s life.

It is difficult to establish the details of this affair, although it is certain that the voievode acted on the orders of the grand vizier. Obviously, the year 1666 brought to light obvious difficulties of

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635 Anonymous, *Cronica anonimă a Moldovei*, 1660-1729, 44.
coordination between different centers of power, and, as Yoldaşlar argues, the shortcomings of the existing arrangement led to Sultan Mehmed IV’s participation in the campaign against Poland-Lithuania, along with the grand vizier. Thus, it is perfectly possible that poor communication and a simple misunderstanding caused the removal of Gheorghe Duca in 1666.

However, there are some indications that the dethronement of Gheorghe Duca was more than a glitch in communication, although all evidence in favor of this hypothesis is circumstantial. A look at the chronology shows that Kara Mustafa Pasha carried out the removal of the voievode with astonishing speed. He received his appointment to the position of kaymakam on May 9, 1666 and took over his duties the following week, after Köprülü Ahmed Pasha left for Crete. Mere two weeks later, he ordered the deposition of Gheorghe Duca and appointed a new voievode to replace him. While this does not prove anything on its own, there are other indications that the kaymakam pursued his own agenda.

While Köprülüzade Ahmed Pasha and Kara Mustafa Pasha had known each other since childhood and cooperated since their entry into Ottoman politics, the 1660s marked a gradual deterioration of their relationship. This crisis reached its nadir in 1670, when Ahmed Pasha removed his deputy from the offices and purged Mustafa Pasha’s key clients. According to Olnon, the reason for the grand vizier’s attack against his deputy was the fact that Kara Mustafa Pasha had conspired against Ahmed Pasha during the latter’s absence. Unfortunately, we do not have any additional information as to the precise nature of the conflict.

Nonetheless, the existence of the conflict between the grand vizier and his deputy in the second half of the 1660s and Kara Mustafa Pasha’s attempts to undermine Köprülüzade Ahmed Pasha’s position shed new light on the dethronement of Gheorghe Duca. If the kaymakam tried to weaken Ahmed Pasha, it was only logical that he would move against the latter’s principal clients. As I have pointed out in the previous chapters, Duca was a close associate of the grand vizier and removing him from the Moldavian throne would certainly serve Kara Mustafa Pasha’s purposes. It would also explain why the latter acted so decisively in the matter and why the anonymous Moldavian chronicler would

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637 Baer, Honored by the glory of Islam, 69.
describe him as an enemy of the voievode.\textsuperscript{639} Thus, it is possible that Gheorghe Duca during his first reign in Moldavia fell victim not of misunderstanding, but of a growing rift between Köprülüzhade Ahmed Pasha and Kara Mustafa Pasha.

Throughout the 1660s and 1670s Kara Mustafa Pasha remained in bad relations with the most prominent members of the Köprülü patronage network in Moldavia and Wallachia, most importantly Grigore Ghica and Gheorghe Duca. Simultaneously, however, the future grand vizier formed cross-border patronage ties of his own, which provide us with a possible explanation for his enmity towards Gheorghe Duca and Grigore Ghica. Most importantly, the Cantacuzinos – according to Radu Popescu, an author hostile to the family – were in cordial relations with Kara Mustafa Pasha:

\"When voievode Ghica came to the throne and there was still unrest caused by Constantin [Șerban], they were unable to gather the harac, in order to send it at the time of bayram, as is the custom. The sultan was thus enraged at Ghica and sent Kara Mustafa Pasha of Silistra to remove him from the throne. Arriving without announcement to Bucharest, he took him to Istanbul, and the throne was given to Ghica. [...] At this time, when Kara Mustafa Pasha was taking Ghica from Bucharest, Șerban logofăt, the son of Constantin Postelnic Cantacuzino, more evil than the rest of his brothers, prepared a beautiful horse, took him and presented it to as his gift. He asked [Kara Mustafa Pasha] to let him be his servant and to keep him in eternal memory. The pasha accepted the gift with pleasure, and told that he will remember him. That was true as soon after that he raised him to the throne.\textsuperscript{640}\" 

The establishment of a patron-client dyad between the Cantacuzinos and Kara Mustafa Pasha likely influenced the grandee's relations with Grigore Ghica. As I have mentioned before, the ascendancy of Ghica had been possible due to his alliance with Constantin Postelnic Cantacuzino, Șerban's father. However, the relations between the two individuals soon soured, as the voievode increasingly

\textsuperscript{639} Cronica anonimă a Moldovei, 1661-1729, 44.
\textsuperscript{640} \textquote{Deci viind Ghică vodă iar la scaun și fiind aceaste turburări de Constandin vodă cum ați auzit, n-au putut să stringă haracul, ca să-l trimiță la vreame la bairam, după obicei, ci s-au minieat înpăratul și l-au făcut că nu iaste vrednic și au trimis pă Cara Mustafa pașa de la Dărstor ca să-l răde den scaun. Și viind fără veaste în București, l-au luat de l-au dus la Țarigrad și au dat domniea fie-său, Gligorașco vodă. [...] Pe vremea ce au luat Cara Mustafa pașa pă Ghica vodă den București, Șarban logofătul, feciorul lui Constandin postelnicul Cantacozino, mai ficlean fiind decit alalți frații, au gătit un cal frumos foarte și l-au dus de l-au răziat pașăi despre dinsul și i s-au rugat să-i fie slăgă și să-l aibă în gîndul de neuitat. Și cu drag priimindu-l pașa, i s-au făgăduț că va ținea minte. Și adăvărăt au fost, că cu vreame îndelungată i-au făcut mult bine, pînă domnie l-au rădicat, precum pă urmă să va arată.\textquote{ Radu Popescu, Istorile domnilor Țării Românești, 126.}
resented the boyar’s influence. In order to get rid of Cantacuzino, Ghica formed a conspiracy against the boyar with leaders of a rival faction, Stroe Leurdeanu and Dumitrașco Vornicul:

“When Grigore Ghica was campaigning in Hungary, Vornicul Stroe reported to him recent clashes with Constantin. [In response], Ghica told him to withhold everything from Constantin, and as soon as Ghica would return to the capital, he would kill [Constantin] without warning. In this way, Grigore turned his thoughts and faith towards Stroe and Dumitrașco, breaking his oath and forgetting about all things that Constantin had offered him. As soon as Ghica returned to his palace in Bucharest, these two devils appeared and turned [the voievode] on a wrongful and dirty path, [...] They managed to convince Grigore to send his soldiers to the Postelnic’s house. Without any warning, they took him away from his house to the sacred monastery of Snagov. This happened on Saturday, as it turned into Sunday, 23 [30 – n.s.] December [...] And he spent Sunday, kneeling in front of holy icons and participating in liturgy. When he was ready, he accepted the body and blood of our lord, Jesus Christ. And when the evening arrived, they killed him in the trapeza of the monastery.”

Following the execution of Constantin Cantacuzino, Ghica turned against the late boyar’s sons. In order to escape reprisals, members of the Cantacuzino clan took refuge to Istanbul, where – as Dapontes informs us – Șerban Cantacuzino found sanctuary in the palace of Kara Mustafa Pasha.  This suggests close cooperation between the two and provides us with a plausible explanation for subsequent enmity of the Ottoman grandee towards Ghica and his associates. Indeed, Kara Mustafa Pasha’s association with the Wallachian family continued into his grand vizierate, since Șerban Cantacuzino was the Ottoman official’s only nominee to the throne of Wallachia.

Finally, it is worth to mention one more conflict within the Köprülü’s cross-border faction, which on two different occasions directly influenced Ottoman military effort. In 1664 voievodes Grigore Ghica and Istratie Dabija were ordered to participate with their troops in the campaign against the Habsburgs in Upper Hungary. They were put under the command of Sarı Hüseyin Pasha, but the relations between the grandee and the voievodes soon deteriorated. The situation reached the boiling point, when Moldavian and Wallachian troops retreated from the battle of Levice, directly

contributing to the Ottoman defeat. Fearing reprisals, Grigore Ghica fled to the Commonwealth and subsequently to Venice, although he remained in contact with his patrons at the Porte - Köprülü zd Ahmed Pasha and Panayiotis Nikoussios. Their protection eventually allowed the former voievode to return, first to Istanbul, and in early 1672 – to the Wallachian throne.

However, the following year, the paths of the voievode and San Hüseyin Pasha crossed again. Soon after Grigore Ghica's reappointment to Wallachia, the Ottoman launched an attack against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The campaign of 1672 brought the Porte a resounding success, but the humiliating conditions of peace led Poland-Lithuania to increase war effort and renew hostilities. In this context, in fall 1673, the voievodes of Moldavia and Wallachia, Ştefan Petriceicu and Grigore Ghica received orders to mobilize their troops and join the forces under the command of San Hüseyin Pasha, by then the beylerbey of Damascus, responsible for the defense of Hotin. The voievodes were unwilling to join the campaign and maintained contact with the Polish Hetman, Jan Sobieski, trying to broker a peace agreement. At the same time, the relations between the voievode and Hüseyin Pasha were abysmal. On one occasion, the disagreement over strategy erupted into a heated argument with the Ottoman official almost beating up the Wallachian voievode. As campaign went on, the relations deteriorated even further, and on the eve of the battle of Hotin (November 1673) Moldavian and Wallachian troops, along with the voievodes, defected to the Polish-Lithuanian camp, contributing to the Ottoman defeat.

Following the battle, Ştefan Petriceicu remained in the Polish-Lithuanian camp, but Grigore Ghica decided to return to Istanbul. According to Mircea Soreanu, this decision of the Wallachian voievode was informed by the fact that his family had remained in Istanbul, and the voievode was unwilling to put their lives at risk. What is interesting, however, is the fact that the voievode managed to exonerate himself before the grand vizier.

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649 ibid., 397.
was surprised by the return of the voievode to Istanbul and offered him opportunity to explain his actions. Ghica put the blame for the defeat on Hüseyin Pasha, who – the voievode argued – had chosen a mistaken strategy and was unwilling to listen to the voievodes’ advice:

“Grigore told the vizier, how he had offered advice to Hüseyin Pasha, to leave the trenches, since the emperor’s army is accustomed to fight in open space, and not in narrow places. Hüseyin Pasha bursted out in anger and took his mace, willing to kill him [Ghica], and he forced both Moldavians and Wallachians to enter the trenches. [...] The grand vizier, when he heard that, told Ghica: ‘you offered him a good piece of advice, and he didn’t listen to you.’”

Eventually, he managed to convince the grand vizier of his loyalty to the Porte and even attempted to retain the throne, and it seems that only his death prevented him from taking the throne once again.

4.4. Competing for One’s Share

The conflicts described above reached significant magnitudes and triggered major political events. In 1639, political rivalry between Vasile Lupu and Matei Basarab led to a large-scale military confrontation and sent shockwaves across the political arenas of the principalities and the Ottoman Empire. In turn, the succession crisis following the death of Ieremia Movilă and Jan Zamoyski led to the collapse of Polish-Lithuanian suzerainty over Moldavia. Finally, the tensions inherent in Köprülü household and the struggle for resources between different individuals and interests groups resulted in numerous dethronements and led to at least two major military defeats. However, while all these events produced geopolitical changes, in none of these cases the causes for the conflict were by any stretch concerns with state interests. Instead, they were driven by personal and factional rivalries between different cross-border patronage networks, vying for resources and influence.

At the same time, the abovementioned instances of factional conflicts show the role cross-border patronage ties played in the rivalry within particular arenas. At first glance, it is surprising to see that high-ranking Ottoman officials and Polish-Lithuanian magnates were ready go to great lengths in supporting their Moldavian clients. However, this proves that such bonds constituted an important part of the balance of power. In their attempt to remove Matei Basarab from the throne, Vasile Lupu

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651 Ion Neculce, Letopiseţul Țării Moldovei, 138–9.
652 ibid., 143.
and Tabanyassı Mehmed Pasha, tried to deal a blow not only to the Wallachian voievode, but also to the sultan's favorite. Stanisław Żółkiewski, trying to install his client on the Moldavian throne, risked (and lost) his prestige and authority. That these individuals were ready to risk so much in their Moldavian designs, suggests that they considered cross-border ties as a crucial political asset, worth fighting for.

In turn, the conflicts within Köprülü cross-border household remind us of the segmentary nature of patronage networks and serve as a warning against molding patronage networks into homogenous, internally undifferentiated blocs. Within extended cross-border patronage systems, not all cliques cooperated with each other, and there were considerable structural gaps, which could complicate management of the faction. Interests of particular groups meant that faction leaders faced the challenge of harmonizing divergent aspirations and demands of their clients. In a fractal-like manner, different sections of their political base competed with each other for preferential access to resources and, should the patron fail to manage these competing pressures, internal rivalry could lead to open conflict. These shifting alliances and factional tensions appear clearly in failed attempts to annex Moldavia, discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 5. Annexing Moldavia

In historiography, as well as in Romanian collective memory, the notion that the Ottomans never conquered the Danubian principalities constituted an axiom and a matter of pride. Scholars have stressed the *sui generis* character of Moldavia and Wallachia, underlining the fact that neither principality endured the imposition of direct Ottoman rule. This attitude conforms to the opinion uttered by nineteenth-century French historian, Edgar Quinet:

"Par une exception éclatante, extraordinaire, les musulmans, dès leur entrée dans le pays, se sont interdit le droit d’y bâtir une seule mosquée. Depuis l’origine jusqu’à ce jour, ils ont tenu parole. Quelle démonstration plus certaine que la terre roumaine n’est pas, n’a jamais été terre musulmane, qu’elle n’a pas été marquée du sceau de la conquête, que l’autonomie, la souveraineté lui a été réservée?"

Still popular, the discourse had continued to remain widespread among contemporary historians and continues to have many adherents to this day. According to this model, the voievodes of Moldavia and Wallachia were granted unilateral instruments of peace, known in the European historiography as ‘capitulations’ (*ahdnames*), which secured the continued existence of their domains and settled the legal relationship with the Porte. Despite the fact that no such *ahdnames* have been found for the seventeenth century, Mihai Maxim claims that the instruments of peace were concealed in the diplomas of the voievodes’ appointments (*berats*). According to the author, the structure of the *berats* constitutes a proof that the Porte considered the Danubian principalities states distinct from the Ottoman Empire. However, as Sándor Papp pointed out in his recent contribution, such *berats* were accorded to a wide variety of polities and provinces throughout the empire, reflecting a composite character of Ottoman governance.

In recent years, Viorel Panaite has introduced an alternative explanation of the status of the Danubian principalities by analyzing the Ottoman concepts of *ius gentium* and the place of Moldavia

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655 See for instance Maxim, *Ţările Române şi Înalta Poartă*, 52.
656 Maxim, *Ţările Române şi Înalta Poartă*, passim.
and Wallachia in a wider legal framework of Islamic law. According to him, the lack of ‘ahdnames in the early modern period stemmed from notion that the Ottomans perceived the Danubian principalities as conquered territories and ones belonging to the sultan. In a well-evidenced argument, Panaite argues that the preservation of Moldavian and Wallachian political structures did not originate from any legal texts or agreements, but rather from custom, as constituted and reshaped according to the balance of power between the Porte and its tributaries. Thus, from the Porte’s viewpoint, Moldavia and Wallachia were ‘conquered provinces’ and no ‘ahdnames were issued to their rulers.

While this explanation is convincing, it nonetheless begs another question: if the Ottomans conquered the Danubian principalities, why did they not impose provincial administration in Moldavia and Wallachia but rather rely on the pre-existing political institutions?

Two hypotheses concerning this issue have been developed within the Romanian literature. In 1947 an accomplished economic historian, P. P. Panaitescu, published an essay “Why the Turks Did Not Conquer Romanian Countries?” In it, he argued that Ottoman economic and geopolitical pragmatism played a crucial role in the preservation of the Danubian principalities throughout the early modern period. He argued that two major concerns were of crucial importance. Firstly, the position of Moldavia and Wallachia was peripheral to the grand strategy of the Ottoman Porte, with the main axis of expansion directed towards Central Europe and against the Habsburgs. By preserving Moldavia and Wallachia under local rulers, the Ottomans obtained a bulwark, without having to foot its defense bill. The second argument relied on the profitability of the existing arrangements and the vested interest of the Porte in preserving the Danubian principalities:

“The Ottoman conquest and rule in the acquired provinces was carried out until the complete exhaustion of their wealth: it was exploitation, not a usufruct. The Turks never had the qualities of colonizers or managers of economic affairs. [...] The Ottoman sultans and the leaders of the empire were aware of this. They knew that by sending a pasha to Moldavia and Wallachia, the corrupt and dishonest Ottoman officials would dry up their resources, scatter their wealth and bring

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oppression to the people and the land. [...] It was in the interest of the empire that its breadbasket, without which the capital and the army would starve to death, would be well-run and this could be achieved only under Romanian administration.\(^659\)

When read now, the argument is replete with racist overtones, in many respects mirroring both the intellectual climate of the 1930s and 1940s, as well as Panaitescu’s own rightwing leanings. However, the main idea behind this argument – that the preservation of the Danubian principalities was due to the profitability of the existent arrangements – merits some attention. While the argumentation and the Orientalist prejudices against the Ottoman administration are obviously wrong, it is quite possible that Panaitescu was pointing in the right direction.

In his analysis of the Ottoman-Romanian relations published in 1993, Mihai Maxim criticized Panaitescu’s arguments and shifted the focus back to the military resistance of Moldavians and Wallachians. Additionally, he drew attention to the international configuration against transforming the Danubian principalities into governor-run provinces.\(^660\) He argues that the position of the principalities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not peripheral, but on par with the main route towards Vienna. He also softens Panaitescu’s argument concerning alleged Ottoman administrative and agricultural idiocy, claiming that the main reason the existing arrangement was profitable is the fact that holding the territory against popular resistance in the provinces would surge the costs, with little to nothing to be gained for the Porte.

Maxim envisioned his concept as a corrective to the arguments of Panaitescu. However, his argument is less convincing. For example, his assessment that the number of sultan-led campaigns indicated the relative importance of the route does not take into account the changing character of warfare and the very rationales for the campaigns against Poland-Lithuania. Similarly, the argument about the strength of popular resistance is not entirely convincing. The Ottomans only once in the period under discussion attempted to impose direct administration in the principalities, in difficult conditions of Long War with the Habsburgs in 1595, when the Danubian principalities made part of a large Habsburg-led coalition. Following this campaign, no serious attempt has been made to

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\(^{660}\) Maxim, Țările Române și Înalta Poartă, 130–1.
abolish the principalities, even if rumors about such plans were circulating in the principalities and in the Ottoman capital.

The Ottoman Porte was not the only one to attempt the incorporation of the Danubian principalities; similar voices could be heard in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth throughout the period. In fact, such a project was put into motion twice, but in a manner similar to the Ottoman attempts, it ended without reaching its goals. The first and most sustained attempt to carry out the annexation of Moldavia was by the Crown Grand Chancellor Jan Zamoyski at the end of the sixteenth century. During the Holy League War, King John III Sobieski (r. 1674-1696) shared similar objectives but to little avail. While both projects are usually perceived in terms of geopolitical interests of the Commonwealth, these goals are not fully clear, and the support rallied by their proponents was far from unanimous.

The scope of this chapter is to look at these abortive annexation attempts in a comparative manner, trying to uncover the different interests of the actors involved. As I will argue, while matters such as profitability as well as geopolitical configuration played a role in the unravelling of events, the key to the annexation plans and their eventual failure was a result of divergent interests of factional groups and actors within the factions themselves. Both preserving the autonomy of the Danubian principalities, as well as carrying out the annexation produced clear winners and losers in competition for resources of the land. These inter- and intra-factional struggles over the status of the Danubian principalities contributed to the striking lack of coordination shown in such attempts and ultimately to the failure of such projects altogether.

5.1. Voyvodalık/Beylerbeylik: Why the Ottomans Never Abolished the Danubian Principalities?

If we are to believe the sources and historiography, the possibility of the Ottoman annexation was looming over Moldavia and Wallachia throughout most of the seventeenth century. Whenever the Ottoman grip on power in the principalities seemed to wane, or – on the contrary – the Porte made a push in the region, rumors spread regarding the planned transformation of the principalities into eyalets and the introduction of a direct administration by the Ottoman officials. Such rumors
circulated in 1612, 1616, 1620, 1641, 1653, 1660 and 1672, to name but only a few of such instances. Historians took the circulation of such rumors as a sign of the constant threat to the principality’s existence and the success of preventing such a development was ascribed to the skillful political management of the voievodes, as well as political configurations.

However, more startling than the fact that such attempts did not produce any results is the impression that the Ottoman did not even try to carry out such plans. Even in the cases, when they had the virtual liberty to do away with the principalities’ existence, they opted for a mere replacement of the incumbent voievodes with new ones. Instructive in this respect is the alleged plan to carry out the annexation of Wallachia in 1660. According to the Cantacuzino Chronicle, after the removal of Gheorghe Ghica, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha toyed with an idea of appointing the Ottoman beylerbey in the principality, only to quickly give in to the request of a boyar, Constantin Postelnic Cantacuzino, to appoint Grigore Ghica to the throne. Clearly, the grand vizier lacked resolve to act upon the idea, despite the fact that it was well within bounds of the possible to do so; instead, he preferred to continue the patterns of cross-border patronage.

In order to understand this apparent lack of interest in annexing Moldavia throughout the seventeenth century, we should turn to the only case, when the Ottomans did try to impose direct administration in the principalities in 1595. As I argue throughout this section, this abortive attempt sheds light on the inherent limitations that factional leaders encountered while trying to restructure the relationship between Moldavia and Wallachia, and the Ottoman Porte – limitations that made the perpetuation of cross-border patronage a preferred alternative to direct rule in the principalities, at least for a section of the Ottoman officialdom.

In 1593 the Ottoman-Habsburg skirmishes in Croatia escalated into a full-blown war, in which both empires were to be pitched against each other for long thirteen years, without any of them reaching a clear victory. The following year the Sublime Porte received another blow, as the Transylvanian prince rebelled against the Porte and joined the Habsburg camp, soon followed by the voievodes of

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662 Maxim, Țările Române și Înalta Poartă, 52.

Moldavia and Wallachia. As I have mentioned in Chapter 3, while the professed reason for the rebellion was joining a Christian cause against the Muslims, much of the evidence suggests a more mundane concern with the voievode’s debt burden and lack of solvency.

While a serious blow to the Ottomans in general, the rebellion of November 1594 was also a personal embarrassment for the Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha. The experienced grand vizier, who at this point held the office for a third time in 15 years, had been instrumental in the appointment of the voievode of Wallachia, Michael the Brave (r. 1593–1601), now a rebel against the Porte.664 The first reaction was removing the voievodes from the throne and replacing them with new appointees.665 However, the campaign undertaken to restore Ottoman control and install new rulers in the principalities ended in a defeat. The defeat caused the dismissal of the grand vizier and the appointment of his sworn enemy, Ferhad Pasha.

The conflict between these two grandees had been the central feature of the Ottoman political arena since early 1580s, reaching considerable proportions due to the extended patronage network they both utilized in the factional struggle. According to Günhan Börekçi, this was the result of the strategy of the sultans Murad III (1574–1595) and his son, Mehmed III (1595–1603), who tried to maintain the balance between these two ambitious figures, alternating them at the key positions.666 In winning the appointment in 1595, Ferhad Pasha also profited from the death of the Murad III when Sinan Pasha was absent from the capital. Ferhad Pasha acting as the kaymakam was thus able to obtain the appointment from the new sultan.667

Immediately after taking over the position of grand vizier, Ferhad Pasha conducted a purge within the officialdom, sweeping away the associates of his rival. In total, fourteen governorships changed hands, with Ferhad Pasha planting his own clients in key positions.668 This was also true for

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664 Mihai Maxim, “Un nouveau document officiel ottoman sur l'origine et la nomination (tevcih) de Michel le Brave à la dignité de voïévode de Valachie,” in Romano-Ottomanica: essays & documents from the Turkish archives, 155–61 (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2001), 160.
665 The appointment of Ştefan Bogdan (in Wallachia) and Ştefan Surdu (in Moldavia occurred in 4th–13th December 1594), see Mihai Maxim, “Voyvodalık ou beğlerbeğlik? La politique ottomane envers la Moldavie et la Valachie (novembre 1594 - février 1596) à la lumière des nouveaux documents turcs,” in Romano-Ottomanica: essays & documents from the Turkish archives, 163–72 (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2001), 166.
666 Börekçi, “Factions and favorites,” 197.
668 Murphey, Exploring Ottoman sovereignty, 132.
Moldavia, since, as the Ottoman historian Mustafa Naima claims, Ferhad Pasha immediately replaced a client of Sinan Pasha with a Moldavian from his own kapi. However, this campaign also proved a failure, which caused the grand vizier to reconsider his steps. In April 1595 Ferhad Pasha led a council, which was to decide the direction for the next campaign, as well as the future of the Danubian principalities.

During the session of the imperial divan on April 24, the grand vizier posed the question regarding the scope of the campaign that year. According to Mustafa Selaniki, the discussion revealed considerable differences of opinion. The idea of turning against Moldavia and Wallachia found its vociferous supporters in the persons of şeyh ül-İslam Bostanzade Mehmed Efendi and the Grand Admiral (kapudan paşa), while other officials either abstained or opted for campaign against the Habsburgs. Eventually, Ferhad Pasha espoused Bostanzade’s point of view and immediately engaged in preparations for the upcoming expedition.

Arguably, the most striking aspect of Ferhad Pasha’s action was the decision to restructure the relationship between Danubian principalities and the Porte. According to Mihai Maxim, three different options were considered at this moment. The conservative approach would envision simply replacing the rebel voievodes with new appointees, changing neither Moldavian and Wallachian institutions nor their status within the Ottoman system of governance. A radical solution, according to Maxim, would be an abolishment of the principalities and introduction of timar system in the provinces established in their place. This way, not only political institutions of the principalities, but also landholding principalities would be overturned. Finally, the third option, which the Romanian scholar interprets as a compromise solution, envisioned the transformation of Moldavia and Wallachia into so-called salyaneli provinces, much like Egypt and several other Arab provinces. In this case, there would be no timars created in the principalities; instead, the beylerbey

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670 It is interesting to note the active participation of Bostanzade Mehmed Efendi, a member of the ulema class, in the discussions concerning the campaign against Moldavia and Wallachia. At the same time, it is noted that the Mehmed Efendi subsequently issued the fetva regarding the campaign and denouncing the voievodes as rebels. This incursion of the ilmiyye members into the management of Moldavian and Wallachian affairs gives credence to the argument by Baki Tezcan regarding the growing role of the jurisconsults in the sphere of Ottoman governance, see Baki Tezcan, “Searching for Osman: A reassessment of the deposition of the Ottoman sultan Osman II (1618–1622)” (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2001), 129.
would remit an annual sum to the imperial treasury. Eventually, the latter variant was the one chosen by Ferhad Pasha.

According to Maxim, the decision not to impose the *timar* system stemmed largely from the reservations of the Porte, which did not want to push too far the changes in the Danubian principalities. However, looking at the economic transformations in the empire, as well as the factional interests of the grandees, a more plausible explanation becomes apparent. Firstly, we should note that by the end of the sixteenth century, the *timar* system was in decline, increasingly failing to mobilize economic and military resources. By 1600 only about 10 per cent of the *timars* belonged to the individuals actually performing any military service. With the spread of monetized economy and the growing role of the *iltizam*, it is not surprising that Ferhad Pasha opted for the *salyaneli* variant instead.

However, there is another cause for the adoption of this solution, one closely connected with the factional interests of Ottoman officials. As I have mentioned in Chapter 3, *iltizam* offered a considerable economic scoop for the political households, with their members becoming important investors in such arrangements. As Molly Greene has pointed out in her study of the Ottoman Crete, no *timars* were established in the island following the Ottoman conquest in mid-seventeenth century. As she argues, this development was driven by the interests of Köprülü household, since the expansion of *iltizam* tax farms allowed the grandee to pocket a considerable share of the island’s revenue.

Would similar interests lie behind the solution adopted in 1595 with regard to Moldavia and Wallachia? Evidence, as well as the context of the mid-1590s, suggest that this was precisely the case. In this period, as Mustafa Selaniki informs us, grand viziers frequently demanded enlistment of their

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672 Mihai Maxim, “Voyvodalık ou beğlerbeğlik?,” 168.
clients, not necessarily members of the askeri class, prior to setting out on campaigns. At the same time, in 1596 the new grand vizier Cigalazade Sinan Pasha with one stroke of pen confiscated the timars of sipahi, who had failed to present themselves on the campaign in Hungary, and immediately distributed the prebends among his own men. I have already mentioned the takeover of administration conducted by Ferhad Pasha just after his ascension to the grand vizierate. Clearly, the 1590s were a period of heightened competition for resources and appointments between Ottoman grandee households.

Implicitly, this can also be seen in the case of the officials appointed as the new administrative staff of the future eyalets of Moldavia and Wallachia, especially in the office of ağalık-ı gönülüyan-ı Boğdan (the Agha of Moldavian Volunteers). According to Mihai Maxim, the reliance on volunteers during the campaign serves as a sign of the Porte’s military unravelling, as he sees them as an undisciplined mass of peasants mobilized haphazardly in order to boost the effectives. However, the gönülüyan were anything but. The volunteer units were quite widespread in the second half of the sixteenth and the seventeenth century, and often included sipahis who fell out of rotation, as well as the mercenaries, who wanted to advance through the ranks and become askeri and join the salaried corps of kapıkulu. To see them as unskilled cannon fodder is thus unwarranted. At the same time, since the power of bestowing honors and revenue on the soldiers was effectively conducted by the commander, it should come as no surprise that the bulk of the revenue from the new provinces would go to the clients of Ferhad Pasha.

This reading of the roots of the annexation diverges significantly from the usual account adopted in Romanian historiography, which frames the decision-making process within the geopolitical interests of the Sublime Porte, or even ascribes it to the temperament of the grand vizier. From this perspective, the underlying logic was a factional one, in which individual grandees tried to gain resources from the Danubian principalities in order to remunerate their clients and prevail over

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678 ibid., 168.
rivals. Thus, in the face of the collapse of the previous system of cross-border patronage, caused by the burden of Moldavian and Wallachian debt, Ferhad Pasha tried to reconstruct the mechanism of procuring resources in the way that would benefit his own Ottoman clientele. However, this posed the problem of cobbling the coalition and enforcing the cooperation of other actors at the Porte.

As Günhan Börekçi has pointed out, the grand vizier at the time of the conflict had to choose between leading the campaign personally and delegating it to other officials. Both choices carried inherent risks, which can be classified as a principal-agent problem: in case the grand vizier left the capital, he stood the risk of other officials undermining his position at the court; if he appointed another commander, there was the possibility that the latter would prove to successful and replace the incumbent; at the same time, by remaining at the Porte, the grand vizier gave up his influence on the appointments and the allocation of resources.

Ferhad Pasha decided to participate in the campaign and, before setting out, he made effort to protect his position at the Porte. Most importantly, he insisted on the execution of Koca Sinan Pasha, his long-time enemy and arch-nemesis. However, all he had managed to obtain was Sinan Pasha’s removal from Istanbul and virtual exile to Malkara in Thrace. However, this failed to secure the position of Ferhad, since Sinan Pasha was able to influence the Porte through his clients. At the same time, the kaymakam appointed for the time of the campaign, Damad Ibrahim Pasha, also had ambitions to secure the grand vizierate for himself and thus was likely to subvert the position of the absent incumbent.

This became clear, when the troops set out from the imperial capital, as Koca Sinan Pasha and Damad Ibrahim Pasha joined forces in order to sabotage the campaign. According to Mustafa Naima, the kaymakam had deliberately neglected the logistical preparations for the campaign. At the same time, even before leaving the capital, the military clientele of the two factions clashed on the street, with dead and injured on both sides. Simultaneously, Damad Ibrahim Pasha and Sinan Pasha’s men accused the grand vizier of cowardliness and a secret pact with the Wallachian

682 Börekçi, “Factions and favorites,” 186.
684 ibid.
voievode, while the *kaymakam* himself demoted the men appointed by Ferhad Pasha, replacing them with his own clients. 685

This well prepared campaign of slander, orchestrated by Koca Sinan Pasha and Damad Ibrahim Pasha soon bore fruit. In early July Ferhad Pasha was dismissed, before the campaign even started. 686 This decision was given an aura of legitimacy, through a *fatva* issued by Bostanzade Mehmed Efendi. 687 In hope to reverse his demotion, Ferhad Pasha decided to pass the command to Satırcı Mehmed Pasha and appeal to the sultan in person. However, suspecting that Sinan Pasha sent the people to kill him he chose a secondary route, arriving to the imperial capital in July 1595, where he interceded with the *valide sultan* Safiye and in the first instance managed to obtain guarantees of safety. 688 However, Koca Sinan Pasha and Damad Ibrahim Pasha countered this: the unfortunate grand vizier was killed on Sinan Pasha’s orders in October 1595. 689

Having dispensed with his nemesis, Sinan Pasha could finally take over the command of the troops on the Danube and enter Wallachia. He immediately removed Ferhad Pasha’s appointee to the eyalet of Moldavia, Ca’fer Pasha. The official to take his place was a certain Ibrahim, *sancakbey* of Vize, a virtually anonymous figure. 690 Maxim, analyzing this change, interpreted this as a sign of the Ottoman decline, arguing that the replacement of the Ca’fer Pasha, a commander distinguished in the fight against the Safavids, with a virtual no-name pointed to the general tendency of promoting mediocre individuals over skilled and experienced officials. 691 However, this change on the office (as it later proved, existing only in name) was dictated by the factional interests, since during his career as a commander on the eastern front, Ca’fer Pasha had been an associate of Ferhad Pasha. From this perspective, it seems logical that Sinan Pasha, after dealing with his arch-nemesis, decided to conduct another purge and remove the ally of his executed enemy, replacing him with a client of his own.

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687 Guboglu, *Cronici turcești privind Țările Române* vol. 1, 39.
688 ibid., vol. 1: 258.
688 ibid.
689 ibid.
690 Maxim, “Voyvodalık ou beğlerbeğlik?,” 168.
691 ibid.
Ibrahim bey did not hold the position for long, falling victim to yet another turn of in-house politicking. The grand vizier had to get the Crimean khan, Gazi Giray II, on board, in order to mobilize enough military force to occupy Moldavia and carry out the plan. However, as Max Kortepeter pointed out, the khan was unwilling to provide support unless his interests were taken into account. The Porte rejected his initial demand – putting Moldavia under Girays' rule – but the negotiations continued. Eventually, Koca Sinan Pasha decided to drop the candidature of Ibrahim bey and instead appointed the khan’s nephew, Ahmed bey of Bender. While the new appointee was an Ottoman official, his kinship with the Crimean ruler constituted his major asset in a successful bid for the post. Clearly in order to carry out the annexation, Koca Sinan Pasha and his faction had to accommodate other interests.

However, embarking on the campaign in Wallachia, Sinan Pasha found himself facing the same risks that had brought down Ferhad Pasha. The troops were unpaid and disgruntled and the campaign schedule was delayed by two months. At the same time, Damad Ibrahim Pasha was trying to get rid of Sinan the same way he had done with Ferhad Pasha. In these circumstances, the campaign proved a total failure. While the Ottomans were able to take Bucharest and Târgoviște, they suffered heavy casualties in the battle of Călugăreni and by October they pulled out of the principality.

The campaign in Moldavia, led by Khan Gazi Giray II, also did not result in an annexation of the principality. By early fall 1595 Crown Grand Hetman Jan Zamoyski entered the principality at the helm of Polish troops, embarking on a parallel attempt to take control of Moldavia. Faced with a prospect of military confrontation, the khan decided not to pursue the order of the Porte, but rather seek arrangement with Zamoyski. Thus, after two days of not-so-intense fighting at Țuțora, Gazi Giray reached out and initiated negotiations with the Chancellor.

The agreement was reached in no time, and a conciliatory attitude adopted by the khan surprised Zamoyski. Gazi Giray quickly recognized Ieremia Movilă as the new voievode and withdrew his

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692 Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation, 145.
693 Chirtoagă, Sud-estul Moldovei și stânga Nistrului, 124.
694 Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation, 145.
695 Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 145; Aykut, “Damad Ibrahim Paşa,” 218.
support for Ahmed Bey. He also expressed his willingness to maintain amicable relations with the Commonwealth and took upon himself to secure the Porte’s recognition for the Moldavian ruler:

“The khan asked me so that Your Highness would forget the past and move on and stay with him in friendship. He said that is ordered by the Turkish emperor to put in Moldavia a ruler, and that he came here with his nephew, a loyal servant of the sultan. However, since he wants to win your favor, he will fall back and agree for Ieremia, promising to obtain emperor’s confirmation for him. He immediately sent the news to Sinan Pasha […] I was surprised and could not understand, why he settled for so little.”

By reaching the agreement with Zamoyski, Gazi Giray II effectively abandoned annexation plans and his support for Ahmed Bey. This sudden shift in the khan’s policy surprised both contemporaries and generations of historians, trying to explain rationale behind the ruler’s actions. In her article on the topic, Cristina Rotman-Bulgaru theorized that Gazi Giray followed Ottoman instructions. The intervention in Moldavia had been directed against Transylvanian appointee, Ștefan Râzvan. In the meantime, Zamoyski’s intervention ousted the voivode from the principality and replaced him with Polish appointee. Lacking detailed guidelines, – Rotman-Bulgaru argues – the khan was free to adopt strategy he deemed suitable for the situation at hand. However, this is hardly the case, since Gazi Giray clearly acted on his own accord and the news triggered disgruntlement at the Porte.

In his analysis of Polish-Crimean relations at the beginning of the seventeenth century, Dariusz Skorupa has provided an alternative, and more plausible, explanation. According to him, Gazi Giray used the orders from the Porte as a bargaining chip in his negotiations with Zamoyski. In fact, the khan achieved more than he would if he carried out the plan. Firstly, by adopting a conciliatory stance and expressing good will, Gazi Giray hoped to receive overdue ‘gifts’ from the Polish court. Moreover, in his arrangement with Ieremia Movilă, the khan secured revenues from nine villages in southeastern Moldavia for himself. Thus, by abandoning the cause of his nephew and the plans to

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697 “Prosi, żeby WKMc tego zapomniawszy na nowe pójść raczył i w przyjaźni z niem mieszkać, on że ma od cesarza tureckiego moc postawić hospodara w Wołoszech i że zasłużonego cesarzowi i siostrzeńca i szwagra swego przyprowadził, ale że chcąc chęć WKム sobie pozyskać, ustąpi tego i Hieremiei pozwoli, obowiązując się i upewniając, że cesarz turecki tego nie odmieni, że w tem zaraz posyła do Sinan basze [...] Zdumiała się temu, nie rozumialem tego, aby mieli tak tanie puścić.” Jan Zamoyski to Sigismund III, October 24, 1595 in Hurmuzachi Suppl. II/1, 356.


annex Moldavia in general, Gazi Giray obtained considerable material and political resources. Lacking enough troops, Ahmed Bey had little choice but to conform to his uncle's wishes.

Thus, the annexation attempt undertaken in 1595 by the Porte ended in an utter failure. The campaign achieved none of its objectives, troops were in disarray and the loyalty of the khan came under suspicion. As a result, by early 1596 the sultan dismissed Koca Sinan Pasha from the grand vizierate and replaced him with Damad Ibrahim Pasha. This abysmal outcome was in many respects produced by Ottoman officials themselves. Factional struggle contributed to the lack of coordination during the campaign and lowered discipline of the army. The replacement of Ferhad Pasha by Koca Sinan Pasha delayed the invasion of Wallachia by at least two months.

The new coalition, led by Damad Ibrahim Pasha with support of Safiye Sultan, took power following the debacle of 1595. The new grand vizier reversed the aggressive policy towards the Danubian principalities, opting for negotiations with the rebel voievodes over the protests of Bostanzade Mehmed Efendi. A return to previous arrangements took place. The Porte quickly confirmed Ieremia Movilă's rule in Moldavia, although the principality's relationship to the Porte and the Commonwealth remained an open question for the years to come. In a similar manner, the Porte decided to seek temporary rapprochement with Michael the Brave of Wallachia, who remained on the throne for another four years until his removal by Polish-Lithuanian troops. Again, accommodation prevailed over repression in Moldavian-Ottoman context.

Mihai Maxim argued that the annexation attempt undertaken in 1595 failed due to local resistance mounted by the population of the Danubian principalities. While Moldavian and especially Wallachian military effort certainly contributed to the Ottoman defeat, the main cause for the debacle was rampant factionalism within the Porte. Throughout the campaign, Ottoman grandees sabotaged war effort in order to prevail in factional struggles. This resulted in logistical difficulties, low morale and tension within the army and rapid turnover at the posts of the grand vizier and beylerbeyis of the provinces yet to be established. Moreover, the Crimean khan, whose military resources were of crucial importance for the success or failure of the campaign, jumped ship as soon

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701 Peirce, *The imperial harem*, 94.
703 Maxim, *Țările Române și Înalta Poartă*, passim.
as Zamoyski and Ieremia Movilă offered him a better bargain. Thus, the disastrous outcome of the 1595 annexation attempt was brought about not only by local Moldavian and Wallachian resistance, but by lack of coordination between rival Ottoman factions, whose members were eager to derail the campaign in order to get rid of their political rivals at the Porte. Clearly, for the Ottoman officials, military success of the Porte constituted a matter of secondary importance.

However, in order to explain the swift abandonment of the project another distinction has to be drawn between the Ottoman top brass and the ‘middling sort’ of their clients. While the former embarked on the annexation project in 1595, they were quick to abandon it following the debacle, and never tried to revive it under more favorable circumstances. In the end, the vast majority of the Ottoman powerholders settled for bargaining with the Moldavian and Wallachian voievodes. Gazi Giray was the first to defect, having reached the agreement with Zamoyski. Ottoman officials soon followed suit, and by April 1596 only Bostanzade Mehem Efendi firmly resisted against reaching the agreement with Michael the Brave. In fact, this willingness to reconcile with the voievode was visible soon after the ascension of Damad Ibrahim Pasha to the grand vizierate. Already by late 1596, the voievode was showered with gifts and received a banner from the Porte. The grand vizier did not hesitate to shift the blame for the rebellion on his predecessor and former ally. According to him, the revolt against the Porte had been caused by the abuses of Koca Sinan Pasha; now, once he had passed away, there was no obstacle to redeem Michael the Brave.704

On the other hand, it seems that the failure of the annexation plans was a bigger loss for the grandees’ Ottoman clients. Instructive in this respect is the career of Ibrahim, the former sancakbey of Vize and a short-time appointee to the beylerbeylik of Moldavia. His short and only nominal tenure as the governor-general turned out to be the high point of his career. By 1598 we find him collecting taxes for wine production in Edirne, with the title mir-i miran-i sabık-i Boğdan (former governor-general of Moldavia), meaning that he had not been not reappointed to another office.705 While Ahmed Bey, his equally unfortunate successor at the post, managed to retain his position as the sancakbey of Bender, his career also stagnated. Fearing repercussions for his failure, Ahmed Bey even asked Jan Zamoyski to pass a good word regarding the governor’s actions to the Porte. Both Ibrahim and

705 Maxim, “Voyvalık ou beğlerbeğlik?,” 173.
Ahmed were minor players in the Ottoman political arena and the abandonment of annexation plans by the Porte deprived them of career opportunities.

This suggests a divergence of interests between Ottoman patrons and their clients within the officialdom. Clearly, Ottoman top brass was more eager to drop the annexation plans, which forced their clientele to follow suit, albeit unwillingly. As I would argue, these divergent attitudes to the project stemmed from the way different members of Ottoman hierarchy were able to access resources embedded in the Danubian principalities. In this respect, the high-ranking officials of the Porte were better poised than their clients and had more opportunities of securing revenue, even if the principalities remained autonomous entities.

As I have mentioned, the reliance on cross-border patronage in order to secure their access to resources from Moldavia and Wallachia was a preferred solution by the Ottoman grandees of the seventeenth century. As the events of 1595 have shown, the overhaul of the relationship between the Danubian principalities was a risky business, resulting in the death of one grand vizier and almost ending the life of Sinan Pasha. However, by using cross-border patronage ties and resorting to what I have called in Chapter 3 ‘shadow iltizam’, they were able to harness the resources they coveted nonetheless. From their perspective, the status quo served them well, while attempts to impose Ottoman administration in the principalities carried unnecessary risks, most importantly from rival factions at the Porte.

However, not everyone in the Ottoman administration had enough political leverage to secure the access to such channels. Throughout the seventeenth century, as debate between Kunt and Abou-El-Haj has shown, the ‘middling sort’ of the provincial officials hit the glass ceiling in their careers, with few of them being promoted to the positions of the beylerbey. This would be the case of such minor officials as Ibrahim or Ahmed bey. Since their political power waned, they were unlikely to access the flow of resources between the Danubian principalities and the Porte, unless they would obtain the positions in the newly created provincial administration there. Thus, they would be a likely pressure group to push for the annexation. However, precisely because they lacked enough

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political and economic resources, their ability to push forward their own agenda was almost null. They may have contributed to the ‘rumblings from below’ that demanded annexation, but they were not the ones to make decisions. Instead, these were the grandees that could carry the plan out, but they have shown no interest in doing it, since the existing patron-client relations with the members of the Moldavian and Wallachian served them well.

Thus, I would argue, the fact that the Ottomans did not seriously try to resume the annexation plans stemmed from the fact that the existing system proved remunerative enough and the alternatives too risky and costly. However, this was not due to the alleged agricultural and administrative idiocy of the Ottomans (as Panaitescu had claimed), or the nebulous claims of profitability to the Porte, presented by Maxim. In fact, those who drew profit from these relations were the household leaders within the Ottoman political arena, who could rely on their relations of cross-border patronage, siphoning the resources to their own households. It was their stance that mattered, and clearly they found themselves content with the existence of the principalities, adapting their methods of resource-procuring to the existing situation.

5.2. The Defeat of the ‘Faction that Could Not Lose’: Zamoyski’s Failure to Annex Moldavia in a Cross-Border Context (1595–1601)

In late summer 1595 Jan Zamoyski, the Crown Grand Chancellor and Hetman, led his troops into Moldavia, re-establishing Polish-Lithuanian suzerainty over its neighbor after more than a century of steady losses to the Sublime Porte. Not only did the magnate check the danger of an Ottoman governor being established in Moldavia, but he also managed to install a Polish protégé, Ieremia Movilă, on the throne in Iași. More than that, he secured the latter’s formal commitment to incorporate the principality into the Commonwealth. While this project was never carried out, the relationship between the Movilă dynasty and Poland-Lithuania remained close. This bond was reinforced in 1600, when Zamoyski intervened in the Danubian principalities for the second time, restoring Ieremia to the throne and installing his brother, Simion, in Wallachia.

Interpreting these events, Romanian and Polish scholars have relied on the notions of geopolitical considerations, balance of power and state interests. According to this line of argumentation, Zamoyski acted out of his concern about possible establishment of direct Ottoman eyalet at the
Commonwealth’s borders and tried to use a window of opportunity created by political conjecture to re-establish Polish-Lithuanian influence in Moldavia. This stands in stark contrast with the dominant approach to magnate expeditions analyzed in the previous chapter, which are depicted as reckless adventures driven by private interests.

There are numerous reasons for this differential treatment, the most apparent being the outcome of particular campaigns. Nothing succeeds like success, and Zamoyski’s military and political victories in the Danubian principalities led to ‘nationalization’ of his achievements. Conversely, the defeats suffered in subsequent campaigns led scholars to dismiss these expeditions as purely private enterprises, detrimental to the Commonwealth’s interests. This approach is complemented with a distinctive ‘Zamoyski myth’ present in Polish historiography, which depicts the magnate as a role model of the Polish-Lithuanian statesman and patriot. This often results in an a priori assumption that the Chancellor’s actions were driven by his concern about state interest.

However, the growing body of scholarship on political development in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth has brought to light a strikingly different portrayal of Zamoyski as a political actor and factional leader. Having secured control of patronage resources in the 1580s, the Chancellor managed to build one of the most efficient patronage networks, promoting his clients to key offices and exerting influence over provincial dietines. He used this political leverage in order to crack down on any opposition, in some cases going as far as to execute his rivals. This skillful management of political ties catapulted Zamoyski from the ranks of middle gentry to the top of power hierarchies in the Commonwealth. Thus, we find two strikingly different portrayals of Jan Zamoyski in historiography. On the one hand, scholars addressing Zamoyski’s diplomatic activity depict him as a state-minded politician and a shrewd diplomat, concerned with the interests of the Commonwealth. In turn, historians of Polish-Lithuanian political life increasingly see him as a ruthless and efficient factional leader.

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708 See, for example, Spieralski, Awantury mołdawskie, 148.

709 Sokołowski, Politycy schyłku złotego wieku, 19.

710 For the perception of Zamoyski’s actions, see Spieralski, Awantury mołdawskie, 145–6.
However, this distinction is largely artificial, reflecting our preconceptions rather than sixteenth-century realities. As I will argue in this section, Zamoyski’s Moldavian policy conformed to a similar factional logic that characterized his political activity in the Commonwealth. Rather than pursuing an abstract state interest, the Chancellor strived to take control of patronage resources in order to enhance his political standing and reward his clients. With the military and diplomatic successes of the 1595 and 1600 campaigns, he seemed to achieve his goal, despite strong opposition within the Commonwealth and a hostile attitude of the king.

However, by 1601 the cohesion of Zamoyski’s cross-border faction was far weaker than it had been in 1594, as his clients grew increasingly less responsive to their patron’s requests. As I will argue in this section, this apparently paradoxical outcome of the Chancellor’s Moldavian venture stemmed from a growing sense of uncertainty within the faction and his clients’ growing concern with the profitability of their association with Zamoyski. Contrary to our intuitions, this crisis of cohesion was not triggered by the lack of new patronage resources flowing into the network, but precisely because new resources appeared. A combination of exogenous pressures, as well as different interests and expectations from among Zamoyski’s own cross-border patronage network – converged in a full-blown intra-factional conflict, which Zamoyski despite his efforts was unable to contain.

By any standards, Jan Zamoyski (1542-1605) was a towering figure in the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the sheer extent of his activity as well as amount of sources has intimidated historians.\(^{711}\) A Renaissance humanist, former rector of the University of Padua, patron of arts and sciences, accomplished orator and skilled politician, Zamoyski managed to dominate the political scene of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and laid the groundwork for his family’s ascendancy from the ranks of the middle gentry to the top echelons of the Polish-Lithuanian elite.

Zamoyski entered Polish political life soon after his return from studies in Padua, becoming a royal secretary under the last Jagiellonian king, Sigismund II Augustus (r. 1548-1572).\(^{712}\) Soon the ambitious

\(^{711}\) Already in the interwar period, an eminent Polish scholar, Kazimierz Lepszy, pointed out that the sheer amount of sources outstrips the capability of analyzing them by a historian during his lifetime. As Wojciech Tygielski noted, this proved true, since no scholarly biography of Zamoyski has been published to date, see Wojciech Tygielski, “A Faction which Could Not Lose,” in Klientelsysteme im Europa der Früher Neuzeit, ed. Antoni Mączak and Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (München: Oldenbourg, 1988), 187.

\(^{712}\) ibid.
upstart emerged as one of the most vocal representatives of the middle gentry, which increasingly emancipated itself from the domination of few elite families concentrated in the Royal Council. Under the banner of ‘execution of rights and estates’, this ascendant social group took a firm stance concerning the enforcement of Sejm’s decisions and existing laws against infringements of the incumbent power-holders. Finding an ally in the person of the king, willing to support the gentry’s agenda, the nobility managed to obtain significant concessions throughout the 1560s and 1570s. While not a first-rank leaders of the ‘executionist movement’, Zamoyski managed to establish himself as a popular figure among his peers and play a crucial role during the first two interregna (1572-1574 and 1575-1576).

The election of Stephen Báthory (r. 1576-1586) provided Zamoyski with new opportunities for career advancement. Discounting the king’s willingness to construct a viable coalition, he soon became his closest associate and the most influential figure at the court, advancing through the ranks of the officialdom and amassing considerable political power. By 1578 he was appointed to the crucial position of the Crown Grand Chancellor, complemented in 1581 with the position of Crown Grand Hetman, which gave him control of the army. At the same time, Zamoyski used his new political influence to move against his rivals, with whom he dealt in a ruthless manner.

However, Zamoyski’s political strategy went beyond the immediate attack on opposition, but aimed at securing his position at the apex of Polish-Lithuanian political life in the long run. In many respects, Zamoyski became a pioneer of new political strategies, simultaneously tapping into multiple political resources. According to Wojciech Sokołowski, Zamoyski’s political machine rested on four distinct but interconnected pillars. The first element in this structure was the royal favor.

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73 Sokołowski, Polityczyc wczesnego złotego wieku, 105.
75 Sokołowski, Polityczyc wczesnego złotego wieku, 131.
76 The case that most revolted the Polish-Lithuanian nobility was the crackdown on a powerful Zborowski family, which had been instrumental in bringing Báthory of power, but subsequently shifted to the opposition against the monarch and the Chancellor. In May 1584, Zamoyski – despite Báthory’s conciliatory approach – intercepted the Zborowskis’ correspondence, arrested and executed Samuel Zborowski, confiscated family estates and charged them with attempted regicide. Seeing this as a clear violation of noble liberties and apparent factional motivation behind the Chancellor’s actions, the nobility sided with the accused, while the whole affair paralyzed the Sejm throughout the last years of Báthory’s reign, see ibid., 133–4.
77 ibid., 19. See also, Tygielski, Listy - ludzie - władza, 397–407.
the Chancellor enjoyed during the reign of Stephen Báthory. In exchange for mobilizing dietines' support for the king's political project, Zamoyski was promoted to the highest offices and received extensive landholdings. He subsequently utilized these patronage resources to expand his clientele and promote his associates to crucial administrative posts.\(^{718}\)

Office holding provided Zamoyski with a different set of discretionary powers and patronage opportunities. As the Crown Grand Chancellor, he exerted control over the chancery and supervised the document this institution issued, which gave him significant political leverage, as well as the control of diplomatic affairs.\(^{719}\) Similarly, his position as the Hetman vested him with extensive prerogatives in the military sphere, including jurisdiction, assignment of winter quarters to the units, influence over officer appointments, and conduct of diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire and its satellites. In addition to their formal prerogatives, both offices offered ample patronage opportunities, which Zamoyski used to full extent. Securing position in the military or in the chancery was effectively dependent on the Chancellor's protection. In effect, it comes as no surprise that by the end of the 1580s virtually all officers in the Quarter Army were Zamoyski's close associates.

This skillful management of patronage resources allowed Zamoyski to build an extensive network of clients not only in the political center, but also among provincial nobility. The institutional design of the Commonwealth, with the crucial role of representative assemblies of the nobility in decision-making process, made local dietines a crucial sphere of political activity. Zamoyski established a reliable political system in the provinces by co-opting local opinion leaders, who promoted their interests at the dietines and – through deputies to the Sejm – at the central political arena. This way, by the end of the 1580s Zamoyski thus obtained strong power base concentrated in (but not limited to) the southeastern provinces of Poland-Lithuania.\(^{720}\)

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\(^{718}\) Even a short list of Zamoyski's principal clients shows the degree to which the Chancellor monopolized the appointment to offices. In the second half of the 1580s, his faction included: Stanisław Żółkiewski, the Palatine of Ruthenia and Crown Field Hetman; Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, the Palatine of Lublin and Grand Marshall of the Crown; Marek Sobieski, the Standard-Bearer of the Crown; Stanisław Tarnowski, the Castellan of Lublin; Mikołaj Oleśnicki, the Castellan of Małogoszcz, to name but a few. The political career of virtually all of them was jumpstarted due to their association with Zamoyski.


At the same time, Zamoyski set out to provide a sound economic basis for his family’s ascendancy. Having inherited a couple of villages from his father, the Chancellor accumulated landed estates throughout his career and managed to bequeath to his son one of the largest landholdings in the Commonwealth, comprising over 600 settlements and numerous towns. Moreover, he introduced legal safeguards against fragmentation of the demesne, thus consolidating his family’s economic power. The measure of his success is evidenced by the fact that the estates he had acquired remained in his family’s possession until the communist land reform of 1944.

This prudent long-term strategy of faction-building resulted in the emergence of a powerful political edifice, which Wojciech Tygielski labelled as “a faction that could not lose.” Throughout the 1570s and 1580s, Zamoyski gradually enhanced his position and increasingly dominated Polish-Lithuanian political scene through the extensive and multiplex political machine, including numerous offices, dietines and considerable economic resources. This process reached its peak during the interregnum following Báthory’s death in December 1586. During this period, Zamoyski played the role of kingmaker, contributing to the election of the Swedish prince Sigismund III Vasa (r. 1587-1632).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Pillars of Zamoyski’s faction</th>
<th>Resources</th>
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| 1. Stephen Báthory’s support  | - patronage resources (promoting clients to the offices, securing royal donations)  
- protection against rival factions |
| 2. Patronage network          | - influence at the dietines and at the Sejm |
| 3. Office-holding             | - control of the army and chancery  
- patronage resources (appointing officers, issuing or withholding donations)  
- judicial and diplomatic prerogatives |
| 4. Landed estates             | - economic resources  
- patronage resources (employment of petty gentry in the estates)  
- political leverage at the local dietines |

721 Kowalski, Księstwa Rzeczpospolitej, 224.
722 ibid., 287.
In spite of Zamoyski's support for Sigismund III during the *interregnum*, the relations between the young monarch and the magnate soon deteriorated. The king had no intention of acting as a mere cipher and resented the Chancellor's patronizing attitude. In turn, Zamoyski was similarly disinclined to kowtow to the ruler's expectations. The conflict escalated, eventually reaching a boiling point at the 1592 *Sejm*, when the magnate accused Sigismund of scheming with the Habsburgs. The confrontation ended with a stalemate, since neither side had enough political influence to dislodge the other. However, despite public reconciliation, the conflict continued and Sigismund III used his powers of appointment to build his own faction and block career advancement of Zamoyski's clients. Deprived of access to patronage resources, the Chancellor and his clients moved to opposition, relying on the political system they had built in the 1580s.

Unwelcome at the court, Zamoyski shifted his attention towards the dietines and the *Sejm* in order to retain his influence in Polish-Lithuanian politics. His paramount task to retain and possibly expand his support base in southeastern provinces of the Commonwealth. In this respect, the crucial dietine was the one convening in Vyšnja, attended by the nobility from the palatinate of Ruthenia. In contrast to other assemblies in the region dominated by powerful magnate families, the Ruthenian gentry retained a large degree of autonomy and enjoyed considerable prestige. Attended by politically active and self-assertive middle gentry, often engaged in military service, and lacking a preponderant lineage, the dietine of Vyšnja was a scene of fierce competition between different magnates as well as the local elite. In Zamoyski's strategy, exerting influence on the assembly was a matter of crucial importance, and local leaders were among the Chancellor's closest associates.

Enter Jan Szczęsny Herburt, a relative of Zamoyski and at the same time one of his most trusted clients. A generation younger than his patron (born in 1567) and a scion of a distinguished family,
Herburt was an important if somewhat unruly associate. Well-educated, short-tempered and overly ambitious, Herburt was very popular among the nobility, reflected in the fact that he was elected six times to represent the province at the Sejm. At the same time, he enjoyed considerable prestige among the soldiers, acting as the army’s delegate on numerous occasions. These assets made him a likely candidate for a senatorial office, but these hopes never materialized. By the 1590s Herburt’s career came to a halt due to the conflict between Zamoyski and Sigismund III. While the Chancellor managed to obtain some landed estate for his client, it certainly did not satisfy the ambitious nobleman. His bid for the office of Crown Referendarz, as well as for a senatorial chair fell victim to the king’s appointment strategy and continued hostility towards Zamoyski. Herburt’s political reversals were further exacerbated by his constant financial difficulties. Nonetheless, he remained a reliable client, providing crucial services for his patron throughout the 1590s.

I have touched upon Ieremia Movilă’s career in the previous chapters. Here I will recount some basic aspect of his political ascendancy and association with Zamoyski. Born to the Moldavian Grand Logofăt Ion Movilă and his wife Maria, Ieremia was a scion of Moldavian voyvodal dynasty through the maternal line. Forced to seek refuge in the Commonwealth at the beginning of the 1580s, due to the volatile political situation in the principality, the boyar formed a lasting bond with Jan Zamoyski, who would become the future voievode’s main patron in Poland-Lithuania. This patron-client relationship was reinforced in the 1590s, when the Chancellor provided Ieremia with crucial assistance in securing indigenatus and acquiring landholdings in the Commonwealth, consolidating the latter’s position as the leader of Moldavian emigres.

These three individuals were crucial members of the cross-border patronage network that the Chancellor had established by the beginning of the 1590s. Despite his conflict with the king, Zamoyski managed to retain his role in the political life of the Commonwealth, relying on patronage ties to extend his influence both at the political center and in the periphery, maintaining the loyalty

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729 Sokołowski, Politycy schyłku złotego wieku, 178.
730 Tygielski, Listy - ludzie - władza, 97.
731 Stoicescu, Dicționar al marilor dregători, 318.
of his clients through the distribution of patronage resources. Sigismund III continued to pose a serious challenge to the Chancellor, since the monarch turned down Zamoyski’s requests regarding appointment of his clients. Nonetheless, his political machine was still functioning and the intervention in Moldavia in 1595 marked the new influx of resources into the network.

Despite the efforts of the Habsburg and papal diplomacy to draw the Commonwealth into anti-Ottoman alliance, Poland-Lithuania remained aloof from the conflict. While some officials favored joining the Christian League, the general suspicion concerning Habsburg motives eventually prevailed. This sentiment was shared by Jan Zamoyski, who was extraordinarily well-placed to handle the matters. As I have pointed out above, the offices of Crown Grand Chancellor and Hetman provided him with extensive prerogatives regarding Poland-Lithuania’s southeastern policy. Moreover, due to the departure of Sigismund III to Sweden, Zamoyski allowed him more room for maneuver. As a part of détente following the clash at the 1592 Sejm, Sigismund III had conferred upon Zamoyski vast discretionary powers in shaping the Commonwealth’s relations with the Ottoman Empire and its tributaries. Finally, the Chancellor had full control of the army, with officer corps staffed by his clients.734

Upon learning about the Ottoman plan to annex the Danubian principalities, discussed in the previous section, Zamoyski decided the conflict on his own. On August 26, 1595, he consulted senators present at the military camp, who expressed their support for his project to enter Moldavia and claim it for the Commonwealth.735 In early September, Zamoyski crossed Dniester at the helm of 7,000-strong army, and was soon joined by the leaders of Moldavian émigrés: Ieremia Movilă and Luca Stroici.736 The Chancellor decided to install the former on the throne of the principality, and on 4 September, Ieremia Movilă was proclaimed the new ruler of Moldavia.737 In the following weeks, the army moved south and occupied the capital, Iaşi. Having reinforced his position in the

735 ibid., 34–5.
principality, Zamoyski turned to confront the advancing Crimean-Ottoman army, which entered the principality.

As I have mentioned in the previous section, this turned out to be easier than Zamoyski expected. After two days of inconclusive fighting at Țuțora (19–20 October 1595), the Crimean khan proved surprisingly eager to negotiate an agreement and swiftly recognized Ieremia Movilă as the new voievode and promised to intercede in his favor at the Porte. Having secured his client’s position, Zamoyski left part of his forces to protect the principality and returned to Poland-Lithuania in order to prepare himself for the upcoming Sejm. The campaign was a resounding success and a clear evidence of Zamoyski’s military and diplomatic skills. In one swift move, the Chancellor managed to re-establish Polish-Lithuanian suzerainty over Moldavia and install his client on the throne without alienating the Sublime Porte.

Two important documents produced during the campaign set the new framework for Polish-Moldavian relations. While not a formal ‘ahdname, the instrument of peace issued by the khan at Țuțora brought the Ottoman recognition of Zamoyski’s actions in Moldavia and the appointment of Ieremia Movilă to the throne. However, the context and contents of the Moldavian voievode’s oath of fealty offer us more insight into the rationale behind the campaign and Zamoyski’s political designs.

The oath sworn by Ieremia Movilă upon his ascension to the throne was subsequently written down and signed by the voievode and a number of Moldavian boyars. The ceremony was held in private, with only three representatives of Poland-Lithuania present: Jan Zamoyski, the Crown Field Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, and Jan Szczęsny Herburt. Through this act, Ieremia recognized that he had received the throne from the king and the Commonwealth and promised his loyalty and service. More importantly, he declared that he would carry out the incorporation of Moldavia into Poland-

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738 Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie 1595–1623, 62.
It remains unclear what place would Moldavia occupy within the Commonwealth following the incorporation, with scholars expressing divergent opinions on that matter. According to Constantin Rezachevici, Moldavia would become a simple palatinate of the Crown. In turn, Cristian Bobicescu offered an alternative reading of the document. Comparing the document with the Union of Lublin from 1569, the Romanian scholars argues that Moldavia would constitute a third constitutive part of the Commonwealth, on par with the Crown of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

While the institutional aspect of the prospective incorporation necessitates further study, it is worth noting that both interpretations are subject to doubt. While Bobicescu is right in his criticism of Rezachevici’s conclusions, the analogies he drew between the Union of Lublin and Jeremia Movilă’s oath of fealty miss important divergences between the two documents. While the former document spoke of merging the two monarchies and nations into one, the Moldavian document refers to Moldavia as “the inalienable part of the [Polish – M.W.] Crown, as are other lands and palatinates.”

While it seems that Moldavia would retain at least part of its institutional identity following the incorporation, its status would be closer to Royal Prussia – an autonomous part of the Crown – rather than one of parity with the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy.

Another crucial stipulation of the 1595 document allowed Moldavian boyars to acquire landed property in Poland-Lithuania, while the nobility would be able to do the same in the principality. This point mirrored similar arrangements included in the act of the Union of Lublin. However, as it had been the case with the Polish-Lithuanian union, this liberty of land acquisition effectively favored Polish nobles, who enjoyed economic and political advantage over their Moldavian counterparts. In fact, the access to land constituted the bone of contention between Poles and Lithuanians throughout the early modern period. Less affluent than their counterparts in the Crown, Lithuanian nobles feared that they would be unable to withstand the Poles’ economic and political pressure, and for a good reason. In effect, the issue of landholding fueled Lithuanian

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743 List hospodara wołoskiego y ziemi Mołdawskiey na dotrzymanie poddaństwa królowi JMci Polskiemu y Røptey, per copiam wysłany, 5th September 1595, Hurmuzachi Suppl. II/1, 344–5.
744 Rezachevici, “Política internă și externă a Țărilor Române (I),” 12–5.
745 Cristian Bobicescu, “Între integrare și păstrarea autonomiei,” 231.
746 Hurmuzachi Suppl. II/1, 344–5.
747 Augustyniak, Dwór i klientela Krzysztofa Radziwiłła, 34.
separatism, which rocked the Polish-Lithuanian political system during the Second Northern War (1655-1660). Since landholding in Moldavia would pave the way for the Polish nobility to obtain offices as well, the boyars ran the risk of losing their control of resources embedded in the political arena.

This brings us to the question of the rationale underpinning the projected incorporation. The interpretation espoused by most scholars emphasized geopolitical interests of the Commonwealth in the region. According to Dariusz Skorupa and Dariusz Milewski, Zamoyski’s ultimate goal was to improve border security against the Crimean Khanate and the Porte, and to cut the land route from the Crimea into the Ottoman lands. However, this interpretation does not add up, since the incorporation would actually extend the border with Crimean and Ottoman domains, thus exposing the Commonwealth to future attacks. If we take into consideration that the length of the existing border already outstripped the military capabilities of the Commonwealth, it is unlikely that spreading Crown’s forces even more would cause anything but a total failure of Polish-Lithuanian defense system. What is more, from a diplomatic standpoint, annexing Moldavia would almost automatically lead to a war with the Ottoman Empire, which surely would respond to such a breach of its suzerain rights.

Zamoyski’s actions raised a serious opposition within the Commonwealth. Numerous adversaries of the Chancellor mounted a vehement political campaign against him, accusing the magnate of overstepping his prerogatives and acting out of his own interest, while putting Poland-Lithuania on the collision course with the Ottomans. These voices gained popularity among the nobles, with dietines expressing their concern with Zamoyski’s handling of Moldavian affairs.

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As Przemysław Gawron pointed out, the legal basis for the intervention was indeed weak. However, Zamoyski countered the charges, claiming that the pace of the events and the imminent threat of Ottoman invasion of Moldavia had forced him to act without prior consultation with the king and senators. The Chancellor also claimed that he had acted within the bounds of prerogatives that Sigismund III had granted him prior to his departure for Sweden. Apparently, these explanations managed to convince the Sejm, which confirmed Zamoyski’s actions and ratified the treaties the Chancellor had negotiated.

In order to explain the motives behind Zamoyski’s intervention, we have to address two major question. We have to ask to what extent the interests of the Chancellor and his faction influenced his decision to enter Moldavia, and secondly, what rationale informed the inclusion of the incorporation clause in Ieremia Movilă’s oath of fealty.

Let us deal with the latter question first. In his analysis of the 1595 document, Cristian Bobicescu argued that the access to Moldavian agricultural land constituted the core of the incorporationist project. According to the Romanian author, Polish-Lithuanian nobles had the most to gain from incorporation and corresponding abolishment of restrictions on land acquisition. Incorporation would thus likely profit both the powerful magnates with landholdings in adjacent provinces of the Crown and the landless nobility, who had grown in number by the end of the sixteenth century. Redistribution of arable land in Moldavia would have provided the latter with means of subsistence, while for the former incorporation provided an opportunity to expand their landholdings.

While this argument better explains the incorporationist drive than the alleged geopolitical interests of the Commonwealth do, it nonetheless requires some modifications. Firstly, there is no evidence to support the thesis that Zamoyski was concerned with the interests of the destitute nobles. Throughout his political career, Jan Zamoyski strived to uphold his image as a noble tribune, but his
activity shows little commitment to the well-being of his ‘smaller brothers’. Since the political influence of landless nobility was negligible, they were hardly the constituency Zamoyski was hoping to attract. As Zofia Zielińska’s study, faction leaders in their strategy preferred to focus on the opinion leaders at the dietines, while mobilizing petty nobility on an ad hoc basis. In contrast, creating opportunities for enrichment for the top echelons of the noble society was a viable strategy, but it is obvious that Zamoyski had no interest in promoting the cause of his factional enemies within this group. Thus, whose interests had Zamoyski in mind, when he included the incorporationist clause into Ieremia Movilă’s oath?

This brings us back to the problem of patronage and its role in the Moldavian expedition of 1595. While Zamoyski acted in his official capacity as the Crown Grand Hetman, evidence suggests that factional structures and political interests shaped the campaign’s organization and outcome. As I have pointed out, the Chancellor consulted the senators present at the army camp before venturing into Moldavia. However, it is important to note that Zamoyski’s associates constituted a vast majority of participants in the council. The same was true for the officer corps, clearly a product of Zamoyski’s military patronage. While this does not allow us to claim that factional interests played a decisive role in the Chancellor’s decision to enter Moldavia, it nonetheless suggests that Zamoyski and his faction were in the position to pursue them under the pretense of acting in Commonwealth’s interest.

In this respect, the immediate context of Movilă’s oath of fealty provides us with an important piece of evidence. As I have mentioned above, only three representatives of the Commonwealth were present during the ceremony: Zamoyski, Żółkiewski and Jan Szczęsny Herburt. While the presence of the former two is understandable due to their official capacities and the chain of command, Herburt’s attendance is somewhat surprising. His presence cannot be explained by either his social and political status or by his position in the officer corps. Since Herburt held no significant offices in the period, it is startling to see that him, rather than any of the senators in the army, present at the event of such importance.

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756 Sokołowski, Politycy schyłku złotego wieku, 19.
757 On the role of landless nobility in the political practice of the Commonwealth, see Choińska-Mika, Między społeczeństwem szlacheckim a władzą, 24.
As I would argue, the presence of Herburṭ was dictated not by his position within social hierarchy or military command, but rather by his role within Zamoyski’s patronage network. Throughout his career, Herburṭ exerted considerable within two – partly overlapping – groups of Zamoyski’s clients: the military and the nobility of the palatinate of Ruthenia. As I have pointed out, these two constituencies were important elements within Zamoyski’s power base, and both had much to gain from the incorporation of Moldavia. Similarly, both soldiers and Ruthenian clients of the Chancellor had suffered from the conflict between their patron and the king, which reduced the flow of patronage resources to a trickle. The situation of rank-and-file was further exacerbated by the inherent weakness of the Commonwealth’s revenue-raising institutions, which meant that their pay was in constant arrears. Strapped for resources, they saw the incorporation of Moldavia as an opportunity to receive rewards for their services and loyalty to Zamoyski.

There were good reasons for them to believe that this was the case. Throughout the 1590s both the military and Ruthenian nobles provided Zamoyski with crucial support and contributed greatly to his political survival. They had also taken the brunt of the conflict between the Chancellor and Sigismund III and corresponding loss of access to patronage resources. With the conquest of Moldavia, the situation changed in favor of Zamoyski. As a triumphant commander, the Chancellor would exert considerable influence on the distribution of land and offices in the principality. It is understandable that Ruthenian and military clients of the Chancellor felt entitled to receive their share as a reward for their unwavering loyalty and hardships they had endured due to their association with Zamoyski. This allows us to identify them as a pressure group that pushed for incorporation, which would make these new resources available to them.

Jan Szczęsny Herburṭ’s political activism in Ruthenia and career as a soldiers signaled that he shared these groups’ interests. The conflict between the Chancellor and the king adversely affected Herburṭ’s career. His close ties with Zamoyski, popularity among the soldiers and the Ruthenian nobility, and his rhetorical talent made him a perfect spokesman for the ‘incorporationist’ camp in

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79 Arguably, relatively few provincial offices resources brought any financial revenue to their holders or vested them with any effective power. However, since they bestowed symbolic capital and served as the primary mechanism of distinction among the nobility, they were highly coveted throughout the early modern period. E. Janas and W. Kłaczewski, “Nominacje urzędników w Rzeczypospolitej (połowa XVII-XVIII wiek),” in Krzys’tollittja: Studii na pošanu Mykolu Krkana z nahody 80-riččja, ed. Oleksij Vinnyčenko et al. (Lviv: Vydavnyctvo Ukraїns'koho Katolyc'koho Universytyetu, 2012), 533.
both the Polish-Lithuanian political arena and within Zamoyski’s faction.\textsuperscript{760} Thus, his attendance to Jeremia Movilă’s oath of fealty should at no surprise, since he represented the section of the Chancellor’s political network most interested in incorporation. At the same time, the contents of the oath imposed by Zamoyski on the Moldavian voievode suggest that he sided with the incorporationists’ interests at this point.

However, a closer look at Zamoyski’s behavior forces us to correct this hypothesis. Quite naturally, Jeremia Movilă and his fellow Moldavian émigrés, who had been able to return to the principality only after the campaign, were unwilling to give up their estates and positions to the Polish nobility. Thus, they opted for the preservation of Moldavian autonomy, and forestall and even derail the incorporation of the principality to the Commonwealth, with the Moldavian voievode acting as the leader of this ‘autonomist’ group within Zamoyski’s faction. Obviously, this stood in stark contradiction with the interests of Ruthenian nobility led by Herburt and created tension within Zamoyski’s patronage network.

Evidence suggests that Zamoyski tried to prevent the conflict and tried to accommodate the interests of both groups. In effect, while Movilă’s oath of fealty committed the voievode to incorporation, it did not set any schedule regarding the matter. Thus, while Zamoyski expressed his support for Herburt and the Ruthenians and included their demands, he effectively postponed the incorporation to an undetermined point in the future.

By postponing annexation, Zamoyski managed to temporarily reconcile two sections of his cross-border patronage networks and avoid a potentially detrimental conflict. However, this solution carried certain risks for the future. Both groups laid their respective claims to the same resources, and their interests were inherently irreconcilable, which meant that the conflict would resurface in the future. At the same time, Zamoyski expressed his commitment to the interests of both groups and, should the conflict resurfaced, each of them would expect their patron to take sides and risk alienating part of his power base. Procuring new patronage resources was the only way the

Chancellor could prevent the intra-factional conflict over Moldavia. In the years that followed, Zamoyski faced the consequences of this temporary arrangement.

In the following years, Zamoyski’s fortunes seemed to take a better turn. At the Sejm of 1596 both the deputies and the king himself approved his decisions. Cooperation between Movilă and the Chancellor proceeded smoothly. It seemed that successful resolution of the Moldavian affairs and expansion of his patronage network to the principality entrenched Zamoyski’s position and allowed him to move against his rivals. The case in this respect was the attack he launched against Prince Ostroz’kyj at the Sejm of 1597, an episode I have discussed in Chapter 3. Thanks to the ‘evidence’ produced by Movilă against Nikephoros Parasios, Zamoyski was able to humiliate his powerful rival publicly.

However, these successes did not bring new patronage resources to the network, while the patience of Zamoyski’s clients was running thin. This led to an increasing pressure from below to settle the status of Moldavia, causing cracks to appear within the faction. This was epitomized in a speech delivered by the Moldavian envoys at the 1597 Sejm. As I have pointed out in Chapter 3, the emissaries of Ieremia Movilă supported the Chancellor in his attack on Ostroz’kyj. However, at the same time, they addressed the king, requesting a number of privileges in clear contravention with the 1595 oath of fealty. These demands touched upon two crucial topics. Firstly, the Moldavians requested formal recognition of Movilă’s hereditary rights to the Moldavian throne. More importantly, they asked the king to grant boyars exclusive access to offices and arable land in the principality. These privileges, if granted, would make it impossible for the nobility to access Moldavian resources, thus rendering the incorporationist enterprise moot.

The response of the king was conciliatory. He recognized Movilă’s hereditary rights to the throne and confirmed customary rights of the boyars, but at the same time reiterated the right of ‘well-deserving people’ to acquire land in the principality. Thus, while this attempt to obtain safeguards against incorporation ultimately failed, it nonetheless showed that Zamoyski’s Moldavian clients were unwilling to give up the principality without a fight.

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76a ibid., 234.
Jan Szczęsny Herburt also made an appearance during the Sejm proceedings. While had not been elected by a dietine, he attended the assembly as a delegate from the soldiers. In a passionate speech, he defended his brothers-in-arms from accusations of misbehavior and presented the army’s grievances to the king. In a particularly harsh statement, he demanded that rewards be given to the soldiers for their service and threatened with mass desertion. He stressed his point with a cautionary tale, which dangerously bordered on the crime of lesé majesté:

“I hope it won’t come to that what happened to the Turkish emperor, Basoktis. When the soldiers asked him to promote one of their own to the position of pasha, he declined their requests and showed no gratitude for their knightly service, so that they [disgruntled] wanted to present his head to king Matthias.”

It is hard to tell if Herburt consulted his address with Zamoyski. While the tone was extraordinarily threatening and harsh, it is possible that the Chancellor colluded with his client in order to put pressure on the king in order to procure patronage resources for Zamoyski’s associates in the military. This seems plausible, since in the same year Herburt endorsed his patron’s agenda at the dietine of Vyšnja. Moreover, the following year he was entrusted with a delicate diplomatic mission to Istanbul, undoubtedly at Zamoyski’s behest. 764

However, Herburt’s address at the Sejm revealed a growing unrest among Zamoyski’s clients. Undoubtedly, the patience of Herburt – and the interest groups he represented – was running thin, since their pay was still in arrears, and received no rewards for their service. This meant that not only the king, but Zamoyski as well, would have to face the growing disgruntlement. The soldiers expected the king to grant them proper recognition. At the same time, however, they expected their patron to take proper care of their interests. This growing frustration became increasingly apparent in the following years.

Despite his successes, Zamoyski failed to force the king to grant him access to patronage resources and his factions still suffered from the lack of appointments. Frustrated, Zamoyski wrote that his constant requests were as effective as ‘throwing beans against the wall’. 765 Due to the hostile attitude

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763 “Dyaryusz sejmu warszawskiego 1597 roku,” 89.
764 Tygielski, Listy - ludzie - władza, 297.
765 ibid., 418.
of Sigismund III, some of the Chancellor’s clients started to distance themselves from their patron.\textsuperscript{766}

While the faction remained relatively intact, problems and tensions mounted.

Herburt’s mission to Istanbul epitomized this growing tension. One of the central objectives of the embassy was to secure Ottoman recognition of the Commonwealth’s rights to Moldavia, which would allow for a consolidation of Polish-Lithuanian suzerainty. In order for the mission to succeed, the diplomat had to coordinate his efforts with Ieremia Movilă. It is possible that in orchestrating the appointment of Herburt, Zamoyski hoped that factional allegiance of both actors would have a positive impact on their cooperation. However, the matters turned out differently. Rather than working together, Herburt and Movilă engaged in constant squabbles and reciprocal snubs, and the mission failed to fulfill its objectives.\textsuperscript{767} Moreover, the relations between Herburt and Zamoyski also grew uneasy, since the former left the estates he leased from Zamoyski just before harvest, without notifying the Chancellor.\textsuperscript{768}

Soon, new political developments upset the balance of power in the Lower Danube region. In the year 1599 Wallachian voievode Michael the Brave, allied with the Habsburgs, invaded Transylvania and defeated prince András Báthory (r. 1598-1599), Zamoyski’s relative, and took control of the principality. Subsequently, he crossed the Carpathians and in May 1600 ousted Ieremia Movilă from the Moldavian throne. Ieremia fled to Hotin and immediately appealed to Zamoyski for help. The Chancellor quickly mobilized his troops, and in September 1600 entered Moldavia, taking control of the principality and restoring his client to the throne. Subsequently, he moved south to Wallachia, defeating Michael in the battle of Bucov, and installed Ieremia’s brother, Simion, as the new voievode of Wallachia.

From the military and diplomatic point of view, the campaign was a resounding success, even if Simion’s rule in Wallachia was to prove short-lived.\textsuperscript{769} As was in the case of the first expedition, the backdrop of the campaign was more interesting and far removed from the apparent success of Zamoyski. When the troops were encamped near Suceava, the only fortress to mount a resistance against the Polish troops in Moldavia, Zamoyski demanded that Ieremia Movilă fulfill his promises

\textsuperscript{766} Sokołowski, \textit{Politycy schyłku złotego wieku}, 16.
\textsuperscript{767} Constantin Rezachevici, “Dimensiunea polonă a activităţii lui Ieremia Movilă,” 260.
\textsuperscript{768} Tygielski, \textit{Listy - ludzie - władza}, 355.
\textsuperscript{769} Ciobanu, \textit{La cumpănă de veacuri}, 287.
about the incorporation of the principality to the Commonwealth. However, the voievode rejected the demands and an infuriated Zamoyski seriously considered removing Movilă from power and replacing him with a more amenable candidate. Eventually, however, he decided against it, apparently unsure if the move would destabilize his position even further. In the end, Movilă’s strategy proved effective, with his power restored in Moldavia and his brother installed as the ruler of Wallachia.

The political solution adopted by Zamoyski involved drawing up the new oath of allegiance, sworn by both Ieremia and Simion. The new arrangement omitted the stipulations concerning the incorporation of the principality, opting instead for the annual payment to the treasury and a contribution to the upkeep of Polish forces. While the point regarding land acquisition in the principalities for ‘well-deserving people of the Polish nation,’ was included, it seems that the decisive voice belonged to the voievode rather than the king. As Cristian Bobicescu argues, the clause concerning the legal privileges of the Polish nobility in the principality was not tailored to serve the interests of the nobility itself, but rather the upper echelons of the boyars, who received their titles through *indigenatus*. In effect, when confronted with the opposition of the Moldavians, Zamoyski had to acquiesce thus leaving Herurt and his likes empty-handed.

Clearly, this had not gone according to Zamoyski’s plans, and he was deeply disillusioned with Ieremia’s defiant stance. As far as early 1601 he still toyed with the idea of removing Movilă from the throne, but eventually decided against such a radical move. However, following the campaign he was less inclined to rely on the voievode himself, but rather tried to build ties with the prominent Moldavian boyars, thus weakening Movilă’s position as the broker between them and the Chancellor.

On another front, the relationship between Zamoyski and Jan Szczęsny Herurt suffered an even bigger blow. As Cristian Bobicescu has rightly argued, Herurt’s own interests and his position within the patronage network made him a champion of the incorporationist camp. This meant that


771 Bobicescu, “Câteva observaţii pe marginea unor izvoare inedite cu privire la relaţiile dintre Polonia şi Moldova sub Movileştii,” 110.

772 Bobicescu, “Pe marginea raporturilor,” 201.
he and his support base were the ones on the losing end, when Zamoyski failed to fulfill his promises and settled with Movilă instead. Their disillusionment with the Chancellor also meant that they were less inclined to carry out their duties, especially since their pay was still in arrears, and the treasury once again failed to provide funds. In early 1601, they presented Zamoyski with an ultimatum. They stated that they would abandon their posts and form a confederation. In order to prevent this potentially disastrous situation, Zamoyski conceived, earmarking his private funds to cover a part of the arrears they were due.\textsuperscript{773} In this matter, however, he could not rely on the assistance of Ieremia. The latter in 1601 pleaded with the Sejm for lifting this obligation, claiming that the devastated country was unable to share the burden.\textsuperscript{774}

The disillusionment of Szczęsny Herburt underscored the souring of his relationship with Zamoyski. Following the campaign, Herburt, while still the client of the Chancellor, became far less responsive to the requests of his patron. For instance, in January 1603, he claimed that he had been unable to attend to Zamoyski’s affairs, since he was ‘too busy’ with his own matters.\textsuperscript{775} At the same time, he tried to put additional pressure on Zamoyski. In order to do this, he turned to his traditional constituency, the dietine of Vyšnja, making the incorporationist agenda a matter of public debate.

There was a degree of controversy with dating Herburt’s exposé. Numerous scholars have pointed different moments in time between 1589 and 1603. However, in his article, published in 2002, Cristian Bobicescu argued that the expose was presented at the dietine before the Sejm of 1603, and most probably in December 1603.\textsuperscript{776} According to the transcript of the speech, Herburt claimed that the Crown possessed ancient rights to Moldavia, while the right of conquest underpinned the Commonwealth’s claim to control Wallachia. Consequently, Herburt argued that the Polish-Lithuanian nobles could shape the principalities’ status as they saw fit. The following project represented the incorporationist view in its clearest formulation: the speaker opted for the incorporation of the principality and subsequent redistribution of land among the ‘people of merit’, which undoubtedly meant soldiers and the nobility of Ruthenia.

\textsuperscript{773} Gawron, \textit{Hetman koronny w systemie ustrojowym}, 104.
\textsuperscript{774} D. Ciurea, “Despre Ieremia Movilă,” 110.
\textsuperscript{775} Jan Szczęsny Herburt to Jan Zamoyski, 2nd January 1603, Warsaw, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Zamoyskich 190.
\textsuperscript{776} Bobicescu, “Pe marginea raporturilor,” 202.
The fact that none of other opinion leaders associated with Zamoyski stepped forward with a similar project or supported Herburt in his bid, suggests that the latter was acting on his own initiative, trying to gain official support of the nobility, while at the same time putting additional pressure on Zamoyski. He had hoped that his influence at the dietine, which he had used when serving the Chancellor, would suffice to mobilize political support for his political plans. However, it seems that Herburt overestimated his popularity, since the nobility failed to back the project and the whole affair fell through.

Thus, by the early 1600s it was clear that balance sheet of Zamoyski’s interventions in Moldavia was far from positive. Arguably, he managed to install members of his faction in Moldavia and – for a short period – in Wallachia. On the surface, he managed to score significant military and diplomatic victories. However, from the factional point of view, the Moldavian policy actually aggravated the problems at hand. The combination of unfavorable royal policy and the growing conflicts among his own clients meant that by the 1600s Zamoyski’s position was weaker than before the intervention. While most of the key clients remained at least formally within his patronage network, the network’s cohesion suffered greatly. Zamoyski increasingly experienced the decreasing responsiveness of his political machine. Various factors were at play the development of this crisis will be discussed in the following section.

In a way, the fact that the crisis of Zamoyski’s factional cohesion manifested itself after the intervention of Moldavia could appear counterintuitive. Despite the hostile political environment caused by his falling out with the king, the Chancellor seemed to secure a significant victory for his faction, taking control of the new resources, which he redirected towards his clients and thus enhanced his own position. Why then this apparent success caused an internal conflict within the network that cost the patron so much in terms of political influence? In order to understand this apparent paradox, we have to look at the events through both the lens of factional dynamics and subjective interpretations of particular actors, including their perception of uncertainty and moral economy of patronage.\footnote{I understand moral economy in terms of a “consensus as to what were legitimate and where illegitimate practices” concerning economic activity of the actors, based on traditional notions of the ‘fair’ production and distribution of resources, see E.P Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” \textit{Past & Present} 59 (1971): 78–9.}
As Bartolomé Yun Casalilla pointed out, the cultural values of the Iberian aristocracy in the early modern period made profound impact on the management of their estates.\textsuperscript{778} However, the profound changes of the economic environment and new concepts also contributed to a shift in the ways the aristocratic lineages drew and allocated resources. However, both these changes and the scarcity of resources contributed to the fact that the aristocracy had to strategize and prioritize some resources to the detriment of others. The same applied to the patronage, creating a potential tension between the patron and his clients, if either of them saw the division of spoils as unfair.

While the patron-client relationship is usually interpreted as an instrumental in its core, in practice it is extremely difficult to disentangle it from the intersubjective notions of trust and affection. In this respect, Charles Tilly’s concept of trust networks is especially useful.\textsuperscript{779} As I have mentioned earlier, exchange in patron-client relations is based on differential schedules, according to which both parties provide each other with resources and services. The constant state of indebtedness of one party to another is crucial for the stability of a patron-client relationship. Since such an arrangement is vulnerable to malfeasance, it requires trust that the partner would keep his end of the bargain and would conform to intersubjective notions of moral economy, thus providing a degree of certainty to the relationship.

During the expansionary period of his faction, Zamoyski gained a reputation as a fair and reliable patron, who managed to deliver rewards that their clients perceived as fair compensation for their service. His control of the patronage resources during the reign of Báthory made members of his patronage network certain that they will receive their share in due time. Therefore, he was able to build up the patronage network, and to establish his reputation as a ‘solvent’ patron, adhering to the principles of moral economy shared by his clients. This level of certainty and trust meant that the members of his faction were ready to forgo some of their ambitions in favor of the Chancellor’s political needs, since they were certain that they would receive due compensation when the opportunity will present itself. This gave Zamoyski a great deal of liberty to manage the distribution of patronage resources among his support base, which he skillfully utilized in his political ventures.


\textsuperscript{779} Tilly, \textit{Trust and rule}, 4.
The conflict with Sigismund III eliminated one of the elements from the equation, reducing the flow of patronage resources down to a trickle. This meant that despite the services Zamoyski’s clients continued to provide, they were now uncertain if their rewards would be forthcoming anytime soon. Unlike before, association with the magnate was now a liability in career advancement. If we perceive the relationship between the Chancellor and his clients in purely instrumental terms, this should have contributed to the defection of clients from Zamoyski’s camp. However, this did not immediately take place. In order to understand this potentially unexpected result, we should conceptualize the problem of certainty and its role in actors’ behavior.

Obviously, the factional struggle and the king’s strategy in reducing Zamoyski’s control over patronage resources meant that the latter’s clients were increasingly uncertain as to how and when they would obtain their share. However, this feeling of uncertainty was external to the trust network. Therefore, it did not make them doubt their patron’s willingness to look after their interests. Instead, they interpreted the situation as exogenous to the patronage network, while still perceiving their patron as adhering to the shared principles of moral economy. In short, while they were uncertain, when they would receive their share of resources, they were certain that the patron would not ignore their interests as soon as the opportunity arose. In short, despite the efforts of the king, the internal mechanisms of trust were still firmly in place.

While this mechanism of trust allowed the Chancellor to maintain his patronage network throughout the period of disgrace, it also created a potential danger for the patron. The offices in the Commonwealth were customarily held for life, which meant that the flow of resources was dependent on the passing away of the incumbents, thus varying wildly over time. In addition, the sheer size of Zamoyski’s support base meant that the demand for resources outstripped their availability at any one time. In the 1580s, the Chancellor, due to his virtual monopoly of patronage, was able to balance the interests of his clients by scheduling the distribution of patronage resources among his clients. However, when the king blocked his influence on the appointments, the expectations of his allies accumulated. Moreover, different clients expected that once the patron gained access to new resources, their interests would take priority according to their perception of the moral economy.
The intervention in Moldavia provided a windfall of patronage resources to the faction, but at the same time created the problem of satisfying different interest groups within the faction, each of whom felt entitled to partake in the division of the spoils. Moreover, each of them was relatively certain that the Chancellor would make meeting their particular demands a priority. Herburg and his support base were certain that their political and military contribution to the factional enterprises would be rewarded by incorporating the principality and distributing land and offices among them. On the other hand, Ieremia Movilă and Moldavian boyars felt entitled to hold to their newly restored control of Moldavia, unwilling to share what they considered was their patrimony. The interests of both groups were inherently contradictory, with each of them certain that Zamoyski would share their perception of moral economy of patronage resources.

The solution adopted by Zamoyski was a conciliatory one: he installed Movilă and the émigrés in the principality, but also made a credible commitment to Herburg and his associates that the incorporation would be carried out. He therefore managed to delay the conflict and prevent the alienation of either interest group. However, the solution was potentially incendiary, as Zamoyski was trying to placate different sections of his faction, and effectively earmarked the same indivisible resources to both factions. If this crisis of solvency was not resolved soon, it would be a matter of time before both sides found themselves on the collision course, with each expecting their patron to adhere to their perception of ‘fair’ division of spoils.

However, intra-factional conflict could still be averted if the Chancellor managed to bring new resources to the faction, which would relieve the building pressure on competition over Moldavian resources. However, the Chancellor was unable to break the stranglehold of Sigismund III’s appointment policy, and the patience of his clients was wearing off. Both Ieremia Movilă and Jan Szczęsny Herburg increasingly doubted Zamoyski's resolve to give priority to their respective agendas and tried to obtain additional safeguards against any infringement on their interests. They increased the pressure on their patron to maintain his end of the bargain. From their perspective, Zamoyski did have access to patronage resources, and their resented his lack of resolve to deliver on his promises. At the same time, the growing level of uncertainty within the faction meant that the conflict erupted between incorporationists and autonomists, which the Chancellor found himself increasingly unable to contain.
When the second intervention in Moldavia took place in 1600, Zamoyski was unable to delay the conflict anymore. He initially sided with the incorporationists as represented by Herbur, and was matched with defiance on the part of Ieremia Movilă, who declined to sacrifice his interests in favor of those of his patron. Finding himself unable to overcome his client’s opposition, Zamoyski changed his mind and opted for a new conciliatory arrangement, which clearly favored the Movilă at the detriment of soldiers and Ruthenian nobility.

This vacillation of the patron shattered his credibility in the eyes of his clients, with each interest group disillusioned with his stance. For Herbur and his associates, Zamoyski's failure to secure their interests meant that the Chancellor reneged on the principles of their relationship, and in doing so sacrificed their interests on the altar of factional strategy. Up until that point, they remained relatively certain that the patron shared their vision of moral economy of patronage, and his failure to act upon his promises sparked the sense of betrayal. Since Zamoyski did not take care of them, despite the services they provided throughout the 1590s, they no longer felt obliged to maintain their end of the bargain. Their disgruntlement is evident in the unwillingness of the soldiers in 1601 to serve without being paid, as well as the stance of Herbur, who similarly tried to pursue his interests outside the factional milieu.

While Zamoyski eventually sided with Ieremia Movilă, the relationship between the two did not remain unscathed, either. The Chancellor’s initial support for incorporationists clearly demonstrated that his commitment to Movilă’s interests was not unwavering, and only the pressure exerted by the voievode forced his patron to take account of the Moldavian’s stance. In Movilă’s eyes, Zamoyski also failed the political test in terms of moral economy, and his support could not be taken for granted. This meant that the Moldavian ruler needed to broaden his political base in the Commonwealth, which adversely effected his responsiveness to the Chancellor’s factional interests.

Thus, a combination of adverse political environment and competing claims within the faction contributed to an internal crisis of uncertainty within Zamoyski's faction. Faced with limited resources and competing claims from with the end his patronage network, the Chancellor tried to balance the interests of the two interest groups by signaling that he shared their divergent perceptions of moral economy of patronage and promising them their due share in the division of spoils. However, this conciliatory measure created a growing sense of uncertainty among his clients,
who ultimately came to doubt his commitment to their interests. In turn, this tension sparked an intra-factional competition for control of resources and increased pressure on the patron to take sides. The latter's failure to satisfy either groups expectations shattered his reputation and alienated his clients, who felt that their interests were ignored by the Chancellor, and in turn questioned their own commitment to him. Thus, this uncertainty translated into the crisis of trust and cohesion within Zamoyski's faction, a condition that persisted until his death in 1605.

5.3. The King and the Poet: John III, Miron Costin and the Limits of Cross-Border Patronage (1683-1691)

The last attempt to annex Moldavia by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth came at the end of the seventeenth century, in the context of the renewal of hostilities between Poland-Lithuania and the Porte. The war that broke out between the Porte and the Commonwealth in 1672 started with a disastrous defeat for the latter: on the brink of civil war between the king and the opposition, it was unable to even mobilize the troops and resist the Ottoman invasion. As a result, the peace treaty was truly humiliating: not only did the Crown had to cede Podolia and Right-Bank Ukraine to the Porte, but it was also forced to agree to pay a tribute to the Porte.\(^78^c\) The treaty was not ratified and the war resumed, with the Polish armies under Hetman Jan Sobieski managing to regain some ground. In the end, however, the treaty of Žuravna (1676) and subsequent ahdname of the sultan did not bring the territorial changes, but marked the end of the tributary obligation to the Porte.

As Jan Sobieski was elected to the throne of Poland on the wave of his military fame and with the support of the French court, he faced a number of difficulties, which had to be resolved in order to establish his control. The war with the Porte continued, the relations with the Elector of Brandenburg and the status of Ducal Prussia were still unresolved. Finally, the position of the king himself, despite his popularity, was a matter of concern. Compared with his predecessors on the throne, John III was a relative upstart: he lacked the dynastic lineage that would set him apart from the upper echelons of the magnate elite. The first king elected in 1572 – Henri Valois – was the brother of the French king; Stephen Báthory was at the same time the ruler of Transylvania. While the Polish branch of the Vasa dynasty lost their Swedish throne by 1599, they nonetheless maintained their claim until 1660; also, they could invoke their maternal descent from the Jagiellonian dynasty.

\(^78^c\) Wagner, *Wojna polsko-turecka*, vol. 1, 292.
Even another Piast king, Michael Korybut Wiśniowiecki (Vyšnevec’kyj) prided himself with descent from the Jagiellonians. Sobieski did not have any of this and in order to gain advantage within the polarized political arena, he had to bring new resources to his disposal.

The solution favored by Sobieski was to establish his family as the dynastic rulers in one of the polities connected to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Throughout the 1670s he engaged himself in the cooperation with Louis XIV, hoping that the Sun-King and his ally, Sweden, would help him to oust the Elector of Brandenburg from Ducal Prussia and take over the Duchy for his own dynasty. Also, he counted on French diplomatic support in Istanbul in order to renegotiate the treaty of Żuravna. In all respects, he was disappointed, since Louis XIV found rapprochement with Frederick Wilhelm more appealing and dropped Sobieski’s plans altogether. In this situation, John III decided to reorient his policy and move towards the war with the Ottoman Empire. This eventually brought him and the Commonwealth to the alliance with the emperor and further into the Holy League War that took the last fifteen years of the seventeenth century, in order to take back the territories lost in 1672 as well as to bring into his fold the principality of Moldavia as the vassal polity.

At the first glance, the decision to move against the Ottoman Empire was well motivated. Sobieski during his military career had gained considerable knowledge of the region and cultivated numerous ties with the Moldavian elite. The presence of a number of Moldavian exiles, with the former voievode Ștefan Petriceicu at the helm, also boosted the legitimacy for the Polish-Lithuanian intervention in the principality. The prospect of reconquering Podolia and Right-Bank Ukraine could help diffuse the internal situation in the Commonwealth, where vocal lobby of noble exiles from these regions contributed to the growing paralysis of the Sejm and was used by the opposition.

However, the crucial figure throughout this period was without doubt Miron Costin, one of the wealthiest and most influential boyars in Moldavia. A son of the Moldavian exile, Iancu Costin, he grew up in Podolia and got his education in the Jesuit College of Bar before returning to Moldavia.

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782 Stolicki, Wobec wolności i króla, 295; Stolicki, Egzulanci podolscy (1672-1699), 9.
by the early 1650s, where he soon emerged as one of the most important political figures, holding the position of the Grand Logofăt of the principality. It is clear that he maintained close ties with the Polish-Lithuanian officials, most importantly Marek Matczyński, the close associate of the king, whom he dedicated one of his historical works in 1678. While he did not join Petriceicu in his rebellion against the Porte, he nonetheless maintained correspondence with Matczyński and John III, informing them about the events in the principality.\(^{783}\)

The resumption of hostilities between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottomans occurred not only at the walls of Vienna. By November 1683 the Polish troops under the Crown Field Hetman Andrzej Potocki entered Moldavia, supporting the exiled voievode Ștefan Petriceicu.\(^{784}\) They also managed to take by surprise the incumbent ruler of the principality, Gheorghe Duca, along with his entourage.\(^{785}\) The captives, including Costin, were subsequently sent back to the Commonwealth, where Gheorghe Duca soon passed away.

Some scholars have suggested that the relationship between the king and Costin and his perception as the leader of ‘pro-Polish’ faction meant that the capture of the Gheorghe Duca was in fact the result of conspiracy between the Moldavian boyar and the Polish troops.\(^{786}\) However, as Lidia Vlasova rightly argues, this seems hardly probable.\(^{787}\) Rather, he was sent as a prisoner along with the deposed voievode to the private town of Crown Field Hetman Andrzej Potocki, and subsequently brought to the royal residence of Jaworów, where he met with Sobieski. According to Czesław Chowaniec, the boyar – who met Sobieski for the first time – was under impression to the extent that he soon sided with the monarch’s plans to impose his own dynasty in Moldavia and dedicated one of his historical works in Polish to the king.\(^{788}\) According to the scholar, John III also took the

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\(^{785}\) Vlasova, Moldavsko-polskie politicheskie sviazi, 29–30.

\(^{786}\) Spieralski, Awantury moldawskie, 198-199.

\(^{787}\) Vlasova, Moldavsko-polskie politicheskie sviazi, 26.

\(^{788}\) Czesław Chowaniec, Miron Costin en Pologne: contributions à l’année 1684-1685 (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1931), 3–4; Vlasova, Moldavsko-polskie politicheskie sviazi, 31–3.
liking in the boyar, since, following the audience, Gheorghe Duca was sent back under custody to L'viv, while Costin was granted relative freedom and moved to the royal castle at Daszawa.\textsuperscript{789}

However, a more plausible explanation than the personal appeal is the fact that Costin was in close relations to Marek Matczyński, who acted as the intermediary between the king and boyar. As one of the most influential individuals in Moldavia, Costin would make an important ally in the future attempts, especially since Ștefan Petriceicu – another Moldavian client of the king – failed to muster enough support among the boyars to remain in power and was soon forced to withdraw to the Commonwealth. In this situation, supporting the Moldavian Logofăt seemed like a more profitable option.\textsuperscript{790} Indeed, even if Petriceicu passed away only in 1693, by 1684 his return to the throne became a non-issue.

This hope seemed to be well founded, since on 25 July 1684 the boyars assembled in Žolkva (Polish: Żółkiew) issued a memorandum to the king, in which they drew a project of the future status of the principality. According to the proposal, the Ottoman suzerainty would be removed and instead Moldavia would join the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, while the boyars would be granted the same status as the ‘nobility of the Crown and Lithuania’, accepting the Polish king as its monarch.\textsuperscript{799}

It is not clear, who was the driving force behind this program. As Lidia Vlasova points out, by that time the Moldavian émigrés in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth consisted of three distinct groups.\textsuperscript{792} The first one, consisting of small boyars coming and going depending on the circumstances in the principality, did not play an important political role due to the small political influence of its members, coupled by their constant flux to and out of the Polish territory. The associates of Ștefan Petriceicu, who had arrived with the voievode after his defection to the Polish side during the battle of Hotin, formed the ‘old emigration’. At the beginning – according to Ilona Czamańska – they counted up to 1,000 individuals, but we can expect their numbers dwindle throughout the period of emigration.\textsuperscript{793} Finally, the third group included high officials of the principality, who were captured along with Gheorghe Duca in early 1684.

\textsuperscript{789} Chowaniec, \textit{Miron Costin en Pologne}, 3–4.
\textsuperscript{789} ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{790} Vlasova, \textit{Moldavsko-polskie politicheskie sviazì}, 37.
\textsuperscript{790} ibid., 17–9.
\textsuperscript{792} Czamańska, “Rumuńska imigracja polityczna,” 18.
As Czesław Chowaniec and Lidia Vlasova rightly argue, the memorandum does not seem to be of Petriceicu's doing, as it totally ignored the interests of the voievode – hardly a likely initiative of the Moldavian pretender.\(^{794}\) Thus, they ascribe the authorship of the petition to Miron Costin, who was clearly emerging at this point as the principal client of Sobieski. No doubt, formulating such a plan would further boost his position vis-à-vis the king.

Lidia Vlasova in her in-depth analysis of the act argues, that this arrangement did not necessarily mean abolition of the institutional identity of the principality and its relegation to one of the palatinates of the Crown. Rather, it was a project of the extension of the ‘composite monarchy’ of Poland-Lithuania, bringing the Moldavian boyars on par with the nobility of the Commonwealth. The reference to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in this respect is telling.

However, the reference to Lithuania is interesting also in the light of what is *missing* from the document, namely the patterns of land tenure. The relationship between the Crown and the Grand Duchy was far from smooth and the problem of land holding was one of the focal points of the conflict. While the Union of Lublin has declared that the Polish nobility could acquire estates in the Grand Duchy (and vice versa), already in 1588 the Third Lithuanian Statute reserved the land holding and office holding to the local nobility, ostentatiously failing to even mention the Union.\(^{795}\) There was a good for such a move: while the union act proclaimed parity of both groups, the balance of political and economic power clearly worked against Lithuanians.\(^{796}\)

In comparison with the Lithuanian nobility, the Moldavian boyars were relatively lightweights and could face the influx of Polish nobility and the slippage of land from their hands in favor of the newcomers. This is visible also in the case of the annexation plan during Zamoyski-Movilă cooperation, described in the previous section: in 1597 the matter of restricting landholding in the principality was one of the central issues raised by the Moldavian delegation to the Sejm.\(^{797}\) While the authors of the memorial of 1684 were ready to do away with the position of the voievode, they


\(^{795}\) Jakovenko, *Ukrains'ka šljaxta z kinceja XIV do seredyny XVII st.*, 50.

\(^{796}\) Augustyniak, “Specyfika patronatu magnackiego,” 103.

\(^{797}\) Cristian Bobicescu, “Între integrare și păstrarea autonomiei,” 233.
did not raise the issue of landholding, but the references to Lithuania, as well as to the preservation of the local laws and customs could conceal precisely this concern.

However, by December 1684 Miron Costin received the permission to return to Moldavia, apparently convincing the king with promises of loyalty and feeding him with the news about the threat that the extension of his stay in the Commonwealth would pose to his family. As evidence, he provided the king with the copy of the letter from his brother, Velicico, who had remained in Moldavia:

“[...] We are wondering that, being in a free and safe land, with people there not so prone to suspicion, you haven’t passed us any news about your fortunes and health. This brought us to think that you rejected your homeland Moldavia. After so much time without any response, the voievode himself decided to call you and assure you of his good affection towards you [...] and I am giving you my brotherly request. For the love of God, if you decided not to return to your homeland, please, change your mind and reject that thought, because you would bring death upon us and your children. I understand that His Majesty, of such a sound mind and great heart, and being the lord and patron of our family for such a long time, would keep you from coming [...]”

The letter clearly bears the stylistic and rhetoric characteristics of Miron Costin’s writing style, suggesting that he had edited it in order to fit his purpose. It seems that the main addressee of the letter was not Miron Costin, but rather John III himself. Apart from the enumeration of dangers that could befall on boyar’s family, the main point of the letter is the eulogy of the king and a clear declaration of the whole family’s loyalty to their patron. It seems that the strategy worked since Miron was soon let go to Moldavia, carrying with him secret letters to the voievode, Constantin Cantemir. Thus, we can see that by the end of 1684 Miron Costin came to play the crucial role in Sobieski’s scheme and seemed to take a favorable stance to the king’s plans.

Throughout the 1685, Miron Costin seemed to maintain his position as the principal agent of the Polish king in the principality, mediating between the voievode Constantin Cantemir and Sobieski. However, the moment of truth was to come the following year, when Sobieski set off his Moldavian campaign, which he had planned at least since early 1684. Mobilizing sizeable forces, the king entered the principality on 20 July, issuing proclamations encouraging the Moldavians to join his army. At the same time, he wrote to Miron and Velicico, requesting them to foment unrest among

798 Chowaniec, Miron Costin en Pologne, 9.
the soldiers of the voievode. By mid-August the Polish forces managed to enter the Moldavian capital, earlier abandoned by Constantin Cantemir, who withdrew with his court and treasury to the Ottoman territory. Entering Iași, Sobieski was allegedly met with enthusiasm by the local population and greeted by the delegation of boyars headed by metropolitan Dosoftei. However, both Costins were missing among the crowd; they had retreated along with the voievode.

Soon the situation of John III turned to worse; he encountered fierce resistance of Moldavian and Tatar troops; also, his hopes for Cantemir and the Wallachian voievode joining his army proved futile. The harsh terrain and weather conditions contributed to the growing exhaustion of the soldiers. The final act of this drama was the fire that broke out in the Moldavian capital and destroyed the army warehouses, forcing the king to take a humiliating retreat. The campaign, which took unprecedented amounts of money and men, failed to produce any effect, apart of the capture of few fortresses in northern part of the principality. For the king it was a true disappointment.

It is important to note that Miron Costin, purportedly a leader of one of the ‘pro-Polish’ faction in the principality, played his part in the failure. While Zdzisław Spieralski and Czesław Chowaniec argue that Costin was assisting the troops, in fact – as Lidia Vlasova – points out, there is no sign of any substantial help on the part of the boyar, who aligned himself with the voievode. While he had maintained communication with the king, he did not contribute in any way to the eventual success of the campaign. In the end, this ‘wait-and-see’ policy proved fatal to Sobieski’s plans.

In 1691 John III decided to undertake one more attempt to take control of Moldavia and put his son Jakub on the throne. However, this time the odds were clearly against him, since he managed to assemble only a small force which he led to the principality. The plan went apart, since the Cossacks that were supposed to attack the fortress of Soroca failed to come and John III was stuck in the northern Moldavia, trying to take local fortresses with little hope for a breakthrough. As the Venetian ambassador Alberti claimed, by October 1691 it was clear that no support would be forthcoming from the population and the king decided to pull out from Moldavia, which proved an enormous task due

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799 Vlasova, Moldavska-polskie politicheskie sviazii, 51; Spieralski, Awantury moldawskie, 202.
800 Vlasova, Moldavska-polskie politicheskie sviazii, 68.
to the weather conditions.\textsuperscript{832} The second Moldavian campaign of Sobieski was thus an even greater fiasco than the first one.

However, why was help not forthcoming? Zbigniew Spieralski interprets the events as a sign that Miron Costin and his faction have lost all their influence and thus could not provide substantial help.\textsuperscript{833} According to him, they were under constant surveillance and were unable to provide any significant support for the troops. This would be confirmed by the desperate sounding letter sent by Costin to Marek Matczyński, as well as the fact that just two months later Miron Costin and his brother Velicico were murdered on the orders of Constantin Cantemir.\textsuperscript{834}

However, the circumstances of the murder provide us with an interesting question. In none of the Moldavian sources, the cooperation with the Polish king is mentioned once in the context of Costin’s death. This and the lack of Sobieski’s reaction has led Lidia Vlasova to the conclusion, that the sense of danger conveyed in the letter to Matczyński was not genuine, but rather served to explain inaction during the campaign.\textsuperscript{835}

Unfortunately, we have very few letters regarding the last year of Costin’s life; however, what we can access are the historical works covering this period, usually written within a relatively short period after Miron’s death. As I have mentioned before it is quite confusing that none of these works refers to the political cooperation between Costin brothers and the Polish king. Instead, they point to a different configuration of power, this time within the Moldavian political arena.

The last quarter of the seventeenth century was dominated by the rivalry between two major factions forming around two most influential families: Costins on the one hand and Cupărești-Ruseteni on the other.\textsuperscript{836} This rivalry reached its peak during the reign of Constantin Cantemir, but for a long time these two factions maintained relative equilibrium in the proximity of the ruler.

Throughout the first period of Cantemir’s rule, one of his closest collaborators and in many respect the superior in relations with the voievode, was Gavriliță Costachi, who during the reign of

\textsuperscript{832} Lidia V. Vlasova, “Dva napravlenia vneshnei politiki Moldavii”, 336.
\textsuperscript{833} Spieralski, Awantury moldawskie, 223–4.
\textsuperscript{834} Lidia V. Vlasova, “Dva napravlenia vneshnei politiki Moldavii,” 336.
\textsuperscript{835} ibid., 337.
\textsuperscript{836} Cândea, O epoca de înnoiri în spiritul european, 297.
Constantin held the position of Grand Vornic. Along these lines, the anonymous continuator of Miron Costin painted a rather idyllic picture of the first years of the voievode's reign:

"[Constantin Cantemir] was good to everyone. His chosen boyar from among all others was Gavril Vornic and all his sons holding offices. Miron Logofăt came from Poland and was received with honors and his sons were given offices, while he received the post of the starostă of Putna, and he wanted to marry his daughter with the son of Miron."\(^{807}\)

However, this situation was not to last, especially as Costache, exercising much influence over the voievode, passed away in 1688.\(^{808}\) This brought the shift in the balance of power within the principality, with the growing position of the Visternic Iordache Ruset and the relative of the voievode, Lupu Bogdan. Thanks to the kinship existing between Bogdan and the voievode, the former enjoyed considerable and patronage possibilities. By 1689 he managed to replace Velicico Costin (Miron's brother) as the hatman, while Iordache Ruset gained control of Moldavian treasury.\(^{809}\)

This brought a major shift in the factional balance within the principality, with Rusets clearly getting the upper hand. Moreover, to add insult to injury, the voievode scrapped the idea of marrying off his daughter to Pătrășcu Costin.\(^{810}\) This created growing opposition of the Costins and their faction, which soon resulted in the family's tragedy. In December 1691 Velicico Costin met with the sons of Costachi in Băcani at the wedding of Ion Pălade. According to Ion Neculce:

"The sons of Gavriliță and many other boyars from Moldavia gathered in Băcani, south from Bârlad, at the wedding of Ion Pălade. Vornic Velicico was there as well, since he was Pălade's relative. At this reunion, they discussed and swore an oath between themselves that they will run away to Wallachia, to Brîncoveanu, to ask him to remove the voievode and to put on the throne Vornic Velicico."\(^{811}\)

However, one of the boyars present at the gathering, Ilie Țifescu, reported the discussions to Constantin Cantemir, who immediately ordered the participants to be arrested and brought to him. While some managed to escape to Wallachia, Velicico was brought to the voievode, who beheaded

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\(^{807}\) Giurescu, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei dela Istratia Dabija, 81.
\(^{808}\) Vlasova, Moldavsko-polskie politicheskie sviazi, 105.
\(^{809}\) Stoicescu, Dicționar al marilor dregători.
\(^{810}\) Ion Neculce, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei, 187.
\(^{811}\) ibid., 186.
him himself.\textsuperscript{812} Then he ordered to detain Miron, who was not present at Băcăni. In this, he was encouraged by Iordache Ruset:

"And the enemies of Miron logofăt told the voievode: 'Now, after you killed Velicico, send for his brother, Miron, to kill him as well. Maybe he is guilty, maybe not; do not let him get away, as he will be even more of an enemy of us all. [...] Thus, the tyrant sent Vataf/Macrei along with the soldiers, to [Miron's] house in Bărboși, and they took him to Roman and they cut his head there. When Macrei arrived to Bărboși [Miron]'s wife just died. And he knew nothing about the whole scheme of his brother or any other boyars, since he did not get around them."\textsuperscript{813}

Many scholars point out various discrepancies in the accounts of Miron Costin's end, with some doubting the very existence of the complot.\textsuperscript{814} While it goes beyond the subject of the study, it is nonetheless important to understand the end of Costin's life and its potential relationship between patronage of Marek Matczyński and John III Sobieski and Costin's execution.

However, contrary to the claims of Spieralski, there seem to be none. No source has attributed the crackdown on the Costins to their cooperation with the Polish patrons. Instead, the matter seems to stem rather from political conflict within the arena, the diminishing role of the Costins at Cantemir's court and the growing influence of those who wanted them dead. Thus, it seems justified to adopt the perspective that Lidia Vlasova presented: Costin did not give the king much in terms of political support in Moldavia, and his death had nothing to do with his Polish alliances.

Ruset faction is often described in scholarship as pro-Ottoman, while Costin's as pro-Polish, as is the case with the essay included in Virgil Cândea's volume on seventeenth-century Romania.\textsuperscript{815} However, providing such indirect connection would imply that the Polish-Ottoman rivalry was somehow involved in this conflict. However, there is surprisingly little evidence to back up such a claim.

Firstly, despite his alleged ‘pro-Polish’ stance, almost unanimously accepted in historiography, throughout his career Miron Costin did surprisingly little to validate this claim. In 1673 he refused to join Petriceicu and shift to the Polish camp. Subsequently, in 1684 he remained loyal to Gheorghe

\textsuperscript{812} ibid., 187.
\textsuperscript{813} ibid., 185.
\textsuperscript{814} Cândea, O epoca de innoiri în spiritul european, 297.
\textsuperscript{815} ibid.
Duca and shared his fate, when he was taken captive to the Commonwealth. Finally, during both expeditions to Moldavia in 1686 and 1691 he clearly adopted a wait-and-see strategy, without committing himself to any type of political activity.

On the other hand, calling the likes of Lupu Bogdan as pro-Ottoman similarly misses the point. Bogdan was a true political chameleon, shifting from one side of the spectrum to another. In 1684 he joined Ștefan Petriceicu, only to abandon him and defect to Constantin Cantemir. While we can understand his motives, it hardly fits under the ‘pro-Ottoman’ label. Somewhat ironically, the two leaders of the allegedly Turkish camp soon found themselves seeking refuge under Polish protection, fleeing from the newly appointed voievode Constantin Duca, their sworn enemy.

5.4. Why Did Moldavia Survive?

According to the chronicle of Ion Neculce, when the Ottomans were besieging the fortress of Kam'janec’ in 1672, the grand vizier asked Miron Costin:

“The vizier told [Costin] to say the truth: ‘Are you happy that the emperor managed to take Kam’janec’? And Miron responded that he’s afraid to tell the truth. The vizier smiled and started laughing and told him not to worry and to tell the truth. At this moment Miron told him: ‘We, Moldavians, are happy that the domain of the sultan grows in all directions, but we would prefer it to grow in some other direction.’”

As the evidence in this chapter has shown, the Moldavians could say the same about the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Moldavians, while cooperating with individuals from one of these arenas, were obstructing at least and resisting at most the attempts to unify them. While they profited from the cross-border patronage ties in operating within their primary arena, they were not interested in bringing down the barriers.

This begs the question of the traditional division drawn by historians between the ‘pro-Polish’ and ‘pro-Ottoman’ factions. If we applied such labels, Miron Costin would belong programmatically to the Polish party, while his adversaries would side with the Ottoman Empire. This distinction has been often complemented by nationalist lens of many historians, who tried to present the former as ‘freedom fighters’ for national independence and unity. Accordingly, the ones siding with the

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Ottomans were labelled as traitors of the ‘national cause’ and subject to vehement historical criticism.\textsuperscript{817}

However, this approach was criticized by the Soviet scholar, Lidia Vlasova. She argued that rather than freedom fighters, the socio-political elite of the principality was firstly and foremostly looking after its own interests.\textsuperscript{818} She pointed out that there was actually no ‘pro-Polish’ faction, but rather a ‘pro-Christian’ one pitched against the allies of the Ottomans in the principality, adding that the membership in both was highly flexible, with individuals shifting between one and another multiple times, depending on the circumstances.\textsuperscript{819} She argued the goals of both parties were basically the same, but with different political strategies adopted at different points in time.\textsuperscript{820}

According to Vlasova – who follows in this respect the Soviet economic historian, Pavel Sovetov – the social-economic goals of the grand boyars could be realized within two different institutional arrangements of the feudal system.\textsuperscript{821} As Sovetov argued, throughout the early modern period Moldavian revenue-extraction system oscillated between two different models:

\begin{enumerate}[a)]
\item \textit{Seigneurial-feudal}, which meant that the extraction of the surplus would be executed through the deployment of coercion by individual boyars within their demesne lands in the form of rents,
\item \textit{Fiscal-statal}, where the extraction would be conducted by means of state coercion in the form of taxes, in which the officials would have their share.
\end{enumerate}

According to Vlasova, the association with the Polish-Lithuanian model would strengthen the former tendency within the Moldavian feudal system, since it would extend Polish nobility’s immunities to the boyars. This would promote boyars who enjoyed vast landholdings at the detriment of the individuals with less extensive landed estates (such as Cantemir family). At the same time, the allegiance to the Ottoman Empire with the financial obligations attached to the tributary status would mean entrenchment of the fiscal-statal model.

\textsuperscript{817} On this topic in Romanian historiography, see Boia, \textit{History and myth in Romanian consciousness}, 155–7.
\textsuperscript{818} Vlasova, \textit{Moldavsko-polskie politicheskie sviazi}, 6, 14.
\textsuperscript{819} ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{820} ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{821} ibid., 12.
This argument is worth our attention, since it provides an attempt to link the political developments and orientations to the deeper structural background. However, at the same time, it poses a number of problems, which the Soviet-style Marxist analysis employed by Vlasova does not explain. Firstly, if the political orientations of the actors involved stemmed from their class position and their eventual profits or losses from introducing one model or another, why would the shifts between the camps occur so often? In addition, if the boyars holding extensive estates, like Miron Costin, had their interests vested with the development of seigneurial-feudal mode of extraction, associated with the Commonwealth, why would they steer away and adopt ‘wait-and-see’ policy?

As I argue, this necessitates a somewhat different approach, which spans beyond the Marxist lens adopted by Vlasova. As shown in the previous chapters, actors on each side of the border were interested in using patron-client networks in order to get access to the resources that would otherwise be beyond their reach. Depending on the ties to their patrons and clients, they would cooperate with them across the boundary of the arena. If the political configuration changed, they could realign their political allegiances, according to the new conditions within the network. For instance, while Lupu Bogdan and Iordache Ruset would fit into the model of ‘pro-Ottoman’ individuals during the reign of Constantin Cantemir, his death and the appointment of their personal enemy, Constantin Duca, would lead to their flight to Poland-Lithuania. Would this make them suddenly the leaders of the ‘pro-Polish’ orientation? Hardly. Thus, the first conclusion is that we should do away with the division into ‘pro-Polish’ and ‘pro-Ottoman’ parties in favor of patronage networks.

Secondly, the actors within the networks both pushing for and resisting incorporation of Moldavia did not operate according to the ‘state interest’ or geopolitical considerations, but had quite specific personal agendas. These goals differed not only depending on the factional allegiance, but also on the position of the actors within their own patronage network. This is best illustrated in the crisis of Jan Zamoyski’s faction. The success of the military interventions in 1595 and 1600 and the prospect of new resources at his disposal did not increase the cohesion of the network; on the contrary, it unearthed the diverging goals and ‘moral economies’ of redistribution within the faction. Szczęsny Herburt hoped for new appointments and donations in the principality; Ieremia Movilă wanted to
safeguard his domain and power as the voievode. This contradiction led to the struggle over redistribution of spoils, while Jan Zamoyski tried to keep his political power base intact.

For the Ottoman case, we do not have such a detailed account of intra-factional struggle over the division of spoils. However, the example of Jan Zamoyski – Ieremia Movilă faction can serve as a basis for a tentative hypothesis, why throughout the seventeenth century rumors (*sparsa voce*) circulated around Istanbul concerning the impending transformation of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia into *eyalets*. Rather than the reflections of actual plans, they could be 'rumblings from below' of those, who would like to tap the resources of the principalities themselves. This would mean that while the general arrangement of the tributary states was profitable enough, it was not equally remunerative for all actors, and some members of the cross-border patronage would prefer its restructuring and the redistribution of resources according to new criteria. This allowed the Moldavian boyars to cut their share, much along the lines of the argument formulated by Şevket Pamuk:

"In order to remain at the top, the central bureaucracy was thus willing to share the tax revenues with the provincial groups during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries until it was able to reassert itself in the nineteenth century."\(^{822}\)

While Pamuk had in mind the Muslim provincial elites, which were on the rise throughout the period, it is perfectly applicable to the Moldavian-Wallachian case as well.

Thirdly, utilizing cross-border patronage networks was one thing; integrating two political arenas was another. While many actors did not have any qualms concerning bringing Polish-Lithuanian magnates or Ottoman *kul* into the struggle for power in Moldavia, they seem to have dissociated themselves from any attempts at annexation of the principality. Even if they paid lip service to the idea, as was in the case of Ieremia Movilă or Miron Costin, they were clearly obstructing any attempts to bring this idea to life. The reason for this was quite clear: the resources that the Moldavian boyars could bring into their primary arena through cross-border patronage could easily outbid their rivals; however, should the principality be annexed, they would enter the competition with real heavyweights, to whom they would be no match. Thus, while Vlasova seems to make an

\(^{822}\) Şevket Pamuk, “The evolution of fiscal institutions,” 323.
interesting argument concerning the relationship between the mode of surplus extraction and political orientation, it seems that the point is the opposite of what she claimed. While cross-border networks allowed the boyars to draw on resources of Polish magnates, the union with Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would not strengthen the position of the landed elite. On the contrary, once the boundary dividing the two arenas was torn down, the more powerful and wealthier Polish nobility would sweep the boyars away. The Lithuanian middle gentry and its anxiety about the influx of new rivals from the Crown serves as a good analogy in this respect.

Finally, the analysis of the attempts to annex Moldavia and Wallachia proves the point about different economic resources being sought by the Ottoman officials and the Polish-Lithuanian nobility. Both in 1590s-1600s and in 1680s-1690s, the Polish annexation attempt were connected to the attempts at land redistribution in the principality, which would fit the pattern of a relatively non-monetized economy of southeastern provinces of the Commonwealth. In 1600s, Herburt was postulating the redistribution of land following the incorporation of the principalities; during the Holy League War conflicts between the boyars and the Poles broke out concerning the allotment of lands in northern Moldavia. On the other hand, the Ottoman attempt to do away with Moldavian and Wallachian autonomy did not pursue the redistribution of land; rather than creating timars, the principalities were to become salyaneli provinces, an indication of the growing monetization of Ottoman economy and the shift from rents in kind towards cash revenue. As I will show in the following section, these characteristics had an important bearing on the political outcomes of the seventeenth century in the region.
Chapter 6. Choosing Ottomans

As I have argued in the previous chapter, cross-border ties and factional conflicts contributed to the failure of both the Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman attempts to annex Moldavia and Wallachia. However, these protracted conflicts took their toll on the Commonwealth and the Porte, diminishing their role in the region. In the former case, this decline was more apparent, since by 1699 it ceased to play an active role in the Danubian principalities. Rather than Warsaw, the courts in Saint Petersburg and Vienna became the points of reference for those disgruntled with Ottoman domination.

The Ottoman Empire, meanwhile, emerged victorious from the struggle over Moldavia and Wallachia, although its prestige suffered greatly from the defeat in the Holy League War. Despite the mounting military and political pressure on its European borders, threatened by the Habsburgs and, most importantly, the Russian Empire, the Porte was able to retain and even enhance its hegemony in the Lower Danube region. At the same time, Moldavia and Wallachia became increasingly integrated into the imperial fabric of the 'well-protected domains,' until Russian expansion at the end of the eighteenth century reversed this trend.

What contributed to the Ottoman success in the seventeenth-century struggle for Moldavia and Wallachia? According to most scholars addressing the topic, the main reason for this outcome was the military superiority of the Porte and the abysmal performance of Polish-Lithuanian troops during the later stages of the Holy League War, when they failed to hold their positions in Moldavia or even recapture the Podolian fortress of Kamjanec'. Following the peace of Karlowitz, which confirmed Ottoman suzerainty in Moldavia and Wallachia, the Porte moved to increase its control of the principalities, establishing so-called 'Phanariot system,' whereby the voievodes were appointed from a narrow circle of Istanbul-based Greek Orthodox families, deemed more trustworthy than local elites.

At the same time, scholars have traditionally depicted the eighteenth century as a period of institutional decline and failure of statebuilding attempts in Poland-Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire, and – to a certain extent – Moldavia. In terms of regional balance of power, the Commonwealth and the Sublime Porte failed to keep pace with their rivals: the Habsburgs, Prussia and the Russian Empire, in terms of bureaucratic expansion and military buildup. Internally, the argument goes,
Poland-Lithuania and the Ottomans were unable to check the increasing paralysis of central institutions and further devolution of power.

The history of the Commonwealth in the eighteenth century seems like the most obvious case of state failure, with the state unable to establish strong fiscal and political institutions. The army, fixed in 1717 at 24,000 troops, was unable to counter the challenge posed by the Commonwealth’s neighbors. The paralysis of the Sejm increased, with only a handful of proceedings reaching conclusions. Local dietines took over the matters of governance, which solidified the dispersal of political power. At the same time, powerful magnates dominated these local assemblies through their extended patronage networks. By the first half of the eighteenth century, the Polish-Lithuanian state was all but moribund. While the reforms took place during the reign of Stanislaus Augustus Poniatowski (r. 1764-1795), the influence of the foreign courts was already too strong to conduct necessary reforms and preserve the Commonwealth intact. The struggle between reformist and conservative camps continued, resulting in the Partitions (1772, 1793, and 1795) and the disappearance of this once powerful polity from the map.

While the relative decline of the Ottoman Empire was not as spectacular as that of Poland-Lithuania, older historiography habitually described the eighteenth century as a nadir of imperial power. Military reversals, devolution of power and the growing autonomy of the provinces – all these phenomena seemed to support this thesis of decline. No longer seen as a threat to Europe, the Ottomans of the eighteenth century became an exotic neighbor and an object of Orientalist fascination rather than the awe-inspiring empire they once had been.

In Romanian historiography, the depiction of eighteenth century is more nuanced, but nonetheless ambiguous. On the one hand, this period brought expansion of administrative capacity, as well as profound cultural and social changes associated with Enlightenment and the integration into European world-economy. At the same time, in the political sphere, the Phanariots period is often painted in the darkest of colors, as the age of foreign rule by Ottoman lackeys, imposed forcefully by the Porte, against the wishes of the population and the local elite. Thus, the increasing integration into the Ottoman imperial system and the inability of principalities to throw off the ‘Turkish yoke’ has been generally interpreted as the major failure of the eighteenth century.
On the surface, these developments of the eighteenth century have little to do with cross-border patronage. However, as I will argue in this chapter, both the outcome of Polish-Ottoman struggle over Moldavia and the internal dynamics within respective political arenas had their roots in actors’ experiences with cross-border networks. Their proliferation as a problem-solving mechanism had the unintended consequence of disinclining the elite to become involved in state-enhancing enterprises, contributing to the weakness of formal institutions in respective polities. In effect, the success of cross-border patronage networks contributed not only to institutional underdevelopment of the state, but also profoundly shaped the political culture of respective arenas.

However, the impact of seventeenth-century cross-border interactions were by no means restricted to internal politics, but also contributed to geopolitical transformations. The Ottomans emerged victorious from the protracted struggle over the Danubian principalities. Arguably, financial and military resources that the enfeebled Commonwealth could muster were inferior to those of the Porte, and subsequent lackluster performance of the Polish troops during the Holy League War tilted the balance in favor of the Ottomans. However, this does not mean that the Commonwealth’s efforts were doomed from the start. Instead, as I have shown in previous chapters, Polish-Lithuanian patrons failed to mobilize their clients in the principality, and even the most ‘pro-Polish’ boyars proved reluctant to provide support for King John III and his army. In turn, many chose to support Ottoman troops in its struggle against invaders. Following the conclusion of the treaty of Karlowitz, cross-border patronage between Polish magnates and Moldavian boyars all but ceased, while the between the latter and the Ottoman officials reached unprecedented intensity.

This observation forces us to reconsider the relationship between the Ottoman and Moldavian elites at the break of the eighteenth century, including the origins of so-called ‘Phanariot system.’ In contrast to the established historiographical narrative and the ‘Turkish yoke’ paradigm, I argue that the Phanariot rule in the eighteenth century was not a heavy-handed security measure taken by the Porte and imposed on the principalities, but rather the result of a compromise between central and peripheral elites. In short, Moldavians were not coerced to accept Phanariot rule, but rather chose to associate themselves with the Porte after discarding Polish-Lithuanian magnates as viable patrons. Thus, one of the causes for the Commonwealth’s ultimate defeat was the fact that Moldavian-Ottoman networks proved more reliable and remunerative.
The model of ‘familial state’ developed by Julia Adams informs the present analysis. According to the author, in the early modern polities one can identify a complex nexus of elite familial interests and state institutions:

"First, gendered familial criteria were constitutive of political authority [...]
Second, the important political officers and privileges were distributed to men on the basis of their family ties and position. [...] [F]amily representation in the state extended both horizontally [...] and over time [...]"\(^{823}\)

While none of the elites discussed here could match the coherence of the Dutch *regent* families, Adams’ conclusions force us to re-examine our understanding of the political goals pursued by the elites in particular arenas, the role of political culture and the place of cross-border patronage in their political strategies. In order to do this, I examine both internal developments and the changing patterns of cross-border networks, trying to answer three interrelated questions. In the first section, I analyze the shift of Moldavian boyars away from cooperation with Polish-Lithuanian nobility. Subsequently, I move towards the underlying causes for the success of Moldavian-Ottoman patronage, which culminated in the form of Phanariot rule. Finally, I shift my attention to the impact cross-border networks had on political institutions and culture of respective arenas.

### 6.1. The Failure of Polish-Moldavian Patronage

As I have mentioned above, the Polish-Lithuanian efforts to take control of Moldavia in the course of the Holy League War resulted in an utter failure. Numerous factors contributed to the lackluster performance of the Commonwealth’s military, including factional squabbles, lack of resources and even bad luck. However, as I have pointed out in the previous chapter, a decisive factor was the reluctance of the Moldavian boyars to side with John III. While there were some exceptions, most members of ‘pro-Christian’ paid only lip service to the king’s calls, Miron Costin being prime example in this respect. This begs the question of effectiveness of Polish-Moldavian cross-border patronage at the end of the seventeenth century in providing resources for both Moldavian boyars and their Polish-Lithuanian patrons.

There are many indications suggesting that by the end of the seventeenth century, the reliability of the patronage ties decreased, and Polish-Lithuanian magnates – some exceptions notwithstanding

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failed to provide assistance to their Moldavian partners. To some extent, this can be explained by political circumstances: in the second half of the seventeenth century, the Commonwealth was engaged in a series of debilitating conflicts. In 1648, the Xmel’nyc’kyj uprising broke out, plunging southeastern provinces of the Commonwealth into turmoil, and wars with Sweden and Russia, drawing the attention of magnates away from the Danubian principalities. Finally, the catastrophic defeat in the 1672-1676 war against the Porte resulted in territorial losses, further reducing opportunities to form viable patronage ties. This state of continuous peril took a toll on potential Polish patrons, preoccupied with protecting their position in the Commonwealth rather than expanding their political influence beyond its borders.

However, these reversals did not automatically lead to the disappearance of Moldavian-Polish patronage. In the 1670s and 1680s, Moldavian boyars clearly considered the king and Ukrainian magnates as attractive patrons, a fact corroborated by subsequent waves of Moldavian political emigration, led by Ștefan Petriceicu and Miron Costin. By securing patronage of the king and other power-holders, these émigrés hoped to regain their position and property in the principality. However, as the examples of Petriceicu and Grigore Hăbășescu show, these hopes never materialized, and the boyars remained in the Commonwealth until their deaths. While Miron Costin was able to return to his Moldavian estates, he managed to do so by reaching an agreement with Voievode Constantin Cantemir rather than by relying on John III's patronage. At the same time, his close ties with the monarch did not save him from execution in December 1691. While Constantin Turcul was able to obtain the appointment as starosta of Cernăuți, his success was only temporary. In short, Polish-Lithuanian patrons were increasingly failing to provide resources the boyars were hoping to obtain.

This decreasing efficiency of Polish-Lithuanian patrons included the procurement of resources embedded in the formal institutions of the Commonwealth. *Indigenatus* privileges are illustrative in this respect. As I have mentioned in Chapter 2, the inclusion into the ranks of Polish-Lithuanian noble estate constituted an important resource for the Moldavian boyars, providing them with a safety net in case of exile from the principality. However, *indigenatus* privileges were subject to the decision of *Sejm*, and this institution was just becoming moribund. As the principle of the *liberum*

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veto took root, the Sejms increasingly failed to reach any conclusions, which meant that securing *indigenatus* was increasingly difficult, even with the patron’s support. Thus, it is clear that the institutional crisis of the Commonwealth took its toll on cross-border patronage.

The structure of Polish-Lithuanian economy also contributed to the decreasing attractiveness of cross-border patronage in comparison with parallel Ottoman-Moldavian networks. As I have argued in Chapter 3.2, while the boyars continued to frown upon the outflow of cash from the principality to the Porte, the ‘shadow iltizam’ made room for accommodating their interests and allowed them to partake in the division of spoils. This was not the case in less monetarized economic system of the Commonwealth. At the same time, the demand for foodstuffs in the Ottoman market offered prospects of considerable financial gain for Moldavian landholders, while the economic crisis in the western markets diminished the profitability of cattle exports to Central Europe in the second half of the seventeenth century. The sources on the circulation of currency similarly suggest a diminishing role of Polish-Lithuanian trade in Moldavia. According to Vladimir Shlapinskij, while during the reign of Movila dynasty Polish coins had constituted the bulk of currency circulating in the principality, their share fell to mere 20 per cent in the second half of the century. While to some extent this decrease was offset by the inflow of Dutch lion dollars from the Commonwealth, the evidence nonetheless suggests a growing rift between the Polish-Lithuanian and Moldavian economies.

While economic changes and institutional challenges reduced the returns of cross-border patronage ties, cultural and confessional dynamics increasingly drew the nobles and boyars apart. As confessional sensitivities grew in importance, interconfessional marriage became a contested matter. Whereas Movila’s marital alliances with Catholic magnates, Stefan Potocki and Maksymilian Przerębski at the beginning of the seventeenth century had been uncontroversial, the 1645 union between Maria Lupu, Vasile Lupu’s daughter, and the Calvinist Prince Janusz Radziwill gave rise to considerable controversy, especially in Moldavia. According to Miron Costin, even the main supporters of the voievode vehemently opposed the marriage on religious grounds:

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“In year 7153 [1645] marriage was concluded between the eldest daughter of Vasile, Maria, and prince Radziwiłł, a man from a great lineage, descending from the princes of Lithuania. However, in his heart and mind he adhered to the Calvinist faith, which had originated from a metropolitan of Flanders, who abandoned his subordination to Rome and rejected the canons of the holy councils, so full of Godly miracles. [...] It is unclear how Vasile could suffer such a thing. The matter was brought repeatedly to the princely council, and some boyars – including Toma Vornic and Iordache [Cantacuzino] Visternic, the brightest minds of the country – tried to prevent [the marriage] from happening.\(^{827}\)

Having received education in the Jesuit college of Bar, Miron Costin was undoubtedly biased against Calvinists and his account clearly reflects this mindset. However, he was not the only one to express reservations regarding the marriage. A Greek Orthodox nobleman, Joachim Jerlicz, had his own doubts regarding the union, although his cause of concern was different:

“That year Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, the heir to Birże and Dubinki and the Lithuanian Field Hetman, married Marina, the daughter of Voievode Vasile Lupu of Moldavia. The wedding took place in Iași, officiated by the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Piotr Mohyla. While the marriage was celebrated with a great pomp, it did not conform to the Polish customs.”\(^{828}\)

Jerlicz’s reservations indicate a shift in mentalities and changing patterns of behavior, if we keep in mind that both Myxajlo Vyšnevec’kyj and Samijlo Korec’kyj had married their wives in Iași without raising any controversy. Comparison of Costin and Jerlicz’s accounts also brings to light increasingly differing world views of the Greek Orthodox elites in Moldavia and Poland-Lithuania, with the latter having no reservations against the Calvinists. Indeed, for Joachim Jerlicz and Petru Movilă, Protestants were allies in the struggle against the ascendancy of the Catholic Church rather than enemies in the sphere of doctrine, the sentiment clearly alien to the boyars opposing the marriage. In religious terms, Polish-Lithuanian nobility and Moldavian boyars were drifting apart, as Counterreformation tendencies contributed to the increased pace of conversion among the Orthodox nobility.\(^{829}\)

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This corresponded with the integration of the Ukrainian elite into the central political arena of the Commonwealth and its political and economic expansion to the west. As I have pointed out, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the political life of the southeastern palatinates had been largely self-contained, and local magnates only gradually ventured into the central political arena. However, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, this process was brought to conclusion. As the prosopographical study by Stefan Ciara has shown, Ukrainian lineages increasingly took over the offices in Little Poland in the second half of the seventeenth century. This change of priorities entailed that the magnates diverted resources away from Moldavian affairs and deployed them in the central regions of the Crown, which explains their growing reluctance to commit to Moldavian and Wallachian affairs.

With state institutions of the Commonwealth crippled and paralyzed, the process of territorialization occurred, albeit on the level of magnate estates rather than that of the Commonwealth as a whole. As Mariusz Kowalski pointed out, the nobility’s privileges accorded them sovereign rule in their landholdings in all but name. With their judicial privileges and control of serf labor, the extensive latifundia became de facto statelets, exacerbating the difficulties of coordination and further contributing to the process of the devolution of power.

While Moldavian-Polish ties declined, the mindset and political culture they had contributed to continued. However, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Polish-Lithuanian magnates’ position shifted from patrons to clients serving foreign courts. This tendency included the top echelon of the Commonwealth’s political elite, such as Jabłonowski, Czartoryski or Sapieha, enlisting assistance from abroad in their factional conflicts. Civil war that erupted in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1700-1703, where all-powerful Sapieha family was challenged by the coalition of nobility and other magnate factions, provides us with an instructive example. As Gintautas Sliesorius pointed out, the success of the opposition was possible due to the patronage of the Russian court, while the Sapiehas squandered their political capital by trying to juggle their allegiances between Vienna, Berlin, Stockholm and Versailles. Thus, the cross-border patronage

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830 Stefan Ciara, Senatorowie i dygnitarze koronni w drugiej połowie XVII wieku (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1990), 57.
831 Kowalski, Księstwa Rzeczpospolitej, 120-123.
remained lock, stock and barrel of the Polish-Lithuanian political practice, the only difference being the change of alliance configurations.

In his article on the possibility of historical comparison between Poland-Lithuania and other polities of early modern Europe, Antoni Mączak provocatively depicted the Commonwealth as a paradoxical ‘precocious nation-state’\textsuperscript{833} According to him, the accumulation of privileges and political monopoly of the nobility contributed to the emergence of its identity as the ‘political nation’ of Poland-Lithuania. However, with their liberties entrenched, the control of land and serf labor secured and political monopoly reinforced by privileges, nobles had little interest in bargaining with the central authority or overhauling state institutions. As Mariusz Kowalski pointed out, in early modern Poland-Lithuania, state formation and institutional expansion occurred on the level of particular latifundia rather than that of the Commonwealth as a whole.\textsuperscript{834}

This is not to say that the nobility lacked any sense of unity. On the contrary, the sentiment of belonging to the imagined community of the Polish-Lithuanian political nation constituted the cornerstone of the nobles’ identity. However, the parallel fragmentation of territory and devolution of power meant that the nobles did not see identity space and decision space as coterminous, thus subverting the concept of a territorial state.\textsuperscript{835} Thus, the sense of being a Polish-Lithuanian noble citizen did not preclude turning to the world beyond the pale and establishing cross-border patronage ties. In this sense, the Commonwealth was more of a community than a state, which allowed individual noblemen and they could reach beyond the boundaries of the arena in order to enhance position of their lineages.

In many respects, this development constituted the legacy of seventeenth-century experiences with cross-border patronage. While relatively small in volume, Polish-Moldavian networks of the seventeenth century also contributed to this outcome and involved a number of the most powerful lineages in the Commonwealth, providing them with resources would have remained unavailable to them otherwise. As Ukrainian magnates subsequently dominated political life of the Commonwealth, they brought with them political practices and family strategies that had been

\textsuperscript{833} Mączak, “Jedyna i nieporównywalna?,” 126.
\textsuperscript{834} Kowalski, Księstwa Rzeczpospolitej, 123–4.
forged in the course of their cross-border ventures. The Zamoyskis remained among the wealthiest lineages of the Crown, while the Potockis managed to dominate the office of the Hetman in the second half of the seventeenth century. In turn, Jan Sobieski and Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki (Vyšnevec'kyj) ascended the Polish throne. If we keep in mind that these families had traditionally acted as patrons for Moldavian boyars, we can understand how cross-border patronage networks contributed to the shaping of political culture and families strategies in the Commonwealth, at the same time subverting the concept of the state territory as a decision space.

In comparison, the Ottoman patronage over Moldavian boyars proved more successful, contributing to the reinforcement of the Porte's hegemony over the principality. However, while these ties developed in a different manner, they also brought about a combination of political repertoires and identity shifts alternative to the established model of the state formation.

6.2. The Phanariot Connection

The Phanariot period, initiated with the appointment of Nicolae Mavrocordat (Greek: Mavrokordatos) to the throne of Moldavia in 1711, has suffered from a black legend since the beginning of Romanian historiography since its inception as an academic discipline. For the historians of the ‘1848 generation’ (pașoptiști), deeply involved in the triple political project of nation building, the unification of Moldavia and Wallachia and throwing off the Ottoman suzerainty, the Phanariots embodied everything that the revolutionaries struggled against. According to Lucian Boia:

"After 1821, and especially on the eve of the revolution of 1848, a virulent and almost obsessive anti-Greek attitude crystallized, which was to be manifest for a number of decades and which can only partially be explained by the real circumstances of the Phanariot period and the revolutionary episode of 1821. The Greeks symbolized the East and several centuries of Oriental culture, which had to be given up now in favor of the benign influence of the West, or, for others, the “Romanian specific”. Bălcescu set the tone in his article “The Romanians and the Phanariots”, in which he underlined the “sorry state” to which the latter had brought the country."

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* Boia, History and myth in Romanian consciousness, 156.
This perception of the Phanariot period as the nadir in Romanian history became an orthodoxy under Ceauşescu regime, which pursued nationalist line in historiography.\textsuperscript{837} This contributed to the pervasiveness of the Phanariot ‘black legend,’ with the voievodes described as ‘Turkish agents,’ serving the interests of the Porte with little regard for the local population.\textsuperscript{838}

According to this dominant paradigm, by the end of the seventeenth century the Porte had grown increasingly suspicious of the Moldavian and Wallachian voievodes, considering them unreliable and prone to defect to the enemies of the empire. The defection of the voievode Dimitrie Cantemir of Moldavia to Peter the Great during the 1711 Russian-Ottoman War finally undermined the Porte’s trust in local lineages and convinced the official of the need to strengthen control over the principalities.\textsuperscript{839} In response, the narrative goes, the Ottomans started to appoint the voievodes from among a restricted circle of Istanbul-based Greek Orthodox elites (‘Phanariots’), whom they considered more loyal to the Porte. The system thus formed, according to Andrei Pippidi and Nicolae Tanaşoca, included four basic elements:

1) voievodes appointed by the Porte rather than elected by the local elite,
2) administration of the principality by bureaucrats of Greek extraction,
3) increasing economic exploitation of the principalities,
4) domination of Greek culture, with strong Oriental component.\textsuperscript{840}

At the first glance, these elements seem self-evident and uncontroversial. However, recent years have witnessed a changing attitude towards the Phanariot rule, reviving the interest in the distinctive features of the period. This renewed attention led to a general deconstruction of the basic tenets of the established paradigm, leading to heated debates regarding periodization, scope and the very nature of the Phanariot rule, with an increasing number of scholars dismantling the notion of the ‘system’ and arguing in favor of continuity with earlier developments.\textsuperscript{841} According to this new

\textsuperscript{837} Murgescu, România și Europa, 29.
\textsuperscript{839} Dumitrache, “Instituțiile centrale ale Principatelor Române,” 295; Subtelny, Domination of Eastern Europe, 66.
\textsuperscript{841} Pippidi, “Phanar, phanariotes, phanariotisme,” 236.
current in historiography, the structure of eighteenth-century Moldavian-Ottoman relations was a product of piecemeal process rather than an Ottoman fiat, with precedents dating back at least to mid-seventeenth century. In order to salvage the concept, some scholars have introduced the notion of a ‘pre-Phanariot’ period starting in 1659. At the same time, these revisions also led to a reassessment – albeit a modest one – of the local response to the Phanariot rule. As proponents of this approach argue, local boyars saw their new rulers as a ‘second-best’ option, clearly preferable to the dissolution of the principalities.

In the field of Ottoman studies, we have witnessed recently a resurgence of studies on the Phanariot phenomenon, which try to contextualize histories of non-Muslim communities within the wider framework of the Ottoman history. The topic of non-Muslim elites has also drawn attention of the authors focusing on the transformations of the Ottoman polity in the early modern period. However, a new master narrative of the Phanariot regime has yet to materialize, tying together disparate strands of Ottomanist and Romanian historiography.

In this section, my aim will be to reconsider the ‘preliminaries’ to the Phanariot period, placing them at the intersection of Romanian and Ottomanist historiography. Unlike the former, I will approach the topic within the larger context of transformation the Ottoman Empire was undergoing in this period; in contrast to the latter, I focus not on the central imperial arena, but rather on the role of Phanariots in center/periphery relations. As I argue, the Phanariot rule was the result of the process of gradual Außenverflechtung between the Danubian principalities and the Ottoman political arena, which paralleled similar processes throughout the empire.

When approaching history of the Phanariots, as Christine Philliou pointed out, one of the main difficulties has been their peculiar position in between Ottoman and national narratives:

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843 ibid., 31.
“[P]hanariots were engaged in a paradoxical imperial enterprise from the late seventeenth century until 1821. They were a composite Orthodox Christian elite that grew out of the social and political fabric of Ottoman governance. Their rise to power flew in the face of religious dogma and political ideology underpinning Ottoman governance, which forbade Christians a formal share in Ottoman sovereignty.”

This in-betweenness resulted in the relative lack of scholarly interest for many decades. On the one hand, as Christian, they remained beyond the purview of mainstream Ottoman historiography; on the other, as members of the Ottoman elite they were excluded from national narratives. This state of affairs changed only recently, as both traditions of scholarship moved beyond traditional narratives and embraced new approaches to their respective topics. In his model of the ‘Second Ottoman Empire,’ Baki Tezcan has argued that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the markers of difference in Ottoman society were redrawn, increasingly converging on religious allegiances. By the eighteenth century, the ‘Second Ottoman Empire’ was dominated by the Muslim political nation and non-Muslims (Christians and Jews) found themselves relegated to inferior positions. Thus, according to Baki Tezcan, Phanariots were a vestige of a bygone age, who managed to cling to their niche within the Ottoman system of governance.

While Tezcan’s argument that the Phanariots managed to carve out their own sphere of political activity certainly holds true, labelling them as a relic does not. In fact, it is only in the second half of the seventeenth century that such individuals like Panagiotis Nikoussios and Aleksandros Mavrokordatos rose to prominence, and their ascendance clearly constituted a part of the wider transformations of the ‘Second Ottoman Empire.’

In turn, the changes in the composition of Moldavian and Wallachian suggest that new officials of Greek origin did not push out local lineages. In fact, as the prosopographical survey conducted by Paul Cernovodeanu suggests, 80 per cent of the highest offices in the principalities remained in the hands of local boyars, indicating that the top echelons of Moldavian and Wallachian society adapted well to the new conditions. However, this came at the expense of the ‘middling sort’ and petty

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849 Cernovodeanu, “Mobility and traditionalism,” 253.
boyars who found themselves pushed out of offices by a coalition of grand boyars and newcomers from the Ottoman Empire. This state of affairs was effectively recognized in 1740-1741, when a new social category – the mazili – was established, setting them apart from the boyars. Unsurprisingly, this group constituted the core of the opposition against the Phanariot rule. This evidence suggests that the local elite did not necessarily oppose the Phanariot rule, which belies the argument that the rulers were only Ottoman governors appointed without taking into consideration local interests. This again brings us to the question concerning the role of the Phanariots in center/periphery relations. In order to answer it, we should first examine their ascendancy in the central political arena of the Ottoman Empire.

The term ‘Phanariot’ originated from the Fanar district in Istanbul, where the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate has been located since the sixteenth century. As the position of the patriarch was becoming increasingly associated with the Church iltizam, it attracted the lay elite of the Greek Orthodox community, seeking to profit from the economic opportunities the Patriarchate offered. Having established their control over economic resources, the members of this circle subsequently converted them into social and cultural capital, slowly entering the field of Ottoman governance. The most important in this respect was the position of the dragoman of the Porte, which served as a springboard, allowing Phanariot families to extend their reach and build a wide-ranging power networks. As Christine Philliou pointed out, by the eighteenth century, a system crystallized around five major nodes controlled by the members of this milieu:

1) the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul,
2) the post of Grand Dragoman,
3) the Dragomanate of the fleet,
4) the Aegean islands
5) the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.

However, it is important to note that this network of institutions and political sites never took a formal shape, but rather emerged organically from the expansion of power and influence of the

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851 Papademetriou, Render unto the Sultan, 128.
Phanariot circle. The same applies for the community itself, which operated along the lines of family and extended household.\footnote{Philliou, Biography of an empire, 7.} Thus, rather than a legally defined social group, the Phanariots constituted a relatively restricted of families, which managed to secure their niche within the Ottoman system of governance. While the positions held by the members of this group required financial and linguistic expertise, recruitment and schooling also reflected this informal character, relying on kinship, patronage and apprenticeship rather than formal institutions. At the same time, these patterns contributed to the emergence of a distinct elite culture characterizing the Phanariots, including mastery of Ottoman Turkish, Latin and Greek.

This reliance on social networks meant that the community remained relatively restricted in size. Between 1711 and 1774, incumbency in Moldavia and Wallachia changed on forty occasions, but only 15 individuals belonging to five families (Mavrokordatos, Ghica, Kallimaki, Racoviţă, Ruset) participating in the rotation. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774 brought new families to the roster, but the number of the lineages was similarly restricted. Thus, Phanariot regime constituted a family business rather than a formal political system. This familial character found in expression in 1819, when Sultan Mahmud II prepared a document regulating appointments to the positions held by the Phanariots. The Dynasty of Four Regulation, as it is known, bestowed quasi-proprietary control of the offices upon Hanedan-t Erba’a, the Four Families. From then on, members of the Kallimaki lineage were to hold the Moldavian throne, while the Suţu – Wallachia. In a similar manner, the Muruzis and Hançerlis would fill the posts of dragomans.\footnote{ibid., 57.}

Around this core of the Phanariot community, other lineages converged, with cultural style of the elite constituting one of its defining features. As Victor Roudometof pointed out, this entailed mastery of Greek, which increasingly served as a mark of the Greek Orthodox elite throughout the Ottoman domains. According to the scholar, this contributed to a distinctly Greek character of the Southeastern European Enlightenment, even if it was immersed in Orthodox universalism.\footnote{Roudometof, “From Rum Millet to Greek Nation,” 20–1.} Since the membership in this milieu was not a matter of nationality, but rather of the cultural style and
family ties, the Phanariot variant of high culture proved attractive to the Christian elites around the empire.\textsuperscript{856}

This also contributed to the major cultural shift in the Danubian principalities. In his superb book on the emergence of Romanian literary language, P.P. Panaitescu argued that the replacement of Romanian-Slavonic occurred at the beginning of the seventeenth century, as a product of changing social and economic conditions. According to the author, at the beginning of the seventeenth century the expansion of market economy provided the boyars with new opportunities and enhanced their position vis-à-vis the voievode.\textsuperscript{857} This was important because it created a rupture in pre-existing cultural patterns, shifting the \textit{loci} of literary production towards groups unfamiliar with Slavonic, who in turn took a more pragmatic and utilitarian approach towards literacy and the vernacular.

Panaitescu concludes his analysis in the seventeenth century, at the moment of the ascendancy of Romanian as the language of culture. However, if we follow his argument, but extend the chronological scope into the eighteenth century, we find another shift in the cultural idiom, characterized by a shift to Greek. At the same time, as Lia Chisacof pointed out, in the eighteenth century Ottoman-Romanian dictionaries began to appear in large number, which indicates a growing demand for such reference works.\textsuperscript{858} If we expand Panaitescu’s argument to encompass this cultural shift, it becomes clear that Romanian as the literary language became insufficient for the needs of the Moldavian and Wallachian elite in the eighteenth century, as their cultural and social space expanded and converged with that of the Ottoman territories.

In his study of Southeastern European historiography under Ottoman rule, Konrad Petrovszky proposed the concept of ‘Ottoman-Orthodox Communication Space’ (\textit{osmanisch-orthodoxes Kommunikationsraum}).\textsuperscript{859} According to the Austrian historian, throughout the early modern period, the Ottoman practices of governance, as well as trade and social mobility, brought non-Orthodox communities in contact with each other and contributed to the emergence of a shared identity and

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\textsuperscript{856} ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{857} Panaitescu, \textit{Începuturile și biruința scrisului în limba română}, 65. \\
\textsuperscript{858} Lia Brad Chisacof, ‘Turkish: Known or Unknown during the Ottoman Rule,’ paper presented at the Fourth International Balkan Annual Conference (IBAC), at the University of Bucharest, 15\textsuperscript{th}-18\textsuperscript{th} September 2014. \\
\end{footnotesize}
cultural space. In the Danubian principalities, this expansion of the geographical and mental horizons found its reflection in historiography, with new, more encompassing works beginning to appear, such as ‘parallel chronicles’ of Moldavia and Wallachia, or histories of the Ottoman Empire itself.

Thus, we can argue that rather than being just Ottoman lackeys, the Phanariots provided a crucial link between the imperial center and the Danubian principalities. While their influence had a strong cultural component, the underlying principle was social capital concentrating within a handful of Greek Orthodox families, straddling the center/periphery division between the Danubian principalities and the Porte. Their extraordinary position was undoubtedly the product of social changes within the Ottoman Empire of that time, but their loyalty to the empire stemmed at least as much from familial interest as it did from ideological goals. Within the Danubian principalities, they managed to establish cooperation with major local families, while at the same time contributing to the integration of Moldavia and Wallachia into the pan-imperial Orthodox culture.

This draws our attention to another feature of the eighteenth-century Ottoman society. In 1695, in order to combat fiscal crisis, the Porte introduced quasi-proprietary tax-farms, known under the term malikane. These contracts greatly increased the duration of the contracts, as well as expanded the prerogatives of their holders. After acquiring tax farms, the central elite at the Porte subcontracted them to provincial notables. This further contributed to the privatization of state revenue by the means of households, as well as to the rise of local notables, known in historiography as the ayan. In the words of Hülya Canbakal:

“[Urban notables] were in a better position than ordinary townsmen to get around the war exactions, and even when they could not, they were financially less vulnerable. More importantly, the fiscal reform of 1695 further enhanced their position, and their political and economic career was marked by continual ascent in the century after the war. [...] The majority of the local power-holders comprised more modest notable families that controlled no more than a single

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86c ibid., 27.
86d ibid., 492.
town and its environs, and before the eighteenth century, they most often operated as an oligarchy.\textsuperscript{864}

Usually seen as yet another sign of an Ottoman decline, the rise of ayan has been revisited since the 1990s, with scholars pointing out that rather than a prelude to state failure, fiscal decentralization and devolution of power opened new channels of communication between central and local elites.\textsuperscript{865} According to Ariel Salzmann:

“The elite households were perfectly posed to reorganize their wealth through malikane by acquiring rights to taxes and sub-dividing them among their clients and absentee management became a norm in malikane arrangements. The local notables came to be associated with the state and held interests in acting as such due to their own social and material interests.”\textsuperscript{866}

While local elites increasingly tied their fortunes to the Ottoman state, officials sent in from the Porte immersed themselves into social and political life of the periphery, bringing the center's cultural values and political practices. These complementary brought about increasing horizontal integration, in both cultural and political terms. Hülya Canbakal has aptly defined this process, known in historiography as 'Ottomanization':

“Ottomanization’ as the creation of a composite elite through the functional and social merger of imperial officials and local powers was made possible by an inclusive system of privilege distribution located in the capital, and it was the degree of economic, social and, possibly, ideological integration thus achieved between the center and provincial elites of different kinds that set the eighteenth century apart from the earlier Ottoman centuries.”\textsuperscript{867}

This was clearly not a deliberate action undertaken by the Ottoman central elite, but rather an unintended consequence of the Porte’s response to pressing financial needs. As Rhoads Murphey rightly pointed out, such horizontal integration was alien to Ottoman ideological tenets, and throughout the early modern period a policy of ‘accommodation’ dominated, allowing the communities to preserve their native customs, practices and systems of belief.\textsuperscript{868} However, the overhaul of tax-farming system, and subsequent privatization of imperial resources, contributed to


\textsuperscript{865} Salzmann, “An Ancien Régime Revisited,” 409.

\textsuperscript{866} ibid., 403–4.

\textsuperscript{867} Canbakal, \textit{Society and politics in an Ottoman town}, 6.

\textsuperscript{868} Rhoads Murphey, ‘Ottoman imperial identity in the post-foundation era: coming to terms with the multiculturalism associated with the empire’s growth and expansion, 1453–1650,” \textit{Archivum Ottomanicum} 26 (2009): 84.
the growing identification of local notables with the state in cultural and political terms. Knowledge of Ottoman Turkish spread, and by the eighteenth century, provincial elites adopted architectural models of the political center in their own building activities.

Similarities between the process of Ottomanization and the Phanariat rule in Moldavia and Wallachia are striking, which leads me to the reconceptualize the notion of ‘Phanariat system’ in the Danubian principalities. Rather than a top-down solution imposed by the Ottomans, the appointment of the individuals from the Fanar circle was a result of the gradual emergence of a common Ottoman-Orthodox cultural space and the integration of the Moldavian and Wallachian elites into the wider cultural, economic and political ecumene of the Ottoman Empire. By providing the link between the center and the periphery, Phanariot lineages and patronage networks contributed to what we may call an Orthodox variant of Ottomanization, parallel to the developments occurring elsewhere in the empire.

This conclusion forces us to reconsider Tezcan’s claim regarding the changing notions of belonging and the rise of Muslim political nation in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries. The fact that the Phanariot cultural model became the blueprint for the Christian elites of the periphery means that we should not identify the Muslims as the sole political nation to emerge in this period. Instead, I argue that similar economic and political tendencies contributed to the emergence of two Ottoman ‘nations’: one Muslim and one Greek Orthodox. The fact that the latter occupied an inferior position in the Ottoman social order, and its members were barred from holding highest offices, does not make it any less real and its contribution to the development of the ‘Second Ottoman Empire’ any less tangible.

While most scholars associate the process of Ottomanization with state formation, the relationship between the two phenomena necessitates further study. However, from the point of the present study there is little to validate such association. While in many respects Ottomanization contributed to a greater integration of the empire, it did not necessarily lead individual actors to engage in state-enhancing enterprises. In many respects both Ottomans and Moldavians perceived the empire as ‘theirs,’ but – as in the case of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – this integration was brought about not by the expansion of state institutions, but rather familial ties and patronage tying the center to the periphery. Since the Porte effectively privatized its revenue-raising mechanisms, local
elites had little incentive to invest in enhancing state control. This meant that, should the Porte fail to keep its end of the bargain, the peripheral elites were able to withdraw their allegiance.

In many respects, this is precisely what happened in the aftermath of the 1768-1774 war with Russia, when military defeat undermined the loyalty of local elites, Christian and Muslims alike. In effect, in order to carry out the reforms and check the geopolitical threat of the Russian Empire and the Egyptian governor Mehmed Ali, the milieu of Sultan Mahmud II was forced to engage the local powerholders head-on:

“In the Ottoman Empire, tax farms were never centralized; when they were too successful, they were eliminated by a state keen to reassert its central power. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that such decentralized wealth could have been usefully gathered and transferred; rather, it was confiscated through battle and opposition. Notables were eliminated, life-term tax farming was abolished, short-term tax farming continued, and reform policies had contradictory effects in that some notables lost their land and revenues, whereas others were able to consolidate their land as private property. By the time the PDA [Public Debt Administration – M.W.] was established in 1881, the notables who remained were replaced by salaried agents collecting taxes, although not on behalf of the Ottoman state but for a foreign consortium established to manage the fiscal debt of the state.”

Apart from decentralization and privatization of resources and political power, another factor prevented institutional centralization in the context of Ottoman-Moldavian relations. As I have pointed out, the interests of Moldavian and Ottoman-Muslim elites were largely contradictory, and certain tension was always present. While the top officials of the Porte were relatively happy with the existing arrangement, the lower echelons sought annexation in order to get access to principalities’ resources. This obviously went against the interests of the local elite. In fact, the emergence of two Ottoman political nations only petrified this situation. Since Moldavia and Wallachia constituted the backbone of Phanariot influence, it was obvious that both the Phanariot elite and local lineages would resist the introduction of direct Ottoman administration. At the same time, due to their position in both the periphery and the central political arena, the Phanariots had much more sway at the Porte than the local elite had, and could forestall such attempts more efficiently. Thus, while patronage ties contributed to the cultural and political integration of the

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Danubian principalities into the wider Ottoman space, it did not lead to the institutional change and state formation, instead petrifying pre-existing, interpersonal practices of rule.

6.3. Faction-Building and State-Building

More than a hundred years of patron-client relations between Polish-Lithuanian nobility, Ottoman officials and Moldavian boyars had a wide-ranging impact on the political trajectories of all three elites, influencing the processes of state formation and geopolitical dynamics in the region. While at the beginning of the period under discussion, Poland-Lithuanian magnates managed to dominate the principality, by the end of the seventeenth century Ottoman-Moldavian patronage networks prevailed. Military superiority and political determination of the Porte surely contributed to the final result. However, these factors account provide us with only a partial answer, while at the same time fail to explain other phenomena that took root in this period, such as the reluctance of the Moldavian boyars to join the Polish-Lithuanian troops at the end of the seventeenth century.

Why did Poland-Lithuania fail in rallying support of the Moldavian elite? As I have argued throughout the thesis, the boyars' reluctance to support the Commonwealth was not a product of political sympathies and antipathies, but rather an outcome of divergent structures of cross-border patronage. Firstly, the Polish-Lithuanian magnates turned out to be less reliable partners than their Ottoman counterparts, and their ability to provide their Moldavian clients with resources decreased as the century progressed. At the same time, the Polish nobility's preoccupation with acquiring landed estates in Moldavia ran against the vital interests of the principality's elite, further discouraging cooperation. As the interests of Ukrainian magnates shifted west, they became more reluctant to engage in Moldavian ventures, while confessionalization drew the two elites apart even further.

In turn, despite obvious cultural and religious differences, the Ottoman Empire proved more accommodating and offered more possibilities to the Moldavian elite. Moldavians' constant complaints about 'Turkish avarice' notwithstanding, the boyars nonetheless profited both from their established sources of revenue, as well as from the new opportunities their association with the Ottoman world offered them. Moreover, the ascendancy of Phanariot families provided a crucial link between Ottoman and Moldavian-Wallachian political arenas, further increasing the
attractiveness of cross-border patronage. With social, political and economic ties in place, cultural integration followed, pulling Danubian principalities into a shared *Kommunikationsraum* of Ottoman-Orthodox culture. The unintended outcome of these developments was an Orthodox variant of Ottomanization, similar to the parallel process among Muslim peripheral elites of the empire.

However, none of these changes brought about state formation. The impact of cross-border patronage on institutional underdevelopment was twofold. Firstly, the *Außenverflechtung* between the Ottoman and Moldavian-Wallachian operated on a familial and factional rather than institutional basis. A handful lineages originating from the Phanariot milieu managed to establish itself in both arenas, but this consolidation never translated into institutional change. On the contrary, when their position was formally recognized in 1819, the solution adopted by the Porte relied on the preservation of *status quo* and effective privatization of the offices in question.

On another level, the experience of cross-border patronage reshaped political culture of the elites discussed in the present study. In Moldavian-Ottoman relations, it brought about a relative stability of the Phanariot rule. In turn, in the Commonwealth it became a blueprint for political interaction and became an integral part of political repertoire. While the Polish middle gentry on some occasions voiced protests against bringing resources from abroad and engaging in cross-border ties, it was too weak to curtail such practices.  

None of these trajectories resulted in the emergence of the state as a ‘political container.’ This supports the argument that the state formation was an unintended consequence of individual practices, which cumulatively could contribute to the expansion of state institutions and networks. That this was not the case in neither of the polities discussed in the present study means that their political strategies were not conducive to the expansion of formal institutions. This is not deny the introduction of particular models of governance, but their success of failure hinged on the interests of the elite. However, the actors described in the present study chose alternative strategies in the

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871 Numerous cases support this thesis, arguably the most prominent one being the general overhaul of Russian administration during the reign of Peter I, see Carol Stevens, “Modernizing the Military: Peter the Great and Military Reform,” in *Modernizing Muscovy: Reform and Social Change in Seventeenth-Century Russia*, ed. J.T. Kotilaine and Marshall Poe (London - New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 254–8. Similarly, despite attempts to introduce Dutch accounting practices in France, the project fell through due to the vested interests of French officials, see Jacob Soll,
form of cross-border patronage networks. The success of this solution as a problem-solving mechanism produced a snowball effect, contributing to a mismatch between identity space and decision space. While the identity space was clearly associated with the particular polity, the decision space straddled political boundaries, with actors reaching out to their counterparts beyond the pale, providing them with opportunities of procuring resources without engaging in cooperation with the central authority. In effect, the reliability of patronage networks and the actors’ readiness to utilize them in political competition hampered state formation processes.

This interpretation supports the argument that faction formation rather than state formation was a priority for the actors involved in cross-border patronage. As a result, even in Ottoman-Moldavian networks, more durable than the Polish-Moldavian ones, the cooperation did not translate into unification of political arenas, but rather continued to rely on interpersonal ties, factional politics and only loose imperial control over increasingly privatized resources.

Conclusions: That Different?

In his work on state formation in early modern England, Michael Braddick subsumed his concluding remarks under a fitting title, ‘Actions without Design, Patterns without Blueprints.’ According to Braddick, there was no master plan, no unitary moving force behind the operation and development of the state. What we can find instead are the patterns of behavior of individual actors, operating within the bounds of social norms and political institutions, ultimately driven by their own particular goals.

With this framework in mind, I attempt to place seventeenth-century Moldavia, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire in a larger context of the age. Whereas, from a state-oriented perspective, they may appear as failures, it is worth reframing the question and adopting a different approach. Instead of focusing on the state, I focus on the nexus of cross-border patronage and state formation, comparing the Eastern European case with the patterns of elite behavior in other contemporary polities. As I will show in this conclusion, at the end of the day, the elites of Moldavia, the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were not much different from their contemporaries in other parts of Eurasia and beyond.

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ceased to exist in 1795, after the Third Partition, in which Prussia, Russia and the Habsburgs divided its territory between themselves. One could interpret this as a sign of ultimate failure on the part of the nobility, which had held political monopoly in the Commonwealth for over two centuries. Indeed, this perception is widespread in both historiography and popular imagination. The narrative of ‘decline’ of the Ottoman Empire points to a similar development, wherein the Porte appears as the ‘sick man’ of nineteenth-century Europe.

However, in the same period we see the disappearance of a couple of other polities, swept away by the maelstrom of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. The same year that the Third Partition erased Poland-Lithuania from the map also marked the end of the United Provinces, replaced with the French-inspired Batavian Republic. Two years later, Venice was no more, soon followed by Genoa and Dubrovnik. If we adopt the survival of the polity as an indicator of elite’s success or

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failure, it would be tempting to describe the United Provinces in terms of a failed state. However, it is unlikely that scholars of the early modern Low Countries would agree with such an argument.

In her fascinating contribution to the history of the United Provinces, Julia Adams analyzed the nexus between interests of regent families and the emergence, and subsequent decline, of Dutch power. As she pointed out, familial interests of the elite profoundly shaped the very structure of the United Provinces, since “corporate elites acquired pieces of the nascent state, in some cases selling them or passing them on to descendants.” Moreover, this nexus contributed to the exceptional success of the United Provinces in the seventeenth century. However, the same mechanisms that had contributed to this success also led to its unravelling, when the United Provinces had to respond to new challenges. Faced with the dilemma of sacrificing their familial interests in order to overhaul the political system, or continuing the established patterns of social reproduction, the Dutch elite chose the latter, eventually contributing to the decay of estatist patrimonialism. Since the leaders of regent households saw the preservation of family’s position as their ultimate goal, they were unwilling to give up on their share in the state. The preservation of the polity itself was in many respects a secondary concern.


Adams, ibid., 515.
While the Dutch case represents an extreme example of the convergence between polity and familial interests, with shares in the state literally bought and sold among the regents, we find similar practices in other polities of the time. As David Parrott and Guy Rowlands have shown in their research on seventeenth-century French army, its administration was a haphazard affair and bore little resemblance to a rationally organized, state-owned and efficient fighting force. Indeed, civilian officials and officers alike were more concerned with pursuing their own agendas than with ensuring military and logistical efficiency. In order to exercise any control over its own army, the political center had to give in to the officers’ demands and find a way to accommodate their interests and aspirations. Mediocrity and corruption had to be tolerated, and personal agendas and matters of status took precedence over the considerations of competence or skill.

Beyond Europe, the same hierarchy between familial and state interests was the order of the day. The conflict between gentry and central authority in the late Ming Empire illustrates this point. While the gentry (shi) had multiplex ties to the state apparatus, both sides engaged in a largely philosophical conflict regarding the true locus of sovereignty. Even if no battles were fought, this controversy had a debilitating effect on the state and contributed to the fall of the Ming Empire. As Harry Miller pointed out, the gentry did not challenge Ming legitimacy, and many chose to commit suicide rather than serve the new Qing dynasty. However, the elite was unwilling to give up its symbolic capital – the resource at stake in the dispute – even at the price of the imperial collapse. This outcome indicates, just as in the Dutch case described above, that early modern elites across Eurasia considered their mechanisms of social and political reproduction as more important than the state and its survival.

This begs the question of how the elites reproduced themselves. As Bartolomé Yun Casalilla pointed out, when we look at the aristocratic estate management style in Southern Europe, we can see that its overarching goal was to perpetuate the lineage and household patrimony rather than to maximize profit. However, this was not only the matter of procuring economic resources and

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875 David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Rowlands, The dynastic state and the army under Louis XIV.
876 Rowlands, The dynastic state and the army under Louis XIV, 340.
877 Harry Miller, State versus Gentry in Late Ming Dynasty China, 1572–1644 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
878 Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, “Reading sources throughout P. Bourdieu and Cyert and March,” 331; idem, “Seigneurial Economies in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Spain: Economic Rationality or Political and Social Management?,” in Entrepreneurship and the transformation of the economy, 10th-20th centuries: essays in honour of Herman van der Wee, ed.
material wealth. Instead, social reproduction of the elite hinged on a complex process of extracting, converting and utilizing different forms of capital in order to secure social and political standing of the lineage. The patterns of behavior that from an economic standpoint would seem as irrational and self-defeating – such as conspicuous consumption by debt-ridden Spanish aristocracy – were in fact rational ways of converting resources in order to reproduce the lineage and, indirectly, the elite in general.

In this process of resource procurement and conversion, the state played a crucial but by no means exclusive role. The ruler and his administrative apparatus controlled crucial symbolic, political and economic resources. Most importantly, service to the ruler provided justification and legitimacy for the elite’s privileged status and social activity. In this respect, the vision of the central authority as ‘the fountain of favor’ holds true for all early modern elites. Even the nobility of Poland-Lithuania, usually seen as vehemently anti-statist and suspicious of the king, enthusiastically pursued appointments as important symbolic resources. In the Ottoman Empire and – to some extent – Moldavia, state service constituted the very rationale for the elite’s existence.

However, this does not mean that the ‘fountain of favors’ transformed the elite into docile servants of the state, led by ‘the collective mind of the government.’ The resources provided by the state were attractive, but there were alternative ways to access them. Eager to obtain competitive advantage over their rivals, individual members of the Polish-Lithuanian, Ottoman and Moldavian elites struggled to find such resource-Procuring networks. Cross-border patronage networks filled this role, providing access to the resources necessary for social and political reproduction of the lineage.\(^879\)

It is important to note that there was no irreconcilable contradiction between these informal networks and state institutions, nor was cross-border patronage directed against the ruler by design. This was clearly no zero-sum game, and most actors participated both in state networks and cross-border patronage. At the same time, the emergence of networks straddling political boundaries

\[^879\] Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, “Reading sources throughout P. Bourdieu and Cyert and March,” 332.
changed the balance of power between the ruler and the elite, which had a potentially subversive effect: while resources procured through cross-border patronage were often used in cooperation with the ruler, they could as easily be deployed against him.

The success of cross-border patronage as an efficient channel of resource procurement led to its proliferation across the arenas, as increasing number of actors began to imitate successful strategies. This bandwagon effect reshaped the political culture, as well as changed the relationship between the center and the periphery. In the seventeenth century, the elite of the Danubian principalities increasingly entered empire-wide networks of the Ottoman Empire, a process that culminated in the ‘Phanariot period.’ This integration went beyond the political sphere, but changed the very lifestyle of Moldavian and Wallachian boyars, bringing it more in tune with the norms embraced in the imperial center.

However, this increased connectivity did not necessarily lead to unification. As I have argued in Chapter 5, Moldavian elite remained adamant in its opposition against the encroachments of more powerful neighbors. The boyars succeeded in ensuring Moldavia’s continued existence, while unsuccessfully trying to retain the right to elect the ruler. While Romanian historiography tends to present this resistance as an expression of national sentiment and struggle for an independent Romanian state, I interpret it in a different vein. The boyars were interested primarily not with the preservation of the principality in itself, but rather defended the system of corporate privileges that secured their control over economic and social resources embedded in the polity. Since the resources at their disposal were inferior to those of their Polish-Lithuanian or Ottoman counterparts, even the wealthiest boyars stood no chance to retain their position at the apex of social hierarchy in case of the unification of arenas. However, once the boundaries between the arenas were established, the Moldavian elite did not shy away from establishing cross-border patronage relations.

These observations hold true not only for Eastern European elites discussed in the present study. Even a cursory look at the relationship between Italian aristocracies and the Spanish monarchy shows striking similarities. Thomas Dandelet, in his study of ‘Spanish Rome,’ pointed out that the city, even if not formally part of the Habsburg composite monarchy, nonetheless played a crucial role in the Spanish system of imperial governance, whereas the Habsburg support reinforced the
papal absolutism of the early modern period. Approaching the topic from an actor-oriented perspective, Hillard von Thiessen showed how cross-border exchanges contributed to factional struggle in both Madrid and Rome. Similarly, Spanish hegemony in Italy created opportunities for scores of Italian nobles, who found employment in the Habsburg armies during the seventeenth century. At the same time, the Genoese bankers and merchants played a crucial role in financing the Spanish Empire, fueling the imperial enterprise with cash and credit. Without them, the Spanish system of governance would certainly look different.

Throughout the seventeenth century, cross-border patronage in Eastern Europe contributed to the emergence of a geography of power radically different from the territorial model espoused by state-oriented scholarship. However, it is important to keep in mind that these two topographies of power and political flows did not necessarily were in conflict in each other. More often than not, they complemented each other, with actors drawing resources from one circuit in order to deploy them in the other. Admittedly, cross-border patronage straddled political boundaries and resources it brought to the arena could be used against the state. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, these cross-border networks were but a tool in the hands of the elites, but so was the state. Polish-Lithuanian, Moldavian and Ottoman elites utilized both of them, pursuing their main objective: social and political reproduction of their own lineages.

On the surface, there are virtually no similarities between Poland-Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian principalities. However, as the present study has shown, these institutional, social and religious differences, while important, did not prevent individual actors from pursuing similar goals and engaging in shared political endeavors. Thus, the present analysis provides further

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evidence that elite practices in the early modern world transcended religious, political and cultural divisions, binding together disparate regions of the ‘Greater Western World.’
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