Creating an ‘International Mind’?

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Europe, 1911–1940

Jens Wegener

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization of the European University Institute

Florence, 12 June, 2015
European University Institute
Department of History and Civilization

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Abstract

How do non-governmental actors exert power beyond the confines of nation-states? Examining the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) and its network of European foreign policy elites, I argue that non-governmental actors developed transnational political agendas in part to counter the democratizing and social shifts of the early twentieth century. Throughout the interwar period the CEIP emerged as a key participant in cultural internationalism by providing financial and logistical aid for transnational outreach. Well connected to social elites in several countries, the CEIP’s emergence illustrates how internationalism was inexorably structured by economic, social and cultural capital. As formerly marginalized social groups—e.g. women, organized labor and ethnic minorities—became more integrated into national decision-making processes, traditional elites began to erect new barriers around transnational spaces to preserve existing power structures. Rather than constituting the formation of an emancipatory “transnational civil society,” the transnationalization of politics emerged as a technique for curtailing social movements.

The project investigates how the CEIP fostered the construction, transformation and circulation of expertise among the technical experts who in the wake of the First World War were becoming increasingly central to the making of foreign policy. Starting in the mid-1920s, the foundation promoted networking between economists, international lawyers and other specialists who staffed foreign ministries and international organizations such as the League of Nations or the Permanent Court of International Justice. The CEIP used these connections and the power of the purse to stimulate the development of professional communities with the ultimate goal of reaching policy consensus on the divisive issues of the time. These agreements—styled as “scientific” or “objective”—then formed the basis of a CEIP-funded educational campaign for a liberal, yet hierarchical, global order in the United States, Europe and Latin America, particularly among highly educated elites.

This attempt to construct an “international mind” faltered with the beginning of the Second World War. Yet, tracing the careers of CEIP-connected experts into the post-war planning projects, the thesis ultimately challenges “creationist” narratives of international financial, human rights and security regimes after 1945. Many of the international policies implemented in the second half of the 1940s had largely been developed in an environment that bore little resemblance to the de facto power constellation of the early Cold War. Instead of representing a clean break with a failed past, they were legacies of an attempt to make the world safe for a return to the liberal capitalist order that had marked the long nineteenth century.
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Acknowledgments

Writing this thesis has been a thrilling, sometimes daunting, but always stimulating journey. Naturally, I have incurred many debts of gratitude. First and foremost, I am grateful to my supervisor, Professor Kiran Patel, whose professional guidance and untiring support made this thesis possible, during even the most difficult legs of this journey. Professor Patel challenged me to look beyond my initial assumptions, and through his patience and knowledge, inspired me to progress. For their helpful support and criticism, I am grateful to my second readers and panel members, Professors Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Federico Romero, Sven Beckert and Gary Gerstle.

A heartfelt “Dankeschön” to Professor Michael Wala of the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, who was not only present at the creation of this project, but encouraged me to venture far beyond where I thought I would go. At Bochum, I also benefited tremendously from the support of an exceptional team of colleagues at the North American History section: Lucie-Patrizia Arndt, Carina Steller, Daniela Städter and Jan Hildenhagen. Many thanks for helping me get this project off the ground.

I would like to extend my gratitude to New York University, particularly to Prof. Thomas Bender, as well as to the German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C., for inviting me to participate in two stimulating scholarly communities. Thanks are also due to the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, whose funding made this dissertation possible. The staffs of the Rare Books and Manuscript Library at Columbia University and of the Milstein Division at the New York Public Library deserve much appreciation from an all-too-frequent patron.

To the professors and staff of the European University Institute I would like to express my thanks for the years of professional and dedicated support. I am grateful to my fellow researchers in Florence—Chris Bannister, Jasper Jans, Ciaran Burke and many others—for camaraderie and friendship that has spanned two continents. Special thanks are due to Bart Luttikhuis for his helpful comments in the final stages of this project as well as to Julien Topal for many a coffee break.

Of course, a long project such as this would not be possible without the backing of family and friends. I would like to thank my parents Jürgen and Hedwig Wegener and my brother Thorsten for encouraging me to follow my dreams and ambitions, wherever they may take me. For giving me the necessary breathers, many thanks to the Bonner family and to my friends in Dortmund—Michael, Björn, Daniel and Alex.

Finally, to my wife Kelly, who was there from the earliest drafts to the final version. This journey would have been immeasurably less fulfilling without her as my travelling companion; without her patience and good humor during late nights and take-out dinners. Thank you for your strength and your love.
Introduction

“In each country there are one or a few dozen men who feel closer to certain inhabitants of other states than to the rest of their fellow countrymen,” José Ortega y Gasset wrote in 1926 to describe the internationalist movement of his time.1 While the years between the two world wars were an era of widespread nationalism and international instability, they also witnessed one of the great movements toward international cooperation. Terms such as “intellectual cooperation” and “moral disarmament” proliferated in public speeches and in the pages of learned publications. The Spanish philosopher ascribed this movement to a spontaneous surge of intellectual convergence, “without any action or even purposeful propaganda.” It was a romantic notion of detached intellectualism that bore, however, little resemblance to the tangible logistical challenges of a field that thrived on cross-border travel, communication and organization. At its heart was a transnational support structure that provided organizational and financial resources and fostered “something akin to an international cartel, cultivated by visits and the exchange of personnel and publications” between institutions, as Alfred Vagts of Hamburg’s Institut für Auswärtige Politik (IAP) later remembered.2 As Vagts knew well, most organizations working in this field—whether peace societies or academic institutions—sooner or later reached out to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), America’s sole philanthropic foundation dedicated exclusively to furthering international understanding. It was a mechanism Vagts was closely familiar with, having himself managed a CEIP-financed program in Hamburg during the 1920s.

Originally founded in 1910 by Scottish-American industrialist and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie to hasten “the speedy abolition of international war between so-called civilized nations,”3 the CEIP rose to prominence after the First World War when, under the leadership of Columbia University President Nicholas Murray Butler, it embarked on a global campaign to spread what it called an “international mind,” an undertaking the foundation pursued with particular vigor through its Centre Européen in Paris. To his contemporaries, Butler appeared as “a kind of permanent American ambassador” to Europe, whose annual transatlantic trips were watched closely for news of the latest political developments. The foundation was held in similarly high esteem in the Old World, where the Norwegian Nobel Committee, which awarded Butler its Peace Prize in 1931, lauded the president

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3 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Year Book 2 (1912), 3.
for pursuing the cause of peace with “superhuman strength and untiring energy.” During the 1920s, the German government worked from the assumption that CEIP reports were “passed from hand to hand among the President, Congress and the administration” where they were allegedly “considered gospel truth.” Even many critics furthered the narrative of the foundation’s legendary clout, holding Butler and the CEIP’s board of East Coast business and financial luminaries to form an “irresistible directorate” of the moneyed elites, an “invisible government” that foisted its own foreign policy views on the country. Journalist Carleton Beals discovered the extent of this far-reaching reputation for influence during his travels in Mexico. Stopped by the police without his papers, he ceremoniously handed over his Columbia University diploma bearing Butler’s signature: “The gendarme promptly drew himself up, saluted, turned on his heel and went out.”

With the passing of time, such outsized interpretations of the CEIP’s commanding authority collided with the more prosaic record of its actual achievements. Already some of Butler’s contemporaries had questioned the innovative value of the president’s countless public pronouncements—a 1934 bibliography of his speeches and articles ran over four hundred pages. A close European collaborator later accused him of having “cautiously avoided anything that smacked of originality.” As successive generations of historians examined the archival records of foreign ministries, they mostly looked in vain for the kind of decisive personal interventions by Butler or his fellow CEIP directors that contemporary supporters and critics alike had always suspected. The one major international agreement that Butler’s foundation could reasonably point to as a direct result of its efforts—the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 outlawing wars of aggression—was ultimately widely regarded as a failure, a manifestation of internationalists’ naïve faith in moral progress. A scathing assessment by one of the Carnegie Endowment’s sister foundations in 1941 judged that it was precisely such attempts at amateur diplomacy, the relentless “concentration of interest and energy on haute politique” that had rendered it largely ineffective. Thus reevaluated, the CEIP president was posthumously transformed into a caricature of a snobbish poseur, a water-carrier for mone

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4 Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, “Nicholas Murray Butler: A Portrait of a Reactionary,” The American Mercury, March 1935, 288; Address of Halvdan Koht, 12 December 1931, Box 6, Nicholas Murray Butler Papers, RBML Columbia.
5 Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff to Bülow, 16 October 1925, R 53703, Bd. 1, PA-AA.
interests, a “pompous old guy” whose illusions of grandeur were unmatched by substance. The flip-side of the fame of his living years, Butler’s biographer Michael Rosenthal notes, was “instant oblivion” after death.\textsuperscript{13}

These conflicting assessments of the CEIP’s impact point to the larger question of how non-governmental actors affect change in the international system. In this thesis I argue that the CEIP’s outreach to Europe was part of the transnationalization of politics in the early twentieth century at a time when the challenges facing societies were increasingly global but politics increasingly national.\textsuperscript{14}

The First World War had overthrown many of the formal and informal institutions that had shaped a globalizing world since the mid-nineteenth century. Governments now asserted unprecedented control over their populations and territories, dividing the world along hardened and often newly drawn borders and hindering the activities of existing non-governmental organizations which had in the past assisted in international coordination. Yet, the problems societies faced at the time were often part of developments that went well beyond the state-level: the impact of industrialization on labor relations, ethnic conflicts, changing gender roles. Activists consequently began to seek out allies in other states to help realize their hopes and aspirations, creating a diverse landscape of transnational activism.

This movement was not exclusive to those seeking sweeping changes to national and international institutions. Instead, I will argue that the technique of seeking consensus and coordinating action beyond the confines of national political processes was at least partially a counter-movement to the democratization and social shifts of the early twentieth century. During the interwar period the CEIP was closely aligned with traditional elites on both sides of the Atlantic that opposed the new nationalist particularism but also a social-reformist internationalism they considered radical and destabilizing. Starting in the 1920s, the foundation initiated or financed exclusive programs and institutions designed to foster cross-border negotiation and consensus formation among liberal policy elites. The “international mind” of the academics, civil servants and technical experts informing state


action would compensate for the lack of official cooperation between governments. Despite the foundation’s persistent protestations of political neutrality this bid to create informal, technocratic governance mechanisms was not an apolitical development. As formerly marginalized groups such as women, advocates of organized labor and ethnic minorities became more and more integrated into national decision-making processes, erecting new barriers around transnational spaces promised to preserve existing social institutions.

Viewing the international history of the interwar period from the perspective of the Carnegie Endowment’s networks illustrates the limits of both a state-centered diplomatic history perspective and of a transnational “history from below”-approach that has marked many recent studies of the field of interwar internationalism. For one, the CEIP’s network of foreign policy elites destabilizes notions of the state as a unitary actor. Diplomatic realism holds that nation states, represented by diplomats and foreign ministries, act in accordance with the national interest and that interwar internationalists (or “idealists”) erred in confusing politics with morality, imagining a world of state autonomy bounded by international norms and institutions.15 Yet, a closer look at the genesis of various policy solutions during the interwar years indicates the process by which the “national interest” was itself a construct, produced in social interactions that often included foreign partners. Starting in the mid-1920s the CEIP specialized in fostering networks between newly-formed foreign policy institutions in the United States and in Europe such as the Council on Foreign Relations in New York or the Institut des Hautes Études Internationales in Paris. It sponsored the exchange of personnel and publications and helped build community institutions, such as the Hague Academy of International Law and the Geneva Institute of International Affairs, which served as platforms for debate, coordination and identity formation among groups of transnationally connected experts. With growing nationalism in the wake of the Great War threatening a lasting fragmentation of the international system, liberal elites allied with the CEIP hoped that the “international mind” binding international lawyers, economists, businessmen and other specialists could further global governance by informing official diplomacy.

Naturally, not everyone with visions for an equitable world order was invited to participate, making

this inherently a story about exclusion—specifically of Socialists, women’s rights activists, Christian pacifists and anti-colonial reformers. Indeed, one of the key motivating factors animating the transnational outreach of liberal elites during the tumultuous interwar years was the belief that the world teetered on the cusp of revolutionary upheaval, which threatened to overturn existing social, cultural and ethnic hierarchies. Containing what traditional elites considered “radical” change and making the world safe for a return to the liberal capitalist order that had marked the long nineteenth century would require intellectual leadership on a global level. The “strongest weapon” in this fight against radicalism, CEIP director James T. Shotwell told an audience of East Coast luminaries in 1921, was “knowledge under control.”

In emphasizing this social and ideological context, I depart from many recent studies of interwar internationalism and global activism more broadly by viewing the transnational field as inexorably structured by the power derived from economic, social and cultural capital. I argue that the proliferation of non-governmental actors did not herald the emergence of a “transnational civil society” in the sense of a Habermasian public sphere, removed from and subversive of existing power structures and creating a reservoir of action for those without a voice in the traditional diplomatic process. Transnational coalition-building was not exclusively or even predominantly a tool of the marginalized and a catalyst for progressive reform. As the CEIP’s utilization of links to financial and political elites in several countries demonstrates, the transnationalization of politics could thrive on and, indeed, perpetuate power.

The attempt to stabilize the international system through elite networking clearly failed in the short run, as neither the CEIP nor the “international mind” of its liberal allies were able to prevent Europe from once again entangling the world in a global conflict. Nevertheless, the body of knowledge

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17 A number of recent approaches—e.g. cultural internationalism, transnational civil society or transcultural history—share this essentially normative approach, cf. Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Eckhardt Fuchs and Matthias Schulz, “Globalisierung und trans nationale Zivilgesellschaft in der Ära des Völkerbundes: Zur Einführung,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 54, no. 10 (2006): 837–39; Jürgen Kocka acknowledges that “civil society” is an inherently normative concept but argues that that is “more an opportunity than a burden,” cf. Jürgen Kocka, “Civil Society from a Historical Perspective,” European Review 12, no. 1 (2004): 68; Madeleine Herren suggests that mapping non-governmental groups in the orbit of the League of Nations may point the way toward a “history of subaltern diplomacy,” cf. Madeleine Herren, Martin Rüesch, and Christiane Sibille, Transcultural History: Theories, Methods, Sources (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 139.
produced by transnational expert communities during the interwar years endured and soon provided
the bedrock for a reconstruction of global order. My research shows that many features of the new
form of post-1945 institutionalized global governance—its emphasis on commercial liberalism and
its hierarchical structure, for instance—can be traced back to technical discussions that took place
years or decades earlier, frequently under the auspices of American foundations. Furthermore, the
CEIP’s interwar activism produced a new technique of transnational coordination that would prove a
lasting innovation. When in the nationalist atmosphere of the 1930s the public legitimacy of
international solutions reached its nadir, the Carnegie Endowment began to follow up on its
transnational policy forums with education campaigns aimed at stripping policies of the “taint” of
internationalism. From the CEIP-financed National World Court Committee in the United States in
the early 1930s to Carlo Sforza’s campaign for a Franco-Italian customs union in the 1940s—activists
learned to ease the adoption of internationalist policies by reframing them as authentic expressions
of a country’s national character. Constructing policy agreement beyond the confines of national
political systems and reintegrating the results as the favored position of national interest groups thus
became a mechanism for shaping domestic as well as international institutions.

Global governance in times of crisis: the historical context
Tracing this process, and the CEIP’s role within it, entails de-centering our understanding of what
constitutes mainstream or “common sense” solutions in international politics. The liberal program
advocated by the foundation and its partners—free trade, collective security, cultural
internationalism—may seem unremarkable today but was at the time often a minority position in the
larger clash of ideologies. No international public opinion data exists for the interwar period but there
can be little doubt that a poll conducted in 1920—among, for instance, cotton farmers in the American
South, small-scale manufacturers from the Loire, steelworkers from the Ruhr and bankers from the
City of London—would have found much more diverse views on which policies were best suited to
provide peace and prosperity in a globalizing world than the same survey conducted thirty years later.
This was especially true where liberal internationalist solutions advocated by the foundation entailed
significant adoption risks: as many critics pointed out, being the first country to reduce armaments or
the first market to open its borders to cheap global imports could expose a society to great harm if
others did not follow suit. Breaking this interwar prisoner’s dilemma required a broader acceptance
of similar visions of global order among most major countries. The story told in this study is thus less
one of inventing new policies than of “making” certain ideas conventional across different polities.
When contemporary critics noted that, compared to other philanthropic enterprises such as the
Rockefeller Foundation and the Brookings Institution, the CEIP’s contributions to public debates
lacked intellectual ambition and academic rigor, these shortcomings were very much a function of its priorities: not generating new knowledge but distributing the “right” ideas, building coalitions and brokering compromise between existing concepts was the foundation’s chief concern.

Specifically, I trace the rise of the CEIP’s networks during the interwar years to a conjunction of four historical developments that marked the national and international histories of the interwar years and that will be referred to frequently throughout the narrative: a crisis of liberalism that particularly affected elites, competition between multiple visions of globalization, a gap in global governance during the interwar period and the rising role of technical expertise in the making of foreign policy:

The interwar crisis of liberalism. The CEIP’s main constituency was a transatlantic liberal milieu that experienced the First World War and its aftermath as a disorienting breakdown of social order, both nationally and internationally. Many of the foundation’s partners were closely linked to a cosmopolitan, nineteenth century, liberal governing consensus embodied by such institutions as France’s Parti Radical, the British Reform Club or the Republican Party in the American Northeast that struggled to find answers to many contemporary challenges: (a) democratization, urbanization, woman suffrage, diversification of populations through migration, etc. Traditional political liberalism was steadily losing ground at the polls to challengers on the left and on the right, while the Russian Revolution and short-lived Soviet republics in Germany, Hungary and Italy served as constant reminders of the possibility of even greater, revolutionary change. Interpreting recent global events as part of a general rebellion against the established order, this milieu tended to be equally skeptical of international change. Rather than embracing the Wilsonian program of national self-determination, European economic and imperial liberals and many of the American East Coast elites associated with the Endowment worried about the effects of tampering with existing international hierarchies between rulers and ruled. Against this backdrop, the CEIP’s transnational networking fit within a pattern of old-guard liberal intellectuals, politicians and international businessmen seeking contacts with like-minded partners in other countries. By negotiating compromise positions between conceptions of

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liberalism on both sides of the Atlantic they were hoping to work toward the preservation of a global order they had come to regard as synonymous with progress and “civilization.”

Contested globalization. Closely intertwined with economic liberals on Wall Street and with American political circles, it would seem natural to connect the CEIP’s promotion of internationalism with the country’s emergence as a global power and with the gradual decline of American “isolationism.”22 Within the larger context of transnational activism at the time, however, such clear categories provide only limited utility. Outreach beyond national borders was a strategy pursued by a range of actors with diverse social backgrounds and political leanings, including nationalists and even fascists. In 1921, a League of Nations handbook of international non-governmental organizations listed over three hundred associations with diverse social backgrounds and political leanings, from the International Colonial Institute to the Anti-slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, from the International Chamber of Commerce to the International Congress of Working Women.23

Globalization—the rise of integrated markets and technology which brought countries ever-closer—had become a widely recognized process by the turn of the century, and even the First World War had merely temporarily diverted global flows rather than changed the direction of the process.24 The debates of the 1920s and 1930s were less a confrontation between “internationalists” and “nationalists”/“isolationists” but a competition between different visions of a global polity and the balance between national and international authority.25 Open questions related to real or perceived trade-offs between national welfare and global stability, between the ongoing legacy of imperialism and a universal right to national self-determination, between a democratic and a hierarchical world order. Was the way of the future a workers’ international, a harmonious coexistence of equal and

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23 Cf. League of Nations, Handbook of International Organisations (associations, bureaux, committees, etc.) (Geneva: League of Nations Secretariat, 1921); cf. Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, 63


largely autarchic colonial empires, a world federation or a loosely organized set of nation states? What advocates for a liberal internationalism such as the CEIP decried as “isolationism” were oftentimes concepts based on patently different notions of whose rights, whose freedoms and whose values should be enshrined in global political, economic and judicial regimes.

The interwar governance gap. Most of the CEIP’s officers and European associates had grown up during the second half of the nineteenth century, in an era marked by an increasingly global circulation of goods, capital and ideas. This “first phase of globalization” was based on a pax britannica during which the institutions of the British Empire—the Royal Navy, the Bank of England—were widely recognized, however grudgingly, as essential to preserving international stability. Already showing signs of fragility before 1914, this system of informal global governance did not survive the war, calling into question the future of global flows and movements. Formal, multilateral institutions such as the League of Nations could have filled this gap, but there was no automatic mechanism for implementing the results of discussion taking place at Geneva and elsewhere into national policy. Furthermore, the United States and the Soviet Union—two crucial states—were initially missing altogether from the League’s membership roll. The insufficiency of global institutions became even more apparent throughout the 1930s when states were unable to formulate a coordinated response to the Great Depression and the League of Nations failed to present a united front against German, Japanese and Italian acts of aggression. Taken together, these events illustrated a gap in formal governance which encouraged non-governmental actors such as the CEIP to fill the void, hoping that informal, transnational deliberations could become venues for reaching at least provisional consensus on contested issues.

The government intellectuals. Enter the role of the technical foreign policy expert: while the CEIP usually made headlines for its association with some of the most powerful statesmen of its time—Aristide Briand, Gustav Stresemann, Edvard Beneš, Benito Mussolini—its broader base was comprised of international jurists, academic economists, historians and philosophers, bureaucrats of international organizations and lower-level ministerial officials at the forefront of foreign policy.


27 For a re-interpretation of “isolationism” along these lines see Christopher McKnight Nichols, Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

debates in their respective countries. These “intellectuels de gouvernement” (Noiriel) had become influential actors at a time when states increasingly turned to scientific knowledge to exert control over their territories and citizens.29 This was also true for the foreign policy sector, and the aftermath of the war witnessed the founding of academic institutions and social groups that became nuclei around which national foreign policy establishments coalesced. This phenomenon has been well-researched for the United States and Great Britain, where the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) have provided institutional continuity.30 But similar developments can be shown for other European countries, where in addition to academia—the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Paris or the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik in Berlin—League of Nations societies often performed comparable functions for forming an internationalist elite consensus.31 In the absence of more formal mechanisms, networking and consensus formation between these functional elites created informal structures of global governance. Additionally, making academic expertise a precondition to participation in policy discussions inserted a new layer between public discourse and government action, thus effectively counteracting some of the contemporary tendencies toward democratization of the political process.

Situated at the intersection of academic research, governments and public education, the CEIP’s lasting contribution to this field did not usually consist of suggesting specific solutions to the problems of the time. Rather, its long-term impact lay in establishing, along with its partners, the normative framework within which experts and the wider public discussed competing knowledge claims. If the present study mostly frames this overarching project as “liberal internationalism,” this


is not to suggest an equivalency with the term frequently encountered in IR literature. Interwar internationalism could be progressive or conservative, pacifist or Socialist, sometimes even Fascist, and usage of the term “liberal” in this context is mainly intended to denote the fact that the majority of those closely associated with the CEIP self-identified as liberals. They were generally dismissive of “pacifism,” a term that connoted a principled rejection of inter-state violence and was contemporaneously understood as a challenge to the nation state—an idea that centrist liberals usually regarded as too radical. “Wilsonianism”—another possible descriptor for this movement that is today a popular shorthand for liberal internationalism—would be problematic as there were significant differences between the American President’s program of national self-determination and liberation and the goals of the CEIP-associated internationalists, who placed more emphasis on stability, even if this meant upholding imperial structures.

As a project on transnational encounters, the goal here is not to posit or even “read back” into the sources a certain notion of liberal internationalism but to observe the formation of transnational consensus—which often hinged on the historical ambiguities that interwar liberalism entailed. The lasting impact of the CEIP’s activities was not to construct a coherent vision of liberal internationalism or a recognizable “Carnegie school” of international relations that could be traced into the post-1945 era. Rather, it promoted and popularized answers to a series of epistemic questions: Are patriotism and internationalism inherently incompatible? Can the national interests of the great powers be reconciled with a world governed by international law? Does the free movement of goods


33 This was not necessarily an accurate reflection of pacifist views. As Sandy Cooper points out, most pacifists regarded defensive wars as legitimate and supported their national governments during the First World War, cf. Sandi Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815–1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 160; Martin Ceadel has coined the italicized term “pacifists” for those only conditionally opposed to warfare, cf. Martin Ceadel, Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7–8.


and capital promote peace or incite war? By virtue of the foundation’s politics, the effects of its interventions in favor of mostly traditional liberal projects amounted to placing a thumb on the scale of transnational politics. In the long run, it thus influenced debates whose outcome ultimately determined which values and interests would govern a globalizing world.37

Networks, culture and power: methodological considerations

A natural starting point for conceptualizing networking among foreign policy experts is the “power elite” approach pioneered by Marxist sociologists C. Wright Mills and William G. Domhoff,38 Here, personal interconnections between governments, corporations and cultural institutions are interpreted as instruments of a small ruling class that consciously exerts control over society. Over the course of the last two decades, this research agenda has been broadened to take account of the transnational dimension of power, for instance by tracing the emergence of a “transnational capitalist class” that shapes a world order conforming to its economic interests.39 In addition to downplaying the often divergent and sometimes clashing interests of business managers, the notion of a unified elite hinges on a rational choice approach to power that gives short shrift to the role of identity formation in shaping interests. Neither the professed globalism of twenty-first century enterprises nor the self-styling of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century captains of industry as builders and defenders of the nation are direct expressions of immutable laws of economics. As business history has shown, corporations and entrepreneurs have proven surprisingly adept at flourishing under most types of regimes and conditions—whether war and peace, autarchy or free trade.40 Economic elite domination theories also cannot easily account for the large presence of academics in internationalist circles, a group whose economic interests—to the extent that they were in play at all—were intertwined with national education establishments.


To connect economics and culture in a more pluralist fashion, the Gramscian concept of cultural hegemony offers a constructive alternative. Inderjeet Parmar employs Gramsci’s notion of “state spirit” to explain how the officers of America’s major foundations paved the way for a *Pax Americana* that ultimately served U.S. national and corporate interests.\(^\text{41}\) As Helke Rausch and John Krige point out, such a unidirectional conception of foundation work downplays the inherently reciprocal nature of intellectual exchanges,\(^\text{42}\) and, it may be added, risks becoming an anachronistic backward projection of post-1945 developments were it to be applied to the interwar period. The CEIP’s concept of the “international mind” is thus a necessary corrective to the “state spirit”: intellectual elites and business leaders came to conceive of their actions as part of the global public good, especially in instances where they ran counter to their government’s positions and to the democratically determined preferences of the voting public. As institutions that facilitated knowledge transfers, transnationally active foundations provide a window into how this globalism was constructed through processes of appropriation and localization that are central to relational approaches to historical inquiry.\(^\text{43}\) Oftentimes, upon further scrutiny, even evidently “American” or “European” ideas and policy prescriptions turn out to be co-productions of coalitions that do not neatly conform to national or regional categories.

The approach taken in this thesis to investigate this co-production of knowledge is to view the transnationalization of politics from the perspective of social practice within networks. As this terminology suggests, Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, in which actors gradually internalize cultural predispositions in interaction with their environment, plays a key part in my theoretical framework.\(^\text{44}\) Interests, whether the “national interest” formulated by a state’s bureaucracy or the self-


interest of an individual, are ultimately grounded in cultural preferences that are the result of practice. While Bourdieu locates the relevant institutions for inculcating and reproducing the dominant cultural reference systems in national contexts—specifically France—this thesis views transnational networks as sites for the production as participants conceived of their contributions in terms of larger projects that corresponded with their own cultural backgrounds and with that of the transnational space in which they participated. These overarching narratives constituted what Daniel Rodgers has called “stories”: they integrated networks around common discourses, drew boundaries against competing knowledge claims and provided the normative and emotional force that allowed associated policy prescriptions to travel across borders.45 The belief that they worked for a greater good—by reconstructing a liberal legal order or by preserving peace through economics—animated liberal internationalists and unified activists across national and professional divides. Of course, the definition of what constituted the greater good was ultimately rarely unrelated to an actor’s professional and economic interests; as Bourdieu observes: “Ideology is an illusion consistent with interest, but a well-grounded illusion.”46

Utilizing network analysis techniques to explain historical change is not without its problems and the current study makes no claim to methodically employing social network tools, as developed by sociologists and political scientists, on an analytical level.47 On the other hand, the accounts of connections, intersections and coalition building between national and transnational groups that form the core of this thesis could not have been reconstructed without a working road map of at least that section of the internationalist field that received most of the CEIP’s philanthropic attention. During the course of my research I have compiled a database matching participation in CEIP programs with membership information for about one hundred national and transnational organizations, comprising just over eight thousand individuals. The value of this method is that it brings to the surface connections that are sometimes buried deep in the archival record, links that can then be pursued with


46 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 74.

the research tools commonly employed for writing culturally informed international history. This is particularly important as network theory reminds us that it is not always the most obvious, most frequently used connections but the “weak ties” linking otherwise unconnected actors that can have the most impact by transmitting new information.\(^{48}\)

On a methodological level, highlighting the practice dimension of transnationalism entails viewing the CEIP not primarily as an institution wielding cash in pursuit of a pre-set agenda but as an organization that facilitated the intermingling of economic, social and cultural capital. By investing in its network, the CEIP complemented its financial resources with the academic qualification, political connections and social status of its associates. In terms of research strategies, this has implied a shift away from the practice of seeking to demonstrate influence by tracing major grant payments to research institutions, as is often the case in studies of scientific philanthropy.\(^{49}\) In fact, about two-thirds of the CEIP’s expenditures did not take the form of direct subsidies but went into scholarship programs, publication projects, conference organization, etc.\(^{50}\) Diverse as these activities were, at the logistical level such foundation programs usually consisted of numerous small reimbursements to individuals (travel expenses, honoraria for articles) that, collectively, tell a larger story. Fig. A illustrates how the CEIP financed communication and mobility within a growing interpersonal network that connected policy research institutions, advocacy groups and international organizations.\(^{51}\) This is not to suggest that asymmetrical power relationships were absent from interactions. This aspect will be more fully explored in Chapter 2, however, in brief, I argue that the CEIP influenced internationalist networks through processes of inclusion/exclusion and by setting broad parameters for debates. Like magnets dropped into a field of metal balls, the foundation’s interventions created clusters around certain concepts and institutions, stimulating activity and attracting further resources.


\(^{50}\) A necessarily somewhat schematic attempt to group the foundation's expenditures for the Fiscal Year 1926/27 shows about 100,000 dollars in direct subsidies, about 240,000 dollars in CEIP-initiatives (conferences, publication projects, travel grants) and a substantial overhead of 200,000 dollars (salaries, office expenses), cf. CEIP Year Book 17 (1928), 179–182.

\(^{51}\) This connection between interpersonal and inter-group networks was first empirically described by Ronald Breiger, “The Duality of Persons and Groups,” *Social Forces* 53, no. 2 (1974): 181–90.
Fig. A – Institutional affiliations of CEIP partners to national policy institutes, national advocacy organizations, transnational and international organizations, 1919–39.\textsuperscript{52} Gray lines denote non-CEIP related links between organizations through interlocking memberships.

\textsuperscript{52} The sample includes both programs run from the CEIP headquarters and those linked to the Centre Européen: Carnegie Visiting Professors of International Relations, Economic and Social History of the War, Hague Academy of International Law, Fellowships in International Law, Special Correspondents, Chaire Carnegie, Carnegie Lehrstuhl, Esprit International.
State of the Art

Research on the international programs of America’s major philanthropic foundations has expanded greatly over the course of the last twenty years. In the wake of the Second World War, these institutions were mainly discussed as part of the American historiographical debate over internationalism and isolationism, in which non-governmental groups drew scrutiny for their role in building elite consensus in favor of an assertive foreign policy at home and exporting American institutions abroad. In recent years, a new body of research has emerged that is marked by a greater interest in those who received foundation funding, and in the cooperation and co-production of knowledge. Reflecting a growing dissatisfaction with a unidirectional “Americanization” frame at a time of transnational approaches to history, newer studies emphasize multiple actors and perspectives, as in Helke Rausch’s and John Krige’s “circulation of knowledge” approach. Particularly, scientific philanthropy has emerged as a field of study suited to highlighting the interactive nature of intellectual exchanges. Studies by Giuliana Gemelli, Christian Fleck and Katharina Rietzler have focused on the reciprocal impact of foundation programs as scholars and knowledge travelled back and forth across the Atlantic, particularly in the social sciences. All of these studies share a new attention to the local contexts and consequences of the programs of America’s major philanthropies.

55 Krige and Rausch, American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century.
A major impulse for the historiography of America’s major philanthropic foundations has resulted from the expansion of the field of international history to encompass the actions of non-state actors and matters of culture, transnational connections, knowledge systems and identity construction. In particular, the international history of the interwar period has expanded greatly since the first pioneering studies of the 1990s. Marrying intellectual with international history, historians such as Mark Mazower and Ian Tyrrell highlight the impact of ideas on global events. International organizations such as the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization have drawn renewed attention for their role in shaping the standards and practices of a globalizing world. The last decade has produced a wealth of detailed studies on the sprawling field of what Akira Iriye has called “cultural internationalism”—League of Nations Associations, women’s groups, study committees, and other INGOs—covering a wide range of social, national and cultural contexts. Although this work is ongoing, the first synthetic treatments of this field point towards the need to revise our understanding of the period as marked by opposing forces of “nationalism” and “internationalism” or “liberalism” and “totalitarianism.” Just as not all transnational activism was liberal in today’s understanding of the term, neither were all nationalists opposed to forms of cooperation across borders.

This new focus on processes of knowledge construction and identity formation in international relations has brought with it a heightened attention to the impact of policy communities, advocacy groups and transnational interest coalitions on the history of the interwar period. Once viewed as


59 Cf. Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order.


63 Cf. Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism; Mazower, Governing the World.

inconsequential, interwar “idealists” have been reappraised by i.a. Cecilia Lynch, Guido Müller and Daniel Laqua, demonstrating how societal actors made an impact in national and international politics through advocacy campaigns and transnational networking. The importance of expert knowledge networks in shaping ideas of global governance is drawing increasing attention. While this literature has recently turned more toward questions of gender, other categories of concern to social historians—especially race and class—have so far played only a minor role. Top-level networks of business and government elites remain under-researched and the few studies that explicitly tackle the social dimension of transnational elite formation in the interwar period still tend to have a narrow Anglo-American focus that does not reflect the trend toward broader perspectives. For instance, the breadth of research on pacifist and women’s groups stands in marked contrast to the almost complete absence of interest in one of the most influential transnational lobby organizations of the time: the International Chamber of Commerce.

Sources, scope and structure of the thesis
The main source material for the study consists of contemporary published material, newspaper accounts, autobiographical writings, as well as three different types of archival holdings: the institutional records of non-governmental and international organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment, the Carnegie Corporation or the League of Nations; archives of governmental...
bureaucracies that openly or quietly cooperated with the CEIP or sought to influence its activities such as the U.S. State Department or the French, German and Italian foreign offices and, lastly, the personal papers of key CEIP officers and their European collaborators such as Nicholas Murray Butler, Philip Jessup, Moritz Julius Bonn and Carlo Sforza. Particularly on the European side, the impact of the twentieth century’s upheavals, of war and persecution, has often made it necessary to revert to secondary records as many personal and institutional archives were either destroyed or lost. In addition to the legacy of state-sponsored violence on the conditions of archival records, research regarding the impact of transnational networks on foreign policy more generally faces the challenge of seeking to highlight processes that ran counter to central tenets of the self-conception of the early twentieth century nation-state: the sovereignty and cultural self-sufficiency of the nation. State archives conformed to these narratives by producing paper trails that documented decisions as the result of internal governmental deliberations. When policy impulses were received from non-governmental or even foreign sources, these ideas were usually quietly incorporated into the bureaucratic process without dwelling on their unorthodox provenance.

The archives of non-governmental organizations are not necessarily a rigorous corrective to this picture. In the case of the CEIP, record-keeping was often deliberately fragmented. The foundation was keenly aware that it operated in a legal gray area, as American law criminalized private diplomatic activity designed to “influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government.” Its annual reports treated payments to European institutions obliquely and the surviving archival record allows for only a partial reconstruction of concrete money transfers. This is at least partly because material with potentially sensitive implications was routinely destroyed to avoid embarrassing and probing questions in the event of public investigations or unintended disclosures. In a particularly stark example, shortly after U.S. entry into the Second World War the CEIP’s New York office collected and reviewed all correspondence relating to its past German grantees. A few weeks later, the files were restored to their original locations, presumably absent any evidence that could have proved inconvenient in light of the new geopolitical constellation. Given the availability of secondary documentation, especially personal archives, there is no reason to believe that such gaps hint at dark conspiracies. It is a reminder, however, that archives of NGOs are not immune to contemporary political and cultural pressures, and should be approached with the same level of skepticism as more overtly political sources.

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69 Butler’s concern for shaping his legacy by suppressing undesired archival material was already noted by his first biographer, cf. Albert Marrin, Nicholas Murray Butler: An Intellectual Portrait (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1976).


71 Cf. Henry Haskell to George Finch, 7 April 1942, Box 55 Folder 1, CEIP US, RBML Columbia; for better legibility, archival information for CEIP collections is omitted in future references.
The main focus of this study is the transatlantic dimension of the CEIP, particularly that portion of its work that fell within the ambit of the Centre Européen, the foundation’s representation in Paris and its sole foreign office for most of the interwar years. The Carnegie vision was of course much broader and, in fact, nearly global. Few efforts were made to establish contacts in Africa, which was still largely viewed as the concern of Europe’s colonial powers, but the CEIP’s cultural diplomacy did encompass Asia, especially Japan and China. Its presence in Latin America, intensified in the early war years to counter Axis influence, is a subject awaiting further study in its own right. On balance, however, the concentration of political power in the capitals of the Old World and of policy expertise in European and North American research and educational institutions made this almost by default a primarily transatlantic story. For instance, even when including colonial territories and dominions, only about fifteen percent of the foundation’s almost one thousand “depository libraries”—the institutions that regularly received the CEIP’s publications—lay in either Latin America, Africa, Asia or Oceania. This obvious underrepresentation of vast areas of the globe was not necessarily specific to the CEIP, but was a hallmark of most interwar foreign policy discussions, ensuring that the balance of knowledge-power would track with political, military and economic might.

Transnational approaches to historiography have the potential to destabilize periodizations derived from political or diplomatic history by highlighting processes that cross conventional divides. The present study does indeed highlight continuities in the activism for international coordination and organization that stretch beyond the period of the two world wars. If I have nevertheless chosen 1940 as a “soft” cut-off date for this study, this is mainly because the war, the founding of the United Nations with U.S. participation, and later, the advent of the Cold War with its imposition of a bipolar order, changed the structural environment in which the foundation operated. While many of the ideas that the CEIP had promoted thrived, and the foundation resumed its work on the Continent with a gradual reopening of the Centre Européen in 1946, these new activities bore little continuity to the day-to-day operations of the interwar period. This was, in addition to the changed external conditions, also a function of changes to the organization itself: many of the CEIP’s established partners had passed away or relocated, and with Butler’s own resignation and death soon after the war, many of the foundation’s interpersonal networks broke down or were reconfigured.

72 On the CEIP’s primary partner in its outreach to Asia, the Institute of Pacific Relations, see Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1919–1945 (London: Routledge, 2002).

73 The breakdown was roughly the following: North America (50%), Europe (34%), Latin America (9%), Asia (7%), cf. CEIP Year Book 17 (1928), 195–205.
The following account is broadly divided into three parts: the first two chapters provide an outline of the socio-cultural contexts and of the techniques underlying the CEIP’s activism in the United States and in Europe, followed by three chapters that serve as case studies of transnational negotiation processes, culminating in a concluding chapter that traces the connections made during the interwar years into the Second World War and beyond 1945.

The first chapter situates the activism of the Carnegie Endowment in the multifaceted interwar discourse on world order. I argue that, rather than showing a clear-cut divide between “internationalists” and “isolationists” on the one hand and “Europe” and “America” on the other hand, interwar debates were marked by divergent visions about the future of a globalizing world that were extensions of broader socio-economic and cultural cleavages within societies. The CEIP was closely aligned with institutions of a pre-1914 liberal cosmopolitan milieu which advocated for an international order based on the principles of individual liberty, minimal state intervention and commercial liberalism. Especially in the wake of the First World War, members of this milieu looked on wearily as competing ideologies rose to prominence on the left and the right, bearing their own knowledge claims on which policies contributed to international peace. With nationalism in the ascendance, Socialist revolutions taking place across Europe, and domestic and international power relations in flux, many traditional liberals believed that transnational outreach was needed to restore an “ordered civilization.” In this chapter I thus argue that controversies over collective security, international law or commercial relations not only aimed at shaping international affairs but ultimately at defining the domestic balance of power within nations through their interaction with the outside world.

The techniques of the Carnegie Endowment’s philanthropy are the focus of the second chapter, which centers on the foundation’s campaign for an “international mind” in Europe. Rather than adopting a diffusionist approach to the CEIP’s transatlantic philanthropy, the chapter argues that the foundation’s strategy is best understood as promoting informal structures of governance by financing communication and coordination among foreign policy elites. Under an approach that seeks to trace the promotion of specific ideas or techniques, the CEIP’s propagation of the “international mind”-language appears quixotic, as the term was never associated with any concrete meaning. Instead, I argue, it served as a marker for a transnational community committed to a liberal interpretation of internationalism. By promoting such discourses and policing networks through inclusion/exclusion mechanisms the foundation and its associates slowly edged out competing knowledge claims.

Three thematic chapters then analyze the CEIP’s contribution in the major fields of cultural, legal and
economic internationalism. Chapter four documents the CEIP’s efforts to heal Europe’s rifts in the wake of the First World War by fostering Franco-German cultural exchange. In the mid-1920s, with the Cold Peace of the immediate post-war years beginning to thaw, the American foundation began to move beyond its traditional base in Paris. Its concerted outreach campaign to Berlin opened up a transnational space that enabled French and German academic elites to meet on supposedly neutral ground, a largely fictitious conceit as foreign ministries continually monitored and influenced the proceedings. The close ties to French and German foreign policy elites enabled the foundation to realize one of the most concrete results of the CEIP’s interwar activism: the Kellogg-Briand Pact. By linking this treaty to the cultural philanthropy that preceded it, the chapter highlights the dual purposes of foundation programs: while pursuing concrete projects to further certain concepts or ideas, they also create a network of partners that allow for ad hoc coordination and cooperation that can have a direct impact on international relations.

This larger project of constructing a rule-based international community failed in the first half of the 1930s, a breakdown that forms the core of chapter five. The key role of American philanthropic foundations in the development of the discipline of international law is frequently noted, however, the chapter shows that the CEIP’s programs aimed at more than creating a body of academic knowledge. Sponsorship of community institutions such as the Institute de Droit International and the Hague Academy of International Law aimed at fostering an internationally-minded legal expert community, in close contact with national governments, that could help govern the world by removing contentious issues from the inherently particularist and nationalist nature of public debate. Legal conferences and international tribunals would provide venues where compromises between competing great power interests could be quietly reached and codified into international law. Ostensibly aimed at creating structures for the adjudication of conflicts that would base international affairs on the rule of law rather than European power politics, this project of juridifying international relations prepared the ground for a CEIP-led effort to negotiate the adherence of the United States to the World Court in 1929. Yet, from its inception, the legal internationalist project was marked by unresolved tensions between the claim to provide equal protection of the law and the aim to fortify international, especially colonial, hierarchies. The chapter proposes that the failures of both the 1929 World Court initiative and the larger undertaking to juridify international relations were as much due to the contradictory ideological underpinnings of the enterprise as to the increasing political headwinds of the 1930s.

With hopes for a functioning legal system of collective security dashed, the CEIP shifted its attention to economics. The final thematic chapter documents the foundation’s work in cooperation with the
International Chamber of Commerce to establish an “economic peace” in the second half of the 1930s, a liberal international commercial and financial regime that would bridge political differences. The close involvement of American, Dutch and Belgian businessmen and politicians illustrates the converging interests of externally oriented U.S. business elites and representatives of smaller, industrialized countries in the restoration of a unified European market. Economic self-interest was, however, only part of the equation, as “economic peace” was fundamentally a concept aimed at preempting the spreading cultural nationalism threatening the status of established liberal elites in ways above and beyond their financial bottom lines. The notion that economics could be divorced from politics proved deeply flawed and led the CEIP and the ICC down a narrow path between peace advocacy and National Socialist propaganda for a “fair” redistribution of Europe’s resources. Yet, the two organizations succeeded in rallying both American and European business communities around a cultural consensus of business internationalism that closely resembled that of the nineteenth century era of British-led globalization——this time with the United States in the driver’s seat.

The transnational sphere that the CEIP had supported and nurtured largely collapsed soon after the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, as travel and communication was impeded. The final chapter traces the mid- to long-term consequences of the CEIP’s interwar activism by tracing the discourses the foundation had promoted into the phase post-war planning and reconstruction. While national historiographies often seek to locate post-war arrangements in governmental planning and decision-making processes, I argue that many of these activities relied on the same transnationally connected experts that the CEIP had worked with during the war. In the United States, East Coast internationalist institutions such as the CEIP, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations became transmission belts for the insertion of interwar discourses into the work of official American planning bodies that would shape much of the post-war international architecture. Meanwhile, former European grantees performed similar functions in their own countries. Thus integrated into official government channels, a significant portion of the body of knowledge produced by the foundation and its allies during the preceding decades was brought to bear on the reconstruction of world order.

In his intellectual history of global governance, Mark Mazower highlights the continuities in institutions and ideas that shaped an interconnected world. In this genealogy, the interwar period stands as an era of a peculiar divergence between institutional arrangements and popular ideas: while the League of Nations provided the most elaborate structure of international organization the world

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74 Cf. Mazower, Governing the World.
had yet seen, there was little public enthusiasm for the idea of liberal global governance. During a
time of national antagonisms and calls for social change traditional liberal ideas of commercial
liberalism and international cooperation had fallen out of favor both with voters and with
governments. For traditional liberal elites, cooperating across borders to embed their political and
cultural preferences in the collected expert knowledge on international law, economics and cultural
relations thus became an alternative route to preserve their ideas and interests. Insulated from the
pressures of mass democracy and nationalism, the story of the Carnegie Endowment’s networks in
the interwar period is thus also part of the circuitous success story of a liberal version of
internationalism in the twentieth century.
1. An ordered civilization: The crisis of liberalism in America and Europe

“The European who wants to understand the core issues of the United States would do best not to disembark in New York. New York is not America,” wrote German economist Moritz Julius Bonn in 1925 after an extensive tour of the country.\(^{75}\) The sentiment was echoed two years later by British author Ford Maddox Ford in the title of his book *New York Is Not America*.\(^{76}\) Admonitions of men like Bonn and Ford came at a time when narratives of America as a land of boundless progress and modernity enjoyed immense popularity in Europe. The City on the Hudson, with its soaring skyline, its immigrant neighborhoods, the jazz bars of Harlem, seemed like the embodiment of American modernity—the “Americanization” that was spreading to the Old World, eliciting hopes for and fears of the future.\(^{77}\) Meanwhile, what Bonn and Ford saw in their travels to the United States was a more ambiguous attitude toward those changes. Rather than celebrating the vibrant city whose port had long been America’s door to the world, many Americans had come to regard the nonconformist, heterogeneous and immigrant culture of the metropolis as foreign.\(^{78}\) By the 1920s, associations with cosmopolitan New York had become so politically toxic in many parts of the country that when New York Governor Alfred E. Smith ran for the presidency in 1928 he lost all but eight states to Herbert Hoover after a campaign filled with anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant and anti-urban sentiment.\(^{79}\) At all levels of society groups were forming to defend the prerogatives of Anglo-Saxon Americans, noted Moritz Julius Bonn, founding circles and societies directed against “those who are different, think differently or want different things.”\(^{80}\)

For interpreting the history of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, an organization which by the mid-1920s had become deeply intertwined with the social fabric of the American metropolis, there is a cautionary reminder in New York’s status as a contested symbol of modernity.\(^{81}\) Since the

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\(^{80}\) Bonn, *Amerika und sein Problem*, 131.

interwar years, the activities of American foundations in Europe have often been interpreted as an axis of “Americanization,” spreading American practices and ideas to the Continent and increasing the soft power of the United States while opening up new markets for the country’s expanding economy. Conversely, there is a literature that casts the CEIP as a “foundation for internationalism” that worked tirelessly to overcome the American people’s traditional “isolationism,” effectively Europeanizing their conception of foreign policy. Both approaches share a reliance on national frames and metaphors of interpenetration and resistance that were products of the very debates they are studying: “isolationism,” the notion that Americans in the interwar years simply turned their back on the world, was a concept originally promoted by organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment to cast foreign policy decisions as a choice between backwardness and modernity, between fear and reason, between participating in history and negating its laws. Meanwhile, the notion of “Americanization” in a non-American context, as a form of cultural imperialism, was devised by those on the other sides of the debate to delegitimize unwelcome cultural and social phenomena as foreign, essentially violent impositions.

Such national frames were of course crucial in structuring the way people thought about the world, particularly during the interwar years. Yet, it is also important to keep in mind that the protagonists whose story will be told in the following pages—the CEIP’s officers, trustees and European associates—had experienced a very different world: they had grown up at a time when one could travel from Bordeaux to Saint Petersburg without so much as being asked for a passport. A Swedish professor and an American businessman meeting in a Paris hotel lounge could most likely converse either in French or in German, and the gold exchange standard meant that neither one had to worry about fluctuating exchange rates. Often called the “first phase of globalization,” this period rested on


a cosmopolitan worldview that embraced the ideas of traditional liberal writers: the free trade theories of Richard Cobden, the emancipatory ideas of Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Giuseppe Mazzini. One school of thought holds that this liberal governing consensus was eclipsed by the final quarter of the nineteenth century as political culture became suffused with imperialism, Social Darwinism and biological racism. This view has been challenged in recent years, as a series of studies on nineteenth century intellectual history have demonstrated that much of the transformation took place within the liberal tradition itself: by the end of the century the liberal belief in the universal equality of all human beings was tempered by hierarchical narratives of progress and civilization.

What did change, however, was the emergence of a robust backlash against the free circulation of goods, ideas and people and, implicitly or explicitly, against the liberal milieu that had shaped the entangling of societies. In the 1880s, British producers reacted with vehement protests to a flood of German imports. In the United States, the country’s westward expansion was largely financed with credits originating in London and running through Wall Street; but the free movement of capital created boom and bust cycles that periodically plunged Western farmers into misery. The result were conspiratorial tracts that accused New York banks of having established “complete control of the political machinery” of the nation and enabling its “bondage” to the British Crown. A form of globalization that exposed large segments of societies to forces beyond their control had the potential to fuel international tensions while also exacerbating diverging interests within countries. This was particularly the case as industrialization, urbanization and globalization processes were also recasting the relationships between classes, races and genders. Just as New York was not representative of America, neither were Hamburg merchants culturally or politically aligned with Pomeranian landowners, nor the bankers from the City of London with Yorkshire textile workers.

The argument presented in this chapter is that the CEIP’s transnational networking grew out of these tensions as part of the transnationalization of politics in the early twentieth century. People recognized

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that their fate was increasingly determined by the policies and norms governing an integrating world and formed transnational coalitions to affect change. This trend was accelerated when the First World War became the catalyst for what Detlev Peuker has called a “crisis of classical modernity,” destabilizing existing domestic and international constellations and creating expectations of (sometimes radical) change. Rather than constituting binary opposites—as “internationalists” versus “nationalists” or “isolationists”—participants in the ensuing debates were advocating for different models of an international system, grounded in competing norms and interests. U.S. Senator William E. Borah, one of the spokesmen of the country’s “isolationist” faction articulated one alternative narrative in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations: while liberal internationalists saw the new “nearness” to the peoples of Europe and Asia as giving rise to mutual understanding and cooperation, the reverse was actually true. Just as proximity led the tenants of densely populated cities to be suspicious of their neighbors and lock the doors of their apartments, greater interdependence between nations had increased not decreased international strife. Meanwhile on his father’s farm, with no neighbor to be encountered within miles, the door had always stood open. Clearly, Borah implied, the rural model of society was more applicable to the international level than the urban vision.

The purpose here is not to suggest a new “primacy of domestic politics” in which economic interests directly drive foreign policy or, for that matter, political ideology. It is to suggest, however, that to understand the emergence of ideas on global governance they have to be located in the specificity of contemporary politics, the social cleavages and cultural tensions of the time, and not in an ideal-type Wilsonian internationalism. Non-governmental organizations in the foreign policy sector such as the CEIP are uniquely suited to studying these contexts. They are institutions which, above all, try to shape the way people think about international affairs. They are thus venues in which the beliefs and interests of participating actors are translated into narratives and norms for a globalizing world. Locating the CEIP’s leading figures and the participants in the foundation’s programs in their socio-cultural milieus is central to exploring their self-conception and the type of liberal internationalism they wanted to construct—or re-construct.

“A Small Phalanx of Eminent Men”: The Carnegie Endowment before 1914
On 10 December 1910, Andrew Carnegie assembled a group of twenty-eight men at the headquarters of the Pan-American Union in Washington, DC, where the trustees of his latest philanthropic

89 Cf. Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik, 81–82.
endeavor were presented with a gift of ten million dollars. The question as to how this large sum of money was to be employed mystified not only the press, but the new trustees themselves. The *New York Times* reported that the philanthropist had not offered any concrete ideas for projects and that the assembled gentlemen had brought no plans of their own to the table: “Few of them have thought of the matter sufficiently to be prepared with any specific ideas.” Their hesitancy was understandable in light of the magnitude of their task. Carnegie’s charge to his trustees was nothing less than effecting the “speedy abolition of war”. In fact, as a sign of Carnegie’s can-do optimism and his openness to an evolving agenda for his foundation, he already envisioned a way forward after warfare had vanished from the face of the earth. In that case, the board was to determine which pressing problem facing mankind could be tackled next in order to “advance the progress, elevation and happiness of man.”

It was not only this allusion to the language of the Declaration of Independence that made the CEIP’s founding appear as a quintessentially American story. As an institution built on the immense wealth of an American industrialist it was testimony to the vibrancy of the country’s business sector and to the nation’s rising power and prosperity. It owed its existence to a democratic public space which encouraged private sector participation in the affairs of government. And it stood, last but not least, for the immigrant success story of Andrew Carnegie, who had come to the United States with his parents from Scotland at age twelve and built an empire of steel in the aftermath of the American Civil War. Carnegie had been among the first to recognize the potential of the Bessemer process for large scale steel production and by 1900 his company dominated the U.S. market. When in 1901 he sold his entire business venture to the banker John Pierpont Morgan for 480 million dollars, the deal made Carnegie one of the, if not the single wealthiest man in the world. However, success in the American industrial sector with its cut-throat business practices had come at a price to his public reputation. After the violent suppression of a strike at his factory in Homestead, Pennsylvania, left twelve people dead, many Americans regarded Carnegie as the epitome of the ruthless industrial baron. Public opprobrium surely played a role in Carnegie’s decision to reinvent himself as a leading philanthropist. Over the course of the following two decades, he donated most of his fortune, building an array of institutions bearing his name: the Carnegie Institution of Washington (1902), the Carnegie Hero Fund (1904), the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1905), the Carnegie Corporation (1911), to mention only a few. With this generosity, Andrew Carnegie set an example for

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93 CEIP Year Book 1912, 3.

several of his fellow industrialists, who followed suit with such institutions as the Russell Sage Foundation (1907), the Rockefeller Foundation (1913) and the Rosenwald Fund (1917).\textsuperscript{95} For all its rootedness in American events, the CEIP’s founding was also part of a larger, nearly global story: the quest for public reform, for social “progress” in the early twentieth century. By the late 1800s, industrialization had transformed societies bordering on the North Atlantic, producing new challenges and giving rise to parallel and interconnected reform efforts to bring the tools of modern science and the machinery of the administrative state to bear on problems of social organization in the modern age.\textsuperscript{96} From harsh working conditions to urban poverty, illiteracy, and alcoholism—the targets of reform were varied but at its heart what in an American context is usually called the “Progressive Movement” was part of often transnationally connected efforts to address the injustices and inequalities of the time by creating new institutions and lobbying for the intervention of the regulatory state.\textsuperscript{97} In founding the CEIP, Andrew Carnegie and his associates worked from the assumption that the same approach that was at the time producing improvements in urban planning and public hygiene could also be applied to the problem of war and peace. Reform institutions such as the Carnegie Endowment would commission research on the major causes of international conflict and thus help formulate policies for a more stable, equitable and peaceful world order.

The CEIP’s place in this broader movement—and that of America’s major philanthropic foundations more generally—illustrates a significant feature of the genesis of social change in the early twentieth century: the story of social reform was not always one of progressive insurgents storming the bastions of an entrenched conservatism but was frequently led from the top.\textsuperscript{98} The gentlemen Carnegie had assembled in December 1910 hardly fit the bill of grassroots pacifists seeking to reign in callous elites. By most sociological markers they and the remainder of the eighty persons who would serve as CEIP trustees before the Second World War were a remarkably homogeneous and powerful
they were exclusively male, mostly wealthy, overwhelmingly Protestant—the only Jewish trustee, Oscar S. Straus, died in 1926—and virtually all of them traced their family history to Britain or Germany. Only a few of them had ties to the traditional organized peace movement in the United States but this did not make their abhorrence of war any less sincere. Many of the trustees belonged to a generation that had experienced the Civil War or its aftermath during their youths—“lame men, men with a blue patch to hide an eye that had been destroyed, men upon crutches,” as Andrew J. Montague described his childhood experiences in Virginia. Overall, this biographical background clearly shaped their views on the means by which world peace would finally be achieved. Just as America’s rapid industrial development had been steered by energetic “men of affairs” they believed that the cause of peace necessitated not so much pious exhortations by Christian preachers but the pragmatism and intellectual leadership of the nation’s best and brightest.

The programmatic outlook these men represented was closely associated with the two cities that became the CEIP’s main bases of operation in the United States: Washington, DC, and New York. Many of the trustees were part of what Priscilla Roberts has identified as the first and second generation of the American foreign policy establishment that led the push for a more expansive interpretation of America’s national interest. They were the international lawyers, colonial administrators and strategists who shaped America’s initial ascent to world power status. Elihu Root had served as Secretary of War under President William McKinley and devised the outlines of colonial governance for the Philippines before serving as Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909. Joseph H. Choate, perhaps the nation’s leading trial lawyer, had spent six years as ambassador to London and represented the United States at the Hague Conference of 1907. Throughout the interwar years, past government service in foreign policy positions would continue to be a well-traveled path toward CEIP trusteeship. Over the course of its first three decades the Board would include eight former secretaries or assistant secretaries of state, ten former ambassadors and eleven active or retired congressmen. Impressed by America’s growing clout as an industrialized nation they were less

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99 This and all following prosopographical analysis is based on a data concerning all men who served on the CEIP Board between 1914 and 1945. Biographical data was mainly derived from the CEIP’s annual reports and entries in Who Is Who in America, supplemented with additional information. The results are similar to the conclusions reached by Inderjeet Parmar from a similar sample for the years 1939–45, cf. Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*, 49–53; Parmar, “Engineering Consent,” 37–39.

100 Speech manuscript, 1928, Box 4, Folder 8, Andrew J. Montague Papers, LoV; only three of the interwar trustees were active in America’s main pacifist organization, the American Peace Society.


idealistic promoters of peace than proto-realists, the first “managers of state power” (Alan Dawley), comfortable with an assertive pursuit of the national interest, even as they sometimes wrestled with the implications of territorial expansion and rule over foreign peoples for America’s democratic polity.  

Lobbying the White House and the State Department for a more active, outward-looking American foreign policy was part of the CEIP’s raison d’être. Andrew Carnegie had timed its creation in 1910 to lend support to an initiative by President Howard Taft, who had just announced his support for U.S. participation in binding international arbitration treaties. Taft’s proposal came to nothing but one legacy of this founding history was that a general orientation toward the federal executive remained built into the foundation’s infrastructure: “The principal office of the association shall be in the City of Washington, in the District of Columbia,” decreed section one of article II of the CEIP’s charter. Its original headquarters at 2 Jackson Place—the adjacent buildings No. 4 and No. 6 were purchased a few years later—placed the foundation near the heart of the administrative center of American foreign policy. The Endowment’s offices looked out onto Lafayette Square, whose southern boundary was formed by Pennsylvania Avenue and the White House. Only two hundred meters of open space separated the peace organization from the residence of the President of the United States; the Executive Office Building housing the State, War, and Navy Departments was literally down the road. Meanwhile, the CEIP’s greater physical distance from the Capitol poignantly symbolized the foundation’s belief that foreign policy was more properly handled behind the closed doors of the executive than openly debated in the halls of Congress.

While Washington, DC, was the city of the practitioners of the country’s newly assertive foreign policy, its strongest constituency was located further north, in cosmopolitan New York. A city that was rapidly growing into the world’s financial hub, New York had much to gain from America becoming more engaged with the world and it is thus not surprising that almost one third of all trustees lived in the Greater New York City area, either directly in Manhattan or in the wealthy suburban areas of Long Island and New Jersey. These trustees were partially drawn from New York’s traditional social elites of merchants and bankers, such as William Jay Schieffelin, Jr., owner of a wholesale drug company and scion of the Vanderbilt family. Later on, they also represented rising professions such as lawyers, journalists, and educators. 

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105 Dawley, Changing the World, 23–24.
107 Cf. CEIP Year Book 1912, 9.
108 Cf. CEIP Year Book 1918, 59.
as corporate managers Thomas J. Watson of IBM and Harper Sibley, who chaired the boards of, among others, the New York Life Insurance Company, the Western Union Telegraph Company and the Hollister Lumber Company. Well-represented were also lawyers working for major Manhattan law firms, for instance Arthur A. Ballantine of Root, Clark & Buckner or John Foster Dulles of Sullivan & Cromwell. Particularly close was the connection between the Carnegie Endowment and the most prominent of the Wall Street merchant banks—J.P. Morgan & Company. Former Morgan partners such as George W. Perkins, Robert Bacon and Dwight W. Morrow were a constant presence on the Board and in the interwar years the firm’s general counsel John W. Davis became one of the CEIP’s most influential trustees.\(^{110}\)

Wall Street—Carnegie Endowment—Washington. The mingling of economic interests and peace activism embodied by the CEIP’s Board of Trustees would seem to imply a rather straightforward interpretation of the foundation’s function in American politics: philanthropy as a vehicle by which an ascendant corporate America sought to impose its preferred foreign policy on the nation. This was certainly the view of contemporary critics such as journalist Upton Sinclair, who pointed to the “interlocking directorates” that tied the CEIP to the “American plutocracy” as indications of influence peddling.\(^{111}\) Recent historiography has been more skeptical about such direct, causal links, yet, studies by Ellen Condliffe Lagemann or Inderjeet Parmar that adopt a Gramscian perspective in stressing the CEIP’s role as an instrument for establishing cultural hegemony share the earlier critics’ focus on the identities and interests of the trustees.\(^{112}\) While the strands that connected the foundation to America’s business elites are certainly vital to understanding its activities, a closer look at the actual functioning of the Endowment during its first three decades yields surprisingly little support for theories of economic elite domination. Despite the illustrious names of the trustees, the CEIP’s true center of gravity lay elsewhere—with the foundation’s permanent staff of academics.

Significantly, the CEIP as an institution was anything but a smooth, centrally run machine, on which a unified approach could have been imposed. Rather, the type of organization that emerged over the course of its first two years resembled three coexisting, sometimes only loosely coordinating


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fiefdoms. The Washington office, in addition to housing the foundation’s Secretariat, was also home to the Division of International Law, under the authority of James Brown Scott. Already during its second year, the foundation established a second foothold in New York with the purchase of a five-story building on Manhattan’s West 117th Street, adjacent to Columbia University’s campus in the Morningside Heights neighborhood, thus laying the groundwork for what became the foundation’s almost symbiotic relationship with one of America’s ascendant academic centers. The new office served as headquarters for the Division of History and Economics, headed successively by Columbia professors John Bates Clark and James T. Shotwell, as well as for the Division of Intercourse and Education under the university’s president Nicholas Murray Butler. The three divisional directors enjoyed large discretion over the administration of their respective units, which left the presidency of the Endowment, held initially by Elihu Root, with the largely ceremonial task of presenting a uniform image to the outside world rather than of enforcing a single philosophy within the organization.

This structure effectively negated much of the trustees’ statutory power to set foundation policy as it left the board with remarkably little sway over its directors. Butler, Shotwell and Scott were all accomplished academics or academic administrators by the time they assumed their CEIP positions and, in contrast to other major philanthropies, they served on an unsalaried, voluntary basis. Secure in their careers, the directors had little reason to feel compelled to serve as academic auxiliary troops for the East Coast’s moneyed interests and they even frustrated most of the Board’s legitimate attempts to exercise its oversight role. This development was further abetted when early in its history the Board decided that Endowment funds should only be spent on original, CEIP-organized initiatives rather than handed out as subsidies to existing organizations. The policy appears to have originally been intended to protect the Endowment’s coffers from influential persons—including trustees—soliciting funds on behalf of their own pet projects. But the effect of this decision was that it made the trustees more dependent on the expertise of the directors and their full-time staff. With originality and seamless integration into existing programs the benchmarks by which new expenditures were judged, the busy trustees usually deferred to the knowledge and experience of those most familiar with the subjects. “It is a bad policy to have your directors your masters,”

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113 CEIP Year Book 1912, 61.
114 Greco sees the trustees as playing an “unimportant role with the exception of the periodic drafting of public resolutions,” cf. Greco, “A Foundation for Internationalism,” 10.
115 Parmar’s argument that declining public funds made academics more dependent on access to philanthropic resources is convincing for the post-1945 era but less applicable to the pre- and interwar period when American research institutions—and Columbia University in particular—were expanding; cf. Parmar, Foundations of the American Century, 10.
116 See e.g. Trustee Oscar S. Straus’s habit of filibustering board meetings on behalf of his three-hundred-member New York Peace Society, cf. CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 29 April 1921, pp. 89, Box 14, CEIP US.
Montague once complained during a meeting. “No corporation would do business that way.” Yet, for at least the first two decades of its operations the trustees remained a largely passive presence. Even on the seven-member Executive Committee that had to sign off on all of the CEIP’s expenditures it was the directors’ opinions that counted most.

There was good reason for the board’s silence for, despite its hands-off approach, the CEIP’s policies usually tracked closely with the trustees’ preferences and expectations. The academics who steered the foundation lacked the personal wealth or prominent family names of their nominal overseers, yet, they, too, considered themselves part of the nation’s leadership elite. As Thomas Bender has noted, the rise of the East Coast research university in the late nineteenth century was inseparable from a broader movement to establish exclusive and selective social and cultural institutions that addressed elite concerns over the rising political influence of lower social classes. As professors of history, law and education at premier institutions of higher learning the CEIP directors considered themselves legitimate gatekeepers to the nation’s levers of power. The directors exhibited a variety of views on the social issues of their times, but, on balance, they shared the view of the trustees that change needed to be gradual and that even in a democratic polity decision-making needed to be guided by established elites—especially in matters as important as questions concerning war and peace.

The man who best exemplified this convergence of worldviews was Nicholas Murray Butler, who over the course of the first fifteen years emerged as the dominant figure in the Endowment. His Division of Intercourse and Education was the largest of the CEIP’s three sections and later he would succeed Elihu Root to the Endowment’s presidency. He eventually came to dominate the board with a mixture of deference to the trustees’ social status and unwavering conviction in his own abilities as an intellectual leader. A succinct testament to Butler’s views on political and intellectual leadership is a brief collection of speeches he published in 1907 under the title True and False Democracy. To Butler, the individual members of a community constituted both “the people” and “the mob,” depending on the quality of leadership guiding them. Left to their own devices or misled by demagogues, citizens would gravitate toward short-sighted and selfish, but ultimately unsound,

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117 CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 29 April 1927, pp. 53, Box 14, Folder 4, CEIP US.
120 This dynamic was similar to Butler’s interaction with Columbia University’s board of trustees, cf. Robert A MacCaughey, Stand, Columbia: A History of Columbia University in the City of New York, 1754–2004. (New York: Columbia UP, 2003), 217.
solutions. To steer a community on a path toward progress and long-lasting prosperity required both wise politicians and intellectual leaders able to bring citizens to a clear-sighted understanding of the issues at hand. What the United States and the world needed was an “aristocracy of intellect and service,” a “small phalanx of eminent men” that would make the difference between progress and decline.¹²² For Butler, cultural institutions such as the CEIP and Columbia University, were thus key components of a liberal democracy as they elevated public discourse, trained capable leaders and prepared the ground for political decisions.

For Butler and his fellow directors such views of joint leadership were grounded in their everyday lived experience as their academic sphere and the world of the trustees intersected in multiple public and private spaces. Many of the trustees and some of the directors, especially Butler, were engaged in Republican Party politics¹²³ and they saw each other regularly while serving on the boards of other charities and philanthropies. Perhaps the clearest example of a shared social space pertained to the practice of joint upper-class sociability associated with the contemporary gentlemen’s club. Among the members of New York’s exclusive Century Association, for instance, were all three of the foundation’s divisional directors as well as at least twenty-seven trustees.¹²⁴ Shaped by (mostly informal) selection criteria that allowed access to a variety of professions while effectively excluding women, racial minorities and those of lower income, elite clubs played a key role in integrating America’s upper class across sectoral divides.¹²⁵ In this way, the club and the CEIP performed quite similar functions for the construction of shared knowledge and values across an upper segment of American society through the dual process of excluding large portions of potentially dissenting voices while eliding the social contingency of the views of its members. To Butler, the club was “a land without rich or poor, without rank or station, without title or outward marks of distinction.”¹²⁶ It was the very homogeneity of such institutions that often left members with the impression of representing the mainstream of American thought on any given issue.

¹²² Ibid., 13–14, 56.
¹²³ Over the entire interwar period, Republicans outnumbered Democrats two-to-one, however, many Democrats only joined the Board during the 1930s as the CEIP responded to the shifting political constellation. Initially, the key figures in the organization—including Root, Butler and Carnegie himself—were largely associated with the progressive, Rooseveltian wing of the Republican party; cf. Fabian, Andrew Carnegie’s Peace Endowment; Rosenthal, Nicholas Miraculous, 172–1978; Zimmermann, First Great Triumph, 140–142.
¹²⁴ Membership information kindly provided by the Century Association’s archives; Butler alone belonged to at least eleven similar establishments: the Union Club, the Century Association, the Metropolitan Club, the University Club, The Brook, the Union League, the Church Club, the Lotos Club, the Pilgrims of the United States, the Metropolitan Club of Washington, DC, and the Bohemians of San Francisco.
¹²⁶ “Dinner Tendered to Right Hon. David Lloyd George at the Lotos Club New York City,” 1 November 1923, p. 9, Box 213, Butler Papers, RBML Columbia.
In summary, the Carnegie Endowment’s institutional arrangements are evidence of an organization in which cultural production was not directly subjected to economic interests but in which the two spheres engaged in a much more symbiotic relationship than is usually assumed. It was a site where economic, social and cultural forms of capital were joined to the benefit of all involved. The foundation’s businessmen-trustees freely dispensed money from the endowment fund with few questions asked while the directors returned the favor by awarding academic honors—for instance the almost obligatory Columbia University honorary doctorate—and by inviting trustees on foundation-sponsored trips abroad. In the process, the trustees and directors collectively constituted themselves as members of the (mostly Republican) East Coast’s foreign policy establishment with broadly shared ideas on the principles that should guide foreign relations. As Shotwell later described this intermingling of spheres, Butler “got his opinions very largely [from the] crowd in the Union League Club or in one of the Republican centers, where they had no knowledge whatever of the real American public opinion.”\textsuperscript{127} Fitting as it was in a domestic context, Shotwell’s assessment was too narrow in one significant aspect: while the CEIP’s directors and trustees rarely went beyond class, race and gender divides to solicit opinions, the same did not hold true for national boundaries. Already at the moment it was created, the Carnegie Endowment rested on preexisting networks that encompassed elites in several countries.

\textbf{A liberal internationalism: The founding of the Centre Européen}

That the quest for world peace and international stability would require, above all, transatlantic outreach was one of the starting propositions of the Carnegie Endowment. In the years leading up to 1910, the major European powers had spun a web of military alliances and now a series of political crises, especially in the Balkans, left little doubt as to where the peace of the world was most threatened. Accordingly, establishing a presence in “those countries of Europe with which questions of peace and war are much more pressing and difficult”\textsuperscript{128} than in the United States was pursued with great urgency. The foundation’s Executive Committee first broached the issue at its third meeting on 13 June 1911 and quickly dispatched Nicholas Murray Butler across the Atlantic to survey the situation on the ground. Arriving at a time when the Agadir Crisis between France and Germany over control of Morocco brought Europe to the brink of war, Butler settled on Paris as the most promising location for an office, later crediting the choice of the French capital with the “long primacy of France and of the city of Paris in international affairs and the use of the French language in formal diplomatic


\textsuperscript{128} CEIP Year Book 1911, 21.
intercourse". But while the CEIP was eager to act, its arrival on the Continent was not without possible pitfalls. Its deep pockets dwarfed the resources available to any of the European peace societies and hence the entire structure of the CEIP’s initial European organization was intended to avoid any impression of American domination. The Centre Européen that was inaugurated with little fanfare on 23 March 1912 at 24 rue Pierre Curie in Paris thus looked less like the headquarters of a self-assured, new global player than like an understated joint venture. It shared its office space with the French Association de la Paix par le Droit, whose managing officers Jean Jules Prudhommeaux and Jules Louis Puech also became the center’s secretary and assistant secretary.

Who were the Europeans that entered into a partnership with the American foundation? A first, if not entirely accurate, picture is provided by the Centre Européen’s first official contacts on the Continent: a thirty-member Advisory Council officially created to help set the policy of the new center as well as sixteen Special Correspondents who were requested to deliver occasional reports on the state of the cause of peace in their home countries. Both groups were politically and nationally diverse and included many of the most prominent pacifists of the time: Bertha von Suttner, Ludwig Quidde, Norman Angell, Henri La Fontaine. If it seemed somewhat incongruous for the temperamentally conservative CEIP to call principled, even radical pacifists such as von Suttner and Angell into its service the reality was that, as a group, these men and women were never intended to have a direct impact on the Endowment’s policies. The members of the Advisory Council served on a purely “honorary” basis, Butler assured the trustees, and their “duties [were] merely advisory.” Not all of the CEIP’s connections were created equal as many contacts were maintained either for the sake of political expediency or to enhance the foundation’s credibility within the European peace movement.

A better guide to the social, cultural and political milieu that welcomed and sustained the CEIP’s European outreach is a man like Paul-Henri-Benjamin d’Estournelles de Constant, the Advisory Council’s first president, who gradually emerged as the Centre Européen’s de-facto director.

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129 CEIP Year Book 1913–1914, 59.  
132 Cf. CEIP Year Book 1913–14, x–xiii.  
133 Cf. CEIP Year Book 1911, 45.  
retired French diplomat and now senator for the liberal Parti Radical, d’Estournelles de Constant already looked back on a long and distinguished career as an advocate for peace that had earned him the Nobel Price for Peace two years earlier. Although in the Senate he often led a lonely fight for peace, he was anything but a radical firebrand, holding, for instance, complete disarmament to be incompatible with the nation’s dignity. D’Estournelles de Constant was also already well-acquainted with the CEIP’s leading figures, having initiated an organization that prefigured many of the foundation’s early transatlantic networks: the Conciliation Internationale (CI). Founded in 1905, this peace organization had spread quickly to other parts of Europe and across the Atlantic by setting up national sections in several countries.\footnote{On Conciliation Internationale and its national sections see esp. Barcelo, \textit{Paul d’Estournelles de Constant, Prix Nobel de la Paix 1909: L’expression d’une idée européenne}, chap. 10; Tournès, “La Dotation Carnegie Pour La Paix Internationale et l’invention de la diplomatie philanthropique,” 28; Roger Chickering, “A Voice of Moderation in Imperial Germany: The ‘Verband Für Internationale Verständigung,’ 1911–1914,” \textit{Journal of Contemporary History} 8, no. 1 (1973): 147–64.}

De Constant’s CI may be said to represent an alternative founding story of the Carnegie Endowment that challenges the narrative of American outreach to Europe and turns it on its head: “Be not deceived—in fact the Endowment is the child of the Conciliation,” d’Estournelles de Constant later reminded Elihu Root of the original relationship between the two organizations.\footnote{D’Estournelles de Constant to Elihu Root, 7 September 1921, Box 5, Butler Papers, RBML Columbia.} Indeed, many of the key figures in the CEIP’s founding—Andrew Carnegie, Butler, Root, Robert Bacon, Joseph H. Choate—had started out as the American section of CI and when the CEIP arrived on the Continent in 1911, CI became the initial bedrock of its European network—more than two-thirds of the members of its Advisory Council were drawn from its ranks.\footnote{At the start of the First World War, twenty-one of the Advisory Council’s thirty members were also Conciliation Internationale members, cf. CEIP Year Book (1915), x–xii; \textit{Bulletin de la Conciliation Internationale} 1912, pp. 63–71.}

From the beginning, the CEIP was thus allied with a “very elitist” organization (Tournès)\footnote{Tournès, “La Dotation Carnegie Pour La Paix Internationale et l’invention de la diplomatie philanthropique,” 28.} that was closely tied to Europe’s traditional liberal, bourgeois milieu. Its members were intellectual leaders teaching at premier academic institutions such as the Sorbonne or the University of Berlin—Henri Bergson, Wilhelm Julius Foerster, Heinrich Lammasch. Many were members of parliament for liberal political parties—Léon Bourgeois, Philip Stanhope, Albert Apponyi. They often belonged to elite social institutions such as London’s Reform Club or the Institut de France and wrote for liberal press outlets (\textit{Journal des débats, Westminster Gazette, Vossische Zeitung}). Almost all of them were already participants in the thriving field of cultural internationalism as participants in such institutions as the
Inter-parliamentary Union, the International Postal Union or the Permanent Court of Arbitration.\textsuperscript{139} This was, in short, the section of the international peace movement that Martin Coadel has italicized as "pacifists" rather than "pacifists".\textsuperscript{140} Situated at the intersection between peace activism and the political establishment, they considered war less an absolute evil to be condemned in moralistic terms than a threat to domestic and international order, to economic growth and personal liberty.

The socio-cultural background of the CEIP’s European associates was representative of a key ambiguity in the history of early twentieth century internationalism: the tension between the liberal reform impulse and the quest for stability and order during times of social change. As a number of recent studies have shown, the internationalist movement was not so much an emancipatory counterweight to inequitable conditions but emerged from the same "liberal muddle" (Morefield) that also inspired competing ideologies.\textsuperscript{141} Deeply invested in the cause of international reform, the CEIP’s European partners were certainly no apologists for oppression and empire. Yet, just as their American colleagues on the Board of Trustees, they were by most sociological markers—class, education, gender, race—part of a privileged group and, on balance, their activism reflected the biases and prejudices of this background. Their internationalism was shaped by traditional liberal tenets, such as the belief that patriotism and internationalism were two sides of the same coin.\textsuperscript{142} But they also drew inspiration from more recent ideas circulating in academic and intellectual circles at the time: Spencerian Social Darwinism,\textsuperscript{143} German historicist economics,\textsuperscript{144} Henri Bergson’s philosophy of creativity.\textsuperscript{145} In the traditionally Anglo-centric literature on the history of liberal internationalism the impact of this intellectual tradition, fraught with complexity and ambiguity, has frequently been

\textsuperscript{139} For instance, seven of the thirty-one members of the Advisory Council were also members of the Inter-parliamentary Union, cf. CEIP Year Book 1915, x–xii.


\textsuperscript{142} This cosmopolitan worldview was clearly shaped by the writings of nineteenth century liberal nationalists such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Giuseppe Mazzini cf. Ulrich Beck, \textit{The Cosmopolitan Vision} (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 9; Sigrid Thielking, \textit{Weltbürgertum: Kosmopolitische Ideen in Literatur und politischer Publicistik seit dem achten Jahrhundert} (Munich: Fink, 2000), 38–40.


\textsuperscript{144} Many of the younger members of this field, including Nicholas Murray Butler, had studied Nationalökonomie under liberal German professors such as Lujo Brentano, Gustav von Schmoller and Friedrich Meinecke; cf. Nicholas Murray Butler, \textit{Across the Busy Years: Recollections and Reflections} (New York: Scribner, 1940), vol I, 125; Bonn, \textit{So macht man Geschichte}, 57–62; on the broader significance of German economics for transnational reform discourses, cf. Rodgers, \textit{Atlantic Crossings}, 88–111.

overlooked.

For instance, perhaps the single overarching theme of d’Estournelles de Constant’s peace activism was his belief that Europe was facing an “onslaught of universal competition” from other parts of the world that made it unconscionable for governments to continue to waste their resources on intra-European quarrels such as the Franco-German conflict over Alsace-Lorraine. Promoting peace at home would enable “joint external action, in the East and in the Far East.”  

The proximate trigger for such cultural pessimism was a “Yellow Peril” discourse common in early twentieth century intellectual circles in the wake of the Chinese Boxer Rebellion and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Underlying d’Estournelles de Constant’s urge to protect the Old World’s global supremacy, however, was a broader turn within the liberal intellectual tradition toward support for imperial projects as a means for elevating the nation and mankind in general. While not in favor of brutal conquest, he, along with many of the CEIP’s European allies, strongly supported the idea of a reformed colonialism that stressed the civilizing aspect of imperial governance. Originally founded on the principle of the equality of all, Europe’s Imperial Liberalism had taken the reformist spirit of the liberal outlook, projected it outwards and justified a hierarchical world order by excluding so-called “inferior peoples” from the domain of liberalism’s protection of the individual.

D’Estournelles de Constant’s cooperation with the CEIP was directly related to this pursuit of European cultural hegemony as he had identified the United States as the decisive factor that could reinvigorate Western Civilization. Frequent travel to the United States, addressing American audiences and building networks with American opinion leaders was part of a project to “make [the American people] realize the incalculable service they could render to civilization, as well as to themselves.” For one, he thought that the economic vigor and political stability of American republicanism, particularly the country’s federal architecture, could serve as an example for Europe’s development:

It is important that the great transatlantic republic should so act as to stand out in contrast to the weaknesses of the Old World; that it should set an example of numerous and varied states federated together in liberty; that it should thus affirm the possibility of a form of progress

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146 De Constant, “La politique de la Paix,” 1–3; the language of an “onslaught of universal competition” was also included in the CI’s official program, cf. Bulletin de la Conciliation Internationale 1906, p. 6.


incredible to the Old World. In addition to serving as a role model, d’Estournelles de Constant also expected the United States to assist the Europeans in more tangible ways. The Eight-Nation Alliance that had suppressed the Boxer Rebellion in China had contained a sizeable American contingent, leading the CI president to hope for a more permanent military alliance. In the long term, he envisioned a world in which a Pan-American and a European confederation would join forces to defend Western Civilization against the “barbarism” of Asians and Africans, of Buddhists and Muslims.

D’Estournelles de Constant’s views on transatlantic partnership can, of course, not be easily generalized for the entirety of the Carnegie Endowment’s diverse array of European associates. The case of its first European director does, however, exemplify some key points that applied generally across the foundation’s activities both in its initial phase and in its later years: Firstly, those who cooperated closely with the CEIP usually did so within the context of overarching political, ideological or professional agendas that need to be taken into account when analyzing the foundation’s initiatives. Their support for the CEIP was part of a strategy to elevate, to transnationalize contemporary issues that they believed exceeded the grasp of the single nation state. Whether it was the future of European culture in an interconnected world, the stability of international markets or Franco-German animosity—European liberals who turned to the CEIP were concerned about issues not easily settled through national political systems.

Secondly, the discourses that circulated in this transnational arena need to be viewed as part of the practice of early twentieth century elite sociability. For instance, d’Estournelles de Constant’s frequent invocation of “civilization” was characteristic for a field replete with references to “civilizational progress,” the “civilized world,” “Western civilization,” etc.—thus referencing a concept that was a pervasive but also nebulous feature of nineteenth and early twentieth century intellectual discourse. This lack of precise meaning was characteristic of a transnational field that habitually operated with abstract slogans such as the “rule of law,” the “international mind,” “Franco-American” or “Anglo-Saxon friendship.” These were, above all, integrating social constructs that allowed speakers to rhetorically claim participation in a work towards a greater good while drawing boundaries against those external to the identity. Significantly, these boundaries were highly dependent on context and were constantly renegotiated as speakers presented their ideas in academic

150 Ibid., 521.
journals, at conferences and receptions, while conversing in hotel lobbies or in the salons of ocean liners. For instance, during a U.S. lecture tour, CEIP Advisory Council member Albert Apponyi framed a talk on the history of his native Hungary as the story of a “bulwark of Occidental Civilization” against the “barbarian hordes of the East”—thus placing Hungary and his American audience on the side of civilization while implicitly assigning many parts of Eastern Europe to a less flattering category.

Thirdly, wherever the boundaries were drawn, a common feature of these transnational identities was an unabashed elitism and paternalism. “Nations touch at their summits. It is always the highest class which travels most, knows most of foreign nations,” nineteenth century British journalist Walter Bagehot had proclaimed. This view was certainly shared by the liberal internationalists connected to the CEIP, who considered international affairs a métier rightfully reserved to the best and the brightest. Participants in institutions such as Conciliation Internationale and the Carnegie Endowment tended to see their role not so much as giving agency to the voiceless and powerless but as constituting themselves as an internationalist vanguard destined for intellectual leadership. “Our members, mutually informed and interconnected, contribute to the maintenance of peace through their influence on public opinion, through the press, through parliaments and through governments themselves,” the CI’s program declared.

This transnational leadership was seen as all the more important as in the years following the Centre Européen’s founding the liberal ideals of the movement were becoming distinctly unfashionable. The CEIP had originally intended to complement its presence in Paris with an office in London, but with Britain and Germany locked in a naval arms race Butler judged that there was little utility in coming to the aid of a movement whose level of public support was “scanty in the extreme.” With Europe moving from crisis to crisis, few of its citizens were in the mood to discuss ideas of civilizational progress and universal brotherhood. Reflecting on the rise of nationalism and militarism in his own country, d’Estournelles de Constant lamented that the national spirit had become “wilfully falsified and obscured” and that even many of his friends failed to see the “patriotic character” of his endeavors. This was the atmosphere in which the CEIP launched its first major initiative on the Continent, an attempt to defuse Europe’s increasing polarization over events in Southeastern Europe.

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156 Cf. CEIP Year Book 1911, 67.
In July 1913, as the Second Balkan War was drawing to a close, the Endowment commissioned an international group of experts to tour the region, investigate the situation and compile an authoritative report. Objective facts were to cut through the propaganda produced from all sides. Coordination between New York, the Centre Européen and the investigators proved time consuming, however, and the enterprise would take almost a year to complete.\(^{158}\)

The following summer, Butler was travelling in Europe just as the Continent was again approaching the brink of war. The CEIP director responded to the rising tensions by first rushing the Balkan Report—which distributed blame fairly widely across all parties—to the press and then calling a series of emergency meetings between the foundation’s European partners, chaired by d’Estournelles de Constant. The two men evidently hoped that assembling prominent citizens from the major powers at the Centre Européen for informal discussions could help defuse the situation by establishing a set of agreed-upon facts and perhaps tentative recommendation for a resolution of the conflict. The CEIP’s partners would then return to their respective countries and use their authority as leaders of public opinion to dampen nationalist passions. Indeed, the Centre Européen meetings, held less than two weeks before the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, produced consensus that the “spirit of militarism” had become a threat that was “sufficient to cause alarm for the near future.”\(^{159}\) Despite such unanimity of purpose the CEIP’s activists soon discovered, as did advocates for peace across Europe, that their calls for restraint would go unheeded.

“Anarchy! The war and the crisis of liberalism

With the start of the First World War both the liberal internationalist field and the larger peace movement foundered. National borders became much less permeable, impeding transportation and communication, as Butler experienced firsthand when he was only able to escape the European conflagration after a circuitous journey through the Italian port of Genoa.\(^{160}\) Many German, French and Belgian activists, including the Centre Européen’s secretaries Jules Prudhommeaux and Louis Puech, left their desks and were drafted into national war service.\(^{161}\) Even more damaging to the field was the ideological polarization that ensued as artists and intellectuals sought to contribute to the national struggle by joining the war of ideas. D’Estournelles de Constant was among the leading pre-war voices for peace who now argued against a quick, negotiated settlement. Prussian militarism would have to be defeated before justice could be restored, and that meant fighting until victory.\(^{162}\)

\(^{158}\) Cf. Akhund, “The Two Carnegie Reports.”

\(^{159}\) CEIP Year Book 1915, 59; see also Prudhommeaux, Le Centre Européen, 66–67.


\(^{161}\) Cf. CEIP Year Book 1915, 51; Prudhommeaux, Le Centre Européen, 70.

\(^{162}\) Cf. Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism, 188–192; see also Aleksander Dmitriev, “La Mobilisation Intellectuelle. La
On the other side, one of the foremost intellectuals of the German CI section, historian Karl Lamprecht, signed the *Aufruf an die Kulturwelt*, a document intended to associate Germany’s academic elite with the war effort by brusquely denying German war crimes in Belgium and accusing Germany’s adversaries of having perverted civilization with an assault on Germany’s unique *Kultur*.

Although most Americans were shocked by the news of German atrocities in Belgium and France, the CEIP at first sought to remain aloof and instructed the Centre Européen to halt most of its activities. At a time when America debated its role in the struggle, the Endowment was not to be seen as violating U.S. neutrality.

This changed with America’s entry into the war in April 1917, when the Carnegie Endowment joined the global trend of intellectuals rallying around the flag. To the great consternation of American pacifists who were looking to the foundation for support in trying times the CEIP abandoned its peace rhetoric and supported the war effort unconditionally. On 1 November 1917, the Executive Committee passed a resolution declaring victory over imperial Germany “the most effectual means of promoting international peace.” All CEIP stationary was replaced with a new letterhead carrying the banner “Peace Through Victory” and the Board of Trustees pledged an entire year’s worth of income—half a million dollars—to support reconstruction projects in France and Belgium once the war had been won. Eager to portray its Centre Européen as an integral part of the war effort the Paris office was rebranded as an information center for visiting American soldiers and officials, run in close cooperation with organizations such as the Comité France-Amérique and the American University Union. In a peculiar demonstration of loyalty, the Centre Européen even stopped a subsidy for *La Paix par le Droit*, the journal edited by its own secretary. Prudhommeaux had come under public criticism in France for his allegedly insufficient support for the war effort after having advocated for a timely, negotiated peace.

As disorienting as the start of the war had been for liberal internationalists, its conclusion and

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165 Cf. CEIP Year Book 1918, 19–26, 37.

166 Cf. CEIP Year Book 1921, 35–36.

167 Cf. CEIP Year Book 1918, 77–79.
aftermath was even more significant for the foundation’s future outlook. Neither those who had served the CEIP before 1914 nor those who would rise to positions of prominence in the organization over the course of the following two decades experienced the Great War at an age that would have made the event the defining, formative experience of their lifetime.\footnote{On the First World War as a formative generational event that brought about a shift in zeitgeist, cf. Beate Fietze, \textit{Historische Generationen: Über einen sozialen Mechanismus kulturellen Wandels und kollektiver Kreativität} (Bielefeld: transcript, 2008), esp. 180.} Already set in their careers and worldviews, they tended not to share in the radical political and ideological responses that the war had engendered among the youths worldwide and generally expected that the cataclysmic violence would soon be followed by a return to a state of normalcy. The international system would return to a version of the pre-1914 order, fortified by new institutions such as a League of Nations, demobilized workers would return to their factories, women would again confine themselves to domestic work and discharged troops from Africa and India would, once returned to their home countries, accept the reestablishment of regular colonial rule.

This was not what happened. At the end of the global upheaval class, gender and race relations were in flux, with many of those who had traditionally been politically marginalized demanding change: Socialist movements worldwide were in the ascendancy and in many countries women fought successfully for the right to full political participation.\footnote{Cf. Geoff Eley, \textit{Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Dorothy Sue Cobble, “A Higher ‘Standard of Life’ for the World: U.S. Labor Women’s Reform Internationalism and the Legacies of 1919,” \textit{Journal of American History} 100, no. 4 (March 2014): 1052–1085; Leila J. Rupp, \textit{Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), esp. 27–32.} Global racial hierarchies were also becoming less stable, especially during what Erez Manela has called the “Wilsonian Moment” of 1918/19 when people the world over harbored hopes for “a radical transformation of their status in international society.”\footnote{Manela, \textit{The Wilsonian Moment}, 5.} Looking to work jointly for a more equitable world order, groups often reached out across national borders. Originally founded in The Hague in 1915, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) became a strong voice for peace as well as for class and gender justice. The first Pan-African Congress was held in Paris in 1919 to coincide with the peace negotiations and the following year Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association held its first international congress in New York, marking the rise of Black Internationalism and Pan-Africanism. To these movements, the horrors of the war pointed to fundamental social imbalances that needed to be addressed through decisive reform if the world was to avoid another catastrophe.\footnote{Cf. Melinda Plastas, \textit{A Band of Noble Women: Racial Politics in the Women’s Peace Movement} (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 103–104; Carrie A. Foster, \textit{The Women and the Warriors: The U.S. Section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 1915–1946} (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 52.} A speaker at the first post-war convention of the Deutsche
Friedensgesellschaft (DFG) expressed the mood of the times when he assailed the timidity of his association’s leaders: “To be moral you have to be radically moral, because there is no non-radical morality. That’s why pacifism, too, will either have to be radical or it will not be at all.”

This outburst of reform enthusiasm was disquieting to many in the CEIP’s traditional, liberal milieu. The public statements and private correspondence of the foundation’s active and future associates during this time give testimony to a profound sense of disorientation, voiced in the language of disintegration and chaos: “destruction of social order” (Robert Lansing), “destructive anarchy” (d’Estournelles de Constant), “imminent revolution and collapse“ (Gilbert Murray). The world seemed to have become “a vast shouting and screaming mob, with fists shaking in the air and each trying to outshout his neighbors,” an alarmed CEIP President Elihu Root told the trustees. The Russian Revolution, Communist uprisings in Germany, Hungary and Italy, or Mahatma Gandhi’s Noncooperation Movement in India—quite disparate events were viewed as part of a “retrograde movement” (d’Estournelles de Constant), a “phantasmagoria of figures and faces and events […] and turbulences” (Butler) against which the pre-1914 world was romanticized as an era of tranquility.

The causes advocated by groups on all sides of these issues highlights how transnational activism was often an extension of domestic conflicts, an attempt to circumvent political opposition at the national level. WILPF called on members of its twenty-one national sections to work toward land reform and increased taxation in their countries “to awaken and strengthen among members of the possessing classes the earnest will to transform the economic system in the direction of social justice.”

D’Estournelles de Constant, meanwhile, seized on his connections to the Carnegie Endowment to rally support for the policies he thought would save the French republic. Convinced that radicalism was bred by economic hardship, he had long advocated for a policy of development (mise en valeur) that would channel funds currently used for armaments into infrastructure projects

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174 CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 7 December 1920, p. 79, Box 14, CEIP US.

175 D’Estournelles de Constant to Elihu Root, 7 September 1921, Box 5, Butler Papers, RBML Columbia; see also Hungarian CEIP partner Pál Teleki’s strikingly benevolent assessment of the Austrian emperor Franz Joseph: “His statecraft lacked ambition but was all the more tactful, and therein lay a good deal of wisdom.” Pál Teleki, “Die weltpolitische und weltwirtschaftliche Lage Ungarns,” *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* 3 (1926): 405.

in France and in its colonies. The CI leader’s ideas were in close accord with those of his fellow Parti Radical member and Minister of the Colonies Albert Sarraut, who wanted France to invest heavily in its overseas possession in the belief that economic growth would put a halt to Communist insurrection and bids for self-determination. As both men were struggling to convince the French political class to abandon its focus on physical security from Germany, d’Estournelles de Constant wrote to CEIP president Elihu Root, praising Sarraut’s ideas and urging Americans to work with France toward a benign colonial policy that would “bring about happy results for the future of civilization.”

European concerns over events in the Middle and in the Far East were shared in New York. At the December 1920 meeting of the Board of Trustees Nicholas Murray Butler launched into a passionate and alarmist speech, which the board members considered so important that they took the unusual step of instructing the secretary to have it reprinted in full in the CEIP’s upcoming annual report. In a lengthy monologue, Butler warned of the danger of a revolutionary wildfire spreading across the globe, a “highly organized and desperately made attack of a fanatical faith on the enlightening principles of Western civilization.” Communism would make “an immense appeal to Oriental people” due to their communal culture and the new creed would soon spread to the heart of the British Empire, to Persia and India. As Butler explained at the next meeting, there was reason to suspect a larger agenda beneath all the strife: a bid by the East to challenge the West’s supremacy by taking “control of the stage of civilization, instead of allowing Europe and America to occupy without challenge the place which they have dominated so long.” Protecting Europe’s colonial possession appeared to be essentially in America’s national interest.

The sources of unrest that really concerned Butler and many of the CEIP trustees, however, were a very different kind of “colonies”—the diversifying immigrant communities in major American cities that they associated with the threat of an alien radicalism. The director’s cri de cœur at the board meeting was fueled by nativist and anti-Communist sentiments shared by many Anglo-Saxon elites at the start of the 1920s. “We are disposed to laugh at Bolshevism […] and to pooh-pooh the idea of it ever menacing this country. I wish that we were less cocksure than we are,” Robert Lansing warned.

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179 D’Estournelles de Constant to Elihu Root, 7 September 1921, Box 5, Butler Papers, RBML Columbia; CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 7 December 1920, p. 28, Box 14, CEIP US.
180 CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 7 December 1920, pp. 27–28, Box 14, CEIP US; also CEIP Year Book 1920, 173–178.
181 CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 29 April 1921, p. 12, Box 14, CEIP US.
fellow board member John W. Davis. “Some day your friends on Wall Street may find their palatial homes alight with torches and ringing with the cries of the mob.” A striking visual representation of this siege mentality was produced in 1920 by a New York State Senate Committee which, in a local variant of the Palmer Raids, led police operations against institutions suspected of spreading socialism, anarchism and other seditious ideologies. As a preparatory step the committee had drawn up a map of “racial colonies” of Russian and Polish Jews spreading in menacing blood red across Manhattan from population centers in the Lower East Side, Harlem and the Bronx (fig. 1a). To men like Butler, Lansing and Davis, the radicalism of anti-colonial activists in Asia was a cause for concern in so far as it was seen as feeding a global, illiberal movement against the established order. The “barbarism” they were most concerned about emanated not from Indochina but from political and intellectual circles on the Lower East Side.

Fig. 1a. “Map of the borough of Manhattan and part of the Bronx showing location and extent of racial colonies,” 1920. CEIP’s Morningside Heights neighborhood at center-left. (Courtesy of the The Lionel Pincus & Princess Firyal Map Division, The New York Public Library)

As this example shows, the transnationalization of politics did not necessarily imply that those who cooperated were working towards identical goals—the logical link between d’Estournelles de Constant’s concerns about Indochina and Butler’s anti-radicalism was tenuous, at best. The glue that

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linked diverse local projects often consisted of shared discourses rather than shared interests. Coalitions were built on concepts that could either be strategically appropriated or serve as foundations for forming more permanent transnational communities. For instance, in the early 1920s a discourse condemning global “imperialism” became a common frame of reference for reform movements across a wide political spectrum from the Communist International, to the women’s rights activists of WILPF, to German republican activists, to even the American Association for Outlawry, a group run by Chicago lawyer Salmon O. Levinson that was closely allied with Senator Borah’s “isolationists” in the U.S. Senate. In the words of political theorist Leonard Woolf there was an economic motive linking inequality and exploitation at home and abroad:

\[\text{Just as the holder of capital in Europe has been enabled to exploit the worker and consumer economically for his own profit, so the white man armed with the power of the modern state […] can reduce to subjection, and then exploit economically for his own profit, the land and labour of the less developed Asiatic and African.}\]

Imperialism in this sense became a symbol signifying that the current international system was rigged against a large number of people—be they cotton producers in India, factory workers in the Ruhr or farmers in the American Midwest. To the liberal vision of a world peacefully interconnected by commerce, finance and travel they objected that the current system was based on domination, coercion and cut-throat competition. It were these iniquities, anti-imperialists argued, that bred war.

A competing discourse frequently employed by those in favor of a return to the pre-war status quo was that of a disruption of the civilizational process. There were few attempts to define what precisely “civilization” entailed but one feature of this discourse was a radically different view of the value of empires: an institution anti-imperialist reformers regarded as standing for oppression appeared to many conservatives and traditional liberals as representing order, peace and continuity in governance. Even liberals from the former Central Powers respected the British Empire as the embodiment of the cosmopolitan civilizational values they cherished, safeguarding global transportation and serving as the “crossroads of world trade.” Similarly, the Habsburg Empire elicited sympathy from many liberals in Allied countries and the Wilsonian concept of national self-determination which had been used to justify its breakup was widely viewed with suspicion. To James Shotwell, it was “a most dangerous shibboleth” that had destroyed the “heritage of a thousand years of European culture by

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erecting impassable frontiers” throughout the Continent. That multi-ethnic Austria-Hungary was now falling into “suffering and poverty and economic disorganization” appeared as an ominous sign for civilizational progress and a harbinger for future “disorder,” according to Elihu Root.

In this debate between competing narratives of social progress liberal internationalists seemed to be steadily losing ground. Already on the defensive in the nationalist environment prior to 1914, social changes after the war increasingly placed them in a minority position. In many countries changes to election laws—woman suffrage, inclusion of lower income men, lowering of voting ages—created more diverse electorates. Mass media was becoming a pervasive feature of people’s daily lives, making politics, including foreign policy, a topic of wider and often more polarized debate. These changes facilitated the rise of mass political movements on the right and the left, squeezing the traditional liberal parties that many of the CEIP’s associates were affiliated with and assigning some of them to electoral obscurity. “Liberalism, in the eyes of the electors, had become an intrusion on the main issue of Socialism versus Conservatism,” a British CEIP partner later wrote of his party’s fate in those years. Subjectively, the CEIP’s milieu of powerful and influential men saw themselves as the main losers of the rise of mass democracy in the early twentieth century. As educated gentlemen they had historically claimed to embody “public opinion” and were now disconcerted as inclusive elections, the media and public opinion polls challenged their preeminent position. Elections consisting of a “simple count of the noses in an unorganized mob” were worth no more than “a throw of the dice,” complained John W. Davis, and even the more progressive-minded James T. Shotwell worried about the effects of placing power “in the hands of the ‘unintelligent’; “which had been done “on a colossal scale”.

187 Shotwell, Intelligence and Politics, 18; see also Butler: “The difficulty with the term self-determination is that we must first determine what is a self,” CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 7 December 1920, p. 23–24, Box 14, CEIP US.
188 CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 7 December 1920, p. 54, Box 14, CEIP US.
191 John Alfred Spender, Between Two Wars (London: Cassell, 1943), 147.
Paradoxically, on the major issue that defined American foreign policy debates after the war the CEIP found itself on the same side as those it denounced as the “mob”. The foundation never officially took a stance on the debate surrounding the Treaty of Versailles but in 1919/20 many of the CEIP’s most prominent officers and trustees, including Nicholas Murray Butler, James Brown Scott and Elihu Root, were in the “reservationist” camp that opposed American membership in the League of Nations in its current form. While this may seem to destabilize the previous analysis it merely underscores the point in a different way: Butler’s and Root’s earlier writings and later activities leave little doubt that they fundamentally supported the idea of a League and that their objections to the Covenant—regarding, for instance, insufficient protections for the Monroe Doctrine—primarily resulted from the intense politicization of the issue. As loyal Republicans, they were concerned that President Wilson was using the peace treaty to drive a wedge between the party’s Midwestern and its Eastern Establishment wing in the run-up to the 1920 election, thus preventing the party they viewed as most representative of the “intelligent” elements of U.S. society from recapturing the presidency. Butler himself launched an ill-fated run for the Republican nomination that year and his inability to openly advocate for the League under these circumstance underlines the extent to which foreign policy was no longer the purview of liberal elites but had become an object of mass-democracy.

Towards an “ordered civilization”

America’s absence from the League of Nations was only one aspect, albeit an important one, of a larger, systemic problem that was to define international politics in the interwar years: the international institutions that had replaced the nineteenth century voluntary organizations and the liberal governing consensus were never able to provide stability by compelling international coordination, resulting in a gap in global governance. The “collapse of globalization” (Robert Boyce) or “end of globalization” (Harold James) usually associated with the Great Depression was prefigured


195 Republicans were particularly alienated by Woodrow Wilson refusal to include any Republicans on the Versailles delegation, which gave the resulting document a partisan aura, cf. Kathleen Burk, Old World, New World: Great Britain and America from the Beginning (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2009), 460; see also Harold George Nicolson, Dwight Morrow (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), 237–238.

by the institutional weakness of formal governance mechanisms after the war.\textsuperscript{197} Extensive international public and governmental support for the League of Nations project in 1919 masked the extent to which the League was an institution whose moment already appeared to have passed by the time it was created. It was a liberal internationalist project in an age of nationalism, an organization designed to “preserve peace in a world of peace” that fit poorly with the polarized political atmosphere surrounding international relations in the early 1920s.\textsuperscript{198} For all the talk of peace, at a time when political rhetoric was replete with muscular (and masculine) assertiveness the idea that sovereign states would put their right to exert military power or even their deeply felt material and immaterial claims to an international vote seemed—depending on one’s politics—either futuristic or old-fashioned.\textsuperscript{199}

Liberal elites were quick to blame mass democracy for the impasse. In reality, the democratization of international affairs in the interwar period was far from comprehensive—for instance, most foreign services retained their elitist character\textsuperscript{200}—but in the eyes of liberal internationalists, increased responsiveness to public opinion was making governments less willing to pursue long-term goals of international security and financial stability. The unifying theme of republican Germany’s foreign policy was a single-minded focus on overturning the war guilt paragraph of the Treaty of Versailles, a popular project at home that did little to overcome the country’s post-war isolation abroad.\textsuperscript{201} French internationalists worried that the “petulant, whining and demanding” tone with which the Quai d’Orsay pursued its quest for military security alienated key allies.\textsuperscript{202} That the United States was rightfully entitled to collect the war debts it was owed by France and Great Britain was habitually affirmed by successive administrations but struck American liberals as bad manners as well as bad

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{198} Statement by Elihu Root, CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 7 December 1920, p. 54, Box 14, CEIP US.
\item \textsuperscript{199} As Peter Jackson shows for the French case, in the patriotic atmosphere of 1919 the League of Nation was largely viewed as an idealist project for the future, cf. Jackson, \textit{Beyond the Balance of Power}, 323–324; in Germany, principled support for the League quickly became a minority position in the Reichstag, cf. Joachim Wintzer, \textit{Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 1918–1926} (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006), 43–45.
\item \textsuperscript{202} Georges Lechartier, “Impressions d’Amérique,” \textit{Le Correspondant} 302 (July 10, 1926): 10–11.
\end{footnotes}
Public “ignorance” appeared to be driving states to eschew policies liberals held essential to the long-term interests of nations and to preserving international stability. “We are now confronted with the problem of how most widely to insure the maintenance of international peace and the carrying forward of an ordered civilization,” Butler told the CEIP trustees.204

Despite the urgency of the diagnosis, the Carnegie Endowment’s initial response to the new challenges necessarily reflected the political constraints of the times. The United States remained formally at war with Germany, Austria and Hungary until July 1921, making comprehensive and inclusive activism impossible for an American organization. The League of Nations was equally off limits as long as the issue was a matter of political controversy in the United States.205 Thus the foundation initially continued its post-1917 habit of focusing funds and energy on improving inter-Allied relations. The foundation’s wartime reserves were now spent on ambitious reconstruction projects, such as the municipal library of Reims, the university library of Leuven and the restoration of the town of Fargniers, to include building a park-like “Place Carnegie,” a post office, a library, public baths as well as a boys’ and a girls’ school.206 It almost seemed as if the foundation had moved into the construction business, however, there was an additional, social dimension to these expenditures. “[M]oney doesn’t amount to anything except as it serves to stimulate the activity of men throughout the years,” Elihu Root once summed up the CEIP’s method.207 The high profile reconstruction projects were intended to attract public attention and bring people from both sides on the Atlantic together in a common task.

There was a specific political context to these efforts. By the early 1920s the Franco-American alliance was in poor shape. Already disappointed by the terms of the Peace Treaty, French public opinion had been further aggrieved when a promised Guarantee Pact in which Britain and the United States would have vouched for French security did not materialize. Many Americans, meanwhile, viewed France’s incessant calls for military and financial assurances as ungrateful and stubborn.208

203 “I do not think they can ever be collected [and] if they could, we would gain more ill will then the money is worth,” John W. Davis to Paul M. Warburg, 11 April 1921, Box 19, Folder 107, John W. Davis Papers, , Yale Archives.

204 CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 7 December 1920, p. 22, Box 14, CEIP US.

205 The Centre Européen at first enthusiastically offered its support to the League but the CEIP’s headquarters quickly intervened and stopped these politically sensitive activities, cf. d’Estournelles de Constant to Eric Drummond, 29 February 1920, R1333, League of Nations Archives, UNOG; Centre Européen Advisory Council Meeting, 13 July 1921, p. 20, Box 113, Folder 3, CEIP CE.

206 CEIP Year Book 12 (1923), 53–54; “Nouvelle don de la Dotation Carnegie,” Journal des Débats, 10 July 1922.

207 CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 14 May 1929, [unpaginated], Box 14, CEIP US.

With the two partners appearing to drift ever further apart, Butler and d’Estournelles de Constant took it on themselves to almost single-handedly reverse the mistakes of politicians and repair the Franco-American friendship they believed to be crucial for the survival of civilization. When in the summer of 1921 Butler was scheduled to travel to Europe for the first time since the war in order to inspect the foundation’s various reconstruction projects, the two men decided to seize on this opportunity to turn the trip into a public demonstration of America’s continuing interest in Europe and, especially, France.

Utilizing his press contacts, Butler actively fuelled public speculation that he was acting as a private envoy for the Warren G. Harding administration. In a disclosure almost certainly based on a leak by Butler himself, the New York Times revealed that days before sailing the CEIP director had been received at the White House for lunch before accompanying President Harding “to the Chevy Chase Club for a round of golf.” The idea of officiousness was eagerly taken up by the French media, which used Butler’s unsuccessful run for the presidency the previous year—he had garnered about seven percent of the vote at the Republican Convention—to play up Butler’s stature in American society. Le Figaro, with little regard for statistical facts, told its readers that “if it had not been for a few missing votes” it could have been Butler, not Harding who would have occupied the White House. Less enthusiastic was the Communist L’Humanité, which called Butler a “well-known friend of ‘France’” and reminded its readers: “You know who ‘France’ is.”

Who was “France”? Or, more generally, who were the partners with whom the CEIP initially wanted to restore international stability? Butler’s French sojourn provides a helpful case study as the Centre Européen’s staff diligently kept track of the director’s roughly one hundred and forty personal encounters. In the first place, Butler interacted with senior academics and those endowed with public honors. Almost a quarter of his French interlocutors were members of the Institut de France, many of these the immortels of the Académie française (Henri Bergson, Jules Cambon). Many were senior military officers, veterans of France’s war effort (Ferdinand Foch, Joseph Joffre, Philippe Pétain) or part of hereditary or economic elites, members of the nobility or of the haute bourgeoisie.

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211 “Un ami de la France,” Le Figaro, 1 September 1921.
212 “À travers les revues,” L’Humanité, 12 September 1921.
213 Cf. “Liste des personnalités ayant rencontré le président Nicholas M. Butler,” Box 217, Folder 3, CEIP CE.
214 At least twenty-eight were members of the Institut de France, eight were members of the military and twelve were from the nobility, cf. “Liste des personnalités ayant rencontré le président Nicholas M. Butler,” Box 217, Folder 3, CEIP CE.
politicians Butler met—ministers, senators and deputies—generally belonged to centrist parties (Aristide Briand, André Tardieu, Raymond Poincaré), with a distinct bias towards the members of the ruling bloc national. D’Estournelles de Constant accurately summed up this group as “the most eminent thinkers,” “statesmen” and “the elite of Parisian society.” But perhaps more instructive than those who the CEIP director met were those who did not make his appointment book: representatives of France’s main Socialist party SFIO or of the powerful Confédération générale du travail (CGT), such as Léon Blum or Léon Jouhaux, were conspicuously absent from Butler’s itinerary.

The CEIP’s “France” was essentially representative of the politics of the transnational space that was to open up in the shadow of the foundation’s interwar programs and investments: intended as a sanctuary for a beleaguered liberalism, it was marked by a sharp cut-off toward the left and a much softer boundary toward the right. Butler articulated his vision for a world order founded on transnationally connected liberal elites in the keynote event of his journey, a public address at the Cour de Cassation on 18 July 1921. Nominally an exposé on current political thought in the United States, Butler ended his remarks on a more “universal” note in which he sketched the liberal values on which he wanted both domestic and international relations to be based. Taking his inspiration from the French motto liberté, égalité, fraternité, Butler emphasized the paramount importance of individual liberty to human progress. Equality, on the other hand, was subordinate and only applicable to a person’s legal status as economic equality would undermine development and lead to “social, political and economic death.” But he reserved most of his praise for the concept of fraternité, which he viewed as the stabilizing link between freedom and equality:

Brotherhood is the solution to many problems that divide individuals as well as nations. Make men equal before the law, take away all the privileges, extinguish all injustices and, as old Mazzini said: ‘Liberty to all men of good will, under the command of the wisest and the best.’ Make man free, teach him to be fraternal and in return you achieve real equality […] D’Estournelles de Constant reported on the success of Butler’s visit in a lengthy and enthusiastic report to the CEIP Trustees. In particular, the closed-door Centre Européen and the CI meetings that Butler had attended struck him as representing “the spirit of the family opposed to destructive anarchy. Noah’s Ark, if you wish.”

215 Of the eleven ministers and parliamentarians Butler encountered two belonged to the center-left (Parti républicain-socialiste), two were centrist (Parti radical) and seven were center-right (Alliance démocratique), cf. “Liste des personnalités ayant rencontré le président Nicholas M. Butler”.
216 “Le séjour du President Butler à Paris,” Box 217, Folder 3, CEIP CE.
218 Ibid., 789; the Mazzini quote appears to be apocryphal.
219 D’Estournelles de Constant to Elihu Root, 7 September 1921, Box 5, Butler Papers, RBML Columbia.
The CEIP’s initial post-war efforts to restore an “ordered civilization” thus mainly aimed at reviving the role of liberal elites as arbiters of meaning in the conduct of international relations. The goal was to foster “a field of comraderie” among “a body of loyal, devoted citizens of various nations,” of “men qualified to be leaders of opinion” as Root and Butler explained at a meeting of the Board.\textsuperscript{220} D’Estournelles de Constant urged the Endowment to “contribute more than ever to the instruction of individuals and peoples” in order to make the citizens of all countries “understand their true interests.”\textsuperscript{221} But the limitations of the CEIP’s method of conducting public diplomacy from the top soon became apparent. In November 1921, Aristide Briand crossed the Atlantic to personally lead the French delegation at the Washington Naval Conference disarmament talks, an event the foundation had long hoped would restore unanimity of purpose among the major powers and signal the beginning of the end of the “grave disorder sweeping across Europe.”\textsuperscript{222} Hosting a dinner for the French prime minister at New York’s Lotos Club, Butler continued the project of his Paris trip, casting France as the defender of “our western civilization” against the hordes of barbarism.\textsuperscript{223} Yet, all this preparation could not prevent the Conference from turning into another low point for Franco-American relations as the French delegation, pointing to their country’s unique security requirements, resisted meaningful disarmament proposals. Even CEIP President and American delegate at the conference, Elihu Root, reflected America’s exasperation with the former ally by openly cursing Gallic intransigence.\textsuperscript{224}

As the immediate post-war years drew to a close, criticism of the CEIP’s genteel version of internationalist outreach began to mount. Edward Ginn, founder of the World Peace Foundation, deemed the entire enterprise impractical as it was missing the “live wires” that would connect it to public opinion.\textsuperscript{225} Christian Lange, head of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and a CEIP special correspondent felt that the Centre Européen’s entire organization was unrepresentative of European circumstances as most key figures were either Frenchmen or “entirely French in […] outlook.”\textsuperscript{226} While such opinions were mostly voiced behind closed doors, public pressure mounted as well when in 1924 journalist Arthur Ruhl published in \textit{Survey} magazine what appears to have been the first in-depth, reported profile of the Carnegie Endowment ever published. He had happened to have arrived for his assignment in Washington just as the international peace activist of WILPF were holding their congress in the city.

\textsuperscript{220} CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 7 December 1920, pp. 32, 56, Box 14, CEIP US.
\textsuperscript{221} D’Estournelles de Constant to Elihu Root, 7 September 1921, Box 5, Butler Papers, RBML Columbia.
\textsuperscript{222} Centre Européen Advisory Council Meeting, 13 July 1921, p. 21, Box 113, Folder 3, CEIP CE.
\textsuperscript{223} “Addresses at the Lotos Club Dinner, New York, November 24, 1921,” Box 213, Butler Papers, RBML Columbia.
\textsuperscript{224} Jessup quotes Root as yelling “To hell with them!” “Let the whole business go to pot—I would not care!” cf. Philip C. Jessup, \textit{Elihu Root} (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1938), 465.
\textsuperscript{226} Christian Lange to Andrew J. Montague, 5 November 1924, Box 20, Folder 11, CEIP US.
Ruhl was impressed by the divergent approaches to the problem of peace taken by the two organizations and his final article made no secret where his sympathies lay. Why was the CEIP in the business of building “model squares, including shower baths and bowling alleys” in France while doing little to “bridge the chasm” the war had left between the peoples of the world? Between the Russian Revolution, unrest in South America and the election victories of the Labor Party in Britain and the Cartel des Gauches he saw “a general social overturn” that made the CEIP establishment look out of touch with the modern world. What he saw among the women at the WILPF Congress was a “passion for peace” that seemed like a breath of fresh air after visiting the staid Endowment headquarters at 2 Jackson Place: “Theirs was not the psychology of opportunists and pussyfooters, but of Christians and crusaders.” Ruhl’s article did much to set the tone of subsequent criticism of the CEIP as backwards looking and conservative. A Harper’s writer later summed up this cliché of the CEIP as the “rich aristocrat” among the peace societies: “sumptuous offices; flawless banquets to visiting diplomats; directors all in Who’s Who, average age seventy years; budget, $687,846;
oppressively respectable.”

Conclusion: The End of Liberal Internationalism?

One year before Ruhl’s article was published, the Centre Européen had moved. Ready to abandon the cramped, shared apartment at rue Pierre Curie, d’Estournelles de Constant had arranged to purchase a five-story building at 173 Boulevard Saint-Germain in Paris’ highbrow sixth arrondissement (fig. 1b). The new headquarters was in every way the visual representation of the CEIP’s concept of a distinguished transnational space: a grand, eighteenth century townhouse with vaulted windows and decorative sculpture-work. A former salon had been converted into a lecture hall, providing a dignified space for the type of exclusive, semi-public events the foundation intended to host. In the summer, a roof terrace afforded enticing views of the surrounding neighborhood and gave guests an opportunity for enlarging their circle of acquaintances while engaging in relaxed, post-lecture *causerie*. “The establishment there is almost perfect,” an impressed James Shotwell noted after his first visit. “The garden on the roof is much more beautiful than anyone could possibly have imagined. Little rock gardens filled with gay flowers […] and the foliage of ivy and box plants just as green as in the best of gardens down below.”

The symbolism of the CEIP’s evident pride in its new base of operations was not lost on Arthur Ruhl who criticized the “unctious preoccupation with the charms of what is, after all, a working headquarters rather than a pleasant club.”

At a time when social movements were transforming the nature of politics, when public opinion was increasingly made through the mass media and grassroots organizing, the CEIP’s predilection for all things elite and bourgeois made the foundation appear to belong to a different era. A useful way to conceive of this apparent paradox is to view the type of transnational networking practiced by the Carnegie Endowment and the Conciliation Internationale as a bid to restore pre-war hierarchies by monopolizing cultural and social capital. Their move into an exclusive transnational space corresponds to Bourdieu’s concept of a “race” in which advantaged groups move onto a new level “to maintain the scarcity and distinctiveness of their assets.” At a time when an expanded franchise was diluting their domestic political power and mass cultural and social phenomena—nationalism, anti-colonialism, Socialism—were challenging their cultural hegemony, traditional liberal elites constructed new spaces of exclusivity and distinction to jointly work for the reconstruction of an

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231 Ruhl, “Seven Million Dollars Worth of Peace,” 54.
“ordered civilization.” The private correspondence of participants suggests that most did not conceive of this movement as a political project. However, as Ruhl noted, it was almost inevitable that a homogenous cadre of “eminent, self-perpetuating gentlemen” would tend “unconsciously to eliminate all that does not fall in with the habitual point of view of those more or less like themselves.”

The liberal internationalist activism represented by the CEIP and its allies reflected the uncertain prospects of their political philosophy. The nineteenth century had been liberalism’s apogee as visions of a strong state receded and Europe’s bourgeois elites united behind liberal national projects. In the aftermath of the war this state of affairs came increasingly under attack as voters rejected liberal parties at the polls and cherished causes such as free trade faced strong headwinds. Four years of war had demonstrated liberalism inability to guarantee peace and stability and mass movements such as socialists and communists on the left and the representatives of the Jeune Droite or the Konservative Revolution on the right explicitly challenged the liberal claim to leadership. Meanwhile, many European societies struggled with economic hardships due to post-war reconstruction and the end of the heady days of industrialization, shifting the political debate to questions of how to manage competing interests in an age of limited resources, questions to which classical liberalism did not have ready-made answers. The base of the CEIP’s brand of internationalism were those opposed to nationalist particularism, Socialism’s international workers’ solidarity but also to a Wilsonian program viewed as corrosive of established institutions.

Nevertheless, by the mid-1920s the growing criticism from even generally sympathetic observers of the foundation’s diminishing ability to influence public opinion had reached a level of urgency that was not easily brushed aside. It became apparent that the Carnegie Endowment had reached the end of a road in terms of tactics, if not strategy. One event that triggered the overdue process of reassessment was the death of d’Estournelles de Constant in May 1924. The passing of its European

233 Ruhl, “Seven Million Dollars Worth of Peace,” 54.
director was a serious blow as de Constant had “practically been the entire organization” in Europe, as Butler privately acknowledged. Yet, it also created an opening for significant change and the following year would not only see a comprehensive reform of its European presence but also the resignation of President Root and a review of the foundation’s entire programmatic posture. The years 1924/25 would become a time of significant changes.

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238 Butler to Andrew J. Montague, 6 June 1924, Box 20, Folder 11, CEIP US.
2. Promoting an “international mind”: Transnationalism as discourse and practice

The honor of delivering the keynote address at the 1926 reunion of the Geneva Institute of International Affairs (GIIA)—an illustrious, international gathering of academics and bureaucrats—went to Alfred Zimmern, the newly appointed deputy director of the League of Nation’s Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. The speech started on a slightly awkward note, however, as Zimmern tried to tactfully dodge the announced topic of his talk—“The Development of the International Mind”—in order to address the subject that was really on his mind: the League’s intellectual cooperation program. He opened his presentation by apologetically explaining that the original subject had been “assigned” to him although he was “not very much in love with that phrase.”\footnote{Alfred Zimmern, “The Development of the International Mind,” in The Problems of Peace: Lecture Delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations at the Palais Des Nations August 1926, ed. Geneva Institute of International Relations (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), 1.} Zimmern’s uneasiness notwithstanding, over thirty years later international lawyer Quincy Wright would cite this very speech as evidence that recognition of the need for a conciliating “international mind” had been a widespread phenomenon during the interwar years. Seemingly independent of each other, intellectuals had settled on this term to describe a vital remedy for the nationalist strife destabilizing the world at the time. Whether willingly or not, Alfred Zimmern had posthumously become part of the great movement towards an “international mind” in the 1920s.\footnote{Quincy Wright, “The Strengthening of International Law,” Recueil Des Cours. Académie de Droit International. 98 (1959): 28–29.}

Wright’s observation has since been repeated by generations of historians of interwar internationalism who have noted the movement’s puzzling attachment to this particular phrase. Jeanne Morefield has noted that “one cannot help but be struck by the almost numbing repetition of the term,” which seemed to have virtually become “a prerequisite for participation in League-associated think-tanks.”\footnote{Cf. Morefield, Covenants without Swords, 126; see also Julia Stapleton, “The Classicist as Liberal Intellectual: Gilbert Murray and Alfred Eckhard Zimmern,” in Gilbert Murray Reassessed: Hellenism, Theatre, and International Politics, ed. Christopher Stray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 278–279; Anne-Isabelle Richard, “Huizinga, Intellectual Cooperation, and the Spirit of Europe, 1933–45,” in Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917–1957, ed. Mark Hewitson and Matthew D’Auria (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 245.} This apparent preoccupation with the spiritual dimension of international politics has sometimes been ascribed to the lingering influence of German idealism on internationalist thinking\footnote{Cf. Morefield, Covenants without Swords, 129.} while others view it as an artifact of the psychological construction of the nation.\footnote{Cf. Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, 31–32; Daniel Laqua, “Internationalisme ou affirmation de la
almost disappointingly prosaic: originally coined by Nicholas Murray Butler before the war, by the
1920s the “international mind” had become part of the CEIP’s international branding campaign,
pushed along by the Division of Intercourse and Education. Zimmern’s speech in 1926, for instance,
was part of an event that was partially sponsored by the foundation and at which CEIP director James
Brown Scott was in attendance. Nevertheless, the swift incorporation of the “international mind”-
language into interwar discourses does pose the question: what did people mean by it and why did
the CEIP’s signature term spread so widely through interwar foreign policy circles?

In this chapter I argue that the proliferation of the “international mind” discourse highlights a new
development that, starting in the interwar period, would have a profound impact on the conduct of
international affairs—networking between foreign policy institutions in several countries became a
means to creating informal mechanisms of global governance and of pursuing political agendas
through transnational channels. The CEIP did not invent this idea but became one of the key sponsors
of communities of foreign policy elites by investing not primarily in individual scholars or institutions
but in mobility between different actors. At the same time that academic and scientific knowledge
was becoming more nationalized and fundamentally associated with the state,244 governments’
increasing reliance on expert advice also opened up the policy process to outside interventions. This
became a key precondition that allowed non-governmental actors such as the CEIP to advance their
agendas.

This argument is mainly based on two conceptual claims. Firstly, in terms of historiographic context,
it posits a broader definition of foreign policy institutions than is often employed in a literature that
traditionally takes the simultaneous and interrelated founding of the Royal Institute of International
Affairs (Chatham House) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in 1919 as its point of
departure.245 The lack of similar initiatives in other countries, notably Germany, Italy and France, has
tended to make the historiography of top-level foreign policy networks a very Anglo-Saxon story.
According to IR historian Andrew Williams, France fell behind Anglo-American innovative thinking
on multilateralism and international organization by clinging to a “backward-looking and emotional”
approach, concluding that the French “effectively wrote themselves out of the debate about the global

244 Cf. Carol E. Harrison and Ann Johnson, National Identity: The Role of Science and Technology (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 2009); Mitchell G. Ash and Jan Surman, The Nationalization of Scientific Knowledge in
245 Riemens, “International Academic Cooperation,” 913–915; Williams, “Why Don’t the French Do Think Tanks?”;
Parmar, “Anglo-American Elites in the Interwar Years”; Andrea Bosco and Cornelia Navari, “Chatham House and
British Foreign Policy 1919–1945: The Royal Institute of International Affairs During the Inter-War Period” (London:
Lothian Foundation, 1994).
Yet, discussions on the future of international affairs were not tied to one specific organizational type as a broadening literature on related institutions has demonstrated: international relations departments at major universities, research institutes for international politics and economics, transnational institutions, often affiliated with the League of Nations, such as GIIA or the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation all thrived in the interwar period. Broadening the lens even further, organizations usually categorized as pacifist or internationalist societies—i.e. advocacy groups—often had much closer connections to policy discussions than one would assume. For instance, under closer scrutiny many of the major League of Nations societies turn out to have been not so much grassroots advocacy groups for peace and cooperation but public-private partnerships, partly financed by foreign ministries to facilitate foreign policy debates between different sectors of society. All of these institutions represented different positions on the spectrum of a new intermediary space between the work of academic expertise, political decision-making in governmental bureaucracies and the public.

Secondly, the chapter focuses its analysis of the impact of philanthropic interventions on the social dimension of knowledge construction. The importance of foreign policy expert networks to interwar internationalist philanthropy—especially that of the CEIP and the Rockefeller Foundation—is increasingly attracting attention. Most studies approach this subject with the methodological tools usually employed for investigating scientific philanthropy by seeking to demonstrate the dissemination of specific knowledge systems through pecuniary incentives, especially grant programs. A closer look at the actual practice of the CEIP’s interventions, however, underlines how

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250 Cf. Kriege and Rausch, American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century; Rietzler, “Experts for Peace: Structures and Motivations of Philanthropic Internationalism in the Interwar Years”; Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen.
contemporary assertions of promoting science need to be historicized. The emergent social sciences of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century largely sought to imitate the popular natural and life sciences that had become so closely associated in the public imagination with material and civilizational advancement. In the process, the term “scientific” became so pervasive and laden with normative associations that, as John Hepp points out, it became almost a synonym for “good." Claims to realism and empiricism were a means of associating new academic fields such as the study of international relations and international law with the supposedly masculine virtues of the hard sciences, as opposed to more subjective and impressionistic modes of knowledge production.251 This was particularly true for the CEIP, which, unlike e.g. the Rockefeller Foundation, never made an effort to systematically formulate what it considered “science.” Rather than tracing the dissemination of scientific knowledge systems, this chapter seeks to analyze the foundation’s “international mind” campaign in order to explore the social conditions under which knowledge was constructed and codified.

The starting point for the CEIP’s efforts to promote an “international mind” in Europe was an internal reform process that took place in 1924/25. Originally set in motion in the wake of d’Estournelles de Constant’s death, this process was accelerated and widened to the entire organization when Nicholas Murray Butler took over the Endowment’s presidency the following year. While his new office invested him with little additional power, it allowed him to make his favored phrase the hallmark of all CEIP activities. Evidence of this change is easy to find, as soon after Butler’s takeover the “international mind” was everywhere in evidence: it dominated the foundation’s press releases; it was imposed on recipients, with book donations to public libraries labelled “International Mind Alcoves”;252 it was used unremittingly in internal office correspondence, sometimes in creative ways (“internationally-minded”).253 It is, however, much more difficult to identify what the substantive change behind this rhetoric was.

At its most basic level, promoting the “international mind” in itself constituted a shift in the CEIP’s posture as, for the first time, the foundation claimed to have an agenda of its own. Not wanting to be seen as aggressive American missionaries, much of the CEIP’s pre-1914 spending in Europe had


252 CEIP Year Book 1926, 51–54.

253 “Notes for President Butler on my visit to Berlin June 2 – June 8, inclusive,” 10 June 1926, Box 204, Folder 4, CEIP CE.
simply been directed at the Bureau international de la paix in Berne, which, in turn, distributed these funds among various European peace societies. This created a double-barrier between the foundation and the actual usage of money, making the CEIP dependent on the aims of other (usually pacifist) organizations. The ambitious reconstruction projects of the early 1920s, while viewed internally as an effective tool for fostering transatlantic amity, never became publicly associated with a coherent philanthropic approach. In this situation, uniform adoption of the “international mind” language signaled that the foundation had begun to pursue a recognizable program. The challenge that remained was to reconcile this new assertiveness with the concerns about resistance to foreign domination that had originally led CEIP leaders to eschew such an explicit agenda in the first place. While this tension would always remain problematic, the foundation gave an indication of how it hoped to resolve it by first acquiring a new group of European partners.

**Government intellectuals: Reforming the Centre Européen**

In July 1924, two months after d’Estournelles de Constant’s death, CEIP Trustee Andrew J. Montague arrived in Paris for a mission in crisis management. Since the loss of its director, the Centre Européen had appeared to drift aimlessly and the impressions gained by Montague during his ten days in Paris confirmed the foundation’s fears: ever since the war, the Paris bureau had effectively functioned as an extension of d’Estournelles de Constant’s personal office and his death had, in Montague’s estimation, not even left a sufficient core on which to base a reorganization effort. Even the Centre Européen’s auditor admitted that the bureau was overstaffed and that the director’s loss had left “a profound void and a lack of occupation.” Montague, however, did not come unprepared. In sending the Virginian on his mission, Nicholas Murray Butler had already anticipated difficulties and suggested broad outlines for a comprehensive reform of the CEIP’s European presence: a permanent American representative was to be put in charge, assisted by a new administrative body that would replace the old Advisory Council—“a small but effective committee of consultation and advice.” Montague endorsed both ideas when he drew up recommendations after his visit and proposed selecting “reputable and influential men […] a composite of publicist and statesman, with strong humanitarian sympathies” for the new committee.

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255 Andrew J. Montague to Butler, 17 October 1924, Box 20, Folder 11, CEIP US.
256 Théodore Ruyssen to Butler, 9 March 1925, Box 106, Folder 5, CEIP US.
257 Butler to Andrew J. Montague, 6 June 1924, Box 20, Folder 11, CEIP US; Andrew J. Montague to Butler, 17 October 1924, Box 20, Folder 11, CEIP US.
Indicating the political sensitivity of transnational activism at this level, the plan was put into practice the following summer with cooperation and consultation of the French government and at least tacit acquiescence of the U.S. administration. The foundations for the Comité d'Administration were laid on the evening of 23 June 1925 at a private dinner given by Butler at Paris’s elegant hotel Plaza Athénée, with former and future Prime Minister Aristide Briand and the American Ambassador Myron T. Herrick in attendance.\footnote{Cf. “Liste au 19 Juin 1925 des personnalités à inviter au diner offert par le President N. Muray Butler,” Box 218, Folder 1, CEIP CE.} What emerged from the meeting was not only agreement to the plan of enlisting the services of a small group of European advisers but also on the preliminary composition of such a body, including the identities of the German (Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron), Austrian (Josef Redlich) and Greek members (Nicolas Politis) who were to participate. The French representatives slated for a position on the Comité were all personally in attendance at the Plaza Athénée that night: mathematician Paul Appell, literary scholar Henri Lichtenberger, journalist Georges Lechartier and politician André Honnorat.\footnote{Cf. Marie-Thérèse Peylade to Amy Jones, 26 June 1925, Box 107, Folder 1, CEIP US.} They formed the core of a group that would eventually grow to fourteen members (fig. 2a); all in all twenty-one persons would serve on the
Comité until it was dissolved shortly before the Second World War.\textsuperscript{260}

There was much continuity between the new Comité d’Administration and the old Advisory Council in terms of the social, cultural and political profile of its members. The CEIP’s European associates continued to come from middle class or lower nobility backgrounds and, as for gender representation, the Comité was even less diverse than the previous body—not a single woman was invited to join the group. French, the traditional language of European diplomacy, remained the working language, effectively restricting membership to those who had enjoyed a comprehensive classical education. In political terms, the Comité moved the CEIP even closer to Europe’s traditional liberal milieu than had previously been the case. For instance, all three British members were fixtures of the country’s liberal intelligentsia and deeply tied to the Liberal Party’s institutional infrastructure. J.A. Spender and Alfred Gardiner were both former editors of liberal newspapers, the Westminster Gazette and the Daily News, respectively. Spender and Gilbert Murray were also both part of the leadership of the National Liberal Federation, a loose consortium of British liberal organization and all were members of the Reform Club.\textsuperscript{261} German Moritz Julius Bonn was an active member of the Berlin branch of the Deutsche Demokratische Partei (DDP), well-connected among the capital’s liberal establishment and once ran unsuccessfully for a DDP Reichstag nomination.\textsuperscript{262} With one notable exception, no self-described conservatives, fascists, socialists or communists ever served on the Comité.\textsuperscript{263}

What differentiated the Comité d’Administration from its predecessor—and thereby signaled the CEIP’s new approach in seeking to promote the “international mind” in Europe—was that it was manifestly a working committee. Members of the Advisory Council had been recruited with a view to their eminent social status in the hopes that their credibility would inoculate the Centre Européen against charges of undue interventionism. Already at the time of its founding in 1911, the median age of Council members had been sixty-eight. In contrast, the members of the new Comité were, with few exceptions, in the prime of their careers. With a median age of fifty-six in 1925, they had been selected on account of their current, active affiliations rather than based on past service. Even more significantly, the majority of the Comité’s members belonged to a new category of actors in foreign

\textsuperscript{260} The names and nationalities of the members were: Rafael Altamira y Crevea (ESP), Paul Appell (FRA), Moritz Julius Bonn (GER), Guillaume Fatio (SUI), Alfred Gardiner (UK), Ernst Heldring (NED), André Honnorat (FRA), Georges Lechartier (FRA), Henri Lichtenberger (FRA), Albert von Mensdorff (AUT), Piero Misciattelli (ITA), Gilbert Murray (UK), Alfred Nerincx (BEL), Nicolas Politis (GRE), Vílem Pospisil (CSK), Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron (GER), Josef Redlich (AUT), Carlo Sforza (ITA), James A. Spender (UK), Pal Teleki (HUN), Bo Östen Undén (SWE).


\textsuperscript{262} Cf. Bonn, So macht man Geschichte, 291–292.

\textsuperscript{263} The exception was the addition of Italian fascist Piero Misciattelli after Benito Mussolini’s personal intervention in 1931.
policy debates. Unlike the members of the Advisory Council, few of them were prominent personalities in their own right but collectively they were well connected among a group of scholars and technical experts at the intersection of academia, government and the public that was becoming more and more central to shaping foreign policy debates.

The emergence of this field owed much to the peculiar legacies of the First World War, as the conduct of the conflict and the method of its settlement had made the boundaries between government and civil society more porous. The total mobilization of societies for war and later the complexity of issues debated at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 had exceeded the expertise of traditional ministerial bureaucracies. Consequently, voices of outside experts had gained new weight. In addition to CEIP directors James Shotwell and James Brown Scott, several later members of the Comité d’Administration participated in the peace negotiations. Hungarian geographer Pal Teleki had led his government’s study group in preparation of the conference, at which his own cartographic work on the country’s ethnic composition became central to Hungary’s territorial claims. German economist Moritz Julius Bonn was in Paris to advise his delegation on economic and financial issues while international law professor Nicolas Politis participated as Greek foreign minister. The presence of academic experts during negotiations was of course not a radically new development. Governments had always relied on outside advice and especially since the two Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907 international lawyers, often associated with the peace movement, had taken on a more visible role in assisting foreign offices. What was new, however, was not only the depth of involvement but also the breadth of disciplines that were sought out by the state: experts in economics, geography, history, ethnography, etc. were called into service to assist in the war effort and to help formulate national policy positions in preparation of negotiations.

In many cases these “scholars hastily and in some cases injudiciously summoned from their books to legislate for an anarchic world,” as one participant described them later, did not disappear in the ivory tower after they had left Paris. One of the legacies of the peace settlement was that it institutionalized financial and legal questions as a key aspect of international relations. Interwar


diplomacy revolved around complex issues such as war debts, reparations, disarmament regulations or the rights of minorities, ensuring that governments’ reliance on technical expertise would continue to grow. The war thus hastened the formation of a new class of actors between government, academia and public policy which Gérard Noiriel has termed the “government intellectual” (intellectuel de gouvernement). These experts derived their immediate political influence from acting as governmental advisers, technical delegates at international conferences or informal envoys. They shaped discussions within academic disciplines and engaged an educated public by publishing articles in journals and newspapers that usually catered to select and influential audiences. It was this new field that became the main target for the CEIP’s efforts to propagate the “international mind,” and the members of the Comité d’Administration were exemplary of this shift.

A claim to special expertise, usually in the form of academic credentials, was the main common characteristic of members of this field. Some were part of the rapid institutionalization of academic research in the field of international relations in the interwar period with universities endowing chairs for international politics across Europe and worldwide. Half of the members of the Comité had served as university professors at some point in their career and a number had participated in the founding of new research institutes that provided training opportunities for future civil servants. As rector of the Sorbonne, Paul Appell oversaw the founding of the Institut des Hautes Études Internationales (IHEI) in 1921. A cooperative arrangement between the university’s law faculty and the French government, especially the Quai d’Orsay, the institute was intended as a school for future diplomats and focused primarily on instruction in international law, economics and history. Moritz J. Bonn taught at a similar German institution, the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHP), which, although also catering to a wider audience, cooperated with the Wilhelmstraße in training future diplomats. The CEIP also maintained close relations with another German institution, the Institut für Auswärtige Politik (IAP) in Hamburg, founded in the wake of the war by its frequent contributor Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy. Scholarly credentials, however, were not the only possible

269 Cf. Noiriel, Les fils maudits de la République, 183 according to Noiriel, these intellectuals see it as their mission “to tell governments what they should do and to tell citizens what they should think.” (ibid.).
source of expertise in this field. Dutch businessman Ernst Heldring and Swiss banker Guillaume Fatio were also part of the Comité, where they could claim detailed, personal knowledge on the international financial and commercial flows that were shaping international relations.

Intermittent or permanent government service was another marker of the new expert field. Government intellectuals often saw it as their patriotic duty to bring their specialist knowledge to bear on the issues of the day by advising ministers, serving on official commissions or representing the state during international negotiations. For Bonn, the Paris Peace Conference was the start of a career as one of the German government’s key experts on reparations policy, advising delegations to the Brussels, Genoa and Rapallo conferences and serving on the German delegation to the World Economic Conference in 1927. Niccolò Politis abandoned his academic career in international law to fully join the Greek foreign service as Ambassador to France while continuing to stay engaged with the latest developments in the legal field. As a professor of German literature and language with numerous contacts on the other side of the Rhine River, Henri Lichtenberger informally advised successive French governments on Franco-German relations. By framing their expert knowledge in ways that made them accessible to governments, these men participated—however indirectly—in the formulation of national interests and strategies, a fact that made them attractive partners for a non-governmental organization such as the CEIP.

National governments and their bilateral negotiations were no longer the only sites where international politics was made. As administrative officials, lawyers, judges and committee members, government intellectuals performed and constructed international relations through new institutions of global governance such as the League of Nations Secretariat, the International Labor Office (ILO) or the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). Spanish Comité member Rafael Altamira y Crevea was a PCIJ judge of the first hour and Josef Redlich would join the court in 1931. The two former law professors Politis and Bo Östen Undén represented their respective governments as delegates at League Assembly meetings. More broadly, government intellectuals such as the Comité members were central to the functioning of the League’s technical sections that in recent years have increasingly received scholarly attention as important venues for the development of norms and standards governing all aspects of international life. For instance, Gilbert Murray had been

275 See e.g. Pierre de Margerie to MAE, “Entretien de Mr. le Professeur Lichtenberger avec Mr. Gessler,” 4 February 1927, Correspondance politique et commerciale, 1914 à 1940, Z, vol. 380, fol. 132, ArchDiplo.
instrumental in setting up the League’s International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC), whose central committee included James T. Shotwell and Pal Teleki, while Lichtenberger and Politis were active in the movement’s national sections.\(^{277}\) The service of government intellectuals on League commissions was significant because it challenges the notion that the nation state reigned supreme during this time. As Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels have shown, discussions in these settings were shaped to a significant degree by the professional or ideological commitments of members and of League officials\(^{278}\)—including, potentially, allegiances to non-governmental groups.

Finally, government intellectuals saw it as their task to elevate public discourse on international relations by publicly sharing their insights. Not only the journalists on the Comité—J.A. Spender, Alfred Gardiner and Georges Lechartier—but also many other of its members regularly published opinion pieces on international affairs in mass circulation newspapers, such as *The Times* and *Berliner Tageblatt*, as well as more in-depth analyses in high-brow publications such as the *Revue des deux Mondes* and *Europäische Revue*. A significant new institution for engaging an informed public on matters relating to foreign affairs was the League of Nation society. As president of the LNU’s executive committee, Gilbert Murray was an influential voice in an organization boasting half a million members, making the LNU perhaps the politically most influential interwar NGO.\(^ {279}\) With Paul Appell and Moritz J. Bonn the Centre Européen’s Comité also included board members of the French and German League of Nations societies.\(^ {280}\) While these organizations had often started at the end of the war as advocacy groups for a liberal, conciliatory peace settlement, by the mid-1920s many of them—particularly the LNU, the AFSDN and the DLfV—had developed into a very different, essentially corporatist, direction. Their board membership reflected the interests of a broad array of social and political groups and their activities were partially financed by national governments. Thus reorganized, League of Nations societies worked to harmonize foreign policy conceptions between

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the government and influential sectors of society while mobilizing public support for the government’s negotiating positions in front of an international audience.281

In summary, in its attempt to spread the “international mind” in Europe, the CEIP relied on a group of well-connected members of national foreign policy establishments whose professional background and social activities reflected the increased role of technical expertise and public engagement in the making of foreign policy. These men also embodied the ambiguous effect of the new age of expertise on international politics: on the one hand, academic knowledge emerged as a battleground in foreign affairs with governments enlisting scholars to justify political demands, consequently increasing nationalist polarization.282 On the other hand, the opening of the policy process to often transnationally connected expert communities called the autonomy and self-sufficiency of national governments into question. Historians have famously speculated whether John Maynard Keynes’s sympathy and affection for the German banker and financial expert Carl Melchior at the Paris Peace Conference influenced his negative assessment of the Treaty of Versailles.283 This encounter was merely symptomatic of a much larger phenomenon as Paris 1919 became a catalyst for cross-border contacts between experts that would intensify over the following years. Even a cursory look at the composition of the delegations shows that many of those present at Paris would later become central figures in interwar foreign policy discussion as government officials, academic experts at international conferences or leaders of non-governmental organizations.284

“Fat Boys”? Grant-making and narratives of national sovereignty

When the members the Comite d’Administration gathered for the first time around a large conference table at the Centre Européen in Paris in October 1925, the meeting was officially chaired by Henri Lichtenberger. There was little doubt, however, that the focus of attention was a quiet, unassuming man in his mid-forties who sat right across from him.285 Although he nominally was only present to

281 Cf. Wintzer, Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 537–539; Birebent, Militants de la paix et de la SDN, 286–295.
285 Seating chart for Comite d’Administration meeting on 19 October 1925, Box 115, Folder 3, CEIP CE.
listen in on the conversations of the CEIP’s European advisors, Earle Babcock, the new director of the Centre Européen who had been personally nominated by Butler, would have a significant say over which of their proposals would eventually be approved by New York headquarters and thus become part of CEIP policy. When Babcock had reached Paris a few months earlier he participated in the arrival of the latest American export to Europe—the foundation manager. Two years later, an anonymous writer in the New Republic satirized the new philanthropic professionals who were becoming more and more central to the functioning of American research institutions as the “Fat Boys.” With the “consciousness of millions behind them” these men exuded an air of competence that stemmed less from a thorough understanding of the issues at hand than from their mastery of the process: “[T]hey seemed to know everything, although in reality they only knew about everything. They [...] knew what was going on but it was always the fact that something was going on, rather than what that something was, which seemed to interest them.”

Babcock was strikingly unrepresentative of this cliché. As a professor of Romance languages and literature on leave from New York University his academic credentials were impeccable and his local knowledge was also beyond reproach. He had run the school of the American Red Cross in Paris during the latter stages of the war and then served as director of the American University Union in the French capital from 1920 to 1921. His friends praised him as a man of “rare diplomacy” who naturally steered clear of controversy: “He did not argue, nor did he ever show resentment. When compromise seemed impossible, he would immediately divert the matter into a different channel.”

Neither under Babcock’s leadership nor under the aegis of his successor Malcolm W. Davis in the second half of the 1930s, was there much evidence of the blustering displays of financial power that the New Republic had mocked.

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286 “The Fat Boys,” The New Republic, 2 February 1927, 300–301; emphasis in original; the subjects of the critique were apparently Rockefeller Foundation officers Beardsley Ruml and Lawrence Frank, cf. Donald Fisher, Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the United States Social Science Research Council (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 70; our knowledge on the background and biographies of American foundations is still limited, see esp. Volker Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone Between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); information on some of the Rockefeller Foundation officers can be found in Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen.

This cautious attitude was reflected in the Centre Européen’s decision-making processes. We might expect the CEIP’s campaign for the “international mind” to have consisted of an effort to sponsor research in the social sciences that conformed to a set of ideas and practices favored by the foundation. Grant requests were indeed considered at all meetings of the Comité d’Administration, yet, except in those rare cases when a member personally made a forceful case for approving a specific grant, few of these applications were ever approved. In fact, an overview of grants, *subventions* in the Centre Européen’s French office parlance, approved by the bureau during the following fifteen years appears to point toward a rather disappointing performance (fig. 2b). None of the institutions which received money through the Paris bureau were elite research institutes in the strict sense of that word and even when including payments to European institutions through the New York office the picture remains unimpressive. Most organizations received no more than a few thousand dollars per year, far below the five- or six-figure sums routinely handed out by the Rockefeller Foundation.

What accounts for this apparent lack of activity? A possible reason for the CEIP’s hesitancy to distribute funds would be simple economics. While its annual income of about half a million dollars
was enough to command public attention, the foundation was not in the same league as the top players in the philanthropic field. The Rockefeller Foundation’s and the Carnegie Corporation’s vast endowment funds supported budgets that were more than ten times larger and, in fact, throughout the 1920s and 1930s the CEIP had to petition the Carnegie Corporation for assistance to cover its budget shortfalls.\(^{288}\) On the other hand, it is easy to overstate the Endowment’s financial woes. Its narrowly defined scope of furthering international peace meant that resources could be concentrated on a much smaller field. Furthermore, the potential European recipients of CEIP grants were usually either cash-strapped academic institutions or advocacy groups, mostly organized as voluntary associations, with little revenue beyond a few hundred annual membership contributions. “I do not know how the Carnegie grant originated,” an astonished British activist wrote after surveying his organization’s financial records, “but it is in rather a different category from the money collected in this country, which is trivial in comparison with it.”\(^{289}\) With the exception of Britain’s Chatham House and League of Nations Union, few European institutions could sponsor activities that even approached the scale of the programs of America’s major philanthropies (fig 2c).\(^{290}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Annual Income (US dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller Foundation, Social Sciences Division</td>
<td>2,617,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (US)</td>
<td>585,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Nations Union (UK)</td>
<td>138,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Institute of International Affairs (UK)</td>
<td>94,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (GER)</td>
<td>72,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paix par le Droit (FR)</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Francaise pour la SDN (FR)</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 2c – Annual income of a sample of academic, policy and advocacy organizations in U.S. dollars, ca. 1930.\(^{291}\)

In fact, it was partly this very imbalance in terms of financial prowess that led the CEIP to eschew


\(^{289}\) H.S. Perris to Philip Wright, 27 January 1931, Box 183, Folder 6, CEIP US.

\(^{290}\) Between 1919 and 1935 Chatham House’s annual income rose from 8,000 to 150,00 dollars but this was the exception. More representative of the internationalist field was the AFSDN which depended on small membership fees and usually operated on a budgets of less than 5,000 dollars, well within the bounds of a typical CEIP grant, cf. Birebent, *Militants de la paix et de la SDN*, 173–180; Stephen King-Hall, *Chatham House: A Brief Account of the Origins, Purposes, and Methods of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 111.

\(^{291}\) Data compiled from CEIP and Rockefeller Foundation annual reports as well as Missioli, *Die Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*, 97; King-Hall, *Chatham House: A Brief Account of the Origins, Purposes, and Methods of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 111; Birebent, *Militants de la paix et de la SDN*, 173–180; except for AFSDN, which refers to the 1925 budget.
grant-making on a larger scale. Its low profile, represented by Babcock’s “rare diplomacy,” was a matter not of economics but of political culture. The process by which a society formulated its national interests and the strategies to pursue them was considered a crucial component of national sovereignty, the exclusive domain of the citizens of a given state. Accepting money from the CEIP—an organization that stood outside the national community and made no secret of promoting a partial, internationalist viewpoint—always carried the seeds of scandal for European research institutes or advocacy groups. As Butler noted, many Europeans feared that under the cloak of philanthropy the CEIP was furthering “American domination or American dictation in European affairs.”292 Once publicly revealed, Carnegie funding of a European organization could quickly be used by critics both on the right and the left to charge the recipient with having sold out to shadowy foreign interests or having become part of capitalist machinations. In those cases where institutions did ask for and accept money from the Americans they usually showed no inclination to advertise that fact.

The CEIP was sensitive to such concerns and went out of its way to provide some degree of protection through a combination of unorthodox accounting practices and opaque public statements. For instance, there was no attempt to bring to the attention of the French public the fact that the Carnegie Endowment had been instrumental in founding AFSDN with a grant that was at least partially funneled through d’Estournelles de Constant’s Conciliation Internationale. The CEIP continued to support the French pro-League activists with an annual subvention until at least the mid-1920s, a fact that went unmentioned in the Endowment’s public reports.293 Even more sensitive were financial relationships that crossed the former battle lines of the war. Until the late 1920s, the foundation’s annual reports only obliquely referred to “cooperation” with German peace societies while actual payments were disguised in a manner more reminiscent of espionage techniques than of philanthropy: funds originating in New York were first deposited into the Centre Européen’s bank account at Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, then transferred via Crédit Industrielle & Commerciale to a Swiss account in Basel, care of CEIP Special Correspondent Otfried Nippold, before finally making their way to the intended German recipients.294

The problem of avoiding public opprobrium did not become any less salient as the CEIP moved progressively toward cooperation with technical foreign policy experts. One of the first initiatives of

292 Butler to Andrew J. Montague, 6 June 1924, Box 20, Folder 11, CEIP US.
293 Cf. Birebent, Militants de la paix et de la SDN, 187–188; a surviving portion of a Centre Européen cash ledger for October-December 1924 indicates an annual subsidy of 2,000 francs, cf. Box 106, Folder 4, CEIP US.
294 See for instance, a payment on 10/14 November 1924 of 5,000 francs each to Die Friedenswarte, Hellmut von Gerlach and Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, cf. Centre Européen cash ledger, October-December 1924, Box 106, Folder 4, CEIP US; Bank statement Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas of 31 December 1924, Box 51, Folder 3, CEIP CE.
the Centre Européen under its new leadership had been a formal cooperation agreement between the CEIP and the Sorbonne’s IHEI. Throughout the academic year, lectures on international relations were held at the foundation’s headquarters at Boulevard Saint-Germain that mainly featured IHEI instructors and were part of the Institute’s regular curriculum. Again, this arrangement was not publicly labelled as a subsidy even though the expenses of roughly 100,000 francs per year would have made it—if paid through IHEI rather than to the instructors directly—one of the foundation’s largest ongoing grant programs in Europe.295 Even this setup, however, appears to not have entirely quelled French concerns of becoming too closely identified with a foreign financier and over the course of the following years a tug-of-war developed that pitted the foundation’s desire to advertise its accomplishments against IHEI’s preference to omit any public mentioning of the arrangement. Eventually, a disappointed Earle Babcock came to very much “doubt that the Institute regards its collaboration with the Centre Européen as the same source of pride” as the Americans did.296

Political pressure emanated not only from Europe, however, as in the United States, too, the CEIP’s overseas connections were frequently scrutinized for evidence that it was being used by foreign powers to influence the American public. Already before the war the CEIP had been mentioned in the context of conspiracy theories alleging that New York bankers and the City of London were conspiring to defraud American farmers and workers of the fruits of their labor. In March 1914, Secretary James Brown Scott was summoned before a Senate Committee investigating lobby influences on American politics, where he was compelled to produce detailed documentation on the CEIP’s expenditures.297 The episode left a profound impression on the young foundation. Firstly, secrecy and deliberately patchy record-keeping became part of its modus operandi as the directors remained mindful of the possibility of future Congressional subpoenas. Secondly, it became the starting point of the foundation’s alienation from the legislative branch as the suspicion that nationalists in Congress wanted to squash the Endowment became a lasting concern. Thirdly, it was the initial impetus for the CEIP’s gradual relocation from Washington to New York. As an organization based in the federally administered District of Columbia, any charter of incorporation as a tax-exempt organization would have had to be approved by Congress. “[W]e came to the conclusion that the charter was going to be so amended before it got through Congress that it would be equivalent

295 Cf. “Depenses pour les Cours, année 1927–1928,” Box 171A, Folder 2, CEIP CE; the annual reports usually referred to these courses as “arranged with the cooperation of” IHEI and did not specify any costs, cf. CEIP Year Book 1928, 74.
296 [Earle Babcock], “Projet de lettre,” [November 1930], Box 173, Folder 2, CEIP CE; the main source of conflict was IHEI’s steadfast refusal to publicly identify these courses as conducted in cooperation with the Endowment, rather than merely “taking place” at the Centre Européen.
297 Maintenance of a Lobby to Influence Legislation: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary. United States Senate, 13 March 1914, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 4776–4781.
to taking our money away from us,” Elihu Root later quipped.298

After the war, the CEIP’s European connections continued to be scrutinized by those suspecting East Coast elites of unpatriotically colluding with foreign economic and imperial interests. Behind the foundation’s campaign for international understanding the *Chicago Daily Tribune* suspected nothing more than a sly maneuver by the British to trick Americans out of their deserved war debt payments. To the *Tribune*, the “international mind” was not so much transforming Europe but enfeebling America, while Britain steadfastly adhered to the “‘national mindedness’ which the Carnegie endowment is striving to transmute in America into an enlightened ‘international mindedness.’”299

Criticism also came from the U.S. government, which watched the foundation’s dealings on the Continent with weary suspicion of its implications for American diplomacy. When in 1924 James Shotwell returned from one of his numerous trips to Geneva, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes personally threatened him with criminal prosecution under the Logan Act for conducting unauthorized negotiations with foreign governments.300 Just as Europeans needed to avoid the appearance of becoming beholden to American interests, a too close association with institutions linked to European governments also carried risks for the CEIP. Especially Butler was acutely aware that the trustees would not have countenanced a development in which the foundation would have become widely regarded as an unpatriotic agent of foreign powers.

These public pressures had a direct effect on the CEIP’s philanthropic strategy. One of the trustees later charged that a significant part of the foundations spending had constituted “patronage dispensed by Dr. Butler to titled persons whose contribution in America to the cause of peace is, to use the kindest word, vague.”301 Outside critics shared this view, claiming that the foundation was mainly focused on hosting “champagne banquets” and “provid[ing] rich sinecures for a favored group.”302

An analysis of a sample of all grants paid through the Centre Européen in the years 1927 to 1931 would seem to corroborate such allegations, indicating the eclectic variety of recipients: they included academic and semi-academic institutions in the field of international relations research such as the DHP or the University of Vienna. A second category comprised institutions that furthered the public education and publicity concerns of the foundation, such as payments to the Austro-American Institute of Education or the Ligue Francaise d’Education Morale. A significant number of payments,

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298 CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 14 May 1929, [unpaginated], Box 14, CEIP US.
301 Maurice Sherman to George A. Finch, 26 February 1942, enclosing “Extract from a Letter of A Trustee After Receiving Mr. Bullitt’s Concurring Opinion,” Box 22, Folder 1, CEIP US.
however, went to causes and organizations that had an, at best, tenuous relationship to the CEIP’s stated objectives such as the 30,000 francs that went to La Bienvenue Francaise, a public diplomacy charity founded by Marshal Ferdinand Foch that tended to prominent visitors to France, or the 8,000 francs that went to Paul Appell’s widow for unspecified “educational work.” The vast majority of items fell in between these categories—showing a reasonable connection to the foundation’s mission but also clearly directed toward long-standing or recently acquired friends and political allies of the foundation.303

These “grants” often came with so few strings attached in terms of a concrete and verifiable contribution to a clearly defined goal that they resembled less contractual arrangements, openly negotiated quid pro quos, than charitable gifts. Yet, rather than conceiving of these acts as spendthrift generosity or eccentricity, as the CEIP’s critics charged, it is helpful to view them as a consequence of the political climate in which the foundation was operating. “You just fritter away the money in little things that don’t amount to much. You please some particular individual but you don’t make any impression on public opinion,” Butler once expressed his own frustration at these expenditures.304

Rather than interpreting such payments through the lens of scientific philanthropy it thus appears more apt to view them in light of sociological and anthropological approaches to commodity exchanges that interpret gift-giving as allowances “with a view to creating, maintaining or regenerating the social bond” (Caillé).305 Bourdieu, following the classic study by Marcel Mauss, emphasizes the implied obligations that accompany a gift and the asymmetrical power relationship that follows from accepting it.306 The CEIP’s grant making in Europe centered on accruing social capital through a network of associations in which the patronage of its argent d’influence (Tournès) created new contacts, reaffirmed existing links and generated good will. It was not any single transaction that counted—gratitude for grants, as all forms of social capital, could be fleeting and was not easily converted into concrete action—but the accumulation of small acts.307

This was also where the function of the Comité d’Administration and its relationship to the CEIP’s leadership comes into clearer view. For purposes of public presentation, participation of respected European academics, journalists and civil servants in the foundation’s decision-making process was

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303 Cf. “Subventions accordées sur le compte en Francs du 1er Janvier 1927 au 31 Octobre 1931,” and, “Subventions accordées sur le compte en Dollars du 1er Janvier 1927 au 31 Octobre 1931,” Box 80, Folder 1, CEIP CE.
304 “Conference with Dr. Butler, Dec 19, 1922,” Box 41, Folder 5, CEIP US.
designed to address local concerns over the legitimacy of American intervention. Its internal function, however, was to provide the foundation with a road map to its European field of activities. Through the members of the Comité, the CEIP directors gained local knowledge on the social and political dynamics both between and within societies. Discussions, both at the formal meetings of the Comité and during informal social gatherings, alerted the foundation’s officers to opportunities and pitfalls, to key relationships that needed to be cultivated and to persons and institutions that should better be avoided. Yet, the direct grant payments that resulted from the Comité’s deliberations were frequently more intended to provide the atmosphere for the larger work of the foundation than in itself perpetuate the “international mind.”

“To link up people like yourself and myself…”: Knowledge as practice

“Keep the initiative in your own hands. Do not wait for persons to come to you, but seek them out and make sure that the influence of our undertaking grows steadily in proper and helpful quarters”—those were Butler’s marching orders to his new Paris director when Babcock took over the Centre Européen. The CEIP president’s energetic enthusiasm underlines the change in the CEIP’s European strategy toward actively trying to shape internationalist activism rather than merely financing it. This started with the Centre Européen itself. Among Butler’s original instructions was to make “the building a center for international activity.” A ground-floor library was set up whose international press selection attracted a diverse audience of students, teachers and journalists from over three dozen countries. Its lecture hall became the venue for regular presentations and discussion rounds that brought in a cast of internationally renowned foreign policy scholars and practitioners. In addition to conducting its own programs, the CEIP also rented out or donated part of its office space to other internationalist ventures, further cementing its claim to becoming one of Paris’s premier addresses for the discussion of international relations. The heart of the operation, however, was the Centre Européen’s new bureaucracy that tended to the correspondence that kept the Paris office in daily touch with the American headquarters and with its contacts throughout Europe. At the time when Babcock arrived in Paris in the summer of 1925 he had led a permanent staff of five. Four years later, that number had almost tripled as a growing number of secretaries, typists, stenographers and

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308 On this function cf. Wegener, “‘An Organisation, European in Character’: European Agency and American Control at the Centre Européen, 1925–40”; according to Butler, the meetings of the Comité were usually followed by lunch at a café on the Seine, where “informal discussion [continued] for a couple of hours,” cf. Butler to Malcolm Davis, 10 April 1935, Box 214, Folder 1, CEIP CE.

309 Butler to Babcock, 27 July 1925, Box 107, Folder 1, CEIP US.

310 “Memorandum for Mr. Babcock,” 7 August 1925, Box 107, Folder 1, CEIP US.

archivists were needed to keep up with the flow of correspondence. Total salaries during the same time period more than quadrupled from 75,180 to 331,705 francs as annual expenditures for work conducted through the Centre Européen increased sixfold from 10,000 to 60,000 dollars.\footnote{Budget for Centre Européen, 7 August 1925, Box 107, Folder 1, CEIP US; payroll for the year 1929, Box 78, Folder 2, CEIP CE; CEIP Year Book 1926, 139; CEIP Year Book 1930, 151.}

In cooperation with their colleagues in Washington and New York the men and women in Paris initiated and supervised an array of new programs that the foundation claimed to be conducive to furthering the “international mind.” Butler’s Division of Intercourse and Education organized educational transatlantic trips for journalists, academics and lawyers, sending American economists to Europe and European journalists to the United States. The division was also a main driving force behind academic exchange programs both between continents and within Europe. It sent German professors to lecture in Southern France and Polish historians to speak in Berlin. The Division of International Law instituted the Academy of International Law at The Hague, a summer school that since 1923 brought an international student body in touch with some of the most eminent teachers of international law.\footnote{Cf. CEIP Year Book 1924, 105.} Meanwhile, Shotwell’s Divisions of Economics and History invested virtually all of its energy and resources into writing an Economic and Social History of the War (ESHW). It was a project of monumental proportions that would take more than a decade to complete and ultimately comprised over one hundred and fifty volumes.\footnote{Cf. CEIP Year Book 1934, 137.}

As variegated as these projects were, there was a common theme to the CEIP’s philanthropic initiatives: most of these endeavors were ultimately designed to foster communication and cooperation among many of the same professional elites in the foreign policy sector that formed the core membership of the Comité d’Administration. Whether exchange programs, lecture tours or publication projects—in addition to the immediate educational or research objective of a project the common denominator was to promote travel and cross-border contacts among members of national foreign policy establishments. Thus, in addition to producing a comprehensive history of the social impact of the First World War, Shotwell’s ESHW also represented a decentralized network of authors and national editorial committees that included some of the world’s foremost economists and political scientists: John Maynard Keynes, William Beveridge, Charles Rist, Luigi Einaudi, David Mitrany. The idea was, Shotwell wrote to IAP director and members of the German committee Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, “to link up people like yourself and myself,” those that the CEIP director felt represented “the saner movement for international understanding.”\footnote{Shotwell to Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 10 April 1926, Box 76, Folder „Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy I,”}
This “saner movement” appeared to be first and foremost a highly educated one. An analysis of a sample of about eight hundred of these program participants shows that the majority of them—at least two-thirds—were academics.\textsuperscript{316} About fifteen percent were in government service (ministers, bureaucrats, members of parliament) while the remainder were distributed more or less evenly among private sector professionals (businessmen, bankers, lawyers), journalists and officers of other non-governmental organizations. Just as with the members of the Comité, most of these programs were not directed at developing promising, young talents but at those already well-established in their professional careers. American international lawyers Pitman B. Potter and Philip C. Jessup, who both launched their careers with CEIP fellowships in international law, were the exception rather than the rule. The median year of birth was 1877, meaning that most participants were in their late fourties and fifties. Female representation was low at only about three percent. While many lesser-known names fill the participant lists among those who accepted CEIP funding were also some of the most influential voices in interwar foreign policy debates: André Siegfried, Ernst Jäckh, Philip Noel Baker, William E. Rappard, Georges Scelle, Walter Simons, Arnold Wolfers, Jacob Viner and John B. Condliffe.

By adopting a philanthropic strategy aimed at the interpersonal level, at sponsoring social practice rather than institutions, the CEIP effectively circumvented the constraints that political culture imposed on its ability to directly fund organizations that were closely associated with national governments. Its growing interpersonal network was always intended to simultaneously serve as a web linking organizations via the institutional affiliations of its members. “If we can possibly effect even the beginnings of a cooperation between the [Deutsche] Hochschule [für Politik] in Berlin, the Institut [des Hautes Études Internationales] in Paris and the [Royal] Institute [of International Affairs] in London, we shall have gone along well,” Butler encouraged Babcock in 1926.\textsuperscript{317} Just as the composition of the Comité d’Administration established links between the foundation and major European research institutions and advocacy groups, mapping the professional affiliations of participants in the CEIP’s major projects produces a similar picture of a dense web of contacts. It was this network that Alfred Vagts, who had served as a secretary for Shotwell’s war history project at the

\textsuperscript{316} The sample includes participants of the following programs: Carnegie Visiting Professors of International Relations, Economic and Social History of the War, Hague Academy of International Law, Fellowships in International Law, Special Correspondents, Chaire Carnegie, Carnegie Lehrstuhl, Esprit International authors.

\textsuperscript{317} Butler to Babcock, 28 September 1926, Box 108, Folder 1, CEIP US.
IAP during the 1920s, later described tongue-in-cheek as “something akin to an international cartel” between foreign policy think tanks and educational institutions (cf. fig. A, p. 18).\( ^{318} \)

From the perspective of those who participated in these activities, the Carnegie Endowment was an institution responding to a demand among experts for community institutions that could supersede the particularism of national academic cultures and narrow-minded political debates. Many of those who utilized the foundation’s forums were also regular contributors to other transnational community institutions: the Williamstown Institute of Politics, the Geneva Institute of International Relations, the Union internationale des Associations pour la Société des Nations or the Institute of International Education—most of which also received some kind of direct or indirect CEIP assistance.\(^{319} \) The spirit that these institutions strove for amounted to a “scientific”, technical consensus that would stand in striking contrast to the inability of politicians to reach political compromise and it was this transnational identity that participants usually referred to as constituting the “international mind.”

For instance, Comité member Georges Lechartier was impressed by a four-day conference held at Briarcliff, NY, in 1926 and organized jointly by the CEIP and the American Academy of Political Science. Strolling through the picturesque Hudson River landscape between lectures and round table discussions and debating disarmament policies with an international cast of experts that included David Hunter Miller, Isaiah Bowman and Ludwig von Mises, Lechartier imagined himself as a student in Aristotle’s Lyceum. Just as the casual meeting of minds of the ancient Greek thinkers had laid the foundations of Western philosophy, the informal gatherings of disinterested scholars of international relations could set the world on a path toward peace. In the calm atmosphere of the rural setting, experts were quickly able to arrive at solutions to even the most contentious problems of the time, espousing opinions that were “sometimes contrary to those officially recognized.”\(^{320} \) Lechartier was aware that their answers would not be adopted overnight. Discussions among experts, even if conducted “in all good will and sincerity” could not produce silver bullets as the implementation of policies was dependent on the public’s readiness to accept them. But what conferences such as Briarcliff could contribute was to found bonds between experts based on “mutual esteem” and “cooperation in a common task.”\(^{321} \) They could hasten the formation of the “international mind”, the

\(^{318} \) Alfred Vagts, „Erinnerungen an Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy,“ p. 13, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy Collection, LBI.


only antidote against the selfishness of nations.”

Nicolas Politis reported a similar experience from his participation in the Hague Academy of International Law, which he credited with “forg[ing] an international scientific outlook.” To Politis, the “international mind” was above all the recognition that “other peoples have the same rights that we do” and it were institutions such as the Hague Academy that could instill this belief: “You have to get people used to thinking about international affairs as what they really are, that is to say, a complex web of interests of different countries; and to examine them objectively, without hidden national motivations, with a sense of duty.” Carlo Sforza, after having attended the Williamstown Institute of Politics, praised the “spirit of disinterestedness” that had marked the proceedings. This was not only true in terms of national but also political viewpoints, as Sforza failed to see any acrimony between Democrats and Republicans among the American participants. The cooperative mindset of scholarly debate appeared to be conducive to depoliticizing and denationalizing issues.

The CEIP’s quest for an “international mind” in the 1920s is thus best conceptualized as reflecting a widespread interest among highly educated, transnationally connected elites in finding technocratic solutions that could overcome both the cultural polarization between peoples inherited by the war and the dysfunction of the international system left in its wake. The positivist idea of the “national interest” as an object of research, susceptible to empirical study by international specialists was, in practice, a call for the transnational construction of policy positions: by personally familiarizing themselves with the political constraints driving, for instance, disarmament policy in France or immigration policy in the United States, experts would return to their national institutional settings with an understanding of the red lines that their own government could not cross without negotiations breaking down or even ending in confrontation. Inserted back into national debates through participants’ contacts with the state and the public, it was hoped that such consensus could forestall the brash assertions of national interest and national honor that had accompanied the battle cries in 1914. “Slender enough seem the cords thus flung across from our lands to others,” Henry Suzzallo of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching once described the CEIP’s role in

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323 Politis, “L’École des Hautes Études Internationales.”
326 Cf. Ibid., 522.
promoting such informal contacts, “but their accumulation with time will make them cables of lasting power, stretched and twisted skilfully by [Butler’s] persistent and patient hands.”

Branding the “International Mind”: Knowledge as discourse

As the above statements indicate, the CEIP’s European associates conceived of the “international mind” as an inherently apolitical phenomenon. The goal was to arrive at an “objective” appreciation of national interests by stripping away all national and political biases. Yet, as with all technocratic movements, there was an unmistakable political dimension to the endeavor. It strove to shift power to a new set of actors—the experts—thus supplanting their values and preferences for those of the voting public. This was, in the first place, a means of transnationalizing politics through a process of inclusion and exclusion. For instance, when the Comité d’Administration discussed the target audience for the Centre Européen’s new journal *L’Esprit International* they were in effect debating who was deemed qualified to participate in debates on international relations. Georges Lechartier was particularly concerned with reaching foreign ministry bureaucrats and journalists while others suggested university professors, members of parliament and senior statesmen. Banker Alfred Nerincx brought up “the leading members of the boards of directors of the major banks, of big businesses” while Nicolas Politis urged not to forget wealthy gentlemen who had retired to the countryside.

Yet, while the foregoing has mainly analyzed the “international mind” as a practice, a mode of interaction, the origins and dissemination of the discourse point toward another means by which transnational power was constructed.

By the mid-1920s the “international mind” discourse already had a longer history that reached back to the founding days of the CEIP. On the morning of 15 May 1912, Nicholas Murray Butler, the then newly minted director of the CEIP’s Division of Intercourse and Education, delivered the opening address at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, a venerable gathering that since 1895 had brought international peace activists and dignitaries to an imposing resort on a ridge in the southern Catskill Mountains. Butler had alluded to the “international mind” as early as 1910 but it was in this speech that for the first time he expounded at length on the concept. He also supplied the delegates with a definition of the term, which—most likely on account of Butler’s typically improvised, ad-hoc delivery—was a rather stilted and not particularly memorable expression of the widely shared belief in a liberal internationalism as part of a teleological development toward a more

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330 Comité d’Administration Meeting, 28 March 1927, p. 14–15, Box 117, CEIP CE.
civilized and peaceful world:

The international mind is nothing else than that habit of thinking of foreign relations and business, and that habit of dealing with them, which regard the several nations of the civilized world as friendly and co-operating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing commerce and industry, and in spreading enlightenment and culture throughout the world.\footnote{Report of the Eighteenth Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration: May 15, 16th and 17th 1912 (Lake Mohonk, NY: Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1912), 16.}

Butler could not quite claim to have invented the phrase, which had occasionally appeared in social reform and peace activist circles since the turn of the century.\footnote{See for example “What Must Follow the Conference?,” Review of Reviews 20 (1899): 145; Brander Matthews, American Character (New York: T. Y. Crowell & Company, 1906), 294.} But it was Butler’s programmatic use in his Lake Mohonk speech, followed several months later by the publication of his book The International Mind, which clearly marked the point at which the term started to gain widespread currency.\footnote{Cf. Nicholas Murray Butler, The International Mind: An Argument for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1912) a search within Google’s text corpus via the company’s NGram Viewer confirms this correlation for both English and French—neither “international mind” nor “esprit international” were in common usage before 1910: https://books.google.com/ngrams.}

Over the course of the following three decades, encouraging adoption of the “international mind” phraseology throughout the internationalist field became a primary preoccupation for the CEIP’s Division of Intercourse and Education as it was viewed as a measure of the Endowment’s rising influence. With his natural grasp of public relations Butler assiduously monitored that its use was consistent across the CEIP’s various activities and, rather curiously in light of its obvious shortcomings, even insisted on maintaining the precise wording of his original Lake Mohonk speech. The CEIP’s trademark was translated into several European languages and when in 1927 the Centre Européen launched its own journal there was little question that the new publication would be named L’Esprit International, complete with a French version of Butler’s definition on its inside cover. With a view toward future translations of the new periodical the president reminded Earle Babcock of the paramount importance of maintaining consistency: “If they make a German edition, be sure they use the same translation Die Internationale Gesinnung that we have statedly used heretofore. I send you the German version of the phrase and its definition.”\footnote{Butler to Babcock, 6 January 1927, Box 106, Folder 1, CEIP US; Butler’s claim to consistency is, in fact, contradicted by the original German translation of his book, which had used a different rendering, cf. Nicholas Murray Butler, Der internationale Geist (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1912).} Throughout the 1920s, the CEIP’s European partners, especially the members of the Comité d’Administration, helped propagate this discourse in their home countries. Educating Europeans to live together peacefully apparently required, as a first step, to teach them Carnegie-speak.

Success was almost immediate in Great Britain, where already during the war the CEIP’s preferred
terminology began to be adopted by the developing field of IR scholarship. In 1916, J.A. Hobson devoted an entire chapter of his book *Towards International Government* to the subject and after the war the first two incumbents of the world’s first IR chair at the University of Aberystwyth, Alfred Zimmern and Charles K. Webster, would make use of it, either with or without direct attribution to Butler.335 But the phrase soon spread far beyond academia across the internationalist and peace movements and into mainstream politics. In 1920, Liberal Party politician Charles Masterman advertised his New Liberalism as striving for understanding and cooperation between all nations and the “formation of an international mind.”336 Perhaps more surprisingly given the term’s bourgeois provenance, it also gained widespread acceptance on the political left, with H.G. Wells writing in 1921 that for Europe to survive there had to be a realignment of “moral and intellectual forces in the direction of creating an international mind.”337 Taking its cues from Wells, the Labour Party’s publishing arm instituted a book series dedicated to contributing to the “international mind” that distributed such definitively non-CEIP-approved material as Leonard Woolf’s critique of economic imperialism and Communist Party leader Raymond W. Postgate’s historical account of the workers’ international.338 The wider the CEIP’s terminology was adopted, the more detached it appeared to become from any definite meaning.

In Germany, where many remained wary of an internationalism primarily associated with the Allied victors, the “international mind” never quite filtered down into the public discourse, however, thanks to the efforts of Comité member Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron it did develop a life of its own as an instrument of public diplomacy. One of Prittwitz’s achievements on behalf of the foundation was to tie Prussian Minister of Culture C.H. Becker, an early German advocate of cultural diplomacy, to the foundation. Becker soon signaled his approval of the CEIP’s mission by liberally invoking *den internationalen Geist* in his public speeches.339 The discourse also entered the Wilhelmstraße and German-American diplomacy via Erich’s brother Friedrich Wilhelm, the German ambassador to the United States. When Ambassador von Prittwitz und Gaffron received an honorary doctorate from Syracuse University in 1929 he demonstrated his thorough grasp of the CEIP’s transnational networks by turning his acceptance speech into an exploration of the conceptual links between Butler’s idea of

an “international mind” and Comité member Henri Lichtenberger’s notion of “international citizenship.”\footnote{Cf. Address of Friedrich-Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaﬀron at Syracuse University, 10 June 1929, I 138, no. 002, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaﬀron Papers, Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, cf. Wegener, “‘An Organisation, European in Character’: European Agency and American Control at the Centre Européen, 1925–40,” 49–50; I am grateful to Michael Wala for pointing out this link.} Becker’s and Prittwitz’s invocation of Butlerian terminology was a clear sign that governments were discovering the utility of adopting the language of non-governmental organizations in their pursuit of foreign policy goals.\footnote{See also the ambassador’s recollections on his meetings with Butler, cf. Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaﬀron, \textit{Zwischen Peters burg und Washington: Ein Diplomatenleben}, (Munich: Isar Verlag, 1952), 195.}

Given such diverse uses and contexts there is a case to be made that the discursive side of the “international mind” campaign did not amount to much beyond an exercise in vanity on the part of the CEIP. By establishing Butler’s signature phrase as what became essentially a synonym for “internationalism” it was scoring a symbolic success at the expense of any definite meaning and thus failed to promote any concrete policies or practices. Such an interpretation would, however, give little weight to the power constituted by the practice of language itself as a process that continually structures social relations and impacts knowledge production. According to Bourdieu, language is not produced in a neutral space of free speech but is constructed by educational processes that involve the “symbolic domination” of those passively or actively accepting normalized modes of expression.\footnote{Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, \textit{Language and Symbolic Power}, ed. John Thompson, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 50–51.} Accordingly, appropriation of the “international mind” discourse often proceeded along a path of unequal power relationships that were reproduced in the act of adaptation and learning on the part of the foundation’s European partners. Although, as has been, shown, the CEIP was careful to avoid overt signs of domination, that did not mean that European institutions did not adjust their rhetoric in the hopes of accessing the foundation’s superior resources. Whether they were already working with the CEIP, were in the process of applying for assistance or simply wanted to demonstrate goodwill to preserve the option of future grant applications, many connected to Europe’s academic institutions and internationalist associations adopted the foundation’s terminology at least partially in recognition of the organization’s financial clout.

An indication for this process is that the incidence of international-mindedness seemed to increase markedly in the proximity of institutions either benefitting from American philanthropy or closely associated with CEIP partners. As may be expected, the CEIP-initiated Hague Academy of International Law was a particularly fertile ground for this discourse. In the years 1925 to 1930 alone, at least nineteen speakers explicitly referenced the “international mind” during their courses\footnote{Search of \textit{Recueil des cours} conducted via Gallica, http://gallica.bnf.fr.} and
in some years the published proceedings of the Academy even featured an index entry for the concept. GIIA, the site of Alfred Zimmern’s speech in 1926, received a subsidy of 7,500 dollars from the Carnegie Endowment that year. A cumulative impact of American funding may have been at play in the work of the League of Nation’s ICIC and its affiliated institute which, while receiving only token contributions from the CEIP, relied increasingly on grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and from the Carnegie Corporation, particularly for the establishment of the International Studies Conference in the late 1920s. During the second half of the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s the ICIC would emerge as a key proponent of the “international mind” language and of related concepts such as the notion of a “League of minds” and the establishment of a regional esprit Européen. In accepting CEIP-supplied language European and international institutions were thus tacitly acknowledging the foundation’s claim to representing the mainstream of internationalist thought.

To the individual speaker or writer conforming to such speech conventions must have seemed rather trivial—a shrewd act of slightly reframing an organization’s established agenda that could secure the goodwill of a rich benefactor. Yet, the subtle power of the “international mind” was that, cumulatively, repetition of a discourse can structure a field to the detriment of competing terminologies and their associated knowledge claims. In E.H. Carr’s seminal critique of the internationalist movement, published in 1939, the British IR scholar accused internationalists of using the language of altruism to obscure the self-interested and even imperialist nature of the global order they were seeking. “Just as pleas for ‘national solidarity’ in domestic politics always come from a dominant group,” Carr argued, “pleas for international solidarity and world union come from those dominant nations which may hope to exercise control over a unified world.” Carr’s caricature of a uniformly utopian movement missed much of the complexities of internationalist activism but his critique of the tendency of idealist language to reproduce existing inequalities had merit. After all, if the root causes of war were primarily spiritual there was no pressing need to address issues of economic inequality between nations and social tensions within them. This made the “international mind” discourse particularly compelling to a liberal milieu seeking to fortify the international system against claims for the redistribution of power and resources, whether they came from “radical” social reformers, anti-imperialist internationalists, anti-colonial movements or propagandists for irredentist European

346 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 109.
governments. Although, like any figure of speech, the “international mind” was open to interpretation and appropriation, its specificity in comparison with competing discourses lay in its linkage between greater international integration and the preservation of the domestic and international status quo.

Many of these competing discourses that were gradually pushed aside predated the CEIP and represented strikingly different visions of race, social and gender relations. Eight years before Butler introduced the “international mind” at the Lake Mohonk Conference, women’s rights activist May Wright Sewall expressed broadly similar ideas at the third congress of the International Council of Women (ICW) in Berlin. Her presidential address cast the Council’s activism in terms of a developing Weltgeist or “world spirit” that brought the peoples of the earth into closer contact. The ICW’s understanding of this Weltgeist was an emphatically egalitarian one. Sewall decried an understanding of internationalism that all too frequently presumed the domination of small nations by larger powers, placed rich above poor and the few above the many. Against this conception the ICW presented itself as a nascent transnational, democratic space in which each woman was treated equally without regard “to her nationality, her race, her religion or her social station.” A different reformist variant that Butler would have almost certainly been familiar with was espoused by his Columbia University colleague Brander Matthews. He, like Butler, touted the “international mind” of well-travelled men versed in the perspectives of other peoples, but to Matthews, the exponents of this spirit were Christian progressive reformers participating in the Interchurch World Movement and in the Federal Council of Churches. The goal of these internationalist connections was to design common standards on labor regulation, safety standards and female integration into the work force with the ultimate objective of determining “the most equitable division of the products of industry that can ultimately be devised.”

It was at this point, in rejecting the demands of what some contemporaries called the “Have Nots”—those seeking to effect a redistribution of power and wealth through the international system—where the “international mind” discourse intersected with the new expert communities the CEIP was seeking to bolster. While the phrase was appropriated widely and often in unintended ways, its central use was as a marker for a liberal internationalism that saw the future of the international system neither in the solidarity of workers worldwide nor in national particularism. The interpretation of the “international mind” promoted by the foundation and by most of its liberal associates framed the


348 Cf. Matthews, American Character, 87.

challenge of international stability as a problem requiring expert-guided, incremental reform and education, rather than sweeping social change and state intervention. Thus, while the CEIP was careful to avoid imposing concrete concepts on its European audience, it did exert an influence on the broader expert field by setting the parameters of debates and defining problems. For instance, the sheer size of the project and diversity of the authors made James T. Shotwell’s war history project appear as a politically neutral project. Yet, the very subject of the study made it an essentially liberal project. The overarching social effect of the war that Shotwell wanted to highlight with the mountain of evidence his authors were assembling was the increase of “government control in wartime.” By demonstrating the suppression of individual freedom and free enterprise under conditions of modern warfare he wished to bolster the liberal case for peace.

Conclusion: Transnationalism and the duality of persons and groups
In 1974, sociologist Ronald Breiger published “The Duality of Persons and Groups,” an article that would become highly influential for the developing field of social network analysis. Building on Georg Simmel’s theories of sociability, Breiger demonstrated in mathematical form how links between individuals also constitute connections between the institutions they are affiliated with, and vice versa. Fifty years earlier, the Carnegie Endowment had intuitively acted along those same lines. Forced to exercise great caution in directly and overtly sponsoring institutions whose work was considered part of the state’s sensitive arcana of foreign policy, the foundation invested in links that ensured cross-border communication and cooperation between those associated with research institutions and advocacy groups. The foundation’s sponsorship of community institutions and exchange programs between transnational expert communities became key to the establishment of what participants hoped would constitute a web of informal governance during a time of dysfunctional international politics.

Both the historiography of internationalism and disciplinary histories of international relations theory have traditionally attempted to read back into the interwar period an opposition between “idealism,” viewed as a precursor to liberal internationalism, and “realism.” The CEIP’s interventions in both intersecting fields demonstrates the ahistorical nature of such an enterprise. The supposedly idealist

351 Patricia Clavin has found a similar strategy of furthering political projects by framing research projects among the members of the League’s Secretariat, cf. Clavin, Securing the World Economy, 127.
rhetoric of the “international mind” was fundamentally about the recognition of and negotiation between competing national interests. Participants did not dispute the legitimacy of states pursuing discrete goals on behalf of their citizens but thought that in the absence of effective mechanisms for preventing those interests from spawning global conflict it was incumbent on a transnationally connected elite to bring these different conceptions into alignment. At the same time, the socio-cultural background of foreign policy professionals affected which societal goals they viewed as legitimate and conducive to the common good. Even after the reform of its philanthropic activities in the mid-1920s, the CEIP continued to represent the interests of those in favor of a liberal variety of internationalism and its views on what constituted “radical” or “socialist” systems of knowledge often filtered down well beyond its immediate network of associates.

Speaking after Alfred Zimmern at the 1926 session of the Geneva Institute of International Relations, James Brown Scott presented the work of the foundation to the assembled experts. “We believe in conference, we believe in intercourse, and we believe in the printed page,” he succinctly summarized the CEIP’s methodology. Of these, it was particularly the first technique that stressed the essentially collaborative nature of what the foundation was trying to accomplish. “Conference”—whether in open forums or behind closed doors—among selected representatives of national elites promised to unite critical actors behind specific policies which could then be introduced into political contexts in several countries. The following three chapters present case studies of this mechanism as the CEIP sought to broker consensus in the fields of cultural, legal and economic internationalism. While these conformed roughly to the foundation’s divisional organization they were, in fact, interrelated projects that had been present in its activities since the very beginning and which, at different times, occupied the attention of the entire foundation. Their rise and demise reflected the foundation’s continual adaptation to political challenges and social movements.

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3. Weltbürgertum: Cultural internationalism and the search for social order

Under heightened security the Carnegie Endowment’s Centre Européen launched the year 1926 with an event sure to draw attention to the foundation’s work on improving Franco-German cultural relations. Its invitation to renowned German author Thomas Mann to speak at 173 Boulevard Saint-Germain on 20 January had attracted widespread publicity well in advance. Yet, after a talk by theater critic Alfred Kerr at the Sorbonne the previous night had been interrupted by Serbian nationalists, the CEIP, fearing public controversy at the more high-profile event with Mann, decided at the last minute to restrict attendance to only a handful of invited guests, leaving even much of the press excluded. The nervousness was understandable. Less than a decade earlier, Mann had played a highly visible role in Germany’s wartime propaganda when he had declared democracy, liberalism and internationalism alien to German culture, but now he had come to Paris with a more conciliatory message. “[T]ime and circumstances place certain obligations on an author,” Mann had told Nicholas Murray Butler in accepting the assignment, assuring the president that it would make him proud if he were able to contribute even slightly to “good intellectual relations between our two countries.” The evening was a milestone that highlighted the recent progress that had been made in Franco-German reconciliation but also demonstrated how fraught with political tensions cultural relations still were, even if conducted on supposedly neutral, American ground.

The intertwining of culture and politics represented by Mann’s lecture was characteristic of mid-1920s Franco-German relations, often labelled as the time of the “Spirit of Locarno.” Yet, culture and diplomacy were often more codependent than that label, with its implication of the primacy of politics, would suggest. Instead of only appearing on the scene after the ink had dried on the treaties,

356 Cf. Thomas Mann, Autobiographisches (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Bücherei KG, 1968), 112.
civil society actors such as peace societies, youth groups, lobby organizations, associations promoting Franco-German and European cultural exchange as well as a transnational coalition of supporters of the League of Nations all contributed to a widespread discourse of conciliation that allowed diplomatic activity to proceed. Furthermore, this Franco-German activism was embedded in a broader movement centered on the League of Nation’s ICIC that promoted cultural exchanges, particularly among elites, as a cure for the hyper-nationalism that had thrust the world into war. As has frequently been noted, the Carnegie Endowment was an almost ubiquitous presence in this transnational cultural space.

The previous chapter has described how in the mid-1920s the CEIP changed its philanthropic strategy, shifting most of its resources toward support for a field of transnationally connected foreign policy experts at the intersection of academia, government and the public. The very existence of this field was predicated on the belief that internationalist activism and government service could be reconciled, in other words that nationalism and internationalism were not in contradiction. “Pro


363 Cf. Guieu, Le rameau et le glaive; Düßler, “Vom Internationalismus zum Expansionismus.”


366 I depart here from both Sandi Cooper and Glenda Sluga, who date the emergence of a “patriotic internationalism” or “new internationalism” to the late nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, respectively. Cf. Cooper,
patria per orbis concordiam” had been Conciliation Internationale’s official motto before the war, but after 1914, governments had discovered control over culture—the symbolic frameworks within which people make sense of the world—as an integral part of ensuring the loyalty of their citizens. Crossborder cultural encounters could now often trigger suspicions of disloyalty. Restoring a version of the liberal identity of the patriotic internationalist was consequently an essential goal of the CEIP’s activism. Thomas Mann’s visit to Paris did not only proceed with the full blessing of the French and German governments but became itself a site for informal consultation. A dinner hosted for Mann at the German embassy and attended by the French ministers Édouard Daladier, Anatole de Monzie and Paul Painlevé—the first such event since the war—provided a welcome opportunity for unofficial Franco-German consultations. At some point during the evening, Mann encountered the German Ambassador Leopold von Hoesch, still agitated from a heated discussion with Painlevé on troop reductions in the Rhineland.367

In addition, the “Spirit of Locarno” or the “international mind,” in CEIP terminology, was not a politically neutral category. To fellow German author Kurt Tucholsky the rarefied atmosphere of Thomas Mann’s visit appeared antiquated in an age of popular democracy and mass mobilization. This type of activity would never “reach the masses” and was in the end nothing more than a “harmless parlor game.”368 To many on the political left, such as Tucholsky, high-minded enterprises reminiscent of the “League of Minds” advocated by leaders of the intellectual cooperation movement such as Gilbert Murray, Henri Bergson and Salvador de Madariaga were doomed from the start as they did not address the social iniquities fueling international instability.369 They considered social peace, not appeals to a unifying humanist spirit a precondition for international peace.370 Those aligned with the CEIP, usually approached the problem from the other direction: elites needed to work together to stabilize the international system to prevent further social upheaval.

The Franco-German conflict certainly gave much evidence to support such views. CEIP officers and trustees watched warily as the contentious politics of security and reparations appeared to destabilize both countries. Especially the year 1923 became a tipping point, as the French Occupation of the Ruhr and the German government’s passive resistance efforts pushed the Weimar Republic to the brink of

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367 Cf. Mann, Autobiographisches, 118–120; “Réunion du mercredi 20 janvier 1926,” Box 178, Folder 2, CEIP CE.
collapse. There were certainly also economic considerations at play. Before 1914, Germany had been the third largest export market for the United States and soon after the war American businesses were eager to move back into the German market. Antagonism between Germany and America’s ally France was a problem because it retarded the normalization of business relations.371 “American business interests are thoroughly dissatisfied with the present policies of the Department of State,” CEIP Trustee Robert Lansing noted as early as February 1922, expressing a common concern that timid American diplomacy was impeding the exploration of new markets.372 Helping the French build a bridge of conciliation across the Rhine River, Butler told the trustees, could do more “to pave the way toward a peaceful Europe in the next hundred years than […] all the armies and navies and reparations and recriminations.”373

Concerns that the nationalist acrimony of the conflict was undermining social order were also shared by many elites in Germany and France. Moderate figures on the French center-left, especially from the foreign policy elites of the Cartel des Gauches under Prime Ministers Édouard Herriot and Aristide Briand as well as a coalition of liberal republicans and conservative _Vernunftrepublikaner_ who supported the policies of Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann became the main European partners in the CEIP’s Franco German programs.374 Two men who stood at the center of these activities were Sorbonne professor of German literature Henri Lichtenberger, who served as the foundation’s designated specialist on outreach to Germany and became a founding member of the Comité d’Administration in 1925, and German economist Moritz Julius Bonn, who had worked with the foundation since 1922 and joined the Comité five years later. Although both men were prominent protagonist in the internationalist academic community of the 1920s this memory quickly faded after the Second World War and historiography has only recently rediscovered their contributions in the course of renewed interest in civil society actors in international relations.375

371 Cf. Costigliola, _Awkward Dominion_, 79–80; Hildebrand, _Das vergangene Reich_, 479.
373 CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 9 December 1922, p. 10, Box 14, CEIP US.
Although the two professors thrived in very different fields they shared key experiences, largely on account of belonging to the same generational cohort, that later motivated their internationalist activism. Born in 1864 and 1873, respectively, Lichtenberger and Bonn had spent the formative early parts of their careers in the international atmosphere of late nineteenth and early twentieth century European academia. Bonn, the scion of a Jewish banking family from Frankfurt, had studied at Heidelberg, Munich, Vienna and at the London School of Economics and conducted field studies for his doctoral dissertation on the British colonization of Ireland. He met his future English wife while travelling in Italy and spent a year surveying German and British colonies in Africa before settling in Munich and then in Berlin as director of the commercial college (Handelshochschule). While not as well-travelled as his German colleague, Lichtenberger’s upbringing and early career were similarly marked by multiple border-crossings that gave rise to a hybrid, or at least flexible, identity. Born into a protestant Alsatian family, he had experienced the German attack on Strasbourg in 1870 as a child. After early studies in Paris at the Lycée Condorcet and at the Sorbonne he returned to Alsace for additional training at the German-speaking University of Strasbourg. One of the foremost figures of early twentieth century German studies in France, Lichtenberger started his teaching career at the University of Nancy before moving to the Sorbonne in 1905 as professor of German literature.

Coincidentally, both for Lichtenberger and for Bonn the first personal contact with the United States was closely tied to the epoch-making events of 1914, each having just arrived in America for guest professorships at Harvard University and the University of Berkeley, respectively. The experience of witnessing the self-immolation of the Old World from the perspective of the ascending Atlantic power must have left a lasting imprint on the two scholars and perhaps partly explains their later interest in the United States and their readiness to work with an American foundation. During the following war years, the professors participated in the breakdown of the pre-1914 academic community as they placed their scholarly and intercultural expertise in the service of their nations. Recalled to Paris in early 1915, Lichtenberger spent the war in intelligence work for the French government, analyzing German press reports and contributing to the propagandistic literature. Bonn stayed in the United States until the American declaration of war in 1917 and, after a hasty transatlantic crossing to avoid detention as an enemy alien, he joined the staff of the German foreign office to perform functions that

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were quite similar to Lichtenberger’s in the American section of the press division.\(^{376}\)

After the end of the war Lichtenberger and Bonn, like many Europeans, regarded American involvement in European affairs as crucial to the reconstruction of the Continent. Their views on this question show the range of economic, geo-strategic and cultural arguments that were made both in Germany and in France. Lichtenberger saw Franco-German reconciliation and American economic assistance as inextricably linked as antagonism between the two adversaries was “the great obstacle” which kept Americans from joining a European collective security structure. Once this problem was solved, American financial aid would start flowing and help stabilize the European economy.\(^{377}\) To the lifelong Anglophile Bonn sound relations between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon countries seemed essential to the survival of Europe and in his autobiography he would call improving these relations his “main task” in life.\(^{378}\) Like many of their countrymen, Bonn and Lichtenberger looked to the United States for support, mediation and particularly financial assistance to solve the seemingly intractable conflicts that hobbled Franco-German relations from security questions to reparations and war debts.

**“These venomous snakes”: The CEIP in aid of German republicanism**

That the Carnegie Endowment would assume a mediating role in these controversies was initially a rather counterintuitive proposition. Given the foundation’s support for the Allied cause during the war and its deep ties to Franco-American friendship societies, the CEIP did not give the appearance of aspiring to become a neutral broker. Especially compromising in the eyes of nationalists from the former Central Powers was the direct involvement of Endowment personnel in the drafting process of the despised peace treaties. The two American delegates on the commission which had authored the war guilt paragraph at Versailles were now both closely associated with the CEIP: James Brown Scott, director of the Division of International Law, and trustee Robert Lansing.\(^{379}\) Even years later, this legacy could elicit strong reactions, as Scott discovered when he traveled to the University of Heidelberg to deliver a lecture on the judicial foundations of state authority. Prepared to take the stage at the scheduled hour, it was instead the university’s rector Karl Heinsheimer who took to the podium. Addressing a capacity audience of students and faculty, Rektor Heinsheimer announced that in a


\(^{377}\) Lichtenberger, “Le problème des rapport Franco-Allemands,” Box 5, Folder 3, CEIP CE.

\(^{378}\) Bonn, *So macht man Geschichte*, 361.

backstage meeting Professor Scott had failed to give him assurances that he would not reiterate his belief that Germany bore the main responsibility for the Great War. The event was cancelled and the audience was asked to go home.\footnote{Un incident à l’Université de Heidelberg,”\textit{Journal des débats politiques et littéraires}, 22 June 1928.} In light of such associations, officials at the German foreign ministry usually ranked the foundation, with its “hostile and spiteful attitude towards Germany,” as a threat to German foreign policy goals rather than as an asset.\footnote{Ago von Maltzan to AA, “Jahresbericht des Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” 23 April 1925, Botschaft Washington 1548, PA-AA.}

This feeling of distance and distrust was mutual, as German peace activists discovered when in October 1921 one of their own, Professor Friedrich Dessauer, a physicist and radiologist from Frankfurt, visited the United States.\footnote{Cf. Friedrich Dessauer, \textit{Kontrapunkte eines Forscherlebens: Erinnerungen, amerikanische Reisebriefe} (Frankfurt/Main: J. Knecht, 1962), 21–22; “Dinner to Prof. Fredor [sic] Dessauer,”\textit{New York Times}, 15 October 1921.} One of the first German academics to receive an official invitation to visit the United States after the war, Dessauer was linked to pacifist circles around the German Conciliation Internationale section and he carried with him a letter of introduction to Nicholas Murray Butler in the hopes of reviving pre-war contacts. His attempt to pay his respects to the Columbia President went badly awry when instead of receiving the German professor Butler sent his assistant Henry Haskell to deliver what amounted to a complete rebuke. Lingering hostility toward Germany as well as the formally still existing state of war between the two countries made cooperation impossible at the moment, Haskell explained. As delighted as he was that there were so many outstretched hands from German pacifists, the CEIP was unable to meet them at the moment “as the danger of harming the pacifist idea would harm the entire world, while the benefits would only accrue to Germany.”\footnote{“Besprechung mit Mr. Haskell, Sekretär vom Carnegie Endowment,” 14 October 1921, R80282, PA-AA} German liberals, many of whom had gained the erroneous impression that animosity against Germany in the U.S. was much lower than in Britain or France, were dismayed and alarmed. “We Germans must not allow ourselves to harbor any illusions,” Dessauer reflected at the end of his journey. “This country was at war with us—mighty and resoundingly.”\footnote{Dessauer, \textit{Kontrapunkte eines Forscherlebens}, 91–92.} Forwarding Dessauer’s report to the German foreign office, Walther Schücking, a member of parliament for the liberal DDP and a central figure in the German peace movement, noted with palpable distress: “Frankly, I am personally embarrassed by how distanced even members of this milieu are treating us.”\footnote{Walther Schücking to AA, 15 December 1921, R80282, PA-AA}

In light of the tense political atmosphere, Butler’s Division of Intercourse and Education took a cautious approach to the issue of re-establishing the foundation’s former German network. To avoid
potentially scandalous direct links with Germany, any activities were initially conducted “entirely through the European Bureau.”386 This placed the matter squarely in the hands of the Centre Européen’s director Paul d’Estournelles de Constant, who would consequently emerge as one of the foremost voices for a rapprochement between French and German peace activists.387 Using his excellent contacts within European pacifist circles as well as the cash at his disposal through the CEIP, de Constant helped broker one of the earliest instances of institutionalized Franco-German cooperation after the war. Since December 1921, the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (LDH) and the German Bund Neues Vaterland/Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte (BNV/DLM) had commenced negotiations for future cooperation. The following January, the two associations, both staunchly republican and mainly comprised of social democratic and socialist intellectuals, reached an agreement that culminated in a joint condemnation of “Prussian militarism” at a meeting in Paris.388

D’Estournelles de Constant had sponsored the German delegation’s trip to this meeting with one thousand Francs, courtesy of the Centre Européen, and during the following years two of the BNV/DLM’s leading members, its chairman Hellmut von Gerlach and professor Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster of Munich emerged as the CEIP’s leading contacts in Germany.389 Officially listed as special correspondents, Foerster and von Gerlach wrote regular reports on conditions in Germany that were frequently circulated among the Endowment’s Trustees. Yet, the generous annual compensation of 10,000 Francs each man received was not strictly intended as remuneration for these reporting services but, as internal documents noted, for “propaganda” in support of a peaceful, republican Germany.390 At a time when economic turmoil and hyperinflation had wiped out much of the resources of German activists, the CEIP’s hard currency, furtively routed through a Swiss bank account, quickly became a central factor for the survival of this field. In early 1923, Henri Lichtenberger transmitted an urgent plea by the BND/DLM for additional funds, noting that the association’s balance as of 31 December 1922 had been “42,875 Marks, or, according to the day’s

386 “Conference with Dr. Butler, Feb 1, 1922,” Box 41, Folder 5, CEIP US.
390 “Releve des subvention allouees par le Centre Européen,” 1 February 1926, Box 79, Folder 3, CEIP CE.
Unsurprisingly, French and German authorities reacted very differently to the CEIP’s embrace of the German pacifist left. Hoping to bolster Foerster’s and von Gerlach’s efforts to hasten the “withering of the reactionary spirit,” the Quai d’Orsay approvingly watched the travels of the two activists to France and Belgium and discreetly provided them with documentary evidence for German war crimes. Many of the CEIP’s partners in Paris were in close touch with the French government, which surely encouraged them to support the Endowment’s support for German anti-militarists. Such minor assistance notwithstanding, upon further reflection pacifist reliance on American generosity should have eased rather than heightened concerns that men such as Foerster and von Gerlach were secretly in the employ of the French state. That was not, however, how the German nationalist right or the Wilhelmstraße, for whom any deviation from a complete renunciation of German war guilt amounted to betrayal, viewed the matter. Especially when, starting in 1925, the BNV/DLM launched a campaign to reveal the secret rearmament programs of the schwarze Reichswehr its activists were branded as traitors. Having learned that Foerster had reported on these illicit military schemes to the CEIP and even urged Wall Street not to lend Germany “a single cent” until the country was again in compliance with the Treaty of Versailles, the ambassador in Washington encouraged his colleagues back in Berlin not to give a moment’s rest in their “fight against these venomous snakes.”

The controversy illustrates how, especially in the charged atmosphere of post-war Franco-German relations, internationalist activism had become virtually synonymous with disloyalty in official quarters. Governments gladly lent support to pacifist groups abroad in the hopes of weakening the patriotic resolve of their adversaries while treating domestic activists working for international causes with great suspicion. Otto Gessler, the German minister of defense at the time, would decades later still speak with contempt of those who had supposedly used the “plentiful funds of the Carnegie Endowment” to “(knowingly or unknowingly) work in the service of French militarism and chauvinism.” Meanwhile, the French government was equally wary of the Wilhelmstraße

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391 Lichtenberger to De Constant, [1923], Box 5, Folder 1, CEIP CE.
393 As in most countries, French internationalist societies, including those of the CEIP’s closest partners, received government subsidies, cf. Birebent, Militants de la paix et de la SDN, 173–180.
exploiting French “minds that are new to matters of foreign policy” to influence public opinion in Germany’s favor.\textsuperscript{396} Even the French diplomats’ reports on Foerster and von Gerlach show a certain ambivalence about the moral rectitude of pacifists in general: admiration for those working against the spirit of German militarism at great personal risk was paired with a latent distaste for men who were prepared to undermine their own government. In von Gerlach’s inner circle, the French ambassador to Berlin wrote, there were virtually “no real Germans” but only “semi-English, semi-French, semi-Swiss, and other hybrids for whom, for these personal reasons, internationalism has become a law onto itself.”\textsuperscript{397}

Particularly in Germany, the nationalist atmosphere of the post-war years made public advocacy for internationalism a difficult task. Discourses that were widely accepted by liberal internationalists could spark heated debates once brought out into the open, as Nicholas Murray Butler discovered personally when he published an open letter on New Year’s Day 1925 in the liberal \textit{Berliner Tageblatt}. Intended as an opening gambit to broaden the CEIP’s involvement in the country, the article described a Manichean struggle between a liberal and forward-looking Germany and a reactionary, Prussian and militarist Germany—a popular frame among French and German activists at the time.\textsuperscript{398} Germans, Butler told his readers, simple needed to renounce the latter, admit their responsibility for the war, pay their reparations in full and rejoin hands with their American friends. As Ambassador Jusserand, with whom Butler had shared his letter before publication, reported not without a hint of glee at the president’s naiveté, the reaction was resoundingly negative: Butler was inundated with hate mail from Germany decrying his “lack of morals” for repeating the great lie of German responsibility for the war and for belonging to a country “whose betrayal had caused the misery of an innocent, pacifist and virtuous Germany.”\textsuperscript{399}

As Butler discovered, the CEIP’s close association with the outspoken pro-republican wing of the German peace movement was proving an obstacle to restoring relations with Germany on a more official level. The foundation’s subsequent abandonment of these connections has sometimes been interpreted as a calculated sacrifice to buy access in Berlin.\textsuperscript{400} Yet, it should not be overlooked that,

\textsuperscript{396}Pierre de Margerie to MAE, “Entretien de Mr. le Professeur Lichtenberger avec Mr. Gessler,” 4 February 1927, Correspondance politique et commerciale, 1914 à 1940, Z, vol. 380, fol. 132, ArchDiplo.
\textsuperscript{398}This view was also embraced by, among others, Édouard Herriot, cf. Guieu, \textit{Le rameau et le glaive}, 131.
\textsuperscript{399}Jusserand to MAE, “Le President Murray Butler et le Berliner Tageblatt,” 17 January 1925, Corr Pol et Comm 72, ArchDiplo.
given the CEIP’s generally conservative politics, its association with the German pacifists had always been an uncomfortable fit and as early as 1922 Butler had personally vowed to not give any more money “to the German Peace Societies or any other peace societies in Europe.”\(^{401}\)

Both the CEIP and the BNV/DLM supported the emergence of a strong republican constituency in democratic Germany that would favor good neighborly relations with France. On most other issues, however, the traditionalist Endowment and the German activists, solidly aligned with the political left, parted ways. Drawing inspiration from the Fabian Society, the 1918 program of the BNV/DLM had dedicated the organization to “cooperating towards the realization of socialism.”\(^{402}\) The BNV/DLM also took a much dimmer view of Great Power politics and colonial expansion than the CEIP. Its activities aimed explicitly at the “peaceful union of all peoples (not only the white ones!)” The fight against colonialism and imperialism would later lead the organization to join the Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrückung, a communist group led by Willi Münzenberg with close ties to Moscow.\(^{403}\)

The CEIP’s sponsorship of Franco-German pacifists in the early 1920s then appears more as a coalition of necessity than one founded on shared ideological commitments. For the French and German activists the CEIP provided not only funding in times of economic uncertainty but also a crucial neutral ground that afforded protection from allegations of selling out to the enemy. Meanwhile, for the CEIP the American political discourse of the time would have made it all but impossible to be associated with any Germans who did not accept the terms of the Peace Treaty and who were not prepared to unreservedly condemn Prussian militarism.\(^{404}\)

The CEIP’s period of reorientation from 1923 to 1927 was then not merely a change in personnel: in addition to marking the transition from peace activists to foreign policy experts, the greater role of men such as Henri Lichtenberger and Moritz Julius Bonn signaled an attempt to change the cultural parameters within which liberal internationalists operated. Butler, had already identified the challenge ahead as early as 1918 in a brief article titled “A Nationalistic Internationalism” that framed the issue with his characteristic grasp for language: “the development of that true internationalism which rests upon nationalistic spirit and loyalty as a foundation, and which instead of denying and lessening patriotism

\(^{401}\) Conference with Dr. Butler, October 23, 1922, Box 41, Folder 5, CEIP US.


\(^{403}\) Lehmann-Russbühlt, Der Kampf Der Deutschen Liga für Menschenrechte, 108, 118; emphasis in original.

\(^{404}\) The BNV/DLM appears to also have profited from the fact that Butler was initially rather uninformed about his German partners. In 1922, he told the Board of Trustees that it had been necessary to “avoid the professional ‘pacifists’” in Germany, even as this was certainly how Foerster and von Gerlach were viewed in Europe, cf. CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 8 December 1922, p. 9, Box 14, CEIP US.
adds to its significance and value […]".

**Weltbürgertum: Cultural internationalism for a nationalist world**

In February 1922, d’Estournelles de Constant appointed Lichtenberger as the CEIP’s special rapporteur for relations with the neighboring country, setting up the Sorbonne professor’s first visit to Berlin after the war in order to survey the opinions of German elites towards France. Lichtenberger’s internal reporting shows him impressed both by the fragile state of the Weimar economy with its attendant social tensions and by the opportunity that this state of affairs presented for Franco-German conciliation among moderate and even conservative elites. His analysis was surprising not only because it challenged conventional wisdom in France that cooperation was only possible with the republican left but also in light of Lichtenberger’s personal views. While not a political activist, the Nietzsche scholar made no secret of his skepticism of capitalism, materialism and traditional hierarchies and of his sympathy for Germany’s left-wing pacifists. Lichtenberger nevertheless made a point of meeting some of Berlin’s more prominent center-right politicians, including Reichstag members Gustav Stresemann of the Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP) and Otto Hoetzsch of the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP) as well as businessmen such as publisher Hans Humann, a close acquaintance of conservative industrialist Hugo Stinnes (DVP). What he found was a growing fear of violent revolution from either the right or the left, a development that was “very dangerous for Germany as well as Europe.” Franco-German detente, Lichtenberger discovered, was held as the key to stabilizing social relations: “The most reasonable men of affairs say that we must end the fever that could lead to a dangerous state of anarchy, clean up the economic situation, reconstruct Europe, [and] find a tolerable modus vivendi with France.”

In the short term, Lichtenberger’s mission was marred by unfortunate timing. The public version of his observations was published right at the start of the Ruhr Crisis, making his calls for an alliance of moderates seem disconnected from reality. Soon, however, reactions to the crisis on both sides of


*406 Cf. Bock, “Henri Lichtenberger, Begründer der französischen Germanistik und Mittler zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland,” 219–220; Earle Babcock would later complain about the “often extreme and radical tendencies of Professor Lichtenberger,” cf. “Notes for President Butler on my visit to Berlin June 2–June 8, inclusive,” 10 June 1926, Box 209, Folder 4, CEIP CE.*

*407 Cf. “Note de M. Henri Lichtenberger,” 28 February 1922, Box 5, Folder 1, CEIP CE.*

*408 “Rapport de M. Lichtenberger,” [1922], Box 5, Folder 2, CEIP CE.*

*409 “Notes sur le voyage en Allemagne de M. Henri Lichtenberger,” February 1922, Box 5, Folder 1, CEIP CE.*

*410 Henri Lichtenberger, *Relations between France and Germany* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, 1923), 132; originally published in French as Henri Lichtenberger, *L’Allemagne d’aujourd’hui dans ses relations avec la France* (Paris: Crès, 1922); in light of the changed situation Lichtenberger had asked to be allowed to add an appendix to the English translation, but the CEIP was eager to take advantage of spiking interest in Franco-German relations and preferred to rush the book to the printer.*
the Rhine would create new opportunities. Raymond Poincaré’s decision to respond to German obstructionism on reparation payments by moving French troops into the Ruhr grudgingly received public support from French internationalists such as pro-League activists of the AFSDN. Beneath the surface, however, the Ruhr Crisis exacerbated latent tensions between the liberal, pro-League internationalists and Poincaré’s conservative Bloc National to the point where a complete break occurred during the election campaign of 1924. To Henri Lichtenberger, the episode “marked a turning point” that begged the question of whether Germany and France would chart a course toward inevitable war or start the process of reconciliation. While the French professor placed most of the blame on the German side, he also held a low opinion of French strategy in the conflict. The government had “deliberately” alienated the United States and Britain and given rise to “accusations of imperialism” in the Anglo-Saxon press.

The growing disaffection of liberal intellectuals such as Lichtenberger coincided with similar developments within parts of the French business community. As Laurence Badel has shown, France in the interwar period saw for the first time the formation of a coherent milieu advocating for the interests and the liberal philosophy of major business enterprises—large retailers, exporters and producers. Against foreign and economic policies they viewed as beholden to the interests of small shopkeepers and peasant farmers—the “cult of the small” (Becker and Berstein)—they advocated for policies that stressed efficiency, mass production and the free circulation of goods and services within a European market. Viewed from the perspective of productivity there was a strong case for reconciliation, founded on the belief that the French and German economies were inherently complementary. The obvious opportunities for synergies and cartelization between the industrial bases of the two countries—particularly between Alsatian iron ore and the coal of the Saar and the Ruhr basins—were lost neither on policymakers nor on French heavy industry but the government was seeking cooperation on terms favorable to the country’s security interests. The clock was ticking, with Germany set to regain sovereignty over its commercial policy on 10 January 1925 under the Versailles peace terms, which could have resulted in impregnable divisions between the French and German markets. During Lichtenberger’s Berlin visit, industrialist Hugo Stinnes even suggested

in its present form, see Haskell to Lichtenberger, 21 May 1923, Box 5, Folder 1, CEIP CE.
411 Cf. Guieu, Le rameau et le glaive, 132–134; Lorrain, Des pacifistes français et allemands, pionniers de l’entente franco-allemande, 199.
412 Lichtenberger, “Le problème des rapport Franco-Allemands,” Box 5, Folder 3, CEIP CE.
414 Cf. Badel, Un milieu libéral et européen.
416 Cf. Jacques Bariéty, “France and the Politics of Steel, from the Treaty of Versailles to the International Steel Entente,
that he personally travel to Paris to negotiate an agreement with Poincaré. Lichtenberger judged this proposition to be naïve. Business was not a sphere independent from politics. In the highly charged atmosphere of Franco-German relations the appearance of industry leaders and politicians colluding behind the peoples’ back was likely to inflame popular sentiment even more.  

Political compromise would have to be preceded by a change in the cultural parameters constraining international conciliation and the following years saw the creation of a network of cultural institutions that combined—sometimes uneasily—the liberal economic pragmatism of business elites with the liberal internationalism of intellectuals and conservatives’ concerns about social stability at a time of international strife. Among the organizations that emerged after 1923 to promote Franco-German and wider European cultural exchanges were the Paneuropean Union (1924), the Europäischer Kulturbund (1924), Komitee für europäische Verständigung (1924) the Comité Franco-Allemand d’Information et de Documentation (1926) and the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft (1926). In this field, Henri Lichtenberger, backed by the funding and the infrastructure of the Carnegie Endowment, emerged as one of the central actors. Through membership in such organizations as the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, the Comité Franco-Allemand, founded by Luxembourg industrialist Emile Mayrisch, and the Union Douanière Européenne, Lichtenberger hoped to play his part in creating a “solidarity of interests” in the economic and cultural fields that would form a “salutary counterpoint to the still prevailing political distrust.”

Disaffection with official foreign policy was also one of the forces contributing to the founding of international relations research institutes during the interwar years. Hamburg’s Institut für Auswärtige Politik (IAP), the secretariat for Shotwell’s war history project in Germany, had been founded shortly


417 Cf. “Notes sur le voyage en Allemagne de M. Henri Lichtenberger,” February 1922, Box 5, Folder 1, CEIP CE.


after the war through an initiative by the Warburg banking family and like-minded hanseatic merchants who, as a former employee recalled, were alienated with the inability of Berlin’s administration “to ‘deliver’ victory—to put it in mercantile terms.” The problem, according to these merchants and bankers, was that the German Reich was still run on the mentality of a “land-locked people like the old Prussian state,” hindering international conciliation and trade expansion. Financed as a public-private partnership between the banking community and Hamburg’s state government headed by liberal mayor Carl Wilhelm Petersen (DDP), the Institut was intended to help broaden that perspective through scholarly and public debate and eventually by helping train officers for Germany’s foreign service.

This was the route through which Moritz Julius Bonn had entered the CEIP’s orbit. When in July 1921 Shotwell brainstormed names of possible German partners with members of the Inter-Allied Reparations Committee in Berlin, Bonn’s name came up almost immediately. The economist was “strongly recommended” by all of Shotwell’s French and Italian contacts as an “open minded” and “fair-thinking” individual and the following year the professor was contracted to draft a general outline for part of the series, receiving a moderate honorarium of one hundred dollars. Bonn was a supporter of the Weimar Republic, a member of the DDP and he considered himself a liberal. Nevertheless, like many in the CEIP’s orbit, his liberalism often appeared to hark back to pre-1914 political institutions—the German monarchy, the Manchester School of economics. He never concealed his lingering attachment to the Hohenzollern court and to the haute bourgeois sociability of the bygone era, while he deplored the “lack of manners” of republican Berlin. Modern parliamentary democracy appeared to him mainly as a system in which key interest groups “divide the national dividend for their own sectional purposes.” As one of the German government’s foremost reparations experts, Bonn considered himself a true patriot and his initial reaction to the Ruhr Crisis displayed none of the anxiety the event had caused among French internacionalists—Bonn even wrote to the government offering to take in a foster child “of someone expelled from the

421 Alfred Vagts, “Erinnerungen an Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy,” p. 8, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy Collection, LBI.
422 Max Warburg at the inauguration of Hamburg’s Übersee-Club, a private gentlemen’s club founded around the same time as the Institut and based on a similar philosophy, Max Warburg, “Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau Deutschlands und Auslandskunde,” Hamburger Übersee-Jahrbuch 1 (1922): 8.
424 “Preliminary investigation on personnel in Berlin,” 29 July 1921, Box 74, Folder “Germany (miscellaneous)”; Shotwell to James Brown Scott, 22 June 1922 Box 74, Folder “Bonn, Maurice [sic],” Shotwell Papers, RBML Columbia.
426 Bonn, “The World Crisis and the Teaching of the Manchester School,” 1931, Box 121, Folder 3, CEIP CE.
But as the crisis dragged on and the government’s bankrolling of “passive resistance” strikes ruined state finances to the point of the breakdown of Germany’s monetary system, the price of the administration’s actions came into stark relief. Bonn would later denounce the government’s brinkmanship as “criminal” and the affinity of Weimar officials for “bold, totally improvised maneuvers” as the bane of the first German republic. In Bonn’s analysis, the bickering between the two nations distracted from the larger problem of the time, which he called the “Crisis of European Democracy”: a global challenge to national and international hierarchies, a rise of the “Have Nots” against the “Haves” that had upturned Europe’s established order.

Among the venues through which Bonn sought to reorient German foreign policy thinking away from a narrowly nationalist mindset was the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHP). Founded in 1920 to educate a new class of public administrators for the new Weimar democracy, the school’s main clientele were entry-level government bureaucrats and other part-time students who attended the school’s evening classes to bolster their résumés. When viewed against the backdrop of Germany’s intense political polarization at the time, the school stood out as a relatively broad tent, with liberals such as Bonn teaching next to social democrat Rudolf Hilferding (SPD) and conservative nationalist Otto Hoetzsch (DNVP). Its center of gravity, however, were the restrained Vernunftrepublikaner such as C.H. Becker and Bonn, who accepted the Weimar democracy as a necessity of modern life. Becker had been instrumental in the DHP’s founding, hoping to break the stranglehold of Prussian militarism and nationalism on the educational system as well as on the broader administration. His inaugural address exhorted the school to interpret its eponymous Germanness “not in the chauvinist sense of hating and reflexively combatting all things foreign” but as a constructive contribution to the “cultural life of all humanity.” As was the case with the IAP in Hamburg, private sector groups interested in a more outward looking German administration looked favorably on such efforts. While the DHP was mainly financed by the Prussian education ministry, Berlin’s major banks contributed about RM 50,000 to the school’s annual budget. Funding remained precarious, however, and so in the winter of 1925/26 the school’s energetic director Ernst Jäckh traveled to New York to meet with potential American sponsors interested in improving their relationship with Germany, including

427 Bonn to Hans Luther, 9 May 1923, NL82 Bonn/50, Moritz Julius Bonn Papers, BA Koblenz.
428 Bonn, So macht man Geschichte, 274.
429 Bonn, The Crisis of European Democracy, 87.
432 Memo of 12 October 1931, I. HA Rep. 151 Finanzministerium, IC No. 7058, GStA PK; by the 1930s these contributions had dwindled to RM 14,000, underscoring the DHP’s dependence on CEIP and Rockefeller funds, cf. “Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. Vorläufiger Etat 1933/34,” Box 3, Folder 51, Arnold Wolfers Papers, Yale Archives.
bankers Owen D. Young and Paul Warburg, Henry S. Pritchett of the Carnegie Corporation and Nicholas Murray Butler.433

The timing of the DHP’s initiative could not have been more auspicious. Only a few months earlier, Butler had included German foreign minister Gustav Stresemann on the mailing list for a 1925 survey of world leaders requesting advice for future CEIP initiatives. Pushed by its Washington ambassador, Ago von Maltzan, who urged immediate action “before the iron goes cold again,” the Wilhelmstraße drafted a sympathetic reply by Stresemann. They also included instructions to the Washington Embassy for a face-to-face meeting, where more detailed discussion of Germany’s hopes for the Endowment’s future work could be discussed.434 At the meeting on 13 November 1925 between the embassy’s counselor Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff and Butler at the president’s Columbia University office, the issue of German participation in the CEIP’s activities was at the top of the agenda. Besides voicing criticism over the general lack of visibility of Germans in the foundation’s programs, Dieckhoff insisted that Butler should seek out partners who “truly represent Germany.”435 Following its standard practice of avoiding as far as possible giving any cause for public controversy, Foerster and von Gerlach were not immediately dropped but rather eased out over the course of several years.436 With Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron and Moritz Julius Bonn, two men who enjoyed the trust of their government were selected to represent Germany on the newly formed Comité d’Administration,

The rapprochement continued in June 1926, when Earle Babcock and later Butler arrived for their first post-war visits to Germany. Meetings with DHP staff and its political supporters took center stage and both C.H. Becker and Gustav Stresemann, as faithful supporters of the DHP, praised the school to the Americans in the highest terms. The lobbying campaign did not fail to make an impact. By late 1926, Butler had made up his mind to make the DHP the center piece of the Endowment’s activities in Germany: “Dr. Jäckh and the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik were both commended to me in explicit terms […] by Dr. Stresemann and Dr. Becker, the Cultus Minister. If we are to work

434 Ago von Maltzan to AA, 14 October 1925; draft letter Gustav Stresemann to Butler, 19 October 1925; AA to Ago von Maltzan, 19 October 1925, R 53703, PA-AA.
435 Report No. 1003 „Unterredung mit Nicholas Murray Butler,” 18 November 1925, R 53703, PA-AA.
436 Foerster and von Gerlach continued to write reports for the CEIP but funding for their political projects in Germany was discontinued. Finally, in 1930, the institution of “special correspondents” was eliminated altogether, thus solving the problem, cf. Winn, “Nicholas Murray Butler, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Search for Reconciliation in Europe, 1919–1933,” 571.
with the new Germany, we must work with her spokesmen and representatives.”

This course of action was also widely supported by the newly created Comité d’Administration. For Lichtenberger the shift toward the DHP fit perfectly with his position that the CEIP needed to reorient itself toward Germany’s centrist Catholics, industrialists and nationalists and away from those who had “taken the side of France against their own country” like Foerster and von Gerlach. Nicolas Politi took the opportunity to denounce the CEIP’s old course in strong terms: in the past the Endowment had developed a reputation as a pacifist organization that required its supporters to subordinate patriotism and national interest to its higher purpose, a program which doomed the foundation to insignificance: “To the extent that the Carnegie Endowment orients itself towards pacifism, it will not have any practical impact in Europe.”

The CEIP’s cooperation agreement with the DHP was officially concluded in the winter of 1926/27. It encompassed the creation of a Carnegie Chair for International Relations at the school that would be successively held by temporary lecturers of international renown. Among those who would hold this title were Moritz Julius Bonn himself, André Siegfried, William E. Rappard and Albert Thomas, director of the ILO. In 1929, the CEIP also added a permanent holder of the chair, selecting historian Hajo Holborn for the position. The genesis of the CEIP-DHP cooperation illustrates the outline of the coalition of European actors that supported the CEIP’s cultural internationalism in the mid-1920s: from the center-left internationalist Lichtenberger to more conservative German Vernunftrepublikaner such as Bonn and C.H. Becker. The academic research and advocacy institutions these men were affiliated with reflected the growing disaffection of liberal elites with the methods, if not the goals, of their countries’ foreign policy bureaucracies. Many of these initiatives—the IAP, the DHP, the UDE—were at least partially financed by members of the banking and business communities who were alienated by a political discourse that appeared to be mainly based on nationalist flag-waving rather than a coolly calculated pursuit of national interests. They participated in a common project that rejected both an extreme form of nationalism that threatened to destabilize the Continent and an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist internationalism that threatened existing social institutions.

The development of different varieties of “new internationalisms” is so frequently observed in the historiography of transnational movements as to have become almost a fixed feature of the literature. These parallel findings indicate how internationalism was a constantly shifting

437 Butler to Babcock, 21 December 1926, Box 108, Folder 2, CEIP US.
438 Meeting of the Comité d’Administration, 26 March 1926, p. 62, Box 115, CEIP CE.
439 Ibid, pp. 45–64.
440 See for example Iriye, Global Community, 37; Nichols, Promise and Peril, 273; Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of
phenomenon that was perpetually redefined and reinvented. As Glenda Sluga notes, this process usually entailed narrowing the parameters of what had always been a diverse movement, based on inherently ambiguous liberal precepts, “through the excision of unwelcome ideas, people, and politics.” 441 The various lectures, exchanges and debate forums organized by the CEIP in Europe became a platform for those who wished to tone down the socially reformist aspects of internationalist rhetoric and emphasize continuity with existing institutions: the state, the church, the capitalist economy. Intellectuals such as Lichtenberger, Thomas Mann, Ernst Robert Curtius and Yves de la Brière and politicians such as the French and Prussian ministers Anatole de Monzie and C.H. Becker participated in a widespread interwar discourse of reconciling nationalism with internationalism: the “international mind” could not be built by “erasing all features of national ideologies” (Becker); international cooperation was an “extension and natural crowning” of true patriotism (de la Brière); positing an opposition between the two made for a “wrong-headed and disastrous alternative” (Curtius).442 Shotwell once described the CEIP’s field of associates as those “who have a clear realization of the primary demands of patriotism but maintain [their] international ideals strengthened on a much more practical basis, for that very reason.”443

Henri Lichtenberger gave a characteristic expression of this discourse in a speech at the University of Berlin during a trip that was partly sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment. Under the title “What is Citizenship of the World?” (Was ist Weltbürgertum?), Lichtenberger only paid passing tribute to the high idealism of principled pacifists. The main purpose of his talk was to clarify that neither nationalism, nor a belief in the inevitability of warfare, nor anti-democratic politics were necessarily incompatible with Weltbürgertum. Had not Friedrich Nietzsche wedded a progressive, European vision with authoritarian politics, Lichtenberger asked his audience of students, professors and high government officials. Had he not been as much a “champion of hierarchy” and “a steadfast foe of democracy and socialism” as any conservative? The professor outlined a dialectical opposition between extreme nationalism on the one hand, whose denial of international interdependence belied

441 Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, 17.
443 Shotwell to Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 10 April 1926, Box 76, Folder “Mendelssohn Bartholdy I,” Shotwell Papers, RBML Columbia.
the facts of modern life, and an exaggerated cosmopolitanism that uncritically endorsed industrialized, urban modernity, leading to a “complete Americanization or even to catastrophe.” Clearly, a synthesis was needed: “The modern man is almost by necessity at once a citizen of the world and a nationalist.”

The Committees for Security and Disarmament: Affirming or subverting the state?

In addition to making internationalism compatible with the ideological preferences of French and German business communities, Weltbürgertum as defined by Lichtenberger was also a gesture toward government officials on both sides of the Rhine at a time when new opportunities for cooperation were opening up. The CEIP’s relationship with official Paris had always been cordial, particularly during d’Estournelles de Constant’s tenure as director of the Centre Européen. His death had briefly set off alarm bells at the Quai d’Orsay, particularly when it heard the rumor that the CEIP was considering moving the entire office to Brussels. The diplomats feared a disastrous “moral effect” that “would benefit our country’s adversaries” and considered having the ambassador personally intervene with Butler or Root to avoid such a blow.

Meanwhile, the electoral success of the Cartel des Gauches in May 1924 had brought to power a new set of foreign policy actors. While no less committed to safeguarding French security than his predecessors, the foreign ministry under Aristide Briand was more inclined toward seeking the necessary guarantees in a multilateral framework. Over the course of the next six years the CEIP was able to deepen its relations with Quai d’Orsay officials such as Jacques Seydoux and Alexis Leger as well as with the larger orbit of foreign policy voices on the center-left such as Albert Thomas, Arthur Fontaine, Julien Luchaire and Paul Painlevé. Vocal affirmations of patriotism were designed to facilitate access by shielding activists working toward internationalist solutions from suspicions of subversion. To avoid any impression of working at cross-purposes with the French government, Henri Lichtenberger conscientiously reported all his interactions with Germany to the authorities and it was perhaps due to encouragement from this side that the professor sometimes strayed from the course outlined by New York. When in March 1925 the German presidential election was shaping up as a contest between the pro-republican camp around Wilhelm Marx and the conservative-monarchist camp around Paul von Hindenburg, Lichtenberger tried to secretly funnel 10,000 Francs out of the

CEIP’s coffers to von Gerlach in support of the pro-republican campaign.446

Similarly, the German government’s sudden embrace of the foundation was directly tied to a tactical shift in German foreign policy. Beginning in 1923/24 and under the leadership of Foreign Minister Stresemann, the country began to abandon its uncompromising opposition to the Treaty of Versailles in favor of a more flexible approach that stressed international cooperation and that placed great emphasis on improving German-American relations. For one, the United States mattered because of the Foreign Office’s new focus on economic issues as leveraging Germany’s industrial resources into political power became the linchpin of the country’s new foreign policy. What was sorely needed to boost Germany’s economy after the effects of war and the breakdown of Germany’s monetary system during the hyperinflation of 1923 was American credit. As Stresemann himself wrote in the CFR’s journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1924, “the lack of available capital caused by the destructive effects of the monetary inflation” was the key impediment to Germany’s development and hence the main factor constraining “her ability to make reparation payments.”447 Cooperation with the CEIP, whose reports, the Wilhelmstraße was sure, were read by a “number of very influential and powerful people,” thus promised an opportunity to exert a positive influence on Germany’s image with the very East Coast establishment whose support the government was seeking.448 Furthermore, as one of the risks of the new policy was further alienation from France, as closer German-American relations could not but exacerbate security concerns in Paris, participation in the Endowment’s Franco-German exchange activities would provide further positive publicity.

The German government’s hopes to make the CEIP part of its diplomatic outreach to the New World were not in vain. Starting in 1925 and reaching into the early years of the National Socialist regime, Berlin consistently found a sympathetic audience at Morningside Heights in its efforts to project the image of a new, a kinder and gentler Germany to the American public—at one point Shotwell publicly praised the German republic as an “unprecedented experiment in the politics of peace” and a “laboratory for the study of pacific international affairs.”449 Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron worked closely with the German government, including officials at the Foreign Office and at the Prussian Ministry of Education to improve the effectiveness of German propaganda. He handed over minutes of the Comité d’Administration’s meetings and privately took credit for having turned the activities

446 Cf. Letter by Lichtenberger, 3 March 1925, Box 5, Folder 1, CEIP CE.
448 Dieckhoff to Dufour, 20 November 1925, Botschaft Washington 1548, PA-AA.
of the Division of Intercourse and Education in Germany’s favor.\textsuperscript{450} Similarly, whenever the Wilhelmstraße wanted to highlight how the reparations burden was crushing the Germany economy Mority Julius Bonn’s international standing made him an attractive messenger.\textsuperscript{451} In 1927, Berlin even felt emboldened to pursue the ultimate price: enlisting the CEIP in its efforts to revise the despised war guilt paragraph by seeking financing for a purportedly independent historical study that was in effect designed to exculpate the Central powers.\textsuperscript{452} This was a step too far. In declining the application, James Shotwell claimed diplomatically that the CEIP was no longer interested in investigating the past but wanted to “face rather the problems of the present and the future.”\textsuperscript{453}

This utilization of the new transnationally connected expert space by national governments for cultural diplomacy purposes was, however, only one side of the coin. Another effect of the CEIP’s sponsorship of cultural internationalism in Western and Central Europe was that it contributed to, and often pioneered, the formation of transnational foreign policy networks that could function as a counterbalance to national particularization. The foundation’s Franco-German networks demonstrate how cultural internationalism became an essential component of the CEIP’s general strategy of furthering informal governance mechanisms through elite networking. The “international mind,” in other words, was especially concentrated along the Rhine River. By the mid-1920s, men such as Henri Lichtenberger and Moritz Julius Bonn were at the core of a sprawling interpersonal network that connected government intellectuals at research universities, foreign-policy-focused institutes and domestic interest groups.

An initial attempt to harness these connections was made in January 1925 when Henri Lichtenberger organized a meeting at the Centre Européen for what would become the French affiliate of the Komitee für europäische Verständigung, a network that was to serve as a forum for “unofficial international conversations on the great problems of European politics.” The project stagnated, however, as Lichtenberger and his French colleagues judged the German committee insufficiently representative of Berlin’s foreign policy elite. While the French section, featuring members such as Paul Painlevé and Louis Loucheur, was well connected among ruling Cartel des Gauches circles,

\textsuperscript{450} Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow to Heilbronn and Martius, 1 May 1926, PA-AA R 65804.

\textsuperscript{451} “It would be extremely thankworthy if you could take up your pen again to defend our stance on reparations in economic terms,” AA to Moritz Julius Bonn, 17 December 1923, NL82 Bonn/50, Bonn Papers, BA Koblenz.


\textsuperscript{453} Shotwell to Hans Draeger, [n.d.], file no. 34, Schnee Papers, GSta PK.
Lichtenberger expressed concern that the German side around Alfred Nossig and Wilhelm Heile was too distant from the government.\footnote{Lichtenberger to Henry Haskell, 9 January 1925, Box 125, Folder 2, CEIP US; on the Komitee für europäische Verständigung cf. Schulz, “Europa-Netzwerke und Europagedanke in der Zwischenkriegszeit”; Holl, “Europapolitik im Vorfeld der deutschen Regierungspolitik,” 41–42; Marian Zgórnia, “Polens Haltung zu den Projekten einer europäischen Union in der Zwischenkriegszeit,” in Europa und Deutschland - Deutschland und Europa: Liber amicorum für Heiner Timmermann zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Helmut Wagner (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005), 118.}

A more successful venture grew out of Shotwell’s ESHW network. For over three years, Shotwell had periodically assembled an American study group on security policies. Its members—Frederic Keppel, Stephen Duggan, John Bates Clark, Henry S. Pritchett—were mainly drawn from the Carnegie Endowment’s East Coast orbit and helped the director formulate liberal internationalist policy alternatives to those pursued by the American government.\footnote{Cf. Andrew Webster, “The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats and Soldiers in the League of Nations’ Pursuit of International Disarmament, 1920–1938,” Contemporary European History 14, no. 4 (November 1, 2005): 506–507; Shotwell, Autobiography, 181.} Now, in the spring of 1925, Shotwell sought to establish corresponding French and German counterparts to this group. The start was made in Germany, where in April 1925 a security policy study group (Ausschuß zum Studium der Fragen der Friedenssicherung) was formed. In addition to including prominent legal and military experts, the world of business and banking was well represented on the Committee. From liberal Hamburg came banker Carl Melchior of M.M. Warburg & Co. and Mayor Carl Wilhelm Petersen while the steel and coal industries of the Ruhr and the Rhineland were represented by Otto Wiedfeldt of Krupp AG and Konrad Adenauer, the mayor of Cologne and future West German chancellor. As Shotwell noted with evident pride, the membership of the Ausschuß represented “as authoritative” a perspective on foreign policy matters as could be found in Germany and while it did not include any Wilhelmstraße officials it was practically “next door to the Government.”\footnote{“Confidential Memorandum on the German Committee on Arbitration and Security,” [1925], Box 46, Folder 1, CEIP US; Shotwell, Autobiography, 197–198; the other members were: professor of international law Theodor Niemeyer, former president of the German Supreme Court Hans Simons, General Hermann von Kuhl, General Detlof von Winterfeldt and Ernst von Simson of IG Farben.}

Nominally, the group met under the sponsorship of the German society for international law but in reality it was Shotwell and the IAP who were leading the enterprise. The idea was, Shotwell explained to Carl Melchior, that in the modern age governments were faced with problems of increasing complexity. Yet, bureaucracies remained attached to the same, traditional approaches leading to potentially calamitous results: “The business of government can no more be run by surrender to prejudice than can any other business.” It was the task of private citizens with special expertise to conduct preliminary studies, prepare the ground for informed government action and thus guide
nations out of their “childhood stage.” At its first session the study group had a spirited discussion on the risks entailed in Germany joining a collective security system in its currently weakened military state but finally passed a resolution that Germany should enter the League of Nations “with a sincere will of co-operation in international matters,” a result that was promptly communicated to the Foreign Office. Finally, as if to highlight the commercial issues implicitly at stake in the deliberations, they were joined for dinner by Carl Duisberg, President of the main employers’ association Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie (RDI), and American Ambassador Jacob Gould Schurman.

After several delays, a French counterpart to the German committee was finally formed in late November 1925 under the chairmanship of Arthur Fontaine, a member of the French editorial board of the ESHW, and with the assistance of Henri Lichtenberger. It was less politically diverse than its German counterpart, however, like Lichtenberger’s previous effort it was well connected among the foreign policy circles of the Cartel des Gauches: Albert Thomas of the ILO and Léon Jouhaux of the CGT represented organized labor. International jurist Georges Scelle and Julien Luchaire, director of the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, were both close to the Quai d’Orsay. Meanwhile Fontaine himself and industrialist Henri de Peyerimhoff of the Comité central des houillères de France guaranteed that business interests would not be absent from the discussions. At the first meeting, Henri Lichtenberger was designated as liaison with the German committee.

A few weeks before the first meeting of the French group, representatives of some of Europe’s major powers had gathered at the Swiss town of Locarno and concluded a series of treaties in which Germany, France, and Belgium pledged to respect their mutual borders, paving the way for German membership in the League of Nations. Once the signatures were affixed to the Locarno Treaties, Shotwell privately boasted to Butler about his role in the chain of events, noting that members of the German delegation had been in close touch with members of his Ausschuß and had studied its reports closely.

This claim of a direct impact is almost certainly overblown. The German committee was only formed after negotiations between France, Britain, and Germany were well underway. Government policy remained driven by a variety of factors and the activities of even well-connected internationalists were certainly not the overriding ones. What the CEIP had contributed to the political

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457 Shotwell to Melchior, 10 August 1925, Box 75, Folder “Melchior, Carl,” Shotwell Papers, RBML Columbia.
458 “Confidential Memorandum on the German Committee on Arbitration and Security,” [1925], Box 46, Folder 1, CEIP US.
459 “Second Memorandum on the Creation of a French Committee on Security and Disarmament,” Box 46, Folder 1, CEIP US.
460 Shotwell to Butler, 23 December 1925, Box 46, Folder 1, CEIP US.
process was the financing of a space for encounters between “patriotic” Germans and Frenchmen that aided in removing the public stigma from making common cause with the former enemy.

The early 1920s had shown that as long as internationalism and transnational outreach remained widely associated with disloyalty to the nation and with radical political views, even social groups keenly interested in Franco-German rapprochement would stay on the sidelines. The years after 1923 saw an effort on the part of the CEIP and its European allies to brand a variety of internationalism that respected existing institutions—including the primacy of the nation state and capitalism—and was apt to become the shared identity of a new internationalist coalition stretching from the French center-left to German conservatives. The core representative of this discourse was a group of transnationally connected foreign policy elites that saw no contradiction between patriotic citizenship and technocratic cooperation across national borders. A typical expression of this identity can be found in a rule Shotwell proposed for the operating procedures of the three corresponding Committees for Security and Disarmament. Apparently responding to concerns by some participants, he suggested that two types of memoranda should be produced: the first category would consist of research papers relating to ongoing negotiations and national strategy, which would only be shared within the national group and with foreign ministry officials; a second set dealing with the “underlying principles upon which sound policy might be built” would be given wide circulation among all three national groups.461 It is easy to see the appeal of this idea of an internal firewall, as it allowed participants to simultaneously see themselves as faithful advisers to their government and as custodians of international stability through transnational cooperation and negotiation.

The political implications of this construction of a technocratic identity observed on the discursive level were again mirrored at the interpersonal level as informal cultural parameters effectively erected barriers around this new transnational space. The fact that practically no women participated in the CEIP’s Franco-German initiatives was not an accident, as it delineated a space of supposedly masculine scientific study from religious, emancipatory or Socialist peace associations with their sizeable female participation. Indeed, there appears to have been virtually no overlap between the senior ranks of the American Peace Society and any of the CEIP’s new cultural internationalist activities. Nor were activists of anti-imperialist groups such as WILPF or the American Association of Outlawry such as Emily Balch, Salmon O. Levinson or John Dewey invited. Meanwhile, the national-internationalist identity no longer accommodated some of the CEIP’s earliest European

461 “Confidential Memorandum on the German Committee on Arbitration and Security,” [1925], Box 46, Folder 1, CEIP US.
partners, such as Ludwig Quidde of the DFG and Otfried Nippold and Hellmut von Gerlach of the BNV/DLM. The construction of international order was intended to be an elite-driven process.

“An American Locarno”: The transnationalization of politics and the origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact

The formal inauguration of the Carnegie-Lehrstuhl in the spring of 1927 was a major social event in the German capital. On noon of 1 March 1927, professors, diplomats, government officials and reporters filed into the auditorium of the Bauakademie on Berlin’s Schinkelplatz to hear James T. Shotwell’s inaugural lecture as the first professor to hold the CEIP’s Carnegie Chair of International Relations at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. After an introduction by the president of the Reichsgericht Walter Simons, Shotwell delivered his address “Are we at a turning point of world history?” to a full auditorium that included such dignitaries as Chancellor Wilhelm Marx and American Ambassador Jacob Gould Schurman, lending the event the desired air of official sanction. Shotwell’s lecture received wide coverage in the German press, which commented favorably on the generosity of the Carnegie Endowment, the oratorical and linguistic abilities of the speaker and the magnificence of the occasion. Almost lost on his German audience, however, was a concrete political suggestion that Shotwell made toward the end of his talk: the United States had so far abstained from participation in the League of Nations for fear of being dragged into unnecessary European wars but had not the Locarno Treaties pointed the way toward a stable European structure? “In a similar way, and I am speaking solely for myself, the treaty could be adapted to the situation of the United States,” Shotwell proposed. This suggestion for an extension of the Locarno Treaties was, as Ernst Jäckh would later observe, the initiating impulse for the Kellogg-Briand Pact—the 1928 international treaty that solemnly renounced war as an instrument of national policy but it widely regarded to have had little to no positive effect on the stability of the international system.

That the Kellogg-Briand Pact today stands mainly as a symbol for naïve idealism reflects a long historiography that did so little to clarify its origins that Michael Dunne has justly called the Pact

464 Cf. Ibid., 29; Ernst Jäckh, “Vorwort,” in Ausgleich als Aufgabe und Schicksal, ed. Shotwell, Scheler, and Jäckh (Berlin-Grunewald: W. Rothschild, 1929), vi.
“one of the most misunderstood episodes in US foreign relations.”⁴⁶⁵ After the initial contemporary literature had mainly served the purpose of claiming credit for this contribution to international peace,⁴⁶⁶ in 1952, Yale historian Robert H. Ferrell would set the tone of the forthcoming historiographical debate with a highly critical study of the Pact’s origins. In Ferrell’s reading, the year 1927 saw an outburst of “immature American idealism,” a sudden and irrational enthusiasm for peace which was further stoked by elites whose vain activism proved “almost as benighted as the public they sought to lead.”⁴⁶⁷ Manipulated by a Trojan Horse offer by Aristide Briand, the State Department, unable to rebuff the offer in the face of the unreasonable zeal of the American people, was at last able to defuse the trap by turning the treaty into a noble-sounding but ultimately pointless multilateral declaration against war. European cunning and sophistication had thus exposed, but not triumphed over, the American public’s “appallingly naïve” conception of international affairs.⁴⁶⁸ This common interpretation illustrates the downsides of a state-centered approach to analyzing what was very much a transnational event: an attempt on the part of the CEIP and its European allies to utilize the networks and discourses developed over the course of the preceding years to overcome domestic American opposition against joining a European security system.

Was the United States a European power? Or rather, should the United States place its considerable economic and political power in the service of maintaining the European balance of power and social status quo? The Locarno Treaties had turned into a Rohrschach test for these questions. For liberal European foreign policy elites the United States belonged naturally in Europe as American culture was “a genuine offshoot of the English-Scottish Europeanism,” as Bonn wrote.⁴⁶⁹ American liberal internationalists, too, considered U.S. participation in Continental affairs more and more urgent. To them, Locarno demonstrated that the rest of the world was becoming more integrated while America was standing on the sidelines, potentially finding itself shut out of important markets and dangerously isolated. “Europe has, constructively, left us incontestably behind. She leads—we trail,” wrote Arthur Bullard of the League of Nations Association in 1925.⁴⁷⁰ Those who had always opposed American

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⁴⁶⁷ Ferrell, *Peace in Their Time*, 264–265; the book’s title was of course intended to suggest a connection between the supposed folly of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Munich accord.
⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., 265.
⁴⁶⁹ “Europäisierung,” [n.d.], NL82 Bonn/10, Folder 10c, Bonn Papers, BA Koblenz.
membership in European institutions considered the Locarno Treaties a long-overdue pronouncement of separation between the Continents. This included, on the one hand, American and European nationalists who preferred the preservation of distinctive national cultural and political spheres to the entangling tendencies of the modern technology and culture. On the other hand, many anti-imperialist peace activists condemned the new treaties as merely affirming the status quo and not tackling the social root causes of conflict.

The Kellogg-Briand initiative was essentially an attempt by liberal internationalists to settle this debate by using their superior access to governmental bureaucracies. The architecture they envisioned is contained in a draft treaty prepared by Shotwell and his Columbia colleague Joseph P. Chamberlain, the core duo of the American Group on Arbitration and Disarmament. In drawing up their proposal in advance of the Kellogg-Briand negotiations the professors took Shotwell’s call for an “American Locarno” literally. The treaty was in effect “a mosaic of texts,” as Shotwell himself put it, blending articles adapted from existing U.S. treaties with clauses inserted from the Locarno accords, often verbatim. The intended effect was to both demonstrate faithfulness to American foreign policy traditions and to integrate the United States into the European collective security system as developed by the 1925 treaties. In fifteen articles the draft outlined an ambitious structure of collective security and collective action that amounted, in effect, to a new Concert of Powers, under participation of the United States.

Shotwell’s initiative bore several of the hallmarks of the transnationalization of politics. For one, it relied strongly on the CEIP’s interconnected foreign policy experts. This was less the case in Germany since, as Shotwell later told Bonn, it had been a strategic necessity to initiate treaty negotiations from France. The CEIP director had, however, utilized his Berlin stay to gauge the mood of official Berlin. He had met privately with Germany’s secretary of defense Wilhelm Groener, who assured him that he had “no objections whatever” to the contents of the speech, and the following week Shotwell travelled to Geneva for a meeting with Gustav Stresemann. Arriving in Paris on 15 March, the

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471 E.g. to William Borah the failed Geneva Protocol, which had preceded the Locarno Treaties, signaled that Europe planned to govern itself “according to European conditions and in harmony with European standards.” William Borah, “Outlawry of War!,” December 1924, RG 59, 711.0012/758, NARA/CP.
473 Cf. “American Locarno to Renounce War Offered in Treaty,” New York Times, 31 May 1927. In light of the uncertain legal status of the CEIP’s domestic lobbying, Butler and Shotwell were careful to emphasize that the foundation was in no way connected to the draft treaty.
474 Shotwell to Bonn, 17 December 1927, Box 74, Folder “Bonn, Maurice [sic],” Shotwell Papers, RBML Columbia.
475 CEIP Board of Trustees meeting, 29 April 1929, p. 30, Box 14, Folder 4, CEIP US; Shotwell to Butler, 8 March 1927, Box 46, Folder 2, CEIP US; also Shotwell, Autobiography, 203–206.
director discussed his plans with Arthur Fontaine and Albert Thomas, both members of the French Committee for Security and Disarmament. It was Fontaine, who agreed to bring the plan to Briand’s attention and finally arranged a meeting between the French foreign minister and Shotwell. Having been informed by a correspondent in Paris of the role of the CEIP’s internationalist networks in having initiated the proposed pact, Senator Borah called the news “extremely interesting” but “by no means surprising.”

Secondly, symbolic communication, i.e. culture, was a key component of the endeavor. The plan finally agreed on by Shotwell, Fontaine and Briand was that the latter would seize the upcoming tenth anniversary of American entry into the war to stage a bold, public signal that could “re-capture American opinion.” Shotwell himself was to draft a speech for Briand that would resonate with the American people. Despite some apprehensiveness as to the legality of his extra-diplomatic activities Shotwell agreed and, working with Earle Babcock’s assistance from the Centre Européen, drafted an appeal to the American people to be delivered by Briand on 6 April. The centerpiece of the Briand/Shotwell letter, published through the Associated Press, was an offer by France to “enter into an engagement with America mutually outlawing war, to use your way of expressing it.” The reference to the language of “outlawry” was no accident. Shotwell had appropriated the language of anti-imperialist internationalism because it had “attained a definite place in the thinking of large sections of the Middle West through the eloquent advocacy of those in Chicago who had coined it and had become its advocates.” For European audiences, Earle Babcock coordinated publicity with Comité member Georges Lechartier of the Journal des Débats, Jean Martin of the Journal de Genève and Prittwitz von Gaffron in Berlin under the headline “an American Locarno,” thus seeking to harness the positive connotations of the earlier agreement. With Comité member Gilbert Murray lining up the support of the League of Nations Union, the foundation had the world’s largest internationalist organization working to overcome the British government’s strong reservations to the proposal.

476 Shotwell to Babcock, 21 May 1927, Box 45, Folder 1, CEIP CE; William Borah to Joseph Agan, 17 May 1927, Box 235, Folder “Outlawry of War, 1926–1929,” William Borah Papers, LoC.
477 Shotwell to Arthur Fontaine, 18 March 1927, Box 36, Folder 2, CEIP US.
479 Shotwell, Autobiography, 208.
480 Cf. Shotwell to Babcock, 21 May 1927, Box 45, Folder 1, CEIP CE; one example of such CEIP-inspired publicity was the article by Lechartier’s colleague August Gauvain, “Les États-Unis et l’Europe,” Journal des Débats, 2 June 1927.
481 Cf. Lynch, Beyond Appeasement, 83–89.
Finally, the origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact illustrate the contested nature of transnationalism as various coalitions seek to advance their causes. Stirred into action by Briand’s use of the “outlawry” language, the chief activist of the Midwestern peace movement, S.O. Levinson, quickly travelled to Paris to negotiate with the French authorities. A concerned Shotwell instructed Babcock to “take great pains to disassociate Briand Proposal from Levinson,” however, shutting out the Midwestern activists would not be as easy as the CEIP had hoped. Over the course of the following weeks Briand’s chef de cabinet Alexis Leger held a long series of alternating meetings with S.O. Levinson and Earle Babcock, leaving both sides of the debate with the impression that they were driving French policy. Yet, when the Quai d’Orsay finally forwarded a concrete draft treaty to the American government it became clear that neither side had gotten what they wanted. J. Theodore Marriner, of the State Department’s Western European Affairs Division, noted that the French proposal was apparently “intended to give the effect of a kind of perpetual alliance between the United States and France.”

In the six months of negotiations that followed, the State Department successfully impressed on the French government that a bilateral treaty would never pass the U.S. Senate and consequently the treaty was opened up to a wider circle of signatories. Berlin enthusiastically greeted the initiative as a step binding America closer to European affairs. Although there were serious reservations on the part of Great Britain, the ultimate toothlessness of the treaty provisions convinced Whitehall that the Pact would not threaten British imperial interests. In the form that it was signed in Paris on 27 August 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact is unrecognizable from the ambitious security structure liberal internationalists had hoped for when they launched the initiative. By the end of the negotiations, all that was left was the general declaration of principle that has left many contemporary observers and most modern readers with the impression of a poorly thought-through, idealist pipe-dream.

Epilogue: The culture of technocracy

In the immediate post-war years the CEIP had built its reputation as a broker in Franco-American relations at a time when public scorn of anyone suspected of colluding with the enemy was still high in the post-war France and Germany. Over the course of the following years, as concerns over the

482 Shotwell to Babcock, 19 May 1927, Box 45, Folder 1, CEIP CE.
484 Memo by J. Theodore Marriner, 24 June 1927, RG 59, Microfilm M568 France, NARA/CP.
486 Cf. 46 Stat. 2343.
effects of international conflict on social cohesion grew, the CEIP cooperated with institutions such as the IAP and the DHP to nurture a transnationally connected foreign policy elite that served as a check on the power of unilateralists in European corridors of power while simultaneously blocking access to “radicals” who proposed sweeping limits to national sovereignty and to domestic social institutions. Circumscribing the group identity of those deemed qualified to formulate the national interest and providing for a steady interchange of ideas between national foreign policy establishments became the main objective of the CEIP’s cultural internationalism. Legitimated by its claim to special expertise, the ideological and sociological composition of this new in-group showed remarkable continuity to the old liberal order, before the advent of social mass-movements and broadly representative popular democracy. By making the affirmation of existing social institutions, especially the nation state and a liberal capitalist economy, a precondition for participation, this form of cultural internationalism erased many competing ideas on the construction of a legitimate global order. Representation was effectively limited to middle class and haute bourgeois men with center-left to center-right political views.

There were, of course, legitimate reasons to think that a world in which the foreign policies of all major powers were governed by a similar politically centrist, technocratic consensus would be more conducive to international stability and peacekeeping. As the creation of the Committees on Security and Disarmament shows, some expected these connections to enable liberal internationalists to directly influence government action, effectively constituting an enlightened technocratic governing elite. As James T. Shotwell explained to Mendelssohn Bartholdy in connection with the German committee: while the work of organizing a study group could be burdensome and tedious, the ultimate payoff was the reward of being in control of “a very powerful instrument for affecting international policies at some crucial juncture.” Yet, while the homogeneity of this group certainly fostered consensus formation, the history of the Kellogg-Briand Pact demonstrates the problems with this essentially elitist strategy. Men such as James T. Shotwell, Moritz Julius Bonn and Henri Lichtenberger found it easy to get a hearing among academics, government officials and businessmen. Beyond these circles, however, public support for their ideas was limited. Even the larger liberal internationalist advocacy organizations such as the ASFDN, La Paix par le Droit or the DLfV, usually had no more than a few thousand members and served mainly an educated, middle class audience. This was far below the millions reached by political parties, labor unions, or, for that matter, even the

487 Shotwell to Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 10 August 1925, Box 76, Folder “Mendelssohn Bartholdy I,” Shotwell Papers, RBML Columbia.
488 For instance, the AFSDN had 3,200 direct members in 1927, while numbers for the DLfV in the early 1920s indicate no more than 2,000 members, cf. Guieu, Le rameau et le glaive, 96–99; Dülffer, “Vom Internationalismus zum Expansionismus,” 177–178.
tens of thousands of supporters of the major peace societies. Thus, while the CEIP’s network had been able to launch the initiative leading to the adoption of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, even the appropriation of the popular “outlawry” language could not camouflage the fact that there was no widespread support for the “American Locarno” that liberal internationalists were hoping for.

The biographies of Henri Lichtenberger and Moritz Julius Bonn after 1927 are testaments to the dashed hopes connected to these projects. While the actions of internationalists contributed to undermining notions of national sovereignty, decisions by national governments continued to be the determining factor not only in the success or failure of their initiatives but also of their personal lives in matters of professional success, personal freedom and even life and death. Henri Lichtenberger documented the rise of National Socialism and the concomitant disintegration of his decade-long work for Franco-German comity in a series of articles for *Esprit International*.\(^{489}\) Seventy years after the occupation of Strasbourg, he witnessed Germany’s third attack on France in his life-time as a terminally ill man. Henri Lichtenberger died in November 1941 in Biarritz, on the Atlantic Coast.

Moritz Julius Bonn’s career was interrupted when he was expelled from the Handelshochschule in April 1933 and forced to flee Germany for Britain via Austria. An internationally renowned economist, fluent in French and English and with professional contacts across Europe and North America, Bonn’s prospects for the future appeared nevertheless less dire than that of most other Jewish refugees. In fact, both Yale University and the University of California at Berkeley were eager to secure his services. In 1935, the Emergency Committee in Aid of Foreign Displaced Scholars agreed to finance part of his salary and it is easy to envision Bonn thriving in a milieu that afforded many of his former fellow DHP colleagues to revive their academic careers.\(^{490}\) In light of his wife’s family in England, however, Bonn turned down all American offers for permanent employment and chose to make London his new home. Pre-war Britain did not prove a hospitable environment for the émigré. Bonn’s fame as an economist had always stemmed more from his eloquent and frequently incisive public interventions than on his scholarly contributions to the field. As a public intellectual he had thrived at the intersection of academic expertise, government service and the media. With the British government weary of the motives of Continental émigrés and the British public in no mood for his interpretation of German affairs, Bonn was never able to revive his professional fortunes or


\(^{490}\) Cf. Bonn to Stephen Duggan, 5 September 1935, Box 45, Folder 20, Emergency Committee in Aid of Foreign Displaced Scholars Records, NYPL.
his political influence.\footnote{Cf. Clavin, “A ‘Wandering Scholar,’” 32–33.}

From the perspective of the Carnegie Endowment, the Kellogg-Briand episode stands out as the high-tide of the foundation’s attempts to directly influence international relations. If there was an encouraging sign in the document, it was the very universalism of its language. Since the nineteenth century, international conventions placing limits on the use of force, such as arbitration treaties, had routinely contained exceptions for all disputes involving matters of “national honor.” By formulating reservations and asserting a sphere of national sovereignty that was beyond the reach of international law or international institutions, governments routinely reaffirmed the notion that nationalism and internationalism were fundamentally in conflict. The universal language of the Kellogg-Briand Pact contained no similar exceptions, leaving especially the British government initially puzzled. The United States was obviously not proposing to overturn the Monroe Doctrine by suggesting that American interventions in the Western hemisphere were now illegal. But if the State Department did not insist on expressing such a reservation, how could Britain assert its own special interests, particularly in Egypt? The answer was, the U.S. administration indicated, that such exemptions did not need to be expressly formulated since they were already implied.\footnote{Cf. Lorna Lloyd, \textit{Peace Through Law: Britain and the International Court in the 1920s} (Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society/Boydell Press, 1997), 126–128.}

Rather than positing an idealist internationalism in which national self-interestedness was disappearing, the Pact thus took the primacy of the interests of the major powers as its point of departure from which international order would be constructed. Internationalism was not in contradiction to nationalism. It was an assumption that was, not least, grounded in the understanding that the diplomatic and academic experts formulating the national interests of the major powers would have the “international mind” to appreciate and respect the interests involved on all sides. In the following years, the foundation intended to build on this first step to construct a more durable international security structure.
4. A lawyers’ international: The juridification of international relations and its discontents

When in 1934 Austrian legal scholar Josef L. Kunz surveyed the literature of his discipline he noticed something peculiar. While up to 1914 and throughout the war his colleagues had devoted much time and effort to the task of elucidating the rules governing the conduct of war, since about 1920 the subject appeared to have mysteriously vanished from the pages of academic journals. A look at the lectures and courses held at the major institutions of the field—the International Law Association, the Institute de Droit International, the Hague Academy of International Law—confirmed his suspicion: just a few decades after the Hague Conferences had set in motion the task of codifying the laws of war hardly anybody seemed to be studying the subject anymore. The Inter-parliamentary Union had even passed a resolution discouraging any further efforts in this direction. It was as if the mere possibility of armed conflict had dropped out of sight. Kunz was certain that this widespread lack of interest could not be accidental: “Quite to the contrary, it is deliberate and part of a predetermined policy; it is often regarded as a great achievement of our time, [...] as a decisive step on the road that leads toward the elimination of war.”

What Kunz, an Austrian émigré and a Rockefeller fellow at the time of his realization, did not appear to realize was that a significant part of the incentive structure of interwar legal scholarship was shaped by the priorities of American philanthropy. All of the institutions Kunz had mentioned were recipients of Carnegie or Rockefeller grants, part of an effort to develop an “international law of peace” as a remedy for war.

The interwar years were a key moment in the development of international legal standards. With new international institutions transforming the practice of diplomacy, many scholars abandoned positivist conceptions of justice for projects to establish a durable international legal regime, leading to a sometimes bewildering array of codification initiatives grouped around the League of Nations and the international academic community. Recent studies have highlighted how the development of international law was shaped by Eurocentric standards as jurists sought to stabilize relations between the major powers while leaving the sovereign rights of non-Western nations in doubt. From concepts of national sovereignty to the origins of an international human rights regime—coding existing global

hierarchies into emergent law was integral to the legal internationalist project. The deep involvement of U.S. philanthropy—especially the CEIP and the Rockefeller Foundation—in codification initiatives was thus a means for ensuring that American voices were present in the process. Not only did legal internationalism speak to the paradigmatic claim of American philanthropy to improve social relations through the application of scientific knowledge and rational organization. The idea was that replacing the inherently volatile competition between European empires with a stable structure based on American-style rule of law also allowed foundations to present themselves as acting in the nation’s best traditions and interests. There was hardly an organization more closely associated with this approach than the CEIP. From Andrew Carnegie to Elihu Root to James Brown Scott, many of the key figures of the foundation were long-standing proponents of international legal institutions.

There was, however, an additional, social dimension to this story. The argument of this chapter is that the legal internationalist project of the interwar years was inseparable from an effort to create structures of governance through the juridification of international relations. By defining and adjusting the boundaries between the political and the judicial, internationalists sought to make formerly political conflicts justiciable by legal institutions. This effectively recast the relationship between the public, the nation state and the international system by inserting a mediating figure: the international legal expert. In cases where the ideological primacy of national sovereignty clashed with the demands of international interdependence the transnational community of international lawyers would resolve conflicts through adjudication, arbitration, negotiation and also education. The endless conferencing that has been noted as characteristic of the interwar codification debates was not merely incidental to this project but rather one of its constituent parts. It constituted a closely circumscribed group of no more than two hundred legal advisers, national and international bureaucrats and justices of international tribunals that became central to the conduct of modern diplomacy, forming a new reservoir of knowledge-power.


497 See e.g. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 124; Grewe, Epochen Der Völkerrechtsgeschichte, 715.

Fostering communication and coherence among this group was the common thread that ran through the CEIP’s interwar legal philanthropy. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that in the first half of the twentieth century the CEIP’s Division of International Law practically managed international legal scholarship in the United States. Elihu Root and James Brown Scott were the founding figures of the American Society of International Law whose *American Journal of International Law* was run from the CEIP’s headquarters.\(^{499}\) Taking into account fellowships, exchange programs and publication initiatives there was hardly an American professor of international law who had not at one point been a direct beneficiary of Carnegie funding. The foundation’s influence also extended to Europe, where CEIP officers were represented on editorial boards and the foundation disbursed annual subsidies to about a dozen journals in ten countries.\(^{500}\) Throughout the interwar period it paid for the establishment or the upkeep of community institutions such as the Institute de droit international (IDI)—the “central bank of symbolic credit” of international jurisprudence\(^{501}\)—the Hague Academy of International Law, the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales and the Grotius Society; it promoted contacts through travel grants; it fostered communication by publishing and distributing monographs. Building a transnational community of theoreticians and practitioners of international law effectively delineated the experts from the amateurs and “objective knowledge” from idealistic aspirations. The juridification of diplomacy was, in the CEIP’s eyes, a means of taking contentious international conflicts out of the realm of small-minded national debates and placing them into the hands of a community of men of a truly “international mind.” In addition to making international law, the foundation wanted to make lawyers international.

This was not merely a theoretical issue for the foundation but one that was attached to a concrete political project: securing American adherence to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), or “World Court,” an issue that acquired great salience after the Kellogg-Briand Pact had been signed. “[W]e cannot renounce war as an instrument of policy unless we have something to take its place,” wrote James T. Shotwell in 1927 as the CEIP’s campaign for the Kellogg-Briand Pact was reaching its climax.\(^{502}\) At a Board of Trustees meeting the following year President Butler explained that while it had been essential to refrain “from any formulation of the next step […] to give the Senate a chance

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\(^{500}\) CEIP Year Book 18 (1929), 187–192; for instance, James Brown Scott was on the boards of the *Revue générale de droit international public* and the *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*.


for ratification” now was the time for further action. At the time it seemed like a logical next step as the PCIJ enjoyed unusually broad popular support in the United States. Eastern Establishment groups were for it; most pacifist organizations were for it; every single interwar U.S. administration was for it. Underneath this superficial unanimity, however, lay strikingly divergent conceptions of what constituted justice on a global scale. As noted before, the CEIP’s activism was tied to the promotion of a specific version of interantionalism over its alternatives.

What many working towards a legal international order associated with the idea of a World Court was nothing less than a complete revision of the ethical underpinnings of international conduct along anti-imperialist and anti-interventionist lines. Already at the Paris Peace Conference the Euro-centric moorings of international law had come under attack. An amendment to the Covenant of the League of Nations declaring the “equality of all races” an inviolable principle had received a majority of votes only to be rejected on dubious procedural grounds. In the 1920s, Pan-Asian activists and Black Internationalists formulated visions of a global order in which solidarity among non-European states would put an end to imperialist exploitation. In the United States, the continuing unequal treatment of nations served to underline the alien nature of an international system still shaped by European ambition and aggression. “They believe in imperialism. We do not”—such was Senator Hiram Johnson’s characterization of the transatlantic divide. Many peace activists begged to differ, finding the United States well on its way to emulating Europe in its dealings with the Western Hemisphere—the National Council for Prevention of War suggested that the occupations of Nicaragua and Haiti constituted “incipient imperialism.” This is not to imply that these discussions could be easily mapped onto a politics of multicultural solidarity. Especially in the American South and West the public discourse of adherence to a global judicial regime was ripe with racially tinged fears that foreign justices could soon rule on the legality of Asian exclusion or examine discrimination against African-Americans. But bracketing the American anti-imperialist discourse was the fear that exploitation abroad would beget domination at home. Inequality on the international plane would

503 CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 6 December 1928, pp. 78–79, Box 14, Folder 5, CEIP US.
set the stage for rule by an international elite in Washington, New York and London, undermining the republican form of government.

To the CEIP such concerns seemed overblown. Inequality was a fact of international life and an established feature of the laws of nations. Andrew Carnegie himself—in clear agreement with the 1907 Hague Conventions—had dedicated the foundation to bringing about the abolition of war between “so-called civilized nations,” thereby placing colonial warfare beyond the ambit of the CEIP’s charter, and Butler’s definition of the “international mind” had contained the same caveat.510 To the foundation’s officers and trustees international law was not primarily an instrument of emancipation but of entangling nations in a web of agreements—the “rules of conduct which regulate the dealings of civilized States” in the words of J.P. Morgan partner Dwight Morrow—that created the preconditions for commerce and finance to prosper on a global scale, raising the standard of civilization for everybody.511 The mistreatment of entire ethnic groups at the hands of European colonizers elicited no sympathy at Morningside Heights but it was shared prosperity rather than sentimental appeals to the equality of man that would ultimately render colonial exploitation unnecessary and anachronistic. In the same vein, the CEIP was scornful of America’s often bullying behavior toward the Western Hemisphere and it applauded the advent of the Good Neighbor Policy in the 1930s. But the fact that the United States had pressing interests in Latin America and a right to pursue them seemed beyond question. “[W]e do control the destinies of Central America,” American Assistant Secretary of State and CEIP trustee Robert E. Olds acknowledged in 1927, “and we do so for the simple reason that the national interest absolutely dictates such a course […]”512 This positive attitude towards the exercise of power earned the foundation the enmity of anti-imperialist critics, who accused the CEIP of “sprinkl[ing] foot-powder on the pages of American publications to ease the boot of imperialism on to the American people.”513

This chapter explores the ideological foundations and the political consequences of CEIP support for a space of juridified governance through the lens of the at first convergent but ultimately divergent career paths of two international lawyers: American law professor Philip C. Jessup and Greek diplomat Nicolas Politis. The two jurists crossed path in 1929 in Geneva when the foundation sent an aging Elihu Root and a young Philip Jessup to abroad to reach an agreement on American adherence

510 CEIP Year Book 2 (1912), 3; in the same letter Carnegie also insisted that the “rights of nations to their respective internal policies” should be recognized, which in the understanding included colonial policies; to Butler the international mind was to unite the citizens of the “nations of the civilized world as friendly and co-operating equals”, cf. ”Butler, The International Mind, 102.
512 Memorandum by Undersecretary of State Robert Olds, 2 January 1927, 817.00/4350, RG 59, NARA/CP.
513 Beals, Glass Houses, 256.
to the World Court in a little-studied instance of transnational negotiation. More broadly, however, the interwar careers of the two men, closely intertwined with the CEIP’s legal programs, shine a light on the ideas and political projects underlying the interwar project of replacing war with law.

Making war aggressive: Nicolas Politis and the codification of international law

Only months after the establishment of the CEIP’s Division of International Law in 1911, Nicolas Socrates Politis, recently appointed Professor of International Law at the Sorbonne, was among the recipients of a circular letter asking for advice on possible lines of actions for the new enterprise. At the time, the professor’s elaborate reply, spanning eleven neatly handwritten pages, received only a perfunctory acknowledgment. Within a few years, however, Politis, now the Greek ambassador to France and an omnipresent League-insider, would become one of the foundation’s key partners in furthering the codification of international law in pursuit of a global order based on the rule of law. He joined the curatorium of the Hague Academy of International Law, lectured at the Geneva Institute of International Relations and became a member of the IDI, serving as its president from 1937 to 1942. Politis was a founding member of the Comité d’Administration in 1925, consequently taking on a more public role as a spokesperson for the foundation. He published in *L’Esprit International* and delivered lectures at the Centre Européen while the Endowment furthered his standing in the legal community by distributing copies of his books and articles to hundreds of libraries around the world.

In return, the CEIP benefited from the ambassador’s well-established links to Europe’s political class as well as from the lawyer’s sharp intellect and political acumen—Earle Babcock was initially somewhat shocked by the “aggressive clearness of [his] remarks” but praised his “most suggestive and helpful” ideas. Politis’ international standing and dedication to the work of the foundation—despite his numerous obligations he did not miss a single meeting during the first eight years of the Comité’s operation—made him, next to Carlo Sforza, the anchor of the CEIP’s European organization.

What made Politis such a compelling partner for an organization seeking to make an impact in Europe was not only his prominence but his border-crossing identity, an inbetweenness that allowed him to address disparate audiences and pursue projects in multiple venues. Born on the Greek island of Corfu in 1872, he had studied international law in France where he attended two of the country’s *grandes écoles*, the Faculté de droit of the Sorbonne and the École Libre des Sciences Politiques. Politis then

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514 Nicolas Politis to James Brown Scott, 21 October 1911, f. 657–668, vol. 253, Division of International Law General Correspondence, CEIP US.

515 “Curriculum vitae de M. Politis,” Box 108, Folder 5, CEIP CE.

516 Babcock to Butler, 22 October 1925, Box 107, Folder 2, CEIP US.
embarked on an academic career as a professor of international law at the universities of Aix-en-Provence, Poitiers and Paris before joining the diplomatic ranks of his home country. In 1919, he attended the Paris Peace Conference as foreign minister and afterwards became ambassador in Paris, while also serving regularly as Greece’s delegate at the League of Nations. Multilingual, independently wealthy, he was equally at home in the ivory tower of international jurisprudence, among the operatives of the Quai d’Orsay and in Geneva’s League circles. He was able to switch fluidly between the register of diplomatic negotiation and the idealist rhetoric of internationalist evangelism. Politis’ views on international law captured the hope of many liberal promoters of the young discipline that legal mechanisms could bring peace and stability to the European continent. “No longer is everything contained in the nation,” Politis was convinced, and as “life beyond [national] borders” was starting to “organize itself,” Politis wanted to play his part.517

What drew Nicolas Politis toward close cooperation with an American foundation? Among the complex, overlapping allegiances of interwar international lawyers, loyalty to the nation still occupied a preeminent position and any inquiry into motives needs to take account of the diplomatic positions of national governments.518 As a Greek civil servant, Politis was associated with his country’s liberal wing under the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos that had been friendly to the Entente during the war and now sought to align Greece with the West against the preferences of the pro-German, monarchist camp. Internationalism and cooperation with the Western powers was thus in line with the political program of his party. As a diplomat representing one of Europe’s smaller nations, a global order based on international law and collective security also served the interest of protecting weaker states from the predations of the great powers.519 In addition, as a long-time resident of France and fixture of Parisian society, Politis was also closely associated with the French government. From this perspective, his labors on behalf of international institutions served the interest of stemming future, particularly German, aggression through effective collective security mechanisms.

The interwar years were also a time when legal scholars increasingly pursued projects of international community-building, such as the formation of a European institutional order, and legal historians have repeatedly stressed the centrality of notions of international solidarity to Politis’ legal philosophy.520 Less well explored is the extent to which many interwar jurists, troubled by the rise of

Asia and Europe’s loss of military and economic power in the wake of the First World War, conceived of this interdependence in culturally or racially exclusionary terms. Politis was well-read in the transnational, Social Darwinian literature that predicted the coming of a war between the races. Lothrop Stoddard saw a “rising tide of color” washing against the dams of Europe’s colonies and Albert Sarraut saw an “aggressive revolt of [non-white] races, solidarized in an assault on and a siege of the European position.” Europe, Politis believed, was “in full crisis.” Only if the major countries such as England, France and Germany recognized that “[t]he dream of universal domination, which has haunted the great powers, has seized to be even conceivable,” could Europe’s hegemony, which to him was equivalent to prosperity and stability, be salvaged. What was at stake was not only the future of colonialism, but the future of the “white race,” as the rise of the “colored peoples” posed an immediate economic challenge that would in the future develop into a military threat. In the context of this adversarial narrative Politis saw the decision of the United States to abstain from collective security mechanisms as all the more vexing: “The steadfast insistence of the United States on its traditional policy of neutrality has created an insurmountable obstacle to the progress of international order.” By refusing to participate in the new European order the United States had “assumed a heavy burden of responsibility before the civilized world.”

Both for Politis and for the Carnegie Endowment, writing the law of nations was a means to bridging the political chasm between the Old World and the New. When in the second half of the 1920s many of his colleagues became disillusioned with America’s reclusiveness and turned from global conceptions of international order to regional solutions, Politis stressed the importance of avoiding a continental rift. Throughout the 1920s Politis pursued the juridification of international relations in close cooperation with the foundation, both through the League of Nations and in the realm of the sprawling field of private codification initiatives. When in 1925 the CEIP offered 40,000 dollars to the Institute de Droit International “for the purpose of a speedy codification of the international law

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of peace,” it fell to Nicolas Politis, chairman of the IDI’s Consultative Committee—the Institute’s link to the CEIP—to respond to this offer.\textsuperscript{526} As legal scholars have pointed out, interwar jurists approached the daunting task of setting down the rules by which the world was to be governed with an almost perplexing optimism and Politis was no exception.\textsuperscript{527} Although he was somewhat concerned about the “overwhelming” scope of the work ahead this was nothing that could not be resolved through careful planning and an intelligent division of labor between the IDI’s experts. Given careful preparation Politis estimated that it would take “two sessions at the most”—equaling four years—for the Institute to “fully complete its work on the codification of the body of public international law of peace.”\textsuperscript{528}

His goal of integrating the United States into the collective security structure directly informed Politis’ main juridical project of the interwar years—arriving at a universally recognized definition of aggressive warfare. The notion that “aggression” was the key marker that rendered military action illegitimate had gained widespread acceptance following the German invasion of neutral Belgium at the beginning of the First World War. The Covenant of the League of Nations had solidified this idea by setting up a system of collective security that would protect the territorial integrity of member states “against external aggression.”\textsuperscript{529} Yet, what constituted such acts of aggression remained ill-defined. States with far-reaching interests and possessions such as Great Britain preferred to define “wars of aggression” narrowly in order to retain their right to intervene, even militarily, in pursuit of imperial interests. Smaller states seeking protection from precisely these kinds of interventions sought a broader interpretation.\textsuperscript{530} The absence of a clear definition meant that, in practice, the task of declaring a military incident an act of aggression and invoking collective security would fall to the League Council. This was a major stumbling block for American participation in collective security, as giving a political body largely viewed as an instrument of European power politics the authority to potentially commit American troops was politically untenable. Even James T. Shotwell admitted that the fuzzy category of aggression opened the door to abuse as “most aggressive wars have been

\textsuperscript{526} “Note sur le projet de codification du droit international de la paix,” f. 831, vol. 304, Division of International Law General Correspondence, CEIP US.
\textsuperscript{528} “Note sur le projet de codification du droit international de la paix,” f. 831, vol. 304, Division of International Law General Correspondence, CEIP US.
\textsuperscript{529} Art. X, Covenant of the League of Nations.
\textsuperscript{530} For instance, a Latin American diplomat, hinting at the history of U.S. interventions in the Western hemisphere, argued that the “great danger lay in aggression unaccompanied by a state of war,” League of Nations, Arbitration, Security and Reduction of Armaments: Extracts from the Debates of the Fifth Assembly Including Those of the First and Third Committees (Geneva: League of Nations, 1924), 93; published version of League of Nations document C.708.1924.IX (C.C.0.1.).
A favorable opportunity presented itself in 1924, when Politis and Edvard Beneš—two longstanding partners of the CEIP—were appointed joint rapporteurs for the drafting of the “Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,” better known as the Geneva Protocol, which sought to transform the League of Nations into a robust system of collective security. Among the papers circulated by the League Secretariat ahead of the deliberations was an obliquely titled “Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security Prepared by an American Group”—drawn up by Shotwell and David Hunter Miller on behalf of the American Group on Arbitration and Disarmament—that radically reinterpreteted the meaning of aggression. It depoliticized the issue by handing authority over all international disputes to the PCIJ; any state which refused the World Court’s jurisdiction was automatically declared an aggressor. But Shotwell and Miller aimed at more than solving a policy problem. Under the heading “Outlawry of Aggressive War” their preamble had the high contracting parties “solemnly declare that aggressive war is an international crime.” By fusing the terminology of crime and illegality favored by American anti-imperialist pacifists with the collective security language of the League Covenant, Shotwell and Miller hoped to find a rhetorical middle ground. Lest they be misunderstood in Geneva, the authors added that the term “outlawry,” while not “accurate from the legal standpoint,” had acquired “great vogue” in America, particularly among League critics. Adopting some of the key phrases of this movement would make the purpose of the Protocol more comprehensible to Americans and thus “further its understanding and popular acceptance.”

The fate of this memorandum at Geneva is a textbook case of how non-governmental contributions were quietly inserted, absorbed and adapted into official action. In the weeks before the Council meetings, Shotwell activated his web of European contacts—Gilbert Murray, Alfred Zimmern, Justin

531 CEIP Year Book 16 (1927), 111.
Godart, among others—to present the project favorably to British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and French premier Édouard Herriot. These efforts paid off as in his opening speech to the League Assembly MacDonald expressed his approval for depoliticizing aggression. “There are questions that can only be settled by the trained expert lawyer,” MacDonald declared, while modifying the original Shotwell-Miller proposal by substituting “arbitration courts” for the PCIJ. Now safely rebranded as the “MacDonald Proposal,” Politis and Beneš were free to pursue this approach without reference to an extra-League source in their respective drafting committees. What remained, however, was to insert the language of illegality that Shotwell and Miller had viewed as crucial to gaining Americans’ trust. At a meeting chaired by Politis, Norwegian delegate and CEIP Special Correspondent Christian Lange took up this issue, urging his colleagues that the Protocol’s preamble should be worded to “impress public opinion” even in countries that were “not yet [League] Members but whose cooperation was both desirable and necessary.” Borrowing heavily from the American draft while somewhat garbling its “outlawry” terminology Lange’s text asserted that “a war of aggression is a breach of [...] solidarity and an international crime involving the outlawry of the State guilty of such a war.”

The entire Geneva Protocol was eventually rejected by a newly elected, Conservative British government but it marked a major step in the juridification of international conflicts and started a larger scholarly debate on the definition of aggression, especially in CEIP-sponsored law journals.

“It is quite plain that public opinion is everywhere moving toward agreement upon a definition of what constitutes aggression in international relationships,” Butler was pleased to note in the wake of the Geneva Protocol, and the foundation’s partner Nicolas Politis continued to be at the forefront of that movement. In 1927, he was appointed rapporteur of the League’s Committee on Security Questions, tasked with preparing the ground for the World Disarmament Conference, at which

538 Minutes of the sixth plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 6 September 1924, League of Nations, Arbitration, Security and Reduction of Armaments, 11.
539 Minutes of the ninth meeting of the Third Committee, 25 September 1924, ibid., 201, 281; typically, Lange did not directly reference the Shotwell-Miller proposal. As a general rule, only those who opposed it explicitly referred to the “American Draft” while those in favor of the approach downplayed its provenance.
542 CEIP Year Book 14 (1925), 50.
distinctions between aggressive and defensive armaments were expected to become crucial. In a widely noted memorandum submitted in his new role, Politis slightly revised the idea of the Shotwell-Miller/Politis-Beneš approach of 1924. The Geneva Protocol’s branding as the aggressor that state which refused to submit a dispute to international arbitration had since come under criticism for being impractically vague. Politis’ new suggestion included a larger role for League institutions while taking care not to revert to an overtly political procedure: in the event of hostilities the League Council would declare an immediate cease-fire and the party first to breach this truce would be deemed in the wrong.\(^543\) Although attracting much attention at the time, the proposal was never officially adopted by the League, setting the stage for Politis’ final contribution to the subject when in 1933 he submitted a second memorandum to the same Committee. Frustrated after a decade of having participated in the “vain attempt […] to devise suitable formulae for crystallising this somewhat evasive idea of aggression,” the diplomat adapted a proposal made by the Soviet delegation that defined aggression through an enumeration of prohibited acts, such as invasion of territory, seizure of vessels, naval blockades, etc.\(^544\) This so-called Politis Definition was never formally enshrined into international law but became part of a number of bilateral treaties and thus the most widely accepted test for aggression before the Second World War.

The quest to define aggression was emblematic of how the agendas of non-governmental actors stimulated interwar codification debates, a legacy that, in this specific case, would span from the Geneva Protocol, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact via the Politis Definition to the Nuremberg Trials and most discussions of the concept of wars of aggression ever since.\(^545\) Just as in its activism for the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the CEIP and its partners rarely challenged the hierarchical global order but appropriated the language of anti-imperialist social movements—the criminality of all war—while effectively working to stabilize the status quo. James Brown Scott liked to point to Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence to claim that not only all men were created equal but that all states enjoyed equality in international relations.\(^546\) Yet, in practice, all CEIP officers took a distinctly more pragmatic approach to inequality. To Shotwell, the full protection of international law could only apply to “civilized powers equal in sovereignty” and the international order needed to reflect “varying degrees of political development.”\(^547\) Nicolas Politis made a similar point in a series of

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\(^{545}\) Cf. Tsagourias, “Nicolas Politis’ Initiatives to Outlaw War,” 258–259; see also Grewe, Epochen Der Völkerrechtsgeschichte, 730.


\(^{547}\) “American Locarno to Renounce War Offered in Treaty,” New York Times, 31 May 1927; Shotwell had expressed
lectures delivered at Columbia University in the summer of 1926, when he asserted that equality in international relations meant only that all states had an equal right to appeal to the protection of the law, not a guarantee that all states would be treated alike: “material and moral equality does not exist.”

The CEIP’s transnational activism was, again, not seeking to overcome inequality in the international system but creating coalitions among those who wanted to perpetuate it.

Critics seized on these internal contradictions to point out that, rather than politics being replaced by justice, the juridification of international relations merely transposed imperialism into the legal field. Upon reading the Geneva Protocol, British IR professor Philip Noel-Baker observed that, the document’s high-minded language of arbitration notwithstanding, the underlying conception of aggression was “the simplest and most obvious that there could be: aggression is resort to war.”

Since the major powers did not regard colonial interventions, police actions or other military incursions into foreign territory in pursuit of their national interest as warfare in the strict sense of the word, such a test necessarily invited differing interpretations. American jurist Clyde Eagleton even doubted the motives behind the entire enterprise, as distinguishing between two kinds of warfare was inherently about reserving the right to pursue the former while declaring illegitimate the latter. With a view of the conflicting interests of the “Haves” and the “Have-Nots” in the international system Eagleton argued, somewhat hyperbolically, that outlawing international aggression would render unjust “the only usage of war that could perhaps be justified: war undertaken to uphold a specific legal right.”

In a characteristically unrestrained comment on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Chicago Daily Tribune expressed a common critique of international law as a smokescreen for the imperialist interest of Europe’s major powers:

Their privilege of fighting the smaller peoples, of coercing the smaller whites as well as gassing the black and tans, is unabridged and unimpaired. [...] The United States is in up to the ears, a party to the realistic scheme of Europe, agreeing to it and supporting it in the name of peace.”

Preventing such heated rhetoric from spilling into the diplomatic process was integral to the

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551 “Mr. Kellogg’s Peace,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 12 August 1928.
internationalist legal project. The juridification of international relations with its blurring of lines between politics and law sought to create a space of dispassionate, transnational negotiation. In that sense, it was not essentially a legal but rather a political project to begin with. The community of international lawyers constituted itself as a realm of scholarly objectivity and scientific rationality in which competing national interests could be reconciled.\(^552\) Codification of the “international law of peace” was thus not simply the creation of a body of knowledge for governing the world but also involved promoting the “international mind” of a group of gentlemen that could perform this knowledge. The result was a pragmatic approach that placed its faith less in the letter of the law than in the character of the lawyer. In a revealing slip which was quickly corrected by his colleagues, Nicolas Politis had expressed this idea of international jurists as essentially diplomatic actors outside the bounds of traditional state-based diplomacy in an early draft of his report for the Geneva Protocol. The job of arbitrators under the new system of collective security, Politis argued, was to “give proof of statesmanship rather than to show knowledge of legal science.”\(^553\) In practice, the strategy of juridification thus concentrated a new form of legal power among a group of academics, judges and counselors with a complex set of allegiances to governments, international institutions, personal friendships and intellectual projects. Given the social and cultural homogeneity of this group—about ninety percent of the exclusively male members of the IDI hailed from Europe or North America—it was questionable to what extent their views represented a truly comprehensive grasp of the world’s problems.\(^554\)

Nevertheless, legal internationalists were aware that as long as international law remained the exclusive discourse of a small, transnational elite there was little hope for it ever gaining widespread acceptance. Nicolas Politis addressed the challenge of spreading the “international mind” beyond the hallowed halls of jurisprudence in one of his Columbia University lectures: “It will not be enough, however, for the professors of international law to acquire this mind themselves. Their conviction must be deep enough for them to feel that it is their mission to spread it even to the popular classes.”\(^555\) If international law was to endure, its proponents needed to be more than diplomats and negotiators—they needed to be educators. The cooperation of Shotwell, Politis and others in the codification debates had aimed at keeping the door open for the United States to join a collective security system based on the rule of law. Ultimately, however, it would have to be the American people, through their
elected representatives, who needed to walk through it.

“A net-work of personal relationships”: Philip C. Jessup and the campaign for the PCIJ

In December of 1925, Philip Jessup, then a twenty-nine year old Columbia University lecturer of international law, went to Washington, DC, with a special mission in political activism on behalf of a broad coalition of non-governmental organizations. The treaty of American adherence to the World Court had been pending before the Senate ever since President Harding had first submitted an accession treaty in 1923 and now, with the crucial final vote imminent, Jessup was to help coordinate cooperation between internationalist and peace groups. The trip was technically not funded by the Carnegie Endowment, however, as President of Columbia University, Butler had signed off on his employee’s leave of absence as an example of “genuine University service,” thus obviating the need for the CEIP to become involved in a domestic lobbying campaign.556 Jessup’s task was complicated by the progressive breakdown of an uneasy truce within the pro-Court coalition that had sent him in the first place. That summer, pro-League and anti-League supporters of the PCIJ, including James T. Shotwell and Outlawry leader Salmon O. Levinson, had agreed to jointly lobby the Senate to vote in favor of adherence in exchange for an American push to revise international law along anti-imperialist Outlawry lines. But around the time of Jessup’s arrival in the capital this so-called “Harmony Plan” had fallen apart when Shotwell, as unofficial leader of the pro-League faction, withdrew his support. With the debate over the Geneva Protocol and the Locarno Treaties indicating ever closer cooperation among European states, a compromise position no longer seemed possible, Shotwell told Levinson.557 From now on, the Carnegie Endowment would pursue American adherence to the Court on its own terms—relying on its financial resources and its transnational connections.

In these efforts, Philip Jessup would play a pivotal role as both negotiator and educator. Born in 1897 as a native New Yorker and son of a prominent lawyer, Jessup’s career was hardly a study in upward mobility. His academic career marked him as a protégé of some of the most influential figures of the first generation of America’s foreign policy wise men. His decision to study international law was inspired by none other than Elihu Root, who, when Jessup returned from military service in France to resume his studies at Hamilton College, was a scholar in residence at the school. Before committing himself to this career Jessup discussed his decision with two other eminent lights of American

556 Butler to Jessup, 28 December 1925, Box A204, Folder “World Court 1925–1926,” Philip C. Jessup Papers, LoC; the arrangement apparently grew out of an agreement between Columbia law professor Joseph Chamberlain and progressive Republican Senator Irvine Lenroot, cf. Joseph P. Chamberlain to Butler, 5 November 1926, Box A204, Folder “World Court 1925–1926,” Jessup Papers, LoC.
jurisprudence—John Bassett Moore and James Brown Scott. The young man’s studies at Yale and Columbia University—two institutions of elite formation *par excellence*—further solidified Jessup’s membership in the American elite. His first formal association with the Carnegie Endowment came in his final year of studies when he was awarded a CEIP Fellowship in International Law. Immediately after he graduated in 1924, he joined the State Department as an assistant solicitor before returning to academia after a year to work as a lecturer and then assistant professor of international law at Columbia.

As for many of his generation of liberal internationalists, Jessup’s activism was fueled by his wartime service and the desire to prevent a repeat of the massive suffering he had personally experienced. He never displayed the same scorn with which some of his older, more conservative colleagues regarded religious or social reformist pacifists and during his World Court campaigns he demonstrated a willingness to work constructively with anti-imperialist pacifist and women’s groups. But by temperament and upbringing he remained an heir to the conservative progressive tradition of Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root. From them he inherited a belief in an evolving global community that needed to be ordered through the gradual development of international law and structures for arbitration and adjudication of conflicts. Jessup’s legal philosophy, progressive as it was, displayed an almost Burkean conservatism in its emphasis on experience and incremental change and avoidance of sweeping theoretical claims: “The principle is that no progress is made in international affairs by leaps and bounds; that all progress has come by very slow and deliberate steps, one step after the other, until finally an advance is made from the position in which we find ourselves.” In regard to policy-making Jessup agreed with his establishment elders that foreign relations were too important a field to be left to the same caustic dynamics of electoral politics that shaped domestic affairs. His work on behalf of organizations such as the CEIP and his participation in public debate on international issues came out of a firm belief in the expert community’s obligation to elevate public discourse by bringing its expertise to bear on the issues of the day, thus helping to steady the ship of state.

Upon arriving in Washington in late 1925, Jessup, working out of temporary quarters at the Cosmos Club, started lobbying Senators, coordinating with his former colleagues in the State Department and

559 Cf. CEIP Year Book 13 (1924), 117.
560 Schachter, “Philip Jessup’s Life and Ideas,” 879.
establishing contact with grassroots organizations. He worked particularly closely with Esther Lape, the energetic director of Edward W. Bok’s American Peace Award organization, the later American Foundation. Like Jessup, Lape saw the Court fight not as an end in itself but as a first step toward aligning the United States with the new structures of international governance with the ultimate goal of attaining League membership. One of the main obstacles on this path was the instrument of so-called “advisory opinions.” These documents issued by the PCIJ were authoritative interpretations of international law on which much of the League of Nation’s concrete work on issues ranging from public health to minority questions rested, making them a key, non-negotiable function of the Court in European eyes. In the U.S. context, however, they were a millstone around the neck of Court activists. Firstly, advisory opinions allowed opponents of the League of Nations to link the PCIJ to Geneva as the “League Court.” Secondly, Court critics believed that the instrument would give hostile European governments undue leverage over American security and domestic policy, specifically the Monroe Doctrine and immigration restrictions. Finally, and on a most basic level, American jurisprudence knew no comparable institution to these advisory opinion, making it easier to brand the PCIJ as alien to American legal culture and as essentially a political, not a legal tribunal.

Jessup’s and Lape’s campaign was only partially successful. Throughout the Senate debate populist opponents of the Court seized on the involvement of prominent East Coast groups as evidence that international bankers were trying to foist an institution on regular American workers that would ultimately mean “their ruin and their slavery.” A speaker at a rally of the Friends of Irish Freedom in New York on 29 December 1925 attacked the “Carnegie World Court” and its Anglo-American propaganda network. In January, the Senate finally voted for American adherence but only after attaching five reservations to the original treaty. The first four of these were seen as uncontroversial, but the fifth reservation, addressing the much contested issue of advisory opinions, stipulated that the United States would only join if no such opinions would be issued on matters “in which the United States has or claims an interest.” The word “claims” turned this reservation into a poison pill since it made the U.S. government the sole judge of how broadly the concept of national interest could be construed. In September, a conference of the PCIJ’s signatory nations accepted the first four American reservations but objected to the fifth on the grounds that the United States could not be allowed to

566 Ibid., pp. 2301–2302.
567 Congressional Record 67 (1926): 2306—.
accede on any basis other than equality. To American observers the public rebuke of the U.S. Senate by the conference of signatories appeared as a harbinger of things to come, with one American journalist interpreting it as “the first expression of [a] United Europe against the United States.”

The world’s powers seemed to be forging an ever closer alliance—and the United States remained shut out.

With the official diplomatic process having ended in a stalemate, the pro-Court forces switched to informal channels. In January 1927, Esther Lape traveled to Europe as their informal to investigate how the situation could possibly be salvaged. Over the course of two weeks Lape held informal discussions with Secretary General Eric Drummond, Henri Rolin, Dag Hammarskjold and other diplomats, jurists and journalists who had been closely involved with the Court debate. Drummond recommended a new push for an international conference to consider the Senate’s reservations, but the suggestion that immediately struck a nerve with Lape came in a conversation with Henri Fromageot, the legal adviser of the Quai d’Orsay and leading French strategist on the subject. Instead of launching another round of official negotiations, he proposed that a small group of experts drawn mainly from the major powers should engage in “entirely unofficial conversations” and arrive at an interpretation of the Senate’s fifth reservation that would satisfy all sides. Fromageot was sure that placing the issue in the hands of legal experts, removed from public pressure and the cacophony of diplomatic voices that was common in Geneva, would result in a negotiated solution “in a few hours—perhaps a few minutes.” Any agreement reached would later have to be ratified by an official conference but the actual negotiations should be conducted outside of traditional diplomatic channels.

The proposal raised serious questions of legitimacy since it aimed at circumventing America’s democratic institutions and potentially infringed on the rights of smaller World Court member states. Nevertheless, Lape submitted what struck her as an “immensely useful” idea to Elihu Root, the doyen of the American World Court community, but with the Kellogg-Briand negotiations capturing the attention of the international legal community after the summer of 1927 no immediate progress was made.

That the Quai d’Orsay had not forgotten about the plan became apparent within days of the signing ceremony for the Kellogg-Briand Pact. At the ninth meeting of the League’s General Assembly in

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569 Memorandum of conversation between Esther Lape and Joseph E. Sharkey, 3 February 1927, Box 195, [Folder 1], Root Papers. Sharkey was an Associated Press correspondent in Geneva.
570 Memorandum of conversation between Esther Lape and Henri Fromageot, 11 February 1927, Box 195, [Folder 1], Root Papers; emphasis in original.
571 Esther Lape to Elihu Root, 13 February 1927, Box 142, Folder “L 1927,” Root Papers.
September 1928 the French delegate René Cassin introduced a seemingly routine resolution suggesting that the upcoming tenth anniversary of the PCIJ was a convenient opportunity to revise its statutes in light of the Court’s recent working experience. There were genuine problems with the PCIJ’s procedures, including its quorum requirements and a lack of qualification on the part of some of the judges, but to most observers the primary motivation behind the maneuver was no secret. Once Cassin’s resolution was adopted and the League Council decided to appoint a Committee of Jurists to work out recommendations, those familiar with the issue, including Arthur Sweetser and Nicolas Politis, pushed for the inclusion of an American delegate. Elihu Root’s name was at the top of the list even if few appear to have seriously expected a positive response in light of the elder statesman’s advanced age. His eventual acceptance was greeted with delight both in Europe, the United States and, particularly, at Morningside Heights. While the Carnegie Endowment had not been involved in the run-up to the Root invitation, Nicholas Murray Butler immediately took charge of the situation and over the course of the next three months the foundation’s New York, Washington and Paris offices effectively became Root’s secretariat, press bureau and logistics service. In addition, the Endowment agreed to pay for the services of a qualified assistant and, after Root had asked Butler for his “brightest young man,” the mission fell, once again, to Philip Jessup.

The press in Europe and America followed the Root-Jessup mission with considerable anticipation. Few observers believed the assurances of the State Department that Root was merely participating in the Committee in a private capacity. As one member of the League Secretariat observed dryly: “Mr. Root is not coming over here […] to discuss the retirement age of the Judges.” In fact, how much importance the U.S. Government attached to the trip is illustrated by a special arrangement that kept Secretary Kellogg in office for an additional month so that the handover to Henry L. Stimson would not occur during the Geneva negotiations. Yet, those closely involved also knew that the journey, while of the utmost importance for the future of the World Court, was almost entirely about symbolic politics. Jurists and diplomats on both sides knew that the question of granting special privileges to

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572 Jessup, Elihu Root, 435; Jessup learned from Sweetser that George W. Wickersham, also a New York lawyer and member of the Council of Foreign Relations, would have been the second choice. Jessup Diary, 7 February 1929, Box A242, Folder “E.R. Post 1916: World Court,” Jessup Papers, LoC.

573 Oral History Interview with Vernice Anderson, Truman Library, p. 18; Jessup Diary, 18 January 1929, Box A242, Folder “E.R. Post 1916: World Court,” Jessup Papers, LoC. The Root-Jessup mission has received little historiographic attention. For brief treatments see Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s, 288; Michael Dunne, The United States and the World Court, 1920–1935 (London: Pinter, 1988), 109–110; for contemporaneous accounts see Jessup, Elihu Root, 435–437; the following narrative is mainly based on the diary Jessup kept during the events as well as Philip C. Jessup, The United States and the World Court, World Peace Foundation. Pamphlets, vol. XII, no. 4 (Boston, 1929), 5–8.

574 “Root Will Seek to Win Foreign Nations to our Reservations on World Court,” New York Times, 7 February 1927; Elbridge Rand to State Department, 11 February 1929, RG 59, 500.C114/752, NARA/CP.

the United States or insisting on adherence on the basis of equality was of little practical import. America’s special status was implied by its economic and political might and few doubted that any initiative for an advisory opinion that could alienate the U.S. Government would be quietly squashed well before it reached the stage of official deliberation. The PCIJ condemning Washington’s reliance on the Monroe Doctrine was no more likely than the Court finding London in breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact for an intervention in India. Conversely, the idea that the United States would use its influence to arbitrarily stymy the League of Nations at every turn, as was suggested in the European press, seemed equally far-fetched as the U.S. Government had little to gain from obstructionism but was in fact vitally interested in European stability. The solution was, as CEIP trustee Norman Davis suggested to Kellogg, to paper over the differences by “re-draft[ing] the Fifth Reservation in such a way as to reduce the fear of both sides and to enable each to claim at least a partial victory.”

As befitting an exercise in informal transcontinental diplomacy, the outlines of the compromise were sketched in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Having left New York late at night on 15 February 1929 on the MS Augustus, Jessup and Root spent the crossing sketching drafts for a new Protocol of Adherence that would address concerns on all sides of the issue. Before leaving the United States, Root had held a series of friendly meetings with Senate leaders, including William Borah, Claude A. Swanson and Thomas J. Walsh, with Secretary of State Kellogg and with both outgoing President Coolidge and president-elect Herbert Hoover. Once the two lawyers settled into Geneva at the beginning of March, they used the final week of the Council meeting to sound out Drummond, Chamberlain, Briand and Stresemann, all of whom offered their support for the project. Root and Jessup eventually settled on a procedural strategy designed to minimize any interaction with the League’s institutions to avoid “tainting” the eventual compromise by association. As a result, the question of U.S. adherence was barely discussed in the Council session and instead was immediately passed to the overtly non-political and technical Committee of Jurists.

Given the nature of the American reservations, Root and Jessup expected opposition to come mainly from Latin America and Asia. Since any agreement would need to be ratified by the fifty-five signatory nations of the PCIJ, a group that included Cuba, Uruguay and Venezuela, the United States would essentially be asking Latin American countries to exempt inter-American relations from the protections of international law. “Certainly it is embarrassing,” commented the Wall Street Journal, “that opposition to [American adherence] comes chiefly from just that part of the world in which our asserted special interest lies.” Always keeping in close touch with Jessup’s and Root’s activities, the

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576 Norman Davis to Frank B. Kellogg, 31 December 1928, Central Decimal File, 1910–29, RG 59, 500.C114/733½, NARA/CP.
New York Times’ Clarence K. Streit reported from Geneva that “American circles” were “doing their utmost” to ease the concerns of Latin American states.577 Indeed, the next day, Root, Jessup and Arthur Sweetser met with diplomats from Cuba, Chile and Venezuela at the League Secretariat to secure the support of the South and Central American republics. Unofficial representatives or not, according to Jessup’s diary the unequal power relationship between the United States and Latin America was palpable: the Chilean delegate eulogized Root’s contributions to inter-American relations before pledging his assistance while Aristides de Agüero y Bethancourt stated acidly that Cuba “would support anything the U.S. proposed,” leading Root to equally sarcastically counter that he hoped the Cuban would never feel compelled to vote against his conscience. The next morning, all three endorsed the project without reservations when at the League Council’s session Austen Chamberlain suggested assigning the question of U.S. adherence to the legal experts.578

The Committee of Jurists was an institution that epitomized the new intermediary space between national governments, international institutions and public audiences which allowed non-governmental organizations to make an impact. The Committee drew its authority from the fact that its apparent independence was, to some extent, an optical illusion. With Cecil Hurst, Henri Fromageot and Friedrich Gaus, its twelve members included the legal advisers to all three major European powers, thus ensuring close cooperation with the governments represented on the Council.579 Such proximity to Europe’s capitals notwithstanding, the jurists were also members of the legal expert community with its overlapping professional and social affiliations that went well beyond the confines of the nation state. With Politis, Root and Jessup the Committee included three CEIP partners. Both Root and Politis were members of the IDI and all in all six Committee members had recently participated in the CEIP’s Hague Academy of International Law. Social and cultural capital as members of the legal community—“a certain net-work of personal relationships” as Root called it later—rather than governmental credentials qualified for this form of expert diplomacy and provided the basis for compromise.580 In Root’s understanding its purpose was to remedy the fatal flaw that the

578 Jessup Diary, 8 March 1929, Box A242, Folder “E.R. Post 1916: World Court,” Jessup Papers, LoC; Venezuelan delegate César Zumeta earned Jessup’s mistrust by “slanting” his eyes and “shooting around” during the meeting and by allegedly bringing up the Monroe Doctrine in the Council session, yet, the official record does not support this claim, cf. Minutes of Seventh Meeting, Fifty-Fourth Session of League of Nations Council, C/54 Session/P.V. 7 (1).
579 The other members were Vittorio Scialoja, Willem van Eysinga, Miyoji Ito, Massimo Pilotti, Nicolas Politis, Szymon Rundstein and Francisco José Urrutia, cf. Minutes of the Committee of Jurists on the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Geneva 11–19 March 1929, p 7, League of Nations Doc. No. C.166.M.66.129.V; the six men connected to the Academy of International Law were Hurst, van Eysinga, Pilotti, Politis, Rundstein and Urrutia, cf. indices to Recueil des cours. Académie de droit international.
U.S. Senate had formulated its reservations without any regard for the European situation. The jurists would seek to change that by effectively redrafting the critical points “as if someone from the other side was sitting in on the formulation of the reservations.” In effect, the goal was to introduce an element of multilateral negotiation to the American legislative process.

The Committee met from 11 to 19 March and, as Fromageot had originally suggested, the cordial atmosphere among the jurists proved a poignant counterpoint to the years of public acrimony that had preceded it. The final document, based on the Root-Jessup plan and finalized by a small drafting committee consisting of Root, Cecil Hurst and Nicolas Politis, finessed the question of advisory opinions by not giving the United States a blanket veto but allowing it to raise objections if it saw its national interest threatened. If the other powers decided to proceed regardless, America would be free to immediately leave the Court “without any imputation of unfriendliness.” The only counter-proposal during the deliberations had come from Politis, who had worried that the proposed scheme did not go far enough in expressing the special status of the United States. It was useless to deny that some states were more powerful than others, he told his colleagues, and the equality envisioned by the Root draft was in any case “theoretical” and not a reality. Politis’ draft would have institutionalized the American veto power in a four-member committee comprised of representatives of the League and the U.S. Government. Root and Jessup held such a formal veto unnecessary and Politis withdrew his draft, acknowledging that he did not wish to be “more American than the Americans themselves.” In its final form the Root Protocol neatly encapsulated the international jurists’ regard for the United States Senate. As Court critics immediately pointed out, enshrining a guarantee against “unfriendliness” in a legal document was hardly a serious endeavor as it was impossible to know under what political circumstances a hypothetical American exit would take place. Jessup and Root were perfectly aware of this. For them, concerns that disagreement over the definition of America’s foreign policy interests could trigger a transatlantic stand-off were simply overblown. They were convinced that in case of a difference of opinion “practical experience, as well as common sense, would find no difficulty in determining whether an interest of this country was touched [...].”

With agreement established among the legal community, attention shifted back to the national level and here the challenges to ratification were formidable. Already during the Geneva mission, Senator

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583 Ibid., pp. 19–21.
Borah had shifted markedly from the conciliatory tone of his talk with Root to a more skeptical stance. Once the Protocol was published, he announced his full opposition to the plan and predicted a contentious fight in the Senate. Jessup and Root were both aware that the expected populist campaign about to sweep the nation that would portray the Court as alien to American culture and incompatible with the country’s interests could hardly be countered by solemn declarations of East Coast elites. Already in 1925, Root had argued that a “gathering of distinguished gentlemen from the eastern seaboard at Washington for the perfectly plain purpose of overawing the Senate would inevitably cause resentment.” For Jessup, the defeat of 1926 had instilled a lifelong concern with the need to educate the American people through channels other than the Council on Foreign Relations or the Foreign Policy Association, groups that did not “reach down to the great mass of the voters.”

In a series of articles in the *American Federationist*, published by the American Federation of Labor, Jessup tried to get “in touch with the great mass of people” who knew little about foreign policy by engaging them on their own terms. In plain-spoken, sometimes folksy language (“You can’t climb to the top of the ladder till you put your foot on the first rungs”) he made the case for United States adherence to the PCIJ to an audience of three million unionized workers that could not be reached through law journal articles or the *New York Times*.

One month after the unofficial diplomats’ return from Europe, the American foreign policy establishment began to map out a battle plan for the new fight in the Senate. On a Monday morning in late May 1929, Elihu Root’s apartment on New York’s Fifth Avenue became the site for a strategy meeting that, in addition to the two negotiators, included James T. Shotwell (CEIP), James G. McDonald (Foreign Policy Association), Stephen P. Duggan (Institute of International Education), John Foster Dulles (Council on Foreign Relations), Frederick P. Keppel (Carnegie Corporation) and Henry S. Pritchett (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching). It was precisely the type of exclusive gathering that had led the Hearst papers to denounce Root as the “emissary of international bankers” and the Chicago Daily Tribune to question his integrity by casting the Geneva excursion as in the “best tradition of a corporation lawyer” and wondering just who Root’s client was in this case. In his opening presentation Root shed light on the legal intricacies of the final Protocol.

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587 Jessup to Root, 11 October 1932, Box A245, Folder “E.R. Corres. Bet. PCJ & ER,” Jessup Papers, LoC.
589 “Minutes of Conference at 998 Fifth Ave,” 27 May 1929, Box A242, Folder “E.R. Post 1916: World Court May 29–June 31,” Jessup Papers, LoC; the CEIP Trustees were John Foster Dulles, Henry S. Pritchett, James T. Shotwell and Norman Davis; “United States Senate and not Secretary Stimson Will Decide American Entry Into World Court,” *Detroit Times*, 9 September 1929; “American Nations and the World Court,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 14 March 1929.
The main purpose of the meeting, however, was to lay the groundwork for the upcoming campaign for Senate ratification. Root reminded his guests that it was essential to establish an organizational structure as soon as possible and to find the person who would coordinate the fight: “You have got to have somebody who will be willing to do the work and know beforehand who it is going to be, and that someone has to get a staff and personnel organized. That person ought to begin right off without delay.”

That person would turn out to be the CEIP’s trusted expert on World Court outreach, Philip Jessup. In the coming years he led the Eastern Establishment’s advocacy campaign through a newly created institution—the National World Court Committee (NWCC). The NWCC united a broad coalition of peace and women’s group behind support for the Root Protocol. Its diverse membership was reminiscent of the “Harmony Plan” coalition of 1925, including Eastern Establishment representatives but also activists from pacifist organizations such as WILPF, the Federal Council of Churches, the National Committee on Cause and Cure of War and even Salmon Levinson himself. Behind the pacifist veneer, however, was a very different structure. The NWCC was not a grassroots organization funded by membership fees from hundreds or thousands of activists but a centrally run advocacy operation that relied on contributions from a milieu that had more than just an idealist stake in internationalism: donors included the presidents of multinational corporations such as Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., of General Motors and Thomas J. Watson of IBM. Money also came from corporate lawyer and Council on Foreign Relations founding member Paul D. Cravath, from Thomas Lamont of J.P. Morgan & Co. and from John D. Rockefeller, Jr. The balance of the budget was carried by the Carnegie Endowment, which made an annual contribution of 2,000 dollars to the enterprise.

As secretary of the NWCC, Jessup saw the bureau’s role as a “central clearing house” whose bustling activity would create the impression of a fervent movement and pull the grassroots organizations along. It was to line up the support of key interest groups such as the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the American Federation of Labor. Most important of all, it was to translate the technical language of the World Court debate into “publicity which appeals to the man on the street.” Yet, from the beginning the organization was hobbled by latent tensions between the groups and, despite its wealthy benefactors, by erratic funding that never allowed the NWCC to develop its infrastructure. At times money was so scarce that Jessup had to collect second-hand office furniture.

592 Cf. National World Court Committee budgets, 1931, Box 255, Folder 5, CEIP US; CEIP Year Book 21 (1932), 66
and on several occasions the bureau was in danger of having to close altogether. Jessup later deplored that the lack of funds had made “consistent steady educational work” very difficult and that the peace groups had found it impossible to “keep the large constituencies roused to intense activity.” These structural problems were compounded by events beyond the NWCC’s control. The Root Protocol had been expected to come up for ratification in the fall or winter of 1929/30 but in October the New York Stock Exchange crashed, signaling the end of the prosperous 1920s and steering the national conversation far away from an American contribution to collective security. Few issues looked less appealing to U.S. Senators in 1930 than finding new ways to tie the fate of America to other parts of the world. As Congress became focused on protective tariff legislation, Stimson tried to rally his President behind the Court issue with martial language. Since Kellogg, Coolidge and Root had already deployed the “infantry” it was now the President’s duty to support them with his “artillery,” even if it meant taking “the hounding of the Hearst papers for a year.” The embattled Hoover, however, was not inclined to take on more controversy and let the issue slide.

In light of the unglamorous end of the 1929 push for American membership in the PCIJ the Root-Jessup mission has subsequently received scant attention. It is an episode that nevertheless stands as a striking example for the emergence of transnational governance mechanisms beyond the nation-state level. Rather than being initiated by authorized representatives of the participating governments, the origins of the 1929 Committee of Jurists lay squarely among informal networks within the legal expert community, which took matters into its own hands once the regular ratification process in the United States had reached a stalemate. It would, however, be overstating the matter to say that international lawyers challenged or circumvented state authority. Once established, the composition of the Committee of Jurists ensured that negotiations proceeded under general guidance of governments, with Secretary of State Kellogg personally monitoring progress on the American side. Professional and ideological commitment to the nation remained central to the self-conception of the international legal community and experts derived their influence and prestige in large parts from friendly relations with governmental bureaucracies.

What the transnationalization and juridification of international relations did succeed in was to

594 Ibid.
596 Entry for 8 November 1930, Henry L. Stimson Diary, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University; Stimson also lamented to Root that “the President being a Quaker and an engineer did not understand the psychology of combat the way Mr. Root and I did.” (Entry for 24 September 1930).
remove, at least temporarily, contentious political issues from the sphere of public debate, as could be seen by the overwhelmingly benign press coverage that the Root-Jessup mission received. Philip Jessup’s National World Court Committee was then an attempt to localize the transnationally produced compromise by combining the money of the Eastern Establishment with the local manpower and credibility of local grassroots organizations. An elaborate plan drawn up by Jessup in the summer of 1931 envisioned identifying the ten states most likely to deliver swing votes on the Court issue so that the NWCC could then focus its campaign entirely on building public support in these states to force the senators’ hands. To gain local standing, the Committee would have recruited prominent supporters on the ground and built state-level organizing infrastructures, supported in each case by an NWCC secretary (“if possible a war veteran”) who would furnish data, coordinate with all local organizations and track the senators’ public statements. Jessup had estimated the cost of this scheme at 50,000 dollars, far beyond the NWCC’s means, but the method of embedding a transnationally negotiated consensus in local contexts through the medium of mass communication and local organizing became an innovation that the CEIP would return to in later years.598

“Mazes of Ambiguity”: The Italo-Ethiopian War and the failure of judicial diplomacy
The year 1935 became an annus horribilis for the partisans of international law. During the intervening years, in which the Protocol of Adherence had languished in the Senate, confidence in the legal foundations of collective security had been shaken by a series of events that demonstrated the limits of detaching law from politics. In March 1931, a closely divided PCIJ issued an advisory opinion against a proposed customs union between Austria and Germany. The decision proved especially controversial in the United States, where critics used it to bolster the case that the Court was merely a smokescreen behind which the enduring political rivalries of European powers continued unabated. Doubts about the even-handedness and efficacy of international law were compounded six months later by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, a direct challenge to collective security that went largely unanswered by the League or the Court, to which the incident was never submitted. Against this backdrop, the U.S. Senate defeated the Root Protocol in January 1935, almost six years after Root’s and Jessup’s journey to Geneva, falling seven votes shy of the required two-thirds majority. Meanwhile, even as the Senators debated American adherence to the PCIJ, a crisis was brewing in another part of the world that would demonstrate the failure of the interwar project of a law-based collective security structure in such a comprehensive fashion that by the end of the year many observers saw Europe on course toward another major war.

598 Minutes of the Meeting of the National World Court Committee, 14 October 1931, Box 255, Folder 5, CEIP US.
Late in the afternoon of 5 December 1934, fighting broke out at the fort of Wal Wal in the disputed desert border region between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. Italian designs on Ethiopia had lingered ever since they had remained unsatisfied during the post-war peace settlements. After years of border skirmishes Benito Mussolini now used the Wal Wal incident to escalate the situation and order the Italian army to prepare for a full-scale invasion. Emperor Haile Selassie I appealed to the Council of the League of Nations, which, in an attempt to buy time, advised both parties to submit their dispute to an arbitration procedure under the stipulations of the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928. Historians have usually treated the resulting Wal Wal Commission as a side-show to the main storyline—the failure of the League’s collective security infrastructure to deal effectively with divisions among Europe’s major powers.\(^{599}\) France and Britain did not wish to antagonize Italy at a time when National Socialist Germany was flaunting its international obligations, and on 14 April 1935 the three countries concluded the Stresa Agreement, which affirmed the united front against Hitler in return for what Mussolini regarded as a *carte blanche* for his African expansion plans. Ethiopia thus fell victim to the politics of national interests, which had trumped the principles of international law.

Yet, this is not precisely what happened. Before the League Council ever took up the issue the arbitral commission did in fact give Ethiopia an opportunity to contest Italy’s actions in front of a body invoking the authority of international law. Although a negative decision might ultimately not have stopped Italy, nor changed the minds of the French or British governments, at least there can be little doubt that an unequivocal condemnation of Italy as an aggressor state would have placed significant pressure on the League. The Wal Wal Commission was thus a public test case for the application of precisely the kind of legal mechanisms that the CEIP and its partners had been developing for a quarter of a century. In fact, the Endowment routinely offered conference rooms at its Centre Européen as a symbolically meaningful venue to arbitration commissions and in light of the high profile of this conflict it was particularly eager to play a role. The offer of utilizing the continental headquarters of an American foundation as a neutral ground, supposedly removed from European power politics, was rejected at the last minute when the Italian delegation learned of the close association between the CEIP and anti-fascist Carlo Sforza.\(^{600}\) The foundation’s associate Nicolas Politis, however, would play a central and at times enigmatic role in the ensuing events.


\(^{600}\) Cf. Malcolm Davis, “The Abyssinian Arbitration,” 3 September 1935, Box 113, Folder 3, CEIP CE.
Politis entered the dispute in the spring of 1935 when he assisted the Ethiopian government’s French legal adviser Gaston Jèze in drawing up the original appeal to the League Council. Most observers at the time expected him to be named one of the Ethiopian arbitrators. Under the terms of the Treaty of 1928, a commission of four was to investigate the claims of both sides regarding the border incident and render its decision.\(^{601}\) Both sides would be represented by two arbitrators of their choosing, virtually guaranteeing a tie. Much would then depend on the selection of an independent fifth arbitrator, agreed to by both sides, whose vote would break the deadlock. Selecting Politis for one of the two original slots seemed logical considering Ethiopia’s traditional commercial and cultural ties to Greece and the fact that Politis and Emperor Haile Selassie were personally on friendly terms. Upon further scrutiny, however, Politis’ allegiances were less straightforward than contemporary observers assumed. Greek politics was slanting strongly rightward during 1935/36, first with the prime ministership of regent Georgios Kondylis and then under the authoritarian Fourth of August regime of Ioannis Metaxas, which was partially inspired by Mussolini’s Italy.\(^{602}\) Politis, the perceptive public servant, had noticed the changing political winds in time and trimmed his sails accordingly by offering muted support to the royalist cause.\(^{603}\) In 1936, he would fully embrace the Metaxas regime and serve as its diplomatic representative. Furthermore, it was doubtful to what extent the Hellenic context even shaped the outlook of the Greek diplomat. The Italian foreign service considered him a “client of France at Geneva” whose traditional enmity towards Mussolini would be moderated by the French interest in upholding the Stresa Front.\(^{604}\)

From the very beginning the Ethiopian government discovered that the terrain of international law was anything but a level playing field. While Italy designated two experienced diplomats with thorough legal training, Ethiopia’s search for arbitrators necessarily took it to the open market for judicial expertise, with all the potential for mixed loyalties and competing agendas that this implied. The Italian foreign ministry immediately exploited this weakness by seeking to block the country’s access to legal representation altogether. After receiving Ethiopia’s invitation both Politis and Swedish law professor Bo Östen Undén, who would soon join the CEIP’s Comité d’Administration, were forced to decline after Italy’s diplomats successfully pressured their governments to intervene.\(^{605}\)

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\(^{601}\) Technically, arbitration procedures do not end with a “verdict” but with an “award.”


\(^{604}\) Filippo Anfuso to MAE, 9 August 1935, Affari Politici, 1931–45, Etiopia – Fondo di Guerra, b. 78, ASMAE.

\(^{605}\) Bova Scoppa to MAE, 4 May 1935, and, Paternò to MAE, 4 May 1935, Affari Politici, 1931–45, Etiopia – Fondo di Guerra, b. 84, ASMAE; René Massigli to Joseph Avenol, 11 May 1935, *Documents diplomatiques francais* (DDF), 1ère série, X, no. 352.
For a while Italy even argued that the selection of foreign arbitrators was impermissible on principle, but Rome soon discovered the advantages of facing opposition whose loyalty to their cause was at least open to question. Gaston Jèze’s presentation to the League Council was judged so weak by the British delegation that they suspected he might have been acting at the behest of the French government. Ethiopia’s designated arbitrators did not inspire much more confidence in those closely watching the proceedings. Jèze’s compatriot Albert Geouffre de Lapradelle was widely suspected to be corrupt while American Pitman B. Potter privately admitted to the U.S. Consul in Geneva that he felt more allegiance to the survival of the League of Nations than to the Ethiopian government. This was a problematic attitude given that it was generally expected that Italy would leave the League if it lost its case.

The Commission held its first organizational meeting in Milan on 6 June before reconvening at The Hague later that month to review evidence and hear testimony. The proceedings turned antagonistic when in a series of articles the French newspaper Le Temps revealed that Jèze intended to corner the opposition by presenting Italian maps that clearly showed Wal Wal to be in Ethiopian territory. The stridency of the Ethiopian case alarmed not only the Italian delegates, who subsequently refused to let Jèze present any evidence at all, but also raised concerns in Paris that Italy was losing the battle over public opinion. Prime Minister Pierre Laval quietly tasked his education minister with informing Professor Jèze that his advocacy on behalf of Ethiopia was “shocking” and incompatible with his professional identity as an “employee of the French government.” With the Commission now deadlocked, the search for a tie-breaking fifth arbitrator began in earnest and in a surprising twist both parties nominated Nicolas Politis to cast the decisive vote, only three months after he had been rejected by Italy as an Ethiopian representative. In fact, this time it had been Laval who had suggested Politis as a compliant candidate to the Italians and once the selection had been personally approved by Mussolini the Italian foreign office remained in close touch with the Greek diplomat to ensure that there would be no negative surprises. Although to the general public the nature of these arrangements remained obscure there was little doubt in League circles that the system was being gamed. There were “mazes of ambiguity,” an American diplomat reported to Washington, “respecting the roles played in this matter by Jeze, Lapradelle and Politis.”

606 Prentiss Gilbert to State Department, 1 August 1935, 765.84/745, Central Decimal File, 1930-39, RG 59, NARA/CP.
607 Prentiss Gilbert to Wallace Murray, 1 June 1935, 765.84/501, Central Decimal File, 1930–39, RG 59, NARA/CP.
611 Prentiss Gilbert to State Department, 5 August 1935, 765.84/745, Central Decimal File, 1930–39, RG 59, NARA/CP.
While France’s and Italy’s backroom dealings certainly put the Ethiopians at a disadvantage, the larger story was not that the arbitral system was being circumvented but that it worked very much as intended. In his private discussions with the Italian diplomats Politis had promised nothing more than to apply the law impartially, referencing his own definition of aggression from two years earlier. And indeed, when Italian diplomats analyzed the Politi Definition they discovered that the statesman had buried a stipulation in his report that, in keeping with the tradition of finessing seemingly universal prohibitions to give the great powers some amount of leeway, effectively called one of its main markers of aggression into question. In discussing the illegality of invading foreign lands Politi specified that the protection of the law applied to all “territory over which a State actually exercises authority.” Basing national sovereignty on the actual exercise of control rather than on recognized borders evidently favored those states which could project superior military force into disputed regions, thus establishing possession. In this case it provided exactly the kind of cover of legitimacy that the Italian government had been looking for. Jèze’s maps notwithstanding, there was no question that Italian troops had been occupying the fort at Wal Wal for some time, thus putting them in de facto possession. The Italian internal analysis concluded that the Politi Report, which is an integral part of three existing international conventions between ten or eleven countries of Europe and Asia whose territories represent a third of the world, and one half of the world represented at Geneva, confirms that an incident like Wal Wal constitutes an act of aggression, in which the attacked has the right to resort to war, without being in turn considered an aggressor state. In light of these facts the author noted that Politi would seem “a most fortunate” choice as fifth arbitrator.

Of course the persuasiveness of these arguments in the court of international public opinion hinged on more than formal legal analysis, which could have been easily dismissed as legalistic sophistry given that Italy’s army was in full mobilization and Mussolini’s public rhetoric left little doubt that his decision to go to war was irreversible. The effort to brand Ethiopia as an aggressor derived its legitimacy and potency from an intellectual atmosphere that marked the conflict as a global moment that focused debates on the politics of race across geographic and cultural divides. The possibility

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613 This point had been raised by Spanish delegate Salvador de Madariaga at the time, who expressed “serious doubts” over the clause, which “according to the interpretation given to it, might be harmless but might also be extremely dangerous.” His warning went unheeded. Minutes of the sixty-ninth meeting of the Committee on Security Questions, 29 May 1933, in Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol. I, p. 243.
614 Ugo Sola to Mussolini, 10 August 1945, Affari Politici, 1931–45, Etiopia – Fondo di Guerra, b. 78, ASMAE; emphasis in original.
615 Ibid.
of an Italian attack on an independent, non-European state became a powerful rallying cry for anti-imperialist sentiment across Africa, Asia and Latin America. In Tokyo, the Great Japanese Turan Youth League sent an open letter to Mussolini, calling on all “colored brothers throughout the world” to “save our poor brother Ethiopia who is going to fall in the clutches of that rapacious White Wolf.”617 In Calcutta, a large public demonstration of both Hindus and Muslims called on Indians to come to the aide of the beleaguered African nation and Mahatma Gandhi urged sending a volunteer Indian ambulance corps.618 This ground-swell of anti-colonialism in turn unsettled publics and statesmen in Europe, where British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare reminded the House of Commons that for “every one white man” there were “six coloured men” in the British Dominions. Jan Christiaan Smuts, the South African politician and proponent of imperial internationalism, echoed these sentiments when he warned that if solidarity with Ethiopia were to spread across Africa, it could “make the position of the European much more difficult.”619 It was against the backdrop of this discourse of racial confrontation that the exclusively European and American arbitrators were conducting their deliberations, with sometimes tangible personal consequences. Gaston Jèze was forced to suspend his courses at the Sorbonne after an orchestrated campaign by the Action Française to brand him as a traitor to the white race, a servant of “the slave-dealing Negus and the petroleum merchants.”620

Culture and public opinion as sites for foreign policy making also brought the Carnegie Endowment back into the picture, as the Italian government hoped to capitalize on its connections to the foundation to prevent the United States from taking Ethiopia’s side. Starting in June 1935, Comité d’Administration member Piero Misciattelli engaged Nicholas Murray Butler with a series of letters designed to convert the President to the Italian cause, probably taking encouragement from the fact that shockwaves of the conflict were starting to surface right on Butler’s doorstep. African-American activists in New York were recruiting and training thousands of volunteers to fight in the anticipated race war and in March two hundred Columbia University students, among them many Communists, had picketed the Casa Italiana.621 Playing on the President’s cultural anxieties, Misciattelli predicted

617 Quoted in Joseph Calvitt Clarke, *Alliance of the Colored Peoples: Ethiopia and Japan before World War II* (Woodbridge: James Currey Ltd, 2011), 134; although negotiations did take place, Japan decided not to provide any assistance to Ethiopia, as taking up the mantle of anti-colonialism could have invited more coordinated action against its own activities in Manchuria, cf. ibid., 144.


that an intervention by a Western power on behalf of the African nation could “kindle a vast conflagration which would probably mean the end of western civilization.” Haile Selassie’s regime was “highly barbaric,” the Italian insisted, clearly referencing the CEIP’s familiar language of ending war only among “civilized nations.” Italian success could be “a victory for civilization in the Black Continent, full of fruitful promise for the Ethiopian population.” With Butler’s anti-communist politics and past commendatory statements about Mussolini’s regime in mind, Misciattelli juxtaposed the “pitiful spectacle” of France’s and Spain’s “socialistic and pro-Bolshevik governments” with the Duce’s “marvelous example of social peace.” Could this not be a model for America to emulate? Appealing directly to Butler’s considerable ambition as an intellectual leader, Misciattelli suggested: “You, my dear President, […] can create a vast movement of thought and action in the United States of America.”

Butler rather breathlessly reported these exchanges to the State Department in the apparent belief that he had just established a back channel to Mussolini that could be used to avert a brutal war: “I have every reason to believe that both the Marchese Misciattelli’s letter and my reply have been seen by M. Mussolini. This fact increases their significance considerably.” There is no evidence that the department ever saw any promise in this offer or followed up on it in a systematic way. Most likely the professional diplomats saw Misciattelli’s overtures for what they were: an attempt by the Italian government to enlist the help of a sympathetic Butler to promote their case for war in the United States. This proved, however, an idle hope. For the CEIP President, Misciattelli’s letters confirmed every doubt he had ever harbored about the character of Mussolini’s regime. Restoring order in a modern world that had lost its bearings—this had been Fascism’s original appeal for Butler. For all its illiberal elements, was it not the case that Fascism had been able to “get things done,” to make advances in “organizing the human will,” as Butler had always demanded, making it consequently a force for progress? But since, according to Butler’s progressive teleology, rejection of violence was an essential element of civilizational advancement, the Duce’s rush to war finally and conclusively proved that he was on the wrong side of history. In the current “more advanced and […] more highly civilized era,” nations were supposed to settle their differences “by frank discussion, debate and joint action,” Butler informed Misciattelli. Moreover, as Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia would entail the breach of numerous international treaties—including the Kellogg-Briand Pact—Mussolini’s actions offended the President’s insistence on a system of global security based on firm liberal values. Was it not the case that “if governments do not keep their plighted word […] there can be no world prosperity,

622 Piero Misciattelli to Butler, 19 June and 21 September 1935, Box 125, Folder 5, CEIP US.
623 Butler to Cordell Hull, 10 October 1935, Box 125, Folder 5, CEIP US.
624 Address by Nicholas Murray Butler at the Lotos Club, 3 January 1932, p. 28, Box 49, Butler Papers, RBML Columbia.
there can be no world peace and there can be no continuing civilization?"625

The day after Butler sent this reply, the result of the “advanced” deliberative response to international conflict, based on international law, was unveiled with the announcement of the Wal Wal Commission’s verdict at Paris. In an anti-climactic turn of events Politis refused to assign blame to either side and did not even publish his arbitral award in an evident attempt to leave the matter entirely to negotiations at Geneva. Although the Italians were disappointed that Ethiopia had not been condemned, Politis, true to his word, technically based his reasoning on his definition of aggression as a challenge to territory that was *de facto* rather than *de jure* controlled by a state, thus clearing Italy of any obvious wrongdoing. The argument that most resonated with the public, however, was the Commission’s finding that “no white officers” had been present at the disputed incident and that the locus of the fighting between Ethiopian and native Italian auxiliary troops had been “extremely obscure.”626 Ethiopia’s League membership notwithstanding, this observation was an unsubtle appeal to the notion that international law only applied to the conduct of “civilized” nations and that the Wal Wal incident should accordingly be viewed in a different light. Reporting to CEIP headquarters in New York, a relieved Malcolm Davis, who had been in close touch with Politis throughout the Commission’s stay in Paris, mocked the fact that Wal Wal had turned out to have started with the shooting of a native “Italian sentinel perched in a low tree […] This is the incident that has led to menacing the peace […] in Europe.”627

The Wal Wal Commission thus exposed the limits of the interwar project to juridify international relations. For all the rhetoric of neutrality and objectivity, *Iustititia* had never been intended to be blind to the realities of power. While European colonialism was entering what would later turn out to be its final phase, international law and those who administered it continued to steadfastly defend a hierarchical world order. Furthermore, the Commission demonstrated how the practice of judicial procedure itself had become an instrument of domination. Its composition epitomized how the CEIP’s strategy of promoting supposedly neutral mechanisms of governance by expertise effectively worked to keep power of those considered unfit for global leadership. Few countries outside of Western Europe and North America possessed the highly specialized expertise required to draw up effective legal briefs and successfully argue cases before arbitration tribunals, the League Council or the PCIJ. This void was filled by the tightly knit community of jurists connected to the IDI and the Hague Academy of International Law, many of whom, in addition to teaching the laws of nations, had a

625 Butler to Piero Misciattelli, 2 September 1935, Box 125, Folder 5, CEIP US.
lucrative legal practice on the side. Smaller, particularly non-European states enmeshed in international disputes had little choice but to turn to this limited market. Far from leveling the playing field by making the strength of arguments the determining factor in international disputes, the juridification of international affairs opened up new avenues for asserting influence in a similar way that financial expertise was used to restructure markets in accordance with political and economic interests.

One year after the Wal Wal Commission, Nicolas Politis outlined the reasoning for his decision in the CEIP’s *L’Esprit International* in terminology that must have come as a shock to the Ethiopians who had originally nominated him as their arbitrator. Collective security, in his reading, was above all an instrument of racial solidarity driven by “fear of an onslaught of colored races,” which created “a community of interests.” Europeans thus finally needed to abandon the “fiction of universality” of the League Covenant that appeared to offer equal protection to all nations and band together to assert their hegemony over other parts of the world. In hindsight, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict struck Politis as having brought about a fortuitous change of mind among European leaders in so far as the prospect of successful sanctions had alerted people to the fact that an Ethiopian victory would have been a “terrible blow to Western civilization.” In a clash between a European and an African or Asian power, Europeans would now be readier to side with the former since “a war between Europeans and between whites in general is much more like a civil war than a foreign war.”

**Epilogue: Hierarchies and the laws of nations**

In October 1935, Italy, ignoring all calls for restraint, commenced its full-scale invasion of Ethiopia. The brutality of the Italian assault with its use of mustard gas, the startling numbers of casualties on the Ethiopian side, as well as the mobilization of a society by a Fascist government for conquest, foreshadowed, as Aram Mattioli argues, future wars of extermination. Once the invasion was underway, the League of Nations reversed course, branded Italy as an aggressor nation and voted to impose economic sanctions. But reacting to a *fait accompli*, the major powers were unable to adopt a

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628 For his less than week-long service as Fifth Arbitrator Nicolas Politis was remunerated with 100,000 francs, split equally between Italy and Ethiopia, cf. Fulvio Suvich to Silvio Lessona, 7 January 1936, Affari Politici, 1931–45, Etiopia – Fondo di Guerra, b. 78, ASMAE.
unified stance so that the measures lacked real force and Italy found them easy to ignore.632 Under these circumstances the Comité d’Administration’s meeting in June 1936 turned into a premature post mortem of the League’s political and legal infrastructure. In comments addressed at the ineffective sanctions regime but that could have similarly applied to the arbitration process that preceded them, Moritz Julius Bonn felt reminded of “a battle in which the general in command had the order that he should make a great deal of noise, but for Heaven’s sake, not hit!”633

Ultimately, the interwar project of juridifying international relations, promoted by the Carnegie Endowment, had failed to secure a peaceful world. Interwar jurists had believed that international politics could and should be made largely independent from the disruptive interferences of populist politicians and demagogic mass media. Once separted from this background noise, the national interest was amenable to objective description and quantification through scientific inquiry. Codifying international law then entailed bringing these competing interests into equilibrium while, as a fail-safe, lawyers would bargain compromises behind closed doors whenever conflicts arose. But what if violence was not a means to an end but an end in itself? In the Italo-Ethiopian crisis Mussolini had given his negotiators strict orders to rather risk sanctions and international opprobrium than agree to an even temporary halt of Italy’s march to war.634 That states would so blatantly disregard the dictates of self-interest in an interdependent world left internationalists puzzled. It may be noted that this interpretation runs counter to the usual criticism of interwar internationalists as idealist visionairies who were impervious to the hard realities of power and national interests.

This apparent contradiction is less stark once we view as the main axis of contention who decided what the national interest was. At the 1936 Comité meeting an anguished Nicholas Murray Butler recounted to his European friends how he had once urged Mussolini to satisfy Italy’s territorial demands by purchasing the colony of Angola from the Portuguese, which could have been “bought at a fraction of what it has now cost to invade these rocks called Ethiopia.”635 The picture of the president of Columbia University bargaining away millions of African colonial subjects to a European dictator epitomizes the shaky assumptions on which the legal internationalist project had always been based. For all the clashing national perspectives represented at places such as the Hague Academy of International Law, the relative ease with which interwar scholars ascertained national interests was a

632 Cf. George W. Baer, Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), 64–68; Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 56–57; although Italy remained a member of the League of Nations until the end of 1937, the Abyssinian War had practically ended any pretense that it was committed to the institution’s functioning in the field of national security.

633 Meeting of the Comité d’Administration, 15 June 1936, p. 12, Box 125, Folder 5, CEIP CE.


635 Meeting of the Comité d’Administration, 15 June 1936, p. 28, Box 125, Folder 5, CEIP CE.
direct function of the cultural and social homogeneity of this transnational in-group. Yet, the claim to leadership of these liberal, largely European elites was increasingly questioned from all directions: anti-colonial activists, social reformers, illiberal social movements from both the left and the right.

Once the system they had labored to create came undone in the mid-1930s, legal internationalists responded in a variety of ways. For Nicolas Politis, the final years before his death in 1942 saw him turning toward increasingly authoritarian solutions. Rather than questioning the project of establishing world order by legal fiat, the failure of the League’s collective security system moved Politis to re-emphasize the need for bringing order to a world drifting towards anarchy. In some of his last writings he saw these values most clearly realized in Portugal’s Estado Novo, whose authoritarian leader António de Oliveira Salazar he celebrated as “wise,” “enlightened” and “virtuous.” What was true for domestic relations was even more important at the international level and here, too, Politis increasingly placed his faith in radical solutions enacted on the basis of supposedly objective inquiry. Was not Europe’s chaotic demographic composition with its uneasy fit between ethnic groups and national boundaries at the heart of the Continent’s continual tensions? Drawing on his own experience in negotiating a population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1922/23, he suggested that careful planning could solve the problem once and for all. The drastic measures he proposed amounted to the forced resettlement of ethnic minorities to remove sources of international tension and allow for reconstituting international order on a solid foundation:

It will be necessary to resettle populations to territories in which they do not currently reside, and if there are other people with whom they will not be able to live together, these populations will have to make room for them. This is a painful procedure, but that is how it is with all operations. We must consider the goal that has to be achieved and if it can be accomplished by no other means than by this process, it would show a lack of political sense to be held back by false feelings.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Politis had drawn attention for his condemnation of the Armenian Genocide and for his calls for a new category of crimes against humanity. His final public writings left a more complicated legacy.

For Philip C. Jessup the 1929 World Court negotiations were merely the start of a long and distinguished career in international jurisprudence and diplomacy (see ch. 7). He served as assistant

636 Nicolas Politis, *La morale internationale* (Neuchatel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1944), 90.
640 There were also rumors circulating in Geneva in 1941 that Politis had offered his services to the Germans in building the structure of a “New Europe”; I have not been able to substantiate these allegations, cf. Sean Lester Diary, 24 March 1941, p. 731, Sean Lester Papers, UNOG.
secretary-general of the Bretton Woods Conference and in the late 1940s and early 1950s became one of the rising stars of the State Department as American representative at the United Nations and later as ambassador-at-large for Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In ways that must have reminded him of the informal diplomacy that he had first witnessed at Geneva, he used his rapport with the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations to open a diplomatic channel that led to the lifting of the Berlin Blockade in 1949, a contribution Acheson later called a “triumph of the diplomatic art in America.”

Jessup’s story came full circle in 1961 when the Kennedy Administration appointed him to the International Court of Justice, the successor institution to the PCIJ.

The approach to international affairs that became characteristic of Jessup’s diplomatic career highlights the generational difference between the young American and his European and Eurocentric elders. Jessup never shared the casual racism he witnessed among his colleagues. In one of his first publications as a young scholar, an analysis of the restrictive Immigration Act of 1924, he had dryly noted that an academic paper was not the place to “speculate upon the pleasing possibility of Nordic supremacy.”

Sixteen years later, in a radio debate on the outlines of a coming post-war order, Jessup’s frustration with the stereotypes of traditional American-European policy was evident when he hoped that the U.S. would not “go back to picking up the ‘white man’s burden.’ Surely the fiction of white supremacy in the East is gone forever, and personally I’m glad of it.”

It was a statement that could be taken as a motto for Jessup’s post-war diplomatic activities, which dealt in large parts with untangling the legacy of European colonialism in Asia and Africa, a mission he chronicled in the semi-autobiographical The Birth of Nations.

Yet, while dismantling the vestiges of European imperial power, the project of reconciling inequality and international law remained with Jessup as he became one of the architects of American global power. During the war he frequently clashed with his colleague Quincy Wright, whose far-reaching goals—an international police force, a world parliament representing mankind in toto instead of nation states—he thought foolish.

Some, including his Columbia colleague Nathaniel Peffer, deplored that America was poised to abandon its traditional anti-imperialist stance to pursue a Pax

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645 Jessup to Quincy Wright, 13 December 1939, Box A112, Folder “Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 1940,” Jessup Papers, LoC.
Americana. What had happened to the project of “international cooperation and an interdependent world, with law as the substitute for force in international relations”?

Such arguments did not convince Jessup, who believed that to protect stability and peace, international order had to reflect established power relations and state interests. In 1945, he organized a graduate study group at Columbia University on the question of inequality and in an article for the *Political Science Quarterly* he reminded his readers that it had long become an established practice of international relations that “while equality is preached, inequality will be practiced.” He defended the seeming contradiction in the United Nations charter between a world order ostensibly based on the equality of sovereign states and the obviously inegalitarian principle of the Assembly-Security Council divide: “It is true, as Woodrow Wilson said, that ‘all nations are equally interested in the peace of the world’; it is not true that all can make equal contributions to its maintenance.”

It was an argument that clearly resonated with the CEIP’s position in the interwar codification debates.

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646 Nathaniel Peffer, “Must It Be Power?,” *Political Science Quarterly* 60, no. 4 (December 1945): 555.

5. Merchants of Peace: Internationalists, multinationals and the cultural foundations of international economic regimes

In the summer of 1933, it appeared to John Maynard Keynes that the world was starting to “shuffle out of the mental habits of the prewar nineteenth-century world.” Since the dawn of the British-led first period of globalization the belief that the free movement of goods and capital could guarantee social welfare and international stability was considered not only an economic insight but “a part of the moral law,” Keynes wrote. Now the Great Depression had prompted the realization that, to the contrary, economic internationalism caused inequality at home and imperialist struggle to secure markets abroad. Keynes’ article was part of a key debate of the 1930s—whether self-sufficient national economies or an integrated global economy was the way of the future. It was a debate that produced competing claims about the causes of economic growth and unemployment but also hinged on the contention of which of the two visions was best suited to guarantee international stability at a time when Europe appeared headed toward another destructive war. Keynes himself noted: “We are pacifist today with so much strength of conviction that, if the economic internationalist could win this point, he would soon recapture our support.”

As the confident challenge implies, it was a debate that for much of the 1930s economic nationalists appeared to be winning handily as the volatility of international markets was widely blamed for the economic malaise and, furthermore, for having ended the Spirit of Locarno with its promise of peaceful stabilization.

Three years after Keynes’s article, Nicholas Murray Butler reflected on this turn toward the nation in a sobering report to the CEIP Trustees: A wave of economic nationalism prevented governments from addressing “the economic forces making for disorder and disaster.” Faced with a crisis of staggering magnitude, governments had resorted to a variety of purely national emergency measures that could only be “a very temporary palliative.” “The one practical method to prevent a world breakdown,” Butler concluded, “is to cause trade to expand in a normal fashion, by restoring confidence to the capital and credit markets of the world.”

These were more than idle words for at that moment the Carnegie Endowment was engaged in an effort to turn the tide of the debate—an ambitious project to convince global public opinion that economic internationalism was indispensable to world peace. In this endeavor, the foundation found partners in the world of finance and multinational corporations.

649 “Report presented by the President to the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Upon his Return from Europe,” 15 July 1936, Box 214, Folder 2, CEIP CE.
Builders of global business empires such as IBM President Thomas J. Watson and Dutch entrepreneur F.H. Fentener van Vlissingen and economic experts such as Belgian central banker and politician Paul Van Zeeland became the main initiators of a close alliance between the CEIP and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to fight economic nationalism and to restore global markets. The CEIP-ICC campaign was not an isolated project but ran in parallel to and interacted with the efforts of a growing number of academic institutions, international organizations and policy groups. But its defining feature was its focus on political culture rather than on direct lobbying of policy makers. It was via this route of network-building and public advocacy that the two organizations helped prepare the ground for the “grand social bargain” of a post-Bretton-Woods era that combined free international markets with domestic safety measures to ensure public welfare.

It appears intuitive to connect changes in international economic regimes—from the demise of British imperial free trade via closed national economies to a return to global markets under American leadership—to the increasing penetration of European markets by American companies since the 1920s, which created new stakeholders in open markets. In this framework, Cordell Hull’s Reciprocal Tariff Agreement Act of 1934, one of of the few interwar initiatives for trade liberalization, reflected America’s growing commercial interests and became the first in a long series of steps toward the U.S.-led embedded liberalism of the post-1945 era. That the American and European owners and managers of companies that stood to profit from the free flow of goods and capital—export-dependent businesses or outward-oriented corporations—would have pushed for and aided in the adoption of such policies appears evident. It has been argued that their increasingly global interests found social expression in the formation of a transnational capitalist class. Yet, it is more challenging to identify by which mechanisms such interests were brought to bear on the political process or how they were

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As will be shown below, actual patterns of political positions taken by business leaders in the 1930s support a more pluralist view of economic elites than notions of cohesive class interests would suggest. Rather than forming a unified voice for open markets, peak business associations on both sides of the Atlantic were still dominated by protectionist sentiment and publicly adhered to an ethos of business nationalism. Furthermore, rather than growing more central, multinational corporations actually constituted a smaller and smaller share of the global economy between the 1920s and the 1960s. The development of widespread business support for economic internationalism and its impact on the political process is as much explanandum as it is explanans.

Such political heterodoxy highlights that, above and beyond rational choice models, accounts of changing international regimes need to take seriously the impact of norms, beliefs, ideology and cultural preferences. As Frank Trentmann has shown, nineteenth century British free trade policies rested on widely shared popular beliefs that associated commercial liberalism with prosperity and stability. The establishment of a liberal trade system under American leadership required a new cultural consensus, both at home and abroad. The close association of American economic hegemony with changes in cultural practices and patterns of consumption have consequently been interpreted in Gramscian terms as the establishment of ideological hegemony by the United States over Europe. But in the United States, as in other countries, political support for economic internationalism varied greatly across different regions, economic sectors and classes and should thus not be assumed as a given but analyzed as a cultural and political phenomenon. This chapter contends that, albeit only politically implemented in the late stages of and after the Second World War and now mainly associated with the Cold War confrontation with Communism, the outlines of an economic internationalist consensus emerged in the second half of the 1930s as a reaction to the wave of

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nationalism and expansion of government brought on by the Great Depression. The alliance between the New-York-based CEIP and the Paris-based ICC played a key part in this effort by associating the free flow of goods and capital with prosperity and peace.

The CEIP-ICC cooperation needs to be viewed in the context of a broader movement among the community of economic advisers and “money doctors” grouped around the central banks and foreign ministries of the world’s major powers, the League’s EFO, the Bank of International Settlements, major universities, banks and corporations in Europe and America. It was a network that had been key to the informal stabilization of the global economy before the stock market crash and by the mid-1930s many of its members became disillusioned by what they considered the harmful consequences of economic nationalism: lagging economic growth, government regulation of the private sector, closing-off of international markets, cultural parochialism and belligerence. Initially pursued to outflank the policy decisions of national governments, the process soon found official support in export dependent economies such as Belgium and the Netherlands and, increasingly, in the United States. Starting in 1935, the CEIP coordinated its activities closely with the State Department to promote the Roosevelt Administration’s RTAA program and supported the aspirations of the BENELUX countries to develop the Gold Bloc into a free trade area, however, the goal was ultimately a more durable and global economic regime. To achieve this desired outcome, economic internationalists sought to change the structure and discourse of domestic monetary and commercial policy-making among Western powers: in a push to decontextualize, or “depoliticize,” the process, authority was slowly transferred away from directly elected officials, who tended to be more responsive to protectionist demands, and assigned to experts in independent or executive branch agencies. Furthermore, economic internationalists made a normative case for a liberal international economic regime that presented free trade as an ethical choice vis-à-vis the narrow self-interestedness of economic nationalism. It was especially this latter aspect that was promoted through the CEIP-ICC cooperation.

Two caveats need to be added to this narrative of a triumphant economic liberalism: Firstly, the extent to which the tenets of economic internationalism were successfully reintroduced into national contexts varied widely. The most measurable impact was achieved in the United States, where

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elaborate public relations campaigns that were fully supported by the administration yielded a bipartisan coalition that was as broad as it was deep, combining a virtually united business community and a largely sympathetic labor movement. Similar initiatives in Europe were stymied by a lack of government support and, eventually, the disruptions of a Continent at war. The most lasting legacy here was the construction of advocacy networks that would continue their activism for transatlanticism and European integration, particularly in its business-friendly form of a *Europe du patronat*, once peace had been restored.661 Secondly, to the extent that the path taken by interwar economic internationalism can be traced to Bretton Woods, the Munich Agreement of 1938 intended to appease Germany major way station on that road. Economic internationalists in the 1930s propagated a method of addressing systemic imbalances that stripped economic grievances of their political contexts to enable dispassionate negotiation. As a result, territorial demands by Germany, Italy and Japan, clothed in the language of scarcity of raw materials and population pressures, were *prima facie* viewed as legitimate concerns and as a technical challenge for businessmen and international planners to affect a more equitable distribution of resources. In the final years before the war, many economic internationalists thus became prominent voices for economic appeasement.

### Sectoral Conflict and the Challenge to Economic Internationalism

Economic internationalism had always been part of the Carnegie Endowment’s ancestral DNA. Andrew Carnegie himself had called for free trade between the nations of Europe, although he insisted that the American protective tariff, which had helped him build his fortune, needed to be preserved.662 The idea’s roots reached back to the Enlightenment era, to Montesquieu’s hope for the pacifying tendencies of “sweet commerce” and to the works of classical economists such as Adam Smith and especially David Ricardo. But it was during Carnegie’s lifetime that British writers such as Richard Cobden and J.A. Hobson elaborated on these points to create a coherent philosophy of economic relations that became the governing ideology of the British Empire’s commercial policy.663 Its chief

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tenet was that the free movement of goods, capital and workers in an open international market would, through an efficient global distribution of labor, maximize prosperity and promote the civilizational advancement of man, thus eventually making territorial ambitions and war unnecessary. Of the specific policies associated with economic internationalism, those that became most relevant during the Great Depression were adherence to a stable international exchange rate (i.e. the gold exchange standard) and the elimination or reduction of tariffs and quotas on foreign products. Any short-term competitive disadvantages and their negative effects on national economies would only lead to temporary hardship and eventually be offset by the salutary effects of a growing global economy as a rational distribution of labor was established.

A second source for economic internationalism was the Continental push for European integration of the 1920s. French and German industrialists figured prominently among the supporters of organizations such as the Pan-European Union or the Union douanière européenne (UDE), which advocated for international cooperation on tariffs and eventually for a common European market. Belgian politician and industrialist Georges Theunis and Luxembourg’s steel magnate Émile Mayrisch were among those pushing, often with support from national governments, for a “Europe of producers” (Bussière) through transnational cartelization. American business staid mainly on the sidelines as stringent U.S. anti-trust laws made active participation in such arrangements a risky proposition. To Nicholas Murray Butler, whose expertise in economics was limited and mainly derived from a basic familiarity with Enlightenment and Manchester School liberalism, there was no question that large-scale, integrated markets were key to prosperity, stability and peace. America proved the point. Its rapid industrialization and current prosperity demonstrated the true potential of unimpeded capitalism on a continental scale. As early as 1915, he had told an interviewer that—“Just as certainly as we sit here”—the World War would lead to the formation of a United States of

Europe as the Old World would look to America for guidance on how to live peacefully in a multicultural society composed of dozens of states with distinct identities. Careful not to commit to any one group or faction, the CEIP supported plans for European integration in general terms throughout the 1920s.

Such schemes were adamantly opposed by economic nationalists, who thought the internationalists had it backwards: according to Keynes it was the “penetration” of countries by “foreign capitalists” that threatened the social fabric and the competition for export markets that drove nations to economic imperialism and war. According to a National Socialist writer, modern interdependence had created a situation too complex and chaotic for governments to leave their citizens at the mercy of the “economic clash of the titans,” as governments and monopolies raid the open market for raw materials. Economic nationalists believed that governments had an obligation to intervene in the economy to protect their citizens from the effects of the global market. Drawing on mercantilist and romanticist sources they pointed out that economic policy was an instrument of power and should thus serve the interests of the nation. The state also needed to take into account the attitude of its neighbors, whose hostile actions could force reactions in the interests of national self-preservation. Managing currencies and keeping out cheap imports were seen as legitimate techniques to preserve social stability and to ward off aggressive foreign competition. Economic policy was thus subordinated to a broader set of political objectives, including social welfare and maintaining the nation’s industrial and military strength. Most Depression era economic nationalists did not denounce the global market altogether, however, to them any restoration of global exchanges could occur only after national recovery had been achieved and preferably on terms that placed the burden of adjustment costs on other countries.

Actual developments during the interwar years did not favor economic internationalists. Democratization, the growth of nationalism and the downfall of empires in Europe all impeded the development of a new globalized economy. A weakened Great Britain could no longer afford to be the guardian of international trade and the United States was unwilling to assume the role of global hegemon. Meanwhile, 12,000 additional miles of tariff borders had been created in Europe, cutting

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669 Keynes, “National Self-Sufficiency,” 757.
across established trade routes and hampering economic recovery. In addition, the war had for the first time established nationality as an essential attribute in business life as governments tried to ensure the security of their supplies and the loyalty of their suppliers. Cognizant of the strategic value of a domestic industrial base, the newly-founded states adopted protectionist policies to cultivate an environment in which key industries could be nurtured without foreign competition, in what liberals such as Moritz Julius Bonn condemned as a “misdirection of capital.” Nationalization of business also continued to work on a cultural level as the stigma of “trading with the enemy” lingered until well into the 1920s between the former Allies and the Central Powers. In the absence of a new, unified economic regime, a degree of international stability was ensured through a variety of channels, including central bank coordination, the activities of American private investment bankers, consulting economists and international institutions such as the League of Nation’s EFO and, starting in 1930, the BIS.

One might expect the owners of internationally oriented businesses to have been at the forefront of opposing such a fragmentation of markets, yet business attitudes towards nationalism have always been essentially pragmatic and the impact of nationalist policies were not entirely negative. Since rising trade barriers threatened to make exports unprofitable, foreign direct investment became a preferred tool for companies that sought to geographically expand their markets. By investing in or buying up competitors in foreign countries multinationals jumped over tariff barriers and competed on foreign markets on a level playing field. This was reflected in the business models of the two men who would later form the core of the partnership between the Carnegie Endowment and the International Chamber of Commerce, Thomas J. Watson and Frederik Henrik Fentener van Vlissingen.

At the time of the founding of Watson’s International Business Machines in 1924, the company’s cosmopolitan name had been little more than a marketing pitch. But over the course of the next ten years IBM pursued a course of international expansion to circumvent tariffs and import quotas by directly investing in foreign markets. “[I]n order to protect our interests abroad it has been necessary

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for us to establish factories in England, France, Germany and Italy,” Watson told President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1935 to illustrate the impact of protectionism on his company. Part of that portfolio was IBM’s ninety percent stake in Deutsche Hollerith Machinen-Gesellschaft (DEHOMAG), of which Watson boasted “we are now employing more than one thousand people in our German factory alone.” As a result, IBM became a company with a global outlook that nevertheless stood to gain little by a dismantling of trade barriers.676

F.H. Fentener van Vlissingen was another such builder of multinational empires. Born into a prominent family of Dutch industrialists, he had started his business career as director of a steel syndicate, allowing him to observe first-hand the interconnectedness of the Western-European steel and coal market, particularly along the Rhine River. In 1920, he capitalized on this knowledge by helping engineer a deal between newly formed Dutch Koninklijke Hoogovens and the predecessor of German steel magnate Vereinigte Stahlwerke. Around the same time Fentener van Vlissingen entered the booming market for artificial silk by co-founding ENKA, which became a major Dutch exporter. But in the mid-1920s, as trade barriers rose and many countries considered artificial silk a strategic raw material worth protecting, ENKA switched strategies and started acquiring stakes in foreign companies in i.a. England, Italy and the United States, where it formed the American Enka Corporation in 1928.677 In 1925, it acquired a stake in German competitor Vereinigte Glanzstoffe Fabriken (VGF) and four years later ENKA practically merged with the much larger German company, forming Algemene Kunstzijde Unie (AKU). Just as the Great Depression started, Fentener van Vlissingen and AKU had thus become closely tied to both the German and the American market, where its stake in American ENKA represented the second largest Dutch investment in the United States after Royal Dutch Shell.678

As befitting entrepreneurs with such geographically dispersed investments, both Watson and Fentener van Vlissingen took an active interest in international affairs. Watson joined the CEIP Board of Trustees in 1934 and both men would serve as presidents of the main voice of business

internationalism, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)—Fentener van Vlissingen from 1933 to 1937 and Watson from 1937 to 1939. Founded in 1919 by businessmen from Allied countries concerned about post-war economic reconstruction, the ICC had quickly established itself as the premier interest group for international business and banking. Yet, throughout the 1920s and early 1930s the ICC took a cautious approach to lobbying for free trade policies. This was partly a function of the organization’s hybrid structure, which combined an international secretariat with headquarters in Paris with a decentralized base of national sections that exercised actual control over policy via their representation in the ICC’s Council. This arrangement gave the ICC a quasi-intergovernmental aspect as the national sections were usually closely aligned with and largely financed by the main business groups in their respective countries, which in turn tended to consult closely with governments in matters of foreign economic policy. Broader political considerations of its members also played a role in the ICC’s hesitancy. Even enterprises with significant international investments, such as IBM and AKU, still relied on the home market for the majority of their business, which meant that on important domestic issues such as taxation and regulation their interests converged with their more nationally oriented colleagues. Consequently, business internationalists were unlikely to risk a major rift with their countries’ major interest groups on whose political support they depended.

This close association of the ICC with national business communities was particularly problematic as by the late 1920s trade associations of industrialized countries had become wellsprings of protectionist sentiment. Peak business associations—i.e. the Chamber of Commerce of the United States (USCOC), the Confédération générale de la production française (CGPF), the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie (RDI) and the British Federation of Industries (FBI)—were dominated by companies from the manufacturing sector which had some interest in boosting exports but were unwilling to do so at the expense of admitting foreign competition into their markets. To ensure

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681 Thomas J. Watson was in so far an exception as he was one of the few prominent American business leaders who parted ways with his colleagues to support the New Deal, cf. Stebenne, “Thomas J. Watson and the Business-Government Relationship, 1933–1956,” 57; but even Watson co-signed a fundraising appeal for the USCOC that promised to fight “confiscatory taxation” and “costly experiments in farm relief,” cf. Watson et al. to W. Averell Harriman, [1933], Box 29, Folder 5, Harriman Papers, LoC.

protection for their members, these business groups usually worked hand in hand with national governments, for instance by advocating for the American Hawley-Smoot Tariff in 1929 or by participating in setting French import quotas in the early 1930s.\footnote{Cf. Douglas A. Irwin, Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 30–37; Rapport de M. de Lavergne, Délégué Général, in CGPG, Annuaire (1934), xxii.} “It is certainly unfortunate,” complained American diplomat and free-trader Robert W. Bingham to Watson, “that there should be a group in control of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce so blind to their own interests and to the welfare of the country.”\footnote{Robert W. Bingham to Thomas J. Watson, 31 May 1935, Box 26, Folder “Watson, Thomas J.,” Robert W. Bingham Papers, LoC.} Meanwhile, the separate pro-free-trade interest groups of internationally oriented enterprises such as the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) or the Deutscher Bund für freie Wirtschaftspolitik (DBfW), were usually small and exercised comparatively little political clout. “We have essentially remained [a nation of] petty bourgeoisie,” complained a German economist at the inaugural meeting of the DBfW, expressing the frustration of free traders everywhere, “the middle classes […] command a traditional influence that is not always proportionate to their economic import or insight.”\footnote{Deutscher Bund für Freie Wirtschaftspolitik E.V., Autarkie. Fünf Vorträge von Karl Brandt, Walter Eucken, Wilhelm Gerloff, Rudolf Löh, Karl Lange (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1932), 15–16; for the classic analysis of sectoral conflict in the American business community see Frieden, “Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940,” esp. 63–67; see also Irwin, Peddling Protectionism, 15; Eckart Teichert, Autarkie und Grossraumwirtschaft in Deutschland 1930–1939: Aussenwirtschaftspolitische Konzeptionen zwischen Wirtschaftskrise und Zweitem Weltkrieg (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1984), 151.}

By the early 1930s, economic internationalism appeared, to many, as a quaint ideology that survived mostly in the boardrooms of investment banks, in the offices of trading firms and at the conferences of interest groups and cultural enterprises they had spawned. Its diminishing appeal as a guiding philosophy was poignantly symbolized by the fate of Dunford House, Richard Cobden’s birthplace. When in 1927 Cobden’s widow could no longer afford the upkeep, the shrinking ranks of the British free trade movement sprang into action with a plan to convert the estate into a museum and training center dedicated to the memory of the great free trader. But the coffers of Britain’s business community remained closed, forcing Cobden’s old associates to turn to his American followers for funds. Starting in 1928, the Carnegie Endowment largely assumed financial responsibility for Dunford House, effectively making one of the few remaining bastions of the free trade philosophy in Britain an outpost of America’s internationalist East Coast Establishment.\footnote{Cf. CEIP Year Book 17 (1928), 52; Trentmann, Free Trade Nation, 345.}

What then changed to bring about renewed activism for a liberal economic world order? Much of the
initial impetus for the new transnational coalition stemmed from the failure of the World Economic Conference in London in the summer of 1933. Many internationalists, including Butler and Thomas Watson, had initially supported even controversial New Deal policies as emergency measures that were justified by the severity of the crisis, soon to be replaced by the inevitable restoration of world markets. High hopes were attached to the London conference at which both the CEIP and the ICC applied to have delegations admitted. The ICC’s Biennial Congress at Vienna, held only weeks earlier, passed by quietly as delegates held their breaths and waited for the diplomats to act. Yet, the summit failed in such comprehensive fashion that it was clearly not merely a temporary setback but, at least for the time being, the end of efforts to negotiate an internationally coordinated response to the crisis. Moritz J. Bonn, who had participated in the preparatory meetings to the Conference, later reported with dismay to the Comité d’Administration on the disappearance of the former collegiality between delegates that had always allowed for frank and confidential exchanges of views on the sidelines of such meetings: “you could barely talk with them, and yet it was our old friends, it was not like those were people we did not know.”

Coming in the wake of the the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, the Ottawa Agreement of 1932, in which Great Britain had turned towards its imperial market, and the consolidation of National Socialist power in Germany, the London fiasco seemed like the final nail in the coffin of commercial and financial liberalism. The world appeared now headed toward a balkanized system of largely self-contained national or regional blocs, which changed the calculations even for businesses that had hitherto profited from economic nationalism. Jumping over the tariff barrier was only a sound business strategy if the long-term security of the investment was guaranteed and if profits could be extracted. Viewed from this angle, interests in Germany such as those of F.H. Fentener van Vlissingen and Thomas J. Watson started to look more and more tenuous as the regime pursued a path toward isolation. Although Fentener van Vlissingen’s AKU profited greatly from Germany’s autarchic ambitions, in which artificial silk played a key role as a substitute for cotton, the flip side of this critical position were repeated calls by National Socialist leaders for nationalization. Watson experienced similar difficulties with DEHOMAG. Stringent currency controls prevented IBM from extracting profits, thus making the company dependent on securing the subsidiary’s long-term

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viability so as not to be forced to write off the entire DEHOMAG investment. Such personal interests were powerful motivations for economic internationalists and Watson made no effort to conceal his mixed agendas when he informed President Roosevelt before one of his sweeping trips through Europe that he was undertaking the journey “in the interests of my Company, the International Chamber of Commerce and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.”

The prospect of a permanent turn toward national economies also had significant implications for domestic political and economic relations. Whether the New Deal’s National Economic Planning, the “Swedish Model” or the extreme cases of Soviet collectivism and National Socialism’s permanent war economy—as countries resorted to a combination of currency devaluation, tariff hikes, import quotas and exchange controls to combat the economic downturn governments directly intervened in the economy. As businessmen the world over discovered, the price of protection from global competition was unprecedented government intrusion into the private sector, leading delegates at the first ICC Congress after the London failure to urge governments to take a step back. René Duchemin, president of the CGPF, asserted that there could be no revival of economic activity among entrepreneurs “as long as they encounter governmental interference at every step” and Eliot Wadsworth, a CEIP Trustee, reminded the Congress that once “the hand of government enters into any field it is slow to withdraw”. Suddenly, the pre-1914 era of British trade liberalism appeared as the Golden Age of private enterprise and tranquility. In a letter that encapsulates the state of mind of economic liberals at a time of shrinking world markets and growing security concerns in Europe and Asia American banker-statesman Thomas Lamont idealized the supposedly “greatest single period of comparative world peace” during the century from 1815 to 1914 and wished for a return to the “relaxed conditions of world trade which marked that fortunate era.”

Finally, and moving squarely into the realm of culture, economic nationalism threatened the political power, social status and cultural cache of cosmopolitan elites in a way that is not easily quantifiable but became part of the everyday lived experience of anyone connected with such institutions as the

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695 Thomas Lamont to Giovanni Fummi, 19 April 1937, Affari politici, 1931–45, Stati Uniti, b. 35, ASMAE.
CEIP and the ICC. Harold James has succinctly summarized the cultural frame that characterized the Depression-era backlash against all things international: “Everything that was moving across national boundaries—whether capital, goods, or people—really had no business to be doing that and should be stopped.”\textsuperscript{696} In the United States, international businessmen and bankers were taken aback by President Roosevelt’s attack on the “unscrupulous money changers” in his inaugural address.\textsuperscript{697} Wall Street’s traditional international spirit had become a “a term of reproach almost synonymous with that of a trafficker with the enemy,” noted The Economist, an experience that was also made by CEIP trustee John W. Davis when he served as the lead attorney for J.P. Morgan & Co. during a Congressional investigation into charges that Wall Street banks had wittingly caused the stock market crash.\textsuperscript{698} The public mood was not much different in Europe, where the charge that the Bank of France was controlled by the infamous \textit{deux cent familles} became a rallying cry of the left, while in Britain a “banker’s ramp” was said to have forced Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald out of office in 1931.\textsuperscript{699}

It was a discursive shift that soon implicated cultural institutions such as the Carnegie Endowment, which encountered crude, conspiratorial attacks on the foundation’s alleged desire to deliver the United States into the hands of Communists, the “Rothschild banking interests” or returning it “to the status of a colony of the British Empire.”\textsuperscript{700} But more respected academics and journalists also began to focus on the strands of interests that tied Butler and the Carnegie Endowment to Wall Street and industry. “All these men are involved in big business, all share the same ideas,” concluded Horace Coon after surveying the CEIP Trustees. “They are members of the group […] which rules America through their interlocking directorates.”\textsuperscript{701} The CEIP’s elevation to the status of political bogey for

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\textsuperscript{696}James, \textit{The End of Globalization}, 187.
\textsuperscript{697}First Inaugural Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 4 March 1933, in Fred L. Israel and Thomas J. McInerney, \textit{Presidential Documents: The Speeches, Proclamations, and Politics That Have Shaped the Nation from Washington to Clinton} (New York: Routledge, 2012), 227.
\textsuperscript{698}“Tariffs and Parties,” \textit{The Economist}, 24 October 1936; Harbaugh, \textit{Lawyer’s Lawyer}, 322–334.
\textsuperscript{700}The Father Coughlin group was especially active in disseminating these theories, cf. “Radical Fads Clutter Our Schools,” \textit{Social Justice}, October 4, 1937; “The Indicator,” \textit{Social Justice}, December 6, 1937; quotes are from “Beasts Or Human Beings,” \textit{Social Justice}, October 28, 1940; from the same political direction, cf. Wise, \textit{Woodrow Wilson: Disciple of Revolution}, who called the CEIP board “an irresistible directorate, one that would have done credit to any banking house in the world” (p. 80–81).
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American economic nationalists, on par with J.P. Morgan and U.S. Steel, culminated in a caustic speech by Congressman George H. Tinkham of Massachusetts in February 1933 before the House of Representatives, in which he called for an investigation into the foundation’s activities. Calling Nicholas Murray Butler “disloyal and seditious” and James T. Shotwell “an expatriated British subject,” Tinkham accused the CEIP of effectively forming an “invisible government” and invoked America’s national heritage to end in a soaring call to arms against internationalists: 702

> We descendants of those who established civilization upon this continent, fought the battle of Bunker Hill, died at Valley Forge, saw the rising of the sun at Yorktown […] are ready here and now to fight again the battle of the Republic without quarter and without cease, by all the means that lie within our power, to expose the plotters against American independence, American sovereignty, American neutrality and American safety. […] Nicholas Murray Butler states he is for peace. There will be no peace on the American continent unless he retires to England or fights the second battle of Bunker Hill. 703

The result of this shift in atmosphere on the foundation itself was somewhat paradoxical. At the very time that internationalism was falling out of favor with the public the CEIP’s trustees became more energized with board members starting to question the leadership’s strategy and actively debated budgeting decisions. 704 It may seem odd that men who had sat silently through countless meetings during the heyday of cultural internationalism in the mid 1920s suddenly discovered an interest in the foundation’s work. But with governments having failed to provide international peace and prosperity and the cultural tide turning against them, Eastern Establishment internationalists such as Thomas Watson turned to transnational and cultural venues to promote their interests and ideas. This change in attitude was not an unalloyed boon for the foundation’s directors as ignoring the “advice” of such influential figures could have unpleasant repercussions. Banker and Carnegie Corporation trustee Russel Leffingwell once lobbied to have the CEIP’s flow of money stopped after he had come to doubt that “in these days of stupendous and agonizing human problems Mr. Carnegie’s money is being effectively used by the Endowment.” 705 The CEIP’s turn toward economic internationalism in the second half of the 1930s was thus partly a continuation of its established program while also reflecting a new sensitivity toward the priorities of businessmen and bankers.

705 Russel Leffingwell to Fredrick Keppel, 5 May 1936, Series III. A, Box 73, Folder 2, Carnegie Corporation Records, RBML Columbia.
London Revisited: The Chatham House Conference and Cooperation with the ICC

When the Carnegie Endowment started its major study program in the field of international economics it joined a growing chorus of international organizations and non-governmental actors. Against the background of the Great Depression and especially in the wake of the World Economic Conference numerous initiatives were launched with the ultimate goal of presenting governments with blueprints for returning to a liberal economic world order. In March 1933, The ICC called an expert committee to study monetary policies with the goal of preparing the ground for a return to an international gold standard. Advocates for stable currencies also found staunch support in the study section of the Bank for International Settlements.706 In the fall of 1933, the Social Science Research Council and the Rockefeller Foundation launched a study of international economic relations and Rockefeller also cooperated with think tanks and universities such as the Brookings Institution and the London School of Economics to found institutes for the study of commercial policy and international economics.707 Around the same time, the League of Nation’s Economic and Financial Section (EFO) reinvented itself as a think tank that strove to promote a liberal economic order and became a consistent advocate for reciprocal trade treaties modeled on the American RTAA.708 Objective, scientific study of international commerce and finance was to guide the way back to stability and prosperity and thus accomplish what diplomats had failed to achieve.

The origins of the Carnegie Endowment’s own initiative dated back to July 1931 when Butler had suggested that an “international conference of economists and business leaders” should be called to work out specific steps for fighting the Depression, present these to the public and force the hand of politicians toward international solutions. The idea was approved by the CEIP’s Executive Committee that December but was put on hold after the World Economic Conference was announced for 1933. Revived after the London failure, the plan for a transnational expert conference was finally worked out during a series of meetings between Butler and Earle Babcock in late 1934 during the Centre Européen director’s annual visit to New York.709 Invitations would be sent out to economic experts,

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politicians and businessmen to gather at Chatham House in London for a three-day conference to work out specific policy recommendations on tariff reduction, monetary stabilization and effective international organization. Each day would be dedicated to one of the three issue areas and on each day a chairman would initiate the discussion with specific suggestions that could serve as a basis for final resolutions. As these chairmen would be hand-picked by the CEIP, this arrangement gave the Endowment obvious sway over the final outcome. The resulting resolutions would then be used to campaign for a political consensus in the several countries to push governments toward action. “Public opinion can make governments do anything,“ Butler was convinced, “provided it knows its own mind and finds a way to express itself.”

The setup was remarkably simple. It essentially claimed for the Carnegie Endowment the authority to arbitrate a transnational consensus on some of the most contentious issues in international politics. This at a time when the world economy was divided into three entrenched blocs—the American dollar economy, the British Empire’s Sterling area and the gold bloc with France as its unofficial leader—with each side insisting on a different solution. France demanded an immediate and universal return to the gold exchange standard, Britain rejected this as long as France did not dismantle its import quota system. Germany, still nominally a member of the gold bloc, was wielding exchange controls as an economic weapon for political ends. Finally, the United States saw multilateral discussions primarily as veiled attempts to make demands for American concessions, especially on war debts, and preferred a bilateral approach to trade liberalization through a series of RTAA treaties while keeping the dollar off gold. “I would no more sit in on a world monetary conference […] than jump out of this window;“ Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau told a French diplomat in 1936. Moreover, and contrary to what Butler imagined, economic experts were rarely the voice of altruistic reason but—at least when speaking at international forums—tended to voice their respective government’s viewpoint. Economics had become the battleground, not a neutral source for technocratic solutions. British journalist and free trade activist Francis W. Hirst, who worked closely with Babcock on the Chatham House project, tried to caution Butler on the “very chaotic and contradictory state of expert opinion” and confessed privately to Babcock: “How on earth we are

18”; “In re London conference – conference of December 20, 1934,” Box 18, Folder 1, CEIP CE.

710 Butler to Hirst, 15 December 1934, Box 17, Folder 4, CEIP CE; cf. Greco, Foundation for Internationalism, 131–132.

The composition of the conference was a careful balancing act as the CEIP was aware that any final result would be judged based on who had participated in the discussions. Nationality was of utmost importance to ensure that the three major monetary blocs would be sitting at the table, as well as the irredentist German and Italian regimes. Politically, the foundation’s officers were aware that, tempting as it was to stack the conference with economic liberals, such a move would later make it easy to dismiss any results as politically motivated (Butler: “That would ruin it entirely”). In the end, the conference had a strongly Anglo-Saxon tilt, with all but ten of the sixty-seven attendees coming from English-speaking countries, forty-seven from Britain alone. A critic later characterized it as a meeting of “a viscount or two, a few lords, and twelve sirs” and Hirst joked that the conference was so Anglican that the CEIP should consider inviting the Archbishop of Canterbury to lead the congregation in prayer. Despite this numerical lopsidedness there was considerable talent from other parts of Europe: with Jacques Rueff, René Seydoux and Paul van Zeeland three of the gold bloc’s more influential economic thinkers attended and the German representative, Ernst Trendelenburg, was a high functionary in industry and government who had been personally selected by Reich Minister of Economics Hjalmar Schacht. Notable was the complete absence of any participant from outside Western Europe and North America as well as political blind spots that had by now become characteristic of CEIP events. Despite having gone to great length to secure German and Italian representation, inviting a Russian economist was never seriously considered: “Russia is the embodiment of tyranny, torture and autarchy. I think it would put people (decent liberal + conservative) off, just as it would if you invited a leading English Communist like [G.D.H.] Cole or [Harold J.] Laski.” The American delegation was entirely composed of committed internationalists with four CEIP officers and trustees as its core—a hand-picked lot of gold standard propagandists, economists, international bankers,” thundered Social Justice.

Perhaps because of its association with the avowedly liberal Carnegie Endowment and the

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712 Francis W. Hirst to Babcock, 17 January 1935, and Francis W. Hirst to Butler, 17 Jan 1935, Box 18, Folder 1, CEIP CE; see for example the inability of the League of Nation’s Gold Delegation to formulate an expert consensus on the issue of the gold standard, cf. Clavin and Wessels, “Another Golden Idol?”.

713 Memorandum “In re round table conference. London. March. 1935,” 23 November 1934, Box 18, Folder 1, CEIP CE.

714 Dana, “Nicholas Miraculous on the Rampage Again,” 12–13; Hirst to Babcock, 29 December 1934, Box 17, Folder 4, CEIP CE.

715 Hirst to Babcock, 4 December 1934, Box 17, Folder 4, CEIP CE; text in brackets was a handwritten addition.

716 “GOP Candidacy of Borah Is Annoying to Gold Crowd,” Social Justice, 10 April 1936; for the attendance list see conference program “International Conference held at Chatham House, London, March 5–7, 1935,” Box 17, Folder 2, CEIP CE; the American delegation consisted of Nicholas Murray Butler, Malcolm Davis, Henry Haskell, Peter Molyneaux (all CEIP), Leon Fraser (BIS), Charles O. Hardy (Brookings Institution), Philip Jessup (Columbia University) and Frederic M. Sackett (for Ambassador to Germany).
tenor of its final resolutions, which in rather general terms called for low tariff zones and on
governments to “consult one another without delay” on the question of monetary stabilization, the
Chatham House Conference attracted little attention from contemporary observers, nor—for that
matter—from historians.\footnote{Winn suggests that the conference was mainly about internationalists “talking shop” and thus “a throwback to 1920s-style internationalism.” But the meeting’s closed-door character, careful selection of participants and focus on consensus building represented a departure from the CEIP’s earlier practices. Cf. Winn, “The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Missionaries for Cultural Internationalism, 1911–1939,” 221.} Predictably, bankers such as Thomas Lamont were delighted while even
Shotwell admitted that the resolutions were hardly inspiring—“a suitable and commonplace
pronouncement.” Yet, he also stressed that this told only part of the story as “behind such statements
lies a necessary good deal of quasi diplomatic adjustment of ideas between men of different
nationalities.”\footnote{Shotwell to Newton Baker, 17 October 1935, Box 208, Folder “James T. Shotwell 1936,” Newton D. Baker Papers, LoC; Lamont thought that there was no “better general chart than the resolutions of the Chatham House conference” for reviving the world economy, Thomas Lamont to Shotwell, 31 October 1935, Box 234, Folder “L-General,” Shotwell Papers, RBML Columbia.} The measure of success in this case was less what appeared on paper than what had
been voiced behind closed doors. In a break with the foundation’s usual procedure, the CEIP had kept
publicity for the event to a minimum, a strategy that clearly paid off as “inter muros, people did not
mince words,” as one attendee noted.\footnote{Heldring diary, 12 March 1935, Heldring, Herinneringen en dagboek van Ernst Heldring (1871–1954), vols. 3, 1103.} The cloistered setting allowed participants to adopt strikingly different perspectives than they might
have taken in a public forum. Instead of downplaying their own interestedness, many who attended
went out of their way to emphasize their private sector \textit{bona fides}. Percival Perry, the chairman of
Ford Motor Company Ltd., based his suggestions on observations he had made on a recent European
inspection tour and several attendees identified themselves as investors in shipping companies that
were vitally interested in a restoration of international trade.\footnote{Cf. Chatham House Conference Minutes, Tuesday, 5\textsuperscript{th} March, Morning Session, pp. 7, 26, 29, Box 37, Folder 2, CEIP CE; those who identified themselves as ship owners were Alan Anderson and Ernst Heldring, leading Hirst to demand that “the people whom governments ought to listen to are Ship Owners,” Chatham House Conference Minutes, Tuesday, 5\textsuperscript{th} March, Afternoon Session, p. 4.} In Chatham House’s unofficial
atmosphere, the experts also felt free from some of the customary deference to official policy. Jacques
Rueff, senior adviser to the Bank of France, chastised his own government’s quota system as
“absolutely incompatible with maintenance of the capitalistic system.”\footnote{Chatham House Conference Minutes, Tuesday, 5\textsuperscript{th} March, Afternoon Session, p. 9, Box 37, Folder 2, CEIP CE.} Ernst Trendelenburg
enabled a pro-League-of-Nations resolution to pass by abstaining from voting and privately even
signaled his approval. Sir Henry Strakosch, an influential expert in British monetary policy-making,
reiterated his government’s position that the restoration of internal markets took precedence to
reviving world trade but conceded that, in the long run, it would be desirable for the world to return
to a common monetary standard, probably based on gold.\textsuperscript{722} The conference demonstrated that below the top level of government—in ministries, central banks and trade associations—there was a sizable and growing reservoir of economic experts who were disaffected with what they considered nationalist and statist policies and were willing to work across borders to affect change.

What distinguished the Chatham House Conference from similar efforts in other venues around the same time was its focus on public opinion and political culture. A number of participants made it clear that they had not come to London to develop concrete policy solutions in the faint hopes of governmental action. Political decision-makers were not lacking in advice but in political incentives to act on the numerous suggestions they were receiving. Banker Sir Henry Bell put the challenge in a nutshell. The problem was that the “world had changed its ideal” of economic relations between states:

\begin{quote}
We have really to choose between a return to a world economy such as existed before 1914, inside of the tariffs that existed then, based upon an almost universal gold standard, and a collection of national economies. The whole trend of political opinion is in the direction of national economies.\textsuperscript{723}
\end{quote}

The main hope that the assembled experts attached to a gathering conducted under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment was that the foundation could help change that dynamic. Pointing toward the achievements of Richard Cobden in broadening the mass appeal of economic liberalism in nineteenth century Britain, Jacques Rueff hoped that the upshot of the meeting would be “to start a Liberal movement in the world again.”\textsuperscript{724} But while Rueff was at times openly dismissive of policy consensus and wanted the foundation to simply advocate on the basis of first principles, the idea behind the conference was something rather more concrete: to create a transnationally negotiated body of knowledge that could serve as the intellectual foundation of such a campaign. It was in this spirit that on the second day of the proceedings CEIP Trustee Peter Molyneaux introduced a resolution that called on the Carnegie Endowment and the International Chamber of Commerce to cooperate in a comprehensive study that would make “available in accessible form all possible accurate information with respect to international economic relations” in an effort to promote international stability and progress.\textsuperscript{725}

The Molyneaux resolution had been cleared in advance with ICC President Fentener van Vlissingen,
who at the time was engaged in his own campaign to rally the ICC around a program against
government intrusion in the economy and for reviving international markets. On 24 June 1935 the
ICC’s biennial Congress opened in Paris and by placing the gathering under the motto “The Revival
of World Trade” Fentener van Vlissingen prepared to tackle the controversial issues that had long
divided the ICC head-on. And indeed, in a move that surprised many observers, the Congress’s 960
debates from thirty-nine countries, including Italy and Germany, unanimously approved the two
main resolutions calling for monetary stabilization and the lowering of tariffs. But below the surface
rifts along national and sectoral lines continued to divide the ICC, with the Wall Street Journal’s
correspondent commenting that the congress’s unanimity “was like that with which diplomats are
familiar”—disguising differences of opinion rather than resolving them.726 It was to expand on his
organization’s incipient turn toward advocacy for economic internationalism that Fentener van
Vlissingen gladly accepted the CEIP’s offer for cooperation, brought to the Paris Congress by Thomas
J. Watson.727 The suggestion was unanimously adopted by the Congress and a few days later the ICC
President dramatically took an airplane to London to personally discuss the broad outlines of the
project with Butler, who was sure that it would be the “greatest undertaking upon which the
Endowment has been engaged”.728

Cooperation was advantageous to both organizations primarily due to the familiar need for
transatlantic bridge-building. The ICC’s seat was in Paris and despite its sizable U.S. contingent
Americans tended to regard it primarily as an “international,“ i.e. European, organization. The CEIP-
ICC cooperation also constituted a much-needed pooling of resources in a challenging funding
environment. The CEIP’s finances were strained as a result of the unfavorable development of the
stock market but its sizable endowment still placed it in a far better position than most voluntary
societies that depended on regular membership contributions, including the ICC. In times of
diminishing personal wealth, even on the part of those well-to-do financiers who usually funded
philanthropic work, internationalists were competing for a limited and shrinking pool of resources.
For instance, the number of businesses that were paying members of the American ICC section
plummeted from 745 in 1927 to 226 in 1935. Similar conditions prevailed in other countries.729 Joint
funding of projects was thus in the interest of both organizations. For the ICC, whose annual budget

1935.
727 Cf. Fentener van Vlissingen to Butler, 29 June 1935, Box 207, Folder 5, CEIP US.
728 Butler to Fentener van Vlissingen, 5 July 1935, Box 207, Folder 5, CEIP US; Butler to Malcolm Davis, 5 July 1935,
Box 113, Folder 3, CEIP US.
729 “American Section International Chamber of Commerce. Number of members of various classes,” Box 63, Folder 2,
Harriman Papers, LoC; see also Minutes of the American ICC Section’s Executive Committee meeting, 29 April 1935
(ibid.): “The limited amount of the total budget of the organization was referred to, and the difficulties that had been
experienced in raising funds, not only in this country, but in the other countries as well.”
was only ten to fifteen percent the size of the CEIP’s, access to the foundation’s money promised an opportunity to undertake work on a scale that would have been impossible for the business organization to undertake on its own. Finally, while the ICC’s direct contacts to senior government circles in multiple countries could be advantageous for achieving real policy change they also constrained the organization’s ability to publicly advocate for policies that were regarded as anathema in certain capitals. Throughout the 1930s, ICC leaders were continually concerned about “keeping clear of political problems” and exceeding the organization’s “legitimate field of action”. Cooperation with the explicitly internationalist Carnegie Endowment, which had experience with and a long record of public advocacy for such policies enabled the ICC to escape some of its political constraints.

The Joint Committee initiated by the two organizations in the summer of 1935 to “study” international economic relations was less an academic inquiry than a site of transnational negotiation between business elites under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment. With René Duchemin, Harper Sibley and Ernst Trendelenburg the Committee’s nineteen member included i.a. the presidents of the CGPF, USCOC and the Reichsgruppe Industrie, the successor to the RDI under National Socialism. Britain was represented by Alan G. Anderson of the Bank of England and Arthur Balfour, a Vice President of the ICC. For the CEIP, James T. Shotwell and Malcolm Davis were joined by Trustees Thomas J. Watson and Peter Molyneaux. The CEIP-ICC group was assisted by a Committee of Experts, mostly comprised of liberal economists such as free trade theorist Bertil Ohlin, Jacob Viner and Ludwig van Mises that would submit studies on individual aspects of commercial and monetary policy. In any case, the organizational setup, which had the experts report to the Joint Committee rather than on its behalf, guaranteed that there would be minimal causal links between the economists’ reports and the Committee’s final recommendations.

This is not to suggest that the two sponsoring organizations agreed on the precise purpose of the undertaking. The ICC president, taking into account his membership’s primary interest in stable international exchange rates, attempted early on to restrict the scope of the inquiry to studying

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730 The ICC’s budget for 1937 was roughly 2.5 million francs, or about $105,000, compared to the CEIP’s expenditures of $883,000, cf. Auditor’s report on ICC accounts for FY 1937, Box 15, Folder 6, CEIP CE, CEIP Year Book 27 (1938), 168.

731 Minutes of 56th ICC Council Meeting, 29 October 1937, p. 10, Box 129, Folder 3, CEIP CE; Paul van Zeeland, “Draft Report Concerning the Creation of a Center of International Action,” p. 11, Box 46, Folder 4, CEIP US.

mechanisms for restoring a global exchange standard. The European ICC leadership essentially wanted the experts to produce a technical blueprint for stabilization that could be presented to governments as the consensus of both business leaders and economists. To this effect, Fentener van Vlissingen stacked the expert committee with specialists on monetary issues and at a preliminary meeting on 8 October 1935 that took place in Paris with minimal American participation, he pushed through a draft outline that would have mentioned international trade only in the introduction. To the Americans this attitude reflected a narrow gold bloc mentality. In the United States the debate over economic internationalism had coalesced around Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s free trade agenda and rallying the business community and eventually the broader public around support for this policy was the top priority of Butler, Shotwell and Watson. When Leo Pasvolsky related his observations on the state of affairs in Paris at a preliminary meeting of the American group in New York at the end of October, his report elicited strong reactions against the ICC president’s agenda.

The conflict came to a head at the first joint meeting of the American and European delegations on 16 November at the ICC’s headquarters in Paris when Shotwell bluntly informed the ICC delegates that the CEIP was “not technically interested in all of the details of stabilization, which are exceedingly difficult to explain to the general public.” The interest of the Endowment was not to resolve certain procedural problems of international commerce but to change the public discourse on trade and internationalism. It was a public belief that international commercial relations were harmful, the “movement of self-sufficiency” that prevented the United States from becoming involved in Europe. By cooperating with the business group the Endowment hoped to embed the idea in the public imagination that there was “peace in economy.” British delegate Alan Anderson, while pointing out that in his country there was more need to rally support for monetary stabilization, agreed that both policies needed to be linked:

“I submit that what we ought to say to the world is ‘you want prosperity—you can get it in one way only, and that is by joining both policies.’ [...] Then there is the other part of the idea to be put across—that peace can only be attained if the people have peace of mind, that trade is the best way to do it and that absence of trade and the presence of debt have quite obviously been the principal causes of an increased spirit of animosity.”

These two interlocking causal arguments, that international trade leads to prosperity and prosperity leads to peace—what Anderson called “the big idea”—were little else than a reiteration of the key tenets of classical liberal economics and Cobdenite internationalism—one critic derided the project

733 Minutes of Preliminary Meeting of CEIP/ICC Joint Committee on 8 October 1935, Box 207, Folder 5, CEIP US; “Revised Outline of Topics to be Dealt with by the Experts,” Box 207, Folder 5, CEIP US.
734 Haskell to Malcolm Davis, 31 October 1935, Box 113, Folder 4, CEIP US.
735 Minutes of CEIP-ICC Joint Committee Meeting on 16 November 1935, pp. 9, 14, Box 207, Folder 5, CEIP US.
736 Minutes of CEIP-ICC Joint Committee Meeting on 16 November 1935, p. 4, Box 207, Folder 5, CEIP US.
as “a new encyclopedia on the eighteenth century model.” Yet, the context had changed significantly: instead of representing the patriotic governing ideology of the British Empire, the idea was to be promoted as a norm by a transnational group of internationalist activists and businessmen. Instead of supporting an imperial government, it was intended to be subversive of government power by forcing states to relinquish authority back to international markets—to consumers and businesses.

How fragile this emergent norm remained became apparent in the late summer of 1936 when the time arrived to issue a report. In early August, the Joint Committee gathered again in Paris to craft thirteen resolutions by which governments were encouraged to sign bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, abolish import quotas and stabilize their currencies. For maximum impact, the finished study, including all expert reports, was set for a simultaneous international release in English, French and German on 14 September. But a delay in printing prevented the finished report from reaching New York in time for a meeting of the American group on 9 September. Instead of signing off on the recommendations, as intended, the Americans vetoed its release until the full report, not just the thirteen resolutions, was in the hands of every CEIP trustee and American ICC member and the boards of both organizations had had a chance to vote on it. In fact, American indignation over the printing delay was little more than a diversion to disguise a more embarrassing truth: political considerations were preventing the American side from endorsing the resolutions. With President Roosevelt standing for reelection in less than two months it was high political season in the United States and the American ICC section suddenly balked at a mention of the controversial issue of war debts in the report’s preamble. Furthermore, Harper Sibley most likely also wanted to delay attaching his signature to a public declaration that could have been interpreted as an endorsement of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States for the President’s foreign economic policy. It were these political considerations rather than the desire to examine two hundred pages of technical studies that prevented a vote.

The European section of the ICC was apoplectic about the Americans’ stalling since time was of the essence. Since the victory of the Popular Front in the French general elections that May and a general strike in June, pressure on France to devalue its currency had reached a tipping point, thus presenting the threat of another round of competitive devaluations. Furthermore, the demands struck at the

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738 Sibley’s stance came as a shock to the Endowment, which had not known of his opposition until the morning of the decisive meeting, cf. Haskell to Malcolm Davis, 10 September 1936, and Malcolm Davis to Haskell, 19 September 1936, Box 114, Folder 4, CEIP US.

heart of the strategy behind the CEIP-ICC cooperation, which had been to decouple international economics from national political pressures. The Joint Committee’s resolutions had never been intended to be examined by anyone but the Committee members themselves before release and certainly not by the national ICC sections with their strong links to governments and protectionist interests. By postponing release and giving national sections time to weigh in the entire report was in peril. “[Y]our demand has upset many applecarts,” complained Arthur Balfour to an American colleague, “By submitting [the report] to your Committee over there you have jumped a claim and, unless we are very careful, all the other National Committees of the International Chamber will wish to examine the Conclusions and quite possibly to modify them.”

The unexpected dissension denied the two organizations the opportunity of taking credit when governments acted along the lines recommended by the Joint Committee. On 25 September 1936, less than two weeks after the planned release, France devalued the Franc after previous consultation with the American and British government. All three countries then declared to henceforth coordinate their monetary policies in order to keep exchange rates between the currencies stable. Butler immediately praised the Tripartite Agreement as “the most important step forward toward economic recovery and world peace since the Pact of Paris” and remarked on its close resemblance to the Chatham House recommendations. A note was hastily inserted into the freshly printed CEIP-ICC report taking notice of the new development, praising its “happy consonance with the needs and facts and tendencies exposed in the attached studies” and expressing the hope that further steps would be taken to restore world trade. There is no evidence that the Chatham House conference or the work of the Joint Committee helped initiate the Tripartite Agreement. The accord had originated on the French side, after pressure on Léon Blum’s Front Populaire to devalue the Franc led the government to search for ways to soften international repercussions. The Roosevelt administration was receptive to stabilization but unwilling to provide an opening to broach other issues by calling for an international conference. Simultaneously issuing a previously negotiated declaration proved acceptable to all parties.

The Chatham House and Joint Committee participants did, however, play a role in creating the necessary political backing for this policy by campaigning for international economic and monetary coordination in front of business and foreign policy elites. In May, Leon Fraser, now Vice-President

740 Arthur Balfour to Willis H. Booth, 15 September 1936, Box 22 Folder 9 “Thomas J. Watson,” CEIP US.
of the First National Bank of New York, had told the American Academy of Political Science that a period of “pronounced prosperity” would ensue once currencies of “the principal nations” had been stabilized.743 Meanwhile, Arthur Balfour urged the British business community to unite behind the CEIP-ICC program and to help “influence international and national policy” in favor of international cooperation. Would British businessmen be willing to stand up for an interdependent world even at the risk of incurring “temporary sacrifices which are inevitably bound up with a policy of international collaboration,” Balfour asked the Derby Chamber of Commerce and called on his colleagues to provide political cover: “These are tasks which we must call on Governments to perform, but they will not act until we show them that business public opinion is behind them.”744

Furthermore, the Carnegie Endowment, the ICC and economic internationalists in general could claim some measure of success based not solely on the specific stipulations of the Tripartite Agreement but also on its general tenor. In language that could have been taken from a CEIP brochure the note declared that the stabilization of currencies was a necessary step to “safeguard peace” and “to promote prosperity in the world and to improve the standard of living of peoples.”745 The language of peace through economics had been inserted at the insistence of French Minister of Finance Vincent Auriol, who wished to embed the Agreement in a scheme of “world monetary peace which would lead to world economic peace.” That the language of economic internationalism had thus made headway in the French Finance Ministry is less surprising in view of the fact that Chatham House attendee and Assistant Director of the General Administration of Funds Jacques Rueff had worked closely with Auriol in drafting the text of the agreement.746

It was not any immediate impact on international economic diplomacy, however, that was the chief legacy of the Chatham House Conference and the CEIP-ICC Joint Committee but its mid-to-longterm perspective. The transnational space created by the two organizations had aimed at insulating economics from the contemporary pressures of national governments, voting publics and protectionist peak business associations. These discussions in 1935–37 coalesced around an alternative liberal policy consensus based on the Cobdenite tradition that associated commercial and financial

entanglements with peace. The question was now how to implement the results at the national level.

“Putting the goods in the shop window”: How Free Trade became American

As the year 1936 drew to a close, signs abounded that the acute economic crisis was passing. Industrial production in many countries had reached pre-1929 levels and the Tripartite Agreement raised hopes that the time of successive rounds of aggressive devaluations was fading. But as economic internationalists looked toward the future there was little reason for celebration. “Can We Maintain Prosperity?” asked the June 1937 cover of the ICC’s journal *World Trade* against the backdrop of a V-shaped graph illustrating the collapse and recovery of the global economy in recent years. Uncertainty was fueled by the instability of an international political situation that showed more and more indications of an approaching war. Furthermore, and to the great disappointment of internationalist businessmen, there were few signs that the recovery would make divisions between the world’s major economic blocs more permeable. Germany still coupled stringent currency controls with restrictive trade policies and import substitution while Britain continued to cling to imperial preference to protect its industry from the world market. Despite the Tripartite Agreement's high-minded language, chances for the return of an international monetary standard and a free movement of capital remained remote. Was the world headed for a recovery without restoration of international trading relations? A permanent international economic regime based on largely self-contained monetary and trading blocs?

To the Carnegie Endowment and the International Chamber of Commerce the response to this challenge was the embedding of the liberal economic consensus expressed by the Chatham House Conference and affirmed by the Joint Committee in national political cultures. As officers of both organizations pondered the next step, the importance of exerting influence on voting publics moved to the fore. While enthusiastically endorsing a continuation of the cooperation, Alan Anderson told the ICC’s Council that the time for scholarly studies had passed. What was needed now was not dispassionate research but public advocacy and salesmanship. It was time “to put the goods in the shop window in attractive form”. In a similar vein, James T. Shotwell informed Butler that the way forward was one of “continued propaganda” for the ideas developed by the CEIP and the ICC. Over the course of the next years the officers of both organizations strove—sometimes jointly, sometimes separately—to build political coalitions for internationalist economic policies. Success of

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747 Minutes of 56th ICC Council Meeting, 29 October 1937, p. 9–10, Box 129, Folder 3, CEIP CE.
748 Shotwell to Butler, 31 August 1937, Box 46, Folder 4, CEIP US.
this strategy was uneven and closely correlated with the amount of political support received from governments.

In the United States, Cordell Hull’s RTAA initiative had set the nation’s commercial policy on an internationalist course and throughout the 1930s the administration concluded a number of treaties, especially with Latin American and smaller European countries. But domestic support for free trade remained lukewarm at best, especially in Congress, and business internationalists such as John W. Davis were frustrated by the “rather tepid support” that Cordell Hull was receiving from his President.749 In the eyes of men like Davis, the problem was that Americans had yet to overcome the “mentality of a debtor nation,” as a number of attendees of the Chatham House Conference had put it.750 For the United States to become a steward of the international economic order Americans would need to no longer associate international economic ties with the threat of foreign domination and instead adopt the perspective of the creditor who was interested in the prosperity of those who owed her money. This was all the more urgent as Congress had provided for the RTAA to expire after three years, setting up periodic reauthorization votes that pitted the administration and economic internationalists against protectionist sentiment in Congress. On the positive side, these debates presented the CEIP with an issue around which to organize its activism. “[K]nowing […] that public opinion can only deal with one major question at a time,” James T. Shotwell suggested to focus all energy on a campaign in support for Hull’s trade policies within weeks of the Chatham House Conference.751

The starting point for this push came on the evening of 13 April 1935 when President Butler, having just returned from London, received some of his regular circle of New York’s internationalist business leaders for an informal dinner at his house to discuss how to most effectively campaign for the Chatham House resolutions. Soon it became apparent that in light of the tense international and domestic situation Butler’s guests were prepared for a new level of involvement. Instead of issuing the usual pro-forma statements of support the group appointed a committee of three, consisting of leading internationalist Newton D. Baker, CEIP Trustee Roland S. Morris and Senator James P. Pope to draft a plan. The committeemen—all three of whom were Democrats—urged that a conference of all “leaders of great bodies of opinion,” from peace societies to business groups to labor unions, be

749 John W. Davis to William E. Dodd, 8 September 1936, Box 107, Folder “1936 September 1–10,” John W. Davis Papers, Yale Archives.
750 Chatham House Conference Minutes, Tuesday, 5th March, Morning Session, pp. 30, 44, Box 37, Folder 2, CEIP CE; the director of the League’s EFO, Alexander Loveday, gained similar impressions of America’s conflicted attitude towards commercial liberalism on a tour of the United States in the fall of 1934, cf. Clavin, Securing the World Economy, 134–135.
called to decide on a “course of common action.” The suggestion was taken up by Butler and in a
striking departure from the CEIP’s long record of eschewing cooperation with anyone it suspected of
being a “radical” pacifist, a socialist or female, a conference that November at Columbia University
brought together such disparate organizations as the Council on Foreign Relations, the League of
Women Voters and the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.752

The roster of organizations invited to Columbia bore a striking resemblance to the membership of the
National Peace Conference (NPC). This umbrella organization had originally been formed in 1933
under the theory that internationalist and peace groups should temporarily lay aside their differences
and form an emergency coalition to weather their own budgetary crises and counter the wave of
nationalist sentiment. The Carnegie Endowment had been approached but, true to its elitist creed, had
refused to join and without access to the CEIP’s resources the underfunded NPC had struggled to
remain afloat. Two years later, the Columbia conference finally ended in a rapprochement between
the CEIP and the broader peace movement, albeit on quite unequal footing. The chairman of the
League of Nations Association submissively hailed the Chatham House resolutions as “the Magna
Charta of our efforts” and the delegates unanimously endorsed them as a basis for unifying the peace
movement behind a common goal.753 On this basis, the CEIP not only agreed to join the NPC but
oversaw a sweeping reorganization of the Conference into an operational advocacy group with a
professional staff, financed almost exclusively with Carnegie funds. The sudden influx of money
causced frustration among many long-time peace activists at what some regarded as a hostile takeover
by the conservative Endowment with the goal of remaking the NPC into an effective lobbying arm
for the Chatham House consensus.754 When talking to journalists off the record, they expressed “a
certain irritation” at the CEIP’s policies and questioned whether its officers were “really fulfilling the
demands of its founder.”755

Over the course of the next two years, the NPC played a major role in taking the cause of peace
through economics out of the corporate boardroom and adapting it to the sensibilities of American
labor union halls and farm workers’ meetings. In the first place, this meant minimizing any

752 Newton D. Baker to Thomas Lamont, 13 June 1935, Box 207, Folder 5, CEIP US; “Organizations Represented at
Meeting of October 3,” Box 207, Folder 5, CEIP US.
753 S. van B. Nichols to Butler, 25 September 1935, Box 207, Folder 5, CEIP US.
754 On the CEIP’s relationship to the NPC see Greco, “A Foundation for Internationalism,” 98–99, 170–176; The annual
operational costs of $25,000 were split almost entirely between the Carnegie Endowment and the Carnegie
Corporation. In 1936 the other NPC member organizations contributed only $170. “Statement of Income and Expenses
April 1, 1936 – March 31, 1937,” Box 253, Folder 1, CEIP US.
755 Among the critics were officials of some of the largest NPC member organizations: the League of Nations Association,
the National Council for the Prevention of War, the Women’s International League, the American League Against War
associations that could have marked economic internationalism as a foreign discourse. NPC Director Walter W. van Kirk was instructed by Baker to downplay the origin of the organization’s new program as “to most Americans Chatham House means little beyond the fact that it is British, and I think the American peace movement ought not to claim to be following a British declaration of policy.” In addition, to broaden the social acceptance of its message and to further Americanize it the NPC called an expert Committee on Economics and Peace that mirrored the CEIP-ICC effort on a national level but whose members represented a much broader set of approaches—such as those of Keynesian economists Alvin H. Hansen and Harry D. Gideonse. Their report generally affirmed the CEIP-ICC credo that "[p]rosperity of nations works toward peace, […] and economic distress helps breed war" and even stressed the special responsibility of businessmen in fostering harmonious relations between nations. Yet, in a nod to labor and small business interests, it stopped short of endorsing a vision of boundless free trade and noted that U.S. policy should navigate between “the extremes of complete interdependence and complete self-sufficiency.” It also noted that “capitalism as we have known it has helped cause some wars” but assured readers that Fascism and Communism were not viable alternatives.

The strength of the NPC, and the reason for its initial attractiveness to the CEIP, was its widely distributed network of grassroots member organizations which allowed it to bring its message directly to every part of the country. Starting in the summer of 1937 and led by Clark Eichelberger of the League of Nations Association, the NPC launched a “Campaign for World Economic Cooperation.” The highly professional operation started with impersonal approaches such as radio broadcasts and publications, leading up to a three day conference in Washington, DC, in March 1938 at which volunteers from the NPC’s member organization assembled in the nation’s capital for the two-fold purpose of lobbying their Congressmen and for being trained in delivering the message effectively to their communities. Taking cues from contemporary advertising techniques, attendees were reminded “to put showmanship into this vast job of trying to stimulate men, women and youth.”

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758 Ibid., 6, 8, 36–37; the report was eventually endorsed by the President of the Georgia Federation of Labor and even – albeit with reservations – by the research director of the Socialist Party of America.
759 Cf. “Reports of Boards of Review submitted to Washington Conference on World Economic Cooperation, March 25, 1938,” Box 253, Folder 5, CEIP US.
The Campaign tailored its message to specific audiences (fig. 5a), producing pamphlets targeted at workers (“High tariffs DO NOT mean high wages”), farmers (“Return American products to the trade routes of the Seven Seas”), and small businesses (“More goods move across the counter which means surer profits”). The CEIP continued to finance these efforts until 1939, when the NPC’s pacifist stance on the neutrality question became unacceptable to the Endowment. But the CEIP continued its grassroots campaign for economic internationalism through its own International Relations Clubs, by
organizing speaking tours, sponsoring radio content and by funding outside groups.761

The Roosevelt administration was involved in this campaign from the very beginning, eager to capitalize on the opportunity to boost support for the RTAA. Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre took the lead in coordinating with the peace activists. He had been the keynote speaker at the initial reorganizing meeting of the NPC in 1935 and subsequently remained in touch with NPC Director Van Kirk, particularly ahead of the 1937 RTAA reauthorization vote.762 At times the objectives of the NPC’s economic campaign overlapped with the administration’s political needs to such an extent that it was difficult to tell the two apart. For instance, the main target audiences of the Campaign for World Economic Cooperation – farmers, organized labor and small to mid-sized manufacturers – happened to coincide with those constituencies where opposition to Cordell Hull’s trade policies ran highest. 763 And it was not only the State Department that participated. A representative of the U.S. Office of Education attended the Washington Conference, where he offered his bureau’s expertise in tailoring messages to specific audiences to help create radio scripts that met “the needs of various elements and mental levels” of American society. 764

The RTAA reauthorization votes of 1937, 1940 and 1945 and their attendant Congressional hearings demonstrated the strength of the new economic internationalist coalition and showcased a discourse linking free trade not only to peace and prosperity, but holding that the consumption of foreign goods was essential to both and hence ultimately patriotic. Secretary of State Cordell Hull even went so far as to rather implausibly inform Congress that in his experience with RTAA negotiations foreign governments were “riveted on peace and promoting peace, rather than dwelling solely on nickels and dimes.” Such altruistic high-mindedness left Hull’s protectionist critics with few arguments other than to protest that fostering peace had not been one of the original justifications for the program.765 The RTAA was easily reauthorized in all three years, but the long-term significance of those debates lay in revealing how quickly the internationalist discourse had become embedded in American politics. In the early 1930s protectionists had found a receptive audience when charging internationalists with putting economic interests above country; only a few years later economic nationalists found

762 Van Kirk to Butler, 21 December 1935, Box 252, Folder 5, CEIP US.
763 Shortly before the RTAA reauthorization of 1937, NPC director Frederick Libby identified the “combination of the farmers and the manufacturers” as the main legislative threat to the RTAA, cf. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Peace Conference, 11 January 1937, Box 253, Folder 1, CEIP US.
764 “Reports of Boards of Review submitted to Washington Conference on World Economic Cooperation, March 25, 1938,” Box 253, Folder 5, CEIP US.
themselves on the defensive, accused of stymieing prosperity and endangering peace with economic particularism.

It was via this indirect route rather than through direct lobbying of decision-makers that the Carnegie Endowment and its allies in the International Chamber of Commerce made an impact. Harper Sibley, having originally blocked the CEIP-ICC Joint Report, did present the findings of the two organizations at the RTAA hearings in 1937 but struggled to make the case that the Committee should pay attention. Congress did not appreciate “advice being offered by some Europeans as to how we should legislate,” Representative Allen T. Treadway informed Sibley, noting that judging by the names of the ICC’s officers they were “practically all foreigners.”\textsuperscript{766} The Congressman most likely did not realize that Sibley and the pacifists campaigning throughout the country at the time were essentially reading from the same “foreign” script. There was also an important symbolism in Sibley’s testimony that went beyond its immediate content. It was a striking gesture for the sitting president of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, an organization that only three years earlier had tempered its muted support for the “principle” of the RTAA by stressing the need of continued protection of American industry from “destructive competition,” to personally present the CEIP-ICC findings.\textsuperscript{767}

If nothing else, the joint CEIP-ICC efforts to rally American business leaders behind the cause of economic peace had helped silence what had once been a powerful voice for economic nationalism in the United States. But the foundation’s close cooperation with the Roosevelt administration was also ultimately pragmatic. For Hull’s State Department the appeal of the RTAA treaties was that they allowed for a gradual restoration of commercial ties without committing the administration to any formal multilateral projects such as global monetary policies or an international trade organization. For the CEIP and the ICC, however, the campaign for reciprocal trade treaties was merely a first step, part of a broader educational program that would prepare the ground for a stable economic regime that would secure peace, prosperity and the future of private enterprise. From the beginning, it was clear that the more formidable challenges to this vision lay not in the United States but in Europe.

\textsuperscript{766} Extending Reciprocal Foreign Trade Agreement Act: Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means. House of Representatives, 26 January 1937, 75\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, 533.
Großraumwirtschaft: Between economic peace and economic appeasement

One of the key movers behind the CEIP-ICC campaign in Europe was a rare example for an almost immediate return on a philanthropic investment. Inviting the vice-governor of the Belgian central bank Paul Van Zeeland to the Chatham House had originally been intended to boost Gold Bloc representation at the conference but the economist had hardly returned from London when on 19 March 1935 the Belgian government fell and Van Zeeland was asked to form a new cabinet. A delighted Butler sent a congratulatory note praising this “happiest of omens” and expressing the hope that the new prime minister would show “how a broken economic world [could] be reconstructed and rebuilt on the foundations of confidence and peace.” Yet, any initial exhilaration of having a CEIP grantee ascend to a position of tangible political power was quickly tempered by political realities. Heading an unstably national unity government, beleaguered by the growing strength of Fascist parties and an economy in crisis Van Zeeland committed a mortal sin in the eyes of many internationalists and devalued the Belgian franc within days of assuming office. That the Belgian nevertheless became one of the CEIP’s most valued European partners in the second half of the 1930s was due to the larger political project he represented. At a time when the governments of Europe’s major economic powers offered little support to the cause of free commerce beyond occasional lip service it were the smaller industrialized, export-dependent countries such as Belgium that pushed energetically for economic internationalism. Just as the RTAA provided the Endowment with an opportunity for advocacy in the United States, Van Zeeland’s attempts to free Belgium from the economic stranglehold of Europe’s closed-off markets offered the foundation an opportunity for alliance-building.

That Van Zeeland and the CEIP saw eye-to-eye on these issues had already been evident at Chatham House, where he had successfully lobbied the Conference for an endorsement of the Ouchy Convention—a 1932 commercial agreement between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg that had been blocked by Great Britain and the United States. The tendency of governments to resort to

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768 The invitation had been extended at the urging of BIS President Leon Fraser, cf. Babcock to Butler, 12 February 1935, Box 214, Folder 1, CEIP CE.
770 Butler to Paul Van Zeeland, 29 April 1935, Box 432, Folder “Van Zeeland, Paul,” Butler Papers, RBML Columbia.
purely national solutions in response to the Depression troubled Van Zeeland, who regarded small national markets as a relic of the past and insisted that in the future coordination would have to be undertaken “on a higher and larger scale.” As with many of the CEIP’s European partners, for the Premier cooperation with the foundation was also part of a broader transatlantic vision. Partially educated at Princeton in the early 1920s, Van Zeeland viewed the Continent’s post-war instability as indicative of Europe’s decline and the rise of America’s responsibility to protect Christianity and Western Civilization.  

The practical project that united the Belgian politician and the CEIP was a shared aspiration to bring the message of economic peace to the Continent and, most pressingly, to use it to soften the defenses of the citadel of economic nationalism: Germany. The foundation’s leadership believed that advocating for economic liberalism in Europe would be futile as long as the German threat persisted and few other statesmen were so identified with efforts to reach a detente with Germany as Van Zeeland. In the summer of 1936, the League’s EFO had turned to the Belgian for help in promoting its plan for an economic entente between the world’s major powers. The following April, at the behest of the French and British governments, the prime minister took on an ambitious assignment of “clearing diplomacy” (Dumoulin) in an effort to bring the major European powers and the United States to an entente that could stop the slide towards war. Armed with the concept of “economic peace” as developed by the CEIP/ICC inquiry and the League of Nations, Van Zeeland toured European capitals, including Berlin, and the United States and released a report in January 1938 that offered few new proposals but has since become infamous for its sympathetic view of German territorial demands.

A range of explanations have been cited for the unsuccessful attempts at economic appeasement in the 1930s, from a politically naïve faith in the rationality of actors to policy constraints to economic and financial stakes in the German market. Personal financial investments and larger economic considerations were certainly never far from the minds of those engaged in outreach to the regime, as the cases of Fentener van Vlissingen and Thomas J. Watson indicate. As the Italian foreign ministry observed, Van Zeeland’s policies proved especially popular with Wall Street circles eager to “meet

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German wishes as far as possible” in the hopes of “reintegrating Germany into the sphere of international economic cooperation.”\textsuperscript{777} Even those not personally invested had their eyes firmly on the economic consequences of Europe’s largest economies possibly turning towards autarchy. “It is possible we are losing forever some of our fundamental markets,” Shotwell warned the CEIP trustees and Belgian member of the Comité d’Adminsitration Alfred Nerincx urged a restoration of foreign trade “so that small countries with industries might have the power to live.”\textsuperscript{778} But in addition to such long-term strategic consideration there was also a short-term, pragmatic argument. At a time when the German regime appeared inaccessible to other forms of political bargaining, many liberal internationalists believed that appeals to economic self-interest presented the most promising form of engagement. As both Van Zeeland and the CEIP repeatedly stressed in the second half of the 1930s, the German Group of the ICC was one of the few remaining channels through which the Western democracies could still possibly exert an influence on German attitudes.\textsuperscript{779}

This claim was not completely unfounded as German businessmen whose interests did not coincide with the regime’s promotion of autarchy embraced the chance to cooperate across borders. The freedom of action of Germany’s corporate leaders under National Socialism remains the subject of debate but most studies agree that the regime’s control applied unevenly across different sectors of the economy and only gradually intensified over time.\textsuperscript{780} Along this spectrum, the German ICC group offers an interesting, and thus-far neglected, example of a business coalition that retained a degree of not only economic but also political autonomy before the war. Already in 1933, the Reichskanzlei planned to bring the group in line with the new regime by “promptly hand[ing] over Germany’s representation to a gentleman from the party.”\textsuperscript{781} This never happened—for reasons that will become clearer below—and throughout the 1930s the group under chairman Abraham Frowein gave full public support to National Socialist policies while simultaneously working to modify them through cooperation with the CEIP and the ICC office in Paris. Far from being a resistance group, however, the German ICC section used these links to pursue a National Socialism that was compatible with

\textsuperscript{777} Italian Embassy (Washington) to MAE, 8 July 1937, Affari politici, 1931–45, Stati Uniti, b. 35, ASMAE.
\textsuperscript{778} CEIP Board of Trustees meeting of 5 May 1939, p. 28, Box 15, Folder 3, CEIP US; Dunford House Conference on “Economic Policies in Relation to World Peace,” 24 June 1939, Box 184, Folder 4, CEIP US.
\textsuperscript{779} See for example Memo on meeting between Frederic Keppel, James T. Shotwell and Paul Van Zeeland, 2 November 1938: “Van Zeeland and Shotwell pointed out that the International Chamber of Commerce was now the only functioning international organization which had the active participation of men from Italy, Germany and Japan.”
\textsuperscript{781} Willuhn to Hans Lammers, 23 May 1933, f. 22, R 43-II/327, BA Berlin.
their international business and banking interests. The goal was not to reconstruct a liberal world order but to reconcile the path of the “New Germany” with the “conviction that the expansion of world economic relations enriches our own country and that the progressive shrinking of world economic relations necessarily entails a further pauperization of the individual peoples.”

The burden of this intellectual balancing act between National Socialism’s illiberal, militarist expansionism and the CEIP-ICC’s vision of a laissez-faire global economy rested mainly on the adaptability of the discourse of Großraumwirtschaft—literally the “economy of large spaces”—that permeated German economic, spatial and racial planning. Most commonly, the concept referred to the economic dimension of the National Socialist vision for Europe—a European economic union dominated by Berlin that would be immune to economic blockade. Left deliberately vague as an integrating economic discourse, however, Großraumwirtschaft could easily be portrayed as sharing some of the same concerns that occupied liberal economists: an equitable distribution of resources, the return to commercial exchanges beyond the borders of existing nation states. One of the key promoters of the latter interpretation was the Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) at the University of Kiel, whose director Andreas Predöhl—a member of the CEIP-ICC expert committee and also a Rockefeller Foundation grantee—became the intellectual leader of the German ICC section. Joining the NSDAP in 1937, he espoused the virtues of autarchy and the dawn of a “new economic order,” based on rule by force, but was nevertheless eager to jump start world trade and to keep channels to the Western democracies open. In May 1936, he hosted Fentener van Vlissingen at the IfW, whose presentation focused on the impossibility of achieving autarchy on a national level but also supported a “different distribution of colonial territories” and, in a not entirely unselfish gesture given his investment in AKU, greeted the synthetic substitution of raw materials as a sensible step towards making nations more secure.

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The notion that the CEIP-ICC project could be uncoupled from political liberalism to find common ground with the German authorities was most infamously on display at the ICC’s Berlin Congress in June 1937, where Watson, Fentener van Vlissingen and James T. Shotwell served as props for the German regime, with the two ICC officials receiving the Order of the German Eagle out of the hands of President of the Reichsbank Hjalmar Schacht and Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels in a crowded ballroom amid swastika banners and Nazi salutes. What to most observers constituted a tasteless display of obsequiousness, appeared to the three men as a unique opportunity to bring their message to the very heart of autarchy and economic nationalism. The regime did indeed show surprising flexibility in allowing the ICC to present an alternative model to Schachtian economics. In his opening address the outgoing Dutch ICC president was allowed to claim that the international division of labor was “more than an ideal” but instead “an undeniable necessity.”\textsuperscript{786} “Fenter [sic] van Vlissingen […] peddles age-old mistakes and global economic nonsense,” Goebbels fumed in his diary that evening, and yet he made no attempt to confine these unwelcome messages to the conference hall.\textsuperscript{787} To the contrary, the German press covered the Congress sympathetically and even reprinted in full Shotwell’s and Georges Theunis’s attack on economic nationalism on the conference’s fourth day, in which the latter used the CEIP/ICC findings to critique the feasibility of autarchy. Even the \textit{Völkischer Beobachter} reported on the Congress without its usual agitation against internationalists and pacifists.\textsuperscript{788}

Apparently encouraged by the progress made at Berlin, Shotwell and Watson next travelled to Brussels, where Paul Van Zeeland was currently working on his economic diplomacy report. The immediate subject of discussion, however, was a public call for the creation of an “organism of economic studies” made a few weeks earlier by King Leopold III. A move—almost certainly inspired by his prime minister—that immediately caught the attention of the Carnegie Endowment.\textsuperscript{789} Underscoring the power of elite consensus formation, Shotwell, Watson and Van Zeeland readily agreed that the theoretical framework of rational international economic relations was by now well-established and that the “great problem was one of education.“ As they looked beyond Van Zeeland’s current mission they concurred that what was needed next was not more studies but a revival of the original Chatham House idea of a coordinated publicity campaign that would “prepare the public

mind for the necessary institutional adjustments,“ as Shotwell later put it.\textsuperscript{790} Apparently, it was tentatively agreed that after the conclusion of his diplomatic mission Van Zeeland would take a leading part in a contemplated new organization under the auspices of the CEIP and the ICC. Funds were scarce, however, and thus for the next two years Shotwell and Watson ran a persistent campaign, loosely coordinated with the U.S. Government, to lobby the Carnegie Corporation for funds for a transatlantic publicity campaign that has left a remarkable record of the worldview that animated economic liberals in the final years before the war.\textsuperscript{791}

The principles of sensible economic policy were known “since the days of Adam Smith,“ Shotwell and Watson maintained in a memorandum submitted in February 1938, but the totalitarian states had been more effective in pressing their case through the means of modern propaganda. The situation was now akin to the “warfare of ideas” that had marked the era of the Reformation in which it had proved impossible for either side to vanquish the other. Straining their historical analogy, the two men argued that the outcome of that conflict—the idea of toleration—had reduced the “sphere of action of governments” and enlarged the “sphere of liberty,“ thus subtly implying that an accommodation with Germany would be good for liberalism as well as for business.\textsuperscript{792} A few months later, Van Zeeland followed up with a concrete outline for the new organization that is striking for the sheer scale of activities it envisioned in Europe, which surpassed anything that was being undertaken in the United States. The plan called for the creation of a “Center of International Action,” whose task would be to conduct “international propaganda in the highest sense of that word.“ Based at the ICC’s headquarters in Paris and presumably headed by Van Zeeland, the Center’s board would be staffed mainly by CEIP and ICC representatives, filling remaining vacancies by cooption to insulate the organization from political pressures. The substantial annual budget was set at 135,000 dollars—or more than the ICC’s entire annual expenditures—of which two-thirds were to go directly into information campaigns through the media. Mirroring the approach taken by the NPC in America, this outreach was to target a much larger audience than previously reached. Working mainly through the radio and cinema, economic internationalism was to directly approach the European mass consumer.\textsuperscript{793}

\textsuperscript{790} “Meeting in office of Premier Van Zeeland, Brussels, Belgium, August 1, 1937,” Box 22, Folder 9, CEIP US; Record of Interview Frederick T. Keppel, James T. Shotwell and Thomas J. Watson, 14 January 1938, Series III. A, Box 73, Folder 2, Carnegie Corporation Records, RBML Columbia.

\textsuperscript{791} Shotwell kept the State Department informed of the endeavor, stressing that it would be “in line with the international economic policy” of the U.S. Government, cf. Memorandum of Conversation, James T. Shotwell and Wallace McClure, 16 August 1938, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1930–39, 600.0031 World Program/369, NARA/CP.

\textsuperscript{792} “Memorandum on International Economic Relations,” 3 February 1938, Series III. A, Box 73, Folder 2, Carnegie Corporation Records, RBML Columbia.

\textsuperscript{793} Paul van Zeeland, “Draft Report Concerning the Creation of a Center of International Action,” Box 46, Folder 4, CEIP US.
The CEIP’s application placed the Carnegie Corporation in a delicate position. Alienating men as powerful as Butler and Watson was not a decision to be taken lightly but on the other hand the Corporation could hardly close its eyes to the reality that it was being asked to undertake a vast propaganda campaign to serve what were obviously specific political and economic interests. The project was essentially a “promotional proposition,” judged referee Robert T. Crane of the Social Science Research Council in evaluating the proposal. The notion that the underlying economic principles were settled science and widely accepted was “sheer nonsense,” an attempt to justify that the money was requested “for promotion of a cause and not for research.”794 But even if one took the CEIP’s claims at face value, another reader remarked, it was still highly doubtful that the proposed campaign could be effective in light of the barriers that totalitarian states had erected “against the diffusion of information.”795 It ultimately fell to Frederick T. Keppel to convey the uncomfortable truth that the Corporation would not approve the application, an experience which, to the IBM director’s great embarrassment, demonstrated that while America’s corporate leaders were a major force behind American economic philanthropy, they were not necessarily in charge: “I felt […] as if I had been passing a tin cup on the corner, and I am not in that line.”796

The Carnegie Corporation’s words of caution were well-founded as, in fact, the flow of information through the CEIP-ICC channel had always been much more one-sided than the Endowment claimed. The National Socialist authorities were adept at utilizing transnational links for propaganda purposes and a main reason for the continued nominal independence of the German ICC section was that it afforded the regime with a means to present its far-reaching territorial demands in terms of sound economic policy. An especially active conduit for such propagandistic outreach was Andreas Predöhl’s IfW. In the early stages of his work for the CEIP-ICC expert committee, Predöhl had attempted to cut the project loose from its liberal moorings. In a personal letter to T.E. Gregory Predöhl complained about the “suggestive character of the enquiry” and, calling the Endowment’s bluff of seeking an “objective” study, he warned of the “risk of introducing liberal tendencies” into the survey. “I […] emphasize this not because I desire to confront your political ideal with a different one, but because I believe that political ideals should be entirely foreign to our enquiry.”797 This plea did not yield any immediate results, but neither was there a process for ensuring the conformity of

794 Robert T. Crane to Frederick P. Keppel, 16 February 1938, Series III. A, Box 73, Folder 2, Carnegie Corporation Records, RBML Columbia.
796 CEIP Board of Trustees meeting of 11 December 1939, p. 44–45, Box 15, Folder 3, CEIP US.
797 Andreas Predöhl to T.E. Gregory, Box 128, Folder 2, CEIP CE.
individual studies with the two sponsoring organizations’ political preferences. Thus, Predöhl’s contribution to the final report was essentially a piece of German propaganda, translated into French and English and distributed to opinion-makers around the world at the expense of the Carnegie Endowment and the International Chamber of Commerce. That such propaganda did not fall on deaf ears is shown by how much credence CEIP trustees gave to German claims that what truly threatened world peace was the unfair distribution of raw materials, which, according to Alanson B. Houghton made “impossible a peaceful Germany.” His colleague David P. Barrows even went so far as to consider a German takeover of much of Europe’s natural resources a fortunate prospect from an economic perspective as they would allegedly be “more ably handled than they would be by any other nations.”

That information flowed much less freely in the other direction is illustrated by the fate of another contribution to the CEIP-ICC Committee. In his 150-page report economist Bertil Ohlin had investigated claims that Germany, Italy and Japan were held back in their natural development by a lack of colonies as sources for raw materials and destinations for exports and emigration. His verdict was that such claims were unconvincing. Economic advantages of a redistribution of colonies for the countries in question would be “minute” and he cast serious doubt on the notion that “over-population” was a problem and, in any case, the possession of colonies was “not an important, still less an indispensable factor” in addressing it. Ohlin’s report had attentive readers in the German government and in late October 1936, within days of the public release of the Committee’s report, the German section of the ICC, informed Fentener van Vlissingen that it had judged Ohlin’s study to contain such a “one-sided” and “tactless” treatment of the subject that any further distribution of this specific volume of the CEIP/ICC report in Germany was out of the question. Worried about the success of the planned Berlin Congress, the ICC President complied promptly. The CEIP’s Centre Européen also expressed its deepest regrets at Prof. Ohlin’s inconsiderateness and even assisted in the complete suppression of the offending study by passing on a list of all German addresses to which the volume had already been shipped.

Despite ample evidence of the difficulty of cooperating with National Socialist Germany the dream of transnational economic cooperation would not die. In 1939, with war more an imminent reality than a possibility, the old CEIP-ICC alliance jolted back into action. The ICC Council shed its political

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798 CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting of 5 May 1939, pp. 17–18, 27, Box 15, Folder 3, CEIP US.
800 Cf. Haerecke to ICC, 28 October 1936; Fentener van Vlissingen to Abraham Frowein, 6 November 1936; Perreux to Haerecke, 30 October 1936, Box 128, Folder 3, CEIP CE.
hesitancy to set up a “Committee on Economic Peace” while the CEIP Board voted to subsidize the undertaking with 50,000 dollars—an amount that in Butler’s words just avoided “smashing” the CEIP’s existing programs—with another 100,000 dollars to be requested from the Carnegie Corporation. As a sign of the urgency felt by international businessmen Thomas Watson, Alan Anderson, Arthur Balfour and F.H. Fentener van Vlissingen also pledged to contribute significant private funds. The seriousness of the undertaking was also reflected at the Committee’s inaugural meeting on 26 January 1940 in Brussels, which included not only Fentener van Vlissingen and Malcolm Davis for the sponsoring organizations but with Royall Tyler (LoN) and Per Jacobsson (BIS) representatives of much of the remaining infrastructure of international organization. The renewed exercise in transnationalism was nevertheless short-lived as wartime conditions soon rendered cooperation impossible, even on an informal level. The Committee’s second and final meeting at The Hague on 29 March 1940—less than two weeks before the German invasion of the Netherlands—took place under a cloud of secrecy. Questioned by local journalists at his hotel, Paul van Zeeland did not give up any information on the Committee’s plans. The situation was even more difficult for the French and British members. After consultation with its government, the French ICC section announced that it had decided not to send any delegates to a meeting that would be attended by citizens of an enemy nation, and in Britain the issue even reached the floor of the House of Commons with a parliamentary question on whether any British subjects had gone to The Hague.

A far cry from the CEIP’s ambitious vision of a transnational propaganda agency, the short-lived Committee for Economic Peace clearly saw its task as continuing to light a way towards a synthesis between economic liberalism, social economic planning and Großraumwirtschaft. At their first meeting the group tasked Bertil Ohlin, Andreas Predöhl and John H. Williams with jointly drafting a report on an “economic framework for a durable peace,” thus leaving it to a Swedish, a German and an American economist to reconcile these different approaches. While no record appears to have survived of the second meeting, a presentation Paul Van Zeeland gave in front American post-war planners around the same time offers some indications on the thinking among this circle of experts.

801 Memo “The Committee for International Economic Reconstruction,” n.d., enclosing “General Resolution adopted at the Tenth Biennial Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce, Copenhagen, July 1, 1939,” Box 289, Folder 1, CEIP US. CEIP Board of Trustees meeting of 11 December 1939, p. 49, 78–79, Box 15, Folder 3, CEIP US; following the German invasion of Poland the Committee’s name changed several times, with the most common one being “Committee for International Economic Reconstruction”.

802 Meeting of the Committee of Inquiry for Economic Peace of the International Chamber of Commerce held in Brussels on 26th January 1940, f. 205–208, R 2501/6741, BA Berlin.


804 Cf. “De bespreking van de Intern Kamer van Koophandel,” Arnhemsche Courant, 29 March 1940; HC Deb 18 April 1940 vol 359 c1159W.

805 Meeting of the Committee of Inquiry for Economic Peace of the International Chamber of Commerce held in Brussels on 26th January 1940, f. 207, R 2501/6741, BA Berlin.
Van Zeeland envisioned a post-war “economic union” between the British Commonwealth, France and its colonial empire and most Western European nations, including Scandinavia, a divided and thus weakened Germany and possibly Poland. While goods and capital would circulate freely within this union there would be no return to the gold standard and no “importation of capital from the United States,” an arrangement that, Van Zeeland freely admitted, was “based in part upon certain phases of Germany’s experience under the Nazi regime.” Much was vague in Van Zeeland’s proposal, including the relationship between the “economic union” and the outside world but the plan demonstrated how by the start of the war the search for common ground had resulted in an amalgamation of economic concepts. Classical liberal ideas of a free movement of goods and capital were blended with the idea of a closed, possibly autarchic, Europe that deliberately evoked notions of a *Großraum Europa*.

**Epilogue**

The final meeting of the Committee for Economic Peace in 1940 marked the end, for the time being, of a five-year CEIP campaign to counter what Harold James has called the “End of Globalization.” In bringing its message of “economic peace” to the European Continent, the foundation participated in activities that placed it firmly on the side of those advocating for economic appeasement, however, this highlights the still slippery definition of that term. Thomas J. Watson’s involvement with the National Socialist regime is often interpreted as a metaphorical fall from liberalism: due to naivete paired with conceitedness or, worse, in the amoral pursuit of profits on the German market the IBM director strayed across the line separating the democratic from the authoritarian camp and found himself on the wrong side of the ideological struggle of the twentieth century. Yet, such an interpretation does not sufficiently take into account the larger discursive context that framed Watson’s actions, which hardly lends itself to a dichotomy of “liberalism vs. totalitarianism.” The concept of “economic peace” as developed by the CEIP and the ICC only becomes legible when read against the backdrop of a mental map of a world temporarily, possibly permanently, divided into national and regional blocs with a variety of political systems: democracy, republicanism, imperial monarchy, Fascism, National Socialism, Communism. The CEIP-ICC project of an “economic peace” that encompassed both America’s RTAA policy and German *Großraumwirtschaft* sought to take account of this diversity by separating economic liberalism, which was to be promoted, from liberal [806]

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806 “Paul van Zeeland’s Ideas on Post-war Economic Reconstruction,” 12 March 1940, Box 1, Folder “International Economic Relations 1940–41,” Leo Pasvolsky Papers, LoC.


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political values, which were optional. In practice, the resulting “liberalism” would have provided for a global regime marked by a relatively free movement of goods and capital, but not of people or ideas.

The case of the CEIP-ICC Joint Committee exemplifies how complex combinations of interests can shape the transnational production of knowledge, yielding no readymade answer to the question of whether transnational networks bolster or undermine state power. Shaping the expert discourse on international economics through transnational networks was an attractive option for private sector interests such as the managers of IBM and AKU trying to scale back government intervention in the economy. It afforded agency to smaller states with little clout in international negotiations such as Belgium and the Netherlands. It was, however, also open to authoritarian regimes such as those of Italy and particularly Germany, which utilized those same channels to disseminate propaganda. Indeed, one area that would warrant further research is to what extent transnational economic governance structures that developed during the Great Depression were later absorbed and redirected by Germany to help govern the Großwirtschaftsraum Europa.

The later careers of some of the members of the Committee for Economic Peace give some indications in this direction: among those attending the final meeting in 1940 was CEIP-ICC veteran Andreas Predöhl as well as the President of the Reichswirtschaftskammer Karl Lindemann, who would over the course of the following years take a leading role in the expropriation of Dutch industry under German occupation.\textsuperscript{808} The Bank of International Settlements at Basle, the rare international organization that still cooperated on friendly terms with the German regime, sent its economic advisor Per Jacobsson.\textsuperscript{809} Fentener van Vlissingen, who also attended, would soon complete the transition from international cooperation to collaboration. As head of the Nationaal Comité voor Economische Samenwerking during the German occupation of the Netherlands, Fentener van Vlissingen served as an intermediary between the German authorities and Dutch industry, helping to bring the demands of the Reich’s war economy into alignment with those of private businesses. He did not lose his faith that the international distribution of labor was the most efficient international economic regime but publicly made it clear that it was only a vision for a distant future. The immediate role for the Netherlands would be as part of an economic bloc under German leadership, which could, for instance, consist of a customs union with the occupier.\textsuperscript{810} His company AKU, meanwhile, continued

\begin{footnotes}
\item[808] “Internationale conferentie te Den Haag,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 28 March 1929.
\end{footnotes}
to expand vigorously as demand for artificial fibers soared during the war.\textsuperscript{811}

Less fraught with moral ambiguities, the CEIP’s campaign for economic peace in the United States nevertheless shows the complex relationship between the private sector and the “national interest.”\textsuperscript{811} The foundation worked closely with the American government to support the Roosevelt Administration’s commercial policy both at home and abroad. The CEIP-ICC cooperation could consequently be viewed as pre-figuring America’s post-war projection of economic power by working to reconfigure the European economy in accordance with American policies, practices and values.\textsuperscript{812} The perspective from Chatham House complicates this picture by showing that “American” interests and values were constructed entities. In a country with diverse political traditions, including a long-standing discourse that associated international capital flows with foreign—especially British—domination, making economic internationalism “American” was a political project, pursued through and in interaction with transnational networks.

In fact, one of the private sector organizations most closely associated with creating political support for the post-1945 establishment of American economic and political hegemony in Western Europe was a direct descendant of the CEIP-ICC cooperation (fig. 6b). In the second half of the 1940s the Committee on International Economic Policy provided key business sector backing for internationalist policies such as a closer integration with European markets through the Marshall Plan.\textsuperscript{813}

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\textsuperscript{813} On this group see Arthur Menzies Johnson, \textit{Winthrop W. Aldrich: Lawyer, Banker, Diplomat} (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1968), 283; Alan R. Raucher, \textit{Paul G. Hoffman: Architect of Foreign Aid} (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 59.
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Few readers who saw the newspaper article announcing the Committee’s formation in July 1944—on Independence Day, no less—will have suspected anything but a spontaneous initiative on the part of patriotic business leaders eager to support the administration’s post-war policies. In reality, the new organization was a rebranding of the CEIP-ICC partnership, an Americanized version of the Committee on Economic Peace featuring some of the same actors. James T. Shotwell and Thomas J.

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Watson still occupied leading positions, key funding continued to be provided by the Carnegie Endowment and, fittingly, the Committee’s first publication, *Merchants of Peace*, was a chronicle of the ICC’s interwar international initiatives that was described by a contemporary reviewer as “a panegyric, not a history.” Not all was the same, however, as the new organization expanded its membership to represent a wide range of the American business community, a move that had been closely coordinated with the State Department, which appreciated the new “emphasis on the interests of American business.”

If the Committee on International Economic Policy’s campaign for the Marshall Plan demonstrated the turn of the American business community toward economic internationalism its European pendant was widespread business support for a project of European integration that was supportive of employers’ interests. Paul Van Zeeland continued to play a leading role in this movement toward an *Europe du patronat*. In 1948, he cooperated with Józef Retinger to found the Ligue Européenne de coopération économique, a pressure group with sections in most Western European countries and closely tied to business interests. Concerned that rising pro-European sentiment could go hand-in-hand with anti-Americanism, Van Zeeland and Retinger were also the initiators of the Bilderberg meetings, which brought together business leaders and politicians from both sides of the Atlantic for off-the-record discussions that would help foster trust and understanding. In contrast to the interwar years, transatlanticism and European integration now enjoyed widespread support among peak industrial organizations. In a show of business solidarity, a “Europe Day” hosted by the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie in Trier in 1952 featured Georges Villiers, President of the Conseil national du patronat français, as a speaker, thus symbolizing an alliance of the successors to the RDI and the CGPF for economic internationalism.

By the late 1940s the language of “economic peace” had, however, been largely consigned to historical retrospectives. Its simultaneous associations with the appeasement policies of the 1930s

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816 Cf. membership list “Committee on International Economic Policy,” Box 289, Folder 2, CEIP US.; Robert L. Gulick to Shotwell, 30 June 1944, Box 289, Folder 2, CEIP US.


and with a pacifist cause now more and more identified with Communist rhetoric made it a poor vehicle of self-identification for Western businessmen. Business advocates continued to make a normative case for free market economics but in light of the new political environment the cause of “freedom” figured far more prominently than “peace.”\textsuperscript{819} It thus fell to James T. Shotwell, now President of the CEIP, to remind readers of a new edition of \textit{Merchants of Peace}, published in 1959, of the contributions of interwar economic internationalists to international order: based on the mundane everyday experience of global economic transactions they had formed “the foundations of an international community” and created “the architectural blueprint of the edifice of international peace.”\textsuperscript{820}


6. Reconfiguring the nation: Interwar networks and the belated triumph of regionalism

When war swept over the European Continent again in 1939 it destroyed or disrupted much of the internationalist infrastructure that had been built up in the previous decades, yet the concepts and ideas did not vanish. While the political contours of the postwar order were negotiated at a series of inter-Allied conferences a normative reconceptualization of nations as parts of larger, interdependent structures was taking place that would have a profound impact on the institutionalization of the global order. In January 1943, readers of the *American Mercury* were given a familiar message by Carlo Sforza, the long-time Italian partner of the Carnegie Endowment, now in exile in the United States. The notion of complete national sovereignty was over, he argued, to be replaced by a “superior international law.” “No American should forget that in the coming world even the Ocean will be no more than a big river,” the Count declared. “The era of isolation is gone forever.” If the content was familiar, the medium was less typical. Sforza’s statement was part of an advertisement campaign for Pan American Airways and below Sforza’s reproduced signature the airline, which had been the first to introduce regular transatlantic flights in 1939, announced optimistically: “Pan American looks forward to playing its part in the world of the future, through […] providing widespread distribution of the world’s culture, science and goods.”

Anticipating the coming end of the war, America’s major corporations were prepared to go global and were helping create a political culture that would sustain the desired expansion of markets. On the other hand, European exile politicians were seeking partners in establishing their own claims to power—the ad identified Sforza as the “Leader of Free Italy”—as well as in securing their countries’ place in a future world order.

The start of the war threw the CEIP into turmoil. Soon after the German attack on Poland the Centre Européen was moved to humble emergency quarters at the seaside town of La Baule in Southern Brittany. Much of the staff returned to Paris during the Phoney War of the following months but with the invasion of France in May 1940 Malcolm Davis left his post to join the International Red Cross and most operations were halted. The ties were definitely severed when the United States entered the war as continued communications with or transfers of funds to an institution in Occupied Europe could have constituted a violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act.

At the same time, nerves were frayed in New York, where for the first first time in its history a dissident faction on the Board

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of Trustees led by William M. Bullitt openly sought to oust President Butler, charging that the Endowment had “spent a great deal of money” and had “little to show for it.” The Endowment’s officers reacted with a concerted lobbying campaign that brought the majority of trustees into the President’s corner and swiftly contained the revolt. In addition to personal loyalty, it was the evidently political motivation of the charges, a populist attack against the Republican East Coast foreign policy establishment, which enraged the CEIP’s staff. James T. Shotwell polemically denounced the insurgents as an alliance between “bolshevist” and “conservative and reactionary” elements, the “same combination as in Germany.” Even worse, Bullitt and his allies had advocated for a kind of patriotic self-censorship in which the CEIP would suspend all operations for the duration of the war and invest its entire annual income in government-issued war bonds.

Such a vision of the proper role of an NGO in wartime could hardly have been further removed from the conception of the CEIP’s directors, for whom the ongoing tectonic shifts in the international system provided an incentive for the foundation to “utilize all its tools and procedures—basic planning, research, publication, education of all types” to influence the contours of the post-war settlement. Around the world, the violent upheaval of the Second World War raised expectations of deep structural changes, yet the shape of the future world order appeared hazy at best. To many Europeans the role of the stock market crash in destabilizing the fragile peace appeared to demonstrate the inadequacy of the existing global economic order to the challenges of modern life. Centralized national planning seemed to be the way of the future. In Britain, the Labour Party affirmed the need for an effective system of collective security but made it clear that the maintenance of international peace was “inseparable from […] the common ownership of the main instruments of production.”

At the treasury, John Maynard Keynes publicly denounced National Socialist designs for Europe but privately commended the Schachtian model of exchange controls and restricted trade, suggesting a similar system for Britain. Exile governments largely shared the British faith in the promise of planning as the road to national prosperity and thinking on a future international regime tended to stress the importance of international planning agencies as coordinating bodies that would prevent

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823 Maurice S. Sherman to Francis P. Gaines, 9 March 1942, Box A90, Folder “Carnegie Endowment, Trustees, 10–2, Mar, 1942,” Jessup Papers, LoC.
824 Shotwell to Douglas Freeman, 24 April 1942, Box A90, Folder “Carnegie Endowment, Trustees, Apr, 1942,” Jessup Papers, LoC.
825 Ibid.
826 “Memorandum on the Work of the Endowment,” [February 1942], Box A90, Folder “Carnegie Endowment, Trustees, 10–5, Feb, 1942,” Jessup Papers, LoC.
interests from clashing. In July 1943, less than three years before becoming the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, Norway’s foreign minister Trygve Lie saw the “national planned economy under the direction of the State” as the enduring legacy of the war, which would then need to be complemented by “international planning” in other fields. By the end of 1942 promoting social welfare by fortifying the nation state through managed currencies and centralized economic planning appeared as a credible basis for a future postwar international regime.

The historiography of the emergence of eventual post-war institutional arrangements—the creation of the United Nations, American-led globalization, Western European integration under an American security umbrella—has traditionally explained them as results of national political deliberations. In the United States, historians have highlighted the central role of the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy in conjunction with private policy groups such as the Council on Foreign Relation’s War and Peace Studies. Similar constellations existed in Britain, where interdepartmental planning boards communicated with private groups such as the Political and Economic Planning group and Chatham House. Some exile governments had their own planning staffs, such as the Belgian Commission pour l’Etude des Problèmes d’Après-Guerre. National positions formulated in these venues were then brought into alignment at a series of inter-Allied conferences, thus laying the groundwork for the future international order. Reconstructing decision-making processes between or within largely self-contained national units has tended to emphasize the national over the international and change over continuity, often resulting in narratives that disassociate post-war institutions from their interwar predecessors, thus constructing the year 1945 as a “clean break” that allowed people and nations to start anew.

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This literature—what Cecilia Lynch has called “creationist” accounts of the post-1945 order—is increasingly challenged by contributions that contextualize new arrangements within long-term developments and stress the resiliency of international institutions, both in social practices and as manifested in organizations. Many aspects of the new international system looked surprisingly like the old as institutions either persevered—the ILO, the BIS—or continued to function under a new name—the PCIJ, many of the League’s technical sections. Methodologically, this change in perspective has shifted attention from the reconstruction of bureaucratic decision-making processes, the traditional terrain of diplomatic history, to the role of ideals and ideas in shaping state action and international institutions. Whether the United Nations, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Non-Alligned Movement or Western European economic integration—the multilateralization of the international system in the second half of the twentieth century was predicated on a normative commitment to supranational formations beyond the nation state. Even to the extent that states sought out supranational cooperation to preserve rather than relinquish power such actions were only possible within the framework of revised notions of national sovereignty and the relation of the state to the international community. Investigating the processes of construction that shaped these allegiances draws attention to a new set of actors and underlying political interests.

In the years prior to Bretton Woods and the United Nations Conference at San Francisco the Carnegie Endowment consciously set out to shape the framework within which political decisions would be made. Its most active directors during this time, Philip Jessup and James Shotwell, agreed: “It is the ideas and not the actions which in the long run move the course of history.” Viewing the wartime and post-war debates on the future global order through the perspective of an organization dedicated to the transnational dissemination of knowledge is apt to destabilize the national framework in at least three ways:

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838 In particular the historical Europeanization literature has recently pointed into this direction, cf. Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel, eds., Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Michael Gehler, Europa - Europäisierung - Europäistik: Neue wissenschaftliche Ansätze, Methoden und Inhalte (Köln: Böhlau, 2010).

839 Philip Jessup to James T. Shotwell, 3 August 1944, Box A83, Folder “Division of Economics and History 1944,” Jessup Papers, LoC.
Firstly, many of the experts who staffed the various national planning bodies were part of the same transnational knowledge networks that had developed during the interwar years. Participants of the Carnegie Endowment’s interwar projects were now widely dispersed throughout official or unofficial planning bodies—CEPAG, Chatham House, the State Department, the CFR. For instance, of the economists who had participated in the CEIP-ICC expert committee Leo Pasvolsky was now the central figure of American post-war planning as director of research in the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. Lionel Robbins headed the Economic Section of Britain’s War Cabinet Offices, Bertil Ohlin and Dag Hammarskjold were ministers in Sweden’s war cabinet and Theodore Gregory was the economic adviser to the Indian government. Finally, Paul Van Zeeland headed the Belgian CEPAG. This is not to suggest that everyone advocated for the same policies but it does point toward the shared discursive frameworks in which post-war planning on the expert level took place on all sides. Additionally, personal acquaintances facilitated the work of postwar planners as governments were keenly interested in learning the position that other states were taking on the same issues.

Secondly, despite the apparent diversity of private American post-war planning there was a significant amount of continuity with earlier internationalist activism as most of the major initiatives—the CFR’s War and Peace Studies, the IIS, the Foreign Policy Association—traced their funding at least partially to America’s major grant-giving foundations and often served to transmit established internationalist discourses into government channels. An example of this mechanism was the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP), a highly visible group that reliably represented Eastern Establishment consensus positions in public debates throughout the war. The Commission also enjoyed access to and support from the top levels of the U.S. government with members meeting

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841 Cf. Howson, Lionel Robbins, 390–397; Markwell, John Maynard Keynes and International Relations, 235.
843 E.g. Chatham House’s Ivison Macadam expressed frustration at the constant need to ascertain American views, cf. Parmar, Special Interests, the State and the Anglo-American Alliance, 71.
regularly with President Roosevelt. Arguably, its more important impact on American policy, however, did not come from the over one hundred eminent citizens who signed CSOP’s public statements but from a small, executive offshoot, the so-called “Design Group.” This fifteen-member team headed by Harvard professor and PCIJ judge Manley O. Hudson was formed in late 1943 with CEIP-funding to facilitate conversations between government officials and leading American experts on the transnational collective security debates of the past two decades. The internationalist networks of America’s major foundations were repositories of expertise on global governance that was now brought to bear on the policy process.

Thirdly and finally, American foundations became key institutional links connecting émigré experts—often former grantees—and U.S. planning groups. The impact of exiled European scholars on American academia in the 1930s and 1940s, particularly in the social sciences, has long been recognized. When it comes to formulating America’s future policy vis-à-vis their home Continent, however, their influence is usually considered small as their wartime service tended to be restricted to branches of the U.S. government that were remote from the levers of power, such as the Research and Analysis branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Nationality did indeed play a key role in determining access to the policy process and the citadel of American planning, Leo Pasvolsky’s Advisory Committee, remained largely closed to émigrés. Yet, exile scholars were not only experienced but inexpensive and American philanthropies and private research institutions sought to make this untapped reservoir of expertise available to the American planning process by organizing conferences and research projects. Facilitated through personal connections, wartime cooperation between government and philanthropy became very close and proceeded according to an almost standardized process: 1. government planners encountered an issue that warranted further research or where competing factions favored different approaches 2. The CEIP or the Rockefeller Foundation learned of the debate and initiated a research group, usually staffed with émigré scholars


847 See for example Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen; Gemelli, The Unacceptables; Claus-Dieter Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile: Refugee Scholars and the New School for Social Research (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993).


849 An exception to this rule was Austrian exile and former League of Nations official Walter Maria Kotschnig, who worked in the State Department’s Division of International Organization.
3. The results were transmitted to the government through publications and, more effectively, through interactive public-private partnerships such as the Design Group, often raising further questions and leading to new research activity.\textsuperscript{850}

The central message of those who had participated in the CEIP’s internationalist debates of the past decades was that recovering stability for a war-torn world required nothing less than reforming the very foundations of the modern international system—the supremacy of the nation state. In his programmatic statement “The World We Want,” published in 1941, CEIP officer Malcolm Davis called for the “modification and pooling of sovereignty among States.”\textsuperscript{851} To Paul Van Zeeland, national sovereignty as it had developed over the course of the last hundred years was “false and artificial because it was wholly exaggerated.”\textsuperscript{852} Thomas Mann, writing for the newspaper of a prisoner-of-war internment camp in the United States wondered how citizens could reconcile their obedience to “world civilization” (Welt-Zivilisation) with individual liberty and national culture.\textsuperscript{853} On the other hand, Mann also saw the danger of a “leveling of the world through the dictatorship of a uniform rational moralism.”\textsuperscript{854} While they recognized the need to reconfigure the nation state, the conservative and liberal internationalists associated with the CEIP were loath to topple it, lest such a move open the door to a technocratic or socialist world commonwealth. A possible intermediary level between the national and the global toward which peoples’ allegiances could be directed were regional groupings, for instance a European confederation.

This concluding chapter analyzes the often subtle and circuitous long-term effects of transnational networking through the lens of the CEIP’s contribution to the expert discourse on international organization, particularly European integration, both through its own advocacy and research activity and by association with the future Italian foreign minister Carlo Sforza.\textsuperscript{855} While many accounts of the process that led to an integration of European markets and the development of regional political institutions take the years after 1945 as their starting point\textsuperscript{856} the interwar period has increasingly

\textsuperscript{850} The opportunities presented to non-governmental actors by uncertainty and crisis situations is stressed i.a. by Haas, “Epistemic Communities,” 14–15.
\textsuperscript{853} Thomas Mann, “[Welt-Zivilisation],” in Reden und Aufsätze, vol. 12, Gesammelte Werke (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1960), 964.
\textsuperscript{854} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{856} By way of a very brief overview, John Gillingham, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Geir
emerged as a key site for this process, particularly on the level of ideas and identity. Like Jean Monnet, Carlo Sforza’s career spanned the war years, yet, seventy-five years of age by the time he returned to the Italian foreign ministry in 1947 and charged with guiding the diplomatic activities of a defeated country, historiography has often regarded him as only a secondary figure in the political history of post-war Europe. An “unreformed Mazzinian federalist,” “baffled” by the challenges of his time, Sforza’s tenure appeared to point back to the nineteenth century rather than toward the future. His most significant original contribution to the process of European economic integration—a Franco-Italian customs union—failed to materialize and is thus not viewed as integral to the development of the European Common Market.

While Sforza and many of the older internationalists certainly were inspired by notions of Europe’s place in the world that differed from those of a new generation of leaders for whom the pre-1914 international system was at best a distant memory, tracing these ideas highlights the complex origins of international institutions as different strands of thought competed or were amalgamated. For this, the CEIP’s wartime activities are a case in point. While the Italian worked on the foundation’s advocacy campaign, its research divisions created some of the foundational studies of post-1945 international relations, including a project by Jacob Viner, the renowned economist who had participated in the CEIP-ICC expert group, Percy E. Corbett, professor of international law at McGill University in Montreal, and Austrian émigré scholar Leopold Kohr. The result of their work would soon be cited by virtually every economic study on the process of European integration. It is unlikely that Sforza, Viner, Corbett and Kohr ever met in person. Yet, taken together their separate efforts show how multiple perspectives and interests inform the production and dissemination of knowledge through transnational networks.

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For a critique of this traditional focus on the main institutions of the EU in European integration history see Kiran Klaus Patel, “Provincialising European Union: Co-Operation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective,” Central European History 22, no. 4 (2013): 649 – 673.
“A community of views”: The CEIP’s customs union project

As it had done in 1917, the CEIP offered its unreserved assistance to the U.S. government within days of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The war produced unprecedented requirements for expertise, resulting in an expansion of the administrative state that brought many foundation officers into government posts and most CEIP officers started donning several official and unofficial hats. Malcolm Davis was recruited by the OSS in June 1942 and over the course of the war advanced from an unpaid, part-time consultant to chief of the covert operations arm of the Foreign Nationalities Branch (FNB) in New York while maintaining his connection to the Carnegie Endowment as cover. James T. Shotwell became a member of the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy and of the General Advisory Committee on Cultural Relations tasked with advising the government in setting up its cultural diplomacy program. Philip Jessup’s familiarity with international administrative procedures led him to join the Department’s Office for Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation in 1943, which soon became the core of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

The CEIP also underwent institutional changes under wartime conditions. With much of the world inaccessible to its programs, resources flooded back into the United States and funded an expansion of the foundation’s domestic educational campaigns as well as a new focus on research both in support of the government’s war effort and with a view toward influencing the post-war order. An internal CEIP report from June 1943 listed forty government agencies and committees that had submitted requests for information or research within the past year, many of which came in the form of “informal inquiries made either by personal visits or by telephone.” With most of the foundation’s junior staff called away for wartime service the CEIP’s Washington office became a veritable international intellectual hub where a growing ensemble of émigré scholars was employed on short- to mid-term research projects.

864 “Report on the Endowment's Cooperation with the Government,” 10 June 1943, Box A84, Folder “CEIP Division of International Law September 1943,” Jessup Papers, LoC.
The Endowment’s aid programs for European refugees were administered unevenly and attracted much criticism at the time. Unlike the Rockefeller Foundation, the CEIP never instituted a comprehensive program to identify and support highly talented scholars in order to save Europe’s intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{865} Aid was granted on an individual basis under circumstances that clearly favored those with established ties to the foundation or who were otherwise well-connected. In addition to Sforza, those who benefited from these arrangements included his former Comité colleague Rafael Altamira y Crevea, Ernst Jäckh of the DHP and men and women whose social status was high but academic credentials tenuous at best, such as German Center Party politician Prince Hubertus zu Löwenstein and Millicent Leveson-Gower, the Duchess of Sutherland. Most applicants for help, however, were told to submit their requests to the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars, an agency of American academic institutions that co-sponsored temporary positions at universities.\textsuperscript{866}

Larger political considerations sometimes played a key role in these decisions, as is evidenced by the CEIP’s reluctant aid to one of its closest partners. When Hajo Holborn lost his position as Carnegie Professor in Berlin in 1934 the CEIP initially refused to become involved at a time when it was still holding out hope that relations with the new German regime could eventually be repaired. The foundation even lent credence to the crude justification provided by the National Socialists that Holborn was fired for disseminating “Marxist” beliefs. Only after remonstrations from other European correspondents and after stern reminders from the Emergency Committee as to its moral obligations to Holborn did the foundation agree to a one-time stipend of one thousand dollars for its former employee.\textsuperscript{867} As in Holborn’s case, who was eventually able to relocate to Yale University, many former grantees found the doors at Morningside Heights shut but still managed to translate the social and cultural capital they had gained through association with the CEIP into opportunities in the United States.\textsuperscript{868}


\textsuperscript{866} For a basic overview still Stephen Duggan, The Rescue of Science and Learning, the Story of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars (New York: Macmillan Co, 1948).

\textsuperscript{867} Earle Babcock to Moritz Julius Bonn, 15 February 1934, Box 123, Folder 4, CEIP CE; Stephen P. Duggan to Edward R. Morrow, 28 February 1934, Box 171, Folder 8, Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars Records; Moritz Julius Bonn was especially incensed since he believed that if Holborn “had not been our Carnegie Professor, he might have been saved,” Bonn to Earle Babcock, 10 February 1934, Box 123, Folder 4, CEIP CE; on Holborn’s exile experience see Gerhard Ritter, “Die emigrierten Meinecke-Schüler in den Vereinigten Staaten: Leben und Geschichtsschreibung zwischen Deutschland und der neuen Heimat. Hajo Holborn, Felix Gilbert, Dietrich Gerhard, Hans Rosenberg,” Historische Zeitschrift 284 (2007): 59–102; Bernd Faulenbach, “Hajo Holborn,” in Deutsche Historiker, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, vol. 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), 114–32.

\textsuperscript{868} Nearly half of the DHP’s faculty went into exile, many of them to the United States, cf. Korenblat, “A School for the Republic?,” 395–396; Christina von Oertzen has observed similar network effects in her study of female scholarly networks, cf. Oertzen, Strategie Verständigung.
The most active research arm of the foundation during the war was the Division of International Law, headed since 1940 by Philip Jessup. Under his guidance, the Division set up two large umbrella projects aimed at making interwar discourses on international law and international organization accessible for an eventual post-war settlement. The first was an undertaking dubbed “International Law of the Future” and chaired by PCIJ judge Manley O. Hudson, which at its core was a series of conferences between mainly American and Canadian jurists designed to foster a “community of views” on the outlines of a future world order. The second major project documented and analyzed the mechanics of the League of Nations, a task that was largely undertaken by exiled veterans of the League Secretariat. At the same that the Rockefeller Foundation funded the installation of the Economic and Financial Section at Princeton’s Institute of Advanced Studies the CEIP was taking in experts from many of the Secretariat’s other sections who had made their way to America. At times the foundation’s office at Jackson Place must have resembled a Little Geneva with researchers including Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer (formerly Information Section), Pablo de Azcárate y Flórez (Minorities Section), Leon Steinig (Social Questions), Vladimir Pastuhov (Mandates Section) and Bertil Renborg (Opium Trafficking Section). The main motivation behind all these activities was that, as Manley Hudson put it, there would eventually be a new Versailles when power would be “concentrated in the hands of a few men” who would lay the foundations of the future world order and experts in international organization needed to be ready to make an impact. “I would esteem it an everlasting disgrace if the historian should have to [say] that we made no effort to contribute what we could.”

One CEIP research project with an unexpectedly long afterlife was a study into the efficacy of customs unions as tools for regional economic integration. The question of how Europe could be organized into larger units after a presumptive German defeat was widely debated, especially during the early years of the war. Acting on a suggestion by Jean Monnet, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill

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869 Percy Corbett to Philip Jessup, 21 December 1942, Box 56, Folder 6, CEIP US.
871 “Statement of Payments and Commitments on Projects of the Division of International Law,” [1943], Box 190, Folder 3, CEIP US.
872 Manley O. Hudson to Edwin D. Dickinson, 30 October 1942, Box 55, Folder 2, CEIP US.
had proposed what amounted to a full Franco-British Union in June 1940. Ideas for regional federations were also developed by the exile governments of Eastern and Southeastern European countries, particularly Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Yugoslavia. Belgian post-war planners such as Paul Van Zeeland also revisited the Ouchy Convention’s abortive attempt to construct an economic Benelux union. The ease with which Germany—and to some extent the Soviet Union—had been able to capitalize on the Continent’s fragmentation in pursuit of its expansionist aims encouraged both exile politicians and the leaders of the major Allied countries to think seriously about stabilizing Europe through larger political and economic constellations.

The State Department started to formulate its approach to such initiatives in late spring 1942. Initial discussions of Pasvolsky’s Advisory Committee centered on an Eastern European union and members initially looked to America’s domestic institutions for ideas on how to organize such a construct. Economic arrangements of the prospective union were to be based “on the experience of the United States with a large internal market” and an electric power corporation along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority was to stimulate infrastructure development. But when toward the end of 1942 discussions moved to the possibility of Western European integration doubts began to surface that the United States would be able to supervise such ambitious social engineering without significant investment of treasure and manpower and without incurring the animosity of many Europeans. As one critic noted, there were real risks associated with “carelessly assum[ing] that our social organization would be sufficient and properly adapted in conditions like those of Western Europe.”

Furthermore, the Advisory Committee’s deliberations became part of a larger debate between proponents of regionalism around Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and advocates of universalism such as Cordell Hull and Leo Pasvolsky. European economic integration, universalist critics argued, would merely transpose conflicts onto a higher plane as an antagonistic Europe would seek to assert its interests against America. “Regionalism means bigger and better wars, and forever,” departmental adviser Eugene V. Rostow warned ominously. As 1942 drew to a close the debate on Europe’s future political, monetary and commercial arrangements was wide open.

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875 “E Minutes 12, May 22, 1942,” Box 80, Harley Notter File, RG 59, NARA/CP; “Preliminary and tentative comments on basic assumptions underlying E Documents 48 and 50,” 1 February 1943, Box 81, Harley Notter File, RG 59, NARA/CP.


877 Eugene V. Rostow to Dean Acheson, 18 February 1943, Box 80, Harley Notter File, RG 59, NARA/CP.
The impetus for the CEIP’s involvement with this question came around the same time. In December 1942, the Endowment’s point man for its League of Nations initiatives, Percy Corbett, moved to the Yale Institute for International Studies (IIS) for a Rockefeller-funded, interdisciplinary research project with economist Jacob Viner, on leave from the University of Chicago. The duo was immediately impressed by the academic talent assembled at Yale, which created a fertile intellectual atmosphere with “close contact and pooling of ideas.”\footnote{Jacob Viner to Joseph H. Willits, [January 1943], Box 28, Folder 22, Jacob Viner Papers, Mudd Library.} The IIS group, referred to by outsiders as the “State Department” for its geostrategic flair and close contacts to Washington included Arnold Wolfers, formerly of the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, Nicholas John Spykman and Frederick S. Dunn.\footnote{Cf. Winks, \textit{Cloak & Gown}, 41.} Before moving to Yale, however, Corbett had reached an understanding that cooperation with the CEIP’s Division of International Law would continue in order to bring “economics, international law and political science jointly to bear on the post-war problems which are selected for attack.”\footnote{Percy Corbett to Philip Jessup, [November 1942], Box 80, Folder “Percy E. Corbett,” Jessup Papers, LoC.} Within weeks of starting their project, Corbett and Viner identified European commercial integration as an area warranting further research and started sending out feelers to gauge the Endowment’s interest in cooperating in a study on the history of customs unions. On 24 February the two men submitted their official proposal, noting that “present interest in the idea of customs unions and the possibility that they will be an important feature of post-war arrangements” made the investigation of the historical experience with such institutions “a timely one.”\footnote{“Provisions of Customs Unions,” enclosure to Percy Corbett to George Finch, 24 February 1943, Box 86, Folder 10, CEIP US; on this context see also Paul Oslington, “Contextual History, Practitioner History and Classic Status: Reading Jacob Viner’s The Customs Union Issue,” \textit{Journal of the History of Economic Thought} 35, no. 4 (2013): 497.}

The customs union project was an unlikely alliance that sought to provide facts in order to mediate between different ideological, disciplinary and national points of views on European integration. Joseph Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation liked to refer to Viner and Corbett as “Corvinbetter” to “recognize the fact that intellectually two minds have become one” but at least when it came to the question of regionalism the perspectives of all participants were far apart.\footnote{Joseph H. Willits to Jacob Viner and Percy Corbett, 30 December 1942, Box 28, Folder 22, Viner Papers, Mudd Library.} Percy Corbett’s views had been shaped by his participation in a study group initiated by the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 that sought to ascertain causes of the conflict and future prospects for international organization.\footnote{Cf. Akami, \textit{Internationalizing the Pacific}, 219, 249–250.} When Corbett released his findings in 1942 they amounted to a strong endorsement of regional groupings as laboratories for reconfiguring the relationship between the citizen and the nation state. Nationalism was not a natural state of human existence, he wrote, but an “artificial product of propaganda.” The challenge was to induce “the
obedience of the official and private individual” to be “transferred from the national government to the supranational authority.” A unified world federation was a utopian project for the time being and internationalists needed to set their sights on lower, more achievable projects. Uniting Europe in one federalist project would be ambitious enough and sub-federations in Scandinavia or the Danubian Basin would probably be a more practicable starting point but, along with a Pan-American Union, these projects offered the best prospect for beginning the process of a “shifting of loyalties” from the national to the supranational level.

As an economist and free trader, Jacob Viner had a far less positive take on European commercial integration. In September 1942, he and Alvin Hansen had co-written a paper on the “American Interests in the Economic Unification of Europe with Respect to Trade Barriers” as part of the CFR’s War and Peace Studies that warned of the effects of the “creation of an autarkic continental economy.” America was interested in a free circulation of goods on a global scale and thus should “aim at the interpenetration of Europe’s economy with that of the rest of the world,” not at arrangements that could lead to the closing-off of the European market. Viner’s apprehensiveness tracked closely with attitudes of America’s internationalist business community. While international, particularly European, stability was certainly good business even progressive managers in the United States represented in such lobbying groups as the Committee on International Economic Policy under CEIP-ICC auspices focused most of their attention on claiming new markets for American exports and investments while avoiding a continuation of wartime state controls over the economy. Robust new global or regional institutions were viewed skeptically as either starting points for new protectionism, supranational statism or insubstantial mirages—Thomas J. Watson stunned his fellow CEIP trustees by declaring that there was “no such thing as international law.”

The Carnegie Endowment, represented by its officer George Finch, approached the customs union issue from the perspective of its long-standing support for both Pan-American and Pan-European movements. Indeed, the CEIP was the American organization with perhaps the best institutional memory of the interwar period’s various initiatives for greater political and economic integration of the European continent. It had, after all, been Nicholas Murray Butler who had written the foreword for the American edition of Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe. Throughout the 1920s

885 Ibid., 112, 140.
887 George Finch to Philip Jessup, 31 December 1943, Box 190, Folder 4, CEIP US.
and 1930s the Centre Européen kept in close touch with organizations such as the Union douanière européenne and the foundation had at various points attempted to broker a Danubian and later a Balkan federation. When in September 1929 Aristide Briand launched his call for a European Union it came as a disappointment to the CEIP only in so far as Earle Babcock had lobbied for weeks for the French Prime Minister to deliver his speech at the Centre Européen, thus forever associating the Carnegie Endowment with the cause of European integration.888 Neither were these associations all in the past, as the CEIP continued to work for the European idea in the United States. The frequently quoted popularity of Clarence Streit’s proposal for an Atlantic union in the early years of the war was helped by the fact that the CEIP gave Union Now wide distribution through a special grant.889 Through Butler’s intervention and a modest subsidy Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi was able to relocate his Pan-European project to the Graduate school of New York University,890 The hope that the CEIP attached to a research project on commercial integration was that its results would prove a “useful tool to those who advocate customs unions for the post-war world.”891

Finally, in addition to these diverse American actors, there were the perspectives of the European émigrés they cooperated with. Having agreed to participate in the customs union project, in June 1943 the Division of International Law hired Austrian exile Leopold Kohr and tasked him with assembling comprehensive documentation on historical instances of customs unions that would prepare the ground for later analysis. Kohr’s employment was testament to the longevity of transatlantic networks as the sequence of connections leading to his hiring reached back to Shotwell’s war history project. Kohr was part of a circle of friends that included Alfred Vagts and his fellow Austrian exile Ranshofen-Wertheimer that had all been connected to the IAP in Hamburg, the secretariat of the German war history section.892 Ranshofen-Wertheimer had already joined the Endowment in the summer of 1942 to work with Corbett on the League of Nations project and advocated for European union through an, admittedly, “painfully slow process of mutual adaptation and progressive diminution of customs barriers.”893

888 Babcock had felt that the Endowment was “in a unique position to be helpful in unobtrusive and tactful ways.” Babcock to Butler, 4 October 1929, Box 202, Folder 2, CEIP CE.
889 Clarence K. Streit, Union Now (London: Federal Union, 1939) cf. George Finch to Robert Lester, 25 February 1939, Box 86, Folder 4, CEIP US.
891 “Activities of the Division of International Law in Relation to War and Post-War Problems,” 4 December 1943, Box 190, Folder 3, CEIP US.
Kohr’s officemate at 700 Jackson Place was Raphael Lemkin, then in the process of writing what would become his seminal work *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* which would soon propel the concept of “genocide” into public consciousness. Born and raised in the multiethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire, Kohr disagreed emphatically with his colleague’s project, holding the introduction of racial concepts—even to protect ethnic minorities—a setback for the notion of a liberal international law.894 In 1941, Kohr had published an impassioned defense of localism—or *Kleinstaaterei*—in an article whose title, “Disunion Now,” was a clear reference to Clarence Streit’s book. The idea that a country as homogeneous as the United States could be a model for European Union seemed fanciful to him. In the long run, democracy in Europe would only be able to survive in small units and, while he did not explicitly call for it, Kohr suggested that existing nations should first be broken up into smaller states to then unite them in a loose European federation.895

The complicated setup of the CEIP’s customs union study with its institutional entanglements and competing agendas was by no means unusual. While focusing on the official institutions of U.S. post-war planning suggests a rather orderly, methodical policy process, the reality looked more like a network of public and private institutions in which organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Brookings Institution created links between transnational expert communities and the state. Meanwhile, the CEIP’s Division of Intercourse and Education focused on building public support. As one participant in the foundation’s League of Nation’s project noted, it was one thing for experts to agree on the legal and economic framework of a future world order. Implementing their recommendations, however, depended on the political will of “statesmen, diplomatists, parliaments and the peoples themselves” and on their willingness to “give up certain prerogatives of sovereignty.”896 After twenty years of disappointment at the hands of the U.S. Senate, the CEIP was acutely aware that it was not enough for elites or even the majority of the population to support internationalist policies, but support needed to be country-wide and extend deep into the low-population, agricultural states of the American Midwest.

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“A receptive mood”: Carlo Sforza as Visiting Carnegie Professor

Applying the lessons learned while promoting the World Court and the Chatham House resolutions the core of the Division of Intercourse and Education’s wartime work was a decentralized campaign for internationalist post-war policies that favored local educational activity. The organizational framework for this campaign was established within weeks of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Concerned about the possibility that the United States would again renounce participation in a future international organization, the leaders of the East Coast’s preeminent foreign policy groups spent the winter of 1941/42 discussing means of spreading their internationalist message “beyond cloistered groups of intellectuals.” The debate over how to anchor internationalist principles was closely tied to an attempt to conceal the source of the funding behind the campaign. While the desirability of activism at the local level was widely shared, it was equally clear that if such activity came under the auspices of any of the established East Coast foreign policy groups, it would create a “stigma in the minds of many.”

In March 1942, Clyde Eagleton of CSOP urged the Carnegie Endowment to take the lead in coordinating a country-wide campaign on behalf of all internationalist organizations. The American people were “in a receptive mood,” Eagleton argued, and with an expenditure of about fifty thousand dollars the CEIP could sponsor “eight or ten regional service centers” whose facilities would be available to all interested parties. The CEIP acted on this suggestion and over the course of the next year, so-called “International Relations Centers” were established in eight cities, covering the country from Dallas to Minneapolis and San Francisco to Chapel Hill. In keeping with the low profile approach, the CEIP worked through existing institutions, such as the World Study Council in Detroit and some of the payments were channeled through CSOP, further obscuring the provenance of the money. The strategy was so successful that it attracted remarkable little attention from the CEIP’s usual critics. An investigation by the Chicago Daily Tribune into the “new propaganda network” darkly hinted at an “eastern-financed drive to submerge the American Union and Constitution in a world government” but was heavy on conspiratorial-sounding conjecture and low on specifics.

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898 W.W. Waymack to Brooks Emeny, 26 December 1941, Box 126, John W. Davis Papers, Yale Archives. Figuring prominently in these discussions were Clyde Eagleton (Commission to Study the Organization of Peace), Brooks Emeny (Foreign Policy Association), Clark Eichelberger (League of Nations Association), W.W. Waymack (National Policy Committee), James T. Shotwell (CEIP), all of whom were also members of the Council on Foreign Relations.
899 Clyde Eagleton to Clark Eichelberger, 8 December 1941, Box 283, Folder 13, CEIP US.
900 Clyde Eagleton to James T. Shotwell, 4 March 1942, Box A083, Folder “CEIP Division of Economics and History 1943–42,” Jessup Papers, LoC.
901 Cf. “Centers of Organization Associated with the Endowment,” Box 26, Folder 1, CEIP US; see also Divine, Second Chance, 54.
As with the more centralized research work conducted in Washington, European émigrés were an integral part of this educational campaign, particularly as part of the CEIP’s Visiting Carnegie Professor of International Relations program (VCP). Throughout the war the foundation sent exile scholars and politicians such as Austrian jurist Hersh Lauterpacht, the former director of economic studies at the Bank of France Robert Lacour-Gayet and Carlo Sforza to mostly mid-sized American colleges for two- to four-week lecture programs on international affairs (fig. 7a). \(^903\) Often branching out into surrounding areas for additional talks at local Rotary Clubs, townhall meetings, or related CEIP-organized conferences, the Visiting Carnegie Professors directly reached tens of thousands of Americans. As Sforza’s case illustrates, motivations and expectations behind such sponsorship were rarely straight-forward but usually consisted of a combination of personal and political calculations.

On a basic level, Sforza’s wartime employment reflected the strong personal bonds that had grown over decades of familiarity. A founding member of the Comité d’Administration, Sforza had long

\(^{903}\) Cf. CEIP Year Book 30 (1941) 35–36; CEIP Year Book 33 (1944), 28–29.
been the most recognizable face of the CEIP’s European operations and, along with Nicolas Politis, its most influential collaborator. Butler heaped praise on the Italian—“a most effective coadjutor of ours in various parts of our fields of work”; “speak[s] with full authority”; “exceedingly judicious”—and Earle Babcock appreciated the Count’s “trenchant, sometimes ironical and usually witty comments” at the Comité’s meetings.904 In exile in Paris and then Brussels, Sforza was in close touch with Europe’s foreign policy elite and Italian opposition figures. Subsequently to joining the Comité in 1925, he also established an increasing presence in the United States. With multiple appointments as Visiting Carnegie Professor at U.S. universities and several appearances at the Williamstown Institute of Politics, the transatlantic steamer passage became an almost annual ritual for Sforza, building up contacts among the East Coast’s foreign policy establishment in the process.905 When in June 1940 Sforza had to flee the Continent, the CEIP was quick to lend assistance by passing an “emergency expenditure” to pay for the relocation of the Count and his family to the United States.906

For Sforza, his choice to come to the United States was above all a political calculation. His association with the CEIP gave him a base of operations, a steady income and political connections that could further his ambitions to become Italy’s post-war leader-in-waiting. Sforza’s CEIP salary, which amounted to about five thousand dollars per year—roughly equivalent to the pay of a senior clerk—became his main source of income throughout his American exile, making him in practice, if not in name, an employee of the Carnegie Endowment. From the beginning, President Butler instructed the CEIP’s staff to consider the Italian “as on our pay-roll.”907 This financial security afforded the Italian free time for his political activities, which mainly consisted of building a base of political support in the United States through the Italian-American Mazzini Society, and—significantly—insulated him from political pressure, be it from Washington or from Rome. Especially the latter was a valid concern in light of constant surveillance by Italian authorities, who for years had attempted to drive a wedge between the prominent émigré and the CEIP. In the past, Italian agents had even attempted to prevent Sforza’s VCP appointments by urging college officials to close their doors to the Count. A Tulane University official rebuffed such a request by pointing out that, given

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904 Cf. CEIP Board of Trustees meeting of 6 December 1928, afternoon session, p. 62, Box 14, Folder 5, CEIP US; Babcock to Butler, 22 October 1925, Box 107, Folder 2, CEIP US.
905 Sforza’s first served as Carnegie Visiting Professor in 1929, teaching at Wesleyan University and Rollins College (cf. CEIP Year Book 18, 1929, 57). This was followed by further appointments in 1931, 1933 and 1935–36. On his first attendance of the Williamstown Institute of Politics in 1927 see esp. his account in Sforza, “Williamstown: Impressions Américaines”.
906 “Summary of Income and expenditures for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1941,” Box 28, Folder 3, CEIP US.
907 “Conference with President Butler,” October 29, 1940, Box 42, Folder 2, CEIP US; on Sforza’s salary see “Summary of Income and Expenditures for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1941,” Box 26, Folder 3, CEIP US; the colleges were Wesleyan University, Union College, University of Virginia, Western Reserve University, Kenyon College, Emory University, Hamilton College, Washington and Lee University, Franklin and Marshall College and the University of Wisconsin, cf. CEIP Year Books 1941–44.
the Endowment’s reputation and the power of its president, it was “hardly possible to deny the offer.”

Sforza’s ambitions were not at all contrary to the foundation’s interests. Just as the Division of International Law’s effort to preserve and make available the expertise of European academia and of the League Secretariat offered shelter for international bureaucrats, the VCP program aimed not only at disseminating knowledge but at positioning European candidates for future positions of leadership in a post-war world. Throughout the interwar years the CEIP had been well aware of Sforza’s ambitions to one day play a significant political role in a post-Mussolini Italy. Now, it was Nicholas Murray Butler who within days of Sforza’s arrival in the United States introduced the Italian politician to President Roosevelt. When after Pearl Harbor the search for a credible Italian exile leader who could rally the Italian-American community and inspire opposition within Italy itself became a pressing issue for the U.S. government, Sforza, a household name in the American foreign policy establishment after fifteen years of association with the CEIP, ran initially practically unopposed. His was “the first name that comes to the lips of practically everyone consulted” noted a State Department analysis in January 1942. To Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle it was “perfectly plain that the only leader available is Carlo Sforza.” On 24 February, Sumner Welles, in a remarkably strong endorsement, urged President Roosevelt to throw the weight of the U.S. government behind Sforza, adding that “practically everyone” who had been consulted agreed with the choice: “no other leader is in sight.”

But Sforza’s elevation to Italy’s leader-in-waiting was frustrated when the enthusiasm of the bureaucracy collided with broader policy considerations. President Roosevelt was skeptical of publicly or even covertly backing a candidate at such an early stage. Furthermore, the British government had concluded that Sforza’s plans for a republican Italy would be far less amenable to British interests in the Mediterranean than a weakened monarchist state and lobbied in Washington to withhold official recognition from a man who, they argued, was “completely unrepresentative of modern Italy.” The monarchist card was also favored by some American strategists, notably

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908 Foreign Ministry to Interior Ministry, “Conferenze del Conte Sforza,” 22 November 1932, Busta 4785, Casellario Politico Centrale, ACS.
909 Nicholas Murray Butler to FDR, 8 July 1940, President’s Personal File 6741, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; cf. Zeno, Carlo Sforza, 59; Varsori, Gli alleati e l’emigrazione democratica antifascista (1940–1943), 47.
910 Harold B. Hoskins, “The Leadership of a ‘Free Italy’ Movement in the United States,” 20 January 1942, RG 59, 865.01/68 1/4, NARA/CP.
911 Adolf A. Berle to Sumner Welles, “Re: Italian anti-Axis sentiment,” 17 February 1942, RG 59, 865.01/66, NARA/CP. Particularly Berle, the former Columbia Law School Professor, would have had ample opportunity to become acquainted with Sforza during the 1920s and 1930s.
912 Sumner Welles to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 24 February 1942, RG 59, 865.01/67a, NARA/CP.
913 British Embassy, Washington DC, Aide Memoire “Free Italian Movements,” 28 March 1942, RG 59, 865.01/76 1/2,
Coordinator of Information William J. Donovan, who hoped that a Vatican-supported royalist coup against Mussolini could remove Italy from the battlefield. The lack of official backing was disappointing to Sforza but what was more serious in the eyes of many inside the administration was that the U.S. government also stopped its covert subsidy to the Mazzini Society, which had helped keep the leaders of the democratic Italian-American community afloat. Among those incensed was OSS officer Allen Dulles, who worried that the decision would create a vacuum that could “leave the Italian field more open to subversive Fascist and Communist elements,” adding: “I can quite understand that this disturbs our friend Count Sforza.”

This was where the new connections between NGOs and the government proved efficacious. Support for Sforza ran particularly high in the OSS’s Foreign Nationalities Branch but multiple appeals by the FNB—by now employing Malcolm Davis—to Donovan to rethink his decision against the Mazzini Society were unsuccessful. Yet, while Malcolm Davis and his colleagues were bound by high-level policy decisions as OSS officers, no such constraints existed for Malcolm Davis the CEIP director. “His high position in the Carnegie Endowment enables him to do numerous things which contribute to the success of our work,” Davis’s supervisor D.C. Poole noted around this time. And indeed, once cut loose by the U.S. government the Mazzini Society increasingly relied on informal CEIP support for its financial survival. Besides Sforza, the Society’s secretary Alberto Tarchiani, whom Sforza had once introduced to Butler as his prospective “Permanente [sic] Under-Secretary of State” if he were ever to return to the Italian Foreign Ministry, also received a modest stipend as a special correspondent for Italy that was only tenuously justified by the actual services he rendered to the Endowment. While Sforza had clearly lost his fight for official recognition by the Roosevelt administration, his deep contacts among East Coast foreign policy elites ensured that his political project remained unharmed.

Sforza’s actual work as VCP was carefully integrated into the CEIP’s overall strategy of exerting pressure through America’s political system by changing the discourse at the local level. Eschewing the East Coast’s Ivy League institutions with their busy academic and social life, the CEIP considered mid-sized universities where a man of Sforza’s stature would command the full attention of the

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915 Memo by Allen W. Dulles, 23 July 1942, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 328, WN#13501, NARA/CP; Allen W. Dulles to Hugh R. Wilson, 23 July 1942, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 328, WN#13501, NARA/CP.
916 D.C. Poole to Robert H. Alcorn, 24 September 1942, Malcolm Davis OSS personnel file, RG 226, Entry 224, Box 171, NARA/CP.
917 Carlo Sforza to Nicholas Murray Butler, [December 1936], Box 337 Folder 6, CEIP US; Tarchiani’s reports developed a reputation among CEIP trustees as “mostly news rewritten uselessly,” cf. Note by Malcolm Davis to Haskell, January 1943, Box 104, Folder 6, CEIP US.
community “worth ten Universities of Chicago or Columbia Universities.” It was also no accident that many of the locations selected to receive special attention from Sforza—Western Reserve University and Kenyon College (Ohio), the University of Madison (Wisconsin) and Emory University (Georgia)—mapped onto the electoral fault lines of the U.S. Senate’s debate on foreign relations. Michigan and Ohio were home to two of the most prominent representatives of the chamber’s anti-internationalist wing, Senators Robert M. La Follette, Jr., and Robert A. Taft, while Georgia’s powerful Democratic Senator Walter F. George was at the time of the appointment chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and a crucial swing vote on international issues. The CEIP’s eagerness to send their lecturers out into the American heartland was a constant source of friction as it conflicted with Sforza’s more pressing concerns with émigré politics. Conveniently, the Count had detected spots around Washington, DC, and New York “where isolationism and provincialism are just as thick as in Alabama” that were within easy traveling distance to Mazzini Society rallies and meetings at the State Department. Thus, the itineraries of European VCPs were usually split between easily accessible locations on the East Coast and politically more salient destinations, especially Ohio, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Georgia.

By sending the liberal aristocrat Sforza to regions of the United States that received much of their information on international affairs from the Hearst press and the Chicago Tribune, the Endowment hoped to counter the cliché of European diplomats as “men of sinister purpose and abnormal capacity” and thus remove a potential obstacle to future transatlantic cooperation. In the dozens of lectures, seminars, round table discussions and newspaper interviews Sforza conducted in- and off-campus his engaging personality proved a perfect fit for the CEIP’s strategy of subtle activism. Faced with the inevitable question about his links to the famous rulers of Renaissance Milan Sforza was fond of gently turning the tables on the questioner by chuckling at Americans’ obsession with European royalty. Since he was well aware that his students and listeners were “afraid of ‘propaganda’” the former diplomat was careful to avoid any appearance of internationalist proselytizing, of a foreigner meddling in American political discussions. His curriculum relied heavily on personal anecdotes to bring to life European diplomatic history of the past decades and it was usually only in his final lecture on “America, her interests and her duties in relation with [the] world of today and tomorrow,” that he

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918 “Conference with President Butler, March 18, 1941,” Box 42, Folder 4, CEIP US.
919 By the time Sforza arrived in Georgia in February 1942, Senator George had relinquished his chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee to head the Finance Committee, whose authority over trade policy made Georgians’ attitudes on foreign affairs no less relevant to internationalists.
920 Sforza to Haskell, 19 May 1943, Box 338, Folder 1, CEIP US.
921 E.g. in addition to Sforza, Ohio also hosted Robert Lacour-Gayet and Hubertus zu Löwenstein, both of whom, along with Hersh Lauterpacht, also visited Minnesota, cf. CEIP Year Books 1941–45.
923 See for example Sforza to Butler, 30 March 1936, with attachments, Box 337, Folder 7, CEIP US.
impressed upon his listeners that there was “no more place of isolation in a world, all the parts of which become more and more interdependent.”^924^ A grudgingly admiring journalist who had witnessed Sforza lecture in Oklahoma in the 1930s once characterized the politician, schooled in the arts of persuasion, as “as tricky as a pet mule in a circus, and as slippery as a Mississippi eel. You aim your forensic howitzer at him and find it was loaded with boomerangs.”^925^ 

The combination of a changed geopolitical constellation and a Carnegie-financed public relations campaign did not fail to make an impression. Future U.S. President Harry S. Truman got a first-hand view of the changed intellectual landscape in the United States when in August 1943 he traversed the Midwest on behalf of the Western Policy Committee (WPC), a local cut-out for the CEIP that traced its roots back to the campaign for the Chatham House Resolutions of 1935. Over the course of three weeks, Truman and his Republican colleague Walter H. Judd visited nineteen cities in four states, reaching over 10,000 Midwesterners with their message of global interdependence.^926^ “When the Japanese moved into Manchuria in 1931 it was as if Hirohito’s soldiers marched right down the main street of Hastings,” Judd proclaimed in Nebraska. “When Hitler’s armies marched into the Sudetenland […] it was as if they walked in hob-nailed boots over the threshold of every home in America.”^927^ The response was rather different than expected. An accompanying journalist observed that the politicians were not “quite prepared for the universal friendliness shown here to the thesis they are presenting.” Already a year earlier the WPC’s director had reported to the CEIP’s headquarters that “the old Borah isolationism” was practically extinct in Idaho.^928^ The changed atmosphere was clearly evident in the Congressional elections of 1944. In Ohio, Robert Taft narrowly avoided defeat to a relatively unknown Democratic challenger. In New York, long-time internationalist target Hamilton Fish III was voted out of the House of Representatives and in the most conspicuous demonstration that times had changed, Senator Gerald Nye lost his Senate race in North Dakota. The Carnegie Endowment and its network of affiliated national and local organizations had been of active assistance in pushing some of these politicians out of Congress.^929^

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^924^ “Program of Lectures by Count Carlo Sforza,” Western Reserve University, October 1941, Box 337, Folder 6, CEIP US; Carlo Sforza, “Democracy Is Stronger: If Only We Knew It,” Vital Speeches of the Day 7, no. 6 (January 1941): 181.


^927^ Quoted in “Nebraskans Shy at Ball Resolution,” Baltimore Sun, 4 August 1943.

^928^ “Iowa the Heart of Isolationism,” Baltimore Sun, 31 July 1943; Harry Terrell to Ursula Hubbard, 14 May 1932, Box 265, Folder 5, CEIP US.

^929^ This was particularly the case for Senator Nye's race, cf. Harry E. Terrell, “Report on Work in North Dakota, May 18–28, 1944,” Box 265, Folder 6, CEIP US.
From research to policy: The Design Group

In the summer of 1943, as the CEIP’s educational drive was showing signs of success, the foundation’s research activities in support of post-war planning were taking on a greater sense of urgency. The war was going well for the Allies. The German advance in the East had been stopped, in North Africa and Sicily British and American forces were making inroads and over the course of the following years a series of inter-Allied conferences—from Hot Springs to Bretton Woods to San Francisco—would create the institutional framework of the post-war world. Conducted mostly at the technical level, these conversations became the natural focal point for lobbying efforts by those who wanted to leave an imprint on the peace settlement. What counted in these discussions were not so much the opinions of individual policy makers—the American lead negotiator at Bretton Woods, Harry Dexter White, privately favored the Soviet economic model—but the body of knowledge brought to bear on the negotiations as delegations formulated the national interest. As the American government prepared its negotiating positions, one of the issues that approached resolution early on was the question of the place of regional arrangements in a post-war world. In July 1943, the State Department initiated a Special Subcommittee on Problems of European Organization to investigate the implications of a European economic union for the interests of the United States. One of the participants was Jacob Viner and this, in connection with the fact that both the chief and the assistant chief of the Department’s Division of Economic Studies were former students of his, greatly increased the potential significance of the CEIP’s customs union study.

One may have expected an American foundation that intended to promote the cause of European economic integration to draw the attention of policy-makers to the example of the United States to suggest that unencumbered trade between states could lead to a prosperous, stable and peaceful commonwealth. Instead, the CEIP’s lead researcher Leopold Kohr approached the project from a rather different perspective. Perhaps in keeping with his “small is beautiful” credo or to make maximum use of his language skills, more than half of the two hundred and fifty treaties and plans he collected as historical examples of customs unions documented the experience of the nineteenth century Zollverein between the collection of small German states or Austro-Hungarian

930 On these conferences see Benn Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Howson, Lionel Robbins; Schlesinger, Act of Creation.
932 Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945; Leroy Stinebower to Viner, 16 January 1943, Box 25, Folder 9, Viner Papers, Mudd Library.
arrangements. This Germanic slant was by no means contrary to the wishes of his financiers, who believed that a Central European union could form the nucleus of a broader European federation. As may be recalled, many of the foundation’s officers and partners had long believed that the break-up of Austria-Hungary had been a mistake. In the course of working on his war history project, James T. Shotwell had become intrigued with the concept of Mitteleuropa, plans for a Central European union generated in German and Austrian debates over war aims, and now touted this to Viner as “the most important effort ever made to create a Central European customs union.”

The approach of stabilizing the perennial trouble spots of Eastern and Southeastern Europe through the enlargement of markets held a certain appeal to representatives of an organization that had long sought to encourage regional cooperation among Danubian and Balkan states and that had been sympathetic to the proposed Austro-German customs union of 1931. Ideas such as Friedrich Naumann’s dictum that the “spirit of large-scale business and of supranational organization has reached politics” certainly resonated with the premises on which the CEIP-ICC cooperation had been built. Mitteleuropa’s abundant illiberal facets received far less attention: deliberately designed as an alternative to Western democratic traditions it conceptualized a supposedly organic economic integration as a means to establishing German political and cultural hegemony over large parts of continental Europe. One émigré who strictly opposed such a Central European route to integration was Carlo Sforza, who saw Mitteleuropa “in no way” as a path toward European union but as a product of scholarly warfare, “inspired by war ideas.” Neither did the nostalgia for the grandeur of the Habsburg Empire endorsed by some of his fellow exiles appeal to the Italian liberal, for whom the future could not be built on the “rotten failures of the past.”

In the short run, the CEIP’s customs union project was anything but a success. Kohr only finished his preliminary work in the summer of 1944 and with Jacob Viner still occupied by multiple consulting commitments the anticipated study never materialized in time to make an impact on American planning. Furthermore, the renowned economist made no secret that he had little sympathy for the course pursued by the foundation and its Austrian researcher, expressing some puzzlement at their

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933 For a list of these documents see the appendix to Jacob Viner, *The Customs Union Issue* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950).
938 Sforza to Sumner Welles, 21 November 1942, Box 83, Folder 10, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
apparent fixation with the Zollverein. Rather than viewing such historical examples as possible blueprints for future arrangements, Viner interpreted them as more sinister enterprises that were mainly vehicles for political domination. During the deliberations of the State Department’s Special Subcommittee he voiced the concern that, just as the Zollverein example had demonstrated with Germany, a future European union would “increase the bargaining power of the area” and thus hurt American commercial interests. These fears were shared by the full committee, which weighed the advantages of a large, prosperous market for American exporters against the potentially disastrous consequences should a united Europe pursue a protectionist or even autarkic external commercial policy. “Like the little girl in the nursery rhyme,” the Subcommittee concluded, a European customs union could either be “very, very good or horrid” and thus counseled “an attitude of caution and reserve” toward such plans.

While the CEIP’s research evidently failed to sway the needle of American post-war planning on the issue of European economic regionalism there were other areas where American experts proved more understanding of the views of their European colleagues. This was particularly the case when it came to the future of Europe’s colonial possessions. The official position of the U.S. government very much followed the anti-imperialist tradition of American foreign policy. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 had promised sovereign rights to “all peoples,” a commitment that was affirmed by U.S. Vice President Wendell Wilkie in October 1942 when in a widely publicized speech he called for an end to Europe’s colonial rule over wide areas of the globe. Colonialism had also always posed a thorny problem to Europe’s interwar federalists. Framing European integration as incompatible with colonialism would have been politically toxic but including overseas possessions in an economic union was equally unfeasible. The State Department’s Subcommittee noted that the future of the colonies could well be “the chief stumbling-block” to any movement toward European integration.

939 Cf. Jacob Viner to George Finch, 2 October 1944, Box 86, Folder 10, CEIP US.
941 “How Would A European Full Customs Union Affect the Long-Run Economic Interests of the United States?,” E Document 177, 17 September 1943, Box 82, Harley Notter File, RG 59, NARA/CP; see also Hearden, Architects of Globalism, 75.
943 “How Would A European Full Customs Union Affect the Long-Run Economic Interests of the United States?” E Document 177, 17 September 1943, Box 82, Harley Notter File, RG 59, NARA/CP.
What European exiles brought to this question was a liberal imperial reform discourse that separated colonialism from its formerly economic or nationalist justification into a project of transnational identity formation, as the joint development of dependent areas would bring meaning and purpose to international institutions.\textsuperscript{944} Carlo Sforza, while harboring no illusions about the often-touted economic rationale for colonies, held continuing European control over these areas important for reasons of political culture. Seeking to turn overseas possessions from a liability into an asset, he proposed to build on the work of the League’s Mandates Section by expanding it into a joint-venture for international development: “In the new frame each of our colonies will cost us much less, our economic gains will be much greater, and the discontent of the natives will be eliminated almost completely.”\textsuperscript{945} Sharing in an internationalized colonial project in the face of rising anti-colonial sentiment in Africa and Asia could reconstitute European morale, preserve national pride and form a bond between European nations as between “two white men meeting in the desert.” For Sforza, international colonial administration thus became an integral part of constructing a common European identity as well as uniting the continent and America, which lacked “colonial experience” in a common purpose.\textsuperscript{946} Coudenhove-Kalergi, similarly promoted the idea of an “Atlantic Civilization” that was distinct from the ”Asiatic branches of mankind”\textsuperscript{947} and Moritz Julius Bonn envisaged a system that would incorporate “politically backwards” peoples “as free members in a co-operative empire” with standards for colonial administration set by an international body.\textsuperscript{948}

One American on whom such arguments made a distinct impression was Jacob Viner. In January 1943 he was handed a letter in which Bonn appealed for help in moving American public opinion toward a more sympathetic attitude vis-à-vis the colonial powers. The U.S. armed forces were now coming into contact with “articulate semi-educated natives” in Asia and Africa who would persuade the American people to support their aspirations for independence by dismantling Europe’s colonial empires, Bonn worried. This would be a mistake based on profound misconceptions as to the nature


\textsuperscript{945} Carlo Sforza, \textit{The Totalitarian War and after: Personal Recollections and Political Considerations} (London: Allen & Unwin, 1942), 69.

\textsuperscript{946} Sforza, \textit{Europe and Europeans}, 236; Sforza, \textit{The Totalitarian War and After}, 71.


\textsuperscript{948} Moritz Julius Bonn, “The New World Order,” \textit{Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science} 216 (July 1, 1941): 174; Moritz Julius Bonn, “The Future of Imperialism,” \textit{Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science} 228 (July 1, 1943): 72; according to Patricia Clavin, it is highly likely that Bonn disseminated such ideas in the United States as an “agent of influence” for the British government, cf. Clavin, “A ‘Wandering Scholar,’” 34.
of the colonial conflict. Hinting at the close link between anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism he warned of seeking to export the “American Brand of Democracy.” The solution lay not in immediate independence but in the gradual transformation of coercive colonial regimes into benign development projects. An impressed Viner suggested that Bonn publish the letter in the *New York Times*, where it would “do a lot of good.” As the Council on Foreign Relations’ rapporteur on colonial policy Viner also gave these sentiments wider circulation in official circles with a 1944 report on “The American interest in the ‘colonial problem.’” “We must avoid a holier-than-thou or ‘moral leadership’ attitude,” the economist argued. The administration should avoid hastily giving in to public sympathies for colonized peoples and instead channel these sentiments into “minimum standards of colonial administration” and improvements in infrastructure, education and public health. Such an approach would not only serve the economic goals of U.S. industry but also “satisfy American humanitarian interests.”

Interpersonal networks were not the only avenue through which established internationalist discourses reached decision-makers. A more formal venue grew out of the CEIP’s “International Law of the Future” project. Manley Hudson’s group completed its work in December 1943 and the resulting two hundred page document was ceremoniously presented to Secretary Hull, Vice President Henry A. Wallace and Attorney-General Francis B. Biddle. Despite its legalistic name, the document was much more than a law treatise. Ranging from abstract principles to concrete proposals for a future political, legal and economic global infrastructure, the booklet represented the fruits of the CEIP’s entire wartime research and was—in effect—a condensation of over three decades of transnational consensus-building. It reiterated many of the core premises of the foundation’s economic and legal internationalism (“A complete autarchy is impossible for any country”; “the sovereignty of a State is subject to the limitations of international law”) and endorsed a successor organization to the League of Nations as well as a continuation of the League’s technical sections. Among the latter was the work of the Mandates Section. While the document noted that the precise involvement of the new international organization in colonial affairs would have to be determined in light of political circumstances, it endorsed the idea that the international community should embrace its responsibility for “protecting dependent peoples against serfdom and exploitation, and of assuring

949 Moritz Julius Bonn to Joseph Willits, 13 January 1943, Box 28, Folder 22, Viner Papers, Mudd Library.
to them an opportunity of developing their indigenous cultures and their self-respect.”

Meanwhile, Hudson, CEIP officers Shotwell, Malcolm Davis and Philip Jessup as well as League veterans Arthur Sweetser, Huntington Gilchrist and Raymond Fosdick started to meet informally with over a dozen State Department officials, including Leo Pasvolsky, Benjamin V. Cohen and Green H. Hackworth, to translate the *International Law of the Future* results into a concrete proposal for an international organization.\(^{953}\) This so-called “Design Group” finished its proposed charter for a “General International Organization” in May 1944, about two months before the State Department finalized its own draft for the postwar political order.\(^{954}\) The final documents bore striking similarities to each other as well as to the eventual outcome of the United Nations Conference at San Francisco the following year. The Design Group’s charter already envisioned a division between a Security Council and a General Assembly, including the distinction between permanent, veto-powers and additional, elected members without a veto.\(^{955}\) Yet, this was less evidence of any direct influence in one direction or the other than of the generally blurry lines between official and unofficial planning at the expert level. Conferences, publications, personal communication and temporary contracts ensured a permanent circulation of ideas between the State Department and institutions such as the CEIP, the CFR, the IIS or the Brookings Institution.

In another remarkable instance of converging discourses, CEIP-sponsored ideas that had been branded as internationalist propaganda only years earlier now became widely accepted across class divides. It may have been unsurprising that the United States Chamber of Commerce’s Committee on International Post-War Problems, headed by former CEIP-ICC Joint Committee participant Harper Sibley, faithfully reproduced many of the transnational compromises negotiated during the second half of the 1930s. More astonishingly, when the American Federation of Labor unveiled its own official post-war program during a mass rally at the Hotel Commodore in New York City in May 1944 the document had largely been ghost-written by James Shotwell.\(^{956}\) The two organizations still advocated for different policies but by relying on the same source of expertise their frame of reference was virtually identical: a future liberal world order with a return of international markets that would, however, be policed by international institutions to prevent exploitative working conditions and the


emergence of international cartels.

On the other hand, as the example of the customs union study shows, the ability of non-governmental groups to suggest concrete policy solutions was limited—even for an organization as well-connected as the CEIP. By the summer of 1943 the type of regional organization favored by many in the foundation had practically been ruled out by the administration and consequently the idea played an ever smaller role in CEIP-connected publications. The booklet on the future of international law still contained a perfunctory mention that the new international organization should not preclude the creation of “groups of States on the basis of regional propinquity” but half a year later the Design Group’s draft charter made no mention of this. Rather than completely abandoning the customs union study, however, the project languished in a state of inertia until a changed political situation refocused attention. On 17 May 1948, almost four years after Leopold Kohr’s document collection had been sent to Chicago, the Carnegie Endowment’s new president Alger Hiss picked up the phone to call Jacob Viner in order to impress upon the professor the urgency of finally completing his analytical work. Viner agreed wholeheartedly that the book was “timely right now” and that “any further delay would be undesirable.” The sudden interest in an economics project now in its sixth year had much to do with the political activities of another former CEIP collaborator at the time.

The union that wasn’t: The Franco-Italian customs negotiations of 1948

In late spring of 1943 the CEIP prepared another full slate of teaching assignments for their VCP Carlo Sforza, alas, when the next academic year started, Skidmore and Williams College did not get the opportunity to host the Italian. As soon as Allied forces had gained a foothold in Northern Africa, the Count had attempted to travel to Libya to create a “public focus of Italian resistance in an Italian territory” but with Churchill still favoring a monarchist solution for Italy the British blocked the return of the major representative of Italian republicanism. The deadlock was finally broken by Roosevelt’s personal intervention and in early September 1943 the State Department informed the British government in no uncertain terms that Sforza would be permitted to travel. Sforza’s rocky relationship with the British authorities continued to undermine his political standing, leading him to decline a number of government positions over the course of the next years. It was not until Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi shook up his cabinet to remove all Socialist ministers that the Count

958 Alger Hiss to E.N. Thompson, 17 May 1948, Box 86, Folder 10, CEIP US.
959 Memorandum of Conversation, Carlo Sforza, Sumner Welles, “Proposed trip to Tripoli,” 8 February 1943, Box 92, Folder 1, Welles Papers, FDRL.
became part of the post-war government. On 2 February 1947, Carlo Sforza became Foreign Minister of Italy once again—a quarter century after he had last held the post.

Sforza entered the foreign ministry at a time when questions of European commercial union had moved to the forefront of newspaper columns and international conference agendas. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had revived the idea behind the Ouchy Convention and formed a tariff union. The Marshall Plan and American pressure had furthered the cause of European integration and since September 1947 a European Customs Union Study Group was meeting periodically in Geneva to discuss the creation of a common market. Sforza’s own contribution to this movement and his signature foreign policy initiative of the first year of his tenure, a push for a customs union between Italy and France, has, however, often been regarded as less a contribution toward the eventual creation of a European common market than as a naïve, idealist project based on questionable economics whose main objective was to placate American calls for market integration in the course of the European Recovery Program. On the other hand, Sforza himself traced the idea back to a pivotal meeting between himself and Charles de Gaulle in Algiers in 1943 at which the two men hashed out the outlines of an economic union between the two countries. In fact, neither of these two narratives accurately reflects the genesis of the foreign minister’s initiative, which had originally taken shape in a rather different context.

While Sforza had campaigned to change the minds of American voters during the war, America had also left an imprint on his own views on the policies needed to restore European stability. The most tangible impact of the Carnegie Endowment’s work on Sforza was his growing conviction that any movement toward a federated Europe would have to start with economic integration and then proceed toward political union. Sforza usually traced the need for closer economic cooperation to his readings of Italian national hero Giuseppe Mazzini, who believed that growing economic interdependence would become a pacifying force in international relations. Yet, it was only during the 1930s and in the course of Sforza’s close cooperation with the CEIP that he began to stress the necessity of European economic integration. In his lectures and wartime publications, Sforza chastised the

961 Cf. Gillingham, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 146; Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 179.
963 Already during his 1931 lectures in Texas Sforza had hinted that “some sort of economic federation” was needed in Europe, cf. article in Austin Statesman, 7 February 1931; Merlone credits “contatti con il mondo accademico e politico anglosassone e nord-americano” with influencing his thinking, cf. Merlone, L’unificazione europea nel pensiero e nell’azione di Carlo Sforza, 216; on Mazzini’s economic views see Recchia and Urbinati, “Giuseppe Mazzini’s International Political Thought,” 19–20.
Fascist illusion of “autarchy” and asserted that “a more-or-less federated Europe” would soon prove its superior ability to address the economic interests of Italians.\textsuperscript{964} To Sforza, the logical starting point for such a union were the “two Latin sisters,” France and Italy. When these two countries stood together they could be a positive force in international affairs, he told the \textit{Cleveland Plain Dealer} in November 1941.\textsuperscript{965} By 1943, his ideas had taken on a more specific form. Italy and France should act as “pioneers of humanity” by demonstrating the feasibility of the integration of two nation states in an “economic alliance or agreement.” This, Sforza thought, would not only command worldwide respect but blaze a trail for other nations to follow.\textsuperscript{966} By the end of his lecture activities for the CEIP, the suggestion for a Franco-Italian customs union had become a fixed part of his program.

Once in office, the seventy-five-year-old set out to put these ideas into practice. A few months after he took the oath of office, Sforza used the first meeting of the Committee for European Economic Co-operation (CEEC) in Paris to sound out the French delegation on Franco-Italian economic cooperation. He followed up on this initiative with a memorandum to the CEEC in August, urging the development of a customs union that encompassed the Marshall Plan area as a prelude to European unification.\textsuperscript{967} While the political advantages of Italy appearing to take the lead as America’s most eager European advocate in support of the Marshall Plan were not lost on the Italian government,\textsuperscript{968} to the foreign minister these policy choices were as much about finally bringing Italy’s foreign policy into alignment with the requirements of new international norms as about short-term political advantage. At a meeting of the Italian cabinet on 16 December 1947, a number of ministers, who no doubt had one eye on the upcoming election in 1948, expressed serious reservations about a policy that was insufficiently assertive of Italy’s sovereignty and could open the government to public criticism. Sforza was nothing if not dismissive of such concerns. Nations had become so interdependent that it was counterproductive for the country to base its diplomacy on “the old cliché of independence,” he lectured his colleagues.\textsuperscript{969}

In fact, as Sforza’s fellow ministers knew and American foreign-policy makers soon discovered, resistance to both European integration and the transatlantic alliance was widespread in Italy as liberal internationalist policies collided with local political constellations and cultural preferences.\textsuperscript{970} A main

\textsuperscript{964} Carlo Sforza, \textit{The Real Italians: A Study in European Psychology} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), 152.
\textsuperscript{965} “Sforza Is Symbol for Free Italy,” \textit{Cleveland Plain Dealer}, 16 November 1941.
\textsuperscript{966} Carlo Sforza, \textit{Italia e Francia di domani}, (Roma: Edizioni Roma, 1944), 36; originally published in French in 1943.
\textsuperscript{968} Cf. Gillingham, \textit{Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe}, 146.
\textsuperscript{969} Quoted in Guido Formigoni, \textit{La Democrazia cristiana e l’alleanza occidentale: 1943–1953} (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996), 172.
\textsuperscript{970} For recent readings highlighting processes of rejection and appropriation see Alessandro Brogi, \textit{A Question of Self-
source of opposition was the political left—Communists, socialists and labor unions. The Italian Communist party (PCI) participated in a Europe-wide campaign to brand the “Marshallization” of Europe as a threat to world peace, claiming that it would lead to a pauperization of the Continent. Yet, to a considerable extent criticism across the political spectrum was voiced in cultural and explicitly nationalist terms, with the PCI condemning Italian participation in the Marshall Plan as giving in to an American capitalist plot to undermine Italy’s national sovereignty and to replace its authentic European culture with shallow Hollywood fare. Even Italian business leaders were less than sanguine about new free trade initiatives. Under Fascism, the blow of government intervention in private enterprise had been softened by protectionist policies that afforded ample opportunities for rent-seeking. In the resulting low-export Italian economy attitudes toward globalization remained conflicted. Angelo Costa, president of the country’s premier employers’ association Confindustria, did his best to unify the contradictory views of his constituents when he declared autarchic policies “errors” that were “perhaps deadly, perhaps necessary, perhaps inevitable” in times of economic hardship. In any case, he affirmed, Italians would never shed their culture of home-made food and small-scale artisanal manufacturing for a globalized economy based on mass-production.

That Sforza was aware of these sentiments is evidenced by the unprecedented emphasis the foreign minister placed on building public support for his policies. Drawing on his decades of experience in campaigning for an “international mind” in Europe and in the United States, Carlo Sforza made public outreach a cornerstone of his tenure. In countless interviews, conferences, speeches and publications he made the case for sacrificing national sovereignty in return for economic and security benefits. Under his management, the foreign ministry’s once staid press office was reorganized into an effective public relations bureau, releasing a steady stream of Sforza’s speeches and statements to the press, which disseminated his ideas to foreign and domestic audiences. The policy prescriptions and their

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971 Cf. Brogi, Confronting America, 128–130; Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe, 123.
normative justification bore unmistakable hallmarks of the interwar liberal internationalist discourse, as was evident in Sforza’s famous programmatic address on European union at Perugia on 18 July 1948. Sforza deplored the notion of the “absolute sovereignty” of nation states that was the “sole cause of all modern wars”; he asserted that European states had become “small in the face of modern technology”; and he called for an end to the “foolish customs barriers that only serve to keep down the standard of living.”  

To the Italian public, however, the foreign policy debate hardly presented itself as a referendum on interwar internationalist schemes but instead at times took the form of an exegesis of the thought of Italy’s nineteenth century founding fathers. Sforza’s Perugia address was replete with allusions to the leaders and the battles of the Risorgimento. He pointed to Giuseppe Mazzini’s support for a United States of Europe and traced it forward to the antifascist philosopher Eugenio Colorni to argue that Italian nationalism had always been singularly compatible with internationalist principles: “only in Italy did we have a Risorgimento that was both national and universal.”  

On another occasion he claimed that the “deeper meaning” of the Risorgimento was for the country “not to isolate itself from the great problems of Europe and of the world.” This brazen appropriation of the symbols of Italian nationalism was countered by Socialist opposition leader Pietro Nenni. Exaggerated fears of isolation were precisely the type of “old attitude of timid moderates against whom Mazzini spoke out in his time,” the Socialist leader argued. He chastised Sforza for repeatedly daring to invoke Mazzini, “heaven knows why […], as the moral authority for his policy.” Sforza’s rhetoric demonstrated an awareness of the importance of the politics of memory in adapting globalist principles to local discourses.

A combination of economic anxiety and fragile national pride in the wake of territorial losses posed a serious challenge to the reigning Christian Democrats in the election campaign of 1948, and this brought Sforza’s customs union idea back into the picture. The PCI seized on patriotic indignation and directly accused Sforza’s foreign policy of failing “to protect Italy’s independence from the American imperialists.” On the far right, Sforza’s pro-Allied statements during the war were now being used against him to support allegations that he had co-conspired to throw the Free Territory of

975 Carlo Sforza, “Discorso di Perugia,” 18 July 1948, busta 4, fasc. 17, Carlo Sforza Papers, ACS. 
976 Ibid. 
977 Sforza speech on 28 September 1948, busta 4, fasc. 17, Sforza Papers, ACS. 
Trieste “into the Balkan hell,” where the monuments “left everywhere by the Italian genius” were now being overtaken by Slavs.980 In February 1948 the Soviet government fanned these nationalist flames in support of the PCI’s campaign by announcing its support for an Italian trusteeship of Somalia.981 The dramatic Soviet offer sprung the Italian government into action, as it sought to convince the Western powers that a similarly generous counteroffer was needed to diffuse the issue. “Do not give me away,” Sforza pleaded with his British counterpart Ernest Bevin, “personally I would sooner prefer a gigantic reconstruction in our South and in Sicily than to spend a penny in Africa. But you know too well that certain traditions are a force one cannot ignore.”982 To provide Sforza with a foreign policy success French foreign minister Georges Bidault quickly agreed to bring the Franco-Italian customs union project to a signature, however, Ambassador Pietro Quaroni reminded him that Italians did not “live by bread alone.” The two men concluded that in addition to the economic agreement there needed to be a further appeal to Italian national sentiment. While concessions on the colonial issue would be difficult in light of Anglo-American opposition, there was a possibility of accommodating Italy on Trieste.983

The final, finely honed message was delivered to the Italian people during a carefully orchestrated meeting between Sforza and Bidault on 20 March 1948 on occasion of the signing ceremony for a governmental agreement on the Franco-Italian customs union. In what was the first visit by an Allied foreign minister to Italy since the end of the war, the two men were greeted by cheering crowds as they made their way through the heart of Turin. A center of Italian industry, the city had been selected by the Italian foreign ministry out of fears that the Piedmont could become a wellspring of opposition to European economic integration. A staged public demonstration of support was intended to deny this potential advantage to the PCI.984 Again symbolically attaching the idea of economic integration to the protagonists of the Risorgimento, the signing ceremony took place in the former study of nineteenth century liberal free trader Camillo Benso di Cavour.985 In their statements, both ministers stressed the need to move beyond the nationalist economic policies of the past and toward an

980 Attilio Tamaro, La Condanna dell’Italia Nel Trattato Di Pace (Bologna: Cappelli, 1952), 17, 71; On the continuities between imperialist and Cold War rhetoric, particularly in regard to Trieste see Sabina Mihelj, “Imperial Myths between Nationalism and Communism: Appropriations of Imperial Legacies in the North-Eastern Adriatic during the Early Cold War,” European History Quarterly 41, no. 4 (2011): 640.
984 Sforza had told Bidault that Turin was chosen “because it could be a center of interest, especially industrial, from which some opposition to the Union could have arisen,” cf. “Colloquio del Ministro Degli Esteri, Sforza, con il Ministro Degli Esteri di Francia, Bidault,” 15 March 1948, in I documenti diplomatici italiani: Decima serie: 1943–48, vol. VII, 15 dicembre 1947–7 maggio 1948, doc. 440, p. 546.
integrated European economic space. Finally, to the surprise of the attending Communist mayor of Turin Celeste Negraville, but agreed upon five days earlier between Sforza and Bidault, the French foreign minister unveiled a joint statement by the Western Allies calling for the complete return of Trieste to Italian control. Speaking only for his own country Bidault went even further, vowing to seek “the greatest possible degree of satisfaction” for Italy’s colonial demands.\(^{986}\) Over the course of the following days the Trieste announcement dominated Italian press coverage, serving, as intended, to blunt any criticism of the government’s internationalist foreign policy.

In addition to the continuities of ideas, Sforza’s connections built during his American exile may have played an additional role in the 1948 election and beyond. The involvement of the recently founded Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Italian campaign was a seminal moment in the development of American conceptions of political warfare that would become a key feature of the Cultural Cold War. Suitcases of cash started arriving in Italy and the country was inundated with propaganda films supporting the Marshal Plan.\(^{987}\) The historical record concerning this time period is still slim, however, we do know that many of the CIA-sponsored institutions set up around this time to fight the cultural Cold War were closely connected to the main U.S. philanthropies and foundation officers often operated in both fields. This was definitely the case with Malcolm Davis. When in 1950, one such political warfare group—the National Committee for Free Europe (NCFE)—opened a Free Europe University in Exile in Strasbourg to help train leaders for a future liberated Eastern Europe they turned to the former Centre Européen director and now evidently CIA officer to help run it.\(^{988}\) To what extent Carlo Sforza may have continued to cooperate with his old partners in the CEIP and OSS in these activities is still unclear, however, it appears noteworthy that an internal NCFE report regarding Davis’s “university” referred to Sforza as “our good friend in Italy.”\(^{989}\)

The Franco-Italian customs union never materialized. The French government’s participation in the negotiations had always been halfhearted as it considered an economic union with the Benelux


countries much more desirable.\footnote{Cf. Gillingham, \textit{Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe}, 146; Milward, \textit{The Reconstruction of Western Europe}, 179.} Even if it had come to pass, it is unlikely that the union, as contemplated, would have been warmly welcomed in Washington. The two governments had delegated much of the detailed bargaining to a commission representing both countries’ business communities and when this body reported back the result was a document full of protectionist safeguards that was far removed from the aspirations of free traders and economic internationalists. Even when accepting the premise of market integration, the Italian vision of a globalized economy hardly resembled the American one.\footnote{Milward, \textit{The Reconstruction of Western Europe}, 252–253; Serra, “L’unione doganale Italo-Francese e la conferenza di Santa Margherita (1947–1951),” 86–87, 92–94; See also the frequent frustrations of American Marshall Plan officials at Italian resistance to free market reforms, cf. Brogi, \textit{A Question of Self Esteem}, 84–85; Ellwood, “Italy, Europe and the Cold War,” 35–36; Romero, \textit{The United States and the European Trade Union Movement}, 193–195.} Tangible results in the realm of territorial restitutions were similarly meager. Once the 1948 election was decided in favor of the Christian Democrats the issue quickly receded into the background of international politics and the United States and Great Britain never followed up on their commitment regarding Trieste, which was eventually divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. In 1949, the United Nations rejected most of the Italian government’s claims regarding its former colonies. The former Italian Somaliland, however, was given as a trust territory and held by Italy over the next ten years until Somali independence in 1960. Having secured this symbolic gesture, Sforza quickly shifted gears and stressed Italy’s desire to establish mutually beneficial trade relations with its former colonial possessions.\footnote{Cf. Brogi, \textit{A Question of Self Esteem}, 193; Christopher Seton-Watson, “Italy’s Imperial Hangover,” \textit{Journal of Contemporary History} 15, no. 1 (1980): 172–173.} Economic interdependence, not political domination, was to bind independent nations in the future.

\textbf{Epilogue}

Spurned by the renewed interest in European economic integration in the late 1940s the CEIP’s customs union study was finally published in April 1950. The launch of \textit{The Customs Union Issue} came a year after Leopold Kohr, frustrated by the repeated delays, had released his own reading of the material as \textit{Customs Unions: A Tool for Peace}. Read side-by-side the two works offer a striking example of two academics working on the same data and reaching distinctly different conclusions. Kohr had little doubt about the efficacy of his subject matter and expressed dismay at the lack of public interest in the promise of commercial alliances for international pacification, speculating that due to the idea’s modern genesis in the \textit{Zollverein} it had been “tainted in the public mind with Germanic associations.”\footnote{Leopold Kohr, \textit{Customs Unions: A Tool for Peace} (Washington, DC: Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1949), 1.} Viner, meanwhile, offered a nuanced reading of the potential of various characteristics of commercial unions for increasing trade and prosperity but, on balance, struck a
decidedly negative tone. From a free trade perspective, Viner argued, customs unions would likely do more harm than good as they tended to preserve or even raise external tariff barriers while only removing internal obstacles. Furthermore, he suggested that in light of the issues of the day the instrument of a customs union appeared rather anachronistic. Since the 1930s novel protectionist measures such as quotas and export controls had in many instances supplanted traditional tariffs as the main obstacles to free trade, making customs unions neither “a practicable nor suitable remedy for today’s economic ills.”

Viner’s emphatic non-endorsement would have likely come as a disappointment to the CEIP officers of 1943 and most certainly to Leopold Kohr. By 1950, however, the political conversation had already moved well beyond the possibility of a simple European customs union. Within weeks of the publication of The Customs Union Issue, Robert Schuman would unveil his plan for a supra-national European architecture of which tariff reductions were only one of many aspects. Remarkably, neither the repeated delays nor the somewhat restricted scope of the study nor Viner’s pessimistic conclusions would do much to undermine the CEIP’s original purpose of offering policy-makers sound scientific evidence in support of policies that would help stabilize Europe through regional economic cooperation. The foundation succeeded in this goal less by virtue of the specific results of Viner’s study than by helping initiate a new field of academic inquiry of which The Customs Union Issue became one, if not the, foundational text: economic integration theory. As John Oslington points out, it was almost inevitable that as the book approached classic status over the course of the following decades its historical context and ultimately even its specific conclusions gradually disappeared from view. Instead of being remembered as Jacob Viner’s warning to resist the siren calls of advocates of customs unions as leading away from the true path of global free trade it today serves as a symbol signifying the respectable lineage and legitimacy of economic integration research as a sub-discipline of economics.

The complex genealogy of The Customs Union Issue illustrates how recovering the non-governmental and transnational connections of expert networks can highlight continuities to earlier events and contexts and thus destabilize established interpretive frameworks. What has usually been viewed as

994 Viner, The Customs Union Issue, 139; Kohr held this argument to be unconvincing as he regarded the term “customs union” and “economic union” to be synonymous as the former would inevitably encompass all kinds of economic and commercial policies, cf. Kohr, Customs Unions, 9.


an artifact of the early Cold War, a reaction to the Marshall Plan and America’s larger designs for an integrated Europe\textsuperscript{997} had started as something else entirely: a wartime attempt by an American foundation to broaden the perspective of American post-war planners by making available to them information on the economic arrangements of the Habsburg Empire and of the German \textit{Zollverein}; an effort to hold up pre-democratic multiethnic or multilateral institutions as a possible point of reference for post-war arrangements. Following these connections reveals that far from “applying the American principle of federalism” (Hogan)\textsuperscript{998} to create a European market and imposing a new social model America’s post-war planners were studying a variety of historical arrangements, past plans and existing institutions, always aware that change is more likely to be resisted when it comes in the form of foreign prescriptions.

For the Carnegie Endowment as an institution the post-war years would bring about a perfect storm of interrelated crises in mission, leadership and public relations that almost destroyed its reputation. The downward spiral began when at the end of 1945 the Board of Trustees finally convinced a reluctant, nearly deaf and blind Nicholas Murray Butler to resign the presidency. With the active intercession of trustee John Foster Dulles the Board hired the promising, young diplomat Alger Hiss, executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference, as Butler’s successor.\textsuperscript{999} The choice was entirely in line with the contemporary trend of America’s major foundations recruiting their officers from the state bureaucracy and vice-versa, participating in a revolving door between American business, academia and government.\textsuperscript{1000} As there was no expectation of conflicts between the interests of these sectors men like Hiss saw the relationship as mutually beneficial and he expected that his work would continue to be “very closely related” to the State Department’s.\textsuperscript{1001} The new president immediately initiated overdue structural and programmatic reforms, abandoning the CEIP’s antiquated divisional organization and reorienting its mission toward the United Nations. This auspicious start was short-lived, however, as allegations began to circulate that Hiss had been a Soviet spy during his time at the State Department.

The Hiss case, which finally led to a perjury conviction in 1950, became one of the most widely-covered public trials of the post-war years. After initially backing their President, the trustees granted

\textsuperscript{998} Hogan, \textit{The Marshall Plan}, 27.
\textsuperscript{1000} Dean Rusk, Paul G. Hoffman, John Foster Dulles, and John J. McCloy all served as presidents of the Ford or Rockefeller Foundation during the 1950s, cf. Parmar, “Conceptualising the State-Private Network in American Foreign Policy,” 23; for case studies of this relationship see Berghahn, \textit{America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe}; Raucher, \textit{Paul G. Hoffman}.
\textsuperscript{1001} Alger Hiss to Adlai Stevenson, 1 March 1948, Box 1, Folder “Stevenson, Adlai,” CEIP US.
Hiss a leave-of-absence in December 1948. But more damaging than the isolated case was the larger political framework of the allegation. On 20 December 1948, Lawrence Duggan, who had succeeded his father Stephen as the president of the Institute of International Education, died of an apparent suicide after his questionable interactions with Soviet intelligence had come to light.\(^\text{1002}\) The Institute of Pacific Relations, the main point of contact for America’s East Coast internationalists in the West, made headlines as an alleged hotbed for Communists during the 1930s.\(^\text{1003}\) Taken together, these cases created a public impression of the major institutions of American interwar internationalism as deeply entangled with Communism, ensuring that the issue would haunt the Endowment for years. In the 1952 presidential election, Democrats played up links between John Foster Dulles, the presumed choice for Secretary of State in an Eisenhower administration, and Hiss in an effort to discredit Republican foreign policy.\(^\text{1004}\) In a peculiar coda to the controversy, in 1954 the CEIP, long accustomed to defending itself against the charge of being a front for capitalists, was investigated by Congress, along with other NGOs, for Communist influences. During his testimony CEIP President Joseph E. Johnson could not entirely suppress his sense of bewilderment at the suggestion: “I cannot believe that men like Thomas J. Watson […] would have had anything to do with the endowment if it had not been interested in the capitalistic system.”\(^\text{1005}\)

\(^{1002}\) Cf. Arndt, _The First Resort of Kings_, 63–64.
\(^{1005}\) _Tax-Exempt Foundation: Hearings before the Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, House of Representatives_, 10 December 1952, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 595.
Conclusion

The *New York Times* published Nicholas Murray Butler’s obituary on 8 December 1947. The paper’s appraisal of the man who had hovered over American foreign policy debates for almost four decades indicated the changing culture of memory regarding early twentieth century internationalism and internationalists. While not completely devoid of the usual honorific celebrations of the former CEIP president’s achievements, the article conveyed a certain sense of detachment from a man who had been born during the American Civil War and lived to see the Nuclear Age: “He passes now on the ebbing tide of a former epoch.”  

1006 Indeed, few had been so representative of the now unfashionable ideas that had animated the early Carnegie Endowment and its European sister organization, the Conciliation Internationale: visions of a world governend from smoke-filled club houses in which benevolent, liberal gentlemen worked to ward off the dangers threatening social tranquility and international peace. Such overt paternalism was strikingly at odds with recent global trends toward democratic participation—from New Deal America to Europe’s Social and Christian Democratic movements. Nor was the unabashed Eurocentrism of men like Butler or the late d’Estournelles de Constant helpful in dealing with the challenges of an era of decolonization. In the wake of the Second World War, Butler’s CEIP consequently joined many other interwar institutions in becoming increasingly associated with a naïve, dated and ineffectual brand of internationalism.

Yet, while the international mindedness of an aspiring transatlantic upper class, celebrated during lavish banquets at the Waldorf Astoria and the Plaza Athénée, had contributed little toward the maintenance of world peace, a more enduring legacy of the CEIP’s philanthropy lay elsewhere. Starting in the mid-1920s, the foundation had invested most of its resources into a field of transnational foreign policy expertise in the hopes that informal agreement and technocratic consensus could provide international stability at a time of national antagonism and social upheaval. Money from private sources—especially from the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations but also from some European benefactors—were indispensable to sustaining the web of connections between the League of Nations, national governments, universities, think tanks, lobby groups and others working for international cooperation that has recently become the focus of much scholarly research. Within this larger network the CEIP connected academics and politicians for the purpose of branding a “patriotic” variety of internationalism. It fostered a field of international legal expertise as a site for

the official and unofficial settlement of competing national claims. In the wake of the breakdown of the global market during the Great Depression, it sought to bring economists, businessmen and select representatives of organized labor into agreement on the outlines of a new economic regime.

By the end of the 1930s, the Carnegie Endowment’s sprawling network of contacts—built through countless exchange programs, conferences, study groups and publication projects—encompassed many of those who would go on to shape international politics, academic disciplines and public administration until well into the post-war years. They included politicians Carlo Sforza, Paul Van Zeeland and Bo Östen Undén; economists Luigi Einaudi, Charles Rist, John Maynard Keynes and Per Jacobsson; jurists Hans Kelsen, Hersch Lauterpacht and Manley Hudson. In some cases, former grantees were clearly able to harness the social and cultural capital they had gained by working with an American foundation to thrive in a post-war climate of transatlantic cooperation. Former Carnegie Professor Hajo Holborn went on to train a generation of American Europeanists and eventually became the first foreign-born President of the American Historical Association. Meanwhile, Pierre Renouvin, who had edited the Centre Européen’s journal L’Esprit International, became one of the founding figures of post-war French historiography of international relations with a particular emphasis on American diplomatic history. By the late 1940s, the Washington, DC, ambassadors of France, Italy and the Netherlands were all former Carnegie Endowment partners.

Attempts to locate the CEIP’s legacy in the propagation of an easily identifiable program of liberal internationalism and transatlanticism—a specific “Carnegie vision” of international cooperation—would, however, be problematic. There was no logical trajectory from membership in the liberal internationalist expert milieu of the interwar years to support for democracy, transatlantic cooperation and economic liberalism. For instance, by the time of the Comité d’Administration’s dissolution in 1938, three of its members clearly displayed sympathy or even preference for authoritarian solutions: Nicolas Politis publicly expressed his admiration for the Salazar regime. Hungarian Pal Teleki was giving lectures in front German National Socialists about the need to transcend the “incompetent” League of Nations and to reorient societies away from the cult of “individualistic lifestyles.” Erich

1009 These were Henri Bonnet (former secretary Geneva Research Center), Alberto Tarchiani (former special correspondent) and Eelco van Kleffens (former secretary of the Hague Academy of International Law); cf. Domenico Fracchiolla, Un ambasciata della ’nuova Italia’ a Washington: Alberto Tarchiani e le relazioni tra Italia e Stati Uniti, 1945–1947 (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2012).
1010 Teleki, “Probleme des Donauraumes,” 18–20; “Spricht man vom Donauraum so spricht man von Europa!,” Völkischer Beobachter (Munich edition), 4 December 1933;
von Prittwitz und Gaffron, having lost his job as a lobbyist for the Silesian chambers of commerce, initially appealed to the CEIP for permanent employment. When that did not materialize, he found a new position as assistant to the General Manager of Prussian State Theaters Heinz Tietjen. After years of having worked for cultural internationalism, Prittwitz reinvented himself as a guardian of an unadulterated German national culture in a position that reported through Tietjen to Herman Goering. The technocratic, often paternalist, aspect of liberal internationalism could manifest itself in a variety of political projects—not all of them democratic.

Given how large a tent the concept of the international mind propagated by the CEIP was, it is especially noteworthy who was excluded from the foundation’s experiment in informal transnational governance: the strident republicans of the DLM/BNV and the women’s rights activists of WILPF shared the experiences of many other pacifists, socialists and campaigners for the interests of ethnic minorities in finding access to Carnegie funding blocked, making it much more difficult for them to thrive and be heard by governments and a global public. That those who argued for addressing matters of economic, gender and racial inequality often found themselves pushed to the margins of the larger internationalist field was not merely a result of the League’s institutional setup or of governmental obstruction. It was also the result of funding decisions by private institutions. When in 1936, W.E.B. Du Bois appealed to the Carnegie Endowment for assistance with his research on the experiences of black soldiers during the First World War, the reply was both polite and resolutely negative. While the study certainly had merit from multiple perspectives, he was told, these did not come “directly within the purview of this Endowment.” Even against the backdrop of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia the CEIP did not see much of a connection between the Global Color Line and matters of war and peace.

Conversely, as the CEIP’s support for economic liberals throughout the Depression years indicates, the political independence of philanthropic foundations could also provide a sanctuary for ideas during times of popular or governmental headwinds. The immediate post-war reconstruction of world order—an “embedded liberalism” representing a qualified revival of global markets with added protections under national social security schemes, all under an American security umbrella—did not immediately resemble the liberal visions propagated by the Carnegie Endowment and its allies.

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As Wolfram Kaiser and Martin Conway conclude in their study of postwar planning within exile
governments, Europe’s political compromises were not produced by experts in London, Washington
or New York.\textsuperscript{1014} Yet, at the technical level, many solutions that shaped post-1945 global governance
mechanisms were based on blueprints developed during the 1920s and 1930s in venues such as the
League of Nation’s technical sections, the International Studies Conference or, indeed, the CEIP’s
transnational programs.

Viewed from a longue durée perspective, the Carnegie Endowment’s interwar activism stands out as
an early attempt to combine financial, cultural and social capital in an effort to set the parameters of
global debates. Private money was invested in structures intended to better represent the interests of
transnational coalitions favoring a global order that facilitated international connection, expansion
and (colonial) development, rather than security, stability and social protection at a national level. It
was a transnationalization of politics which often aimed specifically at blocking, overturning or
superceding strategies pursued and decisions made by national governments and democratically
elected legislatures: American non-membership in the League and in the World Court; Franco-
German antagonism over questions of security and debts; governments’ turn toward national
economies during the Great Depression. While most of the concrete goals associated with these
projects failed, the CEIP helped institutionalize a transnational space for coordination and cooperation
in a world marked by national divisions.

Conspiratorial tales are frequently spun around networking institutions such as those described in this
thesis, particularly the Bilderberg Group. Yet, as indicated by Paul Van Zeeland’s role in setting up
these meetings against the background of his earlier experience with CEIP initiatives, the core concept
behind Bilderberg was neither new nor particularly obscure: from the CEIP’s Hague Academy of
International Law and the Chatham House Conference of the 1920s and 1930s to today’s World
Economic Forum at Davos and the Munich Security Conference—the idea that informal, frank,
transnational discussions between experts and policy-makers can help stabilize an interconnected
world is ultimately grounded in a liberal skepticism of the destabilizing effects of mass psychology
that first became virulent in the early twentieth century. Even less policy-driven and more diverse
initiatives such as the Aspen Ideas Festival or the TED conferences ultimately fall back on a similar
liberal ideal that cultural interchange between functional elites—be they journalists, managers,
academics or politicians—can improve knowledge and ultimately improve social conditions. Yet, as
the motto of TED events—“Ideas Worth Spreading”—implies, there is always a process of inclusion


and exclusion involved in determining the merit of specific forms of knowledge.

In 1947, seven years after it had been closed at the start of the Second World War, the Centre Européen was gradually reopened. Yet, despite the best efforts to adjust the program of the center to the changed international situation\textsuperscript{1015} the Paris office never recovered the same status as a mediating institution between Europe and America it had enjoyed during the interwar period. The focus of international organization had moved from the Old World to the New and there was no longer a need for the type of unofficial American representation on the Continent which the CEIP had provided in earlier years. In 1954, the foundation closed its location on Boulevard Saint-Germain and relocated to Geneva, which remained a center of UN activity. Abandoned in 1970, the European center was resurrected almost forty years later when a branch was opened in Brussels in 2007. From Paris, the capital of a major nation state, to the UN to the European Union, the locations of the Endowment’s representation in Europe tracked the changing interpretations as to the locus of power and influence in a globalizing world; interpretations that the Carnegie Endowment had helped construct in the first place.

\textsuperscript{1015} Cf. Malcolm Davis, „Prospectus for the European Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” 8 December 1947, Box 118, Folder 7, CEIP US.
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<td>Auswärtiges Amt</td>
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<td>ACS</td>
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<td>AFSDN</td>
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<td>AKU</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Peace Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA-AA</td>
<td>Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCIJ</td>
<td>Permanent Court of International Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBML</td>
<td>Rare Books and Manuscripts Library, Columbia University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDI</td>
<td>Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTAA</td>
<td>Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOG</td>
<td>United Nations Office at Geneva Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCOC</td>
<td>United States Chamber of Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>VGF</td>
<td>Vereinigte Glanzstoffe Fabriken</td>
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<td>WILPF</td>
<td>Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPC</td>
<td>Western Policy Committee</td>
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France
Archives Diplomatiques, La Courneuve (ArchDiplo)
- Correspondance politique et commerciale, 1914 à 1940: Série B: Amérique
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- Jules Prudhommeaux Papers

Germany
Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin
- Friedrich-Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron Papers

Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA Koblenz)
- Moritz Julius Bonn Papers

Bundesarchiv Berlin (BA Berlin)
- R 43-II – Reichskanzlei
- R 11 – Reichswirtschaftskammer
- R 2501 – Deutsche Reichsbank

Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin (GSta PK)
- I HA Rep. 151 – Prussian finance ministry records
- C. H. Becker Papers
- Heinrich Schnee Papers

Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin (PA-AA)
- Botschaft Washington 1548
- Botschaft Paris 573B
- R 80282
- R 53703
- Personnel File “Moritz Bonn”
Italy
Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome (ACS)
- Casellario Politico Centrale
- Carlo Sforza Papers

Archivio Storico Diplomatico, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome (ASMAE)
- Affari politici, 1931–45, Stati Uniti
- Affari politici, 1931–45, Etiopia, Fondo di Guerra

United States
Columbia University, Rare Books and Manuscripts Library, New York, NY (RBML Columbia)
- Carnegie Corporation Records
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Centre Européen Records
- James T. Shotwell Papers
- Nicholas Murray Butler Papers
- Nicholas Murray Butler Oral History Project

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC (LoC)
- Leo Pasvolsky Papers
- Newton D. Baker Papers
- Philip C. Jessup Papers
- Robert W. Bingham Papers
- W. Averell Harriman Papers
- William Borah Papers

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY (FDRL)
- Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, President’s Personal File
- Sumner Welles Papers

Library of Virginia, Richmond, VA (LoV)
- Andrew J. Montague Papers

Leo Baeck Institute Archives, New York, NY (LBI)
- Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy Collection
New York Public Library Manuscripts Division, New York, NY (NYPL)
- Emergency Committee in Aid of Foreign Displaced Scholars Records

Century Association Archives, New York, NY
- Membership database

Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives, New Haven, CT (Yale Archives)
- Arnold Wolfers Papers
- John W. Davis Papers

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA/CP)
- Harley A. Notter File (RG 59)
- Records of the Department of State, RG 59
- Records of the Office of Strategic Services, RG 226

Princeton University, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, NJ (Mudd Library)
- Jacob Viner Papers
- Allen W. Dulles Papers

In private possession:
- Earle B. Babcock Papers

Switzerland

United Nations Office at Geneva Library (UNOG)
- League of Nations Archive
- Sean Lester Papers
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