Clientelism, Politics and the Press in Modern Spain. The case of the Godó family and the founding of ‘La Vanguardia’

Pol Dalmau Palet

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization of the European University Institute

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Department of History and Civilization

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Examining Board
Prof. Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, EUI/Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Prof. Lucy Riall, EUI
Prof. Isabel Burdiel, Universitat de València
Prof. Renato Camurri, Università degli Studi di Verona

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the links between politics and the press during the crisis of the liberal state in Europe. During the 19th century, one of the biggest challenges facing the liberal state was how to give voice to local concerns. In countries with a centralised state-model and where liberal principles coexisted with other forms of authority that originated in the Old Regime, local elites (or “notables”) emerged as intermediaries between the state and the territory. However, while the literature has emphasised that these elites secured their position via patron-client relationships, little is known about how they also used the public sphere as a way to reinforce their legitimacy.

Focusing on the press as one of the strategies used by elites to secure their advantaged position in society and embrace new spheres of influence, this thesis will focus on the Godó family, a dynasty of politicians, manufacturers and press proprietors who founded what is Spain’s oldest (still active) newspaper and Barcelona’s top-selling paper today: *La Vanguardia*.

Divided into three parts, the thesis will first examine the role of newspapers in political systems where clientelism was the main means of distributing public office. The case of the Godó family and *La Vanguardia* is used to throw light on this, and on the importance of transnational media transfers in transforming the newspapers’ raison d’être. The second part explores how the Godó family tried to engineer public opinion to advance their private agenda during the colonial wars in Morocco and Cuba. The family underwent a serious reversal of fortune in the early 20th century, when the demise of the Spanish empire and the ensuing climate of national introspection led journalists to be accused of wilfully misleading the public and denounced as collaborators in the corrupt regime of elections. Yet contrary to the “downfall of the notables” narrative, which sees the demise of Europe’s traditional elites as the outcome of the crisis of liberal politics, this thesis shows that elites had a wide room for manoeuvre to maintain their influence in the new mass society. The final part of the thesis examines the strategies the Godó family designed to adapt to this new scenario, and the function that the press played in them.

Drawing on the emerging field of media history, the interdisciplinary perspective adopted here will redress the traditional lack of dialogue between historians and media scholars, providing a novel perspective on the crisis of liberalism in Europe – where press editors are interpreted as political actors, and changes in communicative channels are understood as intricately connected to changes in the nature of power.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing a thesis has been a rewarding experience but one that could hardly have reached a happy ending without the help of many people. My sincerest gratitude goes to my supervisor Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla. Throughout this period he has been a continuous source of intellectual stimulus and constructive criticism. He transformed my way of approaching history and provided something that is fundamental for someone making his first steps in the profession: his trust. The members of the jury — professors Lucy Riall, Isabel Burdiel and Renato Camurri — are all historians whose work has inspired some crucial thoughts contained in this thesis. Their generosity in agreeing to be part of this jury and, above all, in providing valuable feedback, is something I would like to thank them for.

My time in Florence has been an incredible experience that I would not hesitate (if only I could!) to repeat. At the EUI, professors Antonella Romano, Steve Smith and Gerhard Haupt offered valuable advice on how to improve my work, as did the inspiring seminars held at this institution. A generous grant from the Spanish Ministry of Education enabled me to conduct this long research, and I hope that the ongoing cuts in public funding will not prevent future researchers from benefiting from the same opportunities that I have had.

Although no place is perfect, the melting pot of intellectual traditions makes the EUI particularly special. I also met some incredible people there: Giorgio, Alan and Romain were the Tre tenori with whom I was fortunate enough to enjoy many memorable moments. The same goes to the many good friends I made, such as Carolina, Brian, Kaarlo, Daniel, Helène, Robrecht and many more. Special mention goes to Miguel, José and Alejandro. Our endless talks showed me the value of sharing views with colleagues working on other periods in history. The laughs we shared together and the overnights at the Grand Hotel San Marco were fantastic. The two Elisas and Elena were the Florentines who got me out of the academic bubble.

Two research stays at other universities helped widen the scope of this thesis. At New York University I would like to thank Edward Berenson and Andrew H. Lee for their support. In Barcelona, my stay at the Pompeu Fabra became fundamental to improve the chapters of this thesis on colonialism. I would particularly like to thank Josep Maria Fradera, Albert García Balañà, Stephen Jacobson and Martín Rodrigo for their advice on so many matters, and especially for opening the doors of their research seminar. Several chapters in this thesis also benefited from the feedback of colleagues and professors in workshops and seminars. Isabel Burdiel gave me the opportunity to participate in my first conference as a
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writing a thesis. But most precious of all, she has always reminded me that there are many other important things in life beyond the ivory tower. It is to her that this work is dedicated.
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INTRODUCTION

One of the key intellectuals of Modern Spain, Joaquín Costa (1846-1911), wrote the bitter observation opening this thesis shortly after his country had lost the remnants of its empire in a war against the United States, in 1898. In Costa’s view, Spain’s loss of the colonies culminated a process of national decay that had a clear explanation: the country was in the hands of a small but powerful “oligarchy” that controlled public office through the systematic rigging of elections. This method of controlling elections, known in Spanish as “caciquismo”, is commonly known in the scholarly literature as “clientelism”.  

As well as blaming the ruling classes, Costa also blamed the so-called “press oligarchy” (“oligarquia periodística”) for its role in caciquismo. Drawing on the popular currency of Social Darwinism to measure the condition of nations, Costa metaphorically compared Spain’s current situation with the reign of Charles II (1661-1700). The physical condition of this king had been so poor that it prevented him from ruling well and plunged the country into one of the harshest struggles for the succession to the throne. While Charles’ physical state was said to be the result of a curse, Costa considered that in 1898 the Spanish had also been bewitched, this time by the influence of the press. According to Costa, this influence was so pernicious that even the fullest renewal of the political class would not suffice to achieve the nation’s recovery: the replacement of the “press oligarchy” was also an indispensable condition to achieve it.  

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1 Joaquín Costa, Oligarquía y caciquismo como la forma actual de gobierno en España: urgencia y modo de cambiarla, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1998 [1st ed. 1901], p. 217. English translation [E.T.]: “Examine the current psychology of the Spanish people, penetrate into the recesses of its brain, and it will appear to you for a moment that we find ourselves in the days of Charles II, except he who is possessed, he who is bewitched is not the king, but the nation itself. By whom? By the daily press.”

2 “Clientelism” can be defined as “the trade of votes and other types of partisan support in exchange for public divisible benefits.” Simona Piattoni (ed.), Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation. The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 4.

3 “La rehabilitación nacional, he dicho, será imposible, aun dando que nos asista el factor tiempo, con los gobernantes de los últimos veinticinco años en el poder: ahora añado que sería también imposible, aun jubilados
This thesis will focus on the “press oligarchy” to which Costa referred during Europe’s crisis of liberal politics. The years prior to the First World War (1914-1918) have traditionally been considered to be a turning point in the history of the Continent. In the political field, two elements started challenging the socially restrictive politics of liberalism. First, the growing demands to expand democracy (by establishing universal manhood suffrage, in countries that did not have it, and by making elections “transparent”, in countries where clientelism was widely extended); and second, the emergence of new professional politicians and large-scale organisations with the capacity to mobilise thousands of supporters through new forms of action (e.g. political rallies, new spaces of sociability, direct political affiliation, etc.). This “new era” also entailed a substantial change in the composition of elites, often described as the “end of the notables” and the emergence of a new “professional” class of politicians.4

Recent comparative analysis has revealed that in most European countries the social composition of elected representatives started changing in the 1880s.5 The common trend was a declining presence of the traditional upper classes (the so-called “notables”), whose sources of authority originated from an advantageous position in society (such as a well-off background, title of nobility or patronage networks), and its replacement by a new “class” of professional politicians, whose election was more dependent on political organisations than on a privileged status.6 The characteristics and chronology in the turnover of elites varied noticeably according to the specificities of each country, and in most cases was not consolidated until the destabilising experience of the First World War.7

ellos y sustituidos por otros nuevos inculpables y preparados para la gobernación, si hubieran de subsistir las actuales oligarquías periodísticas. La renovación de la prensa se impone como otra condición sine qua non.” Ibidem, pp. 218-219. [E.T.]: “The rehabilitation of the nation, I said, will be impossible, despite the fact that the current situation favours us, with the governments of the last twenty five years in power; I would add that it would also be impossible if they were to be substituted for new ones, blameless and prepared for government, unless the current newspaper barons are replaced. The renovation of the press is an imperative sine qua non for this condition [i.e. the renovation of the government].

4 This change in the composition of elites arguably resulted in the redefinition of politics. As Alan S. Kahan has observed, “the traditional political explanation for the decline of liberalism, sometimes given in tandem with arguments about the decline of the middle classes and sometimes independent of them, is based on the decline of “the politics of the notables”, and its replacement by “mass politics”. Alan S. Kahan, Liberalism in Nineteenth-century Europe: the Political Culture of Limited Suffrage, Basingstoke-New York, Palgrave McMillan, 2003, p. X.


6 Ibidem, p. 21.

However, far from being a top-down process or a pre-determined process of change, the democratisation of politics implied a new competition for the sources of political legitimacy. In the Mediterranean area, this competition was characterised by the efforts of new political movements (like the Republicans, Socialists and Nationalists) to overthrow the political system and undermine the privileged position of liberal elites. Whether in the form of clientelist practices (in the case of Italy, Portugal and Spain) or in the disclosure of successive scandals (in the case of France’s Third Republic), accusations of corruption became part of the political struggle and contributed to discrediting the parliamentary system. In parallel, these countries experienced a series of adversities in their plans of colonial expansion that intensified the feeling of national decay. A new intellectual discourse influenced by biological terminology fostered public concerns about the nation’s future, and was often referred to as the decadence of the Latin race and the rising dominance of the “Anglo-Saxons”.

In this regard, what makes Joaquín Costa’s remarks particularly valuable is that he considered newspaper proprietors to be both to blame for Spain’s decay and its potential saviours. Costa’s testimony evoked the impression that the newspaper editors were decisive actors in directing public affairs. That perception – which was shared by some of his contemporaries – was influenced by the transformation of the press into the main form of mass communication. From the last quarter of the 19th century, the press underwent a series of deep transformations across Europe, epitomised in the expansion of the consumer market, the growing circulation of commercial newspapers and the rise of new ethic codes in the journalistic profession (such as impartial reporting and a public service vocation). However, although 19th-century commentators often observed that newspaper editors had a powerful influence over public affairs, scholars toady have rarely bothered to test those impressions. One explanation for this is that in the study of elites, journalists are rarely regarded as political actors. Another reason is that the growing specialisation of academia has often

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9 France’s crisis in Fashoda, 1898; Italy’s defeat in Adowa, 1896; the British “ultimatum” to Portugal, 1890; and Spain’s loss of the empire, 1898.

resulted in a lack of interdisciplinary work between fields of research. While historians mostly use the press as a historical source, but rarely see it as an “agent of change”, media scholars rarely make efforts to integrate press transformations into the broader history of society. The result is two separate narratives that focus on different aspects of the same picture but fail to provide an entangled view.

As the first study about the changing relations between politics and the press in the crisis of liberalism, this thesis will focus on the Godó family, a dynasty of press proprietors from the northeast of Spain. In 1881, two members of this family established a newspaper in Barcelona called La Vanguardia (“the Vanguard”), which became one of the most influential papers in the history of Modern Spain. La Vanguardia is still in print today, in fact it is Barcelona’s leading paper, and ranks third in the country in total print sales. However, and in sharp contrast with other big dailies in Europe that also have a long-standing presence, there are no scholarly studies on the history of La Vanguardia, or on the family that founded it. As the first in-depth study of the Godó family, this thesis will use their history as a case study to examine how the changing relations between press and politics became closely entwined in the re-definition of elites. In so doing, this thesis will seek to provide new perspectives on the crisis of liberal politics in Europe.


From a broad perspective, the literature on clientelism is far from being homogeneous. In countries like France, and especially in Germany, it is a minor and relatively new topic of historical research. In contrast, in countries like Italy, Portugal and

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Spain, there is a long tradition of studies. Although the term “clientelism” carries a series of different connotations, depending on the language, it can broadly be defined as “the trade of votes and other types of partisan support in exchange for public divisible benefits”.

If clientelism has received so much attention for the case of Southern Europe it is because it has been considered a crucial element in the difficult transition of the countries in this area from liberalism to democracy at the beginning of the 20th century. During the last quarter of the 19th century, the Mediterranean area saw the consolidation of a centralised liberal-state model and a progressive – though complex – process of democratisation. Despite the particularities of each country, the exercise of “politics without democracy” became a common practice in all of them. The fear of the leading groups about widening the social bases of the political system led to a strong restriction of suffrage (only around 2% to 5% of the population) and the establishment of clientelist procedures (“sistema del turno”, in Spain; “rotativismo”, in Portugal; “trasformismo”, in Italy) for the rigging of elections. By means of these procedures public office remained concentrated in the hands of liberal parties and the vast majority of the population was excluded from it.

As a result of this, instead of holding elections to choose the ruling party, the liberal parties in all these countries controlled the government. In the case of Portugal and Spain, this was through the alternation in power between two Liberal parties, whereas in Italy...
clientelism took the form of broad government coalitions. Despite the differences in the methods, in all these countries elections became a formality, designed to confirm the results the liberal parties had agreed upon beforehand. Therefore, these countries had parliamentary systems but not democratic ones, because they were based on the systematic manipulation of elections. The rest of the political parties (e.g. Republicans, Socialists and Catholics) were systematically excluded from power.

Contemporaries were the first to criticise the liberals’ monopoly of public office. Particularly at the turn of the 19th century, the climate of national introspection became common to Southern European countries and gave place to a rich literature that denounced the clientelism on which the liberal politicians based their monopoly of government. Historians, however, have often assumed the views of these contemporaries (like Joaquín Costa or Antonio Gramsci) as well as their interpretative framework. A clear example is the definition that the Spanish dictionary gave of the word “cacique” in the 1970s, when it defined it as “someone of a town or region that exerts an excessive influence on political and administrative matters”. This definition does not just define the cacique (or local boss) on the basis of his main source of power (namely, his influence), but contained an implicit moral judgment: the cacique’s influence was considered to be “excessive”. Something similar happened with the term “notable”, which despite containing differing connotations depending

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20 It must be stressed that in the Italian case, the political system proved to be more open to integrating other parties, and the government intervention in elections was less widespread than in Spain; and manifested with particular intensity in the Mezzogiorno. For comparisons between the Italian and Spanish case, see: Gabriele Ranzato, *La forja de la soberanía nacional: las elecciones en los sistemas liberales italiano y español*, Ayer, 3, 1991, pp. 115-138; M. Suárez Cortina, *op. cit.*; and Renato Camurri, “La Italia liberal y la España de la Restauración: una perspectiva comparada”, *op. cit.*; and *Elecciones y cultura política en España e Italia (1890-1923)*, València, Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2003, p. 21.


22 Examples for the case of Spain were the intellectuals attached to “regeneracionismo”, an intellectual movement that saw the eradication of “caciquismo” as the indispensable condition for the country’s recovery. For the case of Italy, well-known examples are Francesco de Santis, Marco Minghetti and Gaetano Mosca. For an overview of this literature for the Italian case, see: Alberto Mario Banti, *op. cit.*; and Renato Camurri, “Les infortunes de la vertu. La critique des moeurs parlementaires en Italie (1860-1890)”, Jean-Louis Briquet and Frédéric Sawicki (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 251-276.

23 In Spanish: “persona que en un pueblo o comarca ejerce excesiva influencia en asuntos políticos o administrativos”. *Diccionario de la Lengua Española*, Madrid, RAE, p. 219. In Portuguese the “cacique” was also popularly known in the 19th century as “o influente” ("the one who has influence").
on the country was used to refer to an “old way” of doing politics before the birth of mass politics.24

Indeed, the majority of historians writing in the 1960s and 1970s considered “clientelism”25 to be a distinctive feature of backward societies, in which a powerful “oligarchy” used it as an instrument to maintain a privileged position and subjugate the majority of the population. This socio-economic interpretation, inspired in Marxist theory, presented clientelism as a sign of “failure” in historical development: first in the 1970s, from a paradigm of “bourgeoisie revolution” (“rivoluzione mancata”, in the Italian case), and later in the 1980s from a paradigm of “failed modernisation”. Clientelism was thus interpreted as a feature of rural and underdeveloped countries that differed from the rest of Europe because of the weakness of their middle classes and the consequent failure this caused in the transition to democracy.26

Indeed, European democratisation was understood at the time according to ideal models of development.27 While the early extension of the franchise, in countries like France and England, was portrayed as a process inexorably leading towards the full democratisation of politics, the presence of patron-client relationships in Mediterranean countries was regarded as a sign of backwardness. Something similar happened in other countries like Germany and Austria, where the role that corporate representation played in elections was regarded as a special path in historical development (Sonderweg). This perspective fostered a fruitful controversy in the 1980s and 1990s about the role of the “bourgeoisie” (and about the meanings and limitations of using this term) in European societies.28

24 On the different connotations the term historically had in Italy, France, Spain and Germany, and their use in the historiography, see the monograph edited by Renato Camurri, Notabili e sistemi notabiliari nell'Europa liberale, Ricerche di storia politica, Nuova Serie, December 2012, vol. 3.
25 It must be noted that neither historians working in Spain or Portugal used the term “clientelism”, but “caciquismo”.
In the meantime, an alternative historiographical trend (the so-called “functionalist perspective”), which did not escape from the idealised models of democratisation either, started explaining clientelism as an essentially political and administrative phenomenon. This trend focused mostly on elections, with the aim of providing an explanation about the mechanisms liberal parties implemented to control public office.\(^{29}\) The scholars attached to this trend – here presented from a broad perspective, even though they adopted a national perspective – shared a basic conception of clientelism as a form of patronage, in which the control (or privatisation) of public office was considered to be the mechanism to control a vast network of supporters.\(^{30}\) Indeed, and as a new stream of works published in the 1990s explained with further precision, the liberal parties’ monopoly of public office did not necessarily mean that the political systems of the Mediterranean area were entirely disconnected from society, because larger numbers of people besides the local bosses also benefited from it.

As a result of this new interest in delineating the social roots of clientelism, a crucial step was made in the redefining of the terminology used for the social actors who benefited from clientelistic practices. While local bosses were firstly referred to (in the Spanish case) as a “block of power” or as an “oligarchy”, two expressions that implied a closed social group who monopolised both economic and political power, scholars subsequently started referring to them as “bourgeois”, and later on as “elites”. The latter expression was used for the first time in Spain in the late 1960s and in Italy in the 1970s and has arguably remained the more common term until nowadays.\(^{31}\) Although the decision to use the term “elites” is often

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\(^{29}\) In this respect, Javier Tusell’s theory of the “encasillado” deserves special mention. Focusing on the case of Andalusia, Tusell provided a detailed analysis of how the central parties in Madrid and the local “caciques” agreed the results of elections, explaining how the “encasillado” (as the executive’s candidate was referred) repeatedly succeeded in winning elections. Javier Tusell, *Oligarquía y caciquismo en Andalucía (1890-1923)*, Planeta, 1976.

\(^{30}\) In the case of Spain, at the forefront of this interpretation there was a group of historians, like José Varela Ortega and Joaquín Romero Maura, who were influenced by the work of British anthropologists such as Ernest Gellner and the teachings of Raymond Carr at Oxford. Additionally, the works José María Jover had great influence, for instance in the crucial work of Javier Tusell. See: *Revista de Occidente*, nº 127, February 1973; José Varela Ortega, *Los amigos políticos: partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración, 1875-1900*, Madrid, Marcial Pons, Junta de Castilla y León, 2001 [first ed. 1977]. Javier Tusell, *op. cit*.

\(^{31}\) As Javier Moreno Luzón has observed, in the case of Spain the work of Manuel Tuñón de Lara became decisive in spreading the use of this term. Inspired in the work of US sociologists like Charles Wright Mills, Tuñón defined “elite” [in Spanish] as: “un grupo reducido de hombres que ejercen el Poder o que tienen influencia directa o indirecta sobre...”. Quoted in: Javier Moreno Luzón, “La historiografía sobre las elites de la España liberal”, Rafael Zurita, Renato Camurri (eds.), *Las elites en Italia y en España*, València, PUV, 2008, p. 28. Still, and as the same author has observed, the term “elite” was not introduced in Spain’s dictionary of the Royal Academy until 1984 (p. 30). For the Italian case, Renato Camurri, “Las elites italianas: estado de los estudios y perspectivas de investigación”, *Ibidem*, pp. 15-16.
justified on the grounds of using a less politically connoted terminology, historians have often noted that this term is also deeply entrenched in the liberal tradition of Italian sociology, as Pedro Carasa has discussed.32

In recent years, some historians have started vindicating the epistemological value of the term “notable”.33 While this term has traditionally been associated with the social group that dominated politics during the first half of the 19th century, more recently it has also started being used to encompass the period until the First World War, especially for the case of France and Italy.34 One of the reasons behind the recovery of this term is the interest to challenge the prevailing narrative about the “end of the notables”. This expression was popularised by the work of Daniel Halévy,35 even though the interpretation lying behind it corresponded to Max Weber. In Weber’s theory, the “bureaucratization” of the state and the “professionalization” of politics were presented as two steps towards the democratisation of society and to the birth of mass politics. The limitation of Weber’s theory, however, is that it fostered a gradualist understanding of democratisation, whereby the “notables” and the practices they used (such as clientelism) were depicted as an “old way” of doing politics doomed to disappear with the advent of “modernity”.36 In this respect, by recovering the term

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32 Above all, the works of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. See: Pedro Carasa, De la burguesía a las élites, entre la ambigüedad y la renovación conceptual, Ayer, 42, 2001, pp. 213-214.


34 According to the classic definition of André-Jean Tudésq, the notables in Europe shared three main characteristics: an affluent position, a prominent role as members of the ruling class, and an adscription to the family milieu. A.J. Tudésq (1964), Les Grands Notables en France (1840-1849). Étude historique d'une psychologie sociale, Presses Universitaire de France, Paris, 1964, p. 10, quoted in Renato Camurri, I tutori della nazione..., op. cit., p. 263. Luigi Musella, op. cit.. Some of the scholars that have used this term in Spain to study the first half of the 19th century are: Isabel Burdiel, La política de los notables. Moderados y avanzados durante el Régimen del Estatuto Real, 1834-36, València, Institució Alfons el Magnànim, 1987; and Jesús Cruz, Los notables de Madrid. Las bases sociales de la revolución liberal española, Madrid, Alianza, 2000. An overview on the meaning of the term for the case of this country, in: Juan Antonio Inarejos Muñoz, I notabili nella Spagna liberale; dagli esordi del costituzionalismo alla crisi del sistema dei partiti, Ricerche di storia politica, 2, December 2012, pp. 315-326.

35 Daniel Halévy, La fin des notables, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1970 [1st ed. 1970]. Further attention will be paid to these questions in the section of this introduction dedicated to Methodology.

36 According to Weber [here quoted in Spanish]: “La democracia de masas, que elimina en la administración los privilegios feudales y —cuando menos por la intención— los plutocráticos, debe sustituir por un trabajo profesional irremisiblemente pagado de la administración tradicional ejercida al margen de toda profesión por los honoratíores. No es ninguna casualidad que justamente los partidos democráticos de masas (en Alemania, la socialdemocracia y el movimiento agrario de masas; en Inglaterra el partido Gladstone-Chamberlain, organizado desde Birmingham a partir de 1870; en los Estados Unidos, los dos partidos tradicionales desde el gobierno de Jackson) hayan roto completamente, en su organización interna, con el dominio tradicional de los honoratíores basado en las relaciones personales y el prestigio que todavía predomina en los partidos conservadores y en los antiguos partidos liberales, y que se hayan organizado burocráticamente bajo la dirección de funcionarios de partido, secretarios de partido y de sindicato, etc. En Francia ha fracasado siempre el intento de formar una sólida organización de partidos políticos exigida por el sistema electivo, y ello fue debido principalmente a la resistencia opuesta por los círculos de ‘notables de la localidad’ contra la burocratización el partido entonces inevitable y que destruía su influencia.” Max Weber, Economía y sociedad, México DF, Fondo
“notable”, historians are making an attempt to challenge unidirectional explanations about the history of democratisation and to embrace complexity in the explanation of historical change.³⁷

Besides the different terminology chosen, local bosses were crucial actors in linking the liberal parties and the local communities, for they acted as intermediaries between the centre and the periphery.³⁸ This intermediary function was structured according to networks of personal dependence, referred to in sociology as “Patron-Client Relationships” (PCR). To put it briefly, these relationships consist of asymmetric, but mutually beneficial transactions between at least two actors holding different positions in society.³⁹ On the one hand, there is a “patron” who provides privileged access to a “client” to certain public resources he controls. The nature of these public resources might be material (such as jobs or administrative concessions), but they might also encompass human resources (like protection). In return, the client provides his support (in the form of votes and partisan loyalty), reaffirming the patron’s preeminent position in society. For this reason, besides assuring the monopoly of power of liberal parties, clientelism also represented a way of distributing resources to a vast network of clients scattered around the national territory. For the case of Spain, for instance, between 1,000 and 5,000 administrative positions (in institutions that spanned from city councils to judiciary courts, as well as other positions in public bodies) were redistributed after each election through patron-client channels.⁴⁰

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³⁷ Alain Garrigou, op. cit., p. 65.
³⁸ Indeed, scholars have started to explore “clientelism” in terms of administrative efficiency and legitimate demands from the periphery and the margins of society. See: Raffaele Romanelli, Il comando impossibile, stato e società nell’Italia liberale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1988; Simona Piattoni, Le virtù del clientelismo. Una critica non convenzionale, Bari, GLF-Editori Laterza, 2007. For the Spanish case, María Sierra, writing about the Conservative Party in Seville, has argued that clientelism gave access to power to people located at the margins of society. María Sierra, La política del pacto. Sevilla, Diputación de Sevilla-Servicio de Publicaciones, 1996, p. 85. Mercedes Cabrera is another scholar that has placed an emphasis on the capacity of the Restoration system to generate a certain consensus. Mercedes Cabrera, Con luz y taquígrafos. El Parlamento en la Restauración (1913-1923), Madrid, Taurus, 1998.
⁴⁰ Georgina Blakeley, “Clientelism in the Building of State and Civil Society in Spain”, in S. Piattoni, Clientelism, op. cit., p. 83. In his study of a powerful local boss, known as the Marquis of Romanones, Javier de Cultura Económica, 2014 [1st ed. in German, 1922], p. 1174. “Honoratiores” is the German expression word for “notables”.

Such emphasis on the notion of transactions, however, should not sideline the fact that patron-client relationships marginalised those who were not part of such networks (which, as a matter of fact, was the vast majority of the population), nor overlook the fact that liberal politicians often showed little interest in reinforcing anti-corruption laws. Additionally, the work of historians like Raffaele Romanelli has shown that the central government often faced serious difficulties to impose its will in the territory, and often clashed with the highly localised interests of elites. In other words, before each election a complex process of negotiation between central government and local bosses took place.

Moreover, in the last two decades it has been demonstrated that clientelism was neither a distinctive element of Mediterranean countries, nor of so-called “backward” regions (like South America or the Third World). Instead, patron-client relationships have started being referred to as a widely extended phenomenon, spanning across time and space. As a consequence, the majority of scholars no longer refer to clientelism as a sign of deviance in historical development; and they avoid viewing it through the lens of modernisation theories. Instead, historians are showing growing interest in exploring the different characteristics that clientelism presented in each society, as well as how it was re-adapted to change. Indeed, the question at stake is why some elites in certain countries saw clientelism as the best way to promote their private interests, especially during periods of transition (e.g. state-building processes), and why in other countries this was not the case. This approach has the advantage of broadening the frame of analysis, thus allowing for a comparative perspective and the introduction of new geographical areas.

Moreno Luzón has estimated that this man had 6,000 jobs and favours at his disposal, which he distributed to his clients in his electoral fief in Guadalajara. Javier Moreno Luzón, Romanones. Caciquismo ypolitical liberal, Madrid, Alianza editorial, 1999.


42 Raffaele Romanelli, Il comando impossibile..., op. cit.

43 Marco Severini, La rete dei notabili. Clientele, strategie ed elezioni politiche nelle Marche in età giolittiana, Venezia, Marsilio, 1998; and M. Sierra, op. cit.

44 See: Jean-Louis Briquet and Frédéric Sawicki (eds.), op. cit.


II. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS: CLIENTELISM AND THE PRESS IN THE BIRTH OF MASS POLITICS

In my view, one of the limitations for the case of liberal Europe is that while historians have explained in great detail the functioning of clientelism at a personal level – i.e. between individuals, little attention has been paid to the role the public sphere played in the legitimation of elites. In fact, the public dimension of power is an aspect that – with few exceptions – often goes unnoticed in the mainstream of Modern history.\textsuperscript{47} Historians traditionally pay little attention to how the changes in communicative conditions affect the nature of power.\textsuperscript{48} This is particularly the case of the historiography about liberal elites in Mediterranean countries. Scholars tend to assume that the social pre-eminence of the elites in this area was exclusively based on their capacity to control the mechanisms of influence; that is to say, on the capacity of elites to act as the local representatives of liberal parties by means of clientelist methods. This idea is based on the assumption that the low levels of politicisation of society, the importance of the rural world, and the capacity to manipulate elections guaranteed their social supremacy. The problem with that assumption, however, is that it overlooks the public dimension of power. In fact, and as Max Weber noted, the pre-eminent position of the “notables” was not only dependent on material sources (being well-off) but also depended to some extent on the recognition from society.\textsuperscript{49} The reason for this is because in all societies, the exercise of power is a public issue implying a minimum degree of social consent.\textsuperscript{50}

In fact, it can be argued that in those societies where public resources were distributed according to patron-client channels, the symbolic legitimation of elites was of particular

\textsuperscript{47} Some of these exceptions are: Isabel Burdiel, Isabel II. Una biografía (1830-1904), Madrid, Taurus, 2010; Lucy Riall, Garibaldi. Invention of a hero, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007. Early Modern historians have paid more attention to the public legitimation of power. To mention a well-known work: Peter Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992.


\textsuperscript{49} In Max Weber words, the “notables” were [quoted in Spanish]: “los que obtienen los ingresos sin tener (relativamente) necesidad de trabajar o los que obtienen ingresos de tal forma que pueden desempeñar las funciones de gobierno al margen de su (eventual) actividad profesional, en tanto que al mismo tiempo (...) adoptan, en virtud de su posición económica, un modo de vivida que les otorga el ‘prestigio’ social de un ‘honor estamental’ y los destina al ejercicio de la dominación.” Max Weber, op. cit., pp. 1080-1081.

\textsuperscript{50} Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1991, 1st ed. in German, 1962]. A valuable example of the importance the public image played in sustaining (and undermining) power: Isabel Burdiel (2010), op. cit.
importance. The fact that patron-client relationships were neither legal nor contractual, but consisted of informal agreements based on the capacity of the patron to provide resources to a series of clients, implied that the position of the patron was never totally guaranteed. This lack of legal guarantee implied that the position of the patron was subject to competition from other elites aspiring to dispute his role as mediator between the liberal parties and the territory. To give an example of this, in local communities various prominent families might have competed for the position of official interlocutor with the state.

For that reason, what I propose in my research is to study the press as one of strategies through which elites sought to build their legitimation in public and aspired to encompass wider spheres of influence, besides the traditional channels based on patron-client relationships. In so doing, I will argue against the theories of modernisation that give a picture of the notables as an old way of doing politics, and depict them as social actors that were disconnected from society. Thus, a well-off position was certainly indispensable to run for office in liberal politics, but the legitimacy that elites could not obtain from the elections – since they were based on fraud – would have been cultivated in public. In other words, the public sphere became an alternative dimension for the notables to invest in different forms of reputation (symbolic capital) and built their image as the natural representatives of local interests, as well as a space to promote their private interests.

Family often acted as the primary unit through which the elites managed to concentrate power in all its diverse forms – economic, political, but also symbolic – across time and space. This implied the promotion of strategies on a collective basis, both from a synchronic perspective – different members of the same family acting through common aims, benefiting each member of the family; as well as from a diachronic perspective – since the family name, memory and tradition were transmitted between generations. Particularly in local communities, the continuous presence of the same surname across time contributed to

51 “Symbolic legitimation” can be defined as the “investments on the part of the dominant class in reproducing a set of symbols and meanings, which are misrecognized and internalized by the dominated class as their own”. Nan Lin, Karen Cook, Ronald S. Burt (eds.), Social Capital. Theory and Research, New York, Aldine de Gruyter, 2001, p. 6. John B. Thompson has defined “symbolic power” as “the relative estimation or esteem accorded to an individual or institution by others”. John B. Thompson, Political Scandal. Power and Visibility in the Media Age, Cambridge, Polity, 2004, p. 246. This definition is slightly different to that of Pierre Bourdieu: “Symbolic capital, that is to say, capital – in whatever form – insofar as it is represented, i.e., apprehended symbolically, in a relationship of knowledge or, more precisely, of misrecognition and recognition, presupposes the intervention of the habitus, as a socially constituted cognitive capacity”. Pierre Bourdieu, The forms of capital, J. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, New York, Greenwood, 1986, pp. 241-258 (footnote n. 3).

52 According to John B. Thompson, “reputation” is a form of symbolic capital that can be defined as “the relative estimation or esteem accorded to an individual or institution by others”. John B. Thompson, Political Scandal. Power and Visibility in the Media Age, Cambridge, Polity, 2000, p. 246.
reinforcing the public legitimation of successive members of the same family.

However, the public sphere did not only constitute the space where elites sought to reproduce their pre-eminent position in society. It was also a space open to contest from other social actors aspiring to dispute the “legitimate discourse”.53 Indeed, and as Hilda Sábado has argued, the low participation of elections does not necessarily imply the complete demobilisation of society.54 Besides the institutional framework (elections), other channels of political participation existed, like the press. Especially since the last quarter of the 19th century, newspapers experienced an exponential growth – both in terms of circulation and number of publications – that ran parallel to an expansion of the reading market (fall of illiteracy levels and new reading practices). This situation reached the point that every political party and organisation of any type had its own mouthpiece. In the case of heavily populated cities, with very active labour organisations, and, ultimately, being better connected to current thinking in Europe, maintaining a parliamentary system that marginalised large sections of the population became a goal that was much more difficult to achieve.

Therefore, the main objective of this research will consist in exploring the function of the press in the process of self-perpetuation of family elites; but also as an instrument that other actors used to undermine the sources of authority of liberal institutions. This implies an understanding of public opinion that is not socially limited to Habermas’ bourgeois sphere; and where communication is not a top-down process, but rather a multidirectional one.55 Thus, the focus will be on the Godó family, a dynasty of Catalan manufacturers, politicians and newspaper proprietors, between 1850 and 1918. This chronology embraces two generations of the family that will be used as a case study, and provides the opportunity to study both the emergence of new liberal elites in the mid-19th century and their crisis by the

53 This can be defined as “(...) the social-historical conditions which have established a particular set of linguistic practices as dominant and legitimate”. John B. Thompson, “Editor’s Introduction”, Pierre Bourdieu, Language and symbolic power, Oxford, Polity Press, 1991 [1st ed. in French, 1982], p. 5.
55 The argument presented here reflects some of the critiques made of Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. The argument of Sábado can be regarded as representative of the scholarship that vindicated the presence of subaltern actors (like women, the working classes and minorities) in Habermas’ “bourgeois” public sphere. Still, this does not imply that all social actors accessed the public sphere in the same way, for the different forms of capital they command (economic, social and symbolic) were unequal. These points will be examined in further detail in the section dedicated to methodology. An overview of the critiques made of Habermas’ highly influential work, in: Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1992. See also: François Bastien et Erik Neveu (eds.), Espaces publiques mosaïques. Acteurs, arènes et rhétoriques des débats publics contemporains, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1999.
time of the First World War.

Originally, the Godó family was native to Igualada, a major industrial city of inner Catalonia. Favoured by the great expansion cotton manufacture experienced in this city, the family founded a number of commercial establishments, some of which were among the oldest and most important in Catalonia (by then Spain’s most dynamic and industrialised region). The Godó’s process of upward mobility led some of its members to see politics as an important way to promote their private interests. The brothers Carlos (1834-1897) and Bartolomé Godó Pié (1839-1894) started a political career based on a combination of clientelist practices and their entry into journalism. The establishing of the newspaper *La Vanguardia*, in 1881, allowed them to compete with other elites for the position of official interlocutor of the Liberal party in Barcelona; and to turn their hometown of Igualada into the family’s political domain. For an almost uninterrupted thirty-year period (1880-1916), the different members of the Godó family managed to monopolise political representation in the constituency of Igualada.

Eventually, the wish to promote the family business in the Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico, as well as in the North of Africa, led the Godó brothers to attempt to use public opinion to expand their influence beyond the limits of the Liberal Party. As part of this effort, the brothers transformed *La Vanguardia* from a partisan newspaper into a commercial one. Although this was a risky strategy, *La Vanguardia* started experiencing a remarkable growth and by the outbreak of the First World War its circulation had reached 120,000 copies. Thus *La Vanguardia* had the highest circulation in the country (together with Madrid’s *ABC*) and had become the indisputable leader in Barcelona’s press market.

However, the Godó’s social prominence started suffering a serious setback by the beginning of the 20th century. As a consequence of the Spanish-American War of 1898, Spain fell into a national crisis of conscience that resulted in the discredit of liberal elites. Catalonia became the first place in Spain where new political organisations, the Republicans and the Catalan nationalists, put an end to the traditional hegemony of liberal parties. Amidst the novel forms of political action that these new political movements put forward, the denouncing of clientelism in public became a strategy they used to undermine the authority of liberal elites. The second generation of the Godó family became an example of those elites who started facing the direct competition of these new political movements. The outcome was the crisis of the family’s traditional pre-eminence and the emergence of tensions between the family members on how to cope with the new mass politics.
The case of the Godó family consequently raises a series of new questions about the “end of the notables” in Europe. For instance: what functions did public opinion play in the legitimation of elites, in those societies where power was structured according to patron-client relationships? What role did the press play in the competition between different elites to act as the interlocutors between central government and local communities? Furthermore, and in relation to the crisis of liberal politics: in which ways did the changes in the press contribute to discrediting clientelism in public? How did liberal elites seek to adapt to changes in society once politics became more competitive and clientelism started to be more difficult to implement?

Providing an answer to all these questions represents a dual attempt: first, to meet the calls of historians to renovate the studies of liberal elites from the cultural perspective of power; and second, to adopt an interdisciplinary perspective where media studies and historical analysis is merged. To explain how this thesis will do so, the following section will be devoted to discussing the methodology used. This section will be divided in two parts: first, analysing the case of the Godó family from the perspective of group biography; and second, by examining the different ways in which historians and communication scholars have traditionally studied the relations between the press and corruption.

III. METHODOLOGY

- GROUP BIOGRAPHY

Examining the Godó’s trajectory along two generations implies examining the strategies they implemented to achieve and maintain an advanced position in society. In all the spheres where the Godó family participated – whether in the world of business, politics or the press – they never did so alone but were always working according to certain common goals. Therefore, writing the biography of the Godó family appears as one of the best ways to examine the nature of their collective action.

Nowadays biography is a consolidated field of research. Evidence of this is the continuous flow of works dedicated to this topic, as well as the references to the so-called

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56 Javier Moreno Luzón, “La historiografía sobre las élites de la España liberal”; and Pedro Carasa, “La historia de las élites políticas en el Parlamento español: de la prosopografía a la historia cultural”, Rafael Zurita, Renato Camurri (eds.), Las élites en Italia y en España..., op. cit., p. 42 and pp. 113-134, respectively.
biographical turn”. The contributions of the scholarly community in this field have not been limited to the life of single individuals, but have also embraced the lives of different individuals examined together. This approach can be referred to as “collective biography”. This implies understanding individuals as part of a group: individuals are not studied per se, but in their interactions and links with each other. The final goal is to shed light on a series of perspectives that would otherwise be impossible to uncover if only individuals are studied alone. The links between individuals can encompass a wide set of forms, and include individuals who lived in the same historical period, shared an affiliation to the same social group, or held some form of personal connection (blood ties or friendship, among others). The key point, in consequence, is the type of link the historian chooses to illuminate, this being a decision that includes a broad range of possibilities: from the case of individuals whose link was clear and manifest (such as in the case of siblings or spouses, for instance), to the case of those individuals who never met in person but shared some kind of connection that is of interest to the historian.

Still, it is precisely because “collective biography” encompasses a broad range of possibilities that this expression has not always been used in the same manner in the scholarly literature. This might be one of the reasons, in fact, why collective biography is not always referred to as such in the work of many historians. In fact, some of the different forms of approaching collective biography, like “prosopography” and “group biography”, have enjoyed far wider recognition. As will be argued in the following pages, using one or the other (prosopography or group biography) implies a whole set of methodological choices when it comes to studying liberal elites in Europe.

Prosopography is, by far, the most popular way of writing collective biography and has been in use since the 1960s. In a seminal article, Lawrence Stone defined it as “the investigation of the common background of characteristics of a group of actors in history by means of a collective story of their lives”. Thus, prosopography consists in framing a particular space and then creating a set of questions – on social origins, political affiliation,
economic position, etc. – to be addressed. The information obtained from the different individuals is later compared in order to establish similarities and patterns, with the aim of delineating specific group characteristics. This interest in representative social behaviour explains why prosopography has also been referred to as “modal biography” and “social quantitative history”. Indeed, the prime goal of prosopography is to illuminate general patterns, which means that the lives of individuals are interesting in so far as they reflect what are considered to be the representative elements of a social group, or some differentiated pattern. For this reason, prosopography has been of great use to trace the main features of social groups in given periods. Liberal elites have been no exception in this regard, and numerous analyses (both regional and national) have been published in recent decades. It must be noted that prosopography had a longer tradition in France than in countries like Italy or Spain.

More recently, there have also been different attempts at comparative analyses of liberal elites at a European scale. This has been the case, among others, of the work coordinated by Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta. The principal merit of this work is that by building on a long tradition of studies about continuity and rupture in the composition of elites, it has provided a broad overview about the crisis of liberal elites at a continental scale. Indeed, by means of large cross-checked data of different countries, these authors have delineated the chronology and the changes in the social composition of Europe’s elected representatives. They have concluded that the period spanning between the 1880s and the 1920s was characterised “by the decline of the traditional components of the social and political establishment, that is, of privileged social status (particularly aristocratic background), land-ownership, state officialdom, and university education”. Additionally, the replacement of traditional elites with professional politicians proved to be – with important and sometimes “unexpected” variables – rather slow, thus confirming some of the

64 H. Best and M. Cotta (eds.), op. cit., p. 514.
hypothesis of Arno Mayer.\textsuperscript{65}

The problem, however, is that prosopography has led to explaining historical change from a swinging perspective of \textit{decline} and \textit{rise} in the social composition of elites. This has been the result of the tendency among scholars (and especially among sociologists and political scientists) to focus on the quantitative and sociological dimension of power for the sake of representativeness. Liberal elites are presented, in consequence, as a static group that was seemingly bound to disappear, and opposed democratisation by sticking to “autocratic” means.\textsuperscript{66} In recent years, however, some scholars have started demonstrating the limitations of exclusively using prosopography by adopting a more qualitative and dynamic perspective.\textsuperscript{67} Hence, it has been shown that the European aristocracy that Arno Mayer presented as a “feudal vestige” was, in reality, a social group whose internal composition had been thoroughly redefined after the French and the Industrial revolutions of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{68}

In a similar vein, historians like Renato Camurri and Jean Louis Briquet have recently demonstrated that, in reality, the crisis of liberal elites was far more complex than a simple substitution of one social group by another.\textsuperscript{69} These two authors have shown, for the case of Italy and France, that the new professional politicians often adopted some practices traditionally associated with the notables (such as the role of broker between the state and the territory, the holding of personal links with the electorate, and clientelist practices).

In parallel, the same authors have shown the capacity of some notables to adapt to the new mass politics by “recycling” their sources of legitimation.\textsuperscript{70} All these works have

\textsuperscript{65} One of these “unexpected” variables is the case of Nordic countries, where “the primary sector, far from declining, managed to maintain a strong role in parliamentary representation. (...) These conditions enabled agriculture to preserve a significant influence well into the age of full democratization”. In Germany “nobility fell from 35\% to less than 5\%” between 1880 and 1920. In the case of Italy there was a “decline” of traditional elites (like landowners and nobility) and the growing importance of lawyers. \textit{Ibidem}, p. 513, p. 514, respectively. Arno J. Mayer, \textit{The Persistence of the Old Regime. Europe to the Great War}, New York, Pantheon Books, 1981.


\textsuperscript{67} Pedro Carasa, “La historia de las elites políticas en el Parlamento español: de la prosopografía a la historia cultural”, R. Zurita, R. Camurri (eds.), \textit{op. cit.}, pp.113-134.


\textsuperscript{69} An analysis about Pareto’s theory on the “circulation of elites”, see: Pedro Carasa, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 221-223.

\textsuperscript{70} Renato Camurri, I tullori della nazione: i «grandi notabili» e l’organizzazione della politica nell’Italia liberale; Jean-Louis Briquet, Notabili e processi di notabilizzazione nella Francia del diciannovesimo e ventesimo secolo, \textit{Ricerche di storia politica}, Nuova Serie, December 2012, vol. 3, pp. 261-278 and pp. 279-294, respectively. See also the two special issues about the “Trajectoires de la notabilité”, in the journal \textit{Politix. Revue des sciences sociales du politique}, vol. 17, n° 65 and 67, 2004. For the case of Spain some historians have also stressed the capacity of adaptation of liberal parties, though in a less systematic manner than the authors above commented; and, above all, without relating it to the narrative on the “end of the notables” in Europe. See: Javier Moreno-
demonstrated that in order to fully grasp the crisis of liberal politics, it is not sufficient to simply focus on the social composition of elites but it is also necessary to examine what the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called the “strategies of social reproduction” of elites.  

In line with this argument, and with the aim of exploring in which ways the Godó family built their position in liberal Spain, this thesis will adopt the “group biography” focus. According to Barbara Cain, this can be defined as the type of biography that examines those “who are closely connected to each other through marriage, blood ties, friendship or involvement in a particular set of activities or ideas. The concern of these biographies is often to delineate the nature of this connection and to explore the relationships or the shared ideas and activities of the group, paying much less attention to those aspects of the lives of each member of the group which occur outside its ambit”. Therefore, and in contrast to the case of prosopography, in the case of “group biography” the connections between individuals are not used to elaborate the picture of a collective but rather constitute the main point of analysis.

Family and parenthood will be two major points of concern to examine the strategies of collective action of the Godó family. This means that instead of focusing solely on the separate agency of each individual, we will examine how the collaboration – and the potential disagreements – between the members of the family became central in their continuous redefining of power strategies. In this regard, historians of European family have traditionally argued that the crisis of the Ancien Régime and the beginning of a “modernisation” process (understood here as the combined processes of industrial revolution, the rise of the nation-state and the configuration of a new civil society) in the late 18th century produced a major transition in kinship patterns. This transition would have resulted in the organisation of individuals in smaller family units (nuclear) and the triumph of “individualism” over collective action. More recently, however, scholars have challenged the supposed decline of kinship ties during the modern era. David Warren has argued rather the opposite: kinship

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71 These strategies can be defined as [in Spanish] “las estrategias, conscientes o no, que en diferentes campos procuran la reproducción de una clase o de una fracción de clase, es decir, la conservación o la mejora de sus condiciones de vida y de su posición respecto de otros grupos”. Pierre Bourdieu, Las estrategias de la reproducción social, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 2011. This book is a compilation of some of Bourdieu’s classic texts and has been edited by Alicia B. Gutiérrez.

72 B. Caine, op. cit., p. 47 and p. 61.


became one of the central strategies of elites in moments of change, like the period following the Napoleonic Wars.\textsuperscript{75} In a similar vein, Jorge Luengo has shown from a comparative perspective that both in mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century Valladolid (Spain) and Magdeburg (Germany) kinship alliances stood at the centre of the social configuration of liberal elites.\textsuperscript{76}

This thesis will build on this line of argument to demonstrate how kinship alliances became central in the process of upward mobility of the Godó family. This became particularly clear for the case of the first family generation. Two brothers named Carlos and Bartolomé Godó migrated to Bilbao (in the Basque Country) in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century to promote the family business and expand it to the colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico. None of these achievements can be fully understood without taking into account the Godó brothers’ strategies of “sibling cooperation”.\textsuperscript{77} Consequently, kinship will be considered in this thesis as a key element in the social cohesion of elites; not only in biological terms, but also in relation to the different elements individuals shared with each other (such as information, influence, and social credentials) to improve their respective positions in society.\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{- MEDIA HISTORY}

The reason the Godó family managed to reach a prosperous position in Modern Spain was that they were able to combine clientelism with the entry into journalism. Still, none of the family members ever saw this as a professional vocation, but rather as a way to promote their private interests – to the point that not one member of the Godó family ever signed a single article that was published in \textit{La Vanguardia}. However, between the inauguration of this newspaper, in 1881, and the outbreak of First World War, in 1914, \textit{La Vanguardia} underwent a series of drastic transformations that radically altered the newspaper. From being the organ of the Liberal Party in Barcelona and having an early circulation of 1,400 copies, by 1918 the newspaper had reached a circulation of 120,000 and was one of the finest examples of journalism in Barcelona. This transformation was neither casual nor

\textsuperscript{75} This scholar has even referred to Europe during the modern era as a kinship “hot” society. David Warren Sabean, \textit{Kinship in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870}, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
\textsuperscript{77} Giulia Calvi and Carolina Blutrach-Jelín, “Sibling Relations in Family History: Conflicts, Cooperation and Gender Roles (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries)”, \textit{European Review of History/Revue européenne d’histoire}, 2010, 17, 5, Special Issue.
\textsuperscript{78} Nan Lin, Karen Cook, Ronald S. Burt (eds.), \textit{Social Capital..., op. cit.}
predetermined, but evoked the changing strategies of the family to promote their private interests – both in politics and in colonial trade – by appealing to new publics beyond the Liberal Party. Explaining these transformations in La Vanguardia, and examining in which ways they were connected to Godó’s political career, will constitute an additional major goal of this thesis.

The Godó family thus constitute a valuable opportunity to challenge some of the major trends in both the literature on elites and the literature on press history. Although the new political history has contributed to widening the limits of “the Political”, this perspective has not been fully exploited in the history of elites. Ministers, intellectuals, military men and businessmen are among the most studied elites. Journalists, in contrast, have rarely attracted the interest of historians – either in Italy or in Spain. 79 To a considerable degree, this lack of attention is because historians tend not to see journalists as political actors. 80 This is surprising if we take into account that in the liberal era many renowned politicians started their political careers by writing for newspapers; and that parliaments were full of journalists that were also deputies. What makes journalism interesting is precisely the wide camp it covers: from the newsroom as a school for future politicians, to journalism as a form of action that elites combined with others fields of action (like business, politics, and intellectual commitment); as well as newspapers as a central element in the organisation of cadre parties.

On the other hand, communication scholars have rarely been concerned about the links between clientelism and the media, as Daniel Hallin and others have noted. 81 In other words, little is known about how the media historically contributed to sustaining clientelist practices. The reason the literature has not reflected on these questions is because an “ideal-type” of journalism – the so-called “liberal narrative” – has left a powerful legacy among communication scholars. According to this narrative, the press is bound to play a public mission in democratic societies. 82 This mission consists in the defence of the common good by reporting any abuse of power, like corruption, and is referred to as acting as the fourth

79 Javier Moreno Luzón, “La historiografía sobre las elites de la España liberal” and Renato Camurri, “Las elites italianas: estado de los estudios y perspectivas de investigación”, both in: Rafael Zurita, Renato Camurri (eds.), op. cit., p. 32 and p. 22, respectively. Exceptions to this lack of studies are: Juan Carlos Sánchez Illán, Prensa y política en la España de la Restauración. Rafael Gasset y El Imparcial, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1999; Paul Aubert et Jean-Michel Desvois, Les Élites et la presse en Espagne et en Amérique latine: des Lumières à la seconde guerre mondiale, Madrid, Casa Velázquez, 2001.


81 Daniel Hallin and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, Political Clientelism and the Media: Southern Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective, Media, Culture & Society, 24, 2002.

state or as the watchdog of democracy. In parallel, journalists are expected to be as neutral as possible in their reporting of events, for their duty is to provide an “objective” account of reality. As a result, the transition from a partisan press model towards a commercial and politically independent one is often regarded as a history of progress towards the fulfilment of the supposed duties of the press.83

The problem with this approach, however, is that it fails to explain the historical development of the press in Mediterranean countries. As Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini have explained, in Mediterranean countries the press has presented a series of distinctive features that distinguished it from the evolution of the press in other parts of Europe.84 Some of these differentiated features were a remarkably low circulation (in part resulting from the structural features of these countries, like the important presence of the rural world and the high illiteracy levels); a slow path of transition between the partisan press model towards a commercial and politically independent one; and the limited professionalisation of journalism, resulting from the tight links between press and politics. Until the work of Hallin and Mancini, the major features of the press in Mediterranean countries were often seen as a sign of “backwardness” in historical development.85 The press in these countries was considered to have “failed” to evolve towards the commercial press model and to the professionalisation of journalism.86

However, a growing number of scholars have demonstrated that this understanding of the press is, in reality, influenced by a liberal tradition of thought that goes back to 18th-century thinkers (like Edmund Burke and John Locke), and became very influential in shaping the “journalistic culture” of certain countries (like England and the United States)

85 For the case of Spain, for instance, Jesús Timoteo Álvarez outlined the following challenge: [in Spanish] “demostrar cómo alrededor de 1880 la prensa más importante de España intenta cambiar, aliarse al nuevo periodismo de masas en auge en todo el mundo, aunque fracase en este cambio. La pretensión es ver los intentos de los diversos medios y el fracaso”. Jesús Timoteo Álvarez, Restauración y prensa de masas. Los engranajes de un sistema (1875-1883), Pamplona, Ediciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1981, p. 18. “El retraso español”, Josep Francesc Valls, Prensa y burguesía en el XIX español, Madrid, Anthropos, 1987, pp. 160-170. In contrast to the ideal-type paradigm based on the liberal tradition, Hallin and Mancini have proposed three models of media and politics to explain the existence of different patterns of historical development. These models correspond to geographical areas sharing similar structural patterns and cultures. They are: the “Liberal Model” (Great Britain, Ireland and North America); the “Democratic Corporatist Model” (Northern Continental Europe) and the “Polarized Pluralist Model” (Southern Europe). D. Hallin and P. Mancini, op. cit.
86 For this reason, media historians like Mark Hampton have seen in the work of Hallin and Mancini an “effort to reject the normative equation of the Liberal model with ‘modernization’”; the result being “a pathbreaking book of great significance”. Mark Hampton, Media Studies and the Mainstreaming of Media History, Media History, 11:3, 2005, pp. 244-245.
during the 19th and 20th centuries.\textsuperscript{87} The problem is that until recently, the liberal narrative was the normative model against which the historical development of the press in other countries was evaluated.\textsuperscript{88}

To a considerable extent, this approach in the study of the press is also the result of the traditional lack of dialogue between historians and communication scholars. As James Curran put it, “\textit{historical research has tended to be the ‘neglected grandparent’ of media studies}”.\textsuperscript{89} This is because communication scholars tend to study the press through the lens of a highly normative scheme. Instead of studying what the press \textit{was} like, media scholars are more interested in what it should look like. The result is a highly normative scheme that pays little attention to the epistemological contributions of history.\textsuperscript{90} Historians, for their part, tend to adopt a more empirical approach but mostly use the press as a historical source. The reason for this is that many of them see newspapers as a (supposed) mirror of reality.\textsuperscript{91} The misconception is that \textit{printed} opinion is sometimes mistaken as \textit{public} opinion. This misconception often runs parallel to another extended practice among historians, which consists in presenting press content from a top-down perspective, whereby readers are viewed as passive actors. Conversely, communication scholars are more aware of the importance of taking \textit{reception} into account, and about the need to challenge the alleged “almighty” power of the press in society.\textsuperscript{92}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{89} James Curran (ed.), \textit{op. cit.}, p. XXI.
\item \textsuperscript{91} “Historians implicitly thought that the media did not create history but merely reported actual events.” H. Wijffjes and G. Voerman, \textit{op. cit}, p. XI.
\item \textsuperscript{92} A valuable example of this, for the case of Spain, is a book called \textit{La imagen pública de la Monarquía. Alfonso XIII en la prensa escrita y cinematográfica}. The initial hypothesis of the authors was that the bad image that King Alfonso XIII had in the media (press and cinema) decisively contributed to the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy in 1931. However, after intense archival research the authors discovered, to their surprise, that on most occasions the media gave Alfonso XIII positive coverage. This positive image stood in direct contrast to the unpopularity of the Monarchy among wide segments of society, as it became evident in the elections of April 1931 (which led to the Second Spanish Republic, 1931-1939). This work is, in sum, a valuable reminder about the epistemological limitations of using the press as a historical source; and about the risk of using it to illustrate pre-conceived judgements. Julio Montero Díaz, María Antonia Paz, José J. Sánchez Aranda, \textit{La imagen pública de la monarquía. Alfonso XIII en la prensa escrita y cinematográfica}, Barcelona, Ariel 2001.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
For all the reasons mentioned above, the methodological approach of this thesis in regard to *La Vanguardia* will be that of “media history”. Although scholars do not agree on whether this has become a distinct field of research or not, this expression refers to the growing awareness among scholars about the need to establish an interdisciplinary approach between historians and communication scholars in the study of the press. While this perspective is attracting growing attention in countries like England and Germany, it is harder to notice in other national historiographies, like Spain or Italy.

In practice, to adopt the perspective of media history implies that instead of examining to what extent the history of *La Vanguardia* matched the liberal narrative or not, emphasis will be placed on making an entangled analysis between changes in the press and broader changes in society (and politics especially). Hence, the case of the Godó family will be used to argue that the changes in communicative conditions, resulting from the changes in the press, contributed to making the corrupt practices of liberal politics (“clientelism”) more visible to the public, thereby rendering them subject to new criticism. The Godó family, whose social prominence relied on these types of corrupt practices, will be used as a case study to examine how the liberal elites reacted to this criticism. It will be argued that while contributing to democratisation, the new mass press also opened new channels for traditional elites to maintain their influence in society. The Godó family therefore constitutes a valuable case study to explore the changing relations between corruption and the media in modern societies, and to examine the crisis of liberal politics in Europe from a new perspective.

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93 Michael Schudson, *op. cit.*; James Curran, *op. cit.* An example of this new field is the academic journal called “Media History”. Previously known as “Newspaper and Periodical History”, in 1998 it was renamed to promote the dialogue between the two disciplines. Further examples of this growing concern are the establishing of new media history centres, mostly in English speaking countries (Aberystwyth, 2005; Macquarie University, 2007; University College Dublin, 2009; Sheffield, 2009) and in Germany (Hamburg). More recently, a “New International Research Network in Media History” has been created. Niels Brügger & Søren Kolstrup (ed.), *Media History. Theories, Methods, Analysis*, Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 2002.


IV. SOURCES

Since its foundation in 1881, and to this very day, *La Vanguardia* has remained the property of the same family. Only during the period of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), when the current owner of the newspaper (Carlos Godó Valls) fled to Genoa, did the newspaper briefly escape from the control of the family. Paradoxically, the long history of *La Vanguardia* and its enduring position as Barcelona’s top-selling newspaper are in sharp contrast with the scarcity of studies about its origins and the family who founded it. In the last years some works have been dedicated to examining *La Vanguardia* in recent periods of Catalan and Spanish history, but the trajectory of the Godó family and the origins of the newspaper remain largely unknown. Only three authors have approached these questions, with hardly satisfactory results.

But what explains the lack of studies on what can be considered as “the most significant editors and the most significant newspaper in Catalonia”? This was the question that the scholar Daniel Jones posed in 2006, during the 125th anniversary of the foundation of *La Vanguardia*. He coined two hypotheses to answer it. The first regarded the influence the political agenda arguably had in the preferences of Catalan scholars. According to Jones, the majority of the research has been conducted from a “nationalistic and ethnocentric perspective” which led to prioritising those newspapers that were published in Catalan, to the detriment to those published in Spanish, like *La Vanguardia*. The second hypothesis is that the long ownership of the newspaper in the hands of the same family is what prevented historians from accessing the Godó’s private archive. In fact, none of the authors mentioned (Voltes, Huertas and Molina) made use of archival sources.


97 These three authors are: Pedro Voltes Bou (1926-2009), Josep Maria Huertas Claveria (1939-2007) and Vis Molina. In the case of Voltes, he was a journalist of *La Vanguardia* who wrote two voluminous (and apologetic) works that were never published. Huertas wrote the first synthesis of the history of *La Vanguardia*; while the journalist Vis Molina published the first account specifically dedicated to the Godó family. The book of Molina was written on the occasion of *La Vanguardia*’s 125 anniversary and can be considered the “official” (indeed commissioned) history of the Godó family. In practice, it is a book that consists of a description of various family members (mostly based on anecdotes regarding marriages, hobbies, special events, etc.), but does not contain any clarifications on the origins of *La Vanguardia* — nor the motive behind its foundation. See: Pedro Voltes Bou, “Vida y obra de don Ramon Godó y Lallana, primer conde de Godó” (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, “Tesina de licenciatura”, 1980, 343 pages) and “Historia de La Vanguardia” [manuscript]. Josep Maria Huertas, *Una historia de «La Vanguardia»*, Barcelona, Angle Editorial, 2006; Vis Molina, *Los Godó. Los últimos 125 años de Barcelona*, Madrid, Martínez Roca, 2005.

Obviously, the first question I took into consideration before even starting this thesis was the existence of archival sources about the Godó family. In this regard, I had the opportunity of discussing the possible existence of a family archive with the current director of *La Vanguardia* (Màrius Carol) and with the archivist of this newspaper (Carles Salmurri). Both of them confirmed the same point that Pere Voltes had already stated in his manuscript: no archive of the Godó family was ever preserved. This was also the case of the newspaper’s historical archive, which was destroyed during *La Vanguardia’s* confiscation during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939).

Therefore, the lack of private sources has been one of the biggest impediments in the writing of this thesis; all the more when the purpose is to write the biography of a family. These circumstances also carried important consequences for the methodological framework: the lack of private correspondence, for instance, implied that reconstructing the clientelist network of the Godó family would be a much more difficult goal to achieve. Yet at the same time, the lack of a private archive also represented a stimulus to approach the study of liberal elites in Europe from a new perspective, as explained in the section dedicated to Methodology. Indeed, the long and rich trajectory of the Godó family in different spheres (politics, business and journalism) implies that they left many traces in other types of archival sources. These can be classified in two different types: newspaper copies and private-public sources.

In the first case, the lack of a private archive about the Godó family is somehow compensated for by the long history of *La Vanguardia*. This newspaper often contained numerous references to its owners, yet at the same time constituted the instrument of their power strategies. This double dimension in the case of *La Vanguardia* (both “source” and “object of study”) is one of the main perils this thesis has faced, and an effort has been made, throughout the thesis, to differentiate between the two. That being said, the content of *La Vanguardia* is now available via the newspaper’s current webpage and contains a research engine. Needless to say, this has been of great use for this research (although printed copies of this newspaper have also been consulted). Another valuable source of information was the press published in different cities: Igualada, Barcelona and the rest of Spain. Some of the main newspapers in these three spheres are also available on the internet, and have contributed significantly to this research.  

99 “Hemeroteca Digital. Biblioteca Nacional de España”; “Biblioteca Virtual de Prensa Historica”; “Fons locals digitalitzats (Diputació de Barcelona)”. Further details on the newspapers consulted can be found in the Annex.
Archival sources have constituted the second pillar of this thesis. Historians interested in the history of the Godó family and *La Vanguardia* have largely overlooked the fact that the lack of a private archive is not an impediment to reconstruct the trajectory of this family. All the more, because the family’s rich trajectory implies that there are numerous archives where information could be found: in some cases just one letter, in others a wide range of documents. Below is the list of the archival sources that have been used:

- **Notary archives** (containing information about business, wills, and politics): Arxiu Notarial d’Igualada; Arxiu Històric de Protocolos de Barcelona; Archivo Histórico de la Diputación Foral de Bizkaia (Bilbao); Archivo Histórico de Protocolos de Madrid.

- **Parochial archives** (births, marriages, and deaths): Arxiu Parroquial d’Igualada; Archivo Histórico Eclesiástico de Bizkaia (Bilbao).

- **Local, Provincial and State archives** (information about political activity): Arxiu Històric Municipal d’Igualada; Arxiu Històric de la Diputació de Barcelona; Arxiu Històric de Foment del Treball Nacional (Barcelona); Archivo Municipal de Bilbao; Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados (Madrid); Archivo General de Palacio (Madrid); Archivo General de la Administración (Alcalá de Henares).

- **Private archives** (personal correspondence): Arxiu-Biblioteca Museu Víctor Balaguer (Vilanova i la Geltrú, Catalonia); Archivo Fundación Antonio Maura (Madrid); Archivo Romanones (Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid); Archivo del Marqués de la Vega de Armijo (Museo de Pontevedra, Galicia); Archivo Urgoiti (Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid, Madrid).

- **Archives in other countries besides Spain**: the National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom. Contains some references about the Godó’s colonial business); Archives Nationales (Paris, France. Contains the private archives of the news agency “Havas”; the main international news supplier of *La Vanguardia*); Archivo de la Misión Franciscana en Marruecos (Tangier, Morocco. Contains information about the Godó’s colonial business in the North of Africa); Instituto Cervantes-Biblioteca Juan Goytisolo (Tangier, Morocco. *Ibidem*).
CHAPTER 1. THE FIRST GENERATION OF THE FAMILY: CARLOS (1834-1897) AND BARTOLOMÉ GODÓ PIÉ (1834-1896)

INTRODUCTION

1.1. THE ORIGINS OF THE GODÓ FAMILY

1.2. BUILDING THE FAMILY NETWORKS: BUSINESS, MARRIAGES AND THE FIRST YEARS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN BILBAO AND BARCELONA

1.3. CLIENTELIST METHODS IN COMPETITIVE POLITICS

1.4. THE FOUNDING OF ‘LA VANGUARDIA’ AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOURCES OF SYMBOLIC POWER

CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION

In 2006, La Vanguardia celebrated its 125th anniversary, marking the foundation of the oldest (and still active) newspaper in Spain; indeed it is the top-selling newspaper in Barcelona today. The anniversary was also used as an occasion to highlight the paper’s strong historic links to the Godó family. Since its foundation in 1881, and with the sole exception of the Spanish Civil War period (1936-1939), La Vanguardia has remained the exclusive property of the same family. This exceptional continuity in the ownership of the newspaper (a rarity among Europe’s big dailies) is recalled by the motto incorporated on the front page of La Vanguardia – “Fundada en 1881 por Don Carlos y Don Bartolomé Godó”.

Surprisingly, the long history of La Vanguardia has generated very little scholarly interest regarding its origins or its founders. Those works that are available tend to be, at best, broad historical overviews. This lack of interest, however, has not prevented historians from portraying La Vanguardia as one of the newspapers that better symbolised the birth of “modern journalism” in Catalonia and Spain in the late 19th century; namely, the association of the newspaper with editorial independence and commercial success. In my view, this interpretation is highly restrictive, since it is a retrospective image of the newspaper as it is today. And, more importantly for the aims of this thesis, it has prevented historians from noticing in the case of La Vanguardia a crucial moment in the history of the press in Western societies. Namely, the long and uneven transition from the partisan press model towards a commercial and politically independent one. In fact, the founding of La Vanguardia as the mouthpiece of a political party has been largely overlooked. This was not a hidden function, but was stated clearly on the front page of the newspaper when it was established in 1881: “La Vanguardia. Diario político y de avisos y noticias. Órgano del Partido Constitucional de la Provincia”.

100 Vis Molina, Los Godó: los últimos 125 años de Barcelona, Madrid, Martínez Roca, 2005. Among the different commemorative events in 2006, an exhibition called “The pulse of the days. 125 years of La Vanguardia” was held at the “Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona” (CCCB).
101 English translation [E.T.]: “Established in 1881 by Mr. Carlos and Mr. Bartolomé Godó”. See Annex n. 1.
104 An example of a work that focuses on this historical phenomenon, for the case of another country, is: Stephen E. Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, London, Hamilton, 1981, 2 vol.
This chapter will examine the motives that led two businessmen of humble origins, Carlos (1834-1897) and Bartolomé Godó (1839-1894), to establish *La Vanguardia* in 1881 as the organ of the Constitutional Party in Barcelona. This question will lead us to analyse the social and economic origins of these two brothers in order to understand why they saw the founding of a political newspaper as a worthwhile investment. From a historical perspective, such a question implies focusing on the origins of the liberal state in Europe and the role the press played in the power strategies of liberal elites. To do so, this chapter will be structured in two main parts.

The first part (sections **1.1.** and **1.2.**) will trace the historical origins of the Godó family. Between the last quarter of the 18th century and first half of the 19th century, significant parts of the continent underwent a series of structural transformations (demographic growth, urbanisation and industrious revolution) that radically transformed the patterns that had characterised society during the early modern era. This transformation went hand in hand with the drastic changes – triggered by the Napoleonic Wars and the Liberal Revolution – in the way power was structured in European societies. The Godó family symbolised the new social class of traders and manufacturers that emerged in Europe amid the dwindling control of the guilds and the new freedom of trade. This section will focus on the importance that kinship cooperation and being deeply rooted in the local community had for the members of this family to reach an advantaged position in society.

The second part of the chapter (sections **1.3.** and **1.4.**) will examine why the Godó’s saw the press as a new avenue for promoting their private interests. Across Europe, one of the biggest challenges the liberal-state faced was how to represent the interests of local elites. In the case of those countries where a centralist state-model was implemented, and where the legal-rational principles of liberalism coexisted with other forms of authority that came from the *Ancient Régime*, patron-client relationships became the central pillar through which parliamentary representation was organised.\(^{106}\) The political career of Carlos and Bartolomé Godó will allow examining the functioning of these mechanisms from an innovative perspective. Thus, while clientelism has usually been studied through single political periods, especially for the case of last quarter of the 19th century,\(^{107}\) less is known about how it was transformed in times of political transition. The career of the Godó brothers, which embraced


107 The literature has privileged a narrow understanding of political clientelism, based on the procedures liberal elites implemented in the last quarter of the 19th century to control public office. These procedures were: “*rotativismo*” in Portugal (since 1878); “*trasformismo*” in Italy (since the Parliamentary revolution of 1876, which marked the seizing of power by the Sinistra); and “*sistema del turno*” in Spain (1885).
two different periods (the “Democratic Sexennium”, 1868-1874; and the “Bourbon Restoration”, 1874-1923), will provide an opportunity to adopt an intra-period perspective and thus to shed light on the changing nature of clientelism. Special attention will be paid to the strategies elites developed to adapt during these moments of political transformation and to the role of the press in these strategies.
1.1. The Origins of the Godó Family

The Godó name has traditionally been associated with Igualada, an industrial town of inner Catalonia located 60 km northwest of Barcelona. The roots of this family go back to the early 18th century when, on 20 January 1716, Oleguer Godó, a man from the neighbouring town of Esparraguera, married Caterina Gomà in the church of Santa Maria.108 The wedding seemed to have been rooted in a commercial strategy: like Oleguer, Caterina’s father worked as a “paraire” – as the various procedures involved in the spinning of wool were referred to in Catalan.109 The wool industry was, in fact, the town’s most important industry and employed many people.110 However, despite the fact that Igualada attracted numerous migrants at the time, only a few of them were recruited as “paraires”.111 Marrying the daughter of a guild member is presumably what secured Oleguer’s acceptance into the guild. Hence, two years after his wedding Oleguer passed the examination of the guild of “Sant Joan Baptista” and joined it bearing the name “GO”.112

From that moment on the successive generations of the Godó family maintained and reinforced their link with Igualada. Their activities, whether in the world of commerce, family, or politics, cannot be fully understood without taking into account the importance that “localism” played in the agency of the family members. The peculiar way in which Igualada experienced industrialisation in the 19th century directly affected the expectations of the Godó family and conditioned their strategies of action – including the foundation of La Vanguardia.

Igualada became a paradigmatic example of the proto-industrialisation process that Europe underwent in the 18th century, to the point of becoming one of the most industrialised

108 Arxiu Històric Comarcal d’Igualada-Arxiu Parroquial d’Igualada (AHCI-API), Llibre de matrimonis (1684-1726), any 1716, fol. 181.
110 During the first third of the 17th century, as many as four in every ten couples that married in Igualada had a husband working as a “paraire”. Ibidem, p. 53.
112 “Y lo dit Olaguer Gudó accepta lo ésser mestra y confrare de dita confraria, y estará als manaments dels cònsols que vuy són y per temps seran, en quant als càrrechs de dita confraria, y en pagar los talls y càrrechs de aquella, lo bé y profit de aquella. Y promet exercir lo càrrech de andador fins y atant ni haurà de altra. Y per ser casat ab filla de mestre paga per lo examen quinse reals, los quals li done de comptans als dits cònsols. Y ab jurament llargament”. Montserrat Duran Pujol (ed.), Llibre de la confraria y offici de Perayres de la vila de Igualada, en lo qual estan continuadas las ordinaciones y determinaciones de dit offici, tretas del llibre de la confraria de perayres de la ciutat de Barcelona (1614-1887), Barcelona, Fundació Noguera, 2011, vol. I, Session of 12 June 1718, pp. 345-346.
places in Catalonia (by then Spain’s most dynamic region). Indeed, and as Jaume Torras has studied in detail, throughout the 18th century growing numbers of “paraires” in Igualada started to spin cotton outside the control of the guild by relying on the “putting-out” system and the introduction of foreign manual spinning machines.\textsuperscript{113} The result was the growing specialisation of this town in the cotton textile industry and the mushrooming of factories. By 1841 there were as many as 481 factories dedicated to the cotton industry in Igualada, making it the second most important centre in Catalonia, both for the spinning process and in the total volume of wages paid. Only Barcelona fared better in both cases.\textsuperscript{114}

The Godó family played an active role in the expansion of Igualada’s cotton industry. Ramón Godó Llucià (1801-1862), the father of La Vanguardia’s future founders, was a textile manufacturer who inherited a set of spinning machines that were installed in the same building in which he and his family lived – number 10 on the “Rambla Nova”. Ramón’s workshop was founded in 1808 and was the third oldest in Igualada. By 1845 the factory had been relocated in a new building and employed 120 people.\textsuperscript{115} Annual production amounted to 75,000 pesetas, making Ramón the sixth largest manufacturer in town. In 1835 he was ranked 28th on Igualada’s taxpayers list.\textsuperscript{116}

The building that Ramón owned on the Rambla Nova was to hold long-lasting symbolism for the Godó family. Besides being the first setting for the factory, at least four future generations of the family were born and raised in this household. The building thus symbolised the continuity of the family lineage across time, as well as the place where different generations lived side by side. This can be seen in Table 2, which contains the name of all the family members that lived in the building in 1849. The data come from Igualada’s municipal census of 1849. In order to highlight the coexistence of different generations of the family in the same household, the data of Table 2 is displayed in the form of a family tree.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\hline
Place & Monthly value production & Wages paid & Capital investment \\
\hline
Barcelona & 638,000 & 1,120,000 & 68,500,000 \\
Igualada & 309,000 & 543,000 & 10,300,000 \\
Mataró & 138,000 & 211,000 & 11,300,000 \\
Manresa & 125,000 & 196,000 & 12,700,000 \\
Berga & 78,000 & 169,000 & 5,100,000 \\
Vic & 53,000 & 105,000 & 2,700,000 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Monthly value production, wages paid, and capital investment for different places in Catalonia.}
\end{table}

Note: The monthly value production is in “lliures catalanes”, the rest of the figures are in “rals de billó”. Table reproduced in: J.M. Torras i Ribé, “Trajectòria d’un procés d’industrialització frustrat”, Miscellanea Aqualatensis, nº 2, 1974, p. 181.

\textsuperscript{115} Pere Pascual i Domènech, Els Torelló..., vol. 1, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{116} P. Pascual i Domènech, op. cit., vol. I, p. 67 and pp. 132-3, respectively.

As Table 2 shows, in 1849 three generations lived together in the Godó’s household. The names marked with a blue box correspond to the eldest son of each generation and indicate, also, the hereditary line within the Godó family. The coincidence between age and line of transmission is because in Catalonia, in contrast to other parts of Spain, an impartible system of family inheritance prevailed. The *raison d’être* of this system was to prevent the dispersal of family assets and to maintain the economic status. Accordingly, the first-born son (called “hereu”) was bestowed with the lion’s share of the inheritance (around 80 per cent of the total), while the younger sons and daughters (called “cabalers” and “cabaleres”), in contrast, only received the remaining 20 per cent, which was divided into equal parts.

This uneven inheritance system was symbolically reinforced in child-naming customs. The Godó family first sons were usually christened “Ramón”, as Table 2 shows. The name thus provided a regular and unified identity among the members of the Godó family, but also constituted one of the clearest mechanisms of an “institutionalized relationship” within the

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household. This was manifest in various ways. One example was the children’s upbringing. The heir was given special attention and enjoyed a number of privileges that were not extended to his brothers and sisters. An illustration of this was the fact that Ramón Godó Pié, the family’s future heir, had chocolate for breakfast everyday, carefully prepared by his mother; while the rest of his siblings went without this luxury. A second example of such preferential treatment was the fact that Ramón, together with his wife (Bonaventura Llucíà) and their son, lived in the family home. In contrast to this, the remaining brothers were expected to move elsewhere. Still, families developed different strategies that facilitated the departure of cadets while assuring the preservation of their economic status, such as sending second sons to religious institutions. An alternative strategy can be observed in the case of the Godó family: the eldest daughter of Ramón Godó Llucíà, Manuela (1843-1903), was sent to Madrid to join the “Amiga de la Juventud” – an insurance company in which the families invested the dowry of their daughters with the expectation of increasing its value. The final goal was to improve the daughter’s chances of upward mobility by means of marriage. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that Manuela returned from Madrid and married in Igualada in 1866.

The prevailing of an impartible inheritance system in 19th-century Catalonia is a crucial element to understand why the two founders of La Vanguardia, Carlos (1801-1862) and Bartolomé Godó Pié (1839-1894), decided to leave Igualada and move to the Basque city of Bilbao, in the north of Spain. Both of them were cadets and unlike their oldest brother Ramón, who inherited the house and the family business, they only received a dowry. According to the will their father signed in 1851 this consisted of 1,500 “lliuras catalanas” each. Still, if the existence of highly institutionalised relationships within the Godó family

121 Although in practice this was not always the case. One of those exceptions was the case of unmarried brothers. This was the case of Magí Godó Llucíà [see Table 2], who stayed in the family home. This strategy presented two advantages to the family: first, it allowed another family member to work in the business; and, second, it allowed the family to save on one dowry.
123 As Ramón Godó Llucíà established in his will, written on 21st June 1851: “Ytem a Manuela Godó y Pie sa filla comuna al testador y á sa muller Rita Pie, inscrita en la societat anomenada Amiga de la Juventud resident en Madrid; li llega mil lliuras catalanas, à mes de lo que li correspondra per lo Reglament de dita Societat (...).” ANI, Testaments, 1851, expedient 278. The society “Amiga de la Juventud” was established in Madrid in December 1845.
124 “Ytem deixa y llega per iguals drets de llegitimas, à Anton, Joseph, Carlos y Barthomeu Godó y Pie fills comuns també al testador y a sa muller Rita Pie, mil sinc centas lliuras barcelonases à cada un de ells, y robas al
helps explain the path that Carlos and Bartolomé followed, the immediate reason for their
departure to the Basque Country was linked to Igualada’s economic development.
Furthermore, a considerable amount of the activities that Carlos and Bartolomé pursued in
the future, both as deputies and press proprietors, were addressed at solving the deep
economic crisis into which Igualada had fallen since the mid 19th century.

In fact, if Igualada had once exemplified the early burgeoning of industrialisation in
Catalonia, years later it illustrated the downside of this economic revolution. The historian
Vicens Vives identified Igualada as an example of those prosperous towns that failed to adapt
to the changes in the industry.\textsuperscript{125} The first reason for this crisis was a total lack of water
resources: after the 1840s, the Catalan textile industry underwent a series of deep
transformations in which the installation of steam engines became central for the mechanising
of production. The low volume of water of Igualada’s main river, however, prevented the
adoption of these technical advances. Another problem that worsened the situation was the
poor state of the land connections, which prevented the import of coal from coastal cities. In
consequence, obtaining a railway connection with Barcelona was soon seen as the only
possible remedy to Igualada’s industrial crisis.\textsuperscript{126} This explains why the Godó brothers soon
became the standard bearers of this cause, both from their seats in the Spanish Congress (in
Madrid) as well as from the pages of \textit{La Vanguardia} in Barcelona.

The immediate consequence of Igualada’s failure to adapt to the mechanisation of the
textile industry was a traumatic process of de-industrialisation that started in 1850 and had
profound social consequences. Within a few years, factories in Igualada lost their capacity to
compete with neighbouring towns like Manresa and Mataró.\textsuperscript{127} The lack of water resources
prevented businessmen from adopting the new models of spinning machines and forced them
to rely on the so-called “bergadana” – a (by then old-fashioned) manual spinning machine.
This problem of outdated machinery was coupled with the worsening of working conditions:
in the 1850s, the working day in Igualada’s textile industry lasted between 13 and 16 hours.
Women and children formed the vast majority of the workforce so as to keep salaries as low
as possible, and the majority of working families could barely pay the rent and survived on an

\textsuperscript{125} Jaume Vicens Vives i Montserrat Llorens, \textit{Industrials i Polítics (segle XIX)}, Barcelona, El Observador de la
\textsuperscript{126} Miquel Térmens i Graells, “El ferrocarril a Igualada: la lluita pel progrés (1852-1893)”, \textit{Miscellanea
\textsuperscript{127} While Manresa relied heavily on water as an energy source (43.8%), and Mataró did the same with steam
(11%), Igualada was restricted to the use of hand-labour as the main source of energy – this accounted for
37.8% in 1841, representing the highest percentage in Catalonia at the time.
The economic crisis had two immediate consequences for Igualada’s social sphere: the exacerbation of social conflict and a continuous loss of population due to the lack of job opportunities. Table 3 illustrates this second point.

### Table 3. Demographic development in Igualada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of inhabitants</th>
<th>Growth rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1797</td>
<td>6,494</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1812</td>
<td>7,295</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>11,043</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1838</td>
<td>12,779</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>11,896</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>11,879</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>10,201</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>10,419</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>10,442</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As is clear in Table 3, the year 1857 marked a turning point in the demography. During this year Igualada reached its highest number of inhabitants (14,000), but then started suffering drastic demographic loss. In the worst moment of the crisis the town lost as many as 3,000 inhabitants in less than three years (1857-1860). This population decline would continue during the second half of the 19th century, to the point that it was not until 1936 (that is to say, more than 70 years later) that Igualada reached again a population of 14,000 souls. Moreover, the social origins of the people who departed proved to be highly diverse. As well as the numerous textile workers that emigrated there were many businessmen who abandoned Igualada due to the lack of entrepreneurial opportunities.

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129 Source: Josep Maria Torras Ribé, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

130 *Ibidem*.

131 Such as the brothers Muntadas, who founded “La España Industrial”; or Nicolau Tous Soler, who moved to Barcelona and participated in the “La Barcelonesa” and “La Maquinista Terrestre i Marítima”. These factories became iconic landmarks of the industrial revolution in Catalonia. J. Vicens Vives i M. Llorens, *op. cit.*, p 52.
The future founders of *La Vanguardia* Carlos and Bartolomé Godó Pié were another example of well-positioned elites who abandoned Igualada in the mid-19th century. The two brothers emigrated in 1856, during the worst years of the crisis. Apparently, it was a violent incident involving the Godó family that triggered their abrupt departure: the strike of July 1855 – the first general strike in Spanish history. The context behind this strike was the “democratic” revolution of 1854, a military coup d’état that brought the progressive sectors of Spanish liberalism into power. While the strike first erupted in Barcelona, it soon spread to Igualada. At the forefront of the protests stood the workers of the textile industry, who since the 1830s were grouped into unions with a mutualistic character (like the “Asociación Mutua de Obreros de la Industria Igualadina”). Their demands were for limiting the workday to 12 hours, increasing salaries, and abolishing arbitrary dismissal.

While all the businessmen in Igualada eventually came to accept some of the workers’ demands, Ramón Godó Llucià was the only manufacturer in town to reject them. According to one contemporary, Godó’s singular stance had to do with his traditional opposition to the workers’ demands, an attitude for which he was already well known. In response to Godó’s refusal to negotiate, numerous textile workers attacked his house in the street of Rambla Nova. In the struggle that followed, Ramón and his wife Bonaventura were stabbed repeatedly and a fellow-employee was shot. The young family heir (Ramón Godó Pié) managed to escape by hiding in a neighbouring house.

The details of the assault on the Godó’s household vary notably depending on the source. According to some testimonies, it was Godó’s wife who first insulted and provoked the workers; other sources, by contrast, claim that it was the workers who came intent on attacking the house. Besides other small contradictory details that are hard to verify, the

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136 “Fourteen or fifteen delegates marched to Godó's house, with a large group of comrades shouting encouragement from the street. They came to the door, and the maid tried to stop them from entering. Then Mrs. Godó shouted, "Get those deadbeats out of here! They don't belong here!" Then Godó himself appeared. That's when the lady really got furious and threw herself at the delegates with her claws drawn. The one closest to her, seeing that he was about to be attacked by that fury, pushed her back, and maybe he did scratch her up a bit.” Baltasar Porcel, *La revuelta permanente*, Barcelona, Planeta, 1978 [translated into English by John L. Getman as *The Permanent Revolution*, Seattle, Recollection Books, 1999. The fragment here reproduced has been extracted from the editorial’s webpage: www.recollectionbooks.com]. Other sources portraying a similar view of events: Joan Ferrer Farriol, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15; F. Olaya Morales, *op. cit.*
assault on the Godó’s household reveals the context of extreme social violence in which Igualada was immersed. In fact, the attacks on the Godó family were mentioned in the press of Madrid and Barcelona. The reaction of the authorities, however, did little to bring peace. In the trial that followed, where the Godó’s heir testified, six workers were condemned to more than two years imprisonment. In practice, however, only two workers eventually returned. The other six disappeared during their imprisonment and it is not known what became of them.

The news about the disappearance of these six workers created the “black legend” of the Godó family in Igualada. For the working class in this town, this incident equated the Godó name to despotic rule and labour exploitation. In 1916, that is to say 61 years after the incidents took place, the Republicans celebrated the end of the Godó family’s political career right in front of their house. Asked for the reasons behind this animosity, people noted that the grievances against the Godó dated back to 1855. These incidents are crucial to understand the context in which the political career of the Godó would develop in the future.

In contrast to the vast majority of the literature on corruption, which often attributes the persistence of clientelist practices to popular indifference, in Igualada an active (though highly divided) political opposition would confront the Godó’s political career. For this opposition movement, the strike of 1855 became a symbolic reference of their social and political struggle. These kinds of references evoke the importance that memory played in the highly localised dynamics that characterised liberal politics in Europe. Newspapers were a way of keeping these memories alive, but also a device for those interested in counteracting them.

137 “Al presentarse los obreros de la fábrica del Sr. D. Ramón Godó á hacer aceptar á este las nuevas tarifas que decían debían regir en sustitucion de las acordadas, le presentaron un puñal que cayó sobre aquel al momento de haber negado su conformidad, dejándole tendido en su despacho bañado en un mar de sangre. Pasaron los mismos á la habitacion de la señora y la dieron (sic) once puñaladas en el pecho y la espalda y en el mismo acto otros herían de un pistoletazo al mayordomo de los telares. Afortunadamente no murieron los consortes Godó, aunque los facultativos desconfian de su salvacion; pero han podido declarar los nombres de sus agresores.” La Época, 06/07/1855, p. 3. In the case of Barcelona, La Crónica de Cataluña provided a similar account.

138 “That narrow-minded attitude was personified by the Godós of Igualada, who became the caciques, or bosses. (...) For years and years they were the most hated of all bosses, and that came about as a result of the very hard strike of 1854 (sic).” Baltasar Porcel, op. cit.

139 The strong opposition to the Godó family will be analysed in subsequent chapters.
1.2. **Building the Family Networks: Business, Marriages, and the First Years of Political Activism in Bilbao and Barcelona**

It was amidst the economic and social crisis in which Igualada fell in the mid-19th century that Carlos and Bartolomé Godó Pié emigrated. First they settled in Barcelona and shortly after in Bilbao (1856). The two brothers were still young (Carlos was 21 and Bartolomé was only 16 years old) and were seemingly in a precarious situation. The few sources that have been preserved speak of two men of humble origins who made a fortune thanks to their effort and persistence, despite the difficult circumstances.

Some of these testimonies, however, need to be interpreted with caution because they were written as obituaries that celebrated the image of the “bourgeois self-made man”. In the case of Bartolomé, for instance, his obituaries stressed his initiative, honesty, and love of work. These were portrayed as commendable social qualities. In fact, Bartolomé himself apparently “liked to boast, when he was among friends, about the innumerable pieces of cloth that he had loaded on his robust shoulders during his youth”. The praise of such values, which placed the emphasis on the right to control one’s own destiny, exemplified the growing criticism that the Catalan inheritance system began to undergo during the second half of the 19th century. Meritocracy, rather than birthright, started to be presented as the guiding pattern in the life of an individual. Obituaries thus constituted one of the rituals where the Catalan bourgeoisie constructed and redefined its public values as a social class. As part of this meritocratic discourse, the departure of cadets was presented as a sign of determination to control one’s future, as the case of the Godó brothers illustrates.

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140 Unfortunately, very little information has been preserved about the stay of the two brothers in Barcelona and therefore it is hard to precise their date of arrival. One of the possible reasons for the settlement in this city could be the fact that the entire family Godó took refuge in the city after the aggression of 1855.

141 “Porque D. Carlos Godó, que en su juventud fué simple obrero, llegó, gracias á sus extraordinarias condiciones de actividad y de talento, á poseer un capital de los primeros de Barcelona”. *La Correspondencia de España*, 10/07/1897, p. 1.

142 “La actividad, la constancia, el amor al trabajo, el espíritu de empresa, la inteligencia aplicada á los negocios y la honradez y formalidad de sus tratos son condiciones que poseía don Bartolomé en grado sumo, y con ellas se abrió camino en la vida”. LV, 28/01/1894, p. 2.

143 “Don Bartolomé Godó, prototipo de los hijos segundones de nuestra Cataluña, donde subsiste todavía la institución del heréu, todo cuanto fué, su representación y su fortuna, se lo debió á sí mismo”. LV, 28/01/1894, p. 2.

144 Cemeteries and mausoleums were another example of the construction of these values. See: Gary Wray McDonogh, *Good families of Barcelona: a social history of power in the industrial era*, Princeton University Press, 1986.

145 “Fue éste [Carlos], como su hermano D. Bartolomé, uno de los hombres más espléndidos y más caritativos que se han conocido en Cataluña. Vino de Igualada á Barcelona sin más medios de desenvolvimiento que los naturales; aprendió á negociar en una casa de comisiones de Bilbao, al lado de su hermano mayor; desenvolvió luego ese mismo negocio en Barcelona, y después se hizo fabricante y hombre opulento, sin más esfuerzos y sin más dotes que los suyos.” *El Liberal*, 14/02/1900, p. 2.
In fact, the understanding of migration as a sign of individualism has also been present in the work of scholars. Historians of European family have often interpreted the departure of cadets as the rupture of kinship ties. According to this view, departure was the result of an individual choice where cadets sought to escape the control of the family and seek a better future. In other cases, departure was regarded as a mechanism to regulate demographic phenomenon, for instance the overpopulation of given societies. In both explanations, migration is seen as part of a process of “modernisation” taking place in Western Europe since the late 18th century: the rise of the nuclear family.

However, and contrary to the assumptions above, the settlement of the Godó brothers in Bilbao did not imply the breaking of kinship ties. The situation was rather the opposite: the two brothers maintained a strong link with their family in Igualada and collaborated in the family business. In fact, the departure of Carlos and Bartolomé was part of the family’s commercial strategy. The first evidence of this dates back to 1856, when Carlos Godó appears for the first time as a citizen of Bilbao, where he worked as “textile tradesman.”

The municipal census indicates that Carlos was sharing an apartment with his brother Josep Godó Pié, at number 47 on the street named “Ronda”. Apparently, Josep had moved to Bilbao two years earlier, in 1854, and also worked as a textile tradesman. The fact that Carlos settled in Bilbao, following the same path as his brother, doing the same work, suggests that the Godó family operated according to a “migration chain” basis. Hence, and in contrast to spontaneous mobility, the family marked the route of the cadets leaving Igualada. This point is confirmed by the arrival of a third member of the Godó family in 1869.

The second evidence of a collective family strategy was sibling-cooperation. Although the name of Bartolomé does not appear in Bilbao’s municipal census, it was he, and

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147 David W. Sabean, S. Teuscher and J. Mathieu, op. cit., p. 20.
148 Archivo Histórico Foral de Bizkaia (AHFB). Archivo Municipal de Bilbao, Sección primera, c. 261, leg. 1; Libros de padrón, año 1871, Padrón 0003.
149 Ibidem, c. 259, leg. 1; and c. 254, leg. 5. For the case of Josep Godó Pié, see Table 2.
150 This can be defined as “that movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment arranged by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants.” John S. MacDonald and Leatrice D. MacDonald, “Chain Migration Ethnic Neighborhood Formation and Social Networks”, The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), p. 82.
151 This was the case of a boy called Antonio Godó (1858-?), who arrived in Bilbao at the age of 11 and appeared in the municipal census as a “student”. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to determine to which line of the Godó family Antoni belonged. AHFB, Archivo Municipal de Bilbao, Libros de padrón, año 1871, Padrón 0003.
not Josep, who became Carlos’ main business partner. On December 1864 the two of them established a new business called “Godó hermanos” (“Godó brothers”) with the declared purpose of “buying and selling textile goods, both National and Foreign”. The legal domicile was in Bilbao, but the company considered “the opening of a branch in Barcelona as soon as possible” to be a priority. The capital of the company amounted to 1,300,000 “reales de vellón” and was provided in equal parts between the two partners. The two brothers seemingly relied on the dowry of their sister Manuela (estimated at 80,000 “r.v.”) and the assistance of their brother Ramón to raise the capital needed to establish the company. This point would confirm the humble origins of the two brothers, and it reveals the importance that kinship ties had in the context of setting up a new business.

The work of the Godó brothers consisted in selling and distributing all types of textiles, as is confirmed by the information contained in a commercial guide. Even though the founding status clearly stated that “Godó hermanos” dealt with textile goods of different origins (both Spanish and foreign), the Godó brothers seemed to give preference to Catalan goods. This is shown by the company’s goal of establishing a new branch in Barcelona; the opening a new shop in Bilbao called “Ciudad Condal”; and by the import of workers from Catalonia. All this suggests that the migration of the Godó brothers to Bilbao was part of a family strategy, consisting in the distribution and selling of the family’s production from

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152 Josep ran his own company, called “José Godó y Compañía”. From 1860 onwards, Josep disappears from the municipal census. This might indicate his departure from Bilbao (perhaps replaced by Carlos?).

153 Archivo Histórico Provincial de Vizcaya, Protocolos, Notario Blas de Onzaño, 9 de diciembre 1864, pp. 480-482.

154 “… en cuanto á los 60,000 [r.v.] restantes los ha pagado el propio D. Ramon por sus hermanos D. Carlos y D. Bartolomé, á cuenta de los 80.000 que los mismos prometieron tambien en dote en la propia escritura de cartas datales á dicha Doña Manuela, en cuatro plazos de 20.000 cada uno, revistiendo la espresada suma de 60.000 en pago de los tres primeros plazos”. AHCI, Fons familia Godó, carp. 104, doc. 6, “Capítols matrimoniales entre Manuela Godó i Francisco Coma”.


156 This is the name traditionally given to Barcelona. AHFB, Archivo Municipal de Bilbao, “Expediente tramitado por el Ayuntamiento de Bilbao en virtud de instancia presentada por Justo Violet en nombre de Godó Hermanos solicitando permiso para colocar un toldo en el establecimiento de tejidos de la calle Ascao titulado “Ciudad Condal””. Sección Bilbao primera, caja 73, legajo 77.

157 The company usually “imported” the workers from Catalonia (e.g. from the town of Olesa de Montserrat, located 30 km from Igualada). The company covered all the travel expenses between Catalonia and the Basque Country and offered a ten-years contract, with a salary of 6,000 “r.v.” annually, plus a five per cent commission upon benefits, to be paid once the contract finished. The recruitment of workers from the same place origin is a good example of the close networks on which mercantile diasporas relied. In fact, the workers even shared an apartment with the Godó. This strategy was not exempt, however, from tensions. In 1864 the Catalan workers of “Godó brothers” denounced the company. AHFB, Archivo del Corregimiento, Legajo 2108, nº 7, “Pleito promovido por Fulgencio de Segurola y Juan Matas, vecinos ambos de Bilbao y Tarrasa, dependientes en la sociedad “Godó Hermanos”, de Barcelona y Bilbao, contra la misma sobre incumplimiento del compromiso adquirido por esta sociedad para el abono del cinco por ciento de beneficios”.

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Igualada and complemented with the selling of other manufactures, mostly from Barcelona. In short, everything indicates that the Godó brothers were a typical example of the so-called “Catalan mercantile diaspora”.

Historians have coined this expression to refer to the presence of small communities of Catalan merchants across Spain since the 18th century. While different trade diasporas existed in Spain (e.g. the French diaspora), what makes the case of Catalan tradesmen interesting is their perception among local communities as a “differentiated community” – despite their status as nationals. The perception of Catalan traders as a separate group was the result of differentiated customs (like the use of a different language) and, above all, of the close nature of their commercial networks (endogamic practices included). The Catalan trade diasporas were commonly organised along two axes. On one hand there was the textile company, which was located in the diaspora’s place of origin; on the other, there was a group of travellers who were in charge of distributing and commercialising the cotton manufactures in targeted markets. The case of the Godó family fits with this structure of a trade diaspora: while the eldest son (Ramón Godó) ran the textile factory in Igualada, the cadets Carlos and Bartolomé settled in Bilbao to commercialise the family’s cotton manufactures.158

Still, if the study of the Catalan mercantile diaspora has been studied in great detail,159 the case of the Godó family presents a singular characteristic. That is, the extremely small number of Catalans that settled in the Basque country – during the period 1825-1932 there were only 382 Catalans in a region of 490,192 inhabitants.160 Therefore, the Godó brothers moved to a place where the presence of other Catalans was negligible (barely 0.08% of the total population, between 1825-1935).161 Probably as a result of this, the Godó brothers behaved slightly differently than most migrants we know about. Thus, while the integration of Catalan traders in local communities tended to be a “slow process”, which usually required

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158 Hence, there is evidence that as early as 1857, Carlos Godó represented the family economic interests in Santander (a city 100 km north-west of Bilbao). “(...) Don Ramon Godo (...), fabricante natural y vecino de la presente [Igualada] (...) da todo su poder ó sea el del ante dicho su Sor Padre, cumplido y tan bastante cual por derecho se requiera y sea menester á D. Carlos Godó su hermano vecino y del comercio de la Ciudad de Bilbao para que por el otorgante en dicho nombre pueda pedir percibir y cobrar de D. Joaquin Arregui vecino y del comercio de la Ciudad de Santander la cantidad de trece mil cuatrocientos ciento y seis reales vn (...).” ACAN-Arxiu de Protocols d’Igulada (API), Notari F. Especier, 1857, pp. 556-559.

159 The state of the art that frames this topic in a broader perspective, in: Cosme Jesús Gómez Carrasco, “Comercio, burgueses y redes mercantiles en las ciudades españolas a finales del Antiguo Régimen. Un análisis historiográfico”, Revista de Historiografía, nº 16, IX (1/2012), pp. 119-128 (esp. p. 122).


more than one generation,\textsuperscript{162} in the case of Carlos and Bartolomé they managed to integrate themselves into Bilbao’s elites rather quickly. Hence, the two brothers married local women, incorporated the local population in their business, and entered into municipal politics.

That reality obliges us to reflect on the strategies that Carlos and Bartolomé used to integrate themselves in the local community, at a time when urban ruling elites were being redefined across Europe.\textsuperscript{163} The turning point that the building of the liberal-state represented in many fields (especially in the legal and institutional framework) opened up a series of possibilities for upward mobility. The result was a complex process of social integration and exclusion between old and new elites that redefined the nature of municipal power in Europe.\textsuperscript{164} The case of the Godó brothers can be regarded, therefore, as a case study of a broader process of elite reconfiguration that took place in mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century Europe.\textsuperscript{165} Additionally, the brother’s emigration to Bilbao is central to this thesis. In this city, they improved their social status (upward mobility), accumulated a small capital that allowed them to return to Barcelona in the 1870s and build new business alliances related to the trade with Cuba. The need to defend all the commercial interests created in Bilbao became one of the most powerful reasons to found \textit{La Vanguardia} [see Chapter 4]. Still, if the Godó made such a success of their stay it was because they proved capable of integrating into the Bilbao’s elite. The following pages will argue that marriage became their principal mechanism of social integration.

Shortly after moving to Bilbao (by then a city of 20,000 people) Carlos and Bartolomé both married. They did so in the same year (1860) – within a few months of each other, and in the same church (“Basilica de Santiago el Mayor”); but most importantly, they both married Basque women. In the case of Bartolomé, he married as many as three times.\textsuperscript{166} The repetition of the same pattern of behaviour — marrying local women — is all the more

\textsuperscript{162} Mª T. Pérez Picazo, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 73.


\textsuperscript{164} An example of this process, from a comparative perspective, is: Jorge Luengo, \textit{Una sociedad conyugal. Las élites de Valladolid en el espejo de Magdeburgo en el siglo XIX}, València, PUV, 2014.

\textsuperscript{165} It is not the goal of this chapter to enter into the historiographical debate about the controversial “bourgeois” character of the liberal revolution. On the limitations of this debate, see: Isabel Burdiel, \textit{Myths of Failure, Myths of Success: New Perspectives on Nineteenth-Century Spanish Liberalism}, \textit{The Journal of Modern History} 70 (December 1998), pp. 892-912; José Álvarez Junco, “Sobre el concepto de revolución burguesa”, in: Carlos Moyá Espí, Luis Rodríguez de Zúñiga and Maria del Carmen Iglesias Cano (coord.), \textit{Homenaje a José Antonio Maravall}, CIS, 1985, 1985, vol. 1, pp. 135-149. See also: J. Luengo, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 18-20.

\textsuperscript{166} Felipa Belaunzaran Hormaza (Bilbao, 1839-?); Dolors Brunet Cucurull (La Habana, ? – Barcelona, 1871); and Gloria Eguía de Muruaga (Bilbao,1842-Barcelona, 1908). The marriages took place in 07/11/1860; in 1870 (?) and in 16/11/1872, respectively. Archivo Histórico Eclesiástico de Bizkaia (AHEB), Registro de Matrimonios, p. 257; pp. 144-145, resp.
revealing if we take into account that in 1864 Bartolomé had moved back to Barcelona. Yet despite living in the Catalan city, Bartolomé always married Basque women. Besides their place of origin, two of Bartolomé’s wives had one element in common that is of special importance: they came from families with business interests in Cuba. This island was one of the few colonies that were left of Spain’s former empire (after the independence of the South-American dominions in the 1820s and 1830s) and also the most valuable one. Indeed, as a prosperous agro-export economy based on slave labour and the favourable rights of entry to Peninsular goods, Cuba was a highly attractive market for Spanish manufacturers. The Godó brothers saw Bilbao’s well-established maritime connections with the Antilles as a potential market for Catalan cotton fabrics. To do so, establishing commercial alliances with local businessman, both in Cuba and Bilbao, was crucial. And marriage became the way in which the Godó brothers would establish such alliances.

The evidence that best supports the above-mentioned hypothesis is the wedding of Bartolomé with Dolors Brunet Cucurull (? – 1871). Dolors was born in La Habana (Cuba) and was the descendant of a Catalan family who had migrated to San Sebastián in the 18th century. Indeed, the Brunet family had been — like the Godó family — part of the (numerically small) Catalan mercantile diaspora in the Basque Country. The Brunet family had specialised, since the late 18th century, in the imports of colonial goods for the Spanish market. By the mid-19th century they complemented these activities with a successful entry into the banking business, which allowed them to make a fortune and gain a notable reputation. From the perspective of the Godó’s strategies of social integration, the Brunet family present three elements that are of interest. The first one is that Dolor’s family originally came from Copons, a small town located 12 km from Igualada. It is hard to accept that a marriage between two people who shared such close geographic origins, yet

167 In this city Bartolomé made his first will. To Barcelona’s notary Ferran Moragas, Bartolomé declared: “Yo D. Bartolomé Godó y Pié natural de Ygualada y vecino de esta Ciudad [Barcelona], Comerciante, de edad de veinte y cinco años y de estado casado (...).” AHPB, Notari Ferran Moragas Ubac, Vol. 1, 14/03/1864, fols. 412-413. His third (and final marriage) took place in 1872, in Bilbao.

168 “(...) d. Bartolomé de Godó, del comercio, de edad de treinta y tres años, natural de Igualada, y vecino de Barcelona, viudo de dª Dolores Brunet, que lo fue de la Habana (...).” AHEB, Marriage between Bartolomé Godó and Mª Gloria de Eguía, Registro de Matrimonios, p. 144-145.


170 Ibidem.
lived in the Basque Country, was a coincidence. The second element that needs to be stressed is the marriage patterns the Brunet family followed. As Montserrat Gárate has noted, the majority of the descendants of this family married people who lived in San Sebastian, but who were of foreign origin. This peculiar pattern of marriage was related to the Brunet’s business alliances. Finally, and most importantly, Dolor’s father (José Brunet) had business interests in the jute textile industry. This was the same industrial sector in which the Godó brothers would later specialise, once they came back to Barcelona. This business consisted in the export of jute bags to Cuba [see Chapter 4].

Therefore, it can be concluded that Bartolomé’s marriage to Dolors Brunet formalised an alliance between two families who shared commercial interests; namely, the trade between Catalonia and the Spanish Antilles through the Basque Country. The sharing of the same geographic origins also played an important part in the wedding. Scholars have repeatedly noted that endogamy between “migrant communities” brought a series of positive advantages for business. Still, marriage according to geographic origins did not seem to be Bartolomé’s only guiding pattern. His first and third marriages were to women who had no Catalan origins but were from the Basque Country. However, the connection with Cuba was also present in his first marriage. Hence, Bartolomé’s first brother-in-law (Felipe Belaunzarán) became the legal representative of “Godó hermanos” in Cuba. The strong commercial alliance that marriage provided is revealed by the fact that these alliances continued after the death of the married couple. As late as 1897 (when Bartolomé was already dead) the Godó still relied on the Belaunzarán family to represent their interests in Cuba.

172 All the more reason if we take into account that the Godó family had economic interests in Copons.
173 Only in the late 19th century did the Brunet start marrying into the “old” local elites. In the words of Montserrat Gárate: “La integración de estos catalanes en la sociedad donostiarrana no fue rápida. (...) los matrimonios de los distintos miembros de la familia Brunet muestran en pleno siglo XIX, algo de lo que ocurría en los negocios: eran sobre todo los Berthingham, Collado-Echagüe o Balbás, es decir, gentes de origen no necesariamente donostiarrana, los que emparentaron con la familia catalana”. Ibidem, p. 145.
174 On May 3 1888 the company “Sociedad José y Francisco Brunet” requested in Guipúzcoa a patent of invention consisting in a “Machine to weave jute for shoe soles”. Archivo histórico de la Oficina Española de Patentes y Marcas (OEPM), patente número 8207.
175 This route was an alternative to the one Catalan merchants followed during the 18th century, who sought to connect with the Antilles through Andalucía (this explains the large Catalan community living in Cadis). Montserrat Gárate, op. cit., p. 139.
176 Like the sharing of the same economic interests or the importance of trust in business transactions, especially in contexts where high levels of uncertainty existed.
177 “(...) Que dan y confieren poderes tan hastantes como en derecho se requiera á Don José Feliciano de Belaunzarán y Hornaza, mayor de edad, del comercio, vecino de la Habana, para que en nombre y representación de los Señores comparecientes y de la sociedad “Godó y Compañía sociedad en comandita”, pueda usar y ejercer en la Ysla de Cuba las facultades siguientes (...)". AHPB, Notari Josep Ferrer Bernadas, vol. 5, 23/11/1897, fol. 5254-5257.
In the case of Carlos Godó, his wedding provided alternative (though complementary) benefits to those of his brother Bartolomé. Carlos married Antonia Lallana Azpe (1836-1924) on June 30th 1860. Antonia was originally from the Basque city of Vitoria and had moved with her family to Bilbao two years before the wedding. According to contemporaries, Antonia was a woman with a strong character. She had a close bond with her son, the future owner of La Vanguardia (Ramón Godó Lallana), to the point that upon her request, this newspaper stopped publishing reports on bullfighting (which she abhorred) despite it being the most popular sport in Spain at the time.

Another example of Antonia’s imprint on the Godó family is that after their marriage Carlos apparently started using Spanish as his customary language – not just in Bilbao, but also when the couple moved to Barcelona. The adoption of Spanish (instead of Catalan) in the private sphere became a common practice among the Catalan bourgeoisie, and was a marker of “social distinction”.

Moreover, the case of Antonia Lallana sheds light on the role of women in business strategies. In 1870 Antonia granted a loan of 168,647 “r.v.” to the company “Godó hermanos”. This amount corresponded to her dowry and was duly certified in a legal contract establishing that Carlos and Bartolomé would compensate Antonia with an annual rate of six per cent and promised to repay the loan punctually. These types of financial arrangements reveal the importance that marriage played as a financial source for newly created companies, especially for capital increase and long-term loans. But women’s contributions to family businesses did not stop there: marriage also opened the doors to valuable business alliances. Antonia’s unmarried brother (Vicente Lallana) became the sales representative of “Godó hermanos” in Oviedo, a city located 280 km north-west of Bilbao. Additionally, Vicente

178 AHEB, Registro de matrimonios, p. 250.
179 Antonia’s parents were Luciano Lallana (Vitoria) and Maria Angela Azpe (Orduña). AHEB, op. cit.
181 “Familia Godó, empresarios del textil de Igualada, ¿cuándo perdieron el idioma como lengua familiar? “Quizás con el bisabuelo Carlos, que se casó con una vasca con gran personalidad, y cambió el idioma”. Interview to Javier Godó, “El ADN de ‘La Vanguardia’ es catalán”. LV, 01/05/2011.
183 “D. Carlos y D. Bartolomé Godó y Pié en nombre propio y como á únicos Socios de la indicada Sociedad de Godó hermanos, de su espontanea voluntad confiesan deber y querer pagar á la espresada Dª Antonia Lallana de Godó vecina de Bilbao Consorte del otorgante D. Carlos Godó y Pié la cantidad de ciento sesenta y ocho mil seisientos cuarenta y siete reales (...) que les presta de procedencias de las cantidades que tiene recibidos á cuenta de sus legítimas paterna y materna (...) que le pagarán el interés anual del seis por ciento por anualidades vencidas (...). AHPB, Notari Ferran Moragas Ubac, vol. 1, 01/01/1870, fols. 223-226.
184 To spread the commercialising of cotton fabrics to Oviedo, the Godó brothers founded a new company called “La Asturiana”. AHVP, Notario Blas de Onzoño, 22/11/1864, pp. 431-435. There is evidence that Igualada’s cotton goods were consumed in Oviedo, thanks to the intermediary role that “Godó brothers” played. See: José Ramón García, “Notas sobre la presencia de comerciantes catalanes en Oviedo en el siglo XIX”, Instituto de Estudios Asturianos, nº 119, 1986, pp. 795-804.
Lallana (who lived with the married couple)\(^{185}\) contributed to the company’s capital increase with 42,243 “r.v.”; and occasionally acted as the company’s lawyer.\(^{186}\) Consequently, Carlos’ marriage with Antonia Lallana provided the Godó brothers with access to new capital, legal representation, and valuable connections to expand the company’s sphere of action.

Last but not least, Carlos’ wedding also favoured what is, in my opinion, the clearest sign of the Godó’s successful integration into Bilbao’s elites: his entry into municipal politics. Between 1869 and 1871 Carlos became a member of the city council.\(^{187}\) This period corresponded with the establishing of a new parliamentary system in Spain, the so-called “Democratic Sexennium” (1868-1874). This new political system, founded after the overthrow of Queen Isabella II and the introduction of universal male suffrage, replaced the liberal-conservative model that had dominated the construction of the nation-state in Spain since 1843. A coalition of liberal-progressive and democratic elites seized power and put an end to the monopoly of power that one single party (the “Moderados”) had exercised until then. The outcome was the introduction of the most progressive legislation in Spain’s recent history: i.e. the establishing of a democratic monarchy under a new foreign dynasty (the Italian house of Savoy), and the granting of extensive individual rights (like freedom of religion, assembly and press).\(^{188}\)

At first glance it would seem as if Carlos Godó’s entry into public office was the outcome of a new parliamentary system and of the new electoral rules (universal suffrage). In practice, however, things proved to be rather different. If Carlos managed to get a seat in the town council it was not so much as a result of the new democratic system, but rather of his capacity to integrate himself into Bilbao’s elites. Indeed, the political life of this town did not really reflect that of the national landscape. In Bilbao, as in much of the Basque Country, but contrary to most parts of Spain, the Revolution of 1868 awoke little excitement. The reason for this is that during the reign of Isabella II (1856-1868) the Basque Country managed to preserve its tradition of self-government (the so-called “fueros”).\(^{189}\) This autonomy spared

\(^{185}\) In 1871, up to 11 people lived in the same apartment (“Calle de Bidebarrieta, 12, 2ndo piso derecha”): the married couple (Carlos Godó Pié and Antonia Lallana Azpe); the children of the marriage (Ramón, María and Antonio); two store clerks, recruited in the Catalan town of La Pobla de Claramunt, close to Igualada (Jaume and Francesc Figueras Mercader; both unmarried and aged 20 and 17, respectively); and three maiden women (names unknown). AHFB, Libros de padrón, 1872, Padrón 0003.

\(^{186}\) AHFB, Archivo del Corregimiento, Legajo 2108, nº 7.

\(^{187}\) AHFB, Archivo Municipal de Bilbao, Libro de actas municipales, nº 302, sesión 1 de enero 1869.

\(^{188}\) General overviews on this period, in: José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (eds.), Spanish history since 1808, London, Arnold, 2000; and J. Fontana and Ramón Villares (dir.), op. cit.

\(^{189}\) On this issue, see the two chapters of Enriqueta Sesmero Cutanda and Coro Rubio Pobes in S. Calatayud, J. Millán, M. C. Romeo, (eds.), Estado y periferias en la España del siglo XIX. Nuevos enfoques, València, Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2009, pp. 357-398 and pp. 399-438, respectively; and Javier Pérez
the Basque people from suffering the grievances that had contributed to the triumph of the Revolution in 1868, like the abolition of consumption taxes and the uneven system of military conscription.\textsuperscript{190}

Consequently, while most Spanish cities saw the traditional ruling elites (the “Moderados”) being replaced by the new revolutionary elites, in Bilbao the traditional elites managed to remain in power regardless of the change in the political system. This was because a coalition was created between the moderate Catholics and the various liberal trends with one sole purpose: to defend the region’s traditional autonomy against any centralist reforms the new government might seek to implement.\textsuperscript{191} Therefore, Carlos Godó’ election took place in a local context characterised by the on-going entanglement between the old and the new liberal elites. This became possible due to the common front the elites created to preserve regional autonomy and their shared desire to resist the threat that Catholic fundamentalists represented for the liberal order in this city.\textsuperscript{192}

It was in the above-mentioned context that Carlos was elected during the municipal elections of December 1868. The fact that his name had already been added to the list of liberal candidates was proof of Carlos’ successful integration, since Bilbao’s Liberal party explicitly forbade foreigners from being nominated.\textsuperscript{193} Soon afterwards, elections took place according to universal male suffrage. Compared with the political system under Queen Isabella II (1856-1868), the new franchise implied a substantial widening in the number of

\textsuperscript{190} Mikel Urkijo, \textit{La Gloriosa en el País Vasco: ¿revolución o contrarrevolución?}, \textit{Ayer} 44, 2001, pp. 113-114.

\textsuperscript{191} This agreement manifested in the provincial administration: the “Diputación de Bizkaia” changed its name to “Junta de Bizkaia”. That is to say, the institution was renamed to adapt it to the new political system, but in practice it remained the same. See: Mikel Urquijo Góitia, \textit{Liberales y carlistas. Revolución y fueros vascos en el preludio de la última Guerra Carlista}, Leioa, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco, 1994, pp. 17-20.

\textsuperscript{192} The Basque Country was the place where the opposition of Catholic fundamentalists to the liberal-state project enjoyed more popular support. This turned the region into one of the main scenarios of the three civil wars that took place in the last quarter of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century between liberals and Catholic fundamentalists in Spain. As a result of this, Bilbao’s political struggle followed a differentiated pattern: while most of Spanish cities saw electoral competition taking place between the political forces that brought down Queen’s Isabella’s throne (namely, the Liberal Progressives, the “Unión Liberal”, the Democrats) as well as the Republicans; in Bilbao, in contrast, elections were reduced to two opposing sides: the liberal supporters versus the Catholic fundamentalists. See: M. Urquijo, \textit{op. cit.}, 1994 and 2001.

\textsuperscript{193} Unfortunately, little information has been preserved about the activities of the Liberal Party in Bilbao during the Sexenio (as noted by M. Urquijo, \textit{op. cit.}). The best source is the newspaper the party had published since 1850, called \textit{Irrac-Bat}. I consulted this newspaper in the Archivo Histórico Provincial de Vizcaya. For a later period, see: Javier Real Cuesta, \textit{Un ejemplo de caciquismo electoral en el País Vasco: el comité liberal de Bilbao (1881-1899)}, \textit{Espacio, Tiempo y Forma}. Serie V. Historia Contemporánea, t. 5, 1992, pp. 325-342.
voters. In practice, however, little changed during elections: as in Isabella’s reign, the government of 1868 intervened in elections. Such intervention was justified by the need to secure the new political system (only four months had passed since the revolution of September 1868). Likewise, local elites in the Basque Country made use of provincial administrations (the so-called “diputaciones”) to exercise influence over elections. As a result of the authorities’ intervention (both from above and below) elections in Bilbao attracted little interest: electoral turnout was only 28% and Godó was elected with barely 323 votes.

Therefore, Carlos Godó’s election as alderman was not so much the result of the voter’s support, but rather of his capacity to integrate into Bilbao’s small ruling elite. His marriage to Antonia Lallana proved decisive in this regard. Hence, Carlos’ brother-in-law and new business partner (Vicente Lallana) acted as town councillor immediately before him, during the period spanning between the end of the Moderate period and the birth of the new political system in September 1868. One hypothesis can be drawn from this: that Carlos replaced his brother-in-law as alderman. Carlos’ election thus illustrates the entanglement that took place in Bilbao between traditional elites (those who held public office during the Moderate period), and the new elites that gained access to power during the Democratic Sexennium.

Moreover, an analysis of the Godó’s acquaintances in Bilbao sheds light on the close connections they had with both the old and the new political elite [see Table 4]. Some of these relationships were built through professional networks and everyday contact. A good example is the case of Bilbao’s new mayor, Felix Aguirre (1807-1871), who lived in Carlos’ building and was his landlord. On other occasions, these relationships were built through family associations, as in the case of the different brothers-in-law the Godó brothers had in the town council. The adaptation of older elites to the new political system does not imply that Bilbao’s bourgeoise was a hegemonic social group, but rather that a wide consensus existed among them on the need to preserve regional autonomy and to fight the Catholic

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194. In the last elections of Isabella’s reign (1856), the number of voters was limited to 302. On December 18, in contrast, the new electoral law widened the number to 3,382 voters. Joseba Agirreazkuenaga (dir.), op. cit., p. 194.


198. AHFB, Archivo Municipal de Bilbao, Sección primera, caja 181, legajo 1.
fundamentalists. In conclusion, it can be affirmed that if Carlos Godó managed to integrate into the small elite that continued to dominate Bilbao’s political realm, despite his foreign origins and the introduction of universal suffrage, it was thanks to his marriage with Antonia Lallana and the valuable acquaintances that stemmed from it.

Table 4. The Godó brothers’ connections with Bilbao’s political elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Political office</th>
<th>Period (year of election)</th>
<th>Relationship to the Godó brothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hermenegildo Belauzan</td>
<td>Alderman</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>Bartolomé’s brother-in-law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicente Lallana</td>
<td>Alderman</td>
<td>1867; 1868</td>
<td>Carlos’ brother-in-law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juntas Generales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felix Aguirre</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>1841; 1854; and 1868.</td>
<td>Landlord of Carlos’ first apartment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolás Lapeira</td>
<td>Alderman</td>
<td>1854; 1857-1861.</td>
<td>Landlord of Carlos’ second apartment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Maria de Gurtubay</td>
<td>Alderman</td>
<td>1867; 1872.</td>
<td>Godfather of Carlos’ children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serapio Hormaza</td>
<td>Alderman</td>
<td>1840; 1843.</td>
<td>Relative of Bartolomé’s first wife (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Hormaza</td>
<td>Alderman</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>Relative of Bartolomé’s first wife (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro Belauzan</td>
<td>Alderman</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>Bartolomé’s brother-in-law (?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

199 As the French consulate in Bilbao stated: “El terreno neutral en que se reúnen la democracia moderna y el absolutismo ultramontano es el Fuero; una afición común confunde sus sentimientos y sus aspiraciones y es el amor a esta tierra privilegiada (... )”. Quoted in Mikel Urkijo, op. cit. 1999, p. 113, n. 23.

200 Sources: Joseba Agirreazkuenaga, op. cit.; AHFB (padrón habitantes); AHEB (registro bautismos).

Picture 1. Bartolomé Godó with his brother-in-law Pantaleón Belaunzarán and his two daughters Florinda and Amalia Godó Belaunzarán.


Source: Vis Molina, Los Godó: los últimos 125 años de Barcelona..., op. cit., page not numbered.
1.3. Clientelist Methods in Competitive Politics

In 1864, as Carlos Godó entered Bilbao’s municipal politics, Bartolomé moved back to Barcelona. His return followed the business strategy the two brothers had established: Carlos would be in charge of the Bilbao office and Bartolomé would be responsible for the new Barcelona branch.203 This task consisted in purchasing all the fabrics that the Oviedo branch required, as well as taking charge of all company matters. For this work Bartolomé received an annual salary of 12,000 r.v., plus a two per cent commission.204 And the “Godó brothers” business seemed to be going well: in 1864 the company reported a profit of 329,470 r.v.205

Besides running “Godó brothers” from Barcelona, Bartolomé also began a political career in the city. Like his brother Carlos, the first position that Bartolomé held was in the lower ranks of political representation: in 1869 he was appointed alderman in Barcelona’s city council.206 Yet contrary to Carlos, whose involvement in Bilbao’s politics was rather low-key (he attended few council meetings and generally participated infrequently),207 Bartolomé’s entry into Barcelona’s city council marked the beginning of a more ambitious political career: soon after receiving his position of alderman, Bartolomé was elected deputy in Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation (“diputación provincial”), a position that he held between 1871 and 1878; and, in 1881 he was elected deputy in the Spanish Congress, in Madrid.

However, Bartolomé’s political promotion was not a smooth path. It would be simplistic to depict his career as that of a “bourgeois conquérant” who climbed the state’s ladders with ease, namely, because liberal elites were neither a unified class nor a “block of

203 “D. Carlos Godó y Pié continuará en la direccion de la casa de Bilbao como lo ha hecho hasta el día (...) La casa de Barcelona continuará corriendo á cargo del Socio D. Bartolomé Godó y Pié el cual queda encargado de la compra de los géneros ó mercancías para la casa de Oviedo y de hacer todas las demás diligencias que sean necesarias tanto á dicha casa de Oviedo como la de Bilbao. En remuneracion de sus trabajos la Sociedad abonará á D. Bartolomé Godó doce mil reales anuales y a más el dos por ciento de comision de todas las mercancias y géneros que compre para la casa de Oviedo (...).” AHPB, Notari F. Moragas Ubac, Vol. 1, 01/02/1870, fols. 219-222.

204 Ibidem. This salary was double the amount that the company’s store clerks in Bilbao received.

205 AHFB, Archivo del Corregimiento, Legajo 2108, nº 7.


207 According to Bilbao’s municipal minutes, Carlos did not even attend the session when the new aldermen were officially appointed. Such repeated absence probably had to do with his frequent journeys as a tradesman. AHFB, Archivo Municipal de Bilbao, Libro de actas municipales, nº 302, sesión del 1 de enero 1869.
power”. The vast majority shared a well-off background, but their private interests were not always comparable. Moreover, the political career of Bartolomé was not an ascending path but was suddenly interrupted in 1874, when a new political system (“the Bourbon Restoration”) replaced the Democratic Sexenium. That Bartolomé managed to resume his political career in this new political context and eventually reach the Spanish Congress in 1881 was thanks to the founding of *La Vanguardia*. The case of this newspaper constitutes, therefore, a valuable opportunity to shed light on the role that the press played in the patronage networks of liberal elites; this being part of a broader issue – namely, the links between journalism and clientelism – that scholars have largely neglected. To fully grasp the advantages that having a newspaper could bring, the following pages will first examine Bartolomé Godó’s mechanisms of influence during the Sexenio. Then, the ways this influence was interrupted by the Restoration and subsequently redefined through the founding of *La Vanguardia* will be examined.

Bartolomé’s career during the *Sexenio* relied primarily on political clientelism. His political promotion was not so much dependent on the voters’ support, but rather on his capacity to rig elections in his favour. Indeed, despite the fact the *Sexenio* was born with the aim of breaking the monopoly of power that one single party had enjoyed during Isabella’s reign (1833-1868), the establishing of universal suffrage in 1868 did not imply the full democratisation of politics. First, the revolutionary forces that dethroned Queen Isabella in 1868 (the Liberal Progressives, the “Unión Liberal” and the Democrats) formed a heterogeneous coalition with different political worldviews. The understanding that these forces had of political representation and the state model was very different. The Republican Federals, for instance, rejected the replacement of the Bourbon dynasty with a foreign one (Amadeo I of Savoy), and argued instead for a Republican and highly decentralised state-model.


209 As evidenced, for instance, by the difficulties of the Italian state to meet the different needs of local elites. See: Rafaele Romanelli, *Il commando impossibile. Stato e società nell’Italia liberale*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1988. In the case of Spain, the fierce debate between free-traders and protectionists (an issue that will be studied in this thesis) provides further evidence of competing interests between liberal elites.

210 In fact, historians have pointed out the misleading connotations that the term “Democratic Sexenium” implies. For a renewed outlook on this period, see: Rafael Serrano García (dir.), *España, 1868-1874. Nuevos enfoques sobre el Sexenio Democrático*, Valladolid, Junta de Castilla y León, 2002; and the monograph edited by Rafael Serrano (ed.), “El Sexenio Democrático”, *Ayer* 44 (2001).
The liberal-progressives like Bartolomé Godó, in contrast, saw the monarchy as a source of stability. In 1872 they had been renamed the “Partido Constitucional” (“Constitutional Party”) in reference to the document comprising their ideological principles: the Constitution of 1869. This constitution was one of the landmarks of the Sexenium and established the following principles: the constitutional monarchy was the base of Spanish sovereignty; the franchise was based on universal manhood suffrage; and wide individual rights (freedom of assembly, freedom of press and popular juries) should be granted. Still, the advocacy of popular sovereignty did not prevent the Constitutional Party from distrusting the mobilisation of popular classes, which both the Democrats and the Republicans sought; and considered that freedom was inseparable from political order. In parallel to this, the Constitutionals defended the right of private property, the preservation of good relations with the Church and a limited administrative decentralisation. For all these reasons, the Constitutional Party of Bartolomé Godó was among the most conservative movements of the Sexenio Democrático.

Furthermore, the political principles of the Constitutional Party did not prevent them from rigging elections on repeated occasions. Indeed, political clientelism was deeply embedded in the political culture of Spanish liberalism. Liberal politicians considered it their moral obligation to assure the interests of what they variously described as “the general interest”, the “nation”, or “the public opinion”. For the most conservative liberal trends, elections should reaffirm the existing social order. The “nation”, rather than the rights of the individual, should come first. The liberal-progressives, by contrast, believed in citizenship as the expression of popular sovereignty, but circumscribed this category to the “discourse of capacity”. In their view, voting was a social responsibility — rather than an individual right — that consequently required certain conditions to be exerted. According to the “discourse of capacity”, gender, wealth and education were the conditions distinguishing those who were suitable to enjoy political rights (“active citizens”) from those who were not. This restrictive

211 The immediate reason behind the founding of this party was the murder of General Prim, the historic leader of the Liberal Progressives, Spain’s Prime Minister and the most important supporter of Spain’s new king (Amadeo I of Savoy). On the origins of this new party, see: Jorge Vilches, Progreso y libertad. El Partido Progresista en la revolución liberal española, Madrid, Alianza, 2001. On the Liberal-Progressive tradition, from which the Constitutional Party mainly originated, see (among a vast bibliography): Javier Moreno Luzón, Progresistas. Biografías de reformistas españoles (1808-1939), 2005; Manuel Suárez Cortina (ed.), La redención del pueblo. La cultura progresista en la España liberal, Santander, Universidad de Cantabria, 2006.


understanding of citizenship, coupled with the submission of political rights to broader conceptual entities (like the “nation”), is what ultimately justified the rigging of elections — a principle that was morally defended at the time as the “legitimate influence” (“legítima influencia”) of the government in elections.214

Even the Republicans and the Democrats, who argued for a more equalitarian model of political representation than the liberals and who defended voting as an individual right, sometimes rigged elections too.215 The reason is that clientelism also became a way of coping with political instability. In its five-year existence the Sexenio had countless governments and saw the state model changed on repeated occasions.216 In parallel, the political system was confronted with the armed opposition of Catholic fundamentalists (1872) and a separatist insurrection in Cuba (“Ten Years War”, 1868-1878). These circumstances explain why all parties – even the most advanced, like the Republicans and the Democrats – saw the rigging of elections as a way to control public office in times of political instability.

The extended presence of political clientelism during the Sexenio Democrático, however, should not be regarded as a sign of “backwardness” in historical development. In fact, when compared to most European countries, the Sexenio had one of the most progressive systems of political representation at the time. While the curtailing of political rights according to the “discourse of capacity” was a common trend across most of the Continent at the time,217 Spain was the only country – other than France and the German Empire – in which universal suffrage existed.218 Furthermore, clientelism also proved to be a

214 Still, liberals argued in favour of using the legitimate influence in a “discreet” way. Discretion was needed in order to prevent social unrest and to make the government’s intervention in elections less intrusive. María Sierra, Rafael Zurita & María Antonia Peña, La representación política en el discurso del liberalismo español (1845-1874), Ayer, 61, 2006, pp. 30-31.

215 G. L. de la Fuente Monge, op. cit. In Republican thought, voting represented the popular idea of national sovereignty. In parallel, the fight against corruption was part of an imaginary community of virtuous citizens who had the duty of controlling their representatives. On the political culture of Republicanism, see: Javier De Diego Romero, Imaginar la República. La cultura política del republicanismo español, 1876-1908, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2008, pp. 107-161; and Román Miguel González, Las concepciones de la representación política en la democracia republicana española del siglo XIX, Ayer, nº 61, 2006, pp. 139-162.

216 Namely: Parliamentary monarchy between 1871-1873; Federal Republic in 1873; and a “conservative” Republic in 1874.


218 This does not mean that all the elements of this discourse were eliminated during the Sexenio. Gender, for instance, remained an element of political exclusion. For the electoral reforms in France, see: Raymond Huard, “Las prácticas del sufragio universal en Francia entre 1848 y 1914. Avances pioneros, novedades provisionales, proyectos inacabados”, in Salvador Forner (coord.), Democracia, elecciones y modernización en Europa. Siglos XIX y XX, Madrid, Cátedra,1997, pp. 47-72; and Gilles Le Béguec, “Il caso francese”, Maria Serena Piretti (ed.), I sistemi elettorali in Europa tra Otto e Novecento, Bari, Laterza, 1997, pp. 81-129; Margaret Lavinia
widely extended practice in France. The literature usually neglects the case of this country
because it is regarded as an “ideal-type” of democratisation. However, the fact is that
clientelism proved to be a deeply-rooted practice in France too – even if it mutated under
successive political systems. Instead of the traditional manipulation of elections based on the
arbitrary use of electoral rules that characterised clientelism under the Restoration (1815-30)
and the July Monarchy (1830-48), the introduction of universal suffrage in 1848 transformed
clientelism through a practice aimed at influencing the voters’ behaviour.²¹⁹

Besides the progressive legislation it introduced, the Sexenio also represented a
novelty for the popular expectations it awoke (at least during its first stages). In Barcelona,
for instance, the revolution of 1868 was warmly welcomed and led to some of the traditional
demands of the working classes being satisfied, like the indirect tax on good’s consumption
and the city’s duties of entry.²²⁰ In parallel, the Sexenio renewed the political system in this
city and opened decision-making positions to the most progressive elites. For the first time
the Republicans won the control of Barcelona’s city council and obtained the best electoral
results between 1868-1874 – a complete novelty in Barcelona’s politics. Moreover, as much
as 75% of the elected representatives in this city had never held public office before, and they
came from a more varied social background compared to the politicians of Queen Isabella’s
era.²²¹

The case of Bartolomé Godó illustrates well these two sides of the Sexenio
Democrático. On one hand, his case is an example of the positive effects the new political
system had in terms of widening representation. Bartolomé became one of those progressive
elites who gained access to public office for the first time and replaced Barcelona’s
traditional ruling elites. On the other hand, Bartolomé’s story also illustrates how the routes

Anderson, Practicing Democracy. Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany, Princeton University

²¹⁹ In the words of Marcus Kreuzer: “Corruption assumed its more modern means of buying, intimidating or
coercing voters by using illicit financial incentives or retributions”. M. Kreuzer, Democratisation and changing
methods of electoral corruption in France from 1815 to 1914, Eduardo Posada Carbó, Political Corruption in
Europe and Latin America, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 98. See also: Alain
Garrigou, Le vote et la vertu. Comment les français sont devenus électeurs, Paris, Presses de la Fondation

²²⁰ Even if these measures became temporary. Marció Janué, Els polítics en temps de revolució. La vida política

²²¹ As much as 11% of the new ruling elites were manual workers (“menestrals”) and 6% were workers and
clerks. Although this was a low percentage, it stood in marked contrast with both Isabella’s period and the
Restoration (when no single worker or clerk gained access to government). The vast majority of the ruling elites
in Barcelona were businessmen (49%) and liberal professionals (42%). The majority were of Republican
adscription (62%). Only 8.5% of the total ruling elites had held public office during Isabella’s reign. Therefore,
it is clear that in Barcelona the “Sexenío” implied a clear renewal of the ruling elites. Ibidem, p. 14, p. 221 and
pp. 232-233, respectively.
into public office often continued to rely on clientelism, despite the introduction of universal suffrage. The fact that Bartolomé was able to take advantage of clientelism was based upon two factors. The first one was the control of local politics: Bartolomé always ran in the Igualada elections, where the Godó family lived and had numerous supporters. The second source of influence was the personal acquaintances he had in various institutions, especially with the leaders of the Constitutional Party. These acquaintances allowed Bartolomé to intercede in far-flung places like Madrid, where the most important decisions concerning the private interests of the Godó family were made.222

In local politics, Igualada became the first source of influence for Bartolomé Godó. The prominent position the Godó family held in this town allowed him to mobilise a network of friends, relatives and supporters – this being a form of social capital that was of prime importance to manipulate elections. Second, Igualada had a series of administrative features that made it a valuable gateway to various political posts. Under the Democratic Sexennium, this city was the head of a judicial district in charge of electing one representative for Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation and one for the Spanish Congress.223 These two elements – local supporters and Igualada’s administrative position – explain why the Godó family sought to turn Igualada’s constituency into its personal political domain. In fact, in the long-lasting political trajectory of the Godó family (spanning from 1869 to 1914) none of their members would ever run for any other constituency.224 “Localism” became the first and most important source of political power of the Godó family.

Indeed, the desire to protect the family’s interests in Igualada was a major reason for Bartolomé to stand for this constituency, even though he now lived in Barcelona. At a time when Igualada was suffering a major economic downturn, due to the city’s inability to adapt to the mechanisation of the textile industry, Bartolomé’s political career became a way for the Godó family to cope with the industrial crisis. The case of Bartolomé thus illustrates a common trend among the European petite bourgeoisie: namely, the entry into municipal government to protect private interests. Still, and as Geoffrey Crossick and Gerhard Haupt have rightly noted, the entry into local politics was also “an expression of their social and cultural, as much as of their economic, concerns”.225 In other words, the elites’ entry into

222 This point will be examined in further detail in Chapter 4.
224 The only two exceptions are the position of alderman that Carlos and Bartolomé held in Bilbao and Barcelona’s city councils, respectively.
municipal politics was not limited to a defensive strategy, but was part of a highly localised identity.

However, while some European elites could rely on the municipal government to defend their private interests (in the case of Prussia, for instance, where municipal governments enjoyed wide autonomy), this was not the case of Spain, as a highly centralised state-model was implemented during Queen Isabella’s reign (1833-1868). Since 1833 the “Moderados” implemented a new territorial organisation inspired by the French-model that was based on three levels: municipal, provincial and central. The outcome was a highly centralised model where the president of the Provincial Deputations (the so-called “Jefe político” or “political boss”) concentrated all the attributions of municipal government. In fact, the Jefe político had a tight grip over the elections, to the point that this figure became the backbone of political clientelism during Isabella’s reign: he was “in control of the process of voter registration, the creation of voting lists, the nominations of those who would supervise the polling locations on election day, and the validation of the electoral rules”.

This control of electoral procedures by state officials, coupled with an extremely limited franchise (limited to 1 per cent of the total population) explains how clientelism worked during Queen Isabella’s reign (1833-1868).

Under the Sexennium, by contrast, progressive elites like Bartolomé Godó saw the Provincial Deputation as a new way of promoting their private concerns. Indeed, while these institutions had a very restricted room for manoeuvre during Isabella’s reign, during the Sexennium they gained new importance. In line with the liberal-progressives decentralised state-model, Provincial Deputations were entrusted with the administration of public funds and gained new executive functions, mostly concerned with education, charity, and infrastructure. Additionally, deputies started to be elected on the basis of a universal suffrage, including the position of president. As a result of these new attributions, Provincial Deputations became one of the key institutions where local elites sought to defend their respective local interests. This was the case of Bartolomé Godó, who devoted most of his

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226 A comparative analysis between the different attributions that municipal governments had in Prussia and in Spain, in J. Luengo, op. cit., pp. 97-109; and David Blackbourn and James Retallack, Localism, landscape, and the ambiguities of place: German-speaking central Europe, 1860-1930, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2007.


228 Clientelism during this period has still received little attention. A recent valuable contribution is: Juan Antonio Inarejos Muñoz, Ciudadanos, propietarios y electores en la construcción del liberalismo español. El caso de las provincias castellano-manchegas (1854-1868), Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2008.

229 Ibidem.
time in Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation (between 1870 and 1874) to fulfilling some of Igualada’s most urgent needs. These needs consisted, above all, in the lack of overland connections, which were vital for the economic recovery of this city. The archives of Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation reveal that Bartolomé always opted to be part of the commission in charge of promoting new infrastructures. In September 1874, for instance, he was part of a commission that went to Madrid to solve various issues concerning the province. The outcome of that visit was the approval of a new road between Igualada and the neighbouring town of Santa Coloma de Queralt – a connection that Igualada had long requested.

Bartolomé managed to promote these types of infrastructures thanks to the position he held in Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation by means of political clientelism. The provincial elections of March 1872 constitute a valuable case to examine how clientelism worked at a micro-scale. These elections had great symbolic relevance, since they were the first provincial elections of the Sexenio that were open to universal male suffrage. On this occasion Bartolomé stood for Calaf, one of the three districts into which Igualada’s constituency was divided at the time, which comprised a total of 18 small rural towns. Bartolomé won the election with 1,014 votes to 519 (his opponent was Antoni Romà Feliu, a candidate for the Republican party). The analysis of the electoral results shows that Bartolomé’s victory became possible due to the high percentage of votes he obtained in key places. In the town of Prats de Rei, for instance, Godó obtained all 241 votes of the electoral roll, despite the fact that half of the electorate did not vote. Likewise, Godó obtained all the votes in another town called La Llacuna (245 in total) despite the fact that the electoral roll in this town was never created. Apparently, the local mayor of La Llacuna decided to relocate the polling station to his own house, at very short notice. Although this was against the electoral law, which stipulated that any relocation must be publicised eight days in advance,

230 Arxiu Històric de la Diputació de Barcelona (AHDB), Llibre de registre de diputats (1812-1890), fols. 247-249. See also Annex n. 4.
231 The commission went to Madrid in September 1874. AHDB, op. cit., p. 247; and El Eco del Noya, 08/09/1878, p. 3.
232 All men over the age of 25 were entitled to vote. In Barcelona’s province this represented a total of 180,070 people. Borja de Riquer, “La Diputació de Barcelona i la lluita per la democràcia durant el Sexenni 1868-1874”, in B. de Riquer (dir.), Història de la Diputació de Barcelona 1812-2005, Barcelona, Diputació de Barcelona, 1983, vol. I, p. 224.
233 The towns forming this constituency were: Calaf, Rubió, Jorba, Castellfollit de Riubregós, Copons, Calonge de Segarra, Sallavinera, Prats de Rei, Sant Martí de Sesgueioles, Pujalt, Vicens, Argençola, Tous, Santa Margarida de Montbui, Santa Maria de Miracles, Montmaneu, Bellprat and La Llacuna. AHDB, Eleccions de Barcelona, Lligall 207, exp. 19.
no action was taken. Consequently the mayor held the ballot in his own home, to the voters’ complete ignorance. The examples mentioned here are indicative of how clientelism worked. If Godó managed to obtain a wide margin of votes it was because he counted on a network of local supporters in charge of rigging the elections in his favour. Popular indifference and the low voter turnout helped make the rigging of elections easier.

Still, what adds further interest to the provincial elections of March 1871 is the evidence revealing that some voters actively opposed Godó’s electoral corruption. Thus, a group of sixteen people from the town of Calaf contested the electoral results by submitting a formal protest to the Provincial Deputation. According to a memorandum, they claimed that “large number of voters” had voted for the Republican candidate, but their votes were never counted. These kinds of protests demonstrate that despite the low electoral turnout and the rural character of the majority of Igualada’s constituency, a segment of the population (no matter how small) opposed to the clientelistic practices of the Godó family.

The response of state authorities to the formal protest of the Calaf voters, however, reveals the little interest of liberal elites to promote electoral accountability. The electoral law of 1870 stated that in case elections were protested, the Provincial Deputation would appoint a commission of three deputies in charge of reviewing the results. Accordingly, Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation created a commission to examine the memorandum of Calaf voters on April 14 1871. Although the commission formally acknowledged that Godó’s victory in this town was obtained through illegal means, it concluded that the number of votes involved was not sufficient to modify the results. In consequence, the electoral commission gave the green light to Godó’s appointment as provincial deputy, despite formally acknowledging the electoral irregularities. The case of the Calaf voters thus

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235 “(...) el Alcalde para poder obrar mas á sus anchas, no tuvo reparo en mandar hacer un pregon á las nueve y cuarto del primer dia, anunciando la traslacion del primer colegio á su propia casa, infringiendo así el artº 101 de la ley que ordena la publicacion con ocho dias de anticipacion. En una palabra en La Llacuna todo se ha hecho en secreto hasta el punto de que á nadie le ha sido dado ver las listas de los votantes”. AHDB, Ibid.

236 The average electoral turnout in Barcelona’s province was low (35%). In rural towns, in contrast, it turned out to be higher than the average (over 50%). Borja de Riquer, op. cit., p. 224. The supposed higher participation in rural areas was indicative of clientelism.

237 AHDB, Ibid. The signatories of the protest were: J. Millás i G., Josep Torras i Tort, Josep Torreguitart, Felip Torreguitart, Ramon Sala, Jaume Casanovas, Anton C.[?], Ramon Calvet, Josep Casapomer, Ramon Forn, Antoni Closa, Ramon Closa, Bartomeu Canet, Antoni Jordana, Jaume Llansà i Joan Mensa. Unfortunately no further information on these individuals could be found.

238 As established in article 26, and successive articles, of the electoral law passed on August 20 1870. Manuel Santana Molina, “La Diputación Provincial en la España decimonónica”, Universidad de Alicante [thesis manuscript], 1989, p. 338.

239 “Diose cuenta de un dictámen de la comisión de actas emitido sobre la de escrutinio general del distrito de Calaf, por el cual fué proclamado diputado D. Bartolomé Godó y Pié, y cuya acta se había declarado grave en sesion de ocho de los corrientes. En su dictámen la Comision propone que se apruebe dicha acta. Y sin debate
demonstrates that the electoral law granted few rights to those who would contest electoral fraud – especially when the members of the electoral commission belonged to Godó’s own party.240

Viewed from an alternative perspective, the provincial elections of 1871 also shed light on the second source of influence that Godó possessed in the clientelist politics of the Sexenio. Namely, the electoral support he obtained from state institutions. The value of this support became apparent when a group of voters referred to the support the Civil Governor gave to Godó’s candidacy. Apparently, a letter was circulated around all the towns of the district in which the state’s provincial representative (the Civil Governor) “recommended” that votes were cast for Godó and voters who refused to do so were threatened. More precisely, the threat consisted in the state’s rejection of any future requests coming from the towns concerned. According to some witnesses, this threat made a great impression on the voters, most of whom preferred to follow the “official recommendation” rather than to assert their political rights.241

The above-mentioned incident demonstrates to what extent the state’s prerogatives were used to satisfy partisan goals. Indeed, this incident shows that in parallel to the rigging of elections on a bottom-up basis (namely by Godó’s local supporters), political clientelism also worked in a top-down direction – that is to say, by state intervention in local elections. Moreover, the coercion that state officials exerted on the voters shows that clientelism was not a practice limited to the rigging of elections but also contained a violent dimension. In the elections of 1871 symbolic violence – namely, threats – proved enough to coerce the voters’ free will.

Godó’s membership of the Constitutional Party is what granted him the support of the government. This became evident in the elections of March 1871 (during which the Constitutionals were in power), and during the periods of political instability in which

fué aprobado dicho dictámen en votacion ordinaria”. AHDB, Libro de Actas 1871, 8 April, fol. 169; and 14 April, fol. 203-204.
240 Ibidem.
241 “Público y notorio es que por los pueblos comprendidos en este distrito se ha circulado una carta, cuyo presentador ó presentadores afirmaban al exhibirla que la firma puesta á su pie era la de la digna persona que ejerce el cargo de Gobernador de esta Provincia, en cuya carta se recomendaba la candidatura que indicaba su presentador. (...) No se ha omitido medio para hacer comprender á los electores que dejando de votar al candidato recomendado podían sufrir perjuicios por aquella gastada y trivial razon de que así á los pueblos como á los particulares les interesa tener propicias á las Autoridades para la resolucion de cualquier asunto que ofrezcan sus pueblos (...). Ello es, y triste es confesarlo, que se ha producido el efecto deseado entre un buen número de electores, cuya sencillez y escaso conocimiento que tienen de la libertad é independencia con que pueden ejercer sus derechos hace que propendan á complacer á aquellos que les hablan en nombre de la Autoridad, sea esta del rango que fuese”. AHDB, Ibid. The last part of this testimony is of great value, for it makes reference to the lack of awareness of political rights in rural areas.
governments became responsible for directly appointing political posts. The appointment of political posts by the authorities was, in fact, the alternative means Godó used to build his political career.\textsuperscript{242} The use of this strategy to reach public office stood in contrast with the behaviour of other parties, like the Republicans, who always refused to hold political office if it was not through elections. Even some Constitutionalists in Barcelona (half of them, to be precise) refused to hold political posts through the authorities’ direct appointment.\textsuperscript{243} This was not the case of Bartolomé Godó, who had no qualms about accepting the authorities’ support – indeed he actively looked for it.

The way Godó managed to gain the support of the authorities – this being the second source of influence he possessed during the Sexenio – was through his acquaintance with Víctor Balaguer (1824-1901), the leader of the Constitutional Party in Catalonia. Balaguer was a renowned writer and historian, and one of the main leaders of the Progressives in this region. During the Sexenio Balaguer started holding important political posts in Catalonia (among which, the presidency of Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation) and in 1869 he settled in Madrid, where he held important government positions and became the main representative of Catalan economic interests.\textsuperscript{244} Bartolomé Godó was one of the contacts Balaguer used to stay abreast of the political situation in Catalonia. The relation between the two men, however, was not a relation between equals but operated on a patronage basis. This can be seen in the letter Godó wrote to Balaguer on 7 October 1871. The aim of the letter was to inform Balaguer about the divisions existing between the Constitutionalists of Barcelona. As the letter went:

“Muy señor mio, y amigo (...) Supongo enterado por cartas que abrá recibido de esta [Barcelona], que estamos los amigos politicos divididos, los unos á favor de Sagasta y otros á favor de Zorrilla, y estos tratan á Sagasta á V y demas amigos muy duramente [,] llegando las cosas á tal punto que puede que el circulo se divida, pero somos unos cuantos amigos que lo sostendremos cueste lo que cueste, y tarde ó temprano tengo confianza que les haran justicia (...). No dudo que le habrá hecho pasar malos ratos estos disgustos que se puede llamar de familia, pero tenga la seguridad que la mayoria sensata estan á su favor (...). pero lucharemos, y espero que venceremos. Si en este terreno ó cualquier otro cree V.

\textsuperscript{242} As in the case of Barcelona’s city council, in 1869, when he was appointed by the provisional authorities, and to Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation (in February 1870; and February 1874) by the Provincial Governor. These appointments corresponded to moments of political instability, when elections were cancelled. Further details on this appointment, in: B. de Riquer (dir.), \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 213-244.


\textsuperscript{244} The best study on Balaguer is: Joan Palomas Moncholi, \textit{Víctor Balaguer. Renaixença, Revolució i Progrés}, Vilanova i la Geltrú, El Cep i la Nansa, 2004.
The numerous grammatical mistakes throughout the letter reveal Godó’s poor education – another sign of his (relatively) humble origins. Additionally, this letter is the clearest testimony to Godó’s political commitment and reveals the way political parties worked at the time — this being a crucial element to understand the reasons behind the founding of La Vanguardia. Although Godó introduced himself as a “sincere friend” (“verdaderos amigos”) the letter was not written in an informal way, but has a tenor of reverence. This is because Godó’s purpose was to reaffirm his commitment to Balaguer in the face of the division among the Constitutionals. Indeed, in 1871 the Constitutional Party became divided on a national scale into two opposing camps: the group of Mateo Práxedes Sagasta and the group of Manuel Ruiz Zorrilla. Two factors explain this division: the lack of a clear leadership, especially after the murder of General Prim (the leader of the liberal progressives); and the different understandings of the Constitution of 1869 held by the two aspiring leaders (Sagasta and Zorrilla). When this division was echoed in Barcelona’s local branch, Godó hurried to reassure his allegiance to Balaguer. This loyalty was expressed in the letter above quoted and implicitly linked Godó with the candidate that Balaguer supported at a national scale: Sagasta.

This evidence reveals how parties functioned at the time: through personal allegiance, instead of regular membership. Godó referred to the division of the Constitutionals in Barcelona as a “family dispute” (“disgustos de familia”) and referred to the other party members as “political friends” (“amigos políticos”). This language evokes a political culture where the holding of public office was still the concern of a social minority. Indeed, the personal bonds that Godó held with the leaders of the Constitutional Party is a revealing example of “cadre parties” (also-called “notable parties”), the party organisation that

245 Biblioteca Museu Victor Balaguer (BMVB), Vilanova i la Geltrú, Private correspondence of Víctor Balaguer (1842-1876), letter nº. 7103131. [E. T.]: “My good sir and friend (...) I assume that you know, from the letters you have received from here [Barcelona], that we the political friends are divided, some in favour of Sagasta and the others in favour of Zorrilla [,] [the latter] treat Sagasta and his friends in very harsh terms […], to the point that the committee might become divided, but we are some friends who will sustain its unity [the committee] whatever it takes, and sooner or later I am convinced that justice will be done (...). I can imagine the bad moments that can be called family disputes have caused you, but I can assure you that the majority are prudent and they are on your side (...). We will fight and I hope we shall win. If I can be a resource for you in this or in any other matter please command me, and I shall serve you with pleasure.”


247 The division between the Constitutionals of Barcelona, in: M. Janué, op. cit., pp. 61-82.
prevailed in Europe during most of the 19th century.248 The socially restricted levels that official politics had during most of the century, coupled with the liberal’s political culture of limited suffrage, left public office in the hands of a tiny minority. For the people who belonged to this minority, like Bartolomé Godó, public office was not a professional career, but represented a secondary activity.249 Consequently, “cadre parties” had a low number of supporters and instead of having a regular membership they were structured around patronage networks.

Patronage networks are the key concept that one historiographical trend uses to explain the functioning of political clientelism.250 According to this approach, which can be called the functionalist perspective, personal bonds were the guiding principle in the distribution of public resources through clientelist methods. In contrast to the Marxist perspective, which explains clientelism as a sign of class exploitation, the functionalist perspective puts the emphasis on the notion of patron-client “transactions”. The case of Godó shows how these transactions worked: Godó provided Balaguer with the support that reasserted his leadership in the Catalan branch of the Constitutional Party; while Balaguer, in turn, granted Godó access to a series of public resources. These resources were linked to the trade with Cuba, especially after Balaguer’s appointment as “Minister of Ultramar” (the ministry in charge of the Spanish colonies) in 1871. Indeed, Cuba started gaining increasing importance for the Godó family business and politics became a way of promoting the family’s interests there (as will be explained in Chapter 4). What needs to be stressed, at this point, is that Balaguer was the channel that Bartolomé Godó used to expand his sphere of influence to Madrid.

248 The description of cadre parties provided here relies on the classic works of Maurice Duverger, Los Partidos Políticos, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1979 (first ed. in French, 1951), and Angelo Panebianco, Modelos de partido: organización y poder en los partidos políticos, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1990 (first ed. in Italian, 1982); as well as the work directed by Michel Offerlé, La profession politique. XIXe-XXe siècles, Paris, Belin, 1999.

249 In Max Weber’s words, politicians at that time “did not live from politics but for politics”. The difference between both concepts was the privileged economic position that most politicians shared in the system of limited suffrage. This advantaged position is what provided them with the “autonomy” (time and resources) to dedicate themselves to politics, in contrast to other social classes. Max Weber, Política y ciencia, Buenos Aires, La Pleyade, Editorial Elaleph, pp. 19-22.

250 José Varela Ortega, Los amigos políticos. Partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración (1875-1900), Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2001 [1st ed. 1977].
1.4. THE FOUNDING OF ‘LA VANGUARDIA’ AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOURCES OF SYMBOLIC POWER

The instalment of the Bourbon Restoration in 1875 toppled the channels of influence that Bartolomé Godó had built up during the Sexenio Democrático. A military coup d’état put an end to the Sexenio and set the ground for the change of political system. The outcome was a complete redefinition of the party system and of the clientelist methods. In this new political system the Constitutional Party of Godó fell on the losing side. The last part of this chapter will examine how the founding of La Vanguardia allowed the Godó family to confront this adverse situation and recycle its power strategies.

The Bourbon Restoration was a political system that went in line with the conservative reaction that took place in Europe after the Paris Commune (1871). The main individual responsible for organising the Restoration was Antonio Cánovas del Castillo (1828-1897), a liberal-conservative politician. Since 1873 Cánovas had been the leader of Madrid’s “Partido Alfonsino”, a movement in support of the Bourbon dynasty that gained popularity in the last years of the Sexenio, especially among the aristocracy and the army. Taking the British system of representation as a reference model, Cánovas prepared the return of the Bourbon dynasty in 1875, in the shape of Isabella’s son (Alfonso XII), and based the new political system upon the joint sovereignty between the Crown and the parliament (divided into Congress and Senate).

If Cánovas was the intellectual architect of the Restoration, the new Constitution of 1876 reasserted the new political system. For the most part, this constitution represented a substantial step backward in relation to the Sexenio Democrático. The new constitution granted basic individual rights but made them subject to different restrictions. In practice, this meant that basic rights like freedom of expression, association and union became restricted. For instance, censorship was imposed on newspapers, and Catholicism became the only religion that could be practiced in public. The passing of additional policies, like the abolition of civil marriage, or the restriction of academic freedom in universities, was a further step directed at reasserting the new conservative shift. In the field of political representation, the passing of a new electoral law in 1878 limited the franchise drastically. From this moment

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251 In fact, the great popularity of “Alfonsismo” in aristocratic circles led the return of the Bourbon dynasty to be popularly referred to as the “Ladies revolution”. Before obtaining the control of the “Partido Alfonsino”, in 1873, Cánovas and his followers had participated in the Sexenio, albeit from a safe distance. See: J. Varela Ortega, op. cit., pp. 25-93.

252 María Sierra, “El espejo inglés de la modernidad española: el modelo británico y su influencia en el concepto de representación liberal”, Historia y Política, nº 21, 2009, pp. 139-167.
onwards only 5% of the population had the right to vote. Additionally, the King was granted a series of important attributions, like the capacity to appoint the mayor of cities with over 30,000 inhabitants.

In conclusion, the Constitution of 1876 and the electoral law of 1878 became the two legislative pillars of a new political system that was clearly more restrictive than the Sexenio Democrático. However, the Restoration system did not imply a return to Queen Isabella’s political model. Although some of the new laws were inspired in this period, Cánovas was fully aware that the monopoly of power by one single party had been the main reason behind the downfall of Isabella II in 1868. To avoid the same mistake, Cánovas wished to integrate the most conservative parties of the Sexenio into the new Restoration. His hope was to establish a two-party system similar to the English model, where the “Partido Alfonsino” would play the role of the Liberal-conservative party, and the most conservative members of the Sexenio would form the party on the left (or Liberals). In this way, Cánovas aspired to consolidate a new political system based on the alternation in power between two liberal parties; and the King would play a stabilising role through the wide political attributions that the Constitution granted to the Crown. Ideally, this political system would assure the stability of the Restoration, while excluding the most radical parties both on the left (Republicans and Democrats) and on the right (the Moderates and the Carlists).

The founding of La Vanguardia obeyed the Godó’s wish to join the Restoration. Not by coincidence, the newspaper was published for the first time on February 1st, 1881; that is to say, one week before the most conservative elements of the Sexenio reached power for the first time in the Restoration. They did so as a new party called “Partido Liberal Fusionista” (in its abbreviated name, “Liberal Party”) and under the leadership of Sagasta (one of the heads of the Constitutional Party). However, the founding of this party did not take place until 1880, after the five-year period that the Constitutionals spent in the opposition (1874-1881). This means that the integration of this party into the Restoration was not an automatic

253 This was particularly the case of the Constitution of 1876. The majority of the articles were inspired by the Moderate constitution of 1845. Remedios Sánchez Ferriz, Génesis del proyecto constitucional: la comisión de los notables, Revista de Derecho Político, nº 8, 1981, pp. 33-54.

254 The Constitution of 1876 granted wide prerogatives to the Crown. The King was responsible for appointing the ministers and had the power to dissolve the parliament. Consequently, the King controlled the central elements of political life, including the relationship between the executive and the legislative powers, and the leadership of the two main parties.

255 This party was created in 1880 through the joining of members from the Constitutional Party, the Radicals and the “posibilistas” of Emilio Castelar. Unfortunately, there is no monograph on the history of the Liberal Party. The best account is: Carlos Dardé, “El Partido Liberal de la Restauración, 1875-1890”, Madrid, Universidad Complutense, 1974 [Thesis manuscript].

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process; it only took place after much hesitation and a strong intra-party confrontation that lasted for half a decade.\textsuperscript{256}

Indeed, between 1875 and 1881 the Constitutionals became deeply divided on how to react to the new political system. For the most progressive sector of the Constitutionals, headed by Víctor Balaguer, accepting the Restoration was a betrayal of the democratic principles that had inspired the Sexenio. The shared sovereignty between the Crown and the parliament of the Restoration went against the principle of popular sovereignty that the Constitutionals defended. Likewise, the new political system did not assure the political rights (freedom of expression, press, and assembly) that were the banner of the Constitutionals. For all these reasons, Víctor Balaguer stood at the head of those Constitutionals who rejected both the integration in the Restoration and the need to create a new Liberal Party.\textsuperscript{257} This position contrasted with that of Sagasta, who already admitted the legitimacy of the new political system in 1875; and to another group of Constitutionals that immediately joined the Restoration.\textsuperscript{258}

In Barcelona, too, the local branch of the Constitutionals became divided on how to react to the new political system. The outcome of this division was the emergence of a new faction that was willing to join the Restoration system and, in consequence, started challenging Balaguer’s traditional leadership in the party. The leader of this new faction was a man called Pedro Collaso Gil (?-1887).\textsuperscript{259} Collaso was a close friend of the Godó brothers and counted on their total support. Indeed, both Carlos and Bartolomé signed a memorandum in 1875 in which the Constitutional Party publicly accepted the legal bases of the new

\textsuperscript{256} On the integration of the Constitutionals in the Restoration, see: José Ramón Milán García, “Los liberales en el reinado de Alfonso XII: el difícil arte de aprender de los fracasos”, Ayer, 52, 2003, pp. 91-116; and “Conspiración, conciliación y turno: Sagasta y la formación del liberalismo dinástico (1875-1881)”, Madrid, Universidad Complutense, 1998 [“Tesis de licenciatura”].

\textsuperscript{257} Joan Palomas Moncholí, op. cit., pp. 456-457. As soon as the Sexenio fell, Cánovas invited Balaguer to join the new political system. Balaguer, however, refused the offer with the following words: “siento en el alma que mis sagrados deberes de hombre político y de hombre público, á los cuales jamás faltaré, me impidan á mi, monárquico de convicción y de sentimiento, ocupar un puesto oficial al lado de varones que valen y representan lo que V.”. This letter was written on 1\textsuperscript{st} January 1875. Quoted in: José Ramón Milán García, “Conspiración, conciliación y turno: Sagasta y la formación del liberalismo dinástico (1875-1881)”, Madrid, Universidad Complutense, 1998 [Thesis manuscript], p. 63, n. 116; and p. 108.

\textsuperscript{258} This was the case of the faction led by Alonso Martínez, who separated from the Constitutionals and created a new organisation called “Centro Parlamentario”; and the faction of Francisco Santa Cruz, who joined the ranks of Cánovas’ Conservative Party. J. R. Milán García, op. cit., 2003, 95-96.

\textsuperscript{259} Collaso was a rich landowner (in 1875 he was the 14\textsuperscript{th} highest taxpayer in Barcelona) who had made a financial contribution to the success of the Revolution of 1868. During the Sexenium he had been Senator and President of Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation. After the Sexenium, Collaso became responsible for the victory of the Constitutionals in Barcelona during the first elections of the Restoration (1876). As La Vanguardia recalled, this victory “placed him [Collaso] in a position to become the leader of the Liberal Party in Barcelona”. La Vanguardia, 07/01/1887, p. 5. For further information on Collaso, see: Marició Janué et al., op. cit., p. 69
Restoration system.\textsuperscript{260} The reason the Godó brothers decided to support the faction of Collaso and thus challenge Balaguer’s leadership (despite the valuable services that he had provided for the family interests in Cuba and Igualada) was related to their urgent need to reach public office again; a need that was geared towards protecting their commercial interests.\textsuperscript{261}

However, the Godó brothers could no longer rely on the intermediary role of Balaguer. The self-exclusion of the Constitutionals from the Restoration that Balaguer advocated was of little help for the interests of the Godó, since it implied the self-exclusion from public office. The first strategy the Godó brothers devised to reach public office, now that they could not rely on Balaguer, consisted in ignoring the official position of the Constitutional Party of abstaining from power. Instead, in 1876 Bartolomé Godó decided to run in the elections for the Congress without party support. Immediately, both Balaguer and Sagasta (the main leaders of the party in Catalonia and in Spain, respectively) wrote to Bartolomé ordering him to abstain from standing for election.\textsuperscript{262} Bartolomé, however, showed his independent character and ignored the recommendations of the party leaders.\textsuperscript{263} Apparently, he was confident that his supporters in Igualada would suffice to win the elections. To increase his chances of success, Godó also hired new people to manipulate elections in his favour.\textsuperscript{264}

However, the elections of 1876 proved to be a stark lesson for Bartolomé Godó. Contrary to what he expected, his resources of influence proved to be insufficient to win. In

\textsuperscript{260} This was made official in the meeting held at the “Teatro-Circo del Príncipe Alfonso”, in Madrid. The majority of the Constitutional Party of Barcelona supported this decision (Balaguer included). Further details, in: Juan del Nido Segalerva, Historia política y parlamentaria del Excmo. Sr. don Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, Madrid, Imp. de Ramona Velasco, 1915, p. 572; La Iberia, 24/07/1875, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{261} As already noted, the commercial interests of the Godó in Cuba will be studied in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{262} “La cosa está en que como ahora se presenta también Bartolomé Godó quieren ver la forma de que desista y ceda á García Martino su influencia y la de sus amigos. Al efecto Estruch le hablará hoy de una manera indirecta sobre el particular, me ha dicho, y y si no puedo sacar partido podras tú, me dijo, que tienes con el mas confianza entrarle de frente en el asunto. Me han asegurado, dijo Estruch, que Sagasta y Balaguer han escrito á Godó para que ceda en Ygualada y apoye á García Martino. ¿Es cierto este extremo? ¿Estais vosotros en que Martino sea el diputado por Ygualada?”

\textsuperscript{263} “Veré si ha recabado algo de Godó, que lo dudo, pues yo le hable ya hace unos dias, y me manifestó que ya lo había dicho, que quería ir á la lucha y que consideraba no podía sacar partido Martino. Como yo podía hablarle del rente en favor de este ultimo pues quizá creyendo se le quería suplantar hubiera sido peor, atendido al caracter de Godó”. Ibidem, Nº. 7500923, 29/11/1875. There are other sources that confirm Godó’s stubborn character: “De arraigadas convicciones, y caracter independiente, [Bartolomé Godó] nunca rindió vasallaje sino á los dictados de su recta conciencia, y tan inflexible solia mostrarse en este punto, que una de las veces que representó en Cortes el distrito de Igualada, ganó el acta luchando contra el candidato oficial impuesto por su partido (...).” J. Roca i Roca, LV, 28/01/1894, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{264} “No hay que pensar ya en este [García Martino] por Ygualada, porque Godó ha soltado demasiadas prendas y ha tomado la cosa con demasiado empeño adelantando mucho los trabajos para que pueda retirarse. Esta es la verdad, debiendo añadir que á Godó se le presenta bien el distrito.” BMVB, Epistolari, Nº 7500909. 26/11/1875.
contrast to the Sexenio, Godó could no longer rely on the state’s support to rig the elections. As a result of this, the same clientelistic methods that he had used to build his career during the Sexenio were now used against him. The elections of 1876 thus demonstrated that having a network of supporters in Igualada was important but not sufficient to fight against the state’s intervention in elections. The new political system had redefined the functioning of patron-client networks and Godó had fallen on the losing side. In the face of this failure, founding a newspaper became a way of pressing for the Constitutional’s integration to the Restoration – thus challenging the party’s official position.

Despite historically being one of the most influential newspapers in Spain – and it remains so today – the origins of La Vanguardia remain controversial. According to the official account, the brothers Carlos and Bartolomé Godó founded the newspaper in February 1881. This point, however, has never been empirically demonstrated. In fact, there is an alternative account arguing that the Godó brothers did not in fact establish the newspaper, but rather purchased it in 1887. Unfortunately, the historical document that could resolve this controversy – the registry of foundation – has been lost. Still, there are some alternative sources that historians have not consulted that can shed new light on the origins of La Vanguardia. These sources are the press of Madrid and Igualada, which historians, in their attempt to explain the history of a newspaper from Barcelona, have neglected.

In fact, one of these sources about the origins of La Vanguardia is the information that La Correspondencia de España – a Madrid newspaper – published on the 13th of November 1880. The value of this document is that it mentions La Vanguardia three-

265 Prior to the elections the state’s provincial officer (Mr. Villalba) removed the city mayors of Igualada’s constituency and replaced them with new mayors that were favourable to the government’s candidate. “En el distrito de Igualada, para contrarestar la influencia del candidato constitucional señor Godó, hijo de la villa que da nombre al distrito, y rico fabricante en ella, tambien ha considerado necesario el señor Villalva (sic) cambiar algun ayuntamiento de poblaciones importantes, entregando la administracion municipal á los partidarios del pretendiente y á los federales.” La Iberia, 07/01/1876, p. 2.

266 Godó’s eagerness to gain power is demonstrated by the fact that in 1880 he considered the possibility of running in the elections for another constituency (Manresa) without a clear political affiliation. According to the Republican newspaper La Montaña, Godó made contact with various political forces (including the Constitutionals, the Carlists and the Democrats) about the possibility of running for this constituency. Quoted in: Maria Gemma Rubí Casals, “El món de la política en la Catalunya urbana de la Restauració. El cas d’una ciutat industrial. Manresa: 1875-1923”, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales de Paris, 2003 [Thesis manuscript], p. 176.

267 There is no archival proof or official account to confirm this. Vis Molina, op. cit.


269 To establish a newspaper, permission was needed from the “Gobierno Civil”, and according to Juan Givanel, Bartolomé Godó received such permission. Unfortunately, Givanel’s claim is difficult to substantiate as no evidence attesting to this has been found. Both Pere Voltes and myself have searched for such evidence at the historical archives of the “Gobierno Civil” in Barcelona, and in the Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), in Madrid, without success. Joan Givanel y Mas, Materials per a la bibliografia de la premsa barcelonesa (1881-1890). Barcelona, Altés, 1933, pp. 15-16.
months before it was founded. More precisely, the information in *La Correspondencia* referred to the division of the Constitutionals in Barcelona into the party’s official committee of Rius i Taulet (Balaguer’s man in Barcelona), on the one hand, and the rebel faction of Collaso, on the other, which was planning to establish its own newspaper. As *La Correspondencia* stated:

“Tan lejos está de reinar entre los constitucionales de Barcelona la armonía política que (...) según una carta de aquella ciudad que publica *La Correspondencia*, los amigos del Sr. Collaso y Gil piensan fundar un periódico, que se llamará *La Vanguardia*, que estará enfrente de *La Crónica de Cataluña*, que como es sabido respresenta á la fracción del señor Rius y Taulet. Dos circunstancias importantes hay que notar en la noticia que antecede; la primera, que la inauguracion de ese periódico —que será en breve, porque ya hay reunidos los fondos necesarios— se verificará con un banquete en el Tivoli, al cual no asistirán ni el Sr. Balaguer ni los amigos del Sr. Rius y Taulet; y segundo, que se encargará de la direccion del citado periódico el diputado por Tarragona D. Pedro Antonio Torres, es decir, el firmante de aquel comunicado en que se decía que el banquete dado al Sr. Balaguer no había sido una fiesta constitucional, y que en Barcelona hay constitucionales vencedores y vencidos, incluyéndose él en este número. No hay por qué consignar aquí la política que hará *La Vanguardia* y las relaciones de este periódico con *La Crónica de Cataluña* (...)”  

The information given in *La Correspondencia* was predicting what was going to happen three-months later, on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} February 1881: the appearance of *La Vanguardia* as the hobbyhorse of the Collaso faction to challenge the leadership of Rius. As part of this enterprise, Bartolomé Godó became the owner (and therefore the founding partner) of *La Vanguardia*. There are at least three different pieces of evidence to support this statement. The first is the state’s authorisation to establish the newspaper bearing Bartolomé’s name.\(^{271}\) The second is Bartolomé’s obituary, in which *La Vanguardia* referred to him as the sole founder.\(^{272}\) The last, but most important piece of evidence, comes from the *Semanario de La Época*, 13/11/1880, p. 2. This newspaper quoted the news published by *La Correspondencia*.

\(^{270}\) *La Época*, 13/11/1880, p. 2. This newspaper quoted the news published by *La Correspondencia*.

\(^{271}\) Joan Givanel Mas, *op. cit*.

\(^{272}\) “Este periódico debe su fundación a Bartolomé Godó. Periódico de lucha en un principio, para defender á un partido, hubo de sufrir hace años una modificación radical y absoluta, por iniciativa de su mismo fundador, cuando éste se propuso desligarlo de todos los partidos, y crear un elemento imparcial en el estadio de la prensa, que no conservara de la significación del antiguo periódico más que el nombre. Este hecho, aventurando una parte de su capital en la creación y afianzamiento de un elemento de cultura pública, con los riesgos que una obra semejante tiene en España, es otro rasgo del carácter del fundador y de su cariño á Cataluña”. Jordi Roca Roca, LV, 28/01/1894, p. 2.
Igualada - the newspaper published by the political rivals of the Godó family in Igualada. As the Semanario commented, on two different occasions:

“(…) La Vanguardia es un diario que sale también en Barcelona, órgano de D. Bartolomé Godó y que corre á cargo del mismo en la parte del estipendio (…)” 273

“Godò (sic) para encaramarse un dia al poder fundó La Vanguardia en Barcelona sirviéndose de escritores diversos para llenar sus columnas, (…) para formar atmósfera y presentarse al pueblo grande como Rigoletto.” 274

All this seems to confirm that Bartolomé Godó became both the owner and founding partner of La Vanguardia. The name of his brother, Carlos Godó, in contrast, does not appear anywhere. This new hypothesis – namely, that Bartolomé founded the newspaper alone – challenges the official version about the origins of La Vanguardia. From the perspective of the relations between the media and political clientelism, what makes the founding of this newspaper interesting is that it reveals the role the press played as an instrument to both legitimise and dispute the “authorized discourse” of cadre parties.275 The weak organisational structure of cadre parties implied that besides an electoral committee, these parties usually lacked a permanent structure. This was the case of the Constitutional Party in Barcelona. When this local branch was created in January 1871, it made a public call for the creation of a cohesive party structure.276 In practice, however, it failed to do so and the local branch became limited to a small electoral committee. As their political enemies rightly pointed out, the Constitutionals were a group of dispersed people with vague political principles.277

Within this weak party structure, the only permanent organ of the Constitutionals in Barcelona was a newspaper called La Crónica de Cataluña. This newspaper acted as the party’s mouthpiece and reaffirmed its principles against the attacks of its adversaries. The press thus acted as a channel of communication between the members of a political

273 “Recortes” Semanario de Igualada, 26/10/1884, p. 1. English translation [E.T.]: “(...) The Vanguard is a newspaper that is also published in Barcelona, and it is the mouthpiece of Mr. Bartolomé Godó Pié, who covers its expenses (...)”.

274 “Á las urnas!!!” Semanario de Igualada, 04/04/1886, p. 1. [ET]: “With the aim of climbing the ladders of power, Godó (sic) founded La Vanguardia in Barcelona by relying on writers to fill the columns of this newspaper (…) to create an atmosphere and present himself to the people as big as Rigoletto”.

275 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and symbolic power. ..., op. cit.

276 The details of this public call can be found in: Diario de Barcelona, 26/01/1871 (Morning ed.), p. 933.

community and gave it a vital sense of group cohesion. Against the constraints of physical distance, the newspaper became the main platform for the circulation of information and ideas. No matter where the reader lived, the act of buying La Crónica de Cataluña demonstrated the reader’s predisposition towards a certain vision of the world; and it reinforced the notion of an imagined community. Moreover, La Crónica de Cataluña was charged with the vital task of publicising the party’s “authorized discourse”. Thus the newspaper was the official representative of the party in Barcelona, meaning that it also had the task of publishing the official list of candidates. The control of La Crónica de Cataluña was, in consequence, the “source of delegated power” (to use the terminology of Pierre Bourdieu) that made Rius the official interlocutor of Sagasta in the city.278 This explains why Rius, together with Balaguer and the director of La Crónica (Baró), had been responsible for distributing public office during the Sexenio.

The founding of La Vanguardia undermined the traditional prevalence of La Crónica de Cataluña as the official mouthpiece of the Constitutional Party in Barcelona. The new journal of the Collaso faction emerged with the ambition of disrupting the “authorized discourse” monopoly that La Crónica possessed. This intention was made clear in the heading of the journal: “La Vanguardia. Diario político y de avisos y noticias. Órgano del Partido Constitucional de la Provincia”. In consequence, and contrary to what some historians have argued, the name chosen for the new journal (“La Vanguardia”; “the Vanguard”, in English) was not arbitrary.279 Instead, it reflected a clear strategy: the ambition of the Collaso faction to become the new “vanguard” (or the new “authorized representative”, in Bourdieu’s terms) of the Constitutional Party in Barcelona.280

As may be expected, Rius and his followers did not take long to respond to the threat that Collaso represented to their leadership. In November 1880 (shortly before La Vanguardia was created) the Constitutionals organised a political meeting at the Theatre Tivoli in Barcelona, where entry to the followers of Collaso was expressly forbidden.281 Together with the exclusion of the rebel faction, further measures were taken so as to assure that the journalists of La Crónica and its affiliated correspondents were the only ones that had

278 P. Bourdieu, op. cit., pp. 107-116 (“the social institution of symbolic power”).
279 Joan Torrent and Rafael Tasis, op. cit., vol I, p. 141.
280 Before this happened Collaso’s faction had already founded another newspaper (called Diario Liberal) that had disappeared shortly after being founded. La Correspondencia de España, 01/11/1880, p. 2; and La Época, 05/11/1880, p. 2.
281 As Madrid’s newspaper La Época noted, “Es de advertir que han sido inútiles los esfuerzos para reconciliar á los dos grupos [Rius and Collaso], aunque sólo fuera para comer, y esto no deja de ser significativo.” La Época, 02/11/1880, p. 1.
access to the meeting.\textsuperscript{282} These types of measures reveal to what extent contemporaries were aware of the importance of monopolising the party’s public discourse: only the newspapers that were under the control of the party direction were authorised to publish the official version of the event.\textsuperscript{283} Thus, \textit{La Crónica} reported what was actually a small meeting of a local party (around 400 people attended) as a grand occasion where the audience applauded the speeches of Rius and Balaguer.\textsuperscript{284} Next to this favourable press coverage, newspapers loyal to the party leadership depicted the faction of Collaso as a small group of followers driven by selfish interests.\textsuperscript{285} The final indication of these intra-party struggles became evident when the faction of Collaso responded to these accusations by organising an alternative meeting. This meeting was also held in the Theatre Tivoli in Barcelona. The main purpose of the meeting was to announce the creation of a new journal called \textit{La Vanguardia}, to the delight of Collaso’s supporters.\textsuperscript{286}

Still, equally as important as the strategy used to dispute the “authorized discourse” was the audience to whom the discourse was addressed. The first copy of \textit{La Vanguardia} reveals, in this respect, how extremely modest the origins of this newspaper were. At a cost of 5 cents, \textit{La Vanguardia} had a circulation of only 1,500 copies. The newspapers were printed with a Marinoni rotating machine and the newsroom was housed in a dark and narrow apartment, number 8-10, on the street called Les Heures in Barcelona.\textsuperscript{287} From a European perspective, the characteristics of \textit{La Vanguardia} in its early stage were in line with the press in other Mediterranean countries, like Italy and Portugal. These characteristics consisted in a

\textsuperscript{282}“No se admitirá en el mismo [banquete] ningun individuo de la fraccion Collaso, ni ningun representante de la prensa liberal. Estas intransigencias han producido en el público mala impresion. Se sabe que los organizadores del banquete han tomado grandes precauciones para que no asista ninguno de los excluidos. Se quiere que solo La Crónica de Cataluña y La Bomba den cuenta de lo que ocurre.” “El banquete de Barcelona”, in \textit{El Liberal} (Madrid), 01/11/1880, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{283}See for instance: “Balaguer en Barcelona” and “El banquete de Barcelona”, in \textit{El Liberal} (Madrid), 01/11/1880, p. 1; and the \textit{Diario Oficial de Avisos de Madrid}, 01/11/1880, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{284}Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{285}\textit{Diario Oficial de Avisos de Madrid}, 05/08/1880, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{286}“Desahuciado el \textit{Diario Liberal} por los amigos del Sr. Collaso y Gil, (...) ha nacido y está en vias de realizacion la idea de fundar un nuevo periódico, que estará enfrente de la \textit{Crónica de Cataluña}. Todo está ya dispuesto; se han nombrado director de la nueva publicación al Sr. D. Pedro Antonio Torres, diputado por Tarragona, y se inaugurará el periódico que llevará por título \textit{La Vanguardia} con un gran banquete que se dará tambien, como el dedicado al Sr. Balaguer, en el teatro del Tivoli. Reina con este motivo gran animacion en el circulo del Pasage del Crédito, y los iniciadores del banquete se proponen contrarestar la conducta del señor Rius y Taulet, invitando á la prensa y á un gran número de personas. Sirva esta noticia de contestacion á la Crónica de Cataluña que hoy y tiene en realidad esta disidencia (...). \textit{Diario Oficial de Avisos de Madrid}, 12/11/1880, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{287}As noted on the newspaper’s front page.
very small number of copies, limited circulation – usually restricted to the local or to the provincial sphere – and strongly partisan-oriented content.288

In contrast to the press model of Mediterranean countries, other countries in Europe (like France and England) had seen the development of a commercially-oriented press since the second half of the 19th century. Indeed, both the “presse à bon marché” (in France) and the “penny press” (in England) followed a business-model based on the drastic lowering of prices. The outcome of this model were newspapers that were capable of providing profits to their owners, thanks to the massive audience they reached through their low price and the increase of advertising revenues. Compared to this commercially-oriented press model, the 1,500 copies of *La Vanguardia* hardly made it a profitable business. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that this newspaper became a longstanding source of economic loss for the Godó’ brothers.289

However, it would be misleading to interpret the paper’s financial losses as a failed investment. The reason for this is that in the beginning of *La Vanguardia*, partisan goals prevailed over commercial ones. When Bartolomé Godó invested in the founding of this journal his ambition was neither to reach a massive audience, nor to make profits, but rather to gain public visibility. This strategy was acknowledged at the time with the expression “to create an atmosphere” (“crear atmósfera”) and consisted in gaining the attention of a target audience.290 In 1880, this audience was not the public of Barcelona, but the directors of the Constitutional Party in Madrid, headed by Sagasta. The creation of the new “Partido Liberal Fusionista” (“Liberal Fusionist Party”) in 1880 had showed that this politician had been the main promoter of merging the Constitutionals with the other conservative elements of the *Sexenio*, with the goal of holding the principles of the Constitution of 1869 in the new Restoration. The strategy behind the founding of *La Vanguardia* was, in the face of these events, to stop Collaso’s faction being regarded as a small rebel faction within the Constitutionals and to become the legitimate interlocutor of Sagasta in Barcelona. Therefore, the founding of *La Vanguardia* consisted in a strategy that was aimed at challenging the leadership of Rius by disputing the monopoly of authorized discourse that *La Crónica de*
Cataluña had. The strongest sign of this intention was the first copy of La Vanguardia, in which the newspaper publically proclaimed its total commitment to supporting the Constitutional Party and the leadership of Sagasta:

“(...) Nuestro programa, pues, es preciso y terminante. Durante los últimos años de gobierno conservador, nuevo y prolongado paréntesis abierto al ejercicio de las libertades públicas (...) En aquel terrible naufragio, en aquel general desconcierto [e.g. end of the Democratic Sexennium], solo pudieron sobrenadar un partido y un hombre; (...) el partido constitucional, compacto alrededor de su jefe [Sagasta], no se alejaba ni un momento del sitio del combate, no cedia ni un palmo de tierra, sin librar sangriente batalla, y en, seis años de porfiada lucha (...) ha reconquistado todos los dominios de la opinión pública. (...) A aquel jefe seguimos y á este partido pertenecemos. (...) Venimos, pues, al estadio de la prensa á defender los principios del partido constitucional dentro de la fusion por este aceptada y sostenida [e.g. creation of the new Liberal Fusionist Party]. Desde nuestro campo haremos la oposicion al Gobierno tan ruda é implacable como es implacable y rudo su propósito de combatirnos. (...) opondremos nuestro amor y nuestro entusiasmo por la libertad, que no han de retroceder ante ningun obstáculo ni han de debilitarse ante el peligro. (...)”

CONCLUSIONS

While official accounts attribute the foundation of La Vanguardia to Carlos and Bartolomé Godó, this chapter has shown that the origins of this newspaper were more complex. Rather than being founded as a family enterprise, La Vanguardia was the project of a political faction (the group of Collaso) aspiring to gain visibility in the eyes of the party leader (Sagasta) and to challenge the leadership of Rius i Taulet in the Constitutional Party of Barcelona. As part of this struggle for the sources of delegated power, Bartolomé Godó

291 “LA VANGUARDIA”, LV, 01/02/1881, p. 2. [E. T.]: “(...) Our programme is clear and concise. In the last years of conservative governments, a new parenthesis has been opened to public freedom (...) Amidst this shipwreck and widespread uncertainty [e.g. end of the Democratic Sexennium], only one party and one man have managed to stay afloat; (...) the Constitutional Party, gathered closely around its leader [Sagasta] did not abandon the fight for a moment, and did not budge one inch without fighting this bloody battle, and in six years of relentless struggle (...) the party has re-conquered public opinion. (...) This leader we shall follow and to this party we belong. (...) We use the field of the press, therefore, to defend the principles of the Constitutional Party in line with the fusion this has allowed [e.g. creation of the new Liberal Fusionist Party]. From our position we are committed to combatting the government as ruthlessly as it seeks to combat us. (...) We shall do so by opposing the government through our love and enthusiasm for liberty, which shall never desist no matter the threat or the danger at stake (...)”. 
became the founding partner of the new journal and consequently became its proprietor. That Godó, a man of humble origins, could afford to finance such an enterprise only became possible after his stay in Bilbao. For both he and his brother Carlos, this city became decisive for their upward mobility. Furthermore, some of the points that will be examined later on in this thesis, like the importance of Cuba for the Godó business, or their specialisation in the jute textile industry (Chapter 4), also came about as a result of their time in Bilbao.

At a time when urban ruling elites were being redefined across Europe, the migration of the Godó brothers to Bilbao shows the importance that marriage played for the merging of old and new elites. In fact, only five years after moving to Bilbao, Carlos Godó was elected as a member of the city council. This rapid integration into the local scene was rare according to studies on the Catalan trade diaspora, most of which speak of a slow process of integration that usually took more than one generation. The low number of Catalans in the Basque Country and the shared business interests between families explain the rapid integration the Godó brothers achieved through marriage. With one exception, the women they married were born in the Basque Country. Still, three of the four women came from families that had recently moved to Bilbao. This suggests that immigrants were more prone to marrying into families that had recently arrived rather than long-established ones.

If Bilbao was a decisive period in the life of the Godó brothers, their hometown of Igualada shaped and motivated most of their activities. Contrary to what the literature would suggest, their departure as cadets did not imply the breaking of family ties. On the contrary: kinship was a crucial element to organise migration and prevented the loss of status in cadets. The Godó’s departure from Igualada according to a migration-chain basis supports this point. Moreover, cadets proved to be of great value in the expansion of the family business. In the northern strip of Spain, which included cities like Bilbao, Oviedo and Santander, the Godó brothers opened new markets for the textile goods that their father’s factory produced in Igualada. The selling of the family’s goods in the north of Spain must have been decisive at a time when Igualada was undergoing a traumatic process of de-industrialisation. The violent aggression aimed at some of the family members during the strike of 1855 demonstrates to what extent Igualada’s economic downturn directly affected the Godó family.


293 The father of Felipa Belaunzaran’s came from Lequeitio (Basque Country); Dolors Brunet was born in La Habana (Cuba), and came from a family of Catalan origin that had lived in San Sebastián (Basque Country) since the 18th century; and Antonia Lallana was born in Vitoria and her parents came from Vitoria and Orduña (both in the Basque Country). AHEB, Libro de Matrimonios.
Moreover, it can be argued that “localism” was decisive for Bartolomé Godó’s entry into politics. Although modest, his deeds in Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation demonstrate his desire to improve Igualada’s road connections. That interest would continue during the Restoration period, when he insistently requested a railway-connection for Igualada. In this respect, Bartolomé Godó exemplifies the case of those elites who saw in clientelism the best means of promoting their particular interests. For the liberal-progressive elites this strategy became possible after the Sexenio Democrático (1868-1874) put an end to the monopoly of power by one single party of Isabella’s reign (1833-1868) and opened public office to new parties. However, the more competitive and pluralist party system of the Sexenio and the introduction of a more progressive legislation (e.g. the introduction of universal male suffrage and the extension of political rights) did not erase political clientelism.

In this regard, the intra-period time frame adopted in this chapter has served to challenge traditional views on clientelism. Because patron-client relations are often associated to the political systems of the last quarter of the 19th century, they are often depicted as social relations that were embedded in the political culture of the limited suffrage, and were for the exclusive benefit of liberal parties. This perspective has reinforced the idea that the rigging of elections was a “pre-modern” practice, opposed to the democratisation of politics. In fact, nowadays many historians still present the introduction of universal suffrage and the emergence of competitive politics as the symptoms of a new era, characterised by the crisis of the liberal-state model, the demise of “notable politics” and its substitution by mass politics. 294 This chapter, in contrast, has revealed that the introduction of universal male suffrage during the Sexenio did not erase political clientelism; nor were the liberal parties the only ones to take advantage from it. Both the Republicans and the Democrats, for whom popular sovereignty was a pillar of their political culture, also took advantage of clientelism – because clientelism became a way for these parties to promote their political projects and cope with the perennial institutional instability of the Sexenio.

Moreover, the fact that clientelism also existed in France challenges the understanding of democratisation according to ideal models.295 Clientelism was not the feature of an alleged special path of development of Southern European countries, like Italy, Spain or Portugal. Instead, what this chapter has shown is that clientelism was a ingrained and extensive

practice, especially in those countries where a highly centralised liberal-state model existed, and where the legal principles of the liberal state coexisted with other forms of authority that came from the Ancien Régime. The result was a system of representation based on patron-client relationships that was not static, but was re-defined in each political context. Indeed, as this chapter has shown, both for the case of France and Spain the introduction of universal suffrage and the rise of competitive politics did not remove clientelism, it just redefined the way it worked.

From a comparative perspective, the main difference between these two countries is that in France the introduction of universal suffrage in 1848 transformed clientelism into a practice aimed at influencing the voters’ behaviour. In Spain’s Democratic Sexennium, in contrast, the intervention of governments was more erratic and spontaneous (though equally persistent) than in France, and continued to rely on the arbitrary use of electoral rules (as in Isabella’s reign). Likewise, in Spain the rigging of elections continued to be justified by the principle of “legitimate influence”. In France, however, such public justification of clientelism was no longer feasible since clientelism was already perceived as a “corrupt” practice by then, even by public officials.

The provincial elections of 1871 demonstrate, nevertheless, that even in rural constituencies, like Igualada, some ordinary citizens actively tried to oppose the clientelist methods of the Godó. This suggests that in the case of Spain too, the extended nature of patronage did not prevent certain people from seeing clientelism as a corrupt practice. This change of perception of clientelism can be regarded as part of the long and uneven road on the construction of citizenship.

This chapter has demonstrated the importance that newspapers had in the organisational structures of cadre parties. At a time when official politics remained the concern of a tiny minority, the press acted as an element of social cohesion and reinforced the sense of political community. Moreover, the case of La Vanguardia demonstrates that the press also constituted a valuable device in the struggle for the symbolic sources of political power. Even though the skirmishes between the faction of Rius and Collaso would drag on for many years, Bartolomé Godó soon started seeing the returns from his investment in La Vanguardia.

296 M. Sierra, R. Zurita & M. A. Peña, op. cit., 2006, p. 34.
298 R. Romanelli, op. cit.
Thus, in the days that followed the founding of this newspaper, his position within the Constitutional Party improved rapidly. On the 2nd of February 1881 (that is to say, the day after La Vanguardia appeared on the newsstands) Bartolomé was elected as vice-president of Barcelona’s Local committee of the Constitutional Party, and soon after he was made vice-president of the party’s Provincial Committee. The crowning moment of his ascendant career took place in August 1881, when he was finally elected as deputy to the Congress. When Bartolomé finally reached the position he had sought so relentlessly (he failed to do so in the elections of 1876 and 1880) it was thanks to a new political situation: on the 8th of February 1881 the new Liberal Party of Sagasta took power for the first time in the Restoration. This event culminated in the integration of the most moderate participants of the Democratic Sexenium into the new political system. The fact that La Vanguardia started to be published five days before this happened demonstrates that this was a carefully planned strategy and reveals, in sum, the importance that newspapers had in the struggle for symbolic power of patron-client networks.

299 The so-called “Círculo Constitucional” and “Comité de provincia”, LV, 02/02/1881, p. 3 and 14/03/1881, p. 2.
CHAPTER 2. FROM A PARTISAN PRESS MODEL TOWARDS AN INDEPENDENT ONE: THE REDESIGN OF ‘La Vanguardia’

INTRODUCTION

2.1. CLIENTELISM AND THE ADVOCACY FUNCTION OF THE PRESS

2.2. CULTURAL TRANSFERS BETWEEN MEDIA SYSTEMS: ‘The Times’ AS A REFERENCE MODEL IN THE REFORM OF ‘La Vanguardia’ (1888)

CONCLUSIONS
“(...) *The Vanguardia* [is] (...) in size, seriousness, and circulation, as well as in completeness of organization, the most important paper in Catalonia, one might almost say in the whole of Spain.”

*The Times*, May 20 1916, p. 5.

**INTRODUCTION**

The observation opening this chapter was made by John Walter, the correspondent of the British newspaper *The Times* in Spain during the First World War (1914-1918). By then *La Vanguardia* enjoyed wide prestige and popularity, selling between 80,000 and 110,000 copies every day, which made it one of the two most successful newspapers in Spain. But how did a newspaper that was founded in 1881 as the organ of a political faction, and with a circulation of 1,400 copies, become one of the top-selling newspapers in the country – to the point that a foreign observer like John Walter could describe it as one of the finest exponents of journalism?

When historians look to explain the rise of a given newspaper they often identify it with the decisions of the owner. In this case, biographers tend to associate the “success” of a newspaper with the alleged clairvoyance of the proprietor. Although this is a valid argument, it is problematic when historians fall into a teleological narrative in which the sole protagonist is the “great man”. Various national historiographies contain examples of this type of perspective.

The case of *La Vanguardia* is not an exception in this regard. There are, indeed, two different explanations pointing at different architects for the growth of this newspaper. According to Agustí Calvet (the editor of the newspaper between 1920 and 1936) the only person responsible for transforming *La Vanguardia* into a modern newspaper was a journalist called Modesto Sánchez Ortiz. This account, which detracts all merit from the Godó brothers.

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301 According to the estimations of Nicolás Urgoiti (the director of the main newsprint supplier in Spain), in 1918 the circulation of Madrid’s *ABC* and *La Vanguardia* stood at around 80,000 and 100,000 copies; and between 85,000-90,000 copies in the case of Madrid’s *El Liberal*. *Archivo de la Comunidad de Madrid* (ARCM), Fondo Urgoiti (FU), C-462101, exp. 2: “Tirada de los periódicos diarios españoles (octubre 1918)” [manuscript].

in the newspaper’s expansion, has influenced historians like Jaume Vicens Vives.\(^{303}\) In contrast, the current owners of the newspaper have (obviously) proposed a second explanation, according to which Sánchez relied on the support of the Godó brothers to transform La Vanguardia.\(^{304}\)

The common points between the two explanations are the important role that Sánchez played in the reforms, and the year 1888 as the turning point. During that year, which also saw Barcelona host its first World Fair, La Vanguardia formally ended its role as an organ of the Liberal Party and became an “independent” newspaper. This decision symbolised the beginning of a transition between a partisan press model towards a commercial one, where the wish to serve the public – rather than the political community – emerged as the newspaper’s primary aim. As a result of this transformation in the editorial line, the year 1888 has been regarded as the birth of the “modern” Vanguardia as it is today.\(^{305}\) This argument is based on the growth in sales that the paper started experiencing after 1888, as Table 1 illustrates.

\(^{303}\) [In Catalan] “Però aquell “diari polític i d’avisos i notícies, òrgan del partit constitucional de la província”, muntat per defensar una posició familiar dintre del caciquisme imperant, havia de constituir ben aviat un excel·lent afer. Per què? Generalment s’afirma que això fou degut al tremp dels seus fundadors. En dubtem. És molt possible que intervingués decididament en l’èxit l’acció del director, Modest Sánchez Ortiz (...) [el qual] llevà a “La Vanguardia” el seu caràcter polític, el feu independent i informatiu i, per tant, l’encarà amb el poble i les seves realitats vives.” Jaume Vicens Vives i Montserrat Llorens, *Industrials i Polítics (segle XIX)*, Barcelona, El Observador de la Actualidad, ‘Col·lecció Història de Catalunya. Biografies catalanes’, vol. 11, p. 140.

\(^{304}\) “Sánchez Ortiz ocupó la direcció de La Vanguardia desde 1888 hasta 1901, y durante aquellos casi catorce años, en estrecha colaboración con los propietarios, Carlos Godó y su hijo Ramón, dio al diario el primer gran impulso decisivo de su historia”, Josep Maria Casasús Guri, “Estudio introductorio”, in: *Modesto Sánchez Ortiz / El Periodismo*, Barcelona, Fundación Conde de Barcelona, La Vanguardia [Facsimil de la edición de 1903; introducción de J. M. Casasús Guri], 1990, p. X.

Table 1. Circulation of Barcelona’s main newspapers (1886-1927), in thousands of copies ³⁰⁶

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>1886</th>
<th>1888</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1920</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Publicidad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Noticias</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Vanguardia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Diluvio</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Noticiero Universal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diario de Barcelona</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Still, if 1888 marked a turning point in the history of La Vanguardia, no detailed explanation has been offered about how and in what manner this transformation took place. The aim of this chapter is thus to explain the transformation of La Vanguardia into a commercial and independent newspaper, as part of a broader process taking place in Europe and the United States during the second half of the 19th century: namely, the birth of a new mass media culture. ³⁰⁷ Although national perspectives have been dominant in press history, in the last decade the comparative perspective has emerged with great impetus. While this is not to say that comparative media studies did not exist before, ³⁰⁸ it can be argued that the publishing of Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini’s work in 2004 was decisive for triggering greater interest in this field of study. ³⁰⁹ The main contribution of this book lies in challenging the Anglo-American or “liberal media model” as the norm against which the development of the media in other countries is analysed. Hallin and Mancini demonstrated that this model

³⁰⁶ Source: María Carmen García Nieto “La Prensa diaria de Barcelona de 1895 a 1910”, Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona, 1956 [thesis manuscript], p. 89; Francesc Espinet i Joan Manuel Tresserras, La genesi de la societat de masses a Catalunya, 1888-1939, Bellaterra, UAB, p. 77. These circulation figures are based on stamp duties and therefore should be taken with caution.


was not universal, but was part of a certain way of understanding journalism ("journalistic culture") common to certain countries (like the United States and the United Kingdom). In my view, the most valuable contribution of these two scholars has consisted in their proposal of a new theoretical framework for comparative analysis based on three media systems, each portraying three different ways in which the relation between the media and the political system was historically shaped in Western societies.

While representing a remarkable step forward for our understanding of journalism from a comparative perspective, the framework of Hallin and Mancini is not without its limitations. The tracing of a comparative analysis based on "ideal types" has led to the neglect of the cultural transfers that historically took place between countries belonging to different media systems. These types of transfers have only been studied for the case of neighbouring countries, and only recently. Indeed, different cultural traditions and the great divergences that existed in historical development – in terms of urbanisation, economic development and the extension of literacy – between the United States and Northern Europe, on one hand, and Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, on the other, have blinded scholars to the transnational media exchanges occurring between these areas.

However, the existence of different rhythms of historical development in Europe was not necessarily an obstacle for the exchange of ideas across national boundaries. On the contrary, the growing awareness among some journalists about the divergences between countries, especially in the most dynamic urban centres, created a mounting interest in emulating what they perceived as the more developed style of journalism of other societies. *La Vanguardia* is an example of this phenomenon: while it was a genuine example of the strong partisan orientation the press had in Barcelona, in 1888 Sánchez Ortiz transformed the newspaper by taking *The Times* as a reference model. Indeed, when writing the lines that opened this chapter John Walter was probably unaware that the British newspaper he worked for had influenced the new look of the Godó brothers’ newspaper. Moreover, a glance at other cities of the Mediterranean reveals that cultural transfers in the journalistic field were not exceptional. In 1900 a young journalist called Luigi Albertini was appointed as the new

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310 These three models of media and politics correspond to geographical areas sharing similar patterns of historical development. They are: the "Liberal Model" (present in Great Britain, Ireland and North America); the "Democratic Corporatist Model" (Northern Continental Europe) and the “Polarized Pluralist Model” (Mediterranean countries). For a detailed discussion of this book, see the Introduction.

director of Milan’s *Il Corriere della Sera* and he also took *The Times* as his model when redesigning the newspaper.

The main purpose of this chapter is to examine why the Godó brothers decided to transform *La Vanguardia* into an independent newspaper in 1888, and to examine why *The Times* became their source of inspiration to do so. If, as noted in Chapter 1, the founding of the newspaper allowed Bartolomé Godó to gain political prominence in the new Restoration system, then why did he and his brother Carlos feel the need to change the newspaper’s editorial line? How was this decision influenced by the development of the Godó’s political career and the struggle among the Constitutionals of Barcelona? Furthermore, was the fact that another newspaper with a strong political leaning (*Il Corriere della Sera*) took *The Times* as a reference a mere coincidence?

These are the questions that this chapter will address. To do so, it will be divided in two parts. The first part will examine the characteristics of journalism during the first years of *La Vanguardia* in relation to the political career of Bartolomé Godó. It will analyse in which ways journalism served Godó’s political ambitions. In so doing, it will examine the links between press and politics – a relationship that is considered to be particularly close in Mediterranean countries. The second part of this chapter will examine the circumstances that led the Godó brothers to end *La Vanguardia*’s official function as the mouthpiece of the Liberal Party in Barcelona. This decision implied a complete reversal of Godó’s power strategies, as it meant abandoning his struggle with the faction of Rius to be the official spokesman of Sagasta in the city. It will be argued that the Godó brothers took advantage of the changes that were taking place in Barcelona in 1888, particularly as a result of the World Fair, to redefine the editorial line of their newspaper. The way they would do so was by hiring a young journalist, Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, whom they tasked with transforming *La Vanguardia* into an independent and profit-oriented newspaper. By examining why and in what ways Sánchez used the example of *The Times* to redesign *La Vanguardia*, this chapter will adopt a transnational perspective to point to the limits of the media’s “ideal type” theory. In doing so, it will also shed light on the importance that cultural transfers between different media systems had in the creation of new journalistic codes. The case of Italy’s *Il Corriere della Sera* will be used to provide further evidence of this.

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2.1. CLIENTELISM AND THE ADVOCACY FUNCTION OF THE PRESS

In December 1881 the Spanish Congress registered a request for the establishing of a new railway connection between the Catalan towns of Igualada and Balaguer. The man behind this request was the new deputy Bartolomé Godó, and this was to be his – rather discreet – debut in national politics.\(^{313}\) The idea of a railway connection had been a claim in Igualada since the mid-19\(^{th}\) century, when the economic downturn of the textile industry put the town in an extremely vulnerable situation. As early as 1852 the first petition for Igualada’s railway connection was made, and in 1863 the Senate approved it – to the great delight of Igualada’s population. All this public expectation, however, rapidly vanished when a series of bureaucratic hurdles prevented the new railway from becoming a reality.\(^{314}\) The request that Godó made in December 1881 symbolised, in consequence, another step in Igualada’s long struggle to improve its overland connections (even though the railway did not become a reality until 1893).

In fact, the railway connection had already been a major topic of public debate in the elections of August 1881, when Bartolomé Godó was elected for the first time as deputy in Congress. The electoral campaign between him and the Conservative candidate did not consist in the confrontation of either ideas or political principles, but remained focused on the competition between the two companies that aspired to build Igualada’s future railway connection.\(^{315}\) The fact that Bartolomé Godó was a partner of one of these companies reveals to what extent politics was an extension of the struggle between the interests of different economic groups.\(^{316}\) *La Vanguardia* launched a campaign to support Godó and give further visibility to his infrastructure project. Still, when the time to vote arrived, clientelist methods, rather than public opinion, are what won Godó the election. Indeed, the local agents of the

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313 This request was Godó’s only intervention during the plenary session. *La Iberia*, 06/12/1881, p. 3; *La Época*, 07/12/1881, p. 2 and p. 3.
314 1848 saw the inauguration of the line between Barcelona and Mataró, the first railway connection in Spain. This event was soon regarded as the best the solution to Igualada’s economic crisis. Miquel Tèrmens i Graells, “El ferrocarril a Igualada: la lluita pel progrés (1852-1893)”, *Miscellanea Aqualatensis*, 1983, num. 3, pp. 215-245 (p. 219).
315 “Dos distintas empresas se proponen construir un ferro-carril económico que tiene un mismo punto de partida y debe seguir un mismo trazado y como no es posible que el Gobierno, dado la legislación vigente, pueda otorgar dos concesiones iguales, es muy aventurado asegurar cuál de las dos obtendrá en definitiva dicha concesión”. “Á los habitantes de Igualada. Ayuntamiento Constitucional de Igualada (18/02/1881)”, quoted in: Joan Palomas i Moncholi, “El rerefons econòmic de l’activitat dels parlamentaris catalans (1876-1885), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2002 [PhD dissertation], p. 859.
316 Godó was a partner of the company “Bové & Artés”, which gathered a group of Igualada’s businessmen. The Conservative candidate (Manuel Camacho), in contrast, sponsored a second company formed by a group of investors from Madrid, named “Camacho & Carreras”. M. Tèrmens, *op. cit.*; and J. Palomas i Moncholi, *op. cit.*, pp. 890-894.
Godó brothers and the support they obtained from Sagasta’s new Liberal government are what ultimately defeated the Conservative candidate.\textsuperscript{317}

As noted in Chapter 1, the foundation of La Vanguardia placed Godó in a favourable position to reap the benefits of the Liberal Party’s first seizing of power in the Restoration (February 1881). The coming into power of the Liberal’s fulfilled the goal that Cánovas del Castillo had been pursuing since the beginning of the new political system (namely, the integration of the most moderate participants of the Democratic Sexennium in the Restoration). The Liberal Party soon became one of the central pillars of the new political system: in 1885 Sagasta reached an agreement with the Conservative Party of Cánovas (the so-called “Pacto del Pardo”) according to which they would alternate in power successively. According to this agreement, reached under critical circumstances,\textsuperscript{318} instead of holding elections to choose the ruling party the two liberal parties would decide – with the decisive intervention of the King – when power was to be transferred between them.

The “Pacto del Pardo” set out the procedure through which the two liberal parties would monopolise public office during the Restoration period (1874-1923), while excluding from it the rest of the parties. In consequence, elections in Restoration Spain became a pure formality aimed at confirming the results the two parties had agreed beforehand; to the point that until the crisis of 1913, the two liberal parties managed to alternate in power without much difficulty.\textsuperscript{319} Caciquismo became the method the two parties used to impose electoral results, as well as the procedure to distribute public office to all the local bosses (“clients”) they had across the Spanish territory. It has been estimated that between 1,000 and 5,000 administrative positions (in institutions ranging from city councils to judiciary courts, as well as other positions in public bodies) changed hands after each election.\textsuperscript{320} In this way, in 1885 the Restoration implemented a procedure that was similar to that of Portugal: two parties agreed to rotate in power and secured this agreement through the rigging of elections. In Italy too, clientelism was the procedure liberal parties used to monopolise government, even

\begin{quote}
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{317} As one opponent claimed, the supporters of Godó falsified the votes by adding the names of dead people to the ballot box. In parallel, the Civil Governor of Barcelona forced the mayors of Igualada’s constituency to support Godó’s candidacy. J. Palomas i Moncholí, op. cit., pp. 894-895. Between the 1\textsuperscript{st} and the 20\textsuperscript{th} of February La Vanguardia published an article almost every day supporting Godó’s railway project.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{318} The agreement was a way of assuring the stability of the political system after the death of King Alfonso XII (November 1885), and with a civil war (“Tercera Guerra Carlística”, 1872-1876) and a separatist insurrection in Cuba (“Ten Years War”, 1868-1878) going on.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{319} All the electoral results, in: José Varela Ortega (dir.), El poder de la influencia. Geografía del caciquismo en España, 1875-1923, Madrid, Marcial Pons, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2001.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{320} Quoted in Georgina Blakeley, “Clientelism in the Building of State and Civil Society in Spain”, in S. Piattoni, Clientelism, op. cit., p. 83.
\end{quote}
though the procedure was slightly different: in this case, it consisted in the building of intra-party coalitions (“trasformismo”) rather than in party rotation.\footnote{For a comparative perspective on these three countries see: Gabriele Ranzato, Gabriele Ranzato, La forja de la soberanía nacional: las elecciones en los sistemas liberales italiano y español, Ayer, 3, 1991, pp. 115-138; Silvana Casimirri y Manuel Suárez Cortina (eds.), La Europa del sur en la época liberal: España, Italia y Portugal. Una perspectiva comparada, Universidad de Cantabria-Università di Cassino, 1998; and Javier Moreno Luzón y Pedro Tavares de Almeida (eds.), De las Úrulas al Hemiciclo. Elecciones y parlamentarismo en la Península Ibérica (1875-1926), Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2015. See also the Introduction to this thesis.}

Bartolomé Godó was an example of one of those local bosses (or “caciques”) who benefited from the two parties’ monopoly over public office. His election to the Spanish Congress for Igualada’s constituency became dependent on the alternation in power between the Conservatives and the Liberals. Thus, only when the Liberal Party seized power was Bartolomé elected as deputy, as Table 2 illustrates. It was not until more than a decade later that the political influence of the Godó family became powerful enough to impose its own candidate against the will of the government. By then, Bartolomé was suffering from an illness that had led his brother Carlos (who moved back to Barcelona in the 1870s) to assume the family’s candidacy for Congress, see Table 2. However, this did not take place until the elections of 1896, much later than the events this chapter will examine.
Table 2. Electoral results of the Godó family during the period 1879-1897\footnote{Source: Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados (ACD); Albert Balcells et al., Les eleccions generals a Catalunya de 1901 a 1923. Relació dels resultats electorals de 1869 a 1899, Barcelona, Fundació Jaume Bufill, 1982, p. 521 and p. 628; Jordi Planas i Francesc Valls-Junyent, Cacics i rabassaires. Dinàmica associativa i conflictivitat social. Els Hostalets de Pierola (1890-1939), Vic, Eumo, Centre d’Estudis Comarcal d’Igualada, 2011, pp. 41-42. For the characteristics of the electoral map in Catalonia during the Restoration, see Annex n. 6.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date of the elections</th>
<th>Party in power</th>
<th>Winning candidate</th>
<th>Other candidates</th>
<th>Electoral turnout</th>
<th>Percentage of votes obtained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1879-1880</td>
<td>20/04/1879</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Manuel Camacho (C)</td>
<td>Josep Mª Rius Badia</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>63.60 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881-1883</td>
<td>20/08/1881</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Bartolomé Godó Pié (L)</td>
<td>Manuel Camacho (C)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884-1885</td>
<td>27/04/1884</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Francesc Gumà Ferran (C)</td>
<td>Bartolomé Godó Pié (L)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>76.80 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886-1890</td>
<td>04/04/1886</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Bartolomé Godó Pié (L)</td>
<td>Vicente Romero Baldrich (L)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-1892</td>
<td>01/02/1891</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Josep Mª Rius Badia (C)</td>
<td>Carlos Godó Pié (L) and Josep d’España d’Orteu (Carlist)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893-1895</td>
<td>05/03/1893</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Carlos Godó Pié (L)</td>
<td>Josep d’España d’Orteu (Carlist) and Nicolau Estévanez</td>
<td>42.35 %</td>
<td>62.45 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896-1897</td>
<td>12/04/1896</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Carlos Godó Pié (L)</td>
<td>Josep d’España d’Orteu (Carlist)</td>
<td>33.72 %</td>
<td>52.43 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Still, the fact that Bartolomé Godó’s career echoed the alternation in power between the two liberal parties did not mean that his election was guaranteed when the Liberals were in power. The division within the Liberals of Barcelona between the Collaso and Rius factions meant that a struggle between the two factions to impose their respective candidates also existed. This means that despite the extant agreement between the two parties at a national level, the local elites competed amongst themselves to reach public office. The best example of this was the election of 1886. On this occasion, Godó was not the only candidate of the Liberal Party for Igualada’s constituency, but he competed with the candidate
belonging to the faction of Rius – a man from Madrid named Vicente Romero Baldrich. This competition reveals that Godó’s involvement in the founding of *La Vanguardia* placed him on Rius’ list of enemies. This was not a trifling matter given that Rius was the leader of the party, and had been Barcelona’s mayor since 1881.

Consequently, during the elections of 1886 Igualada’s constituency became the scene of the Liberals’ intra-party struggle. Rius’ desire to prevent Godó from being elected was so intense that he made agreements with the Conservatives and the Catholic fundamentalists to make sure his candidate won. Rius also paid various men to rig the elections. In the end, only the support of a local network allowed Godó to win the elections – albeit also by rigging them. Indeed, Godó had a network of local supporters that included various family members, like his brother Carlos Godó (who had returned from Bilbao), and his cousin Juan Godó. This network of local supporters, formally structured since 1887 as the effective board of the “Centro Liberal Monárquico de Igualada y su Partido”, allowed Bartolomé to impose his control in Igualada, and to reject the entry of “foreign” candidates, like the one Rius sponsored. The case of Godó thus demonstrates that in order to influence public institutions, local elites could not rely solely on their contacts with national leaders (like Sagasta); but also depended on a local base of supporters (or “clients”) to manipulate elections. The presence of

323 “(...) hubo de luchar contra toda la fuerza moral y de otra índole de que disponía el cadí de Barcelona [Rius], que se había propuesto, costara lo que costara, derrotar al señor Godó. Al efecto celebró varias entrevistas con el alcalde conservador de Igualada; celebró una alianza ofensiva y defensiva con el mismo, como también se había aliado para un objeto análogo con los conservadores de Barcelona. Pusieron entonces en juego todos los medios para vencer al señor Godó; se echó mano desde los carlistas á los conservadores y empezó una cruzada terrible contra nuestro amigo”. LV, 12/04/1886, p. 4; 19/04/1886, p. 7.

324 “Comité y Junta del Centro liberal monárquico de Igualada y su partido” [“Committee and Central Board of the Liberal Party’s branch in Igualada and its constituency”]:

**Honorary board:** president, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta. Bartolomé Godó Pié, deputy in Congress.

- Vice president: Carlos Godó Pié.
- Spokesmen: José Collaso Gil, deputy in Congress; Sebastián Franch Jover, lawyer and former deputy; Luis Matas Fontcuberta, lawyer and provincial deputy; Francisco Riba Lladó, lawyer.

**Effective board:** president, Ramón Sistaré Gabarró, Igualada’s former mayor and propietor.

- Vice president: Francisco Jover i Girbau, tradesmen.
- Treasurer: Francisco Colomer Fortuny, proprietor.
- Curator: Juan Godó Lucià, manufacturer.
- Spokesmen: José Oliva Piquè, manufacturer; José Carulla Bover, proprietor; Ramón Tosal Boladeras, manufacturer; Isidro Casellas Castellví, proprietor; José Riba Tous, tradesman; Salvador Nadal Adzet, tradesman; Ramón Bassols Costa, “substitute” in the Property Registry; José Prats Galtés, tradesmen; Juan Montaner Gabarró, manufacturer.
- Secretary: Guillermo Dueñas.
- Vice secretary: Juan Coca Calsina, proprietor.

**Source:** LV, 04/02/1887, p. 9 i La Iberia, 23/02/1887, p. 2. The social-background of the Committee reveals that Godó was the leader of some of Igualada’s economic elites.
different family members in the circle of Bartolomé Godó reveals the importance of kinship ties in the social cohesion of patron-client networks.\footnote{This point will be examined in further detail in subsequent chapters.}

Nevertheless, Godó’s victory in the elections of 1886 did not signal an end to the struggle amongst the Liberals of Barcelona. \emph{La Vanguardia} repeatedly proclaimed that it would always back the leadership of Sagasta but that it would never accept the authority of Rius.\footnote{LV, 14/03/1885, p. 7-8.} The instrumental value of the press in political struggle became evident when Rius, tired of the campaign of slander he received from \emph{La Vanguardia}, established his own newspaper: “\emph{El Barcelonés}”. The result was a long period of heated struggles between the two factions where the public space became the battleground.\footnote{As Barcelona’s Conservative newspaper \emph{La Dinastía} reported with amusement: “\emph{El mismo periódico, empuñando las disciplinas, arremete contra su correligionario \emph{La Vanguardia}, y se expresa en estos términos: «¿Tiene \emph{La Vanguardia} ninguno de los timbres de que blasona justamente \emph{El Barcelonés}? No, ni de cien leguas. Un órgano que promete reírse de las decisiones de la más alta superioridad en el partido; un periódico que viene sosteniendo la discordia en el seno de la agrupación á que dice pertenecer; una publicación que sin justificado motivo viene haciendo coro á los más acérrimos adversarios del partido en que milita, ¿qué derecho ni qué autoridad ha de tener ante el público sensato, para lanzar recriminaciones ni aventurar juicios tan torcidos como pudieran formularlos los mayores enemigos de nuestro partido legalmente constituido en esta provincia?»}. \emph{La Dinastía}, 03/02/1888, p. 1.} The blows exchanged through the press reveal the importance newspapers played in the competition between elites. Next to being an instrument to publicise particularistic views, newspapers were thus aimed at undermining the prestige of the opponent. This intra-party struggle did not spare personal attacks, to the point that Rius even sued \emph{La Vanguardia} for slander.\footnote{“Nuestro respetado amigo el señor Rius y Taulet ha llevado á los tribunales al periódico \emph{La Vanguardia} por injurias inferidas á su persona”. \emph{El Barcelonés}, 13/06/1885, p. 1.}

From a broader perspective, the skirmishes between \emph{El Barcelonés} and \emph{La Vanguardia} reveal the strong partisan character of the press at that time; not only in Spain but throughout Europe. In fact, attacks in the press were one of the main causes of duelling on the Continent. In Italy, for instance, journalism was the main reason for this kind of dispute between 1879 and 1895, while in Spain some partisan papers even took the precaution of recruiting swordsmen to pose as editors in case of future duels.\footnote{Steven C. Hughes, \textit{Politics of the Sword. Dueling, Honor and Masculinity in Modern Italy}, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 2007, p. 77; and José Alvarez Junco, “Lerroux, El País y el periodismo de izquierdas”, in J. M. Martínez (ed.), \textit{Grandes periodistas olvidados}, Madrid, Fundación Banco Exterior, Col. Seminarios y cursos, 1987, pp. 56-58 (the anecdote of the professional swordsmen, in pp. 57-58).} Likewise, Germany and France became pioneers in establishing formal codes to settle press disputes in private; and the authorities faced enormous difficulties in preventing them.\footnote{To the point that France’s Third Republic has been described as a “\emph{duelling-abolitionist nightmare}”. Spain’s Infante Don Alfonso de Bourbon even became the leader of an international Anti-Duelling League. See: Kevin McAleer, \textit{Dueling. The Cult of Honor in Fin-de-Siècle Germany}, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994,} Still, while historians have
mostly studied duelling as a way to assess the importance that cultural codes like honour and masculinity played in European societies (particularly in the 1990s, when this became a fashionable topic of research), less attention has been paid to what duelling reveals about print culture. In fact, and besides being an alleged vestige of the Old Regime, duelling was evocative of the strong partisan tradition that journalistic culture had in Western societies. This advocacy tradition was not restricted to an allegedly aristocratic Europe, but was a central feature of the press in the United States too.

The clashes between the Collaso and Rius factions continued for a long time and they reached the point when two separate delegations visited Sagasta in Madrid, claiming to be the true representatives of Barcelona’s party branch. The fact that Sagasta received both of them symbolised the benefits that founding La Vanguardia had brought for Collaso’s group: they were not seen anymore as rebels, but Sagasta acknowledged them as one of the party representatives in Barcelona. At the head of the Collaso delegation was Pere Antoni Torres Jordi (1844-1901), the first editor in the history of La Vanguardia. The case of Torres illustrates the importance that journalism had in the organisation of cadre parties. The position of editor invested Torres with the symbolic authority to act as the spokesman of Collaso’s faction and allowed him to be received as a legitimate interlocutor by Sagasta. The political function that Torres played as editor of La Vanguardia reveals just how closely interlinked politics and journalism were at the time.

In fact, it can be said that Torres was recruited as the first editor of La Vanguardia because of his political affiliation. His political career spanned back to the Democratic Sexenium, when he founded various newspapers in his hometown of Tarragona to support

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331 As Steven C. Hughes has rightly noted for the case of Italy in, op. cit., p. 68. For duelling as an alleged sign of an aristocratic culture, see: Arno Mayer, The persistence of the Old Regime. Europe to the Great War, New York, Pantheon Books, 1981.

332 As Richard Kaplan has explained for the city of Detroit during the Gilded age (1870-1890). Richard Kaplan, op. cit. A work that is fully devoted to the topic above mentioned (though it is less valuable in my view than Kaplan’s work) is: Ryan Chamberlain, Pistols, Politics and the Press. Dueling in the 19th Century American Journalism, Jefferson, McFarland, 2009.

333 “Han venido á Madrid dos distintas comisiones de los constitucionales de Barcelona, una presidida por el Sr. Rius y Taulet y otra por el Sr. Torres. Ambos han pretendido representar la opinion de la mayoria de los constitucionales de aquella provincia, y la segunda ha mandado consignar en algunos periódicos, que no era exacto que el Sr. Sagasta reconociera en el Sr. Rius y Taulet la jefatura de sus amigos en la provincia de Barcelona.” La Correspondencia de España, 20/02/1881, p. 3. La Vanguardia did not lose the opportunity to reproduce the news of La Correspondencia. LV, 22/02/1881, p. 2.

334 There is one biography available on this character, even though it is mostly concerned with his literary career. Josep Mª Vallès i Martí, De l‘idealisme a l’oblit. Poesia i teatre de Pere Antoni Torres Jordi, Valls, Cossétania, 2007. Contrary to what some scholars have argued (like Tasis and Torrent), Jaume Andreu was not the first director of La Vanguardia, but its chief editor. Rafael Tasis i Joan Torrent, Història de la premsa catalana, Barcelona, Bruguera, 1966, 1 vol., p. 140-141.
the Constitutional Party.\textsuperscript{335} The activism in the press provided him with political contacts, among which his close friendship with Sagasta, as well as public positions like that of civil governor in Girona, Malaga, and Granada. Torres’ experience in founding newspapers was surely an added merit, but only second to his acquaintance with the leader of the Liberal Party. The case of Torres demonstrates that political affiliation, rather than professional value, was the guiding pattern in the recruitment of journalists. This is demonstrated by the fact that the first four editors in the history of \textit{La Vanguardia} were all members of the Liberal Party – including Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, the man responsible for turning the paper into an “independent” newspaper.\textsuperscript{336} Therefore, the case of \textit{La Vanguardia} reveals the lack of autonomy that journalism had in relation to politics; and its lack of differentiation as a distinctive professional field.\textsuperscript{337}

The first consequence of the close links between the press and politics was that journalism often acted as a route into public office. Due to the extremely low circulation of partisan papers and the lack of professional recognition, the salaries of journalists were very low forcing most of them to take on other jobs to complement their incomes. These precarious working conditions meant that journalism was not regarded as a profession in itself, but as a springboard into public office. Indeed, for men of humble origins, journalism became a way to attain seats in parliaments, provincial administrations, and city halls. Governments took advantage of this situation and dedicated a special budget – the so-called “reptile funds” – to bribing journalists. Many journalists were on the payroll of the ministry of interior (under various guises – even as street cleaners), while others made their way into public positions thanks to their political contacts.\textsuperscript{338}

The second characteristic that journalism had in Spain, besides the lack of autonomy from politics, was a strong literary profile. This was also a distinguishing feature of

\textsuperscript{335} Named “La Prensa”, “La Prensa Libre” and “La Nueva Prensa”. \textit{Ibidem}, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{336} When Pere Antoni Torres Jordi was appointed editor of \textit{La Vanguardia} he was also deputy in the Spanish Congress for the constituency of Gandesa. The following directors were: Alfredo García López (?-1906), who had been the director of the Madrid newspaper \textit{La Mañana} (the mouthpiece of Víctor Balaguer in Madrid) and was a Liberal; Josep Roger i Miquel (1829-1892), who was the former director of the Liberal Barcelona newspaper \textit{La Bomba}. For the political affiliation of Sánchez, see: “Los encasillados”, \textit{La Dinastía}, 30/01/1893, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{337} On Bourdieu’s field theory applied to journalism, see: D. Hallin and P. Mancini, \textit{op. cit.}, Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{338} The venality of the press was an extended phenomenon in Europe. \textit{The Times}, for instance, received a £300 annual subsidy from the Government, referred to by the newspaper’ owner (John Walter) as a “reward for the politics of the Paper”. Stanley Morison, \textit{The History of The Times}, London, Office of the Times, 1935, vol. 1, p. 213. The “reptile funds” were considered to be an invention of Bismarck. For the Spanish case, see: José Alvarez Junco, “Lerroux, El País y el periodismo de izquierdas”, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 51-54 (for the street cleaner’s anecdote see p. 51); and Jesús Timoteo Álvarez, \textit{Restauración y prensa de masas. Los engranajes de un sistema, 1875-1883}, Pamplona, Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1981.
journalism in Italy, Portugal, and France. The entry into the newsroom allowed many men to satisfy their literary vocation, this being a tendency that was favoured by the strong commentary-oriented tradition that journalism had in the mentioned countries. As a result of this tradition, journalists often combined the writing of aggressive political editorials with the writing of literary works – sometimes published in the same newspaper. The first editor in the history of *La Vanguardia* (Torres) was the paramount example of this combination of self-education, literary vocation, and political ambition. Besides his affiliation to the Liberal Party, Torres was also a renowned poet and playwright. And he soon abandoned his position as editor of *La Vanguardia* for a new appointment, in 1882, as “Director General de Beneficiencia and Sanidad”, which he combined with his role of deputy in the Congress. His case reveals to what extent journalism was regarded as a temporary stepping-stone to higher political positions, rather than as a profession in itself.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the main function journalism played in the early years of *La Vanguardia* was an advocacy function. The case of this newspaper was no exception, but went in line with the strong political content the press had in Barcelona, as Table 3 shows.

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340 In countries like Great Britain, in contrast, journalism tended to be more oriented towards “news gathering” rather than commentary-oriented journalism. See: D. Hallin and P. Mancini, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

Table 3. Circulation of Barcelona’s newspapers in 1888

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Editorial line</th>
<th>Circulation figures</th>
<th>Subscribers outside Barcelona (1886) *</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Diluvio</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Publicidad</td>
<td>Republican / Informative</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>1,649</td>
<td>“ “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Noticiero Universal</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>“ “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diario de Barcelona</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>“ “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Correo Catalán</td>
<td>Carlist</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,945</td>
<td>“ “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diario Mercantil</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>“ “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Renaixensa</td>
<td>Catalan nationalist and conservative</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>Catalan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Nación</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Suplemento</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>“ “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Barcelonès</td>
<td>Liberal (Rius)</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>“ “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Vanguardia</td>
<td>Liberal (Collaso)</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>“ “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Monitor</td>
<td>Conservative (R. Robledo)</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>“ “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Dinastía</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>“ “</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the figures in Table 3 should be interpreted with caution – as they are based on stamp duty records – they do reveal the general features of Barcelona’s press. With a few exceptions, these general characteristics were: a highly politicised content, an extremely

342 Figures based on the quantity newspapers paid on stamp duties. These were only estimated figures. Sources: compilation based on the “Estadística de la Prensa Periódica” (Ministerio de la Gobernación, Madrid, 1889), reproduced in: DDAA, 200 anys de premsa diària a Catalunya, Fundació Caixa de Catalunya – Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat- Col·legi de Periodistes de Catalunya, 1995, p. 539. * The number of subscribers should be taken with extreme precaution, since they are estimations made by the journal La Campana de Gràcia based on the information of the government (“Delegación de Hacienda”), See: La Campana de Gràcia, 18/07/1886, p. 1.

343 Amidst the widely extended partisan character there were some exponents of a more informative type of journalism, like El Noticiero Universal, which achieved a certain success in terms of circulation. Only the Republican press managed to sell more than 10,000 copies, something that reflected the strong roots this political movement had in Barcelona.
low circulation – mostly limited to the supporters of the political community, and the use of Spanish as the predominant language. Amidst the modest panorama the press offered in Barcelona, *La Vanguardia* was merely the mouthpiece of a political faction and had a circulation of 1,400 copies. This was, in sum, the precarious state in which Sánchez found *La Vanguardia* when the Godó brothers commissioned him to overhaul the newspaper.

2.2. **Cultural transfers between media systems: *The Times* as a reference model in the reform of *La Vanguardia* (1888)**

The strong partisan character of *La Vanguardia*’s journalism was suddenly put aside on January 1st 1888. On that day, and without prior notice, the newspaper published an article on its front page in which it announced the beginning of a series of drastic transformations. The article was entitled “*A nuestros lectores*” (“To our readers”) and introduced the changes of the editorial line of *La Vanguardia*, based on the following reasons:

“Uno de los signos más seguros de la cultura y de la vida de un pueblo se ofrece en su prensa periódica. (...) Cualquiera que vea el ‘*Times*’, no necesita ver que está fechado en Londres para saber que es el periódico de una nación rica, poderosa y sabia. La vida de Inglaterra, tan vigorosa como se destaca en el cuadro de la historia contemporánea se refleja en el gran periódico, así en su texto escogido, variado y ameno, y siempre sesudo como en su parte material y tipográfica.

Un periódico es la vocina (sic) de todos los ecos armónicos, es la repetición de todos los intereses legítimos; en él ha de encontrar cada clase su nota, cada lector su frase, y en este concepto y por este medio el periódico vendrá á ser el retrato exacto de la sociedad en cuyo seno y para quien se hace. No intentamos nosotros hacer un ‘*Times*’, sería pretensión vana y ridícula, pero si queremos que nuestro periódico, en compañía de los otros dignísimos colegas de esta capital refleje en primer término y con la mayor exactitud posible la vida de Barcelona, luego la de Cataluña, y por último, la de España entera, que constituyen las tres relaciones primordiales de nuestra existencia social.

(...) Creemos que no se desprende de la prensa, obra fecunda para el público, si los periódicos no se inspiran en altos ideales y en los principios de una crítica severa. Estos serán, pues, nuestros principios de conducta. Imparcialidad y severidad. Aquellos actos que en nuestra conciencia sean acertados, tendrán en nosotros despiadados censores; para aquellos otros que redunden en beneficio público, no nos dolerán aplausos ni regatearemos elogios; pero en uno y
en otro caso, en nuestra jurisdicción de críticos no caerá más que el acto criticable; jamás la persona que lo ejecute, respetable para nosotros siempre. Esta nos parece obra difícil porque al cabo como hombres también tenemos nuestras pasiones; pero es nuestra intención sobreponernos á las miseries humanas en interés general (...). Recibía, pues, la prensa de Barcelona un saludo cordialísimo de LA VANGUARDIA y préstemos nuestros lectores la ayuda que hemos menester en la empresa que en su obsequio acometemos.”

This new editorial line stood in clear contrast to the bellicose tone the newspaper had used until then. The audience La Vanguardia now addressed was neither Sagasta nor Rius but was generally referred to as “the readers”. Consequently, for the first time La Vanguardia did not define its readership according to political affiliation but as a notion surpassing the frontiers of opinion. As the newspaper put it, every “class” and “every reader” should now be capable of finding their own concept in La Vanguardia. Instead of the Liberal party, three elements now justified the raison d’être of this newspaper: Barcelona, Catalonia, and Spain.

La Vanguardia’s statements did not go unnoticed among the Liberals of Barcelona. Some of Collaso’s supporters viewed these statements with disdain; some others were deeply disappointed by them. Still, the general impression was scepticism about the capacity of the newspaper to move away from its partisan origins.

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344 “A nuestros lectores”, LV, 01/01/1888, p. 1. [E. T.]: “One of the clearest signs of culture in every people is its periodical press. (...) Any one who sees the Times does not need to know that it is printed in London to know that this is the newspaper of a rich, powerful and wise nation. The rich life of England in modern history is reflected in this great newspaper, through its select writing, which is always varied and entertaining, as well as accurately made in its material and tipographical dymension. Every newspaper is the loudspeaker (...) of legitimate interests; every reader must find in it its own sentence and concept, and in this way the newspaper will come to be the exact portrait of the society where it is published. We do not pretend to emulate The Times, for this would be a vain pretension, but we do want to make of our newspaper, together with our distinguished colleagues in this city, to reflect as exactly as possible the life of Barcelona, then Catalonia and finally Spain, for these constitute the three raison d’être of our existence. (...) We are convinced that the press only provides a public service when it is inspired in high ideals and the principles of severe criticism. This shall be, therefore, our guiding patterns. Impartiality and severity. (...) This aim appears to be difficult to us, for at the end as all the men we too have our passion; but our will is to overcome human petty miseries for the sake of the general interest (...) A warm greeting to all the press in Barcelona from LA VANGUARDIA and shall our readers support us in this task to which we are now committed for their service.”

345 For instance if compared with the first editorial in the history of La Vanguardia (01/02/1881): “Tenemos que aprestarnos al combate; la reacción avanza; prepárase al Gobierno á la resistencia y no hemos de ser nosotros los últimos que aceptemos en la lucha el puesto de honor que, de derecho, nos corresponde. Nuestro programa, pues, es preciso y terminante”. The full editorial is reproduced in Chapter 1.

346 “(...) la vida de Barcelona, luego la de Cataluña, y por último, la de España entera, que constituyen las tres relaciones primordiales de nuestra existencia social”. “A nuestros lectores”, op.cit.

347 “Alguien asegura que algunos respetables fusionistas disidentes de esta ciudad, están muy disgustados de la nueva actitud adoptada, al parecer, por La Vanguardia. Se añade que este periódico dejará de hacer la oposición al señor Rius y Taulet á quien tanto y tan sañadamente han combatido, y que esto se debe á altas influencias de la Corte. Nos resistimos á creer estas noticias, principalmente la última, porque vivas están en la memoria de todos y escritas quedan en las páginas de La Vanguardia aquellas palabras de que jamás transigiria con el
really behind this drastic transformation in the editorial line of Godó’s newspaper? Contemporaries pointed at the influence that Sagasta had presumably exerted. These rumours were about the victory Collaso had seemingly achieved against Rius; and about the transformation of *La Vanguardia* into an “independent” newspaper as part of a plot to gain Sagasta’s favour. However, the supposed defeat of Rius proved to be a simple rumour. Rius continued to be the leader of the Liberals and ruled as Barcelona’s mayor between 1885 and 1889. The death of Pedro Collaso, in 1887, was probably the real trigger behind Godó’s decision to turn *La Vanguardia* into an independent newspaper. Collaso was the indisputable leader of the faction that challenged the leadership of Rius, and his death left his followers (amongst whom, Bartolomé Godó) without a patron that assured their position. The elections of 1886 (discussed at the beginning of this chapter) already demonstrated Rius’ determination to combat Godó’s election in Igualada. The death of Collaso further deteriorated Godó’s situation within the Liberals. In the face of such a delicate position, Godó’s response arguably consisted in seeking new sources of influence beyond the members of the Liberal Party – and the way to do so consisted in having a politically independent newspaper. To pilot this transformation the Godó brothers hired a young journalist named Modesto Sánchez Ortiz (1858-1937).
Indeed, in December 1887 Sánchez was appointed as the new editor of *La Vanguardia*, shortly before the reforms started taking place. Sánchez was born in the Andalusian town of Aljarque (Huelva), in 1858, to a well-off peasant’s family. Like many other men from rural Spain, he migrated to Madrid to become a journalist. He started publishing comedies to make a living (this being another pattern of the journalists’ literary vocation) and in the meantime he acquired an education in an autodidactic way: he showed an interest in literature and the arts, and also learned English and French. In 1881 he joined the Liberal paper *El Correo de Madrid* and seven years later, at the age of 30, began his role at *La Vanguardia* where with the trust and the money of the Godó brothers he initiated a new plan of reforms by taking a foreign newspaper as inspiration.

Any attempt to examine the influence of *The Times* for the redesign of *La Vanguardia* risks the peril of exaggerating the similarities between the two newspapers, and lessening their differences. It must be stressed, in this regard, that the two newspapers were – and would continue to be – different in many ways. By 1888 *The Times* was the oldest still-active newspaper in Europe and arguably the most reputed one. It was established in 1785 by John Walter (1739-1812) as *The Daily Universal Register* and rechristened as *The Times* in 1788. Walter’s son (John Walter II, 1776-1847) was responsible for turning the newspaper into London’s top selling paper during the period 1815-1840. The principal reason for this success was Walter II’s advocacy of an editorial line based on independence – this being understood as the need to avoid the interference of political parties in news. As *The Times* stated, its objective was “not the prying into private life (...) but the full and fearless investigation of all public acts of public men”. The second ambition of this newspaper was to record – or to “register”, as its original name suggested – all the news and commercial transactions that might be of interest for the widest audience possible.

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350 “Dice *La Vanguardia* que desde el día 1.º de año se encargará de su dirección el señor Sánchez Ortiz”. *La Dinastía*, 29/12/1887, p. 1.
352 “El Señor Sánchez Ortiz”, *op. cit*.
354 S. Morison, *op. cit*., vol. I, p. 20-25 (esp. p. 24). The person responsible for this new line was *The Times*’ editor Thomas Barnes (1817-1841). It must be stressed that *The Times*’ stance for independence did not prevent this newspaper from explicitly supporting different political parties throughout its history (especially the Tories), nor did it prevent Walter from entering politics and being elected deputy on repeated occasions. The prestige of *The Times* stemmed from its political independence (and not from abstaining from influencing politics).
To this end, John Walter II developed a business strategy based on three points, the first of which was to treat news as a commodity. This implied that news needed to be gathered as fast as possible, no matter where it took place; an objective tightly connected to England’s expansion as a colonial power. Thus *The Times* established a wide network of foreign correspondents and started using alternative means to transmit news. Some of the earliest achievements that resulted from this strategy allowed the newspaper to gain an important reputation for international coverage, to the point that the British government proposed this newspaper an agreement to exchange foreign news. Second, *The Times* became a pioneer in introducing new technical developments in the printing industry. The most famous was the invention of the first steam-printing machine, a contraption that allowed the newspaper to print more than 1,100 copies per hour in 1814. The third point of Walter’s business strategy consisted in making the newspaper profit-oriented. Together with a selling price that was substantially higher than that of its competitors, which was a strategy that aimed at targeting an elite audience, *The Times* started placing advertisements in two of the four columns into which the text of the front page was divided; while the third and fourth pages were completely filled with advertisements. All these improvements made *The Times* London’s top-selling newspaper from the first third of the 19th century and the most prestigious one both at a national and international level. In 1882 it printed 100,000 copies.

When compared with the above-mentioned characteristics of *The Times*, *La Vanguardia* had little to boast about. The Godó brothers’ newspaper had a far lower circulation (1,400 copies in 1888) and its readership was limited to a faction of the Liberal Party of Barcelona (no more than a few hundred people). Thus the differences between *The Times* and *La Vanguardia* were enormous; they also echoed the significant differences between England and Spain in terms of economic development, literacy rates, and the emergence of a new mass audience. Indeed, by the mid-19th century over half of England’s population lived in cities. Illiteracy rates were around 20% in 1870 and had dropped to 3% in 1900. Additionally, the development of a mass culture, between 1820 and 1850, based on the

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popularity of religious books and cheap novels among the English popular classes, set the 
ground for the growth of the press in the second half of the century. The outcome was a large 
reading public that allowed popular newspapers like the Daily Mail to sell as many as 1 
million copies in 1901. This was only possible in a country where one in five adult men read 
a newspaper on a daily basis, with one in three reading the Sunday papers.\textsuperscript{361}

The structural characteristics of England stood in clear contrast to those of Spain. In 1877, Spain’s illiteracy rates were 72\% and the vast majority of the population still lived in 
rural areas (only 10\% lived in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants). At that time there 
was only one newspaper per 43,000 people and the top-selling papers had a circulation 
limited to 90,000 copies by 1898.\textsuperscript{362} Illiteracy rates, the urban world, and the number of 
readers were, in consequence, far lower in Spain than in England. This does not mean, 
however, that Spain’s case was “unique”. The characteristics of this country were similar, for 
instance, to those of Italy;\textsuperscript{363} and between 1850 and 1883 Spain’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) per inhabitant grew faster than the European average.\textsuperscript{364} Furthermore, scholars have 
demonstrated that in Spain too a mass culture started emerging after the first third of the 19\textsuperscript{th} 
century. As Jean François Botrel has argued, if one focuses on oral culture, represented in 
different types of spectacles (like theatre, singing or bullfighting) and in various forms of 
sociability, then “millions of illiterate Spaniards turn all of a sudden into participants of 
mass culture”.\textsuperscript{365} In consequence, if regarded from the perspective of oral culture, then the 
country’s public life was indeed massive and dynamic.

However, if regarded from the perspective of print culture, the emergence of a mass 
press clearly took longer to emerge in Spain than in England. There is wide consensus among 
scholars that, when it comes to circulation, it was not until the First World War that a mass

\textsuperscript{361} In 1828 the confession of a murderer sold as many as 1.16 million copies and in 1849 a report about the 
execution of a criminal sold 2.5 million copies (in a country of 20 million people). Additionally, in 1840 there 
were between 1,400 and 1,600 coffee houses were workingmen could read a newspaper for free. \textit{Ibidem}, p. 98-99 and p. 102, respectively.

\textsuperscript{362} Juan Francisco Fuentes & Javier Fernández Sebastián, \textit{Historia del periodismo español. Prensa, política y 

\textsuperscript{363} The first census in unified Italy recorded an illiteracy rate of 74\% (1861). The figures varied greatly 
depending on the region (e.g. 90\% in Sardinia, 54\% in Piedmont). David Forgacs, \textit{Italian Culture in the 

\textsuperscript{364} Leandro Prados de la Escosura, \textit{El progreso económico de España, 1850-2000}, Bilbao, Fundación BBVA, 
2003, pp. 171-172.

\textsuperscript{365} In 1867 as many as 8 million theatre tickets were sold, Jean-François Botrel, “Entre imprimé et oralité: 
143-156 (p. 143). See also: Susan Larson and Eva Woods, \textit{Visualizing Spanish Modernity}, Oxford-New York, 
Berg, 2005; and Jorge Uría (ed.), \textit{La cultura popular en la España contemporánea. Doce estudios}, Madrid, 
press emerged in Spain. Similarly, the 1880s are generally acknowledged as the period when the early roots of this mass press were established. The passing of a new press act in 1883 triggered a substantial growth in the number of newspapers: from approximately 500 in 1879 to 1,300 in 1900 – an increase of about 240%.

This growth of the press was concentrated in the most dynamic urban centres of the country (Madrid and Barcelona) while rural and provincial areas were excluded. These two cities had substantially higher literacy figures than the Spanish average and saw the emergence of a new consumer culture – symbolised in the creation of the first department stores and new retail shops – that went in line with other European capitals, as Jesús Cruz has examined. As a consequence of the more developed characteristics of Madrid and Barcelona, some newspapers based in these two cities started adapting to the changes journalism was undergoing in Europe. For the case of Madrid, Jesús Timoteo Álvarez has examined the reforms that the five top-selling newspapers of this city started implementing in the 1880s. These reforms consisted in the new commercial orientation of newspapers and their progressive detachment from parties.

The creation of the first news agencies, the growing importance of advertising as a source of income, and the growth of sensationalism were other symptoms of broader changes in the Madrid press.

La Vanguardia represents an opportunity to examine the birth of the mass press from a new perspective. Instead of focusing on the new mass press that emerged in Europe to evaluate the Spanish case in terms of “failure” or “success” – as scholars have usually done –

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367 In fact, in the 1880s Madrid had as many political newspapers as Paris, despite its population being five times smaller. This figure demonstrates the new vigour of the Spanish press industry, even though it also uncovers the pervasive partisan orientation the vast majority of them still had. María Dolores Sáiz y María Cruz Seoane, Historia del periodismo en España, Madrid, Alianza ed., Vol. 2: “El siglo XIX: 1898-1936”, p. 254. In 1886, Madrid officially had a total of 328 newspapers (277 at the end of the year). M. Tuñón De Lara, A. Elorza, M. Perez Ledesma, Prensa y sociedad en España (1820-1936), Madrid, Cuadernos para el diálogo, 1975, p. 30.

368 Josep Lluís Gómez Mompart has coined the expression “unstructured cultural system” (in Catalan, “sistema cultural invertebrat”). Josep Lluís Gómez Mompart, La gènesi de la premsa de masses a Catalunya (1902-1923), Barcelona, Pòrtic, 1992, pp. 32-37.

369 Whereas the average literacy figures in Spain stood at around 30% in 1875, in Madrid they were the 54.27% and in Barcelona the 50.03%. Quoted in: Angela Ena Brodonada, “La literatura y la sociedad madrileña en la Restauración”, in: A. Bahamonde Magro & L. E. Otero Carvajal (eds.), op. cit, vol. II, p. 165.


371 Jesús Timoteo Álvarez, Restauración y prensa de masas. Los engranajes de un sistema (1875-1883), Pamplona, Ediciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1981. Sánchez took as a case study the newspapers La Época, El Imparcial, El Siglo Futuro, El Globo and El Liberal.
this chapter will examine how the journalism of other countries influenced the reforms of La Vanguardia. This approach implies moving on from the national perspective, as well as challenging the “ideal-types” of communication studies. Indeed, examining the influence of The Times for La Vanguardia implies adopting a transnational perspective that challenges the explanation of journalism as separate models. Emphasis will be placed on the importance of the exchange of ideas as a crucial element to understand the emergence of new journalistic codes. In parallel, it will be argued that La Vanguardía evoked the interest of Barcelona’s elites to find reference-models of “modernity” in foreign countries. For the elites of this city modernity became a new aspiration that was embodied by foreign cities like Paris and London, rather than by Spain’s capital (Madrid).

If The Times influenced the change of La Vanguardia it is because this newspaper provided the inspiration to adapt to the deep transformations Barcelona had started witnessing in 1888. The redesigning of Godó’s newspaper coincided with a turning point in the history of Barcelona, the moment when this city abandoned its provincial status and started having a new international vocation. The symbol of this transformation was Barcelona’s World Fair of 1888. Although public opinion was initially sceptical about the capacity of Barcelona to organise an event with international standing, the ultimate success and the massive audience that the fair attracted (around 400,000 on the first day) opened eyes about the city’s potential. The dimensions of the fair were undoubtedly modest if compared to those of London and Paris, but they announced the transformation of Barcelona into a cosmopolitan and dynamic urban centre.

Indeed, the World Fair coincided with a new period of economic prosperity and great urban transformations in Barcelona. In the mid-19th century the walls that had prevented the city’s enlargement since medieval times were pulled down and a new process of urban expansion started, reaching the highest point in the 1870s. The World Fair continued this

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374 The years between 1871 and 1875 were the highest point of building construction of the century, symbolised by the construction of Ildefons Cerdà’s new district (the so-called “Eixample”). Xavier Tafunell, “Ritmes de la construcció”, Ibidem, p. 421.
trend and filled the city with new architectural ideas and iconic buildings. As many as 30,000 workers were recruited for the construction of the fair, most of which were migrants from rural Catalonia that kept arriving in Barcelona and caused the city to swell from 400,000 inhabitants in 1887 to 587,000 in 1910.\(^\text{375}\) The World Fair of 1888 thus symbolised the emergence of an incipient mass society in Barcelona and gave it a new international projection. For a new generation of intellectuals, this event opened their eyes to Europe and created the ambition of turning Barcelona into the “Paris” of the Mediterranean.\(^\text{376}\)

In the light of these events, the redesign of *La Vanguardia* was an attempt to match the great expectations the World Fair had created in Barcelona. When the 1888 editorial of *La Vanguardia* spoke about the necessity to mirror the society in which it was published, the newspaper was trying to harmonise itself with the changes Barcelona was living at the time. The city was entering a period of rapid change and remaining the spokesman of the Liberal Party was not the way to face these transformations – all the more if Rius was the mayor of Barcelona and the main promoter of the World Fair.\(^\text{377}\) The wise move of the Godó brothers consisted, in this regard, in understanding the transformations that Barcelona was undergoing at the time and in developing *La Vanguardia* accordingly. To make this happen the Godó brothers put all their hopes in Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, who saw in *The Times* an example to implement the ambitious plan of reforms he was commissioned to carry out.

In fact, the redesign of *La Vanguardia* on January 1\(^{\text{st}}\) 1888 coincided with the 100\(^{\text{th}}\) anniversary of the renaming of the *Daily Universal Register* as *The Times* (January 1\(^{\text{st}}\) 1788). Whether this was deliberate or a simple coincidence is hard to know. In any case, the thing that Sánchez admired the most about *The Times* was its capacity to “register” all the facts and ways of thinking in England, a “powerful, prosperous and wise nation”.

*The Times* was, in sum, the champion of a journalistic ideal where the press acted as a “mirror of society”.\(^\text{378}\) When Sánchez argued that the new goal of *La Vanguardia* was to

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\(^{377}\) This event granted Rius great prestige. See, for instance: “El gran alcalde barceloní”, in: Rosa Cabré, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-196.

\(^{378}\) This expression was used by Agustí Calvet, the director of *La Vanguardia* between 1920 and 1936. According to him, there were two different types of newspapers: the ones that “projected” something into society (“diaris projectors”, in Catalan), this being a model that corresponded to the partisan press; and the newspapers that were a “mirror” of society (“diaris mirall”), corresponding to the informative press. Calvet considered *La Vanguardia* as the best exponent of the latter model, to which he ascribed. The case of Sánchez has the potential of revealing the origins of this “tradition” of journalism in *La Vanguardia*. See: “La prensa en catalán”, in Agustí Calvet (Gaziel), *Història de «La Vanguardia» (1881-1936) i nou articles sobre periodisme*, Barcelona, Empúries, 1994 [edition of Manuel Llanas], pp. 151-154.
mirror three elements (namely, Barcelona, Catalonia, and Spain) he was following the model of *The Times*. Indeed, although Sánchez believed that it would be naive to imitate the model of the British newspaper, as the characteristics of *La Vanguardia* were too modest, he gave further evidence that *The Times* was the model he had in mind. Proof of this is that in February 1890, two years after the reforms of *La Vanguardia* started, Sánchez published an editorial called “*Doctrina profesional*” (“professional rules”) where he mentioned, again, the principles that would guide the newspaper in the future. Sánchez referred one more time to the idea that newspapers should be “an exact portrait of society”, and referred, again, to *The Times* as the best example of this. The reason he chose the British newspaper is because he saw many points of coincidence between England and Catalonia. As he put it:

“Dos palabras debemos decir también sobre otro punto esencialísimo de nuestra doctrina profesional; á saber, que el periódico ha de tener una relación inmediata (...) con el país que lo produce. No es vana teoría, sino (...) observación positiva de la vida: el mejor periódico será aquel que mejor revele á su país. El *Times* –por no acudir á otros ejemplos – revela desde punta á cabo, y esta es su fuerza y su hermosura, la cultura inglesa. Desde el papel y la tipografía, elegidos entre lo bueno, hasta el texto, reflexivo, sabroso, enciclopédico; hasta el sentido moral, egoísta con el santo egoísmo de la patria, en todo late Inglaterra en las columnas del *Times*: Inglaterra la patriótica, la poderosa, la trabajadora. Cuando leemos las hermosas páginas de ese periódico, nuestro amor á Cataluña y nuestro amor al periodismo, tienen su vigorosa conjunción, y este afán incesante por el progreso de lo que amamos encuentra su fórmula concreta: que LA VANGUARDIA revele á Cataluña; *que no sea preciso leer la data de LA VANGUARDIA para saber que es hija de Barcelona; que tenga en su fisonomia el sello de este pueblo, tan rico en elementos propios, *tan perseverante en su labor, tan europeo en su cultura, tan generoso y patriótico en su espíritu.*”

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379 “No intentamos nosotros hacer un «*Times*», sería pretensión vana y ridícula, pero si queremos que nuestro periódico, en compañía de los otros dignísimos colegas de esta capital refleje en primer término y con la mayor exactitud posible la vida de Barcelona, luego la de Cataluña, y por último, la de España entera, que constituyen las tres relaciones primordiales de nuestra existencia social.” LV, 01/02/1888, p. 1.

380 * This sentence was almost the same as Sánchez had used two years earlier (1888) to describe *The Times*: “Cualquiera que vea el «*Times*», no necesita ver que está fechado en Londres para saber que es el periódico de una nación rica, poderosa y sabia.” LV, 01/02/1888, p. 1.

381 “Las reformas de La Vanguardia”, LV, 21/02/1890, p. 1. [E. T.]: “Simply two words in what concerns our professional doctrine; namely, that the newspaper must hold an intimate relation with the country where it is published. This is not mere rhetoric, but an observation: the best newspaper will be the one that shall better reflect the country where it is published. *The Times*—to put but an example—reveals from the head to the bottom (and that is both its strength and beauty) the English culture. The newsprint and the typography, chosen among the best, to the text, always reflexive, juicy, encyclopedic; to the moral sense, selfish as it is the interest of the motherland, every part of England is in *The Times*. England the patriot, the powerful, the hard-working. When we read the beautiful pages of this newspaper, our love to Catalonia and to journalism merge together, and this
The text above quoted reveals the way Sánchez imagined Catalonia’s future. In his view Catalan identity should be based on the industrial character of this region and the values associated with it (like “hard-labour” and “prosperity”), coupled with a proud sense of regional identity based on a series of “distinguishing features” (“rasgos propios”). Surprisingly, Sánchez did not consider language to be one of the distinguishing features of Catalan identity; or at least he did not apply language to his understanding of journalism as a “plant rooted in the earth” (since La Vanguardia continued to be published in Spanish, like most of Barcelona’s press).382 Besides, there is another element worth noticing in Sánchez’s writing: in his view Catalan culture should be “European”. This kind of aspiration was not unique to Sánchez, but evoked a broader aspiration of the Catalan bourgeoisie. The way this social group reacted to the birth of mass society was by “constructing” a regional identity. This construction was based on two pillars: the vindication of Catalonia’s past (through its language, history and tradition of special civil law), and the aspiration to emulate Europe (and Paris especially) in the fields of art and architecture, as the emergence of “Modernisme” – “Art Nouveau” in France – illustrates.

Consequently, the case of Barcelona’s urban elites can be seen as an example of those “second cities” which had a similar size to the capitals of their respective countries, but sought foreign reference-models to reaffirm a distinctive identity.383 Indeed, Barcelona possessed a series of characteristics that distinguished it from Madrid (namely, an expanding manufacturing industry, a large working class, a different language, the defence of protectionist policies, the claim for administrative de-centralization, etc.) and gave it a “modern” look – even to the eyes of some Madrid’s observers.384

Sánchez’s achievement consisted in turning La Vanguardia into the favourite newspaper of Barcelona’s Modernist bourgeoisie. Sánchez was well connected with the intellectual milieus (like the “Ateneu Barcelonès”, where La Vanguardia had its own cultural

will for progress is encapsulated in the following formula: that LA VANGUARDIA shall reflect Catalonia; that it is not necessary to read the date in LA VANGUARDIA to know that this is Barcelona’s daughter (...)

382 See: Table 2.
384 “La ciudad moderna tiene semejanza con todas las grandes capitales de Europa; la Rambla del centro, con sus cafés y restaurantes, kioskos, movimiento, y aún en algún otro detalle, recuerda los Boulevares de París; el paseo de Gracia tiene semejanza con los Campos Elíseos; la Gran-vía y el resto del Ensanche algo tienen de Hayde-Park de Londres; (...) hay algo de Liverpool y de Manchester en los alrededores del muelle y en los barrios industriales (...).” Juan Valero de Tornos, Barcelona tal cual es. Por un madrileño, Barcelona, Sucesores de N. Ramirez y Cª, 1888, p. 40 (chapter “La ciudad moderna”).
gathering) and recruited some of the city’s most talented intellectuals. Thus, in the editorial of 1890 Sánchez announced the list of nineteen artists, writers and painters who would contribute to La Vanguardia on a regular basis. The list included prestigious figures like Santiago Rusiñol, Ramón Casas, Josep Lluís Pellicer and Joan Sardà, among others.

La Vanguardia also started distinguishing itself from other Barcelona newspapers for the space it devoted to European culture; and culture, in fin de siècle Europe, was a synonym of Paris. La Vanguardia began including different sections about the French capital (entitled “Bosquejos parísines” and “De Barcelona a París”), and avidly followed the careers of Catalan painters who had migrated to the French city (like Rusiñol and Casas).

Moreover, the newspaper dedicated the entire front page to the Paris World Fair of 1889. The reason for this, the newspaper argued, was that “the people of Catalonia and especially from Barcelona hold a close link with Paris.”

The second “ideal” that La Vanguardia arguably imported from The Times, besides the need to mirror the taste of the society where it was published, was the relation between the press and political parties. La Vanguardia did not regret its partisan past (and even accepted it as part of its history) but announced that it would no longer be at the service of a political cause. Instead, two principles would now guide the editorial line of La Vanguardia: “impartiality and severity”. Sánchez believed that the press should hold “high ideals” and should judge “deeds, but not the people who do them.” That statement was reminiscent of the famous principle of The Times (quoted earlier): “not the prying into private life (...) but the full and fearless investigation of all public acts of public men”. Accountability earned The

LV, 01/01/1888, p. 1. Italics added.

385 The so-called “Penya de La Vanguardia”. LV, 25/10/1903, p. 9.
386 The full list of collaborators was: “José Zulueta, José Coroleu, José Ixart, Juan Sardà, Narciso Oller, Melitón González, Ramón D. Perés, Francisco Virella, Emilio Blanchet, Josefa Pujol de Collado, E. Suñol, Rafael Puig y Valls, J. Vergés y Almar, José Passos, Doctor Xercavins, Santiago Rusiñol, Ramón Casas, José Luis Pellicer, Felipe Pedrell.” LV, 21/02/1890, p. 2.
387 This issue has been analysed in: Elena Cueto Asín & David R. George, Jr., Looking to France from Barcelona: correspondence and travel writing in La Vanguardia (1890-1900), Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, Vol. 9 No. 3 November 2008, pp. 265-283. See also: LV, 28/02/1890, p. 2.
388 “La población catalana y la barcelonesa singularmente están en constantes relaciones con París. Francia, por otra parte, es de las naciones que más contribuyeron á dar vida y explendor (sic) á nuestra Exposición de Barcelona, y creemos que por estas razones y por otras de interés comercial é industrial, la Exposición de París será visitada por gran número de lectores nuestros”. The newspaper promised to spend as much as necessary to inform about the Paris World Fair. See: LV, 05/05/1889, p. 1.
389 “Respecto de nuestra conducta futura, en nuestras relaciones políticas y sociales con los demás estimados colegas, sin quitar ni poner una sola tilde á la anterior, sino al contrario, reconociéndola en absoluta como nuestra, solo dos palabras hemos de decir. Creemos que no se desprende de la prensa, obra fecunda para el público, si los periódicos no se inspiran en altos ideales y en los principios de una crítica severa. Estos serán, pues, nuestros principios de conducta. Imparcialidad y severidad. Aquellos actos que en nuestra conciencia sean acertados, tendrán en nosotros desapadidos (sic) censores; para aquellos otros que redunden en beneficio público, no nos dolerán aplausos ni regatearemos elogios; pero en uno y en otro caso, en nuestra jurisdicción de críticos no caerá más que el acto criticable; jamás la persona que lo ejecute, respetable para nosotros siempre.”.
LV, 01/01/1888, p. 1.
The nickname of the “Thunderer” and the resolution of men like Sánchez to behave as “ruthless censors” ("despiadados censores"), while respecting personal honour, evoked the same ideal. The adscription to these principles implied that La Vanguardia stopped being the organ of the Liberal Party (at least formally), and abandoned all personal attacks against Rius. The newspaper would now be at the service of “the common good”, and to do so it should focus on providing raw information (“facts”) for the reader’s judgement:

“En esa fórmula «dar á la opinión el dato para su juicio», sencilla en apariencia, pero muy compleja cuando se desentraña, se encierra todo el sistema periodístico moderno, que sirve al público, no al partido ni á la camarilla. (...) El periódico moderno no puede ser hoy, como tantos años, un conjunto de trabajos en los cuales era principio cuando no único elemento, la fantasía y el ingenio del escritor; como tampoco puede ser un conjunto de noticias sin trabazón y sin arte. La hoja diaria hoy, como reflejo de la civilización, ha de confeccionarse con el procedimiento que pide dato, dato y dato; pero ha de ser tan complejo como la civilización misma.”

The emphasis that Sánchez put on providing “facts, facts and facts” was a plea for political neutrality. Supplying facts to the public was not an easy task (as Sánchez acknowledged), but it revealed a new professional ethos of public service. This ideal implied that news needed to be gathered as fast as possible and with the highest possible accuracy, to let every reader make his or her own judgement. As Chapter 8 of this thesis will show, La Vanguardia became one of best providers of international coverage of the Spanish press. What needs to be stressed, at this point, is that the emphasis Sánchez put on public service presented similarities, once more, to the journalism model of The Times. The formula of this newspaper was, as one of its editors put it, “to obtain the earliest and most correct intelligence of the events of the time and instantly, by disclosing them, to make them the common property of mankind.”

Sánchez referred to the fame of The Times in the following way: “El más ilustre periódico de Londres, terror y esperanza de todos los gobiernos y cristalización poderosa de la civilización inglesa, la más completa, á mi juicio, de los tiempos modernos (...)”. M. Sánchez Ortiz, El Periodismo..., op. cit., p. 21.

LV, 21/02/1890, p. 1. Italics added. [E. T.]: “In this apparently simple but very complex formula is where all the modern journalism is condensed: to serve the public, instead of the party or the faction. The newspaper can no longer be, as it has been for many years, a dispersed number of articles based on the fantasy of its writer. (...) Today’s press requires, as in reflecting civilization, to be made by providing facts, facts and facts; but has to be as complex as civilization.”

As the London newspaper proclaimed: “(...) and we, the TIMES, being the PUBLIC’S most humble and most obedient Servants (...)”. S. Morison, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 30.

La Vanguardia’s new vocation of public service implied that journalists should work accordingly. Instead of publicising the views of the Liberal Party, journalists should now focus on providing raw information to the public. This change of philosophy reveals the emergence of a new occupational ethic for journalists, one of the great obsessions in Sánchez’s career. In the book entitled “El Periodismo” (the first theoretical work ever published in Catalonia about journalism) Sánchez expressed his concern about the tight links between politics and the press. In his view journalism should not be a pathway into public office, but an independent profession; or, to use his own words, journalism should be both “priesthood and magisterium” (“sacerdocio y magisterio”). These two concepts, which Sánchez borrowed from Catholicism, expressed his understanding of journalism as a profession that required discipline and rectitude, and was aimed at fostering the “good” and the “truth” in society. Accordingly, Sánchez criticised the press that took advantage of dramatic events, like murders and gossip, to sell more copies. In his view, journalists should stay above the kind of reporting that fuelled the “lower passions” of society, they should adopt, instead, a calm state and a moderate tone so as to serve society in a rightful manner.

Besides the highly moralistic tone that Sánchez’s thoughts contained, they present a certain similitude to the type of reporting that characterised The Times. As some scholars have noted, this newspaper abstained from using morbid events as a strategy to increase sales; this being a professional attitude that stood in contrast to the strategy used by the – increasingly successful – sensationalist press. What needs to be stressed, at this point, is that despite the differences between the two newspapers, what The Times and the new Vanguardia had in common was not just the emphasis placed on “news”, but also the emphasis they placed on the need to balance it. In other words, journalism should not simply consist in providing the public with the latest and most abundant news, it should also be done in a “responsible” manner. This philosophy – certainly not exempt from an educative and

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394 In the view of Josep Mª Casasús, “El Periodismo de Sánchez Ortiz es la más antigua de las obras importantes, hasta hoy conocidas, que tratan de teoría del Periodismo y que fueron escritas por tratadistas o por profesionales relacionados con la prensa catalana”. J. M. Casasús Gurí, “Estudio introductorio”, in: Modesto Sánchez Ortiz / El Periodismo, Barcelona, Fundación Conde de Barcelona, La Vanguardia [Facsimil de la edición de 1903; introducción de J. M. Casasús Gurí], 1990, p. IX.

395 “Sacerdocio es, aunque se le niegue esa consideración, la ocupación de que tiene por objeto, en el mar revuelto de las pasiones y de los intereses humanos, mantener el dogma del Bien, de la Verdad y de la Belleza para que sean esperanza y guía de las multitudes.” M. Sánchez Ortiz, El Periodismo..., op. cit., p. 9.

396 “la narración de sucesos, lo que se llama el reporterismo, sobre todo en cuanto se relaciona con el orden público, es (...) materia de manejo peligroso que requiere escrupuloso espíritu en el escritor, y en el director inteligencia experta y serena, carácter muy firme para sobreponerse á todo estímulo bastardo y del momento.” Ibidem, p. 53.

397 J. Chapman, op. cit., p. 78.
even condescending view of society – reveals the emergence of a new ethic based on public service, a key element in the professionalisation of journalism.\(^{398}\)

Still, the fact that Sánchez took *The Times* as a reference model was not an obvious choice. In the 1880s *The Times* had lost its position as London’s leading newspaper. The once prestigious and top-selling newspaper had entered a period of decay in the last quarter of the century, to the point that it was losing money and its very survival was in peril.\(^{399}\) One of the reasons behind the decay of *The Times* was the emergence of the “New Journalism”. This expression makes reference to a new model of journalism that emerged in the second half of the 19\(^{th}\) century with the aim of targeting a more popular audience (sometimes including women) through a lower selling price and an emphasis on non-political content, like gossip, fashion and the serialised story. “New Journalism” represented a completely new way of organising language, content and format in the press, and symbolised a new form of mass consumption characterised by a less politicised and more entertainment-oriented content. Advertisement revenues compensated for the low price of this popular press, known in France as “*presse au bon marché*” and as the “penny press” in England. In late 19\(^{th}\)-century Europe, the top-selling newspapers were exponents of this new journalism: *Le Petit Journal* (1863), in France, sold 600,000 copies daily; and England’s *Daily Mail* (est. in 1896) sold 540,000 copies daily. *The Times*, in contrast, had a circulation of “only” 100,000 copies in 1882.\(^{400}\)

At this point we should ask: why Sánchez chose to use *The Times* as a model when by 1888 the paper was on the brink of bankruptcy and remained the exponent of the “Old Journalism”?\(^ {401}\) Moreover, if Barcelona’s reading public was so interested in Paris, why did Sánchez not choose the example of ascending French newspapers, such as *Le Petit Journal*? The answer is that Sánchez aspired to turn *La Vanguardia* into a “quality journal”, of which the “Old Journalism” of *The Times* remained – regardless the newspaper’s state of decay – the international benchmark.


\(^{399}\) The crisis was linked to the division of the newspaper’ property between the Walter family and small shareholders. The confrontation between the two sides on how to manage the newspaper paved the way for the acquisition of *The Times* in 1908 by the press tycoon Alfred Harmsworth. See: J. Lee Thompson, *Northcliffe. Press Baron in Politics, 1865-1922*, London, John Murray, 2000, pp. 140-159.


\(^{401}\) British historians hold different opinions about the levels of continuity and rupture between the Old and the New Journalism in the 1880s. For a brief outline of this debate, see: Mark Hampton, “Newspapers in Victorian Britain”, *History Compass* 2 (2004), 101, 1-8.

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Indeed, although Sánchez claimed to serve the “broadest public possible”, in reality this
text was targeting, as The Times did, an educated upper-middle class market, including
the members of the petite bourgeoisie. Two elements prove this. First, in 1890 La
Vanguardia started to sell for 0.10 pesetas. This price doubled that of the vast majority of
newspapers in Barcelona. Moreover, if compared with the average wage in Barcelona
(3.75 pesetas a day in 1904) the price of La Vanguardia (0.10 pesetas) was quite expensive
for the popular classes, but not for the well-off groups. Second, although Paris was
Barcelona’s icon of modernity, this was particularly the case among the bourgeoisie but not
among the working classes. Indeed, the majority of the leisure activities in this city continued
to be highly provincial. In other words, zarzuelas and bullfighting awoke far more
enthusiasm in fin de siècle Barcelona than the arrival of a foreign artist, as some observers
lamented.

It was to the relatively narrow – but expanding – elite market that Sánchez was
targeting the future expansion of La Vanguardia. Evoking the prestige of The Times was a
way of doing so, to the point that Sánchez’s references to the British newspaper can also be
regarded as a strategy of self-publicity aimed at building an image of a new and respectable
newspaper. The fact that The Times was in a period of decline was not an obstacle for this
strategy. Proof of this is the fact that in Italy too, the newspaper Il Corriere della Sera started
a plan of reforms that was also inspired by the British newspaper. Established in Milan in
1875 by Eugenio Torelli and Riccardo Pavesi, Il Corriere della Sera eventually became,
together with its competitor Il Secolo, the main organ of Milan’s bourgeoisie. Initially, Il
Corriere had a modest circulation (less than 10,000 copies in 1880) and supported the

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402 J. F. Valls, op. cit., p. 207.
403 In 1905, when salaries were substantially higher than in 1888, salaries stood between 2.50 pesetas (in the
case of a builder) and 5 pesetas (in the case of a chief spinner – “Oficial hilador”). Therefore, buying one copy
of La Vanguardia in 1905 represented around 37% of the daily average wage in Barcelona (approx. 3.75
pesetas). In 1898 1 kg of bread cost 0.40 ptas, 1 kg of meat cost 2 ptas, and 1 litre of oil cost 1.50 ptas. The
figures are from: Joaquín Romero Maura, “La rosa de fuego”. El obrerismo barcelonés de 1899 a 1909,
404 As Lluís Marfany has noted in: “Burgesia, modernització cultural, catalanisme”, in DDAA, Història de la
405 “Descorazona ver cómo después de tantos años de lucha para llevar á la conciencia social el sentimiento de
lo bello y grande, el género chico, grosero y sensual y la zarzuela, simple y ridícula, salen triunfantes del seno
de las multitudes (....). En tanto la gente afluye á los toros y va, con una candidez infantil, á deleitarse con las
habilidades acróbatas de las focas del Tívoli, ó con las ñoñeces de El Húsar ó de El Santo de la Isidra, la
eminente actriz Italia Vitaliani y su recomendable compañía trabajan poco menos que en familia (....). Esta
indiferencia del público por el arte verdadero, este desvío artístico de Barcelona, encoge y aplasta, entristece y
subleva.” El Diluvio, 17/08/1901, p. 12; quoted in: Luísa Suárez Carmona, “L’oci a la Barcelona de finals del
segle XIX. Les primeres sales cinematogràfiques”, X Congrés d’Història de Barcelona – DILEMES DE LA FI
DE SEGLE, 1874-1901, 27-30 de novembre de 2007, p. 3.
406 David Forgacs, Italian Culture in the Industrial Era. Cultural industries, politics, and the public,
Moderate policies of Cavour and was directly opposed to Giolitti’s. At the turn of the century the newspaper underwent a process of renovation in the hands of Luigi Albertini, a young journalist who spent six months in London and gained first-hand knowledge of *The Times*. The outcome was the drastic reorientation of the editorial line according to a series of principles: a politically neutral standpoint; an emphasis on news content; the hiring of prestigious intellectuals; and a profit-oriented business based on advertisement revenues.

The case of *Il Corriere* and *La Vanguardia* thus reveal that the “Old Journalism” of *The Times* was still an esteemed ideal for those newspapers targeting an educated upper-middle class readership.

Last but not least, it is interesting to note that although Sánchez and Albertini took the same reference model, *La Vanguardia* also imported some features from the French popular press. Proof of this was the serial novels this newspaper introduced in 1888. These novels were written mostly by French and English authors and were published on a regular basis (a few pages at a time). They were displayed at the bottom of the page (the so-called “rez-de-chaussée”, in French), so that readers could combine the different excerpts into a collectable book (see Illustration 1). Although this type of novel had been published in literary journals for a long time, its introduction in the popular press in the 1830s has been considered a breaking point in the history of the press, and as the “beginning of the cultural democratization of French society”.

Indeed, while most of the newspapers traditionally had a strong political content, the serial novel (“roman-feuilleton”) represented a new type of entertainment that attracted the interest of social groups traditionally marginalised in the “quality press”, like the working classes and women. Thus, some French popular newspapers like *Le Petit Journal* started to recognise women as potential consumers as early as the

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407 Albertini was the correspondent of Turin’s newspaper “La Stampa”. During his stay in London he formed a good relationship with one of the main editors of *The Times* (Moberly Bell). Valerio Castronovo, *La stampa italiana nell’età liberale*, Bari, Laterza, 1979, pp. 157-162 (p. 159).

408 These new editorial lines were based on a series of principles: [in Italian] “Il “Corriere” è sempre il primo, il “Corriere” non sbaglia mai”; “un organismo (...) di formazione dell’opinione pubblica, quanto una valorizzazione di certe tendenze di questa”; “dove si gareggiava per il raggiungimento della perfezione e non erano permessi esagerazioni sia nel dire il bene che nel rilevare il male”. Ibidem (esp. p. 161).


The introduction of the serial novel in \textit{La Vanguardia} was probably a strategy aimed at targeting a female upper-class readership. The high selling price of \textit{La Vanguardia} excluded the working classes (not to mention illiteracy rates, which were particularly high among working-class women), but not the educated female readership.\footnote{In 1887 53\% of Catalan men were literate, but only 28\% of women. J. M. Tresserras, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 69.} There are different testimonies that mention the popularity of European (and especially French) literature among Barcelona’s bourgeoisie women.\footnote{Joan Ramon Resina, \textit{op. cit}.} The presence of advertisements targeting female consumers provides further evidence that \textit{La Vanguardia} also had female readers.\footnote{See, for instance, the advertisement published on the left side of the front-page the first day \textit{La Vanguardia} started implementing the reforms (Illustration 3). This advertisement was for corsets for pregnant women: “Corsé higiénico. El verdadero Corsé higiénico privilegiado por la M. Iltre. Academia de Medicina y Cirujía de esta ciudad hecho expresamente para el periodo del embarazo y para señoritas delicadas, únicamente lo encontrarán en esa casa, Escudillers Blanchs, 8, La Emperatriz.”} The serial novel thus exemplifies the last point that needs to be stressed about the transformation of \textit{La Vanguardia}: the goal was to turn this newspaper into a profitable business.

Adopting a commercial orientation represented a radical change in the way the Godó brothers had managed the newspaper until then. While political payoffs were traditionally expected to compensate the loss of money, the Godó brothers now aspired to make a profitable business of \textit{La Vanguardia}. The way to achieve this consisted in increasing the number of readers and in making advertisements the main source of income. To this end \textit{La Vanguardia}’s page layout was completely redefined in 1888. As Illustrations 2 and 3 show, the newspaper page size increased substantially (from 16 pages on 15 x 10 cm format; to 8 pages in two daily editions, each 21.5 x 31.5 cm format) and a new typeface was introduced. The political motto was deleted from the heading and the new heading only bore the newspaper’s title, coupled with the name of the place where it was published (Barcelona) and the day edition (morning or afternoon). The single-column format of 1881 was replaced with a new distribution of content in four columns. Although \textit{La Vanguardia} traditionally dedicated the front page to advertisements, the changes made to the content layout in 1888 reveal a new awareness about the economic value of space. Moreover, \textit{La Vanguardia}
increased its invitations to companies to insert advertisements on the grounds of a (supposed) growing circulation and the serial novel.\footnote{415 “LA VANGUARDIA. Este periódico, merced á las notables reformas introducidas en él desde principios del presente año, es uno de los más leídos de Barcelona y que merece mayor aceptación por parte del público. Además de su numerosa redacción, cuenta con la colaboración inédita de todos los buenos escritores de España. Publica unas cien páginas mensuales de escogidos folletines en forma á propósito para formar una buena biblioteca recreativa. Como su circulación es extraordinaria, los señores anunciantes encontrarán en él un medio eficaz, útil y económico para propagar cuanto les convenga.” LV, 28/03/1888, p. 3.}
Illustration 1. Example of the new serial novel in *La Vanguardia* (located at the bottom page)
LA VANGUARDIA.

DIARIO POLITICO Y DE AVISOS Y NOTICIAS
ORGANO DEL PARTIDO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA.

REDACCIÓN Y ADJUDICACION: calle de lasuras, núm. 8 y 30, (entre la plaza Real y la calle de la Peraleja.)

PRECIOS DE SUSCRIPCIÓN: En Barcelona, un mes 6 rs. —Extranjero: 30 rs. —Ultimado, 40 rs. —Noticias, 60 rs. —ANUNCIOS Y RÉDITIDOS, a precios convencionales.

APRECIACIONES METEOROLÓGICAS dadas por el óptico aleman D. ALBERTO BURGCHARDT

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El Dr. Salvat, esta vezse premiado en páginas opuestas por esta Facultad de Medicina, especialmente en dichas enfermedades, cuales en la curación estos medios están en uso en las Clínicas de París y otros del extranjero.

ESPECTÁCULOS.

Teatro Principal.—3 de abr. —y.—Entre de la ópera de Icocol La Fonda. —1 peseta. A las 8 de la tarde y noche el gran baile Florinda, acompañado respetuosamente de la ópera I Divina y La Fonda.
GRAN TEATRO DEL LICEO.—Hoy no se ejecuta por tener lugar el 3.° bailo de máscaras.
Másbaya, por la noche, 2° representación de lo apasionante opreta Mingo.

417 LV, 01/02/1881, p. 1.
Note that between 1888 and 1890 La Vanguardia had two daily editions, each costing 5 cents. In February 1890 these two editions were merged into a single edition costing 10 cents.
CONCLUSIONS

When the First World War ended in 1918 *La Vanguardia* was one of the principal newspapers in Spain. The proof of this was the high circulation figures the newspaper had achieved and the wide prestige it enjoyed. This situation stood in contrast to the extremely modest characteristics of *La Vanguardia* when it was established in 1881. Numerous reforms made the ascendancy of this newspaper possible, but the year 1888 marked a turning point. The decision to formally abandon the links with the Liberal Party and become an independent newspaper radically altered the newspaper’s course. In contrast to the precarious financial state in which most of the partisan press in Barcelona was subsumed, the change of editorial line allowed *La Vanguardia* to break the glass ceiling of the partisan press and reach an audience that went beyond the members of the Liberal Party. This did not happen all of a sudden but took some years to manifest [see: Table 1]. For all these reasons, the year 1888 can be considered the moment when the pillars of the journalist model of *La Vanguardia* were firmly established.

Yet contrary to a common trend in press history, this chapter has not explained the reforms of *La Vanguardia* as something that was predestined to occur; nor as the creation of a farsighted “great man”. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the historical context of Barcelona and the changes in the political career of Bartolomé Godó. The World Fair of 1888 awoke great expectations in Barcelona and the merit for Godó consisted in redirecting his political career accordingly. The redesign of *La Vanguardia* into an independent newspaper was Bartolomé Godó’s attempt to increase his influence beyond the limits of the Liberal Party at a time when his protector (José Collaso) had passed away and Rius continued to be the leader of the Liberals of Barcelona. Changing the editorial line of *La Vanguardia* was a risky move, and nothing guaranteed that this was going to work. Still, and as Sánchez Ortiz noted, the Godó brothers were determined to radically transform *La Vanguardia*.419

Sánchez can be considered as the person responsible for choosing *The Times* as a reference model for the new *Vanguardia*. Compared to the editor of *Il Corriere della Sera* (Luigi Albertini), Sánchez did not have a first-hand knowledge of the journalism in *The Times*. In fact, the impression that Sánchez had of this newspaper was probably an idealised one, influenced by his admiration for England.420 Moreover, at a time when the “New

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420 In his work *El Periodismo*, Sánchez referred to England and *The Times* in the following way: “El más ilustre periódico de Londres, terror y esperanza de todos los gobiernos y cristalización poderosa de la civilización
“Journalism” was gaining momentum in this country, it might seem surprising that Sánchez took as a reference model the exponent of the “Old Journalism” – even more so considering that *The Times* was in a state of decay. However, this chapter has argued that no matter how idealised Sánchez’s vision of *The Times* was, he had a clear idea of how the new *Vanguardia* should look. The editorials of 1888 and 1890 reveal a carefully planned strategy about the future of *La Vanguardia*, as well as of the kind of market audience the newspaper was going to target. Sánchez’s great accomplishment, in this regard, was in transforming *La Vanguardia* according to the tastes of Barcelona’s Modernist bourgeoisie, as evidenced in the World Fair of 1888, and in the attention paid to Paris.

Coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the *Daily Universal Register*’s renaming as *The Times*, Sánchez implemented a new editorial line that shared a series of parallelisms with the London newspaper, these were: the public service vocation – rather than the political community – as the first mission of the press; the emphasis put on mirroring the different tastes of society, defined as the need to reflect different points of view – in contrast to the particularistic views of parties; and, finally, making accountability the best sign of political independence (a need to act as “ruthless censors”) but avoiding personal confrontation. All these changes in the editorial line were in direct contrast to the strongly partisan character that the press had in Mediterranean countries, as illustrated in the first part of this chapter. In consequence, the reforms that Sánchez implemented in 1888 can be regarded as a significant step forward in the professionalisation of journalism in *La Vanguardia*, this being understood as the progressive detachment of journalists from the control of political parties; the creation of new codes of ethics; and the emphasis put on news. Sánchez summarised this philosophy in metaphorical terms: journalism should be both “priesthood and magisterium” (“sacerdocio y magisterio”).

Therefore, and in contrast to the theory of media systems, this chapter has demonstrated that journalist traditions were not only shaped according to areas sharing similar patterns of historical development; they were also nurtured by the importing of principles and models of reference (“cultural transfers”) from distant countries. This statement does not imply discrediting the value of media systems: the comparison between *The Times* and *La Vanguardia* (and equally between England and Spain) demonstrates to what extent the features of the two newspapers were different. Still, this chapter has argued

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that putting too much emphasis on studying the press through “ideal-type models” entails the risk of losing sight of processes of hybridisation. If emphasis is only put on the countries’ structural features, one risks the peril of neglecting the circulation of ideas that historically took place beyond national frontiers; as the case of La Vanguardia and Il Corriere della Sera has illustrated.

Moreover, the introduction of serial novels in La Vanguardia reveals that the boundaries between the “popular” and the “quality” press were more blurred than is often assumed. In contrast to the case of The Times, which already had a well-established audience, La Vanguardia aspired to create a new one. For this reason the serial novel constituted a strategy for new readership that was aimed at targeting a segment of the market (represented by bourgeois women) that was neglected in the newspapers’ political content. All these efforts to reach the broadest audience possible reveal the new commercial orientation of La Vanguardia and the Godó’s new aspiration to make this newspaper a profitable venture.

Still, the emphasis of this chapter on the redesign of La Vanguardia does not imply that the transition from a partisan towards an independent and commercially oriented-press model was unproblematic. Proclaiming that La Vanguardia now was an independent newspaper was one thing, but the practice often proved to be quite another. Examining the tensions that arose out of the new journalist principles La Vanguardia started asserting in 1888, particularly in relation to the political career of the Godó brothers, will constitute the main question at stake in the next chapters of this thesis.
CHAPTER 3. “OUR FUTURE LIES IN AFRICA”: NEWSPAPERS AND COLONIALISM IN MOROCCO

INTRODUCTION

3.1. THE PRIVATE INTERESTS OF THE GODÓ FAMILY IN THE MOROCCAN EMPIRE

3.2. POPULAR IMPERIALISM AND THE PRESS: THE WAR OF MELILLA (1893)

3.3. ORIENTALISM AS A NEW COMMODITY FOR READERS

CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION

The 1870s have traditionally been considered a turning point in the history of European colonialism in Africa. From this date onwards, the continent that lay beneath Gibraltar became the land where the main European powers sought to fulfil their expansionist ambitions. The literature on colonialism has traditionally regarded Spain as a minor actor in this “scramble for Africa”. At the time, Spain was a second-rate country in the international arena that only possessed the scattered remnants of her former Empire (Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and few islands in the Pacific), and some small possessions in Africa (Ceuta, Melilla, Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea). Two decades later, the defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898 put an end to Spain’s empire and turned the country into a one of the “dying nations”, as Lord Salisbury called them.

However, the image of Spain’s weakness in the aftermath of 1898 has often prevented historians from noticing the efforts that some elites made to intervene in Europe’s scramble for Africa of the 1880s. While Spanish expansionism on this continent is often associated with the outcome of the Spanish-American War, and is therefore regarded as a response to the loss of the empire, less is known about the colonial endeavours that were made before this time. This chapter will examine one example of such an endeavour by focusing on the Godó’s involvement with a group of elites who actively promoted colonialism in Spain: the so-called “Africanist lobby”.

In the 1870s Carlos and Bartolomé Godó entered the textile industry and became interested in exporting to colonial markets. This interest was not limited to the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean (Cuba and Puerto Rico), but also embraced the possibilities of future colonial expansion in North Africa. At a time when the main imperial powers were competing to impose their control over African territories, the Godó brothers joined an influential group of Catalan businessmen that were determined to increase Spain’s presence in Morocco. La Vanguardia actively contributed to this lobby’s wish to turn what was still

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the concern of a small circle of elites (that is, Spanish expansion in the north of Africa) into a new issue on the national agenda.

In so doing, the Godó brothers constitute a case study to address one of the most recurrent questions in colonial studies, namely, the popular dimension of European colonialism. The point at stake in this field is the assumption that imperialism was not just the work of a few elites, nor a top-down process, but rather a phenomenon that required a minimum level of consent from society. While the works of John Mackenzie were seminal in raising interest on this topic, a new stream of research dedicated to studying how colonial rule was perceived in Metropolitan societies has emerged in the last decade. These works have aimed to break the artificial division between metropolis and empire, and constitute an attempt to insert the transnational dimension into the writing of national histories. The outcome has been a rich analysis of how the idea of Empire was lived out at home, sometimes in the most unsuspected daily practices and contexts (such as the church or the school), and of how it influenced the shaping of national identities. The importance of certain media in disseminating visions of empire, like monuments, imperial exhibitions, and music, has been stressed in these studies.

The case of La Vanguardia will serve to explore the role of the press as an active political agent in transforming public understandings of issues such as colonialism and national identity. While Benedict Anderson stressed the importance the press played in building the “nation”, less is known about how newspapers contributed to this process in their role of intermediaries between colonial contexts and domestic audiences. To shed light on these issues this chapter will be structured in three parts. The first part will explain how the Godó’s interest in Africa arose from a voyage of exploration that Carlos Godó undertook in 1889. This trip gave birth to an ambitious plan to spread Spanish influence in Morocco,

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consisting in Godó’s wish to build a brand-new neighbourhood in the city of Tangier. And La Vanguardia became a tool for this family to draw public attention to Morocco.

The second part will provide further insights into how the Godó brothers used the press to promote colonialism by focusing on the War of Melilla (1893) – a three-month conflict that saw Spanish military intervention used to defend its possessions in the north of Africa. This war will be used to examine the role of the press in fostering popular jingoism. Additionally, by portraying Moroccans as Spain’s eternal enemy, newspapers fabricated the image of the “other” against which Spanish identity was defined. Finally, the third part of this chapter will examine the role that commercial newspapers played in popularising an orientalist discourse about Morocco. This will illustrate the new commercial orientation La Vanguardia adopted in 1888, and how this implied changes in terms of management, marketing, and content, which reveals the Godó’s ambition to turn the newspaper into a profitable business while simultaneously promoting their private agenda to new audiences.

Examining all these questions will also uncover some epistemological problems about using the press to measure popular attitudes towards colonialism. Examples of this are the tendency to confuse the opinions of the press with those of the “people”; or assuming the views of contemporaries about the manipulative function of the press, for instance in stirring popular jingoism. Although this chapter will argue that this often proved to be the case, it will also pay attention to alternative points of view. Attention will be paid to the way people responded to the content that was published and to the multi-faceted dimensions of jingoism. A comparison with other newspapers shall reveal that support for the war was not as widespread as it first seemed in La Vanguardia, thus providing further insights about the ways the Godó brothers appealed to public opinion to advance their private agenda.

The writing of this chapter has benefited from a wide range of historical sources, located in Spanish, British, and Moroccan archives. Some of the archives where these sources are located have been used on very few occasions, especially in the case of the private archive of the Marqués de la Vega de Armijo; the Moroccan press written in Spanish; and the private archive of the Spanish Franciscan Missions in Tangier.

430 Spanish archives: Archivo General de la Administración (Alcalá de Henares); Archivo General de Palacio (Madrid); Biblioteca Nacional de España (Madrid); Archivo del Marqués de la Vega de Armijo (Pontevedra); Archivo Histórico de Protocolos (Madrid and Barcelona). British archives: the National Archives (Kew, London); Instituto Cervantes (Tangier, Morocco), Archivo de la Misión Franciscana en Tánger (Tangier, Morocco).
3.1. **THE PRIVATE INTERESTS OF THE GODÓ FAMILY IN THE MOROCCAN EMPIRE**

During the last quarter of the 19th century Africa became one of the most important lands in the plans for expansion of European countries. The Madrid Conference of 1880 represented the first attempt to bring some order to the competing interests of European powers in this continent. Later, the Berlin Conference of 1885 marked out the scramble for Africa in areas of influence, mainly between Great Britain, France, and Germany. In the case of Spain, its influence in the north of Morocco was formally acknowledged due to the possessions it had there (Ceuta and Melilla) and to its strategic position in the Mediterranean.\(^{431}\) Yet the fact was that Spain was little more than an observer in all these conferences.

The difficulties the Restoration was facing at the time – above all, a chronic budget deficit – led to an official policy of “retreat” (“recogimiento”) and neutrality in international relations. This position did not mean that certain parties had no ambitions for new colonies (especially in the case of the Conservative Party of Cánovas del Castillo). Rather, it meant that there was a general agreement that such initiatives should be postponed for the future, and that maintaining what was left of the Spanish Empire should be the priority, not to mention the modernisation of Spain itself. Consequently, caution in international relations became the leading strategy of Restoration Spain – a strategy that was symbolised particularly well by the influence of Castelar’s *Doctrina de la Comodidad*. According to the policy coined by this Republican politician, Spain’s geographical position was the best guarantee to maintain the country’s sovereignty at a time of avid imperialism.\(^{432}\)

However, this policy started to be increasingly contested by the partisans of the Spanish colonialist project. Officially known as “Africanistas” (“Africanists”), they argued that the best way to modernise Spain was by actively promoting an expansionist policy in Africa. According to Sebastian Balfour, two different conceptions were present in this highly


heterogeneous movement. First there was a “neo-colonialist lobby”, composed by a myriad of different vested interests, mainly those of businessmen, traders, and industrialists. All of these parties had high expectations about the benefits that Morocco could provide in the future. The main strategy defended by this lobby was that of a “peaceful penetration” in Morocco. Influenced by positivism’s then-current popularity, they thought that “civilization” would follow trade, thus benefiting both Spaniards and Moroccans alike. The second trend within the Spanish Africanist lobby was composed, according to Balfour, by two different tendencies. First, the “traditionalist” movement formed of Carlists and Catholics, which defended proselytising as an additional mission of colonialism in Africa; and, second, a nationalistic and conservative trend. Their social base was hazy, and included a wide social spectrum: from people who considered Morocco as an exclusively Spanish possession; to those whose objective was the creation of a new Spanish empire in Morocco.

Balfour’s remarks represent a valuable step forward in our understanding of Spanish Africanism, but they still need further research to be confirmed, as Martín Corrales has recently noted. I believe that the case of the Godó family might shed some light here, demonstrating that the dividing lines within the Africanist movement were actually more blurred than Balfour has suggested. Thus, the plans of the Godó family in Africa will reveal a commercial strategy that did not refuse Catholic proselytism, but actually made it the cornerstone of a strategy with clear colonial ends. Emphasis will be placed on the importance of the press in promoting this private enterprise, as part of a broader attempt to raise public awareness about the benefits Africa could provide for Spain.

The Godó family’s interests in Morocco went back to 1889. By then, certain members of the Spanish elites regarded the Moroccan Empire as a potential new market for their products. A former intervention in this territory (the so-called “Guerra de África”, 1859-1860) resulted in a contract of free trade with the Sultan that included a special mention for Spain as “the friendliest country”. However, the fact was that the economic transactions of the majority of the European powers (especially England and France) with Morocco were much higher than those of Spain. To reverse this situation, and with the added goal of

promoting geographical exploration, the main employer organisation of the Catalan bourgeoisie, the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional”, started promoting exploration missions to the Moroccan market. It was precisely from one of these missions that the Godó family’s interest in Africa would arise.

It is important to note that these kinds of missions were not new, but rather relied on a long tradition of Spanish expeditions to Africa. Numerous explorers, diplomats, businessmen and even tourists had long been traveling to African territories.\footnote{M. Marín, Un encuentro colonial: viajeros españoles en Marruecos (1860-1912), Hispania, vol. LVI-192 (1996), pp. 93-114; L. Litvak, Viajeros españoles del siglo XIX por países exóticos (1800-1913), Barcelona, 1984; and H. DRIESSEN, Images of Spanish colonialism in the Rif. An essay in Historical Anthropology and Photography, Critique of Anthropology, 7, 1 (1988), pp. 53-66. For the Catalan case, see: M. D. García Ramon, Joan Nogué i Perla Zusman (eds.), Una mirada catalana a l’Àfrica. Viatgers i viatgeres dels segles XIX i XX (1859-1936), Lleida, Pagès editors, 2008; and Eloy Martín Corrales, Un siglo de viajes y viajeros catalanes por tierras del norte de África y Próximo Oriente (1833-1939): peregrinos, nostálgicos y colonialistas, Illes i Imperis, 8. Primavera 2006, pp. 83-111.} Furthermore, the initiative of the “Fomento” exemplifies the popularity of geographic explorations in Europe at the time: between 1871 and 1890, almost one hundred new geographic societies were founded around the world.\footnote{Dominique Barjot et Jacques Fémeaux (eds.), Les sociétés coloniales à l’âge des empires. Des années 1850 aux années 1950, Paris, SEDES, 2012. A complete list of geographic societies can be found in: José Antonio Rodríguez Esteban, “Las Sociedades Geográficas y el proceso colonial”, A. R. Diez Torre (ed.), Ciencia y Memoria de África. Actas de las III Jornadas sobre Expediciones científicas y africanismo español, 1898-1998, Madrid, Universidad de Alcalá, 2002, p. 163.} The creation of these types of entities intensified as the rivalry between countries to seize new territories increased. In Spain, too, the fear of falling behind in the European Scramble for Africa prompted the gathering of explorers, intellectuals, and businessmen alike in these geographical (and often openly colonialist) associations, for example the “Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid” (1876) and the “Sociedad de Africanistas y Colonialistas españoles” (1883).\footnote{A. Pedraz Marcos, op. cit.; and José Luis Villanova Valero, Las sociedades geográficas españolas como impulsores del colonialismo español en Marruecos, Transfretana. Revista del Instituto de Estudios Céutíes, n. 5, 1999, pp. 133-148.} It must be highlighted, in this regard, that the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional” was an employer’s association, not a geographic society. The “Fomento” shared the perception that Africa could bring remarkable benefits for Spanish commerce, but mistrusted the free trade policies the majority of geographic societies promoted.\footnote{A. Pedraz Marcos, op. cit., pp. 155-164.} This discrepancy on economic policies is an important point, because the support for protectionist policies (one of the traditional demands of Catalan elites) would re-emerge in 1893, during the War of Melilla. Therefore, the fact that the Godó brothers chose to use the “Fomento” as their route into Morocco, rather than through another institution, is an issue that needs to be borne in mind.
While the exploratory mission of the “Fomento” exemplified the interest of Catalan economic elites in Morocco, the Godó brothers became interested in it due to their new textile business. Having initially moved from their hometown of Igualada to Bilbao, in the 1870s the brothers Carlos (1834-1894) and Bartolomé Godó Pié (1839-1897) had established themselves in Barcelona as textile manufacturers. As Chapter 4 will explain in detail, the business of the two brothers consisted in the manufacture of jute sacks, which was a type of manufacture that Spain’s overseas colonies needed in great quantities to store raw materials (like sugar, tobacco and coffee). Each day the Godó brothers’ factory produced 12,000 jute sacks that were exported to Cuba and Puerto Rico alone.\footnote{As noted, the Godó’s business in the jute industry will be examined in detail in Chapter 4.} This pace of production, however, did not seem to satisfy the Godó brothers and they soon set their sights on the Moroccan market.

Indeed, by the 1880s the Godó brothers appeared to have had an interest in opening new markets for their business. The journals of the Africanist movement tirelessly repeated the abundant opportunities the Moroccan Empire offered for businessmen daring enough to explore these territories. The same journals stressed that low-quality manufactured goods were the ones that would fit the Moroccan market better. Jute sacks, which were an extremely cheap and resistant commodity, consequently appeared to be the perfect product to satisfy “the taste of the indigenous people”\footnote{“(…) El género barato y fuerte, aunque sea de construcción tosca, es el preferible en estos países”. A similar recommendation was made by the Spanish consul in Mogador, who noted that “Los indígenas son poco inteligentes y no piden en el género finura o igualdad de hilos sino que tenga tono, parezca fuerte y sobre todo que sea barato”. Revista de Geografía Comercial, 31/10/1885, p. 1.} With this goal in mind, Carlos Godó joined a mission promoted by the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional and travelled to Morocco in March 1889.\footnote{“La Junta directiva del }Fomento del Trabajo nacional, de Barcelona, deseando procurar nuevos mercados á nuestra industria, se muestra siempre dispuesta á favorecer á toda persona que pretenda llevar nuestros productos al Imperio marroquí. (...) Últimamente, ha hecho otro viaje el Sr. D. Carlos Godó, y aun cuando no conocemos detalladamente los resultados de su expedición, cree el Fomento que pueden en su día ser satisfactorios.” “Nuevos mercados para la industria española”, Revista de Geografía Comercial, 08/1889, p. 3.} He did not make this voyage alone, however, but was accompanied by two men: his close friend Enrique Collaso, and the journalist and Arabist Josep Boada Romeu.\footnote{Although there is little information about Enrique Collaso, his brother was Josep Collaso Gil (1857-1926) one the most prominent figures of the Liberal Party in Barcelona and a close acquaintance of the Godó brothers (see Chapter 1). Boada was a famous expert on Morocco and journalist at }La Vanguardia. He would be the first correspondent in the history of the newspaper, precisely during the War of Melilla (1893).

In March 1899 the three men (Godó, Collaso and Boada) embarked on an exploratory journey that took them to the main Moroccan cities. Boada included a vivid account of this tour in his book Allende el Estrecho, one of the classic works of 19th-century Spanish travel.
literature. Although the initial plan was to visit the interior of Morocco (from Fez to Meknes and then back to Tangier through Tétouan and Ceuta) the problems they encountered on the road to Alcazar forced them to change their route (see Illustration 1). The expedition then headed towards the West coast, where the travellers visited some of the main commercial cities of the Empire (Asilah, Larache, Salé, Rabat, Meknès, Fez, Ksar el Kebir and Tangier). Some Moroccan newspapers, like Al-moghreb al-Aksa, provided constant updates about the journey of the three men. Boada penned a rich description of the various cities they visited, and stressed the opportunities the country offered for Spanish goods. Numerous details about the cloths consumed by Moroccans, as well as the fibres they were made of, were included in such descriptions. Boada often compared Spanish manufactured goods with those of other countries (particularly of England and France) and stressed Spain’s secondary position in the trade with Morocco.

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445 As this book explains, the trip was motivated by Godó’s commercial plans of expansion: [E.T]: “With the sole goal of opening new markets to Spanish manufactures, Mr. Carlos Godó, one of the most renowned manufacturers of Catalonia and a man with great initiative, did not hesitate to undertake this trip despite his advanced years”. Josep Boada Romeu, Allende el Estrecho. Viajes por Marruecos. (1889-1894), Melilla, Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla, 2009 [1st ed 1895]. On Boada’s book, see: J. A. Gonzállez Alcantud, El orientalismo desde el sur, Barcelona, Anthropos editorial-Junta de Andalucia, Col. Pensamiento Crítico, Pensamiento Utópico, 2006; M. D. Garcia Ramon, J. Nogué and P. Zusman (eds.), op. cit.; and C. García Romeral Pérez, Bio-bibliografía de viajeros españoles (siglo XIX), Madrid, Ollero y Ramos Ed., 1995.

446 “El jueves último salió en expedicion comercial para Fez, el propietario del periodico La Vanguardia, D. Carlos Godó, socio de la casa fabril Godó Hermanos de Barcelona. Le acompanan el ex diputado Sr. Collaso, el periodista Sr. Boada, otro Sr. representante de la prensa de la ciudad condal [Reig], y el intérprete D. Bernardo Blanco”. Al-moghreb al-Aksa, Instituto Cervantes en Tánger (Morocco) 10/03/1889, p. 3. This newspaper was written in Spanish but was published in Morocco.

447 In Arzila, for instance, Boada comments that: “Respecto al comercio exterior, Inglaterra es la nación que anda á la cabeza; solamente en articulos de algodón importa todos los años, por el vecino puerto de Larache ó Tánger, por valor de 50.000 duros. Francia le sigue en importancia (...). Alemania y España vienen después de estas dos naciones, pero en cantidades mucho menores”. J. Boada, op. cit., p. 122.
Illustration 1. Godó’s journey of exploration in the Moroccan Empire (March-April 1889)

**Route originally planned:** from Fez to Meknes and then back to Tangier through Tétouan and Ceuta.

**Final route:** Asilah, Larache, Salé, Rabat, Meknès, Fez, Ksar el Kebir and Tangier. 448

Having come across certain difficulties, the expedition finally arrived at Tangier in late April 1889. The journey turned out to have been a worthwhile endeavour and had stirred numerous ideas, as the members of the expedition would confess to the Spanish consulate in Morocco.449 In fact, these ideas soon materialised: one month after the trip, Godó and his colleagues founded a new company in Tangier: the “Sociedad Hispano-Marroquí”. 450

This company had a very specific purpose: building a whole new neighbourhood, the “Nueva España” (“New Spain”), with the aim of fostering the settlement of new Spanish immigrants. Although this goal was very different from the Godó’s initial purpose of selling jute commodities, Tangier appeared to be a highly promising market for the building industry. Indeed, this city was undergoing a profound process of expansion. Tangier’s traditional lack of buildings and the great affluence of foreigners radically increased the price

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448 These two routes are based on the description of Boada in *Allende el Estrecho*. The roads taken between the different cities are only approximate.
449 “Antes de ayer estuvieron á verme los Sres. Godó, Boada y Colaso á quienes me recomendaba V. en su último telegrama y ayer les devolví la visita convidándolos á almorzar para mañana á pesar de faltarme aun muchas cosas para hacer honor á la representacion nacional. Dichos señores vienen encantados de su espedición y con mil proyectos para aumentar las relaciones comerciales entre los dos payses. De estos proyectos que tienen todavía que madurar ha quedado el Consul en dar cuenta detallada oficialmente á ese Ministerio. Yo por lo sucinta relacion que de ellos me han hecho los creo muy practicos y realizables (...).” Archivo Marqués de la Vega de Armijo, Museo de Pontevedra (MP), Correspondencia de la Legación de España en Marruecos. R. Figueroa. Solla, 198-8.
450 “Fundación de la Compañía Hispano-Marroquí”, Archivo Histórico de Protocolos de Madrid (AHPM), Notary Francisco Lozano Muñoz (“Cónsul de España en la Ciudad de Tanger, Marruecos”), vol. 36486, pp. 338-341.
of property, to the point that its value multiplied twenty times.\textsuperscript{451} The international community was traditionally very significant and was led by Spanish citizens, whose number grew from 664 individuals in 1876 to 1,412 in 1888. The majority of these Spaniards were of humble origins and came from the provinces of Cadiz and Málaga.\textsuperscript{452}

The considerable number of Spaniards that abandoned the country each year became an issue of concern for the Africanist movement, especially because many of these migrants chose to settle in French possessions (especially in Algeria), rather than Spanish ones.\textsuperscript{453} \textit{La Vanguardia} contributed to raise public awareness about this population flow, and referred to it as “\textit{an open artery where the blood of the nation is shedding}”. This newspaper considered that positive benefit could be obtained for Spanish interests if these migratory flows were properly redirected from French Algeria to Morocco.\textsuperscript{454} The agenda this newspaper was promoting was clear: migratory flows could be turned into a profitable way to increase the Spanish presence in Morocco, provided they were coordinated.

This function of the press in setting foreign policy became evident as \textit{La Vanguardia} argued that Moroccan people would also benefit from Spanish migration. According to this newspaper, the flow of migrants would attract new industries to the area and, more importantly, it would serve to introduce the right of property in Morocco. \textit{La Vanguardia} maintained that the lack of this “right” was one of the reasons behind the alleged backwardness of the country, to the point of arguing that “\textit{In few places in the world is a similar communist principle more extended than in Morocco}”. By consequence, \textit{La Vanguardia} argued that the main benefit the new neighbourhood would bring to the Moroccans was morality – in short, it was an example of the positive influence that Spain could bring.\textsuperscript{455} Eventually, the press gave further details about the Godó’s construction project in Tangier and about the other initiatives associated with it:

\textsuperscript{451} Louis Miège gives the example of a piece of land that cost 32 pesetas in 1860, 500 ptas. in 1876 and 1,000 ptas. in 1890. Louis Miège, “La propriété immobilière à Tanger d’apres un plan du XIXè siècle”, \textit{Revue Maroc Europe}, I, 1991, pp. 84-90 (p. 86).

\textsuperscript{452} Bernabé López García, “Los españoles en Tánger”, \textit{Awraq}, nº 5-6, 2012, p. 10 and p. 8, respectively.

\textsuperscript{453} Juan Bautista Vilar, \textit{Los españoles en la Argelia francesa (1830-1914)}, Madrid-Murcia, Centro de Estudios Históricos CSIC, Universidad de Murcia, 1989; and Eloy Martín Corrales, “La emigración española en Argelia”, \textit{Awraq}, nº 5-6, 2012, pp. 47-63.

\textsuperscript{454} “Semeja la emigración en general verdadera artéria abierta por donde escapa la savia de las naciones. Pero es frecuente que este sea un mal generador de inapreciables bienes cuando se tiene suficiente tacto para encauzar la corriente emigradora hacia aquellas regiones que por su historia y su afinidad de razas y costumbres puede ser lazo de intima unión entre la patria de origen y la que de momento se adopta. (...) si hacía el vetusto imperio de los Sheriffes se encaminaran los emigrantes españoles con preferencia á la Argelia.” “Problemas marroquies. La emigración española”, \textit{LV}, 28/09/1889, p. 1. Italics added.

\textsuperscript{455} “(...) Y es la obra catalana á la que nos referimos, de resultados más político-morales que materiales; de alcance más grande que en Europa tendría, porque como indicamos antes en Marruecos el derecho de propiedad no existe. (...) Y nada como los intereses europeos creados en Marruecos á la sombra de nuestras legaciones.
“A la sombra de estos nuevos prestigios se ha creado la Sociedad Hispano-marroquí con capitales puramente españoles, se han adquirido muchos miles de metros de terreno donde se alzará una nueva población con el nombre de Barrio de España, se han adquirido fábricas que antes estaban en poder de extranjeros, y esta sociedad española, es hoy por hoy, la más importante de las establecidas en todo Marruecos. Hoy mismo se ha desembarcado para ella el primer ferrocarril Decuaville, que se establece en el imperio, si bien ahora no funcionará más que en los terrenos de su propiedad, y todo esto son progresos morales y materiales de gran valor, á los que no se ha dado publicidad para que no abortasen.”

As the article quoted above reveals, the plans of the Godó company were intentionally kept secret, arguably to prevent competition from other countries. Tangier was the most dynamic port in Morocco, and its strategic position in the Strait of Gibraltar attracted the interest of the main European powers, especially England. In fact, the British consul in Morocco (Edward Meakin) carefully monitored all of the Godó company movements and reported them to the British Prime Minister (Lord Salisbury). Eventually, the Godó’s plans in Tangier were even disclosed in an English newspaper – the *Western Morning News*. The British concern explains why Godó’s plans were kept secret, and that the memorandum of the Sociedad Hispano-Marroquí declared that this company had been founded “by the patriotic desire to promote Spanish interests in Morocco and to contribute as much as possible to the increasing of Spanish influence in the Moroccan Empire”. As a result of this, foreigners were forbidden from participating in this company, and its capital (200,000 pesetas) was initially

unas red macroeconómica que pueda contribuir á la regeneración de un país donde á España le conviene desarrollar amistosa influencia, contribuyendo á afirmar y á acrecentar la fortuna del jefe de aquel vasto Estado y á dilatar la vida de cuentos eres se mueven perezosa y dificilmente en él”. “España y Marruecos. III”, LV, 27/07/1890, p. 1.


456 “(...) This new Spanish scheme has arisen out of a purely commercial scheme of my own, and is in all respects exactly similar, so far as the communal part goes, and it is very remarkable that while the English scheme has met with no support from Her Majesty’s government, the Spaniards are supported primarily (...) by their government in the strongest possible way. (...) In fact, Senor Godo has adopted the Company plans originated entirely by myself.” The National Archives (NA), FO 99/269, Edward E. Meakin to Lord Salisbury (Letter of September 18). Further information on this diplomat, in: S. E. Fryer, ‘Meakin, James Edward Budgett (1866–1906)’, rev. Mark Pottle, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004. Italics added.

divided between the five partners. Later on, the entry of Bartolomé Godó assured that the company was family-controlled. 459

While the Godó brothers showed a serious interest in Morocco, and used the press to secure their economic interests in the country, they were not planning to do so on their own. Since the very beginning, the project of building the neighbourhood of “Nueva España” was designed as part of a broader plan, in which other agents interested in promoting Spanish colonialism in Morocco participated. One of these agents was the Catholic Franciscan Mission in North Africa. Although this religious order had had a presence in Tangier since the 13th century, its presence was favoured by the liberty of movements granted by the peace treaty of 1861. 460 A network of Catholic missions was subsequently established in the main cities of the Empire, and included the running of hospitals and primary schools, as was the case of Tangier. At the head of this Franciscan Mission was father José Lerchundi (1836-1896), arguably the most influential Spanish individual in Morocco. 461

Godó established a close friendship with Lerchundi during his stay in 1889, and this personal acquaintance became an invaluable path to obtaining the support of the Monarchy for his projects. Spain’s Queen Regent María Cristina de Habsburgo was in close correspondence with Father Lerchundi’sFranciscan Mission through her honorary presidency of the so-called “Asociación de Señoras españolas bajo los auspicios de María Inmaculada”. This association was founded in 1887 with the purpose of supporting the mission of the Franciscans in Africa. Among its members were some of the wealthiest ladies of Madrid and Barcelona, such as María Gayón, the wife of the second Marquis of Comillas, Claudio López Bru (1853-1925), one of the leading businessmen involved in the programme to increase

459 Initially, Carlos Godó, Enrique Collaso and Josep Boada held 30% each; while Felipe Ovilo and Julio Cervera had 5% each. Later on, another member of the Godó family (Bartolomé Godó) joined the company – and then the two brothers would control 40%. See: Notary Francisco Lozano Muñoz (Cónsul de España en la Ciudad de Tanger, Marruecos), AHPM, Tánger, 17/04/1899, AHPM, Notary Francisco Lozano Muñoz (“Cónsul de España en la Ciudad de Tanger, Marruecos”), vol. 37568, pp. 57-58.

460 A wide literature exists on the Franciscan Missions in Morocco, mostly written by members of the same order. José Mª Alvarez Infante, La Misión Franciscana de Marruecos: desde su restablecimiento en 1856 hasta nuestros días, Barcelona, Tip. Católica, 1911; Juan Menéndez Pidal, Album hispano-marroquí. Misiones católicas de Marruecos, Barcelona, Asociación de Señoras Españolas bajo los auspicios de María Inmaculada, 1897. An exception to this trend is: Ricardo Castillo Larriba, “Los franciscanos y el colonialismo español en Marruecos. José María Lerchundi y Francisco María Cervera (1877-1926)”, Universidad de Alcalá, Doctoral thesis, 2014.

461 Besides being a renowned Arabist, Lerchundi enjoyed a close acquaintance with the Sultan Hasan I. In fact, Lerchundi had been the main promoter of the Sultan’s visit to the Vatican in 1884, and also acted as the Sultan’s translator during his official visit to Spain in 1885. José María López, El P. José Lerchundi. Biografía documentada, Imp. Clásica Española, 1927; Ramón Lourido Díaz (ed.), Marruecos y el Padre Lerchundi, Madrid, Mapfre, 1996.
Spain’s commercial influence in Morocco.462 Through his acquaintance with Lerchundi, Godó was received in an audience with the Queen Regent in the summer of 1889, after which he obtained the Crown’s support for the building of a Spanish neighbourhood in Tangier. 463

For the reasons mentioned above, the plans of Carlos Godó proved to be part of a much broader initiative, which brought together people like the Queen Regent, Father Lerchundi and the Marquis of Comillas.464 What all these individuals shared in common was the belief that Spain’s influence in Morocco should be strengthened, and that the spreading of the Catholic religion should play a central role in achieving this. Therefore, the objective of this group was not simply based on the positivist conception that “civilization” would follow trade (although this certainly played a part), but was based on the conviction that a moral duty was also at stake. The spreading of Catholicism was crucial for such an endeavour as it was deemed to contain a set of values that would contribute to the moral improvement of the Moroccans.

The importance of the press in promoting a religious dimension in Spanish colonialism became evident at a public event that was held on 27 October 1893. On this day, a public ceremony was celebrated in Santa Madrona’s Church, in Barcelona, to celebrate a triumph of the Franciscan Mission in Tangier: the religious conversion of a Moroccan girl to Catholicism. The Franciscan sisters had picked up a Moroccan girl (Fatma Ben Ansor) and saw this as a priceless opportunity to convert her to Catholicism. The culmination of this religious endeavour took place when Fatma was baptized in public with the new name of “María Luisa”. And amidst the great excitement that this ritual represented for Barcelona’s most fervent Catholics, Godó and his wife Antonia Lallana attended as the new godparents of the Moroccan girl.

462 The Marquis Comillas was a devout Catholic who possessed one of the largest fortunes in Spain, as well as being a central figure in Spain's colonial trade with the Antilles. On Comillas, see: Martín Rodrigo Alharilla, “Una avanzadilla española en África: el grupo empresarial Comillas”, in Eloy Martín Corrales (ed.), op. cit., pp. 133-166; and M. Rodrigo Alharilla, Marqueses de Comillas. Antonio y Claudio López, 1817-1925, Madrid, LID, 2000. As president of the above-mentioned association, Comilla’s wife purchased land in Tangier. Arxiu Històric de Protocol de Barcelona (AHPB), Notary Luis Gonzaga Soler i Pla, 20/05/1890, pp. 2124-2125.

463 “S.M. la Reina (q. D. g.) se dignó manifestarme el dia 17 del corriente que tendria mucho gusto en que le presentara al Sr. D. Cárlos Godó, Presidente de la Sociedad Hispano-Marroqui. Espero, pues, de la notoria bondad de VE se sirva citarnos el dia y la hora, en que tendrémos el honor de ser recibidos en el Palacio de Ayete, favor que le agradecerá de todo corazón su afmo. y humilde amigo, S.S. / Q.B.S.m. / Fr. José Lerchundi / San Sebastián (Calle del Puyuelo, nº 19, 2º) 21 de Agosto de 1889”. Archivo General de Palacio (AGP), Reinado Alfonso XIII, Caja 8730, exp. 2.

464 As the Spanish consulate in Tangier observed, Godó relied on the support of Comillas to construct his neighbourhood in Tangier: “Antes de ayer estuvieron á verme los Sres. Godó, Boada y Colaso á quienes me recomendaba V. en su ultimo telegrama Yo por lo sucinta relacion que de ellos me han hecho los creo muy practicos y realizables, contando por supuesto con los capitales indispensables que ellos auguran poder encontrar poniendo el asunto bajo la protección del Marques de Comillas.” M.P. Correspondencia de la Legación de España en Marruecos. R. Figuera. Solla, 198-8.
Moreover, Godó used *La Vanguardia* to give wide coverage to this event. He wrote to Father Lerchundi to request his collaboration in writing an article about the future baptism of the Moroccan girl and his letter reveals to what extent Godó saw the press as a valuable device to spread awareness about the proselytising endeavours in Morocco. The outcome was an article that described the baptism with enthusiasm and included two illustrations that compared the previous Moroccan Fatma with her new Christian incarnation – María Luisa [see Illustration 2]. As *La Vanguardia* reported enthusiastically:

“Si por un momento prescindimos de los bienes espirituales, puramente del orden religioso, que con el ingreso en la fé de Cristo haya podido adquirir la preciosa niña (...) ¡cuánto no ha ganado la pequeña Fatma, escapando á la miseria presente, á la esclavitud futura, al embutecimiento y á la abyección en que los mahometanos suelen tener á sus mujeres, y viniendo á vivir en un pueblo libre, en donde por lo menos encontrará consideración y respeto, si ella es bastante virtuosa para hacerse respetar, que sí lo será, siendo educada por religiosas tan hábiles y celosas como las religiosas franciscanas de esta ciudad!”.

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465 "R. P. Fr. José Lerchundi, Tanger. Mi mas querido amigo: Tengo el mayor gusto en manifestarle que el día 26 se efectuará con toda solemnidad el bautizo de la mora de cuyo acto podrá enterarse por la extensa relación que de él que pensamos hacer en *La Vanguardia*. Si no fuera abusar de su bondad, me permitiría suplicarle que me hiciera el especial favor de mandarme algunos articulos o correspondencias para dicho periódico emitiendo su autorizada opinion sobre asuntos de Marruecos. Si usted quisiera guardar el incógnito, como supongo, le garantizo la reserva mas absoluta en todo, aun en la copia de los articulos antes de darlos á las cajas si así le conviniera. Sería un obsequio que le agradecería con toda el alma, quien le saluda muy cariñosamente y se reitera de V. como su mas affmo amigo y SS QBSM, Carlos Godó.” Archivo de la Misión Franciscana en Tánger (AMFT), Morocco, Carpeta XVII, sección B, Nº 434, Carta de Godó a Lerchundi (23/10/1893).

466 [E.T.]: “If we leave aside for a moment the spiritual goods that the girl – portrayed in our picture first with Moorish clothes and then with new Christian ones – might have obtained; and we simply pay attention for a moment to the worldly goods she has obtained, ¡how lucky little Fatma is! Since she has escaped from the misery and future slavery, from the degradation into which the Moors usually hold their women; and has come to live with a free people, where at least she might gain everyone’s respect and consideration if she behaves virtuously; and we are sure she will, ¡since she has been educated for such skilful and zealous Franciscan nuns like the ones of this city!”, “Bautizo de una mora” (“Baptizing of a Moor girl”), LV, 28/10/1893, p. 5.
Illustration 2. “Baptism of the Moor girl”, the godchild of Carlos Godó and his wife 467

Events like the one described above demonstrate Godó’s close commitment to the task of “bringing civilization” to Morocco, as well as his efforts to convince the public about the central role religion should play in this. If Godó felt that this was an element that deserved more publicity is was because proselytising was not part of the colonial strategy the Liberal government had promoted at the time. On various occasions Godó met with the foreign minister and with the Spanish consulate in Morocco, who officially granted him the state’s support. This support probably stemmed from the Queen Regent’s sponsoring of Godó’s plans and from the sympathies she had for the Franciscan Missions. In private, however, diplomats saw the use of religion as a rather old-fashioned method to foster Spanish colonialism. In the view of these state diplomats, Morocco needed “doctors and businessmen”, rather than the preaching of the Franciscans. 468 In fact, state officials proved to be greatly concerned about the Missionaries’ growing involvement in Spain’s plans for expansion in Morocco, because this religious order was subject to a foreign authority (the

467 Ibidem.

468 “La venida de los Catalanes y las facilidades que parecen encontrar para llevar á buen fin sus proyectos, basados en el amor al clero y al bienestar inherente á la naturaleza humana, me han hecho pensar y este pensamiento lo someto con alguna repugnancia á su buen juicio y consideracion por el temor que tengo de equivocarme, sino ha pasado ya el tiempo en que se creia que la cultura y la civilizacion de estos pueblos no podia obtenerse sinó con el auxilio de las Misiones religiosas. En estos payses donde no se registra una sola conversion de un idigena á la Religion Catolica, entiendo que los médicos, los industriales y los Comerciantes estan llamados á ejercer en el porvenir de Marruecos mayor influencia todavía que la que han venido ejerciendo hasta ahora los monges franciscanos.” M.P. Corresp. de la Legacion de España en Marruecos, Solla, 198-8, Letter of the Spanish Consulate in Tangier (Mr. Figuera) to the Foreign Minister (Marquis Vega de Armijo), Tangier, 21/04/1889.
This suspicion from state officials reveals to what extent a plurality of projects existed on how to promote Spain’s expansion in Morocco, and explains the importance Godó gave to public opinion to reform foreign policy. A few years later, the beginning of a new war presented a new opportunity for Godó to publicise his views on foreign policy.


By the 1890s, Melilla was little more than a speck on the Mediterranean coast of the Moroccan Empire. Although its origins as a Spanish possession went back to the late fifteenth century, Melilla was no more than a fortified town where a small community of 2,000 people lived – basically soldiers, together with a prison population. The territorial limits of Melilla were not entirely clear, but were about 3 km. At the time the hinterland of Melilla was the site of frequent skirmishes between Spanish soldiers and the Amazic tribes that lived in the area known as the Riff. These local tribes were formally bound to the religious authority of the Sultan. However, the truth was that by the last decade of the nineteenth century the Moroccan empire was undergoing a deep internal crisis that would bring it close to dissolution. Vast parts of the territory were detached from the authority of the Sultan, particularly in the interior and south of Morocco, and it was only the intense competition between the European powers that ultimately guaranteed – and greatly benefited from – the fragile equilibrium of the Empire.

The Spanish press frequently protested about the Sultan’s weakness. The Treaty of Wad Ras (1860) formally obliged the Sultan to protect the Spanish possessions from the attacks of the Riffians, but this obligation was rarely enforced. The majority of the Spanish press neither believed in the will nor the capacity of the Sultan to fulfil such agreements. The only solution, the newspapers claimed, was to “repel the aggressions with weapons, since no other plan is possible in Melilla to protect the sacred lives of those who live there”.

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469 “En resumen el Padre Lerchundi cuya influencia sobre el Sultan seria un poderoso elemento para nosotros si pudieramos utilizarlo, pero por lo que voy viendo es ya mas Romano que espanol y en la actualidad espera mas del Santo Padre que del Gobierno de SM. Todo ello nos crea una situación delicadisima (...).” Ibidem, Letter of Figuera to Vega de Armijo (Tangier, 06/04/1889). Italics added.

470 In 1862 it was agreed that the limits would be established according to the distance of two canon shots from the fortress of Victoria Grande. In 1884 the population of Melilla was barely 200 people, though by 1891 it had grown to 2,000. Gabriel De Morales, Datos para la Historia de Melilla (1497-1907), Melilla, Centro asociado UNED de Melilla, 1992, vol. I, p. 233 and p. 304.


472 “Melilla”, LV, 03/10/1893, p. 5.
consequence, wide segments of printed opinion started calling for military action as the only way to guarantee security in Melilla. In October 1893 another incident between the Spanish troops and the kabillas of the Riff triggered the beginning of a new conflict, the so-called “War of Melilla”.473

Although this war only lasted three months, it revealed the popularity colonial wars enjoyed among wide segments of Spanish society. Even though the country had recently experienced sporadic eruptions of patriotism,474 no other international episode generated such public consensus – either politically or sociologically – as the War of Melilla. With very few exceptions475 all political leaders demanded an exemplary punishment of Moroccan tribes. This included the conservatives of Cánovas del Castillo and the republicans of Emilio Castelar, who severely criticised the management of the crisis by the Liberal government of Sagasta and called for prompt military intervention. The same line was followed by the parties at the margins of the political spectrum, such as other minor republican parties, the Carlists and the Catalan nationalists. Broad consensus therefore existed among the majority of political parties in favour of a new intervention in Morocco. This consensus was remarkable, since the Restoration’s foreign policy had been characterised, until then, by a reluctance to take part in foreign adventures (as discussed earlier). The majority of parties threw this caution aside in October 1893.

The decisive contribution of the press in fostering popular imperialism became evident as growing segments of Spanish society mobilised in favour of an intervention in Morocco. As news about the first skirmishes arrived, a wave of patriotism and outrage rapidly spread to various Spanish cities.476 Newspapers described the behaviour of Spanish troops in heroic terms and presented the soldier’s bravery as the only thing that prevented a massacre from occurring.477 All sorts of spontaneous acts of support for the troops in Melilla took place and the press decisively contributed to publicising these. Patriotic demonstrations were organised

473 The War of Melilla would also be referred to as “la Guerra de Margallo” or simply as “la Guerra Chica”, as it only lasted three months (October–December 1893).
474 The most recent examples of this enthusiasm were the African War of 1859-1860 and the Cuban War of 1868-1878. Albert García Balañà, “Patria, plebe y política en la España isabelina: la guerra de África en Cataluña (1859-1860)”, E. Martín Corrales, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-78; Martín Rodrigo Alharilla, “Cataluña y el colonialismo español (1868-1899)”, Salvador Calatayud, Jesús Millán, María Cruz Romeo (eds.), *Estado y periferias en la España del siglo XIX. Nuevos enfoques*, València, Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2009, pp. 315-356. Some sporadic outbursts of patriotism also took place in 1883 (during the visit of King Alfonso XII to Paris) and in 1885 (resulting from a diplomatic incident with Germany over the Carolinas Islands).
475 These exceptions were the socialist Pablo Iglesias and the republican federalist Francesc Pi i Margall. See: J. Pich i Mitjana, *op. cit.*
476 “Entusiasmo patriótico”, LV, 06/10/1893, p. 6.
477 “Doscientos contra seis mil”, LV, 05/10/1893, p. 5-6.
in cities like Granada, Madrid, Seville, Barcelona, Valladolid, Zaragoza and Valencia, where some 10,000 people ran through the streets to protest against the attack perpetrated by the Rifians.478 Other cities sent telegrams to the government to make “the popular dissent against the moors” known and to offer assistance, while city councils promoted public subscriptions to buy weapons and groceries.479 Large numbers of civilians of different social origins publically volunteered to sign up for combat; private entities, like the Red Cross, offered their help to the government; and many declared themselves to be ready to “shed their blood for the motherland”.480 The Church joined this collective fervour and blessed the wounded soldiers of Melilla and praised their deeds.481

All these public demonstrations, which the press reported and helped to promote, were characterised by widespread enthusiasm. Spanish flags were hoisted and demonstrators constantly cheered the names of Spain, the king, and the army. Some contemporaries saw in these demonstrations an opportunity to overcome Spain’s worst problems — among which, the emergence of a nationalist movement in Catalonia. Indeed, the 1890s saw the growth of Catalanism, an identity-based movement that proposed an alternative conception of the Spanish nation to the centralist model of the Restoration. Although a sense of regional identity had long existed in Catalonia, the 1890s were a key moment in the politicisation of these feelings. A new platform called “Unió Catalanista” brought together different entities that opposed the liberal’s plan to implement a common civil law system in all of Spain. This plan revealed the liberal’s ambition to underpin a uniform and centralist state-model, but started facing growing opposition from the periphery. This became evident in 1892 when the Unió Catalanista approved the first political manifesto in which autonomy for Catalonia was explicitly requested.482

479 Like the city councils of Gràcia, Manresa and Barcelona. LV, 05/11/1893, p. 2; 06/10/1893, p. 6.
480 The miners of Bilbao and the prisoners of different cities (Granada, Valencia and Malaga) offered to participate in combat. The Bank of Barcelona sent a telegram to the government to offer a loan of 2.5 million pesetas. The Red Cross sent all kinds of equipment for the wounded soldiers in Melilla. LV, 07-14 October 1893, pp. 1-5; and 05/11/1893, p.2.
481 Those were the cases, for instance, of the bishops of León and Madrid. LV, 07/10/1893, p. 5.
482 This manifesto also asked for other measures besides autonomy, like maintaining the Catalan singular civil law system; for Catalan to be the only official language in the region; that only Catalans could hold public office; and that Catalonia should have its own Courts. As historian Borja de Riquer has noted, this manifesto was rather vague at the time in specifying how autonomy was to be implemented. In social terms, this document was conservative. For instance, it demanded corporate forms of franchise. On the “Bases de Manresa” and the “Unió Catalanista”, see: Jordi Llorens i Vila, La Unió Catalanista i els orígens del catalanisme polític, Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1992; and Borja de Riquer, La Lliga Regionalista: la burgesia catalana i el nacionalisme (1898-1904), Barcelona, Edicions 62, p. 48.
Although the demands for autonomy did not prevent Catalan nationalists from joining the wave of Spanish patriotism, some journalists saw the War of Melilla as an opportunity to transcend domestic politics. As one newspaper from Madrid (El Imparcial) commented with unexcerpted joy:

“¡Consolador espectáculo! El honor de España está en telo de juicio, y particularismos regionales, cuestiones de campanario, antagonismos de clase, convenencias de bandería, todo ha sido puesto en olvido. Las pequeñas patrias han desaparecido ante la patria grande. Nadie piensa ahora en que es gallego ó navarro, castellano ó catalán: sólo se acuerda de que es español. (...) No hay mal que por bien no venga, y los salvajes rifeños (...) han venido á ser ocasión de que se compruebe que á despecho de todas las miserias de nuestra vida pública el carácter español permanece en toda su vigorosa integridad”.

Indeed, the press repeatedly portrayed the war against the Moroccans – referred to in Spanish as “moros” – as a “national movement”. In a political system like the Restoration, where the institutional channels for mass participation were manipulated by the strong presence of clientelist practices, and where the political system showed little capacity to mobilise the population, the euphoria that a potential war in Morocco generated in most of Spanish society was remarkable. The press played an important role in fostering this euphoria. The “war against the Moor” had numerous precedents in Spanish history, but the press greatly contributed to popularising them. Newspapers repeatedly referred to previous military interventions in Morocco, particularly the War of Africa (1859-1860), and made the public familiar with them. Such was the case, for instance, of the Catalan Volunteers (“Voluntarios Catalanes”), a corps of 500 volunteers (mainly from the popular and

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483 Contrary to what some scholars have noted, the colonial wars proved to be very popular in this region too, including the supporters of Catalan nationalism, as shown in: Eloy Martín Corrales (ed.), Marruecos y el colonialismo español..., op. cit.; and in Martín Rodrigo Alharilla, “Cataluña y el colonialismo español (1868-1899)”..., op. cit. A different perspective, in: Abel Albert & Rosa Cesarols, “De viatge pel Marroc: entre el debat colonial i la mirada estereotipada”, M. D. García Ramon, J. nogué and P. Zusman (eds.), op. cit., p. 239.
484 “Movimiento saludable”, El Imparcial, 06/10/1893, editorial. [E.T.]: “What a remarkable event! Now that the honour of Spain is at stake, everything has been put aside: the regional particularities, religious controversies, class conflicts, selfish interests, etc. The small fatherlands have disappeared and only the greatest one has remained. No one thinks anymore about being Galician, from Navarra, Castilian nor Catalan: this moment everyone is a Spaniard. Nothing bad comes without being followed by something good and the savage Riffians (...) have been the best proof that despite all the miseries of our public life, the Spanish character remains in all its vigorous strength.”
Republican classes of Barcelona) who fought in Morocco in 1859. During the War of Melilla the press in Barcelona repeatedly evoked the deeds of this corps as an example of an alleged tradition in fighting against the “Moors”. A whole mythology about the Catalan Volunteers (including songs, poems and plays) re-emerged, and several proposals were made to regroup this corps. Similarly, though to a lesser extent, the press remembered the myth of the Spanish Reconquista, which had ended in 1492. Newspapers consequently depicted Moroccans as the eternal enemy of Spain, and the term “Christian” was often used as a synonym for the Spanish troops in opposition to “the Moors”.

These historical evocations in the press were combined with a discourse that reinforced a stereotypical image of Moroccans, who were depicted as savage, religious fanatics. In so doing, newspapers contributed to building a sense of Spanish identity based on moral superiority and heroic virtues. Indeed, newspapers contributed to creating a general mistrust towards the Moroccans and portrayed them as a bellicose and anarchic people driven by primary instincts. Thus the majority of newspapers presented the Spaniards as being morally superior and this served to pave the way for the conquest of territories in Morocco. In such an enterprise, violence was considered the only language that the local population could possibly understand. This attitude was supported by the impression that the Sultan was incapable of controlling his own people.

The violent language employed towards the Moroccans was, in fact, another ingredient in the construction of an “other” against which Spanish identity was defined. The press of the time is full of examples in which aggression was used as a sign of Spanish patriotism. For instance, the liberal newspaper of Madrid El Imparcial recounted, in an article entitled “We are going to eat Moors!” ("¡Comeremos moros!"), the case of a Spanish soldier who declared that “Spain may not have money to buy ovens to bake bread in Melilla, but we must go there and if there’s no bread, we will eat Moors”. According to the same newspaper, “Several officers that were there (...) burst into enthusiastic applause, feeling the same

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487 LV, 19/10/93, p. 1-2.
488 El Imparcial, 06/10/1893, p. 1. Similar views were expressed in: LV 17/10/1893, p. 5.
489 See: [Illustration "La Nota del Sultán y la música d'Espanya"]: “While the Sultan keeps preaching the terrible sermons, our troops shall preach with the ‘mouths of our canons’”, La Campaña de Gracia, 18th November 1893, p. 1. [special edition]
This hostile vocabulary, however, was not exclusive to pro-government newspapers like *El Imparcial*. The Republican press in Barcelona, which mainly addressed the popular and urban classes, shared a similar stereotyped image of Moroccans. The Republican and satirical newspaper *L’Esquella de la Torratxa*, for instance, had a daily section entitled “Against the Moor” [Illustration 3]. Another satirical and Republican newspaper from Barcelona, *La Campana de Gràcia*, published an illustration in which the head of a Moroccan was shown spiked on a bayonet and called it “the only national solution” [Illustration 4].

Illustration 3

![Illustration 3](image)

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490 See: “¡Comeremos moros!”, *El Imparcial*, 6th October 1893, p. 1. This article was later transcribed in *La Vanguardia*, 8th October 1893, p. 5.

491 Picture 3: “Forget about Moorish figs! We don’t want anything else from these people!” [in Catalan, figs are popularly known as “Moorish figs”]. Second image: “Stand up right now! Don’t you see that it makes you see “moorish” to be seated like that?” “Contra ‘l moro’, *L’Esquella de la Torratxa*, 13th October 1893, p. 5. Translation from Catalan.
At this point we may ask why the Spanish newspapers, both pro and anti government, adopted such a hostile attitude in their reports of the War of Melilla. The first and arguably most important reason is that patriotism was the easiest attitude for newspapers to adopt. The incidents between local tribes and Spanish troops in the north of Africa were not new, and supporting the national cause was something the average reader was likely to sympathise with. All the more so when patriotic demonstrations spread and public imaginaries about the “Moors” re-emerged; these being two phenomena that the journalists contributed to broadcast.

“The only national solution” [Originally published in Catalan as: “L’única solució nacional”, Almanach de la Campaña de Gracia, 1894].
However, the case of the Republican press in Barcelona provides evidence that jingoism also became an opportunity to carry messages with a domestic content. Looking closely at the content of the patriotic discourse that Republican newspapers published reveals that jingoism contained a multifaceted dimension. As Xavier Garcia has noted, some Republican newspapers started drawing parallels between the “savage” Moroccans and liberal politicians.493 These newspapers argued that liberal politicians were as “uncivilized” as Moroccans because they represented the same type of obstacle to “progress”; to the point of considering that Spain’s political system was worse than that of Morocco, because its politicians were never held accountable.494 Moreover, the same newspapers repeatedly referred to liberal politicians as the “moors of Madrid” (“moros de Madrit”). This type of satire was not used as mere entertainment, but contained a clear political strategy aimed at making readers aware of Spain’s political situation.495 As well as this use of patriotism to criticise liberal politics, other Republican newspapers like El Diluvio started echoing the impression that the soldiers sent to Melilla came from the lower classes; and that the ultimate purpose of the military intervention was to defend the economic interests of a few elites.496 In other parts of Spain, the Socialist press manifested similar views and portrayed the intervention in Melilla as a “bourgeois war”, as Rafael Núñez Florencio has noted.497

At this point we may ask how the readers in Barcelona responded to the bellicose stance that most of the press had adopted. One way of answering this question consists in examining some of the apparently casual observations that the newspapers made about society. The Barcelona newspaper El Diluvio, for instance, noted the lack of enthusiasm

493 Xavier García Olivé, “‘Moros de dos menas’. Republicanismes barcelonins i la ‘guerra de Margallo’” [Master thesis, Universtitat Pompeu Fabra, 2008, unpublished manuscript, 57 pages.]. I would like to thank professor Albert Garcia Balañà for giving me access to this work. The following quotations are indebted to the work of Xavier Garcia.

494 As La Campana de Gracia put it: “not all the Moroccans live beneath the Strait [of Gibraltar], but we also have them in Spain”. Another Republican newspaper, called El Diluvio, stated: “¿Qué país este! ¿Y tenemos sistema constitucional? Pues entre España con este sistema, y Marruecos con el que place á cada kábila, declaramos francamente que no encontramos gran diferencia. Allí siquiera se cortan las cabezas de los bajás. Aquí no se ha dado ese caso nunca.” Ibidem, p. 13.

495 “Reader, think about it / and tell me if you are served properly: / Where are the real Moors: / In Melilla or in Madrid?” [originally published in Catalan as: “Lector, pensathi una mica / y digasme si ets servit: / ¿Ahónt son los verdaders moros: / á Melilla o á Madrit?”]. La Campana de Gràcia, 28/10/1893, p. 4. Ibidem, p. 12.

496 “Es para clamar, porque vé uno en España á un pueblo que quiere ser grande, que tiene condiciones para serlo, y que por causa de sus malos gobernantes no acaba de salir nunca de la impotencia y la ruina. (...) Me han dicho que por qué no organizo un batallon y marcho para el Africa. Y he contestado á los que me han hecho la pregunta: ¿Crees que es por falta de valor? (...) Si no organizo un batallon, es porque no quiero ir á exponer mi vida, ni ser causa de que la pierdan los demás, para hacer el negocio de unos cuantos. (...) Dadme quinientos hombres de estos que han sido directores, gobernadores, alcaldes y ministros, y vereis si voy á Melilla y si por gusto de ver diezmada la clase de los que nos arruinan y nos degradan, pongo yo en peligro mi propia vida (...).” El Diluvio, 10/10/1893, p. 2, Ibidem, p. 24.

497 Rafael Núñez Florencio, Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España (1888-1906), Madrid, CSIC, 1990, pp. 115-145.
among a theatre audience applauding the names of Spain and Catalonia at the beginning of a play. Even though this newspaper did not pass on the chance to take political advantage of this event, the fact that the journalist was surprised by the public’s cold reaction reveals that the “war against the Moor” was not as unanimously supported as the newspapers suggested.

Further evidence that reveals the reader’s autonomy in the face of jingoist propaganda was the failed attempt to reunite the Catalan corps of volunteers. During the War of Africa of 1859 this corps of civilians became a symbol of Republican pride among Barcelona’s popular classes. In their attempt to foster popular imperialism, during the War of Melilla liberal politicians made repeated calls to regroup the same corps of volunteers. Many pro-war newspapers endorsed this endeavour, but the fact is that the initiative provoked little enthusiasm and the corps of volunteers was never recovered. This was because, in contrast to the war of 1859, during the War of Melilla there was a wide perception among the Republicans that the same authorities they opposed (the “Moors in Madrid”) were trying to appropriate the myth of the Catalan Volunteers for their own advantage.

The scepticism of the Republican press provides evidence that popular imperialism was not a top-down process, rather, it contained a multifaceted dimension. Thus, the publishing of racial stereotypes about Moroccans (as Illustrations 3 and 4 exemplify) in the Republican press coexisted with alternative forms of patriotism; and even with the opposition of some newspapers about the war. In this respect, the multifaceted attitude of the Republican press has the value of setting a context against which we may contrast the Godó’s attitude. Hence, comparing the stance of La Vanguardia with that of the Republican press will serve to shed some light on certain aspects of the Godó’s intentions that would otherwise go unnoticed.

On 2 October 1893, La Vanguardia first reported the earliest incidents in Melilla. From that day on, and until around the middle of 1894, news from Morocco appeared on a

498 “Anteanoche estuvo en un tris que no fueran recibidos con chacota en un teatro público los venerados gritos de ¡Viva España! ¡Viva Cataluña! Sólo se contuvo la concurrencia porque ninguna multitud congregada hace jamás muestra de sentimentos cínicos. Pero se sentía, se respiraba que aquella asamblea, por cierto muy selectamente compuesta, propendía á mandar en hora mala al autor y á los cómicos que la ponían en semejante compromiso.” Diluvio, 13/10/1893, p. 3.

499 Albert García Balañà, “Patria, plebe y política en la España isabelina...”, op. cit.

500 As the Republican newspaper El Diluvio commented: “No consiste el patriotismo en lanzar á los países por los caminos de perdición á que los conducen los malos Gobiernos. No consiste el patriotismo en decir que somos un pueblo de valientes, ni en atribuirnos victorias cuando hemos sido derrotados. (...) El verdadero patriotismo es aquel que redunda en beneficio de la nación. El verdadero patriotismo debe inspirarse en el bien general (...). El otro patriotismo, ese que consiste en hacer la causa de aquello que desean los malos Gobiernos, ese será un sistema más o menos cómodo y productivo, pero no es patriotismo.” El Diluvio, 09/12/1893, p. 5, X. García Olivé, op. cit., p. 30.

501 Prior to that, LV had informed about minor incidents in Melilla. LV, 1/09/1893 and 11/09/1893, p. 3 and 5.
daily basis. Throughout this period, *La Vanguardia* used an aggressive tone to describe the events, and it criticised Sagasta’s Liberal government for being too cautious. In opposition to the government’s attitude, *La Vanguardia* argued for a more energetic response against the Riff tribes:

“¡La conferencia, la inútil y contraproducente conferencia, es el sistema que antes, como ahora, se viene adoptando en aquella plaza [Melilla] para responder á hechos salvajes, á atentados contra nuestro pabellón y contra nuestra seguridad! (...) Mientras nuestros gobiernos no cambien de modo de pensar; mientras al gobernador de Melilla no se le de otra consigna, por ejemplo, la de rechazar las agresiones con las armas, en Melilla es imposible todo programa, y es exponer de continuo las sagradas vidas de los que allí moran.”

Although many other newspapers argued along the same lines, events would demonstrate that *La Vanguardia* had succeeded in distinguishing itself as a pro-war newspaper. Hence, on the night of 7 October 1893 a public discussion was held in one of the bars of Barcelona’s city centre about Spain’s future in Melilla. Although this public discussion explicitly forbade any form of partisan speeches, as the debate went on the audience became so passionate that it incited a spontaneous demonstration through the streets of Barcelona. The crowd went down La Rambla (Barcelona’s high street) cheering Spain and the army. As the crowd reached *La Vanguardia*’s editorial office in La Rambla, “the demonstrators suddenly went in, where they were welcomed by the staff of this newspaper; a commission of the demonstrators explained to the staff what had happened in the bar (...) and both parties enjoyed a long and pleasant chat. Later on, the demonstrators abandoned the office and continued their march down La Rambla.”

Events like this demonstration reveal that *La Vanguardia* was identified in Barcelona as a newspaper in favour of Spanish patriotism. In terms of domestic politics, this was not a minor issue, especially at a time when Catalan nationalism was gaining momentum. These connotations, however, did not seem to worry *La Vanguardia*, since the following day it

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502 *LV*, 03/10/1893, p. 5. [E. T.]: “¡Diplomacy was the useless method that was implemented in the past, and also the one that is used now, to respond against the brutal attacks against our nation and our security! (...) It will not be until the day that our government changes its way of thinking, and until it decides to repel any aggressions with the weapons, that something important will be done in Melilla. (...) Meanwhile, diplomacy only means to put at risk the lives of those dwelling there. (...) The immediate future should prove it.”. This is an approximate translation.

503 “Opinión de la prensa” and “La prensa de Madrid”, *LV*, 05 and 06/10/1893, p. 3 and p. 4.

504 “Lo de Melilla en Barcelona”, *LV*, 08/10/1893, p. 5.
reported the jingoistic demonstrations in La Rambla in very positive terms.\textsuperscript{505} Moreover, \textit{La Vanguardia} actively sought to promote Spanish patriotism by promoting a public drive to collect groceries for the Spanish soldiers in Melilla. This effort turned out to be a great success: in less than a week more than 50,000 pesetas had been collected, a considerable amount at the time.\textsuperscript{506} And at the top of the list of contributors were various members of the Godó family.\textsuperscript{507}

If \textit{La Vanguardia} showed a clear commitment to Spanish patriotism, the mobilisation generated in domestic opinion became an opportunity for Godó to promote his own views in favour of a more active policy in Morocco. Thus, as the first troops were sent to Melilla (in October 14\textsuperscript{th}), \textit{La Vanguardia} published an article with an illustrative title: “\textit{Nuestra misión en Marruecos}” (“Our Mission in Morocco”). As this article continued:

“Los sucesos de Melilla, que tanto sentimiento é indignación han producido en todo el país, despertando su patriotismo, habrán contribuido, indudablemente, más que todas las excitaciones y estímulos de otra clase, á fijar la atención pública hacia unas posesiones de las cuales ignoraba la generalidad qué ventajas ó inconvenientes ofrece para nuestra nación la posesión de ellas. (...) Todavía hay entre nosotros quienes, con escasa perspicacia, creen que nuestra misión en Marruecos es pura conquista material de territorio. No; hay que ir rectificando esos erróneos conceptos. Nosotros tenemos el deber de llevar á Africa nuestra civilización, y buscar compensaciones positivas á este generoso esfuerzo, ensanchando el tráfico y asegurando mercados á nuestros productos. (...) De ahí que, una vez fortificado y atrincherado el territorio que poseemos [e.g. Melilla], vengados nuestros compatriotas que sucumbieron á la felonía de los bereberes y reclamada y pagada la justa y correspondiente indemnización, debemos asegurar más y más nuestro ulterior tráfico y obtener facilidades y garantías de que no habrá de perturbarse por parte del Sultán ni por nadie. Todo lo que no tienda á esto, será gastar dinero y sangre en empresas ruinosas, (...) que nos señalaría á las naciones civilizadas como un país poco práctico y nada previsor.”\textsuperscript{508}

\textsuperscript{505} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{506} LV, 01-04/10/1893. The Republican \textit{La Publicidad}, promoted a similar initiative. The same thing happened in other Catalan cities. Martín Rodrigo Alharilla, op. cit., pp. 352-354.

\textsuperscript{507} Carlos Godó and his son Ramón contributed 5,000 pesetas each. Additionally, the society “Godó and Compañía” and \textit{La Vanguardia} (both of which belonged to Carlos) added another 5,000 in each case. These donations reveal to what extent Carlos Godó was eager to contribute to the military intervention through the newspaper he owned. “Para las tropas de Melilla. La suscripción de “La Vanguardia”, LV, 01/11(1893, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{508} “Nuestra Misión en Marruecos”, LV, 14/10/1893, p. 4. Italics added. [E.T.]: “The events in Melilla, which have provoked so much outrage in the whole country to the point of awakening its patriotism, have contributed, more than anything else, in directing public attention towards some [Spanish] possessions that have certain potential as well as handicaps that have often been ignored. [...] Amongst us, there are still people who think, with little perspective, that our mission in Morocco consists purely in the conquering of the territory. No. It is important to correct such erroneous thoughts. Our duty is to bring our civilization to Africa, and to look for
As this article explained, in clear terms, *La Vanguardia* wanted Spain’s intervention to be more than a flash in the pan, and instead the first step towards a bolder and longer-term intervention in Morocco. These kinds of articles reveal the importance that the press had in the Godó’s attempt to secure their private agenda. At the time, both Carlos and Bartolomé were members of the Liberal Party, as well as deputies in Congress and in the Provincial council, respectively. The affiliation to this party, however, was not an impediment for the Godó brothers to pressure the Liberal Party over adopting a bolder policy in Morocco. The reason for this is because since 1888 *La Vanguardia* had formally abandoned its official position as Sagasta’s Liberal Party mouthpiece in Barcelona and had become an independent newspaper. Although this move to differentiate between the two spheres (press and politics) was not exempt from critiques, the benefits that stemmed from it became evident in the War of Melilla. *La Vanguardia’s* new editorial independence allowed the Godó brothers to publicise their private agenda to a broader audience, and at the same time to criticise the official policies of their own party.

Throughout October, *La Vanguardia* published further articles that revealed the Godó’s ambition to make Morocco a new issue of the national agenda. The euphoria generated by the War of Melilla became an opportunity to disseminate these demands to new segments of society. Instead of presenting the “civilizing mission” as the demand of the Africanist lobby, *La Vanguardia* presented it as a demand coming from the “whole nation”, and used this argument to exert pressure on Sagasta’s Liberal government:

“Acusada en diversos números y en diversas secciones por LA VANGUARDIA la emoción profunda que ha despertado en toda España, sin excluir á Barcelona, los sucesos de melilla y la buena disposición de ánimo en que se encuentran todas las clases sociales para ofrecer al gobierno su apoyo moral y material en cuanto haga por mantener el honor de las armas españolas, que es el honor de España entera, no insistimos por hoy sobre este sano movimiento nacional (...) Escribimos esta cuartilla meramente para decir al Gobierno en dos
líneas que cuide de no distanciarse del movimiento nacional, porque ese movimiento puede arrollarlo en obra de pocas horas (...) Muchos datos y antecedentes tenemos en la memoria para creer que el Gobierno, á pesar de su patriotismo y de sus buenos deseos, no está muy feliz en sus funciones para dar solución á las incidencias que surgen en la campaña de Melilla (...)

But who authored these articles? Despite the large editorial staff of La Vanguardia, when Morocco was the issue at stake the articles were usually signed by some of the most conspicuous members of Catalan Africanism, like Josep Ricart, Josep Roca and Josep Boada. In contrast to the majority of players in the Africanist movement, however, Catalan Africanists differed from their counterparts when it came to the economic policy colonialism was to follow. In opposition to Spain’s Foreign Office Minister, Segismundo Moret (who supported a peaceful penetration in Morocco by promoting free trade policies), the Catalan economic elites conceived of the colonies as a protected market for their products.

In consequence, during the War of Melilla La Vanguardia acted as the mouthpiece of a network of interests and entities of Catalan Africanism, like the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional” and the “Sociedad Geográfica de Barcelona”. This point can be clearly seen in the newspaper's fierce advocacy of a colonialist project that had protectionism as one of its key points, in contrast to free trade advocates. Josep Ricart i Giralt, together with other writers like the Republican J. Roca i Roca (director of the newspaper La Campana de Gracia), and Josep Boada i Romeu (a close friend of Carlos Godó and expert journalist in Morocco) were the main writers that defended the colonial project of the Catalan bourgeoisie through the pages of La Vanguardia — with the explicit support of the Godó family.

511 “Lo de Melilla”, LV, 31/10/1893, p. 2. [E.T.]: “On various occasions, LA VANGUARDIA has portrayed the deep emotion that the events in Melilla have provoked in all of Spain, including Barcelona. All the social classes have offered their moral and material help to the Government to help it maintain (...) the Spanish honour. (...) However, today we do not pretend to insist on the qualities of this national movement. Rather, we only want to remind the Government that it should pay attention to not becoming separated from this national movement, because this movement is capable of overthrowing the Government itself in a matter of hours. (...) We still have recent memories that suggest that the Government, despite its patriotism and good intentions, does not seem to be very willing to give appropriate solutions to future events that may come from Melilla (...)”.

512 Josep Ricart i Giralt (1847-1930) was arguably the most important theorist of Africanism in Catalonia at the time. He would become the future director of the Geographic Society of Barcelona (SGB), a society created in 1895 with the aim of promoting geographical knowledge “for the fostering of Spanish colonialism and trade”. Javier Moreno, José Ricart y Giralt (1847-1930). Una vida dedicada a la cultura marítima, Drassana: revista del Museu Maritim, nº 14, 2006, pp. 63-83; Eloy Martín Corrales, El nacionalismo catalán..., op. cit.

513 José Carlos Ferrero Cuesta, Segismundo Moret. Una biografía política, Madrid, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2002. The links between economic policy and colonialism will be studied in further detail in the next chapter.
3.3. ORIENTALISM AS A NEW COMMODITY FOR READERS

If the War of Melilla revealed the attempts of the Catalan Africanist lobby to condition Spain’s foreign policy, this war also contributed to promoting interest in Morocco among the domestic audience. In this respect, the literature on Spanish Africanism often stresses that this movement gave great importance to convincing public opinion about the benefits of colonialism. Still, historians rarely specify the way the Africanists aspired to fill the existing gap between them and public opinion. By focusing on La Vanguardia, the last part of this paper will demonstrate the active role commercial newspapers played in popularising an orientalist discourse about Morocco. Analysing the way La Vanguardia tried to do so will also shed light on the changes this newspaper underwent in terms of management, marketing and content, as a result of the reforms of 1888.

The War of Melilla became an illustrative example of how the new commercial orientation La Vanguardia adopted in 1888 was implemented. In comparison to the majority of Barcelona’s press, La Vanguardia stood out for the amount of information it provided and for the way this information was presented. Thus, La Vanguardia did not just provide the latest news and bellicose editorials against the Riff tribes (as discussed above), but combined them with all sorts of extra information for a growing number of readers who were eager to learn more about Morocco. The articles in La Vanguardia during the conflict of Melilla displayed a deep interest in the customs, language, and traditions of Moroccan tribes. Even if that interest was influenced by a deeply stereotyped image of “the Moor”, an interest in orientalism proved to be popular among the urban classes of Barcelona.514

“Orientalism” had already been fostered in Spain by the burgeoning field of travel literature. Although this was by no means a new genre, since the mid-nineteenth century travel literature had become a growing genre following the new wave of European colonialism in Africa and Asia. Like the emergence of tourism, the great popularity enjoyed by the works of certain adventurers, explorers and scientists created a new market of consumers interested in distant cultures and places. In the case of the Moroccan Empire, numerous Spanish travellers had already been there since the 1850s.515 Their work decisively contributed to the re-discovery of North Africa.

However, the travel literature had a limited audience, since its potential readership was usually restricted to the upper classes. Books on travel became a sign of distinction of this social group. The knowledge of certain classic works and authors — such as David Livingstone, Henry Stanley and Gustav Flauvert — became a cultural background for the elites, and constituted a set of symbols in the habitus of this social group. Travel books thus turned out to be the kind of knowledge that developed together with new forms of elite consumption.\textsuperscript{516}

In contrast to travel literature, the information \textit{La Vanguardia} provided about the War of Melilla contributed to popularising an orientalist discourse about Morocco that had been restricted until then to the upper classes. And this was possible because in wide segments of Spanish society the “war against the Moor” showed a capacity to attract bigger audiences. This also became an opportunity for newspapers to increase their profits. Madrid’s newspaper \textit{El Imparcial}, for instance, had an estimated circulation of 80,000 copies. When the conflict in Morocco started, sales rose to 100,000 copies, and reached 124,000 copies during the hot moment of the war.\textsuperscript{517} In other words, the War of Melilla and the resulting explosion of patriotism generated the interest for a new public to learn more about Morocco: the war "against the other" also proved to be a great market for newspapers.

In fact, and contrary to its long tradition of partisan orientation (see Chapter 2), the European newspaper industry of the late nineteenth century was adopting a stronger commercial orientation. Editors began to be concerned not only with potential readership but also with potential advertisers, who provided the biggest revenues for the newspaper. As Gerald J. Baldasty has explained, in order to attract advertisers, the editors also had to redefine the way news was presented in order to attract bigger audiences.\textsuperscript{518} In fact, the 1890s were the moment when “sensationalism” emerged as a new journalist practice that Spanish newspapers started adopting to make news more attractive.\textsuperscript{519} The increasing attention that newspapers devoted to reporting crimes illustrates this change in the content of the press.

Therefore, the gradual transformation from a politically to a commercially based press led to a substantial shift in the way in which news was presented. News became a new

\textsuperscript{516} A good example of this new type of consuming is the figure of Thomas Cook and the “invention” of tourism. See: Luis Riudor, “Entre la curiositat i el plaer: del viatger al turista o la mutació d’una espècie”, M. D. Garcia Ramon, J. Nogué and P. Zusman (eds.), \textit{op. cit}, pp. 137-171.

\textsuperscript{517} Juan Carlos Sánchez Illán, \textit{Prensa y política en la España de la Restauración: Rafael Gasset y El Imparcial}, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1999, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{518} Gerald J. Baldasty, \textit{The Commercialization of News in the Nineteenth Century}, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 1992, pp. 139-146.

commodity and, like any other commodity, its profitability was directly related to its capacity to attract more consumers. The way La Vanguardia reported the War of Melilla is a good example of this process. For the price of 10 cents (0.10 Spanish’ pesetas) per copy, the reader of La Vanguardia gained access to a completely new world of information about Morocco. Together with pictures La Vanguardia included extensive descriptions about the habits and character of the Riff tribes, their religious practices, and their military capacities. For instance, on 12 October (the National day), La Vanguardia published an extra supplement, together with the ordinary copy, dedicated to the War of Africa of 1859-1860 (see Illustration 5). The aim of the supplement (free to subscribers) was to recall the deeds of the Catalan corps of volunteers, because La Vanguardia considered this to be something that “all the readers” – both young and old – would appreciate.520

As Illustration 5 shows, the supplement included numerous illustrations of the most famous soldiers that had participated in the war of 1859-1860 (such as generals Leopoldo O’Donnell and Joan Prim) with a description of their family origins, military careers and deeds in Africa. The supplement also included an extensive description of the customs of Moroccans (Illustration 6) and included range of other characters and entries: a description of Father Lerchundi and a sister of the charity; an article about a “Moorish farmworker”; an article about the “differences between the Spaniard and the Berber” – which included a 50-point list; and even a collection of “Moroccan popular songs” provided by Father Lerchundi. Such supplements reveal that as well as the racial and caricaturised image of Moroccans, there stood another one that revealed a curiosity to learn more about North Africa (“orientalism”). This point is of special importance, because it provides further evidence of the contradictory (or “disoriented”) image that Spaniards often had about Morocco, which they both hated and admired.521

Besides these supplements, the newspaper of the Godó family promoted numerous initiatives aimed at popularising interest in Morocco. Thus, in November 1893 La Vanguardia opened an art gallery in the offices that the newspaper had in “La Rambla”. In this gallery, the public could contemplate, for free, up to 30 pictures and photographs dedicated to the customs, cities and ways of living in Morocco and Algeria.522

520 “(...) we think it is something that will please our readers. The old ones because these memories will evoke their past days of youth and the inner fire that animated them; the youth [readers] because they will discover that in the history of their ancestors they have high values to imitate, and they will certainly constitute an example for the generations to follow”. LV, 12/10/1893, p. 1.
522 LV, 10/10/1893, p. 4.
LA VANGUARDIA

SUPLEMENTO

al número 3752 correspondiente al día 12 de Octubre de 1893

PRECIO DE ESTE SUPLEMENTO: Grat. Al público: Número suelto... 10 céntimos. 25 números 1,75 Ptas.

LA GUERRA DE ÁFRICA DE 1859-60

El presente Suplemento

Se tiene en estos días el placer de decir a nuestras lectores que la Guerra de África está en pleno desarrollo, y que los acontecimientos que se están produciendo en el campo son de lo más emocionante. Se le han dado la razón y se le han dado la razón al jefe de la expedición, el general O'Donnell, en su plan de marcha y en su estrategia. La victoria es elogiada por todos y se celebra con alegría en todas partes.

Don Rafael Reichgott

Diseñado por el famoso pintor Lázaro. Ilustrado por el famoso escultor Gómez. Imprimido por la famosa imprenta de la ciudad de Barcelona. Dedicado a los ciudadanos de la nación.

Don Leopoldo O'Donnell

Diseñado por el famoso pintor Lázaro. Ilustrado por el famoso escultor Gómez. Imprimido por la famosa imprenta de la ciudad de Barcelona. Dedicado a los ciudadanos de la nación.

LV, 12/10/1893, p. 1.
Illustration 6. The “customs of Moroccans” 524

LV, 13/10/1893, p. 8. The drawing on the top left is of Father Lerchundi, the man who contributed so decisively to promoting Godó’s plans in Morocco.
CONCLUSIONS

The War of Melilla ended, finally, at the beginning of 1894. Despite the repeated attempts of the Spanish army to turn the confrontation with the Riff tribes into an open war against the Moroccan Empire, this did not ultimately take place. As a result of this, General Martínez Campos was sent to Marrakesh as the Spanish ambassador to negotiate peace with the Sultan Muley Hassan. The newspapers, just as they had during the conflict, carefully reported all the events. In the case of *La Vanguardia*, Josep Boada went to Marrakesh as a correspondent to follow the negotiations. General Martínez Campos, who was perfectly conscious of the great interest and expectation with which Spanish public opinion was following the negotiations, repeatedly stated to correspondents “I will not go back to Spain until the prestige of my motherland and that of its army is completely restored”. Regardless of the bellicose statement of the General, the peace treaty with the Moroccan Empire brought little benefit to Spain. In fact, the war had represented a very high cost: the economic outlay went up to 35 million *pesetas*, while the Spanish army suffered 123 fatalities and 165 wounded soldiers. Yet the worst consequence was for Spain’s international prestige and, as had already happened in the War of Africa (1859-1860), the peace treaty signed in 1894 did little to help foster Spanish colonialism in Morocco.

However, the newspaper of the Godó brothers made a positive assessment of the War of Melilla. First of all, the war against the tribes of the Riff had generated an explosion of Spanish patriotism. Like many other pro-governmental newspapers, *La Vanguardia* welcomed this sociological phenomenon as a way of transcending class boundaries. Second, the incidents in Melilla contributed to fostering colonialism among Spain’s public opinion, one of the traditional claims of the *Africanist* movement. *La Vanguardia*, which gave proof of acting as the voice of these demands, took clear advantage of the conflict. The journalist, and Godó’s companion on the trip to Morocco, Josep Boada explained:

“Si bien lo que nos dan los moros no bastará á indemnizarnos de los gastos hechos, no por esto habrá sido infructuosa la campaña de Melilla. Con ella habremos logrado, cuando

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525 Later on, he would include this episode in his book *Allende el Estrecho* under the title “La embajada extraordinaria del General Martínez Campos á Marrakeix”. Josep Boada, op. cit., pp. 479-611.

526 “No volveré á España sin que el prestigio de mi patria y de su ejército esté más alto que las nubes. (...) Ó se daba cumplida la satisfacción á España, ó el decoro de su bandera y el prestigio de sus armas exigirían el empleo de remedios heroicos á despecho de todos y contra todos”. *Ibidem*, p. 607.

527 The peace treaty was signed on 5 March 1894. In it, the Sultan promised to control the tribes of the Riff and protect the Spanish possessions in Morocco. Additionally, he promised to pay an economic compensation of 20 million *Spanish pesetas*. In the end, none of these conditions were totally fulfilled.
menos, fijar la atención de nuestros estadistas sobre los asuntos de Marruecos, muy dignos de ser estudiados tanto por lo que afectan a nuestra misma nacionalidad cuanto por lo que, en día no lejano, puedan contribuir al mayor esplendor y engrandecimiento de nuestra patria.”

The brothers Godó, who had important interests in Tangier, therefore used their newspaper to exert pressure in favour of a more active presence of Spain in Morocco. The public subscription promoted by La Vanguardia and the wide coverage that the newspaper gave to the conflict, can be seen as clear examples of this position. Moreover, the War of Melilla proved to be an illustrative example of the new commercial orientation La Vanguardia had adopted since 1888. In order to be successful, the way news was presented became fundamental, and this demonstrates the growing commercial orientation La Vanguardia was adopting. If the newspaper was to attract new readers and advertisers, then reflecting the new tastes of society was crucial. This change in consumption modes was a distinctive feature of an incipient mass society. In England, for example, Gareth Stedman Jones stated that the new working class of the late nineteenth century became depoliticised “through focusing on a consumer and entertainment culture”. In Spain, the rise of “sensationalism” as a new and attractive way of reporting the news is an example of a similar trend.

In the case of La Vanguardia, a certain stereotypical image of “the Moor” also appeared to be greatly successful, even though it ran parallel to a certain curiosity about the customs of Moroccans. Still, the War of Melilla clarified that in Spain’s public imaginary the “orientalist” image was far less extended than the “war against the Moor”. This image would prove to hold a considerable potential to generate expressions of enthusiasm in domestic opinion, as this chapter has demonstrated on repeated occasions. That being said, it seems to me that the consequences of this enthusiasm should not be misunderstood: the popularity of the war did not necessarily imply that the ordinary people identified with the imperial

528 Josep Boada, op. cit., p. 611. [E.T.]: “Even if what we have finally received from the Moors will not compensate all the expenses, it does not necessarily mean that the campaign in Melilla has not been worthy. Thanks to this campaign, we have achieved, at least, to direct the attention of our statesmen to the matters in Morocco. In fact, these matters in Morocco are of great interest, because they affect our nationality and because in a future that is not so distant, they might contribute to give more splendour and glory to our motherland.”

529 Examining in more detail the private interests of the Godó family in Morocco goes beyond the goals of this chapter. Unfortunately, I have been unable to find further evidence about Godó’s plans to build a neighbourhood in Tangier. This suggests that for one reason or another, Godó’s plans were not realised. The lack of sources, however, makes it hard to explain the reasons for this.

projects of the Africanist movement. Likewise, even though the press contributed to popularising an understanding of Spanish identity based on the opposition against Moroccans, we might wonder to what extent this understanding of identity was actually consolidated – especially if we take into account the short-duration of the war (it only lasted three months). In fact, the case of the Republican press reveals that certain segments of society were sympathetic to the military intervention but also started seeing in it the hidden interests of liberal politicians. The Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898) eventually gave further evidence of this perception.531

While this provides evidence that readers were not passive actors, the case of the Republican press also demonstrates that patriotism could be instrumentalized to promote a political agenda. For the Republicans, the War of Melilla became an opportunity to criticise the Liberal government in public and to use the case of Morocco as a metaphor to justify Spain’s need of rejuvenation. Although the Republicans shared the same stereotyped vision of the Moroccans, and contributed to foster this image, this political movement evoked the growing disconnection between liberal politicians and the “nation”. Moreover, this idea was not only portrayed by the opponents of the political system, but also became present in La Vanguardia. On repeated occasions, the newspaper warned the government of the perils of “distancing [itself] from this national movement”. These types of calls reveal the widening gap between the “official” and the “real country”, this being one of the most recurring criticisms of liberal politics in those countries where clientelism was widely extended.

Although the Godó brothers were closely involved in liberal politics, the editorial independence of La Vanguardia allowed them to distance themselves from Sagasta’s Liberal Party. In contrast to the partisan press, which was at the service of the party structure, the non-partisan links of La Vanguardia allowed the Godó brothers to promote their particularistic views – especially in those cases where these views were against the official position of the Liberal Party. The need of a more long-term commitment towards Morocco and the defence of protectionist policies were two examples of this.

Finally, despite being little more than a minor conflict that barely lasted three months, the War of Melilla has the value of showing the important changes that newspapers were undergoing in Spain in the 1890s: above all, the transition from a partisan press towards a business orientation; and the important consequences that this evolution had – both in terms of content and the way news was presented. This transition was to change journalism’s

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531 See the next chapter.
traditional *raison d’être*: it was about attracting new readers and making profits, but also about endorsing private interests while doing so.
CHAPTER 4. BUSINESS, POLITICS AND THE PRESS IN SPAIN’S LOSS OF EMPIRE (1895-1898)

INTRODUCTION

4.1. BETWEEN BARCELONA AND CUBA: THE GODÓ FAMILY BUSINESS AND THE MECHANISMS OF INFLUENCE

4.2. PUBLIC OPINION AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN CUBA’S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1895)


CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION

The hegemony of liberal elites in Southern Europe is often associated with the mechanisms they used to monopolise power, like electoral legislation and clientelism. The liberal parties in fin de siècle Italy showed little interest in extending the franchise,\textsuperscript{532} while in Portugal their counterparts responded to the mobilisation of new social actors (above all, the Republicans) through franchise restriction.\textsuperscript{533} These reforms in electoral legislation – as well as the lack of them – reveal the liberal’s desire to retain exclusive hold over public office. Even in the case of Spain, where electoral legislation took a different direction and universal manhood suffrage was introduced in 1890, the rigging of elections continued to be the norm.\textsuperscript{534} Consequently, it can be argued that in all of these countries liberal elites showed little interest in integrating wider segments of society into the political system. Clientelism remained the main channel used by these elites to distribute public office among their network of supporters.

Nevertheless, the integration into patron-client networks did not always suffice to secure the private agendas of local elites. Liberal parties did not always share consensus on state issues, like foreign and economic policies. This lack of consensus implied that in order to secure their interests, local elites often developed alternative mechanisms besides – and in combination with – clientelism to exert pressure on central government. Thus the

\textsuperscript{532} Universal male suffrage was not introduced in Italy until 1912, considerably later than in other parts of Europe. One of the recurrent arguments liberals used to prevent the widening of the franchise was the population’s high illiteracy levels, which made them “unfit” to hold voting rights. Pier Luigi Ballini, ”Las leyes electorales italianas (1900-1923)”; R. A. Gutiérrez, R. Zurita, R. Camurri (eds.), Elecciones y cultura política en España e Italia (1890-1923), València, PUV, 2003, pp. 73-74. On Italy’s successive electoral laws: Pier Luigi Ballini, Le elezioni nella storia d’Italia dall’Unità al fascismo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1988; and Raffaele Romanelli, Le Regole del Gioco. Note sull’impianto del sistema elettorale in Italia (1848–1895), Quaderni Storici, Nuova Serie, 69, 1988, 3, pp. 685–725.

\textsuperscript{533} In contrast to the electoral law of 1878, which granted voting rights to 18% of the total population (and to 68% of the male population), the reform of 1895 drastically reduced this to 9.4% of the total population (and to 40% of the male population). Pedro Tavares Almeida, “Reformas electorales y dinámica política en el Portugal liberal (1851-1910)”, Salvador Forner (ed.), Democracia, elecciones y modernización en Europa. Siglos XIX y XX, Madrid, Cátedra, 1997, p. 103.

mechanisms that local elites designed to exert influence in centralised political systems constitute a major historiographical concern of the liberal period in Europe.\(535\)

This chapter will focus on the mechanisms of influence that the brothers Carlos and Bartolomé Godó used to secure their business interests in the Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico. While the two brothers migrated to the Basque Country in the mid-century to expand the family business (see Chapter 1), in the 1870s they had both settled in Barcelona and became textile manufacturers. The first part of this chapter will explain this process and examine how the strong colonial orientation of their business made the Godó brothers very dependent on the orientation of economic policies. The outcome was the design of different strategies, sometimes in collaboration with other elites, aimed at exerting pressure on central government.

The second part of this chapter will examine the growing importance of public opinion in the competition between different elites to impose their views in policy-making. This will be shown through the Cuban War of Independence (1895), a separatist insurrection that threatened Spain’s centuries-long presence in the Antilles. Among the different measures addressed at pacifying Cuba, changing the commercial laws became a possibility that successive governments started considering. In parallel, a growing proportion of Spanish society started showing a reluctance to contribute to the war effort. It was in the face of this double threat (the change of commercial laws and the opposition to the war) that the Godó brothers saw public opinion as a way to reverse the situation. By examining the ways in which they sought to do so, light will be shed on the role the public space played in the power strategies of elites.

Finally, the last part of this chapter will focus on the demise of the Spanish empire. The immediate reason behind this demise was the entry of the United States into what had been until then a separatist insurrection against colonial rule. Despite the fact that the United States clearly possessed superior military capabilities, in 1898 the Spanish government threw itself into war against this country. Different contemporaries referred to this as a suicidal move resulting from the pressure that both the press and the military had exerted on the government. This section will examine the role of the press in creating a public state of mind.

that was favourable to the war by popularising an imaginary of the nation based on jingoism. All these elements will be fundamental to address, in subsequent chapters of this thesis, the reasons that led many contemporaries to hold the press responsible for the loss of the empire and for the discredit of the liberal institutions.

As previous chapters have described, the brothers Carlos (1834-1897) and Bartolomé Godó Pié (1837-1895) were textile traders during their youth in Bilbao, the city where both men were married and where Carlos first entered politics. However, it was not until the 1870s that the two brothers were established as manufacturers and built a fortune.\(^{536}\) The secret behind this fortune consisted in specialising in a manufacture that the colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico needed in great quantity, but which had little tradition in Spain: namely, the manufacturing of jute bags.

Well until the first half of the 19\(^{th}\) century, jute was a little known fibre in most of industrialised Europe. The special climatic conditions that jute requires to be cultivated concentrated its production in the region of Bengal, in British India. Unlike cotton, jute’s sturdy composition had long prevented its use in the textile industry. However, things started changing during the Crimean War (1853-1856), when the shortage of Russian flax produced by the conflict generated new interest in the possibilities that jute could offer, particularly as a substitute for flax bags. Sugar, coffee, wheat and corn were all raw materials that were being consumed on a mass scale by that time and thus needed to be carried around the world in cheap but resistant containers. Dundee, in Scotland, was the first place in Europe to make use of the possibilities that jute could offer to satisfy this demand for manufactured sacks, indeed it soon came to be known as “Juteopolis”. The success of Dundee, the Crimean War, and the shortage of cotton during the American Civil War (1861-1865) propelled the jute industry. By the 1860s, the first jute mills were established in Germany, France and other countries in Europe, and in the United States too.\(^{537}\)

In contrast to these countries, in the last quarter of the 19\(^{th}\) century the manufacturing of jute was still a relatively new industry in Spain. The factories that used jute as a raw material were few and were mostly located in Bilbao, Valencia, and Barcelona – all of which

\(^{536}\) Bartolomé had lived in Barcelona since 1864, where he was in charge of the local branch of “Godó brothers and Company”. In the case of Carlos, his name did not appear in Bilbao’s municipal census after 1872, while notarial documents in Barcelona confirm that in 1875 he was living in this city – one of the reasons behind this might be the Third Carlist War (1872-1876), which had a direct impact in Bilbao. From that moment onwards, the two brothers always lived in Barcelona.

had a tradition in the manufacturing of esparto grass. Nonetheless, even in Catalonia where 84% of the Spanish textile industry was concentrated, jute manufacturing represented a very tiny sector. Of the estimated 106,000 workers that lived off the Catalan textile industry in 1890, only 8,000 of them worked in the industries that used flax, hemp, or jute (alone or combined) as their prime raw material. As this figure demonstrates, the manufacturing of jute was still a very modest activity in Spain.

The factory production of jute bags became the gap in the market that the Godó brothers sought to exploit. And their previous stay in Bilbao appears to have helped them to do so. In this city the Godó brothers had accumulated a small capital and learned about the jute industry through Bartolomé’s father-in-law. Once in Barcelona, they took advantage of this knowledge and became shareholders in a textile company called “Arañó, Rodón y Compañía”. The purpose of this company was the “manufacturing of yarn and fabrics made of linen, hemp and jute”. The Godó brothers eventually took control of the company and together with a new business associate named Pere Milà Pi (1838-1880) opened a new branch of the business consisting in the manufacturing of jute bags.

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538 This tradition in esparto grass is what fostered the interest in jute. As it has been noted, “esparto is to Spain what jute is to Pakistan”. Rakibuddin Ahmed, The Progress of the Jute Industry and Trade (1855-1966), Dacca, Pakistan Central Jute Committee, 1966, p. 219.

539 Carles Enrech, Indústria i ofici: conflicte social i jerarquies obreres a la Catalunya tèxtil (1881-1923), Bellaterra, Servei de Publicacions de la UAB, 2005, p. 110 and p. 103.

540 The imports of raw jute from Bengal (by then the world’s main jute supplier) provides further evidence of the small size of the Spanish jute industry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Quantity (in cwts.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6,745,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2,715,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,432,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>316,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>304,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>295,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>36,731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cwts = Centum Weight. The figures correspond to 1890 and 1891. G. T. Steward, op. cit., p. 172.

541 The jute industry had a certain tradition in Bilbao, due to the Atlantic trade this port maintained with England. Bartolomé Godó’s father-in-law (Francisco Brunet) was an example of a local businessman who had a business in the jute industry (and more precisely, the manufacturing of jute shoes). See Chapter 1.

542 “...D. Arañó Rodon y Compañía‘ con el capital de diez y ocho mil setecientos duros para dedicarse á la fabricacion y explotacion de los hilados y tejidos de yute căñamo ó lino y en general á todos los demás actos y operaciones de índole análoga ó necesarios para el objeto de la Compañía”. Ibidem. Italics added. The company had a total capital of 351,750 pesetas. Arxiu Històric de Protocolos de Barcelona (AHPB), Notary Jeroni Cahué i Ribas, 1875, vol 1r, 30 March 1875, pp. 528-535.

543 Carlos became one of the four company partners with a capital of 50,000 pesetas in 1875. His brother Bartolomé joined the company later, in 1877, with a capital of 31,750 pesetas. In 1880 the Godó brothers took control of the company and renamed it: “La Sociedad será en comandita con domicilio en esta ciudad y girará bajo la razon social de ‘Godó hermanos Milà y Compañía’, constituyéndola los socios siguientes: Sres. Don Carlos y Don Bartolomé Godó y Don Pedro Milà (...)”. AHPB, Jeroni Cahué i Ribas, vol. 4t, 17 August 1877, pp. 2534-2537; and vol. 28, t. 2, 4 May 1880, pp. 1292-1316, respectively. Pere Milà Pi (1838-1880) was a
The business strategy of the new company “Godó hermanos, Milà y Compañía” was clear: Spain’s overseas colonies in the Antilles (Cuba and Puerto Rico) possessed a highly specialised economy based on the production of raw materials, principally sugar, tobacco and coffee. Each year, the economy of the Antilles required huge amounts of packaging material, which had traditionally been wood packaging but was now starting to be replaced with the cheaper and more resistant jute bags.544 For the Godó brothers and their associate Pere Milà, the export of jute bags to the Spanish colonies in the Antilles consequently appeared as an untapped market with a great potential; all the more when one considers that Cuba was the first world producer of cane sugar in 1890.

To supply this market the “Godó brothers and Company” set up a big factory in Barcelona’s neighbour city of Sant Martí de Provençals. The factory was popularly known as “Els Sachs” (“bags”, in English), in reference to the activity to which it was dedicated.545 Every single day “Els Sachs” produced between 10,000 and 12,000 jute bags to be exported exclusively to the Spanish Antilles.546 To meet this large pace of production the factory had a 150cv steamship and 2,000 workers who worked in a multiple-shift system: two day shifts and one night shift. The working conditions were very precarious and the factory’s vast workforce was overwhelmingly female: 90% for the spinning process; a 100% in that of weaving; and the 91.4% in the case of jute bags.547 The vast majority of workers at “Els Sachs” were thus women who received lower wages than men and they were employed to keep production costs as low as possible.548

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544 As one economic report noted, speaking of the jute industry: “La sustitución de los envases de madera por la saquería para el transporte de azúcares, café, cacao y otros frutos coloniales, ha contribuido y contribuye hoy mismo en gran manera á impulsar los adelantos de esta industria.” Arxiu Històric de Foment del Treball Nacional (AHFTN), Fomento del Trabajo Nacional. Los dos primeros meses de fusión, Barcelona, Imprenta de Henrich y Cª, 1889, p. 16.

545 The factory was located on the street called Wad-Ras nº 192. It had a total surface area of 9,022 m$^2$ and was complemented by different warehouses (3,021 m$^2$) and a piece of land (5,549 m$^2$). AHPB, Manuel Borras i de Palau, 1897, vol. 3, 09/09/1897, pp. 2911-2936. For all these assets, “Godó brothers and Company” paid 1,939 pesetas in real estate taxes in 1886. This sum represented the 20th highest contribution of all the industries that existed in Sant Martí de Provençals. J. Nadal and Xavier Tafunell, Sant Martí de Provençals, pulmó industrial de Barcelona (1847-1992), Barcelona, Columna, 1996, p. 302.

546 As one commercial guide noted: “La maquinaria de sus varias cuadras, en las cuales trabajan unos 2,000 obreros, está movida por fuerza de vapor debida á una poderos máquina de triple expansión. Por su grandiosidad y por su perfecta organización es uno de los primeros establecimientos del Llano de Barcelona. En la misma fábrica hay un departamento especial de cunas, en el cual son cuidadas y asistidas las criaturas de las operarias ocupadas en el trabajo”. Josep Roca i Roca, Barcelona en la mano. Guía de Barcelona y sus alrededores, Barcelona, Enrique López, 1895, p. 347.
For the Godó’s plans to expand their business in the jute industry, politics became decisive. The reason for this is that while the export of jute bags to the colonies depended on a series of duty tariffs charging foreign production, liberal parties did not share an agreement on the need to maintain these tariffs. In fact, the confrontation between the supporters of free-trade policies and those in favour of protectionism became one of the major political controversies in 19th-century Spain. Although this was a widespread debate in Europe, which scholars have explained as a response to globalization, in Spain it was a debate that became very heated. The reason for this is that the two main parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, could not agree on a common and long-lasting economic policy. While the Conservatives of Cánovas del Castillo embraced protectionism, the Liberals of Sagasta were quicker to defend free trade (albeit with a few exceptions, like the politician Germán Gamazo). In contrast to the divisions between the Conservatives and Liberals, the importance of the textile industry in Catalonia created a wide consensus among the politicians of this region on the need to defend protectionism. This consensus among Catalan representatives went beyond partisan adscription and made room for a collective lobbying strategy known as “diputació catalana”. This strategy had a long tradition and consisted in a corporate strategy in politics: every time a debate over tariffs was at stake, Catalan deputies gathered together to defend protectionism in Congress, regardless of their political affiliation or the position of their respective party.

Because the business of the Godó brothers was dependent upon maintaining duty tariffs, they participated in the actions of Catalan elites aimed at lobbying the government about policy-making on several occasions. In this regard, the case of the Godó brothers provides a valuable opportunity to examine a crucial element of liberal politics in Europe – namely, the mechanisms local elites used to exert pressure on central government. The following pages will examine two different – though complementary – strategies that the Godó brothers implemented to secure their business in Cuba, as part of the “diputació catalana”.

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552 Since the 1830s, if not earlier, the Catalan elites started to make use of coalitions between different institutions to defend protectionism. Ernest Lluch has already documented these practices for the period of Spanish history known as “Trienio Liberal” (1820-1823). Ernest Lluch, *El pensament econòmic a Catalunya (1760-1840). Els orígens ideològics del proteccionisme i la presa de consciència de la burgesia catalana*, Barcelona, edicions 62, 2009 [1st ed. 1973].
catalana” they supported. These strategies consisted, on the one hand, in the adscription to the Liberal Party; and, on the other, on business associativism. These two strategies were eventually reinforced by a third one: journalism, through the establishing of La Vanguardia in 1881.

The first mechanism the Godó brothers used to defend their economic interests in the colonies were the patron-client networks of the Liberal Party. The private correspondence of Víctor Balaguer (the leader of the party in Catalonia, and the Minister of Ultramar in the government of Sagasta during the Democratic Sexennium) contains numerous requests from Bartolomé Godó. All these requests were written in the 1870s and touched upon the same issue: the tariffs concerning the trade between Spain and the colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico. As Chapter 1 showed, Godó displayed an attitude of allegiance towards Balaguer in the party’s leadership. The private correspondence of Balaguer reveals that in return for this personal allegiance, Godó obtained first-hand information on colonial tariffs. The links of personal dependence (“political friendship”), upon which cadre parties were structured, were thus crucial in connecting the interests of elites on the periphery with central government. Moreover, besides promoting his private interests Godó also acted as an intermediary of the broader economic interests. The personal acquaintance he held with Balaguer became the channel through which local concerns were expressed; both in the form of job recommendations and concerns about economic policies related to Cuba. The case of Godó reveals to what extent patron-client relationships were an important channel for local elites to reach Madrid, and to secure group interests in the colonies.

553 For example, in May 1870 Godó wrote to Balaguer under the following terms: “Muy Sor mio me tomo la libertad de dirigirle la presente para que se sirva decirme si en el ministerio de Ultramar han llegado los nuevos aranceles de aduana confeccionados en la Intendencia de la Ysla de Cuba, pues en caso de ser así saldrá una comision de industriales y comerciantes para esa con el objeto de hacer presente al gobierno lo que perjudicaría á la industria nacional puesto que se impone derecho a muchas mercancías que nada pagan en el arancel vigente de aquella Ysla, ó bien algo que pudiese afectar los intereses de la misma. Siento molestar la atencion de V. pero creo se convencera del buen dese que me guia. Y en espera de su grata contestacion tengo la alta satisfaccion de ofrecerme de V. atento (...).” Arxiu Biblioteca Museu Víctor Balaguer (ABMVB), Private Correspondence between Víctor Balaguer and Bartolomé Godó. Letter nº. 7000524 (20 May 1874).

554 “(...) aunque no es mi costumbre escribir á los amigos, cuando estan en puestos oficiales, por no estorbarles de sus muchos que aseres, sin embargo hoy lo hago por encargo de amigos del circulo [Liberal] y fuera del circulo, para que V que deberá tener una parte activa en los empleados y autoridades, que se nombra para esta Provincia, hay a todo lo que dependa de V para que sean individuos sin tacha y las autoridades, muy enerjicas, y al desirlo yo esto no es que dude ni un momento, de su vuena (sic) voluntad en todo lo que atañe á esta provincia, pero muchos de los buenos amigos que tiene V en esta, disen que no debe V permitir que se abuse de su bondad tocante á recomendaciones. Sobre los asuntos de Ultramar, debe mirarse muy especialmente la cuestion economica, y como en esta Provincia hay tantos intereses, en aquellas Yslas, se está muy á la mira de las resoluciones, y nombramientos que puede V aser. Dispense V de haberme atrevido en haserle siertos indicasiones, pero todas son hijas de mis buenos deseos con V y ya sabe puede mandar a este su amigo (...).” ABMVB, Letter nº. 7400359 (15 January 1874). The numerous grammatical mistakes in this letter are indicative of Godó’s lack of education (see Chapter 1).
The second strategy the Godó brothers used to secure their business in Cuba consisted in their membership of the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional”. As the most important association of economic elites in Catalonia, with up to 1,800 members, the Fomento’s main goal was advocating protectionist policies. Bartolomé Godó was one the founding members of this institution, created in 1869, and his brother Carlos joined soon afterwards. Within the different sections that the “Fomento” comprised the Godó brothers turned its “section number 5”, which was in charge of controlling the tariffs concerning “flax, hemp, and jute”, into the family’s personal domain. Hence, Carlos Godó was first appointed as vice-president of this section in 1880, and his brother Bartolomé followed him shortly after. Later on, the second generation of the family “inherited” the same position in the “Fomento”. The reasons for the Godó’s interest in controlling this section were twofold: first, through this section they obtained direct information on tariffs concerning the jute industry; and, second, they were placed in a favourable position to exert pressure on tariff policy. This reveals that in addition to patron-client relationships, business associativism was also central for elites to secure their private interests.

The establishing of La Vanguardia, in 1881, can be considered a further step forward in the Godó’s attempt to secure protectionist policies. Their position on economic policy went against the mainstream of the Liberal Party, which mostly stood for free-trade policies. It was in their attempt to make this dissent in economic policy visible that the Godó brothers used the press. Hence, in the very first edition of La Vanguardia, the newspaper’s total commitment to Sagasta’s Liberal Party was proclaimed, but it was also

555 Unfortunately there are no scholarly works about this entity for the period here concerned. Guillem Graell, Historia del Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, Barcelona, Imp. de la viuda de Luis Tasso, 1910. For a later period, see: Magda Sellés Quintana, El Foment del Treball Nacional, 1914-1923, Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 2000.
556 AHFTN, Foment de la Producció Nacional. Llibre d’Actes. Juntes Generals (09-01-1869/06-07-1879), p. 2. This employer association was the result of the merging of two entities in 1889: the “Fomento de la Producción Nacional” (established in 1869, Godó was involved in its foundation) and the “Instituto del Trabajo Nacional” (1879).
558 See the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
560 Besides the case of Sagasta, another Liberal politician who became a renowned supporter of free-trade policies was Segismundo Moret. Carlos Ferrera, La frontera democrática del liberalismo. Segismundo Moret (1838-1913), Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2002. As already noted, German Gamazo was an exception. The case of this Liberal politician reveals to what extent protectionism also constituted an important demand of local elites in Castile. See: E. Calzada del Amo, op. cit.; María del Pilar Calvo Caballero, “Defensa de intereses y cultura de la patronal castellano-leonesa (1876-1931)”, Valladolid, Universidad de Valladolid, 1999 [doctoral thesis, unpublished].
stated in very clear terms that this would not prevent it from supporting protectionism at all costs:

“Manifiestas nuestras aspiraciones en el órden político, cumple á nuestro deber consignar de manera que no deje lugar á duda, nuestras ideas respecto á la mas trascendental de las cuestiones económicas. Lucharemos sin tregua ni descanso por la proteccion al trabajo nacional. No pertenecemos al número de los que desean la libertad de comercio que nos convertiria en esclavos de otras naciones; y tenemos en tanto nuestra independencia, que no la queremos hacer objeto de codicia de modernos cartagineses. (...) la dignidad y el patriotismo exigen que enarbolemos la bandera de la proteccion, sólida garantía de los mas preciados intereses.” 561

The fact that the newspaper’s editorial line was expressed in such clear terms reveals that as well as the aspiration of challenging the leadership of the Liberal Party in Barcelona, 562 La Vanguardia was established to oppose the party’s official free-trade policies. To give an example of this, during the same month La Vanguardia was established Sagasta’s Liberal Party reached power for the first time in the Restoration (1874-1923). By then the Spanish economy had suffered a series of difficulties (above all, a crisis in agriculture) and Sagasta, who already stood for free-trade policies in the Sexennium (1868-1874), 563 saw in these policies a solution to the economic situation. This became particularly clear in 1882 when Sagasta’s Liberal government started negotiating the trade agreements between Spain and France. The fear that the reduction of tariffs on French imports might harm the Catalan industry resulted in several demonstrations in this region (including massive forms of protest, like the closing of shops) and paved the way for another mobilisation of Catalan deputies under the so-called “diputació catalana”. 564

561 [E.T.] “Now that we have expressed our opinion in the political order, it is our duty to express in the clearest terms our ideas about the most important of all economic issues. We are going to fight tirelessly for the protection of the national “industry”. We do not belong to those who stay for free trade, for this would turn us into slaves of other nations; and we have independence to such a high degree that we do not want to be subject to the greed of modern Carthaginians. (...) dignity and patriotism require us to hoist the banner of protection, which is the best warranty for the most precious interests.” “LA VANGUARDIA”, LV, 01/02/1881, p. 2. In another article of the same edition, entitled “Nuestro criterio economico” (“Our criteria in economy”), the newspaper reinforced the commitment to protectionism.

562 See Chapter 1.

563 On Sagasta’s position in economic policy during the Democratic Sexennium (1868-1874), see: José Luis Ollero Valdés, Sagasta de conspirador a gobernante, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2006, pp. 171-193; and pp. 242-245.

Bartolomé Godó participated in this form of collective action of Catalan politicians in his capacity as deputy of Igualada. Godó joined the demonstrations that were organised against the plans of the Liberal government; and later on he joined other Catalan politicians in Congress to vote against the signing of the new commercial treaty with France.565 During the parliamentary session Godó openly opposed the discourses of his own party, and later on he held a “long conversation” with Prime Minister Sagasta on the need to maintain duty tariffs on French imports.566 Bartolomé’s behaviour illustrates to what extent personal interests (e.g. the need to secure commercial tariffs) went before the discipline of cadre parties. It was in the face of this situation, when private interests clashed with the party’s official position, that the press became a valuable instrument to publicize dissent. Indeed, if La Vanguardia was established to challenge the leadership of Rius in Barcelona’s Liberal Party branch, it rapidly became a platform for the local members to express their opposition to the party’s official position in economic policy.567 This provides further evidence that in addition to patron-client relationships, the press became another instrument the elites used to secure their private interests; especially when there was a desire to make the dissent visible in public.

565 The Fomento addressed a letter to Godó and to other Catalan deputies asking them to attend the voting in Congress: “(...) la gran necesidad que en los momentos actuales existe de que todos los Diputados catalanes se encuentren en la Corte. El Instituto en nombre de la causa que representa tiene que recordarle la gran minoría en que se encuentran los Diputados proteccionistas en el Congreso, y lo premioso de las circunstancias actuales. El trabajo nacional le quedará altamente reconocido si haciendo un sacrificio se traslada en estos momentos a la Corte, para asistir a la votación del tratado y de las enmiendas presentadas”. AHFTN, Comunicaciones, nº 5, letter 4 April 1882; J. Palomas i M. Bravo, op. cit., p. 34. With the exception of one deputy, who was ill, the rest of them attended the vote (including Godó). LV, 10/04/1882, pp. 15-16.

566 “Ha hablado en contra el señor Moret, que ha sido interrumpido varias veces por los señores Godó, Torres [editor of La Vanguardia], Quintana, Roger y otros diputados”; “(...) el señor Sagasta, presidente del Consejo, con quien ha conferenciado tambien largo rato el diputado catalan señor Godó. En ambas entrevistas se han continuado las gestiones activísimas que se vienen practicando en pró de la produccion general y de las cuales se esperan buenos resultados”. LV, 02/06/1882, p. 18; and 10/04/1882, p. 9, respectively.

567 To give an example of this, La Vanguardia criticised the bad treatment that newspapers from Madrid gave to demands in favour of protectionism with the following words [here quoted in Spanish]: “En exceso procaz y agresiva contra Cataluña se muestra una parte considerable de la prensa de Madrid, especialmente la adicta y la benévola, tomando para sus censuras el más excusable de los motivos y escogiendo para lanzarlas el más inoportuno de los momentos. ¿No es para Cataluña cuestion de vida ó muerte la aprobacion ó desaprobacion del infausto tratado negociado (...)? ¿Somos algunos párías los catalanes para negarnos el derecho de quejarnos y de elevar nuestra voz contra un convenio que nos arruina? (...) Nos consideramos hijos de España y con tanto valor y dignidad como nuestros hermanos, cuya armonía de intereses anhelamos, y no tratamos de explotarlos en ventaja nuestra, segun quieren hacer comprender nuestros detractores.” “A una provocación”, LV, 10/04/1882, p. 7.
4.2. Public Opinion and Economic Policy in Cuba’s War of Independence

If the editorials of the early days of *La Vanguardia* were addressed at pressuring the leaders of the Liberal Party, the Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898) revealed the Godó’s interest in conveying the same demands to a broader audience. With the aim of reaching an audience beyond the members of the political community, adopting an independent editorial line in 1888 became decisive. As the second section of this chapter will show, addressing new readers implied adopting a series of new journalistic practices to make the newspaper’s content more accessible. All these strategies were aimed at increasing readership, while at the same time contained the aspiration of “guiding” public opinion.

The Cuban War of Independence symbolically started on February 1895, when an insurrection took place in the Cuban town of Baire. This insurrection initially raised little attention in Spain. The number of insurgents was small, the Spanish newspapers said, and the killing and arrest of some of its leaders indicated that the events in Cuba were mostly under control.\(^{568}\) In the case of Barcelona, far more attention was paid to a different issue, also related to Cuba: namely, the new attempt of Sagasta’s Liberal Government to change the commercial laws concerning Spain and the Antilles.\(^{569}\) Although the Catalan elites traditionally showed great concern about maintaining tariff duties, in 1895 the situation reached a critical point. As news arrived from Madrid about a meeting between the Liberal minister Romero Robledo and the Cuban deputies to reform the commercial laws, unrest spread rapidly among the Catalan elites. The senators and deputies of this region were summoned to the headquarters of the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional” to discuss the situation.\(^{570}\) The conclusion they reached was put in clear terms: any reform to the existing commercial laws between Spain and Cuba would endanger the prosperity of the Catalan industry.\(^{571}\)

The economic ties between the Catalan industry and Cuba had a long tradition, reaching back to the 18th century, but had intensified enormously in the late 19th century. Especially in 1882, a series of tariffs were established that greatly benefited the trade with the colonies: while foreign products entering the Spanish colonies were subject to heavy duties


\(^{570}\) “Reunión importante”, LV, 24/02/1895, p. 5.

\(^{571}\) *Ibidem.*
(of around 40%), Spanish exports to the colonies, by contrast, incurred far lower duties (between 11-12%). All these measures clearly favoured Spanish exports and decisively contributed to turning the colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines into a fabulous market for Spanish manufacturers. In fact, in all of Europe only England exported more to her colonies than Spain did to her own. The economic dependency of exports on the colonial market became acute in the country’s most industrialised region, Catalonia. For manufacturers in this region, who faced serious difficulties to compete with foreign production, the protected market of Spanish overseas colonies became a great gateway for their manufactures. Thus, while the trade with the colonies had traditionally been particularly fruitful, the passing of new protective tariffs in 1886 multiplied by five times the volume of exports of cotton manufactures to the colonies in the following decade. Cuba was undoubtedly the chief market for these exports, and this earned the island the meaningful nickname of the “pearl of the Antilles”.

It is no surprise, in consequence, that when rumours spread in 1895 about the new intention of the Liberal government to change the commercial laws between Spain and its colonies that Catalan politicians were rapidly summoned to the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional”. Among the people who attended this meeting was Carlos Godó (1834-1897). Carlos officially attended the meeting as deputy of the Liberal Party in Congress (he had been elected in 1893), but he was also a businessman with direct interests in the Cuban market. At the time Carlos was running the jute factory he had established together with his brother Bartolomé and their business associate Pere Milà in the 1870s. According to the description in a commercial guide of 1895, it was the most important factory in the country dedicated to the manufacturing of jute bags for the Spanish Antilles. Because of the great importance of

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572 In the period 1892-1896 the colonial market amounted to 24% of the total Spanish exports. Jordi Maluquer de Motes, El mercado colonial antillano en el siglo XIX, in Jordi Nadal and Gabriel Tortella (eds.), Agricultura, comercio colonial y crecimiento económico en la España contemporánea, Barcelona, Ariel, 1972, pp. 322-357; César Yáñez, El perfil ultramarí de l’economia catalana, in Josep Mª Fradera (ed.), Catalunya i Ultramar. Poder i negoci a les colònies espanyoles (1750-1914), Barcelona, Museu Marítim-Ambit, 1995, pp. 53-76; José A. Piqueras, Cuba, emporio y colonia. La disputa de un mercado interferido (1878-1895), Madrid, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003.

573 Further statistics can be found in: Borja de Riquer, Lliga Regionalista: la burgesia catalana i el nacionalisme (1898-1904), Barcelona, Edicions 62, pp. 63-65.

574 “Gran fábrica de hilados y tejidos de yute, la más importante de España. Utiliza procedimientos privilegiados y produce entre otros artículos una enorme cantidad de saquería, en su mayor parte destinada á la exportación á América.”. Josep Roca i Roca, Barcelona en la mano. Guía de Barcelona y sus alrededores, Barcelona, Enrique López, 1895, p. 347.
the colonial market for his business, Godó participated actively in the various meetings dedicated to examining the events in Cuba.575

Godó’s commitment to defending protectionist policies, however, was not limited to business associativism, but also extended to the field of journalism. La Vanguardia gave wide coverage to all the protests of the Catalan manufacturers and portrayed the Cuban insurrection as an action aimed at pressuring the Spanish government to change the commercial laws. This understanding of the Cuban insurrection was influenced by the official accounts of the Liberal government, who initially hoped to hide the extent of the separatist insurrection by presenting it as an act of banditry. In the face of the events, La Vanguardia condemned the insurrection as being motivated by selfish interests, and urged the government not to yield to them.576 Yet, the need to publicise the reasons for opposing any changes in the commercial laws to new publics was as important as pressuring the government. As the separatist insurrection grew in intensity, La Vanguardia started publishing a series of articles under the title of “La Información cubana” (“Information on Cuba”). As the newspaper explained to its readers on the first day these articles started being published:

“Hemos creído oportuno, ya que se ofrece al debate una cuestión tan importante y compleja como el régimen comercial que conviene establecer entre las provincias de Ultramar y la Península, abrir en nuestras columnas una información popular, á fin de que pueda estudiarse algo á fondo el problema y ser más fácil el darle una solución justa.” 577

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575 For instance, the meeting held by another employer’s association named “Liga de Productores”: “Ha sido enviado á Madrid el siguiente telegrama: Congreso Diputados Madrid. —Sala, Rusiñol, Planas y Casals, Bustillo, Monroig, Godó y Sol. Liga Productores Principado Cataluña como protestó proyecto autorización para revisión aranceles peninsulares protesta hoy autorización para reformar aranceles antillanos y aplaude su enmienda relativa aplicación derechos transitorios. (...)”. LV, 03/04/1895, p. 2. On this employer association, see: Jordi Planas i Maresma, La Lliga de Productors de Catalunya i els interessos agraris (1894-1898), Recerques, 47-48, 2003-2004, pp. 155-186.

576 “(...) ese movimiento de los laborantes cubanos, cuya falta de importancia reconocen todos hasta ahora, Gobierno, opinión y prensa, y hasta cuya índole política anda puesta en duda, no sirva de pretexto, ó no amilane realmente al Gobierno y le ha ga ir en sus reformas arancelarias más allá de lo que permiten los intereses vitales de la patria española. Con revuelta ó sin revuelta Cuba española no puede ir en sus reivindicaciones mercantiles más allá que cualquiera de sus hermanas las provincias peninsulares (...). Reformas y concesiones que se aparten de ese espíritu de igualdad y de reciprocidad entre las provincias antillanas y las peninsulares, y que tomen por pretexto un movimiento de opinión en Cortes ó un movimiento de una docena de laborantes, no solo entrañarían verdadera gravedad contra la justicia, sino contra los intereses de la patria española.” “La agitación en Cuba”, in LV, 28/02/1895, p. 1-2.

577 “Información cubana. Ropa hecha. Antecedentes”, LV, 05/03/1895, p. 5. Italics added. [E.T.]: “We have thought it was convenient, now that a debate has started on such an important and complex issue like the commercial laws that shall be introduced between the provinces of Ultramar and the Peninsula, to dedicate to it a column of popular information, so the problem can be studied in detail and be given a fair solution”.

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As this paragraph illustrates, *La Vanguardia* was concerned that the public became aware of the debate that was taking place. The newspaper did not limit itself to providing the latest news about the political debate (on the page it dedicated daily to publishing the telegraphs arriving from Madrid and La Habana), but also made an effort to attract the interest of a “popular” audience to this topic. Every article of “La Información cubana” was conducted as an interview with businessmen holding commercial relations with the Antilles, who explained the characteristics of their business. An example of these articles was the interview with a businessman called Mr. Baldés, who was in the shirt industry. Before commencing the interview, the journalist of *La Vanguardia* set the tone by stressing “the importance that shirt production has in this country, not just because it has successfully rejected the entry of foreign production, but also because it has conquered our own markets in Ultramar and some in South America”. Mr. Baldés then expressed his opinion on the economic debate affecting the Antilles in very clear terms: “The withdrawal of the commercial laws between Spain and the provinces of Ultramar would truly be a disaster for Spain and especially for Catalonia, as far as the manufacture of shirts is concerned. The number of families that live on the jobs our industry provides is incalculable”.

As the interview with Mr. Baldés illustrates, the people interviewed in *La Vanguardia* were mostly small entrepreneurs who were dedicated to the textile industry (tailors of cloths, ties, hats, etc.) who conducted business with Cuba. These were the kinds of businesses that many readers of *La Vanguardia* could identify with, especially given the fact that the majority of readers of this newspaper belonged to the diverse ranks of the Catalan bourgeoisie. As this newspaper confessed, on repeated occasions, the goal of the articles published under the title “La Información cubana” was:

“(…) abrir una información popular, no ya para instrucción de la comisión arancelaria antillana, sino para llevar á la opinión pública el convencimiento de que para los intereses generales, tanto peninsulares como antillanos, conviene que el actual régimen de relaciones comerciales sea mantenido en su afirmación capital (...)”.  

578 “Es este ramo importantsísimo en nuestro país, no ya porque ha conseguido cerrar las fronteras á los productos extranjeros, sino porque ha logrado además conquistar nuestros mercados propios de Ultramar y algunos sudamericanos”. “Información cubana. Camisería”, LV, 10/03/1895, p. 1.
580 On the reader profile of *La Vanguardia*, see Chapter 2.
581 “Información cubana. Corbatería”, LV, 12/03/1895, p. 5. Italics added. [E. T.]: “(…) to open a [section] of popular information, not so much to instruct the tariff commission on the Antilles, but to bring public opinion to the conviction that for the sake of the general interests, both from the Peninsula and the Antilles, it is convenient that the nature of the current system of commercial laws should be maintained (...).”
In consequence, the mission of *La Vanguardia* was no longer limited to pressuring the government – even though this remained central – but was combined with the ambition to address wider segments of opinion. While this ambition had started becoming evident since *La Vanguardia’s* transformation of 1888 when it became an independent newspaper, both the War of Melilla (1893) and the Cuban War of Independence (1895) revealed the introduction of new journalistic practices to achieve this goal.\(^{582}\) This new interest in targeting a broader segment of society revealed that *La Vanguardia’s* function as an independent newspaper was not limited to delivering neutral information to their readers (“*facts, facts and facts*”, as the newspaper proclaimed in 1888), but also included the ambition of “guiding” public opinion. In other words, the Cuban War of Independence provided further evidence that *La Vanguardia’s* mission was not limited to mirroring the interests of its readers; it also consisted in waking the interest of those readers on certain issues and influencing the opinion they should have about them.

The two paragraphs quoted above on “*La información cubana*” exemplify how opinion formation and the search for new publics were combined. The use of an accessible language (the interview) and an informal format (personal stories) were two journalistic techniques aimed at making the content of the newspaper easier to read for a wider public. The case of *La Vanguardia* consequently reveals that despite the fact that large sections of the population were excluded from politics by means of clientelism, and illiteracy rates were still high,\(^ {583}\) businessmen like the Godó brothers were sensitive to the role that public opinion could play in political debates. The press thus constituted a key mechanism used by economic elites to publicise their agenda to broader segments of society; and, in parallel, they used the calls to an imaginary “public opinion” as a pretext to pressure the government.

As it began to become evident that the insurrection in Cuba was more serious than a simple act of banditry, the Godó brothers made great efforts to appeal to the broadest public possible to secure their business interests. Despite the initial attempts of the Liberal government to play down the scope of the insurrection, in March 1895 the call to war was officially announced in Spain. The first troops were sent to fight the Cuban insurrection and the Congress approved a special budget to cover the war expenditure. As the Prime Minister

\(^{582}\) For the War of Melilla, see Chapter 3, section 3.3. (“Orientalism as a new commodity for readers”).

\(^{583}\) Illiteracy rates in Spain amounted to 59% of the population in 1900. Significant differences existed in terms of gender (47% illiteracy in the case of men, and 69% in the case of women) and between urban and rural areas. Illiteracy rates in Barcelona, for instance, were lower and amounted to 48% of the population (38% in the case of men, 57% in the case of women). M. Vilanova Ribas y X. Moreno Julià, *Atlas de la evolución del analfabetismo en España de 1887 a 1981*, Madrid, MEC, 1992, p. 166; Francesc Espinet i Joan Manuel Tresserras, *La gènesi de la societat de masses a Catalunya, 1888-1939*, Barcelona, UAB, p. 69, n. 127.
declared, Spain “was ready to spend the last peseta and the last drop of blood of her sons in defence of her rights and of her territory”.

The explanation for such strong sentiments was that Cuba was a sensitive part of Spain’s public imaginary. Rather than a colony, the island was regarded as an integral part of the Spanish territory that belonged to the so-called “provinces of Ultramar”.

At this point the danger was not limited to the possible reduction of protective tariffs, but to the loss of Cuba from the Spanish empire. In the face of this situation La Vanguardia did not hesitate in fully supporting the action of the Spanish army to maintain Cuba at all costs. As this newspaper asserted, “Catalonia and Barcelona are the most concerned of all the peninsular regions in that the national flag shall always wave in the biggest [island] of the Antilles, a precious reminder of our vast American empire”. Still, for the Godó’s newspaper the war was not something to be proud of. In the view of this newspaper the majority of the Spanish did not want to go to war because it stemmed from a misunderstanding between two parts of the same nation. Indeed, the apprehension about a war in what was considered to be part of the Spanish territory is what led La Vanguardia to present the conflict as something that was particularly painful, but nonetheless necessary.

This “unpleasant necessity” became manifest in the comparisons La Vanguardia drew with the recent War of Melilla of 1893. The memories of this conflict (studied in Chapter 3) inevitably came back in March 1895. As soldiers were in Barcelona’s harbour boarding the ships that would take them to Cuba, La Vanguardia noted how distressing this scene was; and compared it with the recent war in Morocco:

“Barcelona presenció el viernes por la mañana el embarque de dos batallones para la isla de Cuba, en donde ha resonado nuevamente el grito de rebeldía contra la madre patria.

Ir á Melilla á combatir el infiel, al tradicional enemigo de España resultaba menos

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584 On March the 3rd the Liberal Government made the decision to send an expedition of 17,000 soldiers. For the special war budget, and the details on the sending of the first troops, see: Fernando Soldevila, El Año Político 1895, Madrid, Imprenta de Enrique Fernández de Rojas, 1896, p. 83 and 87, respectively.


586 In terms of economic policy, La Vanguardia proposed the cabotage system to satisfy the Cuban demands while maintaining protectionist policies. The cabotage system consisted in abolishing the tariffs in the trade between the colonies and the Metropolis. This system was already proposed in the commercial reform of 1882, but ultimately it was not approved. In contrast to other newspapers in Barcelona, like the Catalan nationalists, La Vanguardia made no favourable references to giving autonomy to Cuba. On the links between the Cuban insurrection and the birth of Catalan nationalism, see: Carlos Serrano, “Diversités régionales et régionalismes péninsulaires face à la guerre de Cuba (1895-1898)”; in C. Dumas (ed.), Nationalisme et littérature en Espagne et en Amérique Latine au XIXe siècle, Lille, 1982, pp. 99-120; and Enric Ucelay-da Cal, Cuba y el despertar de los nacionalismos en la España peninsular, Studia historica. Historia contemporánea, Nº 15, 1997, pp. 151-192.
Las páginas de los periódicos eran centrales en fomentar el comportamiento patriótico, pero también en esconder posibles formas de oposición a la guerra. Diferentes académicos han demostrado que grandes sectores de la clase popular estaban contrarios a la guerra de Cuba de 1895, especialmente debido al sistema desigual de reclutamiento militar. Sin embargo, los hermanos Godó, buscaron esconder esta oposición popular en La Vanguardia, porque se iba en contra de sus intereses económicos en Cuba. Por lo tanto, el poco entusiasmo que la partida de tropas dio en Barcelona no fue presentado en La Vanguardia como una indicación de cierta relucencia sobre la guerra, sino que fue justificada por el “desagradable” carácter que la gente, presumiblemente, consideraba que esta guerra tenía. En contraste con la guerra contra el “Mohos”, que La Vanguardia presentó como un conflicto razonable (ya que combatir a los Moriscos constituía)

La semana en Barcelona”, LV, 10/03/1895, p. 4. Italics added. [E. T.]: “On Friday morning Barcelona witnessed the boarding of two battalions to Cuba, where again has echoed the cry of rebellion against the motherland. Going to Melilla to fight against the infidel, the traditional enemy of Spain was not as unpleasant as going to Cuba to fight against the ill-advised brother who, at a moment of obfuscation, forgets its duties towards the generous nation who at the peak of its glories sacrificed to give birth to a new world. As long as one atom of gratitude exists, Cuba will remain Spanish. The sending of troops to the African coast gave place to great moments of enthusiasm, to noisy demonstrations of public passion, to cheers and shouts. For these soldiers embodied one of the most long standing aspirations of the Spanish nation. In contrast the boarding of the two battalions to Cuba was seen with some regret, but neither because someone thinks that the rebellion should not be fought; nor because there is one single Spanish soldier who is not ready to the biggest sacrifice to assure the integrity of the national patrimony, but simply because it hurts and it is always sad any fight between brothers, any bloody collision between the sons of the same mother.” Italics added.

588 De acuerdo con el sistema predominante, los soldados fueron seleccionados por sorteo. La conscripción podría haber sido evitada al pagar una multa. Como resultado de este sistema, el esfuerzo de guerra pesó sobre las hombros de las clases populares y las guerras coloniales se volvieron poco populares entre esta segmento de sociedad. Evasión de la conscripción se convirtió en particularmente común en regiones como Galicia, Asturias y Cataluña, mientras que en otros lugares, como Castellón y partes de Castilla, el número de desertores fue menor. Carlos Serrano, Prófugos y desertores en la guerra de Cuba, Estudios de Historia Social, nº 22-23, 1982, pp. 253-278; Núria Sales, Sobre esclavos, reclutas y mercaderes de quintos, Esplugues de Llobregat, Ariel, 1974.
“one of the more lasting and vivid aspirations of the Spanish nation”), the newspaper presented the war in Cuba as a regrettable misunderstanding between brothers. For Cubans were “ill-advised brothers”, yet brothers nevertheless. This case illustrates that the power of newspaper editors as political actors consisted in their capacity to select which issues were given public visibility and which others were silenced, according to their private agenda.

Carlos Godó had good reasons indeed to use the press to publicise the war effort in favourable terms. In contrast to the majority of Catalan textiles exports to Cuba, which remained steady during the war, the separatist insurrection was having very negative effects on the jute sack market. The Cuban separatists had adopted a strategy of economic warfare that drastically reduced sugar production, upon which the jute bags industry was highly dependent. As a result, and as one commercial report on Barcelona’s industry noted, “Since 1895, owing to the destruction of the sugar crops in the island, the export of empty jute sacks to Cuba has suffered heavily”. If we take into account that “Godó brothers and Company” was the leading company in the export of jute bags to the Spanish colonies, it is clear that the rebellion was having a negative impact on the Godó’s economic interests.

In fact, the Godó brothers’ resolute commitment to securing the integrity of the Spanish empire also became noticeable in their public behaviour. On August 1895 Carlos Godó contacted the Minister of War to offer 1 peseta per soldier, 1.50 pesetas per corporal, and 2 pesetas per sergeant departing from Barcelona to Cuba. Godó also offered one daily peseta to every “deprived” family of Igualada’s district that had a son fighting in the army. These donations amounted to thousands of pesetas (the district of Igualada included 32 villages) and became the first of the successive donations they made throughout the war. The

589 “Hermanos mal aconsejados” was the Spanish expression La Vanguardia used (see the quotation above). The fact that a Moroccan embassy was visiting Madrid as the war in Cuba took place contributed to remembering the events in Melilla. Ferran Soldevila, El Año Político, 1895, op. cit., p. 96.

590 According to the figures provided by Borja de Riquer, the exports of cotton goods to Spanish colonies followed a growth rate that was only interrupted during the final year of the war. Borja de Riquer, op. cit., p. 66.

591 As a result of military operations, sugar production fell abruptly from more than a million tonnes in 1894, to only 286,000 tonnes in 1896. Carlos Serrano, Final del Imperio. España, 1895-1989, Madrid, Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1984, p. 23. The above-quoted report was elaborated by Consul General Lay in Barcelona for the US Department of State. United States- Division of Insular Affairs, “Industrial conditions in Spain”, Monthly summary of commerce of the island of Cuba, 1901, p. 217.

592 With the exception of textiles, other industries in Barcelona were also suffering the impact of the war: “A causa de la paralización de trabajos en varias industrias de Barcelona, viven en situación angustiosa gran número de familias obreras residentes en Gracia (…)”. LV, 01/03/1896, p. 2.

593 “El general Weyler telegrafía desde Barcelona al señor ministro de la Guerra, que el diputado á Cortes Sr. Godó se le ha presentado ofreciéndose á entregar 1 peseta por soldado, 1,50 por cabo y 2 por sargento que embarquen ó hayan embarcado en aquel puerto con destino a la gran Antilla. Admitido el ofrecimiento, el Sr. Godó ha hecho entrega de las cantidades necesarias. Las tropas que vayan ya camino de Cuba percibirán el donativo del Sr. Godó á su llegada. El general Azcárraga ha telegrafiado dando las gracias al generoso donante”.

“Un donativo”, El Imparcial, 27/08/1895, p. 3.
press rapidly welcomed these donations and presented Godó as an example to follow. Moreover, on April 1896 Godó was awarded the “Grand Cross for Military Merit” for his support of the war effort, and he travelled to Madrid to personally thank the Queen Regent for the decoration he received.

The award given to Carlos Godó reveals the public status he had reached in society. Although he had already obtained the support of the Queen Regent for his business plans in Morocco, the award he received in 1895 provided further evidence of the excellent relations Godó held with the monarchy. From a different perspective, the donations Godó made are also indicative of how an event that was taking place thousands of miles away (namely, the war in Cuba) could be instrumentalized in local politics. The donations Godó made reveal an attempt to reinforce his prestige in the local sphere, and demonstrate the importance patronage played in notable politics. The role of the deputy was not limited to defending the interests of the constituency in Congress, but also encompassed a series of moral duties, like the support of charitable works and the protection of the vulnerable in times of need. The Cuban War was an example of these difficult moments in which the deputy adopted the role of protector.

In fact, there is evidence that Carlos Godó intentionally used the war in Cuba to improve his image in Igualada. The last elections held in this constituency, in 1893, had been very heated. Though Godó had won, he had come up against strong confrontation from the parties in the opposition (the conservatives, the Republicans and the carlists). This opposition revealed the emergence of some resistance to the Godó’s political hegemony in Igualada. In the face of these events, Godó saw the Cuban war as an opportunity to calm the situation and reinforce his position in public. In November 1895 a celebration occurred in Igualada in honour of Anacleto Girbau, a young soldier who had fought in Cuba. This homage was previously announced in *La Vanguardia* and became a local festivity that mobilised a large portion of Igualada’s population. A significant number of people attended the arrival of

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595 “Telegrafían á El Noticiero Universal: Por Real Orden se ha concedido al diputado electo por Igualada don Carlos Godó la gran cruz del Mérito Militar libre de gastos, en premio á los importantes donativos que ha hecho á las tropas expedicionarias á Cuba que han salido de esta región.”, LV, 22/04/1896, p. 2. “La Reina ha recibido en audiencia al diputado electo por Igualada don Carlos Godó. El señor Godó dio las gracias á la Reina por la concesión de la cruz del mérito militar con distintivo blanco que le ha sido concedida.” “Ultimas noticias”, LV, 11/06/1896, p. 5.

596 The electoral results can be found in the Annex.
Girbau at Igualada’s train station, where he was received as a hero amidst constant cheers and shouts. The Godó brothers played a leading role in all these celebrations: a member of the Godó family accompanied the soldier during his trip from Barcelona to Igualada; and, once there, the dinner dedicated to the soldier became an opportunity for Carlos Godó’s supporters to vindicate his position as deputy.

Indeed, the celebration of Girbau presented an opportunity to overcome the political confrontation of the last elections and to publicise the donations Godó made to the deprived families of Igualada. The Godó brothers presented the Cuban insurrection as a threat to the wellbeing of the entire district and required that all the people, regardless of their political affiliation, gathered around a common cause. This event demonstrates that at a time when Godó’s position as deputy started being challenged in the local sphere, the war in Cuba became an opportunity to deflect the criticisms from the opposition and to reassert his position in public. Thus by publicising Godó’s actions, and especially the generosity of his donations, La Vanguardia ultimately contributed to building up and cementing Godó’s public reputation as the “father of the district”.

4.3. Colonial conflicts and the press: The entry of the United States into the War

The last episode of the Cuban War took place in 1898, when the United States joined the conflict. What had been until then a domestic confrontation was consequently turned into an open war between an emerging power, the United States, and a country desperate to hold on to the remnants of its empire, Spain. The last part of this chapter will examine the role of

598 Writing about the welcome dinner celebrated in Igualada, La Vanguardia commented on the speeches made in the following terms: “(...) y como esta unidad de sentimientos, expresados con entusiasmo por todos los concurrentes, sea el signo más elocuente de que empieza el fin de las rencillas politico-locales, como fruto de los esfuerzos de atracción hábilmente iniciados por nuestro buen amigo e celoso diputado á Cortes por el distrito [Godó], en beneficio de los intereses y de la pública administración igualadina, sin abdicaciones ni humillaciones para nadie (...) ya que por él entrevé el retorno de las unánimes iniciativas perdidas y el desenvolvimiento de las energías serenas que tan alto pusieron el nombre de Igualada (...). Y como quien tuvo di[cen] que retuvo, no es extraño, mi querido director, que vea yo con complacencia el término de las terribles tormentas pasionales que por aquí se han cernido hasta con menoscabo de la tranquilidad de todos (...).” Ibidem.
599 “(...) significar una vez más su agradecimiento al igualadino don Cárlos Godó y Pié, por los expontáneos (sic) y repetidos desprendimientos que viene realizando en beneficio de las familias de los soldados pobres de esta comarca ya que con ellos enjuga lágrimas de miseria y desconsuelos, y por los donativos hechos a los batallones embarcados en al capital de la provincia. Con vitores y aplausos fueron sancionados tales acuerdos que honran á todos, y así terminó tan agradable acto que dejará imperecedero recuerdo en la memoria de los igualadinos (...).” Ibidem.

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the press in raising public awareness about the possibility of a war against the United States. It will be argued that the newspapers decisively contributed to the creation of a heated atmosphere by propagating a jingoist discourse. Although different segments of society showed their opposition to the war, or simply remained indifferent, the vast majority of the press chose to encourage patriotic behaviour. The role of the press in this process revealed the role of editors in conditioning the public debate, while at the same time using it to advance their own agenda. These events will be fundamental to understand the deep criticisms the press would suffer in the war’s aftermath, as the discredit of liberal institutions decisively increased.

Since the beginning of the war in Cuba the majority of the Spanish press showed a clear mistrust towards the United States. If the new foreign policy under the motto “keeping America for the Americans” (the Monroe doctrine of 1895) already create uneasiness among the Spanish press, the collision of interests between the two countries increased in 1896, when the United States’ Senate recognised the status of belligerent government to the Cuban insurgency. Despite the attempts of Spain’s Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo to minimise the importance of this declaration, Spanish newspapers took an aggressive stance. The Madrid newspaper *El Imparcial*, for instance, argued that “Spain shall succumb before tolerating the offence of foreign intervention in its own matters”. Other newspapers from the same city, like *El Heraldo*, responded vehemently to the US declaration, while *El Correo* and *La Correspondencia de España* took a more moderate tone, albeit considering the situation “extremely serious”. In the case of *La Vanguardia* the declaration of the US Senate was presented as a direct attack on Spain’s honour. The Godó’s newspaper referred to the United States as a “perfidious and greedy nation”, since Spain had already “sacrificed a great part of its sovereignty and its interests to the American postulates”, in reference to the change of the tariffs that were implemented in 1895 to promote American trade with Cuba.

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601 An example is: “La actitud de los Estados Unidos con relación á España y Cuba”, LV, 11/10/1895, p. 4.
602 “España se halla dispuesta a sucumbir antes que a tolerar el agravio que la intervención exterior en sus propios asuntos supone.” *El Imparcial*, 01/03/1896. Quoted in A. Elorza & E. Hernández, *op. cit.* , p. 365.
603 “La actitud de los Estados Unidos basta para justificar la intranquilidad pública. Engreídos con su poderio han aprendido á jugar con nuestros intereses por no decir con nuestro decoro (...). El dolor de esas dos saetas habrá que sufrirlo como el de las anteriores hasta que España pueda aliviarlo llamando oficialmente al vino, vino, y al farsante y desleal, desleal y farsante. (...). Sí los Estados Unidos manifiestan su hostilidad á España en
The crucial role of the press in increasing public concern about the possibility of a future war against the United States became all the more evident on 15 February 1898. On that day a diplomatic incident between Spain and the United States took place: a US ship located in Santiago de Cuba was accidentally sunk. The outcome of this incident was the declaration by US President McKinley of a possible military intervention in Cuba. Although war was not a certainty, only a possibility, the newspapers contributed to spreading the idea that it was indeed imminent. Newspapers published President McKinley’s statements and encouraged the demonstrations that took place throughout the Spanish territory. In Barcelona, for instance, a play held at the “Liceu” theatre turned into an impromptu demonstration that *La Vanguardia* warmly welcomed and presented as a sign of the patriotic atmosphere that dominated the city.  

Similar demonstrations took place in Igualada, where a play in the local theatre led the audience to request, with much enthusiasm, that the national anthem be played. Afterwards, “*An individual jumped onto the stage and burned an American flag. The crowd started shouting ‘death to the United States and long live Spain’. A demonstration was soon improvised and 3,000 people marched through the streets playing music and carrying Spanish flags*”.  

This event in Igualada highlights that the excitement about a war against the United States was not a phenomenon that was restricted to the big cities like Madrid or Barcelona, but generated great enthusiasm in all corners of the Spanish territory. Newspapers became central in fostering this kind of patriotic behaviour, as well as in hiding possible forms of opposition (or indifference) to the war. The writer Miguel de Unamuno, for instance, recalled having seen great indifference to the war among a group of farmers in Castile. In a largely rural country such as Spain, where 27.5% of the population lived in rural communities of less than 2,000 people in 1900, similar careless attitudes were probably very widespread.  

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604 “La manifestación patriótica surgida espontáneamente en el gran Teatro del Liceo la noche del jueves [22/04/1898] fué un acto importante, revelador del sentimiento íntimo que domina en Barcelona. A ella seguirán, sin duda, actos mil, con los cuales nuestro vecindario renovará las gallardías de que ha dado muestras cuantas veces la patria española, comprometida en un empeño de honra, ha necesitado del esfuerzo y de la abnegación de sus hijos”. LV, 24/04/1898, p. 1.

605 “Entusiasmo en Igualada”, *La Dinastía*, 26/04/1898, p. 3.


607 In the case of cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, the percentage was 32% at the same time. Nicolás Sánchez Albornoz, *La modernización económica de España, 1830-1900*, Alianza editorial, 1985, p. 54. The best in-depth analysis of the attitudes of society in the face of the war is: Manuel Pérez Ledesma, “La sociedad española, la guerra y la derrota”, Juan Luis Pan-Montojo (ed.), *Más se perdió en Cuba. España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo*, Madrid, Alianza editorial, 1998, pp. 91-150.
Likewise, numerous soldiers avoided conscription or deserted the army in different parts of
the country. 608

However, resistance or antipathy towards the war left only a small trace in the press. With
the exception of the Socialist and the Anarchist press, which saw the war as an
opportunity to attack the political system, the vast majority of the press highlighted events
that reflected – and encouraged – patriotic behaviour. To give an example of this, the event
that took place in Igualada’s theatre (described above) was reported by various national
newspapers, like Spain’s top-selling newspaper (El Imparcial) and Madrid’s La Época,
which referred to the events in Igualada as a “patriotic movement”. As could be expected, in
Barcelona too La Vanguardia published positive reports of the same event, and contributed to
fostering jingoism by arguing that “another thousand events like this will follow tomorrow, in
which our residents will renew their bravery as they have done every time the Spanish
fatherland has required the efforts and abnegation of their children”. 609

This capacity of editors to be selective in their reporting became particularly clear in the
case of commercial newspapers. Madrid’s newspaper El Imparcial, for instance,
abandoned the criticism it usually directed against the government and joined the patriotic
discourse without hesitation. 610 Something similar happened in other cities, like Barcelona
and Seville, where the press that did not have a partisan leaning largely supported the war. 611
In fact, if the war-like stance was an easy attitude for newspapers to follow, editors also saw
it as an opportunity to increase sales, especially in the case of profit-oriented newspapers,
because large numbers of readers chose to buy newspapers that were in favour of the war.
The militaristic newspaper El Imparcial, for instance, saw its circulation increase from
70,000 copies to 120,000 during the war. 612

In contrast to the commercial press, partisan newspapers seemed to have fewer
difficulties in opposing the war (when they chose to do so). 613 The reason for this is because

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608 As already noted. Núria Sales, op. cit.; Carlos Serrano, op. cit.
609 LV, 24/04/1898, p. 1.
610 Juan Carlos Sánchez Illán, Prensa y Política en la España de la Restauración. Rafael Gasset y El Imparcial,
612 J. C. Sánchez Illán, op. cit., p. 103.
613 Even in the case of partisan newspapers, support for the war became very widespread. For instance, most of
the Republican press supported the war despite opposing the political system. This reveals to what extent the
sabre-rattling attitude had become the norm among newspapers. José Álvarez Junco, “Los amantes de la
libertad”: la cultura republicana española a principios del siglo XX, Nigel Townson (ed.), El republicanismo en
partisan newspapers privileged opinion formation over selling copies. This was the case, for instance, of a Catalan nationalist newspaper named *La Renaixença*, whose sympathy towards the Cuban insurrection made it an opponent of the war. Despite Catalan nationalists initially supporting the war effort, mainly to protect the interests of the Catalan industry, later on they argued in favour of conceding autonomy to Cuba as the best way to solve the situation. Opposing the war, however, was a decision that carried commercial consequences. As the editor of *La Renaixença* later declared, “during the madness unleashed by the war against the United States” his decision of opposing the war became “disastrous” in commercial terms.

This illustrates to what extent the war became popular among significant number of readers. In the eyes of *La Renaixença*, the eagerness of the press to meet these expectations could have a pernicious influence for the country’s future:

> “little more can be said to the people in the city that are waiting impatiently for the outbreak of the war against the United States. Influenced by newspapers that are more concerned with selling copies than in being Spanish, they cannot wait for the news arriving to Madrid or Washington (...). They want the war: let’s have it then. They shall regret it (...).”

The words of this newspaper reveal the perception that in their eagerness to reflect the wishes of the public, and consequently to increase their sales, commercial newspapers were failing in the moral duty of looking for the general interest. This turned out to be a paradox if we take into account that the guiding principle of commercial newspapers like *La Vanguardia* was, precisely, to provide neutral accounts to their readers. Moderate and impartial reporting were indeed two principles to which the Godó’s newspaper had ascribed since the reform plans of 1888. However, the Cuban War brought to the surface the inner contradictions of commercial papers. The wish to promote a political agenda (e.g. the need to maintain Cuba as a Spanish possession) and increase sales proved to be more important than the professed principle of impartial and responsible reporting. In the aftermath of the war, both the editors of *La Vanguardia* and of *El Imparcial* would regret the bellicose editorials.

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614 As already noted, the links between Catalan nationalism and the Cuban insurrection have been thoroughly studied and highlighted. Carlos Serrano (1982), *op. cit.*; E. Ucelay-da Cal, *op. cit.*
616 Ibidem.
they had published; especially as a growing number of voices started holding the so-called “press oligarchy” responsible for Spain’s loss of empire.617

Still, some exceptions existed in the generalised pro-war behaviour of the commercial press. This was the case, for instance, of El Diario de Barcelona – the oldest newspaper in Spain (it was founded in 1792) and one of the most representative newspapers of conservative opinion in Barcelona. The opinions of its editor (Joan Mañé Flaquer) and those of its leading figures were highly respected. Unlike the newspaper of the Godó family, El Diario de Barcelona became a resolute opponent of war, this being an attitude that became clear in the much more moderate tone it adopted to speak about the United States.618 However, the patriotic pressure that imbued public life became so heated that it was difficult to stand, not just for the liberal politicians, who felt the pressure of going into war to save the political system, 619 but also for the moderate opinion-minded newspapers like El Diario de Barcelona.620 One of the most reputed writers for this newspaper (Joan Maragall) reflected on the oppressive atmosphere the press contributed to create in an article called “la obsesión” (“the obsession”):

“¡La guerra, la guerra...! ¡La guerra con los Estados Unidos! No hay medio de hablar de otra cosa. (...) la obsesión ha llegado ya al punto en que se siente la necesidad, hasta fisiológica, de deshacerse de ella de cualquier manera: ha llegado a convertirse en un clamar unánime de que esto acabe y sea lo que ha de ser. No hay partidario de la paz, por acérrimo que sea, que no esté deseando que rompa de una vez la guerra, si ella, con todas sus catástrofes, ha de acabar con tanta incertidumbre.” 621

617 As will be discussed in Chapter 5.
618 The attitude of the Diario de Barcelona has been examined in: M. C. García Nieto, op. cit.
619 In the words of a leading member of the Liberal Party (Conde de Romanones): “En aquellos días tristísimos, y ésta era la realidad, flotaba sobre los gobernantes, paralizando sus movimientos y sus iniciativas un fantasma: el del miedo. Miedo, sí, a la prensa, al Ejército, á las explosiones del sentimiento nacional. Bajo su presión no se pudo siquiera examinar el ofrecimiento del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos para comprar las colonias. (...) Y a la guerra con los Estados Unidos se fué, con desconocimiento absoluto de la fuerza militar y naval de la gran República”, Álvaro de Figueroa y Torres, Conde de Romanones, Notas de una vida, Madrid-Barcelona, Marcial Pons, 1999, [1st edition 1934], vol. 1, p. 103. Another contemporary expressed similar views: “The press published accounts stressing the military superiority of Spain. This information was clearly wrong, whether for ignorance or in bad faith. (...) As a result, the Spanish people happily went to war in full ignorance (...)”. Joan Garriga Massó, Memòries d’un liberal catalanista, 1871-1939, Barcelona, Edicions 62, 1987, pp. 111-112. Or. version in Catalan.
620 The Catholic newspaper El Correo Catalán, for instance, attacked El Diario de Barcelona for its prudence, which it regarded as a lack of patriotism. The same critiques were addressed to other newspapers that were opposed to the war, like the Catalan nationalist La Renaixença. “Prudentes y patriotas”, El Correo Catalán, quoted in: M. C. García Nieto, op. cit., p. 311; Carola Duran Tort, op. cit., p. 165, resp.
621 Ibidem, p. 138. [E. T.]: “The war! The war against the United States! There is no way to talk about anything else. (...) the obsession has reached the point when it is a necessity, almost a phisiologic one, to get rid of it in whatever way: the moment has been reached when everyone wants this to be ended no matter how it goes.
CONCLUSIONS

Although the fear of a war against the United States was a possibility that the Spanish press had contributed to broadcast since the very beginning of the Cuban insurrection of 1895, when the war finally did break out in April 1898 it was a short-lived affair. Spain suffered a series of rapid defeats on the battlefield and the war was concluded in little more than three months. This conflict put an end to the Spanish empire and to the centuries-long presence of Spain in the Antilles. Neither of the two Godó brothers, however, lived to see this. Bartolomé passed away in 1895, after a long illness, and Carlos died in 1897 during a sojourn in his country house.

In many ways, Cuba was central to the strategies of the two Godó brothers. As this chapter has shown, securing protection for Spanish exports to the Antilles became a recurring theme in the Godó’s activities in the fields of business, politics, and journalism. The case of these two brothers exemplifies, in fact, why Barcelona has been referred to as “Spain’s business centre in the trade with the colonies”. The importance of the colonial market for the Catalan economy traditionally led the elites of this region to give great importance to protectionist policies. This need became all the more important in the last quarter of the 19th century, when the lack of consensus between the two liberal parties implied that economic policy could be changed at any time. Catalan elites were certainly not the only ones that were concerned about protectionism. In other parts of Spain, like Castile and Andalucía, the securing of protectionist policies also became an important concern of local elites.

Indeed, if the question of how local interests were represented in central government was a fundamental question in Europe during the Liberal period, the Godó brothers constitute a case study that illuminates how the mechanisms of influence combined private and group interests. The letters sent to the Minister of Ultramar, the meetings at the “Fomento”, and the intervention in Congress demonstrate that the Godó brothers worked in tight collaboration with other Catalan elites in the so-called “diputació catalana” in order to secure group

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There is nobody in favour of peace, no matter his commitment, who is not wishing the breaking of war if this, with all its catastrophes, shall put an end to uncertainty.” La Vanguardia noted the same heated atmosphere that pervaded society: “En la calle, en el seno de las familias, en todas partes no se habla mientras tanto más que de la guerra, de la guerra ya inevitable”. LV, 21/04/1898, p. 6.


623 E. Calzada del Amo, op. cit.; M. del P. Calvo Caballero, “Defensa de intereses y cultura de la patronal castellano-leonesa...”, op. cit.
interests. This demonstrates that in a political system where government was not decided through free elections, collective action became one of the strategies local elites used to exert pressure on central government.

Moreover, this chapter has shown that the public space became decisive in the power strategies of elites. In the attempt to oppose the free-trade policies of the Liberal Party, the establishing of La Vanguardia became a valuable platform to publicise the Godó views. In parallel, the press was also becoming a space where class interests converged, as public opinion grew in importance. In fact, if La Vanguardia already acted as the organ of the African lobby during the War of Melilla (1893), during the Cuban War of Independence this newspaper gave voice once more to the economic interests of Catalan elites. The case of La Vanguardia thus challenges the traditional depiction in the literature of the “diputació catalana” as a lobbying strategy confined to the halls in Congress and to the headquarters of the “Fomento”. Public opinion was another dimension where these collective interests were defended. In his threefold capacity as deputy, editor, and member of the Fomento, Carlos Godó was in a favourable position to sponsor this strategy. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is based on its new independent editorial line: La Vanguardia was evolving from being the organ of a political community (the Liberal Party) into a prominent mouthpiece of the Catalan bourgeoisie.624

In this regard, the main power that the newspaper editors had as political actors consisted in their capacity to select which topics became the subject of public debate and were given broader visibility. In so doing, the press enabled private concerns to become public concerns. The Cuban War of Independence was an example of this: the Godó’s interest in securing the integrity of the Spanish empire was presented as an argument that wider segments of society could sympathise with (the need to maintain the “integrity of the motherland”). As some other parts of society in Barcelona started demonstrating opposition to the war (as exemplified in the lack of enthusiasm that the departure of troops raised in this city) La Vanguardia chose to conceal these forms of dissent.625 This is an example of the importance of newspaper editors in selecting which issues were given importance in public debate, and which were minimised.

624 The articles La Vanguardia published on “La Información cubana” were later reprinted in the Fomento’s official journal (El Trabajo Nacional). In return, La Vanguardia also published the writings of the Fomento. See: LV, 15/04/, 1895, p. 2 and 30/03/1893, p. 3, resp. This provides further evidence about the close links that existed between Barcelona’s most important employer association and Godó’s newspaper.

625 As explained, La Vanguardia justified the lack of enthusiasm for the war by presenting Cubans as “ill-advised brothers”, yet brothers after all.
The Cuban War of Independence consequently highlighted the growing importance of public opinion in political debate, as well as how editors sought to condition it. The articles published under the title “La información cubana” reveal the ambition of La Vanguardia to address a broader audience that went beyond the members of the Liberal Party. If this newspaper became capable of doing so, it was because contrary to the partisan press, Godó’s newspaper had an editorial independence that allowed it to target a wider audience and thus sell more copies. The new vocation of serving the public – as established in the reform plans of 1888 – became evident in La Vanguardia through its use of varying writing formats, like the interview and the personal story. This does not mean, however, that the function of commercial newspapers was limited to neutral reporting. Opinion formation remained a fundamental goal of the commercial press. Although Spain’s still strongly rural character makes it difficult to speak of a public opinion where the interests of all society were present, this was not necessarily an impediment. La Vanguardia exerted pressure on the government by presenting itself as the interpreter of a broader community that was interchangeably referred to as the public opinion, the nation, and the general interest. If this rhetorical practice had already existed in the past, as in the War of Melilla, this reveals that editorials were also addressed at pressuring policy-makers (who had the final decision over tariff reforms). Newspapers thus presented themselves as the interpreters of an imagined public opinion, and used it as a rhetorical strategy to pressure liberal politicians.

The Godó’s commitment to securing the integrity of the Spanish empire became equally evident in the local sphere. The donations Carlos Godó made contributed to securing his business interests in Cuba, while at the same time were aimed at reinforcing his prestige in the local sphere. The homage paid to the young soldier in Igualada was explicitly presented as an opportunity to overcome the first attacks on Godó’s local pre-eminence; and to reinforce his image as the protector of the vulnerable. These rituals demonstrate that the control of public office by means of clientelism was not sufficient to assure the position of elites. The public dimension was also of central importance, especially at a time when politics were still imbued with strong community values. The construction of prestige was a move aimed at building the social legitimisation that elections could not provide.

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626 An example of this is the following sentence, already quoted in this chapter: “En el modo en que se expresan militares y paisanos, aristocracia y gente del pueblo, revelase una irritación grandísima, al mismo tiempo nótese que en general se abría el temor de que los gobernantes españoles no sepan corresponder a lo que la Nación tiene derecho a exigir de ellos en las actuales circunstancias.” LV, 01/03/1896, p. 5. Italics added.
627 On this occasion the newspapers spoke of a “national movement” of opinion. See Chapter 3.
628 Chapter 6 will examine how these attempts to build a public image were not a top-down process but were also contested from below.
If the Godó brothers were committed to securing the integrity of the Spanish empire at all costs, and also used this endeavour as an opportunity to reinforce their prestige in the local sphere, all these decisions carried important consequences in the aftermath of 1898. The shock that losing the colonies had in Spain would turn the press into an object of severe criticism, and this decisively contributed to eroding the position of liberal elites like the Godó brothers. The consequences of the war for the prominence of liberal elites will be the focus of the following chapter.
CHAPTER 5. PRESS, POLITICS AND THE SPANISH “DISASTER” OF 1898

INTRODUCTION

5.1. THE “DISASTER” AND THE PRESS

5.2. ‘LA VANGUARDIA’ AND THE REGENERATIONIST MOVEMENT

5.3. PRESS BARONS AND THE NATION: RAMÓN GODÓ (‘LA VANGUARDIA’) AND RAFAEL GASSET (‘EL IMPARCIAL’) FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

CONCLUSIONS
“Va acentuándose aquí la creencia de que dentro de breves años sufrirá España una desmembración; este peligro empieza a mirarse como natural, y lo que es más triste, con indiferencia. Se reconoce que Cataluña podrá ser absorbida por Francia, pero lo más alarmante del hecho es que la contestación que se da a los que hacen tal advertencia es la siguiente: peor gobernados que por la gente de Madrid no podemos estar...”.

Letter of Manuel Durán i Bas to Francisco Silvela, 5 January 1899.629

“(…) pongo mi esperanza en la Prensa, en la Prensa española, considerada por mí como poder mucho más intenso y extenso que el del Gobierno, como poder el más rápido y seguro para modificar el estado político, intelectual y moral de la nación.”

Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, director of La Vanguardia.630

INTRODUCTION

On 1 January 1899 the Spanish flag was lowered for the last time in Santiago de Cuba. What started as a small insurrection in the Cuban town of Baire in 1895 had turned into four years of war that affected all of Spain’s colonial dominions, from the Caribbean (Cuba and Puerto Rico) to South-East Asia (the Philippines). The sending of 200,000 soldiers and an expenditure of over 1,000 million pesetas had proved insufficient for Spain to win the war. Thus almost five hundred years of Spanish presence in the Antilles had reached an end, while the United States, in contrast, symbolically joined the group of imperial powers.

The “Disaster” of 1898, as the loss of the colonies became popularly known in Spain, was a national trauma that had long lasting effects. In 1923, when General Primo de Rivera put an end to the Restoration and established a dictatorship, he justified the armed uprising as the result of the national decay that had begun in 1898. In the shorter term, however, the

629 Borja de Riquer (ed.), Epistolari polític de Manuel Durán i Bas (correspondència entre 1866 i 1904), Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1990, p. 489. Note: Manuel Durán i Bas (1823-1907), was a renowned jurisconsult and politician affiliated to the Conservative Party in Barcelona. Francisco Silvela (1843-1905) had been the leader of the Conservative Party since 1897. [E. T.]: “There is the growing sensation that in a few years Spain might well break up; this danger has started being regarded as natural, and what is worse, with indiffERENCE. It is acknowledged that Cataluña might soon be absorbed by France, but what is more appalling is the answer given in the face of this possibility: after all, we can’t be governed any worse than by the people in Madrid...”.

630 Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, El periodismo, Barcelona, Fundación Conde de Barcelona, 1990 [1st ed. 1903], p. 89. [E. T.]: “(…) I put my faith on the Spanish press, which in my view is the greatest and fastest power to modify the political, moral and intellectual state of the nation”.
Disaster of 1898 led to a process of national introspection, which set in motion different projects aspiring to reinvigorate the country. All these projects, known as “Regeneracionismo”, would exert a great influence in the historiography. The works of Regenerationist intellectuals like Joaquin Costa (to mention perhaps the most influential among them) decisively contributed to forging a sense of exceptionalism in the understanding of modern Spanish history. Inspired by the work of Regenerationist intellectuals, historians saw the year of 1898 as further evidence of a nation that had failed in the “bourgeois revolution” of the 19th century, and failed again in the transition from liberalism to democracy in the 20th century.631

However, the intellectual paradigm that saw Spanish history as a history of deviance and failure (something that recalls contemporary trends in the German and the Italian historiography) has undergone a process of full revision in the last two decades. The commemoration of the centenary of the Disaster, in 1998, became an opportunity for historians and intellectuals alike to revisit prevailing paradigms of exceptionality.632 The outcome of this centenary was a myriad of works that demystified the Disaster and framed it in the broader European context. After all, something similar to 1898 had already happened to France two decades earlier, in 1870, with the defeat of Sedan. Not by coincidence, the French case exerted a powerful influence on the response of Spanish intellectuals to the Disaster, as Vicente Cacho noted. Furthermore, Spain’s loss of empire was part of the broader international context, namely that of colonial redistribution between imperial powers that took place in the late 19th century – as Antonio Jover noted, and Sebastian Balfour recalled. As Varela Ortega argued, even the very same crisis of legitimacy that the Restoration suffered after 1898 would not have been possible without the social, economic and political transformations that the same political system had fuelled in previous decades. Additionally, in the countries that were traditionally regarded as exemplary models of

historical development (like the United Kingdom and France), the political systems did not become fully democratic until the First World War, as the same author has reminded.\(^{633}\)

Therefore, the view of historians that the Disaster was a national trauma has started being replaced, in the last two decades, with an interpretation that sees it as a sign of Spain’s new “drive towards modernization”, to use the expression of an influential work.\(^{634}\) The emergence of this new historical paradigm revealed a more confident attitude in the understanding of the recent past and was favoured by the country’s belonging to the European Union.\(^{635}\) Still, some historians – such as Antonio Elorza and Isabel Burdiel – have warned, without directly questioning the need for revisiting the Disaster, of the dangers of falling into an oscillating and now excessively optimistic understanding of Spain’s past in relation to Europe.\(^{636}\)

In my view, the historiographical revision of the Disaster of 1898 has been a fruitful and necessary attempt. That being said, the efforts of historians to stress the continuities that followed the Disaster (in opposition to the previous “dramatic” paradigm) should not lead to underestimating some of the historical changes that took place after it. In fact, there seems to be a certain tendency in emphasising that when it came to politics, little changed in the aftermath of 1898. Historians illustrate this point by arguing that besides the crisis of identity, politics did not change a great deal. Hence, and in contrast to Portugal, where the British Ultimatum of 1890 resulted, in the mid-term, in the overthrow of the monarchy, in Spain the liberal politicians arguably managed to overcome their own colonial drawback.\(^{637}\) An example of this continuity in politics would be the case of Sagasta who, despite being held responsible for the defeat, seized power again in 1903. The political failure of Regenerationist movements (like that of Joaquín Costa or José Canalejas) and the continuity of clientelistic practices would provide further evidence that when it came to everyday politics, everything remained much the same in the Restoration.

In contrast to this view, the case of the Godó family will be used to argue that the Disaster of 1898 did mark a substantial shift in Restoration politics, for two reasons. The first one is that the Disaster became a decisive ingredient in the growing disenchantment of

\(^{633}\) María Dolores Elizalde et al., 1898: ¿Desastre nacional o impulso modernizador?, Revista de Occidente, nº 202-203, 1998. All the authors mentioned on this page made their contributions in this monograph.

\(^{634}\) Ibidem.


\(^{636}\) Ibidem, pp. 410-411; Isabel Burdiel, op. cit., p. 182.

Catalan elites towards the political system. This would not only represent a substantial change in the attitude of these elites, but ultimately had an impact on the entire political system. For while the two liberal parties continued to monopolise national politics for a further two decades (albeit with growing difficulties), in Barcelona liberal politics suffered an abrupt end in 1901. From this date onwards the city never again elected a single deputy from either the Liberal or the Conservative parties. This situation was a watershed in the history of the Restoration. Second, the changes that had started taking place in Barcelona since 1901 would be revealing of a broader European phenomenon, namely the birth of mass politics. While this was the result of longer-term structural transformations, the discredit of liberal parties in the aftermath of the Disaster provided fertile ground for new political movements to take root. Barcelona saw the rise of the first political party capable of mobilising the urban classes through new forms of discourse (namely, the Republicans of Alejandro Lerroux); as well as the creation of a Catalan nationalist party (the “Lliga Regionalista”), which brought together intellectuals, economic elites and the middle-class. The emergence of these new parties can hardly be understood without taking into account the deep discredit that the Disaster of 1898 brought to the political system. And, more importantly for the aims of this thesis, the discredit of liberal institutions would bring direct consequences to the pre-eminence of traditional elites.

The aim of this chapter will consist, therefore, in exploring the impact that the “Disaster” represented for liberal elites through the case study of the Godó family. The family will serve to evoke the discredit of liberalism in fin de siècle Europe, and to examine the common features that characterised this process in the Mediterranean area. Hence, in countries like Italy, Portugal, and Spain, but also in France, the discredit of liberal institutions was combined with an acute feeling of national decay. This resulted from the combination of different elements, like the obstacles these countries encountered in their plans of colonial expansion; an intellectual climate imbued with the ethnographic terminology of racial degeneration; and the growing exposure of corruption in public. If these were features common to the Mediterranean region, the historiography has paid little attention to the role newspaper editors played in them. As this chapter will show, on some occasions editors were held liable for the “national decay” and at the same time were seen as potential saviours. This double condition stemmed from the growing awareness of the power of the press, and fuelled a series of controversies on the role journalism should play in the new mass society. The Godó’s case will be used to examine these debates and thus approach the crisis of liberal politics in Europe from a new perspective.
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part will analyse the relation between the Disaster and the press. The behaviour of newspapers during the Spanish-American War resulted in public controversies where the crisis of national identity became entwined with a debate on the changes that journalism was undergoing at the time. The outcome was a prolific debate about the ideal relationship between journalists and the political system. The second part will focus on the Godó’s response to the loss of empire. In the aftermath of the war a new political context emerged in Catalonia, and a substantial number of elites sought to redefine their relation with central government. This implied the political realignment of many of La Vanguardia’s readers, and the Godó family saw this situation aggravated by a series of internal circumstances. The result was the arrival on the scene of a new generation who faced the challenge of adapting to this difficult new context. The last part will focus on the proposals the Godó family made through the press to renew the political system. These proposals will be put in contrast with another dynasty of press editors from Madrid: the Gasset family. This will provide the case of two families who shared an affiliation to liberal parties, and who were also the editors of Barcelona and Madrid’s top-selling newspapers, respectively. Thus their cases will provide a comparative perspective about the role newspaper editors played in the attempts to regenerate liberal politics.

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638 Namely, the passing away of the first generation, represented by the brothers Bartolomé (1839-1894) and Carlos Godó (1834-1897), and the crisis of the business dedicated to exporting jute bags to the Spanish colonies in the Antilles.
5.1. The ‘Disaster’ and the Press

In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War (1898), the press went from supporting the patriotic discourse to searching for those responsible for the defeat. First and foremost, Sagasta and the Liberal government were blamed for the war and the humiliation the peace Treaty of Paris represented. The same critique was soon extended to the whole political class – and to the army. Spain had not only lost its centuries-long presence in the Antilles and in South-East Asia, but it did so after an embarrassing defeat. As a result the country fell into an atmosphere of widespread pessimism where liberal elites were held responsible. Thus, while the war had been successful in uniting Spaniards against a common enemy, now its outcome was intensely felt in public debates.

Yet far from being a singularity, Spain’s intellectual climate was evocative of the insecurity that pervaded European culture at the time. In contrast to the mid-19th-century confidence in progress through reason and material development, the late 19th century was a period suffused with moral decay. This pessimism was related to a conjunction of historical events, like the consequences of economic development (growth of cities, problems of alcoholism, prostitution, criminality); and a series of new controversies that raised tensions in society (like the clash between capital and labour, the rise of nationalism, and religious controversies). The new figure of the intellectual would be decisive in pervading everyday politics with this language of pessimism and decay. Hence, medical and biological terminology became part of the vocabulary that intellectuals contributed to popularise in the discourse of the nation.

If pessimism was a typical feature of fin de siècle Europe, a series of elements further aggravated the intensity of this feeling in the Mediterranean region. The countries of this area

639 Some demonstrations even took place in front of the house of the prime minister, with shouts of “Muera Sagasta” and “Abajo el Gobierno!”! On the responsibility of Sagasta in the Disaster, and the demonstrations mentioned, see: José Luis Oller Vallés, De “Viejo Pastor” a “chivo expiatorio”: Sagasta y el 98, Berceo, Nº 135, 1998, pp. 25-38.
640 As one newspaper noted: “Cuando en presencia de las desventuras actuales quiera España poner los ojos, la esperanza en lo porvenir, se encontrará con que continúan los mismos hombres, y en vigor de las mismas prácticas a quienes se debe la serie de desastres iniciada en Baire el 24 de febrero de 1895 y cerrada, por el momento, en Washington, el 12 de agosto de 1898”. El Liberal, 14/08/1898, quoted in: Sara Núñez de Prado y Clavell, “La prensa y la opinión pública española en torno al “Desastre””, Juan Pablo Fusi y Antonio Niño (eds.), Antes del “Desastre”: Orígenes y antecedentes de la crisis del 98, Madrid, UCM, 1996, p. 458.
experienced a series of setbacks in their colonial ambitions. Uncertainty about their future as colonial powers became common to all these countries at a time when international relations were interpreted through the lens of Social Darwinism. Evidence of corruption intensified the feeling of crisis in these countries (e.g., the disclosure of successive scandals in France, and a growing criticism of clientelist practices in Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and contributed to discredit the parliamentary system. As Eugen Weber noted, even in France – where the economic situation at the turn of the century was in a favourable condition – an atmosphere of doom pervaded. Contemporaries would often see in this situation the decadence of the Latin race.

Though moral decay was a widespread feeling in the Mediterranean, national peculiarities nevertheless remained important. Besides the chronological coincidence, colonial setbacks were experienced differently in each country. In the case of Italy, the consequence of the defeat in Adowa (1896) was the immediate resignation of Prime Minister Francesco Crispi. In Portugal the British Ultimatum (1890) had longer-term consequences in domestic politics, and became one of the factors that contributed to the discredit of the monarchy and to its toppling in 1910. In the case of Spain, the Restoration survived the “Disaster” of 1898, but a new political climate resulted from it. The most important feature of this new scenario was the discredit of liberal elites and the intense criticism of the method that privileged their position: caciquismo.

Indeed, the country fell into a profound process of national introspection where electoral corruption was blamed for all the nation’s ills, and especially for alienating ordinary people from the political system. In an expression that gained currency, Spain was described as a body that had “lost its pulse”: while liberal elites manipulated public office for their own benefit, the majority of the country remained passive. Although this type of criticism against the caciquismo of liberal elites was not new, the Disaster of 1898 brought it to the fore in the

643 France’s crisis in Fashoda, 1898; Italy’s defeat in Adowa, 1896; the British ‘ultimatum’ to Portugal, 1890; Spain’s loss of empire, 1898.
644 This question will be studied in further detail in subsequent chapters.
646 Examples of these were: Giuseppe Sergi, Origine e diffusione della stirpe mediterranea, 1895; and Edmond Demolins, A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons?, 1899. Lily Litvak, Latinos y anglosajones: orígenes de una polémica, Barcelona, Puvill, 1980.
public debate.\textsuperscript{648} The work of different intellectuals, like Joaquin Costa, decisively contributed to spreading this criticism. According to Costa, Spain’s problem was not a parliamentary regime where corruption was widespread, but rather that corruption made up the whole political system, from which a small “oligarchy” benefited. In his view, if the denouncing of fraudulent practices had had little effect until then it was because rather than being a peculiarity, caciquismo constituted the structural feature of the political system.\textsuperscript{649}

Costa is arguably the most quoted intellectual of “regeneracionismo”, especially in the study of caciquismo, and his analyses have exerted a strong influence on modern historians.\textsuperscript{650} However, the references Costa made to the press when studying caciquismo have largely gone unnoticed. In fact, of the large number of testimonies he gathered to write his work,\textsuperscript{651} several of them held the newspapers responsible for the persistence of fraudulent elections. The common view among these contemporaries was the impression that newspapers were misleading the public during the Spanish-American War. Instead of alerting readers to the risks of fighting against the United States, the newspapers took advantage of the situation by fostering jingoism and selling more copies. If this behaviour of the press was regarded as a lack of “honesty”, the same contemporaries shared the belief that the problem stemmed from the tight links that existed between journalists and liberal elites. In their eagerness to reap the benefits of power – in the form of job recommendations, political positions and other material rewards – journalists had abandoned their neutrality and put themselves at the service of liberal politicians.\textsuperscript{652} In so doing, journalists were contributing to sustaining the fraudulent nature of the political system and to widening the gap between the real and the legal country.\textsuperscript{653}

\textsuperscript{648} An example of early criticism towards caciquismo was the book written by the Republican Federalist Valentí Almirall, entitled \textit{España tal como es}, Barcelona, Anthropos, 1983 [1\textsuperscript{st} edition printed in Paris, in 1886]. See also: Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurúa y Antonio Niño Rodríguez (eds.), \textit{op. cit.}


\textsuperscript{650} See the Introduction.

\textsuperscript{651} Costa had set up a massive survey and as many as 172 of the country’s more distinguished people participated, upon which Costa would build his analysis. The participants belonged to a wide range of positions (intellectuals, politicians, lawyers, etc.) and ideological leanings (liberals, republicans, Catholics, nationalists, etc.). Costa’s conclusions were presented in public at the Ateneo of Madrid in the first months of 1901, and were later printed as a book containing more than 700 pages. Juan Varela Ortega, “Memoria de la sección”, \textit{Ibidem}, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{652} “(...) que se hiciera como sabemos todos que no se hacen los periódicos hoy, que se distinguiese por su veracidad y honradez, que no halagase al público para vender muchos ejemplares, que no persiguiera al anuncio, que priva de la libertad de hablar y juzgar muchas cosas, o la subvención, o el acta de diputado, o la credencial del ministro para su director, o el empleo para el reporter, o hasta la butaca del teatro.” \textit{Ibidem}, p. 216.

\textsuperscript{653} “Por halagar unas veces al público, de quien viven, y otras veces a los hombres públicos, con quien viven, contribuyen poderosamente a perpetuar los convencionalismos presentes, esa apariencia de Estado que funciona
The above-noted testimonies reaffirmed Costa’s conviction that as well as liberal elites, another oligarchy existed: the “oligarquía periodística” (“press oligarchy”). This was the expression he coined to refer to a handful of influential journalists who were subject to the commands of liberal politicians, and who were ultimately responsible for building opinion. The subjugation of journalists by politicians was particularly troublesome in Costa’s view, because in a largely rural and backward country like Spain (which he referred to as a “semi-African country”), the people’s lack of education made the influence of newspapers all the more important – and therefore more dangerous, if their power was not used in a responsible manner. Thus, in the view of this intellectual, the influence of newspapers did not stem solely from their circulation, but also from the reader’s incapacity to discern news content. The problem was that journalists did not use this influence to disclose caciquismo in public, but rather to back the fraudulent illusion of elections. The Restoration was an utter fantasy that journalists contributed to maintain in exchange for political payoffs. As a result of this lack of sincerity among journalists, Costa concluded that Spain’s recovery would never be achieved if the renewal of the political elite was not coupled with a through renewal of the press.

The comments of Costa and his contemporaries are of particular value because they touch upon one of the distinctive features of the press in southern Europe: its tight links with politics. Indeed, while the transition from a partisan press model towards a commercial and independent one was a common trend to all Western countries during the 19th and 20th centuries, the pace and intensity of this historical process differed considerably between geographic areas. From the perspective of comparative media studies, Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini have shown that the tight links between newspapers and parties (referred to in the literature as “political parallelism”) was indeed a distinctive feature of the

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654 “Y así ha resultado que eso que llamamos opinión no tiene su fuente en la conciencia de la nación, sino que se forma en la redacción de dos o tres periódicos; y como, por otra parte, esas redacciones no son, en lo general, cuerpos de tutores, patriciado natural, sino, al igual de la plana mayor de las facciones, cuerpos de oligarcas y de intérpretes y adscritos suyos (...) el vasallaje político del gobernante resulta doblado por el vasallaje teórico del periodista (...).” *Ibidem*, pp. 217-218.

655 “La rehabilitación nacional, he dicho, será imposible, aun dando que nos asista el factor tiempo, con los gobernantes de los últimos veinticinco años en el poder: ahora añado que sería también imposible, aun jubilados ellos y sustituidos por otros nuevos inculpables y preparados para la gobernación, si hubieran de subsistir las actuales oligarquías periodísticas. La renovación de la prensa se impone como otra condición sine qua non.” *Ibidem*, pp. 218-219.

Thus, and in contrast to countries like England and the United States, where the autonomy of journalists was established as an ethical code, in countries like Italy or Spain the professionalisation of journalism took longer. Yet far from being a deviance from the alleged mission of the press, these differences between “media systems” stemmed from alternative patterns of historical development. These patterns resulted from a combination of structural features (economic development, urbanisation and education levels) with the shaping of different journalistic cultures in each “media system”. Whereas in “Anglo-Saxon” countries autonomous and impartial reporting was expected of journalists, in European countries – and especially Mediterranean ones – comment and analysis of news remained important features of journalism.

The Disaster of 1898 represents, in this respect, a valuable opportunity for the aims of this thesis to integrate media studies and historical analysis. The key role played by the press in popularising the war increased awareness among contemporaries about the power of the media. This awareness resulted in a rich controversy that sheds light on how the journalistic culture was being re-defined, and how the case of other countries was often taken into account in this process. Indeed, Costa demonstrated his awareness about the existence of different journalist practices in other countries when he contrasted what he saw as the irresponsible behaviour of the Spanish press with England, where in his view newspapers acted according to the “general interest”.

Moreover, the work of Costa is an illustrative example of how the redefinition of journalistic culture was entangled with the crisis of liberal politics: while contemporaries saw the new commercial press as a pernicious influence for society, at the same time they saw it as a potentially powerful agent of national recovery if it was transformed appropriately.

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658 According to the liberal tradition, the constitutional mission of the press is to act as the watchdog of democracy. This “ideal function” has usually led media scholars to see divergent patterns of historical development (e.g. Mediterranean countries) as a sign of “failure”. See the Introduction to this thesis.
659 As D. Hallin and P. Mancini have noted: “By the late nineteenth century a contrasting model of political journalism was beginning to emerge, in which the journalist was seen as a neutral arbiter of political communication, standing apart from particular interests and causes, providing information and analysis “uncolored” by partisanship. This was often connected with the development of a commercial press” (...) By contrast, “(...) To most continental European journalists in this period analysis and commentary were absolutely central to the function of the journalist”. Ibidem, p. 29 and p. 67, respectively.
660 Speaking about the Spanish newspapers, Costa noted bitterly: “(...) sería preciso que fueran lo que son, pongo por caso, en Inglaterra, cuna de la institución: cosa pública, cosa de la nación, que la paga, en vez de ser una propiedad privada, para ser exclusivo provecho del dueño, regida por las leyes del monopolio y de la oferta y el pedido como otra empresa cualquiera.” Joaquín Costa, op. cit., p. 218.
661 “Exalta el señor Unamuno la misión de la prensa periódica, considerándola como uno de los dos agentes más eficaces de la europeización, mediante el cual empieza a formarse una conciencia pública; más para ello considera preciso que experimente una muy honda transformación. (...) Entre los medios de regeneración,
Furthermore, besides Costa other contemporaries devoted their attention to examining the changes in the press and how they affected society. One of them was Ramiro de Maeztu (1874-1936), one of the writers of the “Generación del 98”. Maeztu harshly criticised the press for its obsession with apportioning blame for the Disaster without assuming its own responsibility for the defeat. In response to this, Maeztu dedicated various articles to studying the changing relations between the press and politics. In his view the introduction of the “factory system” – understood as the transition from a partisan model towards a commercial one – led newspapers to abandon one of their traditional duties: the duty of orienting opinion.

Hence, Maeztu considered that the emphasis that newspapers now placed on providing information (which he referred to as “menchetismo”, in reference to the first news agency established in the country) was not enough. In his view, the main limitations of the new informative press was the lack of effort it put into commenting on and balancing news; this being a limitation that the traditional partisan press supposedly did not have. For Maeztu, journalists should not limit themselves to providing “facts”, but also had to ponder them for their readers. In his opinion this had been the main reason for the loss of the colonies. The “people” had forgotten their civic duties as a result of the pernicious influence of newspapers, which accustomed them to what he called “gobierno por la prensa” (“government by the press”). Therefore, Maeztu concluded that:

“A mi juicio el delito, el crimen de la prensa consiste, no en haberse equivocado al juzgar belicosa a la nación, sino en un absoluto incumplimiento de alguno de sus responsabilidades y de que en sus manos está la vida o la muerte de la nación.”

Ibidem, p. 216.

662 Name given to an intellectual movement that emerged in Spain in response to the loss of the colonies. Maeztu would be one of its most conspicuous representatives, together with other names like Azorín, Miguel de Unamuno and Pío Baroja. See: Pedro Laín Entralgo, La generación del 98, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1997.

663 “Pues bien, hablemos de responsabilidades, ya que las responsabilidades constituyen la obsesión, la monomanía y el delirio de cuantos escriben fondos en los diarios y de cuantos peroran en los cafés, sobre las cosas de la guerra. Hablemos de responsabilidades. (…) ¡Depuremos las responsabilidades!… A las órdenes de ustedes, señores periodistas. Pero veamos, ante todo, si somos nosotros los más autorizados para lanzar la primera piedra… ¿Por qué no habíamos previsto la trascendencia de las insurrecciones coloniales? (…)”. “Responsabilidades”, Ramiro de Maeztu, Hacia otra España, Barcelona, Editorial Planeta DeAgostini, 2011 [1st ed. in 1899], p. 141. Maeztu had a good knowledge of the Spanish-American War, both from his experience as a soldier (posted in Mallorca) and knowledge of Cuba, where he had spent part of his childhood.

664 It must be noted that Maeztu used the English expression “factory system”.

665 This term referred to Francisco Peris Mencheta, who had founded the Mencheta news agency. Another synonym that contemporaries used to refer to the commercial press was “prensa industrial”.

666 “Esa misma intensificación de la vida moderna, que hizo al público apartarse de los periódicos doctrinarios y preferir aquellos otros que le enterraran de cuanto ocurriera de notable, le llevó a demandarles el comentario de los hechos y la previsión de sus consecuencias.” Ibidem, p. 154.
deberes, especialmente del deber de información. (...) ¿dónde están esas informaciones meticulosas, imparciales, dignas, con que la prensa de otros países ilustra a la opinión respecto de los asuntos que afectan a la vida nacional?” 667

Another intellectual who made similar observations on the changes in the press, although from Barcelona’s point of view, was the journalist Teodor Baró Sureda (1843-1916). 668 Baró was the director of La Crónica de Cataluña (the organ of the Liberal Party in Barcelona) and one of the most prominent journalists in this city. In contrast to the opinion of Maeztu, who considered that the new commercial press contributed to diminishing the civic culture of Spaniards, Baró believed that commercial newspapers were the living image of the society for which they were printed. As Baró noted:

“De la prensa no hay quien no reniegue, pero a reserva de acudir a ella y de ella servirse, y tan solicitada se han visto por el interés ajeno que ha acabado por atender al propio, convirtiéndose el periódico en una empresa industrial, atenta a la prosperidad del negocio, que consiste en dar género que tenga fácil colocación en el mercado de la curiosidad y en el de las pasiones, halagando éstas, excitando aquélla y falsificando la mercancía. Tal transformación revela que nuestra sociedad deja mucho que desear, porque el periódico refleja su manera de ser.” 669

Baró thus considered that in contrast to the partisan press, which had an ideal based on opinion formation, the profit-orientation of the new commercial press placed journalists at the service of their readers, whatever their taste. As a result of this change in the raison d’être of journalists, the press content was transformed. Journalists now focused on delivering the shallow and sensationalist news that the public was eager to read. In this regard, Baró’s opinion was probably influenced by his former role as director of the Crónica de Cataluña, a 667Maeztu put the French press as an example the Spanish press should imitate. Ramiro de Maeztu, op.cit., p. 155. Italics in the original. [E. T.]: “To my eyes the worst crime of the press has not consisted in judging the nation as being favour to war, but has rather been its default in fulfilling any of its duties, and especially the duty of information. (...) where are those meticulous reports, impartial, always fair, with which the press in other countries illustrates opinion in regards to what concerns the national life?”.

668In 1906, Baró replaced Mañé i Flaquer as the director of El Diario de Barcelona, one of the most respected newspapers in the city. Unfortunately, there is little information available about Baró. The information here provided, in: El Matí, 07/06/1936, p. 6.

669Teodoro Baró, Discursos leídos en la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona en la recepción pública de D. Teodoro Baró el día 23 de noviembre de 1902, Barcelona, Casa Provincial de Caridad, 1902, p. 7. Document located at the Biblioteca de Catalunya (Barcelona), ref. 07-4-C 1/7. [E. T.]: “Everyone complains about the press, but nobody dares to turn it down [;] to the point that the press has been turned into an industry, based on profits, and which consists in publishing anything that it is easily sold in the market of curiosity and of passions, exciting them and falsifying things. Such transformation reveals that our society still leaves a great deal to be desired.”
partisan newspaper in which he defended the political function of journalism. Still, what makes Baró’s opinions all the more valuable is that his comments on the commercial press were not limited to journalism but evoked the broader transformation of society. His views reflected on the rise of the new mass society, a phenomenon that was particularly acute in the city where he lived, Barcelona.

Indeed, by the time Baró examined the changes in the press Barcelona was experiencing radical transformations. The industrial tradition of the city had intensified at the turn of the new century. Attracted by the expansion of the manufacture industry and the crisis in agriculture, regular flows of immigrants from rural Catalonia had arrived in Barcelona. Additionally, in 1897 a series of neighbouring towns were attached to Barcelona and multiplied its number of inhabitants. From 334,400 people in 1897, the population grew to 533,000 in 1900; to 587,000 in 1910; and to 710,000 in 1920. Thus the population had more than doubled between 1897 and 1920.670 This demographic growth fostered the redefinition of the urban space. While the well-off people moved to the new avenues of “Passeig de Gràcia” and “Rambla Catalunya”, the old part of the city and the new towns attached to Barcelona in 1897 (like Gràcia and Poblenou) became the dwelling places of a growing working class. This redefinition of urban space also had an impact on the city’s cultural life: “El Paralelo” emerged as the new leisure area of popular culture, while “La Rambla” lost its reputation as an affluent avenue.

The developments of new journalistic practices, like yellow journalism, and the new commercial orientation contributed to give new visibility to old urban problems, like prostitution, begging and alcoholism.671 The press thus acted as an active agent in defining the conditions of public debate. Baró’s observations reveal a negative perception about these transformations of the press, especially in the case of the commercial newspapers. The loss of the colonies provided him with the opportunity to accuse commercial newspapers of fuelling the lower passions of the people and of having a negative impact on public morality. Still, Baró absolved journalists for their new situation. After all, many of them were no longer at the service of a political community, as had traditionally been the case of the partisan press;

670 The sudden growth of Barcelona’s population at the turn of the century was linked to the above-mentioned attachment, in 1897, of the neighbouring towns of Gràcia, Sant Martí de Provençals, Sant Andreu de Palomar, San Gervasi de Cassoles, Santes and Les Corts. Pere Gabriel, “Espacio urbano y articulación política popular en Barcelona, 1890-1923”, in José Luis García Delgado (ed.), Las ciudades en la modernización de España. Los decenios interseculares, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1992, p. 61.


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but were now at the service of the public. In their new function, journalists were but mere servants of the “low tastes” of the masses.

If the Spanish-American War increased the contemporary awareness about changes in journalism and how they affected society, the war also had a direct impact for the future of many newspapers. Their decisive contribution to spreading patriotic fervour during the war (as Chapter 4 showed) contributed to their discredit in its aftermath. Most of newspapers suffered a loss of readers that led contemporaries and journalists alike to talk of a “crisis of public confidence”. This crisis became particularly acute in Spain’s capital, to the point that referring to the “crisis of Madrid’s press” (“crisis de la prensa madrileña”) became commonplace among journalists at the time. As the director of La Correspondencia de España wrote, the “lack of public confidence” in the press was still felt intensely in Madrid as late as 1906:

“La opinión es totalmente hostil a la Prensa y en ella tiene aún más desconfianza que en el resto de las clases sociales. Lee los diarios por necesidad de conocer lo que en el mundo pasa, pero no los lee con convicción como antes, a ciegas. Pasó esa época en que los lectores ‘pensaban como su diario’, y ha sido reemplazada por otra en la cual los lectores, o desdeñan la opinión del periódico, o por lo menos de ella desconfían, creyendo que es interesada, egoísta o tendenciosa. Y ésta, aunque muy amarga, es la triste verdad. Creer otra cosa es vivir en el limbo. Y negar que el público tiene razón para desconfiar sería cándido, pues la Prensa tuvo la mayor parte de culpa de cuanto nos sucedió en años no lejanos y no poca de lo que ahora nos acontece.”

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672 As Baró rethorically asked in relation to the behaviour of the press during the Spanish-American War: “¿Por qué la prensa no encauzó la opinión extraviada, en vez de dejarse arrastrar por ella? La respuesta está en la transformación que ha sufrido en el mundo entero. Antes el periódico se fundaba en defensa de una idea, mientras que ahora se ha convertido en una empresa industrial, que se explota como otro negocio cualquiera.” Teodoro Baró, op. cit., p. 10.

673 As Baró put it: “¿Tiene el periodista la culpa de que un torero inflame los entusiasmos de la masa, a quien nada dicen los grandes genios, ni de que no emocione la muerte de un hombre eminente al mismo público que en ingente muchedumbre acompaña el cadáver de un diestro (...)?” Ibidem, pp. 9-10.

674 “No es un secreto, pues, el que descubrimos diciendo que las tiradas de los rotativos bajan, desde hace algún tiempo, lentamente e incesantemente (...) es como si a los lectores de los periódicos de Madrid les fuese acometiendo, uno a uno, un cansancio, una fatiga de prosa periodística, y uno a uno fueran dejando el diario que antes les apasionaba. En las administraciones de nuestros grandes periódicos, y en las redacciones también, se ha cristalizado este estado morboso en una frase: hay crisis de público, se dice.” El Mundo, 08/06/1905, quoted in María Dolores Sáiz y María Cruz Seoane, Historia del periodismo en España, vol. 3. “El siglo XX: 1898-1936”, Madrid, Alianza, p. 69.

675 La Correspondencia de España, 07/05/1906. Quoted in Pedro Pedro Gómez Aparicio, Historia del periodismo español, Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1974, p. 72. [E. T.]: “The [general] opinion is completely hostile to the Press and the mistrust towards it is greater than towards any other social class. [The people] read newspapers for the need of knowing what is going on in the world, but does no longer read them in blind faith, as it was customarily. The moment has reached an end when readers “thought as their newspaper do”, and this moment has been replaced by another one where readers disdain the opinion of the newspaper, or at least hold
The situation described above reveals that the popularity the press reached during the Spanish-American War was not free from constraints. The bitter outcome became a lesson for many readers to differentiate between “printed” and “public opinion”. Moreover, the above-quoted testimony challenges the view that some elites (like Joaquín Costa, Maeztu and Baró) had of readers as being vulnerable to the manipulation of editors. Indeed, the crisis of Madrid’s press provides empirical evidence that communication was not a top-down process, where the people were passive consumers, but shows that readers possessed the capacity to condition the newspapers’ content through their autonomy to buy one newspaper over another. The historical context certainly contributed to these change in readers’ habits (e.g. the widespread feeling of moral decline resulting from losing the colonies) and to the consequences that resulted from it. Different newspapers, like El Nacional, El Correo, El Globo, El Tiempo, La Publicidad, Los Debates and El Resumen, were forced to close due to the fall in readers, while some other turned into “diarios sapo” – this being the Spanish expression used to refer to those newspapers whose financial instability led them to an erratic existence: they were published one day, only to suddenly disappear the next.676

The majority of the examples given above corresponded to partisan newspapers. The lower number of sales they usually had (which stemmed from having an audience limited to the members of a political community) made them more vulnerable to the loss of readers. Additionally, their political orientation hindered the attempts to adopt a profit orientation based on sales revenues (even if exceptions existed).677 Commercial papers, in contrast, seemed to cope with the crisis better than their counterparts, even if their sales also fell considerably (by approximately one third of the total).678 This was the case, for instance, of El Liberal, La Correspondencia de España and El Heraldo de Madrid, and also of El Imparcial, by then the top-selling newspaper in the country.679

mistrust towards it, believing that their opinion is selfish or obeys to private interests. And this, no matter how sad is, is the sad truth. (...)

676 “Sapo” means “toad” in English. Ibidem, p. 79.
677 One of these exceptions was the case of La Publicidad, a commercial-oriented newspaper that maintained a strong Republican orientation and remained one of the top-selling newspapers in Barcelona. Yet contrary to the case of La Publicidad, the majority of the partisan press linked their financial viability to subsidies from parties; and negative sales could only be compensated with political payoffs. The early origins of La Vanguardia (see Chapter 1) is an example of this.
678 Ibidem. Some newspapers even made a more pessimistic analysis, and estimated the fall of sales in the 40% of the total: Manuel Ortega Gasset, El Imparcial. Biografía de un gran periódico español, Zaragoza, Librería General, 1956, p. 167. Quoted in: Juan Carlos Sánchez Illán, Prensa y política en la España de la Restauración, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1999, p. 137.
679 J. Sánchez Illán, op. cit., p. 137; and María Cruz Seoane & María Dolores Sáiz, op. cit., p. 72. To a certain extent this fall in the figures was also the flipside of the same growth newspapers experienced during the war (El Imparcial, for instance, saw its sales increase to 140,000 thanks to the jingoist wave).
5.2. ‘La Vanguardia’ and the Regenerationist Movement

At this point we might ask to what extent the crisis of the press was exclusive to Madrid? How did the press in other parts of the country experience the loss of empire? And more importantly, how was the Godó family affected by the widespread criticism of the caciquismo of liberal elites, and how did those elites respond in the face of it?

The Godó family confronted the Disaster of 1898 from a critical position. During the war the family’s most visible members had passed away. Bartolomé Godó died in 1895 following a long disease that had confined him to his bed for three years, while his brother Carlos died in 1897 in the country house he owned in the coastal town of Teià, named “Manso Dalmau”. The deaths of the two brothers were recorded, as was customary at the time, in obituaries published in the press. In many of these homages the founding of La Vanguardia and the close links with Igualada became two recurrent elements for which the Godó brothers were remembered. Appealing to this tradition would be central to the second generation of this family, especially when the need came for them to legitimise their position in public.680

In the shorter term, however, the family faced more pressing needs. To start with, was the negative impact the loss of the colonies had for the jute sack business. La Vanguardia had insistently campaigned in the past on the dangers of losing the protected market of the colonies, and these fears confirmed once the war ended. As early as July 1898 numerous factories closed and many jobs were lost (an estimated 4,000 in Barcelona alone). The Godó’s factory was among those that closed down.681 The lack of private correspondence makes it very difficult to reconstruct these events, yet there is still evidence that the closing of the factory was directly linked to the loss of Cuba and Puerto Rico. The man who made the decision to do so was Ramón Godó Lallana (Bilbao, 11/05/1864 - Barcelona, 20/09/1931). He was the only male son of Carlos and he had inherited the family textile business.682 The reasons he closed the factory were simple: the loss of the colonies meant the end of the tariffs

680 See Chapters 6 and 8.
681 “Gran número de comisiones obreras que carecen de trabajo han visitado al alcalde con objeto de rogarle les facilite trabajo. (...) Anúnciese el próximo cierre de una fábrica de yute propiedad del Sr. Godó”. La Época, 15/07/1898, p. 3. See also: Dórico, “Cierre de fábricas”, El País, 28/07/1898, p. 2.
682 On 8 October 1897 Carlos Godó’s widow and his son divided the inheritance between them. Initially Ramón assumed the textile business, while his mother (Antonia Lallana) temporarily took charge of La Vanguardia (which by then had an estimated value of 100,000 pesetas). Arxiu Històric de Protocols de Barcelona (AHPB), Manuel Borràs i de Palau, 1897, vol. 4, 8 d’octubre de 1897, pp. 3183-3204.
protecting Spanish exports. In the face of this new situation the Godó’s business was unable to compete with the new major actor in the global jute trade: the city of Calcutta (India).683

The case of the Godó family thus sheds light on the economic consequences of the Disaster. Between 1897 and 1898 the colonies went from representing the 30% of the total Spanish exports to only 8.3%.684 But contrary to what these figures might suggest at first sight, the colonial loss did not result in an economic catastrophe. Economic historians have provided wide evidence that the Spanish economy overcame the end of the empire. In some aspects, it even acted as a stimulus that contributed to the economic integration of this country to European standards.685 In this regard, the Godó family were an example of those elites who managed to overcome the initial downturn. Ramón Godó started replacing the manufacturing of jute bags with the manufacturing of other fabrics made of jute, like cloth, carpets, and ropes. The lack of historical sources makes explaining this business re-orientation difficult, but, if we are to trust what little information is available, Godó seemed to have succeeded in this attempt. Hence, in 1900 – that is to say, only two years after the war – his new activity employed as many as 1,800 workers.686

Besides the business in the jute industry, the deaths of both the Godó brothers also left La Vanguardia without an owner. The family’s response to this situation was slightly different: on this occasion Carlos Godó’s widow, Antonia Lallana, became the new owner of the newspaper.687 The case of Antonia Lallana was a very singular scenario: in the

683 “(...). Este último obstáculo presentado á la casa Godó, le hace cerrar la gran fábrica de tejidos de yute. Efectivamente, la insurrección de las colonias, primero, comienza á entorpecer y á disminuir la exportación del saquerío, y luego la pérdida total de las Antillas trae consigo el cierre de la importante manufactura de tejidos, que producía diariamente de 10 á 12.000 sacos. Y no es que el comercio de nuestras antiguas islas no demande actualmente grandes partidas de sacos, sino que á la industria española de tejidos de yute le es imposible, desde que nos quedamos sin colonias, sostener la competencia económica con sus similares de la India. Es increíble la baratuya verdaderamente inverosímil, con que son exportados á todos los mercados del mundo los tejidos de yute fabricados en la India.” El Liberal, 14/02/1900, p. 2.


685 Historians have put forward various arguments to support this statement: the war provoked the repatriation of a large number of capitals; the end of the war effort (which had annually consumed the equivalent of two years of Spain’s GDP) relieved public expenditure; while alternative markets were found to compensate the loss of the colonies (especially in South-America). See: ibidem, esp. pp. 286-288.

686 During the Paris World Fair of 1900, one newspaper referred to Godó’s new business orientation in the following terms: “(...) Al frente de la industria de que nos ocupamos, con motivo de la próxima Exposición, se hallan actualmente los Sres. D. Ramón Godó, hijo de D. Carlos, y D. José Batlló. No solamente persiguen estos dos jóvenes el objetivo de proseguir la buena marcha de las fábricas de yute; tienen además grande entusiasmos por su negocio, ideas nuevas, proyectos casi terminados para imprimir á sus manufacturas un carácter progresivo, un movimiento de avance; tienen en estudio, en fin, la producción de nuevos artículos, que compensa, de una manera completa y hasta con creces, la pérdida del mercado de nuestras colonias, que paralizó la fabricación de tejidos de yute.” El Liberal, 14/02/1900, p. 2.

687 As already noted, this was the solution she agreed with her son Ramón Godó Lallana after her husband’s death. It must be noted that Ramón Godó was the person who signed the contract with Modesto Sánchez Ortiz
overwhelmingly male world of journalism, the top-selling newspaper in Barcelona was now in the hands of a woman. Even though this was a short-lived affair (her son Ramón took command of La Vanguardia in 1899) the case of Antonia sheds light on the inner functioning of this newspaper. As Carlos’ widow, she signed an agreement with the current editor (Modesto Sánchez Ortiz) in which they established the conditions under which the newspaper would operate. This contract – one of the very few documents that has survived from La Vanguardia’s historical archive – granted ample attributions to Sánchez Ortiz and rewarded him with a generous salary of 625 pesetas, plus 25% of the net profits. These favourable conditions — especially if compared with the average salary journalists perceived in Barcelona — were aimed at securing the continuing services of the man who had designed the successful reform plans of 1888. However, despite the wide power of management conceded to the editor, Antonia Lallana retained for herself one single responsibility that was of paramount importance: the capacity to dictate La Vanguardia’s political orientation.

Indeed, the Godó family were never a dynasty of journalists strictu sensu. None of their members ever signed a single article in the newspaper they owned. The family saw journalism not as a vocation, but rather as an instrument to promote their private interests. The status of ownership is what ultimately granted them the power to determine the editorial line. Or to put it in other words, the Godó’s influence as political actors stemmed from their capacity to use the editorial line of La Vanguardia according to their own interests; and this was a valuable source of public influence, since La Vanguardia was the top-selling newspaper in Barcelona, as Table 1 shows.

on behalf of his mother. This indicates that, in practice, Ramón was probably already in command of the newspaper by that time. For further information on Antonia Lallana, see Chapter 1.


689 The average monthly salary of a journalist in Barcelona at the time oscillated between 40 and 100 pesetas. M. C. García Nieto, op. cit., p. 187.

690 “8-La marcha política del periódico irá de acuerdo con las ideas políticas de la propietaria”, “Convenio entre Doña Antonia Lallana, viuda de Godó, propietaria del periódico ‘La Vanguardia’…, op. cit.
Table 1. Approximate circulation of Barcelona’s main newspapers (1898-1913)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>1898</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1913</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Vanguardia</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>58,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diario de Barcelona</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Noticiero Universal</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Noticias</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Publicidad</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Correo Catalán</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indeed, and as the table above shows, the first decade of the 20th century was the moment when La Vanguardia was consolidated as the principle newspaper in Barcelona. In contrast to the 1,400 copies this newspaper sold when it was first established in 1881, it had reached a circulation of close to 20,000 copies by 1905. This represented a considerable progress, even if the sales figures of the Godó’s newspaper were still very modest – particularly if compared with other cities in Europe. In the case of France, for instance, both Le Petit Parisien (1876) and Le Matin (1883) were selling well above half a million copies by the 1890s; while Paris’ top-selling Le Petit Journal had passed the million copies mark by the same date. In England, too, figures were also far higher than in Barcelona. The London Daily Mail, for instance, sold an average of 700,000 copies in 1900.692 The explanation for this huge gap between the press in Barcelona and the above-mentioned European cities points to, once again, Spain’s low development in terms of urbanisation, industrialisation and literacy levels. Still, circulation is only one aspect of comparative analysis. The prominence given to this quantitative perspective has prevented many historians from noticing the cultural transfers that historically took place between European countries.693 Likewise, the contrast is also dependent on the subject of comparison. The case of Barcelona appears to be

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691 Source: María Carmen García Nieto “La Prensa diaria de Barcelona de 1895 a 1910”, Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona, 1956 [thesis manuscript], p. 89; Francesc Espinet & Joan Manuel Tresserras, La genési de la societat de masses a Catalunya, 1888-1939, Bellaterra, UAB, p. 77. These circulation figures need to be taken with caution as they are based on stamp duty records.


693 Chapter 2.
less “exceptional” if compared with the case of Italy, where in 1900 “only a handful of newspapers sold more than 50,000 copies a day”, as David Forgacs has observed.694

Table 1 also reveals that contrary to the case of Madrid, in Barcelona the press did not seem to suffer a “crisis of confidence”. With the sole exception of the Diario de Barcelona (paradoxically, the newspaper that took the biggest stand against the war) the rest of the newspapers did not suffer a loss in readers. Their total number did not suffer significant changes either: the city had a total of 22 newspapers in 1898, and their number stood at 23 in 1899 and 24 in 1900.695 What, then, explains the striking difference between Barcelona and Madrid? Answering this question is not easy: it has not been possible to find any clues about this in the writing of contemporaries. The scholarly literature on the topic does not make any references to this either. Still, a possible explanation for this contrast between the two cities is that press consumption patterns remained highly localised. For the most part, newspapers had a local – and at best, a regional – circulation. Only a handful of newspapers from Madrid had a national distribution.696 This lack of integration of the press market is one hypothesis that can account for the different evolution of the press in both cities.

In fact, the persistence of local and regional patterns was something that also became present in the political consequences of the Disaster. Despite being lived as a national trauma, the loss of the colonies carried important nuances in each region. One of them was the strengthening of regional identities that pushed for the redefinition of the Spanish nation. In the case of Catalonia, this became clear in the attempt of elites to reassess their relationship with the political system. Until that time the presence of Catalan elites in the leadership of liberal parties had been, for the most part, very limited. Between 1814 and 1899, only 3 Spanish prime ministers came from this region, even though 115 different governments existed during this period. Similarly, there were only 22 Catalan ministers during the same time span (out of a total of 850). Therefore, the number of ministers from this region only accounted for 2% of the total during the period 1814-1899.697

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695 M. C. García Nieto, op. cit., p. 88.

696 Something similar happened with the case of Italy. Valerio Castronovo, La stampa italiana nell’età liberale, Bari, Laterza, 1979, p. 15.

So why was there so little involvement of the elites from the country’s most industrialised region? Apart from the traditional weakness of liberal parties in Catalonia, the main reason is that Catalan elites relied on a series of mechanisms, other than the holding of public office, to secure their interests in central government and in the colonies. These mechanisms of influence consisted in corporate action and business associativism, two strategies in which the press also played a decisive role, as Chapter 4 has examined. The case of the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional” is revealing of these alternative strategies that connected centre and periphery: this employer association held a close relationship with the Conservatives for the support this party gave to protectionism. In fact, it was not a coincidence that the leader of this party (Cánovas del Castillo) was appointed honorary member of the Fomento in 1892, shortly after the passing of a new tariff law. Therefore, rather than opposing the liberal state, Catalan economic elites supported – and conditioned it – through alternative channels of influence.

However, the Disaster of 1898 led a substantial part of the Catalan elites to reassess these mechanisms. The loss of the precious colonial market provided evidence of the incapacity of the political system to defend the interests of Catalan manufacturers. In response to this, on the very same day that the peace treaty of the Spanish-American War was signed in Paris (10 December 1898) the main civic and economic entities in Barcelona addressed a memorandum to the Queen Regent. The main purpose of this memorandum was to express the discontent of the Catalan elites with the political system and to present a radical plan of reforms. The first of these proposals was the complete re-organisation of the Spanish state, based on the concession of autonomy to the “historical regions”. Once this reform was implemented, the memorandum proposed that “The Spanish state should only keep the attributions that require the protection and promotion of the interests that are truly common to all the regions in Spain, like international relations, repression of crimes, tariffs, the navy, communications, etc. etc.” The second reform, of equal importance to the first

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699 On the connections between the Conservative party and Catalan economic elites, see: Borja de Riquer i Permanyer, Cánovas y los conservadores catalanes, in Florentino Portero & Javier Tusell (eds.), Antonio Cánovas y el sistema político de la Restauración, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, pp. 139-166.

700 These entities were the “Societat Econòmica Barcelonesa d’Amics del País”; “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional”; “Instituto Agrícola de San Isidro”; “Ateneu Barcelonès”; “Liga de Defensa Industrial y Comercial”. A reproduction of this referendum can be found in: LV, 10/12/1898, p. 3.

701 “1ª. Reconocimiento de la personalidad de las grandes regiones naturales é históricas de España y consiguiente organización del régimen autonómico de sus intereses, continuando á cargo del Estado español únicamente aquellas funciones que requiere la protección y fomento de los intereses realmente comunes a todas
one, was the reform of the universal suffrage, based on the introduction of corporate forms of representation.

The two demands expressed in the memorandum of Catalan civic entities were a direct challenge to the way the Liberal state had been organised in Spain since the 1830s. Likewise, they demonstrated the discredit of liberal institutions in Europe. Hence, the arguments used in the memorandum were inspired by modern sociology and in the historicist school of law, two types of argument that were much in vogue on the Continent at the time. The memorandum evoked the medieval past as a glorious age that should be taken as a source of inspiration to reform liberal politics. In contrast to the customary uniformist model of Castile, the Crown of Aragon was presented as a historical example that recognised regional peculiarities, and therefore appeared as a suitable reference to re-organise the state-model according to a new understanding of the nation. The same historical reference applied to political representation: the corporate bodies of the Medieval tradition should be used as the model to re-structure parliamentary representation according to corporate patterns.\(^\text{702}\)

The proposal of Catalan elites thus constituted an open challenge to the liberal foundations of the state. In fact, the memorandum openly blamed “modern” influences, like the French revolution and its vindication of individual rights, as the main cause of Spain’s ills. In the view of the entities that signed the memorandum there were two main conclusions that should be drawn from the current crisis: first was the failure of the liberal principles imported from France, first included in the constitution of 1812 (above all, the rights of the individual); and, secondly, the failure of “the policies the Catholic Kings started”, which these entities saw as having inspired the centralised state-model of the liberals since the 1830s.\(^\text{703}\)

The reform proposals reveal the cultural autonomy of Catalan elites. For the intellectuals in this region, the Disaster of 1898 intensified the taking of Paris as the main point of reference, rather than Spain’s capital.\(^\text{704}\) This manifested in many ways, like the

\(^\text{702}\) “2ª. Organización corporativa para fines políticos, de las profesiones, (carreras, artes, oficios, industrias, rentas) hoy día sólo organizadas en parte para fines fiscales y aun en este respecto imperfectamente, formando con las agrupaciones que resulten, clases adecuadas á la vida social moderna que ejerzan el Derecho de sufragio en todos los órdenes: estado municipal, estado regional, estado español.” Ibidem.

\(^\text{703}\) “Recordad, Señora, que si un día unierone Aragón y Cataluña, jamás trataron de absorberse, no se impusieron idioma, ni instituciones, ni menos procuraron el uniformismo. (...) No así Castilla: los territorios que á botes de lanza, en noble y heroica lid reconquistó de los árabes (...) no lograron que les fuese reconocida una personalidad, como los de Andalucía, y otros, como Asturias y León, perdieron la suya, sacrificados todos al espíritu dominador y consiguientemente uniformista de la raza castellana.” Ibid.

\(^\text{704}\) The re-orientation of La Vanguardia in 1888 already provided evidence of this. See Chapter 2.
influence French intellectuals like Ernest Renan and Hyppolite Taine had in the Catalan historicist school. The same happened with the case of the Belgian Adolphe Prins (1845-1919), whose work on *La démocratie et le régime parlementaire* (1884) exerted great influence on the corporativist conception Catalan elites had of political representation. This circulation of ideas was extended to the artistic world, and was evident in the great development “Modernisme” had in Barcelona; this being an artistic trend directly influenced by the French art nouveau. Moreover, the idea of “modernity” became central in the way a substantial part of Catalan elites saw the Disaster of 1898. They saw their region as the most dynamic in the country, and therefore as the most suitable to lead the national recovery. Together with Narcís Verdaguer, one of the central intellectuals of this interpretation was Joan Maragall. For him, Spain’s defeat was the sign of Castille’s decadence, and he saw it as a call for Catalonia to lead the task of national regeneration. As Maragall noted:

“(…) todo está muriendo y Castilla ha concluido su misión. La nueva civilización es industrial y Castilla no es industrial; el moderno espíritu es analítico, y Castilla no es analítica; los progresos materiales inducen al cosmolopolitismo, y Castilla, metida en el centro de la naturaleza africana, sin vistas al mar, es refractaria al cosmolopolitismo europeo. (…) Castilla ha concluido su misión directora y ha de pasar su cetro a otras manos. El sentimiento catalanista, en su agitación actual, no es otra cosa que el instinto de este cambio; de este renuevo. Favorecerle es hacer obra de vida para España, es recomponer una nueva España para el siglo nuevo; combatirle, directa o tortuosamente, es acelerar la descomposición total de la nacionalidad española y dejar que la recomposición se efectúe al fin fuera de la España muerta (…)” 706

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706 Carlos Serrano, “Conciencia de la crisis, conciencias en crisis”, Juan Pan-Montojo (ed.), *Más se perdió en Cuba. España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo*, Madrid, Alianza, 2006 [1st ed. 1998], p. 390. [E. T.]: “everything is dying and Castile has concluded its mission. The new civilization is industrious, and Castile is not industrious; the modern spirit is analytic, and Castile is not analytic; material progress lead to cosmopolitanism, and Castile, placed in the middle of African nature, without seeing the sea, is refractory to European cosmopolitanism. (…) Castile has concluded its directive mission and has to pass over its sceptre. The Catalan nationalist feeling, in the current agitated situation, is but the instinct in favour of this change; of this renewing. Supporting it means to give life to Spain, to rebuild a new Spain for the new century; opposing to it, directly or indirectly, implies boosting the total descomposition of the Spanish nation and to let the rejuvenation to be made outside the death Spain”. 

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For Maragall the moment had come for Castile to pass the leadership to Catalonia, with a clear objective in mind: to rejuvenate Spain.\textsuperscript{707} Maragall’s understanding of the fin-de-siècle crisis is of particular importance, because the same cosmovision would be applied to politics, principally through the founding of the “\textit{Lliga Regionalista}” (1901). This was to become the main party of Catalan nationalism in the Restoration, and would be one of the new political movements that fought doggedly against the political hegemony of the Godó family in Igualada. For the members of this party, regional identity was understood first and foremost as a political project aimed at modernising Spain.\textsuperscript{708} As Piedmont had in the Italian \textit{Risorgimento}, and Prussia in the unification of the German states, the Lliga Regionalista saw Catalonia as the region that should lead the country’s renovation. Political autonomy and corporate representation were the two measures Catalan nationalists advocated to put an end to the inefficiency of liberal politics (epitomised in the loss of the colonies and the widespread presence of clientelism) and to begin the “moral” conquest of Spain.

At this point we may wonder: how did the Godó family react to the changes that were taking place in the regional context? The proposals of the Catalan nationalists were a direct threat to another sector of Catalan elite who, like the Godó family, were closely involved in liberal politics and who took advantage of this political system to advance their position in society. Worse still, a growing number of readers and group interests that \textit{La Vanguardia} had represented in the past (like the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional) now started to embrace the proposals of Catalan nationalism. How did the family react to this new scenario that threatened their political hegemony, and also implied the political realignment of a part of \textit{La Vanguardia}’s readership? To what extent was the response of this family singular, when compared with the response of liberal editors in Madrid?

\textsuperscript{707} “El espíritu castellano ha concluido su misión en España. A raíz de la unidad del Estado español, el espíritu castellano se impuso en España toda por la fuerza de la Historia; dirigió, personificó el Renacimiento; las grandes síntesis que integraban a éste, el absolutismo, el imperialismo colonial, el espíritu aventurero, las guerras religiosas, la formación de las grandes nacionalidades, toda la gran corriente del Renacimiento encontró su cauce natural en las cualidades del espíritu castellano; por eso España fue Castilla y no fue Aragón.” Carlos Serrano, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 390.

5.3. Press barons and the Nation: Ramón Godó (‘La Vanguardia’) and Rafael Gasset (‘El Imparcial’) from a Comparative Perspective

The proposal of reforms that the Catalan elites presented to the Queen Regent in 1898 (namely, the decentralisation of the Spanish state and the reform of the universal suffrage based on corporate representation) were two demands that eventually became the two ideological pillars of Catalan-conservative nationalists of the “Lliga Regionalista” (1901). The conjunction of economic elites and political Catalanism in this new party, however, was not immediate. This conjunction only started forming in 1899, following the failed attempt of economic elites to participate in the regeneration project of a General named Camilo García Polavieja.\(^709\) This General made the first attempt at cooperation between Catalan nationalists and other Regenerationist projects from other parts of Spain. The failure of this cooperation would have important consequences – namely, the growth of Catalan nationalism and its organisation under a new party structure (the Lliga Regionalista, created in 1901).\(^710\)

General Polavieja was one of the few Generals to have escaped the discredit of the Disaster. He was a man of solid Catholic convictions, monarchic and conservative, who had been the Captain General of Cuba (1889-1890) and the Philippines (1896-1897). His military victories during war had provided him with great prestige. This popularity was evident even before the war ended, when Polavieja was received by a large crowd in Barcelona (of around 40,000 people) as part of a public welcome that the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional had sponsored.\(^711\) In fact, during the war General Polavieja established close connections with Catalan economic elites (and particularly with the Fomento) by paying attention to their demands for protectionism. As a result of these previous contacts, when Polavieja started preparing his entry into politics in the aftermath of the war, he requested the support of Catalan economic elites through the president of the Fomento (Joan Sellarés). The support for this proposal did not take long to arrive, especially after Polavieja expressed his commitment to the demands for decentralisation.\(^712\)

Indeed, on 1 September 1898 Polavieja made public his plan of “national reconstruction”. This consisted in a reform plan aspiring to modify the traditional rotation in

\(^{709}\) Borja de Riquer, op. cit., p. 305.

\(^{710}\) The unfolding of these events, and how they affected the position of the Godó family, will be studied throughout this and the two subsequent chapters.

\(^{711}\) He would receive similar expressions of public support in other Spanish cities. In Madrid, 70,000 people turned out to welcome him.

\(^{712}\) The “Unió Catalanista” would participate in preparing a document with a plan of reforms. Therefore, not only the economic elites but also a part of the Catalan nationalists gave their support to the Regenerationist program of Polavieja.
power between Liberals and Conservatives by creating a third party. Polavieja openly condemned liberal parties and caciquismo as the main reasons behind the loss of the empire. He claimed to embody a new way of doing politics, based on a series of measures to foster economic development and in a moderate proposal of administrative decentralisation. Through these proposals Polavieja wished to attract the “masas neutras” (“neutral masses”), an expression that gained currency in the language of regeneracionismo to refer to the segments of society that remained alienated from the political system.

La Vanguardia positioned itself for the first time in relation to the regenerationist plan of General Polavieja on 13 September 1898, the day after it had published his manifesto (as the majority of the press did), and as the peace negotiations were still going on. The newspaper of the Godó family applauded General Polavieja for his decision to enter politics, and welcomed the attention paid to the demands from the periphery in favour of decentralisation. However, La Vanguardia considered the manifesto to be “excessively prudent”, both in its tone and in the measures it proposed. Above all, La Vanguardia accused Polavieja of being too cautious in his criticism of the fraudulent nature of liberal politics. As this newspaper put it:

“Son esos vicios las fuentes vivas del daño que sufrimos. La corrupción de la administración y de la justicia, el imperio del caciquismo municipal, provincial y nacional que esteriliza todas las energías [que] nacen de ahí, y no podrá contar con la opinión quien no los

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713 Although Polavieja denied any attempts to define the movement he led as a party, there is evidence that this was his intention. Álvaro de Figueroa y Torres, Conde de Romanones, Notas de una vida, Madrid-Barcelona, Marcial Pons, 1999, [1st edition 1934], vol. 1, p. 106.

714 As Polavieja argued: “Es preciso que dejemos de pensar en los comités, en las falsificaciones electorales y en los medios de fabricar, no tan sólo las mayorías que votan, sino hasta las minorías que fiscalizan y discuten, para pensar en los campos sedientos, en los caminos sin abrir, en los montes talados por el caciquismo, en los transportes costosísimos, en los puertos, en los talleres, en los tratados de comercio y en la protección inteligente de todo interés constituído y de toda irqueza que nace.” “El manifiesto del General Polavieja”, LV, 12/09/1898, p. 1.

715 Especially when a Catalan (Mr. Manuel Duran i Bas) was appointed Minister of Justice (as will be explained in the following pages). In the face of this appointment, La Vanguardia commented: “Por último, el nombramiento del señor Durán y Bas significa para Cataluña y para todas las regiones un reconocimiento que anotamos con gusto. No es solo el reconocimiento de los méritos del designado. (...) El toque además está en que se llama á la Gobernación directa del Estado en el Centro á las reputaciones formadas en la periferia, á los hombres que en la periferia viven. Eso es un reconocimiento de la vida regional, y también por este motivo merece nuestro aplauso. Ese reconocimiento se acentuará si, como se anuncia, se entrega el proyectado Ministerio de Agricultura, Industria y Comercio á otros hombres de la periferia.” “Ecos de la política”, LV, 05/03/1899, p. 4.

716 “En la expresión hay cierta timidez, quizás muy necesaria en quien aspirando á la conquista del poder [Polavieja] ha de recabar apoyo de determinados organismos y fuerzas sociales, pero timidez al cabo que en un documento que ha de juzgar el país quita fuerza y eficacia. Fuerzas directivas existen en España que tienen principalísima responsabilidad en el desastre que padecemos y no hay en el manifiesto una alusión siquiera que las censure ó que las excite á su regeneración.” “Ecos de la política. El manifiesto del General Polavieja”, LV, 13/09/1898, p. 4.
As the above-quoted paragraph demonstrates, La Vanguardia adopted the language of regeneration and the criticism of corruption. The very same method that the Godó family had used to secure their own position was paradoxically criticised in their own newspaper. If the family could justify this criticism it was thanks to the division they had established between the press and politics. Editorial independence had been decisive in this strategy to separate the family’s two spheres of influence. Regardless of the persistent manipulation of elections that the family had perpetrated in Igualada, Ramón Godó could afford to criticise these methods because La Vanguardia was no longer a partisan newspaper. The above-quoted paragraph is revealing of how this freedom of criteria made it possible to exert pressure on politicians: La Vanguardia argued that Polavieja would only obtain the support of “opinion” if he condemned corruption. This reveals that editors sought to advance their own agenda by presenting it as a demand of an alleged “public opinion”.

The cold reception La Vanguardia gave to Polavieja is particularly telling, especially if we take into account that this opinion was expressed when the political movement was just taking its first steps (the manifesto had only been published a day earlier). Moreover, the Godó family held close personal ties with General Polavieja. This became clear during the Spanish-American War, when before departing to the Philippines as Captain General, Polavieja had lunched with Ramón Godó and his father Carlos. The following day, the Godó family had accompanied Polavieja’s wife to the monastery of Monserrat (close to Igualada) to pray for the General’s safe return.  

This close acquaintance with General Polavieja, however, was insufficient to convince Ramón Godó to put La Vanguardia at his service. The main reason for this is that Polavieja wished to regenerate the country by replacing liberal parties. This was contrary to Ramón Godó’s position: as La Vanguardia would advocate on repeated occasions, traditional...
parties (Conservative and Liberal) should be the ones to lead the reform of the Restoration.  
Instead of replacing them with new ones, as Polavieja wished, *La Vanguardia* argued in favour of deeply renewing liberal parties; especially in their customary use of caciquismo.  
The proposal of *La Vanguardia* to overcome the Disaster of 1898 was thus clearly defined: a need to promote a radical transformation of liberal parties (particularly regarding the widespread use of fraudulent methods), yet opposition to any plan of regeneration that attempted to sweep those parties away.  

Moreover, like other contemporaries (such as Costa, Maeztu and Baró) *La Vanguardia* also argued that the reform of the political system should go hand in hand with the reform of the press. During the war the editor of this newspaper (Sánchez Ortiz) had already criticised the Spanish press for its emphasis on fostering a jingoistic discourse, while forgetting “national interests”.  

Behind this criticism was Sánchez’s personal conviction that newspapers were central to public affairs because they exerted a strong influence on politicians. For Sánchez, the loss of the colonies culminated a process of decadence that was neither the sole responsibility of the government nor of a single party. Rather, it was the responsibility of what he called “la España directiva”. With this expression Sánchez Ortiz referred to the ruling class, in which he included the press as an integral part.

In this respect, the argument the director of *La Vanguardia* used to stress the importance of newspapers in the national regeneration was similar to the testimonies contained in Joaquín Costa’s work. That is, contrary to liberal politicians, who were alienated

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719 “El General Polavieja rechaza á los partidos existentes y hace á la vez protestas de que jamás ha soñado con la dictadura. (...) pero creyendo como creemos sinceras las protestas del general, no vemos la manera de armonizar todo eso con la aspiración inmediata al Gobierno. Es difícil, por no decir imposible, que por los medios ordinarios y constitucionales llegue al poder un partido recién nacido, sin más fuerza moral que la de un hombre (...). El llamamiento á las fuerzas neutrales es plausible, pero no es seguro que respondan en cantidad suficiente á remediar esa pobreza. Quizás el error capital del general Polavieja estriba en eso; en recusar por un lado á título de envejecidas fuerzas organizadas y que bien dirigidas podrían ser útiles (...).” *El manifiesto del general Polavieja*, LV, *op. cit.* Emphasis added.

720 Speaking about the manifiesto of Polavieja, *La Vanguardia* argued: “(...) Fuerzas directivas existen en España que tienen principalísima responsabilidad en el desastre que padecemos y no hay en el manifiesto una alusión siquiera que las censure ó que las excite á su regeneración.” *Ibidem.*  
721 “La prensa española, lo decimos con el respeto y con el amor que nos inspira nuestra madre, pero convencidos, no ha estado en medio de tantos azares como ha producido el problema cubano á la altura que podía esperarse (...). En cuanto ha sido sentimiento de patriotismo, de abnegación (...) ha dado toda ella un ejemplo que nos enorgullece (...). Pero en nuestra humildísima opinión, por punto general y sin excluimos nosotros, le ha faltado serenidad de juicio y previsión en cuanto ha sido obra de análisis para conocer aquel problema y para guiar á la opinión en los momentos supremos. En ninguna nación, pero singularmente en las meridionales (...) existe un poder superior de hecho, al que la prensa en su conjunto ejerce. *En cada acto de Gobierno tiene la prensa una parte principalísima (...).* Esta ventaja ha de tenerse como una carga antes que como un beneficio, porque entraña una responsabilidad, y la mayor prueba de patriotismo que puede dar la prensa es recabar esa responsabilidad cuando encierra la amargura del error (...).” LV, 01/01/1897, p. 3. Emphasis added.

722 Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, “La política en 1898”, LV, 01/01/1899, p. 4.
from society due to their use of caciquismo, he considered that newspapers had a strong influence on ordinary people. The capacity to connect the political system with society is what made the press, in Sánchez’s eyes, the most important political actor in the task of national regeneration. Yet to be in the position to lead this mission, journalists should first assume their own culpability in the Disaster (above all, in their eagerness to increase sales), and adopt a professional code of conduct. Thus, Sánchez made a strong plea in favour of the professionalisation of journalism. This implied putting an end to the journalists’ most common pitfalls: first, the perception of journalism as a pathway into public office; second, viewing sales as the only guiding principle. These two common mistakes should be replaced by two new professional ideals: “priesthood and magisterium” ("sacerdocio y magisterio"). That is to say, to make journalism an end in itself, rather than a route into politics; and to prioritise “truth” over profits. According to Sánchez, adhering to these professional codes would be the only way to avoid the errors of the Spanish-American War and to guide the liberal parties and society to a new age.

If the above-mentioned comments were the work of Sánchez Ortiz, the editorial position of La Vanguardia regarding Polavieja was dictated by Ramón Godó. Although Sánchez was the one who signed the editorials, in his position of proprietor Ramón Godó was the one who had the power to determine the newspaper’s line. In this regard, what needs to be stressed about the way in which Godó positioned La Vanguardia in the face of Polavieja is that it differed from the attitude that Catalan economic elites adopted. If this newspaper became the distinguished organ of the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional” during the War of Melilla (1893) and the Cuban War of Independence (1895), its position differed from this employer association after the Disaster took place. Thus, the Fomento and other economic entities rapidly supported the plans of Polavieja. This was not mere rhetoric, but rather a breakthrough in the attitude the Catalan elites traditionally adopted in relation to the political system. Thus, during the elections of March 1899, 14 of the total 44 deputies that were elected in Catalonia were members of the Fomento supporting Polavieja’s candidacy (including the president of this entity, Joan Sallarès, and his predecessor in the post, Joan Saladrigas). This move represented the new interest of Catalan elites to actively participate in politics, and to do so through corporate action.

723 “(...) La Prensa entra más adentro y está más continuamente en relaciones con la nación española, con la gran masa social que los Partidos, y que los Gobiernos, y que el Parlamento mismo, á todos los cuales la España que trabaja y piensa y hace tiene vuelta la espalda, fuera de las relaciones oficiales. Por eso la Prensa, aunque sea circunstancial y transitoriamente, es la fuerza político-social más capacitada para iniciar la acción en la obra regeneradora.” Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, El periodismo, Barcelona, Fundación Conde de Barcelona, 1990 [1st ed. 1903], pp. 89-96.
Indeed, an added consequence of the Disaster in domestic politics was the growing presence of corporate principles of representation, to the detriment of partisan affiliation. Polavieja and the Catalan elites were not the exclusive representatives of this strategy, but rather exemplified a typical feature of the different Regenerationist movements that appeared in Spain. An example of this was the “Unión Nacional” (1900), a short-lived political movement promoted by Joaquin Costa. Based on the same corporativist scheme, this movement had the ambition of bringing together the chambers of commerce, the economic societies, and the leagues of producers. Although these entities had a long tradition of lobbying, they were now presented as the mobilisation of civic society against liberal politics. Moreover, the movement that Costa inspired and Santiago Alba led also shared Polavieja’s plan of pragmatic policies to promote economic development based on public investment.

The attitude that Ramón Godó adopted in the face of this new political scenario, consisting in the support for the regeneration of national politics, but through the renewal of liberal parties, most surely obeyed his position as a member of the Liberal Party. Indeed, and as the next chapter will show in detail, Godó not only inherited the family business and the ownership of La Vanguardia, but also the political career of his father in the constituency of Igualada. These are important elements to understand the way he positioned his newspaper in the face of the new political scenario that was emerging in the country.

A look at Madrid, however, reveals that not all the liberal editors reacted equally to Godó. This can be seen through the case of Rafael Gasset Chinchilla (1866-1927), the owner of Madrid’s newspaper El Imparcial. What makes the comparison between Godó and Gasset interesting is the many common points that existed between them but also their very different responses to the Disaster. Both of them descended from families that owned newspapers that were also affiliated with the Liberal Party of Sagasta. Likewise, both men were the owners of independent newspapers with a clear commercial orientation; and both inherited these newspapers shortly after the Disaster (Ramón Godó in 1899, at the age of 35; and Rafael Gasset in 1899, at the age of 23). A third similarity between the two men is that following the political careers of their respective fathers, both of them would be elected deputies in Congress; and they always did so for the same constituency, despite the fact that neither lived there.724

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724 Ramón Godó was deputy for Igualada between 1899 and 1906, while Rafael Gasset was deputy for the constituency of Noya, in the region of Galicia, between 1896 and 1910. Both of them also had relatives who would hold other political positions. See the next chapter.
Yet regardless of these points in common, the fact is that the two liberal editors responded differently to the first regeneration attempts. In contrast to La Vanguardia, Gasset’s El Imparcial did not hold the press responsible for the Disaster, but blamed liberal politicians exclusively. This became clear during the treaty negotiations in Paris. Despite the fact El Imparcial had been one of the newspapers that most actively promoted jingoism during the war, it opened its edition of 2 February 1898 with an article specifically addressed to Mr. Montero Ríos, who was in charge of the Spanish delegation in Paris. During the negotiations, Montero Ríos had blamed the press for the loss of the colonies. In response to this, El Imparcial argued that the complicity of the press to go to war had conformed to the false information that the government had provided. Consequently, when it came to establishing who was to blame for Spain’s ruin, El Imparcial did not hesitate in pointing at “los elementos directivos de la política”. With this expression El Imparcial referred to the ruling elites, but did not include the press among them. The understanding of newspapers in relation to politics thus appeared to be different to that of La Vanguardia: journalists did not belong to the political elites.725

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725 “En la enfermedad nacional que ha tenido funesto desenlace, se descubren, como en la mayoría de los procesos morbosos, las causas predisponentes y las determinantes, de las cuales fácil nos será deducir las distintas responsabilidades. Fueron causas predisponentes el desbarajuste de la administración pública, la política menguada del caciquismo con arreglo á la cual los intereses generales quedaban siempre pospuestos á la particular conveniencia y utilidad, el continuo engaño en punto á presupuestos y las falsas estadísticas de soldados y de barcos. Claro es; como no disponíamos de los recusos que esos datos oficiales consignaban (...) Con semejante organización podía representarse el papel de un pueblo fuerte ante una farsa de comediantes; pero al chocar todo aquello con la realidad, tenía forzosamente que descubrirse que eran telones los sillares de piedra y las murallas bambalinas. Aquellos procedimientos y estos engaños prepararon la ruina de España.
In practice, however, Rafael Gasset was involved much more obviously in the first attempts of national regeneration than Godó. General Polavieja found in *El Imparcial* the most active supporter of his political ambitions. During the Spanish-American war Gasset criticised on several occasions the way the Liberal government had conducted the war (particularly the lack of military preparation). Disenchanted with liberal politics (in which he actively participated as deputy in Congress between 1891-1899) Gasset became one Polavieja’s biggest supporters, encouraging him to make the jump into politics.\(^726\) In fact, Gasset was the person who presented the manifesto of General Polavieja in Congress; and, before that, he had even actively participated in the writing of this document advocating for the creation of a third party.\(^727\)

Gasset identified with the Regenerationist calls for modernising the country through economic development. To boost this programme, *El Imparcial* started to publish (in April 1899) a series of articles under the title “Para la nueva política” (“For the new policy”), where it stressed the need for building new infrastructures through public investment. As historian Juan Carlos Sánchez Illán has noted, this “new policy” became the new political strategy of Rafael Gasset, to which *El Imparcial* contributed on an almost daily basis.\(^728\) Gasset’s commitment to this plan of reform culminated in 1899, when his intercession became decisive to unite General Polavieja with the new leader of the Conservative Party, Francisco Silvela (who had also advocated for a Regenerationist plan). The result was the formation of a new government (on 4 March 1899) that combined the most conservative trend within the Regenerationist movements (General Polavieja) with the liberal politics represented by Francisco Silvela. For the first time in Spain, a new government seized power with an explicit political programme of national recovery. Polavieja would be appointed Minister of War, while the support of Catalan conservatives and economic elites became manifest with the appointment of Manuel Duran i Bas as Minister of Justice. Gasset was awarded for his contribution with the mayoral office of Madrid. Although he initially refused this offer, in April 1900 he joined the new government as Minister of Agriculture. His case


\(^727\) *Furthermore, the manifesto was written by a close friend of Gasset (Augusto Suárez de Figueroa, the director of *El Heraldo de Madrid*). J. Sánchez Illán, *Ibid*, p. 117.*

\(^728\) *Ibid*, p. 124.
reveals to what extent liberal editors not only promoted the war effort in 1898, but also sought to maintain their influence in this new scenario.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has demonstrated the growing mediatisation that Spanish politics was undergoing at the turn of the 19th century. Newspaper proprietors not only had influence over public opinion during the Spanish-American War, but also became decisive in the plans for the Regeneration that followed. In the new emphasis that growing voices put on the need to connect the political system with larger segments of society (the so-called “masas neutras”) the press appeared as the only medium capable of reaching large audiences. On some occasions newspaper editors were personally involved in this attempt to breach the gap between the real and the legal country, as the commitment of Rafael Gasset to the political project of General Polavieja illustrates. The efforts of this editor allowed Polavieja to obtain the support of one of the most influential newspapers in the country. This influence stemmed from the visibility that newspapers gave to the deeds of politicians, but also in their capacity to exert pressure during decision-making processes. In both types of influence, having El Imparcial on his side was particularly important for the interests of General Polavieja.

However, the aftermath of the Disaster also revealed that the action of newspapers was not free from constrains. The “crisis of Madrid’s press” represents an event that clearly shows that the readers of newspapers were not a passive audience. As different contemporaries noted, the crisis of the press was, above all, a crisis of “public confidence”. The importance of this crisis for newspapers in Madrid carried visible consequences: a large number of newspapers simply disappeared in the aftermath of the war; while many others suffered a considerable loss of sales. To a considerable degree, this crisis was the consequence of the very same success these newspapers had obtained during the war against the United States. These exceptional circumstances were obviously impossible to maintain in times of peace. But, still, as argued above, there are various sources that make it clear that many readers felt deeply disappointed with the attitude followed by their respective newspapers, thus providing evidence about the readers autonomy.

In this regard, the case of La Vanguardia is particularly striking if compared with the press in Madrid. La Vanguardia had also contributed actively to the patriotic fervour, but its
readers did not appear to feel let down by its behaviour once the conflict had ended. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find any reference to a “crisis” of the Barcelona press during the same period. Still, this does not mean that the circulation of the press was something to be taken for granted: *El Diario de Barcelona*, which had distinguished itself for its advocacy of peace from the very beginning, saw its sales fall after the Disaster (from 9,000 copies in 1898, to 7,000 copies in 1904). This indicates that apart from the strongly localised nature of consumption patterns, the reasons why people bought one newspaper over another were complex, and were not exclusively linked to the attitude of newspapers during the war.

The Disaster also made contemporaries more aware about the power of the media in society. The opinions of intellectuals like Joaquín Costa and Ramiro de Maeztu, and of journalists like Teodoro Baró and Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, reveal the impression that the transformations the press was undergoing had contributed to the country’s decadence. By exploring the opinions of these contemporaries, this chapter has shown that the discredit of liberal politics and the re-definition of journalistic culture were deeply interwoven phenomena. The function of journalists in society was certainly not a new concern (as Chapter 2 has demonstrated), but the defeat against the United States led contemporaries to see journalists as upholding a fraudulent system based on sham elections. The outcome was a myriad of proposals on the relations between journalists and politicians, on one hand; and on relations between journalists and society at large, on the other.

Indeed, the fin de siècle crisis revealed the consolidation of the new commercial press, to the detriment of the traditional partisan orientation of newspapers. The emphasis put on raw information to increase sales explains the success of commercial newspapers in the new mass society that was starting to emerge in the main European cities. Yet, paradoxically, the emphasis this commercial press placed on satisfying popular culture (and also on shaping it) was precisely what conservative men like Teodor Baró lamented. In this respect, the proposal of Catalan elites to reform universal suffrage and the criticisms of Baró of the content of commercial newspapers can be seen as two sides of the same coin, consisting in a negative perception of the “masses” and the need to confront them through new measures.

From a different perspective, Maeztu also despised the commercial press, but in his case he did not blame it on the masses. Rather, he considered that the changes brought to journalism by the factory system led newspapers to fail in their duties – such as the fostering of civic virtues. In their eagerness to provide abundant information, newspapers were abandoning their educative function in a largely rural country that, in the view of Maeztu,
still had a great need of it. It must be noted, however, that despite being two contemporaries with such different views of society, Maeztu and Baró did share a subtle nostalgia towards the partisan press (which while it had certainly not disappeared was losing popularity by that time).

The consequences that stemmed from the growing influence of the press were also the concern of the director of *La Vanguardia*, Modesto Sánchez Ortiz. The incapacity of the press to accept its own responsibility for the military defeat, and the obsession of many newspapers with sales were two elements that convinced him of the need to professionalise journalism. It should no longer be a pathway into public office, nor simply a business venture, but rather a self-sufficient occupation with a strong vocation of public service. Sánchez thus shared a common point with Joaquín Costa: both strongly criticised the behaviour of the press, but at the same time had some confidence in the contribution it could make in the task of national recovery.

The Disaster also brought important consequences in the field of politics. Even when liberal parties managed to overcome the situation (as the seizing of power by Sagasta in 1903 would demonstrate) the widespread pessimism also fostered political re-alignments. The case of the Catalan elites is particularly revealing in this respect. The reform plans that came from this region, consisting in the introduction of administrative autonomy and corporate representation, reveal to what extent the reconfiguration of the liberal state was regarded as a necessary pre-condition for Spain’s recovery. Yet far from being an exclusive proposal of the elites from this region, the political movement of the “Unión Nacional” (which had its hubs in places like Valladolid and Zaragoza) shows that corporate action became a typical feature of the Regenerationist movement. This reveals that civic entities were presented as an alternative to liberal politicians.

In this regard, the positioning of *La Vanguardia* in relation to the new political scenario can hardly be explained without taking into account the figure of its new owner, Ramón Godó Lallana. Although his father before him had shown on many occasions his commitment to defending the economic interests of Catalan elites, particularly in the case of entities like Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, the distancing of *La Vanguardia* from Polavieja reveals that this newspaper did not always follow the direction of general opinion in Barcelona. Still, it also seems clear that it took care not to directly go against it. The position of this newspaper can be explained as the need to navigate between the private interests of the Godó family (linked to the Liberal Party of Sagasta) and the new political context (criticism of caciquismo and of liberal politics). While this reveals to what extent the editorial
line was where the Godó family’s power resided, putting too much emphasis on defending the family’s private agenda could also have serious consequences for its new owner, Ramón Godó Lallana. This is, precisely, what the next chapter will examine.
CHAPTER 6. THE CRISIS OF CLIENTELISM AND THE MEDIATISATION OF POLITICS

INTRODUCTION

6.1. THE GENERATIONAL RENEWAL IN THE GODÓ FAMILY

6.2. WORDS AS WEAPONS: FAMILY SCANDALS AND RAMÓN GODÓ’S RESIGNATION (1906)

CONCLUSIONS
“(…) tan pronto se ha vislumbrado el carruaje del señor Godó, se han echado al vuelo las campanas de todas las iglesias, y el pueblo en masa le ha recibido y le ha felicitado con aclamaciones de entusiasmo diciéndole ¡Bien venido sea nuestro diputado! Dios llene de felicidad al padre del distrito! ¡Albricias y salud al amigo y amparo de los pobres! Dios bendiga al hijo de don Carlos Godó.”

“(…) que el periódico, si no es arma mortífera, es arma temida, porque hiere sin hacer sangre, sólo con un reproche; pero no es la herida la que hiere, sino que de haberla recibido se enteren miles de personas.”

**INTRODUCTION**

By comparison to other “press barons”, like Luca de Tena (ABC), Nicolás María de Urgoiti (El Sol), the Brusi family (Diario de Barcelona) and the Gasset family (El Imparcial), the figure of Ramón Godó Lallana (1864-1931) has received surprisingly little attention. Books on the history of journalism often mention him as the man responsible for *La Vanguardia*’s evolution into one of Spain’s main newspapers. However, the fact is that little is known about Ramón Godó. The traditional image of *La Vanguardia* as an independent and commercial newspaper has contributed, to some extent, to hiding the political career of this individual. The supposedly apolitical character of Ramón Godó would be the ultimate proof of *La Vanguardia*’s “modernity” (understood here as detachment from a partisan adscription), in contrast to other press editors who fell into the temptation of

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729 [E.T.]: “(…) as soon as Mr. Godó’s carriage was seen coming, the bells in all the churches started ringing and all the people went to welcome him saying enthusiastically: ‘Welcome to our deputy! God bless the father of the constituency! Congratulations and good health to our friend and protector of the humble! God bless Carlos Godó’s son!”’ LV, 19/05/1901, p. 6.

730 [E.T.]: “(…) when the newspaper is not a lethal weapon, it is [nevertheless] a feared weapon, because it hurts with just one reproach; but it is not the wound that hurts, but that thousands of people become aware of it.” Quoted in M. Rodriguez, “Como sembráredes cogaredes” (sic), LV, 26/10/1903, p. 10.

731 According to Goméz Aparicio, “el auténtico impulsor de La Vanguardia fue, como ya se ha dicho, don Ramón Godó Lallana, padre del actual Conde de Godó, que, poniendo en tensión su excepcional talento de hombre de negocios y transformando el periódico en una gran Empresa, le dotó de los más modernos medios de información, de composición y de impresión, al servicio de un estupendo cuadro de redactores y colaboradores”. p. 646. According to Schulte, “the Godó family started La Vanguardia, which was begun as a small, partisan organ, favoring the policies of Sagasta. However, under the direction of Ramón Godó Lallana, who took charge in 1897 after the death of his father, the newspaper’s founder, La Vanguardia grew into a national newspaper, a role it fills today (…)”. Henry F. Schulte, *The Spanish press, 1470-1966: print, power and politics*, University of Illinois Press, 1968, p. 214.
participating in politics (like Rafael Gasset and Luca de Tena). This view has been common to the (few) accounts of both historians and family versions of the Godó family. However, the goal here is not to stress how politicised Ramón Godó actually was. Rather, his case will be used to study the tensions between the position of editor of an “independent” newspaper and that of a politician. In the aftermath of the “Disaster”, some contemporaries start arguing that the crisis of the press was due, in reality, to the incapacity of the new commercial press to see beyond the private views of their proprietors. This attitude, which arguably made newspapers unpredictable, was inherent to papers that were the property of liberal politicians (like El Heraldo de Madrid and El Diario Universal, belonging to José Canalejas and to the Count of Romanones, respectively); and of newspaper proprietors who held political ambitions like Rafael Gasset, the owner of El Imparcial. In fact, there is evidence that immediately after his appointment as Minister in the Silvela-Polavieja government, in 1900, Gasset made great efforts to distinguish his entry into government from the path his newspaper would follow. This reveals that the political affiliation of Rafael Gasset was seen as being incompatible with a newspaper that had traditionally based its identity on its (alleged) neutrality.

732 Jaume Guillamet, has argued, for instance, that “A diferencia de sus colegas madrileños, ni Brusi Ferrer ni Godó Lallana ostentaron cargos políticos. La distancia de la Corte podría explicar la independencia de criterio del Diario de Barcelona de Brusi Ferrer en el siglo pasado y la opción más informativa de La Vanguardia.” Jaume Guillamet, Las élites catalanas y la prensa, in Paul Aubert et Jean Michel Desvois (eds.), Les élites et la press en Espagne et en Amerique latine des Lumières à la seconde guerre mondiale, Casa de Velázquez-Maison des Pays Ibériques, 2002, p. 132. This statement probably has something to do with the scant information about this character. There is, however, the unpublished “tesis de licenciatura” that Pere Voltes dedicated to Ramón Godó: “Vida y obra de Don Ramón de Godó primer conde de Godó”, UAB, 1980. Voltes was a journalist at La Vanguardia and his work, despite its obvious interest for our topic, barely makes any reference to Godó’s political career. Something similar happens with the official (indeed commissioned) history of the family, where Godó’s political involvement is also neglected: Vis Molina, Los Godó. Los últimos 125 años de Barcelona, Madrid, Martínez Roca, 2005.

733 “Al transformarse en España el periódico de partido, poderoso hasta los días de la Restauración, en periódico independiente, de órgano de un núcleo político que luchaba por ideales y por la conquista del poder, en empresa industrial, que hace de la información una legítima mercadería, en lugar de ganar independencia política la ha perdido. Al doctrinarismo muerto ha sucedido el fulanismo; representaba antes credos políticos, encarnan hoy criterios particulares, naturalmente tornadizos y volubles. Los ideales, de este modo, en vez de ensancharse se han estrechado y particularizado totalmente.” “La crisis de la prensa madrileña”, El Nuevo Mundo, 08/06/1905, p. 1.

734 “Para el Heraldo nada hay bueno, grande y fecundo en política sino lo que quiere Canalejas, ni nadie en España sabe más de sociología que cuando Canalejas habla por ideales y por la conquista del poder, en empresa industrial, que hace de la información una legítima mercadería, en lugar de ganar independencia política la ha perdido. Al doctrinarismo muerto ha sucedido el fulanismo; representaba antes credos políticos, encarnan hoy criterios particulares, naturalmente tornadizos y volubles. Los ideales, de este modo, en vez de ensancharse se han estrechado y particularizado totalmente.” “La crisis de la prensa madrileña”, El Nuevo Mundo, 08/06/1905, p. 1.

735 “Desde hoy El Imparcial y el Sr. Gasset vivirán en esferas distintas; él atento a sus obligaciones de hombre de gobierno; nosotros cuidadosos como siempre, de representar lo más fielmente posible que nos sea dable los movimientos de la opinión pública... en lo que el Gobierno acierte tendrá nuestro apoyo... en lo que se equivoque hallará nuestra censura tan viva como corresponda. Y no decimos sobre esto más, porque el movimiento se prueba andando”. Quoted by J.C. Sánchez Illán, Prensa y política en la España de la Restauración. Rafael Gasset y El Imparcial, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1999, p. 137.
In this regard, the case of *El Imparcial* and Rafael Gasset is particularly revealing of a tension in value systems. Namely, that a certain number of readers of *El Imparcial* might see the political career of Gasset as being conflictive with the newspaper they read, especially because the identity of this newspaper was based on independence from party interference. This case highlights a change that was occurring in the public sphere, particularly from the perspective of public values. As Ivo Engels has noted, one of the main characteristics of the “long 19th century” was the establishing of sharper lines between the public and the private spheres.\(^{736}\) Or to put it another way, certain practices that were regarded as being legitimate in pre-modern societies (where a pluralistic system of values existed), started to become problematic during the 18th and 19th centuries with the public redefinition of the “common good”. As Zygmunt Bauman and Bruno Latour have noted, one of the main characteristics of modern societies is their tendency to reduce ambiguities and to establish clear categories.\(^{737}\) It is during “episodes of conflict”\(^{738}\) (as Michael Johnston has called them) that the clash of spheres becomes visible.\(^{738}\)

From a more general perspective, historians rarely take into account the communicative nature of politics, and how changes in the media condition the nature of power, as John B. Thomson has noted.\(^{739}\) In this regard, it seems to me that the combined study of changes in the press and certain forms of corruption (like clientelism) can provide valuable insights about the tensions occurring between the private and the public spheres, and track the changes in the genesis of public values in modern societies. Indeed, the recent research on corruption scandals has revealed that during the 19th century some places in Europe experienced changes in the perceptions of private uses of the “common good”.\(^{740}\) In this regard, I will argue that since clientelism treats information as a privately-held resource, and one that is only exchanged in particularistic relationships, its disclosure in the public sphere has *the potential* of diminishing the reputation of the individuals involved.\(^{741}\) This point might be of great interest for the case of the notables, since they were a social group for whom “social esteem” was one of the pillars of their prominence as leaders of the


\(^{737}\) Cited in J. Ivo Engels, *ibid*.


\(^{741}\) J. Ivo Engels, *ibid*. 

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local community, as Max Weber noted.742

By focusing on the case of Ramón Godó Lallana, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the reasons that led him to resign from active politics in 1906. In so doing, I attempt to explore how public perceptions of corruption in Restoration Spain were affected by the “Disaster” of 1898. This change was motivated, I will argue, by the emphasis the Regenerationist movement put on blaming corruption for the loss of the empire, and by the growing mobilisation that took place in Catalonia during the first decade of the 20th century. As noted before, this region was the first place where the monopoly of power by the Liberal and the Conservative party was broken in Spain. This had much to do with the emergence of two political movements (Catalan nationalism and Republicanism) that turned the denouncing of clientelism into one of the central arguments of their political culture. This should allow further comparisons on the crisis of parliamentary politics with other European countries.743

Finally, the case of Ramón Godó will be used to study how elites transmitted power across generations. This topic should allow us to evaluate to what extent the strategies used by the first generation of the Godó family to reproduce their power were equally effective for the members of the second generation, and thus to examine how the notables reacted to the emergence of mass politics.

The objectives mentioned above will be divided in two parts. The first part will be devoted to studying how power strategies were transmitted between generations of the same family, while the second part will deal with the crisis of the family strategies as part of changing perceptions of corruption in the public sphere.

6.1. **The Generational Renewal in the Godó Family**

Although Ramón Godó Lallana was born in Bilbao (in the Basque country), in 1864, and lived most of his life in Barcelona, he did not marry in either of these cities. Instead, he was married in Igualada, where his family had originated. His wedding was on 2 December 1893, to a local woman: Rosa Valls i Valls (1874-1922). The day after their marriage *La Vanguardia* congratulated the young couple (Ramon was 29 and Rosa 19 years old), who would go on to have numerous children in the years to come. Among the celebrations that followed the wedding, there is one that is particularly revealing for the aims of this chapter. Namely, the reception that Ramón’s father, Carlos Godó, gave to the members of the “Comité Liberal Monárquico de Igualada” to celebrate his son’s marriage. This reception gathered the main members of the political network that had been contributing so decisively to the political pre-eminence the Godó family enjoyed in Igualada, often through clientelistic practices. In fact, the Republican newspaper *El Igualadino* did not miss the opportunity to criticise the wedding reception, likening it to the typical display of a “feudal lord” feeding his band of petty followers.

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744 The marriage produced seven children: Rosa (married to Pere Bonet); Antònia (Pasqual Girona); Merçè (Marcel·lí Coll), Ramon (Carme Mir); Roser (Josep Bravo), Maria and Glòria. *La Vanguardia* commemorated the wedding as follows: “Nuestro muy querido amigo don Ramón Godo y Lallana contrajo ayer matrimonio con la señorita Rosita Valls. La ceremonia se celebró en Igualada, de donde es natural la novia. Fueron testigos de la boda, por parte de la novia, los señores Franc (don Sebastián) y Dolcet; y por parte del novio los señores Conde (don Eduardo) y Martorell (don Bernardino); Ligados á los señores de Godo por estrechos lazos de cariño, nos asociamos de corazón á las satisfacciones de esta fiesta de familia, y deseamos á los recién casados todo género de venturas. La feliz pareja habrá salido á estas horas para Andalucía, por cuyas provincias hará su viaje de novios”. LV, 03/12/1893, p. 2. Archivo Comarcal de l’Anoia (ACAN), Llibre de Matrimonis (1879-1893), any 1893, fol. 285 (52).

745 “(...) El banquete con que el diputado Godó obsequió á los socios del Centro liberal Monárquico el pasado domingo se presta á muy amargas reflexiones. Dejemos á un lado el hecho de que el núcleo de los socios de dicho Circulo, con contadasisimas excepciones, se componga de estómagos agradecidos, tránsfugas de los demás partidos con más hambre que vergüenza, vividores que se arriman siempre al sol que más calienta y nécios adoradores del Dios Éxito. No tengamos eso en cuenta, porque en ese caso resultaria naturalísimo lo sucedido y fijémonos solamente en lo que significa la comilona del domingo pasado. Es natural y nada tenemos que objetar al banquete con que se celebró el sábado dia 2 el casamiento del hijo del diputado; es un acontecimiento notable y grato en dos familias y lógico es que se solemnice de la mejor manera posible (...). No hicimos en nuestro número pasado comentario alguno á la boda, porque respetamos estas fiestas de familia, agenas por completo á las cuestiones políticas y á los asuntos de administración local. (...). Pero si no debe importarnos la boda, es en cambio deber nuestro demostrar lo repugnante del espectáculo ofrecido al dia siguiente con motivo de ella. Un cacique, erigido en señor feudal y en el tono que se usa cuando se dá las sobras del plato á un perro, viendo que sobran abundantes provisiones de una comida, dá la orden de que al dia siguiente acuda su partido á comer, y un centenar de personas, sin conciencia de su propia dignidad, se arroja con avidez sobre los restos del festín, mascando con el afán del goloso, y con los ojos, húmedos por el acontecimiento, vuelto á su amo y señor que contempla satisfecho el cuadro, contento de ver como se hartan sus admiradores y convencido de que con un partido tan entusiasta se puede imponer la voluntad, no á una ciudad como Igualada, sino aún á Barcelona si fuera necesario. Acusa un rebajamiento moral lamentable la frecuencia con que vemos al reconocimiento convertido en humillación (...). Pero, perdemos el tiempo si hablamos á los fusionistas. Para tal gefe tales soldados, y no para que dejen de ser tal como son, sino para señalarlos al despacho público escribimos este
In this regard, both the wedding and the reception are illustrative of the same strategy, namely, the attempt of connecting the second generation of the Godó family to Igualada. It was where the family had originated, and the city the brothers Carlos and Bartolomé had abandoned in the mid-19th century to search for a better living – first in the Basque Country and later on in Barcelona. But other members of the same family had remained in Igualada. This circumstance became decisive when Carlos and Bartolomé decided to run for public office at the Congress in the first years of the Restoration (1874-1923). By the turn of the century, now that Ramón Godó was making his first appearances in public life, it was time to start preparing the generational take over. Both the wedding and the reception Carlos held for the members of the “Comité Liberal Monárquico” can be seen, in this respect, as part of the same strategy: to integrate the second generation of the Godó family into Igualada’s social and political life.

In this regard, family was the centrepiece in the politics of Restoration Spain. When it comes to defining the way politics operated in modern Spain, the historian Pedro Carasa has even suggested replacing the classic expression “political friends” with that of “political families”. Carasa made this point after conducting a vast quantitative study on the origins of political elites in the region of Castile. For the case of France, Alexandre Niess has also noted the importance of family connections and nepotism in the Third Republic (1870-1940). By borrowing a concept used by medieval historians for the study of the family (the “Sippe”, understood as “tribe”), Niess has focused on the French department of Marne to explore “how family, matrimonial and patrimonial strategies within particular lines are explicitly constructed in order to keep up the pre-eminence of a particular social group within public affairs – including republican affairs”. In this regard, what the French and the Spanish case had in common was the existence of a number of families that managed to stay afloat in politics for a long time. However, both the studies of Carasa and Niess have adopted a

748 “While in other European polities, the advent of mass politics from the late nineteenth century was accompanied by an influx of representatives from a working-class background or a position as trade-union and party official, this process was quite restrained in France. (...) In the French case, it is not change which requires
quantitative perspective. It thus seems necessary, in this respect, to study how power was transmitted across generations from a more dynamic and qualitative point of view, as Renato Camurri has recently noted for the case of Italy.\textsuperscript{749} That is what I shall attempt to do in the following lines, by connecting it to the crisis of liberal politics in Catalonia, which was where this phenomenon manifested first in Spain, and with the highest intensity.

When Carlos Godó passed away in 1897 (four years after Ramón’s wedding), the Godó family was obliged to adopt a transitional solution for the next elections. As a result of this, in the elections of 1898 the Liberal candidate for Igualada’s constituency was José Balcells Cortada, \textit{“un rico comerciante de nuestra plaza [Barcelona], banquero y armador de buques, [que] cuenta con grandes simpatías, no solamente dentro del partido liberal, sino entre las clases mercantiles de nuestra capital”}. This would be the only occasion, between 1881 and 1916, when no member of the Godó family would lead the candidacy of the Liberal party in Igualada. Still, even in such an exceptional case, like the one created by Carlos’ death, another member of the Godó family (Juan Godó Llucià) would be in charge of “preparing” the elections. Thus, Juan Godó would be responsible for introducing José Balcells to the “Centro Liberal Monárquico” of Igualada, and to the leaders of the same party that came from Barcelona (Mr. Comas i Masferrer and Mr. Bosch). During this event, which took place in March 1898, frequent tributes were made to the late Carlos Godó, the “traditional” representative of Igualada’s constituency. The elections finally went smoothly and José Balcells was elected, probably thanks to the clientelistic practices of the Godó’s network and the little mobilisation of voters (the war with the United States led to the Government “controlling” – rigging – elections in a systematic way).

During the following year’s elections, however, Ramón Godó took on the responsibility and became the official candidate in Igualada. The parenthesis opened by Carlos Godó’s death was thus rapidly put to an end when his son replaced him as the Liberal representative. The second generation of the Godó family, in the figure of Ramón, was ready to maintain the family’s continuity in political affairs. It must be noted, in this regard, that Ramón followed the same strategy that his father and his uncle had traditionally used. Hence, explanation and attention, but rather continuity”. Heinrich Best and Daniel Gaxie, \textit{“Detours to Modernity: Long Term Trends of Parliamentary Recruitment in Republican France 1848-1999”}, H. Best and M. Cotta (eds.), \textit{Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848-2000. Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries}, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{749} “Desde una perspectiva que considere también los desarrollos de la investigación en el campo europeo, aparece necesario (...) empezar a afrontar la cuestión de la formación y del recambio de las elites (...)”. Renato Camurri, \textit{“Las elites italianas: estado de los estudios y perspectivas de investigación”}, R. Zurita, R. Camurri (eds.), \textit{op. cit.}, 2011, p. 24
the brothers Carlos and Bartolomé Godó (the two founders of *La Vanguardia*) had always followed the same electoral strategy: on the one hand, Carlos ran for the elections of deputy at the Spanish Congress, while his brother Bartolomé, on the other hand, always ran for the elections of provincial deputy. This strategy provided valuable benefits. First, Bartolomé’s position allowed him to intervene in the decisions that affected Igualada’s constituency (particularly in the building of infrastructures, like roads), which in many situations depended at the time on Barcelona’s Provincial Council. In parallel, the seat Carlos occupied in the Congress allowed him to extend the family’s range of influence to Madrid (where economic policies and other type of infrastructures, like the building of railway connections, were decided). This strategy of “sibling cooperation” allowed the family interests to be promoted more effectively in two different but complementary spaces of Spanish politics.

The strategy followed by the two brothers between 1881 and 1894 was reproduced (with minor differences) by the second generation. Ramón Godó Lallana (1864-1931; the owner of *La Vanguardia*) ran for deputy in Congress, while his cousin in Igualada, Juan Godó Llucià (1851-1935), ran for deputy in Barcelona’s Provincial Council. [See: Table 2].
Table 2. Four Generations of the Godó family

But who was Juan Godó Llucià (1851-1935), the person with whom Ramón would base his political strategy in the future? Juan was popularly known as “el Morrut” (“Morrudo”, in Spanish) due to his bad temper, and he was the heir in the principal line of descendancy of the Godó family’ [in blue, Table 2]. This means that besides living in the Godó’s traditional household on the “Rambla Nova”, he was the one who inherited La Igualadina Cotonera – the main business that the Godó family traditionally ran in Igualada. By the turn of the century, La Igualadina Cotonera was “one of the oldest and most important textile factories in Catalonia” and employed 350 workers. In an article that the

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750 For the sake of clarity, different family members have not been included (children, etc.), but the full list can be found in the Annexes. The brothers Carlos (in orange) and Bartolomé (in pink) were the founders of La Vanguardia. Following Bartolomé’s death, the ownership of La Vanguardia would become the property of Carlos’ line of descendancy, e.g. Ramón Godó Lallana. This has remained the case up to this very day. Source: Arxiu Històric Comarcal de l’Anoia-Arxiu Parroquial d’Igualada (ACAN-API); Llibre de baptisms; Llibre d’òbits; Llibre de matrimonis.

751 See Chapter 1.

752 M. A. Bisbal & T. Miret, Diccionari biogràfic..., p. 97. This factory has been the object of a recent investigation by historian Pere Pascual Domènech: La Igualadina. Símbol de la Revolució Industrial a Catalunya, Igualada, Ajuntament d’Igualada, Institut Municipal de Cultura, 2014.
journal *La Ilustración catalana* dedicated to this factory in 1893, it was described as the biggest textile factory in Igualada, as well as the first one to install electric current.\(^{753}\) Like his relatives in Barcelona in the jute industry, a significant number of *La Igualadina Cotonera’s* manufactures were also exported to Spain’s former colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines.\(^{754}\) This explains why during the Spanish-American War of 1898 Juan Godó participated very actively in the campaigns to raise money that his cousin Ramón had arranged through *La Vanguardia*, while his employees promised to give one day’s salary every month to the war effort for as long as it lasted.\(^{755}\)

The relationship between Ramón Godó and his cousin Juan went far beyond politics. As *Illustration 2* shows, Ramón held strong emotional bonds with his relatives in Igualada and actively participated in the family life. Despite the fact he never lived in this city, kinship ties and the family name were two elements that grounded him in Igualada. His marriage to Rosa Valls i Valls was another aspect of this. Moreover, the links between Ramón Godó and his cousin Juan included common interests in the textile factory, which led them to establish, in 1897, a company for the production of corsets and other types of cloth made of wool, with a capital of 10,000 pesetas.\(^{756}\) The same year the two men, together with a third cousin, established another company called “Crédito Ygualada”, dedicated to credit and banking operations.\(^{757}\) These kinds of operations ultimately reveal a tight bond between family members in which trust and cooperation were fundamental.

\(^{753}\) [in Catalan]: “La nostra es la província ahont fa més negoci. Lo que no hi hà á Igualada son fàbricas molt en gran per l’estil de les que ha vist vostè a Mataró, Sabadell y altres centres, però potser no tardin à establirsen algunes. Avuy la més gran y la més important per sa producció es la de Joan Godó, de teixits de fil y de cotó, perque es la que conta ab més obrers, crech que 350, y s’hi fan totas las operacions fins al tint, entranthi’l gènero en brut y sortintne ja llest pera la venta. En fi, ja anirà vostè vegent exas y altras fàbricas dignas d’un recort á L’ILUSTRACIÓ”. *La Ilustració catalana*, 31/07/1893, p. 14.

\(^{754}\) “Prèvia una atenta invitació de don Joan Godó, anarem á visitar la fàbrica que porta son nom, tan conegut en tota aquesta comarca, y qual fàbrica, com deya mon payşá don Segundo en lo cop d’ull general á las fàbricas igualadinas qu’en altre article publicarem, figura al devant de las més importants baix lo punt de vista de la cantitat. L’edifici es grandiosissim; axis es que s’hi mouen amplement los 350 treballadors qu’elaboran sos acreditats teixits de fil y de cotó; cuties, tisanas, turcassas, planxas blavas, mallorc, cèfirs, tartans de cotó y altras classes especials pera Cuba, Puerto Rico, Filipinas, etc. Crida l’atenció la superba màquina de vapor construïda en los tallers de la Maquinista, y de 120 cavalls. La primera materia, després d’haver entrat á aquesta fàbrica, no’n surt fins á quedar convertida en tela completament á punt pera vendre. —Fins l’aprest y’l tint se fa aquí,— digu’el senyor Godó.” *La Ilustració catalana*, 31 agost 1893, p. 254.

\(^{755}\) The amount of money donated by Ramón was the highest in all of Barcelona’s provinces, and Juan’s was the second. All these donations were commented on in different Spanish newspapers: “Enthusiasmo en Igualada”, *La Dinastía*, 26/04/1898; and *El Imparcial* and *La Época* on 26/04/1898.

\(^{756}\) The society, called Baldomero Camps y Compañía was established with a third partner (Baldomero Camps Blavi). Ramón and Juan provided the capital in equal parts (5,000 ptas each) while Baldomero Camps was in charge of the management. *Diario de Oficial de Avisos de Madrid*, 17/11/1897, p. 1.

\(^{757}\) Arxiu Històric de Protocols Notarials de Barcelona (AHPNB), Notari Josep Ferrer i Bernadas, 1897, vol 6è, 3 November 1897, fols. 5406-5411.
Illustration 2. The Godó and Colomer family (Igualada, 3 March 1900) \textsuperscript{758}

This picture was taken to celebrate the first mass of Francesc Colomer (first row, sixth from the left). Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find further information about the context in which this picture was taken, nor about the relationship between the Godó and Colomer families. Ramón Godó (owner of La Vanguardia): third row, first man from the left. Rosa Valls i Valls (Ramón’s wife): second row, sixth woman from the left (wearing a white dress). Juan Godó Llucià: front row, seventh person from the left (next to the bishop). Juan Godó Pelegrí (Juan’s son and mayor of Igualada between 1906 and 1914): fifth row, second man from the right. Source: Arxiu Comarcal de l’Anoia (ACAN), photographer Jaume Font.
However, one might wonder what Ramón Godó really thought about the political pre-eminence his family had traditionally enjoyed in Igualada, especially since this pre-eminence relied heavily on clientelistic practices. All the more if Ramon’s newspaper, *La Vanguardia*, presented the fight against corruption as one of the central elements necessary to ‘regenerate’ Spain (as we saw in Chapter 5). How did Ramón, then, deal with what might seem to be a contradiction between the discourse of *La Vanguardia* and his own position as a Liberal politician? Although this question certainly presents numerous limitations from a methodological point of view (that is, what might look like a contradiction for the historian was not necessarily interpreted as such by his subject of study) there are certain sources that might reveal some of Ramón’s opinions about caciquismo.

One of these sources is an open letter that a group of citizens of Sant Martí de Sesgueioles (one of the 32 small towns that formed the constituency of Igualada) addressed to Ramón Godó, in which they denounced the clientelistic practices that were dominant in the constituency Ramón represented. The title of the letter was already indicative of its content: “OPEN LETTER. ANOTHER ARBITRARY ACT. [LETTER] TO MR. RAMÓN GODÓ LALLANA”; and it went like this:

“Dear Sir.: For a long time, the people of your country, who do not worry about anything else but working and living this miserable life of ours (...), have been wondering for a long time... who is our Deputy? In this country, everyone thinks that the word Deputy is a synonym for cacique, and the caciques have indeed much to do with the omnipotence and despotism that prevails everywhere. This does not mean, Mr. Godó, that you are one of this kind; yet we wonder where are all the good civic customs that were the custom in this country that went beyond miserable interests, where have they gone now? All these miserable interests that unfortunately have been revived today as a result of political struggle? Who is it that has influence in this country? Where have the tranquillity and moderate habitudes of this country, where has its perfect order and good management in public things gone now? Will you be the responsible for this, Mr. Godó? The facts do not prove it clearly; furthermore, we do not want to think so. Perhaps you don’t even know that despotism and shamelessness is everywhere (...). We have not treated you well, Mr. Godó, but we believe you have honest and respectable feelings. This is why we cannot imagine you really know the state of things in this country;
otherwise, how could we understand that you allowed all this without you excommunicating it? (...)” 759

This letter, which is only partially reproduced, goes on to detail the “arbitrary acts” the mayors in their town were committing. The authors of the letter kept asking Ramón rhetorically if they were “his mayors” and “whether is it really true that we’re now living in the late 19th century”. The fact that the letter was written in Catalan carried political connotations: Catalan was clearly the dominant language in Igualada’s constituency, but not the one Ramón Godó customarily used. As explained in Chapter 1, the adoption of Spanish as the current language in the private sphere was the result of Godó’s migration to the Basque Country; as well as a typical strategy of “social distinction” among the Catalan bourgeoisie. Moreover, and as the next pages will show, language would become a new issue of political debate in the new mass politics, especially as Catalan nationalists made it a sign of opposition against the liberal-state’s official one (Spanish). Thus, the fact that the letter quoted above was written in Catalan is a subtle yet important element that needs to be taken into account. 760

The letter addressed to Ramón ended with clear warning: “He who sows the wind shall reap the whirlwind” (in Catalan, “Qui sembra vents recull tempestats”). Therefore, the three men that signed the letter (Tomàs Estany, Josep Pont and Joan Boria Vall, about whom nothing has been found) were clearly advising Ramón to do something to remove caciquismo, and even left an open door in case he wanted to change things (though with a clear feeling of suspicion). Yet besides the content, this letter was clearly bad for Ramón Godó’s reputation, especially if we take into account that it was published in a Barcelona newspaper (the Diari de Catalunya).

Ramón’s reply to the letter did not take long to arrive. He replied from San Sebastian, where he was on holiday, and his response was published in La Vanguardia. The fact that he


760 It is important to note that the fact the Godó family members who lived in Barcelona adopted Spanish as their customary language justifies the criteria adopted in this thesis of writing the names of this family in Spanish (instead of Catalan). In so doing, an attempt has been made to leave a trace of a historical phenomenon: that is, the adoption of another language as a strategy of social distinction. That being said, it is important to highlight that at the time Catalonia was undergoing the phenomenon of “diglosia”, understood as the coexistence of two languages in the same territory (one of them carrying more prestige, the other one being the customary one, especially among the lower classes). Still, in villages and inland parts of the territory, like Igualada, Catalan clearly remained the prevalent language, and the branch of the Godó who lived in this town most surely used this as their common one. The nickname that Joan Godó was given (“Morrut”, in Catalan) is an example of this. On the phenomenon of “diglosia” for this period, see: Joan Lluís Marfany, La llengua maltractada. El castellà i el català a Catalunya del segle XVI al segle XIX, Barcelona, Empúries, 2001.
replied in Spanish (and not in Catalan, as he had been addressed in the letter) is indicative of future political realignments of the Godó family in relation to language and identity. Ramón’s letter, made it clear that he had “bothered to reply to the letter only out of social courtesy to the people who signed it”, because the events the letter describes “have nothing to do with him [Ramón], as the men that signed the letter themselves admitted; and have nothing to do with his resolution as deputy, unless this public office is distorted”. According to the reply given by Ramón, if he had to intervene in every small issue in his district, both the public and the private, this would foster caciquismo instead of fighting it. Finally, Ramón’s letter made some clear statements about his own understanding of caciquismo:

“(…) Y en cuanto á las consideraciones estampadas sobre los males del caciquismo, allí donde exista, el señor Godó las suscribiría con sinceridad completa. Por asentimiento natural y por estimación á los pueblos que le honraron con su representación en Cortes y en donde tantas afeciones tiene, el señor Godó no quiere ejercer en su distrito otra acción que la del bien, general y particular, hasta donde sus medios sociales alcancen. Las puertas de su casa están siempre abiertas para todo el que quiera contar con él persiguiendo sinceramente esos fines con respeto de la moral y de la ley. Frecuentemente, y esto no es ataque ni defensa, sino mera observación de un modo de ser de la realidad, se confunde con el caciquismo —otras veces auténtico— lo que es un estado social producido por el interés encontrado y por las pasiones desatadas de muchos. Ese estado social, que se determina por causas complejas, no se remedia por la autoridad ni por la acción de un hombre solo sino que es necesaria la cooperación de todos los hombres de buena voluntad, armonizando esos intereses y aplacando esas pasiones en lugar de fomentar la discordia con el prejuicio.”

The letter above quoted is of immense value to examine the understanding that contemporaries had of caciquismo – especially in the case of social actors who directly exploited it for their own benefit (“caciques”). Thus, Ramón Godó made his opinion crystal-

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761 See also Chapter 7, “NOTAS LOCALES”, LV, 07/09/1900, p. 2. [E. T.]: “In what concerns the observations made on the ills of caciquismo, whatever it takes place, Mister Godó would not hesitate to subscribe them with total sincerity. Mister Godó was granted his position of Congress as a result of the natural approval and estimation that the has in towns, and Mister Godó only wants to exert in his district the comon good, as far as he is able. The doors of his house will always be open for anyone wishing to sincerely combat those ends with respect towards morality and the law. Very often, and this is not a self-defense nor a critique, but a mere observation, [people] mess caciquismo –often authentic– with what is a social state that is the result of heated confrontations. This social state, which stems from complex reasons, is not solved through authority nor the action of one single man but requires the cooperation of all the goodwill men, who shall join their interests to suffocate this passions instead of fostering disharmony through prejudice.”
clear: he regarded caciquismo as something that should be extirpated from society (thus echoing the views of La Vanguardia). Still, Ramón noted that caciquismo was often mistaken as a result of the “existing tensions” in society. The only solution, he argued, was the “coming together of all the good men”. This kind of argument, which distanced Ramón from any responsibility for clientelistic practices, was often accompanied by a parallel discourse, consisting in stressing the excellent qualities Ramón allegedly possessed to represent Igualada’s constituency. Ramón’s close relation with the constituency, which stemmed from the family and material interests he had in Igualada, supposedly made him the “natural” candidate of this constituency. This kind of discourse aspired to construct a positive image of him as a deputy. The historian Manuel Marín has observed similar behaviour in the case of Pau Turull (a Catalan manufacturer from Sabadell, also involved in clientelistic practices). Marín has described this practice as the building of the image of “el buen cacique”.

In practice, this discourse represented an investment in symbolic capital (in notions such as prestige and respectability) and a way to fight against defamation. In 1902, for instance, Ramón made a donation of an entire building to the town of Capellades to be converted into the new town hall. Capellades was one of the towns where the Godó family had traditionally faced stronger opposition. In order to combat this opposition, Ramón decided to donate the building in an attempt to improve his image in Capellades, as becomes clear in his explanation for this donation. In this regard, La Vanguardia turned out to be a particularly valuable instrument to invest in this type of symbolic capital. As had been common with Carlos Godó, when La Vanguardia mentioned anything about Ramón he was

762 The leader of the Conservative Party in Barcelona (Manuel Planas i Casals) also referred to the accusations of caciquismo as a “misunderstanding”, which he morally justified on the grounds of the “legitimate influence” and the “protective role” of elites. For instance, he stated that: “Lo que hay es que se confunde maliciosamente el caciquismo con la legítima influencia alcanzada á fuerza de trabajos y sacrificios, y protegiendo y atendiendo, dentro siempre de sus justas aspiraciones, á cuantos á mi acuden, amigos y adversarios”. “Caciquismo”, La Veu de Catalunya, 07/04/1901, p. 1. On the discourse of the “legitimate influence”, see Chapter 1.

763 Manuel Marín, “El buen cacique”, Historia Social, nº 36, 2000, pp. 21-34. The discussion of the role that the Godó family adopted as “protectors of the vulnerable” is indebted to the work of this historian.

764 The new town hall was established in a pre-existing building (“y en cuanto al nuevo edificio por construcción hecha á sus expensas”) that Ramón had originally bought from Jaume Prats Casañas on 2 November 1900. The sale price was 5,000 pesetas. By the time Ramón had donated the building, its value had gone up to 30,000 pesetas. Arxiu Notarial d’Igualada (ANI), Notari Martí Gual, any 1902, fols. 742-743.

765 “Que impulsado por el intenso afecto que siente para la Villa de Capellades, al que ha correspondido esta con aquella lealtad y nobleza con que en toda ocasión sabe honrarse y enaltecerse y de que fué elocuente manifestación el e[x]pentáneo y entusiasta recibimiento que á raíz de ciertas lamentables injusticias, que quisiera el señor compareciente poder olvidar (sic), recibió en ella su señor padre Don Carlos Godó y Pié (q. e. p. d.); y en testimonio de gratitud y cariño hace donación á esta Villa de todo aquél edificio de reciente construcción, destinado á Casa Consistorial, situado en la calle de las [Plazas] de la presente, en la que aparece señalada, con el número treinta, ocupando una superficie de trescientos setenta y seis metros y cincuenta decimetros cuadrados (...)”.

Ibidem.
always described in especially good terms. Thus, the reception given to Ramón as a result of the donation he had made to the town of Capellades was given very detailed and positive coverage in *La Vanguardia* (a newspaper that was not only sold in Barcelona, but also throughout the Catalan territory):

“El festival en honor de don Ramón Godó y Lallana, oportunamente anunciado, se celebró ayer en esta villa con un esplendor y entusiasmo superior á los cálculos más optimistas. A la madrugada de la fiesta, fué sorprendido agradablemente el vecindario con el toque de diana (...) desde cuya hora empezó el bullicio que fué aumentando con la llegada de forasteros, adquiriendo la población tan animado aspecto, que parecía un día de fiesta mayor. (...) Después de aguardar media hora bajo la bienhechora sombra de frondosa arboleda, con gran regocijo se dividió allá lejos, en la carretera de Igualada, una jardineria en la que se aproximaba don Ramón Godó, acompañado de varios amigos. Al llegar se apearon y cambiaron afectuosos saludos con la comisión (...) al frente de la cual iba la orquesta, ejecutando marchas patrióticas. Entró por la calle de San Ramón (...) pasando en este último punto por el artístico arco triunfal levantado en honor del señor Godó (...). Ante numerosa concurrencia que llenaba literalmente toda la casa, se hizo la ceremonia de la bendición de la misma [casa consistorial] por el reverendo cura párroco (...). En el propio salón de sesiones se leyó, por el notario de Igualada, (...) la escritura de la donación del edificio que motivó esta fiesta (...) Acto seguido, el señor alcalde don José Morera leyó con corrección y entusiasmo un bien escrito discurso ofreciendo al señor Godó un monumento que, si modesto en sí, dijo es grande en la intención, y retirando al efecto la cortina que lo cubría apareció en punto preferente del Salón una preciosa lápida de mármol (...) produciendo todo ello aplausos y vivas al señor Godó.”

Events like the one above reveal the importance that image played in the social legitimation of elites – even for those elites like Ramón Godó whose re-election was often due to clientelistic practices. In this regard, I would argue that one of the limitations that can be observed in the literature is that the notion of “legitimation” of the elites has been too circumscribed to the sociological dimension of power. Thus, whether the aim has been to illustrate how violence was a decisive characteristic of the elites’ ascendancy, or to stress the

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766 LV, 29/07/1902, p. 3. [E. T.]: “The homage paid in honour of Mister Ramón Godó Lallana, previously announced, was celebrated amongst a level of brightness and enthusiasm superior to the most optimist estimations. (...) with great rejoice was announced the coming of Mr Ramon Godó, who came together with his friends. When they arrived they exchanged affectionate greetings with the commision (...) at the head there was the orchestra, playing patriotic songs. (...) [the commission] walked under a floral arch made in honour of Mr. Godó. (...) Before a great audience, which literally filled the whole building, a ceremony was celebrated to bless the new city hall (...) a marble inscription panel was inaugurated containing [leaving testimony of Godó’s donation]. (...) all these deeds were welcomed amidst warm cheers and shouts for Mr. Godó.”
capacity of those elites to create clientelistic networks based on a patron-client basis, both accounts have failed to notice the symbolic legitimation that is, in my view, another crucial element behind the legitimation of those elites.767

In fact, the pre-eminence of the elites was not only obtained through material sources, but was also the result of a (certain) recognition from the rest of the population, based on the accumulation by those elites of social and cultural capital, as the case of Ramón Godó demonstrates. The capacity of the local members of the elite to construct an image of themselves as the representatives and defenders of local interests, as well as their prestige or attachment to the locality, were notions that reinforced their power and acted as sources of legitimation. In the case of Ramón, discussed above, for instance, his reception in Capellades became a public demonstration aimed at strengthening his image in public. Thus, in addition to the public forms of gratitude that Ramón allegedly received (e.g. the “crowds” welcoming him, the music, the arch of triumph dedicated to him, etc.), this event became an opportunity to “invest” in the image of Ramón Godó as the new family leader of the Liberal Party in Igualada’s constituency. Thus, a total of 16 municipalities of this constituency sent their own commission to pay tribute to Ramón Godó, in addition to numerous social entities.768 This kind of demonstration was good publicity for Ramón and contributed to reinforcing his links with the territory. Finally, it must be noted that a substantial number of those assisting in this event were part of Ramón’s own network. Among the assistants included, for instance, his cousin and provincial deputy Juan Godó Llucià. Additionally, there was also Emiliano Orpí, on whose behalf Ramón Godó would intercede during that the same year in Madrid, through the good relations he held with Antonio Maura (by then Minister of “Gobernación”), to have Mr. Orpí re-elected as mayor of Igualada’s city council. In order to secure this “favour”, Ramón reminded Maura of the deep-roots the Godó family had in Igualada, this being the

767 This does not imply that historians have neglected patronage in their study of clientelism; rather that the cultural dimension of elites is a subject that still requires further research, as various historians have stressed: Javier Moreno Luzón, “La historiografía sobre las élites de la España liberal”; and Pedro Carasa, “La historia de las élites políticas en el Parlamento español: de la prosopografía a la historia cultural”, Rafael Zurita, Renato Camurri (eds.), Las élites en Italia y en España (1850-1922), València, Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2008, p. 42 and pp. 113-134, respectively.

768 The municipalities that sent their commissions were: Monbui, Montmaneu, Bruch, Carme, Copons, Vilanova del Camí, Prat del Rey, Collbató, Miralles, Tous, Pobla de Claramunt, Castellolí, Castellfollit de Riubregós, Calonge de Calaf, Sant Martí de Sesgueioles and La Llacuna. The social entities were the Liga Comercial, Industrial y Agrícola, Centro Moral é Industrial, Junta de Socorros Domiciliarios, Círculo Popular, Círculo de la Esperanza.
argument he used to justify the need of not making drastic changes in the constituency’s representatives.\textsuperscript{769}

However, despite the good relations Ramón Godó held with central government (as his contacts with Antonio Maura reveal), and despite his apparently solid position in Igualada’s constituency, the fact is that in the years to follow Ramón’s political pre-eminence would be highly contested. Or to put it in other words, the political strategy that had worked so well for the first generation of the Godó family (consisting in a combination of clientelism and the attachment to the territory through media propaganda) did not bring the same results for the second generation of the same family (that of Ramón and Juan Godó Llucià). This was due, for the most part, to the changed context in Barcelona in the first decade of the 20th century: namely, the emergence of mass politics.

Similar to what happened in other European cities (like Vienna, Austria, where the liberal parties were swept out of the city council in 1897),\textsuperscript{770} in Barcelona the rise of new political forces radically changed political power in the local sphere at the turn of the century. This took place in 1901, a year that can be considered as a turning point in the history of the Restoration. During that year, the two dynastic parties that had traditionally monopolised Barcelona’s council (the Conservative and the Liberal parties, as was the case across Spain) suffered an electoral defeat against the Catalan Nationalists of “La Lliga Regionalista” and the Republicans of Alejandro Lerroux. The outcome of these elections had a long lasting effect: from 1901 onwards, Barcelona did not elect one single deputy from either the Liberal or the Conservative parties, and something similar occurred with city councillors of these parties. The system of rotation between the two parties that Cánovas and Sagasta had organised since 1885 thus started to fail in Barcelona.\textsuperscript{771} Furthermore, in the following years

\textsuperscript{769}“Excmo Señor Don Antonio Maura. Mi distinguido amigo; en varios periódicos de esta localidad y entre ellos, en el de mi propiedad La Vanguardia, se ha publicado la noticia, sin que pueda certificar su validez, de que antes de remover y cambiar los alcaldes de RO en las distintas cabezas de distrito, espera Vd. recibir el informe del Gobernador Civil de cada provincia. Ignoro cual es el criterio del de esta, con respecto al Alcalde de Igualada, Don Emiliano Orpí pero, supongo, que si se ha informado ya convenientemente, su opinion ha de ser, de que continua desempeñando la presidencia del Ayuntamiento, pues el Señor Orpí, reúne, à la par que una honradez extrema, una inteligencia clarísima, siendo en general, muy considerado y querido en toda la localidad. Además, un cambio de alcalde en Igualada, ningún beneficio reportaría para unas elecciones, pues cualquiera que pudiera abrigar la esperanza de representarlo, tropezaría con el inconveniente de su falta de prestigio en el distrito, estando este absorbido por la casa Godó que viene representándolo hace veinte años”. Archivo de la Fundación Antonio Maura, (AFAM) Leg. 45, carp. 29. Carta de Ramon Godó Lallana a Antonio Maura, Barcelona 17 diciembre 1902. On the tight relations between Godó and Maura, see Chapter 7.

\textsuperscript{770}In the case of Vienna, the Liberals were swept out by the anti-Semitic Catholics of Karl Lueger. This process of degradation of liberal politics has been explained by Carl E. Schorske in his classic book \textit{Fin De-Siecle Vienna. Politics and Culture}, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980.

\textsuperscript{771}It must be noted that in previous elections, other city councils also started to challenge the pre-eminence of Liberal Parties. However, it never reached the same abrupt change represented in Barcelona, where the Conservative and Liberal parties practically disappeared from public office. Further details on how this process
this change in politics started to spread to the rest of Catalonia (though very slowly and with enormous difficulties), finally reaching Igualada where the Godó family would feel its consequences directly.\textsuperscript{772}

The change that occurred in Barcelona had much to do with the failure of the Silvela-Polavieja government of 1900. Despite the high expectations this government had created throughout Spain, and particularly in Catalonia (for the entry of Duran i Bas in the government as Minister of “Gracia y Justicia”), the hopes for a reform of the Restoration system rapidly vanished.\textsuperscript{773} This would be due to the conflicting views that existed within the Government, particularly represented by the Minister Fernández Villaverde and his attempt to raise taxes as a way to reduce the debt inherited from the Spanish-Cuban-American War. Fernández Villaverde’s plans were utterly opposed to the public investment defended by Rafael Gasset; and also clearly went against the economic and financial economy that Catalan elites had defended as the first step towards the decentralisation of the liberal state. The immediate outcome of Villaverde’s economic policies was the resignation of Duran i Bas (he submitted his first resignation only two months after the government had started) and the emergence in Catalonia of a massive movement of opposition against paying taxes. This movement, which would popularly be known as the “Tancament de Caixes”, provoked the resignation of the first Catalanist mayor of Barcelona (Bartomeu Robert), the arrest of numerous people and the declaration of the state of war in this city. The outcome of the crisis would be the creation of an electoral candidacy by the main civic entities that promoted the decentralisation of the liberal state in response to the Disaster of 1898. This electoral candidacy would be known as “the candidacy of the Four Presidents” (in reference to the presidents of the four entities that formed it: the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional; Societat Econòmica Barcelonesa d’Amics del País; Ateneu Barcelonès; Liga de Defensa Industrial), who would radically break with the “turno dinástico” (“dynastic turn”) in Barcelona for the first time, in 1901.

\textsuperscript{772} As the historian Borja de Riquer has noted, after 1907 the liberal parties never managed to become again the largest political force in Catalonia. Between 1901 and 1923, the combined votes of the two liberal parties “only” amounted to 40%, compared to the Lliga Regionalista – 28%; the Republicans – 26%; the Catholic fundamentalists – 4%; and the other parties – 2%. In Barcelona’s city council the exclusion of liberal parties became even more palpable: after 1901, not a single liberal councillor was elected. Borja de Riquer, “Los límites de la modernización. El caso de Barcelona, 1890-1923”, in J.L. García Delgado (ed.), Las ciudades en la modernización de España. Los decenios interseculares, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1992, p. 57, n. 57; “Les eleccions de la Solidaritat Catalana a Barcelona”, Recerques, 1972, núm. 2, pp. 93-140. A general overview, in: Maria Gemma Rubí Casals & Josep Armengol Segú, Vots, electors i corrupció. Una reflexió sobre l’apatia a Catalunya (1869-1923), Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 2012.

\textsuperscript{773} For further information on the formation of Silvela’s government, see Chapter 5.
Besides their symbolic value, the elections of 1901 marked a turning point because they represented the start of mass politics in Barcelona. The “Lliga Regionalista” was founded, and the Catalan Nationalist Party was led by Enric Prat de la Riba, which represented, together with the Republican party of Alejandro Lerroux, a new way of doing politics. The Republicans and the Catalan Nationalists, however, had very different political projects. On the one hand, the Republicans saw the immorality of the political system as the ultimate cause of all social ills (and this included not just the loss of the colonies, but all sorts of social problems, like prostitution, violence and alcoholism). In response to this, their new leader, a young charismatic man called Alejandro Lerroux, made use of a populist and anticlerical discourse to attract growing numbers of Barcelona’s working class. In contrast to this, the Catalan nationalist party was a party that despite officially adopting an interclassist discourse, in practice, was mainly formed by the middle-upper sectors of society (including the petty bourgeoisie). This party did not call for the end of the Restoration, like the Republicans, but rather promoted its reform through transparency in elections and the decentralisation of the liberal state.

Yet despite the important differences that existed between the Republicans and the Catalan Nationalists, both in terms of discourse and social base, what they had in common is that they made use of new forms of political activity, like political rallies and mass demonstrations. A good example of this were the “meriendas fraterinales” of Alejandro Lerroux, a gathering – with refreshments – in the countryside that addressed the urban classes of Barcelona. On certain occasions, this kind of social event gathered more than 20,000 of Lerroux’s supporters. In contrast to the liberal parties, which relied on the indifference of the population to use clientelistic practices, the Republicans and the Catalan nationalists actively promoted the mobilisation of their supporters during elections. These two new parties made great use of newspapers to foster political mobilisation, especially at a time when the press in Spain was undergoing a process of great expansion. Thus, in comparison to the estimated 500 newspapers that existed in Spain in 1879, their number rose to 1,300 newspapers in 1900 – a growth of 240%. In this regard, this growth of the Spanish press was characterised by the great upsurge of politically oriented papers. In 1901, for instance, of Barcelona’s 22 daily

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newspapers, half of them still had partisan orientation, while the rest defined themselves as “independent”.

The Republicans and the Catalan nationalists made intense use of the press to achieve their political goals. First of all, they used the press to disclose corruption in public. The aim was to provoke the reaction of their supporters as well as to educate people about their political rights. Thus, it was common that Republican and Catalan newspapers explained the electoral laws so their readers could report any instances of misconduct during elections. Secondly, the press was also used to mobilise their partisans to assure transparency during elections. For example, in 1901, when Alejandro Lerroux gathered hundreds of his supporters in Barcelona’s city council to make sure that the liberal parties did not manipulate the elections. According to some witnesses, many of Lerroux’s supporters did not leave their seats despite the elections lasting the entire day. It was even said that some of the assistants would not even leave to use the lavatory because they were afraid of losing their seats, indeed some of them even relieved themselves in their seats.

From a more general perspective, political life increased notably in Barcelona. Thus, between 1899 and 1893 there were 38 “big” political demonstrations in this city; between 1899 and 1903, there were 54 (with 23 big demonstrations in 1903 alone); and between 1906 and 1909, only 33. Therefore, there was an average of 10 “important” political events in 1890-1893; 11 in 1899-1903; and around 8 in 1907-1909.

It was the use of corruption as a way to foster political mobilisation that ultimately provoked the crisis in the pre-eminence of the Godó family. Indeed, the political strategy that had worked so well for the first generation of the Godó family (that of Carlos and Bartolomé) started to be contested by the growing opposition to clientelistic practices, in which the press would play a decisive role. In contrast to the elections in which the first generation of the Godó family participated, where the opponents of liberal parties based their discourse on the fight against caciquismo, what started to change was the personalisation of this fight – that is to say, the fight against the “cacique”. As one of the main opponents of the Godó family explained when commenting on the elections of 1896 (the last elections in which Carlos

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Godó participated), “Contra el caciquismo se dirigía la campaña; no contra la persona [Carlos Godó] que, en opinión de muchos, hubiera quedado á salvo completamente á no tener á su lado una camarilla que era quien se decía todo lo mangoneaba.” The idea that clientelism was something performed by the local supporters of the Godó family, rather than by the family itself (something that, as we have just seen, was even defended by the political opponents of Carlos Godó) changed with Ramón Godó. For it was Ramón who faced the spread of mass politics from Barcelona to inland parts of the Catalan territory, like Igualada.

Indeed, Ramón Godó had won the first elections in which he participated without much difficulty. In 1899, for instance, he obtained his first victory thanks to the lack of participation of his opponents. The victory of Ramón (who apparently received this victory with “satisfaction” and “deeply felt emotion”) was due to the “total indifference” of Igualada. In fact, abstention would be one of the main reasons for the first victories of the Godó family’s second generation. On certain occasions, such as in 1901 and 1903, Ramón simply had no opposition and obtained 99% of the votes, something that clearly indicates the use of clientelistic practices by his supporters, among the general passivity of Igualada’s population. [See: Table 3]

780 As one Republican newspaper lamented, “while all the Liberals fought with great efforts to win the position of deputy, the majority of people have remained indifferent in these elections which unfortunately have given the victory to Mr. Godó”. El Semanario de Igualada, 23/04/1899, p. 4.
Table 3. Electoral results of the Godó family between 1899-1915

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date of the elections</th>
<th>Ruling party in the Spanish Congress</th>
<th>Winning candidate</th>
<th>Other candidates</th>
<th>Electoral turnout</th>
<th>Percentage of votes obtained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899-1900</td>
<td>16/04/1899</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Ramón Godó Lallana (L)</td>
<td>Narcís Mauri Vidal (?)</td>
<td>39.64 %</td>
<td>68.14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-1902</td>
<td>19/05/1901</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Ramón Godó Lallana (L)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>50.06 %</td>
<td>99.77 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903-1904</td>
<td>26/05/1903</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Ramón Godó Lallana (Liberal &quot;Moretista&quot;)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>59.62 %</td>
<td>99.26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-1906</td>
<td>10/11/1905</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Ramón Godó Lallana (L)</td>
<td>Ildefonso García del Corral (R)</td>
<td>50.68 %</td>
<td>68.75 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907-1909</td>
<td>21/04/1907</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Frederic Rahola (Lliga Regionalista)</td>
<td>Juan Godó Llucià (L) and Josep Puig d’Asper (R)</td>
<td>64.12 %</td>
<td>55.70 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-1913</td>
<td>08/05/1910</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Juan Godó Llucià (Liberal &quot;Canalejista&quot;)</td>
<td>Frederic Rahola (Lliga Regionalista)</td>
<td>80.40 %</td>
<td>50.89 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-1915</td>
<td>08/03/1914</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Manuel González Vilart (C)</td>
<td>Juan Godó Llucià (L)</td>
<td>75.65 %</td>
<td>52.97 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, there is another fact that appears clearly in Table 3, namely, the growing mobilisation in electoral participation. Thus, electoral turnout grew from 39.64% in 1896; to 50% between 1901 and 1906; to more than 60% in 1907; and even experienced an “extraordinary” turnout of 80% in 1910. This progressive change in electoral turnout is revealing, ultimately, of the growing opposition the Godó family faced in Igualada from Catalan Nationalists and Republicans alike to win elections. Furthermore, the case of Igualada is clearly representative of the growth these two political forces (Catalanist and Republicans) experienced in Barcelona, where electoral turnout followed a very similar trend between 1899 and 1907. [See: Table 4].

Table 4. Electoral turnout in Barcelona’s elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of elections</th>
<th>Electoral turnout</th>
<th>Type of elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>20% and 30%</td>
<td>General; local.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of all the elections above considered (both in Table 3 and 4), one of the clear turning points is the year of 1907. Indeed, this year represented a substantial shift in electoral turnout, both in Igualada (64.12%) and in Barcelona (60%). In the case of Barcelona a similar turnout would not be achieved again until the 1930s. This mobilisation would be the result of “Solidaritat Catalana”, a political coalition that would roundly defeat, for the first time, the Godó family in elections. Yet before this occurred, the Godó family would undergo profound internal tensions about how to respond to the rise of mass politics.

6.2. Words as Weapons: Family Scandals and Ramón Godó’s Resignation (1906)

Although La Vanguardia was a newspaper that fully supported the Restoration system (though advocating its full renewal), the failure of the Silvela-Polavieja Government and the “Tancament de Caixes” marked a substantial shift in the position this newspaper adopted in relation to Catalan nationalism. The voluntary resignation of Duran i Bas from the government provoked strong criticisms from Madrid’s press, as the majority of newspapers strongly opposed the Catalan demands for decentralisation because they were regarded as a veiled attempt at separatism. This depiction of the events by the Madrid press occasionally provoked a reaction by La Vanguardia, as became clear on 9 May 1901 in an article entitled “Cataluña y la prensa de Madrid”:

“(...) No somos sospechosos de catalanismo en el sentido político de la palabra, porque jamás hemos militado en sus filas. Amando de todo corazón á Cataluña, de todo corazón amamos á España, nuestra patria. Pero precisamente por tributo á esos amores

782 Source: Joan B. Culla, Eleccions generals a Catalunya..., p. 628.
This article illuminates the attitude *La Vanguardia* adopted in relation to Catalan nationalism. The newspaper openly admitted that “political catalanism” had never been part of its editorial policy. Still, the fact that even a newspaper like *La Vanguardia*, which was not “suspicious” of Catalan nationalism, protested about the way the Madrid newspapers had represented this political movement, is particularly revealing of the changes that were taking place in Catalonia at the time. In fact, immediately after the Disaster of 1898, the Conservative Duran i Bas had already warned General Polavieja about the growing detachment of Catalan public opinion from the Restoration system. And in 1906 this dissatisfaction resulted in the creation of the electoral coalition of the “Solidaritat Catalana” (“Catalan Solidarity”). As we have seen, these elections had the highest participation ever achieved in Barcelona. A similar political mobilisation also took place in Igualada, where the Solidaritat Catalana also ran in the elections with the specific goal of overthrowing the political domination of the Godó family.

The immediate motivation behind the creation of the Solidaritat Catalana was a historical event popularly known as the “*fets del Cu-Cut!”* (1905). This expression referred to the attack on the editorial offices of the satirical journal *Cu-cut!* and *La Veu de Catalunya* by the military. The first of these newspapers had ridiculed the Spanish army in a caricature and a group of young soldiers had decided to retaliate. The vast majority of Barcelona’s press immediately criticised the attack and expressed its solidarity with the two newspapers affected. Like other newspapers in the city, regardless of their ideology, *La Vanguardia* condemned the assault. Yet, despite all these protests, the Liberal government of Segismundo Moret not only refused to denounce the attack but also decided to pass a new Law (20/03/1906) according to which any insult against Spain or Spanish symbols (understood in a broad sense, including criticisms of the army and the Crown) would be judged by martial

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783 “Cataluña y la prensa de Madrid”, LV, 09/05/1901, p. 5. [E. T.]: “(...) We are not suspicious of being Catalan nationalists in the political sense, because we have never been in their ranks. We love with all our heart Catalonia, and we also love with all our heart Spain, our motherland. But precisely because we pay tribute to these beloved we lament that some colleagues in Madrid miss the point of examining with serenity [the nature] of political catalanism, and they also miss, despite their intentions, in their mission, and rather contribute to confusion and to creating discomfort, when they speak of exploiters and exploited.”

784 See the quotation opening Chapter 5.
law and military courts. The response to this law (which designated the display of the Catalan flag or the singing of the Catalan anthem as an “offence” to Spanish symbols) was a massive public demonstration in Barcelona of around 200,000 people (35% of the total population of the city). That same year, another protest gathered some 20,000 people, the biggest crowd ever achieved in a close area. All these demonstrations illustrate the growing politicisation of Barcelona’s population, which culminated the following year in the creation of a wide coalition of political forces. With the sole exception of the liberal parties and the Republicans of Alejandro Lerroux (which were openly against Catalan nationalism), the rest of the political forces joined together in a coalition that would be known as the “Solidaritat Catalana” (the Carlists, the Lliga Regionalista, Centre Nacional Republicà, Unió Catalanista, federal republicans and a part of the Unión Republicana). The political programme of this coalition was based on very few points, consisting in the repealing of the above-mentioned Law and a set of vague proposals (decentralisation, autonomy in education and other social services).

Amidst the heated political situation of Spain, and particularly Catalonia, at the time, Ramón Godó started to become the target of the newspapers that supported the Solidaritat Catalana. As we saw earlier, Ramón had already been criticised in the past by other newspapers. However, what was different in 1906 was that due to the growing mobilisation of political parties in the region, the criticisms levelled at the Godó family in the press became more hostile. For instance, Ramon started to be referred to in the press as a “stranger” to his own country because of his lack of support for the cause of decentralisation and his poor knowledge of the Catalan language. Moreover, a novel strategy was used by these newspapers, consisting in the association of La Vanguardia with the clientelistic practices of Ramón Godó. In fact, the fight against caciquismo would be one of the main leitmotifs of the Solidaritat Catalana. Thus, as La Veu de Catalunya claimed, in an article entitled “La Vanguardia caciquista”:

“La Vanguardiha has finally removed its mask. In opposing Catalonia and the national cause, this newspaper has presented itself as it really is, namely as with the owner of this

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785 As noted by Pere Gabriel, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.
787 Although it is hard to believe that Ramón did not know the Catalan language (especially as he held close ties with Igualada, where this was the predominant language) various contemporaries noted Ramón’s reluctance to speak in Catalan. Apparently, this was related to the fact that he was born in the Basque Country and had a close attachment to his Basque mother, Antonia Lallana. See Chapter 1.
newspaper, as the cacique of Igualada, the Catalan who ignores the language of his own grandparents, the mestizo that repudiates the traditions of the country of his own father. (...) La Vanguardia only keeps repeating the point of view of its foreign owner; this newspaper speaks in the same way as newspapers in Madrid do (...); when honourable patricians decide to start a vigorous electoral campaign, and make the effort of organising endless political rallies, La Vanguardia remains silent, as if nothing has happened (...); it is in Igualada that elections are manipulated shamelessly; it is in Igualada that the will of the voters is manipulated, and when that is not possible, votes are bought with money or with food; it is in Igualada that elections are won at any cost, no matter who should fall to get it. The ones that rule in Barcelona want real votes; in Barcelona the Lliga Regionalista prefers losing the elections rather than winning the Republicans through illegal methods, (...) the same illegal methods that are still used in Madrid; for us it would be easy to employ such methods if we wished to. In Barcelona, if a candidate used the same methods as Godó, he would have been considered a dishonest person, and his enemy would be the one to oppose him through fair rules. (...) So please Mr. Godó don’t tell us about morality... because people will laugh in your face.”

The article quoted above is revealing of how language and caciquismo were two rhetorical arguments that were used to contest the Godó’s political domain. Indeed, if the members of this family had traditionally presented themselves as the natural representatives of Igualada, based on the deep-roots they had in this locality, now the same discourse was used against them. Thus, Ramón’s supposed reluctance to use Catalan was the point that the family’s political rivals sought to exploit through the press: he was not a “native” of Igualada, but a “foreigner”; and therefore he lacked the legitimacy to represent local affairs. These attacks from Barcelona’s press reveal the importance given in politics to the personal attachment to the constituency; as well as how the prestige of local elites was contested in the public sphere by the new political movements.

Moreover, the second persisting argument in the attacks against Ramón Godó was the link between caciquismo and La Vanguardia. The nationalist newspaper La Veu de Catalunya kept publishing further articles with the title “La Vanguardia és caciquista” (“La Vanguardia is the mouthpiece of caciquismo”, in English); while in parallel other newspapers

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789 Besides “foreigner” (in Catalan, “forester”), Godó was also called “mestizo”. This was the Spanish word used in the Spanish colonies in South-America to refer to the children born of Spanish and Amerindians relations. The fact that Godó’s mother was Basque and his father was Catalan was probably the reason behind the use of this word.
in Barcelona accused Godó of silencing any news related to the *Lliga Regionalista*. These kinds of attacks against *La Vanguardia* continued during the latter months of 1905, and not just from *La Veu de Catalunya* and *La Renaixensa*, but also from other newspapers in Barcelona, like *La Campana de Gràcia* and *El Diluvio*, as well as from the press in Igualada. *La Veu de Catalunya*, for instance, argued that “Mr. Godó is nothing more than the cacique of the district, they are all the same. And the newspaper he owns is a defender of caciquismo that shamefully hides behind its label as independent”.

The smear campaign directed at Ramón Godó demonstrates how his position as deputy was increasingly being related to his position as newspaper proprietor. This link between the two spheres of influence (politics and the press) is precisely what the Godó brothers had sought to separate with the reform plans of 1888, when *La Vanguardia* was turned into an “independent” newspaper. But now this strategy was starting to fail, as the family’s rivals saw this double condition (proprietor of an independent newspaper as well as politician) as Ramón’s Achilles heel. These kinds of attacks contained a second aim, that of challenging the image of *La Vanguardia* as a politically neutral (“independent”) newspaper.

If this string of attacks was detrimental to Godó’s image as the father of the district and damaged *La Vanguardia*’s reputation as an independent newspaper, the worst was still to come. A few months later, on 22 June 1906, rumours start to surface about Ramón’s intention to resign as deputy of Igualada. These rumours did not stem from the attacks Ramón had received until then, but rather started when an incident that occurred in Igualada leapt onto the pages of the Barcelona press. The incident in question was the arrest of the presidents of “El Ateneo Igualadino” (Mr. Llansana) and of the “Centro Autonomista” (Mr. Mussons), two entities of Igualada that had a clear Republican and Catalanist orientation. They were arrested for having organised a meeting. This incident, for which the Godó family was blamed, was one among a number of other arbitrary acts that the followers of this family had been committing recently. The situation in Igualada reached its tipping point a few days later, in

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790 “Mentidas del ‘Ciero’ y ‘La Vanguardia’,” *La Veu de Catalunya*, 16/09/1905, p. 1, Night edition. These accusations, in case they were true, reveal that the power of newspaper editors not only consisted in the capacity to publicise certain events, but also to silence others according to their private agenda.

791 *La Campana de Gràcia* reproduced an article published in Igualada’s newspaper *Nova Llevor* that started by saying “Our dear elected deputy, Ramón Godó Lallana, is a FOOL.” This title referred to an event that took place in Igualada that had apparently made a fool of Ramón. *La Campana de Gràcia*, 30/09/1905, p. 7. “*La Vanguardia es caciquista*”, *La Renaixensa*, 16/09/1905, Night edition, p. 1.

792 The original text stressed in italics “the newspaper he owns”. *Ibidem*.

793 The newspaper *El Igualadino* made a detailed account of events: “IGUALADA. – Una de las mayores plagas que nos ha traído la Restauración es, sin duda, el caciquismo (...). Este último es el que impera en Igualada, cuyo cacicazgo comparten el diputado á Cortes, don Ramón Godó y Lallana; el diputado provincial, don Juan Godó y Lluciá, y el alcalde de real orden, don Juan Godó y Pelegrí. (...)* El caciquismo domina todos los
June 1906, when the second major deputy of the city was physically assaulted by an employee of Juan Godó Pelegrí – the mayor of Igualada. Therefore, when these events took place, the Godó family had reached its highest level of control in Igualada’s political life: three members of the family were, respectively, deputy at the Congress, provincial deputy and mayor – each for Igualada’s constituency. Such a monopoly over public office by members of the same family increased the feeling that despotic rule pervaded Igualada’s life.

Yet what is particularly remarkable about the events that occurred in this city is that they rapidly turned into a mediatised scandal, capable of exceeding Igualada’s local sphere and attracting the interest of newspapers in Barcelona. The event that took place in May 1906 turned into an scandal capable of generating interest not only among local readers in Igualada but also in Barcelona because it entered the debate about public perceptions of the common good (e.g. arbitrary violence linked to caciquismo). Furthermore, the scandal in Igualada generated an open protest by a group of deputies, who protested to the Council of Ministers in Madrid. The same deputies also visited the Civil Governor and the President of the Audience to demand an investigation for the “very serious events” that took place in Igualada, while a petition was organised to free the arrested men.

As all these events took place, Ramón Godó found himself embroiled in the family scandal. In fact, Ramón was not directly responsible for the events that had occurred in Igualada. Rather, all the accusations were directed at the mayor, Joan Godó Pelegrí. But it was as a result of Ramón’s membership of a broader collective, that is, the family, that the scandal also affected him and La Vanguardia. Thus, there is evidence that the day after the

terrenos. Los Godós andan descaradamente de continuo visiteo con los funcionarios de justicia, cuando los actos del alcalde son censurados se apela al envio de fuerzas de la guardia civil, la tranquilidad desaparece, se envían anónimos amenazadores; un sujeto apodado Rosa Negra, agente municipal, anda repartiendo palos por las calles, sin que nadie se atreva con él porque el caciquismo le ampara; en fin esto es un vivir insoportable y no será extraño que algún día colmada la medida se registre en Igualada un día de luto.” “Dietario de Igualada”, El Igualadino, 30/06/1906, p. 1.

Juan Godó Pelegrí (1876-1957), popularly known as “Juanito”, was the son of Joan Godó Llucià. He was appointed mayor of Igualada by royal decree on January 1st 1906, a position he held until 1914. For his position within the family, see Table 2; for an image of him, see Illustration 2; both in this chapter. Further details on his career, in Chapter 7.

Hence, one contemporary recalled that “Almost all of Barcelona is aware of the confrontation the honourable town of Igualada is holding against a petty oligarchy, and we are all eager to follow the events”. Another testimony recalled that “the majority of Barcelona’s press has talked about the dispute in our city between the people and the oligarchy”. Indeed, numerous newspapers of Barcelona (like La Campana de Gràcia, La Renaixensa, El Poble Català and El Diluvio) referred to the events and used the opportunity to criticise, once again, the Godó family. See, for instance, El Diluvio, 26/06/1908, p. 14.

aggression took place (22 June 1906), Ramón arrived in Igualada to discuss what had happened with his relatives. During the following days, all sorts of rumours spread about the possibility that the three members of the Godó family would resign from public office. Finally, the tension among the different members of the family was resolved on 1 July 1906, when, only one week after the “scandal” had broke in Igualada, Ramón Godó Lallana decided to resign from his position as deputy. He announced this in an open letter published in La Vanguardia, where he stated that he would not be running for the next legislative elections. The letter went:

“De don Ramón Godó, diputado á Cortes y propietario de LA VANGUARDIA, recibimos la siguiente carta: Sr. Director de LA VANGUARDIA. Mi estimado amigo: En más de una ocasión he manifestado particularmente á algunos amigos íntimos el propósito que abrigaba de apartarme por ahora de la vida política activa, en que ninguna satisfacción personal he encontrado, pero sí muchos disgustos y decepciones. Habiendo mis manifestaciones, no obstante su carácter, hasta ahora meramente particular, trascendido á la opinión en el distrito de Igualada, que tengo la honra de representar en Cortes, y sido torcidamente comentadas é interpretadas, entiendo llegado el momento de declarar que, en efecto, he tomado la firme resolución de no presentar mi candidatura en las próximas elecciones de diputados á Cortes, sea cual fuere el plazo que tarden en verificarse aquéllas y sea cual fuere el partido que las realice, considerándome, por lo tanto, desde ahora apartado de la política. Créome, pues, obligado á poner mi resolución en conocimiento de mis amigos y de los electores del distrito de Igualada, de cuyo afecto y confianza guardaré siempre vivísimo agradecimiento. Ruego á usted ordene la inserción en las columnas de LA VANGUARDIA de esta carta. De usted siempre afmo. amigo, Ramón Godó.”


798 LV, 01/07/1906. [E.T.]: “My dearest friend: on more than one occasion, I have privately confessed to my closest friends my purpose of retiring from politics. No private pleasure have I ever found in politics, and it has rather been a source of continuous annoyance and disappointment. However, since my thoughts have become public in the district of Igualada, which I am honoured to represent at the [Spanish] Congress, and have been repeatedly manipulated, I deem it necessary to announce my firm intention of not running for the next elections for deputy at the Congress, no matter the date or the party that will call these elections. Therefore, I now consider myself as retired from politics. I believe it is my duty to communicate this decision to my friends and voters in the district of Igualada, for whose affection and confidence I will always be grateful.”
CONCLUSIONS

With the above letter, Ramón Godó decided to put an end to his political career. Up to that moment, he had run in four legislative elections (spanning the years between 1899 and 1906) and had won all of them. Yet, as he confessed, he was tired of politics.

Soon after La Vanguardia published Ramón’s letter of resignation, the traditional opponents of the Godó family celebrated the news. In the view of El Diluvio, the resignation of Ramón Godó was the result of the campaign in which this Barcelonan newspaper had so actively participated. Other newspapers from the same city, like La Veu de Catalunya, reached the same conclusions as El Diluvio, and presented Ramón’s resignation as “the victory of the good citizens of Igualada against caciquismo”. Another newspaper insisted that “Everywhere all the newspapers talk about the same thing: articles, correspondences, telegrams and telephone calls, all these comment on and try to explain the reasons that have led him to resign.” Eventually, even Madrid’s press made reference to Ramón Godó’s letter of resignation. In this regard, Ramón’s decision was probably influenced by another element. Namely the fact that Spain’s Superior Court had sentenced a group of Ramón’s supporters to imprisonment for violently assaulting a man in Pierola (one of the towns of Igualada’s constituency).

In any case, regardless of what finally convinced Ramón Godó to resign from politics, his case is revealing of the growing mediatisation of politics. As had happened to Rafael Gasset with El Imparcial (explained in the introduction to this chapter) Ramón’s involvement in politics started to be incompatible with his status as the proprietor of an “independent” newspaper. However, while Gasset saw the sales of his newspaper decrease as a result of his

799 “Por lo visto, el revuelo y desasosiego que reina en el distrito de Igualada por las rechorías del caciquismo, de las cuales se ha ocupado toda la Prensa y motivando que los representantes en Cortes republicanos y catalanistas se ocuparan seriamente del asunto, ha producido sus resultados. Al menos así hay que suponerlo en virtud de retirarse de la vida activa de la política el diputado á Cortes por aquel distrito, don Ramon Godó, retirada que el interesado explica del siguiente modo en una carta que ha publicado.” “Gacetilla”, El Diluvio, 03/06/1906, p. 8-9.
800 R. Romesquet Picantó, “¡¡¡Quin desastre!!!”, El Igualadino, 08/07/1906, p. 2.
801 “Retirada de Godó”, ABC, 03/07/1906, p. 10.
802 “IGUALADA. – El vecindario de esta ciudad y de todos los pueblos del partido de que es cabeza, convertidos por la estirpe caciquista de los señores Godó en otros tantos feudos, ha recibido con entusiasmo la noticia de que el Tribunal Supremo ha confirmado la sentencia dictada por la Audiencia de Barcelona condenando á una temporada de prision por el delito de lesiones á varios prójimos, instrumentos ciegos del cacique máximo señor Godó, que con fecha 5 de julio de 1904 agredieron cobarde y brutalmente al propietario del pueblo de Pierola don José Roviralta. Aquellos cuatro criminales eran entonces uno, llamado José Parcerisas, teniente de alcalde del Ayuntamiento de Pierola; otro, secretario de éste, y los otros concejales del mismo, individuos todos ellos del somaten, y por lo tanto agentes de la autoridad.” “Regionales”, El Diluvio, 03/07/1906, p. 10.
behaviour during the Disaster of 1898, in the case of Ramón the tension between the press and politics manifested itself through public accusations of corruption (clientelism). The case of the Godó family thus reveals how the fight against corruption became one of the main elements in the discourse of the Catalan nationalists and the Republicans. This chapter has shown how the fight against corruption became a new device for political mobilisation, particularly for those parties that symbolised the new mass politics.

As in the case of Vienna, where the liberal parties were swept away by a new political movement (in that case, by the anti-Semitic Catholics of Karl Lueger), something similar happened in Barcelona too. From 1901 onwards this city would not elect a single member of the Conservative or Liberal parties. Although the cases of Vienna and Barcelona obviously obey very diverse political contexts, and the new political forces that emerged were very different, in both cities these forces made clear a new type of \textit{subjective} discourse, one of the characteristics of the new mass politics in Europe. That is to say, a new type of discourse emerged, based on appealing to a burgeoning electorate through subjective elements (such as anticlericalism, nationalism, demagoguery or anti-Semitism).\footnote{803} This kind of discourse was in stark contrast to mid-19\textsuperscript{th}-century politics, which showed a confidence in the progress of mankind through reason and material development. In contrast to this, the turn of the century was a moment in all of Europe (and in the Mediterranean in particular) that was dominated by pessimism and unrest about the future.

The capacity of mobilisation in the denouncing of corruption produced in Catalonia is also revealing of the changes that were taking place – arguably with less intensity – in some of Spain’s major urban settings.\footnote{804} Before 1898 clientelistic practices had already been criticised on many occasions. These public accusations, however, traditionally brought few consequences.\footnote{805} The scarce interest of liberal parties in enforcing anti-corruption laws, combined with the low mobilisation of society during elections, explains why these accusations had little effect. However, the Disaster of 1898 represented a crisis of identity

\footnote{803} The idea of the emergence of a new “subjective” discourse is taken from Carl E. Schorske \textit{Fin De-Siecle Vienna...}, op. cit.

\footnote{804} Especially in the case of Valencia, where the Republicans broke the monopoly of power of liberal parties and gained control of the city council in 1891. In Madrid the Republicans (and to a lesser extent, the Socialists) considerably improved their results, especially in 1893 and 1903; but they did not manage to transform the electoral map. Indeed, this chapter has argued that Barcelona was the place where the crisis of liberal parties became more intense, for none of these parties ever saw one single councillor elected again. See: Borja de Riquer, \textit{op. cit}; Alicia Yanini y Rafael Zurita Aldeguer, “Comunidad Valenciana”; and Rogelio López Blanco, “Madrid”, both in: Joaquín Varela Ortega (ed.), \textit{El poder de la influencia. Geografía y caciquismo en España (1875-1923)}, Madrid, Marcial Pons, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2001, pp. 383-419; and pp. 283-324, respectively.

\footnote{805} An example of this is the case of Bartolomé Godó during the \textit{Sexenio}, explained in Chapter 1.
during which corruption and other moral issues underwent deep scrutiny in public opinion. The outcome was the strong discredit of the political system and the growing calls for the need of redefining the Restoration (or even the need of overthrowing it). Far from being monopolised by the new political movements, the calls in favour of renewing the political system were also embraced and supported – at least in public – by the same liberal parties, as the case the Silvela-Polavieja government illustrated.

However, the case of Ramón Godó reveals to what extent the increasing mobilisation of new political parties became a serious threat for the social pre-eminence of liberal elites. This threat was not only evident in the calls for accountability during elections, but also in the attempts the new parties made at undermining the public legitimation of traditional elites. In this regard, the scandal that affected Ramón can be seen as part of a struggle over the sources of symbolic power. As John B. Thompson has noted, scandals have the potential of destroying reputation and undermining trust. The same author has observed that reputation does not apply equally in all social fields. In certain fields, where confidence and trust are a crucial aspect in the legitimacy of an individual (e.g. a politician), reputation is particularly important, and therefore the consequences a scandal might entail are bigger.

In the case of Ramón, while he invested in his position as the heir of Carlos Godó and therefore as the “natural” representative of Igualada’s interests (as became clear in his visit to Capellades), his enemies used the opposite argument. Namely, that Ramón was a “stranger” to the territory, because he was born in the Basque country and rarely used the Catalan language. Both the strategy of Ramón and that of his enemies reveal one of the characteristics historians have noted about parliamentary life in Catalonia, consisting in the general reluctance to accept “foreign candidates” (the so-called “candidatos cuneros”). In other Spanish regions this reluctance was not so evident as it was in the case of Catalonia.

In this struggle for the symbolic sources of legitimation, public opinion became the target sought by the different actors involved. Since 1881, the Godó family had seen the establishing of La Vanguardia as an opportunity to gain public visibility and as a way to promote their private agenda more effectively. The resignation of Ramón Godó, however, reveals the unexpected consequences of Godó’s strategy to expand their influence to new

807 Ibidem, p. 249.
808 As much as 80% of the deputies in Congress from Catalonia were born in this region, which was in contrast to the customary practice of central governments to impose their own “foreign” candidates in given constituencies. María Gemma Rubí y Josep Armengol Segú, “Cataluña”, Joaquín Varela Ortega (ed.), El poder de la influencia. Geografía del caciquismo en España (1875-1923), Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2001, p. 257.
publics. The role of newspaper editor exposed Ramón in public (even when he did not use the press in the same self-oriented way as Luca de Tena did with *El Imparcial*) and meant being subject to criticism from a wider range of political actors. Especially since the passing of the new press freedom law of 1883, and the expansion of both the number of newspapers and the reader market (mentioned earlier), public opinion became an alternative channel to elections for a growing number of political actors. The outcome was a new space for political participation that was more plural and depersonalised (in contrast to clientelism, which was based on favouritism), and therefore harder for the Godó family to control.

As a man who based the popularity of his newspaper on the commitment to providing “neutral” information (no matter how suspect this claim was), Ramón Godó probably decided to resign from politics to salvage *La Vanguardia* from the bad publicity caused by the family scandal. Ramón’s resignation, however, can hardly be justified if we do not take into account the very special historical context in which it took place (the highly politicised moment of post-1898, the crisis of legitimation of the Restoration system and the creation of the Solidaritat Catalana), and the expansion of the reading market and its pluralistic characteristics. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that for social actors, controlling the “legitimate discourse” became a much more difficult goal to achieve in the increasingly plural market of readers.

Finally, it must be noted that in his attempt to save the prestige of *La Vanguardia*, Ramón Godó disrupted the strategies of his relatives in Igualada. His resignation meant that the Godó family, which had monopolised public office in this constituency for years, now suddenly disappeared from the map. However, the family did not give up its position in the Congress without a fight. According to this determination to resist, the family would redesign its traditional strategies to face the challenge of the Solidaritat Catalana. Ramón Godó himself would participate in this attempt, though by using more subtle forms of exerting influence. This redefining of strategies will be the focus of the next chapter.

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809 See the remarks of Hilda Sábato quoted in the Introduction of this thesis.
810 As the Republican newspaper *El Igualadino* commented: “The advice of family and friends... and the serious damage that Godó feared in *La Vanguardia*, led him to take the decision [to resign] (...) Everywhere the press is full of it”. Original text, written in Catalan: “Els consells de família, la veu dels amic... y ‘ls grans perjudicis que ‘n Godó preveya à *La Vanguardia*, l’han induit à prendre tal resolució. (...) Arreu la premsa d’aquets dies no parla d’altra cosa (...’)”. R. Romesquet Picantó, “¡¡¡Quin desastre!!!”, *El Igualadino*, 29/09/1906, p. 2.
CHAPTER 7. TWO DIFFERENT REACTIONS TO THE CHALLENGE OF MASS POLITICS

INTRODUCTION

7.1. JUAN GODÓ: THE SEARCH FOR NEW WAYS OF LEGITIMISING POWER

7.2. RAMÓN GODÓ: BUILDING THE CHARISMA OF ANTONIO MAURA

CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the way the Godó family responded to the crisis of liberal politics, as part of the rise of the new mass society in Europe. The years prior to the First World War (1914-1918) were a period of drastic transformations across the entire Continent. One of the features that characterised this moment of change was the broadening of the political spectrum, spurred by a double process: the widening of the franchise and the politicisation of larger segments of society, on one hand; and the advent of a new class of professional politicians and large-scale organisations, on the other. A series of heated controversies galvanized these transformations and divided European societies profoundly. Disputes over the role of religion, tensions over social reforms and challenged understandings of the nation pervaded public debate during this period. None of these controversies were new, but intensified as a result of structural transformations (like urbanisation and industrialisation) and the arrival on the scene of a new social actor: the “masses”.

These were all transformations that put liberal institutions and the elites who traditionally benefited from them in dire straits. Historian John Garrard has identified two different patterns of response among Europe’s liberal elites to this new situation, divided by the Rhine. According to Garrard, while elites on the west side of the Rhine (e.g. England or France) accepted the widening of the franchise, after previous periods of initial resistance, elites located on the east of the Rhine, in contrast, accepted the widening of the social bases of their regimes, but arguably “did so within political frameworks intended to remain basically autocratic”. This would be the case, for instance, of Italy. The dividing line that Garrard establishes with the Rhine constitutes an attempt to provide an overview of a phenomenon that is difficult to classify at a European scale.

Still, the geographic division of this author seems to draw on the same perspective that dominated the debate in the 1990s about the role of the “bourgeoisie” in the crisis of liberalism. Hence, in the case of southern Europe, historians have long debated the capacity – and above all, the willingness – of traditional elites to promote the democratisation of the

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political system; as well as how these attitudes contributed or not to the rise of new authoritarian regimes in the 1920s. Nowadays the breakdown of parliamentary representation continues to be an important topic of debate, where emphasis is still put on examining electoral legislation, the deeds of statesman and the evolution of liberal parties, among other topics.

This chapter will adopt an alternative perspective, where the focus is put on local elites and the strategies they designed to cope with the new mass politics. One of the reasons for doing so is because in countries like Italy and Spain, the crumbling of liberal institutions primarily began at a local level, rather than at a national scale. It was in big cities like Bologna, for the Italian case, and Barcelona, Valencia and Madrid, for that of Spain, where the political hegemony of liberal parties was first challenged. This chapter will examine how the crisis of liberal hegemony spread from Barcelona to an inland constituency like Igualada.

For the first time in 30 years the Godó family started suffering a series of electoral defeats that were not linked to the change of party in power, but to the new competitive elections. The crisis of this family culminated in 1914, when in a similar time span to that of other liberal elites in Europe, the Godó’s political career reached an end. Yet before this

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As historian Gemma Rubí has noted for the case of Catalonia, the nature of this process still needs further research: “We know with a considerable degree of detail how the changes in the political system took place in fin de siècle Barcelona, but in contrast we ignore the features of these changes in many other cities”. Gemma Rubí, *Entre el vot i la recomanació. Partits, mobilització electoral i canvi polític a Manresa (1899-1923)*, Manresa, Angle, 1995, p. 60. Quotation translated from Catalan. However, it must be noted that the case of medium-sized localities has received considerable attention. The best analyses are: Salvador Forner Muñoz, Mariano García Andreu, Rosa Ana Gutiérrez Lloret, Rafael Zurita Aldaguer, “Modernización social y comportamiento electoral urbano en España, 1910-1923”, Salvador Forner (ed.), *Democracia, elecciones y modernización en Europa. Siglos XIX y XX*, Madrid, Cátedra, 1997, pp. 241-293; and G. Rubí, Modernizando desde abajo. La reconversión del caciquismo y la política de masas en las ciudades catalanas (1901-1923), *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 2001, vol. 33, pp. 187-202.
happened, the family tried numerous strategies that revealed an attempt to adapt to the new language of mass politics. The case of this family will be used to challenge the narrative that presents liberal elites (or notables) as a monolithic social group that opposed democratisation through autocratic means. Instead, this chapter will demonstrate that in their attempt to maintain their position in society, liberal elites sought to legitimise their authority through new methods. In parallel, this case study will be used to show that the growing politicisation of society did not put an end to notables’ practices, like clientelism, but opened instead a new scenario where fraudulent practices coexisted with new forms of action.

The second part of this chapter will focus on the owner of *La Vanguardia*. As Chapter 6 showed, in 1906 Ramón Godó resigned from politics to protect the prestige of his newspaper. This decision, however, did not imply his dissatisfaction with politics, but rather the adoption of an alternative channel to participate in political life. This consisted in using his position as proprietor of Barcelona’s top-selling newspaper to support the plans of national regeneration of a politician named Antonio Maura. At the same time, though in a subtler manner, Godó would use the same position in *La Vanguardia* to help his relatives in Igualada to hold on to their local hegemony. In this way, the case of the family will shed light on how the new mass society created tension in the relation between family members, as well as demonstrating that newspapers became an alternative to public office for traditional elites to maintain their influence in the new mass society.

The methodology used in this chapter will consist in micro-analysis, with the aim of providing an in-depth picture about the responses elites gave to the crisis of liberal politics in Europe. Still, because the agency of the Godó family was conditioned by events taking place in Catalonia and in Spain, and was deeply entrenched in political controversies that were common to other parts in Europe (like nationalism and anticlericalism), multiple scales of analysis will be combined. Continental, regional and national spheres will consequently be intertwined in a narrative where the micro-experience of the Godó family will take the leading role.

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7.1. JUAN GODÓ: THE SEARCH FOR NEW FORMS OF LEGITIMISING POWER

Historians have seen in the general elections of 1907 a sign of the transition to the new mass politics in Restoration Spain. Next to the traditional fraudulent practices (like the purchase of votes and the intervention of state officials) these elections evidenced important changes in political behaviour. In contrast to the customary apathy, liberal parties faced the growing competition of alternative political movements. Of the total 155 constituencies in which the country’s electoral map was divided, in 62 of them the emerging political forces (Republicans, Democrats and Carlists) presented their candidates. In parallel, these elections became tainted by a strong ideological controversy. In 1905 France established the separation between the state and the church and this decision was echoed in Spain, where anticlericalism was central to the political agenda of the Liberal Party and especially of the Republicans. This propaganda resulted in the mobilisation of Catholics – through demonstrations, protests and the active use of the press – and in their increasing involvement in elections to defend religion. All these elements revealed the growing competition in elections and the politicisation of wider segments of society, two elements that were traditionally absent in the Restoration.

Catalonia arguably became the place where changes in politics became more evident. The broad electoral coalition named the “Solidaritat Catalana” had gathered, since 1906, all the parties in this region, with the sole exception of the two liberal parties and the Republicans of Lerroux. The threat this coalition represented to the status quo became evident in the elections of 1907, when the Solidaritat Catalana won in 41 of the 44 districts. This overwhelming majority exposed the decay of the liberal parties in Catalonia and indicated an unprecedented – yet to some extent, conjectural – mobilisation of society.

The Godó family became an example of those local elites whose social pre-eminence was threatened by the new competitive politics embodied by the Solidaritat Catalana. As

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820 Ibidem, p. 139-140.
822 For further information about the formation of the Solidaritat Catalana see Chapter 6.
823 Conjectural insofar that the same electoral turnout was not repeated until 1931. In some districts, voter participation reached 80%. For an analysis of these contests, see: Gemma Rubí, “Les eleccions generals de Solidaritat Catalana del 21 d’abril de 1907”, G. Rubí i F. Espinet (eds.), Solidaritat Catalana i Espanya, Barcelona, editorial Base, 2008, pp. 69-104.
Table 1 shows, before the elections of 1907 the Godó family had achieved a solid political hegemony. Regardless of the party in power (Conservative or Liberal), the owner of *La Vanguardia*, Ramón Godó Lallana, won four elections in a row. Moreover, he won them without much difficulty: on two occasions he faced no competition and electoral turnout was low. These two elements, combined with clientelism, allowed him to secure ample victories (sometimes with 99% of the vote). However, and as a result of the broader changes taking place in Catalonia, the elections of 1907 marked a turning point in the Godó’s trajectory. As Chapter 6 showed, the creation of Solidaritat Catalana resulted in a smear campaign against Ramón Godó, who decided to resign in order to save the reputation of *La Vanguardia*.

The first part of this chapter will focus on the consequences of Ramón’s resignation for the strategies of the Godó family. The elections of 1907 marked the first of successive defeats that would finally put an end to the political career of this family in 1914 – which would be the last time a member of the Godó family would run in an election. Yet far from resignedly accepting the end of their political hegemony, before these defeats took place the Godó family made various attempts to adapt to the new mass politics. These attempts will be used as a case study to examine, from a micro-perspective, the ways in which liberal elites sought to cope with the new mass politics, as part of the debate about the end of the notables in Europe.
Table 1. Electoral results in Igualada’s constituency between 1899-1918 824

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date of the elections</th>
<th>Ruling party in the Spanish Congress</th>
<th>Winning candidate</th>
<th>Other candidates</th>
<th>Electoral turnout</th>
<th>Percentage of votes obtained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899-1900</td>
<td>16/04/1899</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Ramón Godó Lallana (L)</td>
<td>Narcís Mauri Vidal (?)</td>
<td>39.64 %</td>
<td>68.14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-1902</td>
<td>19/05/1901</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Ramón Godó Lallana (L)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>50.06 %</td>
<td>99.77 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903-1904</td>
<td>26/05/1903</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Ramón Godó Lallana (L)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>59.62 %</td>
<td>99.26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-1906</td>
<td>10/11/1905</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Ramón Godó Lallana (L)</td>
<td>Ildefonso García del Corral (R)</td>
<td>50.68 %</td>
<td>68.75 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907-1909</td>
<td>21/04/1907</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Frederic Rahola (Lliga Regionalista)</td>
<td>Juan Godó Llucià (L)</td>
<td>64.12 %</td>
<td>55.70 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-1913</td>
<td>08/05/1910</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Juan Godó Llucià (L)</td>
<td>Frederic Rahola (Lliga Regionalista)</td>
<td>80.40 %</td>
<td>50.89 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-1915</td>
<td>08/03/1914</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Manuel González Vilart (C)</td>
<td>Juan Godó Llucià (L)</td>
<td>75.65 %</td>
<td>52.97 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-1917</td>
<td>09/04/1916</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Manuel González Villart (C)</td>
<td>Bartomeu Trias Villart (C)</td>
<td>69.66 %</td>
<td>55.59 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>24/02/1918</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Carles de Camps d'Olzinelles (Lliga Regionalista)</td>
<td>Manuel Gonzalez Villart (C)</td>
<td>76.91 %</td>
<td>50.86 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As soon as the resignation of Ramón Godó became public, in late 1906, rumours began to spread that his relatives in Igualada would follow suit and abandon politics too. 825 The decision of the owner of La Vanguardia put the family’s traditional strategy in crisis: while Ramón ran for Congress, his cousin in Igualada (Juan Godó Llucià) ran for Provincial Council. A third family member (Juan’s son) joined this strategy in 1906 when he was appointed mayor of Igualada. 826 But now this strategy based on kinship cooperation was no longer feasible as a result of Ramón Godó’s resignation. The end of this strategy implied the

826 See Chapter 6.
risk of losing access to Congress, the position from which the family traditionally expanded its influence to Madrid. From a broader perspective, the same challenge was extended to other liberal elites in Catalonia. With the exception of the Conservatives (who expected to win the elections with the support of their party, now in government) the majority of liberal elites in this territory decided not to run for elections in 1907. The broad party coalition the Solidaritat Catalana represented made it very difficult for liberal elites to win.

Yet contrary to the majority position, the Godó family decided to stand for election: Juan Godó Llucià (1851-1935) became the new family candidate for Congress. As explained in Chapter 6, Juan was the heir of the Godó family’s branch in Igualada, as well as a prominent textile manufacturer. Still, the decision of standing for election did not seem to be his own, rather it obeyed the pressures from the family’s supporters in the 32 towns that formed Igualada’s constituency. The resignation of the owner of La Vanguardia in 1906 had already generated great unease among these family supporters (or “clients”), for it implied the risk of losing their access to public office. Given this possibility, the mayors of different towns mobilised and pressured Godó to stand for election; they even announced his candidacy in public, despite his promise of not running for elections. This case illustrates to what extent clientelism implied a whole set of close and long-lasting relations of personal

827 Gemma Rubí, op. cit., p. 87.
828 “(...) el distrito está harto de Godós, y lo mas cuerdo hubiera sido el retirar á tiempo la candidatura (...). No se lo han permitido, segun dicen en un manifiesto, los malos amigos que tiene la familia Godó, y sobre tan malos consejeros caerá la responsabilidad de su derrota. La mayoría de los candidatos monárquicos que se presentaban por distritos catalanes, han retirado su candidatura, convencidos de que es imposible luchar contra un movimiento de opinión tan formidable como el actual. Solo Godó no se convence y quiere que le retiren.” El Igualadino, 20/04/1907, pp. 2-3. The historians Jordi Planas and Francesc Valls have written an excellent analysis of one of the rural towns (Pierola) where the Godó family had wide support. J. Planas and F. Valls, Cacics i rabassaires. Dinàmica associativa i conflictivitat social. Els Hostalets de Pierola, 1890-1939, Vic, Eumo, 2011.
829 As the Republican newspaper El Igualadino noted with irony: “(...) Someone commented: ‘I lament Godó has decided to abandon us, for this implies losing my breadwinner’. Needless to say, there are many plans to make Godó reconsider his decision. One hungry secretary of the town council has even argued in favour of organising demonstrations in all the towns of the constituency to protest against the decision of Godó. Perhaps – another man said – it would be preferable to send an exposition to the Government, with thousands of signatures, asking for a Real Order to forbid Godó’s decision. (...) Perhaps it would be more practical to send some commissions to the selfish Godó to ask him not to abandon his empire, under the threat of not supplying him with more votes?’ R. Romesquet Picantó, “¡¡¡Quin desastre!!!”, El Igualadino, 08/07/1906, p. 2. Original version in Catalan.
830 “El gobiernador civil recibió ayer un telegrama en el que se le comunicaba que había sido proclamado candidato para la diputación á Cortes por el distrito de Igualada don Juan Godó y Lluciá. Los firmantes del referido telegrama eran los alcaldes de Copons, Carme, Castellfullit, Pobja de Clarumunt, Prats del Rey, Santa Maria de Miralles, La Llacuna, Torre de Clarumunt, Castelloli, Montbuy, Jorba, Odena, Calonge, Pierola, Veciana, Igualada, San Martín de Saçgayolas y Tous, y dos delegados de los pueblos de Calaf y Capellades.” LV, 01/04/1907, p. 3. Juan Godó Lluciá personally assured the members of the Solidaritat Catalana that he would not run for the next elections, as noted in: Pilar Martínez-Carné Ascaso, Els inicis del catalanisme politic i Leonci Soler i March: 1858-1932, Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1999, p. 523-524.
dependence. The Godó family could not abandon politics because it meant leaving behind the people who had been supporting the family for 30 years.

Still, all these efforts became insufficient for the family to win the elections of 1907. The constituency of Igualada witnessed the early expansion of mass politics in Catalonia and showed the negative consequences this represented for traditional elites. Electoral turnout increased substantially (see Table 1) and echoed the structural transformations Igualada was undergoing at the time. Indeed, the economic downturn this city suffered in the mid-19th century did not prevent it from maintaining a strong industrial character, as historian Pere Pascual has explained.831 The textile and leather industries remained the leading economic sectors of this city with a population of 10,000 inhabitants at the beginning of the 20th century – including a large working class.832 These economic transformations in Igualada were accompanied by the mushrooming of spaces of sociability and political activism. New party headquarters were established in Igualada at the turn of the century, among which Republicans, Catalan nationalists, Catholics and Anarchists.833 Among them, the Republicans consolidated as the new leading force.834 This varied range of political movements managed to expand their influence over Igualada’s population based on two pillars: first, the proliferation of different social spaces (like social centres and “ateneos”) where the working people and the petty bourgeoisie gathered. These centres promoted all sorts of leisure and educative activities (like choral groups and public libraries) and provided a fertile ground for new currents of thought to spread, like rational education, antimilitarism and masonry.835

831 Even though this city did not again reach the 14,000 inhabitants it had reached in the 1850s until the 1930s. Pere Pascual Domènech, Fàbrica i treball a la Igualada de la primera meitat del segle XX, Barcelona, Abadia de Montserrat, Ajuntament d’Igualada, 1991.

832 The main working association was the “Federación local de Sociedades Obreras”, established at the end of the 19th century. Antoni Carner, Els moviments obrers a Igualada durant el segle XIX; Igualada, Centre d’Estudis Comarcals, 1971, p. 33.

833 The new party headquarters of the Republicans were: the “Centre Republicà Històric” (1886), “Centre de la Unió Republicana d’Igualada” (1893), “Cercle Republicà d’Igualada” (1904). The Carlists gathered in the “Centro Tradicionalista de Igualada” (1889) and the Anarchists in the “Federación Igualadina” (1883-1885).


834 As one of the main leaders of the Anarchist movement in Igualada, named Joan Ferrer i Farriol, evoked in his memoires [in Catalán]: “Els nostres republicans, aquests si que tenien traça i manya, car disposaven d’un Serra i Constansó, d’un Sebastià Freixes, d’un Amadeu Biosca, d’un Lopòlit Sàbat. Llur sentit de l’humor enriolava ensems que encoratjava públics, mentre que nosaltres [the Anarchists], decantat pel cantó tràgic, acabàvem en apòstols de la basarda”. Joan Ferrer i Farriol, De l’Anoia al Sena sense pressa, Choisy-le-Roi, Impr. des Gondoles, 1966, p. 56.

The second element that most contributed to the growth of new political movements in Igualada was a modest yet still very active press. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century the press experienced a major growth in Igualada: the number of newspapers increased from 2, in 1900, to 12 in 1910. Thanks to some valuable local studies, the common features of these newspapers can be delineated. Most of them had a partisan orientation, and their sales did not surpass a few hundred copies. The majority of them followed an erratic existence and usually did not last for more than a few years. Yet even under such modest circumstances, the press became one of the most valuable instruments for the opponents of the Godó family.

This expanding civil society is where the new emerging forces, like the Lliga Regionalista and above all the Republicans, widened their social bases and used it to fight the Godó’s domination. The elections of 1907 became an example of the vital function of the press in mobilising society against caciquismo. In the days prior to elections, the newspaper of the Catalan nationalists (Pàtria) gave much publicity to the candidate of the Solidaritat Catalana (Frederic Rahola) and published different articles specifically addressed to workers, and to women, as well. Although the electoral law of 1890 did not allow women to vote, the press encouraged them to participate in the demonstrations and thus contribute to the victory of the Solidaritat Catalana against caciquismo. This reveals that in contrast to liberal politics, which were the concern of a social minority, the new political movements sought to

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837 Name and political orientation of Igualada’s partisan press between 1900-1910: Sometent (1905-1911), Catholic conservative; El Estandarte (1908-1910), Carlist; El Igualadino (1904-1909, organ of the “Unión Republicana”); Igualada Radical (1909-1915, organ of the Republicans of Lerroux); Pàtria (1906-1910), Jovent (1910-1911, satirical newspaper) and Nova Llevor (1905, organ of the “Centre Autonomista d’Igualada”) all Catalan nationalists. *Ibidem.*

838 27.3% of the newspapers founded in this city did not last for more than a year, and 49.2% lasted for between one and five years. In terms of language, Spanish was the common language, even though at the turn of the century growing numbers started adopting Catalan. *Ibid.* pp. 24-26.

839 The resignation of Ramón Godó (explained in Chapter 6) already provided evidence of this. Nevertheless, and as one contemporary noted, these newspapers also had heated confrontations between them: “En 1906 las relaciones periodísticas locales estaban muy tirantes, a causa del fuego graneado que se disparaba entre «El Igualadino», «Pàtria» y «Sometent» con cada artículo, lleno de metralla, que metía miedo.” Ramon Solsona Cardona, *Mi ciudad y yo. Un periodo de historia anecdotica*, N. Poncell-Impresor, 1948, p. 125.

840 [E.T.]: “It is time that women abandon certain concerns and besides being good wives and exemplary mothers they also work for their land (...). Wives, mothers, sisters, fiancées and girlfriends, work for the victory of this candidacy; and support those men who shall defend our [national] rights in Congress.” [original text: “Es hora ja, de que les dones catalanes deixin certes preocupacions que les lliguen y á més d’esser bones esposes y envejables mares, sentin bategar el cor pel bé de Catalunya. (...) Trevalléu, esposes, mares, germanes, promeses y amigues, pera que triomfi aquesta candidatura; apoyeu á n’aquets homes que desde ‘l Congrés han de trevar y defensar els nostres drets’”]. It should be noted that this article was written by a woman, Maria Dolors Cardades. “D’elections. A les dones”, *Pàtria*, 20/04/1907, p. 1; “Als obrers”, *Pàtria*, 13/04/1907, p. 1.
politicise wider segments of society. In so doing the press became a valuable instrument to publicise an interclass discourse.

Moreover, the articles published during these days demonstrate that Republicans and Catalan nationalists also used the press to educate people about their political rights and instructed them on how to prevent the rigging of elections. Readers were advised to be at the electoral college by 7 in the morning and to bring with them “any friends, relatives or people you may know”. Likewise, the press encouraged them to report any wrongdoing they might witness, like vote shopping, and told them not to fear intimidation. These recommendations exemplify how the press became a central device in mobilising broader segments of society.

Still, the new practices of the emerging parties sometimes ran parallel to more traditional ones, like clientelism. One of the leaders of the Lliga Regionalista (Francesc Cambó) made arrangements addressed at winning the support of local bosses who traditionally supported the Godó family. This case illustrates that although the fight against caciquismo was a central point in the programme of the Solidaritat Catalana, on some occasions their candidates used it to their own favour. These dubious practices, also noticed in other constituencies in Catalonia, were morally justified by the challenge of removing the Godó’s long-established roots from the territory. The scale at which the new political movements made use of caciquismo seemed to be considerably lower, yet still the leaders of the Lliga Regionalista justified these measures for the great importance they gave to winning in Igualada.

But the Godó family did not watch the exploits of their enemies with their arms folded; they mobilised their supporters too. One of the ways they did so consisted in monitoring the electoral roll, which became one of the most important features of the new competitive politics. On polling day the chamber of notaries in Igualada was flooded with petitions to appoint legal assistants to monitor the vote counting. This was a strategy aimed at

841 “¡Electors!”, El Igualadino, 20/04/1907, p. 1. A reproduction of this copy, in the Annex n. 10.
842 More specifically, Cambó urged the need of winning the favour of a local boss in the town of Calaf to rig the elections: [E.T.]: “[Mister] Ferrer Carulla, from Calaf, can contribute decisively to our victory. It is of central importance for the Lliga that Rahola wins the elections. I am aware you have influence on Ferrer. It is necessary that you make the greatest use of it. Yours faithfully, Francesch Cambó”. [original version: “En Ferrer y Carulla de Calaf pot ajudar moltíssim a que la victòria sigui nostra. Es, pera la Lliga, d’un interès capitalíssim que’n Rahola surti triumfant. Sé que V. té influència sobre’n Ferrer. És precis que la posi tota en joch. Mani a son afectíssim amich, Francesch Cambó.”] Pilar Martínez-Carné Ascaso, Els inicis del catalanisme politic i Leonci Soler i March: 1858-1932, Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1999, p. 524.
844 Pilar Martínez-Carné Ascaso, op. cit.
manipulating the census, and in the worst case preventing political rivals from doing so.\textsuperscript{845} Among the people who made these requests were various relatives of the Godó family; mayors of neighbouring towns; and the very same owner of \textit{La Vanguardia}, Ramón Godó.\textsuperscript{846} The intervention of this man revealed that his retirement from politics did not mean leaving his cousin in the lurch.\textsuperscript{847} Moreover, in the days prior to the elections Ramón Godó had visited the constituency in his car, almost certainly to encourage the family’s supporters in the different towns of the constituency to rig the elections.\textsuperscript{848} His deeds show to what extent the kinship ties with his cousin Juan remained strong, even when he had retired from politics. In the fierce competition against the new political rivals, the family worked together to maintain the political hegemony.

Still, the efforts that the Godó’s supporters expended in counteracting the mobilisation of the Solidaritat Catalana were insufficient and they lost the elections. Of the total 31,819 people with the right to vote in 1907, Juan Godó only obtained 2,898 votes; in contrast to his competitor, who obtained 3,571.\textsuperscript{849} An important segment of the electorate did not participate (3,507 voters) but these elections registered the highest electoral turnout in the history of Igualada’s constituency (64%). This growth in participation went in line with the broader situation in Catalonia, where the politicised atmosphere increased electoral turnout to similar levels.\textsuperscript{850} The case of Igualada consequently shows that the crisis of liberal parties was not exclusive to big cities like Barcelona – as the literature has often assumed\textsuperscript{851} – but was expanding to inland and medium-sized cities of the Catalan territory too.

\textsuperscript{846} Such as Hermenegildo Godó Llucià (brother of the candidate); Antoni Llansana Soler, who was the examining judge (“juez de instrucción”) and brother-in-law of Juan Godó Llucià; Baldomero Camps Blavi, who was a business partner of Juan and Ramón Godó; and Josep Ferrer Carulla, the mayor of the neighbouring town of Calaf. Arxiu Notarial d’Igualada (ANI), Notari Martí Gual, 1907, pp. 291-292.
\textsuperscript{847} “confiere poderes para que juntos ó cada uno de ellos á solas, (...) intervengan en todas las operaciones ó actos que con motivo de la elección en este Distrito han de tener lugar; y al efecto se personen en los locales de las secciones y presencien la constitución de las mesas, la votacion y el escrutinio en cada una de ellas, examinen y comprueben (...) papeletas, listas de electores y de votantes (...) asistan al escrutinio general y reclamen y protesten por lo que en el recuento de votos y proclamación de Diputados ocurra, si consideran justo (...)”. ANI, \textit{op. cit.}.
\textsuperscript{848} “Don Ramón Godó Lallana, solidario en Barcelona, ha reaparecido en la vida política de la que se había retirado, viniendo á combatir en Igualada la candidatura del solidario Sr. Rahola (...). En la \textit{tournée electoral} que ha hecho estos días por los pueblos, habrá podido convencerse D. Ramón, que todo el distrito está harto de Godós, y que lo mas cuerdo hubiera sido el retirar á tiempo la candidatura de su pariente D. Juan (...).” \textit{El Igualadino}, 20/04/1907, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{849} Modesto Sánchez de los Santos, \textit{Las Cortes españolas: las de 1907}, Madrid, Antonio Marzo, 1908, p. 245.
\textsuperscript{850} Electoral turnout in the four Catalan provinces: Barcelona (55.93%), Girona (58.46%), Lleida (66.73%), Tarragona (68.27%). G. Rubí (2008), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 91. For the changes that resulted in Catalonia’s electoral map, see \textit{Annex n. 11}.
\textsuperscript{851} G. Rubí (1995), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 60.
The Godó’s case demonstrates nevertheless that this was a long and uneven process. The growing mobilisation of society did not imply the immediate disappearance of the family, but forced them to develop new strategies to adapt to the new mass politics. Despite the fact Juan Godó lost the elections in 1907, in the 1910 elections he reversed the situation and won. And, most importantly, he did so in a context of spectacular mobilisation: in 1910, voter turnout in Igualada reached 80%. That percentage revealed a highly politicised local context, where the traditional oligarchy and the emerging political forces fiercely competed to mobilise the population. These elections also presented further novelties: a new electoral law now existed; and Godó’s opponents were no longer united in the Solidaritat Catalana. The wide ideological spectrum of this coalition proved to be too strong to survive, and by 1909 the Solidaritat Catalana ceased to exist. These changes in the regional context were echoed in the local sphere and the coalition also ceased to exist in Igualada. As one contemporary lamented, this implied the end of the united front against the Godó’s caciquismo.

In this now fragmented yet highly mobilised political panorama, the Godó family made an attempt to adapt to the new mass politics. Juan Godó did not seek to limit the rigging of elections, as was customary, but actively sought to attract new supporters. To this end he began an electoral campaign and with a long caravan of cars and other vehicles he visited all the towns in the constituency. This strategy reveals two important novelties in the Godó’s strategy (e.g. the launch of an electoral campaign and the use of cars to do so) and reveals

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852 As one contemporary recalled, speaking of the heated levels of confrontation that politics reached in Igualada: "(...) división de la ciudad y pueblos en dos grandes bandos, que se combatían enconadamente en los cafés, en los talleres, en el campo, en las casas comunales. La «sala de dalt» y la «sala de baix» eran, en los pueblos, la línea divisoria de «godonistas» y «antigodonistas». Parientes que no se saludaban, casamientos que no se efectuaban por no ser del mismo bando, peleas que se entablaban, aún en el seno de las familias, eran los efectos de este germen de discordia, efectos que se dejaban sentir con bastante intensidad, todavía, en los días en que arrancan estas memorias. Preciso es confesar que aquellas luchas llegaron a tomar un aspecto primario y brutal. Todas las armas eran buenas contra el enemigo político, y, para herirlo, todos los medios eran lícitos...” Ramón Solsona, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

853 Among the novelties included in the new electoral law, there was the introduction of compulsory voting; and different measures aimed at counteracting caciquismo. The most problematic of these measures was Article 29, according to which in those constituencies where there was only one candidate standing for election, he would be elected automatically. In practice, rather than preventing caciquismo this article (which was proposed by the Republican Gumersindo Azcárate) was exploited by local elites for their own benefit. See: María Jesús González Hernández, El universo conservador de Antonio Maura. Biografía y proyecto de estado, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1997, pp. 145-150. On the breaking of the Solidaritat Catalana, see: G. Rubí & F. Espinet, op. cit.

854 “Al ceder el paso don Juan Godó Lluciá al empujón de las fracciones coaigadas, que le disputaban la representación en Cortes, vino el desmoronamiento del bloque anticaciquista, por falta de razón de ser. Si bien quedaba el aglutinante solidario, la verdad es que cada uno caminó por cuenta propia, procurando sacar partido de las inteligencias del momento, que se rompían con una facilidad portentosa. Parecía que la ciencia electoral consistía en la posesión de la ciencia de la informalidad en su más alto grado.” Ramon Solsona, op. cit., pp. 139-140.
that besides the rigging of elections he was now interested in addressing the voters too. In this attempt, Juan Godó also displayed a new discourse based on identity issues. All the cars of his caravan hoisted Spanish flags. This was a subtle but not meaningless detail, for it revealed how the liberal elites’ strategies of adaptation were tightly interwoven to the new political context.

Indeed, the first decade of the 20th century was a moment when identity issues became a heated issue in most of Europe. Although nationalism was not a new phenomenon, in this period it presented some distinctive features if compared to previous decades. In contrast to the democratic revolutions of the mid-19th century, when nationalism carried progressive and even emancipatory connotations, the picture was different at the beginning of the 20th century. Nationalism now highlighted the difficulties of the liberal’s nation-building project to integrate the whole of society. These difficulties manifested differently, according to each country. In central Europe, for instance, nationalism took a reactionary shape and revealed the tensions of multi-ethnic entities, as in the case of the Austrian Empire. In the Spanish case, in contrast, nationalism took the form of alternative voices from the periphery that challenged the liberal’s centralist understanding of the “nation”, and held it responsible for the country’s state of decay (intensified in the Disaster of 1898).

In Spain the victory of the Solidaritat Catalana in 1907 gave new visibility to identity issues at a national level. Together with the Republicans, the nationalists of the Lliga Regionalista were now the leading force in Catalonia and proposed to regenerate Spain by means of a decentralised administration. These demands for autonomy, however, were often regarded in the rest of Spain as a selfish demand containing a hidden separatist agenda. In this context, the Godó family saw in the Spanish identity the opportunity to mobilise the segment of society that did not identify with the growing influence of the Lliga Regionalista. Juan Godó thus tried to make identity a new element of his candidacy, and in

857 Historians have debated the supposed weakness of the liberal’s nation-building project and their relation with the rise of alternative understandings of the nation. It is impossible to mention here the vast bibliography on this topic, however some valuable references are: José Alvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa: la idea de España en el siglo XIX*, Madrid, Taurus, 2001; Clare Mar-Molinero and Angel Smith (eds.), *Nationalism and the nation in the Iberian Peninsula. Competing and Conflicting Identities*, Oxford, Washington, Berg, 1996.
that attempt he relied on the precious support of his cousin and thus also of his cousin’s newspaper, *La Vanguardia*. The paper gave positive coverage of Godó’s electoral campaign and stressed his defence of the Spanish identity. In the meantime, it also criticised his rivals from the Lliga Regionalista. As this newspaper stated:

> “En pocos distritos de esta región se presenta la contienda electoral tan empeñada como en el de Igualada. El candidato regionalista multiplica sus esfuerzos para recuperar las simpatías de la mayoría de sus electores, que sufrieron grave quebranto durante la temporada en que tuvo la representación parlamentaria, y no perdona medio para recobrar el favor perdido. Esta ímproba tarea, á juzgar por las apariencias, resulta hasta ahora infructuosa, como pudo comprobarse en el acto celebrado ayer en la Torre de Claramunt, donde el candidato liberal don Juan Godó recibió inequívocas demostraciones de afecto por parte del vecindario y de los habitantes de otros pueblos de la comarca, que permiten augurar el lisonjero éxito que obtendrá su candidatura en la próxima elección. El candidato regionalista y sus amigos se presentaron en carruajes adornados con banderas catalanas, siendo recibidos por sus correligionarios con algunos aplausos, que se trocaron en verdadera ovación á la llegada del señor Godó, quien, como los demás de su comitiva, iban en coches en los que ondeaba la enseñera nacional. (...) Asistieron al acto unas dos mil personas, quienes, con sus aplausos, demostraron claramente su adhesión al señor Godó.”  

This article reveals the importance the press played in the new mass politics. Despite the fact the electoral rally of Juan Godó was held in a very small town (Torre de Claramunt) this rally was turned into a media event that thousands of readers learned about thanks to the intermediary role of *La Vanguardia*. This newspaper, by then Catalonia’s top-selling paper, contributed to publicising the image of Juan in highly positive terms: emphasis was put on the warm welcome he received from the local population ("*the crowds received him with enthusiasm*"); while the presence of Spanish flags in his caravan was implicitly contrasted with the Catalan flags from his Regionalist opponents.

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860 “Movimiento electoral”, LV, 25/04/1910, p. 3. [E. T.]: “In few constituencies of this region the electoral contest appears to be so tight as in Igualada. The Regionalist candidate multiplies its efforts to recover the sympathies of voters, which was severely damaged during his time as deputie (...). This hard to be achieved aim seems to give no fruits by now, as it could be observed in the meeting celebrated yesterday [in the town] of La Torre de Claramunt, where the liberal candidate Mister Juan Godó received clear indications of support from the local people and from people coming from other towns, this being something that allows predicting his victory in the next elections. The Regionalist candidate and his friends arrived with their coaches hoisting _Catalan flags_, and were received with few applause; [in contrast] to the arrival of Mr. Godó, who arrived in a caravan where all the cars were hoisting _Spanish flags_ (...). Around _two thousand people_ attended the meeting, and who showed through their applause their clear commitment to Mr. Godó.” Emphasis added.
with the Catalan flags of his opponent. This double-identity discourse was repeated in subsequent rallies, which *La Vanguardia* contributed once again to publicising.\textsuperscript{861}

This provides evidence of Juan Godó’s attempts to take advantage of the new political scenario, and of how his cousin could help him in doing so through *La Vanguardia*. At a time when the Catalan nationalists were challenging the family’s traditional hegemony, the ownership of this newspaper allowed the promotion of a new discourse based on identity, while at the same time undermining the prestige of the family’s opponent.\textsuperscript{862} All this provides further evidence for one of the arguments of this thesis. That is, that the influence of journalists as *political actors* consisted in their capacity to select which events were given public visibility, and to choose the nature of this publicity (positive or negative). Instead of rigging the elections, Ramón Godó was now supporting his cousin in Igualada through a subtler – yet equally valuable – manner consisting in using *La Vanguardia* to support his cousin’s political campaign.

The lengths to which Ramón Godó would go to maintain the family hegemony in Igualada were laid bare when it became evident that the above-quoted article of *La Vanguardia* was a fantasy. As copies of the edition with this article about the glorious reception that Juan Godó received in the town of Torre de Claramunt were distributed, various voices started questioning that version of events. Apparently, the strong animosity Juan Godó faced in this town had ultimately led him to stay away and instead to send one of his delegates. These last-minute changes, however, were ignored in *La Vanguardia*, and the positive report was made up instead. As it could be expected, Barcelona’s press rapidly noticed the dishonest account of events in *La Vanguardia* and criticised the editorial.

\textsuperscript{861}“La lucha electoral se presenta reñidísima en el distrito de Igualada; uno y otro bando batallan con verdadero encarnizamiento y los candidatos no descansan en sus visitas de propaganda en los diversos pueblos del distrito. (...) los adversarios llevan en sus vehículos la bandera catalana. (....) Nosotros —añadió — llevamos en el carruaje la catalana y la española. ¡Viva Cataluña! ¡Viva España! Por Cataluña y por España, votad á quien ama á ambas por igual; ese es el señor Godó.” *LV*, 02/05/1910, p. 10. The same strategy was used in the elections of 1914: “De noche ya de regreso á esta ciudad, se reunieron en la cruz de término todos los llegados del Bruch, Copons, Montbuy, La Llacuna, etc., etc., formando una caravana de unos treinta carruajes, entre automóviles, coches y tartanas, luciendo todos la bandera española. A la entrada de la ciudad, todas las sirenas y bocinas hicieron sus llamadas, produciendo su paso un entusiasmo indescriptible y siendo saludados los propagandistas con palmas y vivas muestras de afecto, hasta que llegaron en casa del señor Godó, en cuya calle habían situadas unas dos mil personas, que les tributaron una prolongada salva de aplausos”. *LV*, 03/03/1914, p. 6. [E. T.]: “The electoral contest will be very disputed in Igualada’s constituency; both sides battle with determination and candidates do not stop for a moment in their rallies of propaganda around the different towns in the constituency (...) the adversaries carry in their vehicles the Catalan flag (...) We —he added— carry both the Catalan and the Spanish flag. ¡Long life to Catalonia! ¡Long live to Spain! For Catalonia and Spain, please vote who loves both equally; and this is Mr. Godó.”

\textsuperscript{862}As the article above-quoted shows, the candidate of the Lliga Regionalista was deprived of the support of the masses that Godó allegedly received. Thus, Rahola received only a “few applauses”, according to this newspaper, and his record of service as deputy was criticised.
independence that the newspaper liked to boast about. Ramón Godó’s attempts to support his relatives in Igualada thus tarnished the image of the newspaper, and not for the first time. This anecdote reveals the importance traditional elites gave to public opinion to redefine their sources of authority; yet at the same time demonstrates that public opinion was hard to control and open to contest from other actors. In such a disputed field, not even the editorial independence of *La Vanguardia* was a safeguard.

In the end, and despite this small controversy, Juan Godó Llucià won the elections of 1910. Apart from the new methods he started implementing in these elections, there is evidence that he made an intense use of clientelism too. The opposition denounced these fraudulent practices, but once more the liberal institutions showed their disinterest in promoting accountability, and the protests were disregarded once in Congress. These elections illustrate, in consequence, that even when a high mobilisation of the electorate took place (voter turnout reached 80% on this occasion) the use of clientelist practices did not disappear but coexisted with the new methods of competitive politics. Traditional elites like the Godó family consequently demonstrated that while relying on the traditional practices based on clientelism, they also sought to adopt some of the methods of the new professional politics. The electoral campaign, the organisation of caravans of cars, the use of a discourse based on identity, and the use of the press as an instrument of propaganda, are all evidence of this.

But what were the reasons for the end of the Godó’s political career? At least three elements can be identified, the first of which is the active mobilisation of the opposition. Republicans and Catalan nationalists learned a bitter lesson from the elections of 1910: when they ran separately they were incapable of defeating the Godó family. They managed to do so

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863 “(...) ‘La Vanguardia’, afirma que el candidato señor Godó fue recibido con entusiasmo por millares de electores. Eso, sencillamente, es embaucar á las gentes; el señor Godó no pudo ser recibido con entusiasmo por millares de electores de Pobla de Claramunt porque no fué á dicha localidad, mandando á un apoderado. (...) Porque en Igualada, ante los evidentes propósitos del caciquismo de volver á hacer mangas y capirotes en aquellos pueblos, la parte sana del cuerpo electoral ha establecido tan estrecho tacto de codos que al unísono labora por la candidatura del señor Rahola, como se demostró perfectamente en el mitin de anteayer en Pobla de Calaramunt en el que mientras el senyor Rahola y el señor Serra y Constansó (...) fueron ovacionados, á los corifeos del señor Godó se les quería lynchiar, ¡y eso que el candidato caciquista tuvo buen cuidado de no presentarse en aquel pueblo, mandando un representante!” *El Diluvio*, quoted in: “Lo que n’ha dit la premsa”, *La Veu de Catalunya*, 26/04/1910, p. 3. See also: “El famós meeting de Torra de Claramunt”, *La Veu de Catalunya*, 29/04/1910, p. 2.

864 See Chapter 6. As one newspaper rightly put it: “Bien puede estarle agradecido el Godó de Igualada al Godó de Barcelona, puesto que en obsequio del primero sacrifica don Ramón hasta la seriedad y el buen nombre de ‘La Vanguardia’”. *Ibidem.*

865 Godó mobilised as many as 286 assistants and 6 notaries to monitor (and manipulate) the electoral roll. Further details on the protests for the numerous irregularities, in: Modesto Sánchez de los Santos, *Las Cortes Españolas: las de 1910*. Madrid, Establecimiento Tipográfico de A. Marzo, 1910, pp. 341-342.
in 1907, when they ran together in the Solidaritat Catalana, but failed when they ran alone (as evidenced in 1910, and despite the 80% electoral turnout). All this explains why in the next elections, in 1914, the political opposition (the Republicans, the Catalanists and even the Catholics) united again.

On this occasion they did not do so by forming a coalition, but through supporting the Conservative candidate (see Table 1). This shows that in Igualada political struggle did not consist in liberal parties versus new emerging ones, but in a fight between all the parties and one single family. This polarisation of local politics explains why a Republican journal like El Igualadino presented the elections of 1914 as a “war of liberation”, even though the candidate this newspaper now supported belonged to the Conservative party.866

The second cause of the demise of the Godó’s hegemony is that the family started suffering from the same government intervention in elections that it had traditionally benefited from. The strong position this family built in Igualada on behalf of the Liberal Party traditionally led the other liberal party (the Conservatives) not to present their candidate in this constituency. This situation started to change in 1914, when the Conservatives started competing against the family. This decision echoed the growing confrontation between liberal parties on a national scale, and the growing difficulties they faced to impose their will in elections.867 As a result of all this, the Conservative Party attempted to retrieve the constituency in Igualada from the Godó’s hands. This became evident in the methods the Conservative government of Eduardo Dato used in 1914, when a classic repertoire was used to rig the elections (including physical intimidation, intervention of state officials and coercion of voters). Ironically, the Godó’s were now the ones who denounced, via the ever-supportive La Vanguardia, the coercion the government exerted on voters.868 Indeed, although Juan Godó Llucià kept participating in public events to reinforce his image as the “father of the district” (see Illustration 1) such efforts all proved to be in vain. The

866 As this newspaper argued: “Once again we are in the face of a new war of liberation which, like a crusade, we have been holding for many years those of us who have not lost the dignity of free men. (...)” [original text, written in Catalan: “Altre volta ens trovem en vigilies d’una d’aquestes lluites de lliberació, que com una nova creuhada, sostenim des de molts anys els que sentim la rojor de la vergonya, o no hem perdut encara la dignitat d’homes lliures.” “Redempció”, L’Igualadí. Setmanari Republicá Autonomista, porta-vèu d’Igualada i sa comarca, 01/03/1914, p. 2.

867 The divisions between liberal parties will be studied in the second part of this chapter.

868 “Por la mañana recorrieron las calles unos 25 individuos armados de gruesos garrotes, ejerciendo coacciones no sólo con su actitud provocativa, sino incluso de obra, pues agredieron á tres electores, partidarios del señor Godó, causándoles lesiones. A los empleados del Ayuntamiento se les ha hecho votar con candidaturas que llevaban una contraseña, y, á pesar de esto, aun se les acompañaba, a la mayoría, hasta el colegio, no perdiéndoles de vista después de emitir el sufragio, para evitar que cambiassen de papeleta. La presión oficial ha sido grandísima, pues los delegados del gobernador obraron como agentes del candidato conservador, no como representatnites de una autoridad que tiene el deber de guardar una actitud imparcial y la obligación de perseguir las coacciones.” “Igualada”, LV, 09/03/1914, p. 5.
government’s pressure on the Godó family became so strong that it reached a point where the supporters of this family in the city council (eight councillors in total, including Juan Godó Pelegrí) resigned en masse. This was a move aimed at denouncing the Conservatives’ new decision to meddle in Igualada’s affairs, and reveals to what extent the state’s intervention remained an important element in local politics.  

The third and most important reason for the Godó’s downfall was the resignation of Juan Godó Llucià in March 1916. On previous occasions Juan had considered abandoning public office. His continuous hesitation led the family’s supporters to pressure him not to resign. The last evidence of this was in 1914, when an event was organised to thank both Juan Godó Llucià and his son Juan Godó Pelegrí for their years of public service as deputy and mayor, respectively (see Illustration 2). As many as 600 people attended this event, including representatives from all 32 towns in the constituency, and it sheds light on the pyramid of patron-client relations that stemmed from Godó’s leadership, and on the large number of people who were interested in maintaining the family’s hegemony.  

All these attempts from supporters (or “clients”), however, were insufficient to convince a man that was tired of the disquiet and squabbles of local politics. The press in Igualada continued with their smear campaign against Juan Godó, as they had done so before with his cousin Ramón. And these aggressive attacks from the press, combined with some rather more prosaic reasons, finally led Juan Godó’s to abandon politics, as he explained in the open letter he sent to La Vanguardia:

“Con ruego de que la publiquemos, se nos remite la carta siguiente: Sr. Director de LA VANGUARDIA. Muy señor mío y amigo: Dada la campaña de insidias y calumnias que contra mí se ha emprendido y no repuesta todavía mi salud del grave quebranto que sufrió el verano último con motivo de un accidente automovilista, he decidido apartarme por ahora de toda lucha política y retirar, en consecuencia, mi candidatura á diputado á Cortes por el distrito de Igualada. Al suplicarle, señor Director, que haga pública esta determinación mía, le
ruego también que me permita dar las gracias, por conducto de su periódico, á todos los buenos amigos de aquel distrito que, resueltamente y con una lealtad á toda prueba, me han prestado su cooperación, asegurándoles que ahora como antes pueden fiar incondicionalmente en mi amistad y reconocimiento para cuanto, en la esfera privada, se les ofrezca. Con este motivo me reitero de usted afectísimo y atento amigo q. b. s. m., Juan Godó y Lluciá.  (…)  

Illustration 1. Juan Godó Llucià laying the first foundation stone of a school in the town of Pierola (1914)

873 LV, 31/03/1916, p. 3. [E. T.]: “We have been kindly asked to publish the following letter: Mr. Editor of LA VANGUARDIA. My dearest friend. Due to the smear campaign I have been suffering lately and having not recovered yet from my last automovile accident, I have decided to stay appart from political struggle and to withdraw my candidacy for deputie in Congress in representation of Igualada’s constituency. I also ask you, Mr. Editor, when making this announcement public through your newspaper, to express my gratitude to the goodfriends I have in this constituency, for the loyalty they have shown to me in all times, and I promise to all of them my most loyal frienship and help in whatever concerns the private sphere. (…)”

874 Source: La Ilustració Catalana, 03/08/1914, p. 742. Godó had previously donated the land for the construction of the school. This picture is a revealing example of the patronage dimension that politics still involved, and how the Godó family sought to build their prestige on it. The people surrounding Juan Godó are also very indicative of the support he obtained from certain groups in society (like the Church). Unfortunately there is no further information about the context of this picture.
Illustration 2. Popular homage paid to the former deputy Juan Godó Llucià (1851-1935), and to his son and former mayor of Igualada Juan Godó Pelegrí (1876-1957) by the 32 districts of the constituency in recognition of their work (1914)

Source: La Vanguardia, 03/02/1914, p. 9. Juan Godó Llucià is the old man located on the front row - fifth from the right. On the left, holding the scroll, is his son Juan Godó Pelegrí. This picture was taken during the electoral campaign of 1914. The fact that La Vanguardia gave wide coverage of this event and published this picture a few days before the elections were held (February the 8th 1914) provides further evidence about the cooperation between the family members. For the electoral results, see Table 1.
7.2. Ramón Godó: Building the Charisma of Antonio Maura

The letter Juan Godó Llucià sent to La Vanguardia in 1916 put an end to the Godó’s long political hegemony, achieved by two successive generations of the same family. This letter was published in the same newspaper that had already been of invaluable support to his electoral campaign in the past. Yet contrary to what might be expected, La Vanguardia did not lament Juan Godó’s decision to resign from politics, but welcomed it in favourable terms. In the view of this newspaper, noble interests no longer inspired politics in Igualada, and consequently Juan’s decision was praised as being the right one. 876

The attitude of La Vanguardia might seem surprising at first glance. After all, the resignation of Godó implied the end of the family’s long political career. However, the attitude of this newspaper was not that surprising if we focus on the trajectory of its owner, Ramón Godó Lallana (1864-1931). As Chapter 6 explained, Ramón had retired from politics in 1906, in response to the smear campaign he had received from the Solidaritat Catalana. The second part of this chapter will show that his resignation from politics also followed his new will to embrace the cause of a politician called Antonio Maura. The attitude that he showed towards this conservative politician, who embodied one of the most ambitious plans to renovate liberal politics, will reveal that Ramón Godó was still firmly committed to political action – yet not through public office, but through his position as newspaper proprietor. His case will be used to examine the role the press played in the crisis of liberalism, and it will show how public opinion became an alternative platform for traditional elites to maintain their influence in society.

In February 1911, a letter addressed to Ramón Godó had accidentally arrived in the hands of his cousin living in Igualada, Juan Godó Llucià. This letter was written by one of the leading figures in Spanish politics, Antonio Maura, who wished to thank the owner of La Vanguardia for the support he received from this newspaper. Ramón Godó took advantage of this letter to introduce himself to this politician and express the great admiration he felt for him:

876 “Al dejar complacido al señor Godó, no podemos menos de felicitarnos de su resolución, inspirada en los consejos facultativos y en los de buena amistad, que le desean reposo y apartamiento de unas luchas llevadas ahora al extremo del encono y de la mala pasión. Todo espíritu deseoso de la paz ha de apartarse, como acaba de hacerlo nuestro distinguido amigo, de esas contiendas menudas y locales, de móviles mezquinos, en que el ideal patriótico es lo de menos y que, apreciadas de cerca, acaban por infundir invencible repugnancia.” LV, 31/03/1916, p. 3. This commentary went after the letter of Juan Godó.
“Exmo. Sor. D. Antonio Maura. Mi ilustre y respetable amigo; aunque por muy explicable confusión, debida á la identidad de apellido, estuviese dirigida su carta á mi primo Juan Godó y Lluciá, ha venido ella á mis manos puntualmente y me proporciona la honrosa ocasión de corresponder con Vd. y darle mil gracias por el concepto, sin duda benévolo, que forma de mi modesta ayuda y por las expresiones laudatorias que me dirije. Y ya que ha mediado la confusión de nombre á que aludo, me seré permitido decir á Vd. que hace años me retiré de la política activa y rompi mis compromisos de abolengo con el partido liberal, así por la desviación antipatriótica que me pareció observar en sus elementos predominantes, como por la positiva admiración que Vd. y su política me venían produciendo. He dejado, pues, de ser Diputado á Cortes y me he dedicado á acrecentar la influencia y difusión de mi periódico “La Vanguardia” para acabar de convertirlo en un gran instrumento de opinión conservadora en Cataluña y poder apoyar con mas eficacia y libertad los ideales é intereses nobilísimos de que es Vd representacion suprema y en los cuales ha de hallarse al fin y á la postre la única vía de salvacion para nuestro país. Crea Vd. que me he de esforzar con todas mis fuerzas; y su carta de Vd., que me ha llenado de satisfacción, será prenda de perseverancia inquebrantable para este que se reitera suyo afmo. amigo y SS q. s. m. b. Ramon Godó. (...).” 877

This letter illustrates the deep change in Ramón Godó’s political views. As he made clear, both his political career in Igualada’s constituency and his affiliation to the Liberal Party obeyed a family tradition. 878 This confession demonstrates to what extent politics was a family enterprise, where the different members cooperated to reach collective aims. Yet as Godó himself explained, he had ended this family tradition in 1906 for two reasons: “the antipatriotic attitude of the Liberal Party” and the “admiration” he felt for the politics of Maura. The following pages will examine these two reasons, because they were two elements that decisively contributed to the crisis of the Restoration. This will provide the historical context in which to frame the agency of Ramón Godó as a newspaper proprietor, and to

877 Archivo Fundación Antonio Maura (A.F.A.M.), Legajo 266, carpeta 2. Letter written in 08/02/1911. In the past (1905) Ramón Godó and Maura had already exchanged some letters concerning local politics. [E. T.]: “Dear Mr. Antonio Maura. My illustrious and respectable friend; (...) I would like to take advantage of this confusion to let you know that few years ago I retired from active politics and broke my family commitment with the Liberal Party, due to the unpatriotic behaviour of this party, as well as for the positive admiration I feel for your person and your political aims. I have thus ceased in being deputie to Congress and have concentrated in expanding the influence and circulation of my newspaper “La Vanguardia” with the final aim of turning it into a powerful instrument of conservative opinion in Catalonia from where I can support more efficiently and freedom the noble ideals that your person embody, and which represent the only possible salvation for our country. I can assure you that I will contribute with all my efforts to such task, and the letter you sent to me has brought me great joy, and has reasserted me in my determination (...).”

878 In his own words: “mis compromisos de abolengo con el partido liberal”. Ibidem.
explain his declared objective of “turning La Vanguardia into an important instrument of conservative opinion in Catalonia”; a task to which he promised to dedicate “all my efforts”.

But who was Antonio Maura? What was the political programme of this politician, to which Godó referred as “the only salvation for our country”? Maura had started his political career in the ranks of the Liberal Party of Sagasta, but later abandoned it to join the Conservatives.879 After this move Maura started championing one of the most serious attempts of the right to renovate liberal politics. His plans shared some parallels with those of other liberal politicians in Spain (like José Canalejas), as well as with those of Giovanni Giolitti in Italy. All these liberal politicians embodied different gradualist programmes of reforms aimed at renovating the political system by broadening its social base to new actors.880

In Maura’s view, Spain’s state of decay resulted from the great distance that existed between society and the liberal-state project. For a large number of Spaniards the state was a detached entity whose presence in the local sphere was mostly perceived in negative terms (in the form of taxes and interventions in elections). To counteract this situation, Maura designed a programme of national regeneration based on two pillars. The first one was the eradication of caciquismo. In the view of this politician, the rigging of elections had decisively contributed to widening the distance between society and liberal institutions, and led him to argue in favour of “dignifying” and “moralising” public life (in his words). During his time as Prime Minister (1907-1909) Maura sought to materialise this philosophy through a triple legislative reform, consisting in the reform of local government, a new electoral law, and the reform of municipal justice. All these reforms were aimed at eradicating caciquismo, and contained legal measures to prevent both central government and local bosses from doing so. In parallel, these measures wished to foster political participation from below by conferring new administrative attributions to municipalities, and were part of the broader decentralising scheme Maura wished to implement.

879 His affiliation to the Liberal Party had personal motives, for Maura married the daughter of a prominent liberal politician named Germán Gamazo. See: Esther Calzada del Amo, Germán Gamazo, 1840-1901. Poder político y redes sociales en la Restauración, Madrid, Marcial Pons Historia, 2011.

880 In the case of Giolitti, these new social actors were the Catholics and the Socialists. In the case of Maura, they formed the social spectrum he referred to as the “neutral masses” (“masas neutras”), as will be explained. Alexander J. De Grand, The hunchback’s tailor: Giovanni Giolitti and liberal Italy from the challenge of mass politics to the rise of fascism, 1882-1922, Westport, Praeger, 2001. Some comparisons between the plans of Maura and Giolitti, in: Teresa Carnero Arbat, “La difícil transición de la política liberal a la política democrática en Italia y en España: algunas consideraciones”, Edward Acton, Ismael Saz Campos (eds.), La transición a la política de masas, València, Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2001, pp. 34-44.
The second pillar in the programme of this politician consisted in broadening the social basis of the Restoration, in a progressive way and within the framework of the political system. To do so he sought to attract those conservative elements of society that were alienated from politics, and to whom Maura referred as the “clases neutras” (“neutral classes”, in English). In contrast to other supporters of the renewing politics, Maura had an optimistic outlook on society and believed that the majority of the people were conservative. The problem, however, was that the liberal parties had paid little attention to integrating broader segments of society into the political system, as clientelism had demonstrated. Through the legislative measures he proposed to moralise public life, and in combination with a moderate plan of social reforms, Maura aspired to begin a “revolution from above” that would integrate the “conservative classes” into the political system. Total support of the Monarchy, as well as of Catholicism and social order, were other elements in the regenerationist programme of this liberal conservative politician.

The assessments of historians of Maura’s plans of reform have differed considerably. While some of them have seen them as a sincere attempt to renew the political system and to put an end to clientelism, some others have gone a step further and speak of Maura in clearly laudatory terms. In contrast, other historians argue that Maura did not represent a serious attempt to reform the power basis of the Restoration. Accordingly, Maura’s measures to promote free elections were not as transparent as he pretended, and included legal measures that acted as filters for the state control of elections and the banning of “unwanted” candidates. Additionally, these measures contained some dispositions that challenged the liberal nature of political representation, like the introduction of corporative forms of representation.

The emphasis Maura placed on appealing to the “neutral masses” is what made the support of Ramón Godó particularly valuable for the plans of this politician. If it is taken into account that Maura lacked an official mouthpiece, and that he paid little attention to propaganda activities, it can be argued that La Vanguardia became Maura’s most influential

organ in Barcelona. This support became manifest when an unexpected event put an end to Maura’s government (1907-1909) and to his plans of regeneration. This event was the “Tragic Week”, as the popular insurrection that took place in Barcelona during the last week of July 1909 became known. A new military intervention in Morocco promoted a series of protests that eventually turned into a general and anticlerical revolt. As many as 12 churches and 40 convents were burned in the space of a week, and the corpses of nuns were paraded through the streets of Barcelona. This city remained stranded as the events unfolded and the authorities utterly failed to control the situation, which created an acute sense of insecurity among the well-off citizens and revealed the rise of a new social actor (the “masses”).

Indeed, the black columns of smoke rising from the convents lingered for a long time in the city’s memory. In the years that followed, some people regarded the Tragic Week as a plot aimed at social revolution, while others saw it as a spontaneous upheaval against the church. For some of the progressive movements, like the Republican of Lerroux, the Tragic Week became part of their political imaginary based on anticlericalism, and they referred to it as “the Glorious” or the “Red” week. The most conservative and religious elements in society, in contrast, referred to it as the “Bloody” week or “Black” week. In the short term, the Tragic Week resulted in a harsh repression from the conservative government of Antonio Maura. More than 3,000 people were arrested and more than 150 worker unions and secular schools were shut down, accused of having promoted anticlericalism. In August the first five death sentences were pronounced, but one single man was blamed as the sole intellectual instigator. This man was Francesc Ferrer i Guàrdia (1859-1909), a renowned educator who promoted a network of state-independent schools based on secular and rationalist education.

The prosecution and execution of Ferrer, however, unleashed an extraordinary campaign throughout Europe that greatly discredited Maura’s public image. Thousands of people mobilised across the continent, in what became a pan-European mobilisation with some resemblance to the Dreyfus affair (1895). Paris became the first focus of the protest

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884 Maura’s supporters often lamented the little interest this politician showed in party-building activities and propaganda efforts. This attitude stood in contrast to his discourse of a “revolution from above”. M. J. Hernández González (1997), op. cit., p. 117. On Maura’s relations with the press, pp. 61-64.
886 The expression “Tragic Week” contains a negative connotation and was coined by conservative elements, as noted by Joan B. Culla. This expression only started to be used by contemporaries some time after the events. Joan B. Culla Clarà, Revisitar la Setmana Tràgica; and Agustí Colomines Companys, La Setmana Tràgica de 1909: una mirada historiogràfica, both in: Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia, vol. 82, 2009, pp. 57-58; and pp. 22-23, respectively.
campaigns and more than 10,000 protested in front of the Spanish embassy. Demonstrations also spread to literally all the corners of the French territory (incidents were recorded in 52 departments and 82 cities) and the number of people who demonstrated was the largest since the days of the Paris Commune. In Italy too, demonstrations mobilised a great number of people across the country. As many as 10,000 people rallied in Rome, while 3,000 people did the same in Naples and Turin. In the city of Forli, a young socialist called Benito Mussolini participated in Ferrer’s solidarity campaign and held him as an example to follow in the fight against the church’s tyranny. Demonstrations also took place in the United Kingdom, Germany and Russia, and different national parliaments held plenary sessions to discuss the events in Barcelona.

This extraordinary mobilisation in support of Ferrer shows the prominent place religious controversies had in Europe at the time. While the Church traditionally had uneasy relations with the liberal state, the first decade of the 20th century saw an unprecedented mobilisation of Catholics and their involvement in political struggle through new organisations. In opposition to this, liberal progressive parties started making secularisation a new central element of their political agenda. This was a common trend in most European countries, which historians often explained as an attempt of liberal parties to address the new expanding franchise, and to distract voters from labour disputes. More recently, however, it has been argued that anticlericalism was much more than a tactical move from liberal parties. In reality, it was a phenomenon that epitomised the strong polarisation of European societies around religion.

The Tragic Week exemplified how popular anticlericalism was among Barcelona’s working class, and also showed the vital function of the press in creating an unprecedented – though ephemeral – “European public opinion”. Newspapers became the main channel

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890 As exemplified in the attitude of the Vatican during the Italian Risorgimento; and in the Carlist civil wars in Spain.
891 C. Clark and W. Kaiser (eds.), op. cit., esp. chapters 1 and 2.
892 Ibidem, pp. 64-74; Lisa Dittrich, Die Hinrichtung Francisco Ferrers. Ein Fall für die europäische Öffentlichkeit im frühen 20. Jahrhundert?, [“The execution of Francisco Ferrer. A case for the European public
through which news about Ferrer circulated between countries, and contributed to disseminating imaginaries that were re-adapted to local contexts. In Italy, for instance, the doors of some churches were burned for the first time as a symbolic act of anticlericalism borrowed from Barcelona’s Tragic Week. Additionally, newspapers contributed to popularising the name of Ferrer and to transforming him into a major icon among the intelligentsia and the progressive minds of all Europe. The dubious evidence used by the authorities to sentence and execute Ferrer turned him into a martyr of rationalism and freethinking who transcended national boundaries.

In blunt contrast, Antonio Maura was held responsible for the execution and was harshly criticised by the same protestors. The editorials of newspapers all-over the Continent emphasised the numerous irregularities of the trial and generally condemned the execution. The French newspapers *L’Humanité* and *La guerre sociale*, for instance, portrayed Maura as the archetypical politician of a backward country dominated by intolerance and religious fanaticism. Moderate newspapers, like the *The Times* of England, also noted the bad impression the execution made for the international image of Maura’s government; while the Italian *Il Corrier della Sera* denounced the repression of the Spanish government in very strong terms.

The case of *La Vanguardia* revealed the unease this supra-national campaign in support of Ferrer had started generating among the conservative segments of Spanish society. Godó’s newspaper deemed the attacks against Maura as a smear campaign against Spain (“campaña anti-patriótica” were the words it used), and complained about the recurring stereotypes published in the European press. In fact, in most countries the progressive forces spoke of Maura’s government through a limited yet highly evocative repertoire of images (like the Inquisition and religious fanaticism) that had a long history and were inspired by the country’s “black legend”. The most conservative segments of Spanish society mobilised against these attacks and set up different initiatives to protest against what they saw as an

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internationally orchestrated campaign supporting the deeds of the Tragic Week. Ramón Godó actively contributed to this conservative reaction through the press. *La Vanguardia* supported the idea of creating a group of journalists in charge of counteracting foreign news, and made an open call to foreigners living in Barcelona to contradict the image the foreign press gave of this city.

Moreover, the international campaign in support of Ferrer carried destabilising effects in domestic politics. Until that time, and in sharp contrast to the rest of Europe, the indictment of Ferrer had provoked few protests in Spain. However, once the international outcry started, the Spanish left saw it as an opportunity to revive the animosity it traditionally felt towards Maura. Before the Tragic Week the left had already had strong confrontations with this politician. These confrontations were mostly related to Maura’s sympathies with the Church and with his strict measures to combat terrorism. The outcome was the union of the left in a new coalition called the “Bloque de Izquierdas” (“Left Bloc”) in 1908. This coalition was a novelty in the Restoration, as it brought one of the liberal parties (the Liberal Party) together with parties that opposed the political system (the Republicans and the Democrats). This coalition revealed the efforts of the Liberal Party to renew the political agenda by putting an emphasis on the primacy of civil institutions over the church. This new policy

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899 “Va picando en historia la intrusion intolerable que ciertos elementos extranjeros se permiten ejercer en los asuntos de España así que se trata de reprimir demásias revolucionarias ó de mantener el orden, como lo mantiene, por deber y por instinto de la vida, todo país civilizado. En París, en Londres, ¡hasta en Lisboa!, salen echando chispas los periódicos anarquizantes y se organizan mitines y algaradas tumultuosas contra la inquisitorial España, contra sus gobiernos jesuíticos, contra sus procedimientos tenebrosos y de tortura (...) Que hablen esos súbditos. Hay aquí colonias importantísimas de extranjeros establecidos desde hace muchos años. (...) Ellos pueden y deben dar testimonio ante el mundo de la inanidad y vileza de aquellas acusaciones (...) Ellos deben, en suma, contrarrestar esa irritante presión exterior con que trata de inmiscuirse en los problemas interiores de España la hez del internacionalismo, para que la anarquía pueda trabajar con toda comodidad, é incendiar, matar y destruir sin molestias, á costa de Barcelona, á costa de sus naturales, á costa de los extranjeros acogidos á su espíritu emprendedor y á su hospitalidad generosa.” “BARCELONA”, LV, 15/09/1909, p. 4.

900 This silence had to do with the mistrust that both the Anarchists and the Republicans felt towards Ferrer. Juan Avilés (2006), *op. cit*., p. 259.

901 The disappearing of the party’s traditional leader (Sagasta) in 1903 and the passing of the Liberal’s historical demands, like universal manhood suffrage, were other factors that left the Liberal Party without a clear political agenda. An analysis about the evolution of the Liberal Party during these years, in: Javier Moreno Luzón, “ Guerras coloniales, crisis liberal y muerte de Sagasta”, DD.AA., *Sagasta y el liberalismo español*, Madrid, BBVA, pp. 382-408; and “Nacionalizar la monarquía. Proyectos, logros y fracasos del Partido Liberal español (1898-1913), Marcela Alejandra García Sabatini & Fernando del Rey Regulllo (coord.), *Los desafíos de la libertad: transformación y crisis del liberalismo en Europa y América Latina*, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2008, pp. 120-142.
based on secularisation, coupled with the anticlerical discourse, went in line with the realignment other liberal progressive parties adopted in Europe.902

What makes the Spanish Liberal Party interesting, in this regard, is that in its eagerness to replace Maura in power the party relied upon the support of a new media holding called the “Trust”. This English term was how the “Sociedad Editorial de España” was commonly known, and it was the first media holding ever created in Spain. The Trust consisted in an alliance of progressive-oriented newspapers aimed at sharing production costs and counteracting the loss of sales the press suffered after the Disaster of 1898.903 With a capital of 10 million pesetas, the Trust brought together 9 different newspapers. Some of them were top-selling papers like El Imparcial and El Heraldo de Madrid, while some others were created with the aim of extending the Trust’s influence to other cities (like El Liberal, which started to be published in Barcelona, Seville and Bilbao). The newspapers of the Trust covered a wide geographic area and a broad range of opinion (especially on the centre-left) and gave, above all, great capacity of influence to their editors. In fact, all the Trust’s editors were also deputies in Congress, a feature that reveals the intertwined relations between the press and politics at the time.904

The capacity of the Trust to influence policy-making became manifest when Maura’s government was toppled shortly after the Tragic Week. As the international campaign started protesting against Ferrer’s indictment, the Trust mobilised all their efforts into an aggressive campaign under the slogan “Maura no!”. Day after day, the various newspapers belonging to this media holding attacked Maura, and blamed him for Spain’s discredit in the international arena. At the peak of this campaign, the Trust’s standard bearer – Madrid’s El Imparcial – addressed an article to the King with a clear warning: the Liberal Party could hardly support the Monarchy in the future if Maura’s government was to remain in power for much longer. This article was published one day before King Alfonso XIII suddenly decided to remove Maura from power.905 As the King would recognise later on, his decision was motivated by the heated atmosphere – both national and international – that had followed Ferrer’s execution, as well as by the need to distance the crown from Maura’s negative public

903 See Chapter 5.
904 Miguel Moya, José Ortega Munilla, José Gasset Chinchilla (owner of the newspaper El Imparcial) and Antonio Sacristán. They were all journalists and deputies. Pedro Gómez Aparicio, Historia del periodismo español, Madrid, Editora Nacional, vol. 3, p. 250.
905 The title of the El Imparcial article was very clear in this respect: “Problema nacional.— ¿Pueden ser monárquicos los liberales?”. Quoted in: Juan Carlos Sánchez Illán, Prensa y política en la España de la Restauración. Rafael Gasset y El Imparcial, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, p. 246.
This incident reveals the considerable influence editors had over policy-making. They were not simple recorders of events, but actively sought to shape them as political actors.

The fall of Maura’s government in October 1909 decisively contributed to the crisis of the Restoration. The change of government put an end to Maura’s plans of national regeneration and, above all, revealed a new way to reach power. Instead of resulting from an agreement between the two liberal parties, the Liberal Party reached power through the pressure the Trust exerted on the King. As the leader of the Conservative Party, Maura was deeply disappointed with this strategy and considered that it broke the consensus Liberals and Conservatives had established since 1885 to rotate in power. Maura saw the attitude of the Liberal Party as a stab in the back, and after that time refused any form of agreement with this party. Thus the traditional consensus between liberal parties, upon which the Restoration stood, started to tremble.

*La Vanguardia* became the way through which Godó expressed his dissatisfaction with the new political situation. The newspaper put in very clear terms the discontent about the Tragic Week and the following political crisis. Such a bold statement was not very common for a newspaper that was independent and therefore preferred to avoid political confrontation. However, the crisis of October 1909 led Godó to express in very clear terms the social model he supported, and announced the attitude it would hold in relation to the Liberal Party led by Segismundo Moret:

“No tiene por qué ocultar LA VANGUARDIA que vió con disgusto y extrañeza el desarrollo de la última crisis y las campañas desaforadas y en grandísima parte injustas que se desataron contra el anterior gabinete [Maura]. Hemos deplorado que el partido liberal, á raíz de los sucesos de julio y ahora, últimamente, con motivo de la agitación extranjera contra España no consiguiese adoptar una posición despejada y firme (...). LA VANGUARDIA simpatiza con las ideas de conservación social, sin excluir ningún desenvolvimiento ordenado ni ninguna conquista legítima del derecho moderno; es un periódico de tendencia conservadora; pero no es ni será nunca un periódico de partido ni un órgano oficioso. Con la mayor libertad hemos censurado la gestión del señor Maura y de los demás ministros en cuantos extremos nos han parecido nocivos para el país; y del mismo modo aplaudiremos lo que de benigno para el país puedan llevar á cabo el señor Moret y sus colaboradores. En lo que no incurriremos jamás es en la oposición por la oposición, en la tarea disolvente, en la

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campaña de mala fē. (...) Estar al lado del señor Maura en las difíciles circunstancias que han pasado, no era ser ministerial de un gobierno: era serlo de España, puesto que de grandes intereses nacionales se trataba. En tales cuestiones también estaremos al lado del señor Moret (...), sin renunciar á nuestro criterio ni á nuestra significación, y deseando únicamente que no llegue el caso de considerar incompatible la subsistencia del actual gobierno con aquellos supremos intereses nacionales.” 907

The above-quoted article was published as an editorial that positioned La Vanguardia in relation to the Tragic Week and to the new political situation. This newspaper defined itself as conservative, yet open to change as long as this took place within the political system’s framework. This position revealed the fear of social revolution, as evidenced in the Tragic Week, but also showed a clear awareness of the need to promote reforms. Additionally, the above-cited editorial contained a clear criticism of the attitudes of the Liberal Party and of the Trust for taking advantage of the international campaign to attack Maura. On repeated occasions La Vanguardia criticised this press holding for having an irresponsible attitude, similar to the one that led to the Disaster of 1898, and for preventing the renewal of the Liberal Party. Thus, whereas the Conservatives adopted a plan of national regeneration based on Maura’s policies, La Vanguardia criticised the Trust for acting as a boa constrictor that was coiled around its prey (the Liberal Party). This media holding impeded the movements of the party and risked the peril of crushing it to death. 908 Evidence of this was the Liberals’ strategy of criticising Maura and its ant clerical propaganda. This

907 “BARCELONA”, LV, 06/11/1909, p. 6. [E.T.]: “(...) LA VANGUARDIA does not need to hide that it saw with discontent the unfolding of the last crisis, as well as the aggressive campaign launched against the previous government [Maura]. We have also deplored that the Liberal Party has not been capable of adopting a clear position in relation to the events of July, nor against the critiques Spain received from abroad. (...) LA VANGUARDIA sympathises with the ideas of social conservation, but it does not exclude any development that is done with order; nor any legitimate conquest of the modern law; this is a conservative newspaper, but will never be the mouthpiece of any political party. In the past we have criticised Maura when we considered that his decisions were bad for the country; and we are going to applaud the decisions coming from Mr. Moret and his supporters in so far as they are good for the country. (...) The fact that we supported Mr. Maura in the recent past did not mean that we were the organ of his government; what it really meant was to support Spain, since national interests were at stake. In this respect, we will also support Mr. Moret (...) when the same national interests are at stake, even if this does not mean giving up our own judgement [;] we only wish that the new government will not be incompatible with the supreme national interests to which we have referred.”

was, in sum, the “antipatriotic behaviour of the Liberal Party” that Ramón Godó criticised in his correspondence with Maura.

At this point we may ask: if Godó was such a critic of the relationship between the Trust and the Liberal Party, how did he aspire to support Maura if _La Vanguardia_ defined itself as an independent newspaper? The solution to this puzzle was the definition of a new relation between press and politics, where serving “national interests” became _La Vanguardia_’s new guiding ethos. This implied that _La Vanguardia_’s support of Maura was not unconditional, but was at the service of a cause. According to this view, which had much in common with the view Sánchez Ortiz defended in the aftermath of the Disaster of 1898, _La Vanguardia_ declared that it would not hesitate in supporting the Liberal Party, nor any other party, as long as they defended “national interests”. 909 This principle implied breaking with the partisan affiliation that guided the Trust, as well as most of the press in southern Europe. In fact, of the 17 newspapers that were published daily in Barcelona in 1910, 10 of them still defined themselves as “partisan”, and only the remaining 7 newspapers claimed to be “independent”. 910

Still, the “national interest” to which _La Vanguardia_ ascribed was a blurred concept, open to much subjective interpretation. This was, precisely, the value behind editorial independence: freedom of criteria is what allowed the influence of _La Vanguardia_ to be concentrated in Godó’s hands. In contrast to the newspapers of the Trust, which had a partisan adscription that linked them to the Liberal Party, Godó was free to decide the orientation of his newspaper. If he supported Maura it was because he wished to do so, not because _La Vanguardia_ was at the service of the Conservative Party. The instrumental use of editorial independence is what allowed Godó to maintain his influence in society.

This implied a substantial change in the Godó family’s sources of influence. Ramón Godó’s position did not stem from acting as the local representative of the Liberal Party (as was the case of the first generation of his family); nor in the monopoly of public office in Igualada (as was the case of his cousin Juan Godó Llucià). Ramón’s influence stemmed solely from the wide circulation of _La Vanguardia_ and the capacity to control the editorial line of this newspaper. Godó’s case sheds light on the historical transformation of the press from being the mouthpiece of political parties to an autonomous power in society. In this new mass society, public opinion was becoming a dimension of growing importance where the

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909 On Sánchez’ pledge in favour of defending the “national interests”, see Chapter 5.
910 María Carmen García Nieto “La Prensa diaria de Barcelona de 1895 a 1910”, Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona, 1956 [thesis manuscript], p. 88.
power of editors was measured on their capacity to attract readers. Adopting a line of editorial independence and an informative journalistic model became two ways to expand this political influence, while turning newspapers into a profitable enterprise.911

The importance of the press in the new mass society became evident as the crisis of liberal politics intensified. In 1913, Maura began suffering the opposition of his own party. The boycott policy of the Liberal Party in the aftermath of the Tragic Week started creating unease within the Conservatives, who started deeming this position as too radical. The boycott exerted against the Liberals precluded the Conservatives from the support of the government in elections; and therefore from the benefits of holding public office. This situation eventually provoked the crisis of Maura’s leadership within the Conservative Party and the splitting of this organisation into two factions: the supporters of restoring the consensus with the Liberals (named “idóneos”, in Spanish), and the supporters of Maura, who were still reluctant about this. The climax of this intra-party crisis occurred in October 1913, when King Alfonso XIII called the leader of the “idóneos” into power (Eduardo Dato) to Maura’s detriment. This decision demonstrated the consequences that the Tragic Week was still producing on domestic politics, and symbolised the crumbling of the Restoration due to the division between the liberal elites.

Paradoxically, the tensions Maura encountered within his own party greatly increased his popularity, to the point that a new charismatic movement known as “Maurismo” emerged. A historian who has studied this movement in detail has stressed how difficult Maurismo is to define.912 Maurismo was not a political party, but rather a body of opinion that eventually aspired to transform itself into a stable political organisation. It was not a class movement, although the majority of its members were conservative, Catholic, and mostly of a middle-class background. The people who formed it belonged to the segment of society who deeply disliked the anticlerical agenda of the Liberal Party and listened in horror to stories about the burning of convents in Barcelona. They all identified with the regeneration ideals Maura embodied, and sympathised with the marginalisation he had suffered – to the point of creating a cult of celebrity around this politician.913 This veneration stemmed from the effective communicative skills of this politician, like his brilliant oratorical skills or the

911 These are the issues that will be examined in the final chapter of this thesis (Chapter 8).
912 M. J. Hernández González, Ciudadanía y Acción..., op. cit.
pomposity of his gestures; as well as the numerous attacks he was victim to. The vociferous campaigns of the Trust under the slogan “Maura, no!”, and the decision of the King to remove him from power, contributed to Maura’s image of martyrdom. The more Maura was attacked, the more supporters he gained. Yet, and surprisingly, this politician never nurtured this movement nor looked for its support. In fact, it can be said that Maurismo existed in spite of Maura. This movement saw the politician as more of a hero that embodied a noble ideal of regeneration, than as a liberal politician.

The case of Ramón Godó is evocative of the social and political context that gave birth to Maurismo. Godó became the archetypical person who saw in the exclusion of Maura the same obstacles that prevented Spain’s salvation. La Vanguardia had already expressed solidarity with this politician during Ferrer’s international campaign, but the exclusion Maura suffered in the Conservative Party in 1913 intensified even further the admiration that Godó felt for this politician. The correspondence between the two men reveals that Godó’s admiration eventually developed into open worship:

“Exmo Sor D. Antonio Maura. Mi illustre amigo; aun á trueque de molestar su ocupada atencion, no puedo resistir por mas tiempo al prurito de solicitar un retrato de Vd, avalorado con su firma, para colocarlo en mi despacho de La Vanguardia. Creo, que el periódico es digno de tal honor y que sabrá corresponder á él en lo sucesivo, si tuviese la fortuna de alcanzarlo (...) le diré que sigo con profundo interés el desenvolvimiento de los negocios públicos y sobre todo, de los conservadores en su pleito. Huelga añadir que espero con la natural ansiedad oir la voz de Vd, cuando crea llegado el momento de desplegar la labia y romper el silencio guardado hasta ahora. A Vd corresponde fijar ese momento y todos hemos de acader su prudencia; pero no es menos espricable nuestra espectacion, hija del entusiasmo que la causa y el caudillo nos inspira. (...)”

Antonio Maura did not disappoint Godó and rewarded him with a portrait of himself. The fact that Maura’s brother painted the portrait illustrates how close the relation between

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914 Ordinary people, for instance, sometimes assisted in Congress just to be able to hear Maura’s speeches. M. J. Hernández González (1997), op. cit., p. 394, n. 6.
915 Ibidem, p. 396.
916 A.F.A.M., Legajo 45, carpeta 29. [E. T.]: “Dear Mr. Antonio Maura. My illustrious and respectable friend; (...) I cannot resist the temptation of asking for a portrait of your person, bearing your signature, so I can hold it in my office in La Vanguardia. I believe that this newspaper reserves such honour and that shall correspond to this honour in the future (...) I must tell you that I follow with great interest the unravelling of national affairs, and especially the confrontation between the conservatives. Needless to say it, I am looking forward to hearing from you, and I am ready to breaking the silence and start the campaign when you order it. You have the power to decide when the moment has come to do so, and we shall all respect your prudence; but our restlessness is natural, for it is born from the great admiration that both the cause and the leader inspires us (...)”.

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the two men had become. Moreover, Godó was not content with merely hanging the portrait in his office at La Vanguardia, but decided to publish a full-page reproduction of the painting in his newspaper, including the personal dedication it contained (see Illustration 3). This gesture, and the letter quoted above provide clear evidence of the great interest Godó still had in politics. Yet more importantly, his case reveals that besides public office, alternative channels of political action existed, like contributing to build the charisma of a politician through the mass press.
Illustration 3. Antonio Maura’s portrait, with a dedication to Ramón Godó Lallana, reproduced in La Vanguardia. The dedication to Maura (below the image) reads as follows: “A D. Ramon Godó y á cuantos en La Vanguardia han fraternizado conmigo en amor patrio, dando apoyo inestimable á mis conatos en prós del bien públicos, sin recibir ni desear jamás favor alguno. A. Maura, Enero 1914”.

917 LV, 08/02/1914, p. 10. The dedication to Maura (below the image) reads as follows: “A D. Ramon Godó y á cuantos en La Vanguardia han fraternizado conmigo en amor patrio, dando apoyo inestimable á mis conatos en prós del bien públicos, sin recibir ni desear jamás favor alguno. A. Maura, Enero 1914”.
This chapter has shown how an episode in European history, like the responses of the elites to the birth of mass politics, becomes particularly complex and nuanced if studied from a micro-perspective. The reactions of the Godó family to the challenges of mass politics were far from being the same. On behalf of the Liberal Party, and based on a combination of clientelism and a new repertory of political action, Juan Godó Llucià fought to maintain the family’s local dominion in Igualada. In contrast, his cousin Ramón Godó embraced, through the pages of *La Vanguardia*, a project of national regeneration that sought the eradication of caciquismo. The case of these two men illustrates to what extent traditional elites gave different responses to the same challenge.

These different attitudes illustrate the impact that the crisis of Liberalism had at a micro-scale, which challenged the solidarity between family members. Yet, in the end, kinship ties proved to be stronger than personal views, as shown in the cooperation the Godó family sustained. The conclusion that can be drawn is that the family continued to play a central role in the social cohesion of elites, even though the crisis of liberalism (sometimes) posed a serious threat to this.

The full mobilisation of the family’s members, however, became insufficient to save the Godó family’s political domain in Igualada. This case study provides an alternative view about the transition from the liberal’s monopoly of power to the new mass politics. While historians have mostly explained this transition through the case of big cities, this chapter has examined the transition through the case of a smaller city. Igualada was an industrial location immersed in a rural constituency of 32 small towns. In each and every one of these towns the Godó’s had a branch of local supporters. As the family crisis intensified, this network of “clients” became more visible as they mobilised to uphold the family’s hegemony, which they themselves benefited from. In the meantime, an alternative segment of society – those who did not benefit from this privileged access to public benefits, based on patron-client relationships – started participating in politics and challenged the supremacy of the family.

The outcome was a new political scenario where local society became deeply polarised with respect to the Godó family. In contrast to the confrontation that existed at a national level between traditional and new political parties, in local politics this confrontation took place around the position of one single family. This process of polarisation in local

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918 The support Ramón Godó gave to the electoral campaign of Juan Godó Llucià through the pages of *La Vanguardia* provides evidence of this.
politics became manifest in the remarkable increase of electoral turnout. This was the result of changes in the regional context (e.g. the creation of the Solidaritat Catalana) but above all of the great capacity for mobilisation that the new political movements had at a local scale. In contrast to the socially restricted character of liberal institutions, Republicans and Catalan nationalists devoted great efforts to politicising new segments of society. The press became a precious tool in such an attempt, as the calls made to women – who were not allowed to vote at the time – illustrates. Yet, and contrary to what is often assumed, the new competitive and plural character of elections neither removed clientelism nor led the traditional elites to respond exclusively through autocratic methods.\textsuperscript{919} Instead, clientelism took a new form where the two confronting camps competed for the influence of local bosses,\textsuperscript{920} while at the same time the local elite sought to redefine (or “professionalise”) its sources of authority.

The strategies the family developed to redefine their legitimacy can be compared with the strategies of other European elites. For the case of Italy, for instance, Anthony Cardoza has demonstrated that the Piedmontese nobility progressively abandoned its leadership in liberal parties, but kept its sway in public life by “investing” in informal channels of influence.\textsuperscript{921} These channels consisted in those social fields where aristocratic values remained predominant (e.g. diplomacy and the army); but also in the developing new spaces of sociability (like mutual aid societies and religious associations) that allowed noblemen to reassert their role as community leaders. The case of the Godó family, in contrast, highlights an alternative strategy, where elites sought to maintain their influence through public office. The new competitive and plural character of elections, however, implied that clientelism was no longer sufficient to control this position. The case of Juan Godó Llucià reveals different attempts to adapt to the new situation, and it is what allowed him to win in highly competitive scenarios (like the elections of 1910, with an 80% electoral turnout). If all these attempts to renovate the sources of authority finally failed it was, in part, due to the changing relations between this family and the central government. Local politics, therefore, was highly autonomous and yet not totally alienated from outside interference.

Public opinion became an alternative dimension where traditional elites sought to build a new legitimization. If Ramón Godó Lallana achieved a privileged position in society it was not thanks to the combined use of press and public office, but stemmed solely from the


\textsuperscript{920} The calls of the leader of the Lliga Regionalista (Francesc Cambó) to win the support of local bosses is particularly revealing in this respect.

former. This reveals a substantial transformation in the Godó’s traditional sources of influence, consisting in the growing differentiation between two spheres (press and politics). It was in their capacity to address an audience of thousands of readers that the political power of editors now stood. The case of the Trust illustrates this point, and reveals the growing importance that contemporaries were giving to public space, despite the importance clientelism still had. The emergence of an – ephemeral – European public opinion, and the advantage the Trust took from this to topple Maura from power, exemplify how important public opinion was becoming in decision-making.

Contrary to the Trust, Ramón Godó could no longer base his influence on acting as the representative of a political party. Yet rather than an inconvenience, editorial independence allowed him room for a range of manoeuvres, and concentrated La Vanguardia’s influence in his sole hands. This freedom of criteria allowed Godó to continue exerting an influence in politics according to his particularistic views, as the absolute support he gave to Maura reveals. This instrumentalization of the press to support a private agenda, however, also made editors highly dependent on this blurred and diffused power that public opinion represented. Now that he could no longer rely on either party filiation or public office, Godó’s influence was directly subject to his capacity to appeal to the widest number of readers possible. The strategies he designed to do so will be the focus of the last chapter of this thesis.
CHAPTER 8. THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF ‘LA VANGUARDIA’

INTRODUCTION

8.1. THE SPECIALISATION OF ‘LA VANGUARDIA’ IN INFORMATIVE JOURNALISM

8.2. NEW CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE IN THE AGE OF MASS POLITICS

CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 8. THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF ‘LA VANGUARDIA’

“Se vive en tiempos de Moratín, porque es tradición española recoger las noticias del regazo perfumado de las actrices; pero algo han cambiado los tiempos, de otras fuentes más caudalosas dispone la prensa moderna y otra muy distinta es la vida, sujeta á la marcha de los acontecimientos y cada día más compleja y abierta á las influencias exteriores.”

INTRODUCTION

José Escofet (1884-1939), who wrote the lines that open this chapter, was one of the longest-serving journalists at La Vanguardia. Escofet wrote this article, entitled “Old habits: The press and the theatre”, to voice his dissatisfaction with the work of journalists in Spain, and with those of Madrid in particular. According to Escofet, the Spanish capital was still dominated by an old journalistic ideal, where the newspapers focused on three topics: theatre, bullfighting, and politics. The reason these three topics, which Escofet considered as mere “gossip” (“chismorreo”), were given such preference in Madrid’s press was related to the characteristics of the journalistic profession: the majority of journalists were still self-educated men who, after having “wasted their time writing poetry, novels and comedies”, decided to enter in the world of journalism to make a living. It was no surprise, then, that this passion for literature conditioned the way journalists elaborated news.

If Escofet deplored the work of journalists in Madrid it was because he thought that it prevented the regeneration of Spain. Instead of opening the country to what he saw as the positive influence of the outside world, journalists perpetuated an image of Spain as a “tambourine country” (“España de pandereta”). In contrast to the case of Madrid, Escofet

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922 José Escofet, "Costumbres viejas. La prensa y los teatros", La Vanguardia, 29/09/1917, p. 8. [E. T.]: “We still live in the times of Moratín, because it is a Spanish custom to gather news from perfumed actresses; but times have changed, there are alternative and abundant sources on which the modern press can now rely. Life is now very different and complex as a result of the great external influences it is now opened up to.” Moratín was the name of a famous Spanish poet and playwright of the 18th and early 19th centuries.

923 “No se encuentra en los periódicos españoles, salvo honrosas excepciones, más que la chismografía política, la chismografía teatral y la chismografía taurina, es decir, una forma única acomodada á las tres líneas del triangulo alrededor del cual va dando vueltas, viciosamente, el ingenio del periodista español”. José Escofet, “Costumbres viejas. La prensa y los teatros”, LV, 29/09/1917, p. 8.

924 “No lamentaríamos que se hablara tanto de espectáculos, de toreros, copleras y bailarinas, si no se mantuviera con ello constantemente viva en la prensa, la España de pandereta, y si no se habituara al país á la
considered that the situation was slightly different in Barcelona – “where the press has reached greater expansion and mirrors the rich life of a more cosmopolitan and active city”. Although Barcelona also contained examples of the petty journalism Escofet despised, in his view the main difference was due to Madrid’s “strongly parochial character”. Escofet’s comments touch upon one of the central points of this thesis. His article evokes the changes – but also the persisting continuities – of the journalistic profession in Spain during the modern era. The previous chapters of this thesis have explained how the 19th century saw the emergence of “the news paradigm” in journalism. This ideal can be defined as the growing awareness among journalists about the importance of abstaining from partisan views when conducting their work. The previous chapters have stressed that the emergence of new professional codes was part of a broader historical phenomenon: the transition from a partisan press model towards an independent and commercial one, which took place in Europe and the United States during the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century.

This chapter should be read as a step further in addressing the above-presented questions. It will analyse the relation between the press and politics from a different – though complementary – perspective. This perspective will be the relation between technology and the professionalisation of journalism. The reason for doing so is that technology, understood as the investment in new communication machinery, was the pillar upon which Ramón Godó based the growth of La Vanguardia. Since Godó decided to abandon his political career, and then became fully committed to Maura’s plan of national regeneration, his capacity of influence was directly dependent on La Vanguardia’s circulation. The readers of this newspaper were no longer the members of the Liberal Party, but a more plural and depersonalised public. As a result, if Godó wished to secure his influence in this new era of mass politics, he could no longer rely on political office or on clientelism, but depended on a more indirect channel to exert his influence: that is, the capacity of La Vanguardia to reach the biggest number of readers possible. In this attempt, adopting a more professionalised form of journalism, based on continuous investments in technology, became the strategy Godó selected to reach the broadest audience possible. In this way, the case of Ramón Godó allows us to explore in which ways the “notables” that traditionally relied on clientelist...
practices redefined their strategies to maintain a pre-eminent position in society during a crucial moment in the crisis of liberal politics: the years of the First World War (1914-1918).

This chapter is divided in two parts. The first one will analyse the role that technology played in *La Vanguardia* by examining the new journalistic ideal this newspaper adopted during the first decade of the 20th century. At that time, *La Vanguardia* started an ambitious programme of reforms – inspired by the reforms of 1888 – that consisted in signing contracts with different news agencies (such as Havas, Reuters and Wolff) and in installing the first telegraphic machinery in Spain. These services were novelties at the time, and revealed Godó’s ambition to broaden the readership of his newspaper by providing more, and increasingly diverse, content.

The second part of the chapter will use the case study of *La Vanguardia* to tackle historical debates on the role that technology played in the birth of modern journalism. Historians have often argued that the growing dependence on the telegraph and news agencies led newspapers to produce a more “rational” type of news, this being in contrast to the more arbitrary work of journalists. Likewise, it has been argued that the newspaper’s growing investment in technology, produced by the desire to increase their circulation, also increased the newspapers’ dependence on advertising as a fundamental source of income. Such dependence on advertisers allegedly became a second reason that newspapers started to produce more “neutral” news.

In contrast to the above-mentioned views, this chapter will argue that technology was not a guarantee of “objectivity” in the journalist profession. This will be demonstrated by focusing on the public debate that took place in Spain during the First World War. Although this country never entered the war, public opinion became strongly divided into pro-Allies and pro-Germans. Such division did not only show that Spain was, in reality, directly affected by the war (thus challenging traditional views on the subject), but also epitomized the changes of a public sphere that was becoming more diffused and larger in number of readers. In this context, the way *La Vanguardia* responded to the challenge of informing a more plural – and deeply divided – society will be analysed. This challenge was hardened by the divisions taking place within the newspaper itself, due to the opposing pro-German views of the proprietor (Ramón Godó) and those of a pro-Allies director (Miquel dels Sants Oliver) to

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926 This was, in fact, one of the main claims of José Escofet, in the article quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Some reflections on the relation between technology and news, in James Curran, *Narrating Media History*, Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge, 2009, Section VII.

report daily on the war. This confrontation will be used to demonstrate that the emphasis *La Vanguardia* put on technology and “hard” news did not become an impediment for Godó to continue promoting his political views; yet at the same time will demonstrate the difficulties of Godó to instrumentalize the newspaper according to his own agenda.

The archival sources used in this chapter are wide and diverse. In addition to using *La Vanguardia* as a source, I have occasionally consulted other Spanish newspapers. Secondly, I have relied on the archives of two liberal politicians (Antonio Maura and the Count of Romanones), located in Madrid. Thirdly, the archives located at the French news agency *Havas*, in Paris, have been consulted. This archive contains valuable information about Godó’s use of news agencies during the First World War. Finally, the testimonies left by some contemporaries (“ego-documents”) will be used to test some of the arguments that will be put forward.
8.1. THE SPECIALISATION OF ‘LA VANGUARDIA’ IN INFORMATIVE JOURNALISM

In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we saw how the year 1888 represented a radical breakthrough in the history of La Vanguardia. During that year, the Godó brothers abandoned the main reason that had inspired them to establish the newspaper in 1881 (that of acting as the mouthpiece of the Liberal Party in Barcelona) and replaced it with a new ideal: La Vanguardia as an “independent” and commercially oriented newspaper. Following the example of The Times, the new aspiration of the Godó brothers was to turn La Vanguardia into the mirror of the city where it was published. For this reason, they made the renovation of this newspaper coincide with the celebration of Barcelona’s Universal Exposition, an event that aspired to transform this city and symbolised one of the landmarks of mass society in Catalonia.928

In fact, newspapers are part of the city where they are published.929 They aspire to reflect the transformations of society while actively contributing to shaping those transformations. But at the same time, newspapers are also subject, to a considerable extent, to the demands of “the public” – through the autonomy readers have in their choice to buy one newspaper over another. Therefore, any account wishing to explain La Vanguardia’s “golden age” during the First World War should also take into account the transformations that Barcelona and Catalonia were undergoing at the time, and examine the strategies press editors designed to adapt to these transformations. If we take a look at the evolution of Barcelona’s press, it can be argued that Ramón Godó excelled, to a considerable extent, in the task of reflecting the tastes and needs of a substantial part of public opinion in this city, as the paper’s undisputed growth into the city’s top-selling daily demonstrates [Table 1].

928 Francesc Espinet i Burunat & Joan Manuel Tresserras i Gaju, La gènesi de la societat de masses a Catalunya, 1888-1939, Bellaterra, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1999.

Table 1. Circulation of the main newspapers in Barcelona between 1905 and 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1920</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Vanguardia</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>90-100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Noticias</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>45-50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Publicidad</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>25-30,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Noticiero Universal</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>20-25,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Diluvio</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>15-17,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Veu de Catalunya</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>6-8,000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 1 showed, during the First World War (1914-1918) the newspaper of Ramón Godó practically doubled its circulation. The rest of Barcelona’s big dailies, in contrast, experienced few changes, as in the case of Las Noticias and La Publicidad; or even suffered a drastic loss of readers, such as in the case of La Veu de Catalunya. What were the reasons, we may then wonder, behind La Vanguardia’s singular growth during this period? The following pages will argue that La Vanguardia’s expansion during the war was not something that happened all of a sudden. Rather, it will be argued that this expansion constituted the blossoming of a journalistic strategy that started to be implemented in 1888; and was given new impetus on 25 October 1903. It is to this latter date that we will now turn our attention.

On 25 October 1903, La Vanguardia devoted seven of its sixteen pages to explaining in some detail its new planned reforms. Among other things, these reforms included moving the newspaper to a new company building, located at number 28 on Pelai, an excellent location in the centre of Barcelona. The building was designed in the Modernist style, containing a floral decoration and a series of stone reliefs in its interior that were recognised with an honorary mention in Barcelona’s historical-artistic buildings awards of 1904. The dimensions of the new headquarters, built exclusively for the newspaper, were considerable: two five-story buildings, one facing Tallers Street and the other facing Pelai. The building’s

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930 Source: Josep Lluís Gómez Mompart, La gènesi de la premsa de masses a Catalunya (1902-1923), Barcelona, editorial Pòrtic, 1992, p.133.
931 The newspaper had already announced the move to the new building the day before. “Á NUESTROS LECTORES”, 24/10/1903, p. 2.
932 The awarding of the honorary mention, in: Cercador de Patrimoni Arquitectònic, Ajuntament de Barcelona, “Edifici de La Vanguardia”. Available at: http://w10.bcn.es/APPSCat_patri/home.do#
construction amounted to 335,000 pesetas and contained “a total surface of 26,479 palms”. The mere fact that a newspaper owned a building constituted a novelty at the time: as late as the 1920s only two newspapers in Barcelona did – La Vanguardia and Las Noticias.

The first floor of the new building contained a series of decorative figures that symbolised the journalistic model that La Vanguardia wished to champion. These decorative figures consisted of three different elements – “the Science and the Arts”, the “Telephone” and the “Printing Press” – and were sculpted as allegorical figures to which the newspaper wished to pay tribute. This type of decoration reveals a “cult of modernity” based on the progress that technological innovation (in the form of communication and speed) had brought to journalism. In fact, the same admiration for technology was present in the description La Vanguardia made of the new printing machinery it had recently purchased, which it described in an almost poetic manner:

“Por una escalera se baja á la amplia cuadra, en cuyo centro la máquina luce su férreo y complicado organismo, en pleno reposo al escribir estas líneas; aguardando la vida que el motor cercano ha de imprimirla, poniendo en movimiento sus ruedas dentadas, sus cilindros, sus dedos de madera, todo aquel laberíntico engranaje, en que nada huele, pues no hay pieza que no responda á la satisfacción de una necesidad.”

In this way, the new rotary press was referred to as a living thing – “organism”, “life”, “fingers” were some of the words used to describe it – that was perfectly designed and ready to show its full potential. This admiration for technology mainly originated in the new opportunities it offered for journalism. The new rotary press, bought from the German company Koenig and Bauer, was indeed an example of the practical opportunities technology

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933 On 20 November 1901, Ramón Godó signed a contract with the constructor Isidre Majó Carner to demolish the building located in Tallers Street, number 20, and to construct a new one for 55,000 pesetas. Besides this building, a new one would also be constructed, facing Pelai Street, to contain the headquarters of La Vanguardia. The cost of this second building was 280,000 pesetas. The architect of both buildings was Josep Majó Riba. Pere Voltes, “Análisis empresarial y contable del auge del diario “La Vanguardia” en el periodo comprendido entre 1881 y 1939”, Barcelona, Colección “Cuadernos de Investigación, Nº 19, p. 5. The total surface of the two buildings, in “La casa de “La Vanguardia”, LV, 25/10/1893, p. 4.

934 The rest of the newspapers had to locate the newsroom and the printing press machinery in two different places. In the case of the printing machinery, it was usually located in the basement of another building. As Víctor Alba noted in the memoirs: “(...) les impremtes estaven en els baixos de cases de pisos i cap no tenia edifici propi (excepte La Vanguardia i Las Noticias)”. Víctor Alba, Sísif i el seu temps, vol I “Costa avall”, Barcelona Laertes, 1990, p. 92.

935 Ibid. [E. T.]: “Down stairs there is the wide room, at the centre of which lies the machine with its complicate organism, in a calm state as we are writing these lines, but waiting for the moment when the engine shall bring it into life, putting in motion its cogwheels, its cilinders, its fingers made of wood, all this labryinth of gears, where every part fits each place and obeys one purpose.”
opened for the journalistic profession: this new rotary press would allow La Vanguardia to publish twice as many pages, and to do so quickly.\(^{936}\)

If the above-presented examples reveal that technology was seen in La Vanguardia as a tool of progress, the way this newspaper justified the need of investing in it was based on a clear premise. Namely, the wish to satisfy the changing needs of the audience. And this audience, it must be noted, was not a uniform body, but was integrated by a multiple and diverse number of readers, each of them having its own preferences. These were the terms in which La Vanguardia described its audience. Hence, this newspaper presented itself as a newspaper that “\textit{has come to enjoy the favour of the public, to the point of having extended its presence to all the social classes}”. Such support from the public, the newspaper argued, is what ultimately imposed the duty of organising the whole production process as efficiently as possible.\(^{937}\)

Still, identifying the needs of the customers was not something La Vanguardia took for granted. Satisfying these wishes required the ability first to identify them. In other words, if the newspaper was to change, it was because someone thought this change was necessary, so as to satisfy the needs of the “public”. In this respect, the owner of La Vanguardia, Ramón Godó Lallana (1864-1931), was presented as the main promoter of the interpretation of opinion. The plan of reforms of 1903 coincided, in fact, with the recent takeover of La Vanguardia by Ramón Godó. As explained in previous chapters, this takeover was the result of a generational renewal prompted by the death of the founding brothers Bartolomé (in 1894) and Carlos Godó (in 1897), and entailed not only the transmission of the family business in the jute industry, but also the leadership of the political network of the Godó family in Igualada – this being a duty that eventually ended in Ramón’s resignation from politics.\(^{938}\)

The plan of reforms of October 1903 can be regarded as the attempt of the second generation of the Godó family, led by Ramón, to renovate the newspaper.\(^{939}\) Besides the practical arrangements, it must to be noticed that the newspaper itself presented Ramón Godó...

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\(^{936}\) “Abajo aparece la gran mole de la nueva máquina rotativa, que permitirá tirar números dobles que los actuales en menos tiempo que el que se emplea con la que hasta aquí se ha tirado LA VANGUARDIA, y que se emplazará al lado de la recientemente adquirida.” \textit{Ibid.}

\(^{937}\) “Las necesidades á que forzosamente ha de atender en el día un periódico que, cual LA VANGUARDIA, ha conseguido \textit{merecer el favor del público hasta el extremo de haberse difundido en todas las clases sociales}, imponen el deber de montar los servicios de manera que funcionen con la debida holgura é independencia, á fin de obtener la mayor perfección posible en cada uno de ellos, única manera de corresponder al apoyo siempre creciente de la opinión.” “La casa de “La Vanguardia” “, LV, 25/10/1893, p. 4. The quoted parts, in italics.

\(^{938}\) See Chapter 6.

\(^{939}\) This is evidenced by the fact that that Ramón himself signed the contracts for the construction of the new company, as already noted.
as responsible for the construction of the new building. That is to say, Ramón was portrayed as the main driver behind the modernisation of the newspaper. This projection of Ramón can actually be regarded as a strategy of self-fashioning in public, insofar as it presented him as the owner of a newspaper that was ruled according to a family tradition. Moreover, when La Vanguardia announced the inauguration of the new building, in 1903, it did so by printing a portrait of the two founding brothers (Carlos and Bartolomé Godó) on its front page, which was a custom that would be used on further occasions. The faces of the two brothers were also sculpted onto the facade of the new company building in Tallers Street, thus presenting the two men as the pioneers of a journalistic tradition that was still alive in the figure of Ramón. Besides being a mark of respect that Ramón probably wished to pay to his father and uncle (whose portraits he displayed in his office), these gestures had a clear public dimension. Hence, every time La Vanguardia published the portraits of the founding brothers it was actively reinforcing the family tradition in public. Linking the name of La Vanguardia to that of the Godó family constituted a way of reasserting the family control over the newspaper, while also being a manoeuvre that invested the heir with the symbolic capital stemming from it. This means that the transmission of different forms of capital was not limited to the political domain in Igualada, but also took place in the world of journalism.

In practice, Ramón Godó was presented in La Vanguardia as the interpreter of the vague and blurred concept the newspaper referred to as “opinion”. To carry out this task, Godó and the editor of La Vanguardia coined a motto that summarised their business strategy: “to keep up with the times and avoid crystallising” (“hay que marchar al compás del tiempo, rehuyendo de cristalizarse”). This leitmotif is of particular interest, for it reveals the way Godó understood journalism. This motto reveals that he did not conceive of the press as a self-sufficient element, but rather as one that was highly dependent on the social context in which it was published. This line of reasoning, which was publicised on further occasions, implied a clear premise: if the newspaper was to survive, it should be capable of matching the broader changes in society. If there was an area where La Vanguardia was apparently not staying abreast with the times then it was that “concerning information”. This statement reveals the perception, shared by Godó and the newspaper editor, that public opinion in

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940 For instance on 24 December 1911, when the newspaper inaugurated a new rotary press.
941 In consequence, the building of a family “tradition” in journalism should be seen as complementary to building the same tradition in politics, explained in Chapter 6.
942 “No contentos aún la propiedad y la dirección del periódico con las mejoras que se han ido paulatinamente introduciendo, en lo que atañe a la información, teniendo por norma que hay que marchar al compás del tiempo, rehuyendo cristalizarse, han aspirado sin descanso á que LA VANGUARDIA construyera un organismo dotado de todos los elementos indispensables á su vida expansiva.” LV, op. cit.
Barcelona was demanding a different type of newspaper. The crisis that newspapers suffered in Madrid, in the aftermath of 1898, might have acted as a stimulus in this regard.

In fact, during the first quarter of the 20th century the deep transformations taking place in Barcelona had the effect of changing the needs and tastes of newspaper consumers. Between 1887 and 1910, the city grew from 400,000 to 587,000 inhabitants.943 The majority of this population growth came from the inner parts of Catalonia, and were people attracted by the employment opportunities of a city that was abandoning its traditional dependence on the textile industry. Triggered by the broadening of Barcelona's borders (in 1897 the city absorbed 6 of its neighbouring towns) the building industry stood at the helm of a process of industrial diversification, while the metallurgical and chemical sectors gained a new presence too.944 These were also the years of improvements in the literacy levels (between 1900 and 1910, illiteracy dropped from 54% to 41%; by 1930, it had decreased to less than 15%). In the field of culture, “Modernisme” kept expanding its presence in Barcelona’s intellectual life and architecture (of which the headquarters of La Vanguardia were an example), while a series of technological innovations – like the electric light, the telephone, the automobile, the radio and the airplane – intensified a feeling of rapid transformation that contemporaries repeatedly noticed.945 Moreover, the general improvement in living conditions was expressed in new forms of leisure that gained weight in the following decades, like cinema, sports and eventually even jazz.946

943 For the general case of Catalonia, between 1887 and 1910 illiteracy fell from 60% to 42% (in the case of men, from 47% to 32%; and in the case of women from 72% to 51%). F. Espinet & J.M. Tresserras, op. cit., p. 11.

944 In 1900, the main industrial employer in Barcelona was the textile industry (53.1% of the active population), followed at a great distance by the building (8.1%) and dressmaking sectors (7%). In just ten years (1910), the situation had changed considerably: though the textile industry did not lose much of its workforce (from 54,940 in 1900 to 51,710 workers in 1910), it lowered its presence in relation to the total: in 1910 it “only” represented 26% of the active population; in contrast to the emergence of the building (20.3%), metallurgical (19.1%) and chemistry sectors (6.4%). These figures are a selection of the data provided by the “Información Comercial Española” (1962), quoted in: Ibidem, p. 22.

945 Claudi Ametlla noted the differences between his hometown and Barcelona: “The telegraph, the telephone, electricity, the automobile, the cinematograph, the phonograph, these are all novelties which have not arrived here yet [in his hometown of Sarral] [but] that characterise this fecund age and are the subject of passionate debate (....). Perhaps someone will come from Barcelona who has already seen all these devices!.” Claudi Ametilla, Memòries polítiques, Barcelona, Pòrtic, 1963, vol. 1, p. 86. Original version, in Catalan. Further testimonies of contemporaries noticing the speed of change can be found in F. Espinet & J.M. Tresserras, op. cit., pp. 26-28.

946 In his memoirs, José María Francés mentioned the swift changes in Barcelona’s taste for music: “Nos hallamos en la era del charleston. Desde que naci han pasado por mi vida, el “can-can”, los “tangos” primitivos, el “kake-walk”, los “machicha”, los valses franceses de 900, los vieneses, los bostonianos, los “tangos argentinos”, el “fox-trot” y otros más que hoy dejan paso a esta descoyuntada fórmula de danza que hace prosélitos.” This sentence corresponds to the early 1920s. Josep Maria Francès, Memorias de un cero a la izquierda, México DF, Editorial Olimpo, 1962, p. 578.
It was in the context of some of these transformations taking place in Barcelona that the Godó put forward the reform plans of 25 October 1903. This line of reasoning, summarised in the motto referred to above, was explained in further detail in an article that was published on that day entitled “El periódico moderno” (“the modern newspaper”). For the type of reflections it contained, this article constituted a roadmap summarising the journalistic ideal to which La Vanguardia wished to subscribe in the future. The argument of the article was presented in very clear terms and according to a Darwinist standpoint: the newspaper should be regarded as a “living organism”. As such, if it was to survive it should be capable of “adapting quickly” to changing environments. One of the main reasons behind this change, La Vanguardia claimed, was the “development of industry, commerce and banking”, which required “vast amounts of information”. When nations lived in a system of autarchy, the article reasoned, reading about foreign events constituted a mere “amusement”. Now, by contrast, “a war taking place in America or in the Far East touches on the commercial transactions of the entire world; (...) likewise, if England persists in its free trade policies or decides to move into protectionism it might provoke a cataclysm in some businesses, like the agricultural and manufacturing industries. It is clear, then, why all the news is of great importance for the public, no matter how insignificant they may seem.”

The world La Vanguardia was describing in this article of 1903 was one undergoing a rapid process of economic integration. If this newspaper was to satisfy the needs of the public, it could not afford to lose its grip on the changes taking place in society. In this regard, the case of La Vanguardia is illustrative of how newspapers were seeking to adapt to the globalisation process that took place in the 19th century. Indeed, as Jürgen Osterhammel has explained, global communications provided the means for newspapers to gather the news from literally every corner of the world. For the leading newspapers, reporting on worldwide events simply became a must. Together with foreign correspondents, the press based the

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947 A. Riera, “El periodismo moderno”, LV, 25/10/1903, pp. 10-11. Original version: “cuando cada nación fabricaba casi exclusivamente para su consumo, las noticias del extranjero se leían por puro entretenimiento; ahora se leen por necesidad; entonces eran algo así como artículo de lujo; ahora no se puede prescindir de ellas. Una guerra que estalle en América ó en el Extremo Oriente influye en las transacciones comerciales del mundo entero (...); que Inglaterra persista en su sistema de librecomercio ó adopte el proteccionismo, puede producir un cataclismo en algunas industrias, desde las agrícolas á las manufactureras. Se comprende, pues, el interés vivísimo que revisten para el público todas las noticias, hasta aquellas que á primera vista pueden creerse insignificantes.”

948 “The major newspapers felt they had a responsibility to print news from all over the world – indeed, only if they were capable of providing international coverage could they “hit the big time”. Jürgen Osterhammel, The transformation of the world. A global history of the Nineteenth-century, Princeton University Press, 2014, p. 37.
task of newsgathering on the service a few agencies provided, like Reuters and Havas. These agencies were the most important actors in the global distribution of news, thanks to the vast network of correspondents they possessed. Equally as important as the growing dependence newspapers had on agencies is how this dependence transformed the content of newspapers. Hence, and according to Osterhammel, agencies distributed the news without modifying its content, thus contributing to fostering a “uniform kind of journalism” that epitomised “the ideology of objectivity”.

What makes the case of La Vanguardia interesting, in this regard, is that it constitutes an empirical case study through which studying how the growing interest to learn about distant parts of the world (“being informed”) altered the way of presenting the news, as part of the broader changes in the journalistic field. According to the self-perception of La Vanguardia, the wish to provide greater quantities of news obliged newspapers to restructure their content. La Vanguardia criticised the Spanish newspaper’s traditional tendency of publishing long and complicated articles that only a select audience was capable of understanding. In contrast to this, La Vanguardia considered that articles should be shorter and written with clarity and concision, so as to make them accessible to the average reader. The news provided by news agencies also contributed in such attempts to popularise the press. According to the estimates of Godó’s newspaper, this news format multiplied its presence in newspapers by ten times, to the point of appropriating some of the space traditionally devoted to the articles written by journalists.

Two reasons explain the spectacular success of this novel format. First, news coming from agencies tended to be shorter than the journalist’s accounts. This was because news was paid for per word, and therefore newspapers required the agencies to provide news that was as concisely written as possible. Second, this new succinct format allowed newspapers to publish more news in less space, thus allowing the reduction of paper costs. The inconvenience of this news format, however, was that it also obliged newspapers to spend more money on the services of news agencies. Ideally, the new added costs would be covered by the rise in advertisement revenues that a wider readership would attract.

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950 In the words of this scholar: “The agencies contributed to the globalized production and dissemination of news, passing it along without additional comment in a powerful expression of the ideology of ‘objectivity’. On the other hand, their standardized reports promoted a uniform kind of journalism, now that all print media were more or less in the same boat.” J. Osterhammel, *op. cit.*, p. 38.


952 Since more news was fitted into less space. This resulted in paper saving.
All these changes in the content and format of news represented an attempt to broaden the newspaper readership. As La Vanguardia argued, “the modern newspaper must provide room for all the events taking place (...) because it has thousands and thousands of subscribers, and each of them devotes himself to a different profession and has his own understanding of things”. Thus, having the capacity to fit more news into less space, thanks to the advantages provided by news agencies and the telegraph represented an advantage. Additionally, addressing a wider audience also required presenting the news in a different language: the tone used in the articles should be as neutral as possible, so as to avoid upsetting the views of any potential reader. This moderate tone in news, La Vanguardia concluded, is what explained the “death of the partisan press” and justified, ultimately, the huge circulation of foreign newspapers (deemed by La Vanguardia as being “very neutral” in their coverage).

From this testimony it can be deduced that writing news with a moderate tone was still a rare practice among the majority of the Spanish press, which was still driven by partisan ethics. Indeed, the testimony of José Escofet, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, supports the idea that gossip was still a major element of journalism in this country. Inspired by the larger circulation achieved by foreign newspapers, in contrast, La Vanguardia considered that adopting a neutral tone was the key to success. This strategy implied a radical departure from the strongly partisan work of journalists in the early years of the Godó’s newspaper.

The strongest proof of Godó’s intention to turn La Vanguardia into an informative newspaper was his use of one of the most important suppliers of international news: the French news agency Havas. While Spanish newspapers usually relied on the work of journalists when it came to reporting on local and national events, their coverage of international affairs heavily depended on the services of news agencies. As in most of Europe, in Spain too different news agencies were founded in the 19th century to supply foreign news to newspapers. This was the case, for instance, of the agencies Fabra (1865)

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953 “En el periódico moderno han de tener cabida todos los nuevos (sic) políticos, económicos, sociales, científicos, artísticos, locales, que ocurran. Cuanto sucede diariamente que tenga algún relieve, que pueda interesar á buen número de lectores, ha de reflejarse en sus columnas. Tiene miles y miles de abonados y compradores; cada uno de ellos dedica su actividad á un objeto distinto, tiene sus peculiaridades de ideas preconcebidas sobre todos los problemas que se discuten y apasionan los ánimos. Para no herir ningún amor propio, para no producir molestia, para que su lectura aproveche á todos y á ninguno desagrada, es necesario que el periódico hable de cien cosas que la exposición de los hechos se desprenda. Los diarios de partido han muerto ó están á punto de morir. (...) Los grandes periódicos extranjeros son, por regla general, muy imparciales. Sólo así obtienen esas tiradas enormes que asustan á los lectores de España.” A. Riera, “El periodismo moderno”, LV, 25/10/1903. Emphasis added.

954 See Chapter 2.
and Mencheta (1876). However, during the first decade of the 20th century the global information market experienced a process of integration that eventually resulted in the oligopoly of three big agencies: the French Havas, the English Reuters and the German Wolff. These three agencies partitioned the world in three respective areas of influence. In accordance with this distribution map, Spain fell into Havas’ area of influence. The outcome was that Havas came to monopolise the information flow between Spain and the rest of Europe. Indeed, the historian María de la Paz Rebollo, who provided the best study on this phenomenon, referred to Spain’s dependence on Havas as “information colonialism”.

Still, the monopoly of this French agency was not absolute. Newspapers in Spain could always come up with alternatives to escape from their dependency on Havas – whether for political reasons or economic ones. These alternatives were numerous and differed in their degree of complexity. For instance, there was the rather unsophisticated – but greatly extended – practice of simply copying what foreign newspapers had published on previous days. Another alternative for newspapers, significantly more expensive, consisted in sending their own correspondents to the hot spots. This strategy was already put in practice in 1900, when a group of four newspapers in Madrid, tired of Havas’ hegemony, created their own network of international correspondents. Barely one year later, however, the same newspapers abandoned their attempt and subscribed to Havas’ services once again.

The reason for this failure is that Havas based its primacy on two premises that Spanish newspapers could hardly match. First, it had a global network of correspondents, which often benefited from the favourable treatment of national institutions (who used this agency to propagate their “official” views worldwide). Second, the sending of news was faster and cheaper for Havas, thanks to the discounts the three big agencies had in cable transmissions. At this point, Spanish newspapers were left with two options: to content themselves with the cheaper but more limited services of the numerous minor agencies that existed in Spain (like the “Agencia Mencheta”, which specialised in providing national news); or to join efforts with other newspapers to reduce the economic cost of subscribing to

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956 This agency reinforced this privileged position by signing an agreement in 1870 with Spain’s most important agency (“Fabra”), according to which the latter became Havas’s official distributor in Spain.
959 Ibidem.
Havas. This latter option was the one chosen by the Barcelona Press Association (“Asociación de Prensa de Barcelona”), an association that gathered some of the most important newspapers in this city (La Veu de Catalunya, Las Noticias, El Diluvio). Analogous situations to that of the Barcelona Press Association existed in other countries. In England, for instance, Reuters reached an agreement with the Press Association (a cooperative for the provincial press, founded in 1868). This agreement benefited both sides: provincial newspapers received the better service Reuters provided, while this agency received in return the domestic news from the provincial press and used it in its overseas service. A clear difference can easily be noted, however, between the case of the British provincial press and that of the Barcelona Press Association: the relation the latter held with Havas was not a mutually beneficial cooperation, as in the British case, but rather a relation of dependency, for it was Havas that dictated the conditions.

The following pages will argue that the aim of turning La Vanguardia into the best-informed newspaper in Barcelona, as stated in the reform plans of 1903, is what led Ramón Godó to make Havas a central part of his strategy for increased readership. A close look at Havas’ historical records, located in the French National Archives (Paris), reveals that the newspaper of the Godó family had become the best customer the French agency had in Barcelona by the outbreak of the First World War. [Table 2]

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960 Contract signed between the “Asociación de la Prensa Barcelonesa” and Havas in 1908, Archives de l’Agence Havas / Archives Nationales de France (ANF), 5 AR/95.
961 In the United States, for instance, five newspapers from New York joined forces in 1846 to create the New York Associated Press, the seeds of the famous news agency Associated Press.
963 That is to say: the Barcelona Press Association did not provide anything in return, and was subject to the Havas monopoly. Still, it must be noted that the British case was also not an agreement between equals, since the provincial press also made an important payment for Reuters’ service, despite their cooperative agreement. See: Oliver Boyd-Barrett, “Market control and wholesale news: the case of Reuters”, in George Boyce, James Curran and Pauline Wingate (eds.), op. cit., pp. 193-194.
Table 2. Havas subscribers in Barcelona before the First World War\textsuperscript{964}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper (contract date)</th>
<th>Main features of the service</th>
<th>Cost of the service</th>
<th>Other features</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>La Vanguardia</strong>&lt;br&gt;First contract signed in: 01/12/1909&lt;br&gt;Next modifications: - 06/11/1911 - 09/10/1913</td>
<td>- News service of the entire world (except Spain and the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco).&lt;br&gt;- Minimum of 15,000 words per month. Right of increasing this quantity in face of special events. (Contract of 06/11/1911).&lt;br&gt;- New contract (09/10/1913): minimum of 100,000 words per month</td>
<td>- Under 15,000 words: 6 pesetas per word. Over 15,000 words: 5 ptas per 100 words.&lt;br&gt;- Commission of 8 ptas per 100 words coming from London, Berlin, Rome or Vienna.</td>
<td>- Average number of words per month (January-April 1913): 81,709 w/m&lt;br&gt;- Direct service from Paris per Lisbon to the bureau office of La Vanguardia.&lt;br&gt;- Contract period: 11 years and one month (changed on 09/10/1913)&lt;br&gt;- New enlargement of words mainly to be devoted to: Germany, Austria and England.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Diario de Barcelona**<br>First contract signed in: 02/08/1885<br>Next mod.: 22/09/1913 | - News on Spain (made in Madrid)<br>- General service “for the rest of the world”: maximum of 15,000 words per month (from Paris) + 1,000 words per month (from Lisbon).<br>- Others.\textsuperscript{966} | - 200 ptas per month<br>- 600 ptas per month | - General service from Paris is divided in the two editions of the newspaper (6,000 per morning / night edition).<br>- “Does not want to receive any news opposed to its editorial line (clerical newspaper).”
| **“Asociación de Prensa Barcelona”**<br>First contract signed: 01/07/1908<br>Next mod.: 22/09/1913 | - Shared service between La Veu de Catalunya, Las Noticias, El Diluvio.\textsuperscript{967} <br>- General service “for the entire world”: maximum 15,000 words per month (from Paris) + 1,000 words (from Lisbon direct to Barcelona) | - 750 ptas per month (each of the four newspapers) | - To be sent together with the “general service” of Diario de Barcelona by terrestrial cable. <br>- Breaking news to be sent through Marseille. |

\textsuperscript{964} Source: resume of Havas service contracts with Barcelona newspapers. ANF, 5 AR/424.<br><br>\textsuperscript{965} Further conditions: 1) No other newspaper or society neither from Spain or abroad can make use of the same service. Under the threat of immediate cancelling of the service; 2) Increase of the service by 25% in case of war (Europe, US, China or Japan); 3) Right of requesting 250-300 words of a “last minute” service in case the telephone line between Barcelona and Paris is opened to press services.<br><br>\textsuperscript{966} Between 01/07/1908 and 13/06/1909 the Diario de Barcelona also got a “Special service” 6,000 words/month (containing 2\textsuperscript{nd} rate news & special news), at the cost of 50ptas/1,000 words.<br><br>\textsuperscript{967} Members of the “Asociación de Prensa Barcelona”. The newspaper La Publicidad joined this service temporarily (between 15/08/1908 and 01/08/1910). From 22/09/1913 El Gráfico joins the service.
As Table 2 shows, by the eve of the First World War *La Vanguardia* had become Havas’ most important client in Barcelona. The reason for this was *La Vanguardia*’s continuous increase in the pace of demand. Hence, while all the newspapers started demanding from Havas a similar quantity of information (around 12,000 words per month), *La Vanguardia* distinguished itself from the rest of the pack in the contract it negotiated. In contrast to both the APB and the *Diario de Barcelona*, which set strict limits on their respective consumption of words by sticking to a fixed monthly instalment (400 pesetas in 1908; around 800 in 1913) *La Vanguardia* requested a mode of payment that left the door open to increase its demand in the foreseeable future. This method of payment was based on economy of scale: the more words the newspaper requested, the cheaper the cost (e.g. under 15,000 words - 6 ptas per 100 words; over 15,000 words - 5 ptas per 100 words).

The difference in the fees agreed between Havas and *La Vanguardia* and its competitors in Barcelona eventually marked a massive difference in the pace of demand. Whereas the number of words that both the APB and the *Diario* consumed grew very gradually over the years (12,000 words in 1908; 16,000 in 1913); in the case of *La Vanguardia* this demand rocketed: 15,000 words (1909); around 75,000 (1911); 81,000 (1913), 100,000 (mid-October 1913 onwards). Therefore, in barely five years the newspaper of the Godó family had multiplied the number of words it bought from Havas by 6 times, and had reached 100,000 words per month just before the war started. The service of the rest of Barcelona’s newspapers, in contrast, experienced minor changes and halted at 16,000 words by the same period.

In parallel to the growing increase of information from Havas, in 1909 the Godó’s newspaper became the first in Spain to install a telegraphic station in its newsroom. This station consisted of one Hughes receiver and one Morse receiver, as well as a cable that connected the headquarters of *La Vanguardia* with Barcelona’s telegraphic network. Thanks to this, this newspaper was capable of transmitting and receiving information from all the Spanish and international telegraph stations that were connected to Barcelona’s station. For instance, from March 1909 *La Vanguardia* started receiving two daily connections from London. The connection was soon extended to Paris, although in this case it required *La Vanguardia* to undergo complex negotiations with the French authorities. The reason for this was that no laws existed at the time regulating the telegraphic flow of information for

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968 The only exception to this progression was the year of 1912, when *La Vanguardia* set a limit of 55,000 words per month. In October 1913 this limit was removed. This parenthesis might have had something to do (we might imagine) with the newspaper’s temporary lack of liquidity. ANF, 5 AR/95, “La Vanguardia”, 22/03/1912, 02/08/1912 and 20/10/1913.
newspapers to use between France and Spain.\textsuperscript{969} Probably interested in the opportunity of increasing French influence in Barcelona through its top-selling newspaper, the French authorities accepted \textit{La Vanguardia}’s proposal.\textsuperscript{970}

The advantages \textit{La Vanguardia} obtained with the telegraphic station were twofold. The first was the capacity to receive Havas’s service faster and without intermediaries. This was because Havas’s services in Spain were distributed through Madrid’s office, in part resulting from the radial structure the telegraphic network had in this country, in accordance with the liberals’ state centralism.\textsuperscript{971} The innovation of \textit{La Vanguardia} consisted in saving time by doing away with Madrid’s intermediation. This was achieved by making use of an alternative Spanish connection, which connected France and Spain through the location of Portbou, on the northeast side of the border. As a result, journalists of \textit{La Vanguardia} did not have to wait for Madrid’s service or go to Barcelona’s telegraph station to pick up the news. They simply received the news directly to the newsroom. In terms of time, this was not a minor issue for a newspaper that made the provision of information a central element of its editorial strategy.

The second advantage \textit{La Vanguardia} obtained with the telegraphic station was the capacity of requesting higher amounts of words from Havas. For the ordinary needs the newspaper used a Morse receiver (capable of printing 25 words per minute), and a Hughes receiver for more urgent matters (60 words per minute).\textsuperscript{972} The use of such machinery in the journalistic field constituted a novelty, to the point of giving birth to a new journalistic profession: the “news re-writer”. This job consisted in the translation and transcription of news agencies’ dispatches. Joan Puig i Ferreter, who worked for \textit{La Vanguardia}, left a vivid

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{969} By means of its correspondent in Paris, Ricardo Blasco, \textit{La Vanguardia} requested France’s Ministère des Travaux Publics, des Postes et des Télégraphes the establishing of a cable line between Paris and Barcelona to receive the news directly from the French capital. ANF, 5 AR/95, Correspondence Havas-Fabra-Madrid, 1904-1918, “Note pour Monsieur le Chef du Cabinet de Monsieur le Ministre des Travaux Publics, des Postes et des Télégraphes” 20/09/1909, p. 149.
  \item \textsuperscript{970} ANF, 5 AR/95, Correspondence Havas-Fabra-Madrid, 1904-1918, “Note sur une convention réglant les communications télégraphiques de presse entre la France et l’Espagne”, date unknown, p. 148.
  \item \textsuperscript{971} The first line of the Spanish telegraphic network, put forward by the Government on November the 7\textsuperscript{th} 1852, was designed as a “line that will depart from Madrid and will go through the provinces of Zaragoza, Navarra and Guipuzcoa to end up in France’s border through Irún (...).” For this reason, Barcelona’s newspapers usually had to wait for Havas’ service to reach Fabra’s offices in Madrid first, and then to Barcelona’s, from which news was subsequently re-distributed. Because this service was relatively slow, when the Barcelona newspapers wanted to publish breaking news (and therefore were ready to pay a higher cost for the service) they asked Havas to send them through Marseille’s maritime cable. For the regular service, in contrast, they relied on the terrestrial cable that departed from Madrid and connected with France through the town of Irún. On the radial nature of the Spanish telegraph network, see: Ángel Bahamonde (ed.), \textit{Las comunicaciones en la construcción del estado contemporáneo en España (1700-1936). El correo, el telégrafo y el teléfono}, Madrid, Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transporte y Medio Ambiente, 1993 (the previous quote, in p. 140).
  \item \textsuperscript{972} Ángel Bahamonde, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 138-139.
\end{itemize}
account of this job in his novel. The two main requirements for work as a “re-writer”, according to Puig, were the ability to read and translate French (due to Havas’ omnipresence); and the capacity to turn the concise and encrypted dispatches of news agencies into longer, readable articles. It was, thus, essentially a low-skilled job that was often undertaken in a clumsy manner, with untimely working hours (the shifts started at midnight), and a miserable salary of 100 pesetas per month, meaning that most re-writers relied on other jobs to make a living.973 The use of the latest technology thus coexisted with the traditional low levels of professionalisation among journalists. Other testimonies, like Gaziel’s, noted the same paradox: the most prestigious newspaper in Barcelona was essentially run, in its inner life, by a myriad of low-paid workers with meagre salaries.

The new telegraph machinery and La Vanguardia’s pace of demand provide empirical evidence of how this newspaper implemented the reform plan of 1903. As stated in this reform plan, the direction of La Vanguardia considered that “information” was a field where the newspaper was not doing sufficiently well. The strategy adopted involved a growing reliance – and thus expenditure – on news agencies, as successive contracts La Vanguardia signed with Havas demonstrate. The First World War would be the moment when this specialisation in informative journalism delivered its full benefits, thus explaining the great boost in readership of Godó’s newspaper.

8.2. NEW CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE IN THE AGE OF MASS POLITICS

Between 1914 and 1918, Europe and large parts of the world were subsumed into the bloodiest war ever seen. For the scale of tragedy it entailed (an estimated 17 million deaths and 20 million wounded) and the geography of the countries it involved, the First World War represented a truly global event.974 In Europe, the deep social and economic distress that resulted from the war, including the changes in the political map (four empires and three dynasties fell) have led historians to see the First World War as the symbolic demarcation between two eras. That is, a war that put an end to the so-called “Long 19th century” and heralded the birth of a new era, increasingly regarded as a “European civil conflict”, lasting

973 Joan Puig i Ferreter, op. cit.

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up to the Second World War (1939-1945). Historians have traditionally considered that all these changes deepened the transformation that European elected representatives started living after the 1880s: the “decline” of the notables and its substitution by the new mass parties and the professional politicians. The case of Ramón Godó, however, will provide evidence that some elites designed alternative mechanisms besides official politics to maintain their influence in society, at a time when the war shook liberal regimes all over the Continent.

Spain was part of the small group of European countries that did not enter World War One. As early as 30 October 1914, the Conservative government of Eduardo Dato proclaimed the country’s official neutrality. The vast majority of the political class immediately supported the government’s decision. Such consensus among liberal politicians was based on the shared perception, which the Disaster of 1898 and the subsequent calls for national regeneration were a painful reminder of, that Spain had very limited room for manoeuvre in international relations. Ironically, once the war started to reveal its full horror, Spain’s neutral position appeared to have saved the country from its worst consequences.

However, in recent years scholars have challenged the myth that Spain’s official neutrality saved it from being engulfed by the war. The new works published on the occasion of the First World War centenary have provided further evidence that Spain was, in reality, another piece in the complicated European chessboard of 1914-1918 – certainly not the most important one, but one whose fate was still tightly intertwined to that of the Continent. An example of this was propaganda. Some of Spain’s characteristics (like its geostrategic position in the Mediterranean, its condition as market supplier to the warring countries, as well as its potential entry into the war) made both the Allies and the Central Powers aware of the importance of getting the public opinion of this country on their respective sides.

977 Together with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland. Portugal remained neutral too, but its support to the Allies was manifest. Belgium was soon invaded by the Central Powers. Italy entered the war in 1915 on the Allied side.
Indeed, historians have shown the large resources the Central Powers devoted to buying, bribing or blackmailing numerous Spanish newspapers.\textsuperscript{979} The propaganda system of the Allies in Spain, in contrast, was set in motion quite late (in 1915) but despite significant resources it never succeeded in matching the more systematic work of their enemies. The financial outlays were clear in this respect: while Great Britain spent about 24,000 pesetas on propaganda activities in Spain during the March of 1917, Germany spent some 35,000 pesetas every month just to secure the favourable treatment of one single newspaper (\textit{El Día}). Moreover, scholars have estimated that the Central Powers eventually managed to control the impressive number of 500 local and national newspapers in Spain.\textsuperscript{980}

The second part of this chapter will attempt to offer an alternative approach to the traditional narrative that portrays Spanish newspapers as mere transmission belts of European powers. This different approach will consist in studying the case of \textit{La Vanguardia} to demonstrate that the situation of informative newspapers in neutral countries became particularly difficult. I will analyse how an independent newspaper like \textit{La Vanguardia} experienced at a micro-scale the same ideological tensions affecting Spanish society in relation to the war: while the newspaper’s owner (Ramon Godó) proved to be a passionate defender of Germany’s cause, the director (Miquel dels Sants Oliver), in contrast, was an Allied supporter. The confrontation between Godó and Oliver will be used to challenge the association that historiography on the First World War often makes between “neutral” and “passive” countries, and will demonstrate that the adoption of an informative model, based on news agencies, did not prevent Ramón Godó from using the press as an instrument to maintain his influence in society.

Initially, when the First World War started \textit{La Vanguardia} took a neutral standpoint. This position went in line with \textit{La Vanguardia}'s self-proclaimed desire, in the reforms of 1903, to be as neutral as possible when reporting events. Hence, the editorials of \textit{La Vanguardia} referred to the war as the “failure of a whole civilization” and praised the liberal politicians for having defended a neutral alignment for Spain.\textsuperscript{981} However, as the illusion of a hasty war faded and the conflict deteriorated into trench warfare in late 1914, Spanish society started to take sides. The country’s official neutrality began to be contested by the creation of

\textsuperscript{979} The “Treaty of Algeciras” (1906), which subordinated Spain’s foreign policy for that of France and England, is what convinced the Central Powers of the need to ensure Spain’s official neutrality by means of propaganda.

\textsuperscript{980} F. J. Romero Salvador, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 68 and p. 69, respectively. The stipend for \textit{El Día} corresponded to 1916.

\textsuperscript{981} “Por sorprendente que resulte la cosa, hay que tributar un caluroso aplauso á los gobiernos españoles que se han venido sucediendo desde el 98 en cuanto á la política extranjera se refiere. Todos han sido calamitosos dentro de casa, pero han mantenido, sin desviarse nunca del acuerdo, la neutralidad ante los conflictos exteriores”. Alfredo Opisso, “La semana en el extranjero”, LV, 07/08/1914, p. 7.
two opposing camps, which saw in the war the opening of new perspectives for Spain’s future recovery.

On one hand, there were the “Germanophiles”, who saw in the Central Powers the model of order, tradition and discipline they considered Spain needed. This side was formed by the most traditional and conservative ranks of Spanish society, like the church, the army, the catholic fundamentalists and the aristocracy, but also contained many admirers of Germany’s technology and culture. Overall they were the majority in Spanish public opinion (in contrast to the majority of non-aligned countries in Europe) and argued for Spain’s most absolute neutrality in relation to the conflict. In practice, the Germanophiles’ advocacy for “absolute neutrality” benefited the interests of the Central Powers, since Spain’s international commitments were with the Allies (Treaty of Algeciras, 1906).

On the other hand, there was the pro-Allied side, which identified France and the United Kingdom with liberty and democracy. The pro-allies also considered that Spain’s decay was the result of the country’s historical detachment from Europe. For this reason, and now that the fate of the Continent was being decided on the battlefield, the pro-Allies felt that Spain should not remain detached. Consequently, Spanish pro-Allies were the fiercest detractors of the country’s official neutrality, and pressured for an open alliance with France and the UK, if necessary by joining them in the war. The supporters of this trend were mostly the Republicans, the socialists (who would abandon their initial neutralism) and progressive intellectuals. The pro-Allies had a strong presence in the most dynamic regions of the country, like Catalonia, Valencia, Vizcaya and Asturias.982

Therefore, the First World War provoked a great division of Spain’s public opinion. The testimonies of contemporaries evoke, in fact, the heated discussions that took place on various occasions, even between old friends or family members.983 However, it was precisely amidst this highly polarised public opinion that the informative-character of 

La Vanguardia gained popularity. As one witness, Claudi Ametlla, commented in his memoires:

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982 Between these two confronting camps (supporters of the Allies and supporters of the Central Powers) there remained only a small heterogeneous group who advocated for alternative views: the Liberal politicians, most of whom stood for neutralism; the Anarchists, who argued in favour of internationalism but also experienced important divisions; and a small group of intellectuals, led by Eugeni d’Ors, who deplored the conflict as a European civil war.982

983 As the Catalan writer Josep Maria de Sagarra observed: “Como el tema belicoso era del dominio de todo el mundo y todo el mundo podia meter cuchara, estallaba a cada momento en los cafés, los tranvías y en cualquier esquina. La discusión era inevitable, y padres de familia acabaron a puñetazos y echando sangre por las narices a propósito de una cuestión que en realidad no les afectaba ni poco ni mucho. Provocábense riñas a muerte, entre familiares y amigos de toda la vida y en vulgaridad corriente se declaraba indeseable a un señor porque se manifestaba francófilo, o se le marcaba en el calificativo de caníbal si opinaba lo contrario”. Josep Maria de Sagarra, Memorias, Barcelona, Editorial Noguer, 1957, p. 553.
“The passion that this event [the First World War] has arisen is so enormous that you should not be surprised to see that every citizen follows it with great interest. In so doing, one learns about tactics and strategy, international politics and geography. [As a result of this] newspapers see their circulations increase, especially in the case of ‘La Vanguardia’, which due to the wider information it provided, started to stand out in relation to the rest of these newspapers, in such measure that this newspaper never lost its principal position.”  

“In all the material respects, [La Vanguardia] stood out among the rest of newspapers. It was better informed than any other, and counted on its own exclusive means (...). It reached the point were it became indispensable, even for those who supported a political cause and were loyal to a partisan newspaper.”

The above-quoted testimony demonstrates that providing greater quantities of information was not a minor aspect for newspapers; especially if we take into account the great interest the First World War awoke in Spain. This interest, as the testimony quoted above reveals, was not limited to the harsh confrontation between Germanophiles and pro-Allies. In many ways, the war also represented a “media spectacle” in itself. In fact, the First World War was the first moment when a series of technological innovations were implemented in modern warfare, like the airplane, the tank or the Zeppelin. Likewise, the war was also singular for the wide range of countries that were involved, as well as for the style of warfare it entailed (e.g. trenches). For thousands of readers, all these novelties turned the war into a spectacle they followed eagerly in the newspapers. It was precisely in this field of competition, consisting in the abundance and novelty of news, that La Vanguardia stood out from its competitors in Barcelona.

Yet contrary to what the “technological determinist paradigm” would suggest, La Vanguardia’s privileged relationship with Havas did not imply that its sources of information were always more “neutral” than the news of other newspapers. Havas’ service certainly allowed faster access to more news, but this did not assure “impartiality”. The reason for this is because news agencies traditionally held close relationships with national governments.

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This became particularly visible during the Great War, when news agencies were turned into the loudspeakers of state propaganda. In the case of the English agency Reuters, for instance, the German origins of its owner (Baron Herbert) arose many concerns in England about its reliability. These concerns only stopped when Reuters gave public proof of its “Britishness”. In France too, the government repeatedly used Havas’ influence to spread propaganda messages throughout Europe.

Furthermore, Ramón Godó himself gave proof that the informative character of La Vanguardia left ample room to promote his own political agenda. Since 1914 he started considering that defending neutrality in La Vanguardia was insufficient. The polarisation of Catalan society deeply troubled him, as became evident in the letter he wrote to Antonio Maura on 25 October 1914. In this letter, Godó asked the conservative politician to advise him on how to position La Vanguardia in relation to the war, but at the same time took the opportunity to put forward his own political views:

“Exmo Sor D. Antonio Maura. Mi respetable amigo; en el periódico de mi propiedad La Vanguardia, hemos observado hasta ahora, una actitud completamente pasiva, en todos los asuntos relacionados con el pleito internacional que se ventila. Y sin embargo, creo, que las circunstancias imponen que nos preocupemos muy seriamente. El Sor Oliver [the editor of La Vanguardia], tiene su criterio propio y particular. El mio, no solo particularmente, sino, como propietario de un organo de opinion, difiere en algunos puntos. No creo, que en La Vanguardia, convenga una campaña activa, en ningún sentido, que podría soliviantar algo los animos. Pero si, una colaboracion prudente que sirva como guia ú orientacion, precisamente, para mantener nuestras derechas con energia, si llegara el momento. No opino en la inmediata movilizacion, que concluiria de arruinarnos, pero si, prepararnos de cuanto nos haga falta, por si llegara el momento de la movilizacion. Creo, que tenemos demasiado ejercito en Marruecos y aunque se repatriara á todo él, nada perderiamos. Entiendo, que no podemos ponemos enfrente de Ynglaterra, mientras conserve su flota, pero no demasiado francofilos, porque la historia nos dice, que de allende los pirineos nos han venido todos los males. En resumen, que, sin ser apasionados, ya que todo el servicio de informacion viene de Francia y por lo tanto, con una parcialidad, á veces, irritante, conviene contrastarlo con esos articulos prudentes. No hay que

Services and Big Business in the Nineteenth Century, The Business History Review, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Winter, 2003), pp. 577-610. This author speaks, for instance, of the subsidies the Russian government paid to Havas in 1905 to “sweetening” the bad news during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).

The letter that Godó wrote to Maura needs to be framed, first of all, by the historical context. Godó wrote this letter barely one month after the Battle of Marne (5-12 September 1914), which represented the first great victory of the Allies and marked a turning point in the course of the war. The consequences of this victory had a strong impact in Spain, where it produced the first great upsurge of pro-Allied sentiment and even led the Socialists to abandon their previous neutralism and to embrace the cause of France and England. As the testimony of one contemporary shows, this pro-Allied euphoria was felt with particular intensity in Catalonia, the region where this side traditionally enjoyed more sympathies. Thus, the moment when Godó wrote to Maura was characterised by the growing mobilisation of Catalan public opinion in favour of the Allies.

This context explains why Godó felt troubled about the need of “orienting” the “conservative masses”, which he regarded as “the healthiest” segment of opinion in the country (“la más sana del país”). Godó’s concern about the ideological stance of Catalan society demonstrates that as a newspaper proprietor, he was deeply attentive to politics. In fact, and as he had already explained to Maura in 1911, he had a precise political mission for La Vanguardia: to be the lighthouse (“órgano de opinión”) of the political right in Catalonia. This reveals to what extent Godó had a clear idea of the kind of reader La

989 Archivo Fundación Antonio Maura (AFAM.), Legajo 45, carpeta 29. [E. T.]: “Dear Mr. Antonio Maura. My illustrious and respectable friend; (...) At the newspaper of my property La Vanguardia, we have adopted a passive attitude until now, in what concerns the international events. Yet still, I believe that the circumstances impose that we should be very concerned. Mr. Oliver [the editor of La Vanguardia] has his own and particular criteria. Mine, and not just my own, but that of a newspaper proprietor, is different in certain aspects. I don’t think that La Vanguardia should start an active campaigning, in any sense (...) But I do believe that a prudent collaboration could serves as guidance for the right-oriented people and keep them animated. I don’t argue in favour immediate mobilization, which would ruin us, but I do argue in favour of getting ready in case mobilization is necessary. I believe we have too many troops in Morocco and that they should be transferred to the Peninsula. I think we cannot go against England, as long as she keeps her fleet, but also not too much in favour of the Allies, for history reminds us that all the ills have always originated beyond the Pyrenees. To sum up, I believe that without being passionate, for all the news service comes from France, and sometimes, it does with an irritating partiality, that things need to be contrasted with prudent articles. We should not forget that all the neutral masses in the country have positioned in one side. They shall have their reasons for doing so. All this I explain to you for the great esteem I have for your opinion, for it is for me the most urgent necessity to adopt a position. (...) Ramon Godó, Barcelona, 26 October 1914”.


992 See Chapter 7.
The problem with Godó’s political preferences, however, was that a significant part of the Catalan public opinion sympathised with the Allied cause. This situation was worrying from the sales point of view since many of these people were part of Barcelona’s educated upper-middle class male readership, which La Vanguardia was targeting. Moreover, the situation deteriorated when Godó discovered that Oliver, the editor of La Vanguardia, also sympathised with the Allies. As Godó himself explained to Maura, Oliver had “his own and particular criteria (...) which differs from mine in certain points”.

The difference of criteria that Godó and Oliver had regarding the war is confirmed by the testimony of two journalists who worked for La Vanguardia: “Gaziel” (the nickname of Agustí Calvet) and Joan Puig i Ferreter (1882-1952). Their two testimonies confirm the disagreement between Godó and Oliver over the war – although their accounts of this dispute suggest that it was stronger than Godó admitted to Maura. According to the testimony of Gaziel, for instance, the division arose out of the different ideological views the two men had about the war, regardless of their common admiration for Maura. On the one hand, Gaziel described Godó as a “fervent supporter of the German cause”, who loved reading the Germanophile articles of Madrid’s newspaper ABC and wished to adopt a similar stance in La Vanguardia. On the other hand, Oliver is depicted in the same memoirs as a “sincere and disinterested pro-Ally” who deplored the war as a civil European conflict, as well as being determined to keep La Vanguardia absolutely neutral.

According to Gaziel, the different positions of Godó and Oliver resulted in a tempestuous relationship. Every time the course of the war changed, Godó was tempted to adopt a more favourable stance towards the Central Powers. Additionally, numerous Germanophiles who saw La Vanguardia as a potentially valuable mouthpiece for their cause

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993 As Godó confessed to Maura in 1911: “me he dedicado á acrecentar la influencia y difusion de mi periódico “La Vanguardia” para acabar de convertirlo en un gran instrumento de opinion conservadora en Catalunya y poder apoyar con mas eficacia y libertad los ideales é intereses nobilísimos de que es Vd representacion suprema y en los cuales ha de hallarse al fin y à la postre la unica via de salvacion para nuestro pais.” A.A.M., Legajo 266, carpeta 2. Further details, in Chapter 7.

994 Miquel dels Sants Oliver (1864-1920). He was appointed editor of La Vanguardia in 1906, after having worked at the Diario de Barcelona. By the time he joined Godó’s newspaper Oliver was already a widely recognised journalist and intellectual. There is a bibliography available on this figure: Gregori Mir, Miquel dels Sants Oliver. Nacionalisme i síntesi liberal-conservadora, 1898-1919, Palma de Mallorca, Miquel Font, 1993, 2 vol.

995 “As it could be expected, Godó rapidly became a fervent ‘Germanophile’, of the apocalyptic kind I only met in Spain, a neutral country [where this standpoint was common to] the well-meaning people, self-referred as Catholic and who got enormously rich thanks to the war. Oliver, in contrast, and as it also could be expected, was a ‘sincere and disinterested pro-Ally’”. The original text, in: Agustí Calvert (“Gaziel”), Història de La Vanguardia (1884-1936), Paris, Edicions catalanes de París, 1971, p. 83. Originally written in Catalan.
repeatedly pressured Godó to abandon this neutrality. According to Gaziel, only Oliver’s resistance prevented Godó from turning La Vanguardia into the mouthpiece of the Central Powers’ interests in Barcelona. The outcome of this difference of criteria was the worsening of the relations between the two men; to the point that Oliver, tired of the daily struggle he held with Godó, handed in his resignation (which was not ultimately accepted).

Moreover, Godó’s correspondence with Maura shows that his distaste with France was not a kneejerk reaction, but rather a judgement that he had formed from the past. As he himself asserted, “history tells us that all our troubles have always come from beyond the Pyrenees”. It was in accordance with this way of reasoning that Godó suggested to Maura nothing less than sending the entire Spanish army from its current posting in Morocco to the French border in the Pyrenees. Although Maura rapidly tempered Godó’s warlike attitude, Godó’s opinion reveals the animosity that notorious segments of the Spanish right felt towards France. Although various elements help to explain the distaste of Spanish conservatives for their neighbouring country – like the secular and Republican nature of the French state model, contrary to the overwhelmingly Catholic character of the Spanish conservatives, or the tight constraints that France imposed over Spain’s colonial ambitions in Morocco – there was one cause that was of primary importance. This cause was the mass demonstrations that took place in France in reaction to Ferrer i Guàrdia’s indictment and execution, in the aftermath of the Tragic Week (1909). For right-wing oriented people like Godó, these mobilisations were seen as an attack against Spain’s honour (see Chapter 7).

This resentment proved to be alive by the time of the Great War, when in his correspondence with Maura, Godó explicitly noted the partisan character of French news and

996 “Oliver was a prudent, calm and clairvoyant person, who suffered enormously to resist the extreme pressures he received both from the owner [Godó] and the numerous agents (friends and enemies) who wanted to turn La Vanguardia into a fiercest Germanophile newspaper, similar to Madrid’s ABC. On every hot episode — and the war had hundreds of these, of all sorts — the absolute master of La Vanguardia [Oliver] clashed. A hundred times they were close to breaking [their agreement]”. Ibid, pp. 83-84.

997 Ibidem.

998 Originally written in Spanish as: “(...) la historia nos dice, que de allende los pirineos nos han venido todos los males.”

999 Maura advised the owner of La Vanguardia to keep this newspaper in the field of strict neutrality: “Mi querido amigo: con el mayor gusto respondo á su carta de ayer y ante todo le digo que hallo justificadisima la preocupación que le sugirió consultar conmigo sus perplegidades; pues para quien tiene en su mano instrumento de tal eficacia como es La Vanguardia, como para todos los que llevan encomienda de algun modo de cura de almas, resultan ahora complicados en grado excepcional, los miramientos que merece influir en una conducta honrada atenta á responsabilidades de orden moral. Sin embargo soy acerrimo partidario de que España pertenezca neutral. (...) Lo que aprovecharia es desempeñar a quienes no advierten que hoy tenemos virtualmente suprimidas la independencia y la soberania de España; a quienes creen muy gustosos en tal dejadez, eclipse del patriotismo que no es punto muerto sino narcotizado de modo que la realidad de hoy tuviese al menos eficacia docente para vanar el modo político de morir ó vivir España en lo venidero. Por este derrotero llevaria yo la Vanguardia si fuera asi lugar el de V. Mis Afectos. A. Maura”. A.A.M., Leg. 45, carp. 29. Letter of A. Maura to R. Godó, Madrid, 27/10/1914.
“the need to counterweight them”. Godó’s determination to make his opinions correspond with those of his newspaper was made evident on repeated occasions. In 1913, for instance, Godó sent a letter to Paris in which he directly required Havas to “abstain from providing comments and to confine itself to providing information”. Likewise, when in October 1913 Godó discussed expanding La Vanguardia’s contract with Havas [see Table 2] he made it conditional upon receiving more news from Germany, Austria and England. The reason for this, Godó argued, was that “many readers of La Vanguardia are of Saxon nationality (sic) and they have protested, not without reason, about the scarcity of information concerning their countries.”

Still, Ramón Godó’s boldest move to break with France’s monopoly of information took place in the run-up to the war. Thus, in March 1914, before the First World War started, Godó secretly contacted the German consulate in Barcelona to explore the possibility of obtaining news directly from the country. According to the historical documents of this operation that have been preserved, and which are held in the German Foreign Ministry Archives, in Berlin, Godó’s self-confessed attempt was to “free his newspaper from the excessive dependence on Havas” and to “seek new information sources, preferably from German origins”. These two statements, reported by the German representative in Barcelona, reveal to what extent Godó sought to make the opinions of La Vanguardia reflect his own, regardless of the “independent” orientation of this newspaper and its much publicised emphasis on providing “facts, facts and facts”.

1000 “En resumen, que, sin ser apasionados, ya que todo el servicio de informacion viene de Francia y por lo tanto, con una parcialidad, á veces, irritante, conviene contrastarlo con esos articulos prudentes.”
1001 “La Vanguardia” nous prie de nous abstenir dans les dépêches de tous commentaires et de nous limiter exclusivement aux information”. ANF, 5 AR/95, “La Vanguardia”, p. 5.
1002 “Observo, que en dicho servicio, hay alguna deficiencia, por su escasez, en el procedente de Alemania, Austria é Inglaterra, que yo creo no ha de faltar materia importante para darlo mas extensivamente. Naturalmente, que no entra en mi criterio ponerlo al nivel del de la Nación Francesa ya que comprendo que el de esa ha de ocupar por muchas razones, que huelgan exponer, el primer lugar. Hay entre los lectores á “La Vanguardia”, muchos de nacionalidad sajona, que han exteriorizado, he de confesar que con cierta razón, la deficiencia que llevo apuntada.” ANF, 5 AR/424, p. 42 (letter of Ramón Godó to the Director of Havas, 09/10/1913).
CONCLUSIONS

The classic literature on the crisis of liberal politics has traditionally assumed that the First World War became a decisive step in the renewing of elites. In the case of parliamentary representatives, quantitative research has shown that this was very much the case for much of Europe (even when substantial differences existed between countries). However, the adoption of a micro-analysis, based on the study of singular case studies, reveals that the takeover of elites was often a more complex and protracted affair than is often assumed.

This chapter has argued that besides the official channels of political participation, like political representation, alternative channels existed for the “notables” to reinvent their position in the new mass society. Turning La Vanguardia into the top-selling newspaper in Barcelona, during the First World War, had put Godó in a privileged position to promote his own views through the press. The letters he exchanged with Maura reveal the close connections between liberal politicians and press proprietors. Besides the friendship the two men appear to have enjoyed, what made Godó a political actor was his capacity to influence the 100,000 readers of La Vanguardia. For a politician like Maura, whose attempt was to “mobilise the neutral masses”, having Barcelona’s top-selling newspaper on his side was a significant boon; especially as the readers of this newspaper were mostly educated upper-middle class men. Moreover, this capacity to influence did not go unnoticed by other politicians either. Thus, there is evidence that Godó was offered various political positions during his life. Likewise, in 1916 he was granted a title of nobility in recognition for his work as a newspaper proprietor. Although the information at our disposal makes it hard to ascertain if there were political interests behind the concession of this noble title, it is

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1006 As was commented on in an obituary for Ramón: “Nunca quiso el Sr. Godó tomar parte activa en la política ocupando cargos que reiteradamente le fueron ofrecidos. No aspiró más que a orientar patrióticamente a la opinión desde las prestigiosas páginas de su importante periódico.” *ABC*, 22/09/1931, p. 38.
1007 Namely, the title of “Count of Godó” (“Conde de Godó”, in Spanish). This title has been passed from generation to generation until today.
1008 The fact that the title was granted by a Liberal government, led by the Count of Romanones, adds further interest to this concession (since Godó had harshly criticised this party in the past). The concession of the noble title was made official in the Royal Decree of September 18th 1916. Among the reasons that were put forward to justify the concession of the title was Ramón’s position as newspaper’ proprietor: “Propietario del importante diario *La Vanguardia*. Ha consagrado a esta publicación todas sus energías e invertido en ella cuantiosas sumas, hasta convertirla en uno de los principales periódicos de España. Cuenta *La Vanguardia* con edificio propio,
nevertheless an example of the wide influence Ramón Godó had achieved in society — regardless of his retirement from active politics.

Still, the transformation of *La Vanguardia* into a newspaper with a mass circulation should not be seen as something that was pre-determined, or as being driven solely by politics. Instead, the changes occurring in this newspaper should be seen, above all, as the long-term consequence of the reform plans that had started in 1888 when Carlos and Bartolomé Godó sought to expand *La Vanguardia* beyond the limits of the Liberal Party. The plan for new reforms, in 1903, symbolised the continuity of the same strategy by the second generation of the same family. The fact that Carlos and Bartolomé’s faces were sculpted onto *La Vanguardia*’s new headquarters is very revealing, in this respect, of how Ramón saw his father and uncle as the originators of the family tradition in journalism. In parallel, linking the name of *La Vanguardia* to that of the Godó family was a strategy aimed at securing the family control over the newspaper. This reveals the importance of tradition (or its invention) as one of the strategies elites designed to secure and legitimise their sources of influence; and of the importance of displaying – and thus reinforcing – this tradition in public.

If the year 1888 redefined *La Vanguardia*’s identity – from the mouthpiece of the Liberal Party to a politically independent newspaper – the year 1903 symbolised its ambition to specialise in providing information. An editorial published in 1903 made it very clear what Godó and his team hoped to achieve with their new “modern journalism”: namely, “to keep up with the times and avoid crystallizing” (“hay que marchar al compás del tiempo, rehuyendo de cristalizarse”). This motto encapsulates an understanding of journalism as a living organism that must be capable of adapting to change. Additionally, it reveals an understanding of the press as something whose survival ultimately depends on its capacity to satisfy the readers’ needs. In line with this, providing abundant information and providing it quickly was identified as a growing necessity in society. At this point, we might question if this “need” really was felt by all the social classes in Barcelona (like the working classes), or whether it reveals *La Vanguardia*’s attempt to target an educated upper-middle class readership. In any case, the First World War became an exceptional event capable of attracting deep interest throughout Spanish society, as different contemporaries noted. The installation of telegraphic machinery in *La Vanguardia*’s newsroom (the first in Spain), and the undisputed growth in its use of Havas’ services, reveals to what extent Godó was committed to making his newspaper one of the most informed.

gabinete telegráfico, linotipias, cajas, estereotipia y rotativas.” *Gaceta de Madrid*, 15/11/1916, p. 598. In the future I plan to research the reasons behind the granting of this title in more depth.
However, and contrary to what the literature has taken for granted, the adoption of an informative journalistic model did not necessarily imply a more “neutral” type of news. The crucial role that news agencies played in distributing the international flow of news rapidly turned them into the target of governments wishing to spread propaganda more effectively. Additionally, the case of Godó reveals that press proprietors, despite their dependence on these agencies, still had some room for manoeuvre. This is important to note, for it highlights that the growing presence of communicative technologies in journalism did not replace the agency of actors. To put it in more prosaic terms, while assuring that La Vanguardia provided the most abundant information possible, Godó spoke about the necessity of counteracting the French point of view. This capacity to choose the sources of information, combined with the possibility of combining them with editorials addressed to a very specific audience (the conservative classes in Barcelona), were two elements that symbolised Godó’s capacity of influence. If public opinion did not necessarily prove to be receptive to these messages, politicians certainly were. It was in this power to turn public opinion into a form of capital, in the eyes of politicians, that Godó’s new source of influence ultimately lay.
CONCLUSIONS

The main contribution of this thesis has consisted in offering a new perspective on the crisis of liberal politics in Europe by focusing on the links between clientelism and the press. The analysis of two generations of the Godó family has made it possible to examine this process over a long time span, and to see how the relationship between the press and politics was successively redefined. In so doing, this thesis has revealed the importance of the public sphere for the social reproduction of elites. In fact, the public dimension of power is a subject that still needs further research, especially in countries where political representation was structured according to patron-client relationships. Because elections were manipulated on a systematic basis, in the case of Spain, Italy, and Portugal, and because patronage mechanisms remained important, in the case of France, it is often assumed that controlling the mechanisms of favour assured the dominant position of elites. The case of the Godó family challenges these assumptions, and demonstrates that even in those societies where wide segments of the population were de-mobilised and clientelism was a persisting feature, the public sphere was decisive for the societal position of elites.

Indeed, this thesis has moved beyond the depiction of local elites according to their capacity to rig elections (as “caciques”) to reveal an added cultural dimension that contributed to their legitimation in society (as “notables”). Examples of this were the attempts that different generations of the Godó family made to portray themselves as the natural representatives of the local community. This image was the combined result of various important ingredients: the persistence of the Godó surname; the existence of a family memory that was transmitted across generations (e.g. the family household); the family’s deep-rooted economic interests in the territory; and their efforts to be seen as champions of the vulnerable. This image reveals the importance that traditional forms of authority (like patronage) still played in local communities. It does not imply, however, that clientelism and prestige were two separate dimensions. The rigging of elections was not just something that liberal elites relied on to control public office, but was also a socially embedded practice from which a considerable part of the population benefited. Consequently, clientelism and public prestige must be seen, above all, as two complementary and deeply interwoven elements in the social legitimation of elites.

The image of the notable contained a symbolic dimension that was cultivated in the public sphere and transmitted across time and space. The case of Ramón Godó, who
repeatedly emphasised that he was Carlos’ son is very revealing in this respect. Instead of running for elections as a new candidate, Ramón presented himself as the natural successor of a long and fruitful association between the Godó family and the constituency of Igualada. While this reveals how symbolic power constituted a form of capital that elites sought to pass down along family generations, the case of Ramón also shows that location was not necessarily an obstacle for its transmission. As a matter of fact, Ramón had been born in Bilbao and never lived in Igualada, but, nonetheless, he was a familiar face in this town. This reveals that in reality what mattered was not just the individual, but also the source of authority that invested his position (e.g. tradition).

Indeed, the case of Ramón shows to what extent the capacity to manipulate elections was important, but not sufficient to assure the position of elites. His resignation from politics demonstrates the importance of the public sphere as a dimension where different actors competed for the sources of legitimation. The heated climate that local politics had in Igualada’s constituency, and the active use the new actors made of the press, are central to understanding what appears to be a relatively singular scenario in Restoration Spain: the voluntary resignation of a “cacique”. The fact that a second family member resigned under similar circumstances, in 1916, provides further evidence about the constraints of context in the agency of individuals.

From a different perspective, the Godó’s case has also permitted the examination of two issues that have traditionally been neglected in the literature on clientelism. First, the question of how clientelism is redefined in periods of transition; and second, how these changes forced the elites to reinvent their power strategies. These questions have often been neglected in the literature because even though clientelism is being increasingly studied for new periods – that is, besides the last quarter of the 19th century – an intra-party perspective is rarely adopted. This thesis, in contrast, has embraced two different political systems (the Democratic Sexenium and the Restoration) with the aim of examining the changing nature of clientelistic procedures. The result is a picture that reveals that the rigging of elections also existed in competitive and pluralist party systems like the Sexenio, where political rights were considerably extended (e.g. universal manhood suffrage). By illuminating this intra-party system frame, this thesis has challenged the view that clientelism was a “pre-modern” practice doomed to disappear with the widening of the franchise and the rise of competitive politics. Likewise, the comparison between France and Spain reveals the limitations of understanding Europe’s democratisation according to ideal models of development. That
being said, significant differences existed in terms of the procedures and actors that clientelism involved, as the comparison between the two mentioned countries has illustrated.

The case of *La Vanguardia* has been used to illuminate the functions newspapers played in the structure of cadre parties. At a time when political organisations lacked a permanent structure, newspapers provided a physical forum for their members, reinforced the sense of community, and acted as the source of *delegated power* of the party. Equally important was the role of the press as an instrument elites used to compete for the sources of authority of liberal parties. Although the skirmishes between the Rius and Collaso factions lasted for many years, for the latter the establishing of their own newspaper made a crucial difference. From being regarded as rebels, they became legitimate interlocutors in the eyes of Sagasta thanks to the efforts and support of *La Vanguardia*. In other words, the press made it possible to gain public notoriety and to compete for the sources of legitimacy within the structure of cadre parties. All this reveals a political culture in which the mission of the press was not to serve the “common good”, but rather to appeal to the numerically restricted members of a political community. The high number of duels that were motivated by cases of defamation in the press provides further evidence of the advocacy function that print culture still retained in much of Europe.

Official records maintain the account that Carlos and Bartolomé Godó were the founders of *La Vanguardia*. The absence of a family archive has prevented historians from confirming this point; but, in practice, this has contributed to making this the most widespread explanation. Drawing on a wide range of alternative sources (like press accounts, private correspondence and notarial documents) this thesis has demonstrated that the origins of the most popular newspaper in Barcelona today were, in reality, more complex. The birth of *La Vanguardia* was, above all, the collective effort of the faction of Collaso to dispute the leadership of Rius in Barcelona’s Liberal Party branch. Within this faction, the Godó brothers did not seem to be the leaders, but the decision of Bartolomé Godó to be the investor-partner granted him ownership of *La Vanguardia* and therefore the power to change the editorial line of this newspaper.

In a family of manufacturers that never saw journalism as a personal vocation, but rather an instrument to promote their private agenda, the power to dictate the editorial line became fundamental. Moreover, this thesis has argued that this attribution became the Godó’s lifeboat once clientelism was no longer feasible. The capacity to position *La Vanguardia* in favour of one politician or another, and to influence the views of thousands of readers through the news content it selected, is where the influence of the Godó family in the
new mass society ultimately resided. To a considerable extent, the Godó family were responsible for the ascension of *La Vanguardia*. The members of this family were never journalists, but they could envisage the returns that addressing a wider audience beyond the political community could provide for their interests. This possibility became a reality in 1888, when the Godó brothers decided to radically alter the newspaper’s orientation.

Indeed, the transformation of this newspaper has been used to tackle the transition from an advocacy press model towards an independent and commercial one, this being a broader historical phenomenon that took place across Europe and the United States during the 19th and 20th centuries. In so doing, the case of *La Vanguardia* has been used to argue against the liberal tradition, which depicts the transition from an advocacy press model towards an independent one as a teleological history of progress. Likewise, it has also challenged the economic perspective, which identifies the growing commercialisation of newspapers and the emphasis on communication technologies (like news agencies and the telegraph) with the depoliticisation of news. In contrast to the two mentioned narratives (liberal and economic), the case of *La Vanguardia* shows that the birth of the new mass press was a more complex and contradictory process, which requires taking into account the broader changes in political culture and the historical context; as well as reflecting on the intimate circumstances that conditioned (and motivated) the decisions of newspaper editors.

The reform plans of 1888, it has been argued, conformed to the Godó’s wish to reorient their strategies of influence. This need stemmed from two factors: first, there was a new political context, which was the result of the death of the family’s traditional protector (Collaso); and second, the family had understood that this drawback could only be overcome if their sphere of influence was expanded to new publics. Until that moment, the partisan orientation of *La Vanguardia* had provided priceless benefits to various Godó family members, especially to reach Congress and to promote local concerns. However, the lack of consensus between liberal parties on state affairs, like economic and foreign politics, implied that the interests of local elites were heavily dependent on their capacity to pressure central government. In the case of Catalan elites, the historiography has illustrated this need through the development of lobbying strategies (the so-called “*diputació catalana*”). This thesis has shown that public opinion was another sphere in which corporate action expanded through the press. The War of Melilla (1893) and the Cuban War of Independence (1895) underscored the increasingly strong links between the views of the Godó family and those of “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional”. This convergence of interests points to the transformation
of *La Vanguardia* from the organ of a political party into a prominent mouthpiece of the Catalan bourgeoisie.

If the Godó’s managed to do so effectively it is because the reform plans of 1888 became decisive to radically transform *La Vanguardia*’s reader profile. In sharp contrast to its initial readership of around 1,400, mostly from the Liberal Party, by the time of the First World War the Godó’s newspaper was the undisputed leader in Barcelona with more than 100,000 readers. However, it is important to note that the structural features of the press in Mediterranean countries remained very modest. Newspapers in other countries, like France or England, had reached a circulation of millions of readers long before the war broke out. However, and in contrast to the traditional perspective among communication scholars, who tend to evaluate the history of the press according to the liberal narrative, and more recently according to media systems theory, this thesis has adopted a transnational perspective.

In so doing, it has shown that the structural differences between European countries – still important in so many ways – were not an impediment for the circulation of journalistic practices across national boundaries. In fact, the situation proved to be rather the opposite: the wish to emulate – what contemporaries perceived as – a more “modern” type of journalism fostered these cultural transfers. This point has been illustrated through the cases of *La Vanguardia* and *Il Corriere della Sera*, two newspapers that saw *The Times* as the model to emulate in order to expand their influence in society. However, by the end of the 19th century this English newspaper was no longer the successful newspaper it had once been, and it was being outstripped by the *popular*-oriented newspapers of the *New Journalism*. Still, both in Spain and Italy *The Times* continued to be regarded as the best example of *quality* journalism, and therefore as the best model to spread their influence among the bourgeoisie of Barcelona and Milan, respectively.

Indeed, the attempt of Sánchez Ortiz to emulate the English newspaper was much more than simply trying to increase its readership: it evoked the changes that journalistic culture was experiencing in Europe, and how the circulation of knowledge across national boundaries became decisive in shaping this. In this regard, Sánchez can be considered as one of the first advocates for the professionalisation of journalism in Barcelona. His book “*El Periodismo*” – one of the first theoretical works published in the country about journalism – summarised this new occupational ethic with the following motto: journalism should be both “priesthood and magisterium” (“*sacerdocio y magisterio*”). This approach towards journalism was not a very extended practice in Mediterranean countries where, as Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini have noted, the links between press and politics remained very
tight. In fact, as late as 1917, *La Vanguardia* would still deplore the fact that the content in most of the Spanish press was still dedicated to “theatre, bullfighting and politics”. In contrast to this, in 1888 *La Vanguardia* started championing an informative press model, where hard information (“facts, facts and facts”) and the neutral delivery of news (the ideal of impartiality), were regarded as the formula to expand the newspaper’s circulation; and consequently, the influence of its editors too.

If this model of qualitative journalism had considerable success (as the growing circulation of *La Vanguardia* demonstrates) it was not because this was pre-determined; nor because the Godó brothers were especially prophetic men. In fact, in this thesis, when explaining the transformations of *La Vanguardia*, special attention has been made not to rely on the *great men* narrative that is still present in several biographies on “press barons”. Of course this does not mean that the Godó’s agency has been ignored or downplayed. After all, if *La Vanguardia* adopted an informative press model it was only because its owners were committed to spending their money on so doing. The motto of Ramón Godó to “keep up with the times and avoid crystallizing” is very revealing in this respect. Similar to his father and uncle before him, he never wrote a single article for the newspaper he had come to inherit. But, and also like them, he did not hesitate in making important investments. The chapter on the First World War has shown his determination – one is tempted to say obsession – to make his newspaper the best informed in Barcelona. The empirical evidence gathered in the archives of the French news agency Havas, in Paris, show that to a considerable extent he succeeded in this endeavour.

Still, apart from the agency of the newspaper’s proprietors, this thesis has argued that *La Vanguardia* became “successful” because, above all, it adapted its content to satisfy the changing tastes of a considerable part of Barcelona’s reading public. This implies that the relation between newspapers and their readers was not a sender-receiver relationship, but rather a multidirectional one. That is to say, readers were not passive actors, but had the autonomy to choose to buy one newspaper over another; and therefore the capacity to punish or reward the business model of a given newspaper.

This perspective of press history “from below” is present in different chapters of this thesis. In the case of Morocco, the Republican press demonstrated that, under the surface of an ostensibly unanimous wave of support for the war, there were some readers that remained emotionally immune to the efforts of the press propaganda; and on some other occasions jingoism was used to criticise the liberal parties. A second example of the importance of taking *reception* into account is the Disaster of 1898. In the aftermath of Spain’s defeat
against the United States, the press suffered a serious crisis of credibility. This crisis became particularly intense in the case of Madrid, where some newspapers lost as much as 40% of their circulation. A perception that the newspapers had been decisive in fostering popular jingoism produced a general disenchantment with the press, reflected by the fall in sales, even though their consequences were felt very differently in each city. One hypothesis to explain this difference in consumer patterns is the lack of integration of the press market nationally. Most of newspapers continued to have a local, and at best, regional distribution, which was a feature that was common to other Mediterranean countries too.

While pessimism and decay could be said to be widespread feelings in fin de siècle Europe, national peculiarities nevertheless remained important. At first sight, liberal politicians in Spain seemed better able to overcome their particular colonial drawback when compared, for example, with Italy or Portugal. In practice, however, the Disaster of 1898 did mark a turning point, for it contributed – among other things – to intensifying the discredit of the political system. This thesis has shown how the growing criticism of caciquismo became entangled with a rich controversy over the ideal function that journalism ought to play in society. The feeling of national degeneration is what led contemporaries, like Joaquín Costa and the other witnesses quoted in his book, to criticise the collusion between the press and politicians; and to implicitly argue in favour of the professionalisation of journalism (even if none of them ever explicitly used this expression). Still, other contemporaries held the opposite view, and argued that the new commercial orientation of the press is what had ultimately led to the loss of the colonies – thus exposing a hidden nostalgia for the partisan press.

Yet paradoxically, and despite the different views held by these contemporaries, they all evoked the sense of unease that resulted from the emergence of a new mass society. Regardless of their opinion, they all shared the conviction that the press exerted a strong influence over society. This perception is particularly striking for a mostly rural country like Spain, where a large part of the population was still illiterate and lived in small villages. Still, it was precisely this lack of development – rather than the high circulation of newspapers – that ultimately led contemporaries to see the press as a power with great ascendancy over the population; and therefore an indispensible force in any attempt to rejuvenate the country.
For the case of Germany, historian Bernhard Fulda has observed a similar pattern of behaviour in the Berlin of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933).\textsuperscript{1009} Contemporaries tended to regard the press as having great power of persuasion among their fellows. This perception that contemporaries had about the press – a phenomenon media scholars refer to as the “Third Person Effect” – was particularly present among the elites (e.g. politicians and intellectuals). According to Fulda, this was because politicians were still not used to handling the numerous audiences prompted by the new mass politics. As a result of this, they tended to assign great power of manipulation to the press; this being a perception that implicitly assumed that media consumers were passive. In this regard, what makes the examples of Germany and Spain interesting is that despite being very different countries, contemporaries were gaining awareness about the mediatisation of society. This “perception”, it has been argued, was the result of the newspapers’ transformation into the new main form of mass communication.

The last part of this thesis has examined the demise of the Godó’s political career in order to tackle a broader European phenomenon: the birth of mass politics and the consequences this implied for the social composition of elites. Quantitative analysis (prosopography) has demonstrated that during the period between the 1880s and 1920s the composition of Europe’s elected representatives was significantly redefined. National differences remained important, but in most countries a substantial change in the composition of elected representatives took place during this period. The turnover in the composition of elites proved to be, in reality, a long and slow process. Rather than an earthquake, the presence of traditional elites (landowners, nobles, state officials) remained important until the First World War. Quantitative analysis has thus provided the empirical background for the so-called “end of the notables” in Europe, and has illustrated that it was a protracted process.

The contribution that prosopography has made to our understanding of historical change is beyond question, and it has not been the aim of this thesis to underestimate its merits. Yet in giving priority to the quantitative perspective, historians have nurtured a narrative of decline and fall to explain the crisis of liberal politics. This narrative presents two significant problems: first, it provides a static picture of elites, based on their modal features (namely, the capacity of traditional elites to be re-elected or not); and second, it associates the loss of weight of this social group in elected bodies with their loss of influence in society. This thesis has sought to challenge these two assumptions by adopting a qualitative approach.

based on the Godó’s agency. Hence, through this family it has been possible to analyse the crisis of liberal institutions from a micro perspective, and to show how the transformation of the political scenario posed a serious threat to the social cohesion of elites.

Indeed, along two generations the Godó family had managed to build a solid political career based on kinship cooperation. While one family member would run for Congress, another would run for the Provincial Government. This collective strategy provided fruitful benefits: on one hand it allowed them to control key decision-making positions (like the promotion of local infrastructures); on the other hand it expanded the family’s range of influence to Madrid. This strategy was transmitted to the second generation of the family, and was eventually enhanced when a third family member was appointed mayor of Igualada. However, the discredit of liberal parties – which intensified after the Disaster of 1898 – and the emergence of new party movements galvanised the cooperation strategies the Godó family had employed for 30 years (1880-1910s). Their response to the challenge of mass politics was ultimately to separate the two spheres (press and politics) that had traditionally been so closely entwined in the family strategies.

Hence, the owner of La Vanguardia (Ramón Godó Lallana) abandoned his involvement with the Liberal Party and resigned from active politics. From that moment onwards, he decided to concentrate exclusively on his role as newspaper proprietor. In contrast, his cousin in Igualada (Juan Godó Llucià) reacted very differently to the threat of mass politics: he continued with the family’s traditional affiliation to the Liberal Party, and continued to see clientelism as the way to maintain the family’s political domain in Igualada. The case of this family thus reveals that, when studied from a micro-perspective, the responses of the elites to the birth of mass politics was a complex and nuanced episode in Europe’s history.

Moreover, and contrary to the narrative about the “end of the notables”, the case of Juan Godó Llucià demonstrates that the “notables” were neither helpless victims in the face of the new mass politics, nor were they simply opposed to democratisation by sticking to “autocratic means”. Drawing on the line of research that historians Jean Briquet and Renato Camurri have opened for the case of France and Italy, this thesis has used the case of the Godó family to examine the notables’ strategies of adaptation. The launching of an electoral campaign, where public meetings were organised and a caravan of cars visited all the villages in the constituency, reflected the new attempt to win the vote through legal means – albeit in combination with clientelism. Another novelty was the introduction of a new discourse based on identity issues. Thus, Juan Godó did not only present himself as the community leader, but
also started championing a dual conception of identity (Spanish and Catalan) in the local sphere — this being an image that his cousin Ramón Godó contributed to publicise through the pages of *La Vanguardia*. These self-fashioning strategies can only be understood by combining different scales of analysis (local, regional and national). As in other parts of Europe, identity and anticlericalism were two elements that featured in the realignment of political debate in Spain, and therefore inspired the adaptation strategies of traditional elites.

If the case of Joan Godó exemplifies the attempt of some notables to *professionalise* their sources of authority, his resignation from politics is equally revealing. The family’s thirty-year monopoly of public office in Igualada’s constituency was not an impediment for a heterogeneous – and often divided – opposition to challenge the Godó’s political domain. Examining the actions of this political opposition has enabled the Godó family to be seen from an alternative (or de-centred) perspective, and also makes it possible to draw comparisons with other anti-corruption movements in Europe. Indeed, historians have stressed the importance of anti-corruption movements in discrediting liberal politics. Jens Ivo Engels, for instance, has explained that in the case of England and France, the battle against electoral corruption was fought more intensely by the elites than by the voters. In the case of England, bribery became too expensive for political parties to bear, whereas in France, Republican elites denounced bribery to express their opposition to the Second Empire.\(^{1010}\)

In the Spanish case, anti-corruption movements did not emerge as a result of scandals (as was mostly the case in the above-mentioned countries) but rather consisted in the instrumentalization of clientelism to promote a political agenda. In consequence, a tentative hypothesis – that still requires further research – is that Spain’s case was more similar to that of France, since in both countries the non-governmental elites were the ones who tried to overthrow (and sometimes transform) the political system by exposing corruption in public. Through the Godó family it has thus been possible to examine the functioning of these anti-corruption movements from a micro-perspective. In a highly politicised local context, both the Republicans and the Catalan nationalists made intense use of newspapers to politicise larger segments of society, and to launch smear campaigns to undermine the Godó’s prestige. While this indicates the aspiration of these new movements to politicise growing segments of society, the new competitive and plural character of elections did not remove clientelism. In fact, the criticising of liberal politics did not prevent the new political movements from employing, on some occasions, the same fraudulent methods they censured. In a highly

competitive scenario, where electoral turnout even reached 80% of the population, the old
and new elites combined the appealing to voters through legal methods with the traditional
fraudulent method of rigging the elections. This indicates a new mutation of clientelism,
where this was no longer the sole proceeding that liberal parties used to rotate in power, but
also constituted an alternative strategy of the new parties to battle for elected bodies.

Nevertheless, the demise of the Godó’s political career did not put an end to the
influence of this family in society. Next to elected bodies, alternative spaces for political
participation existed. Public opinion became one of these alternative dimensions where
traditional elites sought to redefine their sources of influence. The correspondence between
Ramón Godó Lallana and the conservative politician Antonio Maura reveals to what extent
the former was committed to continuing to influence politics; and to support his relatives in
Igualada. Yet not from public office, but through the subtler channel the new mass press
represented. In Godó’s own words, his goal was to make La Vanguardia the “lighthouse of
the conservative masses”. The fact that he was offered various political positions, and granted
a title of nobility in 1916, proves to what extent newspaper editors were important as political
actors. The case of Ramón Godó thus neatly encapsulates the main argument of this thesis
with regard to the role of the press in relation to the crisis of liberal politics in Europe. That
is, that the transformation of the press not only fostered democratisation (in so far as it
contributed to making the corrupt practices of liberal elites more visible) but also opened new
channels for the traditional elites to maintain and transfer their influence in this new mass
society.
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  - **Madrid**: ABC, El Imparcial, La Correspondencia de España, El Liberal, La Época, Nuevo Mundo.

  - **Tangier**: Al-moghreb al-Aksa.

- **Archives**

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    - Arxiu Fotogràfic d’Igualada (AFI)

  - Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Barcelona (AHCB)

  - Arxiu Històric de Protocols de Barcelona (AHPB)

  - Arxiu Històric de la Diputació de Barcelona (AHDPB)

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- *Hemeroteca Digital*, Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE):
  http://www.bne.es/es/Catalogos/HemerotecaDigital/

- *Biblioteca Virtual de Prensa Historica* (BVPH), Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte:
  http://prensahistorica.mcu.es/

- *The Times Archive*: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/
ANNEXES

1. Modern edition of ‘La Vanguardia’ (05/11/2008)

2. First edition of ‘La Vanguardia’ (01/02/1881)

3. The Godó Family Tree

4. Members of the Godó family elected as deputies to Barcelona’s Provincial Council

5. Members of the Godó family elected as deputies to Congress

6. Catalonia’s electoral map during the Restoration (1874-1923)

7. The business of the Godó family in the jute industry

8. Advertisement of the textile factory of Juan Godó Llucià, named “La Igualadina Cotonera”

9. “La Igualadina Cotonera” at the beginning of the 20th century

10. Edition of “El Igualadino” (20/04/1907)

11. Electoral map before and after the General elections of 1907
1. Modern edition of ‘La Vanguardia’, with the motto referring to its founders: “FUNDADA EN 1881 POR DON CARLOS Y DON BARTOLOMÉ GODO”.

[E.T.]: “Established in 1881 by Mr. Carlos and Mr. Bartolomé Godó”.

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2. **First edition of 'La Vanguardia' (01/02/1881)**

**AÑO I. MARTES 1.° DE FEBRERO DE 1881. NÚM. 1.**

**La Vanguardia.**

*Diario político y de avisos y noticias*

**Órgano del partido constitucional de la provincia.**

**Redacción y Administración: calle de las Eras, núm. 8 y 10, (frente la Plaza Real y la calle de la Arrixada).**

**Precios de suscripción:** En Barcelona, un mes, 6 rs.—Extranjero, un trimestre, 20 rs.—Anuncios y notificados, a precios convencionales.

**Afecciones meteorológicas** dadas por el tépico abejes D. Albérico Burchart.

**Santo de hoy:** San Ignacio y Cecilio. **Santo de mañana:** La Inmaculada de Ntra. Sra., San Cornelio Centurión y San Ercio. **CLAYBERT HOBAS.** Iglesia de Santo Jerónimo. **CORTES DE MARIJA.** Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes, privilegiada, 6 de la del Pino.

**Inyección salvat.** El mejor específico para la curación de todos los casos de fiebres, así en el hombre como en la mujer.

**Vendidas:** Farmacias de Aguilar, Rambla del Centro, 37; de Montserrat, Rambla, esquina Puerta-Ferrería; de Aguilar, Rambla del Centro, 37; de Bode, Platería, 48, y de Marqués, Hospital, 10.

**Reuma, herpes, (briams), VÉNEREO.**

Si se sospecha que existe en la sangre alguna de estos males, basada de la mayor parte de enfermedades, dépararla con las grutas *inmunicejas*, según Fórmula del Dr. Salvi. Este precioso depurativo obra sin irritar ni debilitar las fuerzas, y no hay mal sostenido por algún vicio que no resista a tan poderosa medicación. Franco, 1 peseta. Dóminicos principales: Farmacias de Montserrat, Rambla esquina Puerta-Ferrería; de Aguilar, Rambla del Centro, 37; de Bode, Platería, 48, y de Marqués, Hospital, 10.

**3. El principal, 3.**

**Casa unica en España.**

Ropas hechas y a medida. No hay marcas sin comprar. **Unión de San Agustín.** En plaza de la Iglesia.

Inmune hasta la muerte.—El PEÑO MALAGÜENEO.

**Enfermedades de las vias urinarias.**

**Vénereo, sífilis, estrecheces, mal de piedra, catarro de la vejiga, impotencia, etc.**

**El Dr. Salvi.** Vende y vende en públicas consultas por esta Facultad de Medicina, especialista en dichas enfermedades, emplea en la curación cuántos medios están en uso en las clínicas de Paris y otros del extranjero. De 3 a 4 y de 6 a 8. Puerta-Ferrería, 11, 1.

**Espectáculos.**

**Teatro Principal.** 22 de abono.—Par.—Historia de la ópera de Lecag La Fronda. 1 peseta. A las 8 Manaca mieladora, por tarde y noche, el gran baile Cisneros, acompañado respectivamente de los operistas IRAINE y LA FRONDA.

**Gran teatro del.** Hoy hay función por otro lugar el 2° baile de máscara.

**Manana, por la noche, 6.** Representación de la aprobación de opera Migno.
The names marked with a blue box correspond to the hereditary line of the family branch who remained in Igualada; while those in pink and orange correspond to the descendants of Carlos and Bartolomé Godó, who emigrated first to Bilbao and then settled in Barcelona. See Chapter 1.

Sources: Arxiu Històric Comarcal de l’Anoia-Arxiu Parroquial d’Igualada (ACAN-API), Llibre de baptisms; Llibre d’òbits; Llibre de matrimonis. Archivo Histórico Eclesiástico de Bizkaia (AHEB), Libro de bautismos, libro de difuntos, libro de matrimonios.
4. **MEMBERS OF THE GODÓ FAMILY ELECTED AS DEPUTIES TO BARCELONA’S PROVINCIAL COUNCIL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Election procedure</th>
<th>Date of the elections / appointment / resignation</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Commission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomé Godó Pié (1839-1894)</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>20/03/1870 / 06/01/1874</td>
<td>14/04/1870 – 06/01/1874</td>
<td>Calaf</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment by the Civil Governor</td>
<td>01/02/1874</td>
<td>07/01/1874 / 04/01/1877</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Calaf</td>
<td>“Gobernación”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary resignation</td>
<td>04/01/1875</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Igualada</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>04/03/1877</td>
<td>06/03/1877 / 03/11/1878</td>
<td>03/11/1878 – 03/11/1878</td>
<td>Igualada</td>
<td>“Fomento”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>11/09/1898</td>
<td>03/11/1898 / 20/04/1903</td>
<td>20/04/1903 – 20/04/1903</td>
<td>Igualada-Vilafranca</td>
<td>“Fomento”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>08/03/1903</td>
<td>22/04/1903 / 22/04/1907</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Igualada-Vilafranca</td>
<td>“Fomento”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**


1014 The Provincial Council was divided into different commissions: “Hacienda” (“Public finance”), “Gobernación” (“Governance”) and “Fomento” (in charge of promoting economic activities and infrastructures). B. de Riquer (ed.), op. cit., p. 266.

1015 First provincial elections by universal manhood suffrage. According to the Royal Decree of 10 February 1877, the province of Barcelona was divided into 16 judicial districts and 30 constituencies. Igualada was one of the judicial districts and contained two constituencies (Calaf and Igualada). *Ibidem*, p. 246.

1016 On 6 January 1874 the Civil Governor dissolved the “Republican” Provincial Council and appointed a new one integrated by liberal-conservatives and liberal progressives. B. Riquer, op. cit., p. 158.

1017 Shortly after the coup d’état of General Martínez Campos of 26 December 1874, which would mark the beginning of the Bourbon Restoration (1874-1923), the liberal progressives attached to the leadership of Sagasta submitted their resignation. Bartolomé’s was accepted on 4 January 1875.

1018 On 10 September 1878 the Provincial Council was partially renewed. Bartolomé’s position was filled by Ramón Catarineu Castells (no partisan affiliation).

1019 Partial renewal of the Provincial Council.

1020 The persisting interest of Juan Godó Llucià in participating in the commission of the “Fomento” is an example of the interest of the Godó family in using the Provincial Council to promote inland connections (the traditional lack of infrastructures in Igualada). In his capacity as provincial deputy, Joan Godó participated in the construction of different inland roads: Igualada-Sitges; Vilafranca-Tarragona (1894); Carme-Pobla de Claramunt (1896); Igualada-Santa Coloma de Queralt (1897); Carme-Pobla de Claramunt (1899 and 1901); Vilafranca-Aguiló; Igualada-Sitges (1903); Igualada-Santa Coloma de Queralt (1906). AHDPB, *Llibre de Registre de diputats (1812-1890)*, R-12-179, pp. 131-132 and p. 223.

1021 End of the elected period.
5. MEMBERS OF THE GODÓ FAMILY ELECTED AS DEPUTIES TO CONGRESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Date of the elections</th>
<th>Party in power</th>
<th>Winning candidate</th>
<th>Other candidates</th>
<th>Electoral turnout</th>
<th>Percentage of votes obtained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1879-1880</td>
<td>20/04/1879</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Manuel Camacho Fernández (C)</td>
<td>Josep Mª Rius Badia</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>63.60 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881-1883</td>
<td>20/08/1881</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Bartolomé Godó Pié (L)</td>
<td>Manuel Camacho (C)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884-1885</td>
<td>27/04/1884</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Francesc Gumà Ferran (C)</td>
<td>Bartolomé Godó Pié (L)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>76.80 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886-1890</td>
<td>04/04/1886</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Bartolomé Godó Pié (L)</td>
<td>Vicente Romero Baldírich (L)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-1892</td>
<td>01/02/1891</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Josep Mª Rius Badia (C)</td>
<td>Carlos Godó Pié (L) Josep d'España d'Orteu (Carlíst)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893-1895</td>
<td>05/03/1893</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Carlos Godó Pié (L)</td>
<td>Josep d'España d'Orteu (Carlíst) / Nicolás Estévéances</td>
<td>42.35 %</td>
<td>62.45 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896-1897</td>
<td>12/04/1896</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Carlos Godó Pié (L)</td>
<td>Josep d'España d'Orteu (Carlíst)</td>
<td>33.72 %</td>
<td>52.43 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>27/03/1898</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Josep Balcells Cortada (L)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>59.84 %</td>
<td>98.92 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899-1900</td>
<td>16/04/1899</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Ramón Godó Lallana (L)</td>
<td>Narcís Mauri Vidal (?)</td>
<td>39.64 %</td>
<td>68.14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-1902</td>
<td>19/05/1901</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Ramón Godó Lallana (L)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>50.06 %</td>
<td>99.77 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903-1904</td>
<td>26/05/1903</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Ramón Godó Lallana (L)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>59.62 %</td>
<td>99.26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-1906</td>
<td>10/11/1905</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Ramón Godó Lallana (L)</td>
<td>Idefonso García del Corral (R)</td>
<td>50.68 %</td>
<td>68.75 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907-1909</td>
<td>21/04/1907</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Frederic Rahola Trèmols (Lliga R.)</td>
<td>Juan Godó Llucià (L) and Josep Puig d'Asprer (R)</td>
<td>64.12 %</td>
<td>55.70 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-1913</td>
<td>08/05/1910</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Juan Godó Llucià (L)</td>
<td>Frederic Rahola (Lliga Regionalista)</td>
<td>80.40 %</td>
<td>50.89 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-1915</td>
<td>08/03/1914</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Manuel González Villart (C)</td>
<td>Juan Godó Llucià (L)</td>
<td>75.65 %</td>
<td>52.97 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-1917</td>
<td>09/04/1916</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Manuel González Villart (C) victòria conservadora</td>
<td>Bartolomé Trias Villart (C)</td>
<td>69.66 %</td>
<td>55.59 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>24/02/1918</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Carles Camps d'Olzinelles (Lliga R.)</td>
<td>Manuel Gonzalez Villart (C)</td>
<td>76. 91 %</td>
<td>50.86 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1023 Republican and Federal, and Minister of War (11/06/1873-28/06/1873).

1024 See Chapter 6.
7. THE BUSINESS OF THE GODÓ FAMILY IN THE JUTE INDUSTRY

Picture 1. Location of the “Els Sachs” factory in Poblenou (Barcelona), Street of Wad-Ras, nº192.

Picture 2. Advertisement “Godó Hermanos y Cª”

1026 J. Roca y Roca, Barcelona en la mano. Guía de Barcelona y sus alrededores, Barcelona, Enrique López, Editor, 1895, p. 347. [E. T.]: “Jute spinning mill and bags for America”. See Chapter 4. In Picture 1 the Street of Wad-Ras appears written in Spanish as “Guald Ras”.

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8. Advertisement of the textile factory of Juan Godó Llucià, named “La Igualadina Cotonería”

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10. Edition of the newspaper “EL IGUALADINO”, one of the most actively combative against the Godó family, during the electoral campaign of 1907

¡A votar!

¡Electors!

Demuestra que acogías con agrado el llamado que hice el año pasado a los electores de no olvidar el día de las elecciones, y que tenías en el presente de la responsabilidad del sufragio.

El Igualadino, 20/04/1907, p. 1. For the translation of the content, see Chapter 7.
**11. Electoral map before and after the General elections of 1907**

**10/11/1905**

**Montero R.**

General elections held on 10 November 1905 under the Government of Eugenio Montero Ríos (Liberal Party); and on 21 April 1907 under the government of Antonio Maura (Conservative Party). Conservative Party (green); Liberal Party (yellow); Carlists (blue); Lliga Regionalista (purple); “independents” (grey); Republicans (red). Source: Gemma Rubí / Josep Armengol, *Vots, electors i corrupció. Una reflexió sobre l’apatia a Catalunya (1869-1923)*, Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Biblioteca Serra d’Or, 2012, Annex 2. See Chapters 6 and 7.
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