European University Institute

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION

Colonial Internationalism

How Cooperation Among Experts Reshaped Colonialism (1830s-1950s)

Florian Wagner

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization
of the European University Institute

Florence, May 6, 2016

European University Institute
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Dissertation Abstract

This dissertation assesses the impact of transnational cooperation among experts on colonial policies between 1830 and 1950. While colonial projects always made use of transnational cooperation, I argue that an ideal of colonial internationalism emerged in the 1890s that entirely reshaped colonial policies. Colonial cooperation reached its climax in the foundation of the International Colonial Institute (ICI, 1893) whose membership reached 200 in 1914. The non-governmental institute was the most important international and colonial institution prior to the First World War and developed into a hub of exchange between colonial experts, who contributed in a significant way to making colonial domination more efficient and to establishing a form of best practice of colonial rule. In the interwar period, the ICI provided the League of Nations' Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) with colonial experts. Taking the ICI as a starting point, my dissertation explores the international dimension of colonialism between 1830 and 1950 that remains understudied in the historiography. I investigate a broad range of colonial methods that internationalist experts designed, tested and applied in the colonies. Their impact could be felt across the colonial world. Referring to research in tropical hygiene, they dismissed settler colonization and proclaimed the "triumph of the natives" as potential co-colonizers. They professionalized the training of colonial administrators in all colonizing countries and founded new schools for overseas administrators. By transferring successfully tested seeds and plants from agronomic laboratories in the Dutch Indies to Africa, they established a new cash crop economy. Moreover, members of the International Colonial Institute invented legal anthropology as a means to manipulate native law, while others modified Islamic law to use it for colonial purposes. International cooperation among colonizers was also responsive to Pan-Islamic movements across colonial empires, but they ultimately learned to use Pan-Islamism for their own purposes.

The main argument of my dissertation is that international transfers among colonial experts brought about development policies and cooperation with the "native" populations. Far from granting the colonized a say, however, the colonizers attempted to profit from their collaboration without treating them on equal terms. While modernizing and professionalizing colonial domination and exploitation, colonial internationalists also legitimized and sustained colonial domination. Their flexibility and openness to native collaboration and participation was a strategy to overcome colonal crises and to sustain colonial rule. By using comparison and transfer, they developed methods to achieve this goal, which were often more "modern" than the colonial policy of the PMC. The ICI outlived the PMC as an institution of colonial internationalism. After 1945, the ICI contributed to apply colonial patterns of thinking to the emerging "Third World." Given this *longue durée* success of colonial internationalism, I argue that a theory of colonial internationalism is necessary, or even indispensable, to adequately understand and explain the origins and the endurance over time of colonialism. This dissertation provides the basis for an internationalist theory of colonialism.

This dissertation is dedicated to Levi V. Wagner

Colonial Internationalism
How Cooperation Among Experts Reshaped Colonialism
(1830s-1950s)

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Abbreviations

AEF	Afrique Équatoriale Française
AGRB	Archives Gènèrales du Royaume Belge, Brussels
AHIS	Archives Hoover Institution Stanford
AMAEB	Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Belges/Archives Africaines Brussels
AMEAF	Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, France (Nantes and La Corneuve)
ANOM	Archives Nationales d'Outre Mer, Aix-en-Provence
AOF	Afrique Occidentale Française
AGRB	Archives Générales du Royaume, Brussels
BArch	Bundesarchiv Berlin
BCAF	Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française
BNF	Bibliothèque Nationale de France
CFS	Congo Free State/État Indépendant du Congo
CPM	Commission Pérmanente des Mandats (see Permanent Mandates Commission)
DKG	Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft
DKZ	Deutsche Kolonialzeitung
DC	Dépèche Coloniale
HZA	Hohenlohe Zentralarchiv, Neuenstein
ICI	Institut Colonial International
IfL	Institut für Länderkunde, Leipzig
ILO	International Labour Organization
ILO Archives	Archives International Labor Organization
INCIDI	Institut des Civilisation Différentes
KWK	Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee
PMC	Permanent Mandates Commission, League of Nations
UCF	Union Coloniale Française
ULCSH	Leiden University Archives, Collection Snouck-Hurgronje

Introduction

In 1894, colonial activists from seven European countries founded the International Colonial Institute (ICI) in Brussels. The ICI was the result of a long history of mutual exchange among colonial experts, who shared their experience in colonial journals or over extended meetings that culminated in sociable dinners. By the outbreak of the First World War, it had developed into a think tank involving colonial experts from all colonizing countries. In 1913, the non-governmental ICI listed 136 members from twelve countries. Among them figured colonial governors and ministers, powerful leaders of expansionist lobby groups, authoritative scholars and publicists, as well as technical engineers. They styled themselves as colonial reformers and experts for whom colonialism was a science rather than an ideology. This redefinition suggested that colonialism was not a nationalist project, but an international effort dedicated to the progress of humanity. Consequently, the foundation of the ICI as an international and scientific institute was an attempt to legitimize and rationalize colonialism – at the very moment when it came under attack for being too expensive and immoral. To answer such calls for professionalization of colonial administration, the ICI developed new "techniques" of colonization that would be used in colonies all over the world. Its members professionalized the training of colonial administrators, developed tropical medicine, improved colonial agriculture and codified customary law. They drafted regulations for the transnational recruitment of labor force, and introduced monetary reforms in the colonies. Their voluminous publications on those topics, which appeared in the series *Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale*, left no stone in the European colonies unturned.

This dissertation analyzes the emergence of the International Colonial Institute in particular and of internationalist colonialism in general, and assesses their impact. It locates the ICI within a matrix of transnational exchange and places it in the genealogy of colonial thought during the long nineteenth century. Situated in this broader context of global connection and diachronic evolution, the ICI's significance unfolds in two ways: in a global perspective, it was the first institution to promote comparison and transnational transfers as "methods" of colonization. Seen in a diachronic perspective, it was the first institution to promote a "reformed" colonialism that valued indigenous collaboration over settler colonization and

economic development over both. In doing so, it not only anticipated the supposedly humanitarian colonialism of the twentieth century, but prepared its way.[1]

The thesis of this dissertation is that transnational knowledge transfers among colonial experts inaugurated an era of colonial reform and established the new paradigm of modern development policies. In emphasizing the role of transnational transfers, my purpose is to show the ICI's intention to professionalize colonial management and to emancipate colonialism from its nationalist origins.[2] Being at the center of an international epistemic community of professionals, the ICI launched a non-governmental campaign to improve colonial rule. Its members styled themselves as a colonial avant-garde of scientific experts who repudiated nationalist imperialism. Their main concern was to abandon North-South transfers from the metropole to the colonies, which aimed at reproducing the motherland's society in overseas territories, by creating a Greater Britain, *La Plus Grande France* and *Das Grössere Deutschland*. Instead, they preferred South-South transfers between the colonies and "intercolonial learning" among autonomous colonial experts. Their purpose was to develop colonial techniques that brought about colonial self-sufficiency and colonial exploitation "on the cheap." In doing so, they redefined colonization and shifted its meaning from settler occupation to professional management by means of a skilled "native policy." Transnational knowledge exchange helped the experts to find a best practice of colonial rule and development.

By announcing and partly realizing a new era of colonialism, the ICI broke new ground in every field of colonialism. In the field of colonial science, the ICI deposed geography and crowned anthropology as the queen of colonial science. In political history, it replaced geopolitical jealousy with colonial management and diplomatic rivalry with expert cooperation. In historical semantics it shifted the meaning of civilization from the uplifting of humans to economic penetration of territory. In the field of colonial propaganda it justified colonial expansion with extrinsic (or peripheral) and not with intrinsic (or Eurocentric) arguments. In the field of native policy, it regarded the indigenous peoples not as savages but as natives who were perfectly adapted to their natural milieu and therefore more resilient human capital than white colonists. Finally, it sought legitimization for colonial policies not in a glorious past, but in a prosperous future. All in all, the ICI members thought of themselves as agents of progress and portrayed colonization as a catalyst for the advancement of humanity. Thus, they did not

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[1] About the close connection of empire and humanitarianism see M.N. Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2011).

[2] On professionalization in general see M.S. Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley, 1979).

claim a *right* to colonize on behalf of a superior civilization, but invoked a *duty* to develop colonies on behalf of humanity.

Reform, however, was not revolution, and the new colonial era was different in degree rather than in kind. It goes without saying that the reforms did not overthrow colonial rule. Instead, they were instrumental in substantiating and justifying it. And here, the narrative of reform reveals its true character as a discursive strategy of legitimization. By the 1890s, colonialists had a hard time justifying colonial projects as the benefits promised during the era of costly conquest in the 1880s failed to materialize. No single colony paid dividends and European governments became increasingly reluctant to shore up colonial budgets. The civilizing mission – prominently advocated by Jules Ferry in 1885 – had not shown any effects, if the intention to realize it had existed at all. To make matters worse, former supporters of colonial expansion publicly challenged the idea that colonialism made nations stronger – and suspected it was rather an expensive hobby of a few "colonial enthusiasts."[3]

The reform era inaugurated by the ICI was responsive to this colonial crisis of legitimation. Its members claimed to de-ideologize colonialism, rationalize colonial rule and make the colonies self-sufficient. While prosperity was the purpose of the reforms, development was the means to achieve it. By promoting development, the ICI experts claimed to be introducing rational colonization that would benefit both the colonizers and the colonized.[4] Development policies postponed colonial success once more to a distant future while offering colonial skeptics back home a clear telos and feeding the colonized with new hopes of emancipatory participation. Moreover, it satisfied the concept of "effective occupation", introduced at the Berlin Congo Conference in 1884/5, which granted the right of colonization to those nations who invested large sums of money in developing their colonies.[5] As a consequence, the concept of development was multifunctional and instrumental in justifying colonization before skeptical compatriots, the colonial subjects and an international community of colonizing nations.

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[3] Europeans started to criticize the cost of colonies during this period. The best overview and further literature: B. Stuchtey, *Die Europäische Expansion und Ihre Feinde: Kolonialismuskritik vom 18. bis in das 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2010), 219-372; see also A.S. Thompson, 'The Language of Imperialism and the Meanings of Empire: Imperial Discourse in British Politics, 1895-1914', *Journal of British Studies* 36, 2 (1997), 147–177: 151; The *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* identified a "Kolonialmüdigkeit" (colonial fatigue) among the Germans. Colonial activists were called "Kolonialschwärmer" (colonial dreamers) in Germany and *coloniaux* or *parti colonial* in France: 'Koloniale Statistik', in *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* (*DKZ*) 45 (6 November 1902), 45; 'Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft im Reichstsag', *DKZ* 12 (20.March 1902);'La crise franco-allemande et l'affaire d'Agadir'in *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française* (*BCAF*) from August 1911, 291; C.-R. Ageron, *France coloniale ou parti colonial?* (Paris, 1978).

[4] See J. Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens 2007), 7.

[5] See I. Geiss, 'Free Trade, Internationalization of the Congo Basin and the Principle of Effective Occupation', in S. Förster, W.J. Mommsen, and R. Robinson (eds.), *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition* (Oxford and New York, 1988), 263-280.

Internationalism was an essential part of this legitimization. It helped to portray the colonialists as apolitical experts, not driven by nationalist ideology but by universal rationality. Developmental colonialism was said to originate in humanist rationalism and in methodological science. The ICI promoted international comparison and transnational transfer as the ideal methods of colonial science. Between 1894 and 1914, it published more than fifty comparative studies on legislation and administration, land tenure laws, railway construction, irrigation systems, mining, labor recruitment, and indigenous education in different colonies. The combination of colonial comparison and transfers of knowledge was vital to establish a best-practice of colonization. The ICI intended to develop these methods into ideal-type techniques of colonization. According to its members, comparative colonialism was descriptive, while transfers of colonial techniques resulted in an applied colonial science.

The legitimation crisis of established empires is not the only reason why colonialists turned to internationalism. Equally important was the desire of colonial newcomers such as Germany and Italy – and figuring prominently among them was the USA, which had acquired the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1898 – to learn from other colonizers.[6] The US government sent specialists to all colonies to study and compare colonial policies. American ICI members, for example, hoped to emulate successfully applied colonial techniques by avoiding the errors committed by more experienced colonial powers. The eagerness to learn was a newcomer-mentality that older colonizers soon appropriated for themselves. Smaller colonial nations, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, tried to benefit from international expertise in colonial matters and invited specialists to work in their colonies.[7] Even longstanding empires like France and Great Britain soon realized that they might profit from the transfer of techniques that had been successfully tested elsewhere.[8] Thus, all colonizers hoped to capitalize on transnational exchange, to improve their colonial administration and introduce reforms of professionalization and rationalization.

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[6] See contributions in A.W. McCoy and F.A. Scarano (eds.), *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State* (Madison, 2009), 11-12.

[7] On the Dutch case: A.L. Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra's Plantation Belt 1870-1979* (New Haven, 1995); R. Bertrand, 'Histoire d'une 'réforme morale' de la politique coloniale des Pays-Bas: les Éthicistes et l'Insulinde (vers 1880-1930)', *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* 54, 4 (2007), 86–116; F. Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies, 1900-1942* (Singapore 2008); E. Locher-Scholten, *Ethiek in Fragmenten: Vijf Studies over Koliniaal Denken en Doen van Nederlanders in de Indonesische Archipel 1877-1942* (Utrecht, 1981); G. Vanthemsche, *Belgium and the Congo, 1885-1980* (Cambridge, 2012); J. Stengers, *Congo: Mythes et Réalités* (Brussels, 2008).

[8] As we will see, France was a driving force behind internationalisation: P. Singaravélou, 'Les stratégies d'internationalisation de la question coloniale et la construction transnationale d'une science de la colonisation à la fin du XIXe siècle', *Monde(s) histoire, espaces, relations* 1 (2012); Great Britain was a latecomer, but I argue against its complete isolation : P. Gifford, 'Indirect Rule : touchstone or tombstone for colonial policy?', in P. Gifford and Louis Wm. Roger (eds.)*, Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule* (New Haven, 1967), 383.

While this reformist attitude became paradigmatic in the 1890s and influenced the developmental colonialism of the twentieth century, the ICI members obscured the unpleasant side effects of their efforts. Development projects led to the reintroduction of forced labor in almost all the colonies. If the colonial subjects refused to lend a hand to these projects or resisted outright, the colonizers answered with violent repression. The Dutch war in Aceh, the German war against the Herero and the Maji Maji, as well as the Philippine Revolution ran counter to the alleged liberal native policy. Therefore, the colonial wars and violence did not appear on the ICI's agenda – they were deliberately omitted.

While the ICI's members passed over violence, their racism was more evident. Internationalist solidarity among the colonizers, as propagated by the ICI, resulted in a racist dualism that opposed colonizers and colonized. The ICI couched its racism in terms of cultural relativism, and pretended to respect and preserve the culture of the indigenous "other." As a consequence, the attitude of the ICI members towards the native population oscillated between a cooperative mutualism and segregationist dualism. But as we will see, the racism prevailing in the ICI also had "unintended" consequences. The paradigm of racist anthropology led colonial internationalists to believe that the white race would degenerate once exposed to the dangers of the tropical colonies. Natives, by contrast, were considered superior in the tropics because they had adjusted themselves over generations to the tropical "milieu" and were more likely to survive in a climate hostile to the whites. Consequently, the "superiority of the white race" could be easily disproven with racist arguments.

This dissertation will do justice to both the intended and the unintended consequences of the internationalist reformism. It analyzes convergent discourses and the real transfers of colonial methods and techniques. But it also reads between the lines, searching for hidden agendas and secret intentions of its members. If there is nothing to read between the lines, it looks at contexts, both in the metropole and in the colonies, to understand and explain the actions of the ICI's members. This is therefore not an institutional history of the ICI. It is a history of transnational exchange and transfers and their significance for the entire colonial project. ICI members like the German colonial minister Bernhard Dernburg, the French general-resident in Morocco Hubert Lyautey, the British governor-general of Nigeria Frederick Lugard, the Belgian railway-builder Albert Thys, the Spanish colonial reformer Antonio Fabié and the Russian international lawyer Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens shall suffice to underline the ICI's importance for both colonization and internationalism. Those agents of colonial reformism shaped colonial internationalism between the 1890s and the 1940s. They and their like will be at the center of this dissertation.

In the interwar period, dozens of ICI members acted as colonial advisors to the International Labor Organization, to the League of Nations or had a seat in the latter's Permanent Mandates Commission. Both the Permanent Mandates Commission and the International Labor Organization cooperated closely with the ICI.[9] The Institute continued to exist after the Second World War, re-branded the International Institute of Differing Civilizations, and as such steadfastly survived the period of decolonization. Engaging in anthropological studies, and devoting its energies to the dialogue with the "Third World", it was finally liquidated in 1982 for lack of subsidies. Its spirit lives on in its journal *Civilisations. Revue Internationale d'Anthropologie et de Sciences Humaines*, which stood the test of the twentieth century's turbulent times.[10] This institutional endurance of the ICI makes a compelling case for the success of the international and professional colonialism it had shaped and promoted. Its ideologies even survived the colonial period that had engendered them, and influenced colonial and post-colonial developmental discourses. Colonial internationalism thus helped to perpetuate colonial patterns of thinking in an allegedly post-colonial world. It is the purpose of this dissertation to measure the significance and impact of internationalism on colonial policies and to evaluate the analytical value of an "internationalist" theory of colonialism.

Historiography

Both colonial internationalism and developmental reformism have been said to originate in the interwar period, while their full significance only unfolded after the Second World War. Veronique Dimier has found the roots of scientific colonialism, with comparison and transfers as its methods, in the interwar period. She has revealed the ideological and personal continuities between this reform era and the international organizations of the twentieth century.[11] Mark Mazower and Susan Pedersen emphasized the colonial roots of international organizations from the League of Nations to the United Nations.[12] Anthony Anghie has shown the extent to which the League of Nations used social and political sciences to extend sovereignty to the colonized

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[9] Speech Van Rees in ICI, *Compte Rendu 1927*, vol.1, 15-43 ; ILO Archives, CAT 6C-13-1, J. Goudal 'Rapport sur ma mission à Bruxelles', cited in J. von Daele, 'Industrial States and the Transnational Exchanges of Social Policies. Belgium and the ILO in the Interwar Period', in S. Kott and J. Droux (eds.), *Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond* (Houndmills et al., 2013), 209.

[10] P. Petit, 'Editorial', *Civilisations* 51 (2004), 7-8.

[11] V. Dimier, *Le Gouvernement des Colonies: Regards croisés franco-britanniques* (Brussels, 2004); V. Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy: Recycling Empire* (Basingstoke, 2014).

[12] S. Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford, 2015); M. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, 2009); S. Pedersen, 'The Meaning of the Mandates System: An Argument', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 32, 4 (October-December 2006), 560–582.

world.[13] Frederick Cooper, instead, situates the beginning of international development policies in the 1940s, starting with the proclamation of the British *Colonial Development and Welfare Act*.[14] The semantic history of the transitive term development also suggests that it unfolded its full meaning – as a state-led policy to bring about both economic progress and social welfare – only in the 1940s.[15]

This chronology needs rectification, since the ICI anticipated the main elements of the development programs as early as the 1890s.[16] These included infrastructure programs, the introduction of salaried labor, agricultural banks that granted credit to native planters, various forms of self-government, and sanitation policies. Admittedly, the ICI's impact was limited – for want of adequate funding. But its development program was more detailed and sophisticated than any national plan would be for the next fifty years.[17] While colonial administrations were still reluctant to invest larger sums to bring about colonial development, private colonial societies like the French Colonial Union or the German Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee – which held close ties with the ICI – took the initiative. Their development projects did often go far beyond the "piecemeal and underfunded initiatives" that preceded the more extensive development programs of the 1940s.[18]

Historiography has devoted less attention to the ICI than it deserves. An outstanding exception is Benoit Daviron's article that discusses the ICI's influence on colonial labor policy, but does not mention its long-term effects.[19] Janny de Jong and Jan Henning Böttger provide very general introductions to the ICI. Ulrike Lindner and I analyze the ICI in the broader context of colonial cooperation, while Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, Pierre Singaravélou, Emmanuelle Saada, and Romain Bertrand mention it only briefly.[20] The ICI is strikingly absent in standard

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[13] A. Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge, 2005); A. Anghie, 'Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations', *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 34 (2002), 513-633: 522.

[14] F. Cooper, 'Modernizing Empire', in C.J. Calhoun, F. Cooper, and K.W. Moore (eds.), *Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power* (New York, 2006), 63-72:68; see also S. Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940* (London et al., 1984); and F. Cooper and R.M. Packard (eds.), *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley, 1997).

[15] M. Cowen and R. Shenton, *Doctrines of Development* (London 1996); H.W. Arndt, 'Economic Development. A Semantic History', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 29, 3 (1981), 457-466.

[16] The 1890s reformism has been eloquently described by R.F. Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory* (New York, 1961); see also J.-L. Amselle and E. Sibeud, *Maurice Delafosse: Entre orientalisme et ethnographie, l'itinéraire d'un africaniste, 1870-1926* (Paris, 1998); For Germany see F.-J. Schulte-Althoff, 'Koloniale Krise und Reformprojekte: Zur Diskussion über eine Kurskorrektur in der deutschen Kolonialpolitik nach der Jahrhundertwende', in H. Dollinger, H. Gründer, and A. Hanschmidt (eds.), *Weltpolitik, Europagedanke, Regionalismus: Festschrift für Heinz Gollwitzer zum 65. Geburtstag am 30. Januar 1982* (Munich, 1982).

[17] Frederick Cooper informs us that "It was thus only in the last phase of colonial rule that something like the project of a reformist imperialism was implemented with any degree of seriousness": Cooper, 'Modernizing Empire', 70.

[18] Ibid., 68.

[19] B. Daviron, 'Mobilizing Labour in African Agriculture: The Role of the International Colonial Institute in the Elaboration of a Standard of Colonial Administration, 1895-1930', *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010), 479–501.

[20] Two articles are rather tentative: J. De Jong, 'Kolonialisme op een koopje: Het Internationale Koloniale Instituut, 1894-1914', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 109 (1996), 45–72; J.H. Böttger, 'Internationalismus und Kolonialismus: Ein

accounts of internationalism, although Jasmien van Daele mentions its influence on the ILO.[21] Occasionally, it is mistaken for a Belgian institution, although it has always been a multinational institution with its biennial meetings held in different cities all over Europe.[22] The absence of the ICI from the historiography of colonialism and internationalism is remarkable, if understandable, given the fragmentary research on inter-colonial exchange and comparison in general.

As Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler have emphasized, little has been written about colonial transfers and cooperation between colonizing powers during the 1890s.[23] Véronique Dimier compared the British and the French colonial policies thoroughly without reiterating the simplistic distinction between assimilation (or Europeanization) and association (the co-option of indigenous elites without cultural assimilation).[24] In a similar way, Frederick Cooper used both French and British case studies when analyzing colonial labor and development policies in Africa.[25] Sebastian Conrad has situated German colonial ideologies within a global context, but did not explicitly analyze transfers between colonizing powers.[26] Most of the anthologies published with a comparative purpose deliver interesting insights, like John Mackenzie's *European Empires and the People* or Mathew P. Fitzpatrick's *Liberal Imperialism in Europe*.[27] Their strength lies in overcoming the narrow focus on Britain, France and Germany, by adding Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands to the picture. However, while these anthologies line up national case studies, they fail to provide the readers with a synthesis.

Werkstattbericht zur Geschichte des Brüsseler Institut Colonial International (1894-1948)', *Jahrbuch für europäische Überseegeschichte* 6 (2006), 165-172; F. Wagner, 'Private Colonialism and International Co-operation in Europe, 1870-1914', in R. Cvetkovski and V. Barth (eds.), *Imperial Co-operation and Transfer, 1870-1930: Empires and Encounters* (London, 2015), 58–79 and U. Lindner, 'New Forms of Knowledge Exchange Between Imperial Powers: The Development of the Institut Colonial International (ICI) since the End of the 19th Century', in: Ibid., 36-57; M. Bandeira Jerónimo, *The 'Civilizing Mission' of Portuguese Colonialism 1870-1930* (Basingstoke 2015), 190-193; Singaravélou, 'Les stratégies d'internationalisation'; E. Saada, 'Penser le fait colonial à travers le droit en 1900', *Mil neuf cent. Revue d'histoire intellectuelle* 27, 1 (2009), 103–116: 106; Bertrand, 'Histoire d'une 'réforme': 109-110.

[21] Daele, 'Industrial States and the Transnational Exchanges', 202 and 209; It is not mentioned in J. Paulmann and M. Geyer (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford, 2001); M. Herren, *Internationale Organisationen seit 1865: Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung* (Darmstadt, 2009); M. Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960* (Cambridge and New York 2002); G. Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia 2013); D. Laqua, *The Age of Internationalism and Belgium, 1880-1930: Peace, Progress and Prestige* (Manchester, 2013); D. Rodogno, B. Struck, and J. Vogel (eds.), *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks, and Issues from the 1840s to the 1930s* (New York, 2015);

[22] Emmanuelle Sibeud only mentions it once as the "Institut Colonial International belge": E. Sibeud, *Une science impériale pour l'Afrique ? La construction des savoirs africanistes en France: 1878-1930* (Paris, 2002.), 67.

[23] F. Cooper and A.L. Stoler (eds.), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997), 13.

[24] V. Dimier, *Le discours idéologique de la méthode coloniale chez les Français et les Britanniques de l'entre-deux guerres à la décolonisation (1920-1960)* (Bordeaux, 2000); On the distinction between assimilation and association A. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: Ideology and Imperialism in French West Africa, 1895 - 1930* (Stanford, 1997), 7 and 174-212.

[25] F. Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge, 1996).

[26] S. Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge and New York, 2010).

[27] J. MacKenzie, *European Empires and the People: Popular Responses to Imperialism in France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Italy* (Manchester, 2011); M.P. Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism in Germany: Expansionism and Nationalism, 1848-1884* (New York, 2008).

Moreover, the authors ignore transfers between the colonizers.[28] The same goes for classic accounts such as David Fieldhouse's *Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century* or the Stanford School's detailed studies of British, German and Belgian colonialism in Africa.[29] While providing extensive material for comparison, they refrain from correlating the histories of colonial empires.

Recent years have seen a revival of comparative literature on empire. The authors' primary objective is to consider continental and overseas empires in the same analytical frame. The similarity of continental and overseas empires – as multiethnic and supranational states that managed inequality rather than producing it, and that were characterized by fluctuating relations between center and periphery and not by fixed borders – made them comparable.[30] These empires, historians argue, have ruled the world throughout history, while only the nineteenth century has produced the myth of the eternal existence of nation-states. Empires were said to be the rule, and nation-states the exception, of political organization in history. Among these authors are Frederick Cooper and Jane Burbank, who have written a big history of empires from the Roman period to the colonial empires of the twentieth century.[31] Jörn Leonhard and Ulrike von Hirschhausen have focused on the "nationalizing" empires of the nineteenth century, and broadened the geographical scope by including the Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg empires.[32] Both books highlight empire-building from above by focusing on the strategies and techniques of imperial rule.

In a rather sociological approach, Herfried Münkler and Ann Laura Stoler have universalized empire as an analytical tool to describe various kinds of "imperial formations" from the Romans to the USA of the twenty-first century. In doing so, they draw a line from the Roman Empire to the modern USA. According to their rather blurry definition of empire, which comes close to the general notion of hegemony, the term was applicable to almost every

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[28] Other anthologies are rather desiderata: L. Amaury and C. Traud (eds.), *Nouvelle Histoire des Colonisations Européennes, XIXe –XXe siècles* (Paris, 2013).

[29] D.K. Fieldhouse, *Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1966); L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, *African Proconsuls: European Governors in Africa* (New York, 1978); L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, *The Rulers of British Africa* (London, 1978); L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, *The Rulers of German Africa* (Stanford, 1977); L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 1884-1914* (Princeton, N.J., 1979).

[30] J. Leonhard and U.v. Hirschhausen, *Empires und Nationalstaaten im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2009), 10.

[31] With regard to the debate on Empires: J. Burbank and F. Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J., 2010); An example of the "universality" of Empires: H. Münkler, *Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States* (Cambridge, 2007).

[32] J. Leonhard and U.v. Hirschhausen, *Comparing Empires: Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen and Oakville, Conn., 2012); See also A. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand: A Comparison with India* (Oxford, 2008); G. Hausmann and A. Rustemeyer (eds.), *Imperienvergleich: Beispiele und Ansätze aus osteuropäischer Perspektive: Festschrift für Andreas Kappeler* (Wiesbaden, 2009).

political formation in history.[33] It described everything which is not a nation-state. The focus on these imperial formations in a universal perspective makes the empire a rhetorical evasion that describes a rather elusive phenomenon of domination.[34] This notion received support from representatives of a new imperial history that highlights the cultural hegemony of colonial discourses within metropolitan societies. For those scholars, Geoff Eley remarked, "the concept of 'empire' seems even to acquire analytical, or, perhaps, epistemological equivalence with the older category of 'society'."[35] Empire seems to be everywhere and everything – but does this make it an adequate category for the analysis of trans-colonial cooperation?

Indeed, empire's etymology and semantics were rarely more precise in the nineteenth century. Deriving from the Latin *imperium*, the term had preserved its general meaning of "absolute authority" until the nineteenth century. Empire was used in various ways. A distinction has to be made between a political formation that *is* an empire and persons who *have* empire – or "power" in general. In continental Europe, the empire was the Napoleonic state. When the founder of the ICI, Joseph Chailley-Bert referred to "the Empire", he had the Napoleonic empires in mind.[36] This use of the term empire was still common practice in the 1890s. The German *Kaiserreich* expressed the longstanding tradition of federal organization of various states under a German emperor, but interestingly, the federal idea was not extended to the colonies. The *Kaiserreich* was never used to designate the colonial possessions and colonial subjects could not become *Reichsdeutsche*. Instead the Germans chose the more moderate term of "protectorate" as an official name for their colonies. The Congo Free State founded by Léopold II was a state of its own. The British self-designation as an empire was an exception. Other uses of empire conveyed a more general meaning of "rule" or "power" over something like the "empire of justice" or the "empire of fashion." The ubiquitous use of empire left room for semantic interpretation. In France, and in a special way in Germany, it rose to prominence as an explicitly *colonial* empire only in the 1930s.[37] Using the concept of empire was the

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[33] See especially the critique in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen, 'Zwischen Historisierung und Globalisierung: Titel, Themen und Trends der neueren Empire-Forschung', *Neue Politische Literatur* 56, 3 (2011), 389-404: 392 and 401.

[34] Thompson calls empire and imperialism "empty boxes that were continuously being filled up and emptied of their meaning" Thompson, 'The Language of Imperialism', 147.

[35] G. Eley, 'Empire by Land or Sea? Germany's Imperial Imaginary, 1840-1945', in B. Naranch and G. Eley (eds.), *German Colonialism in a Global Age* (Durham 2014), 20–45: 25. He refers to C. Hall, *Cultures of Empire: Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: A reader* (New York, 2000); A.M. Burton, *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking With and Through the Nation* (Durham, 2003); G. Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-state: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago, 2005); A.L. Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley, 2010).

[36] Institut Colonial International (ed.), *Compte Rendu de la Session tenue à Berlin le 6 et 7 septembre 1897* (Brussels, 1897), 416.

[37] In France, the term empire was used more frequently during the colonial exposition in 1931 and the centenary of Algeria's conquest, see P. Blanchard, S. Lemaire, N. Bancel (ed.), Colonial Culture in France since the Revolution (Bloomington, 2014), 20-21 and a general overview in T.G. August, *The Selling of the Empire: British and French*

expression of a deep insecurity about the legal status of overseas possessions that were not part of the motherland, non-constitutional, and subjected to the arbitrariness of colonial administrators. These had a blurry *imperuim* over an ill-defined space and a non-defined group of subjects.[38] Empire was therefore an allegory or an aspiration rather than a fact.

Colonial propagandists of the 1890s, by contrast, tried to avoid arguing with the help of the stigmatized term of empire that had become the core of a "decline and fall"- narration in post-Napoleonic France and was irrelevant to predominantly liberal minded colonialists in Belgium and the Netherlands.[39] While the British forged the term empire to describe an inclusive entity of metropole and colonies, the German colonies were legally excluded from the *Kaiserreich*.[40] During the 1890s, the expression was rather used by backward-looking nostalgists (like Bonapartists or Monarchist who traced their dynasty back to the Roman Empire) than by colonialist who understood themselves as progressive modernizers who valued individual achievement over privilege through ancestry. It was not until the interwar-period that empire acquired a new meaning as a dynamic space of global progress, which was the proclaimed overall goal of globally thinking Europeans. Chailley, who had founded the French Colonial Union and the International Colonial Institute, preferred to label himself as a colonial expert rather than an imperial ideologist.[41] So did colonial activists from all colonizing countries who organized private colonial interest groups, like the German Colonial Society, the Royal Colonial Institute in London, the Société d'études coloniales belges, the Dutch Colonial Association and the Spanish Sociedad Española de Africanistas y Colonistas. The private experts of these organizations played a vital role in pushing European governments to become active colonizers. They also launched colonial projects themselves, without constantly referring

Imperialist Propaganda, 1890-1940 (Westport, 1985); In Germany, a distinction was made between the continental *Reich* and the overseas *Kolonialreich*, emphasizing the difference between metropole and colony. Only retrospectively, they tended to see the German Empire as one single space that included the colonies.

[38] See for general overview: Dieter Groh: 'Imperialismus', in: Brunner, Otto, Conze, Werner and Koselleck, Reinhart, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, vol.3, (Stuttgart, 1982), 171–236; See also comparative interpretations of early modern empires in D. Armitage (ed.), *Theories of Empire, 1450-1800* (Aldershot, 1998); A. Pagden, *Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France, 1492-1830* (New Haven, 1998); J.H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven, 2006); A. Fitzmaurice, *Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500 - 2000* (Cambridge et al., 2014); D. Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2000).

[39] The Dutch preferred the terms *Indië* and *Nederlandse Indië* to empire: J.L. Foray, *Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands* (Cambridge, 2012), 18. See for a general overview H.L. Wesseling, 'The Giant that was a Dwarf: Or the Strange History of Dutch Imperialism', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 16, 3 (1988), 58–70.

[40] M. Grohmann, *Exotische Verfassung: Die Kompetenzen des Reichstags für die deutschen Kolonien in Gesetzgebung und Staatsrechtswissenschaft des Kaiserreichs* (Tübingen 2001), 3-4; But also the British showed a strong tendency to emphasize the difference between the metropolitan center and the overseas colonies. Great Britain was no empire, but possessed an empire: P Wende, *Das Britische Empire: Geschichte eines Weltreiches* (München, 2008), 327.

[41] S.M. Persell, 'Joseph Chailley-Bert and the Importance of the Union Coloniale Française', *Historical Journal* 17, 1 (1974), 176–184.

to imperial grandeur.[42] This colonial movement from below was responsible for the establishment of the ICI and promoted the idea of colonial experts without political, let alone imperial ambitions.

While they were comparative studies, the political histories of empire from above did not focus on transfers and cooperation among colonial experts. A primary objective was to draw a monogenetic pedigree of empires, which proved that the Roman Empire was the progenitor of a universal model that dominated history. This concept of *translatio imperii*, however, belonged to the Old Régime and its necessity to trace back dynastic origins of monarchs to the Roman Empire. The reformers of the ICI did not believe in such an imperial singularity but in colonial plurality. Generally, they did not take the Roman Empire as an example. They did not miss any occasion to emphasize that the Romans had ultimately failed to colonize North Africa and that their empire had fallen. The Spanish reformer and ICI member Antonio Fabié, for example, feared that the Spanish would end up like the Romans if they did not embrace modern ways of colonization.[43]

An important element of this emancipation from the Roman Empire was that the ICI members explicitly dismissed the concept of assimilation, which was said to be a legacy of the Roman Empire. The Romanized countries, or "Latin peoples" (notably France and Portugal) were said to carry this assimilationist germ in them by tending to "civilize" their colonial subjects and even promising them citizenship. The ICI reformers, instead, were anti-assimilationists. They preferred the British and the Dutch model of colonization, and therefore the model provided by Germanic countries, which were said to be archetypes of an associationist policy of indirect rule. Unlike those who cherished the Roman model of empire, they embraced a racial dualism and a cultural relativism, which claimed that the colonized were inherently different from the colonizers. This attitude was a paradoxical combination of racist belief in difference and serious attempts to respect and conserve foreign cultures.[44] Raymond Betts and Alice Conklin have emphasized this shift from assimilation to association in French colonial theory and in praxis.[45] But already the ICI had popularized this idea in all the colonizing

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[42] For literature on the colonial interest groups in France, Germany, Belgium and Spain see Ageron, *France coloniale ou parti*; P. Grupp, *Deutschland, Frankreich und die Kolonien: Der französische ‚Parti Colonial' und Deutschland von 1890-1914* (Tübingen, 1980); C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, 'The French Colonial Party: Its Composition, Aims and Influence 1885-1914', *Historical Journal* 14, 1 (1971), 99–128; V. Viaene, 'King Léopold's Imperialism and the Origins of the Belgian Colonial Party, 1860-1905', *Journal of Modern History* 80, 4 (2008), 741–790; E. Hernandez Sandoica, 'Pensamiento burgués y problemas coloniales en la España de la Restauración (1875-1886)' (PhD Diss. Univ. Complutense de Madrid, 1982); J.A. Rodriguez Esteban, *Geografía y Colonialismo: La Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid 1876- 1936* (Madrid, 1996); J. Nogué and J.L. Villanova, 'Spanish colonialism in Morocco and the Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid, 1876–1956', *Journal of Historical Geography* 28, 1 (2002), 1–20.

[43] A.M. Fabié, *Mi Gestion Ministerial respecto a la Isla de Cuba* (Madrid, 1898), 651.

[44] S. Belmessous, *Assimilation and Empire: Uniformity in French and British Colonies 1541-1954* (Oxford, 2013).

[45] Betts, *Assimilation and Association*; Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 74-78.

countries. As a consequence, transfers of legitimacy and strategies of ruling from the past to the present – or from Rome to modern colonizers – were on the decline.[46]

Moreover, Saliha Belmessous has emphasized that the Roman model of assimilation differed from modern concepts of civilization, because it had a syncretistic tendency to incorporate the culture of the conquered and was willing to modify its own. This Roman syncretism was diametrically opposed to the modern nation-states' ideal of cultural unity and purity. The Romans absorbed foreign cultures, while the modern states never did.[47] By the same token, the colonizers of the nineteenth century rarely had the intention of learning from the colonized. While "colonial cultures" left an imprint on European societies, "indigenous cultures" rarely did. Portraying the colonial project as a cultural encounter and colonial empires as rather tolerant forms of statehood twists the facts. The frequently cited "intermediaries", for example, were often an invention of the colonial states. Colonial experts employed them to establish a system of indirect rule, which made use of real or imagined chiefs to control the country. Colonizers, although they were often "helpless imperialists" in an unfamiliar setting, rarely learned from the colonial subjects. Instead, they tried to use them for their own purposes. Thus, "syncretistic" transfers of knowledge between the colonized and the colonizers remained the exception to a rule of ignorance and deliberate misinterpretation.[48]

As a result, the colonial experts of the late nineteenth century were skeptical towards transfers from the past ("translatio imperii"), transfers from the motherland to the colony ("assimilation" or settler colonialism) and transfers from the colonial subjects to the colonizers ("syncretism"). Instead, they cherished transfers between colonial experts and sought legitimization in the ideology of future "development". The ICI was the most important expression of a non-governmental colonial movement from below, which helps us to understand the motivations to engage in trans-colonial transfers. Colonial experts accepted the plurality of colonialisms and abandoned monogenetic concepts of empire. They found their legitimacy in the future and the development programs that preached economic assimilation into capitalist systems, but not cultural assimilation. To find a best practice of colonization and

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[46] Duncan Bell exposes the ambiguous British attitude to the Roman Empire as a model: D. Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire, Nation, and the Future of Global Order, 1860-1900* (Princeton, 2007), 226-227.

[47] Belmessous, *Assimilation and Empire*, 6.

[48] While intermediaries such as interpreters or chiefs influenced local policies, they generally had no interest in destroying a colonial system from which they profited. On the invention of intermediaries and their accommodation to colonial rule see D. Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920* (Athens and Oxford, 2000); C. Lentz, *Ethnicity and the Making of History in Northern Ghana* (Edinburgh, 2006); the classic: M. Crowder (ed.), *West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status under Colonial Rule and Independence* (Ile-Ife, 1970); On intermediaries B.N. Lawrance, E.L. Osborn, and R.L. Roberts (eds.), *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa* (Madison, Wis., 2006). On the notion of helpless imperialists: M. Reinkowski and G. Thum (eds.), *Helpless Imperialists: Imperial Failure, Fear and Radicalization* (Göttingen, 2012).

the most rational way of colonizing, they turned to like-minded colonial experts from all over the world. Andrew Zimmerman and Ulrike Lindner have so far provided the only in-depth studies of such intercolonial transfers that resulted from these encounters at the end of the nineteenth century. Recently, Deborah Neill has demonstrated how the practice of transnational transfers in colonial medicine resulted in an international ideal of common colonization.[49]

This dissertation owes much to Ulrike Lindner's and Andrew Zimmerman's pioneering studies of global transfers and exchanges from below. Ulrike Lindner has analyzed the close cooperation between German and British colonial administrations in their African colonies.[50] Andrew Zimmerman, meanwhile, has reinterpreted the intriguing case of Afro-American plantation workers, who were used by German colonial experts to establish a cotton plantation in Togo.[51] Both Lindner and Zimmerman situate the transfers of colonial techniques and knowledge within the context of an emerging discourse on colonial development and free labor. They share the assumption that supposedly rational "colonial techniques" were part of a deeply racialized world view. Comparisons and transfers as methods of colonization or colonial exploitation were also political acts of racial and cultural stereotyping. The transfers of colonial techniques – like cotton growing and sanitation works – helped to spread concepts of racial distinction and segregation. Transnational cooperation ultimately led to a solidification of racist attitudes and corresponding mistreatment of black workers in colonial agronomy.[52]

Both Lindner and Zimmerman confined their analyses to transfers between Germany and Anglo-Saxon countries. Helen Tilley's excellent study *Africa as a Living Laboratory* and Daniel A. Headrick's *The Tentacles of Progress* restrict themselves to analyzing the British case alone.[53] Although knowledge transfers within those "containers" were important, the authors overlooked a more global circulation of techniques and ideas. Also smaller colonial nations, like the Dutch Indies in particular, were fertile sources of inspiration for the colonizers in Europe and America. The Congo Free State and Dutch Indonesia were hubs of international exchange. But also France, Spain, Russia and the USA were deeply engaged in international

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[49] D. Neill, *Networks in Tropical Medicine: Internationalism, Colonialism, and the Rise of a Medical Specialty, 1890–1930* (Stanford, 2012).

[50] U. Lindner, *Koloniale Begegnungen: Deutschland und Großbritannien als Imperialmächte in Afrika 1880-1914* (Frankfurt am Main, 2011).

[51] A. Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (Princeton, NJ 2010); Although brilliantly reinterpreted by Zimmerman, the episode had been known before: M. Yudelman, 'Imperialism and the transfer of agricultural techniques', in P. Duignan and L.H. Gann (eds.), *Colonialism in Africa* vol.4.: *The Economics of Colonialism* (Cambridge, 1988), 329–359: 343; S. Beckert, 'From Tuskegee to Togo: The problem of Freedom in the Empire of Cotton', *Journal of American History* 92, 2 (2005), 498–526.

[52] See also S. Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York, 2014) or the classical study on entangled history: S.W. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York, 1986).

[53] H. Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950* (Chicago, 2011); D.R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism 1850-1940* (Oxford, 1988).

exchanges of colonial strategies and techniques, while allegedly post-colonial spaces like South America served as a template for colonial plantation policies.[54] The ICI affords access to these exchanges and allows analysis of transnational expertise from a less Anglo-centric angle.

The protagonists of the dissertation are those advocates of colonialism who styled themselves as colonial experts.[55] Their main quality was that their identity was not only national but also professional. While Europe had entered the age of nationalism and colonialism by the 1890s, it had equally inaugurated the age of professionalization and positivist belief in rational science. Accordingly, ICI's experts portrayed themselves as professionals who served the supposedly apolitical purpose of human progress. The ICI brought together colonial theorists, lawyers, administrators, technicians, engineers, physicians, botanists and agronomists. Many of them had pursued transnational careers, working for different colonial governments and becoming agents of colonial transfer.[56] All of them were renowned experts in their fields, often teaching at European universities, where they tried to establish colonial science as an academic discipline. Their purpose was to make colonialism both a profession and a science to emancipate it from its ideological origins. For them, colonialism was not the cause for nationalist rivalry, but a reason for transnational cooperation.

Neutral expertise was closely linked to the ideal of transnational science.[57] Several studies have shown that scientific progress – which we would today call the emergence of new scientific paradigms – not only relied on individual research but also on transfers and exchange

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[54] See for the Netherlands: S. Moon, *Technology and Ethical Idealism: A History of Development in the Netherlands East Indies* (Leyden, 2007); For the Russian case: A. Morrison, 'Creating a 'Colonial Shari'a for Russian Turkestan: Count Pahlen, the Hidaya and Anglo-Muhammadan Law', in R. Cvetkovski and V. Barth (eds.)*, Imperial Co-operation and Transfer, 1870-1930: Empires and Encounters* (London, 2015); and for the USA: F. Schumacher, 'Kulturtransfer und Empire: Britisches Vorbild und US-amerikanische Kolonialherrschaft auf den Philippinen im fruehen 20. Jahrhundert', in C. Kraft (ed.)*, Kolonialgeschichten: Regionale Perspektiven auf ein globales Phänomen* (Frankfurt and New York, 2010), 306–327.

[55] See for the expert Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*; C. Rabier, *Fields of Expertise: A Comparative History of Expert Procedures in Paris and London, 1600 to present* (Newcastle, 2007); R. MacLeod, *Government and Expertise: Specialists, Administrators and Professionals, 1860-1919* (Cambridge, 2003); E.J. Engstrom (ed.), *Figurationen des Experten: Ambivalenzen der wissenschaftlichen Expertise im ausgehenden 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main et al., 2005); On "imperial careering" in the British case see D. Lambert and A. Lester (eds.), *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial careering in the long nineteenth century* (Cambridge, 2006).

[56] See for example U. Kirchberger, 'German Scientists in the Indian Forest Service: A German contribution to the Raj?' *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 29, 2 (2001), 1–26; See also the contributions in T. Buchen and M. Rolf, *Eliten im Vielvölkerreich: Imperiale Biographien in Russland und Österreich-Ungarn (1850-1918)* (Berlin and Boston, 2015).

[57] On science R.H. Drayton, *Nature's government. Science, imperial Britain, and the 'Improvement' of the World* (New Haven 2000); P. Singaravélou, *Professer l'Empire: Les "sciences coloniales " en France sous la IIIe République* (Paris, 2011); B. Stuchtey (ed.), *Science Across the European Empires, 1800-1950* (Oxford and New York, 2005) ; R. MacLeod, 'On visiting the "Moving Metropolis": reflections on the architecture of imperial science', in N. Reingold and M. Rothenberg (eds.)*, Scientific Colonialism: A cross-cultural comparison* (Washington, D.C., 1987); L. Pyenson, *Empire of Reason: Exact sciences in Indonesia, 1840-1940* (Leiden et al., 1989); P. Boomgaard, *Empire and Science in the Making: Dutch colonial scholarship in comparative global perspective, 1760-1830* (New York, 2013); S.L. Montgomery, *Science in Translation: Movements of knowledge through cultures and time* (Chicago, 2000); B.S. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, 1996); P. Palladino and M. Worboys, 'Science and Imperialism', *Isis* 84, 1 (1993), 91; S. Shapin, 'Here and Everywhere. Sociology of Scientific Knowledge', *Annual Review of Sociology* 21, 1 (1995), 289–321.

of knowledge.[58] ICI members explicitly emphasized that true expertise required transnational experience. Unlike individualistic and universalistic explorer-heroes of the Humboldtian era, the colonial experts of the outgoing nineteenth century portrayed themselves as specialists for whom internationality was an asset. They were no longer dedicated to the accumulation of knowledge and the design of taxonomies, but aimed at using scientific knowledge to improve economy, society, and governmentality. For them, science had to be applied or at least applicable science. They were much more interested in the improvement of technology than in pure armchair science. Technology was the outcome of both scientific improvement and experience on the ground.[59] Colonial experts thus valued development through improved technologies over a general notion of progress through science. Ideally, internationally experienced experts developed technologies that could be used to develop the colonies.

Unlike evolution, which was brought about by god or the forces of nature, development was man-made. This was the attitude of the colonial experts who believed that their individual activity was the basis of worldwide development. As Joseph Hodge has shown, these experts did not think of colonial expansion as a right, but portrayed colonial development as a duty and a humanitarian intervention.[60] Therefore, to be a colonial expert was a vocation rather than a profession.[61] As development was not a natural force, ICI members considered a colonial *mise en valeur* a catalyst that would bring about human progress. The concept of colonial development emerged in the 1890s in Chamberlain's Lockean "duty of the landlord to develop his estate" and in its francophone version as *mise en valeur* to describe the process of rendering something productive through colonial "assistance" and investments by the metropole.[62] The *mise en valeur* was adopted in Italy, Spain and Belgium, and called *Nutzbarmachung* in

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[58] An excellent overview: B.M. Bennett and J.M. Hodge, *Science and Empire: Knowledge and networks of science across the British Empire, 1800-1970* (Houndmills et al., 2011).

[59] D.R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European imperialism in the nineteenth century* (New York, 1981); Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress*; B. Marsden and C. Smith, *Engineering Empires: A cultural history of technology in nineteenth-century Britain* (Basingstoke and New York, 2005); R. Gillespie and D. Wade Chambers, 'Locality in the history of science: Colonial science, technoscience, and indigenous knowledge', in R.M. MacLeod (ed.), *Nature and Empire. Science and the colonial enterprise* (Chicago, 2000); M. Adas (ed.), *Technology and European Overseas Enterprise: Diffusion, adaption, and adoption* (Aldershot, 1996); M. Adas, 'A Field Matures. Technology, Science, and Western Colonialism', *Technology and Culture* 38, 2 (1997), 478; A. Elena and J. Ordonez, 'Science, Technology, and the Spanish Colonial Experience in the Nineteenth Century', *Osiris* 15, 1 (2000), 70–82; S. Clarke, 'A Technocratic Imperial State? The Colonial Office and Scientific Research, 1940-1960', *Twentieth Century British History* 18, 4 (2007); R.M. MacLeod and D. Kumar, *Technology and the Raj: Western technology and technical transfers to India, 1700-1947* (New Delhi, 1995); J.E. McClellan and H. Dorn, *Science and Technology in World History: An introduction* (Baltimore, Md., 1999).

[60] Joseph Hodge found the origins of a "crusade to end worldwide poverty" in colonial expertise: Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 3.

[61] Max Weber's famous "Science as a Vocation" reflects the attitude of the time: Max Weber, 'Wissenschaft als Beruf' in Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, ed. by Johannes Winckelmann (Tübingen, 1985), 581-613.

[62] On Chamberlain see M. Cowen and R. Shenton, 'The Origin and Course of Fabian Colonialism in Africa', *Journal of Sociology,* 4, 2 (1991), 145 and M. Havinden and D. Meredith, *Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960* (London and New York, 1993), 88.

German. *The Times* translated *mise en valeur* as "profitable working" in 1908.[63] During the interwar period, *mise en valeur* was generally translated into English as development. Development was portrayed as bringing humanity together and linked to the idea of a moral mission.[64] It should profit both colonizers and colonized, although it required the guidance of the former. But it was also the shared goal of different colonizing nations. A *Times* article suggested that, while the French and the British colonial policies were inherently different, all colonizing nations shared the desire for development or "*mise en valeur*."[65]

Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard have defined development as a set of practices "bringing together a range of interventionist policies and metropolitan finance with the explicit goal of raising colonial standards of living."[66] The colonial experts of the ICI argued in the same way. Among them, the most cited reference and testing ground for a development doctrine were the Netherland's Indies. As early as the 1830s, the Dutch government in Java had provided an influential example for interventionist development policies when introducing a system of compulsory crop cultivation to Java. After a period dominated by liberal free traders between 1870 and 1880, interventionism lived through a revival in the 1890s.[67] On the instigation of Dutch ICI members, the Dutch state introduced a so-called Ethical Policy to Indonesia as early as 1901. Investing more than 200 million guilders, a ten year development plan was designed that anticipated the characteristic elements of modern development policies: increasing the area of irrigated rice fields, constructing roads, granting Indonesian peasants access to credit banks, inducing migration to less populated areas, teaching the Indonesians to scientifically grow staple foods, and campaigns to bring about prosperity, a higher standard of living, and welfare (*welvaart*) of the indigenous population.[68] The overall goal of this policy was couched into the abstract concepts of *ontwikkeling* (development) and *zelfbestuur* (self-administration), the latter aiming at autonomy of colonial administration (with both Dutch colonial experts and

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[63]'The Congo State', *The Times*, 26 February 1908, 7; Alice Conklin interprets the *mise en valeur* as a correlate of the civilizing mission. But I think the concept is closer to the idea of development: Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 6-7 and 40-43.

[64] Occasionally, the concept of development comes close to the notion of the civilizing mission, whereas *mise en valeur* does not necessarily include a moral mission to improve economy and human beings; See for example C. Unger, 'Histories of Development and Modernization: Findings, Reflections Future Research' in H-Soz-Kult 09.12.2010, http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/2010-12-001 [last accessed on 25.4.2016], 6.

[65] 'French Africa', *The Times*, 30 October 1928.

[66] Cooper and Packard, *International Development*, 7.

[67] E. Locher-Scholten, *Sumatran Sultanate and Colonial State: Jambi and the Rise of Dutch Imperialism 1907-1907* (Ithaca, 2003), 28.

[68] 187 million guilders went into irrigation projects. Although the development plan failed, there seem to have been lasting effects: R. Cribb, 'Development Policy in the Early 20th Century' in J.P. Dirkse, F. Hüsken, and M. Rutten (eds.), *Development and Social Welfare: Indonesia's Experiences under the New Order* (Leiden 1993), 225-245: 232; Locher-Scholten, *Ethiek in Fragmenten*, 11-54 and 176-208; See P. Boomgard, 'The Welfare Services in Indonesia, 1900-1942', *Itinerario* 10,1 (1986), 57-81: 65-67 on agricultural schools and 75-77 on credit banks.

indigenous administrators) rather than independence of the Indonesians.[69] Development should contribute to "uplift" the colonized and finally make humanity progress. It required the collaboration and the precise knowledge of the native societies to make them "develop in their natural environment" without resorting to methods of cultural assimilation. Expertise, therefore, aimed at rational development and a respectful native policy which helped to make use of the indigenous strength to bring about economic development.

It goes without saying that the purported myth of the experts' neutrality and the alleged rule of technocracy obscured the political agendas behind them. The priority of colonial experts was to lead the colonies to self-sufficiency or to make them profitable. While the metropolitan governments reluctantly invested in colonies, colonial experts were keen on replacing external funding by internal tax-raising. In this way, they hoped to finance the infrastructure projects with the help of the colonial subjects. Timothy Mitchell has shown this eloquently by describing the "rule of experts" in colonial Egypt from a Foucauldian perspective. He reveals how experts "modernized" colonial Egypt by integrating it into the world market with the help of legal measures, the introduction of modern technologies, and the use of violence. Mitchell's *histoire totale* of colonial techno-politics shows that dispossession and deportation were inseparable from the introduction of sanitation measures, irrigation systems, and improved agriculture.[70] Frederick Cooper and John Iliffe warned that such development policies, which promised colonial wealth and a higher standard of living, provoked resistance among the colonial subjects.[71] D.R. Headrick has demonstrated that the attempts to "improve" the colonies with technological engineering was a complete failure and ultimately underdeveloped the colonies.[72] Finally, Andrew Zimmerman interpreted the concepts of scientific colonialism and expert technocracy as a strategy to legitimize colonial domination.[73] Those results have to be taken into account when analyzing the transnational transfers of colonial techniques.

Moreover, transnational exchange led to converging discourses and international standards of colonial legitimization and racist stigmatization.[74] In some cases, as I show in

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[69] S. Wedema, *'Ethiek' und Macht: Die Niederländisch-Indische Kolonialverwaltung und Indonesische Emanzipationsbestrebungen 1901-1927* (Stuttgart, 1998), 21.
[70] T. Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, techno-politics, modernity* (Berkeley, 2002).
[71] F. Cooper, 'Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans and the Development Concept', in F. Cooper and R.M. Packard (eds.), *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley, 1997); John Iliffe has shown how the Maji-Maji revolt (1905-1907) in German East Africa started as a protest against colonial cash crop cultivation by uprooting cotton plants: J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge 1979), 168-178.
[72] Headrick, *Tentacles of Progress*, 14.
[73].A. Zimmerman, 'Ruling Africa. Science as Sovereignty in the German Colonial Empire and its Aftermath', in B. Naranch and G. Eley (eds.), *German Colonialism in a Global Age* (Durham, 2014), 93–108.
[74] M. Kohlrausch, K. Steffen, and S. Wiederkehr (eds.), *Expert Cultures in Central Eastern Europe: The internationalization of knowledge and the transformation of nation states since World War I* (Osnabrück, 2010), Introduction.

Chapter 1, colonial experts even exchanged strategies of how to exterminate native populations. Technological transfers carried bias and prejudice with them. Seemingly apolitical technologies were culturally charged. Andrew Zimmerman has revealed how racist patterns of thinking travelled with the technology for cotton production that was brought from Alabama to Togo (if it was necessary at all to teach racism to German colonizers in Togo).[75] Allegedly scientific institutions, like the ICI, the International Agricultural Institute (IAI, 1905 Rome) and the International Ethnographic Institute (IEI, 1910 Paris) broadcast the newest paradigms of colonial domination beyond national borders.[76] While anthropological sciences seem to be the sciences most prone to racist thinking, the "technological" sciences were also governed by racist bias and instrumental in establishing colonial rule.

However, converging discourses also accounted for the change of such paradigms, such as the shift from racist to humanitarian legitimization of colonialism. Based on the global circulation of colonial knowledge, the concepts of expertise, technocratic rule, and development were frequently invoked to legitimize colonial rule. For example, overt and stigmatizing racism lost ground among the ICI members who replaced it with more subtle (and often tacitly racist) legitimation strategies of native policy, technocracy, and development.[77] Suzanne Moon has convincingly demonstrated to what extent technology projects in the Dutch Indies contributed to creating the myth of an "ethical policy" towards colonial subjects in Asia.[78] The ICI promoted this technocratic and ethical policy starting at the turn of the century, suppressing the fact that it often resulted in domination, exploitation, and segregation.

Ultimately, internationalism itself became an ideology that potentially enhanced the legitimacy of colonial domination. While transnational cooperation and transfers in colonial matters were a practice – and had existed long before the 1890s – colonial internationalism became an ideology.[79] Without doubts, the term was chosen deliberately to give the ICI a profile. According to Madeleine Herren, internationalism became a politically powerful concept in the 1860s. On the one hand, it was used by "states at the periphery of power" as a strategy of empowerment in international diplomacy.[80] On the other hand, internationalism was

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[75] Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa*, 112-166.

[76] All of them still await a historian to write their history, for some remarks about the IEI see Sibeud, *Une science impériale*.

[77] A general overview: Stuchtey, *Science Across the European Empires*.

[78] Moon, *Technology and Ethical Idealism*, 25-144.

[79] See the famous definition of internationalism in Paulmann and Geyer, *The Mechanics of Internationalism*, 3: "political and social movements trying to create international identities and to reform society and politics by way of transnational cooperation, *and* the process of internationalizing cultural, political, and economic practices."

[80] M. Herren, *Hintertüren zur Macht: Internationalismus und modernisierungsorientierte Außenpolitik in Belgien, der Schweiz und den USA 1865-1914* (Munich, 2000); Laqua, *The Age of Internationalism*; See also W. Loth and J. Osterhammel, *Internationale Geschichte: Themen - Ergebnisse - Aussichten* (Munich, 2000); D. Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge and New York, 2013); Sluga, *Internationalism*.

responsive to the failure of nation-states to manage technologies of connectivity – such as telegraphs, railways and postal traffic – and to establish global standards to facilitate commercial or cultural interaction.[81]

Focusing on proletarian or Catholic internationalism, historians have long neglected internationalism as strategy of learned societies to emphasize their non-governmental neutrality, their democratic character and their full dedication to disinterested scientific progress. Referring to this holistic concept of scientific internationalism substantiated the ICI's claim to neutrality and professionality of colonialism. While starting as a collective initiative "from below", governments soon became interested in internationalism as a strategy to legitimize their colonial rule. In this regard, the ICI did not differ from other scientific internationalisms that promoted the idea of establishing global standards and a sort of world government, as Mark Mazower has shown.[82] The mandate system of the League of Nations stands for this "governmentalization" of internationalism as a strategy to justify and perpetuate colonial rule.[83]

It is well established that internationalism and nationalism were twins born of the same age. While they occasionally clashed, they were generally compatible and even mutually dependent, as Glenda Sluga has suggested.[84] Like Mazower, Sluga argues that internationalism was a liberal-bourgeois movement. Bourgeois internationalists dismissed proletarian solidarity and aristocratic cosmopolitanism alike, while supporting nation-states and their colonies as the basis of international cooperation. Nationalists could therefore be internationalists at the same time. This is particularly true for the ICI members, who joined the ICI mostly for nationalist reasons, but soon embraced an ideology of colonial internationalism that also influenced the policy back home.

As indicated above, transnational transfers are often defined as a practice that was less likely than internationalism to be ideologically charged and used for political purposes. Patricia Clavin linked transnational practices to the rise of epistemic communities that valued the exchange of knowledge over governmental (inter-) nationalism. According to this definition, transnationalism was scientific and internationalism political. While the agents of transnationalism were neutral experts, the agents of internationalism tended to be political and often governmental elites. Nonetheless, Clavin emphasizes that the non-governmental and

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[81] R. Wenzlhuemer, *Connecting the Nineteenth-century World: The telegraph and globalization* (Cambridge and New York, 2013); I. Löhr and R.J. Wenzlhuemer (eds.), *The Nation State and Beyond: Governing globalization processes in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries* (Berlin and Heidelberg, 2013).

[82] M. Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York, 2012), 94-153.

[83] Nevertheless, Pedersen prefers to speak of a system of international oversight, and not international government: Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 4, 11-13, 398.

[84] Sluga, *Internationalism*, 3.

scientific character of transnational epistemic communities was not explicitly directed against nationalism or the nation-state. It was not a means to overcome nationalism or destroy the nation-state. Transnationalism could also serve to substantiate nationalist positions and political agendas: "transnational ties can dissolve some national barriers while simultaneously strengthening or creating others."[85] To a greater extent they served to strengthen and enhance colonial rule.

It is the impact of colonial internationalism and transnationalism on national governments and their overseas policy that is of most interest in this dissertation. Prior to the First World War, internationalists supposedly lacked the means to enforce their ideas. Their agendas rarely materialized unless they received support from national governments and their executive administrations. Recent studies on the International Labor Organization (ILO), however, have revealed that internationalist ideas influenced national policies after the Great War. Institutions such as the ILO fostered comparison and knowledge transfers, which led interested governments to imitate policies from other countries.[86] The case of the ICI shows that internationalism influenced governmental policies already before the First World War, both in the metropoles and in the colonies. Moreover, I argue that colonial administrations were even more likely than any other governmental institution to use internationalist ideas and apply the knowledge internationalists produced to colonial contexts. Thus, the ICI illustrates how non-governmental internationalism materialized as soon as colonial governments and administrations had learned to benefit from the ICI's work.

While internationalism was an ideology or a theory, transnationality was a practice.[87] Colonial experts rarely heralded their transnational – or trans-colonial – transfers of technology and often it passed unnoticed by metropolitan governments. Historians have to dig deep into the colonial archives to find evidence of the transfers. This dissertation shows the great variety of trans-colonial transfers of technology and ideas. I analyze in detail transfers in colonial warfare, tropical medicine, the training of colonial administrators, colonial agronomy, the codification of native law and the "development" of colonies. Most of the accounts on colonial technology transfers missed the opportunity to analyze this context.

Those trans-colonial transfers, along with the circulation of experts and the emergence of an "ideal" of colonial internationalism, reshaped colonialism. In the conclusion, I return to

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[85] P. Clavin, 'Defining Transnationalism', *Contemporary European History* 14, 4 (2005), 421–439: 431.
[86] S. Kott and J. Droux (eds.), *Globalizing Social Rights: The international labour organization and beyond* (Houndmills et al., 2013), 5; P.-A. Rosental, 'Géopolitique et État-providence. Le BIT et la politique mondiale des migrations dans l'entre-deux-guerres', *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 61, 1 (2006), 99–134: 107.
[87] G.-F. Budde, S. Conrad, and O. Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien* (Göttingen, 2006), and the definition in Paulmann and Geyer, *The Mechanics of Internationalism*, 3.

the question of whether these findings make it possible to introduce a new "internationalist" theory of colonialism. Such an internationalist theory of colonialism, I will argue in this dissertation, helps to explain colonial reformism and the turn to humanitarian argumentations that legitimized the colonial project.

Methodology and Sources

Zimmerman's and Lindner's works were a conceptual breakthrough towards a global vision of colonialism. They combined multiple methods, like the history of technology, agronomy, and the history of ideas, and analyzed them with regard to transfer processes. This broad scope allowed them to understand the cultural meanings of technology and knowledge circulation in colonial contexts. This dissertation will apply a similar variety of methods to grasp the full effects of the politics of colonial transfers and comparisons introduced by the ICI. Transfers have to be analyzed in a sort of *jeux d'échelles* between practical application of knowledge or technologies and their cultural or political meaning in a colonial context. To understand the cultural and political implications of comparisons and transfers, Zimmerman historicized both comparison and transfer. Asking why historical actors made comparisons, for example, is necessary to understand their intentions. Only the knowledge of their intentions can help us to distinguish between intended and unintended effects of their behavior. This discrimination is necessary to understand and explain how individuals or groups brought about historical change. Thus, we can explain that colonial experts joined the ICI to enhance their administrative skills by comparing different strategies of colonial rule. However, as comparisons were based on stereotypes and socially constructed realities, the outcome was often different from the intended effects.[88]

Indeed, the founding fathers of the ICI declared comparison and transfer their most cherished methods. They published extensive volumes that compared colonial law, irrigation, railway construction, and techniques of ruling in different colonies. While they had an honest intention to find the best techniques of managing a colony, their comparisons were highly politicized. The ICI's politics of comparison cannot be analyzed without attending to the political purposes of those who compared. The political intention of comparisons was revealed during the debate on German exceptionalism (*Sonderweg*). Historians had postulated an exceptional and permanent democratic deficit of the German state throughout the nineteenth

[88] Comparisons that were based on stereotypes are an excellent example of how to "construct" reality in the sense of P.L. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City 1966).

century, which they believed to have inevitably led to the rise of National-Socialism in the 1930s.[89] To prove their claim they chose to contrast Germany with the allegedly more democratic countries such as France and Great Britain, without systematically comparing them.

These contrasting comparisons, however, and the construction of exceptionalisms for political purposes have been frequent in colonial history as well. European nations were ascribed not only a national character, but also a colonial character. Thus, the Dutch and British Indies were portrayed as being the most modern and progressive colonies.[90] The "black legend" claimed that Spain pursued an inhuman and predatory colonial project to justify British or French colonization as more "humane".[91] German rule was portrayed as being rigid but fair-minded in legal matters, while the French were said to be exceptional because of their policy of assimilation.[92] Those stereotypes were the result of pseudo-comparisons that served the purpose of stigmatizing or delegitimizing potential rivals. By the same token, pseudo-comparison could also idealize colonial models and thus suggest that they were worthy of emulation.

All these exceptionalisms and stereotypes did not necessarily reflect the real situation on the ground, but were part of the "politics of comparison" as described by Ann Laura Stoler and others.[93] With them, I am convinced that the units of comparison are artificially constructed or carefully selected to confirm a precast opinion. Comparisons are therefore political by nature and are more likely to be politically misused than scientifically used. Following Frederick Cooper's advice that historiographic comparisons – no matter if they contrast cases to develop typologies or aim at unveiling similarities – risk overgeneralizing about the case studies, I will historicize comparisons and analyze when, why and for what reasons historical actors themselves compared.[94] Consequently, in this dissertation comparisons are not a method. They are not an analytical tool to understand history but the historical object of our analysis.

How do transfers relate to comparisons? After a long debate about the uneasy relationship between comparison and transfer, the scientific community has finally accepted that comparisons and transfers are inseparable – if used as historical methods. To identify similarities and differences between two entities by comparison, the historian has to ensure that

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[89] For this debate see D. Blackbourn and G. Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History* (Oxford, 1984).

[90] See for the Dutch Indies: E. Locher-Scholten, *Sumatran Sultanate and Colonial State* (Cornell, 2004); M. Kuitenbrouwer, *Nederland en de opkomst van het moderne imperialisme* (Amsterdam, 1985); Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation*.

[91] C. Gibson, *The Black Legend: Anti-Spanish Attitudes in the Old World and the New* (New York, 1971).

[92] See Betts, *Assimilation and Association*; Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 74-77 assumes a more critical stance.

[93] A.L. Stoler, 'Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies', *The Journal of American History* 88, 3 (2001), 829–865; C. Lorenz, 'Comparative Historiography: Problems and Perspectives', *History and Theory* 38, 1 (1999), 25–39.

[94] F. Cooper, 'Race, Ideology, and the Perils of Comparative History', *American Historical Review* 101, 4 (1996), 1122–1138.

similarities did not derive from precedent transfers between the two entities.[95] The transition to the new paradigm of indirect rule and development policies dated to the 1890s in almost all colonizing countries. But it would not have emerged simultaneously without the transfers of knowledge, ideologies and techniques of colonial management between the colonizing powers. The ICI played an important role in this diffusion of colonial technologies that always transported ideologies. Therefore, the focus is on transfers between the colonial experts, in the ICI and beyond.

The analysis of transfers between the colonizers aims at identifying real transfers of knowledge, ideologies and technologies. These transfers were part of a colonial discourse about the scientific, humanitarian and developmental character of colonization. The dissertation deconstructs these discourses that the self-styled colonial experts of the ICI produced. It critically analyzes their "methods" of colonization. The focus is on the epistemic community of colonial experts who acted in a global space and pursued transnational careers. As a consequence, the geographical scope of this dissertation is very broad. It rather focuses on networks than on topographically defined spaces. These stretched from Asia to America, and converged in Europe and Africa. Colonizers from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Germany, Spain and the Americas are at the center of this study.

To obtain methodological access to the experts' "transnationality" or "internationality", we have to combine social history with cultural history.[96] As mentioned above, internationalism became an idea, or even an ideology, that could justify colonial rule. Its analysis belongs to the realm of intellectual history. The trans-colonial technology transfers instead are a social phenomenon and can only be analyzed as such. However, they cannot be separated from the cultural bias that accompanied them. By the same token, the history of science and technology

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[95] J. Osterhammel, *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats: Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich* (Göttingen, 2001); M. Middell, 'Kulturtransfer und Historische Komparatistik: Thesen zu ihrem Verhältnis', in M. Middell (ed.), *Kulturtransfer und Vergleich* (Leipzig, 2000), 7–41; M. Espagne, 'Au delà du comparatisme', in M. Espagne (ed.), *Les transferts culturels franco-allemands* (Paris, 1999), 35–49; B. Zimmermann and M. Werner, 'Penser l'histoire croisée: Entre empirie et réflexivité', *Annales* 58 (2003), 7–36; B. Zimmermann and M. Werner, 'Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung: Der Ansatz der histoire croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002), 607–636; H.-G. Haupt, 'Comparative History', *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences,* vol. 4 (Amsterdam, 2001), 2397–2403; G. Haupt and J. Kocka, 'Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives of Comparative History', in G. Haupt and J. Kocka (eds.), *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives* (Oxford and New York, 2009), 1–32; H.-G. Haupt and J. Kocka, *Geschichte und Vergleich: Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung* (Frankfurt and New York, 1996) H. Kaelble and J. Schriewer, *Vergleich und Transfer: Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften* (Frankfurt and New York, 2003), 469-493.

[96] It has become widely accepted that transnational history is a perspective rather than a method: A. Iriye and P.-Y. Saunier, *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* (Basingstoke and New York, 2009), XX; K.K. Patel, 'An Emperor Without Clothes? The Debate About Transnational History Twenty-Five Years On', *Histoire@Politique* 26 (2015); S. Conrad, 'Doppelte Marginalisierung: Plädoyer für eine transnationale Perspektive auf die deutsche Geschichte', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002), 145–169; A. Iriye, *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future* (Basingstoke, 2013); P.-Y. Saunier, *Transnational History* (Houndmills et al., 2013); M. Pernau, *Transnationale Geschichte* (Stuttgart, 2011).

contain elements of social history and cultural history. For example, colonial experts joined the ICI and converted to colonial internationalism because it helped them to build a career. Bruno Latour, among others, has emphasized this social and political determination of science and scientific paradigms.[97] I will thus combine elements of social and cultural history to understand why social interests led colonial experts to embrace internationalism. At the same time I try to show that the "international" ideal had a significant impact on the social history of the metropole and the colonies. This *jeux d'échelle* between social and cultural history is necessary to explain the emergence of colonial internationalism and its impact.

This approach required extensive research in over twenty different archives. The ICI archives do not exist anymore, if they ever did. The ICI's social and ideological history had to be reconstructed by using the correspondence of ICI members, scattered in archives all over Europe. Fragmentary dossiers about the ICI can be found in the archives of the German Colonial Ministry at the Bundesarchiv Berlin, in the African Archives of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, in the archive of the French Colonial Union in Aix-en-Provence and in the British National Archives at Kew. The documents in those archives mainly concern the history of the ICI after the First World War. With regard to the foundation and social evolution of the ICI, I made use of the private correspondence of selected members in Neuenstein (Hohenlohe-Zentralarchiv), Berlin (Private Papers in the Bundesarchiv), Leiden (University Archive), Enghien (Arenberg-Archives), Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale, Institut de France), Brussels (General Archives, African Archives) and other small archives. An invaluable source for the intellectual history of the ICI are its conference proceedings and publications that I consulted mainly in Heidelberg (Max-Planck Institut für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht). The innumerous publications of the ICI members were a starting point to inquire into their background and political agendas. For the first chapter on settler colonialism, I used archives in Nantes (French Foreign Ministry) and Aix-en-Provence (ANOM). Information on technology transfers can be found in the series on "colonial missions" in the ANOM or in the archives of the Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee and its members (Bundesarchiv Berlin). Published sources – like periodicals for colonial agronomy, tropical medicine, and native law – were a rich source to understand technolects and expert knowledge.

As can be seen from the variety of archival materials used, this dissertation is not an institutional history of the ICI. Rather, it is a history of colonial internationalism and its impact from 1830 to the 1950s. Three different periods can be distinguished. Between 1830 and 1870, colonial transfers between "experts" were frequent but did not bring about an ideal of colonial

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[97] B. Latour and S. Woolgar, *The Social Construction of Scientific Facts* (Beverly Hills et al., 1979).

internationalism. Transfers were embedded in a broader context of emigration and colonization and aimed at creating the ideal settler colony (Chapter 1). The second period (1890-1914) is dominated by the ICI's transfers of colonial techniques and the emerging paradigm of development and "native policy" (Chapters 2-6). In the last period (1920-1950s), colonial internationalism spread and institutions like the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization adopted the ICI's development policy, even though they often lagged behind the ICI's colonial expertise (Chapter 8). The periods are respectively the pre-history of the ICI (1830-1870), the foundation of the ICI (1890s-1914) and the long-term impact of the ICI (1920s-1950s).

The *first chapter* is a *pre-chapter* and shows that the colonial theory prior to the foundation of the ICI was dominated by the paradigm of transnational settler colonization.[98] Although settler colonization between the 1830s and the 1870s was transnational, it did not bring about any significant ideology of colonial internationalism, like the ICI in the 1890s. In the early nineteenth century, the concept of colonization emerged and temporarily replaced empire as the driving force behind colonial expansion. Emigration and colonization became a symbol of rebellion against the imperialism of the Old Régime, because they were free and transnational. Liberal thinkers from Europe and America portrayed colonization as a process of liberation. They promoted the "transplanting" of entire European societies to "waste land" overseas. At those frontiers, they argued, European emigrants would settle, multiply, and ultimately replace native populations. This chapter shows how the paradigm of settler colonization emerged and solidified in Great Britain, France, and Germany through transnational knowledge transfers and the global recruitment of colonists. Australia, Algeria, and the South American "Pampas" (where German colonists settled) constituted a single "global frontier" – a cognitive unity despite of its geographic disparity. Both colonists and colonial ideas circulated between Algeria, South America, Russia, Australia and Europe. For example, Volga-German colonists founded agricultural colonies in Argentina, while British colonial entrepreneurs developed colonization systems that were used in French Algeria and South America. And neo-European societies in Argentina emulated French strategies to exterminate native populations. European and neo-European settler colonization was thus by default transnational.

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[98] See for the theory of settler colonialism: L. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (Houndmills et al., 2010) and J. Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-world, 1783-1939* (Oxford and New York, 2009); See also the contributions in: A.D. Moses (ed.), *Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History* (Oxford, 2004).

However, while the frontier colonization produced transnational migration networks and a globally shared notion of colonization, it did not run counter to nationalism. On the contrary, it produced notions of Pan-German, Pan-Anglo-Saxon or Pan-Latin “ethnic” nationalisms. The Germans were said to be the best colonizers, because their migratory instinct and their tribal organization led them to push colonial frontiers further. Ironically, the “barbarian” Germans were deemed the best colonizers and recruited to settle in Algeria and South America. The belief in Germanic migratory atavism led French and South American colonizers to dismiss Roman colonization as a model for Algeria or the Pampas. Rather than embracing colonial classicism, they developed their own version of romantic pan-nationalism and imagined Latin America and Latinized Africa as a single colonial space under French domination. British colonial theorists, for their part, declared the “Anglo-world” an emanation of Greater Britain, which included New Zealand, Australia and the independent USA, because the latter “Anglicized” a global frontier. Thus, settler colonialism was transnational in practice but did not develop any theory of internationalism. It was not until the late 1870s that the Belgian king Léopold II introduced a new standard of colonial internationalism that would also influence the foundation of the ICI.

In the *second* chapter, I explain why colonial activists founded the ICI in 1893, and why over hundred colonial experts joined the ICI and turned to internationalism. By analyzing the social origins of the ICI, we can also learn about its ideological background. ICI members showed a clear tendency to value indirect rule over settler colonialism. While portraying colonialism as a means of human progress, they deliberately omitted the violence of colonial conquest and domination. To de-ideologize colonialism, they re-defined it as scientific, humanitarian and liberal. Internationalism was the umbrella ideology that linked all those ideas. Although the early period of the ICI’s existence was dominated by centrifugal interests and competitive emulation, individual experts and also colonial administrations learned quickly how to capitalize on international exchange. The ICI, which had declared colonialism a science, used comparison and transfer as its method to improve colonial administration. The main result of comparison was that they valued “native” cooperation over the presence of European settlers. Unlike the exclusive liberalism of settler colony schemes, the ICI’s liberalism was inclusive with regard to the “natives”. Referring to notions of cultural relativism, ICI members claimed that colonization benefitted all humanity to which the colonized peoples belonged. These ideological premises led the ICI members to promote an allegedly positive and humanitarian native policy, and the end of settler colonialism. All these concepts were combined into a shared ideal of colonial reform that anticipated the development aid policies of the twentieth century.

As we will see, reform was not revolution and contributed to substantiate colonial domination, rather than easing the pressure on the colonized.

The *third chapter* analyzes converging discourses on tropical hygiene and situates the ICI within international networks of colonial medicine. I argue that medical and racial discourses led the ICI members to believe in a certain degree of superiority of the "natives" in tropical colonies. As early as 1894, the ICI set its hope on hygienists to prepare Europeans for extended sojourns in the tropical colonies. By the 1890s, the hygienist science lived through a process of transformation, provoked by the microbiological revolution and the impact of racist theories. After long debates, the ICI came to the conclusion that tropical hygiene was unable to assure a healthy life for Europeans in the new African colonies. Its members dismissed the methods of both traditional and microbiological hygienists. Instead, they embraced a racist approach that inevitably led to what I call acclimatization dilemma. As Michael Osborne and Warwick Anderson have shown, acclimatization became the "essential science of [French] colonization."[99] It turned out to be a problem for racist theorists in the ICI, who pathologized the process of acclimatization. Initially interpreted as a natural adjustment to the local environment, they claimed that acclimatization of Europeans in the tropics provoked racial degeneration. According to them, Europeans who dwelled in the warmer countries underwent an irreversible process of degeneration, which ultimately led to the "degeneration of the white race" as a whole. Searching for solutions to the acclimatization dilemma, the ICI sent a commission to the colonies and a survey to European experts. Almost all of them agreed that degeneration was inevitable. The debate led to "racist disorientations" among the ICI members: some of them advocated race mixing, others recommended the use of Southern European "races" for colonial projects, because they were accustomed to warm climates. Finally, the ICI concluded that only the colonized, who were "native" to their specific environment and therefore climate-resilient, could work and live in the tropical colonies. As a result, it dismissed settler colonization and relied on the "natives" to exploit the colonies to the benefit of the motherland. Professional white administrators should turn the natives into workers who run the colonial economy.

The *fourth chapter* reveals the ICI's politics of comparison, and identifies three types of political comparison its members used: archetypes, prototypes and stereotypes. These political comparisons resulted in an alleged exceptionalism of the Dutch Indies. Dutch Java, in

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[99] Michael Osborne and Warwick Anderson emphasize the French contribution to bring together colonization and acclimatization as complementary processes: E.T. Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers: Hydrotherapy, Climatology, and French Colonial Spas* (Durham, 2006), 15; See especially: M.A. Osborne, *The Emergence of Tropical Medicine in France* (Chicago and London, 2014); W. Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines* (Durham, 2006).

particular, earned itself the reputation as the only profitable colony because of its successful native policy that had been introduced by professionally instructed white colonial experts. The second part of the chapter analyzes knowledge transfers among the colonizing powers, who intended to model their recruitment of administrators on the Dutch system. Inspired by the ICI's reformism, all colonizing powers reorganized their training of colonial administrators and introduced various forms of "native policy" to their colonies. The reform of colonial administrations, based on comparison and transfers, represents the desire for professionalization and rationalization of colonial rule. According to the ICI's reform, colonial administrators should be specialists in native culture, resistant to the tropical climate, and charismatic rulers who governed independently of the "unprofessional" bureaucracy in the mother country.

The *fifth chapter* analyzes transfers of colonial technologies in the field of agronomy. It emphasizes the political purpose of technology transfers and focuses on agronomist development efforts. Technology transfers materialized in three different "laboratories". The ICI was a virtual laboratory in which its members exchanged strategies and techniques of colonization. By 1900, the ICI's reputation as a colonial laboratory was outdone by the agronomist laboratory in Buitenzorg (Java), which was vital to spread cultivation methods and improved cash crops globally. The third laboratory was a global network of colonial transfers, which will be divided into four different types of transfers: intercolonial transfers (between colonies), transtropical transfers (between the tropical regions), intraprofessional transfers (within a certain profession) and translocal transfers (between neighboring colonies). All these transfers were transnational. While the ICI portrayed these laboratories and the technology transfers as apolitical and scientific operations, this chapter will reveal the political purposes behind supposedly disinterested technologies. I argue that administrators in Africa imported agronomic techniques from the South American plantation system prior to 1900. After the turn of the century, however, the agronomic research laboratories in Dutch Java provided for improved cash crops, together with new techniques to make the natives grow crops for the benefit of the colonial administration. This change marked a shift from the imitation of former slave plantations in South America towards the emulation of more subtle and "modern" ways of forced cultivation that had been invented in the East Indies.

The *sixth chapter* shows the ICI's role in promoting a program of "native policy", which manifested itself in the use and manipulation of "native law". While advocating legal relativism, the ICI set out to actively invent and manipulate native customary law. Since 1900, ICI members launched vast projects to codify native law and to produce knowledge about native

notions of family organization, property, sovereignty and penal traditions. In doing so, they accumulated anthropological knowledge about native customs. I argue that their anthropology of the natives was ahead of its time. ICI anthropologists did not portray native societies as ethnically determined and immobile tribal communities. On the contrary, they analyzed them from a constructivist and functionalist point of view. Consequently, those collections were the origin for a modern science of legal anthropology. At the same time, those trans-colonial collections allowed them to manipulate or even invent "native law" and to use it for their purposes. As those codification projects were transnational and trans-colonial, they helped to disseminate methods of legal anthropology and misinterpretations of customary law alike. The debate about native law and the praxis of native policies could have two diametrically opposed consequences. Native policy engendered both systems of racial segregation and the possibility of nationalist emancipation.

Chapter seven demonstrates that colonial internationalism was also responsive to the "threat" of Pan-Islamic movements in the colonial world. ICI experts on Islam were employed by colonial administrations in German, French or Dutch colonies to advise on matters of Islam. I argue in this chapter that those experts used their international networks to find the best strategy of how to turn Muslims into co-colonizers. Colonial states, they claimed, should not fear Pan-Islamism, but capitalize on the cooperation with Muslims both inside and outside their territory. As a result, colonial administrations in British India, Dutch Java or Algeria paid muftis (Muslim legal scholars) in Mecca to issue fatwas (legal opinions given by muftis in response to a question posed by a Muslim) that advised Muslims not to rebel against colonial administrations. At the same time, ICI members declared Islamic law a customary law and portrayed it as easy to manipulate. In colonies as different as Algeria and Tunisia, codifications of Muslim law resulted in its "modernization" and served as an instrument to change Muslim societies or to expropriate land in accordance with a Muslim law that had been recently invented by the colonizers. To achieve this goal, colonial legislators combined different Muslim schools of law and added elements of the Europeanized Ottoman civil law. Thus, they reshaped Muslim law and used it for their own colonial purposes.

Chapter eight traces the origins of development policies back to the ICI. Analyzing the period between 1890 and 1950, I show that the ICI, the ILO and the League of Nation's Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) influenced each other. The ICI not only provided the PMC and the ILO with colonial experts, but also had more sophisticated and professional answers to the colonial crises of the twentieth century. Already before the First World War, ICI members were actively involved in development policies such as the introduction of capitalist

work modes and the establishment of agricultural credit banks. In doing so, the ICI anticipated the development aid policy of the 1960s. This policy oscillated between the introduction of the free market and paternalistic policies of guidance. While many colonial internationalists often saw a need to "protect" the natives against the shock of European capitalism, they frequently tried to impose it on them. This enforcement involved recurrence to policies of forced cultivation and compulsory labor, practices that were tolerated by both the ICI and the PMC. On the one hand, the ICI rejected the ILO's international convention against forced labor and styled itself as a defender of colonial interests. On the other hand, the PMC often lagged behind the ICI with regard to anthropological knowledge, administrative experience and efficient development schemes. As a response to the challenge of the ILO and the PMC who interfered in global colonial policies, the ICI pursued two strategies: it became more conservative and defended the colonial state, while offering autonomy to the colonized within a federal union between metropole and colony. After 1945, ICI leaders turned against the "anti-colonialists" in the United Nations and continued to defend colonialism as such. In the era of decolonization, the ICI played an important role in applying colonial patterns of thinking to the so-called Third World. Nevertheless, it dissolved in 1981 as a late response to the end of colonialism.

What is the common denominator that ties all these chapters together? First of all, the topics treated in Chapters 2-8 figured high on the ICI's agenda throughout its existence. While the ICI members studied them comparatively, they also further developed the fields of tropical hygiene, administrative training, colonial agronomy and enforced cultivation, customary law, recruitment of labor, and development schemes such as fiscal policies and the introduction of credit banks. Success in those fields was vital to maintaining colonial rule and to make it profitable: tropical medicine kept workers healthy, knowledge of indigenous languages and laws helped to avoid revolts, scientific agronomy improved the harvest, and a period of enforced cultivation should turn colonial subjects into productive peasants and even capitalists. The ICI's approach was to professionalize colonial administration and economic exploitation through comparison and the emulation of successfully tested strategies. It is important to note that during this process, the ICI "colonized" those seemingly "uncolonial" fields of expertise and used them to substantiate colonial rule.

What is more, the ICI hoped to bring about a transition from settler schemes (Chapter 1) towards a professionalized "native policy." Chapters 2-8 show how colonizer's subordinated different fields to the one purpose of introducing a native policy that would make colonial rule and economy more efficient, while legitimizing it by portraying it as mutually beneficial. The

aim of "native policy" was the training, co-optation, and employment of colonial subjects as agents of European administrations and economic development. Their collaboration would substantiate the authority of colonial rulers rather than making it irrelevant in the long term. According to the ICI experts, a successful native policy required a thorough knowledge of the native's strengths on which they could rely without provoking contestations. A crucial element of this policy was to make colonial subjects believe that they acted in their own interest if they accepted colonial rule and participated in it. All the chapters taken together provide us with a definition of a successful "native policy" as imagined by the ICI experts. Native policy was a paternalistic colonial scheme that dismissed white settlers as a productive force in colonies and relied, through various strategies of indirect rule, on the indigenous population as workers, tax-payers, administrators, and producers. A minimum of well-trained European "expert" administrators were supposed to know "native" languages, cultures, and legal traditions in detail. They applied their knowledge to use and manipulate "native" institutions and agencies that should be at the basis of a colony's administrative and economic success. They imposed modes of production, such as the forced cultivation of scientifically improved cash crops, on the indigenous population until they learned to benefit from a restricted capitalist system themselves. Native policy was therefore a mix of indirect rule in administrative matters and direct intervention to enforce economic progress and development.

Finally, the different "colonial fields" treated in the chapters are linked by the fact that they were professionalized or even emerged through transnational exchange among experts. Thus, ICI members not only colonized these fields of knowledge but also internationalized them. For example, there were no international congresses that dealt explicitly and exclusively with tropical hygiene in the colonies before the ICI took the initiative to take the debate to an international level. The ICI was the only institution in which former or current colonial administrators from around the world shared their experiences in a systematic way. As we will see, the ICI triggered reforms of training schools for colonial administrators in all member countries (administrators who occasionally met in the colonies did not design programs to change things). Moreover, early colonial internationalists and ICI members turned the agronomic laboratories at Buitenzorg into a globally emulated model, and a distributor for improved crop seeds for all colonies. The codification of customary law and Islamic law was based on international cooperation among experts who accumulated knowledge and spread strategies of how to manipulate it at the same time. Also, the concept and policy of economic development was closely tied to comparative colonialism and transnational transfers of

techniques. To sum up, all chapters share the subject of treating an internationalized colonial field.

The importance of colonial internationalism can only be assessed by its impact. By analyzing transnational transfers in fields as different as tropical hygiene, the training of colonial administrators, the transfer of agronomic techniques, native law, global Islam and development policies, I demonstrate the impact of colonial internationalism in various colonies. Thus, I argue in this dissertation that colonial internationalism "from below" reshaped colonial policies. Its impact was similar to categories traditionally advanced by historians to explain colonialism, such as nationalism, capitalist expansion, and social imperialism.[100] Given its role for colonialism, I propose to add an "internationalist theory of colonialism" to existing theories. At the end of the dissertation we will be able to assess if a "theory of colonial internationalism" can help to better understand and explain colonialism.

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[100] W.J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism* (Chicago, 1980).

Chapter 1

Counterpoints and Preludes to Colonial Internationalism: The Settler Colonial Paradigm at the Global Frontier (1830s-1870s)

When the doyen of French colonialism, Joseph Chailley, founded the International Colonial Institute (ICI) in 1893, he proclaimed a new age of overseas policy that would overcome colonization. Experienced administrators from Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Germany shared his view and joined the Institute. They asserted that colonies were indeed an obsolete type of overseas possession. The new type of overseas dependencies, Chailley affirmed, "are not *colonies*, and there is no question of colonizing [peupler] them; they are *possessions*, inhabited by *natives* who occupy a big part of it."[1] The presence of the natives, Chailley pointed out, made colonization impossible. His repudiation of colonies left many observers confused. Baffled by the ICI's doubts about colonization, a fresh Russian delegate inquired if he had joined the right institution, which was colonial in name but seemed to be anti-colonial in practice.[2]

The ICI's "anti-colonial colonialism" was far from being a contradiction in terms. What seemed to be an oxymoron was rather a semantic nuance: the ICI members intended to carry on colonialism but wanted to abandon colonization. Colonization, as they understood it, was the process of populating supposedly empty spaces on the globe with European settlers. They took this definition from theorists and encyclopedias of the mid-nineteenth century, who had identified "waste land, immigration and settlement" to be the essential ingredients for a successful colonization.[3] By "transplanting" European settler societies to supposed wasteland overseas, one German lexicon determined in 1858, empty territories would be transformed into colonies and "civilized land."[4] Indeed, such transformatory occupations had materialized from the 1830s onwards, when 50 million European emigrants left their homes to settle in Australia, North America, South America, and on the fringes of Africa. At those global frontiers, they created "new worlds" on the European model.[5] European emigrants who turned into colonists

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[1] J. Chailley-Bert, *Dix années de politique coloniale* (Paris, 1902), 35-56: "Ces colonies, comme nous les appelons, ne sont pas des *colonies*, et il n'est pas question de les peupler. Elles sont des *possessions*, déjà peuplées d'indigènes, qui en occupent la meilleure partie."
[2] Institut Colonial International, *Compte rendu de la session tenue à Berlin le 6 et 7 septembre 1897* (Brussels, 1897), 71.
[3] E.G. Wakefield and J. Collier, *A View of the Art of Colonization: With Present Reference to the British Empire; in Letters Between a Statesman and a Colonist* (Oxford, 1914 [1849]), 63.
[4] 'Colonien', *Pierer's Universal-Lexikon der Gegenwart und Vergangenheit oder neuestes encyclopädisches Wörterbuch* (Altenburg, 1858), 272-277.
[5] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*.

by settling these frontiers were vital to this type of colonization. Between the 1830s and the 1870s, settler colonization was not only a subcategory of colonial policies, but its paradigm.[6]

The paradigm of settler colonialism was characterized by four main points.[7] First of all, it appeared as being a movement "from below" that symbolized a liberation from the exclusive colonial monopoly of the Old Régime, which James Belich has adequately called a "settler revolution."[8] Second, emigration became a pre-condition of colonization. They were regarded as complementary processes that would lead to a global demographic equilibrium.[9] Consequently, the "transplantation" and "reproduction" of European societies, with the help of emigrant families, became a priority of settler colonialism in the nineteenth century.[10] Third, settler colonization was transnational and multinational, in the sense that settler societies were often composed of different nationalities who came from very different countries.[11] Yet, although settler colonialism was multinational, it did not result in a general ideal of international solidarity. On the contrary, settler colonization reiterated romantic notions of ethnic nationalism and reinforced aggressive Pan-German, Pan-Latinist, and Pan-Anglo-Saxon schemes. Fourth, settler societies followed a logic of elimination of the "natives" and openly used languages of extermination. In settler societies, indigenous people were generally "dispensable" and did not play any significant role in their colonial project.[12]

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[6] See for the British case: J. Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System* (Cambridge, 2009), 19-43; As Bayly argued, the "imperialism of 1760-1830", based on slave-trade, military and religious expansion, ended in 1830 and gave way to a new form of white settler colonization: C.A. Bayly, 'The First Age of Global Imperialism, c. 1760–1830', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 26, 2 (1998), 28–47: 38; Three seminal surveys of settler colonization: Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*; P. Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* (New York, 1999); C. Elkins and S. Pedersen (eds.), *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies* (New York, 2005).

[7] The term paradigm is inspired by Kuhn and interpreted here with Foucault as a discursive formation. Paradigms emerge from convergent discurses and can shape reality without "being" the reality. Paradigms are imagined realities and a "set of beliefs, a general conceptual framework, shared by the practitioners of a given discipline." A paradigm is socially and communicatively constructed and does not exclude the existence of other paradigms. Being a discursive formation, a paradigm can be reiterated by contesting it, see: H.L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago, 1982), 58-61. See also Agamben's writings on paradigms summarized in Leland de la Durantaye, 'The Paradigm of Colonialism' in M. Svirsky and S. Bignall, *Agamben and Colonialism* (Edinburgh, 2012), 229-238.

[8] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, 9; See for the traditional distinction between colony and settler colonization: J. Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A theoretical overview* (Princeton, 2005), 10-11; M. Ferro, *Colonization: A Global History* (London and New York, 2005), 18; D.K. Fieldhouse, *Colonialism, 1870-1945: An Introduction* (London, 1981).

[9] Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*.

[10] L. Veracini, ''Settler Colonialism': Career of a Concept', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, 2 (2013), 313–333: 315; According to Mahmood Mamdani, Lorenzo Veracini and James Belich, emigrants do not always become settlers, but settlers have always been emigrants; Settlers do not only migrate but also conquer: Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 3 and 5.

[11] Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation*, 2; Veracini, ''Settler Colonialism': Career of a Concept'': 313; See also the relation between imperialism and internationalism in D. Bell, *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2007).

[12] P. Wolfe, 'Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native', *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, 4 (2006), 387–409 and P. Wolfe, 'Land, Labor and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race' *American Historical Review*, 106, 3 (2001), 866-905.

Emigration agents and colonization entrepreneurs shaped the colonial theory of the mid-nineteenth century with extensive publications on the topic. In the 1830s, the British Edward Gibbon Wakefield (1796-1862) developed a scheme of systematic colonization to transport thousands of settlers to New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and Canada.[13] Together with Oxford professor and Colonial Office employee Herman Merivale (1806-1874), he became the most important colonization theorist in Great Britain.[14] The French Jules Duval (1813-1870) meticulously chronicled the colonization of Algeria, edited the settler press, such as *L'Écho d'Oran,* and was involved in several colonization projects.[15] As the "official delegate of the Algerian colonists," Duval became the most important promoter of French emigration and colonization in the mid-nineteenth century.[16] Theorists, like the Saint-Simonien Prosper Enfantin (1796-1864) and Alfred Legoyt (1812-1885), refined theories of emigration and colonization. The South American frontier, in particular, influenced early German theory and practice of colonization. In the 1840s, the Argentine colonization theorist Faustino Domingo Sarmiento (1811-1888) visited Germany to recruit colonists for his country. He joined forces with Göttingen Professor of Geography Johann Eduard Wappäus (1812-1879), to publish the first extensive survey of German colonization, called *German Emigration and Colonization*, which later influenced the comprehensive and internationally renowned survey by national economist Wilhelm Roscher, called *Colonies, Colonization and Emigration*, which was soon called "the Bible of German colonialism."[17] Their propaganda led to the foundation of the Hamburg Colonization Society (1848), which sent 17,000 German colonists to settle the River Plate States and Brazil.[18] Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-1884), who drafted the constitution that turned Argentina into an immigrant state based on "government through colonization", was

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[13] On Wakefield see E.R. Kittrell, 'Wakefield's Scheme of Systematic Colonization and Classical Economics', *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 32, 1 (1973), 87–111; G. Piterberg and L. Veracini, 'Wakefield, Marx, and the World Turned Inside Out', *Journal of Global History* 10, 03 (2015), 457–478; T. Ballantyne, 'Remaking the Empire from Newgate: Wakefield's A Letter from Sydney', in A.M. Burton and I. Hofmeyr (eds.), *Ten Books that Shaped the British Empire: Creating an Imperial Commons* (Durham, 2014), 29–49; W. Roscher, *Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung* (Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1856), 330-331.
[14] H. Merivale, *Lectures on Colonization and Colonies: Delivered Before the University of Oxford in 1839, 1840 & 1841* (London, 1861); E. Beasley, *Mid-Victorian Imperialists: British Gentlemen and the Empire of the Mind* (London, 2004), 18-38.
[15] O. Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria* (Stanford, 2010), 82 and 234; F. Weil, 'The French State and Transoceanic Emigration', in N.L. Green and F. Weil (eds.), *Citizenship and Those who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation* (Urbana, 2007), 120.
[16] J. Valette, "Socialisme utopique et idée coloniale: Jules Duval (1813-1870)" [Unpublished PhD dissteration Université de Sorbonne, 6 vol.] (Paris, 1975); Y. Charbit, *Du malthusianisme au populationnisme: les économistes français et la population, 1840-1870* (1981), 185-192.
[17] D.F. Sarmiento and J.E. Wappäus, *Deutsche Auswanderung und Colonisation* (Leipzig, 1846), 19-25; Roscher, *Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung*.
[18] BArch, R8023/260, "Kolonisationsverein von 1849 in Hamburg (November-1896-Juli 1906)"; A detailed description of the *Verein*: K. Richter, 'Zwei Hamburger Kolonisationsvereine und ihre Bedeutung für die deutsche Kolonisation in Südbrasilien 1846-1851', *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte* 94 (2008), 21–56; See also H. Leyfer, *Deutsches Kolonistenleben im Staate Santa Catharina in Süd-Brasilien* (Hamburg, 1900).

also widely read both in France and in Germany.[19] Alexis Peyret (1826-1902), a French-born colonist who founded several colonies in Argentina, and John Le Long, a Franco-Argentine recruitment agent who provoked French blockades of the Rio de la Plata (1838-1840; 1845-1849) to "protect" 18,000 French colonists, shaped colonial imaginations in France in tandem with Franco-Algerian colonists.[20]

Unlike North America, which absorbed 35 million of the 50 million Europeans who emigrated during the long nineteenth century, the newly founded South American states needed to actively promote their countries as potential destinations for emigrants, and in doing so influenced European settler colonization theory.[21] All those promoters of colonization read and inspired each other. Their views differed in nuances but had the same purpose: to establish settler colonization as the main paradigm of colonial theory in the mid-nineteenth century.

The five characteristics of settler colonization dominated colonial theory and practice between the1830s and the1870s. It was not until the 1870s that they were gradually replaced by a new colonial ideology introduced mainly by the Belgian "entrepreneur-king" Léopold II. Léopold declared his colonial project in the Congo basin an international project and employed experts from all over the world instead of sending poor peasant emigrants to settle the country. According to his transnational propaganda, colonial sovereignty would not be carried alone by settler colonists, but through scientific expertise and humanitarian argumentation that valued the "native" population. His argumentation anticipated the ICI's agenda of colonial internationalism, which would dismiss colonization by mass settlement and use "experts" instead. To fully grasp the ICI's importance in the long history of colonial internationalism, this

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[19] J.B. Alberdi and F. Cruz, *Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1915 [1852]); D.S. Castro, *The Development and Politics of Argentine Immigration Policy, 1852-1914: To Govern is to Populate* (San Francisco, 1991).

[20] A. Peyret, *Une visite aux colonies de la république Argentine* (Paris, 1889); John Le Long, the French consul in Buenos Aires, made himself the spokesman of 18,000 French colonists who had settled in Uruguay. He provoked a French intervention against the Argentine dictator Rosas, who was hostile to immigrants from Europe and temporarily banned French merchants from the country: AMAEF, Affaires Diverses Politiques 9ADP/1+2 "Confederation Argentine 1849": Mémoire du 18.10.1849 , by M. Clamorgam sent to Foreign Minister Tocqueville; See also: J. Le Long, *Intervention de la France dans le Rio de la Plata* (Paris, 1849) ; J. Le Long, *Appel à la France: Situation actuelle de notre politique au Rio-de-la-Plata* (Paris, 1849) ; J. Le Long, *L'émigration et la colonisation françaises aux rives de la Plata de 1840 à 1884 (avec des documents inédits)* (Paris, 1884) J. Le Long, 'La République Argentine et l'émigration (1889)', in Congrès Colonial International de Paris (ed.), *Congrès Colonial International de Paris* (Paris, 1889).

[21] D.R. Gabaccia, D. Hoerder, and A. Walaszek, 'Emigration and Nation Building during the Mass Migrations from Europe', in N.L. Green and F. Weil (eds.), *Citizenship and Those who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation* (Urbana, 2007), 63; J.P. Daughton, 'When Argentina Was 'French': Rethinking Cultural Politics and European Imperialism in Belle-Époque Buenos Aires', *Journal of Modern History* 80, 4 (2008), 831–864; Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation*; 282-333; S. Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies. Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770-1870* (Durham, N.C., 1997); K.J. Bade, *Friedrich Fabri und der Imperialismus in der Bismarckzeit: Revolution, Depression, Expansion* (Freiburg i. Br., 1975); For British colonial fantasies in South America see M. Brown (ed.), *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce, and Capital* (Oxford, 2009); A. Knight, 'Britain and Latin America', in A. Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 1999), 122–145; J. Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-system, 1830-1970* (Cambridge, 2009), 55 and 137-139.

chapter shows how the paradigm of settler colonization emerged and solidified in the nineteenth century. It is a pre-chapter and a pre-history of the colonial internationalism of the 1890s and helps to identify and explain the changes in colonial theory and practice that the ICI would bring about.

Transnational Colonization and Emigration as Liberation

In the aftermath of the French and American revolutions, the idea that emigration and colonization were liberal concepts, and opposed to the mercantile and protectionist colonies of the Old Régime, prevailed among colonial theorists who declared free emigration and settlement a corollary of free trade.[22] In the 1840s, Oxford professor Hermann Merivale emphasized in his lectures on colonization that the Old Régimes had been conquerors but not colonizers.[23] His co-national Edward Gibbon Wakefield founded the British Colonization Society to give poor emigrants free passage to Australia or New Zealand, a scheme he deemed "really democratic" because it was a means to overcome the British monarchy's policy of using Australia as a penal colony where it sent its convicts and political adversaries.[24]

Representatives of newly independent states in the Americas, like the Argentine Juan Bautista Alberdi, claimed that free colonization might be a way to give sovereignty to the people. Members of creole societies in South America, such as Alberdi, who had liberated themselves from the motherlands' exclusive right to trade with the colonies, celebrated the fall of the Spanish exclusive system while drafting a constitution for Argentina that fostered free immigration and colonization of the country.[25] In France, colonial entrepreneur Jules Duval, who read Alberdi and wrote a groundbreaking account on French colonial policy, thought along similar lines. He praised the creole colonists of the French Antilles for having called upon the British during the Revolution to end Paris' trade monopoly. "Finally", he wrote, "the metropolitan monopoly is abolished" and the "breath of liberty" revitalized the colonists overseas.[26] Duval established himself in Algeria to promote and organize the "free colonization"

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[22] B. Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism 1750-1850* (Cambridge, 1970); Jennifer Pitts has pointed out that liberal theorists turned to empire between the 1830s and the 1850s. Unlike her, I argue that liberal colonial theorists did not promote empires but transnational and free colonial settlement: J. Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, 2005); A more nuanced view: M.P. Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Liberal Imperialism in Europe* (New York, 2012); Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism in Germany*.

[23] Merivale, *Lectures on Colonization*, 4; E.G. Wakefield, *A View of the Art of Colonization: With Present Reference to the British Empire: in Letters Between a Statesman and a Colonist* (London, 1849), 17.

[24] Wakefield and Collier, *Art of Colonization*, 41.

[25] Alberdi and Cruz, *Bases y puntos*, 40-41.

[26] J. Duval, *Les colonies et la politique coloniale de la France: Avec deux cartes du Sénégal et de Madagascar* (Paris, 1864), 177.

of North Africa.[27] The crisis of the Old Régime raised hopes among liberals to replace monarchic colonies with free colonization.[28]

German-speaking liberals of the mid-nineteenth century happily embraced the idea of free colonization. Living in a fragmented country without colonies, they lamented the absence of a potential motherland and therefore longed for a unified fatherland. Nationalists without a nation-state and colonialists without a colony, they actively participated in colonization projects at the South American frontier.[29] When the Argentine colonization theorist Faustino Domingo Sarmiento visited Germany to recruit colonists for his country in the 1840s, he collaborated with Göttingen Professor of Geography Johann Eduard Wappäus to publish a pamphlet on *German Emigration and Colonization* to promote German emigration to Chile and Argentina. There, they would help to populate and colonize the newly founded democratic states.

Seen in this context, Sarmiento's repudiation of the Old Régime colonies and their "exploitation… under the yoke of the motherland" was far from being uninterested. Germans, Sarmiento and Wappäus argued, should not aspire to possessing their own, "exclusive" colonies. History had allegedly proven that "their time is definitely over," because they had led to economic stagnation and violent decolonization wars. To compensate for the absence of colonies, Sarmiento recommended that Germans instead applied their capital and workforce to the colonization in South America. In doing so, they would establish semi-colonial ties with the new states, without bearing the costs of administration or pacification.[30] At the same time, in Paris, recruitment agent John Le Long portrayed the Rio de la Plata region as an ideal colonial territory for France, because it would "enjoy all the advantages of colonization, without having to pay the charges." Unlike the River Plata, he argued, Algeria required a budget of fifty million Francs to keep 35,000 colonists alive: "Algeria demands huge financial sacrifices, which France cannot provide at the moment." [31] According to him, Argentina was the better Algeria and indeed, in the 1840s, more French citizens colonized South America (50,000) than Algeria (45,000).[32]

[27] See for example J. Duval, *L'Algérie: Tableau historique, descriptif et statistique… (1ère éd. revisée et complétée)* (Paris, 1859); and his more theoretical work: J. Duval, *Histoire de l'émigration européenne, asiatique et africaine au XIXe siècle : ses causes, ses caractères, ses effets* (Paris, 1862).

[28] Jennifer Pitts provides the intellectual background of these developments and shows that authors like Wakefield influenced authoritative thinkers like Bentham: Pitts, *A Turn to Empire*, 292, Footnote 6.

[29] Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation*, 282-333.

[30] Sarmiento and Wappäus, *Deutsche Auswanderung und Colonisation*, 19-25.

[31] Long, *Appel à la France*.14.

[32] AMAEF, Affaires Diverses Politiques 9ADP/1+2, "Argentine 1849 Emigration Basque pour Buenos Ayres": Consul de la République Française en Guipuzcoa et Navarre to Ministère des Affaires Étrangères from 4.9.1849; Le Long, *Si la France savait* ; ANOM F 80 1177 "Colonisation Dossier Principal Emigration", Dossier Colonisation Allemande: Akhbar, 29.4.1852: Beaumont: "De l'émigration et de l'Algérie" ; G. Chandèze, *De l'intervention des pouvoirs publics dans l'émigration et l'immigration* (Paris, 1898), 98

In 1856, the famous national economist Wilhelm Roscher argued along their lines and dismissed the "colonies of conquest" of the Old Régime while advocating a system of "free but assisted colonization" that Wakefield had developed for Australia. According to Roscher, the results of this system were agricultural and commercial colonies that were "very democratic" and thus the antipodes of the old mercantile colonies.[33] All those theorists styled themselves as liberals who dismissed monarchs with their vassals and slaves as adequate colonizers. Instead, they proposed sending European settlers who would gain sovereignty over territory by cultivating and populating it.

To achieve this goal, the free and assisted emigration of poor European peasants was seen as a pre-condition of successful colonization. During the feudal system of the Old Régime, individual mobility without official warrant had been impossible in Spain, a crime in France and punished by hanging in Prussia. Those Europeans who travelled to the New World had obtained an exclusive right to cross the ocean and as a general rule belonged to the upper class.[34] This changed in the age of emigration from the 1830s onwards, when European and American governments defined emigrants as impoverished individuals who travelled third class without a return ticket to another country, usually overseas.[35] The maladroit definition of emigrants as steerage passengers, who travelled third class and were poor enough that it was unlikely they would return, was taken from a very practical context. US immigration inspectors used this definition to distinguish between short-term visitors who brought money, and potential immigrants who arrived without any means and intended to stay.[36] But long before the definition was used on Ellis Island, it had been internationally applied to emigrants from Europe and immigrants in Latin America.[37] By the mid-nineteenth century, the poor emigrant was idealized to be the best colonist. This notion differed in essence from the ICI's attitude in the 1890s, claiming that only a few well-trained colonial experts should stay in the colonies for a restricted period of time.

Emigration and Colonization as Complementary Processes within a Global Equilibrium

During the 1830s, colonial theorists began interpreting emigration and colonization as mutually dependent and consecutive operations, following a Malthusian logic of demographic

[33] Roscher, *Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung*, 324 and 26.
[34] Chandèze, *De l'intervention des pouvoirs publics*, 2-3.
[35]See the French 'Décret du 9 Mars 1861, Article 7', cit. in: Ibid., 7-8.
[36] M.I. Choate, *Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008), 27.
[37] Castro, *Development and Politics*, 80.

exchange. Wakefield drew on classical doctrines when he declared the self-regulating balance between supply and demand the ultimate natural law, and believed that migrations were subject to that law. Once the state had acted as a catalyst, the circulation of emigrants would follow the pattern of demand and supply and result in a "self-equilibrating economic mechanism."[38] If there was a global imbalance of population – with overpopulation on one part of the earth and wastelands in another – colonial emigration would be "a natural means of seeking relief from the worst of our social ills,"[39] as Wakefield put it. Merivale also described this reciprocal process of emigration and colonization as a natural phenomenon: "It is as natural for people to flock into a busy and wealthy country that by any accident may be thin of people, as it is for the dense air to rush into those parts which are rarefied."[40] Seen from this global point of view, colonial emigration redressed the world's demographic imbalance, caused by overpopulation in Europe on the one hand and deserted territories overseas on the other.

Jules Duval wrote in 1864 that "Colonization is the consequence and the complement of emigration. The latter is the route, the former the port."[41] Without colonization, emigration made no sense, Duval claimed. His approach was intrinsically Eurocentric, holding that emigration was the "*rayonnement exterieur* of the human families" and that "humanity colonizes to take possession of its domains."[42] According to Duval, the act of emigration and colonization made Europeans human, because they "humanized" an inhuman space.

Inspired by those ideas, the French government in Algeria tried to attract "the peoples who emigrate…to colonize the fertile territory that the French authorities have conquered." The governor sent recruitment officers to Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium to convince potential emigrants to come to Algeria.[43] Hundreds of German and Swiss emigrants, who were about to embark for the Americas, were thus redirected to Algeria by the Colonization and Emigration Department.[44] In Great Britain, Wakefield introduced a system that would, according to German and French colonial theorists, "shape an epoch."[45] After creating the Colonization Society in 1830, Wakefield and his followers acquired "waste land" or "crown land" in Australia, which had been declared public property by the British Crown. They sold the land for a "sufficient"

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[38] Wakefield and Collier, *Art of Colonization*, xxiv.
[39] Wakefield, *A View of the Art of Colonization* (London and Kitchener, 2001 [1849]), 9.
[40] Here Merivale cited Edmund Burke to give authority to his argument: Merivale, *Lectures on Colonization*,138.
[41] Duval, *Les colonies et la politique coloniale de la France*, V.
[42] Ibid., VI-VII.
[43] ANOM, F 80 MIOM 1791: Mémoire sur les relations nouvelles que la colonization de l'Algerie peut et doit établir entre la France et la Suisse, les Etats allemands du Rhin et la Belgique, 14.2.1845.
[44] ANOM F 80 1177 "Colonisation Dossier Principal Émigration": Dossier Colonisation Allemande: Akhbar, 29.4.1852: Beaumont: "De l'émigration et de l'Algérie" ; See also Direction Générale des Affaires Civiles Colonisation et Émigration to Ministre de l'Intérieur au sujet d'émigration from 8.5.1849 ; Dossier Émigration Prussienne: Nr 5 "Installation d'un centre d'émigration prussienne aux environs de Sétif" ; Ministère de la guerre Algérie, Bureau de colonisation to Gouverneur Général from 29.6.1850.
[45] Sarmiento and Wappäus, *Deutsche Auswanderung und Colonisation*, vol.1, 76.

price to "capitalists". The purchase money would then be used to realize an "emigration fund" and to finance the transport of poor European laborers to the colony. The system provided the colonies with both capital and labor, which was supposedly a necessary symbiosis because "waste lands acquire value in proportion as capital and labor are applied to it."[46] In 1841 alone, the Colonization Society transported 19,523 "bounty-emigrants" to Australia. The official Colonial Land and Emigration Commission (1840) applied Wakefield's methods to settle 10,000 emigrants in South Africa.[47]

Recruitment agents from South America also tried to profit from European emigration. By 1874, there were twelve official Argentine immigration agents active in Europe.[48] The agents travelled through France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and Italy to promote emigration to the River Plate States, and Argentina in particular. Sarmiento, who became President of Argentina in 1868, was widely responsible for introducing the first federal Immigration Law of 1876, which was explicitly modelled on Australian immigration laws.[49] Alberdi had drafted the countries' new constitution in 1852 that gave European immigrants the constitutional right to uphold their European citizenship, while enjoying commercial freedom and the full rights to purchase property or even to enter the civil service in Argentina. Constitutional rights extended to "all the men of this world who want to live on Argentine territory."[50] Foreigners were exempted from military service and from taxes for several years. This strategy and international propaganda paid off and the South American countries received hundreds of thousands of emigrants. Between 1857 and 1888, some 1.5 million migrants established themselves in the Argentine federation alone. Among them were 8,000 Belgians, 16,000 Germans, 17,000 Austrians, 18,000 Swiss, 22,000 British, 92,000 French, 145,000 Spanish and, later in the century, 600,000 Italians. [51]

Official and unofficial colonization societies mushroomed in Europe and overseas to assist "free emigrants" in finding a territory to colonize. The combination of free emigration

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[46] R. Torrens, *Colonization of South Australia* (London, 1835), 8.
[47] Roscher, *Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung*, 330-331.
[48] Castro, *Development and Politics*, 160; AMEAF, Affaires Diverses Politiques 9ADP/1+2 : Min. des Affaires Etrangères à Ministère de l'Intérieur du 7.6.1861.
[49] Argentina. Dirección de Inmigración, *Informe anual del Comisario General de Immigración de la República Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1877), VI.
[50] "para todos los hombres del mundo que quieran habitar en el suelo argentino", see original text of the Constitución de la República Argentina 1853, Bibliotéca del Congreso: http://bcnbib.gob.ar/old/novedades/constituciondelaconfederacionargentina1853.pdf, last accessed 24.2.2016.
[51] G. Carrasco, *La République Argentine considérée au point de vue de l'agriculture & de l'élevage; d'après les renseignements du recensement d'agriculture et d'élevage effectué en 1887 sous les auspices de la Commission argentine de l'exposition de Paris* (Paris, 1889), 365. "Brazil was not the only nation to assist immigrants (Australia, New Zealand and Argentina all offered aid at one time), but conditions on Brazil's coffee plantations and the fact that Brazil was encouraging immigrants to replace its slave labor meant that without subsidies, Brazil could not compete with Argentina, for example. Slavery was ended in Brazil in 1888/9": J.D. Gould, 'European Inter-Continental Emigration: the role of" diffusion" and" feedback"', *Journal of European Economic History* 9, 2 (1980), 267–315: 272-82.

and assisted colonization became a business, and those who capitalized on it formulated its theory. This theory emphasized the importance of the simple and poor emigrant and colonist, who in turn became the symbol of the settler colonization movement.

Transplanting and Reproduction: The Myth of Germanic Migratory Atavism

Unlike colonial internationalists of the ICI, theorists of settler colonization in the mid-nineteenth century intended to "transplant" European families to "wasteland" overseas where they would guarantee long-term occupation and cultivate the land.[52] Reproductive and small-scale peasant families should be the nucleus of such a settler colonization based on mass emigration. Consequently, colonial entrepreneurs and administrators put much effort into recruiting rural families or even entire village communities. In 1848, the Algerian government invested fifty million Francs in a project to create *centres agricoles*, entire villages that were modeled on the rural communities of France. For similar reasons, South American immigration agents recruited entire Volga-German village communities and transferred them to Argentina and Brazil where they colonized the frontier. Such projects stood for the desire to reproduce European familial or communal structures in the colonies.[53] Families, village communities, and, if possible, tribe-like collectives, were considered stable entities that resisted the hostile environment of rural frontiers, lived self-sufficiently and were able to defend themselves against indigenous raids.[54]

Referring to the ideal of the small-scale peasant family, colonial theorists held the view that Germanic peoples epitomized this settler ideal, because they emigrated and settled collectively. The Germanic proclivity to emigration and colonization was due to their tribal character and settler spirit acquired during the barbarian invasions, as the Argentine Alberdi argued. Less civilized but more likely to become agricultural colonists, members of the Germanic race were migrants by instinct.[55] In a similar way, the *Deutsche Zeitung am Rio de la Plata* — the press organ of German-speaking Republicans who had emigrated to Argentina — argued that the Germanic peoples were more willing to emigrate (*auswanderungslustig*) the closer they were to the original "Germanic tribe." Since the barbarian invasions had spread

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[52] Wakefield and Collier, *Art of Colonization*, 63; P. Enfantin, *Colonisation de l'Algérie* (Paris, 1843), 10; 'Colonien', 272-277

[53] See on the centres agricoles: France. Ministère de la guerre, ... *Tableau de la situation des établissements français dans l'Algérie* (Alger, 1851), 238-243; between 1842 and 1845, the government had already created thirty-five centers amounting to 105,000 hectares of land. Apparently more than 46,000 settlers populated the centers: C.-R. Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present* (London, 1991), 26.

[54] Enfantin, *Colonisation de l'Algérie*, 10; See for a general overview: F. Tadgh, ''An Unknown and Feeble Body'. How Settler Colonialism Was Theorized in the Nineteenth Century', in F. Bateman and L. Pilkington (eds.), *Studies in Settler Colonialism* (Basingstoke, 2011).

[55] Alberdi and Cruz, *Bases y puntos*, 18.

Germanic blood among the Europeans, a peoples' degree of "Germanness" indicated its predisposition to emigration. The more Germanic blood was flowing in the veins of a European, the more urgent was his wish to settle on foreign lands. The Latin race, instead, did not emigrate. Unlike the Germans, the Latin race had never professed any ambition to establish a "home" (*Heimat*) overseas, but only left temporarily to exploit silver and gold mines. In conclusion, the *Deutsche Zeitung am Rio de la Plata* denied that the lack of a nation-state, pauperism, taxation, or political pressure were reasons for German emigration. It was their racialized "Germanic character" alone that was held responsible for their collective urge to emigrate (*Auswanderungslust*).[56] While the Anglo-Saxons were as mobile as the Germanic people, Alberdi added, the latter only migrated to places were people spoke their own language.[57]

Colonial administrations indeed appreciated "Germanic" communal or collective colonization. According to Algerian authorities, the migration of entire villages ensured the division of labor that made colonies self-sufficient.[58] The French colonial entrepreneur and renowned colonial theorist Jules Duval spread the word, stating that "like the Semites, [the Germans] are at home in their tribe and their families and do not feel exiled anywhere."[59] The Argentine Sarmiento celebrated the Germans for arriving in America and in Algeria as entire villages, with "their mayors, their priests, and their schoolmasters."[60] As the main propagandist of colonization in Argentina, Sarmiento cherished this communal emigration, which appeared to him as the prerequisite of a harmonic and successful colonization. So did the Franco-Algerian newspaper *Akhbar*, which wrote that "in Germany, it is not the individuals that emigrate, but communities, with their priests and schoolmasters." The paper canvassed German emigrants to settle in Algeria.[61]

The belief in Germanic collective settlement even led them to discard "Latin" or "Roman" colonization schemes. As early as 1843, the Saint-Simonian Prosper Enfantin argued that Romans had administered their territories in North Africa, and, at best, had governed them.[62] Never, though, had they colonized the southern Mediterranean shore in the true sense of the word: by sending families there, who would have guaranteed reproduction and therefore

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[56] 'Deutschland und Auswanderung' *Deutsche Zeitung am Rio de la Plata*, 138, February 6, 1866.
[57] Ibid.,18.
[58] ANOM F 80 1177 "Colonisation Dossier Principal Émigration, Dossier Émigration Prussienne": Nr 5 "Installation d'un centre d'émigration prussienne aux environs de Sétif."
[59] *Chandèze, De l'intervention des pouvoirs publics,* 173.
[60] D.F. Sarmiento, *Facundo. Civilización i barbarie* (Buenos Aires, 1921 [1845]), 330.
[61] ANOM F 80 1177 "Colonisation Dossier Principal Emigration, Dossier Emigration Prussienne: Nr 5 "Installation d'un centre d'émigration prussienne aux environs de Sétif" Ministère de la guerre Algérie, Bureau de colonisation 29 June 1850, to Governor General. Similar beliefs re-emerged in the twentieth century: A. D. Moses, "Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History", in A. D. Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History (New York, Berghahn Books), 4.
[62] On the role of Saint-Simoniens see R. Girardet, *L'Idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962* (Paris, 1972), 17-18.

substantiated colonization. Instead, the Roman attempts at military colonization had left no "traces sensibles."[63] "In Algeria," Enfantin complained, "it seems evident that the Roman race cannot be found anywhere, despite seven centuries of occupation, despite the ruins of giant monuments and roads that they built there."[64] The Vandals and Arabs, who followed them, were significantly more effective colonizers. They brought their families to the territory, who were predominantly "familles de cultivateurs," and actually colonized the country by combining settlement, reproduction, and cultivation.[65]

The distinction between Germanic tribes and Latin civilization was a recurrent pattern in the theories of migratory atavism. Sarmiento claimed that Germans preferred agricultural work in the countryside, while Romanic peoples chose to live in cities.[66] Consequently, Germans were more likely to establish themselves in agricultural colonies in rural territory. In those colonies, they created a second home, instead of a new society, as one British observer put it. Their social organization seemed to resemble a community (*Gemeinschaft)*, rather than a society (*Gesellschaft*). The tribal *Gemeinschaft* solidarity was the pre-condition to survive in a hostile frontier environment: "hence it is that the people of Germanic origin, from whom the English and the Americans have alike sprung, make the best of colonizers."[67]

In accordance with this point of view, the "urban" Roman civilization ceased to be important for settler colonists, whose ability to cultivate the conquered rural land was emphasized.[68] French colonial theorists elaborated the idea that the "Romanized" and civilized French generally did not emigrate (which was not true), with the exception of small portions of Bretons, who descended from the Vikings, and of the Basques, who had never been Latinized.[69] The migratory atavism of the Basques and the Bretons distinguished them from the Latinized part of Europe. Like the Germans and the Anglo-Saxons, the argument went, they had preserved their "tribal" character. This tribal character opposed the instinctively mobile Anglo-Saxon and Germanic peoples to the "civilized" but satisfied Latin countries. "Civilization" was therefore not the first quality of an ideal colonist. The ideal colonist, a French colonial theorist wrote, should not be too intelligent and educated, because he had to do practical work in the colonies. Strength was more important than intelligence. After all, the civilized Romans had failed to

[63] Enfantin, *Colonisation de l'Algérie*, 11.
[64] "En Algérie, il me paraît évident que la race romaine ne se retrouve nulle part, malgré sept siècles d'occupation, malgré les ruines géantes de monuments et de routes qu'elle y a laissées." Ibid., 11.
[65] Ibid., 13.
[66] Sarmiento and Wappäus, *Deutsche Auswanderung und Colonisation*, 8.
[67] Chandèze, *De l'intervention des pouvoirs publics*, 175
[68] On the ambigious role of the Roman model see M. Greenhalgh, *The Military and Colonial Destruction of the Roman Landscape of North Africa, 1830-1900* (Leiden, 2014).
[69] "Les Centres Bretons en Algérie, Rapport de l'Administrateur Délégué de la Société d'Emigration Bretonne," in *Rapports Présentés au Congrès Colonial de 1903* (Auxerre, 1903), 53.

maintain their empire, whereas the barbarian German tribes had conquered it and settled perpetually on its territory. Their barbarism had proven a "fertile barbarism."[70]

Fertility was a pre-condition for successful settlement in two ways. First, it was deemed highly important for the settler colonial project that the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon tribes had the reputation of being "more fertile races." Fertility made them more apt to reproduce and perpetuate European societies in the colonies.[71] Moreover, reproduction required Germanic peasants who would be able to turn the colonial lands into fertile lands. It was generally accepted that German peasant families were hardworking and honest, and hence the ideal colonist for any country. French authors declared them the "first colonists of the world," who were hardworking, patient, and visionary.[72] Looking back on the emigration of the nineteenth century, a French emigration expert exclaimed, "Where others fail, the Germans succeed."[73] Sarmiento traveled to German countries several times to promote emigration to Argentina, advancing the Germans' "proverbial honesty, laborious tradition, and their quiet and pacific character."[74] Also in Australia, "the Germans, with their love of land and careful farming methods" were considered as "living models of rural virtues." Germans, one newspaper claimed, were "settling the country…in the best sense of the word," and they were even "better small settlers than the British."[75]

Before the 1870s, the myth of Germanic migratory atavism and settler instinct had serious effects on the immigration policy in Algeria, Australia and South America, whose administrations valued German-speakers over other European immigrants. The Argentine government, for example, funded German newspapers upon condition that they advertised colonization in South America.[76] The recruitment agents, whom South American governments had sent to Europe, would rather enroll Swiss and German emigrants than any other Europeans. Many South American agents, who generally were based in France, opened recruitment offices near the Rhine and the Swiss border to be close to the centers of "Germanic" emigration.[77] So did the French in Algeria, where governor-general Bugeaud preferred "Prussians" to French,

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[70] A. Legoyt, *L'émigration européene: Son importance, ses causes, ses effets* (Paris, 1861), XIV.
[71] Chandèze, *De l'intervention des pouvoirs publics*, 175
[72] Legoyt, *L'émigration européene*.
[73] Chandèze, *De l'intervention des pouvoirs publics*, 173.
[74] D.F. Sarmiento, *Memoria Sobre la Emigración Alemana al Rio de la Plata.* Translated by Wappäus (Santiago, 1851), 5.
[75] D.B. Waterson, *Squatter, Selector and Storekeeper: A history of the Darling Downs, 1859-93* (Sydney, 1968), 126 and 128.
[76] J.A. Alsina, *La inmigración europea en la República Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1898), 70; See also O'Reilley for earlier periods: W. O'Reilley, *Selling Souls: Trafficking German Migrants: Europe and America, 1648-1780* (Cambridge, forthcoming).
[77] AMAEF, Affaires Diverses Politiques 9ADP/1+2: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Ministère de l'Intérieur from 7.6.1861.

Spanish, and Italian colonists, let alone the Maltese.[78] The Algerian administration sent recruitment officers to Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium to convince potential emigrants to come to Algeria.[79] The primordial purpose was to recruit families, among them 300 Hessian and 500 Swiss families, who were supposed to inhabit a *centre agricole* in Sétif in 1850.[80] The Algerian administration granted free passage to "perfectly composed" groups like one German family with three daughters.[81] The Australian Select Committee on Emigration (1860) recruited explicitly "disciplined" German Protestants to avoid the influx of Roman-Catholic Irish paupers.[82]

As late as the 1880s, transfers between the settler societies on the global frontier were based on the notion of collective emigration of the Germans.[83] After the Russian Tsar had abolished the autonomy privilege held by German settler villages on the Volga in the 1880s, those villages were recruited for settlement at the frontier in Argentina and Brazil. On their arrival in South America, emigration commissions allotted the Volga Germans rural territories, which they modelled on their former colonies in Russia. Referring to a well-established cooperative system, the Volga Germans built their meticulously designed villages around a church: a rural architecture that echoed the highly hierarchized and patriarchic organization of the colony that had helped to preserve unity, reproduction, and cultural purity on the Volga. Apart from transferring their ideals of village solidarity from the Russian to the American frontier, they introduced new agricultural techniques to South America. This resulted in refined grains which would ultimately earn Volga-German colonists from South America the gold medal for high-quality wheat at the Paris World Fair in 1889.[84] Success stories of Germanic colonization circulated widely between the 1830s and the 1880s, and colonial propagandists all over the world believed that Germans (or German-speakers in general) were the best colonists.

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[78] T. Bugeaud, *De la colonisation de l'Algérie* (Alger, 1847), 16.

[79] ANOM, F 80 MIOM 1791:Mémoire sur les relations nouvelles que la colonization de l'Algerie peut et doit établir entre la France et la Suisse, les Etats allemands du Rhin et la Belgique, 14 February 1845; See also J.-M. Di Costanzo, *Allemands et Suisses en Algérie, 1830-1918* ([Calvisson], 2001), 46.

[80] ANOM, 80 MIOM 1791: "Mémoire sur les relations nouvelles que la colonisation de l'Algérie peut et doit établir entre la France et la Suisse, les Etats allemands du Rhin et la Belgique, 14. février 1845."; ANOM F 80 1177 'Colonisation Dossier Principal Émigration' Dossier Émigration Prussienne: Nr 5 "Installation d'un centre d'émigration prussienne aux environs de Sétif": Ministère de la Guerre Algerie, Bureau de colonisation to General Governor from 29.6.1850; A. Deruaz, *Les améliorations agricoles dans la Compagnie genevoise des colonies suisses de Sétif sous la direction de M. Ryf, 1884-1903* (Geneva, 1996).

[81] ANOM F 80 1177 'Colonisation Dossier Principal Emigration', 'Emigration-Depossessions Province d'Oran 8.Mai 1849' 'Direction Générale des Affaires Civiles Colonisation Émigration to Ministre de l'Interieur au sujet d'émigration'.

[82] Waterson, *Squatter, Selector and Storekeeper*, 126.

[83] See on German colonies in Russia R. Jannasch and W. Roscher, *Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung* (Leipzig, 1885), 31.

[84] A. Peyret, *Une visite aux colonies*, 83; H. Maier Schwerdt and J.C. Melchior, *Antiguas tradiciones de los alemanes del Volga: Usos y costumbres* (Buenos Aires, 1999), 29, 93 and 114; A. Sarramone, *Los abuelos alemanes del Volga* ([Buenos Aires], 1997), 25-26; J. Riffel, *Los alemanes de Rusia: En particular, los alemanes del Volga en la Cuenca del Plata (Argentina, Uruguay y Paraguay); libro conmemorativo con motivo del cincuentenario de su inmigración (1878-1928)* (Buenos Aires, 2008 [1929]), 35.

The reason for the image of Germanic migratory atavism was a romantic image of the small settler peasant who migrated with his family, or even his entire village, to global frontiers in Algeria, Australia, and America. The French administration in Algeria, for example, claimed to prioritize the *petit colons*, whom they privileged over the "speculators" or aristocratic "settlers in kid gloves", who came to make quick money or to re-establish estates in the feudal tradition.[85] The British colonial entrepreneur Wakefield established his systematic land sales that supplied an emigration fund that enabled poor migrants to travel to Australia for free.[86] According to Jules Duval, the ideal colonist was a smallholder who lived within his village community, took up permanent residence in Algeria, and duplicated European society on African soil. Colonization theorists in Brazil, Argentina and Australia endorsed Duval's notion of the *petit colon*, who was "poor and honest" and able to work the land with his own hands.[87]

The overall purpose of settler colonialism was the reproduction and the perpetuation of European societies by introducing settler families or entire villages.[88] As we will see in Chapter 3, the ICI leaders would explicitly dismiss the colonization of global frontiers with European settler families. Evolutionary and racist theories led them to believe that reproduction of white settlers in the warm overseas possessions would ultimately lead to the degeneration of the white race as a whole. Moreover, they understood that settlement was impossible without expensive military protection of the colonists, which would cost the colonial state a fortune and earn them the hostility of the indigenous populations.

Settler Colonialism and the Reiteration of Ethnic Nationalisms and Pan-Ideologies

While emigration was transnational and settlement multinational, no ideal of international solidarity emerged from the settler experience. In this regard, settler colonialism also differed from the ICI and its systematic and institutionalized internationalism. Far from resulting in a common European or international ideal, distinctions between the "Germanic race," the "Latin race" and the "Anglo-Saxon race" were reinforced during the settler colonial

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[85] K. Kateb, *Européens, indigènes et juifs en Algérie, (1830 - 1962): Représentations et réaltiés des populations* (Paris, 2001), 85; See also J.E. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2011), 208-308 C. Salinas, 'Colonies without Colonists: Colonial Emigration, Algeria, and Liberal Politics in France, 1848-1870', PhD Stanford University (2005); C.-A. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine. Vol. 1: La conquête et les débuts de la colonisation : (1827 - 1871)* (Paris, 1979); A. Bouchène, J.-P. Peyroulou, O. Siari-Tengour, T. Khalfoune, and G. Meynier (eds.), *Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale, 1830-1962* (Paris, 2014).

[86] For a detailed description of the Wakefield's Colonization Society see: Semmel, *The Rise of Free trade*, 76-129; Belich's pedantry aside, the Colonization Society was the first society of significance, even though others might have existed before: Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, 146-147.

[87] C.M. Lede and Société belge-brésilienne de colonisation (eds.), *De la colonisation au Brésil: Mémoire historique, descriptif, statistique et commercial sur la province de Sainte-Catherine* (Brussels, 1843), 359.

[88] Lorenzo Veracini argues that settler colonial societies erase themselves by turning into metropoles once the colonization process ended: Veracini: 'Introducing Settler Colonial studies', 3.

period, which coincided with the rise of ethnic nationalism.[89] The existence of linguistically and ethnically defined language-races was not only accepted by settler colonists, but enhanced at global frontiers. Pan-German, Pan-Latinist and Pan-Anglo-Saxon ideologies extended to global frontiers and were partly invented there.[90] This is particularly true with regard to German and French colonial experiences in South America. At global frontiers, imaginations of ethnic and linguistic belonging often replaced notions of citizenship or institutional affiliation. Or, as James Belich has put it: "Racialism allowed you to take metropolitan virtue with you wherever you went."[91]

Belich has analyzed the emergence of an Anglo-World despite the multinational character of settler societies in North America and Australia. Anglo-Saxonism played an important role in British colonization theory. The foundation of a Greater Britain through settlement overseas, Duncan Bell has argued, was considered a means to strengthen and enhance the Anglo-Saxon race.[92] Wakefield embraced the idea of creating an "Anglo-World" through a Pan-British network by Anglo-Saxon settlers who maintained commercial and cultural solidarity with the motherland.[93] Emigration and colonization were instrumental in increasing the wealth of the mother country, but also racial strength "through the extension over unoccupied parts of the earth of a nationality truly British in language, religion, laws, institutions, and attachment to the empire."[94] For Wakefield, systematic colonization was a means to further strengthen an "energetic, accumulating, prideful, domineering Anglo-Saxon race."[95]

German-speakers, in particular, emphasized their ethnic belonging and their Pan-German attitude as co-colonizers in Australia, Algeria and especially South America. To manifest linguistic solidarity among the German-speaking emigrants, the settler journal in Buenos Aires *Deutsche Zeitung am Rio de la Plata* changed its name to *Deutsche Zeitung. Organ der Germanischen Bevölkerung am Rio de la Plata*.[96] Germans, Austrians, and German-speaking Swiss, the paper proclaimed, were "sons of the same tribe and of the same language"

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[89] B. Vick, 'Imperialism, Race, and Genocide at the Paulskirche: Origins, Meanings, Trajectories', in M. Perraudin and J. Zimmerer (eds.), *German colonialism and National Identity* (New York, 2011), 9–20.
[90] I will not treat the case of the German Eastern Frontier here, which has been thoroughly studied, see for example G. Thum, 'Megalomania and Angst: The Nineteenth Century Mythicization of Germany's Eastern Borderlands', in O. Bartov and E.D. Weitz (eds.), *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington, 2013), 42–60, 42-60.
[91] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, 5.
[92] Bell, *Idea of Greater Britain*, 2, 10, 53.
[93] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*; For the idea of Greater Britain, see: Bell, *Idea of Greater Britain*.
[94] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, *A View of the Art of Colonization* (London and Kitchener, 2001 [1849]), 9
[95] Wakefield, *Art of Colonization* (London, 1849), 79 and 175.
[96] This happened only in the beginning of the 1870s and seems to have been a "großdeutsche" reaction to the foundation of the "kleindeutsches" Reich. The paper apparently wanted to make clear that it represented all German speakers.

and should thus close their ranks.[97] The *Deutsche Zeitung* reported daily on the activity of the patriotic gymnastic clubs, singing societies, theatre groups, and shooting associations in the German colonies. These associations cultivated German nationalism and had names such as *Teutonia*, *Heimath*, and *Germania*.[98]

The emergence of Pan-German colonial ideologies at the Latin American frontier was even more significant. While nationalists in Germany waited in vain to see all the German speakers united in one state, the famous *German Colonial Gazette* proudly reported from the Brazilian colonies that Pan-German ideals had become reality there: "in brotherly union, the Reichsgerman lives next to the Austrian German and the Swiss German"—and all together sang the patriotic anthem *Die Wacht am Rhein*.[99] A German emigrant who recalled his arrival in Argentina endorsed this view of South America as a realm of Pan-German opportunities:

> It was a sad time for Germany. The Reich was fragmented and within its borders, tyrannical sectionalism [*Kleinstaaterei*] ruled. People were subjects of Prussia, Bavaria, the principality of Lippe-Detmold, or the principality of Reuss-Greiz; but they were not allowed to be free German citizens. If they aspired to this, there was only one solution: they had to emigrate. Only outside the huge fatherland were we allowed to speak about a united fatherland… between 1830 and 1860 in Buenos Aires… the German colonists… could be sons of a single nation…. [M]eeting every night at the La Plata riverside, in small German shelters, they drank beer, smoked big pipes and gave patriotic speeches… they wrapped themselves in a Black-Red-Gold Tricolor and drank a toast to Pan-Germany.[100]

Another colonist added, "Southern Brazil is vital to the Germanity [*Deutschtum*] of the future, for that kind of Germanity... that will grow beyond the borders of its motherland and create a new and bigger homeland [*Heimat*] in other parts of the world."[101]

Pan-German romanticism in South America found many followers, and not only colonial theorists believed in the possibility that Germans could be more German on the Rio de

[97] *Deutsche Zeitung*, 684, 10.8.1869.
[98] *Deutsche Zeitung,* 227, 6.9.1866.
[99] 'Die Neue Welt und das Dortige Deutschtum von Alfred Kirchhoff,' *DKZ* 6 (1884): 111-113: 113.
[100] L. Schnabel, *Buenos Aires: Land und Leute am Silbernen Strome: Mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die europäische Einwanderung* (Stuttgart, 1886), 148–149: "Es war damals eine traurige Zeit für Deutschland: das Reich war zerstückelt, und, in sienen Grenzen, wo die tyrannische Kleinstaaterei herrrschte, war man Preusse, war man Bayer, war man fürstliche Lippe-Detmoldscher oder fürstlich Reuss-Greiz Schleizscher Unterthan – nur Eines: ein freier deutscher Bürger durfte man nicht sein. Sehnte man sich danach, so gab es nur einen Ausweg: man musste ins Ausland wandern. Nur ausserhalb des grossen Vaterlandes durfte man von Einem Vaterland sprechen. …dort können sie sich„ als Söhne einer Nation fühlen und mit Verachtung der kleinstaatlichen Tyrannei brüderlich zu gegenseitigem Gedankenaustausch, zu gegenseitiger Unterstützung und Förderung zusammenthaten…um 1830 bis 1860 in Buenos Aires. Wären die deutschen Kolonisten damals in Metternich's Machtbereich gewesen, sie wären in Fesseln auf eine Festung gewandert; hätten Hecker, Struve oder herwegh von ihnen gehört, sie wären als Helden der Revolution gefeiert und besungen worden; denn Schwaben und Sachsen, Kinder vom friesischen Meer und Kinder des Schwarzwaldes, fanden sich allabendlich an den Ufern des La Plata in kleinen deutschen Herberbergen zusammen, sie tranken Bier, rauchten aus grossen Pfeifen und hielten patriotische Reden, sie sangen vom freien Turnertum, schlangen sich die schwarz-rot-goldene trikolore um die Brust und stiessen an auf Alldeutschland."
[101] Leyfer, *Deutsches Kolonistenleben im Staate*, 3: "In Deutschland aber fehlt noch allzusehr die Erkenntniss, welch hohe Bedeutung Südbrasilien für das Deutschtum der Zukunft hat, für jenes Deutschthum, welches wie das Angelsachsenthum über die staatlichen Grenzen des Mutterlandes hinauswächst und sich wie dieses in anderen Welttheilen eine neue, größere Heimath schaffen wird."

la Plata than in Germany. The most striking example of this ideology was the Nueva Germania colony, which Friedrich Nietzsche's brother-in-law Bernhard Förster founded in the Paraguayan Pampas. Driven by Pan-German ideas, Förster – an anti-Semite and founder of the racist *Deutscher Volksverein* – hoped to establish a purely *völkisch* colony, "free of Jews" and full of Germanic originality in the Pampas. A handful of selected anti-Semites joined him. They lived in the complete isolation of the rural colony, and set out to cultivate their Germanness with agricultural work, far from the capitalist "*Verjudung*" that had infested their motherland.

Imaginations of South America as a place where Pan-German projects of ethnic purity could be realized became well known in Germany – although and because the ultimate failure of Nueva Germania and the suicide of its main instigator Bernhard Förster made massive waves in the German media. The Pan-German and semi-colonial periphery in Latin America thus influenced the ideas of German nationalists and colonialists.[102] As late as 1902, the official German Emigration Bureau, which was run by the German Colonial Society and headed by diplomats who had formerly represented Germany in Brazil or the River Plata States, discouraged German emigrants from going to German colonies and advised them to choose the three Southern states in Brazil (Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catharina, and Paraná), Paraguay, Chile, Canada or Australia instead.[103]

South America's reputation among Pan-Germans led groups of Volga Germans to choose Argentina and Brazil as a frontier space, in which they could regain cultural and legal autonomy that they were deprived of on the Russian Volga. They transported their ideals of ethnic purity from the Russian to the American frontier.[104] Meanwhile, Pan-German ideas developed during the German "colonialism without colonies" at the global frontier which revitalized Pan-German activities in Germany. All the founding fathers of the organized Pan-

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[102]See Nietzsche's attitude in "Letter Friedrich Nietzsche (Turin) to Elisabeth Nietzsche (Nueva Germania), May 8, 1888," in N. Miller, R. Müller-Buck, and A. Pieper, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Briefwechsel: Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt/Main, 2004), 33-34 and 1010. See also the influence on the German Colonial Society: HZA La 140 Bü 238, 'Koloniale Unternehmungen in Paraguay. 3. Projekt der Gründung einer Kolonie Neu-Germanien durch Dr. Bernhard Förster in Paraguay; Selbstmord Försters, 1883, 1885-1889'; BArch R 8023/826 'Dr. Bernhard Förster Denkschrift über die Anlegung deutscher Kolonien im oberen La Plata-Gebiet, 1885-1887'; and 'Bernhard Försters Projekt Nueva Germania', fol. 5: Letter Bernhard Förster to Hohenlohe Langenburg, Präsident des DKV, 29.8.1886.

[103] BArch/R 8023/109, fol. 97-98 'Leitfaden für die Auskunftserteilung an Auswanderer'; Most of the Germans willing to emigrate, however, were suggested not to emigrate at all, because they were not equipped with the necessary starting capital; the first head of the "Centralauskunftsstelle für Auswanderer" was Heinrich Bokemeyer who had been a merchant and diplomat in South America and was one of those who kept on advocating German emigration and colonization in Latin America. His successor was German "Gerneralkonsul" Koser, who served in Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre between 1882 and 1900 (BArch/R 8023/109, fol. 125, 'Hamburgischer Correspondent vom 14.5.1903'); In 1902, the first year of its existence, the Information Office printed five brochures that dealt with Argentina, Chile, Rio Grande do Sul, Mexico and Canada as potential destinations (BArch/R 8023/109, fol. 97-98 'Leitfaden für die Auskunftserteilung an Auswanderer'); For Mexico see, for example,: Heinrich Bokemeyer, *Die deutsche Auswanderung und ein neues Kolonisationsprojekt* (Berlin, 1889); For activities in Paraguay: BArch/R 8023/491, fol.13-15 and 25.

[104] Alexis Peyret, *Une visite aux colonies*, 83; Maier Schwerdt and Melchior, *Antiguas tradiciones*, 29, 93 and 114; Sarramone, *Los abuelos alemanes*, 25-26; Riffel, *Los alemanes de Rusia*, 35.

German movement were involved in colonization projects in South America, among them the founder of the German Colonial Association (1882), whose family owned a colony adjacent to Förster's Nueva Germania, and the Pan-German leaders Robert Jannasch and Ernst Hasse, who would lay the foundations of the movement's institutionalization.[105]

As a reaction to the myth of Germanic and Anglo-Saxon colonial superiority, a Pan-Latinist counter-narrative was given a fresh impetus. As soon as the South American nation-states consolidated, fears arose over the Germanic resistance to integration and assimilation.[106] German settlers were said to constitute a "German peril." Paradoxically – or consistently – the "German peril" originated in the myth that Germans did not assimilate but kept their ethnic and cultural autonomy, which threatened the integrity of the Latin American nation-states. This notion coincided with the Pan-German theory of the *Auslandsdeutscher*, which celebrated the Germans abroad who always remained ethnic Germans, even if they were deprived of German citizenship or lived abroad over several generations.[107]

Simultaneously, the increasing influx of Spanish and Italian emigrants to South America and Algeria, and their successful assimilation, lessened the belief in the colonial superiority of Germans and Anglo-Saxons in the Romanic countries. French, Argentine, and Brazilian administrations increasingly preferred emigrants and colonists from the "Latin countries," because they assimilated more easily to the "Latin culture" of these regions. In the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the French completely abandoned the idea of the Germanic aptitude to colonize. For fear of repression, most of the 6,000 Germans settling in Algeria renounced their Germanness and became French citizens.[108]

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[105]Among them were the founders of all colonial societies in Germany, most notably Robert Jannasch and Ernst Hasse, who directed the Pan-German movement until the First World War. See for their influences: IfL, Nachlass Ernst Hasse, Kiste 437, Korrespondenz, 4–7, 21, 23–24.; IfL Nachlass Hasse 437/1: 'Petition sächsischer Aussteller auf der deutschbrasilianischen Ausstellung zu Porto Alegre 1881-82 geb. Aktenstück'; Export Organ des Centralvereins für Handelsgeographie und Förderung Deutscher Interessen im Auslande, no 16, 18 April 1882, 'Brand der Ausstellung in Porto Alegre'; Ernst Bachmann, "Die Provinz Buenos Aires und ihre neue Hauptstadt La Plata," Vortrag gehalten am 10. Februar 1888 im ‚Centralverein für Handelsgeographie und deutsche Interessen im Ausland" in *Export. Organ des Centralvereins für Handelsgeographie* 9 (1888): 127; *Geographische Nachrichten für Welthandel und Volkswirtschaft*, ed. Centralverein für Handelsgeographie (Berlin, 1879-1881), 422f.

[106] The most important publication on the "German peril" in South America is R.E. Gertz, *O perigo alemão* (Porto Alegre,1991); See also D. Bendocchi Alves, *Das Brasilienbild der deutschen Auswanderungswerbung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2000); Silva Jr., Adhemar L. da, C. Mauch, and N. Vasconcellos, *Os Alemães no sul do Brasil: Cultura, etnicidade, história* (Canoas, 1994).

[107] B. Naranch, 'Inventing the "Auslandsdeutsche": Emigration, Colonial Fantasy, and German National Identity, 1848 - 71', in E. Ames, M. Klotz, and L. Wildenthal (eds), *Germany's Colonial Pasts* (Lincoln 2005), 21–40; See for a later period: S. Manz, *Constructing a German Diaspora: The "Greater German Empire," 1871-1914* (New York, 2014); and the contributions in: G. Penny and S. Rinke (eds.), *Rethinking Germans Abroad* [Special Issue *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*] (Göttingen, 2015).

[108] In Algeria, a wave of naturalization of Germans followed the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War: Di Costanzo, *Allemands et Suisses*, 163.

The French developed and magnified Pan-Latinist solidarity in the colonial and semi-colonial spaces they occupied in "Latin Africa" and in Latin America.[109] The editor of the *Courrier de la Plata*, the widely-read organ of the French community in the River Plate States, asserted that the presence of 58,000 French people in the region in 1861 proved that the "Latins are also able to colonize," and moreover knew how to communicate in a "Latin language" with local governments.[110] One of Sarmiento's collaborators, the French doctor Martin de Moussy (1810-1869), was one of the French colonizers who offered his scholarly expertise to the Argentine state. As a member of an official commission, he travelled and charted the Argentine confederation in the 1850s, with special regard to the colonization of the remote territory in and beyond the Pampas. His three-volume *Description Géographique et Statistique de la Confédération Argentine* remains unmatched as a detailed description of South American geography. De Moussy, who co-organized European immigration to the Argentine Entre Rios province, also promoted emigration to the agricultural colonies at the Argentine "frontier" at the World Fairs in 1855 and 1867. Argentina, he proclaimed, had the "the advantage to constitute new population centers…that advance in all directions and conquer every day territory from the barbarians".[111]

Others admitted that German colonists might be more apt to cultivate South America's agricultural colonies on the frontier, while the French would bring literature and culture to urban Latin America. As French culture was closer to the general "Latin culture," it had proven more successful than any Anglo-Saxon or German cultural influence.[112] The French-Argentine recruitment agent John Le Long argued, not without reason, that the French "colonists" were more likely to establish themselves in the cities of Latin America than in the Pampas. There, Le Long argued, they had become teachers and doctors and spread the Latin culture, from which the Creoles of Latin America had been cut off during the Spanish and Portuguese rule.[113] Without doubt, France was assigned the role of a leader of the Pan-Latinist world, whose civilizing mission was by no means rejected in Latin America or among the Spanish and Italians in Algeria.

While the Germanic peoples had been regarded to be the best colonizers, the French-led Latin people were the best civilizers (as we have seen, Anglo-Saxons were also regarded as

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[109] For a general overview see K. Panick, *La race latine: Politischer Romanismus im Frankreich des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Bonn, 1978).

[110] Bibliothèque des Annales Économiques, *Congrès international de l'intervention des pouvoirs publics dans l'émigration et l'immigration tenu à Paris: les 12, 13 et 14 août 1889* (1890), 37 and 46.

[111] M.d. Moussy, *Description géographique et statistique de la confédération Argentine* (Paris, 1860-1864), cit from vol.3, 24, 170, 177, 214, 364; See also Lagneau, 'Discours lu aux obsèques de Martin de Moussy', *Bulletins de la Société d'anthropologie de Paris* 4, 1 (1869), 220–222.

[112] É. Daireaux, 'La Colonie Francaise à Buenos Aires', *Revue des Deux Mondes* 65 (1884): 901–902.

[113] Bibliothèque des Annales Économiques, *Congrès international de l'intervention des pouvoirs publics*, 51.

colonizers, but allegedly remained within the Anglo-sphere).[114] Le Long's argument that in the River Plate States, the French were "only the second colony in numbers, but held in high esteem" was an expression of French cultural imperialism, but Latin American notables shared the inclination to French culture.[115] Faustino Domingo Sarmiento, the Argentine colonization theorist who would become Argentina's president in 1868, promoted the dissemination of French culture. He published his bestselling frontier novel *Facundo o Civilización y Barbarie en las Pampas Argentinas* (1845) in the widely-read French *Revue des Deux Mondes* and tried to win over the French as civilizers.[116] While Sarmiento wanted Germanic peoples to colonize the frontier, he turned to the French to "civilize" the urban regions at the coast. Sarmiento's sharp distinction between the "barbarian" Pampas and those urban parts of South America that had to be "civilized" by the French coincided with the rising importance of the civilizing mission among the French intelligentsia. Latin America became a semi-colonial space that would soon be penetrated by French cultural imperialism.[117] Education systems in Argentina and Brazil were dominated by French and Paris officially sent expeditions to the River Plate States to foster both French immigration and the "*rayonnement* of the *action Française.*"[118]

The solidarity among Latin races was theoretically underpinned by colonial propagandists. The Argentine immigration agent Carlos Calvo (1824-1906), who published in France under the name Charles Calvo, was convinced that the emigrants chose their destiny according to racial, national, or religious affinities. Apart from climate and the political system, language and traditions were the main reasons for emigrants to choose a certain destiny.[119] In Algeria, French archeological associations revived the myth of a shared Roman past of the "Latins of Africa," including Spaniards, Sardinians, Italians, Corsicans and even Maltese.[120] French theorists, and most prominently Michel Chevalier, emphasized Pan-Latinist solidarity, which was directed against the British colonial superpower and the aggressive German

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[114] Alberdi and Cruz, *Bases y puntos*,18.
[115] Bibliothèque des Annales Économiques, *Congrès international de l'intervention des pouvoirs publics*, 51.
[116] C.d. Mazade, 'L'Americanisme et des Républiques du Sud (Civilizacion y Barbarie de M. Domingo Sarmiento)', *Nouvelle Revue des Deux Mondes* 16 (1846), 625–659; The book has been written in a politicized context and aimed at delegitimizing Sarmiento's political opponent, the dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas, by portraying him as a "barbarian"; nontheless, Sarmiento also understood it as a pro-colonial statement.
[117] M. Thier, 'The View From Paris: 'Latinity,' 'Anglo-Saxonsim,' and the Americas, as discussed in the Revue des Races Latines 1857-64', *The International History Review* 33, 4 (2011), 627–644.
[118] Daughton, 'When Argentina Was French'; J. Streckert, *Die Hauptstadt Lateinamerikas: Eine Geschichte der Lateinamerikaner im Paris der Dritten Republik (1870-1940)* (Cologne, 2013); L. Odéro and C.B. de Brancovan, *La Renaissance latine* (Paris, 1905), 163–165.
[119] C. Calvo, *Étude sur l'Émigration et la Colonisation: Réponse à la Première des Questions du Groupe V, soumises au Congrès International des Sciences Géographiques de 1875* (Paris, 1875), 107.
[120] P. Lorcin, 'Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria's Latin Past', *French Historical Studies* 25, 2 (2002), 295–329: 312. Nevertheless, I think Lorcin exaggerates the importance of the Pan-Latinist notions in Algeria, where the myth of Germanic colonial superiority had also been influential. See also: F. Leblanc de Prébois, *L'Algérie prise au sérieux.* (Paris, 1842), 37; An interesting view on the ambiguity of French policies towards the Roman legacy: Greenhalgh, *The Military and Colonial Destruction of the Roman Landscape*.

newcomer. Chevalier made use of the Pan-Latinist concept to promote France as the leader of the Latin world, especially in South America.[121]

Spanish and Italian immigrants in Algeria subscribed to the idea of Pan-Latinist solidarity. For their own interest, press organs of the Spanish colonists in Algeria frequently evoked the linguistic brotherhood with the French, such as the *Heraldo Español* in Algiers, which was founded to "strengthen the ties between our cherished *patria* and the glorious French nation, our sister."[122] The most important newspaper of the Spanish community in Algeria praised the "common mission of the two nations," the "brother peoples [*pueblos hermanados*]" in France and Spain, and published its articles in both Spanish and French.[123] In Oran, the *Correo Español* used the shared linguistic origin by calling for a "Latin Federation" between France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal. This federation was supposed to counter-balance the aggressive expansionism of the monarchic league established by Great Britain, Germany, and Russia. This "monarchic league", the *Correo Español* wrote as late as 1881, wanted to steal the colonies from the Latin countries, like Great Britain had already stolen Gibraltar and Malta.[124] Thus, the colonial Pan-Latinism in Algeria was also a reaction to an alleged Pan-Anglo-Saxonism and British expansion in America and Africa. Political arguments and racist ideologies alike led to the imagination of a Pan-Latinist solidarity, which colonists and colonial theorists reiterated at the colonial frontiers.

In settler societies, the belief in the existence of different European races remained uncontested and seemed to be theoretically underpinned by pseudo-scientific surveys like Gobineau's tract on the *Inequality of Human Races* (1853-1855), in which he idealized the Germanic race and its rural virtues.[125] The pan-nationalism that British, German and French expatriates developed at the global frontiers impeded the emergence of a shared internationalist colonial ideal, and the transnational migration and multinational settlement resulted in pan-nationalist myths rather than in internationalist ideals. Like Juan Bautista Alberdi, many colonization theorists agreed that "we should not forget that there is Europe and Europe."[126] Colonizers of the mid-nineteenth century rarely imagined a European solidarity based on a shared and lived colonial experience. Rather, the diaspora experience produced ideas of linguistic solidarity and ethnic purity that were typical for romantic nationalism in the early nineteenth century. Toward the end of the century, Pan-Latinists and Pan-Germans, who

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[121] G. Martinière, 'Michel Chevalier et la Latinité de l'Amérique', *Revista Neiba* 3,1 (2014), 1-10.
[122] "A las Autoridades y a la Prensa Periodística de Argel," *El Heraldo Español*, 1, January 15, 1920, 1.
[123] "Edicto," *El Heraldo Español,* 1 (25.1. 1920).
[124] *El Correo Español*, 101 (10.4.1881).
[125] M.D. Biddiss, *Father of Racist Ideology: The Social and Political Thought of Count Gobineau* (London, 1970); Gobineau's spent several years in Brazil and influenced its racist policy.
[126] Alberdi and Cruz, *Bases y puntos*, 18.

imagined a Greater France or a Greater Germany, had to compete with a new generation of colonial theorists in the ICI, who were more inclined to formulate internationalist ideas of solidarity among the European colonizers. The ICI members would reject both settlement and assimilation as colonial methods and considered the indigenous populations as part of the colonial project. In this regard, they also differed in essence from the notions of settler colonialists.

Settler Languages of Violence and Total War against the "Natives"

Unlike the pro-native stance the ICI members would assume in the 1890s, settler colonialists openly used a language of hostility, violence and elimination when talking about indigenous populations. The paradigm of settler colonization had indeed severe implications for the people who traditionally inhabited colonial frontiers. "Natives" were not only irrelevant to the project of colonization with white Europeans, but a veritable obstacle to it that had to be removed.[127] In some cases, natives were removed physically, in other cases they were assimilated or absorbed, and almost always settler sovereignty replaced native sovereignty.[128] During this process, colonists often decimated the natives and almost always aimed at eliminating their "nativeness".[129] Thus, the effective occupation with European colonists and the European "want of room", as Wakefield called it as early as 1830, made the elimination of indigenous life more likely than any other colonial type.[130] I argue here that the European multinational character of settler societies and transnational exchange along a "global frontier" made this elimination more likely. Colonists at the global frontier acted according to precedence that had been created elsewhere at the frontier and emulated strategies of violent repression. To be sure, they still believed in racial diversity among Europeans, but they also identified a common enemy to the colonial project. If they evoked a shared European ideal, they did so in the face of the common enemies.

In most accounts by settler colonization theorists, indigenous peoples were strikingly absent. Wakefield's *View of the Art of Colonization* did not mention the native population at all, before they appeared for the first time on page 150 as "savages" without "law, honor and

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[127] See for a general overview: A.D. Moses (ed.), *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History* (New York, 2008).

[128] L. Ford, *Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-1836* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010); Pateman argues that settler "contracts" are unilateral contracts and do not even require the natives as a party who signs the contract: C. Pateman, 'The Settler Contract', in C. Pateman and C.W. Mills (eds.), *Contract and Domination* (Cambridge, 2007), 35–78.

[129] Wolfe, 'Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native'.

[130] Wakefield and Collier, *Art of Colonization*, 66.

religion."[131] In Sarmiento's anti-indigenous novel, *Facundo o Civilización y Barbarie en las Pampas Argentinas*, the "savages" of the Pampas were no more than dangerous nomadic tribes roaming the "desert", comparable to Arabs in Algeria and the "Mongols" or the "Cossacks" in the Russian steppe.[132] In accordance with those notions of savage nomadism, colonial theorists like Sarmiento described the frontier in Algeria and Argentina as a demarcation line between settled territory and the "desert." Populating the desert – or the allegedly deserted land – and pushing back the indigenous peoples who lived there was openly promoted in those accounts.[133]

Global frontiers in Algeria, Russia and South America were laboratories of such an eliminatory occupation, which other Europeans and Americans observed closely. Already when France conquered Algeria, European governments dispatched military officers to Algiers, who participated in its conquest. In 1830, officers from England, Austria, Prussia, Saxony, Russia, and Spain helped to seize Algiers. The Russian Tsar, for example, sent military experts who claimed that French and Russians fought a common "oriental war" against Muslims on a global frontier that stretched from the Caucasus to North Africa.[134] Saint Petersburg's involvement inaugurated a long-standing interest of Russian colonizers in Algeria. The French conquest stirred up curiosity rather than envy among other Europeans who followed the occupation closely.

As soon as Bugeaud became governor of Algeria in 1840, and declared a total war on Abd-el-Kader and his supporters, the interest in Algeria as a global frontier soared. Bugeaud's plans to create military colonies to penetrate into the interior were for their part inspired by strategies used in Russia. French army officers and colonists had long studied military colonies in the Russian steppe and the Caucasus, which the Tsar had created as a means to advance the Russian colonial frontier. They had also analyzed Austrian colonies on the Ottoman border that were populated with militarized Croatians to secure the frontier. These examples influenced Bugeaud's plans to establish military colonies in Algeria, although he was aware of their lack of success in Russia and Austria. To be efficient, Bugeaud and his fellow generals concluded, military colonies in Algeria had to be populated with Europeans, and a "total war" had to be

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[131] Ibid., 154.

[132] C. Civantos, *Between Argentines and Arabs: Argentine Orientalism, Arab Immigrants, and the Writing of Identity* (New York, 2006) 31-52.

[133] B.C. Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902* (New York, 2009); D.F. Sarmiento, E. Garrels, and A. Zatz, *Recollections of a Provincial Past* (Oxford, 2005), lxviii; Peyret, *Une visite aux colonies*, 10, 60, 183; 'Das Entre Rios und seine Bedeutung für die deutsche Kolonisation: Vortrag gehalten im Centralverein für Handelsgeographie etc. von Gustav Niederlein', in: *Export: Organ des Centralvereins für Handelsgeographie und Förderung Deutscher Interessen im Auslande*, no. 1 (4.1.1881), 14.

[134] A.F. Nettement, *Histoire de la conquête d'Alger* (Paris, 1856), 288-290, and S. Haule, 'Us et coutumes adoptées dans nos guerres d'Orient: L'expérience coloniale russe et l'expédition d'Alger', *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 45, 1-2 (2004), 293–320: 302-304.

waged against the "tribes" that offered resistance to white colonization.[135] His strategies included "methodological devastation" and practices of extermination.[136]

Bugeaud's colonizing war in Algeria became a matter of interest to Prussian officers, Russian aristocrats and Argentine colonial theorists, who paid visits to Bugeaud while analyzing and partly emulating his generalship.[137] They interpreted the conflict as a "non-European" war in which Bugeaud had to defeat an undisciplined but very mobile enemy who used his knowledge of the territory as a strategic tool. A Prussian general remarked that "from children to the old men" all the Algerians were the enemies of France – along with the hostile and unfamiliar environment. Given these circumstances, conquest was not enough: only a total defeat of the enemy would lead to a "peace" that made colonization possible. Bugeaud himself had declared that the French had to "dominate the country to colonize it" and that a total occupation required a total war. The colonial territory, the Prussian general continued, had to be freed of Arabs, because they could not be Europeanized or used in any way for colonization.[138] According to him, the two options in this war were either conditional peace or "extermination" [*Vernichtung*]. He dismissed conditional peace because the "Arabs" would never accept it. He also dismissed complete elimination – for the sole reason that it was "too expensive."[139] However, he deemed extermination occasionally necessary. While Bugeaud's plans of "total occupation" were as complex as the German report described it, the extermination of the natives had indeed always been part of his strategic repertoire, while it was widely used in military practice.[140]

The reception of Bugeaud's colonial warfare in Russia, and particularly in South America, illustrates that extermination at colonial frontiers was an option in certain cases and could therefore be portrayed as an overall purpose of colonization in its global reception.[141] The

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[135] M. Emerit, 'L'influence russe et croate sur la colonisation militaire à l'époque de Bugeaud', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer* 46, 163 (1959), 85–96: 89-92.

[136] O. Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria* (Stanford, 2010), 104.

[137] Bugeaud received several Russian delegations, among them the son of the Tsar: H. de Ideville, *Le Maréchal Bugeaud: d'après sa correspondance intime et des documents inédits, 1784-1840* (Paris, 1882), 105.

[138] C. von Decker, *Algerien und die dortige Kriegführung: Nach offiziellen und andern authentischen Quellen, und den auf dem Kriegsschauplatze selbst gesammelten Nachrichten bearbeitet. Algerien und dessen Bewohner. Mit 4 Karten u. 1 Plane d. Stadt Algier* (Leipzig, 1844), vol.1, 243-244 and vol.2, 233, 264, 278 and 282-283; T. Bugeaud, *L' Algérie: Des Moyens de Conserver et d'Utiliser cette Conquête* (Paris, 1842), 6.

[139] Decker, *Algerien und die dortige und die dortige Kriegsführung*, vol.2, 228.

[140] J.E. Sessions, ''Unfortunate Necessities': Violence and Civilization in the Conquest of Algeria', in P. Lorcin and D. Brewer (eds.)*, France and its Spaces of War: Experience, Memory, Image* (New York, 2009), 29–44.

[141] In France, total war strategies and policies of extermination were controversial and not the only paradigm. It is widely known that eminent thinkers like Tocqueville publicly turned against them, as did many Saint-Simoniens. In the 1860s, Napoleon III wanted to put an end to the pushback of Algerians by proclaiming an "Arab Kingdom." Given those facts, I do not follow Olivier de la Cour Grandmaison, who claimed that extermination policies were a paradigm and a consensus among *all* French during the entire colonial period between 1830 and 1962 (I am in line here with E. Saada 'Coloniser, exterminer: sur la guerre et l'État colonial', *Critique internationale* 3, 32 (2006), 211-216). Nontheless, colonial theorists led by Jules Duval, who were generally close to the settler lobby, protested in a "storm of condemnation" against any *indigenophile* plan and gave priority to European settlement over the lives of the Algerians

Argentine Sarmiento – who had written extensively on the confrontation between a superior civilization and inferior barbarians at the South American frontier – travelled to Algiers in the 1840s, anticipating familiarities with his own colonial projects in Argentina that aimed at replacing the "barbaric savages" of the "deserted Pampas" with the "civilization" of European immigrants.[142] In the summer of 1846, Sarmiento disembarked in Algiers. Upon his arrival, he was taken by the oriental charm of the city. With regard to the Algerian population, however, he adopted a different tone and blamed the "Arabs" responsible for the decline of the country:

> It is impossible to imagine a more destructive barbarism than that of this people… never the barbarism and the fanaticism have penetrated deeper into the heart of a people and petrified it, so that it resists to all bettering. Between the Europeans and the Arabs in Africa, there is no and never will be any amalgam or assimilation possible. One of the two peoples has to disappear, withdraw or dissolve. I love civilization too much not to wish from now on the triumph of the civilized peoples.[143]

This attitude brought Sarmiento in line with the French military government in Algiers, whose generals were about to conquer and colonize the country. Facing the (actually well-organized) resistance by Abd-el-Kader and his army, the French had envisaged three options of how to deal with the indigenous population: "mildness" (*douceur*), pushback (*refoulement*), and – if tribes resisted – extermination.[144] By 1846, the ongoing war against Abd-el-Kader resulted in a mixture of pushback and scorched-earth strategies, which would deprive the Arabic tribes of their means of subsistence. Bugeaud deemed these measures necessary to bring his total war against the rebelling "Arabs" to a successful end.[145]

Many of the leading generals in Algeria endorsed his total war strategy, while for members of the settler lobby Bugeaud's war did not go far enough. In 1845, army officer and military doctor in Algiers Eugène Bodichon complained that on African soil, the French had to be merciless [impitoyable] and recommended intimidating the degenerated Arabic race by "the

(Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of* Modernity, 179; C.A. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine* (Paris 1964), 430-431 and B. Delpal, Le Silence des Moines: Les Trappistes au XIXe siècle, France, Algérie, Syrie (Lyon, 1998), 185). Even though extermination was for them "only" one option among others, and maybe "only" a last resort, they rarely dismissed it explicitly between the 1830s and 1870s. Kateb, for example, shows that French colonial administrators dismissed extermination explicitly and entirely only in the 1870s: Kateb, *Européens, indigènes et juifs en Algérie,* 3-6. At least prior to 1870 it was explicitly declared an option by settler colonizers, even for allegedly liberal thinkers like Tocqueville: A. D. Moses, 'Empire, Colony, Genocide. Keywords and the Philosophy of History', in A.D. Moses (ed.), *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History* (New York and Oxford 2008): 27.

[142] The original title was *Civilización i Barbarie: Vida de Juan Facundo Quiroga, i Aspecto Físico, Costumbres i Hábitos de la República Arjentina*. The book was written in a politicized context with the aim of delegitimizing Sarmiento's political opponent, the dictator Rosas, by portraying him as a "barbarian."

[143] Sarmiento to Juan Thompson, Oran, 2.1.1847, in D.F. Sarmiento, *Viajes en Europa, África y América* (Santiago, 1851), 214–15.

[144] Brower, *A Desert Named Peace*, 21; Sessions, ''Unfortunate Necessities'', 31.

[145] Ibid., 31; T. Bugeaud, *Par l'épée et par la Charrue: Écrits et discours de Bugeaud* (Paris, 1848); R. Germain, *Politique Indigène de Bugeaud* (Paris, 1953); A.T. Sullivan, *Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, France and Algeria, 1784-1849: Politics, Power and the Good Society* (Hamden, 1983); B. Singer and J.W. Langdon, *Cultured Force: Makers and Defenders of the French Colonial Empire* (Madison, Wis., 2004)

systematic extermination of an entire tribe" in exemplary raids. Those who refused to be civilized, he added, should be treated "in the same way the Anglo-Americans acted against the Indians."[146] Members of the Société coloniale de l'État d'Alger such as Victor-Armand Hain promoted *refoulement* as a hidden extermination. He wrote that Arabs in Algeria could never be civilized and that "we have to push them far back like savage animals who leave inhabited places and their neighborhood. Faced with the progression of our settlements, they have to draw back into the desert. They have to be thrown back into the Sahara for good."[147] Even those who dismissed extermination and *refoulement*, discarded it for practical reasons (fierce resistance or high costs) rather than advancing moral concerns.[148] Finally, also allegedly indigenophile theorists like the Saint-Simonian Prosper Enfantin thought "destruction necessary for production."[149] Such ideas were not without consequences. Although the losses among the Algerians is hard to be measured, Jennifer Sessions concluded that "the impact of Bugeaud's war on the Algerian population was devastating, as intended." Due to combat, disease and starvation "the demographic effects were staggering."[150]

Sarmiento, who sensed a parallel with the French in Algeria, arranged a meeting with Bugeaud. The latter – who had read Sarmiento's *Facundo* – was glad to share his experiences with Sarmiento and outlined "the details of his military strategies and administrative system" to him.[151] Bugeaud explained that the war had stagnated between 1830 and 1840, and French troops had not made any significant progress.[152] On his arrival in 1840, however, Bugeaud changed the military strategy and reorganized the troops' way of advancing in the southern

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[146] He wrote that "Les exigences africaines veulent que dans certains cas nous soyons impitoyables" and openly called for the "extermination méthodique de toute une tribu" in a sort of *blitzkrieg* to terrorize the population and prevent insurrections. "Si…ils persistaient à vouloir rester *Arabes*, alors nous aurions à faire ce que les Anglo-Americains ont fait contre les Indiens: E. Bodichon, *Considérations sur l'Algérie* (Paris, 1845), 100 and 103-4; For a more detailed study and the importance of Bodichon for the European *colon* society in Algeria see P. Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria (London and New York, 1995), 124-127.

[147] "Comme on ne les civilisera pas, il faut les refouler au loin; comme les bêtes féroces qui abandonnent le voisinage des lieux habités, il faut qu'ils reculent jusqu'au désert devant la marche progressive de nos établissements, et qu'ils soient rejetés pour toujours dans les sables du Sahara": V.A. Hain, *À la Nation sur Alger* (Paris, 1832), 59, cit in: C. Tailliard, *L'Algérie dans la littérature française* (Paris, 1925), 127 ; Such attitudes, Ann Thomson concluded, "run through colonialist writings and had a tenacious existence after their officialisation by those who wrote about the 'indigenous races' after the colonisation of Algeria." A. Thomson, *Barbary and Enlightenment: European Attitudes Towards the Maghreb in the 18th Century* (Leiden, 1987), 71.

[148] E. Pélissier, *Annales Algériennes* vol. 2 (Paris 1836), 439-440; Another critical voice was the civil intendant of Algiers, Pierre Genty de Bussy. Although he described the French colonization of Algeria as a "crusade of civilization against barbarism" and favored "colonization under the protection of the army," he did not see colonization and native presence as mutually exclusive : G. Bussy, *De l'établissement des Français dans la Régence d'Alger,* vol 1 (Paris, 1893), 3 and 33.

[149] Enfantin, *Colonisation de l'Algérie*, 7–8: "Il faut, à nos efforts d'occupation, joindre des efforts de la colonisation, et accompagner nos actes inévitables de *destruction* de puissantes tentatives de *production*." On Enfantin's ambiguous attitude towards colonization see Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity*, 112.

[150] Sessions, ''Unfortunate Necessities'', 32.

[151] A. Pagni, 'Llamando a las Puertas de Europa: Facundo en la Revue des Deux Mondes, París 1846', *Forum for Inter-American Research* 1 (December 2012), 111.

[152]See also R. Cicerchia, 'Journey to the Center of the Earth: Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, A Man of Letters in Algeria', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 36, 4 (November 2004).

regions. The new arrow-like formation of the troops facilitated the penetration of rebels' territory. Sarmiento learned that this reorganization allowed the French to conduct "razzias" as far as the Sahara Desert.[153] Everywhere else, they tried to encircle the enemies and destroy them if they did not surrender. Satisfied, Sarmiento resumed, "I have collected a lot of useful data about colonization in Africa, which I will use for a special tract. The Marshall [Bugeaud] had the kindness to give me one of his own works on the topic."[154]

Already in 1845, Russian generals had equally studied and used Bugeaud's strategies during the campaigns against the anti-Russian resistance leader Shamil in Dagestan. General Voronzoff, the commander-in-chief of the Caucasus army, compared Shamil to Abd-el-Kader in Algeria. Both were Muslim leaders who waged guerilla wars on armies that were said to be superior in strategy and technology. And both successfully delayed their defeat by organizing a decentralized war against the colonial armies. On Bugeaud's example, Voronzoff organized mobile columns, which were able to move rapidly and to "disperse the mountaineers and to give them no rest."[155] Those "razzias" became part of the Russian strategy, along with a cultural stigmatization of the opponents as inferior creatures. In Argentina, Sarmiento would take the comparisons with Algeria even further.

When Bugeaud and Sarmiento met, they realized that the conquest of Algeria and the conquest of the Argentine "desert" had many things in common: Mounted infantry was necessary for greater flexibility in difficult terrain. Because neither the French in Algeria nor the Argentines were able to control the entire territory, they deemed punitive expeditions necessary to destroy the rebels who tried to hide in the "desert." To conduct detailed studies on the *refoulement* of the "gauchos Arabes,"—as Sarmiento called them— Bugeaud enabled Sarmiento to travel to the interior. The head of a *Bureau Arabe* in Oran received Sarmiento, and both visited defeated Arab leaders and their "tribes" in the hinterland. Sarmiento felt uneasy among the Arabic tribes and was haunted by similarities with the "savages of the pampas."[156]

The situations in Algeria and Argentina, Sarmiento remarked, were strikingly similar – "The raids and depredations that the Bedouin hordes inflict on the Algerian frontier give an idea of the Argentine *montoneros* [guerilla fighters]."[157] He equated the natives of America with the

[153] Bugeaud shaped the term "razzia" in this context. See, for example, C. D'Ideville, *Mémoirs of Marshal Bugeaud from his Private Correspondence and Original Documents.* vol. 2 (London, 1884), 91; For an in-depth analysis of the "razzias," see W. Gallois, *A History of Violence in the Early Algerian Colony* (Houndmills et al., 2013).
[154] Sarmiento to Thompson, in Sarmiento, *Viajes en Europa,* 214–216.
[155] A.A. Marga, *Géographie militaire,* 2nd part, vol.3 (Paris, 1884), 166-167.
[156] Sarmiento to Thompson, in Sarmiento, *Viajes en Europa,* 219.
[157] Although these comparisons were instrumental in stigmatizing his political enemies – landowners who had their political strongholds in the countryside – they were also directed at the Amerindian population: Sarmiento, *Facundo*, 79: "Las hordas beduínas que hoy importunan con sus algaradas y depredaciones las fronteras de la Argelia, dan una idea exacta de la montonera argentina."

"Asiatic Arabs," and portrayed the Pampas as the "desert" of Argentina.[158] After his visit to the Algerian Sahara, Sarmiento would add to a later edition of his *Facundo* that "the similarity between the Argentine natives and the Arabs is striking. In Alger, in Oran, in Máscara, and in the douars [tribal camps] of the desert I saw them… I would swear that some of those whom I met in Algeria, I had encountered already known in my country."[159]

Before returning to Oran, Sarmiento was invited to dinner at the house of General Arnault, "the general who had penetrated furthest into the Sahara." Arnault proudly presented him with an issue of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, which contained the extended summary of Sarmiento's *Facundo. Civilization and Barbarism*. Arnault triumphantly told Sarmiento: "do you see, even in the center of Africa, we keep up with what is happening in the world."[160] Sarmiento's imagined frontier between civilization and barbarity had influenced the reality in Algeria and would soon materialize in Argentina, where Sarmiento would become president in 1868 and take the "conquest of the desert" to a new level.

When Sarmiento returned to Argentina, he took several volumes on French military strategy in Algeria with him. One of the books was Captain Charles Richard's study on the Dahra Insurrection.[161] The anti-French Dahra Insurrection (1845-46) was one of the most famous episodes of resistance against the establishment of colonization centers, during which Algerian Muslims attacked the workers of a French agricultural colony. After the insurrection, the alleged rebels fled with their families to the mountains, where they hid in caves to evade French repression. The French troops located them, but the European generals did not fancy following them into the caves. Instead, they set fires at the entrances to "fumigate" more than five-hundred "rebels", among them women and children, who all died. These "*enfumades*" were only the tip of an iceberg of atrocities committed during the conquest.[162]

After French newspapers in the metropole had criticized these practices, Richard defended the *enfumades* in the book that Sarmiento took to Argentina. Richard blamed the French press for their negative coverage of the event and ridiculed "the *bonnes gens*, who support the war only on the condition that no person is killed."[163] Richard continued that

> The war has contributed significantly to creating the current civilization. What would Europe be today without the imperial storm? What would France be, with its advanced ideas? It would be behind the Loire… and the big affair of human progress would be in jeopardy.[164]

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[158] Ibid., 44.
[159] Ibid., footnote 22.
[160] Sarmiento to Thompson, in Sarmiento, *Viajes en Europa, África*, 228.
[161] Cicerchia, 'Journey to the Center', 674.
[162] On the Dahra case, W. Gallois, 'Dahra and the History of Violence in Early Colonial Algeria', in M. Thomas (ed.), *The French Colonial Mind*, vol. 2 (Lincoln, 2011), 3–25.
[163] C. Richard, *Étude sur l'Insurrection du Dhara (1845-46)* (Alger, 1846), 9.
[164] Ibid., 165.

In Richard's case, and in the minds of colonizers of the mid-nineteenth century, human progress involved the extermination of "inhuman" barbarians, such as the Arabs and the "gauchos", who resisted the "progress" brought by colonization.

Sarmiento became globally known to be the most eminent enemy of the "barbarian natives." When he became president of the Argentine Federation in 1868, he continued to push the frontier further west and south and perpetuated the campaigns of general Mitre, who had led several campaigns against the natives in the 1850s and would co-organize the "conquest of the desert" in in the Pampas and in Patagonia, which included the extermination of its Amerindian population.[165] In a letter to Mitre, Sarmiento had encouraged him, claiming that *"fertilizing the soil with their blood is the only thing gauchos are good for."*[166]

In the years that followed Sarmiento's presidency, General Julio Argentino Roca pursued the "conquest of the desert" with even more fervor. Inspired by Sarmiento's writings and the Algerian example, he conducted "razzias" against the native population in the Pampas, but soon systematized the sporadic raids and developed a comprehensive program for the conquest of the desert. Roca considered the "war against the Indians" a special form of war, which aimed at "definitive solutions" against the Amerindians, who were always referred to as a collective — without any distinction between combatants and non-combatants.[167] Roca had studied both the North American and the Algerian strategies to deal with native populations. While in the United States the Indian Removal Act (1830) stipulated containment in reserves, Roca chose the Algerian "model" of razzias, hit-and-run raids, and punitive expeditions against rebellious natives that should deprive them of their means of existence.[168] Like in Algeria, a scientific commission accompanied Roca's expeditions. Its international members celebrated Roca for using the "theories recently applied to frontier wars," which were exposed in the programmatic *La nueva línea de fronteras: memoria especial del Ministerio de Guerra y*

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[165] A. Barros, *La Guerra Contra los Indios* (Buenos Aires, 1877); A. Ebélot, *Frontera Sur: Recuerdos y Relatos de la Campaña del Desierto* (Buenos Aires, 1968 [1876-79]); W. Delrio, D. Lenton, M. Musante, and M. Nagy, 'Discussing Indigenous Genocide in Argentina: Past, Present, and Consequences of Argentinean State Policies toward Native Peoples', *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 5, 2 (2010b).

[166] In a letter to Mitre; historian Jose Maria Rosa interprets this as proof of Sarmiento's harshness toward the lower non-educated classes in Argentina, especially the Gauchos: J. Dittmer, 'Literature and Nationalism', in G. Herb and D.I. Kaplan (eds.), *Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview* (Santa Barbara, 2008), 492.

[167] *Informe Oficial de la Comision Científica Agregada al Estado Mayor General de la Expedición al Rio Negro (Patagonia) Realizado 1879 Bajo las órdenes del General Julia A. Roca* (Buenos Aires, 1881), IX.

[168] G. Rauch, *Conflict in the Southern Cone: The Argentine Military and the Boundary Dispute with Chile, 1870-1902* (Westport, Conn., 1999), 43-44; See 'El Estado se Contruyo Sobre un Genocidio' interview with Diana Lenton, accessed December 24, 2015, http://www.elortiba.org/guedes.html. For the Argentine genocide in general, see D. Lenton, *De Centauros a Protegidos.* "La Construccio´n del Sujeto de la Política Indigenista Argentina desde los Debates Parlamentarios (1880–1970)" (PhD Diss. Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2005); W. Delrio, D. Lenton, M. Musante, and M. Nagy, 'Discussing Indigenous Genocide in Argentina: Past, Present, and Consequences of Argentinean State Policies toward Native Peoples', *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 5, 2 (2010a).

Marina of Roca's predecessor and immigration theorist Adolfo Alsina.[169] Its aim was the "definitive occupation" of the territory.[170] At the same time, the commission used Darwinist arguments to prove the inferiority of the indigenous people and support their extermination ideologically.[171]

The scientific commission summarized the "success" of the 1879 "conquest of the desert" expedition:

> We intended to conquer 15,000 *leguas cuadradas* [349,000 km²], inhabited by circa 15,000 souls. The number of dead and imprisoned of the campaign amounted to 14,000… It was necessary to really and effectively conquer these 15,000 *leguas*, clear them [limpiarlas] of *indios* in such an absolute and unquestionable way [that it was possible to replace them with] the civilized men, [capital, and agriculture].[172]

Europeans followed these campaigns with interest and even participated in them. Prussian officers had played a crucial role in introducing a language and practice of extermination as early as the 1820s.[173] A German botanist, member of the scientific commission in 1879 who had profited from Roca's winter campaign to Patagonia to study the "unexplored desert" reported to Pan-German interest groups back in Germany that Roca's campaign in Patagonia "had the task of exterminating 20,000 Indians, thereby extending the frontier to the South."[174] He thought the expedition a necessary pre-condition of colonization and declared it an exemplary German colonial project. The press organ of the French colonists in La Plata, the *Courrier de la Plata*, equally reported extensively on the campaigns.[175] After all, the European agricultural colonies at the South American frontier were an integral part of the strategy to push back the natives.[176]

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[169] *Informe Oficial de la Comision*, IX; Roca was inspired by A. Alsina, *La nueva línea de fronteras: memoria especial del Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, año 1877* (Buenos Aires, 1977).

[170] V.F. López, *Historia de la República Argentina,* vol. 6 (Buenos Aires, 1960), 697.

[171] Many European immigrants participated as scientific advisors to those expeditions: *Informe Oficial sobre Argentina Comisión científica de la expedicion al Rio Negro 1879 (Patagonia) (*Buenos Aires, 1882), 300, with contributions by Julio Argentino Roca, Adolf Döring, Cárlos Berg, Eduardo Ladislao Holmberg, Paul Günther Lorentz, and Gustavo Niederlein.

[172] "Era necesario conquistar real y eficazmente esas 15,000 leguas, limpiarlas de los indios de un modo tan absolute, tan incuestionable… " *Informe Oficial de la Comisión,* XI.

[173] The case of Federico Rauch, for example remains understudied: F. Operé, *Indian Captivity in Spanish America: Frontier Narratives* (Charlottesville and London, 2008); See also Christoph Kamissek's unpublished PhD thesis "Transnationaler Militarismus: Das Offizierkorps der kaiserlich-deutschen Armee zwischen Nation und Empire (1871-1914)" (PhD Diss. Florence, EUI, 2015).

[174] 'Das Entre Rios und seine Bedeutung für die deutsche Kolonisation, Vortrag gehalten im Centralverein für Handelsgeographie etc. von Gustav Niederlein', *Export: Organ des Centralvereins für Handelsgeographie und Förderung Deutscher Interessen im Auslande*, 1, 4 (January 1881), 14.

[175] See, for example, the collection of the French *Courrier de la Plata*: Olascoaga, Manuel, J., *La Conquête de la Pampa: Recueil des Documents Relatifs à la Campagne du Rio Negro Comprend l'Itinéraire Suivi par Toutes les Colonnes Expéditionnaires qui, sous les Ordres du Ministre de la Guerre, Général D. Julio A. Roca ont Occupé le Désert et Porte la Ligne de Frontière sur le Rio Negro Précédé d'une étude Topographique* (Buenos Aires, 1881).

[176] See for example the French colony in Piguë in MEAEF, Nantes, 59, 152-180: Fond rapatriés du consulat français à Buenos Aires, Dossier 166 Colons a Pigué.

Bugeaud's theories did not only have a bearing on the strategies at the Argentine frontier but were followed with interest in Germany. The naturalist, Moritz Wagner, who traveled around Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s, described Bugeaud's war as a new type of war: a colonial war that adopted the savage means of the savages that had to be defeated. Bugeaud, unlike his Old Régime predecessors who fought cabinet wars, was an advocate of the total war in colonial contexts. Wagner described Bugeaud's war:

> The African Campaign of 1841 and 1842 was not a modern war of disciplined armies, who, whilst fighting one another, spare the agricultural and industrial population, and all those who are incapable of carrying arms. It was a war in the old sense of the word—a war of destruction, not recognizing any individual property to be spared. Every Arab and every Kabyle was a belligerent; his cattle and his crops, his house and tent, his wife and child, fell under the cruel law of war… It is true that no other system of hostilities could have succeeded in Algeria…. Driven to despair, even Abd-el Kader became cruel, contrary to his former habit.[177]

Wagner knew his task: he had received most of his information from Aimable Pelissier, the author of the enfumades after the Dahra Rebellion. Given these practices, the connection between the theories of emigration and colonization had to be complemented with the concept of *refoulement* or extermination. Many of the colonial theorists of emigrant colonialism succumbed to the "logic of elimination."[178] This was the inevitable result of the idea to transfer entire European societies to overseas possessions, by emigration and colonization. Bugeaud couched extermination in a language of "total war" and "total victory," which he deemed necessary to provide the basis for colonization (contrary to the opinion of some French theorists who advocated a restricted colonization of the coast only).[179] Sarmiento made extermination significantly more explicit, and his plans materialized in extermination campaigns during the "conquest of the desert." The paradoxical formulation of the "conquest of the desert" represents the mindset of those who advocated extermination, both in Algeria and in Argentina.[180] From the 1830s to the 1870s, emigration, colonization, and extermination were complementary processes and highly influential in colonial theory in Europe and the Americas.

In the 1890s, the ICI would completely abolish the language of violence and extermination that was used without restriction by settler colonial theorists. The majority of ICI members would turn against razzias, scorched earth strategies and colonial wars in general.

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[177] M. Wagner, *The Tricolor on the Atlas: Or, Algeria and the French Conquest* (New York, 1854), 365. See also: M. Wagner, *Reisen in der Regentschaft Algiers in den Jahren 1836, 1837, 1838, vol. 3* (Leipzig, 1841).
[178] For the "logic of elimination," see Wolfe, 'Settler colonialism', P. Wolfe, 'Land, Labor and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race' *American Historical Review*, 106, 3 (2001), 866-905, and, more nuanced: A.D. Moses, 'Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History', in A.D. Moses (ed.), *Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History* (Oxford, 2004), 3–48; Moses, 'Empire, Colony Genocide: Keywords': 21-27; Moses, 'Genocide and Settler Society': 36.
[179] For significantly different approaches (for example, the ideology of the Saint-Simonians), see: Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity*.
[180] For the metaphor of the desert in the French case, see again: Brower, *A Desert Named Peace*.

Instead of theorizing colonial wars, their aim was to prevent such wars in the first place. To achieve their goals, they turned to international cooperation. Without doubt, this does not mean that settler colonialism disappeared. It persisted well into the twentieth century.[181] But this fact confirms rather than undermines the interpretation of the ICI as a colonial institution that was highly skeptical towards white settlers. Colonial internationalists were therefore more likely to turn against settler colonialism than colonial nationalists. It is also important to note that their solidarity was not based on a common indigenous enemy, but on the interest to co-opt the indigenous elites into their colonial project. They found a model for such a cooption in the East Indies.

Léopold II, Colonial Internationalism and the Critique of the Settler Colonial Paradigm

It goes without saying that settler colonies were not the only type of colony in the nineteenth century, even though other types were less present in colonial accounts of the settler colonial theorists. Colonies of indirect rule, above all British India and Dutch Java, received increasing attention from those who compared colonial types with the purpose of identifying the most "successful" colonial scheme. Among the first to analyze colonies in a comparative way was the Belgian King Léopold II. His comparative interest in colonization led him to inaugurate a new era of colonial internationalism in the mid-1870s.[182]

Unlike the settler colonial theorists, Léopold was no national economist and no emigration agent who hoped to solve social or national problems through emigration or colonization. Léopold's so-called "imperialism of one man" was not destined to provide a remedy for social ills of the European society by transferring entire emigrant groups overseas, as it had been the case in Wakefield's "systematic colonization."[183] Nor did he intend to settle his colony with families but hoped to employ experts who knew how to exploit a colony. The colonial project of the "entrepreneur-king" Léopold was not to benefit the Belgian nation, but his own wealth.[184] Thus, after thoroughly studying colonial history in a comparatively, Léopold had concluded that a colony without settlers best served the purpose of enriching himself. He determined that administrative and economic experts were more apt than settler families to

[181] See especially Pedersen and Elkins (eds.), *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century* (Routledge, 2005). Moreover, settler colonialism and other forms such as plantation colonies were not mutually exclusive and could even reinforce each other: E.S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York, 1975) and A. Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom* (Cambridge, 2010).

[182] For a general overview on Léopold's colonialism see: Stengers, *Congo: Mythes et Réalités*; Viaene, 'King Léopold's Imperialism'.

[183] Coquery-Vidrovitch in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), *Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960.* [in 4vols] (London, 1969), vol. 1, 189.

[184] See for an overview V. Dujardin, et al, *Léopold II: Entre génie et gêne* (Brussels, 2010).

make a colony pay off for its possessor. Léopold recruited such experts internationally. He also promoted his colonial project internationally, which made him the precursor of colonial internationalism and the first to introduce a theory and a practice of colonial internationalism.[185]

Starting in the 1860s, Léopold searched the tropics for a potential colony that he could turn into his private property. As early as 1863, he wrote in a letter to one of his agents who scoured the globe for colonizable territory: "There are three types of colonies: 1. Slave colonies – Cuba; 2. Colonies that are populated by a numerous indigenous race, and that have been made dependent [*mises en dependence*] by a European state – Java, the Philippines, Indochina and British India; 3. Colonies founded by the emigration of the white race – the Americas, Australia, Natal (in the temperate climes)."[186] Among these types of colonies, the third type stood out, especially the Dutch colony of Java. As Léopold emphasized: "the whole world knows the profits the Dutch make in Java", because they had developed a system of forced cultivation that made the Javanese produce cash crops for the European market. Possessions like Java, Léopold explained, were not colonies in the strict sense of the word, but rather profitable "exterior domains". While he admitted the success of some emigration colonies, such as Australia, he portrayed Algeria as an anti-model of a colony, which was in fact not a colony at all but a vast field of experimentation that had cost the French state dearly.[187] Java, Cuba and the Philippines, by contrast, were the "richest national domains that exist."[188] All of them had been based on a certain degree of forced labor (Cuba) or forced cultivation (Java and the Philippines). They became a model for Léopold's policy and the indigenous population was the asset in this policy.[189]

Léopold hoped to make use of the indigenous population to make his private colony an economic success. He studied the system of forced cultivation that had been introduced in Dutch Java in the 1830s, which compelled the indigenous peasants to produce cash crops for the Dutch government. This system had made Java the only profitable colony of the nineteenth century, and was popularized by the famous report of a British colonial administrator entitled *Java, or How to Manage a Colony* (1861).[190] Léopold devoured the book that the British administrator in India had written to bring about a reform of post-1857 colonial policies in India, and imagined a similar system in his future colony. *Java, or How to Manage a Colony*,

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[185] J. Stengers, 'Léopold II et la Conférence Géographique de Bruxelles de 1876', *Bulletin de l'Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-mer* 3 (1970), 476–484.
[186] Letter from Duc de Brabant (Léopold II) to Major from 26.7.1863, in: L. Le Febve de Vivy, *Documents d'histoire précoloniale belge (1861-1865)* (Brussels, 1955), 19.
[187] Letter from Duc de Brabant (Léopold II) to Major from 26.7.1863, in: Ibid., 22.
[188] Léopold II, Note Coloniale from 20 Mai 1865, in : Ibid., 31.
[189] J. Stengers, 'Léopold II et le modèle colonial hollandais', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 90, 1 (1977), 46–71
[190] J. Money, *Java or How to Manage a Colony: A Practical Solution now Affecting British India* (London, 1861); See also: J. Vandersmissen, *Koningen van de Wereld: Léopold II en de aardrijkskundige beweging* (Leuven, 2009), 412.

became Léopold's "colonial bible" in the 1870s.[191] By the same token, Léopold had travelled to the Indian archives in Sevilla, where he had studied the Spanish exploitation of its American colony and familiarized himself with the encomienda-system, according to which the Spanish colonists had received not only territory upon arrival in the colony, but were also free to make use of the native population on that territory to realize economic exploitation.[192]

While Léopold studied profitable colonial projects in the 1870s, many of his contemporaries – among them authoritative colonial theorists like the future ICI-founder Paul Leroy-Beaulieu – stressed the failure of settler colonies. They emphasized that European settlers, rather than the native societies, were the first victims of such settler colonization.[193] The high death rates among European emigrant-colonists had long been a matter of debate.[194] Léopold invoked the disaster of the San Tomas colony, established in 1842 by the Belgian Colonization Company in Guatemala, and whose failure caused an international scandal.[195] Within the first five years of its existence, 211 of the 880 colonists succumbed to malaria, dysentery, diarrhea, and typhus.[196] As the mortality in San Tomas was highest among the working class, even the French Society for the Abolition of Slavery sent a commission to the colony to investigate the causes of their deaths and accused the Colonization Society of keeping the lower class emigrants as "white slaves."[197]

The debate about white slavery had always accompanied the processes of emigration and colonization to South America, and to Brazil in particular. As early as 1859, the Prussian government had passed the *Heydtsche's Reskript* that prohibited the recruitment campaigns in favor of emigration to Brazil. The government feared that indentured German migrant workers would be a substitute for the slaves on Brazilian plantations.[198] In France, the settler colonization in Algeria had been criticized from its early days. Even the French general Duvivier, although an advocate of restricted colonization, had to admit that "cemeteries…are the only flourishing

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[191] Ibid., 412.
[192] Ibid., 334.
[193] See for the Australian case: A. Dirk Moses, 'Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History', in Moses, *Genocide and Settler Society*, 3-48:15.
[194] The title of Philip Curtin's study *Death by Migration* is slightly misleading, because he analyzes mortality rates among European troops in overseas possessions only. An equally systematic study of settler colonists still needs to be written: P.D. Curtin, *Death by Migration: Europe's Encounter with the Tropical World in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge and New York, 1989).
[195] ANOM 2400 COL 35/1: Colonie Belge de Saint-Tomas (1842-1856): Extract from *Journal du Havre* 16.4.1844.
[196] See ANOM 2400 COL 35/1: Colonie Belge de Saint-Tomas (1842-1856) : Rapport Nr. 268, Chambre des Representants, Sénace du 10 Juin 1846, Colonie de Santo-Tomas, Enquête de M. Blondel de Cuelebrouk, 49 and Colonie Belge de Saint-Tomas (1842-1856): Extract Courrier du Havre, 19.5.1845.
[197] ANOM 2400 COL 35/1: Colonie Belge de Saint-Tomas (1842-1856) *Journal du Havre* 18.6.1845, and Rapport Nr. 268, Chambre des Representants, Sénace du 10 Juin 1846, Colonie de Santo-Tomas, Enquête de M. Blondel de Cuelebrouk, 65.
[198] N. Mitchell, *The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America* (Michigan, 1999), 110-111.

colonies in Algeria." He alluded to the fact that the Parisian authorities had sent 15,000 workers to Algeria in 1848, who were supposed to colonize the backcountry. A third of them died and another third returned to France within a year.[199] These failed attempts of colonization in Algeria turned out to be a costly enterprise for the French taxpayer, whose representatives constantly denounced colonization with settlers.[200] Those narratives of settler failure circulated widely and had a bearing on Léopold's colonial decisions.

Given these negative experiences with settler colonization, Léopold was aware of the high costs of settler colonization as well as the increasingly unfavorable public debate. His opinion on the failed Belgian colony in San Tomas was as clear as it was laconic: "St. Thomas, which [was] built on emigration, can never be a success. The Belgian does not emigrate."[201] A more pertinent explanation than his concern about poor European settlers was certainly Léopold's cost-benefit analysis. Colonization with European emigrants, like in Algeria, was too costly, he concluded.[202] Léopold, along with Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, was among the first colonial thinkers who uncoupled colonialism from emigration.

The originality of the colonial scheme that the "entrepreneur-king" Léopold developed in the 1870s derived from its eclecticism, which indeed combined a rhetoric of the free market with feudal elements of Old Régime colonialism. Moreover, opposing himself to the exterminatory settler colonization of the mid-nineteenth century provided him with arguments to portray his own project as a "humanitarian" venture that preserved native lives. At the same time, he won the favor of a British-dominated abolition movement by proclaiming the liberation of Africans from (African) slavery (concealing that his schemes for the forced exploitation of indigenous labor had been carefully thought out as early as the 1870s).

In 1876, Léopold convoked the famous International Geographical Conference, which he used to promote his project of colonizing the Congo Basin in central Africa. In his inaugural speech, he spoke on the authority of humanity and civilization and proclaimed to "open the last unpenetrated territory of the globe to civilization" in "a crusade that glorifies the age of progress" and was directed against slavery in Africa. Those words reflected his attachment to

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[199] M. Heffernan, 'French Colonial Migration', in Robin Cohen (ed.), *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration* (Cambridge, 1995), 33.
[200] Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers*, 14.
[201] "Saint Thomas fondé sur l'émigration ne pouvait pas réussir. Le Belge n'émigre pas", Le Febve de Vivy, *Documents d'histoire précoloniale*, 34.
[202] Duc de Brabant (Léopold II), 'Note sur l'utilité et l'importance pour les États de posséder des domaines et provinces en dehors de leurs Frontières Européennes'…, cit in: Ibid., 31f.

free-trade rhetoric and humanitarian arguments, while the "crusade" was a residual of the Old Régime.[203]

To achieve his goals, Léopold internationalized his Congo venture. He introduced a new standard of internationalism, which won him the support of colonial superpowers like France, Great Britain and Germany.[204] He advanced the idea of Belgian neutrality and used his international aristocratic networks to make Europe believe that he was strong enough to open the Congo basin for international trade but weak enough not to pose a political threat to other powers.[205] To the international community, he promised to turn the Congo into a zone of free trade and to occupy it effectively by introducing commerce rather than settlers. Thus, he redefined effective occupation, which was not achieved by settlement anymore, but by the internationally supervised "civilization" of a territory and the implementation of capitalism.

When the international community of states gave the go-ahead for Léopold's plans during the Berlin West Africa conference in 1884/5, the conference participants defined effective occupation exactly along Léopold's lines. With regard to the population on the ground – whose existence was recognized for the first time by an international treaty – Article 6 of the ensuing Congo Act stipulated that the fourteen colonial powers who participated in the conference were to "watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and [to] care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being and [to] help in suppressing slavery, and especially the Slave Trade."[206] Article 6 of the Congo Act anticipated the League of Nation's guideline that an international community of colonizing powers was necessary to oversee the preservation of nativeness. The article would be copied almost literally by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations after the First World War, which instructed mandatory powers to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants. In particular, he must see that the slave trade is prohibited."[207]

Unlike in the settler colonies of the early nineteenth century, the Congo Act stipulated that occupation should resemble a "protectorate", with a minimalist European

[203] F. von Richthofen, 'Bericht über die unter dem Vorsitz Sr. Majestät des Königs der Belgier vom 12. bis 14. September in Brüssel abgehaltene internationale Conferenz zur Berathung der Mittel für die Erforschung und Erschliessung von Central-Afrika', *Verhandlungen der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin* 7 and 8 (1876), 168-182: 178-179.

[204] For detailed descriptions about the diplomatic background see: S. Förster, W.J. Mommsen, and R. Robinson (eds.), *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition* (Oxford and New York, 1988).

[205] For Belgian neutrality see: É. Banning, *Les Origines et les Phases de la Neutralité Belge. ed. by A. de Ridder* (Brussels, 1927).

[206] 'General Act of the Conference of Berlin, signed February 26, 1885', in A.B. Keith (ed.), *The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act* (Oxford, 1919), 304.

[207] League of Nations, *The Mandates System: Origins, Principles, Applications,* [Series of the League of Nations Publications VI A. Mandates 1945, VI A.1]. (Geneva, 1945), 2. The Mandate "Charters".

presence that was "sufficient" to maintain sovereignty. In the Congo Act, effective occupation aimed at a minimalist role of the colonial state which kept a low profile, whereas the "totalitarian" occupation through settler sovereignty was brought about by the complete re-modeling of the society by European settlers.[208] Consequently, Léopold's international agents, like the American explorer Henry Morton Stanley, were keen on concluding treaties with indigenous chiefs that laid down the rightful transfer of sovereignty to Léopold's International African Association and ultimately to Léopold himself, who became the head of the Congo Free State after 1884/5. The treaties, like the one concluded between Stanley on behalf of the International African Association and the chiefs of Ngombi and Mafela in South Manyanga, stipulated that the chiefs accept that "it is highly desirable that the International African Association should, for the advancement of civilization and trade, be firmly established in their country. They therefore now, freely of their own accord, for themselves and their heirs and successors forever, do give up to the said Association the sovereignty and all sovereign and governing rights to all their territories."[209] While the accord was rarely completely "free", the treaties testified to Léopold's desire to receive sovereignty not by cultivating or settling the land, but to receive it from the local dignitaries. His sovereignty was finally confirmed by the international powers at the Berlin West Africa Conference in 1884/5, when Stanley presented 450 of such contracts to the delegates.[210]

Léopold's internationalism was a prelude to the foundation of the ICI, even though the ICI would soon turn against his relapse into protectionism and forced labor. His personal greed did not minimize his role as the first colonial internationalist. Starting in the 1870s, Léopold created an international propaganda network and watched warily over his project's reputation as a humanitarian intervention.[211] After Léopold had invited European scientists, philanthropists and explorers to his 1876 conference in Brussels, where he presented his colonial plans, he created the International African Association, with branches in Germany, Austria, Spain, France, and the Netherlands.[212] These national branches spread the new colonial ideology in all colonizing countries and led to a revival of colonial activity worldwide. The

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[208] Ibid., 315, see also J. Fisch, 'Africa as Terra Nullius: The Berlin Conference and International Law', in S. Förster, W.J. Mommsen, and R. Robinson (eds.), *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition* (Oxford and New York, 1988), 347–375. The expression 'totalitarian' is my term to describe settler attitudes that aimed at the complete replacement of indigenous societies.
[209] Henry M. Stanley, *The Congo and the Founding of its Free State* (London, 1885), vol. 2, 195-7.
[210] Fitzmaurice, *Sovereignty, Property and Empire*, 277-288: 288; J. Fisch, 'Africa as terra nullius'; Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer*, 156-158.
[211] In his opening speech he used the expression "friends of humanity" who devote themselves "to the suppression of the slave trade": E. Banning, *Africa and the Brussels Geographical Conference* (London 1877), 152-153.
[212] The best first-hand descriptions of the International African Association's foundation: É. Banning, *L'Afrique et la Conférénce de Géographie de Bruxelles* (Brussels, 1887); É. Banning, *L'Association Internationale Africaine et le Comité des Hautes Études d Haut-Congo 1877-1882* (Brussels, 1882).

branches in Spain, the Netherlands and Germany, for example, developed into powerful colonial interest groups.[213]

Moreover, Léopold bribed journalists and international lawyers all over the world to portray his scheme as an international project of (economic) civilization and human progress.[214] The French case rose to prominence when Léopold bribed the general secretary of the most important colonial lobby group in France, the Comité de l'Afrique Française, Hyppolite Percher. Percher, who was also managing editor for the *Revue des Deux Mondes* and other newspapers in the French capital, was the most powerful spin doctor of French colonial Africanism. When the French public learned about the bribery, Percher was challenged to a duel and killed by a former French colonial administrator.[215]

Léopold's lobbyism was more successful in Germany. He paid a journalist of Belgian origin, Henri Gautier, to propagate the creation of the Congo Free State. Gautier was a lucky choice, as he managed to gain access to the German upper class via the chief editor of the semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and convinced Bismarck to officially recognize Léopold's Congo Free State. When Gautier secretly met with the chief editor Emil Pindtner, the latter instructed Gautier "My dear Gautier – entre nous – you can do a big favor to Germany and Belgium." Gautier interrupted Pindtner: "To the International African Association, you mean! The Association is not Belgium. Don't confuse two things that are completely different – but I am ready, what can I do for you?" – "You can be the intermediary between Germany and the Association and tell the monsieurs in Brussels that we have nothing against their project." [216]

The German government wanted to avoid the Congo basin becoming French or British. One day after the above conversation, Gautier met with Heinrich von Kusserow, who headed the colonial section in the German Foreign Ministry and was a leading member of the powerful

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[213] See for example in Spain: F. Coello, 'Discurso en la fundación de la Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid'*, Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid* 1 (1876), 113-169 and F. Coello, 'Asciación Internacional para la Exploración y Civilización del África Central', *Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid* 1 (1876), 501-522; For Germany see F. von Richthofen, 'Bericht über die unter dem Vorsitz Sr. Majestät des Königs der Belgier vom 12. bis 14. September in Brüssel abgehaltene internationale Conferenz zur Berathung der Mittel für die Erforschung und Erschliessung von Central-Afrika', *Verhandlungen der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin* 7 and 8 (1876), 168-182.

[214] The most famous one was obviously H.M. Stanley, see H.M. Stanley, *The Autobiography of Sir Henry Morton Stanley: The Making of a 19th-Century Explorer* (Santa Barbara, 2001); A. Fitzmaurice, 'The Justification of King Leopold II's Congo Enterprise by Sir Travers Twiss', in S. Dorsett and Hunter I. (eds.)*, Law and Politics in British Colonial Thought: Transpositions of Empire* (New York, 2010), 109–128.

[215] Archives Institut de France, Fonds Auguste Terrier, MS 8450 1er mars 1895 - 16 mars 1895 Letter Hipolyte Percher to Alfred Le Chatelier from 27.2.1895, and the newspaper articles published on the topic in MS 8450, 15 mai 1895 - 18 mai 1895. These documents have been discovered recently by John Wilkinson, see J.C. Wilkinson, *A Fatal Duel: Harry Alis (1857-95), A Behind the Scenes Figure of the Early Third Republic* (Eastbourne, 2009).

[216] Archives du Palais Royal, Archives du Cabinet du Roi, Documents relatifs au developpement exterieur 56/11: Letter Gautier to Borchgrave from 19.5.1884.

German Colonial Society.[217] After the meeting, Gautier wrote back to Brussels "The German government offers us their support."[218] Only one year later, Kusserow organized the West African Conference in Berlin (1884/5), which internationally sanctioned Léopold's Congo Free State and launched the peaceful competition for territory in Africa. For the Congo Free State, this was the last step of colonial emancipation from the yoke of the Belgian "motherland": The Congo Free State was not a Belgian colony and a national project, but existed due to recognition by an international community.

Once the newly founded Congo Free State was established, it turned into a training ground for European colonialists. Léopold's International African Association had not only engaged the service of British-born Henry Morton Stanley to explore the Congo and acquire territory, but also employed other Europeans, like the German officers Hermann von Wissmann and Curt von François, who led the by-then biggest European expedition to Central Africa and explored the Kasai region. After leaving the service of the International African Association, Wissmann became governor of German East Africa, while von Curtois held positions in German Togo and Cameroon, before pulling together a colonial army in German West Africa.[219]

Léopold introduced a new kind of colonial discourse, which abandoned emigrant colonialism, dismissed the language of extermination, and promoted the preservation of indigenous populations. His ideas spread via international colonial associations, the employment of international colonial experts, and the West African Conference in Berlin. There, effective occupation through preservation was given a new meaning and became a category of international law. While Léopold's exploitation of Congolese workforce led to new forms of extermination in practice, the ICI picked up his humanitarian and utilitarian ideology and turned it into a doctrine of European colonialism by the 1890s. As Léopold had wished in 1876, the ICI would turn Brussels into "a sort of headquarters of the civilizing movement."[220]

Towards the Foundation of the International Colonial Institute

The passage from the paradigm of pan-nationalist settler colonization to the paradigm of internationalist "native policies" was fluid. The two periods can be distinguished as ideal-type periods and both versions existed in either epoch. The transition phase could particularly

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[217] K. Hildebrandt, 'Kusserow, Heinrich von' in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 13 (1982), 343.
[218] Archives du Palais Royal, Archives du Cabinet du Roi, Documents relatifs au developpement exterieur 56/14: Letter Gautier to Borchgrave, from 21.5.1884.
[219] C. von Perbandt, 'Die Erforschung des Kassai-Gebietes', in: A. Becker and C.v. Perbandt (eds.), *Hermann von Wissmann: Deutschlands größter Afrikaner* (Berlin, 1906), 69-70.
[220] F. von Richthofen, 'Bericht', 178-179.

be felt at International Geographical or Statistical Congresses, where settler colonial theorists met with a new generation of colonial internationalists who dismissed settler colonization.

When European geographers organized the second International Geographical Congress in Brussels in 1875, a section was dedicated to "colonization and emigration." At the conference, Jules Duval was posthumously introduced as one of the most important colonial theorists, while the Argentine recruitment agent Carlos Calvo presented an extensive survey on emigration and colonization.[221] A disciple of Sarmiento and a long-time recruitment agent in France, Calvo represented the settler theorists. He proclaimed that emigration and colonization "are not anymore a national or governmental matter, but an individual act of spontaneity, only determined by personal decisions."[222] Unsurprisingly, he emphasized that Brazil, Argentina, the USA, Australia and New Zealand were the best destinations for emigrants and colonizers. The flourishing young states of the New World, he claimed, offered easy access to property, a more generous remuneration and the most extensive political rights. Referring to the desert-like frontier colonization, he cited Montesquieu in emphasizing that "countries are not cultivated because of their fertility but in relation to their liberty."[223] Without doubt, Calvo represented the settler colonial theory, which linked emigration to colonization, portrayed both as processes of liberalization and as part of the aggressive frontier policy that should push back the indigenous population.

Calvos' settler attitude clashed with the attitudes of a new generation of colonial theorists, such as Paul Leroy-Beaulieu. Members of the 1875 Congress celebrated Leroy-Beaulieu's award-winning comparative study *On Colonization among Modern Peoples*, in which he advocated the "immense superiority of emigration of capital over the emigration of persons," and called for an integration of indigenous peoples in the colonial economy. Leroy-Beaulieu would be a co-founder of the ICI in 1893 and contribute in a significant way to bringing about a new paradigm of "native policy."[224]

It was not until the Paris World Fair in 1889 that the French government organized an independent international congress to manage emigration and colonization on an international scale. One of the organizers of the Paris Congress on Colonization and Emigration was Joseph Chailley.[225] The programmatic combination of emigration and colonization resulted in the fact

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[221] C. Calvo, *Étude sur l'Émigration et la Colonisation: Réponse à la Première des Questions du Groupe V, soumises au Congrès International des Sciences Géographiques de 1875* (Paris, 1875).
[222] Calvo, *Étude sur l'Émigration*, 104.
[223] "les pays sont cultivés non en raison de leur fertilité, mais en raison de leur liberté", C. Calvo, *Étude sur l'Émigration et la Colonisation: Réponse à la Première des Questions du Groupe V, soumises au Congrès International des Sciences Géographiques de 1875* (Paris, 1875), 105-107.
[224] P. Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes* (Paris, 1874), 498-500.
[225] Bibliothèque des Annales Économiques, *Congrès international de l'intervention des pouvoirs publics*, 5.

that settler theorists from South America and France, such as Carlos Calvo and his Chilean colleague Gabriel Carrasco, still dominated the discussions.[226] Chailley attended this emigration congress but kept a low profile. Pursuing a different agenda, he would found the International Colonial Institute four years later, whose members portrayed the colonies that were not based on settlement – British India and Dutch Java in particular – as models of a modern art of colonialism. Chailley and other ICI members would make a very clear distinction between the former settler colonial paradigm and their own "modern" colonial schemes.

[226] Ibid., 18.

Chapter 2

The International Colonial Institute: A Pioneer of Twentieth Century Colonial Reformism

It was well into the night, after a convivial dinner held at the Dutch colonial minister's house in 1893, when the general secretary of the French Colonial Union, Joseph Chailley-Bert, and the head of the Dutch Colonial Association, Professor Pieter Antoine van der Lith, decided to found the International Colonial Institute (ICI).[1] This "after-dinner", one Dutch participant recalled, "was as gracious as it was spiritual" and appeased the nationalist passions of the banquet's guests.[2] Under the impulse of this high-spirited moment, Chailley and van der Lith suggested setting up an international institution, in which experts could share colonial knowledge and work out a best practice of colonial governance. Initially, their plan met with disapproval among many colonial experts who attended the dinner. However, the skepticism of the majority succumbed to the enthusiasm of the few. As the Belgian Albert Thys admitted a few years later, the founders had no clear idea as to the shape of such an institute, but nonetheless, everybody was "full of honor to be part of it."[3]

The vinous founding act stood in sharp contrast to the sober development that the ICI would take in the years to come. In 1894, the Institute held its first meeting and invited delegates from thirteen countries to join their cause. Twenty years later, in 1914, the ICI listed 136 members from Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Russia, Portugal, Spain, the USA, Latin America, Denmark and Austria-Hungary. By that date, it had developed into a powerful non-governmental think tank of colonial rule and exploitation. Among its members figured colonial ministers, overseas governors, directors of colonial companies, the heads of colonial lobby groups and experts in colonial science. They styled the ICI as a scientific institution that captured, shared, recorded and distributed colonial knowledge.[4].

The ICI's members shared the ideal of being the avant-garde of colonial reform. Unlike early modern theorists of empire, they did not think of colonialism as a national right to expansion, but portrayed it as an international duty towards humanity. This redefinition allowed them to imagine colonialism as a creative process rather than a destructive expansion of European settler

[1] Institut Colonial International (ed.), *Compte rendu de la session tenue à Berlin, le 6 et 7 septembre 1897* (Brussels, 1898), 50.
[2] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1901*, 47f.
[3] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 82.
[4] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 50.

societies (see Chapter 1). With regard to the colonized, the ICI's concept of colonialism was ecumenical: a joint effort to develop the world rationally and economically, while maintaining its cultural (and racial) diversity. To achieve this goal, it was no longer a matter of transferring entire European societies to the overseas possessions, where they were to replace "unproductive" native societies. Rather, transfers between colonial experts were to unleash the latent potential of native societies, whom the ICI members considered more apt than European settlers to be productive – if guided by white experts.

This "progressive" program transformed colonial thinking well beyond its institutional frame. Indeed, ICI experts were instrumental in remodeling colonial policies of the twentieth century. During the interwar period, in particular, international organizations would try to take advantage of the ICI's colonial expertise. Both the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization (ILO) would recruit ICI members, who contributed in a significant way to shape the League's colonial policy and the ILO's global labor policy (see Chapter 8). This circulation of experts benefited both the international organizations and the ICI itself, which increased its reputation as the pioneer of international colonial cooperation. Although it suspended its meetings and activities during the world wars, the ICI was a phoenix to colonial policy and arose twice from the ashes of these devastating conflicts. While it never assumed the same shape when reborn into post-conflict societies (Japan was invited to become a member in 1927), its reactions to the post-war reconfigurations of colonial situations were astonishingly consistent.[5]

This chapter analyzes the early years of the ICI and explains why colonizers around the world felt the need to found and join a non-governmental International Colonial Institute in the 1890s – in the midst of an atmosphere coined by national rivalry and colonial conflicts that had earned the outgoing nineteenth century a dubious reputation as the "Age of Imperialism."

I argue that the ICI's foundation coincided with the increasing interest among colonial rulers to enhance their policies by learning from others. Indeed, archival records of the 1890s reveal that colonial administrations did not take any decision without prior consultation of experiences made in foreign colonies. To them, the ICI offered expertise in inter-colonial comparison and knowledge transfers. To be sure, colonial comparison was not entirely new. Yet, while colonial theorists had compared and categorized colonial empires long before the 1890s, the ICI members developed comparison further into a comparative method that helped governments to produce a "best practice" of colonization. While traditional colonial comparison tended to be political, the comparative method of the ICI was meant to be systematic and scientific. Indeed, traditional comparisons had often served to delegitimize other empires – like British liberalism did with the "reactionary"

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[5] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1927*, vol.1 (Paris, 1927), 7.

Spanish Empire – while the comparative method was used to improve colonial government and development by emulating successful colonial strategies. The ICI's comparative method was therefore not a contrasting comparison, but aimed at the transfer of colonial knowledge. Owing to the ICI, comparison and transfers became the most important methods to increase the colonizers' knowledge about colonies and the native populations.[6] Colonial newcomers and time-honored empires alike supported the ICI and tried to profit from its expertise in inter-colonial knowledge transfers.

Aware of this reputation, members explicitly styled the ICI as a scientific expert institution and emphasized its autonomy. By comparing and sharing colonial experience, its members hoped to develop modern "methods" and "techniques" of colonization that were deemed universally applicable. In doing so, they portrayed colonialism as a science and not an ideology. Their claim to the scientification of colonialism entailed the autonomy of colonial science, which they saw detached from nationalism or any other political agenda. Thus, Chailley proudly proclaimed in the 1897 meeting of the ICI that "science has no fatherland."[7] In the early days of the ICI, not all members shared his view. As we will see, many of them joined the ICI on nationalist grounds. But gradually, the internationalist colonial experts developed a corporate mentality that valued professional expertise over nationalist fervor. Slowly, their skepticism towards non-expert politicians in the motherlands surpassed their skepticism towards experts in the same field who worked in foreign colonies. Their desire to govern colonies with experts who were unconstrained by absurd directives from the metropoles strengthened their sense of autonomy – and internationality. This chapter will show the complexity inherent to the ICI's internationalism and its aspiration to autonomy.

After all, ICI members thought of themselves as colonial reformers who inaugurated a new liberal and progressive era of colonial development. For them, the economic "mise en valeur" was the corollary of the past – yet not finalized – period of conquest. Chailley put this attitude in a nutshell: "First security and then prosperity. We believe that every civilization originates there. And I also believe that the most important factor for civilization in the world is economic progress and wealth. There is no civilization for the poor." [8] The purpose of economic development and the rhetoric of human progress anticipated the era of developmental thinking – and actually inaugurated it, as I argue in this dissertation. Faced with the reproach that development of the colonies might serve nationalist purposes, ICI members argued that development also benefitted the colonized, and

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[6] Concerning the importance of knowledge for empires see B.S. Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, 1996); C.A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India. 1780-1870* (Cambridge, 1997); G.R. Trumbull, *An Empire of Facts: Colonial Power, Cultural Knowledge, and Islam in Algeria, 1870-1914* (Cambridge and New York, 2009).
[7] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 84.
[8] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1909*, 112.

therefore humanity in general. The incorporation of the colonial subjects into projects of colonial development became their best argument in favor of colonialism.

At the heart of this development program was a native policy that was economically assimilationist but culturally relativist. Unlike colonial theorists of the 1850s, the ICI experts reinterpreted the natives as human capital, and thought their work force vital in the development of a colonial economy. Once the natives had been educated to be workers and consumers, the ICI's co-founder Albert Thys explained, they would naturally turn to capitalism and finally make colonies profitable.[9] Therefore, the ICI valued native labor over vulnerable white settlers and the guidance of colonial experts over both. The latter were supposed to control indigenous agency, because participation of the natives was increased by assigning them executive tasks only – without granting them sovereignty.

This paradigm of native policy led the ICI's members to embrace relativist attitudes, which accepted and even appreciated indigenous administration and culture. Anthropologists in the ICI studied the language, culture and law of the colonized and compared them on a global scale. It was again Chailley who outlined the Institute's principle of native policy: "These men have a civilization… Indochinese and Madagascans for France, Chinese and African Negroes for Germany, Congo Negroes for the Belgians, Hindus and Muslims for the British … we will not touch their moral civilization, but we will bring them our material and scientific civilization."[10] Chailley's argument was as simple as it was utilitarian. In order to develop the colonies and to make them profitable, the colonizers should refrain from costly projects of cultural assimilation or enforced "moral civilization." Instead, they should make use of indigenous traditions and of European expertise to introduce free labor, capitalism and "material civilization" to the colonies. Chailley's arguments were both utilitarian and humanitarian, and carried the germs of the twentieth century's development ideology and participatory colonialism.

Needless to say that the ICI's reformism was not meant to be a revolution. Its liberal and humanitarian program – as members labelled it – served to substantiate colonial rule rather than to erode it. Humanitarian and utilitarian arguments legitimized colonialism, as did the call for restricted native participation in colonial administration. The international exchange of colonial "methods" in the ICI was conducive to spreading such elements of a reformed colonialism. Dutch Java came to epitomize the "modern" colonialism – and its ambiguities – and owing to the ICI, Dutch policies were soon emulated all over the world. Many of the ICI's members carried forward this utilitarian attitude and their humanitarian argumentation when they were employed as colonial experts by the League of Nations. It unfolded its full effect after the Second World War, when

[9] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1909*, 115.
[10] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1909*, 116-119.

colonialism was about to lose it legitimacy. The ICI's reformism, which originated in the 1890s, ultimately helped to perpetuate colonial domination until the 1960s and beyond. Its role as an initiator of native policy development ideology cannot be denied.

In this chapter, I analyze the foundation of the ICI, its social composition and the contexts from which its ideological guidelines emerged. I argue that a utilitarian attitude and a need to legitimize colonialism led the ICI members to invent key concepts of modern development policies. The first part shows how the ICI worked as an institution. The second part retraces the ICI's origins and exposes the reasons why Europeans joined the ICI. The third part analyzes the key concepts promoted by the ICI and critically outlines its members' concepts of scientific colonization, development, liberalism, humanitarianism and internationalism. I qualify those concepts as "utilitarian ideologies" because they often served immediate purposes of legitimization rather than starting long-term processes. At the same time, I qualify them as "ideologies of utilitarianism" because utilitarianism itself was an ideology. Those ideologies were not without consequences. Taking internationalism as an example, I show how the ICI actively intervened to prevent colonial conflicts –and a world war over colonies – by assuming the role of diplomatic brokers.

The Constitution of an Institution: Promoting and Financing Colonial Internationalism

The ICI was a project launched by French colonial reformer Joseph Chailley and representatives of "small nations," like Belgium and the Netherlands, who hoped to profit from international cooperation in colonial matters.[11] In 1893 – a few days after the convivial dinner in Amsterdam – Chailley and Dutch professor of colonial law Pieter Antoine van der Lith proceeded to action. The founding session of the ICI assembled seven renowned colonial experts from France, Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands. The businessman and railway engineer Albert Thys, who had been vital to the establishment of Léopold's Congo Free State, and the first general governor of the Congo Free State, Camille Janssen, represented Belgium.[12] A former governor of Bombay, the Dutch-born Donald Mackay, 11th Lord Reay, who headed the Royal Asiatic Society from 1893 up to his death in 1921, was the only British delegate at the inaugural session. Moreover, the founders recruited two emblematic "figureheads" for the ICI: Léon Say, the famous French liberal economist and grandson of Jean Baptiste Say, and the Dutch colonial reformer Isaac Franssen van de Putte – an ex-colonial minister who had made a name for himself by reforming the Dutch colonial

[11] Both countries had long traditions of using international staff for their colonial projects. Seventy percent of the employees of the Dutch East India Company had not been Dutch: R. Bertrand, *État colonial, noblesse et nationalisme à Java* (Paris, 2005), 48; Many explorers and administrators who built Leopold's Congo Free State were not Belgian.

[12] Camille Janssen was a Belgian diplomat, who had also been a member of the international courts founded in Egypt during the construction of the Suez Canal: O. Louwers, 'Camille Janssen', in Institut Royal Colonial Belge (ed.), *Biographie Coloniale Belge*, vol. 4 (Brussels, 1951), 427-440.

administration. Those seven founding fathers would shape the ICI's policies for the next decade, with an omnipresent Joseph Chailley and a skilled manager Camille Janssen, who became secretary general of the ICI and remained in place until the interwar period. While its permanent head office was located in Brussels, the ICI members met biennially or annually in different European cities. Prior to the First World War, they held more than thirty official meetings to elect members and to debate and design the future of colonial administration.

Between 1894 and 1914, almost 150 members from eleven countries turned the ICI into a virtual laboratory of colonialism. At fifteen week-long plenary meetings, those experts explored new techniques of colonial rule and development. By referring to comparison and exchange, ICI members tried to design new colonial techniques, in fields as different as tropical hygiene, the training of overseas administrators, the recruitment of labor, railway construction, irrigation systems, mining, native law, land tenure, and native education.[13] None of those diverse topics was exclusively colonial, and most of them had been a matter of scientific debates outside the ICI. During the annual meetings of the ICI, however, they were applied to colonial contexts and underwent a process of "colonization". Tropical hygiene should enable Europeans to live in the tropics, and immunize native workers against decimating diseases. The adequate selection of administrators should guarantee a good government of the colonies. Labor recruitment and railway construction should ensure colonial exploitation. Irrigation should supply colonial plantations with water and mining should help to develop a colonial industry. Native law and land tenure regulation should give Europeans instruments to control the population, as well as the education of the natives. To meet their objective of making science more colonial and colonization more scientific, the ICI members collaborated closely with colonial ministries, universities, and training schools for administrators.

The results of the ICI's comparative studies were published in extensive reports that constituted a veritable *Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale*, a name that editors chose for the series of ICI publications. More than fifty volumes of the *Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale* appeared between 1893 and 1914. Thirty-one of these volumes were comparative studies on colonial science and technology. They covered the recruitment of administrators and the labor force, railway construction, irrigation, and mining, as well as the establishment of protectorates, land tenure and colonial law. Another sixteen volumes contained detailed minutes of the ICI's plenary meetings, which its members organized biennially between 1894 and 1900 and almost annually between 1900 and 1913. Adding to the conference proceedings, the ICI put out expert reports on alcohol and the opium trade, as well as on big-game hunting in the colonies. Those publications left hardly any stone in the colonies unturned. Being predominantly comparative studies, they

[13] For an overview see ICI, *Compte Rendu 1913*, 'Publications de l'Institut Colonial International'.

constituted an archive of shared colonial knowledge. Highly esteemed by colonial governments, the volumes published by the ICI circulated globally.[14] They could be found in colonial offices, in public libraries and even in the sparse book collections of colonial administrations overseas, like in German Cameroon or in Dutch Sumatra.[15] Colonial governments, like in German East Africa, urged colonial ministries in the metropole to purchase and forward the ICI's publications, while complaining bitterly if the authorities back home failed to send them immediately upon publication.[16] Inspired by the ICI's *Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale*, colonial authorities and administrators put the new strategies and techniques of colonial rule and development to the test.

To receive up-to-date information for their publications, ICI members quickly established rapports with colonial ministries and administrations overseas, from whom they requested administrative documents. Although the ICI officially kept a low profile in colonial policies – and explicitly refrained from making recommendations and refused to formulate "colonial doctrines" – it soon won influence among colonial ministries and administrations worldwide.[17] As the founding fathers were former members of the French, Dutch, Belgian, and British colonial administrations, they held close ties with the institutions of political decision making in those countries. In other cases, like in Germany, government circles took the initiative to keep themselves informed about the ICI's development. As soon as the German Foreign Ministry – and the Colonial Division within the ministry – overheard the plans to establish the ICI, it instructed the German embassy in Brussels to report on progress in the matter, claiming that the ICI was an "opportunity to profit from the rich experiences of other colonial powers."[18] Once the ICI was established, it collaborated closely with national governments. On the one hand, it received documents from colonial administrations to use them for comparative studies about railway building, colonial law, tropical hygiene, and the recruitment of labor force.[19] On the other hand, colonial ministries went as far as carrying out the ICI's instructions to launch surveys among overseas administrators on tropical hygiene, and native

[14] Among those governments who would suscribe to the ICI's publications without officially being member states or funding the ICI were Argentina, Australia, Canada, Greece, Guatemala, India, Japan, Siam South Africa, Switzerland, and Uruguay: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1929*, 61.

[15] The Reichskommissariat in Douala (German Cameroon) owned several editions of the *Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale*. In Dutch Sumatra, the ICI was a source of inspiration for its colonial policy: 'Institut Colonial International', *De Sumatra Post* (23.7.1910).

[16] BArch, R1001, 6188, Nr. 71: Governor German East Africa to Kolonialbtheilung from 25.2 1897; Nr. 107 Governor German East Africa to Kolonialbtheilung from 9.9.1898.

[17] The ICI founders emphasized this fact over and over again: "nous n'avons jamais entendu, à l'ICI, donner des conseils et nous nous sommes toujours refusés à vouloir imposer une doctrine": ICI, *Compte Rendu 1900*, 123, 195,208.

[18] BArch, R 1001, 6186: Akten betreffend das Institut Colonial International in Brüssel vom Januar 1894 bis 31 Dezember 1906, Nr. 1-4: Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Belgien 9.1.1894 to Grafen von Caprivi; Nr. 15 Hohenlohe (Präsident der DKG) and AA, Kolonialabtheilung, Stuttgart from 1.6.1894.

[19] BArch, R 1001, 6186: Akten betreffend das Institut Colonial International in Brüssel vom Januar 1894 bis 31 Dezember 1906, Abschrift Janssen to Hohenlohe from 15.6.1894.

law.[20] Colonial administrations overseas even accepted the ICI as an authoritative institution, and responded to its requests to deliver the most recent news from the colonial basis.

ICI members, who had participated in international congresses and institutions long before the foundation of the ICI, also cooperated closely with other international institutions, like the Institute for International Law (1876) and the International Institute of Statistics (1885), on which the ICI was modeled.[21] Some members literally accumulated memberships in non-governmental institutions. The first president of the ICI, the economist Léon Say (1826-1896) appeared in the registers of twenty different associations, many of them international.[22] Unsurprisingly, the ICI was a corporative member of the World Congress of International Organizations held in 1913.[23] Due to overlapping memberships, the ICI launched joint projects, for example with the Institute of International Law to draft an international convention for the recruitment of labor in the colonies (see Chapter 8).[24] While the Institute of International Law openly intervened in political affairs, the ICI pursued a seemingly quietist strategy.[25]

The ICI cultivated an image of absolute neutrality and styled itself as a scientific and apolitical institution. In line with its scientific aspiration, its official purpose was to develop best practice "methods" and "techniques" of colonization that were universally applicable. Chailley, the founding father, proclaimed proudly that the institute's most cherished methods were colonial comparison and transfer. In accordance with its scientific orientation, the statutes banned "political debates" from the institute's meetings.[26] In doing so, its leaders hoped to avoid nationalist or personal confrontation among members. According to them, colonial exchange was supposed to be "disinterested" and transnational, while nationalism belonged to the realm of politics. After all, this anti-political impetus was conducive to a portrayal of colonialism as a science – therefore obliterating its bad reputation as an ideology. By acting like a scholarly and international learned society, the ICI's members tried to counter their image as "colonial enthusiasts" with the political purposes of a "colonial party."[27]

The reality was certainly more complex. As we have seen, the institute maintained close ties with the colonial authorities in member countries, often through colonial lobby groups operating within these nations, like the French Colonial Union, the Royal Asiatic Society or the German

[20] See for example: BArch, R 1001 6187 ICI, Nr 3 Vohsen to Dernburg (Direktor der Kolonialabteilung des AA) from 4.3.1907; Nr. 34: Kolonministerium Dernburg to Vohsen from 2.1.1909.
[21] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 63; H. Schnee (ed.), *Deutsches Koloniallexikon* (Berlin 1920), 99 f.
[22] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 52f.
[23] ULCSH, F.6 Congrès Mondial des Associations Internationales 1913.
[24] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1899*, 53-54; ICI (ed.), *La Main d'Oeuvre aux Colonies: Documents officiels sur le contrat de travail et le louage d'ouvrage aux colonies,* 3 vol., (Brussels 1895-1898), see also: Daviron, 'Mobilizing Labour in African'.
[25] See Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer*.
[26] 'Article 12 of the Statutes', in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1909*, 30.
[27] The notion that the colonial lobbyists were a political party or an interest group dominated the social analysis of these groups: Ageron, *France coloniale ou parti colonial*; Grupp, *Deutschland, Frankreich und die Kolonien*; Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 'The French Colonial Party'; Viaene, 'King Leopold's Imperialism'.

Colonial Society.[28] Moreover, it displayed a tendency to recruit its members from among the political elite of each state. In doing so, it pursued a strategy of indirect influence. This strategy paid off in two ways. On the one hand, the influential notables who joined the ICI received insider knowledge from colonial ministries and even internal documents such as draft laws. Based on these documents – and on their own experience – the institute's members prepared expert reports, which were then discussed and published by the ICI's general secretary based in Brussels. On the other hand, eminent members were able to convince their national governments to fund the ICI.

Governmental subsidies made up an important part of the ICI's budget. Throughout its existence, the ICI received financial aid from the Belgian, Dutch, and French colonial ministries, each subsidizing it with 1,500 to 2,000 Francs annually. In the first years of its existence, Russia and Chile donated smaller amounts but backed out of the project towards the turn of the century.[29] While the colonial authorities in Berlin siphoned off up to 2,500 Francs annually from a special Africa-Fund only after 1900, German colonial administrations in Cameroon, German East Africa and Kiautschou each assigned 250 marks to the ICI, taken from their already low budget. These small donations from overseas were above all symbolic – but revealed that administrators held the ICI's work in high esteem.[30] Although those sums were far from being enough to run the ICI, they contributed to remunerate its general secretary, Camille Janssen, who was permanently employed to manage the ICI. Another 10,000 Francs derived from membership fees (fifty Francs annually for effective members and fifteen Francs for associated members) and from the sale of the colonial publications.[31]

Added to this permanent income were the one-off payments and donations that kept the ICI alive in its early days.[32] The biggest donation prior to the First World War came from the Belgian entrepreneur Albert Thys, who was responsible for the construction of the Matadí –Léopoldville railway in the Congo Free State and who owned several mining companies in the Katanga region. In 1900, Thys funded the ICI with a subsidy of 6,000 Francs, taken from the budget of his Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Congo. This sum enabled the Institute to publish an encyclopedic three volume series on railway construction in the colonies.[33] Despite these rare injections of capital, the ICI struggled continually not to be in the red. In 1912, the Institute spent 14,302.25 Francs, while it earned the by then highest profit in its existence – 3,797 Francs – from selling its

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[28] For example the *Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, see La 140 Bü 246, Letter Lord Reay to Hohenlohe-Langenburg, January 1893.
[29] See for example: AMAEB, D 4782 INCIDI, Report on 'Session Extraordinaire du 6 Juin 1896'.
[30] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1913*, 84.
[31] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 58.
[32] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1913, 34.
[33] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1900*, 255; Albert Thys had already funded the Institute in 1894 with 2,500 Francs, taken from the budget of the Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie : ABAE, D 4782 Manuscript of the procès verbaux of the session held in Brussels on 8.1.1894.

publications. By late 1912, membership fees and the financial support from official colonial authorities allowed for a surplus of almost 8,000 Francs. This sum, however, had to be used to balance the costs of the *Recueil International de Legislation Coloniale,* a comparative report on colonial law that had been published one year before. Although the *Recueil* had 218 subscribers, it had earned the ICI no more than 2,800 Francs.[34]

The financial situation changed for the better as soon as colonial governments came to appreciate the value of the ICI's comparative efforts – and as soon as they embraced the developmental policy which the ICI had promoted as early as the 1890s. The financial take-off started before the First World War but took full effect in the interwar period. By the 1930s, all French colonies granted opulent subsidies to the ICI. Indochina led the field with 20,000 Francs.[35] More importantly, the British government – which had exercised restraint before the war – joined the donor countries with 50,000 Francs annually.[36] By that time, the circulation of the ICI publications increased, because they interested not only colonial administrators and ministers, but also experts in the League of Nations, the International Labor Organization and other international institutions.

Increasing membership confirms the growing importance of the ICI. The number of members was restricted to sixty by 1894 and then gradually raised to 200 up to 1913 (in practice only 136 joined). A strong notion of exclusivity led the founding fathers to accept members on invitation only. ICI members proposed candidates from their own country who were then elected by all ICI members during the annual "extraordinary sessions."[37] Older members approached potential candidates personally, using scientific networks or the national colonial interest groups to recruit them. New members were chosen according to their colonial expertise and their political status, and categorized into effective, associated and corresponding members. Effective members were supposed to be "among those who distinguished themselves in colonial policies, be it in the colonial service of each nation or in the fields of colonial law, political economy or the administration of colonies." The statutes restricted the number of effective members to sixty. The associated members instead were "persons with special knowledge" who did not reside in the colonies, whereas corresponding members generally lived in the colonies and were a source of first-hand information.[38] As corresponding members rarely participated in the ICI's activities, the general assembly decided in 1897 to open the group of "associated members" to those who "want

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[34] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1913*, 83f.
[35] ANOM, FP 100APOM/222-223, dossier ICI, Correspondance Louwers Sécrétaire Général avec Section Française, Letter from Louwers to Olivier, Gouerneur Général and heading the group of French delegates at the ICI from 29.12.1938.
[36] National Archives, Kew, CO 323/1043/1 Request by International Colonial Institute, Brussels for financial support from British Government, 1929; From 1931 onwards the British paid 50,000 Francs to the ICI: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1931*, 71.
[37] AMAEB, D 4782 (D 89) INCIDI, Rapports Sessions Extraordinaires.
[38] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1899,* 19.

to and are able to provide the institute with documents or information about the colonies" and who were promising newcomers in colonial science without having lived in the colonies.[39] It was thus the main concern of the ICI to enroll experts only and to choose them from among politicians, colonial administrators, scholars or technicians. Many of the German members, for example, were taken from the semi-official Colonial Council, which advised the German government on colonial matters.[40] In France they derived from powerful lobby groups like Chailley's Colonial Union.

By 1900, the bulk of the Institute's members were legal experts, both in colonial and international law, like the British Lord Reay or the Belgian Édouard Descamps. The second most important group comprised the "anciens," former governors and administrators, whose experience and expertise endowed them with an authority that no one dared to challenge. They sided with colonial engineers and agronomists. Those "technicians of colonization" were emblematic for the ICI's self-conception as a virtual laboratory, which produced techniques of colonial rule and exploitation. In a similar way, specialists in tropical medicine contributed to its status as an expert institution. Unlike those scholarly experts, entrepreneurs like Albert Thys or the German bank director and millionaire Karl von der Heydt compensated for their low numbers by restless activity. They played an important role for the ICI, as they connected it with the few colonial capitalists in Europe. In accordance with the ICI's inclination to rational colonization, missionaries and army members were underrepresented. Only two missionaries and two navy officers could be found among 136 ICI members prior to the First World War. And they had not even been chosen for their career in missionary circles or the colonial armies, but because of their membership in colonial administrations or interest groups. The striking absence of those who represented conquest and evangelization was no coincidence. It expressed the ICI's desire to exclude "destructive" means of colonization and draw the attention to "constructive" or "positive" colonization.

Unsurprisingly, all the ICI members were male and pursued a lifestyle that can be qualified as bourgeois. Their financial resources allowed them to commit themselves to politics, high society life, and the study of the possessions overseas. Moreover, many of the ICI's members had a seat in national parliaments or were part of the upper ranks of bureaucracy. Others taught at universities. And almost all of them were members of colonial interest groups or learned societies, which operated on a national basis. Among them were the presidents of the German Colonial Society, Hermann von Hohenlohe-Langenburg and Johann Albrecht von Mecklemburg, the head of the French Colonial Union, Joseph Chailley, and the director of the Committee for French Africa, Auguste d'Arenberg. Arenberg was also president of the Suez Canal Company. They were joined by the editors of the interest groups' press organs, like Ernst Vohsen (*Deutsche Kolonialzeitung,*

[39] Ibid., 20-21.

[40] For the German Colonial Council see H. Pogge von Strandmann, *Imperialismus vom Grünen Tisch: Deutsche Kolonialpolitik zwischen wirtschaftlicher Ausbeutung und "zivilisatorischen" Bemühungen* (Berlin, 2009).

Koloniale Rundschau), Alphonse-Jules Wauters (*Mouvement Géographique* in Belgium), or Robert de Caix (*Bulletin du Comité de l'Asie Française*).

The system of national representation was proportional. Each country was allowed to send a certain number of delegates – in accordance with the nation's colonial "importance". In 1894, the ICI's founding fathers offered eleven places to British delegates, seven to French, six to Dutch, five to Germans, three to Belgians, three to Spanish, three to Italians, three to Portuguese, two to Danish and one to an Austrian member (accepted by Oscar Lenz, who was actually German-born and employed by German colonial societies). Moreover, there were five fellowships offered to Russians, three to US-Americans and another three to Latin Americans.[41] This hierarchy among colonizing nations was rather arbitrary, but at least it guaranteed that all colonial and colonizing countries were represented.

Prior to the First World War, the ICI's official language was French, a fact which caused astonishingly few protests and even fewer communication problems. With French being the diplomatic language of the Belle Époque, most of the well-educated ICI members spoke it fluently. When the geographer Henri Froidevaux participated for the first time in an ICI meeting in Wiesbaden, he was surprised to hear all the members "speak in excellent French," not only during the sessions, but also in the animated debates "*hors séances*."[42]

Conversations were unhampered by language barriers, unless British or US-American members were involved, who spoke poor French. Although English was officially the ICI's second language, non-Anglo-Saxon members generally preferred French – Chailley himself was unable to write simple letters in English.[43] The same goes for publications, which the ICI printed only in French, which was mainly due to the fact that it was unable to pay translators. This would change after the Great War, when the ICI sporadically commissioned university students to translate its publications. Although they were underpaid and the quality of their work poor, the increased interest of British colonial experts in the ICI after the war might have derived from those translations.

Nonetheless, it was clear to observers, such as the German government that the "French intellectual element dominated the sessions."[44] Belgians, Dutch and Germans would play an equally important role, while the British kept a low profile until the early twentieth century. Italians and Portuguese attended the ICI's meetings and spoke French, but rarely participated in the discussions.

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[41] See ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894.*

[42] BArch, R 1001, 6186: Akten betreffend das Institut Colonial International in Brüssel vom Januar 1894 bis 31 Dezember 1906, Nr. 89- Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales vom 1.7.1904: Henri Froideveaux: La Session de Wiesbaden de l'Institut Colonial International, p. 11-25.

[43] ANOM, FP 100 APOM/93-98, Folder 1: Union Coloniale, J. Chailley, Projet de Mission aux Indes Anglaises et en Indochine, letter from Chailley to the publisher of his books Archibald Constable Publishers at the India Office, from 9.12.1896.

[44] BArch, R 1001, 6186: Akten betreffend das Institut Colonial International in Brüssel vom Januar 1894 bis 31 Dezember 1906, Nr. 1-4: Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Belgien to Grafen von Caprivi from 9.1.1894.

American delegates normally did cross the Atlantic to attend the sessions, but eagerly studied the detailed conference proceedings. One Danish delegate was a nominal member only.

By 1900, more and more delegates realized the full importance of the ICI (except the Danish who had seemed out of place from the beginning). Increasing numbers of delegates actually travelled to its meetings, which also became more frequent and were held annually instead of biennially. ICI members inspired colonial administrations to review and reconsider their colonial policy. The strategy proved successful and colonial governments took an increased interest in the ICI's comparative studies. As a consequence, colonial ministers joined the ICI, such as the German colonial reformer Bernhard Dernburg who became a member in 1907.[45] In the early 1890s, however, the founding fathers had been at pains to mobilize European colonial experts and make them join the ICI.

From Atomism to Holism: Why Colonialists Turned to Internationalism

When Chailley met Van der Lith at the dinner in Amsterdam in 1893 they were already renowned colonial internationalists. Joseph Chailley-Bert (1854-1928) – the son in law of the physiologist and resident-general of Indochina, Paul Bert, who was close to Jules Ferry – became the founding father of colonial internationalism. Chailley was no stranger to colonial internationalism when he established the ICI in 1893. As early as 1889, he had attended the first International Colonial Congress organized in Paris by the French Foreign Ministry, where he had met with Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch colonial experts.[46] More importantly, he had been a member of Léopold II's International African Association and its successor society, the Société du Haut Congo. As such, he frequently [47]participated in international banquets held in Belgium with administrators of the Congo Free State.[48]

The reasons for Chailley's internationalist attitude, however, were homemade. A protégé of his father-in-law Paul Bert, who had experimented with the liberalization of colonial rule as a governor of Indochina, Chailley was ready to enter domestic colonial politics in the late 1880s. He made no secret of his *indigenophile* attitude, which he had inherited from Paul Bert. His pro-native stance, however, opposed him to the godfather of French colonialism, the Oran deputy Eugène Étienne. Étienne intrigued against Chailley and denied him a colonial career in France.[49] Not

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[45] BArch, R 1001 6187 ICI, Nr. 9: Dernburg to Vohsen from 23.3.1907.

[46] Proceedings of the Congrès Colonial International de Paris (ed.), *Congrès Colonial International de Paris* (Paris, 1889), 3-6.

[47] On Étienne see J. d' Andurain, 'Réseaux d'affaires et réseaux politiques: le cas d'Eugène Étienne et d'Auguste d'Arenberg', in H. Bonin, J.-F. Klein, and C. Hodeir (eds.), *L'Esprit Économique impérial: Groupes de pression et réseaux du patronat colonial en France et dans l'Empire* (Paris, 2008), 85–102.

[48] 'Jospeh Chailley-Bert', in Institut Royal Colonial Belge (ed.), *Biographie Coloniale Belge, vol. 4* (Brussels, 1951)154-155.

[49] W.B. Cohen, *Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa* (Standford, 1971).

acknowledging defeat, Chailley decided to turn the tables and publicly attacked the French-Algerian colonial establishment – headed by Étienne and the governor of Algeria, Charles Jonnart. To assert himself, he accused the "Algerians" Étienne and Jonnart of being responsible for a general colonial mismanagement of Algeria that cost the French dearly. Chailley picked up on pervasive rumors that the conquest and settlement of Algeria had cost the French taxpayer an estimated fifty billion Francs.[50] According to him, the Algerian model of settler colonialism was dated and would be replaced by a new and less expensive way of colonizing. Chailley's criticism fell on sympathetic ears and voiced a feeling that many Frenchmen had on the tip of their tongue: Algeria was too much of a burden for French taxpayers.

The conflict between Étienne and Chailley encapsulated the clash of assimilationist and associationist attitudes in French fin de siècle colonialism. Chailley hoped that the internationalization of the conflict would substantiate his own position. Instead of conquering and settling Algeria, Chailley argued, the French should have followed the Dutch and British example in the East Indies. Unlike the French, the Dutch and the British did not engage in costly adventures of settlement. More importantly, they did not try to "assimilate" the colonized, let alone to "Frenchify" them, as the French had attempted in Algeria. Instead, the British and the Dutch used the native population to establish a colonial economy, which had ultimately rendered the overseas possessions profitable. "Those colonies", Chailley claimed "are not *colonies*, like we like to call them and there is no question of colonizing [*peupler*] them; they are *possessions*, inhabited by natives who occupy a big part of it…seen from Britain and the Netherlands, the colonists are much less interesting than the natives, who produce [goods] and who pay taxes."[51] Chailley's attitude became programmatic for the ICI. Its members were committed to replacing costly settler colonies with a profitable native policy, and shift the meaning of colonization from settler reproduction to exploitative domination.

In France, Chailley wanted to replace the supposedly dated French policy of assimilation by the "modern" and more effective policy of association. While Algeria served as an anti-model, he urged the French colonial authorities to imitate the Dutch and the British model in its more recent colonies. In 1893, he established the French Colonial Union and the journal *La Quinzaine Coloniale* in France to promote his associationist philosophy and combat the assimilationists.[52] Chailley turned the Colonial Union into a powerful think tank and an instrument to pressure the French government. There was an unforgettable scene when Chailley stormed the bureau of the French colonial minister, balancing a heap of official publications from the Dutch, British and German

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[50] 'Le Maroc et l'opinion publique', *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française* (January 1908), 10.
[51] Chailley-Bert, *Dix années de politique coloniale*, 36-40.
[52] See the most important contribution to this debate: Betts, *Assimilation and Association*; However, Betts did not elaborate the international dimension of this debate.

colonial authorities in his arms and exclaiming: "this is what we are lacking and this is what we need…there is no country that is less informed about its own colonies than France."[53] Like the Dutch and the British, Chailley demanded, the French should familiarize themselves with the natives' culture and use their economic potential. To substantiate his claims, he turned to British and Dutch colonial experts and founded the International Colonial Institute with them. In doing so, Chailley hoped to "learn from the Dutch and the British", and to a lesser extent from Germany.[54] Unlike these "associationist" countries, the Latin peoples – especially France and Portugal – were said to have a tendency to follow the traditions of the Roman Empire in assimilating the colonized. According to Chailley, the ICI was instrumental in replacing the Roman concept of assimilation with modern "Germanic" association. The ICI recruited many of its members among the French associationists, who had a fair share in reforming European colonialism.

It was Étienne – serving as a colonial undersecretary – who officially dispatched Chailley on several missions abroad.[55] The outcome of his first official mission to the Netherlands in 1892 was the foundation of the ICI. Three other expeditions to Dutch and British India (1897-1898 to Java; 1900-1901 and 1904-1905 to British India) earned Chailley global fame. Each of his research trips lasted several months, and received support from the French colonial and education ministries, as well as from private companies in Europe.[56] Once he arrived in the East Indies, he made use of his vast international networks to meet Dutch and British administrators, along with experts on colonial law, tropical hygiene, and overseas agronomy. The result of those encounters were two extensive memoirs on British India and Dutch Java, which became global bestsellers and turned Chailley into a star of international colonialism. His works were published in both English and French, while newspapers all over the world reported on his journeys and reviewed his publications.[57] Administrators in British, Dutch, French, and German colonies took his comments on how to improve colonial rule very seriously and often adapted their policy accordingly. At home in France, Chailley's oeuvre inaugurated a new era of colonial policy.

Eminent colonial reformers in France, like Joseph Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey developed their doctrines on the basis of Chailley's writings, and the ICI's comparative studies. Lyautey would appropriate the ICI's ideas in his younger years, long before his paternalistic yet progressive colonial policy in Morocco earned him admiration among Western colonial administrators – for

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[53] Chailley-Bert, *Dix années de politique coloniale*,13-20.
[54] J. Chailley, *Java et ses habitants* (Paris, 1900), X.
[55] ANOM FM MIS//63/bis, Dossier 1 Chailley-Bert Mission aux Pays-Bas en vue d'étudier le mode de recrutement des fonctionnaires coloniaux, Letter from Étienne to Chailley from 20.1.1892.
[56] ANOM FP 100 APOM/93-98, Union Coloniale, J. Chailley Mission aux Indes Anglaises 1900-1901, Letter from Chailley to Ministère de l'instruction publique et des Beaux arts, directions de l'enseignement supérieur 29.7.1900; Letter from Ministère des Colonies to Chailley from 29.8.1900.
[57] ANOM FP 100 APOM/93-98, Union Coloniale, J. Chailley, Projet de Mission aux Indes Anglaises et en Indochine:
The Times from 22 September 1896; Letter sent from Chailley to the publisher of his books [Archibald Constable Publishers at the India Office] from 9.12.1896.

whom Lyautey became an idol to emulate. No one matched Lyautey in self-promotion when he carefully forged his own myth as the founder of the *indigenophile* "Moroccan School." It was only confidentially that he revealed his indebtedness to the ICI and Chailley, whose books he devoured: "especially the book on Java" that he had read "with the pencil in my hand" and which he recommended to all his employees.[58] He regarded Chailley as his "master" and admitted that "nobody more than you has influenced my colonial doctrine. Since my beginnings in Tonkin, I found elaborated in your writings what my daily experience suggested to me."[59] Before the First World War, Lyautey and Chailley continued to cooperate confidentially to promote the ICI's developmental colonialism in France.[60] Inspired by the comparative studies of the ICI, Lyautey modelled his Moroccan policies on Dutch and British examples, be it while "pacifying" the country or when establishing an administration with the help of European experts and native administrators or judges.[61] The governor of French Madagascar Joseph Gallieni also followed Chailley's missions to Java closely. Guided by Chailley's reports, and in close cooperation with the ICI's *spiritus rector*, Gallieni abolished the corvée system in French Madagascar in 1901 and introduced a (restricted) system of free labor. Java became the model for his colonial administration in Madagascar.[62] Chailley, Lyautey and Gallieni revolutionized French colonialism. The ICI's development ideology became their new credo. It is therefore not surprising that Lyautey became an ICI member in 1903. Finally, even the assimilationist Eugène Etienne could not resist the new trends and joined the ICI in 1904.

Dutch colonial experts had embraced colonial internationalism long before the French, mainly because their strategy to make use of international know-how and capital in their own colonies had met with success. As early as 1815, they had established a colonial army that enlisted 7,000 Germans, who made up twenty percent of the colonial troops. On the whole 21,000 Germans, along with smaller contingents of Belgians, Swiss and French, came to Dutch Java during the nineteenth century. Many of them stayed on and established a long-standing tradition of Dutch

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[58] Letter from Lyautey to Chailley from 21.5.1903, in: A. Le Révérand (ed.), *Un Lyautey inconnu: Correspondance et journal inédits, 1874-1934* (Paris, 1980), 229-230 and A. Le Révérand, *Lyautey* (Paris, 1983), 162 and 203.

[59] "Nul plus que vous n'a eu part à ma formation doctrinale coloniale. Dès mes débuts au Tonkin, c'est dans vos écrits, entre nous, que je trouvais formulé ce que me suggérait la pratique quotidienne. Vous m'avez fait voir claire dans tout ce qui s'agitait confusément dans mon esprit, à mon premier contact avec les choses coloniales. Bien de choses me paraissaient évidentes, critiques, réformes, dont la qualité d'apprenti me faisait douter, jusqu'au jour où les trouvant exprimées dans vos lettres avec la clarté et la netteté magistrales qui les caractérisent, je me disais : 'mais c'est cela !: Letter from Lyautey to Chailley from 21.5.1903, in: Le Révérand, *Un Lyautey inconnu: Correspondance*, 229-230.

[60] ANOM, FP 100APOM/321 Copie de lettres Chailley à Lyautey; Union Coloniale et Maroc, Section du Maroc, Correspondance avec Lyautey 1913-195: Letter from Chailley to Lyautey Résident General Maroc, from 17.3.1913.

[61] ANOM, FP 100APOM/321 Copie de lettres Chailley à Lyautey, Maroc Situation Politique 1917-1918: Notes on Cours 1917-1918: Le Maroc et les Grands Problèmes du Gouvernement de l'Administration d'un Peuple Protégé.

[62] ANOM 100APOM 95, Letter Gallieni as Governor General of Madagascar to Depincé (Comité de Madagascar) from 12.1.1901; the abolition of "prestation" had various reasons, among others the abuse of this system by both colonized and European colonists. Apparently it continued to exist unofficially and was re-introduced shortly after Gallieni resigned as general-governor: J. Fremigacci, *État, économie et société coloniale à Madagascar: De la fin du XIXe siècle aux années 1940* (Paris, 2014), 148-150.

colonial internationalism.[63] As we will see in the following chapters, German physicians and European agronomists contributed to shape Dutch colonial policies in the Indies. Given the Dutch tradition of employing international experts, it was no coincidence that Chailley found a like-minded pioneer of colonial internationalism when he met Pieter Antoine Van der Lith in Amsterdam. A professor in colonial law and ethnologist at Leiden University, Van der Lith had founded the *Revue Coloniale Internationale* as early as 1885, in order to give the colonialist "republic of letters" a forum. Van der Lith had established the *Revue* in the wake of the International Colonial and Export Exhibition that had been held in Amsterdam in 1883. It was the first explicit manifestation of colonial internationalism in an official journal.

Published in the name of the Dutch Colonial Association (Nederlandsche Koloniale Vereenigung), the *Revue Coloniale Internationale* had supposedly "completely different intentions from those [colonial journals] that have been founded abroad." The *Revue* refrained from "embracing exclusively the Dutch interests in remote territories or the extension of the Dutch colonies", while preferring to "maintain the relations established among the representatives of colonial science and give a permanent character to the lively interest in general colonial questions." The *Revue* was therefore the "first international organ of the colonial sciences."[64] Experts from "civilized nations of the two worlds," Van der Lith had announced in the first issue, should contribute to "reveal the secrets" about colonial commerce, law, geography and ethnography and provide Dutch colonizers with useful information on colonial topics. Obviously, the purpose of the *Revue* was not only scientific or independent of any "party spirit," as Van der Lith put it, but also served more "practical colonial interests."[65]

The *Revue Coloniale Internationale* mirrored a more general Dutch colonial policy, whose instigators had set up a program of attracting international expertise and capital to the newly established "plantation belt" in Dutch Sumatra. By inviting colonial experts from Europe and the Americas, Van der Lith hoped to accumulate knowledge about economic resources, ethnographical research and administrative strategies that had been produced in colonial countries with comprehensive research institutions. In short, he tried to profit from the knowledge of the bigger colonial countries. At the same time, the *Revue* gave him the opportunity to promote colonial investments in the Dutch Indies.

Indeed, in the 1880s, colonial publicists from all the colonizing countries wrote for the *Revue Internationale Coloniale*. Among them were the pioneer of the German colonial movement, Friedrich Fabri, the French colonial theorist and associationist Louis Vignon and the British

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[63] M. Bossenbroek, ''Dickköpfe und Leichtfüße': Deutsche im niederländischen Kolonialdienst des 19. Jahrhunderts', in K. Bade (ed.)*, Deutsche im Ausland - Fremde in Deutschland: Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Gütersloh, 1993), 249–254.
[64] 'Introduction', *Revue Coloniale Internationale*, 1 (1885), I-II.
[65] *Revue Coloniale Internationale* 1 (1885), IV and IX.

governor of the Bengal presidency, Richard Temple. But there were also American and Russian contributions, whose authors celebrated the frontier colonialism of their countries. For want of funding, the *Revue Coloniale Internationale* was an accumulative rather than a synthesizing expert journal, and the different articles stood side by side in a seemingly disorganized way. This might have been one of the reasons why the *Revue* ceased to exist in 1887. What remained was a pioneer project to familiarize European colonial activists with each other's work.

The Dutch Antoine van der Lith represented the interest of smaller nations in international cooperation and exchange. He hoped to profit from the more sophisticated colonial institutions of bigger countries, and to win the support of the major powers for colonial projects of the "small nations." After all, the foundation of Léopold's Congo Free State had made a compelling case for the success of small nations who succeeded in winning the support of an international community of colonizing nations. The interest of representatives from small nations explains why both the Belgians and Dutch played an important role in founding the ICI, and made up an important part of the ICI's members.

To a certain degree, Belgian membership confirmed that representatives of small nations were more likely to take advantage of international cooperation. Léopold had employed experts from Europe and the USA to exploit, administer and promote his Congo Free State, a strategy that was crowned with success when it was internationally recognized in 1885 (see Chapter 1). Léopold supported the ICI and hosted banquets for its members in the belief that it supplied the Congo administration with useful information.[66] Albert Thys and Camille Janssen, two of the ICI's founding members, had been instrumental in establishing the Congo Free State in its early days, when it was a truly international project. Before becoming the first governor of the Congo Free State, Janssen had been a judge at the international tribunals created in Egypt during the construction of the Suez Canal. His internationalism tended to be "uninterested" and idealistic. Albert Thys' internationalism was materialistic, as he desperately tried to attract funding for the construction of the Congo railway from Matadí to Léopoldville, which he directed. Both Janssen and Thys could profit from the ICI's international networks, especially when Léopold tried to seal the Congo Free State off from international influence in 1890 and turned to a neo-mercantilist colonial policy.

When Léopold abolished free trade in the Congo Free State in the early 1890s, Janssen resigned from his post as its governor.[67] The engineer-entrepreneur Albert Thys, whose success in building the Congo-Matadí railway depended on international capital influx, equally criticized Léopold for introducing a concession system in the 1890s, which put an end to the open door

[66] BArch, R 1001/6186/5-7 *Indépendance Belge* from 9.1.1894.
[67] Louwers, 'Camille Janssen'.

policy.[68] For both of them, the ICI internationalism was a compensatory internationalism that allowed them to preserve their autonomy as colonial experts in the face of Léopold's protectionist policy. In the meantime, Léopold himself tried to use the ICI for his own purposes, even though he never became an official member. Belgian, Dutch and French ICI members now turned to the major colonial powers to win their favor for the project.

How did the representatives of the bigger colonial powers react to the ICI's canvassing for international cooperation? After all, Germany's colonial tradition seemed to go back to a rather aggressive Pan-Germanism (see Chapter 1) that developed into a no less aggressive *Weltpolitk*. The German example is a case in point and reveals that the recruitment among the rather nationalist major powers was initially difficult. In the long term, however, the advantages the ICI offered to colonial experts from those countries were too obvious to decline membership.

In Germany, the ICI contributed in a significant way to push back the Pan-German branch of colonialism and to give a fresh impetus to more liberal internationalists. As early as 1893, the ICI's founding fathers took great care in attracting German colonial experts to the Institute. At the University of Leiden, Van der Lith had made the acquaintance of the Heidelberg professor of law Georg Meyer. A pioneer in studying the legislation of the German colonies, Meyer was also a member of the German Colonial Society and a deputy for the German National Liberal Party in the Baden parliament, which traditionally took a great interest in colonial affairs.[69] He was close to the founder of the German Colonial Society, the liberal Friedrich Hammacher, and acquainted with its first president, Hermann zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg.

When Van der Lith lobbied Meyer for potential members from Germany, the latter immediately contacted the head of the German Colonial Society, Hohenlohe-Langenburg. In the name of the Dutch-British Lord Reay, Meyer invited Hohenlohe-Langenburg to join a "scientific Institut Colonial International" – and to attend its first session in January 1894.[70] Hohenlohe-Langenburg indicated interest in the ICI, even if he personally doubted the success of such an "experiment" and feared "political confrontations."[71] However, he informed the government in Berlin that the fame of the ICI founders "did not allow Germany to stay away from such a new

[68] See the contributions in E. Frankema and F. Buelens (ed.), *Colonial Exploitation and Economic Development: The Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies Compared* (London, 2013).

[69] G. Jellinek, 'Georg Meyer', in *Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung* 5 (1900), 130-31; G. Meyer, *Die staatsrechtliche Stellung der deutschen Schutzgebiete* (Leipzig, 1888); With regard to the 2. Badische Kammer see H. Fenske, 'Imperialistische Tendenzen in Deutschland von 1866: Auswanderung, überseeische Bestrebungen, Weltmachtträume', *Historisches Jahrbuch* 97-98 (1978), 336–383: 353.

[70] HZA, La 140 Bü 246 ‚Gründung des Institut Colonial International in Brüssel', Letter from Prof. Georg Meyer to Hermann zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg, from 18.12.1893.

[71] HZA, La 140 Bü 246, Letter from Karl von der Heydt to Hohenlohe-Langenburg 28.4.1894; BArch, R 1001, 6186: Akten betreffend das Institut Colonial International in Brüssel vom Januar 1894 bis 31 Dezember 1906; Nr. 9: Präsident der DKG Hermann von Hohenlohe Stuttgart to [Undersecretary of Colonies?] from 24.3 1894.

international association for colonial purposes, which is purely scientific."[72] Consequently, he tried to find a leading member of the German Colonial Society to take his place. The search turned out to be an onerous task. No leading member of the German Colonial Society was able or willing to travel to Brussels.[73]

In the meantime, the ICI refused to accept members randomly chosen from the German Colonial Society because it hoped to win the politically distinguished Hohenlohe-Langenburg. Invoking their solidarity as aristocrats, Lord Reay wrote to him: "The idea behind the institute was that the members join it as individuals who only present their individual opinions and do not have to consult anybody else than their own convictions." The ICI had invited Hohenlohe, he argued, because of his authority and his personal expertise in the colonial field. "The aim was not to invite the German Colonial Society, even though the Institut would be very glad to welcome the Society as an honorary member." To make the membership more tempting for Hohenlohe-Langenburg, Reay added that at the next meeting, "his majesty the king Léopold II of Belgium will give a dinner for the members of the Institut."[74] But the royal argument did not have the intended effect. Hohenlohe-Langenburg pleaded that business affairs did not allow him to go to Brussels.

Impatient, the secretary general Camille Janssen took the initiative. Convinced that Hohenlohe-Langenburg's collaboration would be highly conducive to increasing the ICI's reputation, he postponed its first session and travelled to Stuttgart to personally meet Hohenlohe-Langenburg. The meeting, which took place in early March 1894 finally secured Hohenlohe's membership in the ICI.[75] Nonetheless, the president of the German Colonial Society still preferred to send delegates to Brussels. He turned to the director of the colonial division in the German Foreign Ministry, Paul Kayser, to ask him for advice. Kayser proposed to send members of the semi-official German Colonial Council, among them the explorer Georg Schweinfurth, who had participated in the Geographical Conference organized by Léopold II in 1876, and Dr. C. Herzog, former undersecretary of state and director of the German New-Guinea-Company. Kayser – who was harshly criticized by Pan-Germans because of his Jewish faith – wrote to Hohenlohe: "We could also send a member of parliament who has dealt with colonial issues, unless he is a member of the Pan-Germans."[76]

Kayser's advice against sending members of the Pan-German movement to Brussels originated in a split in the German colonial movement. The early 1890s had seen the separation of

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[72] BArch, R 1001, 6186: Akten betreffend das Institut Colonial International in Brüssel vom Januar 1894 bis 31 Dezember 1906; Nr. 9: Präsident der DKG Hermann von Hohenlohe Stuttgart to [Underscretary of Colonies?] from 24.3 1894.

[73] For example, Ernst Vohsen, who had worked for a French society in West Africa and became the first German consul in Sierra Leone, declined the offer first, but became an active member later on, HZA La 140 Bü 246, Letters from Ernst Vohsen to Hermann zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg, from 31.12.1893, 2.1.1894 and 5.1.1894.

[74] HZA, La 140 Bü 246, Letter from Lord Reay to Hohenlohe-Langenburg, January 1893.

[75] HZA, La 140 Bü 246, Letter from Janssen to Hohenlohe-Langenburg, 3.3.1894.

[76] HZA, La 140 Bü 246, Letter from Paul Kayser to Hohenlohe-Langenburg, 31.3.1894.

the Pan-Germans from the German Colonial Society. While the Pan-German breakaway faction was inherently nationalist and racist, the German Colonial Society regarded itself as a more moderate association of colonial experts. Strangely, Kayser's remark seemed to inspire Hohenlohe-Langenburg in a way that nobody would have expected. Hohenlohe proposed the leading Pan-Germans Karl von der Heydt, Carl Peters and Friedrich Ratzel as candidates for the ICI in Brussels.[77] All of them were affiliated to the Pan-German League and moreover controversial figures within the German colonial movement.[78] Carl Peters, in particular, was notorious for his blunt racism and aggressive nationalism. Although he had founded the German East-African Society, which had acquired the colony of German East Africa (1885), the majority of the liberal and moderate leaders of the Colonial Society had turned against him. Long before the German government initiated investigations against Carl Peters – because of several colonial scandals – he was regarded as unrepresentative of the German colonial movement.

Why did Hohenlohe propose Pan-Germans as candidates for an international organization? It is possible that Hohenlohe hoped to shunt troublemakers like Peters out of the way, or at least to neutralize their fervent nationalist and racist views by placing them in a new internationalist environment in Brussels. But his correspondence with the German colonial authorities reveals his real intentions. Hohenlohe sent the Pan-Germans to Brussels to test if the ICI was really an unpolitical and purely scientific institution. The Pan-Germans were his *agents provocateurs* who should provoke nationalist confrontations to see if the ICI members engaged in those discussions. After the first session had passed without any significant conflicts based on nationalist rivalry, Hohenlohe reported back to the German Colonial authorities: "I was not sure if it is a good idea to participate in an association whose purpose was unclear. Von der Heydt now informed me that the ICI really seems to pursue scientific goals….If that be true, [our] participation is important for the German influence." He therefore recommended to dispatch representatives of the highest colonial authority, the colonial section in the Foreign Ministry.[79]

At the same time, the ICI had managed to neutralize its Pan-German members during its meetings and even beyond its sessions. While Ratzel actually never joined the ICI, Carl Peters

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[77] HZA, La 140 Bü 246, Letters from Karl von der Heydt to Hohenlohe-Langenburg from 28.4.1894 and 31.5.1894; Letter from Carl Peters to Hohenlohe-Langenburg, 20.7.1894; Letter from Kayser to Hohenlohe-Langenburg, 1.8.1894.

[78] The Pan-German League was established by former members of the German Colonial Society who were dissatisfied with the moderate policy of the Society. Karl von der Heydt (1858-1922) was head of a family bank in Elberfeld from 1881-99, and moved to Berlin in 1891, where he founded the Berlin Bank Von der Heydt & Co. in 1895. He was an early associate of Carl Peters and played a key part in financing the German East Africa Society in 1885. Prominent in the Colonial Society, he was a natural figurehead for the dissident nationalist initiative which founded the Pan-German League in 1890-1: though resigning as a president in 1893, he remained a member of its Board until 1900, see G. Eley, *Reshaping the German Right: Radical nationalism and political change after Bismarck* (New Haven, 1980), 49.

[79] BArch R 1001, 6186: Akten betreffend das Institut Colonial International in Brüssel vom Januar 1894 bis 31 Dezember 1906, Nr. 15 Letter from Hohenlohe (Präsident der DKG) to Foreign Ministry, Kolonialabtheilung, Stuttgart 1.6.1894.

participated in the first session only.[80] During this session, Peters rose only twice to speak. In his first appearance, he asked for an international convention to protect animal wild life in the colonies. As this was not the first priority of the members in the ICI's early days, his remarks passed without comment. However, he caused an outrage when he spoke in favor of the enslavement and corporal punishment of African plantation workers.[81] A majority of the ICI members were equally members in the international anti-slavery movement and paid at least lip service to free labor in the colonies. Carl Peter's illiberal intransigence, and the fact that he was persecuted in Germany for the killing of his lover and her husband in East Africa, caused him to disappear from the ICI's membership list.

Karl von der Heydt, however, remained in the ICI. A rich banker based in Berlin, von der Heydt had supported colonial expansion from the beginning. He showed a more liberal and cosmopolitan attitude. Nevertheless, his first petition was to add German (as well as Italian and Spanish) to the official languages of the ICI – while the Institute had restricted itself to English and French in theory but stuck to French in practice.[82] Von der Heydt's wish to speak German in the ICI was not fulfilled. However, as he assumed a more critical stance towards the Pan-Germans and resigned as its director in 1893, he became a long-lasting and very active member of the ICI.

At Hohenlohe's suggestion, more moderate Germans joined, all of them showing rather liberal or internationalist attitudes. Although he did not officially select the candidates, the German colonial undersecretary confirmed their candidature. Adolf Woermann, the famous owner of the Hamburg shipping line, represented the cosmopolitan hanseatic merchants. The most eminent internationalist was Prince Franz von Arenberg, a Catholic internationalist born in Belgium and often residing in Brussels. He had studied law in Bonn, was a member of the Reichstag and had become vice-president of the German Colonial Society in 1892.[83] Oswald von Richthofen represented the colonial section of the Foreign Ministry, and Wilhelm zu Wied was a member of the German anti-slavery committee.

By 1900, the Germans had turned into one of the most active groups within the Institute. They were taken from the liberal and internationalist branch of the Colonial Society, which soon gained the upper hand in Germany. After the turn of the century, even the reformist colonial minister Bernhard Dernburg became a member of the ICI. The number of German members grew steadily

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[80] Ratzel accepted the membership but does not appear in the membership list after 1894: BArch R 1001, 6186: Akten betreffend das Institut Colonial International in Brüssel vom Januar 1894 bis 31. Dezember 1906, Nr. 32 Letter from Ratzel to Kolonialabteilung from 30.7.1894.

[81] Peters considered African workers basically as slaves and demanded severe punishment if they left their employer. This caused a long discussion in the ICI's meeting in 1895, in which most of the interveners argued against Peters and in favor of free labor: ICI, *Compte-Rendu 1895,* 253f.

[82] HZA La 140 Bü 246, Letter from Karl von der Heydt to Hohenlohe-Langenburg, 28 4.1894.

[83] Article 'Franz Ludwig von Arenberg', in *Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon*, vol. 1. (Leipzig 1905), 735; H. Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien* (Paderborn, 1995), 69.

and reached a maximum of 29 in 1913. Long before that date, Hohenlohe celebrated the ICI for "giving Germany the excellent possibility to profit from the rich experience that other colonial powers have made"[84] Consequently, the colonial section of the Foreign Ministry bought fifty copies of each of the ICI's publications and distributed them among overseas administrations in Dar es Salaam, Yaoundé, Lomé, Ponapé or Windhoek, as well as among consuls, navy and state libraries in the *Reich*.[85]

British colonial experts were equally reluctant to join the recently founded ICI, maintaining a sort of splendid isolation with regard to French-led continental internationalism. Only the Dutch-born Lord Reay was committed to its cause. Descended from a Scottish noble family, he was naturalized British in 1876. From 1865 to 1869 he had been employed by the Dutch Colonial Ministry and earned himself a reputation as an expert in international law. Entering the public life of his adopted country, he was made a peer of the United Kingdom, with a seat in the House of Lords in 1881, and became governor of Bombay in 1885. After his return to England in 1890, he engaged in considerable activity as a member in several learned societies. He was secretary of the Royal Geographical Society and presided over the Social Science Congress, the Asiatic Society, the Franco- Scottish Society and the British Academy while reforming the University of St. Andrews as its Lord Rector.[86]

Another early delegate from Britain was Sir Alfred Lyall. He had entered the Bengali Civil Service in 1855, took part in the suppression of the rebellion of 1857 and made a stellar career in the administration of India. In addition, he dabbled in history writing and poetry and published a book on the *Rise of British Dominion in India*. Lyall appreciated the social aspects of the ICI and used the meetings as opportunities to meet friends and to travel around Europe while attending ICI meetings in various cities all over the continent.[87] Writing from an ICI session in The Hague in September 1895, he described one of the meetings to his brother: "We meet in a large official room, where speeches are made and papers discussed on colonial questions; the official language being French, I have not yet made any oratorical display. But my French enables me to understand very well what is said, and to me the debates are interesting, especially when the French members take part in it."[88]

As we have seen earlier, everybody who wanted to participate in the meetings was supposed to speak French. British delegates, in particular, seem to have had difficulties with the French

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[84] BArch, R 1001, 6186: Akten betreffend das Institut Colonial International in Brüssel vom Januar 1894 bis 31 Dezember 1906, Nr. 15 Letter from Hohenlohe (Präsident der DKG) to Auswärtiges Amt, Kolonialabtheilung, Stuttgart 1.6 1894.
[85] BArch R1001 6188 Nr. 141: Note; Nr. 44 Kolonialabteilung from 13.April 1896; Nr. 61 ICI (Janssen) to Kolonialabteilung (Von Richthofen), 18. March 1897; Nr. 116 Letter from Königliche Bibliothek to Kolonialabteilung from 28.11.1898.
[86] T. Baty, 'Lord Reay', *Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation New Series* 13, 1 (1912), 9-10.
[87] M. Durand, *The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall* (Edinburgh and London, 1913), 406f.
[88] Ibid., 364.

language and only Reay and Lyall participated regularly in the earlier sessions. Two more British members, George Curzon and Robert Herbert, were never seen at the ICI's meetings. Efforts to recruit more British members failed. In 1897, Chailley lost his temper and castigated those countries, "who, up to now, have not participated at all, particularly England, a country of an enormous colonial affluence. Yet, if the men of these countries do not come to us, we have to go and meet them."[89] Even so the general secretary, Janssen, travelled to England several times, at his own expense. His attempts were not crowned with success. When the ICI finally decided to hold a meeting in London, even Lyall had grown tired of the discussions and complained to his brother: "Next week we have here in London a meeting of the Institut Colonial International, where representatives of various countries are to discuss colonial questions. But I think that except among Hollanders and Englishmen there is very little colonial experience or practical knowledge worth ventilating. The Germans are colonists, but they have no colonies. The French have colonies, but they are not colonists."[90]

Despite these damning verdicts, British colonial experts showed increasing interest in the ICI after 1900. By 1913, the number of British members in the ICI had reached nine, whereas there had been only five up to that date. Two years later, the Royal Colonial Institute in London edited a volume on comparative colonialism inspired by the ICI's colonial schemes. The volume praised colonial comparison as a useful method, "not only to understand thoroughly the methods of other nations, but to benefit by their experiences."[91] Even in the British Empire, the authors claimed, "we have something to learn from foreign nations." They owed to the Germans "great additions to our knowledge" of African fauna, flora, ethnology, scientific agronomy, tropical hygiene and native languages. Moreover, the authors admired "French methods in West Africa, especially in the opening of the Sudan and the Sahara" and the French native policy. The Dutch, for their part, were said to excel in colonial administration and the Belgians in scientific colonization.[92] The volume published by the Royal Colonial Institute – which had sent three delegates to the ICI – marked the beginning of increased British interest in the ICI.[93] By the outbreak of the Great War British experts embraced the idea that mutual learning might be a way to enhance colonial domination and exploitation. The First World War then reconciled the British and French colonial ambitions, and facilitated a colonial rapprochement in international institutions like the ICI.

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[89] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 89.
[90] Ibid., 397.
[91] Royal Colonial Institute (ed.), *A Select Bibliography of Publications on Foreign Colonization, Completed by Miss Winifred C.Hill. (Royal Colonial Institute Bibliographies Nr. 1)* (London, 1915), 3-5.
[92] Ibid., 3-5.
[93] Those were George Baden-Powell, Francis de Winton, and Robert Herbert. The Royal Colonial Institute had been founded in 1868 as the Colonial Society, named Royal Colonial Institute in 1882 (1,600 members), and became the Royal Empire Society in 1928. It has 14,000 members in 1919 and its library held 70,000 books: R. Craggs, 'Situating the Imperial Archive: The Royal Empire Society Library, 1868-1945' *Journal of Historical Geography* 34, 1 (2008), 48-67.

Unlike the international "latecomer" Great Britain, colonial newcomers like Italy or the USA quickly realized that they might benefit from membership in the ICI. The US delegates in the ICI epitomize this colonial curiosity. Although the four US members rarely embarked on a journey across the Atlantic to participate in the ICI's annual meetings, they studied its conference proceedings and publications thoroughly. In 1903 the ICI member and head of Washington's statistics bureau O.P. Austin drafted the most comprehensive official report on colonial policies ever published by the US government. The report analyzed colonial history from 1800 to 1900 in a comparative way to work out a best practice of colonization. Austin used the ICI's publications as sources and cited its members to substantiate his claims. ICI members, he explained, were the "most distinguished and thoughtful of the world's students of colonial matters in other countries" who were aware of the "grave duties and responsibilities which rest upon those who have assumed the government of 500,000,000 people – one third of the earth's population." Austin's report provided the US government with "methods of government and development" for Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico, which it had conquered five years earlier from Spain.[94]

In his report, the ICI member Austin tried to prevent the US government from applying its own colonial experience – the internal settler colonization – to the new tropical colonies. According to Austin, the tropical colonies had emerged out of a completely different context which needed to be governed in a completely different way. Influenced by the ICI's paradigm of native policy, he dismissed settler colonies, like Canada, South Africa or Australia as an adequate model for the new colonial policy of the US. Instead, he wanted to analyze the "causes of colonial failures and successes" of tropical colonies, where the native population was used to bring about economic development. With the help of the ICI, his report was supposed to be "the world's best judgement of to-day's requirement in the government of a people differing in race characteristics and climatic environment from that of the governing people, and occupying noncontiguous territory."[95]

Austin's purpose was to emulate successful methods for effective occupations in the tropics, especially in Dutch and British India. He warned against the imitation of American settler colonization, and discarded the Spanish colonial methods that had allegedly failed in "developing" the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. In doing so, he perpetuated the idea that Spanish colonialism, like the Portuguese, had been exploitative and not constructive. Consequently, he portrayed the Spanish defeat against the US in 1898 as a liberation rather than a conquest of the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. It is widely known that the Iberian empires had fallen into

[94] United States. Dept. of the Treasury. Bureau of Statistics, O.P. Austin, and Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography (ed.), *Colonial Administration, 1800-1900: Methods of Government and Development Adopted by the Principal Colonizing Nations in their Control of Tropical and Other Colonies and Dependencies* (Washington, 1903), 2692.
[95] Ibid., 2559.

disrepute long before that date, yet Austin failed to mention that Spain had gone through a process of colonial redefinition already before 1898.

Back in 1893, membership in the ICI had given a new generation of Spanish and Portuguese colonial reformers the opportunity to prove their will to modernize colonial methods. Their presence in the ICI put them in a position to ward off the reproaches against Spain and Portugal, who were said to exploit their empires without developing them.[96] Spain, in particular, was about to redefine itself, after turning from an overseas empire into a (precarious) nation-state long before 1898. An important group of progressive Spanish intellectuals who called themselves *regeneracionistas* undertook the task of reinventing the country's political identity. They intended to portray Spain as a lost son to the European family who had enjoyed an opulent life in the Americas and returned to the European family after wasting his fortune.

The central strategy of the reformists was to prove Spain's "Europeanness" by taking part in modern and "rational" projects of colonization. Its purpose was the acquisition of new colonies in Africa that compensated the loss of its American possessions. One of the *regenerationists* was Joaquín Costa, a self-taught scholar and reform thinker. Costa transformed the Spanish Geographical Society into a veritable colonial interest group. In 1883, he organized the first Spanish Congress of Commercial and Mercantile Geography and established the Spanish Society of Africanists and Colonialists, which lobbied for Spanish expansion in Morocco. Several associations were to follow and Costa became the most eminent promoter of a reformed Spanish colonialism. Stating that Spain could only recover when it colonized parts of Africa, Costa wanted Spain to prove its ability to colonize in a modern way and, as a consequence, find its way back to Europe.[97]

Colonizing in a European and modern way could thus strip Spain of its discredited 'anachronistic' empire and rehabilitate it as a progressive nation. He laid out his ideas in a book called *Reconstitution and Europeanization of Spain: Program for a National Party* published in 1900.[98] The ICI was a great opportunity for the Spanish regenerationists to participate in the project of a supposedly modern and rational European colonization.

While Costa himself did not join the ICI, his reformist followers did. Antonio Maria Fabié, a former overseas minister who had inaugurated a reform of the Spanish colonial empire will be treated in detail later in this chapter. Another delegate, the liberal Fernando de Léon y Castillo, had launched development projects as an overseas minister as early as the 1880s – although he used

[96] For a detailed description of the Portuguese and a short reference to the ICI, see M. Bandeira Jerónimo, *The "Civilizing Mission" of Portuguese Colonialism, 1870-1930* (Houndmills et al., 2015), 109.
[97] A. Pedraz Marcos, 'El Pensamiento Africanista hasta 1883: Cánovas, Donoso y Costa', *Anales de la fundación Joaquín Costa* 11 (1994), 31–48.
[98] J. Costa, *Reconstitución y Europeización de España: Programa para un partido nacional* (Madrid, 1900); O.I. Mateos y de Cabo, 'El pensamiento político de Joaquín Costa: Entre nacionalismo español y europeísmo' (Diss. Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1996); E. Fernandez Clemente, *Estudios sobre Joaquín Costa* (Zaragoza, 1989); P.B. Cheney, *Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy* (Cambridge, 2010).

them to enrich his own family by commissioning them to carry out public works in the colonies. He would represent Spain at the Algeciras Conference in 1906 and played an important part in realizing Costa's dreams to be accepted by the international community as a modern colonial power in Africa.[99] Those Spanish delegates joined the ICI as early as 1893, full of hope that they might *ipso facto* be accepted among the "modern" colonial powers. A slightly different character was the publicist Wenceslao Retana, who specialized in Filipino culture and literature. While Retana was a fierce advocate of the Spanish Empire when he joined the ICI in 1893, he assumed a more *indigenophile* attitude later in the decade: he was the first Spaniard to promote *Tagalog* as a national language of the Philippines and wrote a biography of the Filipino national hero José Rizal. [100]

Like the German case – where the ICI contributed to convert Pan-Germans to a more internationalist attitude – Retana seemed to be inspired by the ICI to change his views and assume a pro-native stance. While the ICI reiterated the reformist efforts of progressive Spanish members, it also seemed to change the attitude of more conservative defenders of the Empire. Thus, most of them intended to overcome a past that did not live up to modern standards of colonization, which the ICI promoted and colonial experts all over the world adopted. Their efforts, however arrived too late and after Spain had lost its colonies during the war against the US in 1898, all Spanish members left the ICI.

To conclude, the ICI was founded on the initiative of French, Dutch and Belgian colonial experts. Germans joined shortly afterwards and developed an impressive enthusiasm for international cooperation. The British were initially trapped in splendid isolation in colonial matters, but realized the importance of knowledge exchanges prior to the First World War. Representatives of other nations, like the US, Spain, Portugal, and Italy had shown a strong interest in joining the ICI to modernize their policy in tropical colonies. Although Russian and Latin American members participated in the ICI's project, their concepts of frontier colonialism seemed to contradict the ICI's paradigm of a pro-native policy. This conflict will be analyzed in more detail in the second part of this chapter.

All in all, reasons to found the ICI – or to join it in the early period of its existence – were either semi-nationalistic (in the US, the Netherlands and Belgium to profit from international expertise and capital or in Spain to rehabilitate colonial empire) or due to personal and ideological rivalry within nations (between assimilationists and associationists in France or between Pan-Germans and liberal colonialists in Germany). Most colonial ministries quickly realized that they could capitalize on the ICI's comparative approach and, as Belgian and German officials remarked,

[99] V. Morales Lezcano, *León y Castillo, embajador (1887-1918): Un estudio sobre la política exterior de España* (Las Palmas, 1975); V.M. Lezcano, *El colonialismo hispanofrancés en Marruecos: 1898-1927* (Madrid, 1976), 21-22 and 25.
[100] Jiménez. I.D., 'W. E. Retana y la crítica al modernismo: De la evolución de la literatura castellana en Filipinas', *Revista Filipina* 12, 1 (2008), Introduction.

profit from its "reservoir of information to which the founders of overseas colonies added all their accumulated experience."[101] In their imagination, the ICI was a colonial archive that provided them with best practices of colonial government. They thus supported the ICI logistically, ideologically and financially.

In the long term, however, the ICI's internationalism benefitted an emerging caste of colonial experts who developed a strong sense of autonomy from nationalism in the motherlands. For utilitarian reasons, they cherished the autonomy of colonial science and technology. The professionalism of administrators, engineers or legal specialists outpaced their nationalism, in the sense that the international colonial market provided possibilities for them to build a career – regardless of nationalist restraints. For obvious reasons, they acquired professional knowledge by transnational careers and knowledge transfers rather than by sticking to a nationalist ideology. The ICI gave them the opportunity to engage in networking and to acquire professional knowledge.

Utilitarian Ideologies of Internationalism: Scientific Professionalization and Humanitarian Development

Development through Professionalization: Comparison as a Method of Colonial Science

The foundation of the ICI in the 1890s responded to a crisis of old empires and to the needs of new colonial powers that were anxious to avoid the errors that had got the older empires into trouble. For most of the "old empires," such as France or Great Britain, the crisis was not existential. Rather, they lived through a crisis of legitimacy as soon as the nationalist enthusiasm of the conquest era gave way to a controversy over the high costs of colonial administration. While parliaments struggled to budget the colonies, the media voiced concern over whether the colonies were white elephants rather than the promised gold mines.[102] All colonizers became aware that "empire was constrained by its cheapness," as Frederick Cooper has put it.[103] Advocates of colonialism, along with those who benefitted from colonial expansion such as merchants or employees in the colonies, felt a need to defend costly colonial projects. Scholars, who were about to build a career by declaring themselves colonial experts joined their cause. Scientists, in particular became one of the driving forces behind colonization, because they benefitted from its infrastructure. At the same time, colonization helped them to sell their colonial research as new discoveries that contributed to the progress of science and humanity.

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[101] BArch, R1001/6186, 5: German Ambassador in Brussels to Caprivi from 9.1.1894, Article "L'Institut Colonial International", in *Indépendance Belge* 9.1.1894.

[102] The most prominent were the debates between Jules Ferry and Georges Clemenceau in the French parliament: G. Clemenceau, *La Politique coloniale: Clemenceau contre Ferry* (Cork, 2015).

[103] Cooper, 'Modernizing Empire', 67.

The answer of those self-styled colonial experts to colonial skepticism was the professionalization of colonial administration and exploitation. Professionalization branched out into various secondary strategies that gave the appearance of being more "professional". Declaring colonialism a science was such a strategy. Inventing colonial development was another. The turn to internationalism and utilitarianism also provided them with arguments that substantiated the claim to professionalization. Thus, the ICI used and epitomized professionalization as an argument in favor of a reformed and modernized colonialism. While professionalization, development, internationalization or utilitarianism were arguments to legitimize a costly colonialism, there was also a real intention among the colonizers to become more professional. Colonial newcomers, in particular, were interested in hard facts and knowledge of how to professionalize their colonial administration. Their strategy was to learn from others who had committed errors that they wanted to avoid Thus, legitimization strategies and the real intention to professionalize colonial rule converged in the 1890s The ICI was both the outcome of professionalization and promoter of it. Ultimately it would come to epitomize professionalization and its "branches", which we will analyze in the following paragraphs.

Professionalization entailed the emancipation from nationalism, at least to a certain degree. Instead of acting according to nationalist ideologies, the colonial "experts" understood themselves as professional colonizers whose utilitarian attitude stood above irrational ideologies. Moreover, the alleged colonial dilettantism of the governments in the metropole and the rising skepticism in the media resulted in a partial alienation from non-experts. The mistrust between officials and journalists from the metropole and experts in the colonies was mutual. Complaints about the ignorance of colonial matters in the metropole were frequent. Thus, the turn to internationalism and the idea that international experts shared a common experience that differed widely from the ignorant authorities of the motherlands led to calls for professional autonomy.

The first step to achieve this goal was to declare colonialism a science. While the ICI members defined colonialism as a science, they adopted comparison as its method. Consequently, the first paragraph of the ICI's statutes stipulated that the ICI had the purpose of "facilitating and spreading the comparative study" of administration, legislation and economic resources in colonies, possessions and protectorates.[104] The ICI thus introduced comparison as a method to colonial science. Chailley regularly emphasized that colonialism was not only an art but a science, in the sense that it was not incremental but methodologically plannable in advance. His re-definition of colonial science was not without result. A preliminary comparison of different colonial strategies and experiences allowed predictions to be made on the outcome of different styles of colonial

[104] BArch, R1001/6186, 7: Letter from German Ambassador in Brussels to Caprivi from 9.1.1894, Article "L'Institut Colonial International", in *Indépendance Belge* 9.1.1894.

administration. Thus, by comparing before acting, colonial administrations could become more efficient in achieving a defined goal. As we have seen, colonial governments came to value colonial comparison and indeed used it to optimize the outcomes of their policies.

The ICI's comparative methods did not aim at the formulation of generalizing theories. The ICI statutes mentioned those theories and discounted them as political "doctrines." Instead of coming to more general conclusions, the ICI members tried to consider specific and regional problems in the colonies. Moreover, they hoped to avoid the long-standing tradition of empire-labelling by contrasting comparisons, used in stigmatizing the Iberian empires, for example. Those comparisons were political and not "scientific." After all, the ICI did not contrast different colonial "styles" or "characters" of certain nations, but aimed at identifying similarities to make emulation and transfers to similar contexts possible. Madagascar's governor general Gallieni, for example, traced Chailley's journey to Java because he expected to "be inspired by the practice on the ground instead of following mere theories. The latter might exist in their own right at congresses of geographical societies, but they become inapplicable if we want to use them on the ground in our overseas possessions."[105] According to Gallieni and the ICI members, the comparative method was practical and not political – and colonialism was an applied science that did not promulgate doctrines.

A more immediate advantage of portraying colonialism as a science was rather material. By labelling their projects "scientific", ICI members – as any colonial "scholar" – obtained funding for colonial research and expeditions not only from the colonial administrations but also from ministries of science and education. When Chailley planned to travel to British India in 1896, for example, the French Colonial Ministry sponsored his expedition with 4,000 Francs and the Ministry of Public Instruction with 7,000 Francs.[106] However, the Ministry of Public Instructions backed out as soon as Chailley approached French companies and promised to provide them with a market analysis from British India. The Ministry of Public Instruction complained to Chailley that it had "learned that your mission does not have scientific but economic purposes. Thus, we are not responsible for the expedition, but the ministry of commerce."[107] Outraged, Chailley replied that his expedition "had incontestably an eminent scientific character" and that he intended to study the races, religions and castes of India, along with the colonial legislation and education of the British. Refusing to fund his research, Chailley threatened, would "expose French science to disgrace." Chailley had bought

[105] ANOM 100 APOM 93, Union Coloniale, Correspondance with Gallieni, Letter from Gallieni as Governor General of Madagascar to Depincé (Comité de Madagascar) from 12.1.1901.

[106] FP 100 APOM/93-98, 1: Union Coloniale, J. Chailley, Projet de Mission aux Indes Anglaises et en Indochine: Ministère de l'Instruction Publique, Direction du Sécrétariat de la Comptabilité to Chailley from 30.6.1896; Ministre des Colonies Lebon to Chailley from 29.8.1896; Later he received even more: ANOM 100APOM 93, Voyage de Chailley aux Indes Anglaises 1904-1905, Note "Au mois d'avril 1896."

[107] ANOM FP 100 APOM/93-98 "Union Coloniale J. Chailley Mission aux Indes Anglaises 1900-1901", Ministère de l'instruction publique et des Beaux arts, direction de l'enseignement supérieur to Chailley from 13.6.1900.

more than 1,000 books on British India and had hoped that the ministry would "rally to support a man so profoundly devoted to science" whose journey to British India would be "what a laboratory is to the chemist or the physicist." The Ministry of Public Instruction ultimately funded his journey. [108] While Chailley received funding from his own government, other ICI members successfully offered their "neutral expertise" to colonial governments of other countries – and were oftentimes employed by them.[109] As we have seen, the German colonial administration also only financed the ICI when it had established that the ICI was a truly scientific institution without any political agenda. Labelling the ICI as "scientific" did not only convey the impression of neutrality and autonomy but also increased the possibility of external funding.

Even more important was the ICI's contribution to invent and disseminate the concept of colonial development.[110] Colonial development policies can be defined as the controlled and pertinent investment to make colonies self-sufficient in the long term. This was, for example, Joseph Chamberlain's definition, who was among the first to voice the need for colonial development in 1895.[111] Like professionalization, development was responsive to the legitimacy crisis of the 1890s insofar as it presented the metropolis with the prospect of colonial profits in the future to justify immediate investments. The idea of colonial development thus kept the hopes of colonial skeptics alive that colonialism might pay off in the future. At the same time it gave the colonized peoples a perspective of participatory progress without touching upon their cultural identity. ICI members frequently corresponded with the leaders of native elites and even had friends among them. When one R.D. Sata, an Indian Parsi, approached Chailley after a talk on British native policy in India, he reminded the French leader of the ICI that Indians were not only natives but "possess one of the oldest civilizations."[112] Chailley's answer to such inquiries by his "native" collaborators was in line with the ICI's guidelines: natives should "develop within their own milieu" and preserve their civilization on the way to economic progress.[113] None of these promises to skeptical colonizers and colonized was ever kept, but the concept of development helped to put critics off from year to year. The allegedly methodological development was a promise that was never fulfilled, even though occasional attempts to bring about economic progress were made.

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[108] ANOM FP 100 APOM/93-98 "Union Coloniale J. Chailley Mission aux Indes Anglaises 1900-1901", Letter from Chailley to Ministère de l'instruction publique et des Beaux arts, directions de l'enseignement supérieur 29.7.1900.
[109] ARGB, Zaire 68: Rapport d'Emil Zimmermann, intitulé Coopération Belgo-Allemande en vue de l'exclosion de la région de Tanganjika et Meru, Berlin 20.12.1910.
[110] See for the British Development Policy: L.E. Davis and R.A. Huttenback, *Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912* (Cambridge and New York, 1986); M.A. Havinden and D. Meredith, *Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960* (London and New York, 1993); R.M. Kesner, *Economic Control and Colonial Development: Crown Colony Financial Management in the Age of Joseph Chamberlain* (Westport, 1981).
[111] J.M. Carland, *The Colonial Office and Nigeria, 1898-1914* (Stanford, 1985), 101.
[112] ANOM FP 100 APOM/93, Voyage de Chailley aux Indes Anglaises 1904-1905, Letter from R.D Sata to J.Chailley from 13.6.1905.
[113] ANOM 100APOM 93, Dossier "Union Coloniale, Chailley-Bert, Voyage aux Indes Néerlandaises, Mai-Juillet 1897: Plan de Voyage, Documentation rapportée, *Nieuwe Rotterdaamsche Courant* from 27.8.1897 "Chailley-Bert over Java."

One early defender of colonial development policies was the French Paul-Leroy Beaulieu, who was also the first official member of the ICI. As early as 1870, Beaulieu was awarded the first prize of the Institut de France for his comparative study *On Colonization among Modern Peoples* (1874), which was subsequently re-edited and became a classic of colonial comparison. The purpose of his study was to compare colonization efforts in a diachronic and synchronic perspective to find "principles" that were "useful" to the prosperity of colonies.[114] Leroy-Beaulieu was the first liberal and national economist to argue that colonization through mass emigration was inefficient. According to him, the colonial theorists who had promoted emigration were advocates of feudal systems whose leaders tried to avoid liberal reforms by promoting emigration as a sufficient means to remedy pauperism or overpopulation.[115] Instead of referring to emigration, Leroy-Beaulieu proclaimed the "immense superiority of emigration of capital over the emigration of persons," arguing that only capital might render colonies prosperous and thus make them profitable for the motherland. Even more so, he held the opinion that capital was more productive if invested overseas than at home, because it gave access to new resources, created new demand and opened up new markets.[116] Like the Belgian entrepreneur-king Léopold II, he took Java and Cuba as model colonies, because they had been the only profitable colonies.

Unlike those islands, which did not absorb mass emigration, settler colonies posed a problem. The motherland had to put money into settler colonies when they were "young," Leroy-Beaulieu explained, but once they were "old" they gained independence and did not refund the money.[117] According to this argument, capital investment and development only made sense in colonies without a significant settler presence. Leroy-Beaulieu recommended reducing European settler immigration to colonies, while increasing capital investment that would pay off once the colonies were developed. Beaulieu concluded that "the purpose of colonization is to make a new society prosper and progress and that the metropole can yield an advantage from the development of wealth, population and power of the colonies."[118] Leroy-Beaulieu tied the concept of development closely to colonies without settlers that lay in the tropical regions.

Leroy-Beaulieu's plea for development through capital investment in non-settler colonies, headed by a smaller group of white experts, fell on fertile ground among the colonial experts of the ICI. His theories provided them with yet another argument to receive funding for their development projects. One of those projects was Leroy-Beaulieu's design of a French Trans-Sahara railway,

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[114] Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation*, V.
[115] Ibid., 486-488.
[116] Ibid., 498-500.
[117] Ibid., 526 and 529.
[118] Ibid., IV: "le but de la colonistation c'est de mettre une société nouvelle dans les meilleures conditions de prospérité et de progrès, et que la métropole ne peut que tirer avantage du développement de la richesse, de la population et de la puissance des colonies."

widely admired by ICI members such as Albert Thys who had received international capital to build the Congo railway – and who used the ICI to study colonial railway construction in a comparative way. Colonial comparison also led them to believe that colonial development was grounded in the workforce of the native Africans. After all, Dutch Java had become a profitable colony because the natives were instructed to grow cash crops for the European government. Unlike the ICI members, Leroy-Beaulieu belonged to an older generation of colonial theorists – he was Jules Duval's successor as an editor of the famous journal *L'Economiste Français* – who ignored the native population as a productive force. The ICI complemented his theory by declaring the native were the only source of productivity in the colonies, which had to be unleashed by capital investment and guidance through white experts.

Speaking French, the ICI members used the expression *mise en valeur*, rather than the term "development." The concept of *mise en valeur*, signifying "rational colonial development," comprised a comprehensive program that combined economic development, infrastructure measures, medical care, professional education, and a rising standard of living of colonial subjects.[119] Alice Conklin has shown to what extent the idea of *mise en valeur* shaped the French colonial policy, especially governor Ernest Roumes' attempts to develop the French West African Federation after the turn of the century.[120] Roume developed his investment program by making wide use of colonial comparison and transfers, as well as of the ICI's publications and networks. He was an ICI member before he became governor in French West Africa in 1902. Once he was in Africa, he cooperated closely with the ICI (see Chapter 6). Moreover, he sent commissions to England to study the efficient organization of commercial ports and reorganized the port of Dakar accordingly. He also dispatched delegates to Holland and Belgium to analyze their efforts to develop the colonies with the help of a native labor force.[121] The *mise en valeur* was thus well established long before it became an official ideology in the interwar period.[122] The international networks of the ICI helped to spread the concept. ICI members, for example, translated the word literally as *Inwertsetzung* into German. In the Reich, colonial circles spoke of *Inwertsetzung* rather than using a translation of the Anglo-Saxon "development." The German colonial minister Dernburg, who was an ICI member and introduced the *mise en valeur* to German colonial discourse spoke both of *Inwertsetzung* and *Nutzbarmachung* of "the soil, its resources, the flora fauna, but above all the human beings for the colonial economy of the motherland"[123]

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[119] R. Aldrich, 'Imperial Mise En Valeur and Mise En Scène: Recent Works on French Colonialism', *The Historical Journal* 45, 4 (2012), 917–936, See also for the concept of development: Constantine, *The making of British*, 14.
[120] Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 39.
[121] F.D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (Edinburgh and London, 1922), 499.
[122] See A. Sarraut, *La Mise en valeur des colonies françaises* (Paris, 1923).
[123] See for example *La Verité sur le Congo (Fédération Pour la Défense des Intérêts Belges à L'Étranger)* (15.3.1906), 112; B. Dernburg, *Zielpunkte des deutschen Kolonialwesens* (Berlin, 1907), 5; M. Schubert, *Der Schwarze Fremde: Das Bild des*

The ICI's notion of *mise en valeur*, which linked economic development to the use of native commercial and administrative collaboration, also influenced development discourses in the Anglo-Saxon countries. ICI member Alfred Lyall had been among the first to use the word "development".[124] Another British ICI member, George Baden Powell, wrote in 1896 that he had "for years past used the analogy of the estate that needed development by means of good management, good roads, and the investment of capital. This analogy has become suddenly popularized because of its assertion by the new Secretary for the Colonies [Chamberlain], whose businesslike vigor on behalf of a proper and adequate development of Colonial resources we all greet with such confidence." "The development of tropical Africa", Baden-Powell added, speaking to the members of the Royal Colonial Institute in London, "cannot be handled in completeness unless we also carry in mind what our good neighbors in Africa are doing and intend to do. The question is essentially international as well as national." He advocated a "friendly co-operation of all Powers for the development of Africa" and travelled to the French colonies to study their development efforts. Like Joseph Chailley, he called upon "private capital" and "individual enterprise" rather than the state to invest in West Africa and turn it into a profitable market. [125]

Chailley's influence on British policies in India was even more significant. On the return from his two missions to British India (1900-1 and 1904-5), Chailley published an impressive volume of five hundred pages about British policy in the crown colony. The editor of the *Imperial Gazetteer of India* and secretary in India's Financial Department, Sir William Meyer, translated the book under the title *Administrative Problems of British India* (1910). The book treated mainly problems of native policy, but also blamed the British administration for lavishing money while tolerating corruption and usury.[126]

To develop the country, Chailley suggested that the British stop costly education programs that aimed at assimilation, and train Indians in the natural sciences instead. According to him, the Muslim "aristocracy" could be used to establish a true and cheap system of indirect rule.[127] Progressive Hindus for their part "seek training for industrial and commercial careers…and attract capital and energy to the continuous development of national wealth."[128] They could thus be used for economic development of the country without risking political contestation. British colonial administrators praised Chailley's critique. Among them was colonial reformer Sir John Strachey, who had unsuccessfully tried to standardize India's tariff system and land tenure laws during the

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Schwarzafrikaners in der parlamentarischen und publizistischen Kolonialdiskussion in Deutschland von den 1870er bis in die 1930er Jahre (Stuttgart, 2003), 299.

[124] Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 34.

[125] G. Baden-Powell, 'Development of Tropical Africa', *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute* 27 (1895-1896), 218–254: 219-220; 229, and 234.

[126] J. Chailley-Bert, *L'Inde Britannique: Société Indigène, Politique Indigène, Les Idées Directrices* (Paris, 1910), 106-107.

[127] Ibid., 125 and 490-494.

[128] J. Chailley, *Administrative Problems of British India (L'Inde britannique, engl.)* (London, 1910), 154.

1870s, and counseled the secretary of state for India.[129] His son Charles was assistant undersecretary in the Colonial Office between 1898 and 1927, and one of the main instigators of modern development policies in British colonies.[130] According to him, Chailley's study was instrumental in making India an English "solid and self-supporting dominion in the East."[131] Moreover, Chailley was widely read and reviewed not only in Great Britain, but also in the USA.[132]

The "keen learner" that was the USA illustrates the ICI's contribution to spread development ideologies. Immediately after the USA took the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Cuba from Spain, the US government sent several research missions to other colonies, whose authors also consulted ICI members on how to "govern a tropical colony."[133] Austin's official report to the US government from 1903 was the most comprehensive study in this regard and outlined a program of colonial development that was modelled on the ICI's program of mise en valeur. This was no surprise as he used the publications of ICI members as sources for the report. Based on comparative studies, Austin recommended controlling the colonial government from the metropole, while granting administrators sufficient autonomy. New possibilities in communication and transportation, he argued, allowed for the sending of only a small group of experts to the colony, who kept in touch with the metropole but relied on native administration.

Like the ICI, Austin advanced Dutch Java as a model colony, where native administration was respected if possible and interventions only made if necessary. In the Philippines, like in Java, municipal elections should be possible, while Americans should control the superior posts. American administrators, however, had to be elected carefully, because they had to take steps to improve the "material, mental, and moral condition of the people of the colony."[134]Austin followed Albert Thys when claiming that fair wages would make colonial subjects contribute to the development of the colony. Only by introducing capitalism, roads, railways and irrigation systems, Austin claimed, would colony be enabled to become self-sufficient. At the same time, Austin warned, state intervention was necessary to bring about the diversification of agriculture, support smallholders, and encourage, educate or even force natives to grow cash crops. The pre-condition of such an economy was a stable currency, chartered companies, and labor immigration. Native languages and cultures had to be maintained and studied, while only a liberal policy towards the natives might win their loyalty. While he wanted them to own their own land, "guidance in

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[129] A detailed description of his project can be found in J. Strachey and R. Strachey, *The Finances and Public Works of India. 1869-1881* (London 1882).
[130] Carland, *The Colonial Office*, 106.
[131] J. Strachey, *India* (London, 1894), IX-X.
[132] See for example: M.K. Genthe, 'Review Joseph Chailley, L'Inde Britannique', *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society* 43, 3 (1911), 207.
[133] Those are the words of Alleyne Ireland from the University of Chicago who organized the first survey: A. Ireland, *Tropical Colonization* (New York, 1899).
[134] United States. Dept. of the Treasury. Bureau of Statistics, Austin, and Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography, *Colonial Administration, 1800-1900*, 2638.

development" was necessary.[135] Austin's development program was taken from the ICI's studies, based on colonial comparison and transfer from British or Dutch Java.

Those transfers, which derived from comparative studies that aimed at finding a best practice of colonization, formed an integral part of development programs. When Frederick Lugard displayed his system of indirect rule in the famous *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922), he introduced the chapter on economic development with a reference to colonial comparisons and transfers. A systematic development of resources in the tropical colonies, he argued, required preliminary comparative studies. Great Britain had failed to compare systematically, while the USA commissioned experts to study British, Dutch, and French colonization in the Far East, as soon as it had conquered the Philippines.

Lugard also mentioned Ernest Roume's development program and hailed him for analyzing British, US-American, Dutch, Belgian and French colonial trade in a comparative way. Moreover, Lugard admired the German Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komittee, a semi-private society that was responsible for sending out "botanical and agricultural expeditions to German and other colonies to report on economic possibilities and how native industries could be improved and increased by scientific methods."[136] Lugard was well aware of the connection between comparison, transfer and colonial development policies. Indeed, they were not thinkable without comparison and knowledge transfers. While Lugard did not explicitly mention the ICI as his source, he was familiar with its publications and joined it as a British member in the 1920s.

Frederick Cooper and Stephen Constantine have shown that official development policies were given low priority and remained chronically underfunded prior to the 1930s, but the ICI reveals that semi-official and private initiatives had their effects here and there. Reluctant to endow costly development measures, colonial ministries outsourced development efforts and private associations took over. In France, the powerful Union Coloniale*,* which was founded in 1893 and headed by Joseph Chailley, co-organized the economic development of the French colonies. Memberships in the ICI and the Union Coloniale overlapped and frequently resulted in common projects and shared resources.[137]

In Germany, the Colonial Society and the Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee cooperated with the ICI to develop colonial agronomy in German colonies in Africa. Here, again, the responsible experts were members in both institutions. And, as Cooper shows for the British case, schools of tropical medicine, the Imperial Institute, the Kew Gardens, the Colonial Survey Committee and the Colonial Veterinary Committee launched development efforts, which compensated for the lack of

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[135] Ibid., 2822

[136] Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in*, 498-499.

[137] Persell, 'Joseph Chailley-Bert'.

expertise in the colonial office.[138] Thus, while colonial ministries often helped out with providing loans, the development efforts prior to 1914 were often made by private or scientific institutions.[139] The ICI was involved in many of those initiatives. As we will see, the ICI's members, in cooperation with colonial scholars and colonial ministries, professionalized the training of colonial administrators, founded agronomic laboratories in the colonies, supported railway construction, provided medical care for native laborers, reiterated native law and organized labor recruitment in the colonies. Modern development policies were thus both an argument in favor of colonization and a reality inaugurated by the members of the ICI and their colonial networks.

As the idea of economic development advanced, the civilizing mission lost ground – if the civilizing mission is defined as cultural assimilation through humanistic education.[140] In its publications on colonial education, the ICI demanded teaching the natives to work without spending much time and effort on their Europeanization. This anti-assimilationist attitude derived both from a utilitarian need to economize educational resources and from a racially colored idea of cultural relativism. Speaking at the famous Indisch Genootschap – the powerful Dutch colonial society and think tank – Chailley explained that it is generally better to assimilate natives than to exterminate them, but that it is best to let them develop in their own milieu.[141] Turning to the French, he explained that democratic nations had a true sense of the solidarity of races and thus should refrain from administrative or governmental despotism. Colonial education, he argued, had to be in the interest of both the colonizers and the colonized. While France had made laudable attempts to educate the natives, those endeavors produced "sad results" even though they might have aimed at future emancipation. "France pretended to turn the natives into French citizens. She failed completely." Now, Chailley said "we want to make people progress in their own civilization…no more European laws, no more European religion, and only a little bit of European moral, but only if it is more human, abolishes torture or excessive punishments." Obviously this condemnation of the civilizing mission was not unconditional. Nevertheless, it anticipated a new era of development policies that was not based on unconditional assimilation anymore.[142]

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[138] Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development*, 16-20; Cooper, 'Modernizing Empire', 68.
[139] Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development*, 16-20.
[140] AMAEB, D 4701/170 publications et activité de Louwers: Grenade to Louwers from 21.1.1928.
[141] ANOM 100APOM 93, Dossier Union Coloniale, Chailley-Bert, Voyage aux Indes Néerlandaises, Mai-Juillet 1897: Plan de Voyage, Documentation rapportée: *Handelsblad Amsterdam* from [11.4.1898?].
[142] ANOM 100APOM 93, Voyage de Chailley aux Indes Anglaises 1904-1905, *Dépêche Coloniale* from 5.4.1905 Chailley-Bert: "La France en Asie." "une nation démocratique qui a le sens véritable et profond de la solidarité des races ne peut pas s'accommoder des procédés d'administration et de gouvernement qui conviennent au déspotisme. Elle veut la grandeur de sa patrie, soit, mais pas au prix de l'oppression des peuples conquis. Elle doit ménager à la fois et ses propres intérêts et les leurs, et, en même temps, s'assigner un but qui légitimera son intervention, à savoir l'éducation et plus tard, l'émancipation de ses sujets de couleur. La France, en tant que nation, n'y a jusqu'ici pas manqué. Mais elle avait une façon de concevoir l'éducation de ses sujets, qui a donné les plus tristes résultats. Elle a prétendu en faire des Français et des citoyens. Elle a échoué piteusement."; "faire progresser les peuples conquis dans leur propre civilisation…plus de lois d'Europe, plus de religions d'Europe, à peine un peu de morale européenne, en tant qu'elle est plus humaine, qu'elle supprime les tortures, les peines excessives, etc. etc."

Colonization without Conquest? The ICI between "Grenzkolonien" and Indirect Rule

Although the ICI members were skeptical towards settler colonies, their definition of colonization comprised the full scale of possible colonial situations. These ranged from schemes of occupation through extermination (settler colonies) to domination without occupation (protectorates) and even included forms of exploitation without domination (commercial or "pacific" penetration). However, a majority of the ICI experts advocated a redefinition of colonies as spaces that required domination, occupation or exploitation for the sake of development. To parade their allegedly progressive worldview, they publicly advocated a type of colonial occupation that was not destructive but developmental. Everybody who was willing and able to occupy a territory in order to make it more productive might therefore call this project colonial. Eminent members of the ICI, like Arthur Girault, Félicien Cattier, Joseph Chailley, and Bernhard Dernburg defined colonial occupation as such a positive occupation and opposed it to forms of destructive occupation.[143] The ICI's first president and national economist Léon Say added that "a soldier in the colony costs two times more than a soldier at home" and thus underpinned the "peaceful" development policy with utilitarian arguments.[144] Without doubt, the binary opposition between destructive and constructive occupation was an ideal type distinction that served to morally uplift their own colonial agenda. It obscured the fact that violence was also used to impose the development of colonies.

While the ICI was primarily concerned with the "new territories" in Africa, its members also tolerated violent frontier colonization and internal settler colonization. The ICI therefore invited countries like Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, which had set up programs to colonize and civilize the South American continent, to send three delegates altogether. Given the long distance, American delegates rarely attended the ICI's meetings and played a marginal role in the ICI. This marginality did not prevent the Europeans from following the American experience of frontier colonialism closely. America was one of the testing fields for colonization, and although it was not necessarily considered to be a model, it provided both negative and positive examples from which the ICI members hoped to draw conclusions for new colonial projects. As was Russia, which followed a similar pattern of colonization.

Unlike the South American delegates, the Russian envoys were quite active. One of them was Serge de Proutschenko, an associate member and builder of the Transcaspian railway, which had provided the basis for Russian penetration in central Asia. He represented the Russian "frontier

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[143] A. Girault, *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale,* vol. 2 (Paris, 1904); Dernburg, *Zielpunkte des deutschen Kolonialwesens*, Chailley-Bert, *Dix années de politique coloniale*.
[144] Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation*, 527.

colonialism" in the ICI.[145] His own role in the ICI was unclear to him in the beginning. Irritated by the Institute's focus on overseas territories, Proutschenko asked in the 1897 session of the ICI whether "the institute considers as colonies only territories that are separated from the metropolis by sea or whether the definition includes also the 'Grenzkolonien', which Paul Leroy-Beaulieu has so conveniently called the colonies created by extension." By citing the internationally renowned thought-leader of colonialism Leroy-Beaulieu, Proutschenko tried to substantiate his claim that Russia was part of the family of colonizing nations. But according to the Institute's secretary general, Camille Janssen, he had no reason to worry: "the presence of our esteemed Russian colleagues is proof," Janssen proclaimed, of Russia being a fully-fledged colonizing power. Thus, both projects of internal and external colonization qualified countries to send delegates to the ICI.[146]

The ICI members quickly realized that they might also learn from Russian members how to design modern colonialism in the tropics, as another Russian delegate, Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens shows. Martens had earned fame as an expert in international law. In 1883, he had published his widely-read *International Law of Civilized Nations*, in which he assumed a positivist stance that linked the existence of law to the existence of a civil society, following the maxim "ubi societas ibi jus est."[147] His work influenced the Insititute's concept of native policy profoundly, because it implied that European law was not applicable in the recently conquered countries that lacked a civil society. Therefore, European law could not be imposed on those non-civilized countries and legal assimilation was deemed impossible. As a consequence, colonies had to be governed according to their own laws, the native laws or customs. The many specialists in native law who besieged the ICI, among them Arthur Girault, Felicien Cattier and Christiaan Snouck-Hurgronje, adopted Marten's doctrine. They would become the most important experts in native law, and their research provided the basis for an associationist policy in the colonies. In line with most of the ICI members, they saw colonies rather as protectorates, in which the colonizing power left native laws, customs and culture in place and ruled "indirectly". The ICI published three volumes on colonial protectorates to promote this system, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.[148]

While the ICI members accepted all forms of colonization, they propagated the one that was based on exploitation and *mise en valeur* with the help of the natives – and to the benefit of the colonized. This "liberal colonialism," as the general secretary of the ICI in the inter-war period, Octave Louwers put it, consisted of "liberty of work, respect of the property of native territories and commercial freedom"[149] Louwers, who became general secretary of the ICI in 1920 and defended its liberal attitude as a member of the League of Nations' Permanent Mandates

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[145] Concerning the Russian frontier colonialism in central Asia, see the study by Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand*.
[146] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 71.
[147] F. Martens, *Völkerrecht: Das Internationale Recht der Civilisirten Nationen* (Berlin, 1883).
[148] ICI (ed.), *Le Régime des Protectorats*, 2 vol. (Paris, 1899).
[149] Louwers, 'Camille Janssen', 437-440.

Commission (PMC), stood for the colonial liberalism that had its origins in the 1890s.[150] He was not the only one to promote the ICI's liberal colonialism in the League of Nations. By 1924, there were twenty members of the ICI who were members of the PMC, the slavery commission or other subdivisions of the League of Nations. From the beginning, the ICI members had combined their colonial liberalism with a native policy that aimed at the effective exploitation of the colonies.[151]

It is important to note that the ICI deliberately ignored one version of colonialism. Conquest, colonial war and violence were excluded from its debates. Its members insisted that the period of violent conquest had given way to a phase of pacific penetration. Colonial repression, structural or concentrated in temporal but intense wars, was erased from the agenda. Post-conquest violence, like the military interventions during the *Maji* Rebellion and the *Herero-Nama* genocide, was not only strikingly absent, but openly ignored. If ICI members commented on the uprisings at all, they portrayed them as the result of colonial mismanagement. In accordance with their idea of sustainable colonial policies, the liberals in the ICI had always advanced a cooperative indigenous policy as a means to avoid rebellions. A long-term economic liberalization was the means to achieve this purpose, although it had to be brought about by an authoritarian government. Thus, the ICI did not comment on military repression because this was not part of their "scientific" agenda of improving administration and development. Only when administrative mismanagement was concerned, did they intervene. For example, ICI members openly condemned Léopold's illiberal policy of forced rubber collection that had caused the deaths of millions of Congolese. While they kept their eyes on such long-term reasons for colonial unrest, they left repression and its consequences to the military. Rarely, however, did they condemn violence if it was necessary to maintain "security" in their possessions. This strategy of quietism helped to maintain the ICI's liberal image in public.

Utilitarian Liberalism and Economic Humanitarianism as Arguments and Ideologies

The contradictory combination of liberalism and imperialism has given generations of historians sleepless nights.[152] The paradox remains unresolved, if historians take ideologies more seriously than the interests of their historical agents. Liberalism was the most flexible and malleable ideology of the nineteenth century. It involved positive attitudes to free trade, capitalism,

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[150] ANOM 100APOM223, Letter from Louwers to Neveu from 25.4.1929 concerning session of the ICI and the Session of the Mandates Commission.

[151] Most authors claim that both colonial reformism and colonial internationalism originated in the interwar period. My dissertation claims that both originated in the ICI: G. Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-state: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago, 2005); Girardet, *L'Idée coloniale*; Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire*.

[152] Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism in Europe*; the ambiguity of liberals towards empire has been shown by Pitts, *A Turn to Empire*; See also Andrew Fitzmaurice, Jennifer Pitts and Anthony Pagden in *American Historical Review* 117,1 (2012); U.S. Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago, 1999).

rationalism, utilitarianism, positivism, pluralism, political freedom, individual freedom, constitutionalism, democracy, progress, and property rights. It was regionally diverse and used differently according to different situations.[153] While colonialists used liberalism to legitimize very illiberal and forced expansion, the deliberate use of colonialism by liberals was equally frequent. Geoff Eley, for example, has convincingly demonstrated to what extent German national liberals made use of colonial topics and the nationwide network of the German Colonial Society to win votes. This functional side of liberal colonialism is widely ignored in more recent studies on colonialism and liberalism.[154] Liberalism could be instrumental to colonialists as colonialism was instrumental to liberals. The relation between colonialism and liberalism was often a marriage of convenience, and far from being irrational.

It is important to note that liberals in the ICI did not define themselves as liberal imperialists but as liberal colonialists. They saw colonialism – and colonial competition – as a driving force behind human progress and as a means of peaceful evolution to global material wealth. However, they were not imperialists who would risk a destructive war over colonial rivalry. While violence among the colonizers was never an option for the colonial reformers, violence against the colonized was often thought necessary, but only in a transitional phase that guaranteed "security" as a pre-condition of "prosperity" in the colonies.[155] It is therefore more convenient to label their attitude as colonial liberalism, which is less of a paradox than "liberal imperialism."

From its foundation in 1893, the ICI promoted a liberal and humanitarian colonialism, which anticipated the ideology of the League of Nations – and which reformed colonial policies without challenging colonialism as such. Its members defended free labor, the free market and styled themselves as rational and progressive. Their close cooperation with abolitionist societies underpinned their will to put an end to all forms of slavery. In addition, their utilitarian attitude led them to dismiss general colonial theories in favor of a more flexible approach. The ICI's utilitarianism served to portray colonialism as a rational contribution to human progress and denied its origins in nationalist ideologies. Above all, they promoted a "liberal" attitude towards the colonized and launched a more cooperative "native policy." This inclusive liberalism, which extended to the native populations, they called "human" or "humanitarian."[156] Thus, an eminent ICI member proclaimed at the International Congress of Colonial Sociology in 1900 that the age of extermination and expropriation of the natives, as symbolized by the settler colony in Australia, was over. Instead the "humanitarian ideas" of the late nineteenth century "have put an end to slave trade and extermination…from now on the colonizing peoples are forced to respect native property

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[153] D. Langewiesche, *Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1988); J. Leonhard, *Liberalismus: Zur historischen Semantik eines Deutungsmusters* (Munich, 2001).
[154] Eley, *Reshaping the German Right*.
[155] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1909*, 112.
[156] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1899*, 545.

rights on the soil of their territory."[157] This early concept of "liberal humanitarianism" went well beyond the mere rhetoric of paternalistic abolitionism and emergency interventions, which were said to characterize early humanitarian thinking in the nineteenth century.[158] Rather, humanitarianism should bring about a long-term transition of native societies from "passive" to "active" participation in colonial economies. The progressive transition implied granting them liberal rights to property and the possession of land. Granting colonial subjects the economically defined "human right" to property, however, did not necessarily entail political rights.[159]

There were representatives of both economic and political liberalism in the ICI. The majority of its members belonged to a new generation of liberals who had left behind the debates of classical liberal economists. Their focus was not necessarily on freedom of commerce and diplomatic guarantees for a shared open door policy. Neither was their liberalism a strategy to overcome imperial rivalry by international treaties. Rather, they were concerned with the question to what extent internal economic and political liberalism in the colonies contributed to increase the possessions' productivity. Arguing along utilitarian lines, they hoped to stimulate the colonial economy rather than the national economy in the metropole. All in all, their concern was how to organize colonial society by integrating the colonized into an autonomous colonial economy. Thus, their liberalism differed from the liberalism of the settler colonialism theorists in the sense that it was inclusive with regard to the colonized. Their reflections on inclusiveness and utilitarianism resulted in a debate on political participation and its contribution to economic cooperation of the native population. The result of those reflections was a vague idea of "economic humanitarianism" that should enable the natives to participate in colonial capitalism while granting them restricted rights of participation in the administration. The overall purpose behind those ideas can be qualified as utilitarian.

A closer look at the utilitarian liberalism of the ICI members can clarify the paradox of colonial liberalism. On the one hand, the ICI's liberalism originated in the national contexts and experiences of the ICI's founding members. On the other hand, the ICI deliberately styled itself as a liberal expert institution, cherishing rationalism and utilitarianism while abandoning nationalist solipsism or diplomatic confrontation. The ICI's second secretary Octave Louwers underpinned the

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[157] BArch, N2345/54 Aufsätze zu Kolonialpolitik und Diplomatie, 5: Respect de la propriété indigène et moyens de concilier ce respect avec les besoins de la colonisation, in: *Congrès international de Sociologie Coloniale* (Paris 1900), Section Condition Politique et Juridique des Indigènes (Paris, 1900).

[158] Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*; R. Skinner and A. Lester, 'Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 40, 5 (2012), 729–747; B. Simms and D. Trim (eds.), *Humanitarian Intervention: A History* (Cambridge, 2011); A. Ribi Forclaz, *Humanitarian Imperialism: The Politics of Antislavery Activism, 1880-1940* (Oxford, 2015).

[159] The distinction between economic and political human rights might be a nuance to the existing literature but cannot be discussed in detail here: L. Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A history* (New York, 2007); S. Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human rights in history* (Cambridge, 2012); J. Eckel, *Die Ambivalenz des Guten: Menschenrechte in der internationalen Politik seit den 1940ern* (Göttingen, 2014).

ICI's utilitarianism when he urged its members not to follow any diplomatic motto of *noblesse oblige* or nationalist codes of honor, but that in the ICI, "*necessité oblige*."[160] This credo was certainly pragmatic, if we take into account that pragmatism is no lesser an ideology and moreover a good argument in favor of colonization.

Joseph Chailley was probably the ICI's most eminent advocate of economic liberalism. He had translated the works of free-trade activist and Yale professor William Graham Summer into French. As early as 1886, he had addressed the British anti-protectionist Cobden-Club and called Adam Smith, Jean Baptiste Say, Turgot and Stuart Mill his intellectual ancestors.[161] This made him an outspoken adversary of the protectionist economic system through which the French state had monopolized colonial trade during the Ancien Régime.[162] When Chailley edited the *New Dictionary of Political Economy* together with ICI president Léon Say, they described their liberalism thus: "We are of the liberal school…the school of progress…to cut it short: Liberty, freedom of commerce, liberty of the individual, free trade and free initiative… are our doctrines." [163] Their doctrines owed much to Léon Say's grandfather, the liberal economist Jean-Baptiste Say, who had promoted security of property, free trade and a non-interventionist state in the early nineteenth century. Moreover, they applied Say's "use-value" credo to the colonies. It purported that the value of a product is predominantly in its immediate utility. The colonies should be turned into such "useful" elements that created value for its owner – the motherland. Say and Chailley thus played an important part in coining the concept of colonial *mise en valeur*. Chailley and Say combined this economic liberalism with a political liberalism that cherished the productive power of all individuals, including foreigners and the colonized. Their economic liberalism inevitably raised the question of how far political liberalism should go.

For Chailley, political liberalism was a central strategy to repudiate the Republican universalism of his favorite enemies within France, represented by the "Algerians" Etienne and Jonnart. He saw them as universalist Republicans who wanted the French state to govern the colonies as if they were part of a "Greater France" and assimilate them legally and administratively. Chailley turned against all kinds of such universal theories that guided French colonial policy. He opposed them to a professional individualism that he believed had turned out to be more profitable to the colonial motherland. Chailley claimed to adhere to the liberal "school of individual activity," which was truly democratic and ascribed economic and human progress to the sum of individual

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[160] ANOM FP 100APOM/222-223, Dossier ICI Correspondance Louwers SG avec Section Française: Louwers to the head of the French Section of the ICI, Neveu from 15.1.1935.

[161] W.G. Summer, *Le Protectionisme, translated from English by J. Chailley-Bert* (1886 Paris); "The Cobden Club Dinner" *The Times* (London, England), Issue 33993 (Monday, 3.7.1893), 7.

[162] J. Chailley, *Les Compagnies de Colonisation sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1898).

[163] L. Say and J. Chailley, *Nouveau dictionnaire d'économie politique* (Paris, 1900), VIII-IX.

activities in a society.[164] According to Chailley, the colonial experts epitomized individual and autonomous activity. By creating the ICI and the powerful French Colonial Union as private expert institutions in 1893, Chailley realized this ideal of individual activity. Both the ICI and the French Colonial Union – whose 10,000 members stimulated the French colonial economy to a degree that the state would never have achieved – institutionalized the individual activity of "independent experts."[165] Both became influential non-governmental institutions that promoted the *mise en valeur* of colonies and the colonized alike – against unprofitable state programs of colonial civilization and assimilation. Consequently, Chailley's liberal program was directed against the concept of Republican universalism and the legacies of absolutist centralism, a combination that still characterized the colonial policy of the French Third Republic.[166] His notion of individual liberal activity was holistic and enabled him to interpret the French state and the colonies overseas as one economic unit in which professional activity could unfold with disregard to citizenship or nationalism. His universalism was economic and not based on Republicanism.

Within this space, the ICI's *spiritus rector* hoped to replace absolutist protectionism with economic humanism and Republican universalism with cultural relativism. Chailley's notion of economic humanism stipulated that humanity as a whole had to make the world progress and create value. In accordance with this inclusive and economic concept of humanity, colonial governments were supposed to regard the natives as part of this joint effort to develop the world. Thus, instead of spending their energies on the unprogressive cultural assimilation of colonial subjects, administrations had to educate them to be useful workers or even capitalists. Instead of cultural assimilation, the ICI propagated economic assimilation in the form of professional rather than intellectual "education to work."[167] As a result, Chailley redefined colonialism as a common effort of humanity, contrary to older notions of colonialism as a civilizing mission that divided the world population into "civilized" and "uncivilized" parts. Interestingly, he also applied this logic to the colonial state. If liberty of labor, liberty of contracts, and private property were the basis of progress, they had to be granted to the colonized as well. However, he argued, the colonized had not yet felt the benefits of liberal economies and they had to be taught to do so. Inducing the native's taste for capitalism was therefore necessary to make colonies profitable. One of Chailleys collaborators summarized his views, arguing that "the part of Africa which is inhospitable to the Whites…can only be civilized by the races that it has engendered." Yet, he continued, the economic civilization had to be at the instigation and to the benefit of "the entire humanity." Thus, "the law of

[164] Ibid., IX.
[165] Persell, 'Joseph Chailley-Bert'; Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 'The French Colonial Party', 988; C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, 'French Business and the French Colonialists', *The Historical Journal* 19, 4 (1976).
[166] N. Bancel, P. Blanchard, and F. Vergès, *La République coloniale* (Paris, 2006).
[167] 'Discussion de la question: L'éducation professionnelle des indigènes dans les colonies de fondation récente', in : ICI, *Compte Rendu 1900*.

complementary labor [*Arbeitsvereinigung*] takes effect: the whites will be the brains that design, and the blacks those who execute," until they had learned to do it themselves.[168]

How could this education of the colonized be realized given that Chailley repudiated the intervention of the state? According to Chailley, economy was at the basis of progress and individual activity at the basis of economy. States should always serve the individuals, instead of individuals serving the state. The weaker individuals should not be protected by "state socialism," but by a responsible collectivity. Making reference to the French positivists, who combined social solidarity and human evolution, he denied equality among humans but called for a combination of "individual activity and collective responsibility." Chailley, driven by a fervent evolutionism, could not fail to make reference to the paradigmatic Darwinist theory of natural selection and Spencer's "survival of the fittest" (translated by Chailley as "*la persistence du plus apte*").[169] Like most of his colleagues, Chailley was a racist and did not believe in biological or cultural equality. Nevertheless, he believed that leaving the weaker members of humankind behind would be detrimental to society as a whole. A natural solidarity among all was necessary, he claimed, because "progress is brought about by the cooperation of all."[170] All the available energy in the world had to be mobilized to bring about global progress and although there were less productive individuals, they had to participate in the joint effort. Chailley believed that rationality was present in all humans, also among the Africans in the colonies. Their civilization was therefore possible. However, it was not cultural assimilation that spread civilization but rather capitalist education. This education could not be brought about by legal constraint or theoretical instruction. State-led schooling could not adequately teach the benefits of capitalism to the natives: they had to experience the benefits of capitalism themselves. In this way they had to be educated, "not by apologies and theories," but "by acts," to work for progress.[171]

One ICI member who claimed to have put this idea into practice was the Belgian Albert Thys, who had started to build the famed Congo Railway from the Atlantic coast to Léopoldville in 1890. In the ICI, he portrayed the railway as a "humanitarian" achievement, because it had whetted the natives' appetite for capitalism. While the Congolese initially refused to work at the construction site, they soon acquired a taste for the salary that was frequently augmented and came in flocks to work there. At the same time that he had introduced the Congolese to the free market, Thys argued, Léopold had abandoned free trade in the wake of the Brussels Conference in 1890. According to him, Léopold's interventionist and protectionist policy was a huge error, because forcing the

[168] BArch R 1001, 6131 „Einrichtung eines Internationalen Ethnographischen Büros in Brüssel“, Nr. 58: Artikel „Internationale Konferenz für Eingeborenenschutz: Ein Vorschlag von Lucien Hubert“, *Die Woche* (Berlin) 9,9 (2. März 1907), 359
[169] Say and Chailley, *Nouveau dictionnaire d'économie*, IX.
[170] Ibid., IX.
[171] Ibid., XVIII.

Congolese to work for concessionary companies meant denying them the human right to find a job on their own. Only free labor and fair wages provided the basis for a healthy colonial economy in which the natives participated voluntarily. Thys promoted his railway construction site as a successful model of free labor policy that should be applied to all colonies. According to him, the system had delivered the proof that natives were not lazy but reacted like all humans if paid a fair salary. He therefore labelled this version of capitalism a "humanitarian" system, as opposed to the destructive forced labor system introduced by Léopold in the 1890s. Thys failed to mention, however, that the "humanitarian" construction of the Congo Railway had cost the life of thousands of African workers. This fact did not change his opinion that the introduction of a pure capitalist system was a humanitarian act.[172] The economic humanism – or in Thys case the economic humanitarianism – was a recurrent argument among ICI members in favor of the capitalist spirit of the natives. By the same token it legitimized colonial expansion.

The Spanish argued in a very similar way, though for very different reasons. The most active Spanish member of the ICI, Antonio Fabié (1832-1899) illustrates the ICI's liberal inclination to a supposedly humanitarian native policy. Fabié's political orientation was highly ambiguous and oscillated between conservative and liberal. A Catholic by birth and Hegelian by choice, he had pioneered fighting against slavery as early as 1860. Shortly after, he edited the *Revista Europea*, a positivist and evolutionist journal that popularized European science in Spain.[173] In 1879, Fabié broke a taboo in Spain: he published an account of the life of Bartolomé de las Casas, whom he praised as the "great defender of the indios". This book recast Spanish colonial identity.[174] In the decades leading up to Fabié's publication of the biography, Las Casas' had been a historiographic *persona non grata* in Spain. No biography about him had been published. Las Casas' works were banned from publication, because they supposedly served Spain's enemies as the raw material in forging the "Black Legend", according to which the Spanish *Conquista* of the new world had been inhuman and genocidal. Throughout the nineteenth century, Spanish authors had worked hard to refute the black legend. They exposed Las Casas as a liar who had exaggerated the Indian death tolls during the *Conquista* only to make himself popular.

Unlike the anti-Las Casas authors, Fabié turned him into a hero and portrayed him as the real representative of Spanish colonialism. According to Fabié, Las Casas was the first humanitarian thinker.[175] He stood for the positive side of the *Conquista*: a scientific discovery of the new world, which boosted knowledge and made humanity aware of its grandeur. Fabié made reference to the

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[172] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 93-100; 86; 141; ICI, *Comtpe Rendu 1898*, 94, 209, 320.
[173] See A.M. Fabié, 'Exámen de materialismo moderno', *Revista Europea* 3 (1874-1875), 129f.
[174] See for example: C. Schmidt-Nowara, *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century* (Pittsburgh, 2006), 134f.
[175] Fabié inspired many others to assume the same point of view: M.A. Mcdonnell and A.D. Moses, 'Raphael Lemkin as historian of genocide in the Americas'*Journal of Genocide Research* 7, 4 (2005), 501–529: 504.

fact that Las Casas had defended the human character of the *indios* against Sepúlveda during the famous Valladolid debate (1550-1551). Against Sepúlveda, who argued that the Amerindians were non-human and therefore could be reduced to slavery, Las Casas had argued that they were part of the *humanitas* and therefore had a natural right to freedom. Unlike the critics of Las Casas, Fabié claimed that Las Casas' opinion represented the Spanish majority, and he declared Sepúlveda a maverick.[176]

In his biography of Las Casas, Fabié revived the debate on the unity of the human race and embedded it within current disputes between conservative Catholics and liberal evolutionists. In accordance with his Catholic faith and his liberal attitude, he tried to reconcile religious and scientific positions. Therefore, he defended the monogenetic theory, which claimed that all humans were descended from one ancestor. This genetic concept of one origin of all humans coincided with the Christian ideal of the unity of mankind. According to both monogenetic theories and Catholic doctrine, the *indigenas* were part of humanity. They fulfilled the *conditio humana* of being able to develop, and therefore were "civilizable." Fabié denied every difference in kind between Europeans and non-Europeans. However, Fabié made one qualification: although the human race was one, and although there was no difference in essence between humans, variations and differences existed. The "Aryan race", for example, was superior and made to dominate others.[177] Domination, in turn, did not mean extermination. Rather, it was a means to make humanity progress. To do so, Europeans had to teach the natives to work and to bring about progress, because: "wealth is nothing else than realized labor."[178] All in all, Fabiés rehabilitation of Las Casas was a justification of a colonial "native policy." Moreover, it portrayed the Spanish Empire as a model for this native policy, by making Las Casas the real representative of Spanish colonialism. Las Casas was also the origin of the current Spanish policy in the Philippines and in Cuba, as Fabié claimed: "Our humanitarian policy, in America as well as in Eastern Asia…has preserved the autochthonous races of all our colonies and increased the indigenous population of the Philippines considerably."[179]

All the progressive Spanish *coloniales* held similar beliefs. At the first international colonial congress in Paris in 1889, the leader of the Spanish colonial movement, Francisco Coello, protested against the legend that the Spanish had massacred the Amerindians. After the Spanish state had taken control of America, he claimed, they had governed with "morality and humanity" and introduced laws that "can still today be regarded as models." Coello received acclamations from an

[176] A.M. Fabié, *El P. Fr. Bartolomé de Las Casas: Ateneo de Madrid, conferencia leída el día 25 de abril de 1892* (Madrid, 1892), 15.
[177] A.M. Fabié, *Don Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, Obispo de Chiapa,* 2 vol (Madrid, 1879); See also C. Schmidt-Nowara and J.M. Nieto-Phillips, *Interpreting Spanish Colonialism: Empires, Nations, and Legends* (Albuquerque, 2005), 118.
[178] Fabié, *Mi Gestion Ministerial*, 652-653.
[179] Ibid., 648.

international audience.[180] Another Spanish member of the ICI, Rafael Torres Campos concluded that Spanish colonial law was finally "worthy of admiration by our times and history. It is a Code of wisdom, scientific colonization and humanitarianism."[181] In the ICI and at international congresses like in Mons (1910) colonial internationalists frequently emphasized this very "scientific and humanitarian" character of modern colonialism, to which Torres Campos referred.[182] The Spanish colonial reformers tried to be accepted as a modern colonial power by showing their liberal attitude towards the *indigenas* on the European stage. Fabié's revival of Bartolomé de las Casas, - along with his reinterpretation of Spanish colonial history – was instrumental in portraying Spanish colonialism as a part of the liberal and humanitarian program of the ICI.

The Dutch members of the ICI were the driving force behind both economic and political liberalism. All of them had been involved in "liberalizing" Dutch rule in the East Indies during the reform era of the 1860s. The sugar planter Isaäc Dignus Fransen van de Putte, who had been Dutch colonial minister under the liberal government from 1862-1866, had officially abolished forced labor in the Dutch colonies.[183] His reforms were responsive to protests against the inhuman use of forced cash crop cultivation in Java, triggered by Eduard Douwes Dekker's novel *Max Havelaar- Or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company* (1860). Almost all the Dutch members of the ICI had supported Fransen's colonial reforms, among them former colonial minister Conrad Theodor van Deventer and M.C. J Hasselmann, who had been indigenous inspector in Java.[184] Three experts of Javanese *adat* law and culture, Christiaan Snouck-Hurgronje, Emanuel Moresco and Cornelis van Vollenhoven also labelled themselves liberals and called for a conservation of indigenous law, culture and administration.

ICI member Van Deventer became the most famous Dutch liberal, because he allegedly brought about an era of "ethical policy" towards the natives, while making the Dutch parliament invest in the infrastructure of the Dutch East Indies. His famous article "A debt of honor" (*Een Eereschuld*, 1899), triggered a program of metropolitan investments in the Dutch Indies that included the construction of irrigation systems, political decentralization, improved health-care and schools for Indonesians. Its ultimate goal was the autonomy of the native population.[185] Until today, the *Eereschuld* article remains widely misinterpreted and exaggerated as a document of Dutch

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[180] Congrès Colonial International de Paris, *Congrès Colonial International de*, 179.
[181] M. Torres Campos, *Elementos de Derecho Internacional Privado* (Madrid, 1906 [1876])), 183.
[182] BArch, R 1001, 6131 Einrichtung eines Internationalen Ethnographischen Büros in Brüssel, Nr. 66 Abschrift vom Bericht Nr. 27 vom 6.2.1910: (franz.): Au congrès international d'expansion économique mondial tenu à Mons sous la présidence de M. Beernart.
[183] C.T. van Deventer and Fransen van de Putte, I.D., 'Ter gedachtenis', *De Gids* 66 (1902), 128–137.
[184] 'Max Havelaarfonds', *Het nieuws van den dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië* (9.1.1911); See also: C.T. van Deventer, 'Havelaar-voorspel. Multatuli en congé. Documents officiels inédits publiés par Joost van Vollenhoven, Docteur en Droit. Maas & Van Suchtelen, Amsterdam. 1909', *De Gids* 74 (1910), 199–215.
[185] C. van Deventer, 'Een Eereschuld', *De Gids* 63 (1899), 205–257; C.T. van Deventer, 'De 'eereschuld' in het parlement', *De Gids* 64 (1900), 399–418; See for the Ethical policy: Locher-Scholten, *Ethiek in Fragmenten*.

liberality. However, in the article Deventer urged the Dutch parliament to increase the budget of the colonial *administration* only – which benefitted the colonial economy, but not necessarily the colonial subjects. Moreover, most of the development projects during the ethical era were financed by indirect taxes imposed on the colonized. Many of the promised infrastructure measures were not realized at all. Last but not least, the ethical policy was accompanied by a rising fear of native nationalism, and a repressive policy continued to guarantee the domination of Europeans.[186] Nevertheless, Deventer's liberal rhetoric inflated the stereotype of Dutch "liberalism" and "rationalism." The presence of Dutch "liberals" in the ICI contributed to its reputation as a harbinger of development policies.

Apart from Thys, other Belgian delegates in the ICI were famous for their "liberal" attitude. The most prominent among them was Camille Janssen, the first governor general of the Congo Free State (CFS) during the 1880s. A devoted internationalist, Janssen had been fascinated by the international state founded in the Congo basin.[187] However, he was concerned to see that Léopold II had silently abandoned his policy of free trade in the Congo by the 1890s and followed the path of personal enrichment by creating a "fiscal state". This scheme not only alienated Janssen from the project, but most of Léopold's former companions, like Émile Banning, Hubert Jean van Neuss, Félicien Cattier, and Alphonse-Jules Wauters.

Léopold first caused a rift in 1890 when he tried to ease the financial burden of his Congo Free State. He introduced a tax on rubber collection in the Congo, only to establish a state monopoly over rubber exploitation and the ivory trade shortly afterwards. This led to an estrangement of the private colonial companies involved in rubber and ivory trading. Moreover, he passed a decree in September 1891, which rendered illegal the collection of fruit and rubber and the hunting of animals by the Congolese.[188] The decree was never published in the *Bulletin Officiel* of the state and remained unknown in Europe. An internal officer, the financial director of the CFS, Hubert van Neuss, however, protested and resigned from his post in 1890.[189] The governor Camille Janssen followed suit. Both "renegades" joined the ICI, from which they expected to realize their internationalist and liberal ideals.

The colonial entrepreneur and expert in colonial law, Félicien Cattier, defended the legality of the Congo Free State throughout the 1890s, but then turned against Léopold by publishing a *J'accuse* against his former employer in 1906.[190] By that date, Cattier had become a longstanding

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[186] Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas*, 23f.
[187] Janssen had been a member of several international commissions, which were created to supervise and organize the construction of the Suez Canal: Louwers, 'Camille Janssen'.
[188] F. Cattier, *Situation de l'État Indépendant du Congo* (Brussels, 1906), 24.
[189] M.L. Comeliau, 'Hubert van Neuss', in Institut Royal Colonial Belge (ed.), *Biographie Coloniale Belge* (Brussels, 1952), vol 3, 653–656.
[190] Cattier, *Situation de l'État*.

member of the ICI and had internalized its "doctrines" of "liberty of labor, liberty of commerce, and the respect of native property." These doctrines of liberty, the general secretary of the ICI wrote, made Cattier a "pure and total colonial."[191] Writing in 1906 – and therefore after the international campaign against Léopold had started – Cattier styled himself ex-post-facto an early critic of Léopold's rubber exploitation. He retroactively changed his mind and therefore contributed to the myth that critique of Léopold's "econocide" in the Congo was an internal affair, launched by "real colonial experts" in Belgium long before the international community revealed the atrocities committed by Léopold's *Force Publique*.[192]

All of these liberal attitudes of the ICI members originated in different national contexts. However, all of the colonial liberals shared a common purpose in portraying themselves as reformers and experts of colonial administration. The Belgian Cattier and the Dutch Van Deventer, for example, thought of themselves as colonial experts, who wanted to restitute colonial revenues to the colony, instead of bleeding them to death. Therefore, they opposed predatory exploitation by the Dutch state or an avaricious King Léopold. By the same token, the Spanish Fabié wanted to protect Cuba from the corruption that benefitted the *peninsulares* (Spanish of the Iberian Peninsula) only. He called for more financial and administrative autonomy for the colony. So did Chailley, who dismissed the Algerian model and suggested colonial self-sufficiency as a first step to profitability. In various ways, all of them called for financial and administrative autonomy of the colonies. Their "liberalism" aimed at widening the colonial administrators' scope of action, as well as their budgets. The political and financial autonomy should help them to launch professional programs of development.

To achieve this goal, the liberals in the ICI agreed that cooperation with the colonized was necessary. Not forced labor, but the introduction of free labor and capitalism should provide the basis for development and colonial self-sufficiency. Their utilitarian stance towards the natives was serious as was their wish to get rid of metropolitan theories of civilization. Utilitarian liberalism and the belief that progress could be brought about peacefully, led them to embrace an economic humanism, which claimed that a joint and cooperative effort was the only way to make the world advance. Economic humanitarianism was the means to achieve this purpose.

Nevertheless, all of them emphasized that the colonial subjects had neither understood the value of progress nor the importance of individual activity or work to bring about progress. Influenced by racist theories, they postulated a cultural difference between colonizers and colonized. ICI members dismissed the idea that the natives had to prove their affiliation to humanity

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[191] 'Félicien Cattier', in Institut Royal Colonial Belge (ed.), *Biographie Coloniale Belge* (Brussels, 1952), vol. 6, 189.
[192] Cattier, *Situation de l'État*, II-III.

by cultural assimilation or civilization. Instead, they had to activate their potential individual work power to contribute to the progress of humanity. White leadership was still considered necessary in order to render the natives active and to "educate them to work". As a consequence, the ICI members never questioned the colonial project as such. They were colonial reformers, but not revolutionaries. By reforming the colonial project as colonial liberals, they tried to legitimize it.

Individualism, Nationalism and Holism: Reasons for International Cooperation

The ICI's internationalism was ambiguous. On the one hand, it originated in an ideological holism, which valued cooperation among colonial experts over national ambitions. Seen from a holistic point of view, the ICI's internationalism was a sphere of its own, autonomous from those parts that constituted it semantically and according to the ICI's constitution: nation-states and the inter-national relations between their governments. Holistic colonial internationalism was therefore an attitude that did not conceptualize colonial policy under the primacy of domestic politics or national interest. As an ideal-type, holistic internationalism was non-governmental, not state-run, and apolitical. It was imagined as morally superior and found its most eloquent expression in the idea of an autonomous science that by-passed nationalism and the nation-state.[193] A pure colonial science and expertise did not need the nation-state at all and was therefore transnational, a notion which comes close to international holism, but was not used by contemporaries.

On the other hand, internationalism was instrumental in boosting the nationalist ambitions of some ICI members. The latter's concept of colonial internationalism was atomistic. For them, sovereignty was closely tied to the nation as the inalienable basis of collective agency. Atomistic internationalists joined international organizations if they could be used to strengthen the position and sovereignty of their nation-states. Using international institutions, rather than accepting them as a superstructure, reiterated particularism within an inter-national frame. To be sure, most of their contemporaries regarded internationalism as complementary to nationalism, not as contradictory.[194] An ideal-type distinction between holistic internationalism and atomistic internationalism is nevertheless expedient to understand the reasons for why individuals from particular nations joined the ICI.

While opposing holistic and atomistic internationalism we should be aware that those categories were often dissolved by individual pragmatism. Repeatedly, individuals joined the ICI if they gained from the membership, regardless of the ideological opposition between nationalism and internationalism. This "individual activity" that Chailley had evoked was a category that escaped

[193] Glenda Sluga points out that an international commuity is first of all an imagined or invented community. The perception of internationality as a holistic space that is more "moral" than other nations is part of the repertoire of such imaginations: Sluga, *Internationalism*, 9.

[194] Concerning the complementarity of nationalism and internationalism see Sluga, *Internationalism*, 7 and 150-160.

nationalist thinking and was truly atomistic – in the sense that it originated in personal interests alone. We can thus distinguish between holistic, atomistic and individualistic internationalisms.

To contemporary observers in the 1890s, it was not entirely clear what internationalism meant, let alone what its political implications were. The term internationalism might have referred to international law, transnational scientific cooperation, attempts to global standardization, multinational economy, free trade ideologies, socialist solidarity or aristocratic cosmopolitanism.[195] Each ICI member advanced his own definition of internationalism, and external observers contributed to the semantic confusion. Thus, the ICI's internationalism was open to interpretation. In the early period of the ICI's existence, for example, fears arose among democratically-minded Europeans that the ICI might bring aristocratic cosmopolitanism back to life.

Aristocratic cosmopolitanism was the oldest version of internationalism. It brought the days of the Vienna Congress to mind, when the solidarity among European monarchs had shattered the hopes of democratic revolutionaries. This idea seemed to linger on in contemporary attitudes. When Chailley founded the ICI in 1893 and scoured the French political elite for a flagship to represent the young institution, he met with almost unanimous rejection. The upper ranks of the Third Republic claimed that they were "Republicans and not internationalists" and denied their support for the ICI. Chailley complained bitterly about those who still thought that internationalism ran counter to democracy:

> It is a lamentable phenomenon that democracies show a certain indifference, perhaps a certain uneasiness in the face of international associations. They are naturally suspicious and withdraw into themselves; they show an exclusive and grudging patriotism and think that they like their country less if they like another country; they do not respect those cosmopolitan families who maintain friendships and alliances that transcend the *patrie*…families that are like bridges over the borders to connect the peoples and to allow them to mingle with each other, to appreciate each other, to associate, to help each other.[196]

When Chailley complained in the 1898 ICI meeting about the reluctance of democratic nation-states to support international associations, some of the "cosmopolitan families" were present and displayed their consent. The ICI members Franz von Arenberg and Auguste d'Arenberg, for example, descended from the same aristocratic family based in Belgium, but belonged to the German and the French branch respectively. Franz was vice-president of the German Colonial Society in Berlin, and Auguste the president of the French Committee of French

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[195] For the close connection between internationalism and the emergence of international law see: Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought*, 42-43.

[196] "c'est un phénomène bien singulier que les démocraties témoignent une certaine indifférence, peut-être une certaine inquiétude, en face des associations internationales. Elles sont, par nature, défiantes ; elles se replient sur elles-mêmes ; elles ont le patriotisme exclusif et jaloux, elles pensent aimer moins leur pays si elles aiment le pays d'autrui. Elles ne renferment guère de ces familles cosmopolites qui ont des amitiés ou des alliances par delà la patrie…familles qui servent, comme un pont jeté par-dessus les frontières, pour relier les peuples et leur permettre de se connaître, de se pénétrer, de s'estimer, de s'associer, de s'entr'aider ", ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1897, 50.

Africa in Paris. Both promoted ideas of a unified Europe and a Franco-German colonial entente in journals like *L'Europe Coloniale*, published in Paris to give voice to a common European colonial ideal.[197] If ever colonial differences emerged between France and Germany the Arenbergs sought support for an agreement in the French and German parliaments. They were consulted during the Moroccan crises and played an important role in solving the conflict.[198]

Although the Arenbergs were very active in the ICI, and although other peers joined – like the president of the German Colonial Society Johann-Albrecht von Mecklenburg and his kin, the Dutch Prince Henry von Mecklenburg – the ICI was not an aristocratic society. Moreover, the fact that ten out of all seventeen British ICI members prior to 1914 were Lords or Earls, did not make the ICI an aristocratic institution. Their presence was rather due to the British recruitment of colonial administrators who were chosen among the upper class of society. They were invited to join the ICI not because of their aristocratic origin but because of their employment in the colonies. Undoubtedly, the ICI made use of transnational aristocratic networks to recruit members, but it did not pursue any purpose that could be qualified as specifically aristocratic. Therefore, the charge that the holistic cosmopolitanism of the ICI had its roots in a residual aristocratic internationalism has to be rejected.

Unlike the aristocratic cosmopolitans who propagated a holistic version of internationalism, the capitalist internationalists carried individualistic views to an extreme. They did not take the nation or the international community as an ideological point of reference. Rather, they tried to benefit from both, whenever it served their private interests. Thinking along lines of profitability for their individual enterprises, they acted independently of any ideological prerogatives. This was the case with the entrepreneurs in the ICI. Among them were the directors of the European shipping lines servicing the colonies, Adolph Woermann (Woermann-Linie, Hamburg), Jules Charles-Roux (Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, Marseille), and Félicien Cattier (Compagnie Maritime Belge, Antwerp).[199] The ship owners, who were also dominating colonial trade, depended on a multinational clientele of passengers. While they presented themselves as internationalists in the ICI to attract customers and orders on a European scale, they turned into fervent nationalists once

[197] See Archives Arenberg, Enghien, Carton Franz von Arenberg, Dossier „Questions Politiques', membership card of the Section Berlin-Charlottenburg of the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft; Franz von Arenberg 'Opinions Européennes Avant la Conférence' *L'Europe Coloniale* (27.12.1906); *L'Europe Coloniale, financière, économique, littéraire et politique* was edited by Henri Moreau in Paris between 1904 and 1907 and advocated a "rapprochement franco-allemand" and a "Soilidarité Européenne"; it appeared every Tuesday and Friday using the motto: "Prosperity through Freedom", see: *Zeitschrift für Parapsychologie/Psychische Studien* 34,8 (August 1907), 515.

[198] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1907,* 66; Archives Arenberg, Enghien, Carton Franz von Arenberg, Dossier "Questions Politiques", Article 'Franz von Arenberg', without name of the journal and date; 'La Question du Maroc. Le Différend Franco-Allemand et l'Opinion du Reichstag. Ce que dit le Prince François d'Arenberg' *L'Écho de Paris* 22, 7612 (30.4.1905); Franz von Arenberg, a catholic internationalist, and a leader of the catholic Center Party, even blamed German colonial administrators in Togo for mismanagemnt and misbehaviour. He received his information from missionaries in Togo and sent a list of undesirable colonial adminsitrators to the colonial offices in Berlin: 'Aus den Geheimnissen der Zentrumskamarilla', *Die Post* (Berlin) 575 (8.12.1906).

[199] I. Aillaud, *Jules Charles-Roux: Le grand Marseillais de Paris* (Rennes, 2004).

they had to attract subsidies from their national governments.[200] A similar ideological flexibility characterized bankers, such as Karl von der Heydt (German Disconto-Gesellschaft) and Albert Thys (Belgian Banque d'Outre-Mer), who used international capital for their colonial projects, which also profited from national subsidies and political "protection" from their respective governments.[201]

The conversion of German entrepreneur Julius Scharlach from an atomistic Pan-Germanism to a holistic colonial internationalism illustrates the attitude of profit-seeking individuals towards colonial ideologies. While Scharlach was an ICI member, he was also the co-founder of Pan-German associations, like the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland, and therefore a fervent jingoist. At the same time he headed the multinational South West Africa Company Limited. While Scharlach's South West Africa Company Limited received a land- and mining concession from the German government – which was keen on stimulating the economy in German South West Africa – the company registered at the London stock market. Scharlach's inclination to Pan-German nationalism did not prevent him from inviting British shareholders to participate in his colonial company, especially after German investors hesitated to put money into the exploitation of copper mines in German South-West Africa. When the majority of shareholders turned out to be British nationals, Scharlach earned harsh criticism from Pan-Germans and other colonial lobby groups in Germany. But these did not lead him to alter his plans. On the contrary, he sold parts of his concessions to Cecil Rhodes' Debeers Consolidated Mines Ltd., who paid 5,000 Pounds Sterling to exploit the diamond deposits on the companies' territory.[202] Seen from an ideological point of view, Scharlach's behavior seems to be contradictory or even schizophrenic. However, if we see in him a profit-seeking entrepreneur, who used both Pan-German and internationalist networks to increase the profitability of his company, his behavior makes sense.

French entrepreneurs had even less scruples in betraying nationalist ideals when they approached ICI members for economic support. In 1895, Emile Lançon, one of the earliest colonists in Tunisia who cultivated a domain of 100,000 hectares in the protectorate, approached the ICI member and German undersecretary of state Alfred Zimmermann with the request to offshore his Tunisian wine production to German East Africa. Zimmermann remarked that Lançon was "not a bad Frenchman but reasonable and free of prejudice against the Germans," although he remained skeptical about growing wine under bad climatological conditions in German East Africa. Nevertheless, Lançon travelled to Cologne, Bonn, Frankfurt and Berlin to raise capital among the

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[200] The Woermann-Linie, for example, received subsidies from the 1880s onwards, by the demand of the German Colonial Society. See a concise summary in: W. Müller, *Politische Geschichte der Gegenwart: Das Jahr 1885.* vol. 19 (Berlin, 1886), 20-28.

[201] For example the international networks of the Belgian Banque d'Outre-Mer : AGRB, Banque d'Outre-Mer, 16: Correspondance de la Banque d'Outremer s.a. (et particulièrement de son administrateur délégué, Félicien Cattier) and 25-26.

[202] 'South West Africa Company Limited', in Schnee, *Deutsches Koloniallexikon*, vol. 2, 277.

Germans for his project. To do so, he met other members of the ICI, like Franz von Arenberg. All of them discouraged him from growing wine in East Africa. But Lançon seemed to be more interested in German capital anyway, rather than having a real intention to grow wine in German colonies. The ICI networks thus had served his purpose.[203]

For Lançon, Scharlach and other businessmen, the ICI provided a network to realize their business interests and an opportunity to be *au courant* with the latest developments in colonial economy. It allowed them to seize any chance to make profits in colonies of foreign nations. The entrepreneurs benefitted from the ICI's studies on the trans-colonial recruitment of labor force, or from the collection of the best strategies to acquire the right to land and mining concessions.[204] Nonetheless, their membership did not turn the ICI into an effective instrument of multinational capitalists. They used it as a source of information and exchange to coordinate and satisfy their particular – or individual – economic interests.

The ICI itself did not necessarily benefit from the businessmen's presence in a financial way. Despite occasional funding by Albert Thys, the capitalists and entrepreneurs kept a low profile as patrons when the ICI ran out of money. As a consequence, the ICI was more useful to the capitalists than the capitalists were to the ICI. All in all, the ICI was not an institution that was run by, and to the benefit of multinational entrepreneurs. Nor was it a well-financed institution that profited from its members economic internationalism. Rather, the ICI was a scientific institution – though not free of political purposes – and its strength lay in collecting, synthesizing and providing information about the colonial world and its opportunities.

While multinational entrepreneurs used the ICI's networks rather than creating them, scientific universalism was the driving force behind the foundation and success of the ICI. As we have seen, the ICI had been modeled on the International Statistical Institute (set up in 1885) and the Institute for International Law (1876).[205] All those institutes understood themselves as learned societies and independent political think tanks. Scholars all over the world had learned to profit from such international institutions. They helped them to keep up with new developments in the field and provided them with scientific capital that enhanced their career prospects. By the same token, the transnational epistemic communities that emerged from the institutionalization of knowledge transfers provided scholars with a platform to sell their own research.[206] Colonial experts were well aware that joining such an international institution was a win-win situation. Unsurprisingly, scholars flocked to the ICI.

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[203] BArch, N 2345/2, Nr. 45-46: Bary (Tunis) to Zimmermann 17. [?] 1895 and Nr. 50-52.

[204] See the extensive volumes on these topics published by the ICI (ed.), *Le Régime Minier aux Colonies*, 3 vol. (Brussels, 1902-1903); ICI (ed.), *Le Régime Foncier aux Colonies*, 6 vol. (Brussels, 1898-1905); ICI (ed.), *La Main d'Ouevre aux Colonies,* 3 vol. (Brussels, 1895-1898).

[205] ICI, *Compte Rendu 18*97, 63; Schnee, *Koloniallexikon*., vol. 2, 99f.

[206] The best analysis of the Institute of International Law: Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer*.

Scholars capitalized on the ICI's store of knowledge, but first and foremost it helped them to extend their networks and to increase their cultural capital in colonial matters. Cultural capital in colonial matters could be acquired by travelling and studying foreign colonies. Thus, ICI members provided each other with recommendation letters and in doing so enabled each other to study details of the economy or administration in all overseas possessions. Chailley, for example, approached the governor general in Java via his Dutch colleagues in the ICI. The governor, in turn, ordered his administrators to welcome Chailley on his journey to Java, to provide him with food, accommodation, official documents and their company. Owing to the governor's support, Chailley obtained access to administrative archives, military bases or state hospitals in Dutch Java.[207] Having received *carte blanche*, he scrutinized every aspect of Dutch colonization in Java and collected data, which he then processed in his voluminous book on Dutch colonial administration.

Revealingly, even colonial ministries made use of those international networks. As late as 1909, the German colonial minister and ICI member Bernhard Dernburg confidentially approached colonial experts in the USA for letters of recommendation to travel to the cotton plantations in the southern part of the country. He received recommendations to analyze the machines used for cotton production in the Deep South, along with the preparation and education to manual work of the black population in the South.[208] Another member of the German colonial administration, the minister of state Alfred Zimmermann, who had been an ICI member since 1897, visited the Dutch Indies, British possessions, and French Tunisia with the help of reference letters from Paul Leroy-Beaulieu and other ICI members.[209] Zimmermann, described as a jovial Eastern Prussian with an impressive blonde moustache, was a diplomat who specialized in Eastern Asia and the Orient. He became one of the puppet masters of colonial internationalism and knew the right people in the French, Dutch and British colonial ministries. He made wide use of their knowledge and advice to publish a five volumes series on *The European Colonies*.[210]

ICI members like Zimmermann also travelled within Europe, where he met with his colleagues from the ICI outside its official sessions and introduced himself to other colonial experts. Habitually, he was invited to stay in the houses of other ICI members, like the famous explorer and employee of the French colonial ministry Louis Gustave Binger. In other cases, he met colleagues over dinner to exchange information and discuss the latest news from overseas. Close friendships developed, as the intimate language of the correspondence reveals. Both sides benefitted from the

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[207] ANOM 100APOM 93, Dossier Union Coloniale, Chailley-Bert, Voyage aux Indes Néerlandaises, Mai-Juillet 1897: Plan de Voyage, Documentation rapportée, Article "De Heer Chailey-Bert."

[208] BArch, R 1001, 6631, 6: Dernburg to Warburg from 26.8.1909; Dernburg's journey has been analyzed repeatedly, see Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa*, 195.

[209] BArch, N2345/53, 1 Letter of recommendation written by Paul Leroy Beaulieu from 11.3.1894.

[210] A. Zimmermann, *Die Europäischen Kolonien: Schilderung ihrer Entstehung, Entwicklung, Erfolge und Aussichten* (Berlin, 1903), BArch, N2345/30, Article "Rücktritt des Staatssekretärs von Jagow."

exchange of information. Zimmermann proof-read scientific articles written by his Belgian colleagues about German colonialism and vice-versa.[211] In Great Britain, Zimmermann met with colonial experts who translated and published his oeuvre on European colonial policies.[212] All of the European colonial experts frequently exchanged the latest colonial literature of their countries and often collaborated in writing comparative studies like Zimmermann's study of the European colonies. The French colonial ministry, for example, commissioned Binger to request drafts of colonial maps from his German colleague in the ICI. Binger received the German material which the French colonial ministry used for its own edition of a comprehensive map of the colonial world.[213] Thus, by assembling colonial experts from all over the world, the ICI provided channels for knowledge transfers way beyond its own meetings and publications. Both colonial administrations and individual scholars used those channels. But why did scholarly experts, who had their own established networks of internationalist cooperation, acquire a liking for the ICI?

It goes without saying that colonial administrators and theorists in the ICI tried to profit from specialist knowledge. But specialists also profited from the interdisciplinary exchange and the possibility to apply their knowledge to colonial contexts. The most famous Arabist in Europe at that time, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, frequently emphasized the ICI's role in bringing together the experts of colonial science. After attending the ICI's 1909 meeting, Snouck reported to his Arabist colleagues "I hold this meeting in high esteem because it gave me the possibility to meet Lord Reay, Dernburg (the latter rude as the former noble), Chailley (whom I know already because of his Javanese journey), Anton from Jena etc. etc. Prince Hendrik presided over the session. He is intellectually more gifted than his brother Johann Albrecht who eagerly took part in our works"[214] All of these ICI members, he argued, were actively involved in shaping European colonial policies, which gave him the possibility to apply his specialist knowledge.

The German orientalist Becker enjoyed interdisciplinary exchange even more. In 1912, he wrote "I just came back from the meeting of the International Colonial Institute in Brussels…it was very interesting. We got to know each other very well. The topics were accurate, the presentations good and the debates sometimes nuanced. Questions concerning currency, forced labor and acclimatization were problems I was only able to learn from."[215] The ICI and the interdisciplinary exchange among its members played a crucial role in "colonizing" different scientific disciplines

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[211] BArch, N2345/48, 3: Letter from Thozée to Zimmermann from 22.1.1894.
[212] BArch N 2345/47, 8: Letter from Strachey to Zimmermann und Danckelmann from 12.12.1902.
[213] BArch, N 2345/4 Nachlass Zimmermann, Nr.6-7 Binger to Zimmermann from 24.8.1897.
[214] Snouck to Nöldeke from 29.06.1909, in: P.S. Koningsveld, *Orientalism and Islam: The Letters of C. Snouck Hurgronje to Th. Nöldeke ; from the Tübingen University Library* (Leiden, 1985), 150-51; See also his private archives on membership in the ICI: ULCSH, G. 27 Institut Colonial International Brussels.
[215] "In Brüssel war es sehr interessant. Man lernte sich gut kennen. Die Themata waren richtig, die Referate gut und die Debatte manchmal auch pointiert. Währungsfragen, direkte Besteuerung, Zwangsarbeit und Akklimatisierung waren allerdings Probleme, deren gegenüber ich mich nur lernend verhalten konnte": ULCSH, Or. 8952 A145, Letter from Becker to Snouck from 6.7.1912.

by making them available to the colonial administration. Both the men on the spot and the specialist scholars thus benefitted from this partnership of convenience. The link between theory and practice was certainly the most valid reason for European "orientalists" to join the ICI, but it was not the only reason.

In some cases, national rivalries led orientalists to turn into the transnational epistemic community. Snouck, for example, had entered in a fierce scholarly dispute with his Dutch colleague L.W.C. van den Berg.[216] Carl Heinrich Becker, who lectured at the Colonial Institute in Hamburg, saw himself bullied by Martin Hartmann, the director of the rival Seminar for Oriental Languages in Berlin, and complained frequently to his international friends about the "jealousy between Berlin and Hamburg."[217] Ironically, fearing a disadvantage in this rivalry, Martin Hartmann also joined the ICI. Obviously, the ICI was not free of the rivalries between competing scientific schools, which not only derived from personal careerism but also from the need to get research funded – and the rivalry between Berlin and Hamburg as colonial training schools was well known in Germany. Membership in the ICI was good argument in favor of one's expertise and enhanced the chances to get external funding.

Unlike Hartmann and Becker, many of the ICI members developed long-lasting friendships. After Chailley had written his book on Java – and was less keen on taking advantage of Snouck's knowledge – they met frequently in a more convivial atmosphere to discuss their colonial experience over extended dinners.[218] The German Arabist Becker took advantage of the ICI meetings in the Netherlands to spend several days in Snouck's house, and returned whenever possible, attracted by Snouck's sister.[219] Such friendships among ICI members were due to true individualistic reasons, even if we cannot always distinguish them from atomistic and holistic reasons: Becker and Chailley certainly profited from Snouck's knowledge for the training of German and French colonial administrators. At the same time they enhanced their scientific knowledge. While their individual friendships sometimes had no hidden agenda, they would never have occured without the ICI's scientific internationalism bringing them together. The ICI's scientific holism was the condition for unconditional friendships among ICI members.

Even the Great War did not part their ways. While the German Becker was seized by the nationalist fervor in Germany, he wrote to his Dutch friend Snouck: "Our fatherland fights for its existence…those are glory days for us. But eminent values of our civilization [*Kulturwerte*] will

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[216] C.H. Snouck Hurgronje, *Oeuvres choisies de C. Snouck Hurgronje = Selected works of C. Snouck Hurgronje* (Leiden, 1957), XIX.

[217]ULCSH, Or8952, A140: Letter from Carl Heinrich Becker to Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje from 09.1.190[7?]; Or8952, A 145 Letter from Becker to Snouck from 22.1.1912.

[218] ULCSH, Or8952, A224: Letter from Chailley (UCF) to Snouck from 20.6. 1897 and A 225: Letter from Chailley to Snouck from 26.1.1913.

[219] ULCSH, Or8952 A141, Letter from Becker to Snouck from 20.5.1909; Or 8952 A142 Letter from Becker to Snouck from 24.5.1909; Or 8952 A142 Letter from Becker to Snouck from 8.6.1909.

also be irretrievably lost. The learned men, and our international science of Islam [*Orientalistik*] in particular, will suffer considerably. If Germany wins the war, the *Orientalistik* will thrive…but it will be a national science. If we lose, it will be superseded. Both prospects make me succumb to grief. It was above all internationality that stimulated science."[220] Although Becker's lamentation did not reduce his nationalist attitude, he continued to use the ICI networks during the war. Via Snouck, he interrogated Chailley – the head of the ICI who was promoted to a leading position in the French Ministry of War – about friends and relatives who had disappeared on the French battlefields.[221] He also made inquiries about his friend and fellow ICI member Louis Massignon, who was one of the few orientalists who actually fought in the war and had disappeared on the battlefields. Such were the moments when Becker regretted the "total defeat of Internationalism" and a war that had been "a surrender of ideas to reality." [222] At least before the First World War, scientific internationalism had been a reality in the ICI.

Through the contacts among ICI members, the colonizers' ideal of scientific universalism and international holism materialized and became an *idée vécue*. ICI members and other experts profited from this unconditional exchange of colonial knowledge. They increased their cultural capital and their expertise. Experts like Alfred Zimmermann built their colonial and scholarly careers on transnational cooperation. In doing so they reiterated the ideal of holistic transnationalism: If global progress was the sum of individual "activities", as Chailley had put it, nation-states lost their relevance for the shared human effort to develop the world. There was a truth about the ICI styling itself as a scientific institution that made an impartial and "apolitical" dialogue among colonial experts possible. Colonial science was indeed often autonomous of nationalist attitudes. Being colonial without being national was an attribute that distinguished the ICI from former colonial projects.

Unpolitical scientific holism can be distinguished from the colonizers' atomistic or political reasons to embrace internationalist attitudes. We have already analyzed political reasons behind the decisions of colonial newcomers, small nations and reformist colonial powers to join the ICI. Before the turn of the century, the gap between nationalists and colonial internationalists widened. The 1890s saw an ideological divorce between nationalists and colonialists. In France, fervent nationalists blamed the *coloniaux* for taking the nation's attention away from the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine, mainly by offering costly colonies as compensation. The French nationalist leader

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[220] "damit gehen aber ungeheure Kulturwerte rettungslos verloren. Gerade wir Gelehrten, vor allem unsere internationale Orientalistik wird schwer darunter leiden. Sollte Deutschland siegen, so wird die Orientalistik bei uns sehr aufblühen. ; aber es wird eine nationale Wissenschaft sein. Wenn wir unterliegen, wird sie für Deutschland überhaupt überflüssig. Beide Aussichten erfüllen mich mit tiefem Schmerz; denn gerade die Internationalität hat unsere Wissenschaft so sehr befruchtet" ULCSH, Or8952, A149, Letter from Becker to Snouck from 17.11.1917.

[221] ULCSH, Or8952, A150, Letter from Becker to Snouck from 21.11.1914.

[222] ULCSH, Or8952, A152, Letter from Becker to Snouck from 25.6.1915 and 24.7.1915.

Paul Déroulède put this attitude in a nutshell when he reproached the coloniaux publicly in the National Assembly that "I have lost two children and you offer me twenty servants?"[223] Alsace-Lorraine were the lost children, whereas the colonies were symbolically reduced to servants. Déroulède's metaphor stood for a more profound conflict between anti-colonial nationalists and colonial internationalists. As we have seen, the German Colonial Society and the Pan-Germans – though born as twins – had separated and pursued different purposes since 1890, with the leaders of the German Colonial Society turning to international cooperation. In Belgium, Léopold's efforts to nationalize the economy and administration of the Congo started in 1890 and were exposed to increasing criticism among the internationalists. As we have seen, Léopold alienated Belgian internationalists from the project. In all those countries, colonialism emancipated itself from nationalism and tried to lead an autonomous ideological life.

It goes without saying that it is difficult to draw a sharp line between holistic and atomistic internationalism. The "atomists" were often nationalists and internationalists at the same time. For them, the relation between the national and the international was not a contradiction in terms, but a complementary alliance. This was especially true for the internationalism of small nations. In Belgium and the Netherlands internationalism was vital to increase the countries' agency. Both were "dwarfs in Europe and giants overseas", and needed the consent of the more powerful states to exist and to build or maintain their colonies.[224]

Belgium, where the ICI established its ideological and administrative headquarters, epitomized the opposition between atomistic and holistic reasons for internationalism. Belgium looked back on a long internationalist tradition that was grounded in the idea of neutrality. The state had become independent in 1831, on condition of its neutrality. With the 1870s approaching, political theorists and leaders in Belgium had learned to capitalize on this situation.[225] Émile Banning, a Belgian scholar, publicist, archivist and close collaborator of Léopold II, was a one-man-think-tank and, seduced by nationalist politicization of the 1870s, began to develop an impressive *furor scribendi*.[226] During his time as an archivist at the Belgian National Archives he used his access to secret documents to write a three-volume history of Belgian neutrality, which was secretly distributed among Belgian diplomats abroad to serve as a guideline for negotiations.[227]

[223] Cited in P. Vervaecke (ed.), *À droite de la droite: Droites radicales en France et en Grande-Bretagne au XXe siècle* (Villeneuve d'Ascq, 2012), 47.
[224] H.L. Wesseling, 'The Giant that was a Dwarf: Or the Strange History of Dutch Imperialism', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 16, 3 (1988), 58–70.
[225] Banning, *Origines et Phases de la Neutralité Belge*.
[226] Archives du Palais Royal à Bruxelles, Archives du Cabinet du Roi Leopold II. Documents relatifs au developpement exterieur de la Belgique, I: Correspondence générales: Correspondance Banning; E. Banning, *L'Afrique et la Conférence géographique de Bruxelles* (Leipzig, 1877); Banning, *L'Association Internationale Africaine*.
[227] É. Banning, *La Belgique au point de vue militaire et international, ed. by Ernest Grossart,* (Brussels, 1901), XIII.

Banning thought strategically. He was aware of Belgium's precarious situation and his plea for neutrality derived from the following observation: Neutrality is the outcome of "politics and not of conceptions of law. The world is not governed by legal advisors [*jurisconsultes*], and not by philanthropists. It is governed by interests, by passions, by nationalist or dynastic impulsiveness which does not fit into the framework of diplomatic transactions."[228] Therefore, Banning proposed Belgium to all the other powers as a neutral territory of internationalism: "No people…has received to a similar degree an international imprint. Our soil is the territory *par excellence* for congresses, for the exchange of ideas, for free discussions. Belgium cannot disappear without leaving a profound void, a considerable lacuna in the midst of Europe."[229] According to these arguments, this Belgian international vocation secured the country's existence, by making it indispensable as a stage for international cooperation. When Banning met the Belgian King Léopold II in 1867, and learned about his desire to acquire a colony, he soon realized that he could play the international trump-card. It was Banning who organized the International Geographical Conference in Brussels (1876), during which he portrayed a future Congo Free State as a neutral and international state, just as he had projected Belgium's role within Europe. It was Banning, who invented the neutral and un-national *État civilisateur*. He explicitly used his international connections to win the support of all Europeans for the project. He spoke German, English, Italian and Spanish, with French and Dutch being his mother tongues. As a journalist, he published in the French *Journal des Débats* and the German *Gazette of Cologne*.[230] In this way, he contributed to strengthen Belgium as a nation, by portraying it as internationalist.

Indeed, the early Congo Free State, which was the legal successor of the International African Association established by Léopold II and Émile Banning, became an international state, both as a sovereign under international law and by its organization on the ground.[231] Léopold recruited his administrators among all Europeans, while Albert Thys built the famous Congo railway from Matadí to Léopoldville with the help of an international group of engineers and workers, comprising Italian, Danish, German, Swiss, Dutch, Greek and Luxembourger citizens. The multitude of languages spoken during the construction of the Congo-railway from Matadí to Léopoldville in the Belgian Congo brought to mind the "legendary construction site of the Babel

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[228] Ibid., 47.

[229] Ibid., 136.

[230] See J. Stengers (ed.), *Textes Inédits d'Émile Banning. vol.2* (Brussels, 1955), 23 and 28; Banning had studied in Berlin, with Ranke and Droysen being among his teachers. He tried to transfer the German university system to Belgium and wrote an important study on É. Banning, *L'Organisation et l'enseignement de l'Université de Berlin* (Brussels, 1863). His propositions contributed to the reform of the Belgian education system.

[231] C.v. Perbandt, 'Die Erforschung des Kassai-Gebietes', in A. Becker and C.v. Perbandt (eds.), *Hermann von Wissmann: Deutschlands größter Afrikaner* (Berlin, 1906), 69f.

tower", as a keen observer put it.[232] It became the symbol of international holism, until Léopold unveiled his atomistic purpose behind the Congo Free State (CFS).

Up to the 1890s, the CFS was indeed the most eminent symbol of a purely colonial and non-national project. Established by the Belgian king Léopold and his International African Association in 1885, the state had been designed as a "civilizing state" and not as a "nation-state". In a series of articles published in the *Echo du Parlement*, Léopold's one-man think tank in colonial matters, Émile Bannings, had announced the founding of an international *Etat civilisateur* as early as the 1870s.[233] This was prior to the international conference held in Brussels that had launched the occupation of Central Africa by Léopold's International African Association. In a similar way, the ICI member Félicien Cattier cherished an *État colonisateur*: a sovereign state that dedicated all its power to civilizing the territory it governed, without depending on a distant mother nation. The ICI member cherished the early Congo Free State as the symbol of colonial autonomy.

In 1903, an international lawyer in the ICI, Édouard Descamps, felt a need to emphasize the original international character of the *État civilisateur*. His reflections were responsive to the crisis of the Congo Free State, during which Léopold came under attack for having betrayed the internationalist ideal – and the internationally monitored civilizing mission to replace bondage and repression with free labor and capitalism. Descamps published a book that praised and idealized the original *État civilisateur*, which had been established "in the name of science and humanity," because it was dedicated to fighting slavery and "liberate the black race." Descamps was a devoted Christian and a confident internationalist who organized the Hague Peace Conference (1899), set up the Permanent Court of Arbitration (1899) and would be named a special delegate by the League of Nations to establish the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922).[234]

The Congo Free State, he wrote in 1903, was not a nation-state. Its legitimacy was not rooted in ethnic homogeneity or underpinned by a contract with the people. Instead, the CFS was a "civilizing state" or "colonizing state", a "colony without metropole".[235] According to Descamps, its legitimacy as a state originated in its program to civilize central Africa and its inhabitants. For him, the CFS was therefore not a national power, but a moral power.[236] Although regarded with suspicion by international lawyers, the CFS had been officially acknowledged by the international

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[232] See 'Chemin de fer du Congo. Personnel Ouvrier', *Le Congo Illustré: Voyages et Travaux des Belges dans l'État Indépendant du Congo* 1 (1892), 52.

[233] A.J. Wauters, *Histoire Politique du Congo Belge* (Brussels, 1911), 11.

[234] 'Descamps, Édouard', in: Institut Royal Colonial Belge (ed.), *Biographie Coloniale Belge* (Brussels, 1955), vol. 4, 219-230.

[235] É. Descamps, *L'Afrique Nouvelle: Essai sur l'état civilisateur dans les pays neufs et sur la fondation, l'organisation et le gouvernement de l'État indépendant du Congo* (Paris, 1903), 36.

[236] Ibid., 27.

"family of nations" at the 1885 African Conference in Berlin. Since then, Descamps argued, it had acquired an "international personality" as a state.[237]

This international state was exceptional because of its "existence as an autonomous colonizing state, in the face of states that colonize secondarily and additionally only. The latter pursue nationalist purposes as their principal goal."[238] This exceptionalism of the Congo Free State required a justification, because many lawyers denied it a right to exist as a newcomer in the family of states. Descamps defended its legitimacy as a state: the CFS "finds its fundamental legitimacy in the right to assist human beings, who are – like us – made for progress. Moreover, we have to accomplish – with regard to the inferior children of the human race - … the holy law of fraternity"[239] This somewhat confused argument was a combination of Descamps' Christian faith, his universalism and a development mission. However, it revealed that the colonized played a crucial role in his justification of the CFS.

Like the other liberal internationalists in the ICI, Descamps insisted that the indigenous inhabitants were human beings. He had his own reasons for believing that. Once he had proven the legitimacy of the Congo colony as a state, he was concerned about its sovereignty. While the sovereignty of nation-states originated in a monarchical dynasty or an electoral body, none of these existed in the CFS. According to Descamps, the sovereignty of the CFS derived from the multitude of contracts that the International African Association had concluded with the indigenous chiefs in the wake of the 1876 conference. But to do so, the African chiefs who transferred their sovereignty to the International African Association must have been "civilized" enough to possess sovereignty and conclude contracts. Thus, Descamps argued: "Although the barbarian chiefs are fatally unfamiliar with the refinements of political systems, they are nevertheless not without enlightenment regarding the conclusion of contracts. They are not at all incapable of transferring sovereignty rights they might have and acknowledge a superior power of the sovereign who can defend them and guarantee their well-being. They are not at all incapable of saluting the flag of the civilizing state."[240] While the indigenous chiefs were certainly regarded as inferior, they did have the same human propensity for rationality and progress as all other humans. This "humanization" of the Congolese was instrumental in Descamps argument. According to him, the accumulated and rightfully acquired sovereignty rights resulted in one overarching sovereign: the Congo Free State

[237] Ibid., 33.
[238] Ibid., 35.
[239] "trouve son titre de legitimité fondamental dans le droit d'assister des êtres faits comme nous pour le progrès et d'accomplir à l'égard des rejetons inferieurs de l'espece humaine, en harmonie avec la juste recherche de notre bien propre, la sainte loi de la fraternite." Ibid., 37.
[240] "Si des chefs barbares sont fatalement peu initiés aux raffinements des systèmes politiques, ils peuvent n'être pas sans lumière quant aux éléments naturels des contrats; ils ne sont nullement incapables de transférer les droits souverains qui peuvent leur appartenir et de reconnaître un pouvoir supérieur dans le chef d'hommes qui se présentent à eux avec l'engagement de concourir à leur défense et leur bien-être; ils ne sont nullement incapables de saluer à ce titre un drapeau civilisateur" Ibid., 40.

with Léopold ruling it in a personal union. This fact, he argued, was confirmed by the international "family of nations" at the 1884/5 Berlin Conference.

Seen from an idealistic point of view, Descamps' civilizing state was the result of a holistic internationalism and a symbol of colonial autonomy. Descamps' attitude was shared by many members of the ICI who praised the Congo Free State for the purity of its colonial and civilizing purpose. The *État Civilisateur* was the symbol of a holistic internationalism and – at least in theory – the only international state of its time. Colonial internationalism materialized in the Congo Free State, which internationalized its staff and developed into a training ground for European colonial experts. Obviously, Descamps' theory of the civilizing state was an attempt to save the Congo's autonomy in a time when plans to take it away from Léopold and to nationalize it were already underway. Thus, his book was an appeal to maintain colonial internationalism.

While Descamps' praised the autonomous colonial state, colonial internationalists and ICI members indeed played an important part in appeasing diplomatic crises that originated in imperial rivalry. Their activity reached a new level during the Moroccan crisis that peaked between 1906 and 1911, when Germany, France and Spain laid claim on the North African Sultanate. Unlike European governments, who seemed to be willing to risk a conflict over Morocco, the ICI and the leaders of moderate colonial interest groups attached to it, worked towards a peaceful partition. Especially German and French colonial experts, whose nations had become the main competitors after the British had received compensation in Egypt in 1904, called for cooperation. In 1907, the French ICI member Albert de Pouvourville wrote in the *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*:

> We, the friends of colonial expansion in Germany and in France, shall cherish one ideal that we found on the journeys we have made, at the remote places we have seen and during the strenuous and adventurous lives we have led. We should cherish that ideal among all people and in all the different climes. This ideal is certainly not more beautiful than the nationalist thought, but it complements it in the most useful and human way: it is the European ideal.[241]

Pouvourville's appeal echoed the close cooperation between German and French colonialists that had indeed resulted in a veritable friendship by the turn of the century. Inspired by the ICI's success, French and German colonial experts visited each other frequently and engaged in a lively activity of transnational exchange of knowledge.[242] This was remarkable, given that the Franco-Prussian War lingered on in the collective memory of both nations, while a fresh conflict arose in Morocco. Nevertheless, both sides advocated colonial cooperation to overcome political rivalry.

When the French deputy Lucien Hubert gave a speech to members of the German Colonial Society in March 1907 to promote a "Franco-German rapprochement over colonial matters," the

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[241] Albert Comte de Pouvourville, 'Deutschlands Beteiligung am Französischen Kolonialkongreß 1907', *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung,* 33 (17.2.1907), 329.
[242] 'Deutsch-Französische Beziehungen', *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 29 (22.6.1905), 301f.

ICI member Johann Albrecht von Mecklemburg introduced him, claiming that "the recent events delivered the proof of the unifying force of the colonial idea" that might lead to "a similarly successful rapprochement between Germany and France." Lucien Hubert was less sentimental about colonial "friendship" but explained that the *force des choses* left Germany and France no other choice than to cooperate and brought them into dialogue over Morocco. He was struck by the warm welcome he received in Berlin and felt the "respect of the people he met" for the "French colonial methods." Therefore he wanted to see France and Germany "associated, like noble rivals, in the *grand oeuvre* of human progress."[243] The urge to bring about a peaceful solution went far beyond well-meant declarations.

Deeds followed words, and both in France and in Germany, colonial lobby groups like the Committee of French Africa and the German Colonial Society launched press campaigns against nationalist media that favored an armed confrontation over Morocco. The Committee of French Africa turned against the French Foreign Minister, Théophile Delcassé, who advocated an Anglo-French rapprochement and headed for a confrontation with Germany.[244] The German Colonial Society criticized the *Staatssekretär* in the Foreign Ministry, Kiderelen-Wächter, and his attempt to instigate Pan-German journals against France. ICI members and colonial interest groups argued that every nation should have a fair share and French and German colonial experts confirmed each others' right to get a fair share of Morocco.[245]

The private correspondence between ICI members and other colonial internationalists confirms that they saw colonial wars as highly damaging to their own colonial interests. Zimmermann complained bitterly about the German Kaiser who had provoked an international crises by supporting the Moroccan Sultan against the French and by openly insulting their diplomats during his journey to Tangiers in 1906.[246] While the crisis was underway, Zimmermann and Alexander von Danckelmann – two ICI members employed in the German Colonial Ministry – unofficially met with the head of the African Bureau in the French Colonial Ministry in a hotel in Germany.[247] Their aim was to prevent a war by downplaying the role of Pan-German enthusiasm about war. Danckelmann, who had been a co-founder of the Congo Free State and a time-honored colonial internationalist, had a clear opinion on the imperial rivalry. He complained about the "naval

[243] BArch, R 1001, 6131 Einrichtung eines Internationalen Ethnographischen Büros in Brüssel, Nr. 48-55: Lucien Hubert, 'Le rapprochement franco-allemand sur le terrain colonial' *La Grande Revue* 11,10 (10.7.1907), 427-441.
[244] 'Chambre, Séances du 19 Avril' *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française* (April 1905), 163f.
[245] 'Marokko', *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 28 (15.7.1905), 287; 'Deutschland und Frankreich', *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 51 (21.12.1907), 531; BArch, R 1001, 6131 Einrichtung eines Internationalen Ethnographischen Büros in Brüssel, Nr. 48-55: 'Lucien Hubert, Le rapprochement franco-allemand sur le terrain colonial', *La Grande Revue* 11,10 (10.7.1907), 434.
[246] BArch N2345/28, Nr.3: Notizen Zimmermann über Holstein 3.10.[1906?].
[247] BArch N 2345/18, Nr. 34: Duchène (Ministère des Colonies) to Zimmermann from 29.3.1908.

armament" and tried his best "to prevent a war". The Pan-German "inflammatory pamphlets," according to him, did not represent the attitude of German colonial experts.[248]

In 1907, the leader of the French colonial party, Eugène Étienne, who had joined the ICI in 1904, travelled to Germany, and presented himself to the Kaiser Wilhelm II after he had met with several leading politicians. He urged them to find a peaceful solution for the Moroccan conflict and offered to divide the Sultanate among the interested powers. While he gained Wilhelm's goodwill, the predominantly anglophile French government rebuked him for his impertinence.[249] Étienne was a member of the French parliament, but had not been an official delegate of the government. Shortly after Étienne's diplomatic advance, a journey with similar intentions led the French general Hubert Lyautey, the first resident general of Morocco, to Spain. Lyautey, who was a member of the ICI, met with the Spanish King to coordinate colonial policies in Morocco.[250] Both Étienne and Lyautey were admonished by the French government for their unauthorized diplomatic missions.

Ignoring the official position of their government, French *coloniaux* continued to cooperate with like-minded Germans or Spaniards. Lucien Hubert and others came to Berlin while members of the Hamburg-based Colonial Institute visited the French Colonial Union. Relations with Spain were equally good. Hubert contributed to the organs of Spanish colonial lobby groups, like the *Boletín de la Sociedad Geografica de Madrid*, emphasizing the *Entente Cordiale* between the "Latin countries" in colonial matters. Already before the turn of the century, a member of the Spanish Geographical Society, Saturnino Jiménez, had used the *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* to press for a German-Spanish agreement on Morocco in order to provide the basis for a broader European cooperation without confrontation.[251] Although Lucien Hubert's proposal to hold a European Colonial Congress did not materialize due to the outbreak of the First World War, the pre-war era abounded with declarations of mutual friendship.[252]

As Dernburg put it when Hubert came to Berlin: "colonial problems can only be solved internationally." A journal from Frankfurt added that international conflicts could also only be solved on a neutral terrain – the colonial terrain.[253] One first step in this direction was taken when the French colonial minister Théophile Delcassé resigned in 1905 – under pressure from French

[248] BArch N2345/15, Nr. 124: Letter from Danckelmann to Zimmermann from 14.12.12 and Nr. 184 Letter from Danckelmann to Zimmermann from 29.11.1914.
[249] P. Grupp, 'Eugène Etienne et la tentative de rapprochement franco-allemand en 1907', *Cahiers d'Études africaines* 15, 48 (1975), 303–311.
[250] Institut de France, Fonds Auguste Terrier, MS 5955, Dossier Voyage Lyautey en Espagne.
[251] Nogué and Villanova, 'Spanish Colonialism in Morocco': 15.
[252] 'Koloniale Vorlesung des französischen Deputierten L. Hubert', *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, 10, (9.3.1907), 93f.
[253] BArch, R 1001, 6131 Einrichtung eines Internationalen Ethnographischen Büros in Brüssel, Nr. 48-55: 'Lucien Hubert, Le rapprochement franco-allemand sur le terrain colonial' *La Grande Revue* 11,10 (10.7.1907), 427-441.

colonial interest groups who advocated a Franco-German rapprochement. This opened the way for an agreement over Morocco.[254]

The public declarations of Franco-German-Spanish fraternization were, however, not free of political purposes. "Colonial friendship" was clearly directed against British hegemony in colonial matters. The anti-British attitude had already been manifest in the ICI, which was dominated by French- and German-speakers. It took on a dramatic scale after the turn of the century. The French journal *L'Europe Coloniale* – with its full and revealing title *Organe Hebdomadaire des Intérêts Coloniaux de l'Europe Continentale: Allemagne – Autriche – Belgique – Danemark – Espagne – France – Hollande – Italie – Portugal – Russie* – was the most aggressive continental press organ to attack British colonial policy. It openly fought against the "anglo-yankee-australian" expansion and took the Spanish-American War as the starting point to launch "a European action against the Anglo-Saxon crusade." The journal, whose editors were close to Chailley's French Colonial Union suspected the Anglo-Saxons of wanting to expand their influence over the whole globe. In India, in the Spanish Antilles, in Africa in Belgian Congo, and in Transvaal, the Anglo-Saxons tried to "bleed Europe to death…any humiliation of our continent is a national satisfaction for them."[255] This aggressive expansionism, the *Europe Coloniale* claimed, was the "manifestation of a menacing imperialism that aims at Continental Europe." [256] To counterbalance its influence, the *Europe Coloniale* cherished a European Union against the British – and without them. Cooperation with the British, the journal wrote, would be like "kissing Judas." [257] This anti-British attitude of the *Europe Coloniale* has to be seen in the context of the British campaign against forced rubber collection in Léopold's Congo Free State. Although the *Europe Coloniale* denied all accusations, it was obviously funded by Léopold who had recourse to his strategy of bribing colonial activists all over Europe to support his cause.[258]

The anti-British stance of Belgian, French and German colonial activists, along with the Spanish aversion to the USA, gave rise to an alliance among continental colonialists and consolidated their desire for a "Europe coloniale et continentale." Nevertheless, the British had a comeback as potential colonial partners as soon as more delegates from the United Kingdom joined the ICI and when institutions such as the Royal Colonial Institute became interested in colonial exchange. But that was as late as 1913, a year before the World War broke out and put an end to the Franco-German alliance in colonial matters.

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[254] See on Delcassé's role: C. Andrew, *Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy 1898-1905* (London, 1968); For the German-French cooperations see Grupp, 'Eugène Étienne', 306-309.
[255]"Saigner l'Europe aux quatre membres…toute humilation de notre Continent est une satisfaction nationale"… "expression d'un impérialisme menaçant, le domaine de l'Europe Continentale a tout à craindre" Bibliothèque Arsenal Fol-JO-2431, 'L'Europe Coloniale: Son Programme, Sa Raison d'Être, Son Objectif', *L'Europe Coloniale* 1, 1 (9.10.1904).
[256] Ibid.
[257] Ibid., 'L'Union Européenne', *L'Europe Coloniale* 1, 1 (9.10.1904).
[258] Ibid., *L'Europe Coloniale*, 1,3 (23.10.1905).

While the ICI interfered in European diplomacy to maintain colonial peace for holistic and atomistic reasons, the cooperation among its members with regard to "native policy" can be qualified as truly holistic. It goes without saying that the Anti-Slavery Congress of 1890 – when the colonizing powers decided to coordinate their efforts to abolish the trade with slaves, arms and alcohol in the colonies – was conducive to portraying the colonial project as "humanitarian." A memorandum of the German Foreign Ministry described those measures as a "general humanitarian duty that required the cooperation of all powers, also those who did not have colonies in Africa."[259] Indeed the cooperation in this field was holistic and aimed at better controlling the colonized populations and their commercial activities.

More importantly, on several occasions the ICI members appealed to protect native populations, preferably during international colonial congresses. The International Congress on Colonial Sociology (1900) gave a forum to the preservationist colonial internationalists. Held during the World Fair in Paris, the International Congress of Colonial Sociology assembled four hundred individuals, among them delegates from all colonial powers and private associations, like the French Colonial Union and the German Colonial Society who sat down at one table with the representatives of the French and British Aborigines Protection Society.[260]

Philanthropists and colonialists did not necessarily have contradicting views. Protecting the natives from the caprices of colonists and colonial administrators, and protecting native institutions should put an end to anti-colonial rebellions. ICI-member and colonial lawyer Arthur Girault argued at the Congress of Colonial Sociology that in Algeria, juridical assimilation had led to innumerable conflicts, and the replacement of Algerian Muslim *qāḍīs* by European judges had caused jurisdictional chaos. Had the French known about the idea of property in Algeria, for example, revolts would have been avoided. At the same time, Girault argued in favor of maintaining polygamy and collective property, because it was an integral part of Quranic law. Generally speaking, he argued that Europeans should stop assimilation and naturalization to counteract violent resistance. Only by avoiding resistance could prosperity and development of colonies could be achieved.[261]

In 1907, Lucien Hubert proposed to organize an international congress for the protection of the natives and found support in the German press. "Recently, steps have been taken

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[259] BArch, R 1001, 6131 Einrichtung eines Internationalen Ethnographischen Büros in Brüssel, Nr. 59: Memorandum: Internationale Zusammenarbeit zur Einschränkung des Waffenverkehrs und Rolle von 1890.

[260] BArch, R 8023, 655, Präsidiumskorrespondenz, fol. 96/97.

[261] Only labor contracts should be modeled on European examples to guarantee the development of capitalism: A. Girault, 'Condition des Indigènes au Point de vue de la législation civile et criminelle et de la distribution de la justice', in: Exposition Universelle Internationale de 1900 (ed.), *Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale, tenu à Paris du 6 au 11 Aout 1900, vol 1 : Rapport des Procès-Verbaux des Séances* (Paris, 1901), 49-59 and 62-63, see also: F. Cattier, *Droit et Administration de l'État Indépendant du Congo* (Brussels, 1898); A. Girault, *Principes de Colonisation et de Legislation* vol. 2 (Paris, 1907).

to protect certain animal species" the German *Weltwoche* wrote, "therefore, it is not surprising that some bother about humans as well." Inspired by Hubert's initiative, the *Weltwoche* demanded an international declaration "to respect native law, as well as native property rights and family constitution. Their life opportunities [*vitalité, Lebensmöglichkeiten*] have to be protected and they should be granted free work and salaries. Like the French Revolution has proclaimed human rights [*Menschenrechte*] for the grown-up and civilized peoples, the civilized world [*ordnende Kulturwelt*]of today has to claim the human rights for those who are still in the phase of infancy and barbarity" This, Hubert added, can only be achieved through international cooperation among the colonizing states.[262]

While such a conference was not organized prior to the war, more than fifteen ICI members participated in the First Universal Races Congress, among them Camille Janssen, Joseph Chailley, Arthur Girault, Carl H. Becker, Christiaan Snouck-Hurgronje and Rafael Torres Campos. The object of the Universal Races Congress was "to discuss in the light of science and the modern conscience the general relations subsisting between the peoples of the West and those of the East, between the so-called white and the so-called colored peoples, with a view to encouraging between them a fuller understanding, the most friendly feelings, and a heartier co-operation."[263] Although this congress was undoubtedly colonialist in the sense that no spokesmen of the colonized were invited, its members witnessed the participation of W.E.B. Dubois and Indian delegates, who would later play a key role in the Pan-African movement and as supporters of the Indian National Congress.

In conclusion, the ICI was a reformist and internationalist colonial think tank. It dismissed settler colonialism and replaced it with a professional native policy. Its members had various reasons to participate in the project. Smaller nations hoped to enhance their scope of action and participate in the colonial projects. Members of more powerful nations like Germany – or later Great Britain – realized that they could improve their own colonial methods by competitive emulation. But some colonial experts also cherished a holistic ideal of universal colonial science. Portraying colonialism as a science helped them to de-ideologize colonialism and therefore to legitimize it, in accordance with the *fin de siècle* paradigm of rationality and professionalism.

By comparison and knowledge transfer, ICI members tried to bring about international solutions for local problems, like the recruitment of a labor force or the trade in alcohol and opium.

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[262] BArch R 1001, 6131 "Einrichtung eines Internationalen Ethnographischen Büros in Brüssel", Nr. 58: Article "Internationale Konferenz für Eingeborenenschutz: Ein Vorschlag von Lucien Hubert", *Die Woche* (Berlin) 9,9 (2. März 1907); See also Nr. 48-55: 'Lucien Hubert, Le rapprochement franco-allemand sur le terrain colonial' *La Grande Revue* 11,10 (10.7.1907), 427-441.

[263] G. Spiller (ed.), *Papers on Inter-racial Problems: Communicated to the First Universal Races Congress, Held at the University of London, July 26-29, 1911* (London, 1911), v (Preface).

While the ICI itself refrained from issuing political recommendations, or from formulating colonial "doctrines," its members played an active role in shaping an international community of colonizing nations. The attempt to influence European diplomacy is only one manifestation of the desire to have a say in colonial matters as non-governmental experts.

The liberal orientation of the ICI contributed in portraying colonialism as a project of modernity, leading to human progress through economic development. However, their liberalism originated first and foremost in an utilitarian attitude which aimed at making colonies self-sufficient or profitable, with the support of external capital and native labor. The colonized should play a crucial role in this project, and the ICI intended to prepare them to become the "colonists" of the twentieth century, as the head of the ICI, Joseph Chailley, had put it.[264] A Belgian ICI member confirmed the anti-settlerist program and didn't mince words: "the colonists are stupid. They want to destroy [*détruire*] the people that are indispensable for them. They are brutalized monsters who want to bite the hand that feeds them, and are not even aware of it. They are not human if they are not forced to be…only human countries can have colonies in which the natives are treated in a humane way."[265]

Colonial internationalism and "native" participation seemed to be closely linked. The Universal Races Congress confirmed that colonial internationalists were more likely to accept the natives as an integral part of colonial life. Generally speaking, colonial internationalism was the pre-condition of administrative professionalization, scientific comparison, development programs and native policies. In the following chapter, the causal connections between colonial internationalism and native policy will be analyzed in detail.

[264] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1899*, 110.

[265] AMAEB, D 4701/170 publications et activité de Louwers, Folder Institut International Colonial [sic !] O.L. Sécretaire Général 1926, Grenade to Louwers from 21.1.1928.

Chapter 3

From Tropical Hygiene to Racist Anthropology: The International Colonial Institute and the Acclimatization Dilemma

At the turn of the century, the ICI colonial experts proclaimed that colonialism was not based on the racial superiority of the whites, but – on the contrary – that it revealed a certain degree of white inferiority. Native races, they explained, were always superior to invading races. The aims of this chapter are to show how they reached this conclusion, and why such a verdict revolutionized colonial policies. As we will see, their argument derived from an evolutionist and racist world view that led them to conclude that the white race would degenerate once Europeans settled in the insalubrious climate of tropical colonies. Influenced by theories of Jean Baptiste de Lamarck and Gustave le Bon about the enfeeblement of European vitality in a tropical environment, they gradually embraced the idea that the colonized peoples were racially superior - at least in the colonies overseas.[1] This understanding was not intuitive, but was the result of a long process, during which the ICI members realized that neither traditional naval medicine nor progressive microbiology was able to provide them with a means to immunize whites against the hostile tropical environment. Their belief in both racist evolutionism and geodeterministic "milieu" theories resulted in an "acclimatization dilemma", according to which the white race would degenerate once its members tried to acclimatize themselves to a tropical environment.[2] It was this racist notion that led them to proclaim the "triumph of the native," instead of supporting settlement with white Europeans. In tandem with international tropical hygienists, the ICI thus contributed to racializing medical discourses and it spread the news of the "triumph of the native" via its transnational networks. This transnational cooperation was also the reason why it tackled the topic of tropical hygiene in the first place.

When members of the ICI met for the first time in 1894, they chose to discuss the one topic that was least likely to cause nationalist clashes among its members: the unhealthy climate in the colonies. In so doing, they intended to close their ranks against a common "enemy", which had indeed claimed more European lives than any colonial war.[3] Encountering the hostile climate upon arrival in the colony, Europeans blamed it for facilitating contagion and deadly

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[1] On the fear of degeneration derived from an alleged "mismatch of race and place," see Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies*, 2.

[2] Acclimatization means the process during which an organism adjusts itself to a new environment and is modified during this process. See for an overview Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers*, 8-39.

[3] See the classical study by Curtin, *Death by Migration*.

diseases, as well as for causing mental disorders and organic dysfunction. This allegedly "unnatural" encounter between Europeans and the alien environment posed a threat to the "race Européenne", as one member of the ICI put it.[4] In the first part of this chapter I show the extent to which the debate on the tropical climate and converging discourses about its damaging effects on health shaped an imagined transnational *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* on the part of the colonizers.

Against the backdrop of colonial expansion into equatorial Africa in the 1880s, members of the ICI initially embarked enthusiastically on a debate about hygiene and acclimatization as the prerequisites of European colonization. The subject figured high on the agenda of sessions held in 1894, 1895, 1900, 1908, 1909, 1911, 1912 and 1913, with the deliberations continuing after the First World War. Initially, the ICI discussed two promising strategies to immunize Europeans against the tropical climate: "tropical hygiene", which promised immunization through medical prophylaxis and individual discipline, and "acclimatization", which promised neutralization through a gradual process of somatic adaption to the tropical environment. The revolutionary discoveries of bacteriologists in the 1890s seemed to further improve the possibilities offered by tropical hygiene, by identifying the agents of tropical diseases and discovering how these agents entered the human body.

While ICI members felt optimistic about the possibilities provided by tropical hygiene and acclimatization in the beginning, they soon identified the tropical climate to be the major obstacle to European colonization. According to them, even the assertive fin-de-siècle medicine found it difficult to neutralize the climate of the "warm countries" – or to immunize Europeans against its detrimental effects.[5] Distrusting colonial medicine, the ICI created its own committee on acclimatization, which examined the effects of long-term settlement in the tropics on white colonists and their children.

In this chapter, I show that ICI members at the end of the nineteenth century did not share the medical optimism inherent to tropical hygiene, acclimatization and even microbiology. The members discarded these medical sciences as a means to enable white settlement in the colonies on the grounds that most attempts of white settlement had failed. Disappointed by the medical sciences, they searched for alternative possibilities. Some believed that the altitude of colonial hill stations might compensate for the dangers of the tropical latitude; others suggested creolization and race-mixing to create "cosmopolitan" races that would able to settle all over

[4] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, 135.

[5] As a general overview see D. Arnold (ed.), *Warm Climates and Western Medicine: The Emergence of Tropical Medicine, 1500-1900* (Amsterdam et. al., 1996).

the globe. None of those ideas turned out to be successful and ICI members remained skeptical towards white settlement and feared detrimental long-term effects on the white race as a whole.

The firm belief on the part of ICI members in evolutionist racism and environmental determinism, I argue in this chapter, ousted their hope in medical possibilites to immunize Europeans against the tropical climate. At the same time, medical and hygienist discourses were increasingly infiltrated by racist theories. Assuming a pessimistic stance towards acclimatization, ICI members claimed that it would inevitably lead to the degeneration of the entire white race. This argument was inherently racist and anthropological, rather than "medical." It represented the ICI's belief in racist theories rather than practical medicine.

Abandoning settler colonization for racist reasons, ICI members publicly heralded the "triumph of the native," whom they declared as the only productive force in tropical colonies. Ironically, they recommended the use of new developments in tropical medicine, immunology, and microbiology to optimize the native population for work, while dismissing them as adequate means to prepare white settlers for the colonies. The medical care that the ICI provided for the natives thus became an integral part of the "native policy" that should turn colonial subjects into workers. Native policy thereby reconciled their utilitarian desire to make the colonies more productive with paradigmatic racist theories. At the same time, in order to avoid contact with the tropical environment and native races and therefore to avoid illness, the ICI advocated racial segregation.

International Cooperation in Tropical Hygiene and Acclimatization

Most of the new colonies acquired in the 1880s stretched north and south from the equator and lay within the "intertropical" or "torrid" zone, a region with an unhealthy climate that had been considered uninhabitable for Europeans since Aristotle's times. In the late nineteenth century, however, the colonial territory in tropical Africa entered the center stage, when the geopolitical scramble for colonies turned European attention towards this territory.

Although European colonizers had identified central Africa as an ideal territory in which to establish new colonies, it was, however, by no means clear if it was colonizable at all. Officially, mortality rates among Europeans during the 1890s amounted to 57‰ in Belgian Congo, 75 ‰ in the Niger Coast Protectorate, 113‰ in the German Cameroons and up to 264 ‰ in French Dahomey.[6] These official numbers were manipulated to make mortality seem less

[6] These statistics were provided by Gustave Dryepondt, Belgian hygienist and member of the ICI : Société Royale de Médicine Publique et de Topographie Médicale de Belgique (ed.), *Rapports présentés au Congrès national d'hygiène et de Climatologie Médicale de la Belgique et du Congo* (Brussels, 1898), 433.

problematic. German statistic revealed the full extent of the problem: of 164 administrators and soldiers who served in German Cameroon between 1885 and 1896, only one third completed their service, while two thirds either died or became invalid due to blackwater fever, malaria or dysentery.[7] Such high numbers of casualties not only disabled the colonial administration, but, first and foremost, reflected very badly back in Europe, as members of the ICI emphasized when meeting in The Hague in 1895:

> Isn't it the idea of the insalubrious climate that wards off men and capitals from tropical Africa? It is useless to search for other reasons! ... A double benefit derives from taking care of the administrators' life to allow them to endure in the colonies: the state can introduce an element of stability to the colonial administration and inspire confidence among the masses in the colonial project. Are not these the two ingredients that guarantee the success of the whole enterprise?[8]

Since the reputation of the entire colonial project – and its funding – was dependent on the good health of the colonizers, administrators and colonial propagandists urged for immediate and professional solutions to avoid high mortality rates. Leading representatives of the ICI hoped to find these solutions with the help of an international epistemic community of medical experts, who were about to professionalize and establish tropical medicine as an approved discipline.[9] This is why the ICI invited Georges Treille, Professor of Naval Hygiene and Exotic Pathology and Inspector General of the French *Service de Santé des Colonies*, to speak at its first-ever meeting in 1894.[10] An internationally renowned expert on tropical medicine (in French: *pathologie exotique*), Treille made a plea for transnational cooperation and evoked the European sense of community with regard to climatic menaces overseas:

> In these diverse [colonial] climes, a *rapprochement* of interests is prepared which is like an international fusion, and the regrettable divisions of the old Europe disappear. The new colonies open themselves liberally to every European, with disregard to his nationality…This solidarity of European interests – in an attempt to civilize the barbarian and unexploited countries – places huge duties on international science. Science has to make all efforts to render the access to hot countries less difficult and ameliorate the conditions of the colonist, as well as to edict and codify the laws of hygiene and acclimatization. Finally, it needs to join forces to combat the unjust preventions that damage the colonizing spirit.[11]

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[7] A. Plehn, *Beiträge zur Kenntniss von Verlauf und Behandlung der tropischen Malaria in Kamerun* (Berlin, 1896), 24.
[8] ICI, *Compte-Rendu 1895*, 97.
[9] M.A. Osborne, *The Emergence of Tropical Medicine in France* (Chicago and London, 2014).
[10] G. Treille, *Organisation Sanitaire des Colonies: Progrès Réalisés – Progrès à Faire* (Marseille, 1906), 60.
[11] G. Treille, *De l'acclimatation des Européens dans les pays chauds* (Paris, 1888), 6: "Il se prépare dans ces diverses contrées un rapprochement d'intérêts et comme une fusion internationale, où ne se retrouvent pas les regrettables divisions de la vielle Europe. Les colonies nouvelles s'ouvrent libéralement à tout Européen, de quelque nationalité qu'il se réclame. L'éloignement, l'ésprit de défense commune contre des communs ennemis, la secrète affinité humaine que ne viennent pas gâter ici les discordes du vieux continent, tout concourt à cette accord. Cette solidarité d'intérêts européens, dans une tentative de civilisation de pays barbares et inexploités, crée à la science internationale de grands

According to Treille, the tropical climate did not discriminate between nationalities, but threatened the health of all Europeans indiscriminately, who became companions in fate. For this *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* of the colonizers, the climate thus provided an excellent starting point for the Institute's members to forget about their national rivalries.

Treille's holistic and scientific understanding of international solidarity fitted the program of the ICI very well, since it portrayed itself as the *alma mater* of the colonial sciences. Its leaders made use of pre-existing networks provided by a transnational *republic of letters*: medical science looked back on a long tradition of international cooperation, and the comparably young discipline of tropical medicine had become a model of scientific transnationalism.[12] Experts in tropical medicine who joined the ICI, or held close ties with it, formed part of these networks, which spanned the oceans and continents.

Most of these experts pursued transnational careers and were no strangers to foreign colonies. Before the *Reich* acquired its own colonies, German doctors had often practiced in the Dutch Indies, where their skills had been in high demand.[13] Albert Plehn, a German physician, member of the ICI and vice-president of the International Society for Tropical Hygiene, had started his career in the Dutch Indies, where he systematized the use of quinine prophylaxis against malaria.[14] Later, he applied his knowledge as a *Regierungsarzt* in German Cameroon, where he organized the containment of malaria, blackwater fever, dysentery and beri-beri.[15] His brother Friedrich also learned his craft in the Dutch Indies and enhanced his skills in extensive travels through British India, working in the laboratory of the famous malaria specialist Ronald Ross and studying the British health care system.[16] German colonial

devoirs. Elle doit faire tous ses efforts pour rendre l'accès des pays chauds moins difficile et améliorer la condition des colons; pour édicter et codifier en quelque sorte les lois de l'hygiène de l'acclimatation. Elle doit enfin concourir à abattre les injustes préventions qui nuisent à l'ésprit colonisateur."

[12] Michael Osborne's claim that tropical medicine can only be explained within its national borders cannot be confirmed here: Osborne, *The Emergence of Tropical Medicine*, 2; for a nuanced interpretation see: Neill, *Networks in Tropical Medicine*; A. Digby, W. Ernst, and P.B. Muhkarji (eds.), *Crossing Colonial Historiographies. Histories of Colonial and Indigenous Medicines in Transnational Perspective* (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2010); M. Mertens and G. Lachenal, 'The History of "Belgian" Tropical Medicine from a Cross-Border Perspective', *Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis* 90 (2012), 1249–1272.

[13] Snouck to Nöldeke from 4 January 1919, in Koningsveld, *Orientalism and Islam*, 270.

[14] *Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropen-Hygiene* 35 (1931), 205; Plehn, *Beiträge zur Kenntniss*, 18; Other German physicians had made a career in Dutch Java, like Martin Hofrath as hygienist for the Tabakmaatschaatschappy Arendsburg and the Deli-Maatschappy, whose hospital he directed: M. Hofrath, 'Kulihospitäler an der Nordküste Sumatras', *Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene* 1, 1 (1897), 39–46. The same goes for Max Glogner, who worked for the Stadsgeneesheer in Samarang-Java: M. Glogner, 'Neuere Untersuchungen über Aetiologie und den klinischen Verlauf der Beri-beri Krankheit', *Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene* 1,1 (1897).

[15] E. Rumberger, 'Plehn, Friedrich', *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 20 (2001), 524f.

[16] F. Plehn, 'Bericht über die Informationsreise nach Ceylon und Indien', *Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene* 3, 5 (1899), 280.

authorities employed him in the Cameroons and East Africa, and after this he set up a sanatorium in Egypt to treat Europeans and Asians suffering from lung and kidney diseases.[17]

Another German member of the ICI, Hans Ziemann, had visited several foreign colonies before he began to direct the hospital in Duala and was asked to evaluate the possibility of white settlement in Northern Cameroon. He was a member of the British Society for Tropical Medicine and Hygiene and the Société de Pathologie Exotique in Paris.[18] In Paris, he got to know Raphaël Blanchard, a French entomologist who had obtained his degree in Germany and Austria. [19] Blanchard was held in high esteem by the British Nobel Prize winner Ronald Ross, mentioned above, who applied Blanchard's research on medical zoology in India.[20]

In 1902, Blanchard joined forces with the founder of the ICI, Joseph Chailley, to set up the French Institut de Médicine Coloniale, which they modeled after the London School of Tropical Medicine and the Liverpool Tropical School of Diseases by adapting their curriculums.[21] Specializing in tropical pathology, hygiene and parasitology, Blanchard's Institut de Médicine Coloniale evolved into an international training school for tropical doctors: in the first year of its existence thirteen French, one Belgian, three Columbian, one Haitian and two Russian students graduated from the school.[22] Blanchard regularly visited the Tropical School in London with his students.[23]

Blanchard's successor as a director of the Institut de Médicine Coloniale was Émile Brumpt, who had studied malaria in the French colonies and in Brazil, where he founded the chair of parasitology in the São Paolo Faculty of Medicine. Brumpt collaborated with the German Ziemann, and both assisted Ronald Ross.[24] After the World War, Brumpt pursued his international career and joined the League of Nation's Health Committee, which supported his epidemiological studies in the "warm countries", funded by the Rockefeller Foundation.[25]

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[17] Rumberger, 'Plehn, Friedrich', 524f. German and Swiss sanitary doctors were frequent in Egypt: See F. Plehn, 'Reise durch Deutsch-Ostafrika, Ägypten und Italien', *Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene* 4 (1900), 151.

[18] 'Hans Ziemann', in: *Deutsches Koloniallexikon* (Berlin, 1920), vol. 3, 748f.

[19] R. Blanchard, 'L'Entomologie et la médicine', *Congrès international d'Entomologie, Bruxelles, 1910* (Brussels, 1912); see also A. Opinel, 'The Emergence of French Medical Entomology: The Influence of Universities, the Institute Pasteur and Military Physicians (c. 1890-1938)', *Medical History* 52 (2008), 387–405.

[20] W.F. Bynum and C. Overy, *The Beast in the Mosquito: The Correspondence of Ronald Ross and Patrick Manson* (Amsterdam, 1998), 486.

[21] Opinel, 'The Emergence of French Medical Entomology', 391; Chailley's French Colonial Union, the president of the colonial group in the French chamber Eugène Etienne, and the general governors of Indochina and Senegal funded the Institute for Colonial Medicine: R. Blanchard, *L'Insitut de Médicine Coloniale: Histoire de sa Fondation, Extrait des Archives de Parasitologie* (Paris, 1902), 7.

[22] Ibid., 19.

[23] É. Heckel and M. Cyprien, *L'enseignement colonial en France et à l'étranger* (Marseille, 1907), 155.

[24] Neill, *Networks in Tropical Medicine*, 84.

[25] É. Brumpt, *Titres et travaux scientifiques* (Paris, 1934) cited in: Opinel, A., Gachelin, G., 'Emile Brumpt's contribution to the characterization of parasitic diseases in Brazil, 1909-1914', *Parassitologia* 47, 3/4 (2005), 299–308.Concerning the continuity between colonial health services and international health organizations see: I. Borowy, *Coming to Terms with World Health: The League of Nations Health Organisation, 1921-1946* (Frankfurt and New York, 2009), 15 and

Gustavo Pittaluga, an Italian-born expert in malaria studies who put down roots in Spain after participating in the International Medical Congress in Madrid (1903), followed a similar career path. Heading the General Spanish Health Directory, he was responsible for domestic sanitation policy, but also led expeditions to Equatorial Guinea in order to advance the Spanish colonial health service. A member of the ICI, Pittaluga became vice-president of the League of Nation's hygiene commission in the interwar period.[26]

Demand for Italian physicians like Pittaluga had always been particularly high in all the colonies, because these physicians had gained experience in combating contagious diseases in malaria-ridden Italy. In Léopold's Congo, for example, almost half of the doctors employed by the Free Congo State were Italians.[27] The French colonial ministry frequently sent selected colonial doctors to study in Italy before they established themselves in the colonies.[28] The renowned German bacteriologist Robert Koch had also visited Italy frequently, before he continued to study malaria in Dutch Java. Against the backdrop of his fame and experience, the German government then sent him to investigate the origins of sleeping sickness in German East Africa.[29] There, Koch joined forces with colleagues from British Uganda to combat the malady more effectively. On his recommendation, British and German authorities cut the bushes surrounding Lake Victoria, where the contagious tsetse flies had their breeding grounds. In order to stop the endemic wave from advancing in East Africa, German and British colonial governments then agreed to monitor the border crossings around Lake Victoria and to prevent infected Africans from entering the others' territory. So-called 'concentration camps' multiplied on both sides of the border and European doctors cooperated to "segregate" suspect Africans and put them in quarantine.[30] In this respect, the colonial border turned into a zone of German-British cooperation.

At the same time, Léopold II invited a commission from the Tropical School in Liverpool to send several expeditions to the Congo Free State, to further investigate the causes

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198; J. Farley, *To Cast Out Disease: A History of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation (1913-1951)* (Oxford and New York, 2004), vii.

[26] A. Baganet Cobas, et al., 'Dr. Gustavo Pittaluga Fattorini. In memoriam', *Revista Habanera de Ciencias Médicas* 13, 1 (2014), 11–19; See also G. Pittaluga, *Elementos de Parasitologia y nociones de medicina tropical* (Madrid, 1914).

[27] See the account of an ICI member who had worked in the Congo Free State, E. Baccari, *Il Congo* (Roma 1908), 70; J.L. Vellut, 'European medicine in the Congo Free State (1885-1908)', in P.G. Janssens (ed.), *Health in Central Africa since 1885* (Brussels, 1997), 67–87.

[28] ANOM FM Mis/99, Dossier relatif au médecin principal de 2e classe Jean Legendre.

[29] 'Ergebnisse der wissenschaftlichen Expedition des Geheimen Medizinalrats Professor Dr. Koch nach Italien zur Erforschung der Malaria', *Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift* 5 (1899), 344–347; BArch R 6619/75.

[30] 'Quarterly Report on the Progress of Segregation Camps and Medical Treatment of Sleeping Sickness in Uganda for the Quarter December 1, 1902, to February 29, 1903', in H. Brode (ed.), *British and German East Africa: Their Economic and Commercial Relations* (London, 1911), 79-80. Segregation camps already existed in British India and were visited frequently by Europeans: F. Plehn, 'Bericht über die Informationsreise nach Ceylon und Indien', *Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene* 3, 5 (1899b), 310–311: 306.

of trypanosomiasis, and to test the effects of arsenic atoxyl as a counteragent.[31] In order to join the international campaign against sleeping sickness, the Société belge d'études coloniales founded a medical laboratory in Léopoldville, where the ICI member Dryepondt worked with an international team of researchers.[32] The laboratory worked closely with the French Pasteur Institute, which had also been founded to combat sleeping sickness and was located just over the Congo River in French Brazzaville.

In Germany, Robert Koch and ICI member Franz von Arenberg initiated the creation of the Institute for Maritime and Tropical Diseases (1900) in Hamburg and modeled it after similar Dutch and British institutes in Weldevreden and Simla, with the objective of preparing German doctors for their service in the colonies.[33] German tropical hygienist Claus Schilling, who directed the tropical section at Koch's laboratories in Berlin, corresponded with the ICI, and used his international networks to do field research in Léopold's Congo and the French colonies.[34] While the ICI was not an institute for tropical medicine as such, it did contribute to forging a link between tropical hygienists from different countries, overseas administrations, and colonial ministries in the metropole. While the first international congress of tropical medicine was held as late as 1913, the ICI offered a platform to specialists in the field as early as 1894.

After the turn of the century, international congresses and associations gave rise to the emergence of a transnational epistemic community in colonial medicine.[35] International associations and congresses often issued recommendations that influenced colonial policies on the ground. When the infamous *rinderpest* ravaged East Africa in the late 1890s – and threatened to destroy the local cattle breeding culture and to cause unrest among the population, an international expert commission identified a formerly unknown mutation of the virus to be at its origin. Spontaneous measures taken on the spot were soon backed by an extraordinary session on the various "stock diseases" at the International Veterinary Congress in The Hague

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[31] Mertens and Lachenal, 'The History of "Belgian Tropical Medicine"', 1256.
[32] J.E. van Canpenhout and G. Dryepondt, 'Rapport sur les travaux du laboratoire médical de Léopoldville en 1899-1900.'
[33] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1907*, 65 and 'Errichtung eines Instituts für Tropenhygiene', *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 13 (13.3.1899), 106.
[34] C. Schilling, 'Die Schulen für Tropenmedizin in England' and 'Bericht über die Studienreise nach West-Afrika', cit. in: D.J. Neill, 'Science and Civilizing Missions: Germans and the Transnational Community of Tropical Medicine', in B. Naranch and G. Eley (eds), *German Colonialism in a Global Age* (Durham, 2014), 74–9277.
[35] After 1876, international congresses on hygiene and demography were held in different European cities; Even earlier, international sanitary conferences were held in Paris (1851, 1859), Constantinople (1866), Vienna (1874), Washington (1881), Rome (1885), Venice (1892), where an international convention was drafted for the sanitary observance of the Suez Canal. The sanitation policy at the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal became widely admired among colonialists: C. Schilling, 'Welche Bedeutung haben die neuen Fortschritte der Tropenhygiene für unsere Kolonien?', *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1910* (Berlin, 1910), 175.

(1909).[36] The colonial authorities took a great interest in its results: "It is obvious that the respective governments have a joint interest in stamping out those diseases which endanger the economic development of their territories, and wherever the occasion arises the necessary steps are taken in full unanimity."[37] Tropical medicine was the "colonial" science that was most likely to invite "unanimity" among colonial governments, as well as experts.

Tropical medicine was not, however, a *colonial* science by nature. Rather, it dealt with the "warm countries" in general terms. The "warm countries" was a designation of frequent use from the mid-eighteenth century on and was widely used as a term in the mental maps of medical geography.[38] The term covered a wide geographical space and was used in a relatively flexible way. For example, northern Europeans had a tendency to stigmatize the so-called "olive countries" as an unhealthy and tropical territory: in so doing, they pathologized Mediterranean countries like southern Spain and Italy.[39] French scholars preferred to speak in a very general way of "exotic countries" – and correspondingly called tropical medicine "exotic pathology." Such broad concepts added to the vagueness of the discourse about countries with a "tropical", "exotic" or simply "warm" climate.[40] Consequently, the "tropics" were an elastic concept, which could be used to designate most of the non-European territories that had become colonies in the 1880s.

In accordance with this broad definition of the "tropics," the ICI was able to redefine tropical medicine as a colonial science. Consequently, it tropicalized the colonies and colonized tropical medicine. There can be no doubt that both the colonial lobby and tropical medicine benefitted from this amalgamation: the fusion of colonial science and tropical medicine provided experts in both fields with two good arguments instead of one to receive government funding and mobilize resources, and, in this sense, colonial progress and the progress of tropical medicine were achieved together. It is therefore not surprising that the growing importance of colonial expansion induced leading tropical scientists such as George Treille and Karl Daeubler – both affiliated with the ICI – to openly declare tropical medicine as an auxiliary science for colonization.[41] It should also be noted, however, that this was a recurrent pattern in the history of the ICI, that is, to give non-colonial expert knowledge a colonial twist and to subsume other

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[36] A. Theiler, 'Notes on Stock Diseases of German and British East Africa and Uganda, and the Resolutions of the International Veterinary Congress at the Hague, Holland, 1909', *Agricultural Journal of British East Africa* 3, 1 (April 1910), 25–42.
[37] H. Brode (ed.), *British and German East Africa: Their Economic and Commercial Relations* (London, 1911), 134.
[38] Regarding the concept of "warm countries", see H.B. Scheube, *Die Krankheiten der Warmen Länder* (Jena, 1910); G. Pittaluga, *Enfermedades de los paises cálidos y parasitología general* (Madrid, 1923); Treille, *De l'acclimatation*.
[39] 'Akklimatisation', *Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon*, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1905), 224-227: 225.
[40] Accordingly, the French name for tropical medicine was "pathologie exotique": Neill, *Networks in Tropical Medicine*, 15.
[41] K. Däubler, *Die Grundzüge der Tropenhygiene* (Munich, 1895), 4; G. Treille, *Principes d'hygiene coloniale* (Paris, 1899), II.

sciences under a colonial paradigm. In other words, appropriating scientific prestige helped the ICI to elevate mere colonial propaganda to a veritable colonial science.

In a similar way, both ICI members and experts on tropical medicine profited from international knowledge transfers. More than fifteen tropical hygienists and heads of colonial sanitary services joined the ICI to scour the colonial market for employment opportunities and knowledge transfers – even though they had a well-established scientific network of international experts in non-colonial tropical medicine. ICI members, in turn, used the pre-existing networks of *tropical* medicine to answer a most pertinent *colonial* question: Was the colonial settlement of Europeans in the "warm" regions medically possible? As we will see in the following sections, the ICI invited international experts in tropical medicine to answer this question. For them, finding an answer to this question was crucial to define the nature of future colonial projects. In sum, the ICI capitalized on the transnational and universal aspiration of science, with tropical medicine being posited as the first among all "colonial" sciences in the sense that it was considered as an applied science to enable colonization.

From Naval Hygiene to Racist Segregation: the Transformation of Medical Discourses

In order to utilize tropical medicine as a "colonial science", the ICI invited eminent scholars in the field to find answers to the question of whether hygiene would be able to immunize Europeans against the harmful tropical climate and the diseases that it provoked among the Europeans. The ICI's inaugural session in 1894 kicked off with a memorandum by British hygienist Sir William Moore, an old-school doctor and military surgeon. He had been an employee of the Indian Health Service and had compiled the "do*s*' and 'don't*s*" for Europeans settling in British India. Discussed *in absentia* of the author, Moore's memorandum fell short of expectations: his instructions hardly improved upon the nineteenth-century guides for emigrants, while his memorandum highlighted the undeveloped knowledge typical of traditional naval handbooks.[42]

Moore was well known for rejecting the recent discoveries of microbiological research and for insisting – by reference to miasma theories, which blamed high temperatures and emanations from the soil for tropical diseases – on the fact that heat and humidity were the main

[42] See P.D. Curtin, *Disease and Empire: The Health of European Troops in the Conquest of Africa* (Cambridge and New York 1998); Osborne, *The Emergence of Tropical Medicine*; Arnold, *Warm Climates*; R.M. MacLeod and M.J. Lewis, *Disease, Medicine, and Empire: Perspectives on Western Medicine and the Experience of European Expansion* (London and New York, 1988); With regard to global contexts: Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies* and M. Cueto, *El regreso de las epidémias: Salud y sociedad en el Perú del siglo XX* (Lima, 1997).

causes of the irritations from which Europeans who dwelled in the warm climes suffered.[43] Heat, he stated categorically, caused a depression of the nervous system (tropical neurasthenia) once it passed the average temperature back in Europe by twenty degrees Fahrenheit. Moore had observed the consequences of high temperatures in British India, which took the form of languor, aversion to exercise, and anorexia, all of these symptoms that were familiar to Europeans living in Britain's crown colony. In his view, the physical lethargy of these Europeans originated primarily in what was known as tropical anemia. Anemia was caused by a lack of oxygen in the warm tropical air, which led to a dysfunction of the red blood cells that supplied the human body with fresh air. Apart from provoking weakness and pallor, Moore continued, anemia also threatened the average European's life by reducing the capacity of their organs to detoxify the body and break down organic matter.[44]

Upholding the age-old tradition of naval medicine, Moore identified heat and the resulting anemia, but also hypovitaminosis scorbut and malaria, as the main threats to Europeans. Like other naval doctors, he believed that malaria – better known as malarial or intermittent fevers – were endemic to marshy localities and were caused by emanations from the soil that contaminated the atmosphere. The hygienist prophylaxis that he recommended included the consumption of fresh vegetables while avoiding hot spices, invigorating sleep, and frequent holidays in Europe. Moreover, he advised Europeans to avoid sudden changes from hot to cold temperatures and recommended the taking of prophylactic quinine and arsenic against endemic diseases such as malaria.[45]

When the ICI discussed Moore's memorandum in 1894, most of his speculations on the etiology of diseases and climatic determinism had already been disproved, especially those regarding the causes of tropical anemia. Even medical laymen in the ICI had heard that epidemiologists in the famous *Weltverden* laboratory in Dutch Java, as well as researchers in French New Caledonia and in Brazil, had recently discarded the idea of heat as a reason for anemia and identified malaria as the real origin for blood deficiency.[46] Moore's prescriptions for quinine and arsenic were now viewed as deriving from trial-and-error medicine rather than

[43] Moore had written W. Moore, *A Manual of the Diseases of India with a Compendium of Diseases* (London, 1886) and a highly successful companion for European families in British India: W. Moore, *A Manual of Family Medicine for India* (London, 1883)[7 reprints until 1903], which was recommended by the government of India.
[44] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894,* 44-46.
[45] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894,* 50-51; See for malaria and naval hygiene: J. Wilson, *Naval Hygiene: With an Appendix : Moving Wounded Men on Shipboard* (Washington, 1870), 162.
[46] The doctors, who proved this by chemical tests, were Prof. Barendt Stokvis from the university of Amsterdam, Pedro de Magelhaes in Rio de Janeiro, Dr. Marestang in New Caledonia, and particularly the Dutch physician Christiaan Eyckman in his famous *Laboratorium voor Pathologie Anatomie en Bacteriologie* in Weltevreden (Batavia), who cooperated closely with Robert Koch: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894,* 53; Especially van der Lith critizised Moore's memorandum: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894*, 52. Concerning the origins of tropical anemia see B. Nocht, 'Akklimatisation', in: H. Schnee (ed.), *Deutsches Koloniallexikon* (Berlin, 1920), 27ff and Däubler, *Die Grundzüge der Tropenhygiene*, 29.

from professional and purposeful medication. As a result, members of the ICI rejected his expertise, which had nothing to offer but the charm of a bygone age.

Disappointed by Moore's memorandum, participants of the first ICI meeting turned to the head of the French colonial health service, Georges Treille, an internationally renowned scholar and member of the ICI.[47] Acclaimed for his presentation on *The Acclimatization of Europeans in the Warm Countries* at the Sixth International Congress on Hygiene and Demography (Vienna 1887), he was said to believe in the ability of modern medicine and hygiene to make the colonies a habitable place for Europeans.[48] Algeria served him as an example of this and he praised its development into a multi-national settler colony that continued to exist despite a long history of colonial failure and disasters.[49]

Treille's concept of tropical medicine was situated halfway between Moore's guidelines to self-improvement and bacteriologist medical science. His hygienic advice for whites who sojourned in the tropics was conventional: in order to avoid deficient sweating during the hottest period of the day, he recommended frequent showers, baths and ventilation, as well as appropriate clothes and awnings to keep the sun away.[50] As well as high temperatures, humidity and barometric pressure, he blamed "waters, airs and places" – the main sources of disease already identified by Hippocrates – to be detrimental to European bodies.[51] Water posed by far the most dangerous threat to Europeans, he claimed, because of "the mineralizations that are alien to our body and the products of vegetal decomposition, germs, etc." These elements, Treille argued, could "cause intermittent fevers, dysentery, hepatitis or intertropical cachexia."[52]

This shows us that, although Treille accepted germs as one possible cause of disease, he equally maintained his allegiance to the Hippocratic etiology, which believed in contagion through the air, waters and miasma (contaminated air emanating from vegetal decomposition). His continued use of naval medicine terminology confirmed his medical conservatism. The

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[47] Treille, born in Poitiers 1847, had travelled widely in Algeria, Senegal, Australia, India, China and Indochina. He was a member of the *Conseil Supérieur de Santé de la Marine* and held close ties with the French colonial lobby in general and with their leader Eugène Etienne in particular: Osborne, *The Emergence of Tropical Medicine*, 137f; Treille became an internationally renowned expert in tropical medicine. He held close ties with the multilingual journal *Archiv für Schiffs-und Tropenkrankheiten*, which was printed in Hamburg, funded by the German Colonial Society and published by a multinational group of colonial experts: Treille, *Principes d'hygiene coloniale*, 185.

[48] Congresses on Hygiene and Demography were non-governmental congresses held biennially, beginning in 1876. Around 2000 participants attended each of these congresses: H. Bunle, 'Histoire et chronologie des réunions et congrès internationaux sur la population', *Populations* 9 (1954), 9–36; His contribution to the international congress was published in 1888 : Treille, *De l'acclimatation*, 4.

[49] Ibid., 9f: Treille had to admit that Algeria was not a "tropical" colony, but fell in the category of "hot countries."

[50] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894*, 57.

[51] See also M.A. Osborne, 'Medical Climatology in France: The Persistence of Neo-Hippocratic Ideas in the First Half of the Twentieth Century', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 86, 4 (2012), 543–563.

[52] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894*, 60.

term "intermittent fevers" was a dated term when he spoke to the ICI in 1894, and modern bacteriologists already preferred to speak of malaria and "intertropical cachexia" was no longer regarded as a disease (instead, "cachexia" described a variety of symptoms that ranged from a sick person's loss of weight to chronic fatigue). While Treille was aware of microbiology's cutting-edge germ theories, he still interpreted these against the background of miasma theories. This mixture of old and new concepts was typical for those *fin de siècle* physicians who were caught in-between the traditions of naval medicine and the revolutionary claims of bacteriologists. There was, however, a third way of interpreting modern medicine.

This third interpretation saw medical science increasingly affected by racist theories. Treille, for example, drew on racist concepts when analyzing Africans and Europeans' different reactions to tropical heat. He demonstrated that the heat of the tropics caused the Europeans' core temperature to rise by half a degree between four and five in the afternoon. At the same time, the cooling effect of sweat evaporation stopped, due to the increasing humidity of the air.[53] Unlike the defective cutaneous evaporation of white Europeans, he argued, Africans' sweat vaporization continued to work properly because of the properties of the black skin. He concluded that, while Europeans entered into a state of languor, the body temperature of Africans remained stable and did not undergo a severe drop in temperature at night time.[54]

Treille's observations on race-based thermoregulation through perspiration led him to embrace the theory of race immunity, and this soon developed into a credo for colonial doctors. The theory of race immunity stated that "native ethnicities" were generally accustomed to the environment in which they had been living for many years, and, as a consequence, were immune to its pathological effects. Treille went on to pitch the Africans' natural resistance to tropical heat and disease against white vulnerability in the "torrid zone" and, in so doing, contributed in large part to the idea of race immunology that was crucial to the ICI's conceptualization of colonial development. During the 1890s, the ICI went on to spread the idea that only resilient indigenous populations were able to do manual work in the tropics. White settlers, instead, were counterproductive in the colonial economy because they fell prey to the tropical climate.

Treille's "progressive racism" also contained elements of both microbiology and atavistic miasma theories, especially when he suggested introducing sanitary policies to ease the burden of the warm climate on Europeans in the tropics. In his role as the head of the public health service in the French colonies, he did precisely this, describing Senegal as an example of successful sanitation in order to consolidate his proposal. Although Senegal was still

[53] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894*, 56.
[54] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894*, 56 and 65.

generally known as an unhealthy country, he praised the French "industrial genie" for having made at least Dakar a habitable place. The main techniques to render the capital of French West Africa healthier were the drainage of the surrounding swamplands and the construction of irrigation canals.[55] These sanitation measures were costly, but they were successful in changing the microclimate in restricted areas, even if it was impossible to alter the general climate as such. Drainage and irrigation were vital to these sanitation policies, as Treille understood them. On the one hand, the drainage of swamps destroyed the potential breeding grounds for mosquitoes and hampered the emanation of miasmas; on the other, irrigation produced new cultivable lands on which to grow food. Between 1906 and 1909, the ICI would publish four volumes describing the irrigation systems in various tropical countries. These studies praised drainage and irrigation as "colonial techniques" that rendered warm and arid countries habitable and suitable for farming.[56]

The environment was not the only nidus that Treille identified as potentially dangerous- he also warned against "contagious" Africans, whom he believed to transmit diseases. In order to avoid contagion from this source, he recommended racial segregation: colonizers should build their new settlements far away from the natives' villages. Segregation was necessary, he argued, because diseases spread extremely frequently and rapidly when whites entered into direct contact with the "Negroes." Such problems had often occurred when Europeans seized African villages during the colonial conquest, removed the inhabitants and taken over their dwellings. Treille referred to the example of the Soudan region, where Africans had allegedly made their villages insanitary by continuously dumping waste products into holes next to their houses– and by burying their dead in and around these houses. As most of these villages were normally situated within short walking distance of water resources, the Europeans usually wanted to make their homes in the same place. According to Treille, this had proven fatal, and the "Negro" villages near the waterholes were regarded as dangerous if not mortal.[57] Evoking the Africans' unhygienic habits, Treille appealed to the ICI to include his proposal for racial segregation in the norms of international sanitary policies, using in order to do so a medical justification for his racist theories of segregation that still contained elements of miasma theory and microbiology. Treille's case represents a fairly typical development of the kind of reasoning that physicians put forward in the 1890s and illustrates turn of medical discourses towards a

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[55] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894*, 62.

[56] Besides from being part of sanitation policies, the construction of irrigation systems was regarded as an indicator of civilization and the ability to dominate the tropical environment once so "hostile" to the Europeans: ICI (ed.), *Les Différentes Systemes d'Irrigation* (Brussels, 1906-1909).

[57] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894*, 63-64.

dualist version of segregationist theory, which would go on to influence the colonial concepts held by the ICI.

This mixture of climate-based etiology and segregationist racism inspired Treille to discourage Europeans from settling the colonies in great numbers. Following his logic of infection upon contact with the "black" environment, high population densities would inevitably increase the risk of contagion; in order to avoid this contact, he advised Europeans to establish themselves only in low numbers when speaking at the 1889 International Congress of Naturalists in Heidelberg. Speaking at the ICI five years later, and referring to the "situation of Europeans as a collectivity," he concluded, "I can by no means recommend sending Europeans to work or settle in the climes between 15 degree north and 15 degree south," a zone of exclusion that stretched from the Northern Kalahari to the Southern Sahara in Africa.[58] While admitting that climatically comparable regions such as Chile, La Plata, South Australia, Queensland and New Zealand were suitable for European colonization, Treille discouraged women and children, in particular, from settling in the African tropics. In his view, men should stay there for a maximum of four years at a time, provided that they were between 25 and 30 old, restrained their alcohol consumption, and became vegetarians.[59] The tropics were therefore, according to Treille, suitable for a limited number of European specialists, who should be trained in hygiene, sanitation and strategies of racial segregation. To sum up, this kind of colonialization would render the economic exploitation of colonies possible, but would prohibit large-scale and permanent colonization by settlers: to the surprise of the Institute's members, Treille – who had dedicated his entire professional career to "improving the living conditions of the settler and his family" – finally dismissed effectiveness of settler colonialism in the African colonies that had been achieved in the 1880s. [60]

Dissatisfied with Treille's capitulation to the unhealthy climate and confused by Moore's memorandum, ICI members made it clear that they would like to continue the debate. The ICI's secretary Janssen agreed to their request and invited the famous Dutch and Jewish physician and pharmacologist Barend Stokvis to participate in the 1895 session.[61] This invitation exposed the Institute to a risk. Stokvis was internationally known as the "founding

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[58] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894*, 63.
[59] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894*, 67.
[60] Cit. in, E.T. Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers: Hydrotherapy, Climatology, and French Colonial Spas* (Durham, 2006), 17.
[61] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894,* 67; Barend Stokvis (1834-1902), professor at the university of Amsterdam, had written widely on the problem of European acclimatization in the tropics: B.J.E. Stokvis, *La médecine coloniale et les médecins hollandais du 17e siècle* (Amsterdam, 1883); B.J.E. Stokvis, *Über vergleichende Rassenpathologie und die Widerstandsfähigkeit des Europäers in den Tropen* (Berlin, 1890); B.J.E. Stokvis, *La colonisation et l'hygiène tropicale, Institut Colonial International séance du 10 septembre 1895* (Paris, 1896). Sarting in 1896, he edited the *International Archive for Medical History*: 'Barend Stokvis', in: J. Pagel (ed.), *Biographisches Lexikon hervorragender Ärzte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Berlin and Vienna, 1901), 1663-1664.

father of comparative racial pathology,"[62] but, unlike the majority of his colleagues – who called him a "separatist", he was one of the rare optimists who generally approved of European agricultural colonies in the tropics.[63] Already in the 1894 meeting of the ICI, Van der Lith had cited Stokvis' statistics on the mortality rates among soldiers in the Dutch army in Java to prove the success of white life overseas. According to Stokvis' optimistic analysis, the mortality rate among European soldiers in Java had fallen from 120 soldiers annually in 1819 to only 17 in 1892. As a result of improved hygienist policies, Stokvis showed, similar efforts had generated equally satisfying results in British India.[64]

Invoking the statistical success of the hygienists, Stokvis therefore contradicted the assumption that environmental adaptability depended on racial determination and he also rejected the role of "race" as the main source of conflict with climate. Being of Jewish origin, he also discarded the widespread idea that Jews were better colonists because of their Semitic origin and that their "race" had acquired a biological "cosmopolitanism" throughout the diaspora. In his view, neither race nor the climate entirely determined a people, and the acclimatization of human beings to an "unnatural" environment overseas was possible in principle. He concluded that "the establishment and the prosperity of European colonies, both colonies of exploitation and agricultural colonies, are perfectly possible, in lower and higher tropical regions alike," and he added that "the tropical temperature and the race of the colonizers only play a secondary role."[65]

While the ICI cautiously welcomed Stokvis' colonial optimism in his communication to its meeting in 1895, his hypothesis provoked a chorus of outrage among his "racist" colleagues all over Europe.[66] Having already gained a bad reputation as a result of his appearance at international medical congresses in Amsterdam, Berlin and Vienna – where he had supposedly portrayed the tropics as a "greenhouse and a Turkish bath" offering "eternal youth" to Europeans who lived there, Stokvis met a wave of anger after he had spoken at the ICI. Commentators complained that this "charlatan" was "neither a pessimist of colonization in the tropics, nor an optimist, but simply an impressionist."[67] It was probably precisely this overwhelming contestation of his methods and arguments which led him to sing smaller and to

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[62] "Begründer der vergleichenden Rassenpathologie": *Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon*, vol. 19 (Leipzig, 1909), 56. Racial pathology analyzed the influence of race upon the emergence, progress and results of diseases. The spotlight was on the ability of certain races to resist to specific diseases: "Rassenpathologie", in *Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon*, vol. 16 (Leipzig, 1908), 611.

[63] Däubler, *Die Grundzüge der Tropenhygiene*,10. B.J.E. Stokvis, *De invloed van tropische gewesten op den mensch, in verband met kolonisatie en gezondheid – Drie voordrachten gehouden in de Aula der Universiteit te Amsterdam, en uitgegeven door Dr. Zeehuizen* (Haarlem, 1894).

[64] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1894*, 54.

[65] ICI, *Compte-Rendu 1895,* 47 and 74.

[66] His communication to the *ICI* was published as Stokvis, *La colonisation et l'hygiène tropicale.*

[67] P. Just Navarre, *Manuel d'Hygiène Coloniale: Guide de l'Européen dans les pays chauds* (Paris, 1895), 243f.

bring his views into line with medical skepticism now shown towards settlement in the tropics. In the same way as Treille, he finally admitted that the equatorial regions were a hotbed of diseases and caused many problems for white settlers.[68] Speaking in front of the ICI, Stokvis deemed individual acclimatization in the tropics possible, while he ruled out mass settlement. Thus, even the most fervent hygienist optimist finally succumbed to the paradigm of medical discouragement from settler colonialism.

Reactions to Treille's and Stokvis' appearances in the Institute's meetings of 1894 and 1895 show us that the majority of European physicians in the 1890s embraced racist theories and claimed that white settlement in the tropics was impossible. Postulating the incompatibility of the white race with foreign *milieus*, they also believed in the racial immunity of "natives". This attitude led inexorably to the conclusion that colonial exploitation was only possible with the help of the "native" labor force, while European settlers should be excluded from manual work in the colonies. The marginalization of optimists like Stokvis shows that medical discourses radicalized and soon came to prevail among the members of the ICI as a whole. Although they could have potentially embraced a more efficient hygienist policy based on the microbiologist identification of the causes of tropical disease, the ICI gave preference to racist theories that vetoed white settlement in the new colonies.

Lost opportunities? The Role of Microbiology

As a result of the increasing skepticism that ICI members showed towards the traditional techniques used by tropical hygienists, the latest developments of the scientific revolution triggered by microbiology began to become more popular. Microbiologists were on the point of pinpointing the causative agents of tropical diseases: by the 1890s they had identified mosquitoes as the vectors, and germs as the agents, of endemo-epidemic diseases. This awareness enabled colonial authorities to develop more accurate sanitary measures to protect the Europeans.

Together with these developments, the Institute's members kept closely informed about the bacteriologist revolution that were developed as a result of Patrick Manson, Robert Koch and Louis Pasteur's path-breaking discoveries.[69] In the 1890s, these bacteriologists challenged

[68]ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 'Séance du mardi 10 septembre après-midi', 74.

[69] Bacteriologists had produced great success since the 1870 and discovered bacteria as causing certain diseases: Hansen (1879, leprosy), Laveran (1880, in Algeria, malaria), Koch (1883, in Egypt, cholera), de Yersin (1901, plague) de Forbe (1901, sleeping sickness); Since 1888, there was a Insitut Pasteur in Paris with a laboratory in Saigon since 1890; Following the Institut Pasteur in Saint-Louis in Sénégal, Brazzaville, Hanoi, Dakar, Tananarive, as well as Fort de France, Algiers and Tunis: P. Guillaume, 'Médicine et Monde Colonial', cited in P. Singaravélou, *L'empire des geographes: Geographie, exploration et colonisation, 19.-20ième siècle* (Paris, 2008), 218.

miasma theories, which, as mentioned above, claimed that contaminated air and insanitary environments in general caused contagion and infection.[70] Gustav Dryepondt, the head of the Congo Free State's medical service, moved on from this assumption, adopted the bacteriologists' position and pushed it forward in the 1911 meeting of the ICI:

> What are miasmas? A word! Once, they served to define something very vague, menacing, and unknown, which led to 'fevers'. This word has today lost its meaning, all its raison d'être. Miasmas have become microbes, germs and infections. And while they assume a shape, we can also see how – shortly after – they enter the bodies of human beings.

Instead of miasmatic infections, Dryepondt declared that anopheles, stegomyia and tsetse flies caused malaria, yellow fever or the sleeping sickness. In making this claim, he gave his clear support to the bacteriologists, who also identified amoeba as the "agents" causing dysentery and cholera."[71]

This bacteriological revolution was a new medical paradigm; moreover, it brought the era of the environmental determinism of the miasma to an end. The new approach enabled doctors to decipher the causes of tropical maladies and their epidemic functioning. With the cause for the diseases now established, hygienists hoped to be able to find the adequate means to combat them: expedient prophylaxis and artificial immunization should help to improve the resistance of whites to tropical diseases. In the ICI, these findings led to the conclusion that white settlement in the colonies might be possible in a near future. Treille expressed this belief very succinctly:

> For some localities in the intertropical zone, the history of colonization is effectively no more than a long chronology of lamentable disasters. Thousands and thousands of men have succumbed again and again to its climate. They are sad victims of the ignorance of the hygienic prescriptions and of the wrong choice of a place to settle. But the ruin of the first enterprises, the horror of the murderous epidemics, the following misery and abandonment, all of this will now pass slowly into oblivion and disappear from the memory of men. [72]

With the help of this newly acquired medical knowledge, the image of the "new territories" in Africa and Asia as the "graveyard of the Europeans", hostile to European settlement, could be cleaned up.[73] As a consequence, members of the ICI now had good reasons to believe in a splendid future for colonization.

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[70] Neill, *Networks in Tropical Medicine*, 13.

[71] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911,* 112.

[72] Treille, *De l'acclimatation*, 8: "Pour certaines localités de la zone intertropicale, l'histoire de la colonisation n'est, en effet qu'une longue chronologie de désastres lamentables: des milliers et des milliers d'hommes y ont succombé tour à tour, tristes victimes de l'ignorance des lois de l'hygiène, et du choix peu judicieux des établissements. Mais la ruine des première entreprises, l'horreur des épidémies meurtrières, la misère et l'abandon qui en furent les suites, tout cela tombe peu à peu dans l'oubli et sort, avec le temps, de la mémoire des hommes."

[73] See for example Chailley-Bert with regard tot he Mitidja in Algeria: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 101; N. Böckheler, *Theodor Christaller: Der erste deutsche Reichsschullehrer in Kamerun* (Schwäbisch Hall, 1897).

However, their optimism was by no means unqualified. While awaiting a conclusive verdict on the possibility of European settlement in the warm countries, the need for a physical labor force to develop the colonies had become an urgent issue. With regard to physical work in the tropical regions, the ICI were less keen to embrace bacteriologist attitudes and renounce traditional views. Drawing on his own experience in the Congo, Dryepondt cautioned his colleagues against the pitfalls of bacteriologist arguments: if it was not the climate in general – represented by the 'miasma' school of thinking – but identifiable microbes that were at the origin of tropical maladies, then Europeans would be able to do physical work in the tropics:

> The climate can be dangerous to those who work, it is true, but the miasmas are not the problem. The White who labors manually is *not* more exposed to the bites of the anopheles, stegomyia or tsetse flies…than the White who works in his office. [74]

Having experienced the spread of diseases in Congo himself, Dryepondt suspected certain whites of forging a myth to motivate their inability to do manual work in the tropics: indeed, this might, in his view, "be an excuse made up by pathetic and lazy *coloniaux*, who want the blacks, the domestics, and the boys to do all the work."[75] It would seem that Dryepondt struck a nerve among the all-white members of the ICI, who were well aware of the fact that tropical heat and environment in the pre-bacteriological age had long served as an excuse for whites to avoid physical work.

ICI members rejected Dryepondt's pointed reprimand out of hand. However, the arguments that substantiated his verdict were a lesson to them, and cautioned them against the use of bacteriologist theories for colonial practice. This might well explain why bacteriology played only a subordinate role in the ICI's deliberations, although it was - at that time – on the cutting edge of work on tropical medicine. Calls for a precise separation to be outlined between meteorological and infectious factors in order to improve ways of administering hygienic prophylaxis fell on deaf ears. [76] Instead, ICI members continued to express their disappointment about the failure of tropical hygiene to provide the means for large-scale white settlements in the colonies.

In 1911, an ICI committee, formed to investigate European colonization in the tropics, investigated the past for successful examples of whites settling in tropical regions and reached the conclusion that "[u]ntil our times, no white colonization in regions with an equatorial

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[74] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911,* 112.
[75] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911,* 114
[76] ICI *Compte Rendu 1911*, 103; It was only after the First World War that parasitologists like Albert Calmette, vice-director of the Pasteur Institute and founder of the Saigon-branch of the Pasteur Institute, joined the ICI.

climate has been successful…and the few exceptions only confirm the rule."[77] This kind of skepticism towards parasitological research was a recurrent pattern in the history of the ICI. The idea that Europeans might not only be able to live in the colonies, but also to work there, was diametrically opposed to their colonial ideology. After all, microbiology had less to offer to the colonial experts than racist theories of pathological acclimatization.

From Latitude to Altitude: Hill Stations as a Solution?

After dismissing bacteriologist approaches, members of the ICI made a final attempt to rehabilitate tropical hygiene as such, and they did so by analyzing the therapeutic effects of colonial hill stations. Frequent vacations in the fresh climate of colonial mountain stations – combined with a life that resembled that of European spa towns – were said to relieve European bodies from the pressures of the lowland climate in Africa and in other colonies. The French hygienist and follower of the microbiological "*idées pasteuriennes*," P. Just Navarre, discussed the role of hill stations as colonial spa towns in detail. He started by accusing Stokvis and his colleagues of using the term "tropics" carelessly, without making any distinctions between different altitudes, or between the coast and the inner continent.[78] Similar reservations had been made by other discussants in the ICI, who had forwarded the view that the highlands around Nairobi and the mountainous Usambara region might be healthier for Europeans than the lowlands. One ICI member, the geographer and colonial theorist Marcel Dubois, explicitly warned against the formulation of general rules of acclimatization, since the nuances of the "tropical climate" had not been clearly delineated.[79] Identifying towns in tropical altitudes as suitable places to establish sanatoria, members of the ICI hoped to enable stations for temporary recreation or even permanent settlement there.[80]

Several of these "hill stations," such as Simla in British India, the famous Buitenzorg station in Dutch Java, and the Portuguese island of Sao Tomé in the Gulf of Guinea, had already been in operation since the mid-nineteenth century and had developed into dynamic hubs for Europeans who sought escape from the tropical heat in the plains or the "hothouse climate of the coasts".[81] Colonial newcomers such as Germany and Belgium tried to copy these famous spa towns and visited them in order to see how to do so during sanitary "information journeys":

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[77] ICI (ed.), *Rapport Preliminaire à la Session de 1911: Question de l'Acclimatement des Populations de Race Blanche en Pays Tropicaux* (Brussels, 1911), 10.

[78] For Navarre's attitude towards microbiology, see: Just Navarre, *Manuel d'Hygiène Coloniale*, IX-XX; His review of Stokvis' speaking at the ICI: P. Just Navarre, 'Hygiene entre les tropiques', *Bulletin du Lyon Médical* 83, 28 (1896), 243f.

[79] ICI, *Compte-Rendu 1895*, 97.

[80] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1900*, 141.

[81] Plehn, 'Reise durch Deutsch-Ostafrika, Ägypten', 145.

Friedrich Plehn led an expedition to British India and Ceylon, and the governmental gardener of the Cameroons, Hans Deistel, travelled to Buitenzorg in the Dutch Indies.[82] Taking the Dutch and British sanatoria of East India as a model, German authorities built their own 'hill station' in the East African Usambara Mountains, as late as 1905. The German sanatorium soon became an international health resort that was held in high esteem by the residents of the adjacent British colonies. [83] By the same token, the ICI member and head of the Congo Free State's health service, Dryepondt, turned a small hill station in Boma into a fully-fledged sanatorium.[84]

The possibility that cool altitudes compensate for hot latitudes seem to have provided a potent remedy for the vulnerability of Europeans in the tropics. A cautious sense of optimism inspired the ICI to charge Dryepondt with preparing a report on the establishment of hill stations for European administrators, which were to be located at a height of 1000 meters, considered as the minimum altitude to escape the detrimental climate of the plains and endemic malaria.[85] When Dryepondt finally presented his report on hill stations in 1900, the discourse of the medical sciences had already developed new material on tropical altitudes and, indeed, had assumed a more critical stance towards hill stations. The focus of this criticism was placed on solar radiation: a German expert, Paul Schmidt, had calculated that this was most intense in the high-lying regions of the tropics; indeed, that it was double the intensity that could be felt in midsummer Europe. The exposure to the high altitude sun and its short-wave blue-violet and ultra-violet sunrays was thus likely to cause retinal and skin damage. Traversing a reduced amount of air and meeting the earth's surface at a vertical angle, the intensity of the sun's rays in tropical altitudes was said to be the "most elevated of the globe." [86] This intensity was destructive not only to the skin, but also to the underlying tissues.[87] Reasoning along these lines, racist physicians began to fear that the deep penetration of sunrays might damage the inner organs of Europeans, and modify them in the long term. Once the resulting organic mutations were handed down to the next generation, they argued, they would very likely contribute to the "degeneration" of the white race.

Dryepondt confirmed that even model hill stations like Buitenzorg in Dutch Java or Simla in British India were exposed to high levels of sunlight and, moreover, were far from free

[82] Plehn, 'Bericht über die Informationsreise', 296; H. Deistel, 'Bericht über eine Reise nach Britisch- und Niederländisch Indien', *Beihefte zum Tropenpflanzer* 12, 4 (1908), 63–131.
[83] Brode, *British and German East Africa*, 82.
[84] See Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers,* 74*;* Unlike in Jennings' interpretation, Belgians had thought of the first capital of the Congo Free State, Boma, as a sort of sanatorium: C. de Martrin-Donos (ed.), *Les Belges dans l'Afrique Centrale* (Brussels, 1886), 401f.
[85] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1900*, 141.
[86] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*,105; A similar argument has been made by Hubrecht in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1909*, 144f.
[87] P. Schmidt, 'Die Wirkung der tropischen Sonnenbestrahlung auf den Europäer', *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1910* (Berlin, 1910), 311.

of tropical fevers.[88] In particular, blackwater fever, a complication of malaria that even struck long-time residents used to tropical endemics and which led frequently to kidney failure, proved to be "a terrible disease that constitutes a real obstacle to the penetration of the black continent by the Europeans." Unlike malaria, this "fever" was also said to exist in elevated regions around Léopoldville, Vivi, and North Manyanga and even in the mountain areas of up to 1000 meters around Lake Tanganyika.[89]

Although Dryepondt's analysis did not meet with everyone's approval, it led the ICI to abandon the idea of hill stations as a means to enable longer stays in the tropics. Janssen, the ICI's general secretary, concluded that hill stations and sanatoria were no guarantee of a healthier life.[90] Thus, the idea of diversifying tropical climates did not bring the hoped-for solution for Europeans who lived there. However, the real effect of this insight was that the colonial theorists stopped believing in the – very positive – practical experience of Europeans living in Simla or Buitenzorg or even in the lowlands. Instead, they became concerned with the long-lasting effects of tropical climates on the white race and they hypothesized potential damages that might only reveal their harmful consequences in the future. Exemplifying a general process in European medicine discourse that was increasingly infiltrated by racist theories, the ICI discussed the future of colonization from a racist point of view from the turn of the century on.

As we will see, the racist version of tropical hygiene denied Europeans the possibility of settling in the tropics. At the same time, the concept of racial immunity resulted in the notion that the "natives" were the best colonial workers, because they were adapted to their "natural environment." These views complemented each other and resulted in a shift from settler colonialism to native policy. However, these racist attitudes towards hygiene also resulted in the developing of local segregationist policies. The ICI contributed to spread these ideas, through its international expert meetings and the impact that it had on colonial administrators and sanitary officers.

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[88] The European specialist on the influence of the sun's radiation was a "Privatdozent" from Leipzig, Paul Schmidt. He frequently quoted in the ICI's debates: see Ibid. and P. Schmidt, 'Ueber die hygienische Bewertung verschiedenfarbiger Kleidung bei intensiver Sonnenstrahlung', *Archiv für Hygiene* 69 (1909).

[89] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1900*,164-166; It was wrong to claim that blackwater fever "also" existed in the mountainous regions, because it derived from malaria infections in the lower regions.

[90] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1900*, 192.

The Acclimatization Dilemma: From European Empowerment to 'Acclimatation Pathologique'

During the 1890s, colonization was increasingly closely linked with acclimatization. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the ICI set up an expert commission on the "Acclimatization of the Population of the White Race in Tropical Countries," which described acclimatization as a process that was vital to enable colonization: "By white colonization, we understand exclusively the acclimatization of the white race."[91] For the commission, acclimatization was not only a pre-condition of colonization – rather, colonization and acclimatization were two different expressions of the very same idea.

In the same period, acclimatization became intrinsically linked with the notion of racial degeneration. Medical experts claimed that acclimatization in the tropics engendered mutations of the human organism, which would inevitably lead to the degeneration of the white race. The combination of acclimatization with degeneration was grounded in racist doctrines, evolutionary theories of genetic mutation, and Lamarckian *mésologie* – the sociological belief in the lasting influence of an external milieu on the qualities of individuals. According to these theories, Europeans in the tropics may well threaten to "go native," adapt to the tropical environment, and – finally – lose their Europeanness in a process of racial degeneration.

The combination of the need for Europeans to acclimatize to the colonies and the possibility of their degeneration as a result of this process of acclimatization presented the colonial theorists with a serious problem. The problem took the form of a paradoxical syllogism: if colonization equaled acclimatization and acclimatization equaled degeneration, it followed that colonization equaled degeneration.[92] I will call this syllogism the acclimatization dilemma. Its consequences for the colonial project were dramatic: while Europeans had always claimed that they changed their overseas territories for the better through colonization, the definition of colonization as acclimatization turned this view on its head. In other words, it was now claimed that acclimatization changed Europeans; this meant that *they* were assimilated rather than they themselves assimilating the "natives". "Wild nature" in the colonies was now viewed as modifying European civilizers, and not the other way round. This kind of theorizing thus constituted a threat to the much flaunted idea of European superiority, and, as a result, it constituted a threat to the ideological foundations of the whole colonial project.

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[91] ICI, *Rapport Preliminaire à la Session de 1911: Question de l'Acclimatement des Populations de Race Blanche en Pays Tropicaux* (Brussels, 1911), 10.
[92] Schloth, 'Ueber Gesundheit und Krankheit in heißen Gegenden. (Gezondheit en ziekte inbete gewesten). Antrittsrede, gehalten am 1. Oktober 1898 von Dr. G. Eykmann, Professor für Hygiene etc. an der Universität zu Utrecht', *Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene* 3, 1 (1899), 62.

How did the ICI contribute to create the acclimatization dilemma and how did its members cope with the severe consequences that this entailed? To fully grasp the role that the ICI played, we must retrace the origins of acclimatization, originally defined as positive adjustment to a foreign environment, during the 1830s. During the 1880s, however, under the influence of Gobineau's and Le Bon's schemes of racial degeneration, theorists demanded that acclimatization be represented as a disease. This push towards pathologization meant that the ICI would have to verify the theoretical assumptions on which acclimatization was based and, in order to do this adequately, it created a commission to investigate the long-term consequences of tropical climates on white families. As part of its methods, it sent surveys to the colonies and asked white "acclimatized" colonists if they showed any symptoms of intellectual or physical degeneration. Although the interviewees denied any long-term damage, the ICI embraced the racist theories and dismissed – once again – the possibility of a European settlement of the colonies.

To compensate, the ICI searched for alternative ways of motivating the European settlement of colonies. Its members considered the breeding of a mixed race that would combine the "intelligence" of the whites with the "resilience" of the natives. Others preferred the idea of colonizing with Southern Europeans, who were said to be naturally acclimatized to the heat. After much debate, however, a decision was taken to support colonization with the indigenous population under the guidance of professional colonial administrators. At the same time, the colonial authorities started programs to prevent the "depopulation" from taking root among the colonized. Unlike the traditional hygienists who wanted to prepare Europeans for the tropical colonies, the new colonial sanitation policy of the 1890s therefore aimed at medically optimizing the native population as a labor force for colonial exploitation. ICI members labeled this new development the "triumph of the natives" in the sense that they should be the origin of colonial development. However, in so doing, they only abandoned the idea of settler reproduction overseas, and they actually continued to support prioritizing colonial domination and exploitation. The "triumph of the natives" was thus a victory for the anti-assimilationists in the ICI, who hoped to develop the colonies by using indigenous labor.

The "triumph of the natives" was not without alternatives, however. Instead of believing in degeneration through acclimatization, the ICI could have chosen to side with the hygienists or microbiologists who initially promised a carefree life for Europeans in the tropics. Moreover, some Europeans had lived for many years in the "warm countries", without "degenerating". Nevertheless, the ICI members vigorously supported racist theories of degeneration. I will argue here that they did so because it confirmed their associationist attitude that condemned settler

colonization as costly projects and preferred the use of native labor to make the colonies profitable. In other words, it was their utilitarian attitude that led them to embrace racist theory.

When the ICI met for the first time in 1893, the pathologization of acclimatization was in its initial stages. After its introduction in the 1830s, the Frenchman Isidore Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire and his high-profile Société Zoologique d'Acclimatation (1859) went on to popularize the term "acclimatization" so that it was in common usage by the mid-eighteenth century – in the same years that Darwin published the *Origin of Species*.[93]

The zoologists and botanists of the Société Zoologique d'Acclimatation defined acclimatization as the process of a species' gradual adaption to an unfamiliar habitat and climate in order to guarantee its survival and flourishing. Initially a term to describe plants and animals, it was soon applied to human beings. Saint-Hilaire set the agenda, by placing it in a broader context, that of transplanting "species" to another climate: "The differences between local climates, the most powerful barriers that nature has opposed to the indefinite expansion of the species, cannot stop men from gradually propagating a domestic race…over several generations."[94] Written with a firm belief in positivist science, his definition contains two crucial ingredients of acclimatization theory: the *gradual* and trans-generational adaption of a *race* to a different climate. Saint-Hilaire's concept of acclimatization drew on Lamarck's theory of transmutation, which claimed that children inherited modifications of their parent's organism that had occurred during the parents' lifetime. Therefore, a progressive organic accommodation of human beings to a foreign milieu was possible if they inhabited it over several generations. During the course of the nineteenth century, this evolutionary concept was made consistent with both Darwinist worldviews of racial adjustment to biological environments and Durkheimian theories of adjustment to social environments or "milieus."[95]

According to Michael Osborne and Warwick Anderson, acclimatization soon became the "essential science of French colonization."[96] However, it should be noted that while for hygienists, acclimatization was a mere adjustment of daily routines, for anthropologists acclimatization was defined as a process that modified the human organism that might lead to

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[93] M.A. Osborne, *Nature, the Exotic, and the Science of French Colonialism* (Bloomington, 1994).
[94] The French Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire was among the most important promoters of acclimatization.He founded the Paris-based Société Zoologique d'Acclimatation in 1859 with the participation of outstanding scholars and helped to promote the idea of acclimatization in France by publishing a *Bulletin de la Société Zoologique d'Acclimatation.* 'Allocution de M. Isidore Geoffroy-Saint-Hiliaire, Président de la Société Zoologique D'Acclimatation dans la réunion préparatoire du 20 Janvier 1854', *Bulletin de la Société Zoologique D'Acclimatation* 1 (1854), IX-X.
[95] In the ICI, the debate was more detailed. Its members opposed the Darwinist Hugo De Vries and his theory of racial mutation to Alfred Russell Wallace's concept of individual acclimatization to a foreign environment: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1909*, 146f.
[96] Michael Osborne and Warwick Anderson emphasize the French contribution to bring together colonization and acclimatization as complementary processes: Osborne, *The Emergence of Tropical Medicine;* Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers,* 15.

degeneration and, ultimately, to the extinction of the race.[97] It was this latter understanding of the term that soon went beyond the French national boundaries to become internationalized, as a result of transnational knowledge transfers. This occurred mainly as the result of the 1889 International Colonial Congress in Paris, where it was widely discussed; the notion was then further popularized by the ICI and several on other colonial congresses.[98] The main result of this internationalization was that acclimatization soon surpassed tropical hygiene as the paradigmatic way of framing the role of Europeans in the tropics.

The two modes of thinking about enabling Europeans to live in the colonies – tropical hygiene and acclimatization – were situated at opposite ends: tropical hygiene, first, was aimed at preparing Europeans to dwell in the tropics by actively protecting them against the detrimental influence of the climate and endemic diseases. Medical experts therefore tried to identify the "causative agents" of diseases and disorders and understand how they entered the human body. Once the causes and the ways of transmission had been identified, they were supposed to provide the means to combat these detrimental influences on the European body. This could be achieved by palliative medication, such as the taking of quinine against malaria or by personal and public 'hygiene' (mostly a set of rules to follow in order to avoid hyperthermia).[99] A myriad of handbooks for emigrants and colonial administrators synthesized these rules of behavior that advised avoiding the tropical heat and ranged from diets and appropriate clothing to architecture allowing cool breezes and cooling appliances.[100] If individuals complied with these rules of conduct, tropical hygienists promised them a healthier life in the tropics. The tropical hygiene approach was generally optimistic about the ability of Europeans to dwell in the warm countries.

Acclimatization, instead, was not directed towards individuals and their protection by means of personal prophylaxis. Rather, its proponents were concerned about the long-term modifications of the Whiteman's organism during extended stays in the tropics. Therefore, they did not study the causes of tropical diseases, but analyzed the trans-generational effects. While tropical hygiene was intended to actively protect individuals against tropical disease, experts saw acclimatization as a gradual process of collective adaption over several generations. This mutation was said to happen gradually, especially among European settlers. Whereas Saint-

[97] See on the concept of racial degeneration in the American context: W.P. Anderson, 'Immunities of Empire: Race, Disease, and the New Tropical Medicine, 1900-1920', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 70, 1 (1996), 94–118.
[98] Anonymos, *Congrès Colonial International de Paris* (Paris, 1889), 29.
[99] At the turn of the century, public sanitation was added to palliative medicine and personal discipline. Colonial health services launched programs of sanitation, urban planning and engaged in policies of segregation to avoid contact with the allegedly contagious indigenous: P. Curtin, 'Medical knowledge and urban planning in Tropical Africa', *American Historical Review* 90 (1985), 594–613, 594-613.
[100] See for example: Just Navarre, *Manuel d'Hygiène Coloniale*.

Hilaire and other zoologists had defined acclimatization as a positive process of enabling the life of flora and fauna to continue after transplantation to a foreign environment, colonial theorists tended to see its application to human beings in general – and Europeans in the tropics in particular - as a negative process of de-Europeanization: modifications of European organisms in a foreign environment were said to lead to collective degeneration, racial decline and even to extinction because they were said to lead to sterility. This pessimistic view of European colonial settlement was in complete contrast to the optimistic stance taken by hygienists. The latter's credo was that "health is not only the negation of illness" and the "colonization of the tropics is not only a matter of hygiene" – but of race.[101]

There is no doubt that the distinction drawn between hygiene and acclimatization theories represented a division of an ideal-type, and that it did not do justice to the eclectic reality of colonial medicine. However, contemporaries identified the two approaches as two fundamentally different worldviews. One of these was Treille, who felt a need to refine the terminology and who made a distinction between the terms *acclimatement* and *acclimatation*. In his view, *acclimatement* was an anthropological expression, while *acclimatation* belonged to the field of hygiene: "The first of all sciences [anthropology] is dedicated to the study of the laws that govern the evolution of men and wants to discover the past to determine the future of a species. The second one [hygiene] is concerned with the physiological qualities of an individual in the present: its objective is the preservation and the amelioration of its qualities."[102] The long-term analysis by anthropologists, Treille claimed, would lead inevitably to the end of "the migration of whites to hot countries", because they believed that the white race would become extinct after two or three generations in the tropics.

The ICI members adopted Treille's duality of hygienist optimism and anthropologist pessimism and described them as two contrasting groups: "There are, on the one hand, colonial doctors, who dismiss the endemo-epidemies in special climes as the reason for the failure of

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[101] Schloth, 'Ueber Gesundheit und Krankheit', 60 and 62.

[102] Treille, *De l'acclimatation,* 2-3: "Je rappellerai avant toute chose, qu'entre les termes acclimatement et acclimatation, il existe la différence qui sépare l'anthropologie de l'hygiène. Tandis que la première des sciences a pour objectif l'étude des lois qui président à l'évolution de l'homme et cherche à découvrir le passé pour fixer l'avenir de l'espèce, la seconde s'occupe des qualités physiologiques de l'individu tel qu'il existe dans le présent: son objectif, c'est le maintien ou l'amélioration de ces qualités ; et tout ce qui concourt à ce but rentre dans le domaine de l'hygiène."; See also 'Acclimatation, Acclimatement', in: Berthelot (ed.) *La Grande Encyclopédie, Inventaire Raisonnée des Sciences, des Lettres et des Arts* vol. 1 (Paris, 1961?), 283 here it is first of all a zoological and botanical expression: "Acclimatation, Acclimatement: Ces deux mots ne sont pas absolument synonymes. Quand l'homme transporte des animaux dans un milieu, sous un climat autre que ceux où ils sont nés, les tentatives qu'il fait, les soins qu'il leur donne pour leur permettre de s'adapter aux conditions nouvelles, auxquels il les a brusquement soumis constituent l'acclimatation; si ses animaux survivent et s'ils se reproduisent indéfiniment, on dit qu'il y a acclimatement. Le mot acclimatement designe encore la révolution spontanée par laquelle l'organisme, transporté dans un milieu nouveau, se met en harmonie avec lui" ; This distinction was also internationally accepted: Däubler, *Die Grundzüge der Tropenhygiene*, 6: he distinguished between "acclimatement de la race" and private hygiene called individual "acclimatation."

white colonization in equatorial countries; on the other hand, there are anthropologists who invoke meteorological factors – including the effects of the sun's rays – as the preponderant influence and declare it the main obstacle to the colonization of this country by populations of white race."[103] Given that they had to choose between the two approaches, the ICI tended to let the anthropologists decide on the question whether settler colonization was possible, especially in the "new territories" in Africa.

Once hygienists like Moore, Treille and Stokvis had advised Europeans against permanent settlement in the tropical regions, the Institute wanted to find out more about the long-term effects of colonial settlement. Members were particularly interested in possible organic modifications that might appear in children born to white parents in tropical countries and the effects identified among the descendants of the third generation.[104] According to racial and Lamarckian theories of acclimatization, adaption to foreign climate led to the trans-generational modification of the organism. The pathologization of this process was inspired by Arthur de Gobineau's *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races* (4 vols., 1853-1855), in which he was particularly concerned with processes of racial degeneration.

Testing Racial Theories on the Ground: Foundations of Degeneration Theory and the Acclimatization Commission

According to Gobineau, a race that was able to distinguish itself clearly from others was most likely to progress and achieve the status of a civilization. The urge for exclusivity (which Gobineau called *repulsion*) contributed to the purification of the race and guaranteed its success as a superior race. However, the superior race soon developed a drive for the conquest of other races (which Gobineau called *attraction*). By conquering other races, the "civilized" race entered into contact with them and, as a result, lost their purity by hybridization. That is to say, the conquering race blended with the inferior, less differentiated and less successful race. Sooner or later, Gobineau argued, this led to the degeneration of the superior race.[105] On this view, colonial expansion exposed the superior (especially the Aryan or Germanic race) to the danger of hybridization and degeneration.

[103] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912*, 86. "Les uns sont surtout des médecins coloniaux, rejettent la cause des échecs de colonisation blanche en pays équatoriaux basé sur l'existence dans ces contrées d'endémo-épidemies speciales; les autres, composés surtout des anthropologistes, attribuent au contraire aux facteurs d'ordre météorologique, parmi lequel il faut ranger l'action solaire, l'influence préponderante, et en font l'obstacle à la colonisation de ces pays par les populations de race blanche."
[104] *Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon*, vol. 1, (Leipzig, 1905), 224-227.
[105] C. Geulen, *Geschichte des Rassismus* (Bonn, 2007), 71.

Gobineau's warning against racial degeneration worried many of the anthropologists, demographers and physicians theorizing on the white man's settlement in the tropics. Although they were aware of the fact that Gobineau was an armchair philosopher, whose theory was logically coherent but not empirically proven, they took it seriously. The degeneration of the white race in the tropics also became the main topic of the debates in the ICI after the turn of the century. [106] Some of the ICI members had familiarized themselves with Social-Darwinist and racist theory à la Gobineau at the first International Colonial Congress held in Paris in 1889. Joseph Chailley, among others, attended the lecture given by one of Gobineau's followers, Gustave Le Bon. Le Bon had produced a slightly modified version of Gobineau's scheme. Like Gobineau, Le Bon declared world history to be a universal history of races and their conflicts. According to him, the "Long-time continuous influence of the same milieu" created races and influenced their "character and intelligence". Rivaling races differed in both their physical and psychological constitution. Only the most superior races and civilizations, Le Bon argued, developed an internal stratification of unequal classes. Primitive races, instead, were characterized by the equality of their members.[107] Like Gobineau, le Bon dismissed the mingling of a race with "foreign elements," because this would be detrimental to the existence of a race. Moreover, old and long-living races would rather cease to exist than adopt themselves to new environments.

At the 1889 International Colonial Congress*,* Le Bon explicitly situated racial encounter and decline within a colonial setting. He identified a recurrent pattern in world history according to which the more numerous races – no matter what their "character" was like – absorbed the less numerous ethnicities. He cited the example of white families living in the midst of a black population, who "will disappear in a few generations without leaving any trace. This has been the fate of all conquerors who were strong in weaponry, but weak in number." And more dramatically: "All great empires that unite dissimilar peoples can only be created by force and are condemned to perish by violence."[108] By combining Darwinist ideas of racial evolution and the rise-and fall model of empires, Le Bon showed himself to be critical towards colonial settler societies. Being French, he naturally directed his criticism towards French policy in Algeria

[106] See in particular: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1909*, 138.
[107] According to Le Bon, this difference between the backward and the advanced individuals expresses itself in the size of their skulls. While in primitive societies all skulls are of equal size, there are different skull sizes within the superior races, representing the stratification within the superior races. Le Bon combines theories of class and of race, and has to defend the existence of the "masses" in civilized societies. G. Le Bon, 'The Influence of Race in History, translated by Robert K. Stevenson', *Revue Scientifique* (28.4.1888), 13.
[108] Ibid., 7; Le Bon also dismissed the "crossbreeding of races who have attained very unequal phases of evolution," which was "always fatal". Contrary to the mixture of "unequal races," it was conducive to bring about progress if races on equal terms intermingled, like the European immigrants in the USA: See Ibid., 11.

where the French expropriated the Arabs and gave the land to European settlers instead.[109] According to Le Bon and the French "associationists" around Chailley, the French settler policy in Algeria had been a fatal error. Le Bon's condemnation of European settler colonies at the 1889 International Colonial Congress was one of the earliest manifestations of racially grounded anti-settlerist colonialism. It also became the program of the ICI, personified by its founder Joseph Chailley, who had promoted an associationist policy since the late 1880s.

Twenty years later, in in 1909, the leaders of the ICI, among them Joseph Chailley, convened a committee on the "Acclimatation of the Population of the White Race in Tropical Countries" during the Institute's session at The Hague. According to the committee, acclimatization was the main operation to enable colonization:

> By white colonization, we understand exclusively the *acclimatation* of the race, i.e. the adaption to the climate of a whole population, not only during the lifetime of the first arrivals, but also their progeny, conserving from generation to generation the distinctive qualities of their ascendants, without any mixture with the indigenous[110]

The members of the committee were internationally renowned experts on colonial medicine. Gustave Dryepondt, who we met above and who was a "fanatic of Belgian colonization", had begun his career as a doctor in the Congo Free State, where he had created the first hospital in Léopoldville (1891), organized the medical service of the state, and studied tropical diseases.[111] Ambrosius Hubrecht was a Dutch zoologist and evolutionary biologist, who cooperated closely with Charles Darwin and believed firmly in the "great law of evolution"[112] The German professor of colonial policy and national economy Karl Rathgen headed the recently founded the Colonial Institute in Hamburg (1908).[113] He represented a new kind of "anthropologist", who used statistical big data and demographical evidence to trace the development of the world's races, instead of relying on the individual observations of accredited physicians. A fourth member, Bogdan von Hutten-Czapski, participated merely nominally.

Given their anthropological background, the committee's members were, of course, skeptical towards the *colonies de peuplement*, but they nevertheless hoped for solutions to settle

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[109] G. Le Bon, 'Algeria and the Ideas Prevailing in France Concerning Colonization, translated by Robert K. Stevenson', *Revue Scientifique* (2.10.1887), 4-5.

[110] ICI, *Rapport Preliminaire à la Session de 1911: Question de l'Acclimatement des Populations de Race Blanche en Pays Tropicaux* (Brussels, 1911), 10.

[111] Insitut Royal Colonial Belge, *Biographie Coloniale Belge*, vol. 3 (Brussels, 1952), 265-268; Cercle Africain, Comité de Propagande et de Renseignements, *Le Climat du Congo, Conférence par le Dr. Dryepondt* (Brussels, 1895); Dryepondt also contributed to the internationally renowned journal *Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene*, See *Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene* 4 (1900).

[112]Hubrecht had also travelled the Dutch East Indies in search of "missing links" that confirm evolutionary theories of mammalian descent A. Hubrecht, *Descent of the Primates: Lectures Delivered on the Occasion of the Sesquicentennial Celebration of Princeton University* (New York, 1897), 2 and 7.

[113] For his program see K. Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht: Rede, geh. bei d. Eröffnungsfeier d. Hamburg. Kolonialinst. am 20. Okt. 1908 nebst d. weiteren bei d. Eröffnungsfeier d. Kolonialist. geh. Ansprachen* (Hamburg, 1908).

Europeans in the colonies.[114] Because hygienists had failed to provide long-term studies about the effects of the tropical climate on whites, the commission decided to send a questionnaire to Europeans living in tropical regions and having given birth to children there. Their guiding question was whether "the modifications of the Whites' bodies – provoked by the residence in an equatorial country – were physiological or functional, which means temporary; or are they morphological and therefore definitive?"[115] This question was aimed at analyzing the long-term effects of the climate on Europeans dwelling in the tropics.

In order to obtain data, the survey also asked several precise questions to Europeans living in the tropics:

> 1) Do modifications of children born near the Equator, to parents of pure white race, disappear when they return to a temperate country and stay there? This means: does their birth in warm countries make a mark on them? 2) Are modifications irreversible if they stay in the tropics, without mixing with the indigenous races and without the intervention of new elements arriving from the temperate zones? Do they constitute an ensemble of phenomena that might be qualified as the degeneration of the race? 3) Do the modifications inevitably lead to sterility? 4) Can these modifications be identified among children born in temperate countries, to parents who have lived a more or less extensive period under the Equator? – Or only one of them and if so, is there a difference for the child if the parent who stayed in the tropics is the father or the mother? 5) Does the altitude influence the modifications that appear during the sojourn in a warm territory and do these modifications disappear if the colonist settles in higher altitudes, although he is still in the equatorial zone? At what altitude – according to your experiences in your country – do functional or organic modifications cease to appear? In other terms: which altitude guarantees a climate that is not equatorial anymore?

Another question asked about the effects of short-wave (actinic) sun rays in higher altitudes and whether their intensity was vital to the success of white colonization. The survey concluded with a further question: "In your view, what is the role of the natives's social influence on children and women of white race in the tropics? (Given the exclusive employment of natives as domestics, and that only the natives carry out the rough work, etc.) How does it influence the second generation of whites, in particular?"

Those questions reveal the committee's concerns that organic modifications caused by the tropical climate might lead to racial degeneration. On the one hand, degeneration was thought to derive from biological modifications, but anthropo-sociological theories were also followed claiming that socially acquired characteristics were handed down to children and were inscribed into the genetic code of the following generation. These theories combined mesologist fears of modifications induced by a foreign social milieu and evolutionist ideas of biological mutations.

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[114] ICI, *Rapport Preliminaire à la Session de 1911: Question de l'Acclimatement*, 10.

[115] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, 107: "les modifications provoquées chez le blanc par le séjour dans les conditions actuelles, en pays équatorial, sont-elles physiologiques ou fonctionelles, c'est à dire passagères ou sont-elles morphologiques et, par conséquent, définitives?"

What the committee was really interested in was whether evolutionist theories of natural selection and organic mutation would ultimately lead to the absorbance of white individuals by darker races overseas (this was Alfred Russell Wallace's interpretation) or whether these modifications would still allow them to maintain certain traits of the white race (following the theories of Hugo de Vries)[116]

In order to test these racial theories on the ground, Camille Janssen, the Institute's secretary, sent the committee's questionnaire to the Belgian Foreign Ministry, which again forwarded it to the Belgian consuls in tropical countries, who distributed it among the Europeans living there. Moreover, Janssen forwarded the survey to twenty German colonial institutions and thirty-eight doctors in the British colonies.[117]

The answers disappointed the committee and the survey undoubtedly asked too much from those responding to the questionnaire. Since reliable data was missing, some of the respondents gave their opinion and portrayed it as factual knowledge, but most of them openly refused to give conclusive answers. Having lived an everyday life in the tropics for a long time, many seemed to be unfamiliar with the theories of the purity of race alluded to in the ICI survey. Some of them also wondered why the ICI was still interested in universal theories of racial degeneration, given that microbes had been identified to be at the origin of tropical disorders among Europeans. According to the European settlers questioned, it was much more important to immunize Europeans against tropical diseases and to eradicate the causative agents by sanitary measures than to speculate on racist philosophies.[118] The committee, without the means to launch a more competent inquiry, was finally obliged to acknowledge that the replies had been "categorically contradictory."[119]

The Australian case illustrates the contradictory nature of the survey. The committee awaited the answers from Australia with high expectations, because Queensland was said to be one of the few examples of successful white colonization. On the one hand, medical experts from Australia contested that Queensland was a veritable "tropical" region, given the absence of endemic diseases like malaria. On the other hand, the principal medical officer, James W. Hope, wrote in the survey that all white women and children in the truly "tropical" parts of Queensland had to leave during the hot period. The famous American climatologist Robert de C. Ward refused steadfastly to support colonization in Queensland: "*Acclimatisation* … in the full sense of having white men and women living for successive generations in the tropics and

[116] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1909*, 149.
[117] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, vol. 1, 139.
[118] ICI, *Rapport Préliminaire à la Session de 1911: Question de l'Acclimatement,* 44.
[119] Ibid., 5

reproducing their kind without physical, mental and moral degeneration – i.e. colonization in the true sense – is impossible"[120]

While the Australian answers failed to meet the optimists' expectations, representatives of the South American and Antillean Creole societies were – unsurprisingly – more optimistic. Having lived in tropical latitudes for decades, most of them denied any signs of racial degeneration, although anemia and a general "loss of initiative" had been frequently observed. Both the paleness caused by anemia and the lethargy seemed to disappear after lengthy sojourns in the "northern countries". Those who stayed in Latin American countries had to take hygienic care of themselves, but were able to survive in an "insanitary environment" that surrounded them. Apart from a frustrated German-British couple from Ecuador, who was happy to blame racial degeneration for their childless marriage, no cases of sterility were reported.[121] White Creoles in Latin America, one respondent from Haiti concluded, were "acclimatized and modified, but not degenerated."[122]

Others, like the German doctor Albert Plehn, had kept children of colonial missionaries under observation and found them generally healthy.[123] The German doctor Max Fiebig, director of the *Institut für Ärztliche Mission* in Tübingen, agreed with Plehn. A missionary doctor, Fiebig adorned himself with having fathered six sons during his twenty-two years duty in the Dutch Indies. He did not note any physical complications with his children, let alone mental disorder. The paleness of their skin, caused by the constant heat and subsequent contractions of their skin, disappeared after their return to Europe. [124]

While these personal experiences were predominantly positive, most of the medical experts tended to discourage Europeans from mass settlement in the tropics. With regard to the Creole societies in South America and the Antilles, the optimistic delight was tempered by the fact that there was a constant supply of white emigrants from Europe, which helped to replenish and "revitalize" the white race in South America. Therefore, the "purity" of the settler race was not guaranteed and the experience was not regarded as being diagnostically conclusive.[125] The members of the commission made similar arguments in regard to the French Antilles and Australian Queensland, where the constant influx of whites did not allow a final verdict on the successful reproduction of the settler society.[126] Finally, the commission stated that countries with prosperous European settlements like Chile, Argentina, and South Africa were actually

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[120] Ibid., 17-18.
[121] Ibid., 24.
[122] Ibid., 35
[123] Ibid., 47 and 49.
[124] Ibid., 49.
[125] Ibid., 30.
[126] Däubler, *Die Grundzüge der Tropenhygiene*, 8-9.

subtropical regions with sparse and occasional tropical vegetation only and not comparable to the hostility of equatorial territories in central Africa.[127]

With the answers being evasive and often unprofessional, the commission decided to send a similar survey to scholarly experts in Europe.[128] Without altering the questions, they again hoped to find out if organic modifications were physiologic or functional and if the morphological modifications had irreversible effects on the internal cell structure, and thus on the human organism. Therefore, they were interested in the effects "inside the tissue of the intercellular life. If modifications concern the simple functioning of the different organs and not their histological components, that means that adaption is possible, or rather, that it is not impossible."[129]

Sending out the questionnaire to medical experts in Europe, as late as 1911, was a farce. By then, most of them had embraced an anthropological stance and firmly believed in racial decline: In France, scholars agreed that acclimatization was predominantly an "acclimatement pathologique", which inevitably led to racial degeneration.[130] Many of the German doctors followed the "doyen of German anthropology" and histologist Rudolf Virchow in believing that "whites cannot even survive in the tropics, let alone morphologically adapt to them."[131] Making a plea for cellular pathology and against the more optimistic bacteriologists like Robert Koch, Virchow vetoed European colonization in these climes and became an outspoken anti-colonialist before the First World War.[132] One of Virchow adepts, Karl Daeubler, who appeared as an expert for tropical medicine at the German Colonial Congress, went even further in his reply to the ICI's survey:

> We all agree that, if the white race succeeds in establishing itself for a longer time in the lower equatorial regions, it will undergo some functional modifications that are an inevitable consequence of the adaption to the new territory. The question is not to know if modifications

[127] Ibid., 7; See also Chailley in ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 401f.
[128] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, vol. 1, 139.
[129] "…mais dans l'intimité même des tissus de la vie intercellulaire. S'il y a simplement modification de dans le fonctionnement des différentes organes et non de leurs éléments histologiques, c'est que l'Adaption est possible, ou plutôt qu'elle n'est pas impossible", ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, 108.
[130] For example the "French school" Thevenot, Celle, Dutroulau, Leroy de Mericourt, Féris, Léget, Jousset, Bertillon, Orgéas, Fonsagrives and J. Rochard, who denied the possibility of the acclimatization of the white race in the tropics: Däubler, *Die Grundzüge der Tropenhygiene*, 6.
[131] Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers*, 11.
[132] Virchow was against colonial expansion and against a classification of humanity according to the color of the skin: J. Schmeltz, 'Obituary Rudolf Virchow', *Internationales Archiv für Ethnologie* 16 (1904), I, IV, XI and XXVI. For Virchows idea of histology see R. Virchow, *Die Cellularpathologie in ihrer Begründung auf physiologische und pathologische Gewebelehre* (Berlin, 1858); Concerning Virchow's refutation of colonial expansion and acclimatization: R. Virchow, 'Acclimatisation', *Verhandlungen der Berliner Gesellschaft für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte (Meeting May 16, 1885)*, 17 (1885); R. Virchow, 'Review of: Rapport sur le climat, la constitution du sol et l'hygiène d'État Independent du Congo, rédigé par une commission composé des M.M. A. Bourguignong, J. Cornet, G. Dryepont, Ch. Firket, A. Lancester, et M. Meuleman (Brussels, 1898)', *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* 31 (1889); See also M. Davies, *Public Health and Colonialism: The Case of German New Guinea 1884-1914* (Wiesbaden, 2002).

> happen at all, but if these modifications constitute a degeneration that inevitably leads to a final disappearance, notably by means of sterility.[133]

These inconclusive and negative answers to the second survey put an end to all plans of colonial settlement as long as medical measures failed to protect the race from extinction. Although most of the experts agreed that organic modifications disappeared if children born in the tropics returned to Europe, there was no reliable data to sustain this idea. As a consequence, the acclimatization commission in the ICI remained skeptical: if modifications did not disappear, they would result in a *dégenérescence* of the progeny. Therefore, it would be irresponsible to send white women to the colonies, who would produce *dégénerés.* Such a colonial policy would equal, as one member put it, "a crime against the parents and a crime against *la Patrie.*"[134]

Racial Disorientations: Creolization and the "Triumph of the Native"

Given this devastating verdict, the ICI had to provide alternatives to settler colonization. Various options were available, but all of them remained within the realm of racial anthropology that Treille distinguished between three "philosophies" among the anthropologists. The first school made use of statistics and analyzed depopulation and return migration among the whites in the tropics. Its proponents concluded that the white race couldn't live or progress in tropical climes. This view authorized short-term stays of individuals in the tropics and the establishment of *colonies d'exploitation* only. A second school believed that only miscegenation allowed Europeans to settle in the tropics at the cost of the purity of race and the emergence of a *métis* society, a mixed race deriving from the blending of Europeans and the indigenous. Finally, a third group predicted the complete disappearance of the Europeans and the definitive triumph of the indigenous peoples.[135]

All of those anthropological "philosophies" had partisans within the ICI. While most of the ICI's members belonged to the first school, that deemed white settlement impossible but temporary presence of administrators feasible, the second group found support among the representatives of the "old colonies" in French and Spanish America, who spoke for their Creole community. These Creole communities had long undergone processes of "mestization."[136]

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[133] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912*, 91: "et la question n'est pas de savoir si elle subirait des modifications mais de savoir si les modifications constitueraient en fait une dégénerescence devant fatalement aboutir à sa disparition finale, notamment par la sterilité."
[134] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, 109.
[135] Treille, *De l'acclimatation*, 4.
[136] See for example the speech by the mestizo Isaac at the first International Colonial Congress 1889: *Congrès Colonial International de Paris* (Paris, 1889), 84f.

Contrary to Gobineau's or Le Bon's opinion that the purest race is the most durable, they believed in race mixing as a means to immunize Europeans against the foreign climate.

Charles Grall, the head of the Native Health Service in Indochina, spoke for the "French school" of tropical medicine when he defined *acclimatement* as the "total and definitive adaption of the colonial representatives and their descendants to the climate." Total adaption, he claimed, "can be regarded as an unrealizable task," unless Europeans mix with the indigenous races. Only miscegenation stopped the Europeans' "diminution of vitality, children's debility and extreme mortality, as well as the gradual decline of their procreative abilities."[137]

Grall drew on a long tradition of French scholars to claim that acclimatization was only possible through creolization. Creolization was a form of soft acclimatization that allowed Europeans to "indigenize...in other words: the body achieves a mixed temperament, half way between that of the European and the native. That is the creole temperament, the only one compatible with tropical regions."[138] The creole version of adaption was a moderate variant of acclimatization, which led to the alteration of temperament, but did not necessarily lead to mutations of the organism. Creolization equaled indigenization, but not necessarily mestization.[139]

In Germany, colonial experts also considered race mixing as a process that could keep the colonial project alive. At the 1910 German Colonial Congress, Dr. Hartmann had made the tentative proposal to accept the status quo in the colonies and admit the existence of a mixed race of "bastards". According to Hartmann, Europeans should stop exaggerating the difference *between* races and accept that there are also significant differences *within* races. Prioritizing the category of class against the category of race, Hartmann emphasized the inner divisions of the European race that brought the proletarians and the upper class into conflict with each other. As a consequence of the class struggle, proletarians were more likely to leave for the colonies in search of a better life. However, they lacked loyalty to their own nation and were therefore unreliable colonists. Dismissing these proletarian *petits colons* because of their disloyalty, Hartmann preferred a *Mischrasse*, a colonial "new middle class" of mixed race to be the nucleus of colonization instead. Although both native and European blood ran through the veins of these mestizos or "bastards", he argued, they had always been loyal to the white master race, contrary to the untrustworthy European proletariat. By turning against eminent German intellectuals,

[137] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1912, 87: "l'adaption totale et définitive au climat pour ses représentants coloniaux et leur descendants"; "un fait irréalisable."
[138] Cit. after Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers,* 16.
[139] For the French attitude towards the métis in the new Empire see E. Saada, *Les enfants de la colonie: Les métis de l'Empire français entre sujétion et citoyenneté* (Paris, 2007).

such as the colonial geographers Hans Meyer and Friedrich Ratzel, Hartmann tried to rehabilitate the image of the mestizos and to make them one of the pillars of colonial rule, especially because he had found no proof of their alleged moral or physical inferiority. Although Hartmann's bold attempt provoked clamor among the audience of the German Colonial Congress, many medical experts agreed with him that a mixed race was the only way to proceed with the colonial project.[140]

One of the participants of the German Colonial Congress was Karl Daeubler who summarized the attitude of German tropical hygienists in his report to the ICI and repeated their belief in "the superiority of the man of color over the white man, with regard to the regulation of the body temperature and the capacity to work" in the colonies. Daeubler himself was a fervent critic of Stokvis' optimism and had always dismissed the white settlement in the colonies, unless there was a constant supply of settlers from Europe combined with a gradual mixing with the indigenous race.[141] Following the example of Europeans in South America, who had only survived by mixing with other races, Daeubler thought a de-Europeanization was necessary to continue colonial projects.

Gustave Dryepondt, the doyen of Belgian tropical medicine, considered a "mixed race" as an inevitable result of white men's loneliness in the colonies.[142] The most radical proposition, however, came from the Dutch physician Emanuel Moresco, the First Secretary of the Government of the Dutch Indies. In a report *On the Conditions of the Métis and the Attitude of the Governments with Regard to Them,* which Moresco prepared for the 1911 meeting of the ICI, he advocated race mixing to guarantee colonization. Moresco had graduated from the Delft school for the Dutch East Indies Service and held several posts in Java's administration and in the Dutch colonial ministry. His study of the British colonial rule in India earned him a position as a juristic expert at the Dutch Academy of Colonial Administration.[143] He would later become a prominent promoter of the League of Nations and the Dutch delegate for colonial policy, once the League had been established, as well as a member of the International Labor Organization.[144]

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[140] G. Hartmann, 'Die Mischrassen in unseren Kolonien', *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1910* (Berlin, 1910), 907f.
[141] Däubler, *Die Grundzüge der Tropenhygiene*, 7; Review: 'Karl Däubler, Die Grundzüge der Tropenhygiene', *Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene* 4 (1900), 817-819: 10-13 and 318.
[142] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912*, 106 and ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911,* vol.1, 98.
[143] His writings about the British Indies: E. Moresco, *De wetgevende Raden in Britisch-Indië: Uitgegeven op last van den Minister van Koloniën* ('S Gravenhage, 1911); E. Moresco, 'Le Contrat de Travail dans les Colonies Asiatiques', *Bulletin de Colonisation Comparée* (December 1910-January 1911).
[144] A.B. Stuart Cohen, 'Emanuel Moresco', *Jaarboek van de Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde te Leiden, 1945-1946* (Leiden, 1947), 132–141.

Like Dryepondt, Moresco argued that the gender disproportion among the colonizers was a problem common to all colonies, both ancient and modern. The colonizing Europeans were predominantly masculine and chose indigenous females for lack of white women. These "mixed unions" were universal and no laws and no morals had been able to prevent the *croisement* of individuals.[145] Moresco's description was an adequate hint that most of the colonial laws banning interracial procreation had remained *lettre morte*.

Moresco was inspired by the writings of James Bryce, a Scottish cosmopolitan and equally a promoter of a league of nations, who held the view that the "blending of races" contributed to the progress of mankind, contrary to a world segregated along the lines of "pure races".[146] According to Bryce, modernity had made the contact between races inevitable, and the contact occurred mostly under colonial circumstances. While blending races of "equal strength" contributed to maintain peace and order, the encounter between more advanced and more backward races could also improve the situation of both. The mixing of two individuals of differing race led to the blending of physical features, with the child bearing equal proportions of the progenitors phenotypes. But the child's mental type, Bryce claimed, was nearer to the advanced parent, because "the higher race has more to give, and [that] the lower race wishes to receive." In the colonial situation, the male parent usually belonged to the higher race and "more white men have married colored or Indian women than vice versa." As a consequence, the mulatto or mestizo offspring "seeks to resemble its higher rather than its inferior progenitor."[147]

Bryce's speculations on the assimilative and absorbing power of inferior intellect, mixed with the idea of masculine dominance, fascinated Moresco. Even though Bryce denied the possibility of such a symbiosis in tropical regions and between whites and blacks, Moresco did not completely dismiss such an option. In his report to the ICI, he proposed an "exchange of qualities" [*échange de qualités*] between the Europeans and the indigenous in the tropics by intermarriage. In that way, he argued, the intelligence of the white men could be joined with the indigenous' immunity to tropical diseases.[148] Moresco's proposal to combine the physical aptness of the indigenous and the intelligence of the whites was certainly bold, but not exceptional. He called for deeper research to find out about the effects of this "hybridization" and advised the colonial governments to stop useless discussions about the mestizos and their

[145] E. Moresco, *De la condition des métis et l'attitude des gouvernements à leur égard* (Brussels, 1911), 4.
[146] James Bryce was a liberal and cosmopolitan. Regius professor of international law, he was named British ambassador to the United States. He was one of the main advocates of the League of Nations, and promoted its creation in Britain and in the USA: J.T. Seaman, *A Citizen of the World: The Life of James Bryce* (London and New York, 2006), 2.
[147] J.B. Bryce, *The Relation of the Advanced and the Backward Races of Mankind* (Oxford, 1902), 23.
[148] Moresco, *De la condition des métis,* 6f.

status. Obviously, the *métis* were "between the races," and lacked somehow the harmony of pure races in their own environment, but this did not mean that they had to be discriminated against. Instead, Moresco advised the colonial society to "benefit in the most profitable way from their [the mestizo's] aptitudes."[149]

The Spanish Antonio Maria Fabié, one of the earliest members of the ICI, had even sent a delegation to the Spanish Philippines in order to investigate the possibilities to "blend the races" [*fundir las razas*] of the colonizers and the colonized in order to make the Filipinos progress and the Spanish apt to live in the tropical climate.[150]

The advice to merge natives and foreigners into a creole or tropical race was part of a broader racist discourse that took the existence of different races for granted. Apart from this discourse, miscegenation was a fact: even though anti-miscegenation laws were effective in German colonies, the 4,872 male Europeans in the German colonies (in 1902) produced 3,437 "*Mischlinge"* (1912).[151] By the time the institute pathologized acclimatization and refrained from sending Europeans there, mixed marriages and their progeny were part of the colonization process. However, since discourses on racial separation had become hegemonic, the consequences of racial mixing were inevitably interpreted as being detrimental to the white race. When D. van Blom, Professor of Political Economics at the Delft Colonial School, spoke in front of the famous German Verein für Socialpolitik on the "Settlement of Europeans in the Tropics" in 1912, he aptly summarized the arguments against miscegenation: "the Whites can without any doubt live in the tropics, but only under the condition to mix up with the natives. As a consequence, the life of the individual is the death of the race."[152]

Racial Purism: Aryan Purity vs. Southern European Cosmopolitanism

One way of preventing this "death" of the European race was simply to deny its existence. It needed a geographer, the French Marcel Dubois, to warn the physicians against categorizing races according to the color of their skin only. In the ICI's 1895 session, he denied the existence

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[149] Ibid., 12. However, Moresco limited the possibility of hybridization, by excluding the black race in Africa from the "croisement" with Europeans.

[150] Fabié, *Mi Gestion Ministerial*, 648.

[151] The numbers are taken from Gerstmeyer, "Mischlinge" in *Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon,* vol 2, 564f and Thilenius, 'Bevölkerung der Schutzgebiete' in *Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon* vol. 1, 195f; See also Schreiber, 'Zur Frage der Mischehen zwischen Deutschen und Eingeborenen im Schutzgebiet Deutsch-Südwestafrika', *Zeitschr. für Kolonialpolitik* 88 (1909); Fleischmann, 'Die Mischehenfrage', *Zeitschr. für Kolonialpolitik* 83 (1910); U. Lindner, *Koloniale Begegnungen. Deutschland und Großbritannien als Imperialmächte in Afrika 1880-1914* (Frankfurt am Main 2011b), 317-361; P. Grosse, *Kolonialismus, Eugenik und bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1850-1918* (Frankfurt and New York, 2000), 145-192.

[152] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912*, 118; See also K. Saper, D. van Blom, and I.A. Nederburgh, 'Die Ansiedelung von Europäern in den Tropen: Mittelamerika, Kleine Antillen, Niederländisch-West- und Ostindien', *Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik* 147, 2 (1912).

of a “European race” by drawing a line between northern and southern Europeans. According to Dubois, the Bretons, like the Irish and British, were ill at ease to adapt to warmer climates in southern Europe, while the Greeks felt at home in Africa rather than in Scandinavia. Likewise, the Arabs and Kabyles of Algeria suffer and perish in the climate of the Congo: “There is neither a European unity nor an African unity.”[153]

This assumption led many to believe that the southern Europeans, like the Spanish, the Italians and the Greeks were better colonizers. The Congress on Hygiene and Climatology of Belgium and the Congo, under the auspices of the ICI-member Dryepondt, had officially concluded that southern Europeans easily acclimatize to the tropics, whereas the Germanic race failed to do so.[154] The ICI dismissed the blond and blue-eyed Europeans as adequate colonizers, because of their infinitesimal racial immunity. Outspoken racists, such as the German racial hygienist Eugen Fischer, reminded the ICI that the purest and therefore most developed race were the Aryans, who were perfectly adapted to their own special climate and whose vulnerability in alien climates was due to their perfection only. Consequently, “Aryans” could not populate southern Europe, let alone the colonies.[155] By denying the idea that “Germanic” peoples were the best and most reliable colonizers, racial theorists turned the paradigms of the mid-nineteenth century upside-down.

In accordance with Gobineau’s aphorism claiming that purity of the race generated superiority, the northern race was considered to be the least “cosmopolitan” race. Contrary to the Aryans, the Jewish race was accredited with a high degree of cosmopolitanism, because it had developed an exceptional capacity of adaption to foreign milieus during the continued life in diaspora. As a consequence, the Dutch professor van Blom qualified them as the best colonizers, which was, he stated, “an interesting finding for the Zionist movement.”[156] Zionist leaders of Jewish settlements in the Middle East indeed used these arguments when justifying their colonial projects.[157]

Southern Europeans were considered slightly less cosmopolitan than the “Jewish race,” but certainly not as pure as their northern counterparts. On the one hand, the “meridional” races were naturally at home with the warm countries’ climate. On the other hand, their history had turned them into a mixed ethnicity that combined the qualities of different races. The Moors and the Visigoths had conquered the inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula, for example, and the

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[153] “Il n’y a plus d’unité européenne que d’unité africaine.”, in ICI, *Compte-Rendu 1895*, 91.
[154] Virchow, ‘Review of Rapport’, 292.
[155] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912*, 328f.
[156] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912*, 118.
[157] O. Warburg, ‘Die jüdische Kolonisation in Nord-Syrien auf Grundlage der Baumwollkultur im Gebiet der Bagdadbahn’, *Altneuland* 8 (August 1904), 232–240: 234.

latter now "prospered in every climate", as the secretary of the Parisian Anthropological Society remarked.[158] Spanish colonialists capitalized on this idea and legitimized their expansion into the African continent with an alleged historical confraternity with the Moroccans.[159] These concepts of "mixed" versus climatologically "cosmopolitan" races could therefore also serve as an argument in favor of colonization, and the Spanish made wide use of it to substantiate their historical rights to colonize Morocco.

The idea that southern Europeans were the best colonizers also left a mark on colonial policies in northern Europe. German colonial authorities, for example, refused blond Germans from entering the colonial service, because they feared their immediate invalidity.[160] Italians, by contrast, had the reputation of being better workers in the tropical climate. When the Belgian member of the ICI, Albert Thys, sought European workers to build the railway from Matadí to Léopoldville in the Congo, he recruited them among Italians and Greeks, whom he deemed more apt to resist the warm climate and endure the exertions of the construction worker.[161] Moritz Schanz, the expert on cotton production in the ICI, claimed that Italians were better workers for cotton plantations than "negroes" and had already been employed widely on the plantations in the Deep South of North America.[162] In 1903, the Congo Free State and the Italian *Commissario dell'emigrazione* launched a joint project to settle Italians in the Eastern Congo region near Lake Tanganyika and in the Kivu district. On invitation of Léopold II, the Italian Foreign Ministry dispatched the Neapolitan navy doctor Eduardo Baccari to investigate the "convenience of an Italian colonization of these climes, like those proposed by the Congo Free State."[163] Baccari deemed the region uninhabitable, because of the endemic paludism of the region, and the project was abolished. Instead, he used the mission to inspect the Italian members of the *Force Publique*, who had been officially disengaged to join the Congolese army.[164] Baccari concluded that, despite the failed settlement, "the Italians are the natural cooperators of the Belgians in colonization", with the Italians being the second biggest group in the Congo after the Belgians.[165] Finally, authorities modeled colonial architecture on Andalusian and Greek designs, which laid emphasis on the ventilation and cooling of the

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[158] Zaborowski, 'Acclimatation, Acclimatement', in: Berthelot, *La Grande Encyclopédie: Inventaire Raisonnée des Sciences, des Lettres et des Arts vol1* (Paris, 1961?), 296.
[159] J.L. Mateo Dieste, *La "Hermandad" hispano-marroquí: Política y religión bajo el Protectorado español en Marruecos (1912-1956)* (Barcelona, 2003).
[160] J. Tesch, *Die Laufbahn der deutschen Kolonialbeamten, ihre Pflichten u. Rechte* (Berlin, 1912), 24.
[161] See : 'Chemin de fer du Congo. Personnel Ouvrier', *Le Congo Illustré: Voyages et travaux des belges dans l'État indépendant du Congo* 1 (1892), 52.
[162] M. Schanz, 'Der Baumwollanbau in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika', *Beihefte zum Tropenpflanzer* 9 (1908), 13f.
[163] 'Decreto del Ministerio degli affari esteri 21 maggio 1903', cit in: Baccari, *Il Congo*, Prefazione.
[164] Ibid., Prefazione.
[165] There were 238 Italians in the Congo in 1905: Ibid., 687.

administrators' houses.[166] Greeks had come to German East Africa since the 1890s to work as railway retailers and construction workers. Later on, they founded plantations, and by 1914, twenty-eight out of eighty-six European plantation companies in the Kilimanjaro region were Greek, while Italians joined them as coffee planters.[167]

Measures against Native Depopulation

While the inner-European discourse shifted gradually towards a differentiation between the Aryan race and the other races, the ICI took another turn. Certainly, the ICI valued the Southern Europeans over Northern Europeans, but in for "practical" reasons, it valued the indigenous population over both. Claiming that the adapted and immunized natives were the best labor force to develop the colonies, its members only feared their extermination by white colonization. This fear culminated in a depopulation debate and the ICI broke new ground by promoting a sustainable demographic policy in the 1890s, which remained a crucial concern to the League of Nations after the First World War.

While in the 1880s, colonizers had anticipated the increase of the indigenous population by eradicating slave trade, famines and anthropophagy, they had to backtrack by the 1890s. They identified a process of "depopulation", brought about by the decimation of the labor force during the construction of railways, the spread of contagious diseases along that same railway lines and the separation of male railway and plantation workers from their families. By the beginning of the twentieth century, colonial authorities also admitted that wars had exterminated whole "tribes", like the Herero in German West Africa.[168]

Although the "depopulation" was not proven by statistical data and rather derived from an intelligent guess (the *Deutsches Koloniallexikon* qualified it cautiously as "rather stagnating growth than demographic decline"), it shifted the ICI's attention from immunizing the whites to saving the indigenous from demographic decline. Hans Ziemann, the German colonial physician in the ICI, was particularly anxious about strengthening the Africans to work in the tropics.[169] To achieve this goal, he ordered the clearing of the tropical jungle, which he considered an obstacle to the cultivation of land. Moreover, Ziemann prided himself on having equipped fifty percent of the Cameroon's native huts with windowpanes and awnings to protect

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[166] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912*, 112.

[167] T. Bührer, *Die Kaiserliche Schutztruppe für Deutsch-Ostafrika: Koloniale Sicherheitspolitik und Transkulturelle Kriegführung, 1885 bis 1918* (München, 2011), 326.

[168] 'Entvölkerung in unseren Kolonien', in: Schnee, *Koloniallexikon*, vol 1., 565; H. Ziemann, *Wie erobert man Afrika für die weiße und farbige Rasse?* (Leipzig, 1939 [1907]), 8.

[169] H. Ziemann, *Über das Bevölkerungs- und Rassenproblem in den Kolonien (Ein koloniales Programm): Vortrag, geh. 1912* (Berlin, 1912); Hans Ziemann, 'Zur Bevölkerungsfrage usw. in Kamerun', *Sonderabdruck aus den Mittheilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten*, 17, 3 (1904).

the natives from heat and mosquitoes. But most important to him was obstetrics and childcare. He hoped to prevent African women from their traditional dedication to physical work and to suckle their babies instead. Ziemann prohibited African women from feeding their children with unboiled water and with customary food like manioc, yams and batata, which had a reduced shelf life and were often at the origin of mortal digestive diseases. Apart from these practical measures, he blamed early marriage on reducing fertility and tried to combat abortions, which he considered to happen frequently because of the African women's tradition of valuing work over raising their children.[170] Administrators in German East Africa instead were the first to immunize the natives and sent regular vaccination commissions to their villages. But while indigenous auxiliaries took blood samples from the inhabitants, inoculated them against the sleeping sickness or delivered quinine against malaria, a police force accompanied them in order to enforce the hygienist measures and escort reluctant patients to the hospital.[171]

In the Congo Free State, a rudimentary indigenous healthcare had developed in reaction to the fatal death rates among the railway workers who built the Matadí-Léopoldville track. Albert Jullien, the physician employed by Thys' railway company, had tried to model his private health service on the highly successful sanitation policy during the construction of the Panama and Suez Canals. Jullien made no secret of his priority to enhance the "human capital" but his attempts were a complete failure.[172] He ascribed this fiasco to lacking resources and the poor number of sixteen official European physicians in the Congo (in 1911), with only four being specialized in combating the rapid spread of sleeping sickness.[173] As a consequence, Jullien made a plea for indigenous doctors, in addition to the nursery schools in Boma and Léopoldville, whose graduates already informed the natives about the use of clean water, the danger of the mosquitoes and the nourishment of children.[174] The combat against infant mortality and tetanus became their main task. When heading the medical service during the construction of the Mayumbé railway, Jullien himself received the order to vaccinate all the construction workers and the plantation owners also asked him to immunize their employees. Indigenous doctors and their auxiliaries executed these vaccination campaigns because they were more likely to be accepted by the population.[175] Nevertheless, in several colonies, the ambulant doctors, who took blood samples from the indigenous, delivered quinine or inoculated the indigenous.

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[170] Ziemann, *Bevölkerungs -und Rassenproblem.*, 8-10.
[171] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1913,*154.
[172] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1913*, 121.
[173] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1913*, 123.
[174] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1913*, 132.
[175] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1913*, 134.

The French made a more professional attempt of reproductive policy in Madagascar, where general governor Gallieni was directly inspired by the debates in the ICI. Madagascar became the first French colony to train indigenous physicians to combat depopulation and modeled its medical schools on the examples in Dutch Java.[176] Madagascar's governor Joseph Gallieni was famous for taking the lead in aligning French colonial policy with the native paradigm and Joseph Chailley was his example.[177] Monitoring Chailley's journey to Dutch Java in the late 1890s closely, Gallieni himself dispatched missions to Java in order to copy the Dutch "native policy."[178] The centerpiece of this program was the introduction of free medical assistance for the colonized, called *assistance médicale indigène,* since 1896. Following the example of the Dutch medical schools in Java, the French trained Malagasy physicians, who conducted "practical" operations to cure cataracts and hernia or launched vaccination campaigns against smallpox.[179] The most important task of the indigenous medical corps, however, was midwifery and the counseling of mothers of young children. A school of midwives was attached to the medical school in Tananarive since 1896, hoping that the colonized would trust the professional indigenous staff. Gallieni issued a series of decrees that exempted fathers of at least five children from taxes and military duty and charged the unmarried who had no descendants instead. In the framework of the "repopulation policies" inaugurated in 1899, he introduced a children's day, gave rewards to mothers of several children and regulated the marriage age.[180]

Colonial authorities tended to exaggerate the success of these medical campaigns and failed to mention that they were funded by an extra tax that caused more problems to the indigenous than benefits from centralized health policies.[181] Albert Jullien, comparing the results of the campaigns against infant mortality in 1913, qualified them as disappointing and devastating.[182] But given the underlying purpose to optimize the indigenous for colonial labor, this was a serious attempt to stabilize the Malagasy workforce. Both in Java and in Madagascar, prominent plantation owners co-funded the medical services, profiting from the project to enhance their human capital.[183] The program would finally be extended to the whole African continent and laid the basis for a coordinated international health policy in the interwar period.

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[176] A frequently cited publication on anti-depopulation measures was P. Strauss, *Depopulation et puericulture* (Paris, 1901).

[177] Letter of Gallieni to Depincé, 12.1.1901, in: J.S. Gallieni, *Lettres de Madagascar 1896 - 1905* (Paris, 1928), 58.

[178] Heckel and Cyprien, *L'enseignement colonial*, 79.

[179] *Journal Officiel de Madagascar et dépendances*, 13.11.1901, 6644.

[180] M. Lasnet, 'Assistance Médicale', in: Delpincé (ed.), *Congrès de l'Afrique Orientale tenu à Paris du 9 au 14 Octobre 1911* (Paris, 1912), 120.

[181] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1913,* 103.

[182] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1913*,141.

[183] *Journal Officiel de Madagascar et dépendances*, 13.11.1901, 6644.

The "Triumph of the Natives" and the Decline of Settler Ideologies

The "triumph of the natives," although it frequently haunted Europeans in their feverish nightmares in the tropics, had thus become a serious option for the colonizers. One prominent member of the ICI, Jacob Theodor Cremer, former head of the Deli planters in Dutch Sumatra and colonial minister of the Netherlands (1897-1901), encouraged the "native solution." Answering the institute's survey on acclimatization, Cremer claimed that the colonization of the tropical countries would not be made with whites but with natives only. White immigration did not matter anymore. Indigenous populations grew faster in number, he argued, because they had fewer needs than whites and the European medicine would protect them against endemic diseases. His plans included exchanges of indigenous workforce between overpopulated colonies like Dutch Java and vacant areas in Borneo or Sumatra.[184] While white emigration would continue to the "less inhabited" regions like Canada, Australia, South Africa and Argentina, Cremer believed that equatorial countries did not need white settlers.[185] Rathgen, the economically-minded head of the Colonial Institute in Hamburg, further developed this idea. He claimed that it was useless to bring European settlers to the colonies, because the salaries of the natives were naturally inferior to the wages demanded by Europeans.[186] Outdone by the cheaper and more competitive natives, the Europeans would not even be able to secure their subsistence. Only in territories where "colored people" were absent would white workers gain their income.[187] Dryepondt gave the argument another twist by vetoing white working class emigration, because its members were likely to extend their solidarity to the colonized and often ignored the color bar. While proletarian settlers were prone to mix with the natives, professional elites stayed among themselves.[188]

For the ICI members, the "native" option seemed the most likely to be put into practice, provided that professional European administrators guided the indigenous. But this did not mean that they had to make the colonies their home. Otto Dempwolff, Professor for Indigenous Languages at the Colonial Institute in Hamburg, agreed that it is neither possible nor necessary for Europeans to live in the tropical colonies for good.[189] Dryepondt added that the improved means of communications made the transplantation of an autonomous settler society

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[184] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, 131
[185] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, 132
[186] See for this argument also P. Preuss, 'Die Rentabliitätsaussichten der Kameruner Kulturen', *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1902* (Berlin, 1902), 571.
[187] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, 100 and 122-123.
[188] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, 98.
[189] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, 115.

unnecessary. Regular shipping lines provided for the possibility of frequent convalescences in Europe, which prevented the physical and moral degeneration of the whites.[190] As a result, acclimatization ceased to be the *conditio sine qua non* for colonization.

The final verdict of the ICI's commission on acclimatization – represented by Dryepondt and Hubrecht – advised Europeans against sending lower class colonists overseas. Instead, the commission built its hope on an "exclusive elite" of administrators that could afford frequent periods of convalescence in Europe and refrained from "establishing themselves forever in a country, where there is only a white ruling class and a proletariat of black workers." "Only such an elite," Dryepondt argued, was able to "resist to any mixing with the natives."[191]

Finally, the *Colonisation de peuplement*, which had dominated colonial discourses since the 1830s, was replaced by the *colonisation d'exploitation*.[192] Professional and autonomous colonial managers supported such a *colonisation d'exploitation*. Although still being bound up with their nation, colonial experts cherished an ideal of a colony that was not an extension of the motherland, with European settlers populating it and legally assimilated to the metropole. Rather, it was an autonomous body consisting of colonial specialists who knew how to get the maximum out of the natives. This "outsourced" supplier of the metropolitan economy was said to be more profitable to the Europeans, because the specialized colonial professionals guaranteed an efficient and sustainable colonial economy.

The ICI's attempts to redirect colonial policies were serious and had a significant impact on European colonial policies. In France, Chailley became one of the most fervent adversaries of settler colonialism and, as the head of the Colonial Union and the ICI, steered the French colonial policy from the troubled waters of assimilation to the safe haven of a policy of association. The French immediately felt the impact of this new policy: the emigration to French possessions was in steady decline by the end of the nineteenth century even though it had been quite important before.[193]

Neither did Léopold II design his Congo Free State as a settler colony. The authorities refrained completely from settler colonialism: "The Belgians do not emigrate" became Léopold's famous credo, when he organized his colony according to the model of Dutch Java, privileging the indigenous policy over settler colonialism.[194]

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[190] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*,138.
[191]"se maintenir vierge de tout mélange avec les indigenes." ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, 98.
[192] "une classe dirigeante blanche et une classe ouvrière de travailleurs noirs"; ICI, *Compte Rendu 1911*, vol.1, 97.
[193] E. Poiré, *L'émigration française aux colonies* (Paris, 1897), 13.
[194] Stengers, 'Modèle colonial hollandais'.

German colonial experts actively prevented potential settlers from emigrating to their African colonies while encouraging them to go to the Americas. Contrary to the nationalists' demands in the public debates, in which nationalists promoted the redirection of German emigrants to the German colonies, colonial experts advised them against settling in African colonies.[195] In order to so, the German Colonial Society had created a Central Information Bureau for Emigrants, in the Society's office in Berlin. Local branches, scattered all over Germany, supported the central office in promoting emigration to the Americas and gave free advice to those who were interested in leaving Germany. By the turn of the century, the Berlin government declared the Colonial Society's office the official information bureau for emigrants. Brochures and pamphlets informed the Germans about the Bureau's existence and 150 newspapers spread the news of its establishment.[196] The office opened its doors for the first time in April 1903 and in the first year of its existence, the Bureau's secretary had to answer 4,557 written and 734 personal requests. The number of inquiries rose to 11,539 during the accounting year 1908/9.[197] More than half of the annual requests asked for information about emigration to the German colonies, followed by South Brazil and the USA.

It soon became clear, however, that the German Colonial Society's emigration office did not really want the Germans to emigrate to the African colonies. On the one hand, it discouraged most of them from emigrating at all, because they did not even have a minimum of capital to make a start and survive the first days after their arrival. On the other hand, the emigration office issued an official *Manual for the Guidance of Emigrants*, which advised peasants and workers to emigrate to Argentina, Southern Brazil (Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Katharina, Paraua) Paraguay, Chile, Canada and Australia only. Being aware that former colonization projects in these regions had failed, the manual remarked that "the former experiments to establish agricultural colonies were not crowned with success, but this is to blame on the low quality of the emigrant material [*Auswanderermaterial*]."[198]

At the same time, the emigration bureau discouraged the emigrants to leave for the German protectorates, "due to the bad climate." Only "German-South-West Africa and Samoa might be an option, but with restrictions."[199] The bureau proposed South America instead and published brochures that informed readers about emigration to Argentina, Chile, Rio Grande

[195] Sebastian Conrad has linked the low number of Germans who actually emigrated to German colonies (no more than 25,000) to the acclimatisation dilemma: S. Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, 2006), 81-82.
[196] BArch R 8023, 109, fol. 131.
[197] BArch, R 8023 110, fol. 282.
[198] BArch, R 8023, 109, fol. 4, Leitfaden für die Auskunftserteilung an Auswanderer.
[199] BARch, R 8023, 109, fol. 4, Leitfaden für die Auskunftserteilung an Auswanderer.

do Sul, Mexico and Canada.[200] There were no brochures advertising the official German colonies.

The willful neglect of sending emigrants to the German colonies irritated the more nationally minded members of the German Colonial Society. They intended to preserve the emigrants' Germanness by sending them to official German colonies, where they did not succumb to the assimilative pressure of foreign governments. As early as May 1901, Pan-German members addressed a petition to the emigration committee of the Colonial Society and demanded sending German emigrants to German colonies only. However, the central committee of the Colonial Society declined: "We do not share the view that the Reich's emigration policy is anti-national or failing to be national enough." Moreover, the commission remarked, measures had already been taken to expand consular representation in South America, which was considered the most important destiny of German emigration.[201]

All of the reformist European colonial experts agreed that emigrant colonialism contradicted modern colonial policies. The acclimatization debate was either the reason or the excuse for this attitude. The debates on how to deal with the acclimatization dilemma resulted in the declared end of settler colonialism, which also influenced the policy of official colonial governments and semi-official colonial interest groups. The following chapter will show that Dutch Java became the model for a successful colony without colonists. At the same time, the ICI applied itself to train the ideal and professional colonial administrator – modeled on the Dutch training for colonial administrators in the Indies.

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[200] BArch, R 8023, 109, fol. 97.

[201] BArch R 8023 108: Zentral-Auskunftsstelle für Auswanderer (Band 1: Mai 1900-Mai 1907), fol. 66-70, "Bericht über die Sitzung des Ausschusses vom 31. Mai 1901, abgehalten in den Geschäftsräumen der Gesellschaft, Schellingstraße 4."

Chapter 4

The Politics of Comparison: The Dutch Model and the Reform of Colonial Training Schools

Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, colonial experts all over the world propagated the Dutch East Indies – even more than British India – as an example of successful native policy and of professional colonial administration.[1] To unravel the secrets behind the Dutch administrative achievements, the French Ministry of the Navy and the Colonies dispatched Joseph Chailley in 1893 on an official mission to "study the recruitment of colonial administrators in Holland."[2] His journey was the founding act of methodological colonial comparison and resulted in the establishment of the ICI. Based on colonial comparison and transfers, Chailley and the ICI inaugurated an era of colonial reform, which indeed transformed the training of colonial administrators in Western Europe and the USA. At the origin of this transformation was a call for professionalization that marked the shift from military to civil administration and from the rule over territory to the rule over people.[3]

The admiration and emulation of Dutch colonial policies derived from an idealization of Dutch rationality and professional government. While stereotypes often stimulated a general interest in Dutch government over almost sixty million Indonesians, the emulation of its colonial methods were selective and purposeful. In the first part of this chapter, I show how the supposedly scientific method of colonial comparison had led Europeans to believe in Dutch exceptionalism. Dutch Java, in particular, was considered exceptional for its profitability, rational administration and alleged liberality towards the Javanese. In global colonial thought the fifth biggest island of the Indonesian archipelago became both a stereotype to be admired

[1] The Dutch model for a modern native policy remains understudied. It has long been held that the British model, and Lugard's dual mandate in particular, brought about the change to native policy in Europe: See M. Crowder, 'Indirect Rule. French and British Style', *Africa* 34, 3 (July 1964), 197–204; Dimier, *Le discours idéologique*, 11; H.L. Wesseling has been widely ignored when making a plea for the importance of Dutch colonialism: Wesseling, 'The Giant that was a Dwarf'; H.L. Wesseling, *Imperialism and Colonialism: Essays on the History of European Expansion* (Westport, Conn., 1997); See also Kuitenbrouwer, *Nederland en de opkomst*.

[2] J. Chailley, *La Hollande et les fonctionnaires des Indes Néerlandaises* (Paris, 1893), 9 and Preface.

[3] For a general overview with biographies of the main colonial governors see Gann and Duignan, *African proconsuls*; See for general accounts on the British case: A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, *Britain's Imperial Administrators, 1858-1966* (New York, 2000) J.W. Cell, *British Colonial Administration in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: The Policy-Making Process* (New Haven, 1970); T.R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge, 1995); P. Mason, *The Men who Ruled India* (London, 1953-1954); D. Potter, *India's Political Administrators 1919-1983* (Oxford, 1983); C. Whitehead, *Colonial Educators: The British Indian and Colonial Education Service 1858-1983* (London, 2003); C. Dewey, *Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service* (London 1993); L. Ronaldshay, *Life of Lord Curzon* (London, 1928); L. Beveridge, *India Called Them* (London, 1947); M. Gilbert, *Servant of India: A Study of Imperial Rule as Told Through the Correspondance and Diaries of Sir James Dunlop Smith* (London, 1966); J.W. Cell, *Hailey: A Study in British Imperialism 1872-1969* (Cambridge, 1992).

and prototype to be emulated. In the second part of the chapter, I analyze the knowledge transfers that had their origins in the ICI's comparative studies and in the myth of Dutch exceptionalism. Those transfers resulted in the reform of the recruitment and training of colonial administrators between 1890 and 1910.

The restructuring of colonial training schools was embedded in a more ample campaign launched by ICI members to professionalize colonial administration. The reformers of the ICI agreed on four priorities, according to which colonial administrators had to be trained: *hygiene* (physical preparation for service in the tropics), *anthropology* (knowledge of the indigenous language and culture), *specialization* (instead of a general or all-round education), and *autonomy* (from metropolitan "ignorance" in colonial matters). Most of these attributes were assigned to the Dutch model of colonial training, which was therefore popularized by the ICI.

Dutch Exceptionalism between Enforced Profitability and Ethical Liberalization

The pathologization of white acclimatization (see Chapter 3) had led the Europeans to advocate a professional native policy instead of sending settlers to the colonies. This coincided with the wish to turn the natives into workers, taxpayers and ultimately into consumers. With the help of professional administrators, this policy would result in colonies "on the cheap" or even in autonomous and profitable economic entities. Chailley identified British India and the Dutch Indies as models of such a policy, claiming that the Dutch and British utilitarian attitude had led them to cherish a mix of white "professional" organization and native executive.[4] Serving as a model for dynamic colonial development, the British and Dutch East Indies attracted colonial experts from all over Europe, who embarked on a *grand tour* to these time-honored possessions in East Asia, before they started colonial careers in the "new territories" in Africa or Oceania.

Dutch Java, in particular, developed into a template for Europeans who intended to study the "art of colonization."[5] Although Dutch rule in the East Indies was highly ambiguous, and officially changed its course several times, Java outdid British India as a model for rational and successful colonial management. (Other British possessions, like the self-sufficient and allegedly well-governed Southern Nigeria, were not considered models at all).[6] Between 1890 and 1914, the French dispatched more than twenty expeditions to Dutch Java, while only eleven

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[4] Chailley, *Java et ses habitants*, VII.
[5] For an overview on Dutch colonialism, see Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas*; M. Bloembergen, *An New Dutch Imperial History* (Den Haag, 2013); M. Bloembergen and B. Jackson, *Colonial Spectacles: The Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies at the World Exhibitions, 1880-1931* (Singapore, 2006).
[6] Carland, *The Colonial Office*, 103.

were sent to British India.[7] Fifty German colonial experts dwelled in Java between the 1880s and 1914, while much more short-term visitors arrived from Europe or the neighboring colonies.[8] Among them were the leaders of the French and German colonial movement, Joseph Chailley of the French Colonial Union and Johann Albrecht von Mecklenburg of the German Colonial Society. German colonial experts even got grants – the famous Buitenzorg stipends – to study and work in the Dutch Indies, while the French sent junior administrators for similar reasons.[9] King Léopold II of Belgium studied Java in detail, modeling his Congo Free State on it. “Apart from Holland,” Léopold claimed, “there are no governments who know how to make colonies productive.”[10] Towards the end of the nineteenth century, colonial experts published 34 French, 31 British and 27 German books about the “Insulinde,” accompanied by innumerable articles in colonial journals.[11] In the USA, ICI members popularized the Dutch possessions in East India, and induced Washington to send several expeditions there.[12] Although European colonial experts held British India in high esteem, the Empire’s prestige was dwarfed by Dutch Java. Literally all colonial governments dispatched observers to the Indonesian island that was only slightly bigger than Ireland.[13]

Significantly, it was British publicists who first popularized Java as the pearl of all islands that even outshined the British crown colony. As early as 1869, the British Darwinist Alfred R. Wallace had praised Java’s dual administration (native and European) and admired its system of economic exploitation, called the “cultivation system” (*Cultuurstelsel*). By the cultivation system, the Dutch government forced Javanese *desah* (village communities) to

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[7] The French Colonial Ministry sent eleven official commissions to British India between 1893 and 1914: ANOM, 50COL63-78, Ministère des Colonies, Missions: Colonies Étrangères, Colonies et Protectorats Britanniques; H. Wesseling, ‘Le Modèle colonial hollandais dans la théorie coloniale française’, *Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer* 63, 231 (1976), 223–255: 236.

[8] K.W. Dammermann, ‘The Quinquagenary of the Foreigners’ Laboratory at Buitenzorg 1884-1934’, *Annales du Jardin Botanique de Buitenzorg* 45 (1935), 1–54; The German Colonial Ministry encouraged their administrators in the Asian possessions to spend their holidays in Dutch Java: H. Haarhaus, *Das Recht des Deutschen Kolonialbeamten* (Karlsruhe, 1911), 71f.

[9] See for example; BArch R 1001, 6227 Wissenschaftliche Sammlungen aus fremden Ländern und Kolonien, Prof. Engler, Botanische Sammlungen aus Süd- und Ostafrika, Nr. 96: Director des Königlichen Botanischen Gartens und Museums Dahlem, Engler, to Minister des Geistlichen, Unterrichts, und Medizinal-Angelgenheiten from 7.1906; for a detailed analysis of the Buitenzorg fellowship see Chapter 5.

[10] AMAEB, Beyens Papers, Leopold à Beyens from 20.7.1878.

[11] These are the figures advanced by the Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Niedersachsen and might be higher: B. Fabian (ed.), *Handbuch der historischen Buchbestände in Deutschland* (Hildesheim, 1998), 172. There were numerous articles, see for example C. Delannoy, ‘L'évolution de la politique coloniale de La Hollande aux XIX siècle’, *Bulletin de la Société Belge d’Études Coloniales*, 1-33 (1896); Deistel, ‘Bericht über eine Reise’; J. Ferguson, ‘Ceylon, the Malay States, and Java Compared as Plantation and Residential Colonies’, *United Empire* 2 (1911), 104-115 and 156-176.

[12] L.A. Lowell, *Colonial Civil Service: The Selection and Training of Colonial Officials in England, Holland and France* (New York and London, 1900), 113. For expeditions to Java see Chapter 5.

[13] There were also several private expeditions to the Dutch Indies, see J. Elbert, *Die Sunda-Expedition des Vereins für Geographie und Statistik zu Frankfurt am Main* (Frankfurt am Main, 1911); Däubler, *Die Grundzüge der Tropenhygiene*, 18; A. Bastian, *Zwei Worte über Colonial-Weisheit von jemandem dem diesselbe versagt ist* (Berlin, 1883), 5; J. Leclercq, *Un Séjour dans l'Île de Java: Le Pays, Les Habitants, Le Système Colonial* (Paris, 1898); For British India: Plehn, ‘Bericht über die Informationsreise’; For a rather critical account of British Burma see: J. Chailley, ‘Les Anglais en Birmanie’, *Revue des Deux Mondes* 108 (1891), 842–881.

reduce self-sufficient rice production that was of no value to the colonial government and to dedicate one third of their fields to cash crop production – mainly sugar, coffee, and indigo. During the *Cultuurstelsel* period (1830-1860s), it was mandatory for the Dutch peasants to sell the yields of this compulsory cultivation to an official Dutch trading society (Nederlandsche Handel-Matschaappij, since 1824). The Handel-Matschaapij purchased the forced-culture products at a price that was far below the market value back in Europe.[14] Selling these cash crops in Europe earned the Dutch state a fortune that amounted to one and a half billion Francs between 1840 and 1873.[15] In Java, it induced the native rural communities to abandon subsistence agriculture and produce for the European market.

The cultivation system rose to global prominence after James William B. Money, a British administrator and advocate from Calcutta, immortalized it in his best-selling book *Java or How to Manage a Colony. A Practical Solution of the Questions now Affecting British India* (1861). Money's book – written as a response to the post-1857 crisis of the British Empire – was a whole-hearted appeal to model British colonial policy on the more successful Dutch rule in Java. It propagated the cultivation system as an instrument to reduce British India's deficit and to compensate for the losses and expenses it had suffered during the so-called Sepoy rebellion in 1857. Moreover, Money insisted that the *Culturstelsel* was also a way to reconcile the British with the Indians, because it tutored them on how to capitalize on the colonial economy without forcing them into cultural assimilation. The cultivation system was Money's key concept for a prosperous colonial future, during which he intended to substitute cultural assimilation by economic familiarization. Sooner or later, he argued, the whole colony would profit from economic prosperity. Therefore, it was legitimate to force the natives to accept European capitalism – supposedly for their own good. The Dutch model thus stood out, by successfully replacing cultural assimilation with economic assimilation. [16]

Originally destined for the British public, copies of Money's book soon circulated among all European colonial experts, who were fascinated by the alleged success of the Dutch culture system that had earned the Dutch government 22,333,000 Florins a year and allegedly led to demographic growth in Java:

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[14] Wesseling, 'Le Modèle colonial hollandais', 231; On the culture system in general, see Cornelius Fasseur, *The Politics of Colonial Exploitation: Java, the Dutch and the Cultivation System* (Ithaca, 1992); F.E. Elson, *Village Java under the Cultivation System, 1830-1870* (Sydney, 1994); W.J. O'Malley, 'Plantations 1830-1940: An Overview'', in W.J. O'Malley, A. Boot, and A. Weidemann (eds.), *Indonesian Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era* (New Haven, 1990); A. Maddison, 'Dutch Colonialism in Indonesia: A Comparative Perspective', in W.J. O'Malley, A. Boot, and A. Weidemann (eds.), *Indonesian Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era* (New Haven, 1990); J.J. van Klaveren, *The Dutch Colonial System in the East Indies* (Bangkok, 1953), 120f.

[15] Congrès Colonial International de Paris, *Congrès Colonial International de*, 160.

[16] Money, *Java or How to Manage a Colony*, ix.

> A new system was inaugurated in 1832, which, in twenty-five years, quadrupled the revenue, paid off the debt, changed the yearly deficit to a large yearly surplus, trebled the trade, improved the administration, diminished crime and litigation, gave peace, security and affluence to the people, combined the interests of Europeans and Native, and, more wonderful still, nearly doubled an Oriental population[17]

However, while these achievements mesmerized the European colonial experts, another book abated their zeal substantially – by proving Money wrong. Multatuli's documentary novel *Max Havelaar: Or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company* (1860) denounced the forced culture system for having caused flight, poverty and famines among the Javanese. Several journalistic accounts confirmed that up to half of the population fled from populous regions to escape forced cultivation. Those who remained often starved, as they were forced to grow less rice, or rice that matured earlier but gave smaller crop of poor quality.[18] The success of Multatuli's novel *Max Havelaar* and a subsequent campaign against inhuman colonial policies led the liberal Dutch government of the 1860s to gradually abolish the lucrative – but suppressive – cultivation system. From this time, the cultivation system fell into disrepute in Holland (but not colonialism per se, which Multatuli had never criticized). Liberal politicians abolished the Handel-Matschaappij's trade monopoly and introduced what they called a free market economy.[19]

Despite this well-founded criticism, European colonial experts often interpreted the system of forced cultivation as a necessary step to bring about economic development. After all, they argued, it had made Javanese peasants grow cash crops and therefore made them fit to enter the capitalist world market. Statisticians claimed that it had been the reason for a substantial demographic growth of the Javanese population. Most colonizers deemed similar "transition periods" necessary to economically educate the non-Europeans in other colonies, before exposing them to a "liberal" colonial economy.

Thus, the condemnation of the forced cultivation system was far from being unanimous and was often ambiguous. Colonial experts continually admired its expedience. Dutch apologists downplayed its detrimental effects at the first International Colonial Congress in Paris (1889), claiming that the system of forced labor originated in autochthonous traditions of

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[17] Ibid., ix.

[18] Multatuli was the *nom de plume* of a writer and administrator in Dutch Java, Eduard Douwes Dekker. His novel was a milestone of Dutch literature and one of the first critical accounts of colonial rule. Unlike many interpretations claim, it was not an "anti-imperialist" novel, and did not question colonialism in general: Multatuli, *Max Havelaar of de koffijveilingen der Nederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij* (Amsterdam, 1860); See also D. van Laak, *Literatur, die Geschichte schrieb* (Göttingen, 2011); for further accounts of flight to the outer islands, violence and punishment see the accounts of G.H. von Soest, *Geschiedenis van het Kultuurstelsel* (Rotterdam, 1871), 197-204; United States. Dept. of the Treasury. Bureau of Statistics, Austin, and Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography, *Colonial administration, 1800-1900: Methods*, 2227; Stuchtey, *Die Europäische Expansion*, 26.

[19] See for the contemporary discussion N.G. Pierson, *Java en de koloniale questie* (Amsterdam, 1871).

the island and was by no means externally "enforced" on them.[20] During the 1890s, the Belgian King Léopold II, who had devoured Money's book, applied a modified version of the cultivation system in the Congo Free State: he pressed the Congolese village communities to supply his agents with quota of wild rubber from Congolese woods that had been declared *dominium* of the state.[21] When the ICI member Albert Thys warned Léopold that the cultivation system had been stigmatized as early as the 1860s, and that it had become a source of shame for the Dutch colonizers, Léopold replied cynically: "So what! I will also show regret once I will be old."[22] He thought forced culture a necessary tool to "civilize and moralize the indolent and corrupted" natives, and a pre-condition for the liberalization of the colonial economy.[23] Like Léopold, many colonizers of the early 1890s believed that a transition period of forced labor was necessary to introduce the free market and educate the natives to work.

In France, also, even liberal colonial theorists envisaged the introduction of a *culture forcée* system. Joseph Chailley, spoke generously about such a system at the 1897 meeting of the ICI: the efficiency of the system, he suggested, was as important as liberty, because it brought prosperity to all.[24] Chailley's developmental attitude had led him to believe that only prosperity allowed a civilized society to emerge and bring about individual freedom. Many saw this as a valid argument. Not only the economic profits, but also Java's demographic growth of the last decades were said to have their roots in the culture system. However, Chailley was well aware of its moral condemnation. When he noticed the stenographer in the ICI's meeting room, he added hastily: "But now that there are stenographers attached to the *International Colonial Institute,* I do not want that, when in twenty years the students will read in the proceedings of this session that I defended a system, which I reject."[25] Chailley's forbidden fascination for the culture system contributed to maintain the myth of its efficiency among European colonial experts. Like Chailley, they valued colonial prosperity over the civilizing mission. Or, more precisely, they regarded prosperity as the most desired purpose of a civilizing mission.

As late as 1903, ICI member Austin – who was generally opposed to forced cultivation – informed the US government about the advantages of such a system. Although aware that the

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[20] Congrès Colonial International de Paris, *Congrès Colonial International de*,159; It remains a matter of debate, if the system originated in local traditions, or if it was copied from a very similar system established on the Philippine Islands by the Spanish rulers: C. Day, *The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java* (New York, 1904), 337.

[21] 'Kultursystem', in H. Schnee (ed.)*, Deutsches Koloniallexikon* (Berlin, 1920), vol.2, 388; For Leopold's fascination with Java, see Le Febve de Vivy, *Documents d'histoire précoloniale*, 20 and 31; Stengers, 'Modèle colonial hollandais': 69.

[22] A. Thys, 'Devons-nous coloniser au Congo et comment devons-nous le faire', *Association des Licenciés sortis de l'Université de Liège. Bulletin triméstriel* (January 1913), 15.

[23] Letter of the Duke of Brabant (Later Leopold II) from 26. July 1863, in: Le Febve de Vivy, *Documents d'histoire précoloniale*, 19.

[24] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 126-127.

[25] ICI, *Compte-Rendu 1897*, 132.

cultivation system was to the East Indies what slavery was to the West Indies, he considered the latter to be "softer." He argued that both were "so far as results can be measured in dollars and cents, a success." When the Dutch government abolished the cultivation system for "humanitarian reasons" and introduced free labor in the 1860s, productivity dwindled abruptly. Austin took economic decline as proof that forcing the "idle natives" to work was necessary during a more extensive period: "it has become fashionable to emphasize the good sides of that institution and to hint at the possibility of applying compulsion in some modernized and improved form as a remedy for the ingrained inactivity or inefficiency of free natives." According to him, the "wish that such a system might be adapted to other countries" was frequent among the colonial administrators by the turn of the century.[26]

It is important to note that most advocates of the cultivation system ignored the true reasons for its success: profits derived from a global economic boom in the 1850s and the rising coffee prices during this period (coffee accounted for four-fifth of the revenues deriving from forced cultivation), rather than being the outcome of a specifically Dutch "rationalism."[27] The Dutch bought the crops from the Javanese for one third of the market price in Europe. It goes without saying that the system would never have been successful had the government paid fair prices or "living wages." In the long term, the cultivation of cash crops often exhausted the soil, and it was impossible to grow them at all in climatically unfavorable regions. Thus, except from coffee and sugar, the forced cash crop cultivation often failed. While the colonial government profited from the gains, it socialized risks and losses if the cultivation failed: the Javanese alone were held responsible if plant diseases or bad harvests did not allow them to produce their share. Moreover, growing cash crops like sugar required twice the labor force than growing rice and therefore encroached on the Javaneses' working hours.[28] Despite all those deficits, Java's cultivation system had become a stereotype for successful colonial exploitation. That this success came at the cost of thousands of Indonesian lives and a moral deficit was well known.

Dutch colonial experts, and those who studied the system thoroughly, had long been aware of its precarity and shortcomings, which had induced the liberal government to abolish its unprofitable branches in the 1860s.[29] Subsequently, Dutch liberals turned the abolition into a symbol of their own liberality and prided themselves in having replaced it with a free market system. The Dutch reformist Fransen van de Putte, one of the co-founders of the ICI, had been

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[26] United States. Dept. of the Treasury. Bureau of Statistics, Austin, and Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography, *Colonial Administration, 1800-1900*, 2775.
[27] Stengers, 'Modèle colonial hollandais': 60.
[28] United States. Dept. of the Treasury. Bureau of Statistics, Austin, and Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography, *Colonial Administration, 1800-1900*, 2774-2776.
[29] For a rather superficial and unsatisfying interpretation of Dutch liberal policies see E.J.M. Schmutzer, *Dutch Colonial Policy and the Search for Identity in Indonesia 1920-1931* (Leiden, 1977).

the driving force behind the abolition when he served as a colonial minister in the 1860s and 1870s. His close collaborator Conrad T. van Deventer, who equally joined the ICI, even went one step further. In 1899, he published a famous article admitting a Dutch debt of honor (*Eereschuld*) towards the Javanese people. According to him, the Netherlands had a moral duty to reimburse the Javanese people for their suffering during the period of the culture system and had to pay off their debts.[30] By 1901, the new Catholic-Protestant Dutch government publicly announced an "ethical policy" towards its Asian subjects, whom it wanted to profit from the material progress and take over the island's administration in the future.[31] It evoked a new civilizing mission and launched state-led programs of education and development, while investing in Javanese infrastructure. This "ethical policy" seemed to confirm once more that the Dutch colonial policy was always ahead of its time. Java came to epitomize a modern colony that was grounded in a supposedly cooperative native policy and economic development.[32]

The succession of the cultivation system, the liberal era, and the period of ethical policy in the Dutch Indies conveyed the impression that the Dutch were always one step ahead. The ICI contributed to popularize the liberal – and to a lesser extent the ethical – Dutch model, which combined economic liberalism, development measures and the alleged respect of indigenous culture.[33] First of all, most of the ICI members publicly condemned the system of forced cultivation – even though they tolerated "modernized" variations of the system in the Congo Free State, as well as in French and German colonies. Their reasons for rejecting the system, were less ethical than utilitarian. They argued that it did not originate in free competition and therefore resulted in the low quality of the produce. Moreover, by introducing the system, the Dutch colonial government established a monopoly on sugar, coffee and indigo and excluded foreign competitors.[34] But the Dutch model had more to offer than the profitability of their colony or a liberalization of the colonial market.

The Dutch combination of liberalism and internationalism accounted for a large part of its global reputation. Unlike the British, the Dutch used international institutions like the ICI to promote their liberalism and invite others to participate or profit from it. Fransen van de Putte had abolished the cultivation system and Van Deventer propagated the concept of the *Eereschuld*. Another Dutch ICI member, Christiaan Snouck-Hurgronje was an expert in Islamic

[30] Van Deventer, 'Een Eereschuld'.
[31] This ethical policy was introduced mainly by the Protestant government since 1901, see R. Bertrand, '"Politique Éthique" des Pays-Bas à Java (1901-1926)', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue D'Histoire* 93, 1 (2007), 2–41.
[32] See in general Schmutzer, *Dutch Colonial Policy*.
[33] On this topic see C.A. Coppel, 'Revisiting Furnivall's 'plural society'. Colonial Java as a mestizo society?'*Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20, 3 (1997), 562–579.
[34] United States. Dept. of the Treasury. Bureau of Statistics, Austin, and Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography, *Colonial Administration, 1800-1900*, 2776.

culture, married to a Muslim from the Dutch Indies, and advisor to the colonial government in native affairs. He called for cooperation with the Javanese and promoted their political participation.[35] Since 1911, his collaborator and ICI-member Emanuel Moresco, pushed for the creation of a People's Council (*Volksraad*), which was finally established in 1918. This consultative council in the Dutch Indies was composed of both Europeans and Indonesians and would provide the basis for a future self-government of the colony.[36] In tandem with Snouck, Cornelis van Vollenhoven, the specialist of Indonesian native law, codified the famous *adat*-law. According to them, the *adat* was the unwritten customary law of Muslim societies in East Asia and beyond.[37] Their systematization of *adat* law inspired other Europeans to analyze the customary law of the colonized peoples, to embrace legal relativism and to apply a multijurisdictional legal order in their colonies.[38] As a Dutch member of parliament proclaimed at the International Congress of Colonial Sociology in 1900, those theoretical studies aimed at "preserving or procuring for the natives the greatest possible amount of authority" and at the same time increasing the "number and power of the natives."[39]

Thus, the Dutch liberals played an important role in promoting a "liberal" and indigenophile colonial model in and beyond the ICI. The ICI was only one of the institutions that served as a means to disseminate these supposedly liberal ideas, as the Dutch members actively promoted their role within the ICI and used it to establish transnational contacts outside the ICI. After Snouck left the Dutch Indies, he joined the ICI and served as an advisor to the French government in codifying Berber law in Morocco.[40] Emanuel Moresco continued his career as the deputy for the Dutch colonies at the League of Nations, and Van Vollenhoven would have an important impact on the League of Nations by publishing widely on the colonial basis of international peace.[41]

Through those institutions, the "liberalized system" became a model of rational colonial policy in other countries. By the turn of the century, publications that praised Dutch Java as the

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[35] See, for example, C.W. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achehnese* (transl. from Dutch by A.W.S. O'Sullivan) (Leiden and London, 1906 [1893-1894])

[36] Moresco had studied the British system of representation in India for the Dutch colonial ministry: Moresco, *De wetgevende Raden*; When the *Volksraad* was finally established in 1918, only two fifth of the seats had been reserved for the colonized. The *Volksraad* had to be consulted by the general governor, but had no legislative or executive rights. All laws were made by the general government: E. Moresco, *Les Indes Orientales Néerlandaises* (Madrid, 1921), 30f.

[37] Needless to say, by codifying and promoting *adat* rule, they did not only acknowledge the different legal traditions of the colonized, but also shaped them: M. Mamdani, *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity* (Cambridge, Mass., 2002), 2 and 34f.

[38] See on adat law Chapter 7 in this dissertation.

[39] United States. Dept. of the Treasury. Bureau of Statistics, Austin, and Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography, *Colonial Administration, 1800-1900*.

[40] Mamdani, *Define and Rule*, 41.

[41] See especially: League of Nation's International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, *Colonial Questions and Peace: A Survey Prepared under the Direction of Emanuel Moresco* (Paris, 1939).

cutting edge of colonization skyrocketed, while visitors to the island multiplied.[42] Gallieni, the French general governor of Madagascar, who portrayed himself as a progressive and *indigenophile* colonial administrator, sent several missions to Java. As did the governor of French West Africa (AOF), Ernest Roume. The missions studied the Dutch "native policy". Gallieni was particularly interested in the demographic growth among the Javanese, which was said to be a late effect of the cultivation system, resulting in an accelerated population increase during the liberal era. In the course of the nineteenth century, the number of Javanese had allegedly grown from three to thirty million. As the Javanese and the Malagasy "race" seemed to resemble each other, Gallieni was sure to succeed in imitating the Javanese population policy.[43] He hoped to elevate the birth rate in Madagascar and thus produce the labor force necessary to build railways and establish a plantation economy. Gallieni, who employed both military repression and paternalistic indulgence to make Madagascar profitable, had found Madagascar's alter ego in Java.[44]

However, despite Java's fabulous reputation, the Dutch were rarely ethical in their behavior towards the natives and were liberal towards Westerners only. The cooperation with the colonized had already been encouraged by the instigator of the culture system Van den Bosch in 1830, because he needed local village headmen to take responsibility for the successful cultivation of cash crops. Compromising their ethical principle, the Dutch also led a devastating war against the insurgent Sultanate of Aceh in Northern Sumatra between 1873 and 1914, with millions of casualties and thousands fleeing the area, with the costs of war amounting to over 250 million Florins.[45] Snouck, the specialist in native culture and law, served as an advisor during the campaign and developed effective techniques of counter-insurgency. His methods consisted in replacing former scorched earth tactics by "divide and rule" strategies to win the war. By propagating a difference between religious Islamic law and the secular *adat* customs,

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[42] A selection out of a myriad of books: P. Gonnaud, *La Colonisation Hollandaise à Java* (Paris, 1905); J.S. Furnivall, *Netherlands Indies: A Study of Plural Economy* (Cambridge, 1939); Day, *The Policy and Administration*; A. Günter, 'Neuere Agrarpolitik der Holländer auf Java', *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung, und Volkswirtschaft* (1899), 1337ff.

[43] J.-S. Gallieni, *Madagascar de 1896 à 1905; Rapport du General Galliéni, Gouverneur Général, au Ministre des Colonies (30 Avril 1905).* (Tananarive, 1905), 592-593; Heckel and Cyprien, *L'enseignement colonial*, 79; concerning the reasons for population growth in Java: P. Boomgard, *Children of the Colonial State: Population Growth and Economic Development in Java 1795-1880* (Amsterdam, 1989).

[44] See on Gallieni M. Michel, *Gallieni* (Paris, 1989).

[45] B. Worsfold, *A Visit to Java: With an Account of the Founding of Singapore* (London, 1893), 161; see also: E. Kreike, 'Genocide in the Kampongs? Dutch Nineteenth Century Colonial Warfare in Aceh, Sumatra', in B. Littikhuis and A.D. Moses (eds.), *Colonial Counterinsurgency and Mass Violence: The Dutch Empire in Indonesia* (London and New York, 2014), 297–316.

Snouck contributed to drive a wedge between and Muslim and non-Muslim factions on the Aceh party and thus undermined their solidarity.[46]

Snouck's colleague and specialist of native culture, Cornelis van Vollenhoven, served as a secretary to J.T. Cremer, another ICI-member, who was Dutch colonial minister between 1897 and 1901, and a colonial entrepreneur. Cremer headed the *Deli Maatschappij* and similar planter societies who had established a large plantation economy in the former Sultanate of Deli on Sumatra's East Coast. Since the cultivation system had been abolished in the 1870s, the Dutch colonial government had encouraged the planting of sugar, tobacco, tea and rubber supplied by international capital flows. The "Dollar Land of Deli" became one of the most profitable plantation complexes in the colonial world, and accounted for one third of the exported cash crops from the Dutch Indies. Both contractual and forced labor pushed the plantation belt to produce evermore yields. Indentured coolies from China and Java were forced to work towards this success, with plantations rather resembling prison complexes than capitalist enterprises: the "liberal" Cremer had been at the origin of a *Koelie-ordonnatie* (Coolie-Ordinance, 1880), which allowed the planters to control and punish their workers as desired.[47] While the coolies suffered on the Deli plantation in Sumatra, the "free" peasants in Java had to finance development projects of the ethical era through land taxes. The famous state-run and allegedly free irrigation system, in particular, was partly financed by the colonial subjects themselves. Nonetheless, the irrigation system tended to benefit the European planters of water-intensive sugar cane plantations to the detriment of indigenous staple food cultivated in the *sawahs* (rice fields).[48] At the same time, the cultivation system had not been fully abolished. While the government had privatized all ninety-seven sugar mills by 1890, it maintained the forced and lucrative production of coffee. As late as 1898, more than 250,000 families in fourteen out of the twenty residencies still had to produce two thirds of Java's coffee, until the Dutch colonial government lost interest in coffee cultivation because of the decay of the coffee prices on the world market.[49]

Finally, Van Deventer's debt of honor article – which inaugurated the ethical policy period – was not a call to indemnify the Javanese for the losses they had suffered during the

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[46] The ICI also recommended the reading of works on the Aceh wars: W. De Petit, *La conquête de la vallée d'Atchin par les Hollandais: Une page d'histoire coloniale contemporaine* (Paris, 1891).
[47] J. van den Brand, *De practijk der koelie-ordonnantie* (Amsterdam, 1904); P.J. Kooreman, *De Koelie Ordonnantie* (Amsterdam, 1903); J. Breman, *Koelies, Planters en koloniale Politiek* (Dodrecht, 1987); 'Sumatra's Oostkust. Landbouw', *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* 133 ([?]); Stoler, 'Tense and Tender Ties'; Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation*.
[48] See for the continuation of forced labor recruitment, tax paying and conflicts about water: J.J. Van Klaveren, *The Dutch Colonial System in the East Indies* (The Hague, 1953) 68f.
[49] United States. Dept. of the Treasury. Bureau of Statistics, Austin, and Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography, *Colonial Administration, 1800-1900*; Worsfold, *A Visit to Java*, 158-159 and 164.

cultivation system, but a plea to indemnify the "colony". A close reading of Deventer's article thus suggests that the profits the Dutch metropole had made from the system of forced cultivation should be reimbursed to the white administrators of the colony – the "autonomous" colonial government in Batavia. It seems more appropriate to read the article as an attempt to strengthen the colonial administration, which should receive all tax revenues from the colony rather than the government in Europe. Deventer spoke in the name of the European administration and not in the name of the natives. He lamented the robbery of the colony and not of the colonized.

As a consequence, the Dutch model actually consisted of several models. Its "liberal" and "ethical" system was first and foremost a product of the Dutch colonial reformers' propaganda and of those European colonial experts. Some intended to stereotype Java into a successful colony and confronted their own governments with its success to make them invest in the development of their own colonies. Reality was more complex and more prosaic: the Dutch liberalism in the Indies was predominantly *economic* and not *political*. Economic liberalism applied to Westerners only, who were allowed to establish themselves as plantation owners or merchants with disregard to their nationality. This resulted in a multinational planter community in the Deli plantation belt. The political policy towards the natives, instead, was *ethical* and *not liberal*. The "ethical policy" originated in religious paternalism and considered the natives immature.[50]

The colonial Aceh War, forced labor practices and deficient development policies were consciously ignored by those who propagated the Dutch rule in Asia as exemplary. For the members of the ICI, Java and Sumatra remained model colonies. Chailley, perhaps the most prominent promoter of the Dutch model, declared that the Aceh war was an attempt to impose the liberty of commercial activity on the prince of Aceh and defend the "interests of international traffic"[51] According to him, the war proved the liberal attitude of the Dutch government. Colonial engineers in the ICI celebrated Java's technological progress, like the irrigation system that had been introduced by the colonial rulers during the period of "ethical policy."[52] They ignored its deficiencies and the fact that it was financed by the Javanese tax payers rather than by the Dutch government. Through these methods of selective perceptions,

[50] About the ethical policy in general: Locher-Scholten, *Ethiek in Fragmenten*; J. De Jong, *Van batig slot naar ereschuld: De discussie over de financiële verhouding tussen Nederland en Indië en de hervorming van de Nederlandse koloniale politiek 1860-1900* (S'Gravenhage, 1989); M. Bloembergen and R. Raben (eds.), *Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief: Wegen naar het nieuwe Indië, 1890-1950* (Leiden, 2009).
[51] J. Chailley, *Java et ses habitants* (Paris, 1914), XXIV.
[52] The French government and the US government sent commissions to Java, to study the irrigation systems there, see Chailley, *Java et ses habitants* (Paris, 1900), IX.

Dutch rule in the East Indies had become an allegory of liberalism and rationalism, a stereotype of moral behavior and profitable indigenous policy alike.

Colonial Comparison between Political Stereotypes and Transfers of Techniques

As we have seen, colonial reformers of the 1890s defined colonialism not as an ideology, but as a science. In their search for an appropriate methodology, they declared comparison and transfer the new paradigm of the recently invented "colonial sciences". The ICI's devotion to the "art of comparative colonization" aimed at imitating prosperous role models.[53] It resulted in the import of colonial techniques that had already been successfully tested in a transnational laboratory of colonization.

The geographer and engineer Jean Brunhes couched the ICI's method of comparison in very modern terms: "Before comparing, we need to know what exactly we compare. We collect meticulously diverse documents from all latitudes; with their help, we do not necessarily develop a unified colonial system, but we become aware of a certain state of the mind we share." This was conducive to "get a better understanding" of colonial techniques: "I am struck by how beneficial this positive method is, because it allows us to observe the more or less extraordinary facts of concordance and coincidence."[54] Once the similarities had been identified, they made colonies comparable, and ultimately enabled transfers between them. The ICI engaged in a diffusionist policy of imitation and adaptation, while comparison and transfer became the most cherished "method" of "colonial science."[55]

However, by looking at the highly idealized Dutch model, we become aware of the fact that comparisons were always functional and rarely lived up to the scientific standards set by Brunhes. The canonization of the Dutch model reveals that comparison was not only a scientific method, but also a political act.[56] Portraying Java as an archetype of rationality, development and indigenous policy, and simultaneously concealing the Aceh War and the forced labor on the Deli Plantations, clearly served political purposes. Java was no perfect colonial *archetype*, but a manipulated image of Dutch colonial rule, and therefore a *stereotype*. This stereotype derived from the Dutch doctrine of being a "liberal" and "ethical" colonial government, and from descriptions of the Dutch Indies as a rational and profitable colonial enterprise (although seeming natural, they rarely described it as Protestant). This reputation dated back to the times

[53] Chailley, *La Hollande et les colonies*, 85.
[54] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1907, 99.
[55] For the relation between comparison and transfer, see the contributions in G. Haupt and J. Kocka (eds.), *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives* (Oxford and New York, 2009).
[56] For the discussion on historical comparison as a political act or a scientific method, see Lorenz, 'Comparative Historiography'. And above all Stoler, 'Tense and Tender Ties'.

of the East India Company and was revived by the cultivation system and the lucrative Deli plantations. Other national stereotypes or theories of this kind were at use in Europe: France was qualified as an assimilative power, Spain as demi-despotic, and Britain was famously known as an empire of shopkeepers. Even Belgians – "colonialist without being imperialist" – and the German colonial *Weltpolitik* derived from contemporary stereotypes that persist even today. Those stereotypes require historicizing when we want to analyze the comparative method propagated by the ICI.[57]

What was the purpose of these political comparisons, apart from traditional cultural stereotyping that highlighted exceptionalisms and ordered colonizing nations hierarchically, according to their alleged colonial ability or style? One answer can be found in Chailley's work. His comparative studies allegedly proved that Dutch investments in Java had led to economic and demographic growth. He recommended Java as a model colony to the French government and hoped that it would imitate the Dutch example – by investing in colonial sustainable development. His intention was to increase the colonial budget and to receive funding for similar development programs in French colonies. "Java, the pearl of the Dutch Indies, has 30 million inhabitants and a budget of 300 million Francs, which has made the Dutch Treasury swell, enriched thousands of colonists and caused an incredible increase of the indigenous population."[58] By pointing at their rivals' colonial investments, the French *coloniaux* hoped that their own governments would follow and increase colonial expenses for the tropical colonies.

Chailley exaggerated the success of the Dutch model only to belittle the Algerian antimodel. His followers in France, who did not want a costly and assimilated Algeria, but profitable and associated colonies instead, forwarded the much-cited figure of fifty billion Francs, which the conquest, pacification and settlement of Algeria had cost the French taxpayer.[59] Chailley contrasted these expenses with the one and a half billion Francs that Java had earned the Dutch state between 1840 and 1873.[60] According to him, the expenses for Algeria had soared because of an inflated administration without leading to real development. While millions of settlers and thousands of French officials had become a burden for Algeria, there were only 170,000 British in India. Among them were 84,000 were soldiers or merchants and only a thousand administrators ruled over thirty million Indians. In Dutch Java, there were 70,000 Europeans against twenty-eight million natives, but only 214 administrators who

[57] Frederick Cooper warned against mistaking ideal types for historical realities: F. Cooper, 'Race, Ideology and the Perils of Comparative History', *The American Historical Review* 101, 4 (1996); See the plea in Haupt and Kocka, 'Comparison and Beyond: Traditions': 16.
[58] Chailley, *Java et ses habitants* (1914), XXIX.
[59] 'Le Maroc et l'opinion publique', *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Francaise* (January 1908), 10.
[60] Proceedings of the Congrès Colonial International de Paris, *Congrès Colonial International de*, 160.

managed the colony.[61] These comparisons aimed at establishing an asymmetry that dramatized the gap between "ancient" French and "modern" or "effective" Dutch colonization. By emulating the colonial systems of the East Indies, Chailley hoped to prepare the French for a competitive future instead of perpetuating France's failed colonial traditions. Colonial comparison and intercolonial assistance should mark a shift from an aristocratic idea of a glorious colonial past to the meritocratic concept of rational exploitation.[62] Such stereotypes were always instrumental and highly politicized. But they were not the only *modus operandi* of colonial comparison.

Unlike the intentional use of politicized stereotypes, some ICI members regarded Dutch Java as a prototype. Prototypes differed from archetypes or stereotypes in that they made selective comparisons and transfers of knowledge possible. Prototypes are generally early samples or releases that can be used to test and register their positive and negative properties. Based on the outcome of the test, future replications can thus be remediated and enhanced. The Dutch and the British Indies served as early samples to test strategies of colonial government. If they had proven successful, they could have been applied to other colonies, especially the "new colonies" in Africa. Karl Rathgen, the ICI member and head of the Colonial Institute in Hamburg, which trained colonial administrators since 1908, stressed that prototype comparisons should not overgeneralize like stereotype comparisons. He warned his students that "there can be no question of imitating standardized models."[63] This pronounced view of colonial complexity allowed colonial experts to learn from negative and positive experience alike.

Prototype comparisons aimed at the transfer of successful colonial strategies and engaged in a detailed error analysis that helped to master colonial pitfalls. Unlike typologizing theorists, technical experts were not interested in stereotypes, but tried to selectively copy successful techniques of colonization. Colonial specialists in the ICI were well aware that other colonies were not unfailing archetypes but realms of experience that provided examples in certain fields only. The ICI made wide use of such "scientific" and utilitarian comparisons that might end in selective transfers. Styling itself as an institution of experts, its members agreed that, as one German scientist put it, "an expert is a man who has made all the mistakes which can be made, in a narrow field."[64]

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[61] C.T. van Deventer, 'Drie boeken over Indië', *De Gids* 64 (1900), 134–154: 149; Chailley, *Administrative Problems of British India*, 205; Dewey, *Anglo-Indian Attitudes*, 3.
[62] ICI, *Compte-Rendu 1895*, 188.
[63] Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht,* 83.
[64] A. Mackay, *A Dictionary of Scientific Quotations* (Bristol, 1991), 35.

Chailley thought along similar lines. Although he claimed that Algeria had been a failure, and that also “the British have, in the course of their history, committed horrifying errors,” he considered certain elements of French policy in Algeria or British colonial rule as exemplary.[65] Instead of advocating indiscriminate plagiarism, Chailley deliberately used the term “adaptation” to describe transfers of colonial knowledge as processes of methodological selection and adaption.[66] This method was particularly time-saving and efficient, he claimed: “Why invent, if inventions already exist?...it is more effective to look around us.” [67] This was the main purpose of the ICI, which not only promoted colonial comparison, but first and foremost the transfers of colonial techniques that derived from it.

Unlike stereotyping comparisons, transfers of colonial techniques were rarely subject to any kind of nation branding or moral standardizing. Colonial know-how – as developed by professional agriculturists, botanists, foresters, engineers, doctors, lawyers, geographers and anthropologists – could be borrowed from any colonial country, including the stigmatized Spanish Empire or colonial novices like the USA, Germany and Belgium. The prosaic transfers among colonial technicians and professionals materialized in a borderless laboratory that enabled transnational exchange and apprenticeship. Chailley kept sight of the true purpose of colonial comparison: “to lead the colonies rapidly and safely to prosperity.”[68] The foundation of the ICI was only one manifestation of this need, shared by all colonizing powers. After the USA had taken possession of the Philippines, it scoured the archives of the former Spanish colonizers and enhanced its rule with the help of Spanish knowledge about the political, social, ethno-cultural, legal, economic and religious organization of the Philippine society – with disregard to the fact that Spanish colonial methods had provoked an anti-colonial war.[69] US journalists and university professors had also been sent to France and Great Britain to study their colonial policy, while Germans travelled to the Congo Free State, British India, French Africa and Dutch Java.[70] The French government had dispatched expeditions to Java and India and even Dutch and British colonial experts studied the French colonial system.[71] By the 1890s, only a few experts dared to ignore the experiences made in other colonies. The colonial reformers of the ICI regarded nationalist solipsism as a weakness, and transnational exchange

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[65] Chailley, ‘Les Anglais en Birmanie’, 842.
[66] Chailley, *Java et ses habitants* (Paris, 1900), IX.
[67] Ibid., IX.
[68] Chailley, ‘Les Anglais en Birmanie’, 842.
[69] F. Schumacher, 'Embedded Empire: The United States and Colonialism' (Unpublished Paper preseneted at the Conference 'Imperial Clouds' University of Rostock, 18-20 September) and C. Beredo, *Import of the Archive: U.S. Colonial Rule of the Philippines and the Making of the American Archival History* (Sacramento, 2013).
[70] ‘Kamerun. Über seine Kongo-Sanga-Ngoko-Reise berichtet der kaiserliche Gouverneur v. Puttkamer‘, *Deutsches Kolonialblatt. Amtsblatt des Reichskolonialamt* 10 (1899), 272f.
[71] Chailley, *Java et ses habitants* (Paris 1900), VIII-IX.

as a strength, of colonial policies. All the mutual observations, comparisons and diffusionist transfers resulted in a convergence of colonial theory and practice in Europe. The ICI was at the forefront of this convergent colonialism.

That said, it is important to note that a sharp line cannot always be drawn between political stereotype comparisons and scientific prototype transfers. Both were part of the ICI's repertoire and were often hardly distinguishable ideal-types. This is why colonial comparison and intercolonial transfers can only be analyzed in a sort of *jeux d'échelles* between macro-theories of exemplary stereotypes (like the Dutch and British "liberal systems"), and a micro-level analysis of technological transfers.[72] Generally speaking, the ICI members unimaginatively exchanged professional know-how. Colonial "technicians" were less interested in the national origins of knowledge, but rather highlighted its analogous applicability to similar local contexts. For them, transfers did not occur between nations, but within an epistemic community or technical expert group of "colonizers". They exchanged experiences, rather than producing national stereotypes. Nevertheless, their utilitarian intentions were often betrayed by cultural bias and political interests. As a result, the ICI occasionally contributed to myths of colonial archetypes by inventing stereotypes. An analysis of the reform of training based on colonial comparison and transfer illustrates this simultaneity of prototype transfers and stereotype comparison.

Making the Ideal Colonial Administrator and the Role of Colonial Comparison

Paul Leroy Beaulieu, Europe's most eminent theorist of colonization and Chailley's intellectual ancestor, wrote as early as 1874 that:

> …more than any other country, France has committed capital errors in the recruitment of its colonial administrators. There are no rules except hazard and favoritism…it is time for France to imitate the British and the Dutch and to create a corps of administrators who are specially chosen and instructed.[73]

Fifteen years later, the European colonial reformers proceeded to action and reformed the recruitment of specialized colonial administrators. Chailley and the ICI took the lead in this respect. Between 1894 and 1900, the ICI published several shelf-filling volumes that analyzed the *Recruitment of Colonial Functionaries* in a comparative way. Those publications led to a

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[72] The *jeux d'échelle* is an epistemologic combination of micro-analysis and macro-analysis: J. Revel (ed.), *Jeux d'échelles: La micro-analyse à l'expérience* (Paris, 1996).

[73] "Plus que tout autre pays, la France a commis des graves erreurs dans le recrutement de son personnel colonial, il n'y a d'autres lois que le hasard et le favoritisme…Il est temps pour la France d'imiter l'Angleterre et la Hollande et de créer und corps d'administrateurs coloniaux spécialement choisis et instruits" Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, 695. Cit after: Singaravélou, *Professer l'Empire*, 46.

substantial reform of the training systems of all colonizing countries.[74] The reforms were embedded in a European-wide program that the utilitarian-minded Joseph Chamberlain would describe as a transition to "development" and "positive colonization" when he headed the Colonial Office from 1895 to 1903.[75] According to the reformers, positive colonization marked the shift from military rule to civil administration and therefore – and more importantly – from the acquisition of territory to the government over people. Native inhabitants of the colonies were increasingly regarded as human capital whose capabilities could be used for a more efficient *mise en valeur* of the territory on which they lived. Therefore, reformers thought colonial "good governance" by professional and specialized administrators crucial to mobilizing human and natural resources.

The *Binnenlandsch Bestuur* (Civil Service) in Dutch Java undoubtedly set the standards for such a new policy. However, when studying and comparing the colonial training in European countries, the ICI experts tended to take the best from each system to mold the ideal colonial administrator. Such exemplary colonial administrators were supposed to combine four essential qualities. Against the background of the acclimatization debate, they had to be physically and psychologically prepared for extended sojourns in the tropics. Secondly, the new paradigm of the native policy required the knowledge of native languages and culture. This implied, thirdly, the familiarity with specific regions and peoples that they governed. And finally, the reformers wanted them to govern independently of the "unprofessional" and "ignorant" bureaucracy in Europe: they intended to relocate sovereignty and transfer it from the metropole to the colony. There, expert administrators should be free to accumulate sovereignty or to redistribute it among their indigenous assistants. These four paradigms resulted in the four priorities assigned to the newly established colonial training schools: *hygiene, anthropology, specialization* and *autonomy.*

By the early 1890s, hardly any colonizing country operated special institutions to train civil servants for the colonies. Actually, neither France nor Germany had an autonomous colonial ministry, and colonial matters were treated in the Naval or Foreign Ministry respectively. In 1889, the French established an École Coloniale as a training school for colonial administrators, but prior to the First World War, the institution supplied only fifteen percent of French colonial administrators.[76] In Germany, only the Seminar for Oriental Languages (1887) offered superficial preparatory classes for colonial administrators, while its main task was to

[74] ICI (ed.), *Les fonctionnaires coloniaux. Documents officiels,* 3 vol. (Paris, 1897-1910).
[75] Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht,* 46; see for Chamberlain's importance: Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa Africa*, 57.
[76] Cohen, *Rulers of Empire*; For the later development of the École Coloniale, see R. Delavignette, *Freedom and Authority in French West Africa* (London, 1950).

teach Asiatic languages to German diplomats. The only African language taught at the Seminar was Swahili. But as late as 1912, only two percent out of 317 graduates had chosen Swahili, while the majority had learned Turkish or Eastern Asian languages. The Seminar was far from being the colonial academy it often claimed to be.[77] In Great Britain, the India Office was more developed, but awaited restructuring and professionalization, while the Colonial Office did not take charge of important colonies, like Northern and Southern Nigeria, until 1900.[78] The famous "official mind" of British colonialism, as John Darwin argued, was indeed hardly official and not a single mind – and according to the ICI members it was not even colonial, because it was unprofessional. After all, Darwin remarked, it was not the official India or Colonial offices, but "the chaotic pluralism of private and sub-imperial interests" that had established and developed the British Empire.[79] As Gann and Duignan have emphasized, there was no unified colonial service in Great Britain and no professional selection process. The Colonial Service chose its governors in secret sessions, and the selection of colonial administrators was a matter of patronage rather than competition.[80] The India Office, while establishing a competitive examination, recruited its employees among the graduates from public schools and Oxbridge, and chose explicitly among the "sons of fathers" who had already served in the civil service at home or in the colonies. After their graduation, the selected candidates went through a one year phase of preparation, but the India Office did not maintain any special schools for administrators who would govern the Crown Colony.[81] The Sudan Political Service – responsible for the government of the recently conquered Sudan regions – developed and cherished an "athletocracy" by recruiting among the best sportsmen of public schools.[82] After Joseph Chamberlain had become the head of the Colonial Office in 1895, he could not but conclude that the service is "lamentably weak, both at home and abroad."[83]

The lack of a professional and meritocratic recruitment system, along with the fear of colonial scandals and the bad reputation of those who left for the colonies, led colonial reformers in the ICI to call for a professionalization of colonial careers.[84] Even – or above all – fervent colonialists acknowledged cases of colonial mismanagement and excessive violence

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[77] S. Mangold, *Eine "weltbürgerliche Wissenschaft": Die deutsche Orientalistik im 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 2004), 234.
[78] A.F. Kaminsky, *The India Office 1880-1910* (New York, 1986), 16-17; Carland, *The Colonial Office*, 10.
[79] J. Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians. The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion', *English Historical Review* 112, 447 (1997), 614–642: 641. His verdict is based on R. Robinson, J. Gallagher, and A. Denny (eds.), *Africa and the Victorians: the Official Mind of Imperialism* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1961).
[80] Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa*, 46 and 170; Kirk-Greene, *Britain's Imperial Administrators*, 179; There was, however, a competitive examination for the India Office.
[81] Ibid., 15.
[82] Ibid., 168.
[83] Ibid., 52-53.
[84] See chapter "Scandals under the Patronage System", in: Lowell, *Colonial Civil Service*, 251-256; F. Bösch, *Öffentliche Geheimnisse: Skandale, Politik und Medien in Deutschland und Großbritannien 1880-1914* (Munich, 2009), 225-327.

among the administrators. They deplored the high turnovers that originated in the tropical diseases that struck the candidates who were ill-prepared for service in the tropics. British ICI member William des Voeux, for example, published a widely read report on his own physical decline as a governor: “As the consequence of several maladies,” he wrote in the introduction, “including yellow fever and sunstroke, and two serious accidents which caused concussion of the brain and spine, almost the whole of my life as a Governor was a continuous struggle against ill-health.”[85] All those problems were, as one *Bezirksamtmann* (district officer) in German East Africa put it, not due to individual weakness, but to an “error in the system.”[86] The reformation of colonial training schools was responsive to the administrations’ bad reputation and frequent sick leaves.

As a matter of fact, the reform era set in in Spain, shortly before the foundation of the ICI. The crisis-ridden empire in decline took the lead in reforming the careers of its colonial administrators in 1890 as a direct response to the threat of imperial disintegration. The Spanish Overseas Ministry, headed by the future ICI-member Antonio Fabié, tried to appease the radicalizing Cuban separatist movement by loosening the grip of the *peninsulares* (Spanish mainlanders contrary to Spaniards born overseas) on internal Cuban affairs.[87] Fabié criticized the “immoral” and corrupted *peninsulares* who monopolized the Spanish administration in Cuba and had used their position to accumulate wealth. In an unofficial report, the overseas ministry held the corrupted *peninsulares* responsible for the loss of 44, 6 million Pesos that went missing between 1880 and 1890.[88] Fabié set out to “purify” the administration from those corrupt *funcionarios* and launched substantial reforms to make the administration “more efficient,” and to reestablish “the rule of justice.”[89] To achieve this goal, Fabié issued a law that made judges and fiscal officers in Cuba irremovable to guarantee their integrity.[90] Moreover, he introduced age restrictions for certain administrative positions.[91] With regard to the Philippines, his reform project of the 1890s comprised the formation of a “corps of specialized *funcionarios*”, who spoke the “local languages and dialects.”[92] Instead of assimilating colonial

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[85] W. Des Voeux, *My Colonial Service in British Guiana, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Fiji, Australia, New-Foundland, and Hong Kong with Interludes,* vol.1 (London, 1903), IX.
[86] H. Zache, *Die Ausbildung der Kolonialbeamten* (Berlin, 1912), 3.
[87] Curiously, Fabié is ignored in: X. Huetz de Lemps, *L’Archipel des Épices: La Corruption de l’Administration Espagnole aux Philippines* (Madrid, 2006) and in S. Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923* (Oxford, 1997), 9-10.
[88] A.W. Quiroz, ‘Corrupción, burocracía, colonial y veteranos separatistas en Cuba 1868-1910’, *Revista de Indias* 61, 221 (2001), 105;the corruption caused general outrage, see F. Moreno, *El Pais del Chocolate (La Immoralidad en Cuba)* (Madrid, 1887); R. Cabrera, *Cuba y sus Jueces* (La Habana, 1887); See also C. Schmidt-Nowara, ‘Imperio y Crisis Colonial’, in J. Pan-Montojo (ed.), *Más se perdio en Cuba: 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo* (Madrid, 1998), 31–90.
[89] Fabié, *Mi Gestion Ministerial*, 26-27.
[90] Ibid., 28.
[91] Resolución adoptada por el Ministerio de Ultramar el 19 Septiembre 1890, cit. in: Ibid., 50.
[92] Ibid., 646.

legislation to the metropolitan model, Fabié respected the *derecho indiano* (indigenous law), which he saw better adapted to local specificities. The model for his reforms in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in particular, was Dutch Java, a colony he admired for having "created so important results."[93] His attempts to reorganize the administration was at the core of a more general program to rationalize Spanish colonialism by granting Creole administrators autonomy from the Spanish Peninsula, and by fostering specialization and anthropological knowledge about the colonized.

Inspired by Java, Fabié introduced a new tariff system in the Philippines and boosted navigation between Cuba and the Peninsula, thereby increasing the revenues of the metropole. He prohibited the so-called "falsification of wine," which had been, together with the falsifications of accounts and receipts, a common practice of deception among colonial administrators. No stranger to symbolic acts, Fabié also established an overseas school for electrical engineers in Madrid, which was supposed to cement the ties between Havana and Madrid by linking it with a telegraph line.[94] All these administrative measures were supposed to trigger the development (*fomento* or *desarollo*) of the colonies, brought about by real experts who substituted the corrupt administrative elites.[95]

With regard to Cuba, Fabié intended to grant autonomy rights to the *criollos* overseas. He officially proclaimed not to treat the Cuban *criollos* as an inferior race anymore, as it had been the habit since the times of the conquistadors.[96] His reformism in Cuba was a political attempt to win the favor of the Cuban separatists and to find a compromise with them, instead of continuing the genocidal war strategy against the separatists, introduced by the *peninsulares* and the notorious general Weyler.[97] Autonomy rights should appease the independence movements and avoid outright independence at the same time. By making political concessions, he hoped to continue the exploitation of the colonies to the benefit of the Iberian Peninsula. Therefore, his reforms aimed at reconciliation with the Cuban separatists, to stop the devastating war and to reestablish the islands' economic productivity.[98]

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[93] Ibid.
[94] Resolución adoptada por el Ministerio de Ultramar el 23. Septiembre 1890, cit. in: Ibid., 50.
[95] Ibid., 53.
[96] Fabié's attitude towards criollos (in his terminology a mixed race of Europeans and "natives" or "Negroes"), as towards "gypsies" or Jews was typical for the colonial reformists. He regarded these stigmatized groups as products of their social environment, rather than their genetic determination: Ibid., 31.
[97] Fabié supported general Martinez de Campos instead, who tried to win the war against the seperatists by political means: Ibid., 579; on Weyler see A. Stucki, 'Weylers Söldner. Guerillabekämpfung auf Kuba, 1868 - 1898', in S. Förster et al. (ed.)*, Rückkehr der Condottieri? Krieg und Militär zwischen staatlichem Monopol und Privatisierung: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn, 2010), 223–235.
[98] Balfour, *Spanish Empire*, 10; see also C. Schmidt-Nowara, *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century* (Pittsburgh, 2006); A.W. McCoy, J.M. Fradera, and S. Jacobson, *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline* (Madison, Wis., 2012); Schmidt-Nowara and Nieto-Phillips, *Interpreting Spanish Colonialism*.

While he favored Cuba's restricted autonomy, Fabié ruled out the possibility of full independence: the "Spanish family is one and indivisible," he claimed (by excluding the native *indios*) and pursued a straightforward protectionist economic policy.[99] Nevertheless, the *peninsulares*, who called themselves *Españoles incondicionales,* accused Fabié of introducing "self-government" to the Spanish colonies.[100] At their instigation, he had to resign as a colonial minister. Essential regulations of his legislations were withdrawn, while his adversaries seized power. Fabié's predecessors were keen on refilling the upper ranks of Spain's administration in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines with the traditional elites of the *peninsulares*. The restoration of recruitment laws were a retrograde step. They distinguished among five different, hierarchically ordered classes of administrators. Candidates from the colonies could only enter via the fifth class and had to serve at least ten years before they would be promoted into the first class, which constituted the highest authorities and general governors. Unlike local recruits, university graduates or politicians from the Iberian Peninsula were allowed to enter directly into the second class. [101] It goes without saying that this system privileged the *peninsulares* and resulted in reduced autonomy for the administrators, a lack of specialization and a sketchy knowledge about local conditions. Ultimately, the defective administration, the ongoing corruption, and the chronic colonial war led to the loss of the Spanish colonies.

Observed by the international community in general and the ICI in particular, Fabié's reforms were regarded with interest. But the relapse into the vices of the old Empire – monopoly exploitation and genocidal warfare – earned the Spanish harsh criticism.[102] Unlike Fabié's progressive policy, the new laws failed to form colonial "specialists" and leave room for autonomy. The ICI, in particular, deplored the failure. According to its members, the reorganization was useless, as it did not follow the British or Dutch examples.[103] A reform of Spanish overseas administration along Dutch or British lines was regarded as the key transformation that was necessary to maintain the Spanish empire. According to ICI members, its failure anticipated the end of the empire.

Seen from the point of view of comparative colonialists, the French did a better job. Three years after Fabié's reforms in Spain, Chailley travelled to the Netherlands, in order to study the recruitment of Dutch colonial administrators. He received five hundred Francs from the French colonial authorities, on condition of preparing a detailed report for Paris of how to

[99] Fabié, *Mi Gestion Ministerial*, 10 and 21.
[100] Ibid., 44 and 647.
[101] ICI, *Les fonctionnaires coloniaux: Documents officiels,* vol.1 (Paris, 1897), VIII, 16-36.
[102] C.G. Lewis, *On the Government of Dependencies* (Oxford, 1891), lix, 148-149.
[103] ICI, *Les fonctionnaires coloniaux: Documents officiels*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1897), VIII, 16-36.

model colonial training on the Dutch example.[104] Chailley's mission was part of a program to restructure French colonial administration, launched in the late 1880s by Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of the Navy and the Colonies, Eugène Étienne. In 1889, Étienne had established the École Coloniale in Paris as a professional school for white administrators, but had dashed Chailley's expectations to become its first director.[105] Nevertheless, he conceded Chailley the journey to Holland.[106] After Étienne resigned from his post in 1893, Chailley denounced Étienne's École Coloniale to be a laudable project, which had nevertheless epically failed to produce professional administrators. Jumping on the bandwagon of colonial reform, Chailley set out to "realize the perfections that the administration desires and is about to prepare."[107] The Dutch model represented these "perfections" and Chailley urged the colonial authorities in France to follow in its footsteps. During his journey to the Netherlands, Chailley visited the Dutch colonial ministry, interviewed officials in charge, studied the relevant literature and participated in dinners that led to the foundation of the ICI.

Indeed, reforms were badly needed. Most of the French candidates who entered the École Coloniale drew their knowledge about colonization from Jules Verne's or Robert Louis Stevenson's adventure novels. Unsurprisingly, they were said to lack the physical, moral and intellectual pre-conditions to become colonial administrators.[108] Colonial authorities, not only in France, were anxious to ward off applicants who hoped to escape judicial persecution or military service by pursuing a career overseas.[109] Even more important was their desire to professionalize colonial administrations by containing military dominance and replacing military rule with a civil bureaucracy. In France, Germany and Spain, colonial reformers singled out the "militarism" among overseas authorities as the source of inefficiency and colonial scandals.[110]

Chailley identified the Dutch training system as a "perfect" system because of its diachronic transformation from "colonization to administration," a sentence that can be interpreted as a transition from conquest to government, or from the paradigm of colonial settlement to indirect rule with the help of native populations. Moreover, French colonizers had closely followed the Dutch passage from the *kontors* of the East Indies Company to the

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[104] ANOM FM MIS//63/bis, Folder 1, "Chailley Bert, Mission aux Pays-Bas en vue d'étudier le mode de recrutement des fonctionnaires coloniaux": Letter Sous Sécrétaire d'État des colonies Jamais to Chailley Bert, 5.10.1892.
[105] It had served as a seminary for Indochinese students before and should keep a "native section" throughout its existence: Cohen, *Rulers of Empire*, 37.
[106] ANOM FM MIS//63/bis, Folder 1, "Chailley Bert, Mission aux Pays-Bas en vue d'étudier le mode de recrutement des fonctionnaires coloniaux" Letter Eugéne Etienne to Chailley from 20.1.1892.
[107] Chailley, *La Hollande et les*, 9 and Preface.
[108] W.B. Cohen, 'The Lure of Empire: Why Frenchmen Entered the Colonial Service', *Journal of Contemporary History* 4, 1 (1969), 103–116; See also: H. Deschamps, *Roi de la Brousse* (Paris, 1975), 93.
[109] Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa*, 205.
[110] See Haarhaus, *Das Recht,* 35; For French reasons to join the colonial service see: Cohen, 'The Lure of Empire', 105.

establishment of professional colonial schools in Delft (1842-1900) and Leiden (1864-1891).[111] While the training school in Delft had operated since 1842, the colonial reformer and co-founder of the ICI Fransen van de Putte, had reorganized the education of Dutch colonial administrators in the 1860s. He had created the Leiden colonial school in 1864 and introduced a mandatory and central exam for colonial administrators (*groot-ambtenaarsexamen*).[112] This centralized and standardized exam was designed and overseen by an examination board of long-serving colonial administrators. Among colonial theorists all over Europe, the competitive examination in the *groot-ambtenaarsexamen* or great exam became a symbol of expert selection and modern colonial training. Chailley valued it even over the competitive examination of the India Office (which was the only competitive recruitment examination in Europe apart from the Dutch great exam).[113] In his report to the French colonial authorities, Chailley lauded the Dutch system for giving priority to specialization, autonomy and anthropological knowledge – characteristics that the British India Office allegedly lacked.

What was so exceptional about the Dutch training of colonial officials? First of all, it was mandatory for candidates to take the great exam, which was offered annually, either in the Netherlands or in Batavia. It was open to "Dutch citizens, indigenous subjects of Holland or children born to parents of European civilization dwelling in the East Indies." During the reform era of the 1860s, Liberals in the Dutch parliament had insisted on the inclusion of indigenous administrators in the higher ranks of administration. However, the paragraph that stipulated native participation had remained *lettre morte*. Only one Indonesian – a noble vizir's grandson of the Yogjakarta sultanate – was admitted to the higher division between 1864 and 1893.[114]

The education of the white European candidates was undoubtedly destined to familiarize them with the indigenous culture: the curriculum comprised history, geography and ethnography of the Dutch Indies, as well as Muslim law, local customs and indigenous administration. Future administrators had to speak at least one vernacular, either Malay or Javanese. Chailley remarked that the knowledge of native languages was vital to the Dutch system of indirect rule, because it enabled Europeans to understand and control the Javanese subaltern officers. Hence, those Dutch candidates who excelled in Javanese or Malay were among the first to be chosen for civil service in the Dutch Indies regardless of the grades they

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[111] Chailley, *La Hollande*, 18.
[112] *Koninklijk Beslut van 10 September 1864, houdende vaststelling der verordening op het benoemen van ambtenaren bij den burgerlijken dienst in Nederlandsch Indië(*Ned. Staatsblad, Nr. 93).
[113] For a detailed description of the Indian Civil Service, see D. Gilmour, *The Ruling Caste: Imperial Lives in the Victorian Raj* (New York, 2007).
[114] Chailley, *La Hollande*, 20.

received in the other disciplines.[115] As a consequence, he argued, the Dutch did not have to rely on unreliable interpreters in their colonies, like in France or in Germany. The power acquired by these colonial dragomen was a steady concern for French, British and German colonial administrators.[116] The Dutch instead mastered the local idiom and did not depend on unreliable translators.

While the Dutch colonial ministry recruited two thirds of the administrators in the metropole, it chose the rest among the candidates in the Dutch Indies.[117] The lower ranks were thus filled with native administrators. Europeans never fully handed over the reins and filled the important positions themselves, with an astonishing amount of autonomy from the metropole. Once graduates from Delft or Leiden had been assigned a post in the Indies, the general governor in Batavia was free to employ them – without interference by The Hague. This regulation strengthened the autonomy of the authorities overseas and gave the general governor the possibility to react quickly to temporary needs. Colonial experts all over Europe praised this autonomy as a guarantee for effective administration. Chailley contrasted it to the authoritarian but confusing French system, where the Ministry of Internal Affairs decided on the human resource policy in Algeria, the Foreign Ministry ruled over the staff in protectorates like Tunisia, and the Colonial Ministry appointed and strictly controlled the administrators of Indochina and Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, for fear of autonomy and the accumulation of power, French district officers had to swap posts every two years.[118] This led to a high turnover among the "kings of the bush" – as local administrators were called by wary French in the metropole – and kept them from engaging themselves in local languages and customs.[119]

Unlike French *fonctionnaires* or German *Kolonialbeamte*, the Dutch administrators served a comparably long term of twenty years.[120] Their long tenure compared favorably to the

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[115] *Koninklijk Beslut van 20 Juli 1893 houdende vaststelling van nieuwe regelen omtrent de benoembaarheid en uitzending van rechterlijke en administratieve ambtenaren voor den dienst in Niederlansch Indië* (Nederland Staatsblad 117), cit in ICI, *Les fonctionnaires coloniaux: Documents officiels*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1897), 50.
[116] See for example: T.v. Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft: Zur soziologischen Theorie der Staatsentstehung am Beispiel des "Schutzgebietes Togo"* (Tübingen, 1994), 186.
[117] Joseph Chailley, *La Hollande et les fonctionnaires des Indes Néerlandaises* (Paris, 1893), 43.
[118] Analyses of the French colonial administration are rare, most of the literature is still biographical or autobiographical, see: O. Colombani, *Mémoires coloniales: La fin de l'empire français d'Afrique vue par les administrateurs coloniaux* (Paris, 1991); F. Simonis (ed.), *Le commandant en tournée: Une administration au contact des populations en Afrique noire coloniale* (Paris, 2005); J. Clauzel, *La France d'outre-mer (1930-1960): Témoignages d'administrateurs et de magistrats* (Paris, 2003); V. 'Dimier, Formation des administrateurs coloniaux français et anglais entre 1930 et 1950: Développement d'une science politique ou science administrative des colonies' (PhD Diss. Grenoble, 1999); V. Dimier, 'Le Commandant de Cercle : un 'expert' en administration coloniale, un 'spécialiste' de l'indigène?', *Revue d'histoire des sciences humaines, (EHESS)* 9 (2004), 5–17.
[119] A. Girault, 'Rapport sur la surveillance à éxcercer sur les fonctionnaires aux colonies', in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1908*, 290; See also: D. Bouche, *Histoire de la colonisation française* (Paris 1991), 135.
[120] See for example the regulations of the families travelling to the East Indies: Koninklijk Beslut van 19 Februari 1872 houdende vaststelling van het overtochtsreglement (Indisch Staatsblad Nr 125), in ICI, *Les fonctionnaires coloniaux: Documents officiels* vol.2 (Paris, 1897), 163f.

German and French case, where the average tenure of governors between 1884 and 1914 was 4.4 and three years respectively.[121] Dutch administrators dwelled in the same region and occasionally brought their families with them. Many of them even stayed in the colonies after their retirement – at the fixed age of forty-five – and received a pension that made up a quarter of their salary. Such old-age provisions were exceptional in Europe and rated highly by experts of colonial administration, like the German Hans Haarhaus, who declared them a pre-condition of the professionalization of colonial careers.[122] While a majority of administrators had to pass the exam at the Delft colonial school, a minority of legal specialists was recruited directly from Leiden University. Equipped with a doctoral degree in law, they did not need to pass the colonial exam and were sent directly to occupy juridical posts in the Dutch Indies.[123] This exemption from the otherwise compulsory colonial exam also applied to other "technical" specialists, like engineers and foresters. For want of specialized schools in botany and forestry, the Dutch even sent their trainees to high-tech schools in Germany, where they learned their craft.[124] For the Dutch authorities, the expertise of colonial administrators was more important than national belonging, which shows their inclination to the autonomy of colonial experts.

Putting the Dutch colonial education into perspective, Chailley also identified several weak points. There was no age restriction for the Dutch colonial service, unlike the British service that accepted candidates between nineteen and twenty-two only. Chailley, who was particularly concerned with the morality of the administrators in France, feared that the Dutch recruits might be "too young to reassert themselves in the colonies or too old and lacking suppleness."[125] Without any age restriction that guaranteed resistance to the demoralizing milieu in the tropics, they would become a risk for the administration. Moreover, Chailley moaned, the Dutch had failed to test the candidates' physical or moral aptitudes. Here again, the British cut a better figure by introducing moral tests for their civil servants (or guaranteed "morality" by recruiting the elite from universities). Chailley deemed unlikely that the so tested administrators were abusive towards the colonial subjects or ridiculed "the good reputation of the metropole" through misbehavior.[126]

Despite these minor deficiencies, French and German observers emphasized the positive aspects of the Dutch system, which outweighed its shortcomings. Their verdict was positive in

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[121] Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of German Africa*, 68.
[122] Haarhaus, *Das Recht des Deutschen*, 77.
[123] The lawyers watched over a strict legal duality, judging Europeans by Dutch procedures in civil, commercial and criminal law, while the indigenous were subject to their own "customary law" by judges from their own ranks. Only if indigenous practices of penal law contradicted European "civilization" were they replaced by Dutch regulations.
[124] Chailley, *La Hollande*, 81.
[125] Ibid., 21f.
[126] Ibid., 25.

three points: Autonomy of the administrators, their specialization and their knowledge in anthropology was guaranteed, while the weak points were physical preparation and hygiene. Although Chailley knew that the Dutch recruitment system was far from being perfect, he recommended its imitation as the "least imperfect of all," together with the British system.[127]

Back in France, Chailley's 1893 report on the Dutch system caused a great stir. Unlike the Dutch, the French government did not even operate a colonial ministry, with the French colonial administration being a branch of the Naval Ministry. This had been a cause for French embarrassment for a long time. In the 1880s, already, Paul Leroy Beaulieu deplored the lack of an independent Colonial Ministry, and warned the French that they lagged behind the Dutch, the British and even the Spanish professionalization of colonial rule: "The subordination of colonial matter to the views of the marine and war strategies is, in reality, one of the principal reasons for the stagnation of our colonial possessions."[128] After Chailley had visited the Dutch colonial ministry in 1893, he renewed the request for an independent colonial ministry that would be permitted to professionalize colonial policies. Guided by the Dutch model, he urged the French to equip their administrators with anthropological knowledge before letting them embark on the steamships that left from Marseilles.

The French government reacted. In 1894, one year after Chailley had submitted his report, it established an autonomous colonial ministry.[129] In 1896, the École Coloniale introduced entrance examinations to guarantee the quality of its students, and the candidates had to compete for restricted colonial posts in a *concours*, provided that they held a certificate of moral and physical suitability.[130] Chailley's call to include comparative studies of foreign colonies fell on fertile ground. Chailley personally gave comprehensive lectures on comparative colonialism at the École Libre des Sciences Politiques, a university that soon rivalled the École Coloniale as an institution to train colonial administrators.

In one section of his class, Chailley would compare the recruitment of colonial administrators for British India, Dutch Java, Algeria and Tunisia. The results of the comparison were used by Lyautey to improve his colonial administration in Morocco once the protectorate was established. Chailley pleaded for the participation of natives in the administration who would fill the lower ranks and therefore contribute to avoid a "European proletariat" of underpaid functionaries. European administrators instead should be paid sufficiently and

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[127] Ibid., 86.

[128] "La subordination des questions coloniales aux vues de la Marine et de la guerre est, en effet, une des principales causes de la stagnation de nos établissements coloniaux", P. Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la Colonisation chez les Peuples Modernes* (Paris, 1882), 740.

[129] Chailley, *La Hollande*, 10.

[130] A. Enders, 'L'École Nationale de la France d'Outre-mer et la formation des administrateurs coloniaux', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 40, 2 (1993), 272-288: 272.

receive an old-age pension. Like the Dutch, Chailley made a distinction between political and technical administrators and thoroughly analyzed their career, their rights and duties, as well as their knowledge of native languages.[131]

While Chailley promoted an associationist policy through administrative professionalization in the École Libre de Sciences Politiques, the École Coloniale abided by a universalist and assimilationist concept of colonization. It failed to teach native languages, customs and ethnography. The first director, Paul Dislère, preferred teaching European law instead of indigenous laws and withdrew ethnography from the curriculum.[132] Although Dislère was an expert in Dutch colonial policy and corresponded with Dutch plantation companies on new methods in the production of indigo, tobacco and quinine in Java, he did not embrace the Dutch ideal of native policy.[133] In France, language courses in the native idioms were rare and remained a significant lacuna in the French preparatory classes.

Since Dislère ignored the indigenous paradigm of native policies, the École Coloniale failed to become the most important training school for colonial administrators. It was partly outdone by the progressive courses at the École Libre des Sciences Politiques, where Chailley and others taught courses in anthropology and overseas legislation. Only at the turn of the century, did teachers like the famous anthropologist Maurice Delafosse bring the École Coloniale's curriculum in line with the Dutch model.[134] Delafosse, a future member of the ICI and famous *indigènologue*, had dedicated his life to providing Sub-Saharan Africa with a history. He had proven Africa's old-age civilization by translating Arabic sources on the region, notably the famous *Tarikh al-Fettach,* which familiarized Europeans with the history of the Songhai-Empire.[135] Under his auspices, the École Coloniale introduced courses in West African Manding languages in 1910 and openly dismissed assimilative concepts to the benefit of an associationist indigenous policy.[136] By 1912, the École Coloniale – soon to be endearingly called "Colo" – established a precarious monopoly over the training of French colonial administrators.

While Chailley's journey to the Netherlands prompted colonial reforms in France, Dutch authorities pondered over his critical commentaries. After meeting the colonial minister

[131] ANOM, FP 100APOM/321 Copie de lettres Chailley à Lyautey, Folder: Maroc Situation Politique 1917-1918: "Notes on Cours 1917-1918: Le Maroc et les Grands Problèmes du Gouvernement de l'Administration d'un Peuple Protégé".
[132] This is the interpretation of Cohen, *Rulers of Empire*, 37-48.
[133] Paul Dislère observed the production of quinquina, indigo, tobacco etc. in Java and corresponded with Dutch plantation companies: ANOM, Min. des Colonies, École Coloniale, Fonds Paul Dislère FR ANOM 122COL13.
[134] Cohen, *Rulers of Empire*, 48.
[135] See M. Delafosse (ed.), *Le pays, les peuples, les langues* (Paris, 1912); M. Delafosse and O. Houdas (eds.), *Documents relatifs à l'histoire du Soudan: Tarikh el-fettach où chronique du chercheur* (Paris 1913); J.-L. Amselle and E. Sibeud, *Maurice Delafosse: Entre orientalisme et ethnographie : l'itinéraire d'un africaniste, 1870-1926* (Paris, 1998).
[136] Cohen, *Rulers of Empire*, 48.

Van Dedem and the director of the Delft colonial school Jacques Spanjaard, Chailley had published his report on the Dutch system in the widely read journals *Monde Économique* and *Cosmopolis*. His criticism in these reports inspired the Dutch to remodel their own colonial training.[137] They abandoned the time-honored Delft school to the profit of a reformed colonial school, affiliated with the university in Leiden.

Candidates were now able to take courses offered at the university and benefitted from the diversity of language courses and the anthropological disciplines that had found their way into Dutch academia. Moreover, they followed Chailley's advice to imitate the British system by introducing an age limit, as well as physical and moral tests for the candidates.[138] Finally, they launched a debate about how to make indirect rule more efficient, inspired by Chailley's recommendation to make use of the established class of an indigenous "aristocracy", instead of relying on representatives of "*de kleine man*" (the common people).[139]

"Tropendiensttauglichkeit" between Morality and Hygiene

Owing to the foundation of the ICI in 1893, reforms became more frequent. Through the institutionalized circulation of information in the ICI, countries who set the reformist pace put pressure on other colonizers to follow suit. By way of the ICI, reforms to professionalize and to optimize the colonial civil service not only reshaped French and Dutch colonial policies, but also penetrated Germany, Great Britain and Belgium. These reforms were a nail in the coffin of adventurers and explorers from the heroic age of colonial expansion.[140] One of the fallen heroes was Henry Morton Stanley, who had been proclaimed a pioneer of colonization in the 1870s and 1880s, but revealed himself to be a charlatan by the 1890s. His former companions, among them German explorer Eduard Pechuël-Loesche, charged him with ruthless self-promotion and with crimes committed against the indigenous population in the Congo.[141] Stanley became a symbol for the heroic age of colonialism that should make way for the era of professionalization.

No institution other than the ICI, staffed with former administrators and ambitious reformers, was more credible when it stated that colonial administrators were "human and not

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[137] Deventer, 'Drie boeken over Indië', 145-146; C.J. Hasselmann, 'De practische resultaten van de recruteering van civiele ambtenaren uit Indie', *Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur* 31, 1 (1906), 155–166.

[138] Chailley, *La Hollande*, 25-26; ICI, *Les fonctionnaires coloniaux: Premier Supplement*, vol. 3 (Paris et al., 1903), 14.

[139] Deventer, 'Drie boeken over Indië', 134-154: 149.

[140] B. Sebe, *Heroic Imperialists in Africa: The Promotion of British and French Colonial Heroes, 1870–1939* (Manchester, 2013).

[141] E. Pechuel-Loesche, *Herr Stanley und das Kongo-Unternehmen: Eine Entgegnung* (Berlin, 1885), E. Pechuel-Loesche, *Herrn Stanley's Partisane und meine offiziellen Berichte vom Kongolande* (Leipzig, 1886).

all heroes, or examples of disinterest."[142] ICI experts emphasized that colonies lacked legal institutions, state bureaucracy and a civil society that might control or criticize the colonial "kings of the bush." In such a legal and political vacuum, they argued, administrators were seduced by immorality.[143] No one, it seemed, mistrusted colonial administrators more than former administrators – who joined the ICI. They lobbied for a more careful selection of colonial officials and their professional training that would immunize them against corruption and the insalubrious climate alike. This insight was certainly the outcome of the utilitarian attitude in the ICI and its tendency to value practical exploitation over heroizing rhapsody. But as we will see, they also gained from it by augmenting their reputation and receiving government funding.

In accordance with this attempt to domesticate and professionalize heroic masculinity, it was the ICI's highest priority to prepare administrators both morally and physically for a life in the tropics. Assuming the administrators' natural weakness in an unfamiliar setting, the ICI wanted not just to provide them with a professional education, but intended to give them an integral development of upright character and physical strength. Although not heroes, the European administrators were said to be the pillars of the colonial system, and their "character" was the basis of a successful administration. Spanjaard, the director of the Delft school, saw in the formation of "honest men" the only way to ensure the practical application of theoretical laws stipulated in the metropole.[144] Seen from his point of view, all legal regulations were in vain if "honest administrators" did not watch over the application of the rules. Thus, not institutions or collectivities, but individual administrators bore the entire responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. Unlike in Europe, where responsibilities were shared by different institutions, they argued, the colonial administrators had to accumulate responsibilities, and could not rely on external help. They had to be "integral men," as one French administrator put it.[145] Given the lack of democratic or institutional control, honesty was regarded as the only warrant that the colonial administration resisted the temptation of corruption and abuse.

The strict belief in traditional gender roles led the ICI reformers to propose the presence of white women as one way to make administrators honest and integral.[146] Once again, the

[142] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 274.
[143] United States. Dept. of the Treasury. Bureau of Statistics, Austin, and Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography, *Colonial Administration, 1800-1900*, 2624; See also: H. Deschamps, *Roi de la brousse* (Paris, 1975).
[144] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 402-408.
[145] Deschamps, *Roi de la Brousse*.
[146] The gender aspects of colonial administration cannot be treated here in detail, see A.M. Burton, *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915* (Chapel Hill, 1994); B. Kundrus, 'Weiblicher Kulturimperialismus: Die imperialistischen Frauenverbände des Kaiserreichs', in S. Conrad and J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914* (Göttingen, 2004), 213–235; M.P. Ha, *French Women and the Empire: The Case of Indochina* (Oxford, 2014); See also the interesting article by: A.H.M. Kirk-Greene,

Dutch provided a template for such family reunions in the tropics. Although the Dutch had failed to establish moral and physical tests, Europeans praised them for sending the administrators' families to the Indies, suggesting that women created a moralizing milieu in an uncivilized environment. That women, and families in general, accompanied Dutch administrators, was put forward as a reason why they served for an extended term of at least twenty years, as we have seen.[147] The reasons for those extended tenures were certainly more prosaic: The salary of Dutch colonial administrators was three times higher than in the administration of the metropole. It allowed the Dutch administrators to marry in the first place. High wages also gave them the possibility to frequently "evacuate" women and children during the hot periods.[148] In France, where the administrators were generally unmarried, the colonial minister embraced this idea: according to him, the presence of the family in general, and women in particular, was conducive to increase the administrator's morals and avoid colonial scandals.[149] In Britain, the Colonial Office discouraged officers from marrying when they were young and left for the colonies.[150] In British India instead, family members joined the administrators, but were often absent and travelled to Europe frequently. Those absentees seemed to have caused severe problems among British administrators resulting from isolation and loneliness over extended periods, as David Gilmour and Elizabeth Buettner have shown.[151]

The Dutch example stood out, with almost half of the 240,000 Europeans in the Dutch Indies being women.[152] Keen to follow the Dutch example, Chailley's French Colonial Union lobbied to pay higher wages to French *fonctionnaires* and set out to recruit potential wives for the administrators. At one of the recruitment events that was organized by Chailley, Baron d'Haussonville, a fervent adversary of emancipation and the feminist movement, praised the colonial marriages, claiming that "the marriage is, more than schooling or working as a telegraphist or telephonist, the real career for women."[153] Modeled on the British Women's Emigration Association, the French Colonial Union finally set up a Société française

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'Forging a Relationship with the Colonial Administrative Service 1921-1939', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 19, 3 (1991), 62–82.

[147] See for example the regulations of the families travelling to the East Indies: Koninklijk Beslut van 19 februari 1872 houdende vaststelling van het overtochtsreglement (Indisch Staatsblad Nr 125), in ICI, *Les fonctionnaires coloniaux: Documents officiels* vol.2 (Paris, 1897), 163f.

[148] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 274; Leclercq, *L'Île de Java*, 262.

[149] See for example: Heckel and Cyprien, *L'enseignement colonial*, 47.

[150] Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa*, 203.

[151] Gilmour, *The Ruling Caste*; E. Buettner, *Empire Families: Britons and Late Imperial India* (Oxford and New York, 2004).

[152] E. Locher-Scholten, *Women and the Colonial State: Essays on Gender and Modernity in the Netherlands Indies, 1900-1942* (Amsterdam, 2000), 17; See for a general overview: J.A. Clancy-Smith and F. Gouda, *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism* (Charlottesville, 1998); A.M. Burton and I. Hofmeyr (eds.), *Ten Books that Shaped the British Empire: Creating an Imperial Commons* (Durham, 2014)

[153] "Allocution de M. Comte de Haussonville", in Joseph Chailley, *L'Emigration des Femmes aux Colonies* (Paris, 1897), 6.

d'émigration des femmes in 1897, which sent a few women to the colonies, not without testing their morality and physical ability beforehand.[154]

In Germany, the wife of hygienist and ICI member Hans Ziemann, Grete, held the families in the Dutch East Indies up as an example of successful acclimatization – of men, women and children alike.[155] As a consequence, the German Colonial Society founded a women's section (*Frauenbund*) in 1908. The *Frauenbund* of the German Colonial Society chose 107 women to be sent to the colonies in 1912. However, only twenty-nine of them were married there, while the others worked as dressmakers or returned to Germany.[156] All in all, European projects to send women to the colonies proved to be a project too expensive to be realized by the state. While private organizations took over, their funding was insecure. Thus, it was not until the 1920s that a substantial number of women emigrated to the colonies.[157] Sending women to the colonies proved to be an arduous task.

A more promising way to ensure the morality of administrators was either professional and competitive selection or the adequate remuneration of the civil servants. Thus the ICI lobbied for higher salaries. High wages, reformers argued, would immunize administrators against corruption and misuse of their positions. They evoked the Dutch model, where the government had chosen to ensure morality by tripling the salary for those who left for the colonies. So did the British, who had to offer the Oxbridge elites adequate salaries, which "served to attract the best class of men England could give." As a general rule, British governors earned twice the salary of their French or German colleagues.[158] The British Alleyne Ireland of Chicago University, who studied the colonial service for the US government, also recommended high wages to "secure a wide field of selection amongst a class of men who are constitutionally high-minded and honest."[159] It goes without saying that higher salaries were not only a means to counteract abuse and corruption, but also served the self-interest of the colonial administrators. The colonial reformers in the ICI never denied this interest. After all, higher wages for colonial administrators were also "altruistic" in the way that they were part of the professionalization and therefore amelioration of colonial rule. The ICI offered the colonial governments a deal to buy "honesty" and professional administration from autonomous experts - and colonial governments, like in the USA or in Germany, accepted by modelling the colonial careers on the Dutch or British example.

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[154] See for example: Ha, *French Women.*
[155] L. Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884-1945* (Durham [N.C.] 2001), 6.
[156] Schnee, *Deutsches Koloniallexikon*, vol 1, 662.
[157] Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire*, 265.
[158] Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa*, 159.
[159] Ireland, *Tropical Colonization*, 60.

This becomes clearer with regard to the professionalization of colonial careers and the introduction of retirement allowances. To prevent corruption and the abuse of administrative posts for personal enrichment, the ICI wanted to present administrators with the prospect of a stable career and retirement planning. Hitherto, their short tenure in the tropics rarely allowed for the payment of pensions.[160] Although Europeans who joined the colonial service were paid a bonus – for example the *Tropenzulage* for German administrators – many of them dropped out of service even earlier than expected. Only the twenty years of service in the Dutch Indies – with a scheduled retirement at the age of forty-five – enabled the Dutch state to pay appropriate old-age pensions.[161] Granting pension payments was much more difficult in France, where law foresaw a maximum term of service of twelve years only. It was a serious problem in Germany, where the administrators were hired for three years in German Southwest Africa, two years in German East Africa and only one and a half years in insalubrious Togo and Cameroon.[162]

The German solution for this problem had been to recruit colonial administrators among the regular *Beamtenschaft* (the German Civil Service in the metropole) and reintegrate them into the metropole's civil service after they had served in the colonies.[163] This swap of the so-called *Altbeamte* guaranteed administrators a pension based on the lengthy service in both colonial and metropolitan bureaucracy. It allowed the German state to pay the lowest wages to their colonial administrators, even less than the Belgian or Portuguese officials received.[164] Given the short-term service in German colonies, the authorities accepted unmarried candidates only.[165]

According to the ICI, the German system ran counter to the Dutch ideal, and was hardly acceptable for those colonial experts who promoted a separate and autonomous career for colonial professionals. This is why, in 1910, the ICI-member and German colonial minister Bernhard Dernburg instigated a new *Reichskolonialbeamtengesetz*, which guaranteed elevated wages and adjusted the pension system.[166] Dernburg's regulation of the Colonial Civil Service

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[160] See for example the discussion in the German parliament about the old-age pensions: Verhandlungen des Reichtags (Berlin 1910), Reichstag, 80. Sitzung, 6.5.1910, 2944.

[161] Koninklijk Beslut van 10 April 1881 op het verleenen can pensionen aan Europeesche burgerlijke ambtenaren in Nederlandsch Indië (Indisch Staatsblad Nr. 142), in ICI, *Les fonctionnaires coloniaux: Documents officiels* vol.2 (Paris, 1897), 208.

[162] Tesch, *Die Laufbahn der deutschen*, 17; ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 300. In the Congo Free State, the administrators signed contracts for three years. ICI, *Les fonctionnaires coloniaux: Documents officiels* vol.2 (Paris, 1897), 241.

[163] Ibid., 15-16.

[164] In 1913, the governor of German East Africa earned £1,893a year, while the governor general of Nigeria earned £7,500, the governor general of Angola £2,200 and the governor general of Belgian Congo £2,058; The head of French West Africa received £2,469: Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa Africa,* 159.

[165] Tesch, *Die Laufbahn der deutschen*, 17; H. Wolff, *Die Landmesser und Kulturtechniker in Preußen* (Berlin 1912), 83.

[166] J. Spidel, 'The German Colonial Service: Organization, Selection and Training' (PhD Diss. Stanford, 1972).

"regularized the positions of colonial officials, unified conditions of service, laid down explicit conditions of tenure, survivor's benefits and the like. Pay scales improved and became at least comparable to those attaining at home, if not better."[167]

Similar reforms were made in Great Britain. ICI member Robert Herbert had initiated a Government Pensions Act as early as 1865, but the regulations he introduced did not take full effect. It was only after the ICI revived the topic that a systematic pension system was established in 1911 and became "the precedence of colonial governorships in terms of salary and the various grading of governorships into classes."[168] British administrators were divided into different income classes, and received a fixed salary with corresponding retirement allowances – provided that they had pursued their profession for at least ten years.[169] The US government stipulated analogous regulations, after the American Historical Society had thoroughly studied the British, French and Dutch colonial service and concluded that administrators "must be tempted into [the service] by large pay, security of tenure and liberal pensions."[170]

While money was said to buy morality, the high dropout of colonial officials from service continued to be an expensive affair for colonizing states. The civil services had to find ways of assuring the candidates' resistance to changing environmental conditions, formerly ensured by the military rulers of the colonies (they had automatically gone through medical and "moral" tests when joining the navy or the army). [171] German authorities, in particular, attached great importance to the medical test and even forged a new term to describe it: All candidates had to present themselves to the colonial authorities in Berlin to have their *Tropentauglichkeit* – the suitability for longer sojourns in the tropics – certified by a single official physician, Dr. Steudel (a fact which reveals that there were not many administrators in the German colonies).[172] The negative counterpart was the *Tropendienstuntauglichkeit*, a legal term describing a medical status of life-threatening incompatibility with the tropical environment. Before sending candidates to the colonies, the doctor and his team vetted the candidates on the viability of heart, lungs, nervous systems, visual and auditory organs. They vaccinated them to test their tolerance of quinine. They even tended to reject blond Germans because of their

[167] Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of German Africa*, 54.
[168] Lowell, *Colonial Civil Service*, 5.
[169] The classes were: class I (Kenya, Nigeria, Gold Coast, Tanganjika, salary £6000 and allowances £2500), II (Uganda Norther Rhodesia, Sierra Leone, 3500/1500), III (Gambia, Nyasaland, British Somaliland (2500/750), IV (Zanzibar 2000/1000); A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, 'The Progress of Pro-consuls. Advancement and migration among the colonial governors of British African territories, 1900–1965', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 7, 2 (2008), 180–212: 181-183; B.L. Blakeley, 'Pensions and Professionalism: The Colonial Governors (Pensions) Acts and the British Colonial Service, 1865–1911', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 4, 2 (2008), 138–153.
[170] Lowell, *Colonial Civil Service*, 5.
[171] ICI*, Compte Rendu 1895*, 292.
[172] Tesch, *Laufbahn*, 23; Haarhaus, *Das Recht des Deutschen*, 18.

alleged *Tropendienstuntauglichkeit*, arguing along racist lines that blond Europeans were more vulnerable in the tropics than Southern Europeans. Dismissing also candidates who drank alcohol or smoked, the only vice accepted was the corpulence of "moderately adipose persons suitable for colonial service."[173] The German tests were widely admired for their specialization and preparation for the tropics, although they ultimately did not change the high turnover of administrators.

Unlike the Germans, British authorities adhered to a holistic concept of general education and cultivated sports like equestrian sports and cricket as an integral and substantial preparation for colonial service. Sports games were part of the public schools' ideology to form British students' character during the university career. Experts argued that it had the side-effect of strengthening the physique before they left for the colonies and helped them to maintain it on the spot. The British colonial administration became famous for explicitly recruiting administrators among the "blues", who had succeeded in rugby, rowing, cricket, athletics or hockey competitions between Oxford and Cambridge.[174] By the turn of the century, the French and Dutch colonial reformers, inspired by the British enthusiasm for sports, incorporated sports in general and equestrian sports in particular in the candidates' curricula.[175]

The German medical check-ups for *Tropentauglichkeit* instead became a model imitated in all the colonizing countries. Medical tests were part of the professionalization process during which the ICI contributed to institutionalize tropical medicine in specific research institutes. As we have seen, the ICI played an important part in establishing schools for tropical medicine in Paris (1902), Marseille (1905), Hamburg (1900), Liverpool (1898), and London (1900). The bacteriologists who ran these institutions were naturally skeptical towards the British obsession with holism. They promised to immunize Europeans through exogenous medication by drugs and vaccination, rather than by autogenous training of body strength. After all, with the help of microscopes in their laboratories, they had identified the exogenous parasites to be the reason for tropical diseases – consequently they had to be contained with "exogenous" counteragents.

Their findings made the prediction of *Tropentauglichkeit* through health certificates unlikely. Indeed, much to the chagrin of the colonial authorities, the *Tropenuntauglichkeit* often developed only in the colonies, although the administrators had been declared to be in excellent health in Europe. Thys, who had been at pains to recruit engineers and workers for the construction of the Congo railway, complained about the impossibility of testing the Europeans'

[173] Tesch, *Die Laufbahn der deutschen*, 24.
[174] A.C.d. Gayffier-Bonneville, 'La formation des administrateurs au Soudan à l'époque du Condominium', in Samia El Mechat (ed.)*, Les administrations coloniales, XIXe-XXe siècles: Esquisse d'une histoire comparée* (Rennes, 2009), 36; Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa*, 200.
[175] Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht*, 72.

Tropentauglichkeit: "It is a bit like buying a razor blade: you can only tell if it is good after having used it."[176] Regardless of the fact that Thys' metaphor applied very well to several bloody-minded administrators in the Belgian Congo, the *Tropenuntauglichkeit* remained the main reason for administrators to abandon their service.[177] In the French Colonial Service, sixteen percent of the administrators employed between 1887 and 1912 died and only a few accomplished their tenure.[178] As hygienists often failed to provide the means for a better preparation of the Europeans, the colonizers chose different ways and replaced preventative medicine by much more efficient sanitation measures on the spot. Or – as we have seen – they embraced a racist fatalism that denied the possibility of white immunization against the dangers of the tropics. This led them to focus on the natives with their natural immunity to the environment in which they lived. The knowledge of the natives, with their strengths and weaknesses, thus became a priority of the colonial experts.

Specialization through Anthropological Knowledge

Being helpless in the face of hygiene, it was the specialization and anthropological preparation that kept the ICI members busy. Significantly, the British system came under fire for being the least utilitarian and for neglecting specialization and anthropological training. Despite selective borrowing from the British, Continentals repudiated their universal ideal of colonial education: Colonial administrators overseas and civil servants within Britain received the same training. Most of them had graduated from Oxford or Cambridge. Even the temporary training school in India, the Hailebury College (1806-55) had modelled its curriculum on the liberal arts education at Cambridge University.[179] By 1908, three-fourths of the British colonial servants had graduated from Oxford or Cambridge.[180] Almost all administrators shared the socialization and education of public or grammar schools. Only seven percent of the administrators in the Indian Civil Service, for example, had not attended a public school. Thus their *esprit de corps* was grounded in shared "values" of a self-reproducing administrative elite.[181]

ICI reformers criticized this system and blamed it for ignoring indigenous cultures and going back to the assimilationist colonial policy introduced by Macaulay after the British government had taken over India's administration from the East India Company. According to

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[176] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 103.
[177] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 296.
[178] Cohen, *Rulers of Empire*, 23.
[179] Lowell, *Colonial Civil Service,* 12.
[180] Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht*, 65.
[181] Kirk-Greene, *Britain's Imperial Administrators*, 17.

Chailley, Macaulay's reorganization of British colonial training in the 1850s had produced a mistaken ideal of comprehensive elite formation, promoting a classic Oxbridge education that privileged Greek and Latin over Arabic and Hindi.[182] Convinced that modern science and rationality can only be expressed through European languages, Macaulay had dismissed indigenous languages as negligible. According to Chailley, the British "Macaulayism" lingered on, and equipped colonial administrators with the "same intellectual baggage" as civil servants back in England.[183]

It was indeed widely recognized that only few British colonial administrators spoke Asian or African languages, even in colonies based on indirect rule like Nigeria or in East Africa. As late as 1910, only forty-one out of eighty-one officers had passed even the minimum requirement of the Swahili examination.[184] The competitive examinations to enter the Civil Service in India gave more credit to those who excelled in Greek or Latin (750 marks each) than to those who learned Sanskrit or Arabic (500 marks each), with the former being compulsory and the latter optional – Arabic and Sanskrit were less important than learning German or French. While it was compulsory to have at least a basic knowledge of the principal vernacular language of the province to which a candidate was assigned, reassignments were frequent and learning a native language was often useless. In any case, the major part of the examination for the Indian Civil Service was dedicated to natural sciences and riding skills. [185]

In the ICI, experts accused the British of recruiting colonial officials among the educated elite in Oxford or Cambridge, because such a choice would result in the formation of "scholars rather than administrators." While the India Office undoubtedly ensured the knowledge of "sciences, history and living languages," ICI members argued, it failed to provide the candidates with "technical knowledge."[186] Those "lettered gentlemen" hardly lived up to the requirements for efficient colonial administration. They had to acquire specialized knowledge during traineeships on the spot.[187] The former German district officer and teacher at the Hamburg Colonial Institute, Hans Zache, took the same line and ridiculed the British production of "Renaissance men" and "human encyclopedias." Nowadays, he claimed, administrators should be "less humanistic and more realistic."[188] Even members of the British colonial service

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[182] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 326; See also: Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht,*57-61.
[183] Gann and Duignan have remarked that, while administrators were indeed recruited among the Oxbridge elite, those men educated in the classics might also develop useful practical skills and were "adaptable": Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa*, 51.
[184] Ibid., 210 and 233.
[185] 'Examination for the Civil Service in India', cited in: United States. Dept. of the Treasury. Bureau of Statistics, Austin, and Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography, *Colonial Administration, 1800-1900*, 1268-1271.
[186] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 331-332.
[187] ICI*, Compte Rendu 1895*, 334 and 340.
[188] Zache, *Die Ausbildung der Kolonialbeamten*, 8-9.

confirmed this view. One "negrophile" administrator complained that "never in the course of my work in Africa have I been called on to make Greek verse or enunciate the binominal theorem."[189] Like the ICI members, he preferred a substantial training in indigenous culture and languages. The new paradigm of the 1890s reforms was not excessive accumulation of general knowledge, but the facultative acquisition of useful knowledge.[190] Indeed, the British administrators seemed to lack practical skills and technical know-how in agronomy, economy, and the social sciences.[191]

These charges against the British did not go unnoticed in the Empire. Chamberlain initiated a review committee, and as a result of its work introduced pre-posting training for British administrators, which had not existed before. Between 1908 and 1925, pre-posting training was centered in the Imperial Institute in South Kensington, London.[192] Although not an official training school, the Imperial Institute (the former Royal Colonial Institute) offered alternative courses in hygiene, penal law, civil law, accounting and tropical agriculture.[193] The classes at the Imperial Institute were specially designed for sojourns in the colonies and intended to prepare experts for the colonies, but they were not official and not a professional training school.

In the meantime, the director of the ICI, Chailley, had visited India twice. After extended travels in 1900/1 and 1904/5 he published an in-depth study about the British crown colony, under the title *L'Inde Britannique* (1910). He wrote the account in close cooperation with both British and Indian officials he had met on his journey and registered their grievances and complaints. In this 500-pages volume, he regarded British India with sympathy, but lamented the deep social cleft between the British officials and the Indian society. Moreover, he criticized the Macaulayist assimilation of the natives. He urged the British to accept more Indians into the administration – with administration meaning bureaucracy and not decision taking. In 1910, the Secretary of State for India, Lord Morley, ordered Chailley's report to be translated into English, under the more discriminating title *Administrative Problems of British India*. Chailley's close friend and informant, the secretary of the Financial Department in India and ICI member Sir William Meyer, translated the book into English. Meyer's English version resembled occasionally a reinterpretation rather than a translation, and inflated Chailley's latent criticism of the British system. Given Meyer's influence on the writing and translation of the

[189] Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa Africa*, 180.
[190] Zache, *Die Ausbildung der Kolonialbeamten*, 8.
[191] Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa*, 178-180.
[192] Kirk-Greene, *Britain's Imperial Administrators*, 133 and W. Golant, *Image of Empire: The Early History of the Imperial Institute 1887-1925* (Exeter, 1984).
[193] Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht,* 73.

book, it included a good deal of British auto-criticism. It was widely read in Britain and became one of the most referenced studies on British colonialism.

With regard to the "native policy", it condemned the British assimilative policy of educating mostly Hindus at Anglo-Indian universities. Instead of creating "men fit for subordinate official posts", the author(s) complained, the British assimilation policy had produced fervent adversaries to British rule and politicized "intellectuals" who tried to beat the British at their own game.[194] Instead of assimilating the literate Hindus and teaching them European-style general "intelligence", *Administrative Problems of British India* recommended making use of the traditional Muslim nobility, who supposedly had ruled the subcontinent for ages. Although Muslims were not "educated" or "assimilated", they had a historically acquired "character" to rule as intermediaries. This traditional ruling elite, Chailley claimed, could be used for executive tasks in British India – instead of producing assimilated, but potentially subversive, Hindus. Indeed, by 1900, Indian Muslims had only made up five percent of the higher administrative positions held by natives in India. Chailley advised the British to increase their number, and to use them as executive forces, who "accepted" British supremacy. For Chailley, this would be the essential outcome of a modern and successful native policy.[195]

Chailley's publication became a standard reference for British rule in India, and was admired by outstanding colonial experts such as Sir William Meyer or Sir John Strachey, who eulogized Chailley as "the worthy possessor of an illustrious name" and one of the experts on British policy in India. As early as 1894, Strachey had praised Chailley's comparative studies on the East Indian possessions and highly estimated the French attempts to make India a "solid and self-supporting dominion in the East."[196] (Another ICI member, Jules Harmand, had translated Strachey's book on India into French).[197] Chailley's version of indirect rule through Muslim collaborators would be applied in the African colonies from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards, since the internationalist colonial experts agreed that Muslims were the best collaborators in colonial projects, as we will see in Chapter 7.[198]

[194] Chailley, *Administrative Problems*, 562.
[195] Ibid., 203; 561-566.
[196] Strachey, *India*, IX-X ;
[197] L. Aurousseau, 'Jules Harmand', *Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extrême Orient* 22, 1 (1922), 402–404.
[198] See for example: J. Chailley (ed.), *Notes et Études sur l'Islam en Afrique Noire* (Paris, 1962); See also the member of the ICI, Alfred Lyall, "Islam in India", in Alfred Lyall, *Asiatic Studies: Religious and Social* (London, 1884²), translated into French as: *Etudes sur les moeurs religieuses et socials de l'Extrême-Orient* (Paris, 1907-8); A. Eckert, *Herrschen und Verwalten: Afrikanische Bürokraten, staatliche Ordnung und Politik in Tanzania, 1920-1970* (Munich 2007), 37.

Chailley's book and its success in Great Britain is remarkable, because it reversed the polarity between British indirect rule and French assimilationism.[199] Unlike prevailing interpretations, *Administrative Problems of British India* identified the British Macaulayism in India as assimilationist and contrasted it to a policy of indirect rule in Dutch or even French tropical colonies. Chailley and the ICI members were not alone in accusing the British of pursuing a mistaken policy of assimilation. Their critique was repeated by Jules Harmand, a French colonial administrator. Widely read among British colonial officials, Harmand demanded more utilitarianism from a nation that had been considered the most utilitarian in the world. According to Harmand, colonial training should aim at producing technicians "for the immediate utility," artisans or professional agriculturists, but not scholars or professors in literature and law.[200] Harmand deeply influenced British colonial leaders such as Strachey – and also French colonial administrators like Étienne, Gallieni and Lyautey.

Harmand repudiated an "instruction by books" that had created "moral and intellectual métis" among the natives.[201] This intellectual hybridization threw them off their natural course and turned them into a potential danger for the colonial state. Instead, Harmand made a plea for their practical education and took the Japanese as an example of successful emulation: "They have studied Western knowledge in a realistic and utilitarian sense, this is what we have to teach to our natives."[202] After all, he argued, it was not cultural Europeanization, but the practical emulation and technical specialization that had made Japanese "civilization" a success.

With regard to the education of native administrators, specialization became a new meaning. It opposed the generalist education à la Macaulay to the practical formation of workers instead of thinkers. Thinkers, or "intellectuals", as Chailley and Harmand called them, posed a threat to colonial domination, because they thought beyond the immediate task they were assigned to. Dutch, French and British administrators agreed that the colonized should also be specialists, and not generalists. The latter, they argued, showed a strong tendency to be politicized. Thus, the "utilitarian" attitude was instrumental in avoiding subversion.

As mentioned above, the ICI found the true utilitarian attitude in the Dutch system, which seemed to prepare its officers more adequately for colonial duty. Members of the ICI went into raptures about the Dutch expertise: They "learn and perfectly speak the indigenous languages."[203] Moreover, they acquired a certain technical knowledge about colonial

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[199] The idea that French rule was assimilationist and that the British pursued a policy of administration has been treated in detail in Betts, *Assimilation and Association*; Michael Crowder opposed British indirect rule to French assimilationism: M. Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule* (Evanston, 1968).
[200] J. Harmand, *Domination et Colonisation* (Paris, 1910), 277.
[201] Ibid., 270.
[202] Ibid., 274.
[203] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 375.

agriculture, because they "are supposed to control and to guide the natives" in growing cash crops for the colonial state.[204] As a result, they were "excellent *fonctionnaires pratiques.*"[205] Even members of the British colonial service, who had long been reluctant to admit that anyone might be better at governing colonies than the British, looked to the Dutch Indies for inspiration. Henry Boy Scotts of the Bengal Civil Service wrote after visiting Java: "Unquestionably a study of Java and of its government is one of the first duties of an Indian governor, and if that is fairly undertaken it will lead, I think, inevitably to this conclusion, that in many matters it is a mistake to insist that our Oriental subjects should conform to our Western ideas."[206] This attitude was in line with Hans Zache's doctrine that the administrators had to be good leaders and "look into the hearts of the natives" to understand their concerns.[207]

Indeed, the Dutch grand examination was designed to train specialists on the culture of their colonial subjects and in this regard differed from the British exams. This divergence led experts in comparative colonialism to oppose the British to the Dutch system. In the latter, only candidates were admitted who held a degree from the State Agricultural School, the Royal Institute for the Navy, the Polytechnical School, or of Universities, provided that they passed the fitness test. In terms of content, priority was given to history, ethnology and geography of the Dutch Indies, as well as native law, religions and customs. Most important was their proficiency in Malay and Javanese.[208] To be adequately prepared, the Dutch administrators were first trained in Europe as specialists, and then sent to the colonies, where they went through a period of apprenticeship. Given that the Netherlands educated their administrators both at home and in the colonies, it became an international matter of debate if white administrators should be educated in Europe or on the spot.

Despite the plea for a practical, professional and native-oriented education, the ICI members advised against transferring the colonial schools to the colonies. Learning a lesson from the British and French, who had closed down their overseas colonial schools in Haileybury (India) and Saigon (Cochinchine), and skeptical towards the colonial section at the Wilhelm III Gymnasium in Dutch Batavia, they preferred preparation for the service in Europe, followed by an "internship" in the colonies.[209] The official reason for homegrown administrators was

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[204] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 375 and 401.
[205] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895,* 397.
[206] H.S. Boys, *Some Notes on Java and its Administration by the Dutch* (Allahabad, 1892), iii-iv.
[207] Zache, *Die Ausbildung der Kolonialbeamten*, 8.
[208] 'Rules Governing Admission to the Civil Service in Java', in: United States. Dept. of the Treasury. Bureau of Statistics, Austin, and Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography, *Colonial Administration, 1800-1900*, 1273-1274.
[209] Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht,* 52; Some of the British delegates in the ICI, Alfred Lyall and Richard Temple, had been educated at Haileybury, but argued along similar lines, see for example F.C. Danvers, *Memorials of Old Haileybury College,* (Westminster, 1894), viii.

that they wanted to keep the inexperienced and adolescent candidates away from the immoral milieus overseas, at least during the earliest stage of their careers.

Curiously, they believed that these "immoral milieus" in the colony did not necessarily derive from the presence of non-Europeans, but originated first and foremost in the "corrupted" settler societies: Only a preparation in Europe, one member of the ICI claimed, ensured the administrators' respect towards the indigenous majority. A "spirit of absolute impartiality" had to be acquired in Europe, to prevent administrators from favoring European settler interests over native needs, as it had happened in the self-governing British settler colonies.[210] Like settler colonies in general, the British dominions were the ICI's favorite enemies. Thus, the debates about colonial training schools reveals the skepticism of European colonial experts towards European settlers. The autonomy of the colonial expert consisted of the independence from both the metropole and settler societies, who tried to model the colony after the metropole, without taking local conditions and populations into account.

The professionalization and specialization of colonial training in the metropole coincided with the rise of colonial and anthropological research at European universities. While the training within Europe provided for a solid general education, it also gave the possibility for regional specialization. Starting in the 1890s, ever more specialized classes were provided by newly founded departments of colonial science at European universities. Colonial interest groups all over Europe had taken the initiative to establish colonial sciences at universities. Following Chailley's report on Dutch colonial training, the Delft colonial school in the Netherlands closed down (in 1900), to the benefit of a more flexible program at Leiden University.[211] Given the new variety of languages, anthropological studies and courses on colonial administration and law taught at Leiden, the candidates could choose to specialize in certain regions and prepare adequately for local service. In accordance with this idea, French reformers sent the students of the École Coloniale to attend classes at the military academy in Saint Cyr (where Gallieni and Lyautey had studied), to the École Polytechnique for engineers, to the École des Sciences Politiques (where Chailley taught comparative colonization) and to the École française d'Éxtreme Orient.[212] This integration of colonial careers into a diversified metropolitan academia also benefitted the establishment of colonial sciences as academic disciplines, as the French professor of colonial law, Arthur Girault, remarked.

[210] ICI, *Comtpe Rendu 1895,* 402.

[211] ICI, *Les fonctionnaires coloniaux: Premier Supplement* (Paris, 1910), 27; Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht,* 70.

[212] ICI, *Comtpe Rendu 1895,* 419; See also P. Singaravélou, 'L'enseignement supérieur colonial: Un état des lieux', *Histoire de l'éducation* 122 (2009), 71–92.

In Germany, the combined system of academic and practical training had many followers. Unlike other European countries, Germany did not operate any central educational institution. Since 1893, candidates for the colonial service had to go through the three month fast-track course at the Seminar for Oriental Languages (1887) in Berlin to receive an idea of what Swahili, Haussa, Herero, Duala, and Ewe sounded like, and to acquire basic knowledge in colonial law and administration.[213] Physicians were prepared at the Hamburger Institute for Naval and Tropical Diseases*,* and botanists received some practical learning at the botanical gardens in Berlin.[214]

While the German colonial undersecretary abandoned the idea of emulating the British Haileybury College and to train district officers and station masters directly in East Africa, a new endeavor was made to establish a colonial school back in Germany in 1908.[215] Launched by the German Colonial Society, and partly funded by the new Colonial Ministry (1907), the city of Hamburg established the Colonial Institute (1908) as a university for colonial studies.[216] A member of the ICI, Karl Rathgen, became its first director and turned the Colonial Institute into the most eminent colonial training center in Germany.[217] Rathgen based the Colonial Institute organization on the comparative studies published by the ICI and studied British, French, Dutch and Belgian training systems in detail, while consulting other members of the ICI on how to organize a training school that was at the same time a research institution.[218]

Inspired by the ICI's comparative search for a best-practice of colonial administration, Rathgen valued theoretical preparatory classes in Europe over training schools on the spot.[219] In his opening address at the Colonial Institute, he echoed Chailley's stereotypes by blaming the British system for producing "gentlemen" and "universitymen", who lacked specialized knowledge. If the British even privileged sports over indigenous languages, Rathgen moaned, it did not stand up as a model of modern schooling.[220] He cited his British colleagues in the ICI*,* Sir Hubert Jerningham and Alfred Lyall, to testify as witnesses that in Britain "until today, a colonial education does not exist and has never existed."[221] Only the detailed knowledge of indigenous languages, their customs and laws, and their religion and superstitions, Rathgen

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[213] Tesch, *Die Laufbahn der deutschen*, 25; Haarhaus, *Das Recht des Deutschen*, 42.
[214] Zache, *Die Ausbildung der Kolonialbeamten*, 5; Haarhaus, *Das Recht des Deutschen*, 41f; Tesch, *Die Laufbahn der deutschen*, 26.
[215] 'Denkschrift zu Kap. 6a Tit. 23 d. fortd. Ausg. d. A. A.', cit in: V. König, 'Ausbildung der Kolonialbeamten', in *Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon* (Berlin, 1920), vol.1, 98 f.
[216] J. Ruppenthal, *Kolonialismus als "Wissenschaft und Technik": Das Hamburgische Kolonialinstitut 1908 bis 1919* (Stuttgart, 2007).
[217] Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht*, 39.
[218] Ibid*.*, 88.
[219] Ibid*.*, 52.
[220] Ibid., 65.
[221] Ibid., 39 and 88; Jerningham's and Lyall's quotations can be found in ICI, *Compte Rendu 1905*, 283 and 278.

continued, allowed the Europeans to rule, while the "ignoramus" administrator was deemed to fail. According to the founder of the Colonial Institute, the professionalization of colonial rule had resulted in a new complexity of tasks. Colonial administrators faced new, demanding responsibilities, like tax-raising, infrastructure measures and the protection of indigenous labor, all subsumed under the overall goal of the *Nutzbarmachung* (development, *mise en valeur*) of the colonies.[222] By copying successful strategies of other colonial powers and avoiding their errors, Rathgen hoped to realize a colonial university that accorded with the ICI's priorities.

Rathgen borrowed from the recently reformed institutions in Britain and the Netherlands. He studied the courses offered by the British Imperial Institute on hygiene, law and accounting. Another model was a colonial school created by Dutch colonial minister Fock, a member of the ICI, in 1908. Fock's school offered postgraduate training for a small administrative elite of advanced officers who had already served between six and ten years in the colonies. In the spirit of professional development, they studied comparative colonial administration, economy, finance, statistics and law, with the purpose of making exploitation and administration more efficient.

While Rathgen considered the Dutch in-service training as exemplary, he was more skeptical towards the French École Coloniale.[223] Although he respected the French colonial administrators who had gone through the École Coloniale, he dismissed its inflexible and strict curriculum prior to the anthropological reforms instigated by Maurice Delafosse.[224] Rather than taking the École Coloniale as a model for the Colonial Institute, Rathgen praised the colonial institutes that local chambers of commerce had established in Marseille, Lyon, Bordeaux, Nantes, Havre and Nancy. The commercial orientation of colonial institutions in those port cities were a more appropriate template for the Hamburg-based Colonial Institute.[225] However, this did not lower the desire to turn the Colonial Institute into a training school for administrators and an academic research institute.

When the Colonial Institute in Hamburg began to function in 1908, its eclectic character reflected these experiences made in other colonizing countries. Thirty-two lecturers taught history, law, economy, languages, geography (*Landeskunde*), ethnography (*Völkerkunde*) and hygiene. Its inclination to colonial research and its academic ambitions is evident in the fact that it developed into the official Hamburg University. This derived from Rathgen's double

[222] Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht.*,43.
[223] Ibid., 73.
[224] Ibid., 79.
[225] The regional institutes, especially the Institut Colonial in Marseille, held close ties with the *Institut Colonial International*, particularly because they were internal rivals of the colonial elite in Paris: See Heckel and Cyprien, *L'enseignement colonial*, introduction and J.F. Klein, 'La création de l'Ecole coloniale de Lyon. Au cœur des polémiques du Parti colonial', *Outre-mers* 93, 252-253 (2006), 147–170: 158.

purpose of conveying technical knowledge and engaging in scientific research alike:[226] Arthur Girault, a French member of the ICI, had advised Rathgen on offering colonial doctorates, because the introduction of colonial dissertations in France had also vitalized colonial science as a whole.[227] As a consequence, the promotion of explicitly colonial science at European universities and the formation of specialized colonial administrators went hand in hand.

The prerogatives of the Colonial Institute represented the reformist zeal that the ICI had kicked off in Europe. The professional education of colonial administrators, Europeans agreed now, consisted of a solid preparation in European universities, aiming at the "knowledge" of the indigenous and the *mise en valeur* of colonial territories. While mastering indigenous languages was indispensable, accounting, statistics, administrative law and economic management outranked Maucaulayist and Humboldtian ideals of classic education. A flexible curriculum – composed by the candidates according to their chosen position and destiny – was crucial to allow for individual specialization and ultimately efficient administration.

Autonomy of the Colonial Experts

After the colonial administrators had gone through a process of specialization in European training schools and had their moral integrity certified, they were deemed fit for an internship on the spot. There, they were supposed to act as autonomous experts. Following a Kantian ideal, the liberal reformers believed that moral preparation and character building was the pre-condition of the administrator's individual autonomy on the spot. Autonomy was vital to true and pure expertise, which had to be purged from the solipsistic dogmatism of the motherland's bureaucracy. Unlike the bureaucrats back home, the reformers claimed, colonial administrators had to be flexible and self-reliant. Therefore, they came closer to the ideal of a rational individual, which was constantly challenged by an irrational environment, but resisted its unsound temptations.

Unlike European governments, ICI reformers thought administrative autonomy necessary, because they defined colonial rulers as charismatic rather than bureaucratic. Generally speaking, European governments did not appreciate the autonomy of colonial administrators, who were said to govern a space that lacked legal, civil and political control. From a legal point of view, European constitutions did not apply to the colonies and the exceptional circumstances allowed colonial administrators to rule in a permanent state of

[226] Haarhaus, *Das Recht des Deutschen*, 44-45.
[227] Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht*, 51.

exception.[228] After all, colonial administration lacked all the virtues that made up the success of European bureaucracies: hierarchy, clear rules, routine, division of labor, neutrality, and the separation of person and office. Instead, colonial rulers were often qualified as arbitrary, "charismatic authorities" that lacked rules, hierarchy, and control.[229] While European governments did not trust charismatic rulers, the ICI members believed that it was the only way to govern a colony that was naturally located in a milieu where clientelism and patronage dominated.

The ICI identified three different modes of bureaucratic control that did not exist in the colonies: Given the tiny numbers of administrators and a resulting low density, mutual observance among the administrators was almost impossible. Also, the hierarchical control by superiors – who were based in the metropole – was difficult, given the distance between motherland and colony. Moreover, the lack of a civil society or media landscape left the "kings of the bush" out of control.[230]

The lack of mutual observance, hierarchical control and civil society was accompanied by a widespread fear of individual degeneration, colonial neurosis and a tendency to despotic rule. As a consequence, European governments were keen on controlling their colonial bureaucrats by other means. The European parliaments decided on the colonial budgets, which gave them at least control over the general allocation of money to the colonial administrators. The colonial ministries employed inspectors, who supervised the expenses and balance records of colonial administration – with the exception of the Congo Free State, which was a state of its own and accountable to nobody but its King Léopold, and Great Britain, where the "morality" of the administrators was supposedly guaranteed by their elite origin.[231] Moreover, metropolitan governments issued several regulations to assure upright moral behavior. Administrators were not allowed to purchase land or start a business, and they were supposed to refuse gifts. Out of fear that colonial scandals might cause a furor back in Europe, German officers and Belgian administrators in the Congo were not allowed to publish without permission and revision by the central authorities.[232]

Apart from these rather inefficient attempts to hold sway over the colonial administrators, only the French state and Léopold's Congo Free State issued special legislations

[228] See for example M. Grohmann, *Exotische Verfassung: Die Kompetenzen des Reichstags für die deutschen Kolonien in Gesetzgebung und Staatsrechtswissenschaft des Kaiserreichs (1884-1914)* (Tübingen, 2001), 1f.
[229] Charismatic rule has been defined by Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie* (Tübingen, 1980/5), 140f.
[230] A. Girault, 'Rapport sur la surveillance à excercer sur les fonctionnaires aux colonies', in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1908*, 291-292.
[231] Kirk-Greene, *Britain's Imperial Administrators*, 44.
[232] Haarhaus, *Das Recht des Deutschen*, 56.

or created institutions to control their colonial officers. The French colonial ministry created a *Direction du Control*, which dispatched inspectors to the colonies every two or three years, to supervise its administrators. Its purpose was to "unveil irregularities without making noise in the world," and before they caused a stir in the motherland.[233] Unlike other countries, the French inspectors not only controlled the financial situation, but also the moral behavior of their governors. The Congo Free State was an independent state, which evaded control by a European state completely – a fact that contributed significantly to the undisturbed and continual violence witnessed there. Nevertheless, Léopold, eager to lose not a single penny, established a system of close surveillance, modeled on the French inspections. His *inspecteurs d'état* paid spontaneous and unannounced visits to the administrators and mutual observance was guaranteed through frequent reporting of administrators about their colleagues behavior.[234] If news of colonial scandals reached the Reich, instead, they were solved by ad-hoc commissions rather than permanent institutions.[235]

Among the experts of the ICI, the French and Belgian modes of strict control met with unanimous disapproval. In accordance with the paradigm of local *specialization*, they called for a decentralization of colonial rule. Governors and administrators should be granted the necessary liberty and flexibility to decide on their own. Autonomy was a crucial element of colonial expertise, while the bureaucrats in Europe were not considered as being competent in colonial matters. The criticisms were therefore primarily directed against the French state, which was qualified as centralized "bureaucracy rather than a democracy." The French administration was decried for its "*paperasserie*."[236] It was the most famous European expert in colonial law, Arthur Girault, who used these words to blame the French board of colonial control to be an anachronistic legacy of the Old Régime. The absolutist fear of a lack of control, Girault claimed, was grounded in Montesquieu's maxim that "those who are granted power, abuse it." [237] Indeed, the colonial inspectorate had been an institution operating since 1815.[238] But nowadays, the ICI members agreed, experts did not think in terms of power but in terms of rational progress. Thus, the inspections were decried by all the colonial experts in the ICI.

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[233] A. Girault, 'Rapport sur la surveillance à excercer sur les fonctionnaires aux colonies', in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1908*, 291, 300.
[234] Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of Belgian Africa*, 91.
[235] R. Habermas, 'Der Kolonialskandal Atakpame – eine Mikrogeschichte des Globalen', *Historische Anthropologie* 17, 3 (2009).
[236] 'French Africa' *The Times,* n°45037 (30.10.1928), xxiv.
[237] A. Girault, 'Rapport sur la surveillance à excercer sur les fonctionnaires aux colonies', in ICI, *Compte Rendu 1908*, 291, 300.
[238] R. Garner, 'Watchdogs of Empire: The French Colonial Inspection Service in Action, 1815-1913' (PhD Diss. Rochester, 1970).

However, although administrators were experts, they had to act as sovereigns. Drawing on their experience as "*anciens administrateurs*," the ICI members believed that the rule of the colonial administrators was not based on legitimization through consensus but on individual charisma. Only a personalized and charismatic rule – together with clientele politics – was understood, they argued, and was appreciated and respected by the indigenous population. As a result, all of them acknowledged that administrators had to pool juridical, legislative and executive powers in order to be able to manage a colony. Girault, for example, used the ICI to make a strong plea in favor of a "unity of authority" and the accumulation of powers by colonial administrators.[239] Colonial experts, he concluded, had to be granted autonomy to rule effectively without the "ignorant" constraints of the metropolitan governments. Again, the Dutch model was exemplary, because, as the German Hans Haarhaus put it, its administrators were completely independent of bureaucracy in the metropole.[240] France, instead, was an anti-model in this regard, because of its attempts to universalize the achievements of the revolution and apply the separation of powers in its colonies.[241] For the ICI, good governance originated in rigorous knowledge of indigenous culture, and not from control through the separation of powers. Only moral integrity and the familiarity with the indigenous societies would allow them to rule justly and wisely. By the 1890s, the accumulation of judicial, legislative and executive power was a reality in all the colonies. *Bezirksbeamte, dictrict officers* and *commandants du cercle* alike united these powers in their person. Autonomy was granted by the distance between administrators within one colony and the distance between metropole and colony.[242] The ICI encouraged these officers to turn colonial government into colonial governmentality, by making use of their anthropological knowledge.

A crucial element of the administrator's autonomy was the emancipation from nationalist solipsism. He had to study the work of other colonial experts, rather than transferring metropolitan systems of thought or administration to a completely different environment. Comparative studies made up the essence of this "intercolonial learning". However, as the accumulated duties on the spot did not allow for any leave of absence during the service, administrators had to be trained in comparative colonial studies before reporting for duty in the colonies. Therefore, the ICI's reforms of colonial training in France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands had led to the inclusion of comparative studies in the colonial curricula. The

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[239] A. Girault, 'Rapport sur la surveillance à excercer sur les fonctionnaires aux colonies', in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1908*, 291.
[240] Haarhaus, *Das Recht des Deutschen*, 136.
[241] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 304,308, 315 and 375.
[242] For this topic see A. Eckert and M. Pesek, 'Bürokratische Ordnung und koloniale Praxis', in S. Conrad and J. Osterhammel (eds.)*, Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914* (Göttingen, 2004), 87–106.

reformed programs stipulated that all candidates for colonial service had to speak several European languages before they left for the colonies.[243] For some colonial experts, this was not enough.

Belgian colonial internationalists promoted the creation of an international colonial school in Tervuren. The Belgian colonial instruction had always been rudimental. The Congo Free State offered cursory seminars of two months to prepare their administrators for the service in central Africa. Since 1889, ICI member Édouard Descamps had pioneered in giving colonial lectures at Leuven University, but remained the only academic expert in the field. Six years later, the Société des Études Coloniales launched a colonial training program, but abandoned it as early as 1897, due to insufficient funding.

Trying to profit from international expertise and given the international composition of the Free State's colonial staff, Belgian ideologues had flirted with the idea of creating an international training school in Brussels. Cyrill van Overbergh, an internationalist and future editor of the *Mouvement sociologique international,* was the mastermind behind the plan to create an "École Mondiale" in Tervuren. It should be funded by the revenues from the Congo Free State, and was designed as a huge international university. One out of three sections was to be dedicated to instructing specialists destined for the Congo. The training would be geared towards the needs of the African colony: the École would offer professional careers for colonial cooks and for experts in railway metalling. The instruction of specialists, van Overbergh explained, should be accompanied by a general training in sports, morality, language courses and administration. Access would be granted to all Europeans, who were supposed to pursue their studies for between two month and three years.[244] Léopold II was about to inaugurate the school when he had to abdicate as the head of the Congo Free State in 1908. With his abdication, the project was put aside and the *École Mondiale* never opened its doors.[245] Nevertheless, the general idea of a transnational training of specialists persisted.

In conclusion, the ICI can be held responsible for inaugurating a reform era, during which the training for colonial administrators was professionalized through international exchange. Chailley's propagation of comparative studies as a "colonial method" had already come true. It was based on comparative stereotyping, but also provided the basis for transfers of ideas and "intercolonial learning" through prototype comparisons. The reform of the colonial administration was the first step to professionalizing colonial rule. Chailley's 1893 journey to

[243] For Belgium see Heckel and Cyprien, *L'enseignement colonial*, 180.
[244] C. van Overbergh, *École Mondiale: Rapport général sur les conclusions des sous-commissions Pléniére de l'École Mondiale* (Brussels, 1907).
[245] Rathgen, *Beamtentum und Kolonialunterricht*, 89.

study the “recruitment of colonial administrators” in the Netherlands set off an avalanche of reforms in all European countries. It led to the foundation of the ICI, which triggered more colonial reforms according to the priorities of colonial administration, which were hygiene, specialization, anthropological knowledge and autonomy. The ICI became a hub of exchange, while the networks of colonial internationalists stretched way beyond the institute. Reformers of the first hour, like the British Robert Herbert who had been an early promotor of railway development in the Colonial Office, and the Spanish Antonio Fabié, joined the ICI to get support from like-minded experts.[246]

Colonial ministries and training schools from Paris to London and from The Hague to Berlin were influenced by the ICI’s reformist stance. Between 1890 and 1900, colonial offices were established and inaugurated an era of reform. Long-standing institutions increased their activity, like the British Colonial Office that doubled its correspondence in that period, improved its management, built railways and founded the London School of Tropical Medicine.[247] In 1904, the Indian Office and, in 1907, the Colonial Office were thoroughly reorganized, separating the white settler colonies (Dominion Department) from the Tropical Colonies (Crown Colonies and General).[248] They created a “General Department” with tasks as varied as personnel management, audit, or old-age pensions.[249] German ICI members established a colonial ministry in 1907 and the number of specialist advisors was increased from 5 to 9.[250] The Dutch colonial administration, which had long provided the model for the reformers, also reformed the training of its employees. Thus, on the instigation of ICI members, administrative autonomy, anthropological knowledge, hygiene and specialization became the priorities of the administrative training around the colonial world.

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[246] Concerning Herbert’s role see Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa*, 61.
[247] Ibid., 57-62.
[248] Ibid., 64.
[249] Ibid., 62.
[250] Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of German Africa*, 51.

Chapter 5

The Transfer of Colonial Techniques And the Politicization of Agronomic Technology

The International Colonial Institute (ICI) was the starting point for transfers of colonial techniques in general and for methods in colonial agronomy, in particular. These transfers of agricultural knowledge, methods and techniques emerged from the fruitful interaction that took place among colonial specialists, who pursued transnational careers, travelled to foreign colonies, and met in transnational colonial laboratories. The ICI was one of these laboratories, even though a virtual one: experts decomposed, combined, and synthesized techniques of colonization in order to develop best-practice strategies for colonial agriculture, as well as providing a neo-physiocratic *mise en culture*. Its members figured prominently in private and official associations that tried to improve colonial economies through the transfer of knowledge and new techniques.

Around 1900, the ICI's reputation as a virtual laboratory of colonial exchange was challenged by a real colonial laboratory with microscopes, glassware and experimental stations to enhance the yield of colonial cash crops. This laboratory was located in Buitenzorg, a hill station 60 kilometers south of the Dutch Indies' capital Batavia, which was surrounded by the mountains of Western Java. There, colonial botanists had created an extensive complex of agronomist research, and they turned this into the global center of a scientifically steered plantation economy. The laboratories of Buitenzorg accounted for Java's reputation as a prototype of modern and technocratic colonialism and, by 1900, these became a training ground for colonial specialists from all over the world. All the colonial powers sent representatives to Buitenzorg and many of them replicated its laboratories in their own colonies. Members of the ICI studied agronomy at Buitenzorg and promoted the laboratories as an apolitical locus of scientific progress. In reality, however, the laboratories functioned as a nucleus of colonial policy and formed the heart of the Dutch economic exploitation of its colonies in the Indies. Buitenzorg thus epitomized modern development policies and the rule of technocracy over the colonial world.

Andrew Zimmerman has argued that the colonizers evoked science as a legitimization for colonization.[1] Unlike the more traditional understanding of colonial conquest, he argued,

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[1] Zimmerman, 'Ruling Africa. Science as Sovereignty.'

this reference to "scientific colonization" legitimized colonial sovereignty. Going beyond this concept of "scientific sovereignty," I argue that colonial laboratories advanced the concept of colonial technology – a combination of experience on the spot and theoretical science – as a method to bring about development. According to the colonial internationalists, it was not pure and universal science that legitimized colonial projects, but its purposeful application to local conditions with the help of colonial technologies. They thus accorded more credibility to technical experts than to universalist scholars, and their ideology of practice also valued transfers of successfully tested technologies over advice from armchair theorists, whose reasoning grounded on logics rather than experience. Thus, the exchange and emulation of technologies was at the center of colonial development policy – and this was a better legitimization for colonialism than any purely scientific argument.[2] Transfers in colonial agronomy, in particular, illustrate their belief in technology to develop the colonies economically.[3]

Both the ICI and the Buitenzorg laboratories were hubs in a global expert network. Overlapping memberships in both institutions resulted in the promotion of Buitenzorg by the ICI members as the ideal laboratory - indeed, Buitenzorg would be at the origin of multiple technology transfers. We can distinguish among four different types of colonial knowledge transfers, of which the ICI valued *intercolonial transfers* above all. It was by means of these intercolonial transfers that the "new territories" in colonial Africa were supposed to learn from time-honored colonies in the Dutch and British Indies, since these last had already proven their "rationality". Other experts preferred *intertropical transfers*, transfers which took place between regions of the same climate, spanning the globe from South America to Africa and the East Indies. A third group promoted *translocal transfers* between colonies situated in the same region, such as the French Congo, the Belgian Congo and German Cameroons in Central Africa.[4] Finally, colonial agriculturists and engineers also engaged in *intra-professional* transfers, with experts of the same profession or specialization meeting at international congresses to discuss rubber planting, cotton production or the construction of irrigation systems as a pre-condition of colonial agriculture.

Unlike Andrew Zimmerman, who has argued that West African colonial agriculture was influenced by *intertropical* transfers from formerly slave-run American plantation systems,

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[2] See for the idea of "improvement" by science: R.H. Drayton, *Nature's Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the 'Improvement' of the World* (New Haven 2000).
[3] The best accounts of colonial technologies so far are: Headrick, *The Tools of Empire*; D. van Laak, *Imperiale Infrastruktur: Deutsche Planungen für eine Erschliessung Afrikas 1880 bis 1960* (Paderborn, 2004); and the "classical" literature on railway imperialism. For an overview see C.B. Davis, K.E. Wilburn, and R. Robinson, *Railway Imperialism* (New York 1991).
[4] See for example: ANOM FM MIS 70, Mission Heim à Bruxelles: Rapport au Ministre des Colonies from 19 June 1897.

while East African colonies adapted the more "liberal" agronomic models from the East Indies, I show that around 1900, all colonial governments in Africa turned to the East Indies in general and Dutch Java in particular to emulate successful agronomic cultivation.[5] They preferred *intercolonial* transfers and it was precisely the agronomic laboratory in Buitenzorg and its role in promoting technologies of colonial development that accounts for this shift. Viewed in this perspective, the *intercolonial transfers* that took place between the East Indies and the new colonies in Africa by 1900 and that became more important than the transfers from traditional plantation societies in the Americas (*intertropical transfers*) or the use of local or native knowledge (*translocal transfers*) can be fully explained. The rejection of American plantation systems as models and the emulation of Javanese "scientific" cultivation in the new colonies in Africa around 1900 was no coincidence. Modern colonizers felt a need to distance themselves from the American slave plantations (like in Brazil, where slavery was not abolished until 1888) and tried to imitate the more productive cultivation systems developed in the East Indies. While dismissing plantation systems that were based on slavery-like working conditions, they introduced more subtle forms of compulsory labor from the East Indies.

The first part of this chapter reveals the political role played by the allegedly apolitical "specialists", "colonial techniques" and "laboratories" that were responsible for the transfers. They were not apolitical technocrats but contributed to sustaining colonial domination. The second part of the chapter illustrates the four different transfer types with examples, and then focuses on the *intercolonial transfers* by highlighting the role played by Buitenenzorg as a laboratory for colonial agronomy. Finally, the ICI's attempt to improve colonial agronomy by finding a best practice of colonial irrigation will reveal the political implications of a supposedly apolitical colonial technology. I show how ICI members used the establishment of irrigation techniques for colonial agriculture to justify authoritarian undemocratic rule, along with dispossession and the reintroduction of forced labor.

Myths of the Unpolitical: Specialists, "Technik", and the Colonial Laboratory

The need to bring specialists – and with them specialized knowledge – to the colonies was an ideal shared by the colonizing powers. "We need specialists", Joseph Chailley appealed to the readers of the *Quinzaine Coloniale*, "specialists in the cultivation of tea, coffee and so on… the theoretically trained agronomic engineer should visit the colonies that cultivate these specialties and learn how to produce them. When he returns, he should complement his diploma in colonial

[5] Zimmerman, 'Ruling Africa. Science as Sovereignty.'

agronomy with the addendum tobacco, tea, coffee, etc."[6] According to Chailley, specialization was at the heart of colonial professionalization.

At the turn of the century, many professional specialists came into the colonial services sideways, without passing any colonial exams. Botanists, agronomists, engineers, as well as physicians and lawyers, took up colonial employment simply by furnishing proof of their professional expertise. They were trained in the fields of botany, agronomy or engineering, without being specifically colonial. Van der Lith, the Dutch co-founder of the ICI, valued these experienced specialists over the administrators who had been recruited by the official colonial *concours*.[7] In his view, their technical skills and expertise were universally applicable, with no regard needing to be paid to colonial settings or national origins: that is to say, their identity was professional rather than national.

Many reformers of colonial administrations in the 1890s viewed nationalism as an obstacle to true expertise. Consequently, colonial authorities held specialists with transnational careers in high esteem, and international work experience was an additional qualification to enter colonial service. Hans Zache, for example, a former *Bezirksamtmann* in German East Africa, who had travelled throughout British India and taught at the Colonial Institute in Hamburg, even called for official grants to dispatch trainees to foreign colonies, where they would be able to learn their craft.[8] The directors of the Colonial Institute in Marseille envisaged an international organization that would grant colonial scholarships to European children and students in order for them to visit the colonies and fan their "colonial energy".[9] And Chailley published a series of articles entitled "Faites des specialistes!" in the *Quinzaine Coloniale*, in which he advised future colonial experts to become apprentices to specialists in alien colonies or other countries. Agronomists, in particular, should, in his view, specialize in the cultivation of one crop only and be trained in regions where these were successfully grown: "To grow rice, they should go to Italy, Burma, Siam or California; for sugar to Cuba, Louisiana, Brazil and Java; to grow tobacco to Cuba and Borneo, etc. etc."[10] The same applied to merchants or administrators, Chailley wanted these to familiarize themselves with the laws, customs and languages of the natives. Physicians, in particular, were encouraged to travel to several colonies in order to study tropical medicine. Chailley was convinced that true expertise required a transnational career, and he promoted a scientific concept of the neutral specialist – one whose expertise would eliminate his national identity.

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[6] *Quinzaine Coloniale*, 10.6.1910, 408.
[7] ICI*, Compte Rendu 1895*, 411.
[8] Zache, *Die Ausbildung der Kolonialbeamten*,13 and 22.
[9] Heckel and Cyprien, *L'enseignement colonial*, 55.
[10] Ibid., 136-137.

Transnational careers were not a mere fantasy of colonial reformers. Dutch experts in colonial botany were trained in Germany, as the Dutch did not operate specialized schools in the discipline. Over fifty German agronomists, for their part, used the eight-month "Buitenzorg scholarship" offered by the government in Berlin to study agronomy in the famous laboratories.[11] In addition, in France, the Youth League for the Colonies sent young volunteers to Java to study *landbouw* (agricultural) methods.[12] Moreover, French forestry experts organized the British forest service in India, while French medical experts visited the School for Tropical Medicine in Liverpool and Dutch students studied at the *Institut für Schiffs-und Tropenkrankheiten* in Hamburg. The famous French *Institut Pasteur* in Brazzaville hosted researchers from the Belgian Congo and elsewhere. German irrigation engineers worked for the British government in South Africa, while Italians worked for the Belgian Congo and in French Tunisia. Dutch experts from Java organized the irrigation system of Siam, while French specialists studied the irrigation policy in Spain in order to apply similar hydraulic policies in Algeria.[13] In many cases, then, transnational careers of technical advisors were the rule rather than the exception.

Many of these "colonial technicians" with transnational backgrounds were affiliated by the ICI and they were emblematic of the ICI's understanding of itself as an "apolitical" and scientific institution. International colonial technicians were viewed as living proof that colonialism was not a narrow-minded ideology, but a method to make human progress. That is, according to colonial reformists, the abstract idea of progress was given form in the "colonial techniques" which they evoked so frequently in the colonial discourses of the 1890s. While Chailley suggested a "colonial method" as a basis for "the art to colonize", the Germans evoked the concept of colonial *Technik*, which again influenced the English notion of technology.[14] The Dutch reformist van Deventer called for more "techniciens de l'art de coloniser" and identified the internationalist Chailley as the most eminent technician of colonization.[15] The German Colonial Society set up a "kolonialtechnische Kommission" as a support for the *Kolonialwirtschaftliches Kommitee*, which was founded in 1896 to help develop the colonies with the most adequate "techniques" of colonization.[16] By the same token, the French reformers

[11] BArch, R 1001/8604.
[12] ANOM 100APOM 93, Dossier "Union Coloniale, Chailley-Bert, Voyage aux Indes Néerlandaises, Mai-Juillet 1897," Plan de Voyage, Documentation rapportée, *Nieuwe Rotterdaamsche Courant* from 27.8.1897 "Chailley-Bert over Java"; BArch, R 1001/8604, Nr. 47-48: Kolonialabteilung an Staatssekretär des Inneren und des Reichsschatzamtes/Minister des Geistlichen, Unterrichts und Medizinalangelegenheiten from 2.7.1898.
[13] All of them will appear in the course of this chapter.
[14] See also 'Aus Indiens Kolonial-Technik. Sieben Briefe an einen alten Afrikaner von Dr. Georg Roeder', *Tropenpflanzer* 13, 9 (1909), 405–428.
[15] This is how Chailley-Bert is called all over Europe: Deventer, 'Drie boeken over Indië': 147.
[16] See for example Technische Kommission d. Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches Komitee (ed.), *Kolonialtechnische Fragen: Technische Kommission des Kolonial-Wirtschaftlichen Komitees, wirtschaftlicher Ausschuss des Deutschen*

promoted the "diffusion of technologies" with the help of "technicians, well-chosen workers, corporals of engineering [*génie*]… mechanics of the marine, practical engineers and specialized doctors – and not *poly*technicians. All of them are to be preferred to the best graduates from the Écoles Normales and our faculties".[17] Specialization and colonial techniques were, on this view, mutually interdependent and intrinsically linked to each other.

What did technical colonialism mean to the ICI members? The terms "technology" and "technique" cover a vast semantic field. *Technology* was certainly in these circumstances understood as an "applied science"; it therefore represented the application of *techniques* for economic or political purposes, along with the notions of innovation, progress and modernity. Arguing along these lines, the aim of the *Kolonialwirtschafltiches Komitee* became that of introducing "modern technology to the colonies".[18] *Technique*, instead, was a *method* and an *art* – evoked by experts who advocated continuous specialization in a certain craft. It could be used synonymously with the German word *Technik*, which signified the most rational way of organizing a production process. When Max Weber – a fierce defender of German colonial expansion – defined the term *Technik* in the 1890s, he warned against equating it with economic rationality. Contrary to economic profit seeking, Weber argued, *Technik* described the optimization of a method with no regard for the economic value of its final product. *Technik* was therefore simply a means, and technicians did not have any individual profit or political ends in mind when they tried to improve their methods.[19] *Technique* as a perfecting of method and *technology* as an *applied technique* were thus used to portray colonialism as a professional project – and not as a political ideology.

In the field of colonization, autonomous professionals capitalized on their technocratic expertise by offering it to colonial governments. The *Service des Missions* in the French Colonial Ministry, for example, received innumerable funding requests from scholars and engineers who intended to travel to French or foreign colonies. When Christophe Hugot, a chemist at the Colonial Institute of Bordeaux, wanted to study the coagulation of caoutchouc in French West Africa and needed 6,000 Francs for his journey, he wrote to the Colonial Ministry claiming that he had both "scientific and practical purposes" and that he sought to improve "colonial products".[20] In another case, a pharmacist of the Paris Faculty of Medicine received a free mission from the French Colonial Ministry to study "vegetal products" developed in

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Kolonialgesellschaft Berlin (Berlin, 1913) and *Verhandlungen der Kolonialtechnischen Kommission des Kolonialwirtschaftlichen Komitees* (1912-1914).

[17] Harmand, *Domination et Colonisation*, 268-269.

[18] Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee (ed.), *Unsere Kolonialwirtschaft* (Berlin, 1914), Preface.

[19] M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie* (Tübingen, 1980 [1921-22]), 31f.

[20] ANOM FM MIS 70, Mission Ch. Hugot, Letter Institut Colonial de Bordeaux to Colonial Ministry from 19.11.1905 and Letter Ch. Hugot to Ministry of Colonies from [no date].

Belgian Congo for the medication of tropical diseases by claiming that his "technical knowledge [*connaissances techniques*] deriving from of scholarly and useful research … guarantee positive results for our Congolese possessions."[21] A British geologist called Sims Handock, who was an expert in prospecting and exploring ore bodies – and had worked for British and German mining firms, also offered his "technical expertise" to the French Colonial Ministry. He promised to explore new "resources" in the French colonies and to contribute to the economic development of these.[22] So fabulous was the reputation of these technical experts that they even received indemnities from the Colonial Ministry for missions they would never undertake.[23] All of the solicitants emphasized their technical expertise, which combined scientific knowledge and its application for practical – and colonial – purposes. As these examples show, these experts portrayed themselves as technicians rather than as scientists, because technical knowledge was more likely to pay off and therefore arouse interest among colonial administrations.

Colonial administrations, for their part, benefitted from collaboration with engineers, prospectors, agronomists and pharmacists in order to portray colonial domination as technocratic rule. By the 1890s, however, the administrations' promises of colonial fertility and prosperity remained largely unfulfilled. Colonial topics had, moreover, ceased to mesmerize the Europeans by this time, and national parliaments refused to increase colonial budgets. It was at exactly this moment that national and colonial ideologies departed: colonial experts felt constrained to legitimize colonial expansion to their compatriots more than ever. Determined to rationalize an inherently irrational project, colonial experts promoted colonial techniques as a corrective for the benefits that had to date failed to materialize. In other words, they began to forward the strong claim that enhanced colonial techniques and their application would make the colonies profitable in the future and that they would therefore benefit humanity. Portraying colonial rule as a technocratic venture was thus a new promise of future return. By appropriating the alleged political innocence of "pure" technological progress they tried to de-politicize colonialism.[24] This reformist ideology would, they hoped, hide the fact that the colonies had made very little economic progress since their conquest in the 1880s. Finding a "method" or *Technik* of colonization became in this way the main aim of transnational cooperation among colonial experts, since all the European colonies were at that time feeling the effects of a

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[21] ANOM FM MIS 70, Carton 70 Folder Mission Heim, Rapport au Ministre des Colonies from 19.6.1897.
[22] ANOM FM MIS 70, Carton 70, Folder Sims Handock.
[23] ANOM FM MIS 70, Carton 70 Folder Mission Henrique aux Colonies Etrangères: Rapport au Sécrétaire d'État from 4.1.1894.
[24] See for example the idea of social engineering in L. Raphael, 'Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22, 2 (1996), 165–193.

moment of great disillusion on the part of their national promoters. As a result, it should be clarified that, on the ground, colonial *Technik* always served political purposes.

For the colonial administrations, the place where the purity of scientific techniques could be developed was the laboratory. The ICI was such a laboratory, if a virtual one. Its members tested different strategies of colonial management with the help of comparative methods and transfer techniques. The amalgamation of knowledge resulted in new, improved strategies and techniques of colonial management, and these were publicized in the Institute's reports. The reports circulated among the experts on the ground, who often applied them to the "real" colonial situation. For example, when the French established an experimental botanical garden for colonial agronomy in Nogent – modeled on earlier examples in Berlin, Brussels and Kew – they received expert support from the ICI.[25] One of the persons in charge exclaimed that such international "missions", like the foundation of agronomist research gardens and the recruitment of labor force necessary to grow cash crops, "seems to come naturally to the International Colonial Institute – everything seems to concur to participate in it". [26]

The work of Bruno Latour has given us a clear understanding of the sense and ideology lying behind the laboratory at that time. He challenges the notion that laboratories were staffed with technical specialists, were shielded from the corrupted outside world, and were therefore isolated from any contaminating "political" effects. Latour identified the microbiological laboratories of the Pasteur Institutes as such places and described their sterility and cleanliness as contrasting with the "dirty, smelling, noisy, disorganized…farm of the nineteenth century", whose plant and animal breeding the microbiological institute intended to improve. By reducing the complexity of the outside world to a purely technical operation inside the laboratory, Pasteur claimed to do "pure" scientific research, supposedly free of political intentions. Latour then underlines the extent to which Pasteur profited in reality from selling his microbiological method as a progressive technology, and the extent to which this kind of method was embedded in the political interests of the time.[27]

This shows us that the laboratory was in reality a political place, as were the Pasteur Institutes set up in the French colonies from the 1890s onwards. The first of these was founded in Saigon (1891), and this was followed by laboratory in Indochina (1895), Sénégal (1896),

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[25] ANOM, FM, AFFPOL MIS 23, Dossier: Jardin d'Essai et Culture Coloniale, Mission de Michon-Poutignon à la Côte Occidentale d'Afrique, Letter from Chailley-Bert to Colonial Minister from 7.1.1899.

[26] A. Milhe-Poutingon, *Jardins botaniques et Jardins d'essai: La main d'ouevre africaine. Communication faite au Congrès International Colonial de Bruxelles 1897* (Paris, 1898), 16, in: ANOM, FM, AFFPOL MIS 23, Dossier: Jardin d'Essai et Culture Coloniale, Mission de Michon-Poutignon à la Côte Occidentale d'Afrique.

[27] See Bruno Latour's compelling description of the *modus operandi* of the Pasteur institutes, played an important role for the colonies: B. Latour, 'Give me a laboratory and I will raise the world', in K. Knorr Cetina and M. Mulkay (eds), *Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science* (Bristol 1983), 141–170.

Madagascar (1898), Congo-Brazzaville (1908), Martinique (1910) and Cambodia (1912). Generally preoccupied with combating tropical diseases through microbiological research, they actually stood for the "applied research" that enabled and facilitated colonial exploitation; for example, by enhancing the productivity of sugar cane grown in French Guadeloupe.[28] The ICI and the agricultural experimental station of Buitenzorg in Dutch Java were also just such laboratories, both of them developing colonial techniques of exploitation and suitable technologies to make colonies more productive.

Chailley declared in his work that "no colonial agriculture is possible without the combination of science and experience."[29] As we will see, Buitenzorg combined scientific research with trial fields all over the Dutch Indies, while the ICI combined the reformist ideas with the experience of former administrators. Chailley, however, did not mention that all of them actually had a political purpose: to make the colonies profitable for the colonizing motherland, thereby legitimizing colonial expansion.

A Global Laboratory of Colonial Agronomy: Knowledge Transfers and the Reinvention of the Colonial Economy

Colonial technicians were part of a global epistemic community and were responsible for the four types of colonial transfers described above: *transtropical transfers*, *intraprofessional transfers*, *translocal transfers* and *intercolonial transfers*. Without any doubt, these transfers are ideal-types that overlapped and intersected in the colonial situation. However, they can also be classified according to a chronological and a hierarchical order. While in the earlier days of new colonialism, *transtropical* imports from the West Indies played an important role, by 1900 the *intercolonial transfers* between the East Indies and the "new territories" in Africa gained influence and became the most widely appreciated "method" of colonization among colonial specialists. As colonial agronomy was the most important colonial *technology* in the 1890s, examples taken from this field can usefully illustrate the different transfer patterns.[30]

The first type of transfer is the *transtropical transfer. Transtropical transfers* originated in the biogeographical notion that regions with a similar climate required similar institutions,

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[28] Pasteur Institutes and Colonial authorities cooperated closely in this regard, see: ANOM FM AFFPOL MIS 76, Carton 76, Folder Mission Pairault, Letter from Gouverneur of Guadeloupe to French Colonial Minister from 25 March 1899; See also Mission Ozoux 1911, Ministère des Colonies, 4ème Section to Gouverneur de la Réunion, "Mission gratuite de M. le docteur Ozoux."

[29] "qu'il n'y a pas d'agriculture possible en dehors de la science et de l'expérience combinées", cited in Deventer, 'Drie boeken over Indië', 153.

[30] See for an overview C. Ross, 'The plantation paradigm: colonial agronomy, African Farmers, and the Global Cocoa Boom, 1870s-1940s', *Journal of Global History* 9, 1 (2014), 49–71; Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress*; Kirchberger, 'German scientists'.

policies and exploitation techniques. While this was especially true for the transfer of tropical plants or irrigation techniques, it was also believed to be for colonial labor policies. *Transtropical transfers* did not necessarily take place between colonies, but between the "warm countries" in general. As a result, most of the European colonies in Africa imported knowledge and techniques from Latin America and the "Deep South" of North America. While only a few American countries were still official colonies, their social-economic structure was climatically determined and was therefore said to resemble the new colonies in Africa. Therefore, its vast plantation complexes seemed to be transferable to the African colonies.

Colonial authorities from Europe sent dozens of expeditions to South America. Between 1896 and 1914, the French colonial ministry alone dispatched thirteen commissions to Latin America. One of the most favored destinations was the rubber producing Pará region in the renowned plantation districts of northern Brazil. Famed for producing the best quality rubber, the Pará region witnessed frequent visits from European caoutchouc commissions, which intended to establish caoutchouc plantations in the new African colonies. All the colonizing countries wanted to profit from the rubber boom at the onset of the century, which had led to steadily increasing prices that reached their highest peak in 1903. In 1898 and 1901, the French colonial ministry sent Eugène Poisson to Pará, who returned with 100,000 seeds of the profitable *Hevea Brasiliensis* rubber trees and 350,000 grains of the less qualitative, but easily conservable *Manihot Glazivolii*.[31] These samples provided the basis for rubber plantations in the French colonies in Africa and Indochina, where they triumphed over the less profitable autochthonous varieties.[32] Participating in the harvest of *Hevea* plants in Brazil, Eugène Poisson had also observed the processing of the rubber. Brazilian "Indians", he reported, taught him how to tap the bark of the rubber trees. Using a specific technique they were able to collect the milky latex that trickled from the incisions without creating any wastage. Finally, Poisson learned how to make the best quality rubber by mixing the latex from black and white *Hevea* species. When returning to France, he even imported the tools they used to cut the trees (*machetes*) and the calebasses to collect the liquid rubber.[33] His mission proved so successful that the colonial ministry continued to send rubber missions to Brazil, funded by the tire manufacturer Michelin in Clermont-Ferrand, whose agents ultimately established vast *Hevea*

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[31] ANOM FM AFFPOL MIS 76bis, Mission gratuite d'études des arbres à caoutchouc au Brésil et à la Trinité d'Eugène Poisson (1898/1901).
[32] He also sent 1000 seedlings of West Indian vanilla, 1000 nutmeg trees, 200 sugar cane plants, 300 pepper trees, 30 000 cocoa tree grains and 100 000 other plant grains: E. Poisson, *Rapport sur une mission scientifique au Brésil aux Antilles et au Costa-Rica* (Paris 1902), 14; A. Chevalier, 'La situation des plantations d'Hévéa dans le monde de 1939 à 1948', *Revue internationale de botanique appliquée et d'agriculture tropicale* 28 (1948), 297–316: 309-310.
[33] Poisson, *Rapport sur une mission.*

plantations in French Indochina. These missions also imported to French colonies coffee seeds and other tropical crops grown on South American plantations.[34]

Poisson made his Brazilian *Hevea* seeds available to French botanical gardens and the French colonies. In addition, the Boma agricultural research station in the Congo Free State also received seeds from the Poisson mission.[35] Having similar intentions, the Belgian King Léopold had already imported *Hevea Brasiliensis* plants himself, as well as several Brazilian workers. He wanted them to develop an intensive caoutchouc production on professionally organized plantations in the Congo Free State. Professional rubber plantations would substitute the extensive gatherer economy, which had earned the king a fortune in the 1890s but had exhausted the wild rubber trees.[36] At the same time, Léopold's attempt to make use of Brazilian expertise inspired French administrators to imitate the successful management of the labor force on Brazilian plantations. When in April 1901, Algerian day laborers killed several French colonists in a revolt in Margueritte, the French-Algerian planter and mayor of the town, Auguste d'Humières suggested to the French Colonial Ministry that he could travel to Brazil in order to study the recruitment and treatment of labor force on Brazilian plantations. To avoid rebellions in the future, he was particularly interested in the outcome of Brazilian planters replacing freed slaves with indentured laborers from Japan. D'Humières considered both recruiting Afro-Brazilians who had been "freed" after Brazil's official abolition of slavery in 1889 and indentured laborers from Asia who had gathered agricultural experience in Brazil.[37]

The German *transtropical transfers* from South America were even more important In 1899, the head of the Victoria botanical gardens in German Cameroon, Paul Preuss, organized an expedition to Central and South America. This undertaking was jointly funded by ten German plantation companies, several chocolate factories, the *Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee*, and the German Foreign Ministry. The aim of the trip was to analyze and imitate the planting techniques for cocoa, coffee, caoutchouc and vanilla in order to launch a profitable

[34] ANOM FM AFFPOL MIS 64bis Mission d'études des arbres à caoutchouc en Amérique du Sud par Émile Bonnechaux et Ernest Plane, représentants de la maison Michelin de Clermont-Ferrand: recommandations aux autorités consulaires (1899/1900); ANOM 50COL66 Mission d'études au Mexique sur la culture de plantes tropicales susceptibles de s'acclimater dans les colonies françaises pour le compte du ministère de l'Instruction publique et du ministère des Colonies par Léon Diguet (1902/1903); ANOM 50COL63bis Mission gratuite sur les procédés de culture et de préparation commerciale du café au Brésil par Louis Casabona, publiciste, secrétaire général du Syndicat de défense du café et des produits coloniaux (1909/1915).

[35] R. de Padirac, 'L'importance Économique et l'Avenir du Caoutchouc Naturel', in P. Compagnon (ed.), *Le Caoutchouc Naturel* (Paris, 1986), XVII.

[36] Imports of Knowledge from the Para region in Brazil about the Hevea Brasiliensis plant were wide-spread, see C. Mathieu, *Para Rubber Cultivation: Hevea Brasiliensis* (Paris, 1909).

[37] ANOM FM AFFPOL MIS 70, Carton 70 Folder *Voyage d'études de la main d'œuvre agricole au Brésil par Auguste d'Humières, ancien officier d'infanterie, ancien maire du Rivet (1906)*: Memorandum to Minister of Colonies from 4 September 1906 concerning "La main d'ouevre agricole. Voyage d'Études au Brésil pour étudier cette question économique si importante."

plantation economy in German Africa.[38] Throughout the expedition, Preuss sent back thousands of seeds and seedlings to experimental stations and plantations in the German colonies, as well as to the botanical laboratories in Berlin itself. A steamer belonging to the German Woermann-Linie even had to alter its course to take the delivery of the seeds and seedlings on board. Samples included sweet Central American criollo cocoa, coffee plants, *Hevea* rubber trees, watermelon seeds, beans, cotton, maize, nutmeg and many more *Nutzpflanzen* ("useful plants") that served to establish cash crop plantations in German Africa. The *Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee* received more than 800 different plant seeds. 170 plants arrived at the agronomic station in Victoria (Cameroon) and sixty-four in experimental stations in Togo. Private companies, such as the Moliwe plantation and the Zenker plantation in Cameroon, received thirty-four plants each. The botanist and ICI-member Franz Stuhlmann obtained almost 120 for acclimatization in East Africa. In addition, the *Deutsch-Ostafrikanisch Handels- und Plantagengesellschaft*, the Hoffmann Plantation and the Derema Plantation in East Africa were provided with Arabica coffee, mahogany, shade trees, maize, sesame, melons, peanuts, various beans and sorghum. Even more seeds arrived in German Africa, after they had been classified and tested in the botanical gardens in Berlin.[39]

As well as collecting seeds, Preuss also studied the South American *Eingeborenenkulturen* (native techniques of cultivation) in detail. As the formerly famous sugar cane plantations in Central and South America were in decline – because the high demands placed on the work force could not be satisfied in a post-slavery society – Preuss focused on the less labor-intensive cocoa plantations: in his view, they should serve as a model for Cameroon's future cash-crop economy. As European consumers called for increasingly sweeter cocoa products, his aim was to improve the quality of the cocoa grown in Cameroon. Preuss wanted to reduce the sour and bitter taste, which was – according to standards of the time – a sign of the cocoa bean's low quality.[40] In Dutch Surinam, he learned that the bitter and sour taste was due to an insufficient period of fermentation. He therefore instructed Cameroon planters to increase the fermentation period from two to eight days in order to guarantee a more gentle fermentation.[41] Moreover, the Cameroon planters made use of Preuss' detailed descriptions of the processing, drying and roasting of cocoa and coffee beans, and they began to model their drying houses on the South American example.[42] To support their efforts, Preuss

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[38] BArch 1001, 7841 Plantagen und Eingeborenen-Kulturen in Mittel- und Südamerika. Reise des Leiters des Botanischen Gartens in Kamerun Dr. Preuss; See also: G. Karsten, 'Paul Preuß' Expedition nach Zentral- und Südamerika 1899/1900', *Geographische Zeitschrift* 8, 4 (1902), 222–227.
[39] P. Preuss, *Expedition nach Central- und Südamerika 1899/1900* (Berlin, 1901), 424f.
[40] Ibid.167.
[41] Ibid.,176.
[42] R. Schlechter, *Westafrikanische Kautschuk-Expedition* (Berlin, 1900), 31.

sent a variety of Venezuela-Criollo – the sweetest cacao bean available – to Victoria for reproduction and thus laid the foundations for intensive cocoa planting in German Cameroon.[43]

In addition, Preuss introduced an important method of cross planting to Cameroon. He supplied the planters in the colony with seeds from the shady *Erythrina glauca* trees, used to protect the cocoa plantations in Surinam against the sun and wind. These trees were vital to a successful cocoa plantation, because continued exposure to the sun frequently destroyed the saplings. The *Erythrina glauca* shady trees were better known under the name "cocoa mum" and had the advantage of providing shade and protection for the saplings – without taking the nutrients away from the cacao if planted on the same territory.[44]

Going beyond the mere import of grains and plants, Preuss also studied the handling of labor questions. He recommended planters in Cameroon to adopt the American practice of paying plantation workers a fixed piece rate instead of remunerating them per work hour. In Dutch Surinam, which had inspired Preuss the most, imported coolies from Asia (and Java in particular) were paid according to the weight of the harvested crop. Adjusting the salary to output rather than time spent on the plantations, Preuss argued, increased the efficiency, especially among the generally lazy "negroes" in German Cameroon.[45] However, Preuss did not manage to import laborers from South America. Instead, the agronomic research station in Victoria imported workers from Spanish Fernando Po that had long modeled its plantations on the South American system and was experienced in professional plantation management.[46] The trade in plants and seeds illustrates the *transtropical* transfers very clearly, but it was the transfer of methods and plantation techniques that boosted the colonial cash crop production to an even greater extent.

The *intra-professional transfer* represented a second type of transfer. Like *transtropical transfers*, these were not necessarily "colonial", but provided the basis for the spread of knowledge among specialists who worked in the colonies. Most of these *intra-professional transfers* were stimulated by international congresses or through exchange via professional journals. The most important congresses held at the turn of the century dealt with rubber and cotton production or agricultural engineering.[47] International rubber congresses such as the London congress in 1900, made Europeans aware of the latest market trends and induced them

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[43] *Preuss, Expedition nach Central- und Südamerika,* 277.
[44] Ibid.*,* 169.
[45] Ibid.,172; 277.
[46] P. Preuss, 'Die Rentabilitätsaussichten der Kameruner Kulturen'*, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1905* (Berlin, 1905), 574; However, he also imported workers from Sierra Leone where indigenous entrepreneurs had esablished an agricultural system that differed widely from the South American plantation system. Chailley celebrated Sierra Léone to be exceptional because it had a indigenous upper class.
[47] See for example the international congress on navigation and the French participation: ANOM 50COL64bis Congrès internationaux de navigation de Philadelphie et de Bruxelles.

to invest in rubber trees, since these made the highest prices on the world market. At the London rubber congress, caoutchouc experts from all over the world agreed that the *Hevea* rubber trees originating in the Brazilian Para region were the most effective trees, and that these would dominate future rubber production. As a result, French, British, German and Belgian experts introduced them to their colonies.[48] Representatives of these countries also created an international association that agreed on a standardization of physical and chemical methods to evaluate the quality of the rubber.[49]

Moritz Schanz, an ICI member who was employed by the German *Kolonialwirtschafltiches Komitee,* was one of the driving forces behind *intraprofessional transfers.* An expert in cotton production, he had studied cotton fabrication in the USA, Egypt and Russia. He presented his results at international congresses on cotton fabrication in 1908 and 1913, and he played an important role in launching cotton production in the European colonies in Africa.[50] He was particularly interested in the irrigation systems that were necessary to enable the growth of cotton plants.[51] In accordance with the former chief engineer of the Dutch Indies and ICI member, Van Sandick, he declared the centralized management of irrigation systems in North America as exemplary for the European colonies. Van Sandick published an extensive report on irrigation systems and water rights in the American West, which he studied while participating in the 1904 International Congress of Engineers in Saint Louis.[52] Inspired by Schanz and Van Sandick, the ICI engaged in improving the irrigation in the colonies. It published four volumes, in which the irrigation systems all over the world were compared to understand the best way of implementing hydraulic engineering in the colonies. Its members collaborated closely with international institutes, such as the International Agricultural Institute, which had been established in 1905 in Rome to increase global exchange on agricultural techniques.[53] Such *intraprofessional* transfers backed the attempts of colonial authorities to learn from experience made in colonial or non-colonial spaces.

The third type of transfer can be called *translocal transfers* and the term describes the exchange that took place between adjacent colonies. Although seemingly natural, *translocal*

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[48] 'Die Bedeutung der Londoner Kautschukausstellung für die Kautschukproduktion in den deutschen Kolonien', *Der Tropenpflanzer* 13, 4 (1909), 188.
[49] F. Fritz, 'Internationale Vereinigung zur Festlegung der physikalischen und chemischen Untersuchungsmethoden für Kautschuk', *Tropenpflanzer* 13, 1 (1909), 37f.
[50] Moritz Schanz played an important role in importing cotton wool production to the German colonies, see: Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa*, 195; M. Schanz, *Die Baumwolle in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, vorbereitet für den Internationalen Baumwollkongress Paris* (Berlin, 1908); M. Schanz, *Cotton in Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Submitted to the 9th International Cotton Congress Scheveningen* (Manchester, 1913); M. Schanz, 'Die Baumwolle in Russisch-Asien', *Beihefte zum Tropenpflanzer* 1 (1914); for the French missions to study the cotton question: ANOM 50COL68 Mission d'études sur la culture du coton aux États-Unis par V. Fichard, ingénieur agronome (1913/1914).
[51] M. Schanz, 'Erhaltung der Naturschätze und Wasserfragen in Nordamerika', *Tropenpflanzer* 13, 1 (1909), 24f.
[52] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1905, 61f.
[53] F. Stuhlmann, *Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte von Ostafrika* (Berlin, 1909), X.

transfers were not automatic – even among colonies belonging to the same nation. French colonial theorists, for example, complained about the lack of exchange between Algeria, Tunisia and French West Africa. Although these colonies shared a common border, Algeria was governed by the Interior Ministry, the protectorate Tunisia by the Foreign Ministry, and the colonial confederation of French West Africa by the Colonial Ministry. Communications on colonial matters seem to have been difficult between the different *départements*.[54]

It was the German administrators, however, who were most active in sending agricultural missions to neighboring countries. For example, the Cameroon-based botanist Rudolf Schlechter, tried, for example, to establish professional caoutchouc plantations in German Africa. Like Léopold in the Congo, he wanted to replace the indigenous *Raubbau* (depletion), which he held responsible for the extinction of wild rubber trees on the African continent. Dispatched by the *Kolonialwirtschftliches Komitee* in 1898*,* Schlechter studied rubber production in British Nigeria, the Belgian Congo and French Congo. His first voyage led him to the Yoruba region of British Nigeria, where he collected seeds of the *Kickxia* caoutchouc – completely disregarding the prohibitions stipulated by the British administration.[55] Although the British administrators were not very keen on helping Schlechter to analyze caoutchouc trees in the Yoruba region, he did manage to draw some useful information out of the native population.[56] He also received support from some British railway engineers, who regarded him as a like-minded "specialist" in colonial botany.[57] *Kickxia* was a variety of caoutchouc that was native to West Africa, but had not so far been professionally exploited. Schlechter assumed that the endemic *Kickxia* rubber trees would not have to acclimatize in Africa and recommended them for cultivation on Cameroon's plantations.

Schlechter found a warmer welcome among the Belgians in the Congo, because the governor of German Cameroon, von Puttkamer, who had travelled frequently to the Congo Free State, had equipped him with a letter of recommendation to use there.[58] Schlechter was amazed by the large amount of caoutchouc collected by the *Société Anonyme Belge*, a semi-official company under the auspices of Léopold's officers that was responsible for the cruel exploitation

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[54] One famous attempt to standardize colonial legislation in French Subsaharan colonies: ANOM, Ministère des Colonies, Affpol, Mission d'études pour l'élaboration d'un projet de loi organique des colonies par Charles Joseph Vernier de Byans, officier d'administration de l'intendance militaire des Troupes coloniales, en 1911-1912; One example for a French translocal analysis of railway construction in colonies in Subsahran Africa: ANOM 50COL78 Mission d'études des chemins de fer dans les colonies africaines anglaises, portugaises, allemandes et belge d'Eugène Salesses, directeur du chemin de fer de la Guinée française à l'initiative du gouverneur général de l'Afrique occidentale française (1904/1906).

[55] Schlechter, *Westafrikanische Kautschuk-Expedition*, 20f.

[56] Ibid., 18f.

[57] Ibid., 22.

[58] Puttkammer himself had, before becoming governor of Cameroon, travelled the Belgian Congo several times and studied the railway and the agronomic experiments there.

of the Congolese rubber collectors. To Schlechter's regret, he never really travelled to the source of the wealthy rubber grounds, as Belgian officials prevented him from entering the zones in which the natives were forced to collect the wild rubber.[59] Instead, Belgian officials took him to recently established caoutchouc plantations, where they were experimenting with endemic *Landolphia* rubber trees. However, the rubber plantations were still too young to produce latex and therefore to enable Schlechter to predict their output, let alone their productivity. Using his experience with wild rubber trees, he dismissed the *Landolphia* species (which grew especially well in the Belgian Congo), and instead recommended using the *Kickxia* variety he had found in British Nigeria for use in nearby Cameroon.[60] German agronomists learned how to tab the *Kickxia* without damaging its bark from the Fanti population in British Nigeria and were astonished that one tree could deliver 2000 grams of rubber, an exceptionally high amount for West Africa.[61]

Schlechter's attempts to grow *Kickxia* in German Cameroon resulted in 2074 hectares of *Kickxia* plantations in German Cameroon by 1907, while the more productive Brazilian *Hevea* covered only twelve hectares by that date. The reason for the German planters' refusal to plant the more profitable *Hevea* was their belief that the endemic *Kickxia* would have the capacity to resist the local environment and diseases, while the Brazilian *Hevea* trees would instead succumb to the foreign climate in Cameroon.[62] Thus, while the Germans learned from natives in British Nigeria how to tap the wild *Kickxia* trees, they had problems in cultivating them systematically on state-sponsored experimental plantations: the yield was disappointing. In order to overcome this complication, Paul Preuss visited the *Foutir* in Nigeria, who were said to have discovered and exploited wild *Kickxia* rubber trees and whom he therefore believed would be able to help him. He did indeed learn from them that there were different *Kickxia* varieties, with only one of them being productive. *Foutir* experts also taught him to mix the productive *Kickxia* with the *Landolphia* in order to receive a better result.[63] Despite this advice, however, the results were also unsatisfying.

Following all these attempts to cultivate local varieties, the belief that endemic species were more productive and resistant gave way to the conviction that species imported from outside might be more profitable – if tested on successful plantations such as those in the Brazilian Pará region. Thus, it was believed, *Kickxia* would soon be outshone by the

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[59] Ibid., 66.
[60] Ibid., 67.
[61] R 1001, N2345/42 Letter from Stuhlmann to Puttkamer, Nr. 5 with a memorandum: Die Erträge der Kickxia Elastica Preuss in Kamerun.
[62] 'Die Bedeutung der Londoner Kautschukausstellung',189f.
[63] R 1001, N2345/42, Nr. 11: Letter from Preuss to Zimmermann from 27.2.1897.

introduction of the *Hevea* species, which originated in Brazil and had been grown on plantations for a long time. Combined with the spiral-shaped extraction methods invented by planters in Ceylon – and imported into Cameroon – the *Hevea* trees gave a more satisfying result: productivity was four times higher than with the older methods.[64]

In the meantime, experiments at the Buitenzorg laboratories in Dutch Java had gone ahead, and the *Hevea* trees had been "scientifically" improved by chemists who had increased their productivity and resistance to diseases. Grafted and prepared in Buitenzorg, these *Hevea* trees finally substituted the previously planted rubber variations on the African plantations.[65] It was as a result of these experiments in Dutch Java that the agronomic research station in Buitenzorg triggered the interest of other Europeans in the notion of *intercolonial transfers*.

Indeed, these *intercolonial transfers* between the East Indies colonies and the new territories in Africa gave rise to extremely fruitful exchanges, mostly to the benefit of the new colonies. Plantation societies that did *not* follow the professional models provided by the East Asian colonies were said to fail within a short period of time.[66] The *intercolonial transfers*, or "intercolonial assistance" as it was known, became so successful that they formed a staple element of the ICI's terminology of comparative colonialism. This stated that the "new colonial territories" in Africa and in Asia should adopt the systems used by older colonies in the East Indies; British India and, above all, the Dutch Indies were the templates considered worthy of imitation. Unlike the former settler colonies in South and Central America, which had entered a period of economic decline after gaining independence, the East Indian colonies were still seen as progressive and profitable colonies. Their success was not based on mass settlement, but on economic exploitation with the help of the indigenous work force, white expertise and Western technology. While the former settler colonies in the Americas had become independent, the East Indies was profitable – and still in the possession of European powers. It was hoped that by imitating their methods of colonial management, the new territories could be rendered equally as profitable. Thus it was that in the 1890s, the ICI and other international experts valued *intercolonial transfers* over the other types of transfers. The founder of the ICI, Joseph Chailley, was only one among hundreds of colonial experts visiting the British Indies, Dutch Java and especially the famous Buitenzorg laboratories in order to see the results of these transfers themselves.[67]

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[64] R 1001, N2345/42 Letter from Stuhlmann to Puttkamer, Nr. 5 with a memorandum: Die Erträge der Kickxia Elastica Preuss in Kamerun.

[65] Chevalier, 'La situation des plantations', 298; 'Le developement économique de l'Indochine et la culture du riz, par M.H. Sambuc (Avocat défenseur à Saigon, colon-planteur en Indochine', *Quinzaine Coloniale*, 25.04.1910, 288-289.

[66] Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of German Africa*, 169.

[67] ANOM 50COL63bis Mission dans l'Inde anglaise et française et aux Indes néerlandaises pour une étude comparative au point de vue politique, administratif et économique par Joseph Chailley-Bert, secrétaire général de l'Union coloniale

Buitenzorg: the Archetype and the Prototype of a Colonial Laboratory

While the bigger nations like Germany and France sent expeditions to colonies of foreign countries, smaller nations tried to internationalize their specialized staff in order to profit from their expertise. This was the case in the Congo, where Scandinavian technical experts organized navigation on the Congo River and Italian engineers built irrigation systems.[68] In the East Indies, the Dutch authorities were keen on bringing foreign experts and planters to their colonies in order to use their expertise. Emanuel Moresco, an ICI member and general secretary of the Dutch colonial ministry, made this clear when he travelled to Spain in order to propose the Dutch Indies as a destination for planters and capitalists:

> We want Europeans there, who belong to strong but pacific people, who do not aspire to hegemony in the world, to conquest or annexation; we want those expatriates who bring their good sense, their sincerity and their activity … without any hidden political agenda. The Spanish are among these people and it is a pity that there are so few of them in the Dutch Indies.

Moresco concluded that the Germans, Swiss, British, French and Danish had already established themselves in the Dutch Indies, while "the Spanish are highly welcome."[69]

Most of the smaller nations dispatched their experts to other countries or colonies, to specialize in engineering or agriculture. While engineers from the Belgian Congo were sent to study colonial policies in British India, Ceylon, Egypt and Java, the Dutch colonial ministry prepared forestry experts for Java in the German forestry academy in Neustadt-Eberswalde and the forest school in Tharandt (Saxonia).[70]

It was not only the smaller nations which made use of transnational expertise. Between 1867 and 1885, the British recruited colonial forestry agents in French Nancy, and graduates from the Nancy forestry schools built up a colonial forestry academy at Dhera-Dum in Bengal. This was remarkable, as the French did not have a forestry service for their own colonies. Deploring this situation, the French colonial reformers of the 1890s proposed to place French trainees at Dhera-Dum to learn from the French experts who had created the forestry school in

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française, en 1900-1901 et 1904 (1899/1905); ANOM 50COL63bis Mission d'études sur la législation applicable aux colons dans les colonies anglaises par Joseph Chailley-Bert (1893/1895), see also ANOM 50COL65 Mission d'études sur les questions d'agriculture et de travaux publics dans les Indes Néerlandaises et du régime de la propriété et des concessions en Indochine par Alexandre Cohen en 1904 (décision ministérielle du 4 décembre 1903) (1904/1908); The articles on the Dutch model in French and international colonial theory have already been cited: Wesseling, 'Le Modèle colonial hollandais'; R.F. Betts, 'L'influence des méthodes hollandaises et anglaises sur la doctrine coloniale française à la fin du XIXe siècle', *Cahiers d'Histoire* 3 (1958), 35–49; See also for Belgium: Stengers, 'Modèle colonial hollandais'.

[68] E. Baccari, *Il Congo* (Rome, 1908).

[69] E. Moresco, *Les Indes Orientales Néerlandaises: Conference faite par le Dr. E. Moresco, à l'Académie Royale de Jurisprudence et de Legislation le 11 mai 1921, à l'Occasion de la Semaine Néerlandaise a Madrid* (Madrid, 1921), 37.

[70] 'Rapport, presenté aux Chambres par le Ministre des Colonies du 14 Septembre 1910', *Bulletin Agricole du Congo Belge* 1, 1 (November 1910), 11 and 17; Chailley, *La Hollande*, 81.

British Bengal. Nancy would be upgraded into an international academy for colonial agronomy and forestry.[71]

A further example was provided by the German government at the turn of the nineteenth century, which inaugurated a new era by granting a scholarship of 6,000 marks to tropical agriculturists and botanist in the Reich who went to study at the world-famous botanical gardens of Buitenzorg in Dutch Java. If a "colonial laboratory" can ever be said to have existed, it was surely located there in Buitenzorg - then a true Mecca for colonial botanists, foresters, agriculturalists and other specialists: "every globetrotter knows the botanical gardens of Buitenzorg" exclaimed the German *Koloniallexikon*.[72]

At the German Colonial Congress in 1902, participants saw "in the Dutch system of the Indies an example, which we have to imitate in our own colonies in East-and West Africa, as well as in the South Sea".[73] When Chailley visited Java on an official mission from the French colonial ministry in 1900, he praised the botanical gardens, better known under the Dutch name *'S' Lands Plantetarium zu Buitenzorg* and called for a similar institute to be set up in France. The German ICI member and botanist Franz Stuhlmann, who was travelling East India to buy seeds and work animals for the German colonies, emphasized the advantages of Buitenzorg over the British colonial agricultural system:

> In British India, indigo does not pay anymore…but I heard that it does in Java…I believe that this is not only due to better conditions of the soil, but also to the more accurate methods of the Dutch. Despite of the many huge plantations in British India, the methods of cultivation have not changed in the last thousand years. The British wants to make quick money and does not rationally plan for the future, as long as he earns money. Only now, as they are in a crisis, they have employed two chemists (for the entire colony!), while Java has a scientific institute that has been improving indigo cultivation for several years now.[74]

The German Buitenzorg scholarship, which enabled German specialists to visit Java's botanical research center, originated in a combination of the welcoming culture of the Dutch and the German desire to develop its own colonies. Since the late nineteenth century, European colonial

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[71] Heckel and Cyprien, *L'enseignement colonial*, 122-124; Another French headed the British research station for sugar cane in Mauritius, while the famous colonial agriculture school in German Witzenhausen (founded in 1898) sent its students to the whole world: M.H. Sambuc, 'Le developement économique de l'Indochine et la culture du riz' *Quinzaine Coloniale* (25.04.1910), 288-289; Heckel and Cyprien, *L'enseignement colonial*, 179.

[72] 'Buitenzorg', in: *Deutsches Koloniallexikon* (Berlin, 1920), vol.1, 250-251; Curiously, Alfred Crosby's pioneering study on Ecological Imperialism does not mention Buitenzorg at all: A. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe 900-1900* (Cambridge et al., 1986); Lucille H. Brockway attaches more importance to the Kew gardens in London, but neglects Buitenzorg: L.H. Brockway, *Science and Colonial Expansion: The Role of British Royal Botanic Gardens* (London, 2002); only Eugene Cittadino mentions its importance: E. Cittadino, *Nature as the Laboratory: Darwinian Plant Ecology in the German Empire 1880-1900* (Cambridge, 1990), esp. 134-143; The best description of Buitenzorg can be found in: Moon, *Technology and Ethical Idealism*.

[73] G. Volkens, 'Der botanische Garten zu Buitenzorg und seine Bedeutung für den Plantagenbau auf Java und Sumatra', *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1902* (Berlin, 1902), 182–183.

[74] BArch, N2303/1 Entwurf Tagebuch Stuhlmann Britisch-Indienreise/Bericht an Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee über die vom KWK finanzierte Reise nach Britisch Indien, Nr. 246.

experts had visited Buitenzorg upon invitation of the Dutch government in Java. It paid European researchers 4,500 Marks and the ferry ride on Dutch ships, and provided them with accommodation and a working space for four to five months.[75] Among foreigners, this "most liberal way" of granting access to the laboratory became so popular that Buitenzorg quickly ran out of stipends.[76]

Consequently, German botanists – in tandem with colonial lobby groups and academies of science – lobbied the German government to fund the Buitenzorg scholarship. In 1898, Berlin agreed to fund such a scholarship, on condition of "pursuing not only scientific but also practical purposes and letting the colonial undersecretary designate one fellow at least every fourth year".[77] Consequently some fifty Germans were nominated official visiting fellows at Buitenzorg – on both Dutch and German grants – between the 1880s and 1914. They not only contributed to agronomic research in Java, but also sent plants, seeds and technological know-how "for the colonial mission of the German *Reich*." Unsurprisingly, the scholarship was often explicitly awarded to administrators from the German colonies.[78] While German researchers were always the majority among the foreigners in Buitenzorg, there were also Russian, American, Austrian, Swiss, British, French and Belgian guest researchers, who had been invited by the Dutch.[79]

A short description of Buitenzorg can help us understand the reasons for its scientific charisma. The hill station in Java's mountainous West, linked to the capital of Batavia by a railway line, was the summer residence of Dutch administrators, a sanatorium for thousands of anemic patients (in 1897 alone, the Dutch government "evacuated" 2,276 diseased Europeans to the Buitenzorg highlands for recovery, while also using it as a colonial spa) and the biggest botanical workshop in the colonial world.[80] An abundant level of rainfall (annually 4 860 mm contrary to 660 mm back in Holland) alternated with plenty of sun and created an ideal mix of

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[75] BArch, R 1001/8604, Nr. 44/45 Letter from Kaiserlich-deutsches Generalkonsulat für Niederländisch-Indien to Kolonialabteilung from 29.4.1898.

[76] BArch, R 1001/8604, Akademie der Wissenschaften to Foreign Ministry from 24.8.1897; Abschrift from 13.12.1895, Engler and Schwendener to Minister für Geistliches, Unterricht und Medizinal-Angelegenheiten.

[77] BArch, R 1001/8604, Nr. 45/56, Minister des Inneren und Reichsschatzamt from 31.5.1898.

[78] BArch, R 1001/8604, Nr.78-80: "Verzeichnis der aus Java mitgebrachten Nutzpflanzen (von Giesenhagen)" and Nr. 78-85 79/78-83-85: Letter from Giesenhagen to Hohenlohe Schillingfürst (Foreign Ministry), from 27.4.1900; Since 1911, Germans could use the Buitenzorg scholarship to visit other agronomic institutions, for example in British India: R 1001/8605, Nr. 4-5 Reichskolonialamt to Gouverneur in Daressalam from 3.4.1911.

[79] Dammermann, 'The Quinquagenary'.

[80] Dr. Erni, 'Die Krankenfürsorge in Niederländisch-Indien', *Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene* 3, 3 (1899), 164; See for example the reoprts by the former director of the botanical garden, M. Treub, *'S' Lands Plantetarium te Buitenzorg, 18 mei 1817-18 mei 1892* (Batavia, 1892); the German version: M. Treub, *Der botanische Garten 'S' Lands Plantetarium zu Buitenzorg auf Java* (Leipzig, 1893), and a French article: M. Treub, 'Un Jardin Botanique Tropical', *Revue des Deux Mondes* 97 (1 January 1890), 162–183; Richard Drayton, although focussing on the Kew botanical garden in London, emphasizes that Buitenzorg was "the most important center for tropical botany and agriculture in the world": Drayton, *Nature's Government*, 121.

heat and humidity that allowed a whole range of tropical flora to prosper, but also permitted the cultivation of cash crops and larger palm trees, teak trees or the cinchona trees. Specialists experimented with the cultivation of coffee, quinine, caoutchouc, and gutta-percha (used as an insulating material for telegraph and land power lines).[81]

Calling the extensive gardens a "botanical garden" was certainly an understatement: the complex comprised a fifty-eight hectares enclosure with approximately 10,000 different species of tropical plants, a seventy-two hectares agricultural *jardin d'essai* in Tijkeumeuh, a "virgin forest" for experimental purposes in Tjibodas (283 hectares) and a mountain garden. By the 1890s, eight laboratories conducted research in fields as varied as agricultural chemistry, pharmacology, agricultural zoology, phytopathology, physiology, and forestry. The laboratories contained the most modern equipment available, including gas lighting, water supply systems, darkrooms, and a reading room with 200 scientific periodicals. [82] The pharmacological division used the great variety of medical plants in the gardens to develop new drugs.[83] Papaya, for example, was well known for its healing effects among the Javanese, before Dutch specialists used its alkaloid contents to cure beriberi.[84] Researchers also experimented with the use of cocaine as a remedy. A botanical laboratory was reserved for foreign researchers to pursue their own personal studies. Experimental stations for coffee and tobacco cultivation complete the research picture.[85] Moreover, a herbarium with 200,000 specimens, a museum, a 6,000-volume strong library and hundreds of publications – such as the multilingual *Annales du Jardin Botanique de Buitenzorg* – turned the institutes into a veritable scientific research institute. [86] At the German Colonial Congress in 1902, Georg Volkens, a botanist and researcher in Java, celebrated Buitenzorg as a radiating focus of "pure science".[87]

Despite its scientific aspirations, the true *raison d'être* of the Buitenzorg facilities was typically colonial: the laboratories aimed at refining and improving those species of cash crops that had yielded the Dutch colonial state its wealth throughout the nineteenth century. It was for this purpose that it collected plants from all over the world - the culture garden in Tjikeumeuh, for example, cultivated all the coffee and cocoa varieties that were available

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[81] See for the journey FR ANOM 50COL63bis, Mission dans l'Inde anglaise et française et aux Indes néerlandaises pour une étude comparative au point de vue politique, administratif et économique par Joseph Chailley-Bert, secrétaire général de l'Union coloniale française, en 1900-1901 et 1904 (1899/1905) and Chailley, *Java et ses habitants*, 335-369.
[82] Volkens, 'Der botanische Garten', 189.
[83] For the experiments with fertilizers see: P. Cramer, 'La culture de la Patate à Java', *Revue de botanique appliquée et d'agriculture coloniale* 20, 3 (1923), 233–241:237.
[84] 'Mittheilungen aus dem chemisch-pharmakologischen Laboratorium des Botanischen Gartens zu Buitenzorg (Java)', *Berichte der deutschen chemischen Gesellschaft* 23, 2 (1890), 3537–3550; In 1929, the Dutch Christiaan Eijkman was awarded the Nobel Prize for his efforts to cure beri-beri.
[85] Chailley, *Java et ses habitants*, XLII-XLIII.
[86] E. Merrill, *Report on Investigations Made in Java in the Year 1902 to the Depatment of the Interior, Forestry Bureau* (Manila, 1903), 75; Chailley, *Java et ses habitants* (1914), XLV.
[87] Volkens, 'Der botanische Garten', 182-193.

globally; three hundred different varieties of palm trees were planted there, too.[88] The purpose of these comprehensive collections was to select and crossbreed the plants in order to produce more profitable and disease-resistant crops. Subsequently, scholars added experimental improvement stations for gutta-percha, caoutchouc, tea, cardamom, vanilla, and shade-plants.[89] The professional crossbreeding of coffee and tobacco plants was used to establish new tobacco plantations in the Deli region of East Sumatra, which would go on to develop into the greenhouse of the Dutch Indies, famously known as the Deli plantation belt.[90] Financed by international capital investments, planters from all over the world grew oil palm, tobacco, tea, sisal and rubber in the "Dollar land of Deli".

Buitenzorg supplied the planters with improved seedlings and technical know-how. Thanks to the free supply of saplings and seedlings, planters did not have to rely on a single crop but could plant several different species in order to reduce their dependency on monocultures. In this way, plantation companies survived global cash crop crises – such as the collapse of world coffee prices around 1900. Moreover, planters did not have to take the risk of planting low quality crops, prone to infestation by diseases and parasites. Instead, they received plants that had been tested and immunized in Buitenzorg, and whose employees had supervised methods of planting and further treatment of the harvest.[91] By 1900, Buitenzorg, once a center of descriptive botany, had developed into a laboratory for applied botany. But such a laboratory needed extensive financial support.

Between 1880 and 1909, the director of the Buitenzorg research station, Melchior Treub, had organized a system of private funding based on a simple idea. In exchange for seeds and scientific advice, the European planters would finance the researchers at the laboratories. In this way too, the tea planters of the Dutch Indies remunerated the head of Buitenzorg's microbiological division, who directed research on tea plants. Similarly, the *General Syndicate for Sugar Production* funded the commission for the cultivation of sugar. The private funding of the Institute was advantageous and yielded benefits. For example, the sugar output per cultivated hectare was the highest in the world and relegated Hawaii to the second place.[92] Franssen van de Putte, the co-founder of the ICI, and a prominent sugar planter in Java, was one of the beneficiaries of the improved plants from Buitenzorg.[93]

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[88] Ibid., 184.
[89] Ibid., 185.
[90] Chailley, *Java et ses habitants*(1914),XLIII-XLIV; Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation* (Michigan, 1995, 2· edition), 14f.
[91] Volkens, 'Der botanische Garten', 186.
[92] Klaveren, *Dutch Colonial System,* 182.
[93] 'Dépôts des Houilles dans l'Ile de Java', *Journal de Botanique Néerlandaise* 1 (1861), 211.

Otto de Vries, the director of the central rubber station in Buitenzorg, worked together with ten scientific researchers to establish experimental rubber plantations and make their output more efficient.[94] After some years of experimentation, his laboratories were able to increase the Hevea rubber tree's resistance to diseases and the wind by shield budding and plant-breeding.[95] The Hevea seeds, developed into highly productive and disease-resistant plants, were exported to the whole world. In addition, Buitenzorg's chemical laboratories enhanced fertilizers and pesticides to protect plantations from insects and plant disease. This attempt was backed by methods of mixed gardening, such as "intercalary planting", which helped indigenous plantations to avoid expensive fertilizers.[96] The innovative research made Java a leader in modern colonial agriculture and anticipated the development policies of the twentieth century.

These development policies were also directed towards the natives. In several attached schools and on seven trial farms the Javanese learned how to grow cash crops – to the benefit of the European export economy. The colonial government had reserved a budget of 109,000 Florins to fund these agricultural classes, which were held in the vernacular languages. During the three-year courses, indigenous and metis students not only learned how to grow cash crops, but they also received training in accounting and were instructed to use credits offered by the colonial banks. Once the graduates had returned to their fields, Buitenzorg inspectors supervised their cultivation of tea, rice or coffee and evaluated the results. These inspectors of indigenous agriculture also toured the local residences and "informed" the native peasants about the best ways to grow crops and provided them with seed variants and cultigens, among these a dry rice version that required less irrigation and water supply.[97] The idea of these *Wanderlehrer* (itinerant teachers) was inspired by European agricultural teachers of the nineteenth century who had toured the countryside to disseminate new agricultural techniques and technologies.

Given its reputation as the laboratory of modern colonial agriculture, Buitenzorg attracted specialists from all over the world. Commissions from France, Germany, the USA, and Russia visited the laboratory, and the Dutch authorities equipped one of the workshops for visiting researchers, who stayed for several months or up to two years. Foreign researchers were

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[94] O.de Vries, *Estate Rubber: Its Preparation, Properties and Testing* (Batavia, 1920), 445; H. Wright, *Hevea Brasiliensis or Para Rubber* (London, 1912); P. van Romburgh, *Les Plantes à Caoutchouc et à Gutta-Percha cultivés aux Indes Néerlandaises: Des diverses espèces et leur culture rationelle* (Batavia, 1903); See W. Dean, *Brazil and the Struggle for Rubber: A Study in Environmental History* (Cambridge, 1987), 63.

[95] C. Coster, 'The work of the West Java Research Institute in Buitenzorg', in P. Honig and F. Verdoorn (eds.), *Science and Scientists in the Netherlands Indies* (New York, 1945), 56–69.

[96] Intercalary planting combined different plants in one field that increased the resistance of both specimens to parasite infestation: Chailley, *Java et ses habitants* (1914), XLIV.

[97] Ibid., XLIV.

offered lodgings, a small remuneration and free classes in the pidgin versions of Javanese and Malay.[98]

In the 1890s, the gardens looked back on a long international history as a *conservatoire botanique* of tropical biodiversity. Already by the mid-nineteenth century, a multinational commission had catalogued the Buitenzorg collection of tropical plants according to an innovative system grouping them in "families", with the catalogue entries corresponding to the arrangement of the plants in the garden. This taxonomy allowed for a systematic and practical study of the plants under conditions that remained unmatched in the colonial world.[99] Once descriptive botany had been sufficiently developed, international scholars turned Buitenzorg into a seedbank for tropical seeds and a hub for their exchange. The laboratories received plants from all over the colonial world to experimentally improve their yield. Given its outstanding success and its even more outstanding reputation, the Buitenzorg laboratories were imitated all over the world. As we have seen, they were particularly renowned among German botanists, gardeners and foresters, most of whom had visited Buitenzorg during their careers or had even been employed by the Dutch authorities. Among them was the famous German Darwinist Ernst Haeckel and the zoologist Franz Stuhlmann, a member of the ICI.

Stuhlmann – together with his colleagues Walter Busse and Albrecht Zimmermann – played an important role in transferring knowledge from Buitenzorg to German East Africa. In 1902, they closed down an abortive experimental station for colonial agriculture in Kwai, and replaced it with a professional *Biologisch-Landwirtschaftliches Institute* in Amani.[100] Situated in the Usambara Mountains, the new agricultural station was modeled on the Buitenzorg "prototype".[101] Stuhlmann and Busse had done research at Buitenzorg at the turn of the century, while Albrecht Zimmermann had been the head of the Javanese coffee experimental station between 1896 and 1901.[102] Stuhlmann, whose expertise had earned him an extraordinary reputation as a German colonial official, became the first director of the Amani Institute, and appointed Albrecht Zimmermann as his successor. Walter Busse stayed in Buitenzorg and organized the transfer of cash crop seeds and laboratory material from Buitenzorg to Amani. Like Buitenzorg, the Amani Institute in German East Africa was part of a hill station complex that combined agronomic trial fields, several laboratories and the features of a spa town. Its priority was to import cultivable plants that were vital to colonial life.

[98] Ibid., XLIX.
[99] Ibid., XL-XLI.
[100] H. Paasche, *Deutsch-Ostafrika: Wirtschaftl. Studien* (Hamburg, 1913), 246f.
[101] BArch, R 1001/8604, Direktor der botanischen Zentralstelle für die Kolonien am Königlichen Botanischen Garten zu Berlin, Engler, to Kolonialabteilung in the Foreign Ministry from 30.11.1906.
[102] See A. Zimmermann, *Der botanische Garten zu Buitenzorg auf Java* (Berlin, 1899).

In the early days of the Amani Institute in 1896, Franz Stuhlmann and Walter Busse started to introduce cinchona trees from Dutch Java. Grown on large plantations in Java, the bark on the trees produced quinine (the most important palliative against malaria and other tropical maladies in the nineteenth century) in great quantities. Indeed, Java had become the most important producer of quinine in the 1870s, after some German botanists – employed by the Dutch – had smuggled the seeds of cinchona trees out of Peru and Bolivia and brought them to the Dutch Indies. Another German, and a famous explorer of the Java and Sumatra, Franz Wilhelm Junghuhn, had then successfully planted cinchona plantations in Java. The free distribution of seedlings to the Javanese and large-scale plantations around Bandung boosted the Javanese production of quinine and reduced the price of this precious remedy, which used to be "balanced with gold", by eighty percent.[103] In terms of turnover, then, quinine became the most important medication of the world, with Java providing for ninety-seven percent of the world quinine production by 1930.[104]

Chemists and botanists in Buitenzorg increased the quantity of quinine in the tree's bark from 0,4 percent to eighteen percent: Stuhlmann and Busse copied these methods in German East Africa, bought ever more refined species from Java and employed Indian experts to guarantee their prosperity. In 1907, they had planted 25,355 trees in Amani and 66,700 trees on private plantations, which stood for the success of the project in German East Africa.[105] While the Dutch colonial government in Java had sold quinine to its subjects at a reduced price, the German colonial administration was the first colonial government that distributed it for free.[106] Quinin, which was effective against malaria, and remained a vital instrument of European colonial policies.[107]

At the same time, Albrecht Zimmermann was particularly keen on introducing caoutchouc and coffee cultures to Amani. Experts in Java had imported *Hevea* rubber trees from Brazil and had increased their productivity at the Buitenzorg laboratories and on trial

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[103] R. Porter, *The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity from Antiquity to the Present* (Hammersmith and London, 1997), 465–466.

[104] The best-selling remedy quinine was nevertheless also used as a raw material in industrial production: F.A. Flueckinger, *The Chinona Barks* (Philadelphia, 1884), iii; Erni, 'Die Krankenfürsorge in Niederländisch-Indien', 145f.

[105] Stuhlmann, *Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte,* 434-440; See about Dutch achievements also: M.H. Sambuc, 'Le developement économique de l'Indochine et la culture du riz', *Quinzaine Coloniale* (25.4.1910), 288-289.

[106] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1913,* 154*;* Doctors often had to resort to police in order to make Africans who were skeptical about Western therapy swallow the bitter medicine. This was hardly surprising, given that the wrong dosage often led to the opposite effect and aggravated certain maladies such as blackwater fever. Plehn, 'Bericht über die Informationsreise': 282.

[107] After the First World War, the French sent several quinine expeditions under Alexandre Yersin to Java: P. Delaveau, 'Production de quinquina dans l'Empire Français: A. Yersin and E. Perrot', *Revue d'histoire de la pharmacie* 83, 304 (1995), 75–84; ANOM 50COL99 Mission à Java de Georges Frontou, ingénieur d'agronomie coloniale, pour y recueillir des graines de quinquina (1926/1928); See about quinine in general: A. Goss, *The Floracrats: State-Sponsored Science and the Failure of the Enlightenment in Indonesia* (Madison, Wis., 2011), 33-58; Sources veto Headrick's claim that French scientists did not visit Buitenzorg: Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress*, 224f.

plantations. Zimmermann hoped that professional *Hevea* plantations would soon replace the traditional *Raubbau*, the harvest of caoutchouc from wild rubber trees. Dismissing the declining extensive rubber collection in the Congo, he saw the future of caoutchouc production on intensive rubber plantations as taking place in Brazil or Dutch Java. In order to introduce systematic rubber production to Africa, he imported the improved seeds from Buitenzorg to Amani.[108] His estimation for *Hevea* rubber from Java was shared by the French specialist for caoutchouc cultivation, Camille Spire, whom the French Colonial Minister sent on an official mission to Buitenzorg in 1901.

Spire sent plants and seeds from Buitenzorg to Paris, where they were analyzed and forwarded to the French African colonies. In doing this, Spire continued a long tradition of French agricultural missions to Java, which had already led to the establishing of caoutchouc plantations in Indo-China. Moreover, young French agronomists were sent to Buitenzorg to study in the rubber laboratories. Following the Dutch example, Spire advocated the distribution of the seeds among colonists, administrators and indigenous peoples in the French colonies, to encourage the cultivation of rubber trees.[109] In 1914, the French Colonial Union dispatched the agricultural inspector of Madagascar, Fauchère, to Java, to study the cultivation of coffee at Buitenzorg. Fauchère was particularly interested in the work of his German colleague Albrecht Zimmermann, who had been Buitenzorg's expert for coffee planting for seven years and had done extensive research on parasite infestation of coffee in Java.[110]

Zimmermann's expertise derived, first and foremost, from the coffee plantations in Dutch Java, given that he had been the head of the *Proefstation* for coffee cultivation.[111] His advice was highly regarded in German East Africa, since early and random efforts to plant 10,000 hectares of *Coffea Arabica* and *Coffea liberica* had proven disastrous. Zimmermann arrived in 1901 from Buitenzorg and set out to combat a coffee disease that had been known in Java as *blorok*. In German East Africa, it did not have a name, because it had been hitherto unknown. Zimmermann's attempts to control the disease seemed to be successful; however, he also used grafting methods developed in Buitenzorg to replace vulnerable plants with the more

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[108] A. Zimmermann, *Der Manihot-Kautschuk: seine Kultur, Gewinnung und Präparation* (Jena, 1913), 311.

[109] FR ANOM 50COL 14: Mission à Java de Camille Spire, médecin des Colonies, pour l'étude du jardin botanique et du laboratoire de Buitenzorg, prolongation de la mission : rapport au ministre des Colonies (copie) (1901). See also: C. Spire and A. Spire, *Le Caoutchouc en Indochine. Étude Botanique Industrielle et Commerciale* (Paris, 1906), 200-209, 225 and 233-234; Spire's brother André was the general secretary of the association of caoutchouc importers in France; See also : C. Spire, 'Java. La Culture des Arbres Fruitiers à Java', *Revue Coloniale (Ministère des Colonies, Service géographique des missions)* 7, 4 (1901), 208-215.

[110] FR ANOM 50COL68, Mission d'études sur la culture du café aux Indes néerlandaises par Fauchère, inspecteur d'agriculture à Madagascar, à l'initiative de l'Union coloniale française (1914); A. Fauchère, *Culture Pratique du Caféier et Préparation du Café* (Paris, 1908), 168-9.

[111] See Zimmermann, *Der botanische Garten*; J.C. Koningsberger and A. Zimmermann, *De dierlijke vijanden der koffiecultur op Java* (Batavia, 1901); A. Zimmermann, *Kaffee* (Hamburg, 1926).

resilient *Coffea canephora*, and he imported seeds of improved *Coffea Arabica* from Java.[112] Not all of these acclimatized well, but ultimately, Zimmermann's attempts contributed to master the coffee crises of the early twentieth century, when the world market price of coffee collapsed.

Seeds and planting methods continued to be sent to German East Africa. Walter Busse received an extra money from the Amani Institute to take seed samples from Buitenzorg to Africa, among them the famous Manila banana.[113] The transfer of raw material for the colonial plantation economy went hand in hand with the employment of Javanese and Indian staff in German East Africa, who were more experienced with methods and technologies of cash crop cultivation.[114]

The imports were central to the establishment of a colonial exploitation economy, but they were not restricted to cash crops only. Already in 1895, when Stuhlmann worked at the *Versuchsgarten* (trial garden) in Dar-es Salam, the German authorities had asked him to grow two species of bamboo, *B. vulgaris* and *Dendrocalamus strictus*. Both were highly valued for their use as lance shafts for the cavalry of African troops. In order to satisfy the demand, Stuhlmann ordered additional species in British Ceylon, Dutch Java and even Japan.[115] In that same year, he also imported young teak wood trees from the Bombay forest administration and Dutch Java to use for forestations in specific areas along the recently constructed Usambara railway. Planning ahead for a remote future, the grown teak wood trees were aimed at strengthening the autonomy of German colonies from external wood supply, as teak timber was widely used in ship-building and as railway sleepers.[116] As it took the teak trees several years to grow to a size that allowed their commercial use, the long-standing Dutch experience of teak wood production allowed the Germans to reckon if they could the profit from them in the future. This is why the French also showed interest in the Javanese teak wood economy and its use in naval construction. They sent the French consul in Batavia, Paul Serre, to search the archives in Java for material on teak wood production and investigate the growing success of the Javanese teak wood economy: in the 1890s, Javanese teak would be exported to Europe, South Africa and British India, and it became so popular that it overtook even the Californian Redwood exports.[117]

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[112] A. Zimmermann, 'Erster Jahresbericht des Kaiserlichen Biologisch-Landwirtschaftlichen Instituts Amani', *Berichte über die Land- und Forstwirtschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika* 1, 6 (1903), 441.
[113] Ibid.,440.
[114] Ibid., 435.
[115] Stuhlmann, *Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte,* 656.
[116] Ibid., 673.
[117] A. Serre, 'L'Exploitation des fôrets de Teck et autres bois au Java', *L'agriculture pratique des pays chauds: Bulletin mensuel du jardin colonial* 6, 38 (May 1906), 422–430.

All in all, *intercolonial transfers* played a vital role in supplying the new African colonies with cash crops and medical plants. As a general rule, the cash crops were imported to Java, improved in the Buitenzorg laboratories or adjacent experimental stations, and re-exported to other colonies. Amani imported coffee, teak and chinona trees, caoutchouc, gutta-percha, bamboo, indigo and *Erythroxylon Coca* (for the production of cocaine) from Java. As we have seen, Javanese rubber varieties replaced the species that had been imported earlier on from Brazil or species native to Africa. The best quality bamboo came from Buitenzorg and was ordered in Dar-es-Salam.[118] The Javanese also produced excellent cotton seed.[119]

Java became so important that Germans regularly sent delegates there before deciding if they would introduce a new crop into their colonies. In 1911, the head of the German Colonial Society and former president of the ICI, Johann Albrecht von Mecklenburg, travelled to Java. Observing the Javanese plantations, he advised Germans in East Africa against growing chinona trees for the global market, because they were unlikely to be able to compete with the high quality product from Java. Sisal plantations, instead, were rare in Java. As a consequence, Mecklenburg gave the green light to grow sisal in East Africa – sisal hemp was finally introduced by Richard Hindorf, another veteran from Buitenzorg.[120] It became, indeed, one of the most successful commercial plants to be grown in German East Africa. When Germany lost its colonies in World War I, the German expert on sisal plantations, R. Hindorf, continued to establish sisal plantations in Portuguese Mozambique and Angola and thus spread the cultivation to other colonial territories.[121]

Although *transtropical* imports continued way into the twentieth century – including the import of cocoa from South America and cotton from North America and Egypt – *intercolonial transfers* soon dominated the agriculture of the "new territories" in Africa. Moreover, while British Ceylon and the experimental gardens in Calcutta played a minor part in exporting tea, Buitenzorg accounted for the great majority of agronomist transfers from the East Indies. Besides the imports of seeds and seedlings, well-travelled agriculturists from Germany, France or Belgium also imitated methods developed in Buitenzorg, such as polycropping techniques (for example, the import of the Javanese *dadap* trees, which provided

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[118] 'Wirtschaftliche Ergebnisse der Reise des Herzogs Johann Albrecht zu Mecklenburg nach Java', *Deutsches Kolonialblatt* 22 (1911), 87.

[119] Reichskolonialamt (ed.), *Der Baumwollanbau in den deutschen Schutzgebieten: Seine Entwicklung seit dem Jahre 1910* (Jena, 1914), 71.

[120] Franz Stuhlmann, *Der Pflanzer* 15-16 (1907), 229-243; He also recommended to continue the planting of teak, which had seen a great success in Java and could be used for railway construction in East Africa: 'Wirtschaftliche Ergebnisse der Reise', 86.

[121] R. Hindorf, 'Ostafrika Gestern und Heute', in A. Mayer (ed.), *Das Buch der deutschen Kolonien* (Potsdam, 1933), 322.

shadow for the coffee plantations), graftage or phytopathology.[122] Stuhlmann also imported machines, like a cotton harvester from Java. [123] Not all of these imports proved successful. The dadap trees which had been planted in German East Africa, fell prey to caterpillars that did not exist in Java, and not all the coffee plants from the Dutch archipelago prospered on the African continent.[124] Despite these failed acclimatizations – which even induced the German colonial authorities to temporarily ban imports from the East Indies – the ties between Africa and Buitenzorg remained close, based on the myth of the laboratory as a place of applied science. As a consequence of this myth, the laboratories themselves were emulated all over the world.

Given the fact that it was set up by former employees in Buitenzorg, Amani was a blueprint of the laboratory in the Dutch Indies. It redistributed its own plant variations to all the African colonies and also hosted an international community of colonial experts. Situated in the rainy Usambara Mountains, close to the Tanga-Korogwe railway, it was equipped with chemical and pharmaceutical laboratories, 250 hectares of trial fields, research stations and a guest house for foreign visitors.[125] The general government of German East Africa only subsidized researchers who applied their research to improve the "Nutzpflanzen" (useful plants) on white plantations and developed the "indigenous cultivation" of cash crops. Like Buitenzorg, Amani sent advisors to the natives in order to "teach" them how to plant European cash crops like sisal and cotton.[126] Ironically, Amani, which had started as a pale imitation of Buitenzorg at the turn of the century, became its main rival in the tropical world.

Not only Amani emulated the Buitenzorg laboratories In France, Chailley's journey to Buitenzorg and his report on the agronomic laboratories had led the French colonial administration to establish similar laboratories and to imitate the scientific journals on tropical agriculture.[127] Auguste Chevalier, the chef of the Permanent Mission of Agriculture at the French Colonial Ministry, equally took Buitenzorg as an example when he reorganized the French colonial agronomy after the First World War, calling it "the biggest establishment in the world for the perfecting of tropical agriculture."[128]

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[122] Also the Congo Free State imported seeds from Buitenzorg: 'Rapport, presenté aux Chambres par le Ministre des Colonies du 14 Septembre 1910', *Bulletin Agricole du Congo Belge* 1, 1 (November 1910), 16.
[123] Stuhlmann, *Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte,* 487.
[124] A. Zimmermann, 'Zweiter Jahresbericht des Kaiserlichen Biologisch-Landwirtschaftlichen Instituts Amani', *Berichte über die Land- und Forstwirtschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika* 2 (1904), 214-215.
[125] Ibid., 206f; BArch, R 1001/8604, 155/157: Innenministerium to Reichskolonialamt from 22.7.1908.
[126] A. Engler, 'Das biologisch-landwirtschaftliche Institut zu Amani in Ost-Usambara', *Notizblatt des Königlichen botanischen Gartens und Museums zu Berlin* 4, 31 (1903), 63-66: 64; See K. Ingham, 'Deutsch-Ostafrika. Ein wirtschaftliches Experiment in Afrika', *Afrika-Verein* 3, 1 (1961).
[127] A. Chevalier, 'Le Fonctionnement du Laboratoire d'Agronomie Coloniale', *Revue de Botanique Appliquée et d'Agriculture Tropicale* 1 (1923), 3–11; A. Chevalier, 'Historique de la Revue de Botanique Appliquée et d'Agriculture Tropicale', *Revue de Botanique Appliquée et d'Agriculture Tropicale* 23, 1 (1943), 1.
[128] Letter of Auguste Chevalier to G. Angoulvant from 24. June 1922, cited in: G. Angoulvant, *Les Indes néerlandaises : leur rôle dans l'économie international* (Paris, 1926), 748.

German colonial technocrats, who had not been satisfied with the early experimental stations in German East Africa, called for a colonial laboratory in Victoria in the Cameroons, where extensive European cocoa plantations had emerged since the 1890s. The driving force behind the laboratory project was Otto Warburg, an offspring of a Jewish merchant family from Hamburg and a fervent promoter of German colonization. A botanist, he had spent several years in Buitenzorg during the 1880s. After playing an active role in the early colonial movement in Germany, he founded the *Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee* (1896), an economic branch of the German Colonial Society, and he published the famous *Tropenpflanzer*, a journal for colonial agriculture. Partly financed by the German colonial ministry, the *Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee* became the prime mover behind agricultural economy in the German colonies. Among its biggest successes was the dissemination of cotton and rubber plantations in German colonies, the production of palm oil with special machines and the construction of water reservoirs in German South West Africa and of railway lines in Togo and East Africa.[129]

In 1899, the *Komitee* urged the German government to create a "laboratory in connection with a botanical garden" in Victoria, and Warburg became its main propagator. He cited Buitenzorg as an example for a multifunctional laboratory that provided for all the needs of a colony: agricultural engineers would improve the fertilization of the soil, phytopathologists would combat the pests infecting tropical crops, zoologists could improve stockbreeding, pharmacologists could test new drugs, and, finally, hygienists could analyze contagious epidemics and chemists could examine new elements unknown in Europe. Moreover, such a laboratory would boost the production of coffee, cocoa, caoutchouc, tobacco, spices, tannins, gums, wood and fibrous material.[130] Warburg planned to invite foreign scholars to do research there, and as in Buitenzorg, the directors of the surrounding coffee, tobacco and chinona planters would bear the costs to improve their cash crops and contribute towards the salaries for the researchers and technical staff.[131]

Warburg's laboratories, and his wish to increase the cultivation of "Nutzpflanzen", were finally realized. Victoria became a miniature Buitenzorg, with its own chemical and botanical laboratories, trial fields, an experimental station for the clearing and reforestation of the "virgin" woods and a training school to teach practical agriculture to the colonized.[132] Warburg's lobbying was particularly successful because he had teased Berlin with similar plans of the US

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[129] See for an overview: G.A. Schmidt, *Das Kolonialwirtschaftliche Komittee: Ein Rückblick auf seine Entstehung und seine Arbeiten aus Anlass des Gedenkjahres 50jähriger deutscher Kolonialarbeit* (Berlin, 1934).
[130] O. Warburg, 'Warum ist die Errichtung eines wissenschaftlich-technischen Laboratoriums in dem botanischen Garten zu Victoria erforderlich?' *Tropenpflanzer* 3, 7 (1899), 294.
[131] Ibid., 295.
[132] For further influence of Dutch agronomy on Cameroon see R. Thillard, 'La Culture du Tabac de Sumatra au Cameroun', *Agronomie Coloniale* 40 (1921).

government to establish a new "Buitenzorg" in its colonies. Clearly, the German colonies should not fall behind the imperial newcomers from across the Atlantic Ocean.[133]

Indeed, the famous US Taft Commission – which equipped the Philippines with a civil administration between 1900 and 1901 – had created an Insular Bureau of Agriculture in Manila, and this had dispatched the botanist Elmer Merrill to Buitenzorg in 1902.[134] In general, the USA made use of the infrastructure of knowledge that the Spanish had established in Porto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines, consulting Spanish archives and using the scientific institutions that had been created under Spanish rule.[135] Although the Spanish had set up a botanical institute, they had not been very accurate in cataloguing the specimens of the island's flora and the insufficiently labeled leaves could not be identified or were poorly maintained. Moreover, a fire had destroyed both the herbarium and the botanical library in 1897, shortly before the US occupied the Philippines. This explains the fact that the Manila Forestry Bureau sent Merrill to Buitenzorg in 1902.[136] Intending to classify the complete plant variety of the Philippine Islands, he copied parts of Buitenzorg's famous botanical catalogue and ordered specimens of plants that might also have a habitat in the Philippines.[137] Spanish taxonomies in Manila had only registered the indigenous names for the plants, and this led to a great deal of confusion, because there were up to fifteen different names for the same plants in different local dialects. Merrill's greatest accomplishment was to replace these indigenous descriptions with an internationally accepted terminology taken from the Buitenzorg classification.

However, Merill's greatest interest was in forestry, and when he was in Buitenzorg, he learned how to determine the rate of tree growth and to evaluate a tree's economic importance. He copied the Dutch forestry regulations and brought a map showing the method of charting "djati", the teak forests, a method that would soon be applied in the Philippines as well. Finally, he carefully took photographs of every detail in the Buitenzorg laboratories and put the Philippine Forestry Bureau on the "permanent mailing list" of the s'Lands Planetarium to

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[133] Warburg, 'Warum ist die Errichtung', 296; In 1902, Warburg studied different laboratories all over Europe and recommended to copy the Dutch system, see: O. Warburg, 'Über wissenschaftliche Institute für Kolonialwirtschaft', *Verhandlungen des deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1902* (Berlin, 1902), 202.

[134] See about William Howard Taft and the role he played to help establish the League of Nations: F. Gerrity (ed.), *Taft Papers on League of Nations. (Collected Works of William Taft vol. 7)* (Ohio, 2003).

[135] Especially when screening the island for a suitable "health resort", the Taft commission in the Philippines consulted Spanish archives to find an adequate place: Taft Commission (ed.), *Reports of the Taft Philippine Commission* (Washington, 1901), 65f.; See also Beredo, *Import of the Archive* and G. Bankoff, 'The Science of Nature and Nature of Science in the Spanish and American Philippines at the Turn of the Twentieth Century', in C. Ax and N. Brimmes (eds), *Cultivating the Colony: Colonial States and their Environmental Legacies* (Athens 2011), 78-108.

[136] Java has been regarded as a prototype of colonial exploitation in the USA and was taken as a template for its own exploitation: E. Root, 'Preparatory Note', in C.B. Elliott (ed.), *The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime* (Indianapolis, [1916]).

[137] I. Hay, 'E.D. Merrill, From Maine To Manila', *Arnoldia* 58, 1 (1998), 11–19: 13.

receive its comprehensive publications.[138] In the following years, the botanical infrastructure in Manila was turned into a blueprint of the Buitenzorg system, and the laboratories provided the basis for the globally admired system of colonial technocracy in the Philippines. As Warwick Anderson put it, the Philippine laboratories became the "locus of colonial modernity."[139] Merrill, instead, became the U.S. doyen of botanic research by editing several journals, directing the Science Bureau in the Philippines and the botanical gardens in New York. He supervised the botanical collection of Harvard University and created the Biological Laboratory and Botanical garden in Cuba.[140] He widely admired Otto Warburg, who had contributed to classify the flora of the Philippines on one of his scientific journeys.[141]

Warburg himself used his botanical initiation in Buitenzorg and his experience as the head of the *Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee* to take colonial projects to a new level. A Jew from Hamburg, he joined the Zionist movement and became the third president of the World Zionist Organization in 1911. His commitment to Zionist colonization in Palestine aligned with the practicalist branch, which favored the creation of agricultural colonies to support a Jewish homeland in Palestine. While still editing the *Tropenpflanzer* and directing several colonial cash crop companies in German Togo and Cameroon, he became the head of the Zionist Commission for the Exploration of Palestine from 1903 to 1907 and he figured prominently in the Palestine Land Development Company (1908), which acquired territory in Palestine and trained Jewish settlers in farming and agronomy.

During this period, Warburg sent German experts of the *Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee* to investigate the possibilities of Zionist settlement and cotton farming in the Middle East.[142] Appreciating agronomic research and the professional production of cash crops like olives and olive oil over mass settlement, he advocated the creation of training farms, experimental forests and trial fields. He launched several Zionist colonies in the Near East, in general, and in Palestine, in particular, combining his knowledge of forestry and cash crop acclimatization to improve the olive groves in experimental colonies. Further, he promoted olive groves as the material basis of the colonies and received private funding from Jewish organizations (the "*Ölbaumspenden"*) in order to do so. Finally, he launched an agricultural research station in Tel Aviv, which was later transferred to Rehovot, and helped to establish

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[138] Merrill, *Report on Investigations*, 7-10.
[139] W. Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines* (Durham 2006), 111.
[140] He continued to import seeds from Buitenzorg though: Archives of the Arnold Arboretum of Harvard University: I B EDM, Section III Memoranda, Merrill to I.W. Bailey on shipment of Malayan woody specimens from Buitenzorg; See also W.J. Robbins, *Elmer Drew Merrill 1876-1956. A Biographical Memoir* (Washington D.C., 1958).
[141] Merrill, *Report on Investigations*, 12.
[142] Warburg, 'Die jüdische Kolonisation'.

natural sciences as a discipline at Israeli universities. [143] Styling himself as an apolitical technician of colonial exploitation, Warburg thus represents a long tradition of colonial "experts", who dedicated their professional activity to the progress of humanity by enhancing agricultural knowledge and improving the yield of cash crops.

In exactly the same way, the Buitenzorg laboratories, recognized as an internationalist and scientific workshop, gained a reputation as the archetype of a progressive institution that produced specialists in agriculture, botany, forestry, chemistry, pharmacy and tropical hygiene. Emulated all over the world, the tropical laboratories were symbols of a new world and as a seat of transnational cooperation. They were at the origin of the myth of the "rational" and "technical" colonialism that was ascribed to the Dutch administration in Java.

As late as 1926, Gabriel Angoulvant, who had been governor in almost all the French colonies, published a two-volume report praising the Dutch Indies and their role for the future world economy. Commissioned by the internationalist "New World Association", his meticulous study of the Dutch Indies praised its colonial methods: "the technician who has studied, as I have done, the colonization of the archipelago in detail can only sincerely render homage to this effort and proclaim the effectiveness of the methods employed". [144] Full of enthusiasm, Angoulvant accredited the Dutch administration with political liberalism and an unprecedented openness to capital investment from all over the world. With the help of this international capital, the Dutch Indies had monopolized the production of quinine, sugar, kapok, caoutchouc and copra.

Buitenzorg was at the center of the process to develop a methodological and technocratic colonialism and to disseminate these agricultural techniques among colonists and natives alike. Moreover, Angoulvant argued, the Dutch had protected the labor force of the natives from abuse by the colonists, and this policy had induced the prosperity of the colony and led to rising birth rates. Technical masterpieces such as the Javanese irrigation system had provided the basis for the agricultural prosperity and had boosted development of rice and sugar cane cultivation. Angoulvant expressed concisely what colonial experts had thought about Dutch Java since the beginning of the twentieth century: a small nation with an internationalist attitude had managed to become an extremely successful colony. Its rule was rational and "technical", headed by rationally minded technocrats, who did not engage in "politics" but improved the colony for the

[143] See F. Leimkugel, *Botanischer Zionismus: Otto Warburg und die Anfänge institutionalisierter Naturwissenschaften in Erez Israel* (Berlin, 2005).

[144] D.J. Penslar, *Zionism and Technocracy: The Engineering of Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1870-1918* (Bloomington, 1991), 61f, although I disagree with the interpretation that Warburg represented a purely "German" commitment to scientific research, see p.62.

benefit of colonized and colonizers. This ideal was cherished by the ICI and other colonial internationalists of the time.

However, portraying colonization as a technique and the colonies as a laboratory concealed the continuing reality of colonial violence, exploitation and the use of forced labor. The archetype of an "apolitical" laboratory, Buitenzorg was actually a very political place. It was created to enhance cash crop production and to maximize profits through plant engineering. The laboratories were located in the edifices in Buitenzorg, but at the same time, experts went to the fields of European and indigenous planters to supervise and influence the production of cash crops. Sugar and tobacco planters worked on their plantations for half a year and spent the rest of the year in the laboratories.[145] Moreover, the planters financed parts of the laboratory, knowing about its importance to make the plantations more effective. The caoutchouc, gutta-percha and teakwood plantations, launched in Buitenzorg, enriched the government, while the laboratories and the state inspectors helped actively to change the plant topography of the Dutch Indies. They imposed their cultivation systems on natives and supported the exploitation of coolie laborers in the "plantation belt" in Sumatra or in other parts of Java.[146]

Like Buitenzorg, Amani and the French and Palestine laboratories were not places where neutral scholars tried to find out some sort of truth. Instead, they were places of applied science - a means to an end, with the end being the economic development of the colonies.

The Institut Colonial International, Irrigation and the Politicization of Technology

For the colonizers, synthetic improvement of crops was meaningless if scientists did not manage to turn their knowledge into cash. A profitable plantation economy needed more than laboratories and professional instructions for planters. The ICI brought enthusiastic agronomists down to earth by reminding them that as yet there was no satisfactory infrastructure that might render farms in the "new territories" productive. One of the aims of ICI was to lay the groundwork for colonial agriculture by building or extending artificial irrigation systems, as this was vital to the "mise en valeur" of the colonized countries. A constant water supply was, in the view of ICI reformers, indispensable for agriculture, cattle breeding, mining and human settlement in general. The Dutch hydrologist R.A. van Sandick, who had studied US and

[145] C.J. Bernard, 'Le Jardin Botanique de Buitenzorg', in P. Honig and F. Verdoorn (eds.), *Science and Scientists in the Netherlands Indies* (New York, 1945), 10-15:13.
[146] Ibid., 14.

Canadian irrigation systems to apply them in the Dutch Indies, notified ICI members that "the only way of turning the soil of the new territories into capital is the use of water."[147]

Colonial theorists also praised irrigation as the panacea of colonization. Jules Duval, the theorist of French colonization in Algiers, had already claimed that "the *politique algerienne* has to be a *politique hydraulique*".[148] Otto Warburg, the head of the *Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komittee* and, as described above, one of the pioneers of the Zionist colonial agronomy in Palestine, had already promoted irrigation as the basis of the Jewish mass settlement in Palestine. Shortly before this, he had also personally organized the construction of irrigation canals along the famous *Bagdadbahn* in Anatolia, where he intended to settle Jewish cotton-growers.[149] The first precondition of growing cotton in Palestine, he claimed, was to tap the river Jordan and to introduce drip irrigation for the cotton fields. A railway line had to be built to transport the cash crops.[150]

Warburg was experienced enough to know that cash crops were only profitable if irrigation enabled their controlled cultivation and infrastructure their commercialization. Much of his knowledge derived from the ICI's comparative studies on railway construction and irrigation and its promotion as the basis of colonial exploitation, documents which were published between 1906 and 1909.[151] These studies were drafted by hydraulic engineers who had joined the ICI in order to establish a best practice of colonial irrigation. Among these were the head of the French service for public works in the colonies, Marcel Fontaneilles, the Dutch hydraulic engineer and governor of Surinam (1902-1905), Cornelis Lely, and the German engineer Theodor Rehbock, who organized irrigation systems in British South Africa. The ICI published three volumes on comparative irrigation.

The most eminent hydraulic expert in the ICI, however, was the geographer, Jean Brunhes, who had published the work *Étude de géographie humaine* on irrigation systems in Mediterranean countries in 1902.[152] It was in this study that he first introduced his term and concept of "human geography" to the French and Anglo-Saxon world, a perspective that interpreted the surface of the earth as inhabited and shaped by human beings.[153] However, it

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[147] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1907,* 47.Van Sandick held close ties to the American engineers and was an expert in North American irrigation: Van Sandick Archief, CC. Rudolf Adriaan van Sandick CC16, fol 29: 'Waterrechten en irrigatiewetgeving in Canada en de Vereenigde Staten van Noord-Amerika en lessen daaruit te trekken voor Nederlandsch-Indië', *De Ingenieur* 43 (27 October 1906) and 44 (3 November 1906).

[148] ICI*, Compte Rendu 1904*, 379.

[149] Warburg, 'Die jüdische Kolonisation'.

[150] O. Warburg, 'Über die Zukunft der Cultur von Handelspflanzen in Palästina', *Die Welt* 6 (7.2.1902), 10.

[151] ICI (ed.), *Les differentes systemes d'irrigation,* 3 vol. (Brussels, 1906-1908).

[152] J. Brunhes, *L'irrigation: Ses Conditions Géographiques, ses modes et son organisation dans la Péninsule Ibérique et dans l'Afrique du Nord : Étude de géographie humaine* (Paris, 1902).

[153] He had been inspired by Ratzel's anthropogeography and his dissertation was supervised by Paul Vidal de la Blache; his book on human geography became a "textbook" in British and US- universities: J. Brunhes, *La Géographie Humaine*

was equally an appeal to his readers to actively shape of the earth to make it more productive – although without destroying it: "Human geography is not a fact, it has to be brought about by human agency".[154] Thus, Brunhes' human geography was not only descriptive, but also embodied a performative program for cultivating the earth. By making the globe more productive, Brunhes aimed to satisfy the primary needs of human beings: food, garments, infrastructure and lodging. In his view, irrigation was the most important instrument to achieve this goal, make the soil productive and cultivate crops, cotton, and to create settlements in formerly unproductive regions. It is therefore hardly surprising that he joined the colonial movement whose legitimacy derived from the "mise en valeur", development and effective occupation of territory that was "unproductive". [155]

The human geography described by Brunhes was intrinsically anthropological and represented a shift in colonialism from geography to anthropology. It situated the labor of human beings at the origin of the remodeling of the earth's surface.[156] For Brunhes, "every human settlement is the amalgam of a bit of humanity, a bit of soil and a bit of water."[157] Following this reasoning, the possession of water was as important to colonial projects as was the possession of territory. Brunhes studied the Mediterranean irrigation model, placing a particular focus on Spain, Algeria and Egypt and in order to do this, he made use of the ICI's networks. His Spanish colleague in the ICI, Torres Campos, for example, helped him to travel Spain several times between 1893 and 1900, and put him into contact with Francisco Coello, Joaquín Costa and Rafael Altamira, the founding fathers of the Spanish colonial movement and renowned theorists of irrigation and agronomy.[158] In Algeria, he met with the engineers of the "*Ponts et Chaussées*" colonial engineering service, consulted scholars and interviewed colonists on methods of irrigation. When travelling to Egypt, he met with the British director of the irrigation service and the ICI member Auguste d'Arenberg, who headed the Suez Canal Company, and who presented Brunhes to the chief engineer of the company in Ismailia. With the latter's help, Brunhes studied the irrigation systems surrounding the Suez Canal.[159]

While Brunhes admired the Spanish and Egyptian watering systems, he described Algerian irrigation as a complete failure. Two of the barrages that had been built during the early days of colonization in the Tell Atlas broke in the 1880s, killing over 200 people. The

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3 vol. (Paris 1910); P. Deffontaines, 'La Géographie Humaine de Jean Brunhes', *Annales de Géographie* 35, 125 (1926), 268–271.
[154] M. Zimmermann, 'La Géographie Humaine d'Après Jean Brunhes', *Annales de Géographie* 20, 110 (1911), 97–111.
[155] Brunhes, *L'Irrigation: Ses Conditions*, 5.
[156] Ibid., 5.
[157] Zimmermann, 'La Géographie Humaine', 99.
[158] *Brunhes, L'Irrigation: Ses Conditions,* 13.
[159] Ibid., 16.

other seven reservoirs had silted up, which reduced their capacities to less than ten percent of the original content. Further south, in the Sahara region, the digging of too many Artesian Wells had led to an exhaustion of the water resources. This was aggravated by the construction of a fresh water canal between the Nile and the Suez Canal, which reduced the ground water level in the whole of North Africa. Despite this ongoing lack of water, the French state had not assumed any responsibility for the organization of extensive irrigation systems. Officially, the colony counted 500 private irrigation companies, but most of these were both expensive and unreliable.[160] To remedy this situation, the French colonial ministry increased the budget of missions to the Far East in order for the engineers to study and copy hydraulic systems from aqueducts to wells and irrigation systems.[161]

Unlike the Algerian disaster, Brunhes identified the Spanish system as exemplary, and he urged the French to apply one like it in their colonies. Having led to a prosperous plantation economy in the "huertas" of Southwest Spain, Brunhes explained, the irrigation system was privately organized by local associations of planters, who distributed the available water. In every city, a syndicate controlled the way by which water was distributed and a "tribunal de las aguas" settled any conflicts among customers. The construction works of canals and reservoirs were financed by the whole collectivity, and individuals with particular interests had to bow to those of the community. Brunhes described this system a "financial and administrative communism" and praised it as an example of applied human geography – omitting, however, that only the rich planter aristocracy profited from the system.[162] All the same, the Algerian authorities listened to his proposals to establish a similar system in Algeria.[163]

In many ways, Brunhes' human geography resembled the anthropological program of German colonial geographer Hans Meyer, another member of the ICI, who propagated a practical and applied colonial geography that went beyond the "metaphysical purpose of research".[164] Playing an eminent role in the German *Kolonialrat*, Meyer had convinced government in Berlin to fund a comprehensive *Länderkunde* of the colonies, a program that comprised geological, geographical and ethnographical research by *Fachmänner* (specialists)

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[160] *ICI*, *Compte Rendu 1904*, 380-388.
[161] ANOM, FM MIS 76, Carton 76, "Mission D'Osmoy Haut-Laos, Mission Hydrographique 1910", Letter from Ministère des Colonies, Bureau de l'Afrique to [?] from 20 September 1910.
[162] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1907*, 102-119.
[163] Brunhes was widely read and his advice partly followed: Commandant Laperrine to Jean Brunhes from 23.Mai 1907, cited in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1907*, 123.
[164] H. Meyer, 'Die geographischen Grundlagen und Aufgaben der wirtschaftlichen Erforschung unserer Schutzgebiete', *Verhandlungen des deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1902* (Berlin, 1902), 72-82: 81; IfL, Private Papers Hans Meyer, 169/11: Manuscript: "Die Hauptaufgaben und Methoden einer wissenschaftlichen Länderkunde der Deutschen Schutzgebiete."

as a pre-condition for their exploration and exploitation.[165] Unlike Brunhes, Meyer studied and praised the Javanese irrigation system, which he considered to be among the most sophisticated systems in the world.[166] Unlike the Spanish system of irrigation "communism", the Dutch government in Java took control of the irrigation system and centralized it in an authoritarian manner.

Many of the ICI members agreed with Meyer that Java should serve as a template for colonial irrigation. Like most of the colonies in the "new territories", Java did not have any substantial rivers that might serve as a natural source for irrigation canals. Nevertheless, it looked back on a long tradition of irrigation for the *sawah* – irrigated rice-fields that produced three and a half billion kilograms of rice by 1900. However, despite this long and successful tradition, from 1885 on, the Dutch chose to replace and enhance the traditional Javanese irrigation systems. Under the auspices of the Dutch *Waterstaat* ministry it "protected" the system of *sawah* irrigation from the extreme variations in rainfall that depended on the monsoon winds, which brought torrential rains and floods when blowing from the West and droughts when blowing from the East.

The *Waterstaat* thus centralized and organized a sophisticated irrigation system that was run by indigenous technicians under the supervision of European engineers. The engineers divided the cultivable land in Java into sectors and parcels and appointed a native assistant (*mantri*) to supervise the canals and floodgates of each section. Thanks to this controllable irrigation system, the rice cultivators sowed and harvested crops twice a year, while non-irrigated fields were cropped only once a year. Moreover, the alluvial deposits of the irrigation water served as a fertilizer for the fields. As a result, while non-irrigated fields annually produced 498 kilograms of rice per hectare (in the sub-division of Marosse, Southern Celebes), the yield of irrigated *sawahs* rose to 1,145 kilograms a year. As well as the rice fields, the cultivation of recently introduced cash crops, such as sugar cane, was thus now unthinkable without irrigation.[167]

Popularized by the ICI, Java's irrigation system was admired all over the world. In 1899 and 1903, the French colonial ministry sent several expeditions under the leadership of engineer Fernand Bernard to Java to study the system in order to help make the French colonies more productive.[168] Engineers from the Belgian Congo were also sent there to study Java's irrigation

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[165] K. Weule, 'Der Stand der ethnographischen Forschung in unseren Kolonien', *Verhandlungen des deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1905* (Berlin, 1905), 18.

[166] H. Meyer, *Niederländisch-Ostindien: Eine länderkundliche Skizze* (Berlin, 1922), 34.

[167] J.W. Post, *Rapport sur l'irrigation aux Indes orientales néerlandaises*, in: ICI (ed.), *Compte Rendu 1904,* 298-316.

[168] ANOM FM MIS 34, Carton 34: Mission d'études de l'aménagement des eaux et les travaux d'irrigation à Java en 1899 (1903); F. Bernard, *Aménagement des eaux à Java, irrigation des Rizières, Rapport établi à la suite d'une mission*

system in 1910.[169] In 1916, the American engineer George G. Stroebe, who worked for the Bureau of Public Works in Manila, visited Java and, following this visit, decided to transfer Dutch irrigation techniques to the Philippines.[170] These techniques were also widely used in African colonies, where the climate resembled that of the Javanese territories, with an uneven rain supply and both droughts and flash floods that were caught in the temporary riverbeds which were both rapidly formed and rapidly destroyed.

The attempt by the ICI to encourage the construction of irrigation systems was portrayed as a technological method, free from political purposes and conducive to realizing an ideal of "human geography" that would benefit both the colonizers and the colonized. In reality, this was by no means the case and these constructions were not at all apolitical. The Javanese example is a case in point: the construction of a state-led irrigation system by the Dutch *Waterstaat* was a central element of the propagated "ethical policy". While serious attempts were made to adjust the system to "Western" standards, these attempts were incomplete and the distribution of water profited the European cash crop plantations rather than indigenous staple food production. Moreover, the system was not financed by the Dutch state, even though the ideologists of the Dutch ethical policy (described in Chapter 4) suggested that this was the case. Rather, the construction works were financed indirectly by increasing the tax on land (*land rent*).[171] Thus, the Dutch government actually made the Javanese pay for the irrigation system, even though they did not profit from it.

Moreover, until the 1890s, the Dutch – like the British in India and other colonial powers – used coerced labor to build this system, professing that it was a "collective" project. The irrigation laws issued in the East Indies in the 1890s indeed explicitly reintroduced forced labor for the construction and maintenance of irrigation systems, while the resistance of the Javanese to the new irrigation systems and their adherence to traditional – but sustainable – methods were described as a self-destructive opposition to modernity. According to a Dutch engineer in Java, the indigenous peoples lacked the "foresight" of the European specialists. It was therefore necessary, he argued, to replace their rudimental irrigation system, which relied on temporary ditches and rotting bamboo pipes, with European stone canals and long-term planning. In the ICI meetings, he praised the Dutch for finally having introduced "rational methods" to Java.[172]

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d'études aux Indes Néerlandaises (Paris, 1903), 77. The French colonial minister sent another commission to Java, headed by Capitain Lazare: Chailley, *Java et ses habitants*, IX.

[169] 'Rapport, presenté aux Chambres par le Ministre des Colonies du 14 Septembre 1910', 17.

[170] Schumacher, *Embedded Empire*, 15.

[171] Post, *Rapport sur l'irrigation*, in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1904*, 330.

[172] Ibid., in ICI, *Compte Rendu 1904*, 312; on the masonry see F. Kreuter, *On the Design of Masonry Dams* (London, 1894).

The same sort of rationality also underpinned the aims of German hydraulic engineer Rehbock, who worked for the South African government. In 1900, the *Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee* had invited him to German South Africa to set up an irrigation system in the wastelands of the German colony. Rehbock, however, added an extra layer of interpretation by claiming in his communications with the ICI that irrigation was not only a matter of hydrological engineering, but that it was also proof of civilization.[173] The members of the ICI indeed emphasized this fact when they launched their research on irrigation at their 1905 meeting in Rome, chosen for the meeting because it was the "capital of the motherland of irrigation".[174] To consolidate his point, Rehbock also mentioned that the old civilizations, like Roman North Africa and Mesopotamia, had now "fallen back into a primitive state" with regard to their outdated methods of irrigation and organization.[175]

For his part, Brunhes supported Rehbock by claiming that nowadays different types of irrigation systems marked the differences between civilized and uncivilized countries: while abundant rain made irrigation in wet or European countries unnecessary, dry or "Oriental" countries needed irrigation for their agriculture. In wet countries, human labor had to "fight against the water", while it had to "conquer the water" in dry countries. In Brunhes' opinion, the "conquest" of water required a strong and authoritarian government that would organize its exploitation. Thus, irrigation became a metaphor for organization by an autocratic government. In his reports to the ICI, Brunhes anticipated the idea that Wittfogel went on to popularize in 1953: "Oriental despotism" originated in the need for a centralized and authoritarian management of irrigation systems. In other words, in the Orient, only strong and centralized regimes were able to introduce irrigation and organization.

The kind of distinction that Brunhes made between an irrigation-based oriental despotism and wet countries was further developed in the ICI. Its members agreed that hydraulic engineers in wet countries had built canals for *navigation* only, whereas in dry countries they were obliged to secure *irrigation* for cultivation. Members used this distinction to make a difference in irrigation construction and legislation between the territories of wet and dry countries. For the dominant group of legal experts in the ICI, irrigation was not a problem of engineering, but a question of just distribution of water by the law. In their view, justice could only be guaranteed if a central and strong authority declared the water as property of the state – and then organized its redistribution. The *Waterstaat* system in Dutch Java served as an example of such an authoritarian and centralized management of water distribution. Following

[173] T. Rehbock, *Deutsch-Südwest Afrika* (Berlin, 1898).
[174] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1905*, 66.
[175] Rehbock, *Deutsch-Südwest*, VII.

this line of reasoning, the "administrative communism" that Brunhes had identified in Spain was dismissed as insufficient. Brunhes in fact admitted that the Spanish system, which was based on the management of water by a plurality of water syndicates that were each responsible for a small sector only, was not only "communist" but became "anarchist" if the water was sold by private associations. A further example of the Spanish "collectivist" and "communist" system was provided by the French engineer, Caboche, who pointed out similarities between the latter and the Chinese system, where village communities administered the water supply.[176]

Since the colonial governments in Asia and Africa now ruled over so-called "oriental" countries, the members of the ICI concluded, they needed to establish authoritarian regimes and to declare all the water resources the property of the colonial state.[177] Private rights over water, as well as customary rights to its use, should be abolished, Dutch engineer van Sandvick advised. Colonial engineers, he claimed, had adhered to Roman law for too long, spread by Napoleon when he imposed the Civil Code on Europe. Roman law had stipulated that the state was only the owner of navigable waterways, the state thus being responsible for the waterways for *navigation,* but not for *irrigation*. In his view, the colonial governments of the twentieth century should instead emancipate themselves from Roman law and become more "despotic" with regard to the irrigation systems: they should declare all water resources as "terra nullius" and organize their centralized exploitation. This reorganization would naturally also include the expropriation of water rights traditionally held by the native populations.

Even for the most unsuspicious *Technik*, the building of irrigation systems therefore played a highly political role and these systems were used to support colonial domination. They provided an excuse for continued projects of forced labor, increased taxes, expropriations and the legitimization of "despotic" colonial governments. They also helped to divide the globe into civilized and uncivilized regions. Above all, however, these systems ignored the centuries-old indigenous traditions of sustainable irrigation and farming, with some disastrous results: European techniques and technologies exhausted the water reserves in large tracts of the colonized territories. Although some rice paddies in Java yielded more profits, for example, others were destroyed by the inappropriate water used to irrigate them. Moreover, the increased surface of standing water became a fertile breeding ground for the anopheles mosquito and led to a rise in cases of malaria.[178]

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[176] ICI *Compte Rendu 1907*, 87 and 116.
[177] See K.A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparitive Study of Total Power* (New Haven, 1957); R.C. Hunt, 'Communal Irrigation. A comparative perspective' and W. Wolters, 'Geographical explanations for the distribution of irrigation institutions. Cases from Southeast Asia', in P. Boomgard (ed.), *A World of Water* (Leyden, 2007), 188 and 210.
[178] Moon, *Technology and Ethical Idealism*, 26f.

The techniques used for irrigation were, like so many technology transfers to the colonies, a myth of the ideology of development. These techniques served political purposes and were used to justify colonial rule, while legitimizing domination and forced labor. In this sense they can be seen as typical of the ICI's "political" use of technology and colonial techniques. The irrigation debate reveals very clearly the culturally biased thinking of the colonial reformers in the 1890s. In a similar way, portraying the ICI and Buitenzorg as apolitical laboratories of modernity and their employees as engineers of progress undoubtedly helped to justify colonial rule.

Chapter 6

The Invention of Legal Anthropology: Colonial Internationalism and the Manipulation of Native Law

The simultaneous rise of colonial internationalism and native policy during the 1890s was no coincidence. These two paradigms of *fin de siècle* colonialism were interdependent. A new epistemology of the "native" arose from the transnational exchange among experts, who shared their knowledge about colonized societies. Expert cooperation resulted in a convergent accumulation of information about colonized societies. Administrators sought to profit from this knowledge and applied it to their own benefit, in close cooperation with ethnographic, linguistic, or legal experts to whom nationality was less important than their profession. Internationalism shifted the attention away from assimilation and directed it towards the indigenous populations. The colonizers were also quick to learn how to use and manipulate "nativeness" for their own purposes.

This chapter unveils how ICI experts and their informants used indigenous knowledge and manipulated customary law to sustain or legitimize colonial rule. For the ICI experts, customary law was key to both understanding and modifying colonial societies. Driven by the assumption that "native milieus" produced specific customs that in turn determined everyday life, they hoped to grasp the nature of colonized societies by analyzing their customs. Proponents of this functionalist notion of "customary law" claimed that community rules were not autonomous from the societies that produced them. On the contrary, they were deeply entangled with religion, kinship, economy, and notions of property.[1] This idea set the stage for a new science of law, called ethnographic jurisprudence or legal anthropology by theorists close to the ICI.[2]

By launching trans-colonial projects of anthropological research on customary law, ICI members and their collaborators modernized anthropology. As I show in this chapter, they developed a functionalist and constructivist take on native societies. They did not always define them as immobile "tribal" communities, but tried to do justice to their flexibility and plurality.

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[1] A. Billiard, 'Étude sur la condition politique et juridique à assigner aux indigènes des colonies', in Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale (ed.), *Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale 1900,* vol. 2 (Paris, 1901), 5–53, 38 and 42; A.H. Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz* vol. 1 (Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1894), 1.

[2] A.H. Post and S.J.B. Sugden, 'Ethnological Jurisprudence', *Monist* 2, 1 (1891), 31–40; L. Adam, 'Modern Ethnological Jurisprudence in Theory and Practice', *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law* 16, 4 (1934), 216–229.

Ethnic predetermination was secondary to them, whereas environmental predetermination or "nativeness" was their primary concern when analyzing societies in the colonies. The notion of "nativeness" led them to embrace cultural relativism. Natives, they claimed, had to "develop within their own milieu." To study and understand those native milieus was the task of "modern" anthropologists.

I claim in this chapter that the ICI's modern anthropology helped to manipulate native customs and to use them for colonial purposes. Anthropological research went hand in hand with vast projects to codify native law. Legal anthropology became a means to re-interpret or even invent native notions of sovereignty, property, family, penal law or martial law. I show how colonial anthropologists immersed themselves in those domains, manipulating them to justify conquest, dispossession, repression, or even genocidal wars. In doing so, they could use allegedly "native" arguments to justify colonial domination. Thus, while foreshadowing the twentieth century functionalist anthropology, the colonial internationalists also invented legal anthropology as a strategy of colonial domination. This chapter unveils the ambiguities inherent to this process and shows that behind the ICI's propagation of cultural relativism and native policy lay the desire to sustain colonial policy.[3]

All of the international experts in native law faced the same problem in colonial territories: how to combine elements of African customs, Islamic prescriptions, and European laws in order to rule the colonies in the most efficient way. Their combination brought about a myriad of different regulations and resulted in an organized hybridization of colonial law. The "native" as a legal category, for example, emerged from the need to pin down the personal status of the colonized. Whereas ethnicity, language ("Arabs", "Swahili"), civilizational status ("savages") or religion (Muslims, Hindus, animists) were in frequent use to label otherness before the 1880s, the stabilization of colonial rule required a more precise legal distinction. From the 1880s onwards, colonial subjects were referred to as the "natives." To express the double standards in colonial law, authorities pretended to apply distinct codes to the colonizers and the colonized. The *code de l'indigénat*, along with the codifications of *Eingeborenenrecht* and *adat* laws exemplify this connection between legislation and indigeneity. In the eyes of the legislators, the term "native", "*indigène*" or "*Eingeborener*" was more useful than any other

[3] E. Burke, *The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam* (Berkeley, 2014); Trumbull, *An Empire of Facts*.

category.[4] It expressed a notion of cultural and environmental relativism, which claimed that a different milieu required different laws and customs.[5]

The strict duality between indigenous and European law, however, was a myth. The European invention of "native law" was only one of many strategies to justify colonial rule. Even if not intentional, misinterpretations of indigenous culture were inevitable. This chapter does not unravel these legal entanglements. Instead it analyzes different situations in which "indigenous law" or "European law" were invoked to serve particular interests. I will show the ICI's role in launching international projects of ethnographic jurisprudence to codify customary law in Sub-Saharan Africa. In several surveys, they produced knowledge about natives that served as *Herrschaftswissen* (knowledge for domination) in the fields of collectivity, property and sovereignty. The invention and manipulation of native law was particularly important for imagined laws of warfare.

This chapter challenges conventional assumptions about colonial legislation at the end of the nineteenth century. Unlike Lauren Benton, who emphasized the plurality of coexisting colonial laws, I will stress their subsidiary character. Both European and native courts existed in the colonies, with European courts sitting in the bigger cities and acting as courts of appeal (for example Boma in the Congo Free State or Saigon for Indochina).[6] On the one hand, the colonized could theoretically chose to present their case to a European court, if they could afford the fees (which were occasionally below the fees in native courts) and the travel costs to reach the major cities. On the other hand, European courts reserved the right to pronounce judgments on crimes disturbing the "public order." Out of fear of revolts, any crime could be ranked as "political crime" and thus fall within the competence of the European courts. This explains why the verdicts of native judges were frequently double-checked by European administrators.[7] In most cases, however, the general governor possessed full jurisdictional power. He was able to decide on the life and death of convicts. And he could expropriate any property in the name of "public interest." The governors' decisions were above the law and outranked the verdicts of

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[4] I am aware that those terms are highly disrespectful and taken from the language of the colonizers. For the sake of readability I will use them throughout this chapter mostly without quotation marks.

[5] Colonial governments needed to define the "natives" as a legal category: BArch, R1001, 5560: "Reichs-Kolonialamt betreffend Entscheidungen und Sachen der Eingeborenengeichtsbarkeit in Bezirksämtern," Nr. 8-9: Denkschrift über die Eingeborenenrechtssprechung; International overviews are rare, the best account is Burke, *The Ethnographic State*.

[6] For the Court of Appeal in Boma see: K. Stengel, *Der Kongostaat.* (Munich, 1903), 22.
For Saigon: Girault, *Principes de Colonisation*, 21.

[7] Billiard, 'Étude sur la condition politique et juridique à assigner aux indigènes des colonies'. Étude sur la condition politique et juridique à assigner aux indigènes des colonies, 21; B. Durand, 'Originalité et exemplarité de la justice en Algérie (de la conquête à la Seconde Guerre mondiale)', *Histoire de la justice* 16, 1 (2005), 45.

European courts, which again stood above native courts.[8] The system was therefore not "plural" but hierarchically ordered and therefore subsidiary.

The idea of legal pluralism is intrinsically linked to the notion of legal relativism. Propagated by colonial theorists of the late nineteenth century, like Arthur Girault and Félicien Cattier, legal relativism was at the heart of the idea that different milieus require different laws. Therefore, a native law had to exist separately from European law. This concept of moral relativism evoked the idea that legal regimes are separate but equal. This chapter will expose this notion as a myth, claiming that legal regimes were neither separate nor equal. Nevertheless, historians of the twenty-first centuries still follow Girault and Cattier in declaring relativism a main feature of colonial law.[9] In reality, relativism was diluted in many ways. First of all, the superposition of Islamic law in Africa and Asia transformed "native customs" to a high degree. More importantly for the colonial period, Europeans set out to define and codify native law. In doing so, they formally ordered it according to European taxonomies or deformed its content. Native law was a European invention and therefore cannot be separated from European mindsets.[10]

In terms of chronology, historians of colonial sociology used to assume that a sophisticated native policy, which manifested itself in the codification of "native customs," emerged only as late as in the inter-war period. Anthony Anghie, in particular, highlighted the birth of colonial engineering with the help of native arguments after the First World War. According to him, international institutions like the League of Nations stood for the use of sociological and anthropological knowledge while watching over the mandates powers' respect and protection of nativity.[11] By contrast, I argue that the ICI played an important part in inventing "native policy". Richard Roberts, emphasizing the role of ICI members Maurice Delafosse and Ernest Roume in French West Africa, confirms the invention of customary law at the turn of the century.[12] The ICI members' knowledge about African societies was much more sophisticated and varied than the superficial notions of the League's members.

Mahmood Mamdani has demonstrated that elements of such a "native policy" can be traced back to the 1860s, and were responsive to the so-called Sepoy rebellion (1859). Going beyond the British realm, Mamdani's main protagonist is Christiaan Snouck-Hurgronje, a

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[8] O. Depont, 'Aperçu sur l'administration des indigènes musulmans en Algérie', in Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale (ed.), *Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale 1900,* vol. 2 (Paris, 1901), 59- 60.
[9] Saada, 'Penser le fait colonial'.
[10] See the classic on the British case, M. Chanock, *Law, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia* (Cambridge, 1985).
[11] Anghie, 'Colonialism and the Birth'.
[12] R.L. Roberts, *Litigants and Households: African Disputes and Colonial Courts in the French Soudan, 1895-1912* (Portsmouth, 2005), 35-70.

Dutch ICI member who was crucial in spreading the idea of using the natives for colonial purposes during the 1890s. He and others, Mamdani argues, replaced “divide and rule” strategies with “define and rule” practices.[13] Defining customs by codifying them was part of the process of the manipulation. It goes without saying that those definitions were more efficient if they were internationally accepted. The joint projects of ICI members to define and rule by codifying native customs gained importance because they spread anthropological knowledge across different empires. This knowledge was manipulated and intentionally – or sometimes unintentionally – misinterpreted the nature of colonized societies.

The Dedication of Colonial Internationalists to Native Policy

Colonial internationalists declared ethnographic knowledge their cultural capital.[14] Unsurprisingly, it often materialized into monetary capital. Ethnographic knowledge enabled many of them to build transnational academic careers and earned them a standing in an international epistemic community. Some saw their research funded by interested colonial governments: on the initiative of ICI experts, the Algerian colonial government sponsored the famous Encyclopedia of Islam – a transnational compilation of Orientalist knowledge with contributions from several ICI experts.[15] Other ICI members, like the specialists on African societies Félix Meyer or Maurice Delafosse, collected and compiled native customs for the purpose of codifying customary law.[16] Colonial governments generously supported their project. It is not surprising that orientalists and ICI members, such as Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, Marcel Morand, or Carl Heinrich Becker were directly employed to head the indigenous affairs departments of the Dutch, German or French colonies respectively.[17] Their expertise derived from sleepless nights of self-directed studies. More importantly, the expertise was due to an extensive and enthusiastic correspondence with their international colleagues.[18]

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[13] Mamdani, *Define and Rule*, 42; See also K. Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton et al., 2010).

[14] G. Steinmetz, ‘The Colonial State as a Social Field: Ethnographic Capital and Native Policy in the German Overseas Empire before 1914’, *American Sociological Review* 73, 4 (2008), 589–612

[15] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A275: Letter from Doutté to Snouck from 16.06.1904; Or. 8952 A276: Letter from Doutté to Snouck from 28.12.1909.

[16] Roberts, *Litigants and Households*; Amselle and Sibeud, *Maurice Delafosse*.

[17] A. Haridi, *Das Paradigma der "islamischen Zivilisation" - oder, Die Begründung der deutschen Islamwissenschaft durch Carl Heinrich Becker (1876-1933): Eine wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (Würzburg, 2005); O. Arabi, ‘Orienting the Gaze: Marcel Morand Ans the Codification of Le droit Musulman Algerien’, *Journal of Islamic Studies* 11, 1 (2000), 43–72; See also F.v. Benda-Beckmann and K.v. Benda-Beckmann, ‘Myths and Stereotypes about Adat Law: A Reassessment of Van Vollenhoven in the Light of Current Struggles Over Adat Law in Indonesia’, *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia* 167, 2-3 (2011), 167–195.

[18] In particular: ULCSH, Or. 8952; C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Scholarship and Friendship in Early Islamwissenschaft : The letters of C. Snouck Hurgronje to J. Goldziher* (Leiden 1985); Koningsveld, *Orientalism and Islam*.

While an international trend towards colonial sociology gathered pace in the late 1880s, it was the colonial internationalists who declared it the basis of an applied native policy overseas. At the 1900 International Congress for Colonial Sociology, ICI members heralded cultural relativism as the new paradigm of colonial policies. The Congress, they claimed, marked a watershed that divided colonial history in two eras, one assimilationist and the other relativist. The respect for native culture and customs should give the colonized the possibility to "develop within their own milieu." These were the words of the ICI's experts in colonial law, Arthur Girault and Félicien Cattier, who inspired and gave direction to the congress.[19]

The ICI did not only make knowledge about native milieus available to experts, but it also gave them access to administrations overseas or colonial ministries in the metropole. On the one hand, the ICI was an epistemic community and provided a transnational network for experts to gain knowledge about native milieus and to acquire anthropologic capital. Membership in the ICI made them experts. On the other hand, those experts used the ICI's "high connectivity" to receive information from colonial governments or offer them their expertise. When German lawyer Félix Meyer launched a project to collect and codify native customs in the colonies, he used the ICI to distribute questionnaires among all European administrators in Africa. Governor Ernest Roume, who was a member of the ICI before he became governor of French West Africa in 1902, answered the survey enthusiastically. This chapter shows how important those international networks were to produce knowledge about native milieus.

Law, in particular, was the domain in which the members of the ICI drew a sharp line between European and native milieus. The ICI founder Joseph Chailley emphasized that moral relativism, which outlawed the diffusion of Eurocentric legal concepts: "laws are not the expression of the will of human beings, but of the moeurs [customs] determined by the local and historical circumstances."[20] According to him, the best way to legislate in the colonies was the recourse to native law. All colonial internationalists shared his view. After attending the International Congress for Colonial Sociology, 400 delegates from all colonizing countries, among them politicians and representatives of the French Colonial Union, the German Colonial Society and the Aborigines Protection Society, spread the word: "native policy" became the new paradigm of colonial management.[21]

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[19] A. Girault, 'Condition des Indigènes au Point de vue de la législation civile et criminelle et de la distribution de la justice', in: Exposition Universelle Internationale de 1900, *Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale, tenu à Paris du 6 au 11 Aout 1900,* vol 1*: Rapport des Procès-Verbaux des Séances* (Paris, 1901), 52-53.

[20] Chailley in discussion 'La Meilleure manière de légiférer pour les colonies', in ICI, *Compte Rendu 1904*, 79.

[21] Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale (ed.), *Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale 1900,* vol. 2 (Paris, 1901).

To a certain extent, ICI members did not only generate an epistemology of the natives, but even gave room to native epistemology: their knowledge derived from projects of cooperation with their non-European informants. A truly unprecedent aspect of the project was that the fact that the agency of the colonized was no longer restricted to the colonial *praxis*, which had always been hybrid; now, non-European knowledge carried weight in colonial *theory*, which had hitherto been explicitly Eurocentric. Moreover, native knowledge became the most legitimate argument among the international epistemic communities. Experts who did not argue along native lines – or valued their national interests over those of humanity – lost credibility as experts.

Needless to say that opportunities for non-Europeans to manipulate European colonial theory were few. The colonized were rarely manipulators, sometimes cooperators, but mostly collaborators. When the organizers of the 1900 International Congress for Colonial Sociology invited Africans for the very first time to contribute to European colonial theory, they chose two Algerians who put the case for French rule over Algeria: The theologian and professor at the madrasa in Tlemcen, Abdessalam Abou Bekr ben Choaïb asserted that legal assimilation of Algerians to the French *code civil* was impossible, because the Muslim *ummah* was both a religious and political community. According to him, Muslims were unable to distinguish between the religious and the civil status of individuals, and becoming a French citizen entailed renouncing the Muslim religion. In his argumentation, Ben Choaïb endorsed the French policy to refuse citizenship to Muslims by using arguments taken from Muslim law.[22] Another Algerian, the *qāḍī* of Tlemcen, Aboubakr Si Chāïb, tutored congress members about how to make Algerian Muslims sell their lands, and how to turn collective tribal lands (*arch*) into private property. With the collaboration of Algerian *qāḍī*s, he argued, land could be more easily confiscated.[23] This land could be made available to French colonists. The choice to let these Francophile Algerians speak at the International Congress of Colonial Sociology reveals the manipulative use of native collaborators to substantiate European colonial claims.[24] "Native policy," rendered legitimate by the consideration of a presumed "native law," was a colonial

[22] Abdesselam Ben Choaïb, Abou Bekr, 'De l'Assimilation des Indigènes Musulmans de l'Algérie aux Francais', in Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale (ed.), *Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale 1900,* vol. 2 (Paris, 1901), 145–147; See for his publications in French: Abdesselam Ben Choaïb, Abou Bekr, *Répertoire de jurisprudence musulmane algérienne et tunisienne (statut personnel et successions)* (Alger, 1923); For his collaboration with French administrators: Abdesselam Ben Choaïb, Abou Bekr and P. Baur, *Mon Interprète: Grammaire - Dialogues français - Arabes - Vocabulaire* (Oran, 1913).

[23] A. Si Chāïb, 'Note de Si Chāïb, Cadi de Tlemcen (Algérie)', in Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale (ed.), *Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale 1900,* vol. 2 (Paris, 1901), 140–144; For Si Chāïb's collaboration with the French government, especially during the First World War, see 'Appel du Comité de 'l'arrondissement de Tlemcen '', *Courrier de Tlemcen* (12.3.1920).

[24] The same goes for other pro-French Algerians like Abū Naẓẓāra, see Trumbull, *An Empire of Facts*, 46-48, 55.

strategy. The colonizers' native policy tended to be a method, rather than a purpose of colonial policy.

Ethnographic jurisprudence, the leading European expert in colonial law Arthur Girault remarked, did not only serve scientific interests, but could also be applied to achieve political goals. The colonial state was particularly interested in the "essential social institutions" of customary law, family and property. Studying comparatively, Girault argued, was at the heart of all colonial sociology.[25] The identification of analogies in different colonies all over the world might then help to improve colonial legislation. As a consequence, the ICI worked hard to find the "best way to legislate in the colonies" and published a *Recueil International de Legislation Coloniale*, in which it collected and compared colonial laws.[26] Colonial administrations overseas regularly sent information about colonial legislation to the ICI, which printed them in the *Recueil* or in special editions.[27] While the *Recueil* was underfunded and appeared regularly only after 1910, the trans-colonial projects of ICI members to codify native law started in the 1890s. Although the resulting legal codes were not officially applied they shaped the thinking of colonial administrators and theorists of colonial law in Europe alike.

The International Colonial Institute and the Invention of Ethnographic Jurisprudence

The recruitment of experts of native law by colonial governments in general, and departments of native affairs in particular, went hand in hand with the institutionalization of international knowledge transfers. The concerted effort to understand native customs was not only international but also interdisciplinary: lawyers, administrators, anthropologists and linguists joined forces in order to offer timely conclusions on which colonial officials could then ground their policy. As early as 1895, the Internationale Vereinigung für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (IVVR) made an attempt to systematically compile the customary law of African and Oceanian peoples. The main instigator of this transnational project was Felix Meyer, who had joined the ICI in 1894 and created the IVVR almost simultaneously. The systematic collection of customary law in European colonies was his brainchild. Funded by the

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[25] Girault, *Principes de colonisation et*, 532, See for the interest in property BArch, R1001/5529/1: Akten betreffend die Zusammenstellung der Resolutionen des Reichstags bezüglich der Rechtssprechung in den Schutzgebieten, Abschrift Der Staatssekretär des Reichskolonialamtes Lindequist an Herrn Gouverneur Daressalam vom 30.5.1911.

[26] Institut Colonial International, *Recueil international de législation coloniale, publié sous le patronage de l'Institut colonial international* (Bruxelles, 1911); the Recueil appeared in 1911 for the first time and was funded by several colonial governments but had severe financial difficulties: BArch R 1001/5530 Belgian Colonial Minister Renkin to Camille Janssen from 6.12.1912; Ernst Vohsen to Reichskolonialamt from 26.11. 1912 see among many other publications: C.T. Deventer and Institut Colonial International, *La meilleure manière de légiférer pour les colonies* (Bruxelles, 1905).

[27] BArch R 1001/6187, 82, "Auf den Erlass vom 3.3.1909 Nr. KA VI 2094/11584, Nr, 132 betreffend das Internationale Koloniale Institut in Brüssel"; R1001/6187, 74: "Kaiserliches Gouvernement von Togo from 18.6.1909: Betrifft Anfrage des Internationalen Kolonial-Instituts in Brüssel."

Colonial Department of the German Foreign Ministry, the German Colonial Society and Chailley's Union Coloniale Française, Meyer's team sent questionnaires to administrators, missionaries, overseas merchants, and even consulted non-Europeans.[28] The men on the spot reported back and provided detailed ethnographic information on seventeen different peoples living in Africa and Oceania. In many cases, it took several years to receive the answers, and it was not until 1903 that a Dutchman, S.R. Steinmetz, assessed and published them.[29]

The transnational character of the IVVR's project offered two potential advantages: it reduced political preoccupations to a minimum and allowed for a cross-border analysis of the customs that determined the life of ethnic groups. Thus, Meyer's initial purpose was anthropological rather than administrative – and therefore more scientific than political.[30] Anthropologists and missionaries set the tone, while colonial ministries kept a low profile in drafting the questionnaire. Moreover, transnational cooperation enabled the anthropologists to analyze the social life of the Bakwiri, the Bambara, the Malinké, the Waganda, the Herero or Khoi – with disregard to their separation by colonial borders and administrative units.

Searching for ubiquity rather than for specialty, Felix Meyer and his team tried to detect similarities of customs throughout the colonial world, instead of distinguishing differences between tribal units. Thus, contrary to European imaginations of African inertia the survey did not always treat these ethnic groups as immobile tribes. Informed survey questions assumed the groups' flexible openness and enquired about native groups' strategies to integrate foreigners into genealogically defined communities. Other questions highlighted the role of family, religion, political organization, guilds, secret societies, social stratification and castes – identities that were transverse to the merely "tribal" structure of society.

Meyer's project valued the concept of the "indigenous population" or the "natives" [this is my translation of *Eingeborene*, meaning "belonging to a particular place by birth"] over the

[28] BArch R 1001/5530 Schreiben Internationale Vereinigung für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, Felix Meyer an Kolonialabteilung im AA, Berlin 3.3.1896; Meyer (IVVR) to Kolonialabteilung im AA, Berlin from 7.[3?]. 1896; See for Felix Meyer approaching Chailley for help ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912,* 203 ; It was the lawyer A.H. Post from Bremen who drafted the questionnaire. See A. Lyall, 'Early German Legal Anthropology. Albert Hermann Post and His Questionnaire', *Journal of African Law* 52, 1 (2008); Enhanced by Meyer and his collaborator Kohler, the questionnaire integrated elements of British, French and various German specimen, among them the famous edition J.G. Garson and Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, *Notes and Queries on Anthropology* (London, 1892); For other drafts see: F. Luschan, *Instruktion für ethnographische Beobachtungen und Sammlungen in Deutsch-Ostafrika. Zsgest. im Auftr. d. Direktion d. Königl. Museums f. Völkerkunde in Berlin* (Berlin 1896); H. Seidel, *Instruktion für ethnographische Beobachtungen und Sammlungen in Togo* (Berlin 1897).

[29] S.R. Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien: Beantwortungen des Fragebogens der Internationalen Vereinigung für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre zu Berlin* (Berlin, Heidelberg 1903), III; See also: M. Schröder, *Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht in den deutschen Schutzgebieten Schwarzafrikas* (Münster, 1997), 23.

[30] For the internationalism of German anthropology see: H.G. Penny and M. Bunzl, *Worldly Provincialism: German Anthropology in the Age of Empire* (Chicago, 2003); A. Zimmerman, 'German anthropology and the "natural peoples": the global context of colonial discourse', *The European Studies Journal* 16, 2 (1999), 95–112.

concept of the "tribe." According to him, indigenous peoples were less determined by their ethnicity or tribal belonging, but predominantly by their nativeness (meaning environmentally determined and not ethnically). Meyer understood the colonial world as one entity inhabited by *Eingeborene*, and not as a space fragmented into tribal sections.[31] Therefore, the survey's taxonomy aimed at a universal understanding of essential laws that governed native societies. In compliance with environmental explications of human diversity (see Chapter Three), Meyer presupposed that human beings were determined by their natural and social environment rather than by their ethnic descent. It is therefore hardly surprising that Meyer's team preferred to speak of "native" customs rather than of "tribal" usages. Unlike the pejorative expression "tribe," his term "native" [*Eingeborene*] implied that natives were superior to any outsider as long as they functioned within their natural milieu. ICI founder Van der Lith argued along those lines at a conference organized by Meyer.[32] According to them, all humans were "native" to the milieu into which they were born, while only backward humans were part of a "tribe."

For all its advantages, however, being "native" was prejudicial to those who were forced to leave their natural environment. If the natives were alienated from their natural environment, ICI members argued, they were both vulnerable and a potential danger, for they would try by all available means to protest against the alienation.[33] Imposing foreign – particularly European – laws on them would create such a situation. Colonial officials should therefore judge the natives by their own standards and apply their own law to them. It was the task of science to explore this law, but the task of politics to apply it. After all, colonial administrators were striving toward a customary code that could be applied to *all* of their colonial subjects. Science and politics converged.

The premature version of anthropological functionalism that characterized the IVVR's approach to native societies served political purposes.[34] Dismissing the essentialist notions of native immobility, Meyer's team portrayed the indigenous customs as being functional to their everyday life. In doing so, the IVVR co-founded functionalist anthropology as a modern science, which tried to do justice to socially constructed indigenous societies. The paradigm of functionalism and constructivism, in turn, helped colonial administrators to manipulate customary law for their own purpose. If native law was functionalist and the African society

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[31] See for the simultaneous emergence of the 'native' and its use in colonial law BArch, R 1001, 5543: Festlegung des Begriffes "Eingeborener."

[32] Van der Lith, P.A., 'Rechtsverhältnisse in Niederändisch-Indien', in F. Meyer and Bernhöft (eds.), *Jahrbuch der Internationalen Vereinigung für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft* (Berlin, 1898), 1–21: 6.

[33] This were the words of Arthur Girault, cited in Ageron, *France coloniale ou parti colonial?*, 197.

[34] Generally, the introduction of methodological functionalism is ascribed to Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942): M. Young, *Malinowski: Odyssey of an Anthropologist, 1884-1920* (New Haven, 2004), 591. I use the term functionalism to describe an approach that subordinated history to sociology and subordinated individual needs and interests to a holistic cultural determinism.

constructed, it was possible to mollify and "modernize" both to adjust them to a colonial setting. The colonizers did not refrain from constructing their own native law and invent their own native society in the domains of family, sovereignty, property and notions of collectivity. Functionalist anthropology was therefore an essential strategy for colonial rule.

Meyer's team formulated questions that did justice to social constructivism in African societies, without reverting to essentialist notions of immobile tribes. Their constructivist approach did not contradict the drawing up of a comprehensive inventory of lifestyle and customs of the *Naturvölker* (indigenous people) living in Africa and Oceania. The inaugurating question tended to understand these groups as linguistic groups rather than territorially or ethnically determined units. It did not confine them to territorial or biological borders. Moreover, the questionnaire highlighted their mobility not only by asking if they were nomadic or sedentary, but also investigated if they understood themselves as natives (*Eingeborene*) or as immigrants (*Eingewanderte*).[35]

An extensive section was devoted to family life. Choosing a constructivist approach, the questioners did not have a rigid classification in mind, but wanted to know what the Africans thought of themselves. Thus, questions concerning genealogy and pedigree aimed at knowing how West Africans imagined their own descent, and what role ancestors played for their present. Given this attitude, questions about the creation of "artificial kinship" – for example by placing children into foster care of a foreign family – are hardly surprising. Arranged marriage as a means to bring about kinship was analyzed in detail, with special attention given to polygamy and its social function. Information about the rights and duties of the spouses were deemed important to determine the head of the family and its "legal" competence to ban, sell, chastise or even kill other family members. The status of the "other" family members, the survey emphasized, was dynamic and varied according to generation (childhood, adolescence, majority, marital age or seniority). Even the head of the family, originally disposing of despotic powers, might be degraded due to old age senility. By the same token, a family patriarch could be revoked if failing to provide the means of subsistence for the family.[36]

Adding to this functionalist view of family life, the survey assumed a relatively high degree of political organization within African societies. On the one hand, it hoped to identify patterns of social stratification that distinguished between aristocracy, priests, commoners and a group of unfree prisoners of war or slaves. On the other, it asked for political hierarchies, with

[35] A.H. Post, 'Fragebogen', in S.R. Steinmetz (ed.), *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien: Beantwortungen des Fragebogens der Internationalen Vereinigung für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre zu Berlin* (Berlin and Heidelberg, 1903), 1.
[36] Ibid., 2-7.

kings, chiefs or headmen on the top. Meyer's team was particularly interested in the leaders' role as sovereigns. Did they decide on war and peace? Did they own crown land or the entire public domain? Did they have the right to levy taxes? To evaluate the leaders' power, the survey also asked for competing social institutions. Those included priests, guilds, secret societies, associations based age groups, municipalities, bureaucracy and councils with parliamentary competence. Even forms of a public civil society that gathered in public "palavers" or court trials was taken into account. To analyze this social and political plurality was one of the primordial goals of the survey. As we will see, the plurality and flexibility of African societies helped the colonizers to legitimize their rule.[37]

If Meyer's survey emphasized the plurality and dynamic of African societies, it nevertheless continued to label them as collectivist rather than individualist. This essential difference can be observed in customary law. Customary law created legal communities through kinship that was imposed by succession and inheritance laws. Inheritance law, both in its patrilineal and matrilineal manifestations, was of special interest to Meyer's commission. The analysis of the alleged "communist" mode of social organization – as opposed to legal individualism in Europe – also helped to answer one of the most urgent questions of the survey: To what extent did families, villages or "tribes" assume collective responsibility for one of their members? Was a community liable for the payments of debts accumulated by one of its members? Was an individual member of a community allowed to sell segments of collectively owned land? Were taxes paid collectively or individually? Did traditions of collective punishment exist, including feuds and retaliation as legitimate legal procedures?

The notion of legal collectivism set off an avalanche of questions that were at the very heart of civil law, commercial law, tax law, penal law and property law. The commission treated notions of collective property law in extensive detail. Assessing the right to use public domain (forests, fishing grounds, pastures, etc.) was as important as identifying potential crown land owned by a sovereign but used by the people. There was no doubt that the colonizers had to be familiar with those customs if they wanted to rule – or even legislate – in their overseas possessions. The IVVR's survey tried to provide answers on an international scale and thus laid the basis for a codification of customary law.[38]

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[37] Ibid., 7-9.

[38] S.R. Steinmetz (ed.), *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien: Beantwortungen des Fragebogens der Internationalen Vereinigung für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre zu Berlin* (Berlin and Heidelberg, 1903), 1-13; See fort he collectivity problem: Henri Rolin, 'Du respect des coutumes indigènes relatives aux biens et aux personnes dans l'Afrique australe et centrale', in Institut Colonial International (ed.), *Compte Rendu de la Session tenue en 1921* (Brussels, 1921), 259–362: 271.

When the first questionnaire of the IVVR arrived in French Sudan, its governor was enthusiastic about the project. He addressed a circular to all regions, districts and the remotest military post, urging administrators to answer the IVVR's questionnaire and to provide them with ethnographic knowledge. He made clear that he attaches "great importance to this project – *not only* from a scientific point of view and because it is our duty to contribute to the project of the Internationaler Verein by sending them comprehensive and thoroughly researched documents – *but also* because this study is of highest value for those who come to serve in Sudan after us or who are interested in this colony."[39] Inspired by the project, administrators, such as François Clozel in Ivory Coast, embarked on the mission to collect local customs and published its results at the turn of the century.[40]

Clozel's research and the IVVR survey provided the basis for a more sophisticated project, which was launched after France reorganized the colonial federation of French West Africa (AOF) in 1903.[41] After the ICI member Ernest Roume had become governor-general of French West Africa in 1903, he initiated the reorganization of the AOF's *service de justice*. On 10 November 1903, he issued a decree that "guaranteed to the Africans in the Federation [AOF] the maintenance of their customs, adapted to their social conditions and civilizational degrees, as long as they do not contradict the essential principles of humanity."[42] Undoubtedly, this was the language Roume had learned to speak as an ICI member, in accordance with his colleagues who had promoted this formula as their guiding principle as early as the 1890s.

Roume elaborated on the decree in a circular note from 1905, in which he urged native courts to apply either the *Mālikī* rite of Koranic law or local customary law, according to regional traditions. To avoid arbitrary froms of justice, however, it was Roume's long-term objective to "gradually bring about a rational classification and a generalization of those customs that are compatible with the social conditions of the inhabitants. These customs must be made conform, not to the metropolitan law, to which they might be diametrically opposed, but to the fundamental principles of natural law, which are the source of all legislation."[43] Bearing this mission in mind, administrators collected and compared local customs, searching for similarities as a basis for codification.

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[39] 'Note-Circulairedu Lieutenant-Gouverneur du Soudan du 13.01.1897', in J. Ortoli and A. Aubert (eds.), *Coutumiers juridiques de l'Afrique occidentale française* (Paris, 1939), 1–2.
[40] F. Clozel and R. Villamur (eds.), *Les coutumes indigènes de la Côte d'Ivoire: Documents* (Paris, 1902).
[41] See on those projects Roberts, *Litigants and Households*.
[42] "garantissant aux Africains de cette Fédération le maintien de leurs coutumes, appropriées à leurs formes sociales et à leur dégrée propre de civilisation, sauf en ce qui serait contraire aux principes essentiels de l'Humanité" : J. Ortoli and A. Aubert (eds.), *Coutumiers juridiques de l'Afrique occidentale française* (Paris, 1939), 3.
[43] "d'amener peu à peu à une classification rationelle, une généralisation des usages compatibles avec la condition sociale des habitants et de se rendre ces usages de plus en plus conformes, non point à nos doctrines juridiques métropolitaines qui peuvent être opposés, mais aux principes fondamentaux du droit naturel, source première de toutes les législations" Ibid., 3-4.

In the meantime, François Clozel had become governor of Ivory Coast and proceeded with the systematic publication of various ethnographical observations made by him or his colleague.[44] Clozel entrusted ICI-member and Arabist Maurice Delafosse with the systematization of this knowledge. Delafosse, who translated and edited the Arabic *Tarikh-el-fattash*, a history of seventeenth centuries Songhai and Mali empires in central Africa, was no stranger to the region. He headed the newly established codification commission.[45] Like the IVVR's project, Delafosse's commission sent a questionnaire to all administrators. They had five years to compose their studies which would provide the basis for a colonial civil law code. Delafosse's survey resembled the IVVR's template, although it was less hesitant in applying the term "tribe." It nevertheless followed the IVVR's questionnaire in highlighting the tribes' dynamic and ethnic flexibility with detailed questions about adoption procedures and guardianship. To describe this extended family network, Delafosse created the new term "global family," which he defined as a constructed group that was headed by a patriarch and open to the integration of new elements.[46] Adding to the notion that the "global family" was at the basis of all native societies, the fieldwork of Delafosses' collaborators included the analysis of penal law and collective punishment, sovereignty and domain land, and notions of collective property. Clozel's and Delafosse's questionnaire turned out to be much more detailed than the IVVR's pioneering survey. Along with other French studies in ethnographic jurisdiction, it served as model for a new codification program in Germany.[47]

In the aftermath of the so-called Maji-Maji (1905-1907) and Herero wars (1904-1908), the German government initiated a new collection of native laws in 1907. The need for a new project emerged out of the concern that the ignorance of native customs had caused the rebellions. The commission charged with the new collection of native law [*Eingeborenenrecht*] featured ICI members Felix Meyer, Friedrich von Lindequist, Baron von Richthofen and colonial minister Bernhard Dernburg.[48] They sent 103 questions to administrators and missionaries all over the German colonies. While they increased the sample significantly, the

[44] Le Gouverneur de la Côte d'Ivoire, 'Arrêté nommant une commission, chargée de réunir et de codifier les coutumes en usage devant les juridictions indigènes', in F. Clozel and R. Villamur (eds.), *Les coutumes indigènes de la Côte d'Ivoire: Documents* (Paris, 1902), VII
[45] F. Clozel, 'Circulaire relative à l'étude des coutumes indigènes', in M. Delafosse (ed.), *Le pays, les peuples, les langues* (Paris, 1912), 18–20.
[46] Clozel and Villamur, *Les coutumes indigènes*, 97–8.
[47] Questionnaires were partly copied from the French: BArch, 1001 4996,1, see also C. Zwierlein, 'Übersetzungen ohne Original: Die Erfassung des Rechts der 'Naturvölker' per Fragebogen in den deutschen Kolonien 1907-1914', *Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte* 34 (2012), 219–272.
[48] Gerstmeyer, 'Über das Ergebnis der vom Reichs-Kolonialamte veranstalteten Umfrage zur Feststellung des Eingeborenen-Rechts in den deutschen Kolonien.', in Internationale Vereinigung für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (ed.), *Verhandlungen der ersten Hauptversammlung der Internationalen Vereinigung für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre in Berlin* (Berlin, 1912), 69–99: 70.

questions did not differ significantly from the previous surveys. The analysis of inheritance law preceded questions about marriage customs and the social function of polygamy.

The German survey from 1907 stood out from former projects because it frequently referred to the Herero uprising. While the passages on Togo, Cameroon or the Oceanic colonies did not provide any new insights, the paragraph on Herero law revealed the Germans' concern with the revolt. Given the idea that unfair punishment had caused colonial revolts, criminal and penal law attracted the commission's attention. It sought to analyze the whole range of possible "native" sentences, like the death penalty, forced exile, or the deprivation of liberty. The commission asked for more details about collective punishment and compensation, including retaliation and blood feuds. A final section was devoted to procedural law, enquiring as to the composition of the courts, the public character of the hearings and trials by ordeal, like poison ordeals. The colonizers also wanted to know if there were places of sanctuary, like a "witch-doctor's" home, where potential convicts could escape to, in order to avoid punishment.[49]

Given that the Herero had waged war on the Germans because of the expropriation of their lands, the survey focused on property law.[50] Several questions addressed the different ways of acquiring land and transforming it into private possessions. The African's "collectivism" or "communism" was frequently cited as an obstacle to a capitalist economy.[51] The survey came to the conclusion that Herero did not know any "individual possession of land," but owned it collectively. Unlike other Bantu people, Félix Meyer summarized, land did not belong to the Herero chiefs and could not be sold – but leased at best. According to him, the Herero used the land but did not possess it. Land was pasture for everyone's cattle and there was no use in selling it. When European missionaries needed land for their stations in the early days of colonization, they received the right to usufruct only, but never possessed the land, which still belonged to the Herero.[52] A Catholic mission that had insisted on buying the land was immediately expelled by Herero chiefs.[53]

Felix Meyer, who was the most eminent expert on Herero law, described in the survey how Herero chief Samuel Maherero corrupted this notion of collective land.[54] Upon arrival of the European colonists, Samuel Maherero betrayed the customs of his own people and pretended to own the land. A famous case, Meyer reported, was that of Samuel's interference

[49] Ibid.

[50] On property law under colonial rule in general see M. Chanock, "A Peculiar Sharpness: An Essay on Property in the History of Customary Law in Colonial Africa", *Journal of African History* 32, no. 1 (1991), 65-88.

[51] E. Schultz, *Das Eingeborenenrecht: Sitten und Gewohnheitsrechte der Eingeborenen der ehemaligen deutschen Kolonien in Afrika und in der Südsee* (Stuttgart, 1929), 224.

[52] Usufruct is the legal right of using and enjoying the fruits or profits of something belonging to another (in this case the land).

[53] Ibid., 256-257.

[54] F. Meyer, *Wirtschaft und Recht der Herero* (Berlin, 1905).

in the Otavi region. There, the Ovambo people jealously watched over extensive copper deposits, which they used to produce precious bracelets. When the Ovambo chief died, however, Samuel seized the opportunity to declare himself the owner of the land. Shortly after, he sold the copper mines to the German Otavi Company, which exploited them commercially. Officially, Samuel had only received compensation for transferring the land to the Otavi Company, therefore keeping up the appearance that Herero land was inalienable. Samuel Maherero continued to sell land to German colonists, allegedly to satisfy his thirst for alcohol. The problem became so pressing that Herero leaders tried to remove Samuel and approached the German government for help, claiming that he "spends our land on drinks." Ignoring their complaints, the German government cherished Samuel as a collaborator and declined their request.

Ironically, Samuel took the lead in the war that the Herero and the Nama waged against the Germans who had occupied their lands and now denied them access to them. This led Felix Meyer to assume that "Samuel consciously sold the land to the Germans, knowing already that he would take it back from them by the means of revolt."[55] According to Meyer's interpretation, Samuel's violation of Herero customary law, together with the German government's naïve backing of his policy, ultimately resulted in the revolt. The Herero legitimized their violent uprising by portraying it as a protest against expropriation. Therefore, unrest was the consequence of the violation of "native laws." This attitude echoed the wider position of European legal theorists, administrators – and the ICI members. But it also illustrated the dilemma of the colonial policy they propagated: a strict legal relativism created contradictions, for example between the collective ownership of land and the introduction of private property to foster capitalism. The only way to escape this dilemma was to manipulate native law so that it was compatible with the prerogative of economic "development."

While Meyer's interpretations circulated widely, the final synthesis of the German survey did not live up to the legislator's expectations, and was not published until 1929. The synthesis of a myriad of contradictory answers resembled a collection of anecdotes rather than a systematized code. Moreover, they failed to do justice to some contributors' warnings that the presence of the colonizers had already corrupted native traditions to a significant degree.[56] Even so, the editors did not hesitate to portray these anecdotes from the everyday life of missionaries and administrators as representative of indigenous notions of "customary law."

[55] Schultz, *Das Eingeborenenrecht*, 258.
[56] Ibid., 268.

Certain legal anthropologists hoped to avoid similar shortcomings and misunderstandings by working more closely with African informants. In German East Africa, Carl Velten, a Swahili expert at the Berlin Seminar of Oriental Languages assumed that task. He had travelled extensively in French Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, studying Arabic and Islamic culture under colonial conditions. In the 1890s, he served as a translator for the governor-general in German East Africa and specialized in Swahili language and culture. He recorded the mores and customs of the local populations with the help of Mw'allim Mbaraka bin Shomari, and his brother Mwenyi Hija bin Shomari and Muhammedi bin Madigani.[57] He published the results both in Swahili and in German and used them as a teacher at the *Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen* in Berlin. It was in Berlin that Velten's Swahili teaching assistant, Mtoro bin Mwinyi Bakari, enhanced the Germans' knowledge of Swahili customs, which was without any doubt the least Eurocentric account of customary law. Tellingly, it did not mention property rights at all.[58] Velten's collections of Swahili customs became the main source for German colonial lawyers and were used to prepare administrators for service in German East Africa.[59] The colonial ministry, however, did not turn it into a legal code. Although all of Velten's East African informants were loyal to and employed by the colonial government, official authorities feared losing their monopoly over the interpretation – and manipulation – of customary law.

Another German administrator, the district officer Rudolf Asmis in Togo, shared the same fate. The German governor in Togo commissioned him to synthesize the colonies' customary law.[60] Asmis received information from six chiefs in the Atakpamé district and travelled ever more remote regions to interrogate the local population. His research paralleled the official codification commission, while he did not apply their uniform questionnaire. As a consequence, the members of the codification commission and the colonial office remained skeptical towards his more "authentic" results.[61] Nonetheless, he played an important in comparing indigenous customs all over the colonial world. After his service in Togo, Asmis

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[57] The three experts were Swahili teachers, akidas (subaltern administrators in the German government) and generally loyal to the colonial state: K. Velten, *Sitten und Gebräuche der Suaheli von Karl Velten* (Berlin, 1898); L. Harries, *Swahili Prose Texts: A Selection from the Material Collected by Carl Velten from 1893 to 1896* (London, 1965).

[58] J.W.T. Allen, *The Customs of the Swahili People: The Desturi za Waswahili of Mtoro bin Mwinyi Bakari and other Swahili persons* (Berkeley 1981).

[59] H. Wedell, 'Das Sachen- und Vertragsrecht und die politische Organisation der Swahili', *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft* 18 (1905), 119–183.

[60] BArch, R1001/5007-5008 Das Eingeborenenrecht in Togo. Arbeiten von Dr. Asmis; Rudolf Asmis, 'Zur Kodifikation des Eingeborenenstrafrechts' *Amtsblatt für das Schutzgebiet Togo* 2,27 (1907), 107-111.

[61] J. Kohler, 'Bemerkungen zum Bericht von Asmis über die Akposso und Atakpamé', *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft* 25 (1911), 131.

was named German consul in Belgian Congo, French West Africa and Australia. He used his position to travel widely and study native jurisdiction.[62]

Asmis, who was familiar with German, Belgian, French and British colonial legislation, identified essential national differences in conceptualizing legal otherness. His familiarity with the legislation of French West Africa led him to believe that the French based legal duality on the idea of citizenship. Native Africans were defined as subjects, while non-natives were citizens. According to him, this "political" distinction differed from the German notion that took race as a basis of otherness. In German colonies, race defined the status of the native as opposed to the white race. The British, by sticking to a policy of "conservatism" – the conservation of native institutions – used the overall category of development by distinguishing between backward natives and progressive Europeans.[63] According to these stereotypes, the German construction of otherness seemed to be the most rigid. However, a complete lack of any colonial doctrine was deemed even more problematic, as the debate on Belgian legal anthropology revealed.

In Belgian Congo, Asmis learned that questionnaires issued by the Congolese government had largely gone unanswered. Nevertheless, European judges referred to an imagined customary code. A Belgian judge from Stanleyville, who frequently toured the more remote inland, wrote that "in the inner districts I always apply the customary law of the natives. My experience with customary law is entirely positive. An application of European law cannot but fail completely. Often I make use of the blood oath between two chiefs who were at feud with each other. This is the best means to pacify the whole region." He agreed with several experts that a codification as such was not necessary. For him, complex codifications had a scientific interest, but did not answer the needs of a legislative reality. On the ground, customs had to stay flexible to be applicable: "the law appears in the customs only. In Africa, these customs vary and manifest themselves in concrete situations only." [64]

The Belgians faced harsh criticism for this attitude, claiming that their system gave room to arbitrary decisions and penal violence. Unlike other European countries, which claimed to protect the natives by codifying their law, the Belgians were said to perpetuate Léopold's violent exploitation without paying attention to the rights and laws of the Congolese population. Even after Léopold's removal as a head of the Congo Free State, the German *Koloniale*

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[62] He did, however, not actively interfere with colonial matters anymore: R. Asmis, 'Erfahrungen aus meinen kolonialen Wanderjahren', *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin: zugl. Organ d. Deutschen Geographischen Gesellschaft* (1941), 2–25.

[63] W. Asmis, 'Law and Policy Relating to the Natives of Gold Coast and Nigeria', *Journal of the African Society* 12 (1912-13), 17-51; 136-214: 32.

[64] Gerstmeyer, 'Über das Ergebnis', 96.

Rundschau wrote, the Belgians continued to exploit the local population by giving extended concessions to European companies who violated native rights to their land. ICI-member Camille Janssen replied in the *Koloniale Rundschau* that the Belgians were about to protect they natives and their laws, as all the other powers did. A Belgian codification of native law, however, failed to materialize.[65]

Asmis, like other German ethnologists before him, played an important role in introducing the British to the science of *Eingeborenenrecht*. During his service in Boma, he attended several native court trials and studied the modes of decision-making in Nigeria and the Gold Coast. His aim was to familiarize German administrators in the neighboring Cameroon and Togo with the British use of African courts. Asmis' report was translated and published by the Royal African Society, which had been founded in 1901 to promote colonial ethnography. With Asmis' report, the notion of native law entered the British vocabulary and its editors had to explain it to the readers: "The term 'native law' is to be understood as the general principle according to which all the native legal matters should be decided."[66]

Subsequently, German *ethnologische Jurisprudenz* had a strong influence on British research about native law. Taking the German school of ethnographical jurisdiction as a model, the British "government anthropologist" Northcote W. Thomas launched a huge project funded by the Colonial Office, to "study the native races from a political and commercial, no less than from a scientific point of view."[67] The outcome was a rather diffuse collection of a wide variety of different local traditions.[68] A serious attempt to codify native law in British India was not even envisaged until 1915.[69]

While the codification attempts did not materialize in official codes, the international cooperation in collecting native customs resulted in the dissemination of legal anthropology as a method. Codification projects stood for the "modern" attitude of cultural relativism, and colonial governments were supposed to follow this ideal. At the same time, the projects internationalized interpretations and misinterpretations of native societies. Misinterpretations were occasionally unintentional, but very often they served the purpose of legitimizing colonial rule and domination.

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[65] C. Janssen, 'Die Gesetzgebung des Belgischen Kongo seit 1910' and 'Zur Kongofrage', *Koloniale Rundschau* 7 (Juli 1912), 385–400.
[66] Asmis, 'Law and Policy Relating to the Natives of Gold Coast and Nigeria', 17.
[67] N. Thomas, 'Editor's Preface', in A. Werner (ed.), *The Natives of British Central Africa* (London, 1906); For the influence on German ethnology in Great Britian see K. Weule, *Native Life in East Africa: The Results of an Ethnological Research Expedition* (New York, 1909).
[68] N. Thomas, *Anthropological Report on the Edo-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria. Part I: Law and Custom* (London, 1910).
[69] C. van Vollenhoven, 'La Politique Coloniale Par Rapport aux Us et Coutumes Indigènes', in Institut Colonial International (ed.), *Compte Rendu de la Session tenue en 1921* (Brussels, 1921), 363–412: 383.

Inventing Native Law: Punishment, Property, Sovereignty, Family

In accordance with the necessities of colonial rule, the surveys focused on useful knowledge about procedural law, penal law, property rights, sovereignty and family law. The search for "collective" elements played an important role for the colonizers because "modern" systems of indirect rule needed the collaboration of their authorized representatives. Moreover, Europeans saw a need to apply collective punishment and to expropriate collectively owned land. While fighting against collectivity or using it for their own purposes, Europeans rarely respected the self-imposed "laws of humanity." It was not idealist modification, but utilitarian manipulation that underpinned the codification of customary law.

The ICI experts on indigenous law played an important part in recording native customs. Although comprehensive collections were not published as a synthesis until the 1930s, the projects provoked an avalanche of ethnographical research with jurisdictional purposes. The pre-war period abounded with international, national and regional attempts to codify, interpret and therefore manipulate customary law. Unsurprisingly, the results closely mirrored each other. They circulated among colonial administrators and in colonial ministries all over Europe. The publications of the ICI on the best practice of legislating in the colonies were only one element of a broader discourse on native law.[70] Owing to the similarity of the questionnaires, the results of all these commissions were closely aligned.

Drawing on the results of the surveys, the commission recommended that African courts be maintained, but controlled. All the questionnaires acknowledged that the procedures of African courts in the allegedly uncivilized world were quite civil, and moreover effective. Non-Islamic Africa was a case in point: Although there were no professional judges, the chiefs, headmen or councils assumed the role of courts.[71] They often preferred mediation to arbitration and did not need to have recourse to violence in order to enforce their authority. African courts were embedded in local customs and society, and therefore the colonized preferred them to any positivist or divine law. Native juridical institutions enforced their verdicts with the help of social pressure, ancestral authority or trials by ordeal. In most regions, like parts of Togo or Nigeria, even prisons had been unknown.[72] While the surveys agreed that the legal charges were relatively high, none of them complained about corruption or abuse. So obvious was the value of native courts that commissions unanimously recommended their maintenance, unless their verdicts did not contradict generally accepted "essential principles of humanity."[73]

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[70] Institut Colonial International, *Les lois organique des colonies* 3 vols. (Brussels, 1906).
[71] See for example Clozel and Villamur, *Les coutumes indigènes*, 91–3.
[72] R. Asmis, *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft* 25 (1911), 89.
[73] Ortoli and Aubert, *Coutumiers juridiques*, 3.

At the same time, all commissions recommended controlling the decisions of the native courts. In most cases the colonial authorities requested native courts to keep minutes. In British Gold Coast and Nigeria, the native judges had to send lists with the punishments inflicted on the convicts to the governor general. In some cases, Europeans presided over the courts and in others administrators controlled their decisions. Officials prohibited decisions by ordeal at native courts, which exposed the culprits to violent tests, and were considered guilty if they were injured or died.[74] Their purpose was to detect "political crimes" – potential rebellions – rather than to watch over the observance of the "natural law of humanity."

The surveys reveal that many customs that contradicted the "natural law of humanity" were not abolished at all. Sometimes, the colonial authorities encouraged them, particularly in penal law. While native courts made use of a great variety of punishments, the colonial authorities explicitly authorized and sometimes privileged corporal punishment. It was said to be more efficient than prison sentences, for example, which was allegedly not even understood to be a punishment. As the German colonial authorities argued, natives could "enjoy" imprisonment if it was not combined with corporal punishment or forced labor.[75] They took the argument in favor of corporal punishment from the native laws that they had "invented" themselves.

The colonizers argued that Africans accept punishments only if they are immediate, concrete and a direct retaliation for the crime. European law, instead was said to be abstract, often delayed by investigation and refused the principle of retaliation.[76] Corporal punishment, Europeans argued, was the most concrete way of punishing convicts. It had also a deterrent effect. Therefore, they declared corporal punishment to be the most "native" sanction. It was widely known that the German colonial administration used flogging to punish native convicts, arguing that it was a custom in Africa.[77] But also the government of the British Gold Coast determined that whipping up to twenty and flogging up to twenty-four strikes was an adequate punishment for natives.[78] To adjust the penal system, German Togo applied the Criminal Code Ordinance of the adjacent British Gold Coast.[79]

However, the reverse was true for the pre-colonial period, as the questionnaires had revealed. Neither the procedure nor the punishment was particularly cruel. The concept of

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[74] Schultz, *Das Eingeborenenrecht*, 118-120; Allen, *The Customs*, 183-185.
[75] BArch R1001/5561 Eingeborenenstrafrecht, Nr. 8-9, Kolonialabteilung AA to Kolonialrat, Strafgerichtsbarkeit Togo; Nr. 9/[9?], Anlage 7, p.17: Criminal Code Ordinance vom 31. Oktober 1892 (Übersetzung aus dem Englischen)."
[76] See for example BArch, R1001/5559, Nr. 1-5, 1911, Debate on *Züchtigungsrecht*.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Asmis, 'Law and Policy Relating to the Natives of Gold Coast and Nigeria', 41.
[79] BArch, R1001/5561 Eingeborenenstrafrecht vom Februar 1894 bis Juli 1896: Nr. 8/9.

torture, for example, did not exist and corporal punishments were rather rare.[80] Pecuniary penalties were the rule for all kind of crimes, with the possibilities for perpetrators to pay restitution even if they had committed a murder. Generally, Clozel and Morand concluded that native penal law traditionally preferred compensation (*dédommagement*) to corporal punishment (*châtiment*).[81] Reparative payments were the most frequent form of compensation. They resembled the Germanic *wergild*, an amount of money fixed in compensation for a loss, a disablement of a person or murder, and set according to rank. These reparative payments, it was understood, could be offered to the individual victim, but also to the collectivity to which the victim belonged, like a family, a village or a tribe. Restitutions to collectivities were possible, to avoid blood feuds, for example.[82] But this meant that collective punishments were possible as well.

While collective punishment contradicted "European civilization," as Roume put it, the colonizers accepted it as part of the native courts' penal repertoire. Delafosse emphasized that "Civil and criminal responsibility extends to the global family of the delinquent, be it his village or his tribe"[83] The same was true for German Cameroon, where "relatives were liable for the offences of an individual."[84] According to the surveys, the collective punishment was subsidiary: if a perpetrator was not arrested, his closest relatives were punished instead. But if this was not enough, entire "states" could be held responsible for a crime of one of its members.[85] While colonial administrators avoided invoking the idea of collective guilt in their reports – a notion that European law had dismissed as dishonorable – they tended to speak about complicity instead. Complicity was a more legitimate category that justified collective punishment also according to humanitarian law. Thus, cases were reported about villages "hiding" criminals or booty from the authorities and therefore deserved collective punishment – according to both native and European law. The same is true for the role of "agitators," who were – as the survey emphasized – often punished more severely than those who ultimately committed a crime.[86] Obviously, Europeans could use these "native" categories like complicity and agitation to justify collective punishments.

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[80] Clozel and Villamur, *Les coutumes indigènes*, 168; Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern*, 24, 51.
[81] R. Asmis, 'Die Stammesrechte des Bezirks Atakpamé', *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft* 25 (1911), 67–130: 89; Clozel and Villamur, *Les coutumes indigènes*, 90–1.
[82] Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern*, 23. The feuds, as has been shown before, were omnipresent in the surveys, see for example: Schultz, *Das Eingeborenenrecht*, 98, 102, 156. 159, 201, 264, 306, 379ff, 418f, 425ff, 430f.
[83] Clozel and Villamur, *Les coutumes indigènes*, 134.
[84] Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern*, 29.
[85] Schultz, *Das Eingeborenenrecht*, 528.
[86] About complicity see Ibid., 99, 201, 370.

Another field, in which the veto of the "essential principle of humanity" did not apply was slavery. While the slave trade was forbidden in most colonies by 1900, the colonizers explicitly kept their hands off domestic slavery.[87] They argued that domestic slavery was a social institution and that its abolition would cause a "social disaster," including the rebellion of the slave-holders.[88] At the same time, the surveys referred to the successful liberation of 4,000 domestic slaves by the French in Senegal. This mass emancipation entailed no revolt whatsoever. A more convincing argument was that the legal concept of slavery did not apply to the forms of bondage in West Africa. Asmis reported that in Togo, slaves could earn money, purchase other slaves or even become chiefs. For him, there was no difference between free and enslaved people except for their status "on paper."[89] While this argument might be valid in the case of West Africa, it did not live up to the idea that "principles of natural law of humanity" had to be respected. If "humanity" were a priority, slavery had to be banned without compromise.[90]

With regard to property rights, all the surveys emphasized the fact that African "labor theories of property" were almost universal.[91] The land belonged to those who cultivated it and if they failed to do so, someone else could occupy the land. But in most of the cases this meant that they had the right to use the land, not necessarily to eternally possess it. Some ethnographers described this custom as having usufruct but not property of the land. Others claimed that the natives had "possession but not dominium."[92] Their categories derived from Roman law and referred to the simultaneous property of land as collective and individual property. Both notions existed among West Africans in pre-colonial times. The construction of a house on a piece of land, for example, made the builder the owner, whereas cultivation did not imply possession. Colonizers tried to make use of those imagined African property rights when legitimizing dispossession, for example.[93]

Apart from acquiring the right to possess a land by occupying it, conquest was portrayed as a legitimate means to acquire territory in African societies. The Agni on the Gold Coast, for

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[87] Asmis, 'Law and Policy Relating to the Natives of Gold Coast and Nigeria', 80; Curiously, it was not legally abolished in German East Africa: J.-G. Deutsch, *Emancipation Without Abolition in German East Africa, c.1884-1914* (Oxford, 2006), 2.
[88] Asmis, 'Law and Policy Relating to the Natives of Gold Coast and Nigeria', 148; Asmis, 'Die Stammesrechte des Bezirks', 80; See also S. Miers and A. Klein (eds.), *Slavery and Colonial Rule in Africa* (Abingdon, 1999), 1-2.
[89] Asmis, 'Die Stammesrechte des Bezirks': 80-89; Clozel and Villamur, *Les coutumes indigènes*, 130.
[90] That their approach was not necessarily accurate can be seen in F. Cooper, *Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa* (New Haven, 1977); P.E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa* (Cambridge, 2011); C. Meillassoux, *L'esclavage en Afrique précoloniale* (Paris, 1975).
[91] Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern*, 24.
[92] Ibid., 25.
[93] Their arguments were more sublte than the "dominant storyline in the colonial period…from communal land tenure, to individual rights of use, to proprietary rights as identified by M. Chanock, 'A peculiar sharpness: an essay on property in the history of customary law in colonial Africa', *Journal of African History* 32, 1 (1991), 65–88, 65-88: 70.

example, could acquire property rightfully by conquest, inheritance or continued use.[94] The idea that conquest was a legal means for natives to obtain land fascinated the Europeans. Arthur Girault, ICI member and the most seminal expert on colonial legislation, picked up on this idea and declared conquest one legitimate means to acquire land in the colonies – the others being amicable cession, occupation and expropriation. Girault argued that most of the land in the colonies had once belonged to a sovereign (a king or a chief) who allocated it to his subjects. Once the colonial power had defeated the sovereign by conquest, it assumed the sovereign's role, like the British in India or the French in Madagascar. While the sovereign changed, however, nothing changed for the common people who kept cultivating the land for the sovereign.[95] This was the case in Northern Nigeria, Asmis reported, where

> the theory current among the natives to the effect that the Sultan of Sokoto was a kind of supreme landlord rendered the adoption of the system a comparatively simple matter. The landed rights of the Sultan were transferred in part to the Crown at his fall.[96]

This was indeed a far-fetched argument, given that the survey also reported several instances in which Africans were very familiar with private property.[97] Especially in more densely populated areas on the coast, private property was well established.[98]

As a general rule, the surveys were particularly keen on identifying sovereigns and the scope of their power.[99] For colonial governments, there were two possibilities to profit from the sovereign's power: either they used the sovereign as an intermediary or they took his place. On the one hand, sovereigns were potential intermediaries. If the colonial governor controlled them, all the sovereignty rights were under his control. Moreover, it was important to know which institution had the right to decide on war and peace.[100] Once the colonial governor controlled the sovereign, legal ethnographers hoped, he also controlled the authority that might declare war on the European invaders.

Moreover, sovereigns could be used to levy taxes or to provide work force or land. If, on the other hand, the European government replaced the sovereign, it possessed crown land and public domain and had the right to levy taxes.[101] By taking the sovereign's place, the colonial authorities inherited the latter's rights, including taxing authority, the possession of

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[94] Clozel and Villamur, *Les coutumes indigènes*, 85; 107.
[95] Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, 40.
[96] Asmis, 'Law and Policy Relating to the Natives of Gold Coast and Nigeria', 163.
[97] Clozel and Villamur, *Les coutumes indigènes*, 107–9.
[98] Schultz, *Das Eingeborenenrecht*, 65-67.
[99] Ibid., 17, 21, 171, 242, 281, 287, 424.
[100] Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern*, 45
[101] Schultz, *Das Eingeborenenrecht*, 69-70.

crown land and public domain.[102] Particularly intriguing was the role of chiefs in the IVVR survey's section on "political organization". A *commandant de cercle* from the French Sudan, for example, reported that the local chiefs did not have any power, but had the right to collect taxes and the colonial state might therefore use them as intermediaries.[103] A district officer from Cameroon, by contrast, reported that the chiefs of the Banaka and Bapuko did not have tax collecting power and thus could not be used as tax farmers.[104] Other questions helped the interrogators to locate sovereignty within African societies: some administrators, for example, warned that the chiefs had the right to declare war; therefore, they had either to be charmed or eliminated by colonial governments that feared rebellions.[105] It was different in regions where collective "palavers" of the village communities decided on war and peace.[106]

As in European societies, the native courts spent most of their time ruling over issues of inheritance and marriage. The surveys therefore dedicated extensive passages on inheritance rights and marital law. The reports perused inheritance traditions, searching for general patterns of matrilineal and patrilineal inheritance, primogeniture or division of the estate and the role of wills. They could not identify any recurring pattern, even though women were mostly excluded as potential heirs. Nevertheless, questions referring to family and inheritance law helped to define the personal status of individuals, households and bigger collectivities, in order to levy the hut tax. By the same token, family law helped to define who was liable for the payment of debts. This was even more important as the credit and lending system among the natives was much more developed than the colonizers had assumed.[107] Succession law and property law facilitated the taxation and appropriation of land by the colonial state.[108]

Monogamy was the exception and polygamy the rule. This was true in theory, but in practice most of the population in Western Africa lived a monogamous life for financial reasons.[109] Plural marriage, the reports emphasized, had not been introduced by the Muslims, but was inherent to all native societies.[110] Given the authenticity of polygamy, the surveyors argued against its abolition to avoid social unrest.[111] And contrary to the beliefs of many

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[102] As a result, the British government in India and the Belgians in the Congo pretended to own the land as sovereigns and only rented it out to the natives, who cultivated it: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912,* 205.
[103] Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern*, 116.
[104] Ibid., 45.
[105] Ibid., 116, 124.
[106] Ibid., 323, 380.
[107] Schultz, *Das Eingeborenenrecht*, 71.
[108] Ibid., 352.
[109] G.van der Kerken, 'Le mariage au Congo Belge et l'attitude adoptée à son égard par le gouvernement de la colonie', in : ICI, *Rapports préliminaires* (Brussels, 1927), 259.
[110] Clozel and Villamur, *Les coutumes indigènes*, 82.
[111] There were exceptions, however, for example in Togo: Asmis, 'Law and Policy Relating to the Natives of Gold Coast and Nigeria', 47.

Europeans, marriage was less restrictive for women than commonly assumed.[112] Obviously, marriage was arranged, without exception. Unlike in Europe, an ICI report concluded, the marriage established a tie between families and not between individuals.[113] In most of the cases, the fiancé had to pay a bride price (*lobolo* in Bantu-languages) to the parents of his future wife.[114] This bridewealth was a frequent reason for conflict, especially because the brides often abandoned their husband.

Colonial governments were reluctant to expend their time tracking down unfaithful wives and sought a solution for the problem. In southern Africa, the bridewealth was rapidly prohibited. But the Africans stuck to their traditions. In Belgian Congo, the courts only pursued the wives of monogamists, but not the spouses of polygamists – unless it was the first wife. A decree in Belgian Congo from 22 June 1914 created a fund to indemnify abandoned husbands.[115] The escape of women even caused diplomatic tensions. In 1905, a newlywed left her husband in German East Africa to establish herself in Belgian Congo. Claiming that her marriage was unlawful according to the customs in Belgian Congo, she refused to return to her spouse but kept the bridewealth. In response to the German request extradite the women, the Belgian administration answered that they had no legal means to force her to return.[116] Cases were more serious when women were married before they had come of age, which was common practice in African countries, but had begun to change at the beginning of the twentieth century. In Togo, parents waited until their daughters were grown up until they married them off, because women had previously regularly left the husband they had been forced to marry.[117] Although marriage turned women theoretically into the property of their husbands, the surveys argued, it seemed to be possible and common to leave the husband.[118] In most of the cases, the concluded, colonial governments regarded both customary and monogamist marriage as lawful.[119]

Procedural law, penal law, property law, sovereignty and family law were fields, in which the colonizers found pseudo-legitimization for their rule and the possibility of subtle manipulation. In doing so, they violated their own guidelines to respect native societies and

[112] See on women's agency in marriage issues Roberts, *Litigants and Households*.
[113] Van der Kerken, 'Le Mariage', in ICI, *Rapports préliminaires* (Brussels, 1927), 250.
[114] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1921*, 81-83; Allen, *Customs*, 63-64.
[115] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1921*, 81-83.
[116] AMEAB, AE 2 Correspondance échangée avec les puissances étrangères: Allemagne, 4/4 Chef du district d'Udjiji Gähing to Federspiel 1 Mai 1907; 4/8 Chef de Zone de 1ère classe E. Federspiel to Monsieur le Capitaine Chef du district Udjidji, Stanleyville 13.10.1907.
[117] Schultz, *Das Eingeborenenrecht*, 37-47.
[118] Ibid., 50f.
[119] Van der Kerken, 'Le Mariage', in: ICI, *Rapports préliminaires* (Brussels, 1927), 284.

"the laws of humanity". Instead, they used both of them if necessary, to legitimize ad hoc decisions and inhuman repression. The invention of a Herero law of war by German colonizers illustrates the politics of manipulation. The passage on the Herero war made the German survey unique. It unveils the European desire to willfully misinterpret native customs, only to stabilize or justify colonial rule.

In the German survey of 1907, the European colonizers invented a Herero "law of war", which they deemed particularly cruel and inhuman.[120] This justified an "inhuman" response by the German colonial troops, who were criticized all over the world for the genocidal policy during the Herero war.[121] Writing in the aftermath of the Herero uprising, the missionaries and administrators who contributed to the survey made frequent reference to the war. A passage synthesized Herero customary law, which was based on a sample of seven answers that which missionaries and administrators from German South West Africa had returned to the commission.

With reference to the Herero War, the editors of the collection's final version felt the need to insert a section on *Völkerrecht* (international law) and *Kriegsgebräuche* (war customs) – categories that were unique to the passage on the Herero customary law and did not appear in any other account on native law. A paragraph on international law stipulated that Hereros never declared war, but launched surprise attacks instead, notably "without prior notice". Once the undeclared war had started, they "made war with utmost cruelty", as their customs supposedly required. The contributors to the survey emphasized that even Herero women participated in the war and earned themselves the dubious reputation of mutilating their enemies by cutting parts of their body, which were ornamented with precious bracelets.

The editors cited a Herero who claimed that "there is no mercy in wars" and thus justified the assassination of civilian white farmers. This statement was linked to the alleged Herero traditions, according to which war captives were either killed or enslaved. To illustrate the Herero's inhuman behavior towards their enemies, the authors added evidence of anthropophagic rites during which Hereros ate their adversaries' flesh. On another occasion, the authors quoted the Herero leader Samuel Maharero who had ordered his people to spare "missionaries, British, Bastards, Bergdamara, Nama and Boers" from atrocities during the war. The authors twisted every word of Samuel's order by claiming that this *Befehl* (order) instructed the Herero to commit atrocities against all those he had not mentioned, and to kill them at best.

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[120] See for a general overview: J. Zimmerer and J. Zeller (eds.), *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War (1904-1908) in Namibia and its aftermath* (Monmouth, 2008); J. Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner*: *Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia* (Münster, 2001).
[121] See I.V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca and London, 2005).

Without any doubt, this was an attempt to pin a "Vernichtungsbefehl" on Samuel by imputing him with ordering to eliminate all German enemies. A Herero *Vernichtungsbefehl* (extermination order) could then be used to qualify Trutz von Trotha's *Vernichtungsbefehl* and portray it as a *reaction* to the cruel Herero warfare.[122]

The ethnographers who compiled Herero customs emphasized that the latter committed atrocities and murders during wars "in the belief that they acted lawfully." As a result, the Herero were ascribed an understanding of war as a state of exception that followed its own rules. The ethnographers found the proof that Herero custom recognized a special war law in the fact that they cooperated peacefully with Germans before and after the Herero revolts.

According to the logics of the juristic ethnographers, customary law had to be applied to the natives. In the peculiar case of the Herero war, this meant that Europeans might act according to Herero war customs (*Kriegsgebräuche*). As a consequence, it was legal to wage a total war that did not distinguish between combatants and civilians and did not spare Herero women – who had traditionally participated in Herero wars. It was equally in accordance with Herero customs to issue a *Vernichtungsbefehl* (extermination order). If atrocities and even genocide were lawful according to Herero customs then it was legitimate for the Germans to combat the Herero with their own means.

The "codification" of Herero war customs and Herero notions of "international law" illustrates to what extent the ethnographers could manipulate and therefore use native law for their own purposes. Even though the Herero war was an exception, it followed the same logic of the transnational methods to collect and codify native law. It bestowed on the colonizers the possibility to interpret or to misinterpret customary law and use their manipulated versions for their own purposes.

For all this extensive information, the survey's results remained contradictory and fragmentary, and lacked a final conclusion. While family structure and political organization gave the commissions a general idea of African societies, customary law provided them with arguments to act on the African's behalf. The idea of an existing native customary law made it possible to argue along its lines. The colonizers could thus emphasize that no ex-post legislation was imposed on the natives. The reality was undoubtedly very different. The reporting administrators hinted at the fact that there were not yet any official codes that prescribed native law. In Belgian, German, French and British colonies in Africa, the district officers or the

[122] Schultz, *Das Eingeborenenrecht*, 233-234 and 224.

governor general acted as judges according to vague guidelines. They were allowed to judge on every matter and inflict any punishment, according to necessity and circumstances.[123]

To conclude, the codes nevertheless mirror the mindsets of colonial administrators, who collected and “manipulated” customary law. The example of the Herero war is a case in point, and illustrates the – intentional or unintentional – misinterpretation of native laws. The codes also bring to light discussions that ICI members wanted to sweep under the table. Violence, corporal punishment and colonial wars rarely appeared in the ICI’s meetings and publications. These elements of “negative colonization” did not fit the story of a positive native policy.

To be sure, most of the ICI members really wanted to avoid colonial wars and violence whenever possible. Most of them rejected corporal punishment. Once more, they invoked the Dutch Indies as an example, where corporal punishment had allegedly been abolished.[124] They were less reluctant to make use of the *Herrschaftswissen* that the surveys provided. The identification of sovereignty and its manipulation or replacement remained a crucial element of modern native policies. By the same token, they wanted to know who decided on war and peace, thus enabling colonial administrations to respond quickly to potential rebellions. Their agenda aimed at dominating “native” collectivities through intermediaries, at singling out sovereigns to take their place or to use them as intermediaries, and at the acquisition of land. “Native law” provided them with the means to achieve their goal.

The tolerance, or even the encouragement of polygamy was widely accepted to be a result of a more general cultural relativism. But slavery was tolerated for the same reasons. Thus, cultural relativism was both an ideological attitude and a strategy to stabilize and to legitimize colonial rule. The same goes for the new science of legal anthropology, introduced by ICI members. While it was very “modern” in the sense that it promoted a constructivist and functionalist approach to native societies, legal anthropology also became a strategy to sustain colonial domination. It was part of the broader program of “native policy” that helped to perpetuate colonial rule rather than to undermine it. International colonial experts who built a career on accumulating knowledge on native societies were the main driving force behind cultural relativism, legal anthropology and native policy.

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[123] Asmis, ‘Law and Policy Relating to the Natives of Gold Coast and Nigeria’, 38 and 44; Schultz, *Das Eingeborenenrecht*, 188.

[124] BArch, R1001, 5561 Eingeborenenstrafrecht vom Februar 1894 bis Juli 1896, Nr. 21 Kaiserlich deutsche Botschaft in den Niederlanden to Kolonialabteilung from 29 .10.1895.

Chapter 7

Colonial Internationalism
And the Use of Global Islam for Colonial Purposes

This chapter shows the importance of trans-colonial cooperation among experts to respond to the "world of Islam" that transcended the internal borders of the colonial world from Indonesia to Morocco and from Senegal to Mozambique.[1] Orientalists and Arabists joined the ICI to share their first-hand experience of global Islam, a religion that colonial governments often interpreted as a potential threat to colonial rule. As colonial administrations knew astonishingly little about the role of Islam in the territories they ruled, they employed these experts on Islam as advisors. Based on their international experience, Orientalists and Arabists organized or re-organized native policy and redefined it in most of the colonies as Islamic policy.

Islamic experts taught colonial administrations not to fear Islam but rather to capitalize on it. I argue in this chapter that experts on colonial Islam developed strategies to use Muslims as co-colonizers. The globality of Islam played into their hands because they could use the authority of muftis in Mecca or Cairo to influence Muslim behavior in Algeria or Indonesia. By invoking the authority of the holy cities of Islam, colonial experts reconciled Muslims with colonial rule throughout their empires. Once they had won their support, they further used them in schemes of indirect rule or to expand colonial authority.

As the globality of Islam was defined by its diversity, colonial experts could claim that Islamic law was actually a customary law grounded in local conditions rather than in a single law imposed by the Qur'an. It was global but locally very diverse. The diversity gave them the opportunity to invent, redefine and manipulate Muslim law by mixing different local traditions or Islamic schools of jurisprudence.[2] I show that colonizers in Africa even imported elements of Ottoman Law to the colonies, which had been reformed according to Western standards. Finally, the invention and manipulation of Muslim law by the colonizers also provided the basis for subtler strategies of domination, repression or dispossession. Without doubt, colonial

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[1] For a general overview see D. Motadel (ed.), *Islam and the European Empires* (Oxford, 2014); J.A. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904)* (Berkeley, 1994); D. Robinson, *Muslim Societies in African History* (Cambridge, 2004); M. Hiskett, *The Course of Islam in Africa* (Edinburgh, 1994); N. Levtzion and R.L. Pouwels (eds.), *The History of Islam in Africa* (Athens, 2000); A. Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria* (Princeton, 1985); S. Jeppie, E. Moosa, and R. Roberts, *Muslim Family Law in Sub-Saharan Africa. Colonial Legacies and Post-Colonial Challenges* (Amsterdam, 2010).

[2] See for Islamic law, J. Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford, 1986); W.B. Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī Uṣūl al-fiqh* (Cambridge, 1997); N.J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law* (Edinburgh, 2003).

internationalism played a key role in promoting the use of Islam in general and the globality of Islam in particular to sustain and enhance colonial rule. At the same time the unintended effects of this strategy that opened new opportunities for the colonized has to be taken into account.

Theory Meets Praxis: The ICI as a Hub for Exchange about Colonial Islam

Unlike customary law, Islamic law was codified, enduring, and expansive. At least this is what most Europeans thought. Muslim scholars would have agreed on all of these points but phrased them in a slightly different way: Unlike customary law, Muslim law was divine, timeless, and universal. ICI experts on Islam proved both of them wrong. "Muslim law", they claimed, did not exist in the first place. Instead, it was manipulated by humans, historically malleable, and locally diverse. As a consequence, Muslim law did not differ significantly from customary law. Moreover, persisting customary laws in regions that were only superficially Islamized distorted Islamic law.

Like any other non-European law, Muslim law was a "native law" and prone to interpretation and manipulation by colonial powers. The ICI experts drew these conclusions from their personal experience. They were employed by those colonial governments that ruled the Muslim world from Rabat to Batavia and from Algiers to Dar es Salaam. The Dutch Christiaan Snouck-Hurgronje had directed the *Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken* in the Dutch Indies for seventeen years. Marcel Morand dominated the policy of the French Service for Indigenous Affairs in Algeria from the turn of the century well into the inter-war period.[3] And the German Orientalist Carl Heinrich Becker prepared colonial administrators for service in Muslim Africa, while he served as the main advisor to the governor in German East Africa.[4] Other ICI members, like Hubert Lyautey, Henri de Castries and Louis Massignon, studied and used Moroccan Islam while conquering the North African sultanate. All these experts dominated colonial policy between 1890 and 1914.[5] Their influence on the theory and practice of indirect rule even relegated British reformer Frederick Lugard to the status of a latecomer in matters of Muslim policy. Lugard joined the ICI only in 1924.[6]

These experts styled themselves as agents of science. The Dutch government, for example, declared the *Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken* a scientific institution, thereby enhancing its legitimacy.[7] Experts on Islam in the Algerian and Moroccan departments for indigenous affairs

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[3] Arabi, 'Orienting the Gaze'.
[4] M. Pesek, 'Sulayman b. Nasir al-Lamki and German Colonial Policies towards Muslim Communities in German East Africa', in T. Bierschenk and G. Stauth (eds.), *Islam in Africa* (Münster, 2002), 211–229: 225-229.
[5] Burke, *Ethnographic State*.
[6] See his classical study: Lugard, *The Dual Mandate*.
[7] Bousquet, *La politique musulmane et coloniale des Pays-bas* (Paris, 1939), 43.

did not see themselves as administrators but as scholars, who were able to understand the true nature of Muslim jurisprudence and grasp the essence of "the Islamic Law." As a consequence, all of them became at some point of their careers teachers at universities, spreading their knowledge among candidates who prepared for service in the colonies, and among an interested European audience.[8]

An essential contribution to their reputation as experts was their close contact with Muslim scholars and intellectuals. They were well aware that theological debates within the Muslim community had been globalized throughout the nineteenth century. The global debates raised questions about the nature and the future of Islam. In the Najd, the Wahabi movement set out to purge Islam of unorthodox and idolatry practices like the worship of saints. Even though politically opposed, the Arabist Snouck and the Wahabi leaders would agree that Islamic law had been corrupted by local traditions. According to them it resembled a customary rather than a divine law. Different Salafist branches argued in a similar way. Other Muslim thinkers agreed but reacted in the opposite way: Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī or Muḥammad 'Abduh saw in the modernization and rationalization of Islam the only way to shake off colonial rule.[9] As we will see, the ICI experts tried to use both this new global consciousness and the resulting realignment of Islam to redefine the religion for their own purposes. Those purposes were openly colonial.

Scholars specialized in Muslim law and colonial experts in Europe engaged in a concerted effort to generate scientific knowledge and apply it to enhance colonial rule. Chailley, for example, extracted information from of Snouck. He literally invited himself to Snouck's home in Batavia, when travelling Dutch India in 1897. Back in Europe, Chailley followed Snouck on his journeys to Lisbon or in Brussels and asked for even longer meetings.[10] These meetings resembled interrogations, during which Chailley received detailed information about the "Javanese character" with regard to religion and family life, along with conception of love, death, and the afterlife.[11] This anthropological knowledge was central to Chailley's famous publications on Java. Becker, who trained future colonial administrators on Islamic studies in Hamburg made extensive use of the works by his French ICI colleagues, in particular of Delafosse's history of the Central African empires.[12] Moreover, Becker drew on the Dutch

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[8] See for example the Dutch Snouck and the German Becker ULCSH, Or8952, A140, Letter from Becker to Snouck from [? First letter in 140]; Or. 8952 A141, Becker to Snouck from 1.1.1909.
[9] Snouck Hurgronje, *Oeuvres choisies de C*, 58-59; See for a general overview : R. Schulze, *A Modern History of the Islamic World* (New York, 2002).
[10] ULCSH, Or8952, A225 Chailley to Snouck from 1.2.1913.
[11] ULCSH, Or8952, A224: Letter from Chailley (UCF) to Snouck from 20.6.1897 and A 225: Letter Chailley to Snouck from 26.1.1913.
[12] However, the history of Central Africa had also been described in Gustav Nachtigal's *Sahara und Sudan* (Berlin, 1879-1881).

model when establishing Islamic studies at the Colonial Institute in Hamburg. He wrote to Snouck that he was "happy to create something which is completely new for Germany and modelled on your courses" in Leiden.[13] The intellectual exchange between Hamburg and Leiden ultimately resulted in the exchange of students between the two colonial universities.[14]

One of the most celebrated results of cooperation between Arabists and colonizers was the monumental *Encyclopedia of Islam*, which was published in 1913 and is constantly re-edited until today. Eager to raise funding for the joint research project, ICI members won the support of the Algerian government and merchants from Hamburg to finance the multilingual *Encyclopedia*.[15] External funding was even more important as the German, French, and British governments funded the *Encyclopedia* on the condition only that it was published in German, French or English.[16] In defiance of government funding, the project was continued and outlived the crisis of the world war.

The Dutch Arabist Christiaan Snouck-Hurgronje was the *spiritus rector* of Islamic studies, and in high demand as a specialist on Muslim policy in colonial contexts. He had risen to fame during the 1890s, when he had assisted the Dutch colonial government in defeating the insurgent Aceh sultanate in Northern Sumatra.[17] The report on his mission to Aceh became a classic text of colonial counter-insurgency. Taking advantage of his close ties with the Muslim clergy in Indonesia, he had insinuated himself into the Acehnese Muslim circles and fed the Dutch government with information about their war strategies. The Acehnese people, he had notified the governor-general in Batavia, believed to wage a holy war, a "djihad as-sabil or prang sabil in Javanese." In order to win the war, Snouck advised the governor, the Dutch had either to win over the religious leaders – who were the instigators of the holy war – or they had to combat them in a total war. Once the Muslim leaders were eliminated, he claimed, the less "fanatic" common people would voluntarily surrender to the Dutch.[18]

Although Snouck's role in the ultimate triumph of the Dutch over the Acehnese was exaggerated, he became a symbol for the power of anthropological expertise. Few knew that his knowledge about the Acehnese derived partly from governmental archives and that his first-hand experience was probably less original than he claimed.[19] After all, it was the

[13] ULCSH, Or8952, A140, Letter from Becker to Snouck from [? First letter 140]; Or. 8952 A141, Becker to Snouck from 1.1.1909.
[14] ULCSH, Or 8952, 145: Letter from Becker to Snouck from 4.6.1912.
[15] ULCSH, Or 8952, A140, Letter from Becker to Snouck from 9.1.190[7].
[16] In 1909, the Encyclopedia received funding from the Dutch government, scientific academies in the Netherlands, Austria, Saxonia and Bavaria, as well as private persons from Russia: ULCSH, Or. 8952 A141, Letter from Becker to Snouck from [?].
[17] Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*; M. Kuitenbrouwer and H.A. Poeze, *Dutch Scholarship in the Age of Empire and Beyond:* (Leiden, 2013), 70.
[18] Letter from Snouck to Nöldeke from 25.4.1891, Koningsveld, *Orientalism and Islam; the*, 27.
[19] Letter from Snouck to Nöldeke from 25.4.1891, Ibid., 27.

uncompromising warfare of the Dutch army and not Snouck's genius as an anthropological spy that won the war. Even so back in Europe, his fame increased rapidly in a period when colonial powers feared the dynamics of Muslim and Pan-Islamist contestations of power. Chailley interrogated him about the Aceh. The head of the Algerian service of indigenous policy, Edmond Doutté, studied Dutch in order to read Snouck's book on the Acehnese. He convinced Snouck to become an unofficial advisor to the Central Service for Indigenous Affairs in Algeria.[20] Shortly thereafter, Snouck became an official advisor to the French government in Morocco.[21] British colonial authorities translated Snouck's works on the Acehnese, commissioned him to study the relations of Indian Muslims with Mecca, and circulated his publications among the administrators in the empire.[22]

The German Arabist Becker sought Snouck's advice on African Islam in the German possessions, even though Snouck had never set a foot in these colonies.[23] Following Snouck's credo about the local plurality of Islam, Becker prided himself on his awareness of Islam's variety by teaching the *Mālikī* rite for administrators destined for Cameroon and the *Shafi'ī* rite for administrators who were sent to German East Africa.[24] He consulted Snouck in particular on the *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) books of Bā Faḍl al-Haḍramī that circulated in German East Africa and underpinned its specific variant of Islam.[25] As the Islamic traditions from Hadhramaut had influenced the East African Islam in a significant way, Becker hoped that Snouck's knowledge about Hadhrami Islam might help him to understand Islam in East Africa better.[26] Snouck, who complained that he spent his valuable time correcting sloppy colonial administrators on Muslim policy, also corrected the officials in German East Africa pointing out that "the Muslims they are confronted with in East Africa are neither *Ḥanafī* nor *Shāfī*. They are Kharijites."[27] This was not a minor difference, Snouck warned, given that the Kharijite sect had seceded from mainstream Islam and easily revolted against any authority imposed on them. The Kharijite problem illustrates the paradox of the simultaneous globality and local diversity of Islam. The German colonial administration explicitly wished to learn from the British and

[20] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A273: Letter from Doutté to Snouck from 24.2.1901.
[21] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A 183: Postcard from Lucien Bouvat to Snouck from 26.7.1916.
[22] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A 233 Letter from Constable to Snouck from 27.5.1891.
[23] The German colonial administration knew literally nothing about Islam in East Africa as late as 1893: BArch R1001/5557, Sachau Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen to Kolonialabteilung im Auswärtigen Amt from 21.1. 1893.
[24] The *Mālikī* rite is said to be a rather conservative school originating in Medina and using traditional sources such as *Quran* and *Sunnah*. It can be found in North and West Africa, as well as in Sudan. The *Shafi'ī School*, in wide use in Egypt.It also accepts rational reasoning and the consensus of Islamic scholars as sources for Islamic law.
[25] ULCSH, Or8952, A 143, Letter from Becker to Snouck 17.10.1910 and 25.10.1910.
[26] ULCSH, Or8952, A 145, Letter from Becker to Snouck from 15.1.1912.
[27] Snouck identified this error in *Meinecke's Koloniales Jahrbuch* (5, p. 297), claiming that in "East Africa administrators used Leo Hirsch's translation of the studies about Hanafi and Shafii succession right. …but the Muslims they have to deal with are neither Hanafi nor Shafii. They are Kharidjites": Letter from Snouck to Nöldeke from 4.6.1893, Ibid. 34.

the Dutch who had traditionally collected and studied material on the Sunni and Shi'a Islam on a global scale.[28]

Global Islam – An Opportunity Rather than Threat for the Colonial Project

It was the globality of Islam that motivated colonial administrators to seek the counsel of international experts on Islam. They feared Pan-Islamic movements to be one of the most dangerous threats to colonial rule, which had to be contested by an intercolonial alliance. Colonial governments identified three centers of Pan-Islam that stood outside the strict control of a colonial state: Constantinople was the political capital of the caliphate, Mecca was the religious center that radicalized pilgrims, and Cairo was Islam's intellectual nerve center that allegedly plotted the global revolt against the colonizers.[29] If only one of those three centers took the lead in a global jihad against the colonizers, the colonial world risked falling into the hands of Islam.

In particular, the Dutch government in Batavia considered expelling the Hadhrami immigrants from the Arabian Peninsula, who allegedly spread the extremism of the *Wahhābiya*. The governor in German East Africa made similar plans after a subversive letter from Mecca – allegedly found on the Prophet's grave in Mecca – circulated in the colony and caused a rebellion. Although the letter turned out to be a forgery, written by a local notable disappointed with the Germans, the government became wary of Pan-Islamic solidarity. Those Muslim *'ulemā* who really held close ties with the holy cities of Islam, helped the Germans to reveal the fraud of the so called "Mecca letter": they knew that Muhammad's grave was in Medina and not in Mecca.[30] Other colonial powers restricted the pilgrimage to Mecca, fearing the pilgrims' radicalization and return as potential troublemakers.[31] The Indian Civil Service, for example, commissioned Snouck to study the pilgrimage from British India to Mecca, and its consequences for Indian Islam.[32]

While the holy cities of Islam on the Arabian Peninsula rarely seemed to live up to their role as religious leaders, Constantinople was a constant worry for colonial administrations. The seat of the caliphate with a lively diplomatic tradition, Constantinople was suspected of acting as a protector of Muslims worldwide. Imams from Dar es Salam to Batavia designated the

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[28] BArch R 1001/5557, 4: "die Araber in Ostafrika" from 14.12.1892.
[29] See for Constantinople's influence: C.S. Hurgronje, *Politique musulmane de la Hollande : Quatre conférences par C. Snouck Hurgronje* (Paris, 1911), 97.
[30] C.-H. Becker, *L'islam et la colonisation de l'Afrique: Conférence faite sous le patronage de l'Union coloniale française, le 22 janvier 1910 par le M. Dr C.-H. Becker* (Paris, 1910), 8-9.
[31] Snouck-Hurgronje, *Politique musulmane*, 79; C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Oeuvres choisies*, 106; 40-60.
[32] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A 233 Letter from Constable to Snouck 27.5.1891.

Ottoman caliphate as their political leader in their Friday prayers. Warily, the Dutch and the French tried to repress any influence of the caliph's consuls in their country. The British embraced another strategy and portrayed themselves as Constantinople's ally to win over the favor of their Muslim subjects.[33] The German governor in Cameroon adopted a similar approach upon the outbreak of the First World War. He tried to mobilize Muslim in Cameroon to fight for the German side by officially proclaiming that the Germans "have the active support of the Sultan in Stambul, who in matters of religion is the Supreme Lord of all Muhammedans"[34] However, like the governor of Cameroon, most colonial administrations overrated Constantinople's Pan-Islamist authority over the colonized Muslims.

Snouck and Becker ridiculed this concern about Pan-Islamic insurrections as amateurish.[35] Colonial officials, whom Snouck perjoratively called "diplomats," ignored the confessional fragmentation of Islam. They had misunderstood the concept of the caliphate as a sort of papacy with a monopole on religious leadership.[36] Instead, since the Turks had appropriated the caliphate, they had broken with the concept that the caliph – literally the successor to Mohammed – should be chosen among the members of Mohammed's tribe, the *Qurayš*. From this moment onwards, Snouck claimed, Muslims had accepted government by the strongest power and not by the most holy one. In the twentieth century, ninety percent of Muslims lived under non-Muslim rulers. As long as the latter guaranteed freedom of religion, Snouck argued, Muslims accepted even Christian rulers. A Muslim proverb allegedly confirmed his view, saying that "A kingdom can subsist without true faith, but it can't exist without justice."[37] Consequently, as long as the colonial powers maintained Muslim legal institutions, there was no reason to rebel. After all, Snouck added, nationalism was much more attractive to Muslims than Pan-Islamism. As his Orientalist colleague Ernest Renan had put it, nationalism was a daily plebiscite – and Muslims would opt for local nationalism instead of global Pan-Islamism.[38] According to Snouck, Islamic religious internationalism undoubtedly existed, but the idea of a Pan-Islamist state, headed by a caliph Constantinople, was a chimera.[39] By the same token, the diffusionist power of Mecca and Cairo was widely overestimated.

[33] Snouck-Hurgronje, *Politique musulmane* , 98. For an overview on Pan-Islam see C. Aydin, *The Politics of anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York, 2007); J.M. Landau, *Pan-Islam: History and Politics* (London, 2016).
[34] C.H. Snouck Hurgronje, 'The Holy War 'Made in Germany' (1915)', in C.H. Snouck Hurgronje (ed.)*, Verspreide geschriften. Geschriften betreffende den Islam en zijne geschiedenis* (Bonn and Leipzig, 1923), 249–284.
[35] Becker, *L'Islam*, 10.
[36] Snouck-Hurgronje, *Politique musulmane*, 97.
[37] "Un royaume peut subsister sans la vraie foi, mais il ne le peut en vivant d'injustice." Snouck Hurgronje, *Oeuvres choisies*, 108 and 47-50.
[38] Snouck-Hurgronje, *Politique musulmane*, 132.
[39] Snouck Hurgronje, 'The Holy War': 269; ULCSH, Or8952 A140, Letter from Becker to Snouck from 9.1.190[7?]

Much more dangerous than traditional and mainstream Islam were its deviant and sometimes heterodox offshoots. Becker highlighted the Islamic messianism that had engendered violent Mahdiist revolts in Egyptian Sudan (1881), British India (1889) or German Cameroon (1907).[40] Colonizers labelled these Mahdis as "false prophets", thereby often ignoring their political agendas. Mahdiist eschatology was said to create emotions that were hard to control.[41] Against the background of the Aceh djihad, Snouck recommended that the government should immediately "fight these fanatic movements with violence"[42] Although the Mahdiyya in Sudan were loosely inspired by the *Wahhābiya*, most of rebellions of this kind were local and never backed by the Pan-Islamic clergy. Generally, the rest of the Muslim world was ignorant of these local movements. As late as the 1920s, Doutté reported from Marrakesh that he had a hard time finding *'ulemā* who had ever heard of the jihadist *Wahhābiya* movement in Arabia, even though Moroccan scholars frequently attended Muslim congresses in Cairo.[43] Snouck came to a similar conclusion with regard to the 1889 *Ahmadiyya* resurrection in British India. Its instigator, Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad, proclaimed himself Mahdi and an emissary of Jesus, whose tomb he claimed to have discovered near Kashmir. Meccan muftis remained ignorant of the heterodox *Ahmadiyya* sect which "has not been excommunicated, notwithstanding its arbitrary eclecticism and its strange innovations"[44] Both the geographic distance and religious factionalism prevented local Mahdi rebellions from spreading like wildfires in the Islamic world. Confessionalism was a natural barrier to a Pan-Islamist union.

Ultimately, the most "un-Islamic" forms of Islam seemed to be the most subversive. A study commissioned by the French governor of Algeria, Jules Cambon, qualified those regions that stretched from "the Atlantic to the Ganges" as territories where the official and therefore controllable clergy had lost its power to the *khouans* (Sufi brotherhoods), dervish communities and confraternities. According to the Algerian report, those "secret societies" had assumed power in the Muslim world, and organized along democratic principles that were not easily monitored by the Europeans.[45] Apart from being truly and dangerously democratic, they also were in a permanent state of transformation: "Step by step these societies emerge, grow, and multiply. Then they subdivide into several branches in the form of confraternities or other organizations, often in contradiction with the Word of the Prophet."[46] As a consequence, the report deemed them hard to control by colonial governments.

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[40] Becker, *L'Islam*, 9.
[41] Snouck-Hurgronje, *Politique musulmane*, 101-102.
[42] Ibid., 76.
[43] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A279: Letter from Doutté to Snouck from 22.10.1924.
[44] Snouck Hurgronje, *Oeuvres choisies*, 45.
[45] O. Depont and X. Coppolani, *Les confréries religieuses musulmanes* (Alger, 1897), X.
[46] Ibid., X.

These Sufi brotherhoods (*ṭarīqah)* combined Islamic mysticism with idolatrous cults of saints (*marabouts*) and monastic life in their *zawiyas* (Sufi monasteries). Their conspiratorial meetings in which they convulsed in hysteria, their allegedly socialist community spirit, and their military "fanaticism" led the colonial powers to see in them the veritable "Islamic peril." The *Sanūsīya* order that resisted to German, French, British and Italian colonizers in Central Africa was one of these allegedly belligerent opponents to the Europeans.[47] Administrators in the mixed communities of Algeria warned against the rebellious character of the "panislamist Khouanism," a cross-border menace posed by Sufi brotherhoods (the *Khouan* according to the French transcription).[48] Algerian Sufi brothers, the governor general in Algeria calculated, paid annual taxes amounting to 702,180 Francs to mother- *zāwiyas* outside Algeria. *Zāwiyas* within Algeria allegedly welcomed illegal Muslim "missionaries" from Constantinople, Mecca or North Africa. *Zāwiyas* served as places of sanctuary, and the colonial governments suspected them to hide not only illegal foreigners but also criminals. Moreover, the Sufi brotherhoods possessed extensive territories qualified as *waqf* or *ḥabūs,* holy community lands that were inalienable according to Muslim law. Therefore, the government characterized them both as a "state within a state" that levied taxes from ca. 300,000 Algerian Sufi brothers and as "the very soul of Panislamism" that did not respect colonial borders.[49]

Algerian colonial administrators consulted Snouck about Sufi brotherhoods, because he had familiarized himself with similar institutions in East Asia. The head of the Algerian department for native Affairs, Edmond Doutté, evoked the similarities of the most Eastern and the most Western extremes of the Muslim ummah, which had a tendency to heterodoxy. "We are both at the anteports of the Muslim World", he wrote to Snouck. Sufi brotherhoods, maraboutism or sherif nobility dominated Islam in both the Dutch Indies and in North Africa. In both cases a superficial notion of Islam had mixed with local customs. Doutté requested and studied documents on Islam from all colonial powers but was particularly interested in Snouck's cooperation: "If a constant exchange could be established between the two of us, this would be to the great benefit of my administration." [50]

Snouck generally agreed on the potential dangers of heterodox Muslim mysticism and its particular inclination to refute authority. Heterodox Islam was much more dangerous to colonial rule than the orthodox *'ulemā*, for its rebellious potential. However, Snouck informed

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[47] A detailed description of this myth: J.-L. Triaud, *La légende noire de la Sanûsiyya: Une confrérie musulmane saharienne sous le regard français 1840 - 1930* (Paris, 1995).
[48] Billiard, 'Étude sur la condition politique et juridique à assigner aux indigènes des colonies'. Étude sur la condition politique et juridique à assigner aux indigènes des colonies, 18.
[49] Depont and Coppolani, *Les confréries*, 252-253.
[50] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A273: Letter from Doutté to Snouck from 24.2.1901.

the French, it did not matter much if external laws imposed on the Sufis were Muslim or Christian or secular.[51] Sufis allegedly contested authority and not ideology. This could be attributed to their eminent political and social role, and not necessarily to their religious intransigence. After all, Snouck explained, the *ṭarīqahs* were an elite phenomenon, and not a fanaticized mob. Thus, they were open to play a role in a system of indirect rule. Quite frequently, they had been open to accepting the Western authority. While Snouck thought it impossible to reform or dismantle them, he pleaded for cooperation.[52] Their social and economic importance made them a valuable partner for the colonizers.[53] But like in the Acehnese war, he pleaded for implacability should they not be willing to collaborate. For him, there were only two options: Cooperation if possible and violent defeat if necessary. Snouck valued cooperation over confrontation. He found an ardent supporter in Becker, who claimed that irrational fear of mystic confraternities like the *Sanūsīya* had cost the colonial state dearly, while cooperation might be a better strategy of colonial rule.[54]

In the mid-1890s, the Algerian administration slowly adapted Snouck's and Becker's view. Knowing that the brotherhoods were hostile to any kind of authority, it nevertheless assessed that they were "devoted to governments who knew how to approach them."[55] An official government report recommended the imitation of the British rule in India or the Turkish policy towards marabouts, whom they used as tax farmers and intermediaries. What is more, the report reinterpreted the history of the French conquest in Algeria, and found instances of successful French cooperation with the *Tijāniyyah* brotherhood, which had "always regarded us as the rightful occupant of Algerian territory by the will of God." Both the French and the *Tijāniyyah* had profited from mutual military support, and the former defeated Abd-el-Kader with the help of the latter. Against the background of international models and the rereading of Algeria's own history, governor general Jules Cambon launched a policy of alliance with the most important brotherhoods in Algeria. Cambon frequently arranged his colonial policies with his brother Paul, an ICI member and the instigator of French indirect rule over the protectorate in Tunisia.[56] In accordance with the principles of indirect rule, the new policy position for the Algerian administration was to approach the brotherhoods, and to collaborate with them, based

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[51] Snouck-Hurgronje, *Politique musulmane*, 71.
[52] Ibid., 72-73.
[53] Senegal is a case in point : J. Copans, *Les Marabouts de l'arachide* (Paris, 1980); D. Cruise O'Brian, *The Mourides of Senegal* (Oxford, 1971) C. Coulon, *Le Marabout et le prince: islam et pouvoir au Senegal* (Paris, 1981); L.C. Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970)
[54] Becker, *L'Islam*, 10.
[55] Depont and Coppolani, *Les confréries*, 263.
[56] Ibid., 265; 271. See different letters in: H. Cambon (ed.), *Paul Cambon, Correspondance* vol. 1 *1870-1898* (Paris, 1940), for example: 201.

on the example of the Ottomans in Hedjaz and in Egypt.[57] Snouck continued to act as consultant for the French in Algeria, making use of his broad knowledge about Meccan Islam and the geographic and confessional "extremes" of the Islamic world, in North African and Indonesia. His advice, the Algerian authorities informed him frequently, was "extremely interesting" for their colonial policy.[58]

The Ottoman policy in Hedjaz and Egypt would play an equally important role as a model for the future "Muslim policy" of colonial states. Lobbied by European states, the Ottomans had shown in the course of the nineteenth century that Islam and Islamic law could be "modernized." Colonial governments made similar attempts by referring to the fact that Muslims had reformed Muslim law. They concluded that it might be legitimate for colonial powers to reform Muslim law on their behalf – if they cooperated with Muslim institutions. Islamic experts like Snouck and Becker showed them the way of how to achieve this. For them, Pan-Islamism was not a danger, but rather an opportunity to reform Islam to the benefit of colonial powers. A modernized Islam, Snouck hoped, would distinguish between the political and the religious and result in a harmonious coexistence between colonial state and Muslim religion.[59]

While non-experts tended to interpret Islam as a danger to the colonial project, the ICI-experts on Islam taught the colonial administrators that it was an opportunity to better govern the colonized. One of the most remarkable manifestations of this belief was Becker's presentation at the German Colonial Congress in 1907, when he asked the rhetorical question if Islam was a danger for German colonization in Africa. His negative answer baffled the widely anti-Islamic audience in Germany.[60] His ideas fell on more fertile ground when he presented them to the ICI and Chailley's French Colonial Union in 1910.[61] Speaking before the French Colonial Union, Becker claimed that for most of the colonial powers, Islam was not a rival but an ally.[62] He considered Islam more tolerant, ascribed civilizational power to it and declared Islam a co-colonizer to Europeans.

First of all, Becker argued, Islam was more tolerant than Christianity and therefore spread much faster – a fact that statistics from the colonial countries endorsed. Islam was particularly attractive for the colonized in Africa – much more than Christianity. A syncretist

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[57] Depont and Coppolani, *Les confréries*, 283.
[58] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A273: Letter from Doutté to Snouck from 3.6.1902; Concerning the Sociétés de Prévoyance see also: Or. 8952 A274: Letter from Doutté to Snouck from 20.10.1904.
[59] Snouck Hurgronje, *Oeuvres choisies*, 47-40.
[60] C.H. Becker, 'Ist der Islam eine Gefahr für unsre Kolonien?', *Koloniale Rundschau* 1 (1909), 266–293; C.H. Becker, 'Die Islamfrage auf dem Kolonialkongreß 1910', *Der Islam* 1 (1910), 390f.
[61] Becker, *L'Islam*.
[62] Ibid., 19.

religion in practice, Islam advanced by incorporating the customs of the people it conquered. Becker, who had analyzed the libraries of Muslim scholars in East Africa confiscated by the German government, pointed out that they contained books about animistic traditions, magic water or oneiromancy.[63] For him, this was the proof of the confusion between local customs and a superimposed Islam. Edmond Doutté had come to similar conclusions for West Africa, where Islam seemed to be interspersed with magical practices.[64] This hybridization was facilitated by Islam's tolerance, Snouck acknowledged. After all, it was easy to convert to Islam. While Christian missionaries hesitated to baptize Africans if they did not consider them ready to understand the religion, conversion to Islam happened while confessing the *šahādah*, the Islamic creed in one simple and memorisable phrase.[65] According to Becker, the colonial state could use Islam to penetrate animist societies, especially in Africa.

Becker demonstrated that Islam's penetration into African societies was facilitated by the fact that Islam was not racist. Unlike Christians, he argued, Muslims did not refer to distinctions between ethnicities, races or colors of the skin. Everybody could convert to Islam, regardless of his race or civilizational status. More importantly, the internal clerical careers were open to both white and black Muslims. Upon conversion, it was easy to advance in the scholarly community, whereas the Christians' racist color bar prevented natives from receiving the *ordinatio*.[66] Snouck endorsed Becker's theory of a non-racist Islam, stating that only Islam made people noble and not the color of the skin.[67] The tolerance of Islam, a religion with a long history of incorporation of foreign elements, was constitutive of its success. Islam, Becker explained to the members of the French Colonial Union, was more likely to win over Africans' hearts than Christianity their intellect.

Moreover, Islam possessed a civilizational power from which European colonial governments might benefit. It was the sort of "soft" civilizational power that ICI members thought necessary to win the favor of the colonized. Without "uprooting them from their natural milieu", Becker claimed, Islam would civilize the "black people." "Islam spreads a spirit of discipline, interior tuition and a graceful conduct, being the basis of every kind of civilization."[68] However, unlike Christians who wanted to "entirely change their way of thinking," Islam would "give a new and higher sense to the old practices of the blacks." Islam

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[63] C.H. Becker, 'Materialien zur Kenntnis des Islam in Deutsch-Ostafrika', *Der Islam* 2, 1 (1911), 1–48 33.
[64] E. Doutté, *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord* (Alger 1909); See his influence on Becker: Becker, 'Materialien zur Kenntnis des', 31.
[65] Snouck Hurgronje, *Oeuvres choisies*, 294.
[66] Becker, *L'Islam*, 11.
[67] C.H. Snouck Hurgronje, 'L'Islam et le Problème des Races (1923)', in C.H. Snouck Hurgronje (ed.), *Verspreide geschriften. Geschriften betreffende den Islam en zijne geschiedenis* (Bonn and Leipzig, 1923), 413–430: 425.
[68] Becker, *L'Islam*, 12: "L'islam répand un ésprit de discipline, un soutien intérieur et une digne conduite qui sont les bases de toute civilisation."

allowed polygamy and slavery, for example, both deeply rooted in African societies, whereas Christians tried to "destroy the basis of native family live and economy"[69] According to Becker, this destructive colonization had cost Europe dearly. It should rather have taken the Arab's expansion as a model.

For all these reasons, the Muslim-Arab expansion was a model for modern colonizing states. The Arabic "colonial masters", Becker claimed, had no intention of imposing their religion and their culture on the conquered in the first place. Instead, they dominated state and economy, which made conversion to Islam attractive for the colonized. As a consequence, "the astonishing policy of Arabic colonization was not only a brutal policy of war or an intensive propagation of the religion, but an inevitable economic development."[70] Assimilation was not a process imposed from above, but developed naturally from below. The "Arabic model" of colonization was therefore acquiescent with the modern "European way" of development, as propagated by the ICI. For Becker, German East Africa provided two significant examples of Muslim "colonization" within a colonial setting: on the one hand, the Askari soldiers whom the German Wissmann had imported from Sudan to form the *Schutztruppe* (colonial army), played an important part in spreading Islam. Their privileged position granted them a certain respectability and their model role, as well as their political influence, resulted in a rising number of conversions in the regions where they lived.[71] On the other hand, Indian Muslims had a similar effect on the population of East Africa. Indian Muslims in East Africa were mostly cloth merchants. They showed a strong interest in propagating Islam, because Islamic law demanded Muslims to dress. The further Islam spread, the bigger the market for the Indian-Muslim merchants.[72] Their economic expansion and the diffusion of Islam went hand in hand.

Raison d'État, Becker concluded, drove the colonial state to use the Islamic infrastructure for its own purposes. For him, Islam was obviously superior to paganism, as Christianity was superior to Islam. But Becker warned: Islam was only inferior to Christianity because those who created or adopted Islam happened to be racially inferior. The weakness of Islam, he argued, was grounded in the racial inferiority of many of its members, but not in the religion as such.[73] History had shown that Muslims remained loyal to the colonial state. When the Maji Maji war was waged on Europeans between 1905 and 1907, its leaders tried to win the Muslims

[69] Ibid., 11
[70] Ibid., 23.
[71] Becker, 'Materialien zur Kenntnis des Islam', 16.
[72] Ibid., 8.
[73] Becker, *L'Islam*, 19.

over to their cause. But the latter refused, Becker proudly announced, and remained loyal to the German colonial state.[74]

The positive experience with colonized Muslims provided the ICI experts with sufficient evidence to claim their complicity. Islam, with its flexible nature and its inherent tolerance, was an opportunity rather than a threat to colonial rule. The two factors that accounted for its colonial viability were globality and plurality. Both coincided in a methodological institution of Muslim jurisprudence, the fatwa. These scholarly recommendations of how to interpret Islamic law in everyday life became the favorite "Islamic" means for Europeans to achieve their "colonial" purposes.

Global Islam and the Colonial Fatwa Policy

Up to the end of the nineteenth century, colonial governments had made frequent use of fatwas.[75] Islamic jurists, the muftis, issued fatwas in Mecca or Medina, which were then globally accepted by believers as guidelines for lawful behavior. Arabic, as Snouck observed was the "universal language" that facilitated the global circulation and communication of fatwas.[76] Fatwas were scholarly recommendations issued by muftis that instructed Muslims how to make their everyday life consistent with Islamic rules. They became particularly important when problems of jurisdiction emerged that were not explicitly covered by the rules and prescriptions of the Quran and the Sunna.

Issuing fatwas was the high art of exegesis of professional jurisprudents. They reinterpreted rules, drew analogies, and applied laws to a modern world that differed in essence from the ancient world of the Arabs, which had engendered the Quran. In practice, interpretation was often tantamount to manipulation: muftis issued these legal opinions on request only and mostly for cash. If those who commissioned a fatwa phrased their request correctly, they were likely to receive the answers they needed. Snouck, in particular, was aware of the utility of this characteristic of fatwas. He had observed Muslim potentates who employed muftis to confirm the legitimacy of their rule or to impose unpopular policies.[77] From these rulers, Snouck had learned an Arabic proverb that he bore in mind when shaping the Dutch colonial government's own fatwa policy: "the respondent is the prisoner of those who ask the

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[74] Ibid., 17-18.
[75] Fatwas are generally defined as "nonbinding legal opinions issued by a qualified Islamic scholar in response to a question posed by an individual, judge, or government": G. Böwering, P. Crone, and M. Mirza (eds.), *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought* (Princeton, 2013), 173.
[76] Snouck Hurgronje, 'L'Islam', 422.
[77] C.H. Snouck Hurgronje, 'Islam und Phonograph', in C.H. Snouck Hurgronje (ed.)*, Verspreide geschriften. Geschriften betreffende den Islam en zijne geschiedenis* (Bonn and Leipzig, 1923), 419–456: 425.

questions."[78] Since the consolidation of colonial rule in the 1890s, the colonial state would ask the questions and the colonized muftis responded. The answers complied with the needs of the colonial state.

The most important question was if Muslims were authorized to live under a colonial – and mostly Christian – ruler. Colonial administrators who asked that question mostly received affirmative answers. The British were pioneers in this discipline, the Dutch perfected the system and the other colonial powers imitated it. As a legacy of the 1859 rebellion, the British government in Calcutta became increasingly concerned about rebellions. In the early 1870s, this concern turned into an irrational fear of "Wahhabi fanatics" and their influence on Islam in British India. In a witch-hunt atmosphere, several public trials condemned alleged Wahhabi leaders. During this panic, Muslim doctors of law in northern India issued a fatwa that denied British India was part of the *Dār-ul-Islām* – the "house of Islam" – where Muslims could freely practice their religion and follow Islamic law without restrictions. Instead, they declared British India *Dār ul-Ḥarb*, the "house of war" which belonged to the infidels and prevented Muslims from practicing their religion. In the *Dār ul-Ḥarb*, every Muslim had the duty to fight the infidel rulers – and in this particular case the British Queen – or to leave the country. Indian newspapers spread the news as far as Bengal. Faced with this open call to rebellion, the British government felt the need to act. It denounced the Indian Muslims to be "a chronic danger to the British Power," and reacted with a mix of repression and concession.[79] Asking Muslim muftis for fatwas on the topic was vital to British strategies in this regard.

By portraying those who contested British rule in India as "Indian Wahhabis," the British also evoked fear among the orthodox elite in Mecca, who regarded the heterodox Wahhabi sect on the Arabian Peninsula with horror. The British tried to take advantage of this fear, claiming that the "Indian Wahhabi" were "extreme dissenters", "Anabaptists" in the religious sphere and "Communists" in the political sphere, who aimed at eliminating all other religions.[80] The British scaremongering earned them the support of Meccan traditionalists. Hence, the British found it easy to secure fatwas that confirmed the unlawfulness of war against the British. The *Ḥanafī, Šāfiʿī* and *Mālikī* muftis in Mecca replied that, as long as the religious life of the Muslims remains untouched, British India is *Dār ul-Islam* and therefore no rebellion authorized. The doctors of law in northern India had to back down and agreed with Mecca, as

[78] Ibid., 427-428.
[79] W.W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans* (London, 1876), 10-13; See also: F. Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923* (Cambridge 2007), 100-111; F. Devji, 'Islam and British Imperial Thought', in Motadel, *Islam and the European*, 262-265.
[80] Hunter, *Indian Musalmans*, 109.

well as the muftis in Calcutta. The British administration had thus inaugurated the era of fatwa policy, during which Christians could make use of global Islam and its scissions.[81]

W.W Hunter, an administrator in the Indian Civil Service, who published all relevant documents on the case in his *The Indian Musalmans* (1871), popularized the British fatwa policy. Snouck used Hunter's study to familiarize the Dutch government with the strategy.[82] In collaboration with governor general Cornelis Pijnacker-Hordijk, who later followed Snouck in joining the ICI, the Orientalist copied and enhanced the British model. They employed Sayyid Uthman, a scholar of Arabic and descendant of the Prophet, who had become *mufti* in Batavia after extensive studies at the *Šāfiʿī madāris* in Mecca and the Hadhramaut. The close ties that linked Uthman to the holy cities of Islam increased his authority among the Indonesians, who also followed the *Šāfiʿī* rite. Snouck praised him as the paramount Muslim authority in the Dutch Indies, whom a majority of believers would follow as a religious guide. Uthman's pious orthodoxy was said to counterbalance the deviant religious practices of East Asian Islam. To the delight of the Dutch, he contested every form of "fanaticism" and "rebellious spirits" among the Indonesians. This is why Snouck recruited him as early as 1889 as his informant and as a collaborator of the governor general.[83] For 100 guilders a month, he publicly preached loyalty to the Dutch government. When the Dutch queen was enthroned in 1898, Uthman even pronounced the *khuṭbah* during the Friday prayer in her name. In doing so, he not only recognized her as a sovereign, but also praised her as the protector of Indonesian Muslims.[84] Snouck and Uthman then met, studied the British request for a fatwa and used similar formula in a request they sent to Mecca.[85] Uthman's collaboration was vital to maintaining order in the Dutch colonial state. While he seemed to have been popular among the Indonesian middle classes, Uthman became notorious in the rest of the Islamic world for his collaboration with the Dutch.[86] This earned him the sharp criticism of Pan-Islamists in Constantinople and Cairo, and while he did not remain uncontested in Java, the Dutch stuck with him until Snouck's depart to Europe.

In Algeria, governor general Jules Cambon had also read Hunter. Concerned about Algerians from Constantine who emigrated to Syria, he travelled to Mecca in 1893 and received a similar fatwa, signed by all muftis and declaring Algeria *Dār ul-Islām*. Algerians were

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[81] Ibid., 217-219.
[82] Snouck to Directeur van Onderwijs, Eeredienst en Nijverheid from 5.4.1891, in: C. Snouck Hurgronje (ed.), *Ambtelijke adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje 1889-1936* ('S-Gravenhage, 1959) vol. 2, 1512.
[83] Snouck to Directeur van Onderwijs, Eeredienst en Nijverheid from 20.6.1889, from 5.4.1891 and from , in Ibid., vol.2, 1510-1511.
[84] Snouck Hurgronje, 'Islam und Phonograph', 426.
[85] Snouck to Directeur van Onderwijs, Eeredienst en Nijverheid from 5.4.1891, in: Snouck Hurgronje, *Ambtelijke adviezen* vol. 2, 1512.
[86] Snouck to Resident van Batavia from 30.3.1900, in: Ibid., 1516.

henceforth authorized to live under French rule. Muftis in Kairouan and Cairo as well as local *'ulemā* and councils confirmed the fatwa. Cambon's request had reproduced the British and Dutch ones almost verbatim. The questions were highly suggestive. Cambon asked if Muslims who lived in a territory that had been conquered and administrated by infidels were allowed to remain there, provided that they were free to practice their religion and that Muslim jurisdiction was applied to them. He also wanted to know if Islamic Law allowed them to rebel, even though they obviously lacked the strength to win. Both daringly and confidently, he ultimately requested a conclusive answer on whether Algeria was *Dār ul-Islām* or *Dār ul-Ḥarb.* The replies from the muftis in Mecca were unequivocal, and grounded in precedent fatwas. They differed slightly from the Koranic text. The Quran itself allowed only the weak to stay on. But, according to the fatwas, Mohammed, the Muslim community and Muslim jurists had agreed that all Muslims might stay, as long as they can hold the Friday prayers, celebrate religious festivals, and refer to Islamic courts who have to apply Islamic law and punishments.[87] As a result, the overall reply was simple: "Yes, they can stay." The French experts were pleased about the "elasticity" of the Muslim legal texts that allowed European colonizers to "find in them arguments in our favor."[88]

Cambon took advantage of his journey to Mecca to secure another fatwa. This fatwa excommunicated the leaders of the *Sanūsīya* brotherhood, who were about to establish a sovereign state in central Africa and had opposed French troops north of Lake Chad.[89] Cambon had convinced the muftis in Mecca that the *Sanūsīya*, like the Wahhabites, was a heterodox brotherhood that posed a threat to mainstream Islam as the Meccan clergy established it. He styled the Algerian colonial state as a protector of traditional Meccan Islam that fought the deviant *Sanūsīya* sect. The Algerian service of indigenous affairs was happy about the Meccan fatwas, which were "purified from all sectarianism" and provided it with an allegedly objective and orthodox opinion on the expansion towards the Sahara: "the fact of an armed or pacific conquest still authorizes us to call the conquered territory 'terre d'Islam."[90]

The colonizers strategically used the fatwas as Muslim legal arguments to give credit to colonial policy. This is the lesson the international colonizers learned from the British, Dutch and French experiences. The International Colonial Institute recommended it as one strategy for the successful realization of native policy.[91] It was soon applied in all colonies with Muslim

[87] Depont and Coppolani, *Les confréries*, 35.
[88] Ibid., 37.
[89] Ibid., VIII.
[90] Ibid., 37.
[91] Morand in ICI, *Compte Rendu 1909*, p. 441, Footnote 2.

populations.[92] But this was not enough for the colonizers. In the Dutch Indies, Snouck had suggested to his collaborator Sayyed Uthman to go beyond the fatwas in order to influence and control the life of Indonesian Muslims. At Snouck's instigation, Uthman actively interfered with the jurisdiction of Muslim *qāḍīs*. To guide – or manipulate – their decisions, he edited a handbook for jurists. The handbook claimed to synthesize Muslim law and was enforced on the Muslim judges as a mandatory book of reference for decisions taken in Muslim courts. Those guidelines had not been an official codification of law, but they anticipated future developments in Muslim policy: the invention and manipulation of "Muslim Law."[93]

Prepared for Manipulation: Islamic Law as Customary Law

The international experts of Islam deconstructed Muslim law only to re-invent and re-construct it for their own benefit. The most important strategy in deconstructing Islamic Law was to identify the weak points of its system. There were two options to pursue this goal. The first was to reveal the internal contradictions of Muslim law. The second option was to expose the external influences that had corrupted the legal system of Islam. Snouck excelled in both disciplines. He was at the center of reinventing Islam as a "soft" and dynamic law that was diametrically opposed to orientalist notions of the Islamic immobility and backwardness.

The soft character of Islamic law was inherent to the legal system of Islam. Snouck argued that Islamic law has been a dynamic and evolving corpus during the first three centuries of its existence. At that time it absorbed influences from the civilizations that Muslims conquered and was a highly syncretist religion. Snouck identified passages in the Quran that were taken from Christianity, Judaism, and Roman law, claiming that Muhammed not only interpreted divine revelations but also completed them.[94] The Quran itself was put into writing relatively late, but at the moment it had become inalterable, it also became insufficient. Therefore, the Sunna was added as a legal source, consisting of six authoritative collections of the Prophet's words and deeds. When these failed to do justice to the complexity of reality, the consensus of the (early) Muslim community (*Ijmāʿ*) was attributed the authority to decide on cases that were neither covered by the Quran nor by the Sunnah. Islamic scholars then invented ever more refined legal instruments to decide on tricky matters. *Qiyās* were conclusions of analogy, *ra'ī* were the personal and rational judgments of a *qāḍī*, while *ʿadāt* and *ʿurf* were the local customs that had to be taken into account. The repertoire of legal sources thus comprised

[92] M.S. Umar, *Islam and Colonialism: Intellectual Response of Muslims of Northern Nigeria to British Colonial Rule* (Leiden, 2006), 30.
[93] Snouck-Hurgronje, *Politique musulmane*, 70.
[94] Snouck Hurgronje, *Oeuvres choisies*, 51.

Quran, Sunnah, analogy, logics, and customs – and not even in that order, because it was possible to counter a Koranic verse with arguments taken from the Sunnah.[95]

As a result, the varying historical and political contexts determined the evolution of Muslim laws and produced a wide range of contradictory regulations. "So many sects, parties and tendencies," Snouck complained, "so many collections of rules that apply to a small group only."[96] Although this myriad of laws regulated every detail of a Muslim's life, it was constantly manipulated and amended. Sufi fraternities contributed to the confusion by allowing their adepts to interpret the holy texts without the guidance of Muslim scholars. Their heretic worship of saints, for example, remained uncontested because there was no central religious authority and no exclusive and hierarchic clergy that might define which groups were actually to be condemned as heretics.[97] The lack of a stable clergy and an imperious caliphate allowed every Muslim the possibility to declare himself Mahdi or wage a war on the infidels.[98] These "protestant" elements were one more coefficient of Islam's instability, and contributed to its chaotic plurality.

Paradoxically, Islamic "Protestantism" coincided with Islamic "Catholicism" – with the latter unfolding its full power under colonial rule.[99] Starting in the tenth century, Snouck claimed, Islam had stopped modernizing its legal corpus. By that date, the four schools of law had completed their templates of legal interpretation that had subsequently become normative. Believers fatalistically observed this canon, without questioning it (*taqlīd).* More recently, following the decline of Islamic states in the nineteenth century, Snouck argued, Muslim scholars had dissociated themselves from power and politics only to get wrapped up in abstract casuistics of a scholarly caste that was completely divorced from reality. The scholarly cast responded to the advent of the colonial state with further withdrawal and alienation from the modern world. Therefore, their laws became both impractical and inapplicable, with the result and the Muslims ceased to follow them.[100] Muslims in the late nineteenth century were ignorant of their religion, Snouck asserted. Only a few spoke Arabic and followed Islam's liturgies without understanding the divine message. Ultimately, Islamic law had become *lettre morte*, if it had not been meaningless long before the end of the nineteenth century.

Snouck concluded that both the "Protestantism" and the "Catholicism" of Islam resulted in the idea that the necessities of the modern world had made Islamic law irrelevant. According

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[95] Ibid. 217- 273.
[96] Ibid., 223.
[97] Ibid., 55.
[98] Snouck-Hurgronje, 'Politique musulmane de la Hollande: Quatre conférences', *Revue Du Monde Musulman* 14 (1911), 377–509: 27.
[99] Snouck Hurgronje, *Oeuvres choisies,* 60.
[100] Ibid., 49 and 53.

to him, aphorisms, which Arabs loved to insert into their conversations, illustrated the alleged mismatch between Islamic law and everyday life: The phrases “necessity ignores all laws” or “necessity follows its own laws” (*al-ḍarūra lahā aḥkam*) could be overheard from Casablanca to Batavia. In many fatwas, Snouck found the expression “because of necessity or constraint” (*li-ajl al-ḍarūra*) that served to give authority to a claim. Finally, while the political head of the Muslim world in Constantinople refused to wage a holy war on the Europeans, and introduced their civil laws instead, the *ʿulemā* had taken a fatalistic stance. Aware of the irrelevance of Islamic laws, they resorted in the last instance to the following phrase to explain their own inability to enforce it: “force and power is in God alone” (*lā ḥawla wa-lā quwwata illā billāh*).[101] This was the excuse of Sunni experts in law. Followers of the Shia had their own way of explaining the mismatch between theory and practice of law: legal theory and religious practice would diverge continually until the tension reached a maximum. Then the Mahdi would appear.

According to Snouck, the use of “necessity” (*ḍarūra*) as a legal argument had two antithetical consequences. On the one hand, *ḍarūra* was a means for Islamic law to declare itself irrelevant. It offered a legal possibility to suspend the law and declare a state of exception, especially in times of colonial invasion. But even earlier, Islamic law had surrendered to local customs, owing to its own inflexible rigidity. On the other hand, the legal argument of “necessity” provided a means to safeguard the authority of Islamic law. According to *ḍarūra*, it was actually lawful to respond to the “necessities” of modernity and to bring about the modernization of Islamic law. Indeed, modernization was under way, Snouck argued by making reference to reforms in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. There, reformist lawyers had taken the “necessities” of the modern world into account, and thereby reestablished the significance of Islamic Law. If orthodox Muslims in colonized countries failed to engage in similar reforms, they would suffer the same fate as the orthodox Jews in Europe, who refused to modernize their laws – and therefore isolated themselves from the rest of the society.[102] Unlike Roman law, both Islamic and Jewish law were deontologies, which abided by divine rules. They evaluated human action not by its consequences but by the “good intentions” divine law prescribed. This inflexibility had to be abolished, according to the modernizers of Muslim law.[103] With this opinionated analysis of the history of Islamic law, Snouck had claimed to prove his central contention: he delivered the proof that Islamic law had to be modernized in order to survive. He did so by using arguments he found in the Islamic legal repertoire, like the *ḍarūra*, and

[101] Ibid., 247-248.
[102] Ibid., 247-251.
[103] Ibid., 261.

therefore argued along the lines of Muslim law. If Islamic law had always adapted to local customs, it could also adapt to global modernity.

While Islamic law had an inherent tendency to adapt itself to customs and habits, it was even more open to influences from outside the system. The legal flexibility of the Islamic system and its "customary" character was not entirely homemade. Islamic law was adaptable to external influences and the history of Islamic expansion revealed its capacity to incorporate elements of foreign customs. Snouck repeatedly reminded the colonial officials of that analysis. He had spent several years of his intellectual life proving that Islam had reached Indonesia not directly from the Arabian Peninsula, but via India. Thus it had absorbed Hindu and Buddhist elements before carrying them to Indonesia.[104] There, again, it had blended with local *'adat* and customary law. Becker even believed to have singled out elements of India's syncretist "popular Islam" as far as East Africa, where Swahili-speaking *'ulemā* used religious texts from Bombay and the Malabar Coast.[105] These texts were shot through with rites from Indian traditions, including the use of holy water or the art of oneiromancy.[106] According to Becker, no region equaled British India in its variety of Islamic sects. This was due to the adaption of Islam to the caste system.[107]

With regard to diversity, Becker claimed, African Islam was in no way inferior to the varieties of Asian Islam. Becker evoked the works of Edmond Doutté, who had analyzed the magical practices of Islam in the Maghreb. The mysticism of North African Islam ascribed *barakah* (more or less benediction) to saints, but also to things and situations of personal contemplative ecstasy. This "animist" tradition was backed by the omnipresence of beliefs in curses or the harmful effects of the "evil eye." Doutté had come to the conclusion that Islam "absorbed the old beliefs in magic" more easily than any other religion. Customary law was deeply rooted in native societies was nowhere replaced by Islam: "While the beliefs change, the rites persist." [108] This was an attitude shared by both Arabists and anthropologists working in West Africa.[109]

For the ICI members, Islam's openness to foreign elements was deeply rooted in its history of syncretistic expansion. When Islam emerged in the Arabian Peninsula in the sixth century, its religious rules answered the specific needs of an Arabic nomadic tribal society. Following the Muslim's *hijra* to Medina, the religion had to augment its legal repertoire, which

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[104] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A140: Letter from Becker to Snouck from 31.1.1907; Hurgronje, *Politique musulmane de la*, 72.
[105] Becker, 'Materialien zur Kenntnis des', 30.
[106] Ibid., 33.
[107] Ibid., 5.
[108] Doutté, *Magie et religion*, 602; he is cited by all the colonial Orientalists: Becker, 'Materialien zur Kenntnis des', 31.
[109] A. Le Chatelier, *Les confréries musulmanes du Hedjaz* (Paris, 1887); A. Le Chatelier, *L'Islam dans l'Afrique occidentale* (Paris, 1899).

resulted in the so called Medina suras – the Coranic suras that organized social life of the believers in Medina. The subsequent and fast expansion of the religion increased the complexity of Islamic law.[110] Its divine authority blended into a globally diversified customary law.

Moreover, unlike Christianity, Islam did not spread through missionary activity. Instead, economic expansion and military conquest carried the Islam to Asia and Africa.[111] This implied that it was not dogmatically trained missionaries who spread Islam, but merchants, soldiers and administrators. [112] These laymen were dogmatically undisciplined and often misinterpreted Islamic rules. While some recited prayers without understanding their content, others did not even maintain the outward appearance of the rituals. In Java, for example, Islamic law had never gained a foothold. In Aceh people did not pray five times a day, and in other regions in Java, Muslims ignored the fasting period. [113]

It was Java that inspired the Dutch ICI member Cornelis van Vollenhoven to elaborate the most eloquent and far-reaching account of customary law infiltrating Islamic law. Van Vollenhoven both collected and invented the so-called *adat law*. Van Vollenhoven was a close friend to ICI members Snouck, Van der Lith and Chailley, who had inspired him to analyze the native *adat law* in the Dutch Indies, while the IRRV's questionnaire was another stimulus.[114] The term *adat*, deriving from the Arabic word for custom, designated the customary traditions in the Indonesian civilization. They were, however not merely customary traditions, but had become authoritative. To neglect them resulted in punishment. Therefore, Vollenhoven insisted on using the expression *adat law*: "They are *adat* on account of their uncodified state and *law* because they carry sanctions"[115] Since the turn of the century, Van Vollenhoven's collaborators collected *adats* to ultimately systematize them in forty-five volumes of so called *Adatsrechtbundel*.[116] To promote its use, van Vollenhoven published extensively on the theory and practice of *adat* law. He spread his theory via the ICI, where he earned himself the honorific nickname "Homer of adat law" [117]

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[110] Snouck-Hurgronje, 'Politique musulmane de la Hollande : Quatre conférences' 40.
[111] Becker claimed that Islam spread peacefully while expanding economically. Snouck disagreed and said that military conquest imposed Islam on the conquered: ULCSH, Or. 8952 A: 144 Becker to Snouck from 19.5.1911.
[112] Snouck, 'Politique musulmane'. 29-30.
[113] Ibid. 28 and 50.
[114] C. van Vollenhoven, 'The Study of Adat Law (1907)', in J.F. Holleman (ed.), *Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian Adat Law* (Dordrecht, 1981), 24–40: 27 and 31. van Vollenhoven, 'La Politique Coloniale', 409; Snouck to Nöldeke from 1.5.1921, in: Koningsveld, *Orientalism and Islam*, 288.
[115] C. van Vollenhoven, 'The Elements of Adat Law (1907)', in J.F. Holleman (ed.), *Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian Adat Law* (Dordrecht, 1981).
[116] C. van Vollenhoven (ed.), *Adatrechtbundels: bezorgd door de Commissie voor het adatrecht; uitg. door het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie Adatrechtbundel bezorgd door de Commissie voor het Adatrecht* (45 vol.) ('S-Gravenhage, 1911-1955).
[117] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1920*, 143.

Drawing a line between "native" *adat* law and Islamic law in the Dutch Indies was not new. Snouck had made that distinction during the Aceh war. He had claimed that the Sultanate of Aceh rebelled against the Dutch at the instigation of a Muslim elite. The population of the Sultanate, however, was only superficially Islamized and would back down once the Muslim elite had been eliminated. Starting from this idea, Snouck recommended to use "divide and rule" strategies that stimulated the opposition between *adat* law and Islamic law. Van Vollenhoven placed himself in this tradition of legal manipulation but also believed firmly in the authenticity of *adat* law, which the colonizers might embrace in order to win the hearts of the colonized.[118]

Vollenhoven believed in the primacy of customary law over any other law imposed by a monotheistic religion as a universal concept. *Adat* law was a dynamic, "living" law. Its stable flexibility ousted any other codified law in terms of functionality for the common people. It therefore evoked the German distinction between *Volksrecht* and *Juristenrecht*, by valuing the popular law that emerged from below over the codes written by professional legislators.[119] *Adat* always resisted any kind of imposed law, be it religious or governmental. Moreover, the *adat* customs transformed the imposed law, instead of being replaced by it. According to Van Vollenhoven, the *Alfur* people who inhabited the Oceanian world illustrated this fact: they continued to follow the same customary law, regardless of whether they had become Muslims or Christians.[120]

It goes without saying that only intense anthropological research would be able to unveil the practices of this customary law. Vollenhoven instructed his collaborators, who collected elements of customary law in extensive field work in the Dutch Indies, to distrust any report on the legal force of Islamic or Hindu law. His assistants were not even allowed to consult written texts or interrogate the natives about their legal mentalities. They should rely on the close observation of native practice only.[121] Even if Islamic legal concepts were used in Indonesia – like *melk* (right of ownership) or *sarakat* (common property) – this did not prove they were applied in practice.[122] Therefore he believed that only anthropological methods – and participant observations in particular – allowed to understand customary law.

[118] C. van Vollenhoven, 'Aceh (1909)', in J.F. Holleman (ed.), *Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian Adat Law* (Dordrecht, 1981), 54–122: 54.
[119] C. van Vollenhoven, 'Adat, Adat Law, Native Law (1906)', in J.F. Holleman (ed.), *Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian Adat Law* (Dordrecht, 1981), 1–6: 2.
[120] Van Vollenhoven, 'The Elements of Adat', 13.
[121] C. van Vollenhoven, 'Adat Guide (1910)', in J.F. Holleman (ed.), *Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian Adat Law* (Dordrecht, 1981), 262–265.
[122] Van Vollenhoven, 'The Elements of Adat', 12.

Van Vollenhoven's concept of *adat* law derived from the notion that "natives" were determined by their environment and that foreign law rarely managed to penetrate or even uncouple natives from their milieu. However, the Dutch Orientalist was well aware of those elements of Hindu law, Islamic law, and European law that had influenced *adat*, if only superficially. It was the scholars' mission to "purify" *adat* law, collect its rules and provide the colonial governments with a sound compilation that they could use as an argument in trials. The *adat* law compilation was therefore destined to practical use by colonial courts, be they European or native.

Vollenhoven's survey followed recurring patterns of ethno-juridical research by asking for the role of personal status and property rights within native societies that were ruled by notions of collectivity. With utmost care, his collaborators analyzed native collectivities and their territorially or genealogically determined solidarity. This knowledge helped to compartmentalize the territory under investigation into "law areas" that were inhabited by "jural communities" (*rechtsgemeenschappen*). Aceh, for example, constituted such an autonomous legal community. Within each of these jural communities, Van Vollenhoven meticulously described the customs governing marriage, property, inheritance and constitution.

On the one hand, Van Vollenhoven delimited and defined juridical communities in order to determine if they were "legal personalities," and therefore collectively liable.[123] On the other hand, he tried to locate sovereignty within the juridical communities. The role of the chiefs and their customary rights to levy taxes or allocate community land was given particular attention.[124] By the same token, he recorded the rights of a juridical community to freely avail itself of and administer all lands, water, and other resources. This "right of avail" (*beschikkingsrecht*) corresponded to an area of avail (*beschikkingsgebied*) that was in turn congruent with the law area.[125] Like previous projects of ethnographic jurisprudence, Van Vollenhoven hoped to produce useful knowledge about the power of the chiefs and the possibilities to individually use collectively owned lands.

By dividing the Dutch Indies into local "law areas," Van Vollenhoven made clear that it was not a single Islamic law that governed the islands, but a plurality of local customs. Therefore, he insisted that the territory of the juridical communities was not congruent with the administrative units of the *mukims* – the basis of Islamic administrative division. The use of the term *mukim* in Islamized Indonesia was a fact, but only nominally, because the real entity was

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[123] Van Vollenhoven, 'Aceh (1909)' , 57-60.
[124] Ibid. 68.
[125] C. van Vollenhoven, 'Law Areas (1907)', in J.F. Holleman (ed.), *Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian Adat Law* (Dordrecht, 1981).

the collective juridical community.[126] These communities were not territorially or genealogically determined groups, but defined and delimited by their common adat law.[127] Believing firmly that adat law was the authentic law of the Malay Archipelago, Van Vollenhoven was convinced of the importance of revealing its real character to the colonial governments. He produced knowledge, which the administrators could then apply on the ground in their colonies.

Vollenhoven claimed to have discovered the primordial importance of native law in its authentic form that made it resistant to the penetration by "higher law". But Van Vollenhoven also had to admit its creeping amalgamation with Islamic or Hindu law. Matrimonial law in the Islamized regions of the Dutch Indies, like Acehnese or Minkabau jural communities, was a case in point. It illustrated the confusion between customary and Islamic law: The *Šāfiʿī* version of Islamic law played an important role in the initial stage of a marriage. *Šāfiʿī* rite prescribed who was allowed to marry and prohibited the marriage between close relatives or between a commonor and a *sayyed* noble. Marriage then required the mutual consent of the spouses, and was therefore a contract based on offer and acceptance. This contractual nature of marriage was unknown to the Acehnese.[128] The wedding itself was held using Islamic terminology and ceremony. But once the initial phase was over, marriage turned very un-Islamic: the wife continued to live with her parents in her own house, while the husband paid occasional visits to her. The children resulting from these visits lived with the mother. The marriage was based on juridical equality, and neither the wife nor the husband was the sole owner of property. Neither spouse required the legal assistance of the other. This meant that the wife was legally independent of her husband and kept her own property. All these practices, van Vollenhoven concluded, were not Islamic at all, but accepted by Muslim judges.[129] Islamic law tended to be a formality, *adat* law a reality.

With regard to inheritance law, it was harder to make distinctions between Islamic and adat traditions. The legal practice was a mix between matrilineal and patrilineal rules, interspersed with elements of Islamic law. Anthropologists were at pains to identify the origins of elements that derived from a complex history of exchange. Islamic judges often argued along the lines of Islamic law. Van Vollenhoven even reported about a conflict on inheritance at a native court, which was highly complex and did not allow any verdict if *adat* law was applied. Therefore, the court asked the litigants to convert temporarily to Islam. A verdict was then

[126] Van Vollenhoven, 'Aceh (1909)', 57-60.
[127] The pepper plantations of the Aceh, for example, were geographically separated from the Acehnese territory. But their customs applied there, even if they were exclaves: Ibid., 60.
[128] Ibid., 83.
[129] Ibid. 79.

pronounced in accordance with Islamic law. Vollenhoven used this anecdote to illustrate the elasticity of legal practice. But also in legal theory, he claimed, Islamic law and adat law had often converged while "the traces of the past are no longer distinct"[130] Islamic law modified by customary law.

To make colonial authorities familiar with his insights, Van Vollenhoven entered the ICI in 1913. Up to that date, he had published predominantly in Dutch, a language that few colonial officials understood. While the Dutch terminology of his *adat*-theory was hard to translate, he nevertheless hoped to spread its principles. Speaking before the ICI in 1921, Van Vollenhoven extended his diagnosis beyond the borders of the Dutch Indies. While he had always regarded the Malay Archipelago (including the Philippines) and Madagascar as one cultural unit, in which Indonesian *adat* law prevailed, he now added British India to the map of *adat* law countries. In all of them, he complained, colonial administrators had mistakenly assumed that religious laws – Islamic or Hindu – governed the population. As early as 1772, Warren Hastings had committed the original sin of declaring the religious codes (Muslim and Buddhist, Hindu) a basis and source of native law in Bengal. The same error has been repeated over and over again, the last time in Burma in 1898.[131] In the meantime, Macaulay had gone so far as to dismiss even the standard of Muslim and Hindu law by introducing a hybrid mainly based on English law. These Anglo-Indian Codes fostered assimilation, which Van Vollenhoven considered as being even more detrimental to colonial policy than the ignorance of *adat*. It was only until 1915 that the British contemplated a serious and translocal codification of customary law. [132]

In the Dutch Indies, the situation had been similar. Snouck had urged to take *adat* law into account during his service between 1889 and 1906. However, the "ethical policy" introduced at the turn of the century had caused a setback in this regard. Smaller achievements, like the autonomy of villages in legal matters or marriage according to local customs, were insufficient. In the Philippines, the Spanish civil code had been in in force until 1917, although Filipino jurists had already recorded customary law. But only in 1919 a joint Research Committee for Philippine Customary Law attempted a more systematic survey. Madagascar, on the contrary, was more advanced and applied customary law since the mid-1890 in special courts. The law's sources, however, were based on dubious codes made by the precolonial monarch in Tananarive. They were – as ICI member Jean-Baptiste Piolet had shown – unreliable, because influenced by French and British concepts of law. This "French" customary

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[130] Ibid., 85.
[131] Van Vollenhoven, 'La Politique Coloniale', 374.
[132] Ibid., 375.

law abrogated the payment of a fiancé to his future father in law, introduced civil possession, forced the registration of contracts ignored the collective rights of villages and allowed to convert collective land into individual possession. A village law was thus stipulated with regard to the Merino villages, but applied to municipalities that had not used the Merino customs before.[133]

There were two conclusions to be drawn from the post-1900 orientalist theory of Islam. Both made reference to the plurality and flexibility of Islam. The primary result of research was the primacy of customary law. All Orientalist experts in the ICI, among them Snouck, Van Vollenhoven or Becker, agreed that a pure Islamic law did not exist and was moreover hard to define. Their point of view accorded with the notion of Islamic reformers who expressly deplored the customary influences on Islam. They wanted to reform Islam by purifying it from external and contaminating influences. Without doubt, this was a reaction to the Orientalists, who stated that written or monotheistic law was in no way superior to customary law. In the case of a conflict between a codified and a folk law, the latter would always emerge as superior, even though it remained officially "Islamic law."

The second conclusion was that Islam was almost hybrid religion, at least in most parts of the world. The influence of local customs, like the *adat* law, had transformed Islam. Moreover, Islam eroded from within in a paradox tension between orthodox aspiration and heterodox reality. This plurality was not only an attribute to the Islamic religion. It was inherent to the Islams of late the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The ICI orientalists even went as far as to assume that Muslim law was neither Muslim nor a law. Again it was Snouck who put it bluntly: "Muslim law is not a law."[134] Muslim reformers, instead, saw in plurality a harbinger of decline.

The interpretation of Islam as plural and vulnerable, which Muslim reformers and the ICI's Orientalist experts shared, attracted the attention of colonial administrations all over the world. The territory they administered was congruent with those regions that had seen the convergence of local customs and Islamic culture. The Orientalists taught them that Islam might be an opportunity for colonial rulers rather than a threat to colonial rule. As it was potentially open to further modification, they started programs to modify it according to their own interests. Manipulative codification and transformative modernization were to means to the ends of stabilizing colonial rule.

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[133] Ibid., 407.
[134] Snouck Hurgronje, *Oeuvres choisies*, 261.

Although the ICI orientalists openly rejected the codification of Islamic and customary law, they had provided the scientific basis for its political realization.[135] Their studies fell on fertile ground in Algeria, where ICI member and head of the Algerian Indigenous Service, Marcel Morand, started a project to codify Islamic law. Morand was a declared follower of Snouck, although Snouck had always explicitly discredited the codification of Muslim law.[136]

The Codification of Islamic Law in Algeria

Algeria's governor general Jonnart started the most reckless attempt to use Islam's globality, diversity and dynamics for colonial purposes.[137] In 1905, he commissioned Marcel Morand, the director of the Algiers School of Law specialized in Muslim law and native customs, to produce a codification of Algeria's Muslim law. Along with the head of Algeria's indigenous affairs, Jean-Dominique Luciani, he put together an expert commission that comprised both Europeans and Algerian *ʿulamā*.[138] It took them eleven years to publish the code. The process was particularly time consuming: While Morand set the agenda and drafted the Code's preliminary version, the individual paragraphs were sent to local *qāḍīs* and European *juges de paix,* as well as to European court presidents in Algeria's bigger cities. All of them could comment on the draft, with the commission discussing their objections and occasionally changing the Code in response. Although the Code was never officially applied, tribunals in the colonies constantly referred to it and colonial administrators appreciated the Code Morand in which they grounded their juridical argumentation. [139]

Against his better judgment, Morand assumed the existence of a consistent Muslim law (*loi musulmane*). But he was well aware that its application differed from region to region, even within the Muslim hemisphere. Even though Islamic law aimed at universality it was far from being universal. The plurality of its interpretations, be it by the four orthodox schools of law (*madhahib*) or more heterodox variants, was inexhaustible. Morand therefore gave his own definition of Muslim law. Unsurprisingly, it was responsive to the needs of the colonial state. In line with the Algerian settler colonialism, and in accordance with a decree from 17 April

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[135] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A: 144 Letter from Becker to Snouck Hurgronje 19.5.1911.

[136] Contacts beyond the common membership in the ICI seem only to have started in 1923, See ULCSH, Or. 8952 D 103 Letter from Morand to Snouck 27.9.1927.

[137] The first French administrator to chronicle elements of Islamic Law in Algeria was Louis Rinn, see L. Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouan : Étude sur l'Islam en Algérie ; avec une carte indiquant la marche la situation et l'importance des ordris religieux musulmans* (Alger, 1884) and Trumbull, *An Empire of Facts*, 20-25 and 64-71.

[138] The Corsican Jean-Dominuqe Luciani was a cousin of Xavier Coppolani, who had produced a meticulous description of the Muslim brotherhoods in North Africa and beyond. Both worked in the indigenous affairs department: F. Pouillon (ed), *Dictionnaire des orientalistes de langue française* (Paris 2012), 252.

[139] Ibid., "Marcel Morand", 747.

1889, he divested land tenure law from Muslim jurisdiction. "The Muslims residing in Algeria," he proclaimed, "are governed by Muslim law only in the fields of personal status, succession, some of their buildings and the use of testimonies for evidence." French law, however, ruled over matters of land tenure and real estate: "The security of transactions, the development of colonization, and the very interest of the natives whose land tenure system risks to bring down the price of the land. These necessities command that in the future, there will be only one land tenure system in Algeria, which is French law."[140] The French administrators therefore traditionally controlled the most important economic resource in colonial Algeria. But the colonial administration did not stop there. They went further and exploited Muslim law for their own benefit.

Throughout the process of codifying Muslim Law in Algeria, Morand preserved his monopoly on defining its form and content. The monumentality of his project was only matched by its hubris. Unlike former colonial administrators, Morand did not want to use Muslim law. He wanted to create it. Consequently he saw himself as a legislator and not as a mere jurist who interpreted law in the tradition of the Muslim *ʿulamāʾ*.[141]

While adjusting his Code to the specific conditions in Algeria, Morand used international analogies to make a compelling case for the codification. He was inspired by the appeal of ICI members at the International Congress of Colonial Sociology in 1900 to reevaluate not only native jurisprudence but also their legal codes.[142] The ICI with its comprehensive publications on colonial law, was his main source of information and stimulation. A member of the ICI since 1907, Morand had consulted his colleagues for potential models of codification in other countries. Girault, Lyall, Van Deventer and Janssen informed him that no colonial government in France, Britain, Holland or Belgium had so far attempted to classify the integrity of Muslim law.[143]

There were only few models for Morand's code, which had been mostly onetime reactions to particular situations that threatened the colonial order. To retain control over its subject's civil status, the Dutch government had codified rules that designated persons in charge of contracting marriages and granting divorces in the legal case of repulsion as early as 1895. The British had transcribed the law of the *Khodja* sect to stamp out its unclear status between

[140] M. Morand, *Avant-projet de code. présenté à la Commission de Codification du Droit Musulman Algérien* (Alger, 1916), 12-13. "musulmans résident en Algérie ne sont plus soumis á la loi musulmane qu'en ce qui concerne leur statut personnel, leurs successions, certains de leurs immeubles et la preuve des obligations… La sécurité des transactions, le développement de la colonisation, l'intérêt même des indigènes dont le régime foncier est de nature à frapper la terre de déprediation, commandent qu'il n'y ait bientôt plus en Algérie qu'une seule loi foncière, la loi française."

[141] Ibid., 10.

[142] Morand saw the congress and the ICI at the origin of a new policy of native legislation: M. Morand, *Introduction à l'étude du droit musulman algérien* (Alger, 1921), 19, note 2.

[143] Morand, *Avant-projet de code*, 9.

Shiism and Sunnism that caused them to rebel against both Sunni and Shiite intermediary authorities.[144] Larger projects were under way. ICI members Snouck-Hurgronje and Van Vollenhoven launched the transcription of *adat* law in Indonesia – interpreted as the amalgam of local customs with an Islamic sheen – as a delayed response to the Aceh War, when Snouck had learned to study "native" mentalities and use them to refine measures of counter-insurgency. And in British India, two handbooks were in use to inform administrators about the predominating *Ḥanafī* school, but were not necessarily applicable to other colonies with *Mālikī* or *Ḥanbalī* or *Šāfiʿī* rites.[145] This is why Anglo-Indian authors started translating *Mālikī* legal texts in West Africa, by deliberately omitting extensive passages legalizing slavery, which stood in contrast to the colonial mission.[146] It was Russia that was the first to codify a *sharīʿah* for its colony in Turkestan. In 1908 and 1909, so called Pahlen Commission codified predominantly family law, civil status and succession law. While Pahlen's commission had been inspired by developments in Algeria, it did not substantially influence Morand's project.[147] Neither did the codifying projects of other colonial powers. Morand found the model for his codification project elsewhere.

Morand's colleagues in the ICI, Snouck and Becker, inspired his general idea of Islamic law.[148] Morand used their international authority to legitimize his manipulation of Algerian Muslim Law. He agreed with Snouck that history had proven the inconsistency of the two main sources of law – the Quran and the collection of traditions in the *Sunnah* – and therefore their openness to interpretation. Adding to these written sources were various means of exegesis: *ijmāʿ* (agreement of the Muslim community) and *qiyās* (deductive analogy), along with the respect for *ʻadat* and *ʻurf* (local customary law). Morand had learned to use all these instruments of legal interpretation from Snouck. As a consequence, Morand styled himself as Algeria's legislator, claiming to know Islamic law better than the local Muslim judges – who were indeed often autodidacts with varying degrees of knowledge about the mainstream interpretations from Cairo or Mecca.

The codification of Algerian Muslim law covered four domains: civil status (*statut personnel*), inheritance law (*loi de succession*), certain regulations concerning real estate (*immobilier*), and testimony (*prevue des obligations*). An 1889 decree had stipulated that in all

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[144] Ibid., 9.

[145] R.K.S. Wilson, *An Introduction to the Study of Anglo-Muhammadan Law* (London, 1894); S.A. Ali, *Student's Handbook of Mahommedan Law.* (Calcutta, 1897).

[146] A. Russel and A.A.-M. Suhrawardy, *First Steps in Muslim Jurisprudence Consisting of Excerpts from Bãkùrat-Al-Sa'd of Ibn Abù Zayd* (London, 1906), XIV.

[147] Morand, *Avant-projet de code*, 9-10; see on the Pahlen Commission: Morrison, 'Creating a 'Colonial Sharia''.

[148] In 1923, during the debates about the application of the codes, the General Government of Algeria sent a copy of the Code to Snouck-Hurgronje: ULCSH Or. 8952 A277: Letter from Doutté to Snouck 8.9.1923 and 20.9.1923.

other domains French law was applied to Muslims. Moreover, the regulations concerning real estate were equally governed by French law. The commission was nevertheless curious about Muslim notions on the possession of land.[149] This was particularly true for the *ḥabūs* lands, which were inalienable real estate according to Islamic laws. As the founder of a *ḥabūs* immobilized the land mostly by will – while assuring the *usufruct* rights to his heirs – the French Supreme Court treated the *ḥabūs* as subject to inheritance law. As a consequence they escaped French property law, which did not have any legal notion equivalent to the *ḥabūs*.[150]

Morand's codification was a farce. He himself drafted the first version in French, which was then translated into Arabic and sent to local judges. Although Muslims, most of the *qāḍīs* seem to have accepted the codification project. All in all, they only asked for insignificant changes. Morand turned most of these cautious requests down, arguing that "this request contradicts Muslim law and cannot be changed." It was Morand who defined the nature of Muslim law.[151] He left no doubt that his version of Muslim law was the correct one, arguing that it was taken from the reformed *sharia* codes that governed Turkey and Egypt. Indeed, these countries had codified and "modernized" their legal codes since the 1870s under the guidance of Europeans and integrating elements of the French civil code.[152] Morand claimed that Muslim governments of those countries had made those codes. According to him, they represented the most modern version of Islamic law, with which Algerian judges had to be familiarized. Curiously, he ascribed the highest authority to verdicts of the Egyptian mixed courts that had been imposed on Egypt by its European creditors in the 1870s and staffed with European judges.[153]

The other members of the codification commission, which consisted of nine Europeans and three Muslims, who were moreover loyal to the French government, abided by Morand's decisions. Morand also completed the final version of the code. He did his best to Europeanize Algerian Muslim law, by portraying the modifications as a reform that came from within Islam. For example, slavery was banned as a legal category from the code, although some quadis pointed to the traditionally tolerated existence of slaves in the Southern regions.[154]

The full extent of the code's manipulative potential unfolds in Morand's substitution of the local *Mālikī* rite with the foreign *Ḥanafī* rite. The *Ḥanafī* rite dominated the Ottoman and

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[149] Morand, *Avant-projet de code*, 12-13.
[150] Ibid., 17.
[151] Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie, *Projet de codification du droit musulman. Procès-verbaux des séances de la commission Discussion des textes de l'avant-projet concernant le statut réel immobilier et les preuves* (Alger, 1916), 57.
[152] See the Ottoman Mecelle Code (1877) and the Egyptian Civil Code (1876).
[153] J. Skovgaard-Petersen, *Defining Islam for the Egyptian State: Muftis and Fatwas of the Dār al-Iftā* (Leiden and New York, 1997), 60.
[154] Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie, *Projet de codification*, 11-12.

Egyptian codes and used all legal sources available, including the analogy (*qiyas*), the rational decision of the judge (*ihstisan*) or local customs (*adat, urf*). As a consequence, the *Ḥanafī* rite gave more room for interpretation. It also provided married women with more rights concerning personal property and the possibility to divorce their husbands. Introducing the *Ḥanafī* rite to Algeria helped Morand to portray Algerian *Mālikī* rites as lagging behind the advances of Islamic reformism. He did not hide his intentions in this regard: "the dispositions of the Ḥanafī rite are often more human, more open [*large*], more tolerant than those of the Mālikī rite. We should, without hesitation, and even though the majority of Algerians are Mālikī, rule out the Mālikī code and prefer the Ḥanafī to it."[155] But whenever convenience required it, Morand reserved himself the right to mix different rites. The global diversity of Islam provided Morand with the means to combine its elements to create his own "Muslim law."

Morand repudiated traditions that he considered "anachronistic" or "incoherent". The "anachronistic" judgements included the notion that a non-Muslim could not legally marry a Muslim or that a Muslim can anytime repudiate his wife without reason.[156] Among these "incoherent" *qāḍī* judgments was the right to turn mobile property into *ḥabūs*. Morand also overruled the judgement that an expropriation of a *ḥabūs* did not change its character as a *ḥabūs*. Finally, he declared the impossibility to mortgage a *ḥabūs* unlawful, as many Muslims protected their property from seizure by the state by declaring it a *ḥabūs*.[157] Obviously, Morand's intervention with regard to the *ḥabūs* aimed at reducing their number, because they stood in the way of European acquisition of Algerian land.

Several other elements of the code aimed at reducing collective property (mostly *arch* land). Under the guise of simplifying inheritance law, the codification commission reduced the potential heirs to the nuclear family. By the same token, Morand's Muslim law prohibited adoptions. Both regulations aimed at increasing the possibility that there would be no heir to a possession, which then – according to the Egyptian *Ḥanafī* law – fell into the hands of the *beit-al-mal*. In Algeria, however, there was no *beit-al-mal* or institution that administered ownerless land. It was therefore bestowed on the colonial state. Several *qāḍī*s protested against this regulation when they commented on the original draft. A local judge from Arzew complained that the *Mālikī* code conveyed land without an heir to a pious Muslim institution. But if the *Ḥanafī* rite should be applied, he proposed to "say openly that it is the state who inherits, as the

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[155] "C'est ainsi que les dispositions du rite hanafite sont souvent plus humaines, plus larges, plus tolérantes que celles du rite malékite. Nous n'aurons pas alors à nous faire scrupule, malgré que les musulmans algériens sont malékites pour la plupart, d'écarter les règles dur rite malékite pour leurs préférer celles du rite hanéfite" Morand, *Avant-projet de code*, 13.

[156] Ibid., 3.

[157] Ibid., 2-3.

appellation 'beit-el-mal' does not mean anything to us"[158] Added to these regulations was a stipulation that facilitated the liquidation of collective land: if only one of the owners wanted to liquidate his parcel of land, the others had to agree, buy the land from him or dissolve the entirety of collective land.[159]

The *Ḥanafī* code, inspired by the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, was supposed to rule in the entire colony, unless Morand chose a more suitable mix of Islamic schools of law. That caused trouble because Morand wanted to apply the code also to minorities of the Kabyles and the *M'zabites*. The Kabyle Berbers, Morand explained, accepted Muslim law as a religious law but not as a civil law. Each village had its own customary law, which differs significantly from Muslim laws. However, Morand argued, their customs were helplessly under-developed. Women did not have any right to divorce, while, under the *Ḥanafī* rite, they had at least the legal possibility to do so. The division of the estates among the Kabyles had led to a fragmentation of agricultural land that was detrimental to their economic development. Consequently, it would be an "act of civilization" to substitute their customs with Islamic law. By the same token, the *M'zabites* who were sectarian *Kharidjites* had to accept the new *Ḥanafī* code. In Morand's mind the new code would be a remedy for their cultural isolation and foster their economic development.[160]

Morand's attempt to invent and manipulate Muslim law was unique but not without precedent. For want of appropriate models in other colonies, Morand had chosen to imitate the legislation of semi-colonial spaces. He took advantage of two legislative sources, the *Mecelle* codes of the Ottoman Empire (1877) and the Egyptian civil code (1876).[161] On the one hand, those codes had been officially stipulated by Muslim sovereigns and were allegedly more legitimate in the eyes of Muslims. On the other hand, Morand was able to combine elements of Algerian laws, Ottoman rules and European codes into a new and "modern" Muslim law. It goes without saying that this invented law was conducive to the substantiation of the colonial state because it simulated indirect rule.

Colonial powers around the world realized that their rule could be justified with a manipulated Muslim Law. French administrators who were responsible for the codification and its application in Algeria gave lectures on their Islamic policy back in Europe.[162] They were

[158] "L'appellation de Beit-el-Mal ne répond à rien dans l'état actuel des choses , Il vaut mieux dire franchement que c'est l'Etat qui hérite, ou si l'on veut revenir au véritable esprit du droit musulman, d'après la doctrine de Malek, qu'on attribue les successions en déshérence au bureau de bienfaisance musulman de la localité ou du départment ou la sucession s'ouvre" : Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie, *Projet de codification* 43-49 and 26.
[159] Ibid., 60.
[160] Morand, *Avant-projet de code*, 10-11.
[161] Ibid., 7.
[162] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A277: Letter from Doutté to Snouck from 8.9.1923 and 9.10.1923.

well aware, as Doutté said, that the Algerian code actually “not only codifies but also modifies Muslim law”[163] This, they had learned from the ICI experts on Islam. As we will see, they would not be able to control the spirits they had summoned into existence.

While certain Islamic experts in the ICI criticized the Algerian efforts to codify Muslim law, others supported and promoted the attempt to “modernize” Muslim law. The ICI’s most active member Joseph Chailley proudly trumpeted his friendship with the Turkish legislator Sawas Pacha. Formerly Turkish Foreign minister, Sawas Pacha had directed the codification of Ottoman Muslim law in the 1870s, which served as a model in Algeria, but also in the French protectorate of Tunisia. Chailley admired this Turkish theoretician of Muslim law for his ability to express European prerogatives in terms of Muslim law: “Sawas Pacha tells us that every occidental truth can be in the long term understood and accepted by Muslims, provided that it had been islamisized”[164] Colonial administrators were more than happy to share this attitude and acted on Sawas Pacha’s “native” authority. Sawas Pacha – who had become a French national by choice – was member of the Chailley’s French Colonial Union and a proponent of the French civilizing mission. He gave lectures at Chailley' Colonial Union as early as 1893, in which he proposed the framing of modern European law in Islamic terms and its application all over the colonized world.[165] For the European colonizers, Sawas Pasha’s Christianity was of secondary importance, a view not shared by eminent Orientalists like Becker or Snouck who harshly criticized him.

Sawas Pasha’s concept of Muslim law derived from the Ottoman debates on the modernization of the law and its combination with European, mainly French law. He emphasized its compatibility with European law and its ability to develop and to adapt to changing situations. According to him, the history of Islam had proven this flexibility during its expansion, when it was modified while being applied to new circumstances and the necessities of their population. But Islam’s flexibility to adapt to local specificities went hand in hand with its capacity to adjust to change over time. To substantiate his claim, Sawas Pasha cited the “legislating prophet” Muhammad, claiming that “the laws cannot be changed but by the necessities of the time (*exigences du temps*)”[166] Like European specialists, he claimed that Islam was a dynamic religion that reacted to necessities of a global change. Its modernization was not only possible but also necessary.

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[163] ULCSH Or. 8952 A278: Letter from Doutté to Snouck from 11.10.1923.
[164] Institut Colonial International, *Compte rendu de la session tenue à Wiesbaden les 17, 18 et 19 mai 1904* (Brussels, 1904), 74.
[165] P. Sawas, *Le Droit musulman expliqué: réponse à un article de M. Ignace Goldziher,... paru dans le "Byzantinische Zeitschrift", II, 2, p. 317-325, 1893* (Paris, 1896), 1.
[166] Ibid. 22.

The "Modernization" of Muslim Law in the Tunisian Protectorate

Algeria was a settler colony and it was widely known and even accepted that priority was given to the European settlers. Tunisia, by contrast, was said to be different. In Tunisia, the ICI member Paul Cambon had established a system of indirect rule that was said to respect local laws and institutions. Declared a protectorate in 1883, Tunisia was presented as an anti-Algeria, based on a more modern and respectful form of colonization. French policy in Tunisia, however, did not differ in a significant way from the colonial policy in Algeria.

When the French established their protectorate over Tunisia in the 1880s, they had compelled the Tunisian bey to reform the country's legal system according to the Ottoman and Egyptian models. They employed two specialists for this task. One of them was Sawas Pasha, the Christian Ottoman who held close ties with the French colonial lobby. Sawas Pasha was gradually ousted by a much younger Tunisian-Italian Orientalist from Florence, David Santillana, who would complete the draft of the new Tunisian code for the French government.[167] Santillana was chosen for his expertise in Tunisian *Mālikī* law. He would subsequently translate the famous *Mukhtasar* by Khalil Ibn Ishaq, the most prominent and influential reference for the *Mālikī* rite into Italian. If, however, Muslim laws were taken into account, Khalil was the main reference for him. Yet, Santillana's methods did not differ significantly from Sawas Pasha's approach. For both, the Ottoman *Mecelle* and the precedential decisions of the Egyptian mixed courts served as models, like during Morand's codification of Muslim law in Algeria. The Ottoman and Egytpian experiences provided practical insights into the fusion of French civil law with Muslim regulations (*Mecelle* in the Ottoman Empire), and the application of British common law within a Muslim environment (the mixed courts in Egypt).

Sawas Pacha cooperated with Santillana and the French resident general to elaborate the new code. All of them invoked the Islamic concept of "necessity" as a source of legitimacy for the modernization of Muslim law. In his introduction to the *Avant-projet de Code Civil et Commercial Tunisien* (1899), Santillana claimed that the predominant *Mālikī* rite in Tunisia stipulated that laws should be made according to their social utility. The *Mālikī* doctors of law Al-Tasouli and Ibn Farhoun endorsed this view by explaining that custom and tradition can be converted into law, while Ibn Nadjim admitted that "necessity made us accept many things that

[167] D. Santillana, *Code civil et commercial tunisien. avant-projet discuté et adopté au rapport* (Tunis, 1899); See also D. Santillana, *Istituzioni di diritto Musulmano Malichita. con riguardo anche al sistema sciafiita; 1: La comunità musulmana e il suo capo. Fonti del diritto e loro ermeneutica. La legge nelle spazio e nel tempo* (Roma, 1925).

are normally prohibited according too rigid principles." Santillana also invoked the *Ḥanafī* inclination to analogy as a legal instrument, which confirmed that "The law does not follow absolute rules, like grammar or logic…rather it incessantly adopts to the circumstances that engendered it". Mollah Tcheragh Abi concluded in the introduction that the Muslim *shariah* law – if it can be called a law at all, because it is not an organic law – is in no way immobile or unmodifiable"[168] According to him, all Muslims, no matter which school of law they adhered to, agreed on the importance of "necessity," which determined the law.

Like Morand's codification project, Santillana's code also combined different schools of law for the benefit of the Europeans. Both Morand and Santillana cited the Ottoman *Mecelle* that claimed that "it is wrong to stick to one single school of law…we have to pick the best from every imam." A judge from the mixed courts in Egypt agreed that a sovereign might choose among a great variety of interpretations and therefore "has the choice to apply whatever religious rule he wants to apply." Finally, the famous mufti of Cairo, Muhammad Abduh told the Algerian and Tunisian legislators that he was of *Šāfiʿī* origin, but often used the *Ḥanafī* rite for his verdicts. Tunisian lawmakers would happily embrace the same strategy. Ultimately, both the Ottoman and the Egyptian courts mixed rites in their decision, a practice that would become common in Tunisia as well.[169]

Sawas Pacha, who had conducted a preliminary study about the codification of Tunisian law had picked up on the "mixed rites" codification, stating that both the *Mālikī* and the *Ḥanafī* rites were in force in Tunisia. Before the arrival of the Europeans, the *sharīʿa* courts had two sections, one for each rite. Litigants could choose the judge who was specialized in their orientation. In addition to this duality, there was also an independent court for local usages and non-religious administrative law.[170] Thus, even Tunisia provided the colonial guardians with plenty of possibilities to mix different rites. Santillana's team of legislators used all these sources to establish the new code, along with the vast corpus of fatwas circulating in the Muslim world.[171]

Unlike the Algerian code, the Tunisian code openly integrated elements of European law, even though the legislators tried to couch them in Muslim concepts. Already Sawas Pacha had recommended to add European legislation in commercial and civil law, and to win Muslim scholars over for the use of "scientific" and "rational" methods.[172] The commission was

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[168] Santillana, *Code civil et commercial*, V; Morand, *Avant-projet de code*, 14.
[169] Ibid., 14-15.
[170] P.H. X and d'Estournelles de Constant Paul Henri Benjamin, *La Politique Française en Tunisie: Le Protectorat et ses origines, 1854-1891* (Paris, 1891), 366-368.
[171] C. van Vollenhoven, 'Notice Complementaire sur la Codification du droit musulman dans l'Afrique du Nord', in Institut Colonial International (ed.), *Compte Rendu de la Session tenue en 1921* (Brussels, 1921), 413- 416.
[172] A. Servier, *L' Islam et la psychologie du musulman* (Paris, 1923).

officially charged with "codifying civil, commercial and penal legislation based on the model of the French Code."[173] When it published the Tunisian Code, many regulations derived from the French *Code Civil*, as well as German, Swiss, and Italian commercial law. Santillana's code made no secret of those sources. It allowed to trace the origins of every single law by adding its sources to the paragraphs that contained them. At least the possibility to verify the regulations was taken from the Muslim *isnad* tradition, which held verifiability in high esteem. The code was formally Muslim but partly of European content.

The commission involved Muslim laws only, if they were consistent with the European legislation. Thus, Santillana assumed the task to "search…in Muslim jurisprudence, and in the older Tunisian legislation, all those rules that could be useful with regard to the principles of modern law or the current conditions of the native society."[174] Unlike other members of the commission, Santillana did not dismiss Muslim law as immobile and dogmatic, and therefore irreconcilable with European law. According to Santillana, an Aristotelian spirit guided Islamic legislation, which regarded all humans as political and social beings and took their needs into account. Both materialism and utilitarianism determined Muslim laws: "The purpose of the law is social utility"[175] According to him, the principles inherent to all law were also present in Islam: procedural sincerity (*bona fide*), equality before the law, and the ultimate purpose abolish all unjust damage (*dharar*). Arguing in this functionalist tradition enabled Santillana to justify the modernization (and Europeanization) of Islamic law – allegedly out of its own impetus. There was only one component that Islamic jurisprudence lacked, the Italian Orientalist claimed: the "synthesizing spirit."[176] This lacunae should be filed by the codification of Tunisian law.

Drafted in the late 1880s and early 1890s, the codification was brought to a successful end in 1899. But only the commercial code came into force in 1906 under the title *Code des Obligations et Contracts*.[177] Its main purpose was to secure the observance of contracts by two individuals or juristic persons, and to guarantee their mutual obligations. While contract law was a universal necessity in all societies, it was also a typically "colonial" concern. According to the mastermind of French colonial law, Arthur Girault, the natives often broke employment agreements with Europeans, because of their moral dishonesty.[178]

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[173] Santillana, *Code civil et commercial*, I.
[174] Ibid., I.
[175] Ibid., IV.
[176] Ibid., XI.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, 537.

The code was basically a code for contract law, but touched upon various issues concerning every day life. Therefore, an important passage was dedicated to the *ḥabūs*, which were omnipresent in Tunisian daily life. The foundation of such a *ḥabūs* required a contract. And it was by analyzing the Muslim traditions of contract law that Santillana found an instrument in Muslim law to turn the inalienable *ḥabūs* into private property.

"Tunisian Law Provides us With a Means": Dispossession Between Settler Colonialism and Native Law

Unlike the inalienable *ḥabūs*, European law governed all real estate regulations in the colonies – and in the protectorates. Depriving native law of control over real estate was one essential purpose of colonial law's dual paradigm, as formulated by Chailley in the ICI: "the emancipation of the individual and the emancipation of property."[179] Two instruments were available to achieve this dual goal, namely a personal status (yet not a civil status, which was for citizens only) for each individual and individual land titles. The colonial state had to provide for a system that enabled the systematic registration of individuals and their property. Registering individuals and their property was an onerous task, as the ICI expert for land tenure in the colonies Günter Anton explained. In the 1890s, the high court of Algiers, for example, had counted fifty thousand Algerians with the name Muhammed ben Ahmed. This made it almost impossible for courts to distinguish among individuals, to identify criminals, or to register landowners. Collectively owned land and "family communism" were further obstacles to constitute private property. [180]

Colonizers from all countries agreed that there was only one remedy to these problems: The Australian "Torrens Title." Theoretically, the Torrens system was a central register for individual land titles, which was public, transparent and accessible. Once a title was registered it became the undisputable property of the person who had submitted it for inclusion on the register. In practice, the Torrens system manifested itself in a variety of slightly differing forms of centralized land registers, inspired by Australian colonization law, the German *Grundbuch* and notions of French civil law.

The Torrens system originated in Australia and had played a vital role in providing the white settlers in South Australia with colonial land. It was therefore the legacy of nineteenth century settler colonies and those who promoted indirect rule and native policy as the most modern form of colonization had regarded it as anachronistic. The ubiquity of the Torrens Act

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[179] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1904*: Discussion "La Meilleure manière de légiférer pour les colonies", 77.
[180] G.K. Anton, *Französische Agrarpolitik in Algerien* (Leipzig, 1893), 102-103.

seemed to prove them wrong. Chailley's father-in-law Paul Bert was the first to apply it in French Indochina in 1885.[181] All the French colonies adopted the system, ranging from the Algerian settler colony to the Tunisian protectorate and the West-African possessions, where concessionaires received extended territories from the colonial governments.[182] In 1897 Gallieni introduced it to Madagascar.[183] A later ICI member, Hubert von Neuss copied the Torrens Title from Tunisia when reorganizing the real property law of the Congo Free State in the 1890s.[184] It spread further to the Italian and German colonies, and was in force in the mandates of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine from the 1920s onwards. [185]

The ICI members celebrated the Torrens system for its efficacy and claimed that its superiority derived from its unambiguity, its verifiability and its publicity. According to the ICI specialist of land law Günter Anton, who had travelled several European colonies to study their regulation of property, the advantages of the Torrens system were evident. An individual who intended to buy a territory could consult the central register about the land's legitimate owner, about potential rights on the land claimed by a third party, or about its possible encumbrance such as an outstanding mortgage or unpaid property taxes. While the claims of a third party suspended a transfer of the land, an encumbrance lessened its value. If the registered land title did not contain any endorsements of this kind, the purchase contract was concluded and the buyer received the land, "purified" of any hidden charges. But it only entered in his full possession after the buyer's title appeared in the central register.

Before the title was formally registered, the authorities publicly announced the pending transaction. During a fixed period, anybody could contest the contract or assert his or her own right to the land.[186] If nobody raised an objection, the government sent a delimitation commission. The Service Géographique de l'Armée assumed this task in Tunisia, thereby advancing with the mapping of the country.[187] Finally, the land was registered and therefore delivered the absolute proof of possession, especially with regard to contestations of third persons. The buyer received a copy of the title. Thus, the new owner had his property "in his pocket," as Anton put it. In case of changes or transactions, all relevant information was added

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[181] Chailley-Bert, *Dix années de politique*, 9 ; Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, 594.
[182] G.K. Anton, 'Régime Foncier aux autres colonies françaises', *Compte Rendu 1900*, 691 ; See also ANOM, FM MIS Carton 76, Folder Noel Pardon, Letter from Pardon to Colonial Minister from 25.5.1906: Application de L'Acte Torrens, demande de mission gratuite.
[183] Gallieni, *Madagascar de 1896 à 1905*, 524 ; G.K. Anton, 'Régime Foncier', 695.
[184] Comeliau, 'Hubert van Neuss'; K. Stengel, *Der Kongostaat.*, 27, based on Descamps' publications.
[185] G. Soulmagnon, *La loi tunisienne du 1er juillet 1885 sur la propriété immobilière et le régime des livres fonciers* (Paris, 1933); D. Gavish, *The Survey of Palestine under the British Mandate, 1920-1948* (London and New York, 2005), 129-134.
[186] G.K. Anton, 'Politique Agraire en Tunésie', in : *Compte Rendu 1900,* 674.
[187]Ibid., 676.

to the register and the individual copy. Both contained the entire history of a property, along with former and present encumbrances.[188]

Applied to the colonies, the Torrens system worked in favor of the Europeans. European colonists and investors had constantly complained about the contestations of their titles long after they had purchased territory from the colonized. [189] Sometimes the lands had been used as temporary pastures by nomads or the local residents. In other cases the lands had been considered sacred. More frequently, the land was collectively owned and one of the owners had sold parts of it without the consent of his co-proprietors. In similar cases, groups had the right of *usufruct* or the right to hunt or collect firewood on the territory. By introducing a central land register that guaranteed that a territory was free of these burdens, the colonial powers hoped to assure the full rights to a purchased territory and facilitate its transfer – mostly to Europeans.

Unlike the German *Grundbuch* system, which made registration obligatory for all real estate, the colonial Torrens system left it to the natives to choose if they wanted to register their lands.[190] Few of them did, as the procedure was unfamiliar, costly and included travelling to the administrative centers. As a consequence, it was difficult for them to provide evidence of title, particularly upon request by the European colonizers. Their titles were not protected by any authority, and local *qāḍī*s recorded land transactions in rare cases only. Europeans instead registered their land and therefore won the irrefutable right to the land. In the long term, this system resulted in the invalidation of native land rights and the encroachment of European landowners. In Tunisia, the Torrens system enabled a single owner of collective land to demand the inscription of his property. If he asked for registration, the other owners were not allowed to refuse this. They could either buy his part or divide the territory. Both decisions were legal in Muslim law. In any case, the result was the liquidation or dismemberment of the native's real estate.[191] Even Anton had to admit that the introduction of the Torrens Act can be "disastrous" for native farmers[192]

Although ICI members and colonial administrations were enthusiastic about the Torrens system, it rarely took full effect. The administration was unable to cope with its task. And both colonists and native seemed to have little interest into registering their land. In Tunisia, for example, the government strove to make non-European landowners sign up. To avoid confusion, the Tunisian land register was ordered according to properties and not according to persons and names. This was important as the Tunisians, like the Algerians did not use family

[188]Ibid., 672.
[189] Ibid., 670.
[190] Ibid., 674.
[191] Ibid., 687.
[192] Ibid., 680.

names.[193] Moreover, the land titles were not tagged with numbers that appear on the cadaster and the land register, like in Germany and in Australia, but – according to Tunisian customs – labeled with a name. These attempts to make the system more attractive were often in vain. Between 1886 and 1892, there were only 251 registrations, 130 by French, thirty-four by natives and seventy-three by Italians. This was mainly due to the high registration fees. When the fees were reduced in 1892, the demand rose slightly and reached the number of 2089 until 1897. In 1898, there were 236 Tunisians, 224 French and 123 Italians who had registered their lands.[194] Unintentionally, the Torrens Title had made the Tunisians the biggest landowner group registered.

Nevertheless, although the colonizers overrated the effects of the Torrens Title and were not able to foresee its involuntary effects, it enabled – to a lesser extent than the colonizers' enthusiasm suggested – colonization in certain regions and brought about the transition to private property or capitalism in others. When it failed to do so, governors could make use of outright expropriation, if they managed to portray the dispossession as necessary for "public utility". Throughout the twentieth century, for example, the Algerian colonial government continued to seize the land of Algerians. In 1906, for instance, the French government created a new colonization center in the mixed commune of Berrouaghia. It was therefore in need of land and expropriated extensive territories inhabited by the Beni-bou-Yagoub. Among the dispossessed lands was a *ḥabūs* of one thousand hectares. The Beni-Bou-Ygoub resisted bitterly and sent frequent petitions to the French parliament protesting against the violation of the inalienability of the *ḥabūs*. The French General Assembly urged Algiers to stop the expropriation but failed to take appropriate measures.[195]

The ongoing dispossessions were not particular to Algeria, as ICI member Arthur Girault remarked. Conflicts about land were still the main source of anti-colonial revolts, despite the progress "native policy" made to win over the colonized as collaborators. At the outset of the twentieth century, it remained the priority of colonial governments to appropriate the most fertile land for cash crop production.[196] While land grabbing for colonial agriculture lingered on, the discovery of extensive subterranean resources renewed the interest in land tenure regimes and access regulations. In 1904, the ICI undertook a vast study of the *régime minier*, which was closely intertwined with the debates on the *régime foncier*. It was debated whether subterranean resources belonged to the owner of the surface plot (*accession*), to the

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[193] Ibid., 675.
[194] Ibid., 680.
[195] 'Notice sur les travaux parlementaires de l'année 1906', *Revue algérienne, tunisienne et marocaine de législation et de jurisprudence* 23 (1907), 1.
[196] Girault, *Principes de Colonisation*, 33-34.

state (*domanialité*), to the discoverer (*occupation*), to the state because it has to be defined as res nullius (*souveraineté*) or to those concessionary companies who are most apt to exploit them (*adjudication*).[197] The ICI members tended to prefer professional concessionary companies who guaranteed the most effective exploitation. While the colonial state was also supposed to profit from the resources, the colonial government should invite tenders on an international scale, in order to ensure competent exploitation.[198] This might, one ICI report put it, replace the "emigration of people with the emigration of capitals" and therefore lead to a new understanding of colonization.[199] As capital was always welcome regardless of its origin, the exploitation of natural resources in the colonies was occasionally internationalized.[200]

Nevertheless, colonial states had to ensure the appropriation of land in the first place. To avoid protests among the colonized, colonial governments tried to argue along their lines. It was therefore of primordial importance to know "native" customs and laws. The law of succession was of particular interest, because colonial governments tried to style themselves as successors to sovereigns who had governed the county before them. By replacing them, they acquired their sovereignty and all the privileges this entailed. Arthur Girault, the most famous compiler and teacher of colonial legislation, found the origins of this strategy in India, where the British crown had asserted itself as the legal successor to the Muslim sovereigns since 1854. In his courses on colonial legislation, Girault explained to future administrators that most of the land in Muslim countries belonged to the sovereigns, and was only bestowed upon those who cultivated it. The commoners had the right to *usufruct* only.[201] The Algerian case proved Girault right, because there the French had "inherited" the domain land from the Ottomans as early as 1830. The Annamite government in Indochina had ceded all its property to the French in 1888. And Gallieni declared himself successor to the Malagasy monarch in 1897. As such he decreed "all the mobiles and immobiles of the royal domain are now domains of the state.[202] The French thus perfected the system of hostile takeover of sovereignty rights.

In those colonies that lacked a recognizable sovereign, the colonizers invoked the labor theory of property, which they portrayed as universally accepted. G.K. Anton, specialist on the comparison of colonial land tenure, informed the ICI members, of a paragraph in the Koran that assigned the right to occupy a territory to those who cultivated it. It was therefore unnecessary to refer to Locke's labor theory of property, if the holy book of the Muslims said the very same

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[197] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1904,* 169-70.
[198] Ibid., 172.
[199] Ibid., 162
[200] See the joint German-British companies in German South-West Africa in Chapter 2.
[201] Girault, *Principes de colonisation.*
[202] Ibid., 39-40.

thing. Nevertheless, colonial administrators were able to use it as an argument in favor of occupation and dispossession.[203]

The intensive study of Muslim laws at the beginning of the twentieth century provided the colonizers with more subtle possibilities to acquire land in accordance with Muslim law. This is particularly true for the *ḥabūs* endowments in Tunisia, which were generally not seized, to keep up with the appearance of indirect rule. The detailed study of Islam's legal sources in Morand's and Santillana's codification project provided the colonizers with strategies to turn *ḥabūs* land into individual property. Unlike other property, the colonizers agreed, the *ḥabūs* had to be governed by Muslim law. There was no equivalent in European law, and the forced conversion of *ḥabūs* into individual property or domain land was likely to cause unrest among the Muslims. "The pious foundation of the *ḥabūs*" Snouck warned "belong naturally to the realm of the holy law" [204] However, while the *ḥabūs* were considered as immobile, inalienable and "elevated to the other world," they were dedicated to quite worldly purposes: making money. According to the colonizers, they did not make enough money, and they sought ways to dilute their inalienable and "holy" status. [205]

The private *ḥabūs* or *waqf* was a profit-yielding property that its owner declared inalienable by turning it into a pious endowment.[206] In doing so, the land could not be sold or given away. In exchange, parts of its profits – deriving from the production of crops on its soil, for example – were endowed to mosques or madrasas. Several reasons might lead landowners to declare their land estate a *ḥabūs*. One of them was to secure his families' continued possession of the land, which expressed the owner's social status. Another reason was to protect the land from confiscation by the state. A supervisory board (*ǧāmi*, in French transcription *djemaa*) administered the *ḥabūs* and watched over its mortmain character. While the *ḥabūs* supervisory board now legally possessed the land or real estate (*dominium eminens*), the former owner kept the right to use it and make profits from it (usufruct or *dominum utile*). He and his heirs retained the usufruct eternally, unless they did not abuse their rights and neglect its exploitation.

Alongside the private *ḥabūs*, which was perpetually used by the family that had turned it into an inalienable property, there were public *ḥabūs*. Traditionally, Muslims turned a private *ḥabūs* without legal heirs into a public *ḥabūs*, which was then both possessed and exploited by

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[203] Some claimed that the Our'an's authors had taken this passage from the Codex Theodosianus – which had had a considerable influence on the book – some contested this view and claimed that Muhammad had turned against this idea. Anton, *Französische Agrarpolitik in Algerien*, 60.
[204] Snouck-Hurgronje, 'Politique musulmane de la Hollande : Quatre conférences', 67.
[205] Ibid., 56.
[206] On the socio-religious history of the pious endowments in North Africa see M. Hoexter, *Endowments, Rulers and Community:Waqf al-Haramayn in Ottoman Algiers* (Leiden 1998).

a pious foundation. All these modifications of the status were watched over and controlled by the supervisory board, but not necessarily registered. According to the *Mālikī* handbooks, *ḥabūs* could be created by oral agreement only, without the obligation to put the contract into writing. This made it particularly difficult for the colonial powers to distinguish *ḥabūs* from alienable land.[207]

It goes without saying that the *ḥabūs* were an obstacle to European colonization. In Ottoman Tunisia, experts reckoned, one third of all territory had been qualified *ḥabūs* – and were theoretically inalienable. By 1898, the gains of the Tunisian *ḥabūs* amounted to 1,268,886 Francs.[208] Cyrenaica was entirely covered with *ḥabūs* owned by the *Sanūsīya* brotherhood, much to the chagrin of the Italians who were eager to establish a colonize it. They sent Santallina there to find out how they could be removed from the Sanūsīs by using arguments from Muslim law.[209] While codifying Tunisian law for the French and searching for solutions to alienate *ḥabūs*, he had found a contractual procedure called *Inzāl* that allowed both Muslims and Europeans to "purchase" *ḥabūs*.

The *Inzāl* (frenchyfyed into *enzel*) actually allowed for the alienation of *ḥabūs* by giving leaseholders the perpetual right to use it. Muslim jurists had provided *ḥabūs djemaas* (supervising boards) with the *Inzāl*, because the latter were unable to administer and exploit the totality of *ḥabūs*, without converting some of them into capital. The *djemaa* needed capital to exploit the other *ḥabūs* in its custody. This was necessary, as uncultivated and unexploited *ḥabūs* risked losing their status of inalienability, according to the *Mālikī* rite.

Mālikī jurists therefore stipulated that only the *dominium eminens* was inalienable, but not the *dominium utile*. Thus, instead of buying *ḥabūs* land – which was unlawful – persons could lease the *usufruct* for an extensive period of ninety-nine years or more. Instead of a onetime purchase, they committed to pay an eternal and immutable rent. Receiving such a *dominium utile* often resulted in open possession-taking. Moreover, the tenant could provide the *djemaa* – the administrative council of *ḥabūs* – with a piece of land of equal value. If the *djemaa* accepted, he received full property rights over the old *ḥabūs*.[210]

Since the establishment of the protectorate, the French had adapted a "soft" version of the *Inzāl*. They urged the bey to enable long term leases, while formerly a lease on *ḥabūs* land was possible for three years only. A new decree facilitated the lease for ten years, renewable twice. The tenant had to pay rent to the *djemaa* and use an equal amount of money to increase

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[207] A. Baldinetti, *David Santillana, luomo e il giurista 1855-1931; Scritti inediti 1878-1920* (Roma, 1995), 23.
[208] G.K. Anton, 'Politique Agraire en Tunesie', in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1900*, 658.
[209] Baldinetti, *David Santillana*.
[210] G.K. Anton, 'Politique Agraire en Tunésie', in : ICI, *Compte Rendu 1900*, 660-663 ; D. Santillana, Istituzioni di diritto musulmano malichita, I, 4

the yield and make it more profitable. This increase in profit has then to be paid back to the usufructary when the bail ended. However, at any time, this restricted bail could be turned into to a hereditary bail.[211]

These provisory rules were soon replaced by Santillana's 1906 code, which declared the *Inzāl* a legal contract according to Tunisian law.[212] The *Code des Obligations et Contrats* reveals Santillana's strategy to couch European interests in Islamic terms and therefore make it a more "legitimate" law. The concept of *Inzāl*, he claimed, can also be found in Roman law, where it was called the "emphytheotic lease", a contract by which the owner of an uncultivated piece of land granted it to another either in perpetuity, or for a long time – on the condition that he cultivated the land, enhanced its yield and paid an annual rent.[213] This system, Santillana reported, also resembled the so-called *precaria* law of the European Middle Ages. This equivalence between European and Islamic traditions, Santillana claimed, was possible because of a more general similarity between legal concepts. Like the Europeans, who occasionally distinguished between rights of possession and use, the Muslim scholar Ibn Nadjim (or Nujaym) distinguished between the two elements of property, the "*droit sur la chose* (*rakba, corpus rei*) et *le droit qui a pour objet l'utilité ou la jouissance* (*antifaa, utilitas*)."

Ibn Nadjim's definition was taken from the Ottoman Mecelle, which had made wide use of his interpretation of Quranic law.[214] While the general concepts of possession and use of land property were taken from the "modernized" *Mecelle* code, Santillana found the details of the contract in local rites. He cited the *Mālikī* and *Ḥanafī* definitions of *Inzāl*, which shared this interpretation. The definition of the main North African theorist of *Inzāl*, Bairam, came closest to the Roman definition of the emphytheotic lease, and stipulated that the "Inzāl is a contract by which the administrator of a *ḥabūs* gives a virgin territory to another person who cultivates it – with the plantations belonging to the person who established them – and who pays an annual rent to the pious foundation…this is, without any doubt, a lease of the territory, unlimited in time" [215] After defining the *Inzāl*, Santillana explained its different varieties that existed all over North Africa, thereby emphasizing its universal validity.

The rest of the paragraph on the *Inzāl* stipulated that it had to be a written contract to be valid, and that the leaseholder received "full property rights" once the contract had been concluded. The leaseholder could sell his rights on the land to others, even without previous

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[211] Anton, 'Politique Agraire en Tunésie', 664.
[212] Santillana, *Code civil et commercial*, 400-413.
[213] Emphytheosis, in J. Bouvier (ed.), *A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America, and of the Several States of the American Union: With References to the Civil and other Systems of Foreign Law* (Philadelphia, 1868), 525.
[214] C. Mallat, *Introduction to Middle Eastern Law* (London, 2007), 246.
[215] Santillana, *Code civil et commercial*, 402.

notification of the original owner (the *ḥabūs* administration).[216] All these rules helped to make the "acquisition" of the *ḥabūs* easier for potential purchasers. The colonial state in Tunisia made use of this legal possibility when it gave legal force to Santillana's code.

This *Inzāl* system played into the hands of newly arrived European colonists. If leasing a *ḥabūs*, they did not need a huge amount of capital to buy land immediately upon arrival. Instead, they leased a *ḥabūs*, and paid an annual rent until the day they could afford to offer the *djemaa* a new territory in exchange. By 1897, the system was well established. The government put the *ḥabūs* up to auction. Among 11 823 alienated *ḥabūs*, 8 322 were acquired by European colonists.[217] Santillana, who entered the service of the Italian state after he had drafted the code for the French, continued to work on issues related to *ḥabūs* after the First World War. He headed the *Commissione per lo studio di questioni islamiche d'interesse coloniale* which the Italian colonial ministry sent to Cyrenaica to verify the *Sanūsīya*'s right to own the *ḥabūs* that dominated the region. Arguing on the authority of Kahlil, the authoritative scholar of the *Māliki* rite he had translated into Italian, Santillana claimed that the *Sanūsīya* had to deliver the proof of their possession by presenting testimonies of the oral contracts. Although Santillana's mission was not very successful, his investigations resulted in doubts on 23 000 hectares of *ḥabūs* land, on which the *Sanūsīya* had no testable right.[218] In the meantime, his *Code des Obligations et Contrats*, and with it the *Inzāl* contract, was applied in Morocco, Syria and Lebanon. In Algeria, however it was not applied, given that the government continued to expropriate the land, without pretending that this happened in accordance with their own laws.[219]

Unlike in Algeria, the French had to argue along the lines of Muslim law in the Tunisian protectorate. However, the purpose remained the same. The *ḥabūs* had to be pushed back and its territories had to be opened for colonization. "Tunisian law provides us with a means to do so," the ICI expert on land tenure in the colonies, Günter Anton, informed the members of the ICI in its 1900 meeting. He made reference to Santillana's code and spread the word about a new argument of "Islamic law" in favor of colonial dispossession.

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[216] Ibid., 403-413.

[217] Anton, 'Politique Agraire en Tunésie', 660-663; Santillana, *Istituzioni di diritto Musulmano*, I, 4.

[218] Baldinetti, *David Santillana*.

[219] See for Morocco: Dahir du 6 septembre 1913 (Bulletin Officiel du 19 Septembre 1913, N.47), cit. in: 100APOM/321 Copie de lettres Chailley à Lyautey, Folder Maroc : Notes sur la Production Agricole et leur Communication 1912-1915.

Conclusion: The Use of Global Islam

Ultimately, the long history of codification of Muslim law paid off for the colonizers. The initial concern that Islam in general and Pan-Islam in particular might pose a threat to colonial rule proved unfounded. Colonial internationalists developed strategies to reconcile Muslims with the colonial rule imposed on them. Most of those strategies had been used in the East Indies before colonial administrators imported them to Africa. In particular, the fatwa-policy was a product of transnational communication among colonial experts. It included Muslim collaborators, who "sold" their own expertise and issued authoritative fatwa*s* in favor of the colonial power. But specialists on Islam went even further and aimed to manipulate the details of Islamic law, which was said to penetrate deep into the every-day life of colonial subjects.

One strategy to modify Islamic law was to deny its existence. Specialists argued that there was no global Islamic law and redefined it as a customary law that could be modified according to local and temporary circumstances. The lack of a Muslim clergy and the fragmentation in different *madhāhib* (schools of jurisprudence) substantiated their claim that no Muslim could ever know what Islamic law is. Only European Orientalists with their bird-eye's view on Islam would be able to grasp the true nature of global Islam. Consequently, they claimed to be able to have a better understanding of Islam than the regionally bound Muslim theologians. The invention and codification of *adat*-law and its strategic use to drive a wedge between Muslim rebels and the local population in Dutch Sumatra is the most prominent outcome of creative mixing of legal traditions.

At the same time, colonial scientists confirmed that Islamic law provided the means to adapt itself to changing circumstances. Not only did the Quran, the Sunna, or the fatwa*s* prove that Islamic law was open to individual interpretation, but also the use of concepts like "necessity" pointed to the flexibility of Muslim law. Even non-Muslims could use the non-religious concept of necessity to argue against Quranic prescriptions. Once again, Orientalist experts asserted that they knew all those details better than any Muslim *ulama*.

Given the diversity of Islam, colonial administrations combined different legal traditions of Islamic law to create new codes. They applied traditions that resembled Western legal concepts. Apart from spreading the more "European" *Ḥanafī madhab* all over the colonial world, experts also borrowed elements from the Ottoman Mecelle code, which had been modeled on the *code civil* earlier in the nineteenth century. Such amendments taken from the semi-colonial Ottoman Empire were added to "autochthonous" rules that had been chosen for their compatibility with the prerogatives of colonial rule. The *Inzāl* contract, which enabled

both Europeans and Muslims to acquire theoretically inalienable *ḥabūs* property is a case in point. The contract had long been used in Muslim law and came close to European notions of usufruct rights on land. Colonizers then applied it to contexts, where the system had been unknown before.

It is clear however, that international cooperation had been necessary to develop successful strategies of manipulation. Selective knowledge transfers between different colonies were the origin for a successful "native policy." This exchange resulted in a detailed knowledge of Muslim law and culture that had hitherto been unknown. It could be used for colonial and for anticolonial purposes. Most of the time it was used to sustain and to improve colonial domination.

The manipulation of Muslim law has to be seen in the broader context of professional "native policy." The knowledge of customary or Muslim law allowed colonial experts to use it and to manipulate it for colonial purposes. Needless to say that this did not mean that colonial subjects were completely deprived of the possibility to profit from the codification of Muslim law, which was defined as native law. While the "native policy" was a means to control and dominate African societies, unintended effects were possible. Moreover, there were colonial theorists and administrators, who saw in the native policy a means to improve the situation of the colonized. The contingency of the native policy and its advocates fully unfolded in the interwar-period, when new institutions of colonial internationalism portrayed themselves as the defender of the natives and heralded a new era of colonialism.

Chapter 8

"The Institute Lives On": The ICI between Development Assistance and Forced Labor from the League of Nations to the Era of Decolonization (1890s-1950s)

In 1947, the long-serving secretary general of the ICI, Octave Louwers, nominated his Belgian compatriot Pierre Orts as the new president of the ICI. Already in their sixties, Louwers and Orts looked back on almost thirty years of ICI membership, while they had pursued a parallel career in the League of Nation's Permanent Mandate Commission (PMC).[1] Orts, whom the PMC had employed for his "personal value and competence in colonial matters," was a member throughout its existence, from 1921 to 1940. He presided over the PMC between 1936 and 1940.[2] In 1947, Louwers mourned the end of the PMC, but set his hopes on Orts to revive colonial internationalism by re-establishing the ICI:

> The Mandate Commission perished in the last war. M. Orts, however, continues his colonial career…he has been a member of the International Colonial Institute for many years. This time-honored institution is also in critical condition. It has to reorient to the new developments that agitated the colonial world. Luckily, we placed M. Orts at its head to overcome this difficult situation. You have to see his commitment to revive the waning passions. He speaks to everybody in person, to inspire solutions. If need be, you see him rushing to The Hague, to Brussels, to Paris. Success will crown his effort. The Institute lives on.[3]

Indeed, the ICI persisted and was not dissolved until 1982. Its durability (1894-1982) reduced the history of the PMC to an ephemeral period (1919-1945). In this chapter, I argue that the ICI remained a guardian of a colonial order from the 1890s to the 1960s. Its endurance was partly due to the modern colonial schemes that its members designed as early as the 1890s. ICI colonial experts introduced a paradigm of development policy that was based on restricted

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[1] Orts joined the ICI in 1909: AGRB, Papiers Orts I 184, 165: Letter from ICI to Pierre Orts, Docteur en Droit, from 10.2.1909.

[2] AGRB, Papiers Orts I 184, Letter from Secretary General to Orts from 28.2.1921; See on the PMC: Pedersen, *The Guardians*; Pedersen, 'The Meaning of the Mandates'; M.D. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Brighton et al., 1999) ; V. Dimier, 'L'internationalisation du débat colonial: Rivalités autour de la Commission permanente des Mandats', *Outre-mers* 89, 336 (2002), 333–360.

[3] AGRB, Papiers Orts I 184, 388 Extraits de presse 1899-1958, *Revue Coloniale Belge* 84 (19.4.1949), O. Louwers, "Pierre Orts, Colonial": "La Commission des Mandats disparut dans la dernière tourmente. M. Orts n'a pas, pour autant, terminé sa carrière coloniale…Il fait partie de l'Institut Colonial International depuis de nombreuses années. La vieille Institution est presque en péril de mort; il faut l'adapter à la situation nouvelle intervenue dans le monde colonial. Heureusement, on a mis à sa tête, pour passer le moment difficile, M. Orts. Il faut voir son entrain à ranimer les courages défaillants; il va de l'un à l'autre, inspire les solutions; court s'il le faut à La Haye, à Londres, à Paris. Le succès couronnera son effort ; on est presque au but; L'Institut vivra."

cooperation with the colonized. This paradigm was ahead of its time and highly compatible with the "humanitarian" colonial ideals of the twentieth century.[4] It included attempts to create an indigenous middle class by giving them loans to start their own (mostly agricultural) business. To achieve the purpose of economic development, they imagined a colonial order that granted a certain degree of sovereignty to the colonized, without challenging the colonial project as such.

Faced with new international organizations that challenged its colonial expertise in the interwar period, the ICI had to react. On the one hand, it supplied the PMC and the International Labour Organization (ILO) with colonial experts and specialist knowledge. The ICI's longstanding focus on economic development and "native policy" gave it a head start on the PMC and the ILO, which actively sought advice from the ICI and employed its experts.[5] On the other hand, the ICI responded to their attempted interference in the colonial sphere and defended its explicitly "colonial" positions. Thus, ICI members rejected the ILO's international convention against forced labor, and defended the colonial administrations against reproaches by the part of the PMC that believed mandates were morally "better" than colonies. The ICI's answers to the challenge of new internationalisms ranged from retrograde positions to a renewed emphasis of liberal colonial schemes.

In many respects, however, the ILO and the PMC did not go beyond the ICI's reformist program. In the 1890s, the ICI had already anticipated the main debates that shaped the sessions of the PMC. After all, the powers represented in the ILO and the PMC accepted the endurance of colonialism and – contrary to their rhetoric and condemnation – compulsory labor.[6] Moreover, the PMC's program dropped way behind the range of possible "colonialisms" imagined by the ICI, especially with regard to legal autonomy of the indigenous population in a federally organized empire.[7] The "uniqueness" of the PMC's colonial policy, as identified by Anthony Anghie, appears less exceptional if we consider it within the larger context of colonial

[4] Unlike Cooper, I argue that the concept of development shaped the colonial program of colonial internationalists long before the interwar period: F. Cooper, 'Development, Modernization, and the Social Sciences in the Era of Decolonization: The Examples of British and French Africa', *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences Humaines* 10, 1 (2004), 9.
[5] ILO Archives, N/206/1/01: "Correspondence with governments, international associations and individuals on native labor 1921-1940"; N/206/2/0: "Committee of Experts on Native Labour, correspondence with experts"; N 206/1000/15 "Sessions of the International Colonial Institute 1936-1939". See also: ILO Archives CAT-6C-13-1 : J.Goudal 'Rapport sur ma mission à Bruxelles (XX session de l'ICI 24-29.6.1929)', cit. in Daele, 'Industrial States and the Transnational Exchanges', 209; See also Ibid., 202.
[6] See on the continuity of forced labor: Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*; Susan Pedersen's final verdict on the League is rather open, although her case studies clearly show the colonial – if not imperial – character of the League: Pedersen, *The Guardians*; others define it as colonialist: N. Matz, 'Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations as Origin of Trusteeship', *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* 9 (2005), 47–95: 50; PMC president Pierre Orts confirms this interpretation by making the PMC "part of the history of colonization": AGRB, Papiers Orts I 184, Orts to Lester from 31.5.1946.
[7] See on the idea of a federal organization of colonial empires F. Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton and Oxford, 2014).

internationalism in general and the ICI in particular.[8] Unlike Anghie, I argue that the PMC lagged behind the ICI's colonial schemes, which were based on ethnographical knowledge and sociological analysis of the colonized societies, and were more sophisticated strategies to organize colonies in an age of rising contestation of empires.[9] The "ethnographical failure" of the PMC was one important reason for its deficiencies.

While the PMC vanished after 1945, the ICI was reestablished by Pierre Orts and Octave Louwers. Designed as a colonial institution, it was supposed to counterbalance the "anticolonial" tendencies that allegedly prevailed in the United Nations. To achieve this goal the ICI embraced those colonial subjects who were content with an autonomous status within the colonial order instead of claiming independence. In the 1950s, the ICI would specialize in anthropological research and pioneered designing an agricultural "development assistance."[10] When the colonial system crumbled, a new generation of ICI members contributed to applying colonial patterns of thinking to the so-called underdeveloped Third World.

Three Ways to Development: Capitalism, Agricultural Education, Forced Cultivation

As early as the 1890s, the ICI promoted the agricultural development of colonies by making use of the indigenous labor force. Chailley announced the "age of agriculture" in the colonies and praised the *mise en valeur.*[11] Throughout its existence, ICI members maintained that the "health and safety of indigenous labor" should be of primordial concern to colonial governments.[12] To know the indigenous peoples and to protect their valuable manpower was considered a pre-condition for exploiting them without exhausting them. Concerns about depopulation through bad working conditions were on the rise. Thus, a sustained *mise en valeur* pushed all the other interests into the background. Development, ICI members believed, would be the means to achieve profitability – and with it legitimacy for the colonial project as such. But how could development be brought about?

Prior to the First World War, ICI members discussed three models of development that derived from particular experiences with native labor. Ideal-types of those models could be found in the Belgian Congo, which received most of the international attention. The first model

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[8] Anghie, 'Colonialism and the Birth', 543.

[9] For all these reasons, I will argue against Ulrike Lindner's interpretation that the ICI lost weight as early as the interwar period – in the face of the political heavyweights that were the PMC and the ILO: Lindner, 'New forms of knowledge'.

[10] AMAEB, Fonds van den Abeele 3663/ 198 INCIDI, Folder 1 INCIC 1953-54, Session de la Haye, 7-10.9.1953, Séance Économie Rurale "With respect to International Obligations in Development Assistance." For such continuities beyond 1945 see Dimier, *Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy*.

[11] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1929,* 40.

[12] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1929*, 26.

was outright exploitation, symbolized in Léopold's system of forced rubber collection in the Congo, which resulted in short-term soaring profits while it exhausted natural resources and decimated the Congolese population. The second type was a softer version of constrained cultivation, which was meant to teach native populations how to grow cash crops. The third type was the introduction of capitalism in its purest form. While ICI members unanimously dismissed Léopold's genocidal system, which actually ran counter to any idea of sustained development, they took both the free capitalist market and constrained cultivation into consideration.

ICI founder Albert Thys, in particular, became an advocate for the introduction of capitalism. In the late 1880s, he began to construct the railway line from Matadí to Léopoldville in the Congo Free State, which would be accomplished in 1898. Unlike similar railway projects in French Africa, the construction of the Belgian Congo railway was not a state enterprise, but launched by a private joint-stock company, the Compagnie du Chemin de fer du Congo, whose international capital amounted to twenty five million Francs (forty percent of the shares were held by the Belgian government, thirty-one percent by Belgian private investors, twenty percent by British, and eight percent by Germans).[13] To give immediate satisfaction to shareholders in Europe, Thys had to build the track as fast as possible. He was convinced that the velocity of railway building was more important than any attempt at "perfection."[14] At the same time, the construction works were particularly difficult, given the rugged mountains, the lack of labor force and the epidemics-ridden environment, which did not allow the transport of materials by pack animals. Death rates among workers, both Africans and Europeans, were extraordinarily high and amounting to seventeen percent or even more. Between November 1891 and June 1892 alone, nine hundred African workers died due to diseases and exhaustion.[15]

Three members of the Congo Railway's Directory Board were among the early members of the ICI: Albert Thys, Georges de Laveyele, and Sam Wiener, all of them Belgian citizens but internationally renowned for their participation in colonial projects.[16] Another ICI delegate, the physician Albert Jullien, worked as company medical officer on the construction site. Later, leading engineers such as Louis Goffin would join the ICI. Albert Thys directed the company,

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[13] A. Thys, *Au Congo et au Kassaï: Conférences données à la Société belge des ingénieurs et des industriels* (Brussels, 1888); The original umbrella organization was the Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (1887), which had several branches. One of them was dedicated to the Congo Railway, see R. Cornet, *La Bataille du Rail* (Brussels, 1958), 163.

[14] Ibid., 26.

[15] M. Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918-1940* (Cambridge, 2012), 310; Cornet, *La Bataille du Rail*, 209; ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 95.

[16] Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, *The Congo-Railway from Matadi to the Stanley-Pool. Results of Survey* (Brussels, 1889), 4 ; 'Georges de Laveleye', in Institut Royal Colonial Belge (ed.), *Biographie Coloniale Belge,* vol. 4 (Brussels, 1955), 497.

and was a restless promoter of the Congo railway. The ICI was highly indebted to Thys, as its existence depended on the generous financial support from his railway company. He funded the ICI with up to 2,500 Francs annually and remunerated its secretary general Janssen.[17] In return, Thys used the ICI to defend the losses among the workers, while advertising his ventures to exploit the resources in the Congo Basin with the help of international capital. On his instigation, the ICI published several volumes on the comparative study of railways.[18]

Based on comparative studies in railway building and with the help of money deriving from the rubber boom in the Congo, Thys improved techniques and working conditions of the railway workers in the course of the 1890s. Starting in the mid-1890s, the rubber boom had positive effects on the railway construction, as investors were abundant and shares initially offered for 500 Francs soared to a maximum of 16,000 Francs overnight. The chief engineer of the railroad went into raptures over the development: “People were going literally crazy. It was enough to put the word caoutchouc on a brochure and the capital arrived in great quantities.”[19] Thys prided himself on having kept pace with the British velocity of railway building, by introducing new economic methods. Inspired by the Dutch in the East Indies, Thys employed subcontractors who were responsible for a restricted group of workers. These workers were adequately lodged, provided with food (officially a daily ration of 500g rice, 250g biscuits or beans, and 250g dried meat or fish), and had access to medical care. All of them received a regular salary and cash in hand personally from the company’s accountants. Moreover, Thys introduced a system of bonuses that awarded each subcontractor if the works advanced faster than scheduled.[20] In the ICI, Thys reported regularly about the progress of construction.[21] Once it was terminated in 1898, the Matadí-Léopoldville railway became such a profitable enterprise that Thys planned to build a parallel line and to electrify the old one.[22]

Thys’ major achievement was to attract the local population as workers by improving the conditions. In the early 1890s, Thys’ recruitment agents had to enroll workers from as far as Zanzibar, British Nigeria, French Senegal, German Togo and Portuguese Angola.[23] He also

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[17] AMAEB, D 4782 (D 89) INCIDI, Manuscript of the procès verbaux of the session held in Brussels in 8.1.1894.

[18] Institut Colonial International (ed.), *Les chemins de fer aux colonies et dans les pays neufs,* vol. 1 (Paris, 1900); Cornet, *La Bataille du Rail*, 91.

[19] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1904*, 243.

[20] A. Thys, ‘Les chemins de fer aux colonies et dans les pays neufs. rapport de la commission spéciale’, in Institut Colonial International (ed.)*, Les chemins de fer aux colonies et dans les pays neufs,* vol. 1 (Paris, 1900), 5–35, 19.

[21] In later surveys on comparative railway building, such as Salesses’ account, Thys’ project would be portrayed as exemplary: ANOM 50COL78, Mission d'études des chemins de fer dans les colonies africaines anglaises, portugaises, allemandes et belge d'Eugène Salesses, directeur du chemin de fer de la Guinée française à l'initiative du gouverneur général de l'Afrique occidentale française (1904/1906) ; AMAEB, AE 204 Correspondance France, 1/88 EIC CONGO Governor Lieutenant to Sécrétaire d’État Bruxelles: 26.7.1905: Voyage Mr. Salesses, chef of the French railway in Guinea; E. Salesses, *Les Chemins de Fer dans leur état actuel* (Paris, 1914) 32.

[22] Ibid., 32.

[23] Cornet, *La Bataille du Rail*, 219.

employed 3,000 Asian and Antillean coolies, until many of them passed away in the insalubrious climate or became victims of the "deficient organization of work", as officials euphemistically admitted.[24] As soon as Thys improved the hygienic standards and regularized the work time, he reported, Africans even approached him to ask for employment. While he had recruited workers as far as Senegal and Zanzibar in the beginning, Congolese joined the building site at their own expense during the later phase. Thys felt vindicated that his "human" way of organizing the building site – with guaranteed salaries, accommodation, food and a rudimentary show business to entertain the workers – appealed to the Congolese.

Following this success, Albert Thys became the main promoter of the idea that the introduction of capitalism automatically brought about a civilization. He took his experience at the railway building site to a higher level and proclaimed that "the African is born as a merchant," and is therefore a natural accomplice of all capitalists. This commercial spirit, he argued in a capitalist manner, would save them from sharing the fate of the Indians in America.[25] This utilitarian notion, which declared people worthy to live because they were economically useful, dominated Thys' worldview. He was convinced that a capitalist system would have saved the Congolese from Léopold's cruel suppression. This suppression was only possible because the King monopolized trade and controlled the access to the territory via state-owned concession companies. Within Léopold's mercantile monopoly system, Thys argued, it was impossible to protect the natives from outright exploitation and ultimate elimination. The liberalization of commerce, instead, would allow the Congolese to capitalize on their own work.[26] Once they had realized that work paid off, he added, they complied with the universal standard of materialism. As early as 1889, he predicted that it was the inclination of the Congolese to commerce that would open the way to emancipation.[27] By no means, Thys concluded, did the Europeans belong to a "higher" civilization that was made up of better capitalists. According to him, all human beings shared a utilitarian inclination to materialism.[28]

Consequently, Thys explicitly distanced himself from the state monopoly on rubber collection and cultivation established by his patron, Léopold II, in the Congo Basin. While Thys' railway company undoubtedly profited from Léopold's neo-mercantilist policy and the rubber boom it entailed, he condemned the forced collection of rubber by the Congolese, which Léopold controlled through monopoly companies: the state, represented by administrators and

[24] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897,* 95.
[25] Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, *Le Chemin de fer du Congo, de Matadi au Stanley-Pool. Résultats des études. Rédaction de l'avant-projet.* (Brussels, 1889), 119.
[26] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1908,* 207-9.
[27] Compagnie du Congo, *Chemin de fer du Congo*, 119.
[28] Thys, 'Les chemins de fer', 27.

the paramilitary *Force Publique*, urged the Congolese headmen of the villages to collect a certain amount of rubber in place of a monetized tax. If they did not deliver the requested amount of rubber, the *Force Publique* responded with repression, collective punishment and hostage-taking.[29] Léopold's system resulted in overexploitation of resources and labor. When it came under attack in the mid-1890s, his employees searched for solutions for a more sustained economic development.

While Thys generally dismissed the state-run rubber acquisition and Léopold carried it to an extreme, there was a third way to organize colonial economies. It came closest to the Buitenzorg system of teaching indigenous peasants to grow cash crops in Dutch Java, and was a hybrid form of imposed and voluntary cultivation. An ICI member and director of the Agricultural Service in the Congo Free State, Norbert Diderrich, applied this modest version in the Mayumbé region that was not haunted by King Léopold's troops because there were no wild rubber trees to be found there. Diderrich modified the Dutch system of constrained cultivation and combined it with the Belgian tradition of using local headmen and chiefs for colonial purposes. He distributed seeds, for example cocoa seeds, to the chiefs, who looked after their cultivation. When the plant had attained a height of seventy-five centimeters, the chief received an advance of ten cents per plant. Later on, when the plants yielded, the chief sold the output to the administration. As we have seen in Chapter 5, administrators referred to similar methods of imposed cultivation in German and British colonies. To which degree these cultivation schemes were "forced" or the result of financial incentives was a matter of debate in the ICI. When asked how the chiefs selected and recruited potential workers, Diderrich ostentatiously displayed his ignorance. Even though he was the official inspector of state plantations, he did not investigate further whether or not the chiefs forced their subjects to cultivate crops: "I do not know which measures the chiefs use to make their people work, not because I want to close my eyes before their strategies of labor recruitment, but because I respect the sovereignty [*plein pouvoir*] of the chiefs and their territory."[30] Diderrich's development scheme inscribed itself into the program of indirect rule, which shifted responsibility to indigenous notables.

Having to choose among the three approaches to colonial economy – Léopold's forced rubber collection, Diderrich's imposed cultivation, and Thys' paternalistic capitalist incorporation – ICI members advocated in the field of agriculture constrained cultivation, which should "educate" the indigenous population to comply with a capitalist system of cash crop

[29] See the classic but diverging reports: Stengers, *Congo Mythes et Réalités*; A. Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost* (London, 2012) ; Vanthemsche, *Belgium and the Congo*, 23-27.
[30] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897*, 106.

production. With regard to railway-building and industrialization, they gradually embraced Thys' paternalistic development schemes and the introduction of "soft" capitalism. By the turn of the century, Thys had convinced them that his policy of a "social" market economy – a mix of the free market, consumerism and a rudimentary welfare state – would be the best way to bring about development and avoid unrest. Chailley summarized that "all the psychologic arguments by which we can make a European labor also apply to the blacks. We do not have to use other methods than those that succeed in our countries and for our race. These methods are: good treatment, high salaries, and a sufficient bonus…there is no race that refuses to work if we offer them what they need: a well-paid job, sufficient food, a comfortable lodging and some entertainment to spend their money on."[31] By the turn of the century, ICI members had come to the conclusion that the combination of indigenous labor and European capitalism was the best way to stimulate the colonial economy and would ultimately make colonies profitable. Consequently, the ICI tried not only to incorporate the indigenous peoples as workers, but also to turn them into entrepreneurs.

Colonial Subjects into Peasants and Entrepreneurs

Starting in 1900, ICI members engaged in programs to turn the colonizers into agricultural entrepreneurs with the aim of creating an indigenous middle class in the long term. Thys, who had developed into a fervent defender of indigenous entrepreneurial spirit exclaimed in 1908 that "without negroes, central Africa is of no value."[32] The Africans, he continued, "were confirmed by all those who really knew them to be the most commercial race in the whole world."[33] Their commercial energy could be used to develop the colonies. They should become part of the colonial, and thus the global, market.

The integration of the colonies into the world market required a stable currency that would be accepted by local populations. Between 1908 and 1912, the ICI dedicated several sessions to the most efficient organization of monetary systems in the colonies. According to its members, absence of fiat money in the new territories was an obstacle to their integration into the capitalist world economy.[34] Europeans had long complained that the value of the predominant commodity money in Africa was unstable (omitting that the cowry currency in West Africa, for example, had satisfied the needs of African and European merchants for

[31] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1900*, 78 - 81.
[32] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1908*, 211.
[33] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1908,* 212.
[34] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912,* 140.

years).[35] Moreover, pre-colonial currencies circulated with disregard to colonial borders, forcing the colonizers to tackle the issue on an inter-colonial level.

After comparing monetary policies in colonial Africa, the ICI recommended transitory periods and schemes of graduality to replace indigenous currencies with European money. Transitory periods were said to prevent resistance against new money. Moreover, Chailley remarked that a colonial currency required small units and subdivisions in order to be useful for the everyday transactions in African marketplaces. Finally, the ICI recommended to internationalize and stabilize exchange rates between the pre-colonial currencies that still circulated on the entire continent and the new European currencies.[36]

When France did not follow any of those recommendations when it attempted to impose its own currency in its African possessions in 1907. The French abolition of pre-colonial currencies (cowry and the Maria-Theresia Taler), ICI members claimed, had proven a failure. The 5 Franc coin which was introduced was too valuable a piece of money and often cut into two, if used at all. The Franc depreciated and was used for making jewelry or bracelets. In addition, French colonial subjects did not change the pre-colonial cowry currency for Francs, because they gained more if they changed them into British pounds in the neighboring British possessions.[37]

The carefully organized gradual introduction of a new currency in German colonies, ICI members explained, compared favorably to the failed French attempt. In German East Africa, the Indian rupee had been in use in pre-colonial times, a currency initially secured by the British gold standard. The Germans kept the rupees and established a fixed exchange rate with the *Reichsmark*, similar to the British exchange rate. ICI member Karl von der Heydt, who was the head of the German East Africa Company, assumed the responsibility for issuing new “German” rupees.[38] The German financial expert Karl Helferrich, who was responsible for the currency reform in the German colonies, informed the ICI that “We did not change anything in appearance, which did not prevent us from gradually changing the commercial value of the monetary units in our colonies.”[39] The gradual modifications included the decimalization of the rupee and the facultative use of the German *Reichsmark*, which was in use in all other German

[35] For a details see L. Sundström, *The Exchange Economy of Pre-colonial Tropical Africa* (London, 1974), 104-105.
[36] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912,* 155 and 166.
[37] See M. Saul, ‘Money in Colonial Transition. Cowries and Francs in West Africa’, *American Anthropologist* 106, 1 (2004), 71–84; ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912,* 166.
[38] Initially, the introduction led to an accelerated depreciation of the money, before he managed to stabilize it following the British example in the Indies.
[39] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912,* 144; K. Helfferich, *Zur Reform der kolonialen Verwaltungs-Organisation* (Berlin, 1905).

colonies and had a fixed exchange rate with the rupee.[40] The ICI portrayed the German policy in this regard as a model for other colonies.

To give indigenous peasants and entrepreneurs access to starting capital and to loans, ICI members promoted the spread of agricultural credit banks. The ICI studied colonial credit systems in a comparative way and provided the European governments with information about their failures and successes. Most credit banks that had existed before the 1880s in the colonies were designed for, and accessible to, whites only. There were a few exceptions if the colonial subjects had maintained their own credit system, or if colonial administrators established them. Early models could be found in French Algeria, British India, and in the Dutch Indies.

The ICI identified a precursor of credit banks in Algeria. In the 1880s, the Algerian administration introduced so-called *sociétés de prévoyance*, agricultural credit banks that were originally designed to help smallholders to overcome periods of crisis. From the 1860s onwards, local administrators had built grain silos, which stored cereals that were given to peasants in times of need. They had to refund the loans in kind as soon as the harvest period arrived. Once the system had expanded and was more developed, the *sociétés de prévoyance* advanced money instead of grain and took it back with a considerably low interest rate of five percent.[41] Such societies mushroomed in rural Algeria during the 1880s, and in 1906, eleven percent of the Muslim Algerians were members in almost 200 *sociétés de prévoyance*, whose overall capital amounted to 15,000,000 Francs. Only indigenous farmers obtained these credits, together with modern ploughs, harrows and harvesters. The purpose was to gradually modernize indigenous agriculture.[42] The model of the *sociétés de prévoyance* spread to most of the French colonies.[43]

Similar systems were known in the Indies. In the 1890s, Java had introduced the so-called *desa-loemboengs* that resembled the Algerian *sociétés de prévoyance*. If peasants were in need, they obtained a micro credit, which they paid back after the harvest with ten percent of interest. Later, the Dutch government turned the *desa-loemboengs* into private companies with both Europeans and Javanese directing them. Farmers deposed their harvest surplus in the *desa-loemboengs* to make it available to peasants in need.[44] *Desa-loemboengs* were, however, low on funds for most of the time.[45] In British India the administrators came upon an indigenous

[40] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1912,* 144.
[41] Ibid., 632-633.
[42] 'Discussion Credit Colonies ', in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1908*, 63-64.
[43] É. Cuniac, *Le Crédit agricole en Algérie* (Paris, 1903); A.d. Peyre, *Algérie. Sociétés indigènes de prévoyance, de secours et de prêts mutuels des communes de l'Algérie* (Alger-Mustapha, 1900).
[44] 'Discussion Credit Colonies ', in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1908*, 71.
[45] A general description by ICI member C.T. van Deventer, *Overzicht van den economischen toestand der inlandsche bevolking van Java en Madoera* ('S Gravenhage, 1904).

institution called *Kuttu-chittu*. In the *Kuttu-chittu*-system, around 50 men of a rural community paid one rupee each to create an emergency fund and help individual members of their community who were in financial difficulties. According to ICI researchers, the British made no attempt at introducing governmental credit banks and left the field to private "usurers."[46]

ICI members wanted to turn such rudimentary institutions into official credit banks to provide indigenous farmers with loans to start their own business. Albert Thys, who had created the Belgian Overseas Bank as early as 1899, warned in 1908 that the Europeans had to intervene not only to protect the natives from starving, but to help them to create their own industries. The purpose was "not only production but also proceeding of the cash-crops." A Dutch ICI member added that the banks provided only an initial impetus to ultimately "leave them gradually to themselves."[47] Indeed, ICI members played an important part in professionalizing colonial credit banks between 1900 and 1914. The Dutch ICI member Johannes H. Carpentier-Alting reformed the system of 7,500 *desa-loemboengs* in the Javanese villages and founded forty-four new central banks that functioned as savings banks and provided indigenous peasants with credits.[48] Although insufficient, they became a model in the colonial world. By the same token, the British established the most sophisticated agricultural banks in Egypt in 1902. The American Philippines modelled their bank on those Egyptian credit institutions. In Germany, ICI member and undersecretary of state Alfred Zimmermann urged the colonial ministry to introduce state-run banks to protect the indigenous population from European merchants and settlers who granted them loans with unfavorable conditions and caused unrest, such as the Herero-Nama uprising. At the same time, private societies, like the *Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee,* had made the first move in this direction by providing loans and machines for the harvest of cotton and other cash crops.[49] Even though such initiatives did not always pay off immediately, the ICI pursued its program to "make producers" and farmers who possess "private property" after the First World War. Once again they advanced the Dutch model, because there, agricultural products were made "by and for the indigenous population." [50] After the Second World War, the ICI would intensify its efforts to "create a middle class in the tropical and sub-tropical countries."[51]

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[46] Zimmermann, *Le Crédit à Accorder aux Indigènes* in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1905*, 638.
[47] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1909*, 275-278.
[48] 'Discussion Credit Colonies', in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1908*, 64-75; J.C. Kluyver, *Tropisch-Koloniale Staashuishoudkunde. Het Probleem* (Amsterdam, 1910), 79.
[49] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1909*, 275-278; Alfred Zimmermann, *Le Crédit à Accorder aux Indigènes*, in: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1905*, 625 and 630.
[50] See debates in ICI, *Compte Rendu 1923* and ICI, *Compte Rendu 1929,* 8-9 ; Daviron, 'Mobilizing Labour in African': 496.
[51] Institut International des Civilisations Différentes (ed.), *Développement d'une classe moyenne dans les pays tropicaux et sub-tropicaux; compte rendu de la XXIXe Session tenue à Londres du 13 au 16 septembre 1955* (Brussels, 1956).

Contexts: Legacies of the First World War and Radicalization in the late 1920s

It was not until 1920 that the ICI arranged a new meeting in Brussels, organized by the old guard of the prewar ICI. At the outbreak of the First World War, the ICI's meetings had come to an abrupt end. No activity was registered during the war. Many ICI members felt uncomfortable about the interventions of metropolitan governments in colonial affairs with regard to both the ideological and material mobilization of colonial subjects for a global war.[52] Snouck, for example, turned against the attempts of the British and German governments to bring about a global *djihad* in their respective favor.[53] While many ICI members saw their expertise undermined by the prerogatives of the war, they equally feared that the recruitment and dislocation of colonial troops would cause problems to the colonial project as a whole. Their attitude would change slightly in the postwar period, when they realized that the colonial project could also benefit from the new developments triggered by the war.

The ICI's re-establishment after the war was first and foremost due to the Belgian government that funded it, without doubt to strengthen the small kingdom's position in the postwar negotiations on the redistribution of the African colonies. After all, Brussels looked back on a long history of successfully bringing about international decisions to the advantage of the "colonial dwarf" Belgium. Pierre Orts and Octave Louwers, who represented Belgium at Saint-Germain-en Laye in 1919 to negotiate the peace agreements on colonies, were crucial to those plans. Both had been ICI members before the war and were founding members of the PMC. The *eminence grise* of Belgian colonial policies, Octave Louwers, would become the new secretary general of the ICI after Janssens death in 1926.[54] Ort's biggest success for Belgium was the Milner-Orts agreement that turned the formerly German Ruanda-Urundi

[52] See on this topic R. Gerwarth and E. Manela (eds.), *Empires at War: 1911-1923* (Oxford, 2014), 7-8: Around 500,000 French colonial troops served in Europe; 1.4 million men from India were enlisted by the British army, with around 900,000 sent overseas. The vast majority of Africans were not combat troops but used as laborers or carriers; See also M. Michel, *L'Appel à l'Afrique: Contributions et Réactions à l'Effort de Guerre en AOF, 1914-1919* (Paris, 1982); G. Mann, *Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century* (Durham, 2006); R.S. Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918* (Baltimore, 2008); B. Nasson, *Springboks on the Somme: South Africa in the Great War, 1914-1918* (London, 2007); D.C: Ellinwood and S.D. Pradhan (eds.), *India and World War* I (New Delhi, 1978); F.W. Perry, *The Commonwaelth Armies: Manpower and Organization in Two World* Wars (Manchester, 1988), The British did not employ their African soldiers on European battlefields: T. Stapleton, *No Insignificant Part: The Rhodesia Native Regiment and the East Africa Campaign of the First World War* (Waterloo, 2006); B. Nasson, 'British Imperial Africa' in Gerwarth and Manela *Empires at War*, 139.

[53] Snouck Hurgronje and Becker accused each other of being politicized by the war, and therefore deviating from their traditional Islampolitik: W.G. Schwanitz, 'Djihad 'Made in Germany': Der Streit um den Heiligen Krieg 1914-1915' *Sozial.Geschichte* 18 (2003), 7-34.

[54] G. van Pottlebergh, 'Louwers, Octave', *Biographie Coloniale Belge*.

territory into a Belgian mandate – although Belgians had hitherto completely failed in administering the Congo alone.[55]

Unsurprisingly, the smaller Dutch and Italian governments followed the Belgian example and were among the first to finance the reborn ICI in 1920.[56] Like Belgium they had learned that participation in the ICI was an opportunity to promote their interests. Finally, the fear of missing out on new trends during the internationalist remodeling of the world led all former members to rejoin the ICI, except Germany. While the membership list was shorter than before the war, most of the persons who joined in 1920 were familiar faces. The founder of the ICI, Joseph Chailley, became its president and Camille Janssens approached his thirtieth year in the position of secretary general. Colonial reformers Sir William Meyer (Britain) and Dirk Fock (the Netherlands) acted as vice-presidents. Spain had a comeback with five members, while the Germans were excluded, blamed by the Belgian Louwers to have violated the Congo's neutrality during the war.[57] It is not known if the former German members protested against this decision.

In the first ICI meeting after the war, Louwers celebrated the new international regulations on African colonies, stipulated at the peace conference in Saint-Germain-en-Laye in 1919 for having put an end to the "romantic" colonial internationalism of the Berlin Congo Conference of 1884/5. The peace treaty of 1919 (which comprised the League of Nations Covenant) superseded the Congo Act of 1885 that according to Louwers had failed because it was too restrictive and too radical at the same time. The Congo Act was too restrictive because internationalization applied to the Congo Free State alone, and not to all the colonies in Africa. The open door policy in the Congo Free State had as a consequence that Leopold II had to bear all administrative costs while other powers could exploit its resources. Inevitably, Louwers argued, the Act had to be rectified in 1890, when a new international agreement was reached that authorized Leopold to close the borders to foreign enterprises and to introduce tariffs. Because the Congo Act was too "radical" from the start, Louwers explained, the international ideal was inevitably turned upside down in 1890.[58] According to him, the diplomats who signed the 1885 Congo Act were naïve in overstretching an ideal of internationalism that left Leopold with no financial means to govern and develop the colony. Having no means to administer and develop the country economically, Leopold referred to excessive violence to squeeze out money of the country that he had invested personally.

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[55] See on the reluctance of giving African territories to smaller nations during the peace negotiations: William Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization* (London, 2006), 229-230.
[56] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1920*, 81.
[57] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1920*, 83.
[58] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1920,* 105.

Such errors, Louwers argued, had been avoided at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, which gave the signatories the means to refinance their investments by being the sole profiteer of their own colonies' economy. While the peace settlement theoretically allowed unrestricted navigation (especially in the Congo and the Niger) and free trade in all of Africa to members of the League of Nations, it also gave colonial powers the right to restrict them if they deemed it necessary for maintaining order and developing their colony economically, which included projects of long-term investments.[59]

Louwers' argumentation had much to do with the colonies' economic effort during the war. Seen in retrospect, the war had proven the colonies' importance for the metropole and revealed their potential value once the Europeans seriously developed their resources. The Belgian colonial minister Vandervelde, in his opening speech at the ICI's meeting of 1920, was not the only one to be astonished to see that the Belgian "colony had prospered" during the "mortal period" of the war. In Belgian Congo, the agricultural output (especially of palm oil) soared and the copper production in Katanga increased by a factor of five. Exports tripled between 1914 and 1918.[60] What was more was that the war coincided with the discovery and increased exploitation of gold, diamonds, and petrol. Such developments were uneven across the empires and other branches had suffered from the war.[61] But generally, the colonial internationalists were optimistic about the future economic role of the colonies. As early as 1918, the governor of French West Africa expressed this optimism: "In the four years of war, the world has developed like in four decades. Our progress has to keep pace and it is easier in a new country, where the horizons are open and the soil is virgin…Never again, this Colony [French West Africa] will have such an opportunity!"[62]

Like the governor of French West Africa, the colonial experts of the ICI sensed a chance to convince metropolitan governments to invest in the colonies and bring about an active development policy. The war was their best argument. Louwers proclaimed that it was of general interest to develop the colonies faster, with the intervention of the metropole: "it is thus anti-economic and anti-colonial to limit the right of the states to choose the means necessary to achieve this goal."[63] Saint-Germain-en Laye explicitly guaranteed to the signatory states the

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[59] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1920*, 88-94; According to Louwers the signatory powers of 1919 also had the internationally sanctioned right to restrict religious freedom and the protection of the native population that had been prescribed by the Congo Act.
[60] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1920*, 57-58.
[61] J. Leonhard, *Die Büchse der Pandora: Geschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Munich, 2014), 505
[62] Voellenhoven en Afrique Occidentale Française, Son action, in : Comité d'initiative des amis de Vollenhoven, Une âme de chef. Le Gouverneur général J. van Vollenhoven, Paris, 1920, p.169.
[63] "L'intérêt général n'est il pas qu'une colonie se développe le plus rapidement? C'est donc anti-économique et anti-colonial que de limiter le droit des États dans le choix des moyens d'obténir ces résultats": ICI, *Compte Rendu 1920*, 94-95.

rights that the Congo Act had denied to Leopold, such as the right to dispose of the crown domain and grant concessions to societies of their choice (which was officially prohibited by the Congo Act), to establish trade monopolies and to set tariffs, as well as banning foreigners from their territory and restrict religious freedom to maintain order.[64] The regulations of Saint-Germain-en-Laye promoted interventionist development, while standardizing rules across all African colonies. The war seemed to confirm the value of the colonies if the metropole invested money to keep them going.

It was argued that the plea for a restricted re-nationalization of colonial policies for the sake of efficient development should be backed by the internationalization of the infrastructure to reach this purpose. In 1921, ICI members intended to internationalize plans to build a Cap-Cairo railway, along with a Trans-Saharian railway from Algeria to the Congo and a Trans-Sudan railway from West to East Africa.[65] Customs duties should be standardized all over sub-Saharan Africa to guarantee a "natural flow" of all goods. Following the example of the international regulations on alcohol trade, ICI members called for an international "entente" to abolish inequalities in trade.[66]

On the downside, the war effort in the colonies provoked a new debate about the dangers of depopulation and alienation. The scarcity of laborers had been the most pertinent problem before the war and was obviously aggravated by mass recruitment and death during the conflict. Regarding those colonial soldiers and workers who survived and returned to the colonies, ICI members held that their participation in the war was the worst case of alienation that threatened the project of "conservation." In 1921, the ICI felt the need to emphasize that the conservation of the indigenous population should be the overall purpose of colonialism and not only a means to achieve other goals. Apart from taking sanitary measures, ICI members urged colonial governments to watch over the preservation of "native" institutions and laws.[67] The ICI recommended that colonial subjects be ruled by their own institutions, laws and organizations [*sous leur empire*], if those did not run counter to the project of economic development. Development within their natural environment should be achieved by agricultural progress and less so by industrialization, which might lead to detribalization and proletarianization.[68] The focus on agriculture was a legacy of the prewar period and would remain the ICI's priority throughout the interwar period, even if it had to be enforced. Chailley went as far as declaring the Van den Bosch system of forced cultivation (dating from 1830) a "humanitarian" system

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[64] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1920*, 94-95.
[65] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1921*, 46.
[66] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1920*, 49.
[67] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1921*, 44.
[68] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1931*, 103-107; ICI, *Compte Rendu 1936*, 20-35.

because it had allegedly brought about a demographic growth from twenty-seven to thirty-eight million inhabitants in Dutch Java. Even though poverty and lethal misery increased in equal measure, Chailley argued that forced cultivation was not "compulsory labor" [*travail obligatoire*] but "emancipative work" [*travail d'emancipation*].[69] They deemed such a soft development the only way to bring about economic progress without alienation. During the war, the recruitment of indigenous troops had been considered as such an alienation.

At the beginning of the war, colonial experts had displayed a strong skepticism towards the war and its effects on productivity. Sisal planters in German East Africa and beef producers from Southern Rhodesia complained that the war cut them off from international trade and took away their workers.[70] The British government was accused of putting public safety and order in India at jeopardy. There were only a "token force of 15,000 British and Sepoy soldiers" who stayed in the colony, while 900,000 Indian troops were deployed outside the country to fight for the empire. The absence of the troops was a major concern to administrators in India.[71] Declining productivity, the losses among indigenous soldiers, and the insecurity in the colonies further raised concerns about depopulation.

During the war, renowned colonial experts even refused to support the metropole by raising troops or taxes.[72] Colonial internationalists, in particular, showed an inclination to colonial disobedience. The ICI members had closely followed the refusal to levy indigenous troops for the war in Europe by the Dutch-born governor of French West Africa, Joost van Voellenhoven.[73] Arguing that France had to act resolutely along colonial lines, Van Voellenhoven told the "diplomats" in Paris that he needed his subjects in French West Africa to keep the colonial economy going, and could not waste their lives on European battlefields.[74] "French West Africa has to shape its own destiny," he claimed, lamenting the labor shortage caused by the war.[75] After refusing to recruit soldiers in French West Africa, Van Voellenhoven was accused of unpatriotic behavior and released from his duties as governor.[76] Born to Dutch

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[69] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1920*, 154-155.

[70] B. Nasson, 'British Imperial Africa' in Gerwarth and Manela, *Empires at War*, 134.

[71] S. Garton, 'The Dominions, Ireland and India' in Gerwarth and Manela, *Empires at War,* 159.

[72] Important colonial governors in British East Africa, German East Africa, British Gold Coast, Togo etc., even refused to participate in the war at all, claiming the neutrality of their colony: B. Nasson, 'British Imperial Africa' in Gerwarth and Manela, *Empires at War*, 133.

[73] Mainly via the *Union Coloniale* which was the French branch of the ICI, headed by Chailley and close the the colonial ministry: Institut de France, Fonds Auguste Terrier MS 5925 , vol. 2, fol. 365-375, Letter from Gouverneur de l'AOF Voellenhoven to Ministre des Colonies, Dakar 10 November 1917, "Situation Politique de la Colonie."

[74] "Il faut que la France se lance résolument dans la voie coloniale", in Comité d'initiative des amis de Vollenhoven (ed.), *Une âme de chef: Le Gouverneur général J. van Vollenhoven* (Paris, 1920), 38-56.

[75] 'Voellenhoven en Afrique Occidentale Française, Son action', in Ibid., 169.

[76] For his program see Archives Institut de France, Fonds Terrier, MS 5925, vol. 1, fol. 255-277: Le Gouverneur General de L'AOF, van Vollenhoven, à Ministre des colonies, Dakar, 22. Septembre 1917 : "Reorganisation de l'Ouest-Africain après la cessation des hostilités."; J. van Voellenhoven, 'L'Algérie. Les Défauts du Système Algérien', in Comité d'initiative des amis de Vollenhoven (ed.), *Une âme de chef,* 57-70.

parents in Algeria and on good terms with colonial experts in Germany and the Netherlands, Van Voellenhoven faced a xenophobic campaign that questioned his loyalty to France.

A more ambiguous case was the disobedience of British ICI member William Meyer during the war in India.[77] Meyer, who had translated Chailley's *Administrative Problems of British India* (1910) into English, was responsible for financing the recruitment of Indian soldiers in the viceroy's council in British India. The "Finance Minister of India", as Chamberlain called him, had allegedly denied financial support to recruit Indian railway workers and soldiers for service outside the Indian sphere of influence. He refused to levy taxes in India for the British military campaign in Mesopotamia – on the grounds that this territory lay beyond the interest of India. A parliamentary committee investigated Meyer's case. Although the committee found him innocent of all charges, he was "held up to public odium and contempt" in the British media. The press advanced his German name and internationalist activities in the ICI to call his Britishness into question.[78]

Despite the experts' protests during the war, they used the conflict as an argument for the autonomy of colonies in the fields of finance, economy, administration, and government after the war. The war had occasionally cut the colonies off from the motherland. Economic self-sufficiency should help to outlive such situations. Colonial experts convinced the metropolitan governments that both financial and administrative autonomy was the only way to bring about an organic and self-sufficient organization of a colony. One early and extreme expression of this idea had been Joost van Voellenhoven's call for colonial autonomy from France and a "Franco-British federation in West Africa" that should result in a colonial "League of Nations."[79]

ICI members took an active part in bringing about various degrees of colonial autonomy, at least in Asian colonies. Sir William Meyer, who was the ICI's vice-president before he became High Commissioner of India to the United Kingdom in 1920 had already been in the decentralization committee before the war. When Indian troops had to fight on Britain's behalf in Iraq during the war, the Mesopotamia campaign "strained the Indian financial and monetary systems to the limit." During the war, Meyer de-linked the rupee from its fixed exchange rate

[77] William Meyer (1860-1922) played an important role in Indian financial administration for twenty years. He acted as an Indian editor of the *Imperial Gazetteer of India* and was a member of the royal commission on decentralization in India. He was responsible for the cost of imperial defense and became the first president of the recruiting board in India, which he converted from a regimental to a civil agency. Under the new political reforms embodied in the Government of India Act he became Firt High Commissioner for India. In this capacity Meyer headed the Indian delegations at the first and second assemblies of the League of Nations (1920-1921). He was responsible giving India dominion status: B. R. Tomlinson, 'Meyer, Sir William Stevenson(1860–1922)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford, 2004) [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35007, accessed 18 April 2016]

[78] House of Commons (ed.), *Parliamentary Debates (Offcial Report): 5th Series, Volume 95 1917 (June 25-July 13)* (London, 1917), 2230-2232; 2251; 2198-2199; 1584.

[79] 'Voellenhoven en Afrique Occidentale Française, Son action', in Amis de Vollenhoven, *Une âme de chef*, 169.

with the sterling and made the Indian finances autonomous from the metropole. After the war the Indian government succeeded in removing the defense of the Middle East from the list of its strategic obligations in future imperial defense planning.[80] Nominated High Commissioner of India to the United Kingdom in 1920, Meyer further advanced the autonomous status of India, which should be organized along the lines of the other British dominions.[81]

ICI vice-president Dirk Fock was equally involved in projects of decentralization in the Dutch colonies. He set himself the task of strengthening municipal self-government which had been introduced to the Dutch Indies as early as 1903. Long before Meyer in British India, in 1907, Fock had drafted two bills that rendered the finances of Dutch India independent of the metropole. One of them, the *Indische Comptabliteitswet* granted Dutch India a legal personality and allowed it to take out a loan without the consent of The Hague. In 1921, Fock succeeded the ICI member J.P. van Limburg Stirum as governor-general in the Dutch Indies and was responsible for expanding the rights of the *Volksraad* [People's Council] that had been designed by ICI member E. Moresco and was based on a comparative study of similar institutions. Half of the *Volksraad's* thirty-nine members were Indonesians and the other half Europeans (including five delegates of the Chinese who lived in Dutch India). Theoretically, the indigenous delegates were the majority. Yet, half of them were not elected by the municipal and local councils (which existed since 1903) but appointed by the colonial government. At least a quarter of them were thus chosen for their loyalty to the Dutch colonizers and did not necessarily represent indigenous interests. Up to 1925, the *Volksraad* had no legislative powers but had to be consulted by the governor general on matters of budget and military conscription, amongst others.[82] In 1925, Fock accredited the *Volksraad* with extended legislative – and not only consultative – rights. Moreover, he expanded local and municipal autonomy.

Through these reforms that comprised various and restricted forms of local self-government, colonial administrators tried to co-opt more moderate autonomists while relentlessly repressing radical nationalists. The "Wilsonian moment" – the rising awareness among colonial subjects that American president Wilson had elevated self-determination to a fundamental right that also applied to the colonized peoples – was not very present in the immediate aftermath of the war. ICI members never referred to Wilson's role, and Chailley

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[80] Tomlinson, 'Meyer, Sir William Stevenson (1860–1922)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford, 2004); This was also the result of promises made during the war: "In June 1917, Edwin Montague, the new Secretary of State for India, proposed greater efforts toward the 'development of self-governing institutions in India', and later that year the travelled to India to meet Indian nationalist leaders to discuss this proposal. The subsequent 1918 Montagu-Chelmsford Report committed Britain to post-war reforms to promote gradual Indian self-government.": S. Garton, 'The Dominions, Ireland and India', Gerwarth and Manela, *Empires at War*, 162.

[81] Tomlinson, 'Meyer, Sir William Stevenson (1860–1922)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

[82] S. Wedema, *'Ethiek' und Macht: Die Niederländisch-Indische Kolonialverwaltung und Indonesische Emanzipationsbestrebungen 1901-1927* (Stuttgart, 1998), 125-130.

went as far as categorically denying the colonial subjects a right to representation, which some claimed because of their contribution to the war. The ICI was to paternalistic to accept any claim based on a Wilsonian moment. Rather than being a "moment," Wilson's ideas gradually spread in the colonial world, mixing with pre-Wilsonian claims to autonomy and self-determination.[83]

Only a few of the ICI members deduced a right to independence from the war. The Dutch ICI member Jacques H. Abendanon, who had been sent to the Indies at the beginning of the century to implement the ethical policy, wanted to share executive, legislative and judicial power with educated Indonesians. In the ICI session of 1920, he argued that colonial powers had to break with the traditional policy of collaboration with so-called paramount chiefs. Instead, the entire population should be trained through education and internships to take over executive positions in the government, where they should not be treated in a different way from the Europeans.[84] After bringing to a successful end the "moral and intellectual education" that Abendanon had started as Director of Education in 1900, Indonesians should be granted the right to vote.[85] It was now time, he told the ICI members, that they were granted a "certain degree of autonomy." For him, progress was impossible if the inhabitants of the colony "are excluded from the questions that concern their own interests. Only they know what they have to do or not do to achieve this goal."[86]

Abendanon represented the attitude of the most liberal ICI members in the wake of the First World War. All of them understood that colonized populations urged to participate in shaping their own destiny, and many of them agreed that the time had come to act. To avoid an outright revolution, they granted them rights by bits and pieces. Abendanon put it bluntly: "that the renaissance of those peoples does not result in a revolution but in peaceful evolution."[87] At the same time, a distinction was made between the more developed inhabitants in the Asian colonies (British India, Dutch Indies, Philippines, and French Indochina), where different forms of autonomy could be applied and tested. The colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa were rarely included in autonomy plans.

In conclusion, the ICI members believed that the war had confirmed their pre-war doctrines of colonial autonomy, restricted self-administration of the indigenous people on the

[83] E. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the Internaional Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York and Oxford, 2007).
[84] ICI, Compte Rendu 1920, 157, 164.
[85] ICI, Compte Rendu 1920, 48
[86] ICI, CR 1920, 161:"ne peut pas faire de progrès, si les habitants du pays restent en dehors des questions qui se rapportent à leurs intérêts. Or, personne mieux que ces habitants eux-mêmes peuvent se rendre compte de ce qu'il faut faire où éviter dans cette voie."
[87] ICI, CR 1920, 163.

local level, and increased efforts to develop the colonies through investment by the metropole with the aim of self-sufficiency. Their debates directly connected to the last session before the war, held in 1913. In their meetings, the war itself was widely absent, and certainly not interpreted as a turning point of colonial history. That empires were falling apart around them passed without comment. This ignorance was due to the continued pre-domination of the "old guard" that had kept things firmly in hand already before the First World War and continued pursuing their purpose after the war.

It was not until the 1920s that a new generation wielded influence on the ICI, in a period during which its members radicalized and formed two opposing groups. For the group around the Dutch liberals of the older generation, outright independence was an option and self-government a must. The new group was rather regressive and partly dismissed the liberal attitudes that had characterized the ICI before the war. A break with the prewar policy did not occur until the late 1920s. In 1931, the ICI for the first time declared openly that it was "imperialist."[88]

There are at least five reasons for this regressive attitude. First of all, the older generation passed away, symbolized by Chailley's death in 1928. With him, the conservative reformism passed away. Second, delegates from countries that had embraced fascist ideologies and a more aggressive colonial policy injected themselves into the debate. Portuguese, Italian, and later Spanish ICI members joined and showed themselves in the debates. Others set out to combat the communist threat that trade unions and more frequent strikes seemed to represent.[89] The Dutch Dirk Fock, for example, was appointed Governor of Dutch India to fight communist influences. Third, Italians, Spanish, and the French got involved in new colonial wars that perpetuated the techniques of violence that had been developed during the World War. The Rif-War and the Italo-Ethiopian War inaugurated a new era of brutal conquest by adding new techniques of mass destruction.[90] Although these wars were not discussed in the ICI, also the language and mentality in the debates Fourth, delegates from Italy and Portugal joined forces with a new generation of Belgian ICI members who represented the business interests in the Katanga region and who approved of forced or compulsory labor. Fifth, and more importantly, the ICI saw itself faced with other "humanitarian" international institutions such as the League of Nations or the International African Institute that dedicated itself to linguistic and

[88] See ICI, *Compte Rendu 1933*, 1-60.
[89] See for an overview F. Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, 30.
[90] See on those wars and their international repercussions: G.W: Baer, *Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations* (Stanford, 1976); R. Baudendistel, *Between Bombs and Good Intentions: the Red Cross and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–1936* (London, 2006); C.R. Pennell, "Ideology and Practical Politics: A Case Study of the Rif War in Morocco, 1921–1926," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14, 1 (1982), 19–33; P. La Porte, "'Rien à ajouter': The League of Nations and the Rif War (1921—1926)," *European History Quarterly* 41,1 (2011), 66–87.

anthropological research. Rivalling with those institutions, the ICI defended "purely colonial" purposes. Moreover, the contestation of colonial rule by the part of a colonial proletariat ran counter to the ICI's idea of a harmonic colony in which the natives lived in their natural environment and developed the local agriculture. Faced with the contestation of this colonial project, ICI members saw themselves with their back to the wall. For all those reasons, the 1930s marked a process of radicalization of ICI members, even though the radicalization was not absolute and opposed by more liberal-minded delegates from Great Britain or the Netherlands.[91] The outbreak of the Second World War prevented the two groups from clashing. Once again the ICI suspended its activity completely.

Internationalizing and Regularizing the Trans-Colonial Labor Recruitment in the Longue Durée

The need to recruit workers for development projects led to the foundation of the ICI and kept its members busy until the end of the First World War. Assuming that the scarcity and unequal distribution of a workforce within Africa was the main obstacle to colonial development, the ICI discussed trans-colonial labor recruitment in detail, especially during its earlier sessions in 1895, 1897, 1899 and in 1912. The ICI studied migration regimes in a comparative perspective and called both for a protection of workers and for their control.[92] According to them, such a regulation should be international and be based on an agreement among all colonizing powers. Thus, they contemplated a trans-colonial standardization of recruitment contracts, along with international agreements to protect workers [93]

The ICI's plans to regulate and facilitate trans-colonial labor recruitment were responsive to an increasing desire of colonial administrations to control and restrict the mobility of Africans. Fearing emigration and depopulation, which were regarded as detrimental to a development policy based on indigenous labor, colonial governments introduced pass laws and monopolized the recruitment of workers. Remembering the high mortality rate among migrant workers in the Congo and elsewhere, ICI delegates agreed that it was necessary to protect Africans against abuses and exploitation on the part of European entrepreneurs and settlers. This changed in the inter-war period, when ICI members would turn against an international

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[91] As we have seen, Great Britian started financing the ICI in the early 1930s. At the meeting held in London in 1936, British liberals dominated and showed their renewed influence, when F. Lugard inaugurated the meeting: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1936,* 1-15; other British delegates criticized the apartheid policy in South Africa: ICI, *Compte Rendu 1936*, 43-45.

[92] Institut Colonial International (ed.), *La main d'oeuvre aux colonies, vol. 1. Documents officiels* (Paris, 1895).

[93] For an overview see again Daviron, 'Mobilizing Labour in African'.

ban on forced labor proposed by the International Labor Organization in 1929. Their main argumentation, however, remained the same before and after the First World War, as they thought both protection and coercion necessary to bring about economic development. Styling themselves as specialists in colonial development, they rejected interference in colonial matters by the non-experts of the ILO.

In the early 1890s, the circulation of labor in Africa was rarely restricted. As we have seen, railway-builders like Thys hired employees and workers from around Africa, often under suspicious circumstances, but generally with the consent of the foreign authorities.[94] Thousands of workers from West Africa (among them “specialized workers” who had built the railway line between Dakar and Saint Louis and craftsmen from the British Gold Coast) and from Zanzibar (with the help of the Indian recruitment agents) arrived in the Congo.[95]

Bilateral contacts and agreements facilitated this cross-border recruitment. Administrators in the greater Congo region, where population density was low but the need for a labor force temporarily high, were particularly interested in bilateral agreements. Unofficial agreements between the Congo Free State, the Portuguese administration, and French colonies were frequent.[96] Adjacent colonies, like German Cameroon, French Congo, Portuguese Angola and the Congo Free State agreed that workers could freely circulate on their territories. An official ordinance from 1895 allowed the free circulation of Africans from the French Congo to the Congo Free State.[97] The Congo Free State even received permission from the French government in Algiers to recruit Algerians to work in the Congo or to join the ill-reputed *Force Publique*. Long before, the *Force Publique* had enlisted the service of Zanzibaris, and Thys equally used those networks to recruit workers from the spice island.[98] Later in the nineteenth century, a strong influx to the industrializing centers in Katanga and in the mining areas in Transvaal resulted in new arrangements, for example between Portuguese Mozambique and the British in the South African mining areas.[99]

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[94] Thys asserted that he paid half a pound sterling per head to private recruitment agents, who guaranteed him that workers had agreed to the contracts without being constrained or misinformed: Cornet, *La Bataille du Rail*, 219.

[95] Ibid., 180-181; 219; Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, *Le Chemin de fer*, 110; Normally, they were transported by regular shipping lines: Ibid., 107-108.

[96] AMAEB AE 202 Correspondance échangé avec les puissances étrangères; AE 204 Correspondance France 5/300 État Indépendant du Congo Dept. Intérieur to Dept. Extérieur 28.8.1905: Étude de recrutement d’artisans noirs originaires des possessions portugaises; AE 204 Correspondance France 6/3: EIC Gouverneur Génétal to M. Secretaire d’Etat Bruxelles from 9.5.1898; AE 204 Correspondance France 6/10 and 6/11.

[97] In February 1895 EIC writes that there are no licenses necessary for agents from the French Congo: AMAEB, AE 204 Correspondance France, 2/114.

[98] AMAEB AE 204 Correspondance France 6/35 : Légation de France en Belgique to Eetvelde, Administrateur General du Département des Affaires Etrangères de l’Etat Libre du Congo du 26.2.1889 ; 6/32: EIC Département des Affaires Etrangères to M. Bourée, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de la République Française du 4.3.1889.

[99] The Portuguese government in Mozambique even profited from the labor migration to the British territory by taxing the workers from Mozambique as soon as they returned home with their salaries P. Harries, *Work, Culture, and Identity: Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South Africa, c.1860-1910* (Portsmouth, NH 1994); See generally on the topic:

Beginning in the mid-1890s, however, the tide was turning. Governors in West Africa saw their workers perish in the Congo, while others returned exhausted and were ravaged by disease. At the same time, they increased their own efforts to build railways and needed workers themselves. In 1891, Sierra Leone asked Thys for a deposit of 30,000 pound sterling as a warrant that six hundred subjects who left for the Congo would be treated according to the contract and returned in sound condition. Senegal completely banned Thys' recruitment agents from its territory. Not without reason, the European press blamed Thys for using slavers as intermediaries to supply him with workers. Those events were highly publicized in France and Britain.[100]

The French pioneered legislating on the circulation of labor in Africa, especially in the Ivory Coast Colony, which had seen the recruitment of thousands of "crewmen" for ships that cruised along the West African coast – a long-established practice that had earned the coastal inhabitants the ethnicized label of "Kroumen." The Krou had a reputation as experienced workers, and they were recruited for service as far as Panama. At the early stage of the construction of the Congo railway, the Krou and other inhabitants of the West African coast had been Thys' first choice as reliable workers.[101] The constant emigration flow to the Congo Free State and the abuses reported from there, however, led the French administration to interfere.[102] From 1894 onwards, West Africans were forbidden to leave French colonial territory, unless they received official permission.[103] By the same token, recruitment agents had to buy a recruitment franchise from the administration, which restricted the number of workers that were allowed to leave the colony. For every native who left the colony, a sum of 500 Francs had to be paid to the government, which was only reimbursed if the person returned to the colony within one year.[104] By 1900, France extended the emigration prohibition to all its colonies, above all the AOF (French West Africa), the AEF (French Equatrial Africa), and Madagascar.

F.E. Sanderson, 'The Development of Labour Migration from Nyasaland, 1891–1914', *The Journal of African History* 2, 2 (1961).

[100] As a consequence, the value of his company's shares dropped from 995 Francs in 1890 to 200 Francs in 1892: Cornet, *La Bataille du Rail*, 220.

[101] Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, *Le Chemin de fer*, 107.

[102] AMAEB AE 204 Correspondance France 6/41 Sous-sécrétaire d'État au Ministère de la Marine et des Colonies a M. Comte D'Oultremont Paris January 1888 ; 6/19 and 20 Foreign Office, Francis Bertle to Hon. Sir Fr. Plunkett (Communiqué pour M. Malby) from 16.8.1897.

[103] All of them needed a passport to leave the territory: AMAEB AE 204 Correspondance France 6/53 Emigrations des Naturels du Loango from 28.8.1885.

[104] H. Solus, 'Le Régime er l'Organisation du Travail des Indigènes dans les Colonies Francaises de l'Afrique', in Institut Colonial International (ed.), *Le Régime et l'organisation du travail des indigènes dans les colonies tropicales* (Paris, 1929); A preliminary regulation was already in force in 1888: AMAEB AE 204 Correspondance France 6/51: EIC Affaires Étrangères to M. l'enseigne de vaisseau G. Noitoua, Résident des possessions françaises au Sud de Sette Coma Loango from 3.2.1886.

The migration regulations that followed this period, however, were more restrictive and aimed at controlling segregation policies. The Governor-General of AOF, for example, used the prohibition to leave French colonies as an opportunity to also restrict the circulation within the colonial federation. Henceforth, French colonial subjects who wanted to leave the French Ivory Coast for the adjacent French New Guinea had to ask permission. Africans were no longer free to move, even within the French colonial federation. The decree equaled an early version of mobility control through pass laws. The French regulations caused a great stir among the British, whose colonial subjects often travelled as merchants in French West Africa. To protect them from being retained in French territory, the British colonial administration equipped its own colonial subjects with special documents, which proved their status as British subjects and temporary migrants.[105] At the turn of the century, colonial governments developed an ever more refined system of control on both recruitment agents and migrants.

In the meantime, Thys sought to substitute trans-colonial labor recruitment within Africa with intercontinental indentured labor, but his plans failed. He tried to hire accountants among the black middle class in the USA to do the paperwork for the railway company. Before coming to the Congo, the Afro-Americans were supposed to learn French, study African history and read Stanley's books on the exploration of Central Africa. The project turned out to be too expensive, however.[106] Beginning already in the early 1890s, Thys imported 3,000 indentured workers from China and the Antilles, who had been recruited in Macao and Barbados. But they soon fell prey to the climate or became victims of the "deficient organization of work", as officials euphemistically admitted.[107] The deaths of the Asian and Antillean workers would lead the ICI members to discard indentured labor recruitment for the "new possessions" in Africa.[108] In accordance with a general trend, inter-continental labor recruitment lost ground in the African colonies and the local population was valued higher as a potential workforce.[109] It was not only Thys who realized that it was time to improve working conditions in the Congo – and to promote this changing attitude on an international stage. His desire coincided with the foundation of the ICI, which showed a strong tendency to standardize labor contracts and control their observance.

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[105] AMAEB 204 Correspondance France 6/19 and 20 Foreign Office, Francis Bertle to Hon. Sir Fr. Plunkett (Communiqué pour M. Malby) from 16.8.1897.
[106] Cornet, *La Bataille du Rail*, 182.
[107] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1897,* 95.
[108] For different reasons, colonial governments tried to reduce the number of Asian workers, like in 1907 in South Africa: Institut Colonial International (ed.), *Le Régime et l'organisation du travail des indigènes dans les colonies tropicales* (Paris, 1929),11.
[109] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895,* 188; Only the British imported Chinese to Transvaal, or Hindu workers from India to East Africa: Salesses, *Les Chemins de Fer dans leur état actuel*, 6; D. Northrup, *Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 1834-1922* (Cambridge, 1995), 59.

Beginning in 1895, a debate arose in the ICI over the question of whether a regulation with regard to recruitment practices and labor contracts should protect the workers from abuses or enable employers to punish indigenous workers who broke the contract. Advocates of the European employers opposed the defenders of enhanced protection of the Africans. One extremely biased advocate of the European employers was the Pan-German Carl Peters, who had become notorious for his racist attitude and cruel treatment of Africans when he established and headed the colony of German East Africa (1885-1892). An early member in the ICI, he proposed drafting an international convention that allowed white employers in the colonies to prosecute and punish those Africans who had broken their work contracts and fled to foreign territory. Unlike Peters, the majority of the ICI members saw no need to protect the European employers, but rather the colonized from abuse by the Europeans. The latter, together with ruthless recruitment agents, were blamed for the cruel treatment of African workers. Only a few (mostly German) ICI members supported Carl Peters. Their position was undermined by the exclusion of Carl Peters from the ICI and soon afterwards he was found guilty of killing one of his African subjects in German East Africa (1897).[110] Discarding the extreme position of Carl Peters, the protectionist group imposed itself in the ICI.

The *indigenophile* faction in the ICI took the lead in attempting a draft of an international convention on colonial labor recruitment. Its instigator was the Belgian internationalist Édouard Descamps, who was a member of the International Institute of Colonial Law. As such, he had participated in the drafting of an international convention to protect white emigrants. Inspired by this convention, he spoke in favor of protecting migrant workers also in Africa.[111] He wanted administrations to name a commissioner, who monitored licensed recruitment agents, both in the countries of recruitment and the countries of employment. Employment contracts should not exceed a period of five years, and the working time should be reduced to ten hours a day. The salary, Descamps proposed, had to be fixed in the contract and medical assistance, as well as the transport to the employment country, had to be free. Families should not be separated. The most important feature of a future convention, Descamps argued, was that the recruited workers signed the contract voluntarily and in full awareness of its content.[112] Descamps' project in many ways resembled the international convention on emigration drafted by the Institute of International Law for white labor migrants.

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[110] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1895*, 253.

[111] See also for the influence of emigration regulations on colonial migrant protection: G. Kraetke, 'Ordonnance relative à l'engagement et à l'exportation, comme travailleurs, d'indigènes du protectorat de la Cie de la Nouvelle-Guinée (15 august 1888.)', in Institut Colonial International (ed.), *La main d'oeuvre aux colonies,* vol. 1.*: Documents officiels* (Paris, 1895), 6–26.

[112] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1899*, 58ff.

Édouard Descamps was aware that the recruitment of the labor force in and for the colonies differed in essence from European emigration contracts. While emigration was an individual choice, he claimed, the recruitment of African labor often involved cheating and various forms of coercion. European employers or recruitment agents were naturally in a position of superiority.[113] Therefore, a convention in colonial contexts had to lay emphasis on the needs of the colonized, who had to be protected from outright exploitation and mischievous indentured contracts. Only the security of the contracts and a resulting mutual trust, he argued, would make economic development and the "mise en valeur" with the help of the natives possible.[114]

Descamps received support from leading ICI members, such as secretary-general Janssen, whose opinion was authoritative when he addressed the issue in the 1912 session of the ICI. Janssen wanted to avoid any kind of forced recruitment, and insisted that the contract should be signed directly at the place of recruitment. He even intended to accord African workers the right to break a contract, provided that they had good reasons and assumed the costs of repatriation to their country of origin. Janssen turned against any form of corporal punishment inflicted by the employer on those who did not obey or did not fulfill their contract. Finally, he categorically rejected forced labor, even the "compulsory labor" ordered by colonial administrations and governments. As Benoit Daviron has concluded, Janssen's position was "resolutely progressive." Far from being unique, Albert Thys and the Dutch liberals in the ICI endorsed Janssen's position.[115]

As the ICI refrained from official recommendations, the schemes of international regulations for trans-colonial labor recruitment and general laws facilitating labor migration did not bear fruit. Moreover, the development of mobility control and labor recruitment was on a different track. During the process of industrialization of certain parts of Africa, colonial administrations gave power to the industrialists who profited from the recruitment business. However, while the ICI did not stipulate an international convention, its discussions did not go unrecognized and would be studied by the International Labor Organization in the late 1920s, when it prepared an international convention banning forced labor from the colonies.

By the interwar period, and in contradiction with the ICI's paradigm of indigenous protection, the control of Africans became stricter and laws favored the predominantly white employers. In 1922, the government of the Belgian Congo modified the existing laws on labor

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[113] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1899*, 53-57.

[114] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1899,* 53-54; ICI (ed.), *La Main d'Oeuvre aux Colonies: Documents officiels sur le contrat de travail et le louage d'ouvrage aux colonies,* 3 vol., (Brussels, 1895-1898).

[115] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1912, 247-248; Daviron, 'Mobilizing Labor', 488.

recruitment to "protect the employer against the lack of fidelity [*manque de foi*] of the natives" – while the 1910 version of the law had prohibited the violent "excesses" of the employer.[116] With regard to the high mortality rates among the workers in the industrialized zone of Katanga, this modification of the laws in favor of the employers cannot be but qualified as sarcastic: the official Office du Travail du Kinshasa estimated a mortality of 146 per 1,000 workers in the Katanga region, while less biased sources spoke about 250 out of 1,000 who died within weeks of being recruited in their natal village.[117]

Contracts in the Belgian Congo had to be officially concluded between the "civilized master and the native" and not between an employer and an employee who were on equal terms in front of the law. The formulation, which also appears in the South African Masters and Servants Act, allowed the colonizers to pretend that these labor contracts were not contracts according to civil law, but of public law. Therefore, the government of a colony had the possibility of interfering and punishing workers in case they broke the contract.[118] The ICI openly blamed these laws that allowed the direct punishment of workers who "deserted" from their contracts.[119] Thys' liberalist plea for the introduction of a free market economy suffered a severe setback in the interwar period.

While the ICI's agenda was progressive by the standards of the nineteenth century, its members delivered the proof that its reformism should sustain colonialism instead of undermining it in the interwar period. When the International Labor Organization drafted an international convention to ban forced labor from colonial territory in 1929, the ICI was assigned an important role. Before proceeding to action, the ILO studied the publications of the ICI experts thoroughly. Moreover, an ILO delegate was sent to the ICI meeting of 1929 and urged its members to cast their vote on the project.[120] With only two abstentions – the Nigerian governor general Palmer and the liberal Dutch Moresco – the ICI voted against an international convention that banned forced labor from colonial territory.[121]

The arguments they advanced are well known to the reader. Underdeveloped and culturally different societies, ICI members claimed, followed different laws. In general, they added, the colonies differed widely in their state of development. Thus, no "universal law"

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[116] Ch. de Lannoy, 'Le Régime et l'Organisation du Travail des Indigènes au Congo Belge', in: ICI*, Le Régime et l'organisation*, 89.
[117] AGRB, I 184 Fonds Pierre Orts, 439: Ouvrages, 'Le Congo en 1928', 13.
[118] Ch. de Lannoy, 'Le Régime et l'Organisation du Travail des Indigènes au Congo Belge', 90.
[119] Ibid., 38-40.
[120] ILO Archives, N/206/1/01 : "Correspondence with governments, international associations and individuals on native labour 1921-1940"; N/206/2/0: "Committee of Experts on Native Labour, correspondence with experts"; N 206/1000/15 "Sessions of the International Colonial Institute 1936-1939". See also: ILO Archives CAT-6C-13-1: J.Goudal 'Rapport sur ma mission à Bruxelles (XX session de l'ICI 24-29.6.1929)', cit. in Daele, 'Industrial States and the Transnational Exchanges', 209.
[121] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1929, 131-132.

condemning forced labor could ever be applied to the colonies. Administrators needed autonomy from generalizing theories, a Portuguese member explained, and had to act "according to experience and not to theory."[122] "Modern methods", another member added, "cannot be effected by a stroke of the pen, or legal enactments, all at once and on a big scale."[123] Secretary-general Louwers added that too many laws had been stipulated in theory, but what the colonies needed where inspectors who would control the observance of such rules.[124] Others argued with the paternalistic category of protection: to protect health and life of the native race, to fight maladies, and to implement hygiene measures, various and more flexible measures were necessary.[125]

The most powerful, if also the most cynical, argument was that the ILO was Eurocentric and had no idea of what the colonized actually wanted. "Please allow me to ask", the Portuguese Penha Garcia exclaimed, "how many indigenous workers and patrons have you seen in Genova?" The ICI members reacted with "laughter and signs of approval" to the reproach that the ILO had never consulted the colonized.[126] They advanced the knowledge of indigenous societies as a pre-condition of making laws for them. This episode gave expression to the ICI member's concern that their role as colonial experts was challenged, if not contested, by the ILO project. Many ICI members argued that colonial governments had long banned forced labor from their territories. They portrayed the ILO theorists as ignorant of the colonial situation and doubted that anyone would be able to enforce those laws. At the same time, Louwers remarked that the ICI had to show its willingness to combat forced labor, so as not to be suspected of defending it. Generally speaking, the ICI members felt the need to defend their colonial expertise against an alleged "worker's internationalism" of the ILO. After all, the ICI was rather a colonial than an international institution. In order to maintain an autonomous colonial rule, they were willing to sacrifice their internationalist ideal.

The official argumentation of the ICI's vote against the abolition of forced labor sounds like a collection of pretexts:

> In the colonies, more than in Europe, where a better organization of labor, the press and parliaments provide an effective control which serves to prevent many abuses, a particularly attentive and active supervision by the governments concerned of all matters affecting labor is essential to ensure the effectual and practical application of the laws on the subject….the evolution of labor legislation must proceed at a pace corresponding with the rate of development of the native populations. A uniform labor legislation for all colonies is therefore impossible, the rate of progress varying from colony to colony. …All questions referring to health and to

[122] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1929, 55-56.
[123] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1929, 55.
[124] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1929, 72.
[125] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1929, 74.
[126] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1929, 114.

> the protection of the workers must have the precedence over all others…In the present state of affairs, there is room for international agreements only in a limited measure and between colonial powers only. [127]

The last point is important. ICI members complained that there were only six or seven colonizing countries represented at the ILO who were faced with thirty-six non-colonial powers.[128] The ICI members claimed that their institute was the only international institution that represented colonial states only. Indeed, by 1930, more than half of its budget derived from funding by the Belgian, French, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, and British colonial ministries.[129] Six Belgian colonial societies contributed to sponsor the ICI. The ICI was indeed the only international institution depending on colonial states alone and purely dedicated to colonial matters. The vote against the ILO's international convention was thus a vote in favor of autonomous colonial expertise and a sign that the ICI was willing to defend colonialism against the new internationalisms represented by the ILO and the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations.

Adding to this attitude was that after the death of the liberal founding father Joseph Chailley in 1928, a retrograde group of Portuguese delegates gained influence and joined forces with Belgian and Italian members to give the ICI a more conservative orientation (Italy signed the International Labor Convention only in 1934, Belgium in 1944, Portugal in 1956; France, which was still influential in the ICI, signed as late as 1937). A similar influence of those groups can be found in the League of Nations and its Permanent Mandates Commission, which would equally ignore the ban on forced labor, even though it portrayed the mandates as a more progressive form of government than the traditional colonies.[130] When the ILO convention finally took effect in 1932, it was widely ignored by colonial and mandate powers alike. Even the ILO itself undermined it by making exceptions that challenged the rule. While it banned forced labor in general, the ILO permitted it in cases of public utility. The convention stipulated that only male and healthy persons were to be recruited for obligatory work, and they had to be paid a regular salary. A maximum of 60 days of work a year should not be exceeded, unless in exceptional cases when it could be extended to six months.[131] Colonial administrators would

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[127] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1929, 131-132.
[128] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1929, 58.
[129] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1929, 61; ICI, *Compte Rendu 1931*, 71.
[130] Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 259.
[131] C.545.M.194, 1927.VI LoN CPM Procès-Verbal de la 12 Session tenue à Geneve au 24 Oct et au 11 Nov 1927 ANNEXE 7 L'oeuvre de l'organisation internationale du travail en ce qui concerne les conditions du travail dans les colonies et régions analogues (Exposé de M. Grimshaw), 187-189.

indeed rarely stick to those rules, and forced labor continued to exist.[132] While the ICI explicitly dismissed the convention, the ILO and the PMC tacitly ignored it.

The Development Paradigm: Forced Cultivation and Forced Labor in Mandates and Colonies

The cooperation between the ICI and the PMC was close though unofficial. The PMC's guidelines prescribed consulting experts and making use of published documents.[133] The ICI provided them with both. For the PMC, the ICI was a comparably neutral source of information on the development of "normal" colonies, which served as a benchmark for the progress made in the mandates. In 1927, the PMC sent an official delegation to the ICI meeting in The Hague to prepare closer cooperation. Vice-President of the Council for the Mandates of the League of Nations, J.W. van Rees, who headed the delegation, asserted that it "is natural that we personally try to be up to date on the general colonial policy, while being permanently occupied with the mandate."[134] The PMC understood the ICI as a sort of representative body of the colonial powers, or of those who made colonial policy on the ground.

Intellectual exchange between the two institutions was grounded in overlapping memberships. The Belgians Pierre Orts and Ocatve Louwers were the most prominent members who had been recruited by the PMC for their colonial expertise. More than ten ICI members were temporarily employed by the League of Nations to participate in temporary bodies such as the Anti-Slavery Commission (such as F. Lugard and M. Delafosse).[135] However, unlike the International Labor Organization, the ICI did not send a permanent representative to the PMC's meetings. The relations between the ICI and the PMC were rather informal and moreover not free of conflict.

When the PMC delegate Van Rees attended the ICI meeting in 1927, he reiterated the PMC's attitude that the mandates were morally ahead of traditional colonies, because they were not exploited by one national colonizing power but by an international commission that was composed of colonial and non-colonial powers. Van Rees held that the mandates were "a completely new element" and more progressive than the older colonies with regard to labor contracts, as well as the abolition of slavery and forced labor.[136] He regretted that the PMC

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[132] Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 30.
[133] BNF Fol. Gw. 628 (1920-22) Annex 4 Report presented by the Belgian Representative Monsieur Hymans, and adopted by the council of the League of Nations, Meeting at San Sebastian on 5th August, 1920, 16.
[134] LoN, Procès-Verbal de la Onzième Session tenue à Genève, du 20 juin au 6 juillet 1927 (y compris les Rapport de la Commission au Conseil), 11.
[135] H. Bülck, *Die Zwangsarbeit im Friedensvölkerrecht* (Göttingen, 1953), 37.
[136] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1927*, 15 and 41.

possessed "no power to interfere with the internal affairs of Colonial Powers" in applying those measures also in the colonies. However, Van Rees hoped that once reforms were made in the mandates, the colonies would be induced to follow suit. This "exosmosis" effect, as he called it, might finally bring about reforms in the colonies that universalized the ideals of the League of Nations.[137]

ICI members rejected the idea that mandates were more progressive than colonies on the grounds that the ICI had already formulated a reformist program in the colonies a long time ago. All the "humanitarian" schemes that Van Rees advanced as new had been on the ICI's agenda before the First World War. Among them figured the promise of a gradual development towards self-government and the abolition of slavery and forced labor. The notions that assimilation in colonies under international guardianship was counterproductive and that the "protection of native life" was indispensable, had also been promoted by ICI members as early as the 1890s.[138] In short, the ICI had produced an "international morale" in which Van Rees saw a novelty.[139] The sole difference was that the PMC argued ideologically, while the ICI acted according to a utilitarian sense of necessity.

Indeed, while discussions in the PMC echoed the debates that ICI members had led before the First World War, the policies in mandates did not differ significantly from the policies in the colonies. This was due to the fact that "on the spot," mandates were modelled on the colonies – and not the other way round as van Rees had wished. Van Rees had to admit this fact when he explained the mandate system at the ICI meeting in 1927: "it would be…unreasonable to expect that irreproachable results be already obtained under the very dissimilar conditions which we find in the fourteen [mandated] territories" thus, "there still remains, as in any colonial government, a progressive development to be carried out."[140] After all, mandates were not so different from colonies, because the PMC wanted the mandate governments to incorporate them into the pre-existing administrations of adjacent colonies. For practical reasons, most mandates were governed by colonial administrations. In both mandates and colonies the question of forced labor pre-occupied the colonial administrations.

Since 1926, the PMC referred to the League of Nations' anti-slavery convention to officially condemn forced labor, even if the legal concept of slavery differed significantly from the notion of forced labor (which could be temporary, for example). Debates followed, but in 1930, the PMC abandoned the issue and claimed that the abolition of forced labor belonged to

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137 ICI, *Compte Rendu 1927*, 41-42.
138 ICI, *Compte Rendu 1927*, 17-41.
139 ICI, *Compte Rendu 1927*, 39.
140 ICI, *Compte Rendu 1927*, 37.

the domain of the International Labor Organization. The International Labor Congress had adopted a resolution to study the topic in 1925, and established a special commission on "native labor" in 1926. Making use of the ICI's preliminary work on the topic, the commission started to collect information from all countries. As we have seen, the International Labor Conference postponed the discussion on forced labor in the colonies until 1930, before the International Labor Convention was drafted.[141] In the meantime, the introduction of forced cultivation in Rwanda-Burundi during the mandate period illustrated that the use of forced labor was tacitly accepted and even openly justified by the PMC.

Between 1927 and 1930, the Belgian mandatory power introduced forced cultivation to Rwanda-Burundi, which the League of Nations had entrusted to it. According to Susan Pedersen, the forced cultivation of non-seasonal crops like manioc was the administration's response to overcome the devastating famine of 1927-30 in Rwanda and Burundi.[142] But PMC members dropped hints that famines were rather an excuse than the reason for making use of compulsory cultivation and labor. The Dutch PMC member and eminent theorist of the mandate system, J.W. Van Rees, had remarked that the forced cultivation scheme had been adopted in Belgium's Rwanda-Burundi mandate as soon as it had been organized along the administrative structure in the adjacent Belgian Congo – long before the famine occurred. This integration of mandates into the pre-existing colonial administration was common practice and desired by the PMC to rule the mandates efficiently. The administrative merger and bureaucratic standardization disproved the recurrent argument of PMC members that mandates were more "ethically" ruled than traditional colonies, because they were under the international control of "neutral" PMC experts.[143]

Although Van Rees felt uncomfortable with the four ordinances that had decreed the forced cultivation in the Belgian mandate, he accepted their application. The first decree dated from 1925 and introduced obligatory cultivation of non-seasonal crops like manioc to fight famine, but also to supply the porters at the construction sites of roads and railways with food. Moreover, the villages around the administrative outpost had to deliver a certain amount of cash crops for the Belgian administrators. The PMC had explicitly authorized the forced labor system, not only to fight the famine, but also to encourage the export of cash crops for the European market.[144] To approve of those facts, the PMC even modified article three of its

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[141] Procès-Verbal de la Onzième Session tenue à Genève, du 20 juin au 6 juillet 1927 (y compris les Rapport de la Commission au Conseil) Travail forcé:Lettre adressé au secretariat le 28.5.1927 par M. Grimshaw.
[142] See Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 243-260.
[143] C.545.M.194, 1927.VI LoN CPM Procès-Verbal de la 12 Session tenue à Geneve au 24 Oct et au 11 Nov 1927, 147-148.
[144] C.545.M.194, 1927.VI LoN CPM Procès-Verbal de la 12 Session tenue à Geneve au 24 Oct et au 11 Nov 1927, 147-148.

regulations for the Rwanda-Burundi mandate, arguing that it had been too "rigid" in banning forced labor completely.[145] The scheme was the same that had been applied by Didderich and others in the Belgian Congo in the 1890s: Selected chiefs were declared responsible to supply the government with laborers and organize the cultivation of cash crops.

Already upon the foundation of the PMC, some members had called for an "obligation to work" that should be introduced in the mandates. One member explained that "if we want to develop, we need labor. Measures taken in this respect must not be too strict, but they must be efficient. Such laws cannot be the same everywhere, but must vary according to the temperament of the natives. After all, European legislation also says that no one has the right to refrain from work: vagabonds are imprisoned." According to him, "The obligation to work should be established in the colonies for natives"[146] because they "had no right to laziness and idleness…Therefore, labor should be compulsory in this sense, that the native was not entitled to refuse to work though he should have the right to choose freely the nature and place." In civilized societies, he continued, no one had the right to refuse to work, unless he had other means of subsistence. "As it was predictable that the obligation to work would become a general rule for all mankind in the future, the right of the native not to work cannot be admitted."[147] Many PMC members adhered to this idea and hinted at the fact that labor can indeed be forced but paid. Moreover, the general obligation to work do not mean that a person cannot choose what and where he works. This blunt attitude would give way to a more subtle justification of compulsory labor in the course of the PMC's existence.

The PMC, although theoretically banning all kinds of forced labor from the mandate territories in accordance with the League of Nations' Covenant, was aware of all the loopholes that enabled forced labor. It made wide use of the rhetoric that had served to legitimize forced labor for years. One of them was to authorize obligatory labor in the mandates whenever it served the "public utility". Public utility was defined in the broadest sense and included the combat of famines and "essential public works," like the construction of roads, railroads and irrigation systems, along with the requisition of food for troops or administrators. In the French possessions, the assessment of situations that justified forced recruitment for reasons of public utility resided with local administrators – there were no official guidelines about what public utility actually was.[148] The French version of the mandates' regulations about public works, for

[145] C.545.M.194, 1927.VI LoN CPM Procès-Verbal de la 12 Session tenue à Geneve au 24 Oct et au 11 Nov 1927, 163.
[146] BNF Fol. Gw. 628 (1920-22) Société des Nations, CPM, Procès-Verbaux de la Première Session tenue à Genève du 4 au 8 Octobre 1921, Recruitment of labour force, 16.
[147] BNF Fol. Gw. 628 (1920-22) Société des Nations, CPM, Procès-Verbaux de la Première Session tenue à Genève du 4 au 8 Octobre 1921, 37.
[148] Procès-Verbal de la Onzième Session tenue à Genève, du 20 juin au 6 juillet 1927 (y compris les Rapport de la Commission au Conseil), Cameroun sous mandat français: examen du rapport annuel pour 1926, 28.

example, caused great confusion. While the English version allowed forced labor for "essential public works and services," the French translation read "travaux publics et services essentielles." The grammatical delicacy authorized forced labor for all "public works" and "essential services" in French territories. The PMC rectified this error, but did not prevent the French from using compulsory labor (both paid and unpaid) until after the Second World War.[149]

The Portuguese Freire d'Andrade, a member of the ICI and the PMC, pointed at the devastating effects of the persisting *corvée* system: the mortality among the workers recruited for public works was five percent and therefore relatively high.[150] Nevertheless, almost all PMC members agreed that forced labor had to be maintained. Pierre Orts, for example, thought it necessary to combat famines in the long term with a program that included the construction of roads and the recruitment of porters who could quickly supply famine-ridden regions with food. Orts went so far as arguing that Africans had to provide administrators with food, because they organized the combat against famines. According to him, compulsory cultivation for such purposes was "completely justified."[151] Others agreed that all available means were allowed in periods of emergency – but also during long-term preventive measures against potential famines.[152] This argument was in line with the ICI's rejection of the ILO's convention against forced labor, because it authorized any means to "maintain the health of the native race." Belgian PMC member M.E. Halewyck de Heusch made use of his pseudo-anthropological knowledge and also used the argument that the ICI advanced when it turned against the abolition of forced labor: "forced labor is a native custom, because in some regions, the natives owe their chiefs several days of forced labor."[153] To speak on behalf of the indigenous population seemed to be the best argument in favor of forced labor. As Susan Pedersen has shown, the "native" argument, which had been promoted by the ICI as early as the 1890s, penetrated the arguments of the PMC.[154] Along with the need to develop the countries it became the main argument in favor of forced labor.

It was probably to divert attention from the PMC's approval of forced labor in the mandates that ICI member and future PMC president Pierre Orts started a campaign against

[149] BNF Fol. Gw. 628 (1920-22) Société des Nations, CPM, Procès-Verbaux de la Première Session tenue à Genève du 4 au 8 Octobre 1921 Recruitment of labour force, 16.
[150] Procès-Verbal de la Onzième Session tenue à Genève, du 20 juin au 6 juillet 1927 (y compris les Rapport de la Commission au Conseil), Cameroun sous mandat francais: examen du rapport annuel pour 1926, 30.
[151] C.545.M.194, 1927.VI LoN CPM Procès-Verbal de la 12 Session tenue à Geneve au 24 Oct et au 11 Nov 1927 Forced Cultivation 162.
[152] C.545.M.194, 1927.VI LoN CPM Procès-Verbal de la 12 Session tenue à Geneve au 24 Oct et au 11 Nov 1927 Forced Cultivation, 163.
[153] C.545.M.194, 1927.VI LoN CPM Procès-Verbal de la 12 Session tenue à Geneve au 24 Oct et au 11 Nov 1927, 148.
[154] Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 257.

forced labor in the colonies – and claimed at the same time that it was less frequent in the mandates. In 1930, Orts publicly dismissed forced labor and chose the Belgian Congo as a negative example. Orts – once a liberal member of the ICI and a representative of Belgium (but not of the Belgian government) in the PMC – prepared a sweeping blow against the Belgian colonial government of the Congo, which was said to tolerate forced labor and forced recruitment. Ort's campaign was grounded in very personal reasons. It had its roots in a mix of his past as an ICI liberal, his Christian altruism, his antipathy towards the Belgian colonial minister, and a desire to cast a positive light on the PMC's mandate policy, which he contrasted with the colonial policy of Belgian Congo.

In 1928, he had visited the Congo, Rwanda-Burundi and British Tanganjika. During the journey, missionaries called his attention to the continued use of a labor force in the Belgian possessions. A devoted Protestant, Pierre Orts took their complaints to heart and started a campaign against forced labor back in Europe. His fervor was further stimulated when the Belgian colonial minister refused to receive him to hear his accusations against the administration. He therefore chose the Belgian colonial administration as the main target of his accusations (which was without doubt the right choice).[155] During his campaign, he received support from the Aborigines' Protection Societies, from progressive ICI members and from European media. Not only because of their support, Orts' press campaign brought Morel's successful offensive against Léopold II to mind. Orts consciously used Morel's authority to intimidate his adversaries. As Morel had done in 1904, he called for a *commission d'enquête* to investigate in the Congo and claimed that Morel had "saved the colonial oeuvre of the Belgians" by unveiling their atrocities.[156] Ort's campaign was thus inspired by Morel, but also by the anti-Léopoldian Belgians who had joined the ICI around 1900 (Morel himself attended sessions of the ICI during his campaign). Like Morel, and like the Belgian internationalists in the ICI, Orts criticized the way Belgians colonized, without dismissing colonization as such.

Orts published pamphlets against forced labor and even presented his grievances to the Belgian King. The Congo, he explained, faced depopulation because the forced recruitment of male laborers destroyed families. Recruitment agents often tricked the Congolese into contracts, which came close to practices of forced labor. Once they arrived at the construction sites or in industrial zones, Orts claimed, the mortality rates were higher than those on the European battlefields during the First World War.[157] Both the administration and the industrialists should

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155 AGRB, I 184 Fonds Pierre Orts, 389: Souvenirs de ma Carrière, 194.
156 AGRB, I 184 Fonds Pierre Orts, 439: Ouvrages, P. Orts, *Le Congo en 1928* (Brussels, 1930), 3.
157 Ibid., 10-30.

be held responsible for the disaster, along with ruthless indigenous recruitment agents. Orts' accusations were justified, if partly overgeneralized.

In a similar way, he overgeneralized the situation in the Rwanda-Burundi mandate, which he portrayed as the positive counter-example to the Congo. There was no forced labor in the mandate, he claimed. The working conditions also seemed to be better to him. In a Belgian newspaper, Orts wrote that in 1928, 10,000 Congolese had fled to Rwanda-Burundi because they heard rumors that forced labor was banned from the mandate territory. Orts asserted that the Belgians had indeed abolished forced labor in their mandate, in accordance with the League of Nations' prescriptions.[158]

Orts was wrong in all the points he made about the mandate. With the approval of the PMC, the Congo and Rwanda-Burundi formed an administrative union and were governed in the same way.[159] In the Rwanda-Burundi mandate, neither working conditions nor the living standards were better than in the Congo. Orts must have been well aware of that, as the PMC reports on Rwanda-Burundi show. According to official reports from the mandate, there was an important migration from Rwanda-Burundi to the Congo, where the Union Minière offered comparably good conditions to work.[160] The Union Minière recruited an important number of workers from the surrounding colonies and mandates. Revenues from the migration tax amounted to one million Francs annually, which corresponded to 3,300 legal immigrants to the Congo, mostly to the Katanga region.[161] The system of labor recruitment was allegedly well organized, the hygienic standards were good and lodging and food sufficient. Without doubt, the workers earned more in the Congo: while employers in Rwanda-Burundi paid one Franc per day, the Union Minière in the Katanga region paid a salary of 1.50 Francs per day, along with a food ration.[162] Orts himself had proposed to use the exemplary contracts of the Union Minière as a model for labor contracts all over Africa.[163]

As far as legislative theory was concerned, the mandate regions were no exception to the other colonial territories. In the Belgian Congo, the Colonial Charter, dating from 1908, had banned forced labor and stipulated that no one could be forced to work for private enterprises.[164]

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[158] AGRB, Papiers Orts I 184, 388 Extraits de presse 1899-1958, 'Le Régime du Travail dans notre colonie. Une lettre de M. Orts', *L'indépendance Belge (Bruxelles)* (3.5.1930).
[159] Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 256.
[160] C.545.M.194, 1927.VI LoN CPM Procès-Verbal de la 12 Session tenue à Geneve au 24 Oct et au 11 Nov 1927 Travail et émigration, 145.
[161] C.545.M.194, 1927.VI LoN CPM Procès-Verbal de la 12 Session tenue à Geneve au 24 Oct et au 11 Nov 1927 Travail et émigration, 147.
[162] C.545.M.194, 1927.VI LoN CPM Procès-Verbal de la 12 Session tenue à Genève au 24 Oct et au 11 Nov 1927 Travail et émigration, 146-147.
[163] C.545.M.194, 1927.VI LoN CPM Procès-Verbal de la 12 Session tenue à Genève au 24 Oct et au 11 Nov 1927 Travail et émigration, 146.
[164] Orts, *Le Congo*, 10.

Like in the mandates, compulsory labor was authorized if it was necessary and of public interest. All other rules and legislations were the same, as the PMC had decreed that the mandate had to be incorporated into the legislative and administrative structure of the adjacent colonies. In the fields of administration and legislation, the PMC did not go beyond the "normal" colonial situation. All in all, Pierre Orts tried to hide these facts during his campaign against forced labor recruitment in the Congo.

Whatever the reasons for Orts campaign, it is clear that he did never criticize colonial domination as such. He believed that mandates did not differ in essence from colonies and even mentioned to Lugard that mandate territories should be simply annexed by the powers who owned a mandate.[165] As we will see, as the longest-serving member of the PMC and its president from 1936-1940, Pierre Orts always believed in the colonial character of the PMC. At the same time he complained that it had less knowledge about the colonized population than the ICI's experts. This is one reason why he and other PMC members, such as Lugard, Ormsby-Gore and Freire d'Andrade, remained in the ICI while pursuing their careers in the PMC.

The Ethnographical Failure of the PMC and the Contingencies of Native Policy

As we have seen, the ICI linked colonial development policies to "native policies." However, in matters of native policy, the PMC lagged behind the expertise of the ICI. Neutral observers were surprised that the PMC did not employ any experts on "native policy."[166] Pierre Orts, the president of the PMC and ICI member, criticized the PMC's lack of expertise in this regard. In his memoires, he described the PMC as a well-intended institution, equipped with an attractive doctrine, but that was, after all, no more than a part of the "feel-good world" in Geneva, where all kinds of "fantasists" assembled. The PMC had noble motives, he explained, but was removed from the colonial reality. PMC members were specialists but depended completely on external information and questionnaires: they were officially banned from travelling to the colonies, and did not have the possibilities to conduct their own surveys in the mandates.[167] Although the ICI provided the PMC with colonial experts, these experts faced a different understanding of their new role within the PMC, the latter requiring informed neutrality rather than detailed knowledge of the colonized's lives. In many regards, the PMC was much more concerned with managing post-war conflict between European powers than with improving colonial policies.

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[165] Ibid., 205
[166] Bülck, *Die Zwangsarbeit im Friedensvölkerrecht*.
[167] AGRB, I 184 Fonds Pierre Orts, 389: Souvenirs de ma Carrière, 192.

Nevertheless, the PMC immediately tried to make use of pre-existing expertise. In the first place, mandatory powers received a mandate because their older colonies were adjacent to a mandate territory (According to the Anglo-Belgian Milner-Orts agreement dating from May 1919, Belgium received the mandate of Rwanda-Burundi also on the grounds that it was next to the Belgian Congo). Evoking the geographical vicinity, the PMC advised the mandatory powers to administratively and legally incorporate the mandates into the pre-existing colonial order.[168] This administrative and legal union ensured a quick and efficient administration of the mandates by experienced experts.

While the PMC left the details of administration and legislation to established colonial administrators, it did prescribe general guidelines. Thus, it charged itself to "take into consideration native laws and customs" and to "respect the rights and safeguard the interests of the native population."[169] Most of the mandates implied the duty of elaborating an organic law "in agreement with the native authorities" that "takes into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the population inhabiting the said territory."[170] In contrast to those slogans, many of the PMC members were blunt assimilationists in what concerned more detailed questions of everyday life. In the PMC's first meeting, for example, members got down the business of prohibiting polygamy in the colony or to wipe it out by heavy taxation. ICI member Pierre Orts intervened and warned that "polygamy has to disappear through a rising moral, not by imposing taxes or laws." Orts argued along the lines of the ICI, when he recommended to respect local customs and leave change to a natural development.[171]

The details of taking customary law into account were delegated to the local administrations. While some local administrations attempted to realize the PMC's "codification mission", such as in Togo, those projects rarely reached the scope of pre-war codification programs conducted by ICI members.[172] Moreover, legislation in "agreement with native authorities" applied predominantly to the A-Mandates, whose population was considered sufficiently advanced to have a say in the processes of legislation. The PMC did not employ legal experts who dedicated themselves to studying or codifying customary law in the mandates.

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[168] BNF Fol. Gw. 628 (1920-22) Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 4-6; France, for example incorporated its Cameroon and Togo mandates into the administrative federation of French West Africa: Procès-Verbal de la Onzième Session tenue à Genève, du 20 juin au 6 juillet 1927 (y compris les Rapport de la Commission au Conseil).

[169] See for example with regard to alienation of land: C P M 466 / C. 529 M. 314 1922 VI/ C. 667 M. 396. 1922 VI, Mandate for Palestine, 2 September 1926, 4

[170] C P M 466 / C. 529 M. 314 1922 VI/ C. 667 M. 396. 1922 VI, Mandate for Palestine, 2 September 1926, 4

[171] BNF Fol. Gw. 628 (1920-22) Société des Nations, CPM, Procès-Verbaux de la Première Session tenue à Genève du 4 au 8 Octobre 1921, 16.

[172] Procès-Verbal de la Onzième Session tenue à Genève, du 20 juin au 6 juillet 1927 (y compris les Rapport de la Commission au Conseil), 36f.

In the meantime, the PMC pursued its own, Eurocentric agenda. The PMC's classificatory distinction between A-, B- and C-Mandates – according to the civilizational status of their population – hid the fact that the PMC's policy differed from mandate to mandate. The PMC's policy reveals a much more refined diversity of agendas, varying according to "necessities" in Europe. Thus, the PMC urged the British in their Palestinian mandate to cooperate with the Zionist movement to "establish a national home" and to "encourage the intensified establishment of the Jews on the country's territory, including the state domain and the uncultivated lands." A new legal code should provide the basis for an "agrarian system" that helped to "foster intense colonization and intensive cultivation of the land."[173] In Syria and Lebanon, France was supposed to manage and pacify the different ethno-religious clans while protecting the cultural autonomy of (Christian) minorities in particular.[174] In its Nauru mandate, Australia was to ensure the exploitation of phosphates.[175] Pushing back German influence in the former German colonies was a priority in the aftermath of the First World War, ignoring the interest of Germanophile natives, who repeatedly petitioned the PMC to restore German rule.[176] This diversity of mandate policies was not dictated by the facts on the ground. It was a consequence of official instructions given by the League of Nations to the mandatory powers, which diluted the "humanitarian" mission of respecting the native needs and interests. Compared to the ICI, the PMC's agenda was rather Eurocentric.

No ICI experts on customary law and indigenous culture joined the PMC (with the exception of Frederick Lugard, although he can hardly be qualified as an expert on customary law). Some of them were employed by the League, but in commissions detached from the mandates section. Maurice Delafosse and Albrecht Gohr, two renowned experts in indigenous culture, law and policy, joined the League's temporary slavery commission that drafted the 1926 Slavery Convention. ICI experts in international law, like Édouard Descamps, John Basset Moore and Willem van Eysinga, joined the International Courts affiliated to the League. Instead of affiliating him to the PMC, the League sent the German Arabist C.H. Becker to East Asia, where he studied the Chinese education system but could not make use of his specialization on Islam in Africa.[177] And the most eminent European experts in Islamic and customary law,

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[173] C. 529. M. 314. 1922 VI SDN, Mandat pour la Palestine, Geneve, 12 aout 1922, 3-5.
[174] "Mandate for Syria and Lebanon", Art. 8, in: C P M 466 / C. 529 M. 314 1922 VI/ C. 667 M. 396. 1922 VI.
[175] Procès-Verbal de la Onzième Session tenue à Genève, du 20 juin au 6 juillet 1927 (y compris les Rapport de la Commission au Conseil), 20.
[176] The "Bund der Deutschen Togoländer" sent five petitions in this regard up to 1927: Procès-Verbal de la Onzième Session tenue à Genève, du 20 juin au 6 juillet 1927 (y compris les Rapport de la Commission au Conseil), 41-42 ; see also Florian Wagner, 'Regards croisés sur le Togo. Les enjeux du débat franco-allemand dans l'entre-deux guerres (1919-1939)', *Recherche en Anthropologie et en Histoire de l'Afrique* 25 (Winter 2007-2008), 65-77.
[177] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A: 156: Becker to Snouck Hurgronje, from 22.7.1931.

Snouck and Vollenhoven, who cautiously called for autonomy of the colonized, were not taken into consideration at all.

Thus, the mandatory system failed in perpetuating the "native policy" and bringing it to a conclusive end. By re-introducing the civilizing mission, the settler privilege and abolitionary intervention as justification for colonization, it fell back to older patterns. Up to the First World War, ICI experts had tried to use the language of the "natives" to substantiate colonial rule. As we have seen, ethnographers and orientalists studied indigenous customs and used them as arguments to justify colonial rule, exploitation and dispossession. This strategy proved fairly successful. The invention and manipulation of customary law with anthropological methods had increased both the efficiency and the legitimacy of colonial rule. Close and personal cooperation with indigenous elites made up an essential part of the colonial expertise of the Dutch Arabist Snouck-Hugronje. The PMC, instead, still used questionnaires to gather information and refused a dialogue by imposing communication via petition on the colonized.[178] As we have seen, PMC members were officially forbidden to travel to the mandate territories, fearing that such a trip might lead to a biased view and a loss of neutrality. Instead, they received their no less biased information from colonial administrations, filtered beforehand by local administrators in the mandates.[179]

Which role did the "native policy" play for colonial rule in the interwar period? Was the PMC less successful than the ICI, because it did not employ experts on the populations inhabiting the territories it ruled? By the end of the First Word War, the outcome of the native legal policy and the codification of native customs were contingent on one another. An ICI debate on colonial legislation in 1921 illustrates this contingency. The debate anticipated two consequences of native policy, which were situated on the opposite ends of a wide range of possible outcomes. Each extreme position had its spokesman. Henri Rolin, a young jurist from Belgium and theorist of the mandates, concluded that the codification of indigenous customs resulted in the creation of native reserves and racial segregation.[180] Cornelis van Vollenhoven, the restless compiler of adat law, took the opposite stance. He did not dare to pronounce the word independence even if he strongly advocated it. The debate was a showdown, from which Van Vollenhoven emerged the winner.[181]

Henri Rolin's argument was simple: In line with the ICI's credo that "natives" can only survive and develop within their own milieu, he argued that this milieu had to be maintained at

[178] On the petitions and their deficiencies see Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 87-95.
[179] Ibid., 212.
[180] See his 'Rapport de M. H. Rolin sur les mandats internationaux', *Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International* 34,1 (1928), 33-134.
[181] See the discussion in ICI, *Compte Rendu 1921*.

any cost. At the same time, European settlers in colonies like South Africa, Rhodesia and Belgian Congo could not be ignored. Europeans needed land and occasionally access to mining areas to exploit the colony. Inevitably, Rolin continued, Europeans and the indigenous merchants entered into commercial contact, which made it impossible to maintain separate laws for each group.[182] But legal Europeanization might result in a mortal shock for the natives, he continued, because they were alienated from their customary milieu. The only way to solve the problem was to create reserves in which the colonized might live according to their own rules: "natives grew tired of the constraints that European law imposed on them…we have to stop bothering them…the only way to achieve this purpose is to create reserves."[183] As a Belgian, Rolin recommended the racist and segregationist South African Natives Land Act from 1913, which had introduced the Apartheid system, for imitation in the Belgian Congo.

Unlike Rolin, Van Vollenhoven claimed that codification of customary law had to be undertaken by the colonized themselves. He admitted that European codification of native law was inevitably Eurocentric. Thus, for the sake of authenticity, indigenous scholars had to codify their own laws. This was the lesson Van Vollenhoven had learned from a decade of collecting *adat* law. His program was original: while other colonial powers granted self-government to the colonized – who were only allowed to execute the administrators' ordinances – Van Vollenhoven promoted self-legislation.[184] According to him, self-legislation equaled sovereignty under one condition: if native law entered into conflict with European law, priority had always to be given to the former. Once priority was given to the self-legislated native law, they achieved full sovereignty. Van Vollenhoven's program should "exclusively" serve indigenous interests. Presenting his ideas at the 1921 session of the ICI, Van Vollenhoven's claim for exclusivity divided the members of the ICI.

Van Vollenhoven's plea for self-legislation came close to a call for independence. Legislative autonomy inevitably resulted in a shift of sovereignty from the colonizers to the colonized. Contradicting Rolin, Van Vollenhoven wanted to create "reserves for Europeans" instead of "reserves for natives."[185] In Van Vollenhoven's scheme, the colonized should choose the territory and draw the borders of these reserves. In the colonies, he argued, Europeans were on foreign territory, and had to respect the "national cultures" of the Annamites, Indonesians, Hindus, Malagasy, Sudanese, and Algerians.[186] Their respective national laws, he argued, were the cradle of a right to a nation. During the ICI debate, French *indigenophile* Maurice Delafosse

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[182] Ibid., 138.
[183] Ibid., 88.
[184] Ibid., 133-4.
[185] Ibid., 133-34.
[186] Ibid., 131.

"agreed entirely with M. Van Vollenhoven", adding that the Central Africans were as civilized as Indonesians, and should be granted at least legal autonomy. According to Delafosse, every civilization should be allowed to make and to implement its own laws. But he refused absolute segregation. If Africans wanted to incorporate elements of European law, he claimed, they might do so. In any case, it was important that *they* decided on the implementation of European laws and not someone else: "*C'est leur droit, c'est leur affaire*." The future, Van Vollenhoven concluded, did not belong to "one civilization but to several civilizations."[187] The Institute's *spiritus rector* Chailley – who was always quick at condemning settler colonialism and assimilation schemes as anachronistic – endorsed Van Vollenhoven's view and evoked the "universal hypocrisy" of any assimilating civilizing mission.[188]

Henri Rolin found support with the Dutch Emanuel Moresco and the Belgian Félicien Cattier. They criticized Van Vollenhoven's dictum of exclusivity that gave absolute priority to native interests over European interests. Cattier, in the tradition of the Congo Free State, evoked the "interest of the *État colonisateur*" that cannot be abandoned. Grasping the very consequence of Van Vollenhoven's reasoning, Cattier tried to make clear that Van Vollenhoven's attitude meant "the complete negation of the very principle of colonization. Never in history had such a negation been realized. It will never be realized."[189] Van Vollenhoven and Rolin started from the same idea but came to diametrically opposed conclusions. Rolin advocated legal reserves for the indigenous population to bring about racial segregation. Van Vollenhoven recommended forcing back the Europeans in order to bring about legislative autonomy. Both had followers.

In the interwar period, an important section of ICI members pronounced themselves in favor of legislative autonomy of indigenous populations that would result in a federal reorganization of empires.[190] Leading among them was the Dutch group of ICI experts on customary law, consisting of Van Vollenhoven (the *adat* law expert), Ph. Kleintjes (an expert on Indian constitutional law), J.H. Carpentier-Alting (a specialist of the customary law of the Manado residence in Dutch Sulawesi), and Snouck-Hurgronje. In the Netherlands, this group was known as the Oppenheim-Committee that drafted a new constitution, which should turn the Dutch empire into a federal state with legal autonomy and a certain degree of self-

[187] Ibid., 149.
[188] Ibid., 133 and 157.
[189] "la négation de l'idée même de la colonisation. Jamais l'histoire n'a connu la realisation de ces idées. Jamais elle ne les réalisera": ICI, *Compte Rendu 1921*, 154.
[190] The Dutch Indies were a case in point. A first step was taken by granting municipal and local autonomy with the inlanders being subject to their own *adat* law while they could be elected as members of the *Volksraad.* Ideas how to organize the metropole-colony relations oscillated between dominion-status and a "Holland overseas"; see for example D.A. De Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy* vol. 2 (The Hague, 1931), 128.

government in an elected *Volksraad*. The Oppenheim-Committee proposed calling the population of its East Indian colony "Indonesians" and give them an autonomous but equal status with the Dutch in Europe. Although the constitution as a whole was not applied in the Dutch colonies, some regions received legal and administrative autonomy and elected their own representatives.[191] Snouck, who had always been an advocate of restricted autonomy for the colonized, also criticized the League of Nations for being at the center of a regressive effect in the universal history of colonialism.

According to Snouck, the League of Nations' agenda repeated in many regards the stipulation of the Congo Act from 1884/5: both portrayed colonial expansion as a humanitarian intervention to fight the slave trade. Both promoted the protection of the colonized in theory but failed to realize it in practice. Both were launched by sovereign nations to arbitrate international conflicts in colonies. Both ended up dividing the non-Western world among the Western powers. Both had therefore a political mission and not a scientific one, such as the ICI. According to Snouck, the League of Nations was no more than a déjà-vu for the colonizers and a perpetuated nightmare for the colonized.

First of all, Snouck criticized the League's combat against the slave trade as an alibi for colonial expansion. Already in the 1880s, he had explained that Stanley's "anti-slavery rage" was ridiculous. It helped to portray Stanley as a hero of humanity.[192] His purpose, however, was land-grabbing and occupation. According to Snouck, the League's Anti-Slavery Commission, which had been established in 1921 and stipulated an Anti-Slavery Convention in 1926, had failed in two ways: on the one hand, it continued the "old" colonialism by using the Eurocentric argumentation of the last fifty years. Their arguments were an apology of colonialism. On the other hand, they did not at all respect native customary law and society, which knew and cherished various forms of "soft slavery."

Snouck went beyond these analogies and attacked the League in his famous lecture at Leiden University in 1923, which was republished in journals all over the world – and made him a *persona non grata* for European colonial governments. In his address, Snouck explained that unlike Europeans, Islam did not distinguish between races. He referred to the Qur'an (XLIX: 10-13), which stipulated that all men were created equal, descended from the same parents and were therefore "brothers." A hadith dating back to Muhammad confirmed this and

[191] J. Oppenheim headed the official comittee: J. Oppenheim, J.H. Carpentier-Alting, P. Kleintjes, C.H. Snouck Hurgronje, and C. van Vollenhoven, *Proeve Van Eese Staatsregeling Voor Nederlandsch-Indie* (Leiden, 1922); D. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State* (London, 2014), 20.The Oppenheim Comittee is not mentioned in J.L. Foray, 'A Unified Empire of Equal Parts. The Dutch Commonwealth Schemes of the 1920s–40s', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, 2 (2013), 259–284.
[192] Snouck to Nöldeke from 25.4.1891, Koningsveld, *Orientalism and Islam*, 27.

added that there is no superiority of the Arabs: “An Arab is not at all superior to a non-Arab, unless he is more pious.” This “admirable unity and its assimilative power are unique to Islam,” Snouck concluded. It resulted in an “honest league of peoples based on the principle of the equality of human races.”[193]

Criticizing settler colonies, Snouck continued that European Christians should be ashamed of the color bars established in the Americas and in South Africa by whites. Racial segregation, he claimed, was the main obstacle to a veritable “peace of the races,” like it could be found in Islamic anti-racism.[194] He dismissed the “League of Nations, which built on a fictive divergence of political interests” and advocated a “League of Races” to “assure peace and tranquility for the entire humanity.” Every human group would send delegates there. Even earlier, Snouck had tried to realize his dreams by co-organizing the Universal Races Congress in London in 1911, which celebrated the “unity of humanity.”[195]

Already before the First World War, many of the ICI members had participated in the Universal Races Congress, among them Chailley, Snouck and Abendanon who gave a speech on global trade in intoxicants and opium, a topic he had already treated thoroughly in the ICI.[196] The Universal Races Congress was not necessarily anti-racist and certainly not anti-colonial. Snouck himself accepted the existence of different races but turned against “the prerogative of the ‘superiority’ of any race.”[197] The congress had brought together representatives from Europe, but also invited delegates from colonized territories and Panafrican movements. The purpose of the congress was a better understanding and peaceful cooperation between the “so-called ‘white’ and so-called ‘colored’ races.” The participation of the ICI members does not make them anti-colonialists or anti-racists. But it revealed that they considered cooperation with the ‘natives’ an essential part of their colonial expertise.

While criticizing South African racist segregation and its toleration by the PMC, Snouck followed Van Voellenhoven in emphasizing the need to restructure colonial rule on a cooperative basis.[198] In 1921, he proclaimed that “with regard to these [colonized] people we have reached the moment of emancipation.”[199] His ICI colleague Heinrich Becker also complained about those colonizers whose views were dominated by racism [*Rassendünkel*] and

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[193] Snouck Hurgronje, ‘L'Islam’: 419-421
[194] Ibid., 426.
[195] Ibid.: 428.
[196] Interracial International, *Program. First Universal Races Congress =Premier Congrès universel des races. University of London, July 26-29, 1911* (London 1911), 6; J.H. Abendanon, ‘Traffic in Intoxicants and Opium’, in G. Spiller (ed.), *Papers on inter-racial problems. Communicated to the first Universal Races Congress, held at the University of London, July 26-29, 1911* (London, 1911), 324–327.
[197] Snouck to Nöldecke from 23.2.1921, in Koningsveld, *Orientalism and Islam*, 287.
[198] See on South Africa and the League of Nations A. Vandenbosch, *South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid* (Lexington, 2015), 93; For the discussion on South Africa, see Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 112-139.
[199] Snouck Hurgronje, ‘L'Islam’ 429.

their conquistadors' perspective [*Conquistadorenstandpunkt*]. Sticking to the sharp distinction between races, he added, was an "obstacle to veritable colonial progress" because cooperation was grounded in the creation of an upper class that was European.[200] Against all critics, Snouck insisted that miscegenation and a sort of federal organization between metropole and colony was the only way to bring about "progress".[201] His notion of emancipation did not necessarily entail independence, but rather a federal organization between motherland and colony based on the equality of races.

According to those ICI members, the PMC stood in the way of this progress because it revived settler colonialism, conquest and racial segregation. ICI members, especially those who promoted legal autonomy, criticized its support for racist policies in South Africa and for segregation in Palestine.[202] In the PMC, specialists on native policies were rare at a time when Van Vollenhoven and some other ICI members drafted a trans-colonial study on native policies.[203] Although the PMC profited from the preliminary work of the ICI, it did not take up its schemes of a collaborative native policy and rehabilitated settler colonial schemes.[204]

The outcome of the ICI's focus on native policy, however, was hard to predict. While it served to call for autonomy within the colonies it also became an argument for segregationist policies in settler colonies and helped to take land away from the colonized. Therefore, native policy was not "better" or "worse" than any other colonial policy, but a more sophisticated way of perpetuating colonial policies. According to predominantly Dutch colonial experts, this would soon result in increased native autonomy and a more federal relation between colonizers and colonized. In this regard, the PMC lagged behind the imagination of colonial cooperation in the ICI.

The ICI from the "Turning Point of Colonial History" in San Francisco to Decolonization

Following the turbulences of the Second World War, Pierre Orts, who had been a leading member in both the PMC and the ICI, was confronted with a new world order. The League of Nations had vanished and with it the PMC. Orts mourned the end of the PMC and

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[200] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A141, Letter from Becker to Snouck from 1.1.1909.
[201] ULCSH, Or. 8952 A146, Letter from Becker to Snouck from 13.01.1913.
[202] Apart from Snouck, this was also Louis Massignon, an Arabist who had studied at the Al-Azhar turned against the colonization of Palestine, Morocco and Algeria, if not against colonies in general: 'Parole donné 1983', cit. in *F. Pouillon Dictionnaire des orientalistes de langue française* (Paris, 2008), 661; there was, however, also the anti-liberal group of Portuguese and Italian members who held a very different opinion.
[203] ICI, *Compte Rendu* 1931 (Paris, 1931), 11.
[204] On the League and Settler Colonialism, see S. Pedersen, 'Settler Colonialism at the Bar of the League of Nations', in C. Elkins and S. Pedersen (eds.), *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies* (New York, 2005), 113–134.

had a hard time accepting its predecessor, the United Nations. As a colonial expert, he was invited to attend the founding assembly of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. For Orts, this assembly marked the beginning of a new era of anti-colonialism that he rejected. As shown above, Pierre Orts and Octave Louwers saw the ICI as the last institution that would save the colonial idea.

A phrase haunted Orts that he had overheard at the founding assembly of the UN: "The colonies are no more." It was the British foreign minister who heralded the news at the assembly that was held in San Francisco to adopt the Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco turned into Orts' personal trauma. He qualified the statement as "a bad joke" and causing a "heartache." The term trusteeship replaced the word colony in the three chapters of the charter that were dedicated to the colonies. "They did not even maintain the mandate as an expression," Orts lamented "because this word seems to call the League of Nations to mind, which suddenly no statesman wants to remember…even if he once signed its covenant with pride." [205] Orts did remember it, but this was to his disadvantage: he was cut out from drafting new regulations for the colonies. He was disappointed that neither he himself, as "the last official of the former mandates section", nor any other PMC member had been invited to co-draft the new trusteeship system. "Although there is no direct and automatic transfer of powers from the League to the UN, it is nevertheless necessary to make a connection between the mandate and the tutelage."[206] But the UN turned Orts down, and one of the most active and experienced colonial experts was denied collaboration in the new international organization.

Pierre Orts declared San Francisco the radical turning point of colonial history, which was now retold from an anti-colonial point of view.[207] In San Francisco, there were only four colonial powers – the Netherlands, Great Britain, France and Belgium – while the other fifty-four delegates showed anti-colonial tendencies. Confronted with representatives from the anti-colonial countries, Orts felt like "being in the prisoner's box and faced with a tribunal that was completely closed to the arguments of the defense. There, I heard the initial death toll of modern colonization."[208] In the UN, the world was turned upside down and it was only a small consolation for Orts that a truly democratic "world parliament" had been removed from the agenda.[209]

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[205] AGRB, Papiers Orts I 184, 388 Extraits de presse 1899-1958, *Le Quotidien* (20.6.1946).
[206] "Bien que dans le domaine des mandats, il n'y aura pas de transfert direct et automatique des fonctions de la Société à l'Organisation des Nations Unies, il est toutefois nécessaire, dans une certaine mesure, de 'faire la liaison' entre mandats et tutelle": AGRB, Papiers Orts I 184, SDN to Orts from 15.5.1946.
[207] P. Orts, 'La Charte de San Francisco. Un tournant de la colonisation', *Revue Coloniale (belge)* 46, 16 (1946), 1–8.
[208] AGRB, I 184 Fonds Pierre Orts, 389: Souvenirs de ma Carrière, 199: "J'eus l'impression d'occuper le boxe du prévenu en face d'un tribunal fermé aux arguments de la défense. J'ai entendu le premier coup de glas de la colonisation moderne."
[209] AGRB, Papiers Orts I 184, 388 Extraits de presse 1899-1958, *Le Quotidien* (20.6.1946).

A significant step had been taken in the UN charter, which seemed to echo the standpoint of the progressive ICI members. It stipulated that the "interests of the populations that have not yet attained a full measure of self-government" were "paramount." Pierre Orts, for all his disappointment with the UN, celebrated this formulation.[210] The ICI, in particular, had traditionally advocated the formula of the primacy of "native" interests over the interests of the white race, particularly because they knew how to manipulate "native interests." Albert Thys had warned repeatedly that colonization was not only to the profit of the Europeans, but had to be seen in a global context that privileged indigenous interests.[211] Obviously, the Dutch group of legal autonomists in the ICI argued along the same lines. Orts endorsed this attitude and praised Article 73 of the Charter, which stipulated the primacy of indigenous interests: "to have proclaimed this principle gives eternal honor to the authors of the Charter."[212]

As early as 1931, the ICI had seen its attitude confirmed that a colonial order could be legitimized through and with the "interests" of the colonized. In 1931, Blaise Diagne became the first African to speak in front of the ICI, officially representing the French Colonial Ministry. Surprisingly, his appearance did not entail any comment and ICI members did not feel the need to declare his speech a historic moment. After all, Diagne had subscribed to the French colonial agenda and his views were partly more colonialist than the attitude of some ICI members. For Diagne, colonization was a beneficial project and he warned supporters of independence that "once it has been undertaken, no retreat can be thought of."[213] It was him who had convinced the French Parliament that Africans in the Quatre Communes in Senegal could easily be French citizens while they kept their Islamic personal status.[214] This attitude was in accordance with the predominantly Dutch group in the ICI that wanted to combine legal autonomy with a federal organization of the Dutch empire.

After the Second World War, the new Institut International des Civilisations Différentes (INCIDI, formerly ICI) also adopted a stance that advocated autonomy but initially denied independence. A federation between the motherland and the colonies was deemed the best way to create a "community of ideas and interests" and the most efficient way to guarantee the economic development of these countries. The autonomist attitude was therefore not anti-colonialist. The federal organization of the motherland-colony complex imposed itself after the world war, when INCIDI members hoped that the colonial subjects would become citizens and

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[210] AGRB, Papiers Orts I 184, 388 Extraits de presse 1899-1958, *Le Soir* (Jeudi 31.1.1946).
[211] ICI, *Comtpe Rendu 1904,* 241.
[212] AGRB, Papiers Orts I 184, 388 Extraits de presse 1899-1958, *Le Soir* (Jeudi 31.1.1946).
[213] ICI, *Compte Rendu 1931*, 20.
[214] Obviously, his intervention applied only to the Quatre Communes: Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire*, 16.

gain autonomy "like us but with us."[215] Apart from the British Commonwealth members and dominions of Australia, New Zealand, as well as the South African Union, only one former colony joined the INCIDI in 1949: the so-called United States of Indonesia, regarded by INCIDI leaders as a sort of dominion that governed itself but accepted the Dutch Queen as a head of state. The Indonesian nationalists had not approved of this status proposed by the Dutch queen Wilhelmina in 1942. Nonetheless the INCIDI invited a fictional federal state to participate. When Indonesia officially became an independent state it continued to send representatives to the INCIDI.[216] The independent dominions India and Pakistan joined in 1951, as well as Vietnam, which was represented by one Vietnamese officer who fought with the French army against the Japanese invasion. In the same year, members of the recently founded Assembly of the French Union were accepted to the INCIDI such as Paul Hazoumé from Dahomey. Others, like Léopold Senghor from Sénégal would join shortly after. What all of the non-European INCIDI members had in common was their proven ability to assimilate themselves to European culture without being necessarily collaborators. None of them represented an official independent colony, but a territory that had not completely cut ties with the former motherland and adhered to it in a federal union. This was the case for the British dominions, the "United States of Indonesia," and the members of the French Union.[217]

It is difficult to measure if the Second World War itself was Orts' "turning point" and thus the beginning of the end of the colonial era. While the war led to the independence of countries in Asia, such as India, Pakistan and Indonesia, its consequences in African colonies are less obvious. While erudite historians of Africa have given the war an important role in their accounts of independence movements, [218] more recent case studies and oral history have shown that the African soldiers who returned home did not automatically turn into nationalists and revolutionaries.[219] Nor did they strive to become citizens of the metropole they fought for. The debate if decolonization was a "struggle for independence" caused by the war or a "transfer of power" has not come to a conclusive end.[220] Frederick Cooper has recently argued that the post-war situation was contingent with regard to the future of colonies. No dualism between

[215] AMAEB, Fonds van den Abeele 3663/198 INCIDI, Folder 1 INCIDI 1953-54: Letter from Van Abeele to Wigny from 16.12.1953, 2.

[216] On the Dutch case see: C.L.M. Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonization and Indonesia 1945-1962* (Honolulu, 2002).

[217] On the contingency of the French Union and its organization in the early 1950s see Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 24-66; Africans had the right to vote but were underrepresented in the Union's parliamentary assembly due to a double electoral college system. This did not change until the *Loi Cadre* granted universal suffrage in 1956.

[218] Crowder, *Cambridge History of Africa,* 31 and 97.

[219] A. Jackson, *Botswana 1939-1945: An African Country at War* (Oxford, 1999), 3-4.

[220] See on the topics of citizenship and nationalism T. Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca and London, 2006), 4 and 45-50.

imperialism and independence dominated the debates, but both sides imagined a range of possibilities of how to reorganize the relations between metropole and colony in federations or confederations.[221]

The former ICI's approach was pragmatic and ultimately reconciled with the agenda of the United Nation. Its strategy was to broaden its agenda and to apply colonial patterns of thinking to the entire "Third World." Meeting in 1947, the delegates decided to maintain the ICI because it "still has to perform a function that is highly meritorious, and even necessary." However, the term colonial disappeared from its name, in accordance with the re-labelling of post-War colonial institutions as "overseas" institutions. For a short period, they called it the Institut International des Sciences Politiques et Sociales Appliquées (1949-1954). For practical reasons, its members adopted the name Institut International des Civilisations Différentes in 1954. The proclaimed aim of the INCIDI was to study and understand the societies of those countries where "peoples of differing civilizations" had "made contact." To assist other civilizations in developing their economy and administration for self-government in their own way was the second aim.[222] This formula of a contact zone between "different civilizations" was probably the most elegant way to allude to a colonial situation without calling it colonial. Although the INCIDI did not deny its ICI past, members emphasized that civilizations were different but equal and moreover internally complex.[223] According to them, the use of the plural of *civilizations* spoke for itself. The INCIDI's new president endorsed this view: "We have to go beyond our field of research and study all those countries where differing civilizations are in contact with each other. We also need a new spirit that presides over those studies, based on a passionate interest for all civilizations and the desire to develop, and now exchange, the valuable things they produced."[224] This programmatic designation coincided with the ICI's program to "broaden its scope and extend the geographical frame to the overseas territories where problems arise from the contact between populations of different [*différentes*] civilizations."[225]

As early as 1949, the INCIDI members understood that independence of the colonies had become more likely and forms of organization other than colonial inevitable.[226]

[221] F. Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation.*
[222] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1949*, XV.
[223] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1949*, 20-21; 27.
[224] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1951*, 146: "Il faut élargir le champ d'études et porter les investigations a tous les pays ou se trouvent en contact des civilisations différentes. Il faut également qu'un ésprit neuf préside à cette étude, basée sur un interet passioné pour toutes les civilisations et la volonté de developer et maintenant d'échanger entre elles ce que chacun possède de valable."
[225] "les pays d'outremer jouissant de l'indépendance, mais où se rencontrent des problèmes soulevés par le contact des populations de civilisations différentes": AMAEB D 4782 (D 89) INCIDI, Réunion Officieuse tenue par l'Institut les 10 et 11 octobre 1947 Session hors cadre.
[226] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1951*, 94-95.

INCIDI members avoided the term colony and its morphological derivations in the institute's constitution and during its meetings. Following the practice of the UNO's San Francisco Charter, they spoke of "non-autonomous territories" instead. Once those territories gained independence, INCIDI members called them "emerging states" or "new states," as opposed to the "old states" in Europe. Instead of focusing on colonies, the INCIDI applied its patterns of thinking to the entire "underdeveloped territories" and underlined that the INCIDI "is no more an *Institut Colonial*. From now on, what we found confirmed…for Africa and the colonial territories is also true for those territories in which undeveloped populations live."[227]

While the violence of the Second World War was once more strikingly absent from the INCIDI's debates, its members celebrated new initiatives of economic development that were an indirect consequence of the war. The INCIDI followed development efforts closely and reported in its new journal *Civilisations* on the British Development and Welfare Act (1940), the French FIDES program (1946), and the Belgian investments after the war.[228] Dating from 1949, Truman's declaration to provide technical assistance to underdeveloped countries to win their hearts and support in the global struggle against the Soviet Union became a much cited phrase in the INCIDI.[229] They applied Truman's doctrine to all underdeveloped territories with the purpose of "developing internal commerce by developing production with better qualified local labor, by raising the standards of living of the consumers and consequently, by stabilizing an economy thus rendered less dependent on foreign trade."[230] Truman's program was not mere rhetoric. France, in particular, benefitted from US support. The Marshall Plan provided substantial funding for development projects in the French colonies. Fifty-one million dollars were reserved for Algeria, along with special loans that were used to buy machines, fight land erosion, fund the *sociétés de prévoyance*, and save Algerian wine production from ruin. The money was also used to conduct research for resources such as copper and petrol in the Sahara.[231] Another thirty million went to French West Africa. Officially, the focus of the development programs like the later FIDES was first and foremost on technical assistance and infrastructure programs. They were supposed to improve and expand agricultural production, finance research for more efficient exploitation of resources, and introduce professional education.

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[227] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1951,* 105: "dès lors, ce qui a été confirmé aujourd'hui plus particulièrment pour l'Afrique et les territoires coloniaux, vaut pour tous les territoires où se trouvent des populations nondeveloppées."
[228] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1951,* 163-220 and 105; For the FIDES program and its failure see M. Atangana, *French Investment in Colonial Cameroon: The FIDES Era 1946-1957* (New York, 2009);
[229] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1951,* 163.
[230] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1951*, 142.
[231] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1951*, 210-212.

Development, the INCIDI members argued, should not be brought about at any cost. The priority was the integrity of the underdeveloped peoples. Only a thorough knowledge of their culture and traditions would show the way of how to develop them. INCIDI members warned, for example, that attempts at industrialization might alienate them from their natural environment. Faced with a rising labor movement, they recommended avoiding proletarianization and unnecessary displacement through labor migration.[232] Agriculture, not industrialization, should be the key to a harmonious development, a credo that the ICI/INCIDI maintained throughout its existence. With regard to agriculture, INCIDI members explained, underdeveloped peoples were often well aware of how to cultivate their fields without exhausting them. Intervention by Europeans and the shift from family cultivation to mass production had often brought about erosion.[233] Consequently, the developers had to study people, methods and environment of the countries that should be developed. Acting with precipitation, they cautioned, could therefore have the opposite effect. What was more, the INCIDI's aim was to bring technology without touching upon culture.[234] For that reason, they appreciated that extensive development programs like the FIDES or the Development and Welfare Act spent much money on sending scientific commissions to the overseas territories before proceeding to action.

Against this background it is not surprising that INCIDI members subscribed to Article 73 of the San Francisco Charter of the United Nations, which stipulated that in "territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government…the interests of the inhabitants…are paramount." Rather than merely accepting this principle, the INCIDI members claimed to have invented this principle when they had been members of the ICI.[235] The INCIDI styled itself as an institution that had always "defended the rights and interests of the indigenous [*autochtones*] peoples."[236] The main reason behind this attitude was the notion of protecting and preserving native populations as potential workers and administrators.

Unsurprisingly, the ultimate objective of conservation of foreign cultures and traditions resulted in a close cooperation with UNESCO. As early as 1949, delegates of UNESCO attended ICI sessions and tried to win its leaders over for the project of studying and codifying the linguistic and cultural heritage of people in underdeveloped and non-autonomous territories, as they called it. The INCIDI hoped to receive funding from UNESCO and agreed to

[232] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1951*, 142.
[233] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1949,* 93.
[234] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1949*,
[235] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1949*, 14-15.
[236] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1949*, 9.

cooperate.[237] Thus, a permanent representative of UNESCO participated in the ICI's meetings. In a paternalistic approach both institutions proposed setting up "an international agency to explore, conserve and spread the understanding" of the past and culture of those countries that had recently become independent but could not yet do that themselves.[238] The ICI also intended to participate in alphabetization campaigns.[239]

From now on, the ICI not only focused on the colonized people but on all those who were "underdeveloped". Economic development was the key to this program, and moreover an ideal that the ICI had cherished since the 1890s, when it was the first international institution to propagate the "mise en valeur" of the colonies.[240] In the early 1950s, the full developmental program of the ICI unfolded. It drafted a convention on *International Obligations in Development Assistance*, which held that the "underdeveloped" populations had a moral obligation to develop "mainly through their own efforts" and therefore acquired a moral right to assistance and to "be helped" by the developed countries. This stipulation engendered debates that resembled the interwar debate on the obligation to work. One member warned that the "conception of 'moral rights' is a difficult and dangerous one. If underdeveloped countries must be developed, it must be mainly through their own efforts; to give them the idea that they have a moral right to be helped might encourage them to sit down and do nothing."[241] After all, the colonized had the duty to take "measures of self-help" and should be forced to do so if they failed to do it by themselves.

The methodological repertoire to bring about development resembled the prerogatives of the colonial period: increasing production, stopping the subsistence economy, abolishing nomadism and unprofitable sizes of holdings, fragmentation, and insecurity of tenure. A "codification of customary agriculture" was deemed necessary to use and modify the customs from within to the benefit of a capitalist mode of production.[242] To achieve all these goals rapidly, "compulsory organization such as the Société de Prévoyance" was preferable to purely voluntary cooperative organization.[243] The economic development also required some political

[237] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1949*, 160-161; 163.
[238] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1949*, 41-47.
[239] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1951*, 67.
[240] AMAEB D 4782 (D 89) INCIDI, Réunion Officieuse tenue par l'Institut les 10 et 11 octobre 1947 Session hors cadre; ibid. Fonds van den Abeele 3663/ 198 INCIDI, Folder 1 INCIDI 1953-54: Van Abeele (general administrator of colonies) to Inspecteur Royale des colonies Vanhove from 15.4.1954.
[241] AMAEB, Fonds van den Abeele 3663/ 198 INCIDI, Folder 1 INCIDI 1953-54, Session de la Haye, 7-10.9.1953, Séance 'Économie Rurale'.
[242] AMAEB, Fonds van den Abeele 3663/198 INCIDI, Folder 1 INCIDI 1953-54, "Le relèvement rural en fonction de notre connaissance de la coutume agricole par P. de Schlippé"
[243] AMAEB, Fonds van den Abeele 3663/198 INCIDI, Folder 1 INCIDI 1953-54, W. H. Beckett, General Report on Rural economy Document de travail pour la 28e session d'études de l'INDCIDI, The Hague 7.-10.9.1953.

measures, like marketing boards, resettlement schemes, and the creation of a middle class that was "primarily economic and social, rather than political."[244]

To put those plans into practice, the INCIDI could not rely on the aged colonial powers anymore. By the mid-1950s, the colonizers realized that the high costs of development policies would ruin their own economy. The INCIDI developed two strategies to replace the colonial developers. On the one hand, it invited the elite of the new independent states to join the INCIDI. INCIDI ideologists set their hope in the middle classes of the underdeveloped countries who should become the driving force behind development projects. On the other hand, it further internationalized the INCIDI by inviting non-colonial but economically strong powers to send delegates. Thus, Germany and Japan had a comeback as INCIDI members in 1954.

Although the INCIDI was not a driving force behind independence, its members were quick at accepting the *faits accomplis* of over thirty independence declarations between 1950 and 1965. As early as 1949, the INCIDI had changed its constitution to select members among any nationality "with disregard to race or gender" [*membres choisis parmi les personnes de toute nationalité, sans distinction ni de race ni de sexe*] who were knowledgeable in the field of contact between civilizations.[245] The INCIDI proclaimed to "open its doors" to all new and independent states.[246] The turning point was the 1961 meeting, when representatives from the new member states Cameroon, Congo, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Tunisia participated in the debates. In 1963, delegates came from Algeria, Congo-Léopoldville, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Upper Volta, India, Iran, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, the United Arab Republic, Madagascar, Ruanda, Senegal, Singapore, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Uganda, and Vietnam. Although Europeans – represented by Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom – were still the main instigators of the ICI, they provided a platform for the young, independent states.

In 1963, after the independence of former colonies had become the norm rather than the exception, the INCIDI jumped on the bandwagon: it appropriated the achievements of the independence movements by claiming the liberation struggle for itself. European INCIDI members agreed with non-Europeans not to mention that those struggles had been brought about by violence. In the ICI's publications, the phrase "to overthrow the colonial power" was substituted by "secured the end of colonial status" throughout the texts. Headed predominantly

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[244] AMAEB, Fonds van den Abeele 3663/ 198 INCIDI; Folder 2 INCIDI 1955-56-57 Ivor Bulmer-Thomas, Development of a middle class in tropical and sub-tropical countries, Working Paper for the 29th Study Session of the INCIDI, London 13.-16.9.1955.

[245] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1949,* XVII.

[246] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1949*, 10.

by Europeans but assembling the intellectual elite of the new independent states, the INCIDI congress of 1963 would be the "prolongation of your [the formerly colonized] preceding historical meetings, in particular the congress of Bandoeng…which gave expression to your sense of international solidarity; the congresses of Paris and Rome, where black writers and artists from all continents engaged in memorable debates; as well as the congress recently held in Addis Abeba where the idea of the African peoples to unite was born."[247] Establishing a continuity between anti-colonial congresses was the main strategy in rewriting the INCIDI's history as an anti-colonial history.160 participants from thirty-four countries participated in the congress, among them around forty delegates from former colonies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

The main concern of the post-independence INCIDI was to professionalize the training of indigenous administrators and to create "cadres", "elites" and "leaders" in all fields: administration, medicine, courts, and entrepreneurship.[248] The INCIDI analyzed the constitutions and administrations of the newly-founded states in its 1963 session. It invited representatives of the new independent states to outline constitutional changes and administrative efforts made in their countries. The main problems they identified were that the new states were nation-states without nationalism, and characterized by multi-ethnicity. Only a strong central state or a federal system could guarantee stability, they concluded, often to the detriment of democracy.[249] In their terminology, the "new states" or "emerging states" had a lesson to learn from "the older states" with regard to "efficiency [and their] ability to rally the mass of citizens around governments in respect for national laws."[250] The overall purpose of the INCIDI, however, remained the same. The stability of the new states should serve the shared purpose of economic development: "Without stable institutions, there is no state. Without state there is no organized development."[251] But the INCIDI's financial means to realize such plans were more restricted than ever.

Given the lack of funding, the INCIDI reinvented itself as a scientific institution that combined anthropological knowledge, sociological analysis and economic expertise to contribute to the state-building and development of the so-called third world.[252] While it continued to be a hub of exchange in the 1960s, the paternalistic attitude of the Europeans in the INCIDI was barely concealed. Delegates from the new states had been enthusiastic to join

[247] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1963*, 13-14.
[248] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1951*, 86.
[249] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1963*, 602-603.
[250] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1963*, 5.
[251] INCIDI, *Compte Rendu 1963,* 11.
[252] Institut International des Civilisations Différentes, *Les agglomérations urbaines dans les pays du Tiers monde: leur rôle politique, social, et économique* (Brussels, 1971).

the INCIDI in the beginning but they soon realized that it had little to offer to the independent states but theoretical knowledge. The latter turned to more powerful institutions who had a say in international politics and were endowed with more ample financial possibilities. Other international institutions had appropriated the INCIDI's development discourse.

At the same time, the INCIDI's members had a hard time accepting the modernity of the new states. Until the 1960s, the INCIDI advised against the industrialization of underdeveloped countries and recommended agricultural progress as the only solution. It remained skeptical to industrialization and the effects of urbanization. This programmatic consistency and continuity from the beginnings of the ICI in the 1890s to the INCIDI of the 1960s would ultimately be the nail in its coffin. While it was reformist and progressive until the 1950s, the new states did not need its paternalism anymore, especially because the INCIDI had no financial incentives to be of a concrete help to them. After 1945, only the Belgian and the French governments had been left to finance the institute. Other powers were not interested anymore and the new states even less. In the 1960s, the meetings declined in frequency and the last one was held in 1971. The INCIDI was liquidated in 1982 for lack of resources. Its journal *Civilisations* persists until today and is dedicated to anthropological and sociological research concerning the so-called Third World.[253]

Conclusion: The ICI and the Way to Colonial Modernity

Inspired by utilitarian ideas and humanitarian argumentations, most of the ICI members advocated the introduction of capitalism into Africa as early as the 1890s, to build a colonial economy based on indigenous labor. According to the ICI, the introduction of capitalism and free labor was only possible if enforced by the colonizing powers during a transition phase. This led the ICI to support an active developmental policy, including the international organization of labor recruitment, the introduction of a reliable currency and the establishment of agricultural credit banks. The attitude of its members oscillated between a paternalist protectionism and an enforced turn to a European market economy. Their arguments would be repeated over and over again. They reappeared when debating the ILO's international convention against forced labor and even during the allegedly post-colonial era of development policy in the so-called Third World.

Despite the PMC's ambitions to improve the situation for colonial subjects, its emancipative repertoire fell behind the schemes of ICI members to grant legal autonomy within

[253] P. Pétit, ' Éditorial' in *Civilisations. Revue Internationale d'anthropologie et des sciences humaines* 51 (2004), 7-8.

a federal imperial organization. The PMC lacked both expertise and determination to change the paradigms of colonial policy along those lines or in favor of the indigenous peoples. Moreover, the PMC's ideology was a recycled version of the ICI's pre-war justifications of colonial rule. The mandatory mission, to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants" had been a much repeated phrase since it had been stipulated by the Congo Act in 1884/5.[254] At the same time, colonial theorists and administrators had always presented the colonized with the prospect of imminent independence – but never had the intention of actually granting it to them.[255] To guide "people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" was a self-imposed duty that had always been the most important argument to legitimize colonial expansion.[256]

By the same token, the PMC ignored those ICI members who intended to grant at least legal autonomy to the colonized who should be governed by their self-made laws. The Oppenheim committee, for example, promoted a federal organization based on legal and administrative autonomy that undermined the superiority of the motherland, but did not abolish the colonial order as such. Others used the argument of cultural difference (which often implied racial difference) to argue in favor of racial segregation.

It goes without saying that the ICI was in no way morally "better" than the PMC, nor was it more "advanced" on an imagined linear timeline that had its telos in decolonization. Both the ICI and the PMC advocated forced labor, which they portrayed as legitimate "compulsory labor" that brought about economic development as a "humanitarian" necessity. Both were intrinsically colonialist, in the sense that they promised imminent emancipation in order to perpetuate the status quo, which denied the colonized the fundamental right of self-determination. This paradox of anticipated independence and perpetuated dependence was inherent to both institutions. After all, this colonial paradox was the main attribute of the concept of empire, which was indeed a perpetual promise that was never kept. There is no doubt that the conclusions that individuals in the ICI or PMC drew from the colonial paradox ranged from outright independence to schemes of compulsory labor and forced cultivation. Nevertheless, the perpetuation of colonialism, rather than its abolition, was the overall raison d'être of both the ICI and the PMC.

[254] See for example: BNF Fol. Gw. 628 (1920-22) Société des Nations, Mandat pour le Samoa Allemand, Nauru Allemand, other German Pacific Possesions, German South-West Africa, Article 2.
[255] This was different with mandated territories that had never been colonies before, like Syria or Iraq: C P M 466 / C. 529 M. 314 1922 VI/ C. 667 M. 396. 1922 VI Mandate for Syria and Lebanon: Art 1 "facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent States"; BNF Fol. Gw. 628 (1920-22) Annex 4 Report presented by the Belgian Representative Monsieur Hymans, and adopted by the council of the League of Nations, Meeting at San Sebastian on August 5th, 1920; BNF Fol. Gw. 628 (1920-22) Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
[256] BNF Fol. Gw. 628 (1920-22) Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Also after 1945, the developmental and “soft colonialism” of the INCIDI was a means to perpetuate colonial situations. All in all, the INCIDI made a significant contribution in portraying the non-European world as an underdeveloped world in need of help. Fearing that the UN would be turned into the first “anti-colonialist” international institute, Pierre Orts tried to re-establish the INCIDI to preserve once more “colonial” ideals. The INCIDI perpetuated colonial policies until the late 1950s under the guise of a development policy that applied colonial patterns of thinking to the entire “underdeveloped” world. Its pragmatism led it to accept independence and with it, representatives of formerly colonized countries had a say in its debates. Also after the independence of most former colonies, the INCIDI thought of itself as an expert institution that was superior to others because of its dedication to international knowledge transfers. The new nation-states were accepted as a part of an international epistemic community that could make the world progress through scientific cooperation. While the INCIDI was officially more “international” than “colonial” it perpetuated the reformist paternalism that had been inherent to the ideology of colonial internationalists since 1893.

Conclusion

This dissertation showed why international cooperation among colonial experts emerged in the 1890s, and how it reshaped colonial policies of the twentieth century. The ICI, in particular, gave colonial theory and practice a new direction. While trans-colonial knowledge transfers had always existed – even between pan-nationalist settler societies who created a "global frontier" – the ICI declared colonial internationalism a program and an ideal to aspire to. The ideal colonial expert took advantage of transnational cooperation to bring about the scientification and professionalization of colonial administration. Comparison and knowledge transfers became the two methods of a "colonial science" that produced new technologies to rule and exploit colonies. Apart from making colonial rule more efficient, the de-ideologization of colonialism was instrumental in legitimizing and sustaining colonial rule. Consequently, de-ideologization of colonialism through internationalism and utilitarianism was an ideology by itself. But it was not only an ideology. International exchange and converging discourses brought about a new paradigm of colonial policy. According to this paradigm, well-trained colonial experts should develop colonies with the help of a native workforce instead of sending white settlers to occupy overseas possessions. In the words of an ICI founder Joseph Chailley, natives should be turned into "new colonists" and become co-colonizers who contributed to developing the colonies.

While introducing and spreading the ideal of colonial internationalism and the paradigm of development policy, ICI members were also responsible for trans-colonial transfers of knowledge and technology. Transfers of successfully tested colonial technologies – mostly from older possessions overseas to new colonies in Africa – became a reality. Following the advice of the ICI, colonial governments professionalized the training for colonial administrators to better prepare them for service in the tropics. ICI members played an important role in importing enhanced cash crops, agronomic technologies and entire laboratories from the East Indian colonies to Africa. The codification of native law was a trans-colonial project and resulted in a new science of legal anthropology. Colonial experts exchanged strategies of how to manipulate native and Islamic law for their own purposes. Transnational cooperation among colonial experts on Islam was responsive to the globality of the religion, which was omnipresent in the colonial world. And, finally, colonial experts learned from each other how to efficiently organize the recruitment of labor force, or the monetary and banking system in the colonies. Colonizers from around the world quickly learned to capitalize on the exchange of knowledge

and the transfer of technologies. Transfers improved their performance as colonial experts and equipped them with "expert capital."

Those transfers did not necessarily make colonial rule more efficient. Many transfers and adaptions failed, like the acclimatization of imported cash crop plants. Other transfers had unintended effects, like the acquisition of land by natives in newly established land registers. Even if transfers succeeded, they made life for the native population harder than it had been before. Nevertheless, transfers changed the character of colonialism – theoretically it should become more efficient, but practically this was rarely the case. The endurance of colonial internationalism, however, accounts for its relative success in sustaining colonial rule. Given this success, we have to evaluate the significance of internationalism for the colonial project.

Was internationalism a driving force behind colonialism? Can we add internationalism to the existing theories of imperialism? Can such a theory help us to better understand colonialism? This dissertation answers in the affirmative, even if the "yes" is not unconditional. An international theory of colonialism might have its shortcomings. It is adequate only if combined with other theories. But if we make allowance for the nuances of colonial internationalism, it can help to explain why colonialism emerged and – more importantly – why it lasted so long. We can thus relativize traditional theories without dismissing them completely.

After all, traditional theories of imperialism turned out to be defective. Economic, political and social theories of imperialism often proved wrong if put to the empirical test. For example, even Marxist historians had to admit that capitalists from colonizing societies were reluctant to invest in colonies.[1] Social imperialism – defined as a bourgeois strategy to mitigate social unrest at home by proclaiming a unifying colonial mission overseas – was always a rhetorically powerful concept with few real effects. Nationalism and colonialism were gradually growing apart when the euphoria of the scramble diminished. European politicians did certainly enhance their national prestige by imperial propaganda, but often lost prestige if they wasted their budget on overseas matters instead of funding domestic policies. Moreover, pure nationalists – like French revanchists – quite frequently opposed colonial expansion for nationalist reasons. In all countries, colonial interest groups emerged but remained only one "party" among many. Often, those "colonial enthusiasts" as they were called in Germany, split nations rather than uniting them behind the banner of imperialism. The relationship between

[1] See for example: H. Drechsler, *Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft* (Berlin, 1966); G. Ziebura, 'Interne Faktoren des französischen Hochimperialismus 1871-1914: Versuch einer gesamtgesellschaftlichen Analyse', in W.J. Mommsen (ed.), *Der moderne Imperialismus* (Stuttgart, 1971), 85–139; See also on this topic: J. Stengers, 'Combien le Congo a-t-il coûté à la Belgique?', *Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire Moderne* 54, 11 (1955), 29–40; J. Marseille, *Empire colonial et capitalisme français: Histoire d'un divorce* (Paris, 1989); B. Barth, *Die deutsche Hochfinanz und die Imperialismen: Banken und Aussenpolitik vor 1914* (Stuttgart, 1995).

nationalism and colonialism was put to the test by individual, regional, and international interferences. This dissertation uncovered colonialism's fertile affair with internationalism. A nuanced theory of colonial internationalism helps us to understand the impact of internationalism on colonialism.

It is important to note that colonial internationalism is a theory of colonialism rather than a theory of imperialism. Theories of imperialism have always singled out the *origins* of expansion within a certain European *nation*. Their purpose was to explain why European nations turned into empires and became involved with imperial rivalry. Consequently, historians of imperialism wanted to understand societies in the metropole – rather than the colonial societies at the so-called "periphery."[2] While the *explanandum* of those theories was the imperializing nation in Europe, a theory of colonial internationalism can also explain developments in and between the colonies. Unsurprisingly, a theory of colonial internationalism focuses on the colonial situation as the *explanandum* and not on imperializing societies in the metropole (while nationalism can still be an *explanans* for colonial expansion). This "colonial situation" is a constantly modified relation between colonial administrators, native populations, and trans-colonial agents (like colonial "technicians" who transferred knowledge or theorists who compared empires). With the help of a theory of colonial internationalism, we can understand relations between those actors and the situations they created within a global society.[3]

The analysis of the ICI illustrates this new trans-colonial situation whereas inter-imperial concepts allude to the fact that governments interact and exchange general strategies or repertoires of how to establish or maintain an empire. A trans-colonial approach emphasizes nongovernmental initiatives from below, while a notion of interimperiality highlights governmental interaction from above and a higher degree of rivalry.[4] A theory of colonial internationalism does not exclude those cases of interimperial interaction and transfers but integrates them as a sub-category.

Nevertheless, a theory of colonial internationalism can also expose the international origins of colonialism. The scramble for Africa began because Léopold II of Belgium had organized several international conferences and founded the International African Association

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[2] Also the authors who proclaimed a "New Imperial History" in the 1990s were interested in the imperial cultures of the metropole and the cultural penetration of the periphery into the "center." See, for example, C. Hall and S.O. Rose, *At Home with the Empire* (Cambridge, 2006).

[3] The notion of the colonial situation in a global society is inspired by Georges Balandier but adds the tans-colonial actors, see: G. Balandier, 'La situation coloniale: Approche théorique', *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie* 1 (1951), 44–79.

[4] See, for example, the repertoires of power in F. Cooper and J. Burbank, *Empires in World History* (Princeton and Oxford, 2010), 1-22; A slightly different approach to interimperiality as a cultural field in L. Doyle, 'Inter-Imperiality: Dialectics in Postcolonial World History', *Interventions* 16, 2 (2014), 159-196.

to promote the colonization of Africa. Members of the International African Association founded branches in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, while participants of international colonial congresses established colonial interest groups. Once the increased interest in colonization had spread all over Europe and the USA, the 1884/5 conference in Brussels was organized to establish an international *État colonisateur* that operated independently of any nation. It became a training ground for international colonial experts from Italy and Germany. German colonial experts like Hermann von Wissmann and Alexander von Danckelmann were trained in the Congo Free State before they established the German protectorate in East Africa. Another German, the explorer Gustav Nachtigal, had lived in French Tunisia and maintained close ties with its French colonizers before he founded the German colonies in Togo and Cameroon.[5] Colonial newcomers like Germany and the USA placed their experts in foreign colonies, where they learned how to colonize. Germans apprenticed to Dutch Java, whose government invited international experts to develop the colony. Back in Africa, colonial administrators, no matter their nationality, met each other, exchanged their views and delineated common borders – just to ignore them if the spread of endemic diseases required cross-border cooperation. In the colonies, transnational cooperation was often the rule and not the exception.

But more importantly, and unlike solipsistic theories of imperialism, a theory of colonial internationalism can explain the *perpetuation* of colonialism once it had been established – instead of identifying its economic, social or political *origins* within the domestic or national society. This dissertation demonstrates that internationalism was used to legitimize colonialism by portraying it as a professional and scientific venture – a venture that was explicitly opposed to the ideologies of nationalism and imperialism. It is no coincidence that the calls for internationalization and professionalization grew louder in the 1890s. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, colonizers realized that much effort and money was necessary to maintain colonies. For many – not least for those who had built their careers on colonial expertise and feared to receive less funding for their projects – this was too much effort and money. Criticism was on the rise. To this period of colonial crisis, colonial experts responded by turning to internationalism. They promised to make colonial rule more efficient and less expensive – by importing and emulating successful strategies of ruling and exploitation that had been tested in other colonies. Dutch Java was the only colony that had paid its way, and consequently colonizers idealized Dutch colonial rule to be the most rational example of colonial exploitation. The promise of emulating the Dutch was instrumental in legitimizing colonialism in times of crises, because it promised future prosperity. This is why Chailley declared comparison a

[5] Letter from Paul Cambon to Mme Cambon, Tunis, 9.5.1882, in Cambon, *Paul Cambon, Correspondance vol*, 172.

method and colonialism a science that would modernize colonial rule. His strategy performed very well and contributed to legitimizing and sustaining colonial rule. Unlike fervent nationalists, internationalist scientists were vital to *sustain* and *perpetuate* colonial empires.

A theory of colonial internationalism allows us to take a more nuanced view of a field that has hitherto been dominated by historians of international law. Historians of international law, such as Martti Koskenniemi and Anthony Anghie, argue that the concept of internationalism – and colonial internationalism in particular – was shaped to draw a sharp line between sovereign (or civilized) colonizing states and dependent (or uncivilized) colonies. If a state was able to possess colonies, it automatically qualified itself for being part of the international community of civilized states. Seen from this perspective, the world was divided among colonizers and colonized, and there was no in-between.[6]

The colonial experts of the ICI did not necessarily share this binary view and imagined a middle ground. Their desire for autonomy of colonial experts was an early manifestation of possible "in-betweens". Experts on colonized societies, such as C. Snouck-Hurgronje and J.H. Abendanon even imagined a federal system in which the Dutch Indies were not colonies anymore, but part of a Eurasian confederacy.[7] The plea for legislative autonomy and native self-legislation inevitably entailed a transfer of sovereignty from the colonizers to the colonized. Moreover, Snouck and Heinrich Becker were inclined to use Muslims in the colonies as co-colonizers. As official advisors to colonial governments, they were generally open to political alliances with Muslims or other colonial subjects. They dismissed notions of racial or civilizational superiority. At least in theory, they turned against the sharp distinction between those who were part of the international community and those who were not. While advocates of decolonization were still the exception, a restricted transfer of sovereignty to the native population was deemed possible, if not necessary to avoid violent decolonizations.

Did colonial internationalism reinforce and confirm racial difference? As we have seen, hardly any colonial internationalist escaped racist thinking. The ICI members naturally assumed that they shared a common race. Their racism was of a particular kind, however, and valued environmentally determined "nativeness" over biologically determined "ethnicity". It combined evolutionism and mesology – the notion that environment determined the racial character of those who dwelled in a certain "milieu" for extended periods. Skeptical towards the abilities of bacteriologists to immunize individuals of the white race against the hostile and insalubrious tropical environment, ICI members embraced this anthropologically informed

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[6] Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*; Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*.
[7] Schmutzer, *Dutch Colonial Policy,* 8-9, 14, 136; Generally on the idea of colonial federations and conferderations: Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*.

racism, which led them to believe that the entire white race would degenerate once a portion of its members settled in tropical colonies. Whites were said to be the inferior race in a tropical environment, while those who were native to this milieu were naturally superior to them. Plans to overcome this divide by creating a mixed "colonial race" by miscegenation were mostly rejected out of hand. Given the vulnerability and inferiority of whites in the tropics, one ICI member proclaimed the "triumph of the native." Picking up on this argument, experts agreed that native populations could be the only source of productivity in the colonies – and should take the place of vulnerable (and moreover mutinous) white settlers. Ironically, the notion of native superiority was the outcome of the consistent application of racist thinking to the colonial context. It inevitably led to the "acclimatization paradox," the idea that the entire white race would degenerate if whites settled in the tropical colonies. The triumph of nativeness was not an immediate consequence of colonial internationalism, but colonial internationalists spread the news about the profitable incorporation of "superior" natives into colonial economies and administrations. Given their firm belief in environmental determinism, they thought in terms of nativeness of their colonial subjects, rather than in terms of "ethnicity" and pure biological determinism. Being native – rather than belonging to a biologically defined race – was an asset in colonial discourses of the 1890s. This argument was truly Social-Darwinist, but ironically undermined the notion of the superiority of the white race.

Back in the metropole, by contrast, the vitality of colonial internationalists continued unabated. Like no other movement from below, colonial internationalism stood for democratic, liberal and non-governmental commitment. Internationalism was democratic and non-governmental by nature. The ICI founder and liberal economist Chailley sustained this view in his apotheosis of "individual activity" that should bring about collective responsibility and change. Without doubt, he had fallen into euphoria over the success of colonial internationalism, but his verdict contained a germ of truth. The participation in the ICI and its members' commitment to colonial affairs was unmatched. Initially, the Secretary General of the ICI Camille Janssen had a hard time in making its members attend the meetings or pre-circulate detailed studies on colonial law, irrigation systems, and tropical medicine that served as a basis of discussion. But soon participation was on the rise and contributions became more frequent, even if the ICI did not reimburse its members. Adding to the contribution of individuals was the ICI's close cooperation with private or semi-official interest groups, learned societies, and agronomic organizations, like the German Colonial Society, the Committee for French Africa or the Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee. A theory of colonial internationalism

has to lay emphasis on those private initiatives which were crucial to sustain and develop colonial empires.

While colonial internationalism was a movement that started from below, colonial governments and administrations would soon appropriate its ideology and methodology to officialize colonial internationalism. They funded the ICI and emulated its methods to make colonial rule more efficient. Governments tried to capitalize on the ICI's comparative studies, bought its publications and funded delegates to travel to its meetings. Colonial newcomers hoped to learn from the experiences and errors of the time-honored colonial powers, while the latter searched for means to rationalize their administrations. On the initiative of the ICI, colonial policies in the metropole were adjusted to the primordial purpose of colonial development overseas. The professionalization of colonial administration entailed a new comprehension for the peculiarities of the colonies overseas. While overseas territories where governed according to metropolitan prerogatives before the turn of the century, necessities overseas shaped colonial policy in the metropole after 1900. This shift can be explained with the reform of colonial administrations that was brought about and promoted by the ICI. Moreover, the ICI recruited members who were close to executive and legislative authorities. Even colonial ministries placed representatives in the ICI to have an ear on the ground. Throughout the existence of the ICI, representatives of the state, be it ministers or royal family opened the ICI's meetings, like the Dutch queen did in the 1920s. Non-governmentality was not tantamount to a lack of power.

Repeatedly, their excellent networks helped colonial internationalists to interfere in diplomacy. Their overall purpose was to prevent wars among colonizers. The desire to avoid violent conflict and even diplomatic discord over colonial matters induced them to inaugurate peace talks, for example during the Morocco conflict (1906-1912). The leader of the French colonial party Eugène Etienne tried to convince the German emperor to reach an agreement. French colonialists turned against Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé who seemed to approve a war with Germany over Morocco. Delcassé had to resign from his post at the instigation of the French Germanophile colonial lobby. It goes without saying that mutual exchange among colonial experts was not free of nationalist confrontation. However, they always aimed at peaceful competition and refrained from declaring colonial conflicts a casus belli. After all, a war among colonizers threatened to delegitimize the colonial project as a whole. By explicitly rejecting the use of violence to solve imperial conflicts, colonial internationalists contributed in a significant way to avoiding colonial wars.

Unlike internationalism, which was an ideal, transnationalism was a practice. It did not necessarily stand for an ideology or a political agenda. The expression “transnationalism” is a neologism of the twentieth century. It has not been used or exploited by colonialists. We can therefore use it as an analytical category that is not charged with historical meaning. Unlike internationalists, ideal-type agents of transnationality were not concerned with the existence of nations at all – unless national borders were an obstacle to their transnational activities. Merchants, for example, tried to make money with disregard to national purposes or national prosperity. Individual profits were more important for them than national belonging. In a similar way, some of the colonial experts tried to capitalize on the opportunities colonialism offered them, no matter to which nation the colony belonged. Most of the German researchers who worked at the Buitenzorg laboratories profited from its scientific infrastructure and experience to acquire scientific capital (knowledge) and build their own career. Their experience at Buitenzorg might have served nationalist purposes, if they transferred knowledge for use in German colonies. Yet, this purpose was not a primary purpose, but rather a secondary effect. The primary purpose was to increase their individual value as colonial experts – which they could “sell” to anyone who was interested in their accumulated expertise. Their interest was neither nationalistic nor “internationalistic” but egoistic. Consequently, transnational careers were often due to individualistic purposes.

Transnational exchange among colonial experts seems to have been more likely in the colonies than in the metropole. Overseas, experts were rare. Administrations competed for those who were experienced professionals – often with disregard to their nationality. Dutch and Belgian administrations, in particular, dug deep into their small pockets to employ international experts in agronomy, forestry, and tropical medicine. The Buitenzorg stipend had been established for this purpose and was a great success. The German administrations in Africa also invited international researchers, after they had modelled the agronomic stations in Amani and Victoria on Buitenzorg. In a complementary way, self-styled experts realized quickly that they could capitalize on transnational networks to build a career and to finance their projects. Yet, not only experts *in* the colonies, but also experts *on* colonial policy did not grow on trees. Specialists on colonial Islam, like Snouck, Becker, and Morand had no serious competitors within their countries and teamed up with each other. Obviously, the era of professionalization inaugurated by the ICI was meant to provide a remedy for the scarcity of expertise. Nevertheless, experts – if defined as scientifically trained and practically experienced specialists – remained a rare species which would, however, develop into a “new tribe” and a

"cosmopolitan community," in the words of Cooper and Packard.[8] Already before the First World War, colonial internationalists provided the basis for the training of experts, whose transnational experience was said to aggrandize their expertise.

While colonial internationalists in the metropole declared colonialism a science to emphasize its transnational and disinterested character, colonial administrators on the spot were rather attracted by applied science – and the resulting "technologies" they could use to improve colonial exploitation. Unlike pure armchair scholarship, applied science produced useful technologies that were halfway between scientific experiment and practical experience. At best, these technologies had already been successfully tested in colonial practice, before colonial administrations bought or imitated them. This need made transfers of technology from other colonies particularly interesting, because not only the technology but also the experience in using it could be imported. Moreover, it was less expensive to make use of new technologies that had already been tested elsewhere. Chailley put the attitude of the colonizers in a nutshell when he rhetorically asked his colleagues in the ICI "why invent if inventions already exist?" By making use of trans-colonial transfers, time-consuming research and development periods could be avoided. This insight was the main reason why transnational contacts and knowledge transfers became so important for colonial administrators.

At the same time, expertise and technology were not neutral if applied to a colonial context. Colonial rule was not a technocracy just because it had been rationalized, professionalized and technologized. Technologies ultimately served to make colonial domination and exploitation more efficient. For example, when the German administration invited foreign scientists to develop their research projects at the Amani research station, they accepted only those candidates who delivered the proof that their research was "practical" and helped to improve colonial agriculture or tropical medicine. With the emulation of Buitenzorg's trial fields and improved cash crop seeds, the Germans also imported the system of forced – or at least imposed – cultivation of the new products. True, this system differed from the racist plantation economy of the American type, which had served as a model for African colonies earlier. Nevertheless, the Dutch cultivation system was imposed on the natives and caused protests, if not revolts, among those Africans who had been "taught" to grow the imported crops. Resistance was even more likely when the colonizers used the introduction of new irrigation techniques to justify the authoritarian "despotism" of colonial administrations, along with dispossession and forced labor.

[8] Cooper and Packard, *International Development*, 6.

Comparison and transfer – the two “methods” of colonial “science” that the ICI members introduced – represented the international (ideological) and the transnational (practical) colonialism respectively. Comparison has always been a political or ideological method that distinguished between different national characters. By comparing different nations, colonial internationalists contrasted their colonial “characters” to figure out which one was the “best.” The predictable outcome of colonial comparisons in the late nineteenth century was that the British and the Dutch colonial systems were exemplary. Their “rationality” and success became famous all over the world and was idealized into a stereotype that came close to a myth. Colonial experts used those idealized stereotypes to make their own governments invest in their own colonies for future development along the Dutch or British lines. Mostly for political reasons, experts valued the Dutch example over the British one. It was widely accepted to praise a country that was not a serious rival, whereas applauding Britain for its colonial policy was often considered unpatriotic or even treason, at least at the end of the nineteenth century.

Trans-colonial transfers were allegedly less political or politicized than “international” comparisons. Although theoretically the result of systematic comparison and the search for the best way of colonizing, they were less prone to stereotyping and rarely mediatized by the colonizers. The cultural hierarchy between different colonial powers did not necessarily play a role and colonial transfers were eclectic. Indeed, colonial experts imported colonial knowledge from any other colonial power, if only their experience was useful to professionalize the administration. Thus, colonial experts from the USA scrutinized Spanish archives in the Philippines, although the Spanish empire had become a stereotype for colonial mismanagement. Eclectic transfers seemed to be rather “utilitarian” than politically biased stereotypes produced by the politics of comparison. While it was impossible to make a sharp distinction between political comparisons and utilitarian transfers, trans-colonial transfers became the symbol for a utilitarian colonial policy.

Without doubt, colonial internationalists really hoped to bring about a “utilitarian turn” in colonial policies – taking into account that utilitarianism was no lesser an ideology and a strategy to legitimize colonialism. They dismissed settler colonies mainly because it was too expensive to keep white colonists alive and protect them from native attacks. Moreover, a utilitarian policy – that incorporated the natives – was said to avert revolts in the colonies, which occasioned even more costs. Among colonial internationalists, it was generally accepted that natives should not be assimilated culturally or legally because such a forced reeducation would cause resistance. Instead they should be assimilated economically, as the Belgian railway builder Albert Thys demanded. “Economic education”, Thys argued, should not be enforced on

the natives, but developed naturally if fair wages were paid and welfare measures taken. Like Europeans, Thys asserted, Africans were responsive to economic incentives. Once natives had the opportunity to not only participate in the colonial economy, but also to profit from it, they would naturally become workers and capitalists. The ICI took the lead in promoting such a utilitarian turn.

Consequently, the internationalist utilitarians dismissed cultural assimilation – or "civilization" defined as a process of cultural education – on the grounds that it was too expensive. The civilizing mission had come under attack by the end of the nineteenth century both for its high costs and for its potential to provoke anti-colonialism. The ICI warned against spending money on educating the natives to be anti-colonialists – by teaching them to articulate themselves in a free press or liberal society. The British "Macaulayism" stood for such a failed civilizing mission. No attempt should be made anymore to put the civilizing mission into practice, also because the colonized peoples already had a civilization that could be used to for the purposes of the colonizers. Having all those ideas in mind, Chailley emphasized that all peoples of the world, also the Africans, had a civilization.

Skeptical towards assimilation, colonial internationalists dismissed the civilizing mission and redefined colonialism as a humanitarian mission. To keep up with their utilitarian agenda, ICI members rejected the civilizing mission (or cultural assimilation) and embraced what they called humanitarianism – defined as an economic or capitalist humanism, which stated that all human beings were equally inclined to profit from capitalism and equal before capitalism. Frequently, colonial internationalists underlined the unity of humanity and insisted that colonialism was an inclusive and not an exclusive project. Although civilizational and racial gradation within humanity remained unchallenged, the notion of belonging to a common human race became widely accepted. It was confirmed by colonial intellectuals like Antonio Fabié who wanted to rehabilitate Spanish colonial history by claiming that Bartolomé de Las Cases was the first humanitarian thinker and moreover represented the "true" Spanish colonialism. Fabié pretended to speak on the authority of Las Casas' Christian values, when he proclaimed the existence of one humanity. The ICI's humanitarianism was of a particular kind and resembled a long-term process to a shared utilitarian ideal rather than a short-term intervention, as we know it today. Humanitarianism was a manifestation of the ICI's utilitarianism.

The same utilitarian logic brought about the shift from the civilizing mission to development policies as the paradigm of colonial policy. The ICI was the origin for this transition. Its members moaned that the civilizing mission required investments that would

never pay off in the future. Once the mission had been accomplished, the civilized peoples would ask for independence and decolonize, as history had shown. The civilizing mission was thus a waste of money, because it would educate the colonial subjects to disloyalty. Once the civilizing mission was accomplished, they would not pay back the money that the motherland had invested. In the worst case, they would start costly wars of decolonization.

Development instead was said to reconcile the natives with the colonial rulers, because they could participate in the colonial economy and profit from it. Colonial internationalists argued that their investment in "development policies," would pay off once the colonial economy gathered momentum. As we have seen, ICI members propagated such a model of *mise en valeur* long before colonial governments launched official development policies. With comparative studies on railway construction, irrigation systems, colonial credit banks or monetary systems, the ICI prepared the way of development policy. Via the French Colonial Union and the Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee, ICI members raised funding for development projects and study missions. While generally underfunded, these private initiatives had astonishing effects, like the foundation of the Amani Research Institute in German East Africa. Moreover, the attempts of colonial internationalists to organize the trans-colonial recruitment of workers gave expression to their developmentalist attitude.

The ICI's most important contribution to development efforts was that it introduced the "methods" of comparison and technology transfers. Eager to learn from the ICI, all governments and administrations of colonizing countries ordered copies of its publications. All of them commissioned ICI members to compose detailed comparative studies or started similar projects by making use of ICI expertise in comparative colonialism. Austin's meticulously researched comparative study for the US-government is a case in point. As an ICI member, Austin was familiar with the sources and authors that allowed him to provide the US government with the best methods and technologies to govern a colony. Like Chailley had done long before them, German ICI members like Dernburg and Lindequist travelled British colonies and the USA to inform themselves about the possibilities of making colonial development more efficient. British colonial minister Joseph Chamberlain seems to have been inspired by German *Entwicklungspolitk* when he proclaimed to develop British colonies in the 1890s.[9] As we have seen, all colonizing countries sent missions to Dutch Java, which the ICI had promoted as the pioneer of colonial development policies.

Unlike civilization, development was a concept that pretended to be blind to ethnic and cultural difference. No color bar and no standard of civilization stood in the way of economic

[9] Cowen and Shenton, *Doctrines of Development*, xiii; See also: R. Kößler, *Entwicklung* (Münster, 1998).

development. It would show its effects earlier than a long process of cultural civilization, the colonial internationalists argued. According to ICI members, the world was not divided anymore into civilized and uncivilized but into developed and underdeveloped countries. The concept of development could be more easily accepted and adopted by colonial subjects than civilization: development became a goal of humanitarian thinking because it was said to be a common effort to the benefit of all. The temporary "trusteeship" of white colonizers, however was deemed necessary to "develop the capacities of another" and to induce a change from subsistence to market economies.[10] Thus, the combination of "strategic planning", and "technical assistance" of the colonizers could be portrayed as a means to bring about "increased output and improved welfare" in the near future.[11] It thus legitimized the colonial project and became a sort of secular eschatology.

While concepts like utilitarian colonialism, humanitarianism, development, and cultural relativism were strategically advanced by internationalist experts to legitimize colonialism and to receive funding, they also had an impact on colonial policy on the spot. No other field illustrates this more than the codification of customary and Islamic law, because it shows the "real" effects of an idea (cultural relativism) invented in Europe to rationalize and therefore legitimize colonial rule.

By sharing experiences concerning colonial law and comparing regimes of "customary law", colonial internationalists realized that the rich legal culture in the colonized societies could serve their own interests much better than any assimilation to European law and culture. Cultural relativism, which found its expression in legal dualism, was therefore a strategy rather than an ideology. Once colonial experts had familiarized themselves with the elements – and contradictions – of native customs and culture, they could use them for their own purpose. ICI members studied native and Islamic law thoroughly and in a comparative way. They discovered, for example, that the Isalmic *Inzāl* contracts were a means to acquire theoretically unalienable *ḥabūs* lands. On their instigation, colonial governments used those Inzāl contracts to purchase *ḥabūs* lands and give it to Europeans or a native elite who would make them more productive. When ICI members codified Islamic law in North Africa and beyond, the Inzāl contracts were included in the codes, even if they had not been part of local traditions. The case of the Inzāl contracts reveals that cultural relativism – which entailed the exact knowledge of native customs, laws and culture – was a means that could be used to facilitate and legitimize

[10] Cooper, 'Development, Modernization'; Cowen and Shenton, *Doctrines of Development*, ix.
[11] Cooper and Packard, *International Development*, 4; 6.

expropriation and domination. Those strategies were soon emulated and adapted in other colonies.

Manipulation of customary law or Islamic law was possible because it had rarely been codified into a single code before. Its malleable character – which the colonizers frequently overemphasized – made it open to interpretation and manipulation. Colonial experts claimed that there was no Islamic law, but rather a multitude of different rules that varied according to local customs and individual interpretation. Islamic law, they claimed, was actually a customary law, because it had always been adapted to local and temporary "necessities." Islamic theologians actually used the term "necessity" to justify verdicts that contradicted the Koran or the Sunna. Colonizers bribed muftis to issue fatwas that legitimized colonial rule, and the colonial administrations openly employed them to make them argue along their lines. This strategy had long been used by Islamic rulers whom the colonizers wanted to win over as co-colonizers – obviously without granting them full self-determination.

The "knowledge transfer" across the colonial world was an important strategy to manipulate customary law and Islamic law alike. In the case of Islamic law, for example, colonizers mixed different legal schools and imported the more "Western" *Ḥanafī* school of law to Tunisia, although the region was traditionally inclined to a very different school. Moreover, they imported elements from semi-colonial spaces like the Ottoman Empire to the colonies. In the Ottoman Empire, reformers had "modernized" Ottoman civil law earlier in the nineteenth century, by modelling it on the French Code Civil. As a result, elements of this "modernized" – or Europeanized – code had become part of the official civil code in the Ottoman Empire. Colonial internationalists who codified native law in North Africa portrayed the Ottoman civil code as the "most Islamic" law of modern times. On their instigation, colonies all over Africa would introduce this "most Islamic" code that was Ottoman but actually European. Such an indirect assimilation was not the only strategy in creating legal weapons against the colonial subjects.

While colonial administrations initially feared the subversive potential of a trans-colonial Pan-Islamic movement, colonial internationalists advised them to take advantage of it. Soon, the colonial administrations learned to capitalize on the diversity of global Islam. For example, colonial ministries all over Africa paid muftis from the Hejaz to issue fatwas that recommended Muslims not to revolt against colonial domination. Dutch and British colonial governments were first to request fatwas that advised Muslims under colonial rule to accept their fate. Instead of taking up arms against the Christian rulers, muftis recommended a quietist attitude. Other colonial administrations followed suit and paid muftis to send similar fatwas

from Mecca, Medina and Cairo. A detailed knowledge of Islam and its global varieties was therefore vital to sustain colonial rule. Colonial internationalists, like Snouck, Becker, Santillana, and Morand, joined forces to produce this knowledge and made it available to colonial governments. The latter made use of anthropological knowledge to perpetuate colonial domination.

While the colonizers codified and modified native customary law, the anthropological knowledge they acquired during those processes inspired a new "native policy" that brought about different degrees of collaboration between colonial subjects and colonial rulers. The ICI was responsible for the biggest trans-colonial collection of customary laws. The ICI's transnational networks helped the compilers of native law to collect customs from all over the colonies. Those collections would provide the basis for colonial systems of legal dualism that distinguished between a European law and a (manipulated) native law. Moreover, a new science emerged from those codification projects, called legal anthropology. Legal anthropology was one of the few sciences that had been introduced to serve colonial purposes and became a "neutral" science at European and American universities only later. It symbolizes the penetration of science with colonial cultures. Apart from the codification of customary law in African colonies, the most famous project of legal anthropology was the codification of adat law by the Dutch ICI members Van Voellenhoven and Snouck-Hurgronje. They defined *adat* law as a hybrid law that combined elements from Islamic and customary law and ruled over the Malayan islands, Indonesia, the Philippines and as far as Madagascar. Snouck used the notion of *adat* law to drive a wedge between Muslim and non-Muslim Indonesians during the Aceh War in the Dutch Indies. At the same time, Germans used a manipulated "Herero" law to justify a genocidal war against them. These examples illustrate that the "native policy" promoted by the ICI was highly ambiguous. It could lead to a system of collaboration, native autonomy, indirect rule or even semi-independence. But it was also used to justify segregation (cultural dualism) or even devastating and genocidal wars. Anthropological knowledge did not immunize against violent domination.

Colonial internationalism, development strategies and a native policy based on anthropological knowledge went hand in hand. Their combination by the ICI represented the most modern form of colonial policy. Based on this "progressive" role observers ascribed to the ICI, international colonialism saw a great success. Pioneers in modern colonization, like Lyautey, Lugard, and Dernburg, based their policy on the ICI's designs of a colonial modernity. They used comparison and transfer as colonial methods, launched development programs and promoted indirect rule to give autonomy to native rulers. Colonial internationalism and

transnational exchange proved so successful that it was imitated after the First World War in the Mandates System of the League of Nations, and the International Labor Organization. All of those new institutions tried to take advantage of the experiences of the ICI. They invited ICI experts to join them and sent delegates to the meetings of the ICI.

Tellingly, the colonial expertise of those post-war international institutions lagged far behind the ICI's comprehensive development program. The League's Permanent Mandates Commission was primarily concerned with re-establishing an international equilibrium within Europe, and less so with colonial development policies overseas. The PMC was a Eurocentric organization without real competence in colonial matters. The experts in the PMC were explicitly chosen for their neutrality and not for their colonial experience. Unsurprisingly, it kept a low profile in colonial reformism. The guidelines for mandatory powers were taken from the program that Léopold II of Belgium had used in 1876 (50 years earlier!) to justify colonial conquest: combating slavery, arms trade and liquor traffic, promoting material and moral well-being, introducing freedom of conscience and religion, civilization and effective occupation under an international trusteeship. Their anthropological knowledge was poor and their "native policy" a failure. The International Labor Organization tackled the topic of forced labor in the colonies in 1930, but the international convention against forced labor was widely ignored in the colonies. The ICI rejected the convention and defended its explicitly "colonial" attitude, arguing that it was based on a detailed knowledge about colonized societies. Nevertheless, the colonial program of the ICI was ahead of its time, while the new international institutions lagged behind. This "modernity" of the ICI consisted of a broad reformist repertoire in sustaining colonial formations. The flexibility within the colonial framework provided for the fact that the ICI survived the PMC and even the era of decolonization. Its "modern" ideas of development, humanitarianism and native cooperation survived the colonial period and reappeared in the theory and practice of development aid. Thus, colonial patterns of thinking persisted into the allegedly post-colonial era. Its "soft colonialism" was not of a different kind, but a variety of the same species.

A theory of colonial internationalism, developed out of a practice of colonial transnationalism, can help us to understand and explain colonialism and its various manifestations. This dissertation has shown that internationalism shaped colonialism from the beginning, perhaps more than nationalism, capitalism or social imperialism. It revealed why internationalism sustained colonialism and how it continued *après la lettre* – when the world stopped using the word colonialism but maintained the patterns of inequality and injustice inherent to it.

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