Peace without agency?

The emergence and persistence of peacebuilding as a depoliticized practice

Andrea Warnecke

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute

Florence, May 2016
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Examinining Board
Prof. Christian Reus-Smit, University of Queensland
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Prof. Michael N. Barnett, George Washington University
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Department of Political and Social Sciences - Doctoral Programme

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Abstract

Since the early 1990s, building peace in war-torn societies has emerged as a new field of international practice. Given its ad hoc mode of development, this new field of practice has been characterised by considerable concern with improvement and collective learning. These efforts notwithstanding, the field continues to attract criticisms about its failure to engage with local contexts and to address the political dimensions of peace processes. Such criticisms are particularly important since many peacebuilding actors and observers have repeatedly emphasized the political nature of peace processes. Not only is depoliticization criticized by members and observers of the field alike, but it has also been linked to drawbacks in particular interventions. Why, then, has peacebuilding emerged as a depoliticized and de-contextualized practice in the first place, and how can we account for the persistence of depoliticization?

The thesis focuses on the agencies tasked with conducting peacebuilding. It argues that the emergence and persistence of depoliticization can only be understood by analysing the mismatch between actors’ institutional identities and practices and the particular nature of the challenges they face. Most peacebuilding agencies originate from the peacekeeping, humanitarian, and development communities and are committed to observing neutrality and/or impartiality. They initially became involved in peacebuilding on the premise that their task consisted in ‘assisting’ the implementation of a peace agreement. However, as peacebuilding often involves a significant degree of ongoing political contestation, most newly minted peacebuilding agencies have been caught between their commitment to neutrality and/or impartiality and the inherently political nature of peacebuilding and peace processes.

The thesis combines recent strands of practice theory with a Bourdieusian field perspective to emphasize the dynamic link between actors’ identities and practices. The framework I advance not only allows for understanding the reproduction, but in particular the emergence and transformation of international practices. To this end, it analyses the practices of a number of ‘key players’ within the emerging peacebuilding field across two peacebuilding cases (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Timor-Leste). Overall, the thesis argues that the new practice and related thinking on peace and conflict in international organizations continue to be shaped by the ‘foundational dilemma’ and in particular by the ways in which peacebuilders have tried to resolve it while preserving their institutional identities.
Acknowledgments

During the past four years of researching and writing, and in the time that it took me to muster the resolve to undertake my PhD research, many friends, colleagues, and teachers have encouraged, supported, and advised me. First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents, Maria and Bruno Warnecke, and my siblings Kathrin und Tobias with their partners Mark Ruwe and Swantje Wehner. Not only has my family unfailingly supported me, but has also shown considerable patience when I arrived home for Christmas and birthday vacations with a seemingly overwhelming need to work or recuperate. I probably forgot to say it often enough, but this work would not have been possible without your support.

My thesis supervisor Chris Reus-Smit helped me begin the transition from historian to social scientist. I consider myself lucky for having been able to benefit from his enthusiasm for teaching and invaluable advice particularly when I grappled with the theoretical framework, as well as his overall support and encouragement. Most of all, I am profoundly grateful for his willingness to let me pursue my own interests and find my own questions, while readily helping me find some answers – or rephrase the questions – when I got lost. Special thanks are also due to the members of my Examining Board, Karin Aggestam, Michael Barnett, Chris Reus-Smit, and Olivier Roy. After more than four years of searching, sense-making, writing and re-writing, receiving a detailed response from scholars whose work I have so often relied on is truly rewarding and will hopefully help me make further improvements.

While Chris has helped me steer the project through its entire duration, a number of professors and colleagues took the time to comment on individual sections and discuss my questions and concerns. At the European University Institute, I received advice from Pascal Vennesson, Olivier Roy, Heather Rae, Emanuel Adler, Jacintha O’Hagan, and Jennifer Welsh. My colleague and great friend James White provided excellent language editing, and was – thankfully as always – too considerate to press me when I failed to meet agreed deadlines. Also at the EUI, Maureen Lechleitner, Gabriella Unger, and Gridt Find Vigt helped me tackle all administrative and personal matters and kept an open door for advice or just a brief chat, which made me feel truly at home at the EUI. Iassen Lazarov Punky did the same in regard to all things technical, although my old Volkswagen sadly didn’t survive to see the completion of the thesis.
In 2014 I was fortunate to have the opportunity to work at the University of Queensland in Brisbane for six months. Given the great collegial spirit at UQ’s School of Political Science and International Studies and Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, my stay at UQ couldn’t have been any more fruitful or enjoyable – even if it meant that I failed to visit many of Australia’s most attractive sights, an error that I hope to correct in the near future. During my research stay at the UQ, I benefited from conversations with Anne Brown, Volker Boege, Alexander Bellamy, Lene Hansen, Richard Devatak, Sarah Teitt, Kurt Mills, and Charles Hunt. I would like to thank Anne Nolan in particular for helping me make the most of my stay at UQ and at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Finally, Eglantine Staunton, Emma Townsend, and Dyonne Pennings made my wonderful experience at UQ complete by sharing their muffins, dark humour, and friendship. Last but not least, I owe a debt of gratitude to the German Academic Exchange Service for generously funding my thesis research and stay in Florence and Brisbane.

Beyond the European University Institute and the University of Queensland, I encountered a number of colleagues at conferences and during field work who were willing to answer my questions and share their insights with me. Of these, I would like to mention Trevor Stack and the members of the Political Communities Working Group at the University of Aberdeen, my former colleagues Volker Franke, Marc von Boemcken, and Julie Brethfeld at the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), Wolfram Hilz at the University of Bonn, Duncan Hiscock at the Stabilisation Unit, London, and the many interview partners who readily shared their time and experiences with me during field work in London, Oslo, Bonn, Geneva, and Dili.

I am very lucky to have a number of great friends I could and can always rely on at home and abroad. Sandra Stolte, Susanne Zacharias, Maike Dierecks, Elvan Isikozlu, Marie-Christine Heinze, Meida Delic, Sina Wildt, Ruth Vollmer, Anna Kraft, and the entire crew of the BTW 273 have been treasured friends since my Herne, Bochum, and Bonn times and throughout my many absences. Thank you for taking me the way I am! In Florence, Laura Almagor, Christine Andrä, Justiina Dahl, Roel Frakking, Jonas Gerlings, Payam Ghalehdar, Nisida Gjoski, Johannes Jüde, Johanne Kübler, Nina Liljeqvist, Diana Natermann, Sanne Noyon, Petter Sandgren, Maja Spanu, Visnja Vukov, Rebecca Wolffberg, and Simon Watmough have provided me with friendship, company, professional advice, and notable memories for which I am profoundly grateful. Finally, I’d like to thank my partner Nicolás Rodriguez Castillo, for his constant encouragement.
and support and for reminding me that ‘you just can't draw the perfect circle’ whenever
I needed to hear it, and for his patience when I tried nonetheless. Gracias.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Administrative Committee on Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>ADR</td>
<td>Assessment of Development Results</td>
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<td>ACPP</td>
<td>Africa Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
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<td>AMP</td>
<td>Alliance for a Parliamentary Majority</td>
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<td>Apodeti</td>
<td>Associação Popular Democrática Timorense</td>
</tr>
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<td>ASDT</td>
<td>Associação Social Democrática Timorense</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeals Process</td>
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<td>CAVR</td>
<td>Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Country Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Common Country Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEB</td>
<td>United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Revolving Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGMA</td>
<td>Country Group of Multilateral Agencies</td>
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<td>CHASE</td>
<td>Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-military cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNRM</td>
<td>Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere</td>
</tr>
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<td>CNRT</td>
<td>Conselho Nacional de Reconstrução de Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Country Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Programme Action Plan</td>
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<td>CPDC</td>
<td>Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPD-RDTL</td>
<td>Conselho Popular pela Defesa da República Democrática de Timor Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPO</td>
<td>Country Programme Outline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRU</td>
<td>Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRRN</td>
<td>Conselho Revolucionária de Resistencia Nacional</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Country Specific Configuration</td>
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* To distinguish the names of institutions and specific concepts from generic terms, the former have been capitalized.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
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<td>DDSMS</td>
<td>Department for Development Support and Management Services</td>
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<td>DESA</td>
<td>Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
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<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>ECHA</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECPS</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Peace and Security</td>
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<td>EOSG</td>
<td>Executive Office of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>ERP</td>
<td>European Recovery Program</td>
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<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
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<td>ETPS</td>
<td>East Timor Police Service</td>
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<td>ETTA</td>
<td>East Timor Transitional Administration</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FALINTIL</td>
<td>Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>FBiH</td>
<td>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-FDTL</td>
<td>Falintil-Forcas Defensa Timor Lorosa’ê ka</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELITIL</td>
<td>Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente</td>
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<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAFP</td>
<td>General Framework Agreement for Peace</td>
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<td>GCPP</td>
<td>Global Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HABITAT</td>
<td>UN Commission on Human Settlement</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>ICFY</td>
<td>International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IEBL</td>
<td>Inter-Entity Boundary Line</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International financial institutions</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMPP</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Planning Process</td>
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<td>IMTF</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCAF</td>
<td>International Network on Conflict and Fragility</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International organisation</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
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<td>ISF</td>
<td>International Stabilization Force</td>
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<td>ITA</td>
<td>International transitory administration</td>
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<td>JAM</td>
<td>Joint assessment mission</td>
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<td>JIU</td>
<td>Joint Inspection Unit</td>
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<td>LICUS</td>
<td>Low Income Countries Under Stress</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td><em>Médecins Sans Frontières</em></td>
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<td>MSS</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Solidarity</td>
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<td>NC</td>
<td>National Council</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Consultative Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NHDR</td>
<td>National Human Development Report</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the OECD</td>
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<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organisation for European Economic Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>The United Nations Organization in the Congo (subsequently: <em>Opération des Nations Unies au Congo</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Support Office</td>
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<td>PCF</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Fund</td>
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<td>PCIA</td>
<td>Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment</td>
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<td>PCNA</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>PCPB</td>
<td>Post-conflict peacebuilding</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCRU</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PIC</td>
<td>Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>PIP</td>
<td>Peace implementation plan</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping operation</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>RAP</td>
<td>Regional assistance plan</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
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<td>RS</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
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<td>Small arms and light weapons</td>
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<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>UNAMET</td>
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<td>UNMISET</td>
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<td>United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration</td>
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<td>UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<td>Vance-Owen Peace Plan</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
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Over the past two decades, the new objective of building peace in war-torn societies has attracted a diverse set of actors from the humanitarian, development, and peacekeeping fields. Peacebuilding is a multilateral project that is jointly conducted by the United Nations and its bodies, bilateral development agencies, international organisations, and NGOs to help states and societies emerging from internal violent conflict transit to a more stable, or ‘self-sustaining’, peace after the conclusion of a peace agreement. As such, it is fundamentally distinct, yet closely related, to other approaches and instruments in the area of international intervention and peace support, such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement.²

Drawing together institutional actors from the peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian fields, peacebuilding has emerged as a young and self-conscious field of practice characterised by a considerable concern with collective learning, revision, and improvement. These efforts notwithstanding, the field continues to attract criticisms regarding its prevalent depoliticization. More specifically, members and observers of the field have criticized peacebuilders’ failure to sufficiently engage with local contexts and to address the political dimensions of peace processes, highlighting peacebuilders’ tendency to reinterpret social, political, and economic problems in terms of

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2 *Peacekeeping* is defined as the ‘active maintenance of a truce between nations or communities, esp. by an international military force’ and usually seen to fall under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. It rests on three basic principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate (see [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml)). By contrast, in the UN context, *peacemaking* refers to diplomatic (and occasionally judicial) means of brokering an agreement between conflicting parties (see [http://www.un.org/Overview/unbrief/peacemaking.shtml](http://www.un.org/Overview/unbrief/peacemaking.shtml)). In turn, *peace enforcement* is a more challenging concept, as it is sometimes seen as being independent of peacekeeping, or as an extension of it. It describe those actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – often in the context of an existing peacekeeping deployment – that are undertaken to enforce the parties’ adherence to a truce or responses to breaches of international peace and security. See Oliver (2002).
technocratic-administrative solutions (Chandler 2010; Autesserre 2014). Not only is this critique shared by insiders and outsiders of the field alike, but has in some cases also been linked to set backs in particular peacebuilding interventions (Sending 2009; Pantuliano 2014). Why, then, did peacebuilding emerge as a depoliticized practice in the first place, and how can we account for the persistence of depoliticization despite ongoing – internal – criticisms and learning efforts?

This project contends that the answers to these two questions are inextricably linked. In other words: to understand why peacebuilding continues to be characterised by depoliticization, it is necessary to analyse the emergence of peacebuilding as a new field of practice that reassembled actors from diverse communities of practice, such as humanitarianism, development cooperation, and peacekeeping, around a new objective. Most studies of peacebuilding and of UN civilian peace support emphasize the interests and practices of Western states and donor governments as the key explanatory factor for the nature of present-day peacebuilding. By contrast, this thesis focuses on the practices of the institutions that are mandated or commissioned with conducting peacebuilding—international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and bilateral development agencies. It accounts for the persistent depoliticization of peacebuilding practice by analysing the tensions between contradictory institutional identities, mandates, and approaches and the ways these have been resolved over the past two decades.

In the following sections, I will firstly argue that peacebuilding as a political project has to be distinguished from peacebuilding as a depoliticized practice. To clarify the implications of this distinction, I will draw on Mouffe’s (2005) conceptualization of the political as grounded in the ineradicability of social conflict, and her related distinction between politics and the political. This move allows me to draw out some of the mechanisms by which peacebuilding actors sublimate the political dimension of their practices as ‘ways of doing’. The remaining sections will make the case for studying peacebuilding as a new field of international practice with a view to capturing the tension between putatively politically neutral actors on the one hand, and the political nature of their task on the other. In conclusion, I will sketch out the main argument of the thesis and detail my analytical steps.
PEACEBUILDING AS A POLITICAL PROJECT

Peacebuilding has been defined as the international response to protracted intra-state\(^3\) conflict in “societies deeply divided along ethnic, factional, ideological or religious lines” (Mayall 2007:18). Originally, the term ‘peacebuilding’ was introduced by Galtung (1976) as part of a multi-layered effort to resolve social conflicts. Galtung envisaged peacebuilding as the attempt to “overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of conflict” (Galtung 1996: 112, emphasis added; see Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2011: 32), complemented by peacekeeping as the attempt to change behaviour and peacemaking as the attempt to change attitudes. In 1992, then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali adopted this framework in his ‘Agenda for Peace’ for the United Nations and other international actors, defining *peacekeeping* as the interposition of international armed forces between warring parties, *peacemaking* as international efforts to induce parties to reach a negotiated settlement, and *peacebuilding* as “underpin[ning] the work of peacemaking and peacekeeping by addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships between conflictants” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 32).\(^4\)

Since the early days of this international endeavour, countless commentators have pointed out that peacebuilding\(^5\) is in no small part a political project, pertaining not only to the role and intentions, but also to the perception and impact of any kind of third-party intervention in post-war settings (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004; Berdal 2009; Matthis 1997; Moore 1996; Pugh 1995). As Chandler (2005: 309) argues, such a position is also broadly in line with earlier perceived wisdom regarding the centrality and agency of the political sphere for creating stable and viable states or political communities. Taking Huntington’s (1968) widely received *Political Order in Changing Societies* as his starting point, Chandler argues: “For Huntington, the key to state stability

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\(^3\) Note that the two ‘ideal type’ cases or success stories that informed much of the early literature on peacebuilding ‘best practice’, i.e. Japan and Germany after WWII, are in fact countries defeated in inter-state war; see, for instance, Jennings (2003), Smith (2010: 8) on the US, and Pouligny (2006).

\(^4\) “Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peace-making and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples” (Boutros-Ghali 1992: Section II, Art. 21).

\(^5\) As Ramsbotham et al. (2011) argue, it is at times difficult to clearly delineate peacebuilding and peacemaking tasks, and they proceed to propose a model of peacebuilding which effectively combines ‘structural’ and ‘cultural’ peacebuilding, i.e. the long-term improvement of relationships and the solution of structural issues, with peacemaking understood as the negotiation of contested claims. From the point of view of this research, the key observation is that there does not seem to be a clear-cut delineation of peacemaking as a political task as opposed to peacebuilding as a purely ‘cultural’ or ‘structural’ endeavour (even if one posited the latter to be purely ‘apolitical’).
was a political question of building a domestic consensus, a sense of political community, and establishing a government with popular legitimacy .... Political institutions could only cohere society if they emerged out of existing social forces, if they represented real interests and real clashes of interest which then led to the establishment of mechanisms and organizational rules and procedures which were capable of resolving those disagreements” (Chandler 2005: 309). In Huntington’s argument, a lively political sphere is not merely a necessary prerequisite for the formation of a viable state, but in fact the main locus of agency, which brings about stability and legitimacy. It is hence at the same time a means and an end to viable state formation and building domestic stability or peace. Put differently, the (re-)construction of a viable state and society cannot be brought about by focusing on social, economic, or even political (governance) structures alone; instead, these have to co-evolve with and follow from a substantive and necessarily political interaction with and among said ‘social forces’, agents, and interests.

Other contemporary formulations by peacebuilding6 actors include explicit references to the need to “address the root causes of violence” and acknowledge the political nature of the task. For instance, the 1997 British Government White Paper Eliminating World Poverty states that “understanding the causes of conflict, and helping build the will and capacity of state and civil society to resolve disputes non-violently will be central to our international policy” (cited in Lawry-White 2004: 13). Broadly in line with this thinking, but focusing more on the role of third parties within this process, the influential 1997 OECD-DAC report Conflict, Peace, and Development on the Threshold of the 21st Century (OECD 1997: 80) held that:

> Development assistance will have the most impact in conflict prevention when it is designed and timed to address the root causes of violent conflicts, as well as the precipitating factors, in ways that are relevant to local circumstances. These may include the imbalance of opportunities within societies, the lack of effective and legitimate government, or the absence of mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of differing interests within society at the local, national and regional levels.

In addition, the Supplement to the 1997 report clarified that “responding to this imperative, development agencies are accepting the risks of moving more deeply into this sensitive political terrain” (OECD 2001: 17). It follows from this that peacebuilding as a practice of the international community has the objective of preventing the

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6 To avoid the pitfalls of these conceptual discussions given the competing understandings of ‘peacebuilding’ as well as an implicit preference for the Galtungian understanding of conflict resolution, in this context the term ‘peacebuilding’ could be replaced by “civilian peace support following internal conflict”, see the discussion in infra ch. 3.
recurrence of violence after the termination of internal armed conflict and the conclusion of some kind of settlement. Means to this end include ‘addressing structural issues’ and conflict causes, building the will and capacities for non-violent conflict resolution, and improving the relationships between ‘conflictants’. In other words, peacebuilding thus understood seeks to tackle the [root] causes and ongoing7 dynamics of violent conflicts comprehensively, that is both in structural and substantive or ‘political’ terms.

THE PUZZLE: THE PERSISTENCE OF PEACEBUILDING AS A DEPOLITICIZED PRACTICE

Notwithstanding these statements by peacebuilding practitioners and analysts alike, in practice, peacebuilding activities clearly favour the structural dimension of peace and conflict, and, to quote the 1997 UK White Paper, the improvement of actors’ functional ‘capacities’ in dispute resolution, rather than its substantial or political dimensions. Peacebuilding measures include a broad range of donor-driven activities that take place within the scope of or in addition to UN-mandated peace operations. This usually includes a strong focus on building democratic institutions and establishing ‘the rule of law’ and a liberal market economy, i.e. what is usually referred to as the ‘liberal peace’ or ‘New York consensus’ on peacebuilding as statebuilding or governance (Paris 2000, 2004; Richmond 2005, 2011). For instance, the 2006 UN Inventory Capacity in Peacebuilding lists four key areas: 1. security and public order, 2. governance and participation, 3. justice and reconciliation, and 4. socio-economic wellbeing, in addition to a laundry list of ‘cross-cutting issues’, such as gender and environmental concerns.

While the Inventory lacks any conceptualization or definition of peacebuilding as such, the listed activities bespeak a strong focus on ‘state building’ and establishing the structural prerequisites for peaceful societies, seeming to imply that activities undertaken in any of these areas are mutually reinforcing and will ultimately enable ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ societies to develop institutions and practices suitable for the peaceful negotiation of contested claims (Berdal 2009: 18). Similarly, summarizing his inventory and assessment of the bilateral peacebuilding activities of European governments, Lawry-White (2003) concludes that these measures focus almost exclusively on the structural rather than substantial aspects of the task.

7 Woodward (2007, 2009) questions the claim that peacebuilding ought to address the ‘root causes’ of violent conflict and emphasizes the degree to which pre-war root causes might have been transformed or replaced by new drivers of conflict. For an overview of different modes of distinguishing between the causes, drivers, or triggers of conflict, see Bahrinipour (2006).
A persistent criticism that has been levelled at the present practice throughout its emergence is the prevalence of administrative, technocratic, or functional, approaches to peace and conflict and the omission of the political dimension and context of building peace (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; Bellamy et al. 2004; Berdal 2009; Chandler 2000; Duffield 2001; Matthies 1997; Moore 1996; Paddon 2014). Instead, peacebuilding practice is characterized by standardized, or so-called ‘template’, approaches. These templates address violent conflict primarily in functional and structural terms, i.e. as a result of factors such as underdevelopment, insufficient governance capacities, or inequality (Autesserre 2009, 2010; Call and Cousens 2008; Chandler 2005, 2010; Hill 2011). In variations of this assessment, commentators have criticized peacebuilding practice for failing to engage with what is often referred to as ‘local’ dynamics and contexts in target countries or the root causes of violent conflict (Autesserre 2010, 2014; Berdal 2005, 2009; Mac Ginty 2011; Paris 2004; Pouligny 2002; Richmond 2011; Sending 2009).

While these tendencies have repeatedly been noted and at times related to the interests and liberal-internationalist preferences of the most powerful interveners (Chandler 2006, 2010; Duffield 2007; Richmond 2011), their prevalence and persistence is all the more surprising for three distinct reasons. Firstly, as argued in the previous paragraphs, a functional and depoliticized approach to peacebuilding runs counter to long-standing thinking, which held the emergence of peace and the role of internal and external actors therein to be an “inherently political” process and task (Bellamy et al. 2004: 14; Chandler 2010; Matthies 1997). Secondly, and related to this, frequent policy reviews, statements, and discussions within the peacebuilding field continue to reiterate the belief that peacebuilding needs to fully engage with the political and context conditions in target countries in order to address them in any meaningful way (DfID 1997; 2005; OECD 1998; Pouligny 2002; UN 1992, 1995). Thirdly, the failure of peacebuilding actors to do so and the persistence of de-politicized and decontextualized standard approaches to peacebuilding have also been linked to peacebuilding drawbacks9, both in the

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8 For a counterargument on the importance of ‘root causes’, see Woodward (2009). However, Woodward argues that pre-war root causes might no longer be key drivers of ongoing conflict or tensions, which is an altogether different matter from arguing that ‘local’ dynamics are insignificant (on the transformation of conflict dynamics, see Körppen, Ropers, and Giessmann 2011 and Berdal 2009).

9 Assessments of the overall performance of peace operations vary (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Paris 2004; Walter 2004; Diehl and Druckman 2010). While Paris (2004) maintains that only two out of fourteen post-conflict peacebuilding missions undertaken between 1989 and 1999 can be deemed ‘successful’, Call and Cousens (2008) summarize quantitative studies and argue that post-conflict countries assisted by a multidimensional peace operation are less likely to revert to violence compared to those without (ibid.: 8-9). Fortna (2008) assesses peacekeeping
academic discussion (Bellamy et al. 2004; Berdal 2005, 2009; Call and Cousens 2008; Mac Ginty 2011; Pantuliano 2014) and among peacebuilding actors themselves (DFID 2005; Smith 2004; Scanteam 2007). These assessments are usually coupled with calls for peacebuilding actors to ‘address the root causes of violence’, increase or improve their efforts at conflict analysis, and to reflect on their own position within conflict contexts (Lawry-White 2003; Paris 2004; Smith 2004).

In a nutshell, the depoliticization of peacebuilding practice (and thought) has repeatedly been linked to the failures and setbacks of peacebuilding practice, as evidenced by the repeated extension of mandates that have amounted to de facto permanent missions in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Timor-Leste, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Autesserre 2009, 2011; Berdal 2009; Call and Cousens 2008, Schneckener 2006). In light of these criticisms and repeated peacebuilding failures in Rwanda and beyond, towards the end of the 1990s, there have been multiple efforts to revise and improve peacebuilding practices. These efforts have entailed a focus on greater sensitivity to ‘local contexts’ and the inclusion of ‘local actors’, for instance by improving conflict analysis and developing more expertise and capacity in the fields of building peace and understanding conflict contexts, many of which were sponsored or commissioned by relevant donors (Anderson 1999; Bush 1998, 2001; Paffenholz and Reychler 2006; Smith 2004, but see Stepputat 2013). A notable example is a study commissioned by the Norwegian Development Agency (NORAD) in 2006, which, following the recurrence of armed violence in Timor-Leste, was explicitly tasked with reassessing the conflict assessments and specific understandings of NORAD and other external actors that had guided their peacebuilding efforts thus far (Scanteam 2007). However, these efforts at revision, learning, and improvement notwithstanding, peacebuilding has largely persisted as a depoliticized and decontextualized practice (Sending 2009; Autesserre 2010, 2014). How then can we account for the persistence of effectiveness following intra-state conflicts in relation to additional factors that might influence the durability of peace. Inter alia, these factors include the military end state, the number of warring parties, the duration and intensity of war, as well as a number of socio-economic characteristics. According to her findings, the presence of a peacekeeping force reduces the likelihood of recurring warfare by more than 80 per cent (Fortna 2008: 125). By contrast, the presence of a multidimensional (peacebuilding) mission decreases this risk by only 53 per cent (Fortna 2004: 272). This discussion is further complicated by competing standards of what constitutes successful peacebuilding, i.e. a minimalist variant defined as the absence of renewed warfare, a ‘moderate’ standard with peacebuilding aiming at the prevention of renewed warfare and some improvement in the “quality of post-war governance” (Call and Cousens 2008: 7), or a so-called maximalist standard that would require peacebuilding measures to address the ‘root causes of violence’ (see also Diehl and Druckman 2011).
this practice in stark contrast to earlier thinking on the political nature of peace processes and in defiance of ongoing internal and external criticisms and reforms?

As argued above, previous critical\(^\text{10}\) research on peacebuilding has linked its depoliticization to underlying, mostly liberal internationalist beliefs and preferences of peacebuilders, the interests and stabilization agendas of major donors, or bureaucratic practices that lend themselves to standardization and professionalization. While providing many complementary insights into how depoliticization works in practice, none of these provide a comprehensive answer as to its origins and, most importantly, why it should persist despite the frequent failures and criticisms associated with it and its inconsistency with prior long-standing thinking on peace processes (Chandler 2005). By contrast, the argument that this project develops focuses on the agencies and international organisations tasked with conducting peacebuilding. It holds that peacebuilders inadvertently (seek to) render their engagement – and arguably its perception – ‘apolitical’ as a means of enabling them to act in politically contested environments while crucially maintaining their former institutional key principles and identities. It thus seeks to provide a new explanation for the depoliticization of peacebuilding that complements studies that draw on donor interests (Hill 2011) or primarily focus on the present-day personal and professional lives of interveners (Autesserre 2014) by taking the principal agencies and their trajectories into peacebuilding as a newly emerging field of practice as its starting point. Drawing attention to the institutional identities, prior practices, and assumptions of newly minted peacebuilding actors not only explains why peacebuilding emerged as a depoliticized practice in the first place, but in particular why this practice has persisted despite actors’ ongoing criticisms and revisions: in other words, why this key ‘lesson’ cannot be learned.

Before sketching out the main argument and outline of the thesis, I will develop and clarify my understanding of ‘the political’. Building on Mouffe’s (2005) conceptualization of the political, the following section will explore the relationship between what I have so far referred to as structural or functional approaches to peace and conflict as opposed to the substantial or political. As I will argue, Mouffe’s understanding, particularly her distinction between the political and the politics of a society, allows me to argue that the different strands of peacebuilding criticism recounted above all revolve around the

\(^{10}\)The term ‘critical’ is used here to distinguish these bodies of literature from the vast ‘problem-solving’ and policy-oriented literature on peacebuilding, whose primary focus is to revise and improve specific components of peacebuilding practice within the existing frameworks (Cox 1981).
omission of the political dimension in peacebuilding. Secondly, this discussion will allow me to draw out the concomitance of peacebuilding as a political project and peacebuilding as a depoliticized practice by arguing that ‘the political’ in peacebuilding is not merely omitted, but rendered mute by actors across the field.

ON POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL: Peacebuilding as a political project

When arguing that peacebuilding is or has become depoliticized, I do not claim that ‘peace as governance’ (Richmond 2008; Chandler 2009) or any other form of international intervention and peacebuilding, even in its most technocratic-administrative form, is not a political intervention in itself. Particularly in conflict settings, but arguably in any setting, any intervention short of a purely consensual mediating role is bound to be political and to be perceived as such. Instead, the argument that this thesis develops proceeds from the observation that peacebuilding has been rendered ‘a-political’ (which in itself constitutes a clearly political act). In other words, while the role of peacebuilders and the effects of peacebuilding interventions are undoubtedly political, peacebuilding practices, understood as ‘ways of doing’, clearly are not. Instead, peacebuilding practice is constituted by what Huysmans (2008: 165) has characterised as “the suppression of political renditions of the societal.”

To clarify the distinction between what I have so far referred to as the structural as opposed to the substantial, agential, or political dimension of peacebuilding practice, I adopt Mouffe’s (2005) conceptualization of ‘the political.’ Mouffe (2005) posits the fundamental ineradicability of conflict in social life and seeks to explore a channel through which such conflict may legitimately be expressed and negotiated. In so doing, she argues explicitly against a present liberal consensus or ‘post-political vision’ of society. According to Mouffe (2005: 2), such a vision presumes that ‘partisan’, identity-based, or other forms of ‘irrational’ conflict have been or can be overcome through “institutions which, through supposedly ‘impartial’ procedures, would reconcile all conflicting interests and values.” In her assessment, such a portrayal not only overlooks the persistence of collective identities and of the affective dimension of conflict, but also risks transforming existing cleavages into antagonistic ones absent any legitimate form of expression and contestation (Mouffe 2005: 4).

To begin with, Mouffe’s argument, although conceived primarily with a view to contemporary democratic theory, speaks to several key discussions within the peacebuilding field, such as the role of the liberal paradigm and the feasibility of a
'liberal peace’ in divided societies. According to this paradigm, societal conflict can be overcome by creating democratic liberal institutions that allow for the peaceful negotiation of contested claims. In this regard, Mouffe contrasts her understanding of the political with Arendt’s or Habermas’ vision of the political sphere as a space of rational and informed deliberation on the one hand, and with predominant notions within liberal theory of rational and individualistic actors capable of approaching political problems as (technical) issues to be resolved on the other (10). Instead, Mouffe emphasizes the persistence of (binary) collective identities and the affective dimension of social mobilization, a point that seems all the more pertinent with regard to societies that have recently emerged from violent conflict.

Secondly, in Mouffe’s understanding, the institutions of a society are inherently connected to its political dimensions. In this regard, Mouffe defines ‘the political’ as “the dimension of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies” (9). By contrast, ‘politics’ denotes “the set of practices and institutions through which an order is created” (9). In other words, ‘the political’ as constitutive societal antagonism is inherently linked to the ‘politics’ as ‘sedimented’ practices and institutions (9) which, emanating from previous conflict, establish a specific societal order and organize societal life. As Viriasova (2011: 1) emphasizes, in Mouffe’s and other post-foundational political theories, the “concept of the political is always already correlated with the notion of politics.” With regard to peacebuilding, this proposition implies that the institutions, i.e. the politics, of a society cannot be divorced from the ‘political’ either by design or by effect, a position that resonates with Huntington’s argument on the intrinsic links between social and political forces and the establishment (or transformation) of a political order.

Depoliticizing politics and the political

As the previous discussion on Mouffe (2005) has shown, insofar as structural approaches to peacebuilding aim to target the fundamental institutions, societal organisation, and practices of a given society, such as balances of power or access to resources, they do of course heavily engage with the politics of said societies. Such an approach treats issues such as social inequality, lacking access to resources, poverty,

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11 Viriasova (2011: 1) problematizes the “self-referential” nature of theories on ‘the political’ as they risk “overdetermining every position and mode of being, and purifying ... [themselves] of all non-political elements.”
and/or so-called ‘bad governance’ as the ‘root causes’ of violent conflict. How does this observation then relate to the overall argument on depoliticization? In this regard, it is important to distinguish between peacebuilding as a political project and peacebuilding as a depoliticized practice. In other words, while peacebuilding is a political project with political effects, it is the practice of peacebuilding, understood here as ‘ways of doing’, that is depoliticized. In essence, an exclusively structural understanding of conflict, while certainly highly political in and of itself, serves to write present-day political agency and contestation out of the picture, as conflict is ascribed to agent-free issues such as ‘population growth’ or ‘resource scarcity’ (such as in the case of the Rwandan genocide, see Buckley-Zistel 2008), rather than to the agency of contemporary actors. Such a division between agents and structures arguably also underlies Mouffe’s (2005) distinction between the political and politics. However, while both an intervention in the political and in the politics of a society constitute political acts, the former invariably requires an interaction with present-day local actors and (substantial) issues, while the latter can be cast or reframed in structural terms, hence sublimating its political content and rendering it mute (Huysmans 2008).

As subsequent chapters will analyse, depoliticization is accomplished by a set of interacting mechanisms, the most important of which is the focus on societal structures rather than on the political. Accordingly, while peacebuilding understood in standardized structural terms putatively justifies an extended – and certainly highly political – intervention in target societies along the lines of the ‘liberal peacebuilding paradigm’, i.e. the remaking of societies to resemble Western-style liberal democracies, it still allows peacebuilders to depoliticize their practices and to eschew any engagement with the ‘political’ and ‘politics’ of said societies due to the application of a standardized solution that is applied regardless of the context (‘peace from Ikea’, Mac Ginty 2008: 148), hence divorcing peacebuilding practice from a consideration of and engagement with ‘sedimented’ orders and practices (politics).

Building on Mouffe’s distinction between ‘the political’ as constitutive and inherent societal antagonisms and the ‘politics’ as ‘sedimented’ practices establishing a specific social order, the thesis argues that regardless of whether authors criticize peacebuilding practice for lacking regard for ‘local’ dynamics and ‘root causes’ or emphasize the prevalence of standardized, administrative-technocratic approaches, i.e. “peace as governance” (Richmond 2005), they do in fact provide, partly complementary, restatements of what is essentially the same phenomenon: the persistent failure (or avoidance) of external peacebuilders to engage with local actors and dynamics in target
countries, and their subsequent replacement with functional approaches to changing the structures of said societies. As such an engagement would inevitably be political, its avoidance has essentially led to the depoliticization of peacebuilding practice.

CONCEPTUALIZING PEACEBUILDING AS A NEW FIELD OF PRACTICE

The thesis focuses on the agencies tasked with conducting peacebuilding and argues that the depoliticization of peacebuilding and its persistence can only be properly explained by analysing the tensions that arose between actors’ institutional identities and practices on the one hand, and the particular nature of challenges they faced on the other. When the first international organisations were deployed to diverse places such as Rwanda or Bosnia, there was relatively little perceived wisdom to fall back on (Haynes 2008), nor were there any institutions or divisions specifically dedicated to or commissioned with this new task (Ramsbotham et al. 2011). Instead, most peacebuilders initially got involved in the emerging field based on the assumption that their task merely consisted of ‘assisting’ or ‘aiding’ the implementation of an existing peace agreement and relying on their previous practices. While this haphazard and frequently improvised nature of peacebuilding has been criticized before (Bellamy et al. 2004: 13-14), the effects that this mode of development has had for what has become one of the most influential international projects, i.e. transforming a steadily growing\textsuperscript{12} number of conflict-ridden states into peaceful ones, have been relatively neglected so far.

To emphasize the degree to which the new objective of building peace in states emerging from violent conflict, what Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 232) have called “the main driver of post-war reconstruction,” distinguishes this international effort from ongoing and related practices, the thesis conceptualizes peacebuilding as a qualitatively distinct and new field of international practice. While peacekeeping, diplomatic peacemaking, and humanitarian and development aid are mostly ‘practised’ by the very same institutional actors that also engage in peacebuilding, they follow different purposes and/or rationales. What is more, these rationales not only enable actors to implement their mandates, but they are also constitutive to the identities of these communities of practice, as are, for instance, the principles of impartiality in the case of the humanitarian community and peacekeepers (Tsagourias 2007; see chapter 3).

\textsuperscript{12}This increase refers to the number of mandated operations and does not suggest an increase in the number of intrastate wars during the studied period (see Franke and Warnecke 2009).
By combining Bourdieu’s (1977, 1999) conceptual apparatus of field and habitus with different strands of practice theory (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Lave and Wenger 1991; Pouliot and Mérand 2013), the thesis traces and analyses the process by which ‘members’ of existing communities of practice, such as peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian action, incrementally – and by different trajectories – became involved in the new international endeavour of ‘building intrastate peace’. These actors, while retaining their original purposes and mandates (albeit to varying degrees), reassembled around a new objective. In other words, it is the identification of a new objective and its subsequent adoption by specific sets of actors that led to the emergence of ‘peacebuilding’ as a new field of practice that is characterised by “socially meaningful patterns of action” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 6). When looking at it from this perspective, it is the interaction between the new objective and its specific challenges on the one hand and the institutional identities of the new peacebuilders on the other that shaped the depoliticized character of peacebuilding. For this reason, an exclusive focus on studying the actors or their activities in themselves is not sufficient for understanding the evolution of peacebuilding practice, including its persistent depoliticization.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

As argued above, the original assumption of most international peacebuilding actors, as well as of donors and other stakeholders in the emerging field, was that their task largely consisted of providing assistance to the implementation of a (consensual) peace agreement. A common understanding at the time held that agencies were to contribute to peace ‘consolidation’ by conducting projects based on their sectoral expertise. This assumption, i.e. that peace had already been made, implied the expectation of a general degree of consent and political will for peaceful cooperation at least on the elite level, and that the task of the specialized agencies mainly consisted of ‘implementing’ provisions whose political dimension had already been negotiated elsewhere. In many cases, this expectation, particularly in terms of consent and cooperation, was hardly justified and posed particular challenges to the work of those actors who, in their earlier practices – and for different reasons –, had relied on impartiality and/or political neutrality as well as on partnering with host state governments. What is more, in contrast to the provision of short-term disaster relief and the assistance to long-term development, there was no specific expertise at the time for what came to be called ‘managing transition’ or, in fact, building peace (UN 2005; Haynes 2008), nor were there any specific peace and conflict units. In fact, most new peacebuilders entered the field
based on their sectoral capacities in areas such as institution building, disarmament, or the repatriation of refugees. As a result, approaches to peacebuilding were largely developed by way of trial and error, improvisation, and direct learning.

In particular, most newly minted ‘peacebuilding’ agencies faced two related dilemmas. Firstly, there are obvious tensions between forms of external assistance that are characterised by impartiality or political neutrality such as development, humanitarianism, and peacekeeping on the one hand, and peacebuilding on the other, which contains aspects of all these but is essentially a political task. Secondly, while this problem might be less evident in cases where a comprehensive (political) solution to conflict has been endorsed by all parties, this dilemma is exacerbated if peacebuilding is to be conducted in countries where a political settlement has been enforced on the parties, or otherwise remains strongly contested. In these cases, peacebuilding requires (and faces) a considerable degree of (political) contestation and negotiation. This, however, poses a serious dilemma if the actor in question is at the same time a development or humanitarian agency committed to the principles of impartiality or neutrality. Over time, the repeated frustration of peacebuilders’ ‘implementation’ efforts prompted them to revise and reframe their approaches in such a way as to ‘enable’ them to act in highly contested and politically charged settings while crucially maintaining their previous practices and institutional identities.

One way of ‘resolving’ this tension is to resort to a revised understanding of ‘impartiality’ that replaces the perceptions of local stakeholders by a universal, and hence decontextualized, principle or mandate as its primary point of reference (peacekeepers and some humanitarian organisations). Another approach that has arguably been followed by most development agencies reframes the ‘root causes of conflict’ in purely structural terms that are largely devoid of any present-day political agency and thus enable a developmental agenda of ‘building capacity’ and knowledge transfer. What all these mechanisms have in common is that they enable actors to avoid the dimensions of the political and the ‘politics’ of conflict, including issues such as ‘ethnic, religious, or linguistic strife’ as originally identified as a major conflict dimension by the UN Secretary General (UN 1992). In sum, these strategies of conceptual revision/adaptation, reframing, and decontextualization have together characterised and at the same time constituted the new field of practice, and arguably, the ways in which intra-state peace and conflict are interpreted in international organisations.
Why should this be a problem? After all, it could be argued that development agencies, for instance, are simply not equipped to engage in political contestation and should restrict their efforts to redressing structural issues such as inequality. However, coming back to peacebuilders’ initial premises, more often than not, peacebuilding is conducted in heavily contested environments that might require some form of ‘local peacemaking’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 14), rather than in ‘post-conflict’ environments as originally understood. Even if one was to follow the propositions of the liberal peace paradigm, peacebuilding cannot be successful if it is restricted to establishing institutions for the peaceful negotiation of future conflicts, without being willing to address ongoing ‘political’ issues on those precise terms. Against this backdrop, peacekeepers, humanitarians, and development agencies arguably are simply not the most suitable candidates for peacebuilding, or at the very least not on their own. This conundrum might be part of the answer why peacebuilding fails to reach its ‘full potential’ (Autesserre 2014), but it likely accounts for why peacebuilding persists in its current ‘depoliticized’ form: in other words, why this lesson cannot be learned.

UNDERSTANDING PEACEBUILDING ON ITS OWN TERMS

How does this account differ from previous studies of peacebuilding, and what are the advantages of conceptualizing peacebuilding as a qualitatively new field in theory and practice? Analyses of ‘post-war reconstruction’ efforts usually adopt the theoretical and practical lenses of one particular set of actors. For example, Bellamy et al. (2010) study peacebuilding as an extension of UN peace operations and explore its relationship to peacekeeping. Other authors explore the linkages between development practices and peacebuilding, taking their shared concern for long-term processes and sustainability as their starting point. Finally, another group of analysts from the conflict resolution tradition builds on Galtung’s influential distinction between different peace support activities and focuses on their interactions (Ramsbotham et al. 2011).

From the point of view of understanding peacebuilding, the first problem with these studies is that they risk repeating the same compartmentalization on the analytical level that also characterises part of the practice. In other words, any analysis of peacebuilding

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13 E.g. Barnett et al. (2007); Kühne (1997); Matthies (1997); Pugh (1995); Smith (2004). However, with the exception of Barnett et al. (2007) and to some extent Miall et al. (1999), the purpose of these studies is usually not to understand or explain the practice, but to identify possible synergies between the two fields with a view to suggesting improvements for practitioners.
that is based on and accordingly favours a specific component of the new field invariably fails to adequately take into account its overarching objective, as it is bound by the premises and objectives of the particular (origin) community, rather than by the overall objective that all actors have in common. The second, empirical problem with these studies for understanding peacebuilding is the high degree of cooperation and coordination, particularly in the area of developing 'best practices', and the division of tasks – including such unlikely partners as military peacekeepers and humanitarian and development workers in civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)\textsuperscript{14} - that the shared objective of building peace has facilitated amongst these and additional newly created actors (see, for instance, Autesserre's [2014] recent notion of 'Peaceland'). For this reason, it seems hardly feasible to analyse the practices of a particular actor (or group of actors) in a given context without taking into account the partly complimentary measures conducted by other peacebuilders in the same context. Thirdly, by conceptualising peacebuilding as an emerging field of practice, the empirical analysis avoids stepping into the terminological trap mentioned above: in the early stages of the field, many agencies, particularly developmental and humanitarian ones, did not explicitly perceive of themselves as peacebuilders. Instead, they dispatched to so-called 'post-conflict' countries expecting to implement a range of 'ordinary' development or humanitarian activities (see, for instance, UNDP 1997). In many cases, it was only after earlier efforts had been frustrated, usually by the perceived resistance or unwillingness of 'local actors', that agencies took a more proactive, albeit necessarily depoliticized, stance towards addressing conflict, thus embarking on a process of constant revision and transformation of their practices.\textsuperscript{15}

CHAPTER OUTLINE

As the previous discussion has shown, my two claims, i.e. that (1) peacebuilding constitutes a distinct new field of international practice that has (2) persistently been depoliticized, are intrinsically linked. For this reason, I will develop my argument in two steps. The first part of the thesis will study the context in which building peace after intra-state violent conflict came to be identified as a new task for the international

\textsuperscript{14} This cooperation can take many forms, ranging from small-scale so-called 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams' made up of humanitarian and military actors in Afghanistan, to the systematic coordination of all external efforts, such as in the case of the UN's 'Integrated missions' (de Coning 2007).

\textsuperscript{15} Another factor that facilitated this development was the critique of the role of external actors in Rwanda and the potential unintended consequences of aid (Uvin 1999; Kaldor 1999).
community and led to the emergence (chapter 4) and transformation (chapter 5) of the new field and its practices. In addition to studying the premises and assumptions of relevant actors at the time, this part will in particular emphasize the impartial and politically neutral identities and related practices of the new peacebuilding actors from their earlier communities of practice. The second part of the thesis will subsequently move to an analysis of practices in two peacebuilding cases (chapters 6 and 7), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2005) and Timor-Leste (2000-2010), to assess how these key principles have played out in shaping actors’ responses to recurring political obstacles to their efforts, which ultimately led to the depoliticization of the practice and its persistence. In so doing, the analysis will also emphasize the extent to which the nature of the relationship between host state authorities and external peacebuilders influences peacebuilders’ scope of action.

Based on a review of existing explanations for the depoliticization of peacebuilding practice, chapter 2 will argue that these fail to address the creative agency, identities, and practices of the main peacebuilders, as these are usually treated as mere pawns of major donors and Western governments. To the extent that studies of peacebuilding agencies exist, these either focus on bureaucratic practices and frames or on common characteristics and beliefs of the so-called ‘peacebuilding culture’ (Autesserre 2010). Against this backdrop, I will argue that the depoliticized content and nature of peacebuilding practice can only be properly understood based on a theoretical framework that simultaneously captures the traits that all peacebuilding agencies have in common and at the same time allows for an appraisal of the different trajectories by which these actors entered the new field. Accordingly, chapter 3 will combine a Bourdieusian (1977, 1999) field perspective with recent strands of practice theory to develop a new theoretical framework for studying the process by which actors from three diverse communities of practice, peacekeeping, development, and humanitarianism took up peacebuilding as a new objective and brought their earlier mandates and practices to bear on the evolution of the new field.

With a view to identifying potential dilemmas between actors’ institutional identities and practices on the one hand and the requirements of the ‘new task’ on the other, my analysis builds on Hansen’s (2006) methodological framework, which posits that policy actors seek to construct stable discourses that link their policies with their identity. The research scrutinizes the causal narratives within the practical reasoning of

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peacebuilding actors that link their assessments and representations of the context (problem) to appropriate policies (solution) that match their institutional scope of action and are seen as ‘appropriate’ within the peacebuilding field (identity) (March and Olsen 2004). In so doing, the analysis deliberately takes a broad approach to peacebuilding, understood as all civilian actions undertaken by international actors with the objective of building peace in countries emerging from violent conflict (see Tschirgi 2004) and leaving questions of terminology and concepts to the reasoning of the studied actors.

Employing this theoretical and methodological framework, chapter 4 reconstructs the peacebuilding field of practice as constituted by a specific (a) objective (task), building peace after war, and its (b) principal actors from the peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian fields and the conceptual ‘legacies’, principles, and identities they brought from their original communities of practice. This framework integrates an assessment of the context in which peacebuilding was identified as a new task or objective for the UN/international community in the early to mid-1990s. In particular, it will focus on the specific problems this new task was expected to address, as well as on actors’ reasoning on appropriate means. This analysis will be juxtaposed by a discussion of the three major groups of actors that took on the new task, i.e. peacekeepers, developmental, and humanitarian agencies, focusing particularly on their institutional/shared identities and standard operating principles. Both with a view to discussions at the UN and in the case of these actors, a particular focus will lie on the assumptions that guided actors’ initial involvement in peacebuilding.

Chapter 5 traces the transformation of peacebuilding ‘best practices’ over the past two decades at the level of the field, as represented by leading peacebuilding actors. These are the UN Security Council, Secretary-General, and select entities of the UN Secretariat on the one hand, and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) as the major donor forum on the other.\(^\text{17}\) This analysis of the ‘best practices’ and ‘lessons learned’ guides of leading peacebuilding actors will enable me to detail the mechanisms by which actors have navigated the tensions between their institutional mandates and the political nature of obstacles to ‘peace implementation’ after intra-state violent conflict. As this chapter will show, while actors have employed a variety of mechanisms, the common denominator

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\(^{17}\)This analysis is complemented by additional sources from the World Bank and a range of non-governmental organisations.
of these constantly revised approaches to peacebuilding is their depoliticization of essentially political problems and solutions.

Having established the foundational dilemma and tensions within the peacebuilding field and the consistent depoliticization of the evolving ‘best practice’, the second part of the thesis moves to a detailed analysis of central peacebuilding actors in two ‘post-conflict’ settings: Bosnia and Herzegovina (chapter 6) and Timor-Leste (chapter 7). In analysing the making of practice in the context of ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2005) and Timor-Leste (2000-2010) respectively, I will demonstrate the extent to which the persistence of (political) contestation or ‘obstruction’ has prompted impartial and/or neutral peacebuilders to adjust their practices through a set of mechanisms that seek to address this ‘obstruction’ in a depoliticized way. Following a brief introduction, both case studies proceed by a reconstruction of what I will refer to as the ‘executive level’ of the peacebuilding field. For each case, the executive level comprises all those actors that have influenced the shape of the respective peacebuilding effort, for instance through defining the scope and mandate of the peace operation or by providing (donor) funding and/or political leverage to support key initiatives. The reconstruction of the executive level not only serves to contextualize the approaches of the studied peacebuilding agencies, but also enables me to study the dominant narratives that have accompanied the peacebuilding interventions, and in particular the extent to which political contestation and/or opposition were seen to obstruct the international effort. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I study the peacebuilding measures of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and of the UK Department for International Development (DFID). By contrast, the second case study on Timor-Leste only focuses on one peacebuilding agency, the UNDP, and takes the approach of the first case study further by analysing a number of specific projects in addition to country strategies and assessments. As my analysis will show, the two cases differ considerably with regard to the relationship between host state authorities and international peacebuilders. Throughout the studied periods, the relationship between the studied peacebuilders and (most) public authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained problematic, with international actors mostly perceiving of Bosnian authorities at the state and entity levels as obstructing the peace process. By contrast, the relationship between the East Timorese elite/government and international peacebuilders, while certainly not unproblematic, was generally cooperative, with a number of leading East Timorese representatives enjoying a considerable reputation among UN agencies. As I will demonstrate, following the
emergence of a political crises and violent clashes in 2006, this cooperative relationship enabled the UNDP to directly contribute to peacemaking efforts among the population. However, this contribution was entirely framed in terms of building the capacity of and assisting the efforts of the East Timorese government, thus allowing the UNDP to retain its impartial and politically neutral identity and attendant practices.

To conclude, the thesis studies the transformation and depoliticization of peacebuilding practice at the level of the peacebuilding field and in two distinct case studies. While the former allows me to detail the different mechanisms by which the political has been muted in mainstream peacebuilding practice, the case studies will make the argument how the tension between actors’ institutional identities as impartial and/or politically neutral agents on the one hand, and the ‘resistance’ and contestation to the peace processes on the other prompted them to devise ever newer approaches to casting essentially political problems (and in part policies) in non-political terms.
INTRODUCTION

The depoliticization of peacebuilding practice and the persistence of standardized, decontextualized approaches has been observed and criticized in a number of recent assessments. While most analysts agree that these phenomena are problematic and ought to be redressed, only a few venture to account for their origins. Instead, recent publications have investigated the extent to which the ‘liberal peace’ is ‘compromised’ (Barnett and Zürcher 2009) or ‘hybridized’ (Mac Ginty 2010) by local actors. Others have tried to develop new ‘localized’ or ‘hybrid’ approaches to liberal peacebuilding that balance international and ‘local’ instruments (Autesserre 2010; Boege et al. 2009; Richmond 2005; 2008; 2011; Boege et al. 2009).18 While acknowledging that some form of hybridization or interaction between foreign intervention and local practices inadvertently does – and certainly ought to – take place, this thesis holds that suggesting revisions of peacebuilders’ approaches with regard to addressing the political and hence contextual dimension will be unlikely to bear fruit as long as the major dilemmas within the field remain unexplored.

To the extent that the literature (implicitly) accounts for the depoliticization of peacebuilding practices, studies generally fall into one of the following categories: (1) assessments of the (liberal) peacebuilding paradigm and its universalist and institutionalist policies that are held to be inherent to liberalism; (2) analyses of donor (state) interests and preferences with regard to projecting social control, and of (3) institutional and bureaucratic patterns and ‘pathologies’ as drivers behind the current depoliticized practice. Finally, there are a limited number of studies that have begun to systematically engage with the (4) level of the peacebuilding field and its major actors. These are Autesserre’s works on the ‘peacebuilding culture’ in the DR Congo (2006,

\[\text{18} \text{In a similar vein, though usually less prone to advocating the adaptation of ‘Western solutions’ to non-Western contexts, several authors have argued that ‘Western’ assumptions about peace and conflict are not universally applicable (Salem 1993, 1997; De Sousa Santos 2005).}\]
2009, 2010) and beyond (2014), and, to a lesser extent, Barnett and Zürcher’s (2009) chapter on the strategic interaction between peacebuilders and local elites.

2.1 THE LIBERAL PEACE

There is widespread agreement that peacebuilding thought and practice is heavily predicated upon the construction of liberal democratic states and liberal institutions of ‘governance.’ As Mac Ginty (2011: 38) argues, this culture or set of beliefs, i.e. the liberal peace, is “manifest” on two levels: “The first is through the liberal peace as an international system; the second is through specific international peace-support interventions. In the former, the liberal peace often manifests itself through international structures, norms, and regimes and soft power. ... In this way, the liberal peace is latent and customary, and it rests on a series of often unchallenged assumptions”, one of which is peacebuilding’s “attachment to the modern state as the principal unit of political organisation” (Mac Ginty 2011: 39). In regard to the depoliticization of peacebuilding, most analysts seem to concur that there is a tendency that is ‘inherent’ (Richmond 2008) to liberal thought in general and to the liberal peace paradigm in particular to avoid an engagement with ‘local’ contexts and actors and to replace such engagement with standardized, largely institutional, governance reforms. For instance, Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 4) and Call and Cousens (2008: 14) conclude that peacebuilders’ preoccupation with institutional reform and stability encourages the neglect of underlying sources of conflict and of the political nature of peacebuilding.

A wealth of studies analyse the beliefs and culture of ‘liberal peacebuilding’ and its affinity to statebuilding and governance reform as standard solutions to armed conflict.19 The so-called ‘liberal peace’ paradigm rests on the assumption that sustainable peace is to be attained through the transplantation of Western models of liberal democracy and market economy to post-conflict environments. While peacebuilding practice as such has undergone several modifications and extensions and has been subject to an intense academic debate on how to improve its overall performance,20 the conceptual or, as Richmond (2008) puts it, ontological foundations of

20 Beyond the default criticism that centres on a presumed general lack of resources and coordination among external actors, analysts and practitioners have discussed the sequencing of
the ‘liberal peace’ or ‘New York consensus’ (Paris 2002: 638) have largely remained unchanged in the past two decades.

Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004) distinguish between traditional Westphalian and contemporary post-Westphalian perspectives on peace operations. According to this framework, until the end of the Cold War, ‘traditional Westphalian’ peace operations had been delimited to consent-based peacekeeping deployments, primarily in cases of inter-state conflict. By contrast, post-Westphalian peace operations are grounded in the belief that for international peace to prevail, post-conflict societies have to be transformed into liberal-democratic states, assuming far-reaching rights and responsibilities for external peacebuilders (Bellamy et al. 2004: 11). As Bellamy (2005) argues “[t]he principle aim of peace operations thus becomes not so much about creating spaces for negotiated conflict resolution between states but about actively contributing to the construction of liberal polities, economies and societies” (Bellamy 2005, cited in Chandler 2010: 138). Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009) explore competing definitions of peacebuilding objectives and discuss related normative perspectives. According to the authors, the ‘realist’ position is limited to containing conflict, with “failing or conflict-prone states” having replaced dominant aggressive ones as the main threat scenario following 9/11 (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009: 9). On the other hand, peacebuilding as a “liberal project” features a broader objective of facilitating emancipation and social justice (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009: 4; Richmond 2005, 2008). What all these different takes have in common is that they highlight an underlying assumption on the part of peacebuilders and other interveners that violent conflict within societies can be avoided by building (liberal) institutions capable of channelling and negotiating conflict.

The most thorough examination of the liberal peace framework and of its ontological assumptions is offered by Richmond (2005, 2008, 2011), who identifies four major “strands of thought in the liberal peace framework”, i.e. the victor's peace, institutional peace, constitutional peace, and civil peace (Richmond 2011: 5). In Richmond’s account, the ‘liberal peace’ built by external peacebuilders is mostly “made up of a victor’s peace at its most basic level, an institutional peace to provide international governance and guarantees, a constitutional peace to ensure democracy and free-trade and a civil peace to ensure freedom and rights within society” (Richmond 2008: 7). In other words, the peacebuilding tasks (Paris 2004; Schneckener 2005), the tensions between attaining justice and peace in post-conflict environments (Pouligny 2002; Fischer 2011), and the participation and, increasingly, welfare of local actors in the process (Pugh 2005; Richmond 2008, 2011).
first three components translate into security, institutional reform, and constitutional reform as the dominant peacebuilding tasks. By contrast, the last component, i.e. the civil peace, which supports bottom-up emancipatory processes and social justice, is usually insufficiently addressed. This omission triggers dissatisfaction and resistance by the 'subjects' of liberal peacebuilding, who rarely benefit from externally imposed top-down reforms in their daily lives (Richmond 2011: 6-7).

In sum, as Richmond (2011: 6) contends, peacebuilding has increasingly come to be equated with building state and governance institutions, what he terms “peace-as-governance.” In the course of the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, these tendencies have further been exacerbated as liberal peacebuilding is seen as having effectively been “coopted” (Richmond 2008: 114) by statebuilding. In Richmond’s account, the prioritization of governance and statebuilding manifests “a liberal tendency to avoid engaging with local culture and its essentialization of identity in the political institutions it tries to create” (Richmond 2011: 6). In a slight variation of the general criticism, Mac Ginty (2011: 28-29) argues that the key problem with liberal internationalist approaches to peacebuilding is the “particular form of liberalism” that has been endorsed: “its tendency towards militarised or coercive interventions, its neo-liberal interpretation of economics, and its ethnocentrism.”

Richmond questions the liberal peace’s capacity to integrate diversity or “question[s] of agency and autonomy of the subject” and concludes that it has so far largely been unable to “emancipate, critique and reconstruct new forms of politics” (Richmond 2011: 131). In Richmond’s account, these shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding are ‘inherent’ to liberalism and can be traced to its intellectual and conceptual roots in “dominant strands of Enlightenment thought” (Richmond 2011: 131). In this regard, most thinking

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21 These suggestions have also been advanced by proponents of the so-called ‘civil-society first’ approach, who advocate prioritizing civil society ‘development’ and altering ‘conflict attitudes’ through bottom-up approaches on the local or community level (Ryan 1990; Lederach 1997; Fischer 2008).

22 Barnett et al. (2007), however, reach a different conclusion, arguing that donors place more emphasis on the kind of state being built rather than on its degree, i.e. the proper functioning of that state. One of their key recommendations is hence to increase institution-building efforts.

23 This development has triggered criticisms of peacebuilding as a new version of hegemonic or neo-imperialist politics (Duffield 2001, 2007; Pugh 2004).

24 To redress this shortcoming, Richmond explores the feasibility of a ‘post-liberal peace’ through what he calls the ‘everyday of peace’, as it “allows us to escape the essentialisation or romanticisation of the... often translocal local, the marginal, the subaltern, the customary and hybridity, not to mention northern epistemologies. It is the enervation of agency and the repoliticisation of peacebuilding that is the objective here, either by reforming the liberal social contract... or more likely, by opening up a discussion of an individual agency beyond territorial sovereignty and the cosmopolitan or communitarian liberal state” (Richmond 2011: 119).
is seen to converge on what he calls "liberal-realist anti-politics" (Richmond 2011: 131), i.e. a vision of peace that primarily relies on a "state-centric balance of power" in the case of realism and the "institutionalisation of liberal norms of economic, political and social ... cooperation, regulation and governance" in the case of liberalism in its many variants (Richmond 2008: 9). Due to the ubiquity\(^25\) of such thinking among scholars, practitioners, and policymakers, this concept of peace is held to be "ontologically stable" and hence universal and replicable (Richmond 2008: 12, 94): "By extension this means that peace can be engineered in environments ... [and] is constructed according to the preferences of those actors who are most involved in its construction. This confirms the pragmatism inherent in an agenda for peace, but also the interests that may lurk behind it" (Richmond 2008: 12).

According to Richmond (2011: 16), top-down decision-making processes from the headquarters to field levels as well as the monopolization of liberal peace discourses contribute to neglecting the everyday or local dimension of building peace. To redress this tendency ‘inherent’ in liberal conceptions of peace, Richmond (2011: 16) argues for more context-sensitive approaches and investigates the scope for "hybrid local-liberal peacebuilding." In his argument, a focus on the ‘everyday of peace’

allows us to escape the essentialisation or romanticisation of the now very diverse and often translocal local, the marginal, the subaltern, the customary and hybridity, not to mention northern epistemologies. It is the enervation of agency and the repoliticisation of peacebuilding that is the objective here, either by reforming the liberal social contract and so salvaging liberalism and the state, or more likely, by opening up a discussion of an individual agency beyond territorial sovereignty and the cosmopolitan or communitarian liberal state (Richmond 2011: 119).

Richmond provides a powerful critique of the ontological and epistemological underpinnings and implications of dominant ‘liberal’\(^26\) notions of peace. What is more, he ties this argument to the ‘needs’ of liberal policymaking for replicability (Richmond

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\(^25\) See, however, Selby (2013) and Cooper, Turner and Pugh (2011), who argue that the paradigms underpinning ‘the liberal peace’ are not as universally shared as Richmond and others (Paris 2010) claim. In this regard, it is worth pointing out that the notion of the ‘liberal peace’ appears to be near hegemonic among Anglophone IR scholars, but less so within the subfield of peace research or among authors from non-Anglophone, for instance German, linguistic backgrounds.

\(^26\) Chandler (2010: 137) argues that the critics of the liberal peace paradigm themselves tend to conflate the content with the label and “suggests that post-Cold War post-conflict intervention and statebuilding can be better understood as a critique of classical liberal assumptions about the autonomous subject – framed in terms of sovereignty, law, democracy and the market. The conflating of discursive forms with their former liberal content creates the danger that critiques of liberal peace can rewrite post-Cold War intervention in ways that exaggerate the liberal nature of the policy frameworks.”
2011: 94), thus claiming that the liberal peace paradigm is compatible with the interests and preferences of Western policymakers. In Smith’s words, by "eschewing accounts that seek to understand and celebrate difference in favour of explanations based upon a decidedly Western view of rationality, International Relations has effectively served as a handmaiden to Western power and interests" (Smith 2004a: 513, cited in Richmond 2008: 93). However, none of this in and of itself explains the origin of such preferences, nor does it provide any insights into the interests of Western policymakers or of their origins. Instead, in Richmond’s account, the interests and preferences of said policymakers appear to be taken as a given. Secondly, when it comes to the content of these liberal or liberal-realist beliefs, Richmond appears to posit certain traits, such as the disregard for "subjective issues, ... identity and culture" (Richmond 2008: 90) and the inclination towards universalist propositions as ‘inherent’ to liberal thought. This, however, in turn begs the question as to why certain strands of liberalism should have become dominant over others. As Richmond concedes, citing Geuss (2002) and Jahn (2005), there are alternative, for instance Kantian, strands in liberalism that are more favourable towards difference, subjectivity, and local agency and consent (Richmond 2008: 94). In other words, while Richmond provides a compelling analysis of the ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin the so-called liberal peace and shows how these are compatible with requirements of institutional (and in part bureaucratic) policy making, this neither explains the predominance of one particular strand of liberalism over alternative varieties in peacebuilding nor accounts for the content and origin of actors’ interests and preferences. Most importantly, while an argument could be made that such conceptions were dominant in the early stages of the international peacebuilding field following the end of the Cold War and the apparent triumph of Western liberal politics, it seems less clear why such approaches should have remained dominant in spite of their apparent drawbacks and mounting criticisms.

In general, analysts of the ‘liberal peacebuilding’ paradigm such as Richmond, Mac Ginty, and Call and Cousens (2008), while noting a tendency towards either depoliticization or decontextualization, appear to be less interested in understanding its origins than suggesting ways of improvement. Their explanations are hence often limited to observing a ‘liberal tendency’, assessing different schools of thought therein in the case of Richmond, or to the professionalization and standardization of liberal institutions. What is more, these analyses usually focus on the questions of ‘context’, ‘local ownership’, or ‘participation’, without necessarily exploring the degree to which ignoring these dimensions amounts to omitting the entire political dimension of peace
processes. In sum, while noting a ‘liberal tendency’ towards disengagement from local contexts and an affinity to state-based institutional solutions, studies of the liberal peace paradigm shed very little light on why these tendencies should have come to the fore and dominate the entire peacebuilding agenda in the first place. In other words: given the inherent tensions between the political and non-political aspects involved in peace support, the observation of certain tendencies within liberal thought does not explain why, counter to earlier (liberal) thinking, the entire political dimension of post-war peace support should have remained unaddressed and replaced by procedural-administrative solutions such as institution-building, and continues to be so despite its apparent drawbacks.

2.2 WESTERN INTERESTS AND THE STABILIZATION AGENDA

Both Duffield (2001, 2007) and Chandler (2000, 2006) argue that ‘Western’ governments and international organisations have come to reinterpret social, economic, and political problems in terms of technocratic and administrative solutions (see also Mac Ginty 2011: 32-34). Inverting long-standing beliefs regarding the mutual dependence of security and development in so-called ‘fragile’ or ‘weak’ states, Duffield (2007: 4) argues that “a liberal problematic of security” has come to dominate “the political foreground” as a means of Western states to contain and control the “surplus population” in the developing world (Duffield 2007: 19; 24) and to guarantee global stability. In light of the securitization of development over the past decades, particularly the recent shift towards “stabilization”, Duffield (2001, 2007) argues that this has become the key raison d’être of development and other forms of liberal interventionism. In Duffield’s portrayal, the ‘Western’ quest for stability and security is seen as the main driver behind a liberal interventionist agenda that has come to see ‘state failure’ or the existence of “ungoverned space[s]” as key threats to international security (Duffield 2007: 29).

This agenda is organized around ‘development’ as “simultaneously a technology of international betterment and security” (Duffield 2007: 15). In this regard, Duffield argues that while ‘conflict’ has been a “defining motif of the 1990s,” it is gradually replaced by “instability” (26) as a dominant trope. In sum, the combination of development and security has drawn interveners into “a new and enduring political

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27 For a critical engagement with the notion of state failure or weakness in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding, see Schmelzle and Fischer (2009).
relationship: a post-interventionary terrain of international occupation” (27). Over time, the “liberal urge to govern” has come to manifest itself in increasingly coercive and comprehensive forms of intervention: “in supporting the transition from intervention to post-intervention through state reconstruction, the UN has defined its mission in terms of isolating and, if necessary, taking on, political spoilers; the political terrain of post-intervention is one of narrowing and closure” (29). In lieu of this political terrain or space, interveners implement a range of “experimental technologies” within the framework of an “educative trusteeship” characterised by contingent sovereignty (29-30).

Duffield’s argument centres on the preferences and interests of (liberal) interveners to secure, stabilize or control so-called ‘ungoverned spaces’, driven largely by Western security concerns following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and a ‘will to govern’ presumed to be inherent to liberal institutions. The degree to which state failure or weakness has become a key security concern – or securitized – not only among the international community, but also particularly among the peace and development community, can hardly be overemphasized. However, like in the case of Richmond (2011), the inherency argument, i.e. the claim that liberalism has an inherent urge to govern or rule appears to open up more questions than it answers, and hardly provides an explanation regarding the modus operandi of such interventions. While noting the narrowing down of the political space in ‘post-conflict’ post-interventionary territories, the explanation Duffield provides for such ‘depoliticization’ appears to rely on a presumed “longstanding affinity” between “progressive liberal-left institutions and actors” on the one hand and “the synergy between biopolitics, development and security” on the other (Duffield 2007: 30).

The existence of such an affinity, however, does not in and of itself explain why such “experimental technologies” should have come to replace the entire political dimension of peace processes. The same holds true with regard to the synergies between biopolitics, development, and security. While Duffield persuasively argues how these respective agendas have overlapped and partly merged, the fact that actors might assume synergies between development and peace processes (with their own security agenda) does not explain why the former, and more specifically a particular a-political version of the former, should have come to substitute for the latter. In other words, while Duffield’s argument pertains both to ‘post-conflict’ situations and to ‘ordinary development’ situations alike, actors’ distinctions between their different activities and related objectives do not seem to be relevant to his account. As a result, Duffield’s
account neither distinguishes between development and other forms of ‘liberal interventionism’ nor does it take stock of the particular kinds of peace intervention and their at times contradictory principles (peacekeeping vs. peacebuilding and peacemaking), as not all target countries are treated in the same way. Rather, Duffield summarily portrays development as “conceal[ing] a stubborn will to manage and contain disorder rather than resolve it” (2007: viii). In effect, then, Duffield’s analysis implicitly accepts development as the ‘natural’ conceptual starting point for external interventions in peace support.

As a consequence, Duffield’s analysis does not engage with the agencies tasked with implementing or conducting peacebuilding and peace support on their own terms and in regard to their diverse objectives. Instead, they are merely seen as pawns of state interests whose agency vis-à-vis ‘Western’ states is delimited to reframing or repackaging their policies in line with states’ preferences for government and control. This portrayal not only ignores the considerable scope of agency and authority of such institutions (Barnett and Duvall 2005), but it also applies a sweeping brush to all the efforts and motivations of such actors to learn and improve their practices. In this regard, Duffield (2007: 215) argues that ‘development’ fails to learn from problems or experiences other than in terms of “immediate technical considerations relating to effectiveness, appropriateness or best practice”, and instead displays a “marked ability to absorb criticism by constantly repackaging its basic tenets.” From the point of view of understanding peacebuilding and the depoliticization of the practice, this observation merely reiterates, but hardly answers, the question as to why actors should persist in refusing to learn or change a practice that has time and again been criticized as problematic by these and other actors.

Chandler (2006, 2010) shares many of Duffield’s (2001) observations regarding the reinterpretation of political, social, and economic problems in terms of ‘administrative-technocratic’ solutions (Chandler 2005, 2006) and specifically the merger between statebuilding and peacebuilding in the last decade (2010). With regard to statebuilding, Chandler argues that “there is a tendency to see state-building as a technical or administrative process, one which does not require building a popular consensus for policy-making” (Chandler 2005: 308), but rather the building of state or governance ‘capacity’ in largely functional and depoliticized terms (Chandler 2006: 5-6). He contrasts this tendency, and in particular the Bosnian experience in which “all but token local input in the making and implementation of policy” were excluded, with the experiences of the post-WWII Allied reconstruction efforts in Germany and Japan, which
“engaged the local populations in a major project of social, economic and political reconstruction and, through doing so, won a high level of popular legitimacy and support” (Chandler 2005: 308).

However, with a view to authors such as Duffield (2001, 2007) and others who have focused on development, governance, and conditionality as forms of social control of non-Western states (Abrahamson 2004), Chandler argues that such an explanation does not explain why Western governments should cloak their interventions in such apolitical, merely technocratic terms, particularly since there appears to be less need to legitimize their practices in the absence of alternative models of governance (Chandler 2006: 17-19). Summarized as Empire in Denial (2006), Chandler claims that resorting to a standardized and seemingly ‘non-political’ statebuilding agenda that centres on ‘social inclusion’ has allowed Western governments and donors to pursue social control and stabilization crucially while at the same time denying an explicit projection of power and seeking to avoid the adjacent (political) responsibility for impacts and outcomes. As this assessment of the omission or replacement of the political in peacebuilding (as statebuilding and beyond) is compatible with the one that informs this thesis (see the discussion in infra ch. 1), it is well worth quoting it in detail:

The politics of social inclusion are the opposite of traditional politics. Firstly, there are no interests involved; there is no appeal to a particular social or political constituency. Social inclusion is beyond the politics of contestation; social inclusion is based on meeting the needs of the excluded ... Secondly, there is no ideological or political content, the politics of social inclusion are not about social change or transformation, they are based on pragmatism ... policy-making .... is the task of policy-professionals in association with the advocacy groups which represent the needs of the excluded social groups ... However, the clearest connection with state-building is in the broader rejection of responsibility in the politics of social inclusion ... This is the politics of the evasion of responsibility, a shift from government as policy actor to government as therapeutic empowerer (Chandler 2006: 21).

However, for Chandler, the main puzzle arises from the fact that Western governments seemingly continue to depoliticize their interventions despite the fact that there do not seem to be any tangible policy alternatives, i.e. presumably no need for justification and hence depoliticization after the end of the Cold War. However, this claim firstly underestimates the existence of alternatives (and competitors) such as China and potential regional hegemons, and it also underestimates the extent to which such interventions and expenses have to be legitimized vis-à-vis domestic and local audiences. Secondly, this explanation ignores the peculiarities of post-conflict situations as opposed to post-communist transitions on the one hand and ‘traditional’
development situations on the other. If solely looked upon from the point of view of ‘Western governments’, it might be plausible to make the claim that their overriding interests and preferences for stability and control remain unperturbed by such distinctions and do in fact lend themselves to generalist approaches. However, as argued previously, such a portrayal fails to take into consideration the agency of the institutions tasked with conducting peacebuilding, and the degree to which a (political) engagement with societal conflict and other dynamics in contested societies challenges their key institutional mandates and operating principles.

In his 2010 article, Chandler subsequently called into question the content of the ‘liberal peace’ paradigm as such. In his view, the unquestioned acceptance of peacebuilding as an essentially ‘liberal project’ has allowed observers and practitioners to draw the conclusion that, given repeated failures and setbacks, the subjects or targets of the ‘liberal peace’, i.e. the “non-liberal Other” (Chandler 2010: 146), might not yet have been ‘ready’ for full-fledged democracy or liberalisation. Chandler argues that both policymakers and critics of the liberal peace “have developed historically low expectations” regarding the transformative power of external interventions or assistance (Chandler 2010: 146). In this argument, disillusionment with development interventions and a “consensus of opinion on the dangers of democracy” following peacebuilding failures enabled the predominance of “institutional solutions ... to the problems of conflict and transition [which] is indicative of the narrowing down of aspirations from transforming society to merely regulating or managing it” (Chandler 2010: 147; see, for instance, Paris 2004). To some extent, this process is also manifest in the literature on ‘liberal peacebuilding’, which, according to Chandler, by assuming that the content of liberal peacebuilding is indeed ‘liberal’, "bears much less relation to policy practice than might be assumed by the critical (radical and policy) discourses and, in fact, appears to inverse the relationship between the critique of the liberal peace and the dominant policy assumptions” (Chandler 2010: 138; see also Selby [2013] for a similar argument).

Chandler rejects the common claim that international statebuilding endeavours seek to construct liberal states, citing both the enlargement process of the European Union and the modus operandi of international intervention in Sub-Sahara Africa by international financial institutions. In both cases, actors are seen to merely mould and at the same time reduce the state to a “mechanism for external coordination and regulation [rather] than ... a self-standing actor in so-called 'Westphalian' terms” (Chandler 2010: 149). Accordingly, the combination of developmental institutionalism with notions of
‘transition’, i.e. the idea that people, societies, and markets are not yet ready for ‘freedom’, has given rise to the “internationalisation of the mechanisms of governance, removing substantive autonomy rather than promoting it”, thereby effectively replacing transformation with “regulatory stability” (148). In Chandler’s argument, among policy makers, the replacement of liberal content with liberal form and the concern regarding the presumed destabilizing effects of democracy have “informed the focus on human rights and good governance” (147). In the literature, it has at the same time given rise to suggestions regarding the development of ‘hybrid’ or ‘localized’ approaches to peace (Boege et al. 2009; Richmond 2011; Mac Ginty 2011) on the one end of the spectrum, and a renewed interest in revised forms of Empire Lite (Ignatieff 2003; Ferguson 2003), “period[s] of benevolent foreign autocracy” (Chesterman 2004: 4), and ‘shared’ (Krasner 2004) or ‘gradual’ sovereignty (Keohane 2003) on the other. However, according to Chandler (2010), by ignoring the highly illiberal nature of ‘liberal peacebuilding’, both strands of the literature, while suggesting different ways out of this dilemma, invariably buy into the belief that the failures of liberal peacebuilding are attributable to a mismatch between liberal policies and interventions on the one hand, and illiberal subjects on the other.

While putting forward alternative assessments regarding the ‘liberal’ nature of peace support interventions, Chandler and Duffield agree in their claims regarding the ‘(liberal) will to govern’ and the focus on control and stabilization. Both assessments also highlight the influence of developmental ‘lenses’ or thought and practice in shaping the modes of government, or rather liberal interventionism. However, in these perspectives, a direct link between the interests and preferences of the major donors, international organisations and Western governments, and the form and content of peacebuilding practice is assumed. In other words, donors are seen as capable of projecting their preferences to rule by disengagement, i.e. in a decontextualized and depoliticized form via the channels of a set of peacebuilding agencies.

One problem with these accounts is that they pay hardly any attention to the agency and conditions of these peacebuilding agencies themselves, and how these have interacted with conflict contexts. The other related shortcoming of this view is that it does not provide an answer to the persistence of the practice. Why should external actors such as donor governments and agencies continue to hold on to the standardized, decontextualized approach despite its major setbacks, mounting costs in light of the increasing number and duration of these efforts, and a growing sense of disillusionment, or what Mac Ginty (2011: 6) has referred to as a “crisis of confidence” among liberal
peacebuilders of all ranks? In this regard, Chandler (2010) mentions interveners’ pessimism regarding their ability to ‘transform’ societies, but it is not clear why these actors should automatically interpret these setbacks to result from a mismatch between liberal interventions and illiberal subjects, i.e. in essentialist terms. In particular, and in contrast to much of the literature cited by Chandler, actors within the field have long since focused their efforts on learning, revision, and improvement on questions of sensitivity to context, culture, and what is usually referred to as ‘local ownership’, albeit with little effect (Sending 2009). Lastly, this portrayal does not provide an answer to the puzzle of why actors continuously avoid an engagement with the political dimension of peacebuilding, which would in principle provide an alternative or complement to (liberal) institutional or developmental frames, whose purchase is evidently questioned by practitioners and analysts alike.

2.3 ACTORS: BUREAUCRATIC PATHOLOGIES, PROFESSIONALIZATION, AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMES

A growing body of literature studies the dynamics of institutional and bureaucratic practices and their partly unintended consequences. Building on organizational theory (Starbuck 2006; Weick 1995), pertinent research either focuses on the power and practices of international and intergovernmental organizations in general (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; 2004; Barnett and Duvall 2005) or on the practices of specific actors, many of which are involved in peacebuilding. Examples include the World Bank (Ferguson 1990), the UN (Kittikhoun and Weiss 2012; Wyeth 2011), bilateral European development agencies (Lawry-White 2003; Smith 2004; Wilde 2006), USAID (Hill 2011), the US mission to the UN (Barnett 1996; 2002), or the NGO community (Goodhand 2006; Rittberger 2008; Richmond and Carey 2005). While the former group of scholars analyses the origins, dynamics, and sources of power of such organizational practices, the latter group is primarily concerned with analysing the peacebuilding approaches of particular organisations. With the exception of Ferguson (1990), Barnett (2002), and to a lesser extent Hill (2011), they do not attempt to explain the origins of these practices.

While such discussions of context, culture, and ownership might in principle include the notion of a mismatch between ‘liberal’ and ‘local’ perspectives, more often than not peacebuilding actors are concerned with their (institutional) inability or inflexibility to adjust to particular circumstances.
The ‘pathologies’ of international organizations and bureaucratic practices

Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 725) argue that bureaucratic cultures establish “powerful patterns of behavior” and of dysfunction at the same time. In a departure from rationalist principle-agent accounts of international organisations, Barnett and Finnemore explore the mechanisms by which international organisations tend to deviate from the behaviour normally expected within a rationalist epistemology, i.e. a “reasonable degree of responsiveness to states’ expectations.” In this view, the development of internal standard operating procedures, shared beliefs, experiences, and rituals (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 710) encourage the development of distinct bureaucratic cultures and identities that, over time, shape the definition of goals and objectives, and might hence become increasingly independent of or at least modify the organisation’s original purpose. With regard to the peacebuilding field, an example for a distinct institutional approach would be the focus on ‘human development’ pioneered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Whether or not this process is adequately referred to as a ‘dysfunction’ or ‘pathology’ of international organisations does certainly lie in the eye of the beholder, not least since Barnett and Finnemore explicitly argue against a rationalist principle-agent assessment of the phenomenon. Particularly with regard to the United Nations and its different entities, Jolly, Emmerij and Weiss (2009) and Emmerij (2007: 39) highlight the creative capacity and agency of international organisations and argue that their power lies in the “quality and relevance of the policy ideas they put forward”. Regardless of the wider theoretical implications of this debate regarding the power and agency of international organisations (see chapter 3), in the present context, this phenomenon can best be thought of as institutional idiosyncrasies, i.e. the extent to which institutions, and to take it further, their constituent parts, develop their own cultures and identities that subsequently shape their members’ outlook, views, and perceptions (Weick 1995). As Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 720-725) discuss, this process might include such phenomena as redefining new tasks or framing problems in light of existing institutional rules, applying the same rules to all contexts due to an universalist bureaucratic outlook, insulation, and the compartmentalization of tasks according to institutional responsibilities. In sum, this list could certainly be amended.

Barnett and Finnemore’s argument regarding the effects of universalist bureaucratic outlooks ties in with Richmond’s (2008) and Mac Ginty’s (2011) claim that liberal thought is inherently universalist and not prone to integrating diversity. When looking at it from this perspective, it seems that one of the reasons for the ‘success’ of the liberal
peacebuilding paradigm amongst international peacebuilders has been its compatibility with universalist and compartmentalized bureaucratic structures. In this regard, a decisive trait that almost all institutional peacebuilding actors appear to have in common is the tendency to professionalize or standardize their efforts. Several authors have argued that efforts to enhance bureaucratic efficiency internally as well as donor coordination externally (Call and Cousens 2008; Berdal 2009) have had two significant implications.

Firstly, they favour the prioritization of structural or functional understandings of peacebuilding and conflict resolution, not least since relevant country expertise is often lacking while expertise on specific issue areas such as elections or institution building is not. On the one hand, structural interpretations render interventions manageable and feasible by enabling the implementation of a so-called template or ‘cookie-cutter’ approach to peacebuilding; in other words, the application of a standardized set of instruments or ‘tools’ (Berdal 2009: 19; Aggestam 2015; Call and Cousens 2008). On the other hand, such approaches are likely to omit comprehensive conflict assessments, as they tend to mask the complexity of specific conflicts that might eschew pre-existing templates or categories.29 Especially in countries emerging from widespread mass violence, important dimensions that do not fit into structural accounts include the intentions of perpetrators, cultural orders of violence, and the meanings or functions of violence that continue to have a strong impact on affected communities and post-war societies (Baberowski 2008; von Trotha 1997). Instead, as argued in the introduction, ‘structural’ explanations and approaches provide ‘agent-free’ perspectives by focusing on issues such as inequality, weak institutions, and the scarcity or abundance of resources.

Secondly, the professionalization of peacebuilding contributes to obscuring the essentially political nature of any proactive involvement in conflict resolution that transcends traditional consent-based monitoring tasks. Assessing the pertinent paradigms that guide the interventions of development actors, Duffield (2001: 15; 2) argues that their “commitment to conflict resolution and the reconstruction of societies in such a way as to avoid future wars” has led them to pursue “a radical agenda of social transformation,” with development assistance assuming a “new life as a structural form of conflict prevention” (121). Consequently, war and other forms of violent conflict are frequently understood as problems of underdevelopment or institutional breakdown.

29 For a critique on the kinds of criteria that inform most standardized conflict assessments, see Stepputat (2013).
(45) and addressed accordingly, i.e. in terms of social and political engineering. Concurrently, with a view to the practical engagement of external actors in specific conflicts, several authors have highlighted the need for third parties to reflect on the specifics of each given conflict in order to understand their own role and scope of activities therein (Ferguson 1990; Cousens and Kumar 2001; Mayall 2007; Call and Cousens 2008; Berdal 2009).

While claims and admonitions to this effect abound, it seems all the more surprising that they have hardly been taken up so far by the academic community itself as a subject of study. More importantly, however, it is not clear to what extent the professionalization and bureaucratization arguments can account for the content of peacebuilding practice. It appears obvious that a standardized bureaucracy is ill equipped to do justice to a specific national or regional setting or to devise contextualized approaches. Likewise, it seems plausible to suggest that a universalist variant of liberal theory lends itself to bureaucratic standardization. However, none of this constitutes an inevitable development: firstly, as argued above, there are alternative versions of liberalism that could have been adopted; secondly, the absence of contextual knowledge is a consequence of an institutional practice to build sector-related rather than area-specific expertise; and, thirdly, the practice of tasking ‘bureaucracies’ with conducting peacebuilding in the first place is not without alternatives and arguably results from the initial assumption that peacebuilding consisted in a range of ‘measures’ that merely had to be ‘implemented’ (see chapter 3). In other words, the bureaucratization argument is not capable of establishing a simple causal relationship between the professionalization of peacebuilding and its depoliticization and decontextualization.

Another way of approaching the question of standardization and professionalization would be to look at the underlying principles or criteria that have been adopted within this process. In a comprehensive criticism directed specifically at the World Bank and its influential research division, Berdal (2009: 19-20) relates the decontextualization of peacebuilding to the predominance of “modern social-science methodology, specifically in its positivist rational-choice variety.” Similarly, within the context of his critique of the failure of standard IR theories to develop a ‘rich’ concept of peace as more than just the absence of war, Richmond (2008: 5), referring specifically to realism, concludes that

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30 Miller and Rudnick (2010) claim that the predominance of “universalist, structuralist, and rationalist explanations” in research on peace and security was part of a bigger trend in the social sciences which “solidified the dominance of thematic and technical knowledge and deemphasized the importance of area studies” (Miller and Rudnick 2010: 64, cited in Autesserre 2014: 76).

31 Witness, for instance, the more recent practice of appointing individuals as Peace and Conflict Advisers for peacebuilding as jointly developed by UNDP and DPA.
“parsimony, reductionism and rationalism run counter to a peace that engages fully with the diversity of life and its experiences.” In this context, it is worth noting that most authors who have combined an assessment of the underlying notions that inform peacebuilding (and developmental) interventions with richly contextualized studies of the practices and objectives of peacebuilding actors (both individuals and institutions) are either anthropologists or ethnographers by training or have adopted ethnomethodic methods (Apthorpe 2011; Autesserre 2010; Buckley-Zistel 2006, 2008; Campbell 1999; Fechter and Hindman 2011; Mosse 2011). This observation and the fact that research on peacebuilding has very often been conducted within an applied or policy-relevant setting might help us to understand why a larger critical academic reassessment of dominant peacebuilding paradigms has only begun to evolve relatively recently. What is more, while such a lens is not by itself able to explain why this approach has been favoured over others, it does point to the power of epistemic communities, specifically in cases where practitioners and analysts not only share the same ontological and epistemological paradigms and cooperate closely, but are, indeed, identical (Adler and Bernstein 2005; Kittikhoun and Weiss 2011).

Institutional frames
The case seems less clear, however, when it comes to the redefinition of new tasks along the lines of existing institutional frames or rules, as this could possibly work in two directions. On the one hand, several agencies and institutions have modified or extended their original purposes to include reconstruction, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution. This applies to the majority of bilateral development agencies, which, across virtually all OECD member states, have considerably extended their functional expertise and authority to include post-conflict peacebuilding and conflict resolution capacities (Smith 2004; Warnecke 2006). On the other hand, however, it could be argued that such an extension of the agenda does not necessarily imply a ‘deep transformation’ of the institution and its mandate, but merely an incorporation of new policy areas aided by reframing.

A telling example of a pervasive institutional culture and of the effects of applying a particular institutional lens is provided in Ferguson’s (1990) account of the engagement of the World Bank in Lesotho. Ferguson's starting point are the observed discrepancies between academic accounts of Lesotho’s political and socio-economic situation in the mid-1970s and the World Bank’s country report on Lesotho for the same period. Based
on a detailed assessment of the 1975 World Bank Country Report on Lesotho, Ferguson argues that the World Bank’s rendering of the country as an ‘aboriginal peasant society’, neatly fitting into the criteria of a ‘Least Developed Country (LDC)’, not only runs counter to academic accounts of the insignificance of agricultural farming to the country's economy in the past decades, but also entirely eschews a consideration of the primarily political causes of Lesotho’s economic difficulties. According to Ferguson’s assessment, this discrepancy in interpretation is not due to insufficient analytical capacity on the part of World Bank analysts, as the World Bank tends to “attract top talent” (Ferguson 1990: 30). Instead, the discrepancy results from the World Bank’s institutional need and default tendency to frame contexts and issues in technical categories that are amenable to “the only sort of intervention a ‘development’ agency is capable of launching: the apolitical, technical ‘development’ intervention” (Ferguson 1990: 69; see also Upham 2002). On the one hand, such an argument goes some way towards explaining the predominance particularly of developmental frames among peacebuilders, as many peacebuilding agencies are in fact developmental organisations (for instance, the UNDP and most bilateral development agencies of OECD members states). However, while it is certainly true that development practitioners tend to think of themselves as humanitarian or altruistic and hence politically neutral agents (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 5), political neutrality is by no means a defining or mandatory principle for the developmental field, as Ferguson suggests. In other words, while actors evidently frame their new task along the lines of their earlier expertise, rules, and practices, this observation in and of itself tells us very little about which frames become (and remain) influential and which ones do not, particularly in those cases where earlier frames arguably proved to be problematic.

Given its position of authority and resources as well as the agenda-setting role of its research division (Berdal 2005), the World Bank is certainly a key example for the agency and idiosyncrasy of institutional actors, be it in the development or peacebuilding field. However, it appears that institutional or bureaucratic cultures are but one element in explaining the generation and content of actors' practices, as Ferguson’s (1990) findings regarding the depoliticizing effects of the developmental lens are mirrored by Duffield’s (2001, 2007) assessment of developmental and other ‘liberal’ interventionist practices at the supra-institutional level. In this sense, several of Ferguson’s observations on the framing practices of the World Bank are not exclusive to this particular institution, but are shared by segments of the developmental,
humanitarian, and peacebuilding fields and hence point towards a common trait at the supra-institutional level.

With a view to both Ferguson’s and Duffield’s arguments, the important question in the context of the present research is why a developmental lens should have been adopted to address all kinds of problems in a post-war society in the first place. Or, to pose the question differently: why have developmental actors and developmental practices become so influential in peacebuilding, and why has this particular practice prevailed despite its – self-professed – drawbacks and external criticisms? To return to the earlier example: if peacebuilding expertise is claimed to have a markedly apolitical and acontextual outlook due to the prevalence of functional rather than regional and political expertise within the studied bureaucracies, this still does not answer why actors continued to rely on this kind of expertise throughout the major institutional reforms and re-establishments of the past two decades. As early as 1997, the OECD Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation emphasized that peacebuilding required the inclusion of a range of actors from different sectors of government in addition to development ministries and agencies, as well as a greater willingness on the part of the latter to address “sensitive political issues” (OECD 1997: 80). If this was evident to key stakeholders in the mid-1990s, why has this lesson not been implemented despite its having frequently been reiterated ever since?

To conclude this discussion, bureaucratic practices such as standardization, professionalization, and compartmentalization are relevant to explaining the depoliticization of peacebuilding practice in two ways. Firstly, they tie in with explanations that assess the predominant ‘liberal peace’ paradigm, such as the universalism claimed to be inherent to liberal thought. Secondly, standardization and professionalization, while not able to entirely account for the persistence of problematic practices, are nonetheless useful in understanding processes of habitualization and socialization, both of which make critical reflections on and changes to practice less likely. However, as I have indicated above and will argue in subsequent chapters (chapters 3 and 4), a focus on institutional mechanisms alone, both in terms of practices in general or of frames as part of such practices in particular, cannot explain the prevalence of similar or identical practices at the supra-institutional level. In other words, the explanation of the depoliticization of peacebuilding practice either has to focus on factors at the level of the peacebuilding field or culture or has to identify a trait that all or most actors have in common.
2.4 THE PEACEBUILDING CULTURE

A fascinating and comprehensive account of the peacebuilding culture, i.e. of how frames or lenses combine to influence actors’ peacebuilding practices, is provided by Autesserre’s (2010) study of the international peacebuilding intervention in the DR Congo. In contrast to Barnett and Finnemore (1999) and Ferguson (1990), Autesserre argues that these frames located at the supra-institutional level, i.e. the ‘peacebuilding culture’, as institution-centred accounts fail to explain why different actors should exhibit nearly identical dysfunctional practices. Studying the ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ intervention in the DR Congo from 2002 onwards, Autesserre (2006, 2009, 2010) argues that a dominant peacebuilding culture shaped the perceptions and approaches of external actors and led them to ignore persistent local violence in the Eastern provinces as well as its specific origins and dynamics. This dominant culture or “post-conflict peacebuilding frame” consisted of four elements: two dominant assumptions, i.e. that the DRC was in a post-conflict phase in 2002 and that violence was “innate to Congolese society”, as well as pre-existing beliefs that peacebuilding interventions ought to be restricted to the national and regional levels and that holding elections would stabilize the path to peace (Autesserre 2009: 261-271). As a result, different international peacebuilders, both at the institutional and individual levels, shared a set of ideologies, rules, rituals, assumptions, and definitions, which “established the parameters of acceptable action. It shaped what international actors considered at all, what they viewed as possible, and what they thought was the ‘natural course’ in a given situation ... In sum, this culture made it possible for foreign interveners to ignore the micro-level tensions that often jeopardize macro-level settlements” (Autesserre 2010: 10).

In the present context, a key distinction is the one between pre-existing frames and those specific to the Congolese situation. In the case of the former, the question arises as to the origins of the frames. While the assumption that peacebuilding should be restricted to the national and regional levels is hardly surprising in the case of diplomatic staff and other bilateral political actors (Chesterman 2004), it seems less self-evident in the case of developmental agencies working in peacebuilding, as these are also mandated to work with non-state and sub-state level ‘partners’. With a view to those frames or elements of the ‘peacebuilding culture’ specific to the Congolese situation, the assumption that violence was ‘innate to Congolese society’ begs the question to what extent similar frames or readings have also been developed in relation
to other conflict contexts and are hence a necessary constituent part of ‘peacebuilding culture’ or practice.

Autesserre’s (2010) study is a highly persuasive account of how present ‘peacebuilding practice’ enables external actors to ignore or reframe the local context and the persistence of violent conflict, at least on the sub-state level. Drawing on Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Autesserre (2009: 271) also mentions the role of “organizational constraints” in tilting actors’ preferences towards particular frames. However, this does not explain why peacebuilding as a standardized and by default ‘non-political’ and decontextualized practice should have emerged in the first place, not least since Autesserre places hardly any emphasis on distinctions that are (or used to be) relevant to actors within the field. In this regard, like Mac Ginty (2011), Autesserre uses the terms peacemaking and peacebuilding interchangeably (2010).32 However, given the tensions arising from opposing principles and tasks associated with these concepts and activities, the answer to the question as to why these rather than other frames have come to dominate peacebuilding practice necessarily needs to start with actors’ own definitions of tasks and objectives, which long preceded the Congolese intervention.

In her subsequent study, entitled Peaceland (2014), Autesserre moves the focus of her enquiry to the ‘everyday practices’ and routines of peacebuilders to pursue the puzzle of the persistence of inefficient peacebuilding practices despite the widespread acknowledgement of their dysfunction. Autesserre makes a strong argument for studying the ‘how’ of peacebuilding in addition to the ‘what’, arguing that problematic ‘everyday practices’ “enable, constitute, and help reproduce the strategies, policies, institutions, and discourses that political scientist usually study … [and] also explain the existence and continued use of ways of working that interveners view as inefficient, ineffective, or even counterproductive” (Autesserre 2014: 9). In so doing, she emphasizes the creative agency and scope of action of so-called ‘on-the-ground-peacebuilders’ vis-à-vis their headquarters, as instructions are not merely implemented but are also interpreted and adjusted to local circumstances. In this regard, important cases in point are the usually vague character of peacekeeping mandates by the UN Security Council and the substantial degree of autonomy of several peacebuilding and intervening institutions.

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32 In her 2014 study, Autesserre clarifies this relationship by claiming that peacemaking and peacekeeping can be part of peacebuilding (Autesserre 2014: 21). However, this understanding is neither congruent with the original UN definitions (UN 1992) nor uncontroversial or self-evident among practitioners in the field (see Ramsbotham et al. [2011] and my discussion in chapter 3).
Like the present project, Autesserre’s study commences from the observation that interveners ‘habitually’ do not adhere to their own perceived wisdom, particularly when it comes to the inclusion of ‘local ownership’ and sensitivity to context: “It is conventional wisdom that local ownership is essential for successful peacebuilding, but local stakeholders rarely feel included in the design of international programs. Practitioners and researchers have written countless books, articles and reports to explain that approaches based on ready-to-use, universalized templates usually fail and context sensitivity is crucial” (Autesserre 2014: 4-5). She explains this puzzle by identifying a set of habitualized practices, or what she refers to as “mundane elements – such as the expatriates’ social habits, standard security procedures, and habitual approaches to collecting information on violence” (Autesserre 2014: 9). Examples for such problematic ‘Peaceland’ practices are the prioritization of thematic over country-specific knowledge, the isolation of ‘expatriates’ compounds from the target society, and other mechanisms that increase the inequality between interveners and local populations or the emphasis on the capital and regional centres for security and logistic reasons. Autesserre holds that these “various dynamics have four distinct, cumulative impacts on peace and conflict” (13). On the ‘upside’, peacebuilders are able to “function” in a range of highly diverse settings. However, the negative impacts of these dynamics are that peacebuilders continue to rely on counterproductive, inefficient, and ineffective practices, i.e. “biased information and analysis, frequent misunderstandings … the focus on top-down causes and solutions” which “regularly prevent interveners from recognizing existing signs of violence” (13).

This approach addresses an important and likely underestimated dimension of the practice, and it is particularly persuasive with regard to the claims on habitualization and socialization, i.e. the degree to which specific practices (and frames) are being taken for granted by actors in the field. However, while detailing a range of interacting mechanisms and discussing their problematic effects, Autesserre pays less attention to the deeper origins of certain practices and their fundamental origins and importance beyond mere matters of habitualization. There are some practices whose origins might simply be traced to the general trend towards professionalization and the requirements of reporting to donors; for instance, when it comes to the focus on ‘quantifiable’ short-term results, which is certainly characteristic of most project-driven and donor-funded work (Autesserre 2014: 239). However, as this thesis argues, not all these mechanisms can be traced to what Autesserre refers to as the ‘everyday practices’ of peacebuilding, but instead point to more fundamental conceptual problems at the heart of the
peacebuilding project. These, however, can only be properly analysed when studying and disaggregating the institutional and prior identities and practices of the different communities of practice that together make up the peacebuilding field.

A notable case in point is Autesserre's treatment of the issues of impartiality and neutrality (234ff.). While admitting that "adhering to these principles makes the interveners' work possible" (235), Autesserre discusses a number of drawbacks of these principles in the field, particularly when it comes to the discontent by beneficiaries of aid who would prefer aid agencies to ‘take sides’ (236). Autesserre also cites several peacebuilders who in "informal settings and off-record interviews, ... pondered whether the neutrality and impartiality principles are at all useful or relevant” (236) and backs this up with different conflict resolution theories, according to which neutrality and impartiality are only one of the ways of conducting peacebuilding and hence are not indispensable (cf. Lederach and Wehr). These considerations would in principle open up an important discussion on the role of these two principles and the related roles of different kinds of interveners in a ‘post-conflict environment’. However, Autesserre does neither. This is owing in large part to the focus of her enquiry on the ‘everyday practices’ and her starting assumption that all ‘inhabitants of Peaceland’ form one community with one objective regardless of their diverse backgrounds.

Taking up the observation from her earlier study that many of the frames (and practices) of peacebuilding are shared by peacebuilders across diverse institutions and from different social and economic backgrounds, Autesserre argues that all actors, i.e. the employees of international organisations, donor structures, NGOs, diplomatic missions etc., form a “transnational community of practice” (Autesserre 2014: 47), thus subsuming a wide array of actors in light of their joint “official goal: to help the host country and its people reach a sustainable peace,” crucially "regardless of whether or not they have other objectives alongside that goal” (12). This move, however, while highlighting the degree to which habits and practices are jointly shared, arguably disregards important differences when it comes to the trajectories by which these actors have entered the peacebuilding field of practice. This approach is useful when explaining the persistence of mechanisms on the level of ‘everyday practices’ that purely emanate from mechanisms of funding, safety and security provisions, gathering knowledge etc. However, particularly with regard to impartiality and neutrality, this approach obscures more than it explains. Humanitarians, development workers, and peacekeepers all adhere to some version of impartiality and/or neutrality, but for entirely distinct reasons and in different ways. As I will discuss in more detail in chapter
4, impartiality is a necessary requirement for peacekeepers that enables their work at the most fundamental level: only when parties to the conflict are convinced that their relative military and political strength is not altered by the presence of peacekeepers are they willing to consent to the presence of peacekeepers whose role is to safeguard a space for political negotiation and peacemaking. A similar observation holds true for humanitarian aid, which is usually dependent on the consent of or ‘invitation’ by the host state, and whose entire raison d’être is the impartial and neutral provision of aid based exclusively on need. In contrast, development actors are bound by neither principle, although they tend to identify with them. Finally, as Autesserre rightly highlights, there are alternative models in conflict resolution theory in which peacemakers assume a position that might be partial to one or more sides to the conflict (‘insider-partial’ as opposed to ‘outsider-neutral’). In other words, a thorough discussion of these principles in peacebuilding would have to start from an appraisal of the different communities that together make up the peacebuilding field to understand their distinct roles. Secondly, with regard to explaining the persistence of the practice, the analysis needs to aim beyond the habitualization of blurred distinctions between different peace support tasks in present practice. In other words, while I agree with Autesserre’s emphasis on the identification and appropriation of peacebuilding as a new shared objective, this adoption has required different processes of adaptation and modification to harmonize the requirements of the new objective with the requirements of (previous) mandates and identities in the case of peacekeepers, humanitarians, and development actors as distinct communities of practice. In sum, like in the case of Autesserre’s earlier study on the frames that shaped the intervention in the DR Congo, an important element that appears to be missing from her analysis are the important conceptual differences and roles that are all too often subsumed under labels such as peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and peacemaking, thus obscuring distinctions that are not only important to the theory but also to the emergence of the practice of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ and conflict resolution.

A similar observation holds true for Barnett’s and Zürcher’s (2009) study of the Peacebuilder’s Contract, which develops a strategic interaction model for peacebuilders and state elites in target countries. While this study adds peacebuilders’ bargaining positions as a crucial dimension, the analysis refrains from questioning the basic assumptions about the nature of the task by accepting actors’ contemporary understandings as the conceptual starting point for the analysis. Barnett and Zürcher

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33 In a second step, Barnett and Zürcher also add subnational elites (SNEs) to the model.
observe that peacebuilders often fall short of accomplishing their professed goals, i.e. the removal of the “the root causes of violence and creat[ing] ... [a] pacific disposition by investing these postconflict societies with ... democracy ..., the rule of law ..., a market economy ..., conflict management tools, and a culture of tolerance and respect.” The model of strategic interaction is based on the assumption that goal-oriented actors pursue critical preferences: the implementation of a liberal peace amidst a reasonable degree of stability in the case of peacebuilders, or, in other words, “the absence of war and a stable partner in the capital” (31). State and sub-national elites, on the other hand, are assumed to try to “preserve their political power and ensure that the peace implementation process either enhances or does not harm their political and economic interests” (31).

According to this model, “compromised peacebuilding” is the most likely of four possible outcomes: “Peacebuilders and local elites pursue their collective interest in stability and symbolic peacebuilding, creating the appearance (and opening up the possibility) of change while leaving largely intact existing state-society relations” (25). As Barnett and Zürcher (2009: 25) argue, their account allows for the inclusion of domestic politics and provides an answer to the puzzle why peacebuilding (understood as statebuilding) often leads to an increase in the “degree of the state” without actually transforming the “kind of state”, i.e. leaving state-society relations largely intact. However, in regard to the present research question, this approach, while shedding considerable light on the contextual conditions of peacebuilding and particularly the limitations encountered by peacebuilders in target countries (which partly interact with the restricted resources allocated to them by donor agencies) has two shortcomings. On the one hand, the authors limit their understanding of peacebuilding to statebuilding: “In our terms, peacebuilding is designed to enhance the degree and develop a particular kind of state” (28). On the other hand, they posit the existence of a settlement that is accepted by all key players (30). In other words, the authors accept some of the basic premises held by (some, if not all of) their relevant actors: that peacebuilding equals statebuilding and is usually conducted in countries that are in a ‘post-conflict stage’.34

34 The other possibilities being cooperative peacebuilding, in which local elites comply with the liberal peacebuilding agenda; captured peacebuilding, i.e. a subversion of the liberal agenda by local elites; and conflictive peacebuilding, in other words a peacebuilding process that relies on the (threatened) use of force which might include the withdrawal of external peacebuilders.

35 “... the simultaneous presence of a signed peace agreement and international actors signify that the parties have moved into a post-conflict stage” (Barnett and Zürcher 2009: 30).

36 The authors are very careful in qualifying the choices made and admit that these assumptions might be questioned, for instance, in terms of the sincerity of actors to adhere to peace accords etc. Nonetheless, this admission plays no role in their model.
This approach seems reasonable, as Barnett and Zürcher study the strategic interaction of actors, which naturally involves their assumptions and objectives. However, to the extent that their study addresses the bigger question of peacebuilding successes and failures in terms of peacebuilders’ own agendas (Barnett and Zürcher 2009: 31), accepting these premises leads to a distorted representation of the ‘setting’. After all, peacebuilding is more often than not conducted in a post-war rather than a post-conflict context. In addition, while peacebuilding has in effect come to resemble statebuilding in recent years, this is not to say that statebuilding in and of itself might actually be capable of solving all the tasks that peacebuilding originally set out to accomplish, particularly in cases to which the label ‘post-conflict’ has been applied prematurely (Autesserre 2010).

To sum up, while this study adds an important layer to the analysis, i.e. the unfavourable bargaining position encountered by many peacebuilders, it takes many aspects of the current peacebuilding practice whose emergence this thesis tries to explain, such as the narrowing down of peacebuilding to statebuilding and the post-conflict assumption, as given.

Autesserre (2010, 2014) and Barnett and Zürcher (2009) have moved the focus of their analyses to the practices of peacebuilders in interaction with their respective environments. While Autesserre emphasizes the frames (2010) and daily practices (2014) of peacebuilders as a distinct culture or community that transcends the individual organisation, Barnett and Zürcher (2009) study the interactions and bargaining processes between peacebuilders and host state elites. The three studies are highly pertinent for the argument of the present thesis; however, none of them explicitly addresses the depoliticization of the practice.

CONCLUSION

The argument that this thesis makes is that these puzzles can only be resolved by engaging with peacebuilding agencies ‘on their own terms’. This implies grounding the analysis of the emergence of peacebuilding practice in an appraisal of peacebuilders’ professed objectives and mandates in relation to their context conditions on the international level, in target countries, and ‘at home’. In this approach, the insights offered by the four bodies of literature discussed above become an important part of the story, but have to be more thoroughly integrated and grounded in an appraisal of the tensions inherent in the emergence of the new field and the ways in which these have been ‘resolved’ by peacekeepers, humanitarian agencies, and development actors as
distinct communities of practice, thus leading to the emergence of a new field of practice over time.

Most importantly, and in contrast to virtually all major studies of peacebuilding in particular or of peace support in general so far, this research prioritizes the distinctions of means and ends within the ‘peacebuilding’ field as derived from peace and conflict studies. Emerging in the 1950s and 1960s and associated with authors such as Galtung, Burton, and Lederach (Ramsbotham et al. 2011), ‘peace research’ as a discipline sought to understand the origins of violent behaviour among social groups and address them according to conceptual distinctions between the necessary ends and means (peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding). As I will argue, these distinctions and their related rationales have to a considerable degree influenced the identities, reasoning, and practices of actors in the peacebuilding field, owing in no small part to the field’s emergence in response to intra-state violent conflict as opposed to inter-state wars. As a result, these distinctions are taken for granted among most actors in the field and are indispensable to understanding their reasoning and practices, but have for the most part been ignored by previous political scientists and IR scholars, owing in no small part to their different disciplinary origins.
INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter, while primarily concerned with reviewing explanations of the (persistent) depoliticization of peacebuilding practice, has also highlighted two general shortcomings in the literature from the point of view of understanding peacebuilding. On the one hand, IR scholars rarely seem to be aware of the different peace support terms and concepts such as peacebuilding, peacemaking, and, to a lesser extent, peacekeeping that are used by scholars within peace and conflict research. While this could be dismissed as mere terminological differences between the (sub-)disciplines, the important point here is that these terms do in fact denote fundamentally distinct tasks, roles, and principles and carry significant meanings and implications for actors within the field, starting with the allocation of responsibility for peacekeeping, peacemaking and (of late) peacebuilding among the departments of the UN Secretariat. Secondly, and partly due to this conceptual imprecision (or ignorance), very few authors have so far undertaken to study ‘peacebuilding’ as a distinct practice and on its own terms (see ch. 2). Instead, the wealth of activities that take place (usually, if not always) under the auspices of the UN in countries emerging from violent conflict are very often subsumed under the general heading of ‘building peace’. As argued above, such a perspective not only glosses over meaningful distinctions and at times uncritically follows donors’ attempts to attach the label ‘peace’ to a broad range of activities, but it is also analytically fussy as it fails to develop a prior analytical notion of what it entails to support or consolidate peace. At the same time, while the reasoning and concepts of peacebuilders have to be studied on their own terms, for the purposes of the present project it is equally important to avoid presupposing any one particular understanding of peacebuilding, for instance by adopting particular donor understandings predominant at any given point in time (see the discussion on peacebuilding as statebuilding, Barnett and Zürcher [2009] in the previous chapter).

In short, this project firstly requires a working definition of ‘peacebuilding’ that is sufficiently concise to capture the distinct objective as it originally emerged in the early
1990s among the international community. At the same time, such a working definition ought to remain sufficiently flexible to applying a theoretical framework that allows for an analysis of actors’ transformed understandings and practices of their task with a view not only to understanding the emergence of peacebuilding as a depoliticized practice, but first and foremost its persistence. Secondly, the depoliticized content and nature of peacebuilding practice can only be properly understood in terms of a theoretical framework that simultaneously captures the traits that all peacebuilding agencies have in common and at the same time allows for an appraisal of the different trajectories by which these actors entered the new field. As subsequent chapters will argue, while actors have adopted a diverse set of mechanisms to depoliticize their practices, depoliticization is a central point of convergence for all peacebuilders and hence arguably constitutes a central defining feature of the practice.

Accordingly, following the development of a sound working definition of ‘peacebuilding’ (3.1), this chapter will further develop the rationale for conceptualizing peacebuilding as a new field of international practice (3.2). To this end, I will explore the ways in which practice-based approaches not only help me to address the question of the emergence and depoliticization of peacebuilding as a new international objective, but will also detail the analytical advantages of this approach compared to previous analyses. These have tended to subsume peacebuilding as one aspect of the post-conflict intervention agenda, rather than focusing on its distinct purposes and rationales (e.g. Duffield and Chandler). In particular, I will apply Bourdieu’s (1977, 1999) concepts of field and habitus to conceptualize and delimit the new field of practice and review different strands of practice theory with a view to understanding not only the reproduction, but also the emergence and transformation of new practices and fields (Adler 1997, 2005; Adler and Bernstein 2005; Adler and Pouliot 2011; Bourdieu 1977; Büger and Gadinger 2014; Haas 1990; Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 1998, 2006). Having established a theoretical framework for the thesis, I will briefly address the methodological question of how to study the emergence and transformation of practices (3.3). In particular, I will draw on the framework proposed by Hansen (2006) to conceptualize and operationalize the interface of discourse and practices as actors’ practical reasoning. The chapter concludes with an outline of and justification for my research design (3.4).
3. 1 TOWARDS A WORKING DEFINITION OF ‘PEACEBUILDING’

‘Peacebuilding’ has become the standard term to describe the objectives and practices of a host of international actors in the field of post-war reconstruction (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 232). However, despite its seeming simplicity, this term pushes the analyst down a slippery slope on the semantic, conceptual, and practices levels. To begin with, there are countless competing definitions of and synonyms for what the term actually means, both in research and among practitioners. More importantly, on a conceptual level, these terminological uncertainties are accompanied by widely differing views as to what causes conflict or facilitates peace, or, in some cases, a complete lack of such considerations (Richmond 2008). Finally, to make the confusion complete, the application of specific terms such as peacebuilding, peacekeeping, reconciliation, or reconstruction is not necessarily tied to particular conceptual understandings on the one hand or practices on the other (Barnett et al. 2007).

This pandemonium has been pointed out by several observers and usually serves to introduce renewed attempts at classifying peacebuilding, peace operations, or other forms of peace support (Barnett et al. 2007; Tschirgi 2004). An important point put forward by Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2004: 6ff) and Chesterman (2004) with regard to peace operations is the fact that most attempts at distinguishing and defining operations build on the means employed by actors. Accordingly, these analyses place little emphasis on the ends of different kinds of peace operations, still less on assessing the links between the ends and means within particular approaches. This observation ties in with Richmond’s (2008: 12) claim that the preoccupation with redefining concepts often “masks the lack of substantive theorizing of what constitutes (and facilitates) peace in IR.” As Barnett et al. (2007: 44) succinctly put it, “because there are multiple contributing causes of conflict, almost any international assistance effort that addresses any perceived or real grievance can arguably be called ‘peacebuilding.’” How then, are we to handle this unwieldy signifier?

Depending on one’s conceptual starting point or discipline, ‘peacebuilding’ can either be understood as a component activity addressing the level of ‘attitude’ or ‘contradiction’ in Galtung’s triangle of violence (1969; Ryan 1990), as a particular type of peace mission (e.g. Dwan and Wiharta 2005), as an overarching term to summarize all sorts of external

37 Interestingly, the same observation could be made with regard to the evolution of UN thinking and best practices in peacebuilding, which has for the most part been characterized by inventorising existing capacities and activities, rather than the development of strategic or conceptual approaches (Wyeth 2011).
intervention in so-called post-conflict societies (e.g. Autesserre 2011), or as a conflict resolution technique that might or might not be compatible with Galtung’s original concept (Lederach 1995; Ramsbotham et al. 2011). Barnett et al. (2007: 44) liken the term ‘peacebuilding’ to a ‘political symbol’ whose ambiguity functions as a rallying point for collective action while successfully “camouflaging divisions over how to handle the postconflict challenge.” The present project posits neither of the above understandings, nor does it take peacebuilding to be merely a ‘political symbol’. Instead, the analysis emphasizes the degree to which the adoption of a new objective, building peace within states emerging from violent conflict, has led to the emergence of a new field of international practice. In so doing, this approach emphasizes the degree to which the new objective, what Ramsbotham et al. have called “the main driver of post-war reconstruction” (2011: 232) distinguishes this international effort from ongoing and related activities, such as peacekeeping or development cooperation.

Most studied actors have described this activity as ‘peacebuilding’, but as noted before, there are also competing or related terms such as post-conflict reconstruction, peace consolidation or specifications such as post-conflict peacebuilding and post-settlement peacebuilding. To some extent, then, the term ‘peacebuilding’ functions as a container that has been filled through practice (see below and Wyeth 2011) and could hence be considered as a mere heuristic device. However, when studying the reasoning of specific actors, it is evident that the term and concept of ‘peacebuilding’ has not only functioned as an empty container. Instead, its invocation at times implies very distinct concepts and understandings that may or may not have been adopted by specific actors. In this regard, the term carries a distinct meaning for authors and practitioners that have been trained or socialized within the conflict resolution school as developed by Galtung (1976), Ryan (1990), and Lederach (1995, 1997) among others. Conversely, the term appears to be less clearly defined among authors with a background in IR or anthropology, who frequently use terms such as peacemaking and peacebuilding interchangeably (see, for instance, Autesserre 2011 and Mac Ginty 2011). It can reasonably be assumed that a similar observation holds true for practitioners engaging in peacebuilding from different institutional backgrounds or communities of practice. Before distilling my own working definition of ‘peacebuilding’ and returning to the theoretical argument, it is hence important to disaggregate the different meanings of the term ‘peacebuilding’ among different groups of actors.38 In the following paragraphs, I

38 An overview on the terminological preferences of individual agencies working in this field is provided in Barnett et al. (2007).
will briefly review the origins of the peacebuilding term and concept together with the circumstances under which it was adopted by actors within the international community. Based on this discussion, I will extract a working definition of peacebuilding that, while allowing for the incorporation of transformed understandings of what constitutes peace or how to attain it, has remained constant with regard to its objective, i.e. building peace in countries emerging from violent conflict.

Peacebuilding within the peace research and conflict resolution fields
Johan Galtung, who is often referred to as the ‘father of peace studies’ within the conflict resolution literature, has drawn a highly influential distinction between peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding in his Three Approaches to Peace (1976). Envisioning a so-called triangle of conflict, Galtung distinguishes between conflict behaviour, attitude, and contradiction (or interests). Accordingly, of the three approaches, peacekeeping seeks to change violent behaviour, peacemaking is “directed at reconciling political and strategical attitudes through mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation,” and peacebuilding is seen to encapsulate “the practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development” (Galtung 1976, cited in Ramsbotham 2000: 170). In Galtung’s distinction, ‘political attitude’ curiously appears to be divorced from ‘interest’ and ‘contradiction’. While the former falls within the purview of peacemaking to reconcile political and strategic positions or ‘issues’, the latter, i.e. ‘contradiction’ or conflicting ‘interests’, are to be addressed through peacebuilding as the effectuation of peaceful social change. In other words, a case could be made that there is an inherent bias in Galtung’s triad to address ‘interests’ and ‘contradictions’ in terms of socio-economic change and development, i.e. by focusing on the structural level. Such an understanding not only separates attitudes from interests and contradiction, but it also equates the ‘root causes’ of conflict with structural factors such as for instance inequality or (relative) deprivation. This, in turn, corresponds with Galtung’s distinction between direct, cultural, and structural violence. According to Galtung, direct violence as open acts of aggression (or threats thereof) is only the visible tip of the proverbial iceberg and a manifestation and result of structural and cultural violence that work at the deeper level (Galtung 1996: 197). Structural violence is seen to result from ‘social stratification processes’ and is evident in the obstruction of satisfying basic human needs such as survival, identity, freedom, and welfare, usually through organizational and physical structures (Galtung 1996: 197). These are accompanied by cultural violence as all forms of symbolic violence to be found within language, ideology,
science, education etc., which serve to legitimize direct and structural violence (Galtung 1996: 201-207).

While Galtung’s influence on the conflict resolution field can hardly be overstated, it is important to distinguish between the semantic and conceptual adaptation of his work. In other words, while his terminological triad of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding from *Three Approaches to Peace* is widely used by researchers and practitioners alike, there are competing understandings of what the different approaches actually entail, particularly when it comes to peacebuilding. Within the conflict resolution literature, Ryan (1990) criticized Galtung’s omission of improving mutual attitudes on the wider social level, as Galtung only foresaw peacemaking, i.e. the reconciliation of “political and strategical attitudes through mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation” for the elite level. Accordingly, Ryan modified - or in fact partly inverted - Galtung’s triad so that peacekeeping would address violent behaviour, peacemaking would resolve contradictory interests, and peacebuilding would improve mutual attitudes at all levels (Ryan 1990: ch. 3; Ramsbotham 2000: 171; Warnecke and Franke 2010: 78). A similar point regarding the need to involve larger segments of the population in the reconciliation process and to address political attitudes and interests in society at large is made by Ramsbotham et al. (2011). However, in contrast to Ryan, their modification does not change the meaning of Galtung’s original concepts, but rather argues that peacemaking as the negotiation, reconciliation, and mediation of political attitudes ought to be conducted beyond the conclusion of a peace agreement and during the so-called ‘post conflict’ or ‘post-settlement’ peacebuilding phase (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 14). Finally, the most comprehensive understanding of peacebuilding was put forward by an equally prominent figure in the conflict resolution field, John Paul Lederach, who held that “‘peacebuilding’ [ought to] be understood as a comprehensive term that encompasses the full array of stages and approaches needed to transform conflict towards sustainable, peaceful relations and outcomes” (Lederach 1994, cited in Ramsbotham 2010: 171). Summing up the discussion of ‘peacebuilding’ as a technical term within the conflict resolution field, it is evident that Galtung had originally coined the term in relation to his structural understanding of violence. Nonetheless, as early as 1990, this focus was modified within the field with a view to emphasizing the ‘relational dimension’ of conflicts (Ramsbotham 2000: 170), and the interconnectedness of conflicting ‘interests’ and ‘attitudes.’

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39 Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 14) distinguish “between the elite peacemaking that forms the substance of conflict settlement and the deeper levels of peacemaking (including reconciliation and education) that are better seen as part of cultural peacebuilding.”
Peacebuilding at the UN and among the international community

At the level of the UN and international community, originally, only the term peacekeeping was employed by Hammarskjöld to refer to the interposition of UN forces in inter-state conflicts (Ramcharan 2008). It has long held a fixed meaning referring to different techniques of ‘freezing’ a military balance with a view to building trust and enabling negotiations. While peacekeeping spans a spectrum of activities from purely observatory to deterrence or disarmament activities, its key operational principles, i.e. consent, impartiality, and the minimal use of force, have essentially remained unaltered despite a considerable blurring of lines between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and protection activities since the end of the Cold War (see chapter 4, section 4.2.1 on the evolution of the peacekeeping community of practice since the end of the Cold War). By contrast, the term ‘peacemaking’ refers to the negotiation or arbitration of contested substantial issues (which might include interests and relationships) by means of ‘good offices’, mediation, quiet diplomacy, or occasionally judicial means. While peacemaking has traditionally focused on the government or ‘elite’ level and has been conducted by so-called eminent personalities such as the UN Secretary-General, his under-secretaries or former heads of state, as argued above, some authors have highlighted the need for peacemaking below the elite or government level. Finally, within the UN context, the term peacebuilding was adopted by former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace (UN 1992: §57, see ch. 4) to denote “the construction of a new environment” that addresses “underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems” through “sustained cooperative work.” As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, the term ‘peacebuilding’ as adopted in the Agenda for Peace was likely introduced to complete the terminological triad of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding and to underline the need for longer-term engagements in societies emerging from violent conflict beyond the immediate termination of conflict (peacemaking) and violence (peacekeeping). As such, regardless of Galtung's structural leanings, it neither presupposed a specific understanding of conflict as primarily caused by structural factors, nor as resolvable by purely structural means (see the discussion on Boutros-Ghali's depiction of conflict causes, infra ch. 4.1). However, as subsequent chapters will demonstrate, peacebuilding did presuppose the existence of a viable political settlement and a reasonable degree of consent and cooperation on the part of local actors.
In sum, at the level of the UN and international community, peacebuilding was adopted to refer to civilian efforts to help implement the terms of peace agreements. While peacemaking and peacekeeping were relatively well-defined concepts in the 1992 Agenda, peacebuilding was less well elaborated and subsequently largely filled by practice (Wyeth 2011). Against this backdrop, the best common denominator to distinguish peacebuilding from related peace support activities appears to be its objective: building peace in states emerging from violent conflict. As suggested in the introduction (and elaborated in more detail below, see ch. 4.1), peacebuilding as a practice of the international community has the objective of preventing the recurrence of violence after the termination of internal armed conflict and the conclusion of some kind of settlement. Means to this end include ‘addressing structural issues’ and conflict causes, building the will and capacities for non-violent conflict resolution, and improving the relationships between ‘conflictcants’. In other words, peacebuilding thus understood seeks to tackle the root causes and ongoing dynamics of violent conflicts comprehensively, that is both in structural and substantive or ‘political’ terms. It is important to note that this definition of peacebuilding theoretically also allows for the inclusion of peacemaking activities, such as mediation, negotiation, or good offices, as part of the overall peacebuilding agenda.

3.2 THEORIES OF PRACTICE AND THE NEW PEACEBUILDING FIELD

What does it involve to study peacebuilding as a new field of international practice? And how does such an approach differ from earlier studies, i.e. what are its analytical advantages vis-à-vis the present research question? From an empirical point of view, there can be little doubt that studying the emergence and transformation of peacebuilding lends itself to the application of a practice-based framework for a multitude of reasons. On the most basic level, learning, revision, and reform within the UN and other peacebuilding agencies have mostly taken place in the form of inventorizing and reviewing previous ‘practices’ and experiences to distil ‘lessons learnt’ and ‘best practices’. Such a procedure is dominant across virtually all involved agencies, regardless of their original activities. It applies both to internal review processes and to the commissioning of external expertise (e.g. Brahimi Report; Utstein Study on

40 Woodward (2007; 2009) questions the claim that peacebuilding ought to address the ‘root causes’ of violent conflict and emphasizes the degree to which pre-war root causes might have been transformed or replaced by new drivers of conflict. For an overview of different modes of distinguishing between the causes, drivers, or triggers of conflict, see Bahrainipour (2006).
Peacebuilding) and is manifest in monikers such as the DPKO Best Practices Unit, which is in charge of peacekeeping (and, to a lesser extent, peacebuilding) strategy and advice. Several authors have highlighted the extent to which the reform and extension of earlier practices has in effect been shaped by previously held dominant notions. For instance, Bellamy et al. (2010) have demonstrated the extent to which the entire thinking on peace support within the UN was indeed grounded in and guided by presupposing the application of peacekeeping principles and practices as the dominant instrument of UN peace support during the Cold War. In other words, peacebuilding thinking and practices have evolved in close proximity to practical experiences, or, as Wyeth (2011: 10-11) puts it with a view to the predominance of ‘activity-driven’ approaches rather than strategy: “the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding has tended to flow from rather than shape practice.”

From an analytical point of view, as I will demonstrate in the following paragraphs, the application of a practice based framework in connection with Bourdieusian (1977; 1999) field theory firstly enables me to delineate an emerging configuration of actors – the field – who, in spite of their manifold mandates and highly diverse backgrounds, have a shared objective, building peace after war, that corresponds with an evolving set of practices, such as ways of doing and ways of knowing. In other words, the main rationale for studying peacebuilding as a new field of practice is that it allows me to centre the analysis around the adoption of a new objective and the ways in which this has incrementally been adapted into earlier practices and in turn led to the modification of previous (communities of) practice(s). Secondly, as argued above, while peacebuilding is for the most part ‘practiced’ by the very same institutional actors that also – and traditionally – engage in peacekeeping, development, or humanitarian aid, the practices lens importantly draws attention to the differences that have existed between these three sub-groups of actors and the different trajectories by which they have entered the new field. As the reconstruction of the peacebuilding field in the subsequent chapter will demonstrate, the new objective of building peace and its attendant, and largely unforeseen, challenges has frequently been at odds with the standard practices that actors had relied on in their traditional fields and that are intrinsically linked to their original purposes and mandates. While peacebuilding is for the most part conducted by the very same agencies that also – and traditionally – engage in peacekeeping, development, or humanitarian aid, peacebuilding pursues a substantively

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41 In this regard, a useful auxiliary question to studying practice-driven change and learning would focus on the principles and categories that have guided these assessments of previous practices, why, and with what effects.
different objective whose requirements are frequently at odds with agents’ traditional rationales, thus requiring peacebuilders to adjust their practices to address upcoming challenges in ways that are compatible with their prior practices and identities.

To summarize, the thesis posits that it is the implicit or explicit adoption of a new objective and its related tasks that led to the emergence of the field, while its transformation and depoliticization resulted from the mismatch or tensions between actors’ prior identities and the requirements of the new objective. For this reason, neither an exclusive focus on studying the actors nor their activities in themselves are sufficient to understanding the evolution of peacebuilding practice, including its prevalent depoliticization and decontextualization. Instead, a practice-based framework is firstly required to conceptualize the new field and delineate its boundaries, particularly vis-à-vis earlier and related practices. Secondly, this framework needs to be able to integrate actors’ identities, objectives, and practices to provide an explanation for the emergence of new and the transformation of existing practices.

3.2.1 Theories of practice and the communities framework
A comprehensive conceptualization of ‘practices’ is presented by Adler and Pouliot (2011: 6),42 who define practices as “socially meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world.” This definition contains five central characteristics of practices: they are (1) performative and (2) patterned forms of action that are (3) socially meaningful and recognizable to other "groups of individuals [who] tend to interpret its performance along similar standards” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 7). Consequently, they rely on and potentially “reify” a (4) shared body of ‘background knowledge’ and thus (5) "weave[...] together the discursive and material worlds”: “By nature, practices represent the world in specific ways: they implicitly make the claim that ‘this is how things are’. At the same time, practices are mediated by material artifacts” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 8). With regard to the delineation of fields, communities, or otherwise defined ‘units’ of practice, Adler and Pouliot (2011: 9) acknowledge that practices in international relations can be studied at

42 Noting a “growing interest in ‘practical reasoning’” (2011: 4), Adler and Pouliot undertake to develop a comprehensive framework for treating practices as either explanans or explanandum (or in theory both, Adler and Pouliot 2011: 18) in the study of international relations. In so doing, the authors seek to offer a “cross-paradigmatic perspective” on practices that helps overcome the ontological "dichotomies in social theory” (12) of agency and structure, ideas and matter, rationality and practicality, and stability and change (4-5).
different “levels of aggregation”, whose delineation ought to depend on the research puzzle and on the "practical experiences of performers.” In other words, Adler and Pouliot’s (2011) conceptualization allows for the co-existence or concomitance of multiple communities (or entities) of practice at the same time, thus helping me understand how actors from different ‘communities of practice’ reassembled around peacebuilding as a new shared objective, thereby likely bringing their previous practices to bear on the new task.

The notion of ‘communities of practice’ has famously been coined by Lave and Wenger (Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 1998, 2006) as part of their theory of learning. They define communities of practice as “groups of people who share a concern or a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly” (Wenger 2006: 1). As such, a community of practice is characterised by a domain (i.e. a shared competency and common interest/objective), a group of people (community) who regularly interact with each other, and by their practices, i.e. “a shared repertoire of resources: experiences, stories, tools, ways of addressing recurring problems” (Wenger 2006: 2). There is little doubt that humanitarians (Stein 2011) and development practitioners constitute such communities of practice, and a similar argument could be made with regard to peacekeepers. In the case of the former two, there is a common objective, i.e. the alleviation of human suffering following natural or man-made disasters and the facilitation of sustainable economic development and poverty reduction respectively, which is, however, not to deny the existence of several competing agendas and priorities below the level of these general ‘common interests/objectives.’ Members of either community work in large international organisations, bilateral agencies, or NGOs, all of which are characterised by a considerable degree of mutual staff fluctuation. Finally, both communities of practice rely on a very distinct set of ‘tools’ and rules of how things are (and ought to be) done, informed in both cases by strongly principled commitments (Apthorpe 2005; Podszun 2011; Stein 2011; Terry 2003). In this regard, it is worth pointing out that the concept is not only used as an analytical tool, but is also actively employed by some of the studied actors to organize their work and learning processes, as for instance the UNDP (Murphy 2006).

In the case of peacekeepers, the situation is a bit more complex. While the latter equally share a fixed set of normative and operational principles and ‘ways of doing’, the extent to which these are applied to ‘practice’ varies, owing in no small part to the ‘temporary nature’ of the practice and of its institutional provisions (UN 2000: §197). In other words, while there are numerous contingents of seasoned and experienced
peacekeepers, particularly those originating with major troop-contributing countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and India, there is both a higher turn-over of staff in the case of peacekeeping as well as a high degree of tension or interaction between the principles and ways of doing as prescribed by the UN DPKO on the one hand and national military doctrine and instructions on the other (cf. Slim 1996; Cassidy 2004), a tension that would well deserve a separate research endeavour on the interaction of competing practices. These tensions notwithstanding, both at the UN and beyond, there is by now an established body of peacekeeping 'best practices' that is taught, trained, and further revised in so-called 'peacekeeping training centres' around the world (Weinlich 2014: ch. 2). Secondly, both among practitioners and analysts, there is a fixed set of principles and practices that are taken for granted when referring to 'peacekeeping.'

In sum, peacekeepers, developmental, and humanitarian actors can all be – and in some cases have been – conceptualized as communities of practice. In all three cases, belonging to this community of practice crucially implies the adherence to a specific set of principles that not only define appropriate ways of doing, but also the very identity of these communities. As the following chapter (4) will show, in all three cases, a key defining principle is the observation of the principles of impartiality and/or neutrality, which are in each case acted out, or in fact, practiced in relation to the traditional objectives of peacekeepers, humanitarian, and development actors. As peacebuilders from these three communities of practice adopted the new objective of 'building peace', peacebuilding practices largely drew on the specific ways of doing and of sense making (Weick 1995) from these three communities. However, to say that peacebuilding as a new 'objective' in international practice comprises (parts of) these communities of practice is not the same as to claim that peacebuilding has become a tightly knit community of practice in its own right. As the analysis and discussion of the emergence (chapter 4) and transformation (chapters 5-7) of the new practice will show, particularly in the overall drive towards peacebuilding coordination and coherence at

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44 This is not to deny the persistence of considerable disagreements regarding the roles and scope of action of peacekeepers, particularly when it comes to the use of force and the question of consent (see the following chapter 4, section 4.2.1; Bellamy and Williams 2010). However, these fundamental disagreements notwithstanding, there is an established body of shared background knowledge (Adler and Pouliot 2011), in other words, most practitioners and analysts have a common understanding of the peacekeeping terms and principles within which such fundamental disagreements take place.

the UN, while there is a strong impetus towards integrating these component parts of the practice, so far it would appear that these efforts have not been accomplished, particularly when it comes to harmonizing potentially contradictory principles that inform ‘ways of doing’ across the three communities. In other words, while the adoption of the new peacebuilding objective has led actors to adjust their practices, they have retained their fundamental identities as peacekeepers, development, or humanitarian agencies. The resilience of fundamental identities notwithstanding, as argued above, ‘peacebuilding’ has become more than just the sum of its parts, as the reconfiguration of actors around the new objective has generated the emergence of a body of background knowledge and standard practices that links the three communities of practice. In the following section, I will make the argument for studying this new configuration and its attendant practices by employing Bourdieu’s (1977, 1999) theory of habitus and field, to draw out the dispositional and relational logics that have converged to shaping the new practice and particularly its persistent depoliticization.

3.2.2 The Field

The interaction between actors’ prior identities and practices on the one hand with the newly emerging objective and its challenges on the other resembles the relationship between habitus and field as developed by Bourdieu (1977; 1999). In Bourdiesuan terms, “the field is a social space structured along three principal dimensions: power relations, objects of struggle, and the rules taken for granted within the field” (Pouliot and Mérand 2013: 30). In this regard, all social realms, such as different academic disciplines (Bourdieu 1984), but also policy realms can be “characterized as hierarchical systems of positions, in which some agents are dominant and others are dominated” (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 24). Within the field, different actors command different quantities and qualities of material and immaterial resources, understood as different forms of capital, that are interrelated with each other: economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1983). By increasing their respective capital and employing it strategically, agents within the field can improve their relative position vis-à-vis other actors, for instance, by applying their ‘practical knowledge’ or what Bourdieu calls habitus more competently than others. Bourdieu defines the habitus as a ‘system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions’ (Bourdieu 1977: 82-83). Bueger and Gadinger summarize the habitus as “practical knowledge inscribed into individuals” (2014: 24) and explain that it “provides a basis for the generation of
practices, but it [the habitus] does so only in relation to a specific situation or a distinct field." Similarly, Pouliot and Mérand (2013: 31) refer to the dispositional and positional logics behind the generation of practices: "actors act based on the dispositions that have been crafted over time (habitus) which, at the point of intersect with their socially defined positions (in the field), are actualized in the form of practices." In other words, the interaction of habitus and actors’ positions in the field help generate practices. To the extent that the habitus is reiterated by habituation, it becomes increasingly self-evident and less likely to be questioned, i.e. it translates into ‘doxa’ or a ‘doxic situation’ in which doxic practice appears self-evident or commonsensical (see Bourdieu 1980). As a result, the habitus – and Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and field – has an in-built, although not deterministic tendency towards reiteration, stability and conservation, that is towards reproducing ‘orthodoxy’ (Pouliot and Mérand 2013: 28, 30). At the same time, however, the habitus is neither “rigid” nor “unchanging”, but can adapt to changed structures, or might even clash with them, a phenomenon that Bourdieu refers to as ‘hysteresis’ (Pouliot and Mérand 2013: 31).

In regard to the new field of practice, the habitus of all agents accordingly comprises their practical knowledge and dispositional logics, which derive from agents’ community of origin. As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, in all three cases, agents’ habitus is fundamentally tied to the observance of impartiality and neutrality, albeit for varying purposes and rationales. Accordingly, while impartiality is a common feature across these three communities, its expression in the habitus and practices of these agencies differs according to the rationales and objectives of their respective communities of origin. In other words, while all agents will likely seek to maintain their impartial identities and practices, this is accomplished by a diverse set of mechanisms that will be discussed in the following two chapters. The primary purpose of applying Bourdieu’s (1999; see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) notion of field with its related concepts of habitus, capital, and doxa is that it allows me to identify a number of actors and to reconstruct a social configuration in which these actorsreassembled around a new objective and over time modified their practices towards a common field-specific doxa. As previously argued, actors in the peacebuilding field originate from diverse fields of practice (most importantly development cooperation, peacekeeping, and humanitarian aid) and have different institutional positions in this and other fields (as donors, implementing agencies, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and research facilities or think tanks). What initially brought these actors together was the shared, albeit not yet fully specified, objective of building peace in
states emerging from violent conflict. In more conventional Bourdieusian terms, one could, however, more pointedly define the primary objective of actors in the field as ‘participating in peacebuilding’, i.e. to compete for the positions, resources, status, and so on that are to be gained by becoming a ‘player’ or agent in this field.\(^{46}\) In this regard, several authors have pointed out that Bourdieu’s (1999) notion of the field has particular analytical leverage with regard to dissecting actors’ struggles over scarce resources and hence focuses on analysing relations of power, hierarchy, and domination (Buégér and Gadinger 2014; Müller 2014; Poulion 2008; Poulion and Mérand 2013). Such relations of hierarchy and dependence are undoubtedly present and significant in the peacebuilding field. Actors such as donor governments, the different bodies of the UN, bilateral agencies and NGOs, and occasionally, but by no means necessarily, the governments of target states occupy different (hierarchical) positions within this field and command different kinds of capital. Particularly with a view to the principal-agent discussion in IR briefly alluded to in the previous chapter, it is this disaggregation of different kinds of capital that allows me to do justice to the eminent role of the UN and other international organisations within the field. Despite their dependence on donor governments in terms of economic capital, these agencies command an unparalleled, if fluctuating, degree of symbolic capital in terms of moral authority, topical expertise, and arguably agenda-setting (Kittikhoun and Weiss 2012). Within this field, the relative success of individual and institutional agents vis-à-vis their competitors or colleagues depends to a considerable extent on the existence of an ‘adequate’ habitus and the competent performance of doxic practice; for instance, when it comes to securing project-driven and seed funding, being invited to contribute to or ‘implement’ certain tasks, or joining donor forums and networking events in target countries.

As Poulion and Mérand succinctly put it, “to think in terms of fields ... is to think in terms of relations” (2013: 32). In this regard, while other ‘field-based’ theoretical frameworks such as ‘epistemic’ (Adler and Bernstein 2005; Haas 1990) or ‘interpretive communities’ (e.g. Johnstone 2005) similarly allow for the delineation of fields of agents based on their commonalities and shared understandings (such as epistemes), Bourdieu’s original notion of the field enables me to simultaneously emphasize the dispositional (habitus) and positional (field) logics and relations between a set of actors that, while increasingly developing shared practices (including shared epistemes), hold different stakes and

\(^{46}\) See, for instance, Barnett et al. (2007: 43) who argue that peacebuilding offered a new way for development actors to justify their continued importance at a time when overall development spending was in decline and criticisms of earlier development practices increased (see also Murphy 2006: 301). This discussion will be taken up in chapter 4, section 4.3, on the reconstruction of the peacebuilding field of practice.
command quite different resources within that field. What then are the benefits of distinguishing between communities of practice, i.e. peacekeeping, humanitarianism, and development, on the one hand, and the new peacebuilding field, on the other, in regard to analysing the depoliticization of peacebuilding practices? In principle, it would also have been possible to conceptualize development, humanitarianism, and peacekeeping, albeit with limitations, as ‘fields’ in the Bourdieusian sense. In contrast to Wenger’s (and arguably Adler and Pouliot’s) communities of practice framework, Bourdieu’s field emphasizes structures of hierarchy and power. While these dimensions are important for my analysis of the peacebuilding field, my primary research interest with regard to the three traditional practices are the identities of actors at the supra-institutional level as manifest in shared, and largely habitualized practices. In other words, while Bourdieu’s full conceptual apparatus of habitus, field, capital, and doxa is certainly also applicable for studying peacekeeping, humanitarianism, and development on their own terms, for the present purposes, my analytical objective in regard to these three communities of practice does not concern the dynamic interactions between actors within these three communities, but is delimited to identifying the pre-existing identities, practices, and bodies of background knowledge – i.e. the habitus and doxic practice in Bourdieu’s terminology - that members of these communities brought to bear as they entered the new field (see ch. 4.2.1-3).

Based on this framework of communities of practice and the new field, the subsequent discussion will turn to the implications of accounting for transformation and change within a practice based framework. As Bueger and Gadinger (2014: 28) note, Bourdieu’s theory, like other practice theories, tends to emphasize the reproduction, rather than the emergence and transformation of practices. Similarly, it is comparatively silent on the relationship between different fields and practices. For this reason, the following section reviews complementary strands of practice theory with a view to explaining the emergence and transformation of ‘new’ practices. Most importantly, a central issue in need of clarification is the role that practices play within this research. While practices evidently form an important part of the argument, this is not to say that practices are the primary or exclusive explanatory factor for understanding the persistent depoliticization of peacebuilding practices. In other words, to say that the “UN’s understanding of peacebuilding has tended to flow from rather than shape practice” (Wyeth 2011: 11) or by building on and revising previous practices is not the same as to claim that peacebuilding ideas and approaches, and in particular their depoliticization, have been shaped through practice alone. Rather, from the start, peacebuilding practice
has been shaped by resorting to and adapting existing practices from other 'policy' areas, with at times clashing objectives and approaches. To a considerable extent, these prior practices are grounded in and constitutive to actors' identities. Against this backdrop, the focus of the following sections will be on how different 'entities', be they fields, communities, or groups, of practice can be seen to relate to or interact with each other, and secondly, how a practice-based framework can be integrated with an analysis of the identities and objectives that they manifest.

3.2.3 Practices and transformation: the argument
In their comprehensive overview, Adler and Pouliot (2011: 18) emphasize that practice "is suspended between agency and structure" and they hence identify "three possible domains of change: in subjectivities (e.g. preferences, dispositions or intentionality), in practices themselves, or in social orders (e.g. structures, domination patterns, or discourse)." To this, they add a number of propositions that are worth citing in full due to their implications. The first one holds that:

Transformation is the ordinary accomplishment of social life; stability is the result of the work of practice – that is, of process and evolution. Second, practice is the accomplishment of agency and more specifically of political contestation, from which transformations necessarily flow. Third, the engine of practice transformation is not only agential but also structural because, locally, practices interact with one another. All in all, change in practice has no other origin than the accomplishment of practice: practice is both explanans and explanandum (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 18).

Accordingly, researchers have to clarify whether "they treat practice as explanans, explanandum, or both", i.e. whether practice is the origin or outcome of a particular process, or simultaneously acts on both levels. Adler and Pouliot proceed by detailing a number of alternative research agendas for studying the transformation of a practice, or the practices that are 'behind' a transformation. However, while this seemingly amounts to a comprehensive, structured research framework for studying practices, a number of questions arise with regard to analyzing transformation which the framework does not seem to answer. The first proposition appears to juxtapose "ordinary accomplishments of social life" with "practices", associating the former with transformation and the latter with stability. This impression of practices as having an imminently stabilizing or conserving character is furthered by a number of observations, according to which practices "implicitly make the claim that 'this is how things are'" (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 8) and have a "normative or rule-like dimension" (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 15).
Yet, at the same time, practices are also the driver of transformation as they ‘flow’ from agency such as political contestation (in addition to the local interaction of practices).

If practices are indeed believed to have a predominantly reinforcing quality, how is change brought about in this framework? Adler and Pouliot (2011: 18) first posit that transformation is accomplished by ‘ordinary social life’. Secondly, they propose that agency, and more specifically political contestation, accomplishes practice, “from which transformation necessarily flows.” This then leads back to the first question as to how to distinguish ‘practice’ from ‘ordinary social life’? If the true driver of change is taken to be political contestation, then it is not clear how practices fit in here, or which purpose the concept serves at this particular point. What appears to be missing here – or what might be implied, albeit not made explicit, is an additional layer in which ‘practices’ are the material and immaterial results of earlier processes of political contestation that sediment into practice and at some point acquire a “normative or rule-like dimension” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 15) in terms of being taken for granted (the doxa or doxic situation in Bourdieu’s framework). As this brief discussion shows, it is certainly possible to integrate all kinds of frameworks (in this case Mouffe’s [2008] argument regarding the distinction between politics and the political) into Adler and Pouliot’s (2011) grid. However, while their conceptualization is broad enough to incorporate different kinds of research enquiry and frameworks, whether they seek to study practices as a driving force, outcome, or both, it does not – and cannot as Ringmar (2014) persuasively argues – unburden the analyst of the task of having to make a number of ontological choices. In this regard, the proposed framework rather appears to amount to a comprehensive inventory or grid for studying practices that helps to clarify the choices that have to be made, rather than rendering them obsolete. In sum, it seems reasonable to conclude that reproduction and persistence appear to be related to practices, whilst transformation can be brought about by practices or otherwise.

In this regard, as noted above, Bourdieu’s praxeology likewise exhibits an implicit tendency towards emphasizing reproduction (or persistence) as opposed to change. This persistence appears to result from the conservative quality of the habitus as the “strategy generating principle [that] enabl[es] ... agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations” (Bourdieu 1977: 72). However, the habitus is “durable, but not eternal” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 133, cited in Walther 2014: 13) and Bourdieu specifies three principal mechanisms of change. Firstly, the habitus permanently evolves in accordance with changed structures or field dynamics. Secondly, an alternative source of change or transformation might be an agents’ change of field
with its likely attendant clashes of field and habitus that might throw into question the self-evidence of doxic practice. A third source of change results from clashes between the field and the habitus of different actors that have evolved at different points in time (\textit{hysteresis} effect, cf. Walther 2014: 13). Leaving aside the permanent evolution of habitus and doxic practice as sources of gradual change, what the latter two mechanisms of change seem to have in common is that habitus and doxic practice can become subject to change in light of a mismatch between the habitus of different fields (i.e. when actors enter new fields), or between different field-specific habitus that evolved at different points in time. In other words, both forms of change seem to result from a mismatch that brings to the fore and potentially facilitates the (re-)negotiation of what is deemed appropriate, sensible, reasonable, or simply ‘self-evident’ (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Stein 2011). In this regard, it seems likely that the ‘durability’ of the habitus will to some extent depend on its sources, for instance if certain dispositions are grounded in strongly normative or legal provisions or are intrinsic to an agent’s identity as seems to be the case in relation to impartiality (see chapter 4, section 4.2.1 ff). As argued above, within the present argument, the mismatch between habitus and the new field, and hence between previous identities and attendant practices, on the one hand, and the newly emerging objective, on the other, has played a crucial role in shaping the current, depoliticized form and content of peacebuilding practice.

At the most basic level, then, the depoliticization of peacebuilding practice results from a clash between peacebuilders’ politically neutral or impartial identities on the one hand and the – at times – political nature of peacebuilding challenges on the other. These identities are expressed (habitus), and in multiple ways conditioned and habitualized, through previous practice. As I will demonstrate in the following chapter (4), the commissioning of developmental, humanitarian, and peacekeeping actors and their subsequent application of their standard practices arguably resulted from specific expectations regarding the nature of externally assisted peacebuilding processes and the role of peacebuilders therein. The persistent transformation of peacebuilding practices to address peacebuilding challenges in ever-new, but consistently depoliticized terms (see a detailed analysis of the mechanisms by which this is accomplished in chapter 5), is hence to be explained by analysing the clash between political obstacles to successfully accomplishing practice, on the one hand, and the identities (as expressed in the habitus) of politically neutral peacebuilders, on the other, which has led to, and is manifest in, de-politicized peacebuilding practices.
At the outset of the emergence of peacebuilding as a new objective, there are three independent communities of practice, peacekeepers, development agencies, and humanitarian organisations, which, for different reasons and by varying trajectories, become the principal actors that conduct peacebuilding in countries emerging from intra-state violent conflict. The new peacebuilding objective, on the other hand, is initially conceived of by the United Nations and international community as largely translating into an agenda of assisting the consolidation of peace processes in countries emerging from violent conflict. Reflecting early experiences with aiding the implementation of peace agreements towards the late 1980s and early 1990s, the new task was initially understood as a mere process of ‘aiding implementation’ under largely positive auspices, and hence left to peacekeepers, developmental, and humanitarian organisations whose traditional practices putatively rendered them ideal ‘peacebuilders’ (see chapter 4). However, as subsequent ‘history’ has shown, the expectation that peacebuilding merely comprised the implementation of a range of consensual measures from a given peace agreement was more often frustrated than not. Instead, a number of ‘challenges to implementation’, first and foremost the persistence of political conflict and opposition, induced actors from these three communities of practice to adjust their previous practices with a view to securing their new positions in the emerging peacebuilding field, albeit in ways that are or seem compatible with their institutional identities as impartial and/or politically neutral agents. Over time, this process and the extension and revision of peacebuilding tasks and objectives have generated peacebuilding as a new field of international practice, which comprises (parts of these) communities of practice. In this argument, the depoliticization of peacebuilding practice fundamentally results from a number of misconceptions that subsequently facilitated the dominance of developmental agencies, peacekeepers, and humanitarian agencies within the peacebuilding field. To the extent that peacebuilders encountered clashes between their previous practices and identities and their new objectives, this dilemma has helped set an ongoing process of revision and transformation in motion. In this process, actors consistently seek to match their identities as manifest and expressed in previous practices with solutions to peacebuilding challenges.

In this regard, the fact that the new peacebuilding project was primarily handed over to developmental agencies either betrays a misconception of the nature of the task or of the degree to which internal conflicts could be resolved through negotiated settlements. Secondly, it points to a mismatch between the ‘ends’ and ‘means’ of peace support measures. As Bellamy et al. (2004) and Chesterman (2004) have argued, most
taxonomies of peace support operations have been based on the different means employed (usually distinguished by the degree of coercion involved), rather than by the different ends of specific forms of peace support interventions. This practice gives rise to the assumption that little attention has been paid to the specific objectives and their potential contradictions or trade-offs. After all, assisting parties in implementing a voluntarily reached settlement (the ideal case of post-conflict peacebuilding) is a fundamentally different endeavour from ensuring compliance with an enforced compromise. However, these distinctions are largely obscured by standard taxonomies and the general application of the term ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ both in theory and in practice. The thesis contends that these conceptual ambiguities, coupled with the tensions arising from the mismatch between actors’ peacebuilding tasks/objectives on the one hand and their scope of action or identities on the other, together have caused what could be called the ‘foundational dilemma’ of practitioners within the peacebuilding field. Secondly, the thesis analyses how this dilemma continues to shape the transformation of peacebuilding practice. As this dilemma has hardly ever been explicitly acknowledged or addressed, it prompts actors to continuously revise and modify their practices to match perceived problems with solutions that fall within their scope of action, or in Hansen’s (2006) words, to match policy with identity. As will be shown, this process has led to the continuous repackaging of what are essentially ‘political’ problems or conflicts in non-political and seemingly non-conflictual terms that lend themselves to a whole range of socio-economic, psychological, or judicial interventions and hence render peace and conflict ‘manageable’ by ‘neutral’ or ‘impartial’ actors.

What, then, are the methodological implications of studying the emergence and transformation of a new field of international practice? As argued above, understanding the persistent depoliticization of peacebuilding practice requires a twofold research strategy that firstly analyses the specific – and arguably path dependent – circumstances under which peacebuilding emerged as a new objective for the international community (reconstruction of the field), and secondly traces the transformation of the practice and its underlying dynamics (transformation of practice). In this regard, Pouliot (2013: 45) emphasizes that Bourdieu’s conceptual framework “calls for the combination of various methods because not a single one of them is able, in and of itself, to capture the contrasting spaces of habitus, field and practice.” While the first part of the argument necessitates a study of the specific historical circumstances under which peacebuilding was adopted and ‘handed over’ to or taken up by three distinct communities of practice,
the second part will study the transformation of peacebuilding practices in synchronic and diachronic perspective by extracting the 'background knowledge' (Adler and Pouliot 2011), or practical knowledge/sense (Bourdieu 1980) manifest in actors’ practice-related reasoning. As argued above, in addition to the common peacebuilding objective, the new field is defined and hence recognizable by an emerging set of shared understandings and concepts, i.e. the background knowledge or habitus on the one hand as well as a number of common and increasingly doxic practices on the other. In the following paragraphs, I will firstly clarify the relationship between knowledge, discourse, and practices within a constructivist research framework. Secondly, I will reflect on the ways in which these can be seen to manifest actors’ identities and habitus and hence allow me to trace the transformation of actors’ practical reasoning in relation to their prior identities.

3.3 The role of identities in the emergence and transformation of practices

In social constructivist terms, knowledge and meaning are created and applied intersubjectively and are subject to general cultural, scientific, and normative understandings, both within and beyond institutions (Adler and Bernstein 2005: 296). In regard to specific configurations of actors, such as for instance communities or fields, Adler and Bernstein (2005: 296) invoke the concept of epistemes to refer “to the ‘bubble’ in which people happen to live,” i.e. the sum of their background knowledge, dispositions and practices that “provides the fundamental categories in which thinking (and acting) take place” (Wuthnow 1989: 13, cited in Adler and Bernstein 2005: 297). In this context, epistemic validity refers to legitimate forms of knowledge that have been accepted and become naturalized based on “accepted norms, consensual scientific knowledge, ideological beliefs” (Adler and Bernstein 2005: 303) and, I would add, are enforced by a common language that is shared by actors within a field. Thus understood, analysing the ‘background knowledge’ allows for establishing a link between actors’ reasoning and their practices, without necessarily having to make (or accept) a truth claim regarding the reliability of what policy actors report on in their publications. Instead, the ‘reasoned practices’ that are extracted from the studied documents can be treated as manifesting the ‘background knowledge’ that actors in a given field or otherwise defined entity of practice consider appropriate and effective (ibid.; see also March and Olsen 2004) or, even more fundamentally, have come to take for granted, evident to the extent that at some point, certain assumptions, for instance regarding the nature or cause of a particular problem, are no longer discussed or reasoned out, but
simply posited (and reiterated). Following the reconstruction of the peacebuilding field (chapter 4), I will apply these propositions to trace the evolution of peacebuilding best practices at the level of the overall field over the past two decades. By analysing the changing patterns in the practical reasoning of key peacebuilding actors, I will substantiate my argument that notwithstanding countless reforms, revisions, and divergent context conditions in regard to actors’ relationship with host state authorities, the practice has consistently remained depoliticized.

Such an approach is also in no small part warranted by the nature of the studied sources. Most of the documents were written with a view to planning and guiding policy and projects within institutions, improving coordination with partner organisations, and to a lesser extent also with a view to presenting the respective organisation’s peacebuilding work to other actors in the field (e.g. project descriptions, log frames, evaluations; country strategies and framework programmes, annual reports). Secondly, there are a number of statements by the Secretary-General of the UN and of other high-ranking officials in which challenges are defined with a view to encouraging international or Security Council action on specific issues (e.g. reports on particular missions or issues). A third bulk of documents is comprised of inventories, best practice reports, and consultancy studies issued by most peacebuilding institutions. These inventories and reports are crucial to tracing how earlier experiences were made sense of and interpreted or adapted in the form of lessons learned, both positive and negative ones. While these documents evidently have to be contextualized with regard to their respective audiences and agendas, the relevant question is not the extent to which the observations in these reports are actually objectively ‘true’ or ‘false’, ‘adequate’, ‘efficient’, or not. Instead, given the close interaction between practice and reasoning, or practice and learning, these documents specifically allow for tracing the emergence and transformation of the field as manifest in shared categories, assessments, and propositions.

While the analysis of the evolving background knowledge at the level of the overall peacebuilding field over an extended period of time allows me to substantiate the claim regarding the field’s persistent depoliticization, the purpose in regard to the two case studies, i.e. international agencies in Bosnia and Timor-Leste, follows a slightly different logic with a view to demonstrating the degree to which the clash between peacebuilding

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47 In this regard, a fruitful question to pursue is the degree to which certain notions are contested at all by other members of the field (potentially also outside the field, but this follows a different logic).
objectives and actor’s habitus have driven the depoliticization of peacebuilding practice. As Bourdieu (1977), Adler (1997), and Kratochwil (2011) have argued, knowledge within a field or community evolves and results from tensions and contestation, as “applying an understanding of ‘what is called for’” does not happen in isolation, but inter alia interacts with interests and preferences (Adler 1997: 325). In a constructivist ontology, these interests and preferences are in turn linked to actors’ identities, as argued by Reus-Smit who lays out the following four theoretical premises for a constructivist philosophy of history: “to the extent social structures shape individual and collective human action, ideational structures are more important than material structures; actors’ identities inform their interests; structures and agents are mutually constituted; and through communication (linguistic and ritual) ideational structures condition actors and action and, conversely, actors produce and reproduce structures” (Reus-Smit 2008: 399-400).

In line with these premises,\(^{48}\) Hansen (2006) develops an analytical framework that conceptualizes actors’ identities as the significant link between the construction of problems and solutions in discursive practice. To guide her analysis of Western foreign policy makers’ discourses on intervention in the Bosnian war, Hansen posits that actors seek to construct stable discourses that link policy and identity. Adopting Reus-Smit’s and Hansen’s propositions, although not necessarily all of Hansen’s claims on the ontology of discourses\(^{49}\), the two case studies of changing peacebuilding practices scrutinize the causal narratives that peacebuilding actors construct to link their assessment and representation of the context (problem) to appropriate policies (solutions) that match their scope of action (agents’ identity expressed in their habitus) – and are seen as ‘appropriate’ and ‘effective’ within the peacebuilding field (March and Olsen 2004). Linking this methodology back to the Bourdieusian framework developed above, depoliticized peacebuilding practices are the result of an ongoing process in which actors seeks to harmonize their habitus and (previous) doxic practice with the particular challenges and conditions encountered in peacebuilding. As a result, the emerging doxic practice of the new field has to a significant extent been influenced by the tension or mismatch between a non-political or impartial habitus and the political nature of many, if certainly not all, peacebuilding challenges, which has ultimately

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\(^{48}\)While this claim holds true regarding the interconnectedness of identities and interests, on the discursive level, Hansen (2006) takes the co-constitution of ideational and material factors further by arguing that the two are hardly distinguishable: “discourses articulate and intertwine material factors and ideas to such an extent that the two cannot be separated from one another” (Hansen 2006: 1).

\(^{49}\)See above, FN 12.
fostered a constant process of adaptation and transformation that continuously seeks to address the foundational dilemma while upholding the core components of actors’ earlier habitus and identity.

To summarize, in the present project, I combine Hansen’s focus on identities with Bourdieu’s conceptual apparatus of habitus and field to study the discursive and non-discursive practices in three separate steps. Firstly, I will sketch out the historical dynamics that led to the emergence of the peacebuilding field and discuss actor’s prior habitus (ch. 4). Secondly, I study the transformation of peacebuilding ‘best’ practices, i.e. of mainstream practices of leading actors at the level of the peacebuilding field over the past two decades (ch. 5). To this end, I will trace the evolution of ‘background knowledge’ or doxic practice50 of the most important actors at the level of the peacebuilding field by disaggregating their reasoned practices and problematizations in accordance with Hansen’s (2006) methodological framework. Thirdly, I will analyse the practices of two key agencies in two consecutive peacebuilding cases that together span the existence of the peacebuilding field almost entirely (1995-2010) with a view to dissecting the tension between political challenges and non-political identities and to detail the manifold pathways by which actors have – consciously or ‘automatically’ rendered their practices depolitical.

3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN

By applying the extended practice-based framework developed above, the project seeks to answer two interrelated research questions: Why has peacebuilding emerged as a depoliticized practice? How can we explain the persistence of depoliticization that contradicts long-standing beliefs regarding the political nature of peace processes and defies ongoing criticisms among practitioners and analysts alike? The argument that I develop in response to these questions consists of two elements. The first part entails an in-depth study of the commencement of peacebuilding practice in the mid-1990s, focusing particularly on the emergence of building peace in intra-state conflict as a new objective and the subsequent emergence and transformation of the new practice. The second part of the argument moves from actors’ commitments and objectives to the emergence and transformation of their practices, by studying how earlier commitments were revised when peacebuilders were ‘confronted’ with what they met on the ground.

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50 Due to the emergent nature of the field, the point at which the background knowledge from the different communities of practice converges to form a truly ‘doxic practice’ can only be answered empirically.
In other words, this part of the argument traces the consequences of the foundational dilemma that are argued to have hampered the attainment of their original objectives to varying degrees in two consecutive settings, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Timor-Leste, and how these have played out in shaping the content of peacebuilding practice. This analysis shows how the context and the political dimension of peacebuilding have been replaced or transformed into their non-political and presumably acontextual substitutes such as ‘governance’, ‘human rights’, or ‘equality’ (see also Stepputat 2013). To this end, the transformation of actors’ practices is studied based on their activities in two consecutive conflict settings, Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2005) and Timor-Leste (2000-2010), which span the emergence and transformation of peacebuilding as a new field of practice in the past two decades. In conclusion, I summarize and review the different mechanisms that actors have employed to render their practices apolitical in an effort to harmonize their identities with the requirements of their new objective, and consider the wider implications of this process for peacebuilding as such and for the emergence of ‘background knowledge’ in international relations as politics and International Relations as a discipline.

Three steps are necessary to develop my argument. Firstly, I will analyze the commencement of the international peacebuilding project in the early to mid-nineties. This entails a historical study of the reasons why ‘peacebuilding’ entered the international community as a new joint objective as well as of the process by which a set of actors from the development, humanitarian, and peacekeeping fields became involved with the new task, and based on which assumptions. This historical study is complemented by a portrayal of actors’ habitus and of the doxic practice within the three communities of practice, development, peacekeeping, and humanitarianism. Secondly, I will trace the emergence and transformation of doxic (‘best’) practice at the level of the peacebuilding field (ch. 5). This analysis will also serve to demonstrate and assess the validity of the claims regarding the apolitical and acontextual character of peacebuilding through an analysis of past and present peacebuilding (‘best’) practices (explanandum). Thirdly, the bulk of the analysis will be dedicated to tracing the evolution of the practices of two central agencies, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UK Department for International Development (DfID), within the context of the overall peacebuilding endeavours in the case of two major post-war peacebuilding interventions, Bosnia and Herzegovina (ch. 6) and Timor-Leste (ch. 7), which together span the entire period of the emergence of peacebuilding as a new field of practice. As these two case studies will demonstrate, in encountering
obstacles to practicing peacebuilding, actors have persistently and creatively modified, adapted, and reframed their earlier practices, with ‘depoliticization’ arguably constituting the permanent common denominator of all such efforts.

3.4.1 Constructing the peacebuilding field
For the analysis of the transformation of peacebuilding best practices at the field level, I will analyze the decisions and statements of key bodies such as the OECD DAC and the UN Secretariat (including its peacebuilding ‘architecture’ as of 2006). Firstly, the peacebuilding field (field of practice) is an important point of reference for any peacebuilding agency as ‘best practices’ (or doxic practice), such as guidelines or manuals are often developed jointly by a number of agencies. For this reason, the emerging peacebuilding field and the transformation of its reasoned best practices will be traced in chapter 5. Secondly, in each particular peacebuilding case, i.e. at the country level, the country-specific configuration of the field is important to understanding the practices of specific agencies in that setting, as ‘standard’ peacebuilding tasks are often divided among agencies and intended to complement each other. For instance, in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UNDP was tasked with addressing all questions related to refugee return that had not previously been addressed by UNHCR’s mandate or were seen to emerge over time. In general, in Bosnia, many developmental agencies ‘relied’ on donor governments to exert the political pressure seen as necessary to coerce Bosnian parties into cooperation. In Timor-Leste, on the other hand, the UNDP took over many tasks and responsibilities that had previously been executed by successive peace operations. It follows from this that the practices of individual peacebuilding agencies within a given context cannot be accounted for without taking into consideration the degree of actual or expected cooperation with other members of the field, as well as evolving standards of ‘best practice’. For this reason, each country study is introduced by a reconstruction of the country-specific peacebuilding field and its executive level. The ‘executive level’ of the peacebuilding field comprises those actors that command direct political leverage both vis-à-vis the conflict parties and the remainder of the particular peacebuilding field, such as project-driven agencies, the bureaucracies of international organisations, and NGOs. Such a definition of an ‘executive level’ admittedly raises a number of questions, as it simplifies a rather complex web of legal, political, and economic power-relationships between numerous agencies and donors into a bundle of hierarchical relationships. These complexities notwithstanding, the focus on the executive level nonetheless serves as a heuristic device for identifying
dominant peacebuilding objectives and narratives within the particular country context. Accordingly, while the heuristic distinction does not in every case suppose a direct chain of authority, the ‘executive level’ nevertheless can be shown to hold a preeminent role in the interpretation of the respective peace agreement and/or the objectives of mandates issued by the UN Security Council, and hence regarding the key objectives and aspects to be addressed during the peace process.

3.4.2 Peacebuilding agencies: UNDP and DfID
The two actors singled out for in-depth study are the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UK Department for International Development (DfID), both of which are widely seen to hold central positions in the peacebuilding field. The UNDP is a key multilateral agency that often coordinates a range of sectoral UN bodies in post-war societies and has established its own Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Resolution in 2001 (BCPR) (Murphy 2006). In particular, a number of resolutions by the General Assembly, reports by the UN Secretary-General, and decisions of the UNDP Executive Board defined a role for the Programme in regard to so-called “special development situations”, initially with a particular focus on mine clearance, humanitarian aid, and the coordination of development in ‘post-conflict’ countries (UNDP 2000: §12-13). DfID is a bilateral development agency with a strong and increasing focus on conflict prevention (Smith 2004; Wilde 2006) and a unique degree of cooperation on peace- and conflict-related issues with additional British government bodies. With regard to the development of the larger peacebuilding field, the UK departments are widely seen as amongst the most innovative and significant peacebuilding actors among practitioners and researchers alike (Lawry-White 2003; Smith 2004).

3.4.3 Selection of case studies
The research focuses on peacebuilding processes that commenced after the end of the Cold War, as this date marks a significant point of departure for the extension, or arguably inception, and transformation of the UN’s peacebuilding agenda, in the sense that the former focus on inter-state peacekeeping missions was significantly broadened to include so-called post-conflict activities aimed at creating a ‘sustainable peace’, increasingly within states (UN 1992). The focus on UN peacebuilding is essential, both in terms of legitimizing the presence of external actors and to exclude other types of
peacebuilding or statebuilding efforts, for instance following foreign invasion (Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 respectively). Analytically, this is particularly important since the conditions for peacebuilding following internal war are likely to differ substantially from those following external invasion – not least if the peacebuilder is in effect the invading party (Paris 2004). However, the research is not limited to UN bodies or the time span of particular UN mission as such, but covers a wider range of external actors that actively participate in the peace(building) process.

To sum up, relevant peacebuilding countries meet the following criteria:

- Internal violent conflict: Occurrence of intrastate violent conflict;
- Peacebuilding: Multidimensional peace operation with a mandate based on a peace agreement, covering two or more of the four topical peacebuilding sectors;
- External actors: Involvement of a ‘critical number’ of external actors during and beyond the UN peacebuilding mission or operation.

In light of the upsurge of international peacebuilding deployments, a considerable number of countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Sudan, Angola, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Cambodia to name but a few meet the criteria. In at least four cases since the end of the Cold War, such interventions have amounted to the establishment of international transitory administrations. For the purposes of the study, the peacebuilding undertakings in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Timor-Leste have been selected. As mentioned above, the two cases span the entire period of the emergence of peacebuilding as a new field of practice to date and are spread across regions and time. While BiH belongs to the earliest multidimensional peacebuilding interventions and has attracted considerable international attention for the following decade, the deployment to Timor-Leste commenced at a time when many of the early standard approaches, such as the emphasis on conducting rapid elections had already been modified through a higher emphasis on building state capacity (Schneckener 2005). In its early days, the intervention in Timor-Leste was repeatedly referred to as

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51 Schneckener (2005) distinguishes peacebuilding mandates according to the degree to which they curtail the sovereignty of a given state and according to the extent of their activities: 1. Peacebuilding consultation, 2. Specialized peacebuilding, 3. Multidimensional peacebuilding and 4. International transitory government. For the purposes of my research, only the latter two categories will be relevant.

52 Since the early 1990s and prior to UNTAET in East Timor, the UN Security Council had established formal ITAs in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium/Croatia (UNTAES), Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR), Kosovo (UNMIK), and Cambodia (UNTAC), which was, however, limited to supervisory powers (Caplan 2005; Chesterman 2004).
‘the UN’s finest hour’ (Annan, cited in Robertson: 499) due to the relatively speedy military intervention to halt atrocities against civilian populations. However, the subsequent re-emergence of violence among different factions of East Timor took most international peacebuilders by surprise and prompted some of them to re-evaluate their earlier approaches (Scanteam 2007). Despite their similarities in regard to the purposes and scope of international peacebuilding intervention, the two cases differ in regard to the specifics of the set-up of international transitory administration and peacebuilding. Given the controversial role played by UNPROFOR during the Bosnian war and in contemporaneous peace operation failures in Rwanda and Somalia, the international deployment to BiH continues to be overseen and steered by the so-called Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which comprises a long list of states and international organisations and executed through the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. By contrast, in Timor-Leste, the UN established the Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which took on all executive and legislative functions until the country’s independence in 2002, and subsequently deployed a number of comprehensive missions to (help) steer the peacebuilding process.

Focusing on the deployments to BiH and Timor-Leste hence allows me to trace the emergence and transformation of peacebuilding practice over the course of two decades. While not a comparative study, the analysis of actors’ practices in two different post-war countries allows me to identify and disentangle factors that have contributed to shaping their practices on the country, field, and actor levels, as well as their interactions. However, owing in part to empirical limitations as well as to the evolution of peacebuilding practices, the approach taken to studying these two cases varies slightly. In both country studies, the analysis is grounded in an assessment of foreign policy discourses and responses that accompanied the events leading up to the deployment of peacebuilders, both with a view to contextualizing the case studies and to identify the dominant explanatory paradigms that were available to peacebuilders at the outset of their mission. In both cases, this analysis is followed up by a reconstruction of the respective executive levels of the peacebuilding field, which comprises the international administration, the mandate and leadership of respective missions, and the most influential donor governments. In the Bosnian country study, the analysis traces the ‘reasoned practices’ of the UNDP and of DFID throughout the first decade of international peacebuilding in the country. By contrast, the country study on peacebuilding in East Timor/Timor-Leste only zooms in on one agency, the UN Development Programme. This approach was chosen given the expansive scope of
UNDP involvement in the country. The UNDP programmes in Timor-Leste complemented the portfolio of successive UN missions, in particular in regard to the key areas of justice and governance, and hence generated an abundance of source material. In particular, and in contrast to the Bosnian case, the source material available with regard to the UNDP’s engagement in East Timor also includes copious materials that were produced in regard to planning, implementing, and evaluating individual programmes and projects, thus allowing for a much more in-depth assessment of UNDP practices. However, the decision to focus primarily on the UNDP is also warranted by the fact that the UK government has increasingly delimited the number of its partner countries and has taken to working through multilateral agencies, as was already evidenced in the latter stages of its contribution to peacebuilding in Bosnia.

3.4.4 Methods and source material

The evolution and development of this project has to a significant extent proceeded inductively. The research questions originated from a number of ‘puzzling’ observations that I was able to make while working as a researcher and consultant on more than ten projects for national ministries, bilateral aid agencies, private foundations, and international organisations, mostly with a view to evaluating and advising initiatives in the area of conflict, development, and peacebuilding. In particular, many observations regarding the existence and characteristics of the peacebuilding field derive from interviews that I conducted with ‘peacebuilding practitioners’ in countries such as Senegal (2009), Tajikistan (2011), and Russia (2011). While some of my initial impressions were based on these earlier, and largely policy-driven projects and

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53 Interview with Conflict Adviser, DfID, London July 2012.
54 As of September 1999, funds were provided to the UN mission and future ITA to assist humanitarian emergency relief, particularly for IDPs. At the Tokyo Donor Conference in December of that year, DfID announced plans to channel its aid through the World Bank Trust Fund and the UNTAET Trust Fund. Further aid was channeled through IPM, WFP, UNAMET, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, ICRC, WHO, and CARE, as well as a number of NGOs working in the areas of short-term humanitarian assistance. <http://reliefweb.int/report/timor-leste/dfid-uk-east-timor-information-note-15-sep-1999>, <http://img.static.reliefweb.int/report/timor-leste/uk-pledges-long-term-support-people-east-timor> (10 June 2014). In the aftermath of the 2006 crises, DfID funded emergency relief operations conducted by CARE International in East Timorese refugee camps. Further funding targeted different aspects of capacity building in regard to the East Timorese government, which was channeled through the consolidate Support Programme Trust Fund and the World Bank Trust Fund, see <https://web.archive.org/web/20070627020116/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/asia/east-timor.asp> (10 Dec 2014). To the extent that the UK government participated in specific projects in East Timor, these were conducted through its Global Conflict Prevention Pool under the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) rather than DfID.
practical experiences, the primary methods employed in studying the emergence and transformation of peacebuilding practice at the level of the peacebuilding field and in two particular cases are historical process tracing, discourse analysis, and interviews.

In the two case studies, the research proceeds by analysing the objectives and tasks these agencies originally planned to accomplish in the two countries, and how these have been adjusted or modified over time. This part of the analysis builds on the insights of discourse analysis (Hansen 2006), which posits that policy actors seek to construct stable discourses that link their policies with their identity. The research scrutinizes the causal narratives that peacebuilding actors construct to link their assessments and representations of the context (problem) to appropriate policies (solution) that match their institutional scope of action and are seen as ‘appropriate’ within the peacebuilding field (identity).

The decision to employ a discourse analytical method to extracting actors’ reasoning is warranted by the nature of the sources. The studied documents have primarily been written with a view to planning and guiding policy and projects within institutions, and to a lesser extent also with a view to presenting the organisation’s peacebuilding work to other actors in the field. To a reasonable degree, it can hence be argued that these discourses reflect the background knowledge and doxa of the peacebuilding field, and in the case of these project-related documents, that practice and discourse occasionally converge in what Adler and Pouliot (2011) have referred to as ‘reasoned practices’ (see also Neal 2014: 3).55 The purpose of the discourse analysis is hence to extract actors’ reasoning and the shared understandings, ideas, notions, and so on as manifest in their policy reports and planning documents. It follows from this that in this research design, discourse is neither seen as independent of nor as actually causing practice. While it might be seen as causal or constitutive in the sense that ‘new’ practitioners are socialized or habitualized into the field by way of appropriating this discourse and its epistemes (see Skinner’s notion of conditioning, Skinner 2002; Kratochwil 2011), the discourse is first and foremost seen as manifesting the evolving and increasingly taken-for-granted standards and practices of the field (or in this case ‘fields’) and its background knowledge that set the terms for institutional reasoning, while at the same time being influenced by them over time.

The analysis covers the UNDP’s and DFID’s entire country-related documentation as far as available, i.e. country assessments, programme and project information, as well as

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55 This assessment is triangulated with interviews.
internal and external\textsuperscript{56} evaluations thereof. The research extracts the reasoning of these actors by assessing their causal narratives that link the identified problems and challenges in the area of peacebuilding to suggested solutions and planned policy. This analysis enables me to identify cues as to why peacebuilding tasks are approached the way they are, i.e. in depoliticized and decontextualized forms. In other words, this analysis is expected to indicate the relative importance of factors on the institutional, contextual, and field levels that have shaped the evolution of peacebuilding practices over time.

In a second step, this reconstruction of actors’ narratives on problems and solutions is grounded in a process-tracing analysis of how and why these two agencies got involved in post-war peacebuilding to begin with, first in BiH and subsequently in Timor-Leste. To the extent possible, this is followed-up and contextualized by 24 interviews and conversations with present and former staff at field and headquarters levels in London, Bonn, Oslo, Dili, and in two cases via Skype\textsuperscript{57} to triangulate the findings of the discourse analysis. Questions to be addressed during the interviews include the circumstances of individual programmes and projects, institutional practices with regard to funding, project and programme design and implementation, as well as information regarding institutional changes (such as the establishment and adjustments of peace and conflict divisions). In addition to focusing on developments within the peacebuilding agencies, tracing the process by which peacebuilding emerged as a depoliticized practice also necessitates an appraisal of the developments in the two ‘target’ countries as well as on the level of the emerging peacebuilding field.

CONCLUSION

The thesis analyzes the emergence of peacebuilding as a new field of practice with a view to understanding why it has emerged and persisted in its present, largely acontextual and apolitical form. In combining a Bourdieusian (1977, 1999) field perspective with Hansen’s (2006) emphasis on identities in discursive practice, the project contends that the nature of the present practice can only be sufficiently

\textsuperscript{56} Increasingly, it has come to be seen as ‘best practice’ to commission external agencies with evaluating the impacts or performances of projects and programmes. The precise mechanisms, however, vary. In some cases, assessments are carried out by employing guidelines or terms of reference developed by the commissioning body (i.e. the peacebuilding agency). In other cases, evaluations are developed and undertaken entirely independently by third parties, which, in turn, ‘depend’ on the peacebuilding agencies for funding.

\textsuperscript{57} See the list of interviews, Annex 1.
understood by studying the relevant peacebuilding agencies ‘on their own terms’. As argued above, this implies grounding the analysis in an appraisal of peacebuilders’ professed objectives and mandates with regard to peacebuilding, and juxtaposing this with an analysis of their prior objectives, mandates, and standard operational procedures: in short, practices as expressed in the taken-for-granted standards of their respective communities of practice. In so doing, the argument draws attention to the tensions that continue to arise from the mismatch between the identity and ensuing scope of action of the actors mandated with the task, as well as related tensions arising from contradicting principles associated with different activities in the conflict resolution field and the ways in which these interact with conditions in target countries. For this reason, the analysis takes the professed ends or objectives of peacebuilding agencies as its starting point and traces the process by which these have been transformed and depoliticized as a result of the inherent tensions within the emerging field.

The following chapter will apply this framework to re-construct the (nascent) peacebuilding field of practice as constituted by a specific (a) objective (task): building peace after war, its (b) principal actors from the peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian fields, and the conceptual ‘legacies’, principles, and identities they brought from their original communities of practice. With a view to identifying potential dilemmas between actors’ institutional identities and practices on the one hand and the requirements of the ‘new task’ on the other, a particular focus lies on the reasons and ways in which these actors took up the purpose of ‘building peace’ in the first place, and on the premises that guided their initial efforts.
4 RECONSTRUCTING THE PEACEBUILDING FIELD OF PRACTICE: FOUNDATIONAL DILEMMAS AND THE EMERGENCE OF ‘BEST PRACTICE’

‘Because thinking about peace is dominated by a set of key assumptions, most theorists, policymakers and practitioners assume that the concept of peace they deploy is ontologically stable. By extension this means that peace can be engineered in environments where it may not yet be present.’

INTRODUCTION

This chapter disaggregates the foundational dilemma that lies at the bottom of depoliticized peacebuilding practices by reconstructing the emergence of the new field in the first half of the 1990s. In particular, I will trace the process by which peacebuilding was first defined as a new objective for the international community, seeking to identify the ‘problem’ that peacebuilding was supposed to address as well as the means or ‘solutions’ towards achieving it. As Richmond (2008: 12) emphasizes, “peace is constructed according to the preferences of those actors who are most involved in its construction.” While this observation is usually taken to refer to states as the foremost ‘units of analysis’ in the current international system, I will argue that the ‘construction’ of peace has to a considerable extent been conducted by a range of agencies and institutions from the peacekeeping, humanitarian, and development fields, some of which command a significant degree of independence and leverage vis-à-vis state actors. However, as this thesis contends, their scope of action is considerably restricted or defined by their earlier practices and key institutional mandates, particularly in terms of impartiality and/or political neutrality. This tension is manifest in a 2006 statement by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, which observes

58 Richmond (2008: 12).
59 See, for example, Bellamy (2008), Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009), Paris (2004), Pugh (2005), Pugh, Cooper and Turner (2008).
that “building sustainable peace is first and foremost a profoundly political process”, but has so far not led to the development of a “well-articulated paradigm” (UN 2006: 3, 6). Instead, “’crisis ... humanitarians,’ ‘peacekeeping,’ and ‘development’ remain the dominant conceptual frameworks and funding channels, in large part as a result of existing organizational mandates and interests” (UN 2006: 6). Accordingly, the second part of this chapter will turn to the analysis of the ‘peacebuilders’, i.e. of the relevant departments, agencies, and organisations within and beyond the UN that responded to the new objective and subsequently sought to ‘operationalize’ and harmonize it with their doxic practices.

In reconstructing the emergent field, the present analysis pursues three interrelated objectives. First, I will argue that the notion of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ as proposed in Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace* (1992) first and foremost reflected earlier experiences with ‘assisting’ the ‘implementation’ of comprehensive negotiated settlements in Namibia, El Salvador, and Angola that were heralded as highly successful at the time and seemed to fall into the purview of peacekeepers and development agencies. Second, and closely related with this discussion, I will demonstrate that most contemporary agents and agencies, while clearly acknowledging the political nature of peace(building) processes, initially assumed that the main task of external peacebuilders was to aid or assist with the ‘implementation’ of provisions whose political dimension and content had been negotiated elsewhere. As there was initially little specific expertise regarding peacebuilding, ‘managing transitions’, or ‘post-conflict reconstruction’, most new peacebuilders entered the field based on their sectoral capacities in areas such as institution-building, disarmament, or the repatriation of refugees. However, more often than not, the presumption regarding the prevalence of ‘genuine’ consent and cooperation proved unduly optimistic, which posed particular challenges to the work of those actors who in their ‘doxic’ practices – and for different reasons – had relied on impartiality and political neutrality as well as on partnering with host state governments. Over time, and as the case studies of interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Timor-Leste will show, the repeated frustration of peacebuilders’ ‘implementation’ efforts prompted actors to revise and reframe their approaches in such a way as to ‘enable’ them to act in highly contested and politically charged settings while crucially maintaining their previous practices and institutional identities. Accordingly, the chapter will thirdly review the sources and functions of impartiality and neutrality

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60 See, for instance, UNDDMS (1995), UNHCR (1995), and UNDESA (1996), discussed below in 5.1.
as doxic practices and operational principles of peacekeepers, development and humanitarian workers, as well as of the UN Secretariat with a view to their implications on working in politically contested settings.

As this thesis argues, the ‘foundational dilemma’ between the impartial and/or neutral identity of most peacebuilding agencies on the one hand and the persistence of political conflict on the other, while hardly ever explicitly acknowledged, accounts for the persistent depoliticization of peacebuilding practices and has significantly contributed to shaping their form and content. With a view to disassembling the tension between peacebuilding objectives and actors’ identities in contested settings, the present chapter will employ the framework developed above to re-construct the emergent field of practice as constituted by a specific (a) objective (task): building peace after war, and its (b) principal agents from the peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian communities of practice.

4.1. ADOPTING PEACEBUILDING AS A NEW OBJECTIVE

How and in which ways did building peace in war-torn states come to be seen as a task of the international community? Which particular challenges was it meant to address, and how was it originally understood? Studies of peacebuilding in particular and of UN peace efforts in general invariably take the dissolution of the Cold War as their starting point to describe the new international environment that enabled the rise of peacebuilding. While these conditions have extensively been analysed and discussed elsewhere (e.g. Ramsbotham et al. 2011; Bellamy and Williams 2010; Berdal 2009), there is little disagreement that the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of superpower confrontation brought about a new scope of cooperation within the UN Security Council and beyond, as well as a surge in the number of internal armed conflicts whose escalation can in part be attributed to this demise, the ensuing governance vacuum in some countries, and processes of transition and contestation (Mack 2007).

In their account of developments that facilitated the expansion and transformation of the international peace support agenda, Bellamy and Williams (2010) distinguish between demand and supply-driven factors. In particular, they draw attention to the question as to “where the requests for peace operations came from”, and to what extent they were intended to fulfil new or changed purposes (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 94). On the demand side, in the late 1980s, a series of peace operations had been “formally
requested by peace agreements or ceasefires brokered by third parties and endorsed by the parties to the conflict” (95), usually following UN mediation efforts that concluded a series of long-standing conflicts and were seen as successful instruments at the time (97). On the supply side, there was an unprecedented degree of cooperation within the UN Security Council, coupled with higher media and government attention for issues such as democratization and human rights (97). In sum, the period was characterized by the concomitance of optimism regarding the ability to ‘cash in’ the ‘peace dividend’ in material and immaterial terms following the largely non-violent end of the Cold War and a measure of political will to do so, not least given the relative weakness of non-Western powers in the Security Council and beyond.61 As Tschirgi (2004: 2) argues, a crucial characteristic of this optimism was the expectation that “the international community would intervene collectively as a ‘third party’ in both inter- and intrastate violent conflict, thus overcoming conventionally defined national or factional interests seen to have dominated intervention in conflicts for most of the Cold War period and before and heralding a new era of a universal ‘international community’ (Barnett 2011).

In January 1992, six months prior to the hitherto biggest United Nations summit at Rio de Janeiro, the first ever summit of the UN Security Council at the heads of state and government level took place. This gathering of international powers “encouraged the UN to assume a lead coordinating role” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 202) and commissioned the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to draft an “analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening ... within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping.”62 The Secretary-General’s report, An Agenda for Peace (UN 1992), merits some in-depth discussion, as it was the first attempt to systematically review UN peace support instruments and introduced the notion of ‘peacebuilding’ to the UN and international community. While it is important to bear in mind that different agencies took up the new task in different ways and that neither the Agenda nor the subsequent Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (1995) necessarily reflect actual practice, the Agenda in particular has been referred to as a “watershed” that provided an important impetus to the evolution of the field and a framework for the reasoning of affiliated actors (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 17). What is more,

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61 This new optimism was also manifest in the work of numerous international commissions, notably the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission), which culminated in the 1992 UN Rio, or ‘Earth Summit’ (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UNCED). The summit was the first meeting of this kind to be held since the 1972 Stockholm Summit and initiated an intense phase of international summity.

particularly with regard to the extension of peace operations mandates, Bode (2015: 172) demonstrates the extent to which the *Agenda* "manifest[s] peacekeeping ideas 'tried out' by Goulding and others", i.e. leading members of the UN Secretariat in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In other words, the *Agenda* is one of the earliest and arguably most significant manifestations of an expanded understanding of the objectives and instruments of international peace support.

An Agenda for Peace, 1992

*An Agenda for Peace*, although commissioned by the Security Council as an advisory report with policy recommendations, is in large part a manifesto calling on member states to seize the moment to institutionalize and fully implement the scope of action of the UN in line with its Charter. As such, the introductory sections laying out the purpose of the *Agenda* place relatively little emphasis on discussing specific problems, and primarily invoke the broadened, if not entirely unproblematic, scope of international cooperation, particularly the new degree of equanimity within the Security Council (UN 1992: §§8-11; 14-19). In preparing his report and recommendations, the UN Secretary-General expanded the task he had been issued with in two important respects. On the one hand, the *Agenda* establishes conceptual linkages between peace support and the wider agenda of the UN Conference on Environment and Development and related summits on human rights, population and development, women, social development, and the protection of minorities (5, 22). On the other hand, Boutros-Ghali also extended the scope of the commissioned report to include what he termed ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, i.e. “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (21). Which particular problem, then, was post-conflict peacebuilding expected to resolve? And how did it relate to the other concepts and approaches the Secretary-General had been commissioned to address, i.e. preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peacemaking?

The *Agenda* portrays the contemporary international situation as characterized by contradiction and ambiguity. While there is a greater willingness for cooperation among

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63 Regarding the authorship of the *Agenda* and of similar reports, I consistently refer to the respective Secretary-General as the principal author and head of the UN Secretariat, while acknowledging that such reports are usually drafted by the SG in collaboration with key Secretariat staff and undergo extensive revisions based on comments from within and without the UN Secretariat (see Bode 2015; Russett 1997; Weinlich 2014).
states, including the end of the “ideological barrier” and of apartheid, negotiations to reduce nuclear armaments, and transitions to democracy in formerly authoritarian states, on the negative side, “fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife” (11). International security is seen as threatened by a list of contradictory trends. In addition to the tensions between “nationalism and globalism”, or “self-determination and state sovereignty”, insecurity is seen to result from "new racial tensions", the "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ... and conventional arms” (12). In light of the development of the peacebuilding field, one of the most interesting aspects of Boutros-Ghali’s portrayal of the ‘changing context’ is his move to frame several of the challenges that were to be addressed at the Rio Summit as a "new dimension of insecurity" in addition to more traditional, hard power security threats such as nuclear arms. "Poverty, disease, famine, oppression", ecological problems, and large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are seen as "both sources and consequences of conflict” and hence effectively securitized (see Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1997). While the Agenda does not elaborate on how these threats to security are linked to conflict, it clearly carves out an expanded understanding of “peace, stability and security” as “encompass[ing] matters beyond military threats” (UN 1992: §12). In this understanding, the “deepest causes of conflict” are “economic despair, social injustice and political oppression”, which necessitate an “integrated approach to human security” (15-16, emphasis added).

The Agenda does not offer a clear-cut or positive definition of peace or ‘social peace’, assuming simply that “the concept of peace is easy to grasp” (12). However, the replacement of authoritarian regimes by “democratic forces and responsive Governments”, “open forms of economic policy”, and the heightened degree of interstate “political associations” are all reported as positive developments (9, 11). While acknowledging the tensions between the “sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States” on the one hand and the “principle of self-determination for peoples” on the other, the “foundation-stone” of international peace and cooperation “must remain the State” to avoid the “fragmentation” of the international system (16, 19). Instead, clashes between “globalism and nationalism” should, among others, be resolved by a deeper “commitment to human rights, with a special sensitivity to those of minorities, whether ethnic, religious, social or linguistic” ones (18).
The bulk of the Agenda is dedicated to describing the means of addressing violent conflict, both between states and following “civil war and strife” (15), that are presently at the disposal of the United Nations and wider international community, or whose introduction the Secretary-General recommends. These are divided into three categories: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Preventive diplomacy, as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter” (20), is usually conducted by the Secretary-General, senior staff, the Security Council, General Assembly, or specialized programmes and regional organizations. It includes measures to build confidence, fact-finding, and early warning, and should factor in the “economic and social roots of many potential conflicts” in addition to “political developments” (25). The Secretary-General also suggests the development of consent-based preventive deployment facilities and other peacekeeping techniques such as demilitarized zones (28-33).

The second concept, peacemaking, is defined as “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially [but not exclusively, AW] through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter” (20). The Agenda lists a string of relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and discusses the tools at the disposal of different principal organs of the United Nations: in addition to mediation, negotiation, and good offices, the Secretary-General highlights the specific power of the Security Council to recommend the submission of conflicts to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (38-39). Importantly, the peacemaking spectrum presented here also includes a number of coercive instruments, such as sanctions or military force, after all peaceful (Chapter VI) measures have been exhausted in cases of any “threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” (under Article 42, Chapter VII, UN Charter). To this end, and to ensure the flexibility and credibility of the United Nations to deter and counter ‘acts of aggression’, the Secretary-General calls for the establishment of a UN standing armed force as mentioned under Article 43 of the Charter. In this instance, the Secretary-General highlights that these enforcement actions and the Military Staff Committee as the body potentially commissioned with conducting it “should be seen in the context of Chapter VII” (43); in other words, as entirely distinct from the

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64 Contrary to these suggestions and subsequent proposals, no such agreement for the provision of standing forces has ever been concluded. Where the Security Council has authorized the use of force beyond mere self-defence (Art. 51 UN Charter), this has usually occurred through regional organizations or ‘coalitions of the willing’ and relied on Art. 42 (operations using military force by members) and Art. 48 (implementation of SC decisions according to Chapter VII by member states or agencies) in combination with Art. 51 of the UN Charter (cf. Trauttmandorff 2001: 34).
organization's peacekeeping tasks, which traditionally fall under Chapter VI of the Charter and hence the area of cooperative security.65

Related to the military enforcement of peace in cases of 'acts of aggression,' the Secretary-General also suggests the introduction of so-called peace-enforcement units (44), which seem to be conceptualized as sitting at the interface of peacemaking and peacekeeping: while listed as peacemaking instruments, Boutros-Ghali emphasizes that their purpose is distinct from the force to be established under Article 43. According to the Secretary-General, the purpose of these units would be to “restore and maintain [a] cease-fire”, a task that might “exceed the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors” (44). While the latter reason is primarily an operational issue, the former point regarding the mission of peace-keepers seems to indicate a principled concern regarding the purposes of peacekeeping as opposed to peace enforcement “under Article 40 of the Charter” (44), as the latter would arguably violate peacekeepers’ key operational principles of impartiality and consent. In sum, to the extent that the Agenda discusses enforcement action of any kind on the part of the UN, this is exclusively discussed within the framework of peacemaking and carefully distinguished from peacekeeping in conceptual and operational terms.

The third and fourth sections on peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding respectively are the two shortest sections of the Agenda. Peacekeeping is defined as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians” (20, emphasis added). It is held to be the most successful peace support instrument and also the best-known one. Accordingly, the section focuses on the gap between the increased demand for peacekeeping and the shortage of available funds and resources (51-54). The Secretary-General briefly mentions the speedy transformation of peacekeeping practices in recent years, but highlights that this has left the “basic conditions for success” unaltered: “a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties ... ; the continuing support of the Security Council” as well as contributions by member states, “effective UN command”, and “adequate financial and logistic support” (50). To the extent that the Agenda addresses any changes in peacekeeping practices at all, these are related to the fact that operations are “increasingly fielded to help implement settlements that have been negotiated by

65 On the distinction between cooperative vs. collective security or the Chapter VI as opposed to the Chapter VII provisions within the UN Charter, see Neuhold (2001) and Freudenschuß (2001).
peacemakers” (50) and hence require increased numbers of “civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police”, whose importance has come to equal that of the military (52). The changing nature of peacekeeping, however, is only mentioned in the context of increased demands and the Secretary-General’s recommendations to make these more readily available. In other words, in this section, there is no consideration of the extent to which the wider scope of activities relates to the original principles or mandates.

The last concept, post-conflict peacebuilding, is envisioned as “the construction of a new environment” that addresses “underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems” through “sustained cooperative work” (57). The Agenda neither elaborates a comprehensive concept for peacebuilding, nor does it define a particular problem that this newly introduced concept is meant to address. Instead, implicitly mirroring Galtung’s framework, Boutros-Ghali introduces peacebuilding as a “critically related concept” that is employed to second the previous three: “peacemaking and peacekeeping, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people” (55, emphasis added). Two aspects are worth pointing out with regard to this definition. Firstly, the task of peacebuilders is to consolidate a ‘peace’ that has already been made. Secondly, this quote seems to imply a strong structural focus of peacebuilding. However, when taking into account further paragraphs, the relationship between the three peace-support tasks appears somewhat blurred. On the one hand, peacekeeping and peacemaking are seen as concurrent and “mutually reinforcing” tasks (57), although, in practice, “peacemaking is often a prelude to peace-keeping” (45). In this section, both are seen as a “prerequisite for peacebuilding”. Yet, in the later section, peacebuilding is understood as part of the “comprehensive efforts” of peacemaking and peacekeeping operations (55). This is also evident in the depiction of the tasks of post-conflict peacebuilding on the one hand, such as disarmament, restoring order, the collection of weapons, refugee repatriation, training the security sector, election monitoring, the protection of human rights, and government reform as well as political participation (55), and the demand for new staff in peacekeeping for the exact same tasks on the other (52). In short, within the Agenda,

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66 While not acknowledged in the Agenda, the terminological indebtedness of the Agenda to Galtung’s work was acknowledged in later UN peacebuilding publications (see, for instance <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pbun.shtml>, 26 July 2015). By contrast, according to interviews undertaken within the Oral History Project, Boutros-Ghali claimed that he had spontaneously invented the notion when reflecting on the UN operation in El Salvador (ONUSAL) (Oral History Interview of Boutros Boutros-Ghali 2001, cited in Bode 2015: 172).
it is hardly possible to clearly distinguish peacekeeping from peacebuilding activities. For instance, the Secretary-General characterises the ‘link’ between peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the context of mine clearance: while de-mining is a crucial part of peacekeeping, it is an equally important peacebuilding task, as sectors such as agriculture and transportation “cannot be revived without de-mining”, which is key to “heightening the sense of security and encouraging the parties to turn their energies to the work of peaceful restoration” (58).

As this example indicates, within the framework of the *Agenda*, the major difference between peacekeeping and peacebuilding seems to lie in the latter’s long-term focus and – presumably – the higher degree of what would nowadays be called ‘participation’, ‘agency’, or ‘ownership’ of the parties therein. The key terms in this context that set peacebuilding apart from peacekeeping are ‘sustainable’, ‘durability’, ‘confidence’, and ‘development’ (55-57). In other words, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are seen as part of a continuum rather than as qualitatively distinct: both rest on an assumption that conflict is over, i.e. that *peacemaking has succeeded*, at least to the minimal degree of garnering the parties’ consent and general cooperation. In other words, while peacebuilding as a distinct task or objective remains largely unspecified, the term seems to encapsulate the less tangible dimensions of a peace process: it ought to be long-term, agency should remain with the main parties, and it should be based on and lead to confidence or trust between them. What all these attributes have in common is that they address the procedural dimension of peace, or the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what’, thus at the same time expressing the idea of the long-term nourishment of trust, local agency, and development, and providing a broad umbrella for a multitude of approaches and actors.

Responses to the Agenda among the principal organs of the United Nations

As noted above, the *Agenda* was widely and enthusiastically received among UN organs and agencies, and among diverse actors from the development, humanitarian, and peacekeeping fields (see below, 4.2). The report remains today the most-cited pertinent document in relation to UN and international peace support, its influence possibly rivalled only by the 2000 *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations* (Sutterlin 2007).

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67 This is not to say that peacemaking is necessarily terminated, as peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding are seen to interact with a view to preventing future conflict (ibid.: §§40, 45).

68 In fact, the individual tasks listed in the sections on peacekeeping and peacebuilding are largely identical: mine clearance, elections, human rights monitoring, etc.
The Security Council launched a series of monthly meetings\(^69\) to review and implement the recommendations addressed to it. Unsurprisingly, the changed nature of peace(keeping) operations, the cooperation with regional arrangements, and the role and influence of troop-contributing countries commanded the highest attention. In line with, but partly preceding, the provisions recommended by the *Agenda*, in 1992, the responsibilities for peacekeeping and peacemaking were institutionally separated within the UN Secretariat through the creation of the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).\(^70\)

In April 1993, the Security Council considered the Secretary-General’s recommendations on ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ and endorsed the suggested activities. It designated development agencies to conduct peacebuilding “within the framework of comprehensive settlements of conflict situations”, confirming that “social peace is as important as strategic or political peace and [that the Council] supports the .. view that there is a new requirement for technical assistance” (S/25696 of 30 April 1993). Notwithstanding this general endorsement, from the point of view of the Security Council the same fundamental problem that triggered intense debates on peacekeeping reform implicitly also referred to peacebuilding. While the Council asserts its “primary responsibility for the maintenance of *international* peace and security” (ibid., emphasis added), subsequent discussions within the Council reiterated fundamentally opposing views regarding its role in *intra*-state conflict in light of the norm of non-interference.\(^71\)

With regard to the emergence of the new peacebuilding field, it is also worth noting that the Council already emphasized “the close link which may exist, in many cases, between humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations” and the so-called ‘continuum’ between relief and rehabilitation, thus foreshadowing the convergence between peacekeeping, humanitarianism, and development cooperation under the new umbrella (S/25859 of 28 May 1993). The General Assembly, in turn, created an informal open-ended working group on the *Agenda* and issued a number of resolutions that emphasized peaceful and cooperative instruments under Chapter VI and strongly

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\(^70\) Previously, the UN Office of Special Political Affairs (UNOSPA), created in 1961, had been in charge of peacekeeping, and until 1988 also of diplomatic peacemaking and preventive diplomacy, within the UN Secretariat (Weinlich 2014: 31-33).

underlined the principles of sovereignty and non-interference (e.g. A/Res/47/120 of 18 Dec 1992).

Towards the end of the 1980s, the number of new peacekeeping operations had increased dramatically. Only 13 missions had been mandated during the entire period of the Cold War, followed by five new operations mandated in 1988/89 alone, a time of peacekeeping 'euphoria' after UN peacekeepers had been awarded the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize (Bode 2015: 166). In particular, the successful operation in Namibia (UNTAG) helped increase the demand and willingness to mandate multidimensional peacekeeping operations, with the SC authorizing another 12 new, and increasingly 'multifunctional', peacekeeping operations in the following four years, leading to a 'first peak' in UN peacekeeping in 1993 (Weinlich 2014: 21). As Bode emphasizes, citing Goulding and other high-ranking Secretariat officials, this popularity of peacekeeping as an instrument led to its perception "as the solution to all kinds of long-standing conflicts – while not all of them lent themselves to peacekeeping engagement" (Bode 2015: 169). These high expectations – together with the willingness of member states to contribute to peacekeeping operations – were considerably curbed following high-profile 'peacekeeping' failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda, the lessons of which, as they were understood at the time in conjunction with ongoing deliberations on the Agenda, are reflected in the 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, co-authored by Boutros-Ghali and his Under Secretary-General Marrack Goulding, a long-time defender of preserving the ‘integrity’ of traditional peacekeeping principles (Goulding 1993; Bode 2015: 179).

Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, 1995

In contrast to the original Agenda, the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (UN 1995) seeks to provide a concise analysis of the nature of contemporary conflicts, possible solutions, and their inherent tensions. Two developments appear to be of particular concern. On the one hand, the United Nations is not only increasingly called upon to intervene in conflicts, but particularly in intra-state violent conflicts. On the other hand, recent experiences in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrated the difficulties arising from the transformation of earlier UN practices, particularly in the field of peacekeeping. The Supplement hence reviews and refines some of the earlier analyses and recommendations in light of recent practical experiences, and can hence be seen to exemplify the ways in which these have been interpreted by the UN Secretary-
General and Secretariat. In the introductory depiction of the ‘changed context’, the Secretary-General notes the increasing incidence of intra-state wars whose escalation he relates to the end of the Cold War. In important respects, Boutros-Ghali’s depiction of this “new breed of intra-state conflicts” (UN 1995: §12) anticipates the ‘new wars’ debate (Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2004) of the following decade and merits some in-depth consideration, particularly as the Secretary-General seeks to link the new challenge to (traditional) solutions and identifies a number of problems.

A new ‘breed’ of conflict
The ‘new’ conflicts are seen as often “of a religious or ethnic character”, “involving unusual violence and cruelty”, and conducted not only by “regular armies but also ... militias and armed civilians with little discipline and ill-defined chains of command” (UN 1995: §12). These “guerrilla wars” lack “clear front lines” and render “civilians ... the main victims and often the main targets”, increasingly causing humanitarian emergencies and significantly increasing the number of refugees and IDPs (12). In this portrayal, a central challenge is posed by “the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos” (13). On the one hand, this requires a form of intervention that transcends traditional military and humanitarian efforts to include activities such as “the promotion of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government”, seen as “complex” and “sensitive” long-term tasks that “can involve constant danger” if the parties are not (yet) willing to cooperate (14, 15). On the other hand, however, even the implementation of humanitarian assistance occurs without consent and has at times required enforcement, as it often runs counter to the “war aims” of one or more of the warring parties, who might also divert goods for their own purposes (18). This dilemma, together with increased international attention and pressure, has led to the de facto establishment of a new form of peace operation which is not peacekeeping “as practised hitherto”, as there is “often no agreement between the warring parties on which a peace-keeping mandate can be based” (19). At the same time, despite the authorisation of the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in cases such as Somalia and BiH, the UN “remains impartial and neutral between the parties” and cannot “impose a cessation of hostilities” (19). In other words, a qualitatively new challenge is seen to have arisen from a new “breed” of intra-state wars, which is crucially defined by the continuation of hostilities, the absence of an
agreement, and the need to protect humanitarian action with force (19). In sum, these problems all relate to the thorny issues of sovereignty, consent, and impartiality.

The transformation of peace(keeping) operations

In addition to, but notably independent of, the changed nature in the types of conflict to be addressed, the Secretary-General identifies two recent innovations regarding the nature of the instruments at the UN's disposal. Traditionally, peacekeeping operations had been deployed following a ceasefire (agreement) to freeze the politico-military balance, thus creating a space for political negotiations. However, since the late 1980s, a new type of 'multidimensional' peacekeeping has occurred which is, firstly, deployed after the conclusion of a political settlement and, secondly, mandated with "helping the parties implement the comprehensive settlement they had negotiated" (20). Cases deemed successful include Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique, and involved numerous civilian tasks (19). Interestingly, this discussion is accompanied by the observation that the implementation of an agreed settlement within the foreseen timeframe might not be sufficient to ensuring "that the original causes of war are eradicated". Instead, this can only be accomplished through "coordinated programmes ... over a number of years and in various fields", such as "national institutions, human rights, civilian police", and "other actions in the political field", as well as developmental efforts to "resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian problems ... [to] place an achieved peace on a durable foundation" (22). In other words, the discussion of peacekeeping innovations is premised on the existence of a political settlement and the cooperative deployment of peacekeepers, but it also acknowledges the extent to which a peace process is not only likely to transcend the temporal scope of a UN operation, but also distinguishes between 'actions in the political field' and 'developmental efforts.'

In sum, there appears to be a new type of intra-state war, and at the same time a new type of peacekeeping, i.e. multifunctional peacekeeping, which has emerged at a

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72 The list of activities includes: "the supervision of cease-fires, the regroupment and demobilization of forces, their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design and implementation of de-mining programmes; the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures; the establishment of new police forces; the verification of respect for human rights; the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms, the observation, supervision and even organization and conduct of elections, and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction" (21).
particular point in time in response to a particular set of circumstances. Multifunctional peacekeeping is not only distinct as it increasingly involves civilian tasks, but particularly as it seeks to help the parties implement an existing political settlement rather than helping to safeguard the political space for such negotiations to be conducted in the first place. In other words, there is a new problem in the form of intra-state conflict on the one hand, and a number of recent developments regarding the type of peacekeeping instruments or ‘solutions’ on the other: the deployment of ‘multidimensional’ peacekeepers to help implement an agreement and the – problematic – combination of peacekeeping operations with coercive elements. These transformations have for the most part evolved in response to intra-state conflicts. To what extent then are the two issues seen to interact? And what role does peacebuilding play in all this?

Peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding are all seen as hinging upon the consent of parties, a departure from the Agenda which had also allowed for coercive instruments under Chapter VII as part of peacemaking (24). None of these coercive measures are referred to in the correlating section of the Supplement, hence delimiting peacemaking in internal conflict to consensual means. Nonetheless, in all three cases, the absence of ‘consent’ is discussed, albeit under very different premises. In the priority area of prevention and peacemaking, notwithstanding the principled collective support among member states, the main problem continues to be the “reluctance” of one or more parties “to accept UN help” (24). In this regard, there is a crucial distinction between inter-state and intra-state conflicts. While in the former case, potential coercive action “is fully within the Charter” (24), in the second group of intrastate conflicts, ‘UN help’ – in both coercive and non-coercive terms – “must be reconciled with Article 2, paragraph 7” of the UN Charter. This conundrum is not further addressed within the Supplement; instead, the Secretary-General hopes that this problem will be resolved by the emergence of a ‘new norm’ of cooperation among the international community, as the consent of member states is seen as indispensable (28).

Peacekeeping, in turn, is seen to have been hampered in recent years as its three key principles, i.e. consent, impartiality, and the minimal use of force, have not always been observed. In what follows, the Secretary-General argues that the missions in Somalia and BiH were bound to fail as they lost the parties’ consent and the perception of impartiality due to the incremental expansion of their mandates by three tasks: “protecting humanitarian operations during continuing warfare, protecting civilian populations in designated safe areas and pressing the parties to achieve national
reconciliations at a pace faster than they were ready to accept” (34). The Secretary-General highlights the differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, arguing that “the logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate” (35). Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are two alternatives that mutually exclude each other and do not allow for an “easy transition” or sequencing (35). Instead, conflict resolution “requires patient diplomacy and the establishment of a political process that permits, over a period of time, the building of confidence and negotiated solutions to long-standing differences” (36).

In the case of Somalia (UNOSOM) and BiH (UNPROFOR), this technique is seen to have failed as peacekeepers forfeited their (impartial) standing with the parties in the course of the extension of their mandates by coercive instruments. This depiction of the events in terms of ‘mission creep’ implies a simple and unilinear cause-effect relationship and does not address the possibility that the parties in Somalia and BiH were not (yet) inclined to embark on a process of negotiation, or, put simply, that there was not a peace for UNOSOM or UNPROFOR to keep to begin with. On the one hand, the fact that the Secretary-General omits this version of events is all the more surprising, since he had already acknowledged the problem of lacking political will or cooperation in the introductory paragraphs. On the other hand, however, acknowledging this problem would require the Secretary-General to tackle the question of whether and how to act in cases that do not qualify as ‘peacekeeping situations’, with parties that are unwilling to negotiate or settle, and would hence open up the question of enforcement, or potentially restraint. Importantly, such a discussion would require a consideration of the particular challenges and restrictions regarding third-party intervention in intra-state as opposed to inter-state violent conflict. Instead, the discussion focuses on the dynamics between consensual and coercive approaches within a so-called ‘peacekeeping’ context and omits a consideration of how to respond in intra-state conflicts, particularly those characterised as ‘complex humanitarian emergencies’ that do not (yet) allow for peacekeeping or, put simply, for the absence of consent and the scope of action for UN intervention without consent.

‘Post-conflict’ peacebuilding
Arguably, the problem of consent similarly applies to the Secretary-General’s discussion of post-conflict peacebuilding. Like in the case of peacekeeping, the issue is only implicitly addressed when discussing the ‘entrée’ for a legitimate UN presence in host states, but not as a substantial problem of dealing with opposition in its own right. According to the Secretary-General, the notion of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ “has received wide recognition” and is also seen as “valid” in the realm of prevention (47). Like the Agenda, the Supplement does not develop a proper peacebuilding concept, but considers “the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace” as the main objective (49). In regard to sectoral capacities, the Supplement holds that “most of the activities73 that together constitute peace-building fall within the mandates of the various programmes, funds, offices and agencies of the United Nations system with responsibilities in the economic, social, humanitarian and human rights fields” (53). In addition, there also seems to be a distinction between short-term programmes “which are needed for cease-fires, demobilization, humanitarian relief and refugee return” and longer-term programmes “that help rebuild societies and put them back on the path of development” (93). To the extent that these tasks can at all be separated, the former are seen to take part under the auspices of ‘multifunctional peace-keeping’, while the latter can also be conducted by the agencies with the sectoral capacity in the areas of socio-economic development and humanitarianism mentioned above.

The extent to which peacebuilding might indeed involve ‘political’ tasks is implicitly acknowledged in the discussion on authority and leadership. In cases where wartime destruction has incapacitated a government, the coordination of peacebuilding efforts might initially be executed by a ‘multifunctional peace-keeping’ mission under the overall guidance of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Over time, and also in cases where there is no peacekeeping mission to begin with, this responsibility is to be transferred to the (UNDP) resident coordinator (53, 55) normally in charge of coordinating UN activities in developing countries. However, the Secretary-General makes one crucial exception: in situations where there is no peacekeeping mission, peacebuilding measures are to be identified and suggested to the government by the resident coordinator (55), unless “the proposed measures relate to areas such as security, the police or human rights” (56). To avoid risking “the charge of exceeding his

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73 Examples include: “coordinated programmes ... over a number of years and in various fields, to ensure that the original causes of war are eradicated”, for instance, “national institutions, human rights, civilian police, ... [and] other actions in the political field” as well as developmental efforts to “resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian problems” (22).
or her mandate by assuming political functions,” the resident coordinator ought to deliver pertinent information to the Secretary-General who might then take the initiative “with the Government’s agreement” (56; emphasis added).

These recommendations acknowledge the extent to which peacebuilding or multifunctional peacekeeping involve political tasks that are likely to transcend the mandates of agencies such as the UNDP. In cases where no peacekeeping mandate exists this problem is solved by delegating ‘political’ problems back to the Secretary-General, who might then act on the basis of consent. In cases where such a mandate exists, the problem of ‘reluctant political elements’ is not explicitly addressed at all: nor is the question of peace enforcement. Instead, the problem is seen as less fundamental as “the peace-keeping operation will already be mandated to launch various peace-building activities” (50). Problems might arise from “political elements who dislike the peace agreement concluded by their Government” (50). How then is this to be addressed? The ensuing discussion focuses exclusively on the “timing and modalities” of the transitioning out of the peacekeeping operation in close consultation with the government. As soon as the peacekeeping operation has “succeed[ed] in restoring normal conditions,” its peacebuilding tasks are to be taken over by the developmental and humanitarian specialized agencies (53). In parallel with this, decision-making powers might be transferred from the Secretary-General to the General Assembly or to “other inter-governmental bodies with responsibility for the civilian peace-building activities that will continue” (54). In other words, peacebuilding is seen as a continuous task that is initially conducted and steered by peacekeepers and subsequently (i.e. in its civilian components) conducted by international organizations, programmes, and funds.

This discussion assumes that the UN and other actors will partner with the target state’s government as the main responsible party, but it excludes the problem of ‘reluctant political elements’;74 and with it the general problem of lacking consent – on the part of “political elements” and of the government alike – by presuming the restoration of “normal conditions” (which are, however, not further specified). This omission is particularly interesting – or problematic – given the introductory discussion on the ‘new breed of wars’ and the extent to which these are seen as characterized by the presence of non-state or non-governmental actors.

74 It is, however, interesting to note that the potential obstruction of a peace process is narrated in terms of ‘political’ opposition, rather than in the language of ‘criminal’ or otherwise ‘self-interested’ spoilers that is characteristic of the policy discourse on ‘obstruction’ and enforcement in the early 2000s (see chapter 5). On the concept of ‘spoil’ers, see Stedman (1997).
As this discussion shows, despite the acknowledgment of potential political contestation in the immediate 'post-conflict' situation, peacebuilding seems to be understood as largely identical with 'ordinary' development work and is hence supposed to be devolved to the 'usual' agencies and programmes. Notably, this assumption was also reflected in parts of the literature which exhibit conceptual difficulties in distinguishing between development and peacebuilding as development (Barnett et al. 2007). However, this confusion between peacebuilding and development cooperation appears somewhat surprising given the Secretary-General's claim that the "root causes of conflict ... all too often lie in the absence of economic opportunities and social inequities" (UN 1995: §103). If conflict is seen to result from social and economic inequities or injustices, any kind of third-party intervention that seeks to alter the balance, be they understood in developmental or peacebuilding terms, would arguably constitute a political act and hence invite the same charges – and opposition - the Secretary-General seeks to avoid with regard to matters such as 'security' or 'policing' (see the discussion on Mouffe 2008, infra chapter 1). In terms of peacebuilding practice the pattern that emerges appears to assume a division of tasks, in which developmental and humanitarian peacebuilders within and beyond the UN 'implement' the provision of peace agreements and work towards the overall goal of peaceful development, while the Secretary-General and donor governments are in charge of potentially necessary 'political' interventions with the host state government should the need arise. As a result, this approach firstly assumes the presence of a government that is in principle willing to cooperate with or actually 'contract' the specialized agencies, and it secondly ignores the presence of other, non-state conflict parties that are beyond the reach of said governments. As a consequence, peacebuilding efforts are (conceptually) ill equipped to address the absence of consent or cooperation, i.e. the political dimension of peacebuilding, with regard to state and non-state actors alike.

A mismatch between 'problems' and 'solutions'

While the Supplement defines the emergence of a new type of problem, i.e. protracted intrastate wars with parties unwilling to settle or cooperate, the solutions, while taking into account the presence or absence of a UN peacekeeping operation, are essentially defined along the lines of a particular situation, i.e. a so-called 'peacekeeping context', which implies the presence of a government that is – at least in principle – willing and able to build peace, aided by the existence of a presumably 'genuine' political settlement. Conversely, neither the presence of a strong opposing 'political element' nor the case of
a ‘reluctant’ government is taken into account. It could be argued that the Secretary-General has already clarified that peace enforcement is a qualitatively distinct task altogether and hence not discussed here. However, even if that position could be upheld, this would still necessitate some consideration of how to discern between these situations, linking the discussion back to the omnipresent issue of ‘consent’ as a necessary prerequisite to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, and, in its absence, a discussion of possible alternatives. In other words, at which point is there sufficient ‘peace’ in terms of consent and agreement to build on, and how do we know? More importantly, even in the respective section on ‘enforcement action’, which lists international ‘peace enforcement’ in Korea and Kuwait alongside UN activities in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and BiH, the latter are still identified as peacekeeping situations: “Of greater concern … are the consequences of using force, other than for self-defence, in a peace-keeping context” (UN 1995: §79). This, then, rests on the premise that in these contexts, and contrary to interventions in Korea and Kuwait, ‘enforcement action’ was warranted and undertaken to protect humanitarian action, but not to enforce peace, based on “a humanitarian mandate under which the use of force is authorized, but for limited and local purposes and not to bring the war to an end” (19). While this distinction conceptually, if not de facto, preserves the integrity of the three peacekeeping principles, it ignores the bigger question as to whether and how to act when there is no peace to keep.

With peace enforcement or to be precise, the enforcement of consent to or of cooperation in a peace process being out of the question in intra-state violent conflict, we are, in effect, left with the emergence of a new problem, i.e. intra-state wars including non-state parties, widespread violence, and religious, ethnic or other forms of hostile identities, that is neither narratively nor substantively linked with any of the discussed solutions. Given that the Supplement is explicitly intended to “highlight selectively certain areas where unforeseen … difficulties have arisen”, citing Somalia and BiH, and observing that member states have to “take the ‘hard decisions’” (6), this omission is all the more surprising, not least since the original Agenda had explicitly included a range of enforcement activities as peacemaking instruments (UN 1992: §41-45). It is likely that the Secretary-General assumes (or concedes) that the UN is not in the business of ‘enforcing peace’ in intra-state violent conflict. Within the narrative logic of the report, however, this omission appears to be partly substituted for by the assumption that

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75 Witness, for instance, the debate on ‘mission creep’ that occupied most observers at the time, e.g. Crocker and Hampson (1996). On the blurred distinction between the enforcement of peace as opposed to the enforcement of limited objectives, see Sloan (2011), in particular ch. 2.
cooperation, consent, or peace can be nourished or facilitated in the long-term, presumably hoping that peacebuilders can create the consent that peacekeeping requires but cannot enforce, and that the organization is not unequivocally seen as mandated with enforcing in intra-state conflicts due to Article 2(7) of its Charter.

As this thesis argues, this omission – and possible assumption – helped set the mentioned UN bodies and other agencies that have the sectoral, but not the political capacity, mandate, or leverage for peacebuilding-as-nourishing-consent, up for failure. While the political nature of some, if not all peacebuilding tasks, is explicitly recognized, the political aspects of peace processes are in theory supposed to remain with the UN Security Council, Secretary-General, and their delegates, who will then act on the basis of consent. The issue of consent, in turn, is discussed in procedural terms and in light of tensions within the UN Charter, but not linked to a consideration of the more fundamental question as to whether to engage and, if so, how in cases where no such consent is forthcoming. This failure to explicitly address situations in which "hostile factions ... do not ... want to be helped" (UN 1995: §14) becomes particularly problematic in cases where widespread violence against civilian populations and public pressure force the UN and international community to be seen to act, as reported by the Secretary-General, thus likely leading to the deployment of peacekeepers with vague and limited ‘enforcement’ mandates (so-called ‘robust’, ‘wider’, or Chapter VI ½ peacekeeping, cf. Sloan 2011). As the subsequent case studies on peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on Timor-Leste (chapters 6 and 7) will demonstrate, this problematic legacy was often handed over to impartial and neutral peacebuilders, who more often than not were in fact tasked with nourishing the very consent on whose prior existence their deployment was theoretically premised.

After the Agenda and Supplement: Institutional Responses and Decisions
As Russett (1997: 494, 496) concluded based on his review of Boutros-Ghali’s ‘Agenda trilogy’, the Agenda and Supplement, while comprising “a major analytical statement”, were nonetheless unable to “escape some basic contradictions of theory and of practice.” Unsurprisingly, these reflected the tensions within the intergovernmental bodies of the UN in particular and in the wider international community at the time. As argued above, in its responses to the Agenda and Supplement, the Security Council hardly contributed to the conceptual development of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ other than endorsing the Secretary-General’s general suggestions and highlighting the role of ‘technical
assistance'. By contrast, the questions of state sovereignty, consent, and impartiality in peacekeeping at the intra-state level received considerable attention. Following intense discussions, particularly in May 1993, May 1994,76 and, following the release of the Supplement, in February 1995, a formula was found that listed a number of "factors to be taken into account" by the Council before authorizing new peacekeeping operations.77 While these criteria substantially re-affirmed traditional peacekeeping principles, it is noteworthy that the Council was only required to consider 'whether' these criteria applied, and was otherwise free to "respond to situations on a case-by-case basis" and "without prejudice to its ability to do so and to respond rapidly and flexibly as circumstances require" (S/PRST/1995/9 of 22 Feb 1995). In other words, a compromise formula was found that retained the standard operational principles of impartiality, consent, and the minimal use of force, highlighting the importance of the existence of a political settlement, while at the same time allowing the Council to act without the parties' consent by reaffirming its power to identify situations "likely to endanger ... international peace and security" within the context of peacekeeping operations (ibid.). While the exact implications of this formula remained controversial not just among legal scholars, they navigated the peacekeeping dilemma in international political and legal terms. However, this compromise formula did not resolve the operational challenges likely to arise within a peacekeeping setting in cases in which the Security Council chose to diverge from traditional peacekeeping principles.

As this discussion shows, the treatment of the issue of sovereignty, consent, and impartiality on the part of the UN Secretariat/Secretary-General and Security Council amounted to a compromise formula in the case of peacekeeping, but left the problem unaddressed with regard to its implications for 'post-conflict peacebuilding'. At the level of these two organs, the dilemma was primarily a political and legal one in light of opposition by members of the G77 and the limitations imposed by the UN Charter. By

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77 The following criteria are to be taken into account by the Security Council: "(a) Whether a situation exists, the continuation of which is likely to endanger or constitute a threat to international peace and security; (b) Whether regional or subregional organizations and arrangements exist and are ready and able to assist in resolving the situation; (c) Whether a ceasefire exists and whether the parties have committed themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement; (d) Whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reflected in the mandate; (e) Whether a precise mandate for a United Nations operation can be formulated; (f) Whether the safety and security of United Nations personnel can be reasonably ensured, including in particular whether reasonable guarantees can be obtained from the principal parties or factions regarding the safety ... of United Nations personnel" (S/PRST/1994/22 of May 3 1994).
contrast, as I will argue in the following chapters, at the level of the so-called ‘implementing agencies’, the dilemma soon turned out to be an operational one.78

By the mid-1990s, the new objective of 'building peace in war-torn states' had become firmly established within the UN and international agenda. Several UN bodies and international aid agencies began to set up post-conflict units and develop specific policies, increasingly collaborating with think tanks, research institutes, and NGOs working on peacebuilding and conflict prevention, many of which were newly founded at the time.79 As the early peacekeeping optimism gave way to disillusionment in the wake of protracted engagements in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Angola, or DR Congo, the number of newly mandated peace operations temporarily declined (Dwan and Wiharta 2005). At the same time, however, the peacebuilding agenda was further defined and developed by a multitude of new actors, not least since the conclusion of a successful peacebuilding process came increasingly to be seen as a prevention strategy and safeguard against future conflict, and hence as the most promising exit strategy for international actors (UN 2001a). In this regard, the resonance to the new concept might well have been so strong because it offered to address the gap between traditional consent-based forms of peace support and the fact that this consent very often did not seem to be forthcoming. The following sections will hence look at the types of actors who responded to the new task (4.2), before turning to the re-construction of the new field of practice as defined by its distinct objective, agents, and their interactions (4.3).

4.2 AGENTS AND AGENCY IN PEACEBUILDING: THREE COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE

Most analysts concur that “peace is constructed according to the preferences of those actors who are most involved in its construction” (Richmond 2008: 12). As noted in the introduction, a significant part of the literature seems to assume that this process is largely driven by state interest. While state influence is certainly dominant when it comes to decisions on countries of intervention (Gilligan and Stedman 2001), the principal thrust of peace operations and bilateral aid agreements (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 207ff.), and defining the scope of action of the UN Secretariat (Weinlich 2014), the

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78 Exceptions to this are the reports on UN action in specific cases: arguing on the grounds of operational considerations, the 1994/5 review of the UN's actions in Srebrenica drew the conclusion that the organisation “should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of states” (Bellamy et al. 2010: 112; emphasis added).

79 Examples include the International Crisis Group (ICG), Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Conciliation Resources (CR), and Interpeace.
process of ‘constructing’ peace has been handed over to a multitude of non-state agents. In this regard, the absence of dedicated peacebuilding institutions, concepts, or policies at the UN and beyond in the early to mid-1990s necessitated and enabled the agency of heterogeneous actors in devising approaches and filling the new policy objectives with their practices, many of which were of an ad hoc and experimental nature (Haynes 2008; Huddleston 1999; Paris and Sisk 2009: 1; Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 207). In the contemporaneous words of Crocker and Hampson (1996: 57), "we are witnessing a trial-and-error phase of modern history that features no ultimate safety nets.”

For a long time, this conceptual lack of clarity was accompanied by an institutional one. As noted by former UN Secretary-General Annan, in between the institutional provisions for immediate disaster relief and for long-term development, there was a "gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery with respect to the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace" (UN 2005: §114, cited in Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 207; UNDESA 2008). The same holds true when looking at it from the perspective of peace support activities: while there were separate departments within the Secretariat for peacekeeping and peacemaking, no such department existed with regard to peacebuilding. This gap was only more systematically addressed following the drastic failure of ‘post-war’ reconstruction in Iraq with the creation of the so-called ‘UN peacebuilding architecture’ in 2005/6 and the parallel revision of peacekeeping doctrine (UN 2008).

Reflecting on the ‘accessory’ role of peacebuilding in the original Agenda, which, in contrast to the remainder of peace support activities was neither fully elaborated in the documents, nor even mentioned in the full title of the document, it seems likely that the failure to set up a separate institutional structure for peacebuilding resulted from the assumption that – taking over from civilian peacekeepers – most peacebuilding tasks would fall within the purview of ‘ordinary’ development as technical assistance. In fact, this assumption was so dominant\(^{80}\) that, to the extent that such distinctions were attempted at all, most academic observers had difficulties distinguishing peacebuilding from ‘ordinary’ development work, instead emphasizing the continuity, interdependence, and concomitance of peace and development (see, for instance, Gueli et al. 1995).\(^{81}\) As a result, the development of peacebuilding policy and practice occurred

\(^{80}\) See the pertinent statements in the Agenda, Supplement, and deliberations of the Security Council as quoted in infra, 4.1.

\(^{81}\) Unsurprisingly, one of the rare exceptions is provided in a key textbook on conflict resolution from peace and conflict studies, Ramsbotham et al. (2005: 195), which nonetheless only offers a rather crude distinction by distinguishing peacebuilding from ‘ordinary development’ based on
in a haphazard, multi-sited, and frequently ad hoc way. By the mid-1990s, a wealth of actors within and beyond the UN system had begun to get involved in peacebuilding, albeit under different labels ranging from conflict resolution and prevention to post-conflict assistance, rehabilitation, or reconstruction (Barnett et al. 2007; Smith 2004; Warnecke 2006). In sum, it is probably fair to conclude that the nature of peacebuilding practice owes at least as much to contemporary interpretations, (mis)conceptions, and the multi-sited agency of ‘implementing agencies’ as to the interests of leading donors.

Most accounts of peacebuilding or peacekeeping include a brief portrayal of major agents, usually structured according to the different tasks conducted by different types of actors (e.g. Bellamy and Griffith 2010; Berdal 2009; Dwan and Wiharta 2005; Paris 2004). Barnett et al. (2007: 36) suggest the following grouping of peacebuilders: the UN Secretariat, UN specialized agencies, European organizations, and member states. This division is partly based on “prevailing organizational mandates and networks,” linking each organization’s previous core mandate to the specific peacebuilding area in which these actors were involved. The present analysis equally emphasizes the core mandates of participating agencies, but takes this approach further by re-constructing the emerging peacebuilding field of practice and grouping agents according to their earlier communities of practice, such as humanitarianism, development, or peacekeeping. This approach draws attention to the ways in which agencies have taken up and transformed the new task as first described by Boutros-Ghali, while at the same time being changed and transformed through this commitment and its emerging challenges.

In addition to the UN Secretariat, Secretary-General, and Security Council, three groups of actors were ‘implicated’ in the new field from the earliest deliberations onwards: peacekeepers, humanitarians, and development agencies. Both the Council and the Secretary-General agreed that most ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ activities fell into the purview of the respective UN agencies, and were hence development tasks. The extension of peacekeepers’ tasks had already been tested and deemed successful (Bode 2015). Finally, with regard to humanitarianism, the Security Council had repeatedly noted the close link and potential interaction of humanitarian and peacekeeping mandates in target countries, emphasizing OCHA’s coordinating function in this respect and the need to connect relief with rehabilitation efforts (e.g. S/25859, of 28 May 1993).

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82 See also Schneckener (2005) on the topical preferences of European development agencies in peacebuilding.
As argued above, what all of these actors have in common is that their standard practices are to varying degrees and for varying purposes committed to the principles of impartiality and/or neutrality. For this reason, before turning to a discussion of the function of these principles within peacekeeping, humanitarian, and development practices, I will briefly review the rationales of these principles and their mutual relationship.

The ‘twin principles’ of impartiality and political neutrality

Weller (1998: 3) claims that while often used synonymously, the ‘twin principles’ of impartiality and neutrality “should be regarded as partially overlapping”, but distinct. Drawing on the ICRC Code of Conduct (Haug 1996), he defines neutrality as a principle of abstention: “a third party to a conflict must not undertake (or possibly permit) activities which would assist [or conversely hinder, AW] the war effort of either party to a conflict” (Haug 1996: 627, cit. in Weller 1998: 3). Impartiality, on the other hand, is “defined as a principle of action”: “whatever humanitarian action is being undertaken ..., it must be administered in accordance with an objective standard which is applied equally to all parties ... this does not mean that all sides must receive the same amount of assistance. Instead, assistance is to be rendered on the basis of the objective criteria of need” (Weller 1998: 3). In practice, however, as Weller (1998) argues, neither principle can be treated in absolute terms. Instead, their interpretation depends on their legal quality, i.e. whether the principles are part of the constitutive principles of an agency, or invoked as rules of process/code of conduct, as "part of the substantive justification of conduct", or in the context of collective security powers (ibid.), as this alters the degree to which the principles are legally binding. In addition, Weller emphasizes that both principles are subject to interpretation of what qualifies as an impartial or neutral act in a particular situation; for instance, “the meaning of these terms in the context of humanitarian operations is not necessarily the same as in the context of the traditional laws of war” (Weller 1998: 3, see also Terry 2002).

Beyond legal considerations in the narrow sense, the question of interpretation and context points to the political and operational functions or ‘purposes’ of invoking the principles, and the related question of the ‘audience’ or ‘targets’ of invoking and performing them. In this regard, what the two principles have in common is that they help external parties gain and maintain access to ‘situations’ that might otherwise be off limits to them. Such limits may either derive form the legal and political norm of non-
interference in domestic affairs or from the refusal to cooperate with third parties of any
kind in the case of armed conflict, both of which have to be taken into account in intra-
state wars. In both cases, the invocation and performance of the principles of
impartiality or neutrality essentially fulfil the same purpose, i.e. providing assurance to
concerned parties that none of them will be worse off relative to their adversaries as a
consequence of third party intervention of any kind.

By focussing on the function or purpose of successfully performing impartiality and/or
neutrality, I do not make an ontological claim that seeks to distinguish between ‘true’ or
‘proper’ impartiality as opposed to ‘false’ or ‘pretended’ versions thereof. In this regard,
the very criteria against which ‘objective needs’ are assessed are potentially always
open to contestation (see also Barnett 2011: 122). Instead, my argument holds that
humanitarian, peacekeeping, and most development agents depend on the successful
performance of either or both of the twin principles in order to be able to access and act
in contested settings. While this perspective incorporates Weller’s claims regarding the
legal quality of the twin principles and their binding effect on the agents, it draws
particular attention to the ways in which their performance or enactment is perceived
by the warring parties and additional observers, such as states and international
organisations. As I will detail in the following sections on the humanitarian,
peacekeeping, and development communities of practice, when facing tensions between
the requirements of the ‘twin principles’ and those of the new peacebuilding objective,
agents developed a number of strategies that sought to frame the politics/political of
peacebuilding in impartial or neutral terms. However, while most of these strategies
have been accepted – and shared – by other actors within the so-called international
community, their purchase appears considerably less certain among conflict parties
whose ‘trust’ and consent they are in theory meant to generate and ensure.

4.2.1 PEACEKEEPERS AS PEACEBUILDERS

For most of the Cold War period and in the early 1990s, the majority of peace operations
were peacekeeping operations, i.e. military deployments to monitor and safeguard a
ceasefire or peace agreement in inter-state conflict. Peacekeeping operations were
usually mandated (and extended) by the UN Security Council for periods of up to six

83 This observation holds true for the P3 in the Security Council and most ‘Western’ states. However, as the deliberations of the GA in the aftermath of the Supplement and Agenda have already shown, any strategy that might infringe upon the prohibition of political interference is likely to remain contested among numerous members of the G77.
months. These so-called ‘traditional’ or ‘first generation’ operations were premised on the principles of consent, impartiality, and the minimal use of force (Oliver 2002). In this context, impartiality is not merely an operational principle, but also a fundamentally constitutive one, as it is the conditio sine qua non for peacekeepers to be accepted by the parties to begin with. In other words, the traditional operational principle of non-discrimination in their treatment of the different parties ensures that the status quo of the military and hence political power balance between the parties remains unaltered, thus allowing the parties to embark on a process of diplomatic, political, or judicial peacemaking (Weller 1998; Mills 2013). In an international system based on sovereign equality and the norm of non-interference, peacekeepers’ ability to fulfil such a role necessitates the consent of the involved parties, which in turn depends on their willingness to start or continue a process of negotiation, usually after some stalemate has been reached, once the benefits have begun to outweigh the costs (however these may be defined in subjective terms), or possibly due to external persuasion or coercion (Hampson 1996). Impartiality in the conduct of inter-state peacekeeping is hence indispensable to ensure that neither side perceives themselves worse off relative to their adversaries as a result of international intervention, hence safeguarding consent and cooperation.

Accordingly, with the exception of successive peacekeeping deployments to Congo (1960-64), these principles used to be defined in narrow terms during the Cold War. In keeping with these norms, peacekeeping has traditionally been conducted upon the ‘invitation’ by the parties, as expressed in the status of forces agreement (SOFA) between the UN and host state(s) (White 2015: 48). In this regard, a crucial difference between peacekeeping in inter- as opposed to intra-state violent conflict is the source of consent: inter-state peacekeepers require the consent of all states to which they deploy. By contrast, in intra-state violent conflict, peacekeepers only require the consent of the government, but not that of other non-state parties (White 2015). While this legal provision satisfies the requirements of an international system based on sovereignty and non-interference, it fails to transfer the logic that originally informed the principle of consent to peacekeeping in intra-state conflict. As the following chapter will show, peacekeepers have sought to resolve this conundrum by various means, principally the redefinition of impartiality, consent, and self-defence.
UN authorization and leadership are considered to provide higher levels of legitimacy (and arguably success, see Fortna 2008) for a peacekeeping operation. However, NATO, regional organizations such as ECOWAS, individual states, and ad hoc coalitions can all conduct a peacekeeping operation. Until the creation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), only six staff members at the UN Office of Special Political Affairs (UNOSPA) were in charge of steering peacekeeping. In 1996, and following two internal reports on UN (in)action in Somalia and Rwanda (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 112-113), the DPKO was extended by a ‘Best Practices Unit’ to capture and assess ongoing experiences. Given member states’ aversion to codifying peacekeeping doctrine during the Cold War, the Agenda (UN 1992), Supplement (UN 1995), and Brahimi Report (UN 2000) were in fact the first comprehensive attempts at systematization, culminating in the launch of the UN Capstone Doctrine on Peacekeeping Operations in 2008 (UN DPKO 2008; Weinlich 2014).

It has frequently been argued that the expansion of UN peace(keeping) operations and of the overall peacebuilding agenda has been characterized by ad hoc decision-making and strategy-development rather than a conscious reform of doctrine (Bellamy et al. 2004; Berdal 2009; Paris 2004). As almost all UN-led peace operations prior to the 1990s were in fact peacekeeping operations, the term ‘peacekeeping’ has often been used interchangeably with ‘peace operation’. However, as argued above, the 1990s saw a rapid and substantial transformation of the practice of UN peacekeeping operations, many of which no longer observed the constitutive three peacekeeping principles as originally conceived (Tsagourias 2007). This incremental process arguably led to considerable conceptual confusion. As Bellamy and Williams (2010: 67) argue, the changed environment and the “UN’s preoccupation with making its existing peacekeeping infrastructure more efficient detracted from the even more critical task of re-examining the premises underpinning the concepts and practices themselves.” Several contemporaneous observers noted the “extremely steep learning curve” for all component parts of the UN, including the Security Council, generating not only “much earnest debate” and a “plethora of working papers, conferences and manuals”, but also a “series of humanitarian experiments” (Slim 1996: 86-87; see also Roberts 1993). As the above analyses of the Agenda and Supplement have shown, this conceptual fluidity did

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84 Peacekeeping is usually authorized by the Security Council, but can also be authorized by the GA (Tsagourias 2007: 469; White 2015).

85 Excluded from this are the two instances in which the Security Council authorized the use of force by member states (Korea, Kuwait). In addition, the consecutive UN peacekeeping missions to Congo (ONUC) between 1960 and 1964 repeatedly crossed the threshold to enforcement (Sloan 2011: 128-141).
initially not encounter serious problems when incorporating civilian ‘implementation’ tasks, particularly in cases where one of the former conflict parties had largely withdrawn (Namibia, Croatia). However, it ran into fundamental dilemmas in cases where a peacekeeping mandate was extended to include enforcement action (Somalia) or was applied to contexts that did not qualify as ‘peacekeeping situations’ in the sense that they lacked a minimal degree of consent and cooperation from all or some parties, while atrocities committed against the population increased the pressure for the UN and ‘international community’ to ‘protect civilians’.

Among practitioners and observers, the question of combining consent-based peacekeeping as linked to the ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’ under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (cooperative security) with enforcement action as described under Chapter VII (collective security) has received considerable attention. Several authors put forth more nuanced taxonomies of peacekeeping or peace operations, depicting the phenomenon as ‘Chapter VI ½’, ‘second generation’, or ‘wider’ peacekeeping. As Bellamy et al. (2004) argue, most of these taxonomies focus on what the different peace operations ‘do’, i.e. on their means rather than on their ends. By contrast, Bellamy and Williams (2010) systematize peace operations according to their position in terms of the authors’ distinction between Westphalian and post-Westphalian operations. Prior to the end of the Cold War, Westphalian operations were deployed to organize the conduct of states and maintain law and order between them. Since the end of the Cold War, the post-Westphalian agenda has increasingly tied a state’s sovereignty to its responsibilities vis-à-vis its population, which is also reflected in an extended conceptualization of what constitutes (positive) peace within post-war countries. As a result, the distinction between Westphalian and post-Westphalian forms of peace

86 Alternative typologies of peace operations are offered by Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998), Diehl (2001), and Thakur and Schnabel (2001). In addition, several authors suggest distinguishing between different ‘generations’ of peace operations: Mackinlay and Chopra (1992) and Ratner (1996). For a critical assessment of the ‘generations’ framework, see Wilde (2001).

87 The authors define six types: preventive deployment, traditional peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, assisting transition, transitional administration, and peace support operations. One advantage of Bellamy and William’s (2010) typology is that it focuses on the changing objectives (and accompanying normative frameworks) of peacekeeping operations and shows how these interact with the contextual conditions encountered in different ‘theatres of operation’. However, this also implies that their classification is in itself partly dependent on the different contexts. For instance, following the logic of the British government at the time, ‘wider peacekeeping’ in Bosnia is defined as such partially to account for an operation that essentially sought to do what ‘traditional peacekeepers’ had done, but in an environment that does not classify as a ‘peacekeeping environment’, i.e. one that was characterised by ongoing violence and the non-cooperation of some or, at times, all of the parties.
operations interacts with the positioning of such operations regarding the question of consent vs. enforcement. As Bellamy and Williams put it (2010: 93), most new peace operations "marr[ied] peacekeeping with the delivery of humanitarian aid, state-building programmes, local peacemaking and elements of peace enforcement." This holds particularly true for international transitory administrations (ITAs) and peace support operations, which combine the use of force where necessary with an expanded agenda of post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding. The ITAs in Eastern Slavonia, BiH, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste all followed international enforcement action and were accompanied by ‘robust’ peace support operations. Effectively, ‘peacekeepers’ were expected to take over public order functions in support of civilian agencies and, if necessary, ‘enforce’ the peace.

Such a mandate rests on a changed understanding of neutrality and/or impartiality: "Whereas neutral peacekeepers play no political role whatsoever, refusing to take sides even in the face of breaches of a ceasefire ..., impartial peacekeepers discriminate between belligerents according to their compliance with the terms of the peace operation’s mandate and treat like breaches in similar ways" (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 281). In other words, this conceptualization of impartiality replaces the perceived interests and relative gains of the warring parties as its key point of reference with the adherence to a mandate or universal principle. This removes the justification for peacekeepers’ behaviour from the actual conflict and the perceptions of the parties to a larger or presumably higher audience. As Bellamy and Williams argue, it rests on an understanding of the parties’ consent as “malleable, variable, and multi-layered” (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 281). It is evident that such an understanding of consent effectively disables the parties’ ability to withdraw their consent in the course of a peace process in a legitimate way. In addition, particularly in cases in which a mandate or peace agreement remains controversial, it raises the question as to how elements of coercion are supposed to garner the genuine political will or commitment usually required of all major stakeholders for the peace process. In other words, while this reconceptualization of impartiality addresses the problem of peacekeepers’ impartiality in normative and legal terms at the international community level, it does not necessarily perform the same function vis-à-vis the warring parties and might hence not be able to garner their consent and cooperation.

This discussion illustrates the degree to which the emergence of peacebuilding as a new practice has been bound up with the question of adapting peacekeeping to addressing new challenges in conceptual and institutional terms, particularly, the question of the
cooperation of non-state actors and governments in intra-state violent conflict. As this thesis argues, a considerable part of the problem has often been transferred onto the civilian or peacebuilding components of the international effort, which crucially tried to build the consent and commitment that peacekeepers had either been unable or not been mandated with to enforce or generate. In addition, throughout the period under study, the UN continued to grapple with the delineation between peacekeeping and enforcement action, particularly in intra-state violent conflict. While the Secretary-General's Agenda had suggested the inclusion of coercive measures, all such references were later omitted from the Supplement. This position was subsequently reiterated by the Brahimi Report, which reaffirmed that the "consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping" (UN 2000a: §48).

While the problem of mixing peacekeeping with coercion has received considerable attention (Oliver 2002; Slim 1996; Sloan 2011; Tsagourias 2007), there seems to have been less concern with the 'opposite end' of the enforcement spectrum. In other words, while there are obvious problems involved in seeking to keep a peace where there is no peace to be kept to begin with, the same problem certainly applies with regard to attempts to 'build' peace in cases where the "protagonists' genuine commitment to peace and reconciliation" (OECD 2001: 53) is insufficient. What is more, the tendency among practitioners and observers to submerge 'peacebuilding' as merely a part or dimension of peace(keeping) operations ignores the extent to which these and other peace support measures rest on distinct, and partially contradictory, principles (see Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 195). Bellamy and Williams (2010: 16, 3) argue that "operations might involve ... multiple tasks simultaneously or alternate between different types" and hold that "enforcement operations can lay the foundations for a subsequent consensual operation." This seems to assume that the very same external actors can move from enforcing peace to 'keeping' or 'building' it, a phenomenon that has rather been compounded by the overall drive towards coordination and coherence, rendering it unlikely that the target populations of peace operations will perceive the role of particular components of peace operations as qualitatively distinct solely by virtue of changed mandates.

A significant part of the problem appears to have been discerning between peace agreements that were carried by substantial local political commitment as opposed to those that had rather been forced upon the parties. The recommendations of the

Their discussion draws on Diehl et al. (1998).
Brahimi Report did not rule out enforcement action under Security Council authorization, but categorically distinguished them from peacekeeping as part of a system of cooperative security and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Tsagourias 2007: 469). The 2008 Capstone Doctrine reiterated the indispensability of consent, of the parties’ commitment to a political process, and of UN impartiality. It clarified the distinction between the use of force in peacekeeping as opposed to peace enforcement by stipulating that in peacekeeping “the ultimate aim of the use of force is to influence and deter spoilers working against the peace process or seeking to harm civilians; and not to seek their military defeat” (UN 2008: 35). In other words, while peace enforcers can use force at the international and strategic levels, in the case of peacekeepers, the tension between respecting the requirements of consent and impartiality while authorizing the use of force was resolved by extending the notion of self-defence as the only exception to the principled non-use of force to include “defence of the mandate” at the tactical level: “In certain volatile situations, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping operations ‘robust’ mandates authorizing them to ‘use all necessary means’ to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order” (UN 2008: 34). As this discussion has shown, in the past two decades, peacekeeping practice and doctrine have been fundamentally revised and adjusted to serve the purposes of intra-state peacekeeping situations that are often characterized by what could euphemistically be called ‘uncertain’ levels of consent. Some controversies notwithstanding, however, what all these adjustments have in common is the shared emphasis on preserving the principle of impartiality, be it by introducing a revised, and arguably increasingly legalistic notion of ‘consent’ or by distinguishing between the use of force on the tactical as opposed to the strategic levels.

4.2.2 HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES AS PEACEBUILDERS

The field of humanitarian assistance alone (as distinct from humanitarian law and protection, see Terry 2002: 17; Mills 2013) is probably no less complex than the peacebuilding field, spanning as it does a diverse range of actors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC), several UN specialized agencies as well as a long list of international NGOs, some of which are faith-based (Caritas International, Islamic Relief, Norwegian Church Aid), while others have evolved out of social movements or targeted initiatives (CARE, MSF, Oxfam). The minimum three standard principles that almost all contemporary humanitarian [aid]
agencies claim to observe are humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. In this vein, in 1994, the ICRC and a number of NGOs agreed a joint Code of Conduct for the ICRC
Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. Similarly, in its resolution 46/182 of 1991, the
UN General Assembly committed the humanitarian parts of the UN Secretariat,
particularly the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (now OCHA), to these three
principles. In 2004, ‘independence’ was added as the fourth humanitarian principle
(A/58/114, 2004). As OCHA emphasizes, “these principles matter – they separate and
protect humanitarians, under law and in reality” (OCHA 2011: §9). However, as argued
above based on Weller (1998), neither impartiality nor neutrality can be treated in
absolute terms. Instead, their implementation depends on their legal quality and is
subject to interpretation of what qualifies as an impartial act in a particular situation.
This point is reaffirmed by Terry (2002: 20) with regard to the ICRC Code of Conduct: the
fact that the ICRC definition informs the work of many, if not most humanitarian
organisations does not imply that they are interpreted in uniform ways, whether across
country settings or across organisations.

In theory, while humanitarian workers are present in every post-war peacebuilding
context, the provision of humanitarian aid is a task (and objective) that is entirely
distinct from peacebuilding. Even when treated in isolation from peacebuilding or
related objectives, humanitarians in conflict settings face a number of dilemmas. In this
regard, Fiona Terry argues that it is hardly possible for humanitarian agencies to act in a
way that is impartial and politically neutral by design and by effect. Particularly in
cases of what she refers to as ‘total war’, in which actors directly target civilian
populations or else blur the distinction between civilians and combatants, following the
terms of the warring parties, any form of humanitarian assistance to civilians on either
side is perceived of as a form of support and hence politicized (Terry 2000: 2; 2002: ch.
2). These problems are likely compounded when humanitarian agents and
peacebuilders cooperate or are, indeed, identical: In many cases, peacebuilding actors
such as development agencies also conduct or fund humanitarian aid (DfID, World
Bank), collaborate in (donor) coordination meetings, or, in the case of the UN agencies,
together form the respective UN Country Team. Most importantly, however, in addition

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90 The ICRC itself as one of the oldest and best-known humanitarian organisations adheres to
seven principles that guide its work: humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence,
universalty, voluntary service, and unity (see Terry 2002: 19-20).

91 An overview on contemporaneous criticisms and the ensuring debate regarding the
unintended consequences or side effects of aid in conflict is provided in Bradbury, Leader and
Mackintosh (2000).
to developing different responses to engaging with (ongoing) conflict, humanitarian practice in post-war settings has increasingly been included in and affected by increased efforts at improving coordination, coherence, and cooperation among all actors present in the field.

Since the early 1990s, developmental and humanitarian actors have increasingly sought to better coordinate their work with a view to addressing the so-called "relief-rehabilitation-development continuum"; for instance by ensuring that humanitarian assistance does not provide disincentives for relevant populations to participating in development projects (UN GA Res/46/182 1991: Annex I: 9; Gueli et al. 2005). In June 1992, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was established as the main coordinating forum for 'key' UN and non-UN agencies in humanitarian assistance (UN GA Res/46/182 1991). In addition to UN operational agencies such as the UNDP or UNICEF as permanent members, the IASC also comprises a list of 'standing invitees' including such diverse actors as the ICRC, Word Bank, and International Organization for Migration (IOM). 92 One of IASC’s six operating principles is to respect the mandates of its participating agencies (Annex 34). However, in light of the earlier discussion on competing conceptions of the so-called twin-principles, and given the wide range of agencies associated with the process, the question arises as to the extent to which increased coordination changes the ways in which these agencies interpret or implement their original mandates, particularly if humanitarian assistance and development cooperation are considered as parts of a continuum rather than potentially distinct tasks and are conducted in situations of ongoing (internal) violent conflict. The General Assembly resolution reiterated that all humanitarian aid had to be conducted based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality but crucially also "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations", emphasizing that the "sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected" (2, 3). While it acknowledged that the Secretary-General or UN Emergency Relief Coordinator might have to negotiate the consent of the parties in specific cases, the principled refusal or contestation of such consent was not explicitly taken into consideration at the time.

92 The purpose of IASC is twofold. On the one hand, IASC formulates Consolidated Appeals (CAPs) vis-à-vis the donor community to ensure adequate funding based on assessed needs. On the other hand, IASC seeks to coordinate relief efforts among its members by identifying gaps in the international humanitarian response to particular crises and avoiding the duplication of efforts with a view to greater aid effectiveness and coherence. To this end, the process is led by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), who is also the head of UN OCHA/Under-Secretary-General tasked with coordinating all humanitarian efforts conducted by the UN system on behalf of the Secretary-General; see: <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-about-default> on the objectives on the IASC, and <http://www.unocha.org/about-us/ headofOCHA> (12 June 2014).
In addition to coordination among humanitarian and development actors, humanitarian agencies have also been drawn into the coordination efforts of the emerging peacebuilding field. In the 1995 Supplement, Boutros-Ghali had already claimed an authoritative and coordinating role for the UN Special Representative (or UNDP Resident Coordinator) in ‘post-conflict’ countries. In practice, humanitarian agencies, particularly the respective bodies of the UN system, began to help ‘implement’ the provisions of peace agreements in the early nineties: witness, for instance, UNHCR’s responsibility for organising the return of refugees and IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo as prescribed in the Dayton Peace Accords and the division of tasks for the ITA in Kosovo (Barnett 2001). Over time, complex UN peace operations have increasingly handed over remaining peace- and statebuilding tasks to specialized UN agencies, including the humanitarian ones. At the same time, humanitarian actors were drawn into the UN’s and other actors’ strategic frameworks that were increasingly employed to address the ‘coordination challenge’ (Terry 2002: 26). It is quite obvious that such an inclusion in peacebuilding – unless genuinely, i.e. voluntarily agreed-upon by the conflict parties or their major representatives – constitutes an explicit political act that is incompatible with the ‘twin principles’ discussed above and hence poses a potential challenge for humanitarian organisations that view themselves as politically neutral and as bound by impartiality. As a 2011 OCHA paper observed: “any assistance that is delivered on the basis of political (or other) priorities, rather than on the basis of need, contravene[s] these principles. Therefore, neither the organization, nor the assistance, can be considered humanitarian” (OCHA 2001: §9).

The extent to which the approaches of humanitarian agencies, and hence ultimately their understanding of the ‘twin principles’, differ depends on the overall mandate and identity of organisations and on their willingness to risk engaging in potential confrontations. Examples range from the ‘solidarist’ monitoring or advocacy role adopted by Médecins sans Frontières (Weiss 1999) to agencies that also pursue a human rights or peacebuilding agenda in addition to humanitarian relief such as Oxfam. To distinguish these different types of humanitarianism, Barnett and Snyder (2008) have analysed ‘humanitarians’ with a view to their position on two questions: “whether or not they accept that they are political and whether or not they accept constraints on what they can accomplish” (quoted in Mills 2013: 336; Barnett 2011, ch. 1). These questions generate four different ‘ideal types’: ‘bed for the night’, ‘do no harm’, ‘back a decent winner’, and ‘peacebuilding’ (ibid.). Barnett and Snyder’s discussion is particularly interesting since the discussed approaches – with the exception of ‘back a decent
winner’ which is more overtly political, if still justified in a pragmatic consequentialist way – have also strongly shaped the debate on development and peacebuilding, as evidenced in the discussion on whether development actors should seek to work around, in, or directly on conflict (Matthies 1997). In other words, in view of their earlier principles and practices, humanitarian and development agencies both tried to tackle the question of how far to engage in particular conflicts, and whether it was at all possible to engage in a post-war country without this engagement having an impact on processes of peace and conflict (Paffenholz and Reychler 2006; Terry 2000).

Unlike in the case of peacekeepers, the ‘twin principles’ of impartiality and neutrality are not only based on ‘strategic’ or operational considerations (i.e. to gain and maintain the trust of and access to all parties), but also constitutive to the objective of humanitarianism, i.e. the alleviation of human suffering based exclusively on need and disregarding all other considerations. In this regard, it could be argued that agencies’ positions on whether or not they are ‘political’ (or what Barnett 2011 has referred to as ‘alchemist humanitarianism’) depend on divergent principled considerations as to how best to serve this constitutive objective of diminishing human suffering, as this takes normative precedence over impartiality and neutrality. However, such a normative, and at times legal, choice does not provide a solution to the operational problem of gaining and maintaining access to contested settings and securing the cooperation of parties. In some cases, actors have sought to resolve this dilemma by devising joint country specific definitions of what acting ‘impartially’ or ‘neutrally’ means in a particular setting (Terry 2002: 18), which has often been based on the terms of a respective UN resolution, ceasefire, or peace agreement (see also Bellamy and Williams 2010: 280ff.).

In recent years, such country specific definitions have increasingly been replaced by the invocation of universal, particularly legal norms and standards as enshrined in countless UN conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a number of treaties. As noted previously, such a revised conceptualization of impartiality no longer primarily aims at the perceptions and acceptance of the conflict parties or ‘local’ agents, but orients and justifies itself first and foremost towards an international audience that is removed from the actual conflict. In other words, like in the case of peacekeepers, while such redefinitions might help harmonize ‘acting politically’ with the requirements of impartiality and neutrality on the abstract level, i.e. in normative and legal terms, this

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93 In his history of humanitarianism, Barnett (2011) provides a fascinating account of the process by which humanitarianism came to substitute the notion of humanity for earlier, identity-based definitions of need and compassion.
'solution' is less likely to succeed in garnering access and the cooperation of all parties that is required on the operational level, and not least in view of the safety of humanitarian staff. As the previous discussion on the different types of humanitarian agencies indicates, a comprehensive appraisal of how diverse humanitarian agencies have tried to come to terms with this dilemma would transcend the focus on peacebuilding practices pursued in this thesis. Against this backdrop, the following chapter on the transformation of peacebuilding best practices will only draw on strategies employed by the humanitarian components of the UN system that facilitate their work in ‘post-conflict’ environments by adopting a number of ‘needs-based’ and ‘rights-based’ frames, including most recently a focus on resilience (see Bradbury et al. 2000; OCHA 2011).

4.2.3. DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES AS PEACEBUILDERS

Most members of the peacebuilding field are arguably development actors, including aid agencies and development ministries, the bilateral assistance units of foreign ministries, international organisations, and a host of national and international NGOs.94 In addition to the dominance of ‘traditional’ development agents, programmes in the conflict resolution or peacebuilding field are to a significant extent financed through ODA-budgets, i.e. funds made available by the members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to assist the ‘economic development and social progress’ in less developed countries.95 As this phrase illustrates, the primary purpose of development agencies is to further the economic and, increasingly, social progress in target states and societies. How did development agents become so dominant in peacebuilding? While the 1992 OECD-DAC Principles for Effective Aid (OECD 1992) comprehensively covered all relevant aspects of ‘good practices’ in development cooperation, peace and conflict are entirely – and in retrospect curiously – absent from the 140 pages of the report that otherwise covers all standard developmental issues in the familiar developmental language of building capacities and strengthening skills (OECD 1992: v-vii). By contrast, only a few years later, the belief that development requires security while at the same time helping to build ‘sustainable peace’ had become “a journalistic commonplace (Muscat 2002: 104, cited in Podszun 2011: 24). Most significant bilateral and


95 Interview with Early Recovery and Peacebuilding Officer (FCO), February 2014.
multilateral development agencies began working on peacebuilding by establishing conflict units, commissioning research, and participating in a multitude of workshops and studies that sought to improve development practice in conflict-affected countries (Smith 2004; Warnecke 2006).

At least three factors have facilitated the relative prominence of development agencies in peacebuilding. First, the focus on the long-term, procedural element of peacebuilding vis-à-vis other forms of peace support already inherent in the *Agenda* and *Supplement* renders developmental agencies as seemingly suitable peacebuilders. Development agencies have often already had a presence and role in conflict-affected countries before the outbreak of violence and continue to do so thereafter. The Secretary-General reinforced this link in his 1994 *Agenda for Development*, claiming that development was not only a “fundamental human right”, but also “the most secure basis for peace” (UN 1994: §3). In the early 2000s, this nexus gained renewed momentum among peacebuilders following the publication of an influential World Bank report on the economic causes of civil war. Secondly, however, it is precisely this pre-engagement in conflict contexts that led to a process of reflection and reconsideration of development agencies’ role in conflict situations, particularly following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the ensuing debate which focused on the extent to which development actors had in fact ‘aided violence’ (Uvin 2000). In subsequent years, many actors undertook efforts to devise ‘conflict sensitive’ approaches, distinguishing between working in, on, and around conflict, a discussion which culminated in the adoption of Kaldor’s *Do no harm* (1999) principles and related approaches to ‘assessing’ peace and conflict impacts of development measures as one of the central tenets in the field (Bush 1998; Paffenholz and Reychler 2006). Third, as Macrae (2001) argues, the end of the Cold War rendered many countries in the ‘global periphery’ strategically less important to Western foreign policy makers. As the early and mid-1990s saw an overall decline in aid budgets and development funding, for development agencies the new engagement in peacebuilding “provide[d] an important opportunity to demonstrate their continued relevance” (Barnett et al. 2007: 43; Murphy 2006: 301). While peacebuilding practice is hence

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96 The notion that conflict prevention and resolution hinge upon the development of affected societies, the controversial ‘security-development nexus’, has a long-standing pedigree. See, for instance, Hinzen and Kappel’s 1980 edited volume *Dependence, Underdevelopment and Persistent Conflict*, and Azar (1990). The question of whether there is a direct causal relationship between poverty and development on the one hand and violent conflict on the other – and if so, in which direction (Podszun 2011: 22) – has received considerable attention and continues to be highly controversial (see particularly Duffield 2001, 2007).

likely to have been influenced by (previous) developmental thinking and practice, the adoption of the new task has arguably changed the theory and practice of development cooperation.

Many development agents share a strong humanitarian motivation and component. In fact, in the second half of the twentieth century most development workers had “tended to see their function as ‘non-political’” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 5). Notwithstanding the at times blurred boundaries between development and humanitarian ‘relief’, the question of impartiality and neutrality, and ultimately of the role of development cooperation in contested settings, follows different concerns and rationales compared to those predominant within the humanitarian community, whose initial objective of humanitarianism had emerged in the highly politicized context of violent conflict, hence relying on the twin principles to create a de-politicized “humanitarian space” (Curtis 2001: 5; Barnett 2011). By contrast, in the case of development cooperation, the most important distinction is that between bilateral development agencies on the one hand, and multilateral or international organisations on the other.

Multilateral and international development organisations such as the World Bank, the UNDP, and other UN agencies are for the most part bound by the principles of neutrality and impartiality as derived from the norm of non-interference. For instance, in the case of the World Bank as the most important multilateral development donor, the prohibition of political interference in the domestic affairs of recipient states is contained in Art V(10) of the founding treaties of the former IBRD: “The Association and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member ... Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in this Agreement” (cited in Dann 2013: 161). Based on Weller's (1998) distinction, in the case of the World Bank, impartiality is both a constitutional principle, i.e. inscribed in the organization’s founding documents, but also defined in operational terms as part of the code of conduct. What is more, these principles have also been a part of the substantive justification of the Bank’s practice. As Dann (2013: 111-115) argues, despite the manifestly increasing intrusiveness of development practices in the legislative and hence political affairs of recipient states since the 1980s (e.g. ‘structural adjustment’),

98 In this regard, the boundaries between humanitarian aid and development aid or assistance are anything but clear cut, - to the extent that they are occasionally ignored in parts of the literature (e.g. Mills 2013; Podszun 2011; Curtis 2001) and by some practitioners (OECD 1997).
99 This provision also includes humanitarian agencies of an inter-governmental nature, e.g. UNICEF, FAO, and the UNHCR.
and in the 1990s with regard to human rights and governance, the prohibition of political interference has been taken seriously by the World Bank well into the 1990s, if only for strategic reasons. This evident paradox has in practice been ‘resolved’ by applying seemingly objective, quantifiable, and measurable ‘economic categories’ that justified the application of conditionality criteria in the technocratic language of ‘structural adjustment’. A recent example for this process of decoupling the political content from development practice is evident in the degree to which the World Bank has sought to justify and frame its ‘governance’ agenda in purportedly purely economic terms by defining four areas of ‘governance’ that are deemed ‘non-political’: public sector management, accountability, rule of law, and transparency and the fight against corruption (Shihata 1990, cited in Dann 2013: 116).

In contrast to multilateral and international development organisations, bilateral development cooperation has theoretically never been bound by impartiality and/or neutrality. Instead, even when exclusively focusing on the provision of technical or financial assistance as in the classic infrastructure project, development has always been tied to a more or less explicitly political agenda (Morgenthau 1948; Dann 2013: 17-18). During the Cold War both block parties disbursed aid as a foreign policy tool. After the end of the Cold War, this practice has largely continued, albeit with substantial changes regarding the content of such criteria (human rights, democratization, and, increasingly ‘good governance’). However, in practice, donors and implementing agencies usually rely on cooperation agreements with host state governments. In these cases, the degree to which external donors can interfere within the politics of the host state depends on the power balance between the governments in question and the degree to which the recipient government can seek alternative donors or partners that are not suspected of interference (e.g. China).

In fact, to the extent that development actors are commissioned by host state governments, particularly in the aftermath of violent conflict, the questions of impartiality or political neutrality are not simply obsolete, but rather answered in the negative, as the government – often understood as ‘the state’ – is the primary partner of bilateral and multilateral development actors. In this vein, the 1992 OECD-DAC Principles for Effective Aid emphasized: “developing countries themselves are ultimately

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101 The problem of pro-government bias is also discussed in OCHA (2011).
responsible for determining and implementing their development programmes and policies and for the impact on their economies and people” (OECD 1992: 10). In theory, this approach does still allow for integrating the principle of impartiality in procedural terms via the ‘needs-based’ frame, i.e. if assistance is strictly distributed based on needs (see, for instance OECD 2001). Similarly, donors and practitioners have increasingly sought to avoid so-called ‘un-intended consequences’ through conflict impact assessments (Anderson 1999; Bush 1998) and by partnering with NGOs to avoid channelling all of the available funds to governments (see also Richmond and Carey 2005). The latter strategy has in recent years prompted some governments of recipient states to significantly curtail the scope of agency of externally funded NGOs.\footnote{A recent example is the so-called Charities and Civil Societies Proclamation by the Ethiopian government of 2009, which effectively bans civil society actors receiving more than 10 per cent of their budget from working on social and political issues (Warnecke 2015).}

Notwithstanding such efforts, particularly in contested settings, development actors partnering with recipient governments can claim ‘political neutrality’ only so long as this government itself is not the subject of a political conflict within the country concerned, at which point development actors risk ‘taking sides’ or at the very least being perceived of doing so.\footnote{Witness, for instance, the repeated reports on forced resettlements in Ethiopia, some of which are claimed to have occurred in the course of projects funded, amongst others, by the World Bank and DFID, see <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/15/world-bank-address-failings resettlement> and <https://consultations.worldbank.org/Data/hub/files/meetings/ReformingtheWorldBankPolicy onInvoluntaryResettlement.pdf> (20 Aug 2015).}

A standard approach to handling this dilemma is exemplified by the influential OECD Guidelines of 1997. According to the OECD (1997: 129), “the objective of post-conflict reconstruction is not to return to pre-crisis conditions but to lay the foundations for peace and sustainable development.” Notwithstanding this expansive political agenda and the scope of potential contestation implied therein, by relying on the assumption of the “broad acceptance throughout society of the legitimacy of the state and the credibility of the institutions of governance”, this account allows development actors to assume the role of a non-political facilitator, educator, or trainer (113). Accordingly, the role of donors and developmental agencies in this process is primarily described in terms of “strengthening” respective – autochthon - processes and building the required ‘capacity’, typically on behalf of or in close cooperation with the respective government. As the following chapters will show, such developmental notions of building structural stability and equality and the related paradigms of ‘strengthening skills and building capacities’ have strongly shaped peacebuilding practice. In turn, the new objective of...
building peace has incrementally changed the nature of development cooperation, with ‘conflict and fragility’ increasingly merging with combating poverty and supporting economic progress as key driver of the developmental agenda.\textsuperscript{104} In other words, while the ‘types’ of actors who took up the new peacebuilding agenda arguably shaped and changed the nature of the task, peacebuilding as a new task simultaneously changed the ‘nature’ and potentially the identity of the actors.

As this review has demonstrated, peacekeepers, humanitarians, and development agents depend on the ‘competent performance’ of impartiality and/or neutrality as an indispensable prerequisite to gaining access and cooperation in intra-state (‘domestic’) and contested settings. While such performance is occasionally challenged by one or more social group even in situations that are not characterised by violent conflict, it evidently faces a considerable dilemma when peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian agencies are expected to contribute to international peacebuilding endeavours in highly contested environments. The following chapter will take up this thread and identify the mechanisms by which agents in the peacebuilding field from these three communities of practice sought to navigate the tensions between their original and additional new mandates. To be able to do so, however, the remaining paragraphs of this chapter will reconstruct the emerging peacebuilding field of practice and discuss the implications that these multiple sites of agency and authority have had for the generation and thus also the analysis of peacebuilding practices.

4.3 RE-CONSTRUCTING THE PEACEBUILDING FIELD OF PRACTICE

As I have argued in the previous chapter, in light of the multiplicity and diversity of actors, Bourdieu’s notion of the field enhances the analysis of peacebuilding as it allows disaggregating agency and authority while at the same time emphasizing agents’ mutual relationships and their complexity. This holds as much true for the overall field of practice as for individual peacebuilding undertakings. Similar to the notion of a peacebuilding field, but placing a higher emphasis on the formal and informal leadership role of the United Nations, Kittikhoun and Weiss (2012) propose viewing the UN “not as unitary but as three linked components that interact: the ‘First UN’ as the arena for member state decision-making, especially the Security Council and General Assembly; the ‘Second UN’ of secretariat heads and staff members ... ; and the ‘Third UN’ of those

\textsuperscript{104} Interviews Research Fellow, Overseas Development Institute, London Feb 2014; Security and Justice Adviser, Stabilisation Unit, July 2012; Conflict Adviser, DfID, July 2012.
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), experts, commissions and academics who are independent of the UN proper but deeply involved in its activities” (Kittikhoun and Weiss 2012: 120). On the one hand, this approach is useful in that it allows juxtaposing the influence of member states with the agency of non-state actors, e.g. IOs, NGOs, and think tanks, which make up the remainder of the ‘international community’ (on the latter see Jolly et al. 2009). What is more, the division between the first and second United Nations also coincides with the division between the political organs of the organization as opposed to its non-political and impartial ones. On the other hand, however, and particularly in comparison to Bourdieu’s notions of field and capital, the sole identification of three different ‘United Nations’, while highlighting the agency of the non-political components, does not help clarify the relations and resources that these actors command vis-à-vis each other, and that are likely to vary depending on the specific policy field in question, such as peacebuilding.

By contrast, Bourdieu’s conceptual apparatus not only emphasizes the relational dimension between agents in the field, but it also allows for addressing different forms of capital, in particular economic, social, cultural, and symbolic ones (Bourdieu 1983; Müller 2014: 86-88). As argued above, in Bourdieu’s (1983) framework, symbolic capital in particular is a significant source of power and hence likely superior to other forms of capital. Accordingly, in a Bourdieusian perspective, agency and power within the peacebuilding field of practice are not only tied to political and economic capital in the case of member states and donors, or the legal and political capital of the Security Council. Instead power and agency also derive from symbolic and cultural capital, such as the moral authority and leadership of respective Secretary-Generals on behalf of the organization (Kille 2007), the legitimacy of peace operations claimed to represent the “collective will of the international community” (UN 2008: 24), and the sectoral expertise that ‘implementing agencies’, IOs, and NGOs command to varying degrees. In other words, analysing peacebuilding actors as agents within a new field of international practice allows for balancing a traditional, state-centric perspective in which ‘conventional’ forms of state power, such as the provision of funding, direct bilateral pressure, or the decision-making power in legislative councils in different intergovernmental bodies (Weinlich 2014), can be juxtaposed with the successful agenda-setting roles and norm-entrepreneurship of particular agencies, such as the
World Bank and its research division under Paul Collier in the late 1990s (Berdal 2005) or the UNDP’s promotion of human development in the mid-1990s.105

As Boutros-Ghali observed in the 1995 *Supplement*, “the responsibilities involved in multifunctional peace-keeping operations and in peace-building transcend the competence and expertise of any one department, programme, fund, office or agency of the UN” (UN 1995: §93). Particularly in regard to peacebuilding, the capacities and resources have remained spread out across the organization (Wyeth 2011: 5). Reflecting the increasing incidence and importance of UN operations to the organization’s activities in the realm of peace and security (Paris and Sisk 2009: 5), Boutros-Ghali began restructuring the UN Secretariat in his first months of tenure as Secretary-General with the establishment of the Department for Humanitarian Assistance (DHA) in December 1991, which later became the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the Department for Political Affairs (DPA), and the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The DPKO is the principal steering body of UN peace(keeping) operations, while the DPA was supposed to fulfil a more explicitly ‘political’ role. The DPA was in charge of peacebuilding policy, with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) as its principal partner within the UN system for peacebuilding assistance programs (Barnett et al. 2007: 42). As Wyeth (2011: 5) notes, despite attempts to link political, security, and development initiatives in the form of the Joint UNDP-DPA Programme and the deployment of ‘Peace and Development Advisors’, “DPA’s peacebuilding support offices were under-resourced and their record was mixed.” In addition, there were (and likely are) duplications of efforts on the one hand and ongoing “turf battles” on the other, “particularly among DPA (which nominally was the lead agency for peacebuilding, but lacked capacity), DPKO, and the UNDP.”106

While DPKO approaches peacebuilding based on its lead role for peacekeeping, UNDESA approaches peacebuilding based on its lead role for UN development efforts. Curiously,

105 Beyond acknowledging the importance of access and legitimacy to contested settings, my account so far has not yet considered the agency of actors in target countries. This is primarily owing to the fact that the discussion in this and the subsequent chapter focuses on the level of the overall peacebuilding field, in which host state actors have often been viewed as ‘recipients’. However, this does not necessarily hold true for the level of individual peacebuilding cases (see Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond 2011), as I will demonstrate in the two case studies on peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Timor-Leste. In general, it is hardly possible to generalize questions of authority and agency across peace operations in view of the highly idiosyncratic provisions and agreements that provide the legal and political basis of peace operations as well as their institutional support. An overview of different types is provided in Bellamy and Williams (2010).
106 Informal conversation with former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, May 2015.
the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) as the lead department for peacemaking and preventive diplomacy, including UN political and peacebuilding missions, has not contributed to this discourse – and, presumably, practice – with its own statements (UN 1998a). Prior to the creation of the UN peacebuilding architecture in 2005/06, DPA was in charge of peacebuilding policy, with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) as its principal partner within the UN system for peacebuilding assistance programs (Barnett et al. 2007: 42). However, none of the UN documents that summarize and reflect on strategic or operational peacebuilding practice includes any reference to DPA publications or guidelines (although occasionally mentioning DPA input or feedback). In addition, it seems that DPA has not published any guidance or strategy whatsoever prior to a limited number of manuals on mediation starting in 2010. Given the strong interfaces between peacemaking and peacebuilding and the political character of the latter, this is rather surprising.

In 2005/06, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established as an intergovernmental body, to be supported by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and, as part of the UN Secretariat, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The purpose of the PBC is to bring together all relevant actors to develop integrated approaches and ensure the long-term attention and funding on the part of donors (A/Res/180 of 30 Dec 2005). Particularly in regard to countries that the PBC officially takes onto its agenda, the chair of the Commission is supposed to fulfil a diplomatic and political role, which appears to be a unique provision and likely owes to the intergovernmental nature of the Commission in contrast to most other peacebuilding agents (see chapter 5). The PBSO administers the Peacebuilding Fund, the largest recipient of which within the UN system is the UNDP, and provides input to the PBC and the Secretary-General in coordinating peacebuilding. To this end, it consists of a PBC Support branch, a Policy, Planning and Application branch, and a Financing branch (PBSO 2013).

107 Like other departments, DPA has, however, contributed information to peacebuilding inventories (UNDESA 1996; UN 2006) and by commenting on the reports of expert panels.
108 To date, there appear to be no more than five DPA publications, most of which focus on mediation (DPA’s Mediation Support Unit) and none of which dates from prior to 2010, e.g. UN Guidance on Effective Mediation (<http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN%20Guidance%20for%20Effective%20Mediation.pdf>, 14 Jan 2015). A full list is available from: <http://www.peacemaker.un.org/resources/mediation-guidance>. In addition, there is one report by the SG/DPA on preventive diplomacy (<http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/SG%20Report%20on%20Preventive%20Diplomacy.pdf>, 13 Jan 2015)
The DHA/OCHA, in turn, was created to support the ‘mobilization, coordination and funding’ of all relief assistance and as a focal point for non-governmental, intergovernmental, and governmental actors in ‘emergencies and natural disasters’. Additional secretariat departments involved in peace support activities are the Department for Field Support (DFS, created in 2007) as well as the Office of Project Services (UNOPS), UNHCR, and OHCHR at the office level. In practice, however, particularly the division between the DPA and DPKO has never been this clear-cut. In general, the majority of peace operations are coordinated by DPKO, while DPA tends to be in charge of political missions and (largely, but not exclusively civilian) peacebuilding consultation or support missions (Franke and Warnecke 2009). However, as mandates change in particular countries, these distinctions have sometimes been blurred.

In regard to a specific country or peacebuilding endeavour, the overall decision-making power regarding a peacekeeping operation as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council lies with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Guéhenno and Sherman 2009: 6). In the absence or aftermath of a peacekeeping operation the UNDP Resident Coordinator (RC) takes on this role. As discussed above, both variants depend on the consent of the government in intra-state peacebuilding. Beyond the UN system, the most important actors according to Boutros-Ghali are the (donor) governments, particularly through their capacity to set policies for the UN system and agencies (UN 1995: §82), but also in terms of direct interventions with the host government, although, crucially, not with other (non-state) warring parties. Other actors include regional organizations and informal “Groups of Friends of the Secretary General”, and the international financial institutions “who often have an all-important say in making sure that the necessary resources are available” (UN 1995: §94). In this regard, the World Bank’s Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) set up a Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) in 1997. Additional mechanisms to coordinate donor funding include the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which are presumably developed by target state governments in cooperation with the IMF, the ‘Low-Income Countries Under Stress’

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110 Up-to-date data on the strength of peace operations and the coordinating body within the UN Secretariat (or regional organizations) are available from: <http://www.zif-berlin.org/en.html>.
111 In practice, however, international peace operations usually heavily compromise or suspend the authority of the host state government: see the discussion of different types of ad hoc “semi-sovereign mechanisms” by Doyle (2001) and Chopra (1999), cited in Chesterman (2004): 56-57, and Schneckener 2005.
112 A comprehensive study of the agency and autonomy of the UN Secretariat vis-à-vis member states in the area of peacekeeping is provided by Weinlich (2014).
(LICUS) Strategy plans of the World Bank, as well as round tables or consultative groups (Dwan and Wiharta 2005: 147), which have strongly been pushed by the international financial institutions (IFIs). Reflecting the gradual shift towards peacebuilding-as-statebuilding, in 2008, the PCF and the Low-Income-Countries-under-Stress (LICUS) Funds were replaced by the State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF), which is administered by the Bank’s Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 228).113

Most bilateral agents and donors are organized in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.114 The OECD conducts no operational activities of its own, but is largely “concerned with analysis, multilateral surveillance, identification of best practices, and peer review of its members’ policies in practically all policy areas” (Ougaard 2010: 29). As Martens and Jakobi (2010: 1, 5) observe, the OECD is a major source of statistical and policy data and analysis and hence “one of the world’s largest publishers”, issuing about 250 publications per year. As the major forum of industrialized nations, its influence in the development and other policy fields is not simply a function of the financial and political resources of its members, but is also manifest in its capacity to “affect . . . the direction and objective of discussions on a specific topic” by “raising and framing specific issues” and norms (Martens and Jakobi 2010: 10). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the central coordinating forum of the OECD and arguably the single most important formal donor forum in programmatic and operational terms. Its membership currently comprises 27 countries and the European Commission. The IMF, the World Bank, and the UNDP hold permanent observer status. DAC meets more frequently than any other OECD Committee, including at the ministerial level, and is supported by the Development Co-operation Directorate in addition to a number of working groups. As argued above (4.3), neither the comprehensive OECD-DAC 1985 review of development practices, nor the 1992 OECD guidelines contained any reference to peace- or conflict-related issues. Instead, as I will

113<http://web.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,cont entMDK:22031772~menuPK:519150~pagePK:64171531~piPK:64171507~theSitePK:511778,0.html> (12 June 2014). In 2014, LICUS received funding from DK and NO; the SPF from AUS, NL, NO; and the PCF from BE, BR, CA, NL, NO, CH, UNHCR, and UNDP (for ongoing projects).

114 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was established by 18 European states, Canada, and the US in 1961 to promote “the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries”, “sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries”, and the “expansion of world trade” (OECD 2001: 2). It is ‘governed’ by a ministerial council, which holds annual meetings, in addition to more frequent consultations at the permanent representative level. It conducts most of its work through a number of topical departments and directorates (e.g. Development Co-operation Directorate, Economics Department, Directorate for Education, Environment Directorate, etc.) and about 200 specialized committees and special bodies (Martens and Jakobi 2010).
show in the following chapter, the OECD-DAC entered the peacebuilding field with the publication of the 1997 Guidelines Conflict, Peace and Development which provided the first comprehensive statement of the most influential public global donors and aid agencies on peace and conflict and was followed up by a series of topical guidelines and working groups.

Considering the number of potential peacebuilders, the Secretary-General – speaking on the basis of earlier experiences – sought to reinforce the lead coordinating and authorizing role of the UN Secretariat on behalf of the UN Security Council already in the 1995 Supplement.\(^\text{115}\) In practice, however, the influence of the UN on peace operations has been waxing and waning over time, which is in no small part due to the perception among the wider international community of UN successes and failures in relation to individual operations, as manifest in the enthusiasm following the early multidimensional peacekeeping operations discussed above and the considerable loss of UN credibility in the aftermath of UNAMIR and UNPROFOR (see infra, chapter 6). More importantly, in contrast to SC-mandated peacekeeping, peacebuilding activities also comprise a large number of organisations that are not in any way mandated by the United Nations or otherwise linked to the respective peace operation. In this regard, unless an international transitory administration (ITA) has been established, most development agencies work on the basis of bilateral agreements with the host state government. This, in turn raises the question of political and legal power relationships, particularly in cases where donors competitively bid for development contracts (Dann 2013).\(^\text{116}\)

In light of the heterogeneity and diversity of agents, conceiving of peacebuilding as a field in the Bourdieusian sense also allows for a more nuanced understanding of peacebuilders’ objectives. As argued above, notwithstanding competing understandings of ‘peace’, the overall objective of peacebuilding is to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict. However, in a Bourdieusian framework, the objective of peacebuilding has to be distinguished from the objective(s) of peacebuilders as agents, which is to secure, maintain, and presumably improve their position within the new field. In other words, most actors, particularly those depending on external funding, seek to accumulate the

\(^{115}\) This also pertains to NGOs, which have come “into a closer relationship with the UN,” especially in the provision of humanitarian relief in conflict situations and in post-conflict peacebuilding: “It has been necessary to devise procedures that do not compromise their non-governmental status but do ensure that their efforts are properly coordinated with those of the UN and its programmes, funds, offices and agencies” (UN 1995: §89, emphasis added).

\(^{116}\) Interview, Desk Officer for Cooperation Programmes, Federal German Ministry for International Cooperation and Development, August 2012.
necessary capital and to employ it in such a way as to be seen as competent and authoritative practitioners. To the extent that this can be achieved by the competent performance of peace support activities, it could be argued that the objectives of peacebuilders and of peacebuilding are largely identical. However, while there is no reason to deny that this might occasionally be the case, positing the congruence of these two objectives *ex ante* for all actors seems equally unwarranted, particularly if some aspects of the new objective pose fundamental challenges to actors’ standard practices. Instead, to the extent that such challenges, which could perhaps be thought of as incompatibilities between the two objectives, have been difficult to reconcile, they are probably key drivers in explaining the depoliticization of peacebuilding practices.

In this regard, it is important to emphasize that – particularly, but not exclusively in regard to the UN – the notion of capital (symbolic capital) is closely linked to impartiality and the impartial standing and reputation of the Secretary-General and, by extension, the UN organization, as an ‘honest broker’. In other words, the ability of the UN to attract economic capital and to project authority within the peacebuilding field *and vis-à-vis* the parties in (post-)conflict settings also depends on the competent performance of impartiality as a key source of the organization’s symbolic capital (Emmerij 2007). To varying degrees, the same holds true for related actors and communities of practice, particularly independent humanitarian agencies whose access to crisis areas usually depends on the consent of the host government (the requirements of which might or might not be in line with donor expectations). Accordingly, to the extent that clashes between the professed objective of peacebuilding and peacebuilders’ capabilities of attaining them in line with their core institutional mandates exist, a Bourdieusian framework would likely expect agents to seek to harmonize the former with the latter to attain their field-based objective. As argued above, while such compromise formula in regard to impartiality have been sought on the political and legal levels, the feasibility and implications of this process on the operational level, i.e. *vis-à-vis* conflict parties, remains to be studied based on the practices of specific agents in particular peacebuilding settings (chapters 6 and 7).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has reconstructed peacebuilding as an emerging field of international practice that was constituted by a specific (a) *objective (task)*, building peace after war, and a set of (b) *principal agents* at UN headquarters and from the peacekeeping,
development, and humanitarian fields to capture the tension between the impartial and/or neutral identities and mandates of these actors on the one hand, and the political nature of their task on the other. As I have demonstrated, the original assumption of most international peacebuilding actors, including donors and other stakeholders in the emerging field, was that their task largely consisted in providing assistance to the implementation of a (‘genuine’ or consensual) peace agreement. A common understanding at the time held that agencies were to contribute to peace ‘consolidation’ by conducting projects based on their fields of expertise (UNDDSMS 1995). The assumption that peace had already been made, implied the expectation of a general degree of consent and political will for peaceful cooperation at least on the elite level along the lines of a settlement whose political dimension had already been negotiated elsewhere. In many cases, this expectation, particularly in terms of consent and cooperation, be it vis-à-vis the international community or amongst conflict parties, was hardly justified and posed particular challenges to the work of those actors who, in their earlier practices and for different reasons, had relied on impartiality and/or political neutrality as well as on partnering with host state governments. What is more, in contrast to the provision of short-term disaster relief and the assistance to long-term development, there was no specific expertise at the time for what came to be called ‘managing transition’ or, in fact, building peace (UN 2005; Haynes 2008), nor were there any specific peace and conflict units. In fact, most new peacebuilders entered the field based on their sectoral capacities in areas such as institution-building, disarmament or the repatriation of refugees.

In drawing out this fundamental dilemma, this chapter has also begun to identify some of the mechanisms and strategies by which peacebuilding agents have sought to navigate the challenge of acting impartially in politically contested environments and participating in the peacebuilding field of practice. Such strategies include the reconceptualization of consent and impartiality in the cases of peacekeepers and humanitarians, the adoption and redefinition of rights- and needs-based frames in the case of humanitarians (and to a lesser extent among development actors), and the emphasis on skills and capacities in the case of the development community. As is evident already at this point, while some mechanisms are particularly related to individual communities of practice, others, such as the redefinition of impartiality, have gained field-wide purchase. Based on this analysis, the following chapter will trace the evolution and revision of peacebuilding ‘best practices’ at the level of the peacebuilding field throughout the first two decades of its existence. By exploring and extending the
threads identified so far, it will assess the extent to which the foundational dilemma has contributed to shaping international responses to intra-state violent conflict.
5  THE TRANSFORMATION OF PEACEBUILDING (BEST) PRACTICES OVER TIME

‘Peacebuilding entails constant negotiation and renegotiation of expectations and relationships and the distribution of power and wealth in society. These are messy, deeply political processes. And, as this year’s World Development Report pointed out, these are processes that in the best case can take at least a generation.’117

INTRODUCTION

Having reconstructed the emerging peacebuilding field as characterized by an inherent mismatch between peacebuilding as a political project and the impartial and/or neutral identity of most operational peacebuilding agents, the following chapter explores the transformation of peacebuilding best practices over the first two decades of the new field (1992-2015).118 In particular, I explore the strategies and mechanisms by which agents in the peacebuilding field have sought to match upcoming challenges (problems) with policies (solutions) that are compatible with their impartial and/or neutral mandates and practices. As the previous chapter has shown, the three main communities of practice that came to implement and increasingly conduct peacebuilding are all tied to the observation of impartiality and/or neutrality. In addition, as this chapter will emphasize, the development of peacebuilding practice has primarily been supply-driven, i.e. based on inventories and assessments of available capacities within the UN system and beyond, rather than informed by ex ante strategies or assessments of peacebuilding requirements (see also Bellamy and Williams 2010; Wyeth 2011). Taken together, these two observations in themselves account for the (initial) proliferation of

117 Wyeth 2011: 11.
118 This is not to say that earlier practices, particularly in regard to what Boutros-Ghali has termed ‘multidimensional peacekeeping’ were not, in fact, peacebuilding (see, for instance, the parallels drawn in Jennings 2003). In addition, there are a number of precedents in post-WWII Germany and Japan, or arguably the intervention in the Congo in the early 1960s. However, from the point of view of this research, the concern is with the emergence of multilateral peacebuilding as a new field of international practice, for which the Agenda and surrounding discussions formed the starting point.
developmental, peacekeeping, and humanitarian notions and practices in peacebuilding. Against this backdrop, the following analysis will trace the ways in which the practical reasoning on peacebuilding best practices sought to grapple with problems of a political nature, be it opposition to peacebuilding interventions or the persistence of internal conflict, by addressing conflict in non-political terms.

Accordingly, the present chapter will take up this thread to explore the transformation of peacebuilding best practices at the level of the overall field over the past two decades to explore the foundational dilemma that existed between peacebuilders’ identities and the nature of their task. As argued previously, the ways in which peacebuilders have addressed this tension has contributed to shaping the form and content of peacebuilding practice and current thinking about peace and conflict in international organisations. Newman (2013) claims that the UN has increasingly turned towards formal and informal hierarchies in peacebuilding and sought to strengthen coordination, which has “moved to the forefront of the debate ... apparently as the key to successful peacebuilding” (Newman 2013: 315). As this chapter argues, one of the overarching objectives of the move towards hierarchy, strategy, and coordination in peacebuilding was the attempt to project greater political leverage vis-à-vis the conflict parties based on a unified vision among peacebuilders and backed by the political clout of key donors and intergovernmental bodies such as the Security Council and General Assembly.

Whereas peacebuilding agencies from the three communities of practice adopted mechanisms to depoliticize their practices at the operational level, such as the focus on capacity building in the case of development agencies or the reconceptualisation of impartiality among peacekeepers, as I will show, at the level of the overall peacebuilding field, the move towards greater strategy and coordination reflected attempts by all peacebuilders to frame their own interventions within a universally legitimized agenda. Such a shared agenda derives legitimacy from the (claimed) consensus among all stakeholders. With a view to the implementing agencies, adopting this universal agenda allows peacebuilders to steer clear of contentious ‘local politics’ and agency. It is hence necessarily at odds with definitions of peacebuilding as peacemaking, which would “entail[...] the constant negotiation and renegotiation of expectations and relationships and the distribution of power and wealth in society” (Wyeth 2011: 11).

The analysis focuses on the practical reasoning of leading operational peacebuilding agents that accompanied the development and revisions of 'best practices' and 'lessons learned'. These are the UN Security Council, Secretary-General, and select entities of the
UN Secretariat, on the one hand, and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) as the major institutionalized donor forum, on the other. In so doing, my analysis traces two developments that seemingly contradict each other, but are, in fact related. The practical reasoning of leading peacebuilding agents reflects the growing recognition of the degree to which peacebuilders in so-called post-conflict environments encounter – and have to address – political resistance and opposition within or against the entire peace process. As argued above, while most peacebuilding agents initially took up the new objective on the premise that their task consisted in assisting the implementation of a ‘genuine’ political settlement, repeated experiences prompted them to revise this expectation and to discuss the degree of conflict and ‘hostility’ that characterised many ‘post-conflict’ environments. However, as I will demonstrate in this and the two subsequent case study chapters, notwithstanding these experiences and the repeated acknowledgment of the political nature of peacebuilding, as agents sought to resolve these challenges, their practices remained depoliticized. Accordingly, while actors have employed a variety of mechanisms to improve their practices and address upcoming challenges, the common denominator of these constantly revised approaches to peacebuilding is their depoliticization of ‘essentially’ political problems and solutions.

In view of the large number of agents involved and the ever-increasing spectrum of activities deemed to help build peace, sketching out the emergence and transformation of peacebuilding as a practice is an unwieldy task. The analysis is further complicated by the importance of policy development originating from the peacekeeping, humanitarian, and development communities of practice. For this reason, this chapter focuses on the UN Secretariat – including panels convened by the Secretary-General and additional organs and agencies of the United Nations – and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC). While the UN Secretariat is the single most important conceptual (and practical) source of peacebuilding strategy and practice, the OECD-DAC is the principal umbrella organization of donors and implementing agencies from industrialized countries which have come to conduct the majority of peacebuilding measures alongside respective UN bodies.¹¹⁹ Within the UN Secretariat and until the creation of the UN peacebuilding infrastructure, the development of peacebuilding practice has for the most part been

¹¹⁹ The World Bank as another central source of peacebuilding practice (and funding) would certainly warrant an analysis in its own right, but is indirectly included in this analysis as it has increasingly been involved in the practices and reasoning of both entities and contributed through a number of influential reports (e.g. Collier et al. 2003; World Bank 2011) and collaborative efforts with UNDP (PCNA Frameworks).
tied up with the revision of peacekeeping doctrine and the partly related reforms regarding humanitarian aid and protection (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 92, 123; Kaldor 1999). By contrast, not only bilateral development agencies, but also most UN operational agencies approached the new objective based on their sectoral responsibilities in the fields of development (UNDP; World Bank), relief (UNHCR, UNICEF), or combinations thereof (FAO; UNHABITAT).

In the case of the OECD-DAC, it is comparatively easy to separate the organization’s peace- and conflict-related statements and publications from its previous and ongoing ‘ordinary’ development work. As mentioned previously (ch. 4.3), the OECD-DAC first entered the peacebuilding field with the 1997 Guidelines Conflict, Peace and Development, which were extended in 2001 to reflect earlier experiences. By contrast, selecting relevant contributions to the practical reasoning on peacebuilding and peace support is more complex when it comes to the United Nations, particularly the Secretariat. As peacebuilding has for a long time been seen and treated as a ‘cross-cutting issue’, there is hardly any major document originating with any of the Secretariat’s departments and offices relating to the UN’s role in peace and development that has not contributed to or reflected on the formation of the new practice. In fact, with the curious exception of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), commentary and guidance on peacebuilding have been issued by almost all Secretariat departments and divisions, by most operational agencies,120 the former Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC),121 the Executive Office, and the Policy Committee of the Secretary-General. Beyond the Secretariat, important decisions and recommendations have been issued by the inter-governmental bodies: the Security Council as the principal organ in charge of international peace and security and the General Assembly by virtue of its role in peacekeeping financing (Fifth Committee), review (Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations), and recommendations with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes (Art. 14, Ch. IV, UN Charter).

120 Within the UN Secretariat, the most important sources of peacebuilding thinking – both in terms of quantity and influence – are the Secretary-General, advisory panels, and DPKO, followed by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA)120 and, in recent years, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBOSO) and the DPA. As argued above (ch. 4.3), the DPA used to be in charge of peacebuilding policy, but has only begun to publish its own guidance in 2010. Relevant committees include the ACC (heads of UN agencies), the Policy Committee of the SG, the Fifth Committee, and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in the case of the General Assembly.

121 In 2001, ECOSOC renamed the ACC ‘United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination’ (CEB). The CEB is headed by the UN Secretary-General and comprises the heads of 29 specialized and related agencies. See also <http://www.unsceb.org/content/reports-acc> (15 Oct 2015).
Such a broad and diverse range of ‘authors’ admittedly poses methodological challenges in terms of choosing from the wealth of available material and relating the different ‘voices’ to each other. This problem is partially addressed in pragmatic terms by selecting sources from a range of institutions to reflect the different policy concerns, particularly of the three communities of practice, in relation to peacebuilding. In this vein, sources are selected based on their influence within the field, as evidenced by the degree to which actors subsequently refer to and cross-reference them (pointed out to the extent possible in the analysis). At the same time, the focus on ‘best practices’ allows me to reconstruct the background knowledge that binds together the statements and deliberations from a multitude of actors within the UN (and to a lesser extent, the OECD). As argued above (ch. 3), such an approach is particularly warranted by the nature of the studied sources, most of which were written with a view to planning and guiding policy and projects within institutions, improve coordination, and to a lesser extent also with a view to presenting the respective organisation’s peacebuilding work to other actors in the field.

With regard to each of the studied documents, the analysis seeks to clarify both the depiction of specific ‘problems’ and their possible ‘solutions’ in terms of peacebuilding and, at times, peacemaking and peacekeeping. On the side of the ‘problems’, the analysis focuses specifically on actors’ practical reasoning in relation to ‘obstruction’ of the peace process and the generation of ‘consent’, and the ways in which this incrementally changed the original assumption of peacebuilding as implementation. The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (1995) had already been markedly less optimistic than the Agenda regarding the prospects of ‘keeping the peace’ and of implementing agreements in cases where the political cooperation of the parties did not suffice. In reviewing the conceptual and programmatic discussion on peace support at the UN, I will analyse how this dilemma has contributed to shaping actors’ reasoning on best practices. Accordingly, on the side of ‘solutions’, the analysis deliberately takes a broad approach to peacebuilding understood as all civilian action undertaken by international actors with the objective of building or facilitating peace in countries emerging from violent conflict (Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 195).\footnote{While several peacebuilders do in fact employ alternative terms such as post-conflict reconstruction, peace consolidation, or more recently ‘stabilization’ (Barnett et al. 2007; Wyeth 2011), which might at times carry with them different emphases or perspectives, the broad definition applied here resonates with the predominant usage of terminology among practitioners and allows for the inclusion of other, more specific terms.} Note that this broad definition of peacebuilding in principle also allows for ‘peacemaking activities’ such as negotiation and mediation to be considered as part of peacebuilding.
5.1 PEACEBUILDING AS COOPERATIVE IMPLEMENTATION

The UNDESA Peacebuilding Inventory (1996), the Chairman’s Synopsis of the UNDDSMS International Colloquium on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Strategies (1995), and the OECD-DAC Guidelines (1997)

Following the Agenda123 and Supplement, the Secretary-General set up an interdepartmental task force within the Secretariat to “identify the tools at the disposal of the United Nations system for post-conflict peace-building” (UNDESA 1996: iii). In 1996, this task force published the first of two inventories on UN peacebuilding capacities.124 At the same time, in the summer of 1995, an International Colloquium on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Strategies was organized by the UN Department for Development Support and Management Services (UNDDSMS), convening leading officials of all relevant Secretariat departments, specialized agencies, and donor representatives to “identify the practical and institutional issues” concerning peacebuilding as suggested in the Agenda (UNDDSMS 1995: Preface). The Colloquium also reviewed the Inventory and contributed to it. Taken together, the reports of the Colloquium and the UNDESA Inventory provide a snapshot of what was considered to constitute peacebuilding in the early days of the field across the UN Secretariat and agencies.

The Colloquium defines the overarching objective of post-conflict reconstruction as “avoiding the recurrence of war or chaos” (UNDDSMS 1995: 2). To this end, peacebuilding requires a country-specific “macro-political strategy” which is “different from a traditional development plan” (UNDDSMS 1995: 5). Consequently, as “designing a framework for such assistance is in essence a political task”, the UN Secretary-General is expected to lead the process based on his peacemaking mandate (2-3). This discussion of the ‘integrated strategic framework’ reflects the Colloquium’s conception of peacebuilding as comprising developmental measures, but steered by a political peacemaking process, whose terms and conditions hence have to be designed by political stakeholders. Regarding the role of host state actors, the Colloquium underlines that the strategy should not be “super-imposed”, but “tailored to individual

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123 The SG had followed the 1992 Agenda for Peace with the Agenda for Development (1994) and the Agenda for Democratization (1996). Together with the UNDP’s first Human Development Report of 1994, these agendas were intended to connect the promotion of development, security, democracy, and human rights, all of which were seen as interdependent and mutually reinforcing.

124 The second inventory was published in 2006 by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (UN 2006), see below (5.4).
circumstances ... and prepared in fullest cooperation with all available elements at the national and international level” (6, emphasis added).

The Colloquium reviewed a list\(^{125}\) of pertinent peacebuilding activities, some of which are clearly distinct from ‘ordinary’ development not only in terms of their content, but also because they require different kinds of approaches. In addition to the reconstruction of infrastructure, “confidence-building, the re-establishment of law and order, and respect for human rights” are seen as vital priorities (4). In this regard, attempts on the part of the UN system to help ‘re-establish’ civil society are expected to require peacebuilders to “go beyond the normal practice of working only through the government in the capital city” (4). This diversion from ‘normal practice’ is, however, not further discussed, as it is premised on the ‘fullest cooperation’ of all parties, particularly the host government. The Colloquium observes that “post-conflict peacebuilding is a new and largely untried concept” which might cause difficulties in obtaining the necessary resources at a time when “only humanitarian aid seems to generate a sympathetic response, while financial flows for development cooperation are suffering a decline” (9). This is expected to cause particular challenges, as peacebuilding might be seen as more risky by development donors, not least since “the kind of conditions often applied to development assistance are not appropriate” (10). As these budgetary considerations imply, the members of the Colloquium take the close connection between development and peacebuilding for granted. However, “given the special nature of post-conflict peace-building, its political character and its close linkage with peace-keeping”, participants also discussed the idea to either finance peacebuilding from assessed budgets (10) or from defence budgets, as funding is otherwise “almost invariably drawn from aid budgets” (11). As this discussion indicates, while there is no unified vision of peacebuilding as such, it is seen to follow up on the activities of a peacekeeping operation and primarily involves a ‘reorientation’ of development activities.

Consequently, the discussion is entirely premised on the political leadership provided by an SRSG. While the “core of the operation, in view of its political nature” should be guided by the Secretary-General and UN Secretariat (12), within the country, leadership should be exercised by the SRSG “given the political nature and importance of this interim period before normal development activities can resume” (7). As these excerpts reiterate, the political nature of peacebuilding as a phase or process is emphasized and juxtaposed with ‘normal’ development. On the side of national stakeholders,

\(^{125}\) As this list is based on the DESA Inventory, I discuss it below in the respective section.
“community leaders should urge tolerance, forgiveness and cooperation” and establish “governments of reconciliation and national unity” (14). On the side of the UN, “it must be recognized that in some situations the UN should not intervene at all, because of a lack of real capacity to change the situation” (5). This last precaution is not further elaborated, but it clearly indicates that the absence of consent would throw the feasibility of the entire peacebuilding project into question. In sum, then, the 1995 Colloquium reflects the standard assumptions regarding the nature of peacebuilding as discussed in the previous chapter: peacebuilding is understood as a political project of guiding a peace process based on the general cooperation and consent of the parties following the initiation of a peace process. To the extent that political interaction in the form of peacemaking is required, this is to be conducted by the Secretary-General/SRSG based on a comprehensive strategic framework that is agreed upon and ‘owned’ by the parties. The operational agencies, on the other hand, conduct peacebuilding based on their former fields of expertise in the areas of peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian assistance.  

While this might require a degree of adaptation on the part of these agents, both regarding the new objective and with a view to specific post-conflict requirements, in practice this primarily implies that agents orient their approaches towards a universally agreed framework whose provisions they help to implement.

The 1996 UNDESA Inventory sketches out a nearly identical model that allows implementing agencies to rely firstly on the UN as the “engine of the process”, capable of addressing potential political difficulties over time (for instance through the “Friends of the Secretary-General”, UNDESA 1996: 6), and secondly on the “full cooperation” of “domestic authorities and other local entities” (UNDESA 1996: 5). Accordingly, in the aftermath or absence of a peacekeeping operation, when post-conflict peacebuilding “will be carried out largely by UN development agencies” (7), the Inventory suggests creating “a political office to serve as a bridge between the peacekeeping operation and long-term post-conflict peace-building activities, and to help orient development assistance towards projects that promote reconciliation” (7). As with the Colloquium, it is evident that peacebuilding is seen to involve a political dimension that might have to be continuously steered and addressed by the UN Secretariat or a delegated office

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126 Accordingly, the results of the Colloquium were submitted to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, the Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions (CCPOQ), and the General Assembly Informal Open-ended Working Group on an Agenda for Peace (UNDSDSMS 1995: 12).
during and beyond the peacekeeping operation, while the remaining agencies serve as implementers.

The *Inventory* covers the interfaces between development, peacekeeping, and humanitarianism with peacebuilding in five priority areas: 1) basic political agreement, 2) humanitarian assistance, 3) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, 4) human rights and participatory government, and 5) rehabilitation and reconciliation. Peacebuilding is seen to differ from development in three respects that are worth quoting in some detail:

First, the overriding criterion for... priorities is political and it involves addressing problems which ... could lead to the return of fighting. .... Second ... a development strategy should not discriminate among potential beneficiaries .... In post-conflict situations, however, it is often necessary to give preferential treatment to those particularly involved in or affected ... to address the grievances that led them to resort to arms .... Thus, the equity criterion may be supplanted or suspended because of the overriding ethic of peacemaking .... Third, ... peace-related programmes may not be optimal from an economic point of view. (UNDESA 1996: 1)

This depiction illustrates a number of points. The peacebuilding strategy is supposed to work directly on the causes of conflict by re-orientating development strategies. Surprisingly, these are normally considered to be based on the ‘equity criterion’ in regard to the beneficiaries, which is in fact a humanitarian rather than a developmental tenet derived from the principles of impartiality and humanity. Finally, peacebuilding ought to take precedence over the standard economic concerns in development. While development-as-peacebuilding might hence serve explicitly political purposes and effects, relief and humanitarian assistance are seen to largely adhere to the usual rules and as not “strictly related to the political goals of post-conflict peace-building” (9).

Peace support is seen to comprise three phases: peacemaking, transition, and lastly rebuilding and reconstruction. Immediately after the agreement of a political settlement, the first priority is the disarmament of troops by peacekeepers (25). In this context, the *Inventory* cautions that "a conflict between the ‘culture of development’ and the ‘culture of peace-keeping’ is likely to arise” (25). In particular, the standard developmental tenet that international staff should not replace local staff (but rather transfer knowledge and skills), does not take precedence in the case of disarmament (DDR), as there might not be sufficient time for teaching and training. What is interesting about this point is the implicit assumption that a developmental tenet should have any relevance whatsoever with regard to a standard (military) peacekeeping task such as DDR, as it illustrates the
implicit assumption that development actors would be in charge of a wide range of, if not actually all, practical tasks in a 'post-conflict' situation.

Referencing lessons learned during the peace operations in El Salvador, Cambodia, and Haiti, the enhancement of human rights and of "a participatory system of government at all levels" constitutes the third peacebuilding priority. Activities in the human rights field span punitive and conciliatory measures ranging from international tribunals, commissions of inquiry or 'truth', and human rights observers to technical advice and training, as well as "purging the military, police, judiciary and other organs of the State" (41). In regard to what would nowadays be called 'governance', the inventory is careful to highlight that rather than importing a new "model of a participatory system of government", peacebuilders ought to "respond[...] to the aspirations and the cultural values of the people" (45).127 There is a strong overall emphasis on respecting and building on what is already there, as expressed in the repeated use of the prefix 're' throughout the relevant sections. Likewise, the Inventory emphasizes the inclusion of stakeholders beyond the government and of all social levels. For instance, the discussion of elections (47) commences with the need to "ascertain ... general agreement among all major political groups on the need for international involvement" and to act "on the basis of a request from the Government", describing the role of peacebuilders as creating an "intellectual and operational equilibrium between parties" (47). This might entail assisting a "guerrilla organization" to "settle in the capital and ... be able to function properly as a political party" and aid the "transformation of military organizations into political parties" (47). Following elections and the reform of basic institutions in the justice sector, the peacekeeping operation is expected to be completed and replaced by a monitoring mission (48). This, then, is seen to lead over to the 'rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation' phase, whose range of activities might include public sector reform, economic policy, environmental issues, and the restoration of the "social fabric" (52).

127 It is, however, difficult to imagine a participatory system other than a democratic one that would fulfil the requirement of granting full participation and inclusion "of persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities" (UNDESA 1996: 46). In fact, the inventory provides a long list of 'reforms' that are considered necessary in most cases and, taken together, evidently amount to building liberal democratic states ("constitutional reform, electoral reform, judicial reform, and reform of the police and armed forces, ... also requires ratification of ILO standards", ibid.).
The final two sections of the Inventory focus more explicitly on the relationships between conflicting parties, both on the national/sub-national and international level. On the national/sub-national level, the Inventory emphasises the "re-establishment of relations among groups that were previously in conflict" (59). Apart from general attempts to increase participation and representation, the authors suggest analysing the "culture, traditions and institutions in the country and in the regions where conflict has occurred to facilitate peacemaking and the design of post-conflict activities" (59). In light of recurring criticisms of peacebuilding practice as ignoring 'local conflict dynamics' (e.g. Autesserre 2010) it is interesting to note that the Inventory anticipates the need for ongoing peacemaking in and beyond the capital. In other words, this approach not only acknowledges the need for ongoing peacemaking, but also the fact that dynamics at the local level might differ from those on the national level. However, this is mostly framed in the language of including 'needs' in the participatory negotiation of reconstruction programmes: "Assessment of local social needs ... Those included in the negotiations, should present their priorities for the formulation of medium- and long-term rehabilitation programmes" (59).

Like the Colloquium, the first Inventory of UN Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities (1996) sketches out an ideal type of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, i.e. the implementation of a comprehensive settlement, initially in the scope of a peacekeeping operation, in which the UN steers the process and helps define 'needs' and 'priorities' with the full cooperation of all relevant stakeholders. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Inventory repeatedly refers to the ‘basic’ political agreement, which implies that further negotiation and peacemaking through a political office might be conducted following the original settlement. Nonetheless, as the references and cited manuals and reports indicate, the overall vision is informed by the experiences of the UN system in Angola, El Salvador, Mozambique and Namibia, i.e. the implementation of comprehensive settlements. Accordingly, while developmental peacebuilders might adjust their projects

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128 While 'UN post-conflict peacebuilding' is seen to target intra-state conflict, the international level might support the peace process through “Inter-State Joint Ventures for Peace-Building” (UNDESA 1996: 61).

129 Here, as in other UN documents, the distinction between political and judicial peacemaking and peacebuilding is used intentionally and following Galtung’s original distinction (see infra chs. 1 and 3), as is evident from the list of references to this section, which includes Galtung’s 1975 essay in addition to ‘canonical’ peace studies authors such as Kriesberg, Azar, and Burton.

130 Relevant categories for the analysis are the “origin of social differentiation; structures of authority within ethnic groups and within their subdivisions; and relevant cultural characteristics” (UNDESA 1996: 59).
according to political considerations, this is not considered problematic\footnote{The Colloquium (UNDDSMS 1995) in particular acknowledges that there might be cases to which the UN should not be deployed, but the implications and threshold criteria of such decisions are not further elaborated.} given the presupposition of a genuine political agreement and/or strategic framework that is steered by the UN Secretariat in collaboration with donors and national stakeholders.

In parallel with the stock-taking conducted within the UN system, in 1995, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD-DAC) set up a Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation to develop guidance for and harmonise the work across its member states. In 1997, the first paper, entitled Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, was launched. The Guidelines discuss conflict prevention as an "integral part of the cooperation challenge" and a wider task requiring "sustained political commitment" and coordination by developmental, diplomatic, and military actors (OECD 1997: 79). In contrast to the UN Inventory and report of the Colloquium, the OECD Guidelines also include a discussion on the origins of contemporaneous intra-state conflict and seek to identify some commonalities. Conflict is seen to result from a combination of ‘structural’ and ‘accelerating factors’ or ‘triggers’. The former include examples such as "population density, the level and distribution of wealth and opportunity, the state of the resource base, the structure and ethnic make-up of society, and the history of inter-group relations" (87). By contrast, triggers are defined as "events, actions and decisions which result in the escalation of disputes into violent conflict", such as "economic decline, changes in the degree of internal state cohesion; shifts in internal control of the central authority, including the military, change in the internal distribution of power ...; shipments of (small) arms; interventions of neighbouring states ...; ... large movements of people and capital" (87).

These two lists are rather expansive and, with few exceptions among the triggers, prioritize structural and wider societal processes over agent-based ‘decisions’ or ‘events’. What is more, the link between these problems or factors and the “eruption” of violence is constructed via a society’s insufficient capacity to "manage tensions", “manage competition”, or “resolve grievances” (87-88). In other words, this narrative emphasizes skill and capacity, rather than interests, intentions, or identities. To the extent that the latter are present in the list of conflict causes, they are narrated as second-order problems, that is: given a lack of management capacities, certain groups might take advantage. Witness, for instance, the example of ‘ethnic differences’: “Ethnic,
religious and cultural differences, in themselves, seldom cause conflict .... However, they can offer fertile ground for political exploitation. Factors which may contribute to the polarisation of ethnic and cultural differences include: economic, social and political dislocation resulting from imbalance of development itself; the legacy of colonial boundaries; illegitimate or weak state institutions; the forced assimilation of minorities” (88).

Against this backdrop, development actors are called upon to “address the root causes of violent conflicts, as well as their precipitating circumstances” (86). The central notion underlying the Guidelines is the concept of “structural stability”, which not only links ‘root causes’ and ‘triggers’ but also explains the link between conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Structural stability enables ‘sustainable development’ as it “embraces the mutually reinforcing objectives of social peace, respect for human rights, accountable military forces and broadly-shared social and economic development; supported by dynamic and representative political structures capable of managing change and resolving disputes through peaceful means” (79). The counter-narrative to this model, woven throughout the individual sections of the report as they discuss aspects of governance, the distribution of economic resources, or fair and accessible institutions of security and justice, is the potential exclusion of “marginalised groups” as a likely cause of “heightened tensions, oppression and increased levels of violence” (79) in their quest to “effect change” (116). As the report holds, “as a general rule, a society endowed with a good balance and distribution ... is able to manage tensions” (87), with civil society, women’s groups, and other professional groups functioning as social “stabilization points.” In sum, the guidelines faithfully reflect the liberal peace paradigm. Consequently, the depiction of the “root causes” of violence in structural terms justifies a wide agenda of remaking societies: “The objective of post-conflict reconstruction is not to return to pre-crisis conditions but to lay the foundations for peace and sustainable development” (129).

This expansive political agenda notwithstanding, the role of donors and developmental agencies in this process is primarily described in terms of ‘strengthening’ respective processes and building the required ‘capacity’. Of crucial importance, however, is the fact that this account is premised on the “broad acceptance throughout society of the legitimacy of the state and the credibility of the institutions of governance” (113). The report acknowledges that a “broad acceptance” and “civic spirit” are both an objective of and a necessary precondition to this process. While resistance by any one group is narratively explained away by ensuring the inclusion of “marginalized groups”, the role
of development agencies evidently depends on the presence of a legitimate and ‘cooperative’ government, and the guidelines are careful to point out that peacebuilding, just like development in general, is the responsibility of the respective government (95). In other words, within this narrative, there would appear to be little space for development agencies to build capacity or strengthen local processes in the absence of governments’ goodwill.

While not explicitly addressing the absence of cooperation, the guidelines nonetheless touch upon the issue of persuasion and agency when discussing the potential use of “direct incentives and/or disincentives in ... funding allocations” to deal with resistant governments. At the same time, they highlight the need to “avoid seeking to impose externally generated solutions” (126). In this regard, there are three threads that are repeatedly highlighted throughout the report: improving the qualitative and quantitative analysis of each conflict (91), ensuring political sensitivity and judgement (86, 89), and the increased requirements regarding policy coherence and donor coordination that result from the sensitive and complex nature of the task (94, 95). In other words, the possibility of lacking consent is implied, but not substantively addressed. The extent to which this omission might prove problematic becomes visible in the following statement: “The dynamic nature of intra-state conflicts makes it difficult to distinguish clearly when and where violence ends and the conditions for genuine peace are established” (93). Unsurprisingly, as I will demonstrate in subsequent paragraphs, the 2001 Supplement to the 1997 Guidelines reflected more thoroughly on the political role of development agencies in conflict settings and particularly on the case of ‘uncooperative’ governments.

5.2 ENCOURAGING COOPERATION: STRATEGIC PEACEBUILDING FRAMEWORKS

The 1998 SG Report on The Causes of Conflict in Africa and the 1997 Comments by the Secretary-General and ACC on Coordination and Conflict Prevention

Within the UN Secretariat, after the Agenda documents, the first comprehensive effort at assessing internal conflict dynamics and strategically linking them to particular UN instruments was presented in Annan’s 1998 The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of

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132 In contrast to this, the UN Colloquium had considered suggestions to divert from standard development practice to engage directly with non-state actors in host countries.

In this report, the Secretary-General advocates for greater policy coherence and coordination across all actors and policy sectors in post-conflict interventions. While the report focuses on Africa, it is included here as it explores the connections between different instruments of peace support and also seeks to identify “common themes and experiences” regarding conflict causes (UN 1998: §7), many of which are not exclusive to African countries.

On the side of conflict causes, the Secretary-General identifies a number of deep political and economic structures seen to result from historical colonial ‘legacies’ and ‘internal factors’. These include the arbitrary division/merger of peoples, divisive laws and institutions, and unsustainable economic structures that are “strongly skewed towards extractive industries and primary commodities” and accompanied by “unfavourable terms of trade” (8, 9). In many cases, liberation has been accompanied by the “centralization of political and economic power and the suppression of political pluralism” (8), often exacerbated by Cold War dynamics (10). Taken together, this legacy has left many African states with the “challenge of forging a genuine national identity from among disparate and often competing communities” (8). Secondly, with regard to internal factors, the first and foremost cause of conflict is the “nature of political power in many African States” (12), which is seen to result from a combination of “winner-takes-all” modes of political contestation and a “communal sense of advantage or disadvantage” owing to “centralized and highly personalized forms of governance” as patronage (12). If the state neither protects human rights nor the rule of law, “political control becomes excessively important”, which is further exacerbated when “the State is the major provider of employment and political parties are ... regionally or ethnically based” (12). According to Annan’s assessment, it is this personalized and centralized nature of political and economic power that turns the “multi-ethnic character of most African States” into a cause of conflict and facilitates the “violent politicization of ethnicity” (12). Similar to the portrayal provided in the OECD Guidelines, this discussion emphasizes exclusionary political and economic structures over identity-based aspects such as ethnicity, but it goes considerably further in exploring their historical roots and political effects.

On the side of ‘solutions’ or ‘responses,’ the Secretary-General discusses peacemaking, peacekeeping, and humanitarian and development work. The latter two are expected to be conducted both ‘on their own terms’, i.e. as traditional humanitarian and

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development work, and additionally under a 'post-conflict peacebuilding' umbrella. By contrast, the question of enforcement is not addressed, which is likely due to the introductory observation that the UN was originally "intended to deal with inter-State warfare" (3). While not explicitly acknowledged, what this implies is that the UN, and in particular the UN Security Council, does not have a mandate to enforce peace within states. However, as the Secretary-General observes, the UN is "more and more often [required] to respond to intra-State instability and conflict ... [in which] the main aim, increasingly, is the destruction not just of armies but of civilians and entire ethnic groups" (3). If the parties agree, peacemakers can help "facilitating dialogue, defusing tensions, promoting national reconciliation, advancing respect for human rights and institutionalizing peace. Where a peace process is needed, it is the role of the UN, with OAU, to help create one" (18).

Within a peace process, the 'international community' might 'nurture' cooperation with a mix of "short-term stability" and "positive inducements for longer-term reconciliation" (19) to support the negotiation, mediation, good offices, fact-finding missions, or judicial resolution offered by peacemakers. This requires "understanding people's problems in their full complexity" (19) and careful coordination between all third parties through contact groups, Groups of Friends, or special conferences. Accordingly, coordination is not only important to mobilize resources, but also to "harmonize the views of the key external political actors" (24). In this regard, the extent to which ongoing peacebuilding processes are expected to encounter opposition and require political interventions is evident in the suggestion to retain donor fora following the initial stages of a peace intervention "to deal with the challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding" (24), citing rather coercive measures such as economic and political sanctions as a means of "encourag[ing] political dialogue" (25-26). In other words, establishing a unified or 'coherent' conception of a given conflict seems necessary to being able to project political leverage vis-à-vis the parties.

Similar concerns are manifest in the discussion on peacekeeping, which often takes place "in situations that remain dangerous and volatile" and hence require a "constant dialogue with the parties", "realistic peace agreements, and...a credible deterrent capacity" (33, 34). Echoing Boutros-Ghali’s observations from the Supplement, "UN peacekeeping will not always be the best answer to every problem", as it crucially depends on the support of the parties (35). By contrast, the report is most "determined" (57) when it comes to the discussion of humanitarian assistance and humanitarian
imperatives. With regard to humanitarian assistance, the Secretary-General, while noting the principled refusal of some agencies to coordinate their work, emphasizes his determination “to ensure that UN humanitarian action is fully consistent with broader UN peace and development activities, and that our humanitarian action is coordinated” (57). To this end, a number of coordination mechanisms at headquarters and field levels are placed under the overall authority of the Secretary-General’s representative. In the aftermath of violence, humanitarian action is also to be coordinated with development and reconstruction work. In this regard, ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ as “actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation” (63) is supposed to ‘reorient’ “ongoing humanitarian and development activities” in “ways designed to reduce the risk” of conflict (63).

The Secretary-General repeatedly calls for the harmonization of all types of intervention by all participating actors (65). Priorities include the provision of security, “encouraging reconciliation and demonstrating respect for human rights; fostering political inclusiveness and promoting national unity”, the reintegration of combatants and refugees, and small arms control (64-66). Each priority is seen as interlinked with all the others, and the Secretary-General also advocates the adoption of ‘strategic frameworks’ for peacebuilding which would “embrace political, human rights, humanitarian and development activities” across the entire UN system, the IFIs, national authorities, and external donors and NGOs (70). Beyond these priority areas, long-term peacebuilding appears to comprise two principal strategies: good governance and economic growth and development. Good governance addresses “social and political fragmentation” (71) by allowing “contending interests” to be resolved non-violently, as opponents are otherwise “likely to seek to settle their differences through conflict rather than through accommodation” (77). Economic development, in turn, while not in and of itself a safeguard for “stability, satisfaction or social peace” (80) is held to be a necessary prerequisite. Going back to the problems or ‘causes of conflict’ identified in the introductory sections of the report, the suggested governance reforms seem to tally well with the diagnosed principal problem of the ‘nature of political power’ and its interaction with politicized identities as a primary conflict cause. However, and entirely regardless of whether or not this is actually the case, it seems impossible to radically alter such provisions (along with the system of economic distribution) without inviting political opposition, and certainly not within the scope of technical capacity-building.

See the S/RES/1265 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict of 17 Sept 1999, the first thematic resolution on the subject (Brooks 2014), and related resolutions regarding Children in Armed Conflict and 1325 Women, Peace and Security (S/RES/1325 of 31 Oct 2000).
programmes. Here, as in the case of humanitarian assistance, the solution seems to lie in the notion of coordination and strategy, hoped to enable the ‘international community’ to speak with one voice, or, at the very least, present the parties with a unified front.

It is evident that the issue of coordination and the development of joint strategic frameworks became more central towards the end of the 1990s. While the early papers from the Colloquium and Inventory mentioned the importance of harmonising measures across peacebuilding actors, the Secretary-General’s 1998 report explicitly ties coordination and the adoption of ‘strategic frameworks’ to peacebuilders’ capacity to project political leverage vis-à-vis the parties and, importantly, includes humanitarian agencies in this effort. These suggestions anticipate the idea of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) and integrated planning procedures, with which the Brahim Report (UN 2000a) is usually credited. However, the degree to which ‘coordination’ is related to the rising notion of the need to ‘act politically’ is most clearly reflected in an internal note on coordination in conflict resolution by the Secretary-General and the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) (UN 1998a). The ACC (now CEB) is the forum of all UN agency heads. The Secretary-General and the ACC comment on internal studies requested by UNESCO to analyse the scope for peacebuilding coordination across the different UN agencies at headquarters and field levels (JIU 1997).136

Citing the JIU evaluation, the ACC and Secretary-General concur that the “key conceptual problem pertaining to post-conflict peacebuilding” was the fact that peacebuilding is at once “essentially a component of development activities” and “inherently political in nature” (UN 1998a: §25). This conceptual problem is addressed by a new strategic framework approach to ensure that “development, humanitarian and related perspectives ... [will] ‘inform and be informed by’ the political process” (25). In the words of the Secretary-General and ACC, the “fundamental importance of the political dimension of post-conflict peace-building arises from the fact that, within the United Nations system, the source of political guidance and leadership is the Secretary-General ... who is responsible for performing the principal political functions (such as good offices, mediation, negotiation, peacekeeping, verification)” (27). With the exception of

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136 This UNESCO request was driven by the agency’s commitment, entitled ‘A Culture of Peace,’ in response to GA resolution 51/101 of 12 December 1996. Neither JIU nor UNESCO are part of the central peacebuilding agents studied here, and most of the Unit’s recommendations were indeed strongly rejected by the Secretary-General and ACC in an unusually ‘frosty’ tone. In particular, the SG and ACC criticized the inspectors’ failure to acknowledge and address recent developments in the area of coordination. Accordingly, while the JIU report as such is not of interest here, to the extent that they discuss recent changes, the response by the SG/ACC provides highly relevant insights into the reasoning that accompanied the internal reform process in peacebuilding coordination.
enforcement operations, this task is discharged based on consent and hence with the “obligation to be impartial between the parties”, which in turn “precludes the close partnership with the Government which is characteristically and necessarily sought in the developmental and humanitarian contexts” (28). As the Secretary-General and heads of UN agencies conclude, impartiality “severely limits the extent to which the Secretary-General can delegate the political functions to organs of the United Nations system” from the development and humanitarian sector (28). Against this backdrop, the Secretary-General had already extended the authority of SRSGs, whose tasks include coordinating UN policies, “mobiliz[ing] international political support”, and assisting local efforts to “promote reconciliation and respect for human rights” (24). At UN headquarters, the DPA had been designated to help the Secretary-General “exercise the necessary political leadership” by taking over the coordination of all agencies as the “focal point for post-conflict peace-building” (24). Taken together, these arrangements are expected “to ensure that the UN programmes...work in concert to achieve the same goal within the framework of their existing mandates [and] lines of authority” (40). In particular, the DPA was tasked with sharing analysis, monitoring, mobilizing donors, and defining “objectives, criteria and operational guidelines for post-conflict peacebuilding” by UN organizations (see A/51/950). In view of the latter provision, the utter absence (or unavailability) of DPA guidelines and documents prior to its 2010 publications on peacemaking is stunning and, unfortunately, largely inexplicable based on the available material.\footnote{However, several authors have pointed towards internal competitions or ‘turf battles’ between the DPA and DPKO on the one hand, and between the DPA and UNDP on the other (Weinlich 2014; Wyeth 2011: 5; Informal conversation with former USG for Peacekeeping, May 2015).}

In its April 1997 session, the ACC agreed to introduce strategic frameworks for countries in which the UN "operates political programmes" based on SC or GA mandates in addition to its humanitarian and development activities (UN 1998a: 6). Peacebuilding activities are not supposed to substitute but ‘reorient’ existing development and humanitarian activities in such a way as to "reduce the risk of conflict or contribute to creating conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery" (6). In the words of the Secretary-General and ACC, the strategic frameworks reflect an “evolution in the UN system’s thinking ... away from linear and self-contained phases of operation (such as peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building) towards more holistic and mutually reinforcing responses to crisis situations” that has occurred since the release of An Agenda for Peace (3, 4-5). Although some conflicts are "purely...
political or military” in nature, and hence amenable to political and military ‘solutions’, intra-state wars are considered as often more complex and likely caused by “ethnic, economic and social factors and policies which exclude whole sectors of society” (5). At the time of writing, the ‘strategic framework approach’ was still in its early stages, but the authors emphasize the “strong support from both agencies and donors” to resolve the “disjuncture” at the intersection of aid and development on the one hand, and political and non-political assistance strategies on the other (12, 13). A strategic framework is hence to be applied wherever the UN is to lead conflict-resolution and peacebuilding to “define[...] the principles and the normative and consultative arrangements on the basis of which international assistance activities and the political strategy can contribute towards reconciliation and recovery in a mutually reinforcing manner” (14). Within the UN, the process ought to “integrate the system’s analytical capabilities, its capacity for political mediation and humanitarian response, and its experience in development cooperation into a coherent force” (8, emphasis added). In light of the ‘principled refusal’ of some humanitarian agencies to coordinate their efforts, as discussed by Annan in his report on Africa (UN 1998), it is interesting to note that the ACC/SG emphasize that the first country-specific effort at “principled programming” vis-à-vis Afghanistan in practice comprised “two distinct but mutually reinforcing processes: a political strategy for peace-building and a common programming mechanism for international assistance” (UN 1998a: 19; 18).

Within the framework of my overall argument, the note by the Secretary-General and the heads of UN agencies (ACC) is of particular importance as it explicates agents’ understanding of the ‘political’ aspects of peacebuilding and of how the work of peacebuilders relates to this. Premised throughout on the existence of a cooperative, i.e. peacekeeping environment and the parties’ consent, the note nonetheless recognizes the dilemma for humanitarian agencies, which are seen to rely on the assent of the host state government and on political neutrality. Presumably for this reason, the first strategic peacebuilding framework in Afghanistan consisted of a political strategy and a

138 There seems to be a degree of inconsistency when it comes to the characterisation of the relationship between humanitarian agencies and host state governments. On the one hand, these are considered as not fulfilling the impartiality criterion given their partnership with said governments (28). On the other hand, humanitarian agencies are frequently reported as seeking to avoid being drawn into strategic frameworks precisely in order to be able to claim impartiality. This inconsistency most likely points to different notions of impartiality between the SG on the one hand, and some or all UN humanitarian agencies on the other. While the SG defines impartiality as “obligation to be impartial between the parties” (28), in the case of humanitarian agencies, impartiality is usually taken to administer aid based on need alone (see infra 4.2.2), which in turn depends on the assent/protection of the respective government or de facto local authority.
separate assistance strategy. Conversely, in the case of development agencies, it is precisely their habitual cooperation with host state governments that is seen to hinder the Secretary-General from delegating political peacebuilding tasks to the specialized agencies, as their usual *modus operandi* makes it impossible for them to be impartial between the parties. Accordingly, as the note by the SG and ACC demonstrates, strategic coordination and integration effectively fulfils two purposes: firstly, and as already discussed in previous paragraphs (UN 1998), the adoption of a unified strategic framework is seen to increase peacebuilders’ political leverage by moulding them into a “coherent force” (UN 1998a: 8). Secondly, however, this move is also expected to legitimize the delegation of peacebuilding responsibility to UN system agencies, as their inclusion into the overall peacebuilding framework under the SG/SRSG – theoretically – breaks with their standard *modus operandi* of partnering with host state governments and enables them to claim impartiality in relation to the terms of that framework which is overseen by the SRSG on behalf of the Secretary-General.

As noted by the UN Secretary-General (UN 1998), in the second half of the 1990s, the willingness of member states to contribute to peacekeeping decreased following earlier ‘peacekeeping’ failures, while new demands emerged in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. To help address the gap between these requirements and the organizations’ means, the Secretary-General convened an expert *Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, which conducted the first systematic review of UN peace operations, albeit notably through the lens of and with an emphasis on peacekeeping reform. The 2000 *Brahimi Report* is usually credited with putting forward the concept of Integrated Mission Task Forces and has been referred to as a ‘watershed’ that crystallized fundamental changes towards more forceful, and at the same time, ‘holistic’ approaches within the practical reasoning on peace operations (White 2015: 49).

5.3 INTEGRATED PEACEBUILDING IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS: REVISING NOTIONS OF CONSENT, IMPARTIALITY, AND SELF-DEFENCE

*The 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, the Secretary-General’s 2001 Report No Exit without Strategy, and the 2001 Supplement to the OECD-DAC Guidelines*

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140 See, for instance, PBSO (2010). In regard to peacebuilding, its major contribution is held to lie in advancing a narrow conceptualization of peacebuilding as taking place after the termination of violent conflict and hence excluding ‘prevention’ (UN 2000: §13). However, as the discussion of Annan’s 1998 *Causes of Conflict* has shown, both ideas had already been championed by the Secretary-General.
The key contribution of the *Brahimi Report* (UN 2000) regarding the definition of challenges and the practical reasoning on solutions is the explicit recognition that most UN operations of the 1990s "did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them" (UN 2000: viii). While this observation has by now become commonplace, the acknowledgment that armed violence was frequently terminated due to a "military stalemate or international pressure" that left many conflicts 'unfinished' or 'unresolved' (UN 2000: viii) significantly changed the terms of the debate. In line with the argument proposed in this thesis, the panel revisited the positive experiences with implementing comprehensive settlements at the turn of the previous decade, and argued that these had nurtured the belief that the "successful conduct of national elections ... offers a ready exit strategy" (UN 2000: §20). In contrast to these earlier experiences, most peace operations since the early 1990s had in fact been expected to "divert the unfinished conflict, and the personal, political or other agendas that drove it, from the military to the political arena, and to make that diversion permanent" (20). Accordingly, in contemporary 'complex' internal wars, "peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining" (viii).

In contrast, the panel does not discuss, and likely did not foresee, a significant role for peace operations in regard to peacemaking, holding instead that ensuring cooperation and consent could not be attained by the field operation (27), which in turn points to the political role of the Secretary-General and of member states. Instead, in the 'field', "it is ... the peacebuilders' task to support the political, social and economic changes that create a secure environment that is self-sustaining" (28) through an "active engagement with the local parties" (37, emphasis added). Accordingly, peacebuilding is defined as a "hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict" (44).141 In this narrative, the major challenge to "peace implementation" results from spoilers,142 i.e. parties to peace agreements that "renege on their commitments or otherwise seek to undermine a peace accord by violence" (21). In other words, the

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141 Peacebuilding priorities are defined as: quick impact projects to improve livelihoods, elections and institution-building, training the police, national reconciliation including human rights training, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) (UN 2000: 35-43). In the aftermath of a UN peace operation, peacebuilding can be conducted through peacebuilding support offices or UN political offices (36).

142 The notion of 'spoilers' was introduced by Stedman's influential article on 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes' (1997). Importantly, Stedman highlights the contingency of his definition, which is premised on the existence of a formal peace process: "Spoilers exist only when there is a peace process to undermine, that is after at least two warring parties have committed themselves publicly to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace agreement" (Stedman 1997: 7). Stedman also distinguishes 'spoilers' by their position vis-à-vis the peace process (insider, outsider), their intent, and the locus of agency (leadership and/or followers).
notion of spoilers basically refers to the withdrawal or pretence of consent and cooperation. Apart from spoilers, “other variables that affect the difficulty of peace implementation include, first, the sources of conflict”, such as economics, politics, ‘resource and environmental issues’ or “issues of ethnicity, religion or ... violations of human rights” (24). The panel suggests that political and economic disputes might be more amenable to negotiation than, for instance, issues of “resource needs, ethnicity or religion” (24). This claim is neither substantiated nor explained. However, the following distinction between dangerous as opposed to “relatively less dangerous” settings (25) suggests that the distinction between ‘political and economic disputes’, on the one hand, and ‘resource needs, ethnicity or religion’, on the other, is in fact largely identical with a distinction between inter- and intra-state wars, with the former being associated with ‘negotiable’ clashes of interest and the latter with non-negotiable, and presumably ‘irrational’, needs and identities. In this regard, while cases with "just two parties, committed to peace, with competitive but congruent aims, lacking illicit sources of income, with neighbours and patrons committed to peace" are seen as “fairly forgiving” contexts, recently interveners have faced “three or more parties, of varying commitment to peace, with divergent aims, with independent sources of income and arms, and with neighbours who are willing to buy, sell and transit illicit goods” (25). Against this backdrop, UN missions firstly have to be equipped with the necessary resources, mandates, and “serious great power backing” (25). Secondly, they need to have an in-depth understanding of the “political-military environment they are entering” (26), including a realistic assessment of the willingness and capacity of the respective government to ‘cooperate’, particularly in the resolution of “internal disputes” (27).

What, then, are the implications of working in 'uncooperative environments' (in particular, governments) for peacebuilders? According to the panel, UN peace operations conduct “three principal activities: conflict prevention and peace making, peacekeeping; and peacebuilding” (10). Prevention and peacemaking are largely seen as diplomatic tasks (10). Peacekeeping has evolved into a complex effort to “build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars” (12, emphasis added). Peacebuilding, in turn, is tasked with “reassembl[ing] the foundations of peace and provid[ing] the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (13), first and foremost democratic development and “conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques” (13). In regard to enforcement, the panel acknowledges that “the UN does not wage war”, but delegates “enforcement action” to coalitions of member states
authorized by the Security Council (53).\(^{143}\)

This implies a clear distinction between consent-based peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, this distinction is, in fact, considerably blurred. Firstly, while the panel reaffirms traditional peacekeeping principles, this is followed by a significant qualification: In contemporary intra-state or “transnational conflicts”, “consent may be manipulated ... by the local parties” (48). This includes cases in which parties consent to an agreement and peacekeeping operation for strategic reasons only, or in which subsequent divisions between factions occur (48). Secondly, the panel calls for “flexible rules of engagement” to allow peacekeepers to proactively protect not only themselves and the peace operation, but also the mission’s mandate (55).\(^{144}\)

As these deliberations illustrate, the report navigates the tension between traditional peacekeeping principles and ‘robust’ mandates by employing two related conceptual moves: first, the redefinition of impartiality based on the notion of ‘manipulated consent’, and second, the extension of peacekeepers’ self-defence to include ‘defence of the mandate.’ As the following excerpt illustrates, taken together, these two revisions theoretically allow for a far-reaching intervention of peacekeepers without violating the three peacekeeping principles:

Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases ... In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so (UN 2000: 50).

The refusal to distinguish ‘victims from aggressors’ is seen to have constituted one of the biggest failures of the UN in earlier practice, and the panel cites the recent decision by the Security Council according to which the “targeting of civilians ... and the denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations afflicted by war may themselves constitute threats to international peace and security” (50, referring to SC/Res/1296 of 2000). Regardless of the earlier observation that the UN ‘does not wage war’, peacekeepers ought to be able to respond more forcefully to implement their mandates “against those

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\(^{143}\) In this regard, the authors also hold that ‘spoiler’ problems, i.e. the withdrawal of cooperation and other forms of ‘violent obstruction’, are “factors over which a field mission and the UN have little control, yet such a cooperative environment is critical” (UN 2000: 27).

\(^{144}\) On the level of the UN Secretariat, this requires abandoning “best-case planning assumptions” in cases where local actors have displayed a “history of worst-case behaviour” (UN 2000: 51).
who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence” (UN 2000: 55).145

As Bellamy et al. (2010: 281) have argued, such revised conceptualizations of impartiality rest on an understanding of consent as “malleable, variable, and multi-layered” (see infra, ch. 4.2.1). However, the discussion by the panel simultaneously bespeaks a strongly legalistic notion of consent. Once the parties have agreed, they can – and must – be held accountable to the letter of the agreement. More importantly, however, peacekeepers are in effect expected to enforce the agreement against any group that “seeks to undermine it by violence” (UN 2000: 55), regardless of whether it was a party to the agreement or not. In other words, while peacekeeping is in theory and de jure not meant to ‘impose peace’, peacekeepers, once deployed, are explicitly expected to not only enforce the protection of civilians, but also of their mandate, and hence de facto of ‘the peace’. In legal terms, this redefinition allows peacekeepers (and the UN) to remain aloof from ‘politics’ by basing their actions on the terms of the agreement or mandate. In practice, however, the implications that this new role of peacekeepers might have on the perception of local parties are not further discussed. Whereas a priori enforcement action is ‘out-sourced’ to regional organizations or member states, the implications of equipping peacekeepers with ‘robust’ mandates whose defence transcends traditional definitions of ‘self-defence’ are not further considered. As a result, the likely incompatibilities of such a dual role, particularly if peacekeepers are required to distinguish between victims and aggressors, remain unaddressed. The panel tries to delimit the likelihood of peacekeepers’ having to use force,146 but since this cannot be ruled out and is explicitly planned for, it appears all the more surprising that the issue of defining the threshold between a ‘peacekeeping situation’ and a potentially ‘hostile’ environment is not further explored and clarified.

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145 The panel, while supporting the extension of peacekeepers’ mandates and responsibilities, nonetheless cautions against the implications of the heightened expectations that result from this, particularly if peacekeepers continue to be deployed without the necessary capacities (and mandates) for doing so, and in light of the “sheer number of threatened civilians in UN mission areas” (UN 2000: 64), which leads them to call particular attention to the priority of “clear, credible and achievable mandates” (UN 2000: 56) and the necessary political, financial, and logistical support.

146 One of the attempted safeguards to avoid this conundrum is the provision that the UN Secretariat should ensure that “requests for UN implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements … meet certain minimum conditions” (UN 2000: 57-58). Not only should Secretariat staff be present during the negotiations to ensure that tasks are ‘operationally achievable’, but they should only deploy if sufficient “local responsibility for supporting them [is] specified” (and committed to by the member state) and tasks “either contribute to addressing the sources of conflict or provide the space required for others to do so” (UN 2000: 58).
As noted above, peacebuilding is seen to complement ‘ordinary’ UN development activities, “which strive to remain apart from politics while nonetheless targeting assistance at the sources of conflict” (36). Firstly, it is worth noting the strong emphasis on the political nature of peacebuilding, including an “active engagement” with stakeholders, in this account (37). Secondly, the report notes the tension between development and ‘politics,’ which is implicitly ‘resolved’ by the panel’s emphasis on strategy and coordination. To this end, the panel recommends that “the UN should be considered the focal point for peace-building activities” and should build a “permanent institutional capacity” steered by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs (44).

A forum comprising representatives of Secretariat departments, the specialized agencies, and the World Bank should develop peacebuilding strategies, while the “UNDP in cooperation with other agencies ... and the World Bank” should lead the process of implementation (46). As part of such strategy development, there should be a set of criteria “for determining when the appointment of a senior political envoy or representative of the Secretary-General may be warranted to raise the profile and sharpen the political focus of peace-building activities in a particular region or country recovering from conflict” (46). The panel suggests reforming the UN Secretariat and the structure of peace operations to allow for the development and implementation of coherent peacebuilding strategies, introducing a clear division of tasks between political strategy development at UN headquarters on the one hand, and the implementing role of UN agencies on the other. Within the Secretariat, general peacebuilding strategy shall be devised through the ECPS, while Integrated Mission Task Forces are to steer individual operations. Secondly, internal coordination and coherence are to be coupled with greater political force, suggesting that “Council members and the membership at large breathe life into the words that they produce, as did the Security Council delegation that flew to Jakarta and Dili in the wake of the East Timor crisis last year, an example of effective Council action at its best: res, non verba” (276).

To the extent that peace operations are increasingly deployed to ‘create’ rather than ‘keep’ or ‘implement’ a peace, based on Security Council and ‘serious great power backing’ (25), the reorientation of impartiality coupled with peacekeepers’ ability to ‘enforce’ their mandate considerably broadens a peace operation’s room for manoeuvre while crucially upholding the principle of impartiality, if not in spirit, then at least in letter. In the same way, while peacebuilding is to be part of such an integrated and –

147 The Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) convened by the UN DPA was established in 1997 as a sector executive committee to enhance management coordination across participating departments.
ideally – centrally coordinated effort, the need for development and humanitarian agencies to ‘stay away from politics’ is acknowledged and addressed by further decoupling strategy development at headquarters from the process of implementation executed by UN agencies (47), a depiction that ignores the degree of independence that agencies such as the UNDP have vis-à-vis the DPA or a peacekeeping operation, for instance.\textsuperscript{148} What all these mechanisms have in common is that they enable agents to observe impartiality and/or neutrality while at the same time coordinating their efforts.

The degree to which coordination or formal integration link peacebuilders to more forceful forms of intervention was affirmed by the Secretary-General’s 2001 report No Exit Without Strategy. Quoting the Security Council, the report defined peacebuilding as “an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution” (UN 2001: 11, emphases added). In the case of so-called ‘hostile environments’ what this actually implied was the generation of consent and cooperation among the parties following an agreement that some or all of the parties might not have been genuinely committed to in the first place. In such “hostile contexts” operations equipped with Chapter VII mandates “can help to solve commitment and cooperation problems”, a description that was subsequently clarified to signify the use of force to “resist attempts by the parties to prevent the operations from fulfilling their mandates” (UN 2001: 17). This ‘robust support’ is seen as called for in certain circumstances “to overcome deep sources of distrust and powerful incentives to violate agreed provisions of the peace”, warranting “conscious direction by an impartial international agent” (17) and a higher degree of “international authority” (14). To the extent that a comprehensive peace agreement exists, this take on \textit{de facto} ‘peacekeeping enforcement’ against one or more parties follows the Brahimi Report’s reconceptualization of impartiality as relating to the terms of the mandate/peace agreement and is hence seen as within the remit of a peacekeeping operation.

Consequently, in ‘hostile environments’, a peace operation can fulfil such an extended mandate only based on the political will and support not primarily of the parties, but of the Security Council: a peacekeeping operation should not be deployed if there is not sufficient “collective will” to “circumstances for which it is not suited, as it was used in

\textsuperscript{148} In this regard, the 2008 Capstone Doctrine observed that “while the members of the UN Country Team come under the overall authority of the SRSG/Head of Mission, in reality, they are governed by mandates, decision-making structures and funding arrangements that are quite distinct from those of the UN peacekeeping operation” (UN 2008: 71). Accordingly, the integration or coordination of activities could not be imposed but had to be negotiated.
BiH” (47, emphasis added) and if “no self-sustaining political solution is in sight” (46). Accordingly, Council members have to “develop [...] a common understanding of the nature of the problem” (45) and equip the operation accordingly. Notwithstanding the internal nature of conflicts, the Security Council is hence to seek, facilitate, or impose a political solution or peace that can subsequently be ‘kept’ and ‘built’ on by peacekeepers and peacebuilders. In this context, the objective of peacebuilders in the aftermath of a settlement is crucially not the resolution of conflicts, but the removal of “political or economic struggles from the battlefield and into an institutional framework where a peaceful settlement process can be engaged and future disputes can be addressed” (10).

For peacebuilders, this enables an agenda of institution building, facilitating good governance, the rule of law and other activities such as “land reform, strengthening civil society, finding ways to respect ethnic identities” (11) to “build the social, economic and political institutions and attitudes that will prevent the inevitable conflicts that every society generates from turning into violent conflicts” (11). As peace operations move towards greater levels of coordination and coercion, this conception of peacebuilding as institution building depends entirely on the prior resolution of the major fault lines of the conflict by the Security Council. In this vein, it is well worth quoting the observation of a Council representative as recounted by Annan, who “aptly noted that, if the Security Council does not deal with the causes of conflict, the UN will be reduced to dealing with the consequences of conflict, meaning that agencies ... such as the UNICEF, the UNHCR and the WFP will end up paying the consequences” (57).

As this thesis argues, in so-called hostile environments, if the Security Council succeeds in imposing a solution, this still implies a remaining challenge of garnering consent, or making peace, below the elite or government level, and, in adverse circumstances, of the latter. On the one hand, this challenge has generated attempts to accommodate more coercive elements with traditional peacekeeping principles. On the other hand, the attempt to project greater force also contributed to driving the agenda for greater coordination and integration across actors and tasks in peace support broadly conceived, including peacebuilders. Within the coordinated or integrated approaches discussed above, peacebuilders have come to be conceptualized as implementers of a political peacebuilding strategy that has been devised at headquarters. In this context, it is important to note that peacemaking, while occasionally mentioned, is not further considered as a task or objective in any of these and subsequent reports, which creates the impression that no such activities were foreseen in the context of a peace operation.
From a development perspective, the challenges arising from ‘non-cooperative’ host state governments is thoroughly reflected upon in the 2001 Supplement to the 1997 OECD-DAC Guidelines, *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict. Orientations for External Partners* (OECD 2001). Mirroring the observations of the *Brahimi Report*, the 2001 Guidelines address two principal impediments to cooperative peacebuilding as originally envisioned in the 1997 Guidelines. Firstly, the challenge to “win ... the peace” continues after the conclusion of a peace agreement, as the latter is but "one step in a peace-building process" and “often bring[s] together those individuals who provoked or maintained conflict in the first place” (OECD 2001: 53, 51). Accordingly, a peace process ought to be driven “by the protagonists' genuine commitment to peace and reconciliation” (53, emphasis added) to avoid disenchanted parties or losers from “turn[ing] into ... spoilers” (52). Secondly, the OECD-DAC now distinguishes between “situations of weak governance” with collective conflict and “situations of repressive or divisive governance” (13) with “predatory state behaviour and systems of nepotisms” (23). While reaffirming that the “political will to forge solutions, from all actors, is crucial” (23), the report acknowledges the “dilemmas ... on how, or in extreme cases whether, to engage with governments that set aside the rule of law, commit large-scale human rights abuses, target civilian populations, or foster unrest” (15). What guidelines, then, are there for discerning between these two kinds of peacebuilding contexts? And how and with whom are development agencies supposed to engage given their standard approach to partnering with governments?

On the side of solutions, as the “majority of victims of violent conflict and complex emergencies are civilians”, conventional development, peacebuilding, and reconstruction are seen to converge (37). In practice, however, like in most UN reports, there appears to be a distinction between ‘ordinary’ development in conflict settings, and those development activities that directly seek to address conflict. The report acknowledges that external aid invariably “becomes part of the political dynamic and produces political results” (24). With regard to ‘ordinary development’ activities, the report highlights the need to avoid unintended or negative impacts and to take “local perceptions” into account when ‘modifying’ development activities for peacebuilding purposes (31). While this reflects earlier suggestions regarding the ‘reorientation’ of development, what is particularly interesting here is the assumption that ‘ordinary’ development is usually premised on impartiality and the allocation of aid based on need. In this vein, the report discusses potential tensions that might arise between ‘targeting’ particular groups, such as women, and the maintenance of impartiality, or the tensions
arising between the needs-based allocation of aid versus "arithmetic allocation" for political reasons (31).

Almost all of these concerns are to be addressed through improved coordination, context-sensitivity, or research (24); in particular, the report suggests developing "universal techniques to aid judgements", mentioning a varied list of instruments such as "peace and conflict impact assessments (PCIA), strategic conflict analysis, conflict vulnerability analysis, analysis of early warning response," the greed vs. grievances assessments of the World Bank, and joint decisions by donor fora (33). While political neutrality is not explicitly mentioned as a principle for development assistance, at least some actors seem to be concerned with maintaining impartiality. In this context, the resort to "universal techniques" – apart from the omnipresent concern with generating better knowledge – also seems to provide a means of guaranteeing some measure of 'objectivity' or 'fact-based neutrality' by allowing actors to make and justify choices in terms of "universal" criteria rather than interests or preferences (31).

The second category of development activities in 'post-conflict' settings refers to activities that have an explicit peacebuilding objective as opposed to being merely 'conflict-sensitive.' The guidelines particularly focus on the following two roles for development actors: facilitating 1) peace processes, justice and reconciliation, and engaging in 2) partnerships for peace.149 In regard to peace processes, "a clear understanding of the principles of neutrality and impartiality in these politically-charged contexts is crucial" (51). Rather than cooperating exclusively with state structures following the peace agreement, donors are called upon to build the capacity of civil society and women's organisations and to support "marginalised ... segments of society" to enable them to "meaningfully participate in formal peace processes and power structures" (52, 53). In other words, the role of development actors in peace processes is to build the 'capacity' of actors for democracy and to participate in the actual peace process (56). This focus is warranted due to the "changed nature" of today's conflicts, which are "propelled at least in part by quests for self-determination or adequate recognition of communal identity rather than by ideology or extra-territorial conquest". As such, 'identity-conflicts' are seen as "persistent and intractable" and "much less amenable to compromise, negotiation and trade-offs" (56). As a result, the

149 Additional tasks include security governance, 'Countering negative economic forces', particularly the transformation and potential criminalization of so-called war economies (OECD 2001: chapter 8), 'Supporting regional cooperation and consultation' (OECD 2001: chapter 4), and 'Working with business' (ibid.: chapter 7), all of which receive considerably less attention and, with the exception of the issue of war economies, primarily repeat the general discourse of capacity building.
report argues that attempts to ‘resolve’ conflicts should be replaced by “more pragmatic [investments] in a society’s capacities to manage conflict without violence” (56). Peacebuilding as conflict management does not seek to resolve conflicts, but to avoid violence by focusing on the “internal political organisation of a state” and by creating “government systems that embody the main hallmarks of democracy and have the institutional capacity to uphold” political competition, inclusive participation, and civil and political liberties” (56).

In the 1997 Guidelines, issues of ethnic, political, religious, or otherwise defined identity were seen as widely instrumentalized by warring parties, rather than as generating conflict in their own right. In the 2001 report, while still seen to frequently “coincide” with “perceived” inequalities in the economic distribution, the ‘intractable’ nature of identity-based conflict is perceived as the major obstacle to preventing violence. This revised ontology of identity as a cause of conflict and an essential, intractable, and persistent feature of “divided societies” justifies the structural nature of the response. As identity conflicts are ‘intractable’, they cannot be resolved but at best managed within institutions. While the recommended solution, i.e. the democratisation of post-war societies, has hence not changed since the 1997 Guidelines, it no longer relies on a simple conceptualization of “structural stability” (56), but corresponds to the problem of “deeply divided societies”, which is frequently invoked throughout the report as the key challenge to peacebuilding. To this end, the report also incorporates earlier experiences in cases such as BiH by mentioning the particular forms of democracy that might have to be tailored to the ‘needs’ of ‘divided societies’: “in deeply divided societies, a combination of simple majoritarian political institutions and ‘winner take all’ elections can often make things worse, especially if there is a rush to hold elections” (56).

Development agencies and other donors are to tread with “a clear understanding of the principles of neutrality and impartiality” (51). However, in these “politically-charged contexts” (51), impartiality and neutrality are in fact understood as coherence and consistency in relation to “donors’ objectives linked to aid”, which have to be applied consistently across diverse country settings and donors so as not to undermine actors’ credibility and the confidence among parties (51). This, then, is an understanding of impartiality and neutrality that is distinct from that of ‘classical’ humanitarian organisations, as it relates to the impartial observation of agents’ objectives rather than of recipients’ needs. In the same way, the emphasis that “humanitarian assistance should not be driven by partisan or narrowly defined political concerns” primarily seeks to prevent donors from being perceived as self-interested parties (62). It is arguably this
revised conceptualization of impartiality that strongly, if not exclusively (witness the related discourse on aid effectiveness), drives the agenda for coherence and coordination across donors, which in turn enables the maintenance of this claim, particularly since the report acknowledged tensions between needs-based and political or 'peace-related' criteria for aid distribution (31). In this regard, development agents face particular challenges depending on the role of the government within the conflict.

In contrast to this traditional *modus operandi*, external actors are to establish and balance relationships with all parties (so-called 'partnerships for peace') to increase the “trust among all groups” (61). In cases of ‘weak governance’, the peacebuilders’ task is addressed in terms of building the capacity of state institutions, training staff, etc. (62). By contrast, the approach to working with “repressive” or “divisive” governments is less clear-cut. Repressive governance is described as “characterised by an oppressive and predatory role of the state in relation to society, an inability to fulfil its core functions, and involvement in internal conflict” (61). This poses obvious dilemmas for development agencies due to its “implications for donor-state and donor-civil society partnerships” (61). In ‘ordinary’ development practice, bilateral and multilateral agencies engage in target states when they have been commissioned to do so by a bilateral agreement, which usually also defines the topics and scope of cooperation.150

With the exception of international transitory administrations, development agencies and other donors would hence rely on governmental approval, particularly if their activities interact in the political sphere. While the legal aspect of donor-civil society cooperation is not further discussed here, the subsequent considerations indicate the role of coercive elements. Firstly, as before, the report restates country-analysis and research, particularly when it comes to aid conditionality or sanctions, which should be built “on a strong domestic basis for the desired policy goal”, preferably an existing peace agreement, so that “donors can condition their aid to the implementation of the agreed-upon provisions.” (62). Secondly, donors should try to partner with and support a strong civil society to “seek out ... potential change agents and structures within a state/regime since state institutions and regimes are not monolithic” (63). As this discussion shows, a peace agreement – and, presumably, in its absence the respective

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150 Interviews with Desk Officer for Cooperation Programmes, German Federal Ministry for International Cooperation and Development, August 2012 and Security and Justice Adviser, UK Stabilisation Unit, July 2012; see also Dann (2013). As emphasized by the 1992 OECD *Principles on Effective Aid* and countless subsequent documents (e.g. OECD 1997; UN 2001), host state governments are in principle in charge of their own economic and social development. Obvious exceptions are the establishment of international transitory administrations such as in Kosovo, East Timor, or Cambodia (Chesterman 2004). However, see Chandler (2006) and Duffield (2007) on the clash between principle and practice, particularly in the realm of human rights.
UN mandate – not only allows donors to condition their aid and apply sanctions, but also to chose partners and ‘change agents’ from among civil society and the government, which is inadvertently a political act and resembles the redefinition of impartiality suggested by the Brahimi Report with a view to peacekeeping.

Thirdly, and with a view to public authorities, the report distinguishes between support for “viable and legitimate state institutions” on the one hand, and for “specific governments in power” on the other (63). This is to be complemented by “consistent lobbying or advocacy work by donor countries in order to maintain political will of (sic) public opinion” (63). This raises two related issues. Supporting civil society and representatives of ‘marginalised groups’ in the case of a repressive government might arguably contribute to the persistence or re-emergence of conflict rather than to peace (narrowly defined as the absence of violence). More importantly, however, it seems doubtful to what extent development agencies will be perceived to act impartially if their assistance is coupled with direct sanctions or other forms of lobbying and coercion. While it might theoretically be possible to claim the observation of “universal standards” as discussed above, in practice this claim can hardly be upheld if this agenda includes strengthening specific “marginalised ethnic, regional or political groups” (63), which, if successful, is bound to alter the power balance and hence constitutes a political act of the first order.151

Rather than acknowledging these political implications, the issue is followed-up by a lengthy discussion of improving donor coordination, which roughly takes up one half of the entire section on ‘partnerships for peace’ and narratively links the issue back to a universally applied (i.e. coherent and coordinated) set of general “best practice” criteria, and the discussion of particular instruments and efforts that have emerged to this end. Coherence and coordination are to be increased both across the constituent parts of donor governments and amongst donors, and on the country-level through “integrated teams with expertise from development, human rights, police, humanitarian and civil administrations in tandem with local capacities” to ensure “that diplomatic initiatives dovetail with humanitarian and development strategies” (65). Standard rationales for coordinated action are greater effectiveness and the prevention of negative side effects. Beyond pragmatism, however, by seeking to universalize the “criteria of success” and

151 In this context, it is interesting to note that the tensions arising from clashes between the aid principle of “needs-based allocation”, as opposed to, for instance, “arithmetic allocation” for political (“conflict-related”) expediens, are explicitly addressed in the context of the conflict-sensitivity of development cooperation (“Integrating a conflict prevention ‘lens’”), but not with regard to more straightforward peacebuilding interventions.
making them “explicit”, specific decisions or choices are also removed from the political choices and preferences of individual donors and hence rendered ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ or, in other words, ‘impartial’ and ‘neutral’ against a universal standard/template. This is further legitimized by invoking the ‘ownership’ of local actors, for instance through tying strategic frameworks to “a country’s own Poverty Reduction Strategy”152 (66) and by including ‘conflict’ in the National Human Development Reports and UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs).

To conclude, the fundamental challenge that development agents, and particularly donors, face in conflict-affected countries is whether to place greater trust in target state governments and accept the accompanying risks, or whether to exert a higher degree of direct control. While the former position implies capacity building, dialogue, and the use of non-conditional incentives, the latter implies retaining control over funds and the use of disincentives or direct pressure, both of which are to be exerted through governments rather than development agencies (66-67). In practice, a combination of both positions is suggested, for instance by adopting “mutually agreed political benchmarks” and commissioning “high quality political analysis” to take the ‘appropriate’ decisions to “marry trust and control, and local ownership” (67). In contrast to the 1997 Guidelines, the 2001 Supplement hence narrates weak and repressive governance and the persistence of identity-based conflict as problems in their own right. On the operational level, while the promotion of democracy remains the standard response to violent conflict, this response is no longer simply tied to the notion of ‘structural stability’, but justified by the presumed “intractability” of identity-conflict, rendering “divided societies” a more complex problem than territorial and/or ideological conflict during the Cold War era. As a consequence, peacebuilding as the resolution of the ‘root causes’ of conflict is replaced by peacebuilding as conflict management, which comprises the coordinated promotion of democracy and institutions based on universal standards. As this discussion has shown, the 2001 guidelines put forth a revised and more adverse assessment of the peacebuilding challenges as often characterised by ongoing conflict, be it in relation to enforced peace agreements, ‘repressive governance’, or the changed ontology of identity-based conflict. While the main OECD-DAC approach to peacebuilding, i.e. democracy promotion, remains unchanged, the approach taken towards implementing and justifying it has

152 It is, however, a matter of controversy to what extent the IMF/World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are actually driven by the host state government rather than international organizations. To a lesser degree, the same question also arises with regard to UNDP’s National Human Development Reports (NHDR); see chapters 6 and 7 and Duffield (2007).
been changed through the coordination and coherence of donor practices through joint analysis and action, which not only allows for the harmonization of incentives and disincentives (or cooperation and pressure), but arguably even more importantly, seeks to enhance the generation of universalized criteria for engagement and intervention against which actors can uphold their claims to impartiality and neutrality.

5.4 TOWARDS AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PEACEBUILDING ‘MACHINERY’?

The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (2004), the Secretary-General’s report In Larger Freedom (2005), the UN Inventory Capacity in Peacebuilding (2006), and the creation of the ‘UN Peacebuilding Architecture’

The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change was convened by the Secretary-General prior to the 2005 UN World Summit to define a uniform view on the nature of threats and to consider the scope of ‘collective action’, in other words intergovernmental cooperation (UN 2004). The panel compiled a staggeringly long list of man-made and natural threats, with the key message driven home in virtually every paragraph being the ‘interconnectedness’ of each and every one of these. As the analysis of UN and OECD reports thus far has shown, the dilemmas of handling intra-state conflict within the constraints of the present international system had been present in all reports, albeit hardly ever explicitly acknowledged as such. By contrast, the High-Level Panel identifies the “rise of internal wars” as the main conundrum in the area of violent conflict (UN 2004: §5). This ‘rise’ is seen to result from “crises of State capacity and legitimacy” that many decolonizing states faced “by the 1980s” (§5; 2-3). While threats increasingly originate with non-state actors, the “front-line actors in dealing with all the threats … continue to be individual sovereign States” (UN 2004: Synopsis, page 11).

The High-Level Panel lays out its recommendations in two large sections that discuss collective security with regard to prevention and the use of force. In general, efforts at preventing intra-state violent conflict are seen as more difficult compared to inter-State war due to the “reluctance of Member States to see their domestic affairs internationalized” (§100). The panel notes recent drastic increases in the number of negotiated settlements that have ended civil wars, which it relates to the “leadership, opportunities for negotiation, strategic coordination, and … resources” provided by the UN (§85). By contrast, the fact that only 25 per cent of civil wars were ended through mediation is ascribed to insufficient political commitment on the part of all stakeholders (87). In response, the panel calls for “objective and impartial research”, the greater
inclusion of “local” knowledge (98, 99), and suggests equipping the DPA with greater competence on “thematic issues that recur in peace negotiations” (103). Apart from this brief discussion, the issue of peacemaking is not taken up in the sections of the report that discuss the course of action once internal violence has erupted. Once again, then, it seems that peacemaking as the most explicitly political aspect of peace intervention – and its relationship to peacebuilding – is largely absent from any consideration of ‘operational issues’. As a result, the discussion of internal conflict is approached either from the perspective of ‘developmental’ prevention or the use of force.

With a view to the scope of action “if peaceful prevention fails” (61), the panel holds that “peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict-peacebuilding in civil wars have become the operational face of the UN in international peace and security” (84, emphasis added). As noted above, due to the report’s two partite structure, both peacekeeping and peacebuilding are now discussed within the framework of the ‘Use of Force’. The fact that the panel breaks with standard accounts of UN peace support instruments is not simply a matter of semantic inconsistency or confusion. Rather, the approach chosen, i.e. dividing the discussion along the lines of ‘prevention’ and ‘force’, arguably betrays an understanding that – in varying levels of intensity – the use of force has become rather commonplace in UN peace support in intra-state conflict.

The panel justifies this move by arguing that, like peace enforcement, peacekeeping has in recent practice been equipped with a Chapter VII mandate, which is seen to reflect an acknowledgment “that even the most benign environment can turn sour” (213). Moreover, peacekeepers under Chapter VI are also authorized to use force in self-defence “and this right is widely understood to extend to the ‘defence of the mission’” (213).

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153 These competences are seen to include: “the sequencing of implementation steps, the design of monitoring arrangements, the sequencing of transitional arrangements and the design of national reconciliation mechanisms” (UN 2004: 103).

154 The extent to which peacebuilding is bound up with peacekeeping and the latter in turn with enforcement is evident in the chapter structure. Under the general heading of the use of force, there are the following two chapters: X. Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability and XI. Post-conflict peacebuilding, the latter of which is divided into ‘the role of peacekeepers’ and ‘the larger peacebuilding task’. The point could be made that ‘peacemaking’ is implied in the section on ‘preventive diplomacy and mediation’ in the second part on prevention. Nonetheless, it is entirely absent from the third part, which deals with conflicts that have already crossed the threshold from ‘cold’ to ‘hot’ conflict.

155 Consequently, the authors hold that peacekeeping is more often than not deployed with the parties’ consent, while multinational forces are usually tasked with ‘peace enforcement’ – which ex negativo implies that peacekeepers are at times deployed on a non-consensual basis (UN 2004: 210).
Within the narrative of the panel, the important distinction then appears to be that between the use of force on the ‘tactical’ as opposed to the ‘fundamental’, i.e. strategic, level from the outset of the mission. However, while the incremental expansion of peacekeepers’ use of force in ‘self-defence’ to include defence of the mission and/or mandate has effectively moved peacekeeping closer to collective security as described under Chapter VII (as reflected in contemporary terms such as Chapter VI ½ or ‘wider peacekeeping’), the key operating principles of the two remain qualitatively distinct insofar as they pursue divergent objectives, with peacekeepers seeking to work based on cooperation and consent. In this regard, the correlate of peace enforcers’ reliance on the perceived legitimacy and ‘consent’ of the international community is the perceived legitimacy and ‘consent’ among ‘local actors’ in peacekeeping. While the importance of international legitimacy is addressed by the panel, the question of legitimacy among local actors is not. However, if peacekeepers work based on international as opposed to local consent only, they are in effect enforcers rather than peacekeepers.

The discussion of peacebuilding, in turn, is divided into the “role of peacekeepers” and the “larger peacebuilding task”. Here again, the degree to which peacekeeping is seen as bound up with using force is manifest in the depiction of intra-state conflict as hampered by “daunting security dilemmas” which emanate from “spoilers, factions who see a peace agreement as inimical to their interest, power of ideology, use of violence to undermine or overthrow settlements” (222). Accordingly, the role of peacekeepers in peacebuilding is to “build confidence among former adversaries and provide security to ordinary people” and in general support peace ‘implementation’, which might notably require mediation (221). In addition to peacekeepers’ implementation activities, the “larger peacebuilding task” consists in facilitating “long-term recovery” (224), with DDR and institution building as top priorities, as the latter can “through negotiations with civil society … establish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law” (229). As such, the report’s considerations of post-conflict peacebuilding are largely restricted to establishing security, institutions, and related local capacities. Interestingly enough, these are seen as preconditions to attaining “other critical goals such as democratization, justice and development” (227). However, the panel makes one substantial contribution in the field of peacebuilding: the recommendation to establish a “single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peacebuilding, empowered to monitor and … ensure concerted action by donors, agencies, programmes and financial institutions” (225), both in terms of prevention, i.e. cases of imminent collapse or escalation and in the transit phase from war to peace (262). Alongside the Commission, the panel also
suggested the creation of a standing fund (228) and of a Peacebuilding Support Office in charge of strategy development (230).

In essence, then, in the view of the panel, intra-state violent conflict can best be prevented through economic development and improving state capacity. In the event of deteriorating internal tensions, the Peacebuilding Commission should assume a preventive role in cooperation with the national government. However, once the conflict has been escalated, peace ought to be enforced by a multinational operation and subsequently ‘kept’ by peacekeepers capable of projecting force. While the authors concede that this is not ‘traditional peacekeeping’, as discussed above, the practical operational (and strategic) implications of deploying troops for the forceful implementation of a ‘peace agreement’ are neither acknowledged nor further explored.

As this discussion has shown, the panel’s analysis and recommendations blurred traditional UN distinctions between coercive and non-coercive measures. Unsurprisingly, the Secretary-General’s follow-up report on the panel, *In Larger Freedom* (2005), sought to clarify and reinforce the traditional UN distinction, in particular regarding the use of force. Accordingly, measures aimed at “reducing the risk and the prevalence of war” (III D), such as ‘good offices’, sanctions, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and small arms and light weapons (SALW), are discussed separately from “The Use of Force” (III E). In between the two alternatives, sanctions “constitute a necessary middle ground between war and words” as they might both be applied to “produce agreements”, but can also be “combined with military pressure to weaken and isolate rebel groups or States that are in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions” (109). In the area of peacekeeping, the Secretary-General notes the contribution of peacekeepers with regard to “stabiliz[ing] zones of conflict, and in the last 15 years or so also to help countries emerge from conflict” (111). However, in line with earlier UN statements, the Secretary-General does not comment on the threshold towards using force in peacekeeping, which, while signifying a traditional understanding of consent-based peacekeeping, leaves the issue of enforcement and coercion within UN peace operations unaddressed.

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156 In regard to the use of force, the Secretary-General’s concern is with reaffirming the authority of the Security Council and generating the necessary agreement among Council members. However, the SG also argues for the inclusion of “genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity” to the list of threats to international peace and security and hence within the remit of SC action and overruling the non-interference doctrine (UN 2005: 125).
With a view to peacebuilding, the Secretary-General endorsed the creation of the PBC and of the related institutions, but championed a narrow understanding of post-conflict peacebuilding, thus excluding the panel’s focus on prevention (UN 2005: 115; see also Wyeth 2011: 6). This endorsement of the recommended UN peacebuilding infrastructure was one of the few tangible results of the 2005 World Summit (Jenkins 2013). The Secretary-General refers to earlier ‘implementation failures’, noting that "several of the most violent and tragic episodes of the 1990s occurred after the negotiation of peace agreements – for instance in Angola in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994" (UN 2005: 114). As almost "half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back", the Secretary-General concludes that "peace agreements are [to be] implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner” which requires a “UN institutional machinery” (114). The ‘challenge’ thus conceived is one of implementation, institutional machinery, and of "extend[ing] the period of political attention to post-conflict recovery" (115). This ‘political attention’ certainly comprises the question of ‘political will’ on the part of the Security Council and member states, who have repeatedly been entreated by the Secretary-General in his earlier reports to remain actively involved in peacebuilding processes.

The Peacebuilding Commission

The 2005 World Summit agreed on the establishment of the UN ‘Peacebuilding Architecture’, which was subsequently created by the Security Council, acting concurrently with the General Assembly. This architecture consists of the UN Peacebuilding Commission as an inter-governmental advisory body, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and the Peacebuilding Support Office within the UN Secretariat. In its resolution, the Council affirms the High-Level Panel’s view on the interconnectedness of state and non-state threats and emphasizes the “need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation” (SC/RES/1645: 1). The Security Council also reaffirms the central responsibility of national governments, on whose consent the involvement of the PBC depends, and urges the inclusion of women and civil society. The Commission’s three purposes are, firstly, to convene all actors, "marshal resources", and propose "integrated strategies", secondly, to sharpen the focus on “institution building”, and, thirdly, to recommend ways for increasing coordination within and beyond the UN, particularly with a view to ensuring

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the continuity of financing, learning, and policy attention (SC/RES/1645: 2). However, as is evident from the composition of the Commission, which draws from the UN’s three principal intergovernmental bodies, the key purpose appears to be the establishment of a permanent high-level inter-governmental body, i.e. a political, body whose work might enforce that of other ad hoc fora. The Commission ought to meet in ‘various configurations’, i.e. an Organizational Committee comprised of seven members each of the Security Council and of ECOSOC, five members each of the top providers of financial support and of (military and civilian) police personnel, and seven members to be elected by the General Assembly, favouring countries with post-conflict experience and country-specific fora (4, 7). The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) was established as a small department within the Secretariat, headed by an Assistant Secretary-General (ASG), to administer the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and coordinate or mainstream peacebuilding activities across the UN system.

As is evident from these provisions, in particular from the composition of the Commission as drawing on the membership of the UN’s three principal intergovernmental bodies, the establishment of the PBC reflects the belief that peacebuilding requires more intensified and permanent strategy development and coordination backed by greater political clout. Wyeth (2011) argues that in “creating the PBC, there was an explicit recognition that many of the problems plaguing peacebuilding are political ones – challenges of political will, commitment, setting priorities and holding various actors accountable for their commitments – and they require a political body to address them” (Wyeth 2011: 6). In view of earlier calls by subsequent Secretary-Generals regarding the role of member states and of the Security Council, the composition of the Commission to comprise member states with a ‘stake’ in the literal sense also demonstrates the degree to which strategy is seen as linked with and necessitating political leverage, as does the close link envisioned between the PBC, the Security Council (during the peacekeeping phase), and ECOSOC (in the transition phase). While Bellamy et al. (2010: 253) note “that its political character makes ... [the PBC] better suited to acting as a catalyst for attracting government donations for the UN’s civilian-led operations”, as an inter-governmental advisory body, the PBC does not seem to have a significant role to play in terms of coordination. Given the absence of any executive functions, Paris (2009: 74) concludes: “The challenge ... is to strike a balance between preserving the flexibility of the existing networked structure of the international peacebuilding system on the one hand, and the requirement for some measure of hierarchy on the other”, a balance, however, that does not appear to have
been struck thus far, as illustrated by subsequent UN reviews of the Commission’s work (UN 2010, 2015).

In the process of devising this new ‘peacebuilding architecture’, the Secretary-General commissioned the Deputy Secretary-General with an inventory of all peacebuilding capacities across the UN system. Once again, such capacity was rather vaguely defined as “all activities necessary to assist a conflict-torn society to reach a point where violence is no longer a ready recourse [and] the risks of relapse into conflict are reduced” (UN 2006: 2). The inventory identifies existing capacities in 25 specific sectors, grouped into four thematic areas: security and public order, justice and reconciliation, governance and participation, and socio-economic wellbeing. Apart from standard aspects such as security, humanitarian assistance, and economic and institutional recovery, “support to a political process” is considered a key peacebuilding task, thus acknowledging that peacebuilding “is first and foremost a profoundly political process” which requires a “coherent” strategic approach based on country-specific conflict analysis (2, 3). However, instead of a shared notion or framework for peabebuilding, the inventory reports conflicting views among UN bodies as to whether peacebuilding is seen as part of ‘security’, of ‘development’, or as an entirely distinct (‘transitional’) activity altogether, and notes that “crisis (combining natural disaster and conflict-related situations), ‘humanitarian,’ ‘peacekeeping,’ and ‘development’ remain the dominant conceptual frameworks and funding channels, in large part as a result of existing organizational mandates and interests” (6). Given this lack of a “well-articulated paradigm”, there is a “tendency (including in this inventory) ... to adopt a supply-view of what is needed, thereby overlooking critical areas which to date may be weakly conceptualized or ignored by the international community” (6). Not only does this observation tally well with the discussed incremental and improvised evolution of the peacebuilding field (infra ch. 4), but it also supports the explanation for the omission of the political aspects suggested in this thesis, at the very least on the level of strategies and best practices.

These critical initial observations notwithstanding, the extent to which the equation of peacebuilding with statebuilding has come to be taken for granted is not only reflected

158 Executive Office of the Secretary-General, 2006, UN Inventory Capacity in Peacebuilding.
159 The inventory was conducted based on questionnaires completed by: DESA, DPA, DPI, DPKO, FAO, ILO, OCHA, OHCHR, OLA, OSRS-CAAC, UNAIDs, UNCDF, UNDO, UNDP, UNECA, UNECLAC, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNITAR, UNLIREC, UNODC, UNOPS, UNRWA, WFP, WHO.
160 See Schneckener (2005) on the preferences of individual donors regarding the four areas.
In the terminology (3), but also evident from the long list of sectoral capacities, out of which only two or three could be argued as being specific to post-conflict situations, while the remainder are part of a bigger – and presumably developmental – state-building agenda.\(^{161}\) The implications of this distinction are probably most visible in the area of ‘Governance and Participation’: here, narrow post-conflict activities appear to be ‘Good Offices and Mediation’ (and potentially ‘Constitution Making’ and ‘Elections’), while issues such as improving public administration, local governance, financial accountability, and public information are part of a broader state-building agenda. Distinguishing between measures that are specific to a peace process and those that are not is not to claim that the latter, i.e. statebuilding activities, might not contribute to peacebuilding. Importantly, such distinctions likely also depend on – contested – views regarding the causes of violent conflict and pathways to resolving or addressing them. However, this distinction, and the attendant views on how to address violent conflict, are important precisely because they largely coincide with a fundamental difference regarding the degree to which they require peacebuilders to interact with ‘local’ actors, issues, and interests. While the former sets of activities such as good offices and mediation require interveners to engage with the conflict, its actors, and direct results, the latter class of activities often derives from a standardized agenda that is pursued in most developing countries based on the diagnosis of ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ statehood or fragility (Duffield 2001). Accordingly, the latter set of – standardized – statebuilding activities allows actors to focus on ‘capacities’ and ‘skills’ and to avoid any direct engagement with contested ‘issues’ and potentially opposing ‘actors.’

In this vein, by discussing peacebuilding through a state-building lens, the authors hold that “building national and local institutions” should be prioritized in the early ‘post-conflict’ phase to ensure that institutions not only fulfil their usual governance functions,\(^{162}\) but also specifically “address underlying causes of persistent conflict” (6). This seems to reflect the assumption that had already been voiced by the 2001 OECD-DAC guidelines and the 2001 report of the Secretary-General according to which the peacebuilders’ task is not to address or ‘resolve’, but rather to channel existing, and

\(^{161}\) For instance, in the case of ‘Security and Public Order’, Mine Action, and DDR can narrowly be defined as specific to post-conflict situations, while Security System Governance, Law Enforcement Agencies, and Defence Reform are arguably part of a broader developmental governance agenda. The same applies to the second sector, ‘Justice and Reconciliation’, where Transitional Justice is by definition a ‘post-conflict’ activity, while Judicial and Legal Reform, Corrections, and Human Rights seem to fulfil a broader purpose, and are in any case not specific to post-conflict countries (ibid.).

\(^{162}\) Basic governance functions are to ensure “the population’s safety and well-being, deliver basic services and maintain law and order” (UN 2006: 6).
purportedly ‘intractable’, conflicts into institutions that allow for the peaceful ‘management’ of future conflicts. Within the inventory, it also corresponds to the initial observation that holds “fragile and failed states” to be “major threat[s] to peace and stability”, thus requiring the UN to develop a “comprehensive approach in support for institution building and for a nationally formulated and owned peacebuilding strategy” (6). As this discussion shows, while the inventory highlights the political nature of peacebuilding, with the exception of “Good Offices and Mediation” conducted by the DPA, DPKO, and EOSG (11, 12), this stock-taking exercise does not list any political activities or capacity – presumably because it simply does not exist within the UN system at this point.

The only exception to this appear to be field missions that are supported by the DPA or DPKO as well as plans to establish a Mediation Support Unit within the DPA as a “repository for functional and thematic expertise on peacemaking” (12). In this vein, one of the ‘challenges’ that the authors identify is a “general lack of integration among UN entities involved in post-conflict reconstruction at each level: strategic planning, operational planning, and programmatic implementation.” While there seem to be a multitude of pertinent instruments, ranging from standing and ad hoc committees, UN Country Teams, Integrated Mission Task Forces, and Integrated Mission Structures to thematic Framework Teams and the IASC Cluster Network (7,8; see infra ch. 4), the authors argue that the new Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) ought to help the UN system improve its “capacity for integrated strategic planning, coherent and overarching policy and analysis, and best practice” and provide “guidelines that can cut across existing political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, and development lines” (8). On the one hand, these calls for strategy and coordination clearly bespeak the view that the activities of interveners at all levels ought to be harmonized to avoid ‘unintended side effects’, duplication, and planning gaps. On the other hand, however, as before, the entire discussion on strategy and coordination is also linked to the question of maintaining the Security Council’s and member states’ political will and a ‘unified’ vision, not only in terms of ensuring the supply of material resources, but arguably of political leverage in cases where some measure of persuasion or coercion is required to ensure the parties’ ‘compliance’.
5.5 POLITICIZING PEACEBUILDING? POST-WAR PEACEMAKING AND THE SOVEREIGNTY DILEMMA

The 2010 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, the Secretary-General’s report Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict (2009), the Secretary-General’s report on Special Political Missions (2013), and the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture

The creation of the peacebuilding architecture has so far not fulfilled earlier expectations regarding the improvement of overall strategy, coordination, and guidance (UN 2010, 2015). In particular, the PBC only works on a limited number of cases and neither the Commission nor the Support Office provide overall guidance to the degree that is for instance exerted by DPKO in relation to peacekeeping. In this regard, the first periodic review of the UN peacebuilding architecture in 2010 observed that the PBC has only played “a limited role ... so far” and disappointed expectations (UN 2010: 3, 4), both given the small number of countries on the Commission’s agenda and in terms of increasing the attention for either peacebuilding across the UN system or the links between the Commission and the political organs (8). As the reviewers observe, the “Organization is still not rising to the peacebuilding challenge”, calling for a higher level of attention among member states and the Secretariat (9). In particular, the role of the Commission is expected to ensure greater political ‘weight’ for external contributions to peacebuilding, both with a view to international political attention and vis-à-vis the political process in target countries (12, 16). As the authors hold, given the “proliferation of actors” (18) in this “crowded field” (19), “the Commission must use its political weight to seek to align the various actors behind the same overarching objectives” (16). To this end, the review contains detailed suggestions towards increasing the cooperation between the PBC and the other political organs of the UN. In regard to the so-called country specific configurations (CSC), this “requirement for weight and solidity” implies that the CSC chair should be a “respected, knowledgeable” individual, “able to inspire the confidence of key actors” (22). To the extent that this description of the CSC chairs resembles the description of the standing of the Secretary-General, it appears that the chairs are, at least at times, presumed to take over a peacemaking role. The degree to which this review is premised on peacebuilding as a political process requiring political interaction is also evident in the ‘key issues’ set down to frame the review. First, peacebuilding is described as an inherently complex process that seeks to “rebuild[...] fragile or shattered relationships” over an extended period of time (9, emphasis added). The authors emphasize that while this complexity has often been acknowledged, it has “perhaps still not [been] fully internalised” (9). Second, the review repeats that “people must own their own peace: it has to begin, grow
and become embedded in people’s minds” (9). While the importance of ‘national ownership’ has been a common trope of most peacebuilding statements, the review pointedly observes that this is not “merely desirable or politically correct; it is an imperative, an absolute essential, if peacebuilding is to take root” (10, emphasis added). Within the peace process, the role of the international community is thus seen as assisting or facilitating a local process, likened to a “midwife to a national birthing process” (10). Ownership should not be treated “as a right wrested from the international community”, but requires respective governments to “exercise the responsibilities conferred by ownership” (10). Thirdly, and following earlier statements for instance by the Brahimi Report, peace support measures should not be sequenced, but conducted in parallel and mutually coordinated. In particular, the reviewers criticize that peacebuilding “tends to be viewed as an add-on during the lifetime of the peacekeeping operation, expected to come into its own in the aftermath” (10), which also points to “a more fundamental question [of] ... the relative prioritization of peacekeeping and peacebuilding within the Organization as a whole” (28). Instead, peacebuilding “requires a parallel focus on political, security and developmental needs” (28). In this regard, the PBC is seen as tasked with supporting the “integration of political and developmental perspectives” (11) and should act as a “constant and active networker within the United Nations family”, and vis-à-vis the World Bank (32; 31).163

As this report illustrates, while the UN peacebuilding architecture, and particularly the Peacebuilding Commission as an inter-governmental (advisory) body, is seen to have failed to deliver on the high expectations originally placed on it, it could be argued that its creation and the subsequent assessments helped to trigger a more focused debate and sharpen the focus on the insufficient attention that had (or arguably has) so far been afforded the political dimension of peacebuilding processes.

This problem was acknowledged by the Secretary-General in his report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict164 (UN 2009), which observes that the “end of conflict does not necessarily mean the arrival of peace: a lack of political consensus and trust often remains and the root causes of the conflict may persist” and calls for a coordinated approach (UN 2009: 5). The likelihood of consensus is seen to depend “heavily on the conditions under which violence ceases, the quality of the peace agreement, and the nature of the peace process” (10). In this context, the Secretary-

163 Additional important dimensions are a higher emphasis on the participation of women in peacebuilding, and on linking the work of the Commission to the ‘field’, i.e. operational staff (UN 2010: 11-12).
General turns to the often-cited ‘success’ stories from the early 1990s and relates positive outcomes to the “robust and inclusive” nature of these processes, which were aided by a “detailed agenda to address the causes of conflict” and “as a result, have the support of a broad cross section of the population” (10). Regardless of whether this assessment of the earlier cases is accurate or not, it clearly bespeaks the recognition of the need to extend the peace process beyond the elite level and to continue to work on ‘root causes’, however these may be understood, beyond the conclusion of an agreement. What is more, the Secretary-General highlights that some peace processes might be “more fragile” than the cited success stories, calling for “careful political reinforcement and determined efforts by international and national actors”, particularly as the “capacity and will to exercise full national ownership may be constrained because the peace process is still ongoing” (10-11, emphasis added).

It follows that “international support in such complex and rapidly evolving situations is therefore a fundamentally political and often high-risk undertaking” (12). As a result, the Secretary-General calls for UN intergovernmental bodies, member states, and the Security Council to “play[...] an essential role in signalling strong international attention and support”, for instance by authorizing “new peacekeeping operations, special political missions, [and] panels of experts” (14). With such strong political ‘backing’, the priorities of peacebuilders are redefined as “establishing security, building confidence in a political process, delivering initial peace dividends and expanding core national capacity” (15). The support to political processes comprises elections, promoting inclusive dialogue, and reconciliation and conflict-management capacity at all levels. This is crucially seen as a task that is distinct from the restoration of governance/’core government functions’ (17). What is interesting and indeed innovative in this depiction is firstly the extent to which political tasks and in fact negotiation, i.e. peacemaking, are considered as part of a peacebuilding process. Secondly, the ‘protection of civilians’, which has so far been discussed separately or in relation to peacekeeping (Brooks 2014) is now seen as part of peacebuilding, although it often requires the use of force, particularly in cases where the expulsion or killing of civilian populations constitutes a part of the ‘war aims’ of any one party (UN 1995; UN 1998; UN 2000). Thirdly, the previous focus on delivering ‘basic services’ and economic recovery is still seen as part of peacebuilding, albeit not its primary focus, and is reconceptualised as ensuring ‘peace dividends’ with a view to garnering the support and confidence of the overall population (UN 2009: 18). In sum, the entire discussion of peacebuilding is based on frequent reiterations of the ‘complex’ and ‘fluid’ nature of most peacebuilding environments,
which is firstly linked to strong and explicit calls for political leadership and authority at headquarters and mission levels. Secondly, there is a new and strong emphasis on “political negotiation and mediation” after the conclusion of the peace agreement, i.e. in what was previously thought of as the ‘implementation phase’ (UN 2009: 31). In other words, what had so far been cloaked in the language of integration and strategy is more fully detailed in the 2009 report as the need to “establish a dynamic link” between the “political, peacekeeping and development elements of the UN country presence” and the “political process” at large (31, 33).

For international peacebuilders, this is seen to require ever higher degrees of coordination and integration of all efforts and a greater degree of flexibility to be able to adapt to changing conditions (22). While the Secretary-General acknowledges the disparities among peacebuilders in terms of their “different mandates, guiding principles, governance structures and financing arrangements – and different cultures and notions of how things should be done” (24), these are primarily seen as impediments to ‘effective’ peacebuilding action that inadvertently need to be overcome. As with the earlier UN statements, it could be argued that this call for overcoming differences in mandates and roles ignores the different mandates and roles of these actors that derive from their earlier communities of practice. However, in contrast to earlier formulations of this by now standard claim for greater coordination and coherence, in 2009, it was linked with a recognition that the UN ought to assume a more pro-active role in generating the “fundamental political conditions” for cooperative peacebuilding, particularly the “political will and commitment on the part of national actors” (93). Having previously and repeatedly acknowledged that this commitment is often insufficient, the attention to improving and extending the UN’s negotiation and mediation, i.e. peacemaking capacities, was manifest in a number of innovations within the Secretariat. Notable examples of reforms to strengthen the Department of Political Affairs (UN 2013) include the establishment of the UN Peacemaker Database and the commencement of a series of (the first ever) peacemaking and mediation best practices reports and tools, which ended the curious absence of peacemaking from the organization’s practical reasoning on ‘post-conflict’ peace support. In sum, then, in

165 In this regard, the UN and the World Bank have recently revised the ‘Peace and Conflict Needs Assessment’ methodology to “reflect political and security dimensions and to enable more effective engagement with political and security actors” (UN 2009: 42).

166 For instance the UN Guidance on Effective Mediation (<http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN%20Guidance%20for%>}

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2009, the Secretary-General sought a closer integration of peacebuilding into a political process. While the divergent and ‘adverse’ mandates of several peacebuilding agencies are not discussed in detail, the Secretary-General could be argued to address this problem by combining calls for greater integration with suggestions regarding a stronger post-conflict peacemaking role for the UN. In other words, what sets this report apart from earlier UN documents is the focus on mediation and negotiation as part of a peace operation in the so-called ‘post-conflict’ phase.

Reflecting the emergence of peacemaking within the peacebuilding or wider UN peace support field, in 2013 the General Assembly commissioned the Secretary-General to report on the organization’s political missions (UN 2013). Special political missions are defined as “UN civilian missions that are deployed for a limited duration to support member states in good offices, conflict prevention, peace making, and peacebuilding” and fall into one of three categories: special envoys, sanctions panels and monitoring groups, and field-based missions (UN 2013: 2). In stark contrast to all earlier UN and OECD documents discussed so far, this report starts from the premise that “at the heart of conflict, more often than not, are political issues” (2). According to the Secretary-General, if UN deployments seek to prevent and resolve conflict and help “member states and parties to a conflict to build a sustainable peace …. this core function …. defines these missions as ‘political’” (7). Based on this report, it is not possible to discern to what extent such special political missions are distinct from peacebuilding deployments. The Secretary-General describes this type of mission as a “critical peacebuilding tool of the UN” that is increasingly used in several, but not all, of the countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (9). Regardless of the somewhat blurry delineation between types of missions or terminology, i.e. peacebuilding deployments and special political missions, within the report, the Secretary-General’s discussion clearly illustrates the increased attention to peacemaking activities in the aftermath of peace agreements. In this vein, the report observes the “increased recognition that elections are not isolated, technical events but rather part of a continuum of political dynamics and processes”, which ought to be interlinked with activities such as reconciliation, mediation, facilitation, maintaining political dialogues, and other good offices functions (14). Importantly, these are to be conducted beyond the peace agreement and beyond the national elite/capitals to “enable liaison with a broader spectrum of the population” (14). To this end, “specialized expertise” is being
developed within departments such as the DPKO (Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions), the DPA with regard to mediation, and within the UNDP, all of which are defined as "key service providers" (13). As this formulation indicates, the reasoning that underlies the Secretary-General's report seeks to strike a balance between a greater political involvement of peacebuilders by combining a higher emphasis on political processes with the maintenance of the implementing or 'service provider role' of institutions such as the UNDP, all of which continue to be premised on the role of agencies as working “in support of national peacebuilding priorities”, and hence with a cooperative government.

As the 2010 review on the Peacebuilding Commission and the Secretary-General’s report special political missions illustrate, while the practical reasoning on peacebuilding best practices had previously been dominated by largely developmental and structural notions on addressing violent conflict, the focus of the debate has gradually shifted towards political negotiation and mediation, i.e. peacemaking in the post-settlement phase. In recent months, the practical reasoning within the UN and international community appears to have come full circle in regard to acknowledging the fundamental dilemma of intra-state peacebuilding in ‘non-cooperative’ environments and discussing it on the level of intergovernmental cooperation as opposed to a problem of implementing agencies. In parallel with the 2015 Review of UN Peace Operations (UN 2015a), the Secretary-General established an Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (UN 2015). Many of the criticisms, observations, and recommendations reflect standard tropes, such as the need for coordination, the complexity of conflict, or challenges in regard to financing and timing (UN 2015: 7). However, this review takes the concern with integration and coordination further by explicitly acknowledging what seems to be at the same time a central conundrum to ‘successful’ peacebuilding and the source of its persistent depoliticization, and moving the discussion on coordination to the inter-governmental level. In other words, the review focuses on the fundamental structural dilemma that exists between the UN as a state-based organization and the delimitations this implies for the organization’s scope of action in intra-state conflict. As such, the calls for integration and coordination of development, human rights, and peace and security are less concerned with the agendas of various implementing agencies, but directly target the compartmentalization or "silos" that “divide[...] responsibility between the principal intergovernmental Organs” as the root of the problem (26).
In particular, while a renewed increase in civil wars, authoritarianism, extremist movements, ideologies, and violent extremism are listed as new or intensified challenges, the major challenge for international peacebuilders derives from “weak leadership and governance ... fragile institutions, ... corruption, compounded by the muzzling of political dissent and the media” in target states (14): “Not content to see their authority come to an end, some national leaders ... have abetted the promulgation of self-serving legislation or controversial constitutional amendments ... The politics of exclusion provides a related set of conflict drivers. One or another set of ethnic, religious or tribal interests dominates power to the exclusion of others. Minorities are oppressed” (14). Such abuses are reported as linked to economic and environmental issues and other “structural drivers of conflict” (15), but the root driver of all such problems are the power politics of “the same narrow political class that jockeyed for power during the violence” (19) and often retain their positions of power in the peacebuilding process. Accordingly, the challenge thus conceived derives from the postulates of respecting national ownership on the one hand, and the often problematic role of host state governments in “divided post-conflict societies” on the other (21):

The fracturing and loss of credibility in central authority in such contexts are increasingly leading to a profound dilemma. Independent sovereign nation states are the building blocks of the international order, and of the UN in particular. Member States therefore naturally incline towards a predominant international paradigm of re-creating strong, centralized authority. However, in a context of fragmentation, it is possible that an attempt to rebuild or extend central authority could lead not to peace but to deepening conflict. In such cases, new approaches need to be found, which understand peacebuilding at least in its early phases, as having more to do with strengthening local domains of governance than trying to re-establish strong central authority. (UN 2015: 16)

Within the practical reasoning on peacebuilding at the UN and wider international community, this summary is the most straightforward acknowledgment of the fundamental dilemma that arguably lies at the root of the depoliticization of peacebuilding practice in intra-state conflict. This observation also points to the contested role of the Security Council in peacebuilding: despite a number of complex multidimensional operations that have been mandated by the Council in the past decade, “unfortunately, the Security Council is not always understood as a key peacebuilding actor” (27). Against this backdrop, the report calls for a stronger “collective resolve to deal with peacebuilding in a more comprehensive and determined way” (11) to overcome the fragmentation of the UN into separate ‘silos’” (7), which hinders “coherence at the intergovernmental level” (8). The role of the Peacebuilding Commission in this ought to be that of an “advisory bridge between the
intergovernmental organs”, tying the General Assembly and ECOSOC to a “deepened commitment from the main intergovernmental peacebuilding actor, the Security Council” (8, emphasis added). As discussed in the previous chapter on the emergence of peacebuilding (ch. 4), already in the context of the discussion of the Agenda for Peace and its Supplement in the early to mid-1990s, representatives of states from developing nations, China, and India in particular had warned of Security Council intrusion in the domestic affairs of states in the context of peacebuilding and peacekeeping reform. In other words, the authors admit that “there are no easy solutions to this conundrum, since the UN is made up of the Governments representing member states” (21).

Accordingly, the most important contribution of this review, not only in the context of the present argument, is the acknowledgment of the dilemma that arises for intergovernmental and other external actors with regard to building peace in intra-state conflict. At the operational level, the sovereignty dilemma and the call for a unified sense of purpose and (intergovernmental) political leadership is mirrored by the call for greater “authority and capacities of UN leaders on the ground” (9), which once again is tied to an emphasis that “while capacity building, state building, institution building and development all demand considerable technical expertise, first and foremost peacebuilding must be understood as an inherently political process” (13). Beyond the bridge-building role that the Peacebuilding Commission ought to play between the Security Council and General Assembly and ECOSOC, the review develops a number of practical peacebuilding recommendations, most of which combine standard reasoning on peacebuilding approaches, such as institutions, prevention, governance, and extended resources and time lines with the attempt to transcend the inherent state-bias of the UN and most international actors, arguing that peace can neither be “imposed from outside, [nor] ... simply be imposed by domestic elites or authoritarian governments on fractious populations” but needs to “emerge organically from within society” (19). In this vein, the increased focus on peacemaking in the post-settlement phase is coupled with a stronger emphasis on grassroots processes and dialogue that ought to be conducted independent of the timelines of UN operations and development agencies (18). In addition, while the review maintains the focus on institutions and governance, it acknowledges that the development of “legitimate institutions that can help prevent relapse takes a generation” (18) and recommends reviewing the kinds of institutions to be built in particular societies, quoting recent suggestions by the G7+ initiative of conflict-affected and post-conflict states that have “advocated for five key
sectors of priority peacebuilding intervention: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services” (17).

It remains to be seen to what extent such suggestions will or can be adopted by the UN and its member states, both with regard to bureaucratic practices that run counter to lengthy timelines, overcoming the inherent state-bias, or attaining the hoped-for degree of cooperation between intergovernmental bodies in adopting a 'coordinated' role in peacebuilding. Nonetheless, the review’s most significant contribution in the present context is its simple and clear acknowledgment of the tensions between external actors – both of an intergovernmental or bilateral nature – and the challenges of addressing intra-state conflict in which the respective government is a party to the conflict. This acknowledgment allows the authors to not only repeat the call for greater political coherence or coordination, but to significantly remove this discussion from the level of the 'implementing' agencies of the UN to the level of its intergovernmental organs. Thus conceived, the problem is not simply one of improving coordination across the different operational units of the UN system in a given country (such as political missions, Resident Coordinators, UN Country Teams, and peacekeeping operations) through various strategies and steering groups (25), but of developing intergovernmental consensus as to “what situations meet the criterion of ‘threats to international peace and security’” and hence of the respective roles of the Security Council and of other intergovernmental bodies in peacebuilding (25).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has traced the transformation of the practical reasoning on peacebuilding best practices at the level of the peacebuilding field in the past two decades in relation to the persistence of conflict and opposition in peacebuilding contexts. As argued in the introduction, the analysis has substantiated the claim that the evolution of peacebuilding background knowledge or doxa has flown from rather than preceded practice. In this regard, there is a strong tendency throughout the reports to define peacebuilding in terms of its objectives ('sustainable peace', 'long-term development') or by listing available capacities, rather than by linking the one to the other or developing any kind of strategic approach grounded in a consideration of the causes of conflict. Secondly, a considerable portion of those activities seem to derive from the standard project portfolio of development agencies in particular, regardless of whether these
pursue a specific ‘post-conflict’ or peacebuilding purpose. This mode of development has likely reinforced the strong conceptual interactions between peacebuilding on the one hand and development cooperation on the other. As a result, new approaches were adopted into the peacebuilding agenda when they matched the scope of action of such agencies. For instance, while the peacebuilding agenda quickly moved from the overarching goal of holding ‘free and fair’ elections to a broader focus on institution building and governance in the late 1990s, the recognition that peacebuilding requires a higher degree of political interaction and peacemaking only translated into concrete suggestions towards the end of the studied period.

The analysis has yielded five distinct phases of peacebuilding reasoning that differ in regard to their take on the political dimension of peacebuilding. To be precise, throughout the studied period, peacebuilding actors have consistently acknowledged that peacebuilding is a political process. However, in the initial stages, the role of peacebuilding agencies, and of the UN and wider international community, was expected to comprise the implementation of previously agreed terms. To the extent that peacebuilders encountered obstruction to their implementation efforts, i.e. so-called ‘hostile environments’, their practical reasoning first turned towards attempts to enhance strategic coordination, for instance through so-called Strategic Peacebuilding Frameworks, and subsequently adopted the revised notion of impartiality and consent that had been suggested by the Brahimi Report. These attempts at projecting a legitimate and coherent front vis-à-vis ‘non-cooperative’ governments and parties through integrated deployments subsequently led to the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission as an inter-governmental advisory body. What all these mechanisms, i.e. the adoption of strategic frameworks, integrated operations, and subsequently of an inter-governmental body, have in common is that they seek to attain legitimacy by creating a universally accepted baseline, both in regard to overall peacebuilding norms and in regard to the strategic frameworks or country specific configurations of the PBC for individual country settings. However, as the discussion of recent developments within the UN and particularly the Secretariat has shown, the ‘peacebuilding machinery’ has so far failed to deliver on its promises regarding an increased role of inter-governmental actors in peacebuilding. As the discussion of reviews of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture has shown, in recent years the practical reasoning on peacebuilding has hence begun to turn to the contributions of peacemaking, i.e. mediation and negotiation, and hence of the engagement with political issues and agents in post-conflict states both beyond the conclusion of a peace agreement and beyond the
elite levels. While this is not to claim that limitations of intergovernmental and external non-political actors in intra-state peacebuilding have been resolved, or are indeed resolvable, it seems that the most recent reviews in particular have significantly contributed to clarifying the nature of this foundational dilemma.
Analysts who discuss the depoliticization and decontextualization of peacebuilding practices often hold that international agencies address violent conflict based on standardized approaches that are strongly influenced by bureaucratic practices, normative or theoretical commitments, and generalized beliefs as to what peacebuilders ought or ought not do (see infra, chapter 2). As I have argued, while these arguments contribute to understanding the habitualization of particular practices, they neither explain why peacebuilding should have emerged as a depoliticized practice in the first place, nor do they provide an answer to the puzzle as to why depoliticization has persisted despite internal and external criticisms. Against this backdrop, the present chapter studies the foundational dilemma that arose between the institutional mandates and practices of peacebuilding agencies and the political nature of challenges in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As I will show, when trying to grapple with the persistence of political contestation, these obstacles prompted peacebuilding agents to revise their approaches in ever new, but consistently depoliticized ways.

The peacebuilding deployment Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the earliest and most comprehensive international endeavours. Accordingly, when peacebuilders initially deployed to the country to ‘implement’ the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement, peacebuilding as an international practice was still very much in its infancy. In fact, many specialized research facilities and implementing agencies dedicated to peacebuilding and conflict resolution were only established as a direct response to the wars in the Former Yugoslavia and the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Ramsbotham et al. 2011). While the violent break-up of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the Bosnian war (1992-1995) had commenced at a time of international optimism regarding the scope for peaceful international cooperation and the collaborative resolution of violent conflicts, there was as yet no comprehensive strategy or doctrine with regard to peacebuilding as a field of expertise distinct from more
traditional forms of multilateral intervention, such as peacekeeping on the one hand and developmental activities on the other (Smith 2004; Barnett et al. 2007).

Against this backdrop, this chapter analyses the making of peacebuilding as a new international practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the initial decade after the conclusion of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). The GFAP, negotiated in November 1995 at Dayton, Ohio, and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 by the presidents of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, ended three and a half years of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement was only concluded thanks to considerable external pressure and foresaw the creation of two entities, the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) within a weak central state. As several observers have pointed out, the new state was not only characterised by multiple power-sharing arrangements among the three main ethnic groups, but, owing to the considerable influence of the international community in Bosnia's post-war governance, it has effectively been rendered a ‘de facto’ or ‘semi’ protectorate (Bieber 2006; Shoup 2001). In this regard, Annex 10 of the Dayton Accords foresaw the appointment of a High Representative as the final authority in theatre with regard to the civilian implementation of the agreement and the interpretation of its terms (see below, 6.2). In addition, almost all of the substantial provisions of the GFAP listed an international organisation in charge of ‘aiding’ the implementation of said terms, many of which left considerable room for interpretation (Haynes 2008).

By the time the first international peacebuilders arrived in the country in late 1995, an intense three-and-a-half year process of political, academic, and journalistic deliberation regarding the causes of the conflict and the responsibilities of the international community therein had been conducted. For this reason, the practical reasoning of post-war peacebuilders has to be situated within the wider international discourse on Bosnia, particularly the international, largely Western, foreign policy debate on responsibilities, intervention, and the attendant narratives and paradigms that emerged with a view to explaining the war. This discussion leads to a brief overview of the major stipulations set forth by the Dayton Accords and of the controversy that surrounded its major provisions. The main part of the analysis then reconstructs the peacebuilding field in Bosnia and Herzegovina and traces the narratives and practical reasoning that have accompanied and manifested the evolution of peacebuilding practices. In view of the multitude and interconnectedness of peacebuilders (see chapter 3), I will first sketch out the ‘executive level’ of the peacebuilding field and its complex sources of authority, before turning to an in-depth assessment of the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and the UK Department for International Development (DfID). The mission of the UNDP to BiH commenced in spring 1997 and continues to implement a broad range of reconstruction and peacebuilding projects that cover all aspects of society. While traditionally an agency purely focused on development, as of 2000, the UNDP also began to devise explicit strategies and approaches to ‘post-conflict development’ and conflict resolution, including the creation of the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (BCPR) in 2001. DfID, by contrast, is a bilateral development agency with a strong and increasing focus on conflict prevention (Smith 2004; Wilde 2006) and a unique degree of cooperation on peace- and conflict-related issues with additional British government bodies. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, DfID initially provided emergency and humanitarian aid through international relief agencies from 1993 to 1996 (DfID 2004: 31) and subsequently participated in the reconstruction and development efforts through multi- and bilateral channels.

The analysis of the executive level of the peacebuilding field shows the extent to which peacebuilders in Bosnia and Herzegovina have continuously sought to address political obstruction and opposition, more often than not seeking to implement the Dayton Accords against rather than in cooperation with some of the parties. In particular, the High Representative and Peace Implementation Council (PIC), as the forum of donors and custodians of the peace settlement, assumed a clearly political and increasingly coercive role within the peace process. Below the executive level, the analysis of the practical reasoning of the UNDP and DfID that have accompanied their peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1995 to 2005 demonstrates the extent to which persistent (political) opposition and obstruction prompted both agencies to adjust their practices in such a way as to enable them to proceed with their commissioned/mandated tasks while at the same time avoiding any direct engagement with the sources, motives, and authors of said obstruction. As I will argue, in this regard, the Dayton Accords provided both an obstacle and a handmaiden to international peacebuilding in BiH, as it at once came to be seen as the foremost obstacle to reconciliation and the creation of a viable central state, but at the same time legitimized international intervention and provided the central frame of reference that enabled peacebuilders of various ilks, from the Security Council and the High Representative down to various multilateral and bilateral agencies, to uphold their claim to impartiality, albeit with varying degrees of success.
6.1 THE BOSNIAN WAR AND FOREIGN POLICY RESPONSES IN NARRATIVE CONTEXT

The Bosnian war generated an abundance of texts and statements by policy-makers, academics, journalists, and other observers. In recent years, several authors have conducted meta-analysis on these discourses to emphasize the ways in which policy makers, and to some extent academics, journalists, and other observers, discursively constructed the Bosnian war in relation to their own preferred policy choices, interests, and identities (Campbell 1997; Crawford and Lipschutz 1997; Chandler 2000, 2006; Hansen 2006). In drawing on this research, the following section serves two purposes: first, to identify the explanatory paradigms that were available to prospective peacebuilders at the end of the Bosnian war and, second, to trace the ways in which these paradigms were linked to particular courses of action.

Most observers contend that neither major Western powers nor Russia considered any of its vital interests at stake in the early stages of the Yugoslav wars (Rupnik 2007). Following the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia had once again been relegated to the European periphery. Although the European Community initially took the lead in the international diplomatic effort to contain the wars, it failed to develop a unified position and relied on the US government for direction. In the early stages of the collapse of the former Yugoslav state, the position of the US government and most European governments, particularly the French and British ones, was to retain the status quo, i.e. a strong commitment to federalism and the preservation of the Yugoslav state and the rejection of nationhood in the Yugoslav republics (Oeter 2007: 490). In the case of the US government, this position was as much based on the reluctance to be drawn into a seemingly futile conflict in which all parties seemed at fault, if to varying degrees, as well as on the condemnation of nationalism of all sorts (Letica 1997: 165). As an analysis of statements by US Presidents Bush Sr. and Clinton shows, rhetorically, the insistence on the alleged ‘ancient’ historic roots of the conflict as well as the essentialist and depoliticized view of ‘Balkan’ ethnic identities as ‘barbarous’ and ‘savage’ clearly circumscribed the scope of action for any international engagement (Guarino 2008: 70-

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168 Alongside the US, the British position was particularly significant, as British negotiators represented the European Union at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). Throughout most of the war, British foreign policy refused anti-Serb coercion, such as Clinton’s ‘lift and strike’ approach. This position was partly justified with the presence of British (and French) ground troops in Bosnia. In addition, however, this position has been linked to pro-Serbian views as well as to a misreading of the conflict as predominantly a Croat-Serb nationalist competition in the case of the British foreign policy-making elites (Conversi 1997; Rupnik 2007: 467).
and provided a rationalization of the events in such a way as to preclude direct intervention. Instead, the most desirable course of action remained the facilitation of a “negotiated settlement” (Cushman and Mestrovic 1997: 21; Letica 1997: 165). The Russian government, in turn, despite its historical alliance with Serbia, initially did not actively promote a particular vision with regard to the future of the former Yugoslav territories and, owing not least to internal turmoil, would have lacked the capacity and political will to enforce it (Rupnik 2007: 469).

In the absence of major power interest, what discussion there was regarding international intervention in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was strongly grounded in moral or normative terms, especially as first reports about widespread atrocities and concentration camps were published in Western media (Hansen 2006: 117). Based on a comprehensive analysis of Western, particularly US and British foreign policy discourses during the Bosnian war, Hansen (2006) identifies two fundamental basic discourses that constituted the debate: the Balkan discourse and the Genocide discourse. While the Balkan discourse constructs ‘the Balkan’ as radically different, characterised by ethnic conflict and mutual hostility, the Genocide discourse discerns between victims and aggressors and hence implies a clear political stance vis-à-vis the parties. As Hansen (2006) shows, both discourses existed in several variants and were subject to modifications that drew on competing causal narratives to explain the violent collapse of the Yugoslav state (Kaldor 2003; Rupnik 2007). While drawing on a wealth of literary, journalistic, and academic sources that informed these discourses, the main thrust of Hansen’s argument is that policy makers constructed the Self and the Balkan Other in such a way as to justify or rationalize their preferred courses of action. This does not imply a causal relationship between ex ante interests and ex post rationalizations; rather, Hansen’s analysis explicitly argues that actors’ identity and interest, on the one hand, and foreign policy, on the other, are co-constituted.169

The Balkan discourse

In this discourse, there is no distinction between the warring parties (Hansen 2006: 106-110). Instead, Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims are for the most part equally held

169 Despite Hansen’s emphasis on co-constitution, the interests of actors implicitly seem to be given preference over other factors. For instance, in her discussion of the modification of President Clinton’s discourse following the failure of his lift-and-strike policy and the Vance-Owen-Peace-Plan, the discourse is shown to alter following the failure of these plans. Likewise, in the case of the US, the Genocide and Balkan discourses converge on the largely uncontested exclusion of the deployment of US ground troops (Hansen 2006: 136).
responsible for an intractable conflict that is consequently beyond the scope of action and responsibility of Western governments. Hansen also discusses the ‘civilizational’ or modernization aspect within the foreign policy discourse and identifies it as one, largely historical, component of the Balkan discourse, according to which ‘ethnic violence’ in the Balkan states is seen as a temporal condition, i.e. it is not seen as due to the essentially ‘flawed nature’ of the Balkan peoples, but related to a lack of progress and modernization (Hansen 2006: 102). In its ‘humanitarian variant’, the Balkan discourse distinguishes between manipulative leaders on the one hand and innocent civilians as victims of an ethno-national project on the other, but eschews taking sides by avoiding discerning between the groups. Consequently, in line with this discourse, the only viable course of action and responsibility of external actors is the provision of humanitarian assistance.

The Genocide discourse

Conversely, the so-called Genocide discourse locates the responsibility for the war with the aggressive expansionism of the Bosnian Serb (and Serbian) leadership (Hansen 2006: 111-114). In this discourse, the Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak, and to a lesser extent the Bosnian Croat, leadership and population are by no means equal ‘partners in crime’, as in the Balkan discourse, but victims of genocide. Accordingly, this discourse formulates a strong moral (and arguably legal) claim regarding the responsibility of external parties to act. Importantly, unlike the ‘Balkan’ discourse, the Genocide discourse is evidently incompatible with impartiality and political neutrality vis-à-vis the parties, as it discerns between victims and aggressors.

Hansen’s definition of the Balkan discourse ties in with the metaphor of the ‘boiling pot’ or alternatively ‘freezer’, which was employed by several authors to describe the relative stability under authoritarian communist rule. The former was seen to have suppressed ethno-national or religious identities and competition. According to this narrative, following the death of Tito in 1980, economic downturn, and regional destabilization, these barely suppressed competitions resurfaced all the more powerfully and sparked violent conflict. However, the boiling pot paradigm exhibits significant variation regarding the assumed causes of ethnic competition. On the extreme side of the spectrum, an essentialist view held ‘Balkan identities’ to be characterised by ‘ancient’ (i.e. pre-historic) ethnic hatreds that thrived on the presumed passionate or brutal nature of Balkan peoples and whose origins were either irrelevant
or could no longer be fathomed (Kaplan 1993; Kennan 1993; as well as the causal explanation in Huntington 1993, see Hansen 2006). In this context, the ‘Balkan’ terminology often carries a heavily pejorative meaning to depict a historically and culturally determined antagonism among the constituent parts of the former Yugoslav state (Ramet 2006; Todorova 1997). In sum, ‘ethnic hatred’ as a Balkan characteristic was simply taken as a given. By contrast, the neo-realist position explained ethno-national competition as a result of regional destabilization and an ensuing security dilemma among Balkan peoples (Mearsheimer 1993).

In contrast to the ‘boiling pot’ theory, an alternative reading saw the wars as a consequence of purportedly belated economic and political modernization and nation building within the Balkan region (Rupnik 2007: 465). Commenting on contemporary analyses of the Bosnian war, particularly Woodward’s 1995 Balkan Tragedy, Chandler (2000: 31) observes that the war was “seen as the direct result of the mismatch between Bosnian ethnic culture and liberal democracy”, believed to have enabled nationalist leaders to manipulate said ancient ethnic hatreds for their nationalistic projects. As Chandler (2000: 28-31) argues, this view was not only prevalent among US foreign policy makers, but also among prominent political scientists, and helped pave the way for the sustained democratization efforts in the aftermath of the Dayton Peace Accords. In a similar vein, Kaldor (2003: 33-34) argues that the early US and German readings saw the conflict within the framework of the Cold War as a struggle for liberalisation and democrationisation against former Belgrade-based communist elites headed by Milošević. While identifying competing causal mechanisms and placing varying degrees of emphasis on the country’s socialist past and ongoing transition, such theories of belated or reluctant modernization and democratization are based on the same normative premises regarding the desirable and progressive development of European societies towards liberal democracy and the role that civil society (or, in earlier versions, the middle classes) ought to play in the process to ensure its sustainability.

As Chandler claims, within this framework, ‘ethnic division’ is constructed as the antipode to liberal and democratic civil society (Chandler 2000: 31).

In Western Europe, the theory of belated modernization was not exclusive to the German government (Rupnik 2007). However, the latter differed from other European governments by its greater willingness to acknowledge the conflicts as legitimate quests

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170 In addition to Rupnik (2007) and Kaldor (2003), this summary is largely based on chapters 6, 8, and 9 in Hansen (2006).

171 For a recent theory-driven exposition of this view, see Ramet (2006).
for national self-determination. Since July 1991, the German government had pressured the EC into the early recognition of the new republics of Slovenia and Croatia. This stance has been linked to the recent re-unification of the country following the very same logic of national self-determination (Rupnik 2007: 466). It followed the assumption that the international recognition of the secessionist republics would delegitimize the war by turning it from a civil war into a war of aggression against an internationally recognized sovereign state. In the case of Bosnia, this assumption was disproved following the Bosnian referendum and declaration of independence in spring 1992 and the subsequent outbreak of fighting (Rupnik 2007; Siani-Davies 2003: 17-8).

As this discussion shows, it could be argued that the theory of belated modernization is not necessarily distinct from the ethnic paradigms of the ‘boiling pot’ theory, as it is sometimes based on a view of the different Balkan identities as pre-modern or anachronistic. In effect, in the case of most foreign policy-making establishments, these explanatory paradigms and the basic discourses identified by Hansen (2006) were adopted, combined, and blended in line with actors’ preferences and beliefs to form particular understandings of the situation in Bosnia. An illustrative and well-studied example of this process is the changing position of the US government (Campbell 1997; Guarino 2008; Hansen 2006). During his presidential campaign in 1992, Clinton had advocated a ‘lift-and-strike’ policy, i.e. the removal of the arms embargo against the Bosniak side coupled with air strikes against Bosnian Serb and Serb forces, which clearly bespoke a view of Serb aggression; however, this failed to garner the support from European governments. At the same time, for Clinton, as for his predecessor, the deployment of ground combat troops was clearly ruled out. Accordingly the Clinton administration abandoned its clear ‘anti-Serb’ stance and adopted a view of the Bosnian war as a ‘Balkan’ conflict fuelled by ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’, in which each side was equally to blame and an understanding between the parties could not be enforced from the outside. It was only during the Dayton negotiations that Clinton altered his rhetoric, invoking the ‘multi-ethnic’ history and culture of the Bosnian peoples. As Hansen argues, this "vacillation" between two different discourses, the Balkan discourse and the Genocide discourse, was linked to the unwillingness to deploy ground troops and the impossibility to enforce Clinton’s earlier ‘lift-and-strike’ policy against the will of European governments, who professedly neither believed in the effectiveness of air strikes, nor wanted their peacekeepers put at risk during such a campaign (Hansen 2006: 136-140).
According to Hansen, the European discourse of humanitarianism rested on a construction of ‘civilian victims’ as juxtaposed to the ‘warring parties’, regardless of their political stance or ethnicity. These civilian victims of the humanitarian discourse within the Balkan logic are hence different from specific Bosniak or Muslim victims of Serb aggression (and/or ‘ethnic cleansing’) (Hansen 2006: 125-128). By contrast, in the Western media and parts of the US opposition in Congress, the so-called Genocide discourse (Hansen 2006), i.e. the narrative of the war in Bosnia as a war of Serb aggression and ‘ethnic cleansing’ against a multicultural Bosnian society, remained prominent throughout the war. However, it only gained a strong footing among policymakers following the Kosovo war and the subsequent NATO campaign against Serbia in 1998/9 (Sianidavies 2003). Overall, the reaction of most Western governments and of the United Nations was characterized by a statist outlook and, as Woodward (1995: 320) put it, resulted in a policy of “containment with charity.” For most of the Bosnian war, international involvement was predominantly concerned with devising a series of abortive peace plans, the only successful exception to which was the Washington Agreement, which ended the Croat-Bosnian “war within the war” in March 1994 (Ivankovic and Melcic 2007: 415). The picture only changed following the massacre of Srebrenica and the mortar attack on the Sarajevo market in July and August 1995. Under US and French pressure, the UN relocated their troops to prevent Serb retaliation and NATO eventually launched Operation Deliberate Force, an intense series of air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces. Simultaneously, US chief negotiator Richard Holbrooke, together with Carl Bildt, prepared negotiations at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, which were in no small part facilitated by recent Croat successes against Croatian Serb forces and unexpected advances by Bosnian forces in Bosnia (Burg and Shoup 2000; Burg 2001).

Following Hansen's propositions on the co-constitution of identity and policy, among the discourses on the Bosnian war identified thus far, impartial peacebuilders in post-war BiH are most likely to adopt the civilizational variant of the Balkan discourse in their practical reasoning, as it enables a scope of action for impartial and neutral agencies. By contrast, both the Genocide discourse and the essentialist variant of the Balkan discourse are incompatible with the agendas of peacebuilding agencies, as the former necessitates agents to take sides, while the latter leaves little scope of action for externally sponsored reforms in light of its essentialist claims. For the purposes of the present analysis, the aspects of modernization and civilization constitute independent explanatory paradigms that are employed to counter the rhetoric of ethnicity and
nationalism (Chandler 2000; Mac Ginty 2011) and carry a strong bearing in the peacebuilding and development fields (Paris 2003).

6.2 THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS: ETHNICITY VS. STATEHOOD

The Dayton Peace Accords (GFAP) between the governments of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina successfully ended the fighting by creating a weak central state with multiple power-sharing arrangements consisting of two semi-independent entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS). The Croat-Bosniak Federation comprises 51 per cent and the Serb-dominated RS 49 per cent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Brcko was initially kept as a multinational district under international administration (Bieber 2006: 43). The bodies of the central state are based on ethnic proportionality and endowed with a rotating presidency. The central state is primarily in charge of foreign and domestic trade policy, customs, monetary policy, and immigration, while the Serb-dominated RS and the Croat-Bosniak Federation control taxation, educational policy, and defence, and are also permitted to maintain special relations with neighbouring states (Gromes et. al 2004: 4). Beyond the entity level, political power in the Federation is further decentralized on the canton and municipal levels (Burg 2001: 21). As Gromes et al. (2004) argue, the GFAP hence sought to divide power both horizontally (state, entity, canton, and local level) and vertically (through ethnic representation). It rather optimistically foresaw a transition process which, under external supervision, within one year would lead to elections and the creation of accountable political institutions as well as sectoral institutions (economy, law, human rights) that were to be supervised for a period of up to six years by international experts (Chandler 2000: 43-44).

The GFAP has been and continues to be surrounded by several overlapping controversies regarding its main authors, genesis, and content. In addition to principled criticisms regarding the heavy-handed nature of international involvement and the interventionist spirit of the agreement (Chandler 2000; 2006; Richmond 2005),

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172 Officially the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, usually referred to either as GFAP or DPA (Dayton Peace Accords). Importantly, it was co-signed by representatives of the two entities, the FBiH and the RS.

173 A detailed overview and analysis of power-sharing provisions in the GFAP and their subsequent transformation is provided in Bieber (2006).

174 The Croat-Bosniak Federation was based on the 1994 Washington Agreement between the former warring parties of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims (Gromes et. al. 2004: 4) and officially created through the Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 10 Nov 1995 (S/1995/1031 annex).
most controversial issues relate to the normative implications of ethnic partition and representation, and to a lesser extent to differences regarding the treatment of the conflict parties. In regards to ethnic partition, Almond (2007) and Ivankovic and Melcic (2007) argue that, counter to official announcements, the creation of the two entities not only betrayed the international community's belief that separating the different ethnic communities was "inevitable" (Almond 2007: 442), but also constitutes an "irreversible mistake" that has further been legitimized by subsequent decisions (Ivankovic and Melcic 2007: 435). Ivankovic and Melcic claim that not only did the GFAP legitimize the ethnic principle, but also that it did so only with regards to one ethnic (Bosnian Serb) group, which is hence seen as privileged.\(^{175}\) A related criticism focuses on the gains of the conflict parties relative to the size of their ethnic group in the last pre-war census data (1991),\(^ {176}\) and more acutely on the de facto endorsement of Serbian war gains and the policy of 'ethnic cleansing'. Cushman and Mestrovic (1997: 24) claim that, within the GFAP, "all sides are treated as morally equivalent despite what the facts say, and the West behaves as if it does not matter who wins, so long as 'peace' is achieved even at the cost of ethnic partition, which is the central outcome of the peace plan". Whereas most accounts of the GFAP and the process that led to its conclusion stress the overall intention of the US administration and of 'the international community' to end the fighting and delimit the scope of future military involvement (Burg and Shoup 2000),\(^ {177}\) Cushman and Mestrovic cite cultural relativism and (academic) ambivalence, i.e. a widespread reluctance to "choose sides" and a rejection of nationalism as "by nature uncivil, antidemocratic and separatist because it empowers one ethnic group over all others" (Cushman and Mestrovic 1997: 22; last quote by Zimmerman, cited ibid.).

These criticisms notwithstanding, most observers agree that the authors of the GFAP sought to "strike a balance between establishing ethnic representation in a newly formed decentralized government, while emphasizing the express goal of the international community – to reverse the ethnic cleansing and rebuild a multi-ethnic society" (Haynes 2008: xviii), in particular through fostering the return of refugees and IDPs. In this regard, Mac Ginty (2011: 143) concluded that by accepting the ethnic

\(^{175}\) This claim is further substantiated with a view to subsequent decisions by the PIC/High Representative regarding the reconstruction of multi-ethnic police forces and the enforced constitutional changes of 2002 (Ivankovic and Melcic 2007: 435).

\(^{176}\) The RS covers 49 per cent of BiH, while the Federation comprises 51 per cent. In contrast, data from the last pre-war census for Bosnia estimate the share of the Muslim/Bosniak population at 43.7 per cent, the Bosnian Serb at 31.4 per cent, and the Bosnian Croat population at 17.3 per cent (cited in Bieber 2006: 2).

\(^{177}\) Burg and Shoup (2000) argue that the agreement was in fact a result of combined military and diplomatic coercion and 'alliance balancing' on the part of the US (Burg and Shoup 2000; Burg 2001; Chandler 2000).
partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and modelling the new state along the lines of ethnic demography and estimates (including the former Bosniak enclave of Srebrenica in the Serb Republic), the GFAP simultaneously confirmed ethnicity as a defining principle of the new state’s constituent peoples and considered the results of the battlefield situation. The ambivalence of the GFAP regarding ethnicity is highlighted by the extensive provisions for refugee return and the restitution of their property, the insistence on freedom of movement across the Inter-Entity-Boundary-Line (IEBL), and the extensive veto rights and precautions to ensure ethnic proportionality (Gromes et al. 2004: 5-6). In Recchia’s assessment, the de facto ratification of the results of ethnic cleansing, the weakness of the central state vis-à-vis ‘ethnic enclaves’ and the legitimization of the “interests of neighbouring states” were the “price to be paid for reaching an agreement under relatively fluid conditions” and “without the genuine commitment of any of the parties” (2007: 11). While the existence of different ethnicities was hence accepted as an immutable fact for the time being, its significance was hoped to decrease in the course of the peacebuilding process based on an agenda that prioritized “security and stability, humanitarian assistance, economic reconstruction and human rights, and in particular the return of refugees and displaced persons to reverse the wartime ethnic cleansing” (Haynes 2008: xviii). As Mac Ginty (2011: 146) summarizes, “the meta-narrative underpinning the Dayton Agreement was that nationalism was destructive and self-defeating; people must abjure nationalism or ethnic and religious particularism and instead accept plural, civic identifications”. In this meta-narrative, statehood is considered to serve as the “glue” in overcoming the manifold divisions within Bosnian society, emphasizing a “civic bond between citizens and de-emphasiz[ing] ethnic, religious, or nationalist identifications” (Mac Ginty 2011: 146; see also Donais and Pickel 2003).

6.3 RENDERING VIOLENT CONFLICT MANAGEABLE: THE PEACEBUILDING FIELD IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

As previously argued in chapter 4, the peacebuilding intervention in BiH commenced at a time when there was as yet little systematic knowledge or doctrine on how to ‘build peace’ or (re)construct war-torn states and societies, as it was the first comprehensive reconstruction project of its kind (Recchia 2007).\textsuperscript{178} Empirically, this led to high levels of

\textsuperscript{178} External assistance to conflict-ridden states had already occurred prior to the multilateral endeavour in Bosnia and Herzegovina; for instance, in Angola (UNAVEM II), Mozambique (UNOMOZ), Namibia (UNTAG), and Somalia (UNOSOM II). However, these efforts had been more
uncertainty and improvisation among those tasked with devising practical approaches and filling in the many blank spots in their mandates to help reconstruct Bosnia (Huddleston 1999; Haynes 2008). Analytically, this sudden upsurge of activity makes it challenging to select relevant voices from the abundance of activities and contemporary statements on peacebuilding in BiH, as the field comprises a dense, interrelated, and partly overlapping network of international organisations, donor governments, bilateral development agencies, think tanks, advocacy groups, NGOS, international financial institutions, researchers, and consultants.

The peacebuilding presence of most, albeit not all, international actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina was originally legitimized through the Annexes of the Dayton Peace Accords. In addition, military peacekeeping has been conducted, first by NATO-led IFOR and SFOR troops, and since 2004 by the EU peacekeeping operation Althea (EUFOR). After the considerable degree of confusion and controversy regarding the use of force by UNPROFOR (Akashi 1995), all post-war peacekeeping troops deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina have been endowed with so-called ‘robust’ mandates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, i.e. with the provision to employ force not only in self-defence but also if needed to accomplish their mission (Recchia 2007: 14). All aspects related to the civilian peace implementation of the Dayton Accords were to be overseen and coordinated by the High Representative (HR), an ad hoc institution whose role and power by far exceeds that of a UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General or UN Resident Coordinator usually in charge of leading multinational reconstruction deployments (Haynes 2008: 15; GFAP 1995: Annex 10, Art II). These far-reaching powers of the High Representative notwithstanding, the peacekeeping operations, HR, and other civilian institutions are not organized within a unified hierarchical structure (Gromes et al. 2004: ii-iii).

According to the GFAP, the central civilian activities to be conducted, or in fact ‘implemented’, were the organization of free and fair elections (GFAP Ann. 3), the drafting of a constitution (Ann. 4), the provision and protection of human rights (Ann. 6), the return of refugees and IDPS and the restitution of their property (Ann. 7), the preservation of national monuments (Ann. 8), the development of joint infrastructures between the two entities and of other public corporations (Ann. 9), the coordination of limited in nature and/or scope (regarding their staff, resources, and mandates) and did not attract the same level of international attention. The same holds true for several peacebuilding deployments in Central America, which were largely, if not entirely restricted to monitoring and consultation functions, and did not amount to comprehensive international reconstruction efforts (see the exhaustive overview on UN missions in Franke and Warnecke 2009).
all non-military actors by the HR (Ann. 10), and the establishment of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) to oversee and train the local police (Ann. 11). With the exception of Annex 5 (arbitration between the two entities), all annexes listed an external responsible body, the most prominent of which were the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE), the UN Commission and High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD), the International Police Task Force (IPTF, later EUPM), and the High Representative and Office of the High Representative (OHR). Other peacebuilding actors, such as bilateral development agencies and international agencies, subsequently entered the Bosnian peacebuilding field according to their standard practice through bilateral agreements with the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (see the discussion on the UNDP and DfID, below). Undeniably, the Dayton framework provided not only the legal justification for the international presence, but also the primary reference point for international actors in defining their mandates and objectives in Bosnia. However, as Haynes (2008) points out, it constituted an essentially broad and vague, or in neutral terms, flexible point of reference, subject to continuous reinterpretation and redefinition by the actors it mandated. In addition, new powers and mandates were granted or ‘recognized’ by the central body overseeing and ‘steering’ the process, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and its Steering Committee.

6.3.1 The executive level of the peacebuilding field

The ‘executive level’ of the peacebuilding field comprises those actors that command direct political leverage both vis-à-vis the conflict parties and the remainder of the peacebuilding field, such as project-driven agencies, the bureaucracies of international organisations, and NGOs. As discussed above (see infra ch. 3.4.1), while the definition of an ‘executive level’ admittedly simplifies a rather complex web of power-relationships between numerous agencies, it serves as a heuristic device for identifying dominant peacebuilding objectives and narratives. Accordingly, while the heuristic distinction does not in every case suppose a direct chain of authority, the ‘executive level’ nevertheless can be shown to hold a pre-eminent role in the interpretation of the GFAP and consequently regarding the key objectives and aspects to be addressed during the peace process. In this regard, the peacebuilding endeavour in BiH is unique due to the presence of a High Representative (and at times, EU Special Representative) who is commissioned by the Peace Implementation Council and, in addition to the functions
normally executed by a UN SRSG, exerts a considerable degree of political (executive and legislative) power.\footnote{My reconstruction of the peacebuilding field in BiH does not include the peacekeeping operations and their commanders. This delineation could be challenged, as these missions have evidently contributed to the peacebuilding process. However, this delineation is in keeping with my earlier definition of peacebuilding, as all civilian activities in a post-war context (see chapters 1 and 4). As such, and as discussed in chapter 4, peacekeepers are included in the peacebuilding field only to the extent that they conduct civilian activities in addition to their primary military mandate. In this regard, the policing functions conducted by all three deployments to combat organized crime and in the case of IFOR and SFOR, arrest war criminals, arguably sit at the interface of civilian and military activities, but are covered in this analysis through the discussion of UNMIBH which was primarily in charge of the International Police Task Force until its handover to EUPM.}

Contrary to usual peace operations practice and given the loss of UN credibility and reputation in the course of the Bosnian war, particularly in regard to the failure of the safe areas concept and UNPROFOR’s problematic mandates (Zunec and Kulenovic 2007), the international post-war intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been (and continues to be) overseen and directed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). By contrast, operational UN responsibility was limited to the mandate of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMiB), which was primarily in charge of the International Police Task Force (IPTF).\footnote{See S/RES/1026 and S/Res/1035 of Dec 21, 1995. This mandate was later broadened to include police trainings and other ‘key public security issues’ (Haynes 2008: 11).} UNMiB was led by an SRSG who also acted as the Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular the return of refugees and IDPs facilitated by UNHCR. The degree to which the UN was considered as a secondary actor is evident in the deliberations of the PIC on the work of the PIC Steering Board, which stated that the UN will be “invited to attend when their responsibilities under the Peace Agreement are involved” (PIC London Conclusions 1995: 4).

By contrast, both the HR, whose role has been likened to that of a ‘European Raj’ (Knaus and Martin 2003), and the PIC have directly intervened within Bosnian politics and continue to do so by means of a number of instruments, such as conditionality, the removal from office of individual politicians, and the imposition of individual laws and decisions. The PIC was established at the London Peace Implementation Conference of December 1995. It comprises 55 countries and agencies and is directed by a Steering Board made up of the G7 countries, Russia, the EU Presidency, and Turkey on behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. The Steering Board is the ‘executive arm’ of the PIC and provides political guidance to the work of the HR. The PIC meets in various
configurations;\(^{181}\) as of 2002, it established a Board of Principals as the main coordinating body of international actors in BiH.\(^{182}\) Reflecting the increasing role of the EU as main peacebuilder in BiH, the HR simultaneously served as the EU Special Representative (EU SR) from 2002 to 2011.

As provided for in the GFAP and confirmed by the UN Security Council, the HR is the ‘final authority in theatre’ in all matters concerning the interpretation of the civilian provisions. With regard to the coordination of civilian agencies, the HR was expected “to respect [the] autonomy [of the civilian organizations and agencies in BiH] within their spheres of operation while as necessary giving general guidance to them about the impact of their activities on the implementation of the peace settlement” (S/RES/1031: §37). The power of the HR was originally defined as making “recommendations to authorities in BiH and to the PIC” (PIC London Conclusions 1996: 15).\(^{183}\) with the conditionality of aid as the “sharpest weapon” at the HR’s disposal (Gromes et al. 2004: 8). However, in view of ongoing ‘local obstruction’, in its 1997 Bonn meeting the PIC extended the HR’s power “to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions” (PIC Bonn Conclusions 1997: Annex 11). By virtue of these so-called ‘Bonn Powers’, and the close connection with the PIC, the role of the High Representative in BiH is more akin to that of a governor than to an ‘impartial’ interlocutor of the international community as usually conducted by an SRSG, whose political interference or diplomacy takes place behind ‘closed doors’ and whose powers are in any case more limited (Ramcharan 2008). As these complex provisions and the following analysis will show, the Bosnian peacebuilding field was and continues to be characterized by a division of labour\(^{184}\) between the HR and PIC as increasingly coercive enactors of the political will of the ‘international community’ and the remainder of the peacebuilding

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\(^{181}\) Until 2000, the PIC convened six times at the ministerial level. The PIC Steering Board holds weekly meetings headed by the HR at the ambassadorial level in Sarajevo, and convenes at the level of Political Directors three times per year, see Office of the High Representative: <http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=38563> (15 Nov 2015).

\(^{182}\) The Board meets on a weekly basis and comprises the OHR, EUFOR, NATO, OSCE, UNHCR, EUPM, and the EC. Both the IFIs and UNDP participate in these meetings.

\(^{183}\) This wording resembles the powers of the UN Secretary-General under Art 99 of the UN Charter, according to which the Secretary-General has the right to bring matters to the attention of the Security Council.

\(^{184}\) An additional key actor within this ‘executive level’ is the EC/EU, particularly through its Stabilization and Association Agreement process (Recchia 2007). Between 2002 and 2011, the High Representative was simultaneously the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina. As of 1 January 2003, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took over policing tasks from UNMIBH/IPTF (until June 2012). In December, the European Union Mission EUFOR Operation Althea took over peacekeeping from SFOR. While the EU is not analysed here as a separate case study, it is nonetheless included in the analyses of the executive level of the peacebuilding field by virtue of its participation in the PIC and the ‘double-hatted’ role of the HR after 2002.
field whose approaches sought to maintain the basic tenets of impartiality and/or political neutrality.

The PIC and High Representative and political conflict

The degree to which the Peace Implementation Council, particularly the PIC Steering Board, and the High Representative as key political agents within the Bosnian peacebuilding field encounter and seek to ‘address’ political opposition or obstacles is evident in countless PIC statements and decisions and reports by the High Representative. Upon its creation in December 1995, the PIC laid out an expansive reform agenda as the ‘implementation’ of the GFAP, culminating in elections to be held by the end of the first year. However, the PIC communications quickly turned into more impatient expressions of dissatisfaction with delays in substantial areas such as refugee return, arms control, and constitutional and administrative reform. In response, throughout most of 1996 and 1997 the PIC repeatedly threatened the conditionality of further assistance and demanded “a significant acceleration” on the part of all Bosnian institutions regarding peace implementation. Given the “lack of strong multi-ethnic political parties”, insufficient protection of human rights, and the failure to develop functioning common institutions (PIC Bonn Conclusions 1997: 2), the PIC “concluded that an even more persistent approach on the part of the IC is required” (PIC Bonn Conclusions 1997: 3), which led to the recognition of the so-called ‘Bonn powers’ of the HR mentioned above. In subsequent meetings, the Council noted progress in a number of areas, but criticized that these had primarily been accomplished by external actors (PIC Main Meeting Madrid 1998) and were still accompanied by “parallel institutions as well as ethnic chains of command” (PIC SB Political Directors Brussels Meeting June 1999). In subsequent years, the general gist of these statements remains largely unchanged; while noting progress in specific areas, various configurations of the PIC note that “responsibility for insufficient progress lies squarely with obstructionist political parties and their allies, both within and outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

185 During the first decade of peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, successive High Representatives issued 28 reports to the Secretary-General of the UN, while the PIC issued about 90 declarations, decisions, communiqués, and other releases on future priorities and policy.
186 Knaus and Martin have detailed the process by which the Peace Implementation Council gradually increased the powers of the High Representative, starting with the takeover of the public broadcasting system in the RS in May 1997 and leading to the establishment of vast unchecked powers in the areas of institutional reform, legislation, and political personnel to quell political opposition or ‘obstruction’ and, increasingly, corruption or ‘bias’ (Knaus and Martin: 2003:54-66).
Narrow nationalistic and sectarian political interests have impeded everything from refugee returns to economic reform to the functioning of government institutions” (PIC Brussels Meeting May 2000).

Between 2000 and 2002 in particular, the PIC and HR tried to induce the entity governments to implement significant constitutional reforms after the Bosnian Constitutional Court had ruled these to be discriminatory (e.g. PIC Meeting Brussels Feb 2002). While this issue was eventually ‘resolved’ by the imposition of reforms through the HR, another persistent source of contention was the failure to hand over indicted war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In most cases, the PIC’s censure was directed towards public authorities, particularly at the entity level.\(^{187}\) In this regard, the acknowledgement of wider opposition within the Bosnian public to the “recent politicisation of the process of appointing Judges and Prosecutors” in early 2004 (PIC Meeting Sarajevo, Jan 2004) stands out, as it allocated blame beyond public authorities: “while we fully respect the right of people to demonstrate peacefully in accordance with the law, we will not waver in our support for the High Judicial and Prosecutor Councils” (ibid.).

In addition to the General Framework Agreement, the PIC increasingly drew on a number of ‘plans’ the Bosnian authorities had to ‘implement’ or ‘complete’ with a view to attaining membership in the Council of Europe, the establishment of the Stability Pact and EU Stabilisation and Association Process, or admission to NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). Accession to these frameworks has variously been tied to specific action plans, such as the Feasibility Study in the case of the EU, the drafting of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, or a list of “steps” defined by the NATO ministerial meeting (PIC Sarajevo Meeting 2003). In reporting the progress of Bosnian authorities in ‘completing’ these steps, the PIC discourse oscillates between “warmly” noting progress and expressing “serious dissatisfaction.” Following considerable pressure on the part of the PIC, by the end of 2005 negotiations on the EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement were finally initiated, while negotiations with NATO regarding the PfP were postponed due to the lack of cooperation with the ICTY (PIC Sarajevo Meeting June 2005).

\(^{187}\) Explicit denunciations of particular parties are to be found in the Council’s condemnation of the declaration of Croat self-rule in early 2001 (e.g. PIC Meeting Brussels March 2001), the censure of the ‘unconstructive attitude’ by parties such as the HDZ and SDA in regard to the Constituent Peoples’ decision, and, repeatedly, the continued failure of all authorities, and in particular those of the RS, to cooperate with the ICTY
As this brief summary of statements and decisions by the Peace Implementation Council and HR indicates, notwithstanding the language of ‘implementation’, the international effort by the PIC/HR to put the Dayton Accords into practice was accompanied by intense political struggles surrounding issues ranging from the return of refugees, constitutional, administrative, and legislative reforms, to the installation of new broadcasting systems, to name just a few. As is evident from the long list of politicians removed from office and decisions imposed by the HR, these struggles were limited neither to a few ‘obstructionist’ individuals, nor to the first years after the end of the war. In recent years, while the practice of the HR of removing individuals from office seems to have ceased as of June 2009, the latest report of the HR to the UN Security Council of 4 September 2015 again voices great concern regarding the “longstanding policy by the ruling authorities in the RS, and in particular the current RS President, to undermine the authorities of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to openly advocate for RS secession and state dissolution” (OHR 2015: §21).

6.3.2 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
The United Nations Development Programme was created by the General Assembly in 1965 to “support and supplement the national efforts of developing countries at solving the most important problems of their economic development and to promote social progress”. The UNDP is officially ‘commissioned’ by host governments and committed to the principles of neutrality and impartiality with regard to the domestic affairs of states (Murphy 2006). Up until 2000, the UNDP neither had a specific mandate nor an explicit strategy with regard to peace- and conflict-related activities. This gradually changed with the introduction of a stronger commitment to “strengthening ... the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance”, and the subsequent development of a targeted strategy and organizational changes to improve The Role of UNDP in Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations (DP/2001/4) in November 2000.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UNDP established its Sarajevo office in July 1996. Unlike other specialized agencies, it was not specifically mandated by the GFAP, but,

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188 See the full list of relevant decisions: <http://ohr.int/?cat=350&lang=en> (2 Jan 2016)
191 The only exception to this is to be found in Ann. 7 of the GFAP, which stipulates that UNHCR, ICRC, and UNDP shall be granted access to assisting the return of refugees and IDPs.
following its usual *modus operandi*, worked on the basis of an agreement with the
Bosnian government which stipulated that the Bosnian government was to “remain
responsible for its UNDP-assisted projects” (UNDP and GoBiH 1995: Art. III.1). The
UNDP’s initial project portfolio in BiH followed the recommendations of a “multisectoral
UN system mission” of March 1996 and focused on the country’s transition to a market
economy and the development of governmental and local institutions (S/1996/1017:
§39). Subsequent UNDP activities were officially based on the *First UNDP Country
Cooperation Framework for 1997-1999*,¹⁹² which was extended for another year in
November 1999,¹⁹³ and subsequently by the *Second Country Cooperation Framework*¹⁹⁴
covering the years 2001 to 2004 (UNDP 2000b) and a *Country Programme Action Plan
(CPAP)*¹⁹⁵ for the period 2005 to 2009. These Frameworks are official agreements
between the UNDP and other members of the respective UN Country Team on the one
hand, and the government of BiH on the other. In preparation for these agreements, the
UNDP also conducts UN Common Country Assessments (CCA) or Common Country
Studies (CCS).¹⁹⁶ In the case of BiH, in the studied period, such studies were conducted in
2000 and 2004, with the UNDP serving as the lead agency. Unfortunately, no such study
exists in relation to the first CCF of 1997. For the purposes of the present discussion, the
two country studies and the 1997 framework provide rich material for tracing the
evolving practical reasoning of the UNDP in relation to approaching peacebuilding in
BiH.

Initially, the UNDP portfolio in BiH for 1997-1999 comprised ‘area-based development’,
support to national sectoral reconstruction programmes’, and ‘policy advisory support
to improve government decision-making’ (UNDP 1997: §§5-7), which aimed to facilitate
“the transition of donor assistance from reconstruction to development” (17). The
participation of communities in these development efforts is recommended, but
considered to be of secondary importance due to the need to speed up the
reconstruction process: “community participation is a time-consuming process” (14).
‘Peace-building’ is to be included where possible by mitigating tensions through “multi-
ethnic work brigades, youth clubs and centres, and conflict-resolution training.” (23).

¹⁹³ DP/CCF/BIH/1/EXTENSION 1 of 11 Nov 1999.
¹⁹⁴ DP/CCF/BIH/2 of 17 Nov 2000.
Country Programme Document for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2005 – 2009),
¹⁹⁶ While CCAs are drafted in cooperation with host state governments and endorsed by both
sides, a CCS solely “reflects the view of UN system agencies, funds and partners” (UNDP 2000a: 1).
Beyond a few individual peacebuilding measures, however, within this ‘classical’ development framework, “inter-ethnic tensions” are expected to decline as a result of economic development (26) and through the UNDP’s impartial and neutral engagement (40). Three years later, however, the subsequent UNDP /CGMA\(^\text{197}\) Common Country Study (UNDP 2000a) curbed this optimistic tone and reported persistent ‘obstacles to development’. According to the CCS, the political situation in BiH, while “peaceful” thanks to SFOR, is “fragmented and uncertain”, with the former warring parties acting as “uneasy partners” (UNDP 2000a: 2). This dilemma is seen to result primarily from the “complex political structure” created by the Dayton Accords, the overall high levels of aid-dependency, and the prevalence of nationalism (2-3). How, then, should these problems be addressed? And what is the role of the UNDP and other members of the CGMA in this? The study gives two seemingly separate answers, which, upon closer reading, turn out to be quite connected. The report repeatedly emphasizes the neutral and impartial stance of the UNDP and other members of the UN system as "honest brokers" (2). While it holds that, ideally, substantial parts of the Dayton provisions ought to be re-written, this is not seen as a task for impartial agencies and is also not feasible in the volatile political climate. Instead, the authors explicitly suggest reframing social and political problems in terms of development in addition to human rights. Reframing challenges as “development” and “human rights issues” allows for the involvement of impartial agents and the application of practical measures, such as improving technical skills. On the narrative level, this is accomplished by repeatedly highlighting the practical side of political problems (23), whilst relegating further improvement with regard to political “root causes” to a hopefully more cooperative future, enabled by development as an immediate end in itself and as a means to achieving reconciliation and confidence: “Working with committed professionals, focusing on technical issues, and putting the immediate past aside for a moment, we can build consensus and, hopefully, help to achieve the core objective of the DPA – a secure peace” (79-80).

As the example of the so-called ‘returns question’ illustrates, this reframing builds on a number of discursive ‘moves’. Firstly, throughout the study, the ‘corrupt’ and ‘nationalistic’ administrative and political elites are narratively separated from the ‘ordinary population’ by a depiction of Bosnian civilians as victims of war, manipulation, manipulation, manipulation, manipulation, manipulation.

\(^{197}\) The Country Group of Multilateral Agencies (CGMA) consisted of UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR (lead agencies), WHO, ILO, UNFPA, UNESCO, UNOCHCR, FAO, and IOM and was formed specifically for the purpose of drafting the first Common Country Study (The Transition to Development – Challenges and Priorities for UN Development Assistance to Bosnia – Herzegovina) as a basis for improving the development efforts of the UN system agencies in BiH (UNDP 2000a: 2).
and socialist legacies. In this vein, “‘nationalist’ administrations obstruct returns with discriminatory attitudes towards ‘minorities’ who come back, and do little to convince people that peace is here to stay” (11). By contrast, “ordinary people are resilient and decent. It is safe to walk at night in cities and towns” (3). Secondly, the study links the slow progress of ‘minority returns’ to practical problems, such as ambivalent property laws, missing employment opportunities, and the prevalence of land mines. By explicitly linking the returns question to other aspects of economic development, the “issue” is moved “beyond Dayton” (11) and hence removed from the difficult terrain of politics (13). This is not merely a narrative construction, but explicitly formulated as a clear-cut strategy: “setting the returns issue in an even wider development context ... would also help to lower tensions and promote longer term social and political reconciliation” and “deal with the returns question in a less politically intense climate” (13). The key to depoliticizing ‘returns’ is provided by reframing the ‘issue’ as a “housing” issue: “While the basic principles of the DPA must be respected, and nobody condones the de facto acceptance of the harsh consequences of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and forced flight, it might be time to see how DPA objectives can be achieved in a development rather than ‘post-war’ context” (13). The ‘solution’ to overcoming political tensions is hence a reframing of ‘Dayton’ in non-political developmental terms in a move to avoid its major paradoxes.

This narrative strategy and the bracketing of the political are dependent on the distinction between ordinary citizens as victims on the one hand, and manipulative nationalist elites on the other. Following the developmental logic, the grievances of the victimized population will disappear over time as their economic situation improves. To the extent that reconciliation is addressed in the study, this is done in psychological, not political, terms; for instance, by supporting mental health care: “Programmes focusing on social and human development objectives cannot function if managers and beneficiaries are dealing with war-related post-traumatic stress, bitterness and mistrust” (UNDP 2000a: 14). In this excerpt, reconciliation as psychological healing is also linked to development in primarily instrumental terms, as it is narrated as a precondition to attaining ‘development objectives’ more efficiently. Most importantly, however, in separating the population from the elites, the former are moved further away from the realm of political conflict. In this regard, specific emphasis is placed on “apolitical professionals” and experts (19) and, increasingly, on “civil society” as providing both a means and an end to political change: “as part of the process of democratization and empowerment of ordinary citizens; as a development partner more able to ensure that donor support reaches beneficiaries” (30). This construction both
reflects the perpetual practical problems faced by the UNDP and other UN agencies used to working with ‘government partners’, and it simultaneously provides a solution to addressing political problems in a seemingly non-political way, i.e. through ‘empowerment’, ‘capacity-building’, ‘confidence-building’, and training – all of which are subsumed under the heading of ‘technical assistance’.

As Hansen (2006) argues, all policy discourses have an internal inconsistency or narrative weakness that they perpetually try to remedy to match problems to specific policies or solutions in line with their identity. In the case of the 2000 CCS, one such problem consists in the administrative structure prescribed by the GFAP and the many openings this is held to provide for abuse by corrupt or nationalist elites. On the one hand, in substantive terms, the CCS narrative assumes a clearly political stance by suggesting the need to revise parts of the Dayton Accords. However, this does not imply that the CCS ‘breaks’ with the impartial and apolitical construction of agencies’ identity, as change is constructed as possible within the developmental and human rights discourse by formulating the hope that these developmental measures will ultimately help rewrite the Dayton Accords in a subtle way: "In real terms, this would require a complete revision of the terms of the DPA ... Looking at this issue purely from technical aspects however, such as service delivery, economies of scale, operational efficiencies and standardization, it might be possible to promote dialogue on certain aspects of this agenda and lay the groundwork for a more fundamental longer-term reform" (UNDP 2000a: 19).

The subsequent Common Country Assessment (CCA) of 2004 maintains this developmental frame. However, in comparison to the earlier study, the CCA resolutely moves away from the Bosnian context by formulating solutions based on international development and, increasingly, international legal standards rather than specifically Bosnian ‘problems’. Like the earlier study, the CCA acknowledges the political challenges arising from nationalist politics, in particular the “return of the nationalists” in the 2002 elections, and restates the persistence of the “political and administrative fragmentation” seen to result from the GFAP (UNDP 2004: 8). However, the ‘solution’ to this conundrum is no longer proposed in purely developmental terms, but constructed by referencing the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and an extensive list of international treaty obligations incorporated into the Bosnian constitution to which the

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198 The CCA was drafted by UNDP in cooperation with UNFPA and UNICEF as lead agencies of the BiH UN Country Team. It also drew on input from other members of the UN system in the country to provide “the informational and analytical foundation for the development of the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)” (UNDP 2004: 7).
Bosnian government is subsequently held accountable (UNDP 2004: 9, 11). In short, in the face of ongoing ‘obstruction’ and ‘fragmentation’, the discussion of ‘solutions’ moves almost entirely away from the Bosnian context by formulating policies that are entirely derived from international and purportedly objective legal development standards.

In regard to development standards, the CCA establishes three “interlinking deterrents to development progress”: “political and administrative fragmentation”, “weak capacity of professionals”, and “weak civil society participation” (UNDP 2004: 8). These problems are recounted in the matter-of-fact linguistic style of development management, arguing in generalized terms that most of the findings and sections of the report could be applied to other countries without further modification. The Bosnian war and its aftermath, while occasionally mentioned in the introduction, is largely absent from the substantive chapters of the report, as is any consideration of the political situation, including the previous discussions on nationalism or division. Instead, the Bosnian government is called upon to comply with its obligations resulting from being a member to international conventions (9) and the overall goal of European integration: “The goal of European integration ... and integration into NATO ... are the principal aims of the reform process” (11). In 2004, it seems then, BiH is no longer primarily framed as a post-war or post-conflict country (Autesserre 2010), but as a developing or post-socialist transition country in need of reform.

The substantive chapters of the report are structured according to UNDP/UN topical sectors, such as governance, basic social services, social protection, environmental protection, and human security, and exhibit a clear narrative pattern with regard to the construction of problems and solutions. On the ‘problem’ side, the key challenge to the country’s reform process is once again seen to result from the provisions of the GFAP. This is particular evident when looking at the diagnosed problems in relation to the suggested solutions: while the war and the legacies of the socialist state are repeatedly listed as additional problems, they are neither followed up in the substantive analytical sections, nor are they included in the discussion on solutions. By contrast, the GFAP, while duly noted to have ended the war, is seen as maintaining, if not causing, “political

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199 The Bosnian war is briefly mentioned in the introductory discussion of the ‘Bosnian context’, which posits that “while almost all the problems facing BiH can be traced to the political, economic and social destruction during the war alongside the structural weaknesses in managing ... transition in post-war BiH, this CCA focuses on the root causes in each segment and outlines where interventions can be made to reverse the increasing poverty, inequality and discrimination” (9, emphasis added). While this distinction between war-related and root causes is not further clarified, this depiction seems to suggest a compartmentalization of problems or challenges by sector/segment.
and administrative fragmentation”, a wording that is to be found on virtually every page of the entire report: “The ... prevalence of bad governance and weak capacity for policy development – [is] a consequence of continued ethnic division and the fragmented political and administrative structures of the GFAP, which was designed with a view to finding the smallest common denominator, rather than efficient governance” (UNDP 2004: 42-43). As a consequence, “the current structure of public administration has established ethnic separation and protectionism” (24). In short, the Dayton Accords are constructed as the central predicament facing Bosnian society today, perpetuating division and hindering effective governance.

As argued above, the professed impartial and politically neutral stance of agencies such as the UNDP precludes (open) political interventions that would transcend existing agreements. As a consequence, while earlier UNDP/UN documents acknowledged the challenges arising from the Dayton provisions, these were usually considered 'off limits' or addressed in a de-politicized developmental way, i.e. by focusing on the technical side of administrative problems and the overall improvement of professional and civil society relations and capacities, with the ultimate hope that these might over time – and supported by economic improvements – encourage a subtle reversal of the politically charged nature of the provisions. The present report takes a markedly different approach to this complex, and ultimately, to 'rewriting Dayton', which can be summarized in three steps. To begin with, each substantial section outlining UNDP/UN activities is preceded by an invocation of pertinent UN conventions and international treaties included in the GFAP/Bosnian constitution. As a result, the primary reference point for the need to take action is not the Bosnian context and its problems, but the obligations of the Bosnian government under 'international law' as the ultimate authority. This move has two effects: on the one hand, it effectively excludes the entity and local (municipal and cantonal) authorities from the narrative on solutions. While these actors are in fact in charge of several relevant policy domains discussed (such as health and education) due to the quasi con-federal structure of the state, they are neatly removed from the picture, as they cannot be a party to international conventions. On the other hand, the focus on international law, i.e. the so-called "rights-based approach", not

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200 On the employment of developmental frames and their depoliticizing effects, see particularly Ferguson (1990), Duffield (2001), and infra chapter 2.
201 "The BiH constitution ensures the highest level of internationally recognized human rights protections under the following major international instruments: The European Convention on Human Rights, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (ibid.: 7).
only firmly establishes the central government as the preferred and primary partner for international actors (a problem that earlier reports frequently cited to be hampering UNDP efforts), but also simultaneously opens up a practically unlimited space for international intervention on behalf of Bosnian citizens: “From a human rights perspective, the Government’s obligation to realize human rights is all encompassing” (18). Unsurprisingly, in contrast to earlier reports, in the 2004 CCA, the entity and cantonal/district authorities, while occasionally referred to as the ‘root causes’ of a particular problem, are no longer acknowledged as significant partners that have to be worked with (or around), as they cease to be actors in their own right, for instance with regard to education policies, where international actors simply take over and induce the central state to pass key legislation.

The narrative link between international legal obligations and establishing the Bosnian government (and central state) as the primary partner is already powerful in and of itself. However, it is further stabilized by referencing the MDGs rather than the GFAP as the ultimate standard and key link between the developmental and rights-based approaches: “The BiH Government is obliged to respect and fulfil its human rights obligations without discrimination ... It is further obligated to secure protections for civil and political rights through legal reform, and to ensure progressive realization of social and economic rights through legal and other reforms and budgetary allocations, to the maximum extent possible. The MDGs represent goals through which to measure BiH’s fulfilment of human rights in the development context” (UNDP 2004: 7-8). In sum, while the development frame justifies the need to address administrative fragmentation in terms of efficiency and economic progress, the rights-based development frame makes it mandatory to ensure the protection of individual human rights, which is ultimately the highest normative ground and a central raison d’être of the entire UN system.

Finally, this reasoning is mirrored and further stabilized by framing both the planned UNDP activities and the Bosnian subjects in the rights-based language of ‘social protection’, ‘human security’, and ‘vulnerability’. Each of these frames would deserve a lengthy assessment in its own right (Duffield 2007), but in the present context, they are all employed to the same effect. Resting on an expansive definition of "large segments of the society of BiH ... as vulnerable”, an agenda of ensuring their protection and of providing 'basic services' is devised for the UNDP via the frame of developmental human rights: "Vulnerability in this context is understood as exposure to poverty ... Poverty in itself is a human rights violation, but it is also a crucial factor in increasing the
vulnerability to numerous other violations of rights, such as access to education, basic healthcare, justice, and non-discrimination” (UNDP 2004: 18). In this narrative, whether or not the entity governments and other sub-national authorities are seen as unwilling to cooperate for political reasons, as in the case of educational policies, or as unable to do so for structural reasons, as in the case of health policies or mine action, is of secondary importance. Unsurprisingly, the report, while emphasizing the degree to which progress in BiH is hampered by “political and administrative fragmentation”, entirely dispenses with the discussion of the nature of societal or other conflicts, elite interests, or nationalism. To the extent that the Bosnian context is referenced in addition to international treaties and conventions for justifying action, this exclusively occurs with regard to the situation of the vulnerable individual in need of protection. This view of the context, however, is largely, if not entirely, de-contextualized from its societal, and thereby political, environment.

This tripartite narrative structure corresponds well with the activities foreseen for UNDP involvement in the country. Almost all problems discussed in the substantive chapters are ultimately concerned with overcoming “political and administrative fragmentation” caused by non-cooperative political actors on the entity level and below. Against this backdrop, the application of a developmental human rights frame renders the political dimension of the problem irrelevant and simultaneously empowers the central state and impartial external agencies.

6.3.3 The UK Department for International Development (DfID)

In 1997, the new Labour government created the Department for International Development (DfID), which replaced the former Overseas Development Administration of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The creation of the new department was accompanied by a significant budget increase for international development.202 Since DfID’s reconstitution as an independent department, conflict prevention has continuously gained in prominence on the agenda of DfID and British foreign policy (DfID 2004; Lawry-White 2003; Wilde 2006). As defined in the 1997 and 2000 White Papers, DfID’s overarching mandate is the reduction of poverty, with a particular

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202 UK development spending (ODA) increased from 0.23 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) to 0.40 per cent of GNI in the period from 1997 to 2005/06 (DfID 2004a: 4). Following the change of government in 2010, the aid budget (ODA) was the only departmental budget exempt from budget cuts (Interviews with Conflict Adviser, DfID, and Early Recovery and Peacebuilding Officer, FCO, London February 2014).
emphasis on basic health care, universal access to primary education, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). According to these White Papers, conflict prevention and building peaceful societies are seen as ‘means’ towards that end: “Understanding the causes of conflict, and helping build the will and capacity of state and civil society to resolve disputes non-violently will be central to our international policy” (HMG 1997, cited in Lawry-White 2003: 13).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, DfID initially provided emergency and humanitarian aid through an Emergency Task Force and through international relief agencies from 1993 to 1996 (DfID 2004: 31), and subsequently participated in the reconstruction and efforts by providing funding to multilateral organisations, specific programmes, and bilaterally. The Department only developed a comprehensive Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Bosnia and Herzegovina in September 2000 (DfID 2000). This was replaced by a Regional Assistance Plan for the Western Balkans covering the years 2004/05 to 2008/09 (DfID 2004). The 2000 CSP was developed following a DFID mission to BiH in July 1999 (DfID 2000: 14). However, no written assessment could be obtained that preceded the drafting of any of the country and regional strategies. Hence, the following analysis is entirely based on the different strategy papers, additional information available for select projects, and interviews conducted at DfID headquarters in August 2012 and February 2014.

The narrative construction of challenges and solutions

The 2000 DfID Country Strategy Paper analyses the current situation in BiH in political, institutional, economic, social, and environmental terms, reviews the role of other international actors, and presents the department’s future strategy, broken down into seven goals. DfID’s overall vision for Bosnia is the country’s “transition to a pluralist democracy and well-regulated market economy in such a way that benefits are sustainable and spread through all levels of society” (DfID 2000: A8). The “immediate purpose of our programme is to increase the capacity of government at all levels, civil society and the private sector to achieve transition in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement and seek to promote reconciliation and cooperation between the entities and ethnic groups” (A10). The introductory summary provides a disillusioned account of BiH’s progress “towards a non-discriminatory, multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous country” (A2). To the extent that any progress in the implementation of the Dayton Accords has been made, this is ascribed to pressure exerted by the international
community and directives issued by the HR (A1). The main obstacles to progress on all
levels are reported to result from ethnic division and suspicion, war damage, and the
legacies of the centralist Yugoslav state, all of which are exploited by politicians eager to
promote their own interests (A3). While Bosnian ‘ownership’ of the reform process is
seen as a central priority and recent (municipal) elections might provide some evidence
that ‘ordinary people’ are beginning to turn away from “mono-ethnic hard-line parties
and politicians” (A2, A5), the main partners and points of reference for DfID
involvement in the country are the decisions by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC),
the European Union as the most important donor and through its Stabilisation and
Association Process (SAP), and other donors, particularly the international financial
institutions (IFIs).

The main challenges to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ‘progress’ are reported in four
separate sections. In political and institutional terms, the single most important problem
is identified as “obstruction by the nationalist parties” (B2). By contrast, while the
provisions of the GFAP are ascribed to nationalist vested interests at the time, they are
not seen as a problem in and of themselves. Rather, the political leadership and parties
are reported to hinder any reform and legislation that might either run counter to their
own or their “ethnically based interests” (B3). The second obstacle results from
administrative fragmentation and inefficiency, especially at the entity level. Despite
their considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the weak central state, the entity authorities are
seen as weak and inefficient given the large number of subordinate agencies and
ministries and the powers devolved to the municipal and canton levels (B6). The
prevalence of inadequate and rigid practices is ascribed to the legacy of the former
Yugoslav state and the disruption of the transition process by the war (B7). Ethnically-
based pressure and intimidation is also reported to prevail in the lower levels of the
administration, the entity judiciaries, and the media. The weakness of the central state
hinders negotiations with the EU and specifically the SAA. Here, a joint position has to be
agreed upon between the state and the entities prior to entering negotiations (B11).

Most economic problems are related to war damages and incomplete transition.
However, despite the earlier positive assessment of the GFAP, the concentration of
power at the entity level and their refusal to cooperate, coupled with a weak central
state and the persistence of centralist structures from communist times, are cited as hindering economic reform (B15): “Economic decision-making falls to the entity level and is used by the nationalist political parties against the state as part of inter-ethnic power.” In addition, “the major sources of domestic wealth creation remain under the managerial control of nationalist political parties”; these are seen to either resist privatization or divert the gains to their own ethnic communities (B20). To resolve these problems, the IFIs have prompted ‘the country’ to work on a medium-term economic strategy as well as a poverty reduction strategy. However, it is not clear which level of the Bosnian government(s) is involved in the process, as economic policy is the prerogative of the entities. Likewise, while the economic problems are narrated as resulting from the war and incomplete transition, the fact that progress and reform are hindered by nationalist politics or ‘ethnic suspicion’, while explicitly mentioned as a problem, is not specifically addressed in terms of solutions. Instead, the strategy holds that “the fundamental essentials for economic recovery are very much those applying elsewhere” (B21). In social terms, a “strong social policy pillar” is considered a precondition to political and economic “stability” (B26). On the entity levels, administrative structures to deliver social welfare and work are dysfunctional or strongly donor-dependent due to war damages, inefficient pre-war systems, insufficient administrative capacities, and divisions at the entity level and below.

As DfID plans to move from reconstruction to policy development and institutional reform, the lack of political will or obstructionism on the part of Bosnian authorities are to be countered by improved donor coherence to “maximize pressure for reform in key areas” (D4).203 The final section on future strategy summarizes the central dilemma of external actors. On the one hand, all donors in BiH are confronted with “opposition to reform by various vested interests” (E1) while, on the other, the international community has committed itself in the GFAP to “building a multi-ethnic, prosperous democracy”. Accordingly, the suggested strategy combines “persistent pressure ... with technical advice on how to pursue reforms” (E1), emphasizing that the “main players are the multilaterals” (E2). In the following paragraphs, the need to exert pressure and coordinate donor efforts is repeatedly highlighted. To the extent that Bosnian authorities figure as partners or direct addressees of DfID policies, they do so as recipients of capacity building and training measures. With a view to measures that are more directly linked to the legacy or causes of conflict, DfID supports multilateral

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203 To this end, DfID already cooperates with the World Bank, the EC, and USAID in the areas of social policy and social services delivery, the development of a poverty reduction strategy, and privatization and health financing.
initiatives, such as UNHCR’s return and reconciliation programme, the OHR’s strategy for reform of the justice system, and a variety of measures to establish “effective and independent media” (E16-22).

In sum, the 2000 CSP constitutes an agenda for socio-economic development cast in terms of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘improvement’ that is only loosely linked to the legacy and causes of the Bosnian war. DfID’s formal commitment to ‘preventing the re-emergence of conflict’ notwithstanding, issues such as ethnic or nationalist vested interests, while reported as key problems standing in the way of completing the reconstruction and transition process, are hardly addressed in their own right. Instead, improved donor coordination and pressure by the international community are supposed to overcome these hurdles. Concurrently, despite occasional references to the first signs of changing public opinion, there do not seem to be any explicit efforts to address these directly, or to encourage broader inclusion of civil society and other actors. The primary partners for DfID are the OHR and multilateral organisations, whose task is to steer a reform agenda similar to those in other transition countries, with or without the support of Bosnian authorities.

The 2000 CSP was drafted in the early days of the development of DfID’s institutional and conceptual instruments to facilitate a distinct conflict prevention policy. In particular, in 2001, DfID, the FCO, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) were explicitly commissioned to “i) improve the international community’s response to conflict by … mobilizing and supporting coherent bilateral and international action …; ii) … prevent new conflicts in priority countries and regions; and iii) address the national and regional causes of conflict by strengthening local conflict management systems.” To this end, the British government created two Conflict Prevention Pools to coordinate the activities of DfID, FCO, and MoD through joint funding mechanisms and integrated policy-making. As a 2004 portfolio review of previous ‘Pool’ activities argued, these

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204 Service Delivery Agreement Target No IX of 2001. SDAs were used between 1998 and 2010 as a tool for performance management and gradually increased the focus on departmental outputs, see <http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/case%20study%20psas.pdf> (20 Nov 2015).

205 Notwithstanding the focus on ‘prevention’ indicated in the Pool’s name, the “bulk of their resources continues to be spent in societies in the aftermath of the outbreak of large-scale deadly violence” (DfID 2004a: 23).

206 Originally, DfID was in charge of the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), while the FCO took responsibility for the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP), before the Pools were merged in 2008. The departments also cooperate through the Stabilisation Unit (SU), originally created for reconstruction in Afghanistan (Wilde 2006: 10-12). As for DfID, one third of the department’s priority countries will be ‘countries in crises or transition’, hence increasing the department’s
provisions “sought to make conflict prevention an integral part of development policies” by overcoming specific departmental ‘barriers’ or ‘biases’ through collaborative programming (DFID 2004a: 4). Examples of such barriers are the ‘inhibition’ of DFID towards funding military personnel for conflict prevention (DFID 2004a: 4-5). As the same report stated, while the work of the FCO, the MoD, and other security and intelligence agencies was informed by “classic threat-driven foreign and security policy” approach, DFID’s work is derived from a “security and development” perspective (DFID 2004a: 8).

To what extent, then, does DFID’s Regional Assistance Plan of 2004 reflect these new departures? The relevant Regional Assistance Plan (RAP)207 presents the department’s overall strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, and Albania. In line with DFID’s priorities, all RAPs follow the broad objectives of the MDGs, particularly poverty reduction. The 2004 RAP consists of two parts: an assessment of the context in the Western Balkans and the presentation of UK assistance strategy. The context assessment includes a discussion of “Poverty, conflict and transition”, a poverty profile, an overview on external actors in the Western Balkans, the process of EU integration and poverty reduction strategies, and an assessment of risks and lessons learned. Despite “serious structural problems” (DFID 2004: A1), the Western Balkans were found to have been little affected by poverty prior to “the conflict” (DFID 2004: A1).

Drawing on the ‘boiling pot’ theory of historic ethnic hatreds in the Balkans (Kaldor 2003), the economic downturn and the ensuing social and economic insecurity are seen to have contributed to the “resurgence of ethnic nationalism across the Yugoslav republics” (DFID 2004: A1) following a “period of relative stability and prosperity” under Tito’s rule (A2). The ensuing sudden “economic, political and social transition” is seen to have caused economic insecurity and declining incomes, which, in the case of Serbia, ultimately “helped bring Slobodan Milosevic to power” (A2).

The following paragraphs narrate the conflict, crimes against humanity such as ‘ethnic cleansing’, rape as a weapon of war, and displacement in the passive voice and primarily with a view to their humanitarian and developmental impact (A4). Overall, the situation in the Western Balkans is assessed as “fragile” and characterised by “continuing

focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding (Interviews with Conflict Adviser, DFID Chase, and with Security and Justice Adviser, SU, London July 2012; interview with Conflict Adviser, Stabilisation Unit/DFID, London February 2014).  
207 Regional Assistance Plans are drafted for “areas where DFID has smaller country programmes and where those countries are close geographically and face similar development challenges” (RAP 2004: i).
insecurity” and “unresolved constitutional issues” that are seen to have “undermined the ability and motivation of governments to address key development challenges” (A6). While most “immediate reconstruction needs” have been addressed, the most acute legacies of the war are landmines, unexploded ordnance, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and weak rule of law and border controls, which enable “organized crime, corruption and to a lesser extent, political extremism” (A7). The more detailed ‘Poverty Profile’ presents the Western Balkans as comprising middle-income countries (B9-B10), in which conflict and poverty constitute and cause each other: “While conflict and insecurity have contributed to the emergence of poverty and social exclusion, they have in turn contributed significantly to the instability and conflict in the region” (B15). In the present situation, poverty is stipulated to have enabled radical political parties – such as in the 2003 Serbian elections – and to have “provided an environment” that enabled organized criminals to exploit or undermine “fragile state institutions” (B15).

In essence, this account of the linkages between poverty and conflict presents poverty as key to addressing the persistence of conflict, instability, and insecurity in the Western Balkans. Unsurprisingly, beyond invoking the overall notions of ‘fragility’ and ‘insecurity’, the exact mechanisms by which poverty contributes to the rise of ethnic nationalism or to the resurgence of organized crime remain unexplained. This gives rise to the impression that, by framing the approach to poverty reduction in terms of conflict prevention or resolution for the purposes of this RAP, DFID merely satisfies the formal requirements of the increased focus of the British government on conflict prevention since 2000/2001, while actually aiming to fulfil its key mandate of poverty reduction from the 1997 and 2000 White Papers and the Service Delivery Agreements quoted above, particularly since this is also a necessary precondition to obtaining ODA funding.208 Nonetheless, particularly with regard to the long-term evolution of peacebuilding thought and best practices within the department, when taking this approach at face value, this assessment allows it to interpret and address conflict and organized crime in terms of poverty reduction and development. In contrast to the 2000 CSP, the earliest UNDP reports, and most of the reports of the UN Secretary-General for the entire period, DfID’s context assessment in the 2004 RAP almost entirely dispenses with an account of the role of political parties or nationalist politicians. In this vein, the insecurity and instability caused by poverty and economic transition explain not only the perceived inability, but also the lack of motivation or political will of public

208 Interview with Early Recovery and Peacebuilding Officer, FCO, London February 2014.
authorities to implement reforms. Insofar as conflict and poverty are explained by deeper structural factors, this effectively renders the intentions and agency of local parties irrelevant.

The ultimate precondition to DfID's overall objective, the reduction of poverty, is the creation of ‘stability’. With the exception of unresolved constitutional issues in BiH as mentioned above, the persistence of political instability as evidenced by "frequently changing, unstable coalitions (E29) and the persistence of "extremist and criminal networks” (DfID 2004: Annex 24) are hence removed from their political context and only discussed through the lens of poverty reduction, which requires political and economic stability. In this regard, while the RAP observes that “risks associated with conflict need to be addressed more directly” by “identify[ing] and address[ing] the potential causes of conflict”, these risks are subsequently defined as "social and economic exclusion, weak rule of law, limited access to justice, lack of political accountability, and unresolved constitutional issues” (RAP 2004: E31). As these provisions illustrate, within DfID's framework of poverty reduction, the causes of conflict are identified in terms of socio-economic and governance structures. The account constructs a niche for DfID to implement a donor-harmonization agenda that places all hope on an “incentive for change in the region” in the form of the process of EU integration (RAP 2004: D25). DfID's role in this process is seen to lie in ensuring the harmonization of Poverty Reduction Strategies with the requirements of the EU Stabilization and Accession Agreement and governmental ‘ownership’ (D25-27). Consequently, almost all potential problems identified in the ‘risk table’ are addressed in procedural terms, i.e. through reforms and incentives associated with and preparing EU integration.

DfID’s planned interventions are in line with the discussed agenda of increasing donor-harmonization and focusing on poverty reduction through improving administrative capacity and economic reform. DfID’s project portfolio and spending in BiH focused primarily on governance reform, which included the development of a ‘Social Inclusion Strategy’, private sector development, and the creation of integrated national planning mechanisms (DfID 2010). An example for this approach is the DfID-funded SPEM project on reforming public financial management, which was conducted by an independent management consultancy (PKF Consulting) between 2004 and 2011 (DfID 2010a). Only one DfID-funded project with a more explicit focus on conflict resolution could be identified. This was entitled Safety, Security, and Access to Justice in the Balkans (2002-2009) and was conducted by Atos Consulting Ltd. However, notwithstanding the
funding provided by DfID, the respective ‘Strategy for the Promotion of Safety, Security and Access to Justice in the Western Balkans’ was devised by the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) chaired by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.\footnote{The strategy comprised tasks that “respond to the social consequences of conflict”, “manage existing tensions”, and “prevent future conflicts by addressing some of the root causes of conflict” (DfID 2004: Annex 4). In particular, the FCO strategy sought to address democratization, inter-ethnic relations, and organized crime, and the MoD was in charge of a programme on security sector reform (SSR). From the limited information that is publicly available, it appears that these strategies also prioritize procedural activities geared to managing future conflict over the direct engagement with conflict parties.}

DfID’s overall approach bears some resemblance to what Richmond (2011) has called ‘peace as governance’ insofar as the focus lies entirely on preventing future instability or violent conflict through building state capacity, efficient institutions, and a prosperous “inclusive” economy. While defining a number of problems seen to result from the actions or inactions of nationalist or criminal elites and inter-communal tensions, the approach taken to addressing ‘the root causes of conflict’ is entirely framed in structural terms and consists of an improvement of capacities, if necessary supported by applying multilateral pressure, rather than an interaction with political agency, issues, or interests of any kind. Instead, in this understanding, “reconciliation and cooperation between the entities and ethnic groups” (DfID 2000: A10), as postulated by the 2000 Strategy Paper, are hoped to emerge on their own over time, with the prospect of economic progress and EU integration serving as an incentive or ‘glue’ (Mac Ginty 2011). In contrast to what the 1997 White Paper had DfID commissioned with, namely to “understand[...] the causes of conflict, and help[...] build the will and capacity of state and civil society to resolve disputes non-violently”, it is evident that DfID’s institutional understanding of peacebuilding in BiH favours the creation of conditions conducive to peace over actual efforts to ‘build’ or ‘make’ peace by directly engaging with the parties and their claims. As the previous paragraphs have shown, on the narrative level, this omission of parts of the institutional mandate and also of part of the “immediate purpose” of the BiH strategies is resolved by constructing poverty as a central driver and enabling factor of conflict.

As a bilateral development ministry, DfID, unlike the UNDP, is not formally committed to the principle of impartiality, but follows the policy lead of the FCO.\footnote{Interviews with Conflict Adviser, DfID, and with Early Recovery and Peacebuilding Officer, FCO, London February 2014.} Instead, the prioritization of structural factors within the department’s conflict prevention/peacebuilding work evidently owes as much to the department’s primary mandate on poverty reduction as to the institutional practices and identity of DfID as a
development agency. As suggested by the argument that development agencies constitute a community of practice (chapter 4.3), most development actors seek to avoid involvement in host-state politics (infra, chapter 4.3) and normally work on the basis of bilateral agreements negotiated at the intergovernmental level. Subject to the bargaining power of the recipient government, these agreements define the scope of legitimate ‘intervention’, development or otherwise. Against this backdrop, DfID’s increasing focus on donor coordination and on working through contributions to multilateral agencies in the areas of peace and conflict can be seen as an instrument of increasing the political “pressure for reform” (DfID 2000: D4) while adhering to standard developmental practices.

The implications of approaching conflict are aptly summarized by a 2004 DfID evaluation, which identified key differences between the operational cultures of the FCO/MoD on the one hand, and of DfID on the other. The operational culture of the FCO/MoD, termed a “classic threat-driven foreign and security policy”, is characterised by the following characteristics: rather than applying a “single manual on the general causes of conflict or best practices”, it relies on the competitive analytic skills of a number of disciplines which identify “the full diversity of possible causes of conflict” (DfID 2004a: 9). Secondly, such assessments are “specific to a country or specific to a locality inside a country” (id.). Thirdly, such analysis has “always accorded politics a clear position of supremacy over the structural underpinnings of conflict, be they economic, social or military” (DfID 2004a: 10). In contrast, the operational environment of DfID is characterised by the objective of rendering development progress sustainable by decreasing conflict, rather than by a ‘threat-driven’ security framework. In light of earlier practices, this operational culture attaches great importance to “grass-roots politics, to civil society and to the structural causes of violence” (ibid.). In contrast to the FCO and MoD, DfID does not command any in-house analytic or research capacity of its own. As the 2004 evaluation observes, “there has been a high degree of bureaucratic determinism at play because development agencies, such as DfID, have been the main advocates of the need to address the causes of conflict where the UK’s classic (geopolitical and economic) foreign and security interests were not seen to be in play” (DfID 2004a: 10).

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211 Interview with Desk Officer for Cooperation Programmes, BMZ, Bonn August 2012.
212 Interviews with Conflict Adviser, DfID, and with Early Recovery and Peacebuilding Officer, FCO, London February 2014.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has traced the transformation of external peacebuilding practices by the United Nations Development Programme and the British Department for International Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to the perceived persistence of (political) opposition or obstruction to international ‘implementation’ efforts. The rationale for focusing on the narratives of agents resulted from the close link between the identification of problems and solutions in the reports: both the UNDP and DfID are agencies that fund and implement programmes and projects and whose publications are either strategies for action or post-fact explanations and justifications thereof. As argued previously, the primary audience of such reports are agents within the peacebuilding field of practice, such as donors, international organisations, and, to a lesser extent, host-state institutions. For this reason, the narratives and practical reasoning employed can be assumed to reflect agents’ evolving reasoning on emerging ‘best practices’ for addressing violent conflict and building peace. With a view to identifying the most pertinent narrative patterns that had evolved during the Bosnian war and to establish linkages between agents’ identities and their practical reasoning, this analysis was situated within a broader analysis of foreign policy discourses and narratives that accompanied the Bosnian war, the Dayton Peace Accords, and the subsequent international reconstruction effort.

Regarding the discourses that accompanied the Bosnian war identified above, both the Genocide discourse and the essentialist version of the Balkan discourse are entirely omitted from the peacebuilding narratives of the UNDP, and only mentioned once, but not followed up upon, in the case of DfID. Particularly in the case of the Balkan discourse, this is hardly surprising, as the discourse, at least in its most extreme essentialist variant, would rule out any constructive peacebuilding intervention. Instead, the issue of ethnicity, while occasionally acknowledged as a problematic trait of the Bosnian context, is largely separated from the overall Bosnian population and replaced by nationalism and elite manipulation as a significant obstacle to peaceful progress. In turn, nationalism and elite politics are linked to organized crime, all of which are seen to thrive on the administrative fragmentation caused by the Dayton Accords, which is at once the key impediment and the central reference point of the Bosnian peacebuilding enterprise.
In the early stages of their involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both the UNDP and DfID initially focused on a purely developmental agenda, which assumed that economic prosperity and, in the case of DfID, the reduction of poverty would over time contribute to decreasing ethnic tension. To this effect, both agencies devised a series of measures geared towards furthering administrative structures, implementing economic reforms, and measures in the areas of social policy and regional development. However, in both cases, these efforts, as well as the efforts by other international agencies, were seen to be frustrated by the interaction between complicated administrative structures resulting in part from the GFAP and the perceived lack of political will or obstructionism by different Bosnian authorities.

According to UNDP assessments and strategy, ‘political and administrative divisions’ form the root causes of virtually all problems, and they are initially strongly linked to the interests of nationalist elites. As a consequence, in the earlier documents of 1997 and 2000, this problem is narratively solved by decoupling the population from the elites, and in parallel, ethnicity from nationalism, reconstructing the former as the prospective civil society and moving the latter closer to the realm of organized crime and corruption. This distinction between ‘manipulative nationalist elites’ on the one hand, and the victimized or ‘vulnerable’ Bosnian population on the other, narratively justifies the heightened focus on ‘civil society empowerment’ and also helps maintain the developmental and human rights frames. In effect, this strategy renders the political dimension of perceived problems irrelevant and empowers both the central state and, owing in no small part to the depoliticization of the issues at hand, professedly impartial international agencies.

In the case of DfID, the agency of Bosnian authorities or elites plays an even smaller part, as DfID focuses most of its bilateral assistance on the coordination and harmonization of the activities of the donor community. Despite the explicit invocation of the so-called ‘boiling pot’ theory, that is the paradigm of long-standing ethnic hatreds in the region which were suppressed but not resolved under Tito, the key factor to understanding instability and conflict in BiH and the Western Balkans appears to be ‘poverty’. Building on a causal narrative in which political conflict and instability on the one hand, and poverty on the other, mutually constitute and reinforce each other, DfID’s approach to preventing conflict in BiH relies almost exclusively on improving the economic situation in general and reducing poverty in particular. In comparison to UNDP assessments, the problems of lacking political will or elite nationalism play a relatively small role and are primarily addressed by calling on ‘the international community’ to exert further
pressure on the parties and by providing a strong incentive through the process of EU integration. DFID thus stands in marked contrast to the UNDP which, rather than calling for increased donor pressure, initially (up until 2000) relied on a developmental frame to justify its state-building and governance agenda and later sought to increase the pressure on Bosnian authorities and exclude ‘obstructionist’ entity authorities through a combination of the developmental and human rights or ‘rights-based’ frame as encapsulated in the MDGs and the Bosnian constitution.

Both DFID and the UNDP are development agencies. It is hence hardly surprising that both agencies initially applied a developmental logic according to which progress in the economic and governance sectors will in the long run help overcome existing societal tensions. Over time, as this approach failed to yield the expected outcomes, DFID in particular increasingly called on other actors to increase the pressure and incentives vis-à-vis the parties. As the UNDP, unlike DFID, is committed to the principle of impartiality and political neutrality, it increasingly based its reasoning on separating ‘ordinary civilians’ from ‘nationalist elites’ on the one hand and on the invocation of international human rights law and the MDGs on the other. By contrast, DFID’s primary institutional focus on poverty eradication in cooperation with the Bosnian government is manifest in an agenda that largely reframes the conflict in BiH as resulting from economic insecurity during the country’s transition process, and increasingly relies on the concerted action of multilateral bodies.

In sum, both agencies reframe the Bosnian ‘context’ according to their ‘needs’ or, to be precise, their respective institutional scope of action. This seems less surprising in the early stages of their involvement as ‘development agencies’, not least since both organisations only started to extend their institutional expertise in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, when their efforts met with difficulties, neither agency was willing or able to directly engage with the identified ‘obstructions’ to progress in BiH. Based on their own strategic assessments, such a direct engagement would have implied confronting alternative explanations for the reported persistence of political extremism on the one hand, and changes or revisions of the administrative structures as foreseen by the GFAP on the other. Yet both of these options were evidently considered to be ‘off limits’. Instead, ‘peacebuilding’ or ‘conflict prevention’ was effectively understood in procedural rather than substantive terms. In other words, the Bosnian context is narratively constructed in such a way as to depoliticize the persistence of conflict and instability, be it through focusing on ‘ordinary civilians’ as victims or as the promising agents of a future civil
society to ensure government accountability, or through reframing the causes and chief impacts of conflict in terms of human rights, economic development, and social inclusion. As the analysis has shown, this reframing of the Bosnian context enabled the UNDP and DfID to retain their agendas and standard practices, including impartiality in the case of UNDP, by effectively writing politics and (individual or communal) agency out of the picture and replacing them with the depoliticized representation of a transition country in need of better ‘governance.’ In effect, then, this policy approaches peacebuilding as building the structural or governance conditions for future peace to prevail.

Several authors have deconstructed and criticized the liberal content of such peacebuilding policies (e.g. Richmond 2005, *infra* chapter 2), yet the analysis presented in this chapter suggests that a key problem of peacebuilding interventions in BiH lies elsewhere: in the unwillingness of external actors to engage with the relevant actors in the actual political process needed to address or negotiate the causes and ongoing dynamics of conflict. In other words, regardless of the pitfalls and shortcomings of the liberal peace paradigm as such, in light of the persistence of political conflict in the country, the key problem appears to be that international actors’ shied away from actually attempting to ‘build’ or ‘make’ peace, instead relying on approaches geared towards cooperatively sustaining peace once it has been attained. In a nutshell, the problem with this approach to peacebuilding is that it presupposes the prior existence of the parties’ genuine commitment to peace, rather than working towards generating or consolidating this commitment. As this analysis has shown, this practice results to a considerable degree from institutional characteristics and commitments of the agencies tasked with ‘building peace’, as these clearly delimit and precondition the kinds of interventions that are considered feasible within their institutional mandates and identities.

Why should this be a problem? After all, it could be argued that development agencies, for instance, are simply not equipped to engage in political contestation and should restrict their efforts to redressing structural issues such as inequality (or, to be precise, their non-political aspects). However, coming back to peacebuilders’ initial premises, more often than not, peacebuilding is conducted in heavily contested environments that might require some form of ‘local peacemaking’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 14), rather than in ‘post-conflict’ environments as originally understood. Even if one was to follow the propositions of the liberal peace paradigm, it is difficult to see how peacebuilding can be successful if it is restricted to establishing institutions for the peaceful
negotiation of future conflicts, without being willing or able to acknowledge and engage with ongoing ‘political’ agency on those precise terms. By contrast, the analysis of the evolving approaches of the UNDP and DfID in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown the extent to which the persistence of political obstruction has prompted these agencies to revise their portfolios in such ways as to enable them to pursue their objectives in spite of the resistance of public authorities and local stakeholders. This conundrum might be part of the answer why peacebuilding fails to reach its ‘full potential’ (Autesserre 2014), but it likely accounts for why peacebuilding persists in its current ‘depoliticized’ form.
INTRODUCTION

On 30 August 1999, the population of East Timor, the eastern half of the small island of Timor situated in the east of the Indonesian archipelago, was called upon to determine the territory’s political status: integration and special autonomy within the Indonesian state, or independence. Following four centuries of Portuguese colonialism and two and a half decades of Indonesian occupation, the Indonesian government had eventually agreed to a referendum following extended talks between successive UN Secretary-Generals and the Portuguese and Indonesian governments. Notwithstanding violent intimidation campaigns by pro-Indonesian militias prior to the referendum, 78.5 per cent of the electorate opted for independence. As many observers and had feared (Robinson 2010), within hours of the announcement of these results on 4 September, armed pro-Indonesian militias backed by the Indonesian army ventured on a campaign of killings and destruction (Ofstad 2012: 7). On 20 September 1999, a UN-authorized International Force (INTERFET) arrived on the island to restore security and end the killing, prompting many militias to cross the border into Indonesian West Timor. Shortly thereafter, the Security Council established the UN Transitional Administration of East Timor (UNTAET) to “exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice” in the territory to prepare for East Timorese independence (S/RES/1272: 2).

At the time, UN Secretary-General Annan described INTERFET’s fast response as ‘the UN’s finest hour’ (Robertson 2006: 499). Internationally, the UN’s intervention in East Timor was widely regarded as a ‘test case’ for the UN to demonstrate its continued relevance and credibility, not least since the post-referendum violence had occurred in direct defiance of a Security Council mandate (Traub 88: 2000). Given Indonesia’s consent to international intervention and the dispersal of the militias, international peacekeepers and peacebuilders, while acknowledging the daunting challenge of
building a functioning state from scratch, anticipated little or no difficulties in regard to renewed violent conflict. Writing in 2000, Traub (2000: 88) summarized the overarching sentiment by comparing East Timor to Sierra Leone and the DR Congo: “These are the hard cases of peacekeeping; East Timor is an easy one. East Timor actually poses a different question: Where peace or at least relative calm has been achieved, can the U.N. foster political stability, economic development, and reliable and responsive democratic institutions?”

In light of the withdrawal of the Indonesian armies and the East Timorese militias, the challenge perceived was one of filling the “empty shell” (Hebert-Lemay 2011) of East Timorese statehood to quickly facilitate the country’s independence. As in the earlier case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, international actors deployed to East Timor with the purpose of creating a new, liberal democratic state. In contrast to the earlier case, by late 1999 the UN, its specialized agencies, donors, and other peacebuilding agents had begun to gather considerable experience with so-called ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding within states. Particularly in terms of the deployed personnel, UNTAET drew heavily on UNMIK’s experiences in Kosovo and included several experts and templates from that operation (Smith and Dee 2003; Weinlich 2014: 122). The peacebuilding project in East Timor also differs from the multilateral approach taken in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and Kosovo), as UNTAET and its follow-up missions have exclusively been conducted by the UN (Weinlich 2014: 122). However, as this chapter will argue, the most important difference between external peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina and East Timor results from the different nature of the relationship between external peacebuilders and local, particularly government, actors. As the previous chapter has demonstrated, peacebuilders in Bosnia and Herzegovina have persistently tried to ‘build peace’ against or at least despite some of the parties. In contrast, not only did international actors expect East Timor to be an “easy”, i.e. relatively non-conflictual, case (Traub 2000: 88), but also displayed a considerable degree of faith in some of the most prominent East Timorese interlocutors, most of all the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate José Ramos-Horta, who subsequently became a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Guinea-Bissau in 2013.

In short, the peacebuilding challenge in East Timor was primarily anticipated in terms of statebuilding and development tasks, as the overall political situation was taken to be less hostile or averse to reconciliation. However, this expectation was fundamentally challenged in 2006 by the political crisis and violent clashes that once again generated large-scale displacement. Against this backdrop, the present chapter will trace the
transformation of external peacebuilding practices in the nascent state in the first decade following the referendum (1999-2010), focusing particularly on the extent to which external peacebuilders adjusted their earlier approaches in the wake of the 2006 crisis. As in the case study of peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the chapter commences with an overview of relevant foreign policy responses that preceded the referendum and peacebuilding deployment to East Timor to identify pertinent discourses, before turning to an investigation of the executive level of the peacebuilding field and of UNDP peacebuilding practices in the country.

In contrast to the approach taken in the earlier case study, the following analysis only zooms in on one agency, the UN Development Programme. This approach was chosen given the expansive scope of UNDP involvement in the country, which complemented, and subsequently took over, the key programme areas of successive UN missions, including the key areas of justice and governance, and hence generated an abundance of source material. In contrast to the Bosnian case, the source material available on UNDP’s engagement in East Timor also includes copious material that was produced for planning, implementing, and evaluating individual programmes and projects, thus allowing for a much more in-depth assessment of UNDP practices. However, the decision to focus primarily on the UNDP is also warranted by the fact that the UK government increasingly delimited the number of its partner countries and took to working through multilateral agencies as was already evident in the latter stages of its contribution to peacebuilding in Bosnia.

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213 Interview with Conflict Adviser, DfID CHASE, July 2012.
215 To the extent that the UK government participated in specific projects in East Timor, these were conducted by its Global Conflict Prevention Pool led by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) rather than the Department for International Development (DfID).
7.1 THE TIMORESE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY RESPONSES IN NARRATIVE CONTEXT

The island of Timor has been divided into its western and eastern (East Timor, Timor-Leste as of independence in 2002) parts since colonial times. The western part, which since 1949 belongs to the Indonesian province East Nusa Tenggara, was formerly under Dutch colonial rule (the Dutch East Indies). The eastern part was under Portuguese colonial rule from 1642, with a brief intermission during the Japanese occupation in World War II. Portugal withdrew from East Timor following the Portuguese Carnation Revolution of 1974. At the time, two major Timorese parties emerged: the conservative Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and the popular left-wing Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN). Fretilin rapidly succeeded in expanding its support base among the rural population and favoured immediate independence from Portugal. UDT originally advocated independence following a period of Portuguese ‘tutelage’ and had its strongest support base in the western, agriculturally more developed, and wealthier parts of the country and among colonial civil servants (Robinson 2010: 30, but see Brown 2012: 62). A third, smaller party, Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Association) campaigned for the integration of East Timor as a province of Indonesia. It was openly supported by Indonesian authorities, but received little support among the East Timorese (Robinson 2010: 33).

Fretilin and UDT initially formed a coalition propagating self-determination in spring 1975, which fell apart after UDT had renounced the coalition amidst purported fears of growing communist tendencies in Fretilin’s radical wing, opting instead for cooperation with Apodeti and Indonesia (Robinson 2010: 33; West 2007). As Robinson (2010: 6, 34-37) demonstrates, growing tensions between the two major parties were considerably exacerbated by Indonesian interference and covert, partially paramilitary operations. In August 1975, tensions escalated into a brief, but intense civil war triggered by an armed UDT coup attempt, which was defeated by Fretilin and its armed wing, FALINTIL. Fretilin declared East Timorese independence on 28 November and formed a provisional government. Shortly thereafter, Indonesia invaded East Timor under the pretext of Portuguese inaction and concerns over Fretilin’s alleged communist

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216 The eastern part also includes the exclaves Oecussi Ambeno and the islands of Atauro and Jaco.

217 The acronym derives from the party’s Portuguese name, União Democrática Timorense.

218 Portuguese: Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (FreTILIn). The party was initially named ASDT (Associação Social Democrática Timorense/Timorese Social Democratic Association).

219 The acronym derives from the party’s Portuguese name, Associação Popular Democrática Timorense.

220 The acronym derives from Forças Armadas da Libertaçao Nacional de Timor-Leste.
tendencies. In July 1976, Indonesia formally annexed East Timor as a province. This status notwithstanding, the territory was effectively governed by the Indonesian military (West 2007: 316). FALINTIL largely comprised the units of East Timor’s former military and continued to resist Indonesian rule with widespread popular support. Competing estimates indicate that in the following 24 years of Indonesian rule and the guerrilla war up, to 200,000 East Timorese or 25 per cent of the population were killed (Murphy 2006: 340; West 2007: 316; Braithwaite 2012: 285).221

At the time, the Indonesian annexation of East Timor met with little international opposition. While the US government had signalled its acquiescence prior to the invasion (CAVR 2005), neither the Australian government nor other Western governments such as Portugal or the UK sought to deter the Indonesian government during the original invasion or thereafter (Braithwaite et al. 2012). Additionally, Indonesia “could count on many friends in the UN” (Weinlich 2014: 94) among Asian/ASEAN, non-aligned, and Islamic countries, many of which considered the question of East Timor an internal matter.222 The US government continued to provide the Indonesian armed forces with military equipment (Taylor 1999: 84). The Australian government, in turn, not only recognized “Indonesia’s concern that the territory should not be allowed to become a source of instability on Indonesia’s border”,223 but was also the only state to officially recognize the annexation (Weaver 2004: 11; Robinson 2010: 37, FN 90). By contrast, the UN General Assembly "strongly deplore[d] the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor" (GA Res 3485, in Krieger 1997: 123), called on the Indonesian government to respect the East Timorese right to self-determination, and maintained this claim in a series of resolutions throughout the following years. Accordingly, from 1960 up until its independence in 2002, East Timor remained on the General Assembly’s list of Non-Self-Governing Territories (Weaver 2004: 14). The Security Council admonished all parties to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor, but did not take any further action on the matter (S/RES/384 of 22 Dec 1975). As the United Nations did not acknowledge the annexation, the General Assembly only removed East Timor from its agenda in 1982 on

221 See also the 2005 Report by the UN-mandated Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR) or Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste, which worked from 2002 to 2005 as an independent statutory authority with an UNTAET mandate.

222 Weinlich (2014: 93-96) provides a detailed discussion of the positions of most regional and Western states.

the condition that the Secretary-General undertook to seek a negotiated solution (Robinson 2010: 86).

Given its gradual military defeat, in the 1980s the East Timorese resistance began to restructure itself in a series of reforms that sought to emphasize the unity of national resistance beyond divisive party affiliations. It also increasingly targeted an international audience through diplomacy. Under Gusmão’s leadership, the first umbrella resistance organisation was established, the National Council of Revolutionary Resistance (CRRN),\(^{224}\) whose creation indicated a “shift away from direct armed confrontation and toward a more inclusive political strategy” (Robinson 2010: 79). In 1988, following a period of short-lived coalition attempts between Fretilin, UDT, and a number of smaller parties, the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM)\(^{225}\) was created under the leadership of Gusmão, with José Ramos-Horta representing the resistance in exile. To emphasize national unity, in 1987 Gusmão resigned from his role as leader of Fretilin and proclaimed FALINTIL a non-partisan organisation akin to that of a national army. These changes reflected an acknowledgement that combining the armed struggle with “the language of militant anti-colonialism had failed to win international sympathy, maybe undermining it” (Robinson 2010: 79). Instead, the political arm of the East Timorese resistance gradually adopted a strategy of peaceful resistance that increasingly drew on the language of universal human rights, or as Robinson (2010: 83) puts it, “a language that would be most readily absorbed and understood by an international audience.” These strategies notwithstanding, the plight of East Timorese self-determination only gained increased international attention and support in the wake of the 1991 massacre of pro-independence demonstrators by Indonesian armed forces at Dili’s Santa Cruz cemetery (Braithwaite 2010: 286). While the Indonesian government continued to ‘warn’ of the political immaturity and impending ‘Balkanization’ of the country if granted independence (Robinson 2010: 91; UN COI 2000), this claim was explicitly countered by the creation of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT)\(^{226}\) in 1998 as an East Timorese non-partisan coalition.

CNRT emphasized national unity and succeeded in joining supporters of Fretilin, UDT, and Apodeti for the first time since 1975. After the fall of President Suharto and amidst multiple domestic crises (West 2007: 316), the new Indonesian President Habibie gave in to international pressure to hold a ‘popular consultation’ (A/53/951; 1). This

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224 Portuguese: *Conselho Revolucionária de Resistência Nacional.*
225 Portuguese: *Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere.*
226 Portuguese: *Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense.*
agreement was brokered by the UN Secretary-General with the government of Indonesia and co-signed by the government of Portugal on 5 May 1999. While the Indonesian government had originally advocated a plan to grant ‘special autonomy’ to East Timor within Indonesia, the referendum offered the population the choice between autonomy or independence. In the case of a vote in favour of independence, the parties agreed to a “peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations” (A/53/951: 2) to prepare the territory’s transition. Most observers agree that Habibie’s concession was in all likelihood based on the assumption that the referendum could be ‘won’ (Robinson 2010: 96), hence opposing the deployment of international peacekeepers to oversee the referendum. UN efforts at brokering this agreement were substantially supported by a ‘Group of Friends of the Secretary-General’ created in early 1999, a group of up to 30 interested states. Out of these, a smaller ‘core group’ was formed, comprising Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the UK, and the US. As Weinlich (2014: 104) claims, the group’s composition reflected considerations that mixed political expedience (Australia), sympathy for the Timorese cause (New Zealand), and reassurance to Indonesia (Japan) with political and material leverage and the presence of a (purportedly) disinterested and impartial state (UK), while excluding Portugal and Indonesia.

The Popular Consultation, UNAMET, and INTERFET
On 11 June 1999, the UN Security Council authorized the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organize and oversee the planned referendum. UNAMET consisted of the police/military and three civilian branches to organize and oversee the referendum and monitor the conduct of the Indonesian police and military (S/RES/1246: 11). With little time to prepare, UNAMET became operational in June 1999 with a mandate to inform the population and prepare and hold the referendum. The decision to leave public order and security in the hands of the Indonesian military and police was at odds with the stated concerns of the UN Secretary-General of spring and summer 1999, who noted “credible reports ... of political violence, including intimidation and killings, by armed militias against unarmed pro-independence civilians” (S/1999/595: 22). The referendum was twice postponed to 30 August amidst security concerns, but went ahead as almost all political actors outside the UN Secretariat, including the East Timorese leadership, wanted to seize the window of opportunity of Indonesian acquiescence (Robinson 2010: ch. 6; Weinlich 2014: 104-106).
Despite the intimidation campaign, the overall turnout of the referendum was 98.6 per cent, with an overwhelming vote of 78.5 per cent in favour of independence (UN COI 2000: 13). Immediately after the announcement of the results, the armed militias and Indonesian military responded with violent attacks and a ‘scorched earth’ policy that killed more than 1,400 people and displaced an estimated 550,000 (Ofstad 2012: 7).²²⁷

In light of the East Timorese political crisis of 2006, it is interesting to note that already before the referendum, in his earliest reports of May 1999, the Secretary-General noted not only the conflict line between Indonesia and the East Timorese resistance, but likewise emphasized "a pressing need for reconciliation between the various competing factions within East Timor ... between the pro-independence and pro-integration sides" (S/1999/595: 33, emphasis added).

Following the ballot and its bloody aftermath, the strongest condemnation of the behaviour of the TNI, local police, and the decisions taken by the Indonesian government was issued in the Report of the Security Council Mission to Jakarta and Dili of 14 September 1999 (S/1999/976).²²⁸ The mission announced it had "no doubt that large elements in the military and police authorities had been complicit in organizing and supporting the action of the militias" (S/1999/976: 3). It reported concurring statements, including by CNRT leader Gusmão, that armed violence had not been a result of inner-Timorese tensions and hence a civil war, but one-sided and systematically prepared for by pro-Indonesian militias and Indonesian armed forces.

Stopping short of denouncing statements by Indonesian authorities as outright lies (which were nonetheless referred to as “nonsense”, 16), the mission recognized the "extremely sensitive time in internal Indonesian politics" (25), which might account for the careful and considerate inclusion of the Indonesian government in subsequent Security Council resolutions. The mission and the attached report by UNAMET concluded that the violence had been employed to pursue a "'scorched earth' policy in

²²⁷ Given earlier experiences during the UN-monitored referendum in West Papua in 1969, "many in the Indonesian military leadership believed they could intimidate independence supporters from voting by threats of violence and could deliver sufficient carrots for supporters of Indonesia...so that the independence ballot would be defeated" (Braithwaite 2012: 286). Annex II of the General Agreement between the government of Indonesia and the UN had highlighted “that the absolute neutrality of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian police was essential” (S/1999/595: 22) to conducting the ballot. The Secretary-General, while noting the cooperation and repeated assurances issued by Indonesian authorities, also observed that “militias, believed...to be operating with the acquiescence of elements of the army, have ... begun to attack pro-independence groups, but are beginning to threaten moderate pro-integration supporters as well” (23).

²²⁸ The Security Council, despite noting that violence occurred in a systematic way, rather emphasized the “individual responsibility” of perpetrators and called on the parties to cooperate in necessary investigations (S/RES/1246; S/RES/1272: 12).
East Timor, including systematic killings of the intelligentsia and the large-scale relocation and displacement of the population, under the direction of the Indonesian military”, possibly amounting to “the first stages of a genocidal campaign” (Annex 1,4,6). In conclusion, both the Security Council Mission and UNAMET staff clearly ruled out the narrative forwarded by Indonesian authorities of a civil war “conducted by frustrated and insecure civilians” (9). After the Indonesian government finally agreed to an international peacekeeping presence on 15 September, the Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the Charter and authorized the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) to employ “all necessary measures” to “restore peace and security in East Timor” (S/1999/976: 2, 3).

As this brief outline of the events leading up to the creation of the UN international transitory administration illustrates, the same opposing narrative patterns accompanied the Indonesian invasion and occupation of 1975/76 and the referendum and violence of 1999. At the time of the invasion, the Indonesian government had justified the annexation by arguing that the conflict between UDT and Fretilin was evidence for East Timor’s inability to rule itself and the ‘threat’ of communism. In 1999, following the violence surrounding the referendum, the Indonesian government employed a similar narrative, depicting the conflict as a Timorese civil war. In response, the Timorese resistance explicitly adopted a strategy of non-partisanship (Robinson 2010: 79), with the East Timorese leadership urging non-violence after the referendum. The Indonesian narrative was strongly denounced by the Security Council Mission to East Timor, which emphasized the role of the Indonesian army in inciting and orchestrating militia violence, and to a lesser extent by the Secretary-General. Most contemporary observers expected the conflict to have been resolved with the withdrawal of Indonesia/the Indonesian army from the territory. This, in turn, led to the assumption that the peacekeeping operation in East Timor would be “an easy one” (Traub 2000: 88). Following this logic, the primary challenge was defined as preparing East Timorese statehood “from scratch” (Vieira de Mello 1999)230 in the run-up to independence, rather than as conflict resolution or peacemaking in the narrow sense. This sentiment is well encapsulated in the 2000 portrayal by Chopra (2000: 28), who had resigned from UNTAET earlier that year: “there were conditions for success that are rarely available to

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229 Indonesian agreement had been the precondition to the assent of China and Russia within the Security Council. INTERFET’s ability to deploy within a week of the respective resolution was due to the fact that the Australian government had initiated mobilization already in March 1999 (Robinson 2010: 188).

peace missions. The belligerent power had completely withdrawn .... There was a single interlocutor with which to negotiate ... rather than a myriad of unstable factions.” As these statements illustrate, peacebuilders did not expect a tangible degree of political conflict that would have required peacemaking efforts in the narrow sense. Against this backdrop, the following sections will trace the transformation of peacemaking practices in East Timor/Timor-Leste at the executive level of the peacebuilding field and in the case of the UNDP in particular. In so doing, the analysis will trace the process by which successive UN missions and external peacebuilders in East Timor gradually turned their primary attention away from fostering friendly relations between the Indonesian and Timorese governments to addressing tensions within Timor-Leste’s leadership and society, i.e. from inter- to intra-state conflict, and from statebuilding and reconstruction to peacemaking.

7.2 FROM STATEBUILDING TO PEACEMAKING: EVOLVING CONFIGURATIONS OF THE PEACEBUILDING FIELD IN TIMOR-LESTE

In contrast to Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding in East Timor did not draw on a peace agreement in the narrow sense, but on the ‘mandate’ issued by the Timorese referendum and formulated by the Security Council. As noted above, the UN-brokered agreement ‘on the question of East Timor’ of May 1999 had been concluded between the governments of Indonesia and Portugal, who, while recording their opposing “positions of principle on the prepared proposal for special autonomy” (S/1999/513: 5), had commissioned the Secretary-General with the consultation of the East Timorese population. Accordingly, in the case of East Timor, there does not seem to have been a single a priori dominant narrative that tied together all actors in the peacebuilding field to the extent that the Dayton Peace Accords had done in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, as the following paragraphs will show, in the early days of the peacebuilding endeavour, the major concern of the UN in regard to conflict and security was the development of the bilateral relationship with Indonesia, and to a lesser extent, the presence of militias in West Timorese refugee camps situated in the vicinity of the border.

The UN International Transitory Administration of East Timor (UNTAET)
The Security Council authorized the International Transitional Administration of East Timor (UNTAET) in October to “exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice” (S/RES/1272: 2). UNTAET’s task comprised three pillars: humanitarian assistance, military and public security, and governance/civil administration. An additional task was the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed following the referendum through the establishment of UNTAET’s Serious Crimes Unit (SCU). In regard to addressing tensions or conflict within East Timorese society, UNTAET’s objectives also included the development of dialogue mechanisms and confidence-building, but otherwise focused predominantly on statebuilding. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Sergio Vieira de Mello, was appointed Transitional Administrator in charge of all mission components, including peacekeeping as of February 2000 (S/2000/53: 25). By contrast, economic reconstruction and institution building were seen to fall within the remit of development agencies operating independently of the mission (Conflict, Security and Development Group 2003: 26). According to one estimate, within the subsequent decade, the UN, World Bank, and about 50 international donors contributed up to USD 4 billion to peacebuilding, statebuilding, and reconstruction in East Timor (Ofstad 2012: 3).

At the time, UNTAET was the most comprehensive and invasive ITA thus far established by the UN, whose “intrusive civil affairs and rule of law functions became a model for subsequent complex peace operations” (Weinlich 2014: 89). Drawing to a considerable extent on the lessons learned in setting up UNMIK in Kosovo and recruiting former UNMIK staff, the experiences in setting up UNTAET in turn informed the recommendations of the Brahimi Report of 2000 (Smith and Dee 2003; see infra ch. 5).

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231 The Security Council mandated UNTAET: “a. to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; b. to establish an effective administration; c. to assist in the development of civil and social services; d. to ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; e. to support capacity-building for self-government; f. to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development” (S/RES/1272: 2-3).

232 In addition to civilian staff, UNTAET was to comprise up to 1,640 police officers, 8,950 troops, and 200 military observers and was equipped with a Chapter VII mandate.

233 A Trust Fund was established by the Secretary-General to finance relief and rehabilitation work. It superseded earlier mechanisms set up to finance UNAMET and INTERFET. Subsequent peacekeeping deployments to Timor-Leste were primarily funded from the UN’s assessed peacekeeping budget.

234 Since the end of the Cold War and prior to UNTAET in East Timor, the UN Security Council had established formal ITAs in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium/Croatia (UNTAES), Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR), Kosovo (UNMIK), and Cambodia (UNTAC), which was, however, limited to supervisory powers. Previously, the UN had established its first ITA in West Papua Guinea in 1962/3 (UNTEA) (Caplan 2005).
However, within the UN Secretariat, there was significant discontinuity between UNAMET, INTERFET, and UNTAET, as responsibility was transferred from DPA to DPKO upon the creation of the peacekeeping operation (Weinlich 2014: 101). Prior to the violence and the deployment of peacekeepers, the DPA had taken the lead regarding the ‘question of East Timor’, as negotiations with the Indonesian government had been “dealt with from a peacemaking angle,” with the UN Secretariat “playing the role of the neutral negotiator” (Weinlich 2014: 96). As Chopra (2000: 28) recounts, the departmental transfer that accompanied the deployment of peacekeepers led to a “significant loss of continuity in planning and leadership ... in the transmission of in-theatre knowledge and experience from UNAMET to UNTAET. Subsequent planners failed to draft a political-military campaign plan, and instead only produced an organisational diagram and staffing table.” Persistent turf battles and competition between the two departments at the time likely compounded the administration’s continuity problems (Weinlich 2014: 117; 115-118; Chopra 2000). Aside from gaps in the hand-over between the two departments, which crucially included continuity in handling contacts with the Timorese leadership, DPKO also lacked expertise in a number of relevant fields such as civil administration. Nonetheless, it largely planned the mission in isolation from other specialized agencies and the World Bank. Weinlich (2014: 117, 118) holds that DPKO considered DPA’s previous engagement as having been “biased in favour” of the East Timorese resistance, striving towards greater equidistance towards local stakeholders. Ultimately, DPKO’s planning warped the design of UNTAET towards the short time frames associated with peacekeeping planning, “focused on structures rather than on processes”, and insufficiently recognized changing situations within the country (Conflict, Security and Development Group 2003, cited in Weinlich 2014: 120).

In contrast to other operations, UNTAET had a clear exit strategy in the form of East Timorese independence. To this end, it was expected to closely consult with the Timorese population (Chopra 2002; Chesterman 2004). However, the adoption of a ‘peacekeeping framework’ for UNTAET had implications not only in regards to the kind of tasks to be conducted within the frame of that operation, but also with regards to the cooperation with East Timorese actors (Chopra 2002: 996-7). On the one hand, the Secretary-General singled out specific East Timorese actors for praise. He lauded the CNRT and FALINTIL for having “moved into the vacuum of local authority, and in some places asserted a security role” during the post-ballot violence. Gusmão was commended for having executed “an effective leadership role” (S/2000/53: 3). DPKO, on
the other hand, based on an understanding of the situation in the country as an internal conflict rather than a process of decolonisation, “strived to be inclusive, which also meant bringing in those who had favoured ... integration in Indonesia” (Weinlich 2014: 123). This implied that no East Timorese party be given preference over any other. According to Weinlich (2014: 123), this peacekeeping approach also reflected “the sentiment that there was not enough information about the nature of the East Timorese independence movement”, pointing to the recent difficulties experienced in cooperating with the Kosovo Liberation Army by much of the planning staff. Given the subsequent political crises, the adoption of a peacekeeping framework for UNTAET seems justified in hindsight. At the time, however, it led to massive discontent among the East Timorese leadership and sustained criticisms regarding the paternalistic approach adopted by the UN (Chopra 2000, 2002).

Initially, the main instrument for Timorese participation was the National Consultative Council (NCC). This body was comprised of 15 members: seven representatives of the CNRT, a representative of the Catholic Church, and three members of ‘pro-Indonesia’ political groups, plus four UNTAET representatives (S/200/53: 4). In the summer of 2000, the NCC was reconstituted as the all-Timorese National Council (NC). Its 36 representatives came from the country’s 13 districts, political parties, and religious groups, and elected Gusmão as their speaker. The NC was to “initiate, modify, and recommend draft regulations” for the new state and was complemented by a mixed transitional Cabinet, the East Timorese Transitional Administration (ETTA) (Chesterman 2004: 138-140). However, tensions arising from navigating between Timorese ownership on the one hand and international government on the other, as well as controversial views regarding these groups’ claims to representation, led to considerable conflict within UNTAET (Chesterman 2004: 137). In addition, the “UN’s direct rule generated deep resentment among the Timorese” (Murphy 2006: 340; Traub 2000: 85) and was accompanied by criticisms regarding the heavy-handed nature of the intervention and the suitability of its international staff (Chopra 2000, 2002).

Transitioning to independence and development: UNMISET and UNOTIL

235 Other means of East Timorese participation included the establishment of the Transitional Judicial Service Commission and introduction of Timorese deputy district administrators who were to be supervised by international ‘district operators’ (Chesterman 2004: 137).
In 2001, elections to the Constituent Assembly and for the presidency were held. UNTAET was replaced by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) to continue the work on infrastructure, public administration, law enforcement, and defence capacities, with the overall objective of facilitating “a smooth transition of the UN role towards traditional development assistance” (S/RES/1410: 1). Like its predecessor, UNMISET had three programme areas that focused on Stability, Democracy, and Justice; Public Security and Law Enforcement; and External Security and Border Control (4), with the advancement of human rights principles as a cross-cutting priority. The operation was to devolve all operational responsibilities to Timorese authorities as soon as possible. To this end, the Security Council persistently urged the mission to increase coordination with donors and other peacebuilding actors to “start immediate planning for a smooth transition from a peacekeeping operation to a sustainable development assistance framework” (S/2005/99: 1).

The major UN agencies each took over programme areas from UNTAET that corresponded with their topical expertise. The UNDP took charge of the governance component and subsequently directed programmes in the area of ‘governance and public sector management, judiciary, civil society, civic education, poverty alleviation and infrastructure rehabilitation’ (S/2002/432). Upon independence in May 2005, UNMISET was replaced by the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) as a political mission to organize the “immediate planning for a smooth and rapid transition from a special political mission to a sustainable development assistance framework within a year (S/2005/533: 10). UNOTIL’s three programme areas broadly resembled those of UNMISET.

The conclusion of UNMISET also coincided with the conclusion of the Serious Crimes Process and Serious Crimes Unit that had been established to address the violence that had surrounded the 1999 referendum. By May 2005, the unit had only investigated and tried “fewer than half of the estimated 1,450 murders” committed in the aftermath of the referendum (S/2005/533: 49). The East Timorese Truth, Reception, and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR) had dealt with some ‘minor’ cases, but the remainder was handed over to the justice sector supported by UN civilian advisers. In this, like in all policy areas that UNOTIL had inherited, the mission intensified efforts to

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236 The mandate focused on three elements: “a. assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor; b. the (provision) of interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service (ETPS); c. to contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of East Timor” (2).
find development partners\textsuperscript{237} to take over civilian adviser posts and other responsibilities to prepare for UN withdrawal. It intensified efforts at coordinating policy consultancy through weekly meetings of all agencies with the Timorese government and a number of consultative groups to monitor priorities. Towards the end of UNOTIL, planning was hence in full swing for the new UN (UNDP) Resident Coordinator to take office in February 2006 and to hand over responsibilities to Timorese authorities and ‘development partners’. In view of the ‘weakness’ of key government elements (S/2006/24: 55) and the upcoming 2007 general elections, the Secretary-General recommended the continuation of “some international political presence” to accompany the elections (S/2006/24: 56), supporting a similar request by Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri.

The ‘return’ to violence and renewed intervention: UNMIT

In April 2006, the planned UN withdrawal was overturned by open escalation of political conflict and the outbreak of violence following the protest and subsequent dismissal of almost 600 soldiers from the “non-Eastern areas of the country” (SG S/2006/251: 3). The soldiers had complained about discrimination and the dominance of individuals from the eastern-most districts in the East Timorese army (F-FDTL) (Grenfell 2008: 91). In April 2006, these soldiers and other protesters demonstrated in Dili, a protest that turned into a violent riot and was further escalated by Prime Minister Alkatiri’s order for the army to disarm the rebelling soldiers. The violent clashes pitted ‘loyalist’ against ‘rebellious’ parts of the F-FDTL, and ‘loyalist’ soldiers against the police (PNTL) (Kingsbury 2008: 37). Spurred on by interference by parliamentarians and additional armed groups, it led to a disintegration of the security sector (Grenfell 2008: 92). Grenfell (2008) argues that the violence by the security forces and armed gangs drew both on the “ethno-territorial dimensions of the lorosa’e and loromonu [eastern and western, AW] division in the military, but ... was also shaped by the interests of political parties and the control of local urban territories by the gangs” (Grenfell 2008: 92). Kingsbury (2008: 33-35) characterizes the political situation in the country upon

\textsuperscript{237} Of 45 remaining UNOTIL Civilian Advisers in the Timorese government, five positions were withdrawn. The remainder was to be taken over by UNDP in its respective projects (17 positions in the justice sector, 1 in the National Parliament, and 1 in the Office of the President), the World Bank was to take over and fund six positions in the Ministry of Planning and Finance, and the IMF to support one adviser for the Director of the Treasury. In addition, the governments of Australia, Brazil, Portugal, US, Japan, New Zealand, and Cape Verde signaled willingness to support and fund additional positions (S/2006/24 of 17 Jan 2006: 14).
independence as 'restive politics,' defined by a considerable degree of disenchantment regarding the worsening economic situation, police brutality, corruption as well as 'blooming' ethnic and ideological identities that were met with increasingly authoritarian responses by the Fretilin government. In a similar vein, Matsuno (2008) talks of an "obstinate government," whose emergence he ascribes to a number of interlinking factors, particularly UNTAET’s exclusive focus on building central government, the absence of inner-Timorese consultation bodies in the transition phase, and the concentration of power and internal tensions within Fretilin (Matsuno 2008: 52-53; Shoesmith 2003). By contrast, the 2006 UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry concluded that the crises of early 2006 could "be explained largely by the frailty of State institutions ... the weakness of the rule of law", and lacking experience with democratic competition, and placed hardly any emphasis the nature of internal political tensions (UNCOI 2006: 16).

During the violence of April and May, about 37 persons were killed and 150,000 Timorese fled their homes and once again took to the hills. The Security Council twice extended UNOTIL until the end of August 2006 before authorizing a new peacekeeping operation, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). Instead of the planned handover to a Resident Coordinator and to 'development partners', UNMIT was headed by an SRSG and, as a result of the evident weakness and entanglement of the Timorese security forces in the ongoing violence, took over policing from PNTL (S/RES/1704: 1). The operation was accompanied by an International Stabilization Force (ISF), both of which were repeatedly extended until their conclusion in 2012. UNMIT was equipped with an extensive 14-point mandate that foresaw considerable support and capacity building in all sectors of governance, particularly law enforcement and judiciary. In contrast to all earlier missions, the Security Council decided that UNMIT was not only "to support the Government and relevant institutions, with a view to consolidating stability", but was equipped with a strong mandate for 'intra-Timorese' peacemaking aimed at "enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion" (S/RES/1704: 4a).

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238 "This explanation can only be understood fully in the historical and cultural context of the country. Both the Portuguese and Indonesian eras created and subsumed internal divisions within Timor-Leste. Political competition within Timor-Leste has been historically settled through violence" (UNCOI 2006: 16).
239 The police deployment took over operational responsibility from the Timorese police until March 2011.
7.2.1 THE EXECUTIVE LEVEL OF THE PEACEBUILDING FIELD

During the time of the UN Transitional Administration, there does not seem to have existed an a priori formal division of tasks among external peacebuilders as in the case of Bosnia, as UNTAET was formally in charge of the entire administration of the country. The World Bank and the UNDP led a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) to East Timor, which provided the basis for the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) chaired by these agencies and the government of Japan at the donor meeting of December 1999 (World Bank 1999).\textsuperscript{240} With regard to peacebuilding, the two most important UN agencies in Timor-Leste were the UNHCR and the UNDP. UNHCR was in charge of refugees, IDPs, and repatriation from West Timor, while the UNDP focused on democratic governance, decentralization, institutional capacity development, and justice sector support, and closely cooperated with successive peace operations (see section 7.2.1).\textsuperscript{241} Apart from capacity and institution building, most UN agencies also fulfilled operational line functions within the emerging East Timorese administration.

With a view to delineating the ‘executive level’ of the peacebuilding field, most of the UN special agencies, particularly the UNDP, took over the funding and operational responsibilities of UNMISET upon its departure in 2005. In particular, the UNDP became the primary partner first of the ITA and subsequently of the East Timorese leadership in the key areas of governance and justice. For this reason, and due to the transformation of UN operations in the country, the executive level of the international peacebuilding field in Timor-Leste comprises the relevant parts of the UN Secretariat (and Security Council as the decision-making body) and the missions’ consecutive leaderships, as well as the ‘consolidated’ or ‘coordinated’ efforts of the Bretton Woods institutions, major UN operational agencies, and the so-called Core Group of donors, which included the UK, the US, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan (Pushkina and Maier 2012: 333). The East Timorese leadership, by contrast, was only able to exert greater leverage upon the independence of the country, which might in part have been due to the ‘peacekeeping’ approach that UNTAET sought to adapt towards East Timorese parties (see above, 7.2). Given the rapid succession of five different peace operations deployed to East

\textsuperscript{240} The World Bank subsequently administered the Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET), and implemented a wide portfolio of reconstruction and development activities (World Bank 2010). The IMF’s primary activity was consultancy on macroeconomic policy and private sector development, while the Asian Development Bank (with the World Bank) conducted most of the reconstruction of public infrastructures, more than 70 per cent of which had been destroyed (Chopra 2000: 27).

\textsuperscript{241} Other important agencies included WHO, UNICEF, UNIFEM, and FAO with regard to health and livelihoods, as well as UNICEF, UNESCO, and IOM in the areas of education and community development.
Allocating responsibility for the post-ballot violence

After the deployment of INTERFET in September 1999, the Security Council and Secretary-General noted the improvement of the security situation and emphasized the “importance of reconciliation among the East Timorese people” (S/RES/1272: 1; S/2000/53: 2). Apart from the grave humanitarian situation, the major challenge was seen to arise from “incidents” on the border with West Timor and around the Oecussi enclave due to the presence of “pro-integration militia members” in West Timorese refugee camps (S/RES/1272: 1). Although the Secretary-General listed ongoing violent clashes that pointed to persistent conflict lines, these were not explicitly taken up in his recommendations for future policy. With a view to the nature of the violence surrounding the 1999 referendum, an international Commission of Inquiry was established (CHR Resolution S-4/1999/1). In January 2000, the Commission issued its conclusion “that ultimately the Indonesian army was responsible for the intimidation, terror, killings and other acts of violence ... before and after the popular consultation” (COI 2000: 140), thus confirming UNAMET reports and the findings of the Security Council mission. Refuting Indonesian narratives, the Commission compiled “evidence that the Indonesian Army and the civilian authorities in East Timor and some in Jakarta pursued a policy of engaging the militia to influence the outcome of the popular consultation”, and in so doing had tried to “provide the impression that the East Timorese were fighting among themselves” (COI 2000: 136). By contrast, while the report contained numerous witness statements regarding militia violence, the exact nature of the agency, motivations, or identities of these militias, such as, for instance,

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242 For the present analysis, all ‘End of Mission Reports’ by the Secretary-General as well as one status report per year have been selected in addition to all reports by Security Council Missions (1999, 2000, 2007, and 2012), the relevant Commissions, and all Security Council Resolutions.

243 UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1999/S-4/1 of 27 Sept 1999. This was independent of the Special Rapporteurs of the Commission on Human Rights to East Timor (A/54/660).

244 The Commission also highlighted the special responsibility of the United Nations, both in light of its trusteeship relation with that country, but also since the “human rights violations” had been perpetrated in direct violation of UN Security Council decisions acting under Chapter VII and of the agreement with Portugal and Indonesia (COI 2000: 47).
their names or leaders, remained entirely unspecified. The Commission expressed the opinion that the country’s stability and reconciliation depended on the establishment of ‘truth’, the criminal prosecution of those responsible, and the compensation of victims (155).

From UNTAET to independence: Relative stability, ‘minor incidences’, and the returns question

Notwithstanding overall ‘normalization’, in early 2000 the Secretary-General noted rising levels of crime, which he attributed to unemployment and “the re-emergence of long-standing conflicts within the society”, in particular the return of refugees who had harboured “pro-autonomy sympathies” (S/2000/53: 14). Other reported violent incidents involved unspecified “rival groups” (16). The refugee crisis in West Timor was of particular concern, as “East Timorese pro-autonomy militias have established control over the refugee camps” (39). In the following years, the Security Council repeatedly called on the government of Indonesia to curtail the activities of the militias and protect the provisional boundary (e.g. S/RES/1246). In late 2000, the Security Council dispatched a second assessment mission to East Timor and Indonesia, which reported that the “overall security situation in East Timor is relatively stable, with remarkably little general crime” and highlighted UNTAET’s “robust and decisive action” in fending off cross border “militia infiltration” (S/2000/1105: 7, 9). The main source of instability was seen to arise from the “ongoing presence of militia elements in refugee camps and the possibility of further large-scale returns, which in all probability will include militia” (S/2000/1105: 9). While UNTAET had devised a humanitarian contingency plan for large-scale refugee returns, the main responsibility for addressing the “interrelated problems of the refugee crisis and the security threat posed by the presence of militia” was seen to lie with Indonesian authorities (16). At the time, an estimated 120,000 East Timorese refugees lived in West Timorese camps. The report cites intimidation, misinformation, and the extortion of ‘return fees’ by the militia as major reasons for the slow returns process. However, it also quotes refugees who refused to return to East Timor unless Indonesian rule was reinstated. To increase returns, the mission of the Security Council and UNTAET planned an “effective and impartial information strategy” to target the refugees and convince them “that the result of the Popular consultation must be accepted” (18).
The Security Council mission argued that the issue of refugee returns could best be addressed by UNHCR and IOM, which were capable of implementing the process in an apolitical and impartial manner. Nonetheless, it acknowledged the political dimension of the problem to the extent that the unwillingness to return was in some cases recognized as a political choice that could not entirely be explained away by misinformation or militia intimidation.\textsuperscript{245} As the report summarized, “reconciliation among the East Timorese has important implications for the return and reintegration of refugees, long-term political and social harmony in East Timor and good relations between East Timor and Indonesia” (S/2000/1105: 31). However, while the CNRT leadership had proclaimed its willingness to reconcile with opposing groups, the efforts by UNTAET and the Indonesian government to foster a dialogue with pro-integration supporters who fled to West Timor had “not yet produced a satisfactory response from the pro-integration camp” (31).

The problem of militia incursions from West Timor was also taken up by the Secretary-General in his report covering the second half of 2000 (S/2001/42: 12), but primarily\textsuperscript{246} recounted in terms of the deteriorating situation within the camps.\textsuperscript{247} To facilitate reconciliation, UNTAET organized meetings between CNRT and other East Timorese community leaders with pro-autonomy supporters and militias in Denpassar in December 2000. Within East Timor, reconciliation was to be achieved through the East Timorese Truth, Reception, and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR) to “enable the East Timorese to create a public record of human rights abuses since 1975, to facilitate the reintegration of returning refugees and to promote community reconciliation by dealing with low-level offences committed in 1999” (S/2001/42: 26). Except for the problem of militias and refugees in West Timor, the political transition in East Timor was seen as gaining pace. Positive indicators are “the emergence of a growing consensus among the Timorese people to seek independence by the end of 2001” (2), the establishment of the National Council and the East Timorese Transitional Administration, and the emergence of new parties, all of which took place in the second half of 2000. The Secretary-General noted divisions between the leadership of CNRT and key member parties of the CNRT.

\textsuperscript{245} For similar reasons, UNTAET, the government of Indonesia, UNHCR, IOM, and the East Timorese leadership also cooperated in a pilot programme on the return of former TNI reservists from East Timor (MILSAS).

\textsuperscript{246} For the sake of completeness, there is one mention of divisions that “emerged within the pro-autonomy umbrella group and between the militias in West Timor and the Indonesian military” in October 2000 (S/2001/42: 15). However, as this point is not further taken up, it remains unclear to what extent this might be seen to interact with the situation in East Timor.

\textsuperscript{247} This was further exacerbated by the withdrawal of the UN from West Timor following the murder of UNHCR staff.
such as Fretilin and UDT. He also recorded violent clashes between supporters of Fretilin and CNRT on the one hand, and of the Popular Council for the Defence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (CPD-RDTL)\(^\text{248}\) on the other (6-7). However, in contrast to the events in West Timor and their effects on relations with Indonesia and border security (20), these clashes were not deemed a major cause of concern. Accordingly, the Secretary-General suggested addressing these divisions through educational programmes, arguing that problems were likely related to the populations’ earlier violent experiences: “In light of the events of 1975, East Timorese tend to associate political party activity with violence. A civic education programme to be launched in the near future will address those concerns” (7).

A few weeks prior to the country’s independence, in April 2002 the Secretary-General optimistically reported: “as UNTAET draws to an end, East Timor is at peace” (S/2002/432: 107). This assessment does not sit well with the preceding chapters of the Secretary-General’s report. On the one hand, the presidential elections were largely “peaceful, orderly, and without significant incidents” (7). Further progress was reported in regard to the statebuilding process. On the other hand, however, the Secretary-General recorded an “increase in reports of shootings, flares and explosions” close to the informal border with West Timor and the continued presence of “tens of thousands of refugees”, among them “hard-line militia” in West Timor (26, 27, 30). UNTAET, UNHCR, and Timorese leaders jointly sought to facilitate refugee returns through “border reconciliation meetings” and cross-border visits of refugees to East Timor (30). Another potential security threat, although seemingly of little concern at the time, was the continued existence of “small unofficial security groups” within some districts. These groups were believed to include former FALINTIL fighters “disenfranchised by their exclusion from the East Timorese Defence Force and perceived lack of public acknowledgement” (39). IOM reportedly reviewed the reintegration of these fighters under its ‘Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Programme’, while the transitional government planned the creation of an Office of Veterans’ Affairs (40). Notwithstanding these concerns, the Secretary-General’s overall optimistic conclusion was affirmed by the Security Council in its subsequent resolution on the replacement of UNTAET with UNMISET, which encouraged the operation to work towards a “smooth transition of the UN role towards traditional development assistance” (S/RES/1410).

In the following years, as UNMISET took over from UNTAET and was in turn replaced by UNOTIL in 2005, a recurring narrative pattern emerged in the reports of the Secretary-

\(^\text{248}\) Portuguese: Conselho Popular pela Defesa da República Democrática de Timor Leste.
General. Following a brief introductory assessment of the general situation as “calm and stable”, the Secretary-General listed minor ‘incidents’, such as the “incursion of an armed ex-militia group” from West Timor in early 2005 (S/2005/99: 2) or “a few isolated incidents involving mostly martial arts and political opposition groups” (S/2005/533: 2). “Occasional problems” were reported in the relationship between the armed forces and Timorese police (S/2005/99: 5). While duly reporting these ‘incidents’, no elaboration or assumptions were offered as to the motives or affiliations of such groups. In contrast, the primary focus in terms of conflict and security lay on the relationship with Indonesia, which was reported as steadily and laudably improving,249 and on ‘human rights violations’ committed by the nascent Timorese police force. The Secretary-General repeatedly observed the “tendency to use police powers in dealing with political opposition” (S/2005/99: 2, 4). For this reason, a significant proportion of each report dealt with the efforts of different UN missions, the UNDP, and donors to increase the “professional development of the national police” (S/2005/99: 12) through training on human rights, ethics, and professional conduct. Over time, the problem of police violence and misconduct became one of the central concerns, as the situation seemed to worsen rather than improve. However, the reported misconduct of parts of the East Timorese police force (PNTL) continued to be exclusively addressed in terms of capacity-building, professional ethics, and, increasingly, human rights (e.g. S/2006/24). Accordingly, in January 2006, the Secretary-General discussed progress and final preparations in light of “UNOTIL efforts to hand over responsibilities to the Government and development partners” (S/2006/24: 14). The planned hand over to development agencies was accompanied by the conclusion that “the overall situation in Timor-Leste remained calm” with the exception of “a few isolated incidents involving the incursion of former militias in the Bobonaro District” from West Timor (2).

In sum, prior to the onset of renewed violence in spring 2006, violence and tensions were noted, but hardly ever discussed as related to earlier conflicts or any other major social and political cleavage, or as directly relevant to the overall peace- and statebuilding efforts. Incidences of past violence and conflict were to be addressed by the Truth, Reception, and Reconciliation Commission and the judicial system. The primary security concern of the UN Secretariat appears to have been the bilateral relationship with Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, the presence of militias in West Timorese refugee camps, which were addressed by peacemaking efforts. Conversely, as

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249 For instance in May 2004: “Welcoming the excellent communication and goodwill that have characterized relations between Timor-Leste and Indonesia” (S/RES/1543: 1).
far as tensions internal to East Timorese society were concerned, these were either treated as ‘isolated incidents’ of minor concern or addressed in terms of capacity building and training in the case of the police force. To the extent that reconciliation and dialogue measures were reported, they exclusively referred to the refugee and militia problem in West Timor and the bilateral relationship with the Indonesian government. Beyond the returns question, however, the reports are entirely silent on questions such as motives, identities, and agendas, in short the ‘politics’ of violence. This assessment corresponds to an evaluation that was conducted on behalf of the Norwegian Development Agency (Norad) in 2007. Analysing international assistance to the country between 2002 and 2006, the team concluded that, while “there was a significant body of context analysis and internal reporting, much of which included conflict-related issues ... most Development Partners did not undertake specific conflict analysis between 2002 and 2006” as “it was assumed that Timorese society was unified after 25 years of resistance .... Where occurring, analysis had focused on tensions between political groups and within Timor-Leste’s elite” (Scanteam 2007: 1; see also World Bank 2000). As previous paragraphs have shown, while the Scanteam assessment exclusively referred to the activities of development agencies, it largely reflects the outlook of the Secretary-General and Security Council prior to 2006, both of which placed little emphasis on inner-Timorese tensions.

Taken by surprise? The political crises of 2006

Prior to the open escalation of conflict in Dili on 28 April 2006, the Secretary-General delivered an ‘End of Mandate’ report on UNOTIL to discuss the hand over of UNOTIL programmes to UN specialized agencies, particularly the UNDP. The report recommended the continuation of a political office to help prepare the 2007 elections. The Secretary-General noted a “troubling development related to the Timorese armed forces F-FDTL”, i.e. a demonstration by 400 soldiers next to the presidential office in February 2006. The soldiers had demanded a response to their petition “concerning alleged discrimination in promotions and ill-treatments, in particular against members from non-eastern areas of the country” (S/2006/251: 3). However, in late April 2006, the Secretary-General did not consider this matter any further save for reporting President Gusmão’s request for further UN assistance to capacity building in the security sector (4). Instead, at the time, the foremost concern of the Secretary-General related to the upcoming elections and to the role of contending parties as “a series of polemical exchanges and recriminations between them have already begun. While the political
debate has so far been restrained, political tensions could escalate as the elections draw closer” (7).

After the escalation of the crisis in August of that year, the Secretary-General reflects on his earlier report and concludes: “those events were only the precursor to a political, humanitarian and security crisis of major dimensions with serious consequences for the young State” (S/2006/628: 2). The report reviews recent events, starting with “tensions within PNTL, setting easterners against westerners and officers loyal to the Minister of the Interior ... against those who opposed him” (5). Beyond the security sector, the report also relays the tensions between the ruling Fretilin party and opposition groups as well as allegations against Prime Minister Alkatiri regarding his role in the violence. These allegations eventually prompted President Gusmão to demand the prime minister’s resignation (8-19), which caused a prolonged “stand-off between the President and Fretilin” until Alkatiri’s eventual resignation (19). The Secretary-General emphasizes that “the primary underlying causes of the current crisis are political and institutional” (34). Drawing on the Security Council assessment mission of July 2006, he notes an “overwhelming agreement that the events ... constituted more than a short-term political crisis and that the situation has not been resolved simply with a change of government” as “it is widely recognized that deep-seated problems underlay the crisis” (29).

The discussion of these underlying sources listed a number of problems, the most important of which were the combined legacies of resistance and of the post-ballot violence of 1999, including “a lot of unfinished business” that had not (yet) been addressed by the transitional justice process (31, 76). Other factors were the interacting political and institutional failures (32), capacity deficits with regard to governance (33), and, beyond the political realm, “poverty and its associated deprivations, including high urban unemployment and the absence of any prospect of meaningful involvement and employment opportunities ... especially for young people” (34). In this report, the Secretary-General considered the historic legacies of the struggle for independence as well as political and institutional failures for the first time and worked them into a complex, multitiered assessment of factors believed to have triggered the present crises. This understanding is exemplified by the discussion on the conflict within and between the F-FDTL and PNTL seen to be at the “core of the recent crisis” (56). The Secretary-General refers to problems in regard to the recruitment process of the first F-FDTL
battalions.\textsuperscript{250} This is linked to an analysis of factors such as weak institutional oversight in the security sector, which enabled the political interference by the Ministry of the Interior (70-75). In regard to the country's recent history, the Secretary-General lists a number of problems, including a “gulf of understanding” that separates different social groups based on their varied experiences during the Indonesian occupation.\textsuperscript{251} Echoing the conclusion of the Commission of Inquiry of 2000, he also refers to a “deeply ingrained fear of any form of political contention” as a result of the “violent consequences of past intra-Timorese political conflicts” (31). Finally, given Fretilin's political dominance, the Secretary-General also mentions the “communal dimension to the crisis, based on long-standing frictions between easterners and westerners in the armed forces and the police and in the neighbourhoods of Dili” which reportedly “has been seen by some as reflecting in part a failure of the political leadership to sustain the sense of national identity that brought Timor-Leste to independence” (31, emphasis added).

In contrast to the usual direct reporting style, when recounting the accusations against Fretilin or the former Minister of the Interior, the Secretary-General consistently resorted to the style of reported speech, and quotes unnamed sources. This caution notwithstanding, the report is unusually outspoken when detailing the mechanisms and implications of Fretilin's political dominance, executive powers, and ' politicization' of the security sector, seen to have nurtured an "antagonism between the governing party on the one hand, and the church and much of civil society on the other" (32). In addition, constitutional and institutional factors such as capacity deficits and deficits in regard to the development of long-term “norms of governance [such] as the neutrality of civil service, the accountability of government ministers” (33) had reportedly exacerbated a short-term political crisis with complex historic, communal, and socio-economic roots. This report of the Secretary-General on the causes of the 2006 crisis is exceptional given its emphasis on the political, i.e. agent-related dimension of conflict and its repeated, if presumably 'reported', and largely one-sided criticism of Alkatiri's and Fretilin's role in government. This assessment also covers the wider societal level by mentioning

\textsuperscript{250} "The makings of the internal crisis of F-FDTL, however, go back to its creation and the recruitment of its first battalion in February 2001 ..., perceived bias towards Falintil members from the east in the recruitment of the first battalion and the selection of the force’s high command was only partly offset when the second battalion was recruited in 2002-2003. The new intake was more western than eastern, but its youth excluded it from senior command positions and created a generation gap in the force" (S/2006/628: 57).

\textsuperscript{251} The Secretary-General distinguishes between “those who spent those years as resistance fighters, those who lived in Indonesian-occupied towns and villages, and those ... in exile” (S/2006/628: 31).
‘communal frictions’ between east and west, particularly in the security sector and in Dili. These problems are largely discussed in relation to failures at the elite level or of the leadership in fostering ‘national unity.’ The candour of the Secretary-General is likely attributable to the fact that Prime Minister Alkatiri had eventually resigned in July of that year, thus allowing for the creation of a temporary political compromise until the elections scheduled for 2007 (20). In other words, the Secretary-General’s report does not criticize a current government, but recounts criticisms levied against a former government in reported speech. To what extent, then, is this assessment of the political dimension of the crisis and of the role of agents within the government, security sector, and among armed groups mirrored in the suggestions pertaining to the new mission?

UNMIT: Peacebuilding and Timorese politics

The emphasis on political and agent-related problems was reflected by the priorities the Secretary-General recommended for the new UN mission, with ‘Political good offices and reconciliation’ ranking first among the tasks for a “multidimensional and integrated peacekeeping mission” (S/2006/628: 113).252 The Secretary-General warned of the implications of the crisis for the upcoming elections, emphasizing “the power imbalance between the ruling Fretilin party and other political parties, and the extent to which the Constitution is being tested by different interpretations introduced by various parties” (45). For this reason, the new mission was to continue the good offices role of the UN Special Envoy to help address “deeper sources of tension through a process of political dialogue and community reconciliation that is agreed to and defined by key national players” (46). The mission was hoped to provide a “neutral space and a process” to overcome the “most potentially dangerous divisions” (47) based on “good offices, political facilitation and, as appropriate, mediation” while respecting the country’s sovereignty (48). These political initiatives were to be simultaneously conducted in Dili and the ‘regions’ (120).

Another concern of the assessment mission and the upcoming UNMIT mandate was the perception that the “current political crisis has further damaged confidence in the impartiality and capacity of relevant State institutions”, which included the bodies in charge of organizing the elections (51). The mission also described a “post-crisis

252 The mission ought to comprise a military and police component and a “political affairs unit, a planning and best practices unit, a legal affairs unit, a conduct and discipline unit, a public information and outreach unit, [and] a joint operations centre” (113).
political environment that has fractured the polity; lack of full public confidence in the Government-administered electoral process; precarious security conditions and institutions; internal displacement and a climate of fear and distrust among elements of the population; the lack of a legal framework to govern the electoral process” to name just the beginning of a long list of problems UNMIT’s electoral support team was supposed to address (53). Against this backdrop, the Secretary-General discusses an extensive ‘technical assistance’ programme for the upcoming elections as well as a considerable reinvestment in the justice sector and transitional justice. Particularly the latter is foreseen to fall within the scope of the UNDP and expected to work based on the recommendations of an Independent Special Commission of Inquiry, to combat a ‘culture of impunity’ seen to have its “roots in the politicization of police and armed forces, political interference in the administration of justice and weak discipline and oversight mechanisms in the security sector” (74).

The Secretary-General suggested a so-called ‘Timorese-led compact’ between international donors, agencies, the Timorese government, and civil society groups that would identify and co-fund priorities based on a revised version of Timor-Leste’s national development plan and specific sectoral programmes (S/2006/628: 42). The new UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), while “fully respect[ing] the national sovereignty of Timor-Leste” (144) was expected to “support the design and implementation by Timorese actors of an integrated approach to political dialogue and community reconciliation” (49) within an intensified “process of nation-building” (144). Means to this end were finding institutional resources for promoting dialogue and reconciliation on all societal levels, “securing popular participation”, “deepening the population’s understanding of key issues facing the country”, “providing space for debate”, “supporting the development of mechanisms for reconciliation that have gained meaning in people’s lives because of their customary basis”, creating mechanisms for parties and social groups to explain their positions in a “neutral environment”, and capacity building (49). In other words, beyond the ‘political good offices’ or (diplomatic) peacemaking at the leadership level, UNMIT’s objective was the facilitation of a Timorese political sphere from without. In the words of the Secretary-General, this reflected what “the UN and the International Community have learned from lessons elsewhere, and have now been starkly reminded by the Timor-Leste crisis, that nation-building and peacebuilding are long-term tasks” (142). Where they exist, allegations or incriminations against specific parties were presented in reported speech and largely in relation to the previous government, while action measures by the new government
were either omitted or reported as constructive. On the side of solutions and approaches, the Secretary-General increasingly relied on and cited expert commissions and panels, which was reflected in a complex and multitiered account of the political, social etc. origins of conflict in Timor-Leste and foresaw a UN role in terms of protecting a volatile equilibrium in the upcoming elections.

After 2007, a Security Council mission dispatched to Timor-Leste noted that the elections had been peaceful, free, and fair. Once again, the role of the elite was emphasized, as violent clashes in the “eastern districts” (S/2007/711: 7) after the elections had “demonstrated that the differences among the political leaders of the country exacerbated the divisions at all levels of Timorese society” (3). Beyond parliamentary politics, the mission noted that the ‘root causes’ of the 2006 crisis had yet to be addressed, in particular “political tensions .. at both the national and district levels, including pro-and anti-FretiIn support, east and west regional dynamics and divisions between the military and the police” (6). In regard to solutions to the ongoing crisis, on the level of the political leadership in Dili, UNMIT continued its peacemaking mandate through regular meetings, good offices, and mediation with all parties.255 With a view to the unresolved conflict within the security sector, the President and government intended to offer financial compensations to the protesting F-FDTL soldiers and re-recruitment "on a case-by-case basis" to de-escalate the conflict (10).

As the reports by the UN Secretary-General reflect, in early 2008, the most prominent drivers of Timor-Leste's political crisis had still not been resolved (S/2008/26: 5). On the one hand, the leader of the F-FDTL rebellion, Alfred Reinado, refused to give himself

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254 In the 2007 parliamentary elections, while FretiIn had won most seats, no single party had won the required majority. When a number of smaller parties joined ranks to form the Alliance for a Parliamentary Majority (AMP), FretiIn led by Mari Alkatiri protested and claimed that the new AMP government was unconstitutional as the AMP members had not run on a single platform prior to the elections. While repeatedly emphasizing the fragility of Timor-Leste's political situation, the SC mission identifies encouraging signs in Alkatiri's pledge to only protest non-violently, in the fact that FretiIn took up its role in parliament, and in particular based on the roles played by the new President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmão, seen as custodians or guardians of the peace in Timor-Leste (S/2007/711: 4,5).

255 Beyond the level of the government/political leadership, however, it remains to be seen to what extent the perception of political tensions within society also translated into similar efforts, for instance in the areas of governance, justice, and reconciliation, most of which fell into UNDP’s project portfolio (7.2.2).

256 The Independent Special Commission of Inquiry had already recommended the prosecution of 60 individuals in its report of October 2006 (S/2007/11: 13).
up to judicial proceedings. On the other hand, Fretilin continued to “contest the constitutionality of the new government” (3). In regard to the conflict between the government and Fretilin, the SRSG regularly met with leaders of the government, opposition, and other parties “including those without parliamentary representation” (10). To a lesser extent, UNMIT staff also facilitated such meetings for civil society groups to discuss “issues of concern and to hold each other accountable to commitments ... including adhering to principles of good governance, ensuring a meaningful and constructive role for the opposition and civil society, guaranteeing not to politicize State institutions such as the armed forces” (10). The report of the Secretary-General throughout emphasizes the persistence of political divisions, weak institutions, poverty and unemployment (16). By contrast, the cooperation with Indonesia is no longer considered problematic and cursorily reported as good in passing (19). In short, while there are concerns regarding the conflict with Fretilin, as the latter has foresworn the use of violence, the major security threat is seen to result from Reinado and his group of disaffected soldiers. Another newly emerging concern relates to the increased impatience of the East Timorese police with UNMIT mentoring, which has prompted political leaders to call for the hand-over of responsibilities (21-22).

The conflict with Reinado and his followers eventually came to a head with Reinado’s death during a failed attempt to assassinate President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmão on 11 February 2008. The Security Council “commend[ed] the political leadership and State institutions of Timor-Leste for the rapid, firm and responsible manner that respected constitutional procedures of the country, in which they responded to the deplorable events of 11 February 2008” (S/PRST/2008/29: 1). Nonetheless, the Council noted the persistence of political fragility seen to necessitate UNMIT’s continued presence.

Normalization: Fragility, resilience, and the development framework

In subsequent reports by the Secretary-General, as promising signs for Timor-Leste’s recovery from political crisis were reported, the ‘fragility’ frame was gradually replaced by the notion of ‘resilience’. The surrender of Reinado’s associates to state authorities (S/2008/501: 5), the return of IDPs, the compensation scheme for the so-called

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257 The extent to which security had ceased to be a major concern is evident when the Secretary-General refers to the ‘maintenance’, rather than the establishment, of security in early 2009 (S/2009/72: 21).
petitioners’, and the peaceful settlement of a legislative dispute by the Court of Appeal were all listed as indicators for the country’s “strong resilience after the shock of the attacks of 11 February” (S/2009/72: 6). The second conflict line, i.e. Fretilin’s continued refusal to accept the legitimacy of the ruling government, remained a cause of concern due to the “inflammatory rhetoric between some leaders” (8). As before, the conduct of these leaders was seen to have a destabilizing impact by “hardening positions and increasing tensions between followers, and raising the anxiety level of the general public” (8). In addition to efforts by the SRSG and “government dialogue teams” organized by the UNDP, the efforts by President Ramos-Horta were repeatedly commended (9). In sum, there appears to have been an intensive ‘nurturing’ and mentoring relationship between UNMIT/UNDP on the one hand, and the East Timorese government and authorities on the other. Within this relationship, particularly President Ramos-Horta (and, to a lesser extent, Gusmão) appears to have occupied a position of immense political reputation as an honest broker or guardian of the peace process, whose positive connotations resemble those normally aspired to by the UN in the sense that they are working towards the common good and removed from party or partisan politics.

The UN effort to “enhan[e] a culture of democratic governance, including improved accountability mechanisms and increased citizen participation” increasingly drew on numerous expert commissions and “independent peer reviews” that inter alia defined benchmarks258 on the civil service, the police, anti-corruption mechanisms, the security sector, and national development priorities (11-14). Such ‘objective’ benchmarks were increasingly used in lieu of schedules or timelines, with the most important ones referring to security sector reform, the completion of open criminal investigations regarding former violence, the adherence to the rule of law, and better living standards (47). In 2009, then, it appears that the situation in Timor-Leste was seen to have ‘normalized’. As the UNMIT leadership continued its peacemaking meetings with the country’s political leadership, the Secretary-General expressed the hope that the remaining “fundamental tasks are not necessarily about solving particular issues, but about strengthening the institutions of State and improving policy and decision-making processes” (56), thus signalling a ‘return’ to the earlier capacity and institution-building framework.

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258 These benchmarks are defined as “mutually agreed and clearly defined criteria, based on initial recommendations of the expert mission” (S/2009/72: 21)
This overall assessment was affirmed in early 2010, when the Secretary-General stated that the security situation and "political developments were generally indicative of continuing stability" (S/2010/85: 2, 6). In 2009, the medium-term strategy had set benchmarks for UNMIT to monitor progress regarding 1) security and stability, 2) rule of law, justice, and human rights, 3) a culture of democratic governance and dialogue, and 4) socio-economic development, all of which were to be "spearheaded by the continuation of a strong good offices role on the part of my Special Representative" (18).

With the exception of rule of law, justice, and human rights, all objectives and benchmarks were formulated in such a way that they could likely be applied to other developing countries without substantial adjustments. This approach reaffirms the impression that following the crises of 2006 and the prolonged aftermath, Timor-Leste was once again considered within a developmental statebuilding framework, albeit with a particular emphasis on the rule of law, justice, and human rights in regard to the violence of 1999 and 2006. Accordingly, the discussion of persistent challenges such as the incomplete separation of powers, impunity following "recent Presidential pardons and commutations of sentences involving a number of cases from 2006" (24), the ongoing reform of the security sector (26), and socio-economic factors such as "land and property regimes, a large youth population and high levels of unemployment" (28) was juxtaposed with a generally positive assessment. In early 2010, then, the Secretary-General draws the conclusion that notwithstanding the persistence of "fundamental political, institutional and socio-economic issues ... Timor-Leste has recovered from the 2006 crisis insofar as the immediate challenges have been resolved, with stability and security restored, and a largely peaceful transition to a new Government" (S/2010/85: 21). Accordingly, as of 2010, the planning process for UNMIT's withdrawal in 2012 was initiated (S/RES/1912: 2-3).

7.2.2 THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IN TIMOR-LESTE

Prior to the deployment of peacebuilders to East Timor in 1999, the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) by the World Bank and the UNDP had defined two priorities, agricultural recovery and the reconstitution of state capacity, to delimit the dependence on aid and prepare for independence (World Bank 1999: 51-52). In November of that year, the UNDP opened a small country office in Dili and dispatched a Special Envoy to “work with the East Timorese leadership and assist the SRSG in defining key areas for UNDP support” (UNDP 1999a: 4). The Special Envoy was tasked with planning immediate recovery and medium term assistance to social and economic infrastructure, public
administration, and community recovery. The UNDP also chaired the Donor Working Group on Infrastructure and helped prepare the Consolidated Appeal Process\textsuperscript{259} and Donor Conference of December 1999, thus foreshadowing the Programme’s central role in the coordination of external assistance. Already at the time, the UNDP Administrator asked the Executive Board to approve funding for the training of “newly appointed judiciary”, which, together with support to the parliament and to other government institutions, subsequently became the two UNDP ‘flagship’ programmes in the country (UNDP 1999a: 4). In August 2000, the UNDP Administrator requested the Executive Board’s authorization for him to “approve projects on a case-by-case basis for the period 2000-2002” within the framework of three pre-defined areas of intervention: rehabilitation of infrastructure, governance, and the promotion of sustainable livelihoods (UNDP 2000c: 1). Such requests by the UNDP Administrator were necessary as, pending East Timor’s transition to independence, the UNDP could not yet work based on its usual modus operandi, i.e. an agreement with the East Timorese government.

The Administrator defined the key challenge for East Timor as “rebuild[ing] what existed before – and ... tack[ling] the problems of a newly independent country – in the face of the severely diminished level of social capital and institutional vacuum” (7). This portrayal resembles the ‘empty shell’ metaphor of a country that had not only been ravaged by the post-ballot violence but also deserted by most of its educated mid- and higher-level civil servants in the wake of Indonesia’s withdrawal. To complement the work of UNTAET and the World Bank,\textsuperscript{260} the UNDP’s niche was defined to comprise the rehabilitation of infrastructure, governance, and the promotion of sustainable livelihoods. The UNDP’s focus on governance not only covered the judiciary and government institutions, but also incorporated activities that could be summarized as ‘nourishing’ the development of a public sphere, for instance through training civil society organizations and voter education (22). Upon the future independence of the country, these three strategic areas were to be ‘integrated’ into the planned Common Country Assessment (CCA) and the UN Development Assistance Framework. As the

\textsuperscript{259} Within the Consolidated Appeal Process of 1999, UNDP conducted projects in the areas of ‘Infrastructure and Economic Recovery’ (Rehabilitation of Public Utilities and Physical Infrastructure; Joint Programme for Community Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Development [with IOM], Employment Registration and Services Centres, Local Economic Development Agencies [LEDA] for Micro-enterprises and Micro-credit; Comprehensive Vocational Education and Training [VET]), ‘Education and Community Action’ (Mental Health and Trauma Service [with WHO]), and ‘Humanitarian Principles’ (‘Support to Governance and Sectoral Capacity Building’).

\textsuperscript{260} In regard to recovery and rehabilitation, UNTAET and its Trust Fund were in charge of public administration, while the World Bank Trust Fund addressed “education, health, economic and fiscal management, infrastructure, agriculture and community empowerment” (UNDP 2000c: 8).
UNDP had been requested to help steer international efforts in regard to governance and capacity building, the Administrator estimated that 70 per cent of the resources at the disposal of the UNDP would be allocated to governance activities (18). Given the shortage of trained local staff, the UNDP country office was required “to rely on direct execution as the principal modality in implementing UNDP programmes” (36), but established mixed project steering committees that included members of UNTAET and CNRT “to ensure Timorese participation” (37). As this provision implies, in contrast to the DPKO/UNTAET, the UNDP does not seem to have had any reservations in regard to cooperating with (sections of) the East Timorese leadership during the first peacekeeping operation.

Partnering with the CNRT for community development and governance

As these provisions illustrate, in late 1999 and 2000, the UNDP defined its role in East Timor as supporting economic development, reconstruction, and filling the ‘vacuum’ of Timorese statehood. Two of these early projects specifically addressed the aftermath of violence, one supporting the reintegration of displaced persons while the other provided trauma counselling. Beyond this contribution to ‘rehabilitation and recovery’, in the initial phase of its deployment to East Timor, the UNDP did not conduct further ‘conflict’-related or peacebuilding activities, presumably as these were not deemed necessary at the time. On the one hand, the earlier joint assessment mission had noted “many serious social legacies”, which not only included “post-violence trauma” and the suppression of civil society during the occupation, but also addressed issues such as the politicization of language policies and the need for “reconciliation between pro- and anti-independence forces [which] will be a long-term social issues, particularly in the Western border region where pro-autonomy was stronger” (World Bank 1999: §21). On the other hand, however, the same assessment had placed considerable hope in the “conciliatory approach adopted by both the Church and the CNRT” and the constructive effects of involving the population “in positive activities to reconstruct their communities” (World Bank 1999: §21). In other words, while the existence of potential communitarian conflict within East Timorese society was acknowledged, international ‘post-conflict’ intervention was predominantly conceived in terms of development,

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261 In contrast to the definition of peacebuilding as directly addressing the causes and dynamics of a particular conflict as discussed in infra ch. 3, many authors classify broader activities in regard to ‘governance’, statebuilding, or socio-economic development as ‘peacebuilding’ as long as these activities are conducted in post-war societies (e.g. Paris 2004, Schneckener 2005).
state-building, and reconstruction, based on the assumption that the major threat of conflict had ceased to exist with the withdrawal of Indonesian armed forces and given the considerable reputation of parts of the East Timorese leadership. This assumption is mirrored in the list of projects conducted under the Coordinated Appeal Process, which – apart from support to reintegration – only included one project that defines a peacebuilding objective in the narrow sense (i.e. by addressing peacebuilding as peacemaking rather than statebuilding).262

To define a common baseline and to coordinate the involvement of UN agencies in East Timor, a first Common Country Assessment (CCA) was conducted in 2000 under the overall lead of the UNDP through the UNDP Representative and Development Coordinator263 in cooperation with the East Timorese Transitional Administration (ETTA) and UNTAET. While the authors acknowledged that the priorities thus defined were not backed by a democratically elected government, the UN agencies emphasized the “window of opportunity” seen to allow East Timor to “establish itself with full reference to global standards” (UNDP 2000d: 18). Accordingly, the CCA deliberately takes a “rights-based approach to development issues”, citing a number of relevant conferences, conventions, and declarations that introduce most of the substantial chapters (19). With reference to the objectives of the participating agencies within the East Timorese peacebuilding field, the introductory paragraphs also acknowledge peacebuilders’ institutional objectives: “The aim is for the agencies to position themselves as strong and reliable development partners, fully supporting the programmes of ETTA and UNTAET until independence while building up their own capacity for the envisaged long-term cooperation with the Government of an independent East Timor” (3). How, then, does the CCA define the major challenges of the East Timorese peacebuilding process?

Preparing for independence: development, rehabilitation, and nation building

The CCA comprises six substantial sections that discuss the political history, macroeconomic situation, poverty and vulnerability, rehabilitation and recovery, access to basic services, sustainable livelihoods and the environment, and finally governance,

262 One project was entitled ‘Strengthening the Peace Building Capacity of Local NGOs’ and was conducted by Conciliation Resources (CRS), a British NGO. The other project conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) focused on DDR.

263 The Development Coordinator is “akin to the Resident Coordinator System” (UNDP 2000d: 3). Within the country, all UN agencies operated under the authority of the SRSG. CCAs are “part of the UN reform process for greater coherence at country level” (UNDP 2000d: 17).
human rights, and civil society of the nascent state. In almost all sections, the CCA distinguishes between the political, economic, and social legacies of the Portuguese and Indonesian periods and specific problems resulting from the violence of September 1999. While colonialism and occupation are seen to have left the country with the “challenges of development, human rights violations, and capacity building”, the referendum and the subsequent violence have added the challenges of nation-building, rehabilitation, and reconstruction, including the need to “maintain[...] security, particularly on its western border” (UNDP 2000d: 24). On the side of proposed solutions, most of the chapters are introduced by a brief summary of relevant international standards and conventions. Nonetheless, the envisioned solutions are largely formulated based on detailed discussions of the specific situation in the country, rather than on an explicit consideration of these international conventions.

East Timor is depicted as one of the poorest countries in the world, with an economy that is overwhelmingly dependent on agricultural subsistence (UNDP 2000d: 9). Emphasizing “just how low East Timor’s starting point is” (30), the CCA predicts that “fighting poverty in East Timor will be the major pre-occupation of the new government, CSOs, and the donor community” (33). Notwithstanding the recourse to international standards, the CCA primarily focuses on the need to analyse the “historical roots of poverty, the issues of social stratification” and other, specifically East Timorese circumstances to inform and improve the planned interventions (35). Given the coexistence of traditional, Portuguese, and Indonesian rules and systems, the authors emphasize the lack of a universally agreed baseline or standard against which to develop future planning. This conundrum, then, illustrates the purpose not only of the CCA with its frequent calls for further research or assessments, but in particular of the invocation of international norms and standards. On the surface, the invocation of international conventions within the report evidently resembles the approach taken by the UNDP and other agencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see chapter 6). However, while these norms increasingly served as a tool for enforcing cooperation and avoiding an involvement with sub-state public authorities in the Bosnian case, particularly in regard to ‘obstructionist’ administrations at the entity level and below, in the case of East Timor, no such obstructionist groups are seen to discussed. Instead, in the present context, the invocation of international standards\textsuperscript{264} in combination with the reported

\textsuperscript{264} Examples included the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Millennium Declaration; the ILO Declaration on the
community consultations and commissioned assessments primarily serves to establish a purportedly 'objective' baseline to generate the consensus of all stakeholders while at the same time providing legitimacy to the suggested course of action in the absence of a "democratically elected government" (18). In other words, international standards are primarily employed to establish legitimacy through referencing 'universally accepted' or 'objective' criteria, rather than as a means of coercion as had been the case in the 'rights-based' approach adopted in Bosnia to emphasize obligations by that government. To further bolster the agencies’ legitimacy, the report also references the so-called 'Magna Carta' drafted by exiled East Timorese representatives in 1997, which had called for the observation of basic human rights in the territory (52). In other words, international standards are invoked to help the UNDP/UN agencies establish a legitimate baseline on which to conduct their intervention. In line with this observation, and contrary to the approach taken in Bosnia, the cited standards hardly figure in the substantial discussion of specific problems and solutions, and were not employed in any of the UNDP’s subsequent assessments. Instead, subsequent UNDP planning increasingly drew on statements issued by the evolving institutions of East Timorese participation and, eventually, sovereignty.

Of the CCA’s substantial sections, particularly the chapters on the country’s Political History, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, and Governance and Human Rights illustrate the UNDP approach to peacebuilding (and politics) in East Timor. The 'Political History' briefly recounts East Timor’s history of colonization and occupation, and acknowledges Indonesia’s role in “waging a campaign to destabilize” the country prior to the initial invasion (21). This is juxtaposed with the "resolve" of the resistance movement whose “strength ... evolved directly from the community's total and reciprocal commitment to their shared cause...People were united in one singular cause” (22). The following narrative emphasizes the experience of victimhood and resistance seen to have unified the East Timorese population: “Fretilin fought relentlessly in the mountains. East Timorese families provided food, shelter ... Virtually every family had been affected by the horrors of the occupation” (23). The East Timorese population is depicted as a unified entity vis-à-vis the Indonesian occupiers, whose rule had led to the emergence of “two separate classes of people”: “the small elite of mainly Indonesian military and civilians, and the commercial and business class; and the majority of East Timorese population in urban and rural areas who were treated as second class citizens” (23-24).

Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDP 2000d: 52; 72; 91).
This depiction of the political history largely ignores the existence of pro-Indonesian or ‘non-resistance’ East Timorese groups or persons, and instead emphasizes the “terrible legacy of human rights abuse, psychological scars and grief” as well as the “overwhelming challenge of capacity building” (23). The existence of pro-Indonesian groups or individuals is only acknowledged in connection with the Popular Consultation of 1999 and the violence of ‘pro-integration militias’, some of which are reported to “date from the 1970s, having been recruited and armed by the Indonesians to fight Falintil as part of community mobilization” (23). This account depicts East Timorese militias as proxies of the Indonesian authorities. Although intra-Timorese tensions are not discussed, the CCA highlights the existence of numerous “challenges to building national unity, including peace and reconciliation; the prosecution of those who committed serious crimes in 1999; the need to address the abuses that occurred during the Indonesian period; [and] the treatment of linguistic and ethnic minorities” as part of the ‘rehabilitation and recovery process’ (24). In sum, while the narrative had emphasized East Timorese unity, such ‘national unity’ is at the same time treated as something that needs to be built or fostered in the future, emphasizing the importance of “good communication between the leadership and the people, and between different regions” (25).

The discussion on Rehabilitation and Recovery, in turn, primarily focuses on the repatriation and re-integration of refugees and IDPs and on the rehabilitation of infrastructure (38). As discussed above, the emphasis on the returns question had also been one of the primary concerns of the Secretary-General, albeit primarily in regard to the situation in the camps and the unwillingness of former militia members to return. The UNDP report seeks to assess the obstacles to the return of refugees and IDPs and is cognizant of the diverse conditions across the country and across the concerns of different groups of displaces. Accordingly, when discussing the large number of refugees in West Timorese camps, the report, drawing on statements by the East Timor Jurist Association and UNTAET Human Rights Unit, acknowledges the diverse motives for refugees to remain in West Timor, such as misinformation, intimidation by militias, and also the preference to settle in Indonesia of up to 40 per cent of the refugee stock (39). It also recognizes the mutual dependence of reintegration, reconciliation, and in some cases criminal justice at the community level (9-10). The report discusses diverse approaches to the re-admission of returnees on the district and community levels (40), which usually involve representatives of the CNRT, local leaders, the Church, local NGOs, and CIVPOL. In addition to the experiences of different districts, the report also
discusses the specific situation of minorities such as ethnic Chinese or Muslim populations, many of whom are afraid to return, the need to avoid settlements of former militia members in the border area of West Timor, and the complications arising out of unclear property claims mentioned above (41-46). The CCA warns of the “potential for social tension” and the adverse effects for the “nascent reconciliation process” in cases where large numbers of displaced persons return at once (41). Against this backdrop, ongoing activities of the UN agencies include the development of a future land registry system and the rehabilitation of infrastructure. The UNDP in particular runs programmes on small- and medium-enterprise development, basic vocational training, the reconstruction of infrastructure, and supports a civic education programme (50).

As the detailed account within the CCA illustrates, the assessment of post-crisis rehabilitation and recovery seeks to do justice to the specifics of East Timorese ‘post-conflict’ challenges. It also acknowledges potential tensions at the communal level in the context of refugee and IDP return and the need for proactive reconciliation efforts, including as necessary criminal justice. In so doing, the CCA does not identify particular groups, parties, or movements, instead collectively referring to ‘pro-integration’ supporters and members of the militia as potential sources of tension in connection with returns. While reporting reconciliation processes conducted at the village and district levels, the role of the UNDP and of other UN agencies in this process is largely depicted in terms of training and education: “The reconciliation process beginning in villages across the country offer an opportunity to increase people’s understanding of their civil duties, respect for the rule of law, and tolerance. This will benefit reconciliation in the villages and could contribute to nation building. In addition, this process could also lay the foundations for future civic education programmes and preparations for the elections” (41).

Such an educational approach also prevails in regard to governance, which “entails the building of a new nation” (91) to “prepare East Timor for full independence” (Vieira de Mello, cited in UNDP 2000d: 92). Two priorities clearly stand out: the “establishment of an independent East Timorese public administration and governance capacity and ... the organization of elections for a Constitution and a democratic Government” (ibid.). Notwithstanding the continued existence of traditional power structures within the country (92), the nascent East Timorese state is described as a “vacuum in terms of institutions and skills” that furthermore lacks any “history of open democratic political activity” (94) and accordingly has to be built “from scratch” (94) due to the emigration of skilled civil servants. Accordingly, the task at hand is understood as “nothing less than
determining the role, structure, dynamics, and future of the new state, including the configuration of basic pillars of governance and separation of powers” (94). The CCA bases its suggestions on the 1997 OECD guidelines for international engagement in ‘post-conflict recovery’ (OECD 1997, see infra ch. 5.1), according to which “external assistance must strengthen a society’s ability to peacefully mediate and resolve its internal and external tensions, thereby preventing deadly conflict, recourse to violence and the use of force” (92). In other words, governance, including institution and capacity building, human rights, and civil society, is considered the primary approach to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. To support this process, the UNDP primarily focuses on building national capacity and on the development of a number of strategic frameworks (96).265

A similar approach is taken in the final section on human rights. The CCA reports the “well documented” abuses of the Indonesian period and cites the commitment of the CNRT Congress of August 2000 and of UNTAET to upholding human rights standards “in accordance with international law, UN resolutions, the Magna Carta and the wishes of the Timorese people” (105; 105-106). Complementing the work of UNTAET’s human rights unit, the CCA notes the contributions of national NGOs to the “justice and reconciliation process and the promotion of human rights” (107). Despite these promising signs, the CCA reports “some concern over the position of minorities and the promotion of an open political dialogue” and cites recent reports by the UN Secretary-General about “intimidation against groups and parties not under the CNRT umbrella” and against “ethnic and religious” groups (107). Here again, the CCA invokes the “strength, depth and breadth of the civil resistance movement ... [as] a tremendous base upon which the country can draw in developing a culture of human rights” (108). As before, this portrayal reaffirms the trust vested in the parts of the East Timorese leadership organized in the CNRT. It also holds that the intimidation of minorities such as Chinese, Muslims, and Protestants is likely "based on a historical perception of these groups having been economically and politically advantaged under the Indonesian period, rather than an ethnic based discrimination" (107), a judgment that matches the planned approach of civic education.

Accordingly, in 2000, the primary role of the UNDP in East Timor was defined as building East Timorese state capacities in regard to statehood and governance. The

265 Such strategies include a “strategic vision framework for the management of the transition”, “a civil society communications strategy ... to sustain public confidence”, a “human resources development strategy”, as well as public service legislation, regulations, and policies (UNDP 2000d: 96).
frame of capacity building, training, and education is also applied beyond public authorities, i.e. with regard to NGOs and CSOs, and to issues such as reconciliation, reintegration, and the nurturing of a political community “to increase people’s understanding of their civil duties, respect for the rule of law, and tolerance” (41). The UNDP planned to help “educate citizens, especially about the new constitution, their rights and responsibilities and increase awareness and understanding of the principles of participation in a democratic society” (112). Given the repeated affirmation of East Timorese unity, resilience, and commitment from resistance times, it seems that the envisioned ‘education’ is less concerned with addressing former or ongoing causes of tension (which are primarily dealt with through community level initiatives and UNTAET’s human rights unit), but first and foremost seeks to substitute for the presumed lack of ‘democratic experience’ in the country seen to result from the prolonged history of colonization, occupation, and repression.

Independence: Stabilization through statebuilding and civic education

Upon the independence of the country in May 2002, the UNDP and the government of Timor-Leste concluded a Standard Basic Agreement to define the terms under which the Programme “shall assist the Government in carrying out its development projects” (UNDP and GoTL 2002: 2). In line with UNDP standard operational procedure, the agreement held that the government “shall remain responsible for its UNDP-assisted development projects” (3), while the government’s “compliance … with any prior obligations agreed to be necessary or appropriate for UNDP assistance to a particular project” was defined as a precondition to UNDP assistance (4). These provisions, while respecting the country’s sovereignty, simultaneously tied the government to a long list of obligations, particularly if said projects refer to questions of human rights, governance, and the rule of law. Even more to the point, the UNDP directly executed about one third of its projects in Timor-Leste, commissioned the remainder to other UN agencies, and provided about 200 “international development experts” to support or fulfil “key government functions”, which certainly casts some doubt on actual East Timorese ownership in regard to these programmes (UNDP 2002: 74).

Based on this agreement, the UNDP developed its first Country Programme Outline (CPO) for East Timor (UNDP 2002). In particular, the UNDP was to help coordinate the donor community and “the entire technical assistance programme” (UNDP 2002: 2), effectively legitimizing the agency to assume a “strategic role … in the development
processes of a nation” (5). To counter the “overwhelming UN and donor presence” and increase national ownership, the new programmes were either equipped with project steering or coordination committees, and, in some cases accompanied by so-called community mobilization teams “to ensure [that] local people became part of the process” (7). For the new programme period of 2002 to 2005, the UNDP intended to shift from ‘emergency rehabilitation’ to “institutional and individual capacity-building and upstream policy development” with regard to socio-economic policy. Such policies were aligned with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (9). In practice, this translated into two programme areas, one on governance and the other one on community development and rehabilitation. Both programme areas pursued a three-tiered strategy: policy development to match international 'pro-poor' principles, building institutional capacity, and mobilizing communities. The latter were expected to “bridge the gap between government and civil society” by involving local communities in infrastructure projects, building capacities of CSOs and NGOs, and civic education in regard to the constitution and key policies (10). To conclude, the CPO approached the task at hand exclusively in terms of development and statebuilding, without any reference to specific post-conflict or peacebuilding considerations. The state-building objective, in turn, not only targeted the trappings of a liberal democratic state such as institutions and skills, but also simultaneously aimed to recreate East Timorese society in this image based on a long list of community ‘mobilization’ and education measures.

By contrast, the ‘Programme Package Document for Sustainable Development’ agreed between the East Timorese government and the UNDP the following year linked the discussion of statebuilding and development to a wider stabilization agenda. It posited that redressing poverty, unemployment, and fostering participation were necessary to “preserve the fragile social harmony, maintain political stability, and achieve rapid and sustainable growth” (UNDP 2003: 7). Issues of concern were the anticipated withdrawal of the UN mission by mid-2004 (8), but also unemployment among youths and veterans, persistent donor reliance and aid dependency, and overall resource and capacity shortages (7-8). In line with this focus on stability and in addition to the COP means,267

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266 In contrast to this description, however, the 2003 bilateral Programme Package Document for Sustainable Human Development lists a third area that is omitted here, environmental and natural resources management (UNDP 2003: 3).

267 In addition to large programmes on Parliament Support, Assisting the Electoral Process, and Justice Sector Development Support (including also the Truth, Reception and Reconciliation Commission), this included initiatives in regard to local government, justice sector development, support to the Provedor and Inspector General, the Veterans’ Commissions, capacity building of PNTL, and civic education (UNDP 2003 16-17). Examples for projects on community development include the following: Dili Employment Creation, Short-term Vocational Training,
the programme package particularly considered support to the East Timorese justice sector and to the Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR). As the emerging justice sector “does not have the capacity to deal with most crimes committed prior to 25 October 1999 ... the truth, reception and reconciliation process helps to heal the many psychological, social and societal scars that continue to fester [sic] the population” by “document[ing] facts and rebut[ting] innuendo and rumor spread by militias and governments that perpetrated the human rights abuses” (30-31). The UNDP CAVR Support Programme thus reinforced the ‘community reconciliation procedure’ of the Commission. It assisted with the assessment process in regard to returning perpetrators, victim support, and analysis. Similar support was also provided to the country’s Veterans’ Commissions to address another “potential source of instability”, primarily through building the capacities of East Timorese institutions (31).

The Programme Package of 2003 hence extended the statebuilding, development, and education focus of the CPO of 2002 by a higher emphasis on ‘fragile social harmony’ and sources of instability, particularly in regard to unemployment among youths and veterans. This was addressed by renewed support to the justice sector and the truth and reconciliation process (CAVR). Beyond the justice sector and CAVR, however, the overwhelming focus of the UNDP’s work in Timor-Leste upon the independence of the country was institutional and personnel capacity building, coupled with civic education, community activation, and ‘mobilization’ to ensure the participation of the larger society. The 2002 Country Programme had originally been planned to run until 2005, but was extended to 2007 to align subsequent programme cycles with the country’s National Development Plans. In light of the political crisis and armed clashes of spring 2006, planning was further postponed until 2008. Accordingly, between 2002 and 2008/9, no new country planning frameworks were established. How, then, did the UNDP seek to address the causes, dynamics, or aftermath of that crises, and to what extent did these events prompt the Programme to revise its earlier approach?

Post-crisis peacebuilding: Assisting the Government with sustainable returns and community reconciliation

Immediately after the outbreak of the “sudden and unexpected crisis”, the UNDP participated in the UN’s ‘Flash Appeal’ for humanitarian assistance (UNDP 2008: 11). To

Immediate Recovery and Improvement of Agricultural Production, Maliana Guesthouse Reconstruction and Business Development, and Ainaro-Manatuto Community Activation Project (UNDP 2003: 12f.).
complement ongoing development and state-building programmes, a ‘rapid response project’ entitled ‘Work for Peace’ was initiated in March 2007. The project was conducted in cooperation with ILO and three East Timorese ministries to “curb the instability and prevent further social unrest” through employment generation across all districts (UNDP 2007: 5). More specifically, the project sought to provide employment for those groups “which have played a destabilising role during the 2006 crisis, in particular the youth” (7). Beyond these short-term measures and despite the unexpected redeployment of an integrated peacekeeping mission, there was, however, a considerable degree of continuity in regard to the UNDP’s ongoing priorities vis-à-vis statebuilding, socio-economic development, and community mobilization. The UNDP perspective in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis largely resembled that of 2000: once again, the Programme planned for the “transition from early recovery to development” with an emphasis on resolving large-scale displacement (UNDP 2008: 1). This translated into an agenda of technical support for the “Government’s humanitarian response, and the Ministry of Social Solidarity – the lead on dialogue and reconciliation, return and resettlement” (12). As before, ‘reconciliation’ was primarily conducted in the context of facilitating the return of displaced persons to their communities of origin (12). While the overall approach of the UNDP to working in Timor-Leste remained unaltered, the Programme now acknowledged the need to “apply[...] a conflict-sensitive lens” to its development programmes on poverty, governance, and natural resource management (13).

Beyond short-term measures and the extension of the UNDP’s capacity building work with the parliament and justice sector, the main initiative to address the ongoing crisis was the addition of a new thematic area on IDP return and reintegration. To this end, a Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPR) was set up as part of the UNDP’s country presence. This programme area initially comprised three projects, which were evaluated by a 2008 Country Programme Performance Summary (UNDP 2008) and by project-specific evaluations (UNDP 2011, 2011a, 2011b), which together with additional project documents provide the basis for the following analysis of the UNDP’s response to the violent clashes and political crisis of 2006. According to UNDP assessments, “prolonged social tensions and political divisions led to civil unrest and the 2006 crisis”, which in

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268 UNDP continued to focus on community development and statebuilding. Examples include a programme on ‘Conditional Cash Transfer for Women’ (2008-2013) and ‘Strengthening the Justice System in Timor-Leste’, which had already commenced in 2005.

269 In particular, UNDP assisted the government in executing its National Recovery Strategy by supporting “dialogue teams” of the Ministry of Social Solidarity in generating ‘durable solutions’ to displacement (UNDP 2008: 12).

‘Strengthening institutional structures and mechanisms for dialogue’

The objective of the Dialogue Project was to “support camps closure (sic) and the reintegration of IDPs in communities, and to develop local conflict management and peace-building capacities for long-term sustainability” (UNDP 2008a: 2). To “address the root causes of conflict”, the Dialogue Project approached the return of displaced persons with a multitiered strategy that combined community reconciliation and improving the abilities and reputation of state authorities in conflict resolution with an emphasis on fostering East Timorese identity (UNDP 2011b: 7). To this end, the project involved state officials in the resolution of local level conflict to improve their “public perception ... by bringing them closer to the people through real and constructive dialogue with local communities resulting in concrete action” (7). In a similar way, the project sought to increase the reputation and authority of authorities at the local level “by having them publicly empowered by national level State authorities” (7). As these objectives illustrate, the Dialogue Project extended the issue of IDP return by a number of measures that aimed to build national unity and civic identities, in short, what has increasingly been referred to as ‘social cohesion’, an objective which was summarized as “Promoting a common sense of identity rooted in rich cultural traditions, history and shared values” (UNDP 2011b: 7).

In practical terms, these complex objectives were translated into three sets of activities. Firstly, the UNDP trained dialogue and mediation teams in “the use of cultural conflict management mechanisms and community stabilization activities” (7). Secondly, it assisted educational campaigns to improve “public access to relevant information for smooth and sustainable IDP reintegration” (7). Thirdly, training was conducted with local authorities such as *suco* (village) leaders in regard to conflict management and
peacebuilding techniques (7). This training was subsequently complemented by peacebuilding training for staff of the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS). The dialogue teams were tasked to “support facilitation of the reintegration process” with a view to avoiding “potential conflicts and the escalation of tensions” (7). Such tensions included land and property rights (6) and mistrust seen to result from repeated violent conflict, which were reported as having successfully been resolved in 97 per cent of cases (5).

In addition to mediation and dialogue, the project sought to consolidate its achievements through so-called “community stabilization activities”, i.e. sports and cultural events that “underscored common historical and cultural backgrounds” (6). The assessment of the Dialogue Project also notes a number of unresolved conflicts which “involved members of Martial Arts Groups, linked to groups previously identified with the pro-independence and pro-autonomy conflict of 1999, which themselves traced the animosity back to events in 1975” (13). However, while this description is the only reference to the persistence of historical and/or political conflicts that are directly related to the recent crisis, no further information is provided whether and in particular how such conflict had been addressed.

The Dialogue Teams were “embedded” within the Ministry of Social Solidarity and facilitated mediation for individual returns as well as 55 “large-scale community dialogues between IDPs and their receiving communities” (7). The project documents highlight that all these activities took place “in the presence of State representatives” (7). The role of the UNDP in this is portrayed as providing “training and on-the-job mentoring” to the Dialogue Team members and to “assist them in adjusting to the diverse and evolving nature of community dynamics”, for instance through developing tools “such as guidelines [and] templates” (7). In particular, the review stresses the importance of the leadership of the Timorese government/MSS in regard to project implementation, which “provided legitimacy and ownership of results, and secured continued relevance to national priorities and political backup” (17). In addition to the question of sustainability and follow-up, such leadership is arguably also the necessary precondition for the UNDP to legitimately engage in the conflict-prone field of mediation and dialogue meetings. In this regard, the role of the UNDP within the dialogue processes (and overall project) is entirely framed along the lines of a service provider that helps develop the tools and train team members for the mediation and dialogue meetings. In keeping with this observation, neither the project summaries (UNDP

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270 It is, however, worth noting that the UNDP assessment was careful to point out that such successes could not necessarily or in all cases be related to the work of the dialogue teams (UNDP 2011b: 13, 17).
nor the subsequent assessments (UNDP 2011, 2011b) provide any information as to the participation of the UNDP within the dialogue teams. Instead, the UNDP is exclusively referred to in connection to ‘supporting’, ‘strengthening’, or ‘providing’ for the work of the dialogue teams. This portrayal likely underestates the extent of the UNDP’s role in devising (and executing) the project, particularly since the Programme was also involved in the policy and capacity development of the relevant East Timorese ministries. Following the Dialogue Project, the East Timorese government created a new Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion within the Ministry of Social Solidarity, which received UNDP funding to “further build the capacity of community leaders to solve conflicts on their own” (UNDP 2011b: 17) and help nurture social cohesion on the community level (UNDP 2011b: 6). The approach of the Dialogue Project was complemented by the HHK NGO Small Grants Fund initiative, which assisted East Timorese NGOs in confidence building at the community level (UNDP 2011a: 7). The initiative was aligned with the National Recovery Strategy and reintegration efforts, which it supported through “dialogue[s], youth exchange schemes”, and the provision of information on the returns process and National Recovery Strategy at the community level (UNDP 2011a: 7).

‘Strengthening early recovery for sustainable reintegration of IDPs’

In addition to the Dialogue Project and NGO Small Grants Fund, the third pillar of the UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit’s programme also followed up on the Dialogue Project and on the returns question in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Solidarity. The project, “Strengthening Early Recovery for Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs” (SERC), pursued the sustainable reintegration of IDPs by a two-pronged strategy. It combined the “durable reintegration and social cohesion in IDP receiving and conflict-prone communities” with collaborative infrastructure projects “of common benefit” (UNDP 2011: 1). This focus was linked to the priorities of the East Timorese National Recovery Strategy (2007) and the outcomes of the consultations conducted under the Dialogue Project to address participants’ concerns and “mitigate[e] any risk of conflict in already strained communities” (UNDP 2011: 1). Like the Dialogue Project, SERC followed the rationale of building ‘social cohesion’ through participatory processes that “engage[...] both former IDPs and their wider communities in identifying shared priorities and fostering through participatory planning processes the restoration of

A third element was the coordination of recovery efforts, presumably across participating ministries.
communal bonds” (1). In practice, this entailed village consultations and collaboration initiatives meant to bring together returnees and community members by jointly planning small infrastructure measures “in areas of high IDP return and/or conflict prone communities” (UNDP 2011b: 34). The report repeatedly employs terms such as “social cohesion” and “communal bonds” (UNDP 2011: 1). It suggests “improving social interaction” and “mutual understanding” through so-called “social mobilisers” of the Ministry of Social Solidarity who were trained and funded by the UNDP (UNDP 2011: 1, 2). These notions of ‘social cohesion’ tie in with the language of ‘community activation’ that had been employed by the UNDP prior to the crisis (UNDP 2003: 12f.). Like in the earlier strategies, such notions encapsulate the attempt to repair or nurture the social fabric, in this case within recipient communities, through collaborative work and sustained social interactions. In this regard, the SERC project was meant to provide a follow-up to the Dialogue Project by addressing ‘grievances’ voiced during the consultations primarily through improving infrastructures and generating (temporary) employment in these efforts. In this regard, the evaluation of the project held that the “active participation of IDPs and members of receiving communities in identifying, implementing and using infrastructure projects of shared interest and common benefit has helped to sustain interaction between IDPs and members of receiving communities and foster social cohesion.” (UNDP 2011: 6). With regard to the participating ministry, the assessment emphasized the “strong ownership by the Ministry of Social Solidarity” whose “ability ... to conduct participatory planning increased significantly” (UNDP 2001: 6).

A return to statebuilding as usual?
As of 2009, the UNDP returned to standard procedures by adopting a Country Programme (CP) for the period 2009-2013. The Country Programme is a UNDP document that is “formulated in partnership with the Government of East Timor” and aligned with the National Development Strategy and the UN Development Framework (UNDAF) (UNDP 2009: 1). The objectives of the new CP continued the earlier focus areas of 1) poverty reduction, environment, and sustainable development and 2) democratic governance, as well as the work of the new unit for 3) crisis prevention and recovery. This continuity is evident by the predominance of projects that either ‘strengthen’ East Timorese state institutions, such as the parliament, the Provedoria for Human Rights and Justice, or individual departments, or seek to ‘mobilize communities’ with a view to “Poverty Alleviation and Social Inclusion in Service Delivery” (UNDP 2010; UNDP 2014).
CONCLUSION

To conclude, between 2000 (resp. 2002) and 2006, the UNDP contribution to the peacebuilding effort in Timor-Leste was based on the premise that the conflict, i.e. the struggle against Indonesian occupation, had been resolved. As the reports by the Secretary-General have shown, despite so-called ‘minor incidents’, this understanding was shared by subsequent peace operations and related actors in the peacebuilding field. In a similar vein, the relationship between East Timorese representatives and international (UN) peacebuilders was generally deemed cooperative. While the initial UN Transitional Administration had attracted a considerable amount of internal and East Timorese criticism due to its ‘patronizing’ or ‘paternalistic’ approach to working with East Timorese representatives, this does not seem to have been perceived of as a fundamental conflict of interest but rather as an indicator of East Timorese assertiveness and possibly ‘impatience’ to speed up the transition to full independence. Based on the notion of an ‘empty shell’, the primary objective was hence understood in terms of statebuilding and socio-economic development, including the reintegration of the large number of displaced persons. In addition to building state institutions and training staff, the UNDP’s statebuilding objective also included ‘community mobilization’ and civic education, ostensibly designed to train the East Timorese population for ‘democratic citizenship.’ By contrast, leaving aside the UNDP’s work on the reconstruction of the justice sector, there were no measures that directly sought to engage with the causes and dynamics of inner-Timorese tensions, owing to the assumption shared by most development agencies that Timor-Leste was ‘at peace’ following Indonesia’s withdrawal.

As the previous paragraphs have shown, the UNDP’s response to the 2006 crisis was to a considerable extent characterized by the continuation of earlier programmes. In regard to peacebuilding, the most important innovation in the UNDP’s approach was the creation of a Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit within the UNDP office in Timor-Leste. This unit initially conducted three programmes, all of which combined the reintegration of IDPs with dialogue meetings at the community level and were aligned to government strategies. The measures particularly sought to train and build the capacity of pertinent ministries, whose ‘leadership’ and ‘ownership’ was persistently highlighted in a way that is at odds with the UNDP’s expansive role in policy development, capacity building, and the execution of operational line functions within said ministries. Instead, the emphasis on ministerial leadership and the frequent references to the Timorese National
Recovery Strategy served to underscore the UNDP's self-depiction as a 'service provider', or to quote the 2003 planning document for Timor-Leste, "a partner of preference for governments, with a special mandate to press for improved governance and poverty reduction" (UNDP 2003: 21).

As the same country paper had elaborated, the "UNDP's primary interest lies in how effectively the state can deliver its services to the people" (UNDP 2003: 27). This primary interest and the Programme's traditional development mandate unsurprisingly inclined the UNDP to approach peacebuilding by recourse to standard development practices. One example for this is the project on fostering reconciliation and social cohesion through collaborative infrastructure work in conflict-prone communities. As a result, and notwithstanding the UNDP's involvement within the governance of the country and the post-2006 peacemaking initiatives, the practical reasoning and peacebuilding approaches employed remained aloof from politics throughout the studied period. Both the depiction of the East Timorese context, including the causes and implications of conflict, and the depiction of the role of the UNDP therein, are entirely devoid of any discernible engagement with political issues, interests, or actors. To the extent that internal conflict was mentioned at all, it was explained as resulting from the fear of the population regarding open political contestation rather than as a profound clash of interests, agendas, or ideas. In this vein, an internal assessment of the UNDP portfolio in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis concluded that the Programme had addressed most of its activities by resorting to a humanitarian, and hence neutral and impartial, approach (UNDP 2014: xv).

Beyond the influence of standard development lenses and approaches on the design of individual programmes, the UNDP's role as 'a partner of preference for governments' is reflected throughout the studied reports as it portrays its role as facilitating, supporting, or strengthening government policies. In other words, by consistently depicting the agency as a neutral assistant to governmental policies or, at times, an implementer of international agreements, these accounts downplay any (political) agency or impulses that originate with the UNDP. In this regard, while the UNDP obviously contributes to 'community-level' peacemaking within the discussed 'Dialogue Project', and notwithstanding the simple fact that this is actually a UNDP initiative, the role of the UN agency in this project is entirely cast in terms of providing services and capacity training under the leadership of the Ministry of Social Solidarity. In sum, the UNDP's development mandate not only provides a particular development 'lens' for framing peacebuilding, but also reflects the limitations of the Programme's mandate as an
intergovernmental development organization tied to cooperating with host state governments. Aside from shaping the ways in which the Programme can get involved in peacebuilding, this evidently – and unsurprisingly – delimits the Programme’s scope of action to interventions that are publicly endorsed by the host state government (OECD 2001).

Beyond the East Timorese case, this finding also has broader implications in regard to how the agency of international organisations such as the UNDP is conceived within (studies of) the international community. While the UNDP evidently enacts a considerable degree of agency as it not simply implements, but designs and steers programmes in target countries, it simultaneously contributes to framing its interventions as merely contributing to, rather than shaping governmental policies. While this strategy of downplaying the Programme’s creative and political agency and arguably power effectively strengthens the misconception of international organisations as mere implementers or pawns of donor and host state governments in international relations, it also serves to legitimize, and hence ultimately enable their efforts.

The extent to which this strategy has proven successful is illustrated by a report of the final Security Council mission to Timor-Leste of November 2012 (S/2012/889). Dispatched to develop recommendations regarding the pending withdrawal of UNMIT by December 2012, the mission reported being “struck by the consensus among Timorese interlocutors across the spectrum” in favour of UNMIT’s withdrawal and the equally near-universal view among Timorese stakeholders that the country “no longer requires United Nations support through the presence of either a peacekeeping or a political mission and consequently there is no requirement to continue to be on the Security Council agenda” (S/2012/889: §12). Instead of such forms of political intervention under the auspices of the Security Council, the East Timorese government argued for continued cooperation with specialized UN agencies and bilateral development agencies within a “new model” relationship. Within the new model, the specialized and bilateral agencies would continue to develop East Timorese governance institutions and socio-economic development based on the priorities defined by the government’s National Development Plan. These East Timorese suggestions also included the appointment of a Special Adviser who would, however, neither be resident in the country nor report to the Security Council (S/2012/889: 31). The proposal reflects Timor-Leste’s involvement in the ‘New Deal’ principles of the so-called G7+ group of states, an initiative of fragile states that seeks to increase the ownership of the governments of developing and ‘post-conflict’ states vis-à-vis donor governments and
delimit the political dependency of recipient states. This sentiment is well expressed in the G7+ mission statement from one of its founding meetings in Dili: “We, the member countries of the g7+, believe fragile states are characterized and classified through the lens of the developed rather than through the eyes of the developing.”

To conclude, the g7+ statement, just like the opinions of East Timorese representatives recorded by the UN Security Council mission, are indicative of the extent to which agencies operating within the domestic affairs of states depend on being perceived of as (politically neutral) service providers that act on behalf of recipient governments. In cases of cooperative peacebuilding, this relationship defines, but does not necessarily hinder the work of agencies such as the UNDP, which habitually frames its far-reaching interventions in terms of training, capacity building, and institutional development tied to a (purportedly) locally owned agenda. However, as the case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown, such an alignment with governmental policies is difficult or impossible to maintain or claim in cases of contested governance and continued conflict, or what the OECD Guidelines referred to as ‘hostile governance’ (OECD 2001), thus prompting agencies to repeatedly reframe their ongoing approaches.

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Anyone who has ever tried to tease out a simple explanation regarding the origins of a particular war from an historian will realize that such an attempt is virtually impossible. It is safe to assume that any such enquiry will at some point culminate in the exclamation that 'one cannot possibly make such a broad claim'. For instance, when discussing the Thirty Years War, it will be hard to find a specialist willing to concede that it can be explained as a religious war, a conflict over territorial claims, dynastic hegemonies, or, in fact, that it can be defined as a single war at all. Beyond academic divisions between ideographic and nomothetic disciplines, between different philosophical outlooks and corresponding schools of thought favouring economic over political, or structuralist over intentionalist positions, this attitude first and foremost bespeaks a sense of the complexity of phenomena such as violent conflict.

While the historian or social scientist tends to have the benefit of hindsight, practitioners of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction usually do not. Theirs is a much more immediate task, trying to make sense of a recent or ongoing series of events and devising responses and approaches geared to addressing conflict or mitigating its effects. Like the historian or social scientist, peacebuilders can resort to standard practices and earlier experiences in their field, and might in some cases even be able to turn to pre-existing analysis of the conflict at hand. However, regardless of the availability of templates and practices, given the proximity of the task and its actors, it seems inevitable for peacebuilders to try to make sense of their immediate environment, the conflict, status quo, parties, challenges and their own (prospective) role therein. Why, then, do peacebuilding practices mostly ignore political agency and almost exclusively focus on structural aspects?

As I have argued, notwithstanding the conclusion of a peace agreement that usually serves as an entry point for ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilders, more often than not, the preceding conflict and its dynamics continue to shape social interaction during the peacebuilding period. Against this backdrop, it seems all the more surprising that most
international peacebuilding efforts seemingly proceed from the assumption that *peacemaking* as the negotiation and contestation of conflicting identities, interests, and meanings, has either been completed or can be restricted to the elite level. As my argument has posited, such a depoliticized peacebuilding approach emphasizes the structural levels of conflict and largely excludes the peacemaking dimension\(^{273}\), i.e. the involvement of stakeholders’ political agency, contested interests, identities, and meanings. As a consequence, depoliticized peacebuilding practices fail to address the antagonistic dimension of peace processes (Mouffe 2005). Not only does this omission run counter to common understandings and analysis of the origins of violent conflict, but it has also repeatedly been linked to peacebuilding failures by observers and practitioners alike. As Aggestam (2015: 329) claims, particularly in cases of conflict asymmetry, which characterizes most intra-state wars, depoliticization “may strengthen the status quo of conflict and inhibit alternative ideas and practices”, as it is at odds with addressing power dynamics and contextual sensitivity (334). As the analysis of the transformation of peacebuilding practices has shown, while there are myriad ways in which peacebuilders have tried to improve their practices and tailor them to specific circumstances (for instance through commissioning research, gathering lessons learned, and organizing countless assessments), peacebuilding practices continue to remain depoliticized and ascribe the emergence or persistence of conflict to a range of structural factors that are subsequently addressed without any reference to (political) agents and their identities, interests, agendas, or decisions. Why, then, can’t this lesson be learned?

When I first started to work as a consultant and researcher for a think tank that provides peacebuilding consultancy, training, and analyses to governments, I was puzzled by the extent to which violent conflict was habitually made sense of and addressed through the lens of structural ‘issues’, such as underdevelopment, the ‘resource curse’, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, or climate-induced factors. As I have argued in this thesis, what all these explanations have in common is that they define the causes of conflict in structural terms that are largely devoid of any contemporary agency and are thus depoliticized. While I had originally set out to study

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\(^{273}\) As discussed in the context of Galtung’s original terminology (ch. 3.1), while the terms peacebuilding and peacemaking were originally coined to refer to two sets of activities, a number of authors have emphasized the importance of placing a higher emphasis on peacemaking as the negotiation of contested claims, interests, and/or identities as a component of overall peacebuilding efforts (cf. Ryan 1990; Lederach 1995; Ramsbotham et al. 2011). This understanding is compatible with my definition of peacebuilding as all post-war civilian activities that seek to prevent the recurrence of violence after the termination of internal armed conflict and the conclusion of some kind of settlement.
the epistemologies and methodologies that peacebuilders employ with a view to understanding conflict, such as indices and conflict assessment ‘tools’, it quickly became clear that this depoliticization has its roots in a much more fundamental level: in the nature of the agencies tasked with ‘implementing’ and increasingly ‘conducting’ peacebuilding.

Accordingly, this project has focussed on the (prior) mandates, identities, and habitualized practices of peacebuilding agencies and the ways in which these have interacted with the new objective of building peace in violent intra-state conflict. While conscious of the influence of state actors on defining priorities or issues in peacebuilding, the focus of my research has been on international organisations and bilateral development agencies as the ‘front-line’ actors in designing and steering peacebuilding interventions within target countries. In so doing, and to acknowledge the different sources of power and influence, I have borrowed Bourdieu's (1977, 1999) conceptual apparatus of habitus, field, and capital to study peacebuilding as a new international field of practice that has reassembled actors from three communities of practice around a new objective. This move has allowed me to combine an emphasis on actors’ prior identities and practices (habitus) with a focus on the implications of adopting peacebuilding as an additional objective. Over time, the peacebuilding endeavour has become more than just the sum of its parts, as it has given rise to a new configuration of actors – the field – who, despite their manifold mandates and highly diverse backgrounds, have a shared objective, building peace after war, that corresponds with an evolving set of practices, such as ways of doing and ways of knowing. As I have demonstrated, the field perspective also enables me to draw out distinctions between the objective of peacebuilding, i.e. creating stable, peaceful societies, and the objectives of peacebuilders, which comprises the former objective but also the agent's wish to become a successful ‘player’ in the field despite the resulting dilemmas. In this regard, particularly Bourdieu's (1983) distinction between different types of capital has served to highlight alternative sources of power wielded by international organisations, such as moral authority and expertise, as opposed to more traditional, state-based forms of economic and political capital. In the following paragraphs, I will summarize my argument and main findings in relation to the analytical steps I have taken in this thesis, before turning to a discussion of the implications of my research for ongoing peacebuilding reforms and for future research.
Institutional mandates and identities: three communities of practice

Peacebuilding practice is depoliticized because of the prior identities and practices of its leading ‘practitioners’ as politically neutral and/or impartial agents. As the analysis of the emergence of the new field of practice in Chapter Four has shown, building peace in states that have emerged from internal violent conflict was originally conceived of as assisting the implementation of a previously concluded peace agreement. This assumption derived from earlier experiences with assisting ‘implementation’ in cases deemed successful at the time. While the political nature of peacebuilding was acknowledged from the start, this did not include a recognition, or, indeed, anticipation of the extent to which ‘conducting peacebuilding’ might not only implicate peacebuilders in a universally agreed upon political project, but might actually require them to interact with potentially adversarial or ‘hostile’ (state) parties, and hence to act politically. On the one hand, my research has provided comprehensive evidence for the degree to which early peacebuilders expected to work in cooperative environments. On the other hand, it is difficult to know whether a more ‘realistic’ or pessimistic anticipation of the level of contestation encountered in ‘post-conflict’ societies would have fundamentally changed the (initial) configuration of the peacebuilding field, for instance by foreseeing a stronger role for political actors. While it is not at all clear whether there would have been sufficient political will among ‘donor’ governments from industrialized countries to support such an effort (as evidenced in the case of the Peacebuilding Commission), the profound concerns of state representatives from the global South that already surrounded the adoption of the *Agenda for Peace* and its *Supplement* by the General Assembly would seem to have rendered such an alternative course of action highly unlikely even during the optimistic heydays of UN peace support in the early 1990s. In this regard, while helped along by a profound misconception regarding the future challenges of peacebuilding, peacekeepers, development, and humanitarian actors seemed to be the ideal peacebuilders precisely because of their institutional identities, mandates, and practices that usually, if not always had ensured the acceptance of host state governments.

Impartiality and neutrality as proxies for acting politically

Three sets of actors are in charge of conducting most peacebuilding projects and programmes: peacekeepers and development and humanitarian agencies. In view of their respective commonalities, including a shared objective, background knowledge,
and regular interactions, I have proposed to study these actors as three distinct communities of practice, whose common peacebuilding objective not only led them to adapt their prior practices, but also brought them into regular contact. Despite their different characteristics and practices, what these three communities have in common is that they are, for varying reasons and to varying extents, committed to the principles of impartiality and neutrality. Drawing on definitions developed by the ICRC, Weller (1998) has defined neutrality as a principle of abstention, which requires third parties not to undertake any actions in support of any of the conflict parties. Conversely, impartiality is defined as a principle of action, which requires third parties to treat all parties equally. In the case of peacekeepers, this has traditionally been taken to mean treating like breaches in like terms. By contrast, in the case of humanitarian actors, acting impartially implies rendering assistance based on the presumably objective criterion of ‘need’ and disregarding all other considerations such as identities or group affiliations. In the case of humanitarians specifically, impartiality is not only a prerequisite to gaining access to contested areas and/or populations, but also constitutive to the overarching principle of ‘humanity’ as the provision of aid to those most in need. Given the centrality of impartiality to the identity of being ‘humanitarian’, it is unsurprising that many, although not all, agents from the humanitarian community have strongly resisted UN efforts at coordinating and integrating all peacebuilding actors under a common strategic framework. Finally, the situation is more complex when it comes to development agencies. While a number of studies have discussed the extent to which development practitioners consider their own task as politically neutral and inspired by humanitarian motives, development cooperation is not in and of itself committed to either principle, but has for the most part been tied to foreign policy agendas. However, particularly international organisations, and to a lesser extent, bilateral development agencies, depend on the cooperation with host state authorities as expressed in the bilateral agreements that usually form the basis of their involvement. In the case of bilateral agencies, the terms of their involvement are defined through the bilateral negotiations conducted by the respective ministry of foreign affairs. Conversely, most international organisations, such as the specialized UN agencies or the World Bank, have been committed to neutrality within the domestic affairs of states in their founding agreements.

These considerations point to the significance of the relationship between peacebuilding actors on the one hand and host state authorities on the other, with a view to accounting for the depoliticization of the practice. In particular, the degree to which particularly
development agencies as the most prominent group of actors in conducting peacebuilding are willing and/or able to address potentially ‘sensitive’ issues or be seen to act ‘politically’ is likely to depend on the nature of the relationship between the respective donor government vis-à-vis host state authorities and the relative distribution of power, particularly as development agencies might incur repercussions in regard to their reputation as a partner to other target states of development cooperation. In this regard, the introduction of legislation to curtail and monitor not only the work of civil society groups and NGOs, but also of foreign organisations and of domestic ones that receive funding from abroad in (non-peacebuilding) countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Russia, and China provide very tangible examples for the ‘costs’ of being perceived of as acting ‘politically’.

Two country cases: hostile vs. cooperative relationships with host state authorities

The two studied peacebuilding deployments, i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2005) and Timor-Leste (1999/2000-2010), were originally selected with a view to tracing the transformation of peacebuilding practices in two different settings that both saw an extended and comprehensive peacebuilding project and together span almost the entire period of the emergence and transformation of the new field. While peacebuilding in BiH commenced at a time when peacebuilders could not yet resort to standardized peacebuilding templates and indeed, triggered the creation of many pertinent ‘instruments’ and institutions (see chapter 6), the deployment to Timor-Leste in late 1999 drew on lessons learned during previous deployments and commenced at a time of so-called peacebuilding weariness that followed the mixed record of deployments to BiH, Kosovo, and Angola. Both case studies have provided ample evidence for the claim that peacebuilding agencies seek to remain aloof from politics and employ a number of mechanisms that render their interventions depolitical. However, as the project progressed, a key difference between the two case studies began to emerge in regard to the role of the relationship between international peacebuilders and host state authorities. In this regard, the study of the UNDP and DfID peacebuilding in BiH reflects the degree to which external actors sought to induce and increasingly coerce the different local authorities to participate in the planned peacebuilding reforms and interventions. During the studied period, this prompted peacebuilders to move from a developmental approach to a rights-based developmental framework that emphasized the legal obligations of the central state to the exclusion of sub-state level authorities and was increasingly backed by calls for more forceful interventions by a unified donor
‘front’. By contrast, in the case of Timor-Leste, a number of East Timorese representatives enjoyed a considerable reputation among the UN Secretariat/international community. Notwithstanding the heavy criticisms of the ‘paternalistic’ approach taken by the initial UN Transitory Administration (UNTAET), the relationship between international peacebuilders, East Timorese elites, and subsequent governments was predominantly cooperative, which enabled agencies such as the UNDP to get involved in peacemaking and reconciliation efforts in the aftermath of the 2006 crises. However, this contribution was entirely framed in terms of providing skills and capacity to government-led efforts. On the one hand, as my analysis has shown, this framing contradicts the extent to which such programmes were designed and executed by UNDP staff. On the other hand, the observed UNDP approach confirms my claim that the agency maintained its core identity as an impartial developmental agency in a context of internal tensions.

Peacebuilding in contested settings: the transformation of the practice

Overall, most newly minted ‘peacebuilding’ agencies have persistently faced two related dilemmas. Firstly, there are obvious tensions between forms of external assistance that are characterised by impartiality or political neutrality such as peacekeeping, development, and humanitarianism on the one hand and peacebuilding on the other, which contains aspects of all these but is essentially a political task. Secondly, while this problem is less evident in cases where a comprehensive (political) solution to conflict has been endorsed by all parties, it is reinforced when peacebuilders deploy to work in countries where a political settlement has either been enforced/induced or remains otherwise contested. In these cases, peacebuilding requires (and faces) a considerable degree of (political) contestation and negotiation. This, however, poses a serious dilemma if the actor in question is at the same time committed to the principles of impartiality and neutrality. Over time, the repeated frustration of peacebuilders’ ‘implementation’ efforts prompted them to revise and reframe their practices in such a way as to ‘enable’ them to act in highly contested and politically charged settings while crucially maintaining their previous practices and institutional identities.

In tracing the transformation of peacebuilding best practices as manifest in the reasoning of leading central actors, I have demonstrated the extent to which the revision of practices and the quest for coordination and coherence have been tied up with efforts to project greater political force vis-à-vis non-cooperative, particularly state parties. In
this regard, the application of Strategic Peacebuilding Frameworks, Integrated Mission Task Forces, and the attempt to establish an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission not only served to avoid the duplication of efforts, but also to unify all external actors, including as far as possible humanitarian ones, behind a coordinated and coherent political agenda. Such a unified agenda not only seeks to bestow legitimacy through consensus, but has also repeatedly been tied to efforts to garner the political support of influential donor governments, for instance by conditioning aid or, in rare cases, through the use of sanctions.

From the point of view of peacebuilding agencies, one way of ‘resolving’ the tension between impartial/neutral identities and addressing political problems is to resort to a revised understanding of ‘impartiality’ which replaces the perceptions of local stakeholders with a universal, and hence decontextualized, principle or mandate as its primary point of reference (peacekeepers, and some humanitarian organisations). In particular, the development of universal principles that are to be applied coherently by all external actors and consistently across different peacebuilding cases allows actors to redefine their claims of impartiality and neutrality as measured against the backdrop of universal standards rather than based on their role in particular contexts. However, this drive towards coordination and universality moves their reasoning further away from the specific context of a particular conflict, and hence serves to decontextualize their practices. Another approach that has arguably been followed by most development agencies reframes the ‘root causes of conflict’ in purely structural terms that are largely devoid of any present-day political agency and thus enables a developmental agenda of ‘building capacity’ and knowledge transfer. In a variation of this approach, UN agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina increasingly framed their interventions in the rights-based language of international conventions and treaty obligations, which not only served to emphasize the ‘objective’ legal obligations of the Bosnian government, but simultaneously allowed them to sidestep a number of sub-state administrations whose policies were deemed ‘obstructionist.’ This ongoing process of repackaging political problems and planned solutions in non-political, largely structural terms hence accounts for the prevalence of peacebuilding practices that address peace and conflict in agent-free structural terms such as inequality, psychosocial trauma, or deprivation. As the case study of peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown, while peacebuilders mostly shun an engagement with ‘local agency’, in the rare cases that local actors are specifically addressed as part of the problem, this entirely occurs by separating predatory or criminal elites from ‘ordinary’ civilians. To the extent that civilians figure
within peacebuilding best practices and planning, they are either depicted as ‘civil society’ in need of empowerment and capacity building or as victims and vulnerable populations and hence the subjects of psycho-social interventions and trust-building. What all these approaches have in common is that they enable actors to avoid the dimensions of the political and the ‘politics’ of conflict, including issues such as ‘ethnic, religious, or linguistic strife’ as originally identified by the UN Secretary General. In sum, these strategies of conceptual revision/adaptation, reframing, and decontextualization have together contributed to shaping the new practice and, arguably, the ways in which internal peace and conflict are interpreted in international organisations.

A related notable finding in regards to the transformation of peacebuilding best practices is the curious absence of a discernible ‘voice’ of the Department of Political Affairs from the transformation of best practices. As I have demonstrated, at the UN, influential statements originated with the Secretary-General, the DPKO, UNDESA, and a number of panels and advisory groups on peace operations. Outside the UN, particularly the OECD contributed to the development of the new practice. By contrast, until 2010, not a single strategy, concept note, or other document issued by the DPA could be uncovered. Against the backdrop of the present argument, this absence reflects the omission of peacemaking as the negotiation, mediation, or adjudication of conflict between the parties from the evolving thinking of peacebuilding best practices in the aftermath of peace agreements. To the extent that recent statements, particularly the reviews of the UN peacebuilding architecture, have emphasized the importance of connecting peacebuilding measures to a political process, this new development has been reflected in a series of publications and reforms to strengthen the DPA's mediation expertise and support facilities (for instance, the UN Peacemaker Database). However, while these reforms betray a growing recognition regarding the significance of politics in peacebuilding, it seems unlikely that this awareness will fundamentally change the practices of the three communities that are rooted in their identities.

Overall, my research has emphasized the resilience of actors' identities that derive from their institutional mandates and are shared among communities of practice. As I have argued, given the transformation of the practice throughout two decades, it is unlikely that these commitments will fundamentally change. In this regard, the purpose of my research has been to account for the role that institutional identities play in shaping the emergence and transformation of an international practice, and to argue that these can neither be reduced to the interests of influential states nor to the standardizing tendencies of large bureaucracies. By the same token, while my research emphasizes the
creative agency and influence of international organizations and bilateral agencies often thought of as mere ‘implementers’, depoliticization is not simply a result of explicit institutional choices, but also results from the dynamic interaction between agents’ identities and objectives. In this regard, particularly the objective of development actors to improve their standing with host state governments seems to reinforce the depoliticizing tendencies within peacebuilding practice as they constitute the most significant community of practice in peacebuilding. As the case study of the UNDP in Timor-Leste has shown, the agency’s scope of action within the peacebuilding process has explicitly been tied to the maintenance of a neutral and impartial stance vis-à-vis the involved parties, hence directly contributing to the perception of such agencies as mere implementers, or pawns of state policies, within the framework of internationally accepted norms and conventions.

In terms of limitations, my research has only been able to provide preliminary observations in regards to possible differences between the practices of international as opposed to bilateral development agencies within peacebuilding. In contrast to my original plans, it was only possible to study the practices of the UK Department for International Development within the Bosnian case study, as the Department delimited its activities in Timor-Leste to channelling funds through the UK Conflict Pool and via NGOs. This limitation notwithstanding, I decided to retain the study of DfID’s activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it provided me with some insights into the degree to which the Department’s approach differed from that of the UNDP in that country. While both agencies reported ‘elite’ and particularly ‘administrative’ obstruction to their peacebuilding approaches, DfID differed from the UNDP in the extent to which it openly called for greater political force or coercion to be exerted by enhanced donor coordination. This approach resembles the suggestions put forward by the OECD (1997, 2001) as discussed within the chapter on the transformation of the overall practice. It also implied that DfID undertook less efforts compared to the UNDP in reframing its approaches, for instance through resorting to international norms and conventions, and instead maintained its focus on poverty alleviation throughout the studied period, while increasingly calling on political actors to provide incentives and/or political coercion. Based on these initial findings in regard to differences between international as opposed to bilateral agencies, it would appear that the major drive for the revision, reframing, and ultimately transformation of peacebuilding practices originates with international organisations that seek to maintain their impartial and neutral credentials and hence tend to avoid calls for political interference, instead seeking to balance the requirements
of their institutional identities with efforts to address the ‘obstacles’ to conducting peacebuilding.

Implications for further research and peacebuilding reform

As demonstrated in the analysis of the transformation of practice, in recent years a number of authors (Autesserre 2011; Paddon 2014; Pantualiano 2014) and UN evaluations have emphasized the importance of linking peacebuilding to an ongoing political (peace) process. To the extent that political conflict persists after the conclusion of a peace agreement, this would likely necessitate the continuance of peacemaking efforts such as mediation, good offices, quiet diplomacy etc. beyond the initial settlement and beyond the capital/elite level. It is evident that such a task largely falls outside the remit of impartial and/or neutral agencies in cases of contested governance, i.e. if the government is a (former) conflict party. An important question that would result from my research is hence: whom should be entrusted with the political aspects of peacebuilding? Within UN peace operations, such tasks are usually conducted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who acts on his or her behalf (DPKO 2003). While the expectations vis-à-vis the steering role of the Peacebuilding Commission in this regard have not been fulfilled, the recent reform and expansion of the Department for Political Affairs seems to reflect the recognition that peacemaking ought to continue well beyond the conclusion of a settlement and the limited negotiations that have so far been facilitated by the SRSG or political offices of peace operations. By contrast, as argued above, it seems unlikely that any of the studied peacebuilding agencies from the three communities of practice will be capable of conducting such activities unless they enjoy the full backing of the host state government in situations of cooperative peacebuilding such as Timor-Leste.

In short, the problem of politicizing peacebuilding in intra-state conflict is hence directly related to the perennial discussion of the tension between balancing the norms of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of state with meaningful, and hence at times political, forms of support to peacebuilding processes, i.e. peacebuilding as peacemaking. In this regard, it links back to the bigger normative debates surrounding contested norms and instruments relating to ‘humanitarian interventions’, the prevention of gross violations of human rights, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). However, regarding the more narrow discussion of peacebuilding and peacemaking after the conclusion of armed conflict, the risks and limitations of third-
party political agency in peace processes have particular implications with regard to normative frameworks and impartiality claims in international governance on the one hand, and the discussion on the ontology of intra-conflict on the other.

Peacebuilding agencies and non-partisan global governance

This thesis has demonstrated the extent to which international peacebuilding organisations rely on the successful performance of impartiality and/or neutrality both in their previous practices and particularly in contested post-war settings. As discussed in regard to the three communities of practice, the performance of impartiality/neutrality serves slightly varying purposes in the cases of peacekeepers and humanitarians, who strive to be perceived of as acting impartially between the parties, and development agencies, whose primary concern is with the acceptance and hence perception of host state governments. In the case of all three communities, the resort to universal standards and norms supports this claim, as actors have increasingly reoriented the reference point of ‘impartiality’ towards the observation of such universal standards across peacebuilding settings, as opposed to across the parties within a specific peacebuilding case. As argued in chapter 5, this move has made it possible for peacekeepers, humanitarians, and, occasionally, development agencies to maintain their claim to be acting impartially while discerning between victims and aggressors, as the definition of standards for acceptable behaviour was removed from the dynamics of a particular conflict setting.

The revision of the fundamental terms in which impartiality is understood in contemporary peace interventions illustrates the relevance of impartiality claims as an enabling mechanism for peacebuilders’ involvement in contested settings. As such, maintaining impartiality is not only a key interest of said agencies, but at the same time a deeply political act. This in turn raises fundamental questions in regard to claims of disinterestedness and non-partisanship in international affairs. Several analysts have emphasized the degree to which non-state and inter-governmental agencies wield economic resources, epistemic power, moral authority, and hence a tangible measure of political agency and influence that is independent of state-based power.274 Endowed with a reputation as ‘honest brokers’, the moral and expert credibility of these organisations is often thrown into sharp relief with traditional, state-based forms of

power and the pursuit of national, partisan, or state-centred interests (Emmerij 2007; Kille 2007). However, while several observers have rightly cautioned that this expansion of the actor base does not necessarily imply a greater degree of democratic representation, transparency, or accountability in international affairs (Reinalda 2011; Ruhlman 2015), there seems to be little consideration of the role that impartiality claims play in legitimizing certain practices and delegitimizing others, and with what effect. As the link between universalized standards and impartiality in peacebuilding has shown, this discussion potentially ties in with recent research on the turn towards indicators and standardized peer review mechanisms (Davis, Fisher, and Kingsbury 2012). However, particularly in regard to third-party intervention in post-war societies, the replacement of politics with seemingly objective and non-partisan standards or solutions risks reinforcing power dynamics rather than resolving or mitigating them, hence opening up a bigger research agenda on the interaction of post-war power dynamics with non-partisan, and seemingly impartial, international standards (Aggestam 2015).

New wars and the political ontology of intra-state conflict

The degree to which peacebuilding practices are driven by actors’ needs in terms of identities, practices, and interests not only shapes the ways in which intra-state violence has been made sense of in large international organisations, but also has far-reaching implications for the wider discussion on the ontology and epistemology of civil wars (Kalyvas 2003, 2006). As discussed in the context of the emergence of peacebuilding in intra-state conflict as a new field of international practice, numerous new peacebuilding think tanks, NGOs, journals, and specialized degree programmes have been established since the mid-1990s. To a considerable extent, this surge in activity has been policy-driven and reflects the concerns, priorities, and at times funding decisions of policy makers and practitioners within the field. Commenting in particular on the influence of the research unit of the World Bank in regard to ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, Berdal (2005) observes a “marked tendency to abstract the tasks of peacebuilding from their political, cultural and historical context”, which he relates to the predominance of “modern social-science methodology, specifically in its positivist, rational-choice variety” (Berdal 2009: 19, 20). In a similar vein, Kalyvas (2003, 2006) has criticized epistemic preferences in conflict analysis that favour “the universal over the particular, and the easily codable over messy evidence” (2003: 480). While dominant analyses tend to either proceed from a ‘Hobbesian’ or ‘Schmittian’ conception that either explain civil
wars by emphasizing the profit-seeking privatization of violence or its identity-based politicization (Kalyvas 2003), Kalyvas argues in favour of context-specific appraisals of the complex ways in which ‘local’ private identities and interests interact or form alliances with the so-called ‘master cleavage’ usually seen as defining a particular civil war. As a result, Kalyvas’ perspective neither presumes the prevalence of ‘top-down’ instrumentalization and victimization nor favours an understanding of conflict that centres on the so-called ‘local local’ level of grassroots conflict (Richmond 2011; Mac Ginty 2011). Instead, Kalyvas’ work emphasizes the highly idiosyncratic interactions between the centre and its multiple peripheries in any given civil war.

As my analysis has shown, peacebuilding actors tend to adopt those frames of violent conflict that enable them to act. This requirement usually entails a variety of mechanisms that render their engagement depolitical. My research shares Kalyvas’ normative and analytical concern with the varied sources of agency in intra-state wars, and it adds to Kalyvas’ (2006) argument by explaining the dominance of specific frames in particular peacebuilding environments. In this regard, as the analysis on peacebuilding discourses and practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown, so-called ‘Schmittian’ understandings of politicized ethnic and otherwise defined identities were predominant prior to the peacebuilding intervention and usually serve to depict conflicts as intractable due to seemingly inherent conflictual or antagonistic identities. After the conclusion of a peace agreement and the inception of the peacebuilding phase, however, such ‘Schmittian’ discourses are almost always entirely absent from peacebuilders’ practical reasoning, as they would arguably render any constructive third-party intervention futile or require a heavy engagement with conflicting identities, interests, and agency. Instead, in the aftermath of a peace agreement, and hence within the practical reasoning of peacebuilders, understandings of violent conflict tend to exclude identity-based conflict dimensions and emphasize structural aspects that are amenable to standardized, and hence seemingly ‘objective’ and non-partisan, reform. As the Bosnian case study has shown, to the extent that ‘obstructions’ to the peace process are related to the agency of particular stakeholders, such agency is isolated from the ‘ordinary population’ and ascribed to the profit-seeking ‘private’ interests of isolated corrupt and/or criminal elites.

In conclusion, then, the predominance of depoliticized practices, frames, and understandings that reflect the preferences and dilemmas of non-state peacebuilding actors likely influences wider contemporary thinking on peace and conflict. However, while my research has emphasized the dilemmas or ‘pathologies’ (Barnett and
Finnemore 1999) of peacebuilding practices, my argument seeks neither to disregard nor downplay the purposes or significance of post-war engagements in areas such as institutional reform or socio-economic development, to name but two examples. Instead, this study has endeavoured to cast new light on a persistent problem by emphasizing the interaction of institutional identities and objectives that delimit the scope of action of three particular sets of actors. In so doing, I hope to offer a new vantage point for thinking about the revision of peacebuilding practices that transcends the narrow framework of previous best practices and hence simultaneously acknowledges and interrogates the constraints of institutional mandates.
Annex – List of Interviews


Researcher, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Frieden und Entwicklung (FriEnt) Bonn, phone interview by Andrea Warnecke, August 18, 2012.

Desk Officer for Cooperation Programmes with Sudan and Southern Sudan, Federal German Ministry of International Cooperation and Development (BMZ), interview by Andrea Warnecke, BMZ premises, Bonn, August 20, 2012.

Head Archivist, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), interview by Andrea Warnecke, MFA, Oslo, August 22, 2012.

Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRI0), interview by Andrea Warnecke, PRI0 premises, Oslo, August 23, 2012.

Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, interview by Andrea Warnecke, NUPI premises, Oslo, August 24, 2012.

Planning Officer, Competence Center Reconstruction and Peace, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), interview by Andrea Warnecke, via Skype, October 11, 2012.


Conflict Adviser, Stabilisation Unit (DfID), interview by Andrea Warnecke, Old Admiralty Building, London, February 26, 2014.

Member of Staff, Stabilisation Unit, interview by Andrea Warnecke, 28 Charles Square, London, February 26, 2014.

Research Fellow, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, interview by Andrea Warnecke, ODI premises, London, February 27, 2014.

Lecturer, National University of Timor-Leste, interview by Andrea Warnecke, NUTL main building, Dili, July 18, 2014.

Principal Advisor, Support to Peaceful Development through Innovative Employment Promotion, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), interview by Andrea Warnecke, GIZ premises, Dili, July 21, 2014.


Assistant Country Director /Head of Programme Sustainable Development and Resilience (UNDP), interview by Andrea Warnecke, UNDP premises, Dili, July 22, 2014.

Program Manager and Project Officer, Ending Violence Against Women, Australian Aid Program / Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, interview by Andrea Warnecke, Australian Embassy, Dili, July 22, 2014.


President, International Crisis Group and former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, informal conversation, European University Institute, Florence, May 7, 2015

Member of Staff, Section Governance and Democracy, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, (GIZ), informal conversation, GIZ premises, Eschborn, December 11, 2015.
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